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AFRICA REPORT

AMERICA'S LEADING MAGAZINE ON AFRICA

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JANUARY–FEBRUARY 1983
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

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JANUARY–FEBRUARY 1983

AFRICA REPORT

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IN THIS ISSUE

As the title indicates, the succession to President Houphouët-Boigny and the state of the Ivory Coast's agriculturally based economy are the main themes addressed in Robert A. Mortimer's article. Even the prospects of substantial oil production, he suggests, will be less of a rescue operation than a test of the nation's ability to address underlying problems.

Following critical media analyses of President Obote's rule — one of them in *Africa Report* — we publish articles in this issue that show the Ugandan leader in a more favorable light. In addition to a major assessment of the country and a report on a prison visit, veteran Africa correspondent Colin Legum also undertakes an exclusive interview with President Obote.

Zimbabwe is the focus of two articles by *Africa Report* Assistant Editor Margaret A. Novicki. In one, she examines the nation's economic prospects 2¾ years after independence in the light of domestic and foreign political factors. In the other, she spotlights the country's efforts to adapt a tourism industry created under white minority rule to the realities of socialist development. In both cases, in spite of difficulties, she believes that the long-term prospects are bright.

The visit of Vice-President George Bush to seven African countries in November was overshadowed by a number of international developments. We therefore take this opportunity to publish the text of a major speech on U.S.-Africa policy that he made in Nairobi.

Our last issue focused upon Mozambique, particularly its relations in the region. We follow up those articles with two interviews. One is with the foreign minister of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano. The other gives the U.S. State Department view on bilateral relations.

This issue also contains the African Update section, containing a compilation of African developments of the previous two months, and our usual selection of book reviews.

Photo Credit:
The cover photo of President Milton Obote speaking at a Kampala press conference was taken by T.R. Lansner.

Succession and Recession

BY ROBERT A. MORTIMER

Two issues have dominated politics in the Ivory Coast since the much-heralded legislative elections of November 1980. One is the matter of succession: the "father of the nation" has resolutely refrained from designating a political son. The other is the economy: the drop in world market prices of cocoa and coffee has caused an economic recession. Together these two matters have created an unaccustomed degree of political tension in the system that Félix Houphouët-Boigny has built.

The 78-year-old planter-politician has fused politics and economics by making the state the basic instrument of capital accumulation in the country. As the proceeds of a steadily growing agricultural export sector have flowed into state coffers, economic opportunities have abounded for the politico-administrative elite. Strategically located at the center of the decision-making process, this new class has prospered in association with state and foreign investment. Houphouët-Boigny has skillfully presided over this system of state-managed growth, allocating benefits while protecting some semblance of broad public interest.

Robert A. Mortimer is chairman of the Department of Political Science at Haverford College in Pennsylvania. He was teaching at the University of Abidjan in 1981-82 and is author of *The Third World Coalition in International Politics* (Praeger, 1980).

Photo: Camerapix

President Houphouët-Boigny has "refrained from designating a successor"

Now, however, the recession is prompting sharper criticism of the basic options of the Ivorian model. Maldistribution of wealth can no longer be evaded. Moreover, even supporters of the regime are uneasy about the unresolved problem of political succession. That a touch of presidential malaria can render all Abidjan feverish was evident when "le vieux" fell ill not long ago. The government's handling of the strike at the national university last February was a further sign of stress upon the political system. This article examines the impact of the succession and recession issues in the Ivory Coast over the past year.

Succession is of course a classic problem in regimes of personal rule. Having dominated Ivorian politics since the 1940s, Houphouët-Boigny no doubt finds it difficult to contemplate stepping down. No one questions Houphouët's record as a master politician. He has deftly managed the interplay of traditional authorities, nationalist cronies, and younger managerial technocrats in governing the Ivory Coast. Yet of late the deft touch has become a bit clumsy.

The image of the first family has been tainted by rumors of scandal and by excessively conspicuous consumption. National affairs came to an abrupt halt in November 1981 when the president's mistress died in mysterious circumstances. His wife's and son's investments raise eyebrows while the president's own predilection for pumping money into the transformation of his home town of Yamoussoukro causes popular resentment. When Houphouët offhandedly stated that he would make known his successor in his will, implying that this might be a family matter, he touched a raw nerve among his faithful supporters. Whatever his ultimate intention may be, the president has drawn criticism for his handling of the succession issue.

The matter arose when Houphouët arbitrarily pushed a constitutional amendment through a lame-duck National Assembly in November 1980. The move itself compromised the presidential pledge to a more open and representative parliamentary system. The country had just conducted the first relatively free elections in its history. Until 1980 the single party, the Democratic party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI), had presented a national slate of deputies — take it or leave it. In 1980, on the contrary, 647 candidates contested the 147 available seats. Of the 80 members of the outgoing assembly who stood for reelection, only 27 were successful.

Apparently Houphouët lacked confidence in the new deputies, elected in rough-and-tumble campaigns in which persistent ethnic cleavages dominated all other issues. He promptly convened the old legislature to adopt a constitutional text designating a new vice-presidential office whose incumbent would become head-of-state in the event of presidential vacancy. The measure stipulated that the vice-president would be chosen by and elected along with the president — an unexceptional provision except that the presidential election had taken place just a month earlier!

Under the old law, the president of the National Assembly was the successor; the amendment thus took the matter out of the hands of the newly elected assembly and placed it firmly back within Houphouët's grasp. The new procedure, furthermore, completed the eclipse of Philippe Yacé. Until 1980 Yacé was clearly the next in line — constitutionally as president of the National Assembly and politically as secretary-general of the PDCI. Yacé had long served as Houphouët's hatchet man. Yacé cracked heads while Houphouët engaged in dialogue; the party chief implemented unpopular governmental decisions that overrode traditional interests while the president incarnated the lofty authority of a "remote eminence" (as Jackson and Rosberg characterize Houphouët in their *Personal Rule in Black Africa*). Houphouët dumped his apparent successor in stages. First the 1980 PDCI Congress abolished his party post. Then, even after the constitutional revision, he was deprived of reelection to the assembly presidency, which went to the former minister of finance, Henri Konan Bedié. It is said that Houphouët was displeased at Yacé's handling of 1978 local elections but also at his handling of the heir-apparent role. By refusing to name a vice-president since 1980, Houphouët has disposed the latter problem, but at a considerable cost in public nervousness over the "empty chair."

The issue could not be avoided at the November 1981 session of the National Council, the periodic gathering of political, administrative, and socioprofessional personnel Houphouët likes to convene at moments of public tension. The National Council is the village council writ large — the chief listens to the concerns and grievances of the representatives of the nation and then responds. A maverick politician named Camille Adam dared to raise the impertinent question why the president was ignoring his presumed constitutional obligation to designate a vice-president.

Houphouët's answer was that the time was not yet ripe. To name a successor would only feed the divisiveness that had surfaced during the legislative elections. He did feel obliged to deny that he had any intention of naming a member of his family to the office ("I have engaged in enough politics for two generations of Houphouëts") but beyond this he would not satisfy the curiosity of his audience. From his position "on the hill" above the "melee," he could see that a vice-presidential figure would add a "supplement of division." He explained, "We cannot afford a Baoule president, a Bete president, or a Dioula president — we must have a president of the Ivory Coast."

Houphouët may well fear backlash from disappointed ethnic groups upon nomination of a successor. He has tried to achieve some ethnic balance in his cabinets in order to mollify the resentment of Baoule dominance. But most of all he appears unwilling to let go of power, unconvinced of his compatriots' capacity to manage without him. Indeed, the father of the nation has difficulty in perceiving fellow citizens at all: "You are all my brothers, my sons, and my grandchildren; good or bad, you are all my brothers, my sons, my grandchildren. And for my part, I consider you all to be good brothers, good sons, and good grandchildren. Therefore, have confidence in me." Even discounting for rhetorical excess, this excerpt reveals a paternalistic conception of power that is at the core of the succession problem. Until Houphouët reconciles himself to the necessary passage of power, the system will continue to labor under a disability. Houphouët himself, supremely confident of his own staying power, is apparently unconcerned about the institutional void that he has created.

If the empty chair is one major problem, empty coffers pose another. The regime has shown itself capable of absorbing considerable opposition so long as the state treasury had the resources to create jobs, fund projects, and co-opt dissidents into comfortable jobs. The boom in world cocoa and coffee prices during the mid-1970s meant hefty revenues for the government and a splurge of investment in the national economy. Then at the end of the decade the bottom fell out of the market. Even as export production increased from 1.5 to 1.6 million tons, receipts fell by more than a billion dollars in 1979-80. These deteriorating terms of trade have not been reversed since then; austerity budgets have been imposed as a result of the tight international conjuncture. "La conjoncture" became a vaguely understood synonym for hard times. (One undaunted small businessman in Abidjan has just opened a new *maquis* — or cheap African restaurant — which he named "Tonton Conjoncture.")

For critics of the regime, however, the problem is more than conjunctural. They view the outward orientation of the Ivorian economy as a fundamental error. Samir Amin's critique of "extraversion" has influenced many Ivo-



Photo: Beryl Goldberg

Cocoa harvesting: The Ivory Coast is heavily dependent upon export crops

rian intellectuals. They see the heavy dependence upon export crops and foreign markets as one basic cause of the blatant maldistribution of wealth.

The state enjoys a monopoly over the export economy. The Ivorian producer sells his cocoa to the state marketing agency for a fixed price, and the government sells it abroad. What happened to producer revenues during the boom period? Between 1975 and 1977, the world market price of cocoa quintupled, but the government price to the farmer barely budged. As for coffee, in 1975 the government bought at 150 francs a kilogram and sold at 237 francs; in 1977 it bought at 180 francs but sold at 1,770. The market price skyrocketed 740%, but payments to the producers rose a mere 20%.

Although the gap between purchase price and selling price has narrowed since then, the critics contest this transfer of the economic surplus to the powerful bureaucratic elite. The sentiment in favor of economic and political change is particularly strong at the University of Abidjan. It was no great surprise, therefore, that the prevalent sense of malaise became concentrated on the campus and that students were the catalyst for last February's political crisis.

A couple of contentious issues came together to provoke the strike. One had to do with the status of several research institutes, some of which housed dissident intellectuals like Bernard Zadi and Laurent Gbagbo. The government proposed to bring these largely autonomous centers more tightly under the administrative control of the rector of the university. Most faculty members opposed this change. About the same time, independent student organizations (uncontrolled by the officially sponsored MEECI) seeking to open up discussion on sensitive issues scheduled a debate entitled "Can there be democracy in a single-party regime?" The debate was to confront Zadi and a representative of the PDCI. So many students thronged into the amphitheater that the authorities declared the situation hazardous and proposed to hold the discussion elsewhere. In the ensuing confusion and anger, some damage was done to the university lecture hall, and the volatile debate never took place.

With tempers now edgy, students asked Gbagbo to lecture on the topic "Youth and Politics." The rector, citing the earlier incident, denied permission to hold the lecture on campus. The organizers proceeded to hire a hall off campus (though still on government property at one of the *cités universitaires*). Again the government intervened to cancel the talk. The next morning a large body of students surrounded the administration building to protest this restriction of their academic freedom. Charging that Rector Diarrassouba was in physical danger, the government sent troops onto the campus to break up the demonstration; several hundred students were hauled off to the military camp at Akouédo. At this point the faculty union, SYNARES, called a strike in support of student and faculty liberties.

Had the issue solely been academic freedom, no doubt the episode could have been contained within the confines of campus and one or two ministries. Most participants sensed, however, that the disaffection of the intellectuals was more broadly grounded. The strike at the university was implicitly a challenge to the way the Ivory Coast was being governed by a narrowly representative party to the benefit of a privileged class of planters and bureaucrats. The fact that tracts calling for the open expression of other grievances promptly began to circulate in town confirmed that some people saw the events on campus as a possible spark for a larger conflagration. Activist university students quickly brought the message to the secondary schools, inflaming tensions there. Houphouët knows a brush fire when he sees one. He immediately convened the Political Bureau, and within hours of the publication of the strike call the government closed the university, evacuated and shut down the dormitories, suspended student scholarships, and dissolved SYNARES. For good measure, the high-school students were sent home early on their scheduled February vacation.

The Political Bureau claimed to see the hand of outside agitators in the disruption. "These manifestations," it declared, "belonged to a vast movement of destabilization of the most viable regimes in Africa, knowingly prepared and orchestrated by professionals in agitation, exterior to the Ivory Coast." Much more startling than this stock declaration was the insinuation that the real issue was Bete factionalism. The press noted that Gbagbo, Zadi, and Pierre Kipré (who was the head of SYNARES) were all Bete. The media gave prominent play to "motions of support" addressed to the government by prominent Bete politicians and military officers. The military sought to dissipate any suspicion of "connivance" between themselves and the troublemakers. The political officials expressed worry that Bete intellectuals might "cast discredit" on the entire Bete population. This rare injection of ethnic tensions into national politics angered many Ivorians. It violated the usual rules of the game (ethnic politics being acknowledged but not publicly displayed) and cynically manipulated public opinion.

Manipulation aside, the government-controlled means of coercion proved adequate to break the strike. The swift crackdown effectively deprived the protesters of any means of expanding their base of support into the low-income neighborhoods. By dissolving the faculty union (on the grounds that it had not followed prescribed grievance procedures), the government made normal negotiations impossible.

None of this, however, precluded informal bargaining, which Houphouët characteristically initiated after the show of force. The president elicited a public apology from a small group of faculty members who opposed the strike; privately he is said to have promised the union that their demands would be given a hearing once they gave up the strike. Because the government was clearly in command, the teachers had no realistic choice other than resumption of classes, but the outcome hardly dissipated the tension that persists between university and regime.

Rather than a well-organized counterforce to the existing power structure, the strike was symptomatic of social tensions that Houphouët or his successor must address. Many within the existing regime believe that new oil will lubricate the old machine. The offshore wells are beginning to produce, and oil revenues will be significant before long; no doubt that will relieve some of the pressure imposed by the tight economy. Yet the issue of how to redistribute this wealth will be all the more sensitive in the face of current disaffection. Less than a rescue operation, the oil will be a test of capacity to address underlying problems.

Nor can the regime count on a French rescue operation. To be sure, Houphouët and François Mitterrand are old political buddies from the days of Fourth Republic parliamentary politics. The Ivorian president was the first African leader to visit Paris after the 1981 French election and last spring Mitterrand visited the Ivory Coast. The gestures were designed to demonstrate that the French socialists would not foresake France's loyal friends in Africa. Notwithstanding the symbolic reassurances, however, the socialist government is cutting back on certain ties in politically sensitive areas — notably in the number of *coopérants* that it sends to teach in the Ivorian educational system. More broadly, Mitterrand seeks to identify France with Third World progressivism. This raises some doubts about the reliability of French assistance in a political crisis.

The external environment is on the whole a bit more threatening than it has appeared for some time. The country is virtually surrounded by military regimes since the Rawlings coup in Ghana, reviving old insecurities. A former presidential aide has recently published a book on Houphouët's machinations against Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, and the Nigerian federation in the 1960s. The account provides a rare glimpse of Houphouët's methods of undermining rivals and manipulating the regional environment. The fear of subversion that has haunted the Ivorian leader in the past can not be fully laid to rest when a Qaddafy springs to the support of a Rawlings.

These local concerns are not the major reason, however, that Houphouët keeps his lines of communication open to the United States. His pro-Western orientation has never wavered, and he remains convinced that opening the Ivory Coast to Western capital is a guarantee of the success of the model that he has chosen. The Ivory Coast was one of the four stops in the big trade and investment delegation that Secretaries Malcolm Baldridge and John Block led to Africa in January 1982. American companies are centrally involved in the offshore oil industry. Chase Manhattan is in business in Abidjan, and a Hilton is rising on the lagoon. Houphouët asserts straightforwardly that the West has a political stake in governments like his and that they should indeed be doing more to help their friends through the present nasty international economic conjuncture. It is precisely to enhance that stake that Houphouët is happy to receive David Rockefeller in Yamoussoukro.

Foreign alignments are implicitly part of the current debate about the Ivorian model. The critics envisage a development plan more oriented to domestic than to foreign markets. They would prefer to see the Ivory Coast more reliant upon a regional political economy than upon export specialization. This preference is a corollary of their central concern with distributive issues in the Ivory Coast itself. Maldistribution is the fundamental issue with which Houphouët or his successor, or both, will have to deal.

The prospect of a vacancy in the highest leadership is unsettling precisely because many Ivorians feel that some change is necessary. The recession has made change a rising demand just at the moment when the succession void raises a question about the regime's capacity to channel change. Houphouët, who dwells increasingly upon the past, has appeared unable to plan for the future. So long as this situation persists, the Ivorian political system is likely to retain the feverish air of the past year. □

The Economic Outlook

BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI


Photo: Margaret A. Novicki

The government's foremost goal is to redistribute the nation's assets, particularly land, to benefit the majority

Eddison Zvogbo, Zimbabwe's minister of legal and constitutional affairs, recently authored a five-part series published in the Harare daily, *The Herald*, countering the negative image of Zimbabwe he believes is portrayed by the Western press. A powerful analysis of the very real political and economic constraints under which the government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe is required to operate and an assessment of what has been achieved in the nearly three years of independence, Zvogbo's essay concludes with a plea to the world's media to give Zimbabwe "its due."

The minister's contention that cynicism, misperceptions, and projections of doom characterize Western reporting on Zimbabwe is an accurate one. Recent articles in American newspapers bemoaning the return of "repressive measures" and the "poisoning of the mood" by "real and imagined enemies" fail to seize upon the critical issues at stake in governing a nation founded on socialist, egalitarian principles, yet fraught with myriad contradictions and divisions. Nor do they address the legacy of 90 years of settler rule, perpetuated by the economic and political repression of the black majority—a legacy that above all must be addressed by the Mugabe government.

While certainly the strains of governing a nation divided along racial, ethnic, and political lines only three years after the conclusion of a bitter war are more evident now as the glossy veneer of postindependence ebullience wears thin, there is little justification for highlighting every flaw in the still-formative nation of Zimbabwe while avoiding the larger fabric of its not insignificant accomplishments thus far and its ongoing challenges, constraints, and needs. Surely for anyone who has spent time in Zimbabwe within the past two years, the remarkable achievements of the Mugabe government, not the least of which is the relative peace and stability the country enjoys after 13 years of armed struggle, do not go unnoticed. Nor should Zimbabwe's unique racial composition, 97% black and 3% white, its efforts to redress the years of white socioeconomic privilege, and its geopolitical position as a land-locked nation bordering a hostile neighbor, South Africa, to whom its economy is inextricably linked. If one examines the seemingly overwhelming array of problems on the economic and political agenda faced by this government and what has been achieved in so short a time, one could not help but agree with Mugabe's comment, "We don't believe we have succeeded 100 percent, but I think we deserve a distinction" (see *Africa Report*, September-October 1982).

There are many who feared that Mugabe, a committed socialist, would wreak havoc on a relatively advanced and self-sufficient economy, dominated by foreign capital and well-endowed with natural resources, by sweeping nationalizations and drastic land reform. Conversely, there are those who maintain that the government is not really socialist in character, as proven by its wooing of both the domestic and foreign private sectors and cautious movement on the redistribution of land—the issue for which the war was fought.

Neither view is correct. Mugabe has his own definition of what socialism means in the Zimbabwean context, and it is not an imported, rigid doctrine. To reiterate an overused phrase, it is a pragmatic view, taking into account the historical setting and the need for accommodation with private capital if the government is to achieve its ambitious social goals. In addition, dramatic changes in the structure of the economy cannot be expected less than three years after independence, when the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)-led government is still con-

Photo: Margaret A. Novicki

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe: "We haven't succeeded 100 percent, but I think we deserve a distinction"

solidating its position and defining its policies and must pay heed to the divisions in society along racial, ethnic, and political lines. It must cope realistically with the rising expectations of the majority as it attempts to redistribute the wealth of the country, and yet ensure that the productive base of the economy is not harmed.

To achieve its foremost goal, redistribution of assets, particularly land, to benefit the majority, the government has recognized it must foster a high rate of economic growth. Given the state of the world economy, which limits the extent to which Zimbabwe can achieve this on its own, it must continue to seek Western aid, trade, and investment.

The Zimbabwe economy expanded under the pressure of international isolation during the UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) years to become one of the most sophisticated in Africa, through a strategy of diversification and import substitution in agriculture and manufacturing. Second only to South Africa in its mineral resources, which include gold, asbestos, nickel, iron ore, and copper, Zimbabwe is also the leading food exporter in black Africa, with tobacco, maize, cotton, wheat, sugar, groundnuts, soya beans, beef, and dairy products its major agricultural commodities. In 1980-81, agriculture was the main engine of economic growth, as output increased 60 percent in value. The manufacturing sector is similarly vibrant. More than 6,000 separately identifiable products are made in Zimbabwe, contributing up to 25 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The mining sector, on the other hand, has fallen on hard times, owing to low international demand and prices for minerals.

Although the UDI years had the effect of launching the country on a fairly self-sufficient path, they also created and thrived upon a dualistic economic structure, characterized by vast income differentials between and within economic sectors and between racial groups. With public and private investment concentrated in the "modern" sector (comprising the commercial, industrial, mining, and large-scale agriculture areas), the rural sector, where over 60 percent of the population lives, received little attention and was the most seriously affected by the war. In addition to the loss of life and cattle, most of the rural infrastructure, including schools, clinics, water supplies, and roads, was destroyed. As the war intensified in the mid to late 1970s and the effects of international sanctions became more pronounced, the economy declined to its pre-1965 GDP level.

The Mugabe government took office in 1980 facing the immediate tasks of healing the wounds of war, resettling and rehabilitating the rural refugee population, and reconstructing the war-shattered economy whose industrial capital plant had run down from lack of spare parts and antiquated equipment. Enormous pent-up demand not only for consumer goods but for critical capital goods spurred a tremendous increase in imports, by 47% the first year and 27% the second. With the rural and refugee population resettled, bumper harvests in maize and cotton were produced during the first year of independence. A phenomenal real growth rate of 14% was recorded in 1980, followed by 8% in 1981. For 1982, the rate is forecast by reliable financial analysts to drop to between 2.5 and 3%, for reasons to be examined subsequently.

Growth with Equity, the government's economic policy statement published in 1981, linked postwar re-

Photo: Margaret A. Novicki

A resettled Zimbabwean farmer surveys his land

construction priorities with long-term social, economic, and political objectives. The statement recognized the disparities in ownership and control of physical resources, particularly land, the inequities in income and earning opportunities, and the unjust distribution of wealth and social services. Its blueprint is "to pursue and implement policies based upon socialist, egalitarian, and democratic principles in conditions of rapid economic growth, full employment, price stability, dynamic efficiency in resource allocation, and an equitable distribution of the ensuing benefits."

These principles are reaffirmed in the long-awaited transitional development plan, launched by the government in late November. The plan bridges the postwar period with the developmental challenges facing the country through 1985. A three-year plan proposing an annual real growth rate of 8%, it recognizes that projected demographic changes may alter earlier economic formulas. Current analyses estimate the population at 7.5 million, growing at one of the highest annual rates in the world—yet preliminary results from a nationwide census carried out in 1982 suggest a figure closer to 10 million.

