


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
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
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Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, President Mohamed Siad
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U.S. Strategic Policy in Northeast Africa and the Indian Ocean

BY LARRY W. BOWMAN AND JEFFREY A. LEFEBVRE

Current American strategic policy in northeast Africa and in the adjacent Indian Ocean region reflects the growing concern that Washington policymakers, have had about developments in this "arc of crisis" since the late 1970s. U.S. concerns are rooted most fundamentally in the perceived national interest that the steady flow of oil from the region to Western countries must be sustained. In one form or another, most U.S. policy initiatives in this area from the late 1970s until now

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have been predicated upon and justified by the presumed need for greater U.S. capabilities there in order to assure the oil flow. From the enunciation of the Carter Doctrine in January 1980 through the tragi-comic Chad "crisis" of late summer 1983, a range of U.S. policies can be traced that unequivocally suggests a more pronounced forward role for the U.S. in this region.

The fall of the shah of Iran in 1979 meant the collapse of the Nixon Doctrine, which sought to secure U.S. strategic interests through the support of influential regional actors. In his January 1980 State of the Union address, President Jimmy Carter replaced the moribund Nixon policy with a doctrine of his own. Carter declared that "any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." American interests in the region referred to by the State Department and Pentagon as

southwest Asia would now be secured by the direct use of U.S. military force. Beginning with President Carter and now continued by the Reagan administration, the U.S. has undertaken a multifaceted effort to give real meaning to the Carter Doctrine.

THE QUEST FOR REGIONAL ACCESS

Following the shah's overthrow, the subsequent taking of American hostages in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration found the region essentially devoid of any infrastructure with which to conduct forward military operations. Rather than follow the post-World War II pattern of establishing U.S.-owned and operated foreign military bases, the Carter administration instead sought to gain access to already existing facilities. A recognition of the force of Third World nationalism, the necessity of maintaining a low profile in a politically sensitive region of the world, as well as the need to do and to appear to be doing something quickly to acquire

flexibility for military deployment in the region, dictated this course of action.

The American search focused upon Kenya, Oman, and Somalia. Although Washington sought access to a total of 10 military facilities in these three countries, the Pentagon considered the three most important sites to be Kenya's port of Mombasa, the former British airbase on Masirah Island off the coast of Oman, and the seaport/airfield facilities at Berbera, Somalia. By August 1980, the Carter administration had reached agreement with all three governments. In return for access to their facilities, the U.S. agreed to provide Kenya with \$53 million, Oman with \$100 million, and Somalia with \$40 million in security assistance during fiscal years (FY) 1980 and 1981. The total security assistance packages for FY 1982 and FY 1983 are even more impressive, calling for the provision of approximately \$110 million (of which \$57 million was financed by Foreign Military Sales [FMS] credits) to Kenya, \$95.5 million (including \$40 million in FMS credits) to Somalia, and \$100 million (\$70 million FMS) to Oman. In addition, cash or commercial sales of military equipment reached approximately \$175 million to the three countries and U.S. investment to upgrade local facilities has exceeded \$332 million in the past two years.

There is little question about the strategic utility of Masirah Island. Its location near the mouth of the Persian Gulf makes it the most important of the facilities, as well as the most likely target for attack. Still it provides the U.S. with the logistical infrastructure to conduct sea control and maritime operations in the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. Oman also serves as a forward staging area for the pre-positioning of supplies for the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).

Kenya's port of Mombasa is of far less value in terms of supporting direct U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf. The 2,500 miles that separate Kenya and the Straits of Hormuz put U.S. tactical fighters and bombers out of range of the Persian Gulf. Its primary value will be in supporting local sea-control operations, providing an attractive shore leave for U.S. sailors, and pro-


viding fleet support for U.S. carrier battle groups. Kenya's facilities are also the least vulnerable and could be valuable as a rear staging area for the movement of American forces and equipment into the Persian Gulf. Unlike Somalia, the facilities in Kenya can at least be considered a luxury, not a potential liability.

Although Somalia lies approximately 1,000 miles closer to the Persian Gulf than Kenya or the U.S. naval base at Diego Garcia, the U.S.-Somali base rights agreement has been surrounded by controversy. A strategic vantage point, Somalia's facilities may certainly prove useful in supporting U.S. sea-control and air reconnaissance operations in the vicinity of Bab-al-Mandab. The base at Berbera, however, is potentially quite vulnerable. South Yemen lies just across the sea and the Ethiopian border is only 150 miles away. There is also uncertainty as to under what contingencies Somali facilities would prove to be of unique value. A Soviet invasion of Iran would open everything in the Indian Ocean region as well as Europe and Turkey to the U.S., and Somalia would hardly be important. While the Siad Barre government has been supportive of Egypt and the Camp David accords, Barre would most certainly not allow Somali

facilities to be used against other Arab states in the event of another Arab-Israeli conflict.

Like Kenya, Somalia could serve as a rear staging area for the RDF's deployment into the Persian Gulf. However, not much has been planned in the way of pre-positioning military equipment in Somalia. Somalia could prove of considerable value in supporting military operations in East Africa, but given U.S. inactivity during the abortive air force coup attempt at Kenya in August 1982, under what circumstances the United States would use Somali facilities remains unclear.

The U.S.-Somalia arms-for-access agreement has also been mired in political controversy. Somali designs on Ethiopia's Ogaden region put Washington on the wrong side of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict in the eyes of other African nations. Although Washington stipulated that "defensive arms" would be provided only on the condition that Somalia stay out of the Ogaden, at the time the agreement was signed in August 1980 several thousand regular Somali army forces were fighting alongside Western Somali Liberation Front guerrillas inside Ethiopia's borders. This has invited direct retaliation by the Ethiopian armed forces along and inside the Somali border, and



Ethiopian support for the Somalia Salvation Front, which is attempting to overthrow the Barre regime. The most grave concern is that the U.S. could be drawn into a Somali-Ethiopian war. Washington would not only be on the wrong side in terms of African opinion, but probably also on the losing side. Since the massive infusion of Soviet weapons into Ethiopia and the introduction of more than 15,000 Cuban troops in early 1978, the military balance on the Horn has drastically changed. Somalia possesses the military capacity only to harass, and certainly not to turn back a major Ethiopian offensive without increased U.S. assistance.

American uneasiness about Somalia concerns not only the Ogaden, but the

Somalia make it extremely difficult for the United States not to be seen as propping up an increasingly unpopular and unstable regime. Despite its apparent reluctance as an ally, the U.S. risks being implicated in Barre's misdeeds. SDSF representative Mohamed Abshir has been quoted as saying that "the access agreement will be reviewed if we topple Siad Barre."

Washington is attempting a delicate balancing act in the Horn. It has moved very slowly to implement its new relationship with Somalia because many in the Africa bureau of the State Department view Ethiopia as the prize to be ultimately regained in the Horn. The first shipment of U.S. weapons did not arrive until 1982. It took a drive by the SDSF guerrillas into the region north of

administration requested \$30 million and got \$40 million in 1983, and has requested another \$40 million for FY 1984. But if Ethiopia is the ultimate prize, continued U.S. support for Somalia only reinforces the Soviet-Cuban position in Ethiopia.

THE EGYPT-SUDAN-CHAD TRIANGLE

In addition to the access agreements mentioned, in the last two years the Reagan administration has focused upon Ras Banas, Egypt, as the centerpiece of the U.S. strategic network in the region. Outside of Diego Garcia, Ras Banas will be the most expensive U.S. military construction project in southwest Asia. The Pentagon projects expenditures to total over \$522 million through FY 1985 because American facilities in Oman are seen as a vulnerable target for attack. In the event war breaks out and U.S. intervention seems imminent, Pentagon officials look to Ras Banas to serve as the rear staging area for the RDF. Its central location will allow it to be used for a full range of contingencies that might require U.S. forces.

The construction of a strategic network in the region is intended to enhance U.S. power projection capabilities, particularly the ability to support the Rapid Deployment Force and the peacetime naval presence. Although these access agreements have certainly enhanced the U.S. geostrategic position in southwest Asia, each agreement hangs by a somewhat thin political thread. Turmoil runs rampant throughout the region. Protecting this strategic network from a backdoor threat has drawn Washington's attention to Egypt's southern neighbor — Sudan — and, of all places, to Chad.

Since the assassination of Anwar Sadat in October 1981, Sudan's priority rating has risen in the eyes of the Reagan administration. Confronted with the Libyan-sponsored destabilization efforts and strained relations with Addis Ababa concerning antigovernment rebels in Sudan and Ethiopia, each finding refuge in the other country, the Nimeiry government feels itself surrounded by hostile Soviet proxy governments. This concern was heightened by the signing of a tripartite pact



Photo: Department of Defense

Amphibious landing at Berbera, Somalia: "The base at Berbera is potentially quite vulnerable"

shakiness of the Barre regime. In the past two years, Siad Barre's government has been beset by protest resignations by top government officials disillusioned with his internal policies. Secondly, it has come under attack by a well-armed guerrilla movement operating out of Ethiopia and receiving substantial financial backing from Libya. And third, it has seen the coalescence of opposition groups under the banner of the Democratic Front for Somali Salvation (SDSF). The clan-based internal political dynamics of

Mogadishu in mid-July 1982 to regain American attention. The Reagan administration then ordered an emergency airlift of military supplies drawn from part of the \$40 million agreed to in the basing agreement.

U.S. security systems assistance has been kept at such a level that Somalia poses no serious threat to its neighbors. Washington has no desire or incentive to compete with the multi-billion-dollar Soviet arms program in Ethiopia. Somalia received \$20 million in FMS credits in FY 1981-82. The Reagan

between the governments of Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen in August 1981.

During Jimmy Carter's tenure in office, Sudan was seen as about on par with Somalia and Kenya. It received \$25 and \$30 million, respectively, in FY 1980 and FY 1981 in security assistance. But if military assistance is a barometer of U.S. interest in a country, then under the Reagan administration Sudan's priority ranking has risen considerably. U.S. security assistance to the Nimeiry government now far surpasses that received by Somalia and Kenya. The \$100 million it received in FY 1982 and the \$75 million it received in FY 1983 make Sudan the beneficiary of the largest U.S. security assistance package in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, by using the presumed threat posed by Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, the Nimeiry government has found Washington much more responsive and prompt in its delivery of military hardware than has Barre. Because the Khartoum government has offered the U.S. access to military facilities including Port Sudan, and there is the possibility of allowing the pre-positioning of equipment and supplies, the Reagan administration has justified its increased assistance in part on the grounds that it promotes U.S. efforts to protect oil-tanker routes in the Red Sea. Of more immediate concern, however, is that it will also be used to defend against Libyan subversive activities in the region. For in reality, Sudan is of little direct concern except as a buffer to U.S. interests in the Middle East.

It is only in the context of the deepening U.S. desire for the base at Ra's Banas and its concern for the security of the Nimeiry regime that the "crisis" in Chad during the late summer can be placed in perspective. It is a well-known phenomenon that U.S. foreign policy interests are often defined in foreign capitals by governments seeking to acquire a larger slice of Washington's foreign economic and military aid pie. Invoking the spectre of Soviet involvement, either directly or through its presumed surrogates, has generally proved to be a useful prod. This scenario was again readily observable in northeast Africa as shown by the

U.S. response to the recent hostilities in Chad.

Washington's response to Libyan intervention in the Chadian civil war is part of a broad policy of containment. In northeast Africa, this policy is designed to protect three vital regional

were still serious reservations about Goukouni because of his past ties to Qaddafi and his apparent readiness to accede to Libya's continued occupation of Chad's northern Aouzou strip.

With the OAU reluctant to support him on the battlefield, Goukouni once



Photo: Department of Defense

U.S. and Egyptian jets in formation during Bright Star 83: "Ra's Banas is the centerpiece of the U.S. strategic network in the region"

interests: U.S. Middle East policy, access to Persian Gulf oil, and the U.S. strategic network that blankets the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean. A critical part of this effort has involved increased military assistance to the governments of Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and now Chad.

American involvement in Chad first began as a covert operation. Following the Libyan intervention in the civil war, which allowed Goukouni Woddeye to oust Hissène Habré from Ndjamena in December 1980, the Central Intelligence Agency began funneling covert aid to Habré and his rebels. Habré was also receiving assistance from the pro-U.S. governments in Egypt and Sudan. Since the legitimacy of the Goukouni government was recognized by both France and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Washington reportedly put an end to covert assistance following the withdrawal of Libyan forces in November 1981 at Goukouni's request. Although Washington provided some emergency supplies to Chad after the Libyan departure, there

again turned to Libya. During May and early June 1982, Goukouni sought to repair relations with Qaddafi, strained since the expulsion of Libyan forces the previous November. This time, however, Qaddafi preferred to remain on the sidelines for fear of antagonizing moderate African states, and jeopardizing his upcoming tenure as chairman of the OAU. The way was left open for the rebels. Seizing on the opportunity and lack of resistance, Habré regained Ndjamena in June 1982.

Qaddafi was not out of the picture for long. Rebuffed in his attempt to head the OAU, his chains of moderation were unshackled. By the end of December, it was known that Goukouni was planning a new offensive with full Libyan support. At about the same time, Habré approached U.S. military officials to inquire about the possibility of receiving U.S. military assistance. Habré did not get a favorable reply. The Reagan administration still did not quite see eye-to-eye with its Sudanese and Egyptian friends on just what was at stake in Chad.

American attitudes began to change in early 1983. Reports of a proposed Libyan-backed coup against Nimeiry surfaced in February. At a February 16 press conference, Reagan expressed concern about Libyan destabilization attempts in the region. Libyan threats against Chad, Sudan, Egypt, and Tunisia prompted the administration to show the flag. Four AWACS surveillance aircraft were dispatched to Egypt and the aircraft carrier *Nimitz* was sent into the waters off the North African coast.

When the expected Goukouni offensive erupted in June 1983, the main American policy line was to encourage France to take the leading role. Although the French eventually took the lead, Washington devised its own response. As the Libyan-backed rebels moved closer to the capital in the south, the Reagan administration drew on a special \$75 million fund set aside for emergencies, the dispersal of which does not require congressional approval, to assist the beleaguered Habré regime. In mid-July, an "urgent" \$10 million airlift of U.S. military supplies was approved on the grounds that Chad and its neighbors were threatened by a Libyan-backed insurgency. Then on August 4 the administration authorized

an additional \$15 million in emergency assistance, which included 30 Redeye and Stinger ground-launched anti-aircraft missiles to bolster the government's defense capabilities against Libyan bombing raids. Three military advisers were also sent to Chad to instruct the government forces in the use of these weapons. The administration also sent two AWACS to Sudan and the aircraft carrier *Eisenhower* into the waters off the Libyan coast. Washington found its own proxy in President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, who sent approximately 2,000 Israeli-trained troops and six jets to support Chadian government forces.

DIEGO GARCIA, NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS, AND THE RDF

Despite its flash of prominence, developments in Chad must be seen as secondary to, though of course abetting, the larger security strategy that is evolving in northeast Africa and the Indian Ocean. In addition to the access and base agreements that form the setting for concern about Chadian developments, three other Carter-cum-Reagan initiatives should be mentioned to complete the review of recent policy developments that augment U.S. power projection capabilities in the region.

Three developments stand out: the upgrading of Diego Garcia, the sharp increase in naval deployments to the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean, and the development of the Central Command for Southwest Asia (the Rapid Deployment Force).

Began in the late 1960s as an "austere communication facility," the U.S. base at Diego Garcia has over the years steadily accumulated more and more functions on behalf of the U.S. military. By the mid-1970s, the island was being used by U.S. Navy P-3C Orion aircraft for antisubmarine reconnaissance throughout the Indian Ocean region. In addition, fuel, munitions, and other supplies were stored for the use of the intermittent U.S. naval operations that ventured into the ocean.

Regional developments in 1979-80 served as a catalyst for increased funding and new missions for the tiny island. There is speculation that over \$1 billion will go into new construction on the island by the mid-1980s. Diego Garcia will serve as the United States' primary rear staging area for the movement of American forces into the Persian Gulf. Cargo ships, oil, munitions, and other supplies have been permanently pre-positioned there. Its airfield has been expanded to facilitate air reconnaissance and U.S. Air Force B-52 surveillance missions. The island also serves as the center of U.S. intelligence and communications-gathering activities in the region. Although situated in the middle of the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia is not without controversy. Any efforts to rekindle plans to turn the Indian Ocean into a demilitarized "zone of peace" will have to deal with the U.S. base on Diego Garcia. The removal of the island from the control of Mauritius, and the relocation of the indigenous inhabitants to Mauritius — both done in the 1960s — remain a festering sore in Mauritian politics.

The third prong of Washington's efforts to project U.S. influence into the Indian Ocean region involves old-fashioned gunboat diplomacy. The most immediate and most tangible expression of heightened U.S. concern about developments in the region from 1978-79 onward has come in the form of rapidly augmented naval deploy-



Americans instructing Sudanese soldiers: "Sudan's priority ranking has risen considerably"

Photo: Department of Defense

ments. Until 1979, the Navy rotated task forces into the Indian Ocean about three times a year, but there was no permanent presence of any consequence.

This situation began to change in 1979. Throughout the year, there was a steady increase in U.S. naval forces in the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean. During 1980 and into 1981, two carrier battle groups remained on station near the Persian Gulf. Although one of the two carrier battle groups was withdrawn from the Indian Ocean in October 1981, the U.S. has continued to maintain a permanent naval presence of at least one carrier battle group — an indication of continued U.S. military concern. There is little doubt that this new deployment has become a permanent new mission of the U.S. Navy.

The fourth part of the U.S. response to secure its interests in the area involved the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force. Until early 1979, there had been little incentive either from the White House or from within the bureaucracy to establish a Third World intervention force. The Carter administration had adopted the Nixon Doctrine — by which the U.S. looked to the shah of Iran to protect Western interests in the Persian Gulf — as the cornerstone of U.S. regional policy. State Department officials viewed the creation of such a force as politically provocative. Pentagon officials felt it would divert resources from the military's primary mission of defending Western Europe.

Following the taking of American hostages in Tehran, the Carter administration went ahead and established a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in early December 1980. U.S. Marine Corps Major General Paul X. Kelley was appointed as commander. By January 1980, in accord with the enunciation of the Carter Doctrine, the RDF's mission narrowed from being a global fast-reaction force to one focused on the Persian Gulf region. On January 1, 1983, the RDF officially became a full-scale military command, which in the words of its new commander, Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston, has been given "clear authority and responsibility for United States military activity within the re-

gion of the Persian Gulf and southwest Asia."

The RDF is currently a 222,000-man force that includes three and one-third Army combat divisions, three aircraft carrier groups, one amphibious ready group, seven Air Force tactical fighter wings, and one and one-third Marine Amphibious Forces (MAF). Although its power capability may be adequate to deter a Soviet invasion of Iran, it is not likely to be able to stop a concerted Soviet invasion, which is viewed by the Reagan administration as the most serious threat to southwest Asia. The Reagan administration is thus proceeding with plans to double the size of the RDF to 440,000 troops by adding almost two full Army combat divisions, three Air Force tactical fighter groups, and two-thirds of an MAF. To deploy this force, the administration is increasing the U.S. airlift, sealift, and sea-based pre-positioning capacities, begun during the Carter years, to support three MAFs for 30 days of combat in the Indian Ocean region.

Since the creation of the RDF, American forces have participated in several training exercises in the southwest Asia region. U.S.-Egyptian forces conducted desert ground maneuvers and bombing exercises in Egypt in November 1980. A year later, the Bright Star 82 operation involved 5,000 U.S. troops participating in a six-week exercise in Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman. In early December 1982, 2,500 U.S. soldiers conducted maneuvers in Oman. In August and September 1983, 5,500 U.S. soldiers participated in joint military exercises, Bright Star 83, with Somalia, Egypt, and Sudan. Although Egypt and other countries reportedly prohibited maneuvers during 1982 to protest U.S. support for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, whatever reservations they many still have held were put aside. The U.S. feels that these joint exercises both help calm regional fears about Qaddafi and prepare U.S. troops for rapid deployment in case of regional crisis.

There is little doubt that the new initiatives taken by both the Carter and Reagan administrations have sharply augmented U.S. capabilities in northeast Africa and the Indian Ocean. With the new access agreements, pre-

positioned supplies, troops on permanent station, and the RDF, the U.S. now has much greater flexibility for power projection to the region. And even more is in the works.

The benefits attached to these developments, from the administration's point of view, are clearly related to its new ability to augment regional diplomatic efforts with a military component. But what costs might be incurred? The greatest danger lies in the possibility that military means will be substituted for diplomacy. As the Chad scenario suggests, the use of military force in the most unlikely of places is made much more probable once there are fearful clients and local commitments. The reality of politics in the region is of course their extreme volatility. Governmental instability provides a rationale for the U.S. buildup, but it is appropriate to ask whether the response is appropriate to the situation being addressed.

There is always the danger in U.S. foreign policy to attribute instability to Soviet (or Cuban or Libyan) meddling, when in fact there may be other more important causes. The ability to use military options in future crises may seem to offer advantages, but short-run gains may turn into long-range costs. The new options and flexibility may prove to be illusory if they are not linked to proper analysis. The militarization of political conflict may seem satisfying in that it responds to the need to "do something," but this response may often be inappropriate. By applying the wrong analysis, intervention may occur that will deepen commitments in places where the United States actually has little ability to shape events.

The danger of substituting military options for diplomacy, or for doing nothing, is always a possibility; possessing multiple capabilities and numerous options need not insure positive outcomes. In northeast Africa/southwest Asia/the Indian Ocean, a region where the stakes are high but the regimes are often weak, any tendency to substitute military solutions for political ones must be carefully monitored in order to avoid turning smaller internal or regional problems into larger global ones. □

What Mandate for Moi?

BY RICK WELLS

With the dust barely settled after a heated month-long election campaign, poll results and the formation of a new cabinet indicate a significant shift in the direction of Kenyan politics. When President Daniel arap Moi called for general elections — the fifth since the country's independence in 1963 — to be held more than a year ahead of schedule, he made clear his immediate reasons for doing so. At a special meeting of the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) governing council in mid-May, he said: "I have been concerned and very disappointed with the performance of some people whom I have appointed to senior positions as ministers and in the civil service. . . . At times such people have conducted themselves in a manner that leads me to question their loyalty to me as the head of state, to their government, and to this country.

"Because of the greed and selfishness among some unpatriotic people

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Charles Njonjo: The "traitor" wore button-hole flowers and pinstripe suits

Photo: Camerapix

who are entrusted with positions, it has proved very difficult to eliminate magendo [black market activities] and corruption in the country. Their activities have contributed to undermining our efforts to reconstruct our economy. . . . In order to clean the system, I have therefore decided that all elected leaders, including myself, will seek fresh mandates from the electorate."

However, if Moi's aim was to let the electorate rid the government of these disloyal and selfish elements, he must have been disappointed with the outcome. Despite the fact that there had

been four years since the last general elections, that there was apparently a great deal for the 7.2 million registered voters to complain about, and that the weather was fine on the polling day, the turnout was poor — estimated at between 45% and 50%, in contrast to the 67% recorded in 1979.

While the rejection of 49 incumbent members of parliament, including five cabinet ministers, out of a total of 158 seats in the national assembly represents a sizable shakeup by any standard, in the past the electorate has thrown out as many as 60% of the sitting members of parliament. If the generally poor turnout reflected a degree of apathy among Kenyans in responding to Moi's call for change, more disturbing to the 59-year-old president will be the loss of known political allies and the reelection of those recognized to be out of favor. Moi was therefore left with the awkward problem — one he had hoped the electorate might solve for him — of picking a new team from among old faces; and contrary to expectations, the new 23-minister cabinet was not substantially reduced in number from the previous 26.

If anything, the elections served to distract people's attentions from the

so-called traitor affair, the second major political crisis to have rocked Kenya since the abortive coup attempt in August last year. The crisis was sparked by Moi himself when, addressing a public rally in the town of Kisii on May 8, he accused a senior member of his cabinet of being groomed by an unnamed foreign power to replace him as president. This apparently throw-away remark led to weeks of divisive speculation, both in and out of parliament, concerning the identity of the traitor.

While members of parliament throughout the country clamored to affirm their loyalty to Moi and to denounce the traitor and his "henchmen," others made pointed comments within the confines of parliament about the traitor's distinctly Anglophile tendencies, such as his pinstripe suits with buttonhole carnations and his frequent visits abroad. The climax of this thinly veiled campaign by other parliamentarians to oust the former attorney-general, Charles Njonjo, came when he was openly accused in parliament of being the traitor and of having improper financial associations with South Africa.

Rather than confirm these allegations, Moi responded to the crisis with the surprise announcement of an early election. He then suspended Njonjo's cabinet post as minister of constitutional affairs as well as his membership in KANU, effectively barring him from taking part in the elections, pending the results of a judicial inquiry set up to examine the charges against him. Moi subsequently banned all "traitor talk," since the issue threatened to dominate the electoral campaign.

However, the judicial commission of inquiry has yet to convene, and the official silence about Njonjo's fate has done little to diffuse what is still a potentially explosive issue. It is difficult, however, to gauge how far the traitor affair has eroded the power base Njonjo built up — particularly in the civil service and police — during his years as attorney general.

Behind the two major events since last August — the political demise of Njonjo and the subsequent call for an election — lie the maneuverings of a president eager to stamp his mark on the

body politic for the first time since donning the mantle of the government left by the late Jomo Kenyatta in 1978. At

As leading member of the Kikuyu, the country's largest ethnic group at 21% of the population, Kenyatta was



President Daniel arap Moi: Trying to shake off the Kenyatta legacy

Photo: Camerapix

that time, Moi adopted his "nyayo" (Swahili for "footsteps") philosophy of government as a sign to the nation, and to the Kikuyu in particular, that he planned to follow in Kenyatta's footsteps. However, as Moi began to go his own way, the cry of "nyayo" became a call for the country to follow in his own footsteps. Despite his early adoption of the "nyayo" philosophy, Moi failed to match the ability of the late president to keep in check the tensions arising from personal rivalries in the political elite and ethnic division on the broader front — tensions that have always been features of the Kenyan political scene.

able to exercise iron-fisted discipline on his cabinet. Moi, however, belonging to the minority Kalenjin group, adopted a more conciliatory role and formed a ruling coalition based on Kalenjin (placed in key posts), Kambas (who dominate the army), Luhyas, and selected Luos and Kikuyus seen to be loyal to him.

His initial moves toward rapprochement with the second-largest ethnic group, the Luo (13% of the population) — namely toward the rebel leader and former Vice-President Oginga Odinga, who fell out of favor with Kenyatta — proved unsuccessful because it appeared that their political revival posed

more of a threat than an assurance and that Odinga still harbored political ambitions. Moi's suspicions about their loyalty seemed confirmed by the fact that several of the reported ringleaders of the coup attempt were in fact Luo.

The Kikuyus inevitably resented their loss of influence as Kenya's power brokers, but remained divided among themselves, as evidenced by the constant personal rivalry between two leading Kikuyus, Njonjo and Vice-President and Home Affairs Minister Mwai Kibaki. Indeed, what threatened to turn into an open fight for the post of vice-president — the incumbent is in effect Moi's successor — in the KANU party elections was nipped in the bud by the removal of Njonjo from the political scene.

KANU elections, which decide this and other posts, last took place in 1978 and are supposed to be held every two years. Their delay reflected Moi's insecurity concerning loyalty. It appeared to be part of his overall strategy to wait and see what would result from the general elections before holding the party votes.

In effect, Moi's desire to shake off the Kenyatta legacy has meant a steady reduction of Kikuyu influence in government, while he has simultaneously attempted to broaden the base of his KANU party support elsewhere, with the exception of the Luo. The most apparent example of a lessening of

Kikuyu power — the ousting of Njonjo — has been matched by moves against senior civil servants and other important Kikuyus.

What the elections demonstrated was a Kikuyu backlash against such tendencies. Whereas strong ethnic loyalists fared well, those known to be sympathetic to the president failed in their challenge or were rejected. Unlike in other parts of the country, this phenomenon caused a higher-than-ever turnover of members of parliament in the Kikuyu constituencies. In the Kikuyu constituency — Njonjo's former seat — Lawrence Waiyaki Wambaa and Chris Kahara, allies respectively of the president and vice-president, were soundly beaten by one of Njonjo's former campaign managers, Peter Kebibi Kinyanjua. Similarly, despite enormous pressure against him during the election campaign and his known association with Njonjo, Finance Minister Arthur Magugu was returned with 60% of the vote in his constituency. Housing Minister Charles Rubia, the only man to make any attempt to stand up to Njonjo during the traitor affair, was likewise reelected.

