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**IN THIS ISSUE**

Starting with the cover story on the Horn, the focus of this issue is upon the policy options facing the Reagan administration in Africa. Editor Anthony Hughes visited Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya to prepare the article on that region. Interviews with two of the leaders he met — the Somali information minister and the secretary-general of the Western Somali Liberation Front — are also featured. Ethiopian leaders were not available for interviews during his visit nor have they responded to written questions as we go to press.

During a tour of southern Africa, Dr. Gwendolen M. Carter gathered reactions to President Reagan and his policies. She also assesses Zimbabwe's first year and its prospects for the future. Another American observer of the southern Africa scene, Dr. John Seiler, examines the history of negotiations over the future of Namibia and considers options for the United States in that region.

In an article on "Trans-Sahara," Dr. Robert Mortimer sees recent developments creating a closer interplay between the nations of northern, Sahelian, and western Africa, with consequent implications for American policy. Guinean Dr. Lansiné Kaba analyzes the more active foreign policy pursued in recent years by President Sékou Touré and considers reports of a more liberal domestic policy in the West Africa state.

From Washington, Richard Deutsch describes the factors involved in the reformulation of Africa policy now under way.

**Reagan and Africa**

Policy Options in the Horn  
*By Anthony J. Hughes*

4

**Interview**

Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Aden,  
Somali Minister of Information  
and National Guidance

*Interviewed by Anthony J. Hughes*

12

**Interview**

Mohamed Diriye Urdoh  
Secretary-General of the Western Somali  
Liberation Front

*Interviewed by Anthony J. Hughes*

15

**Reagan and Africa**

Which Way in Southern Africa?  
*By John Seiler*

17

**In Washington**

Reagan's Unruly Review  
*By Richard Deutsch*

23

**African Update**

*Editor: Joseph Margolis*  
*Associate Editor: Margaret A. Novicki*  
*Editorial Assistant: Michael Beaubien*

27

**Personal View**

Southern African Reactions to Reagan  
*By Gwendolen M. Carter*

43

**Analysis**

Politics in Trans-Saharan Africa  
*By Robert A. Mortimer*

47

**Guinea**

Myth and Reality of Change  
*By Lansiné Kaba*

53

**African Development**

New Directions for the 1980s  
*By Guy Arnold*

58

**Zimbabwe**

The First Year  
*By Gwendolen M. Carter*

62

**Photo Credit:**

The cover picture of Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam is by Bill Campbell of Sygma.



# Policy Options in the Horn

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BY ANTHONY J. HUGHES

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The Horn of Africa is a volatile region in which the options of the Reagan administration are wide. Proximity to the Middle East and the entrenched position of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Ethiopia are the salient global features of this theater. These factors present the risk — or the opportunity — for confrontation with the Soviets.

As for local factors, a major question involves the ability of the current Marxist regime in Addis Ababa to rule over the empire it seized from Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. The second local factor is the Somali dream of uniting all its people under one flag. This involves claims to the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, to the state of Djibouti, and to one-third of Kenyan territory. These issues concern the integrity of states and the inviolability of national boundaries, principles that are held in special esteem by the Organization of African Unity.

It cannot be denied that in this peripheral region the Soviets and their allies have scored successes that are of more than diplomatic significance. Their presence in Ethiopia could provide a springboard for further activities in Africa. More immediately, it gives them access to ports in Assab and Massawa as well as an anchorage in the Dhalak Islands, complementing facilities in the People's Democratic Republic of

Yemen (PDRY) at Aden, Socotra, and Perim.

Against this lineup, the United States has a base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and access to facilities in Masirah (Oman) and Mombasa (Kenya). France has the use of naval, air, and land-based facilities in Djibouti.

Besides, the issue of the U.S. role in the region goes beyond the tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee of seeking friends and counteralliances. The immediate policy decision facing the administration in this region is whether to activate the agreements made by the Carter administration to take over the former Soviet facilities in the Somali Democratic Republic (SDR) at Berbera and elsewhere — possibly for use by the Strategic Strike Force — and to provide Somalia with defense material.

Discussions between the United States and Somalia started in 1978, and agreements were reached in August 1980. The Defense Department feels that Berbera needs up to \$100 million in renovation before it will be useful, and Congress has approved the first \$10 million appropriation for that purpose. So far the United States has not done more than inspect the facilities at Berbera. No ships have called; no planes have landed; no personnel are established there.

The arms to be supplied comprise a Vulcan defense system made available

through a \$44 million credit under the terms of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) legislation. The installation of the system would involve the presence of a handful of U.S. military personnel in a training and maintenance role. In broad terms, the options lie between renegeing on the agreements and enthusiastically backing the Siad Barre government militarily, politically, and economically.

If anyone has a case for redrawing the map of Africa along ethnic lines, it is the Somalis. They already have the most homogenous state in Africa, following the 1960 union of former British and Italian colonies. The areas of Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia that are the subject of their irridentist claims share a considerable degree of ethnic homogeneity. Ethiopian sovereignty over the Ogaden was achieved through cooperation with Western powers carving up Somali territory in the late nineteenth century. The dominant ethnic group, the Amharas, exercised less authority in this region than in any other fief of their far-flung empire. As late as World War II, the Ogaden was under military administration from British Somaliland. And today the Somalis of the Ogaden suffer under a rule from Addis Ababa even harsher than that meted out in the rest of the country. The fact that the government in Mogadishu is also undemocratic,

oppressive, and Marxist-oriented is not directly relevant. Somali clans traditionally move between the Ogaden and other areas. Many leading Somalis, including President Siad Barre, have roots in the Ogaden.

It is therefore not surprising that the most consistent pressure of Somali irridentism has been directed at this region. In 1977 the guerrillas of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) launched a major offensive when the Ethiopian military junta known as the Dergue was losing ground in Ethiopia, facing half a dozen other regional uprisings, and still struggling for power at the center.

There are conflicting reports of the degree of regular Somali military involvement at the start. But by the close of the campaign a major thrust by the Somali army, using heavy armor and air support, put most of the Ogaden in their hands.

This was the point at which the Soviets switched horses in midstream and intervened massively and decisively on the Ethiopian side. Meanwhile, the United States and the West, who had led Siad to expect their military support if he broke with the Russians, held back, unwilling to be associated with his expansionism. The Somali advance continued well into 1978, until the effect of Soviet supplies and Cuban forces began to be felt. Then within a few months they were driven back, and 8,000 men, one-third of their armed forces, were lost; and, by the end of the Ogaden war, only half a dozen MiGs of Somalia's erstwhile powerful air force were still flying. Currently the WSLF is waging a more traditional guerrilla campaign. After a leadership shake-up, it has attempted to put some distance between itself and Mogadishu, calling for self-determination rather than amalgamation. This is largely a political ploy. A separate Ogadeni state would make no sense. Even more significantly, the WSLF operates with quasi-official status in Mogadishu. Its transportation apparently has a higher priority for gasoline than some government ministries. In authoritarian Somalia, no organization operates without direct official backing.

With regard to the claimed areas of

Kenya, which Somalis still call by the British colonial name, Northern Frontier District (NFD), the campaign has been more sporadic. Although the Ogaden is almost part of the Somali heartland, the Somali incursion into Kenya is relatively recent. Their numbers and density are lower, and they are more geographically interspersed among the original inhabitants, whom they were in the process of displacing at the time of the arrival of colonialism at the close of the nineteenth century.

Just before Kenya's independence in 1963 the inhabitants of the NFD voted overwhelmingly for secession to Somalia. For political reasons, Mogadishu blamed colonial Britain for failure to effect the transfer. In fact, it was the Kenyatta government that vetoed secession. The Kenyan case, then and now, is that their country, like most of Africa, is made up of many ethnic groups. To permit secession in the case of Somalis would start a process that would undermine the stability of all African states. This is the strongly held position of virtually all African governments.

Nevertheless, the Somalis of the region have waged an intermittent campaign for secession, with light arms, cross-border havens, and political backing from Mogadishu (where the NFD Liberation Front still functions, with financial support, an office, transportation, and recognition enhanced by invitations to official events).

The Kenyan response has been uneven. At times efforts have been made to extend to the people some of the social and economic services available in the rest of the country. At other times, when *shifita* (Somali guerrilla) activity has appeared to be on the rise, the area is treated as enemy territory, its inhabitants rounded up and placed under curfew to prevent them from supporting the insurgents.

At the close of 1980, following murders and acts of lawlessness, which the Kenyans declared were politically motivated and committed by Somalis, the authorities began a crackdown. According to Somali sources, the government actions comprised not only curfews and mass arrests but also the killing of innocent civilians, including

children. One senior Kenyan minister virtually declared an open season for shooting Somalis suspected of subversion.

The upsurge of activity followed a state visit to Kenya by the Ethiopian head of state, during which a strong reaffirmation of joint opposition to Somali irridentism was issued. The Kenyan-Ethiopian commitment called upon all states to refrain from arming Somalia — a clear reference to the U.S. proposal to supply Somalia with about \$44 million worth of defensive arms. The Somalis responded angrily to this strengthening of the Nairobi-Addis Ababa axis.

With their new American friend, they had hoped to loosen that axis and had embarked upon a campaign to differentiate their policies towards north-





Photo: Anila Vohiani/UNICEF

Somalia is burdened with more than one million refugees from the Ogaden war

ern Kenya and the Ogaden. The latest crackdown by the Kenyans has been interpreted by some observers as an attempt to cow the Somalis at a time when their fortunes are at a low ebb.

A senior Somali official suggested to me that the blow came at the very time that Somalia was putting out conciliatory feelers toward Kenya. After all, Somalia is undergoing its second major drought in less than a decade; it is burdened with more than one million refugees from the Ogaden war; it has yet to find a replacement for the economic and military aid it received from the Soviets; the implementation of socialism followed by the sudden withdrawal of its foreign backers has left the state-controlled economy in a shambles; Somalia needs to show a less aggressive face, especially to pro-Western Kenya, in order to attract Western backing. The Somalis are in no position, and this is hardly the time for them, to be opening up the Kenyan front, the official said.

In 1979 King Khalid of Saudi Arabia attempted to mediate in the Kenyan/Somali dispute. Presidents Moi and

Siad Barre travelled to Jeddah. But, according to one Kenyan participant in the meeting, the Somalis declined to sign a declaration confirming the boundaries between the two states as those obtaining at Kenyan independence.

With regard to Djibouti, which achieved independence from France in 1977, the SDR has been even more circumspect. This caution has been dictated by a number of factors: the democratic nature of the Djibouti government, the ethnic balance in the country between Somalis and non-Somali (though related) Afars, the continued French military presence, the likelihood of a massive countermove from Addis Ababa in any development toward a Somali takeover of one of Ethiopia's principle lines of access to the sea — not to mention preoccupation with other problems.

At the best of times, Somalia itself is one of the world's poorest countries, depending upon international charity to keep going. And these are not the best of times. The Somali Vice-President, Hussen Kõlmiye Afrah, remarked in a statement to the UNHCR in September

1980, "We Somalis live in a beautiful but most demanding and sometimes even harsh environment where surplus, if any, is quite marginal."

Twice during the past year the country has been on the point of collapse for lack of fuel. In each case a foreign benefactor (once it was Saudi Arabia, once a Western power) donated a small tanker load of oil.

Drought and dislocation have reduced livestock production, which accounts for over 80 percent of export earnings. Bananas (10-14 percent) have declined drastically. The offshore fishing industry was put on the beach when the Soviets pulled out.

The country has no foreign reserves. According to one government minister, total export earnings in recent years have been devoted to meeting fuel import bills. Economic development has virtually ceased. The 1979-81 three-year development plan consisted merely of the unfulfilled projects of the previous five-year plan. But even with inputs of foreign aid, principally from the European Community countries and China, this rump plan is unfulfilled. One minister admitted to me: "All government revenues go to maintaining basic services, to relief work, to help refugees. We have no local funds available to match foreign aid."

Somalia somehow keeps going, with the help of invisible earnings, notably remittances from Somalis working abroad and payments for local purchases and services by foreign governments and relief agencies.

Politically, President Siad Barre has hardened his authoritarian style. Moves from military rule to Soviet-style institutions have slowed in the light of the events of the past few years. Although the president seeks to strike a balance among the Somalia clans and tribes, his own clan and his own relatives occupy a disproportionate number of key jobs. An attempted military coup in 1978 was unsuccessful, and the leaders were executed. Exiled opposition groups base themselves variously on Siad's alleged narrowing ethnic base or on his alleged straying from Marxist orthodoxy. Notable among them is the Somali Salvation Front (SSF), supported by Ethiopia.



In his speech on the 1980 anniversary of the October 21 revolution, President Barre admitted that tribalism was responsible for much of the political tension within the country. He also admitted that the government and its state institutions were in part responsible for the desperate economic condition of the country and promised to dismantle "the cumbersome bureaucracy."

This nation is now urging the United States to replace the Soviet Union as its military ally. (A congressional stipulation that no military deliveries should take place while regular Somali troops were active in the Ogaden has been complied with; they have been driven out by the Ethiopian-Cuban-Soviet forces).

In return, Somalia has offered military facilities, notably the naval and air force base built by the Soviets at Berbera.

In his October 1980 speech, President Siad justified the military agreements with the United States as bolstering peace and security and the sovereignty of states. The agreements "in no way jeopardize the interests of other states but on the contrary would contribute to peace and stability in the region," the president said.

He continued, "Ethiopia is fulfilling part of an overall wide-ranging strategy of other powers, aimed at the countries in eastern Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Gulf area. Instead of making false accusations against Somalia, one wonders why the Ethiopian, Libyan, and South Yemeni regimes fail to face the reality in their own countries. Do they not realize that they constitute floating military bases themselves? Are they not the ones who are risking the peace and security of the entire region by allowing the deployment of substantial foreign forces on their soil, thus paving the way for the counterdeployment of similar other foreign forces in the region?"

With regard to Ethiopia, the possibility at one end of the scale of U.S. options is to wait, in the hope that the Ethiopians will get rid of Chairman Mengistu and his Soviet backers or that Mengistu will disembarass himself of the Soviets, once they have served his purposes. At the other end of the scale,

the United States could actively seek to undermine the government of Ethiopia and seek confrontation with the Soviets and their allies. The choices to be made between these and intervening options necessitate consideration of recent history.

If Ethiopia were a U.S. ally, there would be justified domestic protest at association with such a bloody regime. Mengistu climbed to power by personally ordering the killing of potential rivals. The Dergue, originally numbering about 130, has been reduced to about 30, with an inner core of half a dozen or so loyal supporters.

The elite that held power under Haile Selassie's feudal rule has been killed, imprisoned, driven into exile, or cowed. The leaders of the students and workers, who prepared the way for the military takeover, have seen their leadership destroyed. Even the Marxist

groups that sprang up after the revolution were mercilessly exterminated.

In the conflict between urban guerrilla "white terror" and government vigilante "red terror" in 1977-79, thousands of Marxists, students, workers, and other potential rivals to Mengistu's power were eliminated. The opposition, for its part, killed thousands of government leaders and supporters. This struggle for power at the center took place at the same time that the Ethiopian empire was threatened with disintegration on all sides.

The Eritreans, who had been struggling against Haile Selassie's takeover for two decades, took advantage of the confusion in Addis Ababa to step up their independence campaign. By the beginning of 1978 they controlled 90 percent of the countryside in Eritrea and many of the cities and towns as well. Before the Soviet arms supply and the



Addis Ababa: "The Soviets' enormous commitment to Mengistu is not without risks and disadvantages"



Photo: William Campbell/Sygma

Women of the Ethiopian army: "Mengistu led the most dramatic social economic revolution in Africa"

flow of Cuban troops to the Ogaden theater, they were poised for final victory.

Other regional/ethnic movements, such as the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF), various groups among the numerically predominant Oromo, and traditionally rebellious groups like the Afars were also pressing their claims for freedom from Amhara hegemony. At the height of their power, these movements controlled much of the countryside in their respective areas and often took over towns. Today they are reduced to traditional hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. Even the WSLF does not make claims to territorial control.

This is the double debt Mengistu owes to his Soviet and Cuban allies. He has consolidated central authority throughout Ethiopia, and he has maintained that power in his own hands.

There are believed to be some 12,000 Cubans in fighting units in the country. Apart from those around Addis Ababa, the majority are stationed in the Ogaden. Cuba was not willing to commit troops to fight its erstwhile friends in

Eritrea. Nevertheless, its troops in the Ogaden freed Ethiopian units for the Eritrean campaign, and it is believed that Soviets and Cubans were involved in the Eritrean operations at the planning level.

Aiding the Ethiopian offensive is the internecine warfare between the two strongest movements, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The differences among these and other Eritrean groups strengthen Addis Ababa's hand militarily and politically.

Another branch of Mengistu's strategy has been diplomatic. Following a rapprochement with President Gaafar al-Nimeiry, the Sudan has greatly reduced its backing for the Eritreans. Within the immediate region, Ethiopia is now on good terms with all its neighbors except Somalia. The Sudan has maintained some support for the Eritreans, enough to prepare a role as political arbitrator. One reason President Nimeiry is serious about seeking a settlement for Eritrea is the presence of 500,000 Eritrean refugees in the Sudan.

With the help of a largely compliant bureaucracy, prepared to change one autocratic master for another, the day-to-day government of Ethiopia has continued to function. In a few years, Mengistu has led the most dramatic social and economic revolution in modern Africa. Land has been transferred from feudal, church, and landlord ownership to those who till the soil. This demonstrably popular and populist measure did much to keep the countryside calm. It has been a key factor in limiting the political alienation of the Oromos. In feudal times much of their land belonged to Amhara landlords, the church, and the imperial family.

The western Oromos, especially the educated, are mainly Christians of the Mekane Jesus church, with Western missionary links. The eastern Oromos are more likely to be Muslims. Hence both groups had economic, religious, and ethnic bases for hostility to the Coptic Amhara. The official atheism of the current rulers in Addis Ababa is no less appealing. Since Oromo speakers constitute up to 50 percent of the country's population, this regime must be as

keen as its predecessors to co-opt them. Many were in the original Dergue, and some remain.

Although atheism is the official philosophy, there does not appear to be any general suppression of religion. The Ethiopian churches and mosques are full as ever; religious festivals draw larger crowds than political rallies; religious dignitaries have a place of honor at state functions; and Mengistu's wife is said to be a devout member of the Coptic church.

The rural land changes were matched by a similar urban measure, which limited each family to ownership of one home.

More recently, in response to Soviet pressures, the government has announced that agricultural production will move from what is essentially a cooperative system to a collective style of organization. To many observers, such a policy threatens to undermine peasant support for the regime, generated by the land transfers. To date only some 30 organizations out of thousands have been converted from cooperatives.

If the pace of collectivization has been slow, moves from military to proletarian dictatorship have been even more pedestrian. During the early years of the revolution there were attempts to co-opt some of the civilian Marxist groups into the power structure. Evidently Mengistu was not prepared to risk sharing power with them. At the end of 1979 he announced the formation not of a party but of a Committee for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE). It took six months from COPWE's inauguration to its first meeting, at which an executive consisting of Mengistu and six trusted military associates was selected for the all-important Executive Committee. The meeting underlined the fact that the institution was a front for continuing Mengistu's personal rule when it declared: "All organs of COPWE should follow [Mengistu's] political line as the basis for day-to-day activities."

It must be remembered that Mengistu was brought up within the feudal system. Haile Selassie's autocratic style is his model, to which he has grafted via-

ble elements of the Soviet system, notably centralized control of key areas such as security, information, trade unions, peasants' organizations, and now COPWE.

The Soviets are believed to have sold \$1.5 billion worth of arms to Ethiopia on easy terms. Repayments have not yet started. But unless the debt is forgiven by the Soviets or Ethiopia defaults, it will take a large share of meagre foreign exchange earnings in the future.

The Soviets have also been helpful in supplying oil to Ethiopia at less than world market prices. In recent months a hardening of the tone of Mengistu's public speeches — a reaffirmation of the pro-Soviet line in international affairs and a firm commitment to further socialist measures domestically — has been noted. In February of this year the Ethiopian leader attended the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow. Addressing the congress, Mengistu declared: "Socialist Ethiopia is a priority target of international imperialism and forces of reaction with a vested interest in the destabilization of the revolutionary process set in motion seven years ago" and added, "The revolutionaries of Ethiopia will heighten their contribution to the strengthening of the proletarian internationalist cause."

Also in February 1981, Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen agreed in a joint statement "that the feverish military activities of imperialist powers and the concentration of their military forces in the Red Sea/Gulf/Indian Ocean littorals and the installation of U.S. military bases in Somalia and Oman pose direct and serious threats . . . to peace and security in the region."

Nor is Ethiopian support for Soviet strategy limited to declarations. According to the Somali government, Ethiopia has leased naval bases in Masawa and Assab to the Soviets, as well as according them facilities at the Dahlak Islands and access to all civil and military airports. In a letter to U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in February 1981 the Somali permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Ahmed Mohamed Adan, alleged that Ethiopian, Soviet, and Cuban troops

were poised along the border with the objective of invading Somalia. He compared the potential situation with what had happened in Kampuchea and Afghanistan.

The Soviets' enormous commitment to Chairman Mengistu is not without risks and disadvantages for them. There is the chance that he will turn against them or that he will be assassinated or overthrown. Beyond that, Ethiopia is the traditional enemy not only of the Somalis but also of the whole Arab and Muslim world. The fact that the official dogma has changed from Coptic Christianity to Marxist atheism does nothing to diminish Arab hostility.

This is evident in the case of Eritrea, whose nationalist movements still receive support from radical as well as from moderate Arab states. Among the Arabs only the Marxist PDRY and Qaddafi's Libya have been enthusiastic supporters of socialist Ethiopia. As noted, the Sudan, formerly a major supporter of Eritrean liberation movements, was reconciled with Addis Ababa last year.

In addition to the risk of alienating the community of Arab nations to gain one friend, some internal aspects are also worrisome to the Soviets. Ethiopia is still an empire, ruled by a predominantly Amhara elite. Besides, Chairman Mengistu's bloody establishment and maintenance of power must be something of an embarrassment to them.

They are very anxious to see a vanguard party formed, not only for ideological reasons but also for the purpose of lessening their reliance on the present leadership. A Marxist party would be a more dependable ally for Moscow than the opportunist Mengistu.

Economically Ethiopia is no great prize for the time being, although it has potential in the long run. The dislocation of the revolution, the struggles for power, the wars of secession, and the redistribution of land caused a drastic drop in agricultural production. The price of coffee, the leading export, has fallen. Ethiopia lacks an economic infrastructure. Most people live half a day's walk from the nearest road suitable for a wheeled vehicle. Education



and social services are among the least developed in the Third World. Development of Ethiopia's agricultural and mineral potential will require enormous external investment.

The Soviets' ready abandonment of Somalia may give pause to other countries contemplating friendship with Moscow. A notable diplomatic debacle resulted from the personal intervention of President Castro of Cuba in 1977. His Soviet-backed plan for a confederation of Ethiopia, Somalia, and other Red Sea states demonstrated ignorance of, and insensitivity to, regional realities.

In spite of these setbacks and complications, it cannot be denied that Moscow's involvement in Ethiopia is a success for them. They are on the "correct" side in a matter dear to most Africans — the maintenance of existing boundaries. They have access to bases and facilities for operations in the wider region and for future African activities.

1980, the Ethiopian leader seemed to be throwing down a gauntlet to Washington. He declared, "It seems obvious that the American government is fueling the fire in the region, stocking Somalia's expansionist war machinery, and is realizing its strategic and imperialist objectives at the expense of the people of Ethiopia and Somalia. . . . If the U.S. is determined to base its rapid deployment force in Somalia, then Ethiopia and other countries in the region will have to resort to all available measures to defend their unity and territorial integrity. . . . The situation may also force developing countries exposed to the U.S.'s misguided policies to take measures which will considerably change the present balance of power in the world. . . ."

Should we respond to this challenge by standing up to Ethiopia and its powerful allies with all available means? It is sometimes suggested that a disadvantage of confronting Mengistu is that

support for Somalia, it is suggested, the U.S. could harass Mengistu by covertly backing the various insurgent groups. Such help could be channeled through their present sponsors and would not involve a direct U.S. presence.

The question whether the United States should be involved in undermining an internationally recognized government by subversion and guerrilla warfare has extremely delicate moral and political implications. There is also the matter of consistency, especially for an administration elsewhere taking a strong line against terrorism.

Furthermore, it is rarely possible to keep such involvement secret for long. Either locally or within the United States, evidence of such covert activities will be made public, causing political and diplomatic embarrassment.

More fundamentally, is it a long-term interest of Washington to foster the disintegration of Ethiopia? The fragmentation of the empire could bring even greater chaos to this unstable region.

Besides, many diplomatic observers in Addis Ababa do believe that Mengistu could change his orientation. According to their view, he is motivated by nationalism and by personal ambition. The alliance with the Soviets and the mouthing of Marxist rhetoric, they suggest, merely serve these ends for the time being. When circumstances change, he will be ready to shed the Soviets and their ideology. These observers further point out that the Eastern bloc countries do not have the resources to help Ethiopia's economic advance. So when attention turns to economic development, Addis Ababa will have no option but to open to the West.

They note that the basically Western-oriented, bureaucracy represents an ally in such a process. The West is a major purchaser of Ethiopian products. (Nearly half of its coffee is sold to the United States.) Ethiopia is a recipient of aid from the European Community, whose individual members also have assistance programs. Nor has the Eastern presence changed the Western orientation of Ethiopia's imports. Machinery and motor vehicles




Photo: B. Campbell/Sygnia

"Moscow's Involvement in Ethiopia is a success for them"

They have an acceptable African proxy that could be used in a role similar to that accorded to Moroccan troops by the West.

Given the firmly anti-Western stance of Chairman Mengistu and the entrenched position of the Soviet Union and its allies, what options are available to the United States? At a press conference in Addis Ababa on September 18,

such a posture will drive Ethiopia more firmly into the arms of Moscow and that it reduces prospects for an eventual rapprochement between Addis Ababa and Washington. Skeptics believe that the chances of a change of heart in Addis Ababa are extremely slight and do not justify trimming the direction or thrust of U.S. policy in the region.

In addition providing to vigorous

are from Europe, and Ethiopian Airlines buys its aircraft from the United States. There have been meetings in recent months of the compensation board, set up to deal with claims from nationalized American and other foreign corporations. Ethiopia needs to settle these issues to be eligible for preferential World Bank help.

A recent editorial in the *Standard of Nairobi* seemed to reflect the thinking of moderate African governments. It declared: "It is becoming increasingly clear that, contrary to her expectations, the Soviet Union will not be able to use Ethiopia as one of the tools to further Russian imperialism in Africa. At least not while Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam — pragmatist, committed nationalist, and Pan-Africanist — is at the helm of that proud nation. . . . In Ethiopia the bear reckoned without the personality of Mengistu Haile-Mariam. He is nobody's puppet. He is first and foremost an Ethiopian, committed to the welfare and independence of his country and his people."

A variation of this viewpoint is to suggest that although Mengistu personally may be totally committed to the Soviets, the alliance will not outlast him. Because he is so unpopular and has so many enemies, so it runs, whoever succeeds Mengistu after his death or removal will want to break with those who maintained him in power. If the United States confronts the Ethiopian state, by supporting those seeking to undermine and fragment it, we rule out prospects of a rapprochement not only with Chairman Mengistu but also with those who succeed him, it is suggested.

One option that seems worthy of consideration is to draw back from closer association with Somalia, leaving the field for others. This could mean regional powers, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Even more creatively, it could mean allowing the Chinese a free hand. This strategy has considerable appeal. There would be ideological compatibility. The Somalis would be spared the embarrassment of eating their Marxist rhetoric. The Chinese have already begun supplying military hardware to the Somalis, notably MiGs. They also have an established



Photo: Joseph Margolis

#### Somali President Siad Barre has hardened his authoritarian style

program of economic aid. Nobody doubts that the Chinese would be as active as any Western nation in confronting the Soviets. Their experience in guerrilla warfare could be of value to the various groups seeking to undermine the Ethiopian state. In this way the United States could receive most of the benefits of confronting the Soviets, with none of the risks.

Other voices are pressing Washington to reinforce its support for Somalia, which comes to the same thing as confronting Ethiopia. Moderate Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia would welcome a greater U.S. role in Somalia, even though they have reservations about the SDR's irriditism and its Marxist philosophy. Yet perceptions of Somalia as the spoiler in the region among African states and among the international community generally also weigh heavily.

U.S. military association with Somali irriditism would risk setting us against OAU principles. Over 50 African states (one-third of the international community) together with most of their friends would be ranged against us if the SDR attacked Ethiopia again. And the outcry would be led by Kenya, a staunch ally of the West, which is also providing the United States with military facilities and is about to assume the chairmanship of the OAU.

The Ethiopians, for their part, have always been careful to maintain a correct legal stance. They did not pursue

the invading Somalis back across the border during the Ogaden war and undertook only a few desultory air strikes into Somalia during the campaign. But should the Somalis be emboldened to reopen the war, the Ethiopians have hinted at far more drastic reactions. They have the capability to respond by aerial attacks on Mogadishu — or Berbera.

Such a scenario could place the United States in an extremely tricky situation. If Americans were killed and wounded in aerial attacks undertaken by the Ethiopians and their allies, there would be a great risk that the United States could be drawn into the conflict, on the "wrong" side in the eyes of the international community.

Together with other facilities in the region, Berbera has incremental value to U.S. strategic requirements. Yet the dangers of military cooperation with the SDR are considerable, and a belligerent stand against Ethiopia could be even more damaging to American interests.