The plan envisages a total investment of $7.9 billion, 59% in the public sector (of which 23% will be in manufacturing, 14% in transport, and 13% in agriculture), and the remainder in the private sector. Some 63% of the investment is to be financed by domestic sources, mainly the private sector, and the rest from external funds, including aid funds pledged at the 1981 Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (Zimcord), foreign investment, and public borrowing.

According to Dr. Bernard Chidzero, the minister of finance, economic planning and development, the plan aims at redressing the imbalances caused by the dualistic economy structure, hence a major thrust is on rural and infrastructural development. "It's not just a land question, however," says Chidzero. "It's a whole concept of development—bringing development to the people in terms of schools, clinics, and roads. Given the social structure, black/white, we must redress the imbalance for economic, political, and moral reasons." Manpower training is a key element in the plan, "to equip the nation with necessary instruments as we expand the economic and social sectors," he noted.

Government expenditure will move in the direction of expanding social services, education, health, and employment. The most pervasive problem facing Zimbabwe in Chidzero's view is "how to meet the aspirations of the people, particularly given the disparities. . . . We cannot escape from the fact that we have a skewed society and the contrasts are too great. We will have to address this problem over a number of years." Hence the state will take a larger stake in the economy via the formation of state bodies such as the Zimbabwe Development Bank and the Zimbabwe Development Corporation, which will mobilize domestic and external financial resources to finance priority investment projects and coordinate new enterprises on behalf of the government.

Given the population growth rate, access to skills and job creation remain serious problems. According to economist Roger Riddell of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), the government "needs to be creating about 80,000 new jobs per year," a conservative estimate. "In March 1982, we had 1,037,000 people in formal employment, but we have not reached the 1975 level of total employment, 1,050,000. And yet more than 500,000 new job seekers have come onto the market in that period, so with the gap between new jobs available and new job seekers, the unknown stock of unemployed is increasing." The economy continues to suffer from a dearth of skilled labor, particularly artisans, engineers, accountants, and teachers. Latest statistics indicate, however, that white emigration is running 15% lower than last year. Only 40,000 of the 220,000 whites present at independence have opted to leave the country. Yet the figures for economic growth were the highest in any two years, hence the impact has not been as severe as expected. Nevertheless, government must address access to skills by the majority and the creation of employment if economic growth is to be sustained in the long term.

The current economic slowdown reflected in a drop in the real growth rate to 2.5-3% is due to several factors: the world recession, the 1981-82 drought, and shortages of foreign exchange. The latter translates into a balance of payments problem requiring 20% cuts in foreign currency allocations to importers, which in turn have the net effect of lower agricultural, mining, and manufacturing outputs. According to an economic analysis published by the Standard Bank Group in Harare, Zimbabwe's current economic woes stem less from domestic policy decisions than from circumstances beyond its control, adverse weather conditions, and lower international demand for its exports. Growth will be constrained by the balance of payments position until commodity prices recover in international markets.

Another set of factors limiting trade is transport difficulties. The railway system, damaged by war and sanctions, is being renovated internally. Meanwhile, 60 to 70% of Zimbabwe's trade goes through South African ports—farther away and more costly than using the preferred route through Mozambique. Harare is aiming at a return to its pre-1976 position where most of its traffic was sent through Mozambican ports. Continued disruptions of rail and road links to the harbors and of the Beira-Mutare 880-mile oil pipeline by the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) make progress in this regard painstaking.

In 1981, the deficit on current account increased to an estimated $660 million as the trade balance swung from a surplus to a $142 million deficit. While the poor trade performance was attributed to a bad year for the major export commodity, tobacco, and the withholding of gold exports because of low world prices, some improvement was registered in 1982. Tobacco exports increased and will earn nearly $400 million in foreign exchange in 1982, and some gold was sold in June. Further positive signs are prospects for a better rainy season than last and therefore an improved agricultural outlook for 1982-83. Last year's drought caused a 45% reduction in the maize crop, although Zimbabwe was still able to export 500,000 tons.

Riddell says, "Although Zimbabwe has been able to cope far better than other countries because of its experience with isolation in the past, the world recession is affecting us and will continue to do so. Short-term prospects are not all that good, but everything is in place for rapid expansion when we dip out of the recession with the upturn in the world economy. Zimbabwe is weathering the storm better than any other country in Africa."

The demand management economic policies followed by the Zimbabwe government under Chidzero's ministry are realistic given the difficult times, which have hurt the mining sector in particular. The fiscally conservative 1982-83 budget introduced late in July won praise for its introduction of a $5 million export incentive scheme for manufactured goods and its retention of investment allowances in mining and manufacturing. A 50% increase in total spending is to be financed by increased taxes of $308 million, aid flows, and foreign and domestic borrowing. The money supply has been tightly controlled, subsidies on consumer goods cut, and all but essential imports curtailed.


Photo: Margaret A. Novicki

The government must "meet the aspirations of the people, particularly given the disparities"

The Zimbabwe government remains heavily dependent upon Western sources of aid, trade, financial flows, and, it hopes, investment to fuel its development programs. Although official policy states that as a socialist, nonaligned country, Zimbabwe will trade with any nation, more than 50% of its foreign trade is with OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. It is, however, seeking to expand its trade relationships with Eastern European nations and China. South Africa remains the leading trading partner, supplying 25% of imports and buying 21% of exports. And according to Chidzero, the United States has recently overtaken West Germany as Zimbabwe's second-largest trading partner, partly facilitated by U.S. AID's (Agency for International Development) commodity import program. In what is the largest U.S. economic aid program in Africa, according to U.S. Ambassador to Harare Robert Keeley, AID provided $75 million in assistance to Zimbabwe in 1982, some $40 million of which was in the form of the commodity program, which finances U.S. exports to the country. And the Zimbabwe government is still programming the nearly $2 billion pledged by international donors at Zimcord, of which $400 million has been disbursed.

The need for continued Western aid is apparent. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe has been required to increase its borrowing to counter the high budget deficit. Amid tight international lending conditions, Zimbabwe has turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for balance-of-payments support. Zimbabwe has been drawing short-term loans primarily on the syndicated Eurodollar market, but conclusion of an agreement with the IMF would provide a needed economic breather and could open the door to other commercial lending sources. An IMF team left Harare in October "on amicable terms," according to an observer, although economists speculate that a condition for the loan could be devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, a move the government is loathe to undertake at this juncture. While an overvalued dollar hampers exports, devaluation would increase the price of imports, particularly oil, fueling inflation further, now running at 15%.

Contrary to expectations that the socialist government and the domestic private sector would be at loggerheads resulting in a serious effect on the economy, domestic private investment has slowly but steadily increased. Although short-term gloom among industrialists persists over cuts in allocations of foreign exchange, business sources maintain that the government and the private sector have a clearer and more positive relationship than a year ago. The government now speaks of "partnership" with the private sector—the theme of the 1982 annual CZI conference attended by over 30 government ministers and deputies.

According to A.M. Chambati, a black Zimbabwean who relinquished his post as ambassador to West Germany to take up the position of deputy chairman and chief executive of T.A. Holdings, a Harare-based conglomerate, the private sector will face continuing problems of "adjustment to the government's social and economic goals," including the Zimbabweanization of personnel and the role of the workers' committees in industry, but an atmosphere of consultation is in evidence. Chambati pointed to the business community's positive response to Minister of Labor Kumbirai Kangai's recent introduction of the Labor Act, replacing the defunct Industrial Conciliation Act, and defining the fundamental rights of workers. Industry's furor over a government decision earlier in the year to bond apprentices for a length of employment equal to that of their training has died down. The net impact of the bonding measure was a loss of only 10% of apprentices.

Chidzero maintains that the government seeks to share its social responsibilities with the private sector, and that business must recognize that its role in a socialist economy cannot be solely to maximize profit. A private tobacco company provides an example of the type of cooperation government would like to see more of. Tabex is resettling 500 families on its own land, providing schools, water systems, and health clinics, and those resettled have reportedly made a healthy profit off their tobacco and maize holdings. Thus, in some cases, it appears that the private sector is beginning to show acceptance of the government's social development objectives.

Virtually no new foreign investment came into Zimbabwe during the first two years of independence, although economic growth targets are partially dependent upon substantial injections of foreign capital. The October conclusion of a joint venture with the American company H.J. Heinz, in which the company acquired a 51% interest in Olivine Industries, a major domestic producer of edible oils, margarine, and soaps, with the government taking 49%, marked the first major foreign investment. Richard B. Patton, Heinz' senior vice-president, said the deal represents "a vote of confidence not only in the country and its potential but in the government as well. Zimbabwe is the right place for Heinz to invest at the right time." According to CZI's Riddell, the conclusion of the $30 million deal has prompted a number of inquiries by potential investors, despite the fact that because of international conditions, little investment is going on anywhere in the world. "So clearly people are doing this on an assessment of an upturn in the medium to long term, and confidence in the government of Zimbabwe," he said.

Bowing to international pressure, the government published a set of investment guidelines in October, despite its earlier contention that the Lancaster House constitution provides watertight guarantees against expropriation and nationalization. The guidelines, albeit brief and far from comprehensive, dropped a previous requirement that initial investment be no more than 50% foreign. Now the initial local capital need be no more than 20%, allowing foreign capital to provide up to 80%, a significant concession considering that 70% of the country's economic assets are foreign owned. Foreign investment will be welcomed in new ventures in rural areas, in joint ventures with domestic interests, and in ventures that utilize local raw materials and labor and which generate exports or transfer new technology.

Photo: Margaret A. Novicki

Zimbabwean maize is exported to neighboring countries

Within the southern African context, Zimbabwe's ability to trade with its neighbors apart from South Africa is limited by the transport problems and shortages of hard currency among prospective importers. Zimbabwe has high hopes of expanding economic interdependence via the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the recently created preferential trade area for eastern and southern Africa. As an SADCC member, Zimbabwe has been charged with the responsibility of food security for the region, and will appeal for donor funding to help defray storage costs for its produce until such time when its surplus food can be marketed or used in relief programs. Most of Zimbabwe's maize exports are to countries within the region — Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique. Although most of the exports do not go through regular commercial channels because Zimbabwe cannot afford to sell on credit and importers do not have the currency, organizations such as the World Food Program purchase Zimbabwean maize for use in distribution programs.

The question of land resettlement occupies a position of preeminence within the government's overall aim of redistributing the nation's productive assets. It is the thorniest problem to resolve, as it hinges upon the need to maintain Zimbabwe's record levels of agricultural production, providing 68% of the country's foreign exchange, while satisfying the hunger for land among the rural population. Prior to independence, land was divided into two sectors of nearly equal geographical size: the overcrowded communal lands (formerly tribal trust lands) characterized by rocky, sandy soil and lower rainfall, and the predominantly white commercial farming sector, now supporting 5,800 farmers who grow 93% of marketed produce. Total agricultural exports earn Zimbabwe $655 million in foreign exchange.

Moven Mahachi, the minister of lands, resettlement, and rural development, explains: "Our historical struggle was about land. Zimbabwe belonged to our people until the oppressors took most of the better land with good rainfall and soils. Hence there is the need to deliver what the people were fighting for." On the other hand, the aim of the government's agricultural policies, says Deputy Minister of Agriculture Swithun Mombeshora, is "to ensure self-sufficiency in our food requirements and provide regional food security." Critics of the land resettlement program fear it will spell disaster for commercial agricultural output.

To achieve its food production goals, the government maintains an incentive structure for agriculture that is "unequaled in Africa," according to a Western diplomatic source, and an efficient marketing system that enabled the country in 1982 — a drought year — to harvest the second-largest maize crop in history, 1.5 million tons. And much of the increase in production is coming from the small farmer in the communal lands responding to price. In 1983, some 50% of the cotton marketed in Zimbabwe will reportedly come from the communal areas. Hence there is little evidence to support the contention that resettlement of peasant farmers on commercial land will result in a long-term drop in agricultural output. According to Mombeshora, if a short-term decline is registered, it will be a temporary phenomenon as former subsistence farmers adapt to the cash economy and to new techniques and services, such as access to extension, expertise, and research.

As stated in the constitution, government policy is to acquire land on a "willing seller-willing buyer" basis, funded in part by a $53 million British

Cotton crop at a resettlement cooperative

aid commitment. Since independence, some 3.5 million acres of unutilized or underutilized commercial land have been purchased, while government has been cautious not to infringe upon the "productive" commercial farmer.

Nevertheless, the official plan is to resettle 162,000 families or 900,000 people over the next three years on plots of approximately 12 acres per family. In order to achieve this, a land area of about 25 million acres is required, or 70% of commercial agricultural land. According to James Sinclair, president of the Commercial Farmers Union, a lobbying organization representing the 5,800 commercial farmers, government would have "to remove 1.2 million people already on the land as farmworkers who earn a family income of about $1,570 per annum and who will have to be absorbed or employed elsewhere. The resettlement schemes project a family income of $525 per annum." So, says Sinclair, "you've settled less people than were there before on more land with a lower family income and it's cost some $780 million for the land purchase and the setting up of the resettlement schemes."

In the two years after independence, 14,000 families were resettled along two basic models: collective farms or cooperatives, and individual plot holdings with common grazing, marketing, and input facilities. And government policy is not merely to provide people with a plot of land, but also the basic infrastructure — extension services, irrigation, roads, etc. Mahachi maintains: "Government believes land distribution is not the solution to low standards of living. Land must be made productive, whether communal land or in the commercial sector." Therefore, part of the scheme for redevelopment of the communal areas is the establishment of "growth points" — identifying areas of economic activity from whence planning will emanate for the construction of schools, roads, clinics, irrigation schemes, and marketing facilities.

Meanwhile, Sinclair remains skeptical of the government's avowed intention to resettle 162,000 families. "If we believed they could do it, we'd be a lot more worried," he commented. Other informed sources concur, pointing out that with a 3% rate of population growth, even if the goal is attained, those resettled will be more than replaced in the communal areas within eight years. Thus, little is in fact achieved toward relieving land pressure. Therefore, they maintain, despite official policy, government will be moving very cautiously on land resettlement, planning more carefully, examining different forms, and gradually accepting the fact that not every family will have an individual plot of land.

Political pressures on the government to move on the land question will intensify, however, as the number of illegal squatters increases yearly. Some 70,000 were estimated nationally last year, but by late 1982, 90,000 were reported in eastern Manicaland alone. The government's effective balancing of the demands of the rural poor and landless and the necessity of maintaining a productive agricultural sector for the foreign exchange it provides will be one of its sternest tests in the coming years. Sinclair, however, ended our conversation on an optimistic note. When asked his perception of the future of commercial agriculture in Zimbabwe, he said: "Although we don't know how the debate is turning out, this government has a wider ideological spread than any government in the world. What united them was opposition to colonial domination. There are only two reasons why the commercial farmer is surviving in Zimbabwe: he is desperately needed and he has been able to communicate with government and adapt to the situation remarkably well. So I'm not unhappy about the future."

Apart from the tricky issues involved in land redistribution, Zimbabwe faces challenges stemming from its geopolitical position, bordering on South Africa, and in the domestic political arena — relations between the ruling ZANU and its erstwhile Patriotic Front partner, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by the embittered Ndebele leader, Joshua Nkomo. Both issues present the Mugabe government with a host of internal security problems and hold the potential of feeding off one another, sowing doubts, suspicions, and instability.

South Africa employs a typical two-track policy toward Zimbabwe; on the one hand, extending economic cooperation, and on the other, destabilizing the region via sabotage of the emerging SADCC network. South Africa is bent upon seeing regional cooperation outside its own aegis fail and utilizes trade financing (making it less costly for countries to import South African goods), subsidies (selling beef and maize at artificially low prices to preempt the competitiveness of Zimbabwe's goods), and interdiction of transport routes to Mozambican ports via support for the anti-government MNR. When the Beira-Mutare pipeline is operating, it can meet Zimbabwe's total petrol and diesel requirements, its largest import. However, the line is frequently halted by MNR attacks, requiring Zimbabwe to fall back on the more costly and lengthy rail routes via South Africa and Mozambique. In November, the situation was deemed so perilous that Zimbabwean troops were posted to Mozambique to guard the pipeline. SADCC plans to rehabilitate Mozambique's ports and railways can only help Zimbabwe break out of its transport dependence on South Africa. In spite of its destabilization activities, South Africa renewed its preferential trade agreement with Zimbabwe in March 1982, covering almost two-thirds of Zimbabwe's exports of manufactured goods to South Africa, worth an estimated $125 million in 1980.

The political rhetoric between the two countries has taken on a harsher tone since the August encounter near Sengwe, 10 miles from Zimbabwe's border with Mozambique, between elements of the South African Defense Force and the Zimbabwean army, which left three South African soldiers dead. It is alleged that South Africa was responsible for the sabotage attack on the Gweru airbase in July that destroyed a large part of the country's air force, and for the bombing of the ZANU headquarters in Harare in 1981. It also appears likely that South Africa is and will continue exploiting tensions in the southwestern Matabeleland province, where "dissidents" (former guerrillas in Nkomo's Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary army, ZIPRA, who have deserted from the integrated national army) have been responsible for a cycle of looting, robbing, and murder over the past several months. According to Emmerson Munangagwa, Zimbabwe's minister of state for security, South Africa has established four camps on its border with southern Zimbabwe to develop "subversive activities." Munangagwa alleges that one of the camps houses ex-ZIPRA combatants who have fled the country, while in others are former auxiliaries owning allegiance to Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Zimbabwe has also held talks with President Quett Masire of Botswana concerning dissidents seeking refuge in the remote areas of that country that border on Matabeleland.

The government maintains that the situation with respect to the dissidents is under control and in a localized area. The combination of a harsh security crackdown in mid to late 1982 in Matabeleland and the prolonged drought which hit that province the hardest, found tensions at mid-year at a high point, although with the advent of rains and a better agricultural outlook, observers indicate that temperatures have cooled.

It appears that by isolating Nkomo (sacked from the cabinet with three other ZAPU ministers in February over arms caches) while cooperating with other ZAPU leaders who serve in the government, ZANU hopes to neutralize his support among the Ndebele and within ZAPU, leading toward the eventual constitution of a single-party system. However, its success in doing so is not crucial at this point, because, as Mugabe puts it, "With or without a one-party state, we [ZANU] have a clear majority."

According to the last white liberal prime minister, Garfield Todd, a one-party state "could well be our best form of government for it would bring together the mass of our people who have similar political aspirations but who might divide on the grounds of tribe and personalities." Nevertheless, Mugabe realizes that the country cannot afford civil strife at this point in its history, nor is it something the war-weary population wants. Mugabe fervently espouses the policy of reconciliation, and if it is extended over the long term to encompass not only the black-white dimension, but also the political arena, whether or not a single party is the optimal means of doing so, the prime minister will have succeeded in his strategy to unite Zimbabweans, whatever their ethnic or racial affiliation.

More potentially damaging to the country would be failure to meet the rapidly rising aspirations of the people. After examining the record thus far and the plans for the future, however, one cannot but remain optimistic. As Bernard Chidzero puts it: "Because we are a growing economy and because we are experimenting with so many new institutions and new forms of development, there is bound to be some element of doubt as to what direction we are going in. But there is no cause for worry because first and foremost, we are concerned with doing things that work in this country. We are not propelled forward fundamentally by ideological considerations. We have ideological discussions as do many countries, but these are reduced in the final analysis to how do we create jobs, how do we build more schools, how do we make Zimbabweans proud of their country and integrated into the rest of the world economy." □

After the Amin Nightmare

BY COLIN LEGUM

Photo: T.R. Lansner

President Obote reviewing youths: "A leader who genuinely cares about human rights"

The worst of the troubles in Uganda now lie in the past, but the nightmare years that began with Idi Amin's tyrannical rule in 1971 have left a legacy of a seriously diminished respect for human life, a wrecked economy and social order, and a disrupted public service, all of which will take years to repair. Just how long it will take depends almost entirely on how soon political violence and terrorism can be brought under effective control and, simultaneously, the rate of progress toward reconciliation between the government and the dissident political elements, especially among the Baganda. Until this happens, one must expect periodic violent incidents, infringements of human rights, and lapses in President Milton Obote's administration — as over the deplorable incident involving the treatment of the Rwandan refugees.

The president is himself the first to acknowledge these shortcomings, as he shows in the accompanying interview. Contrary to a widely disseminated view about Milton Obote, he is among the most compassionate of men, a leader who genuinely cares about human rights and who has retained a firm belief in the importance of a multiparty democratic system during a period in the continent's history when the trend has been largely in the opposite direction.

Of course he has his weaknesses, and of course he has made (and no doubt will continue to make) mistakes; but in the 30 years I have known him, admired him, and at times criticized him, he has always shown a readiness to admit when his own aspirations fall below his own or his government's practices. Of how many politicians can one say as much?

This evaluation of Milton Obote hardly squares with much of the reporting about Uganda since he returned to power just two years ago. It is not that all of the reporting has been inaccurate (although some of it has been atrocious); it is rather that much of it has been slanted and otherwise one-sided, with prominence given only to the darker side of the picture and with little attempt made to record the remarkable achievements. The result has been to

Colin Legum is the editor of the *African Contemporary Record* and joint editor of the *Middle East Contemporary Survey*. He was an associate editor of the *Observer* until 1981. He is the author of many books on the Third World.

give, by and large, an unbalanced view of developments in the country. Moreover, very often the blame for what has gone wrong has been placed on the wrong shoulders.

Much of the reporting on Uganda is of the kind that has come out of North Ireland by those who reflect developments there through the eyes of the IRA Provos, in which all the blame for the mutilating horrors and political intransigence is blamed on the Protestant majority and the British troops. Although neither of the two latter forces are without responsibility for atrocities in Ulster, they are not themselves the instigators of the recent chapter of gory violence. There are, indeed, a number of striking parallels between the situations in Northern Ireland and Uganda. Both situations can be properly described only from a proper understanding of their history and of the nature of politics in paranoidal societies — of which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is another notable example. Paranoia, in its correct definition, is not simply a condition of obsessionally suspicious attitudes but one in which the party guilty of persecuting others does so out of a feeling that he is himself the victim of persecution. Thus, the aggressor sees himself as the victim. In the Ugandan situation, a significant element among the Baganda (and, more recently, among some radical elements) complain that they are the victims of persecution by Obote and his supporters.

Ignoring for the moment the precolonial history of Uganda when Buganda was the dominating power, it was the Baganda traditionalists (led by the late Kabaka Mutesa II) who sought at the time of independence to regain their former dominant position and to upset the results of successive elections.

That misguided policy was initiated even before Obote's Uganda Peoples Congress won its preindependence electoral victory. It began when the then Democratic party, led by a prominent Muganda, Benedicto Kiwanuka, defeated the Kabaka's men. It is relevant to recall the Kabaka's secessionist campaign at that time and his attempts to stage first a political and then an armed coup against the elected government. It was these antidemocratic

moves that invited counteraction, resulting in the defeat and exile of the Kabaka and the subsequent breakup of Buganda's traditional political institutions.

