AMERICA'S LEADING MAGAZINE ON AFRICA

AFRICA REPORT

JULY-AUGUST 1986 FOUR DOLLARS

The Commonwealth and South Africa: THATCHER'S GAMBLE

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Sudan's Shifting Alliances • OAU and the Special Session • U.S. Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics
SADCC's Six Years • Chirac, Mitterrand, and Africa

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Photo Credit:
The cover photo of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group was taken in London at Marlborough House by the South African Morning Newspapers.

Thatcher's Gamble

Although the mission of the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group was ended by Pretoria's attacks on the frontline capitals and the internal state of emergency, the group's endorsement of sanctions may be a catalyst in forcing Western governments—in particular Margaret Thatcher's—to re-evaluate their South Africa policies.

BY JOHN BATTERSBY

When South Africa was expelled from the Commonwealth over the race issue in 1961, few heads of government could have foreseen that they were merely papering over the cracks. A quarter of a century later, the issue of South Africa's domestic policies is once again threatening the unity of this unique club of former British colonies.

The report of the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group (EPG) marks a watershed in South Africa's relations with the international community. Although the EPG failed in its six months of intense shuttle diplomacy to achieve any one of its five main objectives, it has paved the way for a fundamental shift in the West's foreign policy toward South Africa.

First, it has ruptured Western Europe's psychological barrier against imposing economic sanctions on South Africa and has bolstered the moral argument that sanctions are the only alternative to a pending apocalypse in which hundreds of thousands could die and Western commercial interests would be totally destroyed.

Secondly, the report has firmly established the African National Congress (ANC) as an indispensable part of the South African solution, thus further undermining Western inhibitions about a closer relationship with the oldest and major liberation movement seeking to overthrow the Pretoria government.

When some 44 Commonwealth heads of government met beside the dazzling turquoise waters of the Bahamas in October last year, Britain's Margaret Thatcher faced what seemed like an inevitable showdown with the rest of the club. Even the Commonwealth's other Western members—Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—had joined the call for sanctions, and the British government was totally isolated.

As the 10-day summit progressed, Thatcher began to warm to Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke's idea for a group of Commonwealth emissaries to promote dialogue between black and white in South Africa as a last-ditch attempt to ward off comprehensive mandatory sanctions. The part Thatcher did not like was that the peace mission should be backed up by a package of economic and political signals to Pretoria with the threat of worse to come if a set of specific objectives were not achieved within a six-month period.

But Thatcher took the gamble and went along with the peace mission idea while making a "tiny little" concession to sanctions by agreeing to some further "measures" against the Pretoria government. In return, Thatcher seized upon what she believed would be an important element in the quest for a negotiated settlement in South Africa—a suspension of violence.

She believed this was a carrot she would be able to sell to President P.W. Botha to enlist his cooperation in the dialogue plan. The EPG was thus mandated "to initiate a process of dialogue in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides." The other objectives were to secure:

- a declaration from President Botha that apartheid would be dismantled and specific and meaningful action taken to fulfill that intent;
- a termination of the existing state of emergency;
- the immediate and unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners; and
- the establishment of political freedom, specifically the lifting of the ban on the ANC and other political parties.

It was with this seemingly impossible mandate that the EPG was entrusted. To assist them in their task, the Commonwealth agreed to a package of sanctions, which include:

- a ban on all new government loans to the Pretoria government and its agencies;
- a readiness to take unilaterally what action may be possible to preclude the import of krugerrands;
- no government funding for trade missions to South Africa or for participation in exhibition and trade fairs in South Africa;

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- a ban on the sale and export of computer equipment capable of use by South African military forces, police, or security forces;
- a ban on new contacts for the sale and export of nuclear goods, materials, and technology to South Africa;
- a ban on the sale and export of oil to South Africa;
- a strict and rigorously controlled embargo on imports of arms, ammunition, military vehicles, and paramilitary equipment from South Africa;
- an embargo on all military cooperation with South Africa; and
- discouragement of all cultural and scientific events except where these contribute toward the ending of apartheid or have no possible role in promoting it.

With the exception of the ban on krugerrands, whose sales had dropped to almost nothing anyway, and the cut in government money for trade missions, the measures had already been endorsed in a similar package adopted by the European Economic Community (EEC) two months earlier. They also served the useful purpose of bringing Britain in line with the U.S. sanctions package enacted by a presidential decree in September last year to preempt tougher moves in the U.S. Congress.

Cynics at the Nassau summit were convinced that Thatcher was merely playing for more time on the sanctions issue so as to avoid the painful choice between trade with Africa and Commonwealth unity—the latter a question of sentiment and deference to the Queen rather than realpolitik—and the consequences of comprehensive sanctions on Britain's $1.5 billion trade with South Africa. But heads of government who listened to Thatcher's commitment to break with apartheid and promote a Lancaster House-style dialogue in South Africa seemed impressed with her sincerity.

There was an awareness too that the collapse of the South African currency and the foreign debt crisis—which followed the calling in of some of the country's $24 billion in foreign loans by certain banks—had somewhat overshadowed the likely impact of limited sanctions.

And so it was that Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath Ramphal set out on a round of shuttle diplomacy to assemble the mission with the rather pretentious name of the Eminent Persons Group. Thatcher knew that she was taking a political risk by effectively entrusting Britain's South African foreign policy to a motley group of former politicians, a cleric, and a black woman president of the World Council of Churches.

The group had a clear four-to-three Third World bias and even its Western co-chairman, former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, had a strong commitment to sanctions. A bid by Britain to secure leadership of the group under Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe failed when Ramphal insisted that the group should not be made up of serving politicians. So Thatcher opted for as safe a nominee as she could find—Lord Barber of Wentbridge, a former conservative chancellor of the exchequer and chairman of Standard Chartered Bank, a leading British bank with a major stake in the Standard Bank of South Africa.

The other appointment which was to prove crucial to the fortunes of the group was that of the other co-chairman—Nigeria's Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, the joint nominee of Zambia and Zimbabwe and the man who devised Ni-

Bernard Bisson/Sygma

Cape Town, South Africa: "The exchanges between the EPG and Pretoria revolved initially around the consequences—and later the meaning—of violence"

geria's federal constitution and returned the country to civilian rule, albeit shortlived, in 1979. His direct and affable style and his understanding of ethnic divisions in a plural society probably had more to do with the EPG getting as far as it did than any other factor.

The other members of the group were Dame Nita Barrow, a former president of the World Council of Churches from Barbados; Archbishop Edward Scott, primate of the Anglican Church of Canada and a friend of Bishop Desmond Tutu; Sardar Swaran Singh, a former Indian foreign minister; and John Malecela, former Tanzanian foreign minister.

To ensure that the EPG would not be subject to Britain's manipulation once it had discharged its mandate, it was agreed that the group would report to a seven-nation committee consisting of Britain, Australia, Canada, the Bahamas, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and India, again ensuring that the initiative stayed firmly in Third World hands.

The EPG report would form the input for a special meeting of the seven-nation committee whose task would be to decide on the imposition of further "measures"—a term used throughout the Nassau Accord to meet Thatcher's refusal to endorse the principle of economic sanctions.

In the event that the EPG failed to make adequate progress toward initiating a dialogue, some Commonwealth countries would consider the adoption of further measures. But Britain dissented from the consensus here, arguing that it was not fair to ask Pretoria to negotiate with a gun to its head. Nevertheless, the list was clearly drawn up with Britain in mind and most Commonwealth leaders indicated that they were prepared to go considerably further than the reserve list. The list of further measures was:

- a ban on air links with South Africa;
- a ban on new investment or re-investment of profits earned in South Africa;
- a ban on the import of agricultural products from South Africa;
- the termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa;
- the termination of all government assistance to, investment in, and trade with South Africa;
- a ban on all government procurement in South Africa;
- a ban on all government contracts with majority-owned South African companies; and
- a ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa.


Camerapix

Margaret Thatcher and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda: "Thatcher was merely playing for time on the sanctions issue so as to avoid the painful choice between trade with South Africa and Commonwealth unity"

Armed with carrot and stick, the EPG set out on an unlikely and seemingly impossible mission—to achieve in six months what Britain had failed to in 1910 and what a combination of black resistance and international pressure during 37 years of Nationalist rule had failed to do—to bring the ANC and the minority government to the negotiating table. Few observers gave the mission even the slightest chance of success. But the considerable diplomatic skills of Secretary-General Ramphal and the Commonwealth secretariat's formidable resources should not have been underestimated.

