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Exclusive Interview with Mugabe

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
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Africa Relations
in Tanzania
Zimbabwe
in Touré's

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The Congo/Angola/
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Disinvesting in
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Prime
Minister
Mugabe
of Zimbabwe

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
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ON AFRICA

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IN THIS ISSUE

Our cover story is an exclusive interview with Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe by *Africa Report* assistant editor Margaret A. Novicki. The prime minister talks frankly about the difficulties still confronting his country in building national unity, especially in the face of activities of renegade military elements. He also discusses relations with the United States and explains the role he foresees for private and public enterprise in Zimbabwe's development.

The theme of economic cooperation with the United States is again taken up in the statement by Guinean President Ahmed Sékou Touré. The Tanzanian and Mozambican development models are compared and contrasted in an article by John Dimsdale, while Guy Arnold examines the significance of the massive Kenana project in Sudan.

Two articles focus on South Africa. In a study of the debate over disinvestment, David Willers concludes that given the current U.S. political climate, American companies will continue to do business in South Africa according to commercial criteria. Nigeria's UN Ambassador Maitama-Sulé, presenting the case against U.S. involvement with South Africa, argues that Washington's policy of accommodation with Pretoria not only runs contrary to American principles but is also harmful to U.S. long-term interests.

Two articles deal with other nations in the southern African region. Mozambican Information Minister Jose Cabaco describes his country's relations with the Soviet Union, the United States, Portugal, and South Africa. Alexandre Mboukou describes the global, regional, and domestic factors that determine relations between Congo, Zaire, and Angola.

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The cover photo of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe was taken by Alain Nogués/Sygma.

Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI



Photo: Zimbabwe Info

Prime Minister Mugabe: "We have been preaching from the mountain a sermon on national reconciliation"

AFRICA REPORT: Mr. Prime Minister, it has been two years since Zimbabwe achieved independence. What have been the most challenging problems and the most rewarding aspects of your leadership?

MUGABE: When we took over, we had elements that, if allowed to remain as they were, would not have made for peace. We had to work as urgently as possible to harmonize those political and military elements, to create circumstances that were promotive of peace. I am talking here of the three or more disparate forces that we inherited. We

decided to get rid of those we believed were really superfluous and too personal to be entertained. We disbanded those, such as Bishop Muzorewa's militia and the Selous Scouts, and we got rid of mercenaries and the like. We remained with only three regular forces: the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA)—the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) military arm; the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA)—the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) military arm; and the former Rhodesian forces. We had to unite these—that was the most

challenging of all the situations we faced at the time of independence. To enable us to do this with greater facility and to ensure greater confidence on the part of the population and among the elements that were to be integrated, especially the former Rhodesian forces, we asked the British to undertake the exercise of helping us to integrate the armies. They sent us 200 instructors who did a marvelous piece of work, standing neutral between themselves and any of the three forces. We have now emerged with a single army. The physical integration did not necessarily mean integration, however. We had to undertake a process of transformation. There is continuing instruction to ensure that the army is apolitical and not associated with political parties. It is necessary that every soldier should have loyalty to the state and to the government that has been elected. One cannot pretend that the process has been accomplished, but quite a great number of cadres have accepted the new outlook. On the surface, you hear about the actions of a few dissidents, even among ZIPRA, but the 16,000 former ZIPRA individuals have by and large complied. There were a few elements who wanted to disturb the harmony that we have created, but the fact that we did not end up with violent conflict speaks for the success of the exercise. This was the most challenging of all.

Of course, we had other challenges in the socioeconomic sectors. We had to resettle the people who had been displaced by the war, some of whom had been refugees abroad. We have succeeded in that task. In fact, during the first year, we managed to get the peasants to produce bumper harvests in maize and cotton. Unfortunately, this past year, when they worked even harder than they did in 1980, the good God did not reward us with good rains and so there is going to be a lower harvest. But still we will have enough food for ourselves. There are areas that have been hit very hard by the drought, but we will move food from the areas that have surpluses. In fact, all marketed food is purchased by the state through the existing parastatal bodies, such as the Grain Marketing Board and the Cotton Marketing Board, under the agricultural marketing authority. We inherited these—we didn't create them ourselves. Then we distribute food to the areas that have been affected by the drought. This has already started occurring.

There has also been the political thrust to try and unite Zimbabweans in spirit, one might say, and make them accept one another. That also was a great challenge. Whatever we did by way of integrating the army also had to be done among the people, integrating them in spirit and getting them to accept that they are now one society, whatever political affiliations they owe, whatever ethnic groups they belong to, whatever religion they believe in, and whatever region they come from. This has been one of our major tasks. So we have been preaching from the mountain a sermon on national reconciliation. I think it has worked, but we had to demonstrate in practice that we meant it, and we went about it by establishing a government of national unity, by inviting ZAPU to join in government and also appointing two or so whites in government so as to make the population see that we no longer were living in the past. We no longer were at war with each other. What we needed now

was to forge one society, forge a program of development, and any development would depend on the degree of our unity, the degree of our acceptance of one another, and the degree of our acceptance of the new political order. So roughly, this is how we have gone about it. These are real challenges. We are happy that by and large we have succeeded. We don't think that we have succeeded 100 percent, but I think we deserve a distinction.

AFRICA REPORT: What would you like to see as the essential elements of U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe? Are you seeking more development assistance, U.S. investment, aid to the Southern African Development Coordination (SADCC)? Are you pleased with the pace of disbursement of aid and its direction, i.e., the Commodity Import Program?

MUGABE: If aid comes to us in a basket of grants, that would be the most desirable form in which we would want to see it. We are happy and grateful that the United States has been one of our largest donors. After Britain, they come second in the size of grant aid or soft loans extended to Zimbabwe. Certainly we would want to see this kind of aid extended to a larger scale to enable us to get through this very difficult period. We are facing the economic world recession abroad and the prices of our minerals are depressed. We are doing very badly in terms of our earning capacity abroad because of the world recession, not because our productivity is low, but because we are not rewarded for that productivity sufficiently. It is these circumstances in which we believe that developed countries can come to our aid.

That is one area, but there is also the subject of trade. We would like to see the United States, for example, buy our sugar with less restriction and accord us a sugar quota. But to throw us in the basket of mini-producers of sugar when we actually are a large producer militates against our ability to sell our sugar. There are other areas in which we believe



"We would like to see the U.S. buy our sugar with less restriction"

Photo: Zimbabwe Info

trade can be enhanced. We are aware that the U.S. is one of our largest buyers of ferrochrome. With Union Carbide, an American multinational, being the main producer of chrome here, it is only natural that the United States should be one of our biggest buyers of this product. This is an area where we believe we can continue to expand our association.

There are other areas where we expect investment from U.S. companies. If investment were to come into these areas, it would enhance our development programs, increase employment, and improve production, leading to a greater gross domestic product. The U.S. has pressed us to sign an Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) agreement. As there have never been any OPIC agreements in this country before, if we sign an OPIC agreement covering new companies, we would be favoring new companies over established ones, unless we are going to extend the same protection cover to the existing ones. We believe that those that are already operating in the country have actually done much more than the potential of a new company, however bright, in terms of enhancing the economy and of leading to greater employment. But the multinational companies in existence—Union Carbide, Anglo American Corp., Rio Tinto, and Lonrho, which operates our pipeline—are companies with large assets in the country. We haven't expropriated those assets and we don't intend to expropriate them. If under any circumstances the state would want to acquire the properties, we would go about it in a very calculated way by consultation. In any case, we believe it is better to participate in these multinationals than to



Photo: Margaret A. Novick

A resettlement cooperative: "You resettle people so they can develop the land"

nationalize them outright. Nationalization is therefore not on our cards. If we have these multinationals that have contributed to the development of the country, surely new multinationals that seek to invest in the country must accept the same circumstances in which their counterparts are operating—the guiding rules that operate. The law that protects them is one of the most rigid laws in the world—the constitution of Zimbabwe—which can only be amended by a 100 percent vote in Parliament. One hundred percent means everyone must vote even when some members may be dead. If they can't vote, one must wait until they are replaced in

Parliament. Everybody has to vote and vote "yes." If that is not a sufficient guarantee, then I don't understand what our friends would want as a guarantee.

Also, we ourselves would not want to be dragged into a government-to-government relationship with countries to which the nationals who seek to invest belong. Why should that relationship be created at all? We would want to create new relationships on a bilateral basis with countries where we have state-to-state programs. But where we have individuals seeking to invest in our country, whether these individuals come as individuals or as partnerships or corporations, this relationship is one between individuals and the state. Agreed, the state of which they are citizens would want to see them protected. But we would ask that state to look at our law and see whether the protection we offer is not adequate. We want to offer protection to all of them, the existing ones and the new ones. It is in these circumstances that we would want new investment to come. We want investment here and we hope that investment will be forthcoming from the U.S. private sector.

We are happy that a number of countries have presented us with commodity aid programs and we are happy that others have not tied us down to importing the commodities from their countries on given terms. Some are more flexible than others. One does tend to get a degree of inflexibility in commodity aid programs and we have been requesting various countries to modify such aid. A country may tie us down to importing its commodities and the items categorized under the program may include machinery. We need tractors in the country, but we must look at the kinds of tractors we already have because importing tractors means creating a need to import spare parts. You must have the technology to repair them. If our existing facilities here, the workshops we have, do not cater for this type of tractor, it means that we are being tied down to a type of commodity that would be a handicap to us or a disadvantage in the long term. Initially, when the tractor is new, it may have its advantage, but sooner or later we will have to cope with breakdowns and the need to repair it, and so we would need flexibility. If the United States says we can import tractors under the agreement, we would want it to agree that we can import the kind of tractor that we already have in the country. It may be a type of tractor made in the U.S.; it could very well be one made in Canada or Italy. We would want to see some degree of flexibility in that case.

AFRICA REPORT: Your government has been actively seeking foreign private investment as well as encouraging local private sector cooperation. Yet at the same time, you have said that eventually you expect to socialize the entire socioeconomic system. What are the short- and long-term policies with regard to the foreign and domestic private sectors?

MUGABE: This is why we say private investment must come into those areas or sectors where we believe we haven't got the technology for now and where we don't intend to operate for the foreseeable future, in terms of our socialism programs. There are areas where we believe we cannot apply socialism in the immediate future or in the medium term. So it is in those areas that we believe we can entertain

capitalism, as it were. In the majority of cases in those areas, we would want that private enterprise to join hands with the state, so that the state is represented in the particular enterprise and there is a joint venture between us. Hence, private enterprise in crucial areas is more acceptable when it is on a joint venture basis than on its own.

There are other areas such as the small enterprise in commerce—we don't bother about having little shops—but one does not expect that investment from the U.S. will come in the form of establishing little shops in competition with our own. It would kill our own shops. That type of shop should be on a limited scale because our own nationals would feel greatly threatened by large-scale commercial enterprises introducing themselves here. It is more in manufacturing, mining, and infrastructure that we need investment. Some of the investments can come by technology rendered to us. Suppose we want to establish a hydroelectric project. A company in the U.S. offers assistance in this direction and after bidding in competition with others, it becomes the preferred firm. That firm would come on a basis that would benefit the economy here. But there is also direct investment, where a firm creates itself here, perhaps as a mining or manufacturing group. Those two areas are very open. We haven't exhausted our mineral resources yet although quite a lot has been shipped abroad by the U.S.'s Union Carbide, Anglo American, and so forth. We still have lots of resources that need to be exploited and prospecting is going on all the time by various companies. It is an area where we are not ourselves equipped to undertake the processes. There are others. We have many projects but limited capacity to undertake tasks such as road building and railway construction. We will have to depend on outside firms to accomplish any sophisticated piece of work.

Then you have irrigation. That's very vital: we are going to emphasize this over the next three years or so. We are talking now of a three-year development plan and one of the features of this plan is the emphasis on the water infrastructure. I don't think we use 30 percent of our water in the rivers, hardly that. The rest just flows into the Indian Ocean and Mozambique doesn't use it either. They have the problem of floods from water that comes surging down from our side. If we can create lots of dams throughout the country, and also use subterranean water, getting it up to the surface, this would improve our agricultural performance and we would have two harvests instead of one. There would be more food for the people and there would be more food for Africa and other starving countries. So that is an area where we need real technology and the United States can provide it. Europe has participated in our railway electrification program. We are now at stage two of our Wankie thermal power plant, and firms in Britain, West Germany, and other European countries are participating in that venture. We can also have U.S. participation in these ventures. There are vast areas that call for investment by the United States.

AFRICA REPORT: It is apparent that you envision a one-party state for Zimbabwe. How do you foresee it coming about, as it does not seem likely to result from a willing merger of ZANU and ZAPU?

MUGABE: I suppose it will come from the people. We will go to a referendum on this one, preferably after our first term of office as a government, inviting the people to cast a vote on it. If they vote for it, then that's it. If they vote against it, we will accept their verdict. In fact, we are not in a hurry. With or without a one-party state, we have a clear majority. But we believe that the unity of our people is fundamental. You asked me in the first question about the greatest challenge. The need for the unity of our people, as I



Photo: Margaret A. Novicki

"We need to accelerate the pace of resettlement"

told you, was one of the biggest issues. We have demonstrated that we are for unity, we are for one society. We are one country, not two, and so we must have one society, whatever the divergent political, religious, or other viewpoints. The divergence should not be of such a degree as to prevent our people from regarding themselves as one.

We believe that with one society organized and contained under this one political umbrella, we can be more effective than we have been hitherto. It's a political, a philosophical concept and idea that we cherish very strongly indeed. We value it not because there is any desire on my part or on anyone else's part to be a dictator, but because we genuinely believe this is the best way of going about it. It also stems from our tradition that we had only one society in any particular geographical area, coming under a single chief. Under the political leadership that was offered, although it might have been traditional or feudal in some cases, our people were given the opportunity in their various areas to assemble, to express their views on fundamental issues before decisions were implemented.

In our particular case, what we have in mind is that all parties would fall under one umbrella. There would be only one party, but various viewpoints can be entertained—the rightists, the leftists, the center people. They can express

their views, but at the end of the day, the view of the majority becomes the view of the party and the view of the state. I don't see why that should be said to spell doom for our democracy. In fact, it enhances democracy in my view. Opposition for the sake of opposition is really a time waster and a negation of democracy in my opinion. You have a party opposing for the sake of opposition in Parliament. A person must stand up to criticize because a member on the government side has spoken, and if the opposition makes a statement, a member of the government side must counter it. We are not saying, of course, that there should not be any opposition in government. People should be allowed to stand as independents if they want to and not just stand as candidates for the one party. Tanzania does that, and in some cases, you get candidates sponsored by the party being defeated. That's what it should be. But then Tanzania being one society with one party presents just that concept of oneness and that's all we really want.

AFRICA REPORT: On the subject of land resettlement, can you assess the progress of the program thus far and cite its major constraints? Some critics maintain that the program is not being carried out rapidly or drastically enough to suit the needs of the people and that perhaps the policy of "willing seller-willing buyer" of land should be abandoned.



Photo: Margaret A. Novick

"In 1981 the peasants produced bumper harvests in maize and cotton"

MUGABE: Yes, there have been problems. The first problem is really a financial one. Fortunately for us, we still have funds that have been donated by Britain that haven't been exhausted, some \$60 million, but that's no money

when you look at the size of the problem and the population that you want to finally resettle, in the region of 350,000 families. We have planned to resettle 162,000 families over the next three years. That may not sound rapid enough, but actually it is a very rapid program. When it started, it wasn't vigorous enough for obvious reasons. We had to plan it and planning meant taking into account the various inputs that should go into it, the various ministerial sectors affected by any resettlement program. You don't resettle people purely to provide them with a home or a piece of land. You resettle them so they can develop in the new environment and develop the land. Hence, you have to carve out the areas first—a geographical exercise—but one which must also entail water resources, and the Ministry of Water Resources and Development must come into it. Then as you resettle them, you must ensure that there are areas that have been marked out for building schools, hospitals, and clinics, and the establishment of growth points, where they will have their little shops. And this exercise has to be done therefore on a multilateral basis. You must have the Ministry of Roads involved in it, and the Ministry of Agriculture for the agricultural inputs. So it is that combination of inputs that has tended to delay the exercise.

I think we need to accelerate it, although we have accelerated the pace and it is faster now than it used to be. We also suffered from a shortage of staff sufficiently tutored in the exercise of land redistribution. But we are now in a better position to accelerate it and I am told it is going on much faster. It should go twice as fast as it is going at the moment. We will see what we can do to accelerate the pace, especially now that the people have just harvested their crops and they are looking forward to planting a new crop. We must get them in position as quickly as possible. It is already late because if they are to remove the trees and prepare the soil, it will be some time before they are really ready. They don't have the necessary equipment with which to carry out the exercise because we are still short of things like graders and tractors. We are getting them in gradual stages, but we are still very short.

The "willing seller-willing buyer" basis is the system we have adopted under the constitution. We don't seize land, we acquire it. If we reach a point where we have no funds from Britain and Britain is unwilling to extend further amounts for this exercise, then we will say, "No, the principle is no longer operative." But as long as we have funds for the exercise, I don't see any reason why we shouldn't continue along that pattern. I can see, however, our coffers running dry and our having to adopt some other method, perhaps creating bonds and getting government to acquire land on credit with a promise to pay in the future.

AFRICA REPORT: In the southern African regional context, you recently signed an agreement to join the preferential trade area for eastern and southern Africa, and Zimbabwe is also a member of SADCC. You are still required to rely heavily on trade routes through South Africa, which is supporting destabilization activities against Zimbabwe and Mozambique through the Mozambique National Resistance. What is the basis of your regional policy and how will you lessen dependence on South Africa?

MUGABE: The fact that we are now a member of these two organizations—the regional one, SADCC; and the east, central, and southern African one, the Preferential Trade Area agreement—speaks of our desire to cooperate with our neighbors and with the rest of Africa in creating a situation of economic interdependence. We believe that there are resources at our disposal which, if developed jointly, can lead to a greater volume of products being yielded and therefore offering us greater prospects of earning foreign currency, let alone greater prospects of creating employment in our region. We believe that if we can therefore examine those areas where we can be interdependent and facilitate cooperation among ourselves, it will reduce our dependence not just on South Africa, but on other countries as well. This is what we are working vigorously to achieve.

In terms of our relations with South Africa, yes, we have inherited a situation of, I don't want to call it dependence, although we have said so, but South Africa also depends on us because we are its largest market in Africa. And so they cannot easily get rid of us. Yes, we know they have a larger market outside Africa than we have, but within Africa, we are their largest market and so are they our largest market in Africa. This is a situation we have inherited. We have accepted it, but continue to look for other markets. Until we have created other markets, and we can do this through SADCC and through the new PTA agreement, the reality that confronts us demands that we continue to trade with South Africa and we have admitted this phenomenon quite openly. We have done our best to reduce our dependence on South Africa with respect to transportation. Whereas in April 1980 not a single train moved to Mozambique and 100 percent of our exports and imports went through South Africa, now some 25 percent of our goods either way travel through the ports of Mozambique and we are increasing this volume. It's nothing unusual, it's not anything new. We want to get back to the situation in which this country was before the 1976 sanctions by Mozambique. The Rhodesian government was exporting and importing 85 percent of its goods through Mozambique and we want to get back to that position. We are still a long way off, but we are getting there in gradual stages. Mozambique is also enlarging its harbors. The port of Beira is being dredged, so we hope that bigger ships will call there and a growing volume of our exports will come through Mozambique.

AFRICA REPORT: The Lancaster House agreement set some very rigid constraints on the policies that you can carry out. What provisions of the accord have you found most difficult?

MUGABE: I think it is the rigidity regarding constitutional amendments. We think the British were just unfair on this one, very unfair to insist that certain clauses can be amended only by 100 percent vote. That is really saying that the whites, with their entrenched parliamentary seats, can hold the rest of the population at ransom and that we must submit to the will of the whites. It is a racist provision in the constitution and we cannot have that lasting for all time. True, we will struggle through during the first five years, but during the second term of office, it just has to go and the will of the people must be reflected in the constitution. This

is a fundamental principle that we feel has been vitiated in this constitution—that the majority of the people can be held ransom by a small population.

AFRICA REPORT: Zimbabwe has been the victim of somewhat of a bad press in the United States. Is there anything you would like to say to clarify the image?



Photo: Margaret A. Novick

**A dried-up river bed in drought-stricken Matabeleland:
Food will be moved to the affected areas**

MUGABE: I want to appeal to fairness. There is no civil war taking place here. Yes, we have had our share of dissidents, but who hasn't got dissidents, who hasn't situations of violent conflict as a state that emerged from a circumstance of violence when we fought a very bitter struggle? It should be understood that the process of attaining peace is a long one and that as you proceed to achieve peace and calm and create unity among the people, there will be discordant notes to that harmony. We would want journalists to report us correctly, to be as objective as possible, to know their facts before they publish them. People just publish what they think the situation is. In most cases, it is what they want the situation to be—an unstable one. Those are not our well-wishers, but we know we have well-wishers in the United States who do not believe in this kind of propaganda. □

Africa, the United States, and South Africa

BY ALHAJI YUSUFF MAITAMA-SULE

What is apartheid? To me it is nothing but Nazism, the superiority of race, institutionalized, perfected, and adopted as the official policy of the government of South Africa. Before the Boers came to power in 1948 there was very little of it entrenched in the law. Of course it was there, but when they came to power they emphasized and vigorously pursued the policy. Apartheid is a comprehensive system of racial discrimination against the people. As an all-embracing policy, it would be extremely difficult to amend or reform it. It has to be totally eradicated. That is why when people talk about reform and certain amendments we take such statements with a pinch of salt. We believe these reforms are cosmetic, superficial, and merely aimed at making



Photo: Michael St. John

Alhaji Yusuff Maitama-Sule: "In spite of so-called reforms, there has been an escalation of aggression by the Pretoria regime"

apartheid more secure and at getting a firmer grip on the African population. That is apartheid. We have been told that there have been reforms in South Africa recently that constitute a sign of good omen. I am very sorry to say that I hold a contrary view, because in spite of all these so-called reforms there has been an escalation of aggression by the Pretoria regime, not only inside South Africa but also outside.

Some years ago when P.W. Botha was the defense minister, he made a statement in which he suggested that South Africa attack its neighboring states in order to divert world attention. Pretoria could then concentrate on per-

petuating apartheid inside South Africa. It is happening today. Botha is the prime minister of the country. Today South Africa has extended its aggression beyond its borders. It has extended its aggression into Angola and has actually occupied Angolan territory. In spite of the UN Security Council's resolution, South Africa has refused to withdraw those troops from Angola. Today South Africa is mobilizing its forces on the borders of Mozambique and no one should be surprised if South Africa attacks Mozambique any day, any time. Today South Africa is sabotaging the economy of Zimbabwe. So in spite of all those "reforms" that we have been hearing of, the aggression has obviously increased. One would have thought the degree of the aggression would be matched by the reforms. That would have been more realistic. But unfortunately it is not so. These reforms are aimed at trying to get international credibility for South Africa. The international community has condemned South Africa for this obnoxious policy of racial discrimination. That is the main reason why today they are trying to give the impression that they are participating in nonracial sports. What happens to those black sportsmen? Yes, they play with the whites, but what happens afterward?

Ambassador Maitama-Sule is the permanent representative of Nigeria to the United Nations and chairman of the Special United Nations Committee Against Apartheid. This article is based on an address delivered to the Conference on African Development and Policy Issues organized by the African-American Institute in Los Angeles, California, June 10-13, 1982.

Can they live in the same areas? Do they have the same rights? The whole idea of Pretoria's sports policy is to seek credibility for South Africa from the international community because it has been isolated.

South Africa is increasing its military strength daily. Today South Africa possesses nuclear capability with which it blackmails not only Africa, but also the international community. Today South Africa has nuclear agreements with Israel. They have collaborated with Israel in order to achieve that nuclear capability with which to blackmail the African and international communities. Today South Africa's military strength is much greater than the combined forces of all other African nations. One may ask, why has South Africa equipped itself to such an extent? Why are Pretoria's backers aiding and abetting South Africa to be so militarily powerful? There is no threat from any African country against South Africa. Even if any African state wanted to attack South Africa, it could not because it hasn't the military strength. As I have said, the total strength of all the African countries combined cannot match the military might of South Africa. South Africa is being equipped, or is equipping itself, with the assistance of military hardware operators in order to subdue the Africans inside South Africa and in order to destabilize the independent southern African countries. The situation in South Africa has never been worse. Even the trade unions are now being trampled upon. It is true that at one time Pretoria gave the black people freedom to form trade unions. Recently the regime has been coming down on all the trade union leaders and trade unionists. A white trade unionist, Dr. Neil Aggett, was not only detained but actually tortured to death because of his opposition to apartheid.

Much has been said in the Western media about recent reforms that have been proposed by Pretoria concerning the Coloureds and the Indians. These are people who all these years have been cooperating with the black population in South Africa. The idea behind introducing this reform is to divide them. The reforms are being introduced to give the Coloureds and Indians a small percentage of representation in

Parliament, while totally excluding the black people who form 70 percent of the population. If the South African regime was serious and sincere it should first of all consider the majority of the people and their plight. Divide and rule is also an element of bantustanization. This is the policy whereby the Pretoria regime seeks to allocate only 13 percent of the land mass to Africans who form 70 or 80 percent of the population. The whites seek to retain the remaining percentage for themselves although they

are less than 20 percent of the population.