However, many among the Baganda fixed the blame for what happened on Obote and since then have sedulously fed the myth that he acted solely for reasons of personal hostility against the Baganda. Hence, their eagerness to embrace Idi Amin when he succeeded in his coup against Obote. When they felt themselves betrayed by Amin, they continued their quest for Buganda's political supremacy, joining hands with radicals like Yoweri Museveni (not himself a Muganda), in an effort first to prevent the return of Obote from exile and subsequently to secure his defeat in the 1980 elections.

Whether those elections were fair (and the Commonwealth team of observers concluded that, under existing circumstances, they were as fair as could be expected) will be inconclusively debated until the cows come home. What is relevant here is that, after the elections, the Democratic party itself became divided between a constitutional wing — led by a prominent Muganda politician, Paul Ssemogerere — and a militant wing that elected to conduct a struggle for power by resorting to armed violence. In this they were joined by Museveni's Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), which unlike the Democratic party had been humiliatingly rejected at the polls and could therefore hardly claim to have been robbed of victory.

It was these two factions — the anti-Ssemogerere group of Baganda dissidents and the UPM — who elected to launch their campaign of violence against the government in collaboration with remnants of Amin's forces. Violence, therefore, began with them, and not with Obote. The decision to plunge Uganda back into a new period of violence, from which it has not yet recovered after Amin's defeat, was disastrous.

Against this violent challenge, all that the Obote government had with which to defend itself was a still-organized army, ill-disciplined, ill-paid, and often commanded by inadequate officers. The result was predictable: a period of appalling violence and counterviolence, in which most of the victims were the hapless peasants.

The actual authors of this violence stayed in secure, and mostly wealthy, exile. From the safety of exile they staged their propaganda campaign, putting all the blame for the mindless violence — which once again sullied Uganda's reputation — on Obote, rejecting his policy of reconciliation, obstructing the efforts of the constitutional Democratic party to reestablish a parliamentary democracy, and denigrating the government's difficult (but not altogether unsuccessful) efforts to rebuild the country.

So much for the past; what matters for the future is whether there is any hope of overcoming the tribal, regional, and political cleavages in Uganda's society and, crucially, the chances of reconciling the majority of the Baganda. If they should prove themselves as irreconcilable as, say, the Irish Catholics in Ulster, the situation will be as despairingly hopeless as in that benighted country.

Even among Baganda intellectuals who reject the irresponsibility of political violence there are those who will say it is impossible to achieve genuine reconciliation so long as Obote remains president. To listen to these patently sincere and decent people (many of them close friends of mine) is to be filled with misgivings. And yet there is hope. By no means all the Baganda take this intransigent view — and certainly not all those who fill important posts in the government, who still predominate in the public service, or who are beginning to prosper under Obote's economic recovery plan.

There are two particular reasons for refusing to take the pessimistic view. The first is that security has returned to most of the country. Out of its 33 districts, a degree of insecurity now prevails in only three areas, and even there the situation is markedly better than it was only six months ago. Despite all the talk about the thousands of guerrillas mustering to topple Obote, the reality appears to be that their number are to be counted at most in a few hundred and that they are now confined to two small pockets. The second, even more encouraging, reason is that Baganda in the countryside have themselves begun to turn against violence. An increasing number of them are now cooperating with the government forces — not out of sympathy with Obote, but because they have come to realize that they are the sufferers from a campaign of violence that stands no hope of success.

Hundreds of armed youngsters have already given themselves up voluntarily — they include the military training officer of Museveni's forces, Captain Marko, an intelligent young Sandhurst-trained officer. When I talked to him in prison, he asked me to appeal to those who, like himself, had at first embraced violence. They should, he said, realize the folly of violence and embrace the need for reconciliation. It is now not uncommon at village public meetings to hear Baganda elders denouncing the campaign of violence.

But although the tide has turned, the struggle is not yet over. There will still be a period of conflict, and so long as that continues there will predictably be periodic nasty incidents. Under present circumstances this is inevitable; what is important is that these incidents should be kept in proper perspective. Local incidents, however violent, should not be judged as evidence of the capacity of Obote's opponents to achieve their aims.

Uganda's return to tranquility still depends on two key factors: the speed with which the army and police can be properly trained and disciplined and the rate of economic recovery. Substantial progress is being made in the training of the security forces, but training good officers (on which everything else depends) takes time. There are no shortcuts. However, the decision to bring the soldiers back to their barracks and off the roadblocks marks an important advance. The nightly shootings in and around Kampala have virtually stopped since effective disciplinary action was taken after the last serious incidents in October. The depredations of misbehaving soldiers are being heavily punished; hundreds have been dismissed; others have been court-martialed and are now in prison.

However, the most encouraging aspect of the situation is the evidence of the country's economic recovery. It has already been transformed in the last two years. Obote's bold decision to cooperate with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to establish a free-market economy and to reward farmers adequately for their production is visibly paying off. A few economic indicators point to the success of these policies.

Unlike the condition of most African countries, Uganda has already achieved food self-sufficiency and more. Exports of foodstuffs are again being licensed; there is now a surplus of grain and rice.

Next season's coffee crop is likely to be better than any in a decade. Tea exports have been resumed. Cotton production has increased fivefold since 1980. Sugar production is advancing rapidly. Tobacco is again being widely grown. The runaway inflation has been not only curbed but substantially reduced. Illegal currency transactions are no longer the order of the day. Imports are flowing into the country. The electricity supply is back almost to normal, and the water situation in Kampala has been greatly improved.

Yet, important as these advances are, there is still a very long way to go before the country is brought back to the point at which Amin took over. For those with fixed salaries, there is still a tremendous disparity between earnings and the cost of daily living. Surprisingly, there is little evidence of hardship caused by inability to pay for basic necessities — a fact due, largely, to the townsmen's ability to cultivate their own plots or to draw supplies from their families in the countryside.

Although the government has substantially increased wages and salaries, they are still hopelessly inadequate. But the government is constrained by IMF conditions from doing more. Only when the economy advances further will it be possible to bring salaries closer into line with living costs and to

Early 1980 photo purporting to show current conditions of prisoners at Luzira

put an end to malpractices within the public service.

Meanwhile, there is still a proper concern about human rights in the country. For example, the courts remain hopelessly clogged, and so those charged with criminal activities and hundreds of detainees remain in prison for unacceptably long periods without having their cases heard.

However, the numbers in prison have been substantially reduced. There are now fewer than 2,000 (criminals and detainees) in Kampala's prisons. Contrary to reports, conditions in these prisons are — and I use the word carefully — exemplary, a view based on my personal observations in the prisons and interviews with prisoners (see sidebar). Nevertheless, it would be cruelly misleading to suggest that all is well, especially in military interrogation centers.

Fortunately, President Obote is no less concerned about breaches of human rights than his critics. Unlike many other African leaders, he does not seek to cover up malpractices, or to deny that they exist. Unusually he is on the side of campaigners for human rights. What upsets him, and rightly so, is that his efforts to cooperate with bodies like Amnesty International are not appreciated.

A former British solicitor-general and member of Parliament, Peter Archer, who recently carried out an investigation on behalf of the House of Commons all-party Parliamentary Group for Human Rights, reported that his mission was "greatly facilitated by the government of Uganda, which was cooperative to a degree far in excess of what I have experienced from many governments in similar situations." He quotes the president as having told him: "Human rights are our most important weapon." He concluded by saying: "One of the contributions that the West can make is to temper its criticisms with a measure of understanding, to recognize and encourage real attempts at improvement, and to attempt to lower the emotional temperature and diminish the feelings of insecurity. People are most prone to misjudge others when they feel they have themselves been misjudged."

Those of us who are involved in the not always easy task of foreign reporting can do no better than to be guided by this magisterial advice offered by so distinguished a parliamentary champion of human rights. Coupled to this advice I would add the need for foreign reporters to equip themselves with an adequate knowledge of Uganda's history and to reflect the many different points of view that are readily available in this remarkably open society. □

INSIDE A UGANDAN JAIL

The Luzira maximum-security prison was one of the most notorious places during Amin's tyranny. It recently gained fresh notoriety when a reputable London Sunday paper published a picture showing a row of Belsen-like prisoners and claimed it represented conditions there. In fact, the picture was one in a series taken by the International Red Cross early in 1980, after liberation, for purposes of fund raising.

I recently spent the best part of a day going through Luzira as well as other prisons and the women's prison. I was allowed to go wherever I wished (having been briefed beforehand by critics of the government about what I should see), including the condemned cells, the punishment block, and the wards for detainees. I was also free to talk to any prisoners. These included Balaki Kirya, one of the top leaders of the armed opposition; Captain Marko, who was in charge of training Museveni's Uganda Resistance Movement (URM) military wing in the bush in Buganda; and the British-born Major Bob Astles.

Balaki Kirya, who is in his 60s and suffers from asthma and high blood pressure, complained to me that his weight had dropped 20 kilos because the food did not agree with him and that he was not getting the medicine he required. The prison doctor, who was accompanying me, asked why Kirya had never before complained to him.

Apart from this single complaint, none of the scores of other prisoners I talked to spoke in anything but highly favorable terms about the prison staff, the quantity of food (they naturally wanted a greater variety), and general conditions. A few told me that the only ill-treatment they had received was while in the hands of the army before coming into prison.

Bob Astles, lean and vivacious as ever, spoke of the transformation of the prison in the two years he has been there. His one wish was for European-style food, but he said that being the only European prisoner he understood why this was not possible "Apart from the frustration of prison life," he volunteered, "I will be sad to leave this place." Having been acquitted of a murder charge, he now faces a number of lesser charges. "One thing I am sure of," he said, " is that I will get justice in the courts."

The prison yards and cells were sparklingly clean—much cleaner than many places in Kampala. The prison hospital conditions are certainly better than those at Mulago (the leading teaching hospital in Uganda). A number of workshops have been rehabilitated—tailoring, printing, furniture making, among others. But the outstanding achievements by prisoners are the farms and gardens. Most of the prison food is grown by prisoners, and there is beginning to be a surplus for the outside market. There are plans to drain a swamp and, with Chinese help, to start paddy rice growing.

It sounds propagandistic to sum up my impression by saying that the conditions I saw in the once-notorious top-security prison stand up well to those in prisons I have visited in other countries—and seem to be vastly preferred to those in prisons in Washington, D.C., if Gordon Liddy's account of them is to be believed.

Far from the need to hide anything about Luzira, the Obote government could do worse than to make it a showplace for their achievements to visitors interested in human rights. Of course, there are shortcomings, but none that touches directly on the immediate well-being of the prisoners.

—C.L.

Milton Obote,
President of Uganda

INTERVIEWED BY COLIN LEGUM

AFRICA REPORT: People say you've changed your policies since coming back to power, and that your ideology isn't the same as before.

OBOTE: The practical problems we are faced with now are very different from those we faced in the 1960s. When we came to office in December 1980, the economy was virtually in ruins, whereas in the 1960s we were dealing with a prosperous economy. We were therefore able in the 1960s to begin to experiment with some ideas regarding the best methods for the distribution of wealth. Uganda's reality today is not the distribution of wealth but the problem of poverty—how to overcome poverty and how to create wealth. Over the years, even before liberation in 1979, we of the Uganda People's Congress [UPC] gave much thought to the appropriate reconstruction policies to be adopted after liberation. We came up with the present set of policies whereby, in short, the whole economy is open to the peasant farmer, the parastatals, and the private sector, and where a minimum of restrictions are imposed by government. We intend to follow this shift in policy, not as an experiment or a temporary measure, but because our own analysis of the situation, made in the depths of exile and now at home, has led us to decide that this is the correct policy.

AFRICA REPORT: Can I ask you next about how you see the security situation in the country? What progress are you making in training the army and the police?

OBOTE: Well, I would be expected to say that the security situation in Uganda is good, and that the position has improved. In fact, I am satisfied that the worst security situation that could have befallen Uganda has passed.

Since 1971, Uganda has passed through three stages of insecurity. First, during the Idi Amin era, state organs became institutionalized organs of death and terror to brutalize the people of Uganda. Second, when that era ended in 1979, it was replaced by a period of political factionalism when we saw the recruitment of men, not so much into the Uganda army as into armed wings of political factions. When one faction lost power, its armed wing left the Uganda army—Yusuf Lule's in June 1979, Godfrey Binaisa's in May 1980, Yoweri Museveni's in December 1980. On leaving the army, each of these armed wings left with their arms and uniforms, and resorted to violence as a means of acquiring power. The third stage began before the general elections of 1980 when there was a level of insecurity in virtually every district of the country; that situation is now reversed. This is not to say that we have eliminated all aspects of insecurity, but it is true that the government is now on top of the situation.

AFRICA REPORT: Your opponents give me a somewhat different picture of the security situation than the one just painted. They tell me that there are today 300,000 displaced Baganda in and around Kampala, that there are some "no-go" areas, and challenge me to go to a place called Kapeka. What is your answer to such claims?

OBOTE: Let's take the points one by one. First, there is the question of displaced Baganda, which is not a correct representation of the situation. Last year in the Luwero District, it was those you call my opponents who began their campaign of terror by harassing a large number of persons in that district, that is to say all those who were known not to be opponents of the UPC. The only people who were to be tolerated in those areas were those Baganda and Banyarwanda who were opposed to the UPC.

A large number of people were killed, and others had to leave. They were the first groups of displaced people since the elections. Some went to live in other districts while

President Obote *(third from left)* **at independence celebrations: Uganda's problems are "how to overcome poverty and create wealth"**

some were put into temporary settlements at Luwero Town and were looked after by the Ministry of Rehabilitation. A large population left the area, and those you call my opponents placed landmines on roads leading to certain areas, including Kapeka which you mentioned.

For a time it was difficult to go to that area, and buses and commercial vehicles were blown up by landmines. Security forces, however, have been going to those areas following not roads but paths. If you are willing to travel along those paths, it will be possible for you to be taken to visit places like Kapeka.

AFRICA REPORT: What of those who have been displaced?

OBOTE: Many have returned to their homes. But I would say that it is not the right description to give displaced persons a particular tribal connotation. The fact is that of all the areas in the country, Buganda is the one that has been more infiltrated by other tribes than any other part of Uganda. It is therefore not possible for anybody to conduct a terror campaign in a large part of Buganda that will only have the Baganda as victims.

It is the tactics of those you call my opponents to force people to leave their homes. The usual form is to spread leaflets in an area and order the people to leave it because it is declared a war zone. This is usually followed by selective killings of leaders inhabiting the area. These tactics have been used in different parts of Buganda, including suburbs and the environs of Kampala.

AFRICA REPORT: What is the position now in the troubled areas?

OBOTE: All we are dealing with now in those districts are pockets of around five to 15 people, cut off from whatever was their unit. They may shoot at a vehicle on the road, or they may still have a few landmines, which they plant and then run away. But to say there are "no-go" areas is not true.

AFRICA REPORT: What of the allegations made about the undisciplined state of your army?

OBOTE: Yes, we have said this ourselves from time to time. We have had incidents of harassment of the people by soldiers. When such incidents come to the notice of senior officers, immediate action is taken and, as a result, a large number of soldiers either have been dismissed or are now in jail. Unfortunately, a false picture has been presented by some journalists and others, as well as by my opponents.

AFRICA REPORT: To what do you attribute what you call misrepresentation, or misreading, of your position in Uganda?

OBOTE: A false scenario has been built up ever since the Moshi Conference in March 1979 where the plans were made to liberate Uganda from Idi Amin. Stories were put around that President Nyerere harassed interim President Lule and then his successor, President Binaisa; that the Uganda army is an Acholi/Langi tribal army sworn against the Baganda and the west Nilers; that the UPC never won the elections of December 1980; and that, without the support of the army, UPC government would not last a week, let alone a month.

In early 1981, virtually all the diplomats in Kampala and others were saying that my government would not last beyond July 1981. This was because Tanzania had announced in March that its troops would be withdrawn by the end of June. But they all had their assessments wrong because they thought my government had no dependable security force and that the anti-government forces were powerful enough to take over the government. Well, they have all been proved wrong.

To sum up, I would say that the opponents of my government have deceived themselves and, perhaps, their own friends in believing they ever had any chance of overthrowing my government. They have no cause to which the people of Uganda would rally. They are known to be politically incompetent persons who never led a serious movement. They have no support except for thugs in and around the city of Kampala.

AFRICA REPORT: Let us turn now to the allegation that the Baganda are being persecuted by the UPC. How can you reassure the Baganda that you have not been following a policy since the days of the Kabaka in discriminating against the Baganda? And what can you do, through your declared policy of reconciliation, to bring the Baganda fully into the national political system?

OBOTE: When the question is put like that it is very difficult to answer because we do not have, nor do we believe in, separate policies for different areas—whether in economic, security, or social services, or in any other field. The best I can do to answer the charge is to state as a fact that we do not have separate policies for Buganda and for other parts of the country, and to point out that the projects and other services in which we are engaged are allocated as much to Buganda as to any other area.

If you want to analyze the present structure in the country—whether it be the civil service, government, or commerce and industry—you will find that the Baganda are still holding dominant positions in all these fields. So where does discrimination come in?

AFRICA REPORT: Is there not a possible link between the allegations made of Baganda persecution and the heavy military pressures applied in some of the Buganda districts?

OBOTE: Your question can be answered from the standpoint of two different developments: the one was what happened at the Moshi Conference, and the other from the nature of the propaganda that was used after liberation, which was against democracy and for the personal rule of whoever happened to be in control at the time.

The Moshi Conference was supposed to be a unity conference; instead it was divisive. The violence that came after the fall of Amin was an offshoot of Moshi. This was because some of the people who came into government after liberation, and through Moshi, had the sole idea of entrenching themselves in office by force of arms. They pursued a deliberate policy of keeping out other Ugandans, not only from the processes of government, but also out of Uganda. This was the famous policy of exclusion that apparently rested on the idea that the more you had done for liberation, the less likely you were to return, let alone participate, in the new administration. I was the leading candidate in that scenario, followed by the entire UPC leadership.

This is proved by the utterances and actions of the first two interim presidents. On the day Yusuf Lule was sworn in, he made a speech in Luganda saying, "This is now our turn." At that time the country was ready for unity and looking for leadership towards achieving that goal. Now, here was the new president talking to one section of the community and telling them that this was now their turn: "Fellow Baganda and other Ugandans"—that was how he opened his speech in Luganda. By the time he was constitutionally voted out of office in June 1979, he had already sown the seeds of division and subsequent insecurity in Buganda.

The next president, Godfrey Binaisa, had great prospects of being accepted throughout Uganda as a leader, but he dissipated that goodwill by turning out to be more of a businessman than a president. Although he had himself been excluded from the Moshi Conference, he became one of the greatest exponents of exclusion, which brought bitterness, resentment, and a public outcry for his removal.

Thus, the first two administrations, under Lule and Binaisa, reflected the reality of Moshi, whose platform was divisive rather than unifying.

We now come to the second important point. Throughout the period from the fall of Amin to the December 1980 elections, the Baganda were made to believe that the strongest man in Uganda was somebody called Yoweri Museveni, that he had divisions of troops, and that he could order anything. When elections approached, he did not want to accept them but different forces compelled him to. Having lost the elections (with only one of his own party elected), he decided to "go to the bush," that is, to take up arms against the government.

Among the Baganda, more than among any other group, one found the belief that with Museveni in the bush, the government couldn't last. In fact, Museveni found he was able to operate only in Buganda and nowhere else—not even in his home area.

The Baganda are now beginning to see that they were misled and cheated. Still there are those, even among senior Baganda, like Lule himself, who continue to believe that Museveni has a lot of troops and can overthrow the govern-


Photo: T.R. Lanener

Ugandan army: Undisciplined soldiers "have been dismissed or are in jail"

Photo: Camerapix

Former President Lule sowed "the seeds of division and insecurity in Buganda"

ment in a matter of weeks, if not days. It is this fallacy that has led them to forecast repeated dates for the fall of the government. Those days have come and gone without anything happening.

It is really a tragic situation where a 70-year-old academic, who has never played an active role in political movements, holds on to the coattails of an adventurer like Museveni, who has no popular base anywhere in the country.

Fortunately for the unity of Uganda, it is now not the army or the police, but the ordinary people in the villages of Buganda who are at the spearhead in routing the bandits.

AFRICA REPORT: Let us look at the question of human rights. I hear and read a lot about the treatment of people picked up for questioning and of detainees in interrogation centers as well as in prisons.

OBOTE: The procedure now is that the police operate with the army. In all cases, anybody apprehended by the army is usually kept for only 24 hours and then handed over to the police. Those are standing instructions. The army only gets the operational information from a suspect after which he is handed over to the police, who then continue with their normal investigations.

AFRICA REPORT: Are the police present during the time of the army's interrogation?

OBOTE: When a suspect is apprehended by the army in an operational area, he is questioned and the suspect is then handed over to the police.

AFRICA REPORT: Well, I have had a lot of experience with army interrogating centers—in Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, Algeria, and elsewhere. Nobody, no matter who he happens to be, behaves very well in situations where the security forces see themselves as fighting against terrorism. It is an unpleasant fact of this kind of situation.

OBOTE: We are aware that since liberation in 1979, something similar to what you have described has happened, but not on the scale you may have experienced elsewhere, or anything like that which has been portrayed by our opponents or by the media abroad. The important point to note is that these happenings are now under control, and this is the great difference between the past and the present.

AFRICA REPORT: I have been hearing complaints in the last few days about people being dispossessed of their homes around Republic House [an army establishment on Namirembe Hill], Kampala.

OBOTE: That is an issue we are taking up. It is true that something went wrong and it is being sorted out.

AFRICA REPORT: There has been, as you know, a great deal of adverse reporting about what is supposed to go on in your prisons. Is it possible to discover the truth about these allegations?

OBOTE: We recently had a visit from an American delegation, including a personal assistant to Senator Mark Hatfield. Although it is not usual to do so, we offered them an opportunity to visit prisons, but the offer was not taken up because they felt they didn't have the time to do so.

Our opponents and even reputable newspapers have resorted to using photographs that I can only describe as unbecoming fabrications, allegedly taken in our prisons. In one such case, a picture published in the London *Sunday Times*, which was supposed to represent conditions now, was in fact taken early in 1980, soon after liberation, when Binaisa was in office.

We have nothing to hide. You are free to go and see for yourself.

AFRICA REPORT: I would like to return now to an earlier question about the progress you have made in training your army.

OBOTE: The government is not being given credit for what has already been achieved. It inherited an army recruited under difficult circumstances and without political leadership worth speaking of. Training has been carried out in three categories. First and foremost, there is the training inside the country that goes on practically daily in every unit, and which is done by Uganda officers and noncommissioned officers [NCOs].

Secondly, we have arranged for training officers and NCOs with friendly countries—in Africa, the Commonwealth, and in North America. Some of these are instructors who will return home to continue as such.

Thirdly, there is the Commonwealth military training team, which is training instructors who will return to their units to continue as instructors.

AFRICA REPORT: Where do the North Koreans fit into this picture?

