

AMERICA'S LEADING MAGAZINE ON AFRICA

# AFRICA REPORT

JULY/AUGUST 1985

FOUR DOLLARS



0001 9999 00 015745 0010 SMP  
MARLENE UNIV. HURST  
ZEROX UNIV. MICROFILMS  
300 N. ZEEB RD.  
ANN ARBOR MI 48106



WEST AFRICA AFTER THE EXPULSIONS:  
What Future For ECOWAS?



# AFRICA REPORT

America's Leading Magazine  
on Africa

Please enter my subscription as indicated below (six issues per year):

*INDIVIDUAL*

*INSTITUTION*

\$21/1 year

\$28/1 year

\$39/2 years

\$53/2 years

\$56/3 years

\$72/3 years

—Regular Mail to Canada/Overseas: Add \$6 per year.

—Air Rate Overseas: Add \$24 per year.

—First-class within USA: Add \$7 per year.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

CITY \_\_\_\_\_ STATE \_\_\_\_\_ ZIP \_\_\_\_\_

The total amount of my order is \$ \_\_\_\_\_

My check is enclosed (Make checks payable to Transaction Periodicals Consortium).

Please bill my:  MasterCard  VISA

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Expiration Date \_\_\_\_\_ Interbank No. \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_




No Postage Stamp  
Necessary if Mailed  
in the United States

**BUSINESS REPLY CARD**

FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 1129 NEW BRUNSWICK NJ

**AFRICA  
REPORT**

Transaction Periodicals Consortium  
Rutgers University  
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903



**The African-American Institute**

**Chairman**  
Randolph Nugent

**President**  
Donald B. Easum

**Publisher**  
Frank E. Ferrari

**Editor**  
Margaret A. Novicki

**Assistant Editor**  
Paula Hirschhoff

**Editorial Assistant**  
André Astrow

**Production Editor**  
Alana Lee

**Contributing Editor**  
Michael Maren

**Interns**  
William Bissell  
Patrick Gaspard  
Julie K. Glynn  
Robin A. Harper  
David Rier  
Dorothy Q. Thomas

Circulation, Subscriptions, Advertising, Management, and Production Services by Transaction Periodicals Consortium.

**Production Editors**  
Alex Fundock III  
George P. Bassett

**Art**  
Dena Leiter  
Scott E. Pringle

*Africa Report* (ISSN 0001-9836), a nonpartisan magazine of African affairs, is published bimonthly in January-February, March-April, May-June, July-August, September-October, and November-December, and is scheduled to appear at the beginning of each date period at 433 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. Editorial correspondence regarding subscriptions, distribution, advertising, and other business matters should be sent to Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Dept. 8010, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903. Telephone: (201) 932-2280. Subscription rates: *Individuals*: U.S.A. \$21, Canada \$27, air rate overseas \$45. *Institutions*: U.S.A. \$28, Canada \$34, air rate overseas \$52. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: If this magazine is undeliverable, please send notice to *Africa Report*, Transaction Periodicals Consortium (address above). Telephones: Publisher (212) 949-5717; Editor (212) 949-5731. Copyright © 1985 by the African-American Institute, Inc.



**Buhari Speaks**  
Page 4



**After Sékou Touré**  
Page 19



**Solution for Sudan?**  
Page 53



**Regional Cooperation**  
Page 69

**Interview**

Maj.-Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, Head of the Federal Military Government, Nigeria  
*Interviewed by Margaret A. Novicki*

4

**Opinion**

West Africa After the Exodus  
*By Margaret A. Novicki*

10

**Ivory Coast**

One-Party State at a Crossroads  
*By Howard French*

14

**Guinea**

A Tough Road Ahead  
*By Richard Everett*

19

**Senegal**

Diouf's Dilemmas  
*By Howard Schissel*

25

**Togo**

West Africa's Middleman in a Pinch  
*By Manfred Steinholtz*

29

**Interview**

Oliver Tambo, President, the African National Congress  
*Interviewed by Margaret A. Novicki*

32

**Update**

*Editor: Paula Hirschhoff*  
*Assistant Editor: André Astrow*

37

**Sudan**

A Plea for Pluralism  
*By Mansour Khalid*

53

**Cameroon**

Biya's New Deal  
*By Frederick Scott*

58

**Liberia**

Democracy Doe-Style  
*By A Correspondent*

62

**Interview**

Commodore S.G. Obimpeh, Chairman of the National Mobilization Programme, Ghana  
*Interviewed by Margaret A. Novicki*

65

**Economies**

ECOWAS at Ten  
*By Carol Lancaster*

69

**Reporter's Notebook**

Sudan After Nimeiry  
*By Carol Berger*

73

**Media**

The West African Beat  
*By Nicholas N. Gouede*

76

**Books Received**

80

**Photo Credit:**

The cover photograph was taken by Sygma.

# Major-General Muhammadu Buhari

## Head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria

Economic decline and popular discontent with Shehu Shagari's leadership were the motivating factors behind Maj.-Gen. Muhammadu Buhari's December 1983 coup d'état. In written responses to questions submitted by *Africa Report* editor Margaret A. Novicki, the Nigerian head of state provides an assessment of his first year and a half in office, outlining the major political and economic challenges confronting the Federal Military Government.

**Africa Report:** When your government took over in December 1983, you said the coup was "necessary to put an end to the serious economic predicament and the crisis of confidence now afflicting Nigeria." Given that Nigeria is still in the midst of very difficult economic times, how successful do you think you have been in these areas? In which specific areas have you failed to meet your goals?

**Buhari:** It is true that two of the major problems which necessitated the change of government on December 31, 1983 were the serious economic predicament and the crisis of confidence afflicting the nation. These were two of the serious problems created by the inept defunct civilian administration. Government workers were not receiving their salaries regularly; schools were closed down in several states as a result of teachers' strikes; hospitals were ill-equipped to provide health services. In short, the government could no longer meet its costs of operation apart from its inability to implement appropriate policy measures to deal with the balance of payments, non-performance of the agricultural sector, high rate of inflation, etc.

Immediately after the take-over, the Nigerian Armed

Forces constituted themselves into the Federal Military Government comprising a Supreme Military Council, a National Council of State, a Federal Executive Council at the center, and States Executive Councils to be presided over by the military governors in each state of the federation in order to stem the political drift, rescue the economy, and embark on purposeful governance of all Nigerian citizens.

In order to tackle effectively the near collapse of the economy, the Federal Military Government was determined to correct the structural imbalance and early in 1984 decided on a policy whereby import licenses would be issued mainly for raw materials and spare parts required by local industry. The importation of various consumer and luxury items was drastically curtailed. In line with the administration's policy of according topmost priority to agriculture, there was an allocation of over 18 percent of the total budget to that sector in the 1985 fiscal year. The intention is not only to ensure that we are self-sufficient in food production, but also to produce raw materials for our industries.

It is appropriate to point out that most of the targets set by government for raising revenue and reducing public expendi-

ture, imports, and the foreign exchange deficit have been substantially met. For instance, the value of external reserves stood at 1.1326 billion naira at the end of December 1984. Compared with the level a year ago, the reserves showed an increase of 334.1 million naira, or 41.8 percent. Also, the level of the deficit on current account in the balance of payments has been reduced considerably from 3.4 billion naira in 1983 to 126.6 million naira in 1984. [Editor's note: In May 1985, \$1 = .895 naira. In December 1984, \$1 = 1.243 naira.]

In order to arrest the problem of the crisis of confidence created by the disorderly conduct of public affairs by the ousted civilian administration, the military administration introduced a number of stringent measures which were meant to give the country a new lease on life and sense of direction. Accordingly, a number of decrees were promulgated to deal with such social vices as armed robbery, drug trafficking, economic sabotage, and foreign exchange trafficking.

Also, public officers were brought before Special Military Tribunals to account for their stewardship especially with regard to public funds and property which were entrusted in their care. There have been remarkable improvements in socio-political areas such as greater security, cleaner towns and cities, and above all, with the introduction of the national consciousness and mobilization crusade, popularly referred to as WAI [War Against Indiscipline], a greater sense of discipline in our lives.

As the country still has inflation, unemployment, shortages, and in a very few cases, non-payment of salaries when due, it is true to some extent that Nigeria is still experiencing some difficult economic times. However, I am happy to say that the overall picture is that within a period of about 15 months, the Federal Military Government has seized the initiative and the country is on the road to recovery. Our measures have started to bear fruit for the socio-economic development and for the peace and stability of the nation.

**Africa Report:** Your government is one of the few in Africa which has made a determined effort to restructure your economy without concluding an agreement with the IMF. In the absence of an agreement, access to foreign borrowing and investment will be limited, imports will have to be further curtailed, and unemployment will increase, whereas if an agreement is reached, you will have renewed access to bank and export credits, and options to refinance medium and long-term debt. Clearly, Nigeria can survive without the IMF, but at what cost in real economic terms? In the absence of a recovery in the world oil markets, won't your debt-servicing burden eventually necessitate your coming to terms with the IMF?

**Buhari:** The Federal Military Government of Nigeria is fully conscious of the possible benefits accruable from reaching an agreement with the IMF on the balance of payments support loan. This is why government has been making determined efforts to reach accommodation with the Fund on the conditionalities for the loan. As you already know, agreement has been reached with the Fund on a wide range of adjustment measures. There are, in fact, only two issues on which agreement has not been reached. These are the recommendations for a substantial initial devaluation of the naira and the removal of subsidies on petroleum products. It is also necessary to

state that all the measures on which agreement has been reached with the Fund have already been implemented.

The adjustment measures so far adopted have had the effect of escalating the inflationary pressure, fueling unemployment, causing shortages of essential commodities, and imposing general hardship on the people of this country. It is the view of this administration, therefore, that under the prevailing conditions in the country, it would be inexpedient to remove subsidies on petroleum products as that would exacerbate the inflationary pressure, cause further hardships, and



**Maj.-Gen Muhammadu Buhari:** "We do not intend to impose any political system on the Nigerian citizens—they will have to decide which system they want"

Margaret A. Novicki

create an atmosphere for possible social and political unrest. Consequently, it is the view of this administration that such a measure should await some improvement in the country's general economic conditions.

With regard to the devaluation of the naira, our analysis has shown that over the short-run, which is the critical period given our present economic problems, it will not bring much advantage to the economy. Instead, it will aggravate our financial problems. This is borne out by the present structure of our imports and exports. Devaluation will definitely not reduce our imports, since our industries depend to a large extent on imported raw materials and spare parts for the time being. It will also not increase our exports, as these items are sold mainly in accordance with prices and quantities determined by their respective international organizations and in addition to this, such prices are quoted in foreign exchange. However, we have continued to review the value of the naira which has gone down from N1 = \$1.3359 in September 1983 to N1 = \$1.13 in April 1985.

While we continue to make efforts to reach an acceptable agreement with the IMF on these outstanding issues, we will also sustain our drive toward self-reliance by trying to live within our means. It is, however, our hope that now that we have substantially narrowed the gap in our positions, it should be possible for the IMF to recognize Nigeria's efforts to restructure its economy in positive directions and give formal recognition to its efforts.

**Africa Report:** Your austerity economic program contains many of the IMF's traditional prescriptives—restraining imports, curtailing government expenditures, providing incentives for agricultural production, etc.—but the main issues blocking agreement with the Fund are devaluation of the naira and ending domestic petroleum subsidies. What additional hardships would you actually be imposing if you complied with those terms, since devaluation intends to curb imports and make exports more competitive? Do you reject the IMF's strategy for Third World economic redressment? In what areas does your economic program differ?

**Buhari:** In actual fact, most of the adjustment measures so far adopted by Nigeria are based on agreements reached with the IMF in the course of our negotiations for a balance of payments support loan under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF).

However, agreement has not been reached with the Fund on the issues of devaluation of the naira and removal of subsidies on petroleum products because of the possible social and political tensions which often accompany such measures wherever they have been tried in Third World countries. We are not prepared to pay such a price because the disadvantages far outweigh the advantages in an economy and a society such as ours.

Nigeria has no ideological differences with the IMF. The fact that we have implemented all the agreements so far reached with the Fund attests to this contention. Our economic program is also not different from that of the Fund. The main problem is that the Fund tends to overlook the peculiar problems of the developing countries. In the first place, it chooses not to recognize the social and political consequences of certain measures because it uses the developed economies

and societies as a frame of reference. They therefore tend to be oblivious to possibilities of riots, demonstrations, etc., and the consequent social and political instability which could nullify all the achievements of the adjustment measures.

Secondly, the Fund does not take due cognizance of the structural rigidities in Third World economies and the consequent prolonged time-lag between measures and expected results. What happens during this time-lag is of course of great concern to any government, since it could be decisive in terms of social and political peace in the country. Again, the results of measures to be adopted are projected by the Fund without due regard to these constraints. The effect is that ultimately the IMF program is not usually successful in Third World countries.

For example, devaluation will certainly not make our major exports more competitive, since these items, namely, petroleum, cocoa, rubber, groundnuts, etc., have their prices determined in foreign exchange by their respective international organizations. Similarly, our imports will not be curbed since they consist, at the moment, mainly of raw materials, spare parts, and essential commodities.

It is, therefore, neither a question of difference in economic programs nor a rejection of the IMF's strategy of Third World economic "redressment." It is actually a question of seeking the best for one's people in the context of various possible solutions to their economic problems.

**Africa Report:** You recently signed barter trade deals with Brazil, France, and Austria, and others are pending. Are these barter arrangements going to be a permanent feature of Nigeria's trade policy under your government? What benefits do you derive from them as they do not improve your foreign exchange position? Aren't these deals damaging relations with your traditional trading partners who feel they may be cut out of the Nigerian market? What impact are these arrangements having on OPEC, as these countries would otherwise have to buy the oil they are now receiving in barter?

**Buhari:** Nigeria is not involved in any barter. We are, however, involved in counter-trade. Nigeria had to resort to it in order to bail it out in the face of dwindling foreign exchange earnings from the sale of crude oil through the conventional system. There are obvious advantages or benefits derivable from such trade agreements since the funds available under such trade agreements are additional to what is available under the normal budgetary allocation. Goods formerly in short supply can now be obtained, while raw materials imported under such schemes will help to keep factories working at increased capacities and so obviate the necessity to retrench workers with its attendant social problems. These deals do not in any way cut off our traditional trading partners as the market is still open for them under the normal budgetary allocations of foreign exchange. In this year for example, 3.15 billion naira worth of import licenses will be issued under the open market system, while those restricted to specific countries under the counter-trade agreement account for less than 40 percent of this value.

Since the scheme is relatively new, it is perhaps too early to assess its impact on OPEC. As the arrangements mature, the effects on OPEC will be monitored so that necessary remedial action can be taken.



**Africa Report:** Although the recent expulsions of illegal immigrants from Nigeria seems to have been carried out in a much more orderly manner than under the Shagari government, critics maintain that the expulsions dealt a blow to regional cooperation, which was improving following the recent security agreements signed between Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, and Benin. They further say the exercise was carried out without sufficient notice and in too short a period, causing undue hardships. It has also been damaging to Nigeria's image abroad. How do you respond to these charges?

**Buhari:** The expulsion exercise was timely and could not be said to have violated the Security and Cooperation Agreements signed between the governments of Nigeria, Benin, Togo, and Ghana. The exercise was aimed at expelling illegal aliens irrespective of their country of origin. The Federal Military Government had granted such aliens concessions which they could never have gotten from any country expelling illegal aliens. They were allowed to leave with their personal property and to purchase air tickets in Nigerian naira even though they were not qualified since they had no residential status for Nigeria. Many of them were transported to their countries free of charge. All aliens genuinely residing in or visiting Nigeria are not affected by the quit order. Consideration has also been given to political refugees.

**Africa Report:** The continued closure of your land borders has had a devastating impact on the economies of your neighbors—Benin, Niger, and Chad. Do you consider the border closure and the expulsions of illegal aliens to be within the spirit of ECOWAS, however legitimate they may have been from a purely legalistic point of view? How have your relations with your neighbors been affected by these two moves? When do you envision reopening your borders permanently?

**Buhari:** The temporary closure of Nigeria's borders was for security reasons. Although it may have some economic disadvantage to our neighboring countries, the deteriorating economic condition in Nigeria and security requirements necessitated the temporary closure of the borders. When security improves and the economy is revamped, the borders will be reopened.

The expulsion of illegal aliens is within the ECOWAS Protocol. Citizens from member countries are allowed visits of 90 days only without having to possess entry visa permits, provided they hold valid travel documents. They are not expected to overstay the 90-day visit or take up employment during such visits as this will mean violation of the ECOWAS Protocol on movement of persons.

**Africa Report:** It has been five years since the Lagos Plan of Action was adopted by the OAU as a strategy for the continent's economic development. However, it appears that Africa is no closer to attaining its goals than it was five years ago. Would you agree? What elements of the Lagos Plan have you incorporated into your own economic development strategy? Given the rate of population growth in Nigeria, can you realistically expect to increase food production enough to achieve self-sufficiency in this century?

**Buhari:** Since the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action and Final Act of Lagos, a number of African countries have adopted its philosophy but the problems of drought and desertification, the collapse of commodity prices in the world mar-

kets, mounting external debt, and the drastic fall in foreign capital inflow into the continent have been largely responsible for the nonfulfillment of the Lagos Plan of Action and the final Act of Lagos.

Nigeria has implemented several components of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos such as planning self-sufficiency in food production, construction of several roads which link us with our neighboring countries, and some of the industrial projects listed in the Industrial Development Decade for Africa, such as a petro-chemical complex, cement, etc.

Our policy objective is self-sufficiency in food production and no stone will be left unturned in order to achieve this objective. We are planning to achieve a rate of agricultural production which is higher than that of the rate of growth of the population. I must explain that by self-sufficiency in food production we aim at the production of agricultural commodities in which we possess some degree of comparative advantage.

We hope to push the rate of production of some commodities in excess of domestic demand so that agriculture can generate foreign exchange earnings with which to import other essential commodities such as wheat. We may not be able to be self-sufficient in wheat production, but we can phase out the importation of other grains, notably rice, in due course. It is my earnest hope that we will achieve self-sufficiency in food production before the end of the Fifth Plan period.

**Africa Report:** In a recent interview, you indicated that it is not the Westminster or American-style systems of government which have failed in Nigeria, but rather Nigerian politicians who have failed the system. On the other hand, you stated that Nigerians should decide in a referendum what kind of political system they want. What do you think is responsible for the volatility of the Nigerian political scene—the inappropriateness of the systems or the politicians? What sort of



**Lagos traffic:** "With the introduction of the national consciousness and mobilization crusade, popularly referred to as WAI, there is a greater sense of discipline in our lives"

political system do you envision as suiting Nigeria best—a diarchy between the military and civilians?

**Buhari:** The failure or success of a system of government does not in many cases depend on the system per se, but mainly on the operators. It may also be due to what is commonly referred to as the alien nature of the adopted system which may be too advanced in our particular case to our stage of development. There is nothing fundamentally wrong with either the Westminster or the presidential or American system as you call it. The failure of both systems which have been tried in this country lies heavily on the operators, that is, the Nigerian politicians and the way they operated the systems. For instance, the British constitution, which is an unwritten constitution, has worked successfully for almost 500 years because of the determination of the British people to make it a success. The American constitution, a well-written document, has worked for over 200 years without any hitch. Nothing, therefore, should prevent any political system acceptable to the generality of Nigerians from working well, if we have the right type of operators with the correct type of orientation.

The basic thing in any system of government is to allow the people to decide who would rule them in a free and fair election and for the politicians to accept the decision of the voters in

good faith. Most constitutions in the world provide for this. However, the difference is only with implementation of this fundamental right of the people. Once this factor is tampered with in any country, you undermine the system and you can expect some political upheavals in the affected country.

We do not intend to impose any political system on the Nigerian citizens—they will have to decide which system they want. All we can do will be to present them with the necessary options to enable them to select whichever one they want. After selecting the system they want, based upon past experience with the politicians, they will also elect the people they feel can operate the system they have selected, thereby avoiding a repetition of the past mistakes.

On the other aspect of your question, I do not think that diarchy will necessarily serve as a panacea for the instability in our system. I will opt for a good government which is responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people. Such a government should also take into consideration our multi-ethnic and multi-cultural background. To my mind, only such a good government will serve as a guarantee for stability. As you are well aware, soldiers are not politicians, they have their distinctive role in society. In our system, soldiers came to power purposely to save the country from collapsing and to stem the breakdown of law and order in the country. A diarchy might



R.J. HICKSON

"Our policy is self-sufficiency in food production and no stone will be left unturned in order to achieve it"

look attractive on the surface in view of the previous military interventions in the governance of the country. A critical appraisal of diarchy, however, would probably reveal that the system may compound our problems since it has an inherent tendency of politicizing the armed forces to the detriment of their professional responsibility and training to protect the territorial integrity of the country.

**Africa Report:** When your government came to power, it was seen as following in the reformist tradition of the Murtala Mohammed/Obasanjo era. Expectations were that Nigeria would reassert its earlier leadership role on the continent in terms of foreign policy issues. However, with the exception perhaps of Nigeria's recognition of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, your government seems to be playing a rather low-key role on the foreign policy front, particularly with regard to southern African issues. What has limited you from playing a more vocal and active leadership role? What foreign policy issues does your government see as priorities right now?

**Buhari:** You are comparing two totally different situations! A decade ago, Nigeria was riding the wave of the oil boom but today, the economic situation is very precarious. These are austere times, not only for us but for others as well. You would appreciate therefore that our diplomacy must take cognizance of these realities of our domestic situation in the pursuit of our foreign policy goals and objectives and this, I believe, is what you perceive as being rather low-key. But even then, we have remained faithful to our historic responsibilities to our continent. For instance, our recognition of the SADR at the 20th OAU summit, which you referred to, was dictated by our desire to rid the organization of an issue that threatened to paralyze it so that it could turn its attention to more pressing problems—drought, famine, etc. In addition, we have revalidated our stand on southern African issues and have re-established our credentials as a “frontline” state in the dual struggle for the independence of Namibia and elimination of apartheid. Our priorities remain the same, namely, eradication of colonialism, racism, and apartheid from the African soil and the promotion of the peace, stability, and economic development of the region.

**Africa Report:** Relations with Britain have been rather strained due to the Dikko affair and the Export Credit Guarantee Department's insistence on an IMF program before insured trade arrears can be rescheduled. Do you expect to resolve these outstanding problems in the near future and what long-term effect will they have on UK-Nigerian relations?

**Buhari:** You have mentioned two of the irritants that threaten to destroy Nigerian-UK relations. But we are still hopeful that the British government will ultimately cooperate with us in removing these irritants in the interest of our two countries. As you know, Nigeria is Britain's largest trading partner in Africa and its investments in our country are quite substantial. So we do not believe that the British government would want to jeopardize these substantial interests. But of course, the Federal Military Government will not hesitate to take the appropriate measures to protect Nigeria's national interests if and when it becomes necessary.

**Africa Report:** It appears that U.S.-Nigerian relations have cooled somewhat since the 1970s and that the U.S. no longer accords as high a priority to relations with Nigeria as it once did when your country was pivotal in American foreign policy considerations in the continent. Do you agree with this assessment and what would strengthen U.S.-Nigerian relations at this point in time?

**Buhari:** Nigeria's relations with the U.S. are on an even keel although they could be better. For an improvement of relations, the U.S. administration must review its Africa policy which has effectively distanced the U.S. from the sovereign aspirations of African countries. For example, a policy that embraces and encourages the apartheid regime in the name of dialogue cannot but alienate African countries. However, I believe a genuine effort by the U.S. administration to help hasten Namibia's independence and bring about the rapid dismantling of the odious system of apartheid in South Africa will do a lot to improve the climate of our relations.

**Africa Report:** What is your government's view of the Reagan administration's emphasis on the private sector as the prime engine for Africa's economic development? Do you think this is an appropriate means for Africa, and for Nigeria specifically, to achieve development? What role do you think the private sector should play in Nigeria's economy? In what specific areas are you seeking American investment?

**Buhari:** Given the situation with respect to government revenue, I feel that the private sector could play a more prominent role in national economic management. Since the level of government intervention is to be reduced in line with the reduced level of government revenue, the private sector is expected to move in and fill the gap.

An appropriate incentive package is being worked out to ensure that the private sector will be able to perform the role to be assigned to it during the Fifth Plan period. We welcome American investment in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, as well as the provision of social infrastructural facilities to assist the productive sectors of the economy where we hope to place the correct emphasis during the Fifth Plan period.

**Africa Report:** What specific changes would you like to see in the Reagan administration's constructive engagement policy in southern Africa? Do you feel this policy has achieved any concrete results/successes? What specific measures has your government taken to further the cause of Namibian independence and majority rule in South Africa?

**Buhari:** The Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement with South Africa is a complete failure and we have said so several times. What the policy has “achieved” has been to strengthen the South African authorities' resolve to delay Namibia's independence and this is why we have called on the administration to review the policy. The changes that we would like to see are along the lines that I have mentioned in my response to your earlier question. On our own part, we remain totally committed to the liberation struggle in southern Africa, and the Federal Military Government has provided and will continue to provide, within our modest means, both moral and material support to the liberation movements until final victory is won. □

# West Africa After the Exodus

An estimated 700,000 West Africans were the intended targets of Nigeria's second expulsion of illegal immigrants in three years. Motivated by Nigeria's current economic crisis, the quit order has chilled regional relations and impeded progress toward the attainment of ECOWAS' goals.

BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

**T**he government of Ghana has said often enough that we recognize the right of the Nigerian government to expel illegal immigrants. What we are dissatisfied about was the manner in which they did it, and the fact that they did it against the spirit of ECOWAS." This view, expressed by Obed Asamoah, Ghana's secretary for foreign affairs, summed up the sentiments of the thousands of West Africans who were on the receiving end of the Nigerian government's second mass expulsion of illegal immigrants in two years.

Completed in late May, nearly ten years to the day after the treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States came into force, the expulsion exercise provided yet another bitter example of the gap between the rhetoric of African economic and political unity, and the realities of domestic self-interest. And that again it was Nigeria—the giant of West Africa and the guiding spirit behind ECOWAS—that was casting out its neighbors, this time under a government dedicated to restoring moral accountability and honest leadership to the corruption-tainted body politic, seemed to make that gap yawn all the wider.

Cautious not to aggravate the underlying tensions and rivalries that have

long jeopardized the dream of regional unity, the governments affected by the quit order—Ghana, Benin, Togo, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Burkina Faso—remained remarkably restrained in their official response to the expulsions. But the accusations and counter-accusations over the manner in which the process unfolded consumed the largely government-owned media of all the countries of the region, fueling animosities and highlighting how little progress has been made in the quest for regional cooperation.

As Dr. Asamoah explained, "I would be less than frank if I were to say that the expulsions have not had any effect on our relations with Nigeria. Certainly they have had some chilling effect, and I think it will be quite some time before our relations can get back to where they were before the exercise."

From the Nigerian government's point of view, the expulsions were justified in narrowly legalistic terms—an estimated 700,000 nationals from neighboring countries were residing and working in Nigeria in flagrant and deliberate disregard of the ECOWAS protocol on the freedom of movement of persons and goods, which in its current stage of implementation, limits aliens to only 90-day stays before regularizing their status.

But to the governments affected, the

legal right to expel illegal immigrants was not in question—the motivation for doing so, the logistics of the exercise itself, and its implications for regional and ultimately continental cooperation were. There was a feeling that Nigeria was once again flexing its muscles in callous disregard of the effects upon its weaker neighbors, many of whom were still reeling from the economic consequences of Nigeria's closure of its land borders in April 1984.

Further, the move aroused a certain amount of indignation, for what country in West Africa does not house its share of its neighbors' nationals, particularly when drought and famine have spawned a new generation of economic refugees? And who would deny the arbitrary nature of colonial borders, the permeability of West Africa's frontiers, and the encouragement given not only by colonial administrators, but also by independent African governments to the free flow of labor across national boundaries?

Heir to the crumbling economy left by former president Shehu Shagari, Maj.-Gen. Muhammadu Buhari's Federal Military Government has spent an unenviable year and a half attempting to scale down the country's ambitious development dreams, once inflated by now-dwindling oil revenues, to a more realistic level. Austerity, however, has understandably been a difficult pill for

Nigerians to swallow after years of prosperity, for the government's redressment efforts have signalled rising unemployment, shortages of basic goods, and spiralling inflation to millions of its citizens.

In retrospect, therefore, the order issued by the Nigerian government requiring all aliens to regularize their residency permits or face deportation was at least understandable; stark economic realities have provoked similar expulsions at various times in West Africa's post-independence history. Invariably, an opportunity to score points at home by acting upon the heightened xenophobia economic distress often engenders was a powerful motivation, and for Nigeria, it was no less so. Judging by Nigerians' overwhelmingly favorable response to the quit order, therefore, the expulsions could be considered a qualified domestic success.

In an interview on Lagos Radio in mid-May, the Nigerian chief of staff, Maj.-Gen. Tunde Idiagbon, explained that while Nigeria was concerned about the plight of the citizens of its neighbors, it could not close its eyes to the serious social and economic constraints imposed by the hitherto unrestricted influx of millions of illegal immigrants. Many of the aliens who were not skilled in any trade engaged in crime, he said, and the rest took up all available job openings to the disadvantage of Nigerians.

Whereas the Nigerian government had cause to claim that the 700,000 illegal aliens posed an additional strain on the resources of the already over-burdened economy, in concrete terms the relative merits of expelling them were less apparent, for it is unlikely that the alleged benefits to the Nigerian economy would compensate for the damage done to the government's regional and international image. African nations in far more dire economic straits have not found it necessary, nor expedient to oust the nationals of their neighbors.

According to the Lagos *Business Times*, the non-skilled illegal aliens were employed primarily in construction, hotels, bakery and confectionary enterprises, and domestic services, whereas foreigners in the more sophisticated sectors of the economy, such as the oil industry, had their papers in order and hence were not affected by the order.

Nigerian contractors who habitually sought out "cheap ECOWAS labor" were finding it difficult to employ Nigerians to fill vacated positions, the paper said, as "they are settled on paying the same amount paid to illegal aliens to Nigerians, while the Nigerians are insisting on the minimum wage of 125 naira a month."

The Federal Military Government was anxious to avoid the widespread criticism engendered by the Shagari government's expulsion of upwards of 2 million aliens in January 1983, and had gone to great lengths to assure its neighbors that adequate precautions would be taken to facilitate repatriation and to minimize suffering and hardship.

In fact, memories of the horrors of the previous expulsion had motivated the Ghanaian government to insist upon the insertion of a provision governing the repatriation of illegal immigrants in the quadripartite treaty on security, customs, and trade matters signed by Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, and Benin in December last year. It was on the basis of this provision in the treaty that the Ghanaian government's subsequent remonstrations to Nigeria were made.

At the outset, it appeared that a repeat of the 1983 nightmare would in fact be averted, as an estimated 700,000 (of which 300,000 were said to be Ghanaians and 100,000 Nigerians) instead of 2 million would be affected by the order, and 25 days, instead of 15, would be allowed for its completion. But reality soon caught up with whatever good intentions had prevailed, for there was one critical variable which differed this time around—Nigeria's land borders were closed to counter smuggling and currency trafficking, and would be reopened for only seven days to allow the aliens to exit by road.

When the quit order was announced on April 15, thousands of Ghanaians and other nationals lined up at their high commissions in Lagos in an effort to regularize their residency status. Others set about spending the naira they had earned on hiring or purchasing vehicles for the arduous trip home. By the time the May 3 scheduled opening of the land borders arrived, a long queue of cars, "tro-tros," and buses had formed behind the Seme and Idiroko posts along the border with Benin.

Whereas the seven days allotted to



"Thousands of Ghanaians and other nationals lined up at their high commissions in an effort to regularize their status"

allow the immigrants to pass by road to their home countries may have seemed sufficient to the Nigerian authorities at the time, it proved woefully inadequate, as Nigerian border officials began searching persons and vehicles one by one for currency above the prescribed 20 naira limit and for dutiable goods. Aliens were further required to show proof of ownership, police reports, and tax clearance certificates dating back three years for their vehicles, or risk their confiscation.

The Benin government further retarded the process, by refusing for the first few days to allow non-Beninese citizens to cross over without escorts. The fear that many Ghanaians and Togolese would wait out the expulsion order in Benin rather than returning home only exacerbated the bottleneck developing at the border posts.

With vehicles backed up for miles on the roads to the border, the frontiers were resealed as scheduled on May 10, and the remaining 25,000 people were

informed that they would have to return to Lagos to be repatriated by sea. For the unfortunate Ghanaians, Beninois, and Togolese who had spent several uncomfortable days camped out along the routes to Benin, in many cases with little food or water, and now faced the prospect of having to leave behind perhaps their only possession—their vehicle—to depart by ship, this was more than they could bear. Tempers flared as many of the immigrants refused to comply with the order to return to Lagos, and violent clashes between the security forces and aliens occurred, as attempts were made to storm the border.

Reports then began filtering out that Nigerian security forces had fired on a group of immigrants at the border, killing and wounding an unverifiable number. The Nigerian Minister of Information, Capt. Emeka Omeruah, vehemently denied that any shootings had taken place, blasting the BBC and the Voice of America for carrying out "a campaign of calumny" against the gov-

ernment and spreading "perfidious information."

The Lagos authorities continue to deny that such an incident occurred, but the Ghanaian government lodged a formal protest over "acts of brutality and harassment committed by agents of the Nigerian government against Ghanaians and other foreigners." The Ghana government's National Mobilization Programme, charged with the repatriation and resettlement of the returnees, has continued to gather evidence from eyewitnesses in order to press its case to the Nigerian government.

Those who made the 50-mile trip back to Lagos were required to await repatriation by sea at the Hadj camp near Murtala Muhammed airport. But with patience and stamina worn thin by the events of the previous week, it would have been a miracle if violence had been averted. On one occasion, tired, hungry, and penniless Ghanaians formed a convoy of some 400 vehicles and broke past police barricades to head



"With vehicles backed up for miles on the road to the border, the frontiers were resealed on May 10"

for the Nigeria-Benin border. Others went on a rampage at the airport, looting and burning, and destroying valuable airport equipment. By May 25, the remaining bedraggled deportees had boarded vessels owned by the Nigerian National Shipping Line at Apapa port and returned home.

The sad truth is that the violence and unpleasantness which ultimately tainted the entire exercise and frosted over relations among the neighboring countries could have been avoided. Some 25,000 aliens found themselves in the unenviable position of having made every effort to comply with the quit order, in many cases at the expense of their cherished personal possessions and financial means, only to find that they failed to meet the government's deadline. Shuttled back and forth between Lagos and the border, the immigrants had every reason to feel victimized.

And their governments, which had appealed to the Nigerian authorities for an extension of the deadline, likewise had cause to take umbrage at their refusal to do so. Any good will the Buhari government might have kindled by pledging to facilitate the repatriation process was dissipated by the illogic of closing off land transit to those who were massed at the border ready to leave.

On the part of the Ghanaian government, there was initially little sympathy for the returnees, whereas in 1983, despite severe drought-induced food shortages and a serious dearth of vehicles, no efforts had been spared to repatriate and resettle the 1.2 million—one-tenth of the population—who were expelled. Both at the governmental and popular level, the feeling was that those who chose to return to Nigeria after the 1983 expulsions rather than staying at home and contributing to the national recovery effort merited any discomfort they might experience.

Said Commodore Steve Obimpeh, chairman of the National Mobilization Programme, "We had warned them. We had wasted our efforts when they came back in 1983 to settle them in productive ventures, but they just picked up their baggage and went again." Therefore, in order to deter those who might consider returning to Nigeria again, the Ghanaian government informed its nationals that

rather than providing transport as in 1983, they would have to hire their own vehicles to return home and would also have to pay customs duties on goods brought into the country.

But the same nationalistic sentiments which were behind Nigerians' support of their government's quit order were aroused in Ghana by returnees' reports of harassment and violence, and Ghanaian government officials were required to calm inflamed tempers calling for retribution. In fact, a Ghanaian-Nigerian soccer match scheduled to be played in

---

**"What country in West Africa does not house its share of its neighbors' nationals, particularly when drought and famine have spawned a new generation of economic refugees?"**

---

Accra shortly after the expulsions was postponed in order to avoid the possibility of violent confrontations. The absence of official recrimination was admirable, given that some 2 million Nigerians reportedly reside in the countries affected by the order, and some form of retaliation, official or otherwise, would not have been surprising.

Fears of such a response were aroused when the Burkina Faso government issued a directive requesting all Nigerians residing in the country to report to a military camp in Ouagadougou on May 25. In anticipation that some of its 10,000 nationals were about to be shown the door, Minister of External Relations Ibrahim Gambari declared that Nigeria was prepared to receive any of its citizens who might be obliged to leave any other West African country.

But the 2,000 Nigerians who assembled at the military barracks in Ouagadougou were advised by Minister of Territorial Administration and Security Ernest Ouedraogo, in the style characteristic of the Sankara government, that "In Burkina, we are revolutionaries and pan-Africans. All Africans are at home in Burkina Faso." The Nigerians were told

that there was no question of reprisals or expulsions by the Burkina government, and were instead merely advised to regularize their status if their resident permits were not in order.