Is it fair in a country to allocate only 13 percent of the total land mass — and that, the most infertile part — to 80 percent of the population, while 20 percent retain the 80 percent for themselves? Would anybody call that a reform? In this bantustanization, moreover, the people are merely being deprived of their South African citizenship. We say that there should be a South Africa in which all would be Africans and there

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would be no racism. The Pretoria regime seeks to concentrate the Africans in these bantustans and accord them so-called independence.

Why is South Africa doing this? One reason is this false notion of racial superiority. They believe that they have been destined to lord it over the Afri-



South African troops in training: South Africa is increasing its military strength daily

Photo: Contact/United Nations

cans. Indeed, to that end they have even reformed the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) teachings! When I was in the Netherlands recently I had some meetings with DRC leaders who told me that the doctrines of the DRC in South Africa are certainly different from its teachings in the Netherlands, the home of the Boers.

Where do we go from here? What will be the solution to the problem? Is it to be via so-called constructive engagement? Or is it disengagement? One has to look back into the historic and cultural background of the Boers themselves. Everyone knows they are stubborn people. So stubborn, that they have even changed the teachings of God to suit themselves, in order to perpetuate their domination over black people! Therefore they do not understand the language of cooperation, the language of constructive engagement.

During the Carter administration, when the newspapers were speculating that the United States might consider applying sanctions against South Africa, Pretoria accepted UN Security Council Resolution 435. People had started speaking in the language they understand. But no sooner had a more

sympathetic administration come into power, than they went back on their word. That is why we think that we must look at this realistically. What is that realistic point of view? It is disengagement. There are two ways of ending apartheid in South Africa. Either take up armed struggle against South Africa and therefore shed blood, or use a nonviolent means of ending the apartheid system. Nonviolent means involve the application of sanctions. We are not asking for sanctions because we want to punish South Africa or because we want revenge. The idea is to isolate Pretoria to force South Africa to face and accept realities, to change its policy in its own interest, in the interest of all concerned, in the interest of humanity. We are asking people to boycott goods from South Africa, to disengage from South Africa. We have been told that one reason why certain countries do not want to apply sanctions against South Africa is that the Africans will suffer. We say that the whites will suffer, because they are the owners of the various industries. They are the people who are exploiting the cheap labor of the blacks to enrich themselves more and more.

At any rate, it is not our concern. We do not want to punish anyone. Indeed, some Frontline states might even suffer as a result of the sanctions. What we are proposing rests upon an important principle, one which people in the United States cherish very dearly, the principle of fair play, the principle of justice, the principle of human dignity. The blacks and the Frontline states are prepared to make the sacrifice and they have been making that sacrifice. We are told sanctions cannot be applied, that sanctions are a negative way of doing it, that sanctions will not solve the problem. But we know that sanctions can be applied, we now know that sanctions have been applied and are still being applied. If the greatest trading partners of South Africa, namely Great Britain and the United States, were to apply sanctions, I am sure that South Africa would change. Because of the minerals they have, the trade they do with the West, Pretoria could not, in the event of Western sanctions, switch to doing business with the Eastern or communist countries. The communist countries would not want to buy from them. It is

only the Western countries that would want to do business with them. We believe the United States can impose sanctions because it has done so in other cases. The United States has a very important role to play. Americans believe in democracy. They are the champions of the democratic process who won their own freedom. Why will they not help others to win their freedom? Americans adhere to religions that profess the equality of human beings, religions that do not teach racial discrimination. I have not seen any religion of God that teaches racial discrimination. The founding fathers of the United States left their respective homes in order to exercise their freedom of worship. Is South Africa greater than the United States? Why should South Africa not practice the same thing? The United States is an economic power, the leading economic power in the West, if not in the world. I believe that American pressure on South Africa will certainly make all the difference. It is not constructive engagement, but the application of sanctions, only for a short period of time, that will force the stubborn people in South Africa to change their policy. Nothing else will make them change.

Let me take this opportunity to say this. Traditionally all liberation movements tend to be radical and revolutionary. But when they achieve their objective, when they get their freedom, they are as realistic and as reasonable as anyone, I reject this practice of referring to the liberation movements as communist inspired because, in any event, some of these liberation movements, particularly the African National Congress in South Africa, were born before the Russian Revolution. These liberation movements sought assistance from all quarters. Because of its economic interests and investments, the West refused to give them that assistance and they turned to the other side. This is like a drowning man who stretched out his hand to get a rope to hold in order to be saved. You are holding the rope that would enable him to save himself from being drowned and you refused to hand over the rope. If someone held out a naked sword, naturally the drowning man who had lost his senses would hold on to that

naked sword, hoping it would save him. It would save him and he might cut his hands but he would rather be saved and have his hands cut, than to drown.

History has shown us that after independence these countries are mainly concerned with the development of their own countries and with the raising of the standards of living of our people. We in Africa, socialist, capitalist, monarchist, totalitarian, and so forth, are merely concerned with the development of our own countries. Let the superpowers not bring their Cold War issues into the question of southern Africa. Angola was forced to seek military help from Cuba because of the aggression it has faced from South Africa. Although the United States does not take kindly to the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, there are American investments and American companies there. Only a few months ago the chief executive of the Gulf Oil Company appeared before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and appealed to the U.S. government to consider establishing diplomatic relations with Angola. He has seen the realities. May I therefore appeal to you that you judge the issues in South Africa and southern Africa in general, not in terms of ideology but in terms of reality. This year has been declared by the United Nations as the International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions Against South Africa. During this year I have visited about 18 countries thus far and I have been encouraged by what I have found in most of the countries, except, unfortunately, the two countries from which we expect the most — the United States and Great Britain. These are the two countries that we have found difficulty in convincing. But I believe that we will overcome. From my personal view, I do not think that apartheid will end logically, it may end ritualistically. Changes are taking place. I was in France and the new administration there is sympathetically disposed toward us. There is a change in Greece, a change of government. Spain is now favorably disposed toward us. Italy, even West Germany, are coming closer. What we are hoping is that world opinion will be mobilized, particularly in Europe, so that the various governments in Europe will come to

understand the justness of our struggle and will bring pressure to bear, influencing Great Britain and the United States to face and accept the realities and impose sanctions. The only alternative to sanctions is bloodshed, which we do not want.

What people here in the United States do not seem to realize is that there is a tremendous amount of goodwill toward the United States in Africa. Unfortunately, this has not been taken advantage of. People should also realize that while they have the investments and economic interests in South

friends to identify themselves with us. The one way that they can do it is to have the courage to apply sanctions and isolate South Africa.

If there is a free and democratic government in South Africa, there will be a free flow of investment in that country and even the whites in South Africa will be free to go to every part of Africa and the world to invest. Would any African country prevent South Africa, with a free and democratically elected government, from being a member of the Organization of African Unity or from going to any part of Africa? Certainly




Photo: W. Campbell/Sygma

Soweto residents going to work: South Africa's reforms exclude the blacks — 70 percent of the population

Africa, there are similar interests in the rest of Africa. Trade between the West and the rest of Africa is 10 times as much as the trade with South Africa and the West. I will give specific examples. Outside of the European Economic Community, Nigeria is the greatest trading partner of Great Britain. Trade between Nigeria and Great Britain is certainly greater than trade between Great Britain and South Africa. Nigeria is the second-largest supplier of oil to the United States. The time will soon come when African countries will start asking themselves — is it not time to choose? We hate to do that. We cherish our relationship with the West and with the other parts of the world. We know how useful it is for us to cooperate with the West. But as far as this question of racism is concerned, all of Africa, irrespective of ideology, is irrevocably and totally committed to the total elimination of apartheid. We expect our

not. Our aim is to have South Africa a democratically free and nonracial country. This is the view of the liberation movement and of all the African governments. Apartheid is an evil. It cannot be amended, it cannot be reformed. It has to be totally abolished, totally eradicated, totally wiped out. Otherwise there is a danger that South African aggression will escalate and bring about world conflict. I say this because superpowers are not concerned with racial issues. They discuss disarmament, nuclear limitations, developmental matters. But over little issues, there is no talk. The history of World War I and World War II shows that they were not started out of major crises. Sanctions are the only nonviolent means of ending apartheid. The world can never be governed by force, never by fear, never by power. In the end what governs is the spirit and what conquers is the mind. □

Two Roads to Socialism

BY JOHN DIMSDALE

The invitation was clear: as an ex-colonial administrator I was welcome to revisit my first posting of 25 years ago. The letter was signed by the local party chairman, and I was asked to cross from Mwanza to Ukerewe Island by steamer. There I would be met and shown the changes that had taken place. But there was a snag. The two Lake Victoria steamers were both out of service awaiting spare parts, a condition that haunts almost every form of commercial activity in Tanzania.

Not wishing to let down my Ukerewe hosts, I walked to the little fishing village just outside Mwanza, the regional capital. Memory told me that Ukerewe fishermen would be there in their motorized dugout canoes selling fish. Sure enough, row upon row of wooden craft were lined up unloading their talapia and other lake fish. Speaking Swahili and adding the few words of Kikerewe that I remembered, I enquired whether one of the boats was returning the 34 miles to Ukerewe Island that day. "Ndio," came the reply: "many of us are sailing within the hour." I selected one of the more seaworthy-looking canoes and asked the owner to take me with him for a fee.

John Dimsdale is a British journalist. As administrator, writer, and broadcaster, he has more than a quarter century of experience in Africa and the Third World.



Photo: Camerapix

"President Nyerere would like to model Tanzania on a liberal social welfare state if he had the money"

Sadly, he said it was quite impossible, because the Tanzanian government did not allow private enterprise of this sort to compete with the state steamers. I suggested that he take me without charge for old times' sake. That idea brought the rejoinder that if he did, he would be suspected of having taken money and the end result would be the same. His canoe would be confiscated.

Such examples of the economic conflicts inherent in Tanzania's slide into economic desperation are commonplace. The crisis situation was recognized in June's massive policy shake-up. Although no immediate release of private enterprise energy is being sanctioned, effort and industry

are to be rewarded with a variety of financial bonuses. Up to 30% can now be added to the pay of workers who work hard in essential industries; 10% to 20% can be knocked off for the idle. This, in egalitarian Tanzania, is both a shot in the arm for individuals and a public acknowledgement that ideology alone does not make bread.

To Tanzania's south lies Mozambique, the huge ex-Portuguese colony, sandwiched between South Africa, Zimbabwe, and its natural partner, Dr. Julius Nyerere's union of mainland Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar. There is much in common between the two countries, and each seeks to learn from the other. Mozambique's leader, Dr. Samora Machel, made an extended visit to Tanzania recently. Rather than stay in the presidential palace in Dar es Salaam, Dr. Machel accompanied Dr. Nyerere to the Tanzanian leader's home village of Butiama in the extreme north. Machel wanted to see village life and cottage industries in action. Though Mozambique successfully manufactures cement and exports large quantities of it to Tanzania, it has not had the same success with rural development. For all the chronic shortages of bandages in the clinics and school books in the schools, Tanzania is a shining example of rural infrastructure that many developing nations including Mozambique recognize and admire.

It is a matter of record that the Portu-

guese colonizers of Mozambique left no trained management or even a cadre of artisans. In contrast, the British fulfilled their UN mandate in Tanzania by training and giving executive responsibility to postmasters, engineers, veterinary surgeons, army officers, electricians, and magistrates. A sound base was laid, and many of that generation are still conscientiously trying to fulfill their slightly altered roles in Tanzanian society. They and their younger protégés are failing because of the economic malaise that has permeated every fibre of Tanzania's being. Why and how did Tanzania and Mozambique travel different economic roads? Both are desperately poor, but the leaders in Maputo are able to point to more concrete achievements and more hope for the future than their cousins in Dar es Salaam.

One simplistic theory would be to suggest that since Mozambique started with nothing at independence it could only go up. But that would be to ignore basic differences in political thinking and economic planning over the last two decades.

While the Mozambican leaders are openly Marxists, Dr. Nyerere of Tanzania can best be described as a sort of Fabian socialist. He rejects Marxism and Marxist society and would like to

model his country on a Scandinavian, liberal, social welfare state if he had the money.

The African socialist *Ujamaa* experiment—and its relative failure—in Tanzania has been well documented. It was born out of Nyerere's insistence that classes do not exist and therefore there could be no class struggle. In Mozambique, classes have always been recognized and the government has directed its energies into channeling and directing class energies. In neighboring Burundi, the form of *Ujamaa* exists, but it has been entirely voluntary; and the physical concentration of people and their huts is so slight that a visitor can be forgiven for not being able to identify a collective village visually in the hills north of Bujumbura.

Tanzania's President, Dr. Julius Nyerere, gained much of his immense stature in the Third World with his Arusha Declaration in 1967. Following these published principles, 11 million peasants were moved into 8,300 *Ujamaa* (collective) villages. Some were moved by force, most went eagerly. The gains are that over 30% of these villagers now have clean, piped water and all have access to schools and health clinics, however rudimentary they may be. The losses are incalculable.

I well remember the village of Nyakabindi, the heartland of the Sukumaland cattle country. A quarter of a century ago, herdsmen knew that the routes that the beasts took to water and grazing should be varied to avoid ruination of the thin top soil. Ex-Chief Majeber, still alive but totally destitute now, told me, "With these cattle and the grazing that we have, we shall never go hungry or become poor." Sadly, the area around Nyakabindi and even more near Shinyanga have now been reduced to near desert. Why? The reason must be that the enforced concentration of humans and cattle has led to daily expeditions for man and beast that have become longer and longer. Trees, bushes, and scrub have all been hacked down for cooking fuel. The rocks, never far from the surface, are now protruding feet into the air.

Ujamaa in Tanzania was a good idea in principal, but it was executed too fast and without proper planning for the future. Long-established village economies went out of the window overnight.

Mozambique is experiencing exactly the same trauma over collectivization as Tanzania but on a much, much smaller scale. About 10% of Mozambique's population lives in communal villages, but only 3% of that number is actively engaged in agricultural cooperatives. This is largely because resources are directed almost entirely toward the state sector. The cooperatives get very little help and, worse, very little of what they are promised.

But there is another difference between Tanzanian and Mozambican experience in the agricultural sphere. There are both large state agricultural schemes and private, commercial farms in Mozambique. The state farms are having mixed success not because of a lack of good land but because the manpower infrastructure is inadequate in its expertise. Most of the state farms eat national resources at an ever increasing rate without turning the bend and becoming profitable. The Mozambican leaders are well aware of this, are determined not to abandon the schemes, and are actively recruiting foreign know-how and capital. Large private farmers (as opposed to self-sufficient homesteads) hardly exist in Tanzania



Ujamaa village in Tanzania: "A good idea executed too fast without proper planning"

Photo: Tanzania Info

outside the coffee belt around Mount Kilimanjaro. In Mozambique they account for 5% of the agricultural sector and are widely spread geographically.

Both Tanzania and Mozambique suffer from an accelerating drift toward the towns and in particular to the capitals, Dar es Salaam and Maputo. Mozambique has now taken tough measures to stem the tide. Maputo's population had jumped from 750,000 to 850,000 in less than 18 months. Even if one discounts the increased birth rate, this amounts to at least three bus loads of new citizens arriving every day. But a halt has been called, and every resident of Maputo has been issued a Resident's Card. Newcomers are finding it impossible to get a card unless they already have a firm job. Only those with this new authorization are being allowed to use the public services such as buses, health clinics, and schools. Certainly none without identification can obtain a ration card. The human tide has been stemmed almost overnight.

Crime is still rampant in Maputo and is causing the authorities to adopt increasingly severe policing measures. In late June, 10,000 handguns were handed out to citizens so that they could protect themselves. The president, Samora Machel, is once again wearing military uniform, something he has not done for several years.

Although crime in Dar es Salaam is not of Maputo's magnitude, it is also on the increase as the urban population becomes more and more desperate. Staying in a Tanzanian government hotel earlier this year, I asked for a light bulb for my room. "Wait half an hour while I go and steal one," said the hotel porter. And he meant it. I actually watched him go across the street and into another hotel with marginally more lights showing than my own. Such behavior and such a statement would have been unheard of a few years ago, when Tanzanians were seen as among the most moral and honest of all peoples.

Certainly, the worst of Tanzania's shortages are experienced by the urban communities. Although there are long lines for the rare delivery of luxuries like sugar and soap in upcountry villages, life is better there. At least there is basic food, because people are falling

back into a subsistence economy and simply bartering any excess that they grow.

There is evidence that the urban malaise of dishonesty also effects Tanzania's more productive farmers. They hold back crops in order to realize higher prices on the black market. Coffee growers in the north are smuggling up to 30% of their crops over the border into Kenya, where they receive as much as six times the Tanzanian price.

Although Tanzania's economic prospects are distinctly poor, they are not yet disastrous. Consistent self-analysis, strategy adjustments, and new initiatives offer a glimmer of hope that Tanzania may be able to pull itself together and regenerate its economic life.

The years of bickering with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) seem to be over with the advent of a new advisory group that is trying to reconcile the monetary dictates of the international financial community and the ideological and particular needs of Tanzania.

Underlying productive capacity and infrastructure are still deteriorating because of an inability to finance imports. Factory after factory has closed down during the last 12 months for want of spare parts or essential raw materials. Welfare is drifting downwards as inflation outstrips the minimum wage and growers' crop prices.

Tanzania reasonably attributes much of its misery to external factors, including the price of imported oil and the slump in world prices for its exports. A fundamental budgetary mistake was made in the assumption that the 1976-77 coffee boom was here to stay. Projections were made in the Dar es Salaam Treasury that have had to be slashed in each of the following financial year's national budgets. External aid, too, has peaked. Although Tanzania has very good friends, notably Canada and the Scandinavian countries, total aid is running at about \$36 per head and falling.

Besides the wrongly forecast future trends from an all-time high in 1976, there are three other basic internal causes for decline, recognized by Tanzanian officials. The most critical has been the failure to give priority to ex-

ports, which actually declined by a fifth between 1970 and 1980. The second has been a failure to provide adequate food-storage facilities, resulting in massive spoilage and waste. The third is the total failure of the agricultural pricing system, which some observers describe as anarchic.

These identified failures are being countered in a series of National Economic Survival Programs. Exports are increasing; and although chronic shortages still exist, some essential imports, such as pesticides and spare parts, are coming into the country again.

Dr. Julius Nyerere has ordered a total overhaul of all the parastatal bodies, whose inefficiency and cumbersome bureaucracy have become legion. The National Milling Corporation actually lost \$250 million in two years without anyone noticing, so bad was the management and bookkeeping.

To the south, Mozambique has suffered some of Tanzania's economic woes but with policy differences. A characteristic of the Tanzanian government has been an inability to admit mistakes and reverse previously set policy guidelines. This contrasts sharply with Mozambique, where just a year after widespread nationalizations President Samora Machel announced that "the state has no business selling matchsticks" and promptly returned much of what had been taken over back to private enterprise.

Mozambique has declared the eighties to be the "Decade of Victory over Underdevelopment." National resources are to be devoted to large-scale commercial farming and to the building up of new industry, directly linked with and appropriate to agricultural mechanization and infrastructure. Mozambique already builds its own railway trucks and is now going into the production of tractors, buses, and agricultural implements.

It now looks as if Tanzania has been persuaded to go at least some of the way down the same road as Mozambique has chosen. In Dar es Salaam's case, the impetus has come from a three-man consultative team representing the national government, the IMF, and the World Bank. Tanzania has long bickered with the IMF and refused to accept free-market conditions. Now the infer-

ence is clear: there is to be a quid pro quo. If the advisory group can produce a set of proposals for the overhaul of the economy acceptable to the Tanzanian government, international funds will again flow. This year's Tanzanian budget measures are the first indicators of the new planning thrust.

In his budget speech in June, Tanzania's finance minister, Amir Jamal, said that expenditure for the forthcoming year would be \$26 million less than for last year. He accompanied this announcement with the news that the consultative group's recommendations were accepted: tight financial control would be exerted on state-controlled industries. Any performing badly would be shut down. Incentives for workers were the other part of the package. Jamal also announced that henceforward Tanzania would concentrate on existing investments rather than start on new development projects. Economic Planning Minister Kighoma Malima told a parliamentary finance committee that introducing new schemes "would be like building museum pieces."

If Tanzania's slight change of course has resulted from a new and more relaxed relationship with the IMF, Mozambique still has nothing to do with the world body. Having seen the pressures applied to Tanzania and Jamaica, Mozambique decided to opt out of the international financial market. It has

not joined the IMF, the World Bank, the Lomé Convention, or the Socialist bloc organization, Comecon. (Except on the big state farms, the Eastern bloc has little influence in Mozambique.) After independence seven years ago, Mozambique's biggest problem was just to keep the economy running. Some 90% of the Portuguese fled, including most doctors, teachers, technicians, managers, and private business people. Workers, most of whom were illiterate, formed committees to keep farms, factories, and shops running. They largely succeeded, and by 1978 the collapse of the economy had been halted. Since then there have been ups and downs, but Mozambique has insisted on trying to develop without undue outside influence. The governing party, Frelimo, has always said that there is a place for the private sector. Those businesses that were nationalized were principally those that had been sabotaged or abandoned by their owners.

Tanzania, on the other hand, has sometimes seemed to be sabotaging its own economy, with real output per worker in manufacturing parastatals falling by more than 40%. Perhaps there is hope, but Tanzanians still desperately hope that there will be no more economic "white elephants." The classic case is the decision to build a new capital in the country's dry, arid

center at Dodoma. The money that has already been spent on building a new city where no one wants to live is calculated to be sufficient to have provided 170,000 new jobs. At a time when Tanzania Airways is pulling right out of international long-haul flights, halving its domestic schedules, and desperately searching for aviation fuel, the government decided to go ahead with an expansion of Dar es Salaam airport at the cost of borrowing \$90 million from France. To add insult to injury, as the mainland aviation schedules are closed down, the Zanzibari leader, Aboud Jumbe, has borrowed \$5 million to buy an executive jet to ferry him the 10-minute journey to Dar es Salaam.

Tanzanians are not fools. They are highly intelligent people who feel that they have put their faith in one leader and one ideology for long enough. Too many of their countrymen have begun to vote with their feet. A large group has recently been repatriated from Maputo. They had gone to the Tanzanian Embassy there to beg for food while hitchhiking by land and sea to seek work in hated South Africa. Until the newfound cooperation with the IMF, a loosening of the rigid socialist economy, and an upturn in the world economy begin to mean soap and sugar in the shops, the hitchhikers' cousins in rural Tanzania are going to continue to retreat into the subsistence economy. □



Photo: W. Campbell/Sygnma

In Maputo, people queue up for rice: "Tough measures to stem the drift to the cities"

What Role for U.S. Capital?

BY AHMED SÉKOU TOURÉ

The government of Guinea attaches great significance to these discussions. We hope that out of our dialogue will emerge an effective base and an institutional framework for fruitful and mutually advantageous cooperation between, on the one hand, the State of Guinea and the Guinean companies, be they public or private, and, on the other hand, the financial and economic firms that you represent. My remarks will be confined to presenting our general broad approach to international cooperation and to outlining our national strategy. I should first of all like to note that we are continuing here a very special form of contact that began earlier. This form of consultation and coordination has been going on for nearly a decade between the countries of the North and those of the South—a dialogue that we have been engaged in—the better to understand each other and to foster closer rapprochement and coordination between peoples of different cultures, of different levels of development, but all living on our own common planet, and destined to build a new and common civilization. By our presence at this meeting we are showing the world the image of our common future and engaging in a dialogue of diversity, which I think is the only reasonable approach to solving issues between nations, peoples, and states. My country believes in the doctrine and is part of the vast movement known as the nonaligned movement. My country was one of the founding members of the movement. Guinea took part in the constituent as-

sembly that established the nonaligned movement held in Belgrade in September 1961. At that time the movement and its original declaration were considered as being of a rather upstart nature, a type of challenge to the established order. Since then, my country has consistently participated in the meetings of the heads of state and heads of government of that body and we are now aware of the weight that the organization has in world affairs.

So I am here in New York today in my twofold role as head of an independent and sovereign nation and as a messenger of the nonaligned movement. What I said in Havana on behalf of my country at the sixth summit of the heads of states and governments is something that I would like to repeat now. I said: "Nonalignment does not mean indifference or noninvolvement between good and bad; we are neither neutral or indifferent. Between colonialism and national independence, we have made our choice. Between apartheid and racial equality, we have also made

This paper by Guinean President Sékou Touré is based upon his opening presentation to the Guinea Investment Forum, organized by the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York City on June 28, 1982.



our choice. Between the economic vassalage of nations and the free and full enjoyment of the people of the fruit of their labor, we have also made a choice. Our choice is to assume our responsibilities as a sovereign people committed to productive efforts to build a future based on internal and external balance. The sixth summit of the nonaligned nations should enable us to build true sovereignty, while taking into account the existence of blocs and the interdependence of the various international groupings. We must see to it that the dialogue that we are engaged in with our various partners is consistent with the collective interest of the nonaligned nations, and our movement must never be at the service of any bloc or any given power, whether it be the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, or the People's Republic of China. Our movement by a courageous and responsible attitude must serve the legitimate aspirations of our people and be able to resist any outside pressures aimed at and amending or modifying our chosen path of development."