Checking Soviet successes in the Third World may be a legitimate foreign policy objective for the United States. But confronting the Soviet Union when it is in a strong legal and political position could prove counterproductive. Far from undermining the Soviets, it risks according greater legitimacy to their role while eroding our own credibility and standing in Africa and the Third World. □

# Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Aden, Somali Minister of Information and National Guidance

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INTERVIEWED BY ANTHONY J. HUGHES

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**AFRICA REPORT:** What was the ideology of the 1970 Somali revolution?

**ADEN:** The main objective of the revolution has been to transfer the economy from the hands of the new colonial masters, the petite bourgeoisie or compradores who brought products from the industrialized countries and, without producing anything, reaped profits from the masses. That was our aim and by breaking away from that pattern we arrived at the socialist system. When one brings up the term socialism, the pattern that springs to mind is the absolute one practiced by the Soviet Union and its European allies. We believe, however, that the kind of socialism we are implementing in our country must take into account the environmental conditions and values of our society. We saw that there are many paths by which one could achieve a socialist transformation. For example, we implemented and adopted certain reforms in the agricultural field. In our country, we have 16 million acres of cultivable land, made fertile by either rain or river waters. Under cultivation already was between 14,000 and 16,000 acres. There was no reason to implement any reforms on the already cultivated lands. We decided to cultivate the remaining fertile lands already at our disposal. We had no problem of royal families or classes, as all of the land was owned by the government.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Your country was close to the Soviet Union; you quarreled with them and you are now closer to Western countries. You are to buy arms from the United States; Western countries have been helpful to you in your economic crisis, supplying you with oil, helping with the refugee problem. Is there also to be a reflection of a more pro-Western ideology as a result of this greater friendship with the West?

**ADEN:** For some time, there has been cooperation between us and the Western nations, as you mention. Both the United States and European countries are helping us in many areas. There is understanding and a general framework of cooperation, which is natural, and the countries will

have an effect on each other, be it economically, ideologically, or politically. The extent of this interrelation will depend on how close they come together in different fields.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Mr. Minister, behind you I see a map marked "Somali Territory," which shows parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti as being part of that Somali territory. Can you tell me in more detail what your policy is towards ethnic Somalis currently under other nations?

**ADEN:** The Somali nation has been divided into parts and that is a matter of history. When two parts of the present Democratic Somali Republic, the northern and southern regions, gained their independence in 1960, within four days they formed a unified republic. That indicates to you how the Somali people feel—that they are the same nation, the same people. There were no problems, no hindrance towards the achievement of that unity. The Italians colonized the southern part for 100 years; while the British colonized the northern part for about 80 years. It was the Somalis' belief that wherever they may be, they are one and they have the right to be unified. We realized that as of 1970 many countries were cynically refusing to understand the nature and truth of the situation. Therefore, since 1970, the birth of our revolution, it has been the policy of the Somali government, if unity could not be achieved, to support the right of freedom for the Somalis wherever they are. We accept the fact that when they reach their right to independence, they have a choice, either to stand by themselves as an independent state, or to unite with the Somali Democratic Republic; or to unite with whatever state they want. For example, we supported Djibouti independence. Since they have chosen to become a state we supported them. We sponsored their membership in the United Nations and in the Organization of African Unity. The Somali government has no intention of uniting any Somali part into its own republic. This is mere propaganda created by others, or other governments, to support the motives that they have against the Somali state. Hence we declare our belief that the people of Western Somalia have the right to self-determination. If they

choose, when the right of self-determination is given to them, to remain within Ethiopia, then we have no objections whatsoever. What we cannot accept is for the Western Somalis to be colonized, to be looted, to have barbaric actions undertaken against them.

The issue of the NFD, the Northern Frontier District, is quite different. Kenya is not a colonial government and they haven't colonized the NFD as Ethiopia did to Somalia. Kenya was under British colonial rule, as was the NFD. The kind of British administration there was quite different than what was evolving in Kenya itself. Before Kenya's independence, the British held a referendum in the Northern Frontier District giving people a choice; and over 86 percent of the inhabitants of the NFD opted in 1963 to become free and unite with the Somali Democratic Republic. The region was amalgamated within Kenya because the British had more interests in Kenya. That is not to say that Kenya is responsible for this creation, but it is the British who were responsible. This problem exists, and we, the Somali and the Kenyans, must have the wisdom to come up with a solution to it, in the best interests of the people.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Turning to other areas, Mr. Minister,

the affairs of Cambodia, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, etc. Whatever the Soviet Union may call itself, it seems apparent that they consider their own interests to be far greater than the interests of the smaller nations. The relations that exist are government-to-government; we have diplomatic ties. But I am of the belief that our relations cannot be improved in the near future.

**AFRICA REPORT:** In general terms, how would you characterize relations between the United States and the Somali Democratic Republic now?

**ADEN:** I believe that our relations are like those between two countries that want to have relations, but are still suspicious of each other. It is quite difficult to expect, after 10 years of strained relations, that in a short time we can have the best relations. I believe there is a need at this time for building understanding and to create confidence between the two states.

**AFRICA REPORT:** How do you perceive American help with the refugee problem, with the drought, and economic assistance generally? Has it been sufficient or would you like even closer cooperation at those levels?

**ADEN:** The Americans have done quite a lot, on the



Photo: Camerapix

Somali army with Soviet weapons: "Our request to the U.S. is to assist us to be in a position to defend our statehood"

could you characterize your relations now with the Soviet Union and where you hope they might develop in the coming years?

**ADEN:** The question is quite a difficult one. Our relations are not good at the present time because we think the Soviet Union has taken actions that are against our interests. Remember that the Soviet Union has invaded and intervened in

humanitarian aspects and with regard to the refugees. But to cope with the present needs, as well as with the increasing number of refugees, we need even greater assistance. As for the refugee problem, we don't think food aid can solve it. We think a fundamental solution is urgently needed, with the assistance of the Americans and others such as the Ethiopians, who are creating the problem.





Photo: Henri Bureau/Sygma

**"We would like the U.S. to aid us economically, to strengthen our development program"**

**AFRICA REPORT:** Do you mean, Mr. Minister, that you would like to see the Americans involved diplomatically in solving the broader issues of Somali ethnics in other countries?

**ADEN:** It is not only the Somalis, but the problem of the Horn of Africa as a whole; the Eritrean issue, the Western Somali issue, the Oromo issue, the relations between the two countries of Somalia and Ethiopia. We would like the

United States to help find an honorable framework for solving the problems of the Horn, as it has tried to do in the Middle East.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Are you not afraid, Mr. Minister, that the Americans, if they move into this region, will have their own agenda? If they come to this area, will they view it in terms of their position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its establishment in Ethiopia? Are you not worried about bringing those kinds of conflict into your region?

**ADEN:** I feel that may occur, as you suggest. We would not want the Americans to be involved in Somalia because the Russians are on the other side in Ethiopia. Rather, we are trying to find a way to oust Russia from Ethiopia. We are not of the opinion that the United States is seeking a foothold in Somalia for its own interests. But we are of the belief that as a world power, the United States can help solve the broader problems of the Horn. We know that the Americans have their own interests, but one of their interests is to help find a general, just, and honorable peace in the area.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Apropos of that Mr. Minister, what is Somalia's purpose in permitting the United States to have military facilities in this country?

**ADEN:** There are many interests that Somalia has. We know that the Soviet Union assists the Ethiopians with its weapons and involved the Cubans militarily on their side. On the other side of the Red Sea, in Southern Yemen, there are Russian bases. Our sovereignty is in danger. Our request to the U.S. is to assist Somalia to be in a position to defend its statehood. Also, we would like the United States to aid us economically, to strengthen our development program, which has been harmed by war, refugees, drought, and other natural disasters.

**AFRICA REPORT:** The Reagan administration, in defining its policy towards Africa and the Third World, has indicated that it will be focusing and targeting on certain countries where the U.S. clearly has interests. Within that framework, why would you think the United States should focus particularly on Somalia?

**ADEN:** Since we are in a strategic position neighboring the Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea, we believe that relations with Somalia are an important component of American policy towards this whole region. □

STOP RUSSIAN AND CUBAN AGGRESSION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

SOOMAAN LIGI SEFTII GUREYSIGA DAK



Photo: Bureau/Sygma

**Mogadishu: "Our relations with the Soviet Union cannot be improved in the near future"**

# Mohamed Diriye Urdoh, Secretary-General of the Western Somali Liberation Front

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INTERVIEWED BY ANTHONY J. HUGHES

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**AFRICA REPORT:** What are the aims of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF)?

**URDOH:** The goal of the Western Somali Liberation Front is to free the land from the oppression of the Amharas and Ethiopia.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What is your view of the claim of the Somali Democratic Republic to incorporate Western Somalia within the SDR?

**URDOH:** There is no such claim.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Mr. Secretary-General, I saw a map this morning in the office of the minister of information of the SDR, showing Western Somalia as part of Somali territory.

**URDOH:** You know there are many maps issued by different groups. But the question is who made the map, is it made by a few people, by colonialists? The maps you mention reflect the politics and propaganda of the colonizers who are anxious to place obstacles in the way of our struggle for the independence of Western Somalia. One must follow the map that we, the fighters of Western Somalia, have already made, not maps made by others.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Sorry to pursue this, Mr. Secretary-General, but do you mean you are seeking total, separate independence for Western Somalia?

**URDOH:** The question will be answered when we get our freedom. Then, it will depend on the voice of the people; the masses will decide.


**AFRICA REPORT:** What is the current situation in Western Somalia?

**URDOH:** You must understand our position. We are struggling with strong nations, not only against the Ethiopians, but against their friends—Russians, Cubans, and others.

**AFRICA REPORT:** By my question, I also meant what are the acts being carried out by the Ethiopians and their allies, and how are you responding to their actions?

**URDOH:** As you know, the struggle is not between two governments, but is between guerrilla fighters and strong

nations, so our response to them is hit and run. That is the method of guerrilla war. Our main aim is, whenever they launch an offensive, we disturb their aim and scatter them



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**Mohamed Diriye Urdoh, secretary-general of the Western Somali Liberation Front**

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so they do not reach their goal. If the Ethiopians succeed in their offensive, or if the guerrillas cannot handle them, the Ethiopians will try to implement their policy of eradicating the people who are living in the country.



**AFRICA REPORT:** Turning to the Western Somalia Liberation Front, does it have an ideology? Is it Marxist, is it a bourgeois party?

**URDOH:** At the moment our main aim is everything to the war. We do not have any ideology, either Western or Eastern. Maybe there are elements or individuals who believe in an ideology. But overall, our goal is to get independence with guns.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What do you think of U.S. policy in this part of Africa? Would you like the United States to be more active in the region? In particular, would you like even some help from the United States?

**URDOH:** I do not see any U.S. aims in the region that are addressed toward us, Western Somalia. But we would welcome any aid coming from other sources, the U.S. or other countries. Our people would welcome and be thankful for any aid.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Speaking of assistance from other sources, the regular Somali Democratic Republic Army was involved for a time. Would you welcome their participation again, or do you want them to keep out of the struggle?

**URDOH:** During 1977 when our struggle was so strong

and the enemy was getting aid from the outside and the situation was at its worst, the Somali government gave a few soldiers to strengthen our struggle. In 1978, the Somali government withdrew their troops and after that not a single soldier from Somalia is in the country or participating in our struggle. We can prove it to anybody who comes. We will take them inside the country. There are many journalists who have been inside the country and who witnessed that no troops of Somalia are inside the Western Somalia Liberation Front.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What is the normal population of Western Somalia? How many of them are now refugees?

**URDOH:** As you know, the Western Somali people are in a colony, so we cannot give you an exact figure of the population. The population was given to be four million a few years ago. However, we estimate that the population of Western Somalia is seven million and above. The refugees in the camps are almost one and a half million and a half million of the people are inside the country of Somalia, either as dependent families, or they have temporary jobs, or are drifters. All in all the refugees inside the country of Somalia number at least two and a half million. □



WSLF rebels: "Our goal is to get independence with guns"

# Which Way in Southern Africa?

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
BY JOHN SEILER

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## THE PROBLEM FOR U.S. POLICY

Can the Reagan administration resolve the continued conflict over Namibia's future? Or will its regional policy fail because of a basic misreading of political dynamics in Namibia, South Africa, and elsewhere in the region, and as a result contribute to exacerbated regional conflict and the increased risk of superpower confrontation in southern Africa?

Although Carter administration regional policy failed ultimately to secure South African acquiescence in a UN-supervised transition for Namibia, it deserves considerable credit for main-



taining a complex multisided diplomatic process in which all participants — SWAPO, the South African government, the Frontline states, the Western contact group, and the UN Secretariat — made substantial accommodations.

The new administration has already jeopardized the prospects for continued negotiations in this framework by a number of actions and inactions that have conveyed strong (if partly unintended) signals to negotiation participants. First, understandably reluctant to automatically approve the policy of the outgoing administration, it overreacted by refusing even an observer role at the January Geneva conference, fueling a suspicion that it intended to reach some agreement with South Africa outside of the UN context. Since January, President Reagan, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and National

Security Adviser Richard V. Allen have pointedly stressed in public statements South Africa's importance to the United States and the limits of our ability to influence change within the republic. Parallel statements about international terrorism in Angola have led to the administration's request for congressional repeal of the Clark Amendment banning covert aid in the Angolan civil war, suggesting immediate U.S. support for UNITA, although in fact the repeal would only take effect in the new fiscal year starting October 1. Finally, in mid-March, separate U.S. visits by a group of senior South African military intelligence officials and Dirk Mudge and other leaders of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), now governing Namibia with South African endorsement, created considerable embarrassment for the State Department, at a time when Chester A. Crocker's appointment as assistant secretary of state for African affairs lacked prerequisite Senate confirmation.

Whatever the motives underlying these various acts, and whatever form southern African policy finally takes,

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the U.S. government is now perceived on both sides of the regional dispute as supportive of Pretoria's interests and an opponent of black-African interests. With this quick crystallization of perceptions, it will be extraordinarily difficult for the Reagan administration to generate the mutual trust and willingness to accommodate required to bring an early end to the Namibian conflict and to initiate the policy of constructive engagement for both the republic itself and the entire region that Crocker insightfully recognizes as indispensable for U.S. interests.

### THE EVOLUTION OF THE NAMIBIAN SITUATION

Until multilateral Western diplomacy began in April 1977, South Africa had to contend with no more than intermittent and usually uncoordinated demarches from the U.S. and other Western governments concerned about the Namibian stalemate. Those interventions came just before scheduled Security Council sessions and were intended to elicit from Pretoria some demonstration of change that the Western governments could then present to the Security Council as justification for their vetoes of sanction resolutions. In general, South Africa responded to these requests, often making substantial changes in political and constitutional arrangements, but never moving far from what it construed as the underlying principles of separate development.

South Africa's pattern was set during the 1972 Waldheim-Escher visits to Namibia, with a joint statement agreeing on the goal of self-determination leading to eventual independence, but with the UN version referring to "self-determination for the *people* of Namibia" and Pretoria's version calling for "self-determination for the *peoples* of Namibia." In September 1974, in response to Western pressure, South Africa prompted the territory's National party leadership to accept informal talks with other ethnic groups about Namibia's future. At that time, South African policy called for encouragement of a greater Ovamboland, including Namibian Ovambos with those in southern Angola, which would eventually gain independence separate

from the remainder of South-West Africa, thus reducing substantially the black-white imbalance in that territory.

These informal talks made no discernible headway until the U.S., U.K., and France joined in a pointed reminder in early 1975. At that time, Pretoria decided to launch a formal constitutional conference for Namibia.

That conference — the Turnhalle conference, named after the refurbished Windhoek gymnasium where its sessions were held — only began in September 1975. SWAPO and the various nonethnic parties based in Windhoek were excluded. Instead, each ethnic group was represented by elected officials or by men appointed by the South African administration.

Turnhalle met only four times between September 1975 and June 1976, and then in August 1976 it presented formal recommendations. For the first time, an early date for independence was set — December 31, 1978 — in a "single political entity" whose structure remained unspecified, but in which protection of minority rights would be a central concern. The naive goal of a benign, independent greater Ovamboland was finally put to rest.

Turnhalle did begin discussions of institutional structure based on the South African proposal for a three-tier

government. Existing ethnic administrative authorities would serve as the second tier and racially determined townships as the third. Only in the first tier, or central government, would there be multiracial government. At that level, the South African proposal demanded an unwieldy consensus of all 11 ethnic groups before any policies could be initiated. Although most of the black delegates accepted the principle of devolution of power, they wanted the central government to implement energetic national development programs that they rightly recognized to be a *sine qua non* if their own leadership was to survive SWAPO's challenge.

Although white condescension and even racism surfaced in the discussions and embittered many of the black participants, the open discussion and the modest steps proposed toward multiracial government were novel for Namibia and generated some optimism among both blacks and whites.

Despite its satisfaction with Turnhalle's progress, the South African government scrapped the constitutional conference with alacrity in its first response to the concerted Western diplomatic pressure that started in April 1977. Pretoria appointed an administrator-general, Judge Marthinus Steyn, ostensibly to bring Namibia to inde-



Western Five at January Geneva Conference on Namibia

Photo: United Nations

pendence under UN supervision. In practice, Steyn implemented South African policy with no regard to UN priorities. His first steps seemed at the time like a dramatic start to rapid social change. In an obvious bid to woo urban blacks to South African policy, he immediately ended segregation of Windhoek's hotels and restaurants and promised to open all residential areas. That move, in fact, took well over a year to complete, and desegregation was never extended to Windhoek's schools, hospitals, or employment. Outside the capital, no effective desegregation occurred in any sphere.

For the rest of 1977 and 1978, Namibian political life stagnated, although hope was stirred briefly in April 1978 by South Africa's acceptance of a transition plan negotiated by the Western contact group. After considerable pressure from the Frontline states, SWAPO accepted the plan in July. Hopes for a rapid settlement were shattered that same month, because of South African anger at what was seen as Western duplicity in supporting a Security Council resolution (in tandem with Resolution 435 which established the general framework for the transition to independence) calling for South Africa to negotiate with an independent Namibia over Walvis Bay's future. South Africa had been given no warning of this resolution's consideration, and, in any case, had no intention of giving up Walvis Bay.

In September 1978, Pretoria announced plans for ethnic-based elections to a constituent assembly, insisting that it had no intentions of foreclosing an eventual agreement in doing so. A quick visit to Pretoria that same month by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and contact group foreign ministers only persuaded the South African government that nothing more than rhetorical pressure would come from the West. The elections were held in December.

Despite this unilateral step, hope was aroused once more in January 1979, when Martti Ahtasaari, acting as Kurt Waldheim's personal representative, visited Namibia and then met Prime Minister P.W. Botha in Cape Town. During that trip, senior military officials from both South Africa and the

United Nations prepared a plan for security transition. Its abrupt dismissal by Ahtasaari and Waldheim left the South African government, and particularly the South African Defense Force, feeling betrayed and cynical about the Secretariat's motives.

Nothing productive happened in Namibia during 1979. Although the constituent assembly was given legislative powers in May, it preoccupied itself with mundane administrative matters, instead of dealing with residual segregation or launching a national development program. A new administrative-general, Professor Gerrit Viljoen, former rector of Rand Afrikaans University and Broederbond chairman, was appointed in August. Despite his *verligte* (enlightened, progressive) reputation, he spent his short term (through August 1980) placating conservative whites in the territory and made no addition to the modest steps taken by his predecessor. On his departure, Pretoria announced that a wide range of executive powers — including defense and police — would go to the legislative assembly. Dirk Mudge, leader of the Republican party — a moderate breakaway faction of the National party — formed a council of ministers and became chief minister.

The negotiations continued in a desultory way during 1980. General Prem Chand was appointed as commander of UNTAG, the military supervisory team for the Namibian transition, and visited Namibia and South Africa in January. During talks with Chand, the South African government focused on the proposal of a demilitarized zone made by Agostino Neto, then Angolan president, and on UNTAG's capability to effectively monitor the long Namibian-Angolan border against SWAPO incursions in the pre-election period.

Later in 1980, Pretoria brought the issue of UN partiality toward SWAPO to the center of its interchanges with the Secretariat. In hopes of quickly meeting this concern, a high-level team headed by Undersecretary Brian Urquhart visited Pretoria in October. No agreement was reached, and in order to maintain some momentum in the negotiations, the Secretariat conceded to the South African desire for a conference that would bring the DTA face-to-face

with SWAPO and shift the negotiations' focus away from South Africa. In its call for the conference, the Secretariat played down the South African priority, insisting that the DTA (and any other parties willing to take part) could come only as a constituent of the South African delegation.

The Secretariat's hope that South Africa would be mollified by a public platform for the DTA and would, in turn, accept a March 31, 1981 cease-fire and Namibian independence by the end of that same year proved naive. In fact, the Geneva conference of January 7-14, 1981 demonstrated more vividly than ever before the South African commitment to its conception of Namibia's political future. No agreement was achieved on a cease-fire date. Instead, Dirk Mudge made an extended attack on the UN's partiality toward SWAPO, and Danie Hough, Viljoen's replacement as administrator-general, bluntly called a cease-fire premature until such time as mutual trust could be established.

UN optimism about the conference had some basis before the Reagan electoral landslide in November, but within a week after that win, the South African government's diplomatic behavior grew strikingly equivocal. Pretoria believed the new administration would support its Namibian policy and therefore could see no justification to give in to UN pressures.

#### **SOUTH AFRICA'S PRESENT POSTURE**

South African confidence about its Namibian policy has been expressed in a number of ways since the Geneva conference. Prime Minister Botha, Foreign Affairs Minister R.F. (Pik) Botha, Major General Charles Lloyd, the commander of the SADF forces in Namibia, Danie Hough, Dirk Mudge, and others have spoken publicly of the total collapse of the UN framework for negotiations.

In the same period, the SADF has launched major raids into southern Angola (one during the Geneva conference) and a bold attack on ANC offices on the outskirts of Maputo, Mozambique. The South African mission at the UN was downgraded to its previous status as a nonambassadorial post even before the General Assembly voted



against South African participation in the March debate on Namibia. Then, in mid-March, reflecting an incautious cockiness about the Reagan administration reaction, Pretoria authorized two "private" visits to the United States — one by senior SADF intelligence officers, and the other by Dirk Mudge and senior DTA officials.

What prompts this massive self-confidence? Obviously pivotal is a South African perception (whether or not justified remains to be seen) of U.S. support for its Namibian and regional policy objectives. But even if this perception proves exaggerated, the South African government rightly assesses itself as regionally preponderant in economic and military power and incorrectly assumes that its black neighbors will accommodate to its own regional goals as a result.

The implications for South African policy toward Namibia are clear. Danie Hough will relinquish his remaining executive powers to the Council of Ministers and adopt a purely symbolic role. The development of a Namibian defense force, already underway, will be accelerated. The DTA will renew its efforts to woo black political leaders — from the Namibian National Front, the Namibian Independence party, and SWAPO-Democrats — into the government with offers of assembly seats

and perhaps even ministerial posts. Its chances of success remain very small. At the same time, training programs for black public servants, mostly in second-tier and third-tier administration, will be expanded.

Underlying this deepening commitment is a basic difference between the South African perception of its Namibian role and its perception of political developments in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere in the region. South Africa was never comfortable with the integrative goals of black nationalism for these other states and gave both overt and covert support to more agreeable alternative parties, but it now takes pride in its pragmatic working relationships with these regimes. But it feels a deep responsibility for Namibia and for what it sees as productive political development based on a healthy acknowledgment of ethnic differences. This moral commitment weighs even more heavily than economic or security calculations. In fact, those calculations argue for early relinquishment of the territory. Security lines would be better drawn at the Orange River than at the Cunene. The major mining interests, especially De Beers, are ready to live with a SWAPO government, if need be. And the South African government anticipates the continuation of economic relations on the lines of those with Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

#### IMPLICATIONS OF STALEMATE

Continued South African support for the DTA will not have immediate drastic consequences, but if continued over the next several years it will bring a profound decay in territorial and regional stability. Black Namibian frustration will grow rapidly, unless the Council of Ministers starts a massive program of economic and social development — which, judging by its near-inertia over the past several years, seems highly improbable. SWAPO can only profit, while the powerless "middle" parties lose their potential support, and the DTA stagnates. Private investment, which has ebbed for several years, will stay low, despite the widespread commercial interest in mineral exploration and development.

SADF raids into Angola will continue, although in turn SWAPO's numbers will be recharged by recruits drawn from the current crop of black draft-refusers who have been leaving the country since late last year, somewhat like their 1974 predecessors, although less-educated and in smaller numbers. SWAPO weaponry will be made increasingly sophisticated by infusions of Soviet-bloc arms and advisers. And most depressingly, the present social disintegration in the operational areas of Ovamboland, Caprivi, and Kavongo — due to the overall impact of SADF, South African Police, and SWAPO raids and coercion — will be enormously worsened.

Beyond Namibia, the prospects for a wider regional accommodation will essentially disappear. The Frontline states will have no political argument for dealing with South Africa. To the contrary, they will be compelled by their political principles to sacrifice short-term economic advantages and to give greater support for SWAPO and the ANC. At the United Nations, renewed efforts will be made to impose mandatory sanctions. The United States will be forced to exercise repeatedly the veto that Reagan administration officials have self-defeatedly insisted will be their sole reaction to calls for sanctions against South Africa. In casting its vetoes, the United States may find itself increasingly in dispute with the United Kingdom and France, who are more likely to abstain on sanctions votes. Growing Nigerian anger at the Namibian impasse cannot be slighted, although a Nigerian embargo on oil sales to Western countries seems unlikely, at least as long as the present production surplus continues. And, finally, increasing Soviet-bloc aid to SWAPO and to the Angolan government will pose temptations for greater involvement to a U.S. administration inclined to see unchallenged Soviet involvement as a sign of U.S. weakness and a harbinger of longer-term communist political successes.

#### EARLY SIGNS OF A REAGAN REGIONAL POLICY

Although no formal statement of U.S. regional policy has been made (as



Photo: Ingelore Frank/Alan Hutchinson Library

**Dirk Mudge of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance accused the United Nations of partiality toward SWAPO**

of late March 1981), the various first steps mentioned earlier suggest an emerging regional policy in which strategic and resource priorities will dominate. Likely elements of Reagan regional policy include: a willingness to accept South Africa's Namibian policy, as long as an independence date is set, even if the transition to independence takes place outside the UN framework; covert efforts to strengthen UNITA, at least to the extent required to give it bargaining power vis-à-vis the Angolan government in a final settlement of their political differences; the retention of Walvis Bay by South Africa; and the use of U.S. economic aid to "buy off" Zimbabwe and other regional governments to accede to these political acts and, at the same time, to strengthen them against Soviet-bloc penetration. Given the general language of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), even these steps could be refitted into the UN framework for formal approval if they could somehow be made acceptable to black regional regimes. Crocker would probably want to do this, although Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and other conservatives would prefer a regional policy taken altogether and irrevocably from the UN framework.

But this overall regional policy contains at least two profoundly incorrect assumptions. First, it assumes (as did the September 1976 U.S.-U.K. plan for Rhodesia) that the Frontline states would accept relegation to a passive role in the settlement of the Namibian conflict — and be placated by the balm of economic aid in doing so. Second, it assumes that the South African government, presently supremely self-confident about its survival, would accede to even minimal U.S. requirements for a transition to Namibian independence.

#### HOW CAN U.S. POLICY BE MADE EFFECTIVE?

An effective U.S. regional policy must in the first instance keep the Frontline states actively involved in negotiations over Namibia and other regional problems. More than a sop to their dignity, doing so would be a recognition of their own tacit accommo-

dation to South Africa, to the extent that they can recognize some constructive possibilities in South African regional and domestic policies, and to their constructive impact on SWAPO (and potentially on the ANC).

It must also recognize the painful truth about South African policy and administration of Namibia in these past few years. Despite concerted (albeit intermittent) pressure from the Western contact group, South African policy has failed to achieve much of anything for urban blacks and only marginally more for the masses of rural Namibians. It has been a case of too little and — even if the DTA administrative pace quickens — in the larger political context far too late. If the first steps taken by Judge Steyn in 1977 had been built on quickly, and particularly if the multiracial central government had attracted the most competent blacks to its service and had taken decisive and bold steps toward national development, even now there might be some chance of non-SWAPO forces winning a UN-supervised election.

These steps did not take place, partly because most moderate blacks chose eventual international legitimacy over immediate South African endorsement for their political activities, but even more basically because both the South African government and its DTA surrogates failed to perceive the degree and rapidity of change required. Of course, SWAPO will now win any fair UN-supervised election, for the same reasons that Mugabe won overwhelmingly in Zimbabwe: only SWAPO's "boys" are actively challenging a regime that offers not even hope to blacks. If Reagan policy succeeds in achieving an internationally accepted election in two years time, which seems to fit the South African timetable for DTA readiness, SWAPO will gain an even larger margin. At least, prompt acceptance of an election before the end of 1981 might salvage some role for the best of the "middle" party leaders — people like Zed Ngavirue, Andreas Shipanga, Kenneth and Ottilia Abrahams, Nora Chase — and perhaps for even a few of the DTA councillors.

Forsaking the temptation to support UNITA must be another basic element of U.S. regional policy. However co-

gent such support was (at least briefly) in 1975, it makes no political sense now. The MPLA is Angola's government, however tenuous the constitutional process by which it grasped power and legitimacy. More practi-



Photo: Y. Negata/UN

**Sam Nujoma's SWAPO will now win any fair UN-supervised election**

cally, U.S. support for UNITA would not achieve the goal of strengthening it just enough to give it political parity, for the very act of support would bring increased political and military support for the Angolan government. The Cuban presence would not be reduced, and even if the Cuban government could not afford to send additional men, other governments would do so, if required.