The message has therefore been loud and clear that the Kikuyu are not happy with the way things have been going. What they can do about it is another matter. Moi's response has been to drop Rubia from the new cabinet, along with Stanley Oloitipiti, the former minister

of culture and social services, who has never made any secret of his great wealth as a leading Maasai and who admitted during the traitor affair to having been a close friend of Njonjo.

Magugu, although retained in the cabinet, has been shifted to the less conspicuous Ministry of Works, Housing, and Physical Planning. The only other minister to have been left out of the new 23-man cabinet is the former minister of economic planning, Zachary Onyonga.

In the traditional areas of support for the president such as the coast and the Kalenjin and Luhya areas of Western province, contrary to prior elections, the incumbents, or old faces, were by and large returned to office. The same was generally true in the pastoralist areas, where, with the notable exception of John Keen, a Maasai close to the president, almost all the same candidates were reelected.

It is difficult to draw any conclusions from the election results in the Luo areas, apart from the fact that all those thought to be allied to Odinga suffered suspiciously large defeats. Most commentators before the election were inclined to discount the Odinga factor — not surprisingly, since he remains under house arrest. In any case, relations with the Luo are unlikely to see any great improvement.

The big question facing Moi, therefore, is how to ensure political stability if the two major ethnic groups, the Kikuyu and the Luo, remain outside the mainstream of politics. For the first time, the new cabinet seems to bear Moi's personal stamp and in particular is without the overbearing influence of Njonjo, whereas in the past, Moi had been careful to maintain an ethnic balance. Perhaps the biggest surprise was the replacement of Robert Ouko as foreign minister by the former minister of tourism, Elijah Mwangale.

However, one of the major drawbacks of the elections was their timing, distracting cabinet ministers' attentions from the tasks of government when their energies were most needed to tackle the problems confronting the country's economy. In the midst of efforts to meet International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendations, to implement a World Bank structural



Counting the ballots in Nairobi: Voter turnout was poor

Photo: Camerapix

readjustment program, and to prepare for the launching of a five-year economic plan in December to coincide with the twentieth anniversary of independence, it was crucial that Moi choose people who not only had the expertise required for the positions but were unlikely to be hampered by the personal bickering and rivalries that had afflicted their predecessors. The replacement of former Minister of Finance Arthur Magugu by George Saitoti, a technocrat previously uninvolved in politics, would seem to be a step in the right direction.

Last year's abortive coup was a shattering blow to Kenya, not only for the loss of life and damage to property, but also for the resulting loss of morale in what had always been recognized as one of Africa's most stable and prosperous nations. What it revealed was an economy riddled with imbalances (and resultant social tensions), which, in the face of the international recession, had proved almost as vulnerable as its socialist neighbor, Tanzania, to the consequences of falling agricultural export prices and rising costs of fuel.

When Moi became president in 1978, Kenya's economy was riding high on the effects of a two-year coffee boom. In the postindependence years, the economy expanded rapidly with gross domestic product averaging an annual growth of 6%. The crunch came with the world recession. Last year, oil imports cost the equivalent of 57% of export earnings; and static export earnings from coffee, tea, tourism, and refined petroleum products, added to a debt service ratio of around 20%, all amounted to a balance of payments deficit of some \$364.9 million last year. Immediately after the coup attempt, a plea was sent by the government to all Kenya's leading Western donors, requesting emergency aid to the tune of about \$300 million. Reports suggest that the Kenyans were disappointed with the response. But an acceleration of aid program finance by both Britain and the United States to provide balance of payments support has at least helped to keep the IMF program on course.

While Britain's vested interests in Kenya stem from colonial days, a long-standing relationship with the United

States was made closer in 1980 by an agreement allowing U.S. access to naval facilities at Mombasa and airfield access elsewhere in the country. With 125 American companies in Kenya

year's standby for a similar breach of terms. However, because Kenya managed to meet the June criteria for the current 175.95 million SDR 18-month standby, the September IMF targets



A victorious Charles Rubia (center) with his supporters: The only man to stand up for Njonjo was reelected

Photo: Camerapix

providing a total of around \$300 million worth of commercial investment, this year's \$60 million in economic aid to the country, added to the military commitment, make Kenya the third-largest recipient of American aid in Africa. In June, the United States signed a \$29.7 million grant to Kenya, of which \$27.7 million is cash in hand, to help close last year's budget deficit.

The first tranche of a \$130.9 million World Bank structural readjustment program has been disbursed, with a further \$50 million to come pending further negotiations. However, Kenya's record with the IMF to date has not been particularly encouraging. A standby facility of 151.5 million special drawing rights (SDRs) negotiated toward the end of 1981 broke down in August last year after a serious breach of IMF conditions for the loan. This followed a suspension of the previous

were deferred until the end of the year because of the elections.

The preelection budget was essentially marking time and focused on efforts to boost exports and perk up the flagging manufacturing sector, while containing few tax or price increases. Observers in Nairobi feel that another minibudget is likely to follow the elections, with higher interest rates and agricultural producer prices, as well as further cut-backs in government spending likely. These tight controls and austerity measures — necessary if the IMF program is to remain on course — will hit hard with the average Kenyan. A continuing rise in unemployment and falling standards of living are something the country's 17 million people will have to bear, a fact that makes the task of president — and those he has chosen to assist him — all the more difficult. □

Rhetoric Meets Reality

BY JOHN DIMSDALE

Tanzania is a country hypnotized, spellbound by President Julius Nyerere's 1967 Arusha Declaration. In part, the document said, "In our country, work shall be something to be proud of, and laziness, drunkenness, and idleness should be things to be ashamed of. . . . It is necessary for us to be on guard against internal stooges who could be used by external enemies who aim to destroy us." These sentiments lie behind the current crackdown against those that society considers to be "economic exploiters or racketeers."

For the past several months, special tribunals have been touring Tanzania to hear cases against people accused of hoarding drainage pipes, of failing to account for the possession of more than a minimum of clothing, of running un-



President Nyerere with President Obote of Uganda: The cost of the war to oust Idi Amin is still being counted

Photo: Camerapix

authorized business, or simply misusing public funds. When the economic purge was announced, every Tanzanian hoped that the promised cleanup would mean goods reappearing in the shops, buses running, and cooperatives with cash ready to buy the country's crops. There was also the hope that the people appointed to investigate economic "crimes" would bring to book senior officials and important people commonly believed to have been the only sector of the population to have enjoyed anything higher than basic subsistence living over the last few years.

The country has been disappointed. The daily reports on Tanzania's radio

and in the official newspapers list those brought before the tribunals. They are mostly petty traders. Just occasionally, a party official in some remote district is included, but no one has been charged with allowing the trains and buses to regularly halt nationwide service for lack of fuel, no one is mentioned as being responsible for the introduction of food rationing in the capital city, and no one owns up to being behind the complete dearth of tourists in the plush and not so plush hotels.

The sad fact is that Tanzania is having to eat words instead of the food that it could and should be able to produce. Most of the words are home-bred ideology that permeates the political grapevines, from the 10-house cells to State House and back again. Other words, not eaten because they are found too unpalatable, are those emanating from the International Monetary Fund with which the Tanzanian treasury is locked in almost permanent dialogue. If ideology smothers the hard facts of daily life, there is a new realism emerging about international aid. In September, Tanzanians were told by Amir Jamal,

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minister without portfolio in the President's Office, "It would be dangerous, absurd, and even irresponsible to believe that an agreement with the IMF signified the end of our economic problems." Jamal, the country's widely respected former finance minister, further warned, "IMF or no IMF, we just have to manage our very limited resources with great diligence and due insight into the consequences of every step we take or avoid taking."

What has gone wrong? Why is Tanzania's continued downward spiral seemingly endless? A boatman I met recently had part of the answer. I was trying to cross from Mwanza at the southern end of Lake Victoria to the island of Ukerewe. It was a journey I had made many times in the 1950s when an efficient power ferry plied backwards and forwards carrying people and their goods to market on "the mainland." Now the ferry is not working. Nor are the two larger ships that used to circumnavigate the lake. Undeterred, I approached one of the many Ukerewe fishermen who brought fish into Mwanza in their dugout boats. Several had outboard engines of great antiquarian interest, but still working. "How much would it cost to give me a lift over to the island?" I asked one man about to leave for home. He replied that he could not possibly take a fare-paying passenger, as that would be against the party's economic policies. Would he

very kindly take me for free, I asked. He couldn't do that either, because if I was seen in his boat, it would be assumed that he had taken a fare from me and that would cause him trouble. Similarly, a taxi driver in Mwanza actually had his second car confiscated because he could not produce documentation to show how he had come by the funds for its purchase.

However great the demand for goods and services in Tanzania, the tiny supply sector of the economy exists by the skin of its teeth. Even an urchin selling little cones of peanuts on the pavement in Dar es Salaam was observed recently being chased by four laughing policemen who then proceeded to pile all other pavement wares — the boy was too fleet of foot — into their Land-Rover and drive away.

The campaign has been dubbed by one Tanzanian wit as the OGCD, the "Ongoing Crackdown against Racketeers and Saboteurs." By definition it is bound to fail. With an exchange rate that is totally unreal, a black market has grown up offering four times the going rate. With a shortage of virtually every commodity, it has been the so-called racketeers who have kept the country going by importing by whatever means they could and paying with whatever currency — other than Tanzania's — that they could get hold of.

While most humble Tanzanians are cocooned in so many years of ideologi-

cal rhetoric that it will be a long job to open their eyes or for development to be remotivated, there is a new awareness of the country's predicament on the part of the leaders. A startled Parliament recently heard Finance Minister Cleopa Msuyu say, "It is not bad to learn from the capitalists; they maintain a very small staff at their headquarters while deploying their workers in the most productive areas." Such a statement would have been not just unthinkable a few years ago, but branded as heresy. Again, led by Prime Minister Edward Sokoine, Tanzania has been making overtures toward capitalistic and "successful" Kenya to the north. Since 1977, the land border between the two neighbors has been firmly closed to all trade and travellers.

One of the reasons behind Tanzania's border closure was frustration at the Kenya tour operators milking tourists of their dollars and pounds in order to look at Tanzanian gameparks. But the hope that Tanzania's own tourist hotels and lodges would automatically benefit from shutting the Kenya door was a false one. True, there has been a slight upturn in the numbers of tourists visiting Tanzania in the recent past, but there is a long way to go before the tourist industry does any more than cover its costs. In mid-July, the prime minister spoke about this, and within days it was announced that a delegation was to visit Nairobi to discuss



Photo: Tanzania Info

Farmers at an ujamaa village: "Forcing peasants away from their traditional fields was the first mistake"

the possibility of resuming limited links, including air service and cooperation between tour operators in both countries. Such a resumption might benefit Kenya more, given that it has a sophisticated and well-based tourist industry, but it would also make a significant difference in Tanzania's desperate efforts to earn foreign exchange.

Sadly, the tourist industry is just one example of a chicken-and-egg situation. With the magnificent Ngorongoro Crater and the huge Serengeti National Park, Tanzania should be *the* tourist attraction of East Africa. It should be, but it won't until Tanzania's currency is once again devalued to make it economically sensible for a hard-saving automobile worker from Detroit or a postman from Hamburg to spend his money on paying a visit. Hotel charges, the price of a beer, a taxi ride, or souvenir are all laughably expensive when compared to similar goods and services in neighboring countries.

Despite international and World Bank funding, the refurbishment of hotels to make them fit places for even the humblest visitor has a long way to go. On a recent visit to Dar es Salaam, the hotel "New Africa's" main dining room had just one light bulb. My bedroom had none. I asked the porter if he could obtain lights for both bed and bathroom. He looked out the window, saw a light was burning somewhere across the street, and said, "Wait while I go steal one." Such is the rundown state of so much of Tanzania's infrastructure and such is the new breed of immorality that it is fostering.

While he has promised that his current term as president is to be his last, there are few signs that Julius Nyerere, *Mwalimu* ("the teacher"), is anything but the single national figurehead that he has been since even before independence. His unquestioned personal incorruptibility has much to do with this. He is seen to be a man of the people and his lifestyle accords with his political belief in egalitarianism. And as a direct result of his personal policymaking, there are many credits to the generally gloomy balance of national achievement. Tanzania boasts of one of the best educational systems in Africa. Schooling is universal and free, with over 90 percent of all children attending

formal schools. Adult education is actively promoted and the literacy rate has climbed to 60 percent. Water is available to all in urban areas and to 40 percent in rural districts. Almost all villages have a dispensary and life expectancy has increased by ten years, to about age 48, since independence.

Critics put the blame for Tanzania's economic decline firmly on the agricultural policies that have been pursued. Forcing the peasants away from their traditional fields was the first mistake, they say, though the single-minded insistence on communal farming is now being relaxed. Killing off the cooperatives and giving state authorities sole control of marketing was the next. And subsidizing urban consumers while starving rural producers was another.

Agricultural output has steadily and dramatically declined by 7 percent per capita over the last decade. As 90 percent of the country's population lives in the countryside, enforced "villagization" must be partly responsible, together with the central directives to peasants that they must grow minimum acreages of famine crops and specific cash crops. This has alienated the small holders who have lost incentive as both producer prices fell and consumer goods disappeared from village stores. In partial recognition of the malaise affecting farmers' morale, the government raised prices paid in both 1982 and 1983. Despite this, forecasts for 1983 crop totals show little or no improvement, with the possible exception of coffee. The most important cash crops as listed by the government are Arabica coffee, Robusta coffee, cashew nuts, tea, cardamom, cocoa, and pyrethrum. At this year's Farmer's Day festivities, President Nyerere told farmers that they were "too choosy" about what they ate. As a result, prices paid for maize and other grains have not been raised. The almost immediate reaction was the introduction of food rationing in Dar es Salaam. Its needs are 400 tons a day, but at the last count the city was receiving only 164.

Minister of Agriculture John Machunda has estimated that maize production can be raised from the 1980 level of 1.7 million tons to 3.5 million tons by the year 2000, and that millet,

rice, and wheat production can also be increased considerably. Given both bad weather and low morale, his plans have been described by one aid worker as "utopian." Significantly, the plight of Tanzania's agriculture prompted an announcement in early September that large-scale farming was to be allowed again, and even encouraged. A group of Asian businessmen have been told to go and choose land both on the coast and upcountry, to establish big wheat, maize, and cattle farms. After years of saying that to hire agricultural labor is to exploit the worker and is therefore immoral and against the country's socialist beliefs, this announcement came as a mild political bombshell, and, perhaps, as a tonic for the country's empty stomach.

The government has tried to halt increases in public spending by freezing 22,000 vacancies in ministries and parastatals. The prime minister has announced that parastatals that register losses are under scrutiny, and some may be closed down. This can only be regarded as healthy and as a relief to central government budgeting. But it leaves untouched the insidious and grossly duplicated bureaucracy that stretches down to the regions, to district and even village level. Where once there was one district office grouping together administrator, local treasury, and extension workers, now there are two in every center. There is the government office and the party office. Neither can function without the blessing of the other and as each has to have its quota of transport, clerks, and typewriters, the waste is appallingly naked eye.

In a purge of the unemployed in Dar es Salaam, Nyerere urged them all to return to their home regions, threatening government action against them. "We pounced on racketeers and economic saboteurs without warning," he said. "We would do the same to loiterers." He further said that the city's population stood at 1.3 million, but that when the unemployed had left, it would still be in excess of one million. He said, "It is ridiculous that the city cannot feed itself from nearby land. It is inexplicable that city residents should depend on cassava from Newala and Songea when Dar es Salaam and the

coast region have better soil than the faraway southern region." Perhaps being further from the source of state ideology, the profit motive in Songea is stronger, but no one is likely to suggest that publicly.

In an uncorrected and unpolished budget speech, prematurely released and printed in the national press, the Tanzanian finance minister listed the woeful state of parastatals, the lack of financial control, the misuse of local purchase orders, and the losses incurred by the government stores. "Their accounts are a shambles," he said. In the revised version, the minister toned down his criticism to say, "Some parastatal accounts are not up to date while others do, not submit their accounts in time for auditing." Either way, he had made his point.

Tanzania's politics are not wholly apathetic or dormant. Thirty-one people were charged with plotting to overthrow the government in early 1983 and a Tanzanian airliner was hijacked the year before and taken to London where the hijackers demanded to see Oscar Kambona, the exiled former foreign minister of Tanzania. More recently, Nyerere so patently failed to answer a string of questions about economic racketeers put to him at a public question and answer session that a procession of cars moved through Dar es Salaam that evening with anti-Nyerere banners and slogans. The procession was broken up by the police and the incident went totally unreported in the local press.

Debating budget estimates in the na-

tional assembly this year, one member of Parliament told the cheering house that the number of officials in the country was simply too many — "a regional party chairman, regional party secretary, regional commissioner, regional party executive secretary, regional member of Parliament, regional development director, regional planning officer . . . and so on." In the same debate, the speaker also called for the reduction of parastatals, giving as an example "10 organizations dealing with the cow that we know of," listing LIDA, Kabimita, Narco, Dafco, Tanganyika Packers, Tanzania Hides and Skins, Tanzania Dairies and its subsidiaries, and a string of others.

For an avowedly peace-loving country, Tanzania sustains a large army and a people's defense militia. It is one of the very few African countries to have used its army to go to the assistance of another state. Without Tanzanian troops, dictator Idi Amin might still be in power in Uganda. But the cost of that war is still being counted. Additionally, there are Tanzanian troops stationed in the Seychelles and, from time to time, detachments in both the Comoros and Mozambique. Those soldiers at home have been given a new task for this fall: soldiers and their families have been recalled not to barracks but to their bases in order to build barracks. Increasing numbers of men were living with their families anywhere they chose. Discipline was suffering and commanders complained that they were unable to parade a detachment on short notice be-

cause it took days to locate the men. The soldiers have been told that they have no choice about building shelters for themselves. To employ a contractor would use valuable taxpayers' money.

While the average Tanzanian peasant spent 1983 looking little further than the next meal, the government has given clear signs that it acknowledges that much has to change. Nyerere has always said that he does not mind admitting a mistake, and while no formal retreat from his 16-year long experiment in African socialism is contemplated, the doors are beginning to open to capital and to capitalistic enterprise. The country remains locked in argument with the IMF, which would like to see a further 50 percent devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling on top of the 30 percent devaluation over the last 17 months. If agreement could be reached, Tanzania would be in line for \$300 million from the IMF and \$400 to \$500 million in aid, and could also reschedule some of its awesome \$2.5 billion external debt. To save what's left of Tanzania's economy is a race against time and a struggle between the divergent philosophies of Nyerere and those that can help him and his people. There is a Swahili expression, "Shauri Ya Mungu," meaning that any given problem is up to God to solve. In Tanzania's case, God has already provided a potentially productive land. It's now up to the normally cheerful, hard-working Tanzanians to till it. Like any other humans, they need motivation and reward to do that. □



Tourists in the Serengeti: Cooperation with Kenya could aid Tanzania's ailing tourist industry

Photo: Tanzania Info

A Tarnished Victory for the NPN?

BY LARRY DIAMOND

There are two striking outcomes from Nigeria's recently concluded national elections. One is that the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN), led by incumbent President Shehu Shagari, has scored huge and stunning victories in each of the five rounds of voting. The other is that the Second Republic is still standing, despite widespread — and in many states massive — electoral fraud, thousands of arrests for malpractice, and furies of postelection violence that have claimed perhaps more than 200 lives and razed over \$100 million in property. Neither of these outcomes was expected.

For a political system with six political parties, two of which were pressing vigorous challenges to the NPN, and at a time when the Nigerian economy was



President Shehu Shagari: "Voters saw his tolerance as an essential ingredient of stability in a country of deep and complex ethnic divisions"

reeling from corruption, mismanagement, and global recession and oil glut (which had slashed national income by 60% in just two years), the scope of the NPN's victory was nothing less than staggering. According to the figures released by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), the NPN won 47% of the presidential vote, more than the combined total of its two nearest rivals — the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), which scored 31%, and the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) with 14%, both of which renominated their 1979 candidates and longtime political heroes, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe.

Having only barely fulfilled in 1979 the constitutional requirement for a first-ballot victory — 25% of the vote in two-thirds of the 19 states — the NPN ticket missed that target in 1983 only in the Yoruba states of Ogun, Ondo, and Lagos. In subsequent elections, the NPN captured 13 governorships (two of which it then lost in court because of findings of electoral fraud), the control of 13 state houses of assembly, and roughly two-thirds of the seats in the federal Senate and House of Representatives, the minimum necessary to amend the constitution. Capturing every state in the Muslim north save Kano, it also penetrated deep into the Yoruba and Igbo political heartlands, particularly Oyo and Anambra states. It was the kind of victory that provokes a national debate over whether the country is becoming a one-party state.

The opposition is hardly about to perish, but there is no question that it was routed in the elections. Both the UPN and NPP had expected to make dramatic inroads in the northern states and had campaigned hard there to shed their images as tribal parties. Both had exploited the divisions in the smaller

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opposition parties, the Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP), led by Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, and the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), headed until his death last April by the founding father of antiestablishment politics in the Muslim north, Mallam Aminu Kano. The NPP reaped the larger share of this harvest, winning the "Imoudu faction" of the PRP, which controlled the governments in Kano and Kaduna, and the GNPP government in Gongola, while the UPN won over the bulk of the dissident GNPP faction in Borno state, including Governor Mohammed Goni.

Each party, having nominated for the first time a northern Muslim running mate, made other incursions in the north as well. The UPN took advantage of divisions arising from the NPN primary elections and the previous GNPP presence in the state to forge a political foothold in Sokoto and also supplanted the GNPP as the major opposition party in Bauchi, from which it drew its vice-presidential nominee, Muhammadu Kura. Led in its forays by the dynamic Lagos governor, Alhaji Lateef Jakande, the UPN also persuaded prominent young PRP personalities in Kano and Kaduna to head its state ticket and party organizations. The NPP mobilized ethnic resentment among the numerically dominant Nupe and Gwari peoples of Niger state, who felt themselves cheated by the NPN governor, a Hausa, of the economic resources and cultural integrity due them. In Benue, the NPP built on widespread disenchantment with the nonperformance of Governor Aper Aku, whose renomination in a stormy primary badly fractured the NPN, and nominated an articulate young Tiv, Paul Unongo, to vie for the mantle of the late Joseph Tarka, the dominant political force among the Tiv for 30 years.

With further gains in Cross River and Rivers states as a result of fractious NPN primaries, the NPP and UPN were confident that, singly or together, they could defeat the incumbent president and substantially improve on the total of eight state governments they had won in 1979. Neither party was in any way prepared for the electoral debacle that awaited it. What happened?

Four familiar factors explain the NPN's sweeping victories in the 1983

elections: ethnicity, personality, patronage, and fraud. Fundamentally, the 1983 campaign did not turn on issues. To be sure, the opposition had a big and resonant issue — which it attributed more to corruption and waste by the ruling party than to global recession. Chief Awolowo in particular attacked on this theme with force and credibility, having warned for two years that the economy was headed toward the impasses of indebtedness, retrenchment, and scarcity in which it is now lodged. Awolowo pledged to pull the country out of OPEC and lift controls on imports of raw materials and spare parts for the nation's idle industries. Azikiwe pledged to reduce the size of the cabinet and the cost of government. Both parties vowed to root out corruption and waste. But the heart of their appeals involved spending commitments — in particular the UPN's "cardinal programs" of free education, free health care, full employment, an integrated rural development — and other promises (such as the UPN's to lift controls on food imports) that seemed to fly in the face of economic realities.

The NPN too had an issue — the peace and stability it claimed to have brought the country and the progress toward real unity by its national character as a party. But this was more an issue of personality and culture than performance. Constitutional systems carry certain regularities with them across cultures, and Nigerians have discovered that in a presidential system, personalities weigh heavily, especially those of the potential presidents. Despite vigorous efforts, the opposition parties were unable to identify the economic crisis with President Shagari personally to the extent they had hoped. Even many of those voters most distressed by the mounting corruption and stagnating economy did not blame the president himself but rather his cabinet, which they could hope would be reshuffled in a second term. Nigerian voters, especially in the north, found appealing the calm, patient, soft-spoken, and tolerant image Shehu Shagari projected. Simple folks liked his quiet dignity, while many sophisticated voters saw his tolerance as an essential ingredient of stability in a country of such deep and complex ethnic di-

visions. Because of his personal manner and perceived integrity, Shagari is significantly more popular than his party. This is one of several considerations that challenge the credibility of the results in the subsequent weeks of voting.

Although intensely, even fanatically, admired by the hard core of their followers in a way that Shagari is not, Awolowo and Azikiwe similarly inspired strong negative feelings elsewhere. In this sense, personality and ethnicity merged as factors in the election. The two men tower in Nigerian politics as the last remaining historical giants from the nationalist era. To their own ethnic groups, they stand as symbols of solidarity, as they have through countless political crises and contests over the past three decades. But they have been perceived by other ethnic groups — unfairly, but acutely — as first and foremost communal champions. Fed and exploited by NPN campaigners, these anxious perceptions of the UPN as a Yoruba party and the NPP as an Igbo party, and both as southern, Christian parties, retarded their progress in the north.

Ethnicity thus became a determining factor at two levels. Once again, the major currents of ethnic division were played upon, merged (as assiduously as ever) with religious themes. Muslim voters were warned by religious leaders as well as politicians not to vote for a "Christian party." The message was spread that Awolowo would reduce the number of Nigerian pilgrims to Mecca each year, restore relations with Israel, and otherwise undermine Islam in Ni-



geria — despite his widely publicized agreement with a group of northern Muslim intellectuals known as the “Kaduna Mafia” — an agreement that produced significant UPN concessions to northern sensitivities on these and related issues.

Frequently the charges reached ridiculous extremes, as in the warning of an NPN campaign coordinator in Kwara that the UPN had met with Fidel Castro on how to proscribe Islam and Christianity in Nigeria in order to promote communism. At a stage in Nigeria's development when the bulk of the electorate remains illiterate, even the absurd may seem credible, especially if it emanates from a powerful source. In the final weeks of the campaign, President Shagari declared in Minna that the NPP was nothing but a

tribal association for the Igbos, in Kano that accepting the NPP was like “offering a pig to Muslims,” in Sokoto that non-Muslims were “unbelievers,” and in Daura (the mythical birthplace of the Hausa people and culture) that the NPP and UPN were seeking to introduce communism in the country, and “to disregard our culture and tradition which we so much cherish.” These blunt admonitions surely had their effect.

Ethnic politics was hardly limited to the north. In the east, the entrance into active politics of Biafran secessionist leader Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu, as NPN national vice-chairman and senatorial candidate from Anambra, resurrected some of the fierce pain and bitterness of that tragic experience. With no false modesty, Chief Ojukwu

pledged to reintegrate the Igbos into Nigerian society by leading them into the “mainstream” of politics, the NPN. The NPP countered that the same selfish, arrogant, and despotic man who led the Igbo people into a fruitless war, only to abandon them in defeat, was now once more betraying them. No less vituperative were the exchanges between Ojukwu and Awolowo, who traded emotional charges about who was responsible for the federal government's decision to cut off relief shipments of food to Biafra during the war.

Ojukwu's denunciations of Awolowo reflected what may have been the decisive ethnic factor in the election: the closure of the Igbo vote to Chief Awolowo and the UPN. Since early in 1982, the UPN and NPP had joined with the renegade factions of the PRP and GNPP in the Progressive Parties Alliance (PPA), dedicated to the defeat of the NPN in 1983. But lacking any clearly articulated commitment to a set of common principles or programs, the PPA depended for its viability on the nomination of a common presidential ticket, which it failed repeatedly to agree upon in several highly publicized meetings. Azikiwe (by four years the elder of the two at 78) appears to have agreed with Awolowo sometime in the late 1982 to step down for him at the appropriate time, but the national executive committee of the NPP repeatedly refused to allow him to do so. It feared that NPP dominance in the two Igbo states might collapse in the face of vigorous campaigning not only by Ojukwu but by the renominated vice-president, Dr. Alex Ekwueme, who had brought considerable federal patronage to his home state of Anambra, and by the former premier of the old Eastern Region, Dr. Michael Okpara. Without the great Azikiwe standing for election one last time as a symbol of Igbo political solidarity, the NPN might have swamped Awolowo in the presidential vote and possibly taken control of one or both states. The failure of Awolowo to campaign in Imo and Anambra did nothing to dispel this apprehension, which also motivated a pointed rebuff of the late-blooming initiative of certain northern and minority elements to nominate the charismatic



An NPN rally in Kano: “Most Nigerians do not believe the 1983 elections were free and fair”

decampée from the PRP, Kano Governor Mohammed Abubakar Rimi, as the NPP presidential candidate.