There were three major elements which ensured that the EPG was to receive special treatment: Thatcher's personal intervention with Botha to urge him to cooperate in a plan which Britain believed could keep sanctions at bay and help begin a meaningful dialogue; the prospect, however slim, of a reduction in the level of violence inside the country; and the scrupulous observance of an undertaking to refrain from public statements about South Africa and to conduct their work in a low-key and discreet manner.

As the mission progressed, it became clear that the group was being given unprecedented treatment and access for a foreign mission—let alone one which included members naturally hostile to the Pretoria government.

During a preliminary visit by the two co-chairmen and two subsequent visits lasting a total of three weeks, the group had unimpeded access to leaders across the political spectrum—from jailed ANC leader Nelson Mandela to President Botha himself.

Anecdotal stories abounded. Gen. Obasanjo had clearly made an impact on all sides. At one meeting, he put his arm around Defense Minister Magnus Malan and quipped: "We generals understand, don't we. . . " Foreign Minister Pik Botha described Obasanjo as "a man in touch with the realities of Africa."

Mandela's respect for Justice Minister Kobie Coetsee was conveyed to the group and at the second meeting, Mandela said he had no objection to Coetsee sitting in.

But there were tense moments as well. The only meeting with President Botha did not go very well. The group felt he was lecturing them like children. During one poignant silence, Obasanjo said: "I was also a head of state and I found there was more to governing a country than killing people." Botha was apparently at a loss for words.

Then came the ill-fated meeting with Foreign Minister Pik Botha at the beginning of the second full visit in May. He arrived 20 minutes late and then exploded in a fit of temper when the group expressed impatience about the timetable for Pretoria's response to its "possible negotiating concept" (PNC).

Given the details of the PNC, it was little short of miraculous that the EPG had judged Pretoria's initial response as reason for a second visit in May following a two-week visit in March/April. The PNC formed the basis of the whole initiative which appeared at one stage to be making surprising headway.

In terms of the PNC, the Pretoria government would be required to: remove the army from the townships and provide for freedom of assembly and discussion and the suspension of detention-without-trial; release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees; and lift the ban on the ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The ANC and others would be required to enter negotiations and suspend violence.

The exchanges between the EPG and Pretoria revolved initially around the consequences—and later the meaning—of a suspension of violence. The endorsement of the concept of a "suspension of violence" was made first by President Botha in a letter to the group on December 24, 1985 and subsequently by Foreign Minister Pik Botha on April 24 when he raised the group's hopes by saying he believed that it "could serve a useful purpose." He proposed further exchanges, "particularly on the modalities of achieving a suspension of violence and facilitating discussions."

But between April 24 and May 12—the start of the second visit—the mood in the South African government and cabinet changed, and exchanges revolved around Pretoria seeking Western and Commonwealth guarantees that the ANC would deliver on a cessation of violence and that the government would not incur further punitive action if it took "appropriate measures" to curb escalating violence. Pretoria also wanted Western recognition of the reforms it had implemented to date—particularly the scrapping of the pass laws.

Subsequently, the South African government tried unsuccessfully to secure similar guarantees from the Tokyo summit of the seven industrialized economic powers, but Thatcher found herself out on a limb in pleading Pretoria's case. Failure to secure such assurances appears to have turned the mood in the cabinet against the EPG plan, and subsequent exchanges focused on the need for a cessation or renunciation of violence from the ANC.

Camerapix

Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo: "His direct and affable style and understanding of ethnic divisions probably had more to do with the EPG getting as far as it did than any other factor"

On May 15, Botha underlined this position and warned against foreign interference in South Africa's internal affairs. On the following day, Mandela gave his personal blessing to the EPG package as a "starting point." This position was broadly endorsed by the ANC leadership in Lusaka in an unofficial response in which key reservations were expressed, including the whole concept of ordering the society on the basis of "group rights."

The EPG accepted the ANC's contention that there could be no renunciation of violence prior to talks and that the government would have to also suspend the violence of apartheid before talks could begin. Shortly after the group returned to Cape Town on May 18, the South African Defense Force struck at alleged ANC targets in three Commonwealth neighboring states and the EPG mission effectively came to an end.

During the long-distance communication between Pretoria and the ANC, it became clear that neither side wanted to be seen as the wrecker and both saw advantages in cooperating with the EPG plan. But for Pretoria, the defects of the plan were spelled out in a booklet entitled, "Talking to the ANC," stressing that there could be no dialogue with an organization that advocated violence and was dominated by the South African Communist Party.

In effect, Pretoria seemed to be telling Britain and the West: If you want us to talk to the ANC, see that it renounces violence and is purged of its pro-Moscow leaders. But the devastating diplomatic consequences of the raid instantaneously transformed a relatively subdued international climate into a deafening clamor for sanctions.

Combined with the internal build-up for the 10th anniversary of the 1976 Soweto uprising, Pretoria opted for its toughest-ever state of emergency on the day the EPG report was unveiled at the Commonwealth's Marlborough House headquarters.

While the EPG deliberately stopped short of recommending economic sanctions, it left little doubt in the minds of Commonwealth heads of government that this was the only hope for averting "what could be the worst bloodbath since the second World War."

In a key paragraph, the report states: "We point to the fact that the government of South Africa has itself used economic measures against its neighbors and that such measures are patently instruments of its own national policy. We are convinced that the South African government is concerned about the adoption of effective economic measures against it. If it comes to the conclusion that it would always remain protected from such measures, the process of change in South Africa is unlikely to increase in momentum and the descent into violence would be accelerated."

It is variations of this argument by the EPG co-chairmen, bolstered by strong calls for tougher economic sanctions, that have shattered the traditional Western resistance to sanctions. The unanimous report studiously avoided the use of the word sanctions in apparent deference to Lord Barber and Mrs. Thatcher. But Lord Barber has made it quite clear that he is in favor of further "effective measures" against South Africa and that he shares the view that it would have been "wholly unfair" to expect the ANC to renounce violence prior to entering into talks with the South African government.

Lord Barber's participation in such a far-reaching consensus carries a powerful message for the international business community and for South African businessmen. As chairman of the British branch of the Urban Foundation, an Anglo American-led business front for social responsibility and black upliftment, Lord Barber is in a unique position of influence. His participation carves out a crucial—perhaps pivotal—role for the business community in putting pressure on the government to change course and lead the way into a post-apartheid society.

It is also Lord Barber's participation which has finally turned the tables against Thatcher—in her opposition to the principle of economic sanctions—or paved the way for her to subtly change tack. The British prime minister now has almost every pillar of the British establishment ranged against her on the issue of sanctions: the Church of England, *The Economist*, trade unions, the SDP/liberal alliance, the Labour Party, and a growing number of her own MPs. Observers say that a majority of Thatcher's ministers accept the adoption of further measures against Pretoria as inevitable.

In preparation for a subtle switch at the seven-nation Commonwealth mini-summit in August, Thatcher has been making a careful distinction between comprehensive economic sanctions—which she rejects as counter-productive and damaging to Britain and South Africa—and "effective measures" aimed at achieving the goal of promoting dialogue and peaceful negotiation. Thatcher says the key to "effective measures"—the language of the EPG report—is that they must be implemented by all South Africa's trading partners—Britain, West Germany, the U.S., and Japan.

To this end, she has undertaken to consult extensively with Britain's partners in the Commonwealth, the EEC, and the seven Western industrialized nations. By pegging the adoption of further measures to conservative and relatively unfettered trading partners—such as West Germany and Japan—Thatcher has adopted a shrewd strategy that could buy her and the Pretoria government more time and help to limit the extent of further measures.

It could also lead to the establishment of a British-led revival of the Commonwealth dialogue initiative spanning the EEC and seven economic powers as well. Thatcher will be anxious to coordinate her "effective measures" with those passing through the U.S. Congress this year.

The Commonwealth package which will form the basis of discussion at the August summit includes: a ban on air links with South Africa; a boycott of agricultural produce; restrictions on new investment and tightening up on loans; removal of consular facilities; and a boycott of the purchase of bulk commodities such as steel and coal.