This statement defines our attitude towards technical, scientific, and economic cooperation. What I want to discuss with you is the human dimension of nonalignment. Because of the nonaligned movement, I have a deep appreciation for dialogue and the ability to communicate with anyone who shares human ideals with us. This contributed greatly to my friendship with the late Nelson Rockefeller.

In discussing nonalignment with you, you might think that I'm getting away from our present and common concerns. It is my belief, however, that nonalignment is the only basis for bringing together people from many different places, from many different backgrounds to work out a pattern for cooperation that will be of lasting value. In order for our dialogue to be fruitful, I think it's important that each and every one of us here say in the clearest, frankest possible way what his approach is to this particular type of cooperation.

As regards my country, our development strategy can be summarized in the following manner: I think that everyone recognizes that Guinea is a reservoir of immense and diverse resources. It might have been very tempting for the government, which I have led now for the past 25 years, to adopt expedient policies, carelessly squandering the natural resources that are the prime national heritage of our country, and which we wish to place at the service of our development. Instead, from the time of independence we developed a strategy of development based on clear and simple principles. First of all, what we had to do was take a careful and exhaustive inventory of all of our natural resources. We had to identify among those resources those which, developed on a priority basis, would enable the government to gradually develop the whole range of resources available to it. Our planning had to be consistent with serving the needs of our people while at the same time respecting the legitimate interests of our partners, because my government believes that in fair, open, dignified cooperation, the partners must help each other and must succeed together. There have been many attempts to obscure these principles, albeit very simple and clear principles, on which our whole development policy has been based. Attempts have been made to discredit our country in an effort to bring down our development strategy. Our respect for private property has been questioned. My upbringing has it that a contract or a



Photo: United Nations

Export packing of bananas: "Guinea is a reservoir of immense and diverse resources"

mutual decision has to be respected. To do otherwise is wrong and dishonest. It is very difficult for the hardened enemies of my country to hide the blinding reality of what has actually happened in our country. You know, for example, that the Bauxite Corporation of Guinea (CBG) is a joint venture, which was created thanks to the cooperation between Guinea and a number of large American, Canadian, and European firms. I won't go into details of the legal structure of this company or of its management or of the distribution of responsibilities between the foreign and Guinean parties. Nor will I go into the details of arrangements for the profits that are drawn by our foreign partners. Nor shall I discuss in detail the guarantees regarding the transfer of profits or funds. What I do want to stress is that in any form of mutually advantageous cooperation worthy of the name, each partner is bound to make a contribution.

What does Guinea offer, you may ask? I would simply respond as follows: My country offers its considerable resources: minerals, forests, agriculture, energy, and others; the absolute guarantee of all foreign investments; the political stability that's necessary for the total success of this kind of venture; an open mind; a willingness to engage in a dialogue; and finally a very high rate of return on investment.

In order to illustrate our development strategy, let me discuss some of the immediate objectives of my people. My country has decided to carry out two major projects, which, when implemented, would ensure economic takeoff. These are first the hydroelectric dam of Konkoure with the associated aluminum complex, and secondly the mining of the large iron ore deposits of the Nimba Simandou region. When these two projects are in operation they will create financial resources enabling us not only to meet our financial obligations, vis-à-vis our partners, but also to develop our agriculture and promote the development of our national infrastructure. We do not conceal the fact that



Photo: J.C. Critton/Sygma

President Touré speaking before a party congress: "Guinea has never been a communist country"

our country, like all the other developing countries, is subject to a number of domestic constraints. Insofar as many of these constraints, in the view of those who wish to work with us, are the responsibility of the host country, it is our responsibility to remove them. We must work for agricultural development and improve our livestock breeding, we must build an adequate infrastructure, and we must provide the necessary technical training for our people. These are all priorities for us. Indeed they are paramount; for without an appropriate solution to these problems we will not attract the necessary cooperation that we need. The people must first have enough to eat. Agriculture, livestock, and fishing must enable us to become self-sufficient in basic foods. This is a major constraint, a major problem that we face. The people also have to be properly clothed, to receive proper medical care, to be educated. It is agriculture that will provide the resources for this. People also have to be housed. This is a first-priority need. The infrastructure of our country must also be developed. We need roads. We need bridges to be built.

The objective of everything that we are doing is to ensure the well-being of our people, the well-being of our population. But I want to make it clear that our country is not looking to our partners to find solutions to all of our problems as a precondition to any form of cooperation. It is appropriate to tell you why my government wishes to engage in this dialogue, why Guinea is looking for direct investment from your countries, in particular from the United States. The act that took place on July 4, 1776 was an event of major historical importance. By that act you Americans proclaimed your independence, your separation from England. You will allow me to quote a passage from the Declaration of Independence, drafted by a committee organized June 10, 1776, the text of which was drafted by Thomas Jefferson. And I quote: "When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with one another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation."

There you have a major reason for my turning to you. I

feel very close to you because of this historical act. My country lived through a similar situation, achieving independence by separating itself from France. You Americans constituted the United States of America because you understood, very early on, that without unity, without the vast market that this country provides, your historical endeavors would have been undermined in the end. That is my second reason for coming to you.

Because my country is engaged in a similar historic undertaking, we have been working for cooperation with other African nations. In Addis Ababa in May 1963, we gathered together to create the Organization of African Unity. When we did so, we had in mind your example. We hope that the OAU will in the long run lead to a "United States of Africa" and to the complete emancipation of the people of Africa. Your creative genius as well as that of the Europeans, Canadians, and the Japanese; your practical approach; your openmindedness; your understanding of all the possibilities that we have for offering you highly profitable investments—these are some of the major reasons that have led us to come here and try to encourage general investment by the West in general and by the United States in particular. And that explains, perhaps, why Guinea has the highest rate of direct U.S. investment in Africa per capita, except for those countries that export oil. And with the exception of the oil-producing countries, Guinea is the major exporter to the United States.

Guinea understands full well that any investor invests in order to make money and that this money must be transferable outside the country. It is only normal that you should expect to receive a fair return for your efforts. We hope that our country will benefit from these investments. We are looking for investors who are willing to cooperate in developing our country and in respecting our fundamental policies, our constitution, our laws and regulations, our material interests, and above all our moral values.

Guinea believes that cooperation with the United States will be far-reaching and positive, not only for our peoples but also for the rest of Africa and the Third World. Guinea has been vilified and castigated by its enemies, called a communist country with communist leaders, and its president has been presented as a dictator who abides by no faith and no law. Our detractors have always misrepresented Guinea. Our country has talked of revolution, and I would like to explain the meaning and the content that we

give this concept. In our country there are a number of ethnic groups. During the entire time of the revolution, the colonial powers set these ethnic groups to warring with one another. We had tribal parties that tended to forget the overall well-being and the general interest of the people of Guinea. They took pleasure in destroying each other and tearing each other apart. Our first reason for revolution was to create a new state, a new nation, based on the genuine, free unity of the Guinean people, above and beyond their ethnic loyalties, above and beyond their religions, and above and beyond any differences.

The second reason for our revolution was a social one. Women in Guinea had absolutely no role in our society. They were considered a form of goods, chattel. Men would pass their women back and forth without their free consent. This human tragedy was a matter of grave concern to us. We sought to bring it to a stop by proclaiming the equality of men and women and by working with courage and faith for the realization of this human ideal.

The third reason was that in our country we had a caste system, under which some classes or groups considered themselves better than others. We waged a struggle to destroy this arbitrary hierarchical structure. In our country there were some malevolent spirits who took advantage of the ignorance of the people and exploited them. We had some Marabouts, Moslem religious leaders, who by outright lies and by discrediting us endeavored to stir up fears and mislead the people. We also had the fetishists, the witchdoctors, who sowed terror and exploited the ignorance of the people. Our revolution endeavored to free the minds of men and women, to open up and to free the creative energies of each and every person. In order to do that, we had to struggle against all of these hostile forces, all of these former systems in our society—everything that tended to exploit the ignorance of our people.

Our revolution set major objectives on the African level. The United States of America became the greatest power in the world thanks to your ancestors, your founding fathers. They are the ones who had a true and accurate sense of history. They not only fought for independence but also fought to achieve the unity of the peoples of this country, the peoples of America. We think that Africa should draw its inspiration from the history of America and develop its own unity methodically—not around a single individual or around a single nation or people. It should be a union that is a freely accepted synthesis of Africa, supported by all the people of Africa. When we talk about African unity or the "United States of Africa," we're not speaking in terms of an ideology. Africa is made up of people who are believers, who are religious. You can say what you want about Africa, but you cannot say that the Africans do not have faith, do not have a religion. The very meaning of African civilization is its belief in God and the love of mankind. African society is a reflection of this belief, which places obligations on men. The African accepts and respects his fellows. Every fortunate person has to make a contribution to his less fortunate fellows. This proverb sums up the humanism that we want to project. It represents our moral and spiritual values. These are the values of our people that we want to foster. That is fundamental in our revolution because colonialism tended to destroy our values. Colonial rule attempted to assimilate us—to make us adopt different values and a different system.

Take the case of Japan, whose evolution and development we all admire. In the past, Japan has gone through all kinds of difficulties—problems of outside domination and exploitation. Gradually and progressively, and particularly with the help of the United States, it has achieved a level of development that makes it an economically solid entity in today's world. What we admire is not so much its economic development and its technical and technological performance, but above all the identity, the personality, the special values of the Japanese that have always been respected. The Japanese have continued to be Japanese. They have not denied or reneged on their spiritual values or moral values. And so when we talk about a revolution in Africa, it is this example that we want to follow. We don't want Africa to follow behind, but Africa to go ahead and know that God is fair and God is justice. God created all the peoples of the world. God is at the basis of the diversity of all the colors that we have in this world. God has given all peoples the same skills, the same attributes. Each nation has the responsibility to work methodically to adopt a system of laws that enables each type of initiative to be expressed, so that all can ensure the well-being of one another. By undertaking an open dialogue between our society and other societies, we can make a contribution to the universal good. Similarly, we are open to receiving from other societies whatever may be adapted and useful, given the conditions in our own country.

In conclusion, I want to say that Guinea has never been a communist country. Ours has never been a communist



President Touré addressed the Guinea Investment Forum in New York, sponsored by the Chase Manhattan Bank

government. Its president has never been and never will be a communist chief of state. I am not saying this just to please you. I am talking here because I want you to know the truth. I am talking here to express the dignity of our country.

You can help us a great deal, but I know because of my upbringing that man achieves nothing and people achieve nothing without the help of God. What God has set aside and reserved for my country and for me is something I shall always have and we shall always have. And that is why that wherever I go I shall tell the truth. Guinea was never communist. Guinea is not communist now. And if there is any country today in Africa where religion is truly free and has the support of the state for purposes of its organization and for expansion of religious education, it is Guinea. Whether Moslem, Catholic, or Protestant, Guineans are free to practice their religion. They enjoy full freedom of worship and even enjoy the help and support of the Guinean state.

We have our way of speaking. We have our way of expressing our national independence. We do not follow in the trail of any country. Anyone who is an impartial observer has only to look at the history of Guinea to realize

people of Guinea for its government. Regardless of the difficulties that we have encountered along the way, the people have remained united throughout. Today, thanks to the efforts that have been made, Guinea has improved substantially both its administration and its organization. That is why we are now able to assert, without equivocation, that anyone who wants to invest in Guinea will not regret it.

The first negotiators who came out for the CBG company were hesitant because they were infected with this anti-Guinean influence. We told them they would not regret their decision. No one can compel an investor to trust Guinea, but if you trust us I can guarantee that you will not regret having done so. We ask all those who wish to contribute to the development of the enormous potential of our country not to hesitate. And if there is anything that we are perhaps not aware of that may run counter to your interest, thanks to our dialogue we will be able to find out about this thing and find a solution for it. We are available to you. We are eager to cooperate, because what we particularly lack today is capital. God has given us immense natural wealth, but we don't have the capital or the technology or the know-how to develop it. You will be able to provide us



Conakry: A bauxite loading plant

Photo: United Nations

that we follow a policy of nationalism because we have a heterogenous country, out of which we want to build a modern nation. It's the intelligence of man, the mind of man, that creates a nation. The infrastructure and the nature of the economy obviously will all contribute to this, but it is the mind of man that makes a country. It is man's spirit that dominates and prevails in all the activities of our government. That is why all of those who sought to destroy the Guinean regime and who did not know of the true harmony that existed between the leadership of Guinea and the people of Guinea failed in their endeavors. And that is what explains the unanimous, vigorous support of the

with what we need. Therefore, we will make available to you the resources that we need to have developed for our mutual good—the tremendous potential that we have in our country. We shall share the responsibility with you for developing and organizing and carrying out projects and managing our common undertakings.

I urge you to trust Guinea, to commit yourselves to the tremendous undertaking of the development of the economy and the natural resources of Guinea in order to give our country a flourishing economy that will serve to bring about the gradual improvement of the standard of living of the people of Guinea. □

Attempted coup spotlights Kenya's economic, political woes

Kenya's two decade-long image of political stability and economic prosperity has probably been irreparably tarnished by the August 1 attempted coup. "Things will never be the same again," acknowledged the *Daily Nation*.

The prospect is for the government of President Daniel arap Moi to turn to more authoritarian and repressive measures to keep the lid on political dissent. And the army, which put down the coup, may take a greater behind-the-scenes role. Moi may also try to breathe new life into his publicly proclaimed campaign against corruption, which has so far failed.

Corruption—broadly speaking, the abuse of power by politicians and other members of Kenya's elite—and the military pact with the

U.S. were two of the reasons for the coup cited by the rebels. They reflected the views of the government's most outspoken critic, Oginga Odinga, a former Vice President, who was this year expelled from the only political party and who had his passport confiscated.

Another critic with similar views, the internationally renowned novelist and playwright Ngugi wa Thiong'o, has had some of his Kikuyu-language plays—accessible to vast numbers of Kenyans—effectively banned.

There have also been a series of detentions-without-trial, including several college lecturers. The colleges and especially the University of Nairobi have been centers of student unrest and criticism of the gov-

ernment. Students came out in large numbers to support the rebels. The extent of looting in Nairobi, \$100 million worth, was seen by some as an expression of support for the rebellion.

Criticism of Kenya's firm pro-Western line seemed to coalesce on the agreement that gives the U.S. access to Kenyan military bases. Besides Mombasa port, Washington has improved and uses the airfields at Nanyuki and Embakasi, whose air force junior officers and men staged the coup bid. Many Kenyans reportedly resent these close military ties.

The role of the army chief of staff, Gen. J.K. Mulinge, will likely be enhanced as a result of the army's loyalty. The army may take the lead in screening and rebuilding the air force, most of whose 2,100 members were detained. But there have been reports of discontent in the small, but well-equipped army. Last year, a treason trial brought by an army investigation into arms-buying by a cousin of the powerful Minister for Constitutional Affairs, Charles Njonjo, was abruptly dismissed and the government reportedly had to appease army officers by "some judicious gifts of land."

Most commentators said Kenya's recent economic decline was the motivating force behind the coup attempt. Income from coffee and tea has been halved since the 1976 boom because of falling prices, and imports have become more costly. Oil imports consumed 1 percent of export earnings in 1973, but 36 percent in 1981. Kenya's profitable tourist industry will probably be adversely affected by the coup attempt. (London *Sunday Times*, August 8, 1982; *Financial Times*, August 2 and 4, 1982; *Kenya Daily Nation*, August 3, 1982; London *Guardian*, August 2, 1982; *New African*, July 1982.) □

OAU summit postponed for 3 months

The OAU summit scheduled for Tripoli, Libya, in August will probably be held in November at another venue, after a compromise formula over the admission of the Western Sahara "nation" failed.

The trouble started in February when OAU secretary-general Edem Kodjo permitted membership of Polisario Front's government-in-exile, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), by a simple majority of 26 OAU members. Morocco, which has been battling Polisario guerrillas for control of the Western Sahara, then walked out of the foreign ministers' meeting with its allies after declaring that admission had to be decided by a two-thirds' majority at a summit conference.

Morocco lobbied fiercely for a boycott of the Tripoli summit, prompting the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafi, to accuse the U.S. of "openly giving bribes to some African leaders" to stay

away. The Reagan administration recently agreed to closer military ties with the Rabat government, including transit rights for U.S. military aircraft at Moroccan air bases.

In the end, only 28 delegations, short of the 34-state quorum, showed up in Tripoli, despite a compromise proposal in which SADR would have been seated at the foreign ministers' session but barred from the summit.

Complicating the issue was a strong dislike for Qaddafi by many African leaders. If the summit had taken place, Qaddafi would automatically have become OAU chairman for a year, succeeding Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, who now remains chairman. Libya originally did not even invite Egypt and Zaire because Qaddafi objects to their diplomatic relations with Israel. (London *Guardian*, August 6, 1982; London *Times*, August 5, 1982; Tripoli Radio, August 3, 1982; *West Africa*, July 26, 1982.) □

ANC, Tutu and Buthelezi oppose land handover to Swaziland

By pushing the handover of part of KwaZulu homeland to neighboring Swaziland, the South African government has succeeded in uniting divided black politicians in a temporary common cause.

KwaZulu leader Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, who is conducting a vocal, high-powered campaign against the give-away of some 3,000 square miles of South African territory, is regarded with suspicion by many blacks because of his government job in Pretoria's Balkanization scheme of granting "independence" to tribal homelands. Ironically, Buthelezi has also angered the government by adamantly refusing to accept "independence" for KwaZulu, which would strip six million Zulus of their South African citizenship.

The plan to cede the Ingwavuma part of KwaZulu and the KwaN-gwane homeland has galvanized opposition from the banned African National Congress, often at odds with Buthelezi, from Bishop Desmond Tutu, a Buthelezi critic, and from the Azanian People's Organi-

zation, another foe of the homeland leader.

The ANC's president, Oliver Tambo, was to have visited Swaziland in August in an attempt to persuade the government to pull out of the land deal. Tambo said he hoped the matter could be resolved "within the family" so that it would not be necessary to put the issue on the agenda of the OAU summit, which was postponed. Swaziland, an OAU member, is a refuge for many ANC exiles and it is believed that a quid pro quo of the land deal is a Swaziland promise to stop ANC guerrilla infiltration into South Africa.

Bishop Tutu, general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, has been hostile to Buthelezi for several years. But he put aside his political differences to share the same platform at a rally where he said there could be no solution to South Africa's problems "if blacks are deprived of their birthright—their South African citizenship."

Buthelezi said Swaziland's take-

over of the territory would result in its "being incorporated into South Africa" and the independent nation would then assume the pariah status of Transkei, BophuthaTswana, Venda and Ciskei, the homelands Pretoria has made "independent." (London Times, July 23, 1982; Sowetan, July 15, 16 and 22, 1982; Johannesburg Star, July 17, 1982.) □

WESTERN AFRICA

Cape Verde

● Following a June meeting in Maputo, Mozambique, of Presidents Aristides Pereira of Cape Verde and João Bernardo Vieira of Guinea-Bissau, their respective nations resumed **diplomatic relations**. Ties were broken in November 1980 following the coup in Guinea-Bissau which brought Vieira to power.

The two presidents commended President Samora Machel of Mozambique for his efforts to facilitate the meeting which culminated in the normalization of relations. However, an outstanding problem yet to be resolved between the two countries is the fate of up to 30 prisoners held in Bissau since the coup. Former Guinea-Bissau President Luis Cabral was released after over a year in prison and currently resides in Cuba.

A meeting of government delegations was scheduled for late July in Bissau to "set up the necessary mechanisms for cooperation in the diplomatic, cultural, scientific, technical and economic fields." (West Africa, June 28, 1982; Maputo Radio, June 18, 1982.)

Chad

● Hissene Habré, Chad's de facto head of state since June when his Armed Forces of the North (FAN) ousted President Goukouni Woddeye's government after a protracted conflict, met with rival southern leader, Col. Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué, head of the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT) in Libreville, Gabon in July to discuss the possibility of holding **negotiations** to resolve their differences.

However, observers indicated, prospects for reconciliation among the rival factions that perpetuated

Less hope for quick Namibia solution

While State Department officials were talking optimistically in July of a Namibian settlement by mid-August, Gen. Vernon Walters, President Reagan's special envoy, who was in Luanda for talks with the Angolan government, was reported not optimistic about a quick solution.

Considerable progress has been made in negotiations over the UN independence plan by deferring the sticky question of a voting formula, but the main hitch remains the 15-20,000 Cuban troops in Angola, an issue that is not addressed in the Security Council plan.

South Africa's continual public pronouncements that removal of the Cubans is a precondition for acceptance of the plan and withdrawal of its troops from Namibia has upset Western diplomats. The State Department insists there is no linkage of the issues but that it expects "parallel movement." There are reports that the Reagan administration has offered Angola substantial aid and investment, as well as diplo-

matic recognition, in return for parallel movement.

Angola maintains it will ask the Cubans to go home once the South African army has left Namibia and the threat of South African attacks is eliminated. Angola claimed that on July 20 South African planes bombed the town of Cahama, 125 miles north of the Namibian border. The Angolan Defense Minister, Col. Pedro Maria Tonha Pedale, said later that South Africa was massing troops on the Namibian border for further attacks into Cunene province.

On July 21, the South African Foreign Minister, Roelof Botha, sent a note to the UN accusing Angola of complicity in plans by the Namibian insurgents, the South-West African People's Organization, "to escalate armed activities in the region." Botha said South African troops were ready to "retaliate." (London Times, July 17 and 26, 1982; London Guardian, July 22 and 23, 1982; Financial Times, July 20, 1982.) □

the civil war in Chad still seemed remote, as Habré has rejected a federal solution to the country's problems. The FAN leader said he was optimistic that negotiations with Kamougué, who served as Vice President under Woddeye, would lead to an end to the fighting and that "the immense task of national reconstruction" could begin.

Former President Woddeye, now residing in Algeria, maintained after his defeat that he wants to "play a role" in Chad's future. Both he and Habré sent delegations to represent Chad at the abortive OAU meeting in July in Tripoli.

Meanwhile, Habré set about attempting to consolidate his hold over Chad by forming a "provisional council of state" with himself as President. The council, containing 18 members, is composed primarily of Habré's closest aides, and according to the FAN leader, will be dismantled when a government of reconciliation is established. Habré has not yet delineated how or when that will take place, and Kamougué has insisted upon the holding of OAU-sponsored elections.

In late June, Chad's Foreign Minister under Woddeye's transitional government, Ahmat Acyl, leader of another of the rival factions—the pro-Libyan Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR)—was killed when he was struck by an airplane propeller. Habré said Acyl's death would not "interrupt the dialogue with the CDR aimed at national reconciliation." Acyl was on his way to meet with Kamougué when he was killed. (*West Africa*, June 28, July 19, 26, and August 9, 1982; *Christian Science Monitor*, July 20, 1982.)

The Gambia

● Sheriff Dibba, opposition leader of the National Convention Party and imprisoned following the July 1981 coup attempt against President Dawda Jawara, was acquitted of high treason and released from jail in June.

Dibba had contested the March presidential elections from his prison cell, but Jawara and his Progressive People's Party won an overwhelming majority.

The Nigerian judge, Olu Ayola, who tried the case, ruled that accusations against Dibba—that he had

supplied material aid to the coup plotters and had encouraged his party to take part in the rebellion—were without basis.

Ayola sentenced another opposition leader, Pap Cheyassine Secka, to death along with four others for complicity in the coup. Some 22 other death sentences were passed at earlier trials and, according to reports, another 600 people are still awaiting trial. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, July 15, 1982; *London Guardian*, June 19, 1982.)

Ghana

● In early July, three of Ghana's high court judges and the personnel director of the Ghana Industrial Holding Corp. (GIHOC) were found murdered in Accra, setting off a debate as to who was responsible for the killings and whether it indicated a wider deterioration in internal security.

Justice Cecelia Koranteng-Addow, Justice K.A. Agyepong, Justice F.P. Sarkodee and Maj. Samuel Acquah were abducted from their homes in late June by four armed men and were found dead several days later.

Flight Lieut. Jerry Rawlings, the Ghanaian head of state, in a radio broadcast expressed his "horror and that of the government at these hideous acts of terrorism. We condemn these acts from the depths of our hearts, that they are against all the principles which this revolutionary process is designed to advance."

The armed forces were put on alert as a result of the murders, and Rawlings said such terrorism "whether originating from counter-revolutionaries or elements ostensibly sympathetic to the revolutionary process," could not be allowed to go unpunished and that such tactics had been used "in order to create an atmosphere of fear and panic among the population."

A five-man board to launch an investigation into the murders was appointed, headed by Secretary of the Interior Johnny Hansen. Meanwhile, judges and lawyers refused to man the judicial system until the assailants were found.

There was speculation that the judges, all of whom had participated in appeals of those convicted of corruption by the secret court set up by

Rawlings after his first coup in 1979, may have been executed for not carrying through the army's efforts to stamp out corruption. When Rawlings turned over power to the civilian government of Hilla Limann, habeas corpus applications were lodged and some of those convicted were released.

Suspensions were further fueled by the fact that the assailants had to have traveled in a vehicle that was able to circumvent the strict curfew deadline.