The two parties were thus trapped by the very profiles of ethnicity and personality that provided their cores of support. As long as they split the opposition to the NPN in the north, they were hard put to stop a first-ballot victory for Shagari. But Azikiwe's withdrawal risked a striking NPN breakthrough in the east. Their only hopes appeared to lie in stopping a first-ballot victory for Shagari with the two candidates, and then uniting behind the one (most likely Awolowo) who won the runoff. It is possible that Awolowo might have achieved this goal in a free and fair election, but not likely.

The ethnic factor was also critical in many state races as well, which mobilized divisions within the major ethnic groups, and between majority and minority groups. Beneath the bitter and chaotic struggle for the UPN gubernatorial nomination in Oyo state lay subethnic tensions dating back to the First Republic. These opened the way for the NPN to reach beyond its limited 1979 base in Ogbomoso out to the larger Osun group, and the Oyos and Ibadan as well, taking enough of these groups to establish a serious electoral base in the state, though perhaps not enough to achieve the gubernatorial victory that was declared for it. In Niger state, as the NPN governor was urging Muslims not to vote for an Igbo party, the NPP, which had nominated a Nupe for governor and a Gwari as his deputy, appealed to these groups to get what was due them by voting for their own sons. Similar feelings of resentment and pride shaped the voting in most of the minority states, where Nigeria's enormous ethnic diversity is most apparent.

These lines of ethnic division and competition, large and small, had more to do with economics than culture. The 1983 election revealed once again that the basic political issue in Nigeria is development. The fundamental political division in Nigeria today is not between left and right or between NPN and UPN or NPP, but rather between those governments and politicians who deliver the goods and those who do not. What people want from politics is a better

life. This means schools and literacy programs, hospitals and medicines, paved roads and bridges, electricity and pipe-borne water, irrigation and fertilizer, industries and markets. At any historical moment, and especially in an era of acute austerity, the resources to deliver such tangible signs of progress are limited. Hence, at every level in the political system, communities are in conflict. The location of a new university in a governor's home town or a new industry in a commissioner's birthplace provokes envy and resentment from other parts of a state that envisioned their areas as ripe for such a project.

The phenomenon is even more basic for the country as a whole, and hence balanced distribution of government positions between ethnic and geographic groups becomes an essential condition of social harmony. This is why Nigeria's president is constitutionally obliged to "reflect the federal character" in all his appointments. It is also why all nominations and party offices in the NPN, at both the state and the federal level, are subject to the principle of "zoning," which distributes power among all major groups, and in the case of the presidency pledges that the most powerful office will rotate between different sections of the country.

In a system in which the basic issue is economic development, an overriding factor in political alignment is the promise or delivery of patronage. As in 1979, ethnic minority states in particular sought to align visibly with the expected ruling party in order to enhance their bargaining position at the center, heeding the warning of Vice-President Ekwueme to Cross River voters that it would be "a calamity and a great tragedy" if they left "the mainstream of government." To his own people, the vice-president appealed to join the NPN bandwagon in order to get their "due share of the national cake." For the same reason, Yoruba voters were enjoined by NPN Chairman Adisa Akinloye and others to come in from the political wilderness. The electoral potency of such appeals can be exaggerated: many voters from minority states resolved to vote against the NPN this time because they believed its previous promises had not been fulfilled.

But the deft manipulation of the power of patronage was certainly a key factor in the NPN's inroads in the Yoruba and Igbo states.

Also at the level of individual politicians, the ruling party was in a much better position to induce important personalities to join its bandwagon. In an era when politicians are generally seen to be motivated more by private material returns than by the ideal of public service, the party that controls federal contracts, jobs, and import licenses is vastly more capable of satisfying individual aspirations for upward mobility than all the opposition parties combined, however many states they control. These lucrative inducements weighed heavily in the continuous drift of disaffected politicians from the other parties into the NPN.

All of these factors, then, played a role in the reelection of President Shagari and the return to federal power of the NPN. It is entirely reasonable to believe that the NPN did genuinely win the presidential election on August 6. But no credible analysis can maintain that the NPN's margins of victory were anything like what has been officially reported. These figures make no sense without an appreciation of the massive electoral irregularities that marred every round of the voting. The intensity and consistency of opposition party complaints over the conduct of the voting, and their heated articulation from the very day of the first round of voting, cast grave doubt on the validity of the reported results in many if not most of the states.

Perhaps most disturbing were the complaints from all five opposition parties in Sokoto, Bauchi, and Kaduna — which together provided more than a third of Shagari's 12 million votes. They charged that their polling agents were systematically and often ruthlessly forbidden access to, or driven away from, the polling booths to which they had been assigned. The presence of these party agents — guaranteed by the 1982 Electoral Act and financed by FEDECO — throughout the voting and counting at the polls was the single most crucial check against electoral abuse. In their absence any outrage could occur, and many did — voting by unregistered voters and by

children as young as eight years old, stuffing of ballot boxes, and announcing of results for polls where no voting occurred. Typical of the charges voiced in these states and several others was the claim by the UPN gubernatorial candidate in Bauchi in a joint five-party statement that traditional rulers, the police, and electoral officials collaborated with the NPN to drive away opposition party polling agents. In September, this problem was acknowledged by the resident electoral commissioner for Ondo State, retired Colonel Ayo Ariyo, when he alleged that some policemen had disgraced the force by colluding with politicians to manipulate the electoral process. He went on to indict electoral officials as well.

Equally serious was the widespread refusal of electoral officials to give opposition party agents the copies of the vote counts to which they were entitled under the law. Such a storm of controversy gathered around these EC 8 forms that following the presidential election the FEDECO chairman, Justice Victor Ovie-Whiskey, ordered copies to be given not only to all party polling agents but to the police and the National Security Organization as well. Still, abuses escalated in subsequent elections, when the EC 8 forms in many races were brazenly and meticulously altered to tilt the outcome to candidates (mostly NPN) who would otherwise have lost.

It is widely believed by independent observers outside the various political parties that the varieties of fraud accounted for the NPN gubernatorial victories in Ondo, Oyo, Anambra, Benue, and perhaps Niger states, at least. These judgments are bolstered by the findings of the State High Courts in Ondo and Anambra, sitting as election tribunals, that the legitimate vote counts recorded on EC 8 forms had indeed been heavily altered and that the defeated UPN and NPP governors in those two states did in fact win the elections. Beyond the courts' reversal of these two results, and those in three senatorial races (two NPP defeats by the NPN and Chief Ojukwu's defeat by the NPP), a range of other doubts have been raised. These began well in advance of the election with the announcement of an electoral register of

65 million voters, implying a Nigerian population of at least 150 million (half again as large as any realistic estimate). In Oyo state, as the minority decision of the election tribunal noted in its finding for the defeated UPN governor, Bola Ige, a third of the votes cast (including all of those in Ige's home area) were disqualified. In Cross River state, all 18,000 electoral officials were hurriedly sacked and replaced a fortnight before the election. In Benue — where even some NPN members are privately amazed at Aperc Aku's reelection — challenger Unongo's electoral petition was rejected by the tribunal on the grounds that it had been submitted on the wrong form. A higher court found this a grave injustice, but regretted that expiration of the brief statutory limitation on election petitions prevented any redress.

Most Nigerians do not believe the 1983 elections were free and fair, even by the standards of what have passed for elections in Africa. The people who could not vote because their names were missing from the register, even though they had with them their proof of registration; the students who were given 10 or 20 registration cards and a wad of cash to hop all over town voting for a certain party; the soldier who insisted on stopping a wailing funeral party, only to find a coffin full of stuffed ballot boxes; the party men who found they could buy and thumbprint a booklet of 50 ballots right at the polling station; the young man who saw his brother accept thousands of naira to change the result of a senatorial election; the businessman who stumbled on a beehive of ballot thumbprinting in the home of a top government official on election eve — all of these people know that the 1983 elections were extensively and imaginatively rigged.

Those without direct evidence had only to examine the reported figures to know something was seriously amiss. Nigerians know that on a day when the turnout was manifestly light the governor of Sokoto, Shagari's home state, could not have scored 700,000 more votes than the president himself the previous week. They know that in a free and fair election the NPN could not win 110 of the 126 state assembly seats in Oyo, where it won nine in 1979. They

know that the NPN's total sweep of legislative seats in Borno, Bauchi, and Kaduna does not reflect the realities of opposition party strength in these states. They know that many of the figures are incredible.

The most pressing question now is not whether the elections were free and fair but whether the governments they have produced will have any legitimacy. The fact that the courts have had the courage to overturn even a few results has bolstered the faith of many people in the judiciary, which is looked to as the ultimate (or even the only) hope for democracy in Nigeria. The Ondo decision may even have saved the Second Republic from collapsing. The NPN victory there was the least credible of the announced results, following upon a 78% showing for the UPN the week before, and it provoked an explosion of violence.

Bands of angry people sought out the homes and businesses of leading NPN figures and set them aflame in the very fury of popular vengeance that the UPN had warned would follow a rigged election. As many as 100 people may have died in Ondo in mid-August, including several prominent NPN politicians and several people shot by the police. In neighboring Oyo, a similar wave of arson and murder is estimated by the NPN state chairman to have left more than 100 dead and some \$150 million in property destroyed. It was this kind of violence in these very areas following a rigged regional election in 1965 that precipitated Nigeria's first military coup.

More than 30 election-related deaths have been reported in other states as well, and a tense bitterness now prevails in several states, including Niger and Benue (where Unongo vowed to prevent Aperc Aku's inauguration). But the most serious question is the ability of President Shagari to govern at the center. Both Chief Awolowo and Dr. Azikiwe believe the national election was stolen from them, and both have pronounced the country "on the brink of dictatorship." And yet neither took the provocative steps — a boycott of the remaining elections, a call for mass demonstrations — that might have widened the election crisis and brought down the Second Republic. Neither

man wants to see Nigeria ruled by the military again.

The legitimacy of a political system cannot be determined in the abstract. People judge the moral right of a regime to govern them partly against the alternatives they have available. By this reckoning, the Second Republic enjoys — particularly among political elites and large sections of the press — a certain base of legitimacy by default; most politicians do not want another long period of military rule, which is what would almost surely follow a political breakdown. But even by default, losing parties will remain committed to the system only so long as they believe it affords them some chance to capture power in the next election. The Second Republic cannot conduct another election like this one and survive.

The balance on which a democratic system in Nigeria depends for its survival is a balance of parties as well as ethnic groups. The promise of Nigerian federalism, expensive though it is, is that every major group is accorded a stake in the system. This balance came close to being destroyed in the 1983 election. It is not yet clear that the return of Ondo and Anambra to the parties that have ruled them will restore a sufficient measure of consensus to enable the system to endure.

More than anything else, the future of the Second Republic depends on how President Shagari governs in the next four years. Sections of the opposition parties and press, and many independent journalists and intellectuals, seriously fear the emergence of the coercive climate and machinery of a one-party state. The blustering talk of the NPN's two top national officers, and the disturbing reports of police brutality and unlawful detention emanating from Ondo and Oyo states, can do nothing to allay these fears. If the reelected president is to preserve and widen the fragile consensus that remains, he must resist the ambitions of his party hawks and demonstrate anew that he is a man of tolerance, even in the face of provocation. In part this will require him to approach with extreme caution the capacity that these elections have given his party to amend the constitution unilaterally.

But tolerance and restraint will not be

enough. The Nigerian economy — \$15 billion in debt and several billions more in arrears on short-term payments — is in a terrible mess. Despite a high-level task force to relieve import bottlenecks and bring down the prices of essential commodities, painful inflation continues unabated for daily necessities. Nigerian newspapers — the freest in Africa — now carry almost daily exposés of pervasive and fantastic corruption. Astute NPN politicians recognize that this time they have all the political tools the system can give them and that there will be no excuse if they fail to perform.

There is abundant evidence to suggest that the Nigerian people are much more ambivalent about the Second Republic than the politicians. A statewide pre-election survey in Kano showed a majority of the state's population, and roughly two-thirds of adults in volatile Kano city, preferring military government. For many, this was not simply a preference but an acute and much-

prayed-for desire. Most people in Nigeria are very cynical about the politicians, and more so now after the elections. In many places this cynicism is now overlaid with a palpable, if temporarily submerged, anger. The Shagari government must urgently come to grips with the twin ills of corruption and economic decay — and make visible progress in doing so — if it is to avoid the escalating cycle of strikes, boycotts, and violent demonstrations that could usher in the military.

The Second Republic has survived the furor over the elections in the form of what Ogun Governor Bisi Onabanjo has termed "wounded democracy." More even than has typically been the case in such historical circumstances, the burden now gathers on the shoulders of the nation's leader, Shehu Shagari, to govern effectively, and govern democratically, and so determine whether democracy in Nigeria will live or die. □



Chief Awolowo campaigning: It is possible, but not likely, that Awolowo might have achieved a runoff in a free and fair election

A Theater for Development in Zimbabwe

BY KIMANI GECAU

It is a hot and dusty Saturday afternoon. Nature has not favored this part of southern Zimbabwe lately. For two years now, there has been drought that has also seriously affected Zimbabwe's neighboring countries. Under shade cast by one of the few trees left standing, a crowd of about 300 has gathered, not to discuss the obvious problems of water, ecology, food, and other pressing development issues, but to see a play! For most of the people in this area — Zimuto — this is the first time they have seen a play. The stage and props may not be elaborate (indeed, the "stage" is a section of the shade, and the props are a couple of tables and chairs), and the actors might be a little dusty, but the audience enjoys every minute of it.

Occasionally, the people break into ululation to express their appreciation and to egg on the cast for more. There

Kimani Gecau, formerly head of the literature department at the University of Nairobi, now works with the Zimbabwe Community Based Theater Project under the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production. He directed Ngugi wa Thiongo and Ngugi wa Mirii's play, *Ngaahika Ndeenda* ["I Will Marry When I Want"], and co-directed Ngugi wa Thiongo's *Maitu Njugira* ["Mother, Ululate for Me"], with the Kamirithu Community Education and Cultural Center Theater Group in Kenya. He also directed Ngugi wa Thiongo and Micere Mugo's *The Trial of Dedan Kimathi*.

are moments of laughter and moments of sober reflection as the action unfolds, reminding the spectators of their history and culture, the highest expression of which was the war of liberation recently waged to free Zimbabwe from colonialism. At times, members of the audience join the actors in song and dance. There are no walls, no barriers separating the audience from the actors. The language, rhythm, and content of the play are theirs, touching and energizing them and renewing their will to continue being actors in their own history and environment, notwithstanding the drought.

The scene at Zimuto has been repeated in many other places during the theater group's tour of Zimbabwe. As part of the Zimbabwe government's desire to inspire theater and other cultural activities in the rural areas, the Ministry of Education and Culture and its affiliate, the Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production, supported by interested donors, organized a theater group composed of villagers, students, teachers, technical trainees — young and old — to produce a play and take it around the country as an example of what other communities could do for themselves.

This theater, which has now come to be known as the Zimbabwe Community Based Theater Project, was planned in phases. The first and second phases were the production of the play and its countrywide tour. The third and fourth phases will lead to theater workshops in different parts of the country and to the

organization of community theater groups and the holding of regional and national theater festivals. The organizers have already conducted one highly successful workshop, which drew participants from seven southern African countries, including Kenya; and more are planned in the coming months. The project's work was also greatly enhanced by the holding of an Africa-wide community theater workshop in Zimbabwe in August.

The Zimbabwe government's interest in theater might appear misplaced in the face of the pressing problems of rural development. Why not spend time and resources in bringing more schools, clinics, and the ever needed water to people such as those of Zimuto? Such misgivings are valid, but they miss the important point that development and transformation can only be a two-way process between government and people and that ultimately it is only a conscious, mobilized, and motivated people who can bring about their own meaningful and lasting development. It is in this area that theater becomes very important, even indispensable tool in the government's development efforts.

Theater has been used by rural extension workers in Africa and elsewhere since the colonial times. Having discovered that theater, unlike the straight and dry lecture, is less boring and more effective, because it is a memorable vehicle of driving home "developmentalist" messages, extension workers have improvised short skits involv-

ing dance and dialogue drama to teach people about the necessity for clean water, good health care, education, and so on. In Zimbabwe, theater has been used in an interesting community health program based in Bindura.

The flaw in this kind of theater, however, is its implicit attitude toward its intended audience. The people, it is assumed, are ignorant and that is why they do not do things the way "developmentalists" think they should be done. The "solutions" that are therefore offered do not go beyond the localized problem to its probable cause within the historical, national, and international context. Such "solutions" usually echo the thinking of the government of the day and are prescriptive and simplistic in nature.

Is it ignorance that makes the people do what they do, or is it lack of facilities — lack of schools, clinics, ample running water (i.e., poverty and underdevelopment) — that is their main enemy? And if it is the case that the people might not be quite enlightened about development issues, it should be asked why this is so and whether this kind of "developmentalist" theater is the best method of enlightening them. Usually in this type of theater the people themselves are not involved in producing the play or skit to reflect their own problems, conflicts, and struggles. Their artistic skills and creative potential are therefore not tapped and developed. They are not led to name, know, and understand their reality — a prerequisite to working to change it. Instead of this theater's becoming a source of such knowledge and enlightenment — a school if you like — it brings a ready-made play with ready-made, pat solutions to the community. This is yet another form of bringing aid and charity to the people from the outside, a form of deepening a dependency complex, of institutionalizing reform and domesticating the people. It is not the stuff from which development comes, if we understand development to be the mobilization and transformation of men and women — a nation's most important resource — to become the makers, the subjects, and the objects of their own lives and history.

The Zimbabwe Community Based Theater Project is intended to bring about a different kind of theater, a

community participatory theater, by and of the people themselves. The project was inspired by a similar project in Kenya, where the famous Kamiriithu Community Education and Cultural Center's theater group developed out of a community's need for literacy and for relevant reading material that would speak to and about their lives. In response, Ngugi wa Thiongo and Ngugi wa Mirii wrote a play, *Ngaahika Ndeenda* ["I Will Marry When I Want"], which not only did respond to this need,

form of external aid. Kamiriithu became a "school" in which people discovered, developed, and brought into use their hitherto untapped organizational and creative skills. They came not only to acquire literacy, but also to relate their general education to their local and national reality. And in the process of knowing who they were and what they were capable of doing, they also began to discover how they could meaningfully change their reality toward the goal of development.



Prime Minister Mugabe addressing a rally: "The ZCBTP fits into the Zimbabwe government's effort to free the mind and inspire creativity among the people"

Photo: Zimbabwe Info

but also sought to involve the adult students creatively in the learning process. By their involvement with the play, the participants rediscovered the familiar ground of their own lives. No one was left out of the production for not being able to read. By the end of the rehearsals, the many people in the 100+ cast who could not read had developed their confidence, mastered the play's text, and become veritable critics of its language and content. The input provided by the Kamiriithu people on the final text and production was invaluable. Equally, the choreography of the songs and dances, the quality of the acting, and the organization of the cast into a harmonious working team owed a lot to the many talents that were awakened and put to use during this time. It was these same talents that were to manifest themselves in the design and construction of a 2,000-seat open-air theater — at that time, one of the largest in Africa — by the people on their own. A cardinal principle at Kamiriithu was to depend on all available domestic resources and talents and to shun any

Kamiriithu is therefore a good example of a theater that is transformative because it rests on the principles of community participation, democratization of culture, and the development process. Such a theater is of vital importance to a new country like Zimbabwe, which is fighting to correct the contradictions and inequalities inherited from colonialism. During colonial times, urban areas developed at the expense of the rural areas and white people at the expense of blacks. Because of unequal economic organization and structures and the underdevelopment of the rural areas, men migrated to the cities in search of jobs, leaving women and children to eke out a living tediously in the overused rural lands. Only an elite group among the black majority were privy to education and manpower development, but they were nonetheless inculcated with an ideology of inferiority, self-disdain, lack of self-confidence, and dependency.

The achievement of political independence after a protracted struggle was a clear testimony to what a

A Theater for Development in Zimbabwe

BY KIMANI GECAU

It is a hot and dusty Saturday afternoon. Nature has not favored this part of southern Zimbabwe lately. For two years now, there has been drought that has also seriously affected Zimbabwe's neighboring countries. Under shade cast by one of the few trees left standing, a crowd of about 300 has gathered, not to discuss the obvious problems of water, ecology, food, and other pressing development issues, but to see a play! For most of the people in this area — Zimuto — this is the first time they have seen a play. The stage and props may not be elaborate (indeed, the "stage" is a section of the shade, and the props are a couple of tables and chairs), and the actors might be a little dusty, but the audience enjoys every minute of it.

Occasionally, the people break into ululation to express their appreciation and to egg on the cast for more. There

Kimani Gecau, formerly head of the literature department at the University of Nairobi, now works with the Zimbabwe Community Based Theater Project under the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production. He directed Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Ngugi wa Mirii's play, *Ngaahika Ndeenda* ["I Will Marry When I Want"], and co-directed Ngugi wa Thiong'o's *Maitu Njugira* ["Mother, Ululate for Me"], with the Kamirithu Community Education and Cultural Center Theater Group in Kenya. He also directed Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Micere Mugo's *The Trial of Dedan Kimathi*.

are moments of laughter and moments of sober reflection as the action unfolds, reminding the spectators of their history and culture, the highest expression of which was the war of liberation recently waged to free Zimbabwe from colonialism. At times, members of the audience join the actors in song and dance. There are no walls, no barriers separating the audience from the actors. The language, rhythm, and content of the play are theirs, touching and energizing them and renewing their will to continue being actors in their own history and environment, notwithstanding the drought.

The scene at Zimuto has been repeated in many other places during the theater group's tour of Zimbabwe. As part of the Zimbabwe government's desire to inspire theater and other cultural activities in the rural areas, the Ministry of Education and Culture and its affiliate, the Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production, supported by interested donors, organized a theater group composed of villagers, students, teachers, technical trainees — young and old — to produce a play and take it around the country as an example of what other communities could do for themselves.

This theater, which has now come to be known as the Zimbabwe Community Based Theater Project, was planned in phases. The first and second phases were the production of the play and its countrywide tour. The third and fourth phases will lead to theater workshops in different parts of the country and to the

organization of community theater groups and the holding of regional and national theater festivals. The organizers have already conducted one highly successful workshop, which drew participants from seven southern African countries, including Kenya; and more are planned in the coming months. The project's work was also greatly enhanced by the holding of an Africa-wide community theater workshop in Zimbabwe in August.

The Zimbabwe government's interest in theater might appear misplaced in the face of the pressing problems of rural development. Why not spend time and resources in bringing more schools, clinics, and the ever needed water to people such as those of Zimuto? Such misgivings are valid, but they miss the important point that development and transformation can only be a two-way process between government and people and that ultimately it is only a conscious, mobilized, and motivated people who can bring about their own meaningful and lasting development. It is in this area that theater becomes a very important, even indispensable, tool in the government's development efforts.

Theater has been used by rural extension workers in Africa and elsewhere since the colonial times. Having discovered that theater, unlike the straight and dry lecture, is less boring and more effective, because it is a memorable vehicle of driving home "developmentalist" messages, extension workers have improvised short skits involv-

mobilized and united people could do for themselves. But it also made all the more urgent the necessity to harness and channel the energies released in the struggle towards the consolidation of the gains of political independence through economic action for the benefit of the many. The government is already mobilizing people to join cooperatives and resettlement schemes, and workers are being urged to join workers' committees. But in order to achieve a comprehensive democratization and transformation of the material and spiritual lives of the people, cultural action is needed to educate the people in the broad sense of their own reality and to inculcate confidence, patriotism, a morality that upholds hard work and

and prejudices, but not politics." By "politics," this observer was referring to the people's ability to analyze and comment on development issues and to recognize and be free from the dangers of political chicanery, ethnic chauvinism, bribery, corruption, and empty demagoguery.

It was in recognition of the importance of literacy that the government recently launched a literacy campaign, for, to quote Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, "to set the mind free, to make observation and analysis accurate, to make judgment informed, objective, and fair, and to make the imagination creative are in our view as important a cause of struggle as the struggle for political and economic emancipation.

themselves and what they can become — what can be achieved if their energies are creatively mobilized within a disciplined and patriotic spirit. In the process, they also rediscover their organizational and leadership skills, the communal spirit that comes with every theatrical production, their individuality within the community, and their ability to laugh and to develop artistic talents within the group. This kind of theater is complementary to, if not more encompassing than, formal education. It calls forth a people's emotional and mental response to the themes, ideas, and issues it deals with, which are drawn from history and contemporary life, and broadens the participants' understanding of humanity's progress. It therefore becomes a form of public forum for actively and creatively debating the issues affecting people's lives, while the people at the same time develop their artistic skills and are provided with a means of entertainment. This theater fosters unity, knowledge, and patriotism and develops a people's aesthetic awareness, while not shying away from a discussion of economics, science, and technology.

One of the aims of the theater project is to encourage schools to become the hub of cultural activities in their communities by drawing participants from the ranks of teachers, pupils, and their parents. This process will help break down the barriers between the educated and uneducated, mental and menial workers, the old and the young. Schools will be no longer the secluded ivory towers of learning, but institutions serving the community. In their common pursuit of theater, the literate will pass on their skills to the illiterate; those well versed in agricultural methods will share with the others; and, above all, the community — that repository of history, culture, collective morality, and national aspirations — will educate the young in school. All will rediscover their common destiny and the necessity of pooling skills and resources in development. A theater that thus helps to mobilize, motivate, and educate people is a veritable development tool that places the people themselves at center stage as the main actors in national transformation. □



One of the theater group's performances during its nationwide tour of Zimbabwe

productivity, self-identity, and pride. Discipline and devotion to the nation and an ability to understand the scientific and technological advances of humanity are also necessary.

Illiteracy therefore becomes a major stumbling block towards development. As one observer said, "An illiterate person stands outside politics; he must first learn his ABCs. Without that, there can be no politics; without that, there are rumors, gossip, fairy tales,

Mental emancipation is thus both the instrument and modality of political and economic emancipation and cannot be taken for granted, or left to develop on its own without a formal strategy for its attainment."

The Zimbabwe Community Based Theater Project fits into this government's effort to free the mind and to inspire creativity among the people. The vehicle of participatory community theater raises the people's awareness of

November-December 1983

Mobutu's attempt to gain congressional support backfires

Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko and the Reagan administration have teamed up to help Zaire to win friends in Congress. The administration has long been billing Mobutu as a American friend in Africa. Despite a notorious record of human rights violations, Mobutu has been supported by the Reagan administration because of his pro-Western policies. His recognition of Israel last year, the declaration of amnesty for political dissidents in May, and his prompt dispatch of troops to Chad have succeeded in winning him the administration's praise. Administration officials also claim that since the implementation of a reform program last December, corruption has been greatly reduced in Zaire.

Congress, on the other hand, has been less easily convinced. Citing corruption and human rights violations, Congress last April approved only \$4 million of the \$10 million which the Reagan administration had requested for military aid to Zaire for FY 1983, and \$4 million out of \$12 million for FY 1984.

When Mobutu visited the U.S. in August, he reported that there were no more political prisoners in Zaire, and he invited a congressional delegation about to leave for Zaire to meet with whomever they pleased. The members of the House Subcommittee on African Affairs arrived in Kinshasa before Mobutu returned, and they found that Mobutu had apparently forgotten to inform his security forces that things had changed in Zaire.

The delegation arranged to meet with 10 of 13 former Zairian parliamentarians who had, upon being freed from prison, organized themselves into an opposition group known as the Group of 13. The Americans wanted to meet with the group members as individuals, but the group insisted on meeting as a

unit. The congressmen agreed on the condition that it was clearly understood that they were meeting with a group of individuals, not a formal opposition group which would have been illegal in Zaire. "We did that because we knew that they were agitating for a second political party," said Rep. Ted Weiss (D-N.Y.), a member of the delegation. "We made it very clear to them that we were not getting into that. That was their business. We were simply there to try and get information as to what conditions were as far as political freedom and repression were concerned."

As it turned out, the members of the delegation got more first-hand information about repression than they expected and certainly more than Mobutu would have wanted them to. According to a legislative

aide who accompanied the delegation, the representatives quickly received "independent confirmation that there had been 10 or 12 new political prisoners since the amnesty." They also learned that the man who printed the business cards for the Group of 13 had been arrested. They later found that a former member of the National Security Council of Zaire, who had been arrested and then released under the amnesty, had again been arrested while bringing the delegation a written summary of the Group of 13's presentation. The man was later released upon the insistence of the congressmen.

The coup de grâce came later when one member of the delegation, Rep. Mickey Leland (D-Tex.), witnessed some of the members of

Continued on next page

Cameroon's calm succession gets rough

In late August, President Paul Biya announced that a coup attempt had been discovered, and that two officers of former President Ahmadou Ahidjo's security guard had been arrested. At the same time, Biya made several bold changes in the governmental structure.