Thatcher has already given notice that she will fight a ban on air links on the grounds that these are governed by international legal contracts with binding obligations for Britain. (The imminent privatization of British Airways is undoubtedly another factor here. But it is possible that Thatcher will settle for a symbolic ban on landing rights for South African Airways.) Her guiding criteria will be to limit the damage to the British economy and to outweigh the stick with the carrot.

Botha's retreat into the *laager* and his threat to "go it alone" should be taken seriously, as they are based on the Afrikaner's will to survive and retain control of his destiny—even at the expense of others. While there is undoubtedly an element of brinkmanship in Botha's tough stand, he does appear to have decided that sanctions are now inevitable and South Africans must prepare themselves for a prolonged period of economic, political, and military siege during which reform will inevitably give way to the priorities of the security arm of government.

The Pretoria government's concerns about the ANC and a suspension of violence are legitimate and need to be addressed. Britain is the only country that is likely to take them seriously. With its major stake in South Africa, it is Britain that will have to maintain the balance between constructive and punitive measures. As Thatcher has pointed out, tough comprehensive sanctions can only be effective if they are applied by all countries—and even then they are not always effective.

South Africa has enormous economic and military resources. It is very difficult to determine whether even a total Western trade embargo would bring Pretoria to its senses—let alone to its knees—before it had devastated the neighboring southern African states.

It is too early to tell whether the Commonwealth initiative has pushed Pretoria over the Rubicon that separates dialogue from siege or whether it has brought it back from the edge of the apocalypse. Whichever turns out to be the case, the EPG has put South Africa's domestic situation in the very center of the world political stage and ensured that the West will become increasingly involved in the unfolding drama.

The EPG disbanded amid growing fears that it could become a repeat of the Western five Contact Group on Namibia which has strung out the elusive goal of internationally recognized independence for another 10 years. But the framework it has devised for breaking the cycle of violence in South Africa and getting a negotiating process underway is likely to be taken up again in the future. It could represent the best chance for Britain, the U.S., and West Germany to secure their considerable commercial interests in South Africa. The real significance of the Commonwealth initiative is that it has engaged Western business interests in the period of transition to a post-apartheid society. □

Idé Oumarou
Secretary-General, the Organization of African Unity

The UN Special Session on the African crisis was convened as the international community's response to the OAU's priority program for economic recovery. In this wide-ranging interview, the OAU secretary-general assesses the outcome of the meeting and discloses his plans to restructure the organization in keeping with the continent's focus on economic development.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: What are the major issues confronting the Organization of African Unity [OAU] at this time and what concrete steps is the OAU taking to address them?
Oumarou: Since the 1985 summit in Addis Ababa, the OAU set two objectives for itself. The first was the resolution of the continent's economic problems in light of the economic crisis which is affecting every African country. In the search for solutions to the crisis, one of the measures decided upon was the convocation of the UN General Assembly Special Session.

The second problem facing us is the situation in southern Africa. Finding itself more and more isolated, South Africa increasingly putting pressure on its neighbors, attacking those countries which receive refugees. You have seen what has happened last year and this year—Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia are suffering the effects of South Africa's pressure. There is also the problem of Namibia, where there is virtually a stalemate. These, therefore, are the problems upon which Africa has decided to focus.

On the subject of our economic problems, at the same time that we called for the convocation of the international community at the UN Special Session, we also adopted Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, a program which envisages reform measures including the rehabilitation of agriculture and a solution to Africa's food problems. There is also another factor, which is to find ways and means by which Africa's debt can be examined so that African countries can have some financial resources to invest in production. All these elements were included in the documents which we presented at the UN Special Session.

Africa Report: African governments have adopted a realistic approach to the continent's economic problems with the priority program. How would you assess the response of the industrialized countries during the special session? If aid is not increased, will Africa's economic program be jeopardized? Has there been any progress on the debt issue?
Oumarou: We have said that the purpose of the special session must be clearly understood—it was not a pledging conference. We have systematically rejected that. Rather, what we are seeking is a partnership with the international community so that it will support Africa's economic recovery efforts. And it was thus to concretize the efforts needed for recovery that we totaled the cost of the program. According to our figures, to address the current crisis and to lay the foundation for long-term economic development, we need $128 billion from 1986-1990. Some have said that this is a colossal figure and ask how the Africans will be able to channel $82 billion into the realization of the program up to 1990, as we ourselves have pledged, considering that the current situation is one of crisis. We agree that this is a pertinent question—if someone says one day that he is poor and the next day says he will release $82 billion, one has the right to wonder where he will find this $82 billion.

But the reality is thus: When we were preparing the African document, we sent missions to all the African countries. Despite their poverty, each of our countries has its own recovery program—a national development plan—and in each plan, a certain number of investments are envisaged. There are national resources available for these investments which reflect what the country intends to do to promote its economic development. There is also assistance from abroad—international aid, either bilateral or multilateral—as well as the assets of financial institutions on the continent. There is also borrowing, because although we are already heavily indebted, we cannot avoid becoming further indebted. Thus, with the total of all these resources, each African country has formulated its own development plan for a given period. We then totaled the sums of all the countries to arrive at a figure of $82 billion that Africa pledges to commit to the priority program.

But between $128 billion and $82 billion, there is a gap of $46 billion, and we are thus saying to the international community, "If you want Africa to achieve the objectives it has set for itself by 1990, you must help us." Without such assistance, we ourselves will only be able to commit $82 billion, although it is $128 billion that is really needed. We will do what is within our power by 1990—$82 billion worth, but in 1990, our objectives will not be achieved if the international community doesn't support us. *That* is the objective of this session.

Unfortunately, reactions to our program have not been at the level that we were expecting. I must be frank about this. We had hoped that the international community, given the fact that everyone is in agreement on the analysis of the African situation and on the measures to be taken to rectify it, would have responded much more comprehensively and more generously. Unfortunately, we also understand the interests of countries in forcing us to make certain choices.

They tell us, "You must put to better use existing resources." We agree completely, given that in our document, we said that the current situation is not only solely due to insufficient financing, insufficient infrastructure, etc. Equally, we have made mistakes in management and erroneous political decisions. Sometimes we have wanted to impose political options on our peoples which do not conform to national realities. But we are saying that we are going to correct all that. Thus, from our side, we have accepted that we have been encumbered by our own errors. We are responsible for part of what is happening on the continent. And we maintain that before asking the international community to help us, we must first say to them, "Here is what I can do and I pledge to correct my mistakes."

We have done so, but we were surprised to come to the special session and hear them sermonizing again, "Here is what you must do. If you don't get the results you are seeking, it's because you have done this or you have done that." We are aware of this, but once again, it is because we are determined to break with the errors of the past that we feel that the others must have the confidence in us to say, "This is the first time this has happened, we will have confidence in you and support you Africans so that in the end, we will be able to tell whether what is really lacking is finance or whether Africa's problems are simply due to insufficient actions."

We want to be put to the test, but to go back to analyzing the situation and giving us advice. . . that gives us the impression of someone who is sick who goes to see a doctor and tells him, "This is what I am suffering from, I have taken certain medicines, but the illness hasn't gone away," and the doctor says, "Yes, I understand, but all I can do is to give you a long list of prescriptions." Obviously, the sick person will go home and if he isn't cured naturally, he might die.

On the question of debt, there too they are making things difficult for us. We didn't come to the special session to ask that our debts be written off. We didn't come here to say that we don't want to pay our debts. The Africans have clearly said that our debts are our responsibility. We will pay our debts, but we are asking for a little longer time to pay them, that we are authorized to pay the debts that are due in 10 years in 30 to 40 years. That is all that we are asking. The interest rates on our loans are very high because of currency fluctuations, particularly of the dollar. We are saying that we would like a little lower interest rates and at the same time new financial resources to create productive investments to boost our economies, which will enable us to pay our debts. That is what we have asked for.

Those who have other analyses of the situation are mistaken because it is not at all the intention of Africa to ask that its debts be erased. There are countries that have done so and have said, "To aid Africa, we are willing to write off its debts for a certain period." That is their right, and Africa is grateful, but that was not the objective of the meeting. It was a spontaneous action on their part which recognized Africa's preoccupations and will help Africa to have more resources at its disposal, but again, that wasn't what we came to ask from the international community.