Expelling aliens in a mass quit order may appear the easy solution to West Africa's perennial migration of illegal labor and a tempting means of gaining domestic political mileage out of economic crisis. But the experiences of the past have shown that such exercises have failed both to halt the tide of citizens seeking a better life in their neighbors' back yards and to discourage refugees from famine and drought from heading to the greener south in search of survival. No African nation can afford to turn its back on the citizens of its neighbors therefore, for the tables can be easily turned.

And just as no West African government can deny that its own economy has benefited at one time or another from the free migration of labor, neither can it shirk a share of the responsibility for the illegal aliens within its borders. Wage and benefit enticements from host governments and enterprises seeking labor to fuel economic growth were frequently the magnet which drew them in the first instance, and their illegal status was enshrined by employers willing to hire them. And even if West Africa's notoriously porous borders were better policed and the myriad "bush paths" were somehow brought under closer scrutiny, there would still be border guards willing to take a little "dash" to close their eyes to transgressions of the law.

It was in recognition of the economic realities of the sub-region that the ECOWAS protocol on the freedom of movement of persons and goods was drafted. The current 90-day limit on residency without papers is only a temporary measure toward the ultimate goal of a West African common market in which the nationals of one country will be able to move and work without hindrance in another. Therefore it is altogether appropriate that the ECOWAS heads of state summit marking its tenth anniversary at the end of May was postponed. For what is there to celebrate when the attainment of the organization's aims appear no closer today than a decade ago? □

# One-Party State at a Crossroads

Presidential succession remains the critical issue in Ivorian politics. As Houphouët-Boigny prepares to name a vice president, doubts remain as to whether this still unknown quantity will be able to adapt the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast—so long associated with its founder—to allow for greater political dialogue in the future.

BY HOWARD FRENCH

With octogenarian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny appearing resolved to settle the issue of his succession, Ivory Coast is moving toward a critical point in its post-independence history. The sole political party, the Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), whose history has been so intimately linked to that of its founder, Houphouët-Boigny, will be put to its most serious test as an institution when the "old man" of Ivorian politics can no longer prop it up.

As time has relentlessly taken its toll on the Ivorian leader, a number of developments, internal as well as external, have caused observers to look beyond the placid veneer of stability, which accounts for the country's largely positive international image, to the growing number of uncertainties hanging over the country's future.

Many would consider Houphouët-Boigny responsible for the most obvious uncertainty affecting the country at present: presidential succession. In 1980, Houphouët-Boigny altered the Ivorian constitution by creating the post of vice president and denying the presi-

dent of the National Assembly the role of constitutional successor. With supreme confidence in his own ability to survive and prevail in a political system of his own making, Houphouët-Boigny declared that the post of vice president would remain vacant until the 1985 elections.

## Worrisome Precedents

Since the constitutional modifications of 1980, turbulence in the country's political environment has steadily increased. Houphouët-Boigny's regime has been repeatedly shaken by student and teacher strikes and corruption scandals, which, against a background of deteriorating living conditions, have threatened to encourage other social groups to express their grievances more openly.

Ivory Coast's major allies, led by France, have applied discreet but insistent pressure on Houphouët-Boigny to clarify terms for his succession "sooner rather than later," in the words of one diplomat, arguing that the country's economy is being hurt by the political uncertainty that prevails. With the controlled Ivorian press insisting that the succession is a "non-issue," observers have noted with apprehension the sharpening rivalries between members of the ruling class. One veteran Ivorian

journalist, referring to the posturing and coalition-building by government ministers, said, "Until the president reveals his choice, they can all afford to dream."

Both within the country and abroad, the developments that have perhaps caused the most anxiety have been the political evolution of two other African one-party states—Cameroon and Guinea—long ruled by strong founding fathers. While the circumstances vary widely, both countries witnessed a violent disowning of their founding fathers and the abolition or remodeling of the political parties that they founded.

Ivorian officials say that the developments that have taken place in these two states have convinced Houphouët-Boigny of his wisdom in delaying his choice of a vice president until the eve of national elections. One party official said: "Houphouët-Boigny pays close attention to what goes on in these countries, seeing Cameroon's violent coup attempt of April 1984 as a warning of the kind of ethnic rivalry that could cripple Ivory Coast," as both countries have a like number of ethnic groups.

Others see the "lesson of Cameroon" as arguing against the political interference of the founding father once he has passed on power to his successor. Observers feel that Houphouët's reticence is in part due to the fact that he has

*Howard French is a freelance journalist living in West Africa, writing for the Washington Post and The Economist publications.*



never shared power and would want to remain in charge as long as he remains healthy.

The coup d'état against the remnants of the Sékou Touré regime is said to have deeply shaken the Ivorian leader. The near-overnight effacement of the Parti Démocratique Guinéen (PDG) and the disavowal of its political program prompted Houphouët to warn his ministers not to be seduced by appearances of popularity. He is said to have noted that a government's popularity is "impossible to evaluate in a one-party state."

More than anything else, Houphouët-Boigny was shocked to witness the abrupt reversal of the work of a lifetime—the political system built by his Guinean counterpart, Sékou Touré. While observers are quick to point out fundamental differences in the styles and ideologies of the two leaders, the similarities in the institutional weaknesses of these two one-party "founding father"-led states are equally fundamental.

### One-Man Rule

Since his election to the French National Assembly in 1946, Houphouët-Boigny has enjoyed a quasi-mythical stature in Ivorian politics. Indeed, with the victory of his party, the PDCI, over its ill-prepared rivals in national elections in 1956, Houphouët-Boigny has personally dominated every aspect of Ivorian politics, coming to represent both the party and the state in the minds of millions of Ivorians whose earliest political memories summon the image of the man who remains the country's president.

The PDCI, Houphouët's most important political creation, differs starkly from most of the political parties which sprung up during West Africa's independence era. Whereas most of the region's parties, notably those of Ivory Coast's neighbors, Ghana and Guinea, confidently proclaimed ideological orientations, the PDCI set for itself a very different agenda.

Since its 1951 *désapparement*, or political divorce from the French Communist Party, the PDCI has assiduously avoided questions of ideology. Instead, it has concentrated on imposing itself on the country through a brand of anti-ideo-

logical "machine politics." In successive electoral campaigns, the PDCI has de-emphasized political programs, concentrating instead on cultivating the image of the president, and by association, the party.

The personality cult celebrating the PDCI's founder—of prime importance to the party—has involved the constant embellishment of Houphouët-Boigny's personal history, particularly playing on his responsibility for the abolition of forced labor, defense of civil rights, and the attainment of independence (this despite abundant evidence of his reticence in 1959-60).

In addition to the classic role of the party as a vehicle for the political and material advancement of its members, long-time associates of the president were, upon death or retirement, elevated to a sort of pantheon of national heroes who enjoyed a status and prestige not unlike that of the founding fa-

thers of the United States. By involving himself in the promotion of party members even at the local level, Houphouët-Boigny reinforced the personal nature of the political loyalty which has allowed him to remain in power so long.

With the advent of independence in 1960, Ivory Coast's newly-sovereign institutions failed to acquire an independent life of their own. Instead of serving to assure a system of checks and balances or even consultation, Ivory Coast's various party and state institutions were largely limited to the role of ratification of executive decisions. This ratification process, largely a formality, supposedly lent legitimacy to political decisions. A number of measures, formalized in the country's constitution, effectively assured the executive of a docile National Assembly.

The justification for highly centralized presidential powers was starkly presented by party stalwart Camille Alliali



**Félix Houphouët-Boigny: "More important than the issue of personalities is the question of the strength of the institutions he will have bequeathed"**

Camérapix

in a 1959 interview: "Democracy is a system of government for virtuous people. It seldom works even in mature countries. Why should we expect it to work here? We must be realistic. Our people are ignorant of the problems we face. They cannot be left to choose the solutions to our overwhelming problems, but must approve the alternatives approved by an elite."

Indeed, with the weakening of the country's institutions, Houphouët-Boigny ensured that debate would be restricted to a very small arena. Though the emasculation of the parliament created an initial outcry, the proliferation of effectively powerless but prestigious party and state institutions increased the regime's distributive efficiency, allowing the leadership to claim that every region and each of the country's 60-odd ethnic groups were benefiting from PDCI rule.

While enjoying near absolute power since the country's independence, Houphouët-Boigny has often opted to distance himself from day-to-day policy implementation. This apparent aloofness has allowed him to cultivate an image as the country's "sage"—a man above politics—while in fact retaining ultimate authority even in seemingly unimportant decisions.

From independence through the mid-1970s, Houphouët typically delegated limited authority to two or three lieutenants. The authority of these subalterns was divided in such a way as to encourage rivalry; the initiative of one always being interpreted as a challenge to the influence of the others.

Three men were particularly permanent fixtures of this second tier of leaders: Auguste Denise, Jean Baptiste Mockey, and Philippe Yacé. Each has held the post of PDCI secretary-gen-

eral, and while Denise led pre-independence governments during Houphouët-Boigny's absences in France, both Mockey and Yacé have been acting prime ministers.

For over 20 years, Houphouët-Boigny's political dominance went largely without serious challenge with only minor modifications in the political power equation. This stability can be laid to vigorous suppression of attempts to revive multi-party politics, and the president's astute handling of his seconds, who were effectively locked in competition among themselves with a view toward the eventual succession process. Less influential if no less ambitious party officials were dissuaded from acting on their ambitions through the ample distribution of the material spoils of power made possible by booming economic growth, and the president's *laissez-faire* attitude toward the accumulation of wealth.

In the late 1970s, however, Houphouët-Boigny's neat political system began its rapid and inexorable degeneration. With Auguste Denise's role in state affairs increasingly limited by advancing age and Mockey's influence reduced due to the enduring suspicion in which he was held by the president (Mockey was to die in a car accident en route to a meeting with the president in January 1981), Philippe Yacé suddenly loomed as the regime's undisputed number-two politician.

At the onset of the 1980s, the regime faced a number of new realities. Perhaps most shocking was the reversal of its economic fortunes, with an abrupt and unexpected fall in the prices of the country's main export commodities, cocoa and coffee. The collapse of these markets brought about an unprecedented fall in state revenues—per capita gross domestic product fell by an estimated 30 percent between 1980 and 1983—and a severe hindering of the regime's capacity to fulfill the population's acquired habit for ever greater material distribution.

At the same time, relations between the regime and the country's rapidly expanded intellectual community were worsening. Many of the regime's more manipulative or coercive methods, such as near-total press control, party candidate designation, and enforced voting in



Beryl Goldberg

Harvesting coffee, Adiake, Ivory Coast: "The abrupt and unexpected fall in the prices of cocoa and coffee brought about an unprecedented fall in state revenues"

non-competitive "elections," proved counterproductive in enlisting the support of the nation's educated class, which in the words of one Ivorian professor, "grew restless at the lack of political change and the continued dominance over the country of a small group of party leaders."

### 1980: Year of Change

In 1980, Houphouët-Boigny responded to the warning signs of increasing disaffection with his rule by introducing a number of crucial changes. In an attempt to reassert his control over the party, Houphouët-Boigny removed Philippe Yacé from the posts of PDCI secretary-general (assuming the post himself) and of president of the National Assembly. Yacé's fall from grace, depriving him of his long-cherished status as constitutional successor, followed his organization of municipal elections with candidates allegedly selected on the basis of their loyalty to him. One Ivorian minister asserted, "There can only be one captain on a ship, and Yacé's growing power confused signals as to who the captain was."

The vacuum in the second tier of Ivorian politics created by the sidelining of Yacé was filled by the nine-member "Executive Committee" of the PDCI, which, in the words of one member, serves as "the secretariat of the presidency in assuring the execution of policy." In a move calculated to calm the spirits of the country's restless younger generations, Houphouët-Boigny created the Executive Committee to provide an institutionalized replacement to the informal triumvirate that had made up the second tier of the Ivorian political power structure. Five of the Executive Committee's nine members were young politicians who had only recently attained prominence. Some of them in fact had been critics of the regime in various student movements.

The absorption of rivals, critics, and political enemies into the party has proven one of Houphouët's most time-honored tactics for assuring stability. In the early 1970s, the president began to patronize a growing number of young, freshly educated Ivorians with dissident pasts. In increasing numbers, these young "technocrats" were given important roles in the party or in the manage-



Beryl Goldberg

**Abidjan, Ivory Coast: "Set against a background of deteriorating living conditions, the regime has been repeatedly shaken by strikes and corruption scandals"**

ment of the burgeoning state sector of the economy.

As the younger politicians were coopted and converted into "fervent" PDCI militants, they began to challenge the remaining influence of the party's "pioneers," largely drawn from the landed class, whose pre-independence interest group, the *Syndicat Agricole Africain*, gave birth to the PDCI.

In the late 1970s, with the outbreak of a series of financial scandals involving the new technocratic class, the dwindling old guard made a failed attempt to reassert its control over the party by disgracing elements of its younger rival class. Houphouët and his comrades-in-arms saw that there could be no return to the past—the hegemony of the landed elite over the affairs of state.

Following his "unanimous" reelection in 1980, Houphouët set the stage for the current divisions among the elite by pushing a constitutional amendment through a "lame duck" National Assembly stipulating that his successor should

be a vice president to be chosen in time for the next elections, five years hence. With nearly every member of the Executive Committee seeing himself as a potential vice president, rivalries have taken on an openness rarely seen in Ivorian politics, leading many to wonder if the elite remains cohesive enough to draw together in the case of the president's sudden disappearance.

The unprecedented modifications introduced in the Ivorian political system in 1980 have had consequences perhaps opposite to those intended by President Houphouët-Boigny. Electoral reforms, which allowed multiple and non-party sponsored candidacies for National Assembly seats, led to the unleashing of bitter ethnic rivalries and the widespread use of money for vote-getting purposes, leading the party to seek a means of reasserting its control over the electoral process for the 1985 elections.

Meanwhile, against the backdrop of diminished national prosperity, the gov-

ernment's modest anti-corruption efforts have merely served to whet the people's appetite for greater accountability in government. Recent scandals over corruption and illicit enrichment have reached the summit of the political class. Likewise, the integration of young politicians in the higher circles of party and government has seemingly promoted restlessness for a larger role for the country's intellectuals and an accelerated "Ivorianization" of positions of responsibility.

Finally, the president's attempted reassertion of control by sidelining Philippe Yacé, the one man who could have conceivably been his rival, and the creation of an enlarged second tier of political responsibility, the Executive Committee, has encouraged the playing of succession politics, with one member not hesitating to describe the atmosphere as the "*fin de regne*."

### Unity of the Elite

The inevitable if unpredictable departure of Houphouët-Boigny from the Ivorian political scene will test the country's immature institutions as they have never been tested before. Perhaps the most immediate test will be whether the PDCI can contain the personality clashes and ethnic-based tensions that can be expected to threaten national unity.

Some observers have speculated that the president will decline to present a vice presidential candidate and will prolong the succession process in the belief that "no two of his ministers can work together." One political bureau member, citing a private remark by the president that he would wait "until there is unity" before making a decision on the succession, cautioned, "Since no political class in the world is united, we may have a long wait."

While the president's exact plans for the succession remain unknown, it is abundantly clear that in anticipation of national elections announced for October 1985, tension and competition among those most frequently cited as potential vice presidential candidates has heightened.

In one of the messier episodes of the all but undeclared race for the succession, Emmanuel Dioulo, the ambitious mayor of Abidjan, was politically elimi-

nated after having been implicated in a financial fraud scandal involving one of his companies and the National Agricultural Development Bank (BNDA). Before fleeing the country, Dioulo made a personal appeal to the president which in effect said that those who are attacking him are doing so to further their own political interests and have all engaged in equally scandalous financial dealings. In the safety of exile, Dioulo made the as-yet unconsummated threat to publish a "white paper" revealing the misdeeds of his rivals.

Well before the eruption of the Dioulo scandal, signs of competition between the Executive Committee members had become apparent. Following the appearance of a number of tracts criticizing the "scandalous management" of the country by the PDCI leadership, the Executive Committee organized a series of tours by political bureau members throughout the country to denounce would-be destabilizers and shore up the party's image.

Reports by Ivorian journalists, corroborated by political bureau members, have suggested that tensions flared between the Executive Committee members over local press coverage of their tours of the interior, with some ministers furious that they had received less space than others. More recently, journalists have reported that ministers have resorted to offering them money to assure their continued exposure in the local press. In response to a question regarding rivalries, one Executive Committee member said, "Of course we engage in heated discussions, but never over the regime's fundamental options. We recognize that we are all from the same group."

### Evolve or Perish

Houphouët-Boigny's eventual successor will enter office with considerable handicaps. It is clear that he will not enjoy the stature of the "founding father," and should he preside at Houphouët's sufferance, he will risk being seen as a "nobody" by his peers. This problem is worsened by the fact that none of the regime's personalities—with the exception of Philippe Yacé—have had any experience which could conceivably prepare them for the responsibilities of the presidency, and

will thus likely be often "second-guessed" by rivals.

More important than the issue of personalities is the question of the strength of the institutions that Houphouët-Boigny will have bequeathed. Recognizing this problem, one PDCI leader said, "Nobody knows what decision the president will ultimately take regarding the succession. Rather than worrying about the party's 'head,' we must make sure that its body is healthy."

In recent years, the increasingly open challenges to the regime by students, workers, and even civil servants, and the strong appetite for a more rigorous pursuit of social justice provoked by recent corruption trials reveal some of the weaknesses the PDCI will need to overcome. One official admitted, "While acclaiming Houphouët, the next president will need to redefine the party, particularly at the grassroots level."

This observation seems particularly salient. While the country's elite sees itself as a coherent group capable of running the country without debate over fundamental orientation, more and more people at the grassroots level see the party as a vehicle for self-advancement and protection of class interests. A typical complaint is that the funds collected by obliging the purchase of party membership cards are unaccounted for. The popular belief that these funds fill the pockets of the elite is reinforced by the fact that local officials are rewarded a percentage of the funds they collect.

More importantly, in the absence of the founding father, the party's declared policy of "dialogue" will need to be given meaning. Under Houphouët-Boigny, dialogue has most often meant informing people well after the fact in the sclerotic local press or in the staged and ritualized forums of the "National Council" meetings, in which the president engages the country's various socio-professional groups in a rehearsed debate over the state of the nation.

In order to contain the egos of his ambitious peers and reduce the frustrations of a more sophisticated nation, Houphouët's successor will have to engage in real dialogue. It remains to be seen if this unknown quantity will have sufficient imagination to breathe needed life into the PDCI so that it can survive as the arena for such dialogue. □

# A Tough Road Ahead

Guineans responded enthusiastically to the military coup that ended the Sékou Touré era. But a year later, the Conté government has found that restoring civil liberties was perhaps the easiest task—altering the rigid political and economic system bequeathed by Guinea's founding father will be the real test for the new regime.

BY RICHARD EVERETT

Conakry, Guinea's run-down capital, once considered the jewel of French West Africa, appears to have changed little since the army assumed power in a bloodless coup d'état in April 1984. Gone are the banners which proclaimed the political ideals of President Ahmed Sékou Touré, but the potholes, trash, broken windows, and battered cars remain. Yet the atmosphere is markedly different than before—the tensions and suspicions have disappeared and the country appears to be on the threshold of an era that could radically change its fortunes.

On April 3, 1984, one week after Guinea's founding father and first president, Sékou Touré, died following heart surgery in the United States, a group of army colonels easily brushed aside the divided remnants of his 26-year-old government. Still recovering from the shock of the "Syli's" death, Guineans were stunned and overjoyed to hear the new leaders promise to restore human rights and liberalize the country's disastrous state-run economy.

Sékou Touré's monolithic and repressive Parti Démocratique de Guinée was abolished, as was the dreaded secret police. Freedom of speech, association, and travel were restored and all political detainees were released from jail. The

*Richard Everett, an Abidjan-based freelance journalist, contributes to the Associated Press, The Times of London, and the Voice of America.*



**President Lansana Conté: "Alternately praising Guineans for their creativity while admonishing them to forget old habits and recognize their role in rebuilding their country"**

estimated 2 million Guineans living abroad were invited to come home.

"Before we were afraid to talk to anyone, especially foreigners, for fear we might be turned in," said a taxi driver in

Conakry. Now people converse freely—at home, work, and in public—and are not afraid to critique both the old and new governments. However, the military's promise for economic reform is proving much more difficult to achieve than the restoration of human rights, and acquiring basic necessities is still a daily struggle for the majority of Guineans.

## Inherited Problems

The newly formed Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN) inherited a massive government bureaucracy and a highly centralized deficit economy from the former regime. Admitting it knew more about barracks than budgets, the CMRN was obliged to leave much of the old system intact until it could determine how to repair the damage done by 26 years of incompetent and corrupt fiscal management.

Under Sékou Touré, the country's economy was officially managed by the government. Thirty-two separate ministries and dozens of parastatal and state-run firms theoretically controlled all economic sectors. Real control, however, was in the hands of Sékou Touré, his family, and close political allies. The system rewarded workers for loyalty rather than competence, and the civil service rolls were bloated by hundreds of politically motivated "make work" positions.

A vast bureaucracy was created, and bribes and connections to a network

scandal" because of its rich mineral reserves. In addition to possessing over one-half of the world's known bauxite reserves, the country also has large deposits of gold, diamonds, iron ore, uranium, and offshore oil. Whereas joint venture operations are being negotiated or are underway in all these areas, bauxite revenues will continue to be Guinea's main source of income.

However, gaining the confidence of foreign investors is proving to be a difficult task for the new government. Officials are openly disappointed at the poor response to their calls for foreign investment. Whereas foreign business representatives have been flocking to Conakry to investigate investment possibilities (one Western embassy official says three to four potential investors visit his office daily), economic analysts say investors are daunted by the fluctuating and inconvertible syli, the chaotic banking system, and the notorious Guinean bureaucracy. One businessman said it would be "suicidal" to do business in

Guinea, given the high level of institutionalized corruption. According to a highly placed official at the port of Conakry, the pilferage rate of incoming cargo runs as high as 30 percent.

Western diplomats say foreign investors are waiting for monetary and administrative reforms before committing themselves. One industrialist with substantial holdings in a nearby country said, "They're not ready for us yet, it's far too soon to be looking at Guinea as a good place to invest."


But some investors have taken a different tack, hoping to take advantage of the lack of competition and the government's eagerness to do business. A French businessman representing a European consortium in negotiations over a multi-million dollar marine fishing operation said, "It's now or never. Three years from now, all the good investment possibilities will be staked out. Right now the government is willing to offer us favorable terms because it needs the investment."

The lack of infrastructure poses serious problems, especially for those companies wishing to develop markets within the country. Finally, there is a lack of reliable information available on the different sectors of the economy, making it difficult for investors to judge the feasibility of certain projects. Statistics gathered under the Sékou Touré regime are incomplete, outdated, and often manipulated for political purposes.

In the late 1970s, Sékou Touré realized the need to actively encourage foreign investment. In conjunction with U.S. AID, the government started the Agribusiness Promotion Office. Just now getting underway, the office is headed by Guinea's former ambassador to the U.S., Hamady Lamine Condy. As AID official Bob Hallyer explained, it is designed to be a "one-stop shopping center" for potential agribusiness investors, providing feasibility studies and acting as a conduit between investors and the Guinean government and private sector.



"After Sékou Touré's death, a group of army colonels easily brushed aside the divided remnants of his 26-year-old government"



Moroccan-built OAU villa, Conakry: "The new government declined to sponsor the OAU citing financial difficulties"

The government has offered other incentives as well. Last October, the CMRN published a new investment code, guaranteeing repatriation of profits and protection against nationalization. In April, a new code for industry, commerce, and agriculture was issued, announcing the eventual creation of a Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture to promote both local and foreign-backed commercial development. Economic analysts say the codes are a good base for negotiations, but will lack force until the currency and banking problems are straightened out.

#### No 'Privileged Partners'

Despite the government's lack of success in attracting private capital, a number of foreign countries have taken a strong interest in increasing trade relations with Guinea. Sékou Touré's ideological convictions kept Guinea largely isolated from the world market, although in later years he became disenchanted with his main trading partner, the Soviet Union, and began seeking trade and aid from Western countries.

France is Guinea's main trading partner, and French aid has more than doubled in the past year to almost \$32 million. French Foreign Minister Roland

Dumas visited Guinea in early June and signed a number of cooperation agreements to provide assistance in developing urban transport, financial management, and gold mining. President Conté says his government hopes to have good relations with all countries, but "will not have privileged relations with any nation," including France.

French officials note that Guinea has expressed interest in joining the French-backed CFA franc zone. However, French Cooperation Minister Christian Nucci has said that Guinea first must meet IMF requirements and re-schedule its debts.

Guinea has also improved relations with other European countries—West Germany and Italy in particular have provided a number of grants and loans. The United States has increased its aid package to the new government. Embassy officials say economic aid is up to \$8 million annually, not including food imports and technical assistance worth another \$11 million.

Morocco is continuing the development projects begun under Sékou Touré. The Moroccans, backed by Saudi financing, built the OAU villas and Palais des Nations in downtown Conakry for last year's planned summit

(which the new government declined to sponsor citing financial difficulties). Guinean officials say they will continue to maintain close ties with the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries in spite of the shift toward a Western-style economy.

#### 'Bad Habits'

Government officials say one of their hardest tasks will be to change the attitudes of people who have become accustomed to and benefit from the methods of the former regime. The president and other top officials regularly denounce the "bad habits"—corruption, absenteeism, favoritism—acquired under Sékou Touré. Officials note there has been substantial resistance to proposed changes within the civil service, whose employees would have the most to lose if the IMF measures were carried out.

The country's sole newspaper, *Horoya*, has taken an aggressive stance on work practices, bluntly denouncing Guineans as "having lost the habit of working." The paper, described by one reader as "no longer under government control but still reading like it is," regularly chides civil servants, saying corruption, absenteeism, and other "old reflexes" are still the acceptable norm. A particularly harsh critique which appeared in a special coup anniversary issue said workers "did not deserve" the 10-15 percent pay raises mandated by the government as an incentive to work harder.

Guineans admit their work habits are not what they should be, but note that working conditions are less than ideal. Abasse Barry, a recently returned exile explains, "Everyone is supposed to be in their office from 7:30 to 3:30, but the lack of public transportation and the traffic jams in Conakry make it impossible to get to work before 10:00." He continues, "Then people have so many personal problems to take care of—getting food for the family or gas for the car—that you will rarely find them in their office after 1:00."

However, some absenteeism has been attributed to worker displeasure with the impending reforms. The government has maintained that any monetary reforms would be accompanied by a rise in salaries, but workers are worried

about the repercussions of any cutbacks in government payrolls. The CMRN has discovered that the same resourcefulness that allowed people to survive under Sékou Touré is now being used to perpetuate the old system of favoritism and petty corruption, and to hinder reform. Tales of "lost dossiers," blocked proposals, and "unavailable" officials are common.

Nor has the military, long neglected politically and financially by Sékou Touré, managed to stay entirely clear of the corruption. Conakry residents candidly comment on the number of military officers who have traded in their battered Russian jeeps for new Mercedes Benzes, and President Conté has harshly criticized officers who have "misinterpreted their responsibilities" in the new government. One officer was reportedly dismissed after he was caught giving expensive foreign cars to over a half-dozen female acquaintances.

A broader challenge facing the government is how to encourage initiative in a population which has grown up in a system where everything was run and decided by the government. The CMRN is in the difficult position of trying to impose a liberalized economy and decentralized decision-making on a people who have learned how to survive by avoiding any semblance of personal initiative.

"No one wanted to look too ambitious during Sékou Touré's time," said Belle Diallo, a returned exile who now works for a public utility company. "People might get jealous or suspicious and turn you in."

Noting that "a liberal economy cannot be established by decree," President Conté and his government have taken a two-pronged approach, alternately praising Guineans for their creativity, while admonishing them to forget old habits and recognize their role in rebuilding the country.

In his first anniversary speech, President Conté said: "It is you—the farmers, craftsmen, and industrial workers—who make up the riches of this nation. . . it is the role of Guinean men and women to build or develop their own businesses." However, in Guinea's subsistence society, very few people have the means to start their own businesses. The government has

promised to assist entrepreneurs and has asked international donors to support small and medium-sized business ventures; however, the mechanism for such support is not yet in place.

Another severe limitation is the relatively low level of education (20 percent literacy rate) and technical skills. Under Sékou Touré, primary and secondary school classes were taught only in local dialects, and much of the school day was spent studying party ideology. The result, say some teachers, is a generation of young Guineans who speak less French than their parents and who lack many of the basic skills and technical knowledge which could help develop the country.

The new government has abolished the political curriculum and reinstated French as the language of instruction, but there is an acute shortage of skilled teachers and classroom materials. Many young Guineans are bitter and demoralized about their education, feeling they were shortchanged. "We are a lost generation," said a civil service worker in his late twenties. "If this country moves ahead, we won't have the skills to keep up with it."

### Low-Key But Firm

The government of President Conté continues to enjoy popular support despite the lack of noticeable improvement in Guinea's economic situation. Conté's low-key leadership is a marked contrast from his charismatic predecessor. Political analysts say there is every indication he is what he appears to be—a hard-working, humble, 51-year-old military man who was suddenly thrust into the limelight. Candid about the successes and failures of his government, Conté once remarked, "We have made the right decisions only 50 percent of the time."

However, the apparently unassuming leader appears to have gained confidence and tightened his grip on the CMRN in recent months, most notably in the December 1984 cabinet reshuffle, one of the turning points of the new government. It was the first major administrative reform undertaken by the military since seizing power. In an effort to streamline the government, President Conté reduced the number of ministers from 32 to 15 and the CMRN member-

ship from 25 to 20. He assumed the defense portfolio and abolished the post of prime minister, thus becoming head of government and head of state.

In addition to eliminating or combining redundant ministries inherited from the previous regime, the reshuffle also redistributed important posts among the country's four main ethnic groups, Soussou, Peul, Malinke, and "Forestiers" (the collective name for the smaller ethnic groups in southeastern Guinea). Sékou Touré had favored his own group, the Malinke, an imbalance which President Conté, a Soussou, appears eager to rectify, having named top military officers from each of the four groups to newly-created minister of state positions.

The most visible change in the new government has been the demotion of Prime Minister Diara Traore to Minister of State for Education. In the months following the coup, Traore made a number of highly publicized trips abroad, and his high profile reportedly annoyed the less visible president back home. More important were allegations, hinted at by Conté in his reshuffle announcement, that Traore and his associates were using their positions to arrange lucrative personal business deals while traveling abroad. This blatant wheeling and dealing conflicted directly with the president's call for hard work, honesty, and personal sacrifice.

Observers say Traore's maneuvering both abroad and within the country appeared to be nothing more than a continuation of practices common under Sékou Touré, a perception given credence by the fact that Traore, a Malinke, held several posts in the previous regime and is thus no stranger to Touré-style power politics.

The reaction to Traore's reassignment highlighted another social problem with political consequences—the Malinke claim that they are being quietly and systematically eliminated from the government. "We are being discriminated against because of the abuses of Sékou Touré," said one recently dismissed Malinke civil servant. The Malinke were also reportedly upset when the country's rich diamond mines were closed to private prospecting. Malinke prospectors were the prime beneficiaries of the private mining industry, and



the shutdown was viewed by some as a direct challenge to the ethnic group, a charge rejected by the government.

Senior government officials deny any ethnic tension or prejudice surrounding reform efforts. However, some officials note privately that the Malinke have dominated Guinean politics for so long that they are bound to see their influence diminish as the other groups seek to restore a balance.

Although the Malinke do constitute a potential source of opposition, government officials say aside from grumbling and foot-dragging on reforms, the Malinke pose no serious threat to the new regime. Members of all four major groups point out that ethnic tensions existed long before independence and are not likely to disappear in the near future.

### Exiles and Detainees

One sensitive political issue for the new government is the reintegration of Guinean exiles into society. The government has said it is looking to the estimated 2 million exiles who fled the Sékou Touré regime to provide much-needed knowledge, skills, and capital to rebuild the country. Despite an initial interest shown by many exiles—the government says 200,000 have already come home—it has become obvious to those who return that a number of difficulties remain.

Two major factors said to be keeping exiles abroad are the lack of job opportunities and the current standard of living in Guinea. Many of the exiles have prospered elsewhere as civil servants or businessmen in nearby African capitals or in Europe and the United States. In addition, the government would like to reduce rather than expand its civil service and the private sector is still too undeveloped to provide ready jobs.

The government hopes returnees will go back to their villages, providing the means and incentive for launching the private sector. However, exiles used to living in large urban centers like Abidjan, Paris, and New York are reluctant to go back to the rural areas to work on farms. In addition, many wealthy exiles express the same hesitations about the country's economic climate as foreign investors—they are waiting for signs of reform before coming back.

Another limiting factor is the noticeable tension between those who fled the country and those who stayed behind. Civil servants in particular are fearful that the better educated returnees may take their jobs, a fear exacerbated by the government's continual references to the exiles' skills and potential. There is also resentment among many Guineans who feel that having weathered the hardest years, they are more deserving of the new society's benefits than those who are perceived as having lived in luxury overseas. "There is definitely some hostility toward those of us who came back," said utility worker Diallo.

In December 1984, President Conté named former exile Jean-Claude Diallo secretary of state of Guineans abroad with the responsibility of handling the concerns of returnees. Diallo has said no more than 400 returnees have taken advantage of government assistance, despite the much larger number re-

---

### **"Conté's low-key leadership is a marked contrast from his charismatic predecessor."**

---

ported to have returned. Guineans say there has been a continual stream of exiles returning to see their families and survey the situation; however, many have since departed feeling it is too soon to return permanently.

There is growing pressure on the government to deal with some 80 people linked to Sékou Touré's regime who were detained shortly after the coup and are being held in Kindia. Their families, many of whom still wield considerable influence, have been pushing for their release. The government has promised to hold trials, emphasizing that the detainees will be tried for economic offenses and not for their political connections to the former regime.

In a surprise move in May, 30 former officials were released, including several ministers, the ex-army chief of staff, and Sékou Touré's daughter,

Aminata. Observers say the releases will ease some of the pressure to deal with the detainees, but note that public sentiment could turn against the government if former officials known for corruption or political repression are freed without punishment. However, the most notorious of these—Sékou Touré's half-brother Ismail and his nephew Siaka—are still imprisoned, accused of being responsible for the torture and murder of thousands of Guineans.

Although Western diplomats say the new government continues to enjoy both foreign and domestic support, they note that either could wane if major reforms are not enacted soon. Conté will have to balance the conflicting wishes of the urban civil servants with the needs of the mostly rural population—a difficult task—for delaying or diluting reforms to appease the former in the short-term will only make it that much longer before benefits will be felt by the latter.

Guinea's trump card is its resource base, considered one of the richest in West Africa. However, development of these resources is dependent on gaining the confidence of foreign investors, which in turn is contingent upon implementing economic reform and dispelling fears of corruption.

The advent of personal freedoms in Guinea remains the largest single change in Guinean society since the coup d'état, and despite the disappointing lack of improvement in basic living conditions, Guineans remain optimistic about the future. Schoolteacher Abasse Barry, expressing a commonly-held opinion of the new government, said, "Sure the soldiers have made mistakes, but they are basically good people, and are unquestionably an improvement on what we had before."

After 26 years, Guineans have learned to be patient and how to survive, acquiring a bit of cynicism in the process. It is rare to find a Guinean who believes prosperity is just around the corner. Many echo the thoughts of a Conakry teacher who said, "One year is not enough to right all the wrongs of the past 26, but the new government has at least given us the hope that things will get better in the future." □

# Diouf's Dilemmas

President Abdou Diouf has consolidated his authority within the Socialist Party, but Senegal's economic doldrums and its dependence on external finance have undermined his ability to bring about sweeping economic and political changes. Popular discontent over austerity measures and political dissent could pose a threat to the multi-party system.

BY HOWARD SCHISSEL

**F**our years after moving into Senegal's top slot following former President Leopold Senghor's unprecedented decision to voluntarily step down from power, the real problems are just beginning for President Abdou Diouf. After a brief honeymoon period during which he extended Senegal's multi-party system, took measures to clean up public life, held new parliamentary and presidential elections, and introduced fresh faces into the upper echelons of the ruling Socialist Party (PS), the Senegalese leader must now confront a series of tough economic problems and political dilemmas which are likely to determine the future of both his regime and of one of sub-Saharan Africa's rare pluralistic democracies.

While Diouf inherited a badly deteriorated economy, the crisis has been aggravated in the past few years. Like other Sahelian states, Senegal has a limited resource base with precious few natural resources. The agricultural sector, composed principally of groundnuts, is dependent on rainfall, and the recurrent drought over the past 15 years has impoverished the rural population and accelerated the migration from the country to the towns. Attempts to diversify agricultural output and efforts to broaden Senegal's indus-

*Howard Schissel is a Paris-based freelance journalist specializing in French-speaking Africa as well as economic questions relating to African natural resources.*



**Abdou Diouf addressing OAU heads of states: "Adopting a more flexible approach than his predecessor on the continental political scene"**

trial infrastructure have failed to bear fruit.

