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AFRICA  
REPORT



IN THIS ISSUE

In light of the role the Reverend Jesse Jackson's campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination has played in raising black political consciousness and translating it into a powerful force in American politics, this issue of *Africa Report* highlights black Americans' views of current U.S. policy in Africa. The Reverend Jackson explains the Africa policies that would be pursued under his presidency and critiques those currently being followed. We also examine issues in U.S.-Africa relations, ranging from trade and aid to corporate responsibility in South Africa, in articles by Andrew Young, mayor of Atlanta; Congressman Julian Dixon, chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus; and the Reverend Leon Sullivan, author of the Sullivan Principles; and in an interview with Tom Bradley, mayor of Los Angeles.

In two related stories, Louis Martin analyzes the problems faced by the U.S. black press in expanding coverage of African issues, and *Africa Report* assistant editor Michael Maren assesses the efforts of lobby groups seeking to influence the formulation of policy toward the continent. Milfred Fierce looks back at the 1981 report *South Africa: Time Running Out* in light of the Reagan administration's southern Africa policies.

We also provide coverage of three countries recently in the news. *Africa Report* editor Margaret A. Novicki interviews Nigerian Minister of External Relations Ibrahim Gambari on the foreign policies of the new government. In two reports on Mozambique, Joanmarie Kalter analyzes the economic difficulties that led to Maputo's nonaggression pact with South Africa, and Mozambican Minister of Information José Luis Cabaço explains his government's position on the accord. And from Khartoum, Rick Wells examines the latest threats to the government of Sudanese President Nimeiry.

Black America and Africa

The United States and Africa  
Under a Jackson Administration 4  
*By the Reverend Jesse Jackson*

Black America and Africa

The U.S. Economy and  
African Development 9  
*By Andrew Young*

Black America and Africa

The Congressional Black Caucus  
and U.S. Policy in Southern Africa 12  
*By Julian C. Dixon*

Interview

Tom Bradley, Mayor of Los Angeles 17  
*Interviewed by Margaret A. Novicki*

Mozambique's Peace  
with South Africa

The Economics of Desperation 19  
*By Joanmarie Kalter*

Mozambique-South Africa

The Nkomati Accords 24  
*By José Luis Cabaço*

Document

The People's Platform 25

Update

Editor: Michael Maren  
Assistant Editor: Jason Zweig  
Researcher: Stephen Adkisson

Interview

Ibrahim A. Gambari 44  
Minister of External Affairs, Nigeria  
*Interviewed by Margaret A. Novicki*

Black America and Africa

The Sullivan Principles and  
Change in South Africa 48  
*By the Reverend Leon H. Sullivan*

Black America and Africa

What Role for the Black Press? 51  
*By Louis E. Martin*

The Africa Lobby

Building a Constituency  
Against Apartheid 55  
*By Michael Maren*

Sudan

Nimeiry Under Siege 60  
*By Rick Wells*

Special Review

Looking Back at South Africa:  
*Time Running Out* 63  
*By Milfred C. Fierce*

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The cover photograph of the Reverend Jesse Jackson campaign-  
ing in New York was taken by Tannenbaum/Sygma.

# The United States and Africa Under a Jackson Administration

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BY THE REVEREND JESSE JACKSON

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Now and in the decades ahead, the United States in particular will be called upon to respond to the triple crises of world food, energy, and resource shortages. One of the primary regions involved will be Africa, both as a donor, via its reserves in natural resources and mineral wealth, and as a recipient suffering under these international shortages. For all the consciousness of world economic inequalities, and for all the world's efforts to seek remedies to these conditions, the gap between the rich and poor nations — specifically African nations — is widening on a progressive scale.

It is in the national interest of the United States to reduce the widening discrepancy that divides the northern and southern tiers of nations. The national interest of the U.S. demands creative diplomacy geared to a development foreign policy approach towards the African continent. My administration will follow this policy approach because it is right and the primary emphasis is on the entire continent. Unlike this policy proposal, however, the present Reagan policy of "constructive engagement" is keyed almost totally to South Africa and to

select countries that have particular cold war significance for the U.S. The Reagan approach is a failure and is counter to U.S. national interests throughout the continent of Africa.

Since decolonization of the African continent in the late 1950s, the American public has been given occasional media coverage of events in Africa. Though the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administrations tried to build bridges between the United States and these newly independent states through a variety of means, the fact remains that Africa has remained on the back-burner of U.S. foreign policy formulation.

Three reasons can be offered briefly as explanations for the low priority given to African issues in U.S. foreign policy formulation. First and foremost is the priority given to the strategic and geopolitical factors aimed at containing communism in the international system. The second reason for the low priority given was that most African leaders embraced a nonaligned policy posture in the 1960s which, to a certain degree, allayed the fears of many U.S. policymakers who had thought that the Soviets were going to seize Africa from Western control. The third reason was the racial calculations of U.S. policymakers. Because of the intensity and activity of the civil rights movement, many policymakers felt that America's greater involvement in African affairs and the possibility of the U.S. commit-

ting serious racial blunders made it necessary for the U.S. to steer clear of active involvement in independent Africa.

Africa is important to American interests for a range of reasons, not least of which is its riches in strategic minerals and its security importance. The double standards of policy behavior towards Africa, however, must be reversed to assure U.S. access, and the inconsistency between what we claim and defend domestically and what we do in Africa deserves and will receive immediate attention. Let me identify some of the key issues and areas where American national interests are critical and demand responsible action.

## ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF AFRICA

The economic situation in Africa is very bleak. The major problems faced by African nations are inflation, depleted foreign exchange reserves, negative terms of trade, and, for the vast majority of them, serious drought and hunger. Because of the gravity of the situation, African governments have been very keen about foreign aid from industrialized nations and loans for development from the World Bank and other such donor agencies. Underdevelopment is the root cause of internal and regional conflicts in Africa, not ideology. Yet instead of offering Africa support for its development, we presently allocate the bulk of our modest

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The Reverend Jesse Jackson is a candidate for the Democratic party's presidential nomination.

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African aid program to military assistance packages. Sudan, for example, will receive \$271 million for fiscal year 1985 and 75 percent of it is for military assistance; Somalia's fiscal year 1985 allocation of \$120 million provides 63 percent for military assistance. The remaining percentages, 25 percent and 37 percent for Sudan and Somalia, respectively, are available potentially for economic growth and development. It is unfortunate that too often without political disputes, which give rise at least to enlarged military assistance, American foreign aid allocations to Africa would be smaller than they are at present even when such allocations include development assistance, food aid (PL-480), and Economic Support Funds. Israel alone receives more U.S. foreign aid than the entire sub-Saharan continent of Africa.

The following factors are key economic issues that will receive serious exploration and analysis by American policymakers under my administration. First, Zimbabwe's land distribution program is critical in the sense that its implementation has serious implications for the future stability of the country and, by extension, the region. Since the national liberation movement selected the land question as one of the bones of contention against the former Ian Smith regime, it would be dangerous and unwise for the issue to remain unresolved. The American government helped in the resolution of this bloody conflict and we undertook a responsibility to provide economic support to facilitate the peaceful implementation of the independence agreement. The U.S. has failed to keep its word.

The Reagan administration has committed \$75 million recently in Economic Support Funds for fiscal year 1984. But because the sovereign government of Zimbabwe decided to oppose the UN censure of the Soviets regarding the Korean Air Lines episode and to condemn the U.S. intervention later into Grenada, this allocation was cut by almost one-half. The 1985 fiscal allocation was slashed even further to \$15 million. The Reagan policy approach was to chastise the Zimbabweans for not following our lead and to reduce our support to teach them a lesson — Reagan's cowboy adventurism.

Second, another current problem of African countries is the uncertainty of the flow of concessional aid. The Reagan administration's policy of reducing American contributions, for example, to the International Development Association (IDA), and even to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), is harmful to our own, as well as African,

bique about 100,000 deaths have been reported — let alone the unreported ones. UN agencies have responded to this human tragedy and their estimates suggest that 3.3 million metric tons of food are needed to meet the emergencies. Presently, only 1.7 million tons of food have been received or pledged. The U.S., whose past record was highly commendable, has contributed



**Rev. Jesse Jackson at a London press conference with Congressman Ronald Dellums (left) and ANC president Oliver Tambo: Most African leaders perceive the U.S. as an active partner in maintaining apartheid**

Stuart Franklin/Sygma

interests. Africa has relied heavily on IDA funding to implement many of its development programs. The critical problem now is the uncertainty of raising the \$16 billion that the World Bank projected for the next three-year interval. The Reagan administration has not only refused to accept the \$16 billion proposal, but it has rejected a compromise of \$12 billion suggested by the World Bank. As a result of this attitude, sub-Saharan Africa alone will lose nearly \$500 million annually in urgently needed IDA concessional loans.

Third, the drought situation is another critical problem. More than 150 million people in at least 22 African countries are now threatened with death by starvation. Compared to the African famine of 1973-74, which claimed 2,000 to 3,000 lives, this one is even more devastating. Already in Mozam-

only 187,000 metric tons, about 11 percent of the estimated need (valued at \$73 million) for the affected nations. In February 1984 the Reagan administration requested a \$90 million supplement in emergency food aid for Africa. This is a meager sum when the U.S. historically has provided about 50 percent of the emergency food aid in similar cases. Had this historical pattern been applied in this crisis, our effort would be some 800,000 metric tons of food, or about \$320 million, a meaningful contribution to break the cycle of pain and despair.

The picture is not presently very reassuring, because Reagan has requested a total food aid level of only \$232 million for fiscal year 1985. Statistically, such an appropriation translates into an annual per capita U.S. food aid contribution of \$1.50 to those

individual Africans most severely stricken by drought and starvation.

Fourth, the continent of Africa is also facing a serious refugee problem. According to UN figures, Africa has about one-half of all the world's refugees. This is due to the political and military turmoil in the Horn of Africa, the conflict in Chad, the desert war in the Western Sahara, the ongoing liberation struggles in southern Africa, and the political and military difficulties in a number of African countries. Insufficient attention, however, is paid to this monumental problem by present U.S. policy. I believe the refugee and economic development problems are far more representative of destabilizing factors than the threat of military aggression. Our program will encourage negotiations between Ethiopia and Somalia, for example, aimed specifically at settling the Ogaden dispute, providing economic and technical assistance to the region, and increasing the opportunity for the refugees themselves to return to a more adequate livelihood.

Fifth, the last economically related problem included here that deserves some immediate attention is the deforestation and soil erosion problems of too many African countries. The pattern of deforestation has serious impli-

cations for agricultural policy, and it has a negative impact on the activities of such generally self-sufficient groups as the nomads, who have ferried their herds for ages across the continent. A decline in the acreage of grazing lands and agricultural plots is exacerbated by a serious threat from an urban population explosion. My administration will maintain U.S. support to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), for example, to assist, with other nations, in confronting this great crisis in Africa. Reagan currently is considering withdrawing U.S. contributions from IFAD. Such a consideration in light of existing reality demonstrates that our simplistic preoccupation with ideology continues to shape U.S. foreign policy and provide the major litmus test by which we identify our friends, allocate our aid, deploy our military, and tailor our political rhetoric.

#### SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA ABOVE THE ZAMBEZI RIVER

This area embraces all of the countries below the Sahara but above the southern Africa region. Within this part of the continent, two conflicts are presently raging and each poses an indirect threat to U.S. national interests. The first crisis is the Chadian conflict. The

second is the Horn of Africa. What these two crisis areas share is the existence of political problems that owe their origins principally to the colonial conquest of the continent. Or, there is a feud that is magnified into dangerous bloodletting by the contesting forces. In Chad, the northerners originally claimed to have been discriminated against by French colonialism and later by the postcolonial regime. Frolinat's stance has been altered radically by the shifting political sands of Chad and the changing alignments of the combatants. What has altered this power struggle was the intrusion of external forces. Since 1978, when the Felix Malloum regime faltered after a fatal blow from the opposition, Chad has known no peace, order, or stability.

Today, Chad is divided into two spheres of influence, namely the His-sène Habré faction, supported by France, the United States, Egypt, Sudan, and Zaire, and the Goukouni Woddeye faction, strongly backed by Libya. Each faction is pressing its claims at the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the question of Chad has enlarged itself to become a divisive issue at the UN.

Besides Chad, there is the more complex and serious problem of the Horn of Africa (which includes Eritrea). In this part of Africa, the problem assumes the character of an interstate dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia. What complicates matters here is that the Ethiopians feel that Somalia wishes to take their land by force. This policy, in Ethiopia's view, is evident via Somalia's claims on the Ogaden and in Somalia's willingness to go to war for it alongside the liberation movement in the area.

Moreover, Ethiopia's new alignment with the Soviet Union, which is a reversal of the political pattern of alignment during Emperor Haile Selassie's regime, pits Somalia against the Soviets and at the same time propels it towards the conservative Arab monarchies who previously were political allies of imperial Ethiopia. This paradoxical situation should be noted by U.S. policymakers, for it reveals clearly that no situation is permanent and that U.S. interests can best be served only through a consistent foreign policy ap-



A resident of Mogopa after being forced from his land by the South African government earlier this year: "Constructive engagement has not won any meaningful concessions, rather it has encouraged South African intransigence"

proach that seeks always to bring peace via diplomacy, and stability via development support, to such troubled regions.

A strong and effective U.S. foreign policy toward Africa is perceived by others as one that clearly demonstrates our understanding of the moral responsibility that is linked to world leadership. Such a policy approach allows this nation to live up to its nationally articulated values and ideals, and to support international law and democratic principles evenhandedly. Such a policy approach, moreover, assures the protection of U.S. national, commercial, and strategic interests throughout the continent. The continued reservoir of Africans' goodwill towards this nation is based on their positive perceptions: Americans are scrutinized more severely because they are respected more sincerely by Africans. The Russians, on the other hand, are perceived differently — as insensitive to racial/ethnic feelings, with a high tendency to alienate locals everywhere they go, and, most importantly, they do not possess the hard currency of the U.S. A Jackson administration foreign policy toward Africa will not only be reactive to Soviet bad behavior, but will also take the initiative necessary to create mutually beneficial climates for meaningful U.S.-Africa relations.

#### THE NORTH AFRICAN PROBLEMS

There are two main problems identified under this heading — the U.S.-Libyan dispute and the Western Sahara question. Regarding the former, it should be noted that the U.S. had good relations with Libya during the reign of King Idris. Even in the formative years of the current leader, Muammar Qaddafi, the relationship was amicable. Things began to sour, however, when the Libyan leader decided to close the U.S. Air Force base in Libya and to pursue policies believed unfriendly to the U.S. What was becoming a very cold relationship reached the limits of tolerance when the U.S. ordered the Libyan diplomats out of the U.S. in 1981. Since that time, relations have almost broken down completely between Washington and Tripoli. Matters were not helped by the Reagan policy that branded Qaddafi the lone financier

of international terrorism, prodded him into an almost meaningless aerial confrontation, and finally introduced a mythical "hit squad"; nor were matters aided by Qaddafi's regional policies and acts of verbal "Yankee baiting."

Even though he is not in good standing presently with the United States, Qaddafi sends Libyan students in large numbers to the U.S. and Western Europe. This preference for Western education and training is a window of opportunity for dialogue with Libya. The U.S. is too big to fear Libya, and for this reason we must make it clear to the world that our policy is not in opposition to Qaddafi's governance of his

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**"A strong and effective U.S. foreign policy toward Africa is perceived by others as one that clearly demonstrates our understanding of the moral responsibility that is linked to world leadership. Such a policy approach allows this nation to live up to its nationally articulated values and ideals."**

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country; rather that we condemn his involvements in the internal affairs of other independent nations without invitation. This country, however, should welcome his moral support for freedom fighters who are locked in battle against the defenders of racism, national terrorism, and exploitation.

The Western Sahara problem is a critical one for American policy. In fact, Morocco, with U.S. support and in violation of international law, now claims the entire territory. This act of illegal occupation has driven more than 80,000 inhabitants of the region to flee to neighboring Algeria. Because the Polisario front is backed by Algeria, and, until recently, Libya, relations between these states have not been very cordial. Again, because of the absence of dialogue between Morocco, the other states, and Polisario, the conflict

has spread into the inner councils of the OAU.

In sum, the U.S. has a primary responsibility to use its world power status to assist the peace process in this region. Apart from the long historical bonds between our early republic and these states bordering the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, there are contemporary political, security, economic, and commercial ties that make our role as a mediator crucial, and possible.

#### SOUTHERN AFRICA

South Africa will be a major economic and political concern in my administration. Southern African states have made enormous progress in the last two decades in ridding themselves of colonial and white settler regimes, but two interrelated problems remain unsolved: independence for Namibia and the elimination of the apartheid system in South Africa. The infamous policy of "constructive engagement" has sought to bring about change by currying favor with the South African regime, but this approach has not won any meaningful concessions. Rather, it has encouraged South African intransigence. By allowing South Africa to exploit the Cuban presence in Angola as a stalling tactic on Namibia and by giving South Africa a free hand to carry out aggression and destabilization on a regional level, the Reagan policy approach has not served America's, but South Africa's national interest. And despite Reagan administration pronouncements condemning apartheid, many African leaders in southern Africa generally perceive the U.S. as an active partner in maintaining the immoral apartheid system.

My administration would reverse the policy of the last two American presidents and take the issue of the recognition of Angola out of the context of East-West politics. The fundamental reason for the new approach is that on the merits of the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Angola, it is in the mutual interest of both countries to normalize relations, beginning with the act of U.S. recognition of that government. Normalization of relations between the U.S. and Angola would underscore the support

of the U.S. government for the substantial range of U.S. companies already involved in doing business in Angola, and would expand upon the productive trading relations between the two countries, which are the bases for long-term relationships in other fields.

#### POLICY OBJECTIVES

- Our values and interests as a nation cannot tolerate making ourselves party to sustaining apartheid or promoting South Africa's regional designs. If the U.S. is to "engage" with South Africa, then it should not be with those elements that retard change, but with those that seek a democratic and just society. If the U.S. is to support "linkage" it should be through recognizing the linkage of regional stability and development, which cannot be meaningfully addressed until there is significant movement towards ending apartheid. My administration would bring to bear the full range of diplomatic and other resources at its command to encourage change in this positive direction.

- Africa is a continent trying to develop for effective use its material and human resources. I would seize the opportunity to assist this development effort by providing appropriate and adequate technical aid, and economic and managerial assistance. Through economic and developmental cooperation, the United States can create the needed climate for stable investments, stable governments, and long-term diplomatic, commercial, and mutually beneficial relations.

- I will promote U.S. national interests through a policy that is consistent with American values and principles. This will allow us to support freedom, justice, self-determination, and independence in Africa through the OAU; and it allows us to oppose dictatorships and racism. The OAU would be given a clear message of support that the U.S. is not against African interests; rather, it supports the OAU efforts to resolve African problems by keeping East-West rivalry and big-power politics from the continent.

- The Zimbabwean government's development efforts, as an example, would be encouraged through an infusion of supportive economic aid and

concessional loans in a depoliticized format. I would encourage U.S. companies to invest in Zimbabwe, help to increase the economy's capacity to expand, and regain a viable trading partner. Moreover, I would support a subsidized land reallocation program by the government to obviate problems of land distribution and thus reduce this



**Drought in the Sahel: The Reagan administration has appropriated only \$1.50 per capita for Africans severely stricken by drought and starvation**

Davico/Unicef

question as a constraint to developmental efforts in the country.

- I would pursue multilateral channels for aid disbursements to assure that medium- and long-term socioeconomic development needs of these nations are met and represent the priorities of our democracy — justice and human dignity. Special supportive arrangements similar to the American-sponsored Marshall Plan for post-World War II European economic revitalization would be supported.

- The desertification of much of West Africa poses a particular threat to millions of lives in the region. We will provide American leadership and tech-

nological know-how to contain this danger and make the desert give back some of its captured lands to bloom again with needed agricultural products.

- I would assume the role of mediator in the Horn of Africa, employing policy options toward Somalia that are African-based, instead of the Middle East policy model pursued by the Reagan administration. Rather than looking at the problems in East-West terms, I intend to address the Horn situation primarily as a conflict between two nationalisms, and to employ a cooperative partnership for agricultural and economic development of the region. Both nations have an even more deadly enemy than each other — hunger.

- The Western Sahara conflict is very serious and is in desperate need of response. With the political and financial power of the American purse, I would call for a cease-fire, to be followed by an internationally sponsored conference of all the parties to the conflict. This negotiated settlement approach, moreover, will be used to seek an end to the Chadian dispute. Knee-jerk responses to such eruptions would be replaced by a recognition of the realities that continue to frustrate the socioeconomic and political aspirations of countries such as Chad, leading to national disenchantment and turmoil. Economic development assistance in light of understanding local structures, values, and priorities will be the cornerstone of our policy approach to the region — including Libya and Sudan. With the national interests of the U.S. as their fundamental guide, the policy options of my administration will be designed to draw into, not withdraw from, the world's other peoples.

Africa represents a primary ally of the U.S. and the rest of the Western world, and it can assist in meeting the challenges of international resource shortages. I would take special care to devise an Africa policy to build upon the natural inclination of African leaders to develop and maintain long-term cooperative and meaningful African-American relations. The foundation for policy formulation will be diplomacy and development, respecting, sharing, and cooperating with others for international peace and security. □

# The U.S. Economy and African Development

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BY ANDREW YOUNG

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**T**he key to economic and political stability in the world is international trade and economic development. The United States should be approaching the developing world on the basis of our economic interrelatedness. The U.S. economy, with huge government deficits and an ever-expanding imbalance in its world trade, is under severe strain, a strain that cannot be overcome until we respond to opportunities for increasing exports, especially to Africa and the rest of the Third World.

Africa, which has long been a source of major raw materials for the United States, increasingly has become a major market for heavy infrastructure projects, manufactured products, technology, and services. The U.S. private and public sectors have been slow to awaken to the potential of this market at a time when African nations are prepared to cooperate with the U.S. in trade and development projects.

I believe that we must make greater efforts to bring together African nations with specific development needs, U.S. private resources capable of meeting those needs, and international financial institutions that can help package the projects. I have found that both African and U.S. leaders, as well as develop-

ment banks, are very receptive to such cooperative efforts.

Growth in the economies of the developing countries clearly stimulates growth in the industrial world. This in turn promotes global economic stability and creates a more peaceful international political climate. Governments, in my view, have serious responsibilities to facilitate economic development and trade, and the North-South dialogue is a useful instrument in this process. But I am equally interested in working with the private sector and government officials to set examples of how North and South can really share in growth together.

The whole world today is threatened by depression, debt crises, protectionism, and war. Destruction is not the answer to any of these threats. The answer lies in peaceful development and economic security for all nations and peoples.

It is evident from the African policy pursued by Ronald Reagan that he does not grasp the paramount importance of peaceful economic relations between the U.S. and Africa. Instead, President Reagan views the nations of Africa with the same bipolar tunnel vision as he views the entire Third World. In his eyes, and in his policies, they are only inconsequential pawns in his ever-heightening cold war with the Soviet Union. Such an erroneous policy premise could be dismissed as the fond oversimplification of a man longing for life in the nineteenth century were it not for the immense human tragedy this policy has perpetuated.

This administration represents a stark contrast to the Africa policy in place in 1980. It has refused to assist

and identify with the millions of oppressed black South Africans in their quest for simple human decency and liberties because such a movement is not nearly as important as stopping the "spread of communism" in southern Africa.

While the worst drought of this century rips across much of the continent, destroying crops, livestock, and entire populations, the Reagan administration ships unprecedented levels of new and more sophisticated weapons, with inadequate levels of humanitarian aid tossed in, to nations that are receptive to their anticommunist preaching.

Meanwhile, the leaders of the most powerful nation on earth choose to punish those African states that suffer from starvation and neglect and are seeking help from the Eastern bloc. Not only do these nations not receive direct U.S. humanitarian aid, but the U.S. attempts to block multilateral aid intended for them. These nations are no less affected by the disastrous economic conditions in Africa than are pro-Western nations, yet we refuse to provide them with even the low levels of aid we supply our "friends."

This misguided policy has resulted in the erosion of American influence and credibility throughout much of Africa, increased tension in the continent, and the exacerbation of an already devastating human tragedy. This ideologically based policy can last no longer than Ronald Reagan's tenure as president. Our policy in Africa must be founded upon the interrelated principles of nonintervention in the affairs of sovereign states and a refusal to cooperate with the horrid system of apartheid.

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Andrew Young is mayor of Atlanta, Georgia. The former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations is also president of Young Ideas, Inc., a Washington-based public policy group that focuses on trade and development questions between the United States and the Third World.

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Political and economic realities require a pragmatic approach to the nations of Africa. The economic importance of Africa to the U.S. is underscored by the fact that Nigeria is now our second-leading supplier of oil, while most of our mineral imports come from southern Africa. These paramount economic relationships do not exist in a vacuum. The U.S. cannot continue to support the intractability of South Africa over Namibian independence and slash funding of important multilateral aid organizations, and still expect to benefit from trade and business relationships with the countries of the continent. Economic realities combined with the growing international political power of African nations require that pragmatism replace irrelevant ideology as the basis of American policy toward the nations of Africa.

The first step toward such a pragmatic policy is to recognize that Africa is not just another forum for the battle over global influence between the United States and the Soviet Union. Only a policy that is premised upon the individual circumstances, culture, and needs of each African nation can be successful. Such an approach necessarily entails the formulation of 52 separate policies — one for each nation. More than three years after he took office, President Reagan has shown no inclination to engage in such an exercise.

This country's historic position as promoter of self-determination and national liberation as well as our stated commitment to the ideals of equality, justice, and human freedoms dictates that our African policies be based upon these fundamental moral imperatives. A policy that does not actively encourage the freedom of all people of Africa is not consistent with our historic moral responsibility.

Our pragmatic interests and moral concerns are not antithetical or even competitive; rather they are intertwined and complementary. Any policy not based upon these principles cannot be effective or credible. Such a policy would be immediately suspect and then rejected by most African leaders. In addition, such a policy would be met by swift disapproval in this country as the constituency for Africa becomes better

organized and more powerful on the national level. Even Ronald Reagan has begun to recognize this as he and his policymakers have made some cosmetic changes in their approach to Africa, particularly toward South Africa.

The economies of Africa were developed not for Africans themselves, but for others. The adjustment of those colonial economies to self-serving ones has been one of the major struggles of the last few decades, and despite the upheavals that have gone on with nation-building there is far more stability on the African continent than American business and newspapers recognize. In almost every country the civil service has remained functioning despite changes in government, and obligations incurred by one government have been respected by its successor.

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**“The U.S. economy is under severe strain that cannot be overcome until we respond to opportunities for increasing exports, especially to Africa and the rest of the Third World.”**

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As these nations move to establish indigenous economies, they should further regional cooperation endeavors such as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Their needs have essentially been in the area of capital formation, technology, management skills, and access to markets, none of which has been offered to any extent by the Soviet bloc. The U.S. has tended to ignore the fact that much of the development process in Africa is Western-oriented.

Africa is aware of the extent to which the world's economies are linked. The difficulties faced by the continent today are documents of inflation exported by the West. The increasing cost of development technology has not only created inflation, but imposed a heavy debt burden on African countries. The

most significant factor in the destabilization of the world monetary system is the \$600 billion of military expenditures by the nations of the world. It is \$600 billion spent on death and destruction. When you compare how much is being spent on life and development, you get the clear message of why our world economies are in trouble. Therefore, when looking at the economies of Africa and the world, it is important not to separate economic development from the political and military chaos of today.

In order for Africa to deal with these problems, the continent must do more business with the United States. The only hope of combating neocolonialism and the domination of national economies by former colonial masters is to develop a more diversified approach. The creation of a public-private sector mix is necessary for African development. In addition, American business should seek out those countries that are willing to work together, as there are the competitive markets of some 41 countries in sub-Saharan Africa to choose from.

Ultimately, American recovery depends on the Third World. The Europeans and the Japanese very aggressively subsidize their exports and are very involved in Africa, hoping that it takes the U.S. a long time to wake up. It would not be helpful for the United States to go into the African market just to match others' cutthroat competition. Instead, a new Bretton Woods approach should be formulated, as the world developed from 1945 to 1970 because people sat down and made agreements by which everyone could prosper and profit. Agreements on monetary stability, commodity consistency, and restructuring of the long-term financing of development are called for now.