In supporting UNITA, the U.S. would be effectively supporting South African policy toward Angola, which calls for destabilization by covert means in order to buffer South African control of Namibian political development. Such support, like support for South African policy towards Namibia, makes no sense even when viewed through Reagan administration perceptions. Chester Crocker has argued cogently for a policy of constructive engagement in South Africa and in the larger region, but the successful implementation of that policy rests on a prompt resolution of the Namibian conflict *within the UN context*. Otherwise, if the U.S. government starts such a policy vis-à-vis South Africa, it



can expect only increasing frustration as South Africa presses for U.S. support in its Namibian and regional policies. Our potential willingness to engage in a policy of constructive engagement must be utilized as a lever to encourage South Africa to give up its counterproductive control of Namibia. Since sanctions make no sense, the U.S. has no other available lever. In this light, the first steps in Reagan administration policy seem both anomalous and near-disastrous. Broad hints of support for South Africa have been expressed, while at the same time South African policy in Namibia has been granted tacit approval.

The South African government has shown considerable shrewdness in encouraging support from U.S. quarters. Conservative Republicans find such support reasonable and have little enthusiasm for constructive engagement, which demands at least as much thoughtful criticism as it does sympathy. Given the bad start of the Reagan administration, the multifold grounds

for agreement between South Africa and conservative Republicans, and the effect on Chester Crocker's ability to control African policy imposed by the long delay in his confirmation, there remains very little ground for optimism about an effective regional policy emerging during this administration.

Yet constructive engagement makes much sense if appropriately implemented. Major U.S. business interests have a stake in a policy that treats with civility and gives credence to both black African regimes and the South African government. They have already expressed their concern about the impact of Reagan regional policy on their overall African interests.

Within Congress, especially if Senator Helms and his staff persist in policy challenges that are overbearing and irrational, some possibility of a moderate Republican-liberal Democratic coalescence will survive. To her credit, Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-Kans.) who chairs the African Affairs Subcommittee of the

Foreign Relations Committee, publicly queried Secretary Haig about the impact in black Africa of repeal of the Clark Amendment. Although she will support repeal and plans no hearings on the issue, her sensibility might help to defer any massive resort to covert activities in Angola following that repeal.

In the House of Representatives, Congressman Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.), chairman of the Africa Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee, may be tempted to bluntly attack the entire Reagan administration for its failing regional policy. But if he could find some common ground with Kassebaum and other moderate Republicans (and Democrats), then Chester Crocker would gain strength in what will be a continuing struggle to secure control of African policy from Senator Helms and his cohorts. Such a convergence behind a moderate policy could avoid disaster for U.S. African interests and might, at best, result in a truly constructive U.S. involvement in that continent. □



Photo: Contact UN

Windhoek: Desegregation was never extended to the city's schools, hospitals, or employment

# Reagan's Unruly Review

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BY RICHARD DEUTSCH

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The Reagan administration kept U.S. policy on southern African issues officially "under review" during its early months in power. But despite the review, statements were made and decisions taken that may have long-range impact on the efficacy of American policy in the region.

Soon after Mr. Reagan's inauguration, Secretary of State Alexander Haig sparked a diplomatic offensive against "communist aggression" in Central America. The intensity of Secretary Haig's El Salvador campaign attracted major national attention. So it was not surprising that a statement on South Africa by a U.S. official in mid-February went largely unnoticed.

The official, Richard Schifter, told the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva that the United States abhors apartheid. Schifter said the racist system "makes it impossible for the U.S. to develop the type of relationship with South Africa that we would wish." He said, "The United States cannot endorse a system that is racist in purpose or effect." Schifter called South Africa "one of the most serious offenders of human rights," yet added that, "we also hold violence and terrorism in abhorrence."

The U.S. delegate recommended "dialogue" with South Africa to encourage "evolutionary change." And

he made clear that neither those South Africans who stand in the way of social reform, nor those who call for violent revolution in Pretoria, would enjoy U.S. support.

Schifter's statement was not echoed in Washington, where the diplomatic spotlight remained focused on Central America. The tough U.S. stance on El Salvador made liberals uneasy. Typical were comments such as those of the *Washington Post's* William Greider: "Think of the Cold War like college basketball, and Vietnam and El Salvador as a series with the Reds. This time the U.S.A. has the home-court advantage. In diplomacy this is known as the Monroe Doctrine. The basic coaching strategy seems to be: pick up a quick win in Central America, re-build team confidence, then take them on the road, maybe to Africa."

It was not until early March that controversy over southern Africa began to simmer in Washington. Ironically, it was President Reagan who turned up the heat.

In a nationally televised interview, Reagan was asked by retiring CBS newsman Walter Cronkite: "Should [we] make the country a full-fledged partner of the United States in the struggle against communist expansion? Should we drop all our concerns about human rights in South Africa?"

"No, No," said Reagan, "I think, though, that there's been a failure, maybe for political reasons in this country, to recognize how many people, black and white, are trying to remove apartheid, and the steps they've taken and the gains that they've made. As long as there is a sincere and honest effort being made, based on our own experience in our own land it would seem to me that we should be trying to be helpful. And can we again take that other course? Can we abandon a country that has stood beside us in every war we've ever fought, a country that is strategically essential to the Free World in its production of minerals we all must have . . . I just feel that if we're going to sit down at a table and negotiate with the Russians, surely we can keep the door open and continue to negotiate with a friendly nation like South Africa."

President Reagan's statement raised more questions than it answered. The State Department would not elaborate on the president's words, saying mainly, "Our overall policy towards the southern African region is still under review."

Reagan's comment was enthusiastically welcomed by white South African leaders. Most African heads of government remained silent, reserving

judgment. In Washington, however, partisans on all sides of the southern African debate began to gear up for political battle.

On the same day of his CBS interview, President Reagan announced the nomination of Dr. Chester Crocker to be assistant secretary of state for African affairs. Crocker's nomination had been held back for weeks because of opposition from Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and other right-wing senators. It also became known in Washington that South Africa had selected a different law firm to lobby for Pretoria's positions. One of the senior partners in the firm, John Sears, had once managed Reagan's presidential campaign. Crocker's nomination seemed to signal increased regard within the administration for moderate positions on southern Africa. On the other hand, Sears' new role appeared to presage a direct channel from Pretoria into the top ranks of the Republican party.

Meanwhile at the United Nations, debate began in the General Assembly on the question of Namibia. Discussion of that issue, however, was overshadowed by diplomatic theatrics on the General Assembly floor. The South African delegation, expelled in 1974 on the grounds that it did not represent the majority of South Africans, once again took its place.

And once again the General Assembly ejected the South Africans. The United States and a handful of other Western nations opposed this decision. U.S. representative Jeane Kirkpatrick insisted, as the U.S. had seven years before, that only the Security Council could expel a nation, and that every member nation had a right to be heard.

A few days later the General Assembly issued its perennial call for trade sanctions against South Africa because of Pretoria's intransigence on Namibia. Having noted Mr. Reagan's reference to "friendly" South Africa, many delegates thought Ambassador Kirkpatrick might vote against the resolution. But along with other Western nations working for the implementation of the UN plan on Namibia, the United States abstained.

"Our objective remains to secure a peaceful, internationally recognized

settlement in Namibia. Few of the resolutions before us contribute to the objective," said Kirkpatrick.

A little more than a week passed before internal Namibian leader Dirk Mudge, head of the South African-sponsored Council of Ministers in Windhoek, flew into Washington.

His visit was facilitated by Marion Smoak, a former senior Nixon administration official and a member of President Reagan's transition team. Mudge prefaced his visit with a letter to President Reagan requesting a meeting. In his letter, Mudge stressed: "SWAPO (The South-West Africa People's Organization), as a communist-bloc terrorist surrogate, has threatened to step up its violence. We have predictable Soviet targets: the largest uranium mine in the world and a deep-water port capable of basing a Russian nuclear fleet to bisect the oil lifeline from the Persian Gulf."

Mudge said that internal Namibian parties are "impatient to achieve full independence of Namibia on an internationally acceptable basis. However, we will not agree to the sacrifice of our local self-government to a SWAPO takeover, to impose a Soviet-oriented dictatorship."

Mudge was refused a meeting with Reagan and allowed to enter the United States only for a "private visit." The Namibian leader spent much of his time in Washington meeting with members of Congress and the press. He stressed the themes of his letter to Reagan, claimed that the South African-sponsored National Assembly in Namibia had been fairly elected by the people. Mudge also asserted that the United Nations could not fairly supervise elections in Namibia, as envisaged under the UN plan, because of the General Assembly's recognition of SWAPO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people." As proof of the UN's bias, he pointed to the General Assembly's refusal to seat the South African delegation.

Alarmed by Mudge's visit, liberal and black-American groups in Washington began mobilizing. The Washington Office on Africa and TransAfrica prompted more than 100 national civil rights, church, and labor leaders to

sign a letter to President Reagan. They urged the president to publicly endorse the UN plan for Namibian independence, and to "press the government of South Africa to implement that plan."

"There is hardly a constructive alternative to working with all the parties to implement the agreed-to plan for Namibian independence. . . . For American silence is construed by Africa and South Africa alike as tacit endorsement of South Africa's indefensible policies," said the letter.

There was no reply from the White House and little from the State Department, which had a far more contentious visit on its hands to worry about. The day Mudge arrived, the State Department had quietly told a group of five high-ranking South African military and intelligence officers to leave the United States. The South African officers had been invited to Washington by the right-wing American Security Council, and had held substantive meetings with Department of Defense and National Security Council officials. Their visit was clearly in defiance of established U.S. policy, which for two decades had generally complied with the UN-mandated arms embargo against South Africa.

The State Department had learned of the visit only after the officers had been in Washington for several days. Embarrassed, State Department officials investigated, then told reporters that the officials had misrepresented themselves while applying for visas in Pretoria. The uproar over the incident would have been far greater, but for the attention given other events of the week in Washington.

That same week Washington newspapers quoted unnamed U.S. officials as saying the administration was considering the idea of inviting South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha to Washington for an official visit. Press reports said "high administration officials" felt a visit by Botha might break the impasse over Namibia. The reports also said that U.S. officials were considering inviting South African homeland leaders to Washington.

A visit by a South African prime minister would be unprecedented, and would probably unleash a storm of op-



position from liberal, labor, and black-American groups in the United States. A visit by Botha would also probably be taken as a deliberate affront by many African nations, regardless of the results of the venture. But some U.S. officials were also reported to feel that a visit to Washington would give Botha leverage at home to deal with critics of his attempts to liberalize Pretoria's racial policies.

The State Department promptly and repeatedly denied that visits by Botha or homeland leaders were being considered. But usually reliable sources say that, official denials to the contrary, both visits have been under consideration.

While controversy raged over reports of a possible visit by Botha, South Africa launched major air raids against SWAPO bases in Angola, and the Reagan administration asked Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment. That legislation prohibits U.S. aid to UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) guerrillas fighting the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government in Luanda. At the same time, reports reached Washington that UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was about to arrive in the U.S. capital to press his case for renewed U.S. military assistance against the Cuban-backed Angolan government.

Secretary of State Haig went before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to appeal for an end to the Clark Amendment as a matter of principle, on grounds that the law "is an unnecessary restriction on the ability of the president to carry out his responsibilities."

The State Department, anticipating Savimbi's visit, said it would issue the Angolan leader a visa and consult with him. The Carter administration had refused Dr. Savimbi official meetings during a prior visit. However, the State Department said U.S. policy on Angola had not changed, but remained "under review," adding that: "We will be prepared to hear the views of the MPLA government in Luanda. We want to hear the views of all parties to the conflict."

The administration's request for a repeal of the Clark Amendment was

expected to become a major issue of contention in Congress. Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kans.), chairwoman of the African Affairs Subcommittee, questioned the timing of the request, saying it would send the wrong signals to African nations. But despite the misgivings of moderate senators and the opposition of liberals, the Clark Amendment is expected to fall in the Senate, as it did last year.

The critical battle over the Clark Amendment will come in the House, where Africa subcommittee chairman Howard Wolpe has announced he will fight to retain the law. Wolpe called the administration's request a "serious mistake" and immediately planned public hearings on the issue. Wolpe will have the backing of the Africa subcommittee's former chairman, Stephen Solarz, who has promised "vigorous resistance" to repeal of the Clark Amendment.

"The administration is about to embark on a course which will undermine the prospects for a negotiated settlement in Namibia, further entrench the Cuban presence in Angola, jeopardize our commercial interests, and set back our relations with a number of African states," said Solarz. "If this is the first shot in the president's policy towards Africa, it is sure to backfire."

Private lobbies also joined the fray. The church-sponsored Washington Office on Africa announced a national campaign to retain the Clark Amendment, charging that the Reagan administration "seeks to make Angola the testing ground for countering Soviet influence in southern Africa, as El Salvador is in Central America."

House sources say crucial action on the Clark Amendment is likely to come in floor votes this spring. Those opposed to repeal of the amendment say they are encouraged by the tone of current mail to the White House, reported to be running 10-to-1 against further U.S. involvement in El Salvador.

Attention given the administration's plans for the Clark Amendment overshadowed another Reagan administration decision announced the same week: Washington would suspend all food aid to Mozambique. This action was said to be in retaliation for the ex-

pulsion of four U.S. diplomats from Maputo earlier in March.

Mozambique had ordered the expulsion after charging the U.S. officials with running a Central Intelligence Agency spy ring in Maputo. Specifically, Mozambique said the CIA had helped South Africa locate the Maputo offices of the banned African National Congress. A South African raid on those offices in January resulted in the deaths of several ANC officials.

The State Department countered that Cuban intelligence officers had convinced Mozambique to expel the Americans, and had tried to force an American diplomat to become a Cuban spy. The affair might have ended with a public U.S. protest, had not Soviet naval forces visited Maputo soon after the South African raid. This reassured Mozambique, but it also set off alarm bells among right-wing forces in Washington, especially in the Senate where Jesse Helms was calling for the use of food as a "foreign policy lever." Right-wing forces pressured the White House for action, the National Security Council was reportedly sympathetic, and the order went out to stop the shipment of U.S. food to Mozambique.

During the same week in Washington the 40 million member National Council of Churches announced a renewed campaign to oppose all U.S. bank loans to South Africa. A spokesman for the NCC said: "The banks can make their choice, whether they want interest from their loans to South Africa, or deposits from black people and others who care in America."

The week ended with a widely reported speech by National Security Adviser Richard Allen to a conservative action convention in Washington. Allen said: "I personally don't consider an improvement of relations with South Africa as any stamp of approval of the system of apartheid, which I do not approve of, and which I feel deserves to be roundly condemned." However, Allen added that if the United States maintains ties with totalitarian nations, "then it makes equal sense that we have to maintain ties with people who do not profess to be our enemies, and with whose systems we may differ radically... We don't have to embrace

every facet of a nation's system to maintain friendship."

The following week marked the end of President Reagan's second month in office. The atmosphere surrounding U.S. policy towards southern Africa grew increasingly tense. UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick was reported to have met with some of the South African intelligence officers shortly before they left the United States. The White House claimed that Ambassador Kirkpatrick had not known the true identity of the South Africans. The Congressional Black Caucus, recalling former UN ambassador Andrew Young's resignation following disclosure of his meetings with PLO representatives, cried "foul." The Black Caucus demanded Ambassador Kirkpatrick's resignation or dismissal.

One Black Caucus member, Democratic Congressman Julian Dixon of California, introduced a resolution in the House calling on Reagan not to invite South African Prime Minister Botha to visit Washington until his nation renounces apartheid.

"In recent days there have been alarming signals that President Reagan will seek to totally reverse U.S. policies toward South Africa and the region in general. . . . Congress is deeply concerned over administration policy in southern Africa, and we will not stand by and watch our progress in this region reversed," said the Dixon resolution, which quickly picked up 30 co-sponsors.

Reaction to events in Washington began to pour in from African leaders as well. Nigerian President Shehu Shagari, visiting London, called a news conference to warn the Reagan administration not to tilt U.S. policy towards South Africa, nor lend support to UNITA in Angola. However, President Shagari said he realized that Washington was "still studying the African situation and we can give them the benefit of the doubt until we see exactly what they are going to do."

From Zimbabwe, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe wrote President Reagan, asking him to pressure South Africa to end apartheid and to implement the UN plan for Namibia. Much the same message came from Organization

of African Unity Chairman Siaka Stevens. Stevens suggested the OAU send a delegation to Washington to protest the administration's "interest in supporting South African backed rebels [UNITA] in Angola."

The State Department responded by quickly inviting Nigerian Foreign Minister Ishaya Adu to Washington for talks with Secretary Haig and Dr. Crocker. Adu emerged from a three-hour meeting with Haig to express optimism that the United States and Nigeria would join efforts in promoting racial change in South Africa. He added that Nigeria was waiting for the Reagan administration to act.

In a further response to African criticism, the State Department issued a statement calling on African nations to "reserve judgment" on Reagan administration policies toward southern Africa. U.S. officials began to broadly hint in private that the "policy review" would soon be over, that some general guidelines on U.S. policy towards the region would be forthcoming.

One voice conspicuously absent from the public forum during the "review process" was that of Assistant Secretary of State-designate for Africa, Dr. Chester Crocker. As the Reagan administration ended its second month, the Republican-controlled Senate Foreign Relations Committee had not yet even scheduled confirmation hearings for Dr. Crocker and other assistant secretaries, many of whom are opposed to right-wing Senate forces.

The apparent impasse, along with a highly publicized rivalry between Secretary Haig and senior White House staff over foreign policy jurisdiction, pointed to an unresolved power struggle within the Republican party. Among other issues, the direction of southern Africa policies appeared to hang in balance.

State Department spokesmen regularly reassured the public: "As we carry out the review, our emphasis in formulation of policy in southern Africa will be on finding diplomatic solutions to the area's conflicts."

But events in Washington suggested otherwise, leaving the clear impression that the administration intended a "pro-South African tilt," and the

White House did little to set the record straight.

As a result, many observers found themselves agreeing with the judgment of a *New York Times* editorial: "Just two months at sea, the Reagan administration seems headed into a foreign policy fog of its own making. . . . The style is not only disquieting, it may be destructive. Even before policies have been charted, the choices are being narrowed by heedless remarks and public posturing. A striking case in point is President Reagan's casual stance on South Africa. . . . When will the administration calculate where it is headed in Africa? Does it really care?"

Pressure continued to mount in Washington for the administration to make some decisions on the direction of U.S. policy towards southern Africa. Rather abruptly, as the administration entered its third month, the first stage of "policy review" came to a conclusion.

U.S. officials let it be known that Angolan leader Jonas Savimbi had been persuaded by the administration to postpone his visit to Washington. A senior administration official would lead a U.S. delegation to an OAU-sponsored conference on African refugee problems. The administration signaled its support for Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's government in Zimbabwe: a three-year, \$225 million aid package was pledged to the new nation's reconstruction efforts.

And finally, the administration announced plans to dispatch Assistant Secretary-designate Crocker on a mission to southern Africa. Crocker was expected to consult with leaders in Pretoria about promoting racial change in South Africa. Crocker was also expected to meet with the leaders of the Frontline states in southern Africa, to stress a Reagan administration commitment to an internationally acceptable formula for bringing independence to Namibia. He would also discuss the thrust of Reagan administration thinking on southern African issues.

"That's going to take a great deal of explanation," commented one high-ranking State Department official, looking back on the events of the administration's first months in Washington. □

## Pretoria welcomes 'Zimbabwe formula' for Namibia settlement

The South African government has indicated it will embrace the Reagan administration's proposal to include constitutional guarantees for Namibia's white minority along the lines of the Zimbabwe settlement.

Pretoria has been advocating constitutional safeguards for more than a year and reportedly held secret talks with the Angolan government last August in an effort to persuade the front-line African states to accept constitutional guarantees for the territory's 100,000 whites. The drawn-out negotiations for the UN plan collapsed at the Geneva conference in January when South Africa unilaterally rejected the solution it had previously accepted.

At that conference, there were private discussions with the Namibian insurgents, the South-West Af-

rican People's Organization, about the possibility of drafting a constitution before elections, and SWAPO's president, Sam Nujoma, indicated he would be willing to accept some constitutional safeguards for the minority. (London *Guardian*, April 2, 1981.)

The administration revealed in March that it intended to pursue the Namibian settlement when Secretary of State Alexander Haig met Nigerian Foreign Minister Ishaya Adu in Washington. Haig reportedly told Adu that the U.S. was prepared to support the Namibian initiative and that American foreign policy toward southern Africa would not substantially change under the new administration. President Reagan told the *Washington Post* in an interview that the Namibian solution involves an election that "should follow the adoption of

a constitution that guarantees equal rights to all people in the country—property rights, minority rights." (London *Guardian*, March 30, 1981; *Washington Post*, March 29, 1981.)

In South Africa, however, Dirk Mudge, the head of Namibia's South African-installed authority who lobbied in Washington in March, said he believed the administration wants a solution that would by-pass the UN resolution and instead would have Western powers supervise the independence election. (London *Sunday Times*, March 29, 1981.)

In April, Chester Crocker, the assistant secretary of state-designate for African affairs, embarked on a nine-nation visit to explain the administration's formula to the front-line African states, Nigeria and

*Continued on next page*

## West promises \$1.8 billion to reconstruct Zimbabwe economy

The government of Zimbabwe sought some \$1.8 billion in international aid over the next three years mainly to improve the lot of five million people in the rural areas who "eke out scarcely a bare subsistence," in the words of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. The Western nations at the aid donors conference in late March pledged what was asked for, \$1.8 billion, with the U.S. promising \$210 million.

The biggest donors were the World Bank, \$430 million, Britain, \$315 million, the U.S. and the European Common Market, \$180 million.

The goal of the massive injection of aid is to correct the imbalance of the dual economy. "Average income in the modern sector is more than 20 times that in the subsistence sector," said Bernard Chidzero, Minister of Economic Planning and

Development. "The urban black per capita income is only 10 percent that of the whites, while that of the rural black population is only 1 percent."

The generosity of the donor nations was considered partly economic. Zimbabwe has a well-developed infrastructure, prosperous farming, mining and manufacturing sectors and has a good chance of becoming self-supporting. In February, the government released an economic plan that emphasized the need to establish "an egalitarian society" through joint ventures involving the government and domestic and foreign businesses.

Another reason was political. A stable Zimbabwe, in this view, could help smooth the process of change in neighboring South Africa, where Western business has large

investments. This point was made by Edem Kodjo, OAU secretary-general, who said at the conference that Western investment in South Africa is 30 times greater than the \$1.8 billion requested by Zimbabwe. (London *Times*, February 26 and March 28, 1981; *Economist*, March 28, 1981; *Washington Post*, March 28, 1981; *Salisbury Radio*, March 23, 1981.)

In politics, the government postponed indefinitely municipal elections scheduled for the end of March in Bulawayo, the stronghold of Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front party. Dr. Eddison Zvobgo, the Minister of Local Government, said that ex-guerrillas loyal to Nkomo had weapons hidden around the city, Zimbabwe's second largest, and there was "a grave risk" of another outbreak of violence like the

*Continued on next page*



## Tutu criticizes foreign investors; his passport is confiscated

Prime Minister Pieter Botha said in March his government had returned the passport of Bishop Desmond Tutu as "a favor, not a right" and it was withdrawn when the outspoken black prelate returned from his trip to the U.S. and Britain.

Tutu, general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, spent his first overseas trip since his passport was confiscated in March 1980 and returned last January publicly and privately urging political, economic and diplomatic pressure against the South African government.

To the South Africans, probably Tutu's most controversial statements were his remarks to the National Council of Churches on the subject of foreign investors who say they are helping black South Africans.

"I am telling them that they are lying," he said. "They must know that they are investing to buttress

one of the most vicious systems since Nazism."

Tutu also said—and it was widely reported in South Africa—that in ten years South Africa will have a black Prime Minister who "may very well be Nelson Mandela," the imprisoned leader of the banned African National Congress.

Tutu's passport had been withdrawn last year because he refused to retract a statement he made in Copenhagen in 1979 urging the Danish government to stop buying South African coal.

While overseas, Tutu kept his promise to speak out "everywhere I get the chance." He told church leaders and officials of the U.S. and British governments: "For God's sake, and the sake of world peace, take action and exert political, diplomatic and economic pressure to make the South African authorities come to the conference table before it is too late."

## UN releases blacklist in sports campaign

The international campaign to isolate South Africa in sports has intensified with the UN's compilation of a blacklist of some 185 athletes who have competed in South Africa or with South Africans. Countries have been asked to boycott these athletes unless and until they mend their ways.

In March, British golfer Nick Faldo declared that he would never again play in South Africa in a bid to have his name expunged from the blacklist. Nigeria banned a British tennis player on the list and Guyana expelled a British cricketer.

Most of the list, which was to be published in May, has already been made public. The list covers people who have had sports links with South Africa since last September and was compiled mainly by the London-based South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (Sanroc) and released by the UN special committee against apartheid.

Other organizations, including ACCESS in the U.S., are drawing their own lists for inclusion by the UN committee, which will review all the names. Some names "could

be withdrawn from the list if they haven't participated in sports with South Africa for some years," said ACCESS director Richard Lapchick.

Sanroc's chairman, Samba Ramamy, claims that not only Third World countries but also Western nations will support the list. "There are sports organizations in the West that won't touch a blacklisted person," he said. There is only one African on the list so far and all the rest are from the West, including 44 Americans and 36 Britons.

In South Africa, the blacklist is strongly backed by the Azanian People's Organization and by the South African Council of Sport, which helped compile the blacklist. The government-run Johannesburg Radio commented: "Radical Third World elements are indeed ill-advised to broaden hostility towards them, as by presuming to dictate to Western sportsmen where and with whom they should play." (London *Guardian*, March 28, 1981; *Sowetan*, March 18 and 23, 1981; Johannesburg Radio, March 16, 1981; Johannesburg *Star*, March 14, 1981.) □

As for Botha's threat to take away his passport again, Tutu said it was "strange that someone seeking change through nonviolent means should be penalized by the withdrawal of a passport. Perhaps this will convince the world that there is no really effective peaceful means left to blacks." (London *Guardian*, March 31 and April 2, 1981; *Sowetan*, March 25, 26 and 27, 1981; Johannesburg *Star*, March 28, 1981.)

## Pretoria continued

South Africa.

President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria—one of Crocker's stops—made a state visit to Britain in March in which he urged the Thatcher government not to veto UN oil sanctions against South Africa.

South Africa's minority regime, he said, "survives with the collusion and encouragement of the Western powers, who are supplying arms to the racists. Further, these Western powers are using their veto to block the oil embargo which is the only way—I say the only way—to end this repressive regime."

Shagari added that Nigeria will give "all aid to the freedom fighters" of Namibia and South Africa. (London *Guardian*, March 21, 1981.) □

## Zimbabwe continued

fighting in February.

A Patriotic Front spokesman said however, that the delay was designed to allow the majority Zanu-PF party to become more organized in Bulawayo. (London *Times*, March 13, 1981.)

A suggestion by Zvobgo that eventually the Patriotic Front could merge with Zanu-PF, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's ruling party, was apparently diplomatically sidestepped by Nkomo in April. Noting the "recent unfortunate incidents" involving ex-guerrillas of both parties, Nkomo said: "On the whole, one hopes that one day we may be able to learn to live together."

Later, though, Mugabe criticized the concept of a multi-party parliamentary system, saying that "opposition for the sake of opposition is negation ... of the positive." (London *Guardian*, April 3 and 7, 1981.) □

## WESTERN AFRICA

### Cape Verde

● President Aristides Pereira was re-elected in late January by the national assembly, and a new Cape Verdean constitution was approved which formalizes the split between the governing parties of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau.

The African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) was formed in mid-January as a result of the November coup in Guinea-Bissau led by Maj. João Bernardo Vieira. The African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) had ruled both countries, toward the aim of their eventual unification.

The assembly also approved the nomination of Pedro Pires as Prime Minister, and Pereira completed his new government with a second cabinet reshuffle in mid-February. Jose Araujo, formerly secretary-general of the executive committee of the PAIGC in Bissau, was named Minister of Education and Culture, replacing Maj. Carlos Reis. Tito de Oliveira Ramos, head of a national public works company, was appointed Minister of Environment and Public Works.

The new Cape Verdean government is composed of ten ministers and three secretaries of state, in addition to the Prime Minister. Six of the ministers and Pires are military men. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, March 15, 1981; *Praia Voz di Povo*, February 23, 1981; *West Africa*, February 23, 1981.)

### Chad

● The Chad Foreign Minister, Ahmat Acyl, notified the OAU in March that Ndjamenia is prepared to hold OAU-supervised elections to end disputes regarding the legitimacy of President Goukouni Woddeye's government. In March, Acyl said that Woddeye had invited OAU secretary-general Edem Kodjo to send a commission to Chad to determine whether it is a proper time for elections. "If they say yes, then we are ready to hold elections at present," said Acyl.

Many African countries have condemned the Libyan presence in

Chad, but Acyl maintained that the troops would only be withdrawn when the threat from the defeated rebel leader of the Armed Forces of the North (FAN), Hissene Habre, has been eliminated. In reference to the Libyan presence, Acyl said "There is nothing for the OAU to worry about. The Libyans are there because our borders are threatened by non-African foreign powers," meaning the French, Chad's former colonial power, who sent troops to the Central African Republic and strengthened its forces in Gabon and the Ivory Coast in recent months.