The influx of foreign assistance largely cushioned the effects of the economic setback and enabled the government to artificially maintain its level of consumption, but by the early 1980s, the situation was no longer tenable. Donors saw few results from their aid and began to impose tough conditions on its

continuation. Grants and capital inflows no longer covered the current accounts deficit. Foreign debt climbed at an alarming rate and the government was unable to meet its repayment obligations. As the budgetary deficit leapt forward, Senegal was faced with a liquidity crisis which forced it to seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

The objectives of the Medium-Term Economic and Financial Redressment Program proved to be overly optimistic, and the Paris Club has rescheduled Senegal's public foreign debt four times since 1981, the last time at the beginning of 1985. The private commercial debt was also rescheduled. At the end of 1984, total foreign debt was estimated at some \$1.6 billion.

The government's adjustment efforts proved to be halfhearted, designed principally to buy time and avoid more painful measures. Donor nations and institutions lost patience with Senegalese tactics, and the IMF broke off its aid during the summer of 1984. With their backs against the wall, the Senegalese authorities finally agreed to more drastic reform measures. Thus, at the beginning of the year, basic foodstuffs underwent a major price hike, and additional increases are in the pipeline. The pruning of the parastatal sector is to be accelerated, as is a reduction of the civil service.

Even with its meager resource base, Senegal could have certainly chalked up

a better economic track record. Economic management has been slack, conditioned more by political facility than a realistic assessment of financial realities. Although Senegal has been a major recipient of external aid, since independence, it has experienced the lowest annual growth in gross domestic product (GDP)—2.3 percent—of any African state not affected by war or civil strife.

Funds were channeled into expanding the unproductive state sector, whose only merit was in furnishing employment opportunities. In 1982, for example, Senegal's civil service was estimated at 61,000, compared with 69,000 for Ivory Coast, whose population is twice as large and whose GDP is three times as high. The civil service has grown at an annual average of 6 percent over the past 25 years. The contribution of the parastatal sector to GDP has steadily fallen since 1978, yet employment has expanded and wages increased. Output per worker in public enterprises is only about 70 percent of that in the private sector, while salaries are at least 20 percent higher.

In the rural economy, state institutions for crop marketing and credit have not in reality served the interests of the small farmer. The failure of bureaucratic state bodies is clearly underlined by the case of the National Office for Coopera-

tion and Assistance for Development (ONCAD), which grew into a huge, corrupt, and inefficient monster, exploiting the peasants who provided the country's main export crop, groundnuts. When ONCAD was dissolved in 1980, the state had to absorb its debt of CFA 94 billion. Years of neglect of the rural population and a skimming off of groundnut profits by the government and foreign interests have slowly but surely alienated the farmers.

More than the lack of rainfall, it was the peasants' conscious decision to reduce groundnut planting in favor of subsistence crops like millet and sorghum that is responsible for the collapse of production. The farmers are now worse off, and the government has been deprived of its chief source of foreign currency and budgetary earnings. The farmers' massive rejection of the established order went so far during the 1984-85 growing season that the groundnut crop was the lowest since independence in 1960.

Farming families have even taken to locally producing cooking oil for sale or smuggling their output into neighboring Gambia, where prices are higher. The fall in export earnings and budgetary income will be a severe blow to Senegal's economic adjustment program. Moreover, since cooking oil factories repre-

sent the most important sector of Senegal's industry, the slowdown of their activity will further exacerbate the economic malaise.

It was against this alarming background at the end of 1984 that the World Bank Consultative Group pledged to provide Senegal with \$500 million a year over a seven-year period to help revive its economy. The disbursement of donor pledges, however, is a different story, and with economic difficulties in a number of Western and Arab countries, purse strings are likely to remain tight. The \$470 million Senegal owes to the Paris Club nations was rescheduled in January, and the IMF announced at the same time that it was according the country a \$75 million standby arrangement.

Nevertheless, Senegal is caught in the debt trap: The IMF contribution in 1985 will be nil, the new facility being utilized simply to pay off earlier borrowing. With the economy incapable of generating even a slight surplus, any improvement in economic aggregates can be achieved only by reducing the population's already low living standards through the application of the entire panoply of IMF-inspired austerity measures. As a recent World Bank report clearly states, "sacrifices will have to be made to pay back past debts and . . . the measures will inevitably be painful."

The political and social consequences of reinforced austerity are likely to dent the popularity of President Diouf's regime. The ruling elite's fear of "bread riots," like those which shook Morocco and Tunisia last year, was evident when a sharp boost in the price of rice was announced in January. Although that increase was taken calmly, just how much can the population be squeezed before reacting?

Moreover, any significant reform of the economic system involves certain politically potent interest groups. During the first two years of Diouf's presidency, the fight against illicit enrichment led to the uncovering of several scandals involving the abuse of public funds and the privileges granted by the banks to certain well-connected figures. Since 1983, however, the efforts to moralize public life have received much less priority. Opposition parties claim that the president hesitates to push his drive fur-



Steve Mann's

**Migrants in Pikine, Senegal: "The recurrent drought over the past 15 years has accelerated the migration from the country to the towns"**


ther for fear of discrediting a large number of politicians within his own party.

Another sensitive issue involves the advantages accorded since independence to the Muslim brotherhoods, especially the Mourides. Based at their historic center of Touba, the Mourides are a state within a state. They control a third of the groundnut crop and exert strong social control over a portion of the rural population. Diversifying agriculture away from groundnuts could be interpreted as a means of diminishing their influence. Likewise, businessmen close to the brotherhood benefit from advantageous financial conditions in their export-import ventures, transport firms, and real estate deals. Will Diouf have the clout to rein in abuses in this area? The fact that the president is from the rival Tidjane brotherhood could further exacerbate tensions with the Mourides.

The Senegalese leader has also been promoting modernist intellectuals, like Minister of National Education Iba Der Thiam, as a means of rallying the support of the growing number of young Senegalese attracted by the Islamic credo. Encouragement from the Arab world bolsters these reformist Islamic groups who favor a more orthodox brand of religion than the syncretic faith of the brotherhoods, which mixes pre-Islamic African beliefs with Sunni tenets imported from the Maghreb.

If the Mourides have a stake in the established order, an active minority of radical partisans of the Iranian path make their viewpoint heard through several publications. Although the regime is not threatened by this agitation, President Diouf must take the profound Islamic sensibility of the country into account when making important decisions.

On the political front, Senegal's second president has astutely played the card of extending democratic freedoms. He opened up the political arena, allowing the number of recognized parties to increase from four to 16, including seven who are officially classified as "Marxist." This move, as well as a free-wheeling press, has given the Senegalese head of state an excellent image abroad. At the same time, he forced the opposition out of the back rooms and on to the streets, thereby diffusing ten-



**Groundnuts in village of N'dielyene Siarakh: "A skimming off of groundnut profits by the government and foreign interests"**

Karen Durfach

sions. Thus, the different opposition parties became bogged down in their own internecine struggles and spent more time competing with each other than lambasting the ruling PS.

Within the PS, the president's main preoccupation has been to replace the old barons associated with his predecessor with a new generation of technocrats loyal to his cause. Without breaking sharply from the past, he has gradually put his men in key cabinet posts and party positions. At the beginning of 1983, presidential elections provided Diouf with the legitimacy he sought.

The legislative elections, in which the opposition only won nine seats out of 120, were marred by ballot rigging. Some observers believe that local barons were responsible for this maneuver in order to embarrass the president. The principal opposition force, the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) led by Abdoulaye Wade, managed to elect only eight MPs, while Cheikh Anta Diop's National Democratic Rally (RND) had a sole deputy.

The opposition boycotted the parliamentary session for several months. President Diouf's offer to form a national unity government failed to come to fruition, and since 1984, the opposition has drifted toward a more critical view of the Diouf regime. Most of the larger parties are in disarray, undermined by internal dissension and their lack of following among the population.

The PDS, the only party to have a credible nationwide infrastructure, has been particularly hard hit.

In February 1984, an extraordinary congress of the PS was held to further diminish the influence of the old guard and reinforce the president's grip over the party machinery. Although members of the Diouf clan strengthened their position, there was a general feeling that not enough new blood was being introduced into the party.

Problems within the PS were soon to dominate Senegalese political life. The first crisis occurred when Prime Minister Habib Thiam was demoted from the post of prime minister, which was abolished, to that of National Assembly president. When the National Assembly voted to diminish his term of office, Thiam resigned. During 1984, party rivalry during town and rural council elections led to fighting between factions and at least four deaths. Clashes between different PS currents within the National Confederation of Senegalese Workers also resulted in bloodshed.

This climate of violence, long absent from Senegalese political life, dramatically boiled over into the PS political bureau. In a nasty incident last autumn, Foreign Minister Mustapha Niassé and Minister of Information Djibo Ka came to blows. Niassé, from the pivotal Siné-Saloum region around the town of Kaolack, is one of the few politicians who were able to challenge the author-

ity of the Senegalese leader within the party, and observers reckon that his subsequent dismissal did not excessively trouble President Diouf. Niassé is also known to have close ties with the Mourides, who had yet another reason to express their discontent.

It was generally expected that the president would carry out sweeping changes in the government in the wake of the town and rural council elections. The cabinet reshuffle at the beginning of this year was more technical than political in nature, leading observers to advance the idea that President Diouf did not have his hands sufficiently free to impose the changes he wished, and therefore chose to adopt a wait and see strategy.

The Senegalese population finds this hard to accept, however, as few basic changes have been introduced in their daily lives over the past four years. As living conditions become more difficult under the IMF-inspired economic program, disillusionment with President Diouf's vaunted "new deal" could dangerously sap his popularity and provide the diverse strands of the opposition with fertile ground for action.

A bone of contention in the Senegalese political scene is the key role played by French-born Jean Collin, secretary-general at the president's office and central figure in PS affairs. The opposition rightly or wrongly believes that he is the prime mover behind all maneuvers in the political arena. When relations between the IMF and Senegal threatened to break down, it was Collin who was sent to Washington, not Minister of Economy and Finance Mamadou Touré. An enigmatic personality, Collin has occupied a variety of posts in the government for over 20 years. Few dispute his competence, personal integrity, or his sense of Senegalese nationalism. Yet he is becoming an easy target for opposition criticism of the Diouf regime.

Further complicating President Diouf's task is the revived separatist sentiment in the southern Casamance region, wedged between the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Long considered by the central government in Dakar as the "poor relative" of the Senegalese nation, it has suffered from benign neglect. In recent times, a separatist group, the Movement of Casamance Democratic

Forces (MFDS), has taken a more activist stance.

Troubles broke out in 1983 in the Casamance capital of Ziguinchor and other towns in lower Casamance leading to severe army repression, resulting in many deaths. MFDS leaders were subsequently arrested. Agitation continues in a more discreet manner, but government officials are wary of new flare-ups. The number of security forces in the region has been boosted and separatists are known to operate out of neighboring states.

The three-year old Senegambian confederation is showing signs of strain, and could become another troublesome issue in domestic politics in the near future. The confederation came into being after Senegalese troops saved Gambian President Dawda Jawara from two coup attempts.

Gambian officials have been dragging their feet on measures to solidify the confederation, particularly in the economic sphere. The idea of renouncing their own currency, the dalasi, in favor of the CFA franc is not enthusiastically supported by the population. In the same way, coordinating tariff policies would deprive the Gambia of one of its chief sources of revenue: the largely illicit re-export of manufactured goods into Senegal and other regional states. Gambian authorities are also becoming increasingly sensitive on the question of national sovereignty.

Relations with Guinea-Bissau have been testy too. The Senegalese even suspect that the MFDS receives certain encouragement from Bissau. But the principal problem confronting the two states is the disputed continental plateau. When Bissau threatened to intervene militarily in December 1983, offshore drilling operations conducted by Petro-Canada International in the contested zone had to be interrupted. The case has been submitted to the International Court of Justice for arbitration.

During a meeting in March between Presidents Diouf and João Bernardo Vieira, it was decided to set up a special three-man arbitration council in Geneva in order to settle the dispute. If an acceptable compromise agreement can be successfully worked out, then the possibilities of regional economic cooperation would be greatly enhanced. □

President Diouf has adopted a more flexible approach than his predecessor on the continental political scene. He has improved relations with neighboring Mauritania by ending the pressure exerted on the Nouakchott government by the threat to abet black separatists in the southern part of the country.

By the same token, Dakar has followed a more balanced policy toward the Western Saharan conflict, ending automatic backing of the Moroccan position. President Diouf played a key role in salvaging the 1983 Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit which was dominated by the Western Sahara imbroglio. By making direct contact with the Polisario front, the Senegalese leader was seen as an African statesman, and it has been rumored that he may succeed Julius Nyerere as OAU chairman. He has also carried out a rapprochement with some of Africa's more "progressive" regimes such as Algeria and Angola.

In the international arena, traditional links with France, the pivot of Senegal's alliance system, have been further buttressed. Ties with the other members of the European Economic Community have also been cultivated. President Diouf made a state visit to Washington in mid-1983, underlining Senegal's growing trans-Atlantic ties, and Senegal became one of the first African nations to sign an investment treaty with the United States. An important recipient of Arab aid, Senegal spares few efforts at reinforcing its Middle Eastern contacts. Nor has Asia been ignored: President Diouf visited both China and Japan last year.

However, translating these diplomatic successes into political points back home is another story. After four years in power, President Diouf has yet to unveil a precise political program to guide Senegal in the trying years ahead. It is true that the stagnant economy and Senegal's extreme dependence on external financing have undoubtedly restricted his maneuvering ability. Yet as time goes by, frustration is growing among the Senegalese population, half of whom are less than 20 years' old. If latent discontent were to boil over into mass protest, the future of Senegal's multi-party democracy could be called into question. □

# West Africa's Middleman in a Pinch

By cultivating ties with the West and privatizing state-run facilities, President Gnassingbe Eyadema hopes to resurrect an economy that has been badly battered by policy errors, governmental mismanagement, and the slump in world phosphate prices.

BY MANFRED STEINHOLTZ

**L**ike a groggy boxer, Togo is staggering back to its feet after a technical knockout of its economy. This tiny West African state, wedged between Ghana and Benin, has suffered badly from the slump in the world price for phosphates, its chief export commodity, which represents around one-half of hard currency earnings and one-third of budgetary revenues. Regional considerations have further weakened the economy, with the prolonged closure of the Ghanaian and Nigerian frontiers depriving Togo of lucrative commercial outlets.

Beyond these conjunctural setbacks, the root cause of Togo's present economic crisis is political in nature—the result of the myopic development policies adopted by the government of President Gnassingbe Eyadema in the mid-1970s. At the time, it appeared that the unprecedented boom in phosphate revenues could help achieve a political consensus through liberal spending on a host of development schemes, many of which soon turned out to be “white elephants;” expansionist credit practices; and massive hiring in the parastatal sector and state administration.

Eighteen years of autocratic rule and the personality glorification second only

*Manfred Steinholtz is a freelance journalist specializing in African development issues.*

to Zaire which has emerged around the “President-Founder” have yet to erase controversy still surrounding the troubled origins of his rise to power. The then-Sgt. Etienne Eyadema was a prime mover in the events leading to the overthrow and assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio in 1963, and he subsequently spearheaded the 1967 coup which toppled Togo's second head of state, Nicolas Grunitzky. After eliminating rival officers from the southern part of the country, Eyadema, a northerner of peasant Kabré stock, entrusted most of the strategic posts in the government and the armed forces to people from his own region or family.

In order to ingratiate the southern elite and create fresh opportunities for northern businessmen, the Eyadema regime threw open the economic floodgates. When the phosphate boom petered out in 1976, Togo found itself saddled with an immense foreign debt, a collection of unprofitable prestige projects, and an untenable budgetary deficit. The situation deteriorated to such an extent that Togo was obliged to rapidly beat a path to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a massive dose of its economic stabilization medicine.

At the end of 1984, Togo's foreign debt was estimated at close to \$1 billion—a large sum for a country with only 2.8 million inhabitants and limited

economic potential. The foreign debt has already been rescheduled on three occasions. The last time—in June 1984—Togo's repayment schedule for the year was trimmed down to \$61 million, which still represents some 40 percent of total exports. The need to further adjust Togo's debt obligations is patent. IMF standby loans were suspended in 1979 and 1981, and Togo, like Zaire, has become a “model” student over the past two years. The effects of a stringent austerity program, which includes an income freeze and special taxes, are starting to be felt, taking a severe bite out of the average Togolese's already low standard of living.

One feature of the IMF rehabilitation package involves the privatization of many state-owned facilities. The \$25 million electric steel mill, Société Togolaise de Siderurgie (STS), was recently handed over on favorable terms to American business interests. Now the government is seeking to rent out part of the \$90 million Lomé refinery, which has lain idle for several years. Efforts are also being made to improve the management of Togo's overly ambitious hotel industry, a prime example of which is the capital's 25-floor Hôtel Deux Février, billed as the most luxurious in West Africa, which operates at only 25 percent of capacity. Other parastatals have been shut down.

The recession in Nigeria and Ghana's

financial headaches have exacerbated Togo's economic morass. Togo has traditionally played a middleman role in both legal trade and contraband activities with these two neighboring countries. The port of Lomé's real *raison d'être* is to serve as an entrepôt for the smuggling of manufactured goods, spirits, consumer items, and foodstuffs. The Rawlings regime, mistrustful of Togo, sealed off their common border for a long period, and currently exercises strict control. The smuggling of Ghanaian cocoa into Togo has been reduced to a trickle. Nigeria's drive against illicit economic operations and closer surveillance of its frontiers has dealt an even more serious blow to Togo's middleman commercial role.

Regional development projects, like Société des Ciments de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CIMA), the joint venture in which Ghana and Ivory Coast also have an equity share, have failed to yield expected dividends. The only good prospect for the future is the proposed \$400 million phosphoric acid complex. A feasibility study is underway on a project likely to involve other West African states as well as partners from elsewhere from the Third World. Meanwhile, phosphate exports picked up last year to 2.4 million tons, from 2 million in 1983. This is still far from installed capacity of 3.6 million tons.

A serious problem bedeviling economic recovery prospects is slack management of many parastatal bodies and state financial operations. In an unusually frank assessment, President Eyadema himself diagnosed the ills affecting the Togolese economy in these terms: "The sabotage of the national economy was cleverly organized on one hand by corrupt cadres and on the other hand by greedy managers whose aim was to embezzle, to precipitate bankruptcy, and ruin the country."

Western financial experts reckon that this is only half the story. In the first place, the government turned a blind eye to such practices for years and when sanctions were finally imposed, they often touched only small fry or politicians who had fallen into political disfavor. Secondly, shadowy non-Togolese personalities often serve as intermediaries in important financial dealings involving the government. While their

role is less prominent than in the past, they are still allocated, with benediction from the highest spheres, a share of the reduced economic activities.

With the economy in the trough, President Eyadema has been forced to shake up his cabinet on several occasions over the past three years. The thrust of the changes was to ease out



**President Gnassingbe Eyadema: "The controversy surrounding the troubled origins of his rise to power has yet to be erased"**

politicians who presided over past economic policies, replacing them with younger technocrats having the IMF's stamp of approval. As is often the case on Togo's turbulent political scene, Minister of Finance and the Economy Tété Tété Benissan fled the country last year when accused of financial misconduct. The opposition claims that he was chosen as a scapegoat to hide more serious misappropriations of funds.

Politically, Togo has been relatively quiet in recent times, especially compared to the tumultuous first 10 years of Eyadema's rule, which were punctuated by plots and assassination attempts against the Togolese leader. The con-

stant tension gave rise to an unusual form of power. Modeled on "Mobotism," all facets of the president were glorified in the local media, which called him a "prophet" for having swept aside the petty politicians and kept the nation from chaos.

Eyadema's dramatic resignation ploys were designed to mobilize popular opinion on his behalf. Uniformed squads of dancers and singers from the ruling Togolese People's Rally (RPT) accompany Eyadema in all public appearances, shouting slogans to his glory. All government officials wear lapel badges with a portrait of the 50-year-old president. His statue, in a rigid pose, adorns party headquarters in Lomé and is found in all large Togolese towns. As in Zaire, the government forced the population to abandon their baptismal Christian names for "authentic" African ones.

Human rights organizations are often critical of Togo's record, particularly the regime's ruthlessness with those it regards to be a future challenge. Idrissou Meatchi, a former vice president, died in detention last year, after being held without trial for two years. The government said the death was from natural causes, while the opposition talks of bad treatment. Amnesty International has expressed concern over conditions in Togolese jails. Former head of the state phosphate marketing board M'Ba Hankpade Kabassema mysteriously disappeared in 1982 when it was rumored that he was about to unveil information about corrupt official practices. Last spring, Col. Kaffi Kongo passed away from a "heart attack" in a Lomé prison.

The rapidly shifting regional political balance has put pressure on President Eyadema's regime. Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings' second takeover in Ghana was frowned upon in Lomé political circles, as many younger Togolese were enthusiastic about the Ghanaian leader and his government's desire to clean up political and economic mores. When Lomé became a rallying point for the Ghanaian opposition, relations between the two capitals seriously deteriorated. Although relations are smoother now, mutual distrust is still strong. To the north, the emergence of Capt. Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso gave the Togolese the impression that they were being surrounded by revolutionary forces.

This led to a *modus vivendi* with the newly pragmatic Benin president, Mathieu Kérékou. Traditional ties with Ivory Coast were also reinforced.

To bolster its economic and political support, Togo has turned to the West, and especially to France. The growing sense of realpolitik in the African policies of President François Mitterrand's regime meant that Togo was considered a natural ally in sub-Saharan Africa. Personal considerations also counted on this score: Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, the president's son and number two in the Elysée's Africa unit headed by Guy Penne, was formerly a correspondent for Agence France-Presse in Lomé. President Eyadema also regularly throws his weight behind all French policy initiatives in Africa and sometimes acts as an intermediary for Paris in delicate diplomatic contacts.

Togo has also skillfully cultivated the West German connection, playing up its history as a German colony until World War I, and it has become the largest recipient of German aid on a per capita basis in Africa. Togo goes out of its way to cater to the Germans, even hosting celebrations commemorating the centenary of German colonial rule during the summer of 1984. The emphasis on only "positive" aspects of the German colonial record shocked many, both in Togo and in West Germany. It is indeed strange that the Togolese should celebrate their colonial past, as one of the ideological tenets of the Eyadema regime is "authenticity."

A frequent visitor to Lomé is the right-wing politician, Hans-Josef Strauss, leader of the Bavarian Christian Socialists (CSU). Strauss and Eyadema co-chair the Bavarian-Togolese Friendship Society. The CSU foreign affairs foundation, the Hands-Seidel Stiftung, is extremely active in Lomé, providing training for trade union leaders for example. The fact that a Strauss protégé, Jurgen Warnke, has become minister of cooperation in Bonn perhaps helps explain the extent of West German financial largesse. In addition, German officers have recently taken over training some units of the Togolese armed forces.

Togo has not spared efforts to reverse its negative image in the United States. Until the Reagan presidency,

U.S.-Togolese relations were distant, stemming from the 1963 assassination of President Olympio on American embassy grounds. It took 16 years before President Eyadema received an invitation to Washington. Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. representative at the United Nations, played an important part in opening White House doors for President Eyadema. The Togolese authorities have also hired a Washington-based public relations firm to promote the country as an attraction for U.S. tourists and businessmen. Results have proven disappointing and cutbacks have been made.

Recently, while maintaining final decision-making authority, President Eyadema has been delegating a greater share of power, spending an increasing proportion of his time in his northern home village of Pya. Public appearances are becoming rare, usually reserved for visits by foreign dignitaries. Daily operations in Lomé have become the responsibility of Minister of Information Gbegnon Amegboh, who works out of the presidential palace, and has replaced disgraced former presidential cabinet director Fambaré Ouattare Natchaba as the regime's *éminence grise*. Another influential southerner is Kpotivi Tevi Laclé, minister of interior.

It is northerners in general who dominate the security and military force com-

mand structure. Lt. Toi Donou, Eyadema's half brother, is in charge of the presidential guard, most of whose members are recruited from the president's own ethnic group. Yaya Malou, the Togolese leader's cousin, is head of the police academy, and it is even said that Eyadema would like to impose his son, a junior officer, as his successor. Other northerners hold strategic positions in the intelligence network.

The exiled opposition—both the military-led National Liberation Front of Togo (FNLT) and the civilian-dominated Togolese Democratic Movement (MDT)—does not appear to pose an immediate threat to the stability of the Eyadema regime. Like other rigidly authoritarian regimes on the continent, the prime threat comes from within, particularly from the armed forces.

With the deteriorating economy spurring popular discontent, the Togolese head of state has sought to diffuse tension. As a palliative, the party has allowed several candidates from its ranks to compete for parliamentary seats in each district. This "innovation" hardly gives any flexibility to the Togolese political system. Other innocuous "liberalization" measures can be expected in the near future, but they cannot hide the fact that the government does not tolerate vocal calls for a real democratization of Togolese political life. □



Phosphate mine near Lomé: "When the phosphate boom petered out, Togo found itself saddled with an immense foreign debt"



# Oliver Tambo

## President, the African National Congress

Has the increasing violence both inside South Africa and against the apartheid regime's neighbors necessitated a change in strategy on the part of the African National Congress? At the forefront of the struggle in southern Africa, Oliver Tambo discusses the objectives of Africa's oldest liberation movement in light of the current crisis in the region.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

**Africa Report:** Over the past several months, events in South Africa have taken an increasingly violent turn, with black South Africans openly defying and challenging the South African government. What factors that are not now present in South Africa do you think are necessary for a truly revolutionary situation to develop? Would the African National Congress [ANC] be prepared for such a development by being able to provide the leadership to carry the struggle forward?

**Tambo:** The ANC is not deliberately working for a revolution. Our target is to fight the system and bring an end to it and replace it with a system that is acceptable to all the people of South Africa. Now whether that is going to require a whole revolution, we cannot say. But we have warned that the situation cannot remain stagnant, that apartheid is not going to be there indefinitely—we will not allow it to be—but while it is there, we must intensify our struggle, which will result in an escalation of conflict, but we must continue until our objective is attained. So we see the current developments as indicative of the growing escalation of the conflict, the growing intensification of the struggle.

One of the results of the current offensive by the people is that the apartheid system is becoming unworkable, it's becoming non-functional, so its structures are being destroyed. That is part of the process that we have initiated—to attack the structures and make the system unworkable and therefore create conditions in which the alternative must be sued for. The alternative is what the ANC puts forward in its Freedom Charter—a non-racial, democratic, united country, one government, one people, a government that takes its mandate from the people as a whole, the majority of all South

Africans, black and white. That's the process that we are involved in. It may consequently develop into a revolutionary situation of one kind or another. We do anticipate that a point must be reached when the people as a whole are involved in the fight to destroy the apartheid system. From that point of view, what we are witnessing is perhaps the tip of the iceberg, the rest of which is going to uncover as the struggle extends itself and deepens.

**Africa Report:** Has the ANC reassessed or altered its strategy in terms of the internal struggle, given the changed political climate and conditions on the ground?

**Tambo:** No, we haven't changed the strategy of the ANC in terms of the internal struggle at all. What is happening is simply a development of that. The people have been getting organized, they have been uniting and increasing their resistance to apartheid measures as they manifest themselves in various ways. But in practice, their resistance, even when it's non-violent, is visited with harsh violent measures. So they've reached the point where they are now fighting back instead of sitting down and accepting defeat. They are fighting back and that is what the ANC has encouraged—that they must be ready to sacrifice for our liberation and face death if necessary. They are in that mood, they don't mind being killed and they kill back as much as their capabilities permit. And so this is proceeding in accordance with the broad directions of the ANC except in its specificity. A person is killed, another is burned to death—these are incidents in a broad offensive against the apartheid system. Some of these incidents are quite unpleasant, but the violence must be seen in the context of the growing struggle, which is going to manifest itself in all sorts of ugly forms.

**Africa Report:** There were reports a few months back that

the ANC was considering a shift in its strategy within the country toward attacking civilian targets and foreign-owned operations inside South Africa.

**Tambo:** I think that must have been a rumor. I read a statement like that allegedly made by one of our people, but it's not that the ANC is now going to go for civilian targets. What I certainly have said is that in an intensifying conflict—which is necessarily violent because the regime responds with violence to determined peaceful demonstrations—it's going to be quite impossible to avoid civilian casualties.

I have also warned that in the South African context, civilians have been killed all the time—black ones—but they were not considered civilians. Therefore, the term civilian has tended to have a racist connotation. But we have said that all civilians—whether they are black or white—are going to be caught up in the situation. This thing is a little war and it is becoming a bigger and bigger war, and no wars are fought without some degree of suffering.

**Africa Report:** The South African government has offered Nelson Mandela freedom—conditionally. Should he and other political prisoners be released without conditions, would the ANC be willing to negotiate with the South African government and on what terms? What could the ANC gain from negotiations?

**Tambo:** Their release would give us some indication of the seriousness with which the regime is considering negotiations, although the objective factors would not indicate that they would be wanting to talk to the ANC with a view to finding a solution. But it would be a significant indication that they seriously want to solve the problem of our country—which is their problem.

We would work out our position once the prisoners came out. It's obviously going to make a very big difference in the political climate in the country and it would give rise to expectations that something would come of it. They are the leaders of our people and they have been away from the situation for more than 22 years. Their return would be quite an event from which all sorts of other things might develop. They would certainly be part of the negotiating process. Guided by the feelings of the people and in consultation with other leaders within the country and outside, the whole situation would be quite a development and that is when we would then ourselves consider seriously a move toward a process of negotiations and direct talks. In the meantime, of course, the struggle will proceed and will be intensifying.

It has been suggested that the regime will talk to us if we abandon violence. Well, this is not serious because it is the regime which is violent and has always been. It is their violence which has resulted in us embracing violence. Unless they stop their violence, which is very difficult because it is the violence of the apartheid system itself, then it would be unreasonable to expect us to stop our violence. But we don't consider this to be a bar to the commencement of negotiations if everybody feels the time for that has come.

**Africa Report:** Were there negotiations, can the ANC represent the majority of the people? At least in terms of tactics or strategy, if not in ultimate aims, there are some differences within the black community inside the country, i.e. between AZAPO and the National Forum on the one hand, and the

United Democratic Front [UDF] on the other, which are to some degree mirrored in the split between the Pan Africanist Congress and your organization.

**Tambo:** Well, the ANC has been representing the people all the time. When it was not banned, it was leading the entire country in a very big way. Then they declared it illegal in the country so it couldn't function. But it grew among the people. Its forms have been dissolved by legislation, but the consciousness of the people and their attachment to the ANC remains and continues to be their inspiration. That remains and that was not affected. In the past 10 years or so, the presence of the ANC within the country has been very impressive and acknowledged, so this is why the regime says they will talk to the ANC, an illegal organization in South Africa, but one with such a powerful presence that everyone recognizes that there is no way out without involving the ANC. It will be speaking on behalf of the people, because it has always represented them.

Don't be worried about so-called divisions among blacks. You know, when people want to form an organization, they have to have some program of theirs which must be seen to be different from the programs of others. But in the South African situation, there is no conceivable statement of our objectives which is not accommodated in the Freedom Charter.



Margaret A. Novicki

**"Our target is to fight the system and bring an end to it and replace it with a system that is acceptable to all the people of South Africa"**

AZAPO might say, "It's wrong to say South Africa belongs to all who live in it." Well, we don't think that is being serious. Most people in South Africa believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it.

In any event, the position of the ANC is that we wouldn't just rush there and talk; we would get a proper mandate from our people. We would involve national leaders, leaders of the whole democratic movement in South Africa in such negotiations. We wouldn't want to go alone, we would go with the authority of the people, uniting all the people in the process of negotiations, and operate with a very clear mandate.

But I did want to say that there are many noises being made inside South Africa from various groups, some claiming to have the biggest following, but one indisputable fact in the country is that the people follow the ANC. It has been with them for more than 73 years now and they support and defend it and they follow its leadership. They support Nelson Mandela. He is not there, but he is the leader of the ANC, and the numerous opinion polls about who is popular and who is not are consistent in their projections. There will always be groups who are in the opposition and who show themselves to

exist by doing funny things like when they suddenly jumped up and opposed the visit of Senator Kennedy. They were doing that just to publicize themselves, to get into the newspapers and needless to say, that was a disastrous thing to do for their credibility, a serious blunder.

**Africa Report:** The South African government has lately been saying that the UDF is the internal front for the ANC, and has been using that as a pretext to detain its leadership. Is there any truth to these allegations?

**Tambo:** You are quite right. They have been using it as a pretext because the UDF has united the people and it is very powerful and determined in its resistance to apartheid measures and they have to find an excuse for striking at it. There's nothing new about the UDF; it has stuck to the program it announced when it was formed. It has expanded and over the period, people wondered why the government was not acting against the UDF and its members as it is a militant organization. They had no excuse to.

But we knew that at some point, the government would act because they act against all opposition, even non-violent opposition. And the UDF has been consistent in its declaration of non-violence. But they are using the ANC as a pretext for striking at the UDF, charging its leaders with high treason by saying that they are the ANC and the ANC is a treasonable organization. Well, we don't know if these charges will hold, but they are using this.

The UDF is not an ANC front any more than other organizations which seek a new order in South Africa, a non-racial society, are ANC fronts. The UDF has got its own structures, its own language. There is a coincidence of objectives in the common desire to end the apartheid system. That unites everybody and from that point of view, the ANC might be treated as a front of the UDF because the UDF does want an end to the apartheid system, it does want a non-racial system. Everybody wants that.

To us it is incredible that if people say what the ANC says, even if they are saying it for their own reasons, they are committing an offense, and for that reason, I doubt that these charges [against UDF leadership] will really hold. But they will have served their purpose of trying to deter and undermine the growing strength of the UDF. They will keep them there for one or two years—it's going to be a long trial—and in the meantime the leadership of the movement will suffer because that is part of the strategy. And then they will get acquitted in the end, as in 1956 when we were all arrested and the trial lasted four and a quarter years. Fortunately of course for us, while the trial was proceeding, the struggle was proceeding, so the government failed in its objective.

**Africa Report:** How has the ANC been able to overcome the setbacks dealt it by the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique, and by the South African government's attempts to cow its neighbors into refraining from any kind of support for the ANC? These efforts must have had a negative impact on the ANC's strategy and ability to infiltrate cadres into South Africa.

**Tambo:** The ANC recognized from the very outset that it couldn't rest its strategy on the availability of rear bases in neighboring countries which would be able to support the struggle and take on pressures from South Africa. We anti-



Odette Lupis

**South African Consulate, New York:** "We hope that the American people will rise on this issue and make it impossible for the Reagan administration to ignore their voice"

pated that South Africa would terrorize them—they are weak and newly independent—therefore our strategy was to build from inside. We concentrated on that. And so by the time they told us not to cross into South Africa via Mozambique, the organization was strong inside.

One of the consequences of the Nkomati Accord was that the struggle leapt up within South Africa—in large extent a reaction to this attempt to destroy the struggle and the ANC. In their anger, the people took up the struggle. We prepared them for this. We have been urging them that they've got to fight themselves and not rely on what comes from outside, which at best was really a trickle because these countries couldn't play for the ANC the role that, for instance, Zambia or Mozambique played for Zimbabwe's struggle, or what Tanzania did for the Mozambican struggle. They were in no position to do that. And it was after Nkomati that the regime really started getting into serious political problems internally within South Africa. And that has continued and it has been growing all the time.


This great upsurge was inspired by, sparked off by Nkomati, and so they got the opposite of what they wanted—a much stronger movement within the country than they had before. And the ANC is there, it has not been affected by this. It is true that the neighboring countries are having to be very, very careful. They've already had to be careful. So that hasn't

affected us very much. The point is that the struggle is being fought inside the country of South Africa where it should be and we are certain that it is going to escalate and reach back to the neighboring countries. So peace is quite a distance away for everybody around there. It's going to spill over into the neighboring countries as it spreads and escalates inside South Africa.

**Africa Report:** Are you satisfied with the level of ANC activities inside the country? Is ANC internal mobilization at a better level after the Nkomati Accord?

**Tambo:** Internally, yes, in terms of the activity of the people which we have been seeking, in terms of the broad involvement of the people. The struggle by workers for improved conditions is also a struggle against the apartheid system and for political power. All this is developing. What the UDF has been doing is part of this growing resistance to the apartheid system, the struggle to bring about a new order. We are happy with that. It's not involving the entire country yet. We must work for that. Millions of people must be involved. Millions already are, but 23-24 million people are affected by the apartheid system. They are coming on to our side, and they are joining the UDF. The UDF unites some 700 organizations and that is a significant development, and very much what the ANC has been working for.

I think that UDF represents the success of our appeals to



Cape Town, South Africa: "The UDF represents the success of our appeals to our people to be organized and to unite in action"

our people to be organized and to unite in action. That doesn't make them ANC. But they've got to fight the struggle. The ANC is with them. The ANC is the people, not in terms of formations, branches, and regional organizations, but it's with them and its political line is public, it is clear. We are going there and these are the methods we must use. The people are using those methods in their own organizational formations. They are using those methods or any other methods that they decide on.

So we are satisfied with the heightened tempo of the struggle, but it's not sufficient. We have to do much, much more than that before the system breaks down. It is beginning to break down in very key areas—the urban areas. The townships are occupied by soldiers. The apartheid structure is dead, it has been destroyed. If that can be spread to affect in general the whole functioning, so that the system doesn't work, things don't happen, and their schemes are frustrated, I think it is going to have a difference, and things are moving in that direction.