Africa Report: But if other creditors are not responsive on the debt question, will it be necessary for the OAU to adopt a more comprehensive strategy on Africa's debts?

Oumarou: No, we say the following: If we gain the understanding of the international community so that the debt problem is regarded as we would wish, then things will clearly improve. If they don't understand our position, Africa will continue to pay its debts, but our recovery will be slower, and in the current situation, any delay in the achievement of economic growth will translate into an extremely catastrophic situation on the continent, because the economic crisis—and in particular the famine—which afflicts the continent is not due solely to the drought. There is also insufficient production and considerable population growth. Thus Africa's situation will continue to deteriorate. In a few years, the world shouldn't come again crying crocodile tears to tell us, "Look, the situation is very serious," because it is already very serious. All those who can act must do so now, for in a few years, it will be too late.

If we leave the special session without concrete results, we will continue with our own efforts, because I believe that is where success will lie. African development must be first and foremost the priority of Africans and it is we ourselves who must work to achieve our own development. This is our position. However, we simply say that if the international community contributes to our efforts, our successes will be that much greater and that much faster. If the international community doesn't get involved, we will continue on our own with less results than we would like. Instead of attaining the objective of food self-sufficiency and the rehabilitation of agriculture in 1990, maybe we will reach it in 2000, which will be a considerable delay for us, given the very rapid evolution of the international climate.

Africa Report: What concrete steps can the OAU take with regard to the situation in southern Africa, given that the Western powers continue to pursue policies in the region which are in complete opposition to the statements and policies of your organization?

Oumarou: Again, by our belief in international solidarity, we have asked for the convocation of an international conference to apply sanctions against South Africa. There are two simple issues which currently bring us into conflict with South Africa: apartheid and Namibia. Without these two problems, South Africa is an African country. All its people—its exiles, its inhabitants, including the whites who hold power--are Africans. We don't deny that. If tomorrow, even with its current government, South Africa decided to abandon apartheid and to reestablish democracy and human rights and to abandon its colonial policy in Namibia, it could become a country like any other and maybe would even take a seat in the OAU. Why not?

We have convened this international conference with two objectives: first, to continue to sensitize international public opinion on the problem of apartheid, as it is international public opinion which can put pressure on governments which are currently partners of South Africa and are not disposed to act against it to speed up the downfall of apartheid. We have seen what has happened in the U.S., where up until recently, the administration was opposed to any idea of sanctions against South Africa. Thanks to the mobilization of American public opinion, it was obliged to begin to consider some pressures on South Africa. We want to accelerate this movement, so that in the same way that it happened in the U.S., it will also happen in England, in West Germany, and that these countries understand that in asking for sanctions against South Africa, it is not because one is against the country as such. Rather, it is because its government must submit to the will of the international community. That is the first objective.

The second objective: We are supporting sanctions because we have seen that it is the only way of making South Africa accountable to international public opinion, given the experiences of the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the UN where a long list of resolutions against South Africa have been passed condemning all aspects of apartheid, but nothing has resulted. We maintain that it is only economic pressure, in conjunccion with political and diplomatic pressures, that will bring South Africa to accept abandoning apartheid. South Africa must understand that its economic interests in the world will be threatened as long as it practices the policy of apartheid. And for that to succeed, we must count on the partners of South Africa. Although it is the cradle of South Africa, Africa obviously can't do much in the way of pressures in this area. However, the other members of the international community have the means to effectively assist in the dismantlement of apartheid.

That is not to say that Africans do not have to help. We have decided to provide our contribution first by recognizing that ties with South Africa exist because of the reality of the situation. There are African countries with considerable economic ties to South Africa due to their geography, their history. But we are saying that we will reduce the dependence of these countries on South Africa first by strengthening our unity against this country, and secondly by formulating compensatory measures which could help these countries in the event that South Africa increases its economic blockade. We know that this will not be easy because without a doubt, there are enormous interests at stake. On the one hand, South Africa's partners are against apartheid—and everyone is against apartheid—and on the other, they say, "If we act against South Africa, we will be threatening our interests." That is the dilemma. We say that these countries can afford to suffer for a short time so that human rights can be established.

Africa Report: Over the past few years, the OAU has been seized with various political crises, such as the Western Sahara and Chad, which threatened to destroy the organization. Has this chapter in the OAU's history finally closed, and what are the organization's latest efforts to resolve these ongoing issues?

Oumarou: Yes, for a few years, the OAU went through a period of crisis due to the issues you mentioned—the problem of Chad and of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic [SADR], as well as other issues which are linked to the daily life of all organizations. But I can say that at least as far as the Sahara issue is concerned, the problem was resolved because the SADR has become a full member of the OAU. Unfortunately, the Moroccans left the organization, which in itself is deplorable because we would like to have an organization which includes all the countries of the continent. If there is one state which is not a member, we believe our objective has not been attained. Thus, the departure of Mo[illegible]dened us, and it undermines the cohesion and the goals [illegible] organization.

Margaret A. Novicki

Idé Oumarou: "We must have an organization which is credible, which is operational, which is adapted to our economic situation"

Nevertheless, we think that the crisis has passed and at the last two summits in 1984 and 1985, we didn't have to suffer from this crisis atmosphere. But the problem of Chad continues. There again, it is undeniable that this problem is dividing Africa. For the last two years, the accepted procedure has been to bestow upon Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso the mission to act in the name of the OAU in attempting to bring together the Chadian factions in order to avoid any outside intervention in the conflict. President Sassou-Nguesso, current OAU chairman President Diouf, and Gabonese President Bongo are currently trying to do the maximum to try to bring together the factions, because if the children of Chad are united, there will be no place for division. Unfortunately, their efforts haven't yet brought about concrete results. What is sure is that from one side or the other, there are some small improvements in the internal situation, thanks in particular to the efforts of President Bongo to unite certain factions.

Unfortunately, however, there is another problem—the occupation of Chad by one faction of the GUNT supported by Libya. The OAU is currently involved in this issue, and by the next summit, we hope to see more clearly, given President Sassou's report, what new actions must be taken to resolve this source of tensions. What is certain is that we must try to work toward the best outcome, which isn't easy because in politics, there are no miracle solutions.

Senegalese President Abdou Diouf, chairman of the OAU, with Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN Secretary-General: "What we are seeking is a partnership with the international community so that it will support Africa's economic efforts"

Africa Report: With Morocco no longer a member of the OAU, has the organization abdicated its role in the solution of the Western Sahara war?

Oumarou: In leaving the OAU because of the Sahara problem, Morocco didn't completely close the door on the organization, given that it accepted the resolution which was adopted during the 41st session which empowered the UN secretary-general and the chairman of the OAU to undertake efforts with a view toward applying OAU resolution 104, which exhorted the two sides to undertake direct contacts to create the conditions for a cease-fire and a referendum of self-determination for the Sahrawi people. I must say that we are pleased to note that contacts, although not direct, have been able to be established under the auspices of the chairman of the OAU and the UN secretary-general, so that we are progressing from a completely frozen situation a couple months ago to one today which, despite the difficulties, has its own dynamic.

It will be an extremely difficult process because the reality is as follows: On the diplomatic front, the SADR controls the situation in Africa, but on the military front, Morocco controls the situation on the ground. These are two contradictory situations and a lot of patience is needed to resolve them. The foot-dragging in these indirect contacts cannot discourage us at the OAU. We maintain that in keeping alive even these indirect contacts, we will eventually arrive at a platform which will allow us to break the stalemate. In any case, the OAU is following this very closely.

Africa Report: As secretary-general of the OAU, what is your program to improve the administration of the organization?

Oumarou: The OAU has existed since 1963, and it was founded with two objectives: The first was to strengthen the unity of African countries leading to the total liberation of the continent. Thus the first phase of the OAU's struggle was to free as many states as possible to wage the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle. Today, this battle has nearly been won, because with the exception of Namibia, all African countries are independent, although we are excluding the one country that has been independent for a long time but is not an OAU member, South Africa.

