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


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
Angola and the U.S.
Page 4



Ten Years After
Page 15



**OSER LUTTER
AVOIR VAINCRE**



CEAO's Future
Page 28



Gorongosa Revelations
Page 67

Interview

José Eduardo dos Santos, President, the People's Republic of Angola
Interviewed by Margaret A. Novicki 4

Angola: Friends and Enemies
By Gerald J. Bender 7

Debate
Angola and American Interests
By Matthew F. McHugh 9

The Reagan Doctrine in Angola
By Jack Kemp 12

Guinea-Bissau
Cabral's Dream
By Adelino Gomes 15

Cape Verde
Making Its Own Rain Fall
By Adelino Gomes 21

Economies
The Lusophone Oil Boom
By Howard Schissel 24

Reporter's Notebook
Burkina Faso at the Eye of a West African Storm
By Howard French 28

Update
Editor: Paula Hirschhoff
Assistant Editor: André Astrow 31

Liberia
Quiwonkpa's Fatal Gamble
By Larry James 47

In Washington
The Other Engagement
By Salih Booker 50

Interview
Manuel Pinto da Costa, President, the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe
Interviewed by Tony Hodges 57

São Tomé and Príncipe
Combating Cocoa Colonialism
By Tony Hodges 61

Mozambique
The MNR: Opponents or Bandits?
By Mota Lopes 67

Interview
Robert Mugabé, Prime Minister, Zimbabwe
Interviewed by Mota Lopes 74

U.S.-Mozambique
Broken Promises?
By Sam Levy 77

Portugal and Africa
Healing Old Wounds
By Victor de Sá Machado 81

Photo Credit:
The cover photo of a young girl at an MPLA pre-independence celebration in Luanda in October 1975 was taken by Jason Lauré/Woodfin Camp.

José Eduardo dos Santos

President, the People's Republic of Angola

In this exclusive *Africa Report* interview, Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos explains his government's reaction to potential American assistance to UNITA and outlines prospects for the U.S.-brokered negotiations to resolve the conflict in southern Africa.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: Your government's position is to keep the door open to negotiations with the United States and South Africa. However, it appears that Angola has achieved little, if any concrete gains out of its willingness to maintain an ongoing dialogue with these two countries over the past two years. Would you agree and how likely is it that the United States can play a positive role in resolving the southern African conflict given that the situation appears to be even more polarized now than it was a year ago?

dos Santos: The talks between the Angolan government, the United States, and South Africa were suspended for some months. And in the various stages of the talks between the Angolan government and the United States on the one hand, and the Angolan government and South Africa on the other, we tried to solve some specific problems. It was possible to find formulas for the resolution of some of these issues. For example, we defended in the past and continue to defend the idea of dialogue between South Africa and SWAPO toward the resolution of the Namibia question. It was possible to get South Africa and SWAPO to establish direct contacts at least twice.

Secondly, there was the issue of the occupation of the southern part of Angola by South African forces. Through these contacts, it was possible to establish a calendar for the withdrawal of these forces, although this calendar was not strictly respected. The South African forces should have withdrawn in a period of 30 days, but they ended up taking 14 months to leave. In fact, the South Africans withdrew the main part of their forces in the south of Cunene and we thus



President dos Santos: "Any form of support to UNITA by the American government would also signify support to the government of South Africa"

Margaret A. Novicki

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
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resolved a serious situation. But two months later, they started new, more serious incursions in southeastern Angola.

So new problems have been created which demand new types of measures. It is still possible to negotiate; it's possible to find solutions to the problems that affect Angola, Namibia, and southern Africa in general. I agree with what you say—that we haven't achieved the final objective yet, the independence of Namibia on the basis of UN Security Council resolution 435 and security and stability in southern Angola. But we have no doubt that the solution to these problems will be finally found at the negotiating table.

The United States can continue to play a mediating role—but as a mediator that is credible. This means that they should not preoccupy themselves with their own interests, but should rather establish a climate and comportment that allows them to implement the role of a mediator.

Africa Report: Do you feel that the U.S. is playing a credible mediating role at this point in time?


dos Santos: I feel that they are not doing so with impartiality. The United States feels that southern Africa is a strategic arena for them, as are many other parts of the world. And as far as we know, the United States intends to force Angola to withdraw the Cuban forces. By attaching too much importance to this problem, the government of the United States loses sight of the problems that the people of southern Africa consider the most important—South African aggressions against Angola and the other countries of the region, destabilization carried out by the armed bandits that South Africa trains, supports, and transports to other neighboring countries, South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and its non-application of the pertinent resolutions adopted by the United Nations, and finally the question of apartheid itself—a system that has been condemned by the entire international community.

So the United States should concentrate its efforts on these problems which occupy the peoples of the region, and then they could play a positive role in negotiations. The main way of maintaining the interests of the United States in the region is to fight for peace and stability. Of course, peace must be just and our people's rights to independence, self-determination, and territorial integrity and their right to freely choose their own way of development must be respected.

Africa Report: Have you changed any elements of the negotiating platform that you proposed in 1984, specifically your position on the withdrawal of Cuban troops?

dos Santos: Angola has already taken various initiatives which we consider constructive in trying to resolve the problems preoccupying southern Africa. We continue to uphold the principles we established. We may apply them relatively flexibly taking into account the interests of the other parties, but the principles will remain unchanged.

The United States says it accepts the implementation of resolution 435, that it wants to see change in South Africa, and that it is ready to establish guarantees for the security of Angola. If these principles are followed by practical acts that confirm their intentions, then we can advance. But we have noticed that in practice, the policy is otherwise. For example, we've noticed the repeal of the Clark Amendment, and now the eventual aid to the UNITA bandits is under discussion.



Margaret A. Novicki

Workers showing wounds sustained after South African bombing of factory in Lubango: "South Africa has been encouraged to carry out these aggressions against the Angolan people"

Instead of facilitating the resolution of the problems, these moves might further aggravate the political and military situation in southern Africa.

Africa Report: So you perceive the moves within the United States—the repeal of the Clark Amendment and the proposals to fund UNITA either covertly or overtly—as a direct threat to your security.

dos Santos: Yes, it is a threat, and it is also an interference in the internal affairs of Angola. UNITA is an instrument of South Africa. We have proof and we have already put forth a lot of evidence concerning the connections between UNITA and South Africa. For example, we denounced the South African presence in Cazombo—that's more than 400 kilometers from the Namibian border inside our territory—where South African officers were fighting side by side with UNITA forces. The South African government had to admit its involvement because a South African was killed in the fighting there. We have also captured a lot of weapons that were manufactured in South Africa.

In May last year, a special South African commando force was neutralized in Cabinda when it tried to sabotage the oil installations in Malongo. A lot of Americans are working in that area and they would have been victims of that sabotage

had it been successful. In this group of commandos were South African officers as well as UNITA. A white South African captain was captured. A lot of materiel and propaganda was also captured—UNITA propaganda, because the intention was to attribute this action to UNITA had it been successful. Without massive support from South Africa, UNITA is nothing. So I repeat, UNITA is an instrument of South Africa to destabilize the political, military, social, and economic situation in Angola.



Margaret A. Novicki

Agricultural research institute near Huambo after UNITA sabotage: "UNITA is an instrument of South Africa to destabilize the political, military, social, and economic situation in Angola"

Any form of support to UNITA by the American government would also signify support to the government of South Africa because UNITA carries out the objectives of South Africa in Angola, just as the MNR carries out the objectives of South Africa in Mozambique, etc. We have condemned these actions as direct interference in Angola's internal affairs. And on the other hand, because it would be a manifestation of solidarity with the apartheid regime and would also provide encouragement to South Africa's destabilization of southern Africa, it's a policy that goes contrary to the negotiations we

have been carrying out with the United States as well as with the South Africans toward achieving a peaceful solution.

Africa Report: Since these moves to support UNITA are coming from the highest levels of American government, would you agree that the American government's role as an "honest broker" in southern Africa has been discredited?

dos Santos: Yes, at least it's a contradictory policy and we feel it should be readjusted to safeguard the interests of the United States. I referred to the attempted attack on the Malongo oil installations. Malongo is an example of cooperation between Angolan and American business in the field of petroleum. There are American citizens who work there. Peace and stability would allow further cooperation between Angola, the United States, and other countries of the world in a fair manner. So this particular policy of destabilization does not coincide with American economic and political interests and that's why we consider it ambiguous and contradictory, and why we think it should be readjusted.

Africa Report: Since the repeal of the Clark Amendment, do you have any evidence of American support for UNITA?

dos Santos: We know that a lot of UNITA 'leaders' have been coming to Washington. And although we cannot say that there is an open support, we believe that such support exists. It is enough to say that the Angolan armed forces were carrying out an operation to destroy the last UNITA bases in the southeast of Angola when a South African delegation came to the U.S., falsely claiming that the Soviets had stepped up their military involvement in Angola, to convince the U.S. to provide help. After this delegation came, the facts showed increased South African involvement in Angola side by side with the UNITA armed bandits, and for the first time, the South African president admitted openly that the South Africans were materially aiding UNITA. The following day, South African aircraft bombed Angolan military units about 250 kilometers inside Angolan territory. South African infantry entered Angola and joined with UNITA forces to fight against Angolan forces. This appeared very strange to us, and we feel that South Africa has been encouraged to carry out these aggressions against the Angolan people.

Africa Report: Given the likelihood that South African support to UNITA and its involvement in the war will increase, and that negotiations for a peaceful resolution have failed to produce any concrete results, what options remain open to your government?

dos Santos: Our situation is one of a struggle. The Angolan people have been resisting external aggression, and naturally, they will continue to resist. They need help and support from all peace-loving people. We know that here in the U.S., the American people have been protesting against apartheid and the repression against South African patriots. So it should also be known here in the United States that apart from repressing its own people, South Africa is also destabilizing neighboring states. It uses armed bandits to destroy economic installations, to massacre the civilian population, and to carry out terrorism against not only the local population, but also against foreign nationals in our countries. Therefore, the American people should extend their support to the Angolan people who are also fighting the apartheid regime, and above all convince the American government to change its attitude.

Africa Report: Will you have to increase the military support you receive from countries such as the Soviet Union and Cuba to combat the situation in southern Angola if it worsens? Do you foresee a further militarization of the conflict?

dos Santos: We will get aid from all countries who would like to help us defend ourselves against external attacks. If this aid comes only from the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union and Cuba, it is not our fault. We have already made a public appeal to all people to help us defend ourselves against South Africa's aggression. We have asked for material aid as well as humanitarian aid.

We would like the UN Security Council to take this matter more seriously because the situation in Namibia is serious. Angola has no common border with South Africa. It has a border with Namibia, and it is being illegally occupied by South Africa. Starting from one illegality, South Africa is trying to create another illegality in Angola and the international community accepts this. Where is the morality and ethics of international law? The Security Council should take emergency measures because the administration of Namibian territory was given to the United Nations. South Africa shouldn't remain there. So our question would be whether or not the Security Council has the power to impose on South Africa. We think it has the power. What could complicate it is the misuse of the veto by some members of the Security Council. Forces of the United Nations have been in the Middle East and in other areas, and forces could be sent to Namibia to make the South Africans adhere to the resolutions of the United Nations because South African occupation of that territory is illegal. This is our feeling.

Africa Report: Over the last year or so, your government

has expanded diplomatic and economic ties with a number of Western countries. Do you think this policy has paid off in concrete terms, and how have your Eastern bloc allies responded to what has been called your "opening to the West?"

dos Santos: Angola is a sovereign state and it establishes its relations on the basis of mutual respect of the sovereignty of each state, equality, and common interests. Angola is a country with a diverse economy. It has great economic potential that has not been exploited. From the colonial period, it inherited a great industrial base from the capitalist countries. Therefore, through its policy of economic diversification, it can establish relations with Western countries, Eastern countries, as well as underdeveloped countries, based first and foremost on the realization of its own interests—because after all Angola has its own interests. Therefore, one cannot say that we've made an opening to the West because the West has been in Angola since the colonial days. Rather, after independence, we diversified our economy because we opened ourselves to the socialist countries, to the West, and to the non-aligned countries. Diversification of our economy is an important part of our policy, because we are a non-aligned country and we want to safeguard our independence.

It is in our interest to normalize relations with the United States. The United States is a great power and it has achieved great technological advances. The Angolan people have never shown themselves to be enemies of the American people. We have never taken hostile actions against the interests of the United States, even when, after the colonial period, the American government showed itself to be hostile to the Angolan people. Therefore we must sensitize American public opinion to the true feelings of the Angolan people. □

Angola: Friends and Enemies

John Stockwell, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's Angola Task Force in 1975-76, appropriately titled his book on American participation in the Angolan civil war, *In Search of Enemies*. At the time, CIA assessments concluded that who won the war would make virtually no difference to the United States. However, once the U.S. decided to enter that conflict, in order to satisfy American public opinion, it was necessary to fabricate enemies and allies. Stockwell's book just as easily could have been titled *In Search of Allies* because the main U.S. ally in that war, Holden Roberto and his FNLA, was unreliable to anyone, including his own soldiers and followers. The CIA did not discover Jonas Savimbi and UNITA until nearly the end of the war, and South Africa proved to be a dubious ally who ultimately undermined American credibility.

Ten years later, the United States is once again engaged in a search for enemies and allies in Angola, and once again, they will have to be fabricated. The Luanda government is not our enemy, nor is South Africa an acceptable ally.

Contrary to the 1975 predictions of then-President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that an MPLA victory in the Angolan civil war would cut off American access to Angola's resources, the United States has become Angola's leading trading partner. In recent years, trade between the two countries has totaled over \$1 billion annually. Angola buys more American goods than all but two or three countries in sub-Saharan Africa. American businesses have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in Angola since independence. No American citizen or property has been touched by the government. Any destruction of American property or murder of American citizens in Angola has been carried out by South Africa and UNITA.

At a recent New York luncheon, Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos was rightly praised for the business-like manner in which his government conducts its relations with American firms. Many of the donors of businessmen who attended the luncheon, hosted by Chevron

and Barbara Thant, were impressed by dos Santos' straight-forward and non-defensive answers to their questions. Dos Santos also visited and impressed a number of members of the House of Representatives and the Council on Foreign Relations with his forthright responses to their questions during an hour-long press conference.

Dos Santos' visit was the first of a two-week tour by a high-level Angolan delegation that visited Washington, D.C., and met with American investment firms. The visit is a sign of a new Angola in the process of re-emerging from its isolation to do business with the world. The visit was the first step in the economic and political opening that is being followed by the Angolans. The visit is a sign of a new Angola in the process of re-emerging from its isolation to do business with the world. The visit was the first step in the economic and political opening that is being followed by the Angolans.

The Angolan government in Luanda is concerned that the United States and other nations underscore the danger of a South African military and political presence in the region. The United States and other nations are misleading. However, the United States and other nations are misleading. However, the United States and other nations are misleading.

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Angola is by no means a democracy; yet criticism of the government is not only tolerated but widespread, and few look over their shoulders when discussing government policies or ministers. There are few political prisoners of conscience. In both of these respects, the Angolan government is far more tolerant than its larger neighbors to the south and north, South Africa and Zaire.

In short, one has to resort to gross distortion or outright fabrication in order to portray the Luanda government as our enemy. In 1975, Stockwell tells us, because of reports from its station chief in Luanda that indicated that the U.S. could work easily with the MPLA, the CIA resorted to writing false reports about the MPLA in order to portray them in a negative light. Similar false reports are beginning to appear now. Is it with the same intention?

We must also be on guard against simplistic platitudes being substituted for hard analysis. For example, one frequently hears that aiding UNITA will provide the president with a bargaining chip in his talks with the Soviets. It may give Mr. Reagan a white chip, but it also gives Mr. Gorbachev a stack of blue chips. Does anyone seriously believe that the president can strengthen American policy vis-à-vis the Soviets by burdening it with the albatross of South Africa? This policy backfired in 1975, and it will backfire again in 1985.

During the December 1975 Senate debate over the Turney and Clark amendments, Kissinger told then-Senator Clark that his opposition to U.S. participation in the Angolan civil war on the South African side might be right in the African context, but it was wrong in the global context. What that was demonstrated is that it is not possible to be wrong in the African context and still win globally.

If the Reagan administration truly is interested in mitigating the Soviet and Cuban presences in Angola, it should continue on its present course of negotiations and end the war. The number of Cuban combat troops in Angola has fluctuated with the extent of South Africa's military threat. The greater the threat, the greater the number of Cuban troops. There is, therefore, every reason to believe that if the United States enters the Angolan conflict, the number of Cuban troops will increase.

While the American-sponsored negotiations have been slow and laborious, they nevertheless represent the only hope for the U.S. to realize its goals of reducing the number of Cubans and promoting national reconciliation in Angola. No one can be certain that the negotiations will succeed, but if they fail, the position of the United States will not be harmed further. What is certain, however, is that if we join hands with South Africa on the Angolan battlefield, we will not only fail but also greatly damage our interests and prestige in the rest of the world. □

—Gerald J. Bender
School of International Relations
University of Southern California

Angola and American Interests

One of the U.S. Congress' leading opponents of assistance to UNITA argues that such an option contradicts long-term American policy goals and interests in southern Africa. Lacking a strong public consensus in support of covert or overt assistance to Jonas Savimbi, the U.S. could find itself involved in an unwinnable and protracted conflict.

BY MATTHEW F. McHUGH

Legislation has recently been introduced in the House of Representatives that would dramatically change U.S. policy toward Angola. One bill would provide \$27 million in U.S. military assistance to the insurgent forces of Jonas Savimbi. Another would provide a similar amount of non-military assistance. Yet a third would prohibit new investment, embargo trade, and prohibit loans to Angola. In addition, the Reagan administration is considering whether to covertly assist UNITA.

Perhaps the most fundamental point that I wish to make is that any change in U.S. policy toward Angola should not be considered in isolation. Proposed changes need to be evaluated in terms of broader U.S. policy objectives toward Africa in general and southern Africa in particular. In short, I believe it would be a mistake to make policy solely on the basis of our assessment of the Angolan government or UNITA. The issues involved are far more complex than that, and need to be carefully assessed in the context of broader U.S. interests.

Congressman Matthew F. McHugh (D-NY) is a member of the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee on Appropriations, and Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.



"Any change in U.S. policy toward Angola should not be made in isolation"

I am opposed to any fundamental change in U.S. policy toward Angola at this time. In particular, I oppose efforts, direct or indirect, covert or overt, to provide U.S. military or economic assistance to Savimbi's forces. I do not believe that it is in our interest as a nation to do so for a number of fundamental reasons.

First, I believe that U.S. involvement in this conflict would seriously damage our relations with governments throughout Africa. Second, such involvement would complicate our efforts to address a host of complex issues in southern Africa and undermine the potentially constructive role that our government can play as a mediator in the Angolan conflict.

Third, U.S. assistance is not needed to sustain UNITA. Thus, the purpose of the various proposals now pending before the House is largely symbolic, that is, to explicitly align the United States with UNITA. That makes very little sense when broader issues regarding U.S. policy toward Africa are taken into account.

Finally, U.S. involvement in ongoing conflicts, whether overt or covert, cannot be sustained over the long haul unless there is a broad consensus among

the American people in support of such involvement. With regard to our potential involvement in the Angolan conflict, there is no consensus.

Africa is a continent of great diversity. While it is sometimes easy to define our specific policy objectives in particular African countries, it is not so easy to detect the common threads of U.S. policy toward the continent as a whole.

Nonetheless, since the dawn of the independence movement on the African continent, United States policy has fostered three broad objectives that most Africans share in common: support for decolonization; opposition to the South African government's policy of apartheid; and encouragement of rapid, sustained, and equitable economic growth and development.

These are goals with which the vast majority of the American people can identify, and by and large, I believe that our government has played a constructive role in attempting to promote them. At the same time, most of us would agree that progress toward the achievement of these goals over the course of the last 30 years has been mixed at best.

On the positive side, with the notable exception of Namibia, the goal of decolonization is largely an accomplished fact today. By way of contrast, far less progress has been made toward the goals of ending apartheid in South Africa and achieving economic growth and development. Nonetheless, these are goals to which the United States remains committed, as demonstrated by the overwhelming bipartisan support for a tougher policy toward South Africa and our continuing commitment of resources to meet the very severe problems that African nations face.

It has been our commitment to these three goals that has earned the United States considerable good will throughout the continent. In this context, one must question the impact in Africa of our providing material assistance to UNITA.

My own judgment is that such a decision would seriously damage our relations with governments across the African continent, given Savimbi's ties to the South African government. Most African governments would question why the United States is prepared to

assist UNITA while refusing to aid those who have taken up arms against a white minority government in South Africa that consistently violates the basic human rights of the non-white majority and that refuses to allow the citizens of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination. In short, assisting UNITA would be perceived throughout Africa as a step away from two of the three basic policy objectives that have enjoyed broad support in Africa.

“Most African governments would question why the U.S. is prepared to assist UNITA while refusing to aid those who have taken up arms against a white minority government in South Africa.”

This should be clear from the reaction throughout Africa to the repeal of the Clark Amendment. The Organization of African Unity expressed deep concern about that decision at its summit conference last summer. A decision to go ahead with assistance to UNITA would undoubtedly evoke a much stronger reaction.

Indeed, in early November a key group of African ambassadors at the United Nations met with Ambassador Vernon Walters to express their concerns about potential U.S. involvement in this conflict. The concluding paragraph of their aide-memoire states: “It is our considered opinion that assistance in any form to the rebels would seriously put in question the credibility and good faith of the United States and undermine efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the conflicts in the region.”

The United States has been pursuing a complex series of objectives in southern Africa. On the one hand, we are seeking to promote an end to apartheid in South Africa and to secure the independence of Namibia. At the same time, we are also seeking to bring about the

removal of Cuban troops from Angola, to limit Soviet influence in Angola, Mozambique, and other countries in southern Africa by promoting peace and stability, and to open up the political systems of countries such as Angola so that groups like UNITA can participate fully in their political life. That is certainly an ambitious policy agenda for the United States and one that remains far from complete. However, there have been some encouraging developments in recent years, including the U.S.-brokered Lusaka and Nkomati accords and an improved relationship with Mozambique.

If the United States actively involves itself in the Angolan conflict, it would be focusing upon one element of a complex equation to the detriment of others. Clearly, Angola would become even more dependent upon Soviet advisers and Cuban troops, and prospects for peace in the region would dim. The United States would have lost its role as a potential mediator within Angola itself and would be seen as having abandoned its efforts to promote the independence of Namibia. In fact, we would be seen as collaborating with the policies of the South African government, which would be an albatross around our neck across Africa, just as South Africa's association with Savimbi taints his movement among Africans.

At a more practical level, moreover, U.S. assistance is not needed. UNITA has carried on this war for a decade partly with captured arms and equipment and partly with the assistance of the South African government, which has demonstrated its readiness to provide whatever assistance UNITA requires (including air strikes if necessary).

The amounts of U.S. assistance contemplated in the different bills before Congress are relatively small. Funding at these levels will not make any significant difference in the war, but will almost certainly complicate our efforts to end it and to open up the Angolan political system.

In short, we are talking about a symbolic commitment of U.S. assistance that aligns us with a particular faction at the expense of broader U.S. policy objectives in southern Africa. That hardly makes sense at this point since it would

represent an abandonment of 10 years of hard work in the region.

What these bills seek to do, then, is to subordinate our regional interests in Africa to larger East-West concerns. Yet, it is questionable as to what would be gained by doing so.

Finally, there is no consensus within our country that would support the use of force in Angola. Most Americans know very little about that country, or about southern Africa's political problems in general. They do not perceive Angola to be the victim of Soviet aggression, as is the case in Afghanistan, but rather a combatant in a conflict with South Africa. Thus, the American people are not likely to support U.S. assistance to UNITA over the long haul, a condition precedent in our democracy if any policy is to be sustainable and successful.

A decision to assist UNITA would undoubtedly prompt many Americans to ask some tough questions. What are our objectives in Angola? Are we seeking to


overthrow the Angolan government? If so, how much are we prepared to spend in this effort and for how long? Are the forces we are supporting truly committed to democracy? Do they have a chance of winning? How will our involvement promote an end to apartheid in South Africa and Namibian independence? Why run the risk of being further perceived as an ally of South Africa? Are we prepared to support similar movements in other African countries, such as Mozambique and Ethiopia?

I recognize that some believe that the mood in the United States has changed since Congress voted to repeal the Clark Amendment. Yet, I have talked with members of Congress who supported the decision but who are opposed to direct U.S. involvement in the Angolan conflict. And the conference report on this issue was quite clear in indicating that the decision to repeal the Clark Amendment should not be taken as an indication that Congress is prepared to support assistance to UNITA:

"It is the intent of the Committee on Conference that the repeal of the Clark Amendment not necessarily be construed to be an endorsement by the Congress of the provision of assistance of any kind, for the purpose, or which would have the effect of promoting or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of a nation, group, organization, movement, or individual to conduct military or paramilitary operations in or against Angola. Provision of such assistance requires further legislative procedures—the appropriate authorization and appropriation bills or presentment by the president of a finding to the Select Committee on Intelligence."

Unfortunately, what we can anticipate from so fundamental a change in policy is a long, bitter, and divisive debate over the wisdom of U.S. policy in southern Africa. Any vote in the Congress is likely to be close. That is not a sound basis for such a major change in policy, and I believe that such a change could haunt us for decades. □

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The Reagan Doctrine in Angola

Advocating American support for UNITA, Congressman Jack Kemp argues that assistance to "anti-Marxist freedom fighters" in Angola is essential to containing Soviet ambitions in the southern African region.

BY JACK KEMP

Angola is fighting its second revolutionary war in 10 years. Dr. Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA movement helped liberate the country from Portuguese colonialism in 1975, and he is now fighting to free Angola from Soviet and Cuban-backed forces which seized the government in the vacuum left by Portugal's withdrawal. I believe it should be U.S. policy to assist Savimbi's struggle for freedom and independence in Angola.

Angola's government is propped up by 35,000 Cuban mercenaries and 1,200 Soviet and East bloc advisers and personnel. It has violated the basic human rights of its political prisoners by torture and beatings "inflicted with fists, wooden sticks, belts. . . and electric shocks" (according to an Amnesty International report), prolonged detention, and arbitrary death penalties. Trade unions are run by the government, which was cited by the International Labour Organization for practicing forced labor. Media censorship is widespread; it goes without saying that only one political party is legal in Angola, the ruling Marxist party.

Congressman Jack Kemp (R-NY) is chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Republican Conference and serves on the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.



"With the Clark Amendment's repeal and our long-delayed financial help, UNITA need not rely on South Africa"

After Congress prohibited U.S. assistance to the Angolan freedom fighters under the 1975 Clark Amendment (repealed this year), Savimbi received no help from us. The Clark Amendment forced him to turn to a government whose racial policies he abhors, as we all do—South Africa.

UNITA's morale is high and the movement has widespread support among Angolans, according to the State Department's 1984 human rights report. Using limited weapons, the freedom fighters have downed Soviet MIG aircraft and HIND helicopter gunships, capturing Russian rifles. UNITA has its capital in the town of Jamba and a *de facto* government over a third of the country.

Early in 1985, it seemed that for the first time in history, a Soviet/Cuban-imposed despotism in Africa would be forced to share power with anti-communist forces or face the possibility of being deposed. But a late communist counter-attack has severely blunted Savimbi's drive toward independence.

Legislation offered by Sen. Claude Pepper, myself, and a bipartisan group of members of Congress would provide a modest \$27 million in non-lethal humanitarian aid for UNITA's movement for independence from Soviet neo-colonialism. This is less, by some estimates, than the amount of tax revenues Chevron pays the government every two

weeks for its Cabinda province oil refinery operations. As House minority leader Bob Michel wrote to Secretary of State George Shultz, "United States support for UNITA—even in such a small way—is not only a geostrategic but a moral necessity."

Angola's government is an outpost of white, Soviet-style colonialism on the African continent. Soviet/Cuban colonization of Angola is reactionary; it flies in the face of history. I believe anti-colonial liberation in Africa is a categorical imperative for democracies. We Americans have no right to sit on our hands while soldiers from Cuba and commanders from the USSR crush the aspirations of 5 million African blacks.

Assistance to the Angolan liberation movement falls under the Reagan doctrine, which says that the U.S. should materially help freedom fighters against Soviet-dominated governments. The doctrine has been described by proponents and opponents alike as the most significant American foreign policy movement in many years. I agree with that assessment. But since the general doctrine as well as its specific application to Angola are controversial, I would like to discuss some of the objections raised against both.

There are two opposing points of view regarding the Reagan doctrine. One is that it represents "interventionism." The other, correct viewpoint in my judgment is that it protects our national security interests as well as our faith in the principles of freedom.

Critics of assistance to Jonas Savimbi claim that the proposal is just a right-wing imperative that bears no relation to the "realities" on the ground. But the original sponsor of the bill to provide assistance is a Democrat, Sen. Pepper of Florida. A recipient of 70 and 80 percent Americans for Democratic Action ratings in the 1980s, he would be quite surprised to hear that he is part of the "right-wing."

The notion that conservatives are so preoccupied with "ideology" that we disregard "practicality" turns the truth upside down. In the 1970s, if there was anything that distressed those on the left of the political spectrum, it was a foreign policy they regarded as merely pragmatic and empty of ideological con-

tent. "Pragmatic realism" in the last decade would have suggested defending governments strategically important to U.S. security interests when its internal opponents have ties to the Eastern bloc or other anti-U.S. forces.

But for the liberal left, ideology said that the United States must withdraw if that government's record on human rights did not meet some impeccably high standard. Thus Iran fell to the Ayatollah; thus Nicaragua fell to the

"Assistance to UNITA falls under the Reagan doctrine, which says that the U.S. should materially help freedom fighters against Soviet-dominated governments."

Marxist Sandinistas, with tragic results for both peoples, with unhappy consequences for us, and with the elimination of all hope for civil rights and freedom of dissent in either country. That truly was the triumph of ideology over reality.

The reality on the ground in Angola is not very complicated. The Marxist-Leninist MPLA government remains in power only because of the support given by Cuban troops and Soviet weaponry. The quid pro quo is that the Soviets derive both economic benefits (by way of Chevron oil revenues) and political/military advantages to their campaign to destabilize and assert control over the whole region.

Although assistance to anti-Marxist freedom fighters is basic to the Reagan doctrine, the State Department has been opposing support for UNITA, arguing that the United States is brokering negotiations to withdraw foreign forces. But aiding UNITA does not prevent a political settlement. On the contrary, the expense to the government of keeping its Cuban phalanx is high—estimated at between \$500 and \$800 million a year. In order to break the Soviet/Luanda alliance, the cost of the Soviet and Cuban presence must be increased enough to exceed the benefits and ad-

vantages. If the resistance is provided with effective help, the government's ability to hold power will be so difficult that it will be compelled to reach an accommodation with the Angolan people and forces controlling over a third of the country. There is no other way to get serious negotiations going, for the simple reason that if UNITA cannot fight, the MPLA government has no incentive to negotiate.

The key then is "effective help." Is \$27 million in humanitarian assistance, as provided under the Pepper-Kemp bill, enough to do the job? Of course not. Its purpose is humanitarian. Those people and tribes that are aligned with the freedom fighters have been entirely cut off from the little social support which was provided by the state for a decade. Medicine, food, education, and training are desperately needed by these impoverished African people. Our USAID programs never reach them. This modest \$27 million dollar emergency assistance is intended to help correct the omission.

Covert assistance, to be sure, is also at issue, and it must be provided. The United States need not bear the entire burden, however. By supporting UNITA, we can signal to other non-communist nations, black and white, that there is now an opportunity to liberate an African nation from neo-colonialism, and hopefully some may choose to help. On the other hand, by refusing assistance we cause others within and outside of Angola to lose hope too, and refrain from any involvement.

This consideration cannot be stressed enough. The highest ranking Soviet defector, Arkady Shevchenko, who was familiar with Moscow ruling circles in the 1970s, has written that Leonid Brezhnev interpreted Congress' 1975 decision to cut off all assistance to Savimbi as a sign that the Kremlin might raise Cuban troop strength in Angola, and the U.S. would say little. And that is what Brezhnev proceeded to do. Burke's famous expression was never more apt: "All that is required for evil to triumph is for good men and women to do nothing." It is an inescapable reality of our time that the United States must lead the Free World, or the Free World will not have a leader. If the principles of

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individual dignity and the idea of human rights are not defended by the U.S. in a material way, they cannot be defended successfully by anyone else.

In Angola today, the dominant occupation is not debating club meetings where the comparative virtues of Edmund Burke and Karl Marx are discussed. Black Angolan men and women have had to take to the jungle and the bush to escape oppression and regroup their forces, taking their supplies of food and medicine, mortars and weapons from any available source. What else, given their situation, could they be expected to do? The essential fact of their life is the life-and-death struggle to achieve freedom. How can we turn our backs on their fight, which ultimately is our fight?

Some say the U.S. should not "march to Pretoria's tune" by assisting a revolution South Africa supports. But this is a case of logic in reverse. With the Clark Amendment's repeal and our long-delayed financial help, UNITA need not rely on South Africa. Our obligation to help people fighting for freedom does not disappear just because a government we don't like is on the same side. That is a rationalization for shirking our responsibility.

Moreover, one major South African excuse for not dismantling apartheid is the communist threat. This excuse would carry less weight if communist regimes in the region, such as Angola and Mozambique, were replaced by genuine democracies—in fact it would become one more force for South African racial reform.

Soviet global adventurism, in southern Africa and elsewhere, threatens developing and developed nations alike with its totalitarian rule. Oppressed by a system of apartheid so reprehensible that no decent American dare defend it, South African blacks still find it possible to appeal to the United States to pressure their country for peaceful change. But to whom will black South Africans or anyone else appeal if Soviet global ambition achieves its goal of world domination? The Reagan doctrine is our effort to prevent that domination and preserve the possibility of freedom where it hardly exists today.

Those who favor and those who op-

pose assistance to Savimbi equally hope that diplomacy can end the conflict and bring freedom to Angola. But if the negotiation process succeeds, it is because of UNITA pressure on the Marxists to move toward free and fair elections and to secure withdrawal of all outside military forces. Assist the freedom fighters and negotiate—we can and should do both.

In foreign policy you deal with one evil at a time, as great democratic leaders recognize. Washington achieved American independence by seeking aid from the autocratic French King Louis XVI; Churchill and Roosevelt defended democracy by an alliance with Stalin to defeat Nazism and fascism.

It falls to each and every one of us, reader by reader, to decide what we would do in the context of this African liberation struggle. We are lucky: We are citizens of the one country endowed with leadership because of our natural wealth and extraordinary human industry. Personally, I would not have it any other way. Reality dictates that we take account of two overriding considerations in foreign policy issues—the demands of our moral conscience, and the imperatives of our nation's interest.

Those who believe that we should be neutral in this struggle illustrate the school of foreign policy that might be called "the new isolationism." That school already has the decimation of Kampuchea to its credit. I do not want to see Angola added to the list. In the world competition of ideas, Marxist-Leninist doctrine has demonstrated its bankruptcy over and over again as a political philosophy and as an economic model for growth and prosperity. No one chooses slavery or poverty willingly. Yet given time, the "new isolationism" could accomplish what the free competition of ideas alone will not: the incremental surrender of our interests, our allies, and finally, our faith in human rights and self-government for all peoples regardless of race or color.

For these reasons, I believe active American support for Angola's freedom fighters is essential to the progress of self-government and freedom in southern Africa and consequently to the future of the global democratic revolution. □

Cabral's Dream

Although recent shake-ups in the PAIGC have consolidated President João Bernardo Vieira's position, ongoing political tensions and Guinea-Bissau's stark economic prospects threaten his government's long-term economic recovery efforts.

BY ADELINO GOMES

For the first time this year, Col. Paulo Correia did not participate in the commemoration of the November 14, 1980 coup d'état in which President Luis Cabral was overthrown. Eight days earlier, President João Bernardo Vieira had ordered his arrest.

Second in rank in the Guinean regime, Correia had spent the past 22 years as military commander—first during the war against the Portuguese and then as member of Bissau's leadership. His arrest followed the removal of other party and government officials—including Prime Minister Vitor Saude Maria—over the past few years which has left only Vieira of the five "brigade commanders" from the guerrilla war era still in power. Umaru Djalo, Constantino Teixeira, and now Paulo Correia are either in prison or under house arrest; Pedro Pires, prime minister of Cape Verde, left the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) after the collapse of Guinean-Cape Verdean unity.

Known as "Commandante Nino" from the days of the liberation struggle, Vieira continues to exert considerable charismatic influence over the population and appears to have the Revolution-

Adelino Gomes is a Portuguese journalist and lecturer on journalism who trained radio journalists in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. He is currently a producer for Radio Comercial of Lisbon.

ary Armed Forces under his control. However, the recent imprisonment of Correia and other military and civilian leaders on charges of plotting a coup d'état reflects the tensions and mistrust, both in the barracks and within the government, which have become increasingly apparent over the last several months.

Among those arrested last November were the chief of staff for civilian affairs at the presidency, the commander of the "14 November" Motorized Brigade—the most important military unit in the country—a secretary of state who had been a member of the Revolutionary Council and military chief of staff (he was shot to death in prison a few days after his arrest), the chief of police, several officers of the regular army, and other dismissed officers. They are all *Balanta*, the largest of Guinea-Bissau's 18 ethnic groups, the first to have supported the struggle against colonial rule, and the people among whom "Nino" had sought support.

Behind this power struggle pitting former fellow combatants against one another lies an increasingly impoverished economy and a pervasive and apparently well-organized network of corruption among senior civil servants, uncovered just before the twelfth anniversary of independence.

Basic goods are in short supply. Daily

water shortages and power failures in Bissau—where 13 percent of the population lives—and difficulty in obtaining new loans have created an environment which calls into question the credibility of the *Movimento Reajustador* (Readjusting Movement) of November 14.

* * *

Two years ago, Guineans welcomed President Antonio Ramalho Eanes of Portugal to the capital city, setting aside the bitter memories of the colonial period. Bissau residents had good reason to look forward to Eanes' visit. Well-acquainted with hardship and lack of resources, the people knew that with his arrival came two ships fully supplied with products which had not been available for a long time.