It soon became clear that the coup attempt and the subsequent government changes were part of a power struggle between Biya and his predecessor. Ahidjo was only 58 when he turned the presidency over to Biya in late 1982, after more than two decades in office. His resignation was apparently motivated by doctors' warnings that the stress of leadership was damaging his health.

Early in his retirement, Ahidjo strongly supported Biya. Having struggled for years against civil war and regional tension in Cameroon, Ahidjo gave Biya his personal blessing in order to prevent the northerners, who had always backed Ahidjo,

from rejecting the leadership of Biya, who is from the south. But despite his apparent faith in Biya, Ahidjo retained the extremely powerful chairmanship of the Cameroon National Union (UNC), and left behind a cabinet in which some of the most important members were his relatives or close friends.

After several months of leisure in the south of France, Ahidjo regained his vitality. Agence France-Presse reported that Ahidjo attempted in June to have the constitution amended to give the UNC party supremacy over the government. The UNC chairman—Ahidjo himself—would then become the de facto national leader, and President Biya would be reduced to a figurehead. Ahidjo's maneuver was badly timed, for Biya chose the eve of French President François Mitterrand's visit as a secure moment to counter the move. Biya, confident

Continued on next page

Cameroon continued

that attention would be fixed on Mitterrand's visit, reshuffled his cabinet, sacking several Ahidjo loyalists and forestalling the constitutional amendment.

In an earlier reshuffle in January, Biya had already eliminated some of Ahidjo's strongest allies, and the June realignment further reduced the strength of the Ahidjo faction in the cabinet.

In August, Biya used the announcement of the coup attempt as an opportunity to reshuffle the cabinet for a third time, removing the Prime Minister, Bello Bouba Maigari, and the Defense Minister, Abdoulaye Maikano, the last powerful Ahidjo supporters in the cabinet.

At the same time, Biya created a "General Armed Forces Task Force," apparently to ensure army loyalty during the transition. He also split the Center-South and Northern Provinces into two and three subdivisions respectively. Although Biya explained that the provincial changes would "bring the administration nearer and nearer the people," the redistricting was also meant to weaken the northern "power bloc," the center of Ahidjo's support.

Just days later, an irate Ahidjo was interviewed in France. He called Biya "a weakling, a cheat, and a hypocrite" and accused him of "plot phobia." He went on to charge Biya with instituting "a police state of terror, threats, lies, and intoxication . . . the phones of officials have been tapped, there have been arrests and arbitrary interrogations." Ahidjo claimed that the two men arrested and charged in the coup attempt had been tortured to extract confessions, and that Biya had arrested the men only because they had been close to Ahidjo. "All this," he added, "is meant to cover up Biya's ill-considered policies, which are jeopardizing the cause of unity that I patiently and doggedly advocated in Cameroon for 25 years."

Western journalists called the Ahidjo-Biya crisis a schism between "Muslim north" and "Christian south." They emphasized Cameroon's ethnic diversity and

pointed out that Biya is a Christian from the south whereas the Muslim Ahidjo is from the north. Cameroon's civil war in the 1960s, they claimed, had been based on a similar conflict. One report of Biya's second cabinet reshuffle called it a "declaration of war against the north."

Africans, however, perceived the duel between Biya and Ahidjo not as a north-south ethnic struggle but as a "war of succession." A Senegalese journalist wrote: "It is purely fanciful to reduce the actual problem to an ethno-regionalistic dimension. First of all, the north, taken as a group, has retained the same number of cabinet positions. Furthermore, Bello Bouba Maigari was replaced by a man who, even though he is a Christian, is no less a 'Nordiste': Luc Ayang. In Yaoundé, an official close to the President commented: 'President Biya's concern for national unity and regional balance is even stronger than Ahidjo's was. He thus feels no need to inflate it into a major political theme. Besides, regional imbalances were more, not less, serious under Ahidjo.'"

A columnist from Cameroon pointed out, "Biya has scrupulously respected the balance between northerners and southerners, francophones and anglophones, Muslims and Christians or animists, which was so carefully nurtured by his predecessor. There is one difference: he has drawn them, both northerners and southerners, from a new generation." Biya's appointees have come to be known as the "young technocrats."

After the last reshuffle, Ahidjo seemed to have sensed that he had lost, at least for the time being, and he resigned as chairman of the UNC. In September, Biya was named UNC chairman.

The stability of Cameroon's economy was not affected by the political changes, and the press is noticeably freer than it had been under Ahidjo. Biya has established himself as a more charismatic figure than Ahidjo, whose speeches, according to one Western diplomat, were "the most boring of any leader I have had to listen to in a long diplomatic career."

Biya has even obtained nominal

support from an outlawed opposition party, the Union of the People of Cameroon (UPC). Some observers speculated that Biya's consolidation of power, and the withdrawal of Ahidjo from the political scene, might enable the new president to consider legalizing other political parties.

While Biya has finally shaped the government to his own liking, it will be difficult for Ahidjo to repair his damaged reputation. "The spectacle that fascinates most," *West Africa* editorialized, is to see Ahidjo "somehow cut down to the size of a petulant spoilsport." □

Zaire continued

the Group of 13 being beaten by security police. As the Group emerged from the hotel where they had met with the delegation, they were greeted by supporters waving banners which, according to Rep. Weiss, "said provocative things like 'Welcome American Congressional Delegation,' but they also showed the initials and logo of their [illegal] political party." The parliamentarians were "then set upon by younger men in civilian clothes who beat them with their hands and clubs, and smashed some of their vehicles which were in the parking lot."

The delegation then filed a protest through the American embassy and informed Mobutu that they wanted to cancel a meeting which was scheduled with him for the next day on his riverboat. The U.S. ambassador in Kinshasa, Peter Constable, was reportedly unhappy with the delegation's decision to cancel the cruise, saying, "You know Mobutu's not going to take this well. He's a proud and sensitive man."

The delegation did eventually meet with Mobutu on the boat, at which time he explained to them that his investigation had determined that the attackers were overzealous members of the youth brigade. The delegation later learned that, at the time of the attack, the youth brigade members had been at the airport hailing Mobutu's return. The attackers were then identified as members of Mobutu's Special Presidential Guard. A legislative

aide who was on the trip emphasized that "this is a very important point because Mobutu is asking everyone to believe in his credibility as a reformer, but he has no hesitation in persisting in a lie as to what had happened." The American delegation insisted on meeting again with the Group of 13. "Four or five of them had been very severely beaten," said Rep. Weiss.

In their meeting with the U.S. delegation, the Group of 13 described themselves as "pro-Western," and offering a "moderate alternative" to Mobutu. They said that it was in the U.S.' interest to support a process of democratization, since the government in Zaire was a one-man rule which would inevitably come to an end. The group's spokesmen, Kibassa Maliba, Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, and Makanda Mtinga Shambuyi, emphasized that democracy in Zaire would provide a more stable basis for a relationship with the U.S.

The Group of 13 also reported that Mobutu's "anti-corruption campaign" was a farce. Only a few minor officials had been arrested, while the high level corruption continues, they alleged. A confidential report prepared by Zaire's Ministry of Finance points to \$500 million in Zairian currency that was stolen by Mobutu and his family. *Libre Belgique* reported in June that Mrs. Mobutu's secretary had been detained at the airport in Brussels after trying to enter the country, immediately behind Mrs. Mobutu, with \$4 million worth of diamonds. "No one there with whom we spoke believes that there has been any significant change in the corruption," said an aide who was on the trip.

Another aide described Mobutu's "reforms" as "a publicity stunt for Western consumption." "I just have to say that the situation there is very depressing. You can feel the tension in the air in Kinshasa," he said. "I can honestly say that out of the seven countries we were in [the delegation also visited Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco], Zaire is the only one where there were not free discussions. Even in Ethiopia we could have practically just put our feet on the table and started talking. We got honest answers. In Zaire we literally heard the same speech over

and over again. No matter which government person we talked to, we would get a memorized speech for the answer, and often it would be the identical speech." The aide later commented, "Clearly the situation is bad, and it conflicts so much with what the administration keeps telling us."

Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.), chairman of the House Africa Subcommittee, described the policy which he felt the U.S. should adopt: "I think we should pursue the path of wisdom that the Belgians and the French are beginning to pursue, which is one of distancing ourselves from the repression of the Mobutu regime. That means that while we may continue to provide development assistance . . . and food assistance, we ought to, in my view, eliminate the military support that flows to the Mobutu regime. We're using neither the influence nor leverage that we have, and I see us doing as we did earlier in Iran where we are so closely identified with a corrupt dictator that our own interests are compromised. Opposition forces in Zaire have come to see us as an adversary. We're viewed right now, in the eyes of Zairians, as the principal prop for Mobutu."

Though the members of the delegation now have a clearer idea about the situation in Zaire, it is unlikely that U.S. policy toward Mobutu's regime will change. Zaire's recently instituted economic reforms have won it high praise from the West.

In mid-September, Zaire announced that it would float its currency, the zaire, a move which in effect led to an 80 percent devaluation. The devaluation was in line with the IMF's prescriptions for reviving Zaire's economy and curtailing the activities of the country's thriving black market.

Since 1967, the zaire had been fixed against the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDR), resulting in an exchange rate of 6.06 zaires to the dollar. The currency will now be allowed to float freely with an initial value of 29.9 zaires to the dollar.

The devaluation opened the door to the release of a \$350 million IMF standby credit which was being held up due to bankers' frustration with the manner in which Zaire was running its economy. Bankers are now

optimistic that Zaire will continue to cooperate.

Though the devaluation will prove to be a windfall to Zaire's exporters, it is certain to cause domestic inflation. Officials have said that prices for electricity, water, and transport would be controlled, with some other essentials possibly coming under price control later. To partially offset the inevitable inflation, it was announced that the civil service budget had been increased by 40 percent, though officials were quick to point out that salaries would not necessarily be raised by that amount.

As Zairians were being encouraged to tighten their belts, security police swept through Kinshasa searching for weapons, a sign that the government is expecting resistance to its austerity program. It is likely that Mobutu will now have to resort to increased coercion and repression if he wishes to contain the resistance to his regime. His past experience has shown him, however, that he will still be able to count on the U.S. for support.

"It's craziness!" said Rep. Wolpe. "There are so many parallels in terms of what we are now doing in Africa and what we did in Southeast Asia earlier, where we failed to understand that it's nationalism that is the primary political force in these countries . . . For years and years Mobutu has been able to manipulate the United States into all sorts of assistance on the grounds of his anti-communism, and very frequently I think that the United States is being played for the sucker." □

WESTERN AFRICA

Chad

● The tenth Franco-African summit convened in Vittel, France in early October, amid hopes that African leaders gathering at a neutral venue could work out a solution to the continuing war in Chad. The summit had been preceded by a flurry of press conferences and meetings in Africa and Europe, which combined to produce speculation that a breakthrough in the civil war might be imminent. In late September, rebel leader Goukouni Woddeye

gave a press conference in Tripoli at which he announced that he was now willing to negotiate directly with President Hissène Habré on a cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a "government of national reconciliation." Presidents Denis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo and Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea held long discussions with African leaders in an attempt to make negotiations possible.

These preparations apparently made it possible for Habré, at the Vittel summit, to reciprocate on Goukouni's offer to negotiate directly. At first hailed as an important concession, Habré's offer was almost immediately negated by the refusal of the summit participants to recognize Habré as Chad's sole legitimate leader. The summit also would not endorse a unilateral withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad.

The Vittel summit left the Chadian situation in what one Western diplomatic source called "a dynamic stalemate." As a precondition to discussions with Goukouni, Habré insisted that the rebel leader must formally acknowledge Habré as the legitimate president of Chad. Goukouni was unlikely to take such a step, according to Western sources.

But a positive sign was the easing of the combat in Chad as French troops consolidated their positions along the 15th Parallel, a line stretching roughly midway across the country. The French presence acted as a deterrent to the Libyan forces north of the line. It is believed that Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi had ordered his troops not to attack the French. Qaddafi had two reasons for doing so: fear of jeopardizing his lucrative trade with France, and the belief that the French forces would badly defeat his troops in battle. As time passes, the French are likely to grow tired of maintaining troops in Chad and may attempt to force Habré to reach an accommodation with Goukouni and Qaddafi. Western sources believe that Qaddafi might be willing to withdraw if Habré were to acknowledge Libyan claims to the Aouzou Strip and if Habré also agreed to take the rebels into his government. But previous "governments of national unity" have not worked in Chad, and a

"GUNT III," as one diplomatic source calls the coalition proposed by Goukouni, would probably fare no better.

The deep and abiding hatred between Habré and Goukouni, as they both know perfectly well, makes any alliance between them a risky and unreliable arrangement. Some Western diplomats still feel that no political solution is possible in Chad, arguing that the two rivals will persist in their battle until one or the other is destroyed. Other observers, however, point out that high-level negotiations are continuing despite the impasse at Vittel, and that the persistent efforts of concerned African diplomats and the French government may yet result in a solution to the war in Chad.

Ghana

● **Hilla Limann**, former president of Ghana, has been released on bail after almost two years in detention. Arrested after Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings' December 31, 1981 coup, Limann is now free pending the results of an investigation into his conduct while in office. J.W.S. De Graft-Johnson, vice president under Limann, was also released.

National tribunals have begun sentencing those who were convicted in connection with the mid-June coup attempts. Twenty people were given the death penalty, a punishment which is becoming more common in Ghana as the public tribunals sentence those convicted of treason and try to cope with the rise in violent crime. Death sentences are usually carried out soon after sentencing, but in the case of the coup trials, only five of those sentenced to death were actually in custody. The others were tried in absentia.

Arrests are still being made in the aftermath of the June attempted coup, while the cases of many accused in last February's coup attempt are still awaiting trial.

A public tribunal has also handed out death sentences in the case of five men accused of murdering three judges and a retired army officer in 1982. The case had been highly controversial in Ghana where many among the professional classes suspected that the Rawlings

government was somehow involved in the slayings.

This suspicion, as well as other conflicts with the Rawlings government, led Ghanaian lawyers to boycott the trials. This left the accused without legal counsel, a situation which attracted the attention of Amnesty International. The chairman of the tribunal, George Agyekum, reacted by publicly condemning Amnesty's involvement, saying that the tribunal insured the availability of counsel but was under no obligation to provide it if no one would represent the accused.

The defendants claimed that they were following orders from Ghana's security chief, Kojo Tsikata, who had sent a coded message ordering the killings. One member of the tribunal commented that orders to commit illegal acts did not require obedience. The tribunal did not investigate Tsikata's connection with the murders. (London *Times*, September 20, 1983; Accra Radio, August 3 and 9, 1983; *Le Monde*, August 8, 1983; London *Guardian*, August 4, 1983.)

● A former Ghana general, Joshua Hamidu, now living in Nairobi, reportedly wrote a letter to Liberia's President Samuel Doe requesting assistance to overthrow Rawlings' government. The letter, dated May 26, 1983, was published in the French-language magazine, *Afrique-Asie*, complete with Hamidu's shopping list requesting, among other things, \$180,000 in cash, plus uniforms, helicopters, mortars, grenades, guns with silencers, gas masks, boats, cannons, and "a radio transmitter capable of covering all of Ghana." In the letter, Hamidu claimed to have 200 men at his disposal, but he said that most of his equipment had been "more or less confiscated by a neighboring country."

A British newspaper, the *Guardian*, also reported the story and implied that the CIA and Israeli intelligence were probably involved in the plot.

The Liberian Foreign Ministry immediately dismissed the letter as "nonsense," calling it "a complete fabrication" designed to "tarnish the good image of Liberia and to disrupt the traditionally cordial relations existing between the govern-

ments and people of Ghana and Liberia."

Hamidu also denied knowledge of the letter while expressing the opinion that Rawlings was being controlled by "a band of communist activists." Though not a member of an active opposition group, Hamidu said that he did not plan to "sit idly by" while Rawlings continued in office. While most observers felt it likely that Hamidu did write the letter, there is no evidence to suggest that the Liberians were prepared to aid him.

It was reported in August that an international alliance of Ghanaian exile groups had formed under the leadership of J.H. Mensah, who was Ghana's finance minister under the presidency of Dr. Kofi Busia from October 1969 until January 1972. Mensah invited all Ghanaians who "believe in democracy and are prepared to fight for it" to join the movement. Mensah said that the movement will become official in the near future and offices will be set up in West Africa, Europe and the United States. He added that more names of those taking part in his movement will be revealed. (*West Africa*, September 12, 1983; *Accra Radio*, September 7, 1983; *London Guardian*, August 18, 1983; *Afrique-Asie*, August 15, 1983.)

Guinea-Bissau

● President João Bernardo Vieira announced in late August that elections will be held later this year. The elections were originally scheduled for early last year, but Vieira postponed them twice in the wake of cabinet purges and allegations of coup plots against his regime.

The announcement came immediately after the dismissal of several high government officials. Acting on the advice of Prime Minister Victor Saude Maria, Vieira replaced Foreign Minister Samba Lamine Mane with Fidelis Cabral Almada. The reasons for Mane's dismissal were stated only as "grave irregularities."

First Commander João da Silva was relieved of his duties as armed forces chief of staff after being accused of "conduct unbecoming of, and incompatible with the duties of a senior officer." Also dismissed were the secretary of state for fish-

eries and the minister of public works. (*Lisbon Radio*, August 22, 23 and 24, 1983.)

Ivory Coast

● Six deputies of the National Assembly were dismissed by Assembly President Henri Konan Bédié in early August as the assembly opened.

The six had earlier accused Bédié of usurping management of the assembly's budget and treating it as if it were a "personal bank account." Bédié countered with accusations that the six had stolen official documents in the course of their investigation and cited this "treason" as grounds for their dismissal.

The summary dismissals are being called a "crisis without precedent" within the generally stable arena of Ivorian politics. All of the figures in the controversy are members of Ivory Coast's sole political party, the Democratic Party of Ivory Coast (PDCI). Thus far, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the founder and honorary president of the party, has remained above the fray, and party supporters hope that the rift can be closed without involving him.

Observers see this incident as part of the scramble for position by presidential hopefuls. Houphouët-Boigny, who claims to be 78, will be selecting a running mate for the 1985 elections and the nominee will most likely be considered his heir-apparent. The six deputies who were dismissed are close friends of Emmanuel Dioulo, mayor of Abidjan, who is considered by many to be a leading candidate for the vice presidential nomination. Bédié is also regarded as a likely candidate.

For his part, Houphouët-Boigny suggested in late July while on a visit to London that, while arrangements have been made in case of an emergency, he will not choose a running mate "until the time comes." (*Afrique-Asie*, August 15, 1983; *Jeune Afrique*, August 10, 1983; *West Africa*, August 8, 1983.)

Liberia

● In late August, Head of State Samuel Doe became the first African leader in 12 years to visit Israel. Flown by an Israeli air force jet from Monrovia, Doe and a 17-per-

son delegation arrived in Tel Aviv to a full state welcome. "We are grateful for your courageous decision," Prime Minister Menachem Begin told Doe. "We hope that other African countries will follow in your footsteps."

The Israelis were clearly jubilant about Doe's visit. Their official relations with Africa had been virtually eliminated when 26 countries cut off diplomatic relations after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Only Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi have maintained relations since then, and Zaire renewed diplomatic relations last year. But Doe's visit was the most significant advance yet for Israeli diplomacy in Africa, and the Israelis carefully controlled every moment of the event. They also took the opportunity to remind Africa that 4000 Israelis still work on the continent, and that Israel still has economic relations with 22 African countries, exceeding \$100 million in trade annually.

Discussions during the visit were dominated by what Israeli President Chaim Herzog referred to as "Libya's new-style imperialism." Doe echoed these sentiments, saying, "Qaddafi is a man who would like to lead the whole continent of Africa." Doe said that he had found evidence that Qaddafi was behind an assassination attempt against him in 1981. The Israelis have agreed to supply Liberia with intelligence about Libyan activities in Africa.

Most observers noted that Doe appeared to be having a good time in Israel and enjoying all of the attention which was being showered upon him. However, the Liberian leader seemed unaware of many of the nuances and details of Middle East politics. While most nations with diplomats in Israel maintain their embassies in Tel Aviv rather than Jerusalem to avoid angering the Arab countries, which consider Jerusalem to be an occupied Arab city, Doe confirmed that the Liberian embassy will be located in Jerusalem. "I don't know the question between Tel Aviv or Jerusalem," he said. "I consider Tel Aviv and Jerusalem to be in the same state. So they can tell us where to put our embassy and we will be glad to do so."

Doe also managed to upset his Is-

raeli hosts by speaking of the "God-given rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to a state of their own."

Doe expressed his concern about Israel's relations with South Africa. Liberian Foreign Minister Eastman later commented that the Liberians were encouraged by the "clear and unequivocal condemnation of apartheid" voiced by Israeli President Herzog.

In response, Arab countries have threatened to cut off aid to Liberia, and there has been talk of denying port clearance in Arab countries to ships and oil tankers with Liberian registry. (It is estimated that Liberia earns \$15 million annually from providing registration for foreign vessels.) The Arab League, after its mid-September meeting in Tunis, also recommended that all Arab countries sever their economic and political ties with both Zaire and Liberia. Liberian Foreign Minister Eastman downplayed the significance of the Arab threat, saying that Liberia had received only \$46 million in Arab aid, almost all of which had come in the form of repayable loans.

The Mossad, Israel's intelligence organization, has already supplied information to other African countries which fear Libyan "expansionism." The Israelis, who have long kept a close watch on Qaddafi, have taken advantage of the fears of some African leaders in order to open discussions.

Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens said that Israel was also considering sending military advisers to Liberia to counter alleged Libyan subversion there. Arens said that the details of the military aid remain to be decided. "My guess is that it will probably start with advice and training before it goes on to weaponry, if at all," he added. Liberian Foreign Minister T. Ernest Eastman later said that his country had no intention of purchasing arms from Israel.

Israel also agreed to provide Liberia with agricultural, technical, medical, and economic assistance. The Israelis will help to reorganize Liberian shipping, build roads, and help to re-establish the Liberian national airline. Upon his return to Liberia, Doe announced that Israeli technicians had returned with him

to repair the airline's only plane, and Israel had agreed to supply two Boeing 707s free of charge. The importance which the Israelis place on their relations with Africa is reflected in the magnitude of this commitment, which will severely tax Israel's already overburdened economy.

Doe has promised to try to convince other African states to resume relations with Israel, and he raised the subject during subsequent visits to Sierra Leone and Togo. While most African leaders have remained silent about Doe's actions, it was reported that President Gnassingbé Eyadema of Togo congratulated Doe, saying that Liberia had set the pace for other West African states.

Mali

• The new head of state of Upper Volta, Capt. Thomas Sankara, chose Mali for the site of his first state visit since taking power in August. Relations between Mali and Upper Volta had been tense ever since a border dispute almost erupted into war in 1974-75. At that time, Mali laid claim to several villages along a 100-mile zone in Upper Volta, a region believed to contain mineral riches.

The border dispute has severely hurt the Malian economy. Mali does not belong to the Monetary Union of West Africa (UMOA), a regulating board within the CFA franc zone. Countries in the zone share the CFA currency, which is valued at a fixed rate to the French franc. Upper Volta has consistently vetoed Mali's application for UMOA membership, leaving the Malian franc to fluctuate wildly in value while the CFA franc has remained relatively stable. The weakness of the Malian currency has hampered foreign exchange and worsened Mali's trade deficit. It has also generated a flourishing black market, and Upper Volta has been one of the main beneficiaries of smuggled Malian livestock and agricultural products.

Sankara's conciliatory visit is surprising not only for economic reasons, but for personal ones as well. His popularity in Upper Volta was originally inspired by his achievements as a "war hero" in the border dispute with Mali almost

a decade ago.

Sankara's talks in Bamako with President Moussa Traoré are almost certainly an indication that Upper Volta will no longer oppose Mali's entry into UMOA. The two heads of state also issued a joint communique announcing that the border dispute was being submitted for arbitration to the International Court of Justice. Traoré and Sankara agreed to form a joint commission on cooperation, and Traoré accepted Sankara's invitation to visit Upper Volta in the near future. (*Jeune Afrique*, September 28, 1983; Ouagadougou Radio, September 17 and 18, 1983; Bamako Radio, September 16, 1983.)

Niger

• Niger's army foiled a **coup attempt** in early October while President Seyni Kountché was out of the country. It was the second attempted coup since Kountché came to power nine years ago, and he dismissed it as the work of "a few ambitious people."

Diplomats and observers quickly raised the possibility that Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi had been behind the attempt. Kountché, who had blamed Qaddafi for the first coup attempt against him, has thus far said nothing to indicate that he again suspects Qaddafi. Niger, which borders on Libya as well as on Chad and Upper Volta, has, however, for several years accused Qaddafi of attempting to destabilize the government. A border dispute in 1980 and a brief Libyan occupation of a strip of land in Niger were followed by Qaddafi's 1981 declaration that after annexing Chad, "we consider Niger next in line." Radio Tripoli since then has issued frequent broadcasts urging the Tuaregs in northern Niger to rise up against Kountché's government, and in early 1982, Libyan-armed Tuaregs launched a guerrilla raid against a uranium mine in north-central Niger.

A Niamey radio broadcast in August called on the people of Niger to "maintain calm and not to be affected by events in neighboring countries," and Tripoli Radio at the same time declared that Kountché's government was afraid that the coup in Upper Volta would lead to

"the blowing of the fire of the revolution" onto Niger.

Some of Kountché's fears were alleviated when Upper Volta's new head of state, Capt. Thomas Sankara, visited Niamey in September. Their meeting, Kountché said, was held in "the framework of true fraternity," and he asserted that "the Upper Volta revolution was not disturbing" to Niger. Sankara also accompanied Kountché on his return to Niamey after the coup attempt, and the two men talked for 45 minutes before Sankara returned home. (*Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 1983; *New York Times*, October 7, 1983; Ouagadougou Radio, September 23, 1983; Niamey Radio, September 22 and August 10, 1983; Tripoli Radio, August 8, 1983.)

Nigeria

● As was expected, the Nigerian government began renegotiating its debts with the IMF and major Western creditors soon after the elections. Some observers believe that Shagari's decisive victory will make the government less hesitant to impose the severe austerity measures that the Fund will certainly demand and that many Nigerian officials feel are necessary.

Nigeria's total foreign debt is estimated at between \$9 billion and \$12 billion, with an additional \$3 billion to \$6 billion in short-term notes.

In July, Nigeria reached an agreement with a group of 26 banks, led by Barclays, to refinance \$1.7 billion of arrears. In September, these banks were joined by 11 others, bringing the total refinanced debt to around \$2 billion, but still leaving Nigeria with as much as \$4 billion in arrears to private banks.

Before signing the agreement, Nigeria's Finance Minister, Victor Masi, defended his government's economic policies, saying that import restrictions, advance deposits, and increased tariffs had reduced Nigeria's import bill, while "the external reserve situation is under firm control."

Nigeria must now come to terms with the IMF. An IMF team visited Nigeria in September to begin negotiating a 3-year extended credit of more than \$2 billion. The head of the Nigerian negotiating team, Alhaji Abubakar Alhaji, commented:

"The negotiations have been going on very well, and all I can say is so far so good."

The two most controversial issues in the negotiations are the IMF's proposals that Nigeria devalue the naira and liberalize its import policies. Minister of Finance Masi said that "the government sees no need to devalue the naira and presently has no plans to do so . . . The question of import liberalization hardly deserves any analysis, for one can rightly describe it from the Nigerian angle as nothing short of economic suicide."

Still, the Nigerian government has openly acknowledged the need to come to some kind of an agreement with the IMF, and some reports indicate that the government may consider a gradual devaluation of the naira as a compromise. For political reasons, Nigerian officials prefer the term "exchange rate adjustment" to "devaluation."

In the midst of these negotiations, the World Bank awarded Nigeria a \$250 million credit to finance the import of fertilizers in 1984 and 1985 to help increase food production. (*West Africa*, September 26, 1983; *Financial Times*, September 20, 1983; *Wall Street Journal*, September 16, 1983; *South*, August 1983.)

● See article on Nigeria's elections, page 18.

Sierra Leone

● Liberian Head of State Samuel Doe visited with President Siaka Stevens in early September, and the two men apparently patched up the faltering relations between their two countries. Stevens said that they should not allow their traditional ties to be jeopardized by "misunderstanding over trivial issues." Foremost among those trivial issues was an incident early this year when Liberia massed troops along its border with Sierra Leone in response to a Freetown newspaper's claim that Doe had murdered his wife. In a passing reference to the episode, Stevens described it as a misunderstanding with the newspaper.