Under the Reagan administration, economic aid to the nations of Africa has been largely distorted by a heavy increase in military aid. This, of course, is consistent with President Reagan's view of Africa as a battleground in his cold war with the Soviet Union. Overall bilateral U.S. aid to sub-Saharan Africa has remained at about \$960 million under Reagan. Military aid, however, accounts for at least



**Andrew Young, mayor of Atlanta, greeting Zambian Foreign Minister Lameck Goma: "In order for Africa to deal with its economic problems, it must do business with the United States"**

S. Romili

14 percent of this total. This proportion of military aid is significantly higher than under previous administrations.

The increasing militarization of Africa comes at a time when much of Africa is experiencing the worst drought of the century. Again, this is an example of an impractical and misguided policy, for military aid cannot save starving nations from communists. Starvation cannot be defeated with more military hardware and Marxism cannot be stemmed by a nation starving to death.

The Reagan administration has asked Congress for an additional \$90 million in emergency food aid to attempt to offset the effects of the drought. This level, however, is far below what the U.S. must contribute if the continued starvation of millions of Africans is to be curtailed. It is estimated by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization that \$300 million would be needed to provide half the necessary disaster relief. Traditionally, the U.S. has provided 50 percent of such emergency aid. Viewed in this context, the Reagan administra-

tion's request is woefully inadequate to meet the tremendous needs of the people devastated by the drought.

This administration's emphasis on military aid to Africa shows no grasp of the reality or gravity of the situation. We in this, the richest nation on earth, cannot continue to ship more weapons to a continent caught in the grip of starvation. We must provide more than token monetary assistance and righ-

teous rhetoric to a people whose very survival is threatened.

We must use our vast resources and wealth in a concerted effort to stem the growing tide of human tragedy in Africa. Our aid must be aimed at the human needs and infrastructural development of the people of Africa.

In concert with this effort, the U.S. role must be in the area of developing a coherent trade policy so that American enterprise can become more aggressive in competing for some of the long-range development projects on this important continent.

The Third World would welcome a new administration in Washington that is determined to use its clout in the world community to assist in the reordering of the international financial institutions. The task is to bring together the surplus-capital nations, the developing nations, and representatives of the underdeveloped nations to conclude agreements on price stability for raw materials, essential infrastructure technologies, and certain consumer necessities.

These will be extremely difficult discussions, but painfully necessary for continued growth in developed and developing countries. The experience of the Lomé Convention is a small but positive example that can be built upon. Should the U.S. see it as in its self-interest to make economic allies of the developing nations, the result will be greater prosperity for all. Until such a consistent and coherent policy is followed, our influence will continue to decline in a region of the world that we greatly depend on for our own growth and prosperity. □



**U.S. food aid arriving during 1970s Sahel drought: "The current level of food aid is far below what the U.S. must contribute if the continued starvation of millions of Africans is to be curtailed"**

U.S. AID

# The Congressional Black Caucus and U.S. Policy in Southern Africa

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BY JULIAN C. DIXON

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Africa, unlike so many other geographical areas, does not have a powerful lobby in the United States to guard its interests and advocate on its behalf. It is therefore the responsibility of those of us in the U.S. Congress who care about the continent to continue exerting pressure on Pretoria to force it to reevaluate constantly the cost of apartheid. That cost should increase until the white-ruled government in South Africa finds that it is no longer in its interest to deprive its fellow citizens of their dignity, or of the basic birth-right worshipped so devoutly in the United States — freedom.

Since 1971, when the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) was established, international affairs have been a major area of importance to its members. The CBC has been particularly concerned with United States policy as it affects Africa.

The first CBC chairman was Con-



**Congressman Julian Dixon testifying before the House Banking Committee on legislation restricting U.S. support for IMF loans to South Africa**

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gressman Charles Diggs (D-Mich.), who was also the longtime chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa. At that time, a specific focus of the CBC was to explore ways in which it could influence the formulation of a more constructive policy towards Africa; by 1979, the CBC was the leading force in the fight to maintain U.S. sanctions against Rhodesia.

Several members of the CBC sit on congressional committees that play a crucial role in shaping the direction of U.S. foreign policy: Congressmen George Crockett (D-Mich.) and Mer-

vyn Dymally (D-Calif.) are on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; Congressman Crockett is also a member of the Subcommittee on Africa; and Congressman William Gray (D-Pa.) and I both sit on the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, the committee that controls the purse strings for all foreign assistance legislation.

## **MERE SURVIVAL: THE ECONOMIC STRUGGLE**

Over the past 18 months, African nations have been faced with the real problem of mere survival. South Africa, either directly or through surrogate guerrilla forces, has waged a brutal military campaign to demonstrate its power and to destabilize the border states that surround it. Even more devastating than the military threat has been the severe drought that has engulfed the entire continent and confronted 20 million people with the threat of starvation. This, together with the decade-long decline in food production, a rising level of debt, and a slump in exports, has left most African nations desperately searching for political security and economic stability.

Those of us in the Congressional

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Congressman Julian C. Dixon (D-Calif.) is chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus.

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Black Caucus know well that the independent African nations have been plagued by a history filled with frustration and disappointment. Of the world's 36 poorest countries, 22 are African. Colonial administrators focused the pre-independence economies on exports rather than on food production. Then, most of the postcolonial African governments accorded too low a priority to the rural sector, with governments investing very small amounts in agricultural research and education and in development of rural infrastructure.

Western donors are also to blame for some of the failures in Africa. Many competing donor nations initiated programs and projects but failed to provide adequate training, maintenance, and follow-through. Many of these projects are monuments to dubious Western influence and embarrassments to both the donor and the host countries.

More recently, the Reagan administration has impeded African economic development prospects by decreasing the U.S. contribution to the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA). The cut in the total three-year replenishment, from \$12 billion to \$9 billion, is harsh and shortsighted. Because of the administration's weakening of its commitment to this international lending institution, aid to Africa will be drastically reduced.

IDA and other international lending institutions are often able to obtain changes in economic policies from recipient governments. These are impartial and independent entities and are therefore more likely to be able to persuade host countries to adopt difficult policy changes that the United States is unable to obtain through bilateral means.

U.S. efforts to encourage economic and political change abroad have also been undermined by the administration's increasing reliance on the Economic Support Fund (ESF). This category of U.S. foreign aid is provided to countries that are of particular strategic value to the United States. The theory is that more direct aid ensures that more leverage can be exerted upon these countries. But in reality, because these countries know that they are of such

vital importance, they have correctly surmised that the money will be forthcoming regardless of their internal situations. Consequently, in countries like Zaire, the carrot without the stick removes the incentive for rectifying its difficult political and economic problems.

The U.S. sorely needs to modify its foreign assistance strategy for Africa. Only as an integral part of a multilateral lending scheme can the U.S. be an effective donor. Many African nations are in a desperate condition. U.S. economic strength and technical expertise can be a catalyst for progress. However, a renewed and progressive vision must precede any further allocation of resources to that continent.

#### **U.S. DIPLOMACY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT**

The U.S. diplomatic policy of "constructive engagement" in southern Africa could be more accurately defined as "simple accommodation." Constructive engagement has allowed the United States to be in the position of broker to some of the interested parties. Therefore, the U.S. is now in a position to attempt to claim a diplomatic coup should a miracle occur and South Africa consent to freeing Namibia. However, that is the only fruit that three years of simple accommodation has borne. No more, no less. The adminis-

tration is to be commended for its persistent pursuit of a peaceful resolution of the tensions in southern Africa. The State Department clearly has not ignored the region, but it is unfortunate that the strategy has been so misdirected.

The Congressional Black Caucus has objected to this approach since its articulation by the Reagan administration in 1981. We have collaborated with interested organizations such as Trans-Africa and the Washington Office on Africa to seek congressional support for stronger policies against apartheid. As implemented by the Reagan administration, constructive engagement has resulted in unprecedented U.S. diplomatic and technological cooperation, with few, if any, concessions in terms of expanded rights for black South Africans.

Many factors have contributed to South Africa's recent peacemaking gestures, with constructive engagement being only one. Within the South African government, those who have argued that their security will ultimately be best ensured by pursuing peaceful relations with their black African neighbors have gained more influence recently. This is probably due to the South Africans' desire for legitimacy and acceptance both within the continent and in the international community at large.

Also, Pretoria has borne a heavy ec-



**Members of the Caucus, Congressmen Dixon, Fauntroy, Mitchell, and Dymally; Congressman Britt; and Caucus members Dellums and Conyers (l to r) testifying in support of Martin Luther King Day**

onomic burden in conducting the wars against Angola and Mozambique. The Angolan campaign has taken the lives of many South African soldiers, and so the spirit within the country now supports the government's moves to end the fighting.

One must, however, keep this recent diplomatic progress in perspective. South Africa's current posture was preceded by harsh, punishing military pressure against both Angola and Mozambique. Pretoria, with U.S. consent, intimidated those nations and demonstrated its unquestionable military superiority. In addition, Prime Minister Pieter Botha has never been stronger politically, thanks to the referendum on the new constitution,

tourism should also improve under the new peace treaty.

Press reaction to recent developments has been enthusiastic, but the media has routinely failed to recognize the role that U.S. legislative pressure has played in bringing the South Africans to the bargaining table. Last fall, Congress passed legislation that restrains economic relations between the United States and South Africa. When President Reagan signed the new International Monetary Fund (IMF) bill into law, it included a provision I introduced that prohibits the United States from supporting any future IMF loan to South Africa unless the loan is conditioned on the South African government's agreement to end apartheid by

following measures: requiring that the fair employment practices embodied within the "Sullivan Principles" be made mandatory for U.S. corporations doing business there; banning importation of the krugerrand gold coin; restricting exports to the South African military and police; and expanding export controls on nuclear-related materials.

Moreover, many state and local legislatures have also passed divestment laws that force their respective governments to withdraw any funds from companies operating in South Africa.

### THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

The administration is committing a critical policy error in refusing to acknowledge the existence of the most popular political organization in South Africa, the banned African National Congress (ANC). The ANC's basic equal rights agenda is already supported by black South Africans regardless of ethnic group, class, age, or education, and it has the backing of the vast majority of Coloureds and Indians, and a small minority of whites.

The Reagan administration does not understand the role and the history of the ANC. The central platform of the Congress is its Freedom Charter, the most important feature of which is the declaration that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white." Not very radical. Only because South Africa does not permit open criticism of its society did the ANC find itself banned in 1960. After five decades, the most popular of all the South African political organizations was denied any legal means of expression.

While being outlawed in no way diminished the need for means of protesting the increasingly brutal repression of blacks, the organization was forced to go underground. It continued to grow, but the government in Pretoria would not consent to any political dissension. As a result, the continued repression of the ANC has culminated in the death or imprisonment of many of the most visible opponents of the government, including the spiritual father of the South African civil rights movement, Nelson Mandela.



**Congressman William Gray (right), vice-chairman of the Caucus, with SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma in Harare, Zimbabwe**

S. Romilly

which gave his government an overwhelming mandate.

South Africa stands to benefit tremendously from the nonaggression agreement with Mozambique. The port at Maputo will be a great asset, and the Cabora Bassa dam, one of the world's largest, could easily provide most of the power needs of the region were it not constantly under siege from South African-supported guerrillas. Trade and

dismantling various elements of the system, including labor mobility restrictions, lack of access to education and training, and the pass laws.

Several other significant bills imposing sanctions against South Africa have also been passed by the House. Congressman Gray has introduced legislation that prohibits new U.S. corporate investment in South Africa. The various other House bills contain the

President Reagan, despite the crises in the region, refuses even to speak to the ANC, thereby exacerbating the problem. The administration also carefully avoids taking a clear position on the South African government's efforts to eliminate the ANC. South Africa has waged a vicious campaign to crush the ANC by increasing repression inside its borders, and by launching extensive military strikes against neighboring states suspected of being sympathetic to the ANC.

The present administration sees regional stability primarily as a problem of relations between states. That view is only partially correct. In fact, the political instability in southern Africa is rooted primarily in South Africa's insistence on repugnant, despicable apartheid.

#### SOUTH AFRICA'S NEW CONSTITUTION

Last year, some 400 prominent South African political, labor, and religious groups from all corners of the country formed an umbrella organization, the United Democratic Front (UDF), in order to coordinate the protest against the proposed new constitution that grants participatory rights to Coloureds and Indians, but not to blacks. Last fall, they held the largest antigovernment rally in the history of the country. The UDF contends that the new constitution is not the first step in a "hidden agenda" that moves toward the inclusion of blacks in the political process, but rather, for the first time, constitutionally entrenches the exclusion of the black majority from any political rights.

Incredibly, despite UDF opposition, the U.S. is supportive of the constitution. This volatile controversy notwithstanding, the U.S. State Department considers South Africa's new constitution "a step in the right direction." It is a mystery to serious students of African affairs how U.S. diplomatic strategy fails to recognize that the new constitution can only lead to more pervasive racial polarization, increasing rather than diminishing the likelihood of racial conflict.

The white-ruled government may, as our State Department insists, have a hidden agenda for progress in human

and civil rights; however, it has yet to surface — the Group Areas Act that controls the segregated racial communities is still enforced; blacks' access to urban areas remains strictly

region in mythical East-West terms, rather than acknowledging the validity of the nationalist struggles of a people desperate only for the most elementary human and civil rights.



**Congressman Dixon with Bernadette Mosala of the South African Council of Churches: "Constructive engagement has resulted in few if any concessions in rights for black South Africans"**

controlled; blacks must carry passes to go from place to place; authorities continue to undertake forced removals of large communities of blacks from their homes to distant, less prosperous lands where they cannot find jobs or even farm successfully; and the worst indignity of all, the continuing, methodical denationalization of the black citizenry.

#### THE STATE OF OUR RELATIONS

By assessing the U.S. voting record in the United Nations, one can clearly see that Washington is pioneering a new relationship with Pretoria. Unfortunately, the new U.S. love for South Africa has not given birth to any benefits for blacks living under apartheid.

Our goal should be to speed the transition to a nonracial society in South Africa. All of the other legitimate objectives the U.S. is pursuing for the region would flow naturally from that. The entire region is left at risk, though, when any fragile peace agreements that are negotiated or brokered by the U.S. frustrate the legitimate goals of southern Africa's black majority. The United States mistakenly sees the re-

The administration is duplicitous when it winks at UNITA or the antigovernment rebels in Mozambique, while inveighing against the ANC and SWAPO. It is deceitful when it avoids the international arms embargo against South Africa and licenses the sale of equipment on the State Department munitions list to that outlaw nation. It is naive if it supposes that constructive engagement has had any discernable positive impact within South Africa's borders. (Yet another example: The U.S. is still attempting, with embarrassingly little success, to get South Africa to sign the international treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and to accept outside inspection of its nuclear facilities. Pretoria says it will talk about it.)

In sum, the United States alone cannot eliminate apartheid. It must be pragmatic, though, and attempt to deal with all the parties in the conflict, especially the groups that are clearly the most important to black South Africans. The U.S., by pursuing this course, could bring about real and lasting progress. □

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# Tom Bradley, Mayor of Los Angeles

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INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

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**AFRICA REPORT:** Could you describe the work of the Mayor's Task Force for Africa/Los Angeles Relations?

**BRADLEY:** We formed the Task Force in 1978 with the purpose of increasing two-way exchange in the area of education, culture, commerce, and trade between the Los Angeles area and several of the African nations. We visited five African countries in 1979 to launch this program and it has been very successful in the field of cultural exchange. In 1981, we held an exhibit in Los Angeles, "Treasures of Ancient Nigeria: Legacy of 2000 Years," one of the most spectacular art exhibits ever held in our city. We have continued to work on educational exchange involving students from both Africa and the Los Angeles area. Our most ambitious program has been in the field of commerce and trade. We have been able to develop contacts in Guinea, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Cameroon that have produced orders for timber from Africa in the amount of about \$3 million. We have held additional negotiations on trade and investment valued at over \$3 million that we think will be successful as well. We have had several programs involved in trade in Africa that deal with everything from cosmetics to ultraviolet water purification systems, so it has been a very rewarding experience.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What led you to set up the task force?

**BRADLEY:** We had long been very actively involved in educational matters, as thousands of African students attend the universities in the Los Angeles area. We felt that there was an opportunity for an increase in our cultural exchanges as we've had a number of troupes and exhibits from Africa here, but we felt that that could be enhanced. We decided that the main area in which there was practically no activity was in the field of commerce and trade. We are looked upon as being so far away from Africa that hardly anybody ever thought of that as a possibility. We thought it did have merit and went over to explore. We were able to bring together representatives from some of the African countries and our fishing industry, our tuna industry. We were able to take some people in the timber industry to Africa. They found a goldmine there in terms of the kinds of wood products that are badly in need here and not available anywhere else in the world.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What have been the difficulties in promoting trade and commerce between Africa and southern California?

**BRADLEY:** I think the relative strength of the American dollar and the economic difficulties in some of the African

countries have been an impediment to substantial trade between our country and African nations. But we believe that these constraints can be overcome and we are continuing to work at it.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What products do you manufacture in southern California that are appropriate exports to Africa?

**BRADLEY:** Everything. We have perhaps one of the most diversified regions in the country in terms of products produced, from aircraft to electronics, from the smallest items of hardware to the large wide-body airplanes. We can also help with technology exchange in the field of agriculture. All of these are fine subjects for trade between Africa and the Los Angeles region.

**AFRICA REPORT:** There are a number of corporations



**Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley:  
Strengthening ties of friendship and trade  
between southern California and black Africa**

S. Romilly



in California with substantial investments in South Africa. Is the task force's promotion of trade and commerce with black African countries a way of offsetting ties between California-based corporations and South Africa?

**BRADLEY:** No, the task force was not designed for that purpose. It is strictly aimed at strengthening the ties of friendship and trade between the southern California area and the black African nations. There was no thought whatsoever about what impact this would have on companies doing business in South Africa.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Have black businesses in California shown a particular interest in expanding trade with Africa?

**BRADLEY:** We have encouraged that. Some of them are thus far not able to make the connection. But one company, a cosmetics firm based in Los Angeles, was a part of our trade mission in 1979, and did in fact establish substantial contracts in one of the African countries.

**AFRICA REPORT:** It seems that the Reagan administration favors promoting private enterprise and the "magic of the marketplace" as an approach to development in the Third World at the expense of official development assistance and financial support for multilateral aid organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Do you think this is a reasonable approach to take with regard to Africa?

**BRADLEY:** I don't think that it is reasonable to expect that that concept is going to work in light of the serious economic woes that are experienced in some of the Third World and African nations.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Do you think there is black political consensus developing on foreign policy issues, and, if not, how do you think it could be developed?

**BRADLEY:** I don't believe there is a consensus at this point. But there are certainly a number of very strong black congressional leaders who have a particular interest in foreign affairs. But I don't think there is any broad-gauged awareness or interest or consensus among the masses of blacks on foreign policy issues.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Is Africa a major foreign policy concern among black Americans at this point in time?

**BRADLEY:** On the basis of my experience, contacts, and discussions with people, it is not. I believe that blacks in this country have not fully appreciated the tremendous importance of Africa to the United States and its foreign policy. I think that as this growing interest develops, we'll see a greater awareness and a stronger degree of pressure on the U.S. to respond fully to this tremendous possibility and potential.

**AFRICA REPORT:** How has Jesse Jackson's candidacy affected the role of blacks in the political process?

**BRADLEY:** On the question of blacks involved in the political process, I think there is no question about it. The rate of voter registration among blacks and the high turnout experienced in the primaries has clearly demonstrated that Jesse Jackson has been a force in that regard. I think that New York is perhaps the best example of the tremendous outpouring of interest, given the huge turnout that was experienced in the primaries. □



Timber in Gabon: "Our contacts have produced orders for timber from Africa in the amount of \$3 million"

# The Economics of Desperation

BY JOANMARIE KALTER

**M**ozambique is a country in economic collapse:

- Drought has killed an estimated 100,000 people and left another four million threatened by starvation.
- Guerrillas of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) have penetrated nine of 10 provinces, burning villages, attacking railway lines, mining roads — making relief efforts impossible in many areas.
- Sick and hungry peasants have begun fleeing into neighboring Zimbabwe at the rate of 1,000 a week.
- January's cyclone "Domoina" ravaged agricultural projects, swept bridges away, and inundated whole villages. In Inhambane province alone, the storm left 80 percent of the citrus trees uprooted.
- At a shop in Magul, in Gaza province, the scene is typical: peasants trade chestnuts for tea, matches, tinned sardines — the only goods available. Local currency is worthless, a villager explains. "At least chestnuts the people can eat."

It is against this backdrop of starvation, war, and natural disaster that the Mozambican government has now struck a deal of its own, bartering its stance against apartheid for a surprising peace with South Africa, and for the same reason as the peasants in Magul: at least the people can eat. For years, the Mozambican economy has been



Camerapix

**"Mozambique's government, headed by Samora Machel, has remained one of the best intentioned, most idealistic, and least corrupt in the world"**

locked in a downward spiral — crippled by the legacy of Portuguese colonialism, battered by South African-backed sabotage, withered by three straight years of drought, and wracked by its own mismanagement. Today, the country is desperate. As one of the delegates to the talks with South Africa bluntly put it, "If we continued our past policies, there would soon be nothing left to destroy in Mozambique."

So for a new beginning, Mozambique now looks to the past, hoping its new security pact, signed in March, will lead to agreements on tourism, trade, and energy exchange. If these go through, South Africans will once again lounge in the hotels and beach houses of Mozambique's coastal resorts. More migrant mine workers will bring home needed remittances. South

African boats will receive fishing licenses and Mozambican harbors will enjoy increased South African use and investment. A joint takeover of the Portuguese-controlled Cabora Bassa dam will presumably end the MNR sabotage that left power lines down for six months last year, will provide South Africa with cheap energy, and give Mozambique a steady stream of revenue.

But all this has its price. The agreements would lead Mozambique back to its vassal-like status as a service sector for South Africa. They would undercut the efforts of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to break Pretoria's economic hegemony in the region. And the weight of this turnaround has already fallen most heavily on a besieged African National Congress (ANC). In return for South Africa's withdrawal of support for the MNR, Mozambique has agreed to cease providing sanctuary for the ANC. The past nine months have seen Lesotho, Swaziland, and now Mozambique cut back their support to the merely moral and diplomatic level. And the sealing of these borders will undoubtedly set back the struggle against apartheid.

What makes Mozambique's plight all the more poignant is its vast potential. It is rich in resources, with reserves of coal and other strategic minerals. The country is crossed by nine river systems and blessed with the longest coastline in Africa. Its 12 million people are scattered on land twice the size of California; indeed, of 150 million acres of arable pastures and forests, less than 7 percent are currently utilized.

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
Joanmarie Kalter is a freelance journalist who has traveled throughout southern Africa and recently returned from Mozambique.

The Frelimo party rode to power in 1975 virtually unopposed. With no landless peasants, Frelimo was not faced with the problems of traditional land reform, nor was there a richly landed class to block its socialist goals. The government, headed by President Samora Machel, has remained one of the best intentioned, most idealistic, and least corrupt in all of the world.

What went wrong? To some degree, as with all developing countries, Mozambique has been caught in the squeeze of a changing world economy. The truck that Mozambique could buy for 5.3 tons of cotton in 1975 cost 13 tons of cotton in 1982. While a ton of Mozambican sugar had the value of a ton of steel in 1975, that steel was worth four tons of sugar by 1982. And during the same period, the price of oil shot up fourfold; Mozambique spent \$235 million in 1980 on oil alone — more than half the total value of its exports.

But Mozambique also inherited deeply embedded economic problems all its own. Before independence, a sign outside city hall in the capital proclaimed, "Here is Portugal." It more correctly should have read, "Here is a satellite of South Africa." Portugal was a developing country itself, on the verge of bankruptcy, and lacking the export capital necessary for Mozambique's development. Because agriculture, mining, and industry contributed a mere 37 percent of total gross national product, the colonial economy was essentially subsidized by its neighbor. The port of Maputo flourished as the nearest outlet for South Africa's minerals and industry. And the remittances of migrant mine workers kept the colonials afloat. Under a 1928 accord, South Africa provided Portugal with 60 percent of migrant wages in gold. With that gold supplied at a fixed price, well below the world rate, Portugal could sell it, pay its miners, and pocket a substantial profit.

But with independence, South Africa launched what Mozambique now calls "an undeclared war" on both the economic and military fronts. Employment of Mozambican miners plummeted 60 percent, from 118,000 men in 1975 to 41,000 in 1977 — where, roughly, it has remained. The following year, South Africa unilaterally withdrew its



fixed-price remittances in gold. The resulting loss in revenues amounted to a staggering \$2.6 billion — almost twice the size of the \$1.4 billion debt owed to Western governments, banks, and international financial institutions that Mozambique must now reschedule.

South Africa slashed its rail and harbor traffic as well, especially over the last three years. In 1973, Maputo handled 6.8 million tons of South African exports and imports; by 1983, after South Africa had built its own port at Richard's Bay, only an estimated 1.1 million tons entered or left Maputo. The harbor now stands near idle, with a spare capacity of 9 million tons a year.

Yet no economic war can quite compare with the devastation of a military struggle. From Rhodesian border incursions to the South African-backed MNR guerrilla movement, independent Mozambique has known barely a day of peace. In the past two years, according to the government, the cost of the war — together with direct attacks by South African armed forces — has roughly equalled the total value of its exports.

Still, it is in the war-torn villages of the countryside where the true human price has been paid.

The roads outside Chibuto, in Gaza province, can only be traveled with a military escort — convoys of soldiers in front and behind. The escort winds past one village where empty, charred buildings are all that remain. At another, villagers dig trenches to protect themselves, and show visitors the food they live on: ground leaves. What little the drought has not ruined here the rebels have taken away.

The MNR, now an estimated 10,000 strong, has been unable to translate Mozambique's economic depression into widespread political unrest. But no resistance movement could so cripple a country without some support from hungry, disgruntled peasants.

Gathered in Changanine, one of 11 camps in Gaza, are women and children displaced by the fighting between both sides. They have received no food in three months. They are covered with scabies. Some have cholera. A woman named Enora suckles her 18-month-old baby — his belly bloated, his hair turned copper — at a dry and withered breast. She has been here five months, she says, ever since her husband went looking for food and never came back. Did he join the MNR? Was he killed by them? She cannot say. "We have both friends and enemies in this camp," says an official. "We cannot tell them apart."

It may be true that the MNR would collapse without South African support. But it is undeniable that Mozambique itself has contributed to its own decline. With a population that is 85 percent rural, agriculture is central to its long-term development. Yet with independence, and the flight of the Portuguese, Mozambique made a grave mistake. It turned abandoned colonial plantations into large state farms, neglecting to nurture cooperatives, and providing no support to the millions of family farmers. This was to be a quick solution: state farms would prevent the plantations from falling into ruin, rapidly produce exports, and meet the food needs of the cities. The family sector would make do on its own. In fact, it has been a disaster. Food imports have risen. Foreign exchange has

been squandered. Total production has declined.

Sadly, these problems could have been foreseen. Portugal had left Mozambique profoundly underdeveloped not only in infrastructure, but in human resources. At independence, a staggering 93 percent of all those above age seven were illiterate. Of 3,800 students at the university in 1974, only 40 were black. Unlike Africans in neighboring countries, black Mozambicans had been barred from running their own businesses — indeed, from all but the most menial labor. With the lightning exodus of skilled Portuguese — their numbers falling from 200,000 to 20,000 in a matter of months — banks, factories, and hospitals were left to be run by people who until then had only swept the floors.

There was, therefore, almost a total lack of technical and managerial expertise in modern agriculture. Yet state farms require a high degree of both. From plowing to harvesting, tasks must be done precisely on schedule. Machinery must work. And the costs are simply enormous: in 1978, heavy equipment for state farms consumed \$25 million of the \$38.5 million budgeted for agricultural development.

But given the lack of expertise, machinery purchased was not always appropriate; and when it broke down, repairs were difficult. In the fertile Limpopo Valley of southern Mozambique, the Limpopo Agro-Industrial Complex (CAIL) imported combines that could not harvest the kind of rice planted in 1978: 30,000 volunteers were called in to pick the crop by hand. The need for spare parts taxed the country's limited foreign exchange. Of CAIL's 200 tractors for the 1979-80 season, 130 did not run.

State farms such as CAIL came to dominate the production of marketed crops, and reaped some modest gains. According to Allen and Barbara Isaacman, authors of *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution*, with 4 percent of the land under state cultivation in 1981, state farms produced 15 percent of all agricultural output and 56 percent of marketed produce. But population growth and increased consumer demand from higher wages drove food imports up each year. And

by 1981, imported food accounted for more than half of all imported consumer goods.