**Africa Report:** Given that one of the pillars of the ANC's strategy is to bring about international isolation of the apartheid regime, how do you see the increasing attention that is being given to the situation in South Africa worldwide, and particularly in the U.S., i.e. in Congress with the proliferation of anti-apartheid bills, the Free South Africa Movement, student demonstrations, and the divestment lobby? What effect if any do you think this is having both on the American government's policies toward South Africa, and on the South African government itself?

**Tambo:** From our point of view, this is a most welcome development. We have worked for this kind of response from the American people, and what is significant today is that the South African issue is being talked about everywhere, from Congress, the State Department, to the general American population. Even the workers are discussing it. Now the demands of these groups vary. The State Department wants South Africa to make some slight changes, but otherwise remain there. In Congress, there are moves to apply sanctions—we think this is welcome. Some of them do not go far enough, but they are a significant step by the United States Congress if it adopts them. The rest of the movement, the Free South Africa Movement, the student demonstrations, and various other people who are involved in the question of disinvestment—we believe that this could grow and become an issue that the State Department cannot close its eyes to. We would hope that the American people will rise on this issue and make it impossible for the Reagan administration to ignore their voice.

In southern Africa, we are really aggrieved by what the Reagan administration did for the apartheid system—the encouragement, the help, the defense it offered to that system, treating it as an ally and carrying out all the obligations of an ally. And so we think the American people should get this policy of constructive engagement to be reversed. They should take up the position of pressurizing the apartheid system in ways which make it difficult for the system to operate, not by pleading with them. We have been doing that, the whole world has been doing that, everybody, but that doesn't hurt them. The thing is to make the apartheid system non-

functional and if it doesn't work then security conditions are developing. The South African government won't wait until the whole situation is chaotic. They will move before that and then recognize that we are human beings in South Africa, even though we are black.

What has happened already has had an impact. There is great fear on the part of the regime that this may result in disinvestment on a substantial scale and American disinvestment can be expected to encourage disinvestment elsewhere because the people in the other countries will take up the issue in the way that it's being taken up in the United States. There is an encouraging wave of anger in Europe and in the governments of Europe and already there are new and significant demands for sanctions. So there is a growing mood internationally among the peoples who are horrified by the system to do something that would rock the functioning of the apartheid system.

The regime is very, very much concerned about this, more concerned about it than I have known them to be concerned about anything, because they know the consequences. They say disinvestment will affect the black workers, but they know even if it did affect black workers, they don't care what happens to them. They are expelling them, dismissing them from work everyday. They don't care that they have millions of them locked up in the bantustans and starving and unemployed. They don't care about that. It is just a pretext. They know it's the system that's going to be influenced. So I hope that this whole movement in the United States will climax in very concrete forms of action, which we are certain in our part of the world will have a significant impact on the situation there. It will make our task lighter and bring nearer the collapse of the apartheid system and its replacement with a democratic system.

**Africa Report:** Where do you see developments in South Africa going over the coming months and the ANC's role in them? When you look at the history of the liberation struggles in southern Africa, how do think freedom will come in South Africa—through negotiation or armed struggle?

**Tambo:** I don't like making any forecasts about what will happen when or whether the question will ultimately be resolved by negotiation. In most cases, there has been negotiation, in Mozambique, Zimbabwe. So it would not be unnatural at some point that negotiations would be embarked upon. But I think that that will be at a point when the regime is unable to run the country in all sorts of ways, when the country is in a serious crisis. It is in a serious political crisis now, but that crisis must be deepened. They have indicated a willingness to talk to the ANC with conditions, so perhaps there will be negotiations, but in how much time, after how many months, how many years? We don't know. Our immediate concern is simply to step up the struggle and throw in everything we can now and the future will take care of itself. Our direction is clear. We are mobilizing our people to struggle and to use all forms of struggle to achieve tactical and strategic objectives, but the main emphasis is on making the system unworkable, making the country ungovernable and that is our tactical strategy. We are not fighting so that there can be negotiations; we are fighting so apartheid can end and a new system can be established. □

# UPDATE

## *U.S. policy shaken by South Africa's incursions*

Pretoria's raid on Botswana in mid-June and its attempt to blow up Gulf Oil operations in Angola several weeks earlier have dealt crippling blows to the U.S. policy of "constructive engagement."

As a result of the actions in Botswana and Angola, as well as Pretoria's installation of a new interim government in Namibia, relations between the U.S. and South Africa have sunk to their lowest point since President Reagan took office. After the raid on Botswana, the U.S. recalled Ambassador Herman Nickel from South Africa "for consultations."

The UN Security Council unanimously condemned the actions in Botswana and Angola and passed a resolution calling for governments to take steps against South Africa—including prohibitions on new investments—unless Pretoria complied with UN efforts to achieve independence for Namibia. (The U.S. and Britain abstained on the resolution.)

Pretoria's pre-dawn attack on homes and an office complex in Gaborone, Botswana, killed at least 16 persons, including members of the African National Congress (ANC), several citizens of Botswana, and a five-year-old child.

Pretoria said the aim of the raid was to terminate ANC infiltration into South Africa—from Gaborone through Western Transvaal, said to be the ANC's sole remaining route into South Africa since Mozambique and Lesotho signed security agreements with Pretoria. After the raid, Army chief Gen. Constand Viljoen announced that the South African Defence Force would wipe out the eight remaining ANC bases in Botswana if the government of President Quett Masire did not take action against them first.

President Masire described the raid as a fulfillment of South African threats made in February to invade if Botswana did not agree to a non-

aggression treaty with Pretoria. Masire has resisted pressure to sign such a pact and has refused to expel ANC members, maintaining that he would permit no armed activity or military training but would continue to accept political refugees. In early May, however, he advised ANC exiles to leave Botswana, as he could no longer guarantee their safety.

A U.S. State Department spokesman said the attack "raises the most serious questions about the sincerity of South Africa and its desire for a peaceful settlement," particularly because South Africa and Botswana were already engaged in talks on security matters. The State Department has insisted that the ad-

ministration has no plans to modify its policy of constructive engagement, but Congress is close to adopting economic sanctions against South Africa that would reverse the direction of that policy.

The strike in Gaborone was the latest in a series of moves by Pretoria that have shaken the Reagan administration's policy. In May, Angolan government forces foiled a South African commando attempt to sabotage the Maongo oil installation, jointly owned by Angola and Gulf Oil Corporation in the northern province of Cabinda. FAPLA killed two and captured one of the South African commandos, seizing a

*Continued on next page*

## *U.S. Congress gives strong bipartisan support to sanctions against Pretoria*

Legislative action on South Africa intensified in June, as Congress came close to passing sanctions against the apartheid regime in Pretoria.

By a vote of 16-1, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed anti-apartheid legislation on June 4, a compromise between a bill sponsored by Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN), majority leader Robert Dole (R-KS), and Sen. Charles Mathias (R-MD) and a stronger measure introduced by Senators Christopher Dodd (D-CT), Mitch McConnell (R-KY), and William Roth (R-DE). Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) cast the sole dissenting vote.

The overwhelming committee approval suggests that the full Senate is likely to pass the bill—probably in July. Strong anti-apartheid sentiment has materialized relatively recently in the Senate, fueled in part by the demonstrations in front of the South African embassy and consulates over the past six months and the wave of protests that swept col-

lege campuses this spring. In addition, the Senate support was bolstered by recent South African actions that seemed to flout the U.S. policy of "constructive engagement," including the aborted commando raid on the Gulf Oil facility in Angola and Pretoria's decision to install an interim government in Namibia.

The day after the Senate committee vote, the full House passed its version of the legislation—the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985, sponsored by Reps. William Gray (D-PA), Howard Wolpe (D-MI), and Steven Solarz (D-NY). The vote of 295 to 127 included the support of 56 Republicans.

The progress of the legislation and especially the solid core of Republican support is considered a strong rebuke to the Reagan administration's policy. In fact, enactment of the anti-apartheid legislation would effectively kill the policy, which advocates quiet diplomacy with Pretoria to bring

*Continued on next page*

**CONGRESS. . . continued**

about change in the apartheid system. President Reagan had been expected to veto the bill, but he might be swayed by the strong support of many Senate Republicans.

Both the House and Senate versions of the bill ban new bank loans to the South African government, terminate nuclear cooperation between the two governments, and prohibit sales of computer goods and technology to the military, police, and agencies that enforce apartheid.

The major difference between the two bills is the timing for a ban on new U.S. private sector investment in South Africa. In the House version, this ban would take effect upon enactment of the bill. The prohibition could be waived, however, if the President certified that progress was being made in dismantling the apartheid system.

The Senate bill includes bans on new investment and on U.S. sales of krugerrands as possible future sanctions that would take effect in 18 months if the president determines Pretoria has not made sufficient progress in dismantling apartheid. Sen. Lugar opposed an immediate investment ban, claiming that it would harm South African blacks. The Senate bill would also mandate the Sullivan fair employment principles for firms doing business in South Africa.

The House bill contains an immediate ban on the sale of krugerrands in the U.S. and the requirement that the U.S. consult with other nations concerning multilateral sanctions against South Africa. The full Senate is likely to add additional amendments, and the differences will be ironed out in a House-Senate conference committee.

In separate action, the Senate passed legislation that would repeal the Clark Amendment that prohibits U.S. covert aid in Angola. The legislation was introduced by Sen. Steven Symms (R-ID) as an amendment to the State Department authorization. He argued that the U.S. should back the Unita insurgents who are seeking to overthrow the Angolan government. ■

**SOUTH AFRICA'S INCURSIONS. . . continued**

cache of weapons including guns with silencers, explosives, contact mines, and firebombs. The commandos also carried pamphlets which were to have linked the explosion to Unita.

Only a month earlier, Pretoria claimed that it had withdrawn the last of its troops from Angola in accordance with the February 1984 Lusaka agreement—a pact that the Reagan administration had hailed as a success of its constructive engagement policy.

Pretoria said the soldiers were gathering information on ANC and SWAPO bases, but Capt. Wynand du Toit—the captured soldier—confirmed that the real aim was to blow up the Mapongo oil tanks and refinery, which are the heart of Angola's oil industry. The act of sabotage would have crippled the economy, which earns most of its foreign currency from the Mapongo operation. It could also have taken a number of lives, including those of Americans who operate the refinery. The State Department said in mid-June that it had called in former

South African Ambassador Brand Fourie a number of times to explain the incident but had still not received a satisfactory response.

Meanwhile, Pretoria proceeded to transfer limited power for the government of Namibia to a coalition of internal parties on June 17. Pretoria retains control of defense, foreign affairs, and internal security. In addition, the South African administrator-general, Louis Pienaar, retains power to veto legislation. The new administration includes black Namibians for the first time, although SWAPO has refused to participate.

SWAPO held a day-long demonstration in Windhoek to protest the move, which the international community views as a tactic to further delay Namibian independence and to bypass UN Resolution 435, which calls for an end to South Africa's illegal control over the country. The U.S., which favors independence for Namibia in conjunction with the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola, also condemned the move. ■

**WESTERN AFRICA**

**Oil swapping alarms Nigeria's partners**

Nigeria's recent shift to countertrade has alarmed its traditional trading partners as well as its partners in OPEC. But the government of Maj.-Gen. Muhammadu Buhari views the new strategy as a short-term solution to the country's critical foreign exchange shortage and desperate need for imported goods.

By mid-June, Nigeria had completed major countertrade deals worth over \$2 billion with Brazil, France, Austria, and Italy, and was on the verge of signing one with West Germany. At least 30 more were being considered with other countries including Japan, the Soviet Union, and the U.S.

These arrangements are a sophisticated form of bartering in which Nigeria transfers its oil to a foreign trading company, which sells it on the spot market. The proceeds are put in an escrow account from which cash is drawn to pay for the

goods that Nigeria has made a commitment to importing.

Under the first agreement, Petrobras, Brazil's state-owned oil company, is purchasing Nigerian oil, while Cotia, the largest private trading firm in Brazil, will sell Nigeria a wide range of goods including food, spare parts, construction materials, and 50,000 Volkswagen kits that will be assembled at a plant outside of Lagos. The agreement, originally for \$500 million, was recently renegotiated to \$950 million.

Scoa, a Paris-based trading house, signed an agreement to provide \$375 million in goods and \$125 million in cash in exchange for Elf-Aquitaine's purchase of Nigerian petroleum. The French exports, primarily vehicle parts, will include a large shipment of Peugeot kits to be assembled at a factory in Kaduna. The Austrian company, Voest-Alpine Intertrading, will pur-

chase \$200 million worth of Nigerian oil in exchange for steel, machinery, construction materials, and other goods. And the agreement with Italy involves the exchange of oil for cars from Fiat and chemicals from FNI, the Italian state oil company.

Nigeria has turned to countertrade as a strategy for economic survival, following a sharp decline in revenues from oil, which brings in 95 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings. As a result of Nigeria's reluctance to reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund, export credit agencies have cut their allocations to the country. International banks have refused to grant letters of credit, and Paris Club nations have yet to reschedule Nigeria's debts. Through countertrade, the nation can pursue a more independent economic path, circumventing the need for currency reserves and credit with financial institutions.

Nigeria is also by-passing the OPEC price structure. Government spokesmen maintain that the oil produced for countertrade should not be subject to the daily quota imposed by OPEC. Even before the deals with France and Austria, Nigeria was pumping an estimated 1.6 million barrels per day—well above its quota, which by Nigerian definition is 1.45 million bpd. OPEC complains that this extra oil will depress prices in the already oversupplied world market and that oil countertrade is merely a subterfuge for offering discounts to oil buyers. But Nigeria is gambling that OPEC will continue to limit its response to complaints.

Great Britain—Nigeria's major trading partner—is also objecting to the new policy, since its share of Nigeria's trade will probably be eroded. Because Britain's North Sea oil is similar in quality to Nigeria's, countertrade deals between the two countries are less likely.

Critics of countertrade claim that it eliminates incentives for competitive pricing and spurs inflation on the products traded. Moreover, the system is more susceptible to graft and corruption than trading in currency is, they say.

In Nigeria, the policy has prompted a lively debate. Some Nigerians suspect that Brazil may be getting the better end of the deal. Oil Minister Tam David-West has called for a national conference to discuss the implications of countertrade for the country.

In response to international criticism, Nigerian officials point out that the surge in countertrade is by no means limited to their own country. Elsewhere on the continent, Angola, Kenya, Zambia, Zaire, Zimbabwe, and other nations are involved in countertrade. In Mozambique, some 25 percent of import-export exchange is through countertrade. OPEC countries, including Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia,

have countertraded their oil. "Even the so-called gift of grains to poor countries is countertrade on the purchase of diplomatic support," commented *The Guardian*, a Nigerian daily, adding, "Perhaps the most important advantage of countertrade. . . is that of solving the foreign exchange problem which has bottled up [Third World] development perspectives."

Many Nigerians welcome the new policy as a dynamic, albeit short-term, solution to their economic difficulties. The *Daily Times* concluded that countertrade "should be seen as an. . . effective way of breaking old-time monopolies built upon colonial relationships and trade restrictions." ■

## *Kérékou aims for peace on campus*

To end a week of student unrest at Cotonou University in early May, President Mathieu Kérékou authorized the armed forces "to check vigorously all acts of vandalism" and "to shoot on sight any demonstrator." At least two students were killed during repeated clashes with police, before Kérékou shut down the university and schools all over the country. They were reopened at the beginning of June.

Five members of the executive bureau of the University Cooperative—the students' representative body—who were said to be responsible for orchestrating the disturbances, were forced to flee when authorities issued a warrant for the arrest of the "anarchists." They were accused of "subversive acts of vandalism" and abusing the country's "aspirations for revolutionary truth." The five had been jailed for their involvement in the student demonstrations of 1979-80, but were granted clemency together with some 20 other activists in August 1984.

The nucleus of previously detained students demanded financial compensation for the time they had spent in jail and organized to take over the cooperative at the beginning of the school year last fall. The

five students swept the elections, and subsequently campaigned for educational reforms and better university services. When their demands were ignored, they held the university rector hostage for several hours late last year. The Kérékou government stood firm, however, maintaining that the students' grievances were unreasonable, because the country had fallen on hard economic times.

The latest wave of student protests erupted in mid-April when the Council of Ministers announced that it was ending the policy of automatic employment in the civil service for graduating students. Student unrest prompted Minister of Secondary and Higher Education Michel Alladayé to meet with student leaders, but hopes of a quick settlement faded with the government's decision to disband the cooperative. Activists called a 48-hour general strike at the university, which was observed by 90 percent of the student body.

When student allegations of widespread government corruption began to surface, and the boycott spread to high schools in early May, Kérékou warned striking students that their scholarships would be suspended if they did not return to school. But the protests intensified,



causing two deaths and extensive property damage during several violent clashes between the security forces and stone-throwing students.

Fear that the movement was getting out of hand and reports of growing sympathy for the protesters within government circles induced Kérékou to close all schools early for "vacation." An official commission of inquiry subsequently was set up to investigate the deaths of the two students and evaluate the causes of the disturbances. ■

### BURKINA FASO Sabotage rocks Ouagadougou

Three soldiers were killed and four injured in the explosion of an ammunition depot at Gounghin military camp on June 1. The latest act of sabotage against the government of President Thomas Sankara rocked Ouagadougou in what was at first thought to be the beginning of a coup attempt.

Sankara had left the capital for Orodara to inaugurate an agricultural fair in the presence of Nigerian President Seyni Kountché, while his second-in-command, Capt. Blaise Compaoré, minister of state to the presidency in charge of justice, was on a state visit to West Germany.

Members of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) in Ouagadougou were quickly mobilized to their assigned posts in the event of armed conflict. Despite the curfew, many high school students took to the streets, attempting to reach the national secretariat of the CDRs to offer their services to "defend the revolution." Members of the CDRs fired warning shots before realizing the students were supporters, but no injuries were reported. ■

### GHANA Rawlings on horseback

A gala celebration on June 4 marked the sixth anniversary of the first coup that brought Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings to power.

Ghanaians packed the Accra Sports Stadium where thousands of

school children, trained by North Koreans, demonstrated their skill at gymnastics in mass synchronized displays. In the stadium stands, other children used colorful flash cards to spell out such slogans as "Defend the revolution," "Grow more food," and "Africa must unite."

Groups of market women and fishermen competed at tug-of-war. Rawlings joined secretaries of the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC)—at least those who were relatively fit—in a 220-meter foot race. The PNDC chairman also played on the victorious PNDC secretaries' team in a soccer match, and exhibited accomplished horsemanship in lancing—a sport in which riders attempt to spear a ring with their lances, long-shafted weapons with metal heads.

tion, aims to increase gold production by 14 percent to 327,000 ounces this year and to 400,000 ounces by 1990, according to the 1985 budget released in late April.

The budget also sets higher targets for Ghana's other mineral exports: Bauxite production is expected to increase by 122 percent; diamonds, by 58 percent; and manganese, by 19 percent.

High priority is also being assigned to improving agricultural production, building on the successes of 1984. Generous rainfall last year helped increase maize production to 435,000 tons from 172,000 tons in 1983. An estimated 150,000 tons of the surplus is being transported to Mali and Burkina Faso through a countertrade agreement with the U.S. Ghana will receive 9,200 tons of rice from the



PNDC Chairman Rawlings: Celebrating June 4th anniversary

Margaret A. Novicki

In his anniversary address, Rawlings warned that the country was "still far away from the realization of those ideals which fired our imagination and prompted us into action in 1979." However, he noted that there have been "traces of national recovery," an observation shared by international financial institutions, which are funding various development efforts in the country.

The World Bank's International Finance Corporation is backing a five-year plan to expand and restore the Ashanti Gold Mine and to improve the living conditions of miners and their families. Lonrho, the conglomerate that owns nearly half of the Ashanti Goldfields Corpora-

U.S., which will transport the maize to the famine-stricken countries to the north.

The cocoa production goal for the 1985-86 fiscal year is 201,000 tons, compared to about 180,000 tons in 1984-85. A former official of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board recently warned, however, that overproduction of cocoa will cause the industry to collapse, and he urged the cocoa-producing nations to establish production quotas. In June, the government implemented a 90 percent increase in cocoa producer prices, largely to compensate for devaluations of the cedi.

The 1985 budget also includes a doubling of expenditures on devel-

opment and a further devaluation of the currency—from 50 to 53 cedis to the dollar. This is a minor adjustment, compared to the 80 cedis to the dollar that the International Monetary Fund proposed. ■

## MALI

### Nomadic life under threat

Over one million people face starvation in the most devastating drought in Mali's history. Many are Tuareg nomads whose traditional way of life is severely threatened. The situation, which has "seriously worsened" in recent months according to the UN Disaster Relief Organization, has forced nomads in the regions of Gao, Kayes, and Mopti to flee the countryside.

A steady stream of people have migrated to Timbuktu, where there are now more than 20,000 homeless. An additional 80,000 are living in camps outside other towns. The Tuareg nomads, who have long relied on raising cattle for their livelihood, have seen 70 percent of their herds destroyed by the drought.

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization has put the 1984-85 grain deficit at 481,000 tons, with cereal production running at 50 percent below normal. While food shipments have begun to arrive in the capital, Bamako, the poor condition of roads and administrative problems have made it difficult to reach Timbuktu and other isolated regions. ■

## SENEGAL

### Visit by Chadli a first

Algerian President Chadli Benjedid's three-day visit to Dakar in mid-May marked a major breakthrough in relations between the two countries. Not only was it the first time since the independence of the two countries that an Algerian head of state had made an official trip to Senegal, but both sides considered it a great success. The official Senegalese daily, *Le Soleil*, described the visit as a "triumph for Chadli."

For many years, relations between Algiers and Dakar had been

strained, largely because of differences between former presidents Léopold Senghor and Houari Boumediene over the issue of the Western Sahara. Since becoming president, however, Abdou Diouf has taken a middle-ground position between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Saharan conflict, leaving the door open for his trip to Algiers in October 1983 and Chadli's return visit.

Diouf said that a "perfect under-

standing" had been reached following several meetings with Chadli, while the Algerian president added, "Both countries are in agreement in the overall approach to both African and international problems." A joint communiqué stressed that steps had been taken to establish greater cooperation in the economic, technical, and cultural fields to match the excellent relations that have developed at the political level.

## Anti-communists lose ground in the air

The conference of Armed Movements Fighting Against Soviet Expansion recently brought together an improbable assortment of rebel leaders to southeast Angola to cooperate in halting what they referred to as "the Soviet Empire." Representatives of movements fighting the governments of Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Laos, gathered in Jamba to form the Democratic International, with a little help from some hard-line conservatives in the U.S.

The help came primarily from Lewis Lehrman, chairman of the Citizens of America—a conservative Washington-based lobby—who organized the pep talk for freedom lovers in the middle of the Angolan bush. Lehrman, who made millions with the Rite Aid drugstore chain but was less successful in his 1982 bid for the New York governorship, used his financial clout to convene the historic anti-Soviet coalition.

Lehrman also brought gifts to Adolfo Calero, leader of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, Pa Kao Her of the Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos, and Col. Ghulam Wardak of the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujaheddin who were flown in to the "provincial capital" of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Each delegate received a framed copy of the U.S. Declaration of Independence and an inscribed copy of a bowl used in the home of George Washington.

The delegates were even treated to a letter of support that President Reagan wrote to Lehrman. The carefully-worded message stated: "Around the world we see people joining together to get control of their own affairs and to free their nations from outside domination and an alien ideology. [We] have to be moved by the example of men and women who struggle every day, at great personal risk, for rights that we have enjoyed from birth. Their goals are our goals."

The participants actually faced "great personal risk" simply by attending the conference. Lehrman's rebels had the misfortune of boarding a dilapidated and overloaded Dakota DC-3 near Johannesburg—appropriately nicknamed the "Vomit Comet"—which followed a precarious low-level trajectory to avoid radar detection into Angola. Passengers who were well enough to remain in their seats reportedly clung to each other for dear life.

The theme of the communiqué signed by the four rebel groups, however, was more predictable. "Our struggles are one struggle—the fight for independence from Soviet troops and the troops of her surrogates." Nor did the conference produce many tangible results, although delegates did hold out hope for the future exchange of people and arms among the insurgent groups.

Lehrman, who had seen enough of the Dakota on the way in, made a quick exit in a light plane. Delegates were reserved the unenviable fate of waiting for the aged charter plane. True to form, the Dakota broke down, stranding delegates at the remote airstrip for more than 24 hours.

## Operating on Diouf's policies

President Abdou Diouf's austerity policies have provoked a series of strikes against the government. Doctors and medical workers belonging to the independent trade union, SUTSAS, called a week-long national strike in mid-May to draw attention to low wages, unsanitary working conditions, and the shortage of medical supplies in state hospitals throughout the country.

For more than a year, SUTSAS has appealed to the government to act against deteriorating health services. Although the government had agreed to introduce medical reforms in July 1984, following industrial action by the trade union, Diouf has since taken a firm stand against the strikers and refused to live up to the agreement.

SUTSAS called a three-day strike in early May, which it claims was supported by 85 percent of its members. Minister of Health Thierno Ba, however, said that only 48 percent of medical staff joined the strike, although he conceded that most rural health centers were closed down. Minimum services were maintained in the major urban hospitals when the government ordered civilian and military staff to report to work or face prosecution.

## SIERRA LEONE

### Seeking Stevens' successor

The search for a successor to President Siaka Stevens has been prolonged with another postponement of the party convention that will choose the presidential candidate and Parliament's six-month extension of Stevens' term, which was to have expired in mid-June.

Stevens had rescheduled the convention of the All People's Congress from April to July, ostensibly because work on the voter registers had not been completed, but also perhaps because of student and worker protests in March. But the convention was cancelled again, because the July date conflicted with a meeting of the Economic Community of West African States (ECO-WAS).

Maj.-Gen. Joseph Saidu Momoh, army chief of staff, has emerged as the strongest candidate to succeed Stevens. He is considered a likely choice because of his military background, and his popularity within both the army and the party. However, his candidacy would necessitate changes in the constitution, including the requirements that presidential candidates be at least 50 years old and that army officers quit their posts at least two years before running for election.

Observers say that Stevens' chief concern is to find a successor who will protect his interests and ensure that his retirement is not plagued with inquiries into the accumulation of wealth and the corruption that characterized his 18-year tenure. The difficulties of finding a succes-

sor have been exacerbated by Stevens' ambiguity about his retirement.

Meanwhile, students, teachers, and government workers demonstrated in the capital. Teachers marched to protest habitual salary delays and nonpayment of housing and travel allowances. Government workers staged a sit-down strike over similar issues for a full week in late March. On April 29, students at Fourah Bay College demonstrated on campus and in the streets of Freetown, protesting a university decision to hold them responsible for damage to campus property and to ban 41 of their colleagues, mostly student leaders, who had participated in an earlier protest and later refused to sign a good behavior pledge. Paramilitary units used teargas to disperse the students. ■

## EASTERN AFRICA

### More food to reach rebel-held areas

Millions of starving Tigréans and Eritreans in the rebel-held areas will have an unexpected source of food this summer while they await the next harvest—feeding centers funded by the U.S.

Two private voluntary organizations—Catholic Relief Services and World Vision—are planning a major expansion of their famine relief operations in the northern provinces with funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). They intend to reach famine victims in Tigré and Eritrea who have been cut off from other sources of relief by warfare between government and guerrilla forces. A major government offensive against the Tigréan People's Liberation Front totally severed the TPLF's relief supply lines to the province in April. Famine relief workers are predicting mass starvation there unless relief supplies start getting through.

The two organizations will open a number of feeding centers in Tigré and Eritrea. The centers will be located in government-controlled towns on the front lines of the war zone. With the concurrence of the

Ethiopian government, they hope to draw people from as far as 150 kilometers away in the surrounding rebel-held areas. If the government allows the operation to expand sufficiently, the U.S. may terminate its assistance to the relief operations run by the guerrilla forces, according to an AID spokesman.

The plight of civilians in the region has drawn worldwide concern as well as harsh criticism of the Mengistu regime for denying access to the guerrilla zones. Only an estimated 20 percent of the famine victims in northern Ethiopia are benefiting from government food distribution.

The guerrilla forces have been transporting food by truck convoy across the border from Sudan. But the convoys, which travel by night to avoid government detection, have reached only a fraction of the famine victims, forcing thousands of Tigréans and Eritreans to flee to Sudan. A stream of the refugees began returning in April, however, when they heard that the rains had started in their home provinces, breaking three years of drought. More than 50,000 had left for home

by mid-May. Some carried provisions for the journey but nothing to sustain them until the harvest in late September. Relief workers predicted that as many as 50 percent of the weakened, malnourished refugees would die before they reached home. Moreover, it was doubtful whether the survivors would have seeds and tools with which to plant and plow.

The U.S. and other Western donors are still declining to provide assistance to the Ethiopian government program to resettle 1.5 million northerners to more fertile lands in the south. More than 360,000 have now been moved by Soviet planes and trucks. Evidence that people are being forcibly removed and that little preparation is being made for their arrival are behind the West's refusal to aid the effort. Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Chairman Dawit Wolde Giorgis has appealed for an international airlift of seeds and tools to allow the resettled peasants to take advantage of recent rainfall to plant crops. In addition, the government has ordered thousands of college students and teachers to spend the summer working with the resettled Ethiopians.

Meanwhile, a great backlog of donated grain is accumulating in the ports of Ethiopia and Djibouti, largely due to a severe shortage of trucks and railway cars. Djibouti, the only port from which famine relief can be transported inland by rail, reported in May that Ethiopia was not returning the railway cars that had gone west loaded with grain. Unexpected rains in the ports of Djibouti and Assab, Ethiopia, ruined some thousands of tons of grain. More than 100,000 tons were stockpiled there, though the maximum port capacity is only half of that.

The World Food Program estimates that only 40 percent of the food shipments are reaching the people in need. In addition to the warfare and transportation tie-ups, the major obstacles are congestion in shipping traffic and government red tape, including the high unloading fees that the government charges for the donated food. ■

## Zanzibar Old Town to get facelift

Prompted by the deteriorating economy and a newfound desire to preserve Zanzibar's rich cultural heritage, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi's administration recently endorsed a \$42.9 million plan to rehabilitate Zanzibar's historic Old Stone Town.

The UN agency, Habitat, coordinated the development of the 10-year plan after an extensive environmental study. Objectives include a major sewer and road-building program, new residential and commercial construction, the restoration of historical sites, and the return to private ownership of property seized after the 1964 overthrow of the government.

The plan is part of an effort to reassess a number of policies that have held sway in the islands since former President Sheikh Abeid Karume assumed power after the overthrow of the Sultan in 1964. Zanzibar's economic decline over the past two decades has been due in part to Karume's policies, including isolation from the West and the Middle East, denial of Zanzibar's history which was considered 'tainted' by Arab and Indian colonial influences, rigid state control of the economy, and over-dependence on clove production as the sole source of foreign exchange.

As a result, Zanzibari culture languished. Historical sites, such as the former Sultan's palace and the old slave market, fell into neglect, and the labyrinthine Old Stone Town—a mixture of African, Arab, and Indian architecture with elaborately carved teak doors, intricate walkways, and parapets—disintegrated to the point where an average of eight structures are collapsing each year.

Mwinyi, elected president in April 1984, has begun to implement reform measures and to restructure the economy. Growing competition from other clove producers such as Brazil, Indonesia, and Madagascar, has created a glut of cloves, weakening the world market and cutting the price per ton nearly in half between March of 1983 and June of this year. Consequently, Mwinyi has sought to diversify the economy through cautious privatization and the encouragement of tourism.

The restoration of the Old Stone Town is intended to substantially increase tourist activity and foreign exchange. There is hope that the proposal might even win Zanzibar a spot on the UN's World Cultural Heritage list. And a 1984 agreement with the French firm Tecotex to construct a luxury hotel on a pristine beach north of Zanzibar town is intended to use the island's natural resources to attract holiday visitors.

There is also a growing appreciation for Zanzibar's rich historical past. Islam is once again being encouraged as a primary cultural influence, a policy that was avoided during Karume's rule. In July 1984, the Idd el Fitri celebration, a religious pageant marking the end of Ramadan, was allowed to take place at its traditional ground for the first time in 21 years.

Western and Kenyan archivists have taught local preservationists new techniques to protect the wealth of historical documents that have been neglected in museum archives for the past two decades. The government has also moved to restore historical monuments ranging from the Persian baths at Kidichi to the old Portuguese fort and the houses of David Livingstone and the notorious ivory trader, Tippu Tip. How drastically that cultural heritage will be affected in the face of a large influx of tourists and the transformation to a service-based economy is one of the key questions facing the islands.

### KENYA Join the party

President Daniel arap Moi announced in early June that grassroots elections for the Kenya African National Union (Kanu), the country's sole political party,

would be held June 22-25—the first since 1976.

By allowing only three weeks of preparation time for the elections, Moi avoided the possibility of further divisive campaigning of the type that had characterized the drive for new party members. From

January to April, recruitment was carried on throughout the country, eventually yielding more than 4 million members. Pressure to join the party came from several directions. Some party and government officials told Kenyans they would need party membership cards to make purchases from local stores and markets. Kenyans also reported police harassment of citizens who had not yet joined. The Rt. Rev. Ndingi Mwana 'a Nzeki, chairman of the Kenya Episcopal Conference and Bishop of Nakuru, urged Christians to join the party so they could vote in the party elections. Membership was mandatory for employees of government and parastatal institutions, who had the membership fee deducted from their salaries.

Members of Parliament gave high priority to the recruitment drive. Parliament adjourned for several weeks in late April and early May so that members could assist in the campaign for new members. Party officials campaigned in their home districts, using the membership drive as a platform to attack political opponents.

Kanu has assumed a more active and powerful role in the country's political life, following the expulsion last fall of 15 party members, including several members of Parliament. All had been associated with the once-powerful Charles Njonjo, formerly attorney general and minister of constitutional affairs. Previously, Kanu had expelled only two members of Parliament in its entire 25-year history.

Meanwhile, bills to legalize the reorganization of the University of Nairobi into separate colleges have been introduced in Parliament. The decentralization will complicate student efforts to organize demonstrations of the type that have repeatedly led to university shutdowns in recent years. The plan was informally implemented in November 1983. Supporters of the legislation, however, maintain that the reorganization is incomplete, and that the university administrators need the direction that the law could provide.

The trial of students arrested in the most recent outbreak of student

protest ended in April with sentencing that observers considered exceptionally mild. Mwandawiro Mghanga, who headed the National Union of Students of Kenya (NUSKE), received a one-year jail sentence for organizing illegal student meetings, including the gathering at the university sports grounds where students clashed with police on February 1. Mwandawiro was reportedly preparing to unite secondary and post-secondary students across the nation under the NUSKE umbrella, an effort that may have been partly responsible for the government crackdown on the student leaders.

Four other students received relatively minor fines for participating in the meeting, and one was acquitted. The main charge—that students had ignored an order to disperse—was dropped.

Several days after the trial, the university reopened; the majority of the students returned to classes after meeting the government's readmission criteria, including certification from local chiefs that the students had conducted themselves well during the shutdown. ■

### SOMALIA Barre woos foreign capital

The government of President Siad Barre has recently opened an office of the Somalia Investment Promotion Service in New York City to attract U.S. and Canadian capital and provide information on business opportunities. The new office, partly funded by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, reflects Somalia's commitment to attracting foreign investment, technology, and expertise for its 1982-86 development plan.

Somalia allows partial or full exemption from levies such as import-export duties and income tax to any enterprise for up to five years, where it is in the national interest. Its foreign investment law permits up to 30 percent repatriation of gains on invested capital. The law is presently being re-examined to make it "even more attractive" to foreign investors, allowing them to

repatriate or reinvest all profits earned, according to Abdulkarim Ali Mohamed, who heads the investment office in New York.

The investment program, however, has indirectly brought the government into conflict with several UN agencies which are funding major development projects and emergency assistance for the estimated 700,000 refugees in the country. As part of the package proposed by the International Monetary Fund earlier in the year, the Barre government agreed to devalue the shilling by 29 percent and adjust it to the black market rate of 81 shillings to the dollar. This led to the introduction of a second official rate—effectively 36 shillings to the dollar—to be applied to foreign embassies and UN agencies. Somalia thus became the first country to insist that financial aid from the UN be converted into local currency at the most favorable rate.



Barre: No favors for the UN

UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar filed a protest with the Barre government, arguing that it had essentially "imposed a 100 percent tax" on UN affiliates. De Cuellar added that it not only jeopardized UN assistance for refugees in the country, but also violated Somalia's 1977 agreement with the UN to convert its funds into local currency at a rate most favorable to the world organization. Barre rejected the protest, contending that "favored status" for UN agencies could "adversely affect" Somalia's economic program.

Some observers view this policy as merely an attempt to use emergency aid to gain foreign exchange. But a Barre government decision to uphold such a move may force several UN agencies to suspend their aid programs to Somalia—including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, which has budgeted \$48 million for Somalia in 1985. ■

## UGANDA

### More violence feared

Opposition leaders and human rights groups are reaching out to the international community in efforts to halt the violence that continues to plague the country.

Paul Ssemogerere, leader of the Democratic Party (DP)—the main legal opposition to President Milton Obote's Uganda People's Congress—flew to London in early June to enlist British support to ensure that the parliamentary elections scheduled for October are free and fair. He reiterated his allegations that half a million Ugandans have died in the past four years—more than in the nine-year tenure of Idi Amin, he said.