Woddeye's government fears continued attacks from FAN, despite the fact that Habre signed a ceasefire after his forces were defeated in Ndjamenia in December. Reports from Agence France-Presse in early March indicated that FAN forces killed 16 foreign military officers including Libyans and East Germans during skirmishes earlier in the year in eastern Chad, Habre's stronghold. Habre's rebels reportedly appealed to the anti-Libyan Vice President, Wadal Kamougue, for "a common war of liberation against the Libyan conquerors." Habre was also said to have asked the Reagan administration for American arms to fight the Libyan troops.

Egypt acknowledged in March that it is supplying arms to FAN, although Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali declined to specify what type. Ali also said no Egyptian military advisers are aiding Habre's forces. Meanwhile a State Department official said that less than 50 Soviet military advisers and technicians have entered Chad to support the Libyans. U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig said the U.S. was watching "with deep concern" the events in Chad.

Efforts by the Economy Minister in the Chad government, Michel Koinaye, to obtain emergency economic assistance from foreign governments and international institutions such as the IMF appeared to be fruitless. Chad is seeking \$140 million from donors including Western countries such as France. Thus far, only Libya has promised assistance in the form of paying six months' salary to all civil servants in April, many of whom have not

been paid for almost two years. (*Christian Science Monitor*, March 31, 1981; *Washington Post*, March 17, 1981; *London Times*, March 14, 1981; *London Guardian*, March 13, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, March 13, 1981; *Financial Times*, March 2, 1981.)

### The Gambia

● President Dawda Jawara reshuffled his government earlier in the year, sacking Muhammadu Cadi Cham, who was Finance and Trade Minister since 1977, and replacing him with Saiku Sabally, formerly Economic Planning and Industrial Development Minister.

Cham was a former member of the opposition United Party, first elected to the Gambian parliament in 1965. He was re-elected in 1970, switched his allegiance to the ruling Progressive People's Party, and was named Secretary of State for Information and Tourism. He also served as Education, Youth and Sports Minister.

Jerrah Daffeh, Agriculture and Natural Resources Minister, was replaced by Seyni Singhateh, formerly parliamentary secretary at the Economic Planning and Industrial Development Ministry. Omar Jallow was appointed head of the newly created Ministry of Water Resources and Environment. (*New African*, March 1981; *Africa Research Bulletin*, February 15, 1981.)

### Ghana

● In a February speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Kofi Batsa, chairman of the board of the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation, outlined the Limann government's new liberal foreign investment policy, which, he said, "upon close study is as attractive as any on the continent of Africa."

Batsa said, "It is our very firm view that it is not attractive for overseas investors to participate in ventures in which they cannot control the disposition of their capital." Therefore, according to reports, the government is prepared to take 30 percent shares in mining investment and the majority shareholder would be entitled to management control.

Batsa also emphasized the necessity of fostering a climate of credi-

bility in Ghana as the foundation for the growth of foreign investment there. Therefore, he said, the government will encourage foreign investment in those enterprises which show a quick return. Tax concessions will be included as another incentive to investors, and the mining sector is being pushed as a ripe area for overseas funds.

The Ghanaian government recently launched a major program to revive its flagging gold-mining industry and held an international seminar on its gold endowment in January to attract foreign investors.

The Minister of Lands and Natural Resources, S. Yeboah-Acheampong, told the Ghana parliament in late February that a consortium of three foreign companies had expressed interest in development of the Kibi bauxite deposits. The consortium, led by Houston-based **Brown and Root Inc.**, includes Granges International Mining of Sweden and Bankers Trust International of Britain. (*West Africa*, February 23 and March 9, 1981.)

- Relations between Ghana and the Ivory Coast soured in March as a result of an incident in the Ivorian capital, Abidjan, in which 46 Ghanians died of asphyxiation in an overcrowded police cell.

The Ghanaians were detained as part of a series of police raids to combat a "crime wave" in Abidjan. The victims were allegedly packed into a cell meant for between five and seven people with very little ventilation.

The Ghanaian government lodged an official protest to the Ivory Coast government, whose President, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, ordered an immediate inquiry into the incident. Ghana also boycotted the late March meeting of the African Parliamentary Union in Abidjan in protest over the deaths.

Observers indicated that tensions over such incidents are likely to run high in the Ivory Coast, as foreigners account for over 25 percent of the population. In 1980, Mauritanian traders were attacked when bread prices went up in Abidjan. Following the recent incident, the Upper Volta embassy, whose citizens compose the largest proportion of aliens in the Ivory Coast,

called together community leaders to stress the need for calm. Foreigners are often regarded as competitors in the Ivory Coast's restricted labor market and according to observers, are often used as scapegoats for economic ills and social problems, such as crime. (*Accra Radio*, March 23, 1981; *West Africa*, March 16 and 23, 1981.)

## Guinea

- President Sekou Toure instituted a **cabinet reshuffle** in February, shifting Information Minister Senainon Behanzin to the head of the Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives Ministry. Behanzin replaced Alafe Kourouma, who was named Minister of Posts and Telecommunications. Siaka Toure, who held the latter post, was named Transport Minister.

A new Ministry for Middle Level Technical Education and Professional Training, and one for Small and Medium Scale Enterprises were formed in the reshuffle, to assure "the maximum effectiveness in the realization of the objectives of the fourth economic and social development plan." The plan, covering 1981-85, was introduced last December, and puts emphasis on the development of agriculture, fisheries, mines, industry and energy.

The Foreign Trade Minister Momo Camara was removed from his post in the shake-up and named to a local government post in Boko, Guinea's mining region. His replacement was not announced. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, March 15, 1981; *Conakry Radio*, February 6, 1981; *Le Continent*, February 5, 1981.)

## Guinea-Bissau

- Maj. João Bernardo Vieira, head of Guinea-Bissau's ruling Revolutionary Council, set up a **provisional government** composed of 16 ministers and two secretaries of state in February. Most of the team that took over when President Luis de Almeida Cabral was ousted in the November coup remain in the new government, with the exception of Filinto Váz Martins, who was replaced as Education Minister by Mario Cabral, formerly in charge of

rural development. Five new ministers entered the government.

Brig. Paulo Correia, considered the operational commander of the coup, was named Defense Minister. Cape Verdian Cruz Pinto was appointed Minister of State without portfolio, formerly state prosecutor. Carmen Pereira was named Minister of Health and Social Security, formerly speaker of the national assembly. She is the only woman cabinet minister. Vieira has not named a prime minister.

Vieira's government has reportedly committed itself against taking any drastic action with regard to the imprisoned former President Cabral, despite earlier pledges that he would be put on trial for the alleged murders of more than 500 political prisoners. Cabral's release, it is believed, would allow for an opportunity for reconciliation with Cape Verde.

The Bissau government is placing immediate priority on agriculture, in order to halt serious food shortages aggravated by drought. The search for oil by international companies is also continuing. The International Development Association agreed earlier this year to go ahead with a grant of a \$6.8 million credit to finance oil exploration, to be carried out by the British firm Digicon. The prospecting is to be done on Guinea-Bissau's continental shelf, outside the areas disputed by Guinea and Senegal. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, February 28 and March 15, 1981; *West Africa*, February 23, 1981; *Le Continent*, February 9, 1981.)

## Ivory Coast

- Earlier in the year, President Felix Houphouët-Boigny formed a **new 36-member government**, five ministers larger than the previous one. Eleven new ministers were appointed and seven removed. Two new secretaries of state, August Denise and Mathieu Ekra, were named.

The Economy, Finance and Planning Ministry was split into two, as was the Public Works, Transport and Construction and Towns Ministry. A new Ministry for the Environment was created. The principal cabinet posts remained in the same hands, with the exception of the



Ministries of Defense and Interior. Konan Jean Banny took over Defense for a second time, having occupied the post previously until his arrest in 1963. He was subsequently freed and given amnesty, and was a deputy prior to the appointment. Konan Koffi Leon was named Minister of Interior.

Contrary to what had been expected, the 75-year-old Houphouët-Boigny has not yet appointed a vice president, who under the recently amended Ivorian constitution, would be his designated successor. Houphouët-Boigny was re-elected to another five-year term of office in October 1980, before the constitution was changed to provide for the post of vice president. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, March 15, 1981; *Jeune Afrique*, February 11, 1981; *Le Continent*, February 4, 1981.)

- The Ivory Coast won approval of a \$591 million loan from the **International Monetary Fund** in March, to alleviate its "severe financial crisis," resulting from a steep drop in world prices since 1977 of its major export commodities—cocoa and coffee.

The \$591 million can be drawn over the next three years to support the Ivory Coast's economic stabilization efforts. A \$35 million credit was also immediately made available.

In addition, as a result of a March visit to the Ivory Coast by a group of British industrialists led by Lord Trefgarne, the parliamentary undersecretary of state for trade, several British companies are to receive more than \$442 million in public contracts from the Abidjan government.

The contracts are expected to result in an increase in trade between Britain and the Ivory Coast, long regarded as a preserve for French business. The largest project is the \$300 million Abidjan airport, for which Plessey will be the main contractor. (*Financial Times*, March 17, 1981; *Wall Street Journal*, March 4, 1981.)

## Liberia

- In response to a request from the Liberian head of state, Master Sgt. Samuel Doe, the Reagan administration announced plans to send 100

**Green Berets** and the destroyer **Thorn** to the country in mid-April, to demonstrate U.S. support for the military government.

The timing of the visit was said to be symbolic, coming exactly one year after the coup d'état in which President William Tolbert was killed. The State Department called the decision "an expression of strengthening ties" between the two countries, and said the U.S. Army Special Forces would remain in Liberia for 30 days to participate in training exercises.

A March visit to Monrovia by acting assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Lannon Walker, laid the groundwork for the April activities. Observers indicated that the U.S. government feared that the current Liberian regime would seek to strengthen relations with Ethiopia and Libya, two of its most persistent suitors, whereas previous governments were closely allied to the U.S.

Washington has pledged to supply Liberia with \$1.7 million in foreign military sales credits and \$449,000 in military training assistance for the fiscal year 1981. Five additional teams of U.S. military training personnel are scheduled to visit Liberia this year. (*Washington Post*, April 2, 1981.)

- The government of Master Sgt. Samuel Doe experienced its first major confrontation with organized labor in February, when 450 dock workers at the National Ports Authority in Monrovia went on **strike**. The workers were demanding to be paid at the government-imposed \$200 per month minimum wage for civil servants. They receive hourly wages averaging \$115 per month.

The government's reaction to the strikers was to order their immediate dismissal, having instituted a decree last July making strikes illegal. Hundreds of unemployed Liberians reportedly stormed the ports authority seeking jobs after learning of the sackings.

Observers noted, however, that the Liberian government may face increased labor unrest in the coming months when workers begin to feel the pinch from Doe's decree making it mandatory for all employees to purchase government savings

bonds. The measure was designed to provide the government with needed ready funds. Doe also froze recruitment to the civil service, and unemployment in Monrovia is estimated at 50 percent.

Meanwhile in February, it was announced that the European Economic Community is to provide the Liberian government with development assistance worth \$45 million, most of which will be in the form of grants. The aid, made available under the Lomé Two Convention governing economic relations between the European and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, will be used primarily for rural development, health, education and infrastructure. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, February 28, 1981; *West Africa*, February 9 and 23, 1981.)

## Mali

- In February, President Moussa Traore confirmed that a New Year's Eve **plot** to assassinate him and the country's military leaders had been discovered only hours before it was to have been launched.

The coup attempt was allegedly planned by a group of about 15 junior officers in the police force, most of whom were arrested.

Meanwhile, the French section of Amnesty International issued a communique in February condemning Mali's human rights record with regard to the government's imprisonment and torture of students and teachers. The organization appealed to participants at a special congress of Mali's sole political party, the Democratic Union of Malian People, to release 39 "prisoners of conscience."

Most of those jailed were believed to have been involved in the teachers' union unrest last fall. (*West Africa*, February 16, 1981.)

- The Mali government decided at a February special congress of the Democratic Union of Malian People to dismantle the **parastatal sector of the economy**, in order to implement its "liberalization."

The first step of the process will be the abolition of the Office of Agricultural Products of Mali (OPAM), which dominated the marketing of domestic agricultural production resulting in low producer



prices and thus clandestine exports to neighboring countries.

Traders, as a result, will be allowed to operate officially and will be taxed on their incomes. Also, the Malian Import and Export Society will hand over all internal trade to private interests and other companies will have to demonstrate their profitability in order to continue in existence.

President Moussa Traore also announced that Mali would seek a full re-integration in to the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). It was believed that many of the steps taken to reorganize the economy are necessary before the integration can be achieved. Mali left the franc zone in 1962, rejoined in 1968, but was not able to become a full member because of its severe economic problems.

Some of the additional measures which will have to be implemented toward that end are a 100 percent revaluation of the Malian franc and a reduction in balance of payments and external reserves deficits. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, March 15, 1981; *West Africa*, March 9, 1981.)

## Mauritania

● Mauritania broke **diplomatic relations with Morocco** in mid-March after a failed coup attempt against the government of Lieut. Col. Mohamed Khouna Ould Heydalla, which Nouakchott alleged, was undertaken with the complicity of Rabat.

The leaders of the coup attempt, both former members of the governing Mauritanian Military Committee of National Salvation, were Lieut. Col. Mohamed Ould Ba Kader and Lieut. Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi. They were among the founders of the Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania, an opposition group in exile, alleged to have pro-Moroccan sympathies. They were executed by a Mauritanian firing squad in late March, along with two other plotters.

Beginning in 1975, Mauritania and Morocco were allies in the Western Sahara war, after Spain withdrew from the colony and divided the territory between the two countries. Mauritania signed a peace agreement with Polisario, the movement fighting for Saharan self-determination, in 1979, relinquish-

ing control over its portion of the territory, which Morocco subsequently annexed.

The leaders of the coup attempt reportedly arrived in Nouakchott with soldiers and weaponry via Paris and Dakar, Senegal. They had planned to launch an attack on a meeting of government leaders, but the meeting was cancelled and they instead attacked the presidential palace. After a battle with government forces in which seven people were killed, the rebels were captured. A curfew was imposed in Nouakchott and the airport was closed.

The Moroccan government vehemently denied any involvement in the affair, saying that "the Mauritians have internal problems and in choosing to hide them they have chosen Morocco as the scapegoat."

Heydalla subsequently alleged that the arms used by the plotters were flown in diplomatic bags by Royal Air Maroc and the rebels were trained at Ben Guerir, a military base near Marrakech, by the sixth Moroccan battalion. He also said they were given false Moroccan passports by the Rabat secret service when they entered Senegalese territory, from where they slipped into Mauritania. (*London Times*, March 19 and 27, 1981; *West Africa*, March 23, 1981; *London Guardian*, March 17 and 18, 1981.)

## Niger

● President Seyni Kountche undertook an important **cabinet reshuffle** in February, dismissing four high-ranking ministers. One of those sacked, Lieut. Col. Sory Mamadou Diallo, was for a long time Minister of the Interior and one of the most powerful members of the regime until last year when he was demoted to the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.

Commander Moussa Sala was removed from the head of the Education Ministry, replaced by Capt. Youssoufa Maiga. Observers linked Sala's departure with student unrest that had been plaguing the country for several months, and which the government alleged was "organized from abroad."

Mai Magana, Minister for Economic Affairs, and Moukhaila Arouna, Minister of Mines, were

also removed. The cabinet was reduced in size from 20 to 19, and the number of military men from seven to six, in line with Kountche's intent to "demilitarize" the government.

In another significant move, Hamid Algabit was named Minister of Commerce and Abdou Mallam Moussa, Minister of Posts and Communications. Both men were previously secretaries of state and are Tuareg, the first of that portion of Niger's population to be cabinet ministers under the military government. The nomadic Tuaregs inhabit the north of Niger, said to be rich in uranium, and Kountche reportedly fears Libyan destabilization in that area. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, March 15, 1981; *Jeune Afrique*, February 25, 1981; *West Africa*, February 16, 1981.)

## Nigeria

● President Shehu Shagari's **state visit to Britain** in late March, during which he held wide-ranging discussions with high-level government and business representatives, resulted in a clarification of outstanding political issues and the likelihood of expanded business ventures between the two nations.

Shagari was unable to persuade the British government to adopt stringent economic and sports sanctions against South Africa, and was told that Britain would not formulate any new initiatives on Namibia until the Reagan administration's policies toward southern Africa were more clearly defined. Shagari warned however that Nigeria "will use every means at our disposal" to fight "the evil system of apartheid" and any "collusion and encouragement of Western powers."

He also cautioned the Reagan administration against adopting a pro-South Africa policy or giving arms to Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels in Angola, calling such a potential move "extremely serious." He said that "the U.S. administration is studying the African situation," and "I believe in giving them the benefit of the doubt until policy is announced."

A few days after the end of Shagari's visit, Nigerian Foreign Minister Ishaya Audu, after a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Alex-

ander Haig in Washington, expressed the same caution with regard to U.S. policy, but said he was optimistic that the U.S. will join efforts to promote change in southern Africa.

An increase in trade between Britain and Nigeria was one expected outcome of Shagari's visit, as well as that of Britain's Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington to Lagos in February. One outstanding issue between the two nations appeared to have been resolved in late February when it was agreed that Nigeria would provide British Petroleum with crude oil worth over \$110 million in compensation for the nationalization of its assets in 1979. The nationalization was the result of allegations that BP was supplying oil to South Africa.

In addition, discussions were being held on the possibility of a substantial arms deal, believed to be worth \$1.3 billion between Britain and Nigeria, which would involve the re-equipment of the Nigerian armed forces.

Britain is currently Nigeria's largest foreign investor with assets estimated at \$4 billion. According to Nigeria's fourth national development plan, the sectors likely to be the most promising for new investment are: agriculture, food processing, engineering, transport, chemicals, telecommunications, household equipment and furnishing.

The British bank Morgan Grenfell signed a loan agreement worth \$200 million with the Lagos government to fund the completion of the Iwopin pulp and paper complex in early March. And representatives from 30 British companies attended an exhibition of electro-technical goods in Lagos in March in hopes of boosting trade. (Washington Star, March 28, 1981; West Africa, March 23, 1981; London Times, March 16 and 21, 1981; Washington Post, March 21, 1981; Financial Times, February 26, March 5, 11, and 18, 1981.)

- According to a mid-February report in the London Times, the Nigerian armed forces and security agencies were put on a nationwide alert because of growing tension on the border with Chad and internal unrest in the north of the country.

Troops were moved to reinforce

the Nigerian border with Chad after clashes between villagers and armed Chadians, according to Nigeria's number-two military chief, Maj. Gen. Wushishi. Concern was also believed to exist over the continued presence of Libyan troops in Chad. Military observers indicated that one army division, T-55 and Scorpion tanks, and nearly a squadron of MiG 21 fighters were moved to Borno state.

The Nigerian government was also concerned about the stability of another northern state, Kano, after religious riots led by a fanatical Moslem sect left up to 2,000 dead in December. The governor of Kano, Alhaji Abubakar Rimi, said in February that he believed a coup could occur at any time.

Some Nigerian officials alleged that the Kano riots were part of a plan to destabilize the country. The leader of the opposition People's Redemption Party, Malam Aminu Kano, alleged that certain state governors are training guerrillas to subvert the government and they are being trained on the federal government's experimental farms, disguised as farmers and laborers. No evidence was brought forth to substantiate these claims. (Economist, February 21, 1981; Kenya Weekly Review, February 20, 1981; London Times, February 16, 1981.)

- The Revenue Allocation Bill, dividing Nigeria's revenues, most of which come from oil, among the federal, state and local governments, was finally signed into law in early February, but not before causing considerable controversy among state governors and threatening a split in the ruling party coalition.

All state governors had asked that more funds be allocated to them, objecting that the largest share of revenues will go to the federal government. The Nigerian People's Party (NPP), led by Nnamdi Azikiwe and the ruling National Party of Nigeria's (NPN) coalition partner, along with other opposition parties had tried to amend the bill during national assembly debates, threatening the collapse of the alliance. The bill went through nevertheless, and the split in the alliance was said to have been averted by a

compromise agreement. According to the new arrangement, NPP members of the national assembly will be "free to vote as they wish," but the coalition accord will remain in force.

While NPP officials were divided on whether to continue the coalition, reports indicated that President Shehu Shagari's NPN seemed more intent on ending it, witnessed by NPN senators' rejections of nominations of all four NPP ambassadorial nominees. The NPN is the largest party in both houses of the assembly, but does not possess an over-all majority.

Twelve of the 19 state governors signed a joint statement questioning the validity of the process by which the revenue bill was passed—a joint committee from both assembly houses approved the bill, but it was never ratified by the two chambers. Those who did not sign the statement were members of the ruling NPN. (Africa Research Bulletin, February 28, 1981; West Africa, February 16 and 23, 1981; Economist, February 14, 1981; London Times, February 14, 1981.)

## Senegal

- Earlier this year, Senegal's new government, led by President Abdou Diouf, announced its willingness to amend a constitutional provision allowing only four political parties, each with an ideological ticket, "to permit and guarantee the democratic expression of all the representative political currents." This measure was made public by Prime Minister Habib Thiam in a message to the national assembly.

The four official parties are: the ruling Socialist Party, the Democratic Party of Senegal, the African Party for Independence, and the Republican Party of Senegal. The National Democratic Assembly, led by Cheikh Anta Diop, is the most likely political organization to benefit from the measure, as it claims to have wide popular support. It lost a bid in 1978 to win recognition as a party.

Thiam warned, however, that this liberalization "would be harmful for the country if it were to provoke an outbreak of sterile quarrels, accentuate the divisions in parliament, and definitively paralyze the

government's activity." He also announced that a reform in the electoral laws was being prepared "to allow the formation of stable parliamentary majorities." (*West Africa*, February 23, 1981; *Jeune Afrique*, February 11, 1981.)

## Sierra Leone

● In February, a scandal dubbed "Vouchergate," involving officials of the Treasury and Ministry of Finance was unearthed by the Minister of State for Finance, Alfred Akibo-Betts, when he was monitoring returns from the Bank of Sierra Leone.

Hundreds of thousands of dollars were reportedly being paid out on false vouchers to fictitious companies, issued by officers in the Accountant General's Office and paid by the Bank of Sierra Leone without clearance from the Minister of Finance. The payments were never recorded. Akibo-Betts said the total amount of funds paid out may be in the millions.

Three cabinet ministers were arrested and charged in March as the government continued its investigation. S.H.O. Gborie, Minister of the Interior, Harry Williams, Minister of Development and Economic Planning, and S.B. Marah, Minister of Energy and Power, along with their permanent secretaries, were released on bail after charges were brought against them.

Several prominent businessmen and other government functionaries have been arrested and 15 of the more than 50 detained suspects were released. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, March 15, 1981; *West Africa*, February 23 and March 9, 1981.)

## EASTERN AFRICA

### Comoros

● The Comoran government, installed by mercenaries in May 1978, was the target of an abortive coup in February.

Some 50 people, including army personnel and members of the civil service, were detained after the attempt, which reportedly was to have been carried out by the presidential guards. A quantity of weapons was said to have been

seized. (*New African*, April 1981; Johannesburg Radio, March 7, 1981.)

### Djibouti

● Djibouti's President, Hassan Gouled, made official visits to neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya in March and was scheduled to visit Somalia in April.

Ethiopia, which uses Djibouti port for its trade, signed a ten-year friendship and cooperation agreement with Djibouti. Kenya and Djibouti "reiterated their commitment to the search for peace and stability which will enhance the social and economic well being of the people living in the Horn of Africa." (Nairobi Radio, March 25, 1981; Addis Ababa Radio, March 21, 1981.)

### Ethiopia

● Ethiopia has appealed for \$330 million in international aid, saying that 3.9 million people have been affected by drought or famine or displaced from their homes by war.

The UN has asked for \$215 million to aid the Ethiopians, saying that 1.5 million people are on the margin of life and need immediately 224,000 tons of food. UN officials claim the superpower shifts in the Horn of Africa have produced a scandalous imbalance for Ethiopia and Somalia after both suffered three years of drought. Somalia, the Western ally, has received an estimated ten times as much assistance.

The wars that produced much of the suffering are not yet over, but reportedly are containable. Diplomats said the Ethiopians have the upper hand in the Ogaden, bordering Somalia, while the guerrilla wars in Tigre and Eritrea have reached stalemate. (*London Times*, April 6, 1981; *London Guardian*, March 14 and 31, 1981.)

### Kenya

● Two Kenyans who were originally charged with trying to steal weapons from the armed forces were committed for trial in March on charges of treason and concealment of treason in an alleged coup plot.

Nairobi businessman Andrew Muthemba, charged with treason, claimed in court that Charles Njonjo, the Minister for Constitu-

tional and Home Affairs, was involved in the plot. Njonjo, who was then the Attorney General, testified in court that this was "absolute nonsense," but that Muthemba had gone to see him in March 1980 claiming he had information about currency smuggling. Njonjo said he advised Muthemba to get in touch with the police.

Muthemba claimed to an air force captain whose help he allegedly sought in obtaining arms that he represented a group of "big men" who wanted to change the leadership. Njonjo has been credited with masterminding the smooth transition of Daniel arap Moi to the presidency after the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978. At that time he appeared to be Moi's closest and most powerful adviser. (*London Times*, March 24, 25 and 28, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, March 20, 1981.)

● Oginga Odinga, the onetime opposition politician popular among the Luos of western Kenya, is making a political comeback in a big way.

An Odinga protege has resigned his seat in parliament because, he said, "the time has come" for Odinga to return to parliament. Odinga was in parliament in 1969 when he was detained for nearly two years under the Kenyatta regime. His subsequent attempts to run for parliament were barred. Then in 1980, President Daniel arap Moi appointed Odinga chairman of the cotton board and he is now one of Moi's staunchest supporters. Political analysts say it was always Moi's intention to maneuver Odinga back into national politics. (*Kenya Weekly Review*, March 27, 1981.)

● The University of Nairobi's 7,000 students got an early Easter vacation, sent home by the government, which feared a confrontation at a planned demonstration on March 2—the sixth anniversary of the assassination of J.M. Kariuki.

Kariuki, a populist MP, has become a folk hero to the students and previous demonstrations have been broken up by riot police.

The government apparently wanted to avoid an embarrassing confrontation at the same time as



450 editors and publishers were attending the International Press Institute conference in Nairobi. However, a week before the conference opened, the government banned the *Voice of Africa*, a nine-month-old weekly edited by a Libyan national and allegedly financed by the Libyan government.

The ostensible reason for the banning was that the paper claimed that the New Year's Eve bombing of the Norfolk Hotel was carried out by Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency. The Kenyan authorities, though, had said the bomb was planted by a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. (*Kenya Weekly Review*, February 27 and March 6, 1981; *London Observer*, March 8, 1981.)

## Madagascar

● More unrest struck Madagascar in February, when a march by 4,000 students through the capital erupted in violence. In clashes between the demonstrators and the army, six people were killed and 60 wounded.

The demonstrations were linked to Madagascar's economic problems. The students carried placards urging the government to stamp out corruption and get rid of bureaucratic "drones."

Unemployment has risen and job prospects for many Malagasy students are dim. "There is disillusionment because of the inefficiency, the lack of goods and the corruption," a Malagasy professional told the *Washington Post*. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, March 15, 1981; *Washington Post*, March 8, 1981.)

## Mauritius

● The extensive trade links of Mauritius with South Africa—an issue in the general election scheduled within the next year—was underlined in March when the Mauritian government accepted a \$187 million loan from Pretoria.

The loan will be used to repair damage caused by a cyclone in March 1980. Originally, South Africa had offered a line of credit but criticism from Mauritius' opposition political parties forced the government to renegotiate the deal.

Mauritian government officials flew to South Africa in March, and said the money would be used for

reconstruction of housing and roads and rebuilding the fishing industry. Mauritius also received a further \$2 million in South African money for improvement of the tea industry. (*Johannesburg Star*, March 7, 1981; *Johannesburg Radio*, March 6, 1981.)

## Seychelles

● The Seychelles government is trying to diversify the economy, because its mainstay, tourism, has slumped after years of expansion.

In the first half of 1980, the number of tourists was down 7 percent over the 1979 period, mainly due to higher air fares caused by rising fuel costs.

The government wants to expand farming in an effort to reduce the huge food import bill. One plan is to develop the small outer islands, which are largely unexploited and uninhabited. In a pilot project, the government intends to build basic infrastructure—air strips, housing and social facilities—on five of these islands. (*African Business*, February 1981.)

## Somalia

● Somalia's economic problems have been aggravated by the continued pouring in of refugees from the Ogaden and food and fuel shortages.

The deputy minister of economic planning, Mohamed Umar Jama, pleaded for more international aid in March, claiming there were 1.3 million refugees in the country and 1.1 million tons of food was urgently needed.

Officials of the UN High Commission for Refugees said that the coordination of food distribution was coming under control in mid-March. The Somali government had begun taking measures against food theft from some camps and the UN commission and other agencies were strengthening their monitoring systems. Altogether, the relief bill for 1981 will amount to \$200 million. (*London Times*, March 27 and 28, 1981; *Mogadishu Radio*, March 8, 1981.)

## Tanzania

● The widespread drought affecting eastern Africa is also troubling Tanzania, where President Julius

Nyerere told his people in March they face the possibility of food shortages.

"We have enormous food problems," Nyerere said. "I can tell you if the situation continues like this, many Tanzanians will die of hunger next year."