Acquah, as personnel head of GIHOC, had dismissed workers who staged a violent demonstration during the Limann administration. When workers appealed to the high court, their appeals were thrown out by Justice Koranteng-Addow. While some observers believed the assailants were undisciplined members of the armed forces, others maintained that they could have been Rawlings' enemies who committed the killings to embarrass him. (*West Africa*, July 12 and 26, 1982; *London Observer*, July 11, 1982; *Economist*, July 10, 1982; *London Times*, July 6, 1982.)

Guinea

● President Sekou Touré paid a private visit to the U.S. in late June to attend a meeting of the Guinea Investment Forum, sponsored by the Chase Manhattan Bank. Continuing a shift away from earlier Guinean policies of a socialist orientation and close ties with the Eastern bloc, Touré said his country has "fabulous economic potential" and urged American private enterprise to invest, particularly in areas which would increase agricultural production.

Representatives of some 70 American companies attended the meeting, although at present only 11 U.S. firms are active in Guinea, primarily in bauxite mining and in oil and diamond prospecting.

Guinea possesses an estimated one-third of the world's bauxite reserves, which are used in the production of aluminum, over 1.8 billion tons of high-grade iron ore, potential oil fields, and diamond and silver mines. Yet it is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita gross domestic product of \$264. Export earnings, of which some 80 percent come from a baux-

ite mining venture owned partly by Alcoa and Martin Marietta, were only \$385 million in 1981, of which debt repayment obligations used up more than half.

David Rockefeller, retired chairman of Chase, visited Conakry in February with a group of bankers, kindling interest among the private sector in Guinea's potential. Washington is said to be encouraging a rapprochement with Touré, who will take over the chair of the OAU in 1983. The Guinean President met with President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Chester Crocker, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and other officials during his visit. An agreement was reportedly reached to form an agricultural task force to aid in Guinea's agricultural development. (*Business Week*, July 12, 1982; *New York Times*, July 1 and 2, 1982.)

Guinea-Bissau

- In an interview published in the Dakar, Senegal, daily, *Le Soleil*, the Guinea-Bissau head of state, Gen. João Bernardo Vieira, reported the discovery of an alleged coup plot which resulted in the arrests of three leading figures.

João da Costa, a former Health Minister; Maj. Leopoldo Alfama, formerly deputy police chief; and Honorio Fonseca, who held ambassadorial posts in Havana and Moscow—all prominent guerrilla leaders during the war against the Portuguese—were arrested and several others were called in for questioning. According to Bissau radio, a "counter-revolutionary organization" had been uncovered and dismantled.

The arrests came two months after Vieira's purge of leftists in the cabinet and his assumption of increased powers by taking on the defense and internal security portfolios. According to observers, the key posts in the cabinet went to Western-trained "technocrats." (*West Africa*, July 19, 1982.)

Ivory Coast

- The Ivory Coast's national oil company, Petroci, was granted a \$102 million loan by the World Bank in July to develop an offshore field being exploited by a U.S.-led consortium.

The consortium is headed by

Phillips Petroleum, and other partners include Sedco Inc., AGIP and Petroci. The loan is to assist the Ivorian company in covering its share of the Espoir field development, where pumping was expected to begin in July, with a potential output of 30,000 barrels of oil per day. (*West Africa*, July 12, 1982.)

Liberia

- Samuel Doe, the Liberian head of state, dismissed the Minister of Justice, Isaac Nyeplu, and the chief of police, Joe Myers, in July, blaming them for corruption within the police force.

The action was precipitated by the commutation of death sentences against two senior policemen, convicted for taking bribes, after no honest policemen could be found to execute them. Doe had ordered that the firing squad should be composed of those who could swear to never having engaged in corruption. The head of state then sacked the minister and police chief for failing to line up an honest firing squad and thus for having damaged the credibility of the police.

Winston Tubman, ambassador to the U.N. at the time of Doe's 1980 coup, was named Justice Minister. William Clark, a former security chief under the late President Tolbert, was appointed director of police.

And in late June, the Planning Minister, Byron Tarr, was dismissed after less than a year in the job. His predecessor, Dr. Togba Nah Tipoteh, resigned in August 1981 and went into exile. No explanation was given for Tarr's removal, and he was replaced by deputy minister Emmanuel Gardiner.

In other news, Doe announced in late June that a new capital city of Liberia is to be built in a rural area not yet determined, because Monrovia can no longer meet the needs of the government and its "colonial legacy" doesn't sit well with the "revolutionary spirit" of the people.

Doe said the construction of the new capital would not affect his government's decision to return to civilian rule in 1985 and would instead "lay the foundation upon which a civilian government can build a more organized and dynamic city."

The preliminary work on the draft of the new Liberian constitution was completed in late June, according to Dr. Amos Sawyer, chairman of the national constitution commission. The document was to be presented to the government, followed by the formation of a constitutional assembly to make recommendations to the government. Finally, there will be a national referendum on the constitution.

And in June, Doe appointed a 13-man task force on agricultural production to define the government's agricultural policy and work out a strategy for production. The co-chairmen of the task force are the armed forces commanding general, Thomas Quiwonkpa, and the director-general of the cabinet, Gabriel Bacchus Matthews. (*West Africa*, June 28, July 5, 12 and 19, 1982; *London Observer*, July 4, 1982; *Monrovia Radio*, June 25, 1982.)

Mali

- Legislative elections were held in mid-June for the 82 seats in the national assembly and the Democratic Union of Malian People (UDPM) won 99.8 percent of the 3.5 million votes cast. Candidates were all members of UDPM, the only legal political party.

Following the elections, President Moussa Traore reshuffled his two-year-old cabinet, as part of "the breath of fresh life" approach adopted by the UDPM congress in February. The number of ministers in the cabinet increased from 15 to 18.

Two new ministries of state were established: one for equipment, headed by Col. Amadou Diarra, deputy secretary-general of the UDPM and considered as the number-two man in the government, and one for economy and planning, led by Oumar Coulibaly. In addition, the Interior Minister, Col. Sory Ibrahim Sylla, was replaced by Lieut. Col. Abdourahmane Maiga. Eight cabinet ministers retained their posts while five others were replaced. (*Afrique-Asie* July 19, 1982; *West Africa*, July 12 and 19, 1982.)

Mauritania

- In mid-July, President Mohamed Khouna Ould Heydalla carried out a major cabinet reshuffle, retaining

Col. Maouya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, but changing a number of other important ministers.

Lieut. Col. Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, a former Minister of Equipment and Transport, but under house arrest since 1980, was named Interior Minister. A former controller general, also under surveillance, Lieut. Col. Aana Amadou Baba Ly, was appointed Minister of Planning and Land Management.

Sidi Ould Ahmed Deya, secretary-general of the government, and considered a supporter of Polisario, Mauritania's adversary at one time in the war over the Western Sahara, replaced Dieng Bouba Farba as Minister of Finance. Farba was shifted to head the Ministry of Mines and Energy. Other ministers changed in the reshuffle included: Industry and Commerce, Health and Social Affairs, and Information and Telecommunications. (*Jeune Afrique* July 28, 1982; *Le Monde*, July 17, 1982.)

Niger

• Three government ministers were sacked in a cabinet reshuffle in June undertaken by President Seyni Kountche. Alou Harouna, Justice Minister, was replaced by Mahamadou Halilou; Abdou Mallam Moussa, Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, by Brah Mamane, and Youssouffa Amadou Maiga, Minister of National Education, by Mamane Ousseini. Maiga was named commander of the national gendarmerie.

Three new ministers entered the government and a secretariat of state with responsibility for planning was formed, headed by Al-Housseini Mouloul. Kountche retains the defense and interior portfolios. (*West Africa*, June 28, 1982.)

• Niger's uranium mining industry was hit by a strike in late July, highlighting worker discontent over inequalities in pay and working conditions between the indigenous and expatriate staffs. Workers at the Compagnie Minière d'Akouta at Arlit walked off their jobs for an "unlimited duration" demanding the sacking of a French personnel manager because of strained relations with his Nigerian staff. Some 1,500 workers participated in the

job action as part of the Union of Mine Workers of Niger.

Representatives of the trades union congress, the Niger Labor Union, and the Minister for Mines, Oumar Diallo, were scheduled to meet to resolve the conflict. (*West Africa*, August 2, 1982.)

Nigeria

• In June, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) nominated President Shehu Shagari as its presidential candidate in the elections which will be held at the end of 1983. Shagari was the only nominee before the special NPN convention, attended by 3,000 delegates from Nigeria's 19 states and from the federal capital territory of Abuja.

Elections will be held for the presidency, national assembly, senate, state governors and state assemblies. While Shagari's nomination as the NPN candidate to the presidential elections came as no surprise, observers said the fact that Shagari did not tip Vice President Alex Ekwueme as his running mate at the convention indicated that the post will be challenged by others.

Shagari said he had not decided whether he would choose Ekwueme again as a running mate, "a man who has been working amicably with me." This led to speculation that Shagari would choose the recently pardoned former Biafran leader, Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, who returned to Nigeria from exile in the Ivory Coast in June.

Despite Shagari's difficulties with the economy, resulting from the drop in revenue from falling oil production and the necessity of introducing austerity measures, it is believed that his political hand is strengthening because of the disarray and intra-party splits within the NPN's main rival parties—the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, and the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe.

The UPN and the NPP, along with the Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP) and a faction within the People's Redemption Party (PRP) had formed the Progressive People's Alliance (PPA) in March to contest the elections and were considered a potential threat to the ruling party. However, the PPA has

not been able to agree on whether to endorse Awolowo or Azikiwe as its presidential candidate, and Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, leader of the GNPP, has deserted the alliance. (*Economist*, July 24, 1982; *West Africa*, June 21, 1982; *Financial Times*, June 14, 1982.)

Sierra Leone

• Alfred Akibo-Betts, former Minister of State for Finance, responsible for uncovering two major financial scandals involving embezzlement of government funds by top civil servants, was flown to London in late June to be treated for injuries sustained in the violence of Sierra Leone's recent legislative elections.

Akibo-Betts had stood for election to the legislature in his constituency, Freetown Central I, the results of which were nullified, along with those of 12 other constituencies. He was then reportedly advised by All People's Congress (APC) officials to withdraw from the newly scheduled by-elections. The former government official's home was then searched by police and he was detained, sparking student demonstrations at Fourah Bay College.

Students circulated a tract calling attention to "the dubious and controversial ways in which [the elections] were conducted, culminating in the arrest of Akibo-Betts," adding "We are appealing to you to join us in condemning the existing state of affairs in the country as barbaric, shameful and disgraceful."

Akibo-Betts was reported to have been severely beaten by thugs who may have been politically inspired. Reports also indicated that he may have been sent abroad for treatment at President Siaka Stevens' behest. (*West Africa*, June 14, 21 and 28, 1982.)

Upper Volta

• In June, an open letter addressed to the head of state of Upper Volta, Col. Saye Zerbo, and signed by over 170 people, criticized the government's methods of pursuing "national reconciliation" and demanded the release of those jailed during the November 1980 coup.

The letter, not endorsed by any specific trade union, political party

or ethnic group, accused the government of favoring a "traditional minority clique" and of "attacking individual and collective liberties." "A ruling group can only be legitimized through democratic and popular expression," the circular stated.

During Zerbo's coup, the entire government, including former President Sangoule Lamizana, was placed under house arrest and none has been released thus far.

Meanwhile, Zerbo denied reports that 12 members of the supreme command of the armed forces had resigned their positions following the demission of Capt. Thomas Sankara, the Secretary of State for Information, in May. Sankara left the government in opposition to restrictions placed on trade unions and the press. Zerbo also said that relations between the government and the trade unions were "frank, direct and trusting." The head of state's comments came at a press conference in June. (*West Africa*, June 14 and 28, 1982.)

EASTERN AFRICA

Djibouti

• Djibouti held its first legislative elections since the 1977 independence in May, with all 65 candidates members of President Hassan Gouled's party, the only legal party permitted in the country.

The opposition to Gouled, which held no demonstrations and made no declarations, had recommended abstention. But of the nearly 86,000 voters who turned out, some 91 percent of the electorate, only 6,615 indicated abstentions. The high turnout itself was seen as popular approval of Gouled's policies. (*Afrique-Asie* July 5, 1982; *Le Monde*, May 25, 1982.)

Ethiopia

• The Reagan administration has reversed a proposed policy in which thousands of Ethiopian exiles in the U.S. faced deportation back to the country they fled for political reasons in the 1970s.

Originally, the administration announced that the Ethiopian government had "moderated" its policies, following purges of "dissidents" in which thousands reportedly were

detained and killed. But Ethiopian refugees joined with human rights groups, the Congressional Black Caucus and conservative members of Congress to protest the deportation.

One liberal Democrat, Julian Dixon of California, and one conservative supporter of the Reagan administration, Rep. Jack Kemp (R-NY), co-sponsored a resolution urging the State Department to revise the proposal and let the Ethiopians stay. The resolution was supported by 60 members of the House and Senate.

In July, the State Department said the estimated 15,000 Ethiopians affected could stay in the U.S. indefinitely. However, a further 3,000 exiles who arrived in 1980 and 1981 when the Addis Ababa government was carefully screening departures, will be dealt with on individual bases. (*Washington Post*, July 8 and 10, 1982; *New York Times*, July 7, 1982.)

Madagascar

• The government of President Didier Ratsiraka devalued the currency by 15 percent in May, although the IMF had originally sought a 30 percent reduction.

The devaluation helped the island nation, whose economic problems were said to be worsening, receive a \$5.7 million credit from the International Development Association, the soft loan arm of the World Bank. The loan is to provide technical assistance, staff training and logistical support to the Ministry of Agricultural Production and Agrarian Reform. The IDA is also helping to prepare a three-year investment plan.

In June, a group of unnamed nations agreed to provide Madagascar with \$68.7 million in aid this year. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, June 30, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, June 21, 1982.)

Mauritius

• The new left-wing government of Mauritius has immediately pressed its claim to sovereignty over the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, which is a U.S. B-52 bomber base leased from Britain.

The first foreign trip after the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) won a landslide election

victory in June was made by Foreign Minister Jean-Claude de L'Estrac, who discussed the claim in Britain with Foreign Secretary Francis Pym. "We would like the problem to be tackled in the spirit of our friendly relations with Britain," L'Estrac said, adding that Mauritius will take its campaign to the UN and the OAU.

The MMM's stance on Diego Garcia was one of its major foreign policy differences with the former government, which lost every seat in the nation's assembly.

The former government had initiated an agreement earlier this year for Britain to pay \$7 million in compensation for 1,200 former inhabitants of Diego Garcia, who were forcibly relocated to Mauritius in 1966. The MMM government has now signed this agreement, which calls for Britain and Mauritius to establish a trust to administer the money. (*London Guardian*, July 3 and 22, 1982; *London Times*, July 3, 1982.)

Seychelles

• Six foreign white mercenaries were found guilty in July of charges ranging from treason to gun smuggling.

Four who pleaded guilty to treason—two South Africans and two Zimbabweans—were sentenced to death. A fifth, Martin Dolincheck, a confessed South African intelligence agent, pleaded not guilty and was sentenced to 20 years in jail. The defense had argued that the men could not be convicted of treason because they were foreigners. Another South African was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for arms smuggling. Charges against a South African woman were dropped and she was deported from the Seychelles. (*London Guardian*, July 8, 1982; *London Times*, July 7, 1982.)

Somalia

• The Reagan administration provided an emergency airlift of weapons to Somalia at the end of July, after Somali insurgents, backed by Ethiopian troops, suddenly intensified their low-level hit-and-run attacks with an incursion across the Ethiopian border.

It was thought the Ethiopians may have been reacting to the esca-

lation of the guerrilla war in the Ogaden desert, fought by Somali-backed forces.

Somali dissidents, supported by Ethiopia and Libya, have been operating for several years inside Somalia, generally carrying out sabotage attacks and broadcasting propaganda against the autocratic regime of President Mohamed Siad Barre through "Radio Kulmis." The Ethiopian-sponsored invasion may have had the aim of setting up a well-publicized rebel administration in the invaded area, thus putting pressure on the increasingly unpopular regime.

The U.S. emergency aid was described as "defensive": just rifles, ammunition and communications gear. Italy also sent military materiel in July. The Somali dissident organization, the Somali Democratic Salvation Front, said the U.S. was making a "mistake" and successive American administrations had "an incurable disease" of continued assistance for "unpopular third world leaders." Ethiopia strongly protested the arms supply.

The front believes the Siad Barre regime is near collapse and that popular rebellions will spring up, such as the one in northern Somalia in May, or that the army will stage a coup. An attempted coup by army officers reportedly was thwarted in April and dozens of officers were arrested.

Again, in June, several senior government officials and army officers were arrested, charged with collaborating with an unnamed foreign nation. (*Financial Times*, July 29, 1982; "Radio Kulmis," July 20 and 26, 1982; *London Times*, July 22 and 26, 1982; Mogadishu Radio, June 12 and July 19, 1982.)

Tanzania

● Tanzania's delicate relations with donor agencies took a turn for the worse in June when the World Bank froze development assistance, worth some \$200 million until Tanzania pays its debt arrears.

The country is \$2.8 million behind in repayments. Last April, the IMF suspended its loan program with Tanzania pending renegotiation of the borrowing agreement.

A World Bank spokesman said: "We have never had a default and

we are expecting Tanzania to pay up." The Tanzanian government has fought hard with both the IMF and the bank over loan conditions it considers unacceptable to a developing country building socialism, particularly such provisions as increases in food prices, 50 percent devaluation, freezing of minimum wages and cutbacks in social welfare programs.

In an effort to increase foreign currency earnings, Tanzania has done an about-face on tourism, which it had previously considered a corrupting influence. Now, it is aiming to attract wealthy Western tourists lured by the wildlife that is more abundant than anywhere else in Africa.

But the country's efforts to upgrade tourism were almost set back in July when eight Western airlines threatened to boycott Tanzania for failing to pay its debts. The central bank then paid out \$1 million in foreign reserves, one-sixth of the total debt to the airlines. (*London Observer*, August 1, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, July 26, 1982; *New African*, July 1982; *South*, June 1982.)

Uganda

● Uganda's security situation appeared to have improved over the summer and Vice President Paulo Muwanga predicted that by July 1983 the country will be "very peaceful."

Sporadic guerrilla attacks continued but the undisciplined army seemed to be having greater success in quelling the rebellion. In mid-July, the army reported destroying three camps near Kampala used by the guerrillas—called "bandits" by the government—and capturing quantities of arms and other equipment. However, there was also a report that three army units had defected to the rebel organization led by Yoweri Museveni, commander of the strongest anti-government group.

The guerrillas contend that the government has detained more than 4,000 people during the months-long crackdown, while the government puts the figure at 237.

An alleged leader of one rebel group, Balaki Kirya, appeared in a Kampala court in July, charged with treason. Kirya, a former Ugandan minister, had been living in Nai-

robi, Kenya, for several years and his wife claimed he was kidnaped from his home by two men who said they were police officers.

Another alleged guerrilla official, Francis Bwengye, was briefly detained in Kenya, following Uganda government representations to Kenya about Ugandan rebels living there. (*New African*, August 1982; *London Times*, July 19 and 28, 1982; *Kampala Radio*, July 23 and 27, 1982; *Zimbabwe Herald*, June 21, 1982.)

CENTRAL AFRICA

Cameroon

● President Ahmadou Ahidjo paid an official visit to the U.S. in late July where he held discussions with President Reagan, Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige and Agriculture Secretary John Block. The trip was believed aimed at buoying both official aid and private sector interest in Cameroon.

American government officials and representatives from the private sector have been seeking new commercial and investment opportunities to correct the trade imbalance between the two countries. The U.S. exports about \$100 million to Cameroon each year, mainly machinery and chemicals, while it imports \$600 million, mostly oil. The U.S. government has increased direct aid to Cameroon by \$12 million, with a pledge of \$60 million by 1988. Ahidjo also met with representatives of the American business community, including David Rockefeller, retired chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank.

The U.S. Agency for International Development has also provided a \$43 million loan program for an agricultural college in Cameroon in cooperation with the agriculture department at the University of Florida, Gainesville. Ahidjo visited the campus during his U.S. trip.

Meanwhile, the Cameroon Action Movement, a London-based organization which has as its aim "freedom, liberty and sovereignty for the people and English-speaking state of West Cameroon," sent a letter to Reagan timed to coincide with Ahidjo's visit, criticizing the State Department's human rights evaluation of Cameroon. According

to the organization, the report contradicts the reality of "on-going human rights violations in Cameroon as reported by Amnesty International." (*Business Week*, August 2, 1982; *West Africa*, August 2, 1982.)

Central African Republic

● Five men found guilty for their part in an attempted bombing of the French military base in Bouar in July last year were sentenced to death by a special court earlier this year. A sixth person, Thomas Isaafi, was acquitted, while the trial of the seventh man, Maurice Ali, allegedly a recruiting agent for the Centrafrican Liberation Armed Forces (FALC), had not yet ended pending further investigations.

Three of the condemned, Isaac Kpakpa, Gabriel Kossi and Benjamin Alazabo, admitted they were Libyan-trained members of the FALC, the armed wing of Idi Lala's Centrafrican National Liberation Movement (MCLM). Neither Lala nor his lieutenant, Martin Koesse, were present at court, but were sentenced to death in absentia.

At a press conference in Paris in July, the Association of Young African Lawyers (AJJAF) denounced the arrests of more than 128 people following the failed coup attempt by Ange Patasse in March. The arrested, said the AJJAF, were being held in "deplorable conditions" and had not been charged with any specific offense, a "violation of the Central African constitution." While many of the detained were said to be members of Patasse's party, the Liberation Movement of Centrafrican People, others were jailed simply because of family or ethnic links. (*West Africa*, May 24 and July 26, 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, June 15, 1982.)

Congo

● President Denis Sassou-Nguesso paid official visits to Brazil, Cuba and Spain in July, securing trade and cooperation with the countries. In Brazil, a country with which the Congo established diplomatic relations in 1980, a cultural cooperation agreement was signed, and a plan to cooperate based upon Brazil's experience in developing the Amazon region was formulated. Brazil will also loan Congo \$95 million for the construction of a major highway.

In Cuba, Sassou-Nguesso was awarded the country's highest honor, the Order of Jose Marti, by Fidel Castro. Several agreements were signed by Congolese Foreign Minister Pierre Nze and Cuba's acting Foreign Minister Jose Viera, including a protocol to extend a cooperation agreement and a trade pact.

Later talks in Spain focused on prospects for the sale of Spanish fishing technology in return for an increased number of fishing licenses in Congolese waters. (*West Africa*, August 2, 1982; Havana Radio, July 17, 1982; Brasilia Radio, July 7, 1982.)

Equatorial Guinea

● Lieut. Carmelo Owono, Equatorial Guinea's Minister for Presidential Affairs, was dismissed in late June for alleged corruption. He had reportedly blocked judicial efforts to force a local businessman and acquaintance to pay debts of over \$500,000 to Spanish creditors, and was accused of "constant irregularities in the performance of his duties."

In late July, Manuel Ruben N'Dongo, leader of an exile opposition movement, the Democratic Assembly for the Liberation of Equatorial Guinea, requested clarification from the government on the legislative elections scheduled for August in hopes that his party would be permitted to contest them. He said the Malabo government had not specified whether the elections would be in the framework of a one-party or multi-party system.

In other news, Jesus Martinez-Pujalte, director of the Spanish office for cooperation with Equatorial Guinea, signed an accord in Malabo providing for Spanish advisers, experts and technicians for development projects in its former colony. Spanish workers currently number 350, most of whom are teachers and health workers. (*West Africa*, July 5, 12 and August 2, 1982.)

Rwanda

● Rwanda celebrated 20 years of independence on July 1, marking the day with festivities and visits by heads of state of several African countries. President Juvenal Habyarimana, in an address to the nation, announced that presidential

and legislative elections will be held in 1983. (Kigali Radio, July 1 and 2, 1982.)

Zaire

● In early July, 13 former parliamentarians were jailed with 15-year sentences on charges of attempting to form an opposition party, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS).

Members of the UDPS were detained originally late in 1980 after having circulated a letter indicating their intention to form a second party to the ruling Popular Movement for the Revolution. Those who signed the letter were placed under house arrest until December 1981. They were re-arrested earlier in 1982 after continuing to press for a dialogue with President Mobutu Sese Seko. Five alleged accomplices were sentenced to one-to-five-year terms and one was acquitted.

The prosecution, maintaining that by organizing an opposition party, the group was trying to overthrow the government, was successful in obtaining the full sentences requested.

The former members of parliament were defended by Belgian lawyers, whose visas to Zaire were originally denied. The accused refused to attend the trial reportedly because the courtroom had been packed with government supporters.

The Belgian Minister of Cooperation and Development, Jacqueline Mayence, postponed a scheduled trip to Zaire which would have coincided with the trial, following a heated debate in the Belgian parliament over her visit and the trial, which was characterized as a "political event."

And Mobutu canceled plans for a working visit to Brussels in July, citing the death of Gen. Bobozo Adurama, a former commander-in-chief of the Zairian army. Belgian officials, however, had reportedly been reluctant to have Mobutu visit, denying that the proposed trip was an official one, as the Zaire government had originally maintained. The Brussels government expected outspoken opposition to Mobutu's visit, as several Zairian political exiles, including Nguza Karl-I-Bond,

the former Prime Minister, and Mungu Diaka, head of the Council for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa, reside there.