Today, the economic problems remain to be solved to strengthen our conquest of political liberation, because independence without economic independence is meaningless. The proof of this is that despite all the efforts of economic strip-tease that we have gone through, the international community is still in the position of being able to push us to extreme humiliation. Thus we say it is absolutely necessary to conquer our economic independence and therefore, we must have an organization which is credible, which is operational, which is adapted to our economic situation. And that is why on the administrative front, there are a number of restructurings to be undertaken, to move away from solely political activities to economic problems, so that the OAU can become an organization which focuses on economic cooperation and analysis in order to forge a common economic platform for Africa.

At the level of the secretariat, we are presently undertaking measures to proceed with this restructuring, to provide the various departments with the means by which they can meet Africa's aspirations. Obviously, you will say that to be effective, the organization requires funds. We find it deplorable to say that, like all international organizations today, the OAU has financial problems due to the accumulation of arrears by its member-states. But I must say that over the past months, we have witnessed a new confidence in the OAU, and despite their difficulties, the member-states are making a considerable effort to pay their arrears.

To give you an example, when I took office last September, I found in the OAU accounts that arrears amounted to $31 million. Today, we are less than $12 million in arrears, meaning that $19 million has been paid by the African states, which puts us relatively at ease. Given this effort by our member-states, we in the secretariat must equally make a considerable effort to adapt our activities to the reality of the situation in Africa. In our continent, countries are applying austerity measures in order to orient the maximum of their resources toward productive activities. Within the organization, we must also apply austerity measures to release the maximum of the funds that Africans are willing to deploy toward a common search for economic independence. Thus it is in this direction that we are headed. We hope that with our determination, and taking into account the realities of the moment, the organization will be able to reach the objectives which it has set for itself.

Africa Report: Are there any further comments you would like to make to our readers?

Oumarou: What is certain is that at the OAU, we consider the United States as a prime partner, and one that is irreplaceable. We admire the concrete results that have been achieved in your country, thanks to the efforts of the American people, toward the attainment of the objectives they have set for themselves. We know that your people have achieved a stage of development which is incomparable in the world and we want the American people to join with us, to help us, taking into account that by circumstances of history, the African continent has found itself in a critical period today which requires that a helping hand be given to assist us in resolving our current problems. We believe that international solidarity and particularly that of the U.S. will allow African countries to better resolve their own problems and to have the means to face the current crisis. We in Africa are grateful to those who spontaneously mobilized themselves to assist us when the famine in Africa was publicized—whether it was individuals, associations, artists, intellectuals, governments, or non-governmental organizations.

But we believe that rather than giving us food to eat whenever there is a crisis, it is better to help us to produce, therefore to give us the means of production—whether in the form of financing, technology, or material resources. *That* is what Africa is waiting for, so that in the same way that the efforts of Americans enabled your country to reach its current level of development, so too Africa's peoples can learn to work and to attain the objectives they have set for themselves. Thus, mine is a message of international solidarity that I send to the American people and to its government. I am certain that Africa has not said its final word. Africa has considerable resources which tomorrow may be needed to help the U.S., as powerful as it may be, in its efforts to promote the well-being and prosperity of its people. □

Margaret A. Novicki

Agricultural cooperative, Burkina Faso: "Rather than giving us food to eat when there is a crisis, it is better to help us to produce, therefore to give us the means of production"

On the Frontline

Zimbabwe's hosting of the Non-Aligned summit will bring the issues of apartheid and South African destabilization to the center of the debates. Will the 101-nation organization succeed in formulating a united strategy to pressurize the Pretoria government?

BY ANDREW MELDRUM

Economic sanctions and other measures that can be taken to speed the end of South Africa's apartheid system are certain to be the focus of the eighth heads of state summit of the Non-Aligned Movement to be held in Zimbabwe from August 26 to September 7.

The 101-nation Non-Aligned Movement has long been an outspoken foe of apartheid, but the Harare summit places non-aligned deliberations so dramatically close to the revolutionary events in South Africa that practical measures against the Pretoria government are expected to be the outcome.

That certainly seems to be the intention of the current Non-Aligned chairman, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and the next chairman and summit host, Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. Both leaders, who have emerged in the United Nations and in the Commonwealth as leading proponents of comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa, are expected to push the Commonwealth toward adoption of a package of limited sanctions in early August.

The two leaders' strategy for effecting sanctions emerged in May during Gandhi's whirlwind tour to four of the six frontline states—Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia, and Tanzania. In Harare, he said that the upcoming summit would focus on "how to end apartheid."

Andrew Meldrum, an American journalist who has been based in Zimbabwe for six years, reports on southern Africa for The Guardian *of London, Agence France-Presse, and Voice of America.*

Earlier Gandhi had said, "The only peaceful way to end apartheid is to enforce mandatory sanctions against Pretoria. The alternative is violence and bloodshed. We cannot wait indefinitely and helplessly in the face of daily destruction of the moral values of civilization. Freedom and racial equality must not be sacrificed at the altar of economic and commercial interests."

It is understood that in their private discussions, Gandhi and Mugabe concentrated on how to achieve sanctions and increase pressure on the South African government. The Non-Aligned summit itself was the other major discussion topic. Included in Gandhi's 19-member delegation was Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development Buta Singh, who organized India's successful Non-Aligned summit in 1983. Singh had visited Zimbabwe earlier this year to advise the government on the logistics of hosting such an event.

At an airport press conference to mark his departure from Zimbabwe on May 16, Gandhi was openly derisive of the efforts of the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to set up direct negotiations between the South African government and the African National Congress (ANC).

"Every indication that we have had so far is that the Eminent Persons Group has not really got its teeth into the actual issue—that apartheid must end," said Gandhi. "Everything else is peripheral."

Gandhi said the urgency of the situation in South Africa necessitated that Commonwealth members draw up measures, such as a package of limited sanctions targeted to increase pressure on Pretoria, to be implemented as soon as possible.

"We have to really start seeing what actions need to be taken in case the EPG process does not work out," said Gandhi, "because we cannot delay that until the last day and suddenly find out that we do not have alternatives available."

He said decisions on that package could be reached at an early August meeting in London of the heads of state of the seven Commonwealth countries that supervised the selection of the Eminent Persons Group: Australia, the Bahamas, Canada, Great Britain, India, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Shortly after Gandhi left Zimbabwe, the South African government took action that ensured the failure of the EPG's negotiating mission. On May 19, the South African Defense Force attacked alleged ANC transit bases in Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, all Commonwealth members.

Although the South Africans claimed the raids were precision attacks on "ANC operative bases," the view from the affected frontline capitals was that they were somewhat haphazard strikes. None of the four people killed—one Botswanan soldier and a South African refugee soccer player in Gaborone, and a Zambian civilian and Namibian refugee in Zambia—were actually ANC guerrillas, according to the ANC's Lusaka headquarters.

Far from being secret "ANC transit facilities," the targets in Zimbabwe were the well-known ANC offices in downtown Harare and the suburban house where ANC representative Joe Gqabi was assassinated in 1981. In Zambia, the South Africans intended to bomb a refugee camp, but instead destroyed a nearby store and bar.

The attacks were taken as President P.W. Botha's effort to appease the growing challenge of white extremists inside the country and to tell the EPG in no uncertain terms that his government would rather fight than negotiate. Most ominously for the frontline states, the attacks and Botha's subsequent threat to strike again were warnings to curtail ANC activities.

But Pretoria's strategy apparently failed, as neighboring states renewed their support for the anti-apartheid struggle.

"No, never, never ever," replied Robert Mugabe on the day of the raids when asked if he would consider shutting down the ANC's Harare office. "In fact, I think now is the time for us to show increased support for the ANC and PAC [Pan Africanist Congress] and other liberation movements."

He denounced the raids as evidence that as the South African government loses control of the domestic situation, it is taking out its frustrations on external targets. The attacks on Gaborone, Harare, and Lusaka provoked a strongly worded report from the EPG that said Pretoria is not in any way interested in negotiations to end apartheid and that "concerted action by the international community" was needed to increase pressure on South Africa—in other words, sanctions.

The unexpectedly forceful report will make it very difficult for the British government to avoid agreeing to some package of sanctions at the August Commonwealth meeting in London, according to Western diplomats in Harare. Prime Minister Thatcher will be up against a large and vocal anti-apartheid movement in Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth, with especially strong pressure from Gandhi, Mugabe, and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, who immediately following the South African raids vowed to pull his country out of the Commonwealth if sanctions are not applied.