International Alert, a new human rights group based in London and Los Angeles, is urging that an all-party conference be convened to prevent a new wave of killings in the run-up to the elections, tentatively scheduled for December 1985.

Opposition members of Parliament have complained that members of the army and the UPC are massacring civilians. The Ugandan *Star* quoted Evaristo Nyanzi, a member of Parliament, as saying that a truck believed to belong to the army took 33 people to the village of Kibutu where they were brutally murdered. The DP newspaper, *Munnansi*, reported that an army truck transported 20 people to Kasangati where they were shot. Another member of Parliament, John Bosa, claimed that gunmen belonging to the UPC opened fire on a wedding ceremony 100 miles southwest of Kampala killing 30 guests.

In more recent incidents, gunmen shot and wounded Chief Magistrate John O'Bwangamoi and threw a

grenade into the courtroom where he was presiding over the trial of a government soldier accused of atrocities against rebels. And the Ugandan *Star* reported that the body of opposition MP Sebastian Ssebuggwawo, who was abducted by the army May 31, was found riddled with bullets.

The DP and other groups continue to protest unlawful detentions of Ugandans. The Uganda Law So-

ciety, an attorneys' organization, has announced that its members may refuse to handle political cases unless court decisions are respected. They made their statement after armed police imprisoned opposition member of Parliament Yoweri Kyesimira even though a High Court judge had declared his continued detention illegal, following his acquittal on treason charges. ■

## GENERAL AFRICA

### Visit to Britain: a Biya-lingual affair

At the end of his first official visit to Britain in mid-May, Cameroonian President Paul Biya welcomed a greater British economic presence in the predominantly French-speaking country. Biya informed British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that Cameroon, which still leans heavily on France for its industrial equipment and takes 44 percent of its imports from Paris, would like to buy more British manufactured goods.

The visit focused on ways to increase trade between the two countries and to create a favorable political climate to enable such relations to flourish. In 1984, Cameroon exported far more goods to Britain (\$165.6 million) than it imported (\$29 million). But several British business sources, following meetings with their Cameroonian counterparts, said that Cameroon presented them with a unique opportunity to tap a hard currency "francophone" market which still had some "anglophone" attributes.

These consultations followed the return of a British trade mission to Cameroon organized by the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI), which attracted 23 companies. An LCCI delegation spokesman revealed that Cameroon, which recently received the coveted "Triple A" rating from international banks, would provide British contractors with several excellent investment opportunities.

With an official growth rate of 6.5 percent last year and an advantageous investment code for foreign

capital—a central pillar of the government's open-door policy—Cameroon is likely to strengthen its ties with Britain in the aftermath of Biya's trip.

The Biya government, which has struggled to attract foreign capital since the attempted coup of April 1984, has made a special effort to reassure potential investors that the political climate is now safe and stable. At the Bamenda party congress in March, the party approved Biya's New Deal program of "rigor, moralization, democratization, and liberalization," while his position as the undisputed leader of the country was confirmed. The ruling party even changed its name to the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement to mark a break with former President Ahmadou Ahidjo's Cameroon National Union.

The banned opposition Union of Cameroonian Peoples (UPC), however, denounced the name change as a "ruse," and warned people not to be duped by the New Deal promises. The UPC appealed to the Biya government to legalize the party and allow multi-partyism, and called for the release of all political prisoners, including party activist Joseph Sendé. Sendé has been held incommunicado in Yaoundé since February, together with other members of the UPC, after filing a complaint with the Supreme Court to recognize the banned party. Sendé's appeal was left unanswered, indicating that the Biya government is not yet prepared to accept multi-partyism. ■

## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Codos Rouges avoid the squeeze

A vast counter-insurgency drive by the Central African Republic and Chadian military commands along their common border recently ended in failure. The joint army operation had been launched in April in an effort to crush the rebels, who are known as "Codos Rouges" and based in southern Chad.

The plan had been for Chadian government troops to force the rebels, led by Col. Alphonse Kotiga, south toward the Central African Republic border, where they were to be ambushed by Gen. André Kolingba's army stationed along the northwest frontier regions of Markounda, Moyenne-Sido, and Maitioulou. Kotiga's guerrilla force, however, said to number over 1,000 men, managed to slip through the net westward to northern Cameroon, avoiding direct clashes with government forces of either country.

As the joint anti-rebel drive got underway, authorities in Bangui expressed doubts over the chance of success in crushing the "Codos Rouges" because of the army's weakness in manpower and arms. Officials also admitted that the rebels would be difficult to trap because of both their familiarity with the countryside and the support they enjoy among villagers along both sides of the border.

Kolingba's decision to engage his forces in overt joint operations with Chadian troops was apparently prompted by the desire to reestablish control of the region and to counter the alleged collaboration between the Codos Rouges and opposition groups based in the northwest. Last November, opponents of the Kolingba regime, led by former Minister of Justice Gen. Alphonse M'Baikoua, together with Chadian rebels, attacked the town of Markounda, and several government soldiers were killed or injured.

At the close of the unsuccessful joint operation in May, Kolingba's troops combed the region for anti-government opponents, leading to reprisals against the civilian popula-

tion. Entire villages were allegedly burned down, under the pretext that inhabitants had been harboring armed rivals of the government. ■

## GABON

### Aliens exit to Bongo's beat

Nigeria's latest expulsions of illegal aliens has prompted Gabonese President Omar Bongo to jump on the bandwagon. In mid-May, he told a press conference in Libreville that he had decided to deport all immigrants whose papers were not in order because foreigners were responsible for "looting, crime, and disease." Earlier in the year, Bongo had denounced foreign prostitutes working in the country, and threatened to have them arrested and turned over to the police.

Bongo claimed that the large influx of aliens has created tensions in the country because "in certain provinces, the number of foreigners is greater than the number of nationals." He revealed that a special census of immigrants would be carried out shortly, and that as of April 1986, foreign residents in Gabon would be required to obtain new residence and work permits.

Bongo told reporters that the security forces had been given a free hand to hunt out immigrants without legitimate papers, and called on his countrymen to reveal the presence of illegal aliens so that they could be quickly deported. Companies which employed foreign workers without declaring them, he added, would be heavily penalized. ■

## SÃO TOMÉ & PRÍNCIPE

### A change in diet

In a bid to revive the floundering private sector, the government of President Manuel Pinto da Costa has begun to dismantle many of the country's socialist economic measures, while accelerating the shift from Moscow toward the West. As one diplomat noted with satisfaction, "Everyone can now own his own pig again."

Virtually all families possessed a pig until they had to be slaughtered

during a 1979 swine fever outbreak. The pigs that were later imported to replace them were kept out of private hands and confined to a centralized piggery. Falling living standards and increasing dissatisfaction with the level and quality of Soviet economic aid, however, have prompted the government, to reverse the trend toward individual ownership in recent months. Cocoa production—by far the country's major foreign exchange earner—declined from 10,000 tons at independence in 1975 to 4,450 tons last year. São Tomé, as a result, has lacked money to pay for food, 90 percent of which is imported.



da Costa: Returning pigs to private hands

The da Costa government is seeking a quick rapprochement with the West, and the U.S. in particular, in hopes that it will receive a substantial inflow of foreign investment and aid. To underscore the improved relations between the two countries, da Costa announced in April that an agreement had been signed to send a small detachment of soldiers to the U.S. for training.

This is a major turnaround for a government which was once described by Gabonese President Omar Bongo as "the mouth of a Soviet gun pointed at Gabon." More recently, the bulk of Angolan troops have been sent home, with only 400 soldiers remaining out of 2,500. The role of Soviet, Cuban, and East German advisers has also been re-

duced, while Minister of Foreign Affairs Maria da Craça Amorim, and Minister of Planning Agapito Mendes Dias—both considered pro-Soviet members of the cabinet—were dismissed.

This has not put to rest allegations in the Western press that Soviet bases in São Tomé harbor over 2,000 Soviet and Cuban troops. Several Portuguese newspapers have even reported that Moscow has built a missile-launching base.

Da Costa dismissed these accounts as a ploy to destabilize the country, and questioned the motives behind them. "What is the objective of this type of propaganda? A Soviet base? There is no Soviet base. A Soviet air base? Only if they are talking about the São Tomé & Príncipe airport which has been expanded. Curiously, the airport—the only one we have—is international. Some Portuguese newspapers have called it an air base, but it was built by a Portuguese enterprise. Does it not seem odd that a Portuguese firm should build bases for the Soviets?"

## ZAMBIA

### Kaunda strives for stability

For the first time in May, President Kenneth Kaunda publicly broached the topic of his retirement, leading to speculation that his recent cabinet reshuffle was an effort to find a successor.

Kebby Musokotwane, the new prime minister, and Grey Zulu, the new secretary-general of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), Zambia's only legal party, are now considered leading candidates to succeed Kaunda.

Musokotwane, 38, who has held several cabinet posts, replaced Nalumino Mundia, a close confidante of the president and a powerful figure in the party. Mundia and M.M. Humphrey Mulemba, former head of UNIP, were offered diplomatic posts abroad.

In comments that observers linked to the reshuffle, Kaunda later said that he wanted to maintain political stability to ease the succession process. "I am now 61," he

said, "and naturally I have to retire, die or be de-selected one day."

The desire to maintain political stability is also behind Kaunda's reluctance to devalue the Zambian currency. Officials from the Zambian government and the International Monetary Fund recently met

in Lusaka to discuss exchange rate reforms, but no plan was approved. Such reforms would further undermine the standard of living for most Zambians. Zambia's stand-by borrowing program with the IMF was suspended pending an exchange rate adjustment. ■

## NORTHERN AFRICA

### Sudanese push to accelerate reform

Public euphoria over the ousting of President Gaafar al-Nimeiry has given way to impatience with the new rulers only weeks after the bloodless coup.

The Trade Union Alliance held a rally in mid-May to demonstrate dissatisfaction with the slow progress of the military regime. Speakers for the alliance, which includes the professional groups that were active in the pre-coup demonstrations, urged more civil disobedience to "safeguard the revolution." They demanded a return to the 1964 constitution, guarantees that legislative power will pass immediately to a civilian cabinet, and abrogation of Nimeiry's laws, including the Muslim code.

The *sharia*, which Nimeiry imposed on the country, continues to be one of the most contentious issues. Political parties have joined the Trade Union Alliance in calling for its abolition. But the Muslim Brotherhood has repeatedly demonstrated in favor of retaining it.

The new rulers are also being criticized for dragging their feet on action against Nimeiry's associates and for having released a number of them. When the auditor-general who served under Nimeiry was recently reconfirmed in his post, 700 members of his staff resigned. At least one trial of a former government official had opened by late May, however—that of ex-vice president Omar Mohammed Tayib, who was allegedly one of the key figures in the CIA airlift of Ethiopian Jews from Sudan to Israel. The government has assured the public that other government officials who aided the effort will also be tried. In addition, the government is report-

edly building a case against Nimeiry for conspiracy in the murder of Mahmud Mohamed Taha, the 76-year-old leader of the moderate Republican Brotherhood, who was executed in January. This may lead to a request to Egypt for the extradition of the former ruler.

The harshest criticism of the military regime comes from Col. John Garang, leader of the rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), who has repeatedly called for the immediate installation of a civilian government. Ending the warfare in the south is the top priority with the new rulers; they have made several peace overtures to Garang, annulled the division of the south into three provinces, and returned to the terms of the Addis Ababa treaty that the government and the rebels signed to end the civil war in 1972. None of these steps appeased Garang, however, and so Gen. Rahman Sawar-Dahab, the new leader, is attempting to cut off support for the rebels through diplomacy with their chief suppliers—Libya and Ethiopia.

Sawar-Dahab is treading cautiously to avoid alienating any faction. Decisions on a number of controversial issues may be postponed until the civilian government takes over. He has repeated his intention to transfer power next year, even setting the date—April 26, 1986—for the election of a constituent assembly, which will formulate a constitution.

He has, however, taken a few steps to reverse Nimeiry's policies. The special criminal courts that Nimeiry had established to apply Islamic punishments were abolished, and the previous system of justice



was revived. Nimeiry's state security operation and his political party—organizations that had consumed a large portion of the national budget—were also abolished.

The most difficult and urgent task facing the country, however, is reviving the economy, which was driven to bankruptcy during the last 18 months of Nimeiry's rule. The new rulers are developing an economic policy package to present to

the International Monetary Fund and other creditors. In early June, a Sudanese delegation met with IMF officials in Washington to discuss \$120 million in arrears to the IMF and the renewal of a standby arrangement. Sudanese delegations have also met with U.S. and Saudi Arabian officials concerning interim financing, and the Paris Club has indicated a willingness to reschedule Sudan's debts. ■

## U.S. farm subsidies to block out rivals

"We're not going to shoot everyone in sight. We will target where we have been victimized," declared U.S. Agriculture Secretary John Block in unveiling his new \$2 billion farm export subsidy program. At a press conference in early June, Block announced that the Reagan administration would sell up to one million metric tons of wheat to Algeria in what it hopes will be the first in a series of subsidized sales to counter what he claimed were "unfair trading practices" by European countries.

While Block acknowledged that the strength of the dollar, together with government programs, has played a part in pricing U.S. farmers "out of the market," he also pointed the finger at European-subsidized wheat exporters for victimizing U.S. farmers. Five years ago, the U.S. was Algeria's number-one wheat supplier, but its share of the market has plunged from 41 percent to only 16 percent in 1984-85. The European Economic Community's (EEC) share, meanwhile, has shot up from 29 to 59 percent.

The agricultural export initiatives, said Block, would enable U.S. farmers "to sell more, to compete more effectively, and to send a message" to competitors that it is time to change world trading practices. In Europe, however, the proposed wheat deal provoked angry reactions. French Agriculture Minister Henri Nallet spoke critically of the export program which, he said, "smacks of a trade war," and warned that it could cause "a spread of protectionist measures."

Block rejected the charge claiming, "It is not our intention to take on the rest of the world in international trade. But the world must realize that the American farmer has lost 25 percent of our export markets in the last five years. That is economically nothing short of intolerable. Politically, it is intolerable."

The U.S. Department of Agriculture indicated that the projected sale to Algeria under the export subsidy program would include "bonuses" of free wheat from government-held stocks, while the sale price is to be determined through bids submitted by export companies. Algeria is to either receive part of the surplus as a bonus for buying U.S. wheat or pay a lower price than that offered by the EEC.

The offer to sell wheat to Algeria underscores the extent to which relations with the U.S. have warmed in recent months. In April, President Reagan approved the sale of arms to Algeria for the first time since the north African nation gained independence in 1962. This decision coincided with what the U.S. administration described as a "highly successful" state visit to Washington by Algerian President Chadli Benjedid.

The deal for wheat—the staple of the Algerian diet—would represent more than a third of the country's annual wheat imports of 2.8 million tons. Although Algeria has already bought 450,000 metric tons of wheat from the U.S. at a cost of \$60 million, USDA officials estimate that U.S. growers can look forward to an additional \$117 million in sales thanks to the export subsidy program.

## ALGERIA Rioting in the Casbah

Over 30 people were arrested and many injured during riots in the Casbah, in what is believed to have been the most serious social unrest in the country since independence 23 years ago. Riot police armed with tear gas and water cannons clashed with several hundred demonstrators who were protesting squalid living conditions and lack of water in Algiers' old quarter in late April.

Despite recent government attempts to alleviate overcrowding in the Casbah by resettling some of the 70,000 inhabitants who are packed into 1,700 houses, its promises to renovate the district have remained largely unfulfilled over the years.

The collapse of a neglected building in the Casbah, killing two people, sparked off four days of protests, culminating in a march beyond the confines of the old town toward the headquarters of the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN). The riot police succeeded in pushing the demonstrators back to the Casbah, but only after injuries to dozens of protesters.

In the aftermath of the riots, the government deployed large numbers of anti-riot forces to patrol city streets, and made clear that it would not tolerate further disturbances. A communiqué released by the authorities stated: "Public order will be assured using all means at our disposal, no matter what the consequence." ■

## EGYPT A go-slow approach to 'sharia'

The Egyptian People's Assembly has defeated a bid to impose a strict interpretation of Islamic law on the country, following a lengthy and heated debate in May.

The majority voted instead for a gradual approach, directing a parliamentary committee to review the Egyptian code of law for any inconsistencies with the *sharia*, as Islamic law is known. Under the Egyptian constitution, adopted in 1980, the *sharia* is the basis for all law. In practice, however, the legal system combines elements of both

French and Islamic law.

President Hosni Mubarak has often stated that since Egyptian laws are based on the Islamic code, they need not be overhauled. He and his National Democratic Party (NDP) lobbied for the gradual approach—in keeping with his policy of attempting to achieve a balance between conservative and liberal forces in Parliament.

In so doing, he risked alienating the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization of religious conservatives which is behind the drive to impose the *sharia*. The Brotherhood is banned in Egypt, but last year it formed an alliance with Wafd, a right-wing party that constitutes the only serious opposition to the NDP. The coalition was the only opposition group with enough popular support to gain representation in the Assembly, winning 58 out of 448 seats. Several of these seats are held by members of the Brotherhood.

Mubarak has granted the fundamentalists greater freedom of speech and assembly than they have had in the past. However, the government banned a demonstration scheduled for June 14 to demand the immediate imposition of the *sharia*. It was Mubarak's first major confrontation with the fundamentalists, who postponed the march rather than confront the force of riot policemen that Mubarak had deployed. While they have not gained widespread support for their ultra-conservative views, the fundamentalists have claimed some victories, despite the setback in Parliament over the *sharia*.

For example, the Constitutional Court recently overturned a six-year-old law introduced by the late President Sadat which required a husband to give his wife official notice if he took another wife and allowed a wife to seek divorce as well as maintenance and custody of young children if she objected to the second marriage. The law was invalid, according to the court, because it was issued by decree and never approved by the People's Assembly. The fundamentalists strongly opposed the law, which they said contravened the *sharia*.

The fundamentalists have also pushed for censorship of books and films that they consider pornographic or threatening to public morality. Late in May, a Cairo court confiscated 3,000 copies of a new unexpurgated edition of the classic, *A Thousand and One Nights*, and fined its publishers and distributors because it contains sexually explicit language.



Mubarak: Confronting the fundamentalists

The ruling provoked an angry protest from Egypt's artistic and intellectual community. In a series of articles in the press, they denounced the "fanatics" behind the action and accused them of attempting to destroy the nation's cultural heritage. Mubarak's greater tolerance for the expression of divergent viewpoints also extends to liberal intellectuals, many of whom have spent time in jail under past regimes.

The secular laws governing Islamic banks are also being challenged on grounds based on a strict interpretation of the *sharia*. For example, Islamic law prohibits the payment of interest. Instead, depositors sign a contract with the bank stating that they accept the risk that they might take a loss. At the same time, secular law requires Egyptian banks to deposit 25 percent of their capital in the Central Bank. So the banks argue that if the depositor accepts the risk of loss, it is illogical for them to have to provide the protection of a central deposit. ■

## TUNISIA

### A vote for an election boycott

For the first time since independence, the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), the influential trade union movement led by Habib Achour, boycotted the municipal elections in mid-May. Opposition parties also refused to take part in the election of 3,500 municipal councillors, leaving candidates submitted by the ruling Socialist Destour Party (PSD) as the voters' only choice.

The Socialist Democratic Movement (MDS), the Popular Unity Party (PUP), the Tunisian Communist Party (PCT), and the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) announced at a press conference that they would not participate since the credibility of the election was in question and because of the "continuing degradation of the social and political climate" in the country. They pointed to the lack of guarantees that the elections would be fair, the widespread confiscation of opposition newspapers, and the adoption of a single round electoral system which favored the ruling party.

In the run-up to the election, opposition parties organized a "counter-campaign" to encourage people to join the boycott—a strategy which remained largely ineffectual in the face of arrests of several MDS militants, the burning down of opposition party offices, and the removal of all anti-government newspapers from bookshops around the country. Opposition leaders strongly contested official reports of a 92 percent national voter turnout and 100 percent participation in certain regions.

For its part, the UGTT declined to allow its leaders to run on the PSD ticket as they had in past years, basing its decision on the deteriorating relations between the trade union body and the government of President Habib Bourguiba over the last 12 months. The move by the union leadership was a means of reaffirming its independence from the PSD at a time when negotiations with the government have broken down over the ruling party's attempt to link proposed wage rises

with productivity increases. Last year, unionized workers received no wage increases despite an inflation rate of over 10 percent.

The UGTT's boycott was also influenced by the outcome of the previous municipal elections in November 1981, which were marked by widespread charges of blatant ballot rigging and the harassment of opposition candidates. The UGTT's participation eventually led to a major split in the trade union confederation and the establishment of the National Union of Tunisian Workers—a body which Achour labels "a creation of the ruling

party."

The UGTT has even lodged a formal protest with the International Labour Organization against the Tunisian government "for violating labor laws and failing to respect established international conventions." The union has objected to the government's decision to prohibit labor meetings in the workplace, to the detention of UGTT militants, and to the passage of laws affecting the workforce without consulting the union leadership. It has vowed to continue fighting for wage hikes in line with the cost of living increases. ■

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

### UDF, Azapo mark Soweto uprising

In a rare display of unity, the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Azanian People's Organization (Azapo) joined hands to form a "June 16 Committee" to commemorate the ninth anniversary of the Soweto uprising. According to a committee statement, the move to hold a joint service at the Regina Mundi Church in Soweto was "testimony to our joint commitment to respecting our differences and leading the nation to a free, democratic society."

Bishop Desmond Tutu, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate who was instrumental in bringing the two groups together, appealed to the audience of 5,000 black supporters "not to dishonor our martyrs and undermine our righteous, just, and noble struggle for freedom by violent conflicts which discredit our cause." To mark the day, some clerics prayed openly for the overthrow of the apartheid regime.

Earlier in the year, the long-simmering tensions between the UDF and Azapo erupted in violence with over-zealous supporters of the groups and government agents provocateurs believed to be fanning the animosity. But following several murders, kidnappings, and fire-bombings, the two groups managed to reach a tentative reconciliation in May.

The differences between the two camps remain ideological. The

UDF subscribes to many principles—but not the use of violence—of the nonracial African National Congress and follows the ANC-sponsored Freedom Charter. Azapo stems from the black consciousness movement, is more socialist-oriented, and believes in excluding whites from cooperation in the liberation struggle.

A number of UDF leaders have been charged with "high treason" and "promoting the objectives of the ANC." The government handed down a 588-page indictment, which took six months to prepare, with the help of security police. Meanwhile, most of the defendants remained in detention without charges. Sixteen UDF members accused of attempting to overthrow the regime are now free on bail and awaiting the trial scheduled for July 11 in Natal.

Another 22 people—many of them UDF leaders—faced treason charges in mid-June for their alleged involvement in violent activities in the Vaal triangle. The trial, which was postponed for two weeks to enable the defense to study the 364-page indictment, brought to 49 the total number of people facing treason charges in the country. The indictment in part relates to rioting in Sharpeville and surrounding townships south of Johannesburg last year in which dozens of people died.

Meanwhile, the ANC, in an apparent switch of tactics, has seized on the current unrest to call for a popular insurrection against the government. The ANC has called for "a long-lasting national work stoppage. . . backed by armed activities;" the replacement of township councils, many of which have collapsed, with "people's committees on every block;" and the transformation of the townships into "no-go areas" which the residents would attempt to prevent police and army troops from entering.

An ANC official in Lusaka explained, "The call contains new and far-reaching objectives which we believe are now realizable because of the astonishing speed with which the situation is changing. It remains true that the idea of a general insurrection as an immediate way forward cannot replace our long-term prospect of a protracted people's war. But we know that history sometimes has a funny way of departing from blueprints."

In late June, on the eve of the ANC's biggest conference since 1969, the organization pledged to step up its military campaign and claimed responsibility for a series of bomb attacks. In May, Minister of Law and Order Louis Le Grange said that the ANC already had carried out 30 to 40 acts of sabotage since January—compared to 44 in all of last year. The ANC recently bombed the Johannesburg headquarters of the Anglo American Corporation, which had just sacked 14,000 miners. In late May, the organization claimed responsibility for a bomb explosion that destroyed offices of the army's medical corps in central Johannesburg. Seventeen people were injured, including four members of the South African Defence Force. ■

### LESOTHO

#### Fair play or dirty tricks?

A coalition of the three main opposition parties, led by Ntsu Mokhehle's Basotho Congress Party, has charged the government of Chief Leabua Jonathan with "widespread shootings and killings" of opposition supporters. The

coalition fears a repeat performance of the country's last election in 1970 when Jonathan declared a state of emergency and threw out the results, which indicated that his Basotho National Party (BNP) would be defeated. Opposition leaders have called for an international team of observers to supervise the upcoming general elections.

They have cooperated to form the Coordinating Council for Joint Action of Lesotho's Political Organization to boost their electoral chances and oppose alleged government attempts to rig the electoral laws in its favor. Opposition leaders recently called a press conference in Maseru expressing "serious reasons to doubt the intentions of the government regarding the holding of fair elections" and appealed to international organizations to send observers as "the only way a farce general election can be checked." Human rights groups and church leaders have backed opposition claims of government abuse and repression.

Opposition leaders have accused the ruling BNP of clandestinely registering voters, while they themselves have not been permitted to campaign—a charge that Jonathan has strongly denied. Essential details, including the dates of voter registration and of the election itself, have yet to be released, which they say has made it impossible for them to begin campaigning. ■

## MOZAMBIQUE MNR tightens grip

The Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) has intensified its campaign of sabotage against economic targets and famine relief operations.

Water and electrical lines, roads, railways, and factories are blown up as fast as they are repaired. An estimated 2.4 million Mozambicans are threatened by starvation, but the rebels have obstructed efforts to transport food supplies to the famine-stricken central and southern provinces. MNR massacres of civilians and attacks on development projects and foreigners who are attempting to assist the country are

## EEC embarks on tsetse fly battle

The European Economic Community (EEC) has launched a controversial scheme to combat the tsetse fly in Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The EEC's decision in early May followed stormy debate and a veto by an EEC committee in March. Opponents claim that the plan for aerial spraying of the chemical, endosulfan, will have disastrous long-term effects on the environment. The EEC, however, describes the aerial spraying as a "clean method" which will "considerably reduce the effects of chemical destruction on the environment." In a further effort to mitigate the criticism, the EEC has included research on the environmental impact of chemical insecticides as part of the preparatory work for the project. The research will be based on results obtained from projects that used aerial spraying in Botswana and ground spraying in Zimbabwe.

Proponents of the plan point out that thousands of Africans die each year as a result of the infestation. The tsetse carries a parasite which causes a chronic and often fatal sleeping sickness in humans and a debilitating disease in cattle. Moreover, eradication of the fly would open the way for major expansion of land use, primarily for large-scale cattle ranching but also for agricultural production. At a recent seminar held in Harare, Zimbabwe, representatives from the Organization of African Unity, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Health Organization concluded that agricultural production and cattle ranching could increase by some \$30 million per year as a result. Supporters of the plan, including cattle ranchers who would profit from its success, also emphasize the need to increase food production for the rural poor.

Environmentalists and wildlife protectors, however, point out that the proposed beneficiaries are least likely to profit from the program, since they cannot afford commercially produced beef. In fact, many of them rely on fish and wild game which would be adversely affected by the tsetse fly program. And any benefits from increased food production would be far outweighed by the ecological damage to the region, according to opponents of the program. In most of the area to be sprayed, the top soil is too fragile to support intensified agricultural production and cattle grazing. The plan would thus accelerate the spread of the desert and actually exacerbate the problems of rural nutrition, critics say.

The experts are even divided over the question of whether the tsetse war can ultimately be won. Some progress against the parasite has been recorded in Cameroon, Nigeria, and, most notably, in Zimbabwe, where sleeping sickness deaths have been reduced to under 15 per year.

However, FAO launched a similar campaign 10 years ago which has cost nearly \$1 billion so far. Yet the tsetse infects 322,000 square kilometers today—a larger area than before the FAO began its effort. The infested region has been expanding steadily since the mid-1970s. Successful eradication, critics say, would require billions of dollars as well as closer coordination among the nations affected. Moreover, previous eradication programs have failed in part because the land was not cleared and settled afterwards, so the flies returned. Finally, scientists point out that other insects, such as the horsefly, could also serve as carriers for the parasite.

frequently reported.

President Samora Machel has said publicly that the survival of the nation is at stake and that, if necessary, schools and factories will be closed to enable Mozambicans to join the struggle against the MNR.

Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and Zimbabwean Prime

Minister Robert Mugabe met with Machel in Harare, Zimbabwe, in mid-June to discuss military assistance for Mozambique. Nyerere had earlier said that if the Frelimo government were to collapse, it would be welcomed back to its pre-independence bases in southern Tanzania. Zimbabwean troops, who have

long been stationed in Mozambique to guard oil pipelines and transportation routes, have recently been authorized to launch counterattacks.

During a visit to Maputo in late April, Portuguese President Antonio Ramalho Eanes indicated that his country would help by sending military instructors to train Frelimo troops. The Portuguese government had earlier indicated that it would take new steps to terminate MNR activities in Lisbon, where the rebel group produces propaganda and recruits mercenaries.

South Africa's renewed commitment to the Nkomati Accord in March and its promises to help curb the rebels have had little effect so far. In early May, a "joint operations center" was opened on the border between South Africa and Mozambique to coordinate efforts to enforce the accord. Border patrols were to be strengthened, and border radar stations established to detect low-flying planes. A special guard may be employed to defend the Cabora Bassa powerlines into South Africa.

In an admission that assistance for the rebels has come from within the South African military, Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha said that members of the South African Defence Force with ties to the MNR had been dismissed or transferred away from the border.

Botha also disclosed that police had uncovered a gang of counterfeitters in South Africa who were forging currency to purchase contraband goods in Mozambique. The proceeds were allegedly used to purchase arms for the MNR. He also described an "international web of businessmen and financiers with large political and economic interests in Africa, Latin America, and Europe" who have been financing the rebels. ■

## ZIMBABWE ZANU geared for victory

As the electoral campaign drew to a close and 2.9 million registered black voters prepared to go to the polls on July 1 and 2, the outcome of

the country's first general election since independence seemed hardly in doubt. The odds heavily favored Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) to emerge with a decisive electoral victory. Whether ZANU was to improve upon its 58-seat majority in the 100-member Parliament—giving the ruling party the mandate it seeks to establish a one-party state—depended largely upon the ability of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) to hold onto the bulk of its 19 parliamentary seats.

Throughout the run-up to the election, ZAPU and smaller opposition parties, including Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC) protested that they were unable to campaign freely because of widespread harassment by ZANU supporters. In early June, Nkomo accused ZANU members of breaking up several ZAPU meetings outside of its Matabeleland stronghold, while complaining that the government had cancelled others under the pretext that it wanted to avert bloodshed.

Opposition parties bitterly criticized the government's changes in election procedures announced by Minister of Justice Eddison Zvobgo in May, which served to shorten the statutory pre-electoral period from 35 to 19 days. The move, ZAPU and the UANC claimed, put opposition parties at a distinct disadvantage, giving them insufficient time to prepare their lists of candidates for nomination day, because neither maps of the newly-formed constituency boundaries nor lists of registered voters had yet been distributed throughout the country.

ZAPU filed a High Court motion in early June requesting a postponement of the nomination date for prospective candidates, which would have led to a delay in the elections. The appeal was rejected, but in a conciliatory gesture, the government agreed to extend the deadline by a day and a half. Zvobgo said, "The Prime Minister feels that although the government was within its rights and acting lawfully, nevertheless we should bend backwards to accommodate any sort of griev-

ance to ensure for all concerned a free and fair election."

ZAPU also protested that it had been victimized by the government's ban on the use of its symbol, the swooping eagle, which ZANU claimed too closely resembled symbols used by air force and police support units. When ZAPU won a court appeal, the government resorted to emergency powers to reinforce the ban. The use of emblems is important because many of the electorate cannot read. Nkomo denounced the move as "a cowardly act." "It is deliberate harassment and an arbitrary rule that shows the nature of the thinking of the ruling party."

To give a needed boost to ZANU's electoral support in urban areas, Minister of Labor Frederick Shava announced major wage increases to take effect at the beginning of July. Domestic and farm workers and civil servants earning less than \$190 a month received 15 percent wage increases. This measure should help ease the growing dissatisfaction with the Mugabe government among low income workers in urban areas whose expectations at the time of independence have generally been frustrated.

Shava revealed that the pay rises were made possible by a turnaround in the economy, spearheaded by the flourishing agricultural sector that had survived three years of drought. With a bumper harvest of maize, cotton, coffee, and tobacco, combined earnings this year are expected to reach \$65 million, more than half of which will provide much-needed foreign exchange.

Most striking has been the success of peasant farmers, whose production of maize—the country's staple food—has doubled over the past year. Combined with commercial farmers' output, as much as one million tons of maize will be available for export in 1985. As Minister of Agriculture Denis Norman said, the peasant sector alone "can now just about feed Zimbabwe, with the commercial production allowing exports and topping the reserves." ■

# A Plea for Pluralism

Northern politicians must share responsibility for Sudan's current political crisis. If southerners' legitimate nationalist aspirations continue to be regarded as sectarian, there is little hope that Sudan's most serious priority—economic development—will be addressed.

BY MANSOUR KHALID

**A**lthough Gaafar al-Nimeiry was undoubtedly the chief villain in the latest drama on Sudan's political stage which closed on April 6, 1985, we cannot pin all of Sudan's ailments on that one man. Many of the endemic political diseases which he certainly aggravated by his arrogance and high-handedness were inherited from past regimes.

To discover what went wrong in Sudan, we need to first identify the problems and then how these problems were or were not tackled. Sudan's basic problems fall into two areas: national unity—what has come to be known as the north-south divide, the cultural specificities of the different groups, and the need to find a formula for unity which accommodates all those differences—and second, economic development—not just quantitative economic growth, but equitable socio-economic change and progress.

These two basic problems were not addressed before the May 1969 revolution due to many factors—some inherited from colonialism, others due to the myopic approach of the traditional political parties and the governing elite. The colonial heritage, particularly as far as

*Mansour Khalid served as Sudan's minister of youth and social affairs, ambassador to the United Nations, foreign minister, minister of education, and presidential adviser for foreign affairs between 1969 and 1978. He is author of Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dis-May (London: KPI Limited, 1985), and has recently joined Col. John Garang's Sudan People's Liberation Movement.*



**Gaafar al-Nimeiry: "Countless opportunities to redirect his policies along a more constructive path"**

southern Sudan was concerned, played a leading role in undermining the possibility of establishing a political consensus needed for government.

British policy had always been based on the principle of treating the south and the north as two separate parts. In the run-up to independence, an advisory council was set up to advise the British governor-general on how best to rule northern Sudan, not the south. It was

not until the Juba Conference in 1947 that the south was brought into the Sudanese body politic.

Sudan's traditional socio-political structure was built on ethnic and tribal differences and sectarianism. Sectarianism served an important purpose at one point in history when tribal and geographical divisions needed to be overcome. But sectarianism has now outlived its purpose. In modern Sudan, politics requires an approach free of historic cleavages and traditional animosities. The depth of the present crisis and the scale of the future tasks demand nothing less.

Political parties in Sudan were deficient because they did not operate as part of the democratic process. Although called "parties," they were really mass organizations acting as fronts for the main religious sects. They were not led by political leaders, but ruled by religious overlords. Their policies were neither action-oriented, nor did they have specific programs to handle the southern problem and economic and social development.

The differences between the parties were more personal than political. When serious ideological differences did occur, they tended to be negated by sloganism and reflected not the clash of ideas, but blind responses to external stimuli, particularly the activities and interests of Egypt. As a result, there was no vigorous dialogue between the various groups inside the country concerning ways of dealing with basic problems

facing Sudan and no serious-minded effort to give sharp definition to the country's national interests.

The primary role of political leaders is to achieve national self-definition. When Gen. Abboud's military government took power in 1958, it was not the democratic process in Sudan that had failed, but rather that the political groups in the country at that time had failed to achieve the minimum national consensus needed to sustain any democratic system.

Indeed, we need look no farther than the Declaration of Independence itself for proof of the validity of a democratic consensus-building system in Sudan. With the declaration, Ismael al-Azhari was compelled to come to terms with the Ansar and Umma parties and abandon his call for union with Egypt. This success in consensus-building in the north was not matched with similar action toward the south.

If anything, the northern parties commenced their era with a betrayal of the south—the abolition from the Self-Government Constitution of the right of southerners to opt for federation if they so wished. The fact that the word federalism was treated as almost synonymous with treason not only reflected the parties' political inadequacy in properly appraising the problem of the south, but also their political ignorance.

Nevertheless, the military interlude under Abboud did prove one thing: Consensus-building should not stop at the banks of the River Nile, but must extend throughout the country. By the use of force, Abboud attempted to achieve what the traditional parties had failed to through "democratic processes." His approach to the southern problem was a military one, and ultimately the reason for his demise. Bullets can never be an alternative to political accommodation.

The inherent transience of military rule eventually became apparent in October 1964, when a wave of civilian protest brought what may be called the second regime of the parties to the helm. With the parties came a new political element, the Muslim Brotherhood, a small elitist group which offered a counter-balance to communist influence in the schools. But the emergence of the Brothers also created intractable problems for the traditional religious parties

in the form of endless wrangling over the question of an Islamic constitution.