Most significantly, in that year the Ministry of Agriculture admitted that not a single state farm had been profitable. Greater mechanization required greater productivity to cover costs. While state farms thus had to produce at least two tons of corn per acre, they in fact produced half a ton. At CAIL, outputs of rice reached only 1.1 tons per acre (in comparison, Spain reaped 2.6 tons and China 3.6). In a forthcoming book, Joseph Hanlon notes that with the majority of state farm purchases — fuel, fertilizer, machinery, and pesticides — paid in foreign exchange, it actually would have been cheaper to import this grain than produce it.

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**“Peasants trade chestnuts for tea, matches, tinned sardines — the only goods available. Local currency is worthless, a villager explains. ‘At least chestnuts people can eat.’”**

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In land-rich Mozambique, every peasant — even workers on state farms and cooperatives — has a family plot. In colonial times, peasants had been forced into agricultural labor, working six months a year on Portuguese plantations, then returning to their own land. In independent Mozambique, however, the pattern was not far different. Many put in their time on state farms, but with only a wage and no stake in the farms' productivity, they turned their attention to the family plots. According to Fernando Sambo, director of the agricultural research station in the Limpopo Valley, “Family farms here are more productive. The people feel closer to the land, they are dedicated to it. They care.” For all the government's good intentions, then, and for all the resources poured into the state sector, its essential socialist goal was not met: the relationship of the worker to the state had not changed.

With state farms doomed to failure,

cooperatives may provide the only practical model for modernizing peasant agriculture in Mozambique. Investment of scarce resources in a cooperative serves more people than investment in an individual farm. But in Mozambique, coops have not received that help. In 1977, there were 180 cooperatives with 25,000 members; in 1981, there were 375 with 37,000 members. In those four years, cooperatives received only 2 percent of agricultural investment.

The state encouraged peasants to join by promising them seeds, tractors, and other inputs. But at the 1980 Conference on Cooperatives, peasants complained that these came too late, or never arrived. Nor were the peasants trained in the difficult tasks of collective decision making: how to organize the work, market the produce, and divide the profits. Though there have been some successes, coop production overall fell by 50 percent from 1979 to 1981.

Frelimo had intended agricultural cooperatives to become the core around which members would later build housing and set up schools, shops, and clinics. Such “communal villages” would gather the widely dispersed population, raise the peasants' living standards, and discourage migration to the cities. In fact, the villages often preceded the coops and the coops never took hold.

*Tres de Fevereiro* is a communal village in Gaza province. Like many others, it was formed in response to a natural disaster — the floods that swept lowland areas in 1977 — rather than evolving from a cooperative core. Indeed, its agricultural coop is its only striking failure.

The coop has been hit hard by the drought, as have the villagers' family farms. But those farms have remained more productive. As Jose Siteo, Frelimo's organizing secretary in the village, explains: “The cooperative's land is especially dry. And when the water pump broke, it couldn't be irrigated, even though it's right near a river. The land there is vast, so planting and irrigating need to be planned and organized. The family farms are smaller. They could respond faster and more easily to the drought.” The coop's

members would spend half their time on the coop fields, half on their own farms. But as the drought wore on, they devoted less time to the coop. With 111 original members, only 40 remain. What is worse, in the long run, the coop's failure has only reinforced the peasants' more backward and traditional farming practices.

But Mozambique's greatest agricultural mistake has been its total neglect of the family farmer. Before independence, this peasant sector produced one-third of all marketed goods, including almost all the cashews and half the cotton — Mozambique's two main exports. As they also produced food for themselves, they accounted for three-quarters of the country's total agriculture. But with so much of independent Mozambique's resources devoted to state farms, the family sector received few tools, seeds, or extension support. For instance, where colonial Mozambique produced 700,000 hoes per year — crucial to the family farmer — independent Mozambique produced less than half that.

The crisis in the family sector is due, most of all, to a lack of consumer goods. Shortly after independence, Mozambique's entire marketing network collapsed. Of 6,000 Portuguese and Indian shopkeepers and traders, all but 2,000 fled. They took their trucks as capital and drove off into South Africa, Rhodesia, and Swaziland. Where the

country once had about 1,600 such vehicles, it was left with about six.

Frelimo encouraged private shopkeepers to return and sent marketing brigades to rural areas to purchase peasant surpluses. By 1981, a new marketing network was in place, and there are now again about 6,000 traders throughout Mozambique.

Still, the problems remain. Too few trucks have been allocated. Roads are impassable from rebel activity. Many of the new traders are inexperienced, and the government has no programs to assist them. According to Vincent Tickner of Agricom, the state wholesaler, of the roughly 250 in the marketing staff for Zambezia province, only 12 were employed before 1979.

But the biggest problem is that the government has given priority to the purchase of machinery and capital goods for state farms, and has spent little on supplying the peasants with what they want: sugar, salt, soap, cloth, bicycles. Peasants have lots of money and nothing to spend it on. Tickner calculates that for every five meticaïs a peasant received for his crops in 1982, he could buy only two meticaïs' worth of goods. Throughout Mozambique, people have reverted to the barter system. And the black market thrives. A dollar brings 40 meticaïs at the official rate; on the black market it can fetch 1,000. And private traders, who buy South African goods in Swaziland, can

make huge profits selling almost anything. In some places, even the army and state farms reportedly pay double for the locally grown food they buy. Some estimate that fully half of all peasant produce is marketed this way, making guesswork of any official production figures.

But the inevitable result is that with little to buy, peasants have little incentive to produce. A Western food broker estimates that of 250,000 metric tons of cashews grown last year, only 27,000 tons reached the factories; peasants ate what they gathered, and didn't bother to pick any more. Cotton production has plummeted to its lowest level in decades as peasants switch from cash crops to food crops, and grow only what they need. A vicious cycle is set in motion. Fewer consumer goods drive down surplus production; that depresses exports and leads to fewer foreign exchange earnings. With less foreign exchange, fewer consumer goods reach the stores.

At the bottom line, Mozambique faces a critical balance of payments problem. As exports (mainly sugar, cashew nuts, cotton, tea, and shrimp) have decreased by half, imports (mainly equipment, oil, spare parts, and raw materials) have surged, leaving Mozambique with an accumulated deficit over the last four years of roughly \$1 billion.

The neglect of Mozambique's family agriculture has moved many to seek jobs in the cities. Food rationing, begun in Maputo in 1980, attracted the hungry from the countryside; by mid-1982, Maputo had to issue residence cards, entitling the holder to a share of the basics — sugar, cereals, beans, peanuts, soap, and cooking oil. Maputo, a city built for 250,000, has now swelled to 850,000. Decrepit shantytowns stretch for miles around the center of the city. People line up at shops before dawn, hoping some produce will be for sale. With no credit, there is little gas, and shortages spark long lines at service stations; with no goods, many clubs, restaurants, and cafes have closed. A pall has settled on Maputo.

There has been much talk since independence about these problems, but only recently has anything been done.



At Changaniné, a camp in Gaza for women and children displaced by fighting between the MNR and government forces

Joanmarie Kaller

The Fourth Party Congress, held in 1983, resolved to divert resources from the state farms, and Joao Ferreira, a man known for his support of the family sector, became the new agriculture minister — the fourth since independence. The disastrous CAIL was broken up into smaller units, and much of the underused land redistributed to peasant and private farmers. Millions of hand tools have been imported along with \$1 million of used clothing bought from the United States for sale in rural shops. A new policy of decentralization has sent many of the government's officials into the rural areas to be in better touch with Mozambique's ground-level reality. And in 1982, in an effort to break the urban bias, both producer and consumer prices of corn, cassava, and other products were raised by 50 percent.

Most dramatically, Mozambique has changed its stance toward the West. From 1978 to 1982, the Soviet Union poured in about \$350 million in military aid, but only about half that in economic aid. Mozambique is now actively seeking Western investment. It will soon join the European Economic Community's Lomé Convention, and talks have opened for membership in the International Monetary Fund. President Machel has promised a foreign investment code. Already, in the first large American private investment since independence, Exxon has signed an onshore oil exploration agreement, and seismic testing is now underway in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique's northernmost province.

Indeed, relations with the United States have changed most of all. Only three years ago, Mozambique expelled four American diplomats on charges of spying for the CIA. President Reagan responded by cutting all planned aid except emergency food assistance. Today, there is a new ambassador in Maputo, and the State Department recently passed a partial waiver of its ban on developmental assistance, allowing the flow of U.S. aid to specific projects. In a stunning reversal, Mozambican officials now credit Reagan's "constructive engagement" policy — which they so recently decried — as the key to their new accord with South Africa.

While many Mozambicans welcome

the broadening of foreign ties, there are some who are dubious about its change in agricultural strategy, suspecting this may undermine the country's socialist successes. An example is *Dezesseis de Junho*, one of 144 cooperatives that surround Maputo in what are known as the "green zones." Since 1981, these small abandoned Portuguese farms have been supplying food for the city. Here, the 38 members — 35 of them women — grow cauliflower, lettuce, potatoes, and onions, and raise chickens and pigs. With no irrigation, no well or water pump, they produced almost four times their target yield this year. With the profit, they paid off the

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**“The U.S. would like to call it a ‘diplomatic triumph.’ Yet the talks reflect little more than Mozambique’s economic desperation.”**

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equivalent of \$8,000 on their \$56,000 bank loan, invested in a refrigerator, and distributed the rest in monthly dividends to their members. Nor is *Dezesseis de Junho* unique; about half of the green zones cooperatives have been almost as successful.

Prosperino Gallipoli is the passionate, socialist ex-priest who oversees their progress. "See these profits," he says, pointing emphatically and eagerly to page after page of figures. "This is how people discover their abilities, build their confidence. These are more than farms, they are schools for human development."

Gallipoli would like to advance further loans to the most successful coops for offices, warehouses, trucks, and windmills. "They can be fully independent, productive enterprises," he says. But he is also pessimistic. "I see a crisis at the government level. And I am afraid that if coops become too strong, the state apparatus will want to destroy them. They will threaten the bureaucrats' power."

Though the government has lost faith in state farms, he says, it still believes in quick results. And for that reason, it is now turning more to the small private

sector rather than to cooperatives. Indeed, the Central Committee told the Fourth Congress that private and family farmers will provide "a short-term solution to the current food supply problems." Shortly after his appointment, the new Agriculture Minister Ferreira met with the private farmers of Maputo province and promised them credit, seeds, and machinery. Some who fled to Portugal are being encouraged to return. And though Gallipoli and others believe the private sector can help, they insist this is no solution to Mozambique's long-term problems: the modernizing and socializing of peasant agriculture. Private farming will mostly benefit a few, they say, and only increase the country's class differences.

Nor will it be easy to dismantle the state-farm sector. Though unprofitable, the country now depends on its production, and a hopelessly clogged bureaucracy impedes significant change. A planned 100 million-acre state farm in the north, to be run by Rumanians, is still going forward, despite the conclusions of the Fourth Party Congress. And Mozambique has set its 1985 corn productivity targets on the remaining farms at one ton per acre — twice the current yield, but still half that needed for profitability. The government will apparently still subsidize these large and inefficient ventures.

The Mozambicans now place their greatest hope for change in help from South Africa. On the streets of Maputo, the rapprochement receives high praise. But officials here and abroad seem deluded. In Mozambique, they say gloatingly that South Africa has bent under the weight of its own difficulties. The U.S. government would like to call it a "diplomatic triumph." Yet in fact, the talks reflect little more than Mozambique's economic desperation. By its own policies, and those of South Africa, the country has been beaten to the ground. Whether Pretoria can be trusted to call off the MNR remains to be seen. Certainly, Mozambique now has no alternative. But returning South African investment to the level of 10 years ago can only deepen Mozambique's dependence, and provide Pretoria with a heavy club should Mozambique need beating once again. □

# The Nkomati Accords

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BY JOSÉ LUIS CABAÇO

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The Nkomati Accord is a result of Mozambican policies whose origins can be traced back to the founding of the national liberation movement, Frelimo, 22 years ago. These policies, the pursuit of peace and national sovereignty, were adhered to by Frelimo's first president, the late Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, and have remained constant features of Mozambique's political position ever since.

Under Mondlane's leadership, Frelimo explored every avenue for a peaceful solution to the problem of Portuguese colonialism before embarking on an arduous armed struggle that cost the lives of thousands of Mozambicans. And in 10 years of anticolonial war, Frelimo tenaciously defended the principle of national sovereignty, never bowing to the wishes of foreign powers, even friendly powers.

Mondlane's belief in peace and national sovereignty has been consolidated by President Samora Machel, and these principles are enshrined in the constitution that was adopted when independence was finally won in 1975. But it has to be admitted that Mozambique's leaders have not been able to convince all of the world all of the time that we are serious about these matters.

Both before and after independence, we have been depicted in some countries as (1) warlike and (2) elements in the East-West conflict. We are neither. Mozambique's position in the struggle for Zimbabwean independence proves this. Shortly after our own independence, we were active in promoting the Victoria Falls talks between the Zimbabwean nationalists, the Rhodesians, and the South Africans, which were aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem. Mozambique's representative was Oscar Monteiro, who is now justice minister, and who has played a prominent part in the recent security negotiations with South Africa.

When all attempts to solve the Zimbabwe problem by peaceful means failed, Mozambique gave its full support

to the Zimbabwean liberation movement, composed in 1976 of guerrillas from both ZAPU and ZANU. And it is worth recalling that from the time ZAPU left the alliance later that year, only two countries in the world gave total, unconditional support to ZANU until the end—Mozambique and Tanzania. This was our government's sovereign decision, influenced by no one, and we are proud of it.

Mozambique supported all Zimbabwe peace initiatives, including the Geneva conference at the end of 1976. And when Britain launched its initiative for a settlement in 1979, Mozambique was among the first to see the opportunity for peace and played an active and constructive part at the Lancaster House conference.

The talks Mozambique has held with South Africa are equally a part of this policy of peace and sovereign independence. Mozambique has had contacts with South Africa, aimed at establishing peaceful coexistence, since 1975.

From the time of the first ministerial-level contacts in 1982, Mozambique has proposed the principle of a non-aggression and good-neighborliness pact. Efforts to reach a security agreement with South Africa were not helped by the initial attitude of the Reagan administration, which we felt was one-sided and based on the old idea that Mozambique was a pawn in the East-West cold war.

Perhaps encouraged by Washington's attitude, South Africa became increasingly belligerent towards Mozambique, launching army and air force attacks and recruiting Mozambican malcontents to wage a terror and sabotage campaign against my country.

Over the last few years, however, and after many diplomatic contacts, it appears that the U.S. administration has had the ability to understand the true essence of the conflict in southern Africa and to understand the sovereign nature of the Mozambican state. This has led to agreement on points of view on how to solve the problem of destabilization in southern Africa. Modifications in the U.S. position have been a positive element in the search for peace in the region.

Mozambique will continue to pursue the objectives of defending its national sovereignty and independence, and promoting peace and development. The Nkomati Accord is a part of this policy. □

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José Luis Cabaço is the Mozambican minister of information. The Nkomati Accord, an agreement on nonaggression and good neighborliness, was signed by the governments of Mozambique and South Africa on March 16, 1984.

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# The People's Platform

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*The People's Platform, a document that examines a number of domestic and international issues and presents a series of policy recommendations to which candidates for public office in the 1984 election will be asked to respond, has been put forward as an alternative to the policies of the Reagan administration, the effects of which have been felt very keenly in black America.*

*The platform was prepared by the National Black Coalition for 1984, in conjunction with the National Black Leadership Roundtable (NBLR). The coalition is headed by the Reverend Joseph E. Lowery, president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The NBLR is headed by Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy (D-D.C.) and is composed of the heads of more than 150 national black organizations, representing civil rights, religious, labor, social fraternal, business, youth, media, and political organizations.*

*The platform was written after issues conferences were convened in states across the country where blacks are a significant percentage of the electorate. The purpose of the platform is to provide blacks in every state with "one standard and one agenda by which to judge all candidates seeking support at the polls in 1984." Excerpted below are the portions of the People's Platform that are relevant to U.S. policy toward Africa.*

## THE PEOPLE'S PLATFORM

### STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE

In the choice between war and peace, we choose the reduction of tension—leading to peace—through the instrument of diplomatic negotiation and a policy of nonmilitary intervention. An immediate reduction of tensions can be achieved by elimination of the East-West framework for United States relations with other nations, especially with the Third World. We specifically encourage a North-South

dialogue with Third World nations to rectify imbalances wrought by neocolonialism and an overreliance on East-West confrontation as a means for determining foreign policy. Moreover, we firmly believe in the right to self-determination for all peoples, and that human and political rights must be respected.

This requires a foreign policy characterized by sensitivity to the basic security and development needs and sharing of international resources. It also requires the mutual elimination of weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the worldwide arms trade that diverts precious resources from the process of development.

Finally, we note with concern the virtual absence of minorities and women in the nation's foreign policy-making apparatus. In order to secure the best talent, and to guarantee that sensitivity to and interest in all parts of the world are brought to bear—in the national best interest—on the making of U.S. foreign policy, we urge greater participation by minorities and women at all levels in U.S. foreign policy-making.

### SOUTH AFRICA

The Reagan administration swiftly unveiled a new policy toward South Africa. Called "constructive engagement" by its proponents, it purportedly was designed to encourage South Africa to gradually discard the most odious elements of its apartheid system; to hasten an international settlement and an end to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia; and to defuse tensions in southern Africa caused—in the main—by South Africa's repeated acts of aggression and destabilization against sovereign neighboring states.

Constructive engagement—flawed and wrong-headed from its inception—has been a dismal failure. More critically, it has provided tacit encouragement to the racist Pretoria regime, and has given it a shield behind which it could



increase its desultory tactics on the Namibia negotiations mandated by UN Resolution 435; tighten the noose of oppression on its indigenous population through its homelands policy, state-sponsored terrorism, torture, and detention of those who oppose apartheid; and increase acts of military aggression. Constructive engagement places the United States firmly on the side of a pariah state that has violated all norms of international law and conduct. It has discredited the United States in the eyes of would-be allies,



and has, ironically, created a situation in which Soviet influence in Africa may increase as the official United States position on South Africa continually is repudiated.

Constructive engagement must be immediately discarded in favor of a more stringent, compelling stand against South Africa. Elements of constructive engagement—including the relaxation of trade restrictions and arms embargos, the exchange of high-level military missions, the opening of more South African consulates in the United States, the provision of landing rights to South Africa Airlines, and U.S. support for South Africa in multilateral organizations—must be rescinded. For example, the U.S.' shameful support for the recent \$1 billion International Monetary Fund loan to South Africa—a loan amount which, not so coincidentally, tracks the amount of South Africa's projected military buildup—can only increase instability in the region.

With particular regard to Namibia, the United States has

permitted the negotiations to sink in a quagmire of its own making. By introducing an irrelevant issue—Cuban troop presence in Angola—the United States has given South Africa yet another reason to act in bad faith on the question of ending its illegal occupation. The United States must immediately uncouple the Cuban troop question—an issue not at all a part of UN Resolution 435, and the result of a bilateral agreement between two sovereign nations in keeping with Angola's urgent defense needs because of repeated South African incursions and financial support of antigovernment guerrillas—from the ongoing negotiations. Since the other parties to the negotiations have continued to strive for Resolution 435's implementation, the United States must adopt a firmer policy and use all means at its disposal to secure South African cooperation, including the implementation of various political and economic pressures or multilateral sanctions permitted by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

Finally, the policy of constructive engagement, and its tacit support for the racist regime, flies in the face of repeated bipartisan pronouncements of U.S. support of the political freedoms, civil liberties, and human rights of all the peoples in the region. The denial of democratic majority rule in South Africa and Namibia places the economic development of the region and U.S. economic and strategic interests at great risk as domestic and trans-country violence escalates. The recent domestic bombings and South African retaliatory raids are but a harbinger of tragedies to come. Without a radically changed policy and salutary actions by the United States, the often predicted upheaval within South Africa and the region will only come more quickly.

#### RECOMMENDATION

The current administration's policy of "constructive engagement" towards South Africa has been thoroughly discredited. The policy must be immediately abandoned in favor of a more realistic, and more compelling, policy of isolation of South Africa until it ends the repugnant policies of apartheid; provides full human and political rights for all its citizens, including the majority black population; and ends the wanton acts of aggression against sovereign neighboring states in the southern African region.

- The United States must renew its efforts to secure good-faith negotiations by South Africa on the question of Namibian independence, as required by UN Security Council Resolution 435. In addition, the question of Cuban troops in Angola should be uncoupled from the negotiations.
- In light of South Africa's continued intransigence on the Namibia question, and its repeated incursions against sovereign states within the southern African region amounting to a campaign of destabilization, the United States must consider imposition of comprehensive economic and political sanctions as permitted by Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
- The arms embargo against South Africa must be reimposed without conditions.
- All diplomatic links with South Africa in this country including the opening of new consulates, visits by military attachés and other high-ranking government officials, aircraft landing rights, training of military and security personnel, and provision of other services should be curtailed until South Africa conforms its behavior to international norms and law. □

## South Africa presses its neighbors in an effort to isolate ANC, Swapo

Pretoria's success in extracting a nonaggression pact from Mozambique, the revelation that South Africa and Swaziland have had a formal peace agreement for over two years, and recent South Africa-Angola joint military actions have given South Africa's other neighbors reason to be concerned that they too will be pressured into signing agreements. South Africa appears to be trying to recreate the "buffer zone" that it enjoyed before Angola and Mozambique became independent and Zimbabwe gained majority rule.

Botswana and Lesotho have stated that they believe Pretoria is trying to intimidate them as a part of its effort to isolate the banned African National Congress (ANC). Though Botswana and Lesotho insist that there are no ANC military bases on their territories, South African security officials claim that there is "some ANC military activity" in the two nations.

Botswana's President Quett Masire said, "South Africa is bullying us all [frontline states] into signing accords." And Lesotho charges that South Africa is carrying out a constant "campaign of destabilization and unbridled interference" aimed at the government of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan.

Still, southern African states have little choice but to deal with South Africa. The South African foreign minister, R. F. Botha held security talks with his Botswanan counterpart, Archie Mogwe, in Cape Town in February and in March. Botha also met with Lesotho's foreign minister, E.R. Sekhonyana, in Johannesburg in late February and again in April.

As for Zimbabwe, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe said that he supported the Pretoria-Maputo accord, but added that there were signs that South Africa was trying to force Zimbabwe into the same situation in

which Mozambique found itself. Zimbabwe has long claimed that dissidents in Matabeleland are armed and trained by South Africa. But now the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance (MNR)—which, under the Nkomati accords, is supposed to be cut off from South African support—has also taken aim at Zimbabwe. In March, the MNR attacked a convoy of trucks traveling from Malawi to Zimbabwe, causing more than \$2 million in damage. MNR slogans calling for the downfall of Mugabe's government have appeared outside Harare.

### Clashes in Angola

The most disturbing element to the other southern African states is the apparent readiness with which Mozambique and Angola, formerly

Pretoria's staunchest critics, have acquiesced to South Africa's bidding.

The joint monitoring commission of South African and Angolan troops in southern Angola clashed at least three times with Swapo insurgents during March while the South Africans continued their withdrawal into northern Namibia. Angolan troops joined South African forces to seal off a large section of southern Angola to prevent Swapo fighters from filtering into Namibia. South Africa claims to have killed 135 Swapo guerrillas since the joint monitoring commission was set up on February 16. Angola denies that its troops have killed any Swapo forces.

### ANC vows to fight alone

As the Mozambique-South Africa joint security commission met for the first time last month in Maputo, Mozambican soldiers and police raided virtually all the homes of

*Continued on next page*

## Congress ready to compromise and approve sanctions on South Africa

Members of a U.S. House-Senate conference committee on the Export Administration Act are prepared to sit down to a lengthy debate on the differing versions of the legislation. The House version of the bill contains amendments which place controls on U.S. investment in South Africa. The Senate bill has no such restrictions, but Senate staffers have reported that "the senators have indicated a willingness to compromise."

The most controversial part of the legislation is the Gray amendment, which would prohibit new U.S. investment in South Africa. Conference committee member Sen. John Heinz (R-Pa.) was quoted in the *Washington Post* as saying that the Gray amendment "would sink the bill," but a congressional aide commented that Heinz's remark "was not a no-compromise

statement. . . there is room for maneuver."

The House version of the bill also contains four other amendments which ban imports of Krugerrands, prohibit U.S. banks from lending money to South Africa, forbid U.S. nuclear exports to South Africa, and make the Sullivan Principles mandatory for U.S. firms operating in South Africa.

Proponents of the House amendments don't expect to get everything they want, but most are confident that some of the sanctions will survive the conference. "It will be extremely difficult to pass the conference report in the House if all those provisions are dropped," said Rep. William Gray III (D-Pa.).

The Reagan administration has lobbied against the restrictions and threatened to veto the legislation if it contains the sanctions. ■

**SOUTH AFRICA continued**

the ANC in the capital, confiscating weapons and money and detaining several ANC members. Although Mozambique will now be keeping close tabs on the ANC, it has so far resisted South African pressure to completely expel the organization.



Margaret A. Novick

*ANC President Oliver Tambo: Preparing to stand alone*

In Swaziland, police have staged raids throughout the country in search of fugitive ANC members accused of entering illegally from Mozambique. Other South African exiles in Swaziland, many of whom have been living there for years under official refugee status, have been ordered to leave the country.

The ANC issued a statement expressing "grave concern [over the expulsions] particularly since there are persistent reports that some of these refugees may be handed over to the police of the murderous Pretoria regime."

ANC President Oliver Tambo has refrained from criticizing Swaziland and Mozambique and vowed to intensify the struggle. "If we are left to stand alone and fight alone, then that is what we shall do," he said. Tambo has maintained that the ANC has decreased its reliance on outside countries and has infiltrated large numbers of guerrillas into South Africa since the agreement with Mozambique was signed. Tambo said that ANC activity would "reach its highest peak" dur-

ing the next months.

The ANC will now have to use its influence in trade unions, quasi-political organizations and student and church groups to step up its organizing within South Africa. But the ANC's role in legal organizations will have to be delicately balanced to avoid government crackdowns on signs of effective political action.

The nonaggression pacts may have the unexpected result of muting the animosity among the divergent political views of black South Africans. The Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) has called on black South Africans to "galvanize all the forces we can marshal to come together and work out a joint strategy."

**WESTERN AFRICA**

*Army steps in after Sékou Touré dies*

While Guinea was still stunned by the death of President Ahmed Sékou Touré only days before, the armed forces deposed the civilian cabinet. The April 3 coup was led by Col. Lansana Conté, the 39-year-old commander of the Boké region near the border with Guinea-Bissau. Observers believe that the coup was timed to prevent a power struggle among Sékou Touré's close relatives, several of whom were eager to succeed him as head of state.

Sékou Touré, who died during emergency heart surgery in Cleveland, was one of the founding fathers of African nationalism and had been Guinea's only president since independence in 1958.

Two days after the coup, the Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN) announced the formation of Guinea's new government. Conté became president. Col. Diarra Traoré was named prime minister, and six civilians were included among the 30 ministers and two secretaries of state. All three of Guinea's major ethnic groups—the Fulani, the Malinké, and the Sousou—are represented in the new cabinet. (In recent years, Sékou Touré had purged his government of officials not belonging to his own Malinké people.)

According to the CMRN, there was no opposition to the coup, and "not a single shot was fired." Only three days after it took over, the CMRN was able to drop restrictions on union activities, open the airport, and lift the curfew.

The CMRN named the restoration of human rights and the renovation of the Guinean economy as its two highest priorities. The first task

was begun quickly. The new government, calling the Sékou Touré regime a "bloody and merciless dictatorship," announced a general amnesty for all citizens imprisoned under the previous government, and the released political prisoners thronged the streets of Conakry. The CMRN also pledged to examine cases of citizens whose property had been seized by revolutionary committees under Sékou Touré. Conté claimed that no officials from the previous regime would be executed, although many would face trial.

The CMRN then began abolishing many of the socialist economic structures established by Sékou Touré. Many state-run corporations will be privatized, and free enterprise will be encouraged. Although Guinea has enormous potential—with two-thirds of the world's proven bauxite reserves, as well as gold, diamonds, iron ore, uranium, petroleum, and abundant hydroelectric power—its economy was battered by Sékou Touré's destructive policies, which included a complete ban on private business activity. Sékou Touré's political repression also drove at least a million Guineans into exile, further crippling the economy.