Those goods supplemented a shipment a few days earlier which had been purchased in neighboring countries with the country's meager foreign exchange earnings. Lines immediately formed at distribution posts, and for the first time in weeks, shoppers were able to take home a few kilos of rice, some soap, and a little milk. Scenes like this were reminiscent of an earlier era—just before the 1980 coup.

Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest countries in the world, with an annual per capita income of around \$220. On average, export earnings are insufficient to finance food imports. GNP declined by about 13 percent between

1977 and 1978. In 1982, the foreign debt reached \$225 million, exceeding the GNP, and in 1984, debt service payments totalled \$10 million.

Twelve years after independence was unilaterally proclaimed from the Boe hills, Guinea-Bissau's future is far from optimistic. Having broken the

and administrative units—lending an unique character to the Guinean revolutionary process—in areas freed from the Portuguese colonial grip. *Tabanca* (small compounds of thatched dwellings) committees still form the basis of the country's economic and social organization. The committees, elected by

In April 1972, a special UN committee mandated by the Security Council visited the territory. Concluding that Portugal no longer held effective administrative control over vast areas of the country, it recognized the PAIGC as the sole and legitimate representative of the Guinean people. It was the first time that a UN delegation had visited the liberated areas of a country fighting a colonial war.

In the same year, general elections were held. One hundred and twenty delegates were elected to the first Popular National Assembly, an event heralded by the international community. Gen. Antonio de Spínola's (Portugal's governor of the territory between 1968 and 1973) last attempt to regain through economic and social reform what had already been lost in warfare and diplomacy—his "A Better Guinea" policy—had clearly become unsatisfactory both to Guineans and the international community.

The assassination of Amílcar Cabral, founder of the PAIGC, on January 20, 1973—by the Portuguese secret police, according to the party—did nothing to further the aims of its perpetrators. Instead, Cabral's powerful image took on mythical proportions, unifying the party and intensifying the guerrilla war.

By March 1973, the PAIGC's deployment of missiles had shifted the military balance in their favor, forcing the Portuguese army into a defensive position made even more dramatic by the harsh climate and treacherous, marshy terrain. Therefore, it was not surprising that when Portugal initiated peace talks with the PAIGC in London on May 25, 1974, the number of countries recognizing the new Republic of Guinea-Bissau exceeded those still maintaining diplomatic relations with its colonial power.

During the early years of independence, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde—both under the PAIGC's leadership, a unique political arrangement—enjoyed a "state of grace" in international terms because of the support they had won during the armed struggle. Aid and technical assistance poured in, placing the two countries at the head of the recipient list in per capita terms. But as with other new nations, development and economic independence proved to



Margaret A. Novicki

President João Bernardo Vieira "continues to exert considerable charismatic influence over the population"

chains of colonial domination, Guineans are still striving to realize the dreams of economic independence, social justice, welfare, and unity which inspired Amílcar Cabral, an agrarian engineer, and five other militants to found the PAIGC in 1956.

The PAIGC was the first liberation movement of the five Portuguese colonies to proclaim its country's independence—months before the coup in Portugal which overthrew Marcelo Caetano on April 25, 1974. It had also waged the most ferocious and most successful liberation struggle both at the national and international levels.

In 1968, five years after the armed struggle began, the PAIGC had already established a number of political, legal,

the population or designated by the party with local approval, and people's courts at the *tabanca*, district, and national levels provided for popular representation in the administration of justice.

With the abolition of currency and the elimination of taxes, a network of 17 people's shops was set up to supply the local population with basic commodities such as salt, fabrics, shoes, and tobacco in exchange for other goods produced by the peasants. The organization of the zones under the direct control of the PAIGC also included a network of health care facilities and an educational system whose 1966-67 records showed the existence of 159 schools staffed by 220 instructors and enrolling 14,386 students.

be far more difficult to achieve than the symbols of self-determination—the flag, the national anthem, and conquest of the capital.

The Portuguese left behind a very burdensome legacy. Regarded for centuries as a military base and commercial entrepôt, Guinea-Bissau achieved its independence with no infrastructure, industry, or trained personnel; less than 600 kilometers of paved roads; half a dozen bridges in a country crossed by hundreds of rivers; no port facilities in spite of its 1,800-kilometer coastline; and a single industry—the beer and soda factory, CICER, started in 1974. Eighty-five percent of the population lived in the subsistence, non-monetary economy and there were only a little over a dozen university-educated people in the entire country.

Added to these problems were climatic conditions and the state of the international economy. The 1970s Sahel drought and desertification, which con-

tinues to advance at an average of five kilometers per year; the oil shock which tripled the cost of crude oil; and declining market prices for two of the country's main exports—groundnuts and coconuts—as well as for seafood and lumber, all compounded the developmental stagnation and regression which resulted from PAIGC policy errors.

Analysts note that the country's economic difficulties were exacerbated by over-ambitious spending on projects unsuited to its needs. Examples often cited are the \$20 million Cumere agro-industrial complex, a Citroen auto assembly plant, and the highway linking the capital to Bissalance airport.

In addition, excessive bureaucratization, nepotism, corruption, smuggling, the state monopoly on trade, and the black market, where two-thirds of agricultural produce was diverted either in direct exchange for other products or sold in neighboring countries for foreign currency, contributed to the degrada-

tion of the economy, generating the conditions for the November 1980 coup. Pervasive food shortages that year, which affected the entire population, including the armed forces, were the last straw.

On the political front, no doubt the suspicion—latent since the beginning of the armed struggle—that the Cape Verdeans were trying to dominate the Guineans influenced discussions on the first draft of the joint constitution, which Nino Vieira later characterized as “a clear negation of the Guinean identity.” For example, the Cape Verdean constitution stated that the president of the Republic should have Cape Verdean citizenship, a point the Guinean constitution did not specify. On a different but equally important level, the Cape Verdean constitution abolished the death penalty, while Guinea-Bissau kept it.

In an interview several months after he seized power, Nino Vieira stressed that his coup was planned against “Cape



Special UN mission in Guinea-Bissau, 1972, “the first time a UN delegation had visited the liberated areas of a country fighting a colonial war”

United Nations/V. Nagata/Ara

Verdeans and Guineans alike who had committed any kind of injustice against the indigenous people." He noted that his government took immediate steps to eliminate racialism of any kind, citing high-ranking Cape Verdean ministers and party officials who remained and still hold the same posts in Bissau after the coup.

Today, five years after Vieira seized power, Guinea-Bissau's foreign policy orientation remains unchanged: non-alignment, preferential links with the four other ex-Portuguese colonies, and privileged relations with Portugal and the Nordic and socialist countries. Although all ties with Cape Verde were broken after the imprisonment of former President Luis Cabral and some members of his cabinet on charges of mass murder, relations today are practically normalized.

Nevertheless, divergences in opinion began to surface in the wake of the coup. Defining the ideology of the PAIGC was always speculative, given that debates within the party rarely focus on ideological issues. More often than not, it is necessary to scrutinize seemingly minor incidents in order to understand the larger picture.

Some members of the new government saw the dissolution of the PAIGC as a logical consequence of the break-up of Guinea-Bissau-Cape Verde unity in the wake of the coup. Proponents for its dissolution explained that the acronym had become historically obsolete and a point of contention between the two states. A communist supporter of the dissolution suggested that Guinea-Bissau's new party be designated "communist" or "socialist."

Supporters of the PAIGC maintained that the party continued to be the symbol of the unfinished struggle. For this group, changing the party's name would indicate a move away from the goals set by Amilcar Cabral. What was at stake, they said, were fundamental questions regarding political principles. And it was the way in which those political principles influenced the new government's urgent policy options that observers became aware of the outcome of a two-year intra-party struggle.

Emerging victorious was a group of young educated people from the Amilcar Cabral's African Youth. Their

victory was confirmed with the removal from the political scene last May of the former prime minister and vice-president of the Council of Revolution, Vitor Saude Maria, and with the gradual eclipse of Freire Monteiro, an influential figure during the period immediately following Vieira's coup. This new generation, in their 30s, began occupying important PAIGC posts and today can be found in all sectors of state administration, from education to information and economy.

The economic sector showed the most dramatic signs as a result. Encouraged by these post-coup efforts, the government's economic team devised a stabilization program for 1983-84 focusing on improving the country's economic and financial position by cutting public expenditures, devaluing the currency, raising taxes, reorganizing the parastatals, establishing an investment code, privatizing commerce and trade,

and rigorously monitoring the allocation of foreign aid—the hallmark of Guinea's new economic approach.

At donor conferences held in Lisbon and Bissau between November 1983 and March 1985, Vieira's government made every effort to regain the confidence of the international community by demonstrating an ability to maximize available financing (only 56 percent of the loans obtained before 1982 were actually used), while trying to gain control of the investment process, which was very often controlled by the lenders themselves in the past. The first victims of its austerity program were government employees and salaried workers in general, who saw their wages reduced by 30 percent.

Guinea-Bissau thus became one of the first sub-Saharan African countries to implement an economic stabilization program containing all of the IMF's traditional recipes. When Vieira received

Speaking Portuguese

At an international conference on relations between Europe and Africa held in Lisbon last October, the key-note speaker called for questions from the audience. A Portuguese teacher—an expert in African issues—stood up and speaking in French, posed his question. As he spoke, the Portuguese-speakers in the audience heard the interpreter's Portuguese translation. The next Portuguese participant also spoke in French. Finally, Renato Cardoso, a counsellor to the prime minister of Cape Verde and the only African delegate to the conference, began speaking in Portuguese—although he speaks fluent French.

Portugal, it seems, has not developed a policy to encourage the use of its language abroad. Adopted as the official language of its five former African colonies, the Portuguese language faces a crisis.

Guinea-Bissau is an extreme example. Observers predict that within the next five to 10 years, the West African country, surrounded on either side by francophone Senegal and Guinea, will be overwhelmed by the influence of its neighbors.

Ten years after independence, Portuguese is spoken by only 11 percent of Guinea-Bissau's 800,000 citizens—less than the population of Lisbon, Portugal's capital. It is difficult for government high schools to hire Portuguese teachers who are offered unattractive contracts, forced to live in sub-standard housing, and are paid 10 times less than professionals from other countries.

The scarcity of teaching materials forces students to use photocopied abstracts from text books which are barely readable, and requests for a "Portuguese by radio" course have gone unanswered. A Lisbon-based film distributor cut its supply of Portuguese and Portuguese-subtitled films to the country because of foreign exchange restrictions. The only movie theatre in Bissau is currently screening films imported from Senegal, with French subtitles, and paid for in Guinea-Bissau's pesos.

On the other hand, the French Cultural Center, located in downtown Bissau, regularly screens French films, and stocks a library of some 13,000 books, including those by such cultural heroes as Jean-Paul Sartre and Marguerite Duras. It offers a choice of cultural and entertainment programs such as free exhibitions and ateliers of art—in sharp contrast to the uninspired activities of the Portuguese Cultural Center, which has only recently opened.

the "men without faces" of the IMF in Bissau, the Guinean government had already implemented its own tough economic program. Hence it did not have to be seen as bending to the dictates of the IMF, perhaps explaining why the more politically conscious sectors of the population did not react with violence to the drastic economic measures in force as of January 1984. Another possible explanation is that there were no other viable alternatives, and the government believed that the longer reforms were delayed, the greater the ultimate sacrifices would have to be.

The 1983-86 economic plan has established a set of goals, which if realized, could lead to encouraging prospects for the Guinean economy. The plan focuses on management of the country's natural resources, which could make Guinea-Bissau self-sufficient in food and considerably increase exports. If the area under cultivation is increased from the

present 400 hectares to 1 million hectares, the production of rice—a food staple—and cash crops—groundnuts, copra, coconut, cotton, and fruit—could be substantially increased.

The fish catch has the potential to expand from the present 8,000 tons per year to a possible 350,000 tons per year. Forestry resources have a potential annual yield of 120,000 tons of lumber (8,500 tons in 1979) of which 32,000 are available for export, as three-quarters of the territory is covered by species valued by European lumber industrialists. There are also apparently bauxite, calcium phosphate, and oil deposits.

The Soviets and the French have differing views on the cost effectiveness of exploiting the country's estimated 200,000 tons of bauxite. While little has been published officially on the oil reserves, the fact that the matter is a state secret and was the source of disputes

over maritime boundaries between Bissau and Conakry, as well as between Bissau and Dakar suggests that it exists in abundance. According to the Portuguese news magazine *Actualidade Economica*, Guinea-Bissau's offshore plateau may contain one of the most significant deposits of hydrocarbons on the West African coast, "probably the fourth largest after Nigeria, Angola, and Gabon."

At the beginning of last year, government officials expressed optimism about the country's economic indicators. Agricultural production rose, although the food deficit for 1985 was still 35,000 tons; exports were at the highest level since independence; the budget deficit decreased in real terms as compared to 1983, marking a departure from the trend over the last several years.

In an effort to encourage production, the government increased producer prices. Nevertheless, in the middle of the year, a delay in the arrival of promised international aid jeopardized this policy because most financial resources had already been allocated to the acquisition of consumer goods for peasants. As Guinea-Bissau is essentially an agricultural country, it was the peasants who carried the heaviest burden of the war. They formed 99 percent of the combat units and were the main victims of massacre and bombardments.

In 1977, Guineans complained that the Soviets were only sending "iron" (military supplies) to their country and that they couldn't eat iron. Eight years later, the shop windows are emptier and the peasants continue to go to Senegal and Guinea-Conakry for basic foodstuffs and consumer goods.

Amilcar Cabral warned against such a situation, questioning the value of liberating a country if the people would be deprived of basic necessities. "The people," he said, "accept the sacrifices imposed by the war in hopes of a better life." And he would add, "National liberation, the struggle against colonialism, forging of peace and progress, independence—all that is empty and meaningless if not translated into a real improvement in the people's standard of living."

Guinea-Bissau's leaders have certainly been among the least corrupt in Africa. Reporters from abroad have had the opportunity to witness the modest

Here, a copy of a sports newspaper, *A Bola*, issued three days a week, is the only attraction to lure Guineans—a poor attempt at disseminating Portuguese culture when the French offer magazines like *L'Express*, and *Le Nouvel Observateur*, sold at extremely reasonable prices to the interested Guinean.

For various geographical and historical reasons, French is spoken by Guineans living along its borders with Senegal and Guinea. During the years of the liberation struggle, Amilcar Cabral's guerrilla base was located in Conakry and guerrilla operations were directed from headquarters there and in Dakar.

In addition, many students have been seduced by aggressive French cultural policies, with the end result that an estimated 1 to 7 percent of Guineans speak the language of Bonaparte. Repeated appeals by the Bissau authorities to the Portuguese government for assistance in promoting the use of the Portuguese language have fallen on deaf ears, despite requests from the president's office itself.

If Lisbon does not respond soon its requests for educational inputs, including teaching materials, teacher-training programs, and additional personnel, Cape Verde will no doubt follow Guinea-Bissau's lead. In Cape Verde too, officials advocating preferential links with Portugal are confronted by obstacles imposed by the Portuguese themselves.

The problem, not solely linked to cultural matters, at times reaches unimaginable, even absurd proportions. In 1982, a summit attended by the five Lusophone heads of state was held in Praia, Cape Verde. Western countries without diplomatic representation in Cape Verde sent observers from their embassies in Lisbon. Yet the Portuguese ambassador to Cape Verde chose to return home on vacation the week of the summit.

More recently, Portugal was the only non-African country invited by the Cape Verdean government to send athletes to participate in a competition celebrating the country's tenth year of independence. The Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined the invitation, saying Portugal could not afford to cover four athletes' travel expenses from Lisbon to Sal and back again. Yet, Mozambique and São Tomé found the funds to send delegations to the festivities.

After five centuries of colonial domination, why is Portugal playing "hard to get?" With 150 million Portuguese-speakers around the world, one wonders why Lusophone countries have to beg Portugal for language programs only to be sent *fado* records, as was the case with the Guinean national broadcasting station, or Brazilian soap operas to be broadcast on Cape Verde's experimental television.

—A.G.

lifestyles of most of the country's leadership. At the end of a tropical afternoon, it is not uncommon to see a military officer or a former "fighter for the freedom of the homeland" carrying a sack of rice on his back to his family who lives in a simple home on the outskirts, or to visit with a secretary of state on the terrace of his home in the dark because he cannot afford to buy a power generator, unlike the diplomats and foreign technicians.

Bissau is a safe town, where a foreigner can stroll in the evening along the dim road from the center of town to the 4 of September Hotel without being harassed. But a visitor doesn't have to be very discerning to notice the serious

The extreme lack of cadres, as is often said, was the worst crime committed by colonialism and Guinea-Bissau is a perfect example. In 11 years of struggle, the PAIGC trained more technical and mid-level cadres abroad than Portugal did during its centuries of colonial domination. In addition, there is still a long way to go—the illiteracy rate is 80 percent (it was 95 percent at independence); enrollment at the primary school level is 88 percent, and at the secondary level, 15 percent. The only graduate program at the university is a law school offering the first three years of a five-year undergraduate degree. About 1,000 scholarships have been granted to date for studies in countries

is not shared by everyone. Without denying the possibility of an ethnic component as well as some personal ambition, well-informed observers think that last fall's confused events are linked to the investigation of cases of corruption, arising from mutual suspicion of the families in power, and a growing generation gap.

The dissatisfaction of Paulo Correia and his colleagues arose from the fact that a number of members of the Armed Forces who had not fought in the war were quickly ascending the ranks and also young cadres who did not fight the war, newly arrived from European universities, were introducing changes in the country's model of development



PAIGC representative Pedro Pires and Gen. Antonio de Spínola at ceremony recognizing the independence of Guinea-Bissau in Lisbon, September 1974

deprivation that afflicts the population. Although hunger has not yet destroyed the people's trust in the government, to prevent it from doing so is the challenge for the regime.

It is for that reason that Nino Vieira, whom Guineans still regard as representing the highest ideals of the PAIGC guerrilla fighters, depends so much on the success of the present economic policy and in the commitment of the young people of the last generation who lived through the war.

such as the USSR, Cuba, Portugal, France, and Brazil. The first students sent abroad on scholarships after independence have started to come home. They will inherit the power that the guerrillas won through armed struggle. Maybe they were, without knowing it, part of the course of events which culminated with the arrests last November in Bissau.

The government's contention that tribalism is the real motive behind the alleged conspiracy by *Balanta* soldiers

which jeopardized the state-run economy conceived in the first years of independence.

As with all nations, Guinea-Bissau's heritage lies with its youth. But again, in the words of Cabral, "the best fruit doesn't come from just any tree." What fruits are going to emerge from the Soviet, Cuban, Portuguese, French, and Brazilian trees where young Guineans are sent to learn the techniques for managing and ruling the country? □

Making Its Own Rain Fall

Ten years after independence, Cape Verde has made the furthest strides of the five former Portuguese colonies in economic and social development. Despite a harsh physical environment and geographical isolation, the islands have benefited from political stability and pragmatic economic policies.

BY ADELINO GOMES

Last June, on the terrace of the radio station in Praia, a group of young Cape Verdean journalists sat listening to a program which had been broadcast from Portugal on the night of their country's independence in 1975. They were learning reporting techniques in a training course to prepare for the inauguration of the National Radio of Cape Verde on July 5, the tenth anniversary of independence.

The youths could not hide their surprise and disbelief as the broadcaster read the conclusions of a UN commission which had visited Cape Verde a few months before independence. At the end of the program, the students turned away from the instructor to question in creole dialect the eldest student in the class—a woman who had experienced the process leading to Cape Verde's independence.

They asked if what they had just heard about their country had been true only 10 years ago: only two hospitals manned by four doctors in the entire country; not a single medical specialist and only one surgeon; 12 doctors for the nine islands, but none for São Nicolau, Maio, and Boavista, and only one for the 50,000 inhabitants of Santo Antao. Were there really people living in caves dug

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Nobu Arakawa

Aristides Pereira is preparing to begin his third term as president of the Republic

out of the mountains, primary schools in the rented rooms of private homes, teachers with only a four-year primary school education?

Ovidio Martins' famous poem, which had been read in the background of the report—"We are the ones flogged by the gale of the east winds!/The goats taught us to eat gravel to survive"—became more than a beautiful literary effect. For the first time, the students

understood the harsh reality of its words.

Ten years after independence, Cape Verde faces a different set of problems. No one dies of hunger and life expectancy has increased by almost 20 years (from 45 to 63). The number of hospitals has tripled, and the physician/patient ratio—1 to 23,000 in 1975—is 1 to 2,800, better than the average for the African continent. The number of schools has doubled since 1975 and every village has a primary school. All administrative districts, with the exception of Paul on the island of Santo Antao, have at least one secondary school. The illiteracy rate has dropped from 75 to 60 percent, and authorities project that illiteracy will be eliminated altogether by 1990.

Under closer scrutiny, however, these statistics are not quite as impressive. While no one dies of hunger today, malnutrition is widespread in the rural areas. Fifty percent of the children do not complete primary school and 70 percent of the rural population is still illiterate. And new problems have arisen from efforts to achieve economic development, including heavy migration to the urban areas, sky-rocketing rents, the rising cost of living, and widespread unemployment.

Cape Verde is widely acknowledged to have made the furthest strides in economic and social development of the five former Portuguese colonies in Africa. For the visitor arriving from Guinea-

Bissau, the contrast is marked. Amid the lunar landscape, with rocks and sand scorched by the sun and winds sweeping the dust in an interminable swirl, Praia, Mindelo, Porto Novo, and São Filipe seem more like typical colonial cities than sisterlands of a poor country lacking in natural resources.

In the markets, fruit, grain, and vegetables are abundant. Meat can be purchased in the butcher shops, and fish almost anywhere. Shopkeepers competing for business display fabrics, tennis shoes, whiskey, port wine, and biscuits in their windows. The supermarkets are stocked with milk, flour, and cooking oil. Small bars are open late with a generous supply of beer. Surprisingly, there is running water and electricity. A survey of the five Lusophone African states would single out Cape Verde as the one with the least evident black market, where it is not necessary to "make deals" or wait in long lines to purchase rice, sugar, or coffee.

This is all the more striking given that at independence, Cape Verde seemed to have the least chance for survival—no rivers and few trees, its landscape weathered by Sahelian winds, and its location a distant 450 kilometers from the African coast. "When it doesn't rain," as a popular song goes, "we starve to death/When it rains, we drown."

Drought and hunger recur in cycles. Between 1945 and 1949, 40,000 people died. There was no rain for 17 consecutive years until 1984, when a storm ravaged the island of Santiago, destroying roads, washing away the arable topsoil, and leaving unprecedented devastation in its wake.

Between 1975 and 1984, 15,000 alluvial dams and about 2,500 kilometers of retaining walls were built to reduce erosion and improve drainage. Cape Verdeans responded to a tree-planting campaign by covering an area of more than 20,000 hectares with some 9 million trees—a task, however, that will have to be continued for generations. In the areas worst affected by the 1984 storm, work had to be started from scratch. Hunger-ravaged peasants were paid by the government to carry gravel by hand to rebuild trails and to sow maize fields.

To make use of the smallest drop of water, to make the barren land produc-

tive, and to harness the natural environment is the saga of the Cape Verdean people. Government officials do not hesitate to point out that survival has been the country's greatest accomplishment. "Our biggest achievement was to have made it through the wilderness," President Aristides Pereira commented in a recent interview. Prime Minister Pedro Pires responded to the same question in even more laconic words: "We are alive. We proved that our country is a viable one."

Investment in Cape Verde has been minimal. A crossroads for peoples and cultures and a trading post for slaves sent to the Americas, the archipelago's economic growth throughout its history has been based upon its geographical position vis-à-vis Europe, Africa, and the Americas and its provision of sea and air facilities—the port of Mindelo and Sal airport. During the colonial period, the only other investments were made in the basic infrastructure required for the operation of the administrative capital, Praia.

As one of Portugal's "overseas provinces," Cape Verde also supplied civil servants and laborers for the colonial administration. At independence, Cape Verdean doctors, judges, and senior civil servants were completing work contracts in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Portugal. Although the low level of skilled manpower and the lack of intermediate professionals are still apparent, Cape Verde did attain independence with a handful of professionals, trained for the most part in Portuguese universities.

One of the keys to the government's success has been its capacity to utilize its skilled professionals to the utmost—a consequence of governmental emphasis on human resource development. Today in Cape Verde, government officials debate the country's development program in round-table discussions with participants from different disciplines, arguing such "hot" issues as the role of the state in the country's economic development.

Enjoying a climate of political stability, Cape Verde's leaders have made an effort to adapt to the realities of the country. In contrast with most Marxist-inspired parties, a senior official commented, "We try to adjust ideology to

reality." However, some *cooperantes* (foreign technicians working in the country on temporary contracts) and representatives of international organizations might differ with this statement, noting the marked contrast between the affluence of the main towns like Praia and Mindelo and the countryside, where survival is the issue.

Nevertheless, without pragmatic social and foreign policies, the Cape Verdean government's three major sources of finance—remittances from its nationals abroad, foreign aid, and migrant labor—might have been jeopardized.

One of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of the archipelago is the rate of emigration. Of the 1 million Cape Verdeans, two-thirds are living abroad—50,000 to 100,000 in Portugal (although illegal immigration makes it difficult to give an accurate count), 15,000 in Senegal, 12,000 in the Netherlands, 10,000 in Angola, tens of thousands in Sweden, Italy, Spain, Brazil, and Argentina, and an unusually large (300,000) community, although mainly second generation, in the United States, particularly in New England.

Their remittances home constitute a substantial portion of the Cape Verdean treasury. They keep the construction and housing markets alive, and their savings are invested in joint ventures for the production of goods, food, and beverages. Official per capita income statistics, therefore, are "artificial," because the goods and remittances that Cape Verdeans abroad send home increase their families' standard of living.

Foreign exchange remittances increased six-fold between 1976 and 1983, reaching a record 2.8 million contos (1 conto = \$12). The explanation for this phenomenon, unique among the former Portuguese colonies, goes beyond Cape Verdeans' "deep-rooted love for their country." Other causes include the government's moderate policies regarding private property and the private sector, particularly in the marketing and retail sale of consumer goods; agricultural reform which permits emigrants to own land; and respect for religious freedom—all contributing to a stable political and economic environment. No doubt this is one reason why exiled opposition groups have failed to marshal support in the emigrant communities

against the "Marxist and totalitarian government" of Aristides Pereira and Pedro Pires.

Along with emigrant remittances, foreign aid is another pillar of the economy. Ninety percent of investment depends on external credits, a proportion that analysts predict will continue into the future. Ironically, Cape Verde's debt is very small—less than 10 percent of export earnings and 5 percent of the gross national product in 1985. Two explanations have been proposed: rigorous management of loans and direct introduction of grants from the international community into the internal market. Sales taxes are controlled by a national development fund which invests in agriculture and transportation, two vital sectors in an island country like Cape Verde.

In June 1982, the principal donor countries and organizations—the Netherlands, Sweden, France, West Germany, United States, EEC, UNDP, and UNICEF, among others—pledged \$350 million to the first National Development Plan (1982-85). As was the case in a similar program for Guinea-Bissau, the socialist countries did not participate, instead providing technical assistance and equipment for the armed forces and police.

Cape Verde's extension of landing rights at Sal airport to South African planes and its repeated denial of port facilities to the Soviet navy exemplify its pragmatic foreign policy. Since 1979, the Praia government has played an important role in mediating the conflict in southern African, providing the venue for high-level meetings between the U.S., Angola, and South Africa.

Its strategic location provides the archipelago with an important source of foreign exchange through the export of goods and services. Sal international airport handles 20 percent of the country's total exports. By building the São Vicente port and shipyard, which offers complete facilities—refrigeration and ship repair units, water, fuel, and food supplies—Cape Verde hopes to compete with the ports of the Canary Islands and Dakar in serving merchant vessels and fishing boats from all over the world.

In the early 1980s, the government devised a plan in order to further orient

the Cape Verdean economy toward external markets. Over the next 20 years, it aims to export about half its agricultural and sea food products, two-thirds of its industrial products, and nearly all services. Analysts believe the country has exceptional potential for solar and wind energy. Its rich coastline offers great possibilities for the development of the fishing industry. Currently, fishing is a very underdeveloped sector of the Cape Verdean economy, with an annual catch only 20 percent of an estimated 40,000 tons potential.

In spite of recurring drought, only one-third of potential water resources are utilized. Only 14 percent of arable land has been cultivated and the present 2,000 hectares under irrigation could be doubled. Agriculture, Cape Verde's most important economic sector, employs two-thirds of the population. In the second development plan, priority will be given to agriculture, fishing, and improved management of human resources—technical and scientific training in particular.

At the political level, the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV)—the only organized political force—retains absolute control of state power. However, analysts note a climate of political and ideological tolerance. Although the government is not moving toward a multi-party democracy, the ruling class is not opposed to pluralism, unlike other one-party systems.

There are no known political prisoners, nor any reported cases of opponents forced to flee the country. The

established opposition figures lead a normal life. And contrary to the situation in other African countries, it is possible to criticize the government without fearing "eavesdropping."

As Aristides Pereira prepares to begin his third term as president of the Republic—having postponed his resignation for another five years—it is likely that direct municipal elections will be held. It is also possible that by the end of this year, independents will be sitting side by side with PAICV leaders and militants as delegates to the third congress of the People's National Assembly.

As a Portuguese journalist with many years of experience in Africa wrote in his commentary on Cape Verde's 10 years of independence, "This country will achieve what none other has—the present generation of leaders is planning its own replacement."

Traveling along the roads of Santiago, from Praia to Tarrafal (Salazar's concentration camp which has now been transformed into a tourist attraction), the prevailing image is far different from that of ten years ago. In a landscape of stones and sand, peasants are building mountain terraces and sowing maize and bean seeds—a ritual repeated every planting season before the rains come.

"We stand there, stubborn/in a challenge to the gods and to men/And we are not afraid of the long drought any more/because we have discovered the origin of all that there is."

"Cape Verde," another leading poet wrote, "is determined to make its own rain fall." □



Volcano on the island of Fogo: "A lunar landscape with rocks and land scorched by the sun and a constant wind sweeping the dust in an interminable swirl"

Ron Barboza

The Lusophone Oil Boom

Despite the soft world market for petroleum and an economy burdened by war-time expenditures, Angola has surged ahead of Gabon to become sub-Saharan Africa's second largest oil producer. Currently attracting interest in Western oil industry circles, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau are likewise poised to enter the African oil producers' league.

BY HOWARD SCHISSEL

When the former Portuguese colonies won their independence in the mid-1970s, Angola was the only one that belonged to the African oil producers' league. A decade later, while this situation has not changed, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau have made sustained efforts to attract Western oil groups and both favor an increase in the level of exploration work, especially in the offshore areas.

In industry circles, prospects for discovering commercially viable oil and natural gas deposits in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau are generally considered good to excellent. During the next two years, the results of the first systematic wave of post-independence oil prospecting should be available for Mozambique, although the precise nature of Guinea-Bissau's hydrocarbon potential probably will not be known until the end of the 1980s. During the second half of the 1980s, Angola should confirm its position as sub-Saharan Africa's second largest oil producer, behind only Nigeria.

Angola surged ahead of Gabon to occupy the second slot among sub-Saharan oil producers at the end of 1983,

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and has increased its lead since then. It should have no trouble retaining its position, as several important new deposits are scheduled to be brought on stream in the next few years. Angola's performance is all the more remarkable, coming at a time when most African and Third World producers have faced serious problems due to the soft market outlook for crude oil. With other producers cutting back, Angola has managed to expand its output through pragmatic marketing policies and flexibility in its working relationship with major American and European oil companies.

Angola's first oil well was drilled near Luanda in 1915, and its first commercial discovery was made in 1955. It was not until Gulf Oil—recently taken over by Chevron—started prospecting off Cabinda in 1962 that the full extent of the nation's hydrocarbon resources began to emerge.

On the eve of independence in 1974, Angola was already an important oil producer with an annual output of 8.7 million tons. With the disruption caused by the civil war and problems between Washington and the newly-emergent MPLA government in Luanda, output from the oil industry plummeted to 4.7 million tons in 1975. For a while, Gulf Oil even paid royalties to an escrow account instead of to the MPLA authorities. When it became evident that the MPLA

had emerged victorious over the South African-backed UNITA and Western-supported FNLA, Gulf worked out a modus vivendi with the late President Neto's government.

It took several years, however, to reorganize the Angolan oil industry and attract enough new investment to boost output, and it was not until 1983 that the 1974 production levels were surpassed. Gulf Oil, in partnership with the Angolan state oil concern, Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola (Sonangol), in the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (Cabgoc), produces 77 percent of Angolan oil.

The U.S. attitude toward Angola has been especially ambiguous vis-à-vis the oil industry. While Congress has repealed the Clark Amendment and the Reagan administration is expected to recommence covert assistance to UNITA, the Export-Import Bank has been funding Gulf's Cabinda expansion scheme. Likewise, American banks have greatly increased their exposure in the Angolan hydrocarbon sector. Several new American oil firms are knocking on the door to pick up offshore exploration acreage, and Cabgoc plans to focus its search for oil on new, deeper zones on the Cabinda continental plateau.

Angola's mainly offshore oil boom is poised to gain new momentum over the

next five years as plans to expand exploration and raise production come to fruition. Output in 1985 should top 11 million tons for the first time, up by around 10 percent from the previous year. Initial projections peg Angola's oil production in 1986 at around 13 million tons. If all goes well, Angola could be producing up to 25 million tons a year by the end of the present decade.

Since a large portion of the country's offshore area has yet to be systematically explored with modern techniques, Angola's oil potential is likely to be much greater than currently anticipated. Reserves are estimated at 252 million tons, or 3.2 percent of Africa's known oil reserves in 1984. However, industry sources reckon that Angola's real oil potential is substantially higher. Indeed, John Silcox, chairman of Chevron Overseas Petroleum, announced last year that Angola could have the greatest undiscovered potential of any West or Central African state, and the most likely zones are the deeper parts of the country's offshore territory.


Oil revenues are essential to Angola's financial well-being. Oil export earnings are presently providing Luanda with about \$2 billion a year, which could double by the end of the 1980s. Not only does this provide President José Eduardo dos Santos' government with funds to finance the import of basic foodstuffs and consumer goods, it is also crucial to Angola's ability to pursue the war against South Africa and UNITA. It is no wonder then that a South African commando unit attempted to attack oil installations in Cabinda last year. Previously, sabotage took place at the Luanda oil refinery.

Over 77 percent of Angola's oil output was produced from the Cabinda enclave in 1984. This percentage should decline slightly during the next few years as new deposits are brought on stream south of the Zaire River. However, Cabgoc operations will remain the lynchpin of Angola's oil activities for the foreseeable future. Last summer, a \$350 million package was signed to finance the development of the giant new Takula offshore field. In total, Chevron expects to spend at least \$600 million in Cabinda between 1986 and 1990, and a new exploration program will report-

edly extend prospection to deeper zones offshore. The main producing areas are at depths of between 40 and 200 feet, but now attention is to be focused on zones as deep as 700 feet. This acreage is known as the Cabinda B area, located in the southern part of the block. Chevron also appears to be interested in acreage south of the Zaire River.

troleos do Portugal, and two Yugoslav firms—Nafta-plin and Nafta-gas—to abandon the acreage.

Just to the south, Texaco and its associates, Total-CFP, Sonangol, and Petrobras, are pleased after highly successful drilling operations over the past 18 months. Two important oil fields were uncovered at Lombo Este and Tu-



Oil rig at Cabinda: "Angola's mainly offshore oil boom is poised to gain new momentum over the next five years"

Margaret A. Novicki

If groups headed by the French state oil company, Elf Aquitaine, and Texaco have chalked up promising results for the area south of the Zaire River, other consortia led by Italy's Agip, France's second national oil firm, Compagnie Française des Petroles (Total-CFP), and a tandem of Cities Service and Marathon Oil have had much less luck. Agip has spent over \$100 million on the 4,000 square kilometer offshore Block 1 without encountering any commercially viable oil deposits. Three of the initial 10 wildcats have hit small pockets of oil. These inconclusive results could lead Agip and its partners, Elf Aquitaine, Pe-

barao, in an offshore area not previously thought to hold much promise. Lombo Este should enter into production this year and Tubarao in 1987. By 1987-88, this will boost output from Block 2's three small producing fields to between 4 and 5 million tons a year. Additional exploration is planned by Texaco. The first results from drilling on a block by Brazil's Petrobras Internacional appear to be promising, too.

The most exciting news from the Angolan oil industry over the past few years has come from Elf's Block 3, in which it is associated with Mobil Oil, Agip, and the two Yugoslav concerns.

Since exploration drilling was initiated in mid-1981, seven out of 15 Elf wildcats struck what are considered to be economically viable hydrocarbon deposits. In early 1985, output began from the Palanca field, followed at the end of the year by Pacassa. A third small field, Bufalo, will enter production in 1987. At this point, Block 3 could be producing between 4 and 5 million tons a year. A recent discovery, Impala South-East, could emerge as a fourth producing field by the end of the decade. Another recent find, Impala North, could also be commercial. Two other Elf discoveries, Punja and Bufalo North, are reported to contain still undisclosed amounts of non-associated gas. In all, Elf's output from Block 3 could climb as high as 10 million tons by 1990.

Exploration on Block 4 under the auspices of a joint venture company, *Entreprise de Services Petroliers de Angola (ESPA)*, struck oil with its first exploration well. It is not known if the find is of commercial value. Another eight wildcats are programmed for the next two

years. Along with Petrobras, ESPA partners include Belgium's Petrofina, Sonangol, and British Petroleum. Sonangol is scheduled to take over the operation of this block when it has sufficient trained personnel.

After spending over \$50 million on Block 6 off Luanda, a consortium headed by Total-CFP and including West Germany's Deminex and Union Texas Oil, handed back the permit in 1984. Four dry wells and a non-commercial one were drilled on the acreage. Cities Service and Marathon spent close to \$80 million for exploration on Block 9, off the town of Sumbe, before it was relinquished in 1984. This is the farthest south that exploration has been carried out on the Angolan continental plateau.

Other blocks have been delineated on the southern offshore portion of the country, where the continental shelf significantly narrows. Industry sources believe that only when security can be guaranteed in this region, which is close to the border with Namibia, will the Angolan government open it up to explora-

tion. In the meantime, attention has been focused on blocks further north. After intense rivalry, the Wilmington-based Continental Oil Company (Conoco) was granted rights to the promising Block 5, in association with several other American and European groups. Nor has Block 8 been ignored by Western oil companies. Angola is expected to select an operator for this attractive acreage early in 1986.