OBOTE: They have come in because they have given us pieces of artillery and are engaged in training artillery personnel. □

AFRICAN UPDATE

Monitoring economic and political developments around the Continent

January-February 1983

Africans condemn U.S. policy of 'linkage' in Namibia talks

Thirty-one African nations meeting in Tripoli issued a condemnation of U.S. policy on the Namibia independence negotiations after Vice President George Bush said parallel withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia and Cuban troops from Angola was "the key" to an international independence settlement.

Bush made the comment, in what was billed as a major policy speech, in Nairobi during his seven-nation tour of Africa in November. African leaders he visited just about unanimously rejected what they termed "linkage" of the two issues, which is not included in UN Security Council resolution 435. Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi called the formula an excuse for delaying progress on Namibia's independence. A U.S. State Department official, however, continued to say off the record that the African leaders' rejection was just political rhetoric because "practically all . . . support our effort for a negotiated settlement."

It has been previously reported that Washington's contact group partners—France, West Germany, Britain and Canada—have disagreements over "linkage" and there was speculation the group could break up if the negotiations do not produce results soon.

The South African government, like the Reagan administration, remains confident of a settlement. After talks in Washington with Secretary of State George Shultz, Foreign Minister Roelof Botha said he believed there was a better than 50 percent chance of getting Angola to agree to sending home the Cubans. Botha said his government would be satisfied with a phased withdrawal of the Cubans, so long as the phases matched those in resolution 435 dictating the removal of South African troops from Namibia. But Botha said all the Cubans must leave, while 435 allows 1,500 South African troops to remain during the elections.

However, doubts about Pretoria's commitment to an international solution were again raised when Botha, in briefing the cabinet on his U.S. talks, brought up the issue of Jonas Savimbi's Unita, the insurgent movement in southern Angola that is supported by South Africa. Savimbi said in November that Washington had assured him, presumably during his 1981 visit, that it wanted the Cubans out and "a coalition, let us say reconciliation government, in Angola."

Doubts were also fueled by two recent comments by Prime Minister Pieter Botha, who said that if it were clear by the end of February that internationally supervised elections were not going to take place in Namibia, "an internal election will have to be held to elect proper leaders under new circumstances." London *Times* correspondent Michael Hornsby said this could mean the South Africans are operating on the assumption there is not going to be a settlement at least for the next two years.

Botha said, on another occasion, "South Africa cannot allow that the red flag be forced down the throats of the people" of Namibia and it was for this reason that Pretoria was taking "such a strong stand against the Cubans in Angola and pressing inexorably that they, together with SWAPO and the African National Congress, should leave southern Africa before South Africa could deliberate on the future of Namibia." (*Financial Times*, November 30, 1982; *Washington Post*, November 27 and 29, 1982; London *Times*, November 27, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, November 20, 1982; Johannesburg Radio, November 18, 1982.) □

Pretoria denies anti-union campaign

The Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, has flatly denied there was a security police campaign to crush independent black trade unions.

The denial was made following the revelation that the security police failed to obtain a single conviction for criminal offenses against 20 trade unionists detained in the past 18 months. One unionist (Dr. Neil Aggett) died in detention and another was still being held last month as a state witness in a political trial.

The last three detained unionists were released in November. Alan Fine, a white official of a registered catering union, was acquitted of Terrorism Act charges when the magistrate ruled that the state had failed to prove its case that Fine had assisted the banned African National Congress.

Thozamile Gqweta and Sisa Njikelana, president and vice president respectively of the unregistered South African Allied Workers' Union, were freed—after 11 months in security police detention—when Terrorism Act charges against them were suddenly dropped. The trial for the two officials had been postponed eight times since May and no indictment was ever presented. Between them, they have been detained 11 times in three years by the South African and Ciskei homeland security police.

Sam Kikine, the union's general secretary who was detained for six months and appeared in court nine times before charges were dropped, said SAAWU had never done anything illegal. "The detentions were part of a government plan to crush

Continued on next page

WESTERN AFRICA

Benin

• In late November, the International Fund for Agricultural Development signed a $9 million loan agreement for a **rural development** project in the Atacora province in northwest Benin. The $15 million project, designed to benefit 28,000 small scale farmers, is also being funded by a $4 million loan from OPEC's fund for international development. Benin will contribute the remaining balance of $2 million. The project is the first provincewide effort to raise food crop and livestock production in the region. (OPEC news agency, November 18, 1982; *West Africa*, November 15, 1982.)

Chad

• Attempts to reconvene the abortive 1982 **OAU summit** in Tripoli in November failed over the issue of whether to admit Hissene Habre, Chad's head of state since June, or Goukouni Woddeye, the former president of the transitional government overthrown by Habre, as representative of the government of Chad.

Habre's Armed Forces of the North captured the Chad capital of Ndjamena in June from Woddeye's troops, who had been supported by Libya. Habre was sworn in as Chad's President in late October, and formed a broadly based 31-member cabinet.

Late in 1982, Habre accused Libya of continuing to engage in destabilization activities against his government, although Tripoli was to have withdrawn all its troops from the northern part of the country in 1981 when they were replaced by an OAU peacekeeping force.

At the November OAU meeting, Col. Muammar Qaddafy, who was to have become the organization's chairman for one year, refused to seat Habre's delegation—a move which resulted in the second failure to reach a quorum of 34 of 50 member countries. The original summit, scheduled for August, broke down over the Western Sahara issue. African nations split over whether Polisario's self-proclaimed government, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, should be seated as a member nation, status it had been accorded by OAU secretary-general Edem Kodjo last February. A compromise whereby the SADR voluntarily absented itself from the reconvened meeting enabled the November meeting to be scheduled.

Although many observers characterized events in Tripoli as spelling doom for the OAU, African leaders reportedly agreed to convene a special meeting in Addis Ababa to resolve the Chad and Sahara issues before the 1983 summit, to be held in Conakry, Guinea.

Meanwhile the Chad foreign minister, Idriss Miskine, accused Libya of preparing a military assault on northern Chad, in collusion with the "rebel government" led by Woddeye. And a 70-nation UN-sponsored conference on emergency aid for Chad, held in Geneva in late November, resulted in $185 million in pledges, well below Chad's $350 million request. (*Washington Post*, November 27 and December 1, 1982; *West Africa*, November 29, 1982; London *Times*, November 26, 1982.)

The Gambia

• In mid-October, the Gambia lifted the curfew imposed following the July 1981 coup attempt, but the state emergency declared at that time was maintained. In addition, the Gambian authorities were continuing to try those arrested in the wake of the abortive coup. While 800 of the 1,084 people arrested at that time have been released, 60 people were standing **trial** in November and 97 were still in custody awaiting trial. In late November, an appeals court began hearing appeals against 19 death sentences including that of Papa Cheyassin Secka, lawyer and leader of the opposition National Liberation Party. Last June, the court rejected 16 death sentence appeals.

And in November, Senegal and the Gambia formed a joint 11-member cabinet—part of the administrative machinery of the Senegambian confederation formed in the aftermath of the coup attempt. Senegalese President Abdou Diouf is the chairman, and the Gambian President Dawda Jawara, his deputy. Five of the nine ministers are Senegalese. (*West Africa*, November 15 and 29, 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, November 15, 1982.)

Ghana

• In late November, the military government of Flight Lieut. Jerry Rawlings successfully put down a **coup attempt** launched by disaffected members of the armed forces. The abortive coup came only a month after a clash between rival factions within the ruling Provisional National Defense Council, during which it was rumored that one of the six PNDC members, Sgt. Alolga Akate-Pore, had seized power. The government admitted

Unions *continued*

the union," he said. "But they failed."

At the time of the union crackdown (some three dozen students and community workers were also detained), le Grange said the detentions were necessary to counteract a "countrywide conspiracy against the state." The government then tried—as revealed in testimony at the Aggett inquest of interrogations of detainees—to link the black trade union movement with the ANC. In defending the crackdown last month, le Grange did not mention the ANC but said black unions were targets for the banned South African Communist Party (which has ties to the ANC) because the party wanted to politicize workers.

Le Grange also attacked the U.S. State Department, which, he said, "readily commented on South Africa's security legislation" when "5,000 incidents of terror or sabotage had occurred in the U.S. in 1978 alone." The attack came on the eve of a visit by Elliot Abrams, State's human rights assistant secretary, who was scheduled to hold talks with government officials, including le Grange.

Later, in apparent response to continuing allegations that security police routinely use torture in interrogations, le Grange issued new instructions to the police specifically barring torture and "inhuman or degrading treatment" of political detainees. (Johannesburg *Star*, November 13 and 20, 1982; *Sowetan*, November 15, 1982; London *Guardian*, November 15, 1982.) □

that a "serious threat to the revolutionary process" had been defeated.

The November attempt came only a day after the resignation of Brig. Joseph Nunoo-Mensah, the number-two man in the armed forces, who said "the going has been tough and chaotic and any hope of bringing about an improvement in the standard of living of our people remains doubtful."

Rawlings maintained that the two plots against his government were linked and a number of arrests, including that of Akate-Pore, had been made. The scene of the November uprising—the Gondar barracks on the outskirts of Accra—was reported back to normal a few days after the attempt, but some of the rebels were still being sought. (*West Africa*, November 9, 1982; London *Guardian*, November 25 and 27, 1982; Accra Radio, November 24, 1982.)

Guinea

• In late October, the Société Mixte Aredor-Guinea signed two financial agreements totaling $45.5 million, including a $43 million commercial bank credit, to help fund the development and exploitation of diamond and gold reserves in the Baule basin.

Aredor, a joint venture between Guinea, which holds 50 percent of the equity, and a consortium of British and Australian firms, expects to produce 300,000 carats of quality stones per year, grossing an estimated $60 million at current market prices. Thus far, $30 million has been spent on the project, slated to begin producing in 1984.

In other news, President Sekou Touré paid an official visit to Canada in early November where he held talks with Prime Minister Trudeau and hosted a seminar on investment in Guinea for Canadian businessmen and government officials. Touré said Guinea was looking for "serious partners over the long-term to develop the country, even with private capital." The Canadian government, which in 1981 designated Guinea as a "focus country" for aid, responded with a pledge to expand relations.

At the same time that Guinea is molding a new international image and seeking foreign investment from the West, Amnesty International released a list of 78 political prisoners it believes have died while in detention in Guinea, in addition to naming some 2,800 others who have "disappeared" since their arrests in the 1970s. A year ago, representatives from the London-based human rights organization visited Guinea, where they met with Touré and other government officials, and inspected Guinean jails. They failed to solicit an official response on the fate of the prisoners. Touré, on the other hand, said, "There are no political prisoners in my country," only "traitors," adding, "I am one of the leading spokesmen for human rights." (*West Africa*, November 8, 15 and 22, 1982; *Financial Times*, October 29, 1982; Kenya *Weekly Review*, October 8, 1982.)

Guinea-Bissau

• Following last year's cabinet reshuffle, which reportedly drew pro-Western elements into the ruling PAIGC, Guinea-Bissau has begun to chart a new economic course away from the Soviet-style approach of Vasco Cabral, the former minister of economic cooperation and planning.

The country's first four-year development plan (1983-1986) was introduced in late October, with the broad objectives of controlling Guinea-Bissau's external debt, catering to basic needs, reducing the food deficit, and setting the foundations for longer-term economic growth.

Since Cabral's departure from the government, Victor Freire Mateso, the current Minister of Economy and Finance and former governor of the national bank, has pursued a policy of fiscal restraint, reorganized the state trading organization in a manner conducive to private initiative, and upgraded producer prices in agriculture. Guinea-Bissau, however, remains heavily reliant on foreign financial assistance, and during the plan period, some $110 million a year will be required.

Meanwhile, President João Bernardo Vieira has been pursuing a conciliatory policy with respect to Portugal, its former colonizer. Portuguese President Antonio Ramalho Eanes visited Bissau in early December. And following a late October visit by Portugal's secretary of state for cooperation and development, Luis Fontoura, agreement was reportedly reached on the main issue of contention between the two nations. The frozen assets of former Guinea-Bissauan residents will be released to Portugal as well as any property owned. A number of joint ventures in the agricultural and industrial spheres were also signed. (*West Africa*, November 8, 1982; Lisbon Radio, October 28, November 1 and 3, 1982.)

Ivory Coast

• British chocolate manufacturers held talks with the Ivorian government in Abidjan in late November on ways to improve the quality of the country's cocoa. The British cocoa industry is expected to increase imports from the Ivory Coast, the world's largest producer, as the output of their main suppliers, Ghana and Nigeria, has been falling steadily.

The delegation's leader, Paul Williamson of Cadbury Schweppes, said the gap in the quality of Ivorian cocoa was not that great. A team of British scientists was carrying out soil, climatic and processing tests in the Ivory Coast to determine means of upgrading the quality.

However, the Ivorian Agriculture Minister, Denis Bra Kanon, said his country would not invest in improvements unless the cost were covered by a long-term trade agreement. (*Financial Times*, November 23, 1982.)

Liberia

• In early November, the head of state, Samuel Doe, reshuffled various cabinet-level positions in an effort "to infuse new dynamism in government and improve general efficiency." Citing "glaring irregularities in ministries and agencies," Doe sacked three of the country's top bureaucrats and combined several security agencies creating a new Ministry of National Security, with the task of overseeing an anti-corruption campaign.

Among those dismissed were the president of the National Housing and Savings Bank, Hilary Dennis; his counterpart at the Agricultural

Development and Cooperative Bank, Adolph Yancy; and the managing director of the Liberia Water and Sewer Corp., Hermann Greene. Doe cited an erosion of public confidence and an "uncompromising rise in the rate of corruption" as the primary factors behind the government reorganization.

In other news, the IMF agreed to lend Liberia $88.7 million over the next year in balance of payments support to strengthen the country's economic adjustment program for 1982-83. In the past two years, Liberia has met most of the IMF's criteria and managed to decrease its negative rate of real growth. The economic adjustment program focuses on the adoption of appropriate management policies and supply-oriented growth measures, and on improving the efficiency of state enterprises. (*West Africa,* November 8 and 18, 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin,* October 31, 1982; Monrovia Radio, October 20, 1982; London *Guardian,* October 7, 1982.)

Mauritania

• In November, Mauritania's Minister for Rural Development, Mohamed Ould Amar, appealed for international aid over the next year to avert a **famine.** A disastrous 1982 harvest was blamed on poor rainfall, with some areas receiving only 20 percent of normal precipitation. In some regions, 90 percent of crops were destroyed by pests, such as crickets.

The year's agricultural output was estimated at less than 20,000 tons, compared with 78,000 in 1981. Food requirements include 114,000 tons of cereal, 17,500 tons of milk powder, and 9,000 tons of butter. Amar said the situation was comparable in severity to the drought of 1972-73. (*Le Monde,* November 4, 1982.)

Nigeria

• In late October, over 450 people died in the northeast city of Maiduguri, in **religious rioting** which spread to Kaduna and Kano. The unrest began when police attempted to arrest followers of the late Alhaji Mohammadu Marwa, leader of an extremist Moslem sect, who died in the 1980 Kano riots which claimed 4,000 lives.

A revolt ensued and riot police were called in to quell the unrest. President Shehu Shagari warned that his government would deal "ruthlessly" with any future outbreaks. Following the 1980 riots, about 1,000 of Marwa's followers were jailed, but never tried and were released from prison in October. They regrouped in Maiduguri and Kaduna.

In late November, Shagari banned the Marwa sect, saying "the religious fanatics who caused the violence early this month act contrary to the provisions of the constitution and of the criminal laws, respecting neither the police nor the army." Jail terms of from three to five years will be meted out to those found to be a member or leader of the sect. (London *Times,* November 1 and 20, 1982.)

Senegal

• Senegal's Minister of Finance and Economics, Ousmane Seck, resigned in November following allegations of **corruption** in the satirical monthly paper, *Le Politicien,* against which he has filed a libel suit.

Seck, who was replaced by Mamadou Toure, the Planning and Cooperation Minister, said he would rather resign than embarrass President Abdou Diouf in his campaign against "illicit enrichment," particularly only a few months before the February presidential elections.

And in other news, the IMF approved a $58 million standby credit facility for Senegal in late November to aid in the recovery of its foreign exchange position. The Senegalese government also arranged a debt rescheduling agreement with 11 Western countries—the Club of Paris. Some $80 million was affected by the rescheduling, which gives Senegal nine years to begin repayment of principal and interest due through July 1983. In 1981, 20 percent of Senegal's export revenues, earned primarily from peanuts, was used to finance debt service obligations. (*Financial Times,* December 1, 1982; *Wall Street Journal,* December 1, 1982; *Le Monde,* November 9, 1982.)

Sierra Leone

• British Caledonia Airways (BCal) suspended its service to Freetown in October over Sierra Leone's refusal to permit **repatriation of profits,** worth more than $7 million. The country inaugurated a new national carrier, Sierra Leone Airlines, but is currently paying the Jordanian line, Alia, to undertake some of its international flights. British authorities have told Sierra Leone that it cannot implement its service to the UK until BCal's money is released.

And in other news, Sierra Leone's recently appointed Minister of Finance, Salia Jusu-Sheriff, presented a revised 1982-83 Appropriations Act to parliament in mid-November, updating the budget put forth last June. The overall budget deficit was reduced from June's estimate of $236 million to $144 million. World Bank officials visited Sierra Leone in November to negotiate a structural readjustment loan. And the IMF granted a $3.7 million loan in November, which was promptly remitted as payment for a previous debt. (*West Africa,* November 8, 15, 22 and 29, 1982; Freetown Radio, November 9, 1982; *Financial Times,* November 6, 1982.)

Togo

• In October, President Gnassingbe Eyadema carried out a major **cabinet reshuffle,** replacing the Minister of Planning and Administrative Reform, Koudjolou Dogo, considered a leading member of the government, with Koffi Walla, Trade and Transport Minister. Six other ministers including Justice, Rural Planning, and Education were changed.

Foreign Minister Anani Kuma Akakpo-Ahianyo and Economy and Finance Minister Tete Tevi-Benissan held onto their posts. Eyadema retained the defense portfolio. (*Jeune Afrique,* October 10, 1982; *Le Monde,* October 5, 1982.)

Upper Volta

• In late November, the military government of Col. Saye Zerbo was **overthrown** by a group identifying themselves as "non-commissioned officers and men of the rank and file" who charged that Zerbo had "betrayed the trust of the people" and "made the paramilitary forces an agent of terror against Upper Voltans." After occupying the presidential palace, seizing Zerbo and quelling minor resistance by troops loyal to the former head of state, the newly formed Provisional People's Salvation Council (CPSP) closed the country's borders, blacked out telecommunications links and imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew.

Maj. Dr. Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo, a former army medical officer who ran a pediatric clinic in Ouagadougou, was named chairman of the CPSP and Col. Some Yorian Gabriel was reconfirmed as chief of staff of the armed forces, a position he held under Zerbo.

Officials of the Zerbo government and its internees (including Gen. Sangoule Lamizana, the former President ousted by Zerbo in November 1980) were placed under house arrest. In Ouedraogo's first press conference, he mentioned a forthcoming reorganization of the government, pledged that military rule "will not last more than two years," and said the coup's death toll was five, including Minister of Interior Nezien Badembie. A government decree also re-established the legal rights of workers; all unionists suspended under Zerbo will be permitted to reapply for work "through usual channels."

Observers indicated that the fourth coup in Upper Volta's post-independence history did not appear to mark any dramatic change in policies, and that thus far there is little to differentiate Ouedraogo's positions from those of his predecessor. (*West Africa*, November 15, 22 and 29, 1982; Ouagadougou Radio, November 18, 1982.)

EASTERN AFRICA

Kenya

• The outspoken former Vice President of Kenya, **Oginga Odinga**, who was ordered to remain in his home town of Kisumu in October, was further restricted in November.

Odinga was confined to house arrest and prohibited from having any visitors; only his wife and cook were allowed to stay in the house. Odinga's son Raila, who worked for the civil service, has been charged with treason for alleged participation in the coup attempt. His trial and those of several others were expected in February.

An MP who was detained five days after the abortive coup, Koigi Wamwere, has reportedly not been heard from since and is being held at a secret detention center.

Two Kenyan air force corporals were sentenced to death for treason, convicted of having played leading roles in the August 1 events. More than 750 other servicemen were charged with mutiny and received sentences ranging from dismissal from the air force to 25 years in jail. (London *Times*, December 7, 1982; Kenya *Weekly Review*, November 12, 1982; London *Observer*, November 7, 1982.)

Madagascar

• President Didier Ratsiraka was easily **re-elected** in November to another seven-year term in a race against a veteran politician, 80-year-old Monja Jaona, who later charged electoral fraud. Ratsiraka polled 80 percent of the vote, but there were some surprises.

The capital city, Antananarivo, split almost 50-50 between the two candidates, with about one-third of the voters abstaining, while Jaona won 65 percent in Nossi-Be, the stronghold of Ratsiraka's interior minister. The rural areas of Madagascar voted overwhelmingly for Ratsiraka.

The main issues in the campaign were the poor state of the economy and charges of corruption and incompetence leveled by Jaona and regularly reported by the government-controlled media. (Kenya *Weekly Review*, November 26, 1982; *Africa Confidential*, November 17, 1982.)

Mauritius

• Paul Berenger, the Mauritian Finance Minister and leader of the majority party, the Mauritian Militant Movement, managed through some tactical moves to get his government to accept the **International Monetary Fund**'s harsh prescription for reviving the island nation's collapsing economy.

Apparently, no one else in the 19-man cabinet, especially the five ministers belonging to the MMM's minority coalition partner, the Mauritian Socialist Party (PSM), accepted the IMF's austerity regimen, which includes a sales tax, elimination of rice subsidies, limits on wage hikes and devaluation of the currency. So Berenger resigned from the cabinet, precipitating a crisis since he is the founder and chief architect of the MMM and forged the party's stunning victory in the June elections. But the IMF diet is a long retreat from the promises made by the MMM during its election campaign and a turnaround for Berenger, who had been considered something of a radical.

However, when the crisis ended, Berenger was still Finance Minister and the PSM, which has 18 seats in the parliament compared to the MMM's 42, was out of the government.

The island's economic woes—stemming mainly from the collapse of world prices for sugar, which accounts for two-thirds of Mauritian export earnings—also forced the government to backpedal on its promise to cut ties with Pretoria. South Africa is the main source of imports and the backbone of the growing tourist industry. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, November 15, 1982; *Jeune Afrique*, November 3, 1982; London *Observer*, October 24, 1982.)

Seychelles

• Another **plot** to use South African mercenaries to oust the Seychelles' government of President Albert Rene was uncovered in October.

The alleged plotters—Seychellois exiles—were exposed when tapes of their conversations in a London hotel room were revealed to the press. Credence was lent to the seriousness of the plot a few days later when two mercenaries were killed in the Seychelles, apparently blown up by a bomb they were handling.

Reportedly, the plotters were the same group of exiles behind the abortive coup attempt in November 1981. Most of the mercenaries involved in that attempt were convicted in South Africa and served four months in prison. (London *Sunday Times*, November 7, 1982; Kenya *Weekly Review*, October 29, 1982.)