French sources claim that the last reserves in Guinea's central bank—17 tons of gold—ran out in the final weeks of Sékou Touré's life, and that the Guinean treasury is now absolutely empty. The CMRN has been warmly welcomed by the Guinean people, but it now must attempt to resurrect the nation's economy after two decades of depression.

## Sankara defies history in challenge to Upper Volta's unions

In Upper Volta—where illiteracy is as high as 90 percent and where party politics have been monopolized by a tiny elite—the trade unions, composed of more than 10,000 civil servants, have dominated political life to an extent unrivalled elsewhere in Africa.

By calling a strike, the unions can cripple Upper Volta's scanty public services at will, causing complete economic paralysis. The unions have used their control over the fragile economy to extract concessions from every government. Going far beyond considerations of salary and work conditions, the unions have insisted on the removal of corrupt public officials, demanded a more equitable distribution of food aid, and forced successive governments to withdraw decisions that the unions considered unjust. One administration was even forced to appoint Zoumana Touré, Upper Volta's most powerful union leader, as minister of labor.

Governments seeking to restrict or outlaw the unions have either been forced to back down after massive strikes or have simply been squeezed out of office by the unions. Since independence in 1960, the trade unions have been instrumental in every change of government; and, until 1982, all of Upper Volta's coups were bloodless, largely because of the unions' power to make governments resign peaceably.

Massive strikes forced President Maurice Yaméogo to abdicate in 1966, pressured President Sangoulé Lamizana to form a civilian government a decade later, and weakened that government so drastically by 1980 that Col. Saye Zerbo seized power. Zerbo's restrictions on union activities and his arrest of Touré were cited among the reasons for his overthrow by Maj. Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo in 1982. In the power struggle between Ouédraogo and his prime minister, Thomas Sankara, who overthrew him last August, the unions supported Sankara.

All of Sankara's predecessors found the unions a constant hindrance. Near the end of the Lamizana government, Upper Volta averaged one strike every three weeks. The unions' strikes and imperious demands have made it impossible for any administration to enact effective austerity measures or a comprehensive development plan.

Since coming to power, Sankara has repeatedly pledged to ensure the independence of the Voltaic labor movement. But recent events indicate that Sankara may become ensnared in a continual wrangle with organized labor.

Sankara's most important innovation is the Revolutionary Defense Committees (CDRs), a "mass movement" seeking to mobilize the populace in a combination of construction, maintenance, and agricultural work. Sankara has stated that the goal of the CDRs is to end

the monopoly over politics once retained by a small elite, but observers believe that he also hopes that the CDRs will counterbalance the enormous power of the trade unions.

One of the teachers' unions, the National Union of African Teachers of Upper Volta (SNEAHV), which helped lead the union drive for a "return to normal constitutional life" in the 1970s, has clashed repeatedly with Sankara, accusing him of "taking anti-worker measures." SNEAHV's criticism is partly motivated by rivalry with Touré's union, the Confederation of Voltaic Unions (CSV), which has close connections to the Patriotic League for Development, a party heavily represented in Sankara's government.

But Touré is also concerned about the possible encroachment of the CDRs on union authority. He said in an interview that "the unions have always been the driving force for democracy in Upper Volta. . . the CDRs are a catch-all. What are they going to do? Inform on people?"

## The Africa Cup goes commercial

The Africa Cup, the championship of Africa's national soccer teams, was held in Abidjan in March. Cameroon defeated Nigeria in the final, 3-1, but the greatest prize may have been won by a Swiss promotional firm, Rofa Sport Management, which was awarded the first contract ever given to market commercial rights during the tournament. The African Football Federation, which runs the tournament, granted Rofa exclusive commercial rights through 1987.

Rofa paid just under \$300,000 for permission to sell and distribute television time, programs and tickets, sponsorship rights, advertisements in official publications and in the stadiums at Abidjan and Bouaké, products bearing the mascots and insignias of the competing teams, and even the contracts to compose special music for the tournament.

While Rofa will reap substantial profits from the deal—one source claimed that Rofa was selling broadcast rights to television stations for \$100,000 each—local merchants were left out in the cold. Small businessmen, who had expected to manufacture the trinkets and paraphernalia normally associated with sporting events, suddenly found that they could not obtain legal rights for any products. Furthermore, although negotiations were underway with African television officials, it was possible that the Africa Cup would not be seen in many African nations unable to pay the high cost of the broadcast rights.

The money paid by Rofa to the Federation will subsidize general operating costs for the tournament and will help defray travel and lodging expenses when the African champions play other teams around the world. Many of those foreign teams are also promoted by Rofa and have benefited from the international exposure the Swiss company provides. The Federation hopes that African soccer will gain new prestige from the same exposure. ■

The resolution of differences between employers and workers will still have to depend on the unions, not the CDRs." So far, Touré has stopped short of stronger criticism.

SNEAHV, however, clashed openly with the government in March. The union went on a two-day strike in response to the arrest of three university teachers accused of "subversive activities." The government retaliated by firing all the teachers who participated in the strike.

In the past, teachers' strikes have usually spread throughout the civil service, inspiring the other unions to join in a crippling general strike. But this time, the government has stood firm. The three arrested teachers have not been released, and the summary dismissal of the strikers was supported by the university students' CDR. The strike has not yet spread to other trade unions.

Sankara remains popular among Voltaic students, and he is counting on their loyalty and the strength of the CDRs to keep the other unions from turning against him. It will be a difficult balance to maintain. No president of Upper Volta has ever been able to retain authority once the trade unions have begun to oppose his policies. ■

## GHANA

### Protests to neighbors

Ghana has protested to Ivory Coast and Togo over their alleged roles in the March 23 infiltration of Ghana by dissidents opposed to the government of Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings. The Ghanaian government claimed to possess "evidence which established beyond all reasonable doubt that some of the dissidents... [were] trained and planned in Ivory Coast and Togo." Seven dissidents were killed by government forces at points near the Ivorian and Togolese borders and three others were captured and executed by firing squad. The executed men had been sentenced to death in absentia for their role in a coup attempt last June.

Meanwhile, the government has proceeded with its austerity mea-

## Press notes

The *Washington Times* has published a series of editorials criticizing the Reagan administration's policies in southern Africa. The thrust of the paper's commentary is that the U.S. should be actively working for the overthrow of the MPLA government in Angola and the entrenchment of the South Africans in Namibia because a South African withdrawal would leave the "pro-democratic" forces in the area, presumably Unita, "scrapping for whatever they could negotiate, which would end up being a choice between the firing squad and the crocodile pit."

"The political future of Namibia remains uncertain," says the *Times*, "and will so continue as long as a single Cuban soldier remains on Angolan soil, imperiling the free choice of Namibia's voters if the territory is declared independent."

Much of the *Times*' reporting from Angola has come from Fred Reed, a.k.a. Rick Venable, roving correspondent for *Soldier of Fortune*.

### *Doe squeezes, Stevens eases*

After closing down the independent *Daily Observer* for its "hostile" attitudes, the government of Liberian head of state Samuel Doe arrested Willis Knuckles, a writer for the paper. Knuckles was detained after filing a report with the foreign press about the shutdown of the *Daily Observer*. Liberia is now without a daily newspaper.

In neighboring Sierra Leone, however, the press has recovered some of its freedom after 11 newspapers ceased publishing in late 1983. At least five independent newspapers have been revived so far this year. Difficulties in publishing the government papers have apparently led the authorities to relax the restrictions placed on independent publications. The independent press in Sierra Leone has traditionally been outspoken, covering stories of corruption and ethnic unrest ignored by the government press.

### *BBC 'Rocks the Botha'*

The South African embassy in London has lodged an official protest to the BBC over the airing of a show called "Rocking the Botha." The embassy reported that in the show "three draft dodgers spoke of sickness and brutality within South African society."

The show in question was produced under a 10-year-old program in which the BBC provides different groups with a camera crew, production facilities, and a free editorial hand in putting together a show. Three white South Africans now living in Britain were responsible for this particular broadcast.

South African officials specifically objected to a satirical skit in which a black house maid, described as an "afromatic," ("the efficient, economical South African labor-saving device which does the job indoors or out") is hauled off by men dressed as South African police. The officials complained that the scene left the impression that it had been filmed in South Africa when it was actually staged in Britain. ■

asures. The cedi, Ghana's unit of currency, was devalued by 14.3 percent in the 1984 budget announced in March; that move comes after last October's 90 percent devaluation. The Trades Union Congress (TUC) had demanded a 1000 percent increase in the minimum wage, but Rawlings' government felt that 60 percent was the largest possible increase within IMF guidelines. The devaluation, by narrowing the

gulf between official and black-market currency exchange rates, is expected to reduce inflation and help control smuggling and shortages of food. But it will reduce the actual gain to be derived by workers from the increased minimum wage.

In his speech on the anniversary of Ghanaian independence, Rawlings announced plans to form a representative national assembly. Rawlings said that "the govern-

ments and people of our country have failed to work together to implement policies and programs. . . and that "there is evidence of mounting despair, deepening apathy, and growing withdrawal and rejection of national responsibility on the part of the ordinary people." Rawlings pledged that, in preparation for the new political structure, the membership of the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) would be enlarged and other mass movements—including farmers' groups, women's organizations, the trade unions, and youth movements—would be consulted. The new national assembly will be the supreme organ of the government, and "the primary task" of the executive body of the PNDC is now to supervise the transition to the proposed national assembly. ■

**GUINEA-BISSAU**  
Refuge and a storm

In March, President João Bernardo Vieira dismissed his prime minister, Victor Saúde Maria, for "plotting against the security of the state." Brig. Gen. Paulo Correia replaced Saúde Maria as prime minister. Saúde Maria, who had been the last civilian in the government, was also expelled from the ruling party and from the national security council.

After being placed under house arrest, Saúde Maria slipped out of his house, ran to the nearby Portuguese embassy, and leaped over the wall into the diplomatic compound. Portugal at first denied having granted him asylum, but the foreign ministry in Lisbon later admitted that "Portugal does not grant political asylum but does provide shelter in its embassies to public figures on humanitarian grounds."

Saúde Maria, who as Guinea-Bissau's first foreign minister was prominent in the negotiations with Lisbon for his country's independence, is extremely well-favored among Portuguese officials. He is considered conservative, and it was at his urging that several "pro-Cuban" figures were ousted from the Guinea-Bissau cabinet last year.

In granting asylum to Saúde Maria, Portugal is departing from its recent policy. Because the violent repression of the independence movement in Portugal's African colonies led to the 1974 military coup in Lisbon, Portugal has tried since then to improve relations with its former colonies.

In 1979, when the ousted prime minister of São Tomé and Príncipe, Miguel Trovoada, sought refuge in the Portuguese embassy at São Tomé, the Portuguese refused to grant him asylum in order not to antagonize the São Tomé government.

Portugal's sheltering of Saúde Maria may cause tension with Guinea-Bissau. Last year, Spain enraged the government of Equatorial Guinea by harboring Sgt. Venancio Miko, the leader of a recent coup attempt, at its embassy in Malabo. Protracted negotiations resolved the issue, but relations between the two countries remain tense and sensitive. ■

**IVORY COAST**  
French going home

During the March visit of French Minister of Cooperation and Development Christian Nucci, the Ivorian government announced that 450 French technicians and their families will leave Ivory Coast this year, followed by another 450 in 1985. The total number of *coopérants* will be reduced by 30 to 40 percent.

Ivory Coast could no longer afford the presence of the French. In late 1983, the Ivorian government found itself unable to pay the third trimester installment of the costs for French technical assistance. Ivory Coast pays just over 80 percent of the cost of supporting the French technical advisors; the French government pays the balance.

The departure of several hundred of the technicians will reduce government expenditures and will also be a boon to the Ivorian bureaucracy, since many Ivorians are qualified to replace the French expatriates.

The reduction of expenditures will be gradual: In 1984, the cost of

maintaining the French presence will be reduced by 20 percent, and the 1985 cost will be half that of 1983.

The French technical advisers, known in Ivory Coast as "*culs blancs*" (white-tails) from the color of their license plates, have been important to the Ivorian economy since 1965, when President Félix Houphouët-Boigny embarked on his program of "globalization," or use of foreign expertise. The majority of the French *coopérants* are teachers, while others serve in private and public industry and government research facilities. ■

**LIBERIA**  
Doe suspends the PRC

Head of State Samuel K. Doe "recessed" the People's Redemption Council (PRC), the governing military committee he has headed since seizing power in 1980. Doe, who has stated his intention to return Liberia to civilian rule in 1985, said that the recess would give the PRC members the opportunity to "prepare themselves for retirement."

At nearly the same time, the final draft of the new Liberian constitution was made public after a year of revisions. The new document, which is modelled very closely on the American constitution, will be submitted for public approval in a referendum.

Originally scheduled for January, the referendum has already been postponed until March and again until April. The constitutional advisory council, an independent group of civilians who drafted and modified the constitution, has asked for a further 90-day delay in the holding of the referendum, claiming that the registration of voters was taking longer than anticipated. Doe did not forbid the delay, which could jeopardize the schedule for the return to civilian rule. Monrovia radio quoted him as saying that the military should not be blamed if Liberia's [civilian] politicians failed to provide good guidelines by which the country could move forward. ■

**MAURITANIA**

**All shook up**

In March, less than two weeks after extending diplomatic recognition to the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara), President Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla announced an extensive cabinet reshuffle. Haidalla moved his prime minister, Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, to army chief of staff and demoted Col. Ahmed Ould Abdallah from minister of interior to commander of the Zouérate administrative area. Haidalla himself assumed the portfolios of prime minister and minister of defense. Days later he also shook up the military command, dropping the deputy chief of staff, Lt.-Col. Moulay Ould Boukhreis.

Prime Minister Taya was shifted to army chief of staff after having tried to remove the military governor of Nouakchott, a close friend of Haidalla's, on charges of financial mismanagement. Haidalla retained the Nouakchott governor and instead removed the governors of Nouadhibou and Zouérate. Boukhreis refused to be posted as governor of Néma region, so he was placed in charge of the military academy at Atar.

The reshuffled officials were no longer considered "unconditionally loyal" to Haidalla. Their new posts scatter the officials into the remote areas of the country, a banishment intended to prevent them from forming coherent opposition to Haidalla's rule.

There have recently been signs that Haidalla's authority is weakening. Several of the demoted cabinet members opposed the recognition of the SADR, which they felt would draw Mauritania back into the Western Sahara war, from which the country officially withdrew in 1979.

Nouakchott radio also referred recently to a "secret organization that, with the collaboration of hostile foreign sources, was intent on disturbing the security and stability of the country." The foreign sources were not named, but the broadcast said that a group of people belonging to the secret organiza-



*President Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla*

tion were arrested in late March. They were accused of distributing "seditious leaflets" and were implicated in recent disturbances at schools in Nouakchott. The radio also accused the group of "fomenting racial hatred," which may suggest that blacks from the south, where a separatist movement is growing, are behind the disturbances. The southerners resent the predominance of ethnic Moors in the central government and oppose the recognition of the SADR. ■

**NIGER**

**Interim consolidation**

Niger's ambitious 1979-83 development plan could not be completely fulfilled when the price of uranium, Niger's principal export, fell sharply during that time. In place of a new five-year plan, the government of President Seyni Kountché has adopted an "interim program for economic consolidation" for 1984-85.

The interim program cuts back public investments by 50 percent and continues previous commitments, adopted under the advice of the IMF, to reduce parastatal organizations. Several economic activities formerly monopolized by state companies, including the importation of processed foods, have been turned over to private business in recent months.

Niger's public debt service in 1984 is now expected to exceed \$70 million, more than \$27 million above the amount allotted for debt service in the 1984 budget. ■

**NIGERIA**

**The military agenda**

As the evidence of corruption under the Shagari regime piles up to mountainous proportions, the government of Gen. Muhammadu Buhari is moving to establish trial procedures to judge the accused. A tribunal has been set up to try the 475 currently detained politicians and businessmen, as well as any exiled figures who can be repatriated, on charges of corruption and economic mismanagement. The tribunal consists of High Court judges as well as senior military officers. Among the most prominent defendants will be deposed President Shehu Shagari, against whom no concrete allegations have yet been made; ex-Vice President Alex Ekwueme, accused of hoarding cash in his home and of "fixing" contracts and commissions; and the former governor of Kano state, Sabo Bakin Zuwo, who is alleged to have stashed more than \$4 million in his home.

**Attacking the debt**

Army Chief of Staff Tunde Idiagbon recently said that the Nigerian external debt now exceeded \$7.5 billion. Nigeria's trade arrears amount to nearly \$6 billion.

The magnitude of the debt has forced the government to seek reschedulings from private creditors and a new loan from the IMF. At least \$3 billion of Nigeria's trade arrears is being renegotiated with a group of more than 350 foreign companies, while in late March Nigeria renegotiated the \$300 million it owes to ITT—the government's largest single private debt. The negotiations on the aggregate \$3 billion sum are contingent upon the IMF granting a new loan in approximately that amount.

The progress in relieving the billions in trade arrears will not affect the cost of servicing the national debt. Debt service costs, estimated at \$3.8 billion for 1984, are expected to rise to \$5.3 billion by 1986, and no decline is foreseen until at least 1988. In the next two to three years, debt service costs will consume half of Nigeria's oil export revenues, causing further shortages of foreign exchange and forcing the govern-

ment to reduce imports. Businessmen and consumers accustomed to greater availability of imports are likely to grow restless. Buhari himself said recently, "We never imagined the economy was so bad, but now we have seen how bad it is."

The government has already come under pressure from the labor unions. The pilots, crews, and engineers of Nigeria Airways went on strike in late March, protesting cuts in flight allowances. The government ordered the strikers to return by March 26 or be fired. The airline employees did not heed the deadline and were fired as promised. However, negotiations continued after the dismissals.

Potentially more serious is the verbal sparring match between Buhari and the Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC). Since assuming power, Buhari has often said that it was more important to control prices than to increase wages. He has called that approach "a real wage policy," saying: "If your money wage can buy ten loaves of bread and we manage to reduce the price of bread so that the same money can buy 20 loaves of the same size bread as before, your real wage has doubled." The NLC, however, has stressed the importance of wage increases as well.

In a late March meeting with the NLC, Buhari reiterated his view that workers would only hurt themselves and the nation by demanding higher salaries. In reply, Alhaji Ali Chiroma, head of the NLC, pledged overall support for the government but strongly criticized specific government policies, especially cutbacks in state schools and hospitals. He added that a devaluation of the naira, which the government has been hinting at, would only add to the dissatisfaction of the workers. According to Chiroma, the NLC might have no choice but to call a general strike if the government does not change its policy on wages and cutbacks. ■

## SENEGAL Parliamentary changes

After more than a year of disputes following the general elections of February 1983, the Senegalese Na-

## Europeans call U.S. aid 'inadequate'

Europe's finance ministers tentatively decided in early April to take up some of the slack left by the U.S. decision to reduce its funding for the International Development Association (IDA). The IDA provides interest-free long-term loans to the world's poorest countries.

The European countries have not hidden their irritation with the U.S. decision to provide only \$750 million per year out of the \$1 billion that was expected. Since the U.S. is committed to contributing 25% of the total fund, the unilateral American reduction decreased the total pool of funds from \$12 billion to \$9 billion over the three-year period 1985-87. The British Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, called the reduced figure "inadequate and a matter for regret."

"Europe's irritation is understandable," said the *Financial Times*. "It is exacerbated further by the fact that many of the developing countries' financial problems stem partly from the imbalance in U.S. monetary and fiscal policy, while the U.S. spends only about half as much on aid, in relation to its national income, as France, Germany, or Britain."

The rules of the IDA prohibit other members from raising the ceiling on funds without the agreement of the U.S. Therefore the European countries have proposed the creation of a separate \$3 billion fund to circumvent the U.S. rejection of the \$12 billion figure which all the other countries have agreed upon. ■

tional Assembly is now full. The seat won by Cheikh Anta Diop, leader of the National Democratic Rally (RND), was finally occupied in March by Babacar Niang, who heads a faction of the RND known as the Party for the Liberation of the People (PLP). Diop refused to take his seat as an act of protest against the results of the general elections, which he claimed had been rigged in favor of the ruling Socialist Party (PS) of President Abdou Diouf. Niang announced his agreement to take Diop's seat during an extraordinary session convened on the demand of the 81 PS deputies.

The Assembly also adopted a bill reducing the term of the assembly president from five years to one year, subject to renewal at each annual session. That move weakens the tenure of Habib Thiam, who was named as assembly president when Diouf abolished the post of prime minister, which Thiam formerly occupied. Thiam, as assembly president, is Diouf's designated successor as head of state. ■

## SIERRA LEONE Opposition alliance

Student riots earlier this year at Fourah Bay College (FBC) in Freetown have galvanized cooperation among exiled opponents of

President-for-Life Siaka Stevens. In February, members of the Sierra Leonean community in the U.S. staged a protest in Washington, D.C. The protestors expressed solidarity with the FBC students and demonstrated against what they called Sierra Leone's "oppressive economic conditions." After the march, the groups began to plan their merger into an umbrella organization of opposition forces that would seek to achieve "democracy and development in Sierra Leone."

Ambrose Ganda, the founder and chairman of the London-based Sierra Leone Alliance Movement (SLAM), made a six-week tour of the U.S., calling for unity among the opposition groups. He was assisted by Pios Foray, the former editor of the banned Freetown newspaper *The Tablet*, who fled to the U.S. in 1981.

The first sign of unity among the opposition movements was a joint statement that they issued in support of the FBC student movement and a return to multi-party rule in Sierra Leone.

At home, Stevens' government faces more immediate problems. Inflation and smuggling have caused severe food shortages. At the urging of the president, Parliament recently amended a 1962 price control



law, giving the government more control over marketing and distribution of food. The new law also stipulates that hoarders or smugglers of food will be severely fined or imprisoned for long terms.

The "Paris Club" of international financiers recently rescheduled \$50 million of Sierra Leone's \$400 million debt, the third rescheduling in seven years. Just before the meeting of the Paris Club, the International Monetary Fund approved a \$51.7 million loan to Sierra Leone to provide badly needed foreign ex-

change.

Stevens claims that the rescheduling and the new IMF loan will encourage industrial and agricultural production and will help revive Sierra Leone's debilitated economy. However, the new financial arrangements will not affect the decreasing value of the national currency, the leone, and the high export taxes which encourage smuggling. Nor will these measures improve the situation of the subsistence farmers, who make up 75 percent of the population. ■

**EASTERN AFRICA**

**Mengistu visits Moscow to firm up shaky Ethiopian-Soviet alliance**

During his late March visit to Moscow, Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam received a welcome befitting one of the Soviet Union's closest allies. He met with Soviet Communist Party leader Konstantin Chernenko, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and Defense Minister Dimitry Ustinov. Tass reported that the meetings were "warm and friendly." Chernenko, in a speech honoring Mengistu, criticized U.S. foreign policy, singling out recent events in southern Africa. The Soviets also pledged to continue aid to Ethiopia, and Mengistu praised the Soviet Union for its aid to Africa.

Despite this exchange of pleasantries, the purpose of Mengistu's visit was to reinforce the shaky Soviet-Ethiopian relationship. The Soviets, who feel that they are losing influence in Angola and Mozambique, are trying to solidify their relationship with Ethiopia and are anxious over the lack of enthusiasm with which the Ethiopians have been moving toward the formation of a communist party. Much of this reluctance can be explained by Ethiopia's internal politics.

The country is ruled by the 93-member Central Committee, which Mengistu heads. Observers of the regime have categorized the committee members into three factions: a pro-Soviet faction; a basically Western-educated pro-West fac-

tion; and a group that has been described as radical nationalists, some of whom lean toward the West, while others favor the Soviet Union. Sources with high-level contacts in the Ethiopian government have estimated that the pro-Western faction, together with their sympathizers among the radical nationalists, constitute around 85% of the Central Committee.

Soviet pressure on the Ethiopians to form a communist party is in part an effort to institutionalize the party before the individual inclinations of members of the Central Committee send the revolution "astray." The Soviet pressure was illustrated by reports that Ethiopia had expelled two Soviet diplomats in late Febru-

ary. Though these reports were denied when Mengistu visited Moscow, sources insist that the expulsions did occur after the Soviet officials tried to promote the advancement of some pro-Soviet Ethiopian officials.

Critics of U.S. policy in the Horn feel that the U.S. has ignored opportunities to capitalize on openings offered by the Ethiopians, giving the Soviets the upper hand in Ethiopia. They say that the failure of the U.S. to pursue high-level contacts has undercut the influence of pro-Western factions within the Ethiopian government.

A U.S. Congressional delegation which visited Addis Ababa last August returned with the impression that the Ethiopians were interested in improving bilateral relations. The delegation recommended a U.S. diplomatic initiative to strengthen ties. Last October, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Goshu Wolde, in the U.S. for the opening of the UN General Assembly, met with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. None of these gestures, however, has been followed up by any aggressive diplomacy.

Still, the formation of a communist party continues under the auspices of the Commission for Organizing the Party of Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE). If the process continues on schedule, by September Ethiopia will have the only completely functioning Soviet-style communist party in Africa. ■

**DJIBOUTI**  
Staying neutral

Ethiopian head of state Mengistu Haile Mariam visited Djibouti in late March, and Djibouti's President Hassan Gouled Aptidon took the opportunity once again to offer his country's services as a regional mediator. "The Republic of Djibouti pursues a non-aligned policy in the current tension prevailing in this region, and urges, and is always prepared to take on, a mediation role if those countries concerned request it." Thus far, however, no one has taken up Gouled's offer.

Mengistu's visit to Djibouti came a few days after a Kenyan delega-



Mengistu: Feeling Soviet pressure

Cametapix

tion visited, and while joint French-Djibouti military maneuvers were in progress. There are over 4000 French military personnel permanently stationed in Djibouti. ■

## KENYA

### Massacre in Wajir

Kenyan security forces have been accused of the massacre of ethnic Somalis in Wajir district in the predominantly Somali-inhabited Northeastern Province. Independent estimates of the number of people killed have ranged from 300 to 1000.

The massacre, which took place over a five-day period in February, was first reported by two members of Parliament from the area, Ahmed Khalif and Abdi Mohammed Sheikh. While making the charges, Khalif produced photographs showing piles of charred bodies. After receiving no response for over a month, Khalif again repeated his claims in late March, and he asked for the resignation of the district commissioner.

The violence reportedly started with a clash between two Somali clans, the Degodia and Ajuran. Local police then called for assistance from the General Service Unit (GSU), a special branch of the Kenyan military which several years ago had been banned from the province after similar allegations of atrocities. The GSU rounded up Degodia men for questioning and searched their homes for arms and ammunition. According to a Wajir town counselor, Sugal Abdullahi Unshur, "Some [of the victims] were burned alive, some were killed with stones, and some were shot dead."

Except for issuing a denial, the Kenyan government at first ignored the MPs' claims. The ruling party's paper said, "It is regrettable that some local leaders and the foreign press have set upon themselves to distort the truth about the situation in Wajir."

In late March, the government finally admitted that 57 people had been killed, but vehemently denied that the number was as high as 300. The admission was also coupled

with an attack upon the politicians who first reported the incident. The government said that the claims were "meant to incite loyal Somalis against their good Kenyan government." A government official accused the Wajir politicians of "perpetrating clanism for their own ends."

The government has also charged that the current violence in the Northeast Province is an organized effort with "an eventual foreign objective." It was claimed that an organization called Iriiria (Somali for tribal confederation), backed by Kenyan Somali leaders and a Nairobi-based firm acting as a livestock agency, has been responsible for the recent violence in Wajir district.

Aside from publishing the government's denials, the Kenyan press has ignored the claims. The reluctance of the independent press to cover the stories, however, is understandable. In 1980, a similar event took place in the town of Garissa, further to the south. Reports from foreign missionaries charged that the government troops killed hundreds of people, looted and burned homes, raped women, and even attacked and set fire to a mission orphanage. The Kenyan press also ignored that incident with the exception of Kenya's *Viva* magazine. *Viva's* editor at the time and the reporter who covered the story both now live in exile, partially as a result of that incident.

The government has set up a commission to investigate the latest charges.

### Njonjo inquiry continues

A Watergate-like mood prevails in Kenya, where the proceedings of the Charles Njonjo treason inquiry continue, with the newspapers printing every word. While many charges are being heaped on Njonjo, the most significant development is that he has now been implicated in the 1969 murder of Vice President Tom Mboya. Charges have also been made that he attempted to enlist the help of other MPs to depose President Daniel arap Moi.