The traditional parties became immobilized. On the one hand, they could not take a stand against the excesses of the Muslim Brothers on an issue as sensitive as the Islamic constitution because their power base was the religious sects. On the other hand, the tactics of the Muslim Brothers placed all kinds of obstacles in the path toward unity and development, particularly aggravating the problem of the south—the running sore of Sudanese politics.

For the second time, the traditional parties failed to work within the democratic process to play by the rules of the game. An example was the expulsion from Parliament of the only elected members of the Communist Party as a result of the connivances of the Muslim Brothers and the traditional parties.

The difficulties involved in achieving consensus, unity, and development are not unique to Sudan. Most countries in the developing world have faced the same challenges in the post-colonial period. But Sudan stands out as a country that has lacked high-minded leadership at moments in its history when it was most required. Sudan never had a Tito or Nehru—leaders with the ability to rise above the divisive forces of ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity to carve a united nation.

In addition to its traditional leadership, the Sudanese political landscape was also inhabited by all sorts of minor effervescent politicians of all hues—islamist, arabist, marxist—all looking outward rather than inward, and whose main *raison d'être* was making it difficult for the established traditional forces who represented order and continuity in spite of their intellectual inadequacy. Such inadequacy, however, could never be compensated for by the vacuous sloganeering of the left or the religious demagoguery of the islamists.

Sudan has lacked leadership endowed with a sense of history, intellectual integrity, and spirit of toleration needed to ensure that the rights of one ethnic group are not purchased at the expense of another. Gaafar al-Nimeiry had the opportunity to fill this gap. In the early years of his regime, it appeared that he might rise to the challenge, but subsequent events proved otherwise. He was

defeated by his own short-sightedness and inability to appreciate the implications of his own decisions.

Nimeiry opted to build his political future on short-term coalitions with all political hues, rather than building lasting unity and development for Sudan. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that Nimeiry's motivation throughout his 16-year rule was to maintain himself in power. To this end, he was able to draw upon an extensive arsenal of tactics to exploit the weaknesses and differences of the various political groups and institutions inside Sudan.

Nimeiry's greatest source of strength was the weakness of others, and he began by playing one force off against another. In the first years after the May revolution, he used the communists to dissolve the traditional parties and crush his opponents on the right, including the Ansar and Sharif al-Hindi, who opposed Nimeiry from day one.

The Communist Party should not be underestimated. It stands out among Sudan's political parties for its recognition of the need for a measure of autonomy for the south and for a political system which respects the cultural diversity of the country. But Nimeiry then turned on the Communists themselves, following their abortive coup attempt in mid-1971, and dealt ruthlessly with the communist "threat."

In that "sacred" war, he was supported by all who had an axe to grind with the communists—supporters of the alienated parties and sects, the arabists, the islamists, and the middle-of-the-roaders. He paid lip-service to democratic principles and accepted proposals to establish an institutionalized government, to devise a peaceful political solution for the southern problem, and to draw national development plans aimed at achieving plenty and equity.

The president also went along with the idea of a permanent "written constitution," the first in Sudan's history. (Sudan was governed by an interim constitution after the Declaration of Independence pending the promulgation of a permanent one.) This constitution acknowledged freedom of belief and non-discrimination on the basis of religion. It also enshrined the principle of regional self-government for the south.

But no permanent constitution was


possible in the past, nor in the future, that does not settle these seemingly contradictory issues: the cultural distinctiveness of Muslim and non-Muslim groups, united only by citizenship, and the reflection of this reality in a constitution where all citizens are deemed to be equal.

President Nimeiry cashed in on the enormous goodwill created by the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement which ended 17 years of civil conflict and solved the southern "problem" by going along with the establishment of the new, broad-based, national political organization, the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), set up to sustain and give direction to the spirit of unity which followed the Addis accord. The SSU was probably the first broadly-based political party in Sudan to have southern membership, with the possible exception of the elitist-based Communist Party. He also agreed to certain checks and balances on his own power as president which were clearly articulated in the constitution.

But the dream of his May revolution changed into a nightmare, for Nimeiry ignored the implications of his own decisions. He had no intention of relinquishing any of his personal authority, either to the south in the form of autonomy or to any other region or institution. Instead, he set about playing the SSU and the army off against one another. He used the north and south as countervailing forces against each other.

The south held firm to the promises of unity and development within the Addis framework for many years, distancing itself from insurrectionist movements in northern and western Sudan, and resisting any temptation to accept external support against Nimeiry until the latter showed his true colors by virtually abrogating the Addis Ababa Agreement. When a new leadership eventually emerged in the south, it had learned the hard way that force was the only weapon against oppressors; and help was welcomed from whatever quarter it was offered.

To President Nimeiry, the classical tactic of divide and rule was honed into almost an art form. He tried to fan the differences among southerners, particularly those of the minorities in Equatoria province who suspected that the south had fallen into the hands of the



Dinka who are numerically the largest tribe in southern Sudan. He also played on the pride and prejudices of elitist elements.

In the north, Nimeiry tried to fan the differences between Sadiq al-Mahdi and Sharif al-Hindi, leaders of the opposition forces who, with Libyan support, attempted a takeover in 1976. He offered the possibility of radical reform to both men. He ensnared Sadiq in order to smother him, and almost succeeded. Sharif al-Hindi, who signed a written agreement with Nimeiry's regime, refused to be drawn into the president's web. Nimeiry, however, went on to use his new-found alliance with Sadiq and the Muslim Brothers—also new converts to "Nimeiry-ism"—to create a gulf within the SSU.

Nimeiry placed great store on the political rewards of patronage, blind as he

was to its destructive long-term effects on the economy. Over the years he built up an empire of patronage—ever more ministers, under-secretaries, and parliamentarians. This was Nimeiry's way of facing the realities of Sudan's inherent cultural and regional diversity. Increasing the area of patronage was the motive behind the subdivision of the south. Patronage was also extended to the neglected provinces of eastern and western Sudan which were turned into administrative regions.

So while Nimeiry was agreeing to cuts in public expenditure suggested by the International Monetary Fund, he was busily extending the area of patronage all over Sudan. The result was yet another inflation in personnel expenditures, while the axe of public spending cuts fell on social services and food subsidies. It was thus the dispossessed and



semi-dispossessed who most suffered the brunt of so-called economic stabilization programs. Throughout his rule, Nimeiry sought to appease the vociferous elite and urban populace at the expense of the silent rural majority. He succeeded only in appeasing the opportunists.

As the implications of his own shortsighted and self-interested decisions began to show through, Nimeiry turned increasingly toward soldiers of fortune for help. They promised the moon and he believed them. Men like Adnan Khashoggi were recruited to massage the president's ego. They undermined the efforts of those men of talent attracted to the administration during its early years of promise, and played havoc with the economy.

Nimeiry had countless opportunities to redirect his policies along a more constructive path, but could not accept criticism from any quarter. For example, he imprisoned many of the traditional southern leadership when they approached him with an appeal to reconsider his decisions and to look again at the Addis provisions. Also when the army offered him honest criticism in 1982 and pointed an accusatory finger at the corruption of individuals close to him, the president responded by sacking 21 senior officers, including the commander-in-chief and his own first vice president, Gen. Khalil.

The army could have taken over at will, had they a mind to do so. However, they opted for the respect of constitutional legitimacy. Nimeiry, on the other hand, strove to muzzle the army by creating the Military Economic Corporation (MEC)—another extension of the area of patronage—which would involve the army in corruption. (The MEC was one of the first institutions to be abolished by the new military government.) Nimeiry displayed the classic symptoms of a weak and paranoid leader: inability to delegate authority, shunning of criticism, and jealousy of competent men or those with a good public image. He increasingly surrounded himself with mediocrity.

Another ploy in Nimeiry's arsenal of tactics was sowing deliberate confusion by changing the rules in the middle of the game. When he exhausted one set of tactics, he quickly switched to another. When the judges went on strike in 1983 arguing for an independent judiciary, Nimeiry responded first by trying to tempt the judges into accepting improved conditions of pay and privileges (corruption again). Then, almost by way of vengeance, he completely changed the name of the game by introducing the Sharia law, making the civil judges effectively redundant.

When doctors went on strike in the same year in spite of presidential admonitions and ultimatums, Nimeiry re-

sponded by laying ignominiously low. A few weeks later, when other professional unions emboldened by the doctors' success threatened to go on strike, Nimeiry escalated the situation by declaring a state of emergency and imposing martial law to preempt a wave of civil disobedience similar to that which brought down Gen. Abboud in 1964. He also declared the islamization of laws and institutions, heaping abuse on the doctors.

Toward the end of his regime, Nimeiry had driven himself into a corner. Having exhausted all ideologies, he thus seized upon Islam as a means of intimidating the northern Sudanese, justifying the selective punishment of political opponents, and galvanizing support in the north behind the unwinnable war against the Christian and animist south. Toward that end, harsh and inhumane punishments were meted out on those opponents, sometimes only to deter others, as was the case with the hanging of Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, the venerated Islamic scholar.

As Nimeiry's credibility was spent, he resorted increasingly to the use of force. This is reflected in the rapid increase in the volume of human rights violations in the closing years of his rule. The support he received from foreign powers—notably the United States and Egypt—made him persist in his suicidal obduracy, but what he failed to realize



Ruling military council: Treating the 'southern problem' as an afterthought

was that foreign powers support a discredited leader as a rope does a hanged man.

Nimeiry's final act was to try and pin all blame for Sudan's crippled economy, with 6 million threatened by starvation and a \$9 billion external debt, on the Muslim Brothers. They too were used and abused by the president. The Muslim Brothers were Nimeiry's allies and cheerleaders in his so-called islamization measures and some of the most notorious judges in his kangaroo courts were drawn from their ranks.

The Muslim Brothers were the only Sudanese political group that supported Nimeiry's criminal act of hanging Taha. (A case has now been brought against the deposed president accusing him of murdering Taha. Among the evidence in support of the charge is a hand-written note by Nimeiry, penned long before the execution, calling for Taha's elimination.) However, the Muslim Brothers were not the authors of Nimeiry's so-called Islamic laws. Theirs was a marriage of convenience. Nimeiry, they thought, would do their "dirty work"—annihilate the communists, subdue the south, and intimidate the anti-Muslim Brothers urban elite.

Since Nimeiry's downfall, the Sudanese have become wiser and more realistic than ever before, as it is now obvious to all that Nimeiry survived and built his one-man show by prostituting the deep-felt convictions of others and by playing peoples and groups off one another. He prostituted all ideologies—socialism, democracy, regionalism, and in the end, religion. The Sudanese people now realize that Sudan can only survive within a pluralist system. This new development has at least three important implications for Sudan's future.

First, it means that any idea of a one-party system imposed from above cannot be entertained since, given Sudan's history, such a "system" would inevitably deteriorate into a one-man show. Second, pluralism can only exist within a framework of liberal democracy. Although liberal democracy was anathema in the early years of the May regime, it is now recognized as the most, if not the only positive way forward. The Communist Party is raising the flag of liberal democracy higher than anyone else.

If liberal democracy is the formula for

long-term success in Sudan, it is imperative that all Sudanese recognize and respect the role of Parliament and the judiciary and realize that the main thrust of political activity takes place through the voting process. There should be no question of destabilizing Parliament by extra-parliamentary measures, such as resorting to army coups or undermining the elected government by street pressures.

Third, people are learning the truth about Nimeiry's brand of Islam, and influential religious and political leaders like al-Mahdi and al-Mirghani have come out in favor of the abolition of the harsh Islamic laws imposed in September 1983 which are a distortion of Islam. Their initiatives need to be followed up by the establishment of a just constitution which will not allow discrimination on the basis of religion, race, or sex.

The area in which parties are still lacking is the issue of the less-developed areas. Future stability in Sudan hinges on this issue. In effect, this is what the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and all regionally-based resistance movements are about. However, the SPLM is quite different from any of the past movements which have emerged in the south. Originally southern-based, the SPLM is a movement with a national vocation which is appealing to all Sudanese of all religions and races to join its ranks. The northerners are called upon to accept that the SPLM is a national movement, even though its origins are in the south.

However, there is one psychological barrier: the inability of many northern elements to perceive that a southern-based and led movement can have national claims, and that it is not simply a pressure group seeking to achieve regional aspirations. If the parties in the north cannot overcome this psychological barrier and recognize the "southerners" as an essentially national force, it is they who in the long-term will be called "separatists."

One of the great mistakes made after the coup and the establishment of the provisional government was that the professionals, in selecting candidates for ministerial posts, had their eyes riveted on the north, worse still on the Nile banks (neither the east nor west were represented). If southerners were se-

lected to the cabinet simply on the basis of professional affiliation, there would not have been an issue of southern representation in the cabinet.

A "southern problem" is inevitably created once the south is treated as an afterthought. This might equally be said of the military council. If there is one officer in the army who aligned himself with the popular opposition to Nimeiry—taking up arms in the process—it was John Garang. Garang had a legitimate right to a place within the Military Interim Council from its inception, as well as a right to compete for the premiership. Neither of those prospects were entertained.

Not until a unified approach is taken to Sudan's problem of national identity, with all its cultural and psychological ramifications, will the country's most serious priority—development—be tackled. Development requires positive action in favor of the more depressed areas—the rural areas in general.

Sudan needs balanced economic growth and equitable apportionment of the benefits of development. This will be the greatest challenge facing the elites since they have been and remain the main beneficiaries of the fruits of development. Sixteen years of division and misrule under Nimeiry have proved quite clearly to all Sudanese that our country cannot afford the luxury of a few winners and many losers—we are all winners and losers together. We are one nation with one future.

Only when we have started to produce and develop and act as one Sudan, capable of facing all the realities of the domestic situation, can we begin to think seriously about defining our place in the world. At the same time, we all know, from our own experience and the bitter experiences of fellow developing countries, that unless Sudan can break out of the orbit of superpower strategies, it will never be united. And if we cannot establish good relations with every country in our interdependent world on the basis of mutual respect for national interests, we shall never develop. The Sudanese need to be Sudanese first before they can be anything else. Unity, national self-definition, and development are therefore the challenges facing the political forces—the forces that shall make or break Sudan. □

# Biya's New Deal

The Bamenda party congress proved to be a political milestone for President Paul Biya. With his troubled succession and the fallout from a 1984 coup attempt at last behind him, the Cameroonian president must translate the consensus he has achieved into effective measures for change.

BY FREDERICK SCOTT

The United Republic of Cameroon celebrated its thirteenth anniversary on May 20, the day when Cameroonians voted in favor of unity between the former French colony and British-administered territory. In the face of severe secessionist tendencies in the early 1960s, the union forged under the leadership of Cameroon's first president, Ahmadou Ahidjo, was considered to be one of his major achievements, although it was achieved through a highly autocratic rule and at the expense of many human freedoms.

Since coming to power on November 6, 1982 following Ahidjo's resignation for health reasons, President Paul Biya has been trying to open up Cameroonian political life. Progress, however, has been hindered by institutions and traditions installed by Ahidjo, as well as by threats to the unity he forged during the quarter-century of his rule.

The fourth ordinary congress of the Cameroon National Union (CNU), held in Bamenda in late March, may have been a political watershed for President Biya who has experienced one of the most difficult succession transitions in the history of independent Africa. Groomed as Ahidjo's successor for a decade as prime minister, he became president only to discover that his "mentor" intended to retain political control through the party and the barons

he had installed throughout the public sector during his 25 years in power. An intellectual technocrat, President Biya initially moved cautiously and consulted his predecessor on important political decisions.

However, a major cabinet reshuffle, on which Ahidjo was not consulted, was announced on the eve of French President Mitterrand's official visit, increasing the growing conflict between the two leaders. Charges of coup plots and assassination attempts were made, raising the political temperature in the country and eventually leading to Ahidjo's departure for France and resignation as party head in August 1983. Biya was chosen president of the party at a special congress in September and elected president of the Republic during special elections in January 1984.

The fact that the succession in Cameroon was less than orderly was brought home on April 6, 1984, when shots rang out in Yaoundé and Radio Cameroon began playing martial music. Members of the presidential guard, resentful at the prospect of being reassigned to remote outposts, revolted, occupying the radio station and attacking the airport and presidential palace. Fighting continued for two days before loyalist forces in the army quelled the insurrection. An estimated 1,000 persons were killed in gun battles—mostly civilians struck by stray bullets.

The violence stunned the nation. Rumors that Moroccan and French troops had been involved aggravated the nation's paranoia and for months, resi-

dents of Yaoundé, especially foreigners, experienced searches, interrogation, and arbitrary arrests. Hundreds of suspected plotters, civilian and military, were arrested. Although most were eventually released, more than 100 were tried by secret military tribunals and executed or sentenced to lengthy prison terms. The trials were criticized by human rights organizations and the mood of insecurity led the sizeable foreign business community to nervously re-examine its "exposure" in Cameroon.

The coup attempt, however, helped consolidate support for Biya, as Cameroonians dismayed by the violence rallied behind their president and what was termed "legality." It also helped authorities identify and purge cells of opposition within the security forces. The presidential guard was disbanded and the army assumed greater influence over the country's internal security.

In his speech to the Bamenda Congress, President Biya mentioned the April 6 events six times, an indication of the lingering effect of the coup attempt on the national psyche. During the congress, however, President Biya also appeared to be ending the tortuous transition of power. He had assimilated all the formal positions of power, his acolytes had managed the meeting relatively well—with a mixture of firmness and compromise—and he appeared poised to further consolidate his rule.

More than half of the 60 members of the party's central committee were replaced and a similar purge was expected

*Frederick Scott is an American journalist living in West Africa who has been writing on African affairs for eight years.*

in the new political bureau. Senior officials said party elections were being planned, during which the much-touted liberalization would be instituted. Candidates are to be chosen by party members at the local level, instead of being picked by a committee at the national level. Finally, officials said proposals were being considered to hold legislative elections in 1986 during which it is expected that multiple candidates within the party will be allowed to contest seats in the National Assembly.

A major accomplishment of the Bamenda Congress was changing the name of the party, the Cameroon National Union, to the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement. Observers of the proceedings in the newly constructed "People's House" in Bamenda affirmed that the name change was indeed a considerable achievement, since the debate over the new name dominated the proceedings until the final day, and the closing ceremonies had to be postponed for several hours while a compromise was struck.

The debate was closed to the press, but participants later told journalists that the new name, proposed originally as the "Rassemblement du Peuple Camerounais," was opposed at first by a number of party barons who had served under Ahidjo. Some saw no point in breaking with tradition. Others felt the change removed the emphasis on unity that had been so important in the years following independence. Finally, some younger party delegates said they saw no reason to change the name at all when so little had actually changed in Cameroonian life.

Nevertheless, the desire to choose a monicker which would best express a willingness for change prevailed, and President Biya was given "his" party with a name that reflected the direction in which he wishes to guide the country. Participants said the name, "Rassemblement du Peuple Camerounais," was chosen by French-speaking party leaders because they wanted the party to be a forum for all Cameroonians and not just the elite, as before. They also felt the new name demonstrated the desire to attract exiled dissidents who had been calling for a multi-party system.

Unfortunately, the word *rassemblement* does not translate well into En-

glish. Anglophone party delegates said the words "rally" or "assembly" did not convey the true intent of the name change and so they chose "Cameroon People's Movement" instead. Then, a number of delegates protested that the proposed name sounded too much like that of a Communist party and in fact was already being used by a small group of leftist Cameroonian dissidents in exile. After a great deal of discussion, the word "democratic" was added to the name to remove ideological undertones and underscore the desire for political liberalization.

Although some called the change "cosmetic," it reflected a sincere desire by the new leadership to transform Cameroonian political life. Paul Biya came to power 30 months ago calling for widespread changes including political liberalization, greater economic rigor, and an emphasis on the community in social life. He launched the New Deal (called *le renouveau* or "renewal" by

French-speakers) and promised freedom of choice in elections, although he said Cameroon was not ready for multi-party democracy. He advocated greater rigor in government and public enterprises, telling Cameroonians to serve their country instead of serving themselves. He said he would consider privatizing unprofitable government-owned enterprises and would remove corrupt or inefficient officials.

President Biya elaborated on these principles during a speech opening the working sessions of the Bamenda Congress. He told the 600 delegates in Bamenda that the party should work to build a society "free of laxism, greed, corruption, and favoritism."

He spoke of allowing free discussion and the choice of party delegates. But he cautioned, "Such new freedom should not lead to permissiveness which would open the door to the demons of division and confusion." In a reference to the exiled Cameroonian opposition,



Former president Ahmadou Ahidjo "forged Cameroonian unity through his highly autocratic rule and at the expense of many human freedoms"

Carnerapix



**President Paul Biya at service for coup victims: "The coup attempt has had a lingering effect on the national psyche"**

Biya said "The party must convince Cameroonians wherever they are that it is no longer necessary for them to take up arms or live in exile in order to express their opinions." And he said that he wished to see develop a tolerance for differences of opinion.

In its final resolutions, the congress expressed support for virtually every point mentioned by the president, encouraging him to pursue his New Deal policies and advocating "multiplicity of candidates" for the next legislative elections. The congress also voiced support for the president's call for liberalization of the Cameroonian economy and the modernization of its agricultural sector.

The response to the congress among the people was generally favorable, although some intellectuals noted that little progress was made toward implementing the policies so vividly described in the rhetoric. Newspaper editorials praised the work of the delegates, but called for measures to "concretize" the policies. It was evident that hopes had been raised by the promises made and government and party will come under increasing pressure to deliver on them.

Long-time observers of Cameroon suggest that some of the most significant changes were the least visible. Delegates noted that the debate for the first

time in history was open and quite critical. Each party provincial division was asked to present a document containing critiques and proposed solutions.

The paper presented by delegates from the Anglophone northwest province called for freedom of the press, the establishment of industries in long-neglected Anglophone Cameroon, a reorganization of the security apparatus, and the creation of an English-speaking university. The paper concluded by asking that a new constitution be drafted protecting the rights of the Anglophone population. Papers from other regions reportedly made equally strong requests for political liberalization, party decentralization, and improved services from the central government.

The proceedings of the congress were closely followed by the Cameroonian people, due in part to the burgeoning media. An estimated dozen newspapers have begun publishing in Cameroon since the lifting of Ahidjo-era restrictions on the media. Furthermore, government officials say they are seeking ways to encourage growth in the privately-owned press without undermining its independence. Nevertheless, editors say their articles are still subject to government censorship that in some cases is quite severe, causing publication delays. One newspaper has re-

sponded by cutting censored passages directly from the paste-up, resulting in articles that are punctuated with blank spaces and stories having no headlines.

The most significant development in the Cameroonian media, however, was the trial run of the nation's new television network. Cameroon, one of the few African countries without television, broadcast English and French coverage from the congress in its inaugural programming. For the first time, Cameroonians were able to see their leaders in action, whether speaking at the podium or dozing in the hot assembly hall. Sales of television sets were reported to be brisk. With their TV sets installed, cafes, restaurants, and private homes became instant social centers for the duration of the congress.

Following the strengthening of President Biya's political position in Bamenda, many Cameroonians are hoping to see further changes in the economy. The directors of a number of banks and government-owned enterprises had been replaced during the 1982-83 recession, which was characterized by a drop in business activity, numerous factory closings, and a liquidity crisis in the banking sector. However, some enterprises rebounded in 1984-85 and good rains have raised agricultural production.

In addition, what appears to be better management of the state budget has improved basic services and hastened the development of the country's infrastructure. The construction of the highway and rehabilitation of the railway linking Douala and Yaoundé appear to be accelerating and new development projects are being inaugurated in the west, central, and southeast regions—areas that had complained of neglect during the Ahidjo era.

One of the best examples is Bamenda itself where in one year, the government built an airport, People's Assembly hall, luxury hotel, and a number of farm-to-market roads. Finally, although revenues from petroleum are still a state secret, officials have admitted privately to journalists that oil production has reached 120,000 barrels per day and revenues are being directed primarily at infrastructural projects.

Rumors of a shake-up in the notoriously slow ministries and a reduction of

employees in the civil service continue to circulate. However, observers express little hope that great improvements in the government bureaucracy will be made in the near future and most Cameroonians remain resigned to the time-consuming "paper chases" through the ministries needed to obtain the all-important "dossier."

Despite the tarnishing of its image as a bastion of political stability, the improvement in Cameroon's economy in 1985 has made it one of the most attractive prospects for foreign investors interested in Africa. A new and liberalized foreign investment code, the convertible CFA franc currency, government's low indebtedness, and the expectation of improved roads and railways have drawn many potential investors, including major trade delegations from Britain, Canada, France, Japan, and the United States. During several trips abroad, most notably to France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom, President Biya himself has encouraged foreign businessmen to study investment opportunities in Cameroon.

Furthermore, the Cameroonian president's travels indicate that Cameroon's foreign policy, like its domestic policies, might be opening up. Under Ahidjo and during the first months of the Biya presidency, Cameroon remained aloof from pan-African and global affairs. Saying it wished to be "a truly non-aligned nation," Cameroonian officials refused to attend the Commonwealth and Franco-African summits and muted their voices in international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.

In recent months, however, the president's travels and his envoys' numerous missions abroad have revealed the government's desire to assume a more prominent role in at least regional African affairs. Biya has visited Ivory Coast twice in the past six months to consult with President Félix Houphouët-Boigny.

The Ivorian president, considered the dean of sub-Saharan African leaders and the guiding spirit of Francophone Africa, is said to be seeking greater Cameroonian participation in the infor-

mal caucus of moderate African nations, particularly on such topics as Chad, the Western Sahara, coffee and cocoa prices, and what is perceived as Libyan adventurism and Nigerian egocentrism in the region. President Biya is said to be interested in Ivory Coast's achievements in the development of its infrastructure, agribusiness, and industry.

Progress in improving its economic infrastructure and in encouraging an influx of new foreign capital would bolster President Biya's expressed desire of improving the life of the average Cameroonian. It would also ease the political pressure on what has traditionally been a difficult country to govern. If they succeed, these achievements would enable President Biya to continue building on the political consensus that was formalized at Bamenda. It would also allow him to seek a basis in the typically careful Cameroonian way for a system that would satisfy the aspirations of the people without jeopardizing the political unity that has been so difficult to achieve, but appears to be desired by most Cameroonians. □

---

# Equator

---

## Merchant Bankers to Africa

Trade, Project and Corporate Finance

## Advisors and Consultants in Africa

Financial Management, Project Development, Economic and Market Studies, Development Planning, Training

## International Traders with Africa

Procurement, Finance, Aviation, Shipping, Insurance, Export Promotion, Countertrade

---

### Bahamas

Norfolk House  
Frederick Street  
P.O. Box SS-6273  
Nassau, N.P. Bahamas  
Telephone (809) 322-2754  
Telex: (20) 409  
Cable: EQUATOR

### U.K.

7a Devonshire Square  
London EC2M 4HN  
England  
Telephone: (01) 283-8221  
Telex: 8812369

### U.S.A.

Equator House  
111 Charter Oak Avenue  
Hartford, Connecticut 06106  
USA  
Telephone: (203) 249-7777  
Telex: 99356  
Cable: EQUATOR

### Zambia

Equator House  
P.O. Box 36759  
Lusaka, Zambia  
Telephone: 214873  
Telex: 40141

### Hong Kong

Hutchison House  
Fifth Floor  
Harcourt Road  
Hong Kong  
Telephone: 5-8418888  
Telex: 75440  
Cable: WARDLEY HONG KONG



Financial, Advisory, and Trade Services to Africa & the World

# EQUATOR

# Democracy Doe-Style

As the October presidential election approaches, Samuel Doe's National Democratic Party of Liberia remains the country's only legally registered political party. Arduous registration procedures and the restrictions of Decree 88A have called into question the government's commitment to the democratic process.

BY A CORRESPONDENT

**F**our months before the general elections that are supposed to return Liberia to democratic civilian rule, it is still difficult to predict the number of political parties that will vie in October's race. The political fever that gripped the nation after the lid was taken off politics in July 1984 has dissipated over the past year, as politicians have confronted repeated and blatant attempts to frustrate their emergence.

Within hours after the ban on politics was lifted, more than 10 individuals and groups had announced their intention to form political parties. But only half met the \$50,000 cash and \$100,000 surety bond pre-registration requirements imposed by the five-member Special Elections Commission, which is supervising the forthcoming elections.

Headed by Liberia's former ambassador-at-large Emmett Harmon, the commission is answerable only to the Supreme Court, and has wide-ranging powers to deny any registration if the party or candidate "seeks to impair or abolish the free and democratic society of Liberia," or seeks to endanger Liberia's existence by "adverse ideological aims and objectives, expressed or entertained."

Detailed financial statements of all political parties must be forwarded to the commission by September 1 of each year. Its guidelines also stipulate that in

*The author is a Liberian journalist.*



**President Samuel Doe: "His critics continue to doubt that the democratic process can be realized in Liberia"**

forming political parties, no presidential candidate can spend more than \$2 million in election expenses.

So far, only the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), President Samuel Doe's party, has passed through the probate court and been registered without hindrance. The legal registra-

tion of the Unity Party (UP), led by the former chairman of the dissolved Constitutional Advisory Assembly, Edward B. Kesselly, and of the Liberia Action Party (LAP) of Tuan Wreh, former legal adviser to Doe and dean of Liberia's law school, have been stalled.

The United People's Party (UPP) of former Liberian Foreign Minister Gabriel Bacchus Matthews also hit a snag last January when the Elections Commission suspended it for three months for alleged violation of election guidelines. The party was charged with circulating information leaflets describing what a political party was, what the UPP stood for, and what the criteria for membership was. The party had to pay a \$600 fine before it could resume the registration process late in April.

Earlier this year, university professor Amos Sawyer, who heads the Liberian People's Party (LPP), was banned from politics until he submitted to an audit of the accounts of the constitutional commission he headed. The commission was dissolved in March, and any auditing should have been done at that time.

Sawyer and nine other prominent Liberians were arrested in August 1984 for an alleged coup plot. Their arrest sparked student rioting at the University of Liberia, and a subsequent protest from the U.S. congressional committee that oversees funding for Liberia. The government's banning of Sawyer's participation in politics has slowed the tempo of the LPP, which resembles

most political parties in Africa as it is centered around a single personality. Student groups and young intellectuals supporting the LPP have complained that the Elections Commission refuses to give them an audience.

Kesselly, Wreh, and Matthews were all imprisoned in April after being implicated in an assassination attempt on the president. The would-be assassin, Lt.-Col. Moses Flanzamaton, deputy chief of the presidential guard, was executed one week later, and the three opposition leaders were released. Wreh has demanded an apology from the president, charging that the three were intimidated and harassed during their imprisonment.

Many Liberians were surprised, however, when the Elections Commission announced that the Liberia Unification Party (LUP), led by schoolteacher Gabriel William Kpoleh, had finally met the initial financial and bonding requirements, following four failed attempts. Kpoleh left the teaching profession more than two-and-a-half years ago to run for the presidency, in compliance with a mandate from Doe to government officials who wanted to pursue a political career. But the LUP still has to canvass for membership and present a list of 3,000 names before it can go to court for final approval.

Initially, Kpoleh's LUP claimed support among students and teachers, but it began to lose ground after a series of failures to meet the requirements of the Elections Commission. Teachers and students had earlier demonstrated their support for Kpoleh following an academic strike for higher pay and better working conditions for faculty which he led in 1983 as president of a powerful public school teachers' association.

Tuan Wreh's LAP, whose documents were accepted by the court in May, making it the second full-fledged political party, was later suspended by the Elections Commission which said it was acting on a Supreme Court order. Commission chairman Harmon said some citizens in eastern Liberia had charged the party with fraud and deceit in its membership list. The case is currently before the Supreme Court.

Unlike LAP, documents for the UP were never approved. Probate Court Judge Luvenia Ash-Thompson dis-

missed protests from two citizens who accused the party of fraud in membership recruitment. They then appealed to the Supreme Court to prevent the acceptance of the UP's documents. It is unlikely that the case will be heard before the court's October term since the appeal was filed specifically for that term.

NDPL Chairman Keikura Kpoto, a member of the interim government, has dismissed accusations that the party instigated the objections to the registration of these parties. He recently said in a radio interview that the NDPL was not responsible for the difficulties other parties faced in gaining legal status. Said Kpoto: "The NDPL will never subscribe to the idea of a one-party state because the constitution outlaws this."

So far, no independent presidential candidate has emerged to contest the elections. Hartzell Killen, a 35-year-old businessman, attempted to be the first, but he is to be prosecuted for issuing a bad check to the Elections Commission in fulfillment of his pre-registration requirements. According to Commission chairman Harmon, the check was refused by a local bank which said Killen's account was closed.

Given the numerous obstacles placed in the path of registration, it seems likely at the time of this writing that only the NDPL will be legalized prior to the July 1 deadline, thus making a sham of the multi-party process desired by Liberians and enshrined in the constitution that they overwhelmingly approved in July last year. However, if this proves to be the case, it would contravene the tenets of the new constitution which prescribes a one-party state.

The constitution also prohibits the promulgation of any decree or laws which might tend to create such a one-party state, and advocates a republican form of government with three branches—executive, legislative, and judiciary. It also set a minimum age of 35 for the president. Doe has changed his date of birth to comply with the requirement. The constitution will become effective on January 6, 1986, the civilian president's inauguration day.

Even if all five parties were legally registered by July 1, none of them would stand much chance of winning the elections with an absolute majority, since

popular support is spread thinly among them. Matthews' UPP is popular among the urban poor and among youths, who make up about 30 percent of the voting population as the new constitution has lowered the age of enfranchisement from 21 to 18 years. These people support Matthews' call for spreading social benefits to the "masses."

Kesselly's Unity Party is supported by substantial numbers of middle-aged intellectuals, who maintain that any taint on the rule of an indigenous Liberian leader would give ex-slave descendants, who ruled the nation for more than a century, a good excuse to reorganize and form a politically solid front. It was probably for this reason that Counselor Wreh of LAP denied rumors that his party was Americo-Liberian, insisting that members hailed from all regions of the country. Some politicians had said in essence that indigenous Liberians in the LAP would be dwarfed by the Americo-Liberians once the party gained power.

Doe does not seem convinced that his NDPL can win with an absolute majority, although he has received support through NDPL resolutions and endorsements from many civic organizations and the provinces. His fears are grounded in the fact that block support during a campaign does not guarantee block balloting at the polls. Moreover, Liberia's illiteracy rate of over 70 percent leads skeptics to speculate that supporters could be swayed to other camps even at the 11th hour.

Doe has made some conciliatory moves, granting clemency to former Vice President Bennie D. Warner and former commander general of the Liberian army, Thomas G. Quiwonkpa, and asking them to return home. Neither has returned, however. The worsening economy is placing an additional strain on the incumbent.

Doe can, however, rely on the votes of the tribal chiefs, cabinet ministers, heads of public corporations, and other high-ranking government officials. Many observers believe that the majority of the interim government members—many of whom hope to gain senatorial and representative posts in the civilian government—believe that a victory for Doe is also a victory for them. The military too, who are voting for the first time under the new consti-



tution, are likely to choose their commander-in-chief in the hope that their position will continue to improve under his leadership.

The last two months before the election will be a difficult period for any political party that meets the July 1 registration deadline, but more so for NDPL presidential candidate Doe who must run the country while canvassing to remain at the helm of state. Party leaders will be organizing their conventions and preparing for campaigns which were scheduled to begin on July 8.

Doe's critics continue to doubt that the democratic process can be realized in Liberia. The government has continued the ban imposed last December on the *Daily Observer*, Liberia's only independent newspaper, thus preventing the media from taking part in efforts to return the country to democratic rule. And the government-run media has become even more cautious than usual during the past year.

The repressive Decree 88A, promulgated by the dissolved Military People's Redemption Council, is the comprehensive mechanism used to stifle attempts to reintroduce democracy in Liberia. Promulgated five days before the ban on politics was lifted, the decree empowers security officers to arrest and detain anyone spreading "lies, rumors, and disinformation" against any government official or individual either by word of mouth, writing, or broadcast.

Anyone who undermines the security of the state, creates disharmony, causes civil strife or confusion or labor unrest, and impedes or interferes with the electoral process can also be arrested and detained without bail under the decree.

Catholic and Protestant bishops have called for repeal of the decree, saying it creates tension and frustrates the smooth return to civilian rule. The bishops believe that the enforcement of the decree could lead to "arbitrary arrest, mysterious disappearances, and extrajudicial trials."

In a strongly worded speech after a dinner honoring the diplomatic corps here last January, Doe warned the bishops not to use the pulpit to make what he referred to as "anti-government statements" or to engage in acts that

would create conflict and confusion in the society.

He said that although clergymen had the right to join political parties of their choice, the separation of church and state must be upheld. He further warned that any religious leader indulging in acts that would create conflict and confusion in the society would face the full consequences of the law. The Catholic and Protestant bishops here apparently replied to the warning by insisting that they would continue to speak for the "silent majority."