As in Angola, oil exploration began in Mozambique at the beginning of the century. Unlike Angola, however, no commercial finds were made in Mozambican territory. By the mid-1970s, 58 wells had been drilled—42 onshore and 16 offshore—without any recorded commercial discoveries. Most of the drilling was concentrated in the Zambesi delta, between Quelimane and Inhambane, but only the Pande non-associated gas field was uncovered. Found to be commercially nonviable, it was abandoned at the time. At independence in 1975, all exploration activities ground to a halt. It was not until 1980 that Presi-

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dent Samora Machel's government was able to formulate a new comprehensive oil investment code and establish a state hydrocarbon unit, Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH), to act as the partner for Western oil groups seeking to launch oil exploration operations.


Several consulting firms reassessed past seismic and drilling data utilizing more modern methods and fresh information in the early 1980s. The new information packages showed a higher oil potential than was previously believed to exist, particularly the presence of geological structures resembling certain areas of the North Sea and eastern Brazil. Mozambique's entire continental plateau, up to a depth of 450 feet, was divided into 17 blocks and put up for bidding. The northern onshore Rovuma basin was also made available for exploration. Although Mozambique began exploration at a time of uncertainties in the world oil market, it attracted considerable interest in industry circles.

In 1983, Exxon and Royal Dutch Shell, two of the largest oil companies in the world, acquired rights to the 3.2 million-acre onshore Rovuma basin on the Tanzanian border. After initial seismic work, this consortium must drill a wildcat by May 1986. The signing of the agreement spurred other Western oil concerns interested in Mozambique. At the end of 1984, the Chicago-based Amoco Corporation signed the first agreement for offshore acreage, acquiring blocks M4 and M8 in the Zambesi delta between Quelimane and Beira. Amoco will have to relinquish two of its four permits by the end of 1986, as Mozambican authorities do not want any one company to control too much acreage. If seismic work is encouraging, Amoco intends to carry out drilling before the end of its contractual obligations in 1987. British Petroleum is conducting seismic studies in 1985 and 1986, with a decision to drill likely if the data is positive.

As in most other development matters, Guinea-Bissau's oil potential received less attention from the Portuguese than did the hydrocarbon resources of Angola or Mozambique. Exploration in this West African state did not begin until the mid-1950s. In 1958, Esso was granted exclusive rights to all the onshore areas and the

shallow part of the continental plateau. During the first phase of prospection, Esso drilled four dry onshore wells. This was followed by six offshore wildcats between 1966 and 1973. All the offshore wells reported hydrocarbon shows, with the PGO-3 well, off the Bijagos islands, the most favorable. Esso abandoned its rights to Guinea-Bissau

Conakry. A similar imbroglio pits Guinea-Bissau against Senegal. At the end of 1984, the two countries almost came to blows when Guinean jets threatened a Canadian drillship operating for the Senegalese in disputed waters. The question of a mutually acceptable maritime frontier between the two states was submitted to a special arbi-



Margaret A. Novick

Luanda Port: "Oil exports are presently providing Luanda with about \$2 billion a year"

acreage in 1975 and exploration work dried up.

In 1983, after a reassessment of past data and new offshore seismic studies, the Bissau government proposed six offshore blocks to interested companies. At the time, only Elf Aquitaine picked up two offshore permits in association with the Guinean state firm, Petrominas, British Petroleum, Texaco, and West Germany's Wintershall. A dry wildcat was spudded in mid-1984, and Elf has been studying the results of the well since then.

Border disputes with Guinea-Conakry to the south and Senegal to the north have delayed exploration on Guinea-Bissau's continental shelf. The dispute between the two Guineas, stemming from differing interpretations of colonial treaties between France and Portugal, was submitted to the International Court of Justice. Last year, the court granted most of the area off Boe, judged to be of high promise, to Guinea-

tration committee in Geneva, whose ruling both governments have agreed to respect. A judgment is expected in early 1986.

Now that these sensitive maritime boundary matters are in the process of settlement, Guinea-Bissau again opened bidding for offshore acreage to Western firms at the end of 1985. Interest was reportedly high at conferences in October attended by over 100 oil companies in London and Houston. As a sweetener, President João Bernardo Vieira's government amended the 1982 petroleum code which automatically grants Petrominas 51 percent equity in joint ventures with foreign companies. Now the percentage of participation by the state company is open to negotiation between the government and the companies concerned. Authorities in Bissau hope to sign up companies for several permits during the first half of 1986 and get exploration work into high gear by the end of the 1980s. □

Burkina Faso at the Eye of a West African Storm

With its rigorous campaign against corruption in francophone West Africa's regional organizations, Captain Thomas Sankara's revolutionary government has found itself at the center of disputes—the latest of which has rekindled the Mali-Burkina border war—with its more conservative neighbors.

BY HOWARD FRENCH

The level of tensions between West African states has sharply increased in recent months. While the regional enmities created by Nigeria's expulsion of large numbers of illegal immigrants have received wide coverage and to a large extent merely served to fuel the recurrent discord between the region's anglophone and francophone states, the latest twist in West African diplomacy involves recriminations among francophone members of the once closely knit Conseil de l'Entente and Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO).

Curiously, one state, Burkina Faso, finds itself involved in nearly all of the region's intra-francophone squabbles. Basile Guissou, Burkina Faso's foreign minister, explaining his country's disputes with its francophone neighbors, said, "Each of them feels that as long as insecurity reigns here, security will be assured in their countries," whereas a Western diplomat in Ouagadougou said,

Howard French is a freelance journalist living in West Africa, writing for the Washington Post and The Economist publications.



Capt. Thomas Sankara: "A crusade to clean up corruption in the CEAO"

"Burkina Faso's difficulties with its neighbors can be attributed to differences of 'style' and ideological options." Presently, Burkina's most acute dip-

lomatic crisis is with Mali, its large and poor neighbor to the north and west. A territorial dispute has opposed the two countries since their military confrontation during the height of the Sahelian drought of the 1970s.

With the advent of the Sankara government in August 1983, Burkina Faso—then known as Upper Volta—immediately established contacts with Mali with the aim of settling the border dispute. Following Capt. Sankara's September 1983 visit to the Malian capital, Bamako, the two states agreed to refer the border delineation problem to the International Court of Justice at the Hague.

After the promising start in relations between Sankara and Malian President Moussa Traoré, relations have soured considerably, with the CEAO serving as the backdrop to their increasingly tense dispute.

Christmas 1985, the two countries were once again engaged in military confrontation, and seemed likely to relive their 1974 war over the Agacher region, which is reputed to be rich in titanium, uranium, and natural gas, and boasts large cattle herds. With widely

divergent explanations emanating from each capital, it would seem that the latest confrontation was sparked when Burkinabe census takers attempted to count inhabitants of four villages in the disputed region.

In an interview with *Africa Report*, Guissou said, "We first noticed Mali's insincere intentions when in 1984, Ivory Coast arranged to have Burkina's turn in the rotation for the presidency of the CEAO skipped in favor of Mali." He added, "Mali made no attempt to explain its acceptance of the CEAO presidency out of turn, despite the fact that we had recently lifted the veto over their membership in the West African Monetary Union [UOAA] as a sign of good will."

In 1985, Burkina finally assumed the presidency of the CEAO, which is headquartered in Ouagadougou. Shortly afterwards, Sankara launched a crusade to clean up corruption in the regional economic body.

One of the major alleged culprits in the CEAO's murky business dealings was former Ivorian government minister, Mohammed Diawara, who is of Malian extraction. In a major coup, Sankara arranged to have Diawara arrested while attending a summit meeting in Bamako and brought to Ouagadougou for trial. Diawara is accused of having organized the embezzlement of CFA 6 billion of the CEAO's development funds.

The Sankara government's puritanical drive against corruption and financial abuses was justified by Burkina's Minister of Financial Resources Justin Damo Baro, who said, "In our countries, one need not travel far outside of the capital to find desolate scenes of misery. Under these conditions, we can't tolerate the creation of small, privileged classes, or of corruption in our institutions."

This difference in "style" and the fundamental divergence in ideological direction between the eclectically progressive Ouagadougou government and its arch-conservative francophone neighbors has made Burkina's handling of the CEAO corruption trials as sensitive as an exposed nerve for the organization's other members.


As the investigation into CEAO financial misdoings drew to a close in late 1985—when Burkina's presidency of the organization was also to have ended—sensational coverage in the

French language press on Africa fed tensions with rumors that members of the political elite in both Mali and Ivory Coast were implicated. *Jeune Afrique* has variously reported that the other heads of state would boycott a Sankara-presided annual summit, and that Burkina Faso had agreed to allow the next summit to take place in either Dakar or Abidjan.

Sankara has refused to give any details on the date or the location of the next summit, but maintains that trials will be held and that he will remain president of the organization until a summit is organized. Tensions with Mali have risen sharply following press reports

that Traoré's wife made use of some of the CEAO's missing funds, and populations on both sides of the long common border are said to fear a renewed outbreak of hostilities. Ivorian authorities have limited their comments to suggesting that "Sankara is manipulating the Diawara affair for political ends."

In an ominous interview prior to the Christmas outbreak of hostilities, in which 30 people have reportedly been killed, Basile Guissou complained of Malian policemen "harassing villagers and collecting bribes from Burkinabe" in the disputed region. Guissou said, "All we need is an act of provocation and we won't be stopped from marching on Ba-



Villagers in Bombore: "One need not travel far outside our capitals to find desolate scenes"

Margaret A. Novick

mako if necessary. We have no doubts about our potential for mobilization."

An indiscreet interview with a *Jeune Afrique* reporter, in which he criticized Burkina Faso for imposing its revolutionary mores on international civil servants, led to the unprecedented expulsion of the CEAO secretary-general, Malian Drissa Keita, further poisoning bilateral ties. Blaise Compaoré, the Ouagadougou government's number-two figure, echoed the sentiments of many Burkinabe officials, saying, "We don't have any relations with Mali at present. That ties haven't been broken officially is a mere formality."

The region's oldest international organization, the Entente Council, has served as the forum for the degradation of Burkina's ties with its two southern neighbors, Ivory Coast and Togo, on whose ports the landlocked country is most dependent.

Early in 1985, a bomb exploded in the hotel suite reserved for Sankara hours before his arrival in the Ivorian capital, Yamoussoukro, for an Entente Council summit. The explosion, for which an official explanation has never been given, was followed by the assassination of a prominent Burkinabe businessman residing in Ivory Coast (thought to have

furthermore, its members had repeatedly failed to condemn "multiform attempts of sabotage and destabilization" against Burkina Faso.

Noting that Togo had slandered Ghana by implying Ghanaian involvement in recent bombings in Lomé, Burkina's foreign minister said: "Only by speaking out and refusing to be intimidated have we escaped similar accusations."

Burkina's ties with its francophone neighbors to the south are highly sensitive because of the country's overwhelming dependence on their infrastructure for its external trade and on the remittances of Burkinabe workers—mainly in Ivory Coast.

While officials admit that Ivory Coast could "strangle" Burkina by shutting down the vital Abidjan-Niger railroad, whose operating deficits are largely supported by Abidjan, they point out that Ivorian aggression would be a risky proposition.

Minister of Financial Resources Baro said, "Remittances of CFA 7-10 billion per year from Burkinabe in Ivory Coast make the difference between a budget deficit and surplus for us." However, added Guissou, "The attitudes of 2 million Burkinabe residing in Ivory Coast would make serious hostilities dangerous for the Ivorians."

At any rate, officials on both sides of the crucial Ivorian-Burkinabe border say that things are far from that point, and both try to downplay their differences. Capt. Compaoré, who is married to an Ivorian, said, "We understand each other. I speak every week with the Ivorians." Ivorian Minister of State Seri Gnoleba added, "We all know there can be no Ivory Coast without Burkina Faso, and no Burkina Faso without Ivory Coast."

Nevertheless, Burkina's uncompromising attitudes on corruption and its "disruption" of the staid diplomatic decorum that has so long prevailed in "Houphouët-Boigny's West Africa" are sure to continue to make life interesting for the entire region. As Sankara told this reporter, "While it is true that there can be no barriers between the youth of the region, our regimes will never agree as long as there are people in power who fatten themselves on the backs of the masses." □



Margaret A. Novicki

Children at agricultural fair in Bobo-Dioulasso: "While there can be no barriers between the youth of the region, our regimes will never agree as long as there are those who fatten themselves on the backs of the masses"

After having remarked that "the Malian people are in need of revolution," and "the Burkinabe revolution is at their disposal," Sankara's comments on the CEAO scandal have become more nuanced. He told this reporter, "I have been deliberately misinterpreted. When we lifted our veto on Mali's membership in UMOA without asking for anything in return, that was an example of the Burkinabe revolution at the service of the Malian people."

links with the Burkinabe opposition), and further explosions at a military depot in Ouagadougou.

Attending a hastily arranged one-day summit of the Entente Council—again in Yamoussoukro—on September 10, Sankara abstained from signing a final communiqué condemning "attempts to destabilize" Togo and Niger. In a rebuff to his presidential peers, Sankara complained that the Entente Council does not have a security component, and that

UPDATE

Black workers draw battle plans to challenge Botha

The largest trade union federation in South Africa's history was launched in early December—a major new force on the labor scene that could play a leading role in the struggle against apartheid. Formed only six years after black trade unionism was legalized, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) adopted an overtly political approach reflecting the recent growth in militancy among black workers.

The new federation is the product of more than four years of complex "unity talks," and represents a merger between well-organized factory-based unions and the more politically oriented unions with community roots. Cosatu, which has member unions in the mining, motor, transportation, and textile industries, includes affiliates of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu), the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), and several unions linked to the United Democratic Front (UDF).

The newly-elected president of the "super federation," Elijah Barayi, stressed at the inaugural rally in Durban, attended by 10,000 cheering supporters, that Cosatu's main function would be to "organize and educate the black masses—not just on wage and bread-and-butter issues but on broader political issues too." Barayi called on P.W. Botha to resign as president of a government composed of "criminals and drunkards" and to "make way for the real leader of the people, Nelson Mandela," the imprisoned leader of the African National Congress (ANC).

As spokesperson for Cosatu, which claims a membership of 500,000 industrial and commercial workers in 34 multiracial but black-dominated trade unions, Barayi gave an ultimatum to the government to abolish the notorious pass laws within six months, or face a call to "burn all the passes of the

black man." A similar campaign of civil disobedience and pass burning in the early 1960s led to the Sharpeville massacre and Mandela's sentence of life imprisonment.

In delivering Cosatu's first policy statement at the rally, Barayi added that the government should immediately lift the state of emergency, withdraw its troops from the segregated black townships, abandon the policy of separate tribal "homelands" for blacks, release all political detainees, and legislate equal pay for black women.

On the shop floor, one of Cosatu's main objectives will be to forge industry-wide unions, merging separate unions that presently undermine black bargaining power by competing against each other in the same industry. Reducing the ex-

isting 34 unions to about 14 will be one of Cosatu's major challenges.

Ultimately, "Cosatu is going to govern this country," said Barayi. "Cosatu will nationalize the mines under the government. And even some of the big industries will be taken over by the government of Cosatu." In the meantime, he said, the federation fully supports disinvestment and deplores the stand taken by the U.S. and British government against the campaign. "They tell us they are against disinvestment because the black people would starve, but black people have been starving here since the first white settlers arrived in 1652."

Barayi also publicly challenged Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of KwaZulu, who has cam-

Continued on next page

CIA gets green light to oust Qaddafi

President Reagan has authorized the CIA to launch a covert operation to topple the Libyan government of Col. Muammar Qaddafi, according to a front-page report in *The Washington Post*.

The leak, which aroused concern on Capitol Hill, revealed that last fall, the President approved a plan designed primarily to "disrupt, preempt and frustrate Qaddafi's subversive and terrorist plans," and to "lure him into some foreign adventure or terrorist exploit that would give a growing number of Qaddafi opponents in the Libyan military a chance to seize power."

A key purpose of the alleged U.S. plan is to force the Libyan leader into a military trial of strength in Chad. CIA support for President Hissène Habré is apparently being stepped up to drive Libyan troops from the north of the country in hopes that Qaddafi will over-extend his forces, creating the climate for a coup in Tripoli.

The Reagan administration's new hard line follows increasing frustra-

tion over the failure of nearly five years of economic sanctions to destabilize the Qaddafi government. More specifically, the fall of Sudanese President Gaafar al-Nimeiry—a staunch opponent of the Libyan leader—has spurred the U.S. to play a more interventionist role in the region. The friendly relations that Qaddafi cemented with the new government of Maj.-Gen. Abdul Rahman Sawar-Dahab shot a hole through the U.S. trade blockade strategy.

The Libyan leader called the CIA plan "more scandalous than Watergate" and said it demonstrated the failure of the Reagan administration's policy, which he described as "open blackmail and muscular thuggery." At a news conference, he said that the operation could only be interpreted as an assassination plot against him, "because I have no authority to be toppled. I am not a president or prime minister," adding, "It can only mean physical liquidation. I think this is a serious vio-

Continued on next page

Qaddafi. . . continued

lation of the law perpetrated by the American president, and I think he should be tried according to American law."

In response to *The Washington Post* disclosure in early November, hundreds of Libyans took to the streets in Tripoli and other towns and villages to demonstrate against the CIA plot and U.S. interference. Stores and offices closed for a day as crowds burned Reagan in effigy along with several American flags.

The Reagan administration refused to confirm or deny the existence of the operation but the White House announced that it would investigate the security leak, as Reagan was "very concerned over the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and classified information." A U.S. official pointed out, however, that although the revelation was damaging, Qaddafi probably already assumed the U.S. was engaged in such activity. "We went ahead with the world's most open covert operation against Nicaragua," he said. "I would not assume that the opponents of this can kill it with leaks."

Although narrow majorities on the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence, which are responsible for monitoring undercover operations, have supported the plot, several members including Sens. David Durenberger (R-MN) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT) have expressed concern that the CIA effort may lead to an attempt against Qaddafi's life. Covert activities to overthrow a foreign government are allowed under U.S. law, but a presidential executive order signed by Reagan himself expressly forbids the CIA from sponsoring assassinations.

Secretary of State George Shultz and CIA Director William Casey have reportedly backed the operation, allegedly not to eliminate Qaddafi but to combat terrorism, which they claim the Libyan leader sponsors in more than a dozen countries around the world. As Shultz told his staff last year, "We have to put Qaddafi in a box and close the lid." ■

Black workers. . . continued

paigned actively against sanctions. "Instead of giving money to the pensioners and the poor, the puppet leaders of the bantustans fly around the world saying blacks will suffer. There is nothing more tragic than a man who believes he is a leader while he is a slave."

Although Cosatu's formation has marked a major step toward unity among organized black workers, it has also brought into focus existing political divisions. In particular, Cosatu's commitment to a policy of non-racialism became a major stumbling block in its attempt to es-

tablish a united labor movement.

Two important union groups dedicated to the principles of black consciousness, the Council of Unions of South Africa (Cusa) and the Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (Azactu), refused to join the new umbrella organization because of this policy. Between them they claim a paid membership of more than 220,000 and constitute the nucleus for a potential rival labor federation. Nevertheless, Cosatu's launching will undoubtedly give a considerable boost to the trade unions and political movements subscribing to non-racialism as they compete for the allegiance of workers on the shop floor. ■

WESTERN AFRICA

US, Ghana swap spies, expel diplomats

An unusual spy exchange and a mutual expulsion of diplomats wrapped up the espionage case that had unraveled CIA operations in Ghana last July.

The U.S. agreed to swap Michael Soussoudis, Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings's cousin who had been sentenced to 20 years in prison for espionage, for eight Ghanaians employed by the CIA. Such exchanges rarely involve individuals of the same nationality on both sides of the deal. It was also said to be the first swap of spies between the U.S. and a Third World country.

Soussoudis, whose sentence was dropped on condition that he leave the U.S. immediately and forfeit his status as a permanent resident alien, returned to Accra to a hero's welcome in late November. His attorneys had argued that his case should be dismissed because a foreigner cannot be prosecuted for criminal acts committed outside the U.S. However, a federal judge ruled in early October that crimes committed in other countries are covered under the Espionage Act.

The Ghanaian CIA employees, who were taken with their families via Togo to West Germany and ultimately to the U.S., were not the high-level government officials who had been suspected. The group included Stephen Oforu-Addo, a

former chief superintendent of police; Robert Yaw Appiah, a communications technician; Theodore Atiedu, an inspector; and Felix Peasah, a former Special Branch employee.

All four had been convicted of espionage offenses, stripped of their Ghanaian citizenship, and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 22 years to life as a result of their CIA involvement. The identities of the other four were not revealed, but there was speculation that they had denied any CIA connection and refused to leave the country.

The key figure in the case—American CIA employee Sharon Scranage—was sentenced to five years in prison followed by two years of probation and 1,000 hours of community service. Judge Richard Williams said that hers was a light sentence in view of evidence that the CIA "may have been loose" in its Ghanaian operations. Scranage's lawyers said the CIA knew that Ghanaian intelligence had targeted her as a potential information source but had failed to warn her.

A few days after the spy exchange, Ghana expelled four U.S. diplomats who were accused of being CIA agents. The U.S. retaliated with the expulsion of four employees of the Ghanaian embassy in

Washington. As a result of the expulsion, the U.S. suspended talks concerning a \$5.1 million increase for Ghana in the Commodity Import Program and decided against a P.L. 480 Title I program increase for Ghana—which had been discussed at a meeting of the World Bank consultative group for Ghana in November.

The spy case, which allegedly undermined CIA operations in several other West African nations, was one in a series of revelations in recent months that have elicited strong criticism of the CIA and its director, William Casey, from Congress, the White House, and the public. Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT), vice-chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said that the series of spy embarrassments has taken a toll on morale at the agency. Critics also predicted that CIA recruitment of Africans and other foreign nationals would become far more difficult. ■

GHANA

Gun-runners nabbed

U.S. customs agents arrested three Ghanaians at Newark International Airport in early December for conspiring to purchase \$250,000 worth of weapons, including missiles and anti-aircraft guns, to arm a 100-man dissident army in Ghana.

The three, who were arraigned in federal court on charges of conspiracy and violating the Arms Export Act, are Joseph Henry Mensah of London, John Andres Boateng of Brooklyn, New York, and Kwasi John Baidoo of Rockaway Township, New Jersey. Boateng and Baidoo are U.S. resident aliens.

Mensah, who was finance minister under the Busia government, is chairman of the Ghana Democratic Movement (GDM), a group of exiled opponents of the government of Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings. A special agent said that the weapons were apparently destined for the GDM.

In August, the GDM produced a document entitled, "Ghana After Rawlings: The Democratic Alternative," in which Mensah discussed his opposition to the Rawlings government and the question of how to

achieve the GDM plan for a "new democratic Ghana." He concluded that if force were to be considered as a means to overcome Rawlings, then it would have to be mobilized and deployed inside Ghana.

Most of the coup attempts against Rawlings have, however, been organized in neighboring countries. In 1984, the government claimed to have concrete evidence that dissidents who had infiltrated Ghana and attempted a coup had been trained and armed in Togo and Ivory Coast. Relations between Ghana and Togo have since deteriorated further, with Togo blaming the Ghanaian government for bomb explosions in Lomé, and Ghana accusing Togolese police of unauthorized entry into the country to arrest Ghanaians and of abusing the freedom of Ghanaians living in Togo. ■

GUINEA

More of the same?

Former Prime Minister Diarra Traoré and several prominent members of Ahmed Sekou Touré's regime were reportedly shot in the aftermath of last year's aborted coup. According to recent allegations in *Jeune Afrique*, a total of 20 detainees were executed without trial last July, 1985, shortly after Traoré failed in his attempt to overthrow the government of President Lansana Conté.

Traoré and his supporters, who had gained control of Conakry radio station while Conté was attending the Economic Community of West African States summit in Lomé, apparently intended to reinstate officials from the Touré era still in detention. When the putsch failed, a number of detainees were allegedly taken from the main prison at Kindia in a police van and according to local villagers, shot by soldiers.

Those said to have been executed include Moussa Diakité, former minister of housing who was apparently designated as the new head of state; Ismaël Touré, former minister of mines and brother of the late president; and Siaka Touré, commandant of the infamous Camp Boiro where thousands of prisoners lost their lives. Some of the remain-

ing detainees were later reported to have been transferred from Kindia, but their whereabouts remain unknown.

In an interview in early November, Foreign Affairs Minister Faccine Touré categorically denied that there had been any executions and asserted that members of the Touré clan were being detained in "perfectly humane conditions." He said, "It will be up to the tribunal, at the appropriate time, to pass judgment on the case of each one." Yet the Conté government, which came to power proclaiming the need to restore human rights in the country, has failed to publicly refute the specific charges made in the foreign media. When pressed on this issue by Guinean journalists, Information Minister Mohamed Traoré refused "to confirm or deny" the executions. ■



Sekou Touré: Former colleagues executed?

Nevertheless, the Association for the Victims of Repression, a French humanitarian group that had provided medical treatment to more than 1,000 Guineans detained by Sekou Touré, announced that it was terminating its activities to protest the turn of events in the country. The organization said it had received "direct and indirect proof of new victims in Guinea," adding, "We cannot remain in Guinea to treat one type of victim while another is being created." ■

GUINEA-BISSAU

Vieira foils another coup

In early November, authorities unearthed and foiled a year-long plot by First Vice-President Paulo Correia to overthrow President João Bernardo Vieira, leading to the arrest of 50 people, including five high ranking military officials. João da Silva, secretary of state for culture and sports, who had been among those detained, was killed by prison guards shortly thereafter while allegedly trying to escape.

The coup attempt marks the fourth time that Vieira's authority has been challenged since he ousted President Luis Cabral in 1980. Vieira assumed power pledging to return the country to the policies of Amilcar Cabral, founder of the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), but since then the economy has noticeably deteriorated.

Correia and his supporters had been openly critical of the president's economic stabilization program involving widespread austerity measures. They had also urged the head of state to take a more pro-Western stance in foreign affairs, questioning in particular Vieira's close relations with Angola and Mozambique.

In the aftermath of the aborted coup, thousands of workers and party activists gathered in front of the Presidential Palace to demonstrate their unflinching support for Vieira and chanted slogans backing the government's decision to arrest Correia, who was described as a "divisionist." Vieira promised his supporters that all those detained in connection with the plot would be tried once the police have completed investigations. ■

IVORY COAST

"While the chief is alive"

Deflecting efforts to identify his successor, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny was sworn in for a sixth five-year term in early December, having been reelected with 100 percent of the vote five weeks earlier.

River blindness battle: A success story

A decade ago, thousands of people had deserted their homes on productive farmland along the river valleys of West Africa, fleeing from a debilitating disease known as onchocerciasis. Today, due to a massive international effort, 3 million children born since 1975 are free of the disease, while many people are recovering from it.

Onchocerciasis, commonly known as river blindness or oncho, is carried by a tiny parasitic worm which is passed to humans by the bite of the female blackfly. The victims often lose weight and become debilitated. In heavily infected persons, the result can be blindness.

Concerned by oncho's devastating implications for the development of West African river valleys, seven countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, and Togo—joined forces to fight the disease. Under the sponsorship of the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Onchocerciasis Control Program was established in 1974. Ten years later, in an effort to fully control the disease, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Sierra Leone were brought into the program. Nineteen donor countries and institutions provide financial support, including the United States.

At present, there is no adequate drug for treating river blindness. A drug called diethylcarbamazine citrate has been used, but its serious and sometimes fatal side effects preclude its adoption on a massive scale. Consequently, control consists of killing the larvae of the blackfly, which breeds in river rapids.

Due to the vastness of the area and inadequate access to the rivers, aerial insecticiding is the only feasible method of control. Biodegradable larvicides are used, which do not cause chemical build-up in the water nor damage to plant or animal life. The program sponsors have established an independent ecological group of internationally recognized experts which meets annually to monitor the insecticides' impact on the local environment. According to Dr. Abraham Samba, who directs the program from its headquarters in Ouagadougou, there is no transmission of the disease in over 90 percent of the area covered by the program.

Besides wiping out the disease, the program is facilitating resettlement of the river valleys. Both government-sponsored and spontaneous resettlements are increasing, primarily along the Black, White, and Red Rivers in Burkina Faso, as well as in Niger and Mali.

The program is only intended to last 20 years, but the donors have already agreed to provide assistance beyond that date so that the participating countries can continue surveillance and maintenance. In the coming decade, preparations must be made to transfer program activities to the national health service of each participating country. Samba notes optimistically, "By the year 2000, onchocerciasis will cease to be a public health problem and a block to socio-economic development."

—Ellen de Nesnera
—Ferney-Voltaire, France

While government officials proclaimed that the high voter turnout and unanimous reelection demonstrated the aging leader's immense popularity, some Ivoirians reportedly objected to the fact that the ballot did not offer space to record a vote against the president. Others said they had gone to the polls because they feared they would be un-

able to obtain official papers if they did not have documentation that they had voted.

Meanwhile, the recent constitutional change that provides for the National Assembly chairman to run the country temporarily in case of a vacancy in the presidential office has not silenced national debate over who will succeed the long-time

leader. In the parliamentary elections on November 20, the two major contenders for the top spot—Henri Konan Bédié and Philippe Yacé—both won reelection. Bédié, 51, was the most recent National Assembly chairman. Yacé, 63, who led the Assembly from 1960-1980, had fallen from favor but recently made a political comeback and was well-received at the congress of the Democratic Party of Ivory Coast (PDCI) in October. The new Assembly chairman—scheduled to be elected in December, will have a decided advantage in the succession struggle.

A number of those who won seats in the Assembly harbor hopes of competing for the presidential spot, even though Houphouët-Boigny considers the debate closed. More than 550 candidates contested the 175 seats in what was described as a relatively peaceful campaign, although approximately two-thirds of the delegates were voted out of office.

In a recent press conference, Houphouët-Boigny remarked that in his culture, "No one may know the identity (of a successor) while the chief is still alive. Ivory Coast has its own traditions, and the West should take us for what we are—not what you would have us be." ■

NIGERIA IMF talks terminated

In mid-December, Nigeria decided to break off negotiations with the International Monetary Fund, following several months of heated nationwide debate on whether to pursue a loan from the agency.

Shortly after seizing power in a coup last August, President Ibrahim Babangida called for public discussion of the matter, announcing that the final decision would be based on a national consensus.

Although key cabinet ministers favored the loan, strong opposition emerged from the press, trade unions, students, and the armed forces. Opponents focused on the IMF loan conditions including a 60 percent devaluation of the naira, a wage and salary freeze, an end to oil subsidies, and trade liberalization.

Nigerians, however, were sharply divided on the issue. Proponents insisted the loan agreement was needed to bring discipline to national economic management and to ease the considerable budget and trade deficits.

In a nationwide broadcast, Babangida told Nigerians that the challenge of restructuring the economy will have to be met through harsh austerity measures and public sacrifice. ■

SENEGAL PDS boots out dissenters

Faced with the most serious internal challenge to his authority as leader of the opposition Senegalese Democratic Party, Abdoulaye Wade announced in late October that three political bureau members had been expelled for creating a "party within the PDS."

The dissenters, led by PDS National Secretary for Orientation Serigne Diop, brought their criticisms of Wade's leadership to the fore in a public statement claiming that the party had "ceased to play the leading role in the struggle for democratization and the building of a better Senegal." As the main opposition to President Abdou Diouf's ruling Socialist Party, the PDS was losing its effectiveness, Diop argued, because it was "moving in two separate directions." Party militants, he proposed, should return the PDS to a "mass party of the people, one which could respond to their wishes for democracy."

Wade responded by accusing Diop and his supporters of "preparing to join the Diouf government" in a bid to sidestep the PDS in the run-up to the legislative elections. To justify the expulsions, Wade also charged the dissenters with receiving substantial financial backing from the ruling party, which intended to destabilize the PDS. Finally, Wade said it was thanks to the party's national slate that Diop had been elected to parliament and formally requested his removal from the National Assembly.

The expelled PDS members, however, refused to recognize the decision taken by the political bu-

reau because it had been "convened illegally" and in the absence of Farah Ndiaye, the party's second-in-command. They vowed instead to continue the battle within the PDS to reestablish its basic principles. ■

SIERRA LEONE Momoh to smash smuggling

On November 28, President Siaka Stevens handed over the reins of government to Maj.-Gen. Joseph Saidu Momoh, who had campaigned on promises to eradicate hoarding, smuggling, and black marketeering. Sierra Leoneans had greeted the pledges with unbridled enthusiasm, turning out in large numbers to elect him to the presidency in early October.



Stevens: Retaining influence

Since the mid-1970s, the country's economy has deteriorated, largely due to pervasive corruption and mismanagement. Most business and financial transactions now occur outside official channels, and almost all of Sierra Leone's considerable diamond and gold wealth is siphoned off to private interests.

"We have to smash this system," Momoh told his countrymen. "We know all the areas where black market activities take place. We shall constantly use the army and police to raid them." He promised to crack down on companies that fail to surrender their foreign exchange earnings and to create an anti-smuggling squad.

Momoh is also expected to prune

the unwieldy 48-member cabinet, perhaps by as much as 50 percent. Stevens had insisted that the large cabinet was necessary to maintain ethnic political balance in the country.

In addition, Momoh has indicated his willingness to implement reforms recommended by the International Monetary Fund, which has suspended all dealings with the country pending drastic action to crack down on the black market and concrete efforts to proceed with repayment of foreign loans.

Widespread excitement at the prospect of reform has raised public expectations for Momoh's administration unrealistically high. Observers speculate that a major reason Stevens willingly handed over power was that he could not make any headway against the deeply entrenched financial powers—including

the Lebanese financiers who have been his allies and advisers. Although Stevens insists he is retiring from active political life, he retains the important post of governing council chairman of the All-People's Congress and could make his influence felt for years to come.

Momoh, however, has signalled his intentions to stay removed from special interests by reportedly refusing to accept their campaign donations. In his inauguration speech, he appealed to the business community—Sierra Leonean and foreign—to cooperate with his administration, stating, "The country can no longer continue to accept a situation in which its resources are exploited only to benefit other foreign countries at a time when we ourselves are in dire need of economic salvation." ■

EAST AFRICA

The NRA puts the squeeze on Kampala

The Ugandan government of Lt.-Gen. Tito Okello and leaders of the rebel National Resistance Army (NRA) finally agreed to a cease-fire and a power-sharing arrangement in mid-December. Negotiations in Nairobi, under the direction of Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, had dragged on for months, stalemated over the make-up of the proposed transitional cabinet, the allocation of portfolios, and NRA demands for punishment of those guilty of atrocities against civilians.

Until the accord was reached, NRA leader Yoweri Museveni had maintained, "The main sticking point is that we want a clean government in future." The military leaders, he claimed, "are very scared of any provision in the agreement which says that whoever committed a crime should be answerable for the crime he committed."

The NRA demand to exclude the country's other military factions from the ruling Military Council had created an additional stumbling block. The Ugandan Freedom Movement, the Ugandan National Rescue Front, the Ugandan National Army, and the Federal Dem-

ocratic Movement of Uganda all signed earlier peace treaties with the government in return for minimal representation on the council. In a joint statement, they rejected the NRA demand and accused the rebel group of trying to "grab power and impose itself on the people of Uganda." The government pointed out that all fighting factions should be involved in order to achieve genuine and lasting peace.

Moi announced that the peace pact had finally been hammered out, with both sides agreeing to roughly equal shares of military and political power while arrangements are made for elections next July. Under the accord, Okello will remain chairman of the council, while Museveni will become vice-chairman.

The Okello government, whose rule had been rapidly disintegrating, was under intense pressure to reach an agreement with the NRA. The guerrillas had been steadily expanding their military and political control over western Uganda, and in November, established an interim administration in the "liberated zones" to "provide services pend-

ing an agreement with the junta in Kampala." They had set up 17 departments dealing with education, finance, and minerals, and had appointed 13 district officers.

The NRA had also kept the regular army garrisons in the towns of Masaka and Mbarara under siege for weeks, effectively dividing the country and cutting off supply routes. The blockade had severed Kampala from the key western region where most of the country's coffee is grown, thereby accelerating economic collapse. Coffee accounts for 95 percent of exports and provides virtually the only source of foreign exchange.

In contrast to the army's notoriously brutal image, the NRA's approach won the respect and support of large sectors of the local population in the "liberated zones." The guerrillas improved security by organizing a network of resistance councils, empowering peasants to set up roadblocks to arrest thieves and unruly soldiers. As a result, many peasants in the area had urged the NRA to continue fighting and to resist signing a peace pact with the government. As one villager said, "NRA soldiers have good manners, they have good character and they don't torture people. People are tired of the government because it has been killing people. They want the NRA to win by fighting and not by talks in Nairobi." ■

ETHIOPIA

"Political" doctors booted out

The charge that 100,000 Ethiopians have died in the government's resettlement operation spurred the expulsion of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) from the country in early December.

Government officials denounced the organization of French doctors and nurses for allegedly devoting more time to politics than to helping famine victims. The MSF has repeatedly attacked the administration of Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, claiming that tens of thousands of deaths have occurred in temporary holding camps or during transit to the southern region, where the government is seeking to

relocate some 1.5 million of the 8 million people affected by drought, principally from Tigré, Wollo, and Shoa provinces. MSF has especially criticized the alleged use of force in the relocations, the break-up of families, poor transport conditions, and the lack of preparation at the resettlement sites.

Several other organizations have reported serious problems with the program and the likelihood of many deaths. A Boston-based agency, Cultural Survival, reported that 50,000 to 100,000 people may have died during the resettlement. The League of Red Cross Societies said in a secret report that tens of thousands of those resettled have died of malaria in the mosquito-infested swampy southwest region. Survival International, a British organization, said people are forced into airplanes and vehicles at gunpoint and transported in such crowded conditions that many die before reaching their destinations.

Ethiopian students who were required to work in the resettlement program in July and August, however, reported no unduly high death rates, although they did describe water shortages, insufficient food supplies, a high incidence of malaria, inadequate land allocation, and other problems.