Tanzania has weathered previous bad harvests, in 1973 and 1974, but this time the country has foreign exchange shortages. In a nationwide broadcast, Nyerere explained the situation:

"In 1972, we used only 10 percent of our foreign exchange from produce to buy oil. With the remaining 90 percent we bought other essentials . . . This year we shall spend between 45 and 50 percent to buy oil. With the remaining 50 or 55 percent we shall buy other essential commodities . . . but the prices of these commodities have also risen."

Late in March, the government took further measures to conserve oil. Gasoline sales were restricted to three days a week. (*Dar es Salaam Radio*, February 5 and March 19, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, March 13, 1981.)

## Uganda

● Armed opposition to the government of President Milton Obote began in February and by April amounted to what observers called insurrection.

The government has responded harshly, detaining at least 100 people, many of them opposition politicians, and reviving the notorious State Research Bureau, the secret police organization under Idi Amin that was responsible for killing thousands of people. In March, at least 50 bodies were found dumped in and around Kampala, the capital.

There have been numerous attacks by several underground groups that are waging a guerrilla war against Obote. After attacks in Kampala, the U.S. embassy evacuated all dependents of American personnel in April, citing the security situation, but also privately acknowledging the government's repressive response.

Among the guerrilla groups are the Uganda Freedom Movement, thought to be led by supporters of Dr. Yusufu Lule, a post-Amin Pres-



ident ousted after 68 days, and the People's Revolutionary Army led by Yoweri Museveni, an ex-Defence Minister in the pre-Obote caretaker government. These groups claim that Obote's party stole the December election and that the government has used the army and the rest of the security apparatus to carry out savage reprisals, among them the alleged massacre of 2,000 people in West Nile province, which was Amin's former base.

Besides the detentions, the government has banned four opposition newspapers which were critical of the army. Student leaders and dozens of others at Makerere University have fled the country following several arrests there. (London *Times*, February 24, March 17, 26, April 3 and 6, 1981; Kenya *Weekly Review*, March 20, 1981; London *Guardian*, March 14, 1981.)

## CENTRAL AFRICA

### Cameroon

- **Oil** was recently discovered for the first time in the Kribi region, 125 miles south of Douala, by the Mobil-Total Oil Company.

Kribi has already been found to possess major natural gas reserves, and production will begin in 1987.

Prior to the oil discovery at Kribi, offshore deposits had only been found in a zone near the border with Nigeria. (*West Africa*, March 23, 1981.)

### Central African Republic

- President David Dacko was re-elected to a six-year term of office in mid-March, in an election which caused much controversy and serious unrest in the Central African capital, Bangui. Running against four other candidates—Ange Patasse, head of the Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People; Dr. Abel Goumba, leading the Oubangui Patriotic Front Labor Party; Henri Maidou, leader of the Republican Party for Progress; and Franco Pehoua, an independent—Dacko won a narrow victory with 50.23 percent of the votes cast.

A curfew was imposed in Bangui while the votes were counted and

when Dacko was declared the victor, some 2,000 youths began protests against him in the capital. Dacko declared a state of siege, authorizing the army to fire on the demonstrators. Over 60 people were believed to have been injured. France reacted to the unrest by bolstering its 500-man garrison in Bangui, bringing in 1,000 troops previously stationed in the northwest of the country. French paratroopers guarded the French embassy.

Many of the protesters said they were supporters of Ange Patasse, former Prime Minister who came in second in the elections with 38 percent of the vote. Patasse is a strong critic of the French presence in the country. The four losing candidates denounced the violence, appealing to the people to accept the election results. Calm appeared to have been restored by the end of March, but Dacko was not prepared to lift the state of siege at that time.

The leaders of the opposition parties met in March to discuss the possibility of forming a coalition to contest the legislative elections, slated for June. (*Le Monde*, March 23, 24 and 30, 1981; London *Guardian*, March 20 and 23, 1981; London *Times*, March 21, 1981.)

- In mid-March, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing finally openly admitted having received large gifts of diamonds from deposed Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa, but claimed that the goods' value did not exceed the average of that of presents that the former monarch gave to any visiting head of state.

Since the fall of 1979, when the French satirical weekly, *Le Canard Enchaîné*, published documents alleging that the French president had received valuables from the deposed emperor, Giscard had maintained silence on the claims. But in March, with the French elections only weeks away, Giscard said that the diamonds were sold at a price of \$23,373 last December after an official appraisal, with the entire proceeds except sales taxes donated to charities in the Central African Republic, including the Red Cross. (*Wall Street Journal*, March 24, 1981; London *Guardian*, March 19 and 23, 1981; Washington *Post*, March 11, 1981.)

## Equatorial Guinea

- Col. Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo, president of Equatorial Guinea since he launched the coup against Macias Nguema in August 1979, took several steps in recent months towards a demilitarization of the government and the establishment of the rule of law.

In February, Mbasogo announced that the government was drafting a constitution and that he planned to gradually diminish the political roles of the armed forces. A decree was published in March making it mandatory for the military within the government to decide whether they want to return to military duties only or keep their jobs in the administration. If they opt for the government jobs, they must accept a leave of absence from the armed forces.

In late March, Mbasogo appointed the first civilian to his cabinet—Emiliano Buale as Minister of Agriculture. Buale is an agricultural engineer and one of the few people with a higher education who remained in the country during Nguema's despotic rule.

According to observers, the administration of the government is becoming more organized with the assistance of 120 Spanish advisers. Many students have gone to Spain since the coup, under scholarship grants, to fill Equatorial Guinea's desperate needs for skills. (London *Times*, April 1, 1981.)

## Gabon

- "Africa Number One," the most powerful radio station in the continent, was inaugurated by Gabon's Prime Minister, Leon Mebiame, in February during a visit by the French Defense and Cooperation Minister, Robert Galley.

The station is located at Moyabi, on a plateau about 2,300 feet above sea level and 300 miles south of Gabon's capital, Libreville. The cost of the project was \$64 million, and the Gabon government has a 60 percent share in it. The French company Sofirad, which loaned Gabon 12 engineers for the station, has the remaining 40 percent share.

The station will broadcast in French 18 hours a day, six of which will be relays from Radio France In-

ternational. (*West Africa*, February 23, 1981.)

## Zaire

- President Mobutu Sese Seko reshuffled his cabinet in February, naming Bomboko Lokumba as Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and Deputy Prime Minister, a newly created post.

Lokumba was Zaire's Foreign Minister in the 1960s, first under Patrice Lumumba and then under Mobutu, but was removed from the position in 1969 after negotiating the return to Zaire of the exiled opposition leader, Pierre Mulele, while Mobutu was out of the country.

Lokumba was named ambassador to Washington for one year in 1969, but was removed from the government in 1970. He was elected a member of the politburo of the ruling Popular Movement of the Revolution and then to the party's central committee in 1980.

Observers indicated that his return to the Foreign Affairs Ministry is designed to create a new international image for Zaire, especially at a time when oil deposits have been discovered in central Zaire, which **Exxon Corp.** characterized as significant.

Lokumba replaced Inonga Lokonga L'Ome, who was named Justice Minister in the shake-up. (*Jeune Afrique*, March 4, 1981; Kinshasa Radio, February 18, 1981.)

- In late February, the Belgian Prime Minister Wilfred Martens paid an official visit to Zaire, its former colony, for talks with President Mobutu Sese Seko aimed at improving relations between the two countries.

Agreements were signed to provide Zaire with a \$27 million line of credit and a Belgian state loan valued at \$12 million, along with a preferential maritime arrangement.

Political differences between the two countries arose over Zairian requests for increased military aid and for pressure to crack down on the activities of Zairian exiles living in Belgium. Martens refused to comply with those requests.

The Belgian Prime Minister did confirm that his country would press for increased international monetary assistance for Zaire.

whose foreign debt is \$4 billion against foreign currency reserves of \$320 million.

In a related event, a senior official of the Zaire government said in February that more understanding and support is expected to come from the Reagan administration than was the case under former President Carter. The official said that letters from President Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig said that the U.S. would not forget its allies even if the total U.S. aid package were smaller than before. (*West Africa*, March 9, 1981; *Financial Times*, February 26 and March 7, 1981.)

## Zambia

- President Kenneth Kaunda replaced the number-two and -three men in the state hierarchy in February in a sweeping reorganization of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the government.

Mainza Chona, UNIP secretary-general, was replaced by Humphrey Mulemba, chairman of the party central committee's appointments and disciplinary committee. Chona, a close political ally of Kaunda, was Vice President before the title was abolished and also an ex-Prime Minister. He will become ambassador to what Kaunda described as a friendly socialist country.

Nalumino Mundia was named as Prime Minister, replacing Lusaka lawyer Daniel Lisulo. Mundia was previously chairman of the UNIP central committee's youth and sports sub-committee, and is a former minister with experience in labor relations, commerce, industry and local government. Lisulo will head the social and cultural sub-committee of the central committee.

Elijah Mudenda, who held the latter post, has been named to head the finance subcommittee, in which capacity he will supervise all cabinet ministries related to the economy.

The reshuffle was apparently undertaken partly as a result of the Copperbelt miners' strike in January, and also a further step in a series of political changes begun with a December 1980 cabinet reshuffle. UNIP backbenchers had recently

been calling for a party reorganization to save it from collapse, and it was alleged that Kaunda was receiving bad advice on methods of dealing with popular unrest over the state of the economy. (*Economist*, February 28, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, February 20, 1981; *London Guardian*, February 19, 1981.)

- In March, forced to follow on Zaire's lead, Zambia cut its producer price of cobalt by 20 percent from \$25 to \$20 a pound, in an already flagging international market for the commodity.

Zaire, the largest cobalt producer, reduced its price in February, despite the fact that major producers had pledged in December to maintain the \$25 price through 1981. As Zambia produces less than 25 percent as much cobalt as Zaire, officials faced little choice but to reduce their price as well.

Zambian producers, however, do not believe that the price cut will result in a dramatically expanded demand for cobalt, as it is available on dealer markets for \$18.50 a pound. (*Economist*, March 21, 1981; *Wall Street Journal*, March 9, 1981.)

In a related event, Zambia secured its largest Euromarket loan in March, \$150 million, in a deal signed with six international banks, to provide Lusaka with foreign exchange needed to buy oil. The credit, available immediately for a 12-month period, was raised by the Bank of America, along with the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Grindlays Bank and Standard Chartered.

Since earnings on Zambia's two main export commodities—copper and cobalt—remain low, a foreign exchange crisis could be in the offing. (*Financial Times*, March 13, 1981.)

## NORTHERN AFRICA

### Algeria

- Contrary to expectations raised earlier this year after Algeria's successful mediation role in the Iranian hostage crisis, the negotiations between Algerian and U.S. Energy Department officials aimed at set-

ting a new export price for Algerian liquefied natural gas (LNG) ended in a stalemate in February.

As a result, **El Paso Natural Gas Co.**, the largest U.S. importer of Algerian LNG, wrote off \$365.4 million against its 1980 profits "in view of the remote prospects" of a resumption of the gas deliveries that were halted in April 1980. The company's after-tax losses were estimated to have been \$7 million a month since the dispute began.

The Algerian government had sought to achieve a parity price level for exports of both oil and LNG of about \$6 per 1,000 cubic feet. The U.S. government and company officials resisted the increase, arguing instead for a ceiling of about \$4.50 per 1,000 cubic feet, in line with the current LNG price charged by Canada and Mexico.

Other U.S. LNG importing companies, including Consolidated Natural Gas, Southern Natural Resources Inc. and Columbia Gas System Inc., however, remained optimistic that the dispute would eventually be settled and that U.S. imports from other sources would grow. However, a 20-year contract was signed by Algerian officials with Distrigaz of Belgium in early April, under which LNG is to be provided at a cost of \$5 per 1,000 cubic feet, the highest price obtained by Algeria from any customer. It was believed that this agreement would set a precedent for future Algerian talks with other countries.

According to a report in the *Washington Post* in late March, influential Algerians were said to be disappointed that the Reagan administration muffed the best chance for improving relations between the two countries since Algeria's independence in 1962. In addition to the collapse of the LNG negotiations, Algeria has been angered by the U.S. government approval of tank sales to Morocco, concomitant with its dropping of language justifying the sales as a means of facilitating the peace process over the Western Sahara. Another contentious issue was said to be the U.S.'s delaying action on such Algerian and Third World concerns as the Law of the Sea draft treaty.

The Algerian government has re-

frained from official public condemnation of the Reagan administration, but an influential Algerian editor was quoted as saying, "We have sufficient reasons to be furious" at the U.S. actions, which are regarded as "slaps in the face." (*Wall Street Journal*, February 23 and April 9, 1981; *Washington Post*, March 25, 1981; *Fortune*, March 23, 1981; *Financial Times*, February 20, 1981.)

## Egypt

• Both the French and American governments agreed in March to each supply Egypt with two nuclear power plants after Cairo ratified the nuclear non-proliferation treaty earlier in the year.

Dr. Abdel-Razzaq Abdel-Meguid, the Egyptian deputy prime minister in charge of the economy, also held discussions in February with the British government for the purchase of two nuclear power stations. He outlined Egypt's plans to construct eight of the plants—four on the Mediterranean and four on the Red Sea coast, which, when completed, would provide 35 to 40 percent of the country's energy needs.

Abdel-Meguid said that the government was setting aside \$500 million annually from oil revenues for the next 20 years to fund the nuclear program.

The French are to build the first two stations, one million kilowatts each, at Al Daaba, 65 miles west of Alexandria, at a cost of about \$1 billion each. France will also train the Egyptian personnel required for the two plants.

The Egyptian government had been negotiating with the U.S. for over five years prior to the March agreement reached with the Reagan administration. The major snag had always been the U.S. requirement that Egypt sign the non-proliferation treaty. Under the accord, the U.S. will provide two pressurized water reactors, each with a capacity of one million kilowatts, costing \$1 billion apiece, along with enriched uranium fuel. The agreement, however, must be reviewed by the U.S. Congress and the Egyptian parliament.

In addition to Britain, the Egyptian government has also held talks

with West Germany and Canada about acquiring plants from them. It is believed that the first plants will be in operation in about 1990. (*Financial Times*, February 18 and March 23, 1981; *Wall Street Journal*, March 23, 1981; *London Observer*, March 15, 1981.)

## Libya

• The Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafi, is to visit the Soviet Union in the coming months for talks aimed at "strengthening and developing friendly relations," according to a March announcement from Moscow. Qaddafi's last visit was in 1976, and according to some reports, he is making the upcoming trip to sign a friendship treaty with the Soviets, which will alter Libya's previous policy of non-alignment.

According to Western analysts, there are more than 5,000 Eastern bloc military and civilian personnel and a \$12 billion arsenal of Soviet weaponry now present in Libya. A U.S. State Department official also reported recently that fewer than 50 Soviet military advisers and technicians were stationed in Chad to assist the Libyans there.

Libya made some conciliatory gestures, however, in February and March after many African and Western countries expressed concern and disapproval over the role of Libyan assistance in bringing about the victory of Chad President Goukouni Woddeye over rebel Hisene Habre and his Armed Forces of the North (FAN). Libyan Prime Minister Maj. Abdelsallam Jalloud met with Nigerian President Shuhu Shagari in February and was said to be considering a plan whereby Libya would withdraw its troops from Chad in return for a French withdrawal from the Central African Republic.

A first contingent of 200 Libyan soldiers was withdrawn from Chad in March. And in late March, Qaddafi proclaimed the end of "the state of confrontation with the Egyptian army" and said there were no longer any Libyan troops stationed on Egypt's border. He also said it was "impossible" for his country to accept the presence of Soviet or other foreign bases in Libyan territory.

It was also reported that Jalloud



told a meeting of representatives of seven U.S. oil companies in Tripoli in February to notify President Reagan that Libya would like to resume full diplomatic relations. The U.S. withdrew most of its diplomats from the embassy in Tripoli in December 1979 when the building was burned and looted by protesting crowds. An oil executive said, "They probably decided that the U.S. would be a good friend to have especially since our oil companies are so important to them."

Qaddafi subsequently summoned heads of U.S. oil companies in Tripoli and told them that Libya is economically dependent on oil sales to the U.S., which account for 40 percent of Libya's total oil production. He asked them to convey his message to the President.

Qaddafi also made known his interest in improving relations with France in March after Paris decided not to deliver ten gunboats Libya had ordered in 1977. He countered his conciliatory remarks with the claim, however, that the security of Chad and Libya is "indivisible."

Most countries, however, continue to be wary of Qaddafi's recent statements. Sudan, fearing that Libyan troops might pursue FAN rebels into the western part of the country, disregarded a report by the Libyan news agency, JANA, that Qaddafi was interested in strengthening Libya's relations with Sudan and in opening new avenues for civilian and military cooperation. Sudanese President Gaafar al-Nimeiry said in late March that he is "at war" with Qaddafi and added that "I think all the world should try to get rid of him." He scolded the West for tolerating Qaddafi because of Libya's oil wealth, and said "we have to do something together" to "get this man out of the government by any kind of war, by taking him out, by killing him." (Washington Post, March 10 and April 1, 1981; *Le Monde*, March 31, 1981; London *Observer*, March 29, 1981; *Financial Times*, February 19 and March 19, 1981; London *Times*, March 4, 1981; *Wall Street Journal*, March 2, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, February 27, 1981.)

● Otrag, the West German rocket firm which was given testing facilities

in Libya after having been expelled from Zaire in 1979, characterized as "ludicrous" reports in March that it had signed a contract with the Tripoli government to provide medium-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

The official Moroccan news agency maintained that Otrag is to provide Libya with the missile system by 1986 and that Libya was developing a nuclear weapon in a separate program. It also said that the first missile tests were carried out in the Libyan desert by Otrag. The system is capable of delivering a nuclear weapon to any target in the Middle East and southern Europe, according to the report.

Otrag's technical director, Frank Wukasch, said the company merely carried out successful sub-orbital satellite tests in the Libyan desert under an oral agreement with the country. (London *Guardian*, March 13, 1981; New York *Times*, March 13, 1981.)

## Morocco

● In late March, the Reagan administration, in its first policy statement on the war in the Western Sahara, said it would abandon the Carter administration's efforts to link arms sales to Morocco with progress by the Rabat government toward the achievement of a negotiated settlement to the dispute.

The announcement, which is regarded as a shift in policy, followed the administration's decision in January to sell 108 M-60 tanks to Morocco. In late March, the recently resigned U.S. ambassador to Algeria, Ulric Haynes, sharply criticized the Reagan administration for announcing the tank sales only two days after the American hostages were released from Iran, largely due to the negotiating role played by Algeria. Haynes said that the first diplomatic contact between the incoming Reagan team and the Algerian government was the notice of intent to sell the tanks to Rabat. Algeria supports the side of the Polisario movement, which is fighting against Morocco for the Western Sahara's self-determination.

The U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for near Eastern and south Asian affairs, Morris Draper, made the policy statement on the

Western Sahara before two House foreign affairs subcommittees. He said that arms sales to Morocco would in the future be based on the same criteria as "for other friends." Draper said the U.S. would encourage a negotiated settlement to the Western Sahara conflict, but added, "We will not, however, make decisions on military equipment sales explicitly conditional on unilateral Moroccan attempts to show progress towards a peaceful negotiated settlement."

Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-In) said that the Reagan administration was "tilting" toward Morocco in the war, despite Draper's claim that the U.S. position was still one of neutrality. Draper said, "I think the present administration feels strongly that traditional old friends such as Morocco need additional support and consideration." He also noted that the tanks would not be delivered for three years and were not suited for use in desert terrain. (New York *Times*, March 26, 1981; Washington *Post*, March 26, 1981.)

## Sudan

● In mid-March, President Gaafar al-Nimeiry put the blame for an abortive coup attempt the week before on Syria and the Soviet Union. The plot, organized by the military, was led by a retired brigadier, Saad Bahar, and included three majors and three non-commissioned officers. Eleven people were arrested in connection with the incident.

Nimeiry said Soviet "infiltration of Africa and the Gulf region" was a "cancer" and stressed that only the U.S. could put an end to it. He also said he was prepared to offer facilities to U.S. forces in Sudan and invited the U.S. to build air bases there to be used jointly by both nations' forces if Sudan's security was threatened.

Nimeiry was said to be concerned by "the ideological communist invasion" of Sudan and the possibility of attacks or sabotage operations, probably due to the strength of the Communist Party in Sudan, which has one million members out of a population of 17 million.

In his 12-year presidency, Nimeiry has survived two other serious coup attempts, in 1971



and 1976, as well as a dozen other minor attempts at the overthrow of his government. (London *Times*, March 18 and 20, 1981; *Le Monde*, March 19, 1981; Sudanese News Agency, March 16, 1981.)

## Tunisia

● Habib Achour, formerly secretary-general of the **General Union of Tunisian Workers** (UGTT), announced in late March that he would run as a candidate in the elections to the executive bureau of the union, which are slated to take place at the upcoming UGTT congress.

Achour had been jailed following the 1978 labor unrest, along with scores of other unionists, but was released from prison in 1980. President Habib Bourguiba, in a liberalization of policy toward the powerful UGTT, granted clemency to all the previously jailed activists, with the exception of Achour and Salah Brour, another UGTT official. They remain under house arrest, and therefore, according to officials, are not permitted to become involved in any political or union responsibilities.

Tensions in February and March resulting from striking students and transport workers were defused when Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali conceded to most of their demands. An alleged government plan to reorganize secondary schools was scrapped after student and teacher strikes and unrest, followed by transport workers walking off their jobs in sympathy. (*Financial Times*, April 9, 1981; *Le Monde*, March 30, 1981; Tunis Radio, February 22 and March 5, 1981; *Jeune Afrique*, March 4, 1981.)

● Algerian Prime Minister Mohamed Abdelghani met with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali of Tunisia in Tunis in early February to discuss the formation of a **bilateral cooperation program** that will encompass all major sectors of the economies in both countries.

The proposed cooperation agreement calls for the creation of a bank with a capital of \$40 million that will develop economic, commercial and financial cooperation in the research, financing and implementation of joint projects—particularly in the industrial sectors—along the

two countries' border areas. The bank will also finance joint Algerian-Tunisian projects in foreign countries, particularly in Africa. Also discussed was the establishment of four higher training institutions in Algiers and Tunis to cover cooperative efforts in customs and taxes, banking, insurance, statistics and planning. Additional meetings are to be scheduled for discussions on exchanges in commerce, health, information, culture, transport and teaching.

In addition, the two government representatives decided to compare international tenders that might be of mutual interest and to set up collective buying operations for basic products. This coordination will further strengthen their position relative to the European Economic Community's "protectionist policies." (*Africa Research Bulletin*, February 28, 1981; *Le Monde*, February 10 and 12, 1981.)

## Western Sahara

● The Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), created when Spain withdrew from its former colony in 1976, marked the **fifth anniversary** of its founding in late February with celebrations in Tindouf. Algeria attended by delegations from all over the world. At the same time, Morocco's King Hassan declared that the Western Sahara is part of his country and he will never relinquish it. He also called for a meeting with Algerian President Chadli Benjedid to settle their differences over the territory, but he said, "If we favor any undertaking aimed at ending the conflict, we cannot allow one that would be carried out to the detriment of our territorial integrity."

Meanwhile, the war for control of the Western Sahara was continuing, with a major battle in late March for control of the garrison of Guelta-Zemmour. Polisario claimed it drove Moroccan forces out of the garrison, killing 500 and wounding 400 Moroccan military officials, on the other hand, denied Polisario's statement, but alleged that the Polisario fighters had attacked from Mauritanian territory.

Mauritania, previously Morocco's ally in the war, relinquished its control over the southern portion of

the territory in 1979 and declared itself neutral in the conflict. In March, the Mauritanian government alleged that Morocco was behind a failed coup attempt, breaking diplomatic relations with Rabat.

Some observers indicated that Polisario is implementing a shift in tactics, concentrating its attacks on Moroccan troops in the central sector of the desert, close to the Mauritanian border, to stretch Moroccan communications and raise the cost of an already expensive war. The SADR also hopes to gain more support from other African countries in order to assure its admission to the OAU at the July summit in Nairobi. Its admission was forestalled at the 1980 Freetown summit, despite the fact that a simple majority of member countries required to approve admission, 26, indicated their support.

In an April statement, Polisario condemned the Reagan administration's recent policy actions on the Western Sahara, particularly its position on arms sales to Morocco. The statement read, "The U.S. has committed itself to unconditional support and involvement in the Moroccan war in the Western Sahara . . . and is choosing confrontation over international efforts for a peaceful settlement of the question of the Western Sahara." (London *Guardian*, April 3, 1981; *Le Monde*, March 31, 1981; *West Africa*, March 16, 1981; *Washington Star*, March 4, 1981.)

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

### Angola

● In mid-March, the Reagan administration asked Congress to repeal the **Clark amendment**, adopted in 1976, which prohibits covert or overt U.S. aid to the rebel forces in Angola. The administration defended its proposal to repeal the ban, regarding it as "an unusually all-encompassing restriction on U.S. policy options." William Dyess, the State Department spokesman, said it would be a mistake to draw conclusions from the administration's proposal regarding future U.S. policy in Africa, which was still under "intensive review."

The proposal to lift the ban elic-

ited heavy criticism from within the U.S. Congress and from African countries, as many observers saw it as an indication of the Reagan administration's willingness to aid Unita, the rebel organization under Jonas Savimbi, which has been waging a guerrilla war against the Angolan government since independence in 1975. During his election campaign, President Reagan had said he was in favor of providing arms to Savimbi. "I don't see anything wrong with someone who wants to free themselves from the rule of an outside power—which is Cubans and East Germans—I don't see why we shouldn't provide them with the weapons to do it," he said during an interview with the *Wall Street Journal* during the campaign.

Reagan said in late March, however, that the Angolan government should first "get rid of the outside forces" and then the U.S. would try to help bring about a peaceful settlement between the rival factions. The Angolan government, on the other hand, maintains that the Cuban troops are necessary to protect the country from South African military assaults, stemming from the conflict in neighboring Namibia.

Angola's Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge said that the Cubans would leave Angola if Namibia gained independence because it would end reasons for South African attacks against Angola. He also said that Unita's attacks are decreasing and are now limited to soft targets, such as villages, and to sabotage. Unita is aided militarily by South Africa.

Savimbi was scheduled to visit Washington to press his case for American support. State Department officials confirmed in early April that the rebel leader had met in March with Lannon Walker, the acting assistant secretary of state for African affairs, in Morocco.

During hearings in the House in late March and early April on the proposed lifting of the ban on assistance, heavy opposition came from Democratic House members and also from Melvin Hill, president of Gulf Oil Exploration and Production Co. Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-MA), chairman of the House subcommittee on Africa, said the repeal would seriously damage U.S. interests throughout Africa

and would "play directly into the hands" of the Soviet Union and Cuba. Former senator Dick Clark, author of the amendment, said: "One wonders how providing military assistance to guerrilla forces fighting in Angola for the purpose of overthrowing an established government squares with Secretary Haig's persistent criticism of the Soviets for aiding guerrilla groups who are attempting to overthrow established governments."

Melvin Hill, whose company has major investments in Angola, said the repeal "would have an extremely negative effect, both in Angola and elsewhere in Africa." He described how "business-like and non-ideological the MPLA government has been in its relationship with Gulf and other American and western multinational companies."

While the Angolan government has not come out with open criticism of the Reagan administration since the announcement of the repeal proposal, the Foreign Minister said his government was maintaining its "usual serenity until things are concrete." "The U.S. has not established a clear political line," he stressed. He said his government still hopes relations with the U.S. can be improved.

Other African countries have been harsher in criticism of the Reagan administration's recent actions with regard to Africa. President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria said, "If the U.S. is willing to support rebels in a sovereign African nation, it would be extremely serious." Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, President Samora Machel of Mozambique and President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, chairman of the OAU, all expressed strong displeasure over indications that Reagan might take a friendlier attitude toward South Africa and might give military support to Savimbi.

The assistant secretary of state-designate for African affairs, Chester Crocker, embarked on a tour of southern African nations in April in an attempt to explain the policy of his administration. (*Washington Post*, March 11, 20 and 21, and April 2, 1981; *New York Times*, March 31, 1981.)

## Botswana

● According to a late March report in the Johannesburg *Star*, the Botswana government has granted the Shell Oil Co. a prospecting license for the Mmamabula district in the central part of the country, where substantial coal deposits are known to exist.

Shell plans to have a coal mine in operation there by the end of the decade, and the coal is to be used primarily for export. The main domestic consumers of coal are the Selebi-Pikwe copper and nickel mines and the Botswana Power Commission.

Botswana's President, Quett Masire, also announced that a coal-fired power station is to be built at Morupule, north of Gaborone. According to Phil Steenkamp, permanent secretary in the office of the President, "Coal is the future of Botswana." It is believed that a major program to export coal could provide the country with a needed stimulus for economic development. (*Johannesburg Star*, March 28, 1981.)

## Lesotho

● A series of nine explosions in Maseru in mid-March was being investigated by Lesotho police, who gave no indication as to who might be responsible. The explosive devices, said to be homemade, were placed at an electricity substation on the banks of the Caledon River border with South Africa. The substation supplies the entire country with electricity, but it was only slightly damaged by the explosions.

Previous explosions in Lesotho had been blamed on the Basotho Congress Party, an exile opposition group which has been launching guerrilla attacks for ten years to bring down the government of Chief Leabua Jonathan. (*London Guardian*, March 12, 1981; *Johannesburg Radio*, March 11, 1981.)

Earlier in February, the South African government was seeking clarification of a statement made by Lesotho Minister of Information and Broadcasting and acting Foreign Minister J.T. Rakheta, alleging that the country's police had foiled an attempt by South Africa to attack Maseru, the capital.