LPP official Dusty Wolokollie, who was arrested in August 1984 for violating Decree 88A, is currently being tried

---

**"Given the numerous obstacles placed in the path of registration, it seems likely that only the NDPL will be legalized before the July 1 deadline"**

---

in criminal court. Anthony Kesselly is reportedly still at large, although an order was issued for his arrest last year. The two are accused of authoring a statement on behalf of the LPP that demanded the immediate and unconditional release of Sawyer, who was accused of an alleged "socialist plot" against Doe. Wolokollie was then acting party chairman, while Kesselly was secretary-general.

Political analyst Albert Porte recently told the court trying Wolokollie that the introduction of Decree 88A ushered in a new era of fear and terror. He called for a repeal of the decree. Doe has defended the decree, claiming it is intended to prevent individuals or organizations from creating disharmony and undermining state security.

He has also repeatedly told his compatriots and the international community that he remains committed to seeing a civilian government whose president is "duly elected and respected by the people," and that he would ensure that the constitutional process is pursued without any setback. He has de-

nied persistent rumors that he intends to declare himself president, saying that there was no need to do so because he already had enough supporters.

The publicity surrounding several assassination attempts during the past year seems designed to divert attention from the obstacles being placed in the path of the political parties. Some of Doe's critics even suspect that the plots have been fabricated, perhaps to establish a crisis atmosphere in which the president could justify his retention of power.

Whoever becomes president in Liberia's second republic is bound to face the realities of the nation's future as charted by the distant and immediate past. Experience has shown that the path from a military to a civilian democratic government is fraught with obstacles, especially when the country is suffering from deep economic problems. If a civilian wins the election, he will have to guard against blaming the past military government for the country's ills, or he could face reprisal from the army. Nor can he continue to criticize the overthrown civilian government, since the current military regime has exhausted that diversionary tactic.

The new government would also have to re-educate the population on the principles of democracy, whose basic institutions have been shaken by martial law for more than five years. Members of the military government undoubtedly find it difficult to perceive themselves in a system where law and order prevails.

Overcoming all of these impediments would mark the beginning of the long process toward economic recovery. In Liberia, the population is unable to feed itself despite the abundant rainfall and virgin forest. Any government committed to improving the livelihood of the people must make agricultural production the priority, particularly the cultivation of rice. Liberia is largely dependent on the United States for the import of rice, a food staple.

As Liberians are reminded that it was over "rice and rights" that the foundations of their more than century-old civil institutions began to crumble in 1979, so must any leader be sensitive that "rice and rights" will have to be provided in the second republic. □

# Commodore S.G. Obimpeh

## Chairman of the National Mobilization Programme, Ghana

Receiving and resettling the Ghanaians expelled from Nigeria in 1983 and in May this year has been the responsibility of the National Mobilization Programme. Chairman Obimpeh outlines the efforts of the Ghanaian government to cope with the second influx of returnees and explains how the Nigerian government's quit order was carried out.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

**Africa Report:** How did the Ghana government view the effects of the recent expulsions of illegal immigrants from Nigeria as compared to that which occurred in 1983?

**Obimpeh:** In 1983, Ghana was not prepared for that massive evacuation exercise, let alone to absorb the 1.2 million people—about 10 percent of the population. The economy was in tatters; the logistical base was nil; our vehicles were virtually grounded because of lack of spare parts, tires, batteries, etc. Even the oil situation was appalling and to mobilize resources to go and evacuate that 1.2 million was really a burden on the country. The 1983 exercise was a major disaster for the country.

In 1985, we were informed about some 300-350,000 Ghanaians in Nigeria who would be affected by the quit order. With the experience of 1983 behind us, this was just going to be an exercise which we would just flash through; we were not going to bother about it as such. This time, I had written up my original orders, clearly defined duties and responsibilities for every department and ministry, and had mobilized resources to receive these people, so it was not going to be a difficult exercise at all for us. And in line with government policy that the people involved would pay for their own transportation, the message got down to Lagos and in fact, the majority of them had chartered their own vehicles, not only to Accra, but to their villages, Kumasi and beyond.

So the job for our committee was purely to receive and screen them, give them shots against communicable diseases like malaria, cholera, yellow fever, and then get them home. We also said that this time they would have to meet the laws of the country, particularly the immigration and customs laws. Therefore, customs were to do their normal examination, and they had to pay duties as applicable to any Ghanaian returning

home. All the customs and excise department personnel were in place for that. The Black Star Line had also been geared up to evacuate those who would come by sea. This time, it was going to be a commercial operation, whereas in 1983, it was free and it cost us a lot of money. So for us, it was going to be a very easy exercise.

Then lo and behold, the border was sealed off, therefore those who wanted to come by road couldn't. The Black Star Line sent the ships and at least one vessel was refused entry or at least delayed for several days. Finally, when Nigeria decided that the remaining aliens must be evacuated by sea, they couldn't get enough vessels. We knew also that one vessel, which was on a normal commercial trip from the United Kingdom to Nigeria, was detailed to convey the returnees, but it was kicked out of the harbor and not allowed. So the impediments which have been placed in the way of the illegal immigrants have tended to make the exercise rather cumbersome, difficult, and taxing.

The Nigerian authorities have not acted in the spirit of good neighborliness, ECOWAS, or the OAU, and it beats my understanding as to why this had to be the case. We do not quarrel at all over the quit order itself. Indeed, Ghanaians generally were not very sympathetic to the plight of the affected illegal immigrants, because we had warned them. We had wasted our efforts when they came back in 1983 to settle them in productive ventures, but they just picked up their baggage and went again. That was one reason why we told them this time that nobody was going to bring them back free of charge and this time they would also pay customs duties to deter those who will just want to come and go again. Nigeria had every sovereign right to expel illegal immigrants, but what we don't understand is the way they went about it, the way their security officers brutalized our departing colleagues. We can sack people anytime we want to, but at least one must be humane about it.

**Africa Report:** What will happen to the remaining illegal Ghanaian immigrants in Nigeria? Will borders be re-opened to allow them to return home?

**Obimpeh:** I have recently been to Lagos to check up on the border post at Seme and Idiroko, but there were no gatherings of illegal immigrants. In fact, we saw only three Nigerian immigration officials at the border post at Seme. There were also no groupings at the Hadj camp, which at one point contained some 25,000 or more of them, and at Apapa port, there were only about 540 Ghanaians who have since been returned home. Therefore, I do not think that there is any need for the border to be re-opened right now. When there was the need, when people gathered there ready to go, they didn't open it, so I don't see them opening it now anyway.

But there will be a problem for some groups of people, particularly Ghanaians, who sooner or later will have to face the second quit order, the second phase of the exercise which the Nigerians prefer to call the "flushing out phase." By this, they mean they will be inspecting workplaces and known premises and residences of illegal immigrants from time to time, and they will just be arrested and flushed out of the system. Now when that happens, we don't know how they will be brought home, because the border is closed and the Nigerians are still not allowing the purchase of air tickets in naira for those who don't have resident permits. When contracts are terminated, one's resident permit expires with immediate effect. Therefore, they are going to have problems. There are no passenger vessels sailing between the ports of Tema and Lagos. So I don't know how these people are going to come back home. I have indicated this to the government as a problem which we must solve.

**Africa Report:** How many Ghanaians were actually returned home in the exercise?

**Obimpeh:** We are now collating the exact figures, but I would estimate the number at under 100,000—92-95,000. Those remaining in Nigeria would be difficult to count because we refer to them as "illegal," meaning they passed through to Nigeria via illegal means and were not recorded by our immigration department when they were leaving, nor were they recorded by our High Commission in Lagos. Some attempt is being made to ascertain the number, but it is going to be very difficult. We want to say, however, that we do not think the figure given of 300,000 illegal immigrants is correct. It is grossly over-exaggerated.

**Africa Report:** Could you explain the procedure used by the National Mobilization Programme to handle the returnees?

**Obimpeh:** This time, the main emphasis was on speedy evacuation and dispersal. In 1983, we quarantined the people for a period before moving them to their various home towns and villages. Even at the regional capitals, we put them in quarantine for a period before they moved to their villages. This time, we changed the procedure completely. But for customs excise and immigration procedures, they would have proceeded home nonstop. We held them for as long as customs and immigration formalities would allow, and then pushed them straight to their villages.

At our reception centers at Tema harbor, El-Wak sports stadium and the trade fair site in Accra, and at Afiao, immigration recorded them; they were all given shots for cholera and yellow fever, and whatever first aid was required; customs carried out investigations; there was the very necessary part of security; and then they were put on the same vehicles, because in many cases they chartered their own vehicles, and off they went to their home towns and villages. Those who had dutiable items had them detained while they went to their villages to get money to come and clear them. Those who



Benin-Nigeria border, May 1985: "The Nigerian authorities have not acted in the spirit of good neighborliness, ECOWAS, or the OAU"

could pay straight away paid and took their things away. Personal effects were, of course, exempted from duty.

Unfortunately, we had to receive some non-Ghanaian aliens, and contacts were made with their embassies or high commissions here through the appropriate diplomatic channels to send them home. We had to foot the bill for those who had no representation here to as far away as Sierra Leone and the Gambia. We have a few on our hands now from Tanzania and we are thinking of how to send them home. Unfortunately, they too had to run away from the wrath of the Nigerians. Even though they protested that they were not Ghanaians, they were pushed on to vehicles and driven away. Some of our nationals also found themselves in Lomé—they were pushed onto a ship bound for Togo instead of Ghana.

**Africa Report:** There were reports that the delays at the Nigerian-Benin border were due in part to the Nigerian authorities' demands for registration certificates and tax receipts for the returnees' vehicles.

**Obimpeh:** Some of the Ghanaians had acquired their own vehicles—"tro-tros"—and had been operating them in Nigeria, so they wanted to bring them home. Some of the teachers and professionals had acquired their own private cars and naturally, they wanted to bring them home. I think that when Nigeria saw the number of privately-owned vehicles that were going to go to Ghana, they changed their mind about that border, and started putting other demands in their way. They were required to show evidence of ownership: if they did so,

then evidence of police reports, and tax clearance for three years.


I want to emphasize that the Nigerians contributed to making the aliens illegal in Nigeria in no small way. They came to Ghana with vehicles and lured our teachers. There was a school where on one Saturday, all teachers boarded a vehicle and left to Nigeria because of promises of good pay, etc. And some of the Nigerian schools boast of having Ghanaian teachers to entice children. So the Nigerians themselves have contributed to this and they cannot absolve themselves from the mess they themselves have gotten into.

We feel it is not fair then if these people work hard and acquire vehicles and then they are confiscated at the border posts. And according to the stories of the returnees, tear gas was thrown into some of the vehicles and in the confusion, the Nigerian security and immigration officers went in and looted whatever they wanted and sometimes drove the cars away.

**Africa Report:** The Nigerian government strenuously denied reports of an incident at the Nigerian-Benin border in which several people were reported to have been killed by gunfire.

**Obimpeh:** On that incident, I can only relate the information we received from returnees and victims of the incident. They reported shooting and some of them reported seeing their colleagues dead. There is a man called Godigar with bullet wounds, who said when he regained consciousness in the hospital, he saw about 15 dead. There are no records, how-

## OVER 100,000 READERS EVERY WEEK...



...rely on **WEST AFRICA** magazine to bring them the news and information that matters – quickly and accurately.

Since 3 February 1917 **WEST AFRICA** has been the leading authority on West African affairs.

**WEST AFRICA** reports on events and supplies weekly valuable background information in all 25 West African nations. Coverage includes:

- ★ West African current affairs
- ★ political and economic commentaries
- ★ news and views on markets and investment opportunities
- ★ industrial and commercial information
- ★ art and culture

### ADVERTISERS

who would like details of Rates and Special Features, plus an Information leaflet and specimen copy, should contact

**STRUDE COUGHLIN ASSOCIATES,**  
112 Laurel Avenue, Larchmont, New York 10538.  
Telephone (914) 834 0228. Telex 66340.

Subscribe TODAY to

# WEST AFRICA

Complete the Coupon on the next page to receive a FREE copy or to take out a Subscription.

ever we know of about five seriously injured by bullet wounds, of whom two were admitted to a certain hospital in Lagos, but they have since been removed. The Nigerian authorities are still denying that those people ever existed, but they have been identified in the hospital. They have been removed to an unknown destination, and we are going to pursue the case to its logical conclusion.

In fact, we had the father of Sebastian Kwesa, said to have been a victim of the shooting, in our office this morning with the picture of the boy and so we are going to take appropriate steps. In a nutshell, we have enough evidence to prove that there have been some brutalities and there have been shootings at the border, and it is up to our authorities to pursue the matter further. But so far the Nigerians are still denying it.

**Africa Report:** Was the security agreement signed last December by Nigeria, Togo, Benin, and Ghana violated by the expulsions?

**Obimpeh:** Any request we made to Nigeria in the implementation of the quit order was in the spirit of Article 14 (2) of the quadripartite treaty signed on 3 December 1984. We recognize the sovereign right of Nigeria to expel illegal immigrants, but the article says before that is done, the governments concerned must be informed so that appropriate action can be taken. If they did so, it was an afterthought, after about 17 days.

Then the closure of the border! There might be security reasons behind it, but we believe it was economically moti-

vated. But I'm sure that Nigeria has more than 1 million soldiers, and they could have opened two or three border posts to enable people to get out of their country. So we think the exercise was not carried out in the spirit of the quadripartite treaty. The article also states that in the event of expulsions of illegal immigrants, "The contracting parties shall do everything to alleviate the suffering of the affected persons" and "the safety of such persons shall be guaranteed and personal effects safeguarded and returned to them."

**Africa Report:** How have Ghanaian-Nigerian relations been affected by this?

**Obimpeh:** That is a very difficult question. On the street, talking to the ordinary person. I would say relations have been strained. And but for the maturity of government officials at the regional centers who talked sense into the people, I think that we would have had some nasty incidents at marketplaces and known residences of immigrants, particularly Nigerians, just because of the brutalities, not because of the quit order. Concerning the quit order, Ghanaians are saying, "We told you that it would happen again, so come back home." So we were not so much worried about the quit order, but the impediments in the way of the willing returnees, the brutalities, the looting of their property—that had inflamed the Ghanaians and they would have retaliated. But the government of Ghana champions an African cause and we are not going to do anything that is going to detract us from the course that we have charted for ourselves. □

## The ONLY magazine that gives you first-hand news and analysis of West African affairs EVERY WEEK



### SUBSCRIPTION RATES

UNITED KINGDOM & IRISH REPUBLIC	52 weeks 26 weeks	£35.00 £17.50	
		AIRMAIL*	AIRSPEEDED*
EUROPE	52 weeks	£45.00	£40.00
	26 weeks	£22.50	£20.00
NORTH AMERICA & MIDDLE EAST	52 weeks	£50.00	£45.00
	26 weeks	£25.00	£22.50
AFRICA other than above	52 weeks	£55.00	£50.00
	26 weeks	£27.50	£25.00
U.S.A., CANADA, S.AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN	52 weeks	US\$95.00	US\$75.00
	26 weeks	US\$50.00	US\$40.00
AUSTRALASIA, FAR EAST & OTHERS	52 weeks	£60.00	£55.00
	26 weeks	£30.00	£27.50

- \* AIR MAIL direct posting from London to subscriber's address.
- \* AIR SPEEDED by air to country of subscriber and thence by internal mail.

Complete this coupon and mail it to: **West Africa**, Graybourne House, 52-54 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8LT  
Tel: 01-834 7654 Telex: 892420

- Send me a FREE COPY of West Africa.
- I enclose US\$ ..... cheque/International Money Postal Order\* for 6 months/12 months\* subscription.
- Air speeded\*     Air mail\*    \* Please check or delete

Name .....  
Occupation .....  
Address .....  
City ..... Code .....  
Country .....  
Signature ..... Date .....

# ECOWAS At Ten

The Economic Community of West African States has come to symbolize the problems plaguing efforts at regional cooperation. Because progress toward economic integration has been limited, the Community must define a new role for itself if it is to serve the needs of member-states in its second decade.

BY CAROL LANCASTER

The party to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been postponed, but not cancelled. The heads of state meeting was scheduled for May 28 to coincide with the signing of the ECOWAS treaty 10 years ago, but at the request of Nigeria and the Gambia, the meeting was postponed until the beginning of July because the earlier date coincided with Ramadan. It was also rumored that Nigeria requested a postponement so as to avoid a meeting of the heads of state so soon after it expelled thousands of illegal aliens for the second time in three years. Postponement but not cancellation has come to symbolize much of ECOWAS' efforts during its decade-long existence.

ECOWAS is the most ambitious example of economic cooperation and integration among African states thus far. It comprises 16 West African countries—Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone—ranging in size from Nigeria, with a population of 100 million, to Cape Verde, with a population of 300,000. Most of its members' economies are based on the production and export of primary products.

Whereas Nigeria and Ivory Coast have made a start in establishing their own industries and manufacture or assemble a number of products, even in these countries, most of the population

is engaged in small-scale farming. And because the ECOWAS economies are so similar—their major trading partners are Europe and North America—less than 5 percent of their trade is with the other member countries.

ECOWAS is not the first or only experiment in regional economic integration in West Africa. A number of other institutions aimed at political and economic integration have been attempted since independence. Even now, six Francophone countries—Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Mauritania—are members of the Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) and three—Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia—are members of the Mano River Union.

These organizations and others like them in other parts of Africa derive from a condition common throughout the continent—economies which are small, underdeveloped, and often resource-poor. Twelve countries in sub-Saharan Africa have populations of less than 6 million and half of those have populations below 2 million. Their domestic markets are even smaller than their population size suggests, since only a small percentage of people are in the money economy.

With a small economic base, the options for development, particularly based on manufacturing and industrialization, are limited. And, in addition to limited economic prospects, these small countries remain powerless vis-à-vis the larger ones, multinational corporations, and international financial institutions.

The limited economic prospects and political fragility of many African countries have produced a number of attempts throughout the continent at creating larger economic and political unions. Most of these have failed, the most spectacular example of which was the collapse of the East African Community between Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania in 1977. However, the dream of economic union was given new life in the Lagos Plan of Action, drawn up by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and supported by the heads of state of the Organization of African Unity at their summit in Lagos in 1980.

The Lagos Plan of Action calls for the formation of an integrated African Economic Community by the year 2000, based on smaller, sub-regional economic units such as ECOWAS. The ECA has been actively promoting the formation of such unions and several additional ones, such as the Preferential Trade Area for East and Southern Africa and the Economic Community of Central African States, have been created.

The recurring African dream of economic and political union is only one reason—and probably not the most important one—for the creation of ECOWAS. ECOWAS is in large measure a result of Nigerian diplomacy in the early 1970s, aimed at developing closer relationships with Francophone countries (which had been strained during the Biafran conflict when Ivory Coast recognized Biafra), at reducing French influence in West Africa, and at expanding markets for Nige-

*Carol Lancaster is director of African studies at Georgetown University.*

rian industrial products. Nigeria doubtless saw the continuing French presence in the region as an obstacle in expanding its own influence and obtaining wider markets for its products.

establishment of a common external tariff and the free movement of goods, persons, and capital within ECOWAS. The creation of a common market was intended to stimulate investment, trade,

movement of persons reflects some of the real problems faced by member-states in realizing the goals of ECOWAS. The ECOWAS treaty states that all citizens of ECOWAS should have the right to visit, establish residence, and set up businesses in any member-state.

The protocol enacting this provision postponed the right to set up residence or business and permitted citizens of ECOWAS states the right to visit member countries for only 90 days without visas. After five years, citizens of ECOWAS would be permitted to establish residence in other member countries. A further five years must pass before ECOWAS citizens can set up businesses in member-states. The period during which ECOWAS citizens are permitted to set up residence in other member-states is due to begin this July. But few are optimistic that members are prepared to recognize this right. The arrangements in the protocol reflect Nigeria's well-grounded fears that a free movement of citizens in ECOWAS will result in an influx of labor from other poorer member-states.

ECOWAS faced other immediate problems. The Fund and the Secretariat were slow in becoming operational due to a dispute over whether the executive secretary had authority over the managing director of the Fund. The issue was finally resolved after several years when the first managing director of the Fund was removed and authority was clearly delegated to the executive secretary. The problems of these two organs of the Community working together are not eased by the location of the Fund in Lomé and the secretariat in Lagos, with the head of one a Francophone, and the other, an Anglophone.

Other problems faced by ECOWAS in its first 10 years of operation were described very frankly in a recent report by its outgoing executive secretary, Aboubakar Diaby-Ouattara, and include continuing uncertainty about the relationship between the Fund and the secretariat. Ouattara points out that smooth working relationships between the two still depend on personalities—a risky arrangement.

Thus far, the two new heads of the secretariat and the Fund, Alhaji Momodu Munu and Alhaji Mahanta Fall, appear to have established a good working



Margaret A. Novicki

**Millet growing in northern Ghana: "Most of the population of ECOWAS countries is engaged in small-scale farming"**

Nigerian proposals to establish a new regional economic union initially received relatively little support. With the exception of Togo, Francophone states were cool to the idea. Indeed, Nigerian efforts to obtain support for ECOWAS and the fear of growing Nigerian influence, particularly among Francophone countries, appeared to have spurred those countries on to establish a common market of their own, the CEAO, referred to earlier.

It took several years of careful Nigerian diplomacy and pressure (including resource transfers in the form of concessionally priced petroleum, investments in various development projects, loans, grants, and trade concessions) for other West African countries to finally agree to join ECOWAS. On May 28, 1975, the treaty creating ECOWAS was signed by 15 heads of government. (When Cape Verde split from Guinea-Bissau, it became the sixteenth member of the group.)

ECOWAS aimed at full integration of members' markets within a 15-year period, beginning in 1977. External tariffs were to be frozen first, followed by a reduction on tariffs on goods produced within the Community, and finally the

and self-reliant development among member-states.

It was recognized that the poorer countries would be the least likely to benefit from membership in the Community. They would lose revenues as they lowered their tariffs and would probably not benefit from new investment. The Fund for Cooperation, Compensation, and Development was set up with \$50 million in paid capital and another \$450 million in callable capital, to compensate those countries losing revenues and to finance specific development projects in member-states, particularly those designed to promote regional integration.

Unfortunately, ECOWAS got off to a slow start after the signing of the treaty in 1975. The treaty did not enter into force until a year and a half later, when the protocols enacting the treaty were discussed and approved by the heads of state. The protocols included definitions of Community products, regulations governing the re-export of goods produced in third countries, member contributions, and regulations governing the free movement of persons and the operation of the Fund.

The protocol governing the free

relationship. A related problem has been the strict enforcement of geographical quotas in the appointment of ECOWAS staff at all levels. Ouattara complains that this has made appointments "unduly political," has led to the hiring of some "sub-standard staff," and has complicated the process of promotion and dismissal.

A more serious problem is the failure of member-states to pay their contributions to ECOWAS. In the words of Ouattara: "On 31 December 1984, the contributions to the secretariat budget from member-states outstanding, accumulated since 1978, stood at \$9,767,053. This meant only 50 percent of the total 1984 annual budget had been paid up; only two member-states had paid in full their 1984 allocations and had no arrears from earlier years. Only five member-states had honored their ECOWAS secretariat budget obligations at the end of 1983. Half of our member-states still owe arrears from 1982, three of them from 1980, and one member-state has made virtually no payments since 1978."

Although Ouattara did not mention it, members have not fully paid up their contributions to the Fund either. However, the shortfall does not appear as great as that facing the secretariat.

The problem of members' failure to pay assessed contributions is not unique to ECOWAS. There are more than 30 intergovernmental organizations in West Africa alone, and some countries belong to as many as 25 and are expected to contribute to each of them. Most of these organizations appear to be suffering from financial problems, as are most member governments. Nevertheless, ECOWAS is among the most prominent and the failure of members to pay even half of their commitments not only presents serious constraints to the organization's activities, but also suggests ECOWAS' low priority in member-states' budgetary decisions.

As serious as these problems are for ECOWAS, they are not the most troubling. Where the least progress has been made is in implementing decisions by the Community, particularly in the area of trade liberalization.

The commencement of the 15-year schedule contained in the ECOWAS treaty for liberalization of trade of Com-

munity products and the erection of a common external tariff was first postponed by two years, from 1977 to 1979. There has been little apparent progress in dismantling trade barriers since then. The obstacle to progress in trade liberalization most frequently cited is the existence of the CEAO and, to a lesser extent, the Mano River Union.

Both organizations have asked to be relieved from treaty obligations to provide most favored nation status to all ECOWAS members. Since CEAO members have already made progress in liberalizing their tariffs on trade with one another, granting most favored nation treatment to all of ECOWAS (and proceeding with ECOWAS' tariff liberalization schedule) would disadvantage them and undermine the CEAO. Other members have argued that they cannot be expected to proceed with trade liberalization if the six CEAO countries maintain a preferential trade grouping with ECOWAS and do not proceed with broader liberalization themselves.

An agreement was reached in 1983 on a liberalization scheme which was acceptable to all ECOWAS heads of state, but CEAO countries apparently later rejected this scheme as well. The problem of integrating the CEAO into ECOWAS is now being further studied by the ECA and a final report with recommendations is expected later this year.

In reality, the existence of the CEAO is not the real obstacle to tariff liberalization in ECOWAS. In addition to unease on the part of the smaller states and the Francophones about the potential for economic and political domination of the Community by Nigeria, there are real problems facing any government attempting to liberalize its trade. Reducing tariffs on Community products brings with it a host of potential costs: It can lead to a reduction in government revenues at a time when most ECOWAS governments are hard-pressed for funds.

Liberalization may also threaten domestic producers who cannot compete with producers in neighboring countries. Trade patterns could change, leaving some countries with deficits and others holding unwanted, inconvertible currencies. While the costs of trade liberalization can be immediate and substantial, the benefits, particularly during

a period of economic stress, are long-term and uncertain.

One of the principal benefits of larger markets is the increased foreign and domestic investment such markets will stimulate. But such new investment is often slow in coming and tends to concentrate in a few places. Within ECOWAS, the incentives for additional foreign investment are further limited by the requirement that products eligible for free trade within ECOWAS be produced in firms which by 1989 have 51 percent indigenous ownership of capital. The advantages of this requirement for Nigerian businesses, many of which are majority Nigerian-owned, and the disadvantages for businesses in Francophone countries, many of which are largely French-owned, have been strongly criticized by Francophone members of ECOWAS.

In short, the risks and costs of trade liberalization, heightened by serious economic problems in many countries, plus the restrictive rules of origin of Community products, would probably be sufficient to delay or discourage trade liberalization even without the existence of a CEAO or a Mano River Union.

The failure to implement ECOWAS commitments is not restricted to trade liberalization, but it has also applied to the protocols enacting and extending the treaty which the heads of state have approved over the past decade. Of the 11 protocols thus far approved by the heads of state, only two have been ratified by the required minimum of seven member governments and have come into force—the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, permitting 90-day visits for ECOWAS citizens to other member countries, and the Third Party Vehicle Assurance Scheme. Most of the other protocols have yet to be submitted to or ratified by member governments.

These problems reflect a fundamental difficulty faced by experiments like ECOWAS. Governments are understandably reluctant to bear the economic costs of trade liberalization and integration without commensurate benefits to offset them. However, there is one very important exception where the benefits of an integration scheme are diplomatic or political.

In the early 1970s, under the leader-



ship of Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria initially promoted ECOWAS for strongly political reasons, whereas the governments which followed were less interested in doing so. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo's government moved away from an activist diplomacy in the region. The Shagari government of the late 1970s and early 1980s was absorbed largely with domestic issues. Today, the Buhari government's attention is focused on Nigeria's very serious economic problems. Without Nigerian efforts and resources and with apparently lukewarm

ECOWAS Fund. As part of a plan to construct a Trans-West Africa Highway running from Nouakchott to Lagos, the ECOWAS Fund has made loans to Benin to help fund the construction of two bridges. The Fund has also authorized loans for construction of the Freetown-Monrovia road and funded other studies of roads linking ECOWAS capitals. In the area of agriculture, ECOWAS financed feasibility studies identifying sites for regional seed multiplication and livestock breeding centers.

Anticipating the technical difficulties

Association, and has sponsored ECOWAS games and soccer competitions.

ECOWAS' past problems and achievements point to the dangers and the opportunities facing the Community in its second decade. Without a substantial increase in the amount of active support provided to ECOWAS by major states in West Africa, including Nigeria and Ivory Coast, it is unlikely that significant progress will be made toward trade liberalization and the creation of a common market. Signs of such active support are not evident today. In the absence of real progress toward trade liberalization, ECOWAS will have to create another role for itself if it is to survive for another 10 years. The opportunities here are clear.

The organization can focus its energies on creating the preconditions for integration by promoting projects like those in communications and transport which are essential if intra-Community trade is to expand. However, to move in this direction, ECOWAS will have to reorient its focus and its staff and obtain larger amounts of funding from developed countries or international financial institutions like the World Bank or the African Development Bank.

The EEC has already promised funding for the second stage of a telecommunications project, but a larger number of viable projects and donors must be identified. By moving in this direction, ECOWAS would come to resemble the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, which has put aside goals of regional integration to concentrate on developing regional projects and obtaining funding for them.

The danger which ECOWAS faces in the coming decade is that it dissipates its energies in creating more regional organizations, in sponsoring minor activities, in engaging in largely symbolic events, in continuing to take decisions on issues such as monetary union upon which governments are unprepared to act, and finally, in enlarging its own bureaucracy. If the dream of self-reliant development and eventual economic union in West Africa is not to be postponed indefinitely, it will be up to member governments and to the ECOWAS staff itself to identify activities which ECOWAS can realistically accomplish and which will contribute to economic progress in the region. □



Steve Mannes

**Iron mining, Sierra Leone: "With a small economic base, the options for development, particularly based on manufacturing and industrialization, are limited"**

support for ECOWAS elsewhere in West Africa (and even some resistance to the goals of the Community among Francophone countries), it is hard to see how progress will be made on the basic objective of creating a common market.

With all of its postponements, ECOWAS has some modest achievements to point to during its decade of existence. The first stage of the Pan-African Telecommunications Project, linking West African capitals, is already underway at a cost of \$12.5 million financed by the

involved in trade liberalization, ECOWAS has also drawn up common customs documents. Additionally, a number of studies have been funded in areas where the Community hopes to make progress in the future, such as in regional agricultural development and monetary union. Finally, ECOWAS has promoted the creation of a number of regional organizations, including the Organization of Trade Unions of West Africa, the West African Youth Organization, and the West African Universities

# Sudan After Nimeiry

For the ruling military council, the warfare in the south remains the most intractable problem. Despite the new regime's conciliatory gestures to the rebels and rapprochement with Libya and Ethiopia, the divisions sown by Nimeiry's policies have yet to be healed, leaving Sudan's future no less uncertain.

BY CAROL BERGER

**W**hen former President Gaafar al-Nimeiry was ousted in a bloodless coup on April 6, 1985, the Sudanese had good reason to rejoice, for a nation rich in Arab and African culture had increasingly become shackled by Nimeiry's desperate state security apparatus. The president's routine exploitation of traditional divisions had insured his continued power, but it also left scars on the nation that may take generations to heal.

Over the past year, rampant inflation and the scarcity of basic commodities and fuel had heightened unrest among the nation's urban population. Famine in northern and western Sudan now threatens the lives of more than half a million people. The thousands who migrated to the capital's twin city of Omdurman and urban areas to the south were largely forced to return to their desertified home regions in the months preceding Nimeiry's overthrow. It was left to the city's professionals and educated elite to paralyze the nation's communications and set the scene for the near anarchy which led to the April takeover by Nimeiry's appointed minister of defense, Maj.-Gen. Abdul Rahman Sawar-Dahab.

Nimeiry, who took power in a coup 16 years earlier, appears destined to

*Carol Berger has recently returned from Sudan where she reported for The Times of London, the BBC World and Africa Services, The Economist, and other publications and news services.*



Richard Hoffman/Sygma

**Maj.-Gen. Abdul Rahman Sawar-Dahab "took charge only after his generals threatened to take power amid the capital city's growing anarchy"**

slip—like so many former despots—into a quiet Egyptian exile. The people of Sudan will be spared his evidently impaired national vision and, as some have described them, his "bursts of religious dementia."

But, like a morning-after hangover, a more cautious, even frustrated air has settled over the country after the spon-

taneous celebrations which followed his downfall. The seemingly intractable problems which faced Sudan under Nimeiry have not abated with his removal.

Since the coup, more than 38 political parties have been registered in northern Sudan, although no more than five will have significant influence. Of the five—Sadiq al-Mahdi's Umma party, the Khattmiyya sect's Unionists, the Communists, the Iraqi-backed Baathists, and the Muslim Brotherhood—the Umma party is expected to gain the largest support from the more than 15 million northern Sudanese.

When the 15-man military council first took power, it pledged that a one-year interim period would be followed by free elections. Given opposing political views in the north, the south's instability, and Sudan's debt of more than \$9 billion, the generals have every reason to delay the transition. High-level Sudanese have few illusions about the possibility of open elections in 1986, and have referred to the timespan as inadequate for a return to any form of democratic rule.

The transition faces its biggest challenge from conditions in southern Sudan. The rebel leader, Col. John Garang, has not budged since his first reaction to the coup, and regardless of his earlier stated goal of overthrowing Nimeiry, his vigilance has not lessened. The new regime, he says, is nothing more than "new Nimeiry-ism." If the military was to hand over power to

northern politicians while the south remained in a virtual state of war, the results could be disastrous.

The predominant attitude among northern politicians, reflecting little understanding of the region, is that the south represents a single interest group. Not surprisingly, many northerners have grown impatient with what they perceive as the poor performance of many southern politicians, and there is a desire to address the problems facing northern Sudan in isolation to the south.

Until as late as 1981, Nimeiry's strongest power base was in southern Sudan. It was there, as the deliverer of peace in 1972, that he achieved the greatest success of his 16-year rule. The bitter civil war which pitted the Muslim north against the Christian-animist south from 1955 to 1972 claimed the lives of untold thousands. The south, where the fighting took place, was denied much-needed development aid and tens of thousands of southerners fled across the border into Uganda and Kenya. Peace came with the granting of regional autonomy and promises of development under the Addis Ababa Agreement. For the black Africans of the south, Nimeiry represented a bridge between the two conflicting cultures.

It was for this reason, as Nimeiry's rule became increasingly oppressive, that many northern Sudanese came to refer to the south as "the rock around our necks." As long as the south was

firmly committed to Nimeiry's leadership, the north would have only a slim chance of removing him. Secret police were stationed throughout the nation but, unlike in the north, the south enjoyed some political freedoms, and the party system continued unofficially.

By his adept handling of political groups in the north, Nimeiry became known as "the juggler" and "the survivor." Countless coup attempts failed to dislodge him. The most serious of these was in 1971 when a Soviet-backed plot erupted into street warfare in Khartoum. The leaders of the coup were duly executed and the once-powerful Communist Party was forced underground. With its intellectuals either imprisoned or killed, the party never recovered.

Shortly after the coup attempt, Nimeiry left his socialist allies and turned to the United States for both economic and military assistance. In the 1980s, that relationship became notably strained as the president pushed through the controversial decrees of southern redivision—removing privileges won under the Addis Ababa Agreement—and the imposition of an Islamic penal code.

The redivision angered the majority Nilotic peoples of the south, while the new penal code jeopardized the religious freedom of all Sudanese. In December 1983, three months after the introduction of Islamic law, the first of several hundred citizens lost his right hand for committing the crime of petty theft.

From late 1983 until only a few months before Nimeiry's ouster, Islamic law was used as a tool to brutally repress political dissent and to further splinter any sense of unity within the urban population. In January 1985, a 76-year-old religious leader, Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, was hanged on charges of "heresy." An international outcry over his execution followed. American officials said they had no control over their irrational ally. The country's order had succumbed to the fanatical and excessive dictates of a discredited police force and secret service.

Maj.-Gen. James Loro, from the southern-most Equatoria region, is one of the 15 men now ruling Sudan. But only months earlier, he was commander of the Juba garrison in his home region. His wife was flogged for alleged liquor

possession while in Khartoum. Fearing the general would cause unrest following the beating, Nimeiry ordered him transferred to Khartoum. There, amid the thousands of secret police employed to monitor the lives of students, professionals, government members, and foreigners, he could be kept under wraps. Such transfers to Khartoum became routine in the last years of Nimeiry's rule.

Maj.-Gen. Loro was recently named chairman of the Southern Region's High Executive Council (HEC). Although wholly appointed by the northern regime, the HEC is one step toward including the south in the current post-coup renewal. For many Equatorians, however, a return to central rule from the HEC in Juba is seen as a retrograde step. Rather than reverting to the administrative system used under Nimeiry, they have called for major changes to allow for more local governance.

The continued resistance of rebel leader John Garang should not come as a surprise. The new Sudanese leader, Gen. Sawar-Dahab, was Nimeiry's former minister of defense. His former close relationship with the deposed president concerns not only the militant southern Sudanese, but also Garang's main supporters—Libya and Ethiopia.

In 1981, when southern Sudanese dissidents known as the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) made their first uncertain visits to Tripoli and Addis Ababa, they were well aware that their needs would be exploited by Nimeiry's enemies. But at the same time they would receive arms, training at Ethiopia's main military base, and permission to use a land corridor between Ethiopia and southern Sudan. They hoped to achieve a higher degree of independence from their paymasters later, but that has not happened. Ethiopia, in particular, has wielded a sometimes heavy hand with the southern rebels. Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi says his support for the rebels ended with the overthrow of Nimeiry.