Stanley Oloitipitip, minister of local government in Moi's cabinet



Njonjo: Implicated in Mboya assassination

and an early supporter of Njonjo, has also been dragged into the inquiry with the allegation that he was slated for the vice presidential post in the planned Njonjo government. According to testimony, Oloitipitip was supposed to have travelled the country making impossible promises on behalf of the Moi government in order to sow discontent.

Observers have noted that the inquiry, which is clearly designed to discredit Njonjo, is also having the effect of discrediting the government. The abuses and petty corruption with which Njonjo is being charged are not uncommon among other members of Kenya's ruling elite. As a powerful figure under both Kenyatta and Moi, and in all likelihood the most powerful man in Kenya during Kenyatta's final years, Njonjo, more than any other individual, is a symbol of post-colonial government in Kenya. By raising the issue of Mboya's assassination, the inquiry has revived questions about the role played by Kenyatta's government. Daniel arap Moi became vice president after Mboya's death.

### Death sentences

Hezekiah Ochuka, the air force private who led Kenya's August 1982 attempted coup, and Pancras Okumu, a former air force sergeant, have been sentenced to death by a court martial for treason. Ochuka was convicted of 31 counts of treason. Employees of the *Voice of Kenya* radio station testified that on

the morning of the attempted coup. Ochuka entered the station, calling himself the chairman of the People's Redemption Council, and forced them to announce the overthrow of the government.

Once it was apparent that the coup had failed, Ochuka and Okumu hijacked an air force plane to Tanzania, where they remained until Kenya and Tanzania reached an agreement on the exchange of political refugees late last year.

Both men pleaded not guilty. Ochuka claimed that a Kenyan official had offered him amnesty if he would agree to implicate the former minister of constitutional affairs, Charles Njonjo, in the plot. Okumu claimed that he had participated in the coup only after learning that Njonjo was involved in another plot which was scheduled for a few days later. He said that the August 1 coup attempt was designed to "destabilize" the Kenyan Air Force before Njonjo could use it for his own coup. The court martial rejected this defense, saying that it was a matter for the Njonjo inquiry to look into.

Ochuka and Okumu are the 12th and 13th men to be sentenced to death in connection with the abortive coup, though two of the earlier sentences were later commuted and none has been carried out. ■

**TANZANIA**  
**Nyerere to step down**

President Julius Nyerere has confirmed his intention to resign from the presidency when his term expires next year. Four years ago, Nyerere's announcement that he would step down at the end of this term was met with some skepticism. He had earlier pledged to resign in 1980 but then accepted the nomination, he said, because it would have been negligent for him to leave Tanzania in such dire economic straits.

Despite the further deterioration of Tanzania's economy, most observers believe that Nyerere will follow through on his promise this time. Nyerere's recent confirmation of his intentions came after President Samora Machel of Mo-

zambique proposed that Nyerere again stand unopposed for the presidency, a suggestion which was then echoed by many Tanzanian organizations.

If the 62-year-old Nyerere does resign, he will probably be a major force in Tanzanian politics for some time. It has been suggested that he might retain the chairmanship of the ruling party, a situation which could leave his successor as a figurehead. Nyerere can be expected to ensure that his departure will not lead to a change in ideology in the part of the Tanzanian government. "It is not strange to change leadership. It would be shocking if we were to change our ideology," he said.

There has been much speculation about who will succeed the man who has ruled Tanzania for 23 years. The most obvious candidates are Prime Minister Edward Sokoine and party secretary general Rashidi Kawawa. Former vice president Aboud Jumbe, who might have

been a candidate, resigned in January.

**New president of Zanzibar**

Hassan Ali Mwinyi, who was named acting president of Zanzibar in January, was the only candidate and landslide winner in Zanzibar's presidential election which was held April 19. As president of Zanzibar, he also holds the posts of chairman of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council and vice president of Tanzania.

Mwinyi became acting president following the resignation of former Zanzibar President and Vice President of Tanzania Aboud Jumbe. Jumbe resigned in January after taking responsibility for the growing secessionist movement on Zanzibar.

Mwinyi, who is from the mainland, has held several cabinet posts, including minister for home affairs, and was formerly Tanzania's ambassador to Egypt. ■

**GENERAL AFRICA**

**Ahidjo loyalists fail, but take heavy toll, in Cameroon's first coup attempt**

On April 6, at least 150 members of the Republican Guard, the special contingent of troops assigned to protect the presidential palace, attempted to overthrow the government of President Paul Biya. Led by Col. Ibrahim Saleh, a close associate of Biya's predecessor Ahmadou Ahidjo, the rebels moved against four targets: the presidential palace, Yaoundé airport, the national radio station, and the home of army chief of staff Gen. Pierre Semengué.

The rebels occupied the radio station long enough to announce the deposition of Biya's government and the formation of a "Superior Military Council." But loyalist reinforcements, landing in C-130 transport planes, retook Yaoundé airport and the radio station. In tank battles and exchanges of heavy artillery fire, Biya's troops defeated the rebels by the morning of April 7, although sporadic fighting continued in the streets of Yaoundé for at least two more days as the government

"mopped up the last pockets of resistance."

Casualties were heavy on both sides. The government radio referred to "massive destruction" and "many bodies in the streets." The presidential palace was severely damaged, and the residential neighborhoods of Meleng and Obili were partially levelled. However, no government officials were killed, and the rebel leader, Col. Saleh, was taken alive.

The coup startled Western observers, who had considered Cameroon one of Africa's most stable nations. But political tension had been increasing in Cameroon since late 1982, when Ahmadou Ahidjo resigned from the presidency and named Biya as his successor.

Ahidjo had intended to retain his own prominence in Cameroon's politics as an advisor and power-broker. But since his accession, Biya methodically eroded Ahidjo's position, supplanting him as head of

the sole political party and, in five cabinet reshuffles, gradually replacing cabinet ministers loyal to Ahidjo with new officials closer to Biya.

Last August, Biya announced that a coup plot had been discovered. Two of the alleged conspirators went on trial before a military tribunal in Yaoundé earlier this year. The two defendants testified that Ahidjo had masterminded the plot, and the court sentenced Ahidjo and the two men to death for treason. Biya later commuted the sentences to life imprisonment.

Many army officers reacted with indignation to the verdict. The trial was mentioned specifically in the rebels' broadcast announcing the deposition of the government: "You can judge the shame brought upon Cameroon by the mockery of justice in this last trial. It was time to cut the Gordian knot. . . the nightmare is over." Another motivation for the coup may have been an order reportedly issued by Biya, transferring all northerners in the Republican Guard to other posts outside the capital. There was, however, no independent confirmation of that report.

The French press was quick to call the coup attempt "a Fulani revolt," referring to the predominant ethnic group in northern Cameroon. Rather than an ethnic or regional revolt, however, it is more likely that the coup attempt was simply an effort to restore Ahidjo to power.

The revolt makes it evident that, despite all his maneuverings, Biya has not succeeded in banishing Ahidjo from the national scene and has not yet secured the loyalty of officers and officials who had served Ahidjo for two decades.

The continuing schism between Ahidjo and Biya does not merely divide their own loyalists. It brings other tensions to the surface in Cameroon. Disgruntled factions have expressed their concern that Biya may be granting too much power to Christian francophones from the south, thereby jeopardizing the heritage of regional and ethnic balance bequeathed by Ahidjo.

In his most recent cabinet changes, Biya removed two important anglophone officials and re-

placed them with francophone southerners, a shift that alarmed western anglophones and northern Muslims alike. Cameroon's economy is dominated by southerners, primarily from the Bamiléké people, and other ethnic groups are worried that an increased presence of southerners in the government will lead to "complete southern hegemony."

In earlier reshuffles, Biya seemed determined to preserve ethnic and regional balances. The recent cabinet changes and the "treason trial" have compromised the reputation for deliberate and careful change which he earned early in his presidency. The trials which are certain to follow the attempted coup will further strain Cameroon's national unity. ■

## French woo Bongo with nuclear reactor

The long saga of President Omar Bongo's irritation with the French may have reached its denouement in April. French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy visited Libreville in the latest of a series of efforts to placate Bongo, and his mission culminated in the announcement that France and Gabon had reached "an agreement in principle" for the construction of a nuclear reactor in Gabon.


On a visit to Gabon last year, French President François Mitterrand "visibly blanched" when Bongo spoke publicly of Gabon's wish for a nuclear reactor, a subject Bongo had never brought up in their private discussions.

raged by French press reports of corruption and decadence in his administration. Among the reports were charges that Bongo's government had contributed illegally to the campaigns of Mitterrand's right-wing opponents. Bongo accused the French government of officially financing the publication of Pierre Pécane's book, *Affaires africaines*, which—among numerous other scandals—claims that Bongo arranged the murder of his wife's lover, a French citizen.

Accusing France of "destabilizing" his government, Bongo threatened with increasing vehemence to expel all French expatriates from Gabon and to restrict or end trade with France in reprisal for the negative publicity.

In an interview with *France-Soir* published on the eve of Mauroy's visit, Bongo warned: "You cannot love Gabon if you do not love Bongo. If [the French] government continues to make a fool out of me. . . I will tell the French workers in Gabon to go home to France and look for work there. . . some of them want to stifle Gabon and the Gabonese to make a place for themselves. For now, they are in no danger. But Gabon is an independent, sovereign nation, and I am free—like the water in the estuary beside us—to go where my best interests lie."

Bongo's scarcely veiled threats against the French expatriates—coupled with fears that he might move to nationalize Elf-Gabon, the extremely lucrative oil corporation in which France has a 70 percent interest—persuaded the Mitterrand administration to approve his re-



"You cannot love Gabon if you do not love Bongo."

But France purchases large amounts of oil, manganese, uranium, and timber from Gabon and was anxious to appease Bongo, who has been squabbling with France since late 1982. Bongo has been en-

quest for the nuclear reactor. Bongo had made the reactor an "essential precondition for the improvement of Franco-Gabonese relations," according to *Le Monde*. The envisioned nuclear project will produce more electricity than Gabon needs, at a cost three times greater than hydroelectric power.

The nuclear reactor will be the first in sub-Saharan Africa and is already arousing concern. Observers expect other francophone countries to demand their own nuclear reactors; and France may be obliged, out of a sense of fairness, to provide them. ■

### CHAD Pounding the rubble

The factions in Chad continue to blast away at each other, reducing the rubble of their country to powder. In early April, nine French soldiers were killed and six wounded when, according to the French government, they attempted to defuse an artillery shell found in a "rebel vehicle" near Oum Chalouba. French sources insisted on the "accidental nature" of the incident, claiming that it was "neither sabotage nor aggression."

Acts of terrorism were previously rare in the Chadian civil war, but they are expected to become a common feature. In March, a booby-trapped suitcase exploded in a French airliner during a stopover at Ndjamena airport, wounding two dozen French passengers.

French intelligence sources said that commandos from the rebel forces of former President Goukouni Oueddei had sabotaged the plane after filtering through the "red line" drawn across the center of the country by French military advisers and the army troops of President Hissène Habré. The French soldiers killed in April were also south of the red line.

The commandos are believed to have driven south from Goukouni's bases, and the French analysts believe that these mobile units may begin a methodical campaign of terrorism and destabilization. The intelligence sources fear that attacks on French interests in the capital,

sabotage of Chadian mining installations, and the taking of European hostages may be among the measures planned by the commandos.

Already the economic consequences of the civil war have forced Habré's government to take extraordinary measures. The government has levied an emergency "contribution for national reconstruction" from all workers and employers, amounting to a full month's salary for paid employees (Chad's minimum monthly wage is around \$25) and as much as \$5000 from large employers. Only students, the elderly, and the seriously ill are exempted from the tax. ■

### SÃO TOMÉ & PRÍNCIPE 'No Soviets'

President Manuel Pinto da Costa has denied that there are Soviet bases or military personnel in his country. The denial, which was reported in Portugal through the Angolan news agency, came in response to an earlier Portugal news agency report which quoted unidentified Western diplomatic sources as saying that there were 2000 So-

viet and Cuban troops on the islands. According to the sources, the troops are stationed at two radar installations which are also guarded by SAM-5 missiles. Despite da Costa's denial, it is generally accepted that the Soviets maintain some military presence on São Tomé and Príncipe.

While denying the Soviet presence, da Costa said that he might accept a Portuguese offer to send military instructors to the islands. He added, however, that he would not allow any foreign country to establish bases.

In mid-March, Portugal's President António Ramalho Eanes visited São Tomé as a part of his country's continuing efforts to strengthen ties with its former colonies. Eanes said that Portugal wanted to establish relations that were free of any kind of paternalism. Observers noted that Portugal may have been attempting to ease tensions caused by the repeated rejection of its requests to participate in the summit meetings of Lusophone African countries. ■

## Qaddafi talks about his neighbors

Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi, never known for biting his tongue, has been characteristically vocal in 1984. In a March interview with *Jeune Afrique*, Qaddafi discussed his neighbors. President Chadli Benjedid of Algeria—once Qaddafi's closest ally in the region—is now "in the process of sliding Algeria into the bosom of imperialism." "Algeria," Qaddafi added, "is behaving like a satellite of France. . . and has abandoned its positions on international problems."

On Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, Qaddafi commented that "the older he gets, the tougher he gets." "I don't understand these Tunisians. Not only do they refuse the riches we offered them on a silver platter—preferring to ally themselves with Algeria, which could absorb them—but they hit below the belt." One of Qaddafi's close aides said: "We have the means to destabilize [Tunisia]. If Bourguiba continues to want to ridicule us, he'll soon be counting the coup attempts in his country."

King Hassan II of Morocco, Qaddafi said, "has a rare intelligence: he dominates the international scene. . . . Lastly, he is a lot like me."

After the Omdurman bombing in Sudan, Egypt alerted its patrols along the Libyan border, based on "American reports" that Qaddafi might be preparing "a mass march" into Egypt. In the preceding two weeks, however, Qaddafi denied any suggestion of a mass march. Expressing his usual contempt for the government of President Hosni Mubarak, Qaddafi said, "Who is going to rejoice by going to Egypt? Has Egypt been liberated that we should go to Egypt?" Speaking to the Egyptian people, he said: "The U.S. is laughing at you and shows contempt for your intelligence [by warning of a Libyan march]. . . . There is no march on the borders." ■

## ZAIRE Bombs in Kinshasa

At least one person was killed and five others injured when explosions damaged the headquarters of Zaire's national radio station and the central post office in Kinshasa at the end of March.

Two Brussels-based opposition groups, the Congolese National Lumumba Movement (MNCL) and the Zairean Socialist Party, claimed responsibility for the blasts. The

MNCL communiqué said that the bombing was in retaliation for "the deaths of more than 200 militants killed at Kivu in November 1983 on Mobutu's orders."

Days later, the Belgian government expelled the secretary-general of the MNCL, saying that Belgium "would not permit acts of terrorism to be organized from Belgian territory." The MNCL leader, François-Emery Lumumba Tolenga, was deported to France; he was expected to continue on to Senegal. ■

## NORTH AFRICA

### Sudan-Ethiopia talks collapse after announcement of 'U.S. arms airlift'

Talks between Sudanese and Ethiopian officials scheduled for mid-March in Nairobi fell through when Ethiopia withdrew, charging the U.S. and Sudan with "collusion and conspiracy against Ethiopia." The Ethiopians claimed that just before the scheduled talks, the U.S. began an airlift to Sudan of "four or five planes a day" loaded with weapons.

The earlier decision to hold the discussions came after an unusual interlude of friendliness between the two countries. In late January, a group of Ethiopian soldiers was captured by Sudanese troops when they accidentally strayed across the border into Sudan. Rather than taking advantage of the incident for propaganda purposes, the Sudanese quietly returned the soldiers in the spirit of what they called "good neighborliness." The soldiers reported that they were well-treated while in captivity, and Sudanese First Vice President Omar Mohammed al-Tayib said that his contacts with the Ethiopians were "encouraging."

The Sudan-Ethiopia relationship then took a quick downward turn when, in early February, a Chevron oil installation was attacked by guerrillas from the Anya Nya II movement. Sudan claimed, as it always does after an attack, that the guerrillas came from Ethiopia. Then, less than a week after the Chevron attack, the Sudanese consulate in Gambela, Ethiopia, was

stormed by Sudanese refugees living in the area. Gambela is home to many Sudanese refugees from the 1955-72 civil war, and now from the recent fighting in the south. Sudan charged the Ethiopians with recruiting the attackers, but the Sudanese living in Ethiopia probably needed little provocation to display their hostility toward the Sudanese government.

There were again positive signs in late February when, before the OAU Council of Ministers meeting, Sudanese Foreign Minister Mohammed Mirghani announced that Sudan would, as a goodwill gesture, unilaterally end its information campaign against Ethiopia. After meeting with the Ethiopian ambassador in Khartoum, Mirghani reported, "I told him that what was going on between Sudan and Ethiopia benefitted no one but a third party." He also said that the Ethiopian ambassador had welcomed the Sudanese initiative. The dialogue was aided by Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Butrus Ghali, who traveled from Addis Ababa to Khartoum carrying the message that Ethiopia was willing to negotiate.

Both countries have much to gain by a cessation of hostilities. Sudan is the main supply line for rebels of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) which has recently been gaining ground in its efforts to control all of Ethiopia's Eritrea Province. The Ethiopian army's at-

tempts to defeat the guerrillas would be facilitated if Sudan cut the rebels' supply lines.

Though it is not true, as Sudanese President Gaafar al-Nimeiry often proclaims, that Ethiopia is solely responsible for the rebel activity in southern Sudan, Ethiopian assistance does play a large role in the mounting violence. Any agreement between the two countries would necessarily be based upon an end to assistance for both of these groups. Though the solution to the problems might seem simple, there are other factors involved which complicate any agreement.

The aid which Sudan funnels to the EPLF comes from some Arab states which have pressured the Sudanese to keep the supply lines open. Sudan, which has already jeopardized its standing in the Arab League by supporting the Egyptian position on the Camp David accords, is anxious to avoid any further isolation. Likewise, the Ethiopians are under pressure, though not as much, from Libya to continue supporting the rebels in southern Sudan.

Upon his return from the U.S. in early March, Sudanese First Vice President Tayib referred to "flagrant acts of aggression by Ethiopia," and reported that the U.S. would be supplying Sudan with military equipment. "The U.S. administration has taken a political decision of supporting Sudan against this major conspiracy. . . and has decided to begin in the next few days airlifting weapons and equipment from the United States directly to Khartoum." Nimeiry also stated that "Reagan has pledged to dispatch equipment shortly."

The next day retired U.S. General Vernon A. Walters, an aide to Secretary of State George Shultz, arrived in Sudan to discuss the situation in the south. The U.S. State Department said that no decisions had been made about sending military assistance aid to Sudan beyond the \$166.5 million slated for this year and the \$190.7 million that the administration is requesting for next year.

After the meeting with Walters, Nimeiry again said that the U.S.

had promised military equipment. Though Nimeiry may have been referring to the already promised assistance, most observers, including the Ethiopians, assumed that the U.S. was sending additional military aid to be used against the southern rebels. The Ethiopians feared that Sudan was preparing for a military solution to the southern problem which, if successful, would destroy Ethiopia's bargaining position.

Ethiopia then pulled out of the talks, accusing the U.S. of supplying arms in order to deliberately disrupt the negotiations. Ethiopian Foreign Minister Goshu Wolde said that Ethiopia would not negotiate until "favorable conditions were laid down for the peace talks."

There has been no confirmation that the alleged airlift ever took place. The U.S. vehemently denied it, but the Sudanese remained deliberately vague on the issue, saying only that the Ethiopians' excuse for cancelling the talks "constitutes an interference in Sudan's internal affairs."

The suspicious bombing raid on Omdurman (see story, page 60) led many observers to the conclusion that Nimeiry was not able to "sell the Ethiopian threat" to the Americans and that he was returning to the reliable strategy of raising the "Libyan threat." The bombing has worked in Nimeiry's favor, as he has used it to invoke his mutual defense pact with the Egyptians, bringing enough support to possibly launch an offensive against the southern rebels.

One week before the Omdurman bombing, Numeiry told Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak, "Sudan is a big country and we are not able to cover every spot through aerial surveillance to monitor whether or not there are hostile aircraft." The AWACs which arrived after the Omdurman bombing have solved that problem for now.

A Sudanese offensive in the south will probably be coupled with increased assistance to the EPLF in Ethiopia. If past trends continue, Libya and Ethiopia can be expected to further reinforce the southern Sudanese guerrillas. The opportunity

missed in Nairobi in mid-March may not come around again for a while. ■

## **MOROCCO** Tax break for farmers

In March, less than two months after widespread rioting provoked by the government's increase of food prices, King Hassan II announced that Morocco's farmers would be exempted from paying taxes until the year 2000.

The farmers would have been the chief beneficiaries of the increased food prices, which would have helped supplement their meager earnings. According to the World Bank, 46 percent of Morocco's rural population falls below the poverty line, and more than half of Morocco's farmers own less than 2.5 acres of land. The small land-holdings, the severe drought of recent years, the government's emphasis on expensive agro-business projects, and the restrictions imposed on European importation of Moroccan produce by the EEC have combined to weaken Moroccan agriculture, which once was the mainstay of the national economy.

Once the riots forced the government to revoke the increases in the price of food, some other means had to be found to ease the farmers' plight. The suspension of the tax on farm income, which accounted for around 10 percent of state revenues, is expected to cost the government more than \$7,000,000 annually.

The food riots have also resulted in the conviction of at least two groups of detainees on charges of violating Morocco's internal security. In early March, 66 students were sentenced to terms ranging from six months to two years for their part in the riots, and two weeks later 91 students and teachers received similar sentences. Many of the defendants were members of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) or the Party for Progress and Socialism (PPS), two of Morocco's opposition parties.

A delegation from the International Federation for Human Rights visited Morocco in mid-March. The delegation found that at least 1,500

people have been detained, but that rumors of "several thousand missing" were unfounded. The visitors were unable to obtain from the government a list of the 29 people said to have been killed in the riots, and the Federation spokesman said the group believed that the actual death toll had been higher. The delegation found no evidence to prove allegations of torture, but did say that the two-to-three-year prison terms imposed on people not directly involved in the riots were "exorbitant." ■

## **TUNISIA** Food riot aftermath

In the aftermath of January's "bread riots," the government of President Habib Bourguiba has taken firm measures to revitalize its authority and restore order. The minister of the interior, Driss Guiga, was dismissed from his post and then was tried in absentia by the Supreme Court on charges of high treason. Guiga left Tunisia in late January. He was accused of allowing the riots to get out of hand in a calculated attempt to bring about the downfall of his chief rival Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali, architect of the price increases which triggered the riots.

Guiga's police department in the Tunis region has been disbanded and U.S.-trained Gen. Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali nominated as director general of public security in order to "unite the national security structure." Ben Ali's nomination was opposed by the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), among whom Ben Ali is remembered for his harsh treatment of strikers during the riots of January, 1978, when he also occupied that post.

In another reshuffle, party steward and public relations man Hedi Baccouch has replaced Mongi Kooli as head of the ruling Socialist Destourian Party in an effort to rehabilitate the party's flagging image.

The government has also demonstrated new firmness in its handling of the rash of strikes which broke out in February and March. A strike by the postal workers lasted 10 days, the longest walkout by public

servants in Tunisian history. The government, refusing to accede to the workers' demands and calling the strikers "enemies of the regime," arrested some of the union members. The strike was ended through negotiations with the UGTT. The UGTT has often been antagonistic toward the government, but the powerful union has recently been weakened by struggles with internal leftist factions and by the formation in February of a rival organization, the National Union of Tunisian Workers (UNTT), led by Abdelaziz Bouraoui.

The press has also been newly restricted. *El Mostaqbal*, the organ of the Movement of Socialist Democrats (MDS), has been suspended for publishing a communiqué from the outlawed "Islamic Movement" and two other articles considered "disruptive." The director of the journal *Maghreb*, Omar Chabou, has been sentenced to four months in prison for publishing an article "defaming" Syrian President Hafez Assad.

Many feel that the government's increasingly authoritarian measures threaten the "democratization" of Tunisian politics, recently highlighted by the legalization of opposition parties. ■

## WESTERN SAHARA Mauritania recognizes SADR

By recognizing the SADR in late February, Mauritania followed through on the promise it made last year to do so unless Morocco declared a cease-fire and held a referendum in the territory by the end of 1983.

Mauritania insists, however, that it remains neutral in the dispute between Morocco and the Polisario for control of the territory. Morocco responded that "Mauritania's recognition of the mercenaries was fully in conflict with the principles of neutrality and good-neighborliness."

While Morocco's King Hassan II continues to affirm his willingness to negotiate, he qualifies that by saying that he will only negotiate with "states." As he does not con-

sider the SADR to be a state, he refuses to negotiate with it. "The problem of the cease-fire and the organization of a referendum remain essential in our eyes," Hassan wrote to OAU Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam. Morocco maintained that it was ready to hold the referendum but was prevented from doing so by unspecified "others," and ac-

cused Mauritania of allowing Polisario to establish bases in Mauritanian territory.

Meanwhile, Morocco has launched several successful offensives against Polisario and is fortifying its positions in the Western Sahara, constructing a second giant wall that will split the territory in two. ■

## SOUTH AFRICA

### Namibian independence still remote despite South Africa-Angola accord

The main obstacle to Namibian independence has been South Africa's insistence that all Cuban troops leave Angola. Despite the recent Angola-South Africa security agreement and Cuba's offer to remove its troops if certain conditions are met, Namibian independence is no closer than it was a year ago.

The Cuban-Angolan offer to remove the troops was made in mid-March when Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos visited Havana. The conditions for the withdrawal—the removal of all South African troops from Angola and Namibia; independence for Namibia and elections under the provisions of UN resolution 435; and a guarantee that South Africa, the U.S., and their allies would not aid the Unita rebels—precisely matched the concessions that South Africa had said it would be willing to grant once the Cubans left Angola.

Instead of responding to the substance of the Cuban-Angolan offer, South Africa hit back at the language of the communiqué. The South Africans objected to the statements in which dos Santos and Castro expressed "admiration and solidarity with the heroic struggle being waged by the people of South Africa and Namibia" and to the clause which called Swapo and the ANC the "sole legitimate representatives of the Namibian and South African people."

Several days after the Cuban-Angolan offer, Willem van Niekerk, administrator general for Namibia, said that he did not think that An-

gola would send home the 25,000 Cubans and called the UN plan for Namibia "moribund." It was the first public dismissal of the UN plan by a South African official.

South Africa had previously proposed a regional conference encompassing "all groups"—Unita, Swapo, and five or six other Namibian organizations as well as the governments of the states in the area—to settle the Namibian issue. South Africa denied repeated charges that the aim of the conference would be to circumvent the United Nations. The proposal that the other Namibian groups participate was a direct challenge, however, to the UN resolution which holds that Swapo is "the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people."

The South African-proposed conference would also have included Unita, a condition which Angola categorically rejected as having nothing to do with Namibia's independence. South Africa replied that it is a matter of common sense that the Angolans will not be able to send the Cubans home as long as they are threatened by Unita.

Since Unita leader Jonas Savimbi has vowed to continue fighting until he is accepted into some kind of governing coalition with the MPLA, the South African-proposed talks would have been a way for Unita to achieve peacefully what it has not yet gained militarily.

In mid-April, Angola charged that Unita forces were being "massively installed" by South Africa in



southern Angola. The Angolans said that South Africa was "not keen to fulfill the Lusaka agreement" which provided for the exclusion of all outside forces in the area. Angola also charged that, as of April 10, South Africa had not completely withdrawn as promised.

South Africa can also be expected to take advantage of the mid-April bomb blast in Namibia which killed two American diplomats and a Namibian. Pretoria immediately blamed Swapo for the bombing, and the South African administrator general for the territory charged that "while virtually everybody in southern Africa is working for peace," Swapo "still clings to barbaric violence." Swapo spokesmen denied any connection with the bombing.

Observers believe that South Africa, fresh from a string of diplomatic victories, will now be content to let pressure build on the MPLA government before proceeding to the next phase of negotiations on Namibia. ■

## **ANGOLA**

### **Savimbi blackmails Britain**

At a dramatic news conference at Jamba, Unita's "capital" in the Angolan bush, Jonas Savimbi promised to take his guerrilla war to the cities unless the MPLA government agreed to meet with him and forge a government of national unity. With his South African allies lobbying on his behalf for a conference, Savimbi paraded his troops and 100 foreign prisoners in front of journalists who had arrived on a charter flight from South Africa.