The two leaders also renewed their commitment to the Mano River Union (MRU). The MRU, an economic alliance which also in-

cludes Guinea, has been left impotent because of the squabbling between the member states. Earlier this year a Freetown newspaper, *Flash*, accused the MRU secretary-general, T. Ernest Eastman, a Liberian, of stealing \$100,000 from the Union. After the charge was disproven, Eastman left his MRU post to become Liberia's foreign minister. The member states have so far been unable to agree on a successor. (Freetown Radio, September 5, 1983; *African Business*, September 1983.)

Upper Volta

● Since the early August coup which brought him to power, Capt. Thomas Sankara has orchestrated several changes in the government. The first, only days after the coup, was the death of two army officers loyal to the previous leader, Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo. The men, Col. Gabriel Somé Yorian and Maj. Fidèle Guebré, were killed when, according to Sankara's National Council of the Revolution (CNR), they attempted a counter-coup.

"Revolutionary Defense Committees" (CDRs) have been mobilized "for the construction of the country and for the defense of the revolution." The CDRs, which are apparently modelled after the PNDGs instituted by Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings in Ghana, are involved in propaganda, defense, and the maintenance and improvement of public works. In further changes, several high-ranking military officers—including the deposed Ouédraogo—were "removed" from the army in two successive purges.

A new cabinet replaced the provisional one in late August. Two officers who were instrumental in Sankara's rise to power—Capt. Blaise Compaoré, who led a rebellion in support of Sankara at the Pô army base, and Cmdr. Jean-Baptiste Lingani, former secretary-general of the defunct Council for Popular Salvation—received important posts in Sankara's new government. Compaoré was named minister of state to the presidency, and Lingani was awarded the defense portfolio. The new cabinet has a majority of civilians, although Sankara, Compaoré, and Lingani, all military men, hold the three most

important posts. To "reduce difficulties of conflicting authority," the CNR reorganized the administrative regions of Upper Volta into 25 provinces in mid-September.

Sankara, the CNR, and the reorganized administration seem to have consummated the transfer of power from the previous government. Having secured his domestic position, Sankara looked beyond his borders. As a first step toward international approval of his new government, Sankara moved to improve relations with his neighbors. In September, he launched a veritable diplomatic blitz, sending delegations to Libya, Algeria, Togo, Ivory Coast, Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, and Niger (see also Mali and Niger, page 32). Sankara also hosted Christian Nucci, the French Minister of Cooperation and Development, who spent three days in Upper Volta. Throughout his visits, Sankara assured foreign officials that he was not a "pawn" of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi and that he intended to pursue a policy of strict non-alignment. (Ouagadougou Radio, September 14 and 15, August 18, 19, 21 and 24, 1983; *Le Monde*, September 8 and August 12, 1983.)

EASTERN AFRICA

Djibouti

• Some of the 30,000 Ethiopian refugees who have been living in Djibouti since 1977 returned home in late September. These 200 people were the first to go back to Ethiopia in a voluntary repatriation program launched under the auspices of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the governments of Djibouti and Ethiopia.

Like the refugees in Somalia, the Djibouti refugees fled Ethiopia in 1977 to escape the Ogaden war and the drought. But the Djibouti government would prefer that they return to Ethiopia. Many of the refugees seem to have settled in Djibouti, and though many often cross the border into Ethiopia to visit relatives, they are hesitant to return permanently.

In order to lure the refugees back to Ethiopia, UNHCR promised money and assistance in the form of

tools, seeds, or livestock, and Ethiopia has offered amnesty for those who fled the country illegally. Still, life in Ethiopia does not appear to rival the relative luxury of the refugee camps, where food and medical attention were provided regularly.

Though the number of returnees began to increase toward the middle of October, there is no guarantee that Djibouti's refugee problem will be solved. In the words of one refugee camp official, "If they go home and find nothing, they will be back the next day."

The governments of Djibouti and Ethiopia also received a message from the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), calling on them to halt the repatriation. "The Front has warned that Djibouti will have itself to blame for any difficulties encountered by the repatriated refugees." The WSLF has used the refugees in Djibouti and Somalia, who have attracted world attention, to publicize their goal of liberating the Ogaden from Ethiopian control. The WSLF has also used refugee camps in Somalia as recruiting grounds for guerrilla fighters. (London *Guardian*, September 20, 1983; Addis Ababa Radio, August 25 and September 12, 1983; Voice of Western Somalia Radio, September 11, 1983; *The Economist*, September 3, 1983.)

Ethiopia

• In mid-September, Ethiopia released some 1200 prisoners, including 117 who were reportedly detained for political reasons, to commemorate the ninth anniversary of the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie. Among the former prisoners are eight princes and princesses from Ethiopia's deposed royal family. Ten other members of the old imperial family are still in jail along with an unknown number of political prisoners. Amnesty International estimated in 1982 that there were "several thousand" people being held in Ethiopia without charges.

Meanwhile, the country continues to be plagued by a devastating combination of famine and fighting. The Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) regularly issue claims of "victories"

against the Ethiopian army. Though many of these claims are pure propaganda, there is no doubt that the guerrillas have made some gains against the Ethiopian army despite its moderately successful offensive against the rebels earlier this year. Observers in Addis Ababa now believe that the army is preparing to launch another such offensive.

Private voluntary organization doing famine relief work in Ethiopia have appealed to the UN to help put a stop to the fighting which is severely hampering their efforts. The groups have also pressed the U.S. government to increase its relief aid to Ethiopia, a position supported by a congressional delegation which visited Ethiopia in August. (*New York Times*, September 17, 1983; London *Guardian*, September 9, 1983; EPLF Radio, August 25 and September 8, 1983.)

Kenya

• See article on Kenya's elections, page 10.

Madagascar

• Monja Jaona, leader of the opposition party, the National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar (MONIMA), was released from an eight-month period of house arrest in mid-August.

• Jaona had been placed under house arrest at the end of last year, when he had publicly disputed the results of the last presidential election, in which he was defeated by the incumbent, Didier Ratsiraka.

Immediately after his release, Jaona began campaigning vigorously on behalf of MONIMA candidates in the legislative contest against members of Ratsiraka's Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (AREMA) party.

Although the elections did not dramatically reduce the overall domination of the National Assembly by AREMA members, MONIMA was able to win two of eight seats in the capital district of Antananarivo. (*Jeune Afrique*, September 21, 1983; London *Times*, September 1 and 2, 1983; *Le Monde*, August 17 and 31, 1983.)

• In September, 13 men accused of attempting to assassinate Ratsiraka were released from custody. Eight

Revival of the East African Community?

Ever since the Kenya-Tanzania border was closed in 1977, there has been speculation that it would soon reopen. Kenyan newspapers and politicians have stated on numerous occasions that the reopening was imminent. These predictions have thus far amounted to little more than wishful thinking on the part of Kenyans, whose tourist industry profited by showing Tanzania's abundant wildlife to foreigners who would then spend their nights and their money in Nairobi.

This exploitation was one of the reasons that Tanzania closed the border in 1977, but the resentment emanating from Dar es Salaam was also grounded in some of the other inequities of the trilateral relationship among Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, the three former partners in the East African Community. Though the three nations all benefitted financially from pooling their resources into posts and telecommunications, an airline, and a railroad, Kenya, because of a more highly developed industrial sector, was the beneficiary of a markedly skewed trade imbalance. At the same time, political differences further separated the three partners. It is difficult to imagine a group of three more disparate African leaders than Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, and Idi Amin, the trio who presided over the breakup of the community in 1977.

The idea of the East African Community was revived most recently by the fall of Charles Njonjo in Kenya. Njonjo, a long-time opponent of the community, was known to harbor a deep hatred for Nyerere, a sentiment which Nyerere reportedly returned. Njonjo's demise was rapidly followed by overtures toward Kenya from Tanzanian Prime Minister Edward Sokoine who called for the renewal of diplomatic and trade relations. Representatives of Tanzania's tourist-starved tour operators then put forward proposals for cooperation with their colleagues in Kenya.

Uganda also chimed in with pledges to buy more Kenyan goods, and the two countries announced plans to cooperate in security and other matters of mutual interest.

It will take more than friendly messages and a flood of promises to wash away the mistrust which has developed over the last years. There are still obstacles, such as the three Kenyan politicians who have received political asylum in Tanzania, but for the first time since 1977, the revival of the East African Community is receiving serious consideration from all the former members.

were given suspended sentences and five were acquitted in a collective judgment of the criminal court. The men had been detained since January 1982. (Antananarivo Radio, September 22, 1983; London *Guardian*, September 22, 1983.)

Mauritius

• After defeating Paul Berenger's Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) in the August elections, the victorious multi-party alliance led by Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth divided the new cabinet posts among the constituent parties of the coalition. Most positions were awarded to members of Jugnauth's own Militant Socialist Movement (MSM), but three posts were given to members of the Mauritian Labor

Party (PTR), and Sir Gaetan Duval, the "pro-Western" leader of the Mauritian Social Democratic Party (PMSD), was appointed deputy prime minister.

Soon after the elections, Jugnauth announced that his government would initiate further austerity measures in accordance with the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund. Another high priority, the government announced, would be the creation of jobs. Unemployment is a serious problem in Mauritius, where at least 70,000 people have no work out of a total population of only one million.

A month after the change of government, Britain announced plans to give \$15 million in aid to Mauritius.

Tanzania

• Tanzania has instituted a new policy of allowing private farming in order to revitalize its agricultural sector. Groups of Asian farmers have been given permission to embark on large-scale agricultural projects. The move follows a recommendation from the World Bank calling for Tanzania to increase incentives for farmers.

A British company, Lonrho, is looking to buy back tea estates which it owned in Tanzania before they were nationalized. The company concluded an agreement with the Tanzanian government in mid-September under which the government agreed to compensate the company for its former interests, including the tea estates. "We would like to recover our tea estates as part of a program to reinvest in Tanzania," a spokesman for the company said.

Lonrho's interests in Tanzania were nationalized after the company was charged with breaking sanctions which were imposed against Rhodesia. The latest company report said, however, that "the circumstances giving rise to the confiscation . . . arose from a misunderstanding and are no longer valid." (*Financial Times*, September 20, 1983; London *Guardian*, September 10, 1983.)

Uganda

• To commemorate the twenty-first anniversary of Ugandan independence, President Milton Obote granted amnesty to more than 2,100 prisoners in early October. Among those freed were "a sizeable number" of soldiers from the army of deposed dictator Idi Amin, as well as alleged sympathizers with anti-government "bandits." A few weeks before, the Ugandan government had published a list of 359 political detainees held under the public security act. The discrepancy between the official list and the actual number of released prisoners was not explained.

Meanwhile, the government's struggle against the "bandits" continued. A district commissioner was reported missing after numerous kidnap threats, and the party chair-

man of the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) in Mpigi, just west of Kampala, was "ambushed and killed with three other people by bandits" in September.

In the course of its counter-insurgency campaign, the government has displaced tens of thousands of people in the Buganda districts of Mpigi, Luwero, and Mubende. Obote recently announced that his government would assume full responsibility for coordinating the distribution of food and other aid to the dozens of resettlement camps in which the displaced peasants have been gathered. International relief workers have charged that supplies of food and clothing often do not reach the refugees, and that the Ugandan army has "harassed" people in the camps. Obote replied to the criticism of his army's continued presence in civilian areas by saying that "no government in the world would accept terrorists and gunmen ruling part of the country."

The government plans eventually to resettle the refugees in their original homes and villages, but some of the refugees might be reluctant to leave the camps despite their poor conditions. The "bandit" guerrilla forces were once headquartered in Buganda, and many local residents, although they may have been politically neutral, sought protection among the guerrillas from the advancing government troops. Many of these refugees now fear that they have been indelibly marked as "bandit sympathizers" and are afraid to abandon the group security they have found in the camps.

Obote is confident that the resettlement can be successfully carried out, and he has requested a massive infusion of foreign aid to help return the displaced persons to their homes.

CENTRAL AFRICA

Equatorial Guinea

• Elections were held in late August in which 50,000 voters went to the polls to elect 41 representatives to five-year terms in the newly-formed National Assembly. Opposition groups based in Madrid labeled the elections undemocratic and a sham.

They supported their assertion by pointing out that there were no political parties and that President Teodoro Obiang Nguema personally selected all of the candidates.

The main opposition group, the People's National Salvation Front, which encompasses five opposition parties, has consistently dismissed the possibility of a democratic political process in Equatorial Guinea as long as "60 percent of the population is in exile" and there is no general amnesty for opponents of Obiang's regime.

Observers have surmised that the elections were staged to placate Obiang's patrons in Madrid, who have been rapidly losing patience with his regime. Equatorial Guinea's debt to Spain exceeds \$40 million, with another \$12 million in aid due from Madrid this year. Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando Morán has persistently expressed concern about the "deviation" of Spanish aid, and in June he told the Spanish Parliament that unnamed officials in Obiang's government had "diverted" \$50,000 in aid. A Spanish newspaper reported that Spain was considering cutting off all aid to Equatorial Guinea.

In August, before the election, Obiang visited Spain, where he announced the renegotiation of his country's debt and the settlement of a sticky affair involving a sergeant who participated in last May's coup attempt and who had later found refuge in the Spanish embassy in Malabo. Obiang first threatened to remove the soldier from the embassy by force, but the Spanish agreed to hand the soldier over if Obiang promised that he would not execute him. Obiang was immediately accused by his critics of being a Spanish pawn, and they encouraged him to execute the prisoner. In Madrid, Obiang affirmed that the agreement not to execute the soldier would be honored.

Despite its irritation with Obiang's regime, Spain seems determined not to lose its last bit of influence in Africa. The Spanish aid program gives Madrid, at least in principle, a measure of control over Equatorial Guinea's affairs, but Spain correctly perceives that France would like to extend its sphere of influence to include Equatorial Guinea. France was the only

Western country to maintain diplomatic relations with Obiang's predecessor, the murderous dictator Francisco Macias Nguema, and the French rushed in with aid and recognition for the new regime when Macias was overthrown in August 1979.

Despite its mineral wealth and economic potential, Equatorial Guinea's economy is in ruins, and its currency is virtually worthless. For these reasons, Obiang would desperately like to gain entrance to the CFA franc zone, a move which Spain opposed out of fear that it would increase French influence. Spain has now apparently reached an understanding with its former colony, and that objection has been dropped.

If Equatorial Guinea is able to gain acceptance into the zone, which is by no means a certainty, it could be a double victory. It could rescue the country's devastated monetary system and, as long as Spain remains interested, it may assure continued Spanish aid to counterbalance French influence. (*New York Times*, August 29 and September 8, 1983; *Africa Now*, September 1983; Madrid Radio, September 29, 1983; *West Africa*, August 15, 1983.)

Rwanda

• A timetable has been set for Rwanda's forthcoming elections. The presidential election has been set for December 19, 1983, and the general election will follow one week later on December 26. President Juvénal Habyarimana will be the only presidential candidate.

In economic news, the government announced in early September that the Rwandan franc will no longer be tied to the U.S. dollar. The announcement said that, effective immediately, the Rwandan currency would be realigned with the IMF's Special Drawing Rights at the rate of 102.71 Rwandan francs to the SDR. (Kigali Radio, September 1 and 6, 1983.)

Zambia

• In late September, Zambia announced its plan to repay \$540 million that it owes on short-term notes. The governor of the Bank of Zambia, Bitwell Kuwani, met with

the 20 largest companies which are owed money and stated the Zambian government's intention to repay the arrears over five years.

Though the outlook is still bleak, Zambia's economic conditions have shown some signs of improvement. The state-run Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) announced a profit for the first quarter of the current fiscal year. The profit of \$8.9 million compares with a loss of \$5.7 million for the previous quarter. ZCCM officials attributed the reversal to higher metal prices, last January's devaluation of the kwacha, and a program to cut costs which was instituted last year. Increased demand has also led to a reduction of Zambia's stockpiles of copper, lead, and zinc. The U.S. government has also purchased more than 2.2 million lbs. of cobalt from Zambia for its national defense stockpile.

Zambia's mining industry is still facing a challenge from the miners' unions, which have opposed the IMF-inspired wage controls. Faced with declining real wages and increasing prices for staple goods, the unions have been impatient with the government's requests for cooperation. With the mining industry's prospects looking up, the unions may decide to press their demands more forcefully. (*Financial Times*, September 9, 15, 21 and 28, 1983.)

● Zambia held its parliamentary election on October 27, after *Update* went to press. President Kenneth Kaunda was the sole candidate for president.

NORTHERN AFRICA

Egypt

● Egypt's emergency laws, which were enacted by the late President Anwar Sadat to restrict demonstrations and public meetings, have recently aroused a "commotion" in Egypt, according to Interior Minister Hassan Abu Basha.

In late September, President Hosni Mubarak announced that he would propose that Parliament repeal the emergency laws when they came up for renewal. Egypt's opposition parties had already demanded that the laws be repealed before the general elections in April 1984.

Only days later, however, the Egyptian government formally requested that Parliament renew the emergency laws for another one-year period, justifying the extension by saying that, in the last year alone, 13 attempts had been made to overthrow Mubarak. The request to extend the laws was made despite a statement by the minister of parliamentary affairs that a proposed "anti-terrorist bill" would eliminate the necessity for continuing the emergency laws.

A few weeks earlier, the Neo-Wafd Party, which had disbanded in 1978, announced that it would seek to resume its political activities "within the bounds of constitutional legitimacy." The party is modeled after the Wafd (Delegation) movement, the leading Egyptian nationalist group of the 1920s and 30s. More than 10,000 people attended the first Neo-Wafd rally in late August, among them the leaders of Egypt's three other opposition parties. The Neo-Wafd's emphasis on secular socialism caused a disturbance at the rally when Islamic fundamentalists who shouted, "Allah is great!" were answered by Neo-Wafd supporters shouting, "The Wafd is the creed of the people!" A ruckus ensued.

The government has tentatively refused to grant legitimate party status to the Neo-Wafd on the grounds that all political organizations dating from the era of the monarchy are forbidden by a 1978 law. The Political Parties Commission concluded that the Neo-Wafd has "no legal existence," but the party's leaders affirmed their determination to appeal and, if necessary, to continue their political activities in defiance of the ruling.

Morocco

● Morocco, which is the world's largest exporter of phosphates, has been hurt by the decline in prices for that commodity, which is used in the manufacture of fertilizers. The Moroccan economy has also suffered from the high costs of the war in the Western Sahara, while the oil-rich Arab states have cut back loans and grants to Morocco as the price of oil has declined.

In response, Morocco has asked a group of leading Western banks to

reschedule its debt. The rescheduling will affect principal repayments on commercial debt falling due through the end of 1984, an amount estimated at \$450 million. Citibank leads the committee which will arrange the rescheduling. Meanwhile, Morocco also sought a meeting of the "Paris Club" of international financiers to renegotiate its official state-guaranteed debts of around \$500 million.

The International Monetary Fund, during these discussions, approved a \$315 million structural adjustment loan aimed at helping to reduce the growth of consumption in the public and private sectors.

The refinancing measures followed a "draconian" austerity plan initiated by the government earlier in the year, which entailed a 13 percent cut in public expenditure, a substantial tax increase, and reduced food subsidies. (*Financial Times*, September 12 and 20, August 24 and 26, 1983; *Wall Street Journal*, August 24 and September 13, 1983; *Le Monde*, August 22 and 29, 1983.)

Sudan

● Eleven members of the opposition Muslim Ansar movement, including its leader, former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, were arrested in Khartoum in late September. Ironically, the arrest followed the adoption of Islamic law, the *Sharia*, to replace civil law in Sudan—a policy for which the Muslim Ansar had long been campaigning.

The new official code, which, among other things, prohibits the consumption of alcohol, was installed in early September with a symbolic dumping of liquor and beer into the Nile at Khartoum. President Gaafar al-Nimeiry personally poured one can of beer into the river. Under the new laws, the consumption of alcohol is punishable by 40 lashes.

Nimeiry also ordered that all of the 13,000 inmates in Sudan's jails be released. Even those awaiting execution on murder charges were freed on the grounds that they had not been sentenced under Islamic law. The former convicts were given \$55 to "go out and start a new life." Nimeiry apparently had few reservations about allowing crimi-

nals to roam freely. "Islamic law will put an end to all crimes," he said.

Thieves will now be punished by the amputation of a hand, and adulterers will be stoned to death. Convicted murderers will die by the same means by which they killed.

Also in keeping with the new laws, Khartoum University announced that Arabic will replace English as the primary language of instruction.

Observers have seen the adoption of Islamic law as a means for Nimeiry to head off a powerful challenge to his rule from Islamic fundamentalist groups. The policy could backfire, however, if it serves to further alienate his opponents in the Christian south, who strongly oppose the imposition of the *Sharia*.

This resistance may be the reason for Nimeiry's decision to offer amnesty to southern Sudanese rebels who were involved in a series of attacks and uprisings earlier this year in Bahr al-Ghazal province. The rebels opposed the redivision of the south into three provinces, a move which they thought would weaken their regional authority while increasing the influence of the Muslim north. Reports from southern Sudan indicate that some of the rebels have accepted Nimeiry's offer.

Tunisia

- Thirty Tunisian members of the international, fundamentalist Islamic Liberation Party were arrested in August. Although 19 of the defendants were soldiers, the other 11 were civilians, and they all were tried, convicted, and sentenced by military tribunal several weeks later. The defendants' lawyers lodged an appeal with the Tunisian Supreme Court, since a military tribunal cannot reverse its own decision. Early in the trial, all but one of the 21 defense lawyers had withdrawn from the case when the tribunal refused to postpone the trial, or to allow them access to their clients' dossiers. (*Afrique-Asie*, September 12, 1983; *Le Monde*, September 8 and August 27, 1983.)

- Tunisia is attempting to assemble a \$120 million package of Euro-market loans for use in financing development projects. The credit is to be partly in the form of an eight-year

loan, with the remainder financed via a floating-rate note (FRN). Though Tunisian officials want to remain flexible over the precise distribution of the loans, observers anticipate that the FRN will account for no more than half of the package.

Tunisia's application to the Euro-market has been enthusiastically greeted by bankers who are submitting bids to participate in the deal. (*Financial Times*, September 21, 1983; *Wall Street Journal*, September 20, 1983.)

Western Sahara

- The September meeting of the OAU's Implementation Committee on the Western Sahara, which had been created to implement the OAU resolutions on a ceasefire between Polisario guerrillas and Moroccan troops together with a referendum to decide the future of the territory, was suspended after only one day of proceedings. The secretary-general ad interim of the OAU, Peter Onu, said that "Morocco had refused to sit with Polisario in the same hall and at the same table."

The meeting took place in Addis Ababa, where OAU Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam proposed that the Implementation Committee act as intermediary between the Moroccan and Polisario delegations. The Moroccans rejected the proposal, maintaining that it was possible to hold a referendum without the two parties coming together. Speaking later at the UN, Morocco's King Hassan II said: "Morocco solemnly declares that it would consider itself bound by the results of that referendum."

Polisario, however, wants to meet with Morocco directly before the referendum is held. The dispute between the two parties may cause another confrontation similar to the one which prevented the OAU summit from convening in 1982. The showdown could come in February at an OAU Council of Ministers meeting where Polisario will probably demand to be seated. This would undoubtedly lead to another walkout by Morocco and its allies.

African Update has received confirmation, however, from two highly-placed diplomatic sources, that in fact Morocco and Polisario

have met together at least twice: first in Bamako, Mali in 1978, and again last April in Algeria at a discussion convened by President Chadli Benjedid.

Polisario Secretary General Mohamed Abdelaziz announced at this year's OAU summit in Addis Ababa that he had met with a Moroccan delegation, a statement which was emphatically denied by Morocco's Foreign Minister, M'hamed Boucetta.

Morocco's refusal to acknowledge its meetings with Polisario representatives can be explained by strong popular sentiments within Morocco. The "reintegration" of the Western Sahara with Morocco has long been a goal of Moroccan nationalism and incites Moroccan patriotism like no other issue.

Moroccan diplomats perceive a clear distinction between the Saharawi people and Polisario, whom they consider to be a "gang of mercenaries." The Moroccans apparently feel that if a referendum were held, the results would be in their favor. They therefore see no reason to antagonize their own people by publicizing their contacts with Polisario.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

- The civil war between Jonas Savimbi's UNITA guerrilla movement and the army of the MPLA government continued to escalate throughout August, September, and October. In mid-August, UNITA forces launched an 11-day assault on the town of Cangamba, considered the last strategic outpost still held by the MPLA in southeastern Angola. Three thousand UNITA troops took the town after heavy fighting. The MPLA claimed that the UNITA forces were supported by South African combat aircraft, which dropped napalm and phosphorous bombs on the MPLA troops and "against residential areas" of the town. UNITA counter-charged that Cuban pilots had carried out repeated bombing and strafing runs. Each side claimed that the other had lost at least 700 lives in the battle. The South African government would not admit to

the bombings, claiming that any South African military aircraft sighted over Angola were making routine reconnaissance flights "to monitor the movements of SWAPO terrorists."

Both UNITA and the MPLA continued to claim an almost incessant sequence of victories against the other's forces. UNITA asserted that from August 1982 to August 1983, it had killed 5,744 MPLA troops and 501 Cubans. UNITA went on to claim that in its first "general offensive," from August 2 to September 3, 1812 MPLA troops, 12 Soviet advisers, and 349 Cuban soldiers had been killed. The MPLA reported in early September that 99 UNITA guerrillas had been killed in various skirmishes and that, in only "a few days," MPLA troops had destroyed a UNITA base and thwarted four "enemy ambushes," resulting in 67 more UNITA casualties. A week later, the MPLA claimed to have killed 37 UNITA "puppet bandits" in three assaults. The following week, the MPLA announced that government forces had killed 89 UNITA troops in just five days of fighting.

The maelstrom of combat and body counts left little certain, but observers believe that UNITA has definitely made significant advances in recent months. Though the MPLA and UNITA claims conflict, they seem to agree on one thing: UNITA is now able to attack government installations in every region of Angola except the three northernmost provinces of Uige, Zaire, and the capital state of Luanda. In early September, UNITA captured the town of Calulo, at the edge of Luanda Province and only 120 miles from the capital.

Although MPLA troops apparently pushed UNITA back out of Calulo, the government was alarmed at the proximity of the UNITA advance. The MPLA issued a directive in mid-September making military service compulsory in Angola, a measure which suggests that the army has suffered severe losses, weakened morale, and recruiting difficulties. In October, the U.S. State Department estimated that the Angolan government has brought in more than 5,000 Cuban reinforcements in the last few

months to help counter the UNITA threat.

Most observers do not expect UNITA to attack Luanda directly. The largest concentration of Cuban troops in Angola is stationed there, along with thousands of MPLA soldiers, and UNITA's military tactics are ill-adapted for an attack on such a massive force. The guerrillas are more likely to continue directing their assaults against the government's centers of transportation, communications, industry, and agriculture. The provinces of Malanje and Kwanza Sul, the heartland of Angolan agriculture, are now, for the first time, targets of UNITA attacks.

Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, has repeatedly said that he will enter into peace discussions only if President José Eduardo dos Santos will agree to negotiate the inclusion of UNITA in a "government of national reconciliation." (*New York Times*, October 7, 1983; *Washington Post*, October 4 and 5, 1983; Luanda Radio, September 13, 15, 18, 23 and 30, 1983; *Baltimore Sun*, September 22, 1983; *London Times*, September 20, 1983; UNITA Radio, September 16, 1983; Johannesburg Radio, August 31 and September 15, 1983.)

Lesotho

● In September, South Africa succeeded in pressuring the government of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan into deporting South African refugees from Lesotho.

South Africa has long accused Lesotho of harboring members of the African National Congress and, in December 1982, its armed forces launched a commando strike against Lesotho's capital of Maseru, killing 42 people in an attempt to destroy an alleged ANC base. Lesotho has always denied that it allows ANC guerrillas to operate within its borders, but South Africa has continued applying pressure on the government of Lesotho.

Since May, South Africa has blockaded Lesotho's borders, restricting the importation of supplies into Lesotho and the passage of workers from Lesotho to South Africa. The economic attrition caused by the blockade forced Lesotho to yield to Pretoria's demands by ex-

PELLING the South African refugees.

Meanwhile, Lesotho charged that South Africa was harboring members of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), whose guerrilla activities against targets within Lesotho have escalated markedly since the imposition of the blockade. In September alone, the LLA bombed a post office, an airport warehouse, and the home of a cabinet minister. The guerrillas also launched an attack with armored vehicles, mortars, and bazookas, but were driven back across the South African border. A baby girl and her mother were killed in another LLA raid, Maseru Radio said. (*Le Monde*, September 22, 1983; Maseru Radio, September 2, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 17, 1983; *Washington Post*, September 9, 1983.)