The latest opposition leader to move to Brussels is Professor Dikonda wa Lumanyisha of the UDPS, who maintained that some 1,000 people were arrested during the trial of the parliamentarians.

And in July, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, returned from a trip to Zaire and four other African countries, reportedly characterizing Mobutu as "a man particularly sensitive to the interests of the free world." (*West Africa*, July 5, 12, 19 and 26, 1982; *Afrique-Asie*, July 19, 1982.) London *Guardian*, July 16, 1982.

- The governor of Zaire's central bank, Sambwa Pida Nbagui, warned the country's creditors in late July that Zaire will be forced to reschedule its \$4.1 billion debt this year or face further arrears. Nbagui said that the country's total medium- and long-term 1982 debt service obligations are \$946 million, including \$175 million arrears. Debt service payments were said to absorb more than 60 percent of export earnings in 1982.

Earlier in the year, the IMF suspended its nearly \$3 billion assistance program when Zaire failed to meet its performance criteria—mainly by not maintaining its budget deficit within set limits. A drastic fall in earnings from its major exports—copper, cobalt, diamonds and coffee—was responsible, and resulted in the June replacement of the Zairian head of Gecamines, the state-owned copper and cobalt mines, with a Belgian, Jacques Crem.

The disruption of the IMF program, a critical aspect of a three-part economic recovery package involving a World Bank-chaired consultative group and the Paris Club of western creditors, resulted in a virtual collapse of Zaire's efforts to resuscitate the economy. A team from the IMF visited Zaire in June, but no new agreement was expected before the end of 1982.

The Zaire government has expressed willingness to adopt some drastic economic measures, including slashing of government spend-

ing and restrictions of imports including food, to curry favor with its Western creditors. (*Economist*, July 31, 1982; *Financial Times*, July 30, 1982.)

Zambia

- In early July, President Kenneth Kaunda warned the population of the need for **austerity measures**, as the Zambian economy continues to suffer from deteriorating terms of trade. World prices for copper, the country's chief foreign exchange earner, are depressed, and demand for cobalt is low, exacerbating Zambia's difficulty in servicing some \$2 billion in external debt.

The government was reportedly pondering over meeting tough IMF conditions in order to draw the remaining half of the fund's \$867 million loan negotiated in 1980. Among the IMF's terms was said to be the adoption of restrictions on credit to the copper mines, which would result in the closure of some and labor unrest on the part of the 60,000-member Mineworkers' Union.

Zambia is becoming increasingly dependent upon railway lines to South African ports, which handle about 60 percent of its external trade, because of the growing inefficiency of the Tazara railway, linking the country with the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam.

The growing dependence on Pretoria was seen as one of the major factors behind Kaunda's April meeting with South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha. Zambia's need for a rapprochement with South Africa is evident, observers maintain, by its dropping of the label "racist" when referring to the apartheid government.

Kaunda also reportedly has plans to adopt "scientific socialism" as the country's political philosophy, according to some, in order to be able to exercise tighter bureaucratic control at a time when threats to his tenure are increasing. The philosophy, which emphasizes centralized bureaucratic control and state ownership of the means of production, has already been opposed by the 1.5 million-strong Catholic Church. Archbishop Emmanuel Milingo described the doctrine as "an unacceptable extreme whose consequences are tantamount to an pro-

of human rights." (London *Guardian*, June 28 and July 15, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, July 13, 1982; *Zimbabwe Herald*, July 5, 1982; *Economist*, June 26, 1982.)

- In late June, **University of Zambia** was reopened after student boycotts of classes over the expulsions of several of their leaders in April prompted the government action. Students had distributed leaflets criticizing government policies and were expelled. A new code of behavior was introduced, which returning students were obliged to sign in order to be re-admitted. (London, *Guardian*, June 22, 1982.)

NORTHERN AFRICA

Algeria

- According to an early August report, an American company, **Distrigas Corp.**, reached an agreement with Algeria's state oil company, Sonatrach, for the sale of liquefied natural gas (LNG). The pact was said to be for the delivery of 40.25 billion cubic feet of LNG annually, although the purchase price was not disclosed. The contract must be approved by the U.S. and Algerian governments.

Distrigas had signed a contract with Algeria in 1976, but the agreement was suspended because of failure to agree on a new pricing formula. Algeria was seeking to link the export price of its oil with that of the LNG, and was renegotiating all previous contracts.

Sonatrach reached agreement earlier in the year with Gaz de France and Distrigas of Belgium, whereby the LNG sells for \$4.79 per thousand cubic feet, with two further pegged price increases.

Meanwhile, Italy and Algeria held ministerial level talks in Algiers in June to resolve a deadlock and enable LNG to begin flowing through the \$3 billion trans-Mediterranean pipeline completed in late 1980. Algeria denounced a 1977 agreement which maintained the price of its LNG at \$3.25 per million BTUs. SNAM, the gas subsidiary of the Italian state energy concern ENI, wants to raise its offer only to \$3.85, while Algeria is requesting \$5.25.

The agreement reached with

France provides for an LNG price 20 percent above market levels in return for which French companies were guaranteed access to a number of Algerian contracts. Sofregaz, an affiliate of Gaz de France, signed a contract with Sonatrach in late June for the supply of equipment to the gas industry.

Meanwhile, another American company, the Houston-based Panhandle Eastern Corp., began arbitration proceedings in late June to force Sonatrach to fulfill a 1975 contract for deliveries of 3.3 trillion cubic feet of gas over 20 years. Deliveries were to have begun in August 1981. (*Wall Street Journal*, August 3, 1982; *New York Times*, July 2, 1982; *Le Monde*, July 1, 1982; *Financial Times*, June 15, 1982.)

Egypt

● On the 30th anniversary of Egypt's 1952 revolution in July, President Hosni Mubarak delivered a speech addressing the country's economic problems and told his audience, "You've got to work harder, that's the only solution." He quieted Egyptian fears concerning the possibility of canceling government subsidies on basic goods such as oil, sugar, rice and flour, which cost the government more than \$2 billion per year. An economic conference held in February had recommended a gradual elimination of the subsidies over a five-year period, but Mubarak said, "We cannot and will not do that."

The Egyptian President said increased productivity, along with recently instituted sales taxes on luxury goods were the only means available at present to aid the worsening economy. Government and public sector salaries will not be increased, he said.

In June, the Minister of Planning, Dr. Kamal el-Ganzouri, announced an ambitious five-year plan whereby Egypt hopes to raise its gross domestic product by 8 percent per year and reduce its balance of payments deficit by 75 percent over the next five years.

The plan foresees an 8.6 percent growth in the commodity sector, which includes agriculture, industry, power generation, construction and oil. The annual growth rate over the past five years has been 5.8 per-

cent. Some \$46 billion has been allocated for investment, the major portion of which is for the public sector. The Mubarak government has been concentrating on diverting resources toward investment in industrial and agricultural projects and curbing imports. It hopes to reduce the balance of payments deficit from \$2 billion to \$500 million by 1988. (*London Guardian*, July 27, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, July 27, 1982; *Financial Times*, June 18, 1982.)

● The Egyptian government released 450 political prisoners in July to mark the end of the Ramadan fast. Most of the freed had been arrested in the crackdown on opposition just before President Anwar Sadat's assassination last October, and others were rounded up after his death.

In June, 182 detainees were ordered released after the government determined they presented no threat to government security. The releases of the two groups of prisoners brought to nearly 2,000 the total number of detainees freed by President Hosni Mubarak. Over 4,000 are said to still be behind bars, of which 1,000 face charges of conspiracy to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic fundamentalist regime. (*London Guardian*, July 19, 1982; *Kenya Sunday Nation*, June 20, 1982.)

Libya

● Mobil Corp., scheduled to cease its oil exploration and production activities in Libya on July 13, withdrew its "notice of surrender" to the Tripoli government, according to observers, because of "very significant discounts" being offered by the Libyans for their oil.

Mobil's concession in Libya had cut its production to 50,000 barrels a day in June from 100,000 a day the year before. It announced its intention to leave the country earlier in the year, following Exxon's departure from Libya, because of declining profits and political pressures from the Reagan administration, which embargoed Libyan oil imports last March.

The Libyan government was said to have been angered by Mobil's decision to follow Exxon out of the country and oil industry analysts

speculated that because Libya has been selling its light crude to some buyers at as low as \$31.50 a barrel (the OPEC price is \$35.50), Mobil may have struck a better deal causing it to reverse its decision.

Other American companies getting discounts on Libyan oil include Amerada Hess Co., Conoco Inc. and Marathon Oil.

Earlier reports had indicated that Mobil was seeking potential buyers for its Libyan facilities and had been in negotiation with Land Oil Group, Inc., a private Philippines oil company with ties to Manila government officials. Observers said, however, that with negotiations reopening in Tripoli, it appeared likely that Mobil would drop its plans to sell its Libyan operations. (*Wall Street Journal*, July 21 and 22, 1982; *Financial Times*, July 22, 1982.)

● Spanish, Italian and French bankers and businessmen have become increasingly concerned in recent months about the fact that Libya is more than \$2 billion in arrears on payments to them, despite a recent report which characterizes Libya as "one of the more promising markets in the Middle East."

In July, the Bank of Spain halted all payments to Libya after diplomatic efforts to collect overdue payments for Spanish exports failed. Libyan firms owe some \$130 million to individual Spanish exporters, some of the debts outstanding for over a year.

Following talks in May between Libya and Italy, some \$100 million of Libya's \$500 to \$600 million debt was paid to Italian businesses. Libya had suspended or delayed payments on most of its debts there since January. The Tripoli government agreed to move on debt repayments in return for a renewal of Italian purchases of Libyan oil.

Coface, the French export credit agency, has distributed \$47 million to French businessmen who are owed money by Libya.

And in July, Libyan Prime Minister Maj. Abdusalam Jalloud went to Europe requesting \$1 billion in debt relief, a pitch turned down in Paris, Rome and Madrid. Most of Libya's \$12 billion debt to the West is in the form of private trade credits, half of

which are guaranteed by national export credit agencies.

Declining oil revenues are the major reason behind Libya's financial problems, but according to a July report by the Committee for Middle East Trade, the Libyan import market will improve "once the oil situation is stabilized." Despite Libya's cash flow problems, the report says the nation is "a credit-worthy country and should have little difficulty in securing external funding." (*Financial Times*, July 23, 1982; *Economist*, July 17, 1982; *London Times*, July 6, 1982.)

Morocco

● In June, the Moroccan parliament approved a new investment code to replace the one in force since 1973, which provides 100 percent equity in Moroccan companies to foreign investors. Foreign companies can remit all profits after tax to their home country and can repatriate all initial invested capital and accrued capital after five years.

Rebates of up to 50 percent will be granted on the initial cost of land and basic infrastructure in industrial zones being set up in Moroccan cities.

In putting forward the new code, the Moroccan government hopes to attract more foreign investment than the yearly average since 1975 of \$100 million. (*Financial Times*, June 28, 1982.)

Sudan

● President Gaafar al-Nimeiry issued a decree in late June removing Vice-President Abel Alier from his post and replacing him with one of his rivals, Joseph Lagu. Alier, a veteran politician from the semi-autonomous southern region of Sudan, had been opposed to those favoring a redivision of the south into two or three regions to be answerable to the central government in Khartoum.

Elections were held for a new regional assembly for the south in late June. Nimeiry had dissolved the southern parliament last October and appointed a transitional administration. Joseph James Tembura, formerly Minister of Public Works, Transport and Communications, was elected president of the southern High Executive Council,

defeating another veteran southern politician, Clement Mboro.

Mboro was arrested early in 1982 along with a group of southern politicians for forming an illegal organization opposing calls to redivide southern Sudan. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, July 15, 1982; *Zimbabwe Sunday Mail*, July 4, 1982; *Economist*, July 3, 1982.)

● With relations deteriorating between Sudan and Ethiopia, Sudanese first Vice-President Omar Mohamed al-Tayeb went to Addis Ababa in late July bearing a message from President Gaafar al-Nimeiry to Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam. Al-Tayeb's visit came about one month after the Sudanese under-secretary for foreign affairs, Hashem Osman, and military and state security officials travelled to the Ethiopian capital to discuss implementation of an early June agreement signed by both countries.

The pact said both sides agreed to "close down all facilities used by secessionists and dissidents or destabilizing elements" operating against either state and "to expel all groups who in any way work to the detriment of the neighboring country."

The Sudanese-Ethiopian border, 1,200 miles long, is very difficult to police. Ethiopia objected to the fact that the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Tigré People's Liberation Front, were maintaining headquarters in Khartoum and were able to cross the border freely, although in 1980. Sudan reportedly closed their offices.

Ethiopia, on the other hand, allegedly provides a base for anti-Nimeiry dissidents, including the 800-man army of Yagoub Ismail. Sudan has also accused Ethiopia of complicity with Libya in destabilization activities against Khartoum. In May, Sudan invoked its defense pact with Egypt and held talks on deploying Egyptian troops along the Ethiopian border. The Ethiopia-Sudan agreement signed in June was believed indicative of the seriousness with which the Addis regime regarded the potential use of Egyptian troops.

Sudanese government officials also met with representatives from Uganda to discuss Ugandan refu-

gees who are seeking asylum in southern Sudan. Uganda maintains that Sudan is encouraging refugees to remain and demanded that they be resettled further inland. The "Uganda Army Guerrilla Movement," identified with former President Idi Amin, is based on the Zaire-Uganda-Sudan border and its leadership reportedly lives as refugees. (Omdurman Radio, July 28, 1982; *London Times*, July 28, 1982; *London Guardian*, July 26, 1982; *Financial Times*, July 28, 1982; *Economist*, June 26, 1982.)

Western Sahara

● Morocco reopened the Bou Craa phosphate mines in the contested Western Sahara in July, closed down since 1975 because of attacks by the Polisario front, fighting for control of the disputed territory. The Moroccan military built a 400-mile defense wall from southern Morocco surrounding the mines to the Atlantic coast and the Rabat government apparently felt sufficiently confident about its defenses—that Polisario would be unable to breach the wall—to start the mine operations again.

The defenses include minefields, barbed wire entanglements and a ten foot-high ridge of sand and rock, as well as a sophisticated ground radar detecting system.

A 60-mile conveyor belt carrying the phosphate rock to the coast, a power station, a treatment plant and a loading pier are all back in operation. The Bou Craa mine, one of the richest in the world, contains estimated phosphate reserves at 1.7 billion tons.

Polisario meanwhile was stepping up its attacks against Moroccan positions in July, to coincide with the opening of the OAU foreign ministers' meeting in Tripoli, Libya. In late July, the front reported three raids on positions around Smara, a major city within the Moroccan-controlled zone, and claimed to have inflicted heavy losses on Moroccan forces, with 93 casualties and four tanks destroyed. Morocco on the other hand claimed to have suffered only two casualties and 11 wounded. (*London Guardian*, July 29, 1982; *Le Monde*, July 23, 1982; *Financial Times*, July 13, 1982.)

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

• The Angolan government was holding preliminary discussions earlier in the year to borrow some \$100 million from Western banks led by Chase Manhattan for balance of payments support, according to the Minister of Planning and External Trade, Lopo do Nascimento. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos said in July, "We are in a difficult economic and financial situation. [We must] concentrate on carrying out very concrete tasks. To this end, the people's assembly, the council of ministers and the party itself are constructing an emergency plan."

Do Nascimento said part of the new plan will entail encouraging peasant agriculture instead of state farms, and public spending will be curbed to balance the budget. Marketed agricultural production was down 26 percent last year, a result of the collapse of the transport infrastructure during the civil war and the continuing security problems.

With prices falling for Angola's three major exports—oil, diamonds and coffee—in 1981, imports of all but essential goods were banned to curb foreign exchange outflows. Military spending consumes about 50 percent of foreign exchange earnings, which were short \$350 million last year because of declining export prices for Angola's commodities.

Thus, according to observers, Angola is placing hopes on a settlement in Namibia to remove the South African threat, which would in turn decrease the power of the anti-government Unita rebels. The resolution of the security problems would free more funds for development and result in American diplomatic recognition, thereby increasing Western aid, trade and investment.

France signed a cooperation agreement with Angola in late July covering the economic, social and scientific spheres, and confirming a process of rapprochement between Paris and Luanda. Meanwhile, seven U.S. corporations financed an American basketball team's trip to Angola in late July to play in a

tournament against teams from Angola and Senegal. The tour was said to be aimed at promoting the normalization of U.S.-Angolan relations.

While Angola has been seeking increased economic links with Western countries, several prominent members of the MPLA were being purged from their government and party posts, reflecting, according to some, a strengthening of the pro-Soviet Marxists in the government. Manuel Pedro Pacavira, secretary of the MPLA central committee for production, was replaced in his post in July by Santana Andre Pitra Petrof, provincial commissioner for Huambo province. Pacavira was sacked for alleged "errors" in his previous position as Minister of Agriculture.

It was also rumored that Mendes de Carvalho, the Minister of Health, and Lieut. Col. Paiva Domingos da Silva, head of the People's Defense Organization—both men along with Pacavira co-founders of the MPLA with the late President Agostinho Neto—would be dismissed.

And Henrique "Iko" Carreira returned to Angola with the rank of general after having spent three years in military training in the Soviet Union. Carreira, a former MPLA military leader, left Angola after having been implicated in a controversial court case. Observers indicated that he would be named to one of three posts: Minister of Defense, the vacant premiership, or one of the three new posts of Vice President. (*Le Monde*, July 29, 1982; *Financial Times*, July 21 and 29, 1982; *Economist*, July 24, 1982; *London Guardian*, July 16, 1982; *Journal of Commerce*, June 29, 1982.)

Botswana

• In order to offset the impact of declining foreign exchange earnings from its major export, diamonds, the government of Botswana is currently exploring further development of its coal mining industry. A senior government official announced recently that Botswana hopes to become a principal coal exporter "within the next few years." It is also expected that the development of new mines will generate

thousands of new jobs, thus enhancing the growth of the domestic economy.

In addition, Botswana is planning to mine large amounts of soda ash in the Sua Pan region with the technical assistance of Japanese experts. Last year, the Minister of Mineral Resources, Dr. G.K. Chiepe, went to Japan to discuss the project. It is hoped that soda ash, which is used in the production of glass, will become a major export in the near future. Botswana will also use the mineral for domestic glass production, a commodity which is presently imported. (*Johannesburg Star*, June 26 and July 24, 1982.)

Lesotho

• The Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), the military wing of the exiled Basotho Congress Party (BCP) led by Ntsu Mokhehle, was reportedly responsible for a mounting wave of violence in Lesotho over the past few months, as its efforts intensified to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan.

In early August, the Lesotho Minister of Works, Jobo Rampeta, and two other people were assassinated in an ambush in the northern district of Berea. The murders occurred about one week after the residence of Jonathan near Leribe, 60 miles north of Maseru, was attacked by a group armed with mortars, bazookas, rockets and AK-47s. The attackers fled over the border into South Africa and the LLA subsequently claimed responsibility for the act, as well as for the assassination of BCP secretary-general Koenyama Chakela in Leribe in early July.

Chakela had lived in exile in Zambia since fleeing Lesotho in 1974. In 1980, he accepted the Lesotho government's offer of an amnesty, returning to the country and reportedly planning to participate in the elections promised by the government. Mokhehle's LLA, however, has demanded that elections must be organized and supervised by the UN and not by the government.

Jonathan accuses the LLA of working in collusion with the South African security police toward his overthrow. In July, he charged that the LLA is using the South African

town of Ficksburg as a base for attacks into Lesotho. Pheta Matlanyane, reportedly an LLA member, was killed in July in a bomb explosion in a black township of Ficksburg. South African police defused two homemade bombs at the scene of the explosion. (*Financial Times*, August 9, 1982; Maseru Radio, July 29, 1982; London *Guardian*, July 17, 1982; *Sowetan*, July 7, 1982.)

Malawi

● Orton Chirwa, leader of the Tanzanian-based **opposition** movement, the Malawi Freedom Movement (Mafremo), a former Minister of Justice and Attorney General, and his wife, Vera, pleaded not guilty to charges of treason in July. Accused of "preparing, endeavoring or conspiring to overthrow the government by force or other unlawful means," they were facing prosecution by a "traditional court." The court differs from others in that it has no jury or judge, but a panel of five selected by the state to pass judgment.

Mr. and Mrs. Chirwa were unable to consult each other since they were detained last Christmas Eve, and have been refused legal aid. Part of a transcript broadcast by the BBC World Service is alleged proof of Mr. Chirwa's intent to "remove [President Kamuzu] Banda."

In exile from Malawi for 17 years, the accused reportedly were either forcibly abducted over the border from Zambia or discretely allowed to return by Banda. The trial was still continuing in mid-August. (London *Observer*, August 8, 1982; London *Guardian*, July 29 and August 6, 1982.)

Mozambique

● Portugal's Prime Minister, Francisco Pinto Balsemao, paid an official visit to Mozambique in late June, where he discounted South African claims that Lisbon's **military cooperation** with Maputo is "a betrayal of the West." Balsemao told the Mozambique News Agency, "Cooperation in the military field can be one more aspect of the cooperation between our two countries being guided by the same principles of mutual respect and mutual benefits."

A military agreement was signed

between Portugal and its former colony in April providing training for Mozambicans in Portuguese military colleges. Lisbon was also reportedly providing machine guns, ammunition and other weapons to Mozambique, which is facing a serious threat to internal security from the activities of the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance (MNR).

Balsemao's visit culminated in the signing of a series of cooperation agreements. The Bank of Portugal opened a special line of credit of \$13 million to pay for contract workers requested by the Mozambican government for a wide range of activities, including agriculture and government service. Portugal will also contribute between \$20 and \$40 million to help finance the construction of houses mainly for the Portuguese workers, and will substantially increase its purchases of cotton from Mozambique. (*Financial Times*, July 2, 1982; Zimbabwe *Sunday News*, June 27, 1982.)

● Zimbabwe and Mozambique are growing increasingly worried by the stepped-up sabotage efforts of the South African-supported **Mozambique National Resistance Movement** (MNR).

The main targets of the MNR have been road and rail links between Mozambique and Zimbabwe and between Zimbabwe and Malawi, which pass through Mozambique. The two railroads from landlocked Zimbabwe to the Mozambican ports have been attacked frequently and there is now a reluctance by Zimbabwean businessmen to ship their goods through Beira and Maputo.

Trucks using the road between Zimbabwe and Malawi have been ambushed by the MNR several times. Many truckers now use the longer route through Zambia and as a result freight rates have doubled. Foreign aid projects have also been attacked and many foreign workers, whom Mozambique needs to rebuild its economy, have fled the country.

South Africa denies it supports the MNR, but Western diplomats and the Mozambican government maintain the evidence is overwhelming. In addition, a Portu-

guese-language radio station in South Africa beams MNR propaganda into Mozambique. Pretoria's apparent aim is to ensure that its neighbors, particularly Zimbabwe, remain dependent on South Africa's transportation network in the region. (Johannesburg *Star*, July 17, 1982; London *Guardian*, July 12, 1982.)

South Africa

● The president and vice president of the **South African Allied Workers' Union** (SAAWU) were taken out of their detention cells in July for a court appearance. Thozamile Gqweta, president, and Sisa Njikelana, vice president, were then remanded in custody until August 31 without any charges placed against them.

SAAWU general secretary Samuel Kikine made a later court appearance but no charge was laid and he was freed on \$450 bail until a court date on August 6.

It was believed that all three men will be charged under the Terrorism Act in connection with a conspiracy trial the government is preparing in an attempt to link the militant black unions with the banned African National Congress.

Two white detainees, who appeared in court in June with the three SAAWU executives, have already been charged with high treason under the Terrorism Act for allegedly furthering the aims of the ANC.

The government said in July it had detained 58 people since last year in connection with the alleged conspiracy, including union activist Dr. Neil Aggett, who died in security police detention. Of those 58, the authorities said 40 had been freed, six had been convicted, six were awaiting trial (including the SAAWU officials) and six were being detained as potential state witnesses. (*Sowetan*, July 2 and 15, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, June 19 and July 3, 1982.)

● Joe Thloloe, a banned former *Sowetan* reporter who was detained in June along with two other **journalists** under the 14-day detention law, is now being held under a new law that replaces the notorious Section Six of the Terrorism Act.

The other journalists were briefly

held under the new interrogation law, Section 29 of the Internal Security Act, and then released. They are Quraish Patel, a *Natal Daily News* reporter, and Vas Soni, *Durban Post* copy editor. Three other people were also detained under Section 29: Truman Mnguni, Victoria Makgetha and Joyce Makhesi, the acting general secretary of the Commercial Catering and Allied Workers' Union.

Section 29 differs from the Terrorism Act provision by theoretically providing certain safeguards for detainees. However, both sections allow indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation by the security police. Section 29, though, calls for visits by a magistrate and doctor every two weeks, and stipulates that the commissioner of police may not hold anyone for more than 30 days without giving a reason to the Minister of Law and Order. (*Sowetan*, July 8 and 21, 1982; *Johannesburg Star*, July 17, 1982.)

● The South African government announced in July an early release program for some political prisoners, but many black and white critics believe the policy is a "publicity stunt" aimed at impressing world opinion.

Initially, the authorities said some prisoners would be paroled—reversing the no-parole policy for people convicted of a wide array of political offenses—but later changed parole to "remissions of sentence" and "conditional releases."