Savimbi also announced that he would release all the hostages except the 16 Britons whom he has held since late February. He demanded that Britain engage him in direct negotiations for their release, a move that he would regard as a de facto recognition of Unita. The British, announcing their willingness to negotiate, said that they will make no policy concessions to Unita.

Critics in Britain have accused the government of "giving in to terrorism." Britain's *Guardian* editorialized: "The fate of the unlucky 16 rates the maximum humanitarian

effort on the part of the British government, but Britain cannot be seen as endorsing a revolt. Dr. Savimbi is the wrong horse."

Unita will clearly be able to carry on a long war of attrition with or without South African support. The unanswered question is whether Savimbi can make good on his threat to carry the war to the cities. In an attempt to demonstrate its strength, Unita attacked the town of Sumbe, 175 miles south of Luanda. Though Unita claimed to have taken the town, most reports indicate that the rebels were quickly expelled by government troops. ■

## **LESOTHO**

### **Election complications**

At the end of 1983, Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan announced that national elections—the first since 1970—would be held this year. The elections are now in doubt. A census must be taken before voters can be registered; but, according to a source in the government's statistics bureau, the next census will be held no sooner than 1986.

Meanwhile, South Africa has provided support to an alliance of politicians opposed to Jonathan, provoking charges from Lesotho that South Africa is interfering in its internal affairs.

South African Foreign Minister R.F. Botha met in Pretoria on January 6 with several veteran politicians from Lesotho, including Phoka Chaolane of the legal opposition Basotho Congress Party (BCP) and ex-cabinet ministers C.D. Molapo and J.T. Mokotso of Jonathan's ruling Basotho National Party (BNP).

Botha, along with his assistant, Louis Nel, and the chief of South Africa's security police, Gen. François Steenkamp, urged the politicians to form a new organization, called the Basotho Democratic Alliance (BDA), which would receive "assistance from South African friends and businessmen."

Botha told the members of the alliance that South Africa might have to "intervene directly" if the new organization failed to win the elec-

tion. The BDA is unlikely to be recognized as a legal party by Jonathan's government, so the South African threat has provoked charges by Lesotho that South Africa intends to overthrow Jonathan if he wins the elections.

The outcome of the elections, if they are held, is in no doubt. Ntsu Mokhehle, the only opposition leader popular enough to strongly challenge Jonathan, is in exile; without Mokhehle, no party except the BNP can expect to win. ■

## **MOZAMBIQUE**

### **More violence feared**

Though South Africa has promised to end its aid to the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), which has been terrorizing Mozambique, that does not guarantee a halt to the MNR's activities.

MNR guerrillas struck at the Moamba power station on April 5, plunging Maputo into darkness for a week. The MNR then attacked pumping stations, disrupting the city's water supply, and opened fire on a passenger train 45 miles north of the capital, killing one person and wounding 31.

These episodes may only be desperate attempts by the MNR to show that it can survive without South African support, but Mozambicans privately fear that South Africa may be keeping the rebels on reserve in order to ensure that the government of President Samora Machel "stays in line."

In mid-April, the Mozambican government began an offensive against the MNR, which reportedly crossed into Mozambique from South Africa in large numbers just before the nonaggression pact was signed. ■

## **SOUTH AFRICA**

### **Panel urges legal reforms**

A government-appointed commission of inquiry has recommended sweeping reforms in South Africa's legal system. The commission's most significant recommendation was that the influx control

system—also known as the pass laws—be abolished. The recommendation that the pass laws be abolished hits at the heart of the apartheid system. Blamed for giving South Africa the highest per capita prison population in the world, the pass laws are the legal wedge that the government uses to deport black South Africans to the “independent” homelands, making them foreigners in their own country.

Noting that the cabinet has the right to appoint judges and that magistrates are civil servants, the commission’s report also called for measures to increase the independence of the judiciary. These reforms, the report said, would answer blacks’ suspicions that the court system is “an instrument . . . to subjugate the black man.”

The panel also rejected a recommendation by the Department of Cooperation and Development—the ministry which handles black affairs—that there should be separate legal systems for blacks and whites. “By any civilized standards,” the report said, the principle of having separate courts for different races “is unnecessary, humiliating, and repugnant.”

The report was welcomed by opposition politicians. David Dalling of the Progressive Federal Party called it “a comprehensive indictment of government inertia” and “a public crucifixion” of the legal system.

The government is not expected to jump at the recommendations—it has often ignored calls for reform from its own commissions—but this outspoken and widely-circulated indictment of the South African legal system will not be easily dismissed.

### Sanctions-busting network

Over five years, beginning in 1978, a South African government-controlled corporation established a network of companies in Britain through a series of clandestine takeovers, according to the London *Guardian*.

The company, Freight Services, gained control over freight forwarding, procurement, and travel com-

## Apartheid in a new vein

The South African Blood Transfusion Service recently admitted that blood from blacks is never supplied to white patients, although “white” blood could be used in treating blacks.

Furthermore, blood from black donors is “stored separately” from white-donated blood, and all blood is clearly labelled not only with its type but with its “origin” as well.

The Blood Transfusion Service defends its policy by claiming that “hepatitis is more prevalent in black blood. . . . We are as non-racial as the policy in this country permits, but because of hepatitis, certain blood is not ethnically acceptable. . . . A certain amount of white blood goes to blacks, but for medical reasons no black blood goes to whites.”

The National Medical and Dental Association commented: “This racial attitude is a relic from the colonial approach to medicine and has no foundation in science. The people who implement these policies should bear in mind that black people have suffered much more from diseases introduced by white people than the other way around. The legacy of diseases such as tuberculosis and measles which came as a result of the white people is well-documented. . . . Not satisfied with segregated toilets and segregated love, the authorities now wish to maintain what they believe is a pure race. It is ridiculous in the extreme. . . . These people are prepared to use the hearts and kidneys of blacks without any qualms. Don’t they realize the same black blood is in those organs?” ■

panies which, linked together, can buy goods and transport them anywhere in the world without traceable origin or destination—allowing South Africa to keep doing business even if trade embargoes are imposed by other nations.

Freight Services is best known as the company which broke the UN sanctions against Rhodesia by supplying most of the oil that sustained the Ian Smith regime.

Since then, the company has built up an international organization with 60 subsidiaries, including one in nearly every African country, allowing South Africa to sell goods while camouflaging their origins.

With its British network, Pretoria has access to computer technology, heavy machinery, and communications equipment without directly compromising either the supplier companies or the governments involved. ■

### ZIMBABWE Curfew lifted

After more than a year of allegations in the international press that civil rights violations and atrocities were being perpetrated by govern-

ment troops in Matabeleland, the government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe has relaxed the strict curfew imposed on the region. Since the imposition of the latest curfew on February 3, store hours were cut back, travel was limited, and supplies of incoming food were restricted by the army. Journalists and international relief workers were also restricted in their movements.

Zimbabwe’s Roman Catholic bishops have presented the government a detailed list of human rights violations that they say took place during the curfew. Government spokesmen have denied the charges and accused the churchmen with acting in sympathy with the rebels and opposition leader Joshua Nkomo.

According to several sources, Zimbabwe lifted the curfew in response to U.S. pressure. As a precondition for the delivery of 30,000 tons of corn, American officials insisted that the Zimbabwean government guarantee that the grain would be distributed equitably throughout the country, including Matabeleland, which has been especially hard-hit by drought. ■

# Ibrahim A. Gambari, Minister of External Affairs, Nigeria

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INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

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**AFRICA REPORT:** Could you provide your assessment of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence, with particular reference to the Murtala Muhammed/Obasanjo and Shagari governments? What were the foreign policy achievements and shortcomings of each era?

**GAMBARI:** Since independence in terms of foreign policy, there are not two major eras, but four, and now of course five with the coming of the Muhammadu Buhari administration. The first was the Balewa regime, for which foreign policy was an entirely new area of public policy. Therefore, the foreign policy of the Balewa regime can be characterized as one of hesitancy and uncertainty, and one in which our government was very much pro-West in its foreign policy orientation. In fact, our first prime minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, was very pleased with the British, whom he regarded very highly. He was very, very reluctant to open relations with the Soviet bloc, and even when he was compelled to do so politically, he did not take relations with the Soviet bloc very seriously. So our nonalignment policy was in name, but not in practice.

With the coming of the Gowon regime, some tentative steps forward were taken. We repaired our relationships with our neighboring countries. We put Africa at an important level in terms of our foreign policy activities. We recognized China and began to move our foreign policy to a more nonaligned position. Unfortunately, the last year or so of Gowon's regime saw a losing of steam of his domestic policies, which had a corresponding impact on foreign policy.

The Murtala Muhammed/Obasanjo regime, which was the third, was regarded by most Nigerians as the most dynamic and the most purposeful government in the area of foreign policy. This was the period when we recognized the

MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola and worked hard to get it accepted as a member of the OAU [Organization of African Unity]. It was also during this time that Nigeria nationalized BP [British Petroleum], and this definitely had something to do with the acceleration of the process of independence for Zimbabwe under the truly nationalist government of Mugabe, rather than the "internal solution" of Muzorewa.

By the time Shagari came into power, the basic structures of a new foreign policy had emerged, with, first, a commitment to the total liberation of Africa; second, a commitment to the eradication of apartheid and racism in South Africa itself; third, support for regional and economic cooperation in our West African subregion; and fourth, a truly nonaligned foreign policy. Unfortunately, by the end of the first term of President Shagari's administration, many people in this country felt that these structures were seriously eroded and that Nigeria was returning to the subservience to the West that characterized the Balewa regime.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Do you envision a return to the activist foreign policy of the Murtala Muhammed/Obasanjo era? Will Nigeria's current economic difficulties limit your government's ability to carry out an activist foreign policy?

**GAMBARI:** When Major General Muhammadu Buhari came into power in January of this year, he said among other things that Nigeria would pursue under his administration a dynamic but realistic foreign policy. By that he meant that as an offshoot of the Murtala/Obasanjo regime the leaders of this new administration would emulate the dynamism in the foreign policy behavior of that previous military regime, but that the new administration would be mindful of our economic resources and make such foreign policies realistic. That does not mean that we will return to

the subservience of the latter years of the Shagari administration or of the First Republic. Rather we are going to take principled positions on foreign affairs, but at the same time pursue those policies that we can confidently implement.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What are the foreign policy priorities of the Buhari government? In what specific areas do you think your government can improve Nigeria's foreign policy performance?

**GAMBARI:** We believe that Africa must remain the centerpiece of our diplomatic activities because Africa is our primary environment. But within that priority, there is likely to be another focus and that is on the outstanding decolonization issues in Africa—Namibia and self-determination of the people of the Western Sahara. Also, we will pay greater attention to the problems of our neighbors, ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States], and good relationships toward all our neighboring countries. In other words, we will try to define those areas within Africa that demand urgent attention and on which we can make an impact.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Nigeria is viewed as playing a leadership role in foreign affairs in the continent by virtue of its size and relative economic wealth. How can it better translate its resources into an effective foreign policy? How can Nigeria bring its weight to bear in the regional, continental, and international arenas?

**GAMBARI:** I believe that what we have to do is to take principled positions, and also sharpen the instruments of foreign policy, in other words, our foreign service, in which we have made extensive changes in terms of the quality and numbers of our overseas representation; and the military, so as to safeguard our territorial integrity and also to make it quite clear to our neighboring countries what we are prepared to accept and what is not acceptable. Thirdly, we will try and manage our economy in such a way that in spite of the present economic difficulties, we still have resources that we can put into supporting African liberation, in southern Africa in particular.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What are your government's regional policy objectives? How would you assess your government's relations with your neighbors? Are there any outstanding problem areas?

**GAMBARI:** Our regional policy objectives are as follows: first, to promote the prosperity of all the states in the region. We believe that Nigeria can never be a secure island of relative prosperity surrounded by a sea of abject poverty. Second, we have to strengthen the security of the region so that collectively we will be able to resist external aggression. Thirdly, we must strengthen the internal security of our countries so that by cooperation and taking collective efforts, we can check religious disturbances, armed robberies, and the menace created by aliens illegally residing in our respective countries.

Our relations with our neighbors are generally very good. We have no outstanding problems with Niger, for example. Indeed, the head of state has just come to pay an official visit to Nigeria, which was cordial and very successful. We are in close contact and close collaboration with Benin on a number of bilateral issues. We are closely monitoring the

developments in Cameroon and maintain our interaction with that country. All issues that may appear to be dividing us are thoroughly discussed at various bilateral and other forums in which solutions to our problems are looked for.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What kind of role should Nigeria play in ECOWAS? What are the prospects and obstacles in ECOWAS' efforts to promote regional economic integration and development? Can the political differences and domestic policy imperatives in the member countries that jeopardize the attainment of economic union be overcome?

**GAMBARI:** Nigeria will play a role in ECOWAS commensurate with its size and population. We believe that it is in our long-term interest to support ECOWAS for economic as well as political and security reasons. We believe that there are still a lot of obstacles in ECOWAS' efforts to promote regional economic integration and development. These are the result of years of division that are also perpetrated by the former colonial powers between the various countries in the subregion of Anglophones and Francophones. Another obstacle is the reluctance of member states to leave the known for the unknown, in other words, leave the benefits of bilateral relations or membership in an exclusive economic community like CEAO [Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest] for an ECOWAS that is still a promise for the future.

We believe, however, that ECOWAS can move forward if members will implement the protocols and agreements that have already been reached in very many summit meetings of the heads of state and government of ECOWAS, because ultimately nations have to see their national interest in



**Major General Muhammadu Buhari:**  
"Under his administration, Nigeria will pursue a dynamic but realistic foreign policy"

W. Campbell/Sygma



Margaret A. Novicki

**Polisario leader Mohamed Abdelaziz (center) after the SADR withdrew from the 19th OAU summit in Addis Ababa: "It will be morally wrong to demand that they should voluntarily withdraw again"**

a wider focus—that the more prosperous ECOWAS, an ECOWAS that promotes trade between members, an ECOWAS that tries to modify the direction of trade from intercontinental to intraregional, will really be of more lasting benefit to their countries. I believe that this point will be gradually registered in the leadership of the member states.

**AFRICA REPORT:** You recently held discussions with the French foreign minister and at the OAU Council of Ministers meeting on the organization of an international force under OAU auspices to intervene in the Chad crisis. This was attempted before and failed. What new approaches are being considered to resolve the Chad issue and how can the past failures be avoided? Will Nigeria play an active role in finding a solution to the situation?

**GAMBARI:** Nigeria has taken a lot of initiatives already in trying to find a solution to the Chadian crisis. We have made extensive consultations with all the major parties to the dispute. We have talked to the Libyans, we have talked to the French, we've talked to the various groups in Chad. We sent two special messages to the chairman of the OAU, the head of state of Ethiopia.

Our immediate task is to get a general consensus behind a set of principles that we believe will govern a solution to the Chadian problem. The first principle is to accept the fact that much as other interested parties can assist, the problem of Chad can only be resolved by the Chadians themselves. Secondly, only a political solution can bring about lasting

peace in Chad. Therefore, there should be a new attempt to bring the various parties together for a political discussion. The third principle is that this national reconciliation, this national political discussion, will not take place and will not have a successful outcome unless all non-Chadian troops leave Chad, because as long as each of the major parties can rely on support from outside, they will not be inclined to go to the conference table. Four, all political talks about disengagement of troops should be done under the auspices of the OAU as our only continental organization, which is also the most neutral in terms of helping us to find a solution to the Chadian problem.

The issue of the international force has to do with the third principle that I mentioned before, which is the exit of non-Chadian troops. Before such an exit might take place, some kind of an arrangement has to be made in terms of supervising the withdrawal and interposing, perhaps, a neutral force. What this will be exactly, who will finance it, what will be its very clearly stated objectives—these are subjects for further negotiations and discussions.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What is the Nigerian government's position on the war in the Western Sahara and the disputed OAU membership of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic? Are there any signs of progress toward the implementation of the Addis Ababa summit resolutions on this issue, or do you expect it to disrupt the upcoming heads of state summit?

**GAMBARI:** Our position is as follows: Polisario has withdrawn from participation in two OAU meetings, the 19th summit and the last OAU Council of Ministers meeting. It will be morally wrong to demand that they should voluntarily withdraw again from forthcoming OAU summit meetings, unless we have something to offer them in return. Without their voluntary withdrawal and without some progress toward the solution of the issue of Western Sahara, the next OAU summit meeting will seriously be threatened. We want to avoid Tripoli I and Tripoli II situations, which could have the effect of really destroying our organization; as for us, the primary thing is the survival of the OAU. Everything else and the interests of each individual member state have to be subordinated.

We believe that the next step forward is to have the chairman of the OAU convene a meeting of the implementation committee. But in order for him to do so, and in order to have a successful meeting of such a committee, of which Nigeria is a member, there has to be something to implement. We have called on the king of Morocco to show greater flexibility in his position, such that we can begin to implement the various aspects of the OAU 19th summit resolutions regarding direct negotiations, cease-fire, and referendum. Not all these issues can be resolved at once. We believe that Morocco can give us enough flexibility to have something to implement because there is the danger that if there is nothing to implement and the implementation committee does not meet, and no further progress is registered on the issue of Western Sahara, the OAU will really have problems when the 20th summit is actually convened.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Recent developments in southern Africa, particularly the agreements between South Africa

and Angola and Mozambique, have been characterized as evidence of the success of the Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement. Would you agree with that assessment? What is the Nigerian government's view of U.S. policy in southern Africa?

**GAMBARI:** Our position is that whatever the United States can do to help stop South Africa from destabilizing the countries of southern Africa, and to prevent South Africa from killing our African brothers and sisters in these countries and from trying to support rebel forces in Angola and Mozambique, is a welcome change. I will also recognize the right of Mozambique and Angola to enter into any kind of diplomatic contract that is designed to safeguard their individual nations' security and territorial integrity. In fact, it is in this same vein that we have no quarrel with Angola asking Cuban troops to come to its territory to help in the fight against UNITA and South African forces, and to consolidate its national security. Our reservation is that nothing that Angola or Mozambique does, nothing that African countries, Frontline or not, do should be seen as compromising the commitment to African liberation in general, the termination of apartheid in South Africa in particular, and the independence of Namibia at the earliest possible date.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Nigeria has played an active role in southern African diplomacy in the past. Will your government play a similar role, and if so, what kinds of specific measures could your government take vis-à-vis the situations in Namibia and South Africa?

**GAMBARI:** Yes, we have played an active role in the past and we intend to continue to do so. We are going to work hard with all peace-loving countries of the world and in Africa and with the Frontline states to try to support African liberation, to support SWAPO, to support the ANC, and to support all the progressive forces that are aligned in favor of Namibian independence and against the continuation of apartheid in South Africa. We are at the moment in serious economic difficulties, but those problems notwithstanding, we are going to make all efforts, together with other like-minded countries, to see that we shore up the spirit of those who are fighting for their freedom in southern Africa and to encourage them to intensify their struggles and support them in any way we can within our resources.

**AFRICA REPORT:** How are your relations with the U.S. at present, considering that the U.S. was a strong supporter of the previous political system and government in Nigeria? What is your assessment of the level and need for U.S. aid, trade, and investment in Nigeria?

**GAMBARI:** There are many things that bind the people of Nigeria and the people of the United States together. We have an economic system that is basically based on free enterprise. We speak the same language. We share similar democratic spirits and traditions. Between us, we have the largest concentration of African people. We need American technology and investment in Nigeria. At the moment, we have a fairly large volume of trade between the two countries. These are of such fundamental importance that they cannot be pushed aside by a change of regime, either in the United States or in Nigeria.

We understand very well that the last civilian administration in Nigeria was often regarded as a model of American democracy and the democratic system. That may have been so in terms of our hopes and aspirations in 1979, but by the end of the first term of the Shagari administration, what we had in Nigeria was not a model of American democracy, but a caricature of it. So what the new military administration terminated was not a true democratic system, but a caricature of such a system. Nonetheless, if you take one look at the newspapers in our country, you will see that the democratic spirit and tradition is not dead and free enterprise is in the blood of our people. I think what Nigeria and the U.S. should do is to build on these more fundamental common interests and I look forward to the next round of bilateral trade talks that are expected to take place at the vice-presidential level between Nigeria and the U.S., so as to consolidate the gains we have made in trade, agriculture, and industrial promotion in the two countries in terms of their exchange.

I am confident that the relations between our two countries can be strengthened and I am encouraged by the very warm reception that the minister of defense, General Bali, and myself received in Washington recently when we met our counterparts: Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. We were warmly received and we had extensive and very positive talks, which will make the contacts between our two governments continue at the constructive level.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Is there anything we have not covered that you would like to convey to the readers of *Africa Report*?

**GAMBARI:** There is really not much more to say other than that the readers of *Africa Report*, in Africa, North America, Western Europe, and elsewhere, should rest assured that the new administration in Nigeria is a progressive one, is a nationalistic one, is a committed one, and, before very long, we are going to overcome the present economic difficulties, which we consider to be temporary in nature, and we are going to resume a truly activist foreign policy and a truly nonaligned one. □



French troops with Chadian army commander: "National reconciliation will not be successful unless all non-Chadian troops leave the country"

Alan Keller/Syigma

# The Sullivan Principles and Change in South Africa

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BY THE REVEREND LEON H. SULLIVAN

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The so-called Sullivan Principles that I initiated seven years ago, in March of 1977, were intended to bring the actions and influence of American companies in South Africa to bear against the racist practices, customs, and apartheid laws of that country. It was further my hope that the principles would cause the initiation of similar efforts by multinational companies in South Africa from other parts of the world, thereby, hopefully, creating a global multinational campaign in South Africa against the racial injustices that have existed there for 300 years. It was also my intent that the principles would serve as a catalyst to help change racial segregation practices in other private and public places throughout the country.

I have attempted to make it clear from the beginning in speeches and writings that the principles are not the total solution to the South African problem, and that even if they were implemented to the optimum, the principles alone could not end apartheid. The principles are limited in what they alone can accomplish. Apartheid is a ruthless, inhumane system of practices and laws deeply embedded in the world's

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The Reverend Leon H. Sullivan is pastor of the Zion Baptist Church of Philadelphia. An American civil rights activist, he is the initiator of the Sullivan Principles, an equal rights code of conduct for American companies doing business in South Africa.

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**Reverend Leon Sullivan: Launching a campaign to get global multinational compliance with the Sullivan Principles**

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most racist society. In order for apartheid to be completely eradicated, it requires the combined efforts of many forces, including governments, companies, churches, unions, the United Nations, the courageous efforts of those who believe in justice within the country, and world public opinion. But it is also my firm opinion that the multinational corporations have a major role to play in the struggle against apartheid, because in the past the companies have been the main beneficiaries of cheap labor and profits from this evil and unjust system and among its main supporters. It should be the responsibility of these companies to help change that

system, or they have no moral justification for remaining in South Africa, and should be compelled to leave the country.

The principles were never intended to be a camouflage for corporations to hide behind. They were meant to assist, along with other thrusts, to help end race discrimination and apartheid in South Africa hopefully by peaceful means, without the need for a devastating war, the loss of millions of lives, and the predictable involvement of most of the rest of the world, particularly the superpowers, that could lead to a nuclear confrontation.

Though progress is still limited in comparison to the enormity of the problems, the fact is that the principles are beginning to work. Starting from where we began seven years ago, at a near zero base where blacks were not even legally considered as "employees" in that country, some significant changes are occurring in industrial relations in South Africa as a result of the principles — changes that seven years ago were considered impossible.

Throughout South Africa, plants are being desegregated in spite of the laws. Blacks and other non-whites are being upgraded, for the first time, to administrative and supervisory jobs. Blacks are supervising whites for the first time in South Africa. Blacks and non-whites are being trained for skilled jobs in ever-increasing numbers. Black representative registered and unregistered trade unions are now beginning to be recognized for the first time. Technical

schools, training blacks and other non-whites, are being built and developed. Black businesses in ever-increasing numbers are being initiated and supported. Equal pay for equal work is beginning to be instituted more and more. Companies are beginning to improve the quality of life for blacks and other non-whites outside the workplace — in housing, health care, education, and other areas. Recent changes in racial labor laws would not have occurred without the impact of the principles. For the first time, some company executives are beginning to lobby the South African government for an end to all racial discriminatory laws, and the apartheid system.

The principles have also led the way in the initiation of similar multinational codes of conduct for companies operating in South Africa from around the world, including a group of companies in South Africa who were inspired by the principles to develop their own code. These South African companies employ nearly one million workers, most of whom are black.

In conjunction with the principles, the Arthur D. Little Company has formulated the most stringent and comprehensive measurement requirements for fair employment and social responsibility practices ever developed for multinational corporations operating in a foreign country.


As a result of the principles, the last seven years have marked the beginning of a revolution in industrial race relations in South Africa.

Unfortunately, even considering these beginnings, the vast changes necessary are not happening fast enough. The necessity for greater changes — visibly, broadly, effectively, and quickly — is imperative. No one is more aware than I that the principles and other codes must be pushed harder for greater and faster results. It is my view that if the principles and codes of other nations are enforced and vigorously implemented and monitored, they can and will be a formidable influence for significant change in that racially beleaguered society. But in order to bring this about, more pressure is needed on the companies for fuller and swifter compliance.

In a word, in my opinion, the volun-

tary support of the principles has been effective, but it is not getting the desired results quickly enough. More enforcement is needed. As I have testified before congressional committees on several occasions, "the full compliance with the Sullivan Principles of all American companies with operations in the Republic of South Africa should be made mandatory by the United States

there should be immediate divestment actions by stockholders, institutions, pension funds, government bodies, and other fiduciaries. Although I am aware that these 150 nonsignatory companies represent only 20 percent of all investments of American companies in South Africa, it is still my opinion that all American companies should be measured by the same exacting standards



**Face vocational school in Soweto, supported by Western corporations:**  
"Corporations have a responsibility to help change the system or they have no moral justification for remaining in South Africa"

government, and backed up with embargos, tax penalties, sanctions, loss of government contracts, and any other effective means." The strength of the United States government behind the principles is needed for enforcing greater efforts by the companies, along with the use of "targeted" stock divestment actions.

My views on mandatory enforcement are opposed by the U.S. State Department and the companies, but I continue to hold to my position. Mandatory enforcement and monitoring are vital to get the companies to move more broadly and effectively ahead.

There are 150 American companies who have not as yet signed the Sullivan Principles. Against those companies,

alike, or they should leave South Africa. And even signatory companies must be constantly evaluated and pressed to making "passing grades" or face divestment and government enforcement actions.

I realize that American companies employ less than 1 percent of the workers in South Africa and that in order for these kinds of efforts on the part of the multinational companies in South Africa to be broadly visible and effective, the participation will have to be global. Towards this end, I have just completed a tour to a number of nations in Europe — West Germany, France, Great Britain, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland — in a campaign to get 1,000 multinational companies from all parts of the



world to practice equal rights in South Africa, to provide equal pay for equal work, to recognize representative black free trade unions, to support massive programs of education for blacks, and to take a stand against the apartheid laws in that country.

As a result of the trip, progress was made. In meetings with leaders of government, industry, and churches, the beginning of a network of interests has been established that can assist in bringing about this 1,000-company world multinational effort. The U.S. State Department and business leaders in America can be of great assistance in helping to make this global effort a reality.

During the European journey, I also urged that compliance with codes of conduct in the various countries be raised for debate in the various parliaments, and that action be taken to make the codes binding and mandatory for the companies by the respective countries, with heavy financial penalties for noncompliance.

Foremost in all of these efforts, I see the necessity for the recognition of the rights of association of black workers, and the recognition of their representative registered and nonregistered trade unions, thereby empowering black workers to speak out for their rights on the job, as they will one day also speak out for their rights in society. The growing strength of the black worker is one of the greatest hopes for peaceful change in South Africa.

The principles continue to evolve, and are now calling for companies to support the right of workers to seek jobs with freedom of mobility, to sell their labor anywhere in South Africa according to their ability to find work, and to have the right to live with their families where they are employed. Also, U.S. signatories are being asked to urge companies with whom they do business, and others in South Africa, to follow the principles in their own labor relations.