Malawi

● Although severe drought has caused crop failures throughout southern Africa, Malawi will have an abundant harvest this year. The government recently announced a large surplus of maize, much of which has already been designated for export to Tanzania, Zambia, and Zaire. Commenting on the bumper crop, President-for-Life Hastings K. Banda said that "the only problem now is the unavailability of sacks in which to put the maize," and he appealed to international agencies to supply enough sacks to transport the grain.

Cash crops, which account for 90 percent of Malawi's export earnings, are also up. Growers of burley tobacco will be restricted in their future plantings, because this year's yield exceeded demand by 50 percent. Tobacco farmers are being urged to cultivate other varieties of tobacco which remain in high demand.

The International Monetary Fund expects growth rates in Malawi to rise from 2.5 percent this year to 4.5 percent by 1986. In late September, the IMF gave Malawi a \$100 million three-year credit, which will be used to alleviate the country's balance of payments deficit. The extended credit agreement was only the second to be awarded to an African state and is seen as a sign of IMF approval for President Banda's economic austerity mea-

tures. (*Financial Times*, September 23, 1983; Blantyre Radio, August 5 and 18, 1983; *Le Monde*, August 17, 1983; *New African*, August 1983.)

Mozambique

● The Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) intensified its armed offensive against the Frelimo government, attacking transportation, agriculture, and mining projects in Mozambique throughout August and September. The most daring attack was an early morning raid on the Mozambique Mining Company installation in Murrua, Zambezia Province. The MNR killed two Soviet geologists and two Mozambican militiamen who were guarding the mine. Twenty-four Soviet mining technicians were taken hostage by the MNR. The MNR warned the government that the lives of the Soviets would be endangered if the armed forces attempted to rescue them.

The Frelimo government accused South Africa of assisting the MNR in the attack on the mining project. This view was supported by reports that MNR forces were seen landing from the Indian Ocean on the coast of Mozambique, 100 miles east of the Murrua mines. The MNR lacks the naval capacity to mount such an operation on its own, leading Western observers to believe that a South African involvement was indispensable to the success of the raid.

The Mozambican armed forces responded to the recent increase in MNR activities by launching a counter-offensive against MNR strongholds in the key provinces of Zambezia and Inhambane. In a late-August assault on an MNR base 150 miles north of the capital of Maputo, the armed forces freed three Portuguese nationals who had been taken hostage by the rebels, also capturing 150 MNR guerrillas and large quantities of arms and munitions. (London *Guardian*, August 10 and September 29, 1983; London *Observer*, August 28, 1983; Maputo Radio, August 25, 1983; MNR Radio, August 25, 1983; *New York Times*, August 23, 1983.)

● President Samora Machel has continued his efforts to broaden Mozambique's foreign relations

and to lessen its economic dependence on the Soviet Union. In October, Machel travelled to Europe, visiting Belgium, Britain, and other countries including Portugal. His visit to Portugal, the former colonial power in Mozambique, breaks new ground. Although several high-ranking Portuguese officials have visited Mozambique recently, Machel's first visit to Lisbon is perceived as the most important single contact between the two countries since Mozambique's independence.

Machel was expected to request a comprehensive assistance package including substantial economic, commercial, and military cooperation. In recent months, relations have rapidly improved between the two countries. Portugal agreed earlier this year to finance railway reconstruction and also signed an agreement to develop Mozambique's fishing industry. Other agreements covered cooperation in health and education, coal mining, public works, and communications.

Some observers speculated that Machel might be prepared to offer a withdrawal of the Soviet and Cuban presence from Mozambique in exchange for Western aid. Other sources, however, pointed out that Mozambique, which is crippled by drought and the MNR guerrilla war, is in no position to dictate terms to international donors.

Another indication of a shift away from Soviet influence was Machel's statement in Brussels that Mozambique was now willing to join the Lomé Convention. As a member of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group, Mozambique would become party to agreements on development and trade with the European Economic Community. Machel also said that relations with the U.S. were improving: "The American administration now has without a doubt a more lucid attitude to cooperation with Mozambique. They discuss things with us very frankly and we appreciate this." (*New York Times*, October 9, 1983; *Financial Times*, August 31, October 5 and 7, 1983.)

South Africa

● Black organizations and trade unions are trying to mobilize interna-

l pressure against the South African government and the Ciskeian authorities following the "independent" homeland's banning of the 80,000-member South African Allied Workers' Union (Saawu).

All but one of the union's executive and many of its members have been detained without charges by Ciskeian security police, and the only top Saawu official not in detention is Thozamile Gqweta, the union president who is in hiding in the Ciskei town of East London. Gqweta and other officials have been frequently detained by either Ciskei or South Africa; the homeland has accused them of furthering the aims of the banned African National Congress, but none of them has ever been charged.

The banning came during a prolonged boycott of commuter buses operated by the partly government-owned Ciskei Transport Corp. Ciskeian authorities blamed the union for the boycott, but Saawu said the action was organized by community groups, and Gqweta even offered to mediate the dispute. At least seven people were killed during the boycott when Ciskeian security forces opened fire on crowds swarming to trains run by the South African government. (Johannesburg *Star*, September 26, 1983; *Sowetan*, September 6, 7, 9, 12, 16, 20, 21, and 23, 1983.)

● Black South Africans have revived the campaign to release Nelson Mandela, the leader of the banned African National Congress who is imprisoned for life, but the campaign has been rebuffed by the government.

First, a mass rally planned for Soweto in September was banned by a chief magistrate under the Internal Security Act.

Second, Prime Minister Pieter Botha made it clear the government would ignore the campaign. He said, "Nelson Mandela was found guilty under the laws of the country, was convicted and is serving his sentence. That is all I have to say on the matter."

The Release Mandela Committee has rescheduled the rally for October 23. "The ban did not come as a surprise to us," said the committee's publicity secretary, Aubrey

A watchdog story

Two watchdogs mauled a 21-year-old black maid to death in September in a white Johannesburg suburb.

The dead woman's employer, who had been boarding the dogs for a friend, discovered her dismembered body on his return from work. The dogs were then turned over by police to the SPCA.

After the story appeared in newspapers, the SPCA began receiving large numbers of phone calls from security-minded whites, who asked to adopt the dogs to protect their property.

"I told them they were bloody mad," said Mrs. Billie Greyvenstein, manager of the local SPCA. The dogs were destroyed. (London *Guardian*, September 16, 1983.)

Mokoena, who is a former black consciousness adherent. He said the ban was indicative of "the acute fear" with which the government regards Mandela. The campaign, like a previous one more than a year ago, intends to collect petitions which will eventually be sent to the UN.

Meanwhile, Mandela has been nominated by students for the honorary chancellorship of the University of Natal. Mandela agreed to be a candidate and Alan Paton, the novelist, then withdrew his nomination. (*Sowetan*, September 7, 16, 20 and 21, 1983; *London Times*, September 3, 1983.)

Celebrities launch coordinated boycott

A renewed effort to persuade American entertainers and athletes to boycott South Africa was begun in September by a coalition called Artists and Athletes Against Apartheid.

The campaign, coordinated by the Washington lobby TransAfrica, mailed 15,000 brochures nationwide to entertainers, asking them to sign pledges against performing in South Africa.

The coalition includes some 30 organizations, ranging from church

Africans criticize U.S. over Namibia

The leaders of two frontline states, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, have both said they are "dismayed" at the Reagan administration's role in the protracted negotiations over independence for Namibia.

Mugabe, in the U.S. on an official visit in September, said he was "dismayed and deeply disappointed" that Washington still links Namibia's independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. "One hopes," he said, "that the U.S. will be persuaded to abandon this very unfortunate position." Mugabe said that if Pretoria continues its "intransigence" on the issue, African countries should step up aid to the South-West African People's Organization, which is battling South African troops for the liberation of Namibia.

Kaunda said that he had helped the Reagan administration set up its first contacts with the Angolan gov-

ernment in 1982 because he was convinced then of Washington's seriousness in negotiating independence for Namibia. "Really, what has followed has dismayed me a great deal," he said.

Kaunda said that Washington's approach to the negotiations had allowed time for South Africa to help UNITA, the rebel Angolan movement, to build up its forces. The Angolan government has acknowledged that UNITA has recently made military gains, but contends that Pretoria controls the movement.

In October, *Newsweek* alleged that UNITA is being secretly given "training, arms, and financial assistance" by the CIA, which did help the movement in 1976 until the Clark amendment cut off all such aid in Angola. The CIA denied the charge. (*Washington Post*, September 13 and October 4, 1983; *New York Times*, September 23, 1983.) □

groups to unions, and 60 artists and athletes. It appears to be the first coordinated effort by entertainers to influence other entertainers.

Harry Belafonte, a co-chairman along with Arthur Ashe, said he hoped the boycott would take effect within weeks. Belafonte said that any performer who went to South Africa despite the boycott would "not do it with impunity."

There have been sporadic attempts in the past to organize boycotts. In 1981, the Rev. Jesse Jackson, for example, pushed for a boycott, noting that Frank Sinatra, who received \$2 million for nine days at Sun City, was not paid "for his talent—but to use his reputation as a stepping stone to world recognition for South Africa."

In that same year, the O'Jays made a disastrous tour of South Africa that ended in collapse because of an intensive boycott organized by black South African groups which believe that visits by foreign performers help prop up apartheid. The O'Jays are now members of Artists and Athletes Against Apartheid and have pledged to help persuade other entertainers not to go.

As an indication of how the campaign will work, Ashe related that

John McEnroe was once offered \$1 million to play tennis at Sun City. Ashe said he asked McEnroe's father to listen to Franklin Williams, president of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, who filled him in during "a low-key discussion" on why McEnroe should not go. Ashe said, "John later decided, 'Hey, if that's the way they operate down there, then I don't want to go.'"

The educational process may not always be so easy. As Ashe launched the campaign at a press conference at the UN, American singer Gwen Brisco was performing in South Africa, and British rock singer Elton John was booked for his second Sun City appearance in October.

Swaziland

● After being deposed in August, former Queen Regent Dzeliwe appealed to the High Court of Swaziland to reinstate her. A constitutional clash between the court and the Supreme National Council, or Ligoqo, was averted when the court accepted the Ligoqo's contention that "royal family matters are beyond the purview of the courts."

Although the court withdrew the case from consideration, the deposed queen's attorney was arrested under orders from the Liqoqo. The removal of Dzeliwe and the arrest of her attorney provoked student protest at the University of Swaziland. Swazi police, reinforced by "fully armed" soldiers, broke up the demonstrations and arrested 30 students. Other students later boycotted their classes to protest the detention of their colleagues, and a further protest occurred days later.

The Prime Minister, Prince Bhekimpi, charged that the demonstrations, "the scattering of anonymous leaflets," and "rumblings of discontent" were caused by "someone who is stoking the fires of disharmony." "Political matters," he added, "are restricted to the duly chosen ones, not the whole Swazi nation. Our role as a nation is to accept with gratitude the direction which the elders have mapped out for the country."

Bhekimpi went on to speak of "wolves in sheep's clothing" and "a cancer that had invaded the former Queen Regent's domain." Several days later it appeared that the subject of Bhekimpi's remarks had been the Minister of Home Affairs, Prince Gabheni, who was a member of the Liqoqo and the head of its armed forces council, and a close adviser to the deposed Queen Regent. Shortly after the Prime Minister's speech, Gabheni was suspended from office and removed from the Liqoqo amid charges that he had been the instigator of Dzeliwe's appeal to the court.

The dismissal of Gabheni, like the earlier dismissals of Dzeliwe and former prime minister Prince Mabandla, is viewed as a sharp response by the Liqoqo to what it perceived as threats against its supremacy. Before his death in 1982, the late King Sobhuza II conferred increased authority on the Liqoqo and even authorized it "to overrule any law or decision in the national interest."

The Liqoqo tolerated Mabandla's "modernist" leanings for only a few months, and then replaced him with the more "traditional" Bhekimpi. Dzeliwe was less cooperative with the Liqoqo than its members had expected her to be. Dzeliwe, who is

childless, was kept on the defensive by the Liqoqo, which threatened to designate a Crown Prince at any time. That move would terminate Dzeliwe's regency and automatically replace her with the mother of the crown prince. When Dzeliwe finally responded by attempting to dissolve the Liqoqo, the council lashed back with the official selection of Makhosetive as Crown Prince and the consequent replacement of Dzeliwe by Makhosetive's mother, Ntombi LaDhwala.

After the royal reshuffle, it was rumored that a witchdoctor had tried to fly to Britain in order to poison Makhosetive at his prep school there. Observers believe that the rumors were intended to suggest that Dzeliwe or her chief supporter, Gabheni, sought to prevent Ntombi's accession to the regency.

When the replacement of Dzeliwe was first announced, Gabheni summoned a "meeting of the nation," a palaver to be held at Lobamba, the traditional seat of the royal family, but Prime Minister Bhekimpi declared the meeting illegal and forbade anyone to attend it.

Gabheni's public advocacy of Dzeliwe's cause put him into open conflict with the Liqoqo, and he was swiftly removed from the government. Although he was well-liked by the people and held a powerful post, equivalent to the minister of defense, even Gabheni was forced to accede to the will of the Liqoqo. The elections scheduled for late October will have little effect on that inner circle, where virtually all of Swaziland's important political decisions are made.

Zimbabwe

● Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Robert Mugabe has accused the British government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of "meddling" in the domestic affairs of Zimbabwe. At a press conference in Zimbabwe following his 19-day overseas tour to Ireland, Canada, and the United States, Mugabe accused the Thatcher government of pressuring those countries to demand the release of six white air force officers who had been detained in Zimbabwe after being acquitted by the High Court. Mugabe declared: "I am not happy at all to

run a government which Mrs. Thatcher feels she can manipulate."

During his overseas tour, Mugabe was constantly harassed by reporters demanding an explanation for the redetention of the airmen. At times he was visibly perturbed. "The criminal procedure which we inherited is a stupid ass," he shouted to reporters in Dublin. "Why is there so much concern about these men? Because they are Mrs. Thatcher's kith and kin."

Mugabe aroused such strong resentment that a British member of parliament warned, "Parliament will be very reluctant to vote aid to Zimbabwe after this." Mugabe countered by declaring that Zimbabwe was willing to forsake British aid if that is the price of maintaining its sovereignty. U.S. officials announced that they would reject any call to suspend aid to Zimbabwe.

In Harare, 2000 supporters of Mugabe's Zanu party protested the British interference. They carried signs saying: "British passport holders go home," and "Thatcher we want our airplanes back," a reference to the thirteen planes that the airmen are accused of destroying.

Two of the airmen were released as Mugabe embarked on his overseas trip, but it was announced in mid-September that the other three will remain in jail. A fourth airman is still being held without charges. (London *Guardian*, September 29, 1983; *International Herald Tribune*, September 26, 1983; *Kenya Weekly Review*, September 9, 1983; London *Times*, September 2, 1983.)

● In an effort to relax tensions in Matabeleland, the government has formed a commission to investigate allegations that the Fifth Brigade committed atrocities there earlier this year. The announcement followed an early September decision to redeploy the Brigade in the province after it had been withdrawn in July. The Zimbabwe government has claimed that the rebels in Matabeleland are no longer just a splinter group from Joshua Nkomo's Zipra army, but that they are now being supported by South Africa. (London *Times*, September 12, 1983; London *Guardian*, September 19, 1983.)

Aristides Pereira, President of Cape Verde

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

AFRICA REPORT: Mr. President, you came to the United States to address the United Nations General Assembly in your capacity as current president of the Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel [CILSS]. Could you describe the objectives of the organization and what has been accomplished since its formation in 1973? Could you also characterize the extent of the drought that is currently afflicting the Sahel?

PEREIRA: The Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel was founded 10 years ago. A prolonged drought began afflicting the Sahel in 1968 and 1969, and by 1972 to 1973, the situation had become more critical and alarming. It was at that time that the affected countries fortunately decided to unite in order to better coordinate their battle against this scourge. Initially, CILSS was envisioned as a means of awakening international public opinion to the extent of the problem and its consequences, and also as a means of channeling international aid for member countries, in order to enable them to confront the situation. One can say that to a certain extent our organization accomplished these tasks in the face of the persistence of the drought, which has become endemic in the Sahel since 1973. In Cape Verde, for example, we have had nearly 14 consecutive years of drought.

Therefore, in confronting this situation of endemic drought, the member countries have had to take into account past experiences and the results obtained thus far by CILSS.



President Aristides Pereira: "We place great importance on our relations with the United States"

Photo: Nobu Arakawa

We have found that it is a propitious time to change the statutes under which CILSS was formed, which were very limited, in order to transform it into more of an instrument of development for the member countries. Therefore, this course of action was decided upon last year during the summit of heads of state of the Sahel, which met in Praia. It was with that intention that a commission of experts was created and charged with undertaking an analysis of all of



Photo: U.S. AID

Food aid for the victims of the Sahel drought: "Our aim is to reach food self-sufficiency where it is possible"

CILSS' activities over the past 10 years in order to present suggestions and recommendations to the heads of state before they next meet in Niamey, Niger, in January. The intention of this exercise is to provide new dynamics to the activities of CILSS, an organization that has proven very useful and has achieved very positive results. In spite of errors and shortcomings in certain areas, the final balance sheet of the organization is a positive one. One must also take into account that over the past 10 years this group of eight countries has succeeded in creating a very favorable climate for cooperation. Because we are all suffering from the same scourge, we have been able to strengthen our unity. CILSS has fulfilled the mission for which it was created, and we are now seeking to give it new possibilities and a new spirit to confront the current situation in the Sahel, which has changed slightly.

AFRICA REPORT: One of the principal aims of CILSS is to achieve food self-sufficiency in order to avoid starvation during times of serious drought. Yet, it is said that, apart from Niger, all the Sahelian countries are actually less food self-sufficient today than in 1973, when CILSS was formed. Why is this so and what is CILSS doing to counter this negative trend?

PEREIRA: Our aim in this fight against the drought is to reach food self-sufficiency where it is possible. But in Cape Verde, for example, it has been demonstrated on a technical level that we do not have the capacity to attain food self-sufficiency; hence we are aiming for food security, which is

a bit different. Therefore, CILSS' two objectives are to achieve food self-sufficiency where possible and food security elsewhere. However, the other seven countries are continental, so there are projects to manage the rivers that flow through these countries, especially to increase irrigated land, given the rainfall. One way to surmount these difficulties is to maximize irrigation by making use of the rivers. It is for that reason that we have begun projects on the Niger, Senegal, Gambia, and Volta rivers. It appears that if the necessary finance is obtained for these projects, it will be possible for these countries to arrive at food self-sufficiency. We can also hope that the cycle of drought may change a bit for a few years, which would enable us to a certain extent to regain the levels of food production before 1963.

On the subject of food security, we have a project that has already been financed to a large degree, which envisions establishing stockpiles of food, particularly of cereals, in each Sahelian country, which would assure the population of several months' emergency food supplies in order to avoid what happened earlier because of the lack of such stocks. All the eight Sahelian countries are in the midst of working on this project, and we think that in this period we will be able to establish a network of silos for storage of the food that will enable us to maintain the stocks and hence food security.

AFRICA REPORT: Cape Verde recently announced its first five-year economic plan. Can you explain the aims and priority sectors of the plan? Where are you obtaining the finance necessary to implement this plan?

PEREIRA: To undertake this plan, we were obliged to count on international public assistance. It was for that reason that last year we organized a round table with our development partners, with whom we discussed all the projects envisaged in the plan. Our economic plan is financed nearly 90 percent by foreign aid. Although it might seem bizarre in our case, there is no doubt that the priority sector is agriculture, because in spite of everything, our population is almost 100 percent farmers, and it is not possible to transform them overnight into workers in another profession. Therefore, we must address ourselves first to agriculture. We believe that the future of our nation lies in the development of small industries, provision of services, and tourism. Therefore in the first period of the plan, we envisage the creation of many industries that can serve as the base upon which economic development can be built.

AFRICA REPORT: Cape Verde is among the least-developed countries in the world. You have acted as spokesman for the least-developed countries in international fora. What hopes do you have of achieving economic independence? How should the international community respond to the special needs of the least-developed countries?

PEREIRA: It is true that Cape Verde is among what are known as the least-developed countries. One of the greatest difficulties we have faced since independence has been the lack of infrastructure. Without infrastructure and without trained manpower, we believe, it is impossible to attain economic development. Therefore, all international aid has been directed first of all toward solving this problem of lack

of infrastructure, so that we can then attract financing for various projects. For example, when one speaks of infrastructure, one always means energy, water, telecommunications, ports, and air links, because without these minimum requirements we cannot begin to talk of development perspectives. We have rigorously applied and utilized all the aid granted to us to develop the necessary infrastructure and trained manpower. In these areas, we must rely on international aid. But we believe that because we are applying this aid to the creation of infrastructure and the formation of skilled manpower that will be able to take on administrative responsibilities, it is possible for us to arrive at a stage when we will be self-sufficient to a certain extent and will be able to avoid dependence on external aid. But during the current period, it will continue to be necessary for us to rely on international aid. Our outlook is not that favorable, but we are working in every way now to do what we can in providing the minimum up until that time when we can dispense with international aid altogether.

AFRICA REPORT: What kind of restructuring of the international economic system would you like to see?

PEREIRA: There is no doubt that the international system must be reviewed because the situation today is such that it is always the poor nations that suffer the most. The rich countries get richer each day and the poor nations, poorer. Therefore a just solution must be found. There are exchange rate problems; economic, monetary, and financial problems. We believe that by taking into account the problems and difficulties of the least-developed nations we will be able to find a global solution that will satisfy everyone, because one cannot conceive of growth in the industrialized countries without the development of the Third World.

AFRICA REPORT: In 1982, Cape Verde reestablished relations with Guinea-Bissau, which had been broken off after the 1980 coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau. But your two political parties remain apart, and plans for the unification of your two nations are no longer active. How are your relations with Guinea-Bissau, and what obstacles are standing in the way of unity? What are the ideological differences between your two parties, the PAIGC [African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde] and the PAICV [African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde]?


PEREIRA: We can say that our relations with Guinea-Bissau are correct on the state-to-state level, as we stated in the proclamation that established the PAICV. We are in the midst of negotiations to resolve pending economic problems, and we think that during this month we will find a solution to these difficulties. It is not the same thing concerning the relations between our two parties, however, although we have nothing against the party in Guinea-Bissau. But there is one basic problem, which for us carries a great deal of importance: Guinea-Bissau has organized its party in a way that does not conform to international norms. This is to say, the PAIGC is a party that carries the name of the foreign country without the agreement of that country. The PAIGC stands for Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. We do not understand that decision, and it is this problem that is hindering the normalization of relations at the party level. I

must say, however, that we have approached our Guinean brothers on this problem and we are seeking an understanding. We think it is a question of time and that the earlier they make a decision on this matter the sooner we will be able to normalize relations at the party level. On the question of ideology, both parties can be traced to the thinking of Amílcar Cabral. Therefore, in principle, at least theoretically, there are no great differences.

AFRICA REPORT: You have played an important role in the improvement of relations between Portugal and its former African colonies. Could you comment on your relations with Portugal and also on the role, within the African context, of the five former Portuguese colonies?

PEREIRA: We have excellent relations with Portugal, based on the ties that have linked our peoples for centuries. One can also say that our relations are based on mutual respect and cooperation. Concerning the five former Portuguese colonies in Africa, our relations are very special and specific, given the common struggle we waged against the Portuguese colonial system. We believe that taking into account all that we have experienced, we can provide an important contribution within the African context, for example, in terms of African solidarity and the possibilities for cooperation on all levels. But the current war situation in southern Africa is hindering the efforts we are trying to set in motion. We think that as soon as a climate of peace exists in southern Africa we will be able to create conditions for exemplary cooperation among our five nations.

AFRICA REPORT: Cape Verde is playing an important role in seeking a peaceful solution to the conflicts in southern Africa. You hosted a meeting between the Angolans and South Africans; you were involved in the establishment of diplomatic relations between Angola and Senegal; and you have played an active role in southern African diplomacy. What motivates your involvement in southern African issues, and what are your views on the situation there, specifically on South African destabilization of the region and the status of the negotiations for Namibia's independence?



PEREIRA: Our actions concerning southern Africa are related to our special relationship with the two large countries in this region — Angola and Mozambique. It is from this point of view that we are interested in what happens in this region, although we must admit that we are interested in everything that goes on in Africa. But there is no doubt that for us, our interest is that a climate of peace reign in this region. That is the fundamental factor that would enable our relations with Angola and Mozambique to develop normally. That is the principal element that has caused us to become involved, to contribute in one way or another, to restore peace in this region. We feel that it is a very difficult situation now, considering that there is a certain impasse in the negotiations between Angola and South Africa. But we believe that it is possible to find a solution to this problem. It is a question of continuing in a patient and effective manner in order to find the best way to lead those who are interested to direct contacts, because we are in favor of direct contacts. That is very important. But for us, it is a matter of time.

AFRICA REPORT: Why do you continue to allow South African Airways to land in Cape Verde?

PEREIRA: This is a problem that goes back to the beginning of our independence, because at that time decisions had already been made to boycott South African planes and ships. We analyzed the situation and found that we should not suspend the landing rights of South African planes. After independence, we realized that in our case it was very difficult to go ahead with sanctions, because we are islands and our communications with the exterior are very difficult. Therefore, we needed the airport. Because we didn't have

financial resources to maintain the airport, it had to maintain itself by providing service. Just two planes—TAP of Portugal and South African Airways—utilized the airport at that time. We tried to attract other airlines, but this was not possible. Our choices were to boycott South African Airways and to have to close the airport, or to keep the airport open. Anyone in our situation would choose the second.

We have had the opportunity to listen to our friends from the ANC [African National Congress], and they have understood our position. Therefore, within our government, we decided to continue to accept these planes, and it is something we have never hidden. We declared this publicly at the level of the OAU [Organization of African Unity], in spite of their decision to boycott. An OAU mission visited us to verify the conditions under which we authorized South African planes to land, and a subsequent OAU decision incorporated the Cape Verde government's decision, meaning that the OAU found that in our specific case it is normal that we not boycott South African planes. Given this OAU decision, and the ANC's agreement, we feel that we have taken all interests into account.

AFRICA REPORT: How would you characterize your relations, both political and economic, with the United States? How do you view the Reagan administration's policies toward southern Africa, specifically with regard to the negotiations for Namibia's independence?

PEREIRA: We consider our relations with the United States correct, as those between two nations that respect one another and wish to cooperate. One must also take into account the existence in the U.S. of a substantial community of people of Cape Verdian origin, which means that ties between the people of Cape Verde and the United States date back for centuries. Therefore, we place great importance on our relations with the U.S., and see the same concerns on behalf of the American leaders. This is also a positive factor that helps us to understand each other better. On the political level, our point of view is that in relations among friends, it is not absolutely necessary that we always agree. It is not possible for us to agree on everything, but we consider mutual respect essential. With respect to the U.S. administration's policies in southern Africa, we believe that the U.S. role is a very important one and could help a great deal in finding a solution to the situation. We believe that the U.S. has a great responsibility in this domain.

AFRICA REPORT: Could you comment on the subject of the discussions you will have with President Reagan? Are you satisfied with the current level of American aid to Cape Verde?

PEREIRA: There is no established agenda, but we feel that we will benefit from discussing those problems that currently preoccupy U.S. leaders. I am sure that we will discuss southern Africa. On the question of American aid, our philosophy has always been to wait for each to provide what he can, not to ask for what we really need. We very much appreciate the aid that we have thus far received from the U.S., but we must express our concern with the general tendency to decrease foreign aid. But we hope to find a solution at least for Cape Verde, so that the aid is not decreased. □



Photo: Y. Nagata/United Nations

Food being imported by Cape Verde: "We are working to do what we can until we can dispense with international aid altogether"

Assessing the Revolution

BY MATT MANN

Separatist wars, the threat of irredentist invasion, natural disaster, and falling agricultural production combine to provide a bleak economic outlook for Ethiopia, already one of the world's poorest nations. With its wars contained but far from won and the traumas of revolution and attempted counterrevolution behind it, Ethiopia is going through a period of relative normalcy in which its economic problems have become all the more apparent.

Facing these problems and, as current chairman of the Organization of African Unity, many others, is head of state Mengistu Haile Mariam. The short, trim, solemn, American-trained colonel rose to become top man in the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), or Dergue, during

Matt Mann is a British journalist who has traveled widely in East Africa.