• The Reagan administration has named the first **resident ambassador** to the Seychelles: David Fisher, a career diplomat. Previously, the ambassador to Kenya also represented the U.S. in the Seychelles.

Chester Crocker, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, said the move means that "we take the country seriously, that we have important interests there and that we intend to make certain that we do everything that we can do to have the necessary access which is implicit in having an ambassador resident in the country."

Somalia

• Several foreign correspondents in Somalia have noted there was little evidence of the war to repulse the **Ethiopian invaders,** begun in July, and one correspondent was briefly detained by Somali security police for saying the regime of President Mohamed Siad Barre had exaggerated reports of battles.

Richard Wells, a correspondent for the British daily, *Guardian,* and the BBC, reported that he had seen no sign of fighting during a government-arranged tour of a battlefront. Subsequently, he was expelled from Somalia.

The significance of this incident is that the Ethiopian invasion into Somalia (which in 1977-78 had invaded and then withdrawn defeated from Ethiopia's Ogaden region) sparked pleas by Siad Barre for the U.S. weapons deliveries promised in 1980. The Reagan administration then airlifted "defensive" weapons to Somalia.

The reason for Ethiopia's sudden attack, observers said, was that dissident groups operating in Somalia with Ethiopian backing were able to convince Addis Ababa that there would be a popular rising against the Somali government, which did not occur. Meanwhile, Siad Barre has issued at least two appeals to the Ethiopian government to negotiate a settlement of the conflict. (*Economist,* November 13, 1982; London *Guardian,* November 8, 1982; Kenya *Weekly Review,* October 29, 1982.)

Uganda

• According to foreign press reports, the issue of **Rwandans** living in southwest Uganda had been divisive within the Ugandan government before the expulsion of some 60,000 (see **Rwanda,** page 33).

Many ministers, including Vice President Paulo Muwanga, reportedly had favored returning the Rwandans. The expulsions took place when both President Milton Obote and the minister responsible for refugees, Dr. James Rwanyarare, were out of the country.

Reliable reports said that two ministers in the government and an MP went to southwest Uganda, called a meeting of the district council and ordered the district commissioners to evict the Rwandans, many of whom had lived in Uganda for generations, occupied civil service jobs and had aroused resentment. The youth wing of the ruling Uganda People's Congress and local chiefs then drove out all people with Rwandan connections, forcing them to abandon their property and belongings. (London *Guardian,* November 4, 1982; Kenya *Weekly Review,* October 29, 1982.)

CENTRAL AFRICA

Burundi

• In a November **cabinet reshuffle,** the Minister of Justice, Laurent Nzeyimana, was named to replace Edouard Nzambimana as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. Eleven new ministers were named, including for the first time two women.

The cabinet reorganization came shortly after the country's first general elections in 17 years, in which 95 percent of the electorate voted. Voters chose 52 deputies to the parliament from among 104 candidates selected by the sole political party, the Union for National Progress (Uprona). Three government ministers and three Uprona secretaries-general failed to win seats. Thirteen additional members are to be chosen by President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza. Presidential elections are scheduled to take place before 1985. (*Le Monde,* November 10, 1982; Agence France-Presse, November 9, 1982.)

Cameroon

• **Ahmadou Ahidjo,** Cameroon's President for 24 years, resigned from office unexpectedly in early November, handing over power to Prime Minister Paul Biya. No reason was given for the resignation, although ill health was suspected.

Biya, 49, Prime Minister since 1975, was not expected to differ in any fundamental policy directions from his predecessor. Biya reshuffled the cabinet upon assuming office, changing seven of the 29 ministers and named the former economy and planning minister, Bello Bouba Maigari, as Prime Minister. The only newcomer to the government, Tori Limangana, filled Maigari's vacated post.

Ahidjo remains chairman of the sole political party, the Cameroon National Union, with Biya as vice-chairman. (*West Africa,* November 15, 1982; Kenya *Weekly Review,* November 12, 1982.)

Central African Republic

• The first **official visit** by the Central African head of state, Gen. André Kolingba, to Paris in late October marked an improvement in what had been rocky relations with President François Mitterrand's government.

During the visit, French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson praised Kolingba for leading a "rigorous" economic recovery program and said, "We back the legitimate authority in the Central African Republic."

France, the country's largest aid donor, provides about $14 million a year in budgetary support. Aid will continue at the same level for 1983, although Kolingba was quoted as saying it would increase.

Relations between the two countries had deteriorated following the March attempted coup by opposition leader Ange Patasse, who was given asylum in the French embassy in Bangui, and the August arrest of another opposition leader, Dr. Abel Goumba, who was rector of the University of Bangui. Meanwhile, Kolingba has pledged to launch the country on the road to civilian rule by 1985, when a national assembly will be set up. (*Le Monde,* October 27 and 29, 1982; London *Guardian,* October 28, 1982.)

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Rwanda

• According to October reports, tens of thousands of Rwandans have been driven from their homes in southwestern Uganda, where many had been living since before Rwanda's independence in 1960, and forced to flee into crowded **refugee camps** near the Uganda-Tanzania border. Thousands were reported to have crossed into Tanzania or Rwanda rather than enter the Ugandan camps.

The UN High Commission for Refugees protested to the Ugandan government over the "horrifying" campaign against the Rwandans, a prime motive for which was said to be the theft of property. Local chiefs and representatives of the ruling Uganda People's Congress were said to be behind the evictions.

The Ugandan government issued a denial of the charges made by UNHCR representative Tom Unwin, calling his statements "grossly irresponsible." But in late October, following a meeting between Ugandan and Rwandan government officials, Uganda agreed to keep the refugees within certain zones, and Rwanda pledged to integrate its nationals who are refugees and facilitate the repatriation process.

The refugees are for the most part those who fled early ethnic unrest in Rwanda, and therefore from that government's point of view, are now Ugandan nationals. Some 35 refugees reportedly committed suicide after giving up hopes of being repatriated into Rwanda. An additional 8,000 were reportedly huddled at the border, and Rwanda, having already taken in 45,000, was refusing any more unless UNHCR would guarantee their resettlement elsewhere. (*Le Monde*, November 11, 1982; London *Guardian*, October 15 and November 9, 1982; Kampala Radio, October 28, 1982; *New York Times*, October 10, 1982.)

Zaire

• President Mobutu Sese Seko re**shuffled** his cabinet in early November, naming Kengo wa Dongo prime minister to replace Nsinga Udjuu, and Kamanda wa Kamanda, Zaire's representative to the UN, as foreign minister. Munongo Mwenda Msiri, interior minister under Moise Tshombe in the early 1960s and one of the most powerful members of the ruling People's Revolutionary Movement central committee, regained his prior post, as well as that of deputy prime minister.

The political changes took place shortly after elections to the national assembly, in which only 60 of the 310 members of parliament retained their seats.

Meanwhile, in October, Zairian political exiles in Brussels announced the formation of a coalition led by former Prime Minister Nguza Karl-I-Bond in opposition to Mobutu's 17-year rule. Called the Congolese Front for the Restoration of Democracy (FCD), the group is composed of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress, 13 of whose members of parliament are in prison in Zaire, and the Party for Popular Revolution. (*Le Monde*, November 8, 1982; Kinshasa Radio, November 5, 1982; Kenya *Weekly Review*, October 8, 1982.)

• President Mobutu Sese Seko won two gestures of **foreign support** in November—one from U.S. Vice President George Bush, and the other from Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

Bush, who stopped in Kinshasa on his seven-nation African tour, announced agreement to begin negotiations leading to a bilateral investment treaty. A Zairian delegation was scheduled to visit Washington for talks in December. It appeared that the rift in U.S.-Zaire relations stemming from criticism of Mobutu during a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee aid hearing was smoothed over by the Vice President's visit.

And Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir characterized his visit to Kinshasa as "our return to Africa." Zaire resumed diplomatic relations with Israel in 1982, broken off along with those of several other African nations in 1973 over the Arab-Israeli war. Some 85 officials, private businessmen and technicians made the trip with Shamir. An $8 million arms sale was concluded, as well as agreements on economic cooperation in agriculture, development of water, fishing and natural resources, and improvement in health services. Shamir said he hoped his visit would act as a "catalyst for renewing relations with black Africa." (*New York Times*, November 24 and December 5, 1982.)

Zambia

• Facing the most serious **foreign exchange crisis** since independence, the Zambian government instituted strict controls on currency outflows in October. Remittances abroad by expatriate workers were suspended as well as holiday allowances and educational allowances for primary school students outside the country.

In addition, the central bank was given sole authority for the issuance of business travel allowances, curtailing them sharply. Imports were effectively blocked by tight restrictions of licenses.

The foreign exchange crisis was brought on by low world demand and prices for Zambia's copper and cobalt exports. Total export earnings are absorbed by debt servicing and oil requirements. As a result, the Zambia government was pinning hopes on the successful conclusion of negotiations with the IMF undertaken late last year. A three-year loan facility worth $856 million was signed in May 1981, but suspended a year later, with only $321 million issued, because Zambia failed to meet IMF conditions. (*Wall Street Journal*, December 1, 1982; London *Times*, November 30, 1982.)

NORTHERN AFRICA

Algeria

• The 2,000-mile trans-Mediterranean **gas pipeline** linking Algerian gas fields to Italy and other European markets was scheduled to open in November following the accord reached between Algeria and Italy last September. Algeria is now able to commence exporting about eight billion cubic meters of gas, or 20 percent of its current export total, via the pipeline.

Last September, Italy followed France and Belgium in signing a long-term contract for Algeria's liquefied natural gas (LNG) at about 20 percent above current market prices. The agreements include a cost-parity formula, tying the LNG price to that of Algeria's crude oil. The *Financial Times* observed that the three European nations "agreed to pay a political price" for the LNG "partly because they did not wish to see their diplomatic and commercial relations with Algiers worsen, but also because all three states are relying to a greater or lesser extent on the volumes contracted."

However, Algeria has lost several contracts with other European and American buyers. El Paso of Houston, which had signed a long-term contract for 9.8 billion cubic meters of LNG in February 1981, withdrew completely from negotiations last year, as have Tenneco and Consolidated Natural Gas. On the other hand, Distrigas of Boston and Panhandle of Texas may lose their re-negotiated agreements with Algeria if they fail to win U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Committee approval. (*Financial Times*, November 5 and 17, 1982; *Jeune Afrique Economie*, November 14, 1982.)

Egypt

• In early December, the **trial** of 280 people charged with conspiracy to overthrow the Egyptian government after the assassination of President Anwar Sadat opened in Cairo. Most of the defendants were said to be associated with the Moslem group, Al Jihad, and were also being held in connection with the violence in the upper Egypt city of Asyut in October 1981 when 70 people were killed. Officials said the trial will take several months and it may be a year before verdicts are issued.

And in late October, Ismat Sadat, the brother of the late President, was arrested and charged with a series of corruption counts, stemming from allegations that he accumulated his multimillion dollar fortune by using the family name to buy influence and impose "royalties" on firms. Sadat's trial, popularly called the "second trial of Anwar Sadat," is being conducted before the controversial court of ethics, established by the late President to deal with political dissidents. Sadat's arrest came in the wake of an anti-corruption sweep ordered by President Hosni Mubarak, who declared "no one is above the law and the courts must do their job free of interference." Sadat maintains his innocence, and said "They say I got rich through fraud. If the government can find any of these riches, it can keep them." (*New York Times*, November 1, December 5 and 7, 1982; *Financial Times*, December 6, 1982; London *Times*, November 29, 1982.)

Libya

• According to a mid-November report, more than 100 officers in the Libyan army were arrested after a **coup plot** against Col. Muammar Qaddafy failed. The plan, to have been hatched upon the Libyan leader's return to Tripoli in early November from visits to China and North Korea, was uncovered in advance, leading to the plotters' arrests by security forces.

Qaddafy paid his first official visit to China in late October, for "political" talks with Premier Zhao Ziyang. Although the substance of the talks was not made public, observers indicated they were indicative of China's softening in attitude toward countries with strong pro-Soviet links. Despite Qaddafy's characterization as a "Moslem fanatic" by a Chinese newspaper a year ago, he received a warm welcome in Beijing. A Chinese official remarked, however, "He is welcome, but we don't know why he has come." (London *Guardian*, October 27 and November 16, 1982.)

Morocco

• The U.S. and Morocco held joint **military maneuvers** for the first time ever in November, the most recent indication of the strengthening of relations between the two countries.

The maneuvers took place near Al Hoceima on the Mediterranean and ships from the U.S. Sixth Fleet, 1,000 Marines and Moroccan infantrymen and naval officers carried out the exercise.

Algeria issued a condemnation of the military activities, characterizing them as a "provocation." Algeria supports the Polisario Front, Morocco's adversary in the Western Sahara war, and has become increasingly critical of the bolstering of U.S.-Moroccan military ties, which has taken place under the Reagan administration's policy of developing a "strategic consensus" of moderate north African states. (London *Times*, November 1, 1982.)

Sudan

• The Sudanese pound was **devalued** by 31 percent against the U.S. dollar in November, the second devaluation in a little over a year. According to the Finance and Economic Planning Minister, Ibrahim Monem Mansour, measures were undertaken to minimize the effects of the devaluation on the cost of living. He said there would be no increase in the price of sugar, medicine, wheat and flour.

Mansour, noting a $570 million balance of payments deficit, said, "This is a gap we have to bridge by whatever possible means, by obtaining aid from brothers, friends, and international institutions." In February 1982, the IMF granted Sudan a $224 million one-year loan for the agricultural sector, plagued by "financial disincentives."

And in other news, President Gaafar al-Nimeiry and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak signed a "charter of integration" in Khartoum in October, aimed at strengthening bilateral cooperation in foreign policy, security and economic development fields over the next ten years.

The charter provides for the formation of four new institutions: the higher executive, composed of the two presidents; a joint 60-member Nile valley parliament—a consultative, not legislative body; a general secretariat; and a joint fund, which hopes to attract financing from international lending institutions, aid donors and public and private Arab investors. The agreement follows an earlier integration pact signed in 1974 but never realized, and a mutual defense treaty in 1976. (*Financial Times*, October 12 and November 16, 1982; Sudanese news agency, November 15, 1982; *Economist*, October 23, 1982.)

Tunisia

• Despite an IMF forecast which projects a less favorable economic future over the next few years than for the last decade, Tunisia recently launched its sixth five-year **development plan**, envisaging a $13.2 billion investment. The plan aims to create 324,000 jobs and achieve a 6.7 percent rate of economic growth.

About 40 percent of the investment will come in the form of loans, aid and equity from foreign sources, about half from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf states via five new joint Arab investment banks. The remainder will come from European sources.

The 6.7 percent projected rate of growth is below the 1977 level, due to an expected decline in income from oil and gas exports and a decline in the agricultural sector. Agriculture will receive 19 percent of the investment and an emphasis is also placed on encouraging the development of local industry. (*Financial Times*, October 25 and November 16, 1982; *Le Monde*, November 8, 1982.)

Western Sahara

• Mohamed Abdelaziz was elected president of the **Saharan Arab Democratic Republic** (SADR), Polisario's self-proclaimed government, during the front's fifth "popular congress" held in the Western Sahara in October. Some 600 Saharan delegates, as well as representatives from the Algerian and Mauritanian governments, met to formulate a plan of action and elect a seven-member executive committee and a 25-member political bureau.

The increasing military ties between the U.S. and Morocco, Polisario's adversary in the Western Sahara war, were condemned in the conference's final declaration, as well as American attempts to "attack and limit the Saharan peoples' achievements" in international organizations, particularly the OAU.

The SADR was granted member state status in the OAU by secretary-general Edem Kodjo in February 1982. However, the August OAU summit collapsed, having failed to reach a quorum of member nations, because of a dispute over the seating of the SADR. The SADR willingly absented itself from the November reconvened OAU meeting in Tripoli, but the second attempt to hold the summit failed over who should be considered the legitimate representative of the government of Chad. (*West Africa*, November 15, 1982; *Economist*, October 23, 1982; *Le Monde*, October 19, 1982.)

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Botswana

• Following President Quett Masire's visit to **Zimbabwe** in November, the two governments signed cooperation agreements establishing a joint commission to strengthen political, economic and social ties. The bilateral agreement also reaffirmed both countries' commitment to working within the framework of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference. The commission will meet at least once a year alternately in each country.

Zimbabwe's concerns over "dissidents"—guerrillas in the former Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army of Joshua Nkomo, who have been carrying out looting, robbing and murders in Matabeleland province—seeking refuge in the remote border areas of Botswana were also a topic of discussion between Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and Masire. (Gaborone Radio, October 31, 1982; Harare Radio, October 27, 29 and 30, 1982.)

Lesotho

• Late in 1982, the **Lesotho Liberation Army** (LLA), the military wing of the exiled Basotho Congress Party (BCP) led by Ntsu Mokhehle, renewed its campaign of violence aimed at unseating the government of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan.

In November, the Minister of State for Cooperation and Rural Development, Lekhoana Jonathan, narrowly escaped death after a landmine exploded under his car, seriously injuring his chaffeur and bodyguard. The bodies of two men, said to be LLA members, were found near the scene of the attempted assassination, armed with Soviet AK-47 rifles, explosives and literature. In addition, the wife and son of Matete Majara, Minister of Water, Energy and Mining, were seriously injured when a landmine blew up their car. In another incident, a bus detonated a landmine near the South African border, injuring seven people.

The recent incidents, according to observers, mark the start of a campaign to disrupt the general elections promised by Jonathan. Pheta Matlanyane, a member of the Lesotho opposition who lives in South Africa, commented that the LLA will sabotage polling booths in order to force Jonathan to hold elections under international supervision. Jonathan, in power since 1970, refused to accept the outcome of the last elections when Mokhehle received the majority of the vote. (Johannesburg *Star*, November 13 and December 4, 1982; Johannesburg Radio, November 10, 12 and 15, 1982.)

Malawi

• The Malawi government denied that it has any connection with the **Mozambique National Resistance** (MNR), the Pretoria-backed guerrilla movement opposed to the rule of President Samora Machel, after having been charged with aiding the group in an article in the Zimbabwe *Herald* in early October. In rebutting the charges, the Malawi government said it has "no connection whatsoever with the so-called MNR, nor does it have any sympathy for the objectives which this group's activities may seek to achieve."

The increased activities of the MNR in Mozambique's northern provinces has had a crippling effect on Malawi's trade. Supplies of much needed fertilizer for this year's crop lie stranded in Beira and gasoline shortages have resulted from the MNR's disruption of transport lines from the coast of Mozambique to the interior. Malawian President Kamuzu Banda said his country was suffering "social and economic hardships" as a result of MNR activities, adding, "Can Malawi really be said to be supporting its own destabilization?" (Kenya *Weekly Review*, October 15 and November 8, 1982; Zimbabwe *Herald*, November 6, 1982; Johannesburg Radio, October 11, 1982.)

South Africa

• The 1982 report on U.S. companies operating in South Africa has given good grades to only a third of the **Sullivan principle** signatories and urged the firms to give more attention to the training and advancement of their black employees.

This year, the Arthur D. Little management consulting firm rated only 32 firms as making "good progress" in implementing the Sullivan principles, which include equal pay for equal work, community development and training for blacks. In last year's report, the worst previous record in the four years of Little ratings, 34 companies got top marks.

This year, out of 146 signatories, only 93, employing 69,000 people in South Africa, responded to the questionnaire. Last year, 113 out of 144 responded.

In the top category were Kodak, Ford, General Motors and most of the computer companies. Union Carbide received the highest score. One computer company, NCR, was downgraded from the top in 1981 to a failing grade this year ("needs to become more active").

The Sullivan signatories are increasingly supporting community programs, the report said, donating about $1 million in the year ending last June on scholarships for non-employees. (*Financial Times*, November 24, 1982.)

• A gasoline storage depot in Natal province owned by Mobil Corp.'s South African subsidiary was seriously damaged in a **sabotage attack** in November, presumably carried out by guerrillas belonging to the banned African National Congress. Five explosions were heard at the depot, which is only some 60 miles southwest of the Mozambican border.

Guerrillas also attacked a house occupied by army conscripts near Komatipoort, injuring two of them. The attackers fired rockets and AK-47 automatic rifles at the house.

In another incident, three armed black men were shot and killed by the counter-insurgency and security police in northern Transvaal. The shootings followed the woundings of two police officers by the men when their car was stopped at a roadblock. (*Sowetan*, November 9, 16 and 20, 1982.)

• A schools inspector and a clergyman have been **detained** by security police in Ciskei, the homeland made "independent" by Pretoria a year ago.

D.F. Kunjuzwa, the inspector, was arrested shortly after writing an assessment of Ciskei's progress since independence. Ciskei's leader, Lennox Sebe, had suggested that civil servants analyze the homeland's record. Colleagues of Kunjuzwa said his mistake was to criticize mildly Sebe's brother, Lieut. Gen. Charles Sebe, who is head of the security police.

The cleric, Rev. Themba Sibeko, was detained after returning from his job inside South Africa where he works for a self-help organization called Shade. (Johannesburg *Star*, November 20, 1982; *Sowetan*, November 16, 1982.)

Poverty continues in black homelands

The five black homelands in South Africa and the four made "independent" by Pretoria registered very little economic growth in the last five years, according to figures released by the government's Bureau for Economic Research.

Worst off were the homelands of KwaZulu, QwaQwa, Gazankulu, KwaNgwane and KwaNdebele, where per capita gross domestic product (GDP) rose from R44 (about $40) in 1975 to only R46 in 1980, adjusted to take into account inflation. Of the 6.2 million people in these homelands, more than 5.2 million had no measurable income in 1980. Half the population had no education.

In the "independent" homelands, the per capita GDP increase was slightly better: R70 to R85 in Transkei, R117 to R159 in BophuthaTswana, R50 to R69 in Venda, and R50 to R70 in Ciskei. Only one million of the 4.6 million people in these homelands had jobs in 1980. (Johannesburg *Star*, November 20, 1982; *Sowetan*, November 18, 1982.)

• White South Africans are revealed as more militaristic than had generally been believed, according to a poll sponsored by the South African Institute of International Affairs.

The survey showed that whites, whether *verligtes* or *verkramptes*, overwhelmingly approved of the government's hardline approach to neighboring countries.

In fact, on the issue of Namibia's independence, for which UN-sponsored negotiations have been going on for five years, whites seemed more hawkish than their government. More than 70 percent believed that Pretoria can win militarily against the SWAPO insurgents, and 60 percent opposed direct negotiations with SWAPO.

The government's constant warnings of a "total onslaught" against South Africa were felt to be true by 80 percent of the respondents. The same percentage supported military raids on guerrilla bases in neighboring countries, and 72 percent said South Africa should not export food to nations that harbor anti-apartheid guerrillas.

While English-speaking whites were only marginally less hawkish than Afrikaans-speakers, the survey found that those who believed in using the military against neighbors also tended to support the "reformist" racial policies of Prime Minister Pieter Botha.