The international aid agencies and western governments working in Ethiopia have disputed the MSF claims. However, most of them have withheld assistance to the program, even though it is the top priority of the government's long-term recovery plan. Reagan administration officials and representatives of other governments have charged that the resettlement is Mengistu's scheme to depopulate the northern provinces so as to deprive anti-government guerrilla forces of their local support.

MSF President Rony Brauman charged aid organizations in Ethiopia, including the UN emergency operation, of complicity with the government by remaining silent about abuses. They fear that any criticism of the government could result in their expulsion from the country and that publicity given to such abuses could dry up famine re-

lief donations, Brauman said. Before his retirement in October, Kurt Jansson, director of UN emergency operations in Ethiopia, had urged Western governments to assist the resettlement effort, even though he described it as poorly planned and haphazardly executed.

At the heart of the conflict with MSF was the government's refusal since June to allow the group, which operated four medical and feeding sites in Wollo Province, to open a children's feeding center in one of the locations. The government allegedly did not want families to become too established in the area because of its long-term plans to resettle them.

This was the first expulsion of a humanitarian group from Ethiopia and the first time MSF, which operates in 30 countries, has been forced to leave a country. ■

SEYCHELLES Gunned down in exile

Gerard Horeau, leader of the exiled Seychelles Resistance Movement (MPR), was shot and killed outside his London home in late November by an unidentified gunman.

While the British Foreign Office would not speculate whether Horeau had been the victim of a political assassination, members of the dissident group claimed that his death was engineered by President Albert René. They cited a series of death threats and a recent attempt on Horeau's life allegedly masterminded by the René government. A one-time cabinet minister under

René, Horeau had personally prepared a dossier for *The Sunday Times* in London just prior to his death in which he disclosed details of a purported scheme to assassinate him in France.

Former president and now exiled opposition leader, Sir James Mancham, added fuel to the accusations. "The René government has often declared that it is after the MPR and is out to teach [it] a lesson. Horeau was always very defiant, so you can draw your own conclusions about the killing," he said.

René denied complicity in the murder, claiming, "I knew nothing about this. My government does not hire assassins." Horeau's death was rather "the result of an internal struggle" within the exiled opposition movement, he said. According to the Seychelles acting High Commissioner in London, Robert Delpech, "Only an idiot could believe that a country which depends so much on tourism and good publicity could possibly contemplate ordering an assassination in another country."

René, who overthrew the Mancham government in 1977, has since been continually plagued by coup attempts. Horeau was implicated in several plots against the government, including the 1981 mercenary fiasco led by Col. "Mad Mike" Hoare involving South African officers. René subsequently requested the extradition of both Mancham and Horeau, claiming that the 2,000 Seychellois exiles in London were using Britain as a base for subversive activities directed against his government. ■

CENTRAL AFRICA

Currency auction boosts production

Zambia's new currency auction system has provided an immediate and much-needed stimulus to an industrial sector that had been operating at only 30 percent of capacity. The auction was introduced as part of an economic reform program regarded as one of the most drastic in Africa—but one that Zambia's economic advisers are hoping will save the economy from collapse.

Through the weekly currency auctions, both the private sector and the parastatals have obtained desperately needed foreign exchange to import equipment, spare parts, and fuel. The new system is also expected to establish a more realistic exchange rate, making Zambia's exports more competitive on the world market.

Introduced in early October, the

auction has eliminated government favoritism in foreign exchange allocations and reduced the uncertainty previously associated with the exchange rate. Each week, the Central Bank of Zambia auctions off some \$5 million, largely provided by the World Bank. The rate thus established applies to all foreign exchange transactions in the country.

As a result of the auction, however, the kwacha has been devalued by about two-thirds—a development that has pushed the cost of basic commodities so high that most low-paid workers are forced to spend their entire salaries on food purchases. Unemployment is reportedly at an all-time high because of government cutbacks, business closings, and bankruptcies. Dunlop Tyres, for example, temporarily shut down recently, due to a shortage of foreign currency to buy rubber. The closing disrupted other industries dependent on trucks to transport their raw materials and

products.

The auction is part of a three-year IMF-supported economic reform program, which has included cancellation of subsidies on many basic goods, a 50 percent increase in the price of maize meal, and the elimination of many civil service jobs. The IMF, whose negotiating team spent three weeks in Lusaka in November, is said to be on the verge of providing a 100 million SDR standby loan to Zambia. The government, however, is balking at the IMF demand for the removal of all government subsidies on basic goods, which it says could prove counterproductive. If fertilizer subsidies were removed, for example, farmers might cut back production, according to government officials.

The World Bank has called on creditors and donors to assist Zambia in its "extraordinary" efforts to save the economy. It recently provided Lusaka with \$62 million to revitalize the manufacturing sector—

\$42 million through the Special Facility for sub-Saharan Africa and \$20 million through the International Development Association. The consultative group of Zambian donors was meeting in Paris in December for the second time in 1985 to mobilize extra assistance for the country. ■

CHAD Survival of the fittest?

In an effort to ease tensions with Goukouni Oueddei's Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), Libya recently released Acheikh Ibn Omar, secretary-general of the Revolutionary Democratic Council (CDR), who had been detained for nearly a year in northern Chad. As the largest faction in the Libyan-backed GUNT, the CDR had made Omar's release a precondition for the unity of the opposition forces battling the government of President Hissène Habré.

At a press conference in early November, Goukouni announced that Omar had ratified the Cotonou agreement of last August uniting several GUNT factions under a newly-created Supreme Revolutionary Council. In the GUNT reshuffle marking the implementation of the accord, Goukouni was confirmed as president; Col. Wadal Abdel Kamougué was named vice-president; and Omar, minister of state in charge of coordination.

The realignment within the GUNT opposition came only weeks after Mahamat Issa Idriss, first vice-president of the Popular Armed Forces (FAP), issued a statement from Tripoli claiming that Goukouni had been deposed. Idriss accused Goukouni of "abandoning ministers, soldiers, and fighters" while battling government forces and of "complicity with the enemy."

GUNT officials in northern Chad dismissed the statement as "extremely irresponsible," claiming that its authors had fled the region following an unsuccessful bid to topple Goukouni. Kilan Ahmet, Goukouni's top aide in Paris, revealed that Idriss was suspended

Black autumn for Zairean refugees

Swiss authorities have admitted deporting 59 Zairean refugees to Kinshasa in early November amid reports that the asylum-seekers were beaten during the flight and that several were executed upon arrival. The refugees—mainly opponents of President Mobutu Sese Seko—were expelled in an operation codenamed "Black Autumn" after Switzerland rejected their demands for political asylum.

The daily *La Suisse* claimed that six of the men died at Mamayemo Hospital in Kinshasa from maltreatment by Zairean security police. The federal Ministry of Justice in Bern, however, said there was "no information whatsoever to substantiate this report." Swiss officials acknowledged that the refugees had been handcuffed, escorted by 120 policemen, and forced aboard the Swissair plane, but denied that they had been physically abused. The heavy guard, they claimed, was needed because some of the Zaireans had destroyed their cells and scuffled with police officers.

Other local newspapers ran banner headlines such as, "Beaten during flight" and "Chained together like cattle." Although the Swiss government denied both these allegations, the newspapers said their sources included policemen and would not withdraw the charges.

While Mobutu formally protested to Switzerland about the "inhuman treatment of the deportees during the flight," observers noted that the government would consider most of them undesirable. A few weeks earlier, a number of those deported had allegedly been involved in clashes with Mobutu's bodyguards during his birthday party at a Geneva hotel, putting them in serious danger upon their return to Zaire.

Following the first wave of deportations, more than 100 African refugees still in Switzerland—including many from Zaire—have appealed to the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches for protection. Churches have opened dormitories where exiles can live while they battle deportation orders. Nearly half of them have already exceeded the time limit for remaining on Swiss territory after the rejection of their applications for political asylum.

from the FAP in 1984 for "incompetence and tribalism."

Ahmet referred to "an abortive mutiny" at Faya Largeau in September, led by FAP leader Goukouni Guet, while Goukouni

Oueddei was in Libya. Loyalist GUNT forces, however, quashed the rebellion in which at least 30 people were killed and others arrested. Guet and a co-plotter, Moussa Sougui, escaped. ■

NORTH AFRICA

Achour arrested in labor crackdown

Habib Achour, secretary-general of the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), was placed under house arrest in mid-November, the latest in a series of government moves to undermine the union's power.

Government officials said they arrested Achour, who had led a number of strikes in recent months, to put an end to "the violence and terrorism" provoked by the labor leader. According to Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali, the UGTT leader deliberately sought confrontations with the government to deflect attention from purported mismanagement and embezzlement in the labor union.

Sadok Allouche, a UGTT leader considered close to Mzali, took over as acting secretary-general. The prime minister, who claims that tens of thousands of unionists have silently opposed Achour, is counting on Allouche to steer the UGTT away from the confrontational tactics of its former leader.

For several months before the arrest, the government had conducted a campaign to discredit Achour and the union. In October, UGTT headquarters were closed down and its regional offices evacuated, following searches ordered by judicial authorities. Most of the offices were taken over by provisional committees of the ruling Socialist Destour Party, seriously threatening UGTT autonomy and arousing fears that the government would dismantle the union as it had after the 1978 labor riots.

The government also conducted an anti-Achour campaign in the official press, challenging his patriotism during the Libyan crisis. The labor leader had called a UGTT transport strike for August 5—coincidentally the same day that

Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi began expelling some 30,000 Tunisian workers. Achour was accused of collusion with Libya, prompting him to postpone a series of strikes. In addition, judicial inquiries were initiated into his financial affairs, and his son, Tahmeur Achour, director of the Hotel Amilcar, was arrested on charges of mismanagement.

A minor cabinet reshuffle in October also strengthened government control over the UGTT. The social affairs portfolio was divided in two—labor and social protection. The new labor minister, Nouredine Hached, son of the martyred founder of the Tunisian labor movement, will be in charge of labor negotiations. Hached and other new appointees—including Transport Minister Mohammed Kraiem—are long-time political opponents of Achour.

Following the crackdown, the government indicated a willingness to meet with the UGTT and released some union leaders who were detained in October. The UGTT executive bureau voted to reopen salary negotiations, broken off last April over the government's insistence on linking wage hikes to increases in productivity. Although the executive bureau protested Achour's arrest, describing it as unacceptable, it did not insist on his release as a prerequisite to meeting with government representatives. ■

EGYPT

Dog day afternoon for hit-men

Egyptian security forces scored another dramatic propaganda coup against the government of Col. Muammar Qaddafi when they uncovered and thwarted the second plot in less than a year to assassi-

nate former Libyan Prime Minister Abdul-Hamid Bakkush.

In mid-November, the state-owned Egyptian television company broadcast a 45-minute video tape providing a blow-by-blow account of the activities and eventual capture of the Libyan hit-squad allegedly sent abroad by Qaddafi to assassinate Libyan dissidents. Television viewers were treated to a James Bond-like documentary, revealing how the commandos were foiled in their attempt to eliminate a large number of Libyan exiles, including Bakkush and Mohammed Mugarief, a former Libyan official.

Bakkush, who was prime minister under King Idris prior to the 1969 coup that brought Qaddafi to power, eventually fled to Egypt where he was granted political asylum in 1977. However, as one of Qaddafi's leading opponents, he has been hounded by threats and attempts on his life. In November 1984, the Egyptian government infiltrated a hit-squad and tricked Qaddafi into believing that the Libyan dissident had been assassinated. After Tripoli announced that the "the stray dog Bakkush" had been executed, he appeared unscathed at a news conference.

In the latest Libyan fiasco, Egyptian Interior Minister Ahmed Rushdi revealed that Egyptian security forces had closely monitored the commandos' movements through surveillance, tape recordings, and information from a source who had infiltrated the hit-squad. The Libyans, who had been promised \$5 million each to complete their mission, were captured after a 15-minute gun battle with police in Alexandria, near the residence of a Libyan exile. Security forces recovered an important cache of arms including several machine guns, revolvers, and grenades.

The Libyan government denied complicity in the attempt against Bakkush, asserting that he had "arrived in Egypt with the help of the Libyan security apparatus" and was "still collaborating with it." Bakkush called the Libyan claim "unbelievable," remarking, "Once I started opposing Qaddafi, I knew he would come after me." ■

SUDAN

Strikes prompt stern steps

The ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) imposed tough new measures for handling illegal strikes in early December, following a series of walkouts during the preceding months.

At least seven categories of government workers have organized illegal strikes to press for better pay. Petrol pump attendants and telecommunications workers struck briefly in mid-November, but returned to work after the government agreed to grant them extra benefits. Customs officers and teachers are among the other groups that have refused to work to protest salary levels.

The TMC announced that it would no longer negotiate with strikers who have not followed the proper preliminary procedures and warned that participants in illegal strikes would be prosecuted.

Political parties have stepped up their protest activities as well, including the Sudanese National Party, which held a demonstration outside the residence of Maj.-Gen. Abdul Rahman Sawar-Dahab in October. Several thousand people protested the continued detention of Abbas Ghabbush, a politician and priest from the south, and other detainees held in connection with late September's army mutiny.

Sawar-Dahab also drew strong criticism at home when he traveled to Cairo in October—his first visit to Egypt since coming to power. Anti-Egyptian sentiment is strong in Sudan because former President Gaafar al-Nimeiry has received asylum there. Thousands protested at the Egyptian embassy in Khartoum last July, demanding that President Hosni Mubarak release Nimeiry for trial. After three days of talks with Mubarak, Sawar-Dahab said the TMC was willing to drop demands for Nimeiry's extradition.

Observers expect political activity to escalate further in the early months of 1986. The TMC is committed to holding multi-party elections by April. Political parties are proliferating, with more than 20 already organized in the north and at

least five in the south.

Meanwhile, relations with the U.S. have deteriorated, due in large part to the signing of a cooperation agreement with Libya. In late November, the State Department

warned Americans against visiting Khartoum, claiming that Libyan and other terrorists have established bases in the capital. It also announced a 10 percent reduction in its embassy staff there.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Mugabe mends fences with the Kremlin

Making his first official visit to the Soviet Union since taking office in 1980, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe was given red carpet treatment by Kremlin leaders in a determined bid to patch up past differences between the two countries. Describing the trip to Moscow in early December as a "mission of friendship," Mugabe signed a bilateral economic and technological accord, and a pact to expand political ties between the Soviet Communist Party and the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF).

Mugabe, who met with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Andrei Gromyko, said that as a result of his visit to Moscow, "We are very much closer in our ideas, in the rapport that we have created, and in our assessment of international issues." During the war of liberation and even in the post-independence period, relations between the two parties have been uneasy as a result of the Soviet Union's longtime support for Joshua Nkomo's rival Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).

Mugabe and Gorbachev paid "special attention" to the deteriorating situation in southern Africa and discussed possible Soviet military aid to buttress Zimbabwe against the menace of South African intervention. "We talked about our own military capability," said Mugabe at a press conference, "and how we can strengthen ourselves in the face of threats from South Africa." But he indicated that any specific military agreements would have to wait until Soviet officials visit Zimbabwe in early 1986.

Only a few days earlier, Pretoria had warned Mugabe that it might send its troops to Zimbabwe in "hot pursuit" of suspected African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas,

following a series of five land-mine explosions that injured four policemen near the northern border town of Messina. Several weeks later, two more land-mines exploded in the same area, killing six persons and injuring five.

South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha accused the Mugabe government of harboring ANC guerrillas and informed Harare that "steps must urgently be taken to ensure that no further incidents of this nature take place, otherwise the South African security forces will have no other choice but to follow the tracks themselves." In the past five years, South Africa has launched reprisal raids against three neighboring countries—Botswana, Lesotho, and Mozambique—for providing asylum to ANC members, while regularly invading Angola in "preemptive strikes" against Namibian guerrillas.

South African Minister of Defense Magnus Malan claimed that some Zimbabwean leaders were seeking a confrontation with Pretoria "so that they can again blame us for their inability to cope with a deteriorating situation in all spheres in that country."

The Mugabe government denied all knowledge of the land-mine incidents and reiterated its policy that although ZANU-PF deplors apartheid and does not have formal relations with Pretoria, the ANC cannot be permitted to use Zimbabwe as a springboard for attacks. According to Mugabe, however, South African troops had already massed near the Zimbabwean border, and his government was taking Pretoria's threat to invade seriously. "We can't just say South Africa is playing an artificial game. It is a real game. We must be prepared to ward off any war."

ANGOLA

Congress demotes old guard

Several prominent veterans of the liberation war were unexpectedly axed from the 13-member Politburo as the second MPLA party congress since independence came to a close in early December. The MPLA's decision—which is likely to strengthen the authority of President José Eduardo dos Santos within the party—followed week-long debates critically assessing Angola's past and present policies.

Lucio Lara, the MPLA's secretary-general and one of Angola's top guerrilla leaders, was the major casualty in the party reshuffle. The ousting of Ludi Kissassunda, a former chief of security under late President Agostinho Neto, produced the other big surprise.

Minister of Industry Henrique Santos Onambwe, former Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge, and Air Force Commander Col. Iko Carreira were among the central committee members downgraded at the Congress. They were elected only as alternate non-voting members of the body, which was expanded to 90 people. Observers pointed out that Carreira's demotion in particular was unforeseen considering the central role he has played in the war against the South African-backed rebels of UNITA.

The congress was marked by a conscious effort to discuss the party's shortcomings over the last five years in dealing with the country's immense social and economic difficulties. The tone of self-criticism was set in dos Santos' opening speech, of which one-third was devoted to economic problems and specifically to failings in the agricultural sector. He said that although there had been noticeable economic improvement in the past two years, Angola would continue to be faced with major difficulties because of the "aggressive designs of imperialism." Dos Santos called on the party to make "global emergency plans" to cope with a "significantly changed situation, namely the racist aggression against our country."

While the congress reaffirmed the

Quotas could help elephant survival

The average weight of ivory tusks traded on the world market is rapidly declining, a sure sign that greater numbers of elephants are being killed. Most of the oldest elephants—which have the largest tusks—have already been decimated, and increasing numbers of younger animals are now needed to fill the world demand for ivory.

A quota system being implemented early in 1986 could help to stabilize the elephant population and provide a steady source of future export earnings for many African countries. The new system, approved last year by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) requires each nation with an elephant population to report the maximum amount of ivory it will export in the upcoming year. Other nations are to base their ivory imports on these figures. The CITES Secretariat in Lausanne, Switzerland, will advise the governments and monitor the ivory trade. Twenty-six African nations and many ivory-importing nations are parties to CITES.

An estimated 80,000 to 100,000 African elephants are killed annually out of a total population of from 1.1 million to 2.5 million—twice the rate that can be sustained without eventually wiping out the species. Poaching accounts for a large proportion of the overall decline, though its incidence varies greatly from country to country.

In Zimbabwe, elephant poaching has been a relatively minor problem, due to strict controls on the trade and a well-administered game management program. Ivory carving is a source of employment and foreign exchange in that country.

President André Kolingba of Central African Republic took a strong personal interest in the problem last year, after elephant poachers attacked a helicopter in which he was riding. He is reportedly now working to ban all ivory trade and to mount an anti-poaching campaign.

Poaching is most prevalent in countries plagued by guerrilla warfare, where guns are more readily available and governments are unable to devote resources to protecting wildlife. Ninety percent of Uganda's elephants have disappeared in the past five years, while half of Sudan's were lost over a 10-year period. Between 1982 and 1984, Mozambique's herd shrank from 51,000 to 27,000.

The steep decline in elephant herds is a function of the escalating price of ivory, but it is also related to the plight of the rhinoceros—a species that was hunted almost into extinction during the early 1980s. Poachers turned to elephants after the rhinos virtually disappeared. An estimated 9,000 black rhinos remain, representing a decline of 40 percent in four years, following a 50 percent decline in the 1970s.

The Kenyan government has launched a plan to relocate its surviving black rhinos to sanctuaries enclosed by electric fences. Zimbabwe, too, is transferring its rhinos, at the rate of 50 per year, to a game park considered a safe site.

The primary market is in North Yemen where most adult males own daggers with rhino-horn handles, but rhino products also have medicinal uses in many Asian countries. An international campaign now underway to save the rhino will focus intensive lobbying on governments of countries that still allow importation of rhino products.

MPLA's commitment to building a socialist state, dos Santos stressed the need for dialogue, particularly with the United States, if a negotiated end to the war with UNITA is to be reached. The party leadership,

however, pledged to give "absolute priority" to the defense of the country's 10-year revolution and vowed that Angola would never again be "colonized or subjected to any form of domination."

1985 Index

AUTHOR INDEX

- Abdul-Rahim, Salih, "Namibia: End game or old game?," Jan-Feb 14
- Anyaoku, Emeka, "Women: Changing attitudes: a cooperative effort," Mar-Apr 21
- Barrow, Nita, "The Decade NGO forum," Mar-Apr 9
- Belknap, Timothy, "Laboring under apartheid," May-Jun 57
- Berger, Carol, "Sudan after Nimeiry," Jul-Aug 73
"Sudan: The North-South divide," Nov-Dec 15
- Cabaço, José Luis, "Reporting southern Africa: an African perspective," Jan-Feb 69
- Callaway, Barbara J., and Katherine E. Kleeman, "Women in Nigeria: Three women of Kano: modern women and traditional life," Mar-Apr 26
- Canady, Hortense, "The African diaspora," Mar-Apr 75
- Challenor, Herschelle S., "The U.S. and the UN: A challenge to multilateralism," Sept-Oct 70
- Cunha, Antonio-Gabriel M., "Africa and the IMF: Toward a new deal," May-Jun 21
- Daly, M.W., "The mythology of nation-building" (book review), Nov-Dec 73
- de St. Jorre, John, "At the UN: The African group: a new political realism?," Mar-Apr 76
- Diamond, Larry, "Nigeria: High Stakes for Babangida," Nov-Dec 54
- Edlin, John, "Economies: A new effort at regional cooperation," Jan-Feb 76
- Everett, Richard, "Guinea: A tough road ahead," Jul-Aug 19
- Faul, Michelle, "Zimbabwe: Mugabe's election maneuvers," Jan-Feb 61
- Fitzgerald, Mary Anne, "Uganda: What prospects for peace?," Nov-Dec 11
- Fraser, Arvonne S., "American women and the Decade NGO forum," Mar-Apr 12
- French, Howard, "Ivory Coast: One-party state at a crossroads," Jul-Aug 14
- Gouede, Nicholas N., "Media: The West African beat," Jul-Aug 76
- Harris, Joan, "Women in Kenya: Revolution or evolution?," Mar-Apr 30
- Haski, Pierre, "Socialist France and the frontline," Jan-Feb 22
- Hirschhoff, Paula, "Congressman William H. Gray III" (interview), May-Jun 49
- Hodges, Tony, "Congo: The IMF logjam," Nov-Dec 58
- Hughes, Michael, "Voices from South Africa" (book review), Mar-Apr 80
- Hughes, S.O., "Letter to the Editor," Mar-Apr 80
- Isaacman, Allen, "Mozambique: After the Nkomati Accord," Jan-Feb 10
- Kennedy, Edward M., "Africa in the U.S.: A call for justice," May-Jun 10
- Khalid, Mansour, "Sudan: A plea for pluralism," Jul-Aug 53
- Kleeman, Katherine E., and Barbara J. Callaway, "Women in Nigeria: Three women of Kano: modern women and traditional life," Mar-Apr 26
- Kotani, Toru, "Africa and Japan: Rising sun over Africa?," Nov-Dec 68
- Lambert, Rollins E., "The Catholic Church and apartheid," May-Jun 68
- Lancaster, Carol, "Economies: ECOWAS at ten," Jul-Aug 69
- Manning, Robert A., "In Washington: Constructive engagement, round two," Jan-Feb 79
"Reagan's African aid agenda," May-Jun 73
"Toward constructive disengagement?," Sept-Oct 82
- Maren, Michael, "Media: A video version of constructive engagement," May-Jun 78
"Covering the Continent" (book review), Nov-Dec 72
- Margolis, Joseph, "Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, Secretary-General, South West Africa People's Organization" (interview), Jan-Feb 19
- Matheson, Alastair, "A notable year for Nyerere," Jan-Feb 64
- Mathias, Charles McC., "The U.S. and the UN: Defining a new role," Sept-Oct 28
- Mbeki, Thabo, "The struggle inside South Africa," Jan-Feb 59
- McHenry, Donald F., "Africa and the UN: The United Nations and decolonization," Sept-Oct 4
- Mishra, Brajesh, "UN and Namibia: Ending the impasse," Sept-Oct 65
- Moore, Cornelius, "Filming southern Africa," May-Jun 81
- Mortimer, Robert A., "An indictment of the single party system" (book review), Mar-Apr 81
- Naude, Beyers, "Where is South Africa going?," May-Jun 4
- Ndumbu, Abel, "Kenya: Seven years of Nyayo," Nov-Dec 51
- Novicki, Margaret A., "Angola: Against all odds," Jan-Feb 4
"Ethiopia's drought and famine crisis" (interview), Jan-Feb 47
"G.K.T. Chiepe, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Botswana" (interview), Mar-Apr 14
"Joyce Aryee, Secretary for Education, Ghana" (interview), Mar-Apr 55
"A.W. Clausen, President, the World Bank" (interview), May-Jun 14
"Father Lebamang Sebidi" (interview), May-Jun 70
"Major-General Muhammadu Buhari, head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria" (interview), Jul-Aug 4
"West Africa after the exodus," Jul-Aug 10
"Oliver Tambo, President, the African National Congress" (interview), Jul-Aug 32
"Commodore S.G. Obimpeh, chairman of the National Mobilization Programme, Ghana" (interview), Jul-Aug 65
"Brian Urquhart, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs" (interview), Sept-Oct 11
"Bradford Morse, Director, United Nations Office for Emergency Operations in Africa" (interview), Sept-Oct 20
"Harry Belafonte" (interview), Sept-Oct 31
"Paul J.F. Lusaka, President of the 39th session of the United Nations General Assembly" (interview), Sept-Oct 53
"Kenneth K.S. Dadzie, High Commissioner for Ghana to the Court of St. James" (interview), Sept-Oct 61
"Julius Nyerere, former president, the United Republic of Tanzania" (interview), Nov-Dec 4
"El-Gizouli Dafaalla, Prime Minister of Sudan" (interview), Nov-Dec 30
- Osman, Abdillahi Said, "Letter to the Editor," Nov-Dec 75
- Otunnu, Olara, "Africa and the UN: A forum for Africa," Sept-Oct 17
- Payne, Les, "Reporting southern Africa: an American perspective," Jan-Feb 71
- Reddy, Enuga S., "UN and apartheid: Decades of resistance," Sept-Oct 56
- Reagan, Ronald, "The United States and human rights in southern Africa" (excerpts from a statement), Jan-Feb 52
- Reynolds, Nancy, "American participation in the official conference," Mar-Apr 8
- Rizika, Jill, "UN and women: After the Decade," Sept-Oct 75
- Rogombe, Rose Francine, "Women: Equal partners in Africa's development," Mar-Apr 17
- Schissel, Howard, "Gabon: The economic outlook," Jan-Feb 27
"Senegal: Diouf's dilemmas," Jul-Aug 25
- Scott, Frederick, "Cameroon: Biya's new deal," Jul-Aug 58
- Seiler, John, "The dynamics of South African foreign policy" (book review), May-Jun 82
- Shaw, Antony, "Somalia: Barre's balancing act," Nov-Dec 26
- Shepherd, Jack, "The politics of food aid," Mar-Apr 51
"Congress and the White House at odds," May-Jun 25

- "Changing equations in the Horn," Nov-Dec 22
 Shultz, George P., "The U.S. and the UN: Idealism and realism," Sept-Oct 24
 Staudt, Kathleen, "Women in development: Policy strategies at the end of the Decade," Mar-Apr 71
 Steady, Filomina Chioma, "African women at the end of the Decade," Mar-Apr 4
 Steinholtz, Manfred, "Togo: West Africa's middleman in a pinch," Jul-Aug 29
 Streek, Barry, "Apartheid under siege," Jan-Feb 54
 Thomas, Rosalind, "Women: The law in southern Africa: justice for all?," Mar-Apr 59
 Tutu, Desmond, "The question of South Africa" (document), Jan-Feb 50
 Urdang, Stephanie, "Women in Mozambique: Rural transformations: women in the new society," Mar-Apr 66
 Utete, C.M.B., "Economies: PTA: toward an African Common Market," Jan-Feb 63
 Villa-Vicencio, Charles, "Twenty-five years after Sharpeville," May-Jun 63
 Walker, Robert S., "Africa in the U.S.: A conservative viewpoint against apartheid," May-Jun 54
 Walt, Vivienne, "Botswana: Feeling the heat," Nov-Dec 64
 Watkins, Robert, "Famine: Sudan's hidden tragedy," Nov-Dec 19
 Wilkins, Roger, "Africa in the U.S.: Demonstrating our opposition," May-Jun 29
 Zvobgo, Eddison, "Women in Zimbabwe: transforming the law," Mar-Apr 64

SUBJECT INDEX

African National Congress

- "Oliver Tambo, President, the African National Congress" (interview), Jul-Aug 32

Agriculture

- Update, Jan-Feb 35; Mar-Apr 38,43,46; May-Jun 40,42,44,48; Jul-Aug 40,46,48,51,52; Sept-Oct 40,42,43,45,51; Nov-Dec 39

Aid, economic

- Update, Jan-Feb 44; Mar-Apr 33,42,43,46; Jul-Aug 44
 "Reagan's African aid agenda" by Robert A. Manning, May-Jun 73

Aid, food

- Update, Jan-Feb 39; Mar-Apr 51; May-Jun 39,44; Jul-Aug 40,42,51; Sept-Oct 41; Nov-Dec 40,50
 "Ethiopia's drought and famine crisis" (interview), Jan-Feb 47
 "The politics of food aid" by Jack Shepherd, Mar-Apr 51
 "Congress and the White House at odds" by Jack Shepherd, May-Jun 25
 "Harry Belafonte" (interview), Sept-Oct 31
 "Sudan's hidden tragedy" by Robert Watkins, Nov-Dec 19
 "Changing equations in the Horn" by Jack Shepherd, Nov-Dec 22

Books

- Goodwin, June, "Cry Amandla! South African women and the question of power," reviewed by Michael Hughes, Mar-Apr 80
 Gbagbo, Laurent, "Côte d'Ivoire: Pour une alternative démocratique," reviewed by Robert A. Mortimer, Mar-Apr 81
 Geldenhuys, Deon, "The diplomacy of isolation: South African foreign policy making," reviewed by John Seiler, May-Jun 82
 Ungar, Sanford J., "Africa: The people and politics of an emerging continent," reviewed by Michael Maren
 Voll, John Obert and Sarah Potts Voll, "The Sudan: Unity and diversity in a multi-cultural state," reviewed by M.W. Daly

Economics

- "Angola: Against all odds" by Margaret A. Novicki, Jan-Feb 4
 "Gabon: The economic outlook" by Howard Schissel, Jan-Feb

27

- "PTA: Toward an African Common Market" by C.M.B. Utete, Jan-Feb 73
 "A new effort at regional cooperation" by John Edlin, Jan-Feb 73
 A.W. Clausen, President, the World Bank" (interview), May-Jun 14
 "Toward a new deal" by Antonio-Gabriel M. Cunha, May-Jun 21
 "Laboring under apartheid" by Timothy Belknap, May-Jun 57
 "Senegal: Diouf's dilemmas" by Howard Schissel, Jul-Aug 25
 "Togo: West Africa's middleman in a pinch" by Manfred Steinholtz, Jul-Aug 29
 "ECOWAS at ten" by Carol Lancaster, Jul-Aug 69
 "Kenneth K.S. Dadzie, High Commissioner for Ghana" (interview), Sept-Oct 61
 "Congo: The IMF logjam" by Tony Hodges, Nov-Dec 58
 "Africa and Japan: Rising sun over Africa?" by Toru Kotani, Nov-Dec 68

Education

- Update, Jan-Feb 36,40,41; Mar-Apr 35,43,46,49; May-Jun 35,40,46,47; Jul-Aug 39,42,44; Sept-Oct 40,42; Nov-Dec 48
 "Joyce Aryee, Secretary for Education, Ghana" (interview), Mar-Apr 55

International Monetary Fund

- Update, Jan-Feb 43; Mar-Apr 35,37,38,43,46; May-Jun 34,41,42; Jul-Aug 39,44,47,48; Sept-Oct 38,40,41,48,49; Nov-Dec 35,39,44,46
 "Toward a new deal" by Antonio-Gabriel M. Cunha, May-Jun 21
 "Congo: The IMF logjam" by Tony Hodges, Nov-Dec 58

Media

- Update, Jan-Feb 36; Mar-Apr 35; May-Jun 46; Sept-Oct 42,50; Nov-Dec 42,44,48
 "Reporting southern Africa: an African perspective" by José Luis Cabaço, Jan-Feb 69
 "Reporting southern Africa: an American perspective" by Les Payne, Jan-Feb 71
 "A video version of constructive engagement" by Michael Maren, May-Jun 78
 "Filming southern Africa" by Cornelius Moore, May-Jun 81
 "The West African beat" by Nicholas N. Gouede, Jul-Aug 76

Military aid and equipment

- Update, Jan-Feb 40,41,44; Mar-Apr 49; May-Jun 44; Jul-Aug 38,46,52; Sept-Oct 51, Nov-Dec 35,50
 "Mozambique: After the Nkomati Accord" by Allen Isaacman, Jan-Feb 10

Oil

- Update, Jan-Feb 37,45; Mar-Apr 36,37,46,47; May-Jun 37,43,45; Jul-Aug 37,38; Sept-Oct 42,48,51,52; Nov-Dec 37,40,45,46,49
 "Angola: Against all odds" by Margaret A. Novicki, Jan-Feb 4
 "Gabon: The economic outlook" by Howard Schissel, Jan-Feb 27
 "Congo: The IMF logjam" by Tony Hodges, Nov-Dec 58

Organization of African Unity

- Update, Jan-Feb 42; Mar-Apr 42; Sept-Oct 43; Nov-Dec 49
 "A notable year for Nyerere" by Alastair Matheson, Jan-Feb 64

Refugees

- Update, Jan-Feb 36; Mar-Apr 39,47; Jul-Aug 37,41,42,44; Sept-Oct 45
 "Letter to the Editor" from Abdillahi Said Osman, Nov-Dec 75

Religion

- Update, Jan-Feb 45; May-Jun 33,45; Jul-Aug 44,47,48,50; Sept-Oct 37,41,44,50; Nov-Dec 42,45,48
 "Twenty-five years after Sharpeville" by Charles Villa-Vicencio, May-Jun 63
 "The Catholic Church and apartheid" by Rollins E. Lambert, May-Jun 68

"Father Lebamang Sebidi" (interview), May-Jun 70

Trade Unions

Update, Jan-Feb 45; Mar-Apr 38,46; May-Jun 35; Jul-Aug 42,47,49; Sept-Oct 45,49,51; Nov-Dec 44

United Nations

Update, Jan-Feb 35,29; Mar-Apr 34,39,42,43; Jul-Aug 37,41,43,44; Sept-Oct 41,46; Nov-Dec 46,47

"The African group: a new political realism?" by John de St. Jorre, Mar-Apr 76

"The United Nations and decolonization" by Donald F. McHenry, Sept-Oct 4

"Brian Urquhart, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs" (interview), Sept-Oct 11

"A forum for Africa" by Olara Otunnu, Sept-Oct 17

"Bradford Morse, Director, United Nations Office for Emergency Operations in Africa" (interview), Sept-Oct 11

"Idealism and realism" by George P. Shultz, Sept-Oct 24

"Defining a new role" by Charles McC. Mathias, Sept-Oct 28

"Paul J.F. Lusaka, President of the 39th session of the United Nations General Assembly" (interview), Sept-Oct 53

"UN and apartheid: Decades of resistance" by Enuga S. Reddy, Sept-Oct 56

"Kenneth K.S. Dadzie, High Commissioner for Ghana to the Court of St. James" (interview), Sept-Oct 61

"UN and Namibia: Ending the impasse" by Brajesh Mishra, Sept-Oct 65

"The U.S. and the UN: A challenge to multilateralism" by Herschelle S. Challenor, Sept-Oct 70

"UN and Women: After the Decade" by Jill Rizika, Sept-Oct 75

Women

Update, Jul-Aug 49; Sept-Oct 50

"African women at the end of the Decade" by Milomina Chioma Steady, Mar-Apr 4

"American participation in the official conference" by Nancy Reynolds, Mar-Apr 8

"The Decade NGO forum" by Nita Barrow, Mar-Apr 9

"American women and the Decade NGO forum" by Arvonne S. Fraser, Mar-Apr 12

"G.K.T. Chiepe, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Botswana" (interview), Mar-Apr 14

"Equal partners in Africa's development" by Rose Rogombe, Mar-Apr 17

"Changing attitudes: a cooperative effort" by Emeka Anyaoku, Mar-Apr 21

"Women in Nigeria: Three women of Kano: modern woman and traditional life" by Barbara J. Callaway and Katherine E. Kleeman, Mar-Apr 26

"Women in Kenya: Revolution or evolution?" by Joan Harris, Mar-Apr 30

"Joyce Aryee, Secretary for Education, Ghana" (interview), Mar-Apr 30

"The law in southern Africa: justice for all?" by Rosalind Thomas, Mar-Apr 59

"Women in Zimbabwe: transforming the law" by Eddison Zvobgo, Mar-Apr 65

"Women in Mozambique: Rural transformations: women in the new society" by Stephanie Urdang, Mar-Apr 66

"Policy strategies at the end of the Decade" by Kathleen Staudt, Mar-Apr 71

"The African diaspora" by Hortense Canady, Mar-Apr 75

"Voices from South Africa" (book review), by Michael Hughes, Mar-Apr 80

"After the Decade" by Jill Rizika, Sept-Oct 75

World Bank

Update, Jan-Feb 43; Mar-Apr 33,35,37,38,42; Jul-Aug 40; Sept-Oct 41; Nov-Dec 35,38

"A.W. Clausen, President, the World Bank" (interview), May-Jun 14

COUNTRY INDEX

Algeria

Update, Jan-Feb 43; Mar-Apr 36,47; May-Jun 43,45; Jul-Aug 39,41,48; Sept-Oct 50,51; Nov-Dec 44,45