A young woman at a rally to raise funds for Ethiopian soldiers fighting in the Ogaden: "Only isolated incidents are reported on the eastern front"

Photo: Cernepix

the years of the bloody ideological turnabout that followed the 1974 overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie.

Although the separatist wars in the vast Ethiopian hinterland are on a smaller scale than in the past, they still represent a drain on what would be at best a fragile economy. Western diplomats say that Mengistu faces increased activity by guerrillas in the northern provinces of Tigre and Eritrea.

The Eritrean war is the longest-running conflict in Africa, having begun in 1962 when Haile Selassie scrapped the regional autonomy enjoyed by the Red Sea province and incorporated it into the empire controlled from the central highland capital of Addis Ababa.

In 1977-78, the Eritrean guerrillas, who, like the Mengistu government, say they are Marxist, gained control of over 95 percent of the province. But with the aid of Soviet arms and advisers, they were pushed back and now control areas of the countryside and the mountain fortress of Nakfa, which has withstood a series of government assaults. Western experts estimate that 75 percent of the 250,000-strong army is taking part in Operation Red Star II, aimed at crushing the guerrillas in Eritrea and Tigre. But, they say, after initial success, the government troops' progress seems to have slowed, with the rebels, particularly those in Tigre, again becoming active as the rainy season nullifies the army's armor and air power.

On the eastern front bordering

Somalia, only isolated incidents are reported. Many of the 12,000 Cuban troops in Ethiopia are stationed around this ethnically Somali region, which the Mogadishu government has claimed as part of Greater Somalia. In 1977, Somalia took advantage of the postrevolution turmoil in Ethiopia to invade the arid Ogaden region but was eventually pushed back after a massive airlift of Soviet arms and Cuban troops. Somalia denies that its forces are involved in the cross-border clashes that still occur and maintains they are the work of anti-Ethiopian guerrillas, the Western Somali Liberation Front. Also active in the region are Ethiopian-backed Somali guerrillas fighting against the Mogadishu government under the banner of the Somali Salvation Front.

It was at the time of its wars against the Somalis and the Eritrean guerrillas in 1977-78 that the Addis Ababa government incurred much of the \$2 billion debt it now owes the Soviet Union for arms. This debt, which it is soon due to start paying, and the upkeep of the Cuban forces as well as that of its own standing army represent a huge burden to the world's sixth-poorest nation, with a per capita income of \$140 and a life expectancy of 40 years.

Already maintaining one of the largest standing armies in Africa, in May the government issued a decree requiring all Ethiopian citizens between the ages of 18 and 30 years to register for two years of military service. While some observers indicated that the measure might be indicative of the government's military difficulties with the guerrillas, others characterized the conscription decree as having more of a political motivation — a means of "mobilizing the masses."

In addition to the presence of Cuban troops, there are some 4,000 Soviet advisers, of whom about half are with the Ethiopian army, and a much smaller number of East Germans, who train the security services. The Soviet Union has the use of naval facilities on the Dahlak Islands in the Red Sea.

The human toll of Ethiopia's conflicts includes over one million refugees who fled to Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia, and thousands of orphans. Some of the orphans are housed in showpiece children's villages, which



the government proudly displays to foreign visitors. In Addis Ababa, the visitors will see the less lucky orphans begging in ragged groups on the streets or pathetically singing for small change at the windows of cars halted at traffic lights.

Northern Ethiopia was hit this year by a drought and famine, during which United Nations experts estimated that 50 to 100 children were dying daily. The government and relief agencies said three million people were affected, one million critically. The government took Western journalists to the drought areas in a bid to attract relief aid for the stricken Tigre, Eritrea, Gondar, and Wollo provinces. The drought was more serious than that of 1972-73, which was one of the principal causes of Emperor Haile Selassie's overthrow.

The Reagan administration increased its humanitarian aid to the drought-stricken areas after critics charged that such aid was being withheld because of the Ethiopian regime's Marxist stance and its close ties to the Soviet Union. In a statement made during an August trip to Ethiopia as head of a congressional delegation, Representative Howard Wolpe, the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, warned that thousands of Ethiopians faced "imminent death" unless there was "an immediate increase in the American and international relief assistance to Ethiopia." Yet relief efforts have been hampered by bad roads, lack of trucks, and the fact that antigovernment guerrillas control many of the affected areas.

To add to these economic and social woes, Western experts say that agricultural and industrial growth in Ethiopia is still falling after mass nationalizations and the creation of a socialist system of production. Production of coffee, the main earner of foreign exchange, has dropped by 34 percent in the last five years, and prospects for an improvement are not good. The experts say the crop collection system is inefficient, much of Ethiopia's agricultural techniques are primitive, and there has also been some resistance to collectivization, which has slowed work rates. Mengistu has made it clear that improved efficiency in agriculture is one of his government's main priorities.

Ethiopia is nearly three times the size of California. Its population is estimated at between 30 and 40 million — there has never been a census. It is Africa's oldest independent country and was never fully colonized by a European power. Italy ruled the country during 1936-41, forcing Haile Selassie into exile, until, with the support of the Allied forces, he was able to return to his throne and rule until 1974. Opposition to him coalesced as a result of the 1972-73 drought and famine. There was widespread agitation against the nobility and the Coptic church, which were the country's principal landowners, and in 1974, a military junta, the Dergue, seized power. The aged Haile Selassie died in detention in 1975.

The new rulers were enlisted men and officers from units all over the country. Soon after coming to power, they began to abolish the feudal system. Land reforms and nationalization of the banks, industries, businesses, and housing followed. Landlords were entitled to keep one of their houses and were required to give the rest to the government. The country was declared a socialist state with communism as its goal. As relations with the Soviet Union grew more cordial, those with the United States cooled. There were disagreements over compensation for expropriated American property. Washington suspended bilateral development assistance and opposed loans to Ethiopia from development banks.

The unity of the revolution splintered

when one faction, which included many Addis Ababa students and intellectuals, pressed for a return to civilian rule. When their demonstration failed, they began a campaign of assassination against government supporters. This campaign was known as the White Terror and was countered by the Red Terror, with the military rulers distributing 20,000 guns to newly formed urban residents' associations, or *kebeles*, and urging them to kill "counterrevolutionaries." From November 1977 to March 1978, the streets of the capital echoed with gunshots virtually every night. In the morning, bodies lay in the streets, often with signs pinned to them. It is estimated that 10,000 people died, most of them in Addis Ababa, before the Dergue eliminated all opposition and gained absolute power. In 1977, Mengistu emerged as head of state after reports of clashes within the Dergue, including gun fights.

This was a time of confusion and virtual societal upheaval. Thousands of political prisoners were taken and thousands more were recruited to fight in the Ogaden or Eritrea. Many of the prisoners and recruits never returned to their grieving families. To celebrate the revolution's ninth anniversary in September, 1,200 prisoners were released, of whom over 100 were said to be "political," yet hundreds more are still believed to be in prison.

These days, the streets of the sprawling capital are again quiet, and any expression of dissent is likely to be delivered sotto voce over a glass of beer by someone who trusts you absolutely. The *kebeles* have almost eliminated petty crime and have made the streets of Addis Ababa among the safest in Africa. Armed *kebele* guards enforce a midnight-to-5 A.M. curfew.

Superficially, the streets of Addis Ababa — it means "New Flower" in Amharic — are little changed apart from the huge billboard pictures of Marx, Engels, and Lenin in Revolution Square. It remains a beautiful city, with shanty towns and donkey-drawn carts side by side with modern buildings on the wide streets. Menelik II founded Addis Ababa in 1887 primarily, it is said, because of the health-giving spring water that arises from the earth.

This water can be sampled by visitors at the Coptic cross-shaped swimming pool at the Hilton Hotel.

However, society has had radical change imposed upon it by the regime. Just how far this change has permeated the hearts and minds of the people, especially in the remote rural areas, is difficult to say. Lack of education, communications, and, on the part of many people, lack of motivation, make it difficult to spread revolution evenly in such a vast and underdeveloped country. The primary means by which this is being attempted are the peasants' associations in the rural areas and the *kebeles* in the towns and cities.

Urban administration has been virtually handed over to the *kebeles*, which demonstrated their usefulness during the Red Terror. Each *kebele* — there are 289 in the capital — has its own court and volunteer police squad and is run by an executive committee. The benefits of the system to Ethiopia's urban dwellers are emphasized by officials, but the *kebeles* also give the gov-

ernment a tight hold on the country's towns and cities, the sources of any antigovernment sentiments. "It gives the government real grass-roots control. The *kebele* officials know everything that is going on in their neighborhoods," one Western diplomat said.

At the time of the Red Terror, there was what one observer described as "a good deal of amateur, freelance torture" in the *kebeles*, but today residents say the revolutionary squads are better disciplined. One typical *kebele* in a densely populated area of Addis Ababa near the university has a small health center, a classroom where people learn to read and write as part of the national literacy campaign, and a small library. There are usually armed, uniformed guards standing in the courtyard, and office walls are decorated with Marxist slogans, the hammer and sickle, and pictures of Soviet leaders and Colonel Mengistu. This *kebele* revolutionary squad has 125 members, who patrol the area in shifts. All are volunteers, working four shifts a month.



Col. Mengistu embracing Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, who arrived in Addis for this year's OAU summit

Anyone arrested is held in the squad office until he or she can appear before the people's court at the kebele, which deals with petty offenses and can pass jail sentences of up to three months and levy fines of up to \$150.

Although there are inevitable difficulties in the socialization of the economy, the government claims success in two areas in particular — the eradication of illiteracy and the improvement of the position of women. A massive national literacy campaign was launched in 1979 after it was discovered that 93 percent of the population was illiterate. Although the initial target was 1.3 million people, the government said 5.4 million turned up for classes, of whom nearly three-quarters were women. "Women have been neglected in the past. We are seeking to change men's attitudes so that women can receive the education that has been denied them," one official said.

Initially, 34,559 centers were set up with 241,887 teachers. The government's aim was to eradicate illiteracy within seven years, with aid from the East and West and from the United Nations. Officials said the education system is also being reorganized, because schools had been geographically maldistributed, with 90 percent of the population living in the rural areas but less than 50 percent of the schools in the countryside. The reforms were being carried out via kindergartens created within the peasants' associations and by doubling the number of teacher-training institutes in rural areas.

Although it is unlikely that the revolution changed the attitude of all Ethiopian men to their spouses, who were often treated as little more than chattel before 1974, there is evidence of widespread female participation in the kebeles and peasants' associations and their institutions. One woman, who runs a rural restaurant, told a Western reporter: "My life has completely changed. Before, women had to do as they were told. Now that is gone. I have my own business, and if anyone abuses me, I can go to the kebele and complain." The second congress of the Revolutionary Ethiopia Women's Association was held in August, attended by over 1,000 women from the regional, provincial, and district levels.

Col. Mengistu addressed the meeting and told the assembled delegates that much was expected from the organization "in raising the cultural status of women, changing their lives, and making them productive elements of society."

But these are limited successes, and Ethiopia's primary problem, as in many other African states, remains the abject poverty of many of its people. Like



Ethiopian soldiers parading in Addis Ababa: One of the largest standing armies in Africa

Photo: Camerapix

many other countries on the continent, it has been hit by rising oil prices and falling returns for its commodities. Ethiopia has the added burdens of falling commodity production and the immense cost, financial and human, of its wars. At present, there is no sign of moves by either government or guerrillas to end the fighting. Addis Ababa rulers, whether feudal or Marxist, seem determined to keep the empire together.

Although the Soviet Union is providing the military assistance to fight Ethiopia's wars, the country badly needs an increase in Western aid, which dropped off drastically after the revolution. At present, there seems little likelihood that such aid will be forthcoming in the near future. World Bank payments were blocked by angry industrialized members of the bank over the issue of compensation for private firms and assets of British, French, Dutch, Italian, American, and other nations, which were seized after 1974. A new program of World Bank aid depends on Washington's agreeing that

enough progress has been made on the compensation issue, but this has not yet occurred.

Last January, the military regime issued a joint venture project proclamation aimed at encouraging foreign and private investment, and there were reports of a limited revival of Western interest by private firms wishing to participate in the Ethiopian economy. However, it seems doubtful that such investment from the private sector would be sufficient to boost the economy significantly. For such a boost, rapid progress on the compensation issue and the implementation of a World Bank program seems the country's best bet.

Even if there are Western trade and aid inroads, it seems Ethiopia is far too committed to the Soviet bloc militarily and ideologically for there to be any drastic change in domestic or foreign policy. The next significant development in the revolution is expected to be the creation of a communist party, a move the Soviets have been encouraging for many years. The Commission to Organize a Party of Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE) was set up three years ago, and following visits to Moscow by COPWE delegations, it is hoped that a party will be formed by the end of this year.

Some Western observers said Mengistu had resisted Soviet pressure to form the party, being really much more interested in Ethiopian nationalism than communism. Others said he was biding his time so as to consolidate his position and then, as party head, he would distance himself further from his military colleagues of the Dergue and from any threat they might represent. At a June news conference, Mengistu said: "As soon as the party is formed, it is obvious it will take over the role of the party from the PMAC. This means that the PMAC will be governed by the party's principles, program, and leadership." The creation of the party will also further strengthen Soviet influence in Ethiopia. Western analysts believe that at this stage, even if Mengistu were to decide overnight to follow a capitalist path, the Soviet Union would be unlikely to let its investment in such a strategic piece of real estate slip away just like that. □

America's Ally in the Horn

BY GUY ARNOLD

The Soviet-Cuban presence in Ethiopia makes the Horn of Africa an inevitable focus of big-power politics. The Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean are elements in an East-West strategic confrontation, and the countries in the area, whatever they may wish to do, find themselves increasingly subject to manipulation by forces beyond their control. What happens to Ethiopia is the key to present Somali policies. There are other factors as well that complicate or limit Somalia's options still further. The presence of French troops in Djibouti, for example, has effectively taken that small country out of the five-point-star Somali jigsaw puzzle, at least for the time being. Growing American military support for the Sudanese army has also been dictated by events in Ethiopia and Libya, although the recent swing towards Islamism in Khartoum could foreshadow changes there that might alter the lineup of the entire region. The Horn is nothing if not volatile.

Thus the Somali government has to take into account two constantly changing sets of circumstances — the interests of the big powers, who are in the area for their own purposes, and the Ogadeni factor — the need for the Mogadishu government to demonstrate that it takes its refugee problems seri-

ously. Further, Somali policy has to be worked out against a background of underdevelopment — the country is listed by the UN as one of the 25 poorest nations in the world.

One of Somalia's top priorities is to bring about an increased American presence in the area, and much attention is therefore given to demonstrating the extent of the Ethiopian threat, playing naturally upon Washington's sensitivity to Soviet, Cuban, or Libyan activities. In more general terms, Somalia is also seeking Western economic aid.

In spite of its rhetoric, Somalia needs to end the confrontation with Ethiopia. To achieve this end, Mogadishu needs to be seen to have the backing of the United States; hence American aid and a "presence" have become indispensable aims of Somali policy. If there were no cold war in the area, and refugees in Somalia, what interest would the West and the United States in particular show in Somalia? According to one Somali minister, the U.S. hesitates too much, although just what it is supposed to do is less clear.

President Mohamed Siad Barre urgently needs a stable peace with Ethiopia. On the Ogaden question, Somalia has adopted a policy — that the refugees from the Ogaden are an autonomous people and Somalia must help them maintain their semi-independent status in relation to Addis Ababa — that lies midway between war to regain the territory and renunciation of its claims. This is a somewhat vague policy. In reality, there are 35 refugee camps and continuing border incidents, but few signs that the refugees will re-

turn to Ethiopia or that the present stalemate is about to be resolved.

The Ethiopian government faces plenty of internal troubles and Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam wishes to keep open the door to Western, especially American, business and aid. The possibility, however remote, that Mengistu may turn from his Moscow alignment is an important influence upon American attitudes toward the Horn. One result is an American avoidance of any total commitment to Mogadishu. But if a U.S.-Ethiopian accord is ever to materialize, it will be in the future — talks on compensation for U.S. assets have not borne fruit. Nonetheless, Western aid has ensured that many thousands of Ethiopians have survived the current drought, for which little or no help has been forthcoming from Eastern sources. At the same time, Ethiopia is struggling to pay for the



Guy Arnold, a British Journalist specializing in African and Third World affairs, just returned from a visit to Somalia.

several billion dollars' worth of arms it received from the Soviet Union at the time of the Ogaden war. Mengistu, indeed, is in such deep debt to the Soviets that at present there is little prospect of any change of policy on his part. But the fact that the West keeps the doors open in Addis does not please

fugees. Whatever the true figure, the refugees represent a formidable burden on the resources of the country. They are the reason for the substantial inputs of aid, and the government appears to regard them as a necessary lever for obtaining Western assistance. The West responds readily to disasters, but

comes to \$87 million, and the total cost of the refugee program provided through UNHCR is \$120 million. CARE, the U.S.-based voluntary agency, is currently responsible for food distribution and logistics for the camps and deals with over 100,000 tons of food a year.

The basic Western concern with the refugees may be humanitarian, but the size of the problem and the inputs required make this Western involvement a highly political one. The political dilemma facing Somalia at present is that both extremes in the refugee dilemma have to be discounted — Mogadishu is unable to renew the war in the Ogaden in order to achieve "Greater Somalia," nor can the government afford to renounce its claims. So the stalemate represented by the refugee camps along the border areas continues.

With regard to the United States, Somali policy is clear — to maximize U.S. support and involvement in the area so as to strengthen the Somali position in relation to Ethiopia. American policy is somewhat more opaque — a cautious increase in support for Somalia, but with an eye fixed warily upon Addis Ababa. The United States would undoubtedly like to regain the position it once held in Ethiopia, whose large population and strategic location near the Red Sea and Sudan is seen as far more important than Somalia's assets, despite the latter's huge coastline on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Thus, while supporting Somalia, the United States wants to leave doors open to possible reconciliation with Mengistu should the Moscow relationship sour. In the context of the Horn, that is certainly a possibility.

Currently, the U.S. is rehabilitating the port facilities at Berbera, and there are a small number — estimated at 40 — of military advisory personnel in the country. American policy has three aspects: first, to develop in the country a presence that is neither too large nor obtrusive; second, to encourage other Western powers to become more involved in Somalia, principally as aid donors; and third, to reactivate Berbera as a potential base for the Gulf area. However, the Somalis would prefer to see a more forward U.S. policy than this.



Photo: Somalia Info

President Siad Barre: He "appears to have achieved and maintained a remarkable level of stability for his country"

Mogadishu. And though the Somalis argue that Ethiopia may precipitate a new wave of refugees at any time, this event appears unlikely, especially during a year when Mengistu is chairman of the OAU.

Of key importance in analyzing Somali foreign policy is the refugee situation. The officially accepted figure is 700,000, but as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) admits, this is a figure "of negotiation." Most aid agencies say privately that there are currently no more than 500,000 to 550,000 re-

five or six years after the event, it becomes far more difficult to persuade Western donors and relief agencies that a semipermanent static population of refugees is as much in need of food and other assistance now as it was immediately after the Ogaden war.

In March of this year, the government defined its priorities with respect to the refugees — first, voluntary repatriation, and second, settlement in Somalia — but at present, no repatriation of refugees to Ethiopia is taking place. The cost of the refugee program is formidable. The annual food bill

Even so, the United States has substantially increased its aid to Somalia over the last few years, in the areas of agriculture, health, water, management, port rehabilitation, commodity support for timber, and major refugee assistance. As of September, there was \$120 million worth of ongoing U.S. aid projects in the country, the main emphasis of which is improving food production. The U.S. is currently providing food aid for the refugees at an annual amount of 25,000 tons and is contributing about 48 percent of the total \$16 million UNHCR budget. The \$50 million nonrefugee aid program is scheduled to rise to \$70 million in 1984. Part of this aid — about \$18 million this year — is aimed at promoting business activities (i.e., the supply of dollars for Somali shillings), with 60 percent going to the private sector and 40 percent to the public sector.

Western aid commitments to Somalia have grown rapidly over the past two or three years. The West Germans are now major aid donors, as are the Italians and the European Economic Community (EEC), the Chinese, the

Saudis, and other Gulf states. Aid now plays a central role in development and foreign policy. The Somali gross national product, estimated at about \$1 billion in real terms, is one of the lowest in Africa. The annual flow of aid has now reached \$400 million, the equivalent of 40 percent of GNP. Refugees alone absorb \$120 million.

Such a high level of aid is bound to distort so small an economy and is also likely to induce attitudes to development where consumption and "growth" become habits unsupported by an equal internal capacity to produce. Western donors tend to treat Somalia as though it were an underfinanced enterprise that could be put back on its feet by injections of capital. This policy ignores the country's lack of infrastructure and absorptive capacity for aid on such a scale. In the long run, the results could be disastrous.

A high-powered Somali delegation attended the Washington IMF-World Bank talks this September, and the word in official banking circles is that Somalia has impressed officials with its record of meeting obligations. No

doubt this approval is the prelude to further loans and therefore larger debts.

Somalia's 1982-86 development plan is based upon the expectation of attracting 80 percent of its investment from outside. This growing aid dependence is sucking Somalia ever deeper into the Western economic system; whether it is doing much to solve the country's development problems is another question. Lack of skilled manpower, low salaries and consequent absence of incentive, inadequate infrastructure, and limited absorptive ability must raise many doubts about the wisdom of the present Western rush to supply massive economic assistance.

The proposed Bardera dam focuses attention upon the validity of policies that provide large-scale aid for minuscule economies. If it goes ahead, the dam will cost an estimated \$630-\$800 million, and that figure could escalate substantially before the project's completion. Even if the dam is completed, Somalia will face a heavy burden of debts. And arguably a greater restraint than the debts will be Somalia's likely long-term dependence upon expatriate



Western Somali Liberation Front training camp near Jigjiga, Ethiopia: "The Somali government cannot afford to renounce its claim to the Ogaden"

Photo: Camerapix

skills to maintain the agricultural developments the dam is designed to promote.

The state of the Somali economy is difficult to assess — there are almost no statistics, and those that exist tend to contradict each other. Although profits may be taxed up to 80-90 percent, emphasis on the private sector has increased in recent years, no doubt as part

incentives to widespread moonlighting activities. The few major industrial enterprises or projects, such as the Juba sugar plantation, are government controlled. There is, however, no policy of protection for home industries. The most well-off members of the community are first those in private business — a limited group — and then the nomadic cattle herders. Livestock exports,

since a scare of rinderpest threatened to interrupt exports of cattle to Saudi Arabia, the principal market for Somalia's most valuable export. Saudi Arabia is now a major source of Somalia's aid.

Recently a friendly Arab state delivered 15 Hawker Hunters to Somalia to boost its air force capacity, but as yet they have neither spare parts (which may be obtained only with a license from Britain) nor pilots qualified to fly the plane. There are perhaps 100,000 Somalis working in the Gulf, and as in the case of Sudan they represent a drain of skilled manpower the country can ill afford to lose but also a source of hard currency from the remittances home. At present a small number of Egyptian military personnel are in Somalia, responsible for training Somalis in the use of SAM missiles.

The departed Russians are little mourned. Whatever they may have done to assist development, they seem to have left behind a legacy of unpleasantness. There are currently seven Soviet diplomats in Mogadishu with an equal number of Somalis in Moscow. When the Russians were still in the country, the undercover joke — a play on the KGB — was *Kindly Go Back*; today the new joke about the Americans — a play on the CIA — is *Come In Again*.

The Somalia government would like, and certainly needs to have, a lasting peace with Ethiopia, if only for reasons of economic survival. Its chances of achieving peace depend upon a Western presence in the area and Western aid for the economy. This accounts for Mogadishu's urgent wooing of the United States. Barre may not be a popular leader, yet despite his miscalculations in the Ogaden war, he appears to have achieved and maintained a remarkable level of stability for his country. Western interest in Somalia would be low indeed — the country has no mineral or other resources of value to Western business — were it not for its strategic position and the fact that in recent years big-power politics have returned to the Horn with a vengeance. Sad to say, Somalia is playing upon this aspect of international affairs, which offers it the best hope of economic or other assistance. □



Photo: Anid Vellan/UNICEF

Refugees from Ethiopia in Somalia's Hiran region: A formidable burden upon the country's resources

of a calculated appeal to the West. And though Western indicators rank Somalia very low on the per capita basis of wealth, signs in Mogadishu belie such economic assessments. There are growing numbers of video shops in a country that will introduce television only this October. Mogadishu is witnessing a building boom, and a house may rent for \$1000 or more a month, no doubt as a direct result of the recent increase in the number of foreigners looking for accommodation.

In the formal sector, the majority of people work for the government, receiving low salaries that appear to act as

which go mainly to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, account for most of the country's foreign exchange earnings. The nomads, who compose 60 percent of the population, provide 80 percent of Somalia's exports, upon which the rest of the economy depends. Imports of rice and wheat reflect the changing tastes that come with increased prosperity.

The Gulf and Saudi Arabia in particular have become of increasing economic importance to Somalia. President Barre visited Saudi Arabia in September, accompanied by the minister of livestock, which had special signifi-

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A Tilt to the West?

BY ARTHUR GAVSHON

Just 27 months after France Albert René ousted playboy James Mancham from the presidency of the Seychelles in mid-1977, he stood before the sixth summit conference of the Nonaligned Movement in Havana, Cuba, with nearly 100 heads of government among his listeners. The handsome, 49-year-old René recounted how, during the Cuban missile crisis, as a law student, he was among thousands demonstrating in London's streets, chanting: "Kennedy — No! Castro —



President Albert René: From fiery rhetoric to a mellow worldview

Acclaim greeted his fiery rhetoric, not least from Fidel Castro in the chairman's seat.

Much has happened since that September in Havana to mellow the world view of the man who leads the 70,000 Seychellois. The position of his government on the far left flank of the Nonaligned Movement worried key Western nations as well as political foes in exile or still at home. For although the Seychelles group, comprising 92 islands, is a minor state, it controls 500,000 square miles of seabed resources in the Indian Ocean. At a time of high East-West global tension, the political stances of big and small countries alike in the Indian Ocean are of considerable significance to the superpowers, both American and Soviet.

The Seychelles, an island-republic within the Commonwealth, is strategically located astride the vital oil routes between the Persian Gulf and the Cape of Good Hope, 1,000 miles away. It is 700 air miles from Diego Garcia, where some of the U.S.' nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed warships refuel, refit,

Arthur Gavshon is a British writer based in London who has traveled extensively in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the United States. He worked for many years as diplomatic correspondent for the Associated Press in London, Washington, and most European capitals. He is author of *The Last Days of Dag Hammarskjöld* and *Crisis in Africa*, and is currently co-authoring a book about an aspect of the Falklands war. He last visited the Seychelles in 1983.

Sí! Cuba — Sí!" He continued: "Today, 17 years later, I am proud to state here in free and socialist Cuba: Imperialism — No! Castro — Sí! Cuba — Sí! Nonalignment — Sí!"

It was a heady occasion and René rose to it with denunciations of capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, and "those fence-sitting states" that preferred "stagnant neutrality" to the revolutionary aims of true nonalignment.

and resupply. Nearby South Africa displayed equal concern when René, with his commitment to socialism, ousted the collaborationist Mancham. Among other privileges, the South Africans lost staging facilities on the islands for their air services to the Far East.

It was no surprise then that the government in Victoria became a target of attack by foreign conspirators backed, in some instances, by states like South Africa who sought either privileged access to the islands themselves or facilities to exploit their fishing and suspected offshore oil and other seabed resources. In late 1981, a mercenary band from South Africa, equipped with arms from the national defense forces, tried but failed to topple René's government. There were charges at the time that elements within the Kenyan government were privy to the expedition. Then in August 1982 a mutiny within the Seychelles army was put down with the help of Tanzanian troops who had been introduced to help sustain René's regime. In between there had been a succession of arson and bombing attempts against the government.

The side effect of these incidents was the destabilization of the economy of the Seychelles, the motor of which is tourism. Because of the instability, the 1979 peak of 78,000 tourists slumped to 47,000 in 1982, reducing hotel occupancy to 38 percent. Because of the political uncertainties, foreign investment also lagged.

Despite these setbacks, René's government pressed ahead with its social program. A state-run health service was set up, surpassing most others in the Third World. An education program has raised the literacy rate from under 40 percent to around 60 percent in six years. Schooling is free for nine years, up to age 14. From then, youngsters can enroll for two years of secondary schooling within the National Youth Service, during which, according to Education and Information Minister James Michel, they can qualify for further education at polytechnics or universities abroad. Wage levels have been raised by between 50 and 100 percent since 1977, giving the Seychellois one of the highest standards of living in all of Africa, with an average annual


per capita income of around \$1,300. This strain on public funds has had to be paid for not only by increased income and other taxes, but also by international borrowing from institutions like the International Monetary Fund, which depend on Western finance.