The horrific violence by police-assisted vigilantes in the Crossroads squatter camp outside Cape Town and the South African government's new state of emergency declared to avoid new revolts at the commemoration of the 1976 Soweto students uprisings added fuel to Mugabe's conviction that this is the strategic moment for the international community to increase pressure on Pretoria.

A militant Mugabe addressed a rally of some 40,000 people on June 15 to mark the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprisings. "The Boer is using the gun to mow down the people of South Africa," said Mugabe. "The only language they understand is a bullet for a bullet. They will understand that very easily. To the representatives of the liberation movements I say, the more Boers you kill, the nearer you are to your goal."

In a speech notably more strident than usual, Mugabe called for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to set up a continent-wide defense force to help protect the frontline states from South African aggression. He also announced that civilians would receive paramilitary training to repel any South African attack, a new army brigade would be formed and equipped, and a "solidarity fund" would be established to aid the liberation movements of South Africa.

Presidents Kenneth Kaunda and Samora Machel: "Following the South African raids, Kaunda vowed to pull his country out of the Commonwealth if sanctions are not applied"

Mugabe also said he would continue to press for restrictive economic measures from the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the United Nations. He dismissed claims by the Thatcher and Reagan governments that sanctions would hurt the neighboring countries, asserting that Zimbabwe was ready for any measures those international bodies might impose, even if they mean hardship for the country.

He pointed out that Zimbabwe was already suffering both military and economic destabilization by South Africa. Zimbabwean troops are deployed in Mozambique to protect the Beira transport corridor—landlocked Zimbabwe's only route to the sea aside from South Africa—from sabotage by the South African-backed rebels of the Mozambique National Resistance.

"The time for pious rhetoric against apartheid has run out. We must take practical measures. If sanctions mean suffering, then we say we prefer them because these sanctions will shorten our suffering," said Mugabe, adding that he would take that message to the London Commonwealth meeting.

Commonwealth sources say that a list of sanctions short of comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions has already been drafted to be presented at the London meeting as the minimum that Thatcher can accept. Those include the termination of air links, sales of agricultural products, new investment, government-assisted trade, government contracts with majority-owned South African companies, and South African tourism promotion.

"It looks like the Commonwealth will impose something like that package of sanctions," said a Commonwealth source. "And if Britain agrees to that, then the rest of the international community should not be far behind."

Sarah-Jane Poole

Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Robert Mugabe: "In their private discussions, they concentrated on how to achieve sanctions and increase pressure on the South African government"

Such measures will certainly be the focus of debate at the Non-Aligned summit, but it is not at all certain that the body will actually agree to enforce even a modified package of sanctions, said a long-time observer of the movement.

"The Non-Aligned Movement has always found it easy to excoriate the apartheid system, but they also have a notorious reputation for simply agreeing on rhetoric and avoiding any specific action," said the observer, who has attended several Non-Aligned summits. She pointed out that many Asian countries in the Non-Aligned Movement would balk at adopting measures which would restrict their trading practices.

"It will definitely be a battle to see if they can agree to actually do something," she said. "South Africa may well be the issue that determines if the Non-Aligned Movement can actually take action on anything."

At an April preparatory meeting in New Delhi, non-aligned ministers drew up a declaration which said the summit was being held in Zimbabwe on the Non-Aligned Movement's 25th anniversary to show solidarity with the frontline states' stand against apartheid.

The longest sections were on South Africa, affirming the non-aligned countries' determination to help end the "barbarous" apartheid system. According to the document, other issues to be considered include nuclear disarmament, terrorism, Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Iran-Iraq war, and the need for a new economic order.

To host the summit, which is expected to draw more than 10,000 people, the Zimbabwe government is lodging, feeding, and providing necessary transportation and communications for the visitors. Housing and security precautions for the more than 70 heads of state expected to attend pose the biggest problem, especially in light of the May 19 South African raid into the center of Harare. Zimbabwean ministers have warned that they are on the lookout for some form of sabotage from South Africa, possibly only symbolic but perhaps something more sinister.

The government has booked all Harare's hotels and is building 30 luxury villas for some heads of state, but is still a bit short of suitable accommodation. It is expected that rented houses, the University of Zimbabwe, and other institutions will satisfy the need for housing.

Many private residences are being leased for the summit, especially luxury homes next door to embassies of non-aligned countries. There have been reports in Harare that former Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith has been approached by his neighbor, the Cuban embassy, to rent his house as accommodation for Fidel Castro. Smith said that as yet no firm deal has been made, but added, "Non-Aligned summits can make for strange bedfellows." □

Business As Usual?

Changes in France's Africa policies were expected in the wake of the election victory of Jacques Chirac's right-wing coalition. Southern Africa, however, is likely to be the only arena where ideological lines will be drawn between Socialist President Mitterrand and his conservative prime minister.

BY PIERRE HASKI

Symbols are an important part of foreign policy. It was therefore significant that Jacques Chirac's first official trip abroad as prime minister of France was to Côte d'Ivoire. Despite his busy schedule in the hectic period following the March 16 election that gave his right-wing coalition a majority in Parliament, Chirac paid a one-day visit to President Félix Houphouët-Boigny's home town of Yamoussoukro on April 12.

Chirac was accompanied during this short visit by his two key men on Africa, Michel Aurillac, minister of cooperation, and Jacques Foccart, the prime minister's personal adviser on African affairs—a 73-year-old whose name has been closely linked with the history of the continent over the past 30 years.

By calling the aging Foccart to Hotel Matignon, the prime minister's office, and by devoting his first official trip to Côte d'Ivoire, Chirac's message to France's former African colonies was clear—it is business as usual in Franco-African relations, despite the unusual political scene in Paris.

With Socialist President François Mitterrand remaining in office until the 1988 presidential elections and neo-Gaullist Prime Minister Jacques Chirac having been chosen by the newly-elected right-wing majority, France has entered the era of "cohabitation"—or "coexistence" as the president's friends prefer to call it.

For French-speaking African countries, it means one more compulsory stop-over on the Paris circuit. In addition to Elysée Palace (the president's office) and the ministries of cooperation and foreign affairs, African visitors now have to call at the prime minister's office—previously insignificant in foreign policy decision-making.

Before March 16, the key man on Africa was Guy Penne, Mitterrand's adviser on African affairs. A dentist and long-time political associate of the president, Penne still holds his office, but Foccart has been officially appointed adviser to the prime minister on African affairs, a position that now is most powerful in this important area. He therefore has the upper hand on the activities of the Ministry of Cooperation, led by a faithful Gaullist, Michel Aurillac.

Foccart's name is not a neutral one in Africa. A close aide to Gen. de Gaulle, he supervised the decolonization of France's Africa empire, and became absolute king-maker on the continent until President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing replaced him in 1974. His reputation probably goes beyond the reality, but for nearly 15 years, Foccart's name was mentioned in every coup attempt or change of government in France's former colonies.

Guinea's late president, Ahmed Sékou Touré, regularly accused him of trying to overthrow his government as punishment for his having said "no" in de Gaulle's referendum in 1958. He described him as the "number-one responsible for all subversive actions organized in Africa, notably in West Africa, and particularly in Guinea."

Also involved in business dealings in Africa which made him one of the Gaullist party's main fund-raisers, Foccart has the reputation of working through "*reseaux*", or networks of informers and agents in key positions throughout the continent. His main "bases" during his years in office were Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon, two countries which have remained central to the French presence and influence in Africa.

Foccart, who remained silent in the past few years except to answer a highly critical book on Franco-Gabonese relations, was expected to play a key role in the shadows of the new right-wing majority. No one, however, expected him to return to an official position such as adviser to the prime minister. His appointment surprised everyone, including African leaders, some of whom belong to a new generation with mixed feelings about the Foccart era.

The new government's first decision was to announce that its activities on the continent would be concentrated on French-speaking countries. The Ministry of Cooperation, previously attached to the Department of External Relations and in charge of relations with the entire developing world, has been made a full ministry, but restricted to relations with francophone countries. This highly publicized change of orientation was

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meant to reassure some francophone leaders who had been worried by the Socialist government's intention to extend the scope of French cooperation to English and Portuguese-speaking countries.