The Ethiopian influence can explain in part Garang's insistence for the past two years that the struggle is one of national liberation and not a purely southern separatist movement. After all, it was the go-ahead from Ethiopia

## The Black Resource Guide

A National Black Directory

1985 Edition / Hard Cover

An Enormously valuable aid in a wide range of Afro-American applications. This book is immediately useful. It lists over 2,600 nationally known black organizations, institutions, businesses, and public figures. It also includes the latest census data and health statistics on Blacks.

To order *The Black Resource Guide*, please enclose a check or money order for \$25.00 (includes postage and handling); for 1st class delivery add \$3.00. Make all checks payable to *Black Resource Guide, Inc.*, 501 Oneida Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20011; (202) 291-4373.



that helped Garang's rise to leadership and the eventual liquidation of at least three of his rival southerners. While the southern Sudanese unrest is a convenient wedge between Ethiopia and the Khartoum regime, its value as a national movement has been as a cosmetic means of illustrating the general discontent of both north and south.

Libya was the first nation to recognize the new regime. They, like everyone else, well know that Gen. Sawar-Dahab was an unwilling participant in the coup, taking charge only after his generals threatened to take power amid the capital city's growing anarchy. For Libya, the sudden explosion of political activity comes as a golden opportunity. It is rumored that they, like the Iraqis, have entered Sudan with ample funds for political organizing. For at least the near future, there will be room in the north for a rebuilding of alliances and power bases.

As Nimeiry's successors, the new military leaders will attempt to distance themselves from the overt American support Nimeiry enjoyed. Libya's enthusiastic welcome of the coup ensured this, if only as a short-term measure. The joint military exercises, part of the Operation Bright Star series, that were scheduled to take place between U.S. and Sudanese troops in August are unlikely to be held now. But the U.S. can afford to be patient.

Most observers describe the new regime as "naive" in its haste to normalize relations with Libya and Ethiopia. In the first heady weeks of returning dissidents and reconciliation, one could not ignore the presence of a distinct air of suspicion. Egypt, Sudan's defense pact partner, began disseminating critical information about Libya only days after the celebrated return of Sudanese exiles from Tripoli. While distribution of Qaddafi's *Green Book* began in earnest, Egyptian military sources talked of Libyan arms entering Sudan from both its western and eastern borders. It is an unlikely charge, but indicative of the Egyptian mood—the Libyan influence in Khartoum should be short-lived.

Ethiopia, in fact, poses the greater challenge. Libya is easily discredited. The two countries say all aid to the southern rebels has been cut, but few believe them. Ethiopia remains the big

prize in the East-West competition for influence in the Horn. The U.S. welcomes a rapprochement between Sudan and Ethiopia. The loud criticisms of Ethiopian policy made by George Bush on his pre-coup visit to Sudan have quickly died out. The much-touted "cross-border operation" to provide rebel-held areas in northern Ethiopia

SPLA, already fraught with tribal splits, would further break apart. The inevitable result would be accelerated violence against southern civilians and their displacement by the rebels. If atrocities took place, the northern-led army might feel pushed to wage a counter-attack. But to do that, the army would require support that they currently lack. They



**Presidents Reagan and Nimeiry: "Nimeiry left his socialist allies and turned to the United States for both economic and military assistance"**

with food has never quite begun. Many in Sudan wonder how far U.S. policy toward Ethiopia can diverge from U.S. actions.

If real negotiations between the two were successful, they would lead to greater stability in both northern Ethiopia and southern Sudan. But Eritrean and Tigréan rebels in northern Sudan are far less vulnerable to diplomatic shifts than the southern Sudanese based in Ethiopia's Gambela area. The southerners have no known sources of support other than Libya and Ethiopia. The Eritreans and Tigréans, however, rely on a well-established network including North America, Europe, and most importantly, the Gulf states.

The Ethiopians have more to offer than the new regime in Khartoum. The southerners could be starved out, sent back inside Sudanese territory, and left to manage at a time when food shortages are affecting parts of all three southern regions.

Without a base of operations, the

are poorly armed, poorly trained, often underfed, and not surprisingly, demoralized.

The SPLA has warned of a coming offensive. The most likely area of attack is the border region of the Upper Nile. Although the army is in strong force there, so is the SPLA. Whatever victory they achieve could well be pyrrhic however. The SPLA has virtually run out of strategic targets since its devastating series of attacks on the Jonglei Canal project and on oil exploration sites.

Many parts of the Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal regions have been reduced to the control of "war lords." Taking advantage of their relative nonalignment, they have in some cases received backing from the national army to harass the SPLA. One can only wonder how the north will respond. Indifference can only lead to the total loss of the vital development projects there and the further breakdown in the lives of southerners. □

# The West African Beat

Western press coverage of the Third World is often limited to the sensational and the tragic. While American journalists complain of being frustrated by technical and political constraints, their African counterparts maintain that the Western media should focus more attention on the challenges of African economic development.

BY NICHOLAS N. GOUEDE

On April 17, 1984, the four-month-old military government of Nigeria issued a tough new law granting itself the power to close down newspapers and radio and television stations that were deemed to be acting in a manner detrimental to the interests of the government.

It also assumed the power to imprison journalists for giving too much publicity to anti-government speeches of politicians who had fled abroad and for making inaccurate reports that exposed government officials to ridicule. The regime subsequently jailed five journalists and intimidated many others, both foreigners and Nigerians.

Six months later, Thomas Sankara, President of Burkina Faso, was in New York City to address the 39th UN General Assembly. During his visit, he expressed dismay to a group of black journalists that the current economic adjustment efforts by West African nations would probably not be fairly reported to American readers. He urged the journalists to do everything in their power to see that the news media pays attention to African problems. "If you do not," Sankara said, "you are part of the conspiracy as well."

These two incidents illustrate the tensions and paradoxes implicit in the relationship between the foreign media

*A native of Ivory Coast, Nicholas N. Gouede is a graduate of the Columbia University School of Journalism. He was a Dag Hammarskjöld Fellow covering the 1981 UN General Assembly for Radio Ivory Coast International.*

and West African nations. On the one hand, a free press as it exists in the United States is virtually unknown in West Africa and other Third World countries, where governments constantly hinder the reporting of both local and foreign journalists. The harassment prevents newsmen from writing freely about African issues. On the other hand, West African nations feel ill-served by the foreign media, which they say distorts the story of their growth and development or fails to report it at all.

Both African journalists and many American reporters who specialize in African affairs point to the overwhelming dominance of American and Western European media in West Africa and the way it distorts African issues. American news reports are focused on the failures of West African nations, they say, rather than on important socio-economic events.

"Where is the Western media's coverage of the largest hydroelectric scheme to have been launched in Angola since independence?" demands Cesaire Pooda, a journalist for *Le Carrefour Africain*, a weekly based in Ouagadougou. The Western media focuses on droughts and famine, while ignoring or paying little attention to the daily struggles of West African nations to overcome poverty, hunger, and illiteracy, Pooda complained, noting that stories reaching American readers usually portray African countries in bleak or desperate circumstances.

For at least a decade, African and other Third World nations have been

voicing these complaints and challenging the West's monopoly over world news. They have called for a "new world information order," which would end the dominance of the Western press over news flowing in and out of Africa and the rest of the Third World. In reality, the debate over the order is a North-South issue, a fundamental question of how the South can solve its development problems and how, with assistance from the North, it can manage its information resources to aid in this struggle.

The primary forum for debate over the new order has been the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). But proposals made in UNESCO have incensed the Western media, which believes that the UN agency wants to impose a code of conduct on journalists and bring the media under government control.

African journalists say that the supposed custodians of press freedom, such as the U.S. and British governments, have imposed restrictions on journalists during crises such as the Grenada and Falkland operations that conflict with their own standards of press freedom, defended in the UNESCO forum. They maintain that these examples illustrate that no nation is immune from the temptation to muzzle the press.

## Through a Western Lens

The American press does more than convey information to the American public. It also funnels the news and values of the Western world back to West

Africa and other regions of the developing world. Stories on the region are sent from correspondents to American news centers, where they are edited before being returned to West African readers and listeners. Thus, West Africa often learns of news about itself or other African nations from Western cities such as New York, London, and Paris. Not only is this clearly inefficient, but it means news is refracted through a Western "lens"—a lens that may, for example, transform a courageous "freedom fighter" into a clandestine "terrorist."

Complaints about distortion are based not only on the choice of story topics and on editing in Western newsrooms, but also on the frequent failure to provide the background necessary to explain the significance of the events. While the coup that brought Maj.-Gen. Muhammadu Buhari to power in Nigeria received some attention in the news media, the nature of the coverage seemed woefully inadequate for a story that was to affect tens of thousands of people.

"A coup is usually covered in bloody detail, but coverage of the conditions creating the coup is surprisingly sparse," said Lawrence Ukwu, the UN correspondent for the News Agency of Nigeria. Because the daily news diet of most mainstream American papers lacks "non-breaking" background stories, American readers are ill-prepared to receive information concerning a crisis when it does erupt.

Critics bemoan not only the distorted substance of coverage, but also the limited amount of news that reaches the U.S. The abbreviated picture presented to American readers distorts the significance of events by suggesting that little of importance happens in Africa. While news of Latin America and Western Europe periodically finds its way to the front pages, West African news is buried deep within the paper.

The problem starts with the lack of resources devoted to coverage of Africa. John Darnton, deputy foreign editor of *The New York Times*, says the rising cost of maintaining journalists overseas has shrunk the pool of American newspapers generating their news from Africa. "It costs over \$200,000 a year to keep a correspondent in Africa," Darnton says. The *Times* has only four

correspondents covering Africa—not many for coverage of an entire continent, but more than any other U.S. newspaper. Darnton said that rising costs have also reduced the space allotted to foreign news of any kind, news that competes for space with national and local stories.

Darnton, who traveled throughout Africa as a correspondent for *The New York Times*, also pointed to the difficulties arising from the state of the African communications systems. While the telecommunications infrastructure is taken for granted as an essential component of the sophisticated information systems in the U.S., in most African countries it is not adequate to sustain even essential services.

In many areas of sub-Saharan Africa, there is no system at all. High-speed technology is expensive to install and, in any case, transport and communications lines are inadequate to maintain it, Darnton said. While some countries have made impressive progress, many others will need extensive foreign assistance to establish telephone lines, telex services, and direct broadcast satellites.

Another serious difficulty is that American editors are often ignorant about African affairs or are simply uninterested. In this respect, they differ from French and British editors, whose countries had colonial ties with Africa, and whose reporters serve longer stints on the continent. The American news

media generally prefers that its reporters serve short terms abroad, fearing that longer stays would result in reporters becoming too emotionally involved in the areas they cover.

This revolving door policy contributes to superficial coverage. American reporters do not acquire the necessary expertise and perception to improve their understanding of political and cultural events, which are often rooted in the bitter times of colonial rule or even farther back in history. American editors also are ignorant of the historical context of news from Africa. Critics argue that increasing the number of journalists in Africa will not improve coverage as long as editors are selecting stories about nations whose names they do not even know.

### The Paradox

The problem, however, cannot be blamed entirely on the American media. African governments usually pay lip service to the fundamental concept of press freedom, sometimes through constitutional guarantees. But about 90 percent of African governments deny basic press freedoms, according to a ranking official of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). This situation is related in part to the fact that governments run most newspapers as well as radio and television stations.

West African governments also exert control over foreign correspondents



Mobil broadcasting unit, Sierra Leone: "Many West African journalists advocate government-run national news agencies"

Margaret A. Novick



Joseph Margolis

**Liberian television: "While the telecommunications infrastructure is taken for granted in the West, in most African countries it is not adequate to sustain even essential services"**

through denial of transmitting facilities, difficulties in covering rural areas, or even in some cases police detention. Some countries like Guinea or Benin formerly banned foreign correspondents on principle, and reporters have been refused visas to others.

If they succeed in entering a country, reporters then risk being thrown out for writing unfavorable stories about the government. An OAU official estimated that over 100 foreign journalists have been expelled from African countries during the last decade. This denial of press freedom occurred even in Nigeria, a country that was regarded as the best example of modern democracy in Africa, and where an independent critical press has flourished over the years. The military government that seized power at the close of 1983 took strong measures against the press, with the result that journalists now speak candidly from within Nigeria only without by-lines.

Certainly, a paradox does exist. West African nations and other developing countries that call for a freer flow of information invariably restrict that flow through limitations on the freedom of both local and foreign journalists.

What is the outlook for improving American and other Western media coverage of Africa in the next decade? Nate Polowetzky, a foreign correspondent for 12 years and now the foreign editor of Associated Press, said the nature of

foreign news is changing. "I believe that most journalists assigned overseas nowadays are better prepared than in the past," Polowetzky said. "No correspondent goes abroad for the AP without absolute fluency in the language of the country to which he has been assigned."

Edward Butler, deputy foreign editor of AP, said that American press coverage of the Third World—at least coverage by the wire services—is not as inadequate as it is made out to be. "Africa's drought and famine has been one of AP's most dramatic continuing stories for more than a decade," he said. He acknowledges that there have been deficiencies, but insists that coverage is improving. AP has recently expanded its bureaus to eight major African cities. The world's largest news agency has also increased its staff by hiring local stringers, and is now filing more stories on Africa—about 228 in 1984, as compared to 101 in 1983.

In addition, the nature of the stories has been changing, he said. "We cover all aspects of life in Africa, providing the necessary background about such issues as agricultural projects, literacy campaigns, birth control, and climatic conditions. Not only is the correspondent expected to report on a regional meeting of the West African Economic Community, but he's got to tell how decisions agreed upon affect the lives of coffee or cocoa farmers in Ghana or the Ivory Coast, for example."

Even if Western wire services improve their coverage, as Polowetzky and Butler insist is happening, the news flow may still be unbalanced. The development of more sophisticated communications infrastructures, including the establishment or improvement of independent or national news agencies in Africa, is also required. Through the generation of news by Africans themselves, reporting the views of all sides, the present coverage can be improved.

Many West African journalists advocate government-run national news agencies, since the private sector in many African nations lacks the necessary resources to establish news outlets, or is prohibited from doing so on ideological grounds.

American journalists, however, are concerned that national news agencies will become the sole source of news and will limit their coverage to merely relaying government propaganda. In general, Americans oppose the principle that the press should be used as another tool, along with health care services, agricultural agencies, and educational systems, to further the goals of national development and to bring about socioeconomic change.

The relations between Western journalists and Third World nations embody strong contradictions. Inspired by models of reporting that have helped bring down governments, American reporters often seek out stories of social inequity. Many believe that the concept of "developmental journalism" implicitly furthers the aims of the ruling class. Some maintain that in a one-party state, the press becomes an arm of government and a vehicle for stifling legitimate opposition.

They also fear that government-run news agencies would eventually subject all media representatives to the dictates of national press coverage policies and that cooperation in furthering development goals would be enforced by censorship of stories critical of governments.

Frank Brown, associate editor of *Black Enterprise*, an American monthly magazine, has called for the black American press to be more receptive to the development needs and problems of African peoples. The American media

"should be committed to doing analytical stories about the continent that has and continues to see so much suffering, much of which is due to the policy of the U.S. and other Western countries," Brown said.

"It is extremely important to have a vigilant black American press that will take upon itself the responsibility to present fair information about what is happening to their brothers and sisters in Africa, in the same way that we see the Jewish press covering Israel or other ethnic groups covering countries of their heritage," he said.

While such proposals for improving the news flow are being advanced, Pat Orvis, formerly UN correspondent for the now-defunct Chicago Sun-Times News Service and currently a UN-based columnist focusing on developing countries, disagrees with American editors who claim that Americans are not interested in news about Africa because they cannot connect it to their daily lives. "By allowing American readers to see Africans as fellow human beings across the Atlantic, their interest in the story [is] enlivened," said Orvis, who speaks from a decade of experience in covering Third World development.

She suggested that coverage could be improved if newspapers and magazines created a daily or weekly section for news of West Africa and other developing countries, much as they do now for business, fashion, and food news. This would allow papers to break out of the routine of daily hard news coverage and provide the necessary analysis on socio-economic issues.

American journalists and their editors and publishers share a duty to their readers to go beyond the daily news from Africa and the rest of the Third World. They should educate themselves. Monique Rubens, an American freelance writer based in New York, who covers the UN for Gemini News Service and *West Africa*, a London-based weekly, said "West African nations and their political systems need to be understood, not solely against a measure of the present political and social system of the U.S., as many news media and correspondents tend to do, but against the perspective of the historical evolution of these countries." □

The need for better coverage can no longer be ignored. African journalists are justified in asserting that the Western press in general and the American press in particular have been for the most part indifferent to their development struggles. Their charges are substantially correct: Western reporters are guilty of what they call "instantaneous journalism," and a desire to titillate their readers, listeners, and viewers with quirky or sensational anecdotes that do not reflect the wider reality of a developing nation.

For the most part, newpeople in the West have not been aggressive in showing that they are interested in the problems of Africa. Western journalists should not stop advocating the benefits of a free press in keeping the African nation informed about itself and the world informed about the African nation. They should join in finding ways and means to evaluate the wisdom of government policy and publicize the needs of African people to Western readers.

On the other hand, West African nations should see that placing barriers in the way of Western coverage results in the loss of a valuable perspective, just as the West suffers by not having an African or Third World perspective on world events transmitted through the news media. Contrary to their often-held belief, control of the press does not create political stability in the long run. Conversely, a free press provides the forum for national debate on development issues.

African leaders must realize that news should not consist only of stories that glorify their policies or themselves. They should regard telecommunications as a complement to other investments and an essential component in the development process which can raise productivity and efficiency in other sectors and enhance the quality of life. They should be encouraged to recognize how their own repressive press policies not only keep Western journalists from telling their story, but also hinder the growth of a healthy indigenous press which could compete with Western news media, adding a new dimension to reports from this important part of the world. □

## Arms and the African

*Military Influences on Africa's International Relations*

edited by William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen

In this important book, six noted Africanists examine key aspects of Africa's militarization and consider its implications for U.S. foreign policy. Topics include Africa in the strategic calculations of the superpowers, Soviet and French involvement in Africa's military



affairs, the increasingly political role of the army in South Africa, and the effect of the spread of military regimes in Africa on the international behavior of African states. \$22.50

*A Council on Foreign Relations Book*

## The Political Mythology of Apartheid

Leonard Thompson

This "immense, valuable study" by a leading historian of South Africa examines the causes and effects of political mythology, focusing on South Africa as a test case.

"[This book] reveals the critical importance of historical mythology in the ideology of apartheid."  
—George M. Fredrickson\*

"For anyone seeking to understand current South African issues, [this] is one of the most significant books of this decade."

—A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.  
\$22.50

*Yale*

Send orders to Dept. 762  
Yale University Press  
92A Yale Station  
New Haven, CT 06520



# Books Received

(Inclusion in this list does not preclude the review of a book at a later date.)

- Achebe, Chinua. *The Trouble with Nigeria*. Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann Educational Books Inc., 1984, 68pp., \$4.00.
- Achebe, Chinua, and Innes, C.L. (eds.). *African Short Stories*. Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann Educational Books Inc., 1985, 159pp., \$5.00.
- Asiwaju, A. I. (ed.). *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, 258pp., \$29.95.
- Bame, Kwabena N. *Come to Laugh*. New York: Lillian Barber Press, Inc., 1985, 190pp., \$21.50 cloth, \$10.00 paper.
- Batran, Aziz A. *Islam and Revolution in Africa*. Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1984, 51pp., \$4.95.
- Boley, G.E. Saigbe. *Liberia: The Rise and Fall of the First Republic*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, 210pp. \$27.50.
- Bolton, Dianne. *Nationalization: A Road to Socialism? The Case of Tanzania*. Totowa, N.J.: Zed Books Ltd., 1985, 167pp., \$26.50 cloth, \$10.25 paper.
- Boulle, L.J. *Constitutional Reform and Apartheid: Legitimacy, Consociationalism and Control in South Africa*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984, 270pp., \$27.50.
- Maher, Kevin. *In Whose Interest?: A Guide to U.S.-South Africa Relations*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1984, 265pp., \$11.95.
- Davies, Rob; O'Meara, Dan; and Dlamini, Siphho. *The Struggle for South Africa: A Reference Guide to Movements, Organizations and Institutions*, Volumes I and II. Totowa, N.J.: Zed Books Ltd., 1984, 440pp., each volume \$29.50 cloth, \$10.65, paper.
- Emecheta, Buchi. *The Rape of Shavi*. New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1985, 178pp, \$12.95 cloth, \$6.95 paper.
- Eriksen, Tore Linné, with Moorsom, Richard. *The Political Economy of Namibia: An Annotated, Critical Bibliography*. Uppsala, Sweden: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1985, 423pp., \$12.50.
- Feinberg, Richard E., and Kallab, Valeriana (eds.). *Uncertain Future: Commercial Banks and the Third World*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1984, 140pp., \$12.95.
- Feinberg, Richard E., and Kallab, Valeriana (eds.). *Adjustment Crisis in the Third World*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1984, 200pp., \$12.95.
- Gershoni, Yekutiel. *Black Colonialism: The Americo-Liberian Scramble for the Hinterland*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985, 123pp. \$19.00.
- Hachten, William A., and Giffard, C. Anthony. *The Press and Apartheid: Repression and Propaganda in South Africa*. Madison, Wisc.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, 336pp., \$22.50.
- Hanlon, Joseph. *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire*. Totowa, N.J.: Zed Press Ltd., Totowa, N.J., 1984, 292pp., \$29.50 cloth, \$10.75 paper.
- Khalid, Mansour. *Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dis-May*. London: KPI Limited, 1985, 394pp.
- Leape, Jonathan; Baskin, Bo; and Underhill, Stefan (eds.). *Business in the Shadow of Apartheid: U.S. Firms in South Africa*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985, 242pp., \$19.95.
- Luke, David Fashole, and Shaw, Timothy M. *Continental Crisis: The Lagos Plan of Action and Africa's Future*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, Inc., 1984, 223pp., \$22.50 cloth, \$12.00 paper.
- Malwal, Bona. *The Sudan: A Second Challenge to Nationhood*. New York: Thornton Books, 1985, 42pp., \$3.95.
- Mandy, Nigel. *A City Divided: Johannesburg and Soweto*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, 407pp. \$35.00.
- Mariam, Mesfin Wolde. *Rural Vulnerability to Famine in Ethiopia: 1958-1977*. New York: Advent Books, 1984, 191pp., \$30.00.
- Miller, Norman N. *Kenya: The Quest for Prosperity*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984, 180pp., \$28.00 cloth, \$15.95 paper.
- Nichols, Lee. *African Writers at the Microphone*. Washington, D.C.: Three Continents Press, 1984, 281pp.
- Nyang, Sulayman S. *Islam, Christianity, and African Identity*. Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1984, 87pp. \$6.95.
- Odendaal, André. *Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912*. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984, 391pp., \$28.50.
- Parker, Richard B. *North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984, 194pp.
- Pfeifer, Karen. *Agrarian Reform Under State Capitalism in Algeria*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985, 252pp., \$26.00.
- Pheko, Motsoko. *Apartheid: The Story of a Dispossessed People*. Totowa, N.J.: Zed Press Ltd., 1984, 196pp., \$10.95.
- Rocha, Geisa Maria. *In Search of Namibian Independence: The Limitations of the United Nations*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984, 192pp., \$16.95.
- Rogge, John R. *Too Many, Too Long: Sudan's Twenty-Year Refugee Dilemma*. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985, 183pp. \$34.95.
- Rossiter, Caleb. *The Bureaucratic Struggle for Control of U.S. Foreign Aid: Diplomacy vs. Development in Southern Africa*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985, 232pp. \$21.50.
- Schwab, Peter. *Ethiopia: Politics, Economics and Society*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1985, 119pp. \$18.50 cloth, \$10.00 paper.
- Sepamla, Siphho. *A Ride on the Whirlwind*. Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann Educational Books Inc., 1984, 244pp., \$7.50.
- Serote, Mongane. *To Every Birth Its Blood*. Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann Educational Books Inc., 1984, 206pp., \$6.50.
- Sesay, Amadu; Ojo, Olusola; and Fasehun, Orobola. *The OAU After Twenty Years*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985, 133pp., \$20.00.
- Shaw, Timothy M. *Towards a Political Economy for Africa: The Dialectics of Dependence*. New York: St. Martin's, 1985, 116pp. \$22.50.
- Shaw, Timothy M., and Aluko, Olajide. *Africa Projected: From Recession to Renaissance by the Year 2000?* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, 208pp.
- Silver, M.S. *The Growth of Manufacturing Industry in Tanzania: An Economic History*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985, 323pp., \$24.00.
- Thomas, Clive Y. *The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984, 157pp., \$11.00.
- Thomas, Gerry S. *Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985, 133pp. \$15.00.
- Timberlake, Lloyd. *Africa in Crisis: The Causes, the Cures of Environmental Bankruptcy*. Washington, D.C.: Earthscan, 1985, 223pp. \$6.25.
- Tordoff, William. *Government and Politics in Africa*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1985, 352pp., \$25.00 cloth, \$10.95 paper.
- Voll, John Oberst, and Voll, Sarah Potts. *The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985, 159pp., \$28.00.

Journal of **African  
Earth Sciences**



 Pergamon Press

The *Journal of African Earth Sciences* is an international interdisciplinary journal devoted to all aspects of research related to the African continent. Papers incorporating the results of research on regional geology of the African cratons and mobile belts, economic geology, geophysics, structure, Quaternary geology and analysis of sedimentary basins are featured.

Submission of papers for publication are welcomed. Contributors should send three copies of completed manuscripts to the Editor-in-Chief or any of the editors.

In addition the journal includes book reviews, short notes and selected papers from the proceedings of conferences, symposia and workshops on any aspect of African geology and related subjects.

**Subscription Information**

**No price increase for 1984**

Published quarterly (Volume 2)

Annual subscription (1984)

Two-year rate (1984/85)

**US\$60.00**

**US\$114.00**

# JOURNAL OF AFRICAN EARTH SCIENCES

Editor-in-Chief: C A KOGBE, *Centre International pour la Formation et les Echanges Geologiques*, 103 rue de Lille, 75007, Paris, France

Editors: M MOULLADE, *University of Nice, Centre de Recherches Micropaleontologiques*, Parc Valrose, 06034 Nice Cedex, France,

R REYMENT, *University of Uppsala, Paleontologiska Inst., Postadress Box 558, S-751 22 Uppsala, Sweden*, J J W ROGERS,

*Dept. of Geology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, NC 27514, USA*, &

R SHACKLETON, *Dept. of Earth Sciences, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK*

## A selection of papers

Review of the Precambrian of the Ivory Coast: geology and metallogeny, Y ANGÖRAN & E KADIO.

Geological interpretation of landsat imageries across central Nigeria, C A KOGBE.

Les mineralisations de type itabirite dans l'atacorier du Togo, A S KPALMA & F K SEDDOH.

Texture and mineralogy of soils with repeated additions of pyroclastics (in the Nguu Volcano area — Machakos District Kenya), W N WAMICHA & V P D'COSE.

A rare-earth element geochemical study of some Precambrian rocks from the metasedimentary belt of North Western Nigeria, P O OKEKE & B E BAFOR.

Geological and geochemical investigations of the metavolcanic-sedimentary belt in the Ife-Elesha area of southwestern Nigeria, D D KEMM *et al.*

Tectonic and sedimentation framework of the lower Benue Trough, southeastern Nigeria, O K AGAGU & C I ADEGHIJE.

Geophysical investigations for Kimberlite pipes in the Greenstone belt of Western Kenya, J O BARONGE.

West African and North American transgressional maxima and the dispersal of benthic organisms, R REYMENT.

Processing of El Barramia gold ores, Egypt using heap-leach method, S EL-SHOFAI *et al.*

FREE SPECIMEN COPIES AVAILABLE ON REQUEST  
Advertising rate card available on request. Back issues and current subscriptions are also available in microform. Prices are subject to change without notice. Journal prices include postage and insurance. Sterling prices are available to UK and Eire customers on request.



## Pergamon Press

Heading Hill Hall, Oxford OX3 0BW UK  
Fairview Park, Elmsford, New York 10523, USA

Journal of **African  
Earth Sciences**



 Pergamon Press

The *Journal of African Earth Sciences* is an international interdisciplinary journal devoted to all aspects of research related to the African continent. Papers incorporating the results of research on regional geology of the African cratons and mobile belts, economic geology, geophysics, structure, Quaternary geology and analysis of sedimentary basins are featured.

Submission of papers for publication are welcomed. Contributors should send three copies of completed manuscripts to the Editor-in-Chief or any of the editors.

In addition the journal includes book reviews, short notes and selected papers from the proceedings of conferences, symposia and workshops on any aspect of African geology and related subjects.

**Subscription Information**

**No price increase for 1984**

Published quarterly (Volume 2)

Annual subscription (1984)

Two-year rate (1984/85)

**US\$60.00**  
**US\$114.00**

## JOURNAL OF AFRICAN EARTH SCIENCES

Editor-in-Chief: C A KOGBE, *Centre International pour la Formation et les Echanges Geologiques, 103 rue de Lille, 75007, Paris, France*

Editors: M MOULLADE, *University of Nice, Centre de Recherches Micropaleontologiques, Parc Valrose, 06034 Nice Cedex, France,*

R REYMENT, *University of Uppsala, Paleontologiska Inst., Postadress Box 558, S-751 22 Uppsala, Sweden,* J J W ROGERS,

*Dept. of Geology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, NC 27514, USA, &*

R SHACKLETON, *Dept. of Earth Sciences, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK*

### A selection of papers

Review of the Precambrian of the Ivory Coast: geology and metallogeny, Y ANGORAN & E KADIO.

Geological interpretation of landsat imageries across central Nigeria, C A KOGBE.

Les mineralisations de type itabirite dans l'atacorier du Togo, A S KPALMA & F K SEDDOH.

Texture and mineralogy of soils with repeated additions of pyroclastics (in the Nguu Volcano area — Machakos District Kenya), W N WAMICHA & V P D'COSTA.

A rare-earth element geochemical study of some Precambrian rocks from the metasedimentary belt of North Western Nigeria, P O OKEKE & B E BAFOR.

Geological and geochemical investigations of the metavolcanic-sedimentary belt in the Ife-Elesha area of southwestern Nigeria, D D KEMM *et al.*

Tectonic and sedimentation framework of the lower Benue Trough, southeastern Nigeria, O K AGAGU & C I ADEGHIJE.

Geophysical investigations for Kimberlite pipes in the Greenstone belt of Western Kenya, J O BARONGE.

West African and North American transgressional maxima and the dispersal of benthic organisms, R REYMENT.

Processing of El Barramia gold ores, Egypt using heap-leach method, S EL-SHOFAI *et al.*

FREE SPECIMEN COPIES AVAILABLE ON REQUEST  
Advertising rate card available on request. Back issues and current subscriptions are also available in microform. Prices are subject to change without notice. Journal prices include postage and insurance. Sterling prices are available to UK and Eire customers on request.



**Pergamon Press**

Headington Hill Hall, Oxford OX3 0BW UK  
Fairview Park, Elmsford, New York 10523, USA

# alternatives

A JOURNAL OF WORLD POLICY

Editors: **Saul H. Mendlovitz**, Rutgers University  
Law School — Newark

**Rajni Kothari**, Centre for the Study of Developing  
Societies, Delhi

A Publication of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi,  
and the World Policy Institute, New York

This journal provides policy relevant analysis of major global issues and presents alternative paradigms, processes, and strategies for confronting problems such as militarism, underdevelopment, dependency, exploitation, and ecological deterioration. Embodying a world order value approach, it is written for those concerned about realizing a global humane governance responsive to all members of the emerging global society. Its contributors include scholars and policymakers from all regions of the world.

## Recent Issues Featured

ANDRE GUNDER FRANK	From Atlantic Alliance to Pan-European Entente: Political Economic Alternatives
CHRISTIAN BAY	Hazards of Goliath in the Nuclear Age: Need for Rational Priorities in American Peace and Defense Policies
JIMOH OMO-FADAKA	The Mirage of NIEO: Reflections on a Third World Dystopia

Published four times a year. Founded 1974.

*Subscription Rates:* Individuals \$16/yr., \$28/2yrs., \$40/3yrs.; Institutions \$30/yr., \$60/2yrs., \$90/3yrs.; Students \$12/yr.; Within the Third World: Individuals \$10/yr., Institutions \$15/yr. Domestic First Class add \$6/yr.; Airmail outside the U.S.A. add \$8/yr. Single copies (min. order \$10) \$4.50/individuals, \$8.50/institutions (current issues); \$5.00/individuals, \$10/institutions (back issues). ISSN: 0304-3754

Please address inquiries and orders to:

*Transaction Periodicals Consortium*  
Department 2000  
Rutgers—The State University  
New Brunswick, NJ 08903



**Exclusive distributors for Europe and the British Isles:**

Karger Libri AG, Petersgraben 31, P.O. CH-4009, Basel, Switzerland

# AFRICA REPORT

America's Leading Magazine  
on Africa

Please enter my subscription as indicated below (six issues per year):

*INDIVIDUAL*

\$21/1 year

\$39/2 years

\$56/3 years

*INSTITUTION*

\$28/1 year

\$53/2 years

\$72/3 years

—Regular Mail to Canada/Overseas: Add \$6 per year.

—Air Rate Overseas: Add \$24 per year.

—First-class within USA: Add \$7 per year.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

CITY \_\_\_\_\_ STATE \_\_\_\_\_ ZIP \_\_\_\_\_

The total amount of my order is \$ \_\_\_\_\_

My check is enclosed (Make checks payable to Transaction Periodicals Consortium).

Please bill my:  MasterCard  VISA

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Expiration Date \_\_\_\_\_ Interbank No. \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_




No Postage Stamp  
Necessary if Mailed  
in the United States

**BUSINESS REPLY CARD**

FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 1129 NEW BRUNSWICK NJ

**AFRICA  
REPORT**

Transaction Periodicals Consortium  
Rutgers University  
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903



In 1954 African independence was only a dream.



# AFRICA TODAY

believed in that dream and worked for its realization.

In the 1980s the struggle continues:

for majority rule in Namibia and South Africa  
for economic independence and political stability

For up-to-date background and analysis second to none  
read AFRICA TODAY — enter your subscription now.

### Recent Topics

Namibia and the West  
Zambia's Political Economy under Stress  
Changing Strategies in Rural Development  
Integrated Rural Development

### Future Topics

Urbanization in Africa  
Migratory Labor in Africa  
Libya: Unpublicized Realities  
Human Rights in Africa

### Editors

George W. Shepherd, Jr.

Tilden J. LeMelle

Edward A. Hawley, Executive Editor

published by Africa Today Associates in cooperation with the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver

### Subscription Rates

	Individuals	Institutions
North & South America	1 yr. \$12.00	\$22.00
	2 yr. \$22.00	\$40.00
	3 yr. \$31.00	\$54.00
	Student (1 yr.) \$ 9.00	

Elsewhere: Add \$2.00 per year for surface mail.

Add \$8.00 per year for air mail.



**AFRICA TODAY**  
GSIS, University of Denver  
Denver, Colorado 80208

Please enter/renew my subscription to AFRICA TODAY for 1 yr. \_\_\_\_\_, 2 yrs. \_\_\_\_\_, 3 yrs. \_\_\_\_\_

At the institutional \_\_\_\_\_, individual \_\_\_\_\_, student \_\_\_\_\_ rate.

(If student, where enrolled \_\_\_\_\_ remaining years of study \_\_\_\_\_)

My payment is enclosed \_\_\_\_\_ Please bill me \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_ State \_\_\_\_\_ Zip \_\_\_\_\_

Country \_\_\_\_\_

Good morning, America! There's a good chance your morning cup of coffee started as a coffee bean grown in the Ivory Coast. And it's almost certain your favorite chocolate bar has its roots in West Africa, too. Africa produces one third of the world's coffee and 90% of its cocoa.

Our schedule is a businessman's dream. Leave JFK Saturday evening on Air Afrique's Flight 50. Sunday, relax on the beach or by the pool. Sunday evening, a dry martini, a delicious dinner and a good night's rest. Monday morning you're ready for business. Call your Travel Agent or Air France for reservations.


West Africans know that "all work and no play makes Jack a dull boy." So you'll find fine restaurants, discos, theatre, ballet and lots of sports to keep your mind and body relaxed.

The bean business is really jumping in West Africa. Two of our major businesses are the growing and exporting of coffee beans and cacao beans.



A surprising fact: One third of all the oil imported into the United States comes from West Africa.

# African jumping beans?



Air Afrique has the most extensive reservation system in West Africa. We'll reserve your car. Your hotel. Your flight to anywhere, on any airline. You see, we're the general agents in West Africa for more than 100 airlines, including Air France, British Airways, Japan Airlines, Lufthansa, Pan Am and SAS.

Tourism is also a big business in West Africa. Recently the World Bank loaned Senegal \$13 million for the development of its Petite Côte region, south of Dakar. Resort and hotel complexes with 30,000 beds will be built here during the next ten years. And there's a lot more beds!

So remember, when you fly to Africa on Air Afrique, you'll be getting more than just another airline. You'll be getting personal attention from the airline that knows Africa best.

**AIR AFRIQUE**

Africa begins with Air Afrique.  
And it's just seven hours to the new sun.