Angola

Update, Mar-Apr 48; May-Jun 37,39,41; Sept-Oct 43,51; Nov-Dec 35,47

"Against all odds" by Margaret A. Novieki, Jan-Feb 4

"Socialist France and the frontline" by Pierre Haski, Jan-Feb 22

Benin

Update, Jan-Feb 38; Mar-Apr 33; May-Jun 35; Sept-Oct 40; Nov-Dec 36,37

Botswana

Update, Jul-Aug 37

"G.K.T. Chiepe, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Botswana" (interview), Mar-Apr 14

"Feeling the heat" by Vivienne Wait, Nov-Dec 64

Burkina Faso

Update, Jan-Feb 37,38; Mar-Apr 35; May-Jun 36; Jul-Aug 40; Sept-Oct 40,43; Nov-Dec 36

Burundi

Update, Jan-Feb 37; Mar-Apr 33; May-Jun 38; Sept-Oct 47,48; Nov-Dec 42

Cameroon

Update, Mar-Apr 44; May-Jun 40; Jul-Aug 45,51; Sept-Oct 41; Nov-Dec 43

"Biya's new deal" by Frederick Scott, Jul-Aug 58

Cape Verde

Update, Mar-Apr 42

Central African Republic

Update, Jan-Feb 36,42; Mar-Apr 44,45; Jul-Aug 46; Sept-Oct 41,47; Nov-Dec 43

Chad

Update Jan-Feb 35,41,42,43; Mar-Apr 40,45; May-Jun 42; Jul-Aug 46; Sept-Oct 47; Nov-Dec 42

Comoros

Update, Jan-Feb 40; Mar-Apr 40,42,49; May-Jun 39; Nov-Dec 41

Congo

Update, Mar-Apr 45, May-Jun 42; Sept-Oct 48

"The IMF logjam" by Tony Hodges, Nov-Dec 58

Cuba

Update, May-Jun 48; Jul-Aug 46; Sept-Oct 51; Nov-Dec 47

Djibouti

Update, Jul-Aug 43

Egypt

Update, Jan-Feb 44; Mar-Apr 46; May-Jun 33,43; Jul-Aug 48; Sept-Oct 47,50,51; Nov-Dec 44,45

Equatorial Guinea

Update, May-Jun 42; Sept-Oct 49

Ethiopia

Update, Jan-Feb 35,39,41; Mar-Apr 39,42; May-Jun 33,39; Jul-Aug 42,47; Sept-Oct 44,45,51; Nov-Dec 40,42

"Ethiopia's drought and famine crisis" (interview), Jan-Feb 47

"The politics of food aid" by Jack Shepherd, Mar-Apr 51

"Changing equations in the Horn" by Jack Shepherd, Nov-Dec 22

France

Update, Jan-Feb 40,41,42,43,44; Mar-Apr 33,37,44; May-Jun 37,39,43,45; Jul-Aug 38,45; Nov-Dec 43
"Socialist France and the frontline" by Pierre Haski, Jan-Feb 22

Gabon

Update, Mar-Apr 36; Jul-Aug 46; Nov-Dec 44
"The economic outlook" by Howard Schissel, Jan-Feb 27

Gambia

Update, May-Jun 37

Ghana

Update, Jan-Feb 36; Mar-Apr 33,35; May-Jun 40; Jul-Aug 40; Sept-Oct 38; Nov-Dec 37
"Joyce Aryee, Secretary for Education, Ghana" (interview), Mar-Apr 55
"West Africa after the exodus" by Margaret A. Novicki, Jul-Aug 10
"Commodore S.G. Obimpeh, chairman of the National Mobilization Programme, Ghana" (interview), Jul-Aug 65
"Kenneth K.S. Dadzie, High Commissioner for Ghana" (interview), Sept-Oct 61

Great Britain

Update, Jan-Feb 37,39,44; Mar-Apr 33,36,43,47; May-Jun 45; Jul-Aug 37,39,45; Nov-Dec 50

Guinea

Update, Jan-Feb 38; Mar-Apr 33,36; Sept-Oct 39
"A tough road ahead" by Richard Everett, Jul-Aug 19

Guinea-Bissau

Update, Mar-Apr 37, May-Jun 37

Israel

Update, May-Jun 39,42; Jul-Aug 47; Sept-Oct 44,47; Nov-Dec 47

Ivory Coast

Update, Jan-Feb 38; Mar-Apr 37,42; May-Jun 40; Sept-Oct 41,48; Nov-Dec 36,38
"An indictment of the single party system" (book review), by Robert A. Mortimer, Mar-Apr 81
"One-party state at a crossroads" by Howard French, Jul-Aug 14

Japan

Update, Mar-Apr 33
"Rising sun over Africa?" by Toru Kotani, Nov-Dec 68

Kenya

Update, Jan-Feb 40; Mar-Apr 33,41,42,43; May-Jun 38,40; Jul-Aug 39,43; Sept-Oct 41,44,48; Nov-Dec 51
"African women at the end of the Decade" by Filomina Chioma Steady, Mar-Apr 4
"The Decade NGO forum" by Nita Barrow, Mar-Apr 9
"American women and the Decade NGO forum" by Arvonne S. Fraser, Mar-Apr 12
"Revolution or evolution?" by Joan Harris, Mar-Apr 30
"Seven years of Nyayo" by Abel Ndumbu, Nov-Dec 51

Lesotho

Update, Mar-Apr 48; May-Jun 48; Jul-Aug 37,50; Nov-Dec 49

Liberia

Update, Jan-Feb 39; Mar-Apr 33,34; May-Jun 37; Sept-Oct 42; Nov-Dec 38
"Democracy Doe-style" (anon), Jul-Aug 62

Libya

Update, Jan-Feb 41,43,44; Mar-Apr 36,38; May-Jun 33,44; Jul-Aug 39; Sept-Oct 39,46,47,51; Nov-Dec 42,44

Madagascar

Update, Mar-Apr 33,41; Jul-Aug 43; Sept-Oct 45

Malawi

Update, Mar-Apr 33,42,43,49; May-Jun 38,48; Jul-Aug 51; Sept-Oct 48

Mali

Update, Jan-Feb 35,38; May-Jun 44; Jul-Aug 40,41; Nov-Dec 44

Mauritania

Update, Jan-Feb 35,37,38; Mar-Apr 33; Nov-Dec 44

Mauritius

Update, Mar-Apr 42; May-Jun 41; Sept-Oct 45; Nov-Dec 47

Morocco

Update, Jan-Feb 43,44; Mar-Apr 38,47; May-Jun 45; Jul-Aug 41; Sept-Oct 41,47,51; Nov-Dec 44,46,47,48

Mozambique

Update Jan-Feb 35; Mar-Apr 42,43,49; May-Jun 48; Jul-Aug 37,39,51; Sept-Oct 43,48; Nov-Dec 35,47
"After the Nkomati Accord" by Allen Isaacman, Jan-Feb 10
"Socialist France and the frontline" by Pierre Haski, Jan-Feb 22
"The law in southern Africa: justice for all?" by Rosalind Thomas, Mar-Apr 59
"Rural transformations: women in the new society" by Stephanie Urdang, Mar-Apr 66

Namibia

Update, May-Jun 48; Sept-Oct 51; Nov-Dec 35,47
"End game or old game?" by Salih Abdul-Rahim, Jan-Feb 14
"Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, Secretary-General, South West Africa People's Organization" (interview), Jan-Feb 19
"UN and Namibia: Ending the impasse" by Brajesh Mishra, Sept-Oct 65

Niger

Update, Jan-Feb 35,38; Mar-Apr 33; May-Jun 44; Sept-Oct 43; Nov-Dec 36,39,44

Nigeria

Update, Jan-Feb 36,37; Mar-Apr 36,37,38; May-Jun 35,40,42; Jul-Aug 38,46,51; Sept-Oct 38,43,48,52; Nov-Dec 39
"Three women of Kano: modern women and traditional life" by Barbara J. Callaway and Katherine E. Kleeman, Mar-Apr 26
"Major-General Muhammadu Buhari, head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria" (interview), Jul-Aug 4
"West Africa after the exodus" by Margaret A. Novicki, Jul-Aug 10
"Commodore S.G. Obimpeh, chairman of the National Mobilization Programme, Ghana" (interview), Jul-Aug 65
"High stakes for Babangida" by Larry Diamond, Nov-Dec 54

Portugal

Update, Mar-Apr 48,49; May-Jun 37; Jul-Aug 47,52; Nov-Dec 47

Rwanda

Update, May-Jun 38; Sept-Oct 47,48

São Tomé and Príncipe

Update, Jul-Aug 46; Sept-Oct 43

Senegal

Update, Jan-Feb 38; Mar-Apr 33,38; May-Jun 37, Jul-Aug 41; Sept-Oct 43; Nov-Dec 46
"Diouf's dilemmas" by Howard Schissel, Jul-Aug 25

Seychelles

Update, Jan-Feb 41; Mar-Apr 41,42

Sierra Leone

Update, Jan-Feb 38; Mar-Apr 33,39; Jul-Aug 42; Sept-Oct 43

Somalia

Update, Jan-Feb 41; Mar-Apr 33,42; May-Jun 44; Sept-Oct 45,48; Nov-Dec 42
"Barre's balancing act" by Antony Shaw, Nov-Dec 26

"Letter to the Editor" by Abdillahi Said Osman, Nov-Dec 75

South Africa

Update, Jan-Feb 35,45,46; Mar-Apr 33,38,42,47,48,49; May-Jun 41,45,47,48; Jul-Aug 37,50,52; Sept-Oct 37,51; Nov-Dec 35,47,48,49,50

"Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, Secretary-General, South West Africa People's Organization" (interview), Jan-Feb 19

"Socialist France and the frontline" by Pierre Haski, Jan-Feb 22

"The question of South Africa" by Desmond Tutu (document), Jan-Feb 50

"The United States and human rights in South Africa" (excerpts from a statement by President Ronald Reagan), Jan-Feb 52

"Apartheid under siege" by Barry Streek, Jan-Feb 54

"The struggle inside South Africa" by Thabo Mbeki, Jan-Feb 59

"Reporting southern Africa: an African perspective" by José Luis Cabaço, Jan-Feb 69

"Reporting southern Africa: an American perspective" by Les Payne, Jan-Feb 71

"Constructive engagement, round two" by Robert A. Manning, Jan-Feb 79

"The law in southern Africa: justice for all?" by Rosalind Thomas, Mar-Apr 59

"Voices from South Africa" (book review), by Michael Hughes, Mar-Apr 80

"Where is South Africa going?" by Beyers Naude, May-Jun 4

"A call for justice" by Edward M. Kennedy, May-Jun 10

"Demonstrating our opposition" by Roger Wilkins, May-Jun 29

"Congressman William H. Gray, III" (interview), May-Jun 49

"A conservative viewpoint against apartheid" by Robert S. Walker, May-Jun 54

"Laboring under apartheid" by Timothy Belknap, May-Jun 57

"Twenty-five years after Sharpeville" by Charles Villa-Vicencio, May-Jun 63

"The Catholic Church and apartheid" by Rollins E. Lambert, May-Jun 68

"Father Lebamang Sebidi" (interview), May-Jun 70

"A video version of constructive engagement" by Michael Maren, May-Jun 78

"Filming southern Africa" by Cornelius Moore, May-Jun 81

"The dynamics of South African foreign policy" (book review), by John Sailer, May-Jun 82

"Oliver Tambo, President, the African National Congress" (interview), Jul-Aug 32

"UN and apartheid: Decades of resistance" by Enuga S. Reddy, Sept-Oct 56

"UN and Namibia: Ending the impasse" by Brajesh Mishra, Sept-Oct 65

"Toward constructive disengagement?" by Robert A. Manning, Sept-Oct 82

"Botswana: Feeling the heat" by Vivienne Walt, Nov-Dec 64

Sudan

Update, Jan-Feb 36,40,44; Mar-Apr 39,47; May-Jun 33,39,44,45; Jul-Aug 42,47; Sept-Oct 38,48,51; Nov-Dec 44

"A plea for pluralism" by Mansour Khalid, Jul-Aug 53

"Sudan after Nimeiry" by Carol Berger, Jul-Aug 73

"The North-South divide" by Carol Berger, Nov-Dec 15

"Famine: Sudan's hidden tragedy" by Robert Watkins, Nov-Dec 19

"El-Gizouli Dafaalla, Prime Minister of Sudan" (interview), Nov-Dec 30

"The mythology of nation-building" (book review), by M.W. Daly, Nov-Dec 73

Swaziland

Update, Jan-Feb 36; Mar-Apr 49; May-Jun 48

Tanzania

Update, Mar-Apr 33,42,43; May-Jun 38; Jul-Aug 51; Sept-Oct 37,46,48; Nov-Dec 46

"A notable year for Nyerere" by Alastair Matheson, Jan-Feb 64

"Julius Nyerere, former president, the United Republic of Tanzania" (interview), Nov-Dec 4

Togo

Update, Jan-Feb 36,38; Mar-Apr 33,39; Sept-Oct 41; Nov-Dec 36,40

"West Africa's middleman in a pinch" by Manfred Steinholtz, Jul-Aug 29

Tunisia

Update, Mar-Apr 46; Jul-Aug 49; Sept-Oct 49,50; Nov-Dec 44,47

Uganda

Update, Mar-Apr 33,40,43; May-Jun 38; Jul-Aug 45; Sept-Oct 37,48

"What prospects for peace?" by Mary Anne Fitzgerald, Nov-Dec 11

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Update, Jan-Feb 40,41; May-Jun 44; Jul-Aug 41,46; Sept-Oct 39,42; Nov-Dec 50

"Changing equations in the Horn" by Jack Shepherd, Nov-Dec 22

United States

Update, Jan-Feb 35,39,42,43,44,45; Mar-Apr 33,39,43,44,46,47,49; May-Jun 33,37,39,40,43,44,45,47; Jul-Aug 37,40,41,42,43,44,48; Sept-Oct 38,42,51; Nov-Dec 35,39,40,42,44,47,50

"The United States and human rights in South Africa" (excerpts from a statement by Ronald Reagan), Jan-Feb 52

"Constructive engagement, round two" by Robert A. Manning, Jan-Feb 79

"The politics of food aid" by Jack Shepherd, Mar-Apr 51

"Congress and the White House at odds" by Jack Shepherd, May-Jun 25

"Demonstrating our opposition" by Roger Wilkins, May-Jun 29

"Congressman William H. Gray, III" (interview), May-Jun 49

"A conservative viewpoint against apartheid" by Robert S. Walker, May-Jun 54

"Reagan's African aid agenda" by Robert A. Manning, May-Jun 73

"A video version of constructive engagement" by Michael Maren, May-Jun 78

"Idealism and realism" by George P. Shultz, Sept-Oct 24

"Defining a new role" by Charles McC. Mathias, Sept-Oct 28

"Harry Belafonte" (interview), Sept-Oct 31

"A challenge to multilateralism" by Herschel S. Challenor, Sept-Oct 70

"Toward constructive disengagement?" by Robert A. Manning, Sept-Oct 82

"Changing equations in the Horn" by Jack Shepherd, Nov-Dec 22

Western Sahara

Update, Jan-Feb 44; Mar-Apr 47; May-Jun 45; Jul-Aug 41; Sept-Oct 51; Nov-Dec 47,48

Zaire

Update, Jan-Feb 42; Mar-Apr 33,40,44,48; May-Jun 42; Jul-Aug 39; Sept-Oct 41,46,47

Zambia

Update, Jan-Feb 46; Mar-Apr 33,42,43,45; May-Jun 41,43,48; Jul-Aug 39,47,51; Sept-Oct 48; Nov-Dec 44,46

"PTA: Toward an African Common Market" by C.M.B. Utete, Jan-Feb 73

"Paul J.F. Lusaka, President of the 39th session of the UN General Assembly" (interview), Sept-Oct 53

Zimbabwe

Update, Jan-Feb 36,46; Mar-Apr 42,43; May-Jun 33,38,48; Jul-Aug 39,51,52; Sept-Oct 48,52; Nov-Dec 36,49,50

"Mugabe's election maneuvers" by Michelle Faul, Jan-Feb 61

"PTA: Toward an African Common Market" by C.M.B. Utete, Jan-Feb 73

"The law in southern Africa: justice for all?" by Rosalind Thomas, Mar-Apr 59

"Women in Zimbabwe: transforming the law" by Edisson Zvobgo, Mar-Apr 64

Quiwonkpa's Fatal Gamble

Regarded by many as fraudulent, the elections that were to return Liberia to civilian rule instead sparked an attempted coup. In its aftermath, the Doe government has launched a massive crackdown against its opponents, calling into question the country's political future.

BY LARRY JAMES

For several hours on the morning of November 12, it looked as though Liberia would have the second successful military coup in its 138-year history. That morning, former armed forces commander Brig.-Gen. Thomas Quiwonkpa announced over Liberian radio that "patriotic forces" under his command had taken control of the government and ousted President Samuel Doe in what Quiwonkpa described as the "ultimate gamble" to liberate Liberia.

Four days later, Quiwonkpa's bullet-riddled body lay on public display at the Barclay Training Center, Monrovia's main military barracks, and his forces on the run.

It is still not known how many casualties there were. The official version lists 11—10 rebels and one on the government side. But that total conflicts with eyewitness reports of truckloads of bodies rolling through the streets of Monrovia during the fighting. Broadcast appeals for donations of blood and other medical supplies, which continued for several days after Doe insisted that his forces were in complete control, suggest that casualties on both sides were considerably higher.

Larry James is a freelance journalist living in West Africa who covered Liberia's election for the Associated Press. He also reports for NBC and publications specializing in African affairs.

The Doe government admits there was heavy fighting at the Executive Mansion, and diplomats in Monrovia say the building was seriously damaged by artillery and heavy machine gun fire.

1985 should have been a year when Liberia returned to civilian rule and began to regain political stability. The campaign and subsequent elections were to return the country to democratically elected government after five years of military control, but the events of that November day have cast serious doubts on Doe's popularity and the possibility of a democratic government under his leadership.

The abortive coup and Doe's retaliation have further muddied the political future of sub-Saharan Africa's oldest independent country. Many observers were genuinely surprised at the outcome of Quiwonkpa's coup attempt. It was widely believed that Doe had only minimal support in the country, with his real strength residing in the Executive Mansion Guard manned by members of his own ethnic group, the Krahn.

The fact that forces loyal to Doe were able to overcome those of his former army commander surprised many, not because of the Guard's military ability, but due to the apparent lack of support for Quiwonkpa from rank and file soldiers in other units of the army.

Some reports speculated that

Quiwonkpa committed a tactical error by allowing himself to be cut off from his forces, leaving them leaderless at a crucial moment, while others suggest that the expected active support from within the military simply did not materialize. What seems most likely is that although there was support in principle for the coup attempt, those within the armed forces adopted a wait and see attitude. When Doe's troops responded with stiff resistance, Quiwonkpa's potential allies lost confidence and declined to commit themselves.

Many Liberians had privately expressed the opinion that the army would not support Doe in any attempt to wrest power from him and that he would never be able to hold off Quiwonkpa because of the former commander's immense popularity throughout the country. It is now clear that Doe does possess the military machinery necessary to protect himself and his government.

Trials of those alleged to have taken part in the coup attempt began on November 25, when former armed forces commander Gen. Morris Zaza went before a military tribunal to face charges of conspiracy, mutiny, sedition, and aiding an enemy force. It is still unclear how many have been arrested and who they are. Those within the armed forces appointed by Quiwonkpa to head various military units are certain to be included,

but it also seems likely that a number of civilians will face charges before civil courts.

Former Finance Minister Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf is expected to head the list, as Doe has publicly charged her with complicity in the coup attempt, specifying that she raised the money to finance it. Johnson-Sirleaf, a senior member of the party that is now Doe's primary political opposition, the Liberia Action Party (LAP), was convicted in September of calling Doe and members of his government "idiots." She was later pardoned after intense pressure from the United States and other countries, and served only a few weeks of her 10-year sentence. On the eve of the elections, her passport was seized without explanation. Now the Doe government says she was planning to meet with Quiwonkpa in the United States to arrange payment for those taking part in the coup attempt.

LAP presidential candidate Jackson Doe, who is believed to have won the election by a wide margin, has also been arrested and his fate is unknown. One who will not face charges is Charles Gbayon, editor-in-chief of the national television, who was shot to death by security forces at a roadblock when, according to the Doe government, he "tussled" with security forces over a gun said to be in his possession. His death occurred the morning after Liberian television broadcast a news report showing large crowds gathering in the streets of Monrovia to celebrate what they thought was Quiwonkpa's victory over Doe.

Diplomatic sources believe U.S. efforts in the immediate aftermath of the coup may have saved the lives of many others—especially opposition politicians—by making it clear to Doe that American aid would be affected if anything happened to them. A State Department spokesman said that the "widespread but unconfirmed reports" that soldiers who had participated in the action against Doe were summarily executed was a cause of "deep concern" to the United States.

The Liberian government was quick to deny any such executions and Doe sent a message to President Reagan to reassure him that all persons arrested after the coup attempt would be tried

according to law. The release on November 27 of five prominent opposition leaders who had been arrested after the coup attempt was viewed as further proof of Doe's desire to please the American government. Doe's allegation of Cuban involvement—his government claims to be holding a Cuban in custody—and his charge of Sierra Leonean and Ivorian participation in the "invasion of Liberian territory" are also viewed as an attempt to maintain good relations with his principal aid donor by casting blame anywhere but on the



President Samuel Doe: "It is now clear that he possesses the military machinery necessary to protect himself and his government"

United States. Many observers are quick to point out that since Thomas Quiwonkpa lived for two years in Baltimore, Maryland, the U.S. government must have at least known of his intentions if they did not actually give him active support.

American diplomats in Liberia have been extremely reluctant to discuss recent events and in fact declined to talk on or off the record, or even be quoted as Western diplomats, the traditional method of conveying their embassy's views.

While the State Department is being extremely cautious in public statements regarding Liberia, Congress is less ambiguous in its expressions of concern.

The chairman of the congressional subcommittees on Africa, Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-MI) and Sen. Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), have called for the reduction or suspension of U.S. aid to Liberia. American security assistance to the country totals more than \$60 million. A Senate subcommittee hearing on U.S. policy toward Liberia was held in early December. As Wolpe said, "The key question is whether the government is legitimate in the eyes of the people and whether it can be sustained over time."

U.S. embassy observers in Liberia said that although there were some instances of voting irregularities during the October 15 elections, they believed the process was by and large "free and fair." Now, however, informed sources on Capitol Hill believe that although the elections may have been conducted in an acceptable manner, the vote counting and subsequent results were clearly rigged in Doe's favor. Prior to the voting, there had been widespread skepticism that Doe would allow any result other than his own victory, but no one knew how he planned to accomplish it. Observers now believe the mechanism was put into place when Doe's Special Elections Commission (SECOM) Chairman Emmett Harmon announced that the ballots would be recounted by a special panel, which was not provided for in the electoral laws established by SECOM itself. Known to be loyal to Doe, that group of officials delivered the expected verdict—a 50.9 percent victory for the head of state.

Even before the coup, the three opposition parties said they would not take part in the new government—what some termed "his fraud to perpetuate Doe's regime." It remains unclear what course the opposition will follow. One Liberian official said that the international community might view a refusal to participate in a new civilian government as an expression of a national desire for a one-party state. Given the widespread enthusiasm which greeted the multi-party campaign throughout the year, it seems unlikely that such a view is held by many outside the Executive Mansion.

Although it appears that Doe will be inaugurated in January, it is still far from certain how well that will sit with his countrymen. Doe has called for national

reconciliation in the wake of the coup attempt, but the political establishment seems unwilling to accept the kind of democracy Doe embodies. Many Liberians feel it would have been possible for Doe to have taken a course other than the one he chose. They say he could have gone down in history as the man who freed Liberia from its ruling oligarchy and gave the nation its first real democracy. Had he not contested the election, they contend, he would have become a national hero.

Tensions within Liberia have spread to its neighbors, fueled by Doe government charges of Sierra Leonean and Ivorian complicity in the attempted coup. Doe claims that Quiwonkpa's forces were recruited in both countries, trained at Sierra Leone's Camp Siaka, and provided with transport to their invasion route along the Mano River Road.

Sierra Leone has denied any involvement. After Doe closed their common border, former President Siaka Stevens expressed his irritation by commenting that if "Doe wants to seal the border, we'll help him." Relations between the two West African neighbors have been strained for some time. In 1983, Doe sent 3,500 troops to the border following Freetown newspaper reports which wrongly accused him of having murdered his wife.

Ivory Coast, for its part, has not commented publicly on the charges nor responded to Liberia's official protest. Doe claims that Ivory Coast knew of the coup in advance and that as early as August had arrested "mercenaries" who were actively recruiting in the Ivorian coastal village of Grand Bassam. He further claimed it was provocation on the part of President Felix Houphouët-Boigny to release the arrested men while aware of their intentions. There were reports that those released by Ivory Coast were merely being recruited to serve on a Liberian merchant vessel.

This added tension also brings into question the future of the Mano River Union. The virtually bankrupt union is currently owed an estimated \$2.5 million by Guinea, \$2 million by Sierra Leone, and \$1.25 million by Liberia. Work at the headquarters in Freetown has come to a standstill because of cash

flow problems and it is doubtful the grouping can survive without financial support, which is now unlikely to come from Liberia. In fact, the Liberian secretary-general of the organization, Augustine Caine, was recalled to Monrovia for consultations after the charges of Sierra Leonean involvement in the coup attempt. The only other likely candidate to pump funds into the organization is Sierra Leone, but support from the new president, Gen. Joseph Momoh, did not seem likely.



Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf: "Publicly charged with complicity in the coup attempt"

The prospects for Liberia's economic recovery are also uncertain. Diplomatic and banking sources had not expected much improvement until after the elections and the expected return, after five years of military rule, to what investors would term stability. The coup attempt and widespread dissatisfaction with the election results offer little hope of boosting investor confidence. As one Monrovia businessman put it, "Confidence builds economies. With Doe in the Executive Mansion, there is no confidence."

In a statement to the nation on No-

vember 22, Doe said he was imposing new austerity measures "in order to save the nation." The measures called for an across-the-board 25 percent reduction in salaries for all government employees earning more than \$200 per month, except the military, doctors, and nurses. He also eliminated the \$24 per month transportation subsidy to nurses and teachers and ordered the termination of employment of unproductive workers and the mandatory retirement of all employees above retirement age. He announced that individuals would not be allowed to carry more than \$1,000 when they leave the country and warned business leaders and government employees against giving or accepting bribes. He also appealed to all Liberia's friends, "especially the United States," to help reconstruct the economy.

Since the 1980 military coup that brought Doe to power, U.S. aid to the country has quadrupled. The small nation of just over 2 million inhabitants is by far the biggest per capita recipient of U.S. aid in sub-Saharan Africa, yet the effects of such infusions of money are nowhere evident in the country. Except for the 35-mile stretch of road from Monrovia to the huge Firestone rubber plantation and Robertsfield International Airport, the roads are mostly unpaved, full of potholes, and in bad repair.

The only construction in process is the new 35,000-seat soccer stadium being built by the People's Republic of China. Since Doe came to power, no building projects have been completed except a military barracks and a new national police headquarters. It is not surprising then that many view the Doe government as being alarmingly corrupt. A prominent Liberian economist and former adviser to the government said that examples of official corruption abound. In 1984, he said, more than \$48 million in U.S. aid simply disappeared.

The bleak economic picture and uncertain political future do not offer much promise for Liberia and its people. One prominent political figure's observations may provide some insight into the country's mood. In the days following the election, he said, "What Liberia doesn't need is another military government, but it doesn't need Samuel Doe either." □

The Other Engagement

Recent congressional initiatives to provide assistance to the UNITA rebels in Angola and to halt American aid to Mozambique have undermined constructive engagement's espoused policy goals to achieve a negotiated withdrawal of Cuban troops and to woo Mozambique away from its dependence on the Eastern bloc.

BY SALIH BOOKER

Amid the euphoria which swept through the House of Representatives following the passage of the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 on June 5, another political effort on southern Africa was emerging in both Congress and the White House, threatening the very idea of a new U.S. policy toward southern Africa which would support the aspirations of the region's black majority.

Within weeks of the House action on South Africa, both the Senate and House voted to repeal the Clark Amendment (a 10-year old prohibition on U.S. intervention in Angola), and to prohibit military assistance and restrict economic aid to Mozambique. These moves opened the way for consideration of renewed aid to rebels in Angola and turned back the momentum for a new cooperative relationship with Mozambique.

The votes reflected an effort on the part of conservatives in Congress and hardliners in the executive branch to reassert the primacy of East-West aspects of the southern Africa conflict and to overcome any hesitancy about a public alliance with Pretoria in the fight against the perceived Soviet threat in

the region. A direct reaction to the campaign for sanctions against South Africa, the new approach very bluntly argues that communism is worse than racism in terms of U.S. interests.

The conservatives' approach seeks a stronger application of the basic tenet of the constructive engagement policy—that the U.S. and South Africa share strategic interests in the region and that as bad as apartheid is, Pretoria is nonetheless an anti-communist ally.

Despite an overwhelming 295 to 127 vote in favor of sanctions against South Africa one month earlier, the sponsors of the Mozambique and Angola measures successfully characterized their amendments as anti-Soviet or anti-Cuban in order to gain support from a majority of members. Contributing to their success was the "get tough" atmosphere in Congress during the foreign aid bill debate in the wake of the TWA hijacking, the Walker spy case, and the deaths of several U.S. marines in El Salvador.

Thus, while attempting to force a repudiation of the constructive engagement policy, the sanctions effort, which culminated in the president's executive order, actually achieved much less. The imposition of mild sanctions against South Africa represented the least damaging option for President Reagan in order to avoid a major political defeat at the hands of Congress and to maintain

control of policy toward South Africa.

The executive order on sanctions was not a major departure from constructive engagement as it has evolved over the past five years. As if to underline this point, President Reagan described the measures as a part of an improved "active constructive engagement" policy. And by stalemating the movement for stronger sanctions against Pretoria, the administration was again free to stress the policy's regional application.

Congressional efforts to impose economic sanctions on South Africa last year were largely based on the argument that a new American consensus had emerged which favored a process of disassociation from the apartheid state. American national interests in the region would be better served by identification with the goals of the African majority within South Africa and throughout the region.

In essence, an attempt was made to fashion a new policy which was the reverse image of constructive engagement. However, the political movement across the country and in Congress which ultimately produced the limited sanctions against South Africa offered very little in terms of a regional analysis. It therefore failed to advance a strong argument for new approaches toward the other countries of the region.

Surprisingly, even South Africa's ille-

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gal occupation of Namibia did not receive much attention during the South Africa debate. By focusing almost exclusively on the problem of apartheid inside South Africa, the congressional leadership behind the anti-apartheid legislation failed to grasp the wider implications of its own approach. Consequently, it achieved only a minor adjustment in U.S. ties with South Africa.

For conservative members of Congress, restoring a "fundamentalist" East-West view of constructive engagement required a shift in focus to alleged Soviet intentions in the region, allowing them to advocate assistance to the "freedom fighters" in Angola and Mozambique. Although backed by Pretoria, they were characterized as fighting the socialist-oriented governments of those two countries.

Thus, vilifying Mozambique and Angola as "Soviet-backed Marxist regimes" became the prerequisite for restoring the *raison d'être* of constructive engagement—that the top U.S. priority is to stop Soviet encroachment in southern Africa. While the Reagan administration differed with this approach on Mozambique, all of the major executive branch actors except the State Department—the CIA, Pentagon, and the National Security Council—believed that intervention in Angola was an appropriate and attractive policy option consistent with constructive engagement's regional approach.

The conservatives' initial success on Angola and Mozambique highlighted another important weakness of the anti-apartheid campaign in the United States. While sanctions advocates made a serious effort to advance a new policy approach on the grounds that it was necessary to protect U.S. national interests in South Africa, southern Africa, and throughout the continent, the moral argument alone was decisive in persuading a majority of members to support the anti-apartheid legislation.

Without a solid national interests argument as the basis for redirecting policy toward the region, the moral argument can only succeed in forcing gradual adjustments in the U.S.' bilateral relationship with Pretoria. It also allows the opponents of sanctions to seize the initiative on other regional issues, claiming the moral ground of fighting "Marxist

tyranny" and containing Soviet influence.

If the effort to reorient U.S. policy toward southern Africa is to succeed in the legislature, a bi-partisan majority will have to be convinced that the system of apartheid and South African regional violence constitute the greatest threats to U.S. national interests and security and stability in the region.

In that context, the struggle over U.S. policy options toward Angola and Mozambique may well become the most important arena in which any changes in the U.S.-South African relationship are determined. The critical issue which must be addressed is whether or not the United States has independent interests in southern Africa which require a new policy approach or simply global interests which are coterminous with Pretoria's interests.

Mozambique

During the past two years, relations between the United States and Mozambique have dramatically improved. But recent congressional initiatives restraining assistance to Maputo—which were not actively resisted by the administration—combined with the deteriorating security and economic situation inside the country itself suggest that the White House's commitment to Samora Machel's government could be fleeting.

Since 1977, providing American assistance to Mozambique has required a presidential waiver of a prohibition on aid related to U.S. human rights concerns. When the prohibition was waived by the Carter administration, an Agency for International Development (AID) mission was opened in Maputo, and relations between the two countries showed promise of improvement. Machel continued to express an interest in closer political and economic ties with Washington and the West.

Perhaps due to the immediate souring of relations between Washington and Maputo after President Reagan took office in 1981, Mozambique did not figure prominently in the initial formulation of constructive engagement. And while that policy stressed the priority of stopping Soviet encroachment in the region, the State Department made a distinction between countries where the Soviets and Cubans have a combat presence

and those whose governments espouse Marxism.

This distinction eventually facilitated an improvement in relations once Mozambique had resigned itself to South Africa's military predominance in the region and its own fragile hold on power if it continued to support the armed struggle against the apartheid regime. But it was also a distinction that conservatives in Congress rejected out of hand.

The first three years of constructive engagement focused on achieving a Namibia settlement. Yet, while the Namibia negotiations provided the diplomatic arena for the U.S. to help rehabilitate South Africa's international image even without achieving a solution, it was the South African-Mozambican diplomacy that provided constructive engagement with its first tentative success.

The initial strain in relations between the U.S. and Mozambique meant that the U.S. did not make a priority of urging restraint on Pretoria as it increased its direct assaults on Mozambique and escalated the sabotage activities of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Administration critics argued that U.S. policy encouraged South African destabilization of Mozambique and its other neighbors by accepting the South African theory of "hot pursuit"—the legitimacy of pre-emptive strikes against supposed "terrorists." Yet there was no legislative vehicle for concerned congressmen to utilize in order to improve the U.S. response to South Africa's war against Mozambique.

The Reagan administration nonetheless was cognizant of the danger that instability in Mozambique might provide a new opening for greater Soviet involvement and influence in the region. But as Mozambique began to weaken from the combined effect of South Africa's war effort, a prolonged and devastating drought, floods, cyclones, and the resulting massive economic and social dislocations, the Reagan administration seized the opportunity to negotiate a peace agreement between the two adversaries.

The Nkomati Accord, signed in March 1984, committed Mozambique to withdraw any material and logistical support from the African National Congress (ANC) and precluded the use of

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During the past two years, relations between the United States and Mozambique have dramatically improved. But recent congressional initiatives restraining assistance to Maputo—which were not actively resisted by the administration—combined with the deteriorating security and economic situation inside the country itself suggest that the White House's commitment to Samora Machel's government could be fleeting.

Since 1977, providing American assistance to Mozambique has required a presidential waiver of a prohibition on aid related to U.S. human rights concerns. When the prohibition was waived by the Carter administration, an Agency for International Development (AID) mission was opened in Maputo, and relations between the two countries showed promise of improvement. Machel continued to express an interest in closer political and economic ties with Washington and the West.

Perhaps due to the immediate souring of relations between Washington and Maputo after President Reagan took office in 1981, Mozambique did not figure prominently in the initial formulation of constructive engagement. And while that policy stressed the priority of stopping Soviet encroachment in the region, the State Department made a distinction between countries where the Soviets and Cubans have a combat presence

and those whose governments espouse Marxism.

This distinction eventually facilitated an improvement in relations once Mozambique had resigned itself to South Africa's military predominance in the region and its own fragile hold on power if it continued to support the armed struggle against the apartheid regime. But it was also a distinction that conservatives in Congress rejected out of hand.

The first three years of constructive engagement focused on achieving a Namibia settlement. Yet, while the Namibia negotiations provided the diplomatic arena for the U.S. to help rehabilitate South Africa's international image even without achieving a solution, it was the South African-Mozambican diplomacy that provided constructive engagement with its first tentative success.

The initial strain in relations between the U.S. and Mozambique meant that the U.S. did not make a priority of urging restraint on Pretoria as it increased its direct assaults on Mozambique and escalated the sabotage activities of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Administration critics argued that U.S. policy encouraged South African destabilization of Mozambique and its other neighbors by accepting the South African theory of "hot pursuit"—the legitimacy of pre-emptive strikes against supposed "terrorists." Yet there was no legislative vehicle for concerned congressmen to utilize in order to improve the U.S. response to South Africa's war against Mozambique.

The Reagan administration nonetheless was cognizant of the danger that instability in Mozambique might provide a new opening for greater Soviet involvement and influence in the region. But as Mozambique began to weaken from the combined effect of South Africa's war effort, a prolonged and devastating drought, floods, cyclones, and the resulting massive economic and social dislocations, the Reagan administration seized the opportunity to negotiate a peace agreement between the two adversaries.

The Nkomati Accord, signed in March 1984, committed Mozambique to withdraw any material and logistical support from the African National Congress (ANC) and precluded the use of

Mozambican territory for assaults against South Africa. In return, South Africa pledged to cut off support for the MNR. By promoting the pre-existing dialogue between Mozambique and South Africa, the U.S. was able to secure an agreement which assisted South Africa by helping to isolate the ANC and ostensibly retard ANC sabotage inside South Africa. The agreement also allowed South Africa to appear interested in peaceful coexistence with its neighbors.

Mozambique was to have benefited by getting a reprieve from South African commando raids and a gradual end to the MNR campaign inside the country. Improved ties with the United States were to be a by-product of the settlement, as AID officials began to develop an economic assistance program and emergency food assistance increased.