In reality, economic limitations had long restrained the previous government's policies. As newly appointed Minister of Cooperation Michel Aurillac admitted, francophone countries, which received 85 percent of France's public development aid before the 1981 Socialist victory, still received 83 percent of the total in 1985—an insignificant shift which shows that French-speaking countries have remained the priority.

Different styles, different men, but a common cooperation policy and understanding of Africa's importance to France unites both left and right in government. Returning from an African tour, Aurillac said in June that African leaders were reassured to know that Mitterrand and Chirac had a common view of the issues, including Chad, where France re-dispatched its forces shortly before the elections, a move no one in the country dared to criticize, not even the French Communist Party.

There are, of course, nuances. Liberal-minded, the new government wants to promote private investment rather than public funding in Africa, is pressing African countries to liberalize their economies, and accepts without reservations IMF interventions in African economies.

Southern Africa constitutes the only exception. Ideological differences become obvious as soon as one leaves the protected domain of francophone countries. One of Chirac's first diplomatic moves was to send back to Pretoria the French ambassador, Pierre Boyer, who had been recalled in July 1985 by the Socialist government following South Africa's first imposition of the state of emergency. The decision was criticized by the French Socialist Party, now in opposition.

Unlike his predecessors, Laurent Fabius, the last Socialist prime minister, had focused on South Africa as a major foreign policy issue. He broke with previous policies by deciding upon some economic sanctions, such as freezing all new investment in South Africa and not renewing imports of coal. He also expressed public hostility to apartheid by observing a moment of silence outside the South African embassy in Paris when young black activist Benjamin Moloise was hanged in Pretoria last October. Within the EEC, France pushed for tougher policies against the Pretoria government, despite British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's opposition to sanctions.

This radical policy was followed only for a few months, as Chirac's election victory sent Fabius into opposition. Fabius nevertheless confirmed his anti-apartheid commitment by going to South Africa for a private but highly publicized visit at the invitation of Bishop Desmond Tutu.

The new government's shift on South Africa became clear when the new prime minister made his first public statement on the sanctions issue. Expressing views close to Thatcher's, Chirac strongly attacked the call for an economic boycott of South Africa, saying its only aim was "to ease the consciences of the privileged ones." "Let us stop making policies to please ourselves and clear our conscience," Chirac said.

The French prime minister condemned apartheid policies, but quoted

Jacques Langevin/Sygma

Jacques Chirac and Jacques Foccart with President Houphouët-Boigny: Chirac's first official trip abroad was to Yamoussoukro

Ivorian President Houphouët-Boigny as saying that economic sanctions would hurt South African blacks. This attitude pleased part of Chirac's constituency—French businessmen who strongly lobbied in favor of a lifting of restrictions on economic relations with South Africa. France is South Africa's fifth largest commercial partner, holding important contracts particularly in the nuclear and electronic fields.

Pretoria was quick to note the change of government in France, a change for the better as far as it was concerned, in view of Fabius' open hostility. However, the South Africans too quickly tried to take advantage of the situation, when President Botha made it known that he wished to come to France in June. The pretext was the inauguration of a museum devoted to South African veterans of World War I in Longueval, in the Somme region. Botha had laid the first stone of that museum during a previous visit to France in 1984, but at that time, the Socialist government had refused to receive him in Paris. Pretoria thought the present circumstances would be more favorable.

However, the intended date of Botha's proposed visit was unfortunate—June 14, on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the 1976 Soweto uprising. Also on that day, the UNESCO headquarters in Paris was hosting an international conference on sanctions against South Africa. African National Congress leader Oliver Tambo and the chairman of the Organization of African Unity, Senegalese President Abdou Diouf, were to attend the conference. Tambo, Diouf, and Botha in Paris at the same time would have been too embarrassing for the French government, whatever its political hue.

The French government therefore asked Pretoria to postpone Botha's visit, offering November 11, the anniversary of the end of the first World War, as an alternative date. Chirac publicly stated that he was not opposed to the South African president's visit. "France," he said, "welcomes heads of state and government who have no better record on human rights and the least we can say is that they get triple red carpet treatment." Observers thought he was referring to the controversial visit to Paris a few months before the elections by Polish leader Gen. Jaruzelski, which created some tensions between President Mitterrand and then-Prime Minister Fabius, who opposed the visit.

Presidents Mitterrand and Kountché of Niger: "There's very little difference between successive governments on the foremost issue in French Africa policy—relations with francophone states"

Events in South Africa also forced Chirac to change his position. After publicly criticizing economic sanctions, the French government backed a request for an embargo on all food imports from South Africa at the EEC level, following the re-institution of the state of emergency in Pretoria. In June, the government abstained in the UN Security Council vote on mandatory sanctions against South Africa over its raid in Angola, while the U.S. and Britain vetoed. British diplomats had hoped that France would join them in their opposition to sanctions.

The debate on the sanctions issue and on Botha's proposed visit is new to France. Previously, the public had showed limited interest in the South African issue, leaving the government a free hand to conduct its policies, including massive arms deliveries in the 1960s and early 1970s. With daily scenes of violence in the black townships appearing on television and in newspapers last year, the public in France, as in other Western countries, started reacting.

This is a new reality that Chirac cannot ignore. Despite his initial opposition to sanctions, he made sure he paid lip service to a condemnation of apartheid and found it impossible to cancel his predecessor's limited sanctions.

In fact, as reactions to the state of emergency demonstrated, Chirac's policies will be dependent on events inside South Africa. Each new repressive measure, detention, or killing fuels growing French anti-apartheid sentiments, particularly among the youth. And although Chirac publicly praised Chief Gatsha Buthelezi for his "moderate" attitudes, a member of his cabinet met with ANC leader Oliver Tambo during the Paris sanctions conference.

Another critical area for French policy in the region is relations with Mozambique and Angola, the two former Portuguese colonies with which the Socialist government had established strong links. While first indications were negative, the new government has proven to be more pragmatic than ideological.

In a controversial interview with a Portuguese newspaper on the eve of his election, Chirac was quoted as saying that he approved of the U.S. policy of backing UNITA rebels in Angola, and that he would allow Jonas Savimbi's movement to establish an office in Paris. In his first statement to the press, his minister of cooperation excluded Angola and Mozambique from the field of French cooperation.

Diplomats from Angola and Mozambique were clearly worried. The Angolan ambassador was recalled to Luanda for consultations and returned with his minister of foreign affairs. After a few weeks, however, the ideological fever cooled down. Mozambican Cooperation Minister Jacinto Veloso had a long discussion with Chirac in Paris and came out reassured of continued French assistance to his war-torn country.

In early June, Angola's Minister of Energy, Pedro de Castro van Dunem, arrived in Paris for discussions with government and private sector representatives. "France," he told me, "has become one of our great partners, one of the most diversified, one of the most reliable. We want a guarantee that those relations will continue."

The Angolan minister came with some points of disagreement: French exports to Angola more than doubled in the past two years, leaving a $66 million surplus for France in 1985. Major French firms, such as the oil companies Elf Aquitaine and CFP Total, the oil platform maker Bouygues Off-Shore, and the building firm Dumez, have invested in Angola. In 1985, the French Bank Paribas became the first Western bank to open a branch in Luanda.

To make its case heard, the Angolan government relied on its "friends." "We and Elf Aquitaine have the same interests," the Angolan minister noted, not without humor. The message was heard.

"We have done what was needed," a top Elf official told me. "We have recalled Angola's importance to Elf at the highest level," the official said. With Albin Chalandon, the previous Elf chairman, as Chirac's minister of justice, the state-owned oil firm, which hopes to get new contracts in Angola, had the means of getting its message across.

As a result, Minister of Cooperation Aurillac told the press that there would be no interruption of France's economic relations with Angola. "France honors its commitments," he said.

Although the French government backed down on its stated intention to reconsider its relations with Angola and Mozambique, the political confidence that existed previously had disappeared. While aware of the limitations of the Socialist administration, both Luanda and Maputo had relied on France as their main partner in the Western world and as their advocate within the EEC.