The survey's author, Deon Geldenhuys, wrote that "South Africa finds itself so drastically at odds with the international community over its domestic political arrangements," a point illustrated perhaps by the survey finding that 71 percent of whites believe that blacks have no reason to take up arms against the government. (Johannesburg *Star*, November 20, 1982; Johannesburg Radio, November 16, 1982.) □

• The West German automaker BMW has built an upholstery plant in the BophuthaTswana homeland made "independent" by Pretoria. It is the first major investment by a foreign company in the homeland, which is best known for its Las Vegas-style entertainment complex, Sun City.

The factory is actually near Pretoria, in one of the sections of BophuthaTswana that borders on South Africa's major urban industrial areas. BMW's managing director acknowledged that setting up the plant was politically significant because it was in line with the South African government's policy of decentralizing industry to neighboring "countries."

In the last two years, German companies have been aggressive investors in the South African economy, with direct investment of about $20 million in 1981 and about $12.5 million in the first half of 1982. Arno Baltzer, president of the South African-German Chamber of Trade and Industry, said this direct investment—which he called the "tip of the iceberg"—"clearly shows how attractive South Africa is to German investment." (Johannesburg *Star*, November 6, 1982; *Sowetan*, November 1, 1982; Johannesburg Radio, October 28, 1982.)

• Only 51 percent of adult black South Africans are literate, while the figure for whites is 87 percent, according to the recently published 1980 census statistics.

Over-all, South Africa's literacy rate is 60.5 percent, poor by world standards. The other racial breakdowns are: Coloureds (mixed-race people), 69.6 percent, and Asians, 77.8 percent.

The country's 1980 population was put at almost 25 million, comprising 17 million blacks, 4.5 million whites, 2.6 million Coloureds and 821,000 Asians. According to the census, only 22 percent of the 17 million blacks are South African citizens—the others are considered homeland citizens. (Johannesburg *Star*, November 13, 1982.)

• The London-based Consolidated Gold Fields, which is controlled by the giant Anglo American-De Beers conglomerate of South Africa, has discovered gold in California.

Consgold's U.S. subsidiary, Gold Fields Mining Corp., announced that the new field, near the Arizona border, may contain up to 4.25 million ounces of pure gold, worth about $1.6 billion at present prices. The field is small by South African standards but may be one of the biggest producing gold mines in the U.S. Consgold operates another American field, in New Mexico, which produced 50,000 ounces of gold in 1981. (London *Guardian*, November 11, 1982.)

• A survey of one million South African workers has shown that despite efforts to improve the wages of blacks, the gap between pay for whites and for blacks is at its widest since 1978. The survey was conducted by the Port Elizabeth Consulting Group.

Since 1981, white earnings increased on average by 14 percent while black earnings rose 20 percent. Because white wages are far higher than blacks' earnings, the improvement was not considered significant. There were dramatic increases in black pay in 1976-77, the survey said, but employers found that continued big increases would cause them serious financial difficulties.

The survey also said that South African companies were doing more to end racial discrimination than the multinationals which subscribe to U.S. and EEC codes of conduct. (*Zimbabwe Financial Gazette*, November 5, 1982.)

• **Herman Nickel**, the U.S. ambassador to Pretoria, and Charles Wick, director of the U.S. Information Agency, have both recently expressed qualified support for Prime Minister Pieter Botha's plan to give limited political power to Coloured (mixed-race) people and Asians—but not blacks.

Nickel said the constitutional proposals were the thin edge of the wedge and could signal the beginning of further reforms. Wick, on a tour of Africa in November, including South Africa, said the plan could eventually draw blacks into the political process. "I have no reason to believe the government is not sincere," Wick said. "How quickly it is going to do it is hard to judge."

South African critics of the reform plan say it is designed to prevent the black majority from ever sharing political power. Nickel's remarks were called "regrettable" by Sheena Duncan, president of the Black Sash service organization. She said that since the Transkei homeland was made "independent" in 1976, eight million blacks have been stripped of their South African citizenship and blacks would continue to lose their citizenship under the Botha plan. (Johannesburg *Star*, November 13 and 20, 1982.)

• The government-set up **community councils** in three Soweto-area townships came under fire in November for rejecting a $70 million private sector loan to build much-needed housing. Virtually all the councils' finances for various township projects are provided by Pretoria.

The money was offered by the Urban Foundation, a private philanthropy funded by South African and foreign businesses, primarily to develop 2,500 houses and 800 apartments in the Protea North section of Soweto. The rest of the money would have been divided between the councils of Soweto, Diepmeadow and Dobsonville for other housing projects.

The Soweto council turned down the loan, saying it should be given "with no strings attached," and complaining that the foundation has "ties" with the Committee of Ten. That unofficial body, headed by Dr. Nthato Motlana, has been at odds with the Soweto council ever since it carried out a successful boycott of the voting for council members. The council was elected by only 6 percent of registered voters. (*Sowetan*, November 2, 8 and 10, 1982.)

Swaziland

• Swaziland has served notice on the **African National Congress**, banned in South Africa, that it "cannot afford to allow its territory to be used as a springboard for launching armed attacks against other states," in the words of Prime Minister Mabandla Dlamini.

In a televised speech, Dlamini said his government was re-introducing the 60-day detention-without-trial law for anyone who participates in an illegal meeting. Earlier, the Swazi chief justice directed that all cases involving ANC members charged with possessing weapons must be referred to the high court, where stiffer penalties would be imposed.

In October, nine ANC members were charged with weapons' possession, for which convictions used to draw a fine, usually paid by the ANC representative.

Dlamini's speech followed several sabotage incidents in South Africa in the area bordering on Swaziland and Mozambique. South Africa claims that ANC guerrillas pass through Swaziland on their way from training camps in Mozambique to attack targets inside South Africa. After the Komatipoort attack in November, Maputo charged that South African troops were massing on the border in preparation for a punitive raid into Mozambique.

Dlamini emphasized that Swaziland would continue to grant political asylum to "bonafide refugees" from South Africa and issued "a strong appeal" that they "respect the laws and territorial integrity of our country." (Mbabane television, November 22, 1982; *Sowetan*, November 16 and 22, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, November 13, 1982.)

Zimbabwe

• The Zimbabwe government published its long-awaited three-year transitional **development plan** in late November, projecting an annual growth rate of 8 percent, and envisioning $7.9 billion in investment—59 percent in the public sector, of which 23 percent will go to manufacturing, 14 percent to transport and 13 percent to agriculture. Some 63 percent of the investment will be financed from domestic sources and the remainder from abroad in the form of grants, loans, foreign investment and public-sector borrowing.

The state will take a greater role in the country's economic development priorities via the creation of two new institutions—the Zimbabwe Development Bank and the Zimbabwe Development Corporation. Nonetheless, the government hopes to attract more foreign investment along the lines of the successfully concluded $30 million joint venture with the American company, H.J. Heinz. In what is the first major foreign investment since independence, Heinz will take a 51 percent share in Olivine Industries, a major Harare-based producer of edible oils, and the government the remaining 49 percent share.

In October, the government came out with a set of investment guidelines, bowing to international pressure. The government had maintained previously that the Lancaster House constitution contained adequate insurance against expropriation or nationalization of foreign assets. The guidelines dropped a previous insistence on no more than a 49 percent foreign stake in any Zimbabwean venture, now allowing up to 80 percent foreign equity. Foreign investment will be welcomed in new ventures in rural areas, in joint ventures with domestic interests, and in ventures using local raw materials and labor which generate exports or transfer new technology. (*Financial Times*, October 14 and November 30, 1982.)

DOCUMENT

"A New Partnership with Africa"

BY GEORGE BUSH

The past 10 days have been important to me. President Reagan asked me to carry our message of friendship and of deep commitment to a true partnership with the nations of Africa. We are determined to work with the leaders of this continent in the quest for peace and progress. My visit has been particularly satisfying. It has permitted me to see old friends and make new ones.

I have exchanged views with some of Africa's most impressive leaders. I have had an opportunity to see and feel firsthand the diversity of this beautiful continent and to sense its great promise. In several days I will be able to share with President Reagan and my fellow Americans the thinking of Africa's leaders on the major issues important to us.

I should come as no surprise to you that President Reagan thought it especially important for me to visit Kenya. Since Kenya's independence, close ties have bound our two countries and peoples. Your nation has been admired in the United States for its political and economic record.

We share important values—democratically elected governments, civilian rule, freedom of press and religion, a multiracial society, and an economy guided by the principles of free enterprise. Kenya has been a strong advocate for peace in the world. Your country and its distinguished president have led the Organization of African Unity during a year in which Africa faced many problems. Because Kenya has served this year as spokesman for Africa's aspirations, I am especially pleased to speak from the city of Nairobi to all the people of Africa. I particularly wish to speak about the hopes and values that grew up during Africa's struggle for independence and that will guide Africa as she faces the future. Chief among these values is the desire for freedom—freedom of nations from outside pressures and freedom of people within nations. That desire gave birth to the OAU, thanks to the recognition that without regional cooperation the peace, progress, and independence of Africa would not be maintained. Such cooperation is not an easy goal given the great variety of peoples, circumstances, and cultures in Africa. This tremendous diversity, coupled with the harsh impact of today's global economic recession, underscores more than ever the importance of African regional cooperation for common purposes.

There is no justification for despair about Africa's future. Despite trials and setbacks, the history of Africa since the independence era has included significant progress, especially in the development of human resources. Education, talent and energy, such as that represented by this very audience, prove that Africa has the capacity to make good the promise of its enormous potential in spite of the many problems it faces. Thanks to the abilities and values that men and women like us bring to the everyday task of national development, Africa can enter its third decade of independence with confidence in the future.

Because we believe that Africa has the capacity and will to be master of her destiny, President Reagan has, over the past 20 months, worked to forge a new and mature partnership with the nations and peoples of Africa. We speak of a partnership that begins with mutual respect. We speak of a partnership that includes honest discussions. We speak of a partnership that recognizes that each nation must do its part if the goals we share are to be achieved. Partnership is a two-way street based on shared goals, common principles, and mutual interests.

These principles have guided our administration's policies toward Africa. The time is ripe for the sort of candid dialogue I have been privileged to experience on this trip. And I have learned a lot. A top priority in our diplomacy is southern Africa, where the choices between regional strife and regional cooperation are stark. The inescapable need for peaceful change is challenged by a climate of fear, distrust, foreign intervention, and cross-border violence.

The United States is committed to the search for constructive change in southern Africa. In cooperation with our allies and in direct response to the will of Africa's leaders, the United States has engaged its influence and resources in the effort to bring Namibia to independence. We are determined to help turn the sad tide of growing conflict and tension in southern Africa. We are fully committed to work for a settlement that will enhance regional security and assure Namibia's early independence on terms acceptable to its people, Africa, and the world at large.

Let me state again that we are fully committed to an independent Namibia. I can assure you that significant progress has been made. A year ago the settlement effort was relaunched with vigor. Since then the United States and its Western Contact Group partners have worked closely and intensively with all parties. This past July, agreement was reached on the principles that will guide Namibia's Con-

This is the text of a speech delivered by Vice-President Bush in Nairobi, Kenya, on November 19, 1982, during his tour of seven African countries.

stituent Assembly. Since then substantial progress has been made on remaining issues concerning the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435. We are close to agreement on implementation of the UN plan. Remaining issues can be resolved.

From the outset of this administration's engagement in the peace process, we have emphasized that there are vitally important issues arising from the situation in Angola that must be resolved if Namibia's independence is to achieved. For seven years Angola has been engulfed in war, its territory invaded, its progress towards a better economic future stalled. Thousands of Cuban troops remain in Angola. Wouldn't Angola and the region itself be better off with all foreign forces out of that country—South African forces and Cuban forces?

This history of foreign conquest in Africa is replete with examples of armed foreigners who came with the professed purpose of helping others but who stayed in order to help themselves. The withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola in a parallel framework with South Africa's departure from Namibia is the key to the settlement we all desire. In the final analysis, it is also the surest way to guarantee Angola's long-term security and independence. The United States wants the earliest possible independence for Namibia. At the same time, the United States wants an end to Angola's suffering and to the dangerous cycle of violence in the region. My government is not ashamed to state the U.S. interest in seeing an end to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. Their introduction seven years ago tore the fabric of reciprocal restraint between the United States and the Soviet Union in the developing world. Such restraint is vital if African regional security and the global balance are to be maintained.

We recognize there will be no agreement unless all the parties know that their security is protected. We also recognize there will be no settlement unless each party is prepared to make the concessions necessary. If the challenge is accepted, we believe, peace can be achieved and a brighter future for southern Africa can begin. The substantial progress already made is based on diplomatic partnership of equals in which all parties share burdens. That partnership remains vital in our continuing efforts for peace. In the search for that peace, the United States seeks constructive relations with all the states of southern Africa. We are building bridges of communication to each nation in the region, including South Africa. However, we will not ignore or disguise our strong belief in the importance of justice and equality before the law. Apartheid is wrong. It is legally entrenched racism—inimical to the fundamental ideals of the United States. America's history and America's future can only be understood in terms of our commitment to a multiracial democracy in which all citizens participate and from which all benefit. The rule of law, the principles of consent and participation in the political process, and the right of every human being to citizenship that reflects these principles are to Americans a sacred trust. We will not betray this trust. Nor can we escape reality; if there is to be security in southern Africa, South Africa must be involved in shaping it. If there is to be constructive change in South Africa, South Africans of all races—not foreigners—must be the ones who shape the pattern of that change. The United States is working for constructive change in ways that benefit all South Africans. Our actions match our words, as our deepening involvement in expanding educational, social, and economic opportunities for black South Africans demonstrates. We also believe there is a relationship between the security of southern Africa and the pace of peaceful change within South Africa. We do not believe that armed conflict must be the road to justice, and we doubt that it can be the road to lasting freedom and well-being.

The United States believes that it can be helpful in advancing the frontier of freedom and observance of human rights, not only in southern Africa but in Africa as a whole. Without respect for human rights, there is a great risk that Africa's enormous human potential will be wasted. Fear and intimidation keep people from working to achieve their aspirations, from contributing to the common good, and from pursuing the democratic principles and ideals that are denied for too many in the world today. Narrowing political participation by their citizens can be highly counterproductive. African nations that have devised their own national democratic institutions broaden public participation in government, protect the integrity of the individual, and expand the frontier of economic freedom for the ultimate good of all.

In Kenya respect for individual rights is written in your constitution. Democratic institutions that embody the democratic process have been established. They are an essential framework for lasting stability. Experience in Africa and elsewhere clearly demonstrates that the abuse of power, the suppression of diversity, and the denial of individual rights leads only to instability and a loss of confidence at home and abroad. My visit to Africa has shown me encouraging examples of African nations that are building their own institutions to broaden political participation and advance the frontier of freedom. We realize, however, that nations cannot reap the benefits of individual freedom in an environment of insecurity. We attach high importance to strengthening Africa's security and are prepared to be Africa's partner in building the necessary conditions for security.

We have no interest in an East-West confrontation in Africa; such a confrontation increases the threat to world peace. The goal of the United States in Africa is to help establish a framework for restraint and broad rules of conduct that discourage the use of outside force in African conflicts and encourage peaceful settlement of conflicts in the region. In this area our goal is consistent with the goals enshrined in the charter of the Organization of African Unity.

At the same time United States is deeply sensitive to the threats individual nations and the regions of this continent face and probably will continue to face. Internal instability, often fueled by outside interference, and long-standing border and ethnic disputes tax heavily the resources of African governments. The United States has no mandate to act as a policeman in Africa, and it seeks no such role. But neither do we believe that the sovereignty of African nations will be preserved if the West is unable or unwilling to respond to the legitimate defense needs of its friends in Africa. The United States intends to be a reliable partner both in working with our friends on a long-term basis to meet these needs and in responding to their urgent requirements in emergency situations. We have done so in the past; we are doing so today; let there be no doubt about our determination and capability to do so in the future. At the same time our overall concern, including the concern that guides our military assistance, is to dissuade countries from undertaking military solutions and to encourage negotiated settlements of differences between them. We believe negotiated solutions are possible for even the most difficult and long-standing disputes on the continent. We are ready to lend whatever support we can to those efforts in Africa and to give them the highest priority. In this view, we believe that Africa's capacity for collective security deserves our help. We will when asked support multinational peacekeeping forces that Africa creates in its own defense. The record of the United States in support of the OAU peacekeeping role in Chad is the most recent illustration of the importance we attach to regional security. We want African nations to be able to defend their interests and resolve their problems without foreign intervention.

Real security, and with it the confidence that can enhance prospects for peace, cannot be achieved without sustained economic growth. During my travels, I have seen Africa's most serious economic crisis in more than 40 years. Because African countries are often dependent on one or two export commodities, and because they have borrowed heavily to spur growth and meet the costs of higher oil prices, they have been vulnerable to commodity fluctuations, high interest rates, and to the impact of world recession. There has been a long, slow decline in per capita food production; population has increased rapidly, and balanced growth has not occurred. Many nations have experimented with subsidies, centralized economic direction, and extensive public ownership of industry and commerce. Those strategies have proved costly.

The present state of the global economy is not of Africa's making. In the world economy system, the United States has a special responsibility not only to put its own house in order but to help rekindle growth in other lands. We are deeply committed to that task; and to achieve it, the American people are making real sacrifices. We are confident that when we are successful Africa will benefit quickly and significantly.

At the most fundamental level, we will remain concerned about those imperiled by strife and starvation. We have taken the lead both in mobilizing international relief efforts to help African refugees and in providing emergency assistance. In the past two years the United States has provided Africa $187 million for such programs. But we are equally concerned about the underlying problems that produce refugees and other forms of human misery.

As we look at these problems, we can see that the next few years in Africa will be critical. The current economic situation is forcing austerity on all African nations. It points to the need for a reexamination of economic strategies and national economic policies. It would be a mistake to view this period as only a temporary phenomenon and to believe that as the world recession begins to ease Africa will be able to resume an easy path of growth and diversity. On the contrary, in the current situation, many fundamental decisions must be made about the future of African development, about the priorities of agriculture and other sectors, and about the degree of sacrifice that should be demanded of the various elements of the population. How these decisions are made will affect the future of African development for decades to come.

We in the United States admit that there are serious differences among experts over the best path to development. We believe that there should be a full exchange among all those involved in African development. We must reach a common agreement regarding the kinds of programs that must be developed, financed, and mobilized. Discipline and self-reliance are necessary. Courageous leadership is necessary. Now is the time for fresh thinking, an eschewing of old ideologies that have not passed the test of experience.

We are prepared to help give African governments the wherewithal, and the international political and financial backing, to take the steps where necessary to restructure their economies

During the past two years, a growing number of African countries have applied to the International Monetary Fund for assistance in meeting immediate balance-of-payments crises. This has led to difficult adjustments in exchange rates, budgets, and other aspects of economic policy.

Recognizing the fundamental nature of the development crisis, we have encouraged a more comprehensive approach by both donors and multilateral agencies in Africa. We have urged that reform be supported with short-term foreign exchange and development assistance adequate to fuel the recovery process. We are fully aware of the importance of debt in this equation—where countries are making serious efforts to restructure their economies. Relief from heavy debt must be part of the exchange program. For our part, we are committed to participating in the difficult process of recovery.

The United States, despite the fact that its resources are under special strain in this time of economic adversity, still remains committed to Africa's stabilization and growth. Our bilateral economic aid for all of Africa now totals approximately $800 million a year and extends to 46 countries throughout Africa. It encompasses a variety of programs, including fast-disbursing balance-of-payments supports, food aid, and development assistance. Including the U.S. contribution to multilateral programs, our total economic aid to sub-Saharan Africa is in excess of $1.4 billion annually. Of the multilateral portion, the largest share by far—almost $300 million per year—goes to the soft loan programs of the World Bank's International Development Assistance.

The Reagan administration has placed a new emphasis on the role of private enterprise in development. In Africa, as elsewhere, we define "private sector" broadly to include small businessmen and farmers, as well as large corporations. Our aid planners are seeking new ways to help develop market institutions and more effective incentives for farmers. Wherever possible, we are encouraging mutually beneficial partnerships between large and small American companies and their African counterparts. The recent enactment of export trading legislation supported by President Reagan will make it possible for small and medium U.S. firms to pool expenses and thereby play a more active economic role in Africa.

The economic task that you and we face is enormous. But it is far from impossible if we all work together in a wise and understanding partnership. The exact nature of that cooperation will be as varied as the countries of Africa, but it will have some common elements. We, the industrialized countries, must help Africans manage their debt burden so that private credit, which is so essential to growth, can resume and increase. We must support successful economic policies at both the national and regional levels. We must seek greater coordination among Africa's friends who wish to finance development. The importance of Africa's economic future demands that we do no less.

As we look to the future and decide how Africa and the United States can work together, the agenda of issues we face is long. It includes essential issues of security, peacemaking, human rights, and economic progress. It calls for advancing the frontiers of freedom.

The United States is a friend who respects your potential and shares your commitment to maintaining the hard-won prize of freedom. With respect to that freedom, our nations are equals who must be prepared to work together, making sacrifices and tough decisions at the same time. Each of us has a share of the burden to carry; each has a contribution to make. All have a better future to gain. This is the meaning of a true partnership. □

Joaquim Chissano,
Foreign Minister of Mozambique

INTERVIEWED BY ALLEN ISAACMAN

AFRICA REPORT: Mr. Foreign Minister, are there particular pressures that make it difficult for Mozambique to pursue a policy of nonalignment?
CHISSANO: Yes, military pressure coming from South Africa. If international measures are not taken to stop South Africa from escalating its aggression, Mozambique, in the long run, may require more and more military assistance from the socialist countries that supported us during our struggle for independence. Since most of the socialist countries belong to the Warsaw Pact, increased aid may give the impression that our country is also involved with the Warsaw Pact, which is not the case.

We would like to have more effective cooperation—economically, socially, and culturally—with all countries, including the West. But the Western nations, many of whom opposed our struggle for independence, must now state unequivocally that they support us in the struggle against apartheid, in the struggle against South African aggression, in the application of sanctions against South Africa, and so on. We are in a real war, and this war may escalate and intensify in such a way that we may be forced to lean to one side and not be as nonaligned as some countries want to see us.

Allen Isaacman is professor of African history at the University of Minnesota. He is co-author, with Barbara Isaacman, of a newly completed book, *Sowing the Seeds of Revolution: Mozambique in the Twentieth Century*, to be published in 1983 by Westview Press.


Photo: Camerapix

Foreign Minister Chissano: "We would like more effective cooperation with all countries, including the West"

Photo: Ricardo Rangel

Chissano and other Mozambican officials with a West German delegation: A joint agreement was signed

Let me complete my answer by saying that we are trying our best to maintain our policy of nonalignment. We are opposed to the installation of any foreign bases in our country, are unwilling to join any military bloc, and are committed to preserving our independence at all costs. If today the Soviet Union would say to us that as a condition for our cooperation, and I emphasize cooperation, you must turn your country into a base for the Warsaw Pact, we would say no. And yet we know that only the socialist countries are supporting us against South African aggression. All the same, we are going to remain a socialist country. This too has to be emphasized.

AFRICA REPORT: Many critics argue that, for all Mozambique's rhetoric, it is not really nonaligned, pointing to your country's position on Afghanistan.