Yet the Nkomati agreement did not stand the test of time as MNR activity—aided by a massive South African airlift of supplies prior to the signing ceremony—increased significantly inside Mozambique. The famine continued to claim thousands of lives and relief efforts were often obstructed by the MNR.

The U.S. initiated a small project aimed at reviving Mozambique's private sector through technical assistance and training and a commodity import program aimed at providing agricultural inputs. The U.S. extended \$8 million in economic aid by the end of 1984, and an increased amount of \$13 million in 1985.

Not surprisingly, the Mozambicans were disappointed by the small size of the U.S. aid program. While the Machel government was committed to encouraging private sector growth—part of its revised agriculture policies—and welcomed U.S. aid, some officials found the program too narrow and limited to a small area of Mozambique's enormous agricultural problems. They were disappointed by the lack of American interest in the critical needs of the country's transport sector, and with the United States' apparent inability to pressure South Africa into honoring the accord by withdrawing support from the MNR.

Lofty speeches about a new era of cooperation between South Africa and Mozambique in economic endeavors such as the tourist industry, and the belief that Mozambique would attract new Western investment as a consequence

of restored peace proved to be wishful thinking. Mozambique lived up to its part of Nkomati by severely restricting ANC activity, but received nothing in return apart from the criticism of many African states. Yet despite the grossly uneven compliance with the Nkomati accord, Mozambique and South Africa recommitted themselves to the agreement on its one-year anniversary in March 1985.

Even Mozambique's new bilateral relationship with the United States was threatened by conservative members of

“The political realities of southern Africa were rapidly obscured as the congressional debate on Angola continued to intensify.”

Congress during deliberations on the foreign aid bill in the summer of 1985. Still trying to salvage the non-aggression pact, the administration had requested a \$15 million increase in economic aid to Mozambique and proposed a \$3.2 million program for the provision of military training and non-lethal supplies such as uniforms, boots, radios, and jeeps.

Jesse Helms (R-NC) sponsored an amendment in the Senate—which was adopted—to prohibit military assistance to the Mozambican government until certain conditions—such as a reduction in the number of Eastern bloc advisers to 55 and free elections—were met. In the House, conservative members prepared to assault the aid program as well. Supporters of the assistance program urged the administration to lobby the Republican leadership to prevent conservative mavericks from directing U.S. policy toward Mozambique. However, the State Department claimed that it was restricted from lobbying on specific items in the bill and failed to get a single Republican to speak out in support of aid to Mozambique.

While the first effort to cancel the military aid program failed on a voice vote, the conservatives, encouraged by the subsequent repeal of the Clark Amend-

ment, returned with an amendment to restrict economic aid. They won the requested recorded vote, and then reintroduced the amendment prohibiting military assistance, winning it as well. Ironically, the Democrat-controlled House went further than the Republican Senate by restricting economic aid in addition to prohibiting military assistance.

The message conveyed was that conservatives could forestall administration initiatives to gradually reduce Mozambique's reliance on Soviet support by characterizing the assistance program as buttressing a Marxist surrogate of Moscow. The anti-Soviet posturing of the conservative leaders on this issue provided a protective curtain behind which congressmen unfamiliar with the substance of the issue could hide to cast their votes. Only through a compromise worked out in the foreign aid conference was economic assistance to Maputo restored.

By halting any proposed military aid to Mozambique, Congress undermined what the administration viewed as an opportunity to demonstrate American commitment to Nkomati and to Mozambican security. It also probably encouraged the South African government to maintain its options regarding MNR activity.

South African violations of the accord persisted and on the eve of Machel's state visit to Washington, Pretoria acknowledged the continued existence of a supply line to the MNR from within its borders. While Machel was having lunch at the White House, Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) and Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN) introduced legislation to provide \$5 million a year in military assistance to the MNR. At the same time, MNR representatives from Europe were given visas to the United States during the Machel visit.

The Mozambican delegation was surprised by these developments. As nothing of substance resulted from the visit, Mozambican officials probably felt uncertain about the depth of White House commitment to Mozambique's objectives at home.

Angola

Perhaps the most important African issue Congress and the administration will face in 1986 is the question of U.S.

policy options in Angola. The policy the United States decides to pursue vis-à-vis the Angolan government and the anti-government insurgents of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) will largely determine American priorities in southern Africa and will also influence its relations with the rest of Africa and the Soviet Union.

The policy choices available to the U.S. can best be characterized as intervention versus negotiations. Both the history of the Reagan administration's views on Angola as well as the current congressional atmosphere do not augur well for the latter option.

During the 1980 presidential campaign, candidate Ronald Reagan told the *Wall Street Journal* in an interview that if elected, he would supply weapons to the South African-backed UNITA insurgents fighting to overthrow the government of Angola. Once in office, the administration announced that it would ask Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment, which prohibited covert or other assistance to any faction in Angola which would promote military or paramilitary operations without the authorization of Congress.

While the Senate passed a repeal provision in the foreign aid bill that year, House Democrats successfully prevented a comparable provision from coming to the floor for a vote. The House-Senate conference on this legislation adopted the House position and the Clark Amendment remained on the books.

Encouraged by the administration's view of the conflict in southern Africa, South Africa invaded Angola in August 1981, claiming "hot pursuit" of South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas. Pretoria was further encouraged when the U.S. vetoed a Security Council resolution condemning this attack, continuing to occupy parts of southern Angola for the next three years and launching additional invasions on an annual basis.

Between 1981 and mid-1985, Congress paid little attention to Angola while the administration began discussions with the Angolan government aimed at achieving a formula for a Cuban troop withdrawal—a condition the U.S. imposed for a Namibia settlement.

Members of Congress following the Namibian diplomacy objected to the "linkage," partially on the grounds that it provided the South Africans with yet another mechanism to continue their occupation of Namibia and attacks on Angola, thus assuring the Cuban presence.

These members argued that an end to South Africa's occupation of Namibia would facilitate a departure of the Cubans and that ending Pretoria's illegal rule in Namibia should be the first priority. Yet the only legislation introduced to address these concerns, a Sense of the Congress Resolution offered by the chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, Rep. Julian Dixon (D-CA) in April 1983, was never considered by any congressional committee.

In February 1982, Angola and Cuba issued a joint statement affirming that once South Africa withdrew from Namibia and ended its aggression against Angola, the Cuban troops would leave. This was insufficient in the eyes of the Reagan administration, which continued to press for the linkage formula which at a minimum would require parallel Cuban withdrawal from Angola and South African withdrawal from Namibia.

Following another South African invasion in December 1983, Pretoria agreed to ceasefire negotiations and withdrawal of its forces from Angola. The U.S. mediated this agreement which was concluded in mid-February 1984, although South African troops remained inside Angola well into 1985.

Finally, in the fall of 1984, the Angolan government sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar spelling out in great detail its platform for a withdrawal of four-fifths of the Cuban troops within a three-year period, with the remainder moving to a position north of the 13th parallel—1,000 miles from the South African border—within two years, to be withdrawn altogether at a later date. The process would begin once the UN plan governing the transition to Namibian independence was initiated. The South Africans responded by demanding a withdrawal of all Cuban troops within a three-month period. The State Department then began a series of talks aimed at moving these two vastly divergent positions toward a mutually acceptable formula.

But by mid-1985, the State Depart-

ment's diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Angola came under heavy fire from congressional conservatives and within the administration. On June 11, the Senate repealed the Clark Amendment by a 63-34 vote. One month later, the House followed suit with a 236 to 185 vote. Report language was adopted which stated in part that the repeal of the Clark Amendment should not be construed as a congressional endorsement of the provision of any kind of assistance to Angolan rebels and that the provision of such assistance would require the satisfaction of certain conditions.

The report also stated, "Any assistance for military or paramilitary operations in Angola should be considered in the context of the prospects for the achievement of an internationally recognized independence settlement in Namibia in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution 435 and its effect on the U.S. political, economic, and strategic interests in Africa."

The qualifying language of the report represented an effort by House Democrats to counterbalance the growing momentum for aid to UNITA with a consideration of the political realities in southern Africa and U.S. interests throughout the continent.

But the political realities of southern Africa were rapidly obscured as the congressional debate on Angola continued to intensify. By October, three separate pieces of legislation were introduced. Although most members of Congress in favor of repealing the Clark Amendment claimed to have no intention of promoting aid to UNITA and were only seeking to remove an unnecessary foreign policy restriction on the president, the reality was quite different.

Rep. Claude Pepper (D-FL), whose district contains the largest Cuban-American constituency in the U.S., introduced a bill to provide \$27 million worth of so-called humanitarian aid to UNITA. Pepper, a key player in the effort to aid Jonas Savimbi, is a senior Democrat with tremendous influence in Congress due to his long tenure and chairmanship of the powerful House Rules Committee. He was drafted by the original conservative Republican sponsors of the repeal effort because they acknowledged their own lack of credibility and influence among a major-

ity of members. During the debate on the Clark Amendment, Pepper said, "We are simply saying, 'Let us remove the perception that the Clark Amendment gives the world that we washed our hands of Angola.'"

The other legislation offered includes a proposal by Rep. Mark Siljander (R-MI) for \$27 million in military assistance to UNITA, and a bill offered by Rep. Bill McCollum (R-FL) which would effectively impose a total economic embargo on Angola. At the same time, it became public knowledge that the administration was seriously contemplating both aid to UNITA and possible economic restrictions against Angola.

Advocates of aid to Savimbi have portrayed the rebel leader as an anti-communist freedom fighter struggling for democracy against a government imposed on the people by Cuban troops and Soviet advisers. They claim that he was forced to turn to the white minority regime in South Africa for help after the U.S. withdrew its support.

For many members, the ahistorical nature of their arguments was more an indication of their ignorance than a cynical manipulation of myths for political purposes, although the latter is an accurate characterization of the role played by certain members. Pepper admitted his own ignorance in testimony before the House Africa Subcommittee when he stated, "A few months ago I was not any more aware of what was going on in Angola except in a general way that one is aware of other parts of the world that pass in kaleidoscopic review from time to time before our mental and hindsight vision. But I was approached about this matter by the Cuban American National Foundation. . . they told me something about conditions in Angola."

Pepper continued that he lunched in Miami with Michael Alvarez (who led the Bay of Pigs invasion) and Jose Rebelo, the son of the former Portuguese governor of Angola, who told him they preferred aid to Holden Roberto. The congressman responded, "I told him, 'All right, I will say to my colleagues I think what we mean in our bill [is] we want to give aid to anybody that is fighting communism in Angola.'"

Unfortunately when it comes to African issues, many if not most members of Congress suffer from tremendous ig-

norance and (to be frank) racism. These two factors make this important policy-making body extremely vulnerable to manipulation by those seeking to make Africa a battleground for competition with the Soviet Union. If an African government is characterized as "Marxist," "socialist," "communist," or even simply "leftist," it is certain to provoke the wrath of the U.S. Congress, particularly if it receives military training or security assistance from Cuba or Eastern bloc countries.

And it is politically unacceptable for any member to make the obvious counterpoint that no such view is held regarding French troops and security assistance to Africa, or that U.S. troops should perhaps be called home from

"By halting any proposed military aid to Mozambique, Congress undermined the administration's opportunity to demonstrate American commitment to Nkomati and Mozambican security."

Honduras or Europe. Interestingly, members are willing to risk being called racist for opposing sanctions against South Africa, but very few can afford to risk being called soft on communism.

Congressional opponents of the "aid UNITA" movement recognized early on that to succeed, they needed time to mount an educational campaign which would provoke a more thoughtful discussion of this issue. They circulated "Dear Colleague" letters from the Congressional Black Caucus and the Democratic majority on the Africa subcommittee, a letter from David Rockefeller, and articles and editorials from prominent newspapers.

The main points they sought to convey are:

- support for UNITA would place the U.S. in an alliance with South African aggression against Angola, opening the way for an expansion of Soviet and anti-American influence throughout Africa;

- the Organization of African Unity had issued a declaration that any U.S. aid to UNITA would be "considered a hostile act against the OAU;"

- support for UNITA would undermine U.S. negotiations to obtain a South African withdrawal from Namibia and Angola, increase Angola's dependence on Soviet and Cuban military aid, and undermine the credibility of the policy of pressuring South Africa to end apartheid;

- UNITA is not a group of "freedom fighters" but an ethnically-based political faction with no significant ideological differences with the MPLA government, which has engaged in terrorist activities such as hostage-taking, car bombings, and shooting civilian aircraft.

These members suggested that while a reconciliation between UNITA and the MPLA government was desirable and in American and Angolan interests, it was virtually impossible until Angola was free of foreign intervention, beginning with the intervention of the apartheid state.

On the economic side, the argument was presented that as Angola's leading trading partner with more than \$1 billion in annual trade, the U.S. should not ignore its considerable commercial interests there. Angola is a reliable supplier of oil and is not an OPEC member. It purchases over \$500 million in American equipment and services annually, and American investment in Angola exceeds \$500 million.

But while Angola is one of the U.S.' largest and most important economic partners in Africa and has tried to facilitate a larger Western role in its economy through policies promoting privatization and reliance on market mechanisms, conservative Republicans in Congress reversed the position they hold on South Africa, arguing that the level of American investment in Angola should not be a priority.

In late October and early November last year, the House Subcommittee on Africa held two hearings to debate U.S. policy toward Angola. While the record of these hearings may prove to be an important scholarly resource, they achieved little in changing the views of the opposing sides.

However, the views expressed by Ambassador David Newsom, former

assistant secretary of state for African affairs in the Nixon administration, and Rep. Matthew McHugh (D-NY), a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, deserve mention. Leaving aside the political biases of the opposing sides, these men raised the critical issues of objectives, resources, and public consensus. They both pointed out that the proposals to aid Savimbi were unclear in their objectives—whether they sought to overthrow the Angolan government, force a coalition government, increase U.S. bargaining chips with the Soviets, or simply raise the costs of Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola.

Further, they argued that efforts to achieve any of these objectives would require tremendous financial and other resources over a prolonged period, and that the public consensus required to sustain such a prolonged confrontation is non-existent.

While it is unclear whether the educational campaign in Congress was successful, it did help prevent the issue from being brought to the floor for a

vote before Congress recessed for the winter holidays. It will remain difficult to educate so large a number of American policy-makers on the intricate history and political realities of Angola, particularly those anti-communist crusaders who hold the attitude, "Don't confuse me with the facts."

Contributing to these difficulties is the presence of UNITA representatives in Washington who are supported by a large coalition of conservative groups such as the Heritage Foundation, the Conservative Caucus, and Lew Lehrman's Citizens for America. They have been extremely active in lobbying congressmen, while the Angolan government has no presence in Washington and the coalition of anti-apartheid groups is slow to respond to this initiative. However, an Angolan trade delegation that visited Washington in September and October did make an important contribution to the debate by meeting with key congressmen and raising the neglected issue of U.S. economic interests in Angola.

Many observers and politicians have

focused too much attention on Congress' role in this issue, paying little attention to the National Security Council discussions where CIA, Pentagon, and NSC staff were battling the State Department over a proposed covert military assistance program for UNITA. Many congressmen fail to realize the implications of covert assistance, which represents the greatest threat to a new southern African policy. It is also the most likely program to succeed.

The CIA, Pentagon, and NSC strongly support such a program as the preferred option. Its secret nature would give them greater flexibility and would remove the issue from the public debate. Even the State Department, which initially opposed any aid for Savimbi, reportedly took the position that if there was to be a program, a covert one would be preferable, as it would allow them to maintain a public profile of peaceful diplomacy.

Secretary of State Shultz went so far as to write a letter to the Republican leader in the House, Rep. Robert Michel, urging him to oppose the legisla-

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tion because it was "ill-timed and will not contribute to the settlement we seek." The confidential letter was leaked by Republican members sympathetic to UNITA and provoked an angry response from Michel who argued that such assistance was "not only a geostrategic, but a moral necessity."

On November 22, President Reagan acknowledged that his administration supported covert aid to the Angolan insurgents seeking to overthrow the Luanda government. The president said that covert aid "would have much more chance of success right now." With the revelation of what is generally considered a highly classified secret, the question of why this program is even considered covert was raised.

There appear to be at least two explanations for the apparent contradiction of overt discussions on covert options. First, it has been suggested that the State Department, which has increasingly diluted its opposition to the proposed aid, believes that the threat of a covert program will encourage the Angolans to be more forthcoming in negotiations for a rapid Cuban withdrawal, thereby giving the department more leverage in forestalling the implementation of the interventionist option.

The naivete implicit in this view is surprising and suggests a certain level of desperation in the Africa Bureau. Such a threat is only likely to force the Angolans to stiffen their defenses and become much less enthusiastic about the American mediating role in southern Africa, since it was the Angolan government that proposed a realistic and detailed plan for Cuban withdrawal and which has little reason to change it given the increasing South African assaults.

Second, the anti-Angolan hardliners in the executive branch reportedly felt that public disclosure of the covert plan would provoke the Angolan government to request greater security assistance from the Soviets and perhaps launch a second 1985 offensive against UNITA. This would provide them with further ammunition to gain public and congressional support for a military aid program for Savimbi. One of the UNITA supporters' major criticisms has been the increase in Soviet military aid to Luanda over the past two years, though they fail to mention that it has been in

direct response to repeated South African attacks. There is a certain irony in the fact that this second view may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Angola debate has produced some rather strange bedfellows. Liberal and moderate Democratic congressmen, the State Department, and the business community are now pitted in a tenuous coalition against far right advocacy groups, conservative Republicans,

"The struggle over U.S. policy options toward Angola and Mozambique may well become the most important arena for change in the U.S.-South African relationship."

and most of the executive branch foreign policy-makers. Yet, while this alignment has formed to battle the definition of U.S. interests in Angola and the best policy to pursue to protect those interests, the Democrat-State Department-business coalition differs substantially on the appropriate U.S. response to South Africa.

The outcome of the Angola debate will have direct bearing on the overall U.S. approach to the southern Africa region, and especially to South Africa. It will be interesting to observe how strong this alliance will become. Already, it is apparent that the State Department's commitment is wavering. The business community has been extremely reluctant to take a strong public advocacy position opposing intervention in Angola, presenting a stark contrast to its visibility in opposing sanctions against South Africa.

As a result of the current policy trends vis-à-vis Angola and Mozambique, it is unlikely that the U.S. response to southern Africa's regional crises will involve a rapid disassociation from the apartheid regime or a new policy emphasis on the urgency of Namibia's independence. Nor is it likely that the present administration will be dissuaded from its fixation on the Soviet

role in the region as the principal determinant of policy.

Such a pessimistic view need not come to fruition if the political forces that generated the campaign for sanctions against South Africa are courageous enough to address the reflexive anti-communist approach to southern Africa and convincingly make the case that South Africa—not the USSR—is the greatest threat not only to American interests in the region, but to our own multi-racial society. In so doing, they must also provoke a public discussion on racism in the United States and its implications for a U.S. policy response to South Africa's institutionalized racism. The U.S. can ill afford to have racism as a policy determinant in southern Africa.

Regarding U.S. relations with South Africa vis-à-vis the entire region, it has often been said that South Africa is "the tail that wags the dog." In the long run, a view of the region which is based on shared strategic interests with Pretoria can only guarantee the triumph of Soviet ideology throughout southern Africa. This need not be the case. If the anti-apartheid campaign in the U.S. broadens its focus and addresses the external manifestations of apartheid throughout southern Africa, perhaps in a few years, it will be possible for legislation to be introduced—and taken seriously—for overt assistance to the freedom fighters of South Africa and Namibia.

Conservative supporters of UNITA, responding to charges that aiding Savimbi places the U.S. in an alliance with South Africa, often quote Winston Churchill who, when asked about his alliance with Joseph Stalin, said: "I have always been rather outspoken against the devil, but I would say a few kind words for the devil if he would come out against Hitler."

Perhaps the time has come for the United States to understand that Churchill's quote is far more appropriate for arguing that Soviet support for the Namibian and South African liberation movements and their assistance in defending Angola's sovereignty and security do not threaten U.S. interests but rather the interests of apartheid. Americans should understand that from an African perspective, no one is an unacceptable ally in the war against apartheid. □

Manuel Pinto da Costa

President, the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe

With the legacy of Portuguese colonialism, geographical isolation, and a mono-crop economy, the island nation of São Tomé and Príncipe has found its first ten years particularly difficult. Manuel Pinto da Costa discusses what his country has been able to achieve given these limitations and describes its efforts to open up the economy in the coming years.

INTERVIEWED BY TONY HODGES

Africa Report: Last July, São Tomé and Príncipe celebrated 10 years of freedom from Portuguese rule. What have been the achievements of this decade of independence?

Pinto da Costa: After our independence on July 12, 1975, we had all the inherent problems of a country just freed from colonialism, aggravated by being a small country which had experienced no economic development. It is rare to find an African country as dependent on one product as we are. We depend on cocoa, and it is with the income from cocoa that we have achieved what we have up to now.

The country could not be built after independence without specialists. We had almost none. The entire administration had been run by the Portuguese. I'll give you an example. In the health sector, we had only three São Tomean doctors, and one Portuguese doctor who stayed. In the administration, you could count the people with a university level education on the fingers of one hand. In the agricultural and cattle-raising sectors, which were entirely run by the Portuguese, we had no skilled people when they left. Even now, you find that the people in charge of some companies were previously their foremen. The management was handed over to them because they knew a little about what had to be done.

It was the same story in education. The Portuguese all left. Although we had very few São Tomean teachers, at the same

Tony Hodges is Africa editor at the Economist Publications, Ltd., London.

time we declared that schooling would be free for everyone. We had a huge number of students and almost no teachers. So we had some people who had to work both in the administration and in the teaching profession.

So ours was a country with no financial means, with no specialized people, totally disorganized. This was our starting point, which has to be recalled when judging what has been achieved. We started from practically nothing.



São Tomean armed forces: "The contingencies of the modern world oblige us to have the means to safeguard our sovereignty"



Cametapix

President Pinto da Costa: "We believe that our 10 years of independence have been 10 years of experience"

Africa Report: The country's geographical isolation must have been another handicap.

Pinto da Costa: Yes, there was also the problem of the two islands, São Tomé and Príncipe, being completely isolated in the Gulf of Guinea, with no relations whatsoever with countries on the African mainland and no means of communication—even between the two islands. The Portuguese did not leave us a single ship. You can now grasp the difficulties we had when we started. In spite of all this, we have made significant progress in these 10 years. Only by comparing what we had when we started with what we have now can we appreciate things in an objective way.

We were and still are a country almost exclusively dependent on cocoa. We managed to free ourselves from Portuguese colonialism, but not from cocoa colonialism. We remained slaves of cocoa because all our imports depended on it. The colonial structure was conceived in such a way that we had to import absolutely everything. We had to export everything we produced and import everything we needed. And the income from cocoa was not enough.

Immediately after independence, cocoa production diminished, which was entirely normal considering the inadequate management. We inevitably had to cope with lower cocoa

production. We have now tried to revitalize the cocoa companies, and we have invested considerably in agriculture and cattle-raising. Investments in the past 10 years have exceeded all those made in the colonial period. If we had people able to manage the companies more efficiently, we would get much better results and those investments would be more productive.

We have tried to free ourselves from dependence on cocoa and from dependence on food imports. We have tried to diversify our production. We can now say that we are on the right path, even if we have not yet reached a level sufficient to supply all our food needs.

Africa Report: What strategy is your government pursuing to reverse the decline in cocoa output?

Pinto da Costa: Our main aim is to increase our export capacity, which we can only achieve by improving the organization and increasing the productivity of the agricultural companies. On the other hand, we want to diminish our food imports, and this can only be achieved by producing more food. There is another consideration: We must also remold certain food habits we acquired during colonial times. People must consume what São Tomé and Príncipe produces. However, we know that our cultivable land area is not big enough to satisfy all our food needs.

As for exports, in view of our weak management and investment capacities, we have sought cooperation with foreign countries interested in collaborating in the creation of mixed companies. We believe that once we have achieved this, we will be able to resolve a series of development problems, because we will be able to save foreign exchange and invest it in increasing productive capacity.

But to return to your earlier question, if we look point by point at our positive achievements, we can identify several. We had nothing in industrial terms, not a single industrial unit and, despite all these difficulties I have mentioned, we have managed to create some. We have a clothing factory, a ceramics factory, and a brewery producing for the domestic market and for export. We have projects for a palm oil factory which will satisfy our needs, for a soap factory, and for a rum factory.

In education, we have had considerable success. We now have about 50 percent illiteracy, compared with 80 percent before. This is very important. Education was only enjoyed by a small percentage of our people. Nowadays, every child can enter school, starting at the nursery level, and continue through the secondary level without paying a penny. In the health sector, we have achieved great successes, providing medical assistance for everyone.

In the field of transport and communications, our isolation still remains, but it has diminished considerably. You can telephone Japan or the United States in a couple of minutes, which was certainly not possible in 1975. The only aircraft that came here were Portuguese. Now we have flights to Angola, to Cape Verde, to Guinea-Bissau, and to Portugal, and we are working to extend our air links to neighboring countries.

We still face difficulties in our communications with Príncipe, but these can only be resolved gradually as our country's productive capacity increases, allowing us to accumulate the financial resources to invest in this sector.

So, we have achieved much these past 10 years. If we did not do more, it was because of the shortage of trained people, the insufficient managerial experience, the limited financial resources. We became independent in the middle of the world economic crisis, with all its negative consequences, especially for countries dependent on a single product like cocoa. You have to consider the price fluctuations for this product, which are extremely grave for the budget of a small country like ours. Considering all this, you should not ask what we have achieved but how we have been able to do what we have done.

Africa Report: In the past year, your government has taken a series of radical policy measures to increase the role of the private sector, notably in trade and agriculture. What has led you to reduce the role of the state in agriculture?

Pinto da Costa: People are now talking about a "turn" in São Tomé and Príncipe. Many people even talk of a turn to the West. We say that only someone who was oriented to the East can turn to the West.

Africa Report: I was referring to the shifts in your economic policy.

Pinto da Costa: We had nationalized everything. As I said earlier, we had no trained people in 1975. However, we have to bear in mind that the Portuguese policy in São Tomé and Príncipe had a monopolist character. The Portuguese never encouraged private initiative. Trade and the *roças* [agricultural estates] were all in the hands of the Portuguese. The natives had what we call here *glebas* [small plots of land], with very few exceptions, of only one or two hectares, accounting for less than 1 percent of cultivated land. So, for 500 years private initiative was repressed. After independence, one could say that there were no native São Tomeans with the initiative, stimulus, or money to invest. Our bank was not even in a position to provide credit.

This being so, the state was obliged to do things it would not have done in a normal situation. A number of companies were created and the state had to attend to matters that are not its concern, matters that should be handled by private citizens. As we develop, the state must start to get rid of a certain burden that it should not be bearing—and for which it does not have a vocation. So we want to provide incentives for private citizens to play an important role in our economy.

Our constitution recognizes three types of property: state-owned, private, and mixed. But if in 1975, we had taken the *roças* and given them to private citizens, we would now be in much more trouble. Nobody in the country was prepared to manage anything. It was not possible to do what we are doing now. It was totally impossible.

We believe that our 10 years of independence have been 10 years of experience. We are not stubborn-minded. We take what we have experienced into account and adapt as necessary. We believe now that in order to manage a modern enterprise, we need the help of foreign countries, of specialized foreign companies that are competent as far as management is concerned. It is not possible to conceive of a modern company without all the technical and financial requisites, and we are not able to provide them on our own. That is why we have decided to create mixed companies with interested foreign companies.

We believe our traders can play an important role in our



Tony Hodges

Marketplace: "Our cultivable land area is not big enough to satisfy our food needs"

development process. They can and they should. We think we made the right decision when we allowed the traders to import. Besides, the results have been positive.

Africa Report: There has been speculation that São Tomé and Príncipe is considering joining the franc zone, as Equatorial Guinea did in January 1985. Might you do so?

Pinto da Costa: We live in the Gulf of Guinea and most of the countries of the Gulf of Guinea are francophone. It is incomprehensible that our country would not have any relations whatsoever, especially economic relations, with these countries. We are a member of the Economic Community of Central African States. We are very attentive to developments in this area, and it is impossible to conceive of development outside a regional framework. We will therefore continue to establish regional relations as our needs arise. We will have to cooperate with all the countries in Central Africa, at both bilateral and multilateral levels.

Africa Report: In 1982, the Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe [MLSTP] held an extraordinary congress, described as a congress of "rectification." What was rectified?

Pinto da Costa: Since 1975, we have defined the MLSTP as a front, which groups all citizens regardless of their political views—all citizens who are truly interested in struggling to consolidate the economic and political independence of São Tomé and Príncipe. In 1982, it was necessary to hold this extraordinary congress to analyze if the MLSTP was fulfilling its program, its guidelines as a front, or if it was acting more like a party. Since then, between July and August 1985, we have increased the number of members. Sixty-five percent of the present members joined in the last few months.

The rectification of the MLSTP's guidelines as a democratic front—and not a party—was required in order to reach all social classes, so that everybody who is interested in contributing to the country's development can find a place in the front—regardless of his political and ideological disposition.

We want a large democratic front, allowing all kinds of serious debates and thus the true exercise of democracy. I am

aware that for the Western democracies the concept of democracy is linked to the existence of several parties, but I can say that if São Tomé and Príncipe had as many parties as Great Britain there would be total confusion. A country with 102,000 inhabitants and very serious problems cannot afford to have as many parties as the English. But the exercise of democracy is possible within the MLSTP because there are people in it from different classes with different ideas who debate, and propose solutions for what they think is wrong.

Africa Report: There are several opposition politicians living abroad, notably Carlos da Graça and Miguel Trovoada. Under what conditions would you allow them to return to São Tomé and Príncipe?

Pinto da Costa: To get to the truth, what are they opposed to? We do not consider the people you mentioned as opponents. Miguel Trovoada, for instance, left as a normal citizen and he is abroad. To my knowledge, he has not created a party or anything like that which opposes the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe. Inside our country, there are people who claim not to agree with many things and they are not in prison. When we have meetings or rallies, we tell people if they are pretending to agree to speak their minds. If here in São Tomé, we do not encourage people to speak from their hearts, we are not contributing to people's liberation but to their enslavement. We did not fight for so long to bar people from expressing their opinion. If somebody says he does not agree, we do not consider him an opponent. Everybody who left São Tomé and Príncipe and is a national may come back whenever he wants.

Africa Report: Including Miguel Trovoada and Carlos da Graça?

Pinto da Costa: Miguel Trovoada and Carlos da Graça left as free men. Carlos da Graça had been sentenced but was pardoned. He left as a free man; he was not expelled. They can come to their own country whenever they like. We have more to do than arrest people.

Africa Report: At times there have been reports in the foreign press that São Tomé and Príncipe has allowed the Soviet Union to construct a military base on its territory. Could you comment on these stories?

Pinto da Costa: I don't think there is anybody better than you to answer that question! São Tomé and Príncipe is a small country and you have been here for a week. A foreigner who has been here for a week could surely find out if there was a single base here.

There was very intense propaganda to try to isolate São Tomé and Príncipe. They talked about air bases, missile bases, submarine bases. All sorts of things were invented. And what is even more regrettable, there were journalists who never bothered to come here who published all this disinformation—which does no honor at all to their trade.

There are not and there will not be any bases in our country, because we have not won our independence to give it away again. All that propaganda was meant to create the idea that São Tomé and Príncipe is a fief of the Soviet Union. It is not a fief of anyone but the São Tomeans.

Africa Report: What is the role of Angolan troops in São Tomé and Príncipe?

Pinto da Costa: That is an interesting question. I am sure

that, as a journalist, you could put the same question to many European countries, both Western and Eastern, and also to many African countries, in both Central and West Africa. But I also suspect you would not do so.

What happened is that in 1978 we had forces here from Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Cape Verde, and Mozambique, because we needed a significant force and we had none of our own. A country needs to defend its sovereignty. We do not intend to attack anyone and we will not serve as a base of aggression against anyone, but we are entitled to take all necessary measures to defend our sovereignty.

Africa Report: What was the threat you faced?

Pinto da Costa: We had an invasion attempt. We had no means to defend ourselves. Nowadays, with our constructive policy, we do not think these are matters to preoccupy us. We think our policies will allow São Tomé and Príncipe to be a place of peace. We also think that, in our relationship with the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, we will be able to create such a climate of confidence that we will be able to save a lot of money. São Tomé and Príncipe is poor and is not interested in having an army.

But unfortunately, the contingencies of the modern world do oblige us to have the means to safeguard our sovereignty. The Angolans are here within the framework of collaboration among the "five" [the five former Portuguese-ruled African countries], just as we would be in Cape Verde or Guinea-Bissau if that was necessary.

Africa Report: In February 1985, São Tomé and Príncipe hosted a summit conference of the five Portuguese-speaking African countries. What are your objectives as current chairman of the "five?"

Pinto da Costa: You know that the chairmanship of the "five" is a rotating post. For a year—and it is now our turn—the host country has to coordinate all the cooperation underway among the five Portuguese-speaking countries. This year we have been promoting this cooperation in several ways, to consolidate our traditional links and to take common decisions on matters that concern African countries and the world at large. We have the task of mobilizing support for the countries of southern Africa, particularly Angola and Mozambique. I have visited both of them this year to have a close look at the situation there.

We believe we have made a big step forward in cooperation among the "five." We want to create bodies that can ensure execution of the decisions we have taken. As the summits are held once a year and each time in a different country, we need to create a body that can study and draw up perspectives for cooperation. We believe that this year important steps will be taken in this direction and that when our term is over, we will be able to present a positive balance sheet.

Africa Report: How would you characterize the present state of relations with the United States?

Pinto da Costa: We believe these relations are good and have got much better lately. We now have what was missing before—dialogue. There were many matters that neither of us understood, precisely because of the lack of dialogue. Now that our embassy in the United States has been set up and opened, this dialogue will make the improvement in our relations with the United States very promising. □

Combating Cocoa Colonialism

Completely dependent upon the export of a single commodity, cocoa, São Tomé and Príncipe has spent its first decade of independence attempting to rejuvenate the declining industry in order to fuel the diversification of its economy.

BY TONY HODGES

Few African countries are as isolated and little known as the former Portuguese colony of São Tomé and Príncipe which, like Portugal's larger African colonies, gained its independence in the wake of the April 1974 revolution in Lisbon. What other African country has direct air service from Europe only once a month and only three flights a week from anywhere else—two from Luanda and one from Cape Verde?

These two small islands in the Gulf of Guinea, about 175 miles off the coast of Gabon and mainland Equatorial Guinea, experienced more than five centuries of continuous colonial rule after their discovery by Portuguese mariners at the end of the 15th century. As a strategic component in Portugal's far-flung mercantile empire, they served as an entrepôt for the slave trade between Africa and Brazil and were a major producer of sugar cane during the 16th century. In the early 20th century, São Tomé enjoyed the brief distinction of being the world's largest producer of cocoa—before cocoa cultivation began in earnest on the West African mainland.

Today, São Tomé and Príncipe illus-

trate in microcosm—and in extreme form—the problems of an inherited dependence on a single export commodity, plus the difficulties facing a remote island state with a tiny internal market (the population numbers only 109,000) and infrequent, expensive transport links with the outside world.

When the first Portuguese seamen reached São Tomé in 1471-72, they found an uninhabited, lushly forested, and mountainous island, with peaks permanently bathed in rain clouds. Eighty-six miles apart, São Tomé (332 square miles) and Príncipe (55 square miles) are volcanic islands in an archipelago that also includes Ano Bom and Fernando Po (Bioko), now both part of Equatorial Guinea. São Tomé's mountains rise above 6,500 feet and Príncipe's highest peak is about 3,000 feet. Criss-crossed by rivers and streams which descend to craggy bays and inlets, both islands receive very heavy rainfall—up to 240 inches a year in southern São Tomé, and 40-60 inches in the "arid" and less mountainous northeast—the most suitable area for crop cultivation.

There, in the northeastern lowlands, the sugar planters set up their slave-manned *fazendas* in the 16th century. Until the 19th century, the Portuguese made no attempt to penetrate the mountains, which became a sanctuary

for escaped slaves and for a community known as the *angolares*, the descendants of a group of Africans—presumably from the Angolan coast—shipwrecked off São Tomé in 1544.

It was among these runaways and *angolares* that on July 13, 1595, Rei Amador, self-proclaimed King of São Tomé, massed an army of 5,000 that overran most of the *fazendas* and laid siege to the island's capital. Honored to this day in the pantheon of São Tomean heroes, Rei Amador was eventually captured and executed in 1596, but the blacks in the mountains remained a permanent threat to the planters, who saw better prospects across the ocean in Brazil, and began to depart in the early 17th century, leaving São Tomé in somnolent decadence until new cash crops were introduced in the 19th century.

First came coffee in 1800 and then, more successfully, cocoa in 1822. Toward the end of the century, there was a fierce struggle for the land, as Portuguese investors bought out or evicted the local creoles and set up large plantations, known as *roças*. By 1900, São Tomé was exporting 11,482 tons of cocoa, expanding to 36,090 tons by 1912 and 55,830 tons in 1919.

"The islands possess exactly the kind of climate that kills men and makes the cocoa tree flourish," wrote British journalist Henry Nevinson while visiting São

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Cocoa Production (tons)

1973	11,586
1974	7,402
1975	5,831
1976	4,640
1977	7,392
1978	6,080
1979	7,376
1980	7,036
1981	5,688
1982	4,060
1983	4,429
1984	3,378

Source: Ministry of Agriculture.

Tomé in 1905. Nevinson went to the island to investigate labor conditions on the *roças*, and his published findings moved the English Quaker chocolate manufacturers, Cadbury and Rowntree, to boycott São Tomean cocoa.

The cocoa and coffee planters, like the sugar barons before them, needed a large and cheap workforce. This was recruited entirely from outside São Tomé, as the local creole population, the *filhos da terra* (sons of the land), refused to work on the plantations. In 1869, Portugal theoretically abolished slavery, but contract laborers were imported to fill the growing demand for workers. These *serviçais*, often obliged to sign five-year work contracts, were shipped from Angola and other Portuguese colonies.