## Malawi

● In late March, Blantyre Radio reported that former Minister of Youth and Culture **Gwanda Chakuamba** had been found guilty of four charges lodged against him, and was sentenced to 22 years' imprisonment with hard labor.

Chakuamba was arrested and ousted from the government in February 1980 and was put on trial beginning in December on charges including illegal possession of firearms, prohibited publications and photos of rebel ex-ministers, and of vocalizing seditious plans against the government of President Kamuzu Banda. He had been regarded as the most powerful political figure in Malawi after Banda, and had been commander of the President's personal paramilitary force, the Young Pioneer Movement. He had denied all the charges against him.

Faindi Phiri, a former member of parliament who was tried along with Chakuamba on sedition charges, was also found guilty and sentenced to five years' hard labor. (Blantyre Radio, March 20, 1981.)

## Mozambique

● The Mozambique government expelled four American diplomats and two of their wives in early March, accusing them of "espionage, subversion and interference" in government affairs: The two wives were accused of "carrying out support" for their husbands' work.

Maputo alleged that the six Americans were part of a CIA spy ring which included a number of Mozambicans and at least two Portuguese citizens, who were being detained. The Ministry of Security said that the CIA had "intimate links" with South African security and intelligence services and that one of the spy ring's tasks had been to "collect information on the location of African National Congress (ANC) residences and the movements of South African refugees in Mozambique." The ministry's statement implied that this information was a basis for the January raid by South African commandos on ANC residences in Maputo.

The Ministry of Security also said that the CIA had collected information on Zimbabwe African National

Union (ZANU) refugee camps which it had passed to the former white regime in Rhodesia and that the CIA had recruited agents in Mozambique's key industries "with the object of worsening our economic difficulties."

U.S. officials sharply disputed the Mozambique government's claims and said the expulsions had been ordered after a Cuban espionage team had seized one of the Americans and tried unsuccessfully to recruit him as a spy. The State Department said it viewed the expulsions "with most serious concern" and thought it "not coincidental" that they came shortly after a group of Americans who publish the *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, an anti-CIA publication, had visited Mozambique.

In retaliation for the expulsions, the Reagan administration suspended its entire food assistance program to Mozambique. Some \$5 million in sales of wheat and rice were halted and shipments of 27,000 tons of corn were also stopped in late March.

The Mozambique government released from jail an American businessman, Arthur Zimmerman, in early April who had been held in connection with the alleged spy ring. Zimmerman, an engineer in the **General Tire and Rubber Co.** plant in Maputo, had been held for five weeks. (Washington *Post*, March 6 and April 13, 1981; Washington *Star*, March 21, 1981; London *Guardian*, March 6, 1981; New York *Times*, March 5, 1981.)

## South Africa

● The South African army has been participating in raids with the police on Soweto for some time, it was disclosed in March.

In one such raid late in March, hundreds of men, both military and police personnel, surrounded the township and swept inwards, using roadblocks, vehicles searches and house-to-house raids in what the police described as an "ordinary crime prevention operation."

The Johannesburg *Star* said it had known for a while about the use of the army in Soweto raids but had not been able to inform the public "because of Defense Act restric-

tions." The paper said that using the military in police operations is "most shortsighted" and would "heighten racial tensions sharply." (Johannesburg *Star*, March 28, 1981; London *Guardian*, March 28, 1981.)

● Five black students were brought before a Kimberley court in April on charges stemming from last year's boycott of black schools.

The five are among 23 detainees who are either leaders or members of the Galeshewa (black township) Action Committee, formed to present the views of pupils and parents to government officials in an effort to negotiate an end to the boycott.

The boycott was called off at the beginning of this year with the expectation that the 23 detainees would be released. They are still in detention. (London *Times*, April 2, 1981.)

● Two South African companies are involved in oil consortiums which have been awarded licenses by the British government to prospect for oil in at least two North Sea blocks and perhaps as many as ten.

Britain's Anti-Apartheid Movement revealed in March that Union Oil Exploration, UK subsidiary of Federale Mynbou, has a 10 percent stake in a consortium managed by Gulf Oil, and Charter Consolidated, the British subsidiary of the Anglo American Corp. mining conglomerate, has a share of a consortium operated by Burmah Oil Exploration.

If oil is found and exploited, the South African companies would own part of it, although the British government officially embargoes South Africa from receiving its North Sea oil.

MP Ted Rowlands, the Labor Party energy spokesman, said: "It would be a national disgrace to allow South African interests to buy their way into our North Sea oil assets."

Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands were expected to make "strong representations" to the British government since their state-owned energy companies are partners in the Burmah Oil group. (London *Guardian*, March 18, 1981; *Financial Times*, March 17, 1981.)



# Southern African Reactions to Reagan

BY GWENDOLEN M. CARTER

From the Cape to Cairo during the first two months of this year, expectations, premonitions, or both of what the Reagan victory would mean to southern Africa were my daily fare. Moderate to extreme elation in right-wing circles in South Africa contrasted with restrained or open dismay among those urging effective change in its race relations. In other parts of southern Africa, the failure of the Geneva conference on Namibia and even the February raid on African National Congress (ANC) houses on the outskirts of Maputo were frequently linked to apprehensions that the "global" orientation and strategic interests of the new U.S. administration were encouraging the South African government to adopt a more belligerent external stance. In general, rumors rather than information about the orientation of the Reagan advisers formed the basis for comments. (An abbreviated version of Chester Crocker's article in *Foreign Affairs*,

printed in the *New York Times*, January 11, 1981, seemed one of the few early sources. Crocker was introduced there as "Haig's man for Africa.") Yet there were thoughtful discussions that revealed trends in thinking in significant sectors that may have long-term significance.

At a Cape Town luncheon on January 8, 1981, the assistant editor of *Die Burger*, Louis Louw, reacted vigorously when I sought a comment on the Reagan victory. "It will get Jimmy Carter off our backs," he said, "and maybe America will keep quiet." But the former editor of the paper, Piet J. Cillié, now professor of journalism at Stellenbosch, differed. "No, not keep quiet, but mix criticism with compassion. They should recognize the parallelism and tactfully encourage movement." Later, he added, "There won't be so much difference in terms of policies, but what will get better for us will be the attitudes. We have usually found that the atmosphere is better with Republicans." Benjamin Pogrud agreed during a Johannesburg conversation on the eve of the inauguration but also saw advantages because it would be more difficult for South Africans "to reject the Reagan crowd on emotional grounds than it was Carter."

Others in Johannesburg expressed sharply differing views on local reac-

tions to the change of administration. Hendrik Grosskopf, former editor of *Die Beeld* and now head of *Die Nasionale Pers*, believed that informed Afrikaner sentiment was cautious in its reactions because there had been such a false euphoria of expectations over the nomination of Barry Goldwater in 1964. Willem Kleynhans, UNISA professor and well-known analyst of the South African scene, had a different view from his platteland visits. He reported jubilation over the Reagan victory and expectations that it would create "a totally different America" that would "erase everything Carter was doing." John Rees, director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, agreed that "Afrikaners generally welcomed it, and in some circles were ecstatic because they felt there would be a more open attitude to South Africa, that there would be more understanding, and it would reverse Carter's negative attitude." Kleynhans went so far, however, as to express the fear that Prime Minister Botha would have more difficulty "doing liberal things" because "the rest of the world was going conservative: Reagan and Thatcher." People were "fed up with integration," he maintained, "and feel Botha is running counter to the rest of the world," a comment surprising to the South African liberals to whom I spoke.

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Gwendolen M. Carter is a professor of political science at Indiana University and has written widely on South Africa. Her most recent books are *Which Way is South Africa Going?* and *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*, edited with Patrick O'Meara.

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Black reactions to the Reagan victory were scantier but forceful. Dr. Nthato Motlana, chairman of the Soweto Committee of Ten, simply said, "The United States is disappointing." Farouk Khan, news editor of *Post*, Natal, was more forceful: "Every American who voted for Reagan was an indictment against themselves. It's like voting for Verwoerd," he charged. "Reagan means trouble; he's only good for the Nats, the multinationals, and the profit factor. Behind every Afrikaner is a Rockefeller." And he warned, "In southern Africa with Reagan in power, we are on the brink of a full-scale war." Other blacks were to join subsequently in expressing fears that Reagan would be a defender of white-minority rule and would promote U.S. investment in South Africa that would tie the two countries closer together. (In a lengthy and rare interview with Gary Thatcher, published in the *Christian Science Monitor* on March 13, 1981, Winnie Mandela, one of the most influential of black activists, called President Reagan "no friend of the black people of South Africa" and said his statements made it "quite clear he's going to promote apartheid." Stating that "violence in this country is inevitable," she added, "We want an end to our struggle. America could do us a favor by just getting out of our way." Since Mrs. Mandela is banned, she cannot be quoted in South Africa.)

Another possible result of Reagan policies, voiced by a labor specialist from the University of Cape Town, was that they might "generate new activity in the black community in America, and thus put more pressure on the administration to take a positive approach to the South African situation." But future American policies toward South Africa were generally viewed by blacks with dismay and even alarm.

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, head of Kwa-Zulu and Inkatha, was one of the few to endorse specifically the American role in South Africa outlined in Crocker's *Foreign Affairs* article while at the same time criticizing the "false euphoria in white South Africa" over Reagan. His own view of the South African situation was that "Botha

could carry the majority of Afrikaners for a national internal settlement" and that he was "amazed that he hesitates." By "acting as a catalyst," the United States could "help move events toward a [national] convention," he said, which, to avoid controversy, might be called "a conference." Above all, he urged, "there should be less emphasis on divisions between black parties," and on "looking for the winner" but concentration on the interests of the "majority of the people."

These diverse reactions to the Reagan victory are at least as revealing on the current state of South African politics as they are on expectations regarding American policies under the new administration. The Verwoerdian "answer" to South African race relations is widely recognized as having imposed a straitjacket on government policies affecting Africans. But having freed itself largely from the earlier dogmas, the Botha government has not yet determined its own consistent lines of policy. Thus, it combines apparent "reforms" with counter-actions that threaten still more uncertainties and restrictions.

A notable example were the legislative proposals taken to Parliament in January 1981, in which provisions avowedly intended to reinforce African stability in urban areas were combined with others undercutting the one legislative guarantee of African "permanence" in those areas by transforming Section 10 (a), (b), and (c) rights into regulations that would have been subject to administrative decisions. In the period during which this latter provision was still under consideration, a prominent African leader exclaimed to me bitterly, "It makes me feel like an animal that can be pushed anywhere."

Although this threat to the Section 10 rights of urban Africans has been removed, at least temporarily, massive African resettlement continues. North of Pretoria, long-domiciled families of farm laborers in the northern Transvaal are being moved to the new Kwa-Ndebele "homeland"; so too are those of African laborers in Pretoria and — through a denial of essential labor permits to their men — African families previously living in the African-owned

area of Winterfield. So old policies grind on even as new proposals for black-white relations are widely believed to be under consideration.

The most far-reaching of these proposals are suggested privately to involve some kind of an "internal settlement" in which Africans would be involved, even as partners. Chief Buthelezi's name was often raised in such discussions but in my experience only by whites. Nelson Mandela is most commonly mentioned by blacks, although among the young the banned head of the Media Workers Association of South Africa (a recent populist outgrowth of the Writers Association of South Africa), Zwelakhe Sisulu, now under tight house arrest, is a new hero. What is apparent, however, is that behind many of the discussions in white circles within South Africa of the possible implications of the Reagan administration's policies toward their country lies an almost equal uncertainty regarding the character of its own future policies. Few blacks, on the other hand, expect advantages for their people from whatever may ensue; on the contrary, almost all seem reinforced in their belief that basic change in South Africa will come only as the result of their own efforts.

On the implications for Zimbabwe of the Reagan victory, the most optimistic expectations were voiced from Johannesburg by David Willers, senior advisor to the South African Foundation, who was reported by Voice of America as saying, "I think you'll see Reagan move quickly and firmly to cement ties with Mugabe" and "befriend Zimbabwe more forcibly than others could think . . ." He added, "Mugabe is seen as an ally of the West," and "has been especially cool to the Soviet Union. By signing the Lome II agreement, Mugabe has placed himself firmly in the Western trading zone." Within Zimbabwe itself, however, mining, agriculture, and industrial leaders (all white) were reported as expressing hopes, rather than assurances, of American support, fearing that Mugabe's avowed long-term socialist objectives might inhibit such aid. Subsequently, however, John Hillis, Chairman of the Confederation of Zim-

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babwe Industries and a member of the Media Trust, said more positively, "We are expecting good things from Reagan."

Zimbabwean officials had also been cautious in commenting on the change in the American administration, balancing the appeal of Mugabe's coolness to the Soviet Union against his stated objective of ultimately moving Zimbabwe to a fully socialist state. But as Anthony Ryder, central African editor of the *Cape Times*, remarked in private conversation, "Mugabe is a very mild Marxist."

Although no Zimbabwean political figures commented publicly on Reagan's victory, they were said to be "mildly suspicious" of his intentions towards South Africa and wary regarding his policies towards a Namibian settlement and South Africa itself. Professor Hasu Patel of the University of Zimbabwe, who has wide experience in the United States, felt there was, in fact, "no way in which Reagan can support the South African government" but believed that he would "soft-pedal on sanctions." Most constructively, he suggested that Reagan could do "a Carrington" on Namibia.

The deeply disappointing failure of the Geneva conference on Namibia was widely interpreted privately within the Frontline states as resulting at least in part from the Botha government's expectation that the new U.S. administration would be less forceful than the Carter one had been in pressing for UN-supervised elections leading towards Namibian independence. Whether this is true or not, Zimbabwe, like other Frontline states, remains committed to continued support for SWAPO and to an ultimate Namibian independence based, as was its own, on internationally supervised elections.

The particular fear among the Frontline states is that South Africa may be planning overt moves to destabilize them. Mugabe has warned Parliament of the threat posed by former Rhodesian armed forces massed in the northern Transvaal and of the need, therefore, for a Zimbabwean army far larger than most external observers feel is necessary. Incursions by South African forces into southern An-

gola, and more particularly the South African raid in February 1981 on ANC houses on the outskirts of Maputo coupled with the lack of even mild U.S. criticism of this invasion, have intensified these fears. As a highly placed Tanzanian official said to me: "We live in trepidation."

Concern over the Reagan administration policies expressed by Zimbabwean leaders and others among the Frontline states extends also, of course, to economic policies and potential cuts in foreign aid. Despite what the United States feels has been a fairly substantial aid package for Zimbabwe — \$14.5 million at independence and \$75 million budgeted by the Carter administration (which Reagan's administration has not yet confirmed) — Zimbabwean officials still speak of the "Kissinger billions" and the "pledges" during the Lancaster House negotiations. (The Kissinger Plan of 1976 suggested US\$1.5 billion for land settlement, development, and compensation for those desiring to emigrate.) Zimbabweans, particularly those concerned with the Donors Conference in late March and the country's economic future, point out the crucial need for external funds to enable them to carry through essential rehabilitation, resettlement, and reconstruction in their postwar situation in order to provide foundations on which the country can then build. They point to the moderation of their plans and their assurances of stability to the white commercial farmers and to private mining and business interests. They also stress the unusual potentialities of their economy, in which agriculture, manufacturing, and mining are balanced to a degree not rivaled by any other African-controlled state. (By 1975, manufacturing had become the single largest contributor to Zimbabwe GDP at 24.0 percent, with agriculture close behind with 20.6 percent, and mining at 6.7 percent.) In general, Zimbabwe feels it can make special claims on the international community because of the distinctiveness of its situation and the key role it can be expected to play in the emerging grouping of southern African states seeking to lessen their dependence on South Africa.

Important as Zimbabwe's needs are, they pale beside those of Mozambique and Tanzania. In the former, there was a special concern among those who felt they had successfully urged concentration on development needs and now realized that the South African raid made it inevitable that funds would be diverted to defense. They also worried, with reason, that Mozambique's recent openness to Western investment might be replaced perforce by more dependence on the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc.

In Tanzania, the drain of ever increasing costs of oil, coupled with the growing need to import food for its expanding population, is threatening the viability of its economy. Thus, their ever growing need for foreign aid and their deepening concern lest the Reagan administration impose severe restrictions on American contributions.

There are still many uncertainties both at home and abroad about the implications of the Reagan victory. In regard to South Africa, how will U.S. distaste for its legally imposed racial discrimination be weighed by right-wing politicians against the attraction of its strategic minerals and position and its government's outspoken anti-communism? Even more influential on Reagan's policies may be what interpretation is given to such reforms as the Botha government makes after the April election. Regardless of the policies the Reagan administration may follow, however, what happens in the long run in South Africa will be determined by the blacks, and not by the whites.

Zimbabwe's moderate socio-economic programs, coolness to the Soviet Union, determined nonracialism, and promising economy may well be attractive to a conservative regime. If so, extensive U.S. aid can speed up Zimbabwe's development along the lines it has already laid down but is certain to continue to pursue in any case. But for Mozambique and Tanzania, aid if it comes will probably only result from long-term calculations on the value of their stability in an area of marked volatility. In the meantime, to reiterate the comment from Tanzania, they "live in trepidation." □



# Politics in Trans-Saharan Africa

BY ROBERT A. MORTIMER

The Libyan tanks that rolled into Ndjamena in mid-December 1980 were not solely a decisive interventionary force in Chad's civil war. They were tangible manifestations of a process of change that is transforming politics in a vast region of Africa. Maghreb, Sahara, Sahel, and the coastal belt from Guinea to Nigeria are all becoming part of a single geopolitical unit that I shall call trans-Saharan Africa.

The subsequent announcement that Chad and Libya would merge was unduly hasty and more symbolic than real. Although politically premature, it further dramatized the fact that a geopolitical struggle of far-reaching dimensions and enormous consequence is underway in this huge theater. Power is being redistributed in North and West Africa transforming two African subsystems into a new geopolitical entity.


Col. Muammar Qaddafi's Libya is clearly a major actor in this emergent region. Oil power and a visionary conception of a new political order have made it so. Nigeria and Algeria, OPEC-mates and diplomatically influential states, are the other major pow-

ers in this nascent trans-Saharan system. Both have the human, material, and ideological resources to give them weight in the regional balance of power. Like Libya, they have exploited their power to influence region-wide issues. These three states are poles that cannot be ignored by the other states of the region as they seek to preserve their own interests.

The balance of power in trans-

Saharan Africa is of no small interest to the United States as well. Before defining American interest in the area, one must understand this reshaping of the very boundaries of political space that underlies day-to-day events in the region. Two wars, in Chad and in Western Sahara, have been the foci around which extensive region-wide diplomacy has been conducted. It is necessary to examine these specific

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


Photo: Henri Bureau/Sygma

**Col. Muammar Qaddafi's Libya is a major actor in the emergent trans-Saharan system**

conflicts and their spillover into the affairs of many other states to perceive the broad lines of the emergent trans-Saharan system. Once the contour of the region has been delineated and its politics clarified, one can examine the implications for American policy.

Until recently the Sahara has been more a barrier than a bridge. There was no steady flow of transactions across the desert. To be sure, caravans or cavalry, traders and soldiers occasionally linked Maghreb to Sahel. So too did Muslim missionaries, but the exchange was limited even if a common faith took hold throughout much of the area. "Trans-Saharan" denoted passage ways that were centuries old but only intermittently traveled. The Sahara was not a bridge but a vast sea to be traversed.

Today petrodollars and Islamic revival are constructing some spans, for many of which Libya is the master architect. Libyan spans reach out to factions in Ndjamen, to Toubou and

Tuareg clansmen in Niger and Mali, to the Polisario Front in Western Sahara, to dissidents in Senegal and fundamentalist cults in Nigeria. The governments of these states have expressed concern over Libya's creation of an "Islamic Legion," apparently manned by recruits from throughout the region. Col. Muammar Qaddafi's vision of a Saharan republic, long dismissed as a castle of sand, is now viewed as a genuine threat by several Sahelian states. In broader perspective, Libya's probing trans-Saharan policy is a harbinger of new regional forces.

Libya has of course pursued ambitious external goals ever since the 1969 revolution. For several years, Col. Qaddafi seemed most concerned with Arab affairs and events in the Middle East. His repeated efforts to forge Arab unions — with Egypt, later with Tunisia, and most recently with Syria — apparently relegated his concern with Africa to secondary status. Uganda under Idi Amin was Qaddafi's

most publicized venture into African affairs and turned out rather badly.

Yet Libya was gradually becoming more and more deeply involved in Africa over the 1970s, first as a patron of the Palestine Liberation Organization but eventually in behalf of its own vision of a culturally revolutionary African Islamic movement. The intervention in Chad had its own deep roots, reaching back to the early 1970s. The merger announcement of January 1981 was the end-product of a long involvement in the faction-torn country.

Although the National Liberation Front of Chad (Frolinat) was created in Sudan in 1966, Libya under Qaddafi promptly established contact with the dissident movement that controlled much of the northern part of the country. In 1971 Chad's President Francois Tombalbaye broke relations with Libya after an attempted coup d'état against him. A few years later, Libya occupied the contested Aouzou Strip along the northern border while maintaining a close support relationship with Frolinat. The stress of civil war and other problems did bring down Tombalbaye in 1975, but the new government had no greater success in ending the Frolinat rebellion despite profound divisions within the rebel movement itself.

Libya chose to back the Toubou, Goukouni Woddeye, son of the Derde or traditional Toubou leader who himself had long been in exile in Tripoli. Woddeye broke with the fervently anti-Libyan Hissene Habre and consolidated control over the dominant force within Frolinat in 1977. At this point, Habre, having reconstituted a new force personally loyal to him, negotiated with the central government of Gen. Felix Malloum, which he entered as prime minister in 1978, claiming that the country was under invasion from Libya. Goukouni Woddeye, characterizing his alliance with Libya as tactical, kept the pressure on the Ndjamen coalition that collapsed into armed conflict (between Malloum and Habre) early in 1979.

With Chad virtually shattered, an inter-African mediation effort produced a temporary settlement (the Kano Accord of March 1979) that brought

Woddeye to power, initially as chairman of a provisional "Council of State" and eventually as president of the GUNT or "Transitional Government of National Union." The GUNT was composed of no less than 11 factions of which four were most important: Goukouni's wing of Frolinat; Habre's new FAN (Armed Forces of the North); the southern group now under the leadership of Col. Wadal Kamougue; and another pro-Libyan movement led by Ahmat Acyl. Habre, who was the defense minister under these delicate provisional arrangements, complained of harassment of the FAN by Libyan troops and the pro-Libyan groups. Once more Chad lapsed into civil war in March 1980 as the collage government came unstuck, apparently under Libyan pressure to eliminate Habre.

The final phase of the Libyan intervention occurred in incremental stages beginning with a defense agreement signed with Woddeye in June. Over the next several months, Libyan troops gradually reinforced Woddeye's men and established staging areas in the country. In November, while the OAU labored for a cease-fire, a Libyan air base was reported under construction only 40 miles north of the capital. Both Libyan aviation and armored vehicles engaged in the final offensive that drove Habre's forces from Ndjamen. Some 6,500 Libyan troops were estimated to have participated in the overall operations; after years of covert involvement, Qaddafi achieved his first military victory near the shores of Lake Chad.

Chad was of course an exceptionally vulnerable target after 15 years of civil war. Internal strife invites external intervention. Libya's cultivation of the Saharan Toubou leaders was a readily available means of influence in so porous a political situation. Libya simply capitalized upon its advantageous geographic position to shape the outcome of the most recent round in this long — and no doubt ongoing — struggle for power (for Goukouni Woddeye and Col. Kamougue of the cotton and food-growing south must now agree on how to govern Chad). What the victory of Woddeye over his rival Habre sig-

nifies is the incorporation of Chad not into Libya (the merger announcement notwithstanding) but into the trans-Saharan geopolitical system.

Over the past two years Chad's affairs have become a region-wide concern. The succession of diplomatic conferences in Kano, Lagos, Lomé, and elsewhere has involved a large number of states and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the Chadian question. Although the Libyan intervention has nullified the practical impact of these diplomatic efforts, the fact remains that Nigeria, Senegal, Niger, Togo, Guinea, Benin, and others have been drawn into the struggle for power in Chad. They recognize that they are part of the same trans-Saharan system.

One explicit linkage is obvious to President Seyni Kountche of Niger which has a minority Toubou population in the east related to those of Tibesti and Fezzan. Niger claims that broadcasts from Libya have urged these Toubou to rise up against the regime in Niamey. In mid-November, Kountche issued a joint statement with President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon deploring foreign intervention in Chad, and personally consulted with President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, who was active in the OAU mediation effort.

Libyan broadcasts are also reportedly beamed to the Tuaregs, a population long at odds with the authorities in Bamako, Mali. The general theme of these broadcasts is the purity and grandeur of the Muslim civilization of the nomads. This appeal has great emotional impact during this era of Islamic revival, but even more important than the message is the evidence that Qaddafi is arming a force whose ultimate mission is presumably to liberate a "Saharan Islamic republic."

Well before the battle of Ndjamen, ex-President Leopold Senghor of Senegal denounced this "mercenary army" as a threat to regional stability. Senghor's decision to dispatch troops to the Gambia last November to shore up President Dawda Jawara revealed his sensitivity to signs of destabilization. So too did the Nigerian government's violent reaction to a dissident cult in Kano alleged to be backed by Libya.

The expulsion of Libyan diplomats from Lagos and an increase in the Nigerian military budget were further signs of Nigerian uneasiness in the aftermath of Chad. In sum, West African policymakers up and down the coast were operating as if they believed that a trans-Saharan system existed.

The other major intraregional conflict concerns the territory of Western Sahara. The rise of a coherent liberation movement, however dependent upon external allies, in this long-ignored chunk of desert is another manifestation of Saharan peoples influencing the emergence of a trans-Saharan system. Although Morocco and Algeria have been the foremost state actors in this conflict, Mauritania has also been profoundly affected while Senegal, Mali, and Niger have felt the reverberations of the war. Others including Guinea and Nigeria have been involved through the OAU's Ad Hoc Committee. Now after five years of military and diplomatic struggle, there are persistent rumors of secret negotiations to achieve a compromise settlement. Diplomatic resolution of this issue would be significant for a large number of states.

The roots and evolution of the Western Sahara conflict have been well covered in this magazine (see especially *Africa Report*, March-April 1978, May-June, and September-October, 1980). Suffice to recall that Morocco has historically claimed sovereignty over large stretches of the Sahara while Algeria has sought to contain Moroccan expansion, notably through the independence of the Spanish Saharan colony. Toward this end, Algeria nurtured close relations with Ould Daddah's Mauritania from the mid-1960s through 1974. Algiers supplied technical assistance in the training of police and internal security personnel and conducted frequent diplomatic consultations with Nouakchott. Overly confident about this relationship, the Algerians were aghast when Ould Daddah decided to accept King Hassan's 1975 offer to partition the Spanish territory.

Outmaneuvered by Hassan on the western flank of the Sahara, Algeria cultivated closer ties with Mali and Niger, instituting periodic summit meetings of this "greater Saharan"



grouping in which Libya also participated on the early occasions. This series of meetings enabled Algeria to develop a good working relationship with Generals Seyni Kountche and Moussa Traore and to impress upon them the utility of cooperation in dealing with their Tuareg populations. Algeria has probably the most stable relationship with the Tuaregs through its administration in Tamanrasset and an emergency food distribution program that reaches the northern Malian population as well. At the most recent of these Saharan summits in March 1980, Benjedid offered Mali further aid essentially in return for Malian support on the Western Sahara issue. Not only is Moussa Traore a member of the OAU committee on the conflict but more importantly he has not objected to Polisario recruitment and freedom of movement in the northern Malian corridor to Mauritania.

Algeria's "greater Saharan" policy contrasts with Libya's instigation to resist central authorities. Libya harbors, among others, Sidi Demba Soumanou, one of the Malian opposition figures. One can assume that circumscribing Qaddafi is a factor in the calculations of Niger, Mali, and Algeria although the Algero-Libyan relationship is a complex amalgam of cooperation and competition. Libya has supported Algeria on Western Sahara but may now threaten to displace Algeria as the patron of Polisario. Assuming that Algeria is now discretely pursuing a diplomatic settlement, the Libyan factor could become an unwanted constraint.

Upon the overthrow of Ould Daddah in 1978, Algeria resumed its ties with Mauritania successfully urging Nouakchott's disengagement from the Saharan war. Mauritania has been crippled by its futile campaign to annex its hunk of the Saharan partition. Many blacks from southern Mauritania entered the army during 1975-78; now they are pressuring the regime for civil and economic rights long denied. Moors from the north, on the other hand, have been throwing in their lot with Polisario, more attracted by the prospect of a separate Sahrawi republic than affiliation with a bankrupt Mauritania.

Nouakchott, its finances in shambles as a consequence of the war, is virtually

paralyzed diplomatically. It does not wish to offend Morocco, which now occupies all the territory that once provided a buffer; the Polisario, which roams across Mauritanian territory; nor Algeria, its ally in the cause of reconstituting some kind of buffer state. Haplessly caught up in the turbulence of regional change, Mauritania's fate depends largely upon other states' decisions to stabilize the trans-Saharan system. Algerian and Mauritanian interests are, however, relatively compatible, and Mauritania can serve as a representative of their joint preferences in Senegal and some of the other Francophone states in the area.