Also, it is clear to me that the main problem in South Africa is not just fair employment practices or equal opportunity or better schools — as important as all these needs are. The main problem in South Africa is freedom, including an end to influx control and the

incredible homeland policy, and full political equality for the black population. Therefore, beyond the principles, it is my position that there should be no new expansion in South Africa by American companies until apartheid ends, including full political equality for blacks, and that no new bank loans should be made to the South African government or its agencies, nor any sales made to the South African police or its military until all South Africa's racial discriminatory regulations and apartheid laws are rescinded.

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**“The Sullivan Principles are not the total solution to the South African problem. Even if they were implemented to the optimum, they alone could not end apartheid.”**

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Perhaps the Sullivan Principles and the other codes in the world will only do so much, and only go so far. Perhaps the only way South Africa can be fundamentally changed is by massive conflict and a devastating war. But I believe that attempts must be made to find peaceful means for change if it is still possible, and that is what I am trying to do along with others.

If these world multinational company efforts are aggressively initiated, broadly and effectively applied, and closely monitored, and if we can get 1,000 companies practicing equal rights and taking a stand against apartheid laws, it will have to make a difference in South Africa.

- One thousand companies in South Africa desegregating their facilities and ending all vestiges of discrimination among workers will have to make a difference.
- Hundreds of thousands of newly trained black and other non-white technicians will have to make a difference.
- Hundreds of technical schools, initiated and supported for training skilled black and other non-white workers, will have to make a difference.

- Equal pay for equal work for millions of black and non-white workers, increasing their purchasing power by billions of rand a year, will have to make a difference.
- Thousands of black businesses being initiated, sponsored, and supported by the companies, developing their own stores, factories, and mines, will have to make a difference.
- A thousand “adopted schools” by companies, improving education for large numbers of black and non-white youth, until all education is unified, will have to make a difference.
- Hundreds of thousands helped by companies with literacy and basic education will have to make a difference.
- Hundreds of black and non-white representative trade unions being recognized by companies, strengthening workers’ rights, will have to make a difference.
- Hundreds of executives of multinational companies and South African businesses, lobbying the government for an end to all discriminatory laws and the apartheid system, will have to make a difference.
- Large numbers of blacks and whites for the first time coming into contact with each other in plants, mines, and other places in new human relationships will have to make a difference.

None of us can be sure that the total goals of the principles will ultimately be attained, but things are beginning to happen in South Africa as a result of the principles. The principles are a catalyst for social change in South Africa.

In this endeavor, powerful support will be needed beyond the companies, including unrelenting and much, much clearer commitments to racial justice in South Africa from the president of the United States, the Congress, and other government leaders and nations of the world. I have faith, in spite of all the problems and doubts, that with God’s help and with all the forces for human justice within and without South Africa aggressively pursuing their aims, there is still hope for a nonviolent solution to the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. Considering the awesome consequences and magnitude of death, destruction, and international upheaval should these efforts fail, somehow . . . somehow . . . we must succeed. □

# What Role for the Black Press?

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BY LOUIS E. MARTIN

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In order to assess the role of the black press in providing information on African issues and in influencing black attitudes toward Africa, it is useful to make a distinction between editorial commentary and stories on breaking news events. Historically, the black press — over 200 newspapers with an estimated 12 million readers — has been much longer on commentary than on ongoing news coverage. Indeed, until comparatively recently, the majority of black newspapers, almost wholly engrossed in domestic struggles, provided little of either. In this respect, the press has reflected the interests and attitudes of the black American leadership.

The black newspapers have operated under severe financial constraints that have limited their expansion and made costly foreign correspondents almost impossible. Even efforts to pool resources for regular African news coverage have proven too costly, although reporters have been sent abroad for special events such as independence ceremonies.

The first black newspaper, *Freedom's Journal*, began publication in New York City on March 16, 1827, under the leadership of Jamaican-born John B. Russwurm, the first black graduate of a U.S. college. During this period, many public figures in the United States were involved in a controversy over colonization. Through the efforts of the American Colonization Society, freed slaves were encouraged to return to Africa, and Liberia was founded in 1847 by freed slaves from the United States. The colonization efforts were opposed by blacks and whites who fought for the abolition of slavery, but others took the position that the most humane, expedient way to solve the "race problem" was simply to ship blacks back to Africa. After initially opposing colonization, Russwurm finally concluded that Africa offered a brighter future: in 1829, he left for Liberia where he was to become the first superintendent of public schools and the editor of the *Liberia Herald*.

The interest and enthusiasm of the rank and file of black Americans today for their African roots and their concern with African issues represent a comparatively recent phenomenon. As late as 1937, Dr. Carter G. Woodson, the noted black historian, said, "Negroes themselves accept as a compliment the theory of a complete cultural break with Africa, for above all things, they do not care to be known as resembling in any

way those 'terrible Africans.'" The stereotype of the savage swinging on tree limbs or slinging poisoned spears, so popular with Hollywood filmmakers, had an impact on American blacks.

In a speech at Howard University in 1970, Dr. John Hope Franklin, the distinguished historian, said, "Even Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois, in his autobiography, *Dusk of Dawn*, wrote of blacks 'who had inherited a fierce repugnance toward anything African, which was the natural result of the overcolonization schemes. They felt themselves Americans, not Africans. They resented and feared any coupling with Africa.'" Dr. Franklin added, "These sentiments, uttered at various times during the last three quarters of a century by careful and thoroughly responsible observers, are in marked contrast to some views that Negro Americans have expressed in recent years."

Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois, the editor of *Crisis* magazine, the official publication of the NAACP, and a few pioneer black historians, including Dr. Woodson and Dr. Rayford Logan of Howard University, began to promote a more enlightened view of Africa early in this century. Dr. Du Bois' efforts in organizing the Pan-African Congress were reported in magazines and special papers, but they received limited coverage in the black press. Better covered were some of the missionary activities in Africa of the African Meth-

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Louis E. Martin is assistant vice-president for communications at Howard University in Washington, D.C. A former newspaper publisher and editor with the *Michigan Chronicle* and the *Chicago Daily Defender*, he also spent a year in Nigeria as editorial adviser with Amalgamated Publishers, Ltd.

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odist Episcopal Church and other denominations.

Perhaps the most important source of spot news and commentary on African affairs available to the black newspapers in the first half of this century was Associated Negro Press (ANP), established in 1919 by Claude Barnett of Chicago. The ANP releases were

vided profiles on African leaders who were virtually unknown in the United States.

One of the most skilled writers on African affairs, whose work appeared in ANP releases and in a special weekly column in the national edition of the *Defender*, was George Padmore. Based in London, Padmore was an archfoe of

for "redemption of Africa" stirred his followers and raised the consciousness of millions of black Americans on African affairs. The dynamic Garvey was jailed for mail fraud, and his movement fell apart when he was deported to his native Jamaica. But unlike the efforts of Dr. Du Bois and the black intellectuals, Garvey's stimulated the rank and file;



Until recently, the majority of black newspapers were engrossed in domestic struggles and provided little coverage of African issues

mailed twice a week to the subscribing papers, most of which were weeklies, and the only two dailies — the *Atlanta Daily World* and the *Chicago Daily Defender*.

Barnett had a lifelong interest in Africa and frequently traveled there. In addition to reports on his travels and those of his friends, Barnett culled items for his news service from African and European publications. ANP carried stories of the cultural and political developments in the colonies and pro-

British colonialism and was credited with persuading Kwame Nkrumah to return to Ghana to take a political post that landed him first in jail and later in the presidency of the republic.

The *Black World*, a newspaper first published shortly after World War I by the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) under the direction of the famed black nationalist Marcus Garvey, merits mention here. The UNIA became known as the "Back to Africa" movement, and Garvey's call

he poured scorn on the black middle class, whom he charged with having turned their backs on their African heritage. Opposed by black newspaper publishers, notably Robert S. Abbott of the *Defender*, Garvey claimed they distorted the facts and did not understand his vision. At the last conference of UNIA at which Garvey appeared, in a public meeting on the closing night of the meeting, he restated his philosophy and urged his followers to keep the faith. In his hotel room in an interview,

he said among other things that he could not understand how Negroes could trust the black NAACP head, Walter White, who was fair-skinned and had blue eyes.

Nkrumah's ascendancy and the winning of independence from Great Britain by its former colonies represented perhaps the most significant turning points in black American attitudes toward Africa. Ghanaian independence ceremonies in 1957 were witnessed by black American journalists, and the stories and photographs that appeared in the general, as well as the black, media captured the imagination of black America. Nkrumah's name became a household word in black communities all over the nation.

Ethel Payne of the *Defender* and other journalists writing about Africa began to develop a national audience. The editors and publishers of the National Newspaper Publishers Association (NNPA), founded in Chicago in 1940, recognized the dramatic rise in popular interest in African affairs and sought ways and means to increase African coverage. Efforts were made to work out an exchange of correspondents with some African newspapers and to pool limited resources to finance roving journalists on the continent. Some editors used stringers and part-time correspondents from among African students in the United States.

The economics of newspaper publishing, however, grew more and more difficult, as revenue from circulation proved inadequate and success in attracting national advertising was limited. The "majority" newspapers in the major cities, under pressure from civil rights activists and in recognition of the importance of the black market, began to open their columns to black news and hired a few black reporters.

A handful of black publishers were able to afford the United Press International wire service, which carried coverage of major African news breaks. Despite the efforts of the NNPA, however, there was no substitute for the kind of coverage provided by the ANP, which went out of business in 1964.

In the past few decades, there have been peaks and valleys in the interest

that black American leaders have shown in African affairs. The rise and fall of their interest has been reflected in the amount of space and attention given by black newspapers to African issues. Recently, I made an informal survey of African coverage in four major black newspapers over a one-week period. The papers surveyed were the New York *Amsterdam News*, the Los Angeles *Sentinel*, the *Michigan Chronicle*, and the *Chicago Daily Defender*. My findings? First, there was not a single story with an African dateline in the March 1, 1984 edition of the Los Angeles *Sentinel*. Second, in the February 25, 1984 issue of the *Michigan Chronicle* there was no story with an African dateline, although there was a three-inch story on emergency food for Africa with a New York dateline. Third, in the *Amsterdam News* of March 3, 1984, there was no story with an African dateline, although there was a 10-inch story assailing Mayor Edward Koch for accepting campaign contributions from South Africa. Fourth, in five issues of the *Defender* for the week beginning February 27, 1984, there were two United Press International stories with African datelines, one from South Africa and one from Lagos, Nigeria. The March 1 issue carried 12 inches of commentary on African issues.

For about 16 years following World War II, the Afro-American newspaper chain carried regular reports from the late Ollie Stewart, who was based in Paris and covered some African issues. The Washington *Afro-American* traditionally does the best job of covering the African embassies and social events, but like other black newspapers has severely limited spot news coverage. And it has even had difficulties in covering local news with an African angle. Art Carter, editor of the *Afro-American*, relates an interesting story of an incident involving the visit last fall of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe to the White House. Reading a notice of a press conference to be held at the Madison Hotel, Carter and Ethel Payne, now a columnist for the *Afro-American*, decided to attend, although neither had been invited. According to Carter, they were barred from the conference because their

names were not on a list of invitees. Carter protested that they had press credentials, and could not understand why they were not permitted to attend.

The week following the incident, Carter wrote an editorial in which he assailed the State Department and the Africans for the insult. The flap was finally resolved when the Ambassador from Zimbabwe apologized for the treatment accorded the two journalists and promised to recognize them thereafter. Carter's lead editorial in the September 27, 1983 issue of the *Afro-American* sets forth views that are shared by many other black editors and publishers. The editorial is reprinted here: —

#### ZIMBABWE FORGETS TOO QUICKLY

It is ironic that black Africans who constantly seek international help, especially from black Americans, in their frantic fight for governmental independence and economic freedom, repeatedly overlook the black press when they come running to the United States for aid.

An incident typical of what we are concerned about took place this week with the visit of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe to Washington and the White House. It is not unusual for officials of the Reagan administration to conveniently ignore the black press when invitations are given out for state dinners and other White House functions involving black African dignitaries, but for the black Africans themselves to do so is hard to understand, and from some aspects, unbelievable. Yet it happens and happens fairly regularly.

The history of the black African countries representatives' visits to the United States will reveal that they have come virtually begging for support from the black press and politically influential black organizations in their quest for economic aid. But once they reach the high pinnacle and get an audience with the powers-that-be, somehow they forget the black press and never dream of spending any of the millions they spend for advertising, services, and supplies with black businesses, including the black press. And when there are press conferences, interviews, and photo sessions, they, too, somehow forget to notify the black press.

A good deal of this, of course, comes from the "advice" they get from State Department officials and special public relations agents or companies they employ. These agents pressure them into

deals with their friends and either from ignorance or non-concern, simply steer them away from the black press. Oddly, they also steer them away from visits to predominantly black institutions and shrewdly pare the guest lists for social functions down to the "politically safe" guests. When questioned about some of these incidents, the black African representatives put the blame on the State Department, which, of course, must share some of it, but we think not all.

If the black African ambassadors and press officials know where the black press is when they need their help, they surely should know where to find the black press on other occasions.

The Ambassador from Zimbabwe is one of those black African representatives guilty of this odd kind of behavior. When it was pointed out to him this week that he had forgotten to advise the black press of the Prime Minister's visit and schedule, he merely said, "Too bad, but call me and we'll talk about it." He added that it was "too late" to do anything about it and literally put the two reporters out of his hotel suite. To put a little frosty icing on the cake, the ambassador refused to tell the reporters his name.

This was really strange because all the reporters were trying to do was to get the correct spelling of his name, which they already knew. This should have been the correct way to do it for any good journalist, so it was doubly surprising that he took this tack.

We think this is a strange kind of behavior for an ambassador from a country struggling for its freedom and seeking the help of the black press. While it may be a little extreme from the general attitude of black African ambassadors, it is somewhat typical of what happens all too frequently. We think it is time for the African countries to rethink their position and change their tactics.

This editorial was well received by black newspapermen who share the concerns expressed over their treatment by African leaders. This situation represents a dilemma to many of the publishers who want to be helpful in covering African developments but also represent the attitudes of some African leaders toward the black press.

Over the years, black newspaper editors and publishers have recognized the need for more African and international news coverage. The participants in the midwinter workshop of the National Newspaper Publishers Association, in January 1984, discussed this subject. There are 132 member papers

of NNPA, and at most of the meetings of the association the subject of expanding news coverage in the face of limited financial resources is discussed. Unfortunately, very little action has followed.

From time to time, black reporters, editors, and publishers have been invited to participate in conferences in Africa sponsored by private or governmental agencies. The African-American Institute has been most helpful in underwriting trips and tours to Africa for members of the black press. The stories that flow from these occasional sojourns are published in most of the papers and are well received by their readers.

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**"Black newspaper publishers have not been very innovative or aggressive in developing a system of news coverage of African affairs."**

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News and features on African leaders who are well known in America, especially those who have studied at black colleges in the U.S., have always attracted the greatest readership. Former and current African heads of state always create excitement when they visit the United States. The black press extols them as heroes without much analysis of their views. The leaders represent "black power"; and in view of the fact that most of this century the black press has been protesting black powerlessness at home and abroad, stories about the African leaders are considered excellent copy by the editors.

It is fair to say that the newspaper publishers have not been very innovative or aggressive in developing a system of news coverage of African affairs. Most of their efforts have centered on problems of domestic coverage, and they are unable to get financial support for expansion abroad. Very few of the newspapers are circulated in Africa, and it is not surprising that they are not better known there. The black

magazines, notably *Jet* and *Ebony* of Johnson Publications, have done a better job of coverage, especially with feature stories and photographs, than the newspapers. Both *Jet* and *Ebony* are circulated in many of the African countries and are, therefore, better known throughout the continent.

The impact and influence among U.S. blacks of Alex Haley's book *Roots* and the television film that followed have been enormous. Haley's work stimulated a new interest in the cultural and biological links between Afro-Americans and Africans, which has manifested itself in fashions, lifestyles, and social ceremonies, particularly among the younger generation of U.S. blacks. The book has helped to stimulate a remarkable growth in travel to African countries over the last decade.

Interest and concern among black Americans in African affairs has led to the formation of national organizations such as TransAfrica, headed by Randall Robinson, and Africare, led by C. Payne Lucas. These Washington-based organizations are growing in influence, and their programs and projects have been well publicized in the black press. TransAfrica has done significant work in uncovering abuses in foreign policy and in bringing them to the attention of blacks in this country, as well as in acting as a prod to the State Department.

Historically, no African issue has been treated more extensively in the commentaries and news in the black press than apartheid in South Africa. Editorials on this issue generally express the outrage and anger of black Americans toward South Africa's racist system and toward all those who are perceived to be supportive of that government, including those in the U.S. private and public sectors.

From my interviews with black editors and publishers, I believe there is a recognition of the desirability of greater news coverage of the African continent as well as of the countries of the Caribbean. Nevertheless, the intensity of their engagement in the domestic struggles in the United States and the financial constraints within which they operate will serve to impede significant changes in the near future. □

# Building a Constituency Against Apartheid

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BY MICHAEL MAREN

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South Africa has recently shown increased concern about attempts that are being made to isolate it economically and politically. Ted Pavitt, president of the South Africa Foundation, a group that promotes South Africa's image and seeks foreign investment, told a group of South African businessmen and diplomats in March that the country is "not the citadel of self-sufficiency that many think it is." He continued: "We are a trading nation, and there is no longer any place for romantic notions of a courageous people carving their destiny in isolation from a malevolent world."

What concerns the South Africans about their relations with the United States, despite the Reagan administration's stated opposition to any form of economic sanctions, is the string of divestment measures that have been approved in state legislatures and city council chambers. The movement to divest public funds from corporations operating in South Africa is being propelled by a growing public awareness about apartheid. The South Africans fear that this movement may become so strong that a candidate's stand on South Africa could eventually influence the outcome of an election.

It is clear that a popular constituency is being cultivated for African issues in general and for the antiapartheid movement in particular. It is evidenced

ir. the three states — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Michigan — that have passed binding divestment legislation and in the 26 states and 20 cities that are considering it. Last year, Congressman Julian Dixon's (D-Calif.) amendment to the International Monetary Fund funding bill was passed, restricting South Africa's ability to draw from the Fund. And last October, Congressman William Gray's (D-Pa.) amendment to the Export Administration Act, which would prohibit new U.S. investment in South Africa, passed by voice vote on the floor of the House of Representatives. It was the first time that such a bill had reached the floor from committee. The Reagan administration, however, has threatened to veto the Export Administration Act if the Gray amendment and two other antiapartheid provisions emerge intact from the House-Senate conference, and despite bipartisan support for the measures in the House, a veto override is unlikely.

The picture is quite different on the state level. In 1982, the Massachusetts legislature, backed by unions, churches, and popular opinion, forcefully overrode outgoing Governor Edward King's veto of the nation's most comprehensive divestment legislation. The local divestment group, MassDivest, was joined by a national coalition of lobbying groups working together in the Campaign Against In-

vestment in South Africa (CAISA). CAISA is made up of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), the Southern Africa Program of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Clergy and Laity Concerned, the Connecticut Anti-Apartheid Committee, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), TransAfrica, the United Methodist Church office for the UN, and the Washington Office on Africa (WOA). The CAISA coalition has benefited each of the member organizations since all of them are handicapped by severely limited funds and small staffs.

Because of these limitations, an all-out national campaign to cultivate support for antiapartheid legislation is out of the question. The coalition has worked only on state and local campaigns, which gives the members an opportunity to concentrate their full energies in a small area, complete a project, gather supporters, and move on to another area. Outgunned by South Africa's supporters in the administration, the antiapartheid forces have relied on tactics that amount to a kind of guerrilla war.

"Our feeling right now is that you can't change policy in Washington with the Reagan administration there," says ACOA's Gail Hovey. "Although we can work on passing some bills, the basic thrust of U.S. policy is pretty

horrific. The way to change that is a hard long-term process of building up a constituency across the country that will demand a different kind of policy. That's why the state and local initiatives are so important."

Any group that seeks to influence policy must have either access to power or a large enough constituency to demand that access. When the Reagan administration came to Washington, the groups lost their connections in the White House and State Department and found that they lacked the constituency. "I personally participated in three or four meetings with President Carter, but we haven't had one with Reagan," said TransAfrica executive director Randall Robinson. "We've yet to have a black leadership meeting with the secretary of state — Haig or Shultz — and we had them on a quarterly basis with Vance and Muskie." The loss of access to the power in Washington underlines the necessity for the lobbyists to concentrate on the task of building and expanding their constituencies.

Robinson's TransAfrica is credited with raising interest among black Americans in African issues. Though

blacks have often been thought of as the natural constituency for U.S. Africa policy, until the creation of TransAfrica in 1977, the antiapartheid movement did not have a large black following.

Black groups were involved in African issues as early as the turn of the century when the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) and Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association spoke out against colonial policies in Africa and racism in South Africa. For obvious reasons, however, the energies of these organizations were always directed toward the immediate goals of civil rights for blacks in the United States.

Black involvement in foreign affairs has evolved as the number of black members in the House of Representatives has slowly but steadily increased to 21, and individual black members have risen to powerful positions on committees. The increased visibility of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and its individual members is a key factor in the recent surge of antiapartheid bills. "The caucus is definitely moving to become more involved in the

issues of foreign affairs," said a congressional aide to the CBC.

Congressman William Gray, the head of the CBC's "foreign policy brain trust," believes that foreign policy questions are becoming more important to black Americans. "The domestic agenda has invariably been the major agenda of the black caucus," he said, pointing to the economic hardships that disproportionately affect blacks. "But foreign issues are increasingly having a significant effect on blacks in this country." As an example, the CBC points out that U.S. military expenditures use resources that they would prefer to apply to domestic social programs. Military spending constitutes a major portion of the projected \$200 billion budget deficit, and to the extent that the deficit raises interest rates and effects the economy, the poor will be the first to suffer. A third concern is that if the United States goes to war, the disproportionate number of blacks in the military means that they would fight and be killed in relatively higher numbers.

A more subtle and perhaps more important consideration is that many black



**UN press conference launching Artists and Athletes Against Apartheid: From left, Gregory Hines, Tony Randall, Arthur Ashe, Rose Elder, TransAfrica director Randall Robinson, Phelps Stokes Fund president Franklin Williams, Harry Belafonte, and Joel Grey**

S. Lwin/United Nations

Americans see the administration's South Africa policies as a mirror of its attitude about blacks in the United States. Gray has criticized U.S. policy for being "insensitive to the aspirations of Third World people in general and blacks in southern Africa in particular. . . . Isn't it time to do as we have done in 20 other countries in the world — Iran, Poland, Cuba, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and others — impose some restrictions, to say to the South Africans that we will not be a party to financing this horrendous system of oppression?"

The feeling that U.S. foreign policy did not adequately reflect the views of black Americans on Africa and the Caribbean was what led the members of the CBC to create the TransAfrica lobby. Through its local chapters and connections with influential blacks, TransAfrica has become a crucial element in the antiapartheid movement. In only six years, Randall Robinson has become the best-known Africa lobbyist on Capitol Hill. The depth and strength of TransAfrica's connections in the black community are illustrated by the fact that Robinson is often asked to act as a political emissary and powerbroker when deals are struck involving Africa-related legislation. Because of this position, TransAfrica has been successful in enlisting the support of black leadership whenever appeals are sent out for support on a particular issue.

Blacks are only one part of the larger constituency that will have to be formed if the antiapartheid forces are to succeed. Robinson, like activists from all of the other organizations, emphasizes the need to work in coalition with other antiapartheid groups. "We're not strong in some states where others are," he said. "We take on the states where there are substantial black concentrations, where we can have some real leverage."

TransAfrica therefore works closely with other organizations such as the New York-based American Committee on Africa. ACOA, the oldest of the Africa lobbies, was started in 1953 by churches as an American support group for African liberation movements. The Algerian independence movement was an early cause, and as African nations gained their independence, the focus of

ACOA's activities moved slowly southward to Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe. Now the group's efforts are focused on Namibia and South Africa, though ACOA still provides some support to Polisario in the Western Sahara.

Through its educational arm, the Africa Fund, ACOA has provided most of the literature used in state and local divestment campaigns. The committee is the only Africa lobby with a full-time staff person working exclusively on the

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**"The lesson, perhaps a cynical one learned from years of campaigning, is that appeals based on morality and human compassion won't work."**

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divestment campaign. In 1981, ACOA sponsored a forum in New York for state legislators on the divestment issue. "Twenty legislators came, and when they went home, 20 divestment bills were introduced," said Dumisani Kumalo, who heads the divestment project.

A third lobbying group is the church and trade union-backed Washington Office on Africa. Founded in 1969 as ACOA's Washington office, it became an independent organization in 1972. The two organizations continue to work closely together and each executive director sits on the other's board. From its office on Capitol Hill, WOA, along with TransAfrica, handles the bulk of the direct lobbying effort. Ken Zinn of WOA described his organization and TransAfrica as "the catalysts that the other organizations look to for leadership, advice, and timing about what to do."

WOA has pledged to make South Africa an issue in the 1984 presidential election. In a February news release, executive director Jean Sindab called the election a "watershed in determining U.S. policy toward southern Africa in the eighties." WOA has published a pamphlet entitled "Election 1984: Stop

U.S. Support for Apartheid," which includes tips for organizers and provides questions about U.S. South Africa policy for voters to pose to the candidates.

A key participant in the effort to make South Africa an issue in the 1984 race has been the Southern Africa Program of the Quaker-backed American Friends Service Committee. Spokesmen for the committee emphatically point out that AFSC is an educational group, not a lobby. The important difference is that as an educational institution, it is tax exempt. (Each of the lobbies has a tax-exempt educational arm: TransAfrica has the TransAfrica Forum, ACOA the Africa Fund, and WOA the Educational Fund.) Jerry Herman, who directs the Southern Africa Program, targeted the Iowa caucuses as the best opportunity to try to bring the issue into the presidential race.

With a total of 18 people, including exiled South African poet Dennis Brutus, Herman divided the state into five regions and set out to educate people on the South Africa issue so that they could then ask the right questions of the candidates. "We tried to develop a constituency that was knowledgeable, but more importantly wanted to do something about South Africa," Herman said. "After we'd been through, the people in Iowa felt that they had this issue under control and that the candidates, for the most part, did not." Herman estimated that when the Democratic candidates addressed the Black and Brown Forum in Des Moines, 50 percent of the questions from the floor were on South Africa. Herman and his group also met with Democratic contender Gary Hart for an hour and "urged him in a different direction." "In the debates that followed, Hart moved away from the pack, with the exception of Jesse Jackson," Herman said. "Our effort in Iowa had an impact that I didn't predict. People really came alive on it, which, to be quite frank, surprised me. I had anticipated a minimal success with the key objective being to try to get the candidates to talk about southern Africa publicly, and they've been doing it."

In order to cultivate a constituency, the antiapartheid organizations have



had to address the concerns of Americans and relate those concerns to South Africa issues. In fact, many Americans have long been interested in these issues, but only recently have the lobby groups sought to galvanize those interests into a coherent antiapartheid movement. "The early state divestment initiatives came from the areas themselves and were not the result of lobbying by national groups," remarked Jean Sindab. Though one might expect divestment legislation from traditionally liberal states like Massachusetts and Michigan, the first divestment bill was actually a nonbinding resolution passed in Nebraska in 1980. The lesson for the activists is that South Africa is an issue that can be discussed outside of the traditional bounds of liberal-conservative politics once it is made relevant to the constituency that is being addressed. "I won't even try to talk to unemployed people about what is happening 10,000 miles away unless I can make it truly relevant to what is going on in their lives," said Sindab.

During the earlier years of the anti-apartheid campaign, the movement was confined to a relatively small circle — a case of what one activist called a "snobbery of the left, a smugness that came with being insiders." All of the groups are now committed to breaking away from insular politics and ex-

panding their constituencies to include anyone who will listen. Randall Robinson discussed some of the changes in attitude that have taken place: "There is a growing appreciation of the need to raise money, of the cost of building a constituency and an organization, and of the need to reduce the dream to project proportions. A compromise of tactic is not a compromise of principle. There is no special virtue in knowing more about these issues than most people do. The idea is to get more people to know more than you do."

Jean Sindab discussed the same subject as it related to WOA. "I think that *Washington Notes on Africa* (WOA's publication) is one of the finest pieces of writing that this community produces, but I would not use it to organize people who have never heard about South Africa. When I took this job, that was one thing I was very concerned about: there were no mobilizing resources. . . . We can't approach someone who has been working on an assembly line all day the same way we talk to someone who spends the whole day studying these issues."