Until the 1920s, few of them outlived their initial contracts. Mortality rates were very high due to sleeping sickness, and Nevinson reported that one-fifth of them died every year on Príncipe. Nonetheless, the number of *serviçais* on the two islands grew from 16,000 in 1895 to 39,000 by 1921. The labor supply from Angola and Mozambique diminished greatly after World War II, and though extreme poverty drove many Cape Verdeans to São Tomé, the number of *serviçais* began to decline, dropping below 20,000 in the 1950s.

When São Tomé achieved independence in 1975, the cocoa industry on which its economy rested was in historical decline, and the decrease in the labor supply was one of the causes. Addition-

ally, the soil had become increasingly depleted and disease attacked the cocoa trees. From its peak of 55,830 tons in 1919, cocoa production slumped below 10,000 tons a year by the 1950s, and on the eve of independence in 1973, it was at 11,586 tons.

At independence, São Tomé inherited a deeper socio-economic problem. The monoculture plantation economy and the importation of African labor had created a complex and stratified society. At the apex of the colonial system were the Europeans, numbering about 2,000 by the early 1970s. Employed on the plantations was an imported labor force, the *serviçais*, whose population had halved between the 1920s and 1950s. By independence, they numbered about 15,000.

The *angolares* remained isolated in the mountains until the Portuguese penetrated there at the end of the 19th century. At that point, they descended to the coast and became fishermen. To this day, the 5,000 or so *angolares* speak their own language—of African origin. The rest of the population, the *filhos da terra*, or *fórros*, are descendants of the slaves and creoles from earlier chapters in São Tomé's long colonial history. Speaking *fórru*—a language derived primarily from 15-16th century Portuguese—they eked out a subsistence living from tiny plots of land and artisanal trades.

Until independence, there were two parallel societies in these small islands. First there was the world of the *roças*, covering 80-90 percent of the cultivated land, with migrant workers housed in labor compounds similar to those of the South African mines. The *serviçais* could not leave the *roças* without permission and were thus completely isolated from indigenous São Tomean society.

Initially outnumbered by the *serviçais*, the *fórros* gradually became dominant, accounting for at least four-fifths of the population by independence. The decline of cocoa and the *serviçais* class—whose toil built the islands' profits—was accompanied by the growing demographic weight of an economically marginal indigenous population.

It was among the *fórros* that São Tomean nationalism developed in its modern form. A turning point was in 1953 when hundreds of São Tomeans were

slaughtered for protesting Portuguese attempts to get the *fórros* to work on the *roças*. The "wind of change" blowing across Africa had a significant impact on the handful of São Tomean students in Portugal in the 1950s, among them Manuel Pinto da Costa—later to become São Tomé's first president. At age 23, he helped set up the country's first modern nationalist organization—the Committee for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe (CLSTP)—at a secret meeting in September 1960.

The CLSTP faced far greater organizational difficulties than its counterparts on the mainland. The watchful eye of PIDE, the Portuguese secret police, made it impossible for the CLSTP to establish a presence—let alone begin armed struggle—in the isolated islands.

Abroad, the committee's small band of activists was scattered in Europe and Africa and divided by factional disputes. After several years of stagnation, the CLSTP was reconstituted and at a conference held in Santa Isabel, Equatorial Guinea, in July 1972, its name was changed to the Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe (MLSTP). Headquarters were set up first in Equatorial Guinea and later in Gabon, and at the end of 1972, the MLSTP gained OAU recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the São Tomean people.

However, it was not until the 1974 coup in Lisbon that mass anti-colonial mobilization began in the islands. After a wave of strikes and demonstrations organized by a nascent pro-MLSTP "civic association" and a mutiny by São Tomean troops, the Portuguese provisional government signed an agreement with the MLSTP in Algiers on November 26, 1974, setting up a transitional government to prepare São Tomé for independence on July 12, 1975.

The following November 5, a newly elected constituent assembly adopted a constitution establishing a one-party system. Elections to the Popular Assembly were to be held every four years, with candidates selected by the MLSTP. The Popular Assembly would vote to ratify the MLSTP's choice for the presidency and would have the legislative responsibility to "enact the political, economic, social, and cultural line defined by the MLSTP."

What was the MLSTP's ideological outlook? Prior to independence, it had been deeply influenced by the left-wing underground opposition in Portugal and by its sister parties in the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies—the MPLA in Angola, Frelimo in Mozambique, and the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

The MLSTP government took several radical measures in the immediate aftermath of independence. In August 1975, it banned South African aircraft from landing in São Tomé. Free compulsory education and free medical care were introduced. Most important of all, in a decisive move against the symbols of slavery and colonial humiliation, the *roças*, which had already been abandoned by their Portuguese owners, were nationalized on September 30, 1975. About 90 percent of cultivated land was brought under state ownership.

However, it was not until August 1978 that the MLSTP formally spelled out its political philosophy—defining the movement as a “revolutionary front of democratic, anti-neocolonialist, and anti-imperialist forces”—in a set of theses adopted at its first congress. Unlike the post-independence MPLA or Frelimo, the MLSTP did not formally embrace Marxism-Leninism, although its leaders were certainly influenced by Marxist ideology.

The statutes adopted at the 1978 congress defined the MLSTP as a “revolutionary vanguard” operating under the classic norms of democratic centralism. The movement was to be headed by a coordinating council—since renamed the central committee, which currently has 51 members—and a smaller political bureau.

In view of the low level of development in São Tomé's productive forces, the theses argued, “The present socio-economic structure in São Tomé and Príncipe does not permit an immediate socialist revolution.” Instead, São Tomé had to pass through a transitional stage to socialism—a “national democratic revolution”—led by the radical *petit bourgeoisie* which, “identifying with the aspirations of the working masses,” would steer the country along a “non-capitalist road of development.”

However, political homogeneity has

remained an elusive goal. Factional and ideological disputes are commonplace, resulting in expulsions and the departure abroad of former party leaders and cabinet ministers—although the president pledges that they are all free to return.

When the transitional government took office in December 1974, leaders of the civic association and former MLSTP exiles joined forces in an uneasy coalition under the watchful eye of the last Portuguese governor, Lt.-Col. Pires Veloso. Within weeks, the cabinet split over policies toward the *roças* and the colonial army units on the islands. In a tactical alliance, the MLSTP leadership and the governor dismissed two leftist ministers, Gastão Torres (labor) and Pedro Umbelina (information), deporting them to Portugal.

In 1977, a dispute broke out between Pinto da Costa and his conservative health minister, Carlos da Graça, who had been in exile with him in Libreville before independence. Da Graça returned to Gabon and in February 1978 was accused of plotting a comeback with the aid of mercenaries. Pinto da Costa alerted the UN and the OAU that a mercenary invasion was imminent, set up Popular Vigilance and Defence Groups to reinforce the army, and appealed for military aid to Angola, which dispatched 1,000-1,500 troops. The invasion never took place. Several of da Graça's supporters were arrested and da Graça was sentenced in absentia to a 24-year jail term by a “special tribunal for counter-revolutionary acts” in March 1979. He was pardoned by the president a year ago.

Within a month of da Graça's trial, the abolition of the premiership was announced—a move which consolidated Pinto da Costa's power, but led rapidly to a power struggle with Miguel Trovoada, the MLSTP leader who had negotiated the Algiers agreement and served as prime minister since independence.

Popular discontent was growing due to the economic hardships since independence and the frustrations aroused by dashed expectations. Trovoada was accused of instigating anti-government demonstrations which broke out during a census (a traditional focus of dissent) in August 1979. Arrested in October af-

ter being taken from the local UNDP offices where he had sought refuge, Trovoada spent two years in jail before being allowed to go to Paris, where he has lived in exile since July 1981.

Leonel D'Alva, who served as prime minister in the transitional government in 1974-75, is another MLSTP leader who fell out of favor with the president and his supporters. He was dismissed from the cabinet in 1980 and now lives in Cape Verde.

Following food shortages in 1981, there were new disturbances, this time in Príncipe, whereupon Pinto da Costa moved against another rival, Daniel Daio, a veteran of the Portuguese army who was then minister of defense. He was dismissed from the government in January 1981 and later left the MLSTP, but he still lives quietly in São Tomé.

These successive crises caused the party leadership to purge the MLSTP of unreliable members, a process known as “rectification,” which began in September 1979 and required two extraordinary MLSTP assemblies in May 1980 and December 1982.

THE AMBIGUITIES OF DEPENDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

Class, Nationalism, and the
State in Twentieth-Century
Natal

Shula Marks

This multifaceted examination of the foundations of apartheid in South Africa explores the ambiguities manifested in the lives of three remarkable figures: Solomon ka Dinuzulu, heir to the last Zulu monarch; Allison Wessels George Champion, leader of South Africa's largest black trade union; and John Langalibalele Dube. The interests and actions of these extraordinary men intersected during the 1920s and 1930s and have influenced South Africa ever since.



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Pinto da Costa, confirmed as head of the party at the MLSTP's second ordinary assembly last September, and then subsequently re-elected president of the republic by the Popular Assembly, seems to be firmly in control, despite the difficulties facing the economy and the sharp fall in living standards since independence. Party membership increased by 60 percent on the eve of the congress and now stands at just over 2,900—about 5 percent of the adult population.

In foreign policy, the MLSTP opted for a strategy of active non-alignment, combining "peaceful coexistence" with the West and militant support for national liberation movements and Third World efforts to achieve a new international economic order. Close relations were established with the parties and governments of the other ex-Portuguese African countries—especially with Angola, which provides all of São Tomé's fuel needs on concessional terms and has a small garrison of troops stationed in the islands ever since the 1978 mercenary invasion scare.

The Soviet Union operates a small radar tracking station built by the Portuguese on the island of Príncipe, and Cuba has provided training to the country's small army, the *Forças Armadas Revolucionárias de São Tomé e Príncipe*. East Germany, which has been a major aid donor and buys São Tomean cocoa under barter arrangements, has emerged as one of the principal trade partners, purchasing 32 percent of São Tomé's exports and supplying 27 percent of its imports in 1984.

However, economic ties are primarily with the West. Friendly relations have been reestablished with Portugal, whose president, Antonio Ramalho Eanes, paid a state visit in March 1984, and Portugal is still the principal source of imports—providing 34 percent in 1984. Dutch chocolate manufacturers are the main consumers of São Tomé's high quality cocoa; thus the Netherlands is the leading export market. Since 1977, São Tomé has been a signatory of the Lomé Convention and has participated in the annual Franco-African summits for several years. Last year, an embassy was opened in Washington for the first time and President Pinto da Costa paid a state visit to Gabon, consolidating a rapprochement with the conservative Bongo government, which he had suspected of aiding São Tomean exiles in the late 1970s.

Few African countries became independent with as meager economic prospects as São Tomé. The country faced not only the development constraints of geographical isolation (ships call rarely and freight charges are very high) and a minuscule domestic market, but also extreme vulnerability to sharp fluctuations in world prices of cocoa, the source of 80-90 percent of its foreign exchange.

Furthermore, for many years, cocoa production had fallen far below its record levels of the early part of the century. Yet with two-thirds of the cultivable land devoted to it, most of the country's food had to be imported. Very little fish was caught by São Tomé's fishermen, most of whom are *angolares*, using

dug-out canoes. Although many *fôrro* families kept a pig around the homestead and fruit was plentiful, there was barely a tradition of peasant agriculture as 80-90 percent of the land was controlled by fewer than 30 Portuguese *roças*.

The transition to independence laid bare the precarious nature of the plantation economy. Even before independence arrived, about 95 percent of the white settlers had packed their bags and left for Portugal, abandoning *roças* and government jobs alike. The country suddenly found itself without skilled personnel, for virtually no São Tomeans held senior administrative posts either in the *roças* or in the colonial government. In the *roças*, men who had been plant foremen suddenly found themselves catapulted into senior management positions, trying to run complex agribusiness companies.

But the problems were not just of management and technical expertise. The strict discipline of the colonial *roça* broke down. With plantations abandoned by their owners and managers and then nationalized, the workforce celebrated the end of years of subservience—no longer would they be a dragooned, semi-servile labor force.

Cocoa output collapsed from 11,586 tons in 1973 to 4,640 tons in 1976. Subsequently, some progress was made in reorganizing the nationalized *roças* into 15 state agricultural companies and in reviving cocoa production. As the sole significant source of foreign exchange earnings, cocoa had to be restored to former production levels—not only to cover the costs of food imports but also, paradoxically, to finance investments in economic diversification that could one day reduce dependence on this single crop.

By 1979, cocoa output increased to 7,376 tons. This partial recovery was accompanied by soaring prices on the world market which temporarily boosted foreign exchange earnings, disguising the fragility of the islands' economy.

But then came a second blow. The crash in world cocoa prices at the end of the decade sent São Tomé into a downward spiral. As cocoa earnings slumped, there was insufficient foreign exchange to buy vital imports, including pesticides



Tony Hodges

São Tomean fishermen: "Investments have been made in fisheries, which could cover much of the country's protein needs and generate a surplus for export"



Tony Hodges

São Tomé coastline: "Tourism has been non-existent despite the islands' striking beauty and rich culture"

for the cocoa estates and food for workers. A virulent disease attacked the crop, and labor absenteeism grew as workers took time off to cultivate small family plots—on land legally belonging to the state agricultural companies. One more twist to the downward spiral was the drought in 1982-83. By 1983, cocoa production fell to 4,429 tons, and a year later, it was a mere 3,378 tons.

Meanwhile, several initiatives were taken to increase food production. With help from USAID and the Netherlands, two state maize farms were set up. France provided aid for the creation of an experimental maize and vegetable farm at Mesquita. The Netherlands helped set up a cattle-raising station at Nova Olinda, now being funded by UNDP, and the European Development Fund has supported a palm oil project at Ribeira Peixe which could eventually cover the country's cooking oil needs.

Investments have also been made in fisheries, which could cover much of the country's protein needs and generate a surplus for export. The UN's International Fund for Agricultural Development and the German Catholic aid agency, Misereor, have been funding projects to provide motors for the fishermen's dugouts. A small industrial fishing company, Empesca, has been set up at the port of Neves and now has two

ships which fish off the Angolan coast, as São Tomé's own continental shelf is extremely small. By 1984, the fish catch reached 4,289 tons, compared with a mere 377 tons in 1975.

Economic diversification could eventually include industrial processing for export (a successful textile factory has recently been set up with the regional market in mind) and the development of tourism, which has been non-existent despite the islands' striking beauty and rich culture. Tourism development, for which Yugoslavia recently submitted a master plan, will hinge on improving air access and accommodation capacity, though some progress has already been made. A Yugoslav company is putting the finishing touches on a new 100-bed hotel and a \$12 million runway was completed at São Tomé's airport in 1984.

Whatever small steps have been taken to diversify the economy, the unavoidable reality is that São Tomé has suffered because of the collapse of its cocoa industry. By 1984, gross domestic product was 25 percent lower in real terms than it was in 1980, and per capita GDP (\$345) was almost a third lower.

The trade balance, in surplus until 1980, was in deficit to the tune of \$22 million by 1982, with exports covering less than a third of the costs of imports. A small trade surplus (\$1.2 million) was

restored in 1984, but only by cutting imports to the bone. By these draconian means, the balance of payments deficit on current account, which had reached a record \$31 million (equivalent to 81 percent of GDP) in 1982, was cut back to \$400,000 in 1984, but at the cost of severe shortages of food, consumer goods, and inputs for the cocoa estates. With the state agricultural companies heavily in the red, requiring large subsidies from the government, the state budget has drifted deeper and deeper into debt. By 1984, the balance of payments deficit had reached \$26.4 million, equivalent to 72 percent of GDP.

The crisis finally forced the government to rethink its economic strategy. In January 1985, the president, who is himself an economist (he received a Ph.D. in East Germany in the 1960s), dismissed the planning minister, Agapito Mendes Dias, taking on the portfolio himself—with the assistance of a young secretary of state for planning, Agostinho Rita, who had just returned from Portugal with an economics doc-

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torate. Rita was asked to draw up a recovery program, and turned for assistance to the country's most successful private businessman, Jorge Coimbra—one of the few whites who remained after independence, choosing São Toméan citizenship.

Together they proposed sweeping reforms, which gained the approval of the government and were endorsed by the MLSTP's second ordinary assembly in September. The overall thrust is to reduce the state's role in the economy and to attract foreign capital and management skills to São Tomé.

One of the first measures to be implemented last April was the liberalization of trade, which was previously almost entirely monopolized by two state companies, Ecomex for import-export trade and Economin for internal wholesale trade. Both companies have been given a more restricted mandate, allowing private traders to import and distribute all

but 12 basic necessities. Programs were also begun to distribute seeds, pigs, and land to private farmers, who until 1985 received very little support from a government preoccupied with state farms.

UNDP has been asked to help evaluate the potential benefits of membership in the Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale, a customs zone which groups the francophone equatorial states and since 1983, the former British colony, Equatorial Guinea. The latter joined the franc zone in January 1985 and its experience is being watched with interest in São Tomé—though no decision has yet been reached to give up the local currency, the dobra, for the benefits of the French-backed CFA franc. Another plank in the reform program is the drafting of a liberal investment code, which was due to be completed by the end of last year.

Perhaps more eloquent than any other move, the government has invited foreign firms to assume the management of the state agricultural companies. This attempt to harness much needed foreign managerial and technical expertise is being accompanied by injections of capital to rehabilitate the cocoa estates from agencies such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the French Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique.

As a sign of confidence in the future of São Toméan cocoa, no less than 17 companies, from as far afield as France and Malaysia, recently bid to take on management of two estates due to receive \$7 million in aid from the World Bank. Hopefully, this belated attempt to revive the cocoa industry will allow São Tomé to make up the ground lost since independence—and move forward toward its long-term imperative of economic diversification. □



Tony Hughes

Textile factory: "Economic diversification could eventually include industrial processing for export"

The MNR: Opponents or Bandits?

Documents captured at the MNR's base in Gorongosa last year have provided some startling insights into the clandestine relationship between the armed movement and South African military intelligence. This *Africa Report* exclusive examines the background and objectives of the newest form of external aggression in southern Africa.

BY MOTA LOPES

Last August in Lisbon, a Portuguese spokesman for the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), which claims to be fighting to overthrow the government of President Samora Machel, declared that by December his group would gain control of Maputo, the country's capital. "That's where we're going to celebrate Christmas," he said.

Normally such a peremptory statement might have caused a great commotion. Instead, it prompted a feeling of déjà-vu, for every year, from 1982 through 1985, the same words are used to make the same promise to whoever wants to listen. Nearly every year, the international mass media hasn't hesitated to carry the news. Nevertheless, many Christmases have come and gone without any substantial change in the situation.

A war with extremely serious implications continues to be waged in Mozambique. Principally confined to the rural areas, the war has had a disastrous effect on the country's economic output, wreaking destruction on its main transportation routes both within the

Mota Lopes, a Mozambican journalist, is a researcher and deputy director of the African Studies Center at Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo.

country and to its neighbors. Along with the droughts and massive floods which have hit large parts of the country over the past years, the war is the main cause of the extreme poverty and famine which has afflicted thousands of Mozambicans.

The presence of armed aggressors in the country can be traced back to 1976. Until the end of 1979, their activities paralleled direct armed aggressions by the military forces of the rebel colony of Southern Rhodesia and later by South Africa. From 1981, the conflict spread to almost all of the country's provinces, and in early 1984, the MNR reached Maputo province in the south.

As a result, the already frail and highly dependent economy which was inherited from centuries of Portuguese colonialism came close to total collapse. During 1982 and 1983—the peak years of its activities—the MNR caused damages officially estimated at \$3.8 billion. If the extensive indirect losses are added, this figure climbs to nearly \$4.5 billion, equalling the estimated amount of Mozambique's debt to Western countries. This calculation includes the systematic destruction of the agricultural, industrial, and transportation infrastructure, but omits the heavy social costs stemming from disrupted educational,

health, and welfare projects. The statistics of destruction—over 1,000 schools and health centers, 140 villages, and 900 stores, most of which were privately owned, either burned down or brought to ruin by the armed groups during that period—can only faintly express those social consequences and their future impact.

The war in Mozambique has also caused the death of thousands of children, women, and elderly people in the rural areas—through acts of intimidation which include destruction and plundering of a particularly brutal and terrifying nature. According to several impartial observers, massacres, abductions, rape, and brutal and arbitrary murders of Mozambicans and foreigners alike have become the painful routine. Although Portuguese colonialism came to an end in June 1975 after a long liberation struggle led by Frelimo, Mozambicans have been unable to celebrate their 10 years of independence in peace.

In its assessment of the conflict which continues within its borders despite the non-aggression pact signed with South Africa in March 1984, the Mozambican government perceives the MNR as a terrorist organization which takes orders from the South African Defense Force (SADF), whose well-known goal

is to destabilize southern Africa, especially Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Though for many years it denied any involvement, the Pretoria government has recently publicly admitted its direct involvement in the expansion, training, and financing of the MNR.

This essay about the *modus operandi*, sources of support, and history of the MNR summarizes some of the preliminary conclusions of a longer study on the war in Mozambique and its effects. There is evidence to support the view that throughout its 12-year history, the MNR has never been a true movement of political opposition to the Mozambican government. Contrary to what is often said, the situation in Mozambique is far from a civil war in which legitimate national forces are fighting to topple a regime altogether or to gain a share of power for some oppressed social strata that is not represented in the government.

Above all, the MNR's operations in Mozambique represent a new type of foreign aggression in Africa. The instrument is a military unit created in Southern Rhodesia in 1972 to carry out acts of counter-insurgency and the gathering of strategic and operational information in other countries. Following Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the unit was transferred to South Africa. There, South African military and intelligence services have transformed it into a powerful war machine whose present objectives are all too clear—to defend and maintain apartheid and South Africa's political and economic dominance in the region.

Mozambican government spokesmen have stated recently that the current military situation in the country can be characterized as an attempt by the army to consolidate and continue the important operations conducted during the second half of last year. At that time, with the support of the Zimbabwean army, the government launched a major offensive on the country's central region. Conducted simultaneously with other operations in the south and north, the aim of the offensive was to occupy and destroy the MNR's complex system of operational camps and bases in the Gorongosa region. Here, the presence of both forest and savannah as well as abundant sources of water and high

mountains offered excellent conditions for guerrilla tactics. It is also in this region that the MNR's headquarters were located; from the so-called *Casa Branca* (White House), its military chiefs coordinated and launched operations against seven of Mozambique's 10 provinces.

The government's occupation of the area was an important tactical success as it secured and reactivated the international roads and the pipeline between the city of Beira and Zimbabwe. Also, and perhaps as important, the Mozambican army was able to gather large quantities of MNR documents and reports which the rebels had left behind in the *Casa Branca* in their hasty flight.

Part of these documents, known as the Gorongosa Documents, have already been made public and provide proof of the permanent contacts between the MNR's central base in the region and the military intelligence headquarters in Pretoria, as well as the frequent visits to the region by high officials and advisers of the South African government. The captured documents also show how Pretoria continued to direct and supply the armed groups while it was engaged in the peace negotiations before the signing of the Nkomati Accord and how it designed alternative strategies for pursuit of the war after the accord was reached.

In August and September of last year, the Mozambican army also staged an offensive in the southern part of the country, occupying Malungane, the rebels' main base in the region, 50 kilometers from Maputo. Though the MNR's main strongholds in the south were destroyed in the operation, sporadic attacks against civilians as well as against agricultural, industrial, and commercial centers, and transport continue to occur. These missions are made possible by South Africa's direct supply of the MNR and by the existence of sanctuaries across the border. In some areas of the northern provinces of Zambia and Tete and along the Malawi border, there is a similar situation. Many believe that here the MNR's supply lines come from Malawi, where they are also believed to find protection.

Although the effects of the war are still felt, the overall picture at the beginning of this year points to a recovery by the Mozambican army. As a result of

the "mopping up" of more and more regions, new programs to improve living conditions and provide assistance to the most affected areas are being conducted. Yet the prevailing view among government officials is that the victory over "banditry" is still far from complete and will demand renewed and even more intensive neutralizing operations.

The relief programs launched to assist the populations most affected by the conflict—especially the 70,000 people who live in the Gorongosa region—have brought to light valuable information about how the MNR relates to the population. The MNR's spokesmen never tire of boasting about the positive reception the guerrilla movement receives throughout the country. They often point to the rebel government network they have established in the past years in the so-called liberated zones, especially Gorongosa, and their words echo those of modern guerrilla movements. Yet if the population of Gorongosa is to be believed, words are the only similarity between the MNR and a genuine guerrilla operation.

It is clear that the armed groups have never been able to fulfill the basic requirements for a sound relationship between the guerrilla and its social support structure—an effective link with the people, the predominance of political factors over purely military aspects, and formation of provisional administrative structures and alternatives to the established power. To the contrary, apart from destruction, MNR contacts with the population are characterized by authoritarianism and repression. Instead of providing a political platform and some form of social organization, the power of their weapons speaks the loudest, perhaps explaining the disoriented flight of the people whenever the MNR is said to be approaching.

This has two consequences. First, the MNR must use brutality, kidnappings, armed coercion, and blackmailing as its recruitment methods. Secondly, villages that are situated within their zones of operation and influence are surrounded by their camps and heavily armed check points. These networks of control aim at concentrating the people in small areas; circulation within them is restricted and access is permitted only to food production centers. Usually, the

MNR's operational centers are located within these restricted areas; their lines of huts are surrounded by people often living under open sky or in tents. The armed groups' leaders rely on the people living around their bases as sources of food and water for their troops and women. Also, the people living near their bases act as a shield against surprise attacks and bombings by government forces.

Daily life in these areas revolves around satisfying two criteria—security and food. Here no form of administration or organization exists that could be the seed of a rebel government. Authoritarianism, repression, and militarism are its key features. Frequent punishment, mutilations, and arbitrary executions are the means used to avoid any rebellion or opposition to the burdensome daily obligations imposed by the armed groups' commanders.

Obligated to provide a large part of their food production to the MNR, the villagers suffer from inadequate nutrition, which primarily affects the elderly, women, and children. However, this problem would be much more serious if the peasants did not hide part of the food they produce. After the government operations in August, many of the families in the Gorongosa region showed government soldiers and officials stationed there how they concealed food. Under such conditions, the mortality rate from malnutrition, sickness, and war casualties rises rapidly.

In their contacts with the population, the leaders of the armed groups frequently argue the importance of regional and ethnic factors to the detriment of the concept of national food, providing public and formal recognition of the traditional local chiefs and their families as partners in the exercise of power.

Nevertheless, given their daily acts of repression and their exercise of strict military control, this recognition often transforms itself into serious contradictions over the exercise of power between the bearers of arms—the MNR—and the traditional chiefs, invariably resulting in the summary execution of one of the armed leaders. André Matade Machangaíssa, the first leader of the MNR, was killed in 1979 when a group of traditional chiefs in the



Peasant woman from Manica province whose ear was cut off by MNR forces: "MNR contacts with the population are characterized by authoritarianism and repression"

Mozambique Information Agency

southern region of Gorongosa, feeling deceived and offended by the methods of force used against the population by Machangaíssa and his men, revealed his whereabouts to the Mozambican armed forces.

The execution of terrorist acts is another one of the principal characteristics of the MNR's mode of operations. According to various observers, the use of terrorism as a means of assuming power constitutes an integral part of the exclusively military training of the armed groups provided at bases in South Africa and the interior of the country. Acts of terrorism are undertaken for their publicity value and to guarantee the docility of the population.

However, these terrorist acts also derive from the apolitical nature of the group—the absence of cadres and an ideology or program minimally relevant

to the needs of Mozambique—and constitute an instrument of military aggression serving interests and objectives antithetical to the national interest. Since at least 1981, some of the MNR's leadership abroad became aware of this reality, announcing the need for the politicization of the MNR.

Efforts to this end, which were referred to publicly in an interview in a weekly Portuguese newspaper in 1981 with the MNR's then-secretary-general, Orlando Cristina, and on the program, *Voz da Africa Livre*, in August 1983, produced no results. The politicization efforts undertaken in 1983 resulted in serious internal contradictions and in a power struggle which ended with the assassination of Cristina in Pretoria and in the summary execution or expulsion of his supporters. Evo Fernandes, of Portuguese nationality,



Mozambique Information Agency

President Samora Machel inspecting captured weaponry at Gorongosa

became the MNR's new secretary-general.

Thus, the philosophy of the group is based on the systematic negation of Mozambican politics and of all the accomplishments and projects of its government. Its anti-Marxist line, which aims to attract sympathy and support from the West, reflects a glaring absence of serious analysis of the national reality and the problems which affect Mozambique today. At times, full of contradictions and of positive references to the system of colonial exploitation, the MNR's philosophy provides no alternatives or effective solutions for the country's current problems. It is not coincidental or for lack of effort in this sense that the group has never succeeded in attracting to its ranks intellectuals or other segments of the Mozambican population who emigrated or exchanged their difficult situation in the country for a better life abroad. The history and conditions which spawned the MNR's creation afford an understanding of the reasons for this situation.

In effect, the group—which after Mozambique's independence was first known as the Resistance, then as the Movement of National Resistance, and

finally as the Mozambique National Resistance or Renamo—was initially created by the Central Intelligence Office (CIO) of Southern Rhodesia in 1968. The CIO's model derived from the counter-insurgency methods applied by the British in defense of its empire in Malaysia, Aden, Cyprus, and Kenya. Secondly, PIDE's (the Portuguese secret police) formation of the *Flechas* during the colonial war in Angola, and later in Mozambique, also served as a model.

Kenneth Flower, director of the Rhodesian security forces at that time, recently revealed this for the first time during a long interview. He affirmed, "I had made frequent visits to Angola during this period and knew that the Portuguese had created a movement via PIDE called *Flechas*. It was a sort of pseudo-guerrilla group whose principal objective was to obtain intelligence. I thought that it was the type of thing we could promote in Tete. And I managed to obtain agreement at least in the beginning that we could start to operate on a small scale in the Tete district in 1968."

For the Rhodesians, it meant creating an instrument which, composed of Mo-

zambicans, would be the eyes and ears of the CIO in Mozambique at a time when Zimbabwean liberation forces, benefitting from the advance of Frelimo guerrillas from the south and their activities along the Tete and Manica border, had become a growing threat to the rebel Rhodesian regime in a region previously considered secure. It would also allow for the defense of Southern Rhodesia beyond its borders and would permit the Rhodesians to overcome their lack of trust in the information that was transmitted to them by the Portuguese. Given the difficulties that the CIO would encounter in the formation of these groups, they only started operating in 1972. Composed of deserters and Frelimo prisoners captured by PIDE, they were trained by an official of PIDE who was transferred from Angola for this purpose.

In the period following the April 25, 1974 coup d'état in Portugal and the coming to power of Frelimo in Mozambique, hundreds of Portuguese and Mozambicans who during the colonial war were part of the repressive forces flocked to Southern Rhodesia. Contrary to what is generally believed, they did not belong to the CIO groups, for the CIO distrusted the soldiers who had lost the war and wanted to maintain the operational secrecy of their pseudo-guerrillas. In the meantime, in 1976, a group of PIDE agents, the majority ex-*Flechas* who fled across border with their white officers, were integrated.

The new Mozambican government's condemnation of the rebel colony of Southern Rhodesia, its closure of their common border, and its application of sanctions as decreed by the United Nations were the main reasons behind the expansion of the initial group of pseudo-guerrillas. This group needed a larger base closer to the border with Mozambique and named Machangaíssa, an ex-Frelimo fighter, as their first leader. He had escaped from a Mozambican prison where he was serving a sentence for petty crime. Also at this time, the CIO named the group "the Resistance." Kenneth Flower affirms: "We had to give them a name, and therefore we came to call them the Resistance, later the National Resistance Movement."

The intensification of Rhodesian military aggressions against Mozambique

led the rebel colony to view the Resistance as a potential instrument of sabotage and intimidation to be used against the Mozambican government in the interior of the country. However, the CIO categorically opposed this. Said Flower: "This was not the purpose. In other words, the group would lose its original mission as strictly an instrument of intelligence gathering and we did not want that." In order to overcome this divergence, new groups of Mozambicans were created and trained within the Rhodesian special forces which although independent from the CIO, were also designated as the Resistance. On the outskirts of Salisbury, the propagandist radio station known as the Voice of Free Africa was created.

Operationally, these groups, as well as the pseudo-guerrillas of the CIO, were used in the two main provinces of the center of the country, Manica and Sofala, as well as in Tete and Gaza. The use of Gorongosa as a broadcast station and base dates back to this period. The brutality of their methods—the indiscriminate assassinations, sabotage,

massacres of entire villages, and plundering and destruction—led to their being known as "hyenas" or armed bandits—titles which remain until today.


In March and April of 1980, with the imminent independence of the Republic of Zimbabwe, both the groups who worked for the CIO and those who were used by the special forces were transferred to South Africa, accompanied by several of their Rhodesian and Portuguese officials. Rejected by the civil security forces of South Africa, they were received by the military and immediately taken to a base in northern Transvaal. Although their exact numbers are not known, diverse estimates put their total at between 2,000 and 4,000 men. Approximately 1,000 men divided into various groups remained in the interior of Mozambique. The first effective gesture of support from the South Africans was the supply of arms, ammunition, and combat rations to these groups via secret night airlifts beginning the week after Zimbabwe attained independence.

In South Africa, the MNR and its leadership, recruitment, training, sup-

ply of ammunition, integration, and operations began to be coordinated by the Directorate of Special Operations of the Military Intelligence Section (MIS) of the South African armed forces, representing a total redefinition not only of its objectives, but also in part of its characteristics. Three fundamental aspects define this change.

In the first place, the group came to be considered as the principal instrument for the destruction of the Mozambican government and the seizure of power. The then-prevalent view among Pretoria's strategists was that the Mozambican government, seriously debilitated by Rhodesian aggressions, would be unable to endure organized armed destabilization for more than two or three years. Therefore, this would be the ideal period in which to demonstrate the efficiency and efficacy of South Africa's new and more aggressive regional policy in the defense of apartheid. At the same time, in April 1980, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference was founded, uniting all independent countries of the region that

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consider Pretoria as a threat. In the U.S., a new administration which by all indications would be more friendly than its predecessor toward South African designs was to take power within a few months. Thus, the timing was considered opportune.

Secondly, according to the military intelligence section of the South African armed forces, the number of MNR contingents needed to be multiplied several times to allow them to operate in all of Mozambique's provinces. Thousands of Mozambican workers in South Africa and those in hiding there were easily blackmailed in a vast recruitment initiative. Later on, armed coercion was used when necessary in order to spread this recruitment effort throughout Mozambique's interior. The new contingents then began to train in special bases in South Africa—particularly in Phalaborwa. Up until 1984, approximately 2,000 men per year were enlisted in South Africa. In addition, from 1981 on,

elements inside Mozambique were also trained by South African officers who went to Mozambique for that purpose.


Thirdly, South African military intelligence attempted to establish the MNR—primarily in Mozambique, but also in Western Europe and the United States—as a legitimate movement of anti-Marxist opposition to the Mozambique government. To this end, a political section was created composed of Portuguese ex-residents of Mozambique living either in Pretoria or in Lisbon. This political section supplied the propaganda, reinitiating the broadcasts of the Voice of Free Africa, and from 1983 on, provided the new name of the Mozambique National Resistance or Renamo.

Simultaneously, what later came to be known as the Portuguese component of the MNR was revived. It consisted of former colonialists with economic or political interests in Mozambique—businessmen and Portuguese capitalists still

living out the neo-colonialist dreams which had been destroyed by the coup in Portugal. Political forces in Portugal looking to recuperate their lost positions were led to believe that a recolonization of the country would be made possible through the MNR. A vast and complex system of political and financial assistance involving diverse transportation and import-export companies was expressly created for this purpose, launched with South African and other financing.

In 1981, the armed groups reinitiated their action in Mozambique, following direct interventions by the South African armed forces in the beginning of the year in Manica against the roads and railway installations to Zimbabwe, and in Tete, against the energy lines of Cahora Bassa. These were the first attacks in a long series which from the middle of the year and after a brief phase of economic recuperation found the country once again in a large-scale military aggres-

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sion, causing a new decline in its economic conditions and capacity for production.

It was also at the end of 1981 that Gorongosa became the MNR's main base. In addition to their operations in the provinces of Manica, Sofala, and Tete, it was from Gorongosa that they advanced to the provinces of Niassa and Zambezia in the north and toward Gaza and Inhambane in the south. When operationally necessary, the special forces of the SADF intervened directly in the territory in order to permit this advance, while the land and air infiltration and resupply routes were augmented by the use of the sea and the Mozambican coast via ships and submarines. Documents collected in Gorongosa in September 1985 confirm these facts.

In this new offensive, the main targets of attack—the civilian population, infrastructure, routes of commerce and production—explain the objectives that they set out to achieve—the paralysis of the economy and the fall of the Mozambican government. The infrastructure and the communications system in the country are crucial to the economies of the neighboring countries, especially Zimbabwe, and for the development of SADCC.

The response of the Mozambican armed forces against this generalized aggression began to make itself felt in the middle of 1983. In August the year before, an important meeting of Frelimo's central committee concluded that it was necessary to intensify the struggle against the MNR in all of the affected provinces. In order to do so, the distribution of arms to the people in the rural areas and in the cities would be necessary. Simultaneously, the central committee placed the economy on war-time footing and intensified its diplomatic efforts on an international scale in denouncing South Africa's role in the destabilization of the region.

These measures were immediately applied and in the process of destroying the MNR's offensive apparatus, the Mozambican armed forces were able to count on an unexpected ally—the drought and floods which affected regions of Mozambique where the armed groups were stationed. According to Mozambican sources, by December 1983, the MNR's offensive had been

broken and ceased to constitute a danger to the government and the state. Pretoria's predictions of a rapid seizure of power in Maputo and of the Mozambican government's vulnerability proved to be wrong.

The about-face in the security situation in Mozambique was reflected in its conversations with South Africa leading up to the signing of the Nkomati Accord. By December, South Africa had changed its firm opposition to Mozambique's conditions and demands. The victorious manner in which Mozambique viewed the accord—which surprised many people—is directly related to this; hence, Nkomati was considered a success both in the diplomatic and military arenas.