Algeria could use a friend at court in Dakar. Senghor has seen Algeria as entertaining hegemonic aspirations in the Sahelian belt. The two states normally come down on opposite sides of African and global issues and Senghor immediately rallied to the Moroccan/Mauritanian cause in 1975. Now that Mauritania's position has changed (and Houari Boumediene has passed from the scene), Senghor maybe less worried about Algerian ambitions. (One can assume that Senghor, the party leader, will continue to have influence on foreign policy even though he has turned the presidency over to Abdou Diouf.) In opening the Freetown OAU summit last July, Senghor appealed for a "dynamic African-style compromise" on Western Sahara. Although leaning toward Morocco's conception of an appropriate compromise — Senegal being one of only six states to vote with Morocco against the Algerian-sponsored resolution at the UN last fall — Senegal's position has become more flexible along with that of the other interested parties.

Does Algeria seek hegemony in the Sahel? There is no doubt that Algeria remains an activist state with a vision of progressivism in Africa as a whole. It has usually tempered its vision with a hearty dose of realism, however; its current policies are dominated by its dispute with Morocco, and its initiatives in the Sahel/Sahara are designed to isolate Morocco diplomatically. Rather than hegemony, Algeria courts influence in the Sahel to keep Morocco under pressure. The black African states are seen in Algiers as actors in a

trans-Saharan system that can influence the outcome of a dispute in which it has high stakes.

Moroccan policy is likewise dominated by the conflict over Western Sahara. It has sought to parry Algerian diplomacy in order to gain recognition as the legitimate sovereign of the contested territory. Diplomatically this has been a losing battle as Algeria has successfully exploited the norm of national self-determination. By the time of the Freetown summit, the Sahrawi government-in-exile was recognized by 26 African states. Under these adverse diplomatic conditions, Morocco stepped up its military effort last spring by deploying three new mobile divisions. These forces have shored up the military situation but have done little to stem the diplomatic deterioration.

Hence King Hassan has been obliged to entertain some kind of compromise (*à l'africaine* in Senghor's words — or otherwise). At least exploratory talks are widely presumed to be underway, notably by the Moroccan press that has begun to criticize the government for its "pacifist" outlook. Both Algeria and Morocco are no doubt weary of the costs of the war, but they must find a formula that humiliates neither. On the Algerian side, this means that Polisario must gain something. Recent disclosures concerning earlier futile negotiations indicate that Polisario was the "grain of sand" that prevented a smooth reconciliation. On the Moroccan side, the king can not lightly renounce very much of what he has claimed. The task of accommodating both parties' needs is formidable. While the major responsibility lies with Algeria and Morocco, the sanction of several other trans-Saharan states could provide a helpful collective legitimization of a settlement.

Nigeria is the third major actor in this emergent international subsystem. As noted above, it has been diplomatically involved in both the Western Saharan conflict and Chad's civil war. Having striven for a broad national union compromise in Chad, it is dismayed by the turn of events there and is concerned to limit further Libyan interventionism. Quite aside from this immediate concern, Nigeria has been pursuing a broad policy of regional economic involve-



Photo: Desjobert/Sygm

Polisario fighters: "Key to reducing tensions in the area is resolving the Western Sahara dispute"

ment through its support of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

As the Nigerian writer Olatunde Ojo has emphasized, Nigeria embarked upon a sustained "diplomatic offensive" in the early 1970s to create ECOWAS: "It took Nigerian leadership, extensive efforts in national coalition formation, and even more intensive and difficult regional negotiations and coalition formation to get ECOWAS inaugurated." The decision to press hard toward an eventual regional common market was a significant step in redefining economic and political space.

The ECOWAS treaty associates 16 states from Mauritania to Nigeria in an effort to transcend colonial boundaries. Although conceived in terms of "West Africa," the entity includes the states of Niger, Mali, and Mauritania that have seen to be crucial links in the trans-Saharan system. As Nigeria sees ECOWAS as an instrument to pry French influence out of the area, it must concern itself with the security fears of

these three former French colonies. In the case of Chad, where Nigeria sought to neutralize both French and Libyan influence, it failed and stirred up misgivings in Senegal and Ivory Coast to boot. The failure revealed the limits of Nigerian power but intensified the sentiment that Lagos had interests to defend in the Sahel and Sahara. The ambition to mold a West African unit necessarily implicates Nigeria in trans-Saharan geopolitics.

ECOWAS itself remains a fragile instrument. At best it has been "inching towards implementation" as Ralph Onwuka has put it. It took four years from the signature of the treaty in 1975 to carry out the first state of trade liberalization. Early decisions on personnel, budgets, and free movement of "community citizens" proved controversial. A jurisdictional dispute between the Ivoirian executive director and the Liberian managing director of the Community Fund delayed organizational progress. Nor has the Francophone CEAO (comprising Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,

Senegal, and Upper Volta) been disbanded, reflecting ambivalence toward Nigerian intentions. Yet ECOWAS, fragile as it is, has undeniably served to orient Nigeria toward a regional environment that other forces have rendered trans-Saharan.

What then are the implications of this new African configuration for United States policy? While the old geopolitical divisions (Arabs in the Maghreb, Francophones and Anglophones in West Africa) may have been simpler to work with, it is necessary first to acknowledge that these colonially bequeathed units are relics of a past age. The new regional powers do not delimit their interests inside these boundaries and their impact can not be contained within them. American policy planning must acknowledge the dynamics of the trans-Saharan system and the preeminent capability of the three OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) states.

All three are committed to change, namely to enhancing the political and economic autonomy of the region as a

whole. Their notions of how to effect change are not identical however. Algeria and Nigeria have essentially pragmatic conceptions of economic development through coordinated national and regional policies of increasing self-reliance. This is a goal that the United States can share. Libya in pursuing more directly interventionary policies sees subversion as a means of transformation. The United States by itself can do little to affect Libyan behavior, but it can associate itself with the majority of states, Algeria and Nigeria included, that seek a generalized reduction of tensions.

The first step to such a cool-down must be taken in Western Sahara. The moment seems ripe, as indicated above, for a sustained diplomatic effort to reach a compromise settlement. Although the American role is indirect and secondary, the United States does have some leverage to encourage a realistic solution. To resolve this long-festering conflict is clearly in the American interest and requires both diplomatic subtlety and pressure.

To date, while retaining an officially neutral posture, American policy has tilted towards Morocco. Under great pressure from Rabat, the Carter administration decided late in 1979 to sell arms to Morocco. At the same time, the sale was publicly justified as an incentive to King Hassan to negotiate. Although this logic was too subtle for some observers, there is evidence that the United States has indeed been urging Morocco to negotiate seriously. These moves, of course, predate the recent Algerian role in the hostage negotiations with Iran. It is reasonable to assume that Algeria expects the United States to maintain such pressure.

What is required to achieve an acceptable settlement? A breakthrough depends upon Moroccan willingness to cede territory to the Polisario Front, thus to provide a homeland for the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. Morocco, one can speculate, is ready to yield something (for example, Tiris el Gharbia, the southern third of the Spanish colony first annexed and later surrendered by Mauritania), but presumably not enough to satisfy Polisario and its patron Algeria. Is it possible to

satisfy the latter parties without humiliating Hassan and thereby menacing his throne? Somehow diplomatic ingenuity must come up with an affirmative answer to this question.

This requires enticing Morocco into greater flexibility, but it does not mean abandoning Morocco. The United States can persuasively argue to Hassan that Morocco, Algeria, and the United States share an interest in limiting Libyan influence in the Western Sahara. Libyan opportunities to cultivate Polisario continue so long as the war is prolonged. One can furthermore imagine schemes for the joint exploitation of mineral resources, confederal arrangements for the most harshly



Photo: Joseph Margolis

**President Chadli Benjedid: Algeria is "an activist state with a vision of progressivism in Africa"**

contested territory, and financial aid offers to guarantee postwar economic development. Such diplomatic imagination is necessary to sweeten what will inevitably be a bitterly controversial settlement. By the same token, Algeria and the Polisario Front must be urged to recognize Morocco's stake in avoiding national disgrace.

Whatever the means, the United States should do its utmost to facilitate a settlement because this is the key to trans-Saharan politics in the near-term. The turbulence in Western Sahara has encouraged a climate of tension that encourages Libyan probes elsewhere in the Sahara and Sahel. It has polarized relations as Morocco and Algeria have bid for diplomatic support. A defused, less competitive regional environment is in the interests of nearly everyone,

which makes it realistic to assume that the OAU could be used to sanction a settlement as suggested above.

Resolution of the Western Sahara issue will not undo the extension of Libyan power into northern Chad. The reduction of tensions that it would provide, however, is a precondition for containing Libyan influence within reasonable bounds. The future course of politics in Ndjamená, notably the relations between northern and southern peoples, depends in part upon the overall external environment. The south has no desire to become a Libyan satellite. Goukouni Woddeye must weigh the cost of losing the south against the benefit of a close Libyan connection. Having been caught short by the scale of last fall's intervention, Chad's neighbors (and France) are now exerting countervailing pressure encouraging Col. Kamougue to resist complete satellitization.

Libya is likely to remain the rebel in the trans-Saharan region, but is unlikely to dominate the area except under conditions of generalized insecurity. A French diplomat recently characterized Qaddafi as the man who "wants to unite everything that lives under a tent." The political awakening of desert society has, as we have seen, contributed to the emergence of a trans-Saharan system. Qaddafi's vision of a "Saharan Republic" can not be dismissed as a force in regional affairs. Yet the "Islamic Legion" notwithstanding, its realization is a more secure environment. The key to reducing tensions throughout the area turns upon resolving the Western Saharan dispute.

To defuse tensions is not to cast the status quo in bronze. States like Nigeria and Algeria will continue to promote gradual progressive change. With its natural and human resources, Algeria is the core state of the Maghreb. Algeria thinks in trans-Saharan terms in facing Africa's most fundamental issue — economic development. Nigeria likewise is a core state increasingly convinced that events throughout the region affect its own developmental prospects. These two states are worthy partners for the United States in encouraging progress toward greater human welfare in trans-Saharan Africa. □



# Myth and Reality of Change

BY LANSINÉ KABA

Guinea is a country of salient paradoxes. Its leader, President Sékou Touré, is a mixture of intrinsic qualities and frailties, a man of great contradictions. Now that for the first time since the mid-1960s Guinea is witnessing at least some changes that the president himself has spearheaded, many of his foreign admirers refuse to accept that he has changed. Indeed, they continue to defend his harsh rule in Conakry as warranted under the circumstances of struggling against plotters. They seek to uphold his image untarnished as an "anti-imperialist theoretician."

For several understandable reasons, the admirers of President Touré often refuse to acknowledge that he can make overtures to the West and renounce some of his "revolutionary" stands for the sake of accommodation with the outside world. To some degree, one may argue that many things have not changed in Guinea. As it has become easier to visit Conakry, we have learned that Guinea is still a beautiful land with its fascinating physical features, abundant natural resources, and harmonious human mixture. Visitors also speak of the charm of Conakry — its marvelous insular site, its greenery of giant coconut trees swaying in the breeze along the coast — in short, its natural

splendor. But the tone quickly changes when comparison is made with Dakar and Abidjan, two truly modern urban centers in West Africa. The Guinean capital is a city without pretense, an archaic city with its most impressive buildings dating back to the colonial era, a city that has grown in poverty from 100,000 inhabitants to more than 500,000 in 20 years. These inhabitants, who are of unusual warmth, appear in the streets to be without great enthusiasm and motivation because of the lack of meaningful employment. Physically, Conakry has deteriorated. To worsen the situation, an air of suspicion and uneasiness permeates the whole atmosphere. As a recent traveler put it, "What is bad in Conakry is not the people but rather the fact that the higher you go in the social ladder the

more fear you find — fear of being seen to be subversive." This is why the Guinean counterparts of foreign experts working in Guinea are literally terrorized at being assigned to work with a foreigner and do not dare to invite him to their houses, as is frequently done elsewhere in West Africa. Such attitudes are symptomatic of a long, repressive rule.

However, it is difficult to deny that some change has taken place in Guinea. First, at the level of the leadership, one cannot help observing the toll which the past 20 years have taken on the president himself. Although we all change with time, many people who came in great number to listen to President Touré at Howard University in July 1980 were amazed at his lack of exuberance compared with 1958, when

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he made his first visit to the United States and charmed his audience. His face has hollowed, his gait has grown heavier, creases have invaded his face, and even his fiery eloquence has dwindled. To explain this metamorphosis requires an understanding of the context in which the president evolved during the last 20 years. Amnesty International and many critics have explained the change in the president as the effect of change from a beloved, charismatic young leader, symbol of his nation's optimism, to a middle-aged, notorious tyrant and vindictive perpetrator of horrible crimes living in a cocoon of suspicion, secrecy, and isolation. Yet suddenly President Touré has been making a spectacular comeback on the international political scene, trying to carve for himself the image of a sage committed to regional peace and unity, brotherhood among Muslim states, and friendly relations with the West. How is one to explain this change, and what did it entail?

#### TOURÉ'S NEW DIPLOMACY

A summary of the main events that signaled a change in Conakry may be useful. Everything started slowly in 1975, when Guinea participated in a special mediation commission that tried to settle the Mali-Upper Volta border

conflict (December 1974-March 1975). Under President Touré's auspices, the heads of state of Mali and Upper Volta signed a permanent peace agreement in Conakry in July, 1975. The involvement in this peace effort gave to Touré the opportunity to travel outside Guinea for the first time in many years and to have a firsthand appreciation of how the world was changing. Accustomed to scarcity, the Guineans in Bamako or Ouagadougou wondered at bountiful markets, luxury shops, and factories that were fully operative. A question that beleaguered their minds and that President Touré, their theoretician, had to answer was how to explain their backwardness given that "their political options were correct." Guinea had been left behind economically, and a reassessment of the situation was in order. More than ever, greater attention had to be given to economic development and the happiness of the people, as was dramatized by events that followed. The year 1977 saw growing popular discontent in all the regions over economic policy and the shortage of food. Starvation was threatening, as workers with very low incomes could not find necessities in the government stores or afford them in the black market. The country had a crippling foreign debt. In short, the economic performance had not matched the promising

outlook of the time of independence. These major difficulties in general, and food shortages in particular, culminated in mass protests led mostly by women across the country. The apex of the demonstrations occurred in Conakry in August 1977. Although the militia and the police were able to reestablish order after killing many demonstrators, these events shook the government because women have been instrumental in the success of Touré's *Parti démocratique de Guinée* (PDG). This may explain why in 1978 the president reappeared forcefully on the African political scene with a "new image" to create confidence among potential investors.

Owing mainly to the efforts of the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and his representative, the German-born French diplomat Andre Lewin, contacts were reestablished between Guinea and West Germany and France, two countries with which President Touré had broken diplomatic relations. (Mr. Lewin left the services of the UN to become French ambassador in Conakry in 1976.) Europeans imprisoned in Conakry for "participation in plots to overthrow the regime" were released in order to pave the way to an atmosphere conducive to normal relations. Indeed, a Franco-Guinean communique issued on July 14, 1976, announced the intention of the two governments to bury the past and finally culminated in full diplomatic relations in February 1976. Obviously it is difficult to have excellent relations with France without detente with the Ivory Coast and Senegal, two neighboring countries often maligned by President Touré and most consistent in their pro-French attitudes. Hence the reconciliation without preconditions — signed between Presidents Touré, Houphouët-Boigny, and Leopold S. Senghor on March 18, 1978, under the auspices of the late President William Tolbert of Liberia — represented a major breakthrough. (In the past, President Touré had required that Guineans living in Senegal and the Ivory Coast and opposed to his government be arrested and sent to Conakry as a condition of reconciliation.) The Guinean organ *Horoya* hailed this event as the "spirit of Monrovia," the



President Sékou Touré (right) with Ivory Coast's Houphouët-Boigny (center) and Senegal's Senghor after 1978 reconciliation



Photo: Richard Mellou/Syama

**French President Giscard's visit to Guinea in 1978 was the apogee of Touré's new diplomacy**

cornerstone of Touré's new diplomacy of brotherhood and moderation. Immediately thereafter, President Touré traveled frantically throughout Africa and the Middle East in his quest for brotherly relations and economic cooperation. From April to October, 1978, he jetted to 16 countries, including Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Nigeria — all rich, oil-producing states. Later he made triumphant visits to Dakar and Abidjan, where he entrusted President Houphouët-Boigny with his son's education. He also attended his first OAU summit in 11 years in Khartoum, preaching moderation, which, in the view of some, was a complete about-face of his previous position. Afterward, the liberation of the bishop of Conakry and other prisoners facilitated his visit to the United States in July 1980. However, the apogee of this new diplomacy was the official visit by President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing on December 12, 1978, the first French president to touch Guinean soil since 1958, when Sékou Touré's argument against the project of the Franco-African community infuriated General de Gaulle.

In terms of relation among African states, President Touré's participation in the mediation commission to settle the Western Sahara crisis and to strengthen the OAU thrust him into the limelight. He was among the "sages" designated by the OAU to seek an acceptable solution to the conflict between Morocco and Algeria. Although the war is still going on in the Sahara, the commission's recommendation of an immediate cease-fire and autodetermination was praised as an alternative to the division of the country. President Touré was credited for trying to organize a meeting between King Hasan II of Morocco and President Chadli of Algeria at the OAU summit in July, 1979. Even *Jeune Afrique*, which so far has been consistent in its critique of Sékou Touré, hailed him as a peacemaker and, with General Obasanjo of Nigeria, as "the superstar of the summit of Monrovia" (*Jeune Afrique*, August 1, 1979). Guinea has been readmitted to the Organization of the River Senegal Valley and has shown greater interest in the multinational African Bank of Development located in Abidjan. As a matter of fact, the former Guinean minister of banking

and ambassador to the European Economic Council in Brussels, Nfaly Sangaré, would have been elected director of that influential institution in June 1980 except for the opposition of Nigeria and Algeria, two main shareholders. In other words, President Touré is being taken by his peers, once again, as a serious leader. This represents an undeniable change.

At the same time in Guinea itself, there have been many notable signs of transformation. More political prisoners were released in the last two years, thereby enabling President Touré to boast that his "jails are now empty," a statement difficult to prove. Furthermore, Guinean borders are now open; and contrary to an earlier article by this author, obtaining a passport has become less difficult. Therefore, Guineans in greater numbers travel throughout the world for business or personal reasons; and goods, although sold at exorbitant prices, are now more available owing mostly to private African entrepreneurs. The resumption of the exploitation of alluvial gold in the Niger-Tinkisso River Valley and diamond mining in the southeastern re-





Conakry: In 1977, women led mass protests against food shortages

gion have alleviated to some degree the scarcity of funds to be used by traders. Certainly the government's new policy of paying diamond sellers coming from the mines in both Guinean and foreign currency may have paid off so far. It has reduced smuggling and has helped to increase sales to Belgian buyers. Concurrently with this "liberalization," President Touré has tried to lure foreign capitalists to invest in the exploitation of the abundant resources of his country and in the building of modern infrastructures. The years 1978 and 1979 saw literally a rush by foreign businessmen, contractors, and even adventurers to take advantage of this new frontier. For example, the Guinean government and the American Quintad Group International created Guinea Diamonds International, an association for diamond exploration and exploitation and for the training of Guinean staff in a diamond-cutting school in Conakry. However, up to this date, major transnationals have yet to make a serious commitment to the development of heavy industries in Guinea, and rich Arab states are hesitant to initiate such investment on their own.

Many observers thought that the ouster of the president's brother Ismael Touré, the longtime minister of economic development, from the politburo and the government in April 1979 and the Eleventh Congress of the PDG, the first to be held since 1973, would

have signaled a higher degree of liberalization of the Guinean economy and polity. For it appears that for many people Ismael was the symbol of inefficient economic planning and above all was one of the leading figures involved in the torture of political prisoners. Guineans thought that the Eleventh Congress, to be held in October 1978, would mean a reassessment of the whole system because President Touré had stated that "everything will be up for discussion, including the constitution itself." Yet Ismael was reinstated as a member of the politburo and minister of mines, and the congress rubber-stamped old principles. Thus, the promises of deep structural changes did not materialize, and Guinea remains essentially the same with a new façade.

#### THE CONTINUITY OF THE GUINEAN SYSTEM

Stability is one of the chief characteristics of President Touré's rule. In terms of political longevity, he is the dean of African heads of state. Since 1958, he and his party have had a firm hold on Guinea despite some major political and economic turmoil. His political success has depended mainly on his organizational ability, his talents as a theoretician and orator, his sagacity, and his determination to deal with the opposition — real or imagined — swiftly and mercilessly. As the late, great Guinean epic singer Sory Kandia

Kouyaté used to admonish, Sékou Touré is a dangerous leader with whom one should play very cautiously. After making his PDG a monolithic institution superior to all organs of government, Touré has become the embodiment of the nation as general secretary and *responsable suprême de la révolution*, the strategist upon whom all authority in the country depends. Not surprisingly, this totalitarian system has resulted in an atmosphere detrimental to individual initiative and efficient managerial activities. Here lies the source of the economic crisis that has paralyzed Guinea since the early 1960s and has led to many unnecessary arrests.

Concurrently, intense politicization and the practice of arbitrary arrests and kangaroo courts as reported by Amnesty International have crippled the administration of the country. Scores of competent officials, well-trained managers and officers, and able businessmen, intellectuals, and diplomats have been sent to prisons, torture, or death. For example, two former ambassadors to the United States, the very able Karim Bangoura and Fadiala Kéita; a former permanent representative to the UN, Koyah Achkar Marof; the brilliant former general secretary of the OAU, Diallo Telli; the gifted businessmen Sékou Diané, Mohammed "Petit" Touré, and Bayidi Gueye, to name only a few, have all disappeared. From 1960 to 1977, mass arrests were common in Guinea. Despite the president's declaration that his jails are now empty, the families of these able men and of thousands of prisoners have no news of their imprisoned relatives. Needless to say, this situation represents a major calamity and a serious internal "brain drain" from which the country has yet to recover, despite the attempt by the government to create a corps of well-trained and educated cadres. But the lack of sufficient care, of a sense of purpose and of well-kept research facilities has hindered the work of this new elite. For example, it has been reported that Guinea cannot keep a brewery operating for a year and has one of the largest collections of rusty machinery. Indeed, as a team sent by the World Health Organization found, Guinean

laboratories lack even elementary equipment. This bankruptcy is camouflaged by impeccable mass mobilization and rallies as well as socialist jargon, which have led to the perpetuation of the cult of Touré's personality.

From outward appearances, President Touré is the living national hero for Guineans. He supposedly knows everything; and everything stems from him and passes through him. He sets the standards. This is how the cult of personality operates. However, it may be simplistic, if not erroneous, to reduce the issue of autocracy to the peculiar character of one single man, however important his historical role may be. Unlike many people who make Touré and his family solely responsible for Guinea's misfortune, I think that the political and cultural apparatus that the president and others have created has played a definite role in promoting totalitarianism. It is the party and its machinery that have built the image of a strong hero and continue to support it. In other words, Touré should be viewed as the top of a pyramid with a large base consisting of many like-minded people who enjoy power and abhor dissent. These small tyrants are the main agents of the cult of personality, those without whom the system could not have endured and whom the president is very adept at manipulating in order to perpetuate his rule. The Eleventh Congress of the PDG has not changed that power relationship. In sum, the Guinean regime has not drastically changed. Touré's new diplomacy is mostly an exercise in public relations. The opening of Guinea to Westerners means that he has become aware of the limitations of his muddled rhetoric of revolution and socialism. He is now eager to catch up with the Ivory Coast and Senegal to insure a long-lasting image of himself as the liberator and father of modern Guinea. Thus, economic development has become imperative after 20 years of stagnation, because Guinea, although very poor, is potentially rich. The problem is whether the West or the Arab states will trust Touré.

President Touré is in a bind. On the one hand, his old allies tend to think that he has betrayed the cause of the revolution as demonstrated by his

growing friction with the Soviet Union over the price of bauxite and other bilateral issues and by his rapprochement with Morocco at the expense of Algeria. He has made enemies of former friends without gaining new ones to fill the vacuum. His reputation of being whimsical and quick tempered is another liability. On the other hand, his spectacular overtures have created constraints on his regime without tangible material gains thus far. For example, no influential Guinean has yet returned from exile. Yet Touré appears to be following his new posture, as demonstrated by his reaction when two hand grenades were tossed at him in the theater in Conakry on May 15, 1980. (Some thought that this was the work of the Guinean police to justify new arrests. But the *Front patriotique de Guinée* claimed responsibility for the attack in a memorandum issued by the *Collectif de l'opposition guinéenne* on May 7, 1980. The opposition groups include the *Regroupement des Guinéens à l'étranger* [RGE], the *Organisation unifiée pour la libération de la Guinée* [OULG] and several others.) In December 1980, Radio Conakry announced the discovery of a new plot. Insofar as we know, in both cases there were no mass arrests; or at least no public censure ensued, as had been the tradition. This shows that perhaps the president is concerned about outside criticism that may jeopardize further economic assistance.

Indeed, the reconciliation with France raised great expectations in Conakry. The issue is whether France can or will help Guinea to pull out of her 20 years of stagnation. Realistically, the projects for energy and industrial development in Guinea are too large for one single country to finance. Furthermore, the French government may be reluctant to make Sékou Touré's Guinea a privileged partner at the expense of old and trusted friends like the Ivory Coast and Senegal. Some observers have suggested that Guinea should enter the French monetary zone in order to have readily available funds to pay her foreign trade partners. But this will require a substantial reorganization of Guinean banking as well as an accommodation with the Bank of France that

may be at variance with Touré's tradition of staunch autonomy. Therefore, only a meaningful international cooperation including Western and Japanese capitalists and Arab investors may provide the funds necessary for Guinean development.

Here the role of the U.S. may be crucial in light of the guaranteed loans that the State Department extends to friendly countries, as was the case in 1963 with the \$400 million loan Guinea received to develop her bauxite industry. In this context, African states in general and Guinea in particular have reason to worry about the policy of the Reagan administration. Reagan's support of white-ruled South Africa and unconditional opposition to Angola and the liberation struggle will alienate the OAU, Nigeria, Guinea, and other states fully committed to black rule in southern Africa. Moreover, the Reagan administration, by demanding total loyalty to the West from peripheral states, tends to narrow the options of leaders like President Touré. The new U.S. president seems to overlook the many facets of nationalism in Third World countries and the way some leftist principles are essential components of that ideology. His policies, if enacted, will have grave consequences on African-American relations. The blunt distinction General Haig has drawn between totalitarian states (characterized by one-party state and leftist orientation) and authoritarian regimes (led by military juntas but not necessarily opposed to a Western type of democracy) will make it difficult for the United States to collaborate with Guinea and most African states. Faced with this dilemma, President Touré, who is proud of his leftist tradition and his long relationship with Fidel Castro, must try to exploit the potential rift between Washington and its European allies for whom socialism is not synonymous with Soviet communism. However, the worldwide economic crisis makes it difficult for Touré to receive major awards from Europe for his new diplomacy. In conclusion, one must wait to see substantial economic improvement in Guinea under the PDG and a genuine liberation from 23 years of totalitarian rule before one may speak of genuine change. □

# New Directions for the 1980s

BY GUY ARNOLD

For the first time since the independence era began, Africa talked seriously at the special meetings of 1979 and 1980 about its collective economy and ways in which the continent might improve its performance. The prospects are hardly encouraging: continuing world recession, the heavy cost of imported oil, inflation imported from the advanced economies, and savage cutbacks in aid, most significantly by the new Reagan administration.

For 20 years, from 1960 to 1980, African countries have approached development along a well-worn path: seeking aid, developing import substitution industries, exporting bulk raw materials and commodities, and attempting political pressures in the United States or elsewhere to demand a greater say in an economic system which Africa neither does nor can control. It was the realization in 1979 that even collectively Africa was largely peripheral to the Western economic system, which led to some of the in-depth thinking that occurred at that time. What Africa may achieve in the 1980s remains to be seen. At least its

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more perceptive leaders began the decade with a strong sense that more needs to be done by Africa itself and that less emphasis should be given to demands for more aid or other economic assistance from the West.

Africa is the world's least-developed continent: it is fragmented, with poor, almost nonexistent communications between member states. It contains 21 of the world's 45 least-developed countries. Yet it possesses huge material resources. The question for the 1980s, therefore, is how to harness these resources in such a way that the continent becomes less rather than more dependent. That will not be easy.

Africa's gross national product (GNP) comes to only 2.7% of the world total, and in 1980 its average per capita income was \$530 — the world's lowest. The population of Africa was 472 million in 1980, increasing at the rate of 2.9% a year, and is expected to reach 832 million by the year 2000. Infant mortality is 140 per 1,000; 45% of the population is under age 15; only 3% reach 64 years; life expectancy is 49; and the urban population now accounts for 24% of the total. Less than 5% of Africa's rural people have access to piped water and 70 million are permanently undernourished. Unemployment affects 45% of the active population and a high proportion of the world's 800 million poorest are found in Africa. The continent has the world's largest number of refugees. The rapid increase of the urban population is not being matched by a comparable increase of available food supplies. On a conti-

mental basis, while the population increases by nearly 3% a year, food production is only going up by 2%.

This galaxy of problems indicates the difficulties Africa faces. The continent is overwhelmingly dependent upon exports of commodities — either minerals or foodstuffs — while its manufacturing base remains minuscule. One of its few present advantages (which could easily turn sour) is its possession of 30% of the world's total known mineral resources (excluding oil). Yet the exploitation of these often presents serious doubts as to what benefits Africa itself derives from them.