CHISSANO: As I have explained privately to a number of government leaders, we take positions when we are convinced that they are correct. We may be mistaken, but these positions are ours, and they are not dictated from abroad. Since the beginning of our struggle for liberation, we have always insisted on maintaining our autonomy.

Let's take some historical examples. During the early phases of our war, some of our combatants were trained in Israel, and we received money and equipment from the Israelis. Despite the fact that Israeli aid was larger than that which came from the Arab countries, we always supported the just struggle of the Palestinian people. When the 1967 war broke out, we took a stand against the war and the occupation of Arab territories. Our position was based on the fact that we were fighting against foreign domination and foreign occupation and we could not, even if Israel gave us money and assistance, justify its actions. From then on, we rejected any cooperation with Israel. Similarily, we are one of the few countries who refused to become embroiled in the Sino-Soviet split, although both countries provide important assistance to us during our war of independence.

We have acted the same way with regard to Afghanistan. We thought that the Soviet troops came to Afghanistan under similar conditions as those that brought Cuban troops to Angola, maybe different in intensity but they were about the same. And we judged that in both cases it was the legitimate right of the government to seek support from whomever it wanted. That is why we supported the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. It is not a position to be judged in the context of the East-West conflict.

AFRICA REPORT: Speaking of your country's historic links to China, does the commercial agreement recently signed with China mark an improvement in relations?

CHISSANO: We have always had good relations with China. However, this did not prevent us from criticizing China when China interfered in Vietnam. We concluded that China's actions were not justified; we discussed it privately with the Chinese and never discussed this issue with anyone else.

Despite our disagreements on Vietnam, relations between our two countries did not deterioriate. Even before the conflict between China and Vietnam, the Chinese informed us that they had to reevaluate their internal economic situation and that they probably would only be able to expand bilateral economic cooperation in 1983. During the past several years we met regularly and recently they indicated that they were now in a position to enter into new agreements. As a


Photo: Ricardo Rangel

ANC house near Maputo destroyed by a South African attack in 1981: "Military pressure is coming from South Africa"

result of this commercial agreement, China is going to send chemical products, consumer goods, and agricultural equipment that are in short supply in the rural areas, particularly in the small agricultural cooperatives we are creating.

AFRICA REPORT: What is the significance of the recent agreement signed with West Germany? Does it have any bearing on Mozambique's decision to sign the Lomé Convention?

CHISSANO: We now expect substantially improved relations with West Germany. For many years the Federal Republic of Germany claimed that it would be impossible to enter into agreements with us if we did not subscribe to the "land Berlin" clause. In the past we could not accept this clause because we understood "land Berlin" to mean the "state of Berlin" and we did not know of any state of Berlin. In the agreement we just signed they indicated in writing that "land Berlin" means just the Western part of Berlin. This is what we have accepted, and we now expect better cooperation between us. It is said that we have been reluctant to join the Lomé Convention because we would have had to sign the Berlin clause. The joint agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Mozambique removes this barrier. Our doubts about the Lomé convention, however, were not based on this issue, although it was clearly an issue that would have surfaced had we decided to join Lomé.

AFRICA REPORT: What are Mozambique's reservations about Lomé?

CHISSANO: Our major concern, which is not only applicable to Lomé, relates to the concept of international cooperation. We believe that cooperation is most suitable and positive between countries who share common conditions and objectives. These affinities are not necessarily geographically based. Is it realistic to assume that there exists a united Europe or a united Third World stretching from Latin America to Asia, passing through Africa?

Conversations with ACP countries that are signatories of the Lomé Convention reinforced our concern that Lomé would provide few benefits. Nevertheless, we did send observers to a meeting held in Brussels, but we encountered a hostile attitude from certain Western countries. The meeting coincided with our request to join the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [Comecon], and there was much speculation about the significance of our request couched in terms of the East-West conflict.

For the moment, we prefer to work through bilateral agreements with individual European Common Market countries and to continue studying the question of our future participation in Lomé.

AFRICA REPORT: How would you characterize these bilateral relations?

CHISSANO: They are certainly improving. We have always had excellent relations with Sweden, and during the past several years agreements with Italy, Brazil, and Portugal have been very important. Of course, there have been improvements in our relations with other Western countries, but these countries I have mentioned have been most visible.

AFRICA REPORT: You mentioned Mozambique's interest in joining Comecon. What is the current status of your request for membership?

CHISSANO: It is still under consideration. The members of Comecon have not made any decision yet, and we are also studying the question to determine the best form of association. This is what we are doing with reference to Lomé and the European Common Market as well.

AFRICA REPORT: Is it possible that Mozambique might seek an association with both the European Economic Community and Comecon?

CHISSANO: Yes, although the specific details of each relationship still need to be clarified.

AFRICA REPORT: Relations with Portugal seem to have improved and President Antonio Ramalho Eanes recently sent a small amount of military equipment to Mozambique. Was this merely a symbolic gesture, or is there some basis for more substantial military ties?

CHISSANO: It represents many things. Politically, it reflects the liberation of the Portuguese from the mentality of colonialism. It means that they regard Mozambique as a sovereign nation with the right to define its own politics, to select its own friends, and, above all else, to exist independently. Portugal, as a Western country and a North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] member, showed this understanding with its gesture demonstrating support for our struggle against South African aggression. Its action also is consistent with the spirit of the Security Council resolutions calling for international support to enable Mozambique to increase its defensive capacity. Secondly, it is a signal that the armed forces of the two countries, which in the past were enemies, are today building ties of friendship.

Portuguese assistance will contribute toward peace in the region. And it again demonstrates that we are independent enough to cooperate with a NATO member. We would be pleased if all Western countries acted similarly.

AFRICA REPORT: Are there likely to be more comprehensive military negotiations with Portugal?

CHISSANO: Yes. We are preparing a high-ranking delegation to visit Portugal. [Editor's note: At the end of October the minister of defense did, in fact, spend several days meeting with high-ranking Portuguese military authorities.]

AFRICA REPORT: In 1979, when I interviewed President Samora Machel, he indicated that relations with the United States had improved somewhat under the Carter administration. How would you characterize relations with the present administration?

CHISSANO: Relations were very tense because after we succeeded in explaining to the previous administration the basis of our international positions, the Reagan administration started from zero in its analysis of Mozambique's foreign posture. It perceived us as fighting against the United States, on the side of its enemies. We therefore had to patiently explain to them the same things we had explained to the previous administration.

Of course, there were some additional issues which complicated the situation. We had to take some strong measures against the United States' diplomatic mission in Maputo [Editor's note: Several of whom were expelled for CIA activities]. This did not please the Reagan administration, which viewed our actions through the prism of the cold war. And so it reacted badly. But I think that it now realizes that we jealously guard our independence.

After my recent talks with Secretary of State George Schultz, I hope that there will be some improvement in our relations. Some of the doubts seem to have been dispelled. I can tell you that these discussions were held in a very calm atmosphere. Relations, however, would be improved immediately if, instead of remaining silent, the United States condemned South African aggression against our country, ceased supporting puppet movements like UNITA in Angola, and adopted a just attitude toward the Namibian question.

AFRICA REPORT: With reference to the expulsion of members of the American diplomatic mission, surely Mozambique must have known that there were people working for the CIA in Maputo, just as there are British, French, and Soviet agents. What was it that warranted the expulsion of the Americans?

CHISSANO: What was unique was that we had reached the point where their actions were jeopardizing our national interests. We knew for a long time that they were there, but their activity became so serious that we could no longer tolerate it. You must understand that they were also representing a country that has been hostile to us in the past. We would do the same if Soviet intelligence was working against our interests. Of course, we do not want either Soviet or American intelligence in our country even if they are not working against our interests, but sometimes we can't help it. □

The State Department Perspective

Photo: Margaret A. Novicki

President Machel: "The Mozambique government has recently shown willingness to work toward better relations" with the United States

The questions in this exchange were prepared by Africa Report *editor Anthony J. Hughes and put verbally to officials of the Bureau of African Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. The bureau collated its responses into the form in which they are published here.*

AFRICA REPORT: How would you characterize Washington-Mozambique relations? Can you outline the relationship since 1975, when Mozambique became independent?

STATE DEPARTMENT: The course of U.S.-Mozambican relations since 1975 can best be described as uneven. In the past, problems have been caused by Mozambican anti-U.S. rhetoric and by what we see as closer identification with the policies of the Soviet Union on international issues than would be consistent with a posture of true nonalignment. Despite these difficulties, the United States has over the years continued to work toward better relations. In December 1980, for example, the secretary of state signed a waiver of the congressional prohibition on developmental aid to Mozambique, and in early 1981 the Agency for International Development [AID] began to look at possible projects in that country.

Our consideration of aid projects came to an abrupt halt in March 1981 when the government of Mozambique summarily expelled four members of the staff of the American Embassy in Maputo on the same day an AID team arrived in Maputo to discuss specific projects, with a lot of attendant publicity. Although this action and Mozambique's continuing anti-U.S. rhetoric led to another cooling of relations, the U.S. by no means turned its back on Mozambique. This is evidenced by the fact that in both 1981 and 1982 we responded favorably to Mozambique's international appeal for humanitarian food aid.

The Mozambican government, in turn, has of late shown willingness to put the events of the past behind us and work toward better relations in a spirit of mutual respect. We are responding, and as a result bilateral relations are gradually improving.

AFRICA REPORT: Can you comment more precisely on foreign policy differences? What domestic aspects of Mozambique are troublesome—its human rights record, its attitude toward private property?

STATE DEPARTMENT: There is in fact some significant coincidence of interests between the United States and Mozambique in matters of foreign policy. Both countries share a desire to see improved prospects for peace and stability in southern Africa, in particular a rapid settlement in Namibia. We, as a member of the Contact Group, work closely with Mozambique as one of the Frontline states in the southern African settlement negotiations. We and the Mozambicans also share a strong interest in working for economic progress in all of southern Africa.

This is not at all to say that Mozambique's views on all international issues are in harmony with our own. In fact, in last year's session of the UN General Assembly, Mozambique's votes coincided with ours less than 10 percent of the time. Although it is true that the United States and Mozambique obviously disagree in many area, as a general principle we prefer to discuss differences with any nation with its representatives in private diplomatic channels rather than in public.

AFRICA REPORT: What changes on Maputo's part would help to bring warmth to the bilateral relationship?

STATE DEPARTMENT: It isn't for us to tell Mozambique what to do if it wants improved relations with us. That is for Mozambique to determine. We do feel it would be helpful were Mozambique to show greater flexibility on issues of concern to us and be more willing to take our concerns into account when formulating its own views. Differences will inevitably arise, but we would obviously prefer that Mozambique express these differences to us in private rather than in public rhetoric.

AFRICA REPORT: What are the levels of commerce, investment, aid? Is Mozambique eligible for economic aid, Export-Import Bank guarantees, disaster assistance, security assistance? Why and why not?

STATE DEPARTMENT: In 1981, United States purchased $83 million worth of imports from Mozambique, mostly cashews and sugar. We are thus one of Mozambique's most important customers, if not in fact the most important. Our exports to Mozambique added up to $35 million. There is only about $10 million of U.S. investment in Mozambique. Outside of a one-time grant shortly after independence, the only U.S. aid to Mozambique has been the provision of foodstuffs; the value of this aid has varied from year to year.

The Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act stipulates that none of the funds appropriated under its authority (development assistance) may be used for Mozambique unless the president first reports to Congress that such assistance would further the foreign policy interests of the United States. Otherwise, there are no special provisions affecting the U.S. government's economic relations with Mozambique.

AFRICA REPORT: Could you describe differences in approaches by Western countries in their relations with Mozambique?

STATE DEPARTMENT: The state of relations between various Western governments and Mozambique do, of course, differ to some degree. We do not see any useful purpose served by seeking to characterize these. We feel that Western nations in general share the desire to see an independent and economically strong Mozambique, in a position to pursue policies contributing to stability and development in southern Africa.

AFRICA REPORT: What is your assessment of Mozambique's economic situation?

Photo: Michael Evans/The White House

President Reagan: "The U.S. deplores recourse to violence by any party in southern African conflicts"

STATE DEPARTMENT: Mozambique appears to be facing very serious economic difficulties. Because of climatic conditions and the inability of the agricultural sector to produce at its potential level, there have been serious shortfalls in the production of foodstuffs and export crops. The lack of sufficient capital and skilled labor, coupled with acknowledged examples of inefficient management, have clearly retarded the performance of the industrial sector. The activity of the Mozambique National Resistance [MNR] has hampered use of Mozambican transport routes by neighboring countries, resulting in the loss of potential revenue from transit fees. These problems have caused a worrisome balance-of-payments deficit and a shortage of foreign exchange.

Despite these difficulties, there are some encouraging signs. Mozambique does not have foreign debt problems of the magnitude faced by some other developing countries. The government is making a serious effort to develop the economic infrastructure and recently has been making a greater effort to attract Western investment, for example, by accepting bids for oil exploration.

AFRICA REPORT: How happy or unhappy is Washington at South African destabilization policies in southern Africa and toward Mozambique in particular? Can you indicate any U.S. actions or statements pertaining to this issue?

STATE DEPARTMENT: As a matter of general policy, the United States deplores the use of violence as a means of dealing with international conflicts. We have repeatedly stated our opposition to hostile actions taken against neighboring states by or from any country of southern Africa.

AFRICA REPORT: How close are Maputo links with Moscow, compared, say, with those of Angola, Ethiopia, and Congo?

STATE DEPARTMENT: It would be unrealistic to attempt to rank the standing of Mozambique's relations with Moscow with those of other African states, because the foreign policy of every country reflects and comprises a unique set of circumstances. From the presence of Soviet advisers, the frequency of Soviet naval ship visits, and the positions taken by Mozambique in international fora, Mozambique obviously feels its very close ties with the Soviet Union.

AFRICA REPORT: How important within Mozambique is the MNR? Is it a nationalist movement? How much support does it get from South Africa? Would U.S. interests be served by helping Mozambique put down the movement? Or by helping the MNR? Is there any law limiting covert American activities in Mozambique?

STATE DEPARTMENT: The MNR appears to have had some success in carrying out disruptive guerrilla actions in some areas of Mozambique. It appears to be basically a military organization with none but the most general political program, apart from trying to replace the government of Mozambique. It receives the bulk of its support from South Africa. It would not be possible to estimate the level of domestic political support, if any, that the MNR has in Mozambique. The United States recognizes and enjoys improving diplomatic relations with the government of Mozambique. Secretary of State George Shultz met most recently with Mozambican Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano in New York in early October. The United States has provided no support whatsoever to the MNR; it is difficult to imagine that any U.S. interest could be served by doing so. Without in any way suggesting that the government of Mozambique should negotiate with the MNR, we nonetheless would like to see the conflict in Mozambique ended, thus making it possible for the government of Mozambique to devote its resources to the economic and social development of its people in a country free of violent conflict.

AFRICA REPORT: Does the administration quietly applaud Pretoria's attacks on the African National Congress [ANC] of South Africa in Mozambique?

STATE DEPARTMENT: Not at all. The United States deplores recourse to violence by any of the parties involved in the conflicts of southern Africa. Given Mozambique's own revolutionary history, it would be very difficult for its government not to acquiesce at least in some ANC presence on its soil. Given its own security concerns, it is equally natural for South Africa to respond to what it perceives as a threat to its national security operating from Mozambican soil. We believe that wisdom lies in seeking to resolve these conflicts by negotiation and encouraging peaceful change, the approach at the heart of our southern Africa policy. □

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Ronald E. Springwater, Vice President & Treasurer
African-American Institute, 833 U.N. Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017

EDITOR (Name and Complete Mailing Address)
Anthony J. Hughes, Editor - Africa Report
African-American Institute, 833 U.N. Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017

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Tourism with a Socialist Slant

BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

The Great Zimbabwe ruins, once the center of a black civilization that flourished between A.D. 1200 and 1450 and to which present-day Zimbabweans can trace their ancestry, illustrate some of the challenges of the Zimbabwe government in turning a page on its minority-ruled past and developing a tourism industry that caters to the local population as well as to the international traveler — without the harmful side effects evidenced in other Third World countries.

The most spectacular, moving, and enriching of the many attractions Zimbabwe holds for the tourist, Great Zimbabwe was officially described before independence as "one of Africa's great mysteries." The Ian Smith regime sought to discredit substantial archaeological evidence that linked the largest single complex of ruins in Africa south of the Sahara to a black civilization that thrived around a cattle- and gold-based economy during the Middle Ages. Hoping to prevent black Zimbabweans from regarding the ruins as a symbol of cultural pride, the Smith government forbade publications on the ruins from stating categorically that they were products of an indigenous civilization. Archaeological studies and texts took great pains to disassociate the ruins from black culture, attributing the massive stone edifices to foreigners such as the Phoenicians or Egyptians.

At least from the Zimbabwe government's point of view, the record has been set straight. Nevertheless, a controversy is raging over the hiring by the National Museums and Monuments Department of an American-born archaeologist to write the official guidebook on Great Zimbabwe. A professor at a South African university, he had been one to toe the Smith line on the ruins during the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) years. Minister of Home Affairs Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze, under whose jurisdiction the museums and monuments lie, in his introduction to a text on Great Zimbabwe by Zimbabwean archaeologist Dr. Peter Garlake, wrote:

Zimbabwe's minister of natural resources and tourism, Victoria Chitepo

> This precious cornerstone of our culture was taken away from us with our country by the colonialists. Drained of life, it became an object for foreign tourists, and the subject of absurd theories of every sort, with a single aim in common, to rob us of our past and our pride.... In spite of what hired cynics would like the world to believe, Great Zimbabwe was built by the Great People of Zimbabwe.

Under the socialist government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe, whose name was taken from the ruins (derived from the Shona *dzimba dza mabwe*, or houses of stone), is building a tourism industry that seeks to correct the past denial of the country's heritage, is no longer reliant upon the South African tourist but can attract visitors from other African countries and overseas, and avoids the incongruities associated with large-scale tourism structured around the tastes of an affluent minority of the world's population. Also critical to the Zimbabwe government's approach to tourism are that the country's scenic and cultural attractions such as Great Zimbabwe be made available to the local population at a reasonable cost and that mass tourism be discouraged so as not to upset the delicate balance of nature upon which tourism in Zimbabwe rests.

The tourism industry in Zimbabwe, devastated by the war for liberation, is successfully being resuscitated by the nearly three-year-old government, with Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism Victoria Chitepo at the helm. From a 1979 low of 75,000 tourists visiting the country, a steady increase has been registered: in 1980, 240,000; in 1981, 375,000; and for 1982 (an estimate), 400,000. In the medium term, the aim of the Zimbabwe Tourist Board (ZTB) is to maintain an annual growth rate of 10 to 15 percent toward a goal of one million tourists a year by 1986. If the optimal figure of one million is indeed reached, the ZTB will have realized a pragmatic goal, given the existing infrastructure and the government's policy of "quality tourism": limiting the numbers of visitors so as not to degrade the natural environment.

"Tourism in Zimbabwe is based upon our fauna and flora," says Minister Chitepo. "Victoria Falls, for instance, the jewel of our tourism, cannot take more than 1,500 tourists per day. If we had mass tourism, we would find ourselves having to regiment people and it would lose its effect."


Photo: Zimbabwe Ministry of Information

Victoria Falls, the "jewel" of Zimbabwe's tourism

In any event, with the high cost of air fares from international departures to Zimbabwe, tourism on a grand scale seems a remote possibility. Nevertheless, the ZTB is keen on promoting tourism from Europe, Canada, and the United States, as well as from other African countries, moving away over time from the current situation whereby 40 percent of the total number of tourists are South African. According to Etherton Mpisaunga, the ZTB director, "South Africa as a generating country is really an embarrassment for us. We would rather have visitors from other African nations come in, but at the moment, the South African situation is a reality and you can't wish it away."

During the war and the sanctions years, the Rhodesian government relied on South African tourists for two reasons: to generate foreign exchange, and to use as a political tool to argue that people were still visiting the country despite its alleged international isolation. Taking into account the facts that the commerce and economies of southern Africa have historically been linked to South Africa and that there are many Zimbabwean citizens of South African origin with family in the country, the percentage of South Africans visiting Zimbabwe is likely to remain stable in the short to medium term. The low cost of travel from South Africa to Zimbabwe is an additional factor — one need only drive across the border.

However, the ZTB expects the numbers of tourists from other African countries to increase in the years ahead as a result of regional cooperation and improving standards of living, at some point exceeding the South African trade. Already an increase in the number of tourists from Zambia, Botswana, and Malawi has been reported, although the bulk of Zambians visiting Zimbabwe are excursionists — entering the country for a short period to purchase goods not readily available at home.

The British comprise the largest percentage of non-African visitors to Zimbabwe, followed by Americans, Canadians, and West Germans, then Swiss, Dutch, French, and Australians. In order to tap the overseas market, the ZTB maintains offices in Chicago, Frankfurt, and London and plans are afoot, according to Minister Chitepo, to open bureaus in a Scandinavian country, Australia, and perhaps Los Angeles. Information attachés in the overseas ZTB offices maintain contact with local tour wholesalers and agents interested in sending groups to Zimbabwe and provide information on what Zimbabwe has to offer the traveler. The attachés also attend tourism and travel conferences and conventions all over the world, sometimes joined by representatives of the Harare main office.

In October, Mpisaunga attended the American Society of Travel Agents convention in Miami, where some 5,000 delegates in the travel business, from airline employees to travel agents, had the opportunity to "discover Zimbabwe," as the ZTB promotional brochures exhort, by visiting the tourist board's booth. Mpisaunga characterized the response in Miami as "absolutely fabulous." He also took the opportunity afforded by his U.S. visit to meet with leading American travel magazines and participated in a hot-line radio program in Chicago. Mpisaunga's message to the potential American traveler? "Zimbabwe is an absolutely unique destination, a very peaceful country. We've had our fair share of problems during our war of liberation, but this is history. The policy of reconciliation is working, and we have a multiracial government to prove the point."

Certainly a major factor entering into a potential tourist's decision to visit a foreign country is an assessment of the political stability and internal security situation. Hints of domestic troubles are usually enough to discourage all but the intrepid tourist. As a result, one would have reason to question the impact upon Zimbabwe's nascent tourism

Photo: Margaret A. Novicki

The Great Zimbabwe ruins: "A precious cornerstone" of Zimbabwe's culture

industry of the July kidnappings of six tourists — two Americans, two British, and two Australians — on the Bulawayo-Victoria Falls road by "dissident" elements of the former Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), and the murders of the three British tourists in the Eastern Highlands during the same month.

Mpisaunga noted that although "those unfortunate events" did result in a dip in arrival figures for July and August the numbers were "beginning to come back right on target again." He added that tourists should not fear for their safety in Zimbabwe, since the government has been in effect "forewarned," and therefore has "intensified and redoubled its security." "The incidents happened in two small areas of the country, but the world press gives the impression that this is a common phenomena throughout Zimbabwe. This is very disappointing, because if they would only bother to come and see for themselves, they would find it is not the case." Mpisaunga commented, "Our problem is one of image — the image we would like to see portrayed and the image the popular press is portraying for us."