The divestment campaign has therefore sought to make connections. In some western, predominantly Lutheran states, people are informed that many of the Africans oppressed in Namibia are also Lutherans. Trade

unions are educated as to how jobs are lost as American industries are utilizing cheap labor in South Africa. Physicians are told that in South Africa, black doctors can't treat white patients, and farmers are told that 17 percent of the people in South Africa own more than 80 percent of the land.

Antiapartheid activists have also sought to make connections with other mass movements such as the nuclear freeze movement. In the January *Freeze Newsletter*, Jean Sindab wrote the lead article which announced that "the National Freeze Campaign approved a resolution to do educational work around the issue of stopping U.S.-South Africa nuclear collaboration." Sindab later commented, "The freeze movement needs a Third World handle on the issue that they can use to mobilize people other than white middle-class activists. They're not going to make this their top priority, but when there's a critical vote coming on, we can call on them and ask them to pull out some people to do some work for us."

The lesson, perhaps a cynical one learned from years of campaigning, is that appeals based on morality and human compassion won't work. "People don't want to hear about racism," said Dumisani Kumalo. "The divestment issue has moved into the mainstream because we're talking about money. We're not moralizing; we're looking at the balance sheets. In America, they listen to you when you talk about money."

"Though apartheid is a moral question, that's not the angle we use," commented Gail Hovey. "We approach it from a self-interest point of view in the sense that if you are talking about pension funds you can't afford to lose money if you divest. The whole question about prudent investments has become a central part of the campaign, and we've had to become more sophisticated in the economic side of those issues."

In Massachusetts, the divestment campaign's slogan was "Make it in Massachusetts, not in South Africa." The idea was to invest public funds in industries that are doing business in the state. Similar appeals were made in economically depressed Michigan and in



Dumisani Kumalo of the American Committee on Africa addressing college students on apartheid: "The divestment movement has moved into the mainstream because we're talking about money"

Ripon College

Illinois, which is now considering divestment legislation.

The antiapartheid movement's case has been helped by the economic arguments for divestment that are as sound as the moral ones. Investment bankers, who might have been considered as allies of South Africa, have recently been giving evidence on the side of divestment. Testifying before the New York State Assembly, which is considering what could be the largest divestment ever, Robert Schwartz and David Sand of Shearson/American Express posed and answered the following question: "Would laws barring investment of state funds or state pension fund assets in U.S. corporations that do business in South Africa prevent the state from earning the highest return possible on its investments? Our experience with both our institutional and individual clients is an unequivocal no." Though Schwartz and Sand were careful to point out that Sherson/American Express was not advocating divestment, that firm and other investment houses such as Dreyfus and smaller funds have facilitated divestment by providing ready portfolios of apartheid-free stocks. Though banks are by no means taking the lead in the divestment fight, they can be counted on to respond when they see an opportunity to make a profit. The availability of these portfolios testifies to the viability and acceptance of the idea of socially conscious investment among a new and influential constituency.

Carl Penn, who is a stockbroker with the minority-owned New York firm of Daniels and Bell, has travelled the country testifying on behalf of divestment legislation. He estimates that return on investment has been 15-25 percent higher from the "sanitized" portfolios.

In a 12-page letter to Michigan legislators, the South African consulate presented the case against divestment. The letter documented the state's economic troubles and said, "There is little evidence that the divestiture of university holdings would lead to any outcome other than having those stocks purchased by other investors. . . . American economic disengagement will have little impact and divestment will not wreck the South African economy."

The South Africans' letter then goes on to call divestment a "hollow, symbolic gesture."



**Jean Sindab (right) director of the Washington Office on Africa, protesting South African policies: Trying to make South Africa an issue in the '84 election**

Washington Office on Africa

Why, then, are the South Africans worried? They are concerned that a widespread divestment campaign in local communities will raise the South Africa issue to thousands more people. The South Africans are correct when they say that divestment is symbolic — the activists don't really expect that American industry will walk away from the profits to be made in South Africa — but it is not hollow as indicated by the South Africans' efforts to stop it.

Dumisani Kumalo even feels that the South Africans' attempt to promote their own cause helps the antiapartheid campaign. "Every time they go somewhere to speak, we get calls from people who want to know the other side," he said.

Americans, to the extent that they know something about it, are antiapartheid. But information on South Africa, and Africa in general, is not consis-

tently available through the popular media. In an effort to attract some media attention, TransAfrica has launched Artists and Athletes Against Apartheid. Well-known athletes like Arthur Ashe and Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, and performers such as Harry Belafonte, Sidney Poitier, and Tony Randall have recorded public service radio messages and appeared at press conferences where they have pledged not to perform in South Africa until apartheid is abolished.

Still, the press, like the constituency that the activists are trying to educate, must learn to ask the right questions. An example of the press' lack of interest in Africa was shown during a recent television interview with Democratic candidate Jesse Jackson. Asked about his foreign policy positions, Jackson several times raised the issue of South Africa, but reporters' follow-up questions were all about the Middle East and Central America.

"Press coverage is only one step," said Randall Robinson. "In order to change society we have to reach critical mass. That means moving people from feeling to applied feeling — a letter, a phone call, a visit, a concern expressed, an outrage articulated to a state legislator or a congressman. That's difficult to organize. Very little of it is self-directed. The prod has to come from somewhere and that's what we're paid to do.

"We must tear down the walls of isolated activity and make sure that the movement is broadened beyond the believers talking to the believers. We must bring in other people, and that is beginning to happen."

In half the states and in many cities there are now legislators who are committed to introducing divestment bills every year until the measures are enacted. The antiapartheid movement's victories have been hard fought and relatively few, but each time that a state or local divestment bill is introduced, people who know little or nothing about South Africa examine the issue. Even if the legislation does not succeed, the debate brings the movement more publicity and additional supporters. "Even when we lose, we win," said Robinson. "And we are losing by increasingly smaller margins." □

# Nimeiry Under Siege

BY RICK WELLS

Sudan's President Gaafar al-Nimeiry, one of Africa's most successful political survivors, is fast running out of time. The enormous problems currently facing the country 15 years after he seized power in a bloodless coup have not simply sprung up overnight. Yet his ability to cope with them appears to be failing.

If the current political climate in the capital, Khartoum, is a reliable gauge, then the innate passivity and tolerance of the Sudanese people is also running out. Few have any faith left in their president's ability to sort out these problems. Indeed, many hold him responsible for having caused them.

The latest in a series of body blows to have hit the Sudanese since last fall, one that left them completely stunned, was an air raid in broad daylight on the national radio station in Omdurman, just across the river from Khartoum. On March 16, as people were enjoying the quiet of the Muslim sabbath along the banks of the White Nile, a Soviet-built TU-22 bomber coasted up the Nile from the southwest at low altitude, dropped its load of five 500-pound bombs, and then disappeared as mysteriously as it had arrived.

Despite the precision of the surprise attack both in its timing and accuracy, the damage done was miraculously minimal. That only five people were killed in such a crowded urban area was remarkable, and the one bomb that hit

the radio station destroyed only part of an administrative building. Another landed without exploding in the back garden of Sadiq el-Mahdi, a former prime minister and leader of the powerful Ansar movement, whom President Nimeiry imprisoned last September. Nimeiry's subsequent remark that this should be seen as a lesson to those who allied with Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, was regarded by educated Sudanese as both tactless and in extremely bad taste.

More interesting perhaps than the bizarre nature of the raid itself was the reaction it provoked from the Sudanese. There was very little sense of panic or fear that it might happen again. The official version of the event identified the plane as a TU-22 (as Western aircraft experts had already agreed), and therefore it must have come from the airbase at Al-Kufra oasis in southeastern Libya. Three weeks earlier, Qaddafi had proclaimed his intention to

"liberate Sudan inch by inch." Nimeiry responded with a diatribe against Qaddafi and warned that Sudan would beat him if he "opted for war." This was now confirmation of the Libyan leader's aggressive intentions.

Western diplomats in Khartoum, backed up by U.S. intelligence reports, seemed prepared to accept the official version of events. The distance between Al-Kufra and Khartoum and back, some 1,800 miles, was within the bomber's tactical radius. Only two Soviet satellite countries have ever been given such aircraft (Libya and Iraq), and Qaddafi had a motive of sorts. The radio station at Omdurman is used for broadcasting vitriolic anti-Libyan propaganda.

However, not one of the Sudanese I spoke to three days after the event was prepared to fully accept this version. Conspiracy theories were rife in Khartoum. Was the plane in fact a Sudanese aircraft flown by dissident air force



Presidents Reagan and Nimeiry at the White House: "AWACs were dispatched to Egypt to bolster Egyptian and Sudanese air defenses after the Omdurman bombing"

Bill Fitz-Patrick/The White House

Rick Wells is a British journalist based in Nairobi. He is currently East Africa correspondent for *The Economist*.



men? Was it the prelude to a planned coup attempt? Perhaps Nimeiry had organized it himself to serve as both a distraction from the other problems in the country and to drum up support from his closest allies, Egypt and the United States, and further military assistance? Why could it not have come from neighboring Ethiopia, with whom relations are almost as bad as with Libya, where southern Sudanese rebels fighting the Nimeiry regime are based?

Apart from anything else, people felt strong resentment that the military had been helpless to prevent such a thing from occurring. However unlikely these alternative explanations were, the point is that many simply refused to believe what Nimeiry and the media were telling them. They are too used to Qadafy being held up as the scapegoat for all Sudan's ills. Such is the lack of information available to the people and the consistency of blatant untruths fed to them by the state-controlled media. They simply don't know what to believe any more. To illustrate this, one former lecturer at the university said,

"If they wanted us to believe there was oil in the country, President Nimeiry should have told us that there wasn't any."

Whatever the truth of the matter, the outcome did, for the time being at least, strengthen Nimeiry's position. Egypt responded quickly with the arrival of its defense minister, Abu Ghazala, in Khartoum just six hours after the raid. The 1976 joint defense pact between Egypt and Sudan was invoked and a team of Egyptian military experts was told to look into its provisions.

Three days later, and for the third time in 13 months, American AWACs reconnaissance aircraft arrived in Egypt from the U.S. to "bolster the capability of Egyptian and Sudanese air defense systems... and to deter further sustained attacks." A week after the raid, the U.S. began an airlift of Egyptian air defense equipment and personnel into Sudan. Although sources in the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum stressed the defensive nature of these provisions, reports circulating that between 2,000 and 12,000 Egyptian troops were also

being brought in to help fight the southern Sudanese rebels cast doubt on these assertions.

On the other hand, Egypt is wary of getting too involved in Nimeiry's internal problems. It disliked his bid to buy off the powerful Muslim Brotherhood by unexpectedly announcing the full implementation of Islamic Sharia law last September, and it is well aware of the danger of pursuing a military solution to the escalating guerrilla war in the south.

The reaction of the southern rebels, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), to these events was predictable. Their spokesman in London viewed it as a deliberate move by Nimeiry to gain U.S. and Egyptian military support against them. The arrival of Egyptian troops only confirmed their feelings that he remained bent on pursuing a military solution to the problem. The rebels also speak from a position of considerable strength. The SPLM currently has an estimated 4,000 or more well-armed and disciplined guerrillas controlling several hundred miles of the Upper Nile. Operating from bases within Ethiopia and with Libyan backing, they are led by 38-year-old Colonel John Garang, a southern Sudanese who has three American university degrees and attended the West Point military academy.

Over the last six months, particularly during the dry season, they have surprised everyone with the strength and audacity of their activities. Their attacks on sites belonging to an American oil company, Chevron (a subsidiary of Socal), and a French building firm, Compagnie de Construction Internationale (CCI), in February during which four people were killed and six others taken hostage, came as a severe blow to the government and the morale of expatriates working in the region.

Work on the \$300 million Jonglei canal project had in fact been halted last November as CCI withdrew all its technicians after raids and kidnappings by the rebels. The 260-mile canal, jointly financed by Egypt and Sudan with European Economic Community aid, aims to provide 70 billion cubic meters of urgently needed water a year to Egypt. Already half-completed, it is designed to save evaporation losses by

shortcutting the Nile swamps. The rebels knew full well the impact the stoppage would have on the Egyptians, and sent to Cairo a list of conditions for allowing work to restart on the canal. In mid-February, after a meeting between Chevron chairman George Keller and President Nimeiry, Chevron decided to halt production and exploration "pending a resolution to the current security problems in the operational areas." Another major success for the rebels.

Since 1979, when it was first discovered in significant quantity by Chevron at Bentiu, oil has been regarded by Sudan as the panacea to all of the country's economic ills. Estimates of reserves have varied between 10 billion barrels and a substantially less impressive 200 to 250 million barrels, but for as long as it lasts it means much needed hard currency for the country. The decision to pipe the oil 900 miles to the Red Sea coast instead of going ahead with plans to build a refinery at the oil fields in the south was a major source of grievance to southerners who sought some direct benefit from the oil.

Chevron has tried hard to remain motivated by economic, not political, considerations — a difficult task given the worsening political climate since it began work, and its obvious link by association with U.S. strategic interests in the country. Having invested nearly \$800 million in Sudan since starting operations, it will certainly think twice before leaving. The effect of the shutdown has been to cut its expenditures by roughly one-third to \$6 million a month, and, as of now, the whole project has been set back about nine months. A hold has been put on production of the pipeline and, understandably, banks financing the project are having second thoughts about their investment.

Chevron has tried to remain optimistic. President Nimeiry has expressed his feeling that Chevron has betrayed him. But as one Chevron spokesman said in Khartoum, "Killing three of our people is a pretty powerful statement by the rebels." While at present they have no contingency plans to pull out, if a solution isn't found in the next few months, on purely economic grounds, they may be forced to give up.

But how is the solution to be found? Apart from stating their intention to oust Nimeiry, the SPLM has come up with no specific proposals around which negotiations might take place. Their grievances are real enough. Development in the southern region has been painfully slow in the 12 years since it was given semiautonomy by the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement ending 17 years of civil war.

Sadly, the blame rests almost as much with the incompetence and greed of its own elected representatives as on the intransigence of the northerners in recognizing its importance to the economic development of the country as a whole. Increasing dissatisfaction and

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**"Not one of the Sudanese I spoke to three days after the bombing was prepared to fully accept the government's version of the events."**

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dissent over the past two years over such issues as oil, previously mentioned, eventually provoked Nimeiry into decreeing the division of the one region into three — a move that smacked of "divide and rule" and which most southerners saw as a betrayal of the Addis Ababa treaty.

The introduction of Sharia law, despite the fact that 25 percent of Sudan's 20 million population is non-Muslim, gave the largely Christian and animist south even more incentive to fight. As if oblivious to the sensitivities of southerners at the time, Nimeiry has since retracted somewhat and said that Sharia law does not apply to non-Muslims. He, however, missed a golden opportunity of extending an olive branch to the southern rebels in his March 3 Unity Day speech, choosing to concentrate more on the latest round of verbal fist-cuffs with Qaddafi.

The SPLM says it supports unity rather than succession. Its political leader, Joseph Oduho, a former regional minister and one-time member of Nimeiry's political bureau, said recently: "We are ready to cooperate with the Arabs, and with the Egyp-

tians. But we do not accept that only a northerner can lead Sudan." Clearly there is an urgent need for more give on both sides. The government is expecting an upsurge of rebel activity with the start of the short rains in April, a prospect that the already demoralized and ill-supported northern troops cannot face with relish.

From 1955 to 1972 about a million people died in the civil war between north and south. Largely through the efforts of Nimeiry after he seized power in 1969, a political solution, albeit a compromise, was reached. A compromise is again needed to prevent a full-scale civil war from reemerging — something by no means beyond Nimeiry's capability if the will is there. But he is a very different man, more alone now perhaps than ever before. Through his own machinations and instinct to survive, he bears the full responsibility of government on his own shoulders. Neither the creation of his party, the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) — modeled on Nasser's single party in Egypt — nor the successive reconciliations with the various opposition groups have altered the reality of one-man rule. The country, in effect, is bereft of institutions.

Signs that the Sudanese, in particular the professional classes, are losing patience with Nimeiry are emerging. A week after the bombing raid, the majority of the country's doctors — more than 3,000 in all — quit their jobs for good after months of remonstrating and a 10-day strike over pay and hospital conditions that failed to produce any adequate response from the government. They had the sympathy of a number of student bodies at the university, and there was talk of the powerful engineers' union adding its weight to the fray. It will be remembered that it was widespread discontent among students, workers, and the professional classes merging into open revolt that brought down the military regime of General Ibrahim Abboud in October 1964. As Nimeiry the man has become more remote from these people, so the myths and superstitions surrounding him and his ability to survive have multiplied. The myth, however, appears to be dying, if it is not already dead. □

# Looking Back at South Africa: Time Running Out

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BY MILFRED C. FIERCE

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In May of 1981, following two years of intensive study, the 500-page report, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, was issued by the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa. A central feature of the commission's work was the sophisticated policy framework it advanced for analyzing U.S. foreign policy in southern Africa. The commission stressed the importance of the integrated nature of four ingredients in policy analysis: U.S. interests, the situation in the country, a set of clearly articulated policy objectives, and a series of recommended actions flowing from the objectives.

The commission presented all sides of the best arguments in the thorniest issues in the U.S.-southern Africa policy debate. This was preceded by substantial background on South Africa's history, people, economy, labor scene, system of apartheid, status of civil

liberties, and its relations with the rest of Africa and the international community. These background chapters were overlaid by a set of vignettes that gave a flavor of life in South Africa for all of its people and brought alive the hard facts of the situation in the Republic.

The commission has now disbanded. The interest of the former commissioners in the subject, however, remains strong. Many businesses and others in the private sector, and their policies in southern Africa, have been swayed by the work of the commission. Letters and other testimonials continue to come in, affirming the soundness, quality, and usefulness of the report.

The extent to which the findings and recommendations of the commission figured in the deliberations of the Reagan administration when determining its southern Africa policies is not clear. Copies of the report were sent to all of the key people in the administration, including the president, and many of them were briefed individually, notably Vice-President George Bush and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker. However, three years hence, it is apparent that the administration has not followed the recommendations of the commission if

one examines the southern Africa policies that have been pursued.

Recent legislation in the House of Representatives, on the other hand, appears to have been influenced by the work of the commission. Two amendments in particular, sponsored by Congressmen William Gray (D-Pa.) and Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.), attached to the Export Administration Act, are cases in point. The Gray amendment would allow no new investment in South Africa, a recommendation of the commission. The Wolpe amendment would expand controls on the transfer of nuclear technology to countries like South Africa that have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and that have refused International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards for their nuclear facilities. The commission recommended a broadening of the nuclear embargo.

It may be helpful to reexamine the reasons why the U.S. government and people should be concerned about South Africa and developments there, and to look again at the key findings and recommendations of the commission in light of Reagan administration policy and developments in southern Africa over the past three years.

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Milfred C. Fierce is professor and chairman, Department of Africana Studies, Brooklyn College. He was research director of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa.

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Advancing political freedom and civil liberties, maintaining satisfactory diplomatic and commercial relations with other African countries as well as commercial relations with South Africa, ensuring adequate supplies of key minerals, protecting U.S. military and strategic interests, and minimizing Soviet influence collectively represent the U.S. national interest in southern Africa. There is no priority among these interests. Each has a constituency, and too often these interests seem to be in competition, but they all appear to have the same objective, albeit for different reasons—reduced violence, stability, and peace.

## FINDINGS

One of the commission's major findings was that the active collaboration of the South African government was not an important factor in protecting the Cape Sea route, exploding a myth that had gained some currency in the debate over U.S. policy. A greater source of danger to the West, the commission found, was the growth of Soviet influence in the region, promoted by white intransigence in South Africa, growing political instability, rising levels of racial violence, and armed conflict.

Another major conclusion was that halts in the supply of key minerals exported from South Africa, should they occur, are likely to be partial, intermittent, and short-term in duration. Medium-term (five to 10 years) and long-term (more than 10 years) interruptions are unlikely.

In addition, the commission also found the following: black forces inside the country would not accept the status quo and would eventually alter it; there was much ferment and many contradictory forces at work in South African society; whites were not yet ready to accept blacks as equals or to share power with them, and blacks did not yet possess sufficient leverage to compel whites to share power; many black and white leaders inside the country recognized the need for real reforms; and fundamental change would not come quickly and compromises would have to be made. Although the final battle lines have not yet been drawn, and fundamental political change without sus-

tained, large-scale violence is still possible, time is running out.

Both blacks and whites hold non-negotiable positions that are not necessarily irreconcilable and therefore may be the key to the solution (blacks must have a genuine share in political power and whites cannot accept a winner-take-all form of majority rule). The choice for South Africa is not between "slow peaceful change" and "quick violent change" but between a slow, uneven, sporadically violent evolutionary process and a slow, but much more violent descent into civil war.

Both these paths could lead to genuine power sharing. The United States should encourage the less violent path because it is more likely to protect the full range of U.S. interests. In the final analysis, black and white South Africans must make their own choices, and whatever system they freely and fairly choose should be respected by the United States and the international community.

The specific actions for the U.S. government and American business proposed by the commission in pursuit of its five policy objectives were:

*Objective 1:* To make clear the fundamental and continuing opposition of the U.S. government and people to the system of apartheid, with particular emphasis on the exclusion of blacks from an effective share in political power.

*Recommendations:* The arms and nuclear embargoes should be broadened to cover foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies, and diplomatic recognition and economic aid should be withheld from the so-called independent homelands. U.S. corporations should not expand their operations in South Africa and those companies not already there should stay out. Companies should commit a generous proportion of their corporate resources—determined in accordance with a specific "social development expenditure standard"—to improving the lives of black South Africans, and they should subscribe to and implement the Sullivan Principles.

*Objective 2:* To promote genuine political power sharing in South Africa

with a minimum of violence by systematically exerting influence on the South African government.

*Recommendations:* The specific actions in pursuit of this objective are the so-called push-pull, carrot-stick, inducement-pressure ones, designed to encourage positive and discourage negative initiatives by the South African government. Diplomatic moves such as reducing the levels of U.S. representation in South Africa and vice versa or barring the export of particular categories of U.S. goods, services, and technology would follow if South Africa implemented more repressive policies. If the government showed signs of making genuine attempts to share power with blacks and at ending the system of apartheid, the U.S. should recognize such efforts and take commensurate steps.

*Objective 3:* To support organizations inside South Africa working for change, to assist the development of black leadership, and to promote black welfare.

*Recommendations:* Public interest organizations working for change should be supported. Antiapartheid activities by private groups in South Africa should be encouraged by U.S. counterparts. Research efforts of South African organizations and individuals working for change should be supported. African and multiracial unions should be aided. Black economic and social development should be supported through investments and loans, and a social development expenditure standard and the Sullivan Principles should be adopted and implemented. Leadership exchange programs should be continued. The monitoring of South African government repression by private U.S. organizations should be continued.

*Objective 4:* To assist the economic development of the other states in southern Africa, including a reduction in the imbalance in their economic relations with South Africa.

*Recommendations:* The private sector should be encouraged to expand trade and industrial development in the re-

gion and to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, especially for the development of agriculture, transport, communications, and energy resources. Increased aid for Zimbabwe was urged in recognition of its vital role in southern Africa.

*Objective 5:* To reduce the impact of stoppages of imports of key minerals from South Africa.

*Recommendations:* U.S. stockpiles of these minerals (chromium-ferrochrome, manganese-ferromanganese, platinum, and vanadium) should be increased; a national minerals policy and contingency plans developed; sources of supply diversified; and transport systems in the other mineral-supplying states in southern Africa developed.

In addition, there were three general recommendations for the U.S. government. First, it should encourage U.S. allies to adopt similar approaches. Second, it should issue a white paper defining U.S. interests in South and southern Africa, describing the overall framework for policy. And third, it should establish a high-level inter-departmental committee to coordinate policy toward South Africa.

The principal findings and recommendations of the Study Commission are still valid even though they were made almost three years ago. The policy framework—the mechanism proposed by the commission for analyzing U.S. policy in southern Africa—is still the best way to think about policy and to appreciate how all of the crucial ingredients (interests, realities, objectives, and actions) are mechanically linked. The framework can accommodate disagreement on the specific actions presented by the commission and remain an effective tool for policy analysis.

#### **REAGAN ADMINISTRATION POLICY**

The Reagan administration assumed office in early 1981 with an announced intention of changing the style of U.S. southern Africa policy in order to have greater influence with the South African government. The policy orientation shifted from an emphasis on human rights issues to regional security concerns. The Carter administration was

criticized for railing against South Africa and delivering nothing. South Africa for Ronald Reagan was "a friend and ally."

Top priority for the administration has been the search for a solution to the Namibia conundrum. The system of apartheid, the exclusion of Africans from an opportunity to share political power in South Africa, and human rights violations have been relegated to the back burner. It is unfortunate that the Reagan State Department introduced a device in the Namibia negotiations called "linkage," which associates Namibian independence with the removal of Cuban troops from Angola, and it has even been suggested that this tactic, quickly embraced by the South African government, now establishes a condition for Namibian independence. The linkage idea has been forcefully and repeatedly condemned by African leadership, who insist that the presence of Cubans in Angola and Namibian independence are two wholly separate issues, and should be treated as such. The South Africans have taken full advantage of this "window of opportunity," outmaneuvered the U.S., and prolonged the negotiations, buying needed time along the way. Although there has been a flurry of media enthusiasm recently about a new possibility for a Namibia settlement, careful observers are not optimistic and many suspect that another stalemate has developed because the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) has rejected the "disengagement" proposals.

The Reagan "constructive engagement" approach has inspired an intensification of the destabilization policies of the South African government, which over the past three years has stepped up its military adventures into Angola, Mozambique, and Lesotho, and aggressively agitated the new government in Zimbabwe. Their objective, they assert, has been search and destroy missions against African National Congress (ANC) sanctuaries. Their efforts have netted them primarily civilian casualties, property destruction, and U.S. vetoes of UN resolutions condemning the attacks.

The three-year report card on Reagan southern African policy is not a good

one. The evidence is as follows: The system of racial separation in South Africa is essentially status quo ante. There have been at best only chinks in the solid armor of apartheid. The new constitution, overwhelmingly approved by whites six months ago, provides for the nominal and meaningless inclusion of Coloureds and Indians in a reorganized Parliament. The 22 million Africans will simply continue to be excluded, which prevents the proposals from being taken seriously as a long-term solution.

There are reports that licenses have been made available for the sale of U.S. enriched uranium and helium-3, both of which are used to make thermonuclear weapons. Sales of high-tech nuclear equipment to South Africa have increased and the Reagan administration has facilitated the shipment of enriched uranium from Europe to South Africa.

Even though the Gulf Oil Company is turning handsome profits from which the Angolan government derives needed foreign exchange to help pay the approximately \$6 million per month cost of keeping the Cuban troops on its soil, the Reagan administration steadfastly refuses to establish diplomatic relations with Angola until the Cubans leave, firmly establishing the proverbial "Catch-22" situation.

Shock batons have been sold to the South African government; it has received a \$1.1 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund; and the ban on "gray-area" goods, such as computers, airplanes, and helicopters, to the South African military and police has been relaxed. The South African government has not reciprocated for these incentives by comparable movement away from apartheid, nor toward Namibian independence. It has, it seems, had things pretty much its way since January 1981. There have been many carrots and few sticks. Recognizing this and that time may be running out for the Reagan administration as the presidential elections approach, the South Africans have recently been angling to impress outsiders with their attempts at disengagement with Angola, to be followed by a cease-fire in Namibia/Angola.

They have, in addition, released SWAPO founder Herman Toivo Ja



Toivo after 16 years in prison, possibly to sow some seeds of division within SWAPO, and signed an unprecedented nonaggression pact with Mozambique that has provoked heated debate and mixed reaction in and out of South Africa. These developments, however, will not make it any easier for the Reagan administration to defend its ineffective and anachronistic policies in southern Africa. South African troops are still on Namibian soil and the war

goes on. Some observers are no more optimistic now about Namibian independence and the implementation of UN Resolution 435 than at any other time during the tenure of the Reagan administration. The Cubans and Angolans supplied their own conditions for troop withdrawal, assuring a continuation of the diplomatic impasse that even the best efforts of Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and others may not be able to break.

Robert McNamara has referred to southern Africa as the Middle East of the 1990s. Indeed the prospects for a negotiated resolution of the problems in southern Africa—Namibian independence and the elimination of apartheid—appear as intractable as they are susceptible to escalation. At the same time, surprisingly, the possibility for negotiation still exists, although, as the commission so perceptively noted three years ago, time is running out. □

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
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
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