At least a dozen Robben Island prisoners were released on those terms but only "those who have cooperated and shown that they have in fact turned their backs on crime," according to Justice Minister Kobie Coetsee.

Tom Manthata, secretary of Soweto's Committee of Ten, said, "This means that there is a danger of those who are released being government puppets."

The Black Sash service organization charged that the released prisoners had nearly completed their sentences. Mrs. Joyce Harris said the press and the public were being "cheated and misled." (*Johannesburg Star*, July 3 and 17, 1982; *Sowetan*, July 13 and 15, 1982.)

Black unity makes fiasco of soccer tour

South Africa's aggressive campaign in July to get back into international soccer turned into a fiasco when black organizations and soccer teams pulled off a successful boycott of the visiting foreign stars.

South Africa was banned from international competition by the world soccer federation in 1976 and the tour—following on the heels of World Cup soccer, which was not even televised in the country for political reasons—was designed to show up the international boycott. South African Breweries put up \$1.6 million to tour a dozen world-class players, lured by vast sums into breaking the boycott and jeopardizing their careers.

But at least 12 black organizations teamed up to persuade Soweto's three top soccer teams and thousands of black soccer enthusiasts to shun the scheduled matches against the internationals.

The success of the boycott stunned white South Africans, whose government radio had said: "For the black people of South Africa in particular this tour is a momentous and joyous occasion. They

● A Lutheran lay preacher who died in security police custody in the Venda homeland last year had been brutally beaten to death, an inquest found in July.

Tshifiwa Muofhe, 28, was said to have suffered severe injuries to the brain, arms, legs, kidneys, chest, back, buttocks, abdomen and genitals. An autopsy showed he died from "blood loss secondary to widespread bruising and hemorrhage," and doctors testified that death was caused by "extensive use of blunt force."

Muofhe was one of several churchmen and others held without trial by Venda security police for interrogation about an armed attack on a police station last August. The police had said Muofhe died when he leaped from a truck in an attempt "to escape or commit suicide." (*London Guardian*, July 21, 1982; *London Times*, July 20, 1982.)

● The head of the black journalists' union and a former activist, both living in the "independent" Ciskei homeland, have been declared for-

above all are the soccer players and supporters of South Africa and anything designed to promote the sport in this country they welcome with open arms."

The tour organizers miscalculated badly, according to Dr. Nthato Motlana, chairman of Soweto's Committee of Ten. "They were all so bloody arrogant," he said. "They took it for granted that because blacks are crazy about soccer they could go ahead and organize this tour without asking how we felt about it . . . They tried to use the tour to put over the lie that soccer here is normal and we could not let them get away with it."

While Soweto's three best teams boycotted the tour, the mediocre AmaZulus were drafted at the last moment to play, for a reputed \$11,000. Only 3,000 fans showed up at the Soweto stadium that draws 60,000 for big games, and hundreds of them chanted "Go home" at the international squad. (*Economist*, July 24, 1982; *Sowetan*, July 13, 19, 22 and 23, 1982; *London Times*, July 22, 1982; *Johannesburg Radio*, July 18, 1982.) □

eigners by the South African government and barred from re-entering South Africa.

Charles Ngakula, acting president of the Media Workers' Association of South Africa, and Malusi Mpumlwana, a former activist who is now studying for the priesthood, were declared "prohibited immigrants" in July and ordered to obtain visas to enter South African territory. There is little hope that the two men, who were banned until earlier this year, will be granted visas. They are thus effectively banished to Zwelitsha black township near Kingwilliamstown, because in order to reach other parts of Ciskei they would have to traverse South African territory.

Mpumlwana said he believes the move is calculated to force him to go overseas to complete his studies. (*New York Times*, July 18, 1982; *Johannesburg Star*, July 17, 1982; *Sowetan*, July 14, 1982.)

Ciskei security police have detained an official of the black General Workers' Union, David Thandani. (*Sowetan*, July 23, 1982.)

● The Rev. Frank Chikane, an Apostolic Faith Mission Church priest, was freed from security police detention in July after 230 days in jail.

On his detention last November, Chikane was suspended by church authorities for "political involvement" and stripped of his duties at his Krugersdorp church. (*Sowetan*, July 12, 1982.)

● The banned African National Congress, which has carried out sporadic sabotage attacks in South Africa, intends to "heighten the intensity" of those attacks and engage "the enemy face to face."

This was the message delivered by the ANC president, Oliver Tambo, during his recent tour of front-line African states, which reportedly urged the liberation organization to step up its armed struggle.

Tambo spoke of "more and more confrontation with the enemy," and warned whites to resist increased recruitment into the South African army because they then "become part of the enemy forces."

Armed struggle has so far been only one small part of the ANC's efforts. Its primary aim is seen as mobilizing and politicizing as broad a front as possible among all races.

The front-line states' appeal for further military action was reflected in criticism in July by the Zimbabwean government national newspaper. The *Herald* said the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress had failed to make "real efforts" to overthrow the government. It said most South Africans were "ripe for revolution" and needed guns. "What might not be ready," said the newspaper, "is the leadership of the liberation movements, who seem to be spending most of their time galloping from one capital to another." (*Johannesburg Star*, July 17, 1982; *Kenya Sunday Nation*, June 27 and July 11, 1982; *Zimbabwe Herald*, June 21, 1982.)

● There may soon be co-operation between the U.S. and South Africa in developing new markets for the export of maize (corn).

Last year, South Africa was the world's sixth largest maize exporter, behind the U.S., Canada, the EEC, Argentina and Australia.

Most of the 4.9 million tons of South African maize was sold to Japan but a substantial part went to several African countries. This year, however, South Africa's crop is way down from last year's record harvest, 8.4 million tons compared to 14.6.

The idea behind U.S.-South Africa co-operation would be to develop more export markets and to prevent "disruptive competition" among an informal club which would include France and Argentina as the other members. Talks were held in July between Bill Mullins, American Corn Growers' Association president, who was the guest of the National Maize Producers' Organization, and the organization's head, Dr. Piet Gouws.

Mullins said that "better export realization would immensely help" American farmers and could lead to "more orderly grain-export efforts." (*Financial Times*, July 22, 1982; *Johannesburg Star*, July 17, 1982; *Christian Science Monitor*, July 12, 1982.)

Zimbabwe

● Prime Minister Robert Mugabe met with Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in early August in an attempt to formulate a joint initiative to counter the increasing wave of violence plaguing Zimbabwe. The meeting between the two men was the first since Nkomo was sacked from his position in the government as Minister without portfolio in February. After holding discussions with Mugabe, Nkomo said, "I am glad the meeting took place. It was a good sign for the future." He added that a meeting of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and ZAPU central committees would be held.

The discussions between the two former allies was seen as an indication that it was unlikely that Nkomo would be arrested in the near future, as some hardliners in the government and in ZANU have been urging. Nkomo's ZAPU had been blamed as responsible for the increasingly serious security situation in the country, as the so-called "dissidents" carrying out robbing, looting and murder in the rural areas are alleged to be deserters from the in-

tegrated national army and former guerrillas of Nkomo's Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). Their activities and the measures taken against Nkomo and other ZAPU officials earlier in the year have heightened the split between ZANU, whose base of support lies with the Shona people, and ZAPU, mainly composed of Ndebele people.

Blame for the late June abortive armed attack on the Harare homes of Mugabe and Minister of Supplies Enos Nkala was ascribed by the government to ZAPU. "ZAPU was responsible; therefore the inference can be drawn that Nkomo was responsible," Mugabe said.

Less clear to observers was who was behind other acts of violence in late July, including the murders of three British tourists in the Inyanga area, and the sabotage attack on the Thornhill air base in which at least five aircraft were destroyed. There was speculation that because of the sophistication of the weapons used in the attack on the air base, it was the work of disgruntled whites, or possibly South African-inspired. The bodies of the tourists were found in an area that had not been affected by dissident activity, most of which had been concentrated earlier on in Matabeleland, Nkomo's stronghold.

In late July, two American, two British and two Australian tourists were kidnapped on the road from Victoria Falls to Bulawayo, and a ransom note demanding the release of the jailed former ZIPRA commanders was signed "ZIPRA forces." And in early August, gunmen believed to be dissident former guerrillas and Nkomo supporters attacked a military base at Mrewa, 40 miles from Harare, killing an officer and stealing weapons.

Meanwhile, Mugabe has ruled out the possibility of forming a one-party state during his current term of office, calming fears that the system would be imposed in the near future to effectively eliminate ZAPU. Mugabe said ZANU would contest the 1985 elections on a one-party platform (see also page 4). (*Financial Times*, August 10, 1982; *London Times*, August 4 and 10, 1982; *London Guardian*, July 30 and August 5, 1982.)

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An African Triangle

BY ALEXANDRE MBOUKOU

After more than a decade of ideological and even military confrontation, the leaders of Angola, Congo, and Zaire have in recent years apparently decided that only when there is peaceful coexistence at the regional level can they hope to achieve social and economic development. The major determinants of this development in equatorial Africa have been the leading role played by Congolese presidents, particularly the late Marien Ngouabi, who strongly believed that a good-neighbor policy was the most viable instrument for fighting regional poverty and foreign exploitation; the conciliatory moods of Zairian President Sese Seko Mubutu, dictated by a sense of African nationalism and a quest for leadership in equatorial Africa; and the willingness of Angolan President Agostinho Neto and his successor, José Eduardo dos Santos, to participate in reconciliatory talks.

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American oil companies doing business in Angola lobbied Congress to oppose repeal of the Clark Amendment

Photo: J.P. Laffont/United Nations

The process has not been easy. The painstaking efforts that finally led to this development in 1978 had to overcome competing ideological, national, and foreign interests. These contradictions were responsible for the ups and downs in Congo-Zaire relations and Zaire-Angola relations.

Although the three states have now succeeded in setting in motion a good-neighbor policy, there remains an obvious question to be answered: "How long will this last?" This question is all the more pertinent because suspicion persists, particularly between Angola and Zaire. Left-wing Portuguese newspapers have reported detailed allega-

tions of Zaire's new involvement with Angolan dissident groups. The Mobutu government may consider that the Luanda regime has too many problems to be able to survive. It would also appear that the Angolans seem to have forgotten Robert Frost's advice that good walls make good neighbors.

There is no doubt that these suspicions are being fueled by the lingering impact of ideological differences and competing foreign interests. The history of the relations between the three countries has clearly demonstrated that breaking agreements has been much easier than keeping them. Together with its vast mineral wealth, the strategic importance of central equatorial Africa represents a major incentive for foreign-power rivalry. First, there is East-West hostility; second is the much less publicized rivalry within the Western camp.

To get a true picture of the significance of the Soviet Union's unconditional support for the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and its government through the proxy efforts of Cuba, one has to look beyond the geopolitical considerations.

The defeat of Patrice Lumumba and

his forces in Zaire (then Congo-Kinshasa) in the early 1960s dealt a deathblow to the attempts by the Soviets at establishing a strong foothold in central equatorial Africa. In those days, the Soviet Union did not have a friend in the region. But by the 1970s, the geopolitical scene had changed. Congo (Brazzaville) was a declared ally of the socialist bloc, providing the Soviets with logistical support for their assistance to the MPLA forces and government in taking political control of Angola.

On the other hand, American support for the two major factional groups opposed to the MPLA, namely the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FLNA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), must be viewed as an attempt to repeat the victory that the Kennedy administration had scored against Soviet adventurism in Zaire in the early 1960s. Although the Ford administration failed in similar efforts in the early 1970s and the Carter administration accepted the status quo in Angola in the mid-1970s, the Reagan administration has attempted to rekindle these same efforts on a larger scale. It has sought repeal of the Clark Amendment, channeled financial and military assistance to UNITA, and encouraged the formation of opposition groups, such as the Military Committee for Angolan Resistance (COMIRA), to replace the defunct FLNA.

A great controversy has surrounded the Clark Amendment, which bars U.S. military involvement in Angola. The Reagan Administration argues that the amendment improperly ties the president's hands in formulating and conducting foreign policy. It blames the measure for the failure of the Ford and Carter administrations to dislodge the Soviets and Cubans from Angola. Although the Reagan administration has failed to get Congress to repeal the amendment, it is seriously thinking of extending recognition to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA to force a political showdown in Angola, by creating a military stalemate. In January 1982 in Rabat, Morocco, Savimbi said, "Material help is not dependent on nor limited by the Clark Amendment. A great country like the United States has

other channels." These and like comments tend to lend credibility to allegations of U.S. subversion made by the Angola News Agency (ANGOP). In March 1982 ANGOP reported that COMIRA was formed in close collaboration between the Reagan administration and Savimbi's UNITA as a replacement for the FLNA and was readying 2,000 men in northern Angola.

Aside from the East-West rivalry there are also contradictions within the Western camp. Relations between Congo and Zaire, in particular, have sometimes suffered from the competition between American and French interests. In the 1961-63 period, Congo supported the Katanga secessionist movement to safeguard French mining interests. The Kennedy administration was vehemently opposed to this secessionist effort, being in full support of the central government in Kinshasa. In 1968 the American government encouraged Zaire to create a new political and economic organization, the Union of Central African States (UEAC), thereby seeking to curtail the strong French influence in the region. This organization had as one of its primary aims the dismantling of the Union Economique et Douaniere de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC), a customs and economic union left by the French, and binding together the former French colonies of Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, and Gabon. President Mobutu's efforts were short-lived partly because of the strong French pressures upon the Central African Republic and Chad, the only two countries that had agreed to join UEAC.

There are threats to the efforts of Angola, Congo, and Zaire to maintain good relations. Because the MPLA authorities are so hard pressed by South African attacks, they may call upon the Soviet Union for more arms supplies and Cuba for more troops. Congo would probably provide logistical support for reasons of ideological and geopolitical solidarity. Also threatening is the reemergence of the politics of accusation and counter-accusation between Congo and Zaire.

Since a December 10, 1981 speech by President José Eduardo Dos Santos,

calling for direct talks with the Reagan administration to sort out problems between Angola and the United States and thus pave the way for the normalization of relations, a number of other factors have appeared. American corporate executives have intensified their campaign efforts to caution the Reagan administration on its African and Angolan policies. In the October-December period, American oil companies doing business in Angola, mainly Gulf Oil and Texaco, had lobbied Congress to oppose repeal of the Clark Amendment. Gulf Oil and Texaco received the strong backing of a number of internationally renowned corporations, such as Bechtel and the Chase Manhattan Bank. In fact, before David Rockefeller retired in April as chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, he sent a letter to the Reagan administration in which he expressed the apprehension of many U.S. corporate executives about key elements of U.S. policy on Angola. He also stated that leaders of left-wing regimes in Africa such as Angola, Guinea, and Zimbabwe have been disillusioned by the lack of economic support from the Soviet Union and the strings attached to any kind of Soviet aid and feel that they have much greater opportunities working with the West than with the Soviets. Despite the lack of diplomatic relations between the United States and Angola, visits by American representatives to Luanda, Angola's capital, have become routine, and Angolan government officials are regularly seen in New York corporate offices.

Second, faced with these strong pressures from the corporate world, the Reagan administration has started to use the Namibian settlement talks to engage in a dialogue with the MPLA government. Its objectives in this regard are twofold: first, to link the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the Angolan soil with the settlement of the Namibian issue although the Angolan government insists that the Cuban presence is necessary to counter incursions by South African troops into its territory; second, to bring together the MPLA and UNITA in order to reach a political settlement.

That the dialogue is bearing results was recently evidenced by the ex-

change of two Russian pilots held prisoner by UNITA for two unnamed Americans held captive by the MPLA government. In addition to this exchange, the Reagan administration sent representatives in March 1982 to a conference organized by the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and attended by an official Angolan delegation led by Dr. Jose Victor de Carvalho, governor of the Central Bank of Angola. These types of contacts led the Soviet Union early in January 1982 to warn an Angolan delegation in Moscow of an American plot to return the African nation to the American sphere of influence.

The Peoples' Republic of the Congo, whose leadership is becoming increasingly pragmatic, is determined to see that the good-neighbor policy the three countries have set in motion does not falter. As recently as February of this year, the Congolese government offered its capital, Brazzaville, to serve as a meeting place for Angolan and South African delegations. The Angolan delegation, which was led by the defense minister, asked the South African delegation to ease military tension in southwest Angola, where South African attacks on SWAPO's camps have been concentrated. On the other hand, the South African delegation, which included senior army generals, asked the MPLA to put pressure on SWAPO to maintain a low profile while the current diplomacy over Namibia continues.

Congo-Zaire relations have been marked by perennial flare-ups. Differences resulting from competing ideological, national, and foreign interests have, to a large degree, been the major determinants of this state of affairs. Idiosyncratic leadership and immaturity in diplomatic matters, as seen in the radio war of words, have been additional factors.

Relations between Congo and Zaire can be divided into five major periods, reflecting political vicissitudes and leadership changes within both countries. In the 1960-63 period, which epitomized the height of the Cold War, the Congolese government, under the leadership of President Abbe Fulbert Youlou, carried on a two-front fight against the government of Zaire. At the

United Nations, it mustered the support of the moderate Monrovia Group against the Lumumba government, which had the support of the radical Casablanca Group and the socialist countries. Congo was a bastion for the defense of Western ideas and interests against the "forces of communism" and Soviet adventurism in black Africa. Regarding Zaire, Youlou sought to preserve and promote French and Belgian mining interests by providing support to the Katangese secessionist movement under the leadership of Moise Tshombe against the central government in Kinshasa, Zaire.

The second period, 1963-65, coincided with a drastic ideological switch in both countries. The arrival of the Massamba-Debat government to power in Brazzaville (Congo), after the "Three Glorious Days Revolution" against the Youlou government in 1963, did not change the state of unfriendly relations between Congo and Zaire. The new government in Brazzaville turned Congo into a radical socialist state. In Kinshasa meanwhile, President Joseph Kasavubu recalled Moise Tshombe, the former Katangese secessionist leader, from exile to form a

government of national unity. As a result an atmosphere of open confrontation, including name calling over the radio airwaves, developed between the two countries. Authorities in Brazzaville, whose revolution was only one year old, were extremely concerned about the impact of Moise Tshombe. In Kinshasa, on the other hand, leaders were worried about the impact of Brazzaville's assistance to the Simba (Lumumbist) forces in Zaire. The Tshombe government, in an apparent effort to put more political and economic pressure upon leaders in Brazzaville, expelled Congolese residents in Kinshasa in August 1964.

The third period, 1965-68, was one of accommodation made possible by two major developments. First, there were the efforts of the authorities in Brazzaville to assist then Colonel Joseph Mobutu in consolidating his People's Revolution Movement (MPR) in the aftermath of his successful coup against the Kasavubu-Tshombe government in November 1965. Second, Mobutu launched a campaign reverberating with strong expressions of African nationalism, aimed at winning acceptance in Africa and consolidating



Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso (left) with Zairean President Mobutu: Relations between the two countries once suffered from competing French and American interests

Photo: Congo Info

his power. As a result of these two developments, an atmosphere of greater harmony emerged between Brazzaville and Kinshasa. It was reported that the Congolese government sent representatives of their Youth for the National Movement of the Revolution (JMNR) to Kinshasa to help give Mobutu's coup a truly revolutionary character.

The politics of accommodation was abruptly brought to an end by the Mulele affair in August 1968.

The next period, 1968-73, was characterized by bad faith in negotiations, accompanied by accusations and counteraccusations. In 1968 the Mobutu government executed Pierre Mulele, the former Simba rebellion leader in Kwilu province, after the authorities in Brazzaville had persuaded him to return to Kinshasa. The action violated the assurances of safe conduct for Mulele given to the Congolese government by the Zairean Foreign Minister, Justin Bomboko. The incident prompted embarrassed Congolese authorities to break ties with Zaire. In announcing the decision, President Marien Ngouabi stated that his government's dignity and honor had been deeply offended by the bad faith and treachery of the Kinshasa authorities. In March 1970, in the aftermath of the unsuccessful coup attempt by Lieutenant Kikanga in Brazzaville, the Congolese leaders accused the Zairean government of plotting their overthrow. In August 1971, the Zairean government accused the Congolese authorities of involvement in communist subversion in Zaire.

The final period, 1973 to the present, has seen attempts by Congo and Zaire to maintain good-neighbor policy. These attempts have been frustrated, however, by the Angolan factor and by various sporadic incidents. In April 1976, Zairean troops attacked a village on the island of Mbamou on the Congo River, capturing 47 Congolese fishermen. When the captured villagers were returned several days later, President Mobutu blamed the attack on undisciplined elements. Whatever significance the incident may have had was blown out of proportion by suspicions resulting from the two countries' respective support for two of the rival factions in Angola. While Zaire backed the FLNA, Congo supported the MPLA.



President dos Santos has called for direct talks with the Reagan administration to work out problems in Angola-U.S. relations

Following unsuccessful earlier attempts at reconciliation by their central African neighbors, Presidents Ngouabi and Mobutu agreed to normalize relations. The agreement called for the restoration of normal traffic across the river between Brazzaville and Kinshasa, the resumption of economic, trade, and cultural ties, and the exchange of ambassadors. These developments created a climate for the eventual normalization of relations between Zaire and Angola. The economic interdependence of the two capitals, which face one another across the Congo River, and the desire of people on both sides to maintain their traditional ties have contributed to the rapprochement.

Zairean authorities realize that despite its small size, Congo has a superior, better trained, more disciplined army. The embarrassing retreat of Zairean troops in their attempts to invade the Boko and Mindouli regions of Congo convinced the Zairean au-

thorities that peaceful coexistence and cooperation, rather than military confrontation, were in their best interests.

Zaire's dealings with Angola, like those with Congo, have had their ups and downs. The relationship has been marked by repeated attempts by one party (Zaire in particular) to outmaneuver the other. Although Congolese support for its ideological ally, the MPLA, was uneven until 1975, the Zairean government had from the onset identified its interests with the Bakongo element alone. Thus, it consistently supported the FLNA and the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC). The only exception was the 1964-65 period, when Prime Minister Moise Tshombe curtailed FLNA activities because of his close ties with the Portuguese in Angola and white settlers in Zaire.

While some crises in Zaire-Angola relations have been based on assessment of their respective broad national interests, others have been linked to ideological issues. Throughout the Angolan liberation struggle against Portuguese colonial rule, Zaire sought to further the leadership of Holden Roberto and the FLNA. This included even those periods when efforts were being made by Presidents Marien Ngouabi, Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), and Sese Seko Mobutu himself to reconcile the various factions of the Angolan liberation movement.

To be sure, Zaire had two major stakes in a FLNA victory. First, such a victory would guarantee Zaire assured access to the Benguela railroad, and, Zairean leaders hoped, preferential tariff treatment. Second, it would allow Zaire to play a "big brother" role, enhancing its hopes for leadership in central equatorial Africa. Although ethnic sentiments and ties (Bakongo solidarity) dictated Zaire's unconditional support for Holden Roberto and the FLNA during President Kasavubu's term in office, considerations much more political in nature influenced the decisions for continued support for the FLNA during Mobutu's presidency. In 1963 Zaire asked the MPLA to close its office in Kinshasa, following the formation and recognition by Zaire of the Republic Government of Angola in

Exile — National Front for the Liberation of Angola (GRAE-FLNA) under the leadership of Holden Roberto. Ironically, the decision benefitted the MPLA in two ways. By moving its headquarters to Brazzaville, the organization gained access to the Angolan district of Cabinda. Then, at the request of Congo, an OAU investigatory subcommittee found that the MPLA activities merited OAU funding. In 1973, Mobutu refused the MPLA authorization to cross Zaire from its bases in the Peoples' Republic of the Congo into northern Angola, claiming security reasons, while at the same time, he continued to play an active role in negotiations encouraging the MPLA-FLNA merger. There were even reports that Zairean troops engaged MPLA guerrilla troops. Finally, in 1974, Mobutu arranged for Holden Roberto to meet General Antonio da Spínola to negotiate the decolonization of Angola. This was in flagrant violation of the agreement reached between Mobutu and the presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi, with OAU endorsement, which prohibited separate negotiations with Lisbon until unity had first been achieved among the liberation movements. That same year, it became evident that President Mobutu had consistently given support to the FLEC. According to *Africa Contemporary Record* (1974-75), President Mobutu's Angolan policy was threefold: to achieve unity among the liberation movements in a manner that strengthened Holden Roberto's position, to ensure a dominant role for Zaire in an independent Angola, and to annex oil-rich Cabinda. The latter aspect of the policy caused serious conflicts between President Mobutu and his protégé, Holden Roberto.

These developments were ethnically and politically inspired. With the possible exception of the Shaba invasions, others that have taken place since 1976 have had an ideological basis. During this phase, competition increased among foreign powers seeking to maintain or carve out spheres of influence. To counter the growing Cuban presence and Soviet military arms shipments to Angola, estimated at \$106 million in 1976, the United States and China stepped up their military assist-

tance to the FLNA and UNITA through Zaire. Total U.S. military assistance was estimated at \$32 million in 1975, with most going to the FLNA. During this period there were reports that Zairean troops had joined FLNA forces fighting the MPLA government.