And Chitepo, characterizing the dissident activities in Matabeleland as "a temporary and unfortunate setback," said in late September that "things are back to normal and the tourist industry is picking up fast. Next holiday season should be prosperous."

The natural splendor of Zimbabwe, a geographically diverse and richly endowed country, is more than sufficient to attract even the most experienced of travelers. Game parks and recreational areas constitute 11.5 percent of the total land mass. In addition to the cultural and historical experience afforded by a trip to Great Zimbabwe, there is the "jewel" of Victoria Falls, one of the largest waterfalls in the world, where the force of water falling from the Zambezi River into a 100-meter chasm sends clouds of spray into the sky, hence the African name, *mosi oa tunya*, the smoke that thunders. Unspoilt natural beauty at its best, Victoria Falls is viewed by the visitor via a footpath winding through a dense rain forest created by the mist from the falls. There are no concession stands, no throngs of noisy merrymakers or tour buses to hamper the rustic splendor of the scene, and the ministry is keen to keep the falls in their natural state.

For the many who travel to Africa for game viewing, Zimbabwe's largest reserve is the 14,620 square kilometer Wankie National Park, home of over 100 species of animals and over 400 of birds. At Wankie, a tourist may spend a memorable night in bush camp, housed in a hut nestled in the treetops in the midst of the wilds, or in one of three camp sites within the national park, or in a luxury hotel. There are numerous other national and privately owned game parks throughout the country as well. Although game hunting is permitted in three geographical areas, the sport is carefully monitored by the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management.

Other exceptional spots for rest or recreation include Lake Kariba, one of the largest man-made lakes in the world, created by the damming of the Zambezi River in 1961, where one's choices range among peaceful cruises on the lake, fishing, or gaming expeditions. There are also the mist-enshrouded mountain ranges of the Eastern Highlands, known for excellent trout fishing. All of the major tourist attractions are serviced by the national carrier, Air Zimbabwe, which maintains a convenient and efficient flight schedule within the country, as well as to the international destinations of London, Frankfurt, and Athens. There is also a wide range of accommodations throughout the country to suit the tastes of any traveler, from luxurious hotels and casinos to national park chalets and campgrounds.

Although no one would doubt that a magnificent vacation can be had for the price in Zimbabwe, there are those who criticize tourism promotion in developing countries, finding fault with the often heard justification of tourism as a means of generating foreign exchange for the government. They also question the allocation of scarce funds to infrastructural development servicing an industry that caters to an elite segment of the world's population.

The Zimbabwe government fortunately does not suffer from the con-



The dam at Lake Kariba, one of the largest man-made lakes in the world

tradiction of having to spend vast sums of money on building the infrastructure required for the industry at the expense of meeting basic needs. When the Mugabe government took office in 1980, all basic tourist amenities were already in place, although some were damaged by the war. At each of Zimbabwe's tourist areas one found hotels, airports serviced by Air Zimbabwe, and tour and ground operators only waiting to reinaugurate their services, badly hurt by the years of war. Having visited all the major tourist spots in Zimbabwe, this writer can testify to the return of normalcy and the smooth, efficient, and friendly operation of each area.

As for the well-established fact that most of the foreign currency brought by tourists into the country ends in the pockets of the private sector, i.e. hoteliers, tour and ground operators, and curio sellers, thereby bypassing the national exchequer, the ministry has found at least a partial solution — the formation of a parastatal tourist development corporation. Chitepo says, "In order to rectify this situation, there is the need for government participation in all aspects of the industry, a parastatal body that will promote, invest, and participate in the industry."

In 1982, some $53 million in foreign currency was generated by tourism. The envisioned parastatal, on the cards but not yet in operation, would be able to tap a higher percentage of that amount if it ran its own amenities in competition with those in existence or bought into existing facilities. However, says Mpisaunga, "It's not something we are going to do in a haphazard fashion. We need trained personnel. We need to study areas that would be the most economical to run. There is no point in trying to run a huge hotel if the existing ones are making a loss, so all these factors must be taken into account."

Critics also point to the fact that because tourism caters to a small group of economically privileged pleasure seekers, developing the industry does not befit a government with the socialist goals of improving the lot of the masses. Chitepo, on the other hand, contends: "We believe that tourism promotes our socialist economic thrust. Besides the much-needed foreign currency generated by international tourism, the industry provides jobs and economic growth points in areas that under normal circumstances would remain undeveloped, because they are not fit for either agriculture or resettlement purposes. The gains from tourism are plowed back to the development of areas in which they are generated."

In addition, the ZTB along with an interministerial committee is launching a program to promote domestic tourism, which according to Chitepo, "not only educates our people further and makes them aware of our national heritage, but also helps build a sense of national pride . . . . As a socialist country, we cannot abide by the principle of the few benefitting from the majority."

Central to the facilitation of domestic travel by lower-income groups is the construction of low-cost pleasant accommodations in the major tourist sites or the availability of group hotel discounts, as well as reductions in transport costs. The main thrust at present is directed at students, women's clubs, and sporting bodies, to be followed by efforts to interest commerce and industry in sending employees on domestic holidays.

Another interesting facet in the Zimbabwe government's approach to tourism is its desire to have it play an educational role. Visitors from abroad generally are isolated from the people of the country they are visiting by circumstance, but not necessarily by desire, coming in contact only with tour guides, waiters, and hotel employees. Rarely do they leave with an appreciation of the country's history or culture, particularly in a country such as Zimbabwe, where the main attractions are "fauna and flora."

As a result, the ministry is looking at the possibility of creating a series of cultural centers in close proximity to the tourist areas, where a visitor can meet with local people and learn the history and culture of the area. The need for such centers is perceived as particularly acute at Great Zimbabwe, Victoria Falls, and Lake Kariba.

And as to whether the tastes of the economically well-off traveler might tarnish attitudes among the local people, Chitepo comments: "We do not foresee any potential adverse impact from tourism on the people of Zimbabwe if we are vigilant. One can only be caught unawares. Now that we are aware of it, we shall do all we can to make sure that we counter the influence of affluent lifestyles."

Will Zimbabwe's tourism, since it is based upon the natural wonders described earlier, suffer in comparison with the attractions of its neighbors such as Kenya and Tanzania? The government does not believe so, in view of the fact that together with its neighbors Zimbabwe hopes to adopt a regional approach to tourism, with the countries complementing rather than competing with the others.

In 1981 Zimbabwe was one of the founding members of the Eastern and Southern Africa Travel Organization (ESATO), grouping the nine countries of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) with Kenya and Uganda. ESATO was conceived as a means of promoting tourism and facilitating travel among the members. Although still in its infancy, it hopes to be able to pool resources and promote as a group, standardize customs and border formalities, and synchronize airline arrivals and departures, in this way facilitating a tourist's visit to several countries in the region instead of just one.

Another possibility that appears logical is to incorporate the regional tourism concept within the framework of SADCC, because its machinery and secretariat are already in place. The lack of these structures at present is hindering ESATO from getting off the ground.

The regional tourism theme was given impetus by a May meeting at Victoria Falls of the World Tourist Organization (WTO), a UN body of which Zimbabwe became a member in 1981. Zimbabwe highly values its membership in WTO, as well as its election to its executive committee, because the organization provides expertise to any member nation requiring advice or assistance on aspects related to the tourist industry. It also sponsors international meetings where members can learn from the experiences of other nations and can develop new strategies for tourism promotion.

In conclusion, therefore, the future of Zimbabwe's tourist industry is a bright one. With more than its share of natural scenic beauty, an excellent and efficient infrastructure already in place, and a ministry and tourist board anxious to correct the injustices of the past and avoid the social disharmony created by tourism in other countries, tourism can indeed play a positive role in a socialist economy. And with a focus on regional tourism, which makes good economic sense, cooperation among the nations of southern Africa is one step closer to reality. □

Books

ZIMBABWE: STRUGGLE AND INHERITANCE

David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981, $8.95.

Colin Stoneman, *Zimbabwe's Inheritance*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981, $25.00.

For the last 20 years, events in Zimbabwe have seldom been out of the headlines, despite the country's relatively small population and economy. First, it was Ian Smith's regime defying British sanctions and declaring "1000 years" of white rule. Then, the escalating guerilla war was met with ferocious repression. Finally, the stunning electoral victory of the Zimbabwe African National Union's (ZANU) Robert Mugabe reverberated throughout the world. Even today the friction between ZANU and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) for leadership is widely reported.

This global attention may be explained by the inherent drama of a match-up between one of the world's last settler regimes and a movement for popular power. The proximity to and interaction with Africa's most powerful (and hated) state, South Africa, also has invested the struggle with a special gravity.

These two books take up rich and tangled history of Zimbabwe's long struggle for independence and offer a partial interpretation of events there. Martin and Johnson's provides a thorough historical account, whereas the Stoneman collection focuses primarily on the economic situation and offers tentative scenarios for the future.

The Struggle for Zimbabwe leads the reader through the myraid twists and turns of Zimbabwe's independence movement. It traces the evolution of strategy from the period when black leaders pleaded with Smith (and the British) to share power to their eventual conclusion that only armed struggle would achieve majority rule. The early failures and political splits that resulted from premature attempts at armed insurgency are recounted in detail. These early mistakes were gradually corrected so that by the war's end in 1979 over 10,000 combatants were deployed throughout the countryside, where they enjoyed the active support of much of the population. The authors point out that Mugabe's overwhelming electoral victory did not surprise those who understood this fact. Although Frelimo's victory in Mozambique *did* open up important sanctuaries and base areas in 1975, the bulk of credit for victory belongs to the ZANU cadre, who had mastered the art of people's war.

The international maneuvering that went on throughout the war particularly among the Frontline states and South Africa is also chronicled. In fact, at some points it seemed as though the views and politics of the Zimbabweans were secondary to those of neighboring governments. The authors reveal a six-point "detente" proposal in 1975, through which Smith could have brought peace and a gradual transfer of power — but which he arrogantly tossed aside. They also disclose a Mozambican plan that would have created a government led by Nkomo and Mugabe and backed by Cuban and Soviet military aid. Fortunately this plan was abandoned, for the authors believe that it would have led to a full-scale intervention by the South Africans.

Few international figures, including Kissinger, Castro, and Harold Wilson, could resist trying their hand at the negotiating table at one point or another — all to no avail. It wasn't until ZANU and ZAPU fighters had encircled the cities and begun to cripple the economy that Smith sued for peace. The authors don't hide their contempt for Bishop Muzorewa, whose "peace" initiatives undercut the guerrillas' unity. They note that the only military the bishop was to command was a racist army that slaughtered thousands of Zimbabweans.

Although *Struggle* deserves to be considered a standard reference work on the war for independence, I wish that the authors had offered some detailed accounts of guerrilla life — from their training through combat, in the vein of Wilfred Burchett's books on the Vietnamese revolution. Comparisons with people's wars in China, Kenya, Malaya, the Philippines, and so on would also have made interesting reading.

Zimbabwe's Inheritance consists of a number of essays focused principally on Zimbabwe's economic history and structure. In a chapter on Zimbabwe's prospects for development, editor Stoneman is pessimistic: "Zimbabwe inherit[ed] a situation of total economic dependence, for which political independence offers only token compensation to the masses." He suggests, however, that perhaps a "third way" (between the status quo and sweeping nationalization) could be found that might gradually overcome some of the inequities. I found his sketch of a 10-year "reward and punishment" development plan whereby capital might be goaded toward greater economic democracy quite interesting.

Other essays tell us that the problems facing Zimbabwe, despite its considerable resources, are enormous. Just to overturn the ruinous effect of 50 years of apartheid on agricultural policy and rural investment would require massive aid over many years. Housing remains a terrible problem: 50,000 living units are needed in Harare alone. Another problem is handling the enormous expectations that were released by the achieving of independence. Stoneman compares the ZANU previctory promise that all mining would be nationalized with Mugabe's present position that such investment is sancrosanct.

Inasmuch as he wrote (or co-authored) the most informative chapters, I wondered why Stoneman chose not to write a complete book. Presumably, doing so would have smoothed out some of the lumpiness and redundancies that appear in the present collection. There is some overlap between the two books; and for a reader who must choose only one, the Martin and Johnson volume is much to be preferred.

Prime Minister Mugabe points out in his foreword to *Struggle* that the accounts and memoirs of the actual participants have yet to be published. Until they are, these books will serve the general reader well.

Tod Ensign
New York, N.Y.

AFRICA AND THIRD WORLD DEBT CRISES

Jonathan David Aronson, ed., *Debt and the Less Developed Countries*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1979, xxi, 359 pages.

Lawrence G. Franko and Marilyn J. Seiber, eds., *Developing Country Debt*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1979, xi, 309 pages.

Stephen H. Goodman, ed., *Financing and Risk in Developing Countries*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978, xv, 103 pages.

By the end of 1980 the total medium- and long-term debt of non-oil African countries reached $47.8 billion. As Susan Strange notes in her fine opening chapter to the Aronson volume (p. 7), "Indebtedness among developing countries generates fierce emotions. Anger, anxiety, fear, resentment, jealousy, disdain and discontent—these are strong feelings often associated with debtors and creditors or (for different reasons) with both at once." Lately such feelings have become more apparent in Africa and among a wide variety of actors dealing with Africa. In the context of world recession, growth rates are down, per capita income figures are nearly stagnant or actually declining, balance of payments and debt service problems become more severe as many commodity prices remain low while oil prices, despite the "glut," remain high, and in many countries agricultural production levels are falling while aid levels continue to decline. These problems are often exacerbated by economic mismanagement and corruption.

Four years ago only two African countries had credit agreements with the International Monetary Fund; there were nine in 1979 and twelve in 1980. By the end of last year, 21 of the 48 African members of the IMF had agreements with it. Seven of these were three-year Extended Fund Facility agreements (EFF). The EFF agreements with Zaire and Zambia are in serious trouble, and the IMF has reportedly cut off further drawings by Tanzania, Senegal, Togo, and Uganda, although some of these may only be temporary. Recent political and social unrest in Morocco and the Sudan is at least partially related to conditions set by the IMF. In Zaire, internationally sponsored teams of expatriates now operate in the central bank, the finance ministry, the planning office, and the customs department in an attempt to improve economic management, monitor compliance with IMF conditions, and supervise the service of its $4.5 billion debt. Tanzania has been waging a running battle with the IMF, and President Nyerere has said that compliance with the desires of the IMF would spawn "chaos." Of the 25 African countries ranked globally as to their creditworthiness by *Institutional Investor* in March, only three (South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria) were above the rank of 50, half of them were between 80 and 104. Zaire and Uganda were ranked 103 and 104, respectively.

In this context, the three volumes reviewed here provide useful background information and analysis on the general issues of Third World debt. Topics discussed include the Eurocurrency markets, petrodollar recycling, the stability of the international financial system, the changing role of the IMF focusing on its hotly debated "conditionality" procedures, government reschedulings in the creditor club mechanisms, private bank refinancing practices, relations between the IMF, the World Bank, Western governments, and the private banks, U.S. government policies and congressional attitudes, the developmental impact of debt problems, and various proposals for reforming the current system. In addition, these topics are given real impact on a number of revealing case studies.

The most useful of the three books for those concerned with African debt problems is Professor Jonathan Aronson's fine edited volume, because it focuses on the economics, technicalities, developmental impact, *and* politics of debt problems and their subtleties. Its essays, by both scholars and practitioners, show diversity, depth, and quality, and it presents much useful, if now slightly, but understandably, dated data. Professor Strange provides a valuable historical perspective on the expansion of credit and the handling of debt crises. She stresses that creditors have always preferred case-by-case treatment of debt problems and that they are unlikely now to accept general rules for debt management. At the same time they want to avoid default, even at high cost. My own research on Zaire indicates that well developed informal norms appear to be emerging along with increased coordination between various actors on the creditor/management side. In their respective chapters, Brian Crowe and Jane D'Arista provide useful data on the levels and concentrations of public and private lending and attempt to assess the overall risk to the international financial system. All three books agree that there is no major breakdown on the horizon and that the system copes relatively well with the problem cases. In large part this has proved to be the case. Recently, however, concern appears to be on the rise again—the Polish debt crisis and the IMF's growing business are largely responsible. In May the Group of 30, a New York-based group of leading central and commercial bankers, called for the establishment of a top-level group to evaluate the rising risks of international lending and to improve the flow and use of information and rescheduling processes. Crowe also describes the creditor club mechanisms and assesses U.S. policy perspectives. D'Arista points out that the rapid growth of lending preceded the oil crisis and was then fed by it *and* by the need of lenders to lend, intensified by competition between them to do so.

One of the real benefits of the Aronson volume is its discussion of debt-related development issues from both "reformist" and "radical" positions, focusing in particular on Latin America. These debt-related questions have yet to be seriously addressed in the African context. On the statist "reformist" side, Clark Reynolds argues that with proper political will funds and banking institutions could be better controlled and managed for the "goals of radical structural change," but this begs the nature of the regime issue. Arthur Laffer presents his standard supply-side "reformist" view that growth equals development and more growth results from more savings induced by less state control. In the context of Brazil, W. Ladd Hollist argues from the "radical" side that growth reulting from heavy external borrowing does not equal development, and, in fact, creates more dependence, with the repayment burden falling on those who benefit least from the growth. R. Peter DeWitt and James Petras present a "radical" analysis of the "dynamics of international debt peonage" in which expansion of global debt injures true development prospects while possibly increasing the instability of the global economic system. The developed capitalist states and their international banks manipulate regimes and attempt to "restructure political power and economic systems." The authors use the Zaire case with its customhouse takeover aspects as a key example of this process. But, in fact, the Zaire case shows *both* the significance of international influence *and* the fact that it nonetheless has distinct limits. Manipulating regimes is more difficult that the authors assume; debt is after all a two-way street. Zaire no longer performs its neocolonial functions properly, and external actors are finding it difficult to make it do so. In addition, they cannot just walk away from the problem either, and for geopolitical and strategic reasons as well as economic ones. According to DeWitt and Petras (p. 190), "These Western interventions in Zaire illustrate the banks' and developed nations' ability to restructure LDC debtors." In fact, it illustrates quite the reverse. How the nature of Third World regimes and the international system can frustrate external control and restructuring efforts remains one of the largest lacunas of the growing debt literature.

The last section of the Aronson volume explicitly discusses the politics of international debt renegotiation. Barbara Stallings' fine case study of Peru illustrates the politics of international debt. Peru attempted to avoid the IMF in 1976 by going directly to the international banks who established and attempted to monitor a set of economic conditions. The banks backed off in 1977, and the IMF stepped in, highlighting its legitimating and monitoring roles as the point organization in the management of international debt problems. She also stresses the societal havoc resulting from the stabilization efforts and that the power of a debtor requires economic *and* political importance *and* a clear and present danger to its stability. In case studies of Ghana, Brazil, and Chile, John Odell illustrates the politics, power, and limits of official creditor club mechanisms (primarily the Paris Club). He nicely points to intra-creditor group conflicts and the fact that the outcome in one case can affect actor perceptions and behavior in other cases. He believes, however, that the chances are slim for united LDC action to change these mechanisms.

Using Zaire, Indonesia, and Turkey as examples, Aronson looks at private bank renegotiations and notes (pp. 288, 312) that "lending is a two-way street," and that "multinational banks have become political actors of the first rank." However, he also valuably underlines the importance of technical factors in renegotiation decisions, the existence of cross-default clauses being a prime example. Finally, to complete the volume, Charles Lipson assesses the operations and changing role of the IMF itself. He usefully points to the rise of generally agreed upon "rules of the game," revolving primarily around the IMF and resulting in what he calls the "political coherence of international finance." A key rule of this "game" now is that formal default is out of the question, and the issue then becomes what type of refinancing or rescheduling and on what terms. Another major process is the growing informal, and even formal, communication, but not necessarily consensus, between the major debt management actors. The centrality of the IMF has resulted in an intensifying debate over exactly what its role should be.

A major lacuna of this and the other two volumes, but one that is not their fault, is discussion of the role, importance, and consequences of a major new type of actor—investment banks, or groups of them, that act as advisers and/or negotiators, even administrators, for debtor countries. Since the summer of 1979, for example, Zaire has been represented by the "triad" or "holy trinity"—Lehman Bros., Kuhn Loeb, Lazard Frères, and S.G. Warburg. They have assessed the actual size and structure of the debt, prepared information memoranda, supervised debt service, and represented Zaire with the IMF, in Paris Club and private bank reschedulings, and in World Bank consultative group and other aid meetings. More study is also needed of the complex relations between all the major actors and how their behavior is affected by personalities, reputations, career paths, personnel policies, organizational interests, and cultural perceptions as well as by political, economic, and strategic interests and structures at both the international and regime levels. Two other emerging issues need further study—what to do about previously rescheduled debt and the degree of continued availability of public and private credit to needy regimes and under what terms.

The other two volumes are less satisfying in large part because they do not as adequately treat the politics, complexities, and subtleties of LDC debt. Nonetheless, they are quite useful to those concerned with Africa's debt problems since they are good primers that provide much more of a practitioner's perspective. Only the more useful chapters will be mentioned. In the Franko and Seiber volume, which grew out of a panel at the 1978 meeting of the International Studies Association, Neil McMullen presents a valuable historical perspective that nicely complements the Susan Strange piece in the Aronson volume, while Robert Solomon provides a quantitative analysis of current debt patterns and the consumption vs. investment issue regarding borrowed funds. He does not see a major financial crisis looming up soon. Marilyn Seiber offers a fine look at the rise and nature of the Euromarkets while banker Charles Ganoe, in two chapters, explodes five "myths" and heavily criticizes country analysis procedures. Case studies of the Philippines and Jamaica come from Seiber and J. Daniel O'Flaherty, respectively, while Robert McCauley assesses the role of the IMF and the public creditors in Turkey, Portugal, Peru, and Egypt. Then Seiber describes available debt relief strategies and the proposals put forward by LDC debtors to change the current system. Looking at the IMF, Carl Neu assesses the impact of conditionality and its "certifier" and monitoring roles for both public and private creditors while stressing that it is not likely to become a lender of last resort. He also makes the often forgotten points, that private bank lending has on the whole been quite profitable and that the IMF indirectly facilitates such lending. In a generally overly optimistic chapter, Robert Russell usefully points out that U.S. economic and political interests can easily clash. William Noellert says that international debt has helped international financial adjustment but has made very little contribution towards structural adjustment, and, finally, Franko discusses ways excessive LDC debt can be avoided.

The volume edited by Stephen H. Goodman grew out of a Symposium sponsored by the Export-Import Bank in 1977. Charles Kindleberger provides what seems to be the obligatory historical perspective, but one with a more pessimistic viewpoint, while Anthony Solomon presents the more optimistic position. Irving Friedman, himself a major actor, defends the role of the private banks and their assessment procedures while calling for more IMF-World Bank coordination. Finally, there are seven chapters that evaluate the country risk procedures of various actors.

Thomas M. Callaghy
Columbia University


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
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

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

The Bateke people of the Republic of the Congo hav a tradi e, upon the bi of a boy child, a statue is carved by a talented villager. The atue is to prot the boy until he reaches puberty. Although the quality of thes y inconsistent, t best of them are worthy of a place among the great works A

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