The example of Mauritania is instructive. In order to open up new iron ore deposits at Guelb during the mid-1970s, Mauritania had to seek \$500 million in capital. It obtained the money from Arab sources (\$290 million), the World Bank, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the African Development Bank (ADB), France, and Japan, but the price it had to pay was very high. Thus, in 1974 debt servicing cost Mauritania 3.8% of foreign earnings; four years later, when the finances for the new ore developments had been arranged, debt servicing was taking 20% of foreign earnings; the national debt had risen to \$805 million, equivalent to one and a half times the GNP; 49% of the state mineral prospecting enterprise (SNIM) was then owned by Arab financial interests; and effective control of the mining was no longer in Mauritanian hands. It is legitimate to ask how much real benefit will have accrued to Mauritania in 10



years time when the ore has been extracted.

Perhaps nothing illustrates the dilemma of African development better than agriculture. Seventy percent of the people on the continent remain rural based yet again and again agriculture receives insufficient priority in development plans. By the year 2000 the world population will have passed the 6 billion mark and demands for food will have nearly doubled. Africa ought to be able to feed itself and have a sizable surplus of basic foodstuffs (as opposed to commodities such as coffee) for export. Yet almost all the agricultural patterns of recent years have been in the wrong direction. In 1960 Africa was virtually food self-sufficient; by 1972-74 it produced 90% of its requirements and on present trends could be producing only 81% by 1985 and 65% (two-thirds) by 2000. A vital question therefore is how it can reverse this obstinate agricultural decline. Grain imports for the continent, for example, came to 11 million tons in 1978 and are expected to be as high as 15 million in 1985. To change an agricultural approach that has seen a steady erosion of the capacity of farmers to produce enough is essential: it has to be done first at the national level. Only then does it make sense to talk of regional or continental food self-sufficiency. Over the last 10 years an increasing number of African countries have become net food importers.

The Food and Agriculture Organization's per capita food production index for Africa, which stood at 100 in 1970, was down to 93 by 1978. At the same time, the FAO index for export volume of agricultural products, which was 104 in 1970, was down to 84 by 1978; and the import index, which stood at 101 in 1970, had almost doubled to 194 by 1978. Per capita food production in Africa decreased by 1% a year through the 1970s. Other factors are at work. There is increasing evidence, for example, that the ready availability of World Food Program (WFP) aid undermines farming in West Africa to induce a mentality (with the Sahel disaster in mind) that shortages can be solved by appeals to the WFP rather than by making sure farmers produce enough food — which they are perfectly capa-

ble of doing given the right inducements.

Seventy percent of African revenue is derived from the export of primary products and a high proportion of these are food commodities. There have been a few success stories in agriculture: Kenya, Ivory Coast, and Malawi, but all too often they are offset by the dismal and growing line of failures. The 1970s witnessed a great deal of rhetoric in terms of "back to the land" but very little real achievement. In Nigeria, Operation Feed the Nation under Obasanjo failed; in Ghana, Operation Feed Yourself failed; in Zambia, Rural Reconstruction failed. What is needed (and was pointed out at Monrovia in 1979 and Lagos in 1980) is a policy that involves youth in agriculture (currently an occupation of older workers) and halts the rural-urban drift.

Africa's agricultural failures need not take place. Malawi has amply demonstrated how to make agriculture pay. By 1979, for example, agriculture accounted for 43% of Malawi's gross domestic product and its agricultural exports were worth \$139 million out of a total of \$148 million, while a high proportion of its peasant farmers had by then been turned into cash crop farmers. The Nigerian Fourth Plan published in January 1981 allocates 13% of resources to the agricultural sector and aims to generate a 4% agricultural growth rate during the plan period.

A possible pointer to the right approach may be the findings of a recent study in Nigeria by Edeniye Osuntogun of the University of Ife. He found that only 39% of credits to farmers were actually spent on their farming; the balance went to cover their social service needs; that is, the education of their children, health, housing, durable goods. This use of the money reflected the lack of such amenities or their inadequacy in the rural areas.

The lessons are obvious enough: to make agriculture a success it needs more than extension services. If the young are to be attracted to stay in the rural areas then adequate social amenities must be created there to make it worthwhile or the urban drift will continue.

A growing awareness of these problems informed the group which met to conduct a symposium in Monrovia in February 1979 in preparation for the sixteenth Organization of African Unity (OAU) heads of state meeting to be held in Monrovia later that year. The symposium produced a document entitled "What Kind of Africa by the Year 2000?" which examined the failures of the period from 1960 to 1979 and charted possible paths for the 1980s and beyond. In an important passage the report argued:

The prime objective of development has to be the creation of a material and cultural environment that is conducive to



Africa's population increases by three percent a year, but food production by only two percent

Photo: A. Matheson/UNICEF



Photo: F. Mattioli/WEP

**Mali rice seed farm: "Agriculture receives insufficient priority in development plans"**

self-fulfillment and creative participation. This implies a number of breaks with the past: a break with a number of concepts and habits, starting with excessive mimicry in every field; a break with the obsessive accumulation of material and financial possessions and with the persistent confusion of growth with development, which prevents the promotion of a policy aimed at a better distribution of income for the sake of a balanced and harmonious endogenous development; a break with the evil and deceitful slogans and paper-thin achievements in favor of a courageous attempt to tackle the embarrassing facts of life so as to be able to start today to prepare for the future.

The most important aims set for Africa by the year 2000 were: the establishment of a continental common market; the free movement of people and goods on the continent; and to make people more aware of their interdependence. The symposium looked critically at the African assumption that its problems will be solved if enough technology is transferred to the continent from outside. The symposium "proposed that the degree of a country's dependence for its food imports should henceforth be considered as one of the most significant indications of its level of development."

The report of this symposium was presented to the OAU summit later in the year at Monrovia and on that occa-

sion there took place one of the best economic debates the OAU had ever witnessed. The result was the proposal to hold a special OAU economic summit at Lagos early in 1980. This summit met in April 1980 and was the first OAU attempt to find a continental approach to economic problems. Top emphasis was placed upon the need for a return to continental agricultural self-sufficiency as the basis for other developments. It was also accepted that industries should be based upon internal African resources (of both people and materials) so as to reduce the need to turn outside the continent which had been so marked a feature of the 1960s and 1970s.

As President Nyerere told the Lagos summit, they "should aim to build upon existing institutions." The summit set a target for Africa of "collective, self-reliant, and self-sustaining development" with precise aims spelled out, such as: a return to food self-sufficiency; the improvement of transport and communications links so as to encourage horizontal trade links; and the establishment of an African monetary fund. Again to quote Nyerere: "It is absurd that Africa should be importing food." Many of the points made at Lagos were unexceptionable; the summit adopted a Plan of Action for the 1980s.

The first, most immediate objective was the target for 1980-85 to improve the general food situation and to lay the foundations for self-sufficiency in cereals, livestock, and fish. If this new approach to development is to have a chance there will have to be a far more urgent sense of African unity than exists at present. Politicians must drop the rhetoric of "back to the land" and instead produce plans that they can implement. Much is likely to depend upon the example set by one or two key countries, and in this respect two of the most important are Nigeria and Zimbabwe since both have the resources, the infrastructure, and the special position in their parts of the continent upon which will hinge other action.

Analysis of what is wrong represents a start. A cursory examination of the problems the continent will face in 1981 reveals how difficult action may prove to be: growing danger in southern Africa as the republic appears ever more ready to make military strikes against its neighbors; the explosive situation in the Sahara with the future of King Hassan increasingly dependent upon what he does — or does not do — in relation to the Polisario; the troubled Horn with its Cuban and Russian involvement and Nimeiry's sudden offer of base facilities to the United States; the volatile policies of Libya's Qaddafi; and the constant economic crisis in Zaire. Mention of these alone highlights how hard any agreed continental economic policy is likely to be.

A European Community (EC) paper, "The European Community and the Third World," argues: "The drive to independence was essentially a movement for political emancipation" and did not change economic relations so that "seen through the eyes of industrialized countries, the Third World remains what it was during preceding decades: a supplier of raw materials such as mineral ores and agricultural produce." That indeed sums up how the EC regards Africa today. It is that relationship which Africa would break, but when the extent of the continent's dependence upon aid (less for growth than for survival) is taken into account and when that is coupled with the debilitating effects of debt with countries

such as Zaire or Sudan using 20%, 30%, and sometimes 40% of their foreign earnings simply to service their debts, it becomes clear just how little room the continent as a whole or its individual members in fact possess in which they may maneuver and bring about real changes — to their advantage.

At the end of the 1960s the *Pearson Report* was hailed as a courageous analysis of rich/poor relations; its target of 0.7% of GNP as aid, however, was derided in some liberal quarters as far too modest, yet 10 years later only three or four countries — mainly Scandinavian — had ever reached or passed that target. Now we have had the *Brandt Report*. Looking at the 1980s and 1990s it calls for top priority to be given to the poorest; that hunger should be abolished; that earnings from commodities should be strengthened while the producing countries (a high proportion in Africa) should be helped to process more themselves; that the North should stop protecting its industries against the South; that the transnationals should share more of their technology; and that the monetary system should be reformed. The report also calls for increased aid and for more money to be made available for borrowing. These propositions are no more than the old expedients dressed up for another decade. It was to get out of the Western-aid dependency trap that Africa 2000 called for new African initiatives. Arguments for huge cash transfers can too easily turn into arguments for continuing indebtedness and dependence upon a monetary system that Africa cannot hope to control. Brandt also argues for greater power-sharing in the World Bank. There is little prospect — certainly not with hard-line administrations in both Washington and London — that any of these very modest proposals have much chance. All the more reason, then, for Africa to take new initiatives now.

Africa's strength lies in its possession of so many minerals — an estimated 30% of known resources apart from oil — including 97% of chrome, 85% of platinum, 64% of manganese, 13% of copper, and 75% of cobalt. The continent also possesses an estimated 20% of the world's hydroelectric

capacity, 20% of traded oil, and produces 70% of cocoa, 50% of palm produce, and 33% of coffee. These constitute its bargaining strengths but also, ironically, its weaknesses since, too often, the easiest temptation is simply to be a commodity producer and hope the revenues from the one or two base metals or foodstuffs will solve all other development problems.

Africa also suffers from the aid dependence attitude that has grown up in most of the continent over the last 20 years. Africa can make out a powerful case for receiving more aid; it is only one step further to argue that without aid it cannot solve its problems and therefore that the responsibility lies with aid donors instead of inside Africa.

Similarly much of Africa's industry is controlled by non-Africans: thus an estimated 83% of Zimbabwe's mining and other industries at independence were reckoned to be controlled by transnationals from outside the country. How much real room to maneuver does this allow Mugabe, unless he nationalizes? And if he does nationalize, what happens then? Finally, in this context (see Mauritania above) what is left when the minerals have been extracted?

To date, African efforts at industrialization have been limited: not through any lack of desire but because of the inhibitions of manpower skills, technology, available markets, and costs in the face of Western industrial imports. Though Nigeria is now developing an industrial base and though Zimbabwe has a substantial industrial infrastructure, they are exceptions. By the year 2000, on present trends Africa will still only account for 2% of total world industrial output.

The special summit at Lagos called upon Africa to build on existing institutions and emphasized the importance of regional developments. Here there are several existing or newly created regional groupings but past experience forces caution. ECOWAS in West Africa has made some progress but, overwhelmingly, depends upon its giant, Nigeria, and that at once raises all the fears and jealousies of the smaller members that it will try to dominate. In East Africa not only has the old com-

munity collapsed but Kenya and Tanzania have had their common border closed for four years.

The most immediately encouraging regional development is the Southern Africa Committee for Development Cooperation that has emerged out of Zimbabwean independence. The nine states on the periphery of South Africa — Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe — met in Lusaka in April 1980 and again in Maputo in November 1980 to draw up plans for regional cooperation and to lessen their dependence upon South Africa. They have gotten off to a good start, but whether the practical difficulties of welding together their diverse interests and overcoming their problems produces more than generalizations remains to be seen.

A final constraint upon Africa concerns the direction of trade. A minimum of Africa's trade is at present intracontinental: for the second half of the 1970s it stood at less than 5%. The direction at present is: European Community, 45-50%; North America, 28%; socialist countries, 11%. As the Lagos summit noted, there is a great deal of trade that could be inter-African and there should be no need half the time to go outside the continent. In part it is a question of inherited patterns, and just as it is absurd — to quote Nyerere — for Africa to import food, so also is it absurd for it to import a good many manufactured goods (at great cost in foreign exchange) when at least a proportion of these can be provided from within the continent itself.

In summary, the problems appear increasingly to be understood. The solutions demand the political determination to bypass the present easy options. Much must depend upon two or three anchor countries with already well-developed economies or special influence. Nigeria has the oil power and is rapidly industrializing; Zimbabwe has the infrastructure and could well become the cornerstone of SADEK. Whether Africa takes the advice of the Lagos summit and stops the process of excessive "mimicry," turning instead to its own resources, will provide the most challenging question for the continent in the 1980s. □



# The First Year

BY GWENDOLEN M. CARTER

On New Year's Day, 1981, Robert Mugabe, prime minister of Zimbabwe, called for the consolidation of the People's Power, to which he had dedicated the previous year. The year 1980 had seen the achievement of political independence and the establishment of a working system of democratic government. Moreover, claimed Mugabe, it had provided "a single nationality that claimed precedence over the heterogeneity of our racial, regional, tribal, and religious groups." It was a brave statement in the light of the Tekere incident and the 1980 guerilla fighting at Entumbane, and it was to be proved overly optimistic by the bloody, factional ZIPRA-ZANLA outburst early in February 1981. Yet, it seems likely that the response from all sides to Mugabe's firm handling of that situation affirmed not only the existence of a greater degree of basic unity than had been foreseen but also a greater determination to reinforce it.

Mugabe noted two special aims for



the year 1981 in his New Year's speech: working for economic independence and furthering the country's social and economic goals. By March 1981 the government had already instituted some daring social programs. The most striking of its moves was to establish universal free primary education and also to guarantee admission to secondary school to all who qualified for it. Since previously only white children had compulsory primary and secondary education, the new opportunities vastly raised the number of children in school, increasing the total from 850,000 in 1980 to 1.3 million and more than quadrupling the number of pupils in

form one (the first year of secondary school) from 20,000 to 90,000.

The new policy was a major affirmation of the regime's goal of equality, but it placed a heavy strain on existing resources of classrooms and particularly of teachers, many of whom had left their posts during the war to join the expanding commercial sector. Temporarily, teachers are being recruited from Australia and the United Kingdom, particularly for form one, but in the meantime an average class both in primary school and in form one numbers 40, to the concern of many educators.

Disturbing to some whites has been the government's pressure on parents associations to return to the state educational system the 49 fee-paying community schools — 41 at the primary level and eight at the secondary level — that the Muzorewa transitional regime had permitted them to buy and run. Although the associations were pledged "not to turn away any children

solely on the ground of race," the fees required for running the schools meant they have catered almost exclusively to white communities. Since the government has continued to pay the teachers' salaries and provide maintenance grants, it is exerting pressure on the associations by threatening to withdraw this support. The government, however, approves of private boarding schools, like the renowned Peterhouse, that get no state funds and are largely church-supported, and it does so even though some of them still maintain quotas of 15 percent and 10 percent for coloured and African students in their yearly intakes.

One concern about the massive expansion in secondary education is that it will arouse unwarranted expectations among the young people who will be seeking jobs a few years later. Despite the 60,000 new openings said to have resulted from the country's accelerated recovery, which by February 1981 had provided a 7 percent sustained economic growth in real terms — the first since 1974 — and had led to a boom in sales from local manufacturers, there were still unsatisfied work seekers. Partial answers for the future have been to include some vocational training in the curriculum and to enlarge intakes in technical institutes to help meet the country's urgent need for skilled labor. (Africans were not previously eligible for apprenticeship training unless they posed as coloured.) The university is also expanding enrollment and is planning to add at least a Faculty of Veterinary Medicine.

Free medical care was also instituted in 1981 for those earning below a certain income, but the benefits of this measure have yet to be realized because of the shortage of facilities and of drugs, particularly in rural areas. Although the former division between "open" (whites only) and "closed" (blacks only) hospitals no longer exists, it should be noted that up to this time the Andrew Fleming Hospital in Salisbury has received 50 percent of the state's health support. This hospital is superbly equipped (its boast is that it can perform any operation except heart transplants), but it seems unlikely that a populist government will long continue

what seems a disproportionate division of funds. The repeal of the Medical Services Act in February 1981 has in fact opened the way for the future introduction of a national health service bill. Since the white population is particularly sensitive to any reduction in the quality of health care, the government may be wary of moving too quickly to make radical changes, but at least some seem inevitable.

Another social measure targeted initially to black urban dwellers seeks to expand home ownership, which the government sees as a major means of ensuring stability. Even by African standards, Zimbabwe is not highly urbanized, despite its relatively advanced level of economic development. As late as 1978, the country had only 14 towns with populations over 10,000 persons, and less than 17 percent of the African population (excluding refugees) lived in them. This fact was due in large part to the tight rein that had been kept on squatting, the limitations on the accommodation of servants' families under the African (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act, and the fact that only employed heads of families could even enter their names on the waiting list for the scarce housing in the townships. The present government does not encourage African migration to urban areas, but any family that has paid rent continuously for 30 years for a township house is now given it freehold. Moreover, after five years of occupancy, increasing percentage reductions in rent are provided until full 30 years.

To introduce multiracial representation in urban areas and a measure of self-government in rural ones, local administrative structures have been radically changed. By the simple device of enlarging urban boundaries to include adjoining black townships and incorporating the units as cities, black mayors and a majority of black councillors have come into office throughout the country, except in Salisbury and Bulawayo, where the elections were postponed.

For rural government, districts have also been redesigned into larger units; and their council members, who are ultimately to be elected on a one-man,



Photo: Margaret A. Novick

**Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's aims for 1981 are economic independence and social and economic growth**

one-vote basis and reimbursed by their communities, have taken over the administrative powers previously exercised by chiefs. Oversight of local schools and clinics is to be among the councils' duties, and chief executive officers are being trained to assist them. To eliminate the roles played by the district commissioners, who, in the view of Eddison Zvobgo, minister of local government and housing, had been "petty dictators," a freeze was put on their activities and their enforced idleness led 30 of the 60 to resign. "The rest were constructively absorbed elsewhere," said Zvobgo, adding that "whites who remain in the civil service have an incredible sense of duty; they tend to over-volunteer and they work well with blacks."

The spur is a real one. Writing in October 1980 on his return to Salisbury as central Africa editor for the *Cape Times* after nearly two years in the United States, Anthony Pyde reported that his most exciting experience was "to watch the explosion of black ability, frustrated by artificial barriers

down the years, spread into every aspect of life, from political to the social and cultural, and into commerce, mining and agriculture." It is commonly acknowledged, in fact, that the Zimbabwe cabinet (which is predominantly drawn from the majority party, ZANU, with minority ZAPU representation and two white ministers holding important portfolios, including agriculture) is the most highly educated in Africa, some of its members, like the prime minister himself, having secured advanced degrees while in prison.

In the public service, it is openly stated government policy that black Zimbabweans have preference in promotions; and in some though not many ministries, young black administrators have been promoted over the heads of senior whites. Contracts of expatriate staff members are not being renewed, and in some cases they are being given bonuses to resign; new contracts for non-Zimbabweans do not include the kind of guarantees common in other African-controlled states. Most striking of all is the inflow of mature and internationally well known black Zimbabweans who have left significant posts that they were holding with distinction abroad to return to serve their country.

The new principal and vice-chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe, Professor Walter Kamba, for example, came directly from his post as dean of the faculty of law at the University of Dundee to handle what is admittedly a mammoth task of upgrading and expanding the university's faculties. Thomas Mswaka, secretary of the Ministry of Economic Planning, another distinguished returnee — as is its head, Dr. Bernard Chidzero — directed the preparation in a remarkably short time of the basic document ZIMCORD, and background information for the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (commonly known as the Donors' Conference) held in Salisbury on March 23-27, 1981. Some 45 countries and a number of international financial institutions were invited to this conference in the hope of securing the financial underpinning needed to overcome the

dislocations caused by the war and to aid the government's stated long-range objectives of "rapid economic growth, full employment, dynamic efficiency in resource allocation, and an equitable distribution of the ensuing benefits."

The Zimbabwean economy has long been characterized by a basic duality between its sophisticated modern sector — dominated by the small, urbanized white minority centered around Salisbury and Bulawayo — and the extensive, largely undeveloped African rural sector of the scattered Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs). Although manufacturing, stimulated by the constraints of sanctions, had slightly outstripped agriculture by 1975 in its contribution to the country's GDP — 24.0 to 20.6 percent — with mining the third most important with 6.7 percent, all three are, in fact, extensions of the urban-industrial structures. At the same time, this structure is linked to and dependent upon cheap African labor for the commercial farms and the mines, and upon the small, commonly better paid African proletariat of the townships, which is playing an increasing role in the manufacturing and service sectors.

Introducing ZIMCORD at a news conference, Dr. Chidzero said the government's long-range economic plans were designed to "establish an egalitarian and socialist society under democratic conditions." Warning that the immediate problems were of "a Marshall Plan type," the background information for the conference asserted that the government and people of Zimbabwe were determined to bring about "a more nonracially integrated society than had been possible so far anywhere else in the world." But the tenor of the document itself is markedly pragmatic, indicating changes that can be expected only to modify the country's white-dominated capitalist structure.

Accepting that the future of Zimbabwe lies in its agriculture and rural development, the document maintains, as Mugabe had from the start, that commercial agriculture would continue "to play a vital role in the strategy." Indeed, the white Commercial Farmers' Union, one of whose members, Senator Denis Robert Norman, is

minister of agriculture, is strongly supportive of government policy and is strengthening its ties with organizations representing small commercial and communal (African) farmers. Both white and African maize production expanded rapidly in 1981 in response to the government's increased price support, leading to one of the largest harvests on record. (I saw maize grown everywhere from outside squatters' shacks to the gardens of cabinet ministers.) Tobacco and cotton are also grown by both commercial and rural farmers.

But land redistribution is also essential, the document points out, both to make agriculture viable in the badly overcrowded African rural areas and to resettle the estimated 1.6 million persons displaced by the war. In carrying out this resettlement, the government aims to avoid extending the existing pattern of subsistence agriculture and to see that those resettled can produce a reasonable income on land that they can call their own.

The core of the government's basic strategy is thus to develop both existing and new rural areas so that they become integral parts of the economy, with incomes equivalent to those of low-level earnings in the urban areas. In this way, it hopes also to fulfill another objective, which is to avoid or at least restrict what might otherwise be a large-scale migration from impoverished rural areas into the urban townships.

The Zimbabwe government itself has been providing major quantities of aid to refugees and others displaced by the war in a program to which it is committed until April 1981. With substantial help from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) more than 7,500 tons of food have been distributed through some 350 centers to nearly half a million persons. OXFAM and the International Save the Children Fund have assisted with feeding services and training for the mothers of the thousands of children who are suffering from serious malnutrition.

In addition, close to a million people, including those in the feeding scheme, have been involved in self-help projects, using nearly a quarter of a million



crop packs provided by the government to enable them to restart their plots in the Tribal Trust Lands that had suffered so much during the war, not only from the fighting but also from the herding of some half a million people into the 230 hated "protected" villages. A further problem that the TTLs have faced in recommencing normal farming operations is that at least a third of their cattle (used for plowing) were lost during the war owing to the cessation of dipping.

Some white farmers adjacent to a TTL have aided its farmers by plowing their fields. Other rural settlements have organized community plowing, although usually with careful noting of who is to receive the return from which

abandoned by whites who have left the country are being taken over by the government, and it is buying other unused land to the degree it can afford. But there is pressing need for external funds to purchase the extensive acreage required and available for its long-range development plans.

One problem besetting a national program of land resettlement and enrichment results from the generally poor soil in the TTLs in Matabeleland compared to that in the predominantly Shona areas. Cattle raising rather than commercial farming is the preference in the former areas, which generally experience only one good crop every three years, whereas results are commonly

tive period, the appeal of farming has been low. Only some 2,000 are presently involved out of the planned 10,000.

The large number of remaining guerrillas, a third now housed in tents and the rest in undercover barracks, provide a serious economic drain through their substantial R\$100 (U.S.\$160) monthly wages (the newly established minimum wage is R\$70 a month with R\$30 for farm work and household service). The outlay is justified by the government both as a return for the wartime service they have rendered and as the basis for the new national army that is slowly being trained by the British.

The particular problem faced in this process is the difficulty of integrating former ZANLA and ZIPRA units into the same battalions. The foreign press, in particular, tends to stress the different ethnic backgrounds and presumed historic antagonism of the two groups, as well as the better equipment and what are termed the superior fighting aptitudes of the Ndebele. In fact, it was ZANLA that undertook most of the fighting, since it was centered along the Mozambique border and in the eastern part of the country, while ZIPRA, with a far more difficult terrain to invade in northeast Rhodesia, remained based throughout much of the war in Zambia. The two groups are also disproportionate in numbers, since the Shona-speakers comprise nearly four-fifths of the approximately seven million Africans in Zimbabwe whereas Ndebele speakers amount to only 16 percent, although the contiguous Shona-speaking Kalanga, to whom Joshua Nkomo belongs, commonly associate with them and voted solidly for his party in April 1980.

When bloody factional violence broke out early in February 1981 between ZANLA and ZIPRA units in three of the supposedly integrated battalions, the danger that it would spread seemed acute, and many outside observers warped of the possibility of civil war. The immediate cause of trouble appears to have been a brawl over the price of beer, rather than ethnic conflict, but subsequently fighting broke



Photo: Diego Goldberg/Syama

**A striking social program is to guarantee admission to secondary school to all qualified**

part of the crop. Although the government favors communal farming and grazing arrangements, there seems little enthusiasm as yet for them. For the moment, the most immediate needs of reconstruction are to develop clean water in the TTLs (which, it is said, would cut health-care costs in half) as well as passable roads, to repair and extend electrification, to provide marketing arrangements for districts without easy outlets to the main roads and, of course, to acquire more land. Farms

better in the eastern part of the country. This fact leads, in turn, to more attention to their needs, which is a possible cause for friction.

A still more serious problem has been the lack of success so far of the SEED program, Mugabe's favored approach to reducing the number of guerrillas in the assembly points. Its administration is said to be poor; and for teenagers, particularly from ZIPRA, who have known nothing except the army during their most forma-

out between ZIPRA and ZANLA forces encamped near each other in the Bulawayo township of Entumbane where it had occurred in the year before.

In this threatening situation, Mugabe moved swiftly and forcefully. He sent the largely white-manned airforce, armed with bombs, to the scenes of trouble and used the former Rhodesian African Rifles and an armored car unit to turn back ZIPRA guerillas moving towards Bulawayo from Essexvale and the Gwaai base near the border, to which trainloads of equipment had been sent from Zambia over the previous months. All the ZIPRA commanders remained loyal to the government and the Joint Command acted together to separate the combatants. Joshua Nkomo went to Bulawayo to help to calm the ZIPRA forces. When I asked Josiah Chinamano, vice-president of ZAPU (PF) and recently appointed minister of transport (one of the most powerful offices in the cabinet because of its key role in development) how the situation would develop, he said gravely, "Mr. Nkomo and I will do everything to maintain unity." In fact, it was achieved.

Mugabe emerged from this trying test the undisputed military and political leader of Zimbabwe. He is assured the loyalty of the former Rhodesian

forces, and he is now starting to disarm the guerillas, beginning with the arms handed in by ZIPRA forces as they left their camp at Entumbane and adding the heavy equipment, including Soviet tanks, that other ZIPRA forces still possessed. In time, it is said, all the guerillas will be disarmed unless they are on active service. Although the units of the 12th, 13th, and 41st battalions that engaged in the fighting have been disarmed, no other penalties have been imposed.

Mugabe has now ordered an acceleration of the training and integration program conducted by the British, which had already been speeded up to handle 3,000 men a month through the so-called super sausage machine, with what the British report as better results. Officers are trained separately and selected by a joint committee of four representing ZANLA, ZIPRA, the Rhodesian Front (RF), and the British. Only after the ZANLA and ZIPRA integration is completed will they be joined with the members of the former Rhodesian forces. Many observers, and the British themselves, feel that the army should be much smaller, and thus more highly organized, than Mugabe plans, but so far he has remained adamant that they are needed in case of attacks across the border to destabilize his country.

During Zimbabwe's first year of independence, a series of far-reaching social programs have been introduced to bring greater equality of opportunities between whites and Africans. The government has also contributed substantially from its own resources to aid the rural population to integrate itself into the working economy of the country and has developed a well-constructed plan to put before the international community to carry these efforts much further.

Whites have been generally satisfied by the accepted role given the commercial farmers, by an adequate safeguarding of industry, and by the acceptance of the existing structure of the mining industry except for an unwelcome proposal to market the minerals through a government-appointed board. The so-called takeover of the local press has been less controversial since a distinguished Media Board was appointed to provide its oversight. In fact, much criticism might have been avoided had the appointment of the Media Board preceded the purchase of the Argus stake in Zimbabwe's newspapers.

The worst ZIPRA-ZANLA outbreak since independence has been successfully contained, although at a substantial loss of life caused by the guerillas, and efforts are being made to disarm them, and to speed up their integration into a genuine national army. The drain on the economy of supporting them remains but is accepted as the price of external security and, it may be, of helping to insulate the community from their presence.

In sum, Mugabe has succeeded in promoting both social and economic change without seriously alienating the country's white minority, and he is clearly demonstrating his determination not to permit any future ZIPRA-ZANLA discord to disrupt the life of the country. New problems may arise, but he has assured a firm foundation from which to deal with them. It seems symbolic that it is at this time that the stone birds of Great Zimbabwe have been returned to the country after 90 years of exile and will soon be placed in the museum at the foot of its world-renowned ruins. □



Photo: William Campbell/Syama

ZANLA members in training to join new Zimbabwe national army

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
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

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