This ideological struggle reached a climax in 1977 when the MPLA leadership decided to provide support to General Nathaniel Mbumba and his National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FNLC) in their efforts to topple Mobutu's government. Zaire's unconditional support for the FLNA against the established government in Luanda had backfired. The two invasions of Zaire's Shaba province by the Angola-based FNLC in 1977 and 1978 were counterstrategies by Luanda to ease the military and security pressures represented by the FLNA and UNITA.

Persistent conciliation by the Congolese, Zambian, and Tanzanian presidents paved the way for the normalization of relations between Angola and Zaire in July 1978.

Since the 1978 Brazzaville agreement, relations between Zaire and Angola have been based upon a good-neighbor policy. President Neto paid an official visit to Kinshasa in August 1978. President Mobutu reciprocated the gesture in October 1978 with his visit to Luanda. The talks between the two presidents resulted in the creation of a permanent commission charged

with the implementation of agreements on military security. In October 1979, Mobutu belatedly enforced his promise to expel Holden Roberto, the FLNA, and FLEC forces from Zairean soil. This was in line with an agreement prohibiting the provision of political and military assistance to their respective political opponents and the recruitment of refugees for political and military purposes. President Dos Santos reciprocated the gesture in November 1979 with the expulsion of General Nathaniel Mbumba and his FNLC forces from Angola. On December 24, 1979, Zaire and Angola signed a monetary agreement to promote bilateral trade, reinforcing earlier accords on fisheries, trade, transport, and fishing. Although the reopening of the Benguela railroad was to be an integral part of these arrangements, Zaire has been unable to make full use of it. This is not because of any political machinations on the part of the Angolan government but because of constant attacks on the railroad by UNITA forces.

A shared expression of commitment to Marxism-Leninism, and efforts by one partner to maximize its own national interests, provide the framework of Congolese-Angolan relations. From 1958 to 1963, when the conservative President Youlou was in power, Congolese loyalties went to Holden Roberto, mainly because of ethnic (Bakongo) solidarity. Since that time



The late Angolan President Neto (left) with Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso: "Congo's leadership becoming increasingly pragmatic"

Photo: Congo Info

Congo has consistently supported the MPLA on grounds of ideological solidarity. This expression of open support first became evident in late 1963 when Congolese authorities allowed the MPLA leaders to move their headquarters from Kinshasa to Brazzaville after Zaire's recognition of Holden Roberto's GRAE-FLNA. A year later, this support was evident in Congo's successful request for an OAU investigation to determine whether the MPLA deserved OAU funding. In 1966, the Congolese government allowed the Cuban military forces then on its soil to train MPLA guerrillas.

But whether under Massamba-Debat's or Ngouabi's regimes, the leading cause of upward and downward swings in Congo-Angola relations has been the Cabinda issue. The Angolan enclave borders Congo and Zaire. Its elite have been trained in Brazzaville and Kinshasa. It has ethnic ties with both Zaire and Congo (the Vili population in Congo and Cabinda and the Bayumbe population in Zaire and Cabinda). It possesses considerable oil wealth; consequently, Cabinda has attracted the annexationist eyes of both Congo and Zaire, further worsening relations between Congo and the MPLA, and between Zaire and the FLNA. This is the contextual framework within which the political maneuvers of the Congolese leaders can be best understood.

At the same time that the authorities in Brazzaville were giving help to the MPLA, they also allowed the Cabinda separatists to organize on their territory. They sometimes slowed arm shipments to the MPLA to give the FLEC forces time to recoup. This explains why until 1975 Dr. Augusto Tchioufou, leader of one separatist faction of FLEC staunchly supported by the Zairean government, continued at the same time to receive help from Brazzaville. It has been alleged that the MPLA was implicated in the unsuccessful ultraleftist push against the government of President Marien Ngouabi in 1972.

In April 1975 Congolese Prime Minister Henri Lopes said, "Cabinda exists as a reality and is historically and geographically different from Angola." He subsequently proposed a re-

ferendum. Later in the year, however, President Ngouabi decisively swung his support behind the MPLA's role in Cabinda, stating that Congo would intervene to aid the MPLA in Cabinda if mercenaries entered the enclave. Since then relations between the Congo and the MPLA have been consistently good. The transshipment of Soviet arms and Cuban troops to Angola to support the MPLA was effected from Pointe-Noire. In October 1976 President Ngouabi paid a visit to Luanda to discuss bilateral relations and a friendship treaty. His successor, President Yhombi-Opango, joined President Neto in Cabinda, where both signed a cooperative agreement in September 1978. Thus, Congo was guaranteed an ideological ally and a geopolitical "comrade" who might be called upon for assistance in case of a threat of invasion from Zaire.

Several conclusions can be drawn regarding the triangular relationships between Angola, Congo, and Zaire. The fate of a good-neighbor policy between these three countries remains closely contingent upon the big powers. The recent exchange of Russian and American prisoners between UNITA and the MPLA was the result of strong pressures by Moscow and Washington on their respective protégés, José Eduardo Dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi. The outcome of the Namibian settlement talks will have an impact on relations between the three states. Success might well result in the eventual withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and lead to a rapprochement between Luanda and the West. It is already alleged that Angolan leaders are dissatisfied with the Soviets and Cubans. Any attempt by Zaire to destabilize the Angolan government could inhibit Angola's opening to the West. The failure of the Namibian negotiators would have an adverse impact upon the attempts by the three countries to maintain a good-neighbor policy. Although the Angolan authorities may be dissatisfied with the Soviets and Cubans, they would then have no choice but to continue to rely on them, particularly if the United States continues to assist and encourage UNITA and South Africa in their attacks upon the MPLA government.

Zaire could then be expected to provide logistical support to COMIRA and UNITA forces, whereas Congo will continue to back the MPLA government.

A change of administration in Washington in 1984 would bring more hope to the good-neighbor policy. A less conservative administration would be more likely to listen to the views of what a recent article in the *New York Times* called "a critical coterie on foreign policy." According to the article, there is a new generation of leaders in Washington, many of whom served in the Peace Corps and who are articulating their views on foreign policy issues. Most of these new lawmakers are liberal Democrats who are opposed to the foreign policy of the Reagan administration and strongly favor what they regard as President Carter's positive start. In April 1982 one of these lawmakers, Senator Paul Tsongas (D-Mass.), was quoted as saying, "You can't live in a village for two years and think that the people see themselves in an East-West context. It never came up. So when Ronald Reagan tells me that the Ethiopians are Marxists, it's like me telling Ted Williams the fine points of batting."

Beyond the impact of domestic political vicissitudes in the three countries and leadership changes in the United States and the Soviet Union, the frail fate of the good-neighbor policy set in motion by Angola, Congo, and Zaire will also depend on the strength of the "African spirit of togetherness." This is not just a question of the three concerned countries alone. It also involves the other states in central equatorial Africa and even beyond. In the Congo-Zaire context, the reconciliatory efforts of the presidents of Cameroon, Central African Republic, and Gabon were crucial. In the Angola-Zaire context, on the other hand, there were the efforts of the presidents of Tanzania (Julius Nyerere), Zambia (Kenneth Kaunda), and Congo (Marien Ngouabi) to help bring peace in equatorial Africa. To what extent this "African spirit of togetherness" will prevail may depend upon the continued awareness among African leaders of the famous dictum: "When the elephants fight, the grass gets trampled upon." □

The Disinvestment Debate

BY DAVID WILLERS

The question of whether U.S. corporations have increased their investment in South Africa in recent years is easily answered — it is yes. But although the figures (see Table 1) show a steady increase in investment of a relatively modest nature until 1980 (when President Reagan came to office), we do not yet know whether the same level of increase of new investment has been sustained or has even accelerated — 1981 figures will only be made available in August of this year. The table also shows that there has been a real increase in reinvestment over the period 1975 to 1980 and suggests that notwithstanding the erratic regional and domestic political fortunes of the country, that American businessmen appear to have been guided in the main by more parochial considerations of market opportunity and that their investments over the years have been proportionate to this market. Of course the twin spurs of the South African boom

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during the 1980/81/82 economic cycle and the advent of an American administration less likely than its predecessor to discourage American trade with South Africa, may have excited some additional interest among U.S. investors, but until the next batch of figures emerges it is difficult to be categorical about this.

Meanwhile the attraction of South Africa as an investor haven has been somewhat tarnished by what many American companies refer to as "the hassle factor" — the criticism they face at home for investing in this country in the first place, coupled with labor and other difficulties they sometimes experience in South Africa itself as a result of apartheid.

The real question should thus be not whether the Reagan administration "tilt" to South Africa is seen by U.S. corporations as an *opportunity* for increasing investment in South Africa but rather to what extent the Reagan administration's approach succeeds in ameliorating the causes of such pressure and encourages a sympathetic business climate as a whole; and also to what extent it is supportive of the consensus among the majority of U.S. companies of the need to develop a common strategy to use current links in South Africa to encourage racial change. In general it would be fair to

infer that to the extent that American companies are relieved of the "hassle factor" and remain convinced of the medium-term viability of their investments and rightness and effectiveness of their corporate social policies in South Africa, that there is no reason why U.S. investments will not remain.

The issue before the American companies is the same as that which affects Western exposure in South Africa as a whole, which has to do with the consequences of the West's new Africa strategy. Politically, the effect of this "rapprochement" has been to force the West in a sense to start taking sides — to choose between white and black Africa. They have been reluctant to do so, preferring to treat South Africa with the same broad policy brush being wielded towards other African countries. The strategy is triadic in nature: development aid coupled with powerful diplomatic initiatives to resolve regional conflict situations. Finally, a continuing emphasis on human rights. The latter is naturally of concern not only because of altruistic considerations but because of the implicit danger that human rights violations can trigger off regional instability. Uganda and the then Central African Empire are cases in point.

For these reasons, the West is also anxious that South Africa moderate its

TABLE 1
U.S. Investments and Equity and Intercompany Account Outflows, 1975-80
 (in millions of dollars)

	U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION ABROAD AT YEAR'S END					1980
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	
South Africa	1,582	1,668	1,792	1,968	1,906	2,321
	NET CAPITAL OUTFLOWS					1980
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	
	69	71	96	89	241	430

Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

internal policies, which are widely viewed as a violation of human rights. Not only is there a fear that regional instability resulting from the continued application of apartheid might endanger access to vital raw materials (and that the Soviets will exploit the situation), but that continued association with South Africa will jeopardize Western standing in the Third World generally. The problem has been one of forging a policy towards the country that will encourage change within a stable environment, while simultaneously preserving Western interests and avoiding African charges that they are supporting apartheid. There is no question of disengagement; but rather a question of how best to exploit and abet moves within the country towards reform.

Within the Western alliance there have in the past been tactical differences of approach stemming from different perceptions of African issues — the Americans tend to take a more globalist view of things, looking at regional problems through an East-West prism, while the Europeans are more regionalist, less linkage orientated, and more concerned with the North-South debate. President Reagan still takes a hard line on the Soviets, but assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker, has introduced greater sophistication, stressing the dangers of internationalizing disputes, subtly blending the American global approach with the European regional one. Crocker is more explicit than his predecessors in dealing with the South African government: "How can we turn our backs at a time when a serious and

honest effort is being made to move away from apartheid? We believe that effort is being made and intend to back it insofar as it is being made. So constructive engagement is conditional obviously on that movement." The Reagan "tilt" towards South Africa is in point of fact only the same policy carried out for many years now by most European countries who have favored a policy of dialogue with Pretoria, and the U.S. has remained reluctant to "choose sides" on the grounds that Western corporate exposure in South Africa does more good than harm. Rather than disengage, the emphasis was placed on working through Western companies to create islands of non-racialism in the divided society and improve black lifestyles. Hence the appearance of the different codes of conduct, e.g., the Sullivan principles and the European Economic Community (EEC) code, which while setting industrial standards do not however specify that these should be accompanied by political change.

Increasingly, American corporations have found that the codes of conduct do not in themselves deflect criticism of their presence in South Africa. Rather the debate hinges now not so much on how these American companies treat their employees, but whether the very presence of American companies and American investment strengthens the South African government's capacity to sustain apartheid. These arguments are well known, as are criticisms of the Sullivan principles, that they are merely a smokescreen that conceals American participation in South Africa's military-industrial complex, that

American companies continue to exploit apartheid to hold down the wages of their employees, and that as former U.S. ambassador to South Africa, William Bowdler, found, there was a growing opposition among important elements in the black community to continued United States trade and investment in South Africa. American companies themselves are sensitive to such criticism, which is one reason why they are looking beyond the codes at other measures to improve the quality of life for blacks.

The choices they face are fairly clear: either they believe that *disinvestment* will hasten an end to apartheid by making the government less capable of implementing it, or conversely that *continued investment* will have the effect of accelerating the entry of skilled blacks into a growing economy stimulated by foreign injections of capital and that, as a consequence of such interracial attrition, apartheid will wither on the bough.

On the whole it is the latter position that seems to have been adopted by most Western companies; but one might argue that, to the extent that they have done so, they have merely resonated to the changed policy of the West generally on South Africa, which in the context of its Third World posture has sought not to choose sides, but rather to reinforce some of the assumptions and structural themes upon which change is predicated in the Republic itself.

Equally, if these assumptions are not valid and change does not occur — something which the West and Western corporations have put their money and their international reputations on — then it would be logical to infer that the positions might be reversed.

So what are these assumptions and themes running through South African political life that have encouraged the West to take the risks of association with the "pariah" that they have?

Again the scenario is by now well known. It assumes there will be no change in South Africa without Afrikaner acquiescence. It further assumes that Afrikaner attitudes have evolved during the past 60 years from a position of anti-capitalism to one of pro-capitalism, and that the middle-class families that the National party of

South Africa represents today are more likely to be persuaded by economic arguments than narrower Afrikaner tribal interests — “An Afrikaner second and a South African first” seems to be the mood of a growing number of National party supporters who realize that they cannot sit back and enjoy the fruits of absolute control forever and that Afrikaner domination will have to be ended through negotiation if the whole country is not to go up in flames.

This sociological shift has manifested itself in an apparent alliance with the English-speaking middle class. It also takes cognizance of other changed circumstances, namely a perception that in the period 1976 to 1978 fundamental change on the South African regional scene necessitated a more classical approach to what appeared to be an incipient revolutionary situation. Not only had South Africa's *cordon sanitaire*, the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, gone but developments pointed to a tidal wave of African nationalist sentiment threatening to engulf and topple the status quo in the Republic itself unless something was done.

With the unexpected election of P.W. Botha in a sort of knight's move on the political chessboard as a result of the Department of Information corruption scandal, it became apparent that the new prime minister was more attuned to what his generals thought: someone more inclined perhaps to depart from the ruinous apartheid orthodoxies of his predecessors and to reach for social counterrevolutionary prescriptions of a more durable universal nature instead. These were principally constitutional — the establishment of the President's Council was interpreted by many as an attempt to win greater acceptance for a new South African constitution — economic, and social. The Wiehahn and Riekert commissions were seen by most observers as an attempt at encouraging greater labor mobility both in the vertical and the horizontal sense as necessary prerequisites to involving more blacks in the South African economy. Others in turn saw the legitimization of black trade unions and the partial scrapping of job reservation as creating a climate congenial to the implementation of the Sulli-

van and EEC codes of conduct — essential if foreign companies were to remain. Labor mobility also meant ameliorating a few fundamental tenets of apartheid — restrictions such as the influx control laws, the Group Areas Act, and other measures curbing the mobility of blacks would have to be lifted. This was a tampering with the very guts of apartheid policy, and it has largely been the tensions triggered off by these seminal insights that led to the schism in the National party earlier this year. The reasoning on the right is quite simple: economic integration will lead to political integration, and as the

than \$1 billion a year, much of it in foreign investment.

A social problem recognized by the government in broader terms has been that of black grievances, the argument being that unless these are ameliorated, foci of anger will result. And here as well the response of Western governments and Western corporations has been to invest and participate directly in projects that improve the black quality of life. This is rapidly becoming a tandem issue with the implementation of the Sullivan principles, and is seen as having deeper structural effects on apartheid policy inasmuch as one can



Many Western corporations are supporting educational projects like the Pace School in Soweto

blacks develop a middle class they will in time form an alliance with the white middle classes, the price of which will be unfettered access to the reward system, power-sharing, and the abandonment of white privilege. U.S. corporations and Western governments in the main understand this too. Equally, they know that for the economy to continue to “bend” the ideology it must maintain a healthy growth rate, and growth depends on a net capital inflow of more

increasingly expect corporations and banks to link such loan offers to social issues and make them conditional upon changes, e.g., freehold title. This will go some way to meeting the criticism that the Sullivan principles merely create islands of normality in a sea of abnormality. Further, many of these corporations have begun to develop educational projects such as the Pace School in Soweto, which are major investments in themselves.




Photo: Michael Evans/The White House

The Reagan administration "is less likely than its predecessor to discourage American trade with South Africa"

But having said that, the West, particularly the United States, now finds itself in something of a dilemma: for while the rhetoric of "constructive engagement" may have encouraged the government to press ahead with limited reforms more rapidly than it might otherwise have done, something difficult to quantify in any event, the time has come for the West to go beyond verbiage and offer some tangible concessions as a reward for cooperation over Namibia and as an enticement for continuing reform at home. This is not to say that some minor concessions have not already been made. A degree of relaxation in several fields of common interest between the two countries is already a reality, but there are still trade, finance, foreign policy, nuclear and military, and investment restrictions, and such concessions as the U.S. does make in these fields are inevitably going to suggest identification with South Africa and alienate pressure groups in Congress. The choices are difficult but indications are that the Reagan administration will press ahead regardless and lift some controls on South Africa imposed by the Johnson,

Nixon, and Carter administrations. Conversely, of course, there is little enthusiasm in Republican ranks for additional trade restraints on South Africa, as suggested from time to time, on the grounds that strict U.S. export controls are unenforceable and ineffective inasmuch as it is an open question whether South Africa, dependent upon the United States for only 16.5 percent of a broad range of imports, will change her policies in response to sanctions (indeed there is a school of thought that maintains sanctions will only exacerbate racial oppression), and such trade restraints could be damaging to those very U.S. corporations who have so courageously taken the lead in removing racial barriers. Trade restrictions remain a rather blunt policy instrument that has other implications as well for the United States, namely conflicts with other national goals, potential retaliation by South Africa, the effect on foreign policy flexibility, and the effects on the U.S. economy. U.S. exports to South Africa currently support some 55,000 American jobs and lifting trade restrictions could mean a surge of new investment interests and more jobs still, not only in the United States but also in South Africa where black unemployment is anathema to liberal reform. By and large, however, Reagan's critics will probably take the view that lifting current restrictions can only mean that the administration feels that significant progress towards the elimination of apartheid has been made.

But is this the case? Again the West finds itself uncomfortably sandwiched between the black left which argues that current Western investment in South Africa is in fact only entrenching apartheid and enabling the whites to retain their hands on the levers of power well into the twenty-first century, and that the only sacrifice they will have to make is to share this power with co-opted Coloured, Indian, and urban black elite classes. For millions of Africans in the "homelands," however, political rights will remain elusive and the black population will in fact have been divided on the basis of class.

The white right again feels that the government's alliance with Western capital is a conspiracy designed to undermine the position of the whites and

especially the Afrikaners. The Herstigste Nasionale party and the Conservative party have resolutely set their faces against any form of power sharing, no matter how limited.

And on top of the pyramid somewhere sit perched Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, apostles of constructive engagement *inter alia* through corporate proxies, as a more effective means of influencing change in South Africa than outright condemnation. It is they, increasingly under fire for their accommodation with Pretoria, who are now looking to South Africa to produce the sort of change that will vindicate constructive engagement. Some believe Namibia is the litmus test of the success or failure of Reagan's Africa policy. Others believe that Namibia cannot be seen in isolation of the attempts at reform within the Republic itself, because of the consequences of a settlement that could lead to a right-wing backlash, and a *verligte* setback. This is why the recent President's Council recommendations for a new constitution are so important.

But do the President's Council recommendations indicate genuine reform? Are they the "thin end of the wedge" or a significant way station on the road to a fair political dispensation? Or will they increase racial polarization instead, as Dr. David Welsh of the University of Cape Town believes, pitting a sort of chocolate-colored oligarchy against the black majority? Certainly the overwhelming criticism of the recommendations is that they exclude blacks from the central government, but on the other hand they do point to fairly far-reaching changes in the South African polity that may satisfy some of the Rockefeller Foundation's recommendations in its mammoth report on South Africa that there are specific actions the South African government can take, both positive and negative, that the U.S. government might link to appropriate inducements and pressures. The positive actions include acceptance of the principle of negotiation as a basis for resolving the question of political rights, creating a forum for negotiations on power sharing and the implementation of decentralized measures including communal institutions (Coloured

and Asian) with genuine powers, etc. The Rockefeller recommendations do not stipulate the ideal but say such action could be done within the compass of a confederacy or a consociation or one person/one vote in a unitary state. The point about this is that the President's Council recommendations may go some way toward creating conditions that the U.S. government would regard as "positive" rather than negative, triggering off a concomitantly positive response in line with the tenets of constructive engagement. That being the case, United States-South Africa relations would become incrementally warmer, and on the face of it U.S. business interest should pick up, albeit cautiously given the oft-expressed view that reform and instability go hand in hand as a result of rising expectations. As things stand though the recommendations seem to be predicated on some primary assumptions of total strategy with implications for stability.

These assumptions are primarily that a "total onslaught" is being waged against the legitimate authority of South Africa and that a "total strategy" is required to meet this threat. This requires the mobilization and harnessing of South Africa's human, technological, spiritual, and economic resources. Much of the recent restructuring in the civil service has been geared towards evolving bureaucratic mechanisms for the efficient coordination of these "power bases."

Total strategy is in fact a misnomer. The correct term is total national strategy, of which total strategy comprises the mainly military response to the threat, while national strategy refers to the social engineering required to construct a society inimical to revolution along the lines of the classic "hearts and minds" approach. Military planners believe that war cannot be won by military means alone, and that 80 percent of the effort should be of a nonmilitary nature — geared towards making social changes.

The objective from a regional perspective is to cobble the states of southern Africa together into a "constellation of states" revolving around the hub of South Africa. This logically can best be achieved through military and economic alliances forged between

the states in the region that share common assumptions about the nature of the "total onslaught."

It becomes apparent, when studying the recommendations of the President's Council, that the four provinces replaced by eight provincial regions suggest a large measure of self-governing autonomy, with the participation of inhabitants of all races, including blacks who will have a (small) voice through the Metropolitan Councils.

These regional "governments" become the instruments through which identified social grievances, which could become a "military-type" threat, are rectified. More, the boundaries of these proposed regions are approximately equal to the boundaries of the government's economic development plan (EDP), a congruity which means that relations with the "homelands" — encompassed within the EDP — may devolve down to the regional provincial level and thus be the instrument for "putting together what apartheid has put asunder" in some sort of confederation.

Given these developments I would argue that, on balance, and despite the glaring shortcomings of the recommendations, they will be construed as providing a continuing mandate for constructive engagement by the U.S. government. A settlement in Namibia will undoubtedly accelerate this process and could lead to an easing of the arms embargo since this was primarily imposed as a response to South Africa's occupation of Namibia. This in turn would have an important bearing on business perceptions of the country's potential ability to contain the security situation.

Ultimately, however, the Nationalist government will still find itself confronted with the conundrum challenge of finding the right mix of reform and control, and constructive engagement or not. American executives will probably continue to be guided by their assessment of the risks of doing business with South Africa on the basis of their contacts and understanding of the situation not only in the Republic but elsewhere in Africa as well. □



American firms have found that codes of conduct do not deflect criticism of their presence in South Africa

Photo: W. Campbell/Sygma

Jose Cabaco,

Information Minister of Mozambique

INTERVIEWED BY ANTHONY J. HUGHES

AFRICA REPORT: What are your responsibilities as minister of information?

CABACO: My Ministry is responsible for the information policy of the government and for the good management of the institutions, mainly state enterprises, which are linked to the production of information. We also have contact with private enterprises in the field of information that are in touch with us for some of their needs. Under my Ministry directly, I have the National Directorate of Information that deals mainly with the media—the press and the national news agency. I have the National Film Directorate that is responsible for production and distribution. This same institution deals with our television project, a small undertaking that we started very recently. Publishing is another responsibility of the Ministry of Information. We have state, corporate, and private publishing houses in the country and we supervise the planning of their operations for each year to determine the material needs of the industry, according to the requirements of the publishers. We are also responsible for the import of books. Radio also comes under the Ministry. We have one radio corporation, which is state owned, and we have advertising and propaganda. Propaganda is directly under the structure of the Ministry. Advertising for state-owned companies and for one of the private-owned companies is handled by the National Directorate for Advertising and Propaganda. We have six departments that comprise a special project for social communication in both



President Machel of Mozambique hosted Portuguese President Eanes: "A foundation for building a new relationship"

rural and urban areas. This is an experimental project that we are developing with the support of UNICEF [the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund].

AFRICA REPORT: Tell me your perception and your viewpoint on the proposed New International Information Order (NIIO).

CABACO: We think that NIIO is a must for achieving freedom of information. The present information order causes us to suffer from the manipulation of information by a few large transnational institutions. They have their own editorial policy, and by means of their extraordinary capacity for processing and distributing information they have the

international flow of information. That is why we attach so much importance in Mozambique, for instance, to the program of social communication in the rural and urban areas. Although our experience is limited due to a lack of resources, we succeeded in involving the local population in the creation, organization, and diffusion of information inside the country, from community to community. We think this is a very important experience that in time will come to have international significance.