Against this background, the government has had to reappraise its policies and, in fact, to modify its stance in the international arena, although no one seems prepared to openly acknowledge this reality. A newfound pragmatism seems to run through the policies of the René government. Its votes and actions in the United Nations and elsewhere are focusing more on the interests of the country than on the impulse to play a frontline role. Offers of cooperation and aid are examined for their relevance to the nation's needs, whether the offers come from East or West. If politically inhibiting conditions are attached, the offers are rejected.

These factors seemed to be reflected

in René's speech before the latest summit conference of the Nonaligned Movement in New Delhi in March. His rhetoric of Havana 1979 had vanished. The Seychelles leader focused instead on the need for regional cooperation. He urged the reallocation of some defense spending for development projects. He called for the formation of an Indian Ocean alliance whose members would cooperate to conserve the natural resources and wildlife of the region. Environmental protection, he said, was an economic factor that had to be considered for its relationship with the depletion, restoration, and increase of marine, agricultural, and mining resources. The contrast between the René of 1979 and the René of 1982 was striking.

Fellow leaders who attended the New Delhi summit pondered the Seychellois president's changed emphasis. Had the socialist government shifted somewhat from its previous identification with the Eastern bloc?



Was it tilting toward the West? Or was it merely attempting to strike a better balance between the two sides, thus propelling the Seychelles away from the far left toward the middle ground of the Nonaligned Movement?

The answer lay, perhaps, not in the words, but in the actual deeds of René and his government. They told the story, although interpretations of their significance vary. Among the recent moves was René's reorganization of his cabinet early this year. One key change was the supplanting of Jacques Hodoul by Dr. Maxim Ferrari in the post of foreign minister. Hodoul was what some writers in the Western media would label as a "hardline leftist." Ferrari, older and more conciliatory, is a gynecologist-turned-politician who once confessed that the women of the island had taught him the meaning of true humanity.

Secondly, while the November 1981 shootout with mercenary gunmen from South Africa was still going on, René called on French President François Mitterrand for help. By dawn the next day, November 26, three French frigates had entered Seychellois waters. So began a new program of French social, economic, and military aid for the Indian Ocean republic. And, as a consequence, an informal understanding has emerged by which France can be counted upon to help the Seychelles defend itself against any external attacker. The arrangement also provides for French training, equipping, and advising of the Seychelles' air, land, and sea forces. As Defense Minister Ogilvy Berlouis related, none of this was accidental, for the French originally settled the islands in the eighteenth century and were there for 40 years before the British threw them out 160 years ago. The Creole spoken by the islanders is French-based.

The British looked on open-mouthed at the unique spectacle of a Commonwealth country turning to France for military help and succeeding in obtaining it. But the British need not have been surprised. As both Michel and Berlouis related, the British under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher were first approached for military help and arms, but displayed little interest in the advances of a socialist regime.

Thirdly, at the United Nations, the Seychellois ambassador, Giovinella Gonthier, was ordered to soften her government's anti-Western posture



The Texas-based oil giant Amoco has been awarded exclusive rights to search for oil in Seychellois waters until 1984

when important issues requiring votes arose. Until mid-1982, the Seychelles' record of anti-Western votes rated alongside that of the Soviet Union. One example of the order to ease up came when Gonthier, despite her government's commitment to oppose all forms of colonialism, abstained on the issue of Britain resuming talks with Argentina over the disputed future of the Falkland Islands.

Gonthier has also recently been ambassador to the U.S. government as ambassador, reciprocating for the installation of David Fischer as the first resident American ambassador in Victoria. Fischer, a career diplomat, previously had served as ambassador in Poland and Tanzania, testifying to the importance with which Washington is now viewing its relationship with the Seychelles. At the same time, another

diplomat, Danielle St. Jorre, was accredited as high commissioner to Britain, elevating the Seychelles mission from consulate-general status to that of a full-blown embassy. The Seychelles is now represented at ambassadorial level in Washington, London, and Paris, but not in Moscow or Beijing.

Picking up the signals, the Reagan administration arranged an allocation of \$60,000 for the training of a few Seychellois army officers in 1983. President René accepted the offer. It was seen as a way of balancing the training the Seychellois have had from countries of the Eastern bloc.

The U.S. and British governments have negotiated new arrangements that are expected to allow their Indian Ocean warships to visit the paradise islands for rest, recreation, and resupply. No such visits have taken place since about 1979, because the two Western powers had refused on security grounds to fulfill a Seychellois requirement to declare that they carry no nuclear weapons. René's government does not permit nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed vessels to enter its waters. Under a new formula, the Americans and British would not be asked formally to declare whether each incoming ship carries nuclear arms. The effect of this will be to permit thousands of their servicemen to visit and dally in one of the world's most congenial settings, injecting millions of scarce dollars into the economy.

The Texas-based oil giant Amoco has been awarded special and exclusive rights to expand its search for oil in Seychellois waters until 1984. At that point, Amoco will have another year in which to decide where to drill and then it will have first choice of about 25 out of 90 blocks that are to be offered for tender. Amoco thus far has spent more than \$60 million on a variety of surveys and drillings, anticipating that a big bonanza may lie ahead along the western section of the continental shelf.

In another development, the British Broadcasting Corporation has been given the right to set up a relay station in the islands so as to enable it to transmit its news more effectively to the countries of Africa. The move could assume controversial overtones if BBC trans-

missions were to conflict in tone and content with the policies of the Seychelles, or if some Eastern bloc country were to request similar facilities. The United States already maintains a satellite-tracking station on the island of Mahé at an annual rental and offset cost of \$4.5 million — a rental soon to be renegotiated.

All these arrangements seen together may suggest a marked shift by the Seychelles toward the West, not only functionally but politically. They could in some respects be interpreted as prejudicial to the country's proclaimed adherence to a policy of positive non-alignment. But few of René's ministers, nor the president himself, see things that way.

Minister of Education and Information Michel, who is also army chief of staff, emphasized that the Seychelles remains loyal to the principles and policies of the Nonaligned Movement. "We do not support any military bloc," he said. "We are still fighting for demilitarization and peace, we are for a new world economic order and the strengthening of South-South cooperation."

He was asked if the modified Seychelles voting pattern in the United Nations signified a tilt away from the East toward the West, or was merely a display of greater pragmatism. "Our vote in all international organizations conforms with the same preoccupations of other developing countries," he replied. "I don't think there has been any shift in our voting pattern from one bloc to another. It is true, however, that we have not lately been in the frontline on certain specific issues as in the past. It may be greater pragmatism, but in no way does it mean that we are renouncing our principles or adherence to nonalignment."

Answering a question related to military cooperation with foreign countries, including the United States, and to the possibility of American and British naval visits to the islands, Michel made the following points: First, Seychelles welcomes unconditional aid from all countries ready to help in its national development. "If it's offered to get us to do something against our interests, then we don't want it," he added. Secondly,

Seychelles will accept military aid to strengthen its defenses against foreign attack, provided no conditions are attached. Third, on facilities for foreign warships, the Seychelles takes the general view that the Indian Ocean ought to be demilitarized and declared a zone of peace. But because this has not yet happened, certain rules have been laid down regulating the visits of foreign warships and these apply equally to all countries.

In response to another question, Michel listed 12 countries that have contributed most to the development of the Seychelles since 1977 in the order of the volume of help they have provided: France, Britain, Algeria, India, the United States, Libya, West Germany, North Korea, the Soviet Union, China, Australia, and Japan.

There appears to be little doubt that René's government has modified its policies and posture in the past two or three years. Without compromising its adherence to the principles of nonalignment, leaders of the Indian Ocean republic have patently introduced an element of better balance into their relationship with the West. But the shift did not take place in a vacuum. It was at least in part a response to a less hostile attitude displayed by several

major Western powers, including the United States and Britain.

René's initial extremist demeanor may well have been his way of dealing with what he took to be the antagonism of some countries he had expected or hoped would be friendly. Britain was one. Seychelles ministers turned first to Britain for defensive weaponry before going to the French, but report that they were given the cold shoulder.

Again, some of René's ministers have claimed privately that they know for sure — and indeed have proof to show — that the Central Intelligence Agency was actively implicated in the abortive mercenary attempt to overthrow their government in 1981. They also maintain that they have evidence pointing to other CIA activities, in cooperation with South African authorities, to destabilize their socialist experiment. And this, they argue, explains why they felt compelled to seek shelter under the umbrella of any country ready to provide protection, including the Eastern bloc. Their newfound flexibility expressed in a shift toward the center of the Nonaligned Movement could therefore be the result of lessened Western hostility rather than greater disenchantment with the East. □



National Youth Service members at a school library: The literacy rate has gone from 40 to 60 percent in six years

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
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Léopold Sédar Senghor, Former President of Senegal

INTERVIEWED BY STEPHEN H. GRANT

When he voluntarily stepped down from the Senegalese presidency in 1980, Léopold Sédar Senghor did not retire. He decided to devote the rest of his life to improving the dialogue between cultures. At 77, Senghor cuts an impressive figure. He rises at 6 a.m. and performs a half-hour of physical exercise. He writes from 8 a.m. to noon, and in the afternoons he receives visitors. In his villa in Dakar, he responded to questions put to him by Africa Report correspondent Stephen H. Grant.

AFRICA REPORT: It is said, Mr. President, that you do not miss being in power; you prepare lectures, you write, you travel extensively. One can imagine that relieved of many constraints, you are occupied with projects that you had placed on the back burner during your presidency. Is this an accurate portrait?

SENGHOR: Your portrait is indeed an accurate one. After my studies at the Sorbonne and after receiving my doctorate in grammar in 1935, I succeeded in being appointed to teach in France rather than in Senegal, precisely to avoid getting involved in politics. I was very ambitious, but not to enter the political arena. My greatest ambition from 1935 to 1945 was to become a professor in black African languages and civilization at the Collège de France. In order to do that, I had to obtain a "state doctorate." Consequently, I returned to Senegal in 1945 during my vacation to gather data for my thesis, the subject of which was Sérère folk poetry.

A foreign service officer with the United States Agency for International Development, Stephen H. Grant has lived most of the last 20 years in West Africa. He is currently serving with AID in Cairo. The views expressed in this interview do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. State Department.



Photo: Papa Diaw

Former President Léopold Senghor: "I have returned happily to my vocation of professor and writer"

My trip happened to coincide with an election campaign for the French constituent assembly, the creation of which had been decreed by General de Gaulle. The Socialist Federation party in Senegal pursued me for a month, insisting that I become its candidate. I finally gave in. In a 1946 interview later published in *Liberté II*, I stated my goal—to obtain for Senegal independence from France without sacrificing friendship. And I was the first one to obtain inde-

Senghor
à l'académie française

UN HONNEUR POUR LE PEUPLE NOIR

Nous consacrons aujourd'hui un dossier à Senghor, qui vient d'être élu membre de l'Académie Française. C'est en effet un événement important, non seulement pour l'Afrique mais aussi pour le peuple noir tout entier, consacrant pour la première fois l'admission d'un Nègre sous la coupole, institution créée en 1635 par Louis XIII pour défendre la langue française.



Photo: Papa Diaw

Abidjan newspaper headline: Senghor's election to the French Academy was an "honor bestowed on black Africa"

pendence from de Gaulle. So, in 1960 I was elected the first president of the Republic of Senegal. As early as 1962 I had made a pact with my wife not to become a candidate for reelection in 1965. But in 1962 my prime minister, Mamadou Dia, attempted a coup d'état. It was only in 1970 that I found someone else capable of becoming a prime minister and eventually my successor. In 1978 I resolved not to accept reelection, but Senegal was going through an absolutely devastating drought, so I remained. Finally, in 1980, I could leave. So now, I have returned happily to my vocation, that of a professor and writer.

I am writing an essay that will be entitled "From Negritude to Universal Civilization." Next I plan to write an essay on Maurice Béjart and the Dance. Finally, I intend to write a new collection of poems, which I will entitle *October Poems*.

AFRICA REPORT: You have recently been elected to the French Academy, a high honor by which France has recognized your personal merit. Through it, you as well the African continent and black Francophone literature are honored. What contribution do you hope to make to this institution?

SENGHOR: First, how should one interpret my election? My enemies—for I have some—were the first to carp, spreading the word that this election confirmed that I was more French than black! However, the French press focused more on the negritude aspect than on the Francophone aspect. An article written about me by a poet, by the way, in the major French rightist newspaper, *Le Figaro*, was enti-

tled "The Poet of Negritude." In the major leftist paper, *Le Monde*, the article bore the title "Negritude on Top." Africans reacted to the election in the same way. The telegrams I received from heads of state, in particular from those of Ivory Coast, Morocco, Mali, Comoros, and Zaire, all point out the honor bestowed on black Africa.

What do I intend to do as a member of the French Academy? I am going to work on what I call the "crossbreeding" of the French language. As a result of colonization in each Francophone territory, be it Quebec, Senegal, or Madagascar, we invented new words and new expressions with which to enrich the French language. That is why I hope to introduce into the French Academy's dictionary words like "negritude" and expressions that developed as Senegalisms, Ivorianisms, Canadianisms, etc. A few years ago we published a lexicon of Senegalese French. The words and expressions we invented are more concrete, more vivid, more symbolic. The French language is a language of logic and precision, but also a language with images. I consider English poetry, both British and American, some of the greatest in the world. Compared to French, the language of abstraction, English and German are concrete languages built on and built for their vividness. This is the personality that I hope the French language can adopt, to add to its own genius, so that the result will constitute a cultural symbiosis among Europe, Africa, and Asia.

AFRICA REPORT: You have said that the greatest civilizations are "crossbred." Can you provide concrete examples of what you mean by this term?

SENGHOR: I always say that if you clearly define a problem, you have half solved it. In the 1930s, after my studies at the Sorbonne, I decided to take courses at the Paris Institute of Ethnology and Miss Homburger's courses at the Practical School of Advanced Social Studies, where she held a chair in the Department of Black African Languages. At the Ethnology Institute, the professor who impressed me the most was Paul Rivet, who really founded French anthropology. Rivet was a very cultivated person. He would point to a map of the Mediterranean and say, "It is at this latitude all around the earth where the greatest civilizations flourished. Here developed crossbreeding of whites and blacks from the Strait of Gibraltar to East India and the crossbreeding of black and yellow peoples from Burma to Japan and beyond."

The first civilization and the first writings developed in Egypt and Sumer. And it is reported that Egyptians and Sumerians were more black than white. In the second book of his *History*, Herodotus writes that Egyptians have black skin and tightly coiled hair. Today, reputed biologists such as Jean Bernard and Jacques Ruffié are saying much the same. Neither skin color nor scalp shape, one must understand, is an indication of the degree of crossbreeding. The determining factor is the frequency table of blood groups. Today, Egyptians and Senegalese are only one or two points different in their blood group frequency. And the Senegalese are often considered model blacks: they are tall, with an average height of 1 meter, 76 centimeters [5'-9"], like Americans, and they are very black. As my professor Paul Rivet used to explain, all those civilizations—Egyptian,

Sumerian, Latin, Greek, Arabic, Indian, Aztec, and Mayan—are on the latitude of the Mediterranean and all have crossbred.

In the twentieth century, the United States represents a model of both biological and cultural crossbreeding. The American people are a crossbreeding of Europeans (Teutons, Latins, Slavs, etc.), black Africans, and Amer-Indians. You know what blacks have contributed to American civilization in the fields of dance, poetry, and song. I remember a talent show when I was a student in Paris where everyone performed something from his culture. The American students sang spirituals, which just astounded us. At any rate, together what have North America and Europe (which I call Eur-America) brought to the universal civilization? They have brought a genius for organization and for methodicalness, especially in the fields of science and technology. Not that I agree with the Americans in their political stance or economic policies; for instance, the United States is criticized for having brought about the failure of the last meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development through its intransigence. Nevertheless, I have always said that in culture, the United States is a model, for it accepts its biological and cultural crossbreeding.

Compared to those fertile contributions that Eur-America has brought to be assimilated by the Third World, what do we bring? We bring, among other things, black aesthetics. Interestingly enough, these black aesthetics were introduced by the French into Eur-American civilization in the twentieth century. This introduction took place after what I call "the Revolution of 1889." This year was marked in France by three literary milestones: Henri Bergson's essay "Time and Free Will; Paul Claudel's first play, *Golden Head*; and Arthur Rimbaud's *Season In Hell*, where he defines a new aesthetic, which was introduced at the School of Paris.


I remember when Pablo Picasso accompanied me to the door and looking me straight in the eyes said, "You should keep on being savages!" The black African aesthetic put its stamp on German expressionism. And if you are interested in the influence of black art on surrealist poetry, I suggest you read the book *The Black Model*, by Jean-Claude Blanchère, a French professor at the University of Dakar.

Or take the Japanese. The reason they constitute a model in a wide variety of endeavors is that they represent a balanced crossbreeding of three cultures. The first inhabitants of Japan were blacks who migrated from Melanesia. They spoke an agglutinative language similar to African languages. Then the white Ainus came from the north; yellow-skinned people arrived only in third place. When I was received into the Rouen Academy, I delivered an address on the "lessons from Japan." I explained that Japan had taught the whole world lessons, first of all in economy and finance, but also in the cultural field owing to its biological and cultural crossbreeding.

Let me give you some other examples of what I mean by biological and cultural crossbreeding. In the fifth century B.C., the Greeks took the torch of civilization from the hands of the Egyptians. Who were the Greeks who had gone to Egypt to study? My compatriot Cheik Anta Diop tells us

that the philosophers Plato and Pythagoras, the scientist Thales, the mathematician Eudoxus, and the father of history, Herodotus, all studied in Egypt, in an Egypt where the population was black.

Even today, the frequency table of blood groups for Greece, unlike that of any other European country, presents distinct similarities to the frequency table of blood groups



The Senghor residence: "We are creating a new architecture, of which my house is a model"


for Africa, where the major blood group is "O." In Europe, in general, group "A" is predominant.

If I had the time, I would prove to you that the choral odes and stage dances of ancient Greek theater, which come from the Eleusinian Mysteries, in reality have their origins in the worship of Osiris, which was carried out in Egypt through processions with choral and choreographed accompaniment.

Let's move on to France. The French are composed, first, of pre-Indo-Europeans. Before the arrival of the Hellenic Europeans, the stock was Negroid (the Grimaldi family in Monaco is an example). The French are made up of Mediterranean Negroids, Celts, and Teutons. The French government today officially recognizes the French culture as being a result of crossbreeding. You will see this statement in the report published in 1963 by the French minister Jeanneney. In this report, French culture is defined as a symbiotic force that has exposed itself to fertile contributions from foreign civilizations in order to form a new culture, the principal characteristic of which is a creative force.

Finally, I come to my own country, Senegal. Since independence in 1960, we have made every effort to create a new literature—using the French language, I admit—a new plastic art, a new dance form, and a new music. In 1980 to 1981, you will recall the success of an exhibition of contemporary Senegalese art that traveled to many major American cities. My election to the French Academy is, in part, recognition of the fact that we are creating a new literature. The Mudra Dance School is helping us develop a new

dance form. The director of the dance school is Maurice Bédjart, whose father, Gaston Berger, was a crossbreed of French and Senegalese origin. Bédjart is redefining classical ballet by concentrating on its Asian and African influences. We are creating a new architecture, of which my house is a model. This architecture is marked by asymmetric parallelisms. My eldest son, Francis, is helping us to create a



A selection of Léopold Senghor's books: "I have always accorded a higher priority to culture than to politics"

Photo: Papa Dial

new music. After studying at the Berkeley College of Music in Boston, he returned to Senegal and over a 10-year period composed 20 orchestral works. Those are a few examples of cultural crossbreeding. I wrote an article entitled "A Black African Aesthetic" for the journal *Diogenes*, in which I define the black African aesthetic as a collection of symbolic, melodic, and rhythmic images. When Pierre Soulages, one of the greatest living painters, read my article, he exclaimed, "That definition could apply to aesthetics of the twentieth century in general."

AFRICA REPORT: Adopting biological and cultural crossbreeding as an intellectual theory is one thing, but are there also practical political applications? For instance, do you believe that understanding and appreciating other civilizations can increase the chances for conflict resolution among nations?

SENGHOR: I think so. When I led a mediation team twice to Jerusalem and to Cairo, in responding to a toast by President Anwar Sadat, for whom I had the highest admiration, I noted that the Arab-Israeli conflict was nothing but frat-

ricide. I said, "You, Arabs and Jews, represent the two great branches of the Semitic stem that contributed so much to the world, and in particular the three great monotheistic religions, Christianity, Islam, and Judaism." The last time I went to Amman, Jordan, and gave a lecture on negritude and Arabity, I developed the same thesis—the civilizations of the Near East represent an ideal cultural crossbreeding of Indo-European, Semitic, and Arabic civilizations.

AFRICA REPORT: Besides your writings, are there other channels through which you can promote cultural crossbreeding as a means of approaching the "universal civilization?"

SENGHOR: I have always accorded a higher priority to culture than to politics. Currently as president of the Socialist Inter-African, I place emphasis not so much on socialism, or even on social justice, but on democratization. I recently addressed a letter to King Hassan II of Morocco to congratulate him on progress in democratization registered in the last municipal elections. With Prince Hassan of Jordan, I am co-president of the Afro-Arab Cultural Forum of Asilah. Soon we will name representatives from Latin American, Caribbean, and Asian countries to add to the Africans and Arabs in the forum's governing board. My objective is to achieve, in a concrete fashion, cultural crossbreeding between Arab-Berbers and black Africans, and then to extend the crossbreeding to Asia and Latin America. I am also president of the Friends of Miguel Angel Asturias, the Nobel Prize winner. This organization includes Latin American, Caribbean, and African intellectuals. We held a colloquium in Paris in May and next year will hold one in Central Africa.

I presided over a colloquium at the Sorbonne in February. Entitled "Creation and Development," this colloquium was attended by 400 scientists, including Nobel Prize winners, artists, and writers. The colloquium brought out a new definition of culture. I have defined culture as "the spirit of a civilization." President François Mitterrand, however, proposed to colloquium participants a new definition. Viewing culture as a dynamic, not static, phenomenon, he defined it as a "force of creation." I think France is to be honored for being in the avant-garde in the definition of culture as a force of creation and of a new civilization of the universal.

AFRICA REPORT: What influence would you like to exert on the younger generation?

SENGHOR: I would hope that today's youth realize two things—first, the importance of cultural identity. Each person should first of all become deeply rooted in his culture. For us, this means in the values of negritude. Then, to be a whole person, one should expose himself to the fertile aspects of other cultures. For instance, one should be open to the spirituality of the Near East, where three major religions were revealed, but also be open to the organizational abilities and methodicalness that have typified the development of the Eur-Americans. It is not a question for us blacks of simply reliving the negritude of our ancestors. That attitude does not represent progress. What is important, however, is to create a new negritude, a negritude that brings about a symbiosis among European, Near Eastern, and African cultures. That is what I have spent my life trying to achieve.

Letters to the Editor

THE ADDIS ABABA SUMMIT

To the Editor:

I would like to express my favorable impression of Margaret A. Novicki's article on the 1983 OAU summit (see September-October issue). I was impressed by the author's very good understanding of our organization and the accuracy of her reporting.

I have obviously read many articles on the summit and I must admit that her article is definitely one of the best. She did not waste her time on the mishaps and the insignificant incidents that her journalistic colleagues seem to consider the most important aspects of our annual meetings! Ms. Novicki has shown respect and maturity rarely found in Western journalists writing on African issues. She has also avoided all the popular clichés and the stereotypical statements on Africa and the OAU.

Oumarou G. Youssoufou
Ambassador,
Executive Secretary of the
OAU to the United Nations

To the Editor:

I have read with a great deal of astonishment your article "The Addis Summit and African Unity," whose sole aim seems to project all the ills and problems of Africa through the imbrolio of the question of Western Sahara.

One can easily detect through the article a distinct line of prejudice against Morocco and its supporters who de-

fended the legality of the OAU charter and insisted that it be respected.

The article, though focusing on the crisis of the OAU, has failed even to hint to the real cause of this crisis, namely the attempt to force into the membership of this intercontinental organization, reserved exclusively for sovereign and independent states, an "entity" that does not "qualify" for this membership.

The article seems to give more value to the viewpoints of the "revolutionary" trend in Africa, spearheaded by Algeria and Libya, while trying to subdue all the views of those moderate and legalistic countries who only defended the legal proceedings according to tenets of the charter and international law.

The article speaks freely about Morocco's intransigence, without elaborating on this blatant accusation.

Morocco has gone out of its way to accommodate all the conditions put by the OAU to reach a peaceful solution to the question of Western Sahara. But the article, in distorting this known fact, tends to say that Morocco is interested only in a military solution.

What the article seems to ignore is the fact that Morocco has proposed a process of self-determination for the population of Western Sahara. Morocco has accepted that a referendum conducted by the UN and the OAU should take place to consult the population freely about their political future.

To guarantee the fairness of this referendum, an international interim administration will be set up in the Sahara

headed by a neutral high commissioner, while the army will be confined to the barracks.

Many other "precautions" have been demanded and accepted by Morocco in good faith, although these precautions are unprecedented in the history of all "referendums" conducted by the UN across the world.

His Majesty King Hassan II on two occasions has confirmed "Morocco's willingness to comply with the results of the referendum no matter how bitter that result might be." He reiterated this pledge again in his address to the UN General Assembly on September 27, 1983.

The question of Western Sahara can only find its solution through the conduct of a free referendum of self-determination, surrounded with adequate conditions to guarantee its fairness. This is the just and democratic way of finding a solution to this kind of conflict. To this solution Morocco is wholeheartedly committed.

Saad Eddine Taib
Moroccan Ambassador
to Kenya

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
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
Music and dance were the first African arts to attract the attention of travelers and historians. A shield from ancient Greece depicts an African trumpet player. African sculpture was not appreciated until the end of the 19th century.

Among the Dan people who live in the Ivory Coast, the importance of a mask is in proportion to its size. The biggest, most impressive ones, the "Masks of Peace," are sufficiently powerful to end hostilities between villages.



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


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


The Bateke people of the Republic of the Congo have a tradition where, upon the birth of a boy child, a statue is carved by a talented villager. The purpose of this statue is to protect the boy until he reaches puberty. Although the quality of these statues is very inconsistent, the best of them are worthy of a place among the great works of African art.

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Rwanda

● According to October reports, tens of thousands of Rwandans have been driven from their homes in southwestern Uganda, where many had been living since before Rwanda's independence in 1960, and forced to flee into crowded refugee camps near the Uganda-Tanzania border. Thousands were reported to have crossed into Tanzania or Rwanda rather than enter the Ugandan camps.

The UN High Commission for Refugees protested to the Ugandan government over the "horrifying" campaign against the Rwandans, a prime motive for which was said to be the theft of property. Local chiefs and representatives of the ruling Uganda People's Congress were said to be behind the evictions.

The Ugandan government issued a denial of the charges made by UNHCR representative Tom Unwin, calling his statements "grossly irresponsible." But in late October, fol-

lowing a meeting between Ugandan and Rwandan government officials, Uganda agreed to keep the refugees within certain zones, and Rwanda pledged to integrate its nationals who are refugees and facilitate the repatriation process.

The refugees are for the most part those who fled early ethnic unrest in Rwanda, and therefore from that government's point of view, are now Ugandan nationals. Some 35 refugees reportedly committed suicide after giving up hopes of being repatriated into Rwanda. An additional 8,000 were reportedly huddled at the border, and Rwanda, having already taken in 45,000, was refusing any more unless UNHCR would guarantee their resettlement elsewhere. (*Le Monde*, November 11, 1982; *London Guardian*, October 15 and November 9, 1982; *Kampala Radio*, October 28, 1982; *New York Times*, October 10, 1982.)

Zaire

● President Mobutu Sese Seko re-

shuffled his cabinet in early November, naming Kengo wa Dongo prime minister to replace Nsinga Udjuu, and Kamanda wa Kamanda, Zaire's representative to the UN, as foreign minister. Munongo Mwenda Msiri, interior minister under Moise Tshombe in the early 1960s and one of the most powerful members of the ruling People's Revolutionary Movement central committee, regained his prior post, as well as that of deputy prime minister.

The political changes took place shortly after elections to the national assembly, in which only 60 of the 310 members of parliament retained their seats.

Meanwhile, in October, Zairian political exiles in Brussels announced the formation of a coalition led by former Prime Minister Nguza Karl-I-Bond in opposition to Mobutu's 17-year rule. Called the Congolese Front for the Restoration of Democracy (FCD), the group is composed of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress, 13 of

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