However, neither the military operations nor South Africa's acceptance of Mozambique's conditions, which ended in the signing of the Nkomati Accord in March 1984, put an end to the MNR's activities in the country. In January last year, they initiated attacks in the province of Maputo for the first time, following what Mozambican sources described as a massive infiltration of men and arms in the region. As of last May, new infiltrations by land, sea, and air, aimed at the urban center, provoked a renewed aggravation of the war. An attempt at infiltration with the support of a large group of mercenaries was blocked in the north.

Mozambican analysts concluded at that time that a new phase of aggression had begun, with the armed groups continuing to be supplied by sectors of the South African military apparatus—particularly their intelligence services. The documents recovered at Gorongosa confirm this analysis. Citing excerpts of some of these documents at a press conference, Minister of Security Sergio Vieira affirmed: "This phase shows how the South African military prepared for the transition of the bandits from an organic extension of the SADF to a force ostensibly independent of South Africa. And it showed how they organized the transition from direct and open support to a more clandestine means of support."

The documents, which consist fundamentally of three diaries written over a period of three years by one of the secretaries of the MNR leadership, showed

that in the phase immediately preceding the signing of the Nkomati Accord, the South African military had reorganized the armed groups for the period which would follow the signature, rearming and resupplying them for at least another six months. They had additionally infiltrated and trained new contingents in "massive numbers." Finally, they had organized clandestine links between the armed groups and South Africa and through the latter, with other foreign countries. According to the documents, the objective was to force the Mozambican government to share power with the MNR, as distinct from the phase initiated in 1981 which sought to overthrow the government.

The diaries lead one to believe that the new phase coincided with worsening divisions within the Pretoria regime, with high-level military leaders not sparing insults nor accusations of treason against the top politicians who were considered responsible for the signing of the Nkomati Accord and were apparently more inclined to abide by it.

The intensification of reconnaissance operations and the neutralization of the armed groups in the center, south, and north of the country were the main Mozambican response to this new phase, while relations between South Africa and Mozambique declined to their lowest point ever. Due to incapacity or the bad faith of its government, as President Samora Machel asserted, South Africa did not fulfill the Nkomati Accord. Ultimately both the Pretoria government and the military once again began insisting on the necessity of putting an end to what they considered to be a civil war in Mozambique, again emphasizing the necessity of a "political accommodation" between the MNR and Frelimo—in other words, power-sharing.

This is seen by Mozambicans as a flagrant infringement on their independence and sovereignty and therefore it is considered unacceptable. While the army is being reorganized and supplied with the most advanced weaponry possible to prepare for what could be a new escalation of violence, the Mozambican people's unanimity on this issue is indisputable. "We have already spoken with the true leaders of the MNR—the South Africans—at Nkomati," it is said. "There is no one else to talk to." □

Robert Mugabe

Prime Minister, Zimbabwe

In an interview granted shortly after the joint operations by Mozambican and Zimbabwean armed forces against the MNR's stronghold in the Gorongosa region of Mozambique, Prime Minister Mugabe outlines the effects of South African destabilization of the region and explains why the Zimbabwean military is assisting in its neighbor's offensive against the rebels.

INTERVIEWED BY MOTA LOPES

Africa Report: What are the main forms of South African destabilization against your country?

Mugabe: South Africa has tended to pursue a strategy of destabilization that varies in terms of its tactics from country to country in the southern African region. Where they have found a ready-made group of bandits, as they did in Mozambique with the Mozambique National Resistance [MNR], which was a creature of the Rhodesians, they give it further training, arm it, equip it, and reinforce it with mercenaries and then depend on it to carry out their acts of destabilization. Similarly in Angola, they made use and continue to make use of UNITA. But over and above that, they also have carried out their own blatant acts of aggression through the South African [armed] forces. And this they have done in both Mozambique and Angola.

With respect to Zimbabwe, early in 1981-82, they tried to infiltrate commando groups of both whites and blacks from this country, but we annihilated every group as they came in. Then they stopped doing this and relied much more on the economic destabilization of Zimbabwe by aiding the bandits in Mozambique to attack the rail system that serves us—the Maputo and Beira lines—the pipeline, and the road infrastruc-

ture. And we have really been affected over the last three or four years. But together with the Mozambicans, we have managed to protect the pipeline, the rail lines, and the road from Beira.

But now, the South African strategy is taking yet another form. They are grooming dissident elements from ZAPU—the former ZIPRA elements—retraining them, arming them, and giving them direction. In small groups, they are harassing and assassinating our people. And we are greatly disturbed that in this blatant manner, South Africa continues to harass our people and to commit acts of murder in our territory—and manages to get away with it with impunity.

This is therefore the mode South Africa is pursuing in its own strategy to destabilize Zimbabwe. Basically the strategy is to create both political and economic chaos in the country leading to the overthrow of our government.

Africa Report: You referred to the actions of the MNR in Mozambique as another means of destabilizing Zimbabwe. To what extent are they a menace to your country?

Mugabe: The MNR bandits are a very serious menace to the independence of Zimbabwe in two ways: directly, as they attack the rail system in Mozambique that services Zimbabwe—the lines to Maputo and Beira. They also attack the pipeline and the roads that we use to Beira, Tete, and to Malawi. They are a direct menace and are directly affecting our economy, as well as of course affecting Mozambique's economy in that the benefits that Mozambique should receive will not accrue to it because the system is disrupted and the volume of exports and imports tends to be reduced.

Mota Lopes, a Mozambican journalist, is a researcher and deputy director of the African Studies Center at Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. Part of this interview was filmed and excerpts will be used in a movie, The Struggle for Peace in Southern Africa, produced by Kanemo, a private communications enterprise, for release worldwide in the second half of 1986.

Above and beyond that, the infrastructure that has been created in Mozambique costs money and as they destroy the infrastructure there, they actually are destroying capital investment by Mozambique. So this is the direct way in which they are destabilizing us.

Indirectly, as they operate to try to overthrow Mozambique, they affect the independence of Mozambique, thereby also affecting our independence. Let it not be forgotten that our independence was born out of the independence of Mozambique and that the independence of our two countries are intertwined. To us it is one process, one leading to the other. There has also been interaction of our two movements, Frelimo and ZANU, in establishing our independence and trying to consolidate it. So, if Mozambique's independence is affected adversely, ours will also be affected. If the government led by President Samora Machel falls, then we know that the enemy will have succeeded in creating a reactionary regime in Mozambique and reversing the socialist trend that is in motion there.

Ultimately, this will mean that the process in Zimbabwe will also be reversed, that the political order we have created will be affected, and perhaps our government will also be overthrown. And so as we see it, the survival of Mozambique is our survival. And hence there is that unity in the nature of our struggle. As I have said before, in assisting Mozambique, Zimbabwe is assisting itself. The military assistance we are giving to Mozambique we are giving to ourselves.

Africa Report: What was the significance and importance of Mozambique's independence for the liberation struggle and independence of Zimbabwe?

Mugabe: The significance of Mozambique's independence to Zimbabwe is very great indeed. Some people tend to forget that before Mozambique was independent, we had immense difficulties in carrying out our struggle here.

From 1972 to about 1974, we combined forces in Tete with Frelimo in order to give our guerrilla struggle an orientation. Frelimo had an early political, ideological, and military start and therefore we felt we should groom some of our leading cadres by combining them with Frelimo's fighting cadres in Tete, so they could gain experience on the ground on how to carry out the liberation struggle.

After they had done so, in 1972, they started a new front in the northeastern part of our country, and this went on until 1974. The enemy became very jittery and very frightened. Hence a dialogue was started at the end of 1974, in order to bring about cessation of the struggle that was by then gaining momentum in the northeastern part of our country. All this derived from Mozambique's experience.

So when Mozambique became independent in 1975, there was a whole country next to us with not only a longer experience in carrying out a liberation struggle, but now with a geographical area readily at our disposal. And so we made use of it. We created rear bases in Manica, Sofala, Tete, and Gaza and on the strength of those rear bases, we launched our victorious struggle, especially from the beginning of 1976 to the end of 1979, when the Lancaster House Conference was convened.

In Mozambique, not only did we enjoy ready geographical bases, but we also enjoyed the support of Frelimo, the support of the government led by President Samora Machel, and the support of the people. All this was a contribution—very immense indeed—to our struggle.

Toward the end, we also had FPLM [Mozambique's Armed Forces] soldiers right here in Zimbabwe, joining hands, joining forces with our own ZANLA forces and fighting a common enemy. So at the end, our victory in 1980 became our victory together. And this is the unity that history has created out of our two peoples.

We cherish that unity. We don't want to see it severed. So the enemy of Mozambique becomes our enemy, and the enemy of Zimbabwe is Mozambique's enemy. And this the enemies of our two countries should not forget. Hence, we go to the rescue of each other.

Africa Report: What would Zimbabwe have achieved in terms of development had it not been faced with South African destabilization? In other words, what is the cost of destabilization against Zimbabwe?

Mugabe: The destabilization policy being pursued by the Pretoria regime has cost us a lot in terms of money, manpower, and diversion of our resources.

With respect to Zimbabwe, our most natural harbors are the Mozambican ports of Beira and Maputo. They are the closest to us and here I wish to remind those in imperialist circles who think that we should use South African ports that until President Samora Machel declared sanctions against Rhodesia in 1976, the Rhodesian government led by Ian Smith was sending its goods and importing commodities through Mozambican ports—more than 84 percent of its imports and exports. This was the most natural thing for them to do. But with the imposition of sanctions, they naturally diverted this traffic of goods to South African ports.

Hence, we had wanted to divert most of our goods to ports in Mozambique. But with the attacks taking place in Mozambique, it has not been possible for us to do this. With the railway system constantly disrupted, we are compelled to have the greater volume of our goods flow through South African ports, which is more expensive—there is also this aspect to be considered.

Over and above this, because of South African support of bandits inside Zimbabwe, we are having to deploy forces in Matabeleland, for example, to ensure that the "super-ZAPU" elements do not become as systematically organized as UN-ITA or the MNR tend to be. And so we have to spend money in defense which we would rather spend in development projects. And all the time, we must train our militias, strengthen our [armed] forces, and equip our army and air force because we must be ready for the eventuality of an attack by South Africa.

As a small country, we do not need as large an army, we don't need to equip our army with the weaponry that we are now seeking. This would be unnecessary in circumstances in which South Africa recognizes the principle of peaceful coexistence. But South Africa will not do that. And so we have had to go on spending money for defense.

Africa Report: How do you assess the present situation in South Africa and its evolution in the near future and in the long-term?

Mugabe: The situation in South Africa is a cause of great concern to the frontline states. Zimbabwe feels that not enough has been done by the international community to bring pressures to bear on the Pretoria regime to force it to desist from its policy of apartheid.

Africa. But in our case, we later realized that non-violent and purely political struggle, even when reinforced by boycotts, strikes, and demonstrations, can never overthrow a regime which is armed to the teeth.

That regime is dependent on guns for its own sustenance in power. And only by arming the people and leading them through political and ideological direction can you eventually overthrow an armed reactionary regime.



Margaret A. Novicki

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe: "The enemy of Mozambique becomes our enemy, and the enemy of Zimbabwe is Mozambique's enemy"

But we feel gratified that the masses in South Africa, especially the non-white masses, are now building up tremendous resistance against apartheid; that they are no longer prepared to live under the system of apartheid and that they prefer to die; and that they are offering their own resistance so that this can lead eventually to the overthrow of apartheid.

But we do recognize the limits to which an unarmed people can continue to offer this kind of resistance. The resistance that they are offering is reminiscent of the purely political resistance we once led in this country, especially in the 1960s when the masses were being arrested, dogs were set on them, and police shot callously at any mass demonstration. We had this perhaps to a lesser extent, but the same thing was happening here.

We notice therefore that history is repeating itself in South

And so one is gratified that the efforts of the liberation movements in South Africa—the ANC especially, and the PAC—are building up and that sooner or later there will be greater participation and greater involvement of fighting cadres in the struggle—so that the military thrust can be reinforced by the mass demonstrations and the other political forms of struggle. Those really must be supportive of the military form of struggle. And one would want to see this military form of struggle build up.

But for now we are gratified that the world is growing more and more aware of the situation in South Africa, that some countries are now proposing sanctions against South Africa. We would want these sanctions to increase and be reinforced, but in a context in which the military struggle, led by the liberation movement, takes the forefront. □

Broken Promises?

Over the past year, the Reagan administration has sought to repair relations with Mozambique, encourage its economic reforms, and reduce its dependence on Soviet bloc assistance. However, the U.S. government appears unwilling to provide Maputo with its most urgent need—military aid to combat the South African-backed MNR rebels.

BY SAM LEVY

Ronald Reagan may be the most popular man in Maputo. A crowd of television viewers in the Mozambican capital breathed a deep sigh of satisfaction when the American president grasped Samora Machel's hand and murmured "amigo" during a recent special broadcast of their head of state's official visit to Washington last September. American visitors to the Mozambican interior are often shown pairs of pants or sneakers by smiling citizens and told that "Reagan sent me these," and Maputo residents fondly recall the "Reagan's butter" they enjoyed courtesy of the U.S. emergency food aid program for this drought-stricken nation.

The United States, vilified at public rallies only four years ago, is widely regarded by Mozambicans as the country's best friend abroad and the most likely source of aid for national economic recovery. The Soviets, by contrast, are generally dismissed as surly racists who "only send us arms."

But if some Mozambicans predicted that the country's ubiquitous Russian military advisers would be declared "24/20s"—given 24 hours to leave the country with 20 kilos of baggage—upon Machel's return from Washington, they

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were badly mistaken. Despite its dramatic rapprochement with the United States, the Mozambican government remains more dependent than ever for its survival on Soviet and allied military aid.

The guerrilla war waged by the rebel Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) has reached the suburbs of the capital, and no Western power, including the United States, has proved politically able or willing to supply the military hardware necessary to stave off or contain the guerrilla threat. The urgency of the Machel government's security needs are beginning to make the limits of improved relations with the U.S. apparent.

Those relations are the best they have been since the former Portuguese colony attained independence in 1975. The United States had supported Portugal, a NATO ally, against the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) during the nationalist movement's 10-year liberation struggle. Despite some sympathy in Kennedy administration circles for the message and person of Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, Frelimo's founder, the U.S. closed ranks behind Portugal soon after Frelimo began its guerrilla insurgency in 1964, and especially after Mondlane's assassination in 1969 and the radicalization of the succeeding leadership's political rhetoric.

Most of the training and equipment provided to Frelimo during the colonial

war came from the Soviet Union and other socialist states, which were well represented at independence day celebrations in Maputo in June 1975 and in the early years of the nation's economic and political life. The U.S. was not invited to the independence ceremonies, and diplomatic relations were not established until six months later.

Relations grew quietly, with the U.S. providing modest loans and ignoring occasional bursts of hostile political rhetoric, until 1981 when four American diplomats were accused of being CIA spies and expelled from Maputo. In retaliation, the U.S. did not immediately replace its absent ambassador and refused Mozambique's request to purchase Boeing aircraft. The alleged spy incident, along with long-standing American concern that Mozambique might grant Soviet requests for an Indian Ocean naval base, caused bilateral relations to wither.

It took a drought, with its devastating human consequences, to restore good relations. When Mozambique made an international appeal for disaster relief in 1982, the U.S., along with its Western allies, responded promptly and generously. By fiscal year 1983/4, Mozambique was the largest recipient of U.S. emergency food aid in the world; another 170,000 tons of food were sent the following year. By April last year, the most plentiful items in Maputo's otherwise empty markets were shopping



Joel Chiziane/Mozambique Information Agency

Green zone near Maputo: "U.S. officials in Maputo have gently urged Machel to reform party agricultural policy"

bags stitched from used American food aid sacks. The U.S. ambassador to Mozambique, Peter Jon de Vos, recently estimated that total aid to Maputo in FY 1985/6 would be between \$60-65 million.

Not all that aid is emergency food. For some time, U.S. officials in Maputo have gently urged Machel to reform party agricultural policy, and promised help if he did. After years of declining agricultural production, the government began to rethink its policies. In the early years of independence, along with Eastern bloc technicians, Frelimo had implanted Soviet agricultural models with disastrous results. Private holdings were consolidated into huge state farms, to be worked with expensive imported machinery. But the skilled labor needed to properly operate and maintain the equipment was lacking, as was the capital to purchase spare parts and the incentive to produce.

Changes made at the fourth Frelimo party congress in April 1983 included removing disincentives to private commercial and peasant farmers and raising controlled producer prices. The promised U.S. aid, \$8 million in 1984 and \$13 million in 1985 (granted to private

sector farmers at congressional insistence and administration preference), soon materialized.

U.S. embassy officials in Maputo regard these and other recent domestic policy changes as the result of growing American influence in Maputo. Ambassador de Vos expressed satisfaction at the Machel government's decontrol of vegetable prices in May 1984 and the new policy of allowing companies to retain 25 percent of their hard currency earnings to buy supplies abroad. The new, liberal foreign investment code and the warm welcome given American trade delegations are considered further fruits of redoubled diplomatic labors.

Mozambican foreign policy has also given American proponents of bilateral rapprochement reason to smile. The much-feared Soviet naval base was never granted. Long wary of Western-based international organizations, Mozambique joined the IMF and the World Bank in 1984 and the Lomé convention shortly thereafter. State Department officials regard the country as tied to the Western aid and trade network and moving toward "genuine non-alignment." Anti-American polemics have virtually disappeared from the state-

controlled press and party officials' speeches.

Recent Mozambican positions on regional southern African questions, including Namibian independence and apartheid in South Africa, are considered compatible with American goals. Moderate rhetorical support was even won for the Reagan administration's policy of "constructive engagement," bitterly criticized by most frontline states. Asked in Washington last September whether he thought the U.S. was doing enough to bring about change in South Africa, Machel tactfully replied that it had made "an excellent start."

But U.S.-Mozambican relations may have peaked at the Reagan-Machel White House meeting in September. For despite its generously open hand—which is acknowledged by Frelimo officials and for which the average Mozambican is grateful—the U.S. cannot give the Machel government what it most desperately needs—massive, short-term military aid.

It isn't that there is no will in the State Department to begin a military relationship with Mozambique, but that Congress has repeatedly blocked the way. Neither of the administration's proposals for token amounts of "non-lethal" military assistance to Maputo—\$1.2 million in FY 1984/5 and \$3.2 million in FY 1985/6—passed unexpectedly vehement opposition in both the House and Senate. The more recent proposal, in fact, provoked such a violent congressional response that the entire aid package to Mozambique was briefly imperiled.

The Helms amendment to the FY 1986 foreign aid bill put conditions on all non-food aid to Mozambique—including presidential certification of human rights progress, the reduction of foreign military personnel to 55 advisers, and a demonstrated commitment to free elections—that were unacceptable and offensive to Machel's government. In Maputo, de Vos hurriedly took to national radio to announce that the Helms amendment was certainly not administration policy.

Although the amendment was written out of the bill's final version, conservative activists in Congress had made clear their jaundiced view of American aid to an avowedly Marxist

country with large numbers of Soviet and allied military advisers. The critics were unmoved by arguments that some "non-lethal" aid was necessary if Mozambique was to be weaned from its military dependence on the Russians. Conservative antipathy toward Machel had not dampened by the time of his visit to Washington: A full-page ad published in the *Washington Times* suggested that President Reagan was being misled by excessively liberal State Department advisers and ought never to meet with Machel.

The Mozambican president may have failed to achieve one of his and the State Department's primary goals in visiting Washington (a trip undertaken despite the opposition of hardline, pro-Soviet elements in Frelimo)—to make enough friends in the American Congress and media to overcome conservative opposition to a U.S.-Mozambique military relationship. At last word, American diplomats in Maputo seemed pessimistic about the chances for passage of a military assistance package for Mozambique in FY 1986. And if the Reagan administration cannot deliver a token \$3.2 million in jeeps and radios, the Machel government can write off the prospects of enough American arms to secure the MNR-ridden suburbs of Maputo, let alone to confront the rebels on a nation-wide scale.

Nor have Frelimo's recent overtures to other potential Western suppliers proven promising. While the British agreed to train some Mozambican sergeants in neighboring Zimbabwe, this small-scale program doesn't begin to address the government's urgent needs. Army Chief of Staff Sebastião Mabote's anticipated visit to Portugal last August to request training for a "rapid deployment force" (a term used by a Mozambican academic with close ties to the Frelimo government) was postponed and later cancelled when the new Portuguese government proved predictably cold to the idea of sending military personnel to Africa. Mabote reportedly then flew to East Germany to make a similar request.

In early November, Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano led a delegation—including Economic Affairs Minister Jacinto Moso, the architect of the 1984 Nkomati Accord with South Africa and

generally regarded as pro-Western—to the Soviet Union to shore up relations with Mozambique's primary military supplier.

Should the Soviets or East Germans, with whom the Mozambicans have increasingly close relations, raise their military profile in Maputo, the congressional consequences for U.S. policy in Mozambique could be devastating. Critics could use the heightened Eastern bloc military presence as an argument against further military or other aid proposals. The administration might be obliged to reduce or renege on its commitments to Machel, and the vicious circle of Mozambican military dependence on its Eastern bloc allies would be closed. But the Mozambican president may feel he has no other choice but to appeal to the Soviets if his government is to resist the rebel advance on the capital.

However, a higher Eastern bloc military profile in Mozambique might provoke the intervention of a regionally more powerful interested party—South Africa. The U.S.-brokered Nkomati Accord was supposed to buy surcease from the South African-supplied MNR rebels. At considerable cost in personal prestige among his fellow African leaders, Machel agreed to withhold support from the African National Congress (ANC) if the South Africans cut off aid to the MNR.

Although Machel expelled ANC guerrillas from Mozambican territory, it is clear, especially since the capture of

MNR documents at the rebels' Gorongosa headquarters last August, that the South Africans did not live up to their part of the agreement. Mozambican charges of South African duplicity were made at a Maputo news conference just before Machel met with Reagan on September 19, a tactic no doubt calculated to help him ride a wave of sympathy in the American press and Congress. Reagan expressed his "distress" at the news—but little else.

Frelimo strategists' timing in publishing the Gorongosa documents just days before the White House meeting may have been off. Instead of provoking a sense of mutual betrayal by South Africa, the announcement may have confirmed some administration officials' disposition to walk quietly away from the increasingly disappointing Nkomati Accord. Once celebrated as a triumph of constructive engagement, Nkomati is increasingly seen as a liability to that policy.

The accord was heralded as a remedy for "cross-border violence" and a model for peaceful relations between South Africa and its neighbors, but since it was signed, MNR attacks in Maputo and other provinces have increased and tensions between the two signatories have risen. With what is left of constructive engagement's good name in jeopardy, the Reagan administration seems to be lowering its stake in Nkomati. One senior American official was quoted during Machel's U.S. visit as saying: "I wouldn't look at that agreement as a



Presidents Reagan and Machel at the White House: "The urgency of the Machel government's security needs are beginning to make the limits of improved relations with the U.S. apparent"

great U.S. accomplishment. We weren't even in the room when it was signed."

In Maputo, the mild, qualifying language of the official American reaction to South African violations of Nkomati was taken as a signal of just how far the U.S. would go to defend its new Mozambican friends at the expense of its old South African ally. In addition, it seems that Machel went to Washington with expectations quite different from those of the State Department. Frelimo strategists regarded the Machel visit as a necessary condition for more economic assistance: The Mozambican president's charismatic public presence and new rapport with Ronald Reagan, it was supposed, would be the final twist of the faucet needed to start the aid really flowing.

In retrospect, these expectations were inflated, and observers in Maputo note a sense of disappointment in government circles at the lack of immediate results from the trip. State Department officials, on the other hand, regarded the visit as the well-earned wages of constructive engagement and four years of considerable financial outlay for Mozambique, as well as an opportunity for Machel to influence middle-of-the-road congressmen in his country's favor.

When the U.S.-Mozambique rapprochement began in 1982, long-term planning for economic recovery and good neighborliness with South Africa suited both parties' needs. Neither side, however, counted on Mozambique's internal security situation deteriorating so quickly. In the past four years, MNR activity has spread to all 10 provinces of the country and intensified in most, and not only because of South African ammunition. Frelimo's policy of radical social transformation, including communal labor and rural "re-education," antagonized a deeply traditional rural population and created fertile recruiting ground for the rebels.

Moreover, since Nkomati, the MNR has diversified its sources of foreign support and no longer depends exclusively on South Africa. Consequently, a politically negotiated cut-off of South African aid—perhaps at American insistence—is no longer sufficient to end the

rebel threat. With the guerrillas attacking almost nightly in the capital's suburbs and the demoralized army unable and unwilling to respond effectively, the Mozambican government's priorities have changed; U.S. policy, however—outpaced by events and hamstrung by congressional reservations—remains the same.

"The U.S. cannot give the Machel government what it most desperately needs—massive, short-term military aid."

Only Eastern bloc governments, free of the domestic political constraints peculiar to the U.S., can address Machel's urgent short-term needs. That lesson was dramatically reinforced when the government's largest ammunition dump in Malhazine, a Maputo suburb, blew up hours before Machel spoke at the United Nations last September. The Malhazine depot, which supplies the army in all 10 provinces, was filled with Soviet ammunition. Fresh from his debut in Washington, Machel was obliged to ask the Soviets to replace the destroyed stock.

The Machel government is caught between a rock and a hard place: Its short-term needs for Eastern bloc military aid are politically incompatible with its long-term interests in closer economic ties with the United States. The short-term seems to be getting even shorter: On December 6, MNR guerrillas dynamited a bridge over the Nkomati River, severing the vital rail link with South Africa and making the capital's supply lines that much more precarious.

What happens next in Mozambique and how it affects relations with the U.S. will in some measure be a function of decisions taken in Harare and Pretoria. Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's request for Soviet military cooperation to address the perceived South African threat was made in part

because so many Zimbabwean troops—7,000 to 10,000 by current estimates—are tied down fighting MNR guerrillas in Mozambique.

Pretoria's attitude toward the Machel government may depend on its perception of just how much the badly tarnished Nkomati Accord is worth in the world public relations market. Ironically, Maputo's denunciation of Pretoria's violations, instead of embarrassing the South Africans into compliance (or at least pledges to comply), may impel them to tacitly write off the accord and supply the muscle necessary to force Frelimo to negotiate directly with the MNR. Domestic events and recent incursions into Angola and Botswana have damaged the South African image abroad so severely that it may be indifferent to the international opprobrium more South African-supported violence in Mozambique would certainly provoke.

U.S. policy in the short-term will depend on how Machel reacts to growing South African and MNR pressure. If the Mozambican president decides to negotiate with the rebels, the U.S. would most likely support the talks and perhaps act as a financial guarantor to any settlement. Although State Department officials have never supported direct negotiations between the two sides in Mozambique and publicly contest the MNR's claim to legitimacy ("neither Christian nor democratic," said Chester Crocker recently), most recognize that the war can only be ended by some form of mutual political accommodation. Recent developments in Maputo and Lisbon suggest that some sort of Frelimo-MNR talks—mediated perhaps by the Catholic church—may occur early this year.

If, on the other hand, Machel elects to resist South African pressure, attempts to roll back rebel advances on a national scale, and turns increasingly to his Soviet and allied military suppliers to help him do so, relations with the U.S. would be harmed in rough proportion to congressional perceptions of a "Soviet tilt." And if the Russians extract their long-coveted Indian Ocean naval base as the price for massive immediate help, the damage to U.S. relations would be irreparable for a long time to come. □

Healing Old Wounds

While the decolonization process which ended with the independence of Portugal's five colonies in Africa was a particularly difficult and bloody one, a decade later, relations have reached a more cooperative level based on shared political and economic interests.

BY VICTOR DE SÁ MACHADO

Looking back on Lusophone Africa's decade of independence from Portugal, two trends have been evident in relations between the colonial power and its former colonies: The Portuguese have demonstrated a clear political will to overcome the traumas that accompanied decolonization, and a similar attitude is apparent on the part of its former colonies, though at different levels of conviction and at a different pace in each of the countries.

There are strong feelings that cooperative relations between the former colonial power and the newly sovereign countries will serve the fundamental interests of both sides. However, there are difficulties that arise, due in part to the aftermath of the decolonization process and also to the manner in which these countries achieved independence. Today, among the larger of the five new states, problems stem from the complexities of their own development process, for which it is often easier to blame the former colonizer.

There is no such thing as a pleasant decolonization process, and Portugal's case was no exception: Decolonization was initiated within the context of the revolution in continental Portugal. At a certain point, the revolutionary pro-

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cess, which began with the April 25, 1974 coup, changed orientation under the influence of certain groups who supported internationalist doctrines. The resulting process of decolonization was disorderly and disconnected. There was no defined program to create the conditions necessary for a peaceful transition based on non-controversial institutional structures and embodying the minimum consensus needed to ensure internal stability and peace.

For the smaller countries—Cape Verde and São Tomé—the independence process was not quite as difficult: They did not experience protracted liberation wars and were able to maintain a certain homogeneity which helped accelerate the building of a state structure. This was also the case with Guinea-Bissau and to a certain extent Mozambique, though for different reasons—while they both fought fierce wars, they were waged by a single liberation movement in each country, helping to foster unity among different ethnic groups.

The political unity of the ruling class and among the different ethnic forces—molded during the long, bitter wars—provided an important cohesive factor, conferring undeniable legitimacy on the governments which were formed during the decolonization process. Those governments were recognized as legitimate political partners, both within the country and internationally.

However, there was a very different situation in Angola. A country of enormous potential and considerable resources, strategically important, and bound to play an important role in the southern African region, Angola experienced the most difficult decolonization process of all of Portugal's former territories. The existence of three liberation movements with different ethnic and ideological affiliations, their relative difficulties in winning the war, and the absence of a common front posed additional problems for Portugal during the transfer of power.

The Organization of African Unity's recognition of the three liberation movements and the Mombasa and Alvor agreements between these movements placed them on equal footing vis-à-vis the colonial power, forcing Portugal to confer with all three in trying to reach a common platform in order to ensure not only a peaceful transition, but also the unity of the Angolan nation.

This was to be a difficult task and a complete failure. In spite of the agreement made at the Alvor conference, the three movements were unable to reach an agreement, and it was impossible to prevent certain ideological predilections within Portuguese ruling circles from making their influence felt. Finally, both open and covert superpower interference transformed the issue of Angola's independence into another facet of the East-West conflict.



United Nations/J. P. Laffont

Demonstration in Luanda supporting MPLA, November 1975: "Portugal only recognized the MPLA government after the OAU and most Western countries had done so"

This situation explains why the formal proclamation of Angola's independence on November 11, 1975 was not followed by a transfer of power to any of the liberation movements who were still fighting among themselves, and why international recognition of Angola's independence was not followed by the recognition of an Angolan government. There were two self-proclaimed governments—the MPLA's People's Republic of Angola in Luanda, and the Democratic Republic of Angola in Huambo, led by UNITA and the FNLA. Portugal only recognized the MPLA government after the OAU and most Western countries had done so, which did not help to improve relations between Luanda and Lisbon.

A pro-Third World alignment had been a tempting foreign policy orientation for the revolutionary governments. After the approval of the new Portuguese constitution in 1976, the Portu-

guese Communist Party began to lose power as the revolutionary governments gave way to constitutional government. As a consequence, the country gained more internal stability and adopted a clearer and more open foreign policy.

Portugal reassessed its foreign policy commitments, and made its options more consistent with its own geopolitical position. Adopting what could be called "a new project with new designs," its foreign policy became focused around its prospective integration into the European Economic Community. In pursuit of this objective, Portugal was required to take into account its traditional links with Europe as well as other historical factors—its strategic importance in the Atlantic and its privileged ties to Africa, especially the new Portuguese-speaking nations. The constitutional governments—both left and right wing—which have followed the 1974

coup have all favored preferential relations with the former colonies and have succeeded in conducting these relations in a peaceful manner based on national consensus.

Along with a clearer definition of its foreign policy goals regarding Africa, Portugal has made efforts to establish bilateral relations on the principle of non-interference. It sought to replace direct contacts between the ruling political parties with more appropriate state-to-state relations, as there was no longer any justification for a policy based on principles of international solidarity. Further, Portugal placed great emphasis on developing a policy of cooperation with those countries, creating appropriate structures for its implementation.

This made it possible to reduce obstacles of an ideological nature and to move toward a healthier relationship focusing on those factors likely to bring the countries together in hopes of averting further friction and mistrust. In making efforts toward cooperation with the ex-colonies, Portugal is attempting to safeguard the vital interests which are shared by all parties and their mutually valued heritage, best represented by the use of the Portuguese language. Language is a natural and important vehicle for cooperation, which can help open new avenues beyond formal relations and establish deeper solidarity between peoples.

With the exception of Cape Verde and São Tomé, the former Portuguese colonies find themselves confronted with the monumental task of building national unity, an essential prerequisite for internal stability, peace, and development. From the colonial power, the Lusophone African countries inherited borders which could not be altered and which had to accommodate various nations and ethnic groups who lived together peacefully before only under the iron hand of the colonial rule. After independence, faced with the typical weakness of their institutional structures, these new countries needed to build a state before they could establish a nation—unity being a necessary component for nation-building.

The existence of different ethnic groups, whose identities were not suppressed by colonization, is the cause of

much of the internal unrest in Angola and Mozambique, and now possibly in Guinea-Bissau. Instability resulting from old conflicts between ethnic groups is an important factor complicating normal and unprejudiced relations with the former colonizer—and it is the latter that ultimately is blamed for the new countries' problems.

This seems to be the case with Angola, which has been cooling its relations with Portugal. Angolan leaders argue that Portugal has not been strong enough in its opposition to UNITA's alleged activities against the Luanda government. These charges have little basis, as the Portuguese government's attitude is exactly the opposite. In fact, it is a small ultra-rightist press—which does not reflect popular opinion—which should be blamed. Nevertheless, Angola's charges indicate the importance it attaches to Portugal's policies and its role as a potential moderator of internal conflicts.

Because of its unique relationship with Angola, Portugal can assist in mediating the current instability, but also in times of peace, it can offer invaluable aid because of the common language and its familiarity with Angola and its cultural realities. This has added significance because of the disappointing results of cooperation between Angola and countries of the Eastern bloc. With little knowledge of Angolan realities, these

countries have limited their cooperation to the supply of military hardware and expertise. It is a cooperation for war, not development; in developmental terms, their contribution has been insignificant and inadequate.

In conclusion, one could say that after 10 years, relations between Portugal and its former colonies are satisfactory. Due to the commitment of all parties to reestablish relations after years of conflict, they are unexpectedly good—if it is realized that a decade is a relatively short period, especially given problems of opposing ideologies, interference by powerful internationalist forces, and unfavorable conditions for the building of state structures.

With the smaller countries, relations are excellent and are improving every day. The same could be said of Mozambique, with which Portugal has already solved former disputes. As far as Angola is concerned, existing difficulties are mainly the result of its problematic internal situation. It is hoped that an improvement in relations will occur as such difficulties begin to ease. Peace would clarify Angola's own foreign policy objectives and allow it to make policy choices which reflect its real economic needs. Peace is a precondition for development and achieving a settlement of the war in Angola should be the international community's major concern. This will also enable Angola to perform the

role that it should in the southern African region.

In terms of development, Portugal's contribution is indispensable to Lusophone Africa. Portugal's efforts in assisting development are apparent in the bilateral cooperation programs which have been implemented in various sectors of the former colonies' economies. Again, language plays a key role, as well as the emotional ties that link the peoples of the countries.

Economic cooperation between Portugal and its former colonies has reached a considerable level despite Portugal's own domestic financial difficulties. Nevertheless, Portugal has granted credit lines for the purchase of consumer goods and equipment; it has also supplied direct services, especially in education, health, and technical and industrial development. A considerable number of Portuguese professionals—*cooperantes*—are employed in the former colonies, thus contributing to their national reconstruction.

It is worth mentioning the support given by Portugal in providing training at various levels, advice in the formulation of sectoral development policies, in health services and medical personnel, and in the creation of basic infrastructure. Even military cooperation is not excluded from this framework of cooperation as long as it does not involve Portugal's dispatch of troops. □

Books Received

(Inclusion in this list does not preclude the review of a book at a later date.)

- Ajayi, Ade J.F., and Crowder, Michael. *Historical Atlas of Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 144 pp., \$75.00.
- Benson, Mary. *South Africa: The Struggle for a Birthright*. Cambridge, Mass.: The International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, U.S. Committee, 1985, 314pp., \$17.00 cloth, \$9.00 paper.
- Epale, Simon Joseph. *Plantations and Development in Western Cameroon, 1885-1975: A Study in Agrarian Capitalism*. New York: Vantage Press, Inc., 1985, 233pp., \$12.50.
- The Hunger Project. *Ending Hunger: An Idea Whose Time Has Come*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985, 393pp., \$35.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.
- InterAction. *Diversity in Development: U.S. Voluntary Assistance to Africa*. New York: InterAction, 1985, 49 pp., \$6.00.
- Kent, Tom, and McAllister, Ian. *Management for Development: Planning and Practice from African and Canadian Experience*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1985, 110pp., \$22.75 cloth, \$9.50 paper.
- Kibreab, Gaim. *Reflections on the African Refugee Problem*. Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1985, 128pp., \$25.00 cloth, \$7.95 paper.
- Mandela, Winnie. *Part of My Soul Went With Him*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1985, 150pp., \$5.95.
- Marsh, Dave. *Sun City: The Struggle for Freedom in South Africa. The Making of the Record*. New York: Penguin Books, 1985, 128 pp., \$8.95.
- Patinkin, Mark. *An African Journey*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1985, 48pp., \$4.95.
- Ranger, Terence. *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985, 333pp., \$35.00.
- Ritter, E.A. *Shaka Zulu*. New York: Penguin Books, 1985, 411 pp., \$4.95.
- Saitoti, Tepilit Ole. *The Worlds of a Maasai Warrior*. New York: Random House, 1986, 144pp., \$16.95.
- Seidman, Ann. *The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa*. Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1985, 157pp., \$19.95 cloth, \$8.95 paper.
- Swantz, Marja-Liisa. *Women in Development: A Creative Role Denied?* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, 170pp., \$27.50 cloth, \$11.95 paper.
- Tangri, Roger. *Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann Educational Books, Inc., 1985, 146pp., \$12.50 paper.
- Timberlake, Lloyd. *Africa in Crisis: The Causes, the Cures of Environmental Bankruptcy*. Washington, D.C.: Earthscan, 1985, 232 pp., \$5.50.

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US\$40.

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
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