AFRICA REPORT: There are those who suggest that the thrust of the New International Information Order is in fact going to give governments tight control over the press. They



Photo: W. Campbell/Sigma

A bridge destroyed during the war in the former Rhodesia: Mozambique has suffered from attacks by Rhodesia and South Africa

ability to manipulate worldwide information according to their own point of view. Sometimes we find it difficult to get the views of the developing countries presented to the international public because the transnational news agencies always translate developments according to their own conceptions, views, and policies, which are not those of the Third World countries. We think that NIIO must start from inside our countries. We should first promote a national information policy within each of our countries, creating a democratized domestic information flow. We need to increase the participation of the people in the act of information and encourage a wide flow of information about our own realities, inside the country. As long as any country is not able to dynamize and control its own nation's information, it is very difficult to strive for participation in the in-

say, for example, that it would legitimize the kind of control that the South African government now has over its press.

CABACO: The control over the press in any country of the world represents the nature of the political power of that country. The international order of information is a reflection of the international economic and political order. The nature of the regime in South Africa, whatever the international framework of information, is always going to be a dictatorship and their information will be the information of a dictatorship, controlled by the government. We don't consider the conception of a New International Information Order can create a justification for a dictatorial use of information. A Mozambican journalist has more capacity than anyone else in the world to impart information about the country within its cultural, historical, and political back-



Photo: Michael St. John

Jose Cabaco: "We suffer from the manipulation of information by transnational institutions"

ground and within its general context. Journalists of my country or those who have lived there for many years are really the ones who can provide information in its true context. A foreign journalist who comes to my country and sees something will interpret it from his own cultural, historical, and economic background, and out of the context of our nation. He will give false information about my country. We want to re-establish the link between information and truth. That is the meaning of the New International Information Order.

AFRICA REPORT: Your country has intimate economic links with South Africa. What are you doing to lessen that interdependence?

CABACO: The question of economic links with South Africa is not a problem concerning my country alone. It concerns all states in the region. We inherited the situation of South Africa's hegemony over southern Africa in general. Most of these countries are extremely dependent on South Africa. That is why their response to the initiative of the late President Seretse Khama to promote regional coordination was so enthusiastic. That is why we created the Southern Africa Development and Coordination Council (SADCC). The first aim of SADCC, according to the agreement signed in Lusaka on April 1, 1980, is that the member-states should increase economic cooperation in order to free themselves from the influence of Pretoria's hegemony in the region. The main thing we have to do is establish regional cooperation to find alternatives to dependence on South Africa. We have emphasized the need to reduce every unnecessary link with South Africa. In every instance where we can buy from any country other than South Africa, we shall do so.

AFRICA REPORT: Would the SADCC countries be in a position to apply sanctions against South Africa?

CABACO: In the case of most countries that have economic relations with South Africa, Pretoria is more depen-

dent on them than they are dependent on South Africa. We are the only countries in the world whose relationship with South Africa is one of dependency. So, we should not be the first to be asked to apply sanctions. But whenever the countries that are responsible for the economic growth of South Africa are ready to apply sanctions to South Africa, all the countries in the region are ready to support and to implement such a decision.

AFRICA REPORT: Regarding your relations with the Soviet Union, your critics allege that not only do you have a socialist system internally, which is your own business, but that you are within the Soviet orbit. They give as an example that while most African and Third World countries condemned the Soviet role in Afghanistan, you supported that role. How do you generally reply to those who say that you are within the Soviet camp?

CABACO: First, regarding our position concerning Afghanistan, you will find we never supported an intervention. We always supported the right of the Afghanistan government to ask for any forces to help them. That is why we voted against any attempt to condemn the Kabul government for seeking help from the Soviet Union or from any other government. The second point is this: Why should we be considered a Soviet satellite for voting pro-Afghanistan? Shouldn't the others be considered American satellites for voting against the Soviet role in Afghanistan? That leads to a third point. Why should we be considered satellites because we have good relations with the Soviet Union, because we are building our armed forces by buying equipment from the Soviet Union, and because our forces are being trained by the Soviets? Why are not the rest of the African countries considered satellites of the Western powers? After all, their armies have been trained by the West; they have Western military equipment; some of them have foreign troops in their countries, which we don't. I will tell you one thing: Many Mozambicans died to achieve our independence. Many Mozambicans were killed in maintaining our independence when we were under attack from Rhodesia and from South Africa. No government in our country that attempted to compromise our independence and sovereignty would be able to survive. Our people would never accept a puppet government.

AFRICA REPORT: What is your relationship with the former metropolitan Portugal?


CABACO: Since our war of liberation against Lisbon, our relationship has had its ups and downs. Decolonization, if it is genuine, is extremely traumatic, both for the colonizer and for the colonized. The struggle understandably causes bad relations between the two parties. When the trauma of decolonization is so strong, the relationship becomes so sensitive that any remark by either party is liable to be immediately misunderstood by the other. One of the contentious issues between Mozambique and Portugal is so-called compensation. Portugal made economic and financial claims against us that we rejected. We won the war but we didn't claim compensation from Portugal for the damage caused to our country during 500 years of colonization. It was ridiculous for the losing party to claim compensation for losses suffered in the process of decolonization. The as-

sets that they left to Mozambique were more than compensated by the wealth those assets had generated for Portugal. We told the Portuguese to solve the problem of abandoned assets with Portuguese citizens. We never expelled Portuguese citizens from Mozambique; they decided to leave the country and they were free to do so. During 500 years of colonization, the wealth the Portuguese took from the country was far more than anything they left behind. The Portuguese eventually proposed that all claims should be "frozen." We accepted this. For us they are frozen forever. It consequently became possible to slowly improve the relationship. The visit of President Antonio Eanes was crucial because he came to Mozambique with the attitude that Portugal really was ready to bury the past—more than that, was able to accept the past as the foundation for building a new relationship. When he arrived in Mozambique, the first thing he did was to place a wreath on the monument of the heroes of the liberation struggle. We were touched by that and believed that we could start a meaningful relationship with Portugal. One must accept that there was a war and that a force was defeated. It was not the Portuguese but fascism and colonialism that were defeated. The freeing of our country was something that should cheer the democratic forces in Portugal. I think that this year some of the outstanding economic and social issues between us will be settled.

AFRICA REPORT: For the past three weeks you have been in the United States. Can you tell me your positive and negative reactions to what you have seen and heard?

CABACO: This has been an extremely useful visit. My two objectives were to learn and to inform. I think both objectives were completely realized during these three weeks.

I was able both to inform and to have frank discussions with many people concerning my country and to give the latest information to the many groups that I contacted. I had a very useful visit in terms of learning from the experience of the United States. I have come to appreciate the extreme complexity of U.S. society. There are so many people in this country who are really interested in learning and who are extremely receptive to information about what's happening in the world and in southern Africa in particular. It was very interesting to see the workings of American institutions. We were able to see part of the electoral process at work. I found the visit to Washington, D.C. extremely useful, with the appointments we had on Capitol Hill, learning the way the institutions operate. It was important to learn of the problems of the South of the United States, of the racial problems and of the forces that are still actively organizing around racist ideas. We had thought that this problem was practically solved in the United States. We greatly appreciated our experiences in Iowa, visiting the corn belt and the family farms. I was very impressed by the high productivity achieved with very little use of manpower. I was interested to see that in most cases the farm owner was the main active member of the farm team. We talked with the farmers and noted their great interest in the agricultural problems we are facing in Mozambique and how we are solving them. We noted the willingness of people to come to Mozambique, if necessary, to help us. The meetings with the media were also important. I can say in conclusion that results of this visit were positive. I hope it will make a small contribution to developing the relationship between the American and the Mozambican peoples, for the benefit of both countries. □



Maputo: "Jornal de Povo" provides international news as well as government reports

Photo: W. Campbell/Sygnia

The Kenana Controversy

BY GUY ARNOLD

Sudan's giant sugar estate at Kenana has often been in the news since its inception: it is part of Arab-African development politics; its costs have skyrocketed; and in any case sugar in Sudan is a political issue. Yet ultimately only two questions are of real importance. First, will the size of the investment provide a commensurate return to the Sudan economy, and will this be maintained in the years ahead, when Kenana is on its own rather than receiving special priority treatment? Second, is this the right kind of agricultural development for the country to pursue?

Kenana is situated between the White and Blue Niles south of Kosti in an area of rich soils, which agronomists confidently predict could become the center of a national agribusiness. The area undoubtedly has incredible potential: water, power, the right soil. The Kenana Sugar Company (KSC) started in 1976 with 36 acres of experimental land. Today about 87,000 acres have been brought under irrigation, and of these 78,000 produced sugar during the harvest season that ended this May. The land is divided into some 70 blocks of

approximately 1,000 acres, each with a small village attached, in which about 70 laborers who work on the block live with their families.

The total infrastructure for this huge estate is formidable: the canal system for irrigation consists of 19 miles of main canal, 170 miles of primary canals, four pumping stations, 100 control structures, and over 500 field offtake structures from the canals to feed the cane fields. The factory is one of the largest of its kind in the world. And this infrastructure is fed by a new system of roads, bridges, a new railway extension, and an airstrip. A township has grown up around the sugar mill, with its own schools, a clinic and dispensaries, shops, and housing. The size of the operation may be gauged from the fact that on the agricultural side there are 1,100 vehicles: 60 harvesters, 100 trucks and trailers, 350 wheeled tractors, 30 to 40 heavy-equipment vehicles such as caterpillars, 100 trucks, and 450 light vehicles. There are workshops to maintain these.

This huge operation in its turn depends upon the national infrastructure and other factors often beyond the control of the KSC, such as availability of hard currency or petroleum supplies. Kenana is situated 625 miles from Port Sudan and relies in part upon a creaking railway system. The roads to it are good, but national availability of petroleum products is sometimes problematical. Much of the operation depends upon machinery and spare parts

that have to be imported. Isolation makes it essential to maintain adequate supplies of spares including fuel supplies, although at present Kenana receives priority treatment. The company has to be self-sufficient, and so tries to keep enough spares in hand to cover an eight-month harvest season.

Delivery of inputs on time is a major administrative headache: for example, the sacks in which the sugar is exported from the site are at present made in Korea, and so enough of these — purchased with hard currency — have to be held to cover a lead time of five months. Approximately 30% of the sugar goes out by rail and the balance — 70% — by road. The road system north of Kenana to Kosti, where the oil refinery is to be built is good. At harvest time, Kenana requires 60,000 gallons of diesel fuel a day for harvesting, land preparation, planting, and irrigation. All this means that Kenana, quite simply, is big business.

The KSC employs about 12,700 people, although with additional contract personnel the figure may reach 15,000 at any one time. With their dependents they make up a community of 75,000. In addition, between 30,000 and 50,000 people are estimated to have moved into the area, attracted by its township and opportunities. Many of these provide casual labor, and some produce food for the market. Formerly the area supported only a nomad population.

Sugar is political in Sudan: an essen-

Guy Arnold, a British journalist specializing in African and Third World Affairs, wrote this article after a recent visit to the Sudan.

tial commodity whose price is crucial in social as well as economic terms. Key commodities subsidized in 1981 were gasoline, sugar, wheat, and flour, but by November of that year the state of the economy was so bad that President Gaafar al-Nimeiry was obliged to agree to a package of measures that included the ending of these subsidies as well as a 12.5% devaluation in return for International Monetary Fund (IMF) credits of \$220 million. One result was the riots in Khartoum at the end of the year, when more than 100 shops were burned down after a 62% increase in the price of sugar. The sooner Sudan can meet all its own sugar requirements so that it does not have to rely upon costly imports, which use up precious foreign exchange, the better. Thus, a great many hopes have been placed upon the performance of Kenana and its ability to fill a major gap in supplies for the country as a whole. As a result the scheme has been accorded priority as the most important of the big agricultural development projects.

The 1981-82 crop came to approximately 1.8 million tons of cane, producing about 170,000 tons of refined sugar. The target for 1982-83 is 230,000 tons of sugar and for 1983-84, 330,000 tons. The lowest grade of Kenana sugar is at present superior to the best sugar produced elsewhere in Sudan. This gives it an important competitive edge, one that will be vital if Kenana enters the export trade. There are four other sugar-producing areas in Sudan: between them they have a theoretical capacity to produce 370,000 tons a year — greater than Kenana's target for 1984 — yet last year, owing to lack of inputs, deteriorating maintenance, and other problems, they produced only 94,000 tons.

The Sudan needs 450,000 tons of sugar a year: if Kenana and the other four estates were at full capacity, Sudan would have a surplus for export to earn hard currency, which at present is required to purchase a part of its sugar needs. Such a turnaround — even if Kenana keeps to its scheduled output — is some years in the future. Yet the KSC could perhaps produce as much as 400,000 tons of sugar a year. This optimistic forecast depends upon increasing productivity. At present one

acre produces about 35 tons of cane, yielding sugar at the rate of 9.8%. However, it is thought that an acre could produce 50 tons of cane with a yield of 10.5% sugar: that would represent a 70% increase. Whether or not this is achieved depends upon experiments now in progress.

The sugar refinery itself is one of the largest of its kind, with a present capacity to process about 17,000 tons



The prestige of the Nimeiry regime is tied to the success of Kenana

of cane a day: this could be increased to 19,000 or 20,000 tons. The factory employs 1,500, of whom 500 are staff and technical personnel, 500 are operators, and 500 are laborers. Of these, 300 are expatriates, although the target is to reduce the number of expatriates to 50 over the next three years. One problem

is the loss of Sudanese skilled people, such as engineers, to the Gulf, attracted by the higher salaries available there. The factory is yielding at 97% sugar extraction, and its thermal efficiency is also very high, enabling it to produce excess power.

At maximum output, the factory thermal unit produces 40 to 45 megawatts. The factory itself requires 10 megawatts, the township 2 megawatts, and the irrigation operation 13 megawatts; thus, there may be up to 15 megawatts surplus for sale to the national grid. The power is derived from burning the bagasse (waste from the crushed cane) so that the number of megawatts produced depends upon the amount of sugarcane passing through the factory. When the amount is down to 8,000 tons a day, only enough power is produced to service the factory and township. If production is at the rate of 13,000 tons a day, there is also sufficient power to cover irrigation requirements. Otherwise, irrigation has to rely upon power from the grid, and this is sometimes inadequate. The 1982-83 crop season — roughly from October through May — ought to see an output of 16,000 tons of cane a day. At that rate there will be a surplus of power for the KSC to sell to the national grid.

The senior staff of Kenana numbers about 150, and at present most of these remain expatriates although there are 40 to 50 Sudanese in parallel roles preparing to take over some of the top jobs. In a country where the brain drain to the Gulf is a constant adverse factor, Kenana probably pays somewhat above the going rate though keeping more or less in line with civil service scales. It has the disadvantage of being remote, although there is considerable prestige attached to the operation and so it has not suffered too much from staff problems. A breakdown of the agricultural staff in 1982 is seen in Table 1.

The size of such an operation poses immense problems of logistics, staff, and maintenance. It is industrial agriculture of a kind totally different from the operation of small-scale farmers elsewhere in the country. Sudan is famous for its giant projects — Gezira, Rahad, now Kenana — but how much do they and can they solve some of the country's agricultural problems? The

establishment of such a scheme, momentous though it might be, is almost certainly easier than its ongoing maintenance at the required standard to justify the huge original inputs.

TABLE 1

	Local	Expatriate
Agriculture	5437	12
Agronomy	180	1
Harvesting	1,864	5
Workshops	449	25
Contractors		108
Totals	7,930	151

There is a tendency in Sudan, once a project has been started, to take it for granted. Earlier this year — through no fault of Kenana — there was no lubricating oil in the country. The huge harvesters therefore had to use lubricating oil removed from others that had broken down. That is no basis for sound maintenance. As long as Kenana is accorded priority for political reasons, it should be able to overcome its problems. But in recent years production at Gezira and Rahad has declined because they were neither obtaining the inputs they required nor receiving the maintenance necessary to ensure that such large-scale operations remain efficient. This could well be a problem for Kenana in the future. If it is no longer given the priority it now receives and cannot easily obtain the inputs it requires, how well will it be maintained? It could end up like other operations, producing at a rate half or less of its capacity.

Kenana could act as the catalyst for Sudan agribusiness development. It has the potential. And if it does begin to realize the "bread basket" dream, for the land can produce just about anything, then it could in turn generate renewed investment interest in Sudan's agricultural sector. The possibilities extend far beyond sugar. The area could sustain an animal-feed factory and beef lots as the basis for direct meat exports to the Gulf. Yeast and citric acid could be produced for a plant to bottle minerals. It is also possible to

produce fast-growing timber. Nor is there any limit to available land.

Infrastructure and foreign exchange inputs are Kenana's biggest headaches, and in Sudan (as elsewhere) few things turn out according to plan. Thus, Kenana holds lessons for the country's other major projects and must be seen as an operation quite separate from small-scale farming. Its importance at the present time can hardly be overrated: the way Kenana is used as a catalyst to expand and develop agriculture generally may in the long run be far more important — if handled correctly — than its contribution to sugar, relevant though that may be.

Thus, Kenana has enormous possibilities matched by equally large problems. In the first place, it is involved in Arab-African politics: the details of shareholding demonstrate the size of the Gulf in the venture. Shareholders are seen in Table 2.

TABLE 2

	%
Government of Sudan	31.74
Government of Kuwait	30.83
Government of Saudi Arabia	11.04
The Arab Investment Company	11.01
Sudan Development Corporation	5.11
Lonrho	0.73
Nissho-Iwai	0.25
Gulf Fisheries	0.25
Sudanese Banks	4.02
The Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development	5.02
Total	100.00

The governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia jointly control 41.87% of the shares while a further 16.03% of the shares are held by the Arab Investment Company and the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development; thus, well over half the equity is in the hands of non-Sudanese Arab interests. Although Arab investments in Africa have grown remarkably in recent years, the main investors are increasingly cautious about where they place their money and expect reasonable and fairly prompt returns. These shareholders will undoubtedly exercise a major influence upon the way Kenana

is handled and are in a position to put pressure upon the government, if necessary, to ensure the project receives adequate priority.

The total shareholding stake is now \$400 million, an enormous sum to be invested in one project over a few years. As yet it is too early to estimate just what returns shareholders will get: ultimately, of course, the return will depend upon performance. In the case of Kuwait, for example, the investment is tied to buying a proportion of the sugar at cost price.

Sudan is preeminently an agricultural country, and in recent years there appears to have been a growing realization that big development schemes by themselves are not enough: the small farmer must be the backbone of the system. This raises the issue of what kind of return might have been expected if the money put into Kenana had instead been earmarked to help peasant farmers with extension services and other inputs. In fact this could not have occurred since the kind of money forthcoming for an investment venture such as Kenana that yields fairly quick returns on capital is not available for government investment in the small farmer.

The prestige of the Nimeiry regime is tied to the success of Kenana. Nimeiry himself is reputed to be in poor health and faces so many pressures that his detractors constantly predict his political demise. He faces the threats of Libyan subversion, to which he appears especially sensitive. There are many tensions within the Sudan Socialist Union, as well as from Islamic groups and the illegal Communist party. Moreover, relations between the Islamic Arab north and the animist and Christian south have recently deteriorated. Economic belt tightening in the face of continuing recession and mounting debts has created other problems of social unrest. As a result, the government is badly in need of positive achievements, especially on the economic front, and success at Kenana would both contribute to the country's food and foreign exchange problem and act as a catalyst in the public relations sense of attracting other investment into the economy. □

Books

RECIPES FOR LEADERSHIP

Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982, pp. 316 + xi.

How this book came into being is perhaps best described in the language of Curnonsky (or Craig Claiborne): Take a generous chunk of patrimonialism, either from Max Weber or Guenther Roth, depending on your ability to carve at the joints, mix thoroughly with heavy doses of clientelism, readily available from a variety of sources: sprinkle generously with bits and pieces of classical theories of personal rule—Machiavelli's *Prince* and Hobbes' *Leviathan* are strongly recommended. Stir until all ingredients are limp. Let sit for a while and spread over a thick data base, to be found at little cost from *Africa Contemporary Record*, *West Africa*, and *Africa Report*. Serve on a bed of tabulations consisting of the names of current African rulers, the effective date of their access to power, and the identity of their predecessors in office.

The result is a dish of dubious merits. Overall, the ingredients do not mix very well, while others, indispensable to leaven this otherwise heavy dough, have been omitted from the recipe. The surprising thing about the Jackson and Rosberg special is that it happens to have been put together by a couple of experienced chefs, from whom our tastebuds expected somewhat more than they were able to deliver. Not unlike eating chicken-à-la-king at Maxim's.

Recognizing at the outset that "by

most informed accounts personal rulership plays a very important role in the political life of the new states of Black Africa," the authors proceed to investigate "the ways in which African rulers and other leaders have provided or failed to provide political goods without the aid of effective institutions" (pp. 2, 3). Whether mediated by military men or civilians, personal rule is "inherently authoritarian" (p. 23), yet it involves more than the use of arbitrary power. It brings into play certain arrangements by which a modicum of stability and predictability can be achieved; one such arrangement is clientelism, itself

dependent upon loyalty, patronage, and political and administrative corruption, the latter being "probably quite widespread" (p. 45). Because of or despite all this, political uncertainty remains a built-in feature of personal systems, along with "political types of calculation and action—which have ancient origins" (p. 58), i.e., jockeying for position, scheming and plotting, factional strivings, and coups.

The core contribution of the Jackson and Rosberg volume lies in their typology of personal rulership. African rulers can conveniently be ranged into four types: (1) princes, (2) autocrats, (3) prophets, and (4) tyrants, respec-

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tively identified with (1) oligarchic rule, (2) lordship, (3) leadership, and (4) abusive rule. The remainder of the book (approximately 200 pages out of a total of 286) is devoted to a series of vignettes of African leaders intended to show how the realities of African rulership fit into each of the foregoing categories. The conclusion is in the form of a predictably dismal assessment of "the prospects for institutional government." This is clearly the most rewarding chapter in the entire book (and not just because it is the last).

The most serious flaw in this typology is that it rests on categories that not only are more wanting than most in

meeting the basic test of being conceptually exclusive of each other, but that tell us relatively little about the dynamics of personal rulership. The matching of names categories is at times highly misleading. Thus, we find lumped together under the same rubric the names of leaders whose political style, resources, and personalities are very dissimilar; Mobutu and Houphouët-Boigny turn up as "autocrats" practicing "lordship," while Senghor and Nimeiry are presented as "princes" engaged in "oligarchic rule."

The authors' casual handling of conceptual and methodological issues shows up most cruelly in their discussion of clientelism: the latter is seen as the strategic outcome of personal rulership, never as its cause, suggesting in effect that traditional modes of social organization (i.e., clientelism, factionalism, kinship, etc.) are of little consequence in explaining modern manifestations of personal rulership. Their discussion is essentially geared to an analysis "from above," with virtually no attention paid to how local parameters interact with and condition the exercise of power at the center. Missing from their analysis, in short, is a genuine appreciation of the political anthropology of African rulership. With all due deference to Montesquieu, Tocqueville, Carl Friedrich, and John Rawls, from whom the authors appear to have drawn much of their inspiration, my guess is that Gellner, Fallers, Colson, or P.C. Lloyd would have provided more useful intellectual guidance.

Another element left out of the picture relates to the effects of colonial rule on the inherited forms of rulership. As has been shown by recent historical research, in a large number of cases the colonial bureaucratic model involved relatively little in the way of institutionalized norms and procedures, and a great deal in the way of personalized, autocratic, clientelistic, and corrupt rulership. If so, this raises the possibility of a persistence of this "personalized" colonial tradition beyond the formal extinction of imperial rule. Again, almost nothing is said of the options exercised by the former metropolitan power in encouraging the sur-

vival of personal rulership; here the story of the rise and fall of Emperor Bokassa would have been most illuminating, but unfortunately "Le Bok" nowhere appears in the cast of characters discussed by the authors. His case, one suspects, would have required yet another conceptual niche.

Instead of constructing their argument around the Weberian concepts of "traditional-personal" and "charismatic" domination (corresponding roughly to their definition of "princely" and "autocratic" rule), from which they appear to derive very little analytic mileage, a more useful tack would have been to concentrate on the broad spectrum of strategies employed by African rulers to ensure their political survival. This would have led them to investigate personal rulership not just as a predictable response to a pluralistic environment that admits of no other form of political organization, but as a way of accumulating and (perhaps) distributing political, economic, and coercive power, a process that is inevitably tied up with what some might call the "neocolonial nexus." At any rate, and regardless of the merits of the authors' Weberian framework, personal rulership involves more than just a systemic response to a particular environmental challenge: on this, Professor Gary Cowan (the distinguished Africanist and former president of the African Studies Association who recently retooled himself into a "super-spook") could elaborate at some length.

Thirteen years ago W. Howard Wriggins published a jewel of a book, appropriately titled *The Ruler's Imperative: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press), which better than any other work in print conveys the sense of strategic maneuvering and short-run calculations involved in political survival. The reader may still learn more about "Personal Rule in Black Africa" from Wriggins than from Jackson and Rosberg; one thing at least is sure—he will be spared a good deal of turgid prose and not a few platitudinous statements.

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
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
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