With a conservative government now in Paris, neither country will be in the same favorable position of having their case taken up by France. While the Luanda government recalls France's withdrawal from the Western Contact Group on Namibia—at Angola's request—as one example of the past relationship, the new French government appears more tempted by the American line.

Once again, the change of government in Paris has illustrated that on the foremost issue in French African policy—relations with francophone states—there is very little difference between successive governments, except perhaps in style. However, outside the *"pré carré"*—an expression used by Mitterrand to describe nations which are traditionally linked to France—differences might appear, with the South African situation the main arena in which ideological differences will come into play. □



Alain Nogues/Sygma

François Mitterrand with President Mobutu in Kinshasa: "A common cooperation policy and understanding of Africa's importance unites both left and right in government"

Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics: Reagan, Congress, and the Erosion of Consensus

The Reagan administration's approach to foreign aid has pitted different regions of the world against one another in a competition for resources. The effects of the restructuring of the U.S. aid program are being felt most dramatically in sub-Saharan Africa.

BY GARY BOMBARDIER

On May 8, 1986, Secretary of State George Shultz placed an urgent telephone call from the Philippines to Congressman William H. Gray of Pennsylvania. Shultz had been alerted that the House of Representatives Budget Committee, which Gray chairs, was about to vote on a budget resolution that would substantially cut foreign aid.

There is no universally accepted definition of foreign aid, but Shultz was concerned in large part about programs funded in the annual foreign aid appropriations bill (for which the budget resolution serves as a funding ceiling). Those programs can be loosely grouped into three categories:

- *bilateral assistance*, which includes foreign military aid and security-related economic assistance provided directly by the United States to other nations to enhance U.S. strategic interests;
- *economic development assistance*, provided either bilaterally or multilaterally (through organizations such as the World Bank, the regional development banks for Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and UN agencies) to promote long-term development in the poorest countries, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa; and
- *trade promotion*, primarily subsidized loans by the U.S. Export-Import Bank designed to help American firms remain competitive in international markets.

Congress routinely cuts presidential requests for foreign aid in order to pacify the voters back home, who have little tolerance for or understanding of these programs. The cuts being contemplated by the House Budget Committee were not routine, however. The Reagan administration requested $15.5 billion for foreign aid in 1987. Gray was working on a proposal to scale that back to less than $12 billion.

Shultz understood that cuts of this magnitude could substantially inhibit the Reagan administration's conduct of foreign affairs. Thus, he pleaded the importance of foreign aid to U.S. interests. Gray was unyielding. Hours later, the House Budget Committee approved his recommendations.

Denounced by Shultz as irresponsible, threatening "nothing less than the reversal of 40 years of constructive American leadership for peace and freedom," the resolution simply confirmed the conventional wisdom for many in Washington—that foreign aid is unpopular and always in danger of being hacked to pieces by an unthinking Congress. Shultz and others frantically mounted an effort to rescue funding for the program.

Whether that effort will succeed remains to be seen, but even as it launched its rescue effort, the Reagan administration failed to grasp that its current problems could be traced to its earlier successes.

Priorities Reordered

Ronald Reagan assumed office with a pledge to reduce federal spending. The new president lacked a fully developed view of foreign aid, but was thought sympathetic to perennial right-wing criticism of the program as welfare for countries unreceptive to U.S. interests and ungrateful for American help. Thus, many assumed that foreign aid would be a prime target for budget reductions.

That assumption proved false, primarily because the president and his foreign policy managers were committed to eradicating the perceived impotence of the United States in the wake of Nicaragua, Iran, Afghanistan, and (more distantly) Vietnam. This would not be accomplished cheaply, they knew; thus, they pushed relentlessly and largely

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successfully for substantial increases in foreign aid over the course of the next four years.

When the Carter administration left office in 1981, foreign aid funding totaled $14.4 billion. Overall funding increased approximately 45 percent in nominal terms during Reagan's first term—to $15.5 billion in 1982, $17.2 billion in 1983, $17.9 billion in 1984, and $20.9 billion in 1985. In 1986, as pressures to address the federal deficit mounted, foreign aid funding fell back to $14.4 billion. By that time, however, priorities within the program had been dramatically reordered.

The reordering of priorities reflected four principles that have guided the Reagan administration in its stewardship of the foreign aid program:

- Bilateral aid is preferable to multilateral aid as a tool for influencing other nations;
- Security aid is preferable to development aid in advancing U.S. interests;
- Both security and development aid should be targeted primarily on countries considered strategically important to the United States by the administration; and
- Subsidized loans for trade promotion amounted to little more than food stamps for U.S. firms.

The hostility of the Reagan administration to multilateral aid is well known. In a January 27, 1981 memorandum, Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman argued that a principal objective of the new administration should be "to eliminate or reduce U.S. participation in a range of multilateral organizations which are not responsive to U.S. foreign policy concerns and which in many cases may be ineffective in producing sound economic development."

Admittedly, Central America is a region wracked by conflict, but conflicts rage throughout Africa as well. While the Reagan administration sees U.S. interests as being less directly engaged in those conflicts, every available indicator suggests that sub-Saharan Africa's development needs are much greater than those of Central America.

Yet, between 1981 and 1986, U.S. development aid to Central America rose almost 145 percent in nominal terms, 96.9 percent in real terms. In stark contrast, U.S. development aid to sub-Saharan Africa increased less than 13 percent in nominal terms. In real terms, after taking inflation into account, U.S. development aid to sub-Saharan Africa fell about 10 percent between 1981 and 1986.

"It will not do to deal with Africa from essentially philanthropic premises, flinging money at a continent as though it were a United Givers Fund beneficiary," Chester Crocker argued in the *Washington Post* before the Reagan administration took office. For Africa, at least, Crocker proved prophetic.

TABLE 1

U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE*

(In billions of dollars)

	Fiscal Year 1981		Fiscal Year 1986		% Increase 1986 v. 1981
	Actual	% of Total	Actual	% of Total	
Security Aid	$ 5.3	36.8	$ 9.3	64.7	76.0
Military	3.2	22.2	5.8	40.1	81.1
Economic	2.1	14.6	3.5	24.6	68.2
Development Aid	3.6	25.2	4.0	27.9	10.4
Bilateral	2.3	16.4	2.6	18.1	10.0
Multilateral	1.3	8.8	1.4	9.8	11.3
Trade Promotion	5.5	38.0	1.1	7.4	-80.5
Total	$14.4	100.0	$14.4	100.0	0

*Data drawn from the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Acts for fiscal years 1981 and 1986 using comparable accounting methods between fiscal years. *Development assistance* includes Title I (multilateral economic assistance) and the bilateral economic assistance programs of Title II (except for the Economic Support Fund). *Security assistance* includes both the Economic Support Fund from Title II and military assistance (Title III). *Trade promotion* includes the Export-Import Bank's direct lending program limitation from Title IV. U.S. food aid is not funded in the foreign aid bill and is thus excluded. Likewise, IMF budget authority is excluded since its quota increases are funded irregularly. Off-budget callable capital is excluded but FMS loans (largely off-budget in FY1981 but completely on-budget in FY1986) are included. All percentages are based on actual figures, not the rounded-off figures used in this table. FY1986 figures do not include pending supplementals.

Sensitive to this point, the Reagan administration likes to stress food and disaster assistance provided by the U.S. to sub-Saharan Africa as an appropriate response to African needs. No one denies that the United States responded generously to the African food crisis, but much of this response was funded by Congress over administration objections.

The administration also fails to note that while development assistance was allowed to languish, U.S. military aid to sub-Saharan Africa doubled between 1981 and 1985, from $84 million to $168 million. Only as resources grew scarcer in 1986 was this development reversed.

The reshaping of U.S. foreign aid has given the program a more militarized and short-term orientation, one focused on countries considered strategically important to the United States by the administration.

Operationally, the priorities of the Reagan administration fall into four categories: the Middle East (primarily Israel and Egypt); countries that provide base and access rights to the United States, and frontline states; Central America; and all other countries. Even within a region like sub-Saharan Africa, the priority has been on countries considered strategically important, either because they provide military access or important facilities (Kenya, Liberia, and Somalia) or because, within the African context, they are considered frontline states (Chad, Sudan, and Zaire).

Few in Congress disagree with the priority accorded to the Middle East. However, many question the wisdom of flinging money at Central America in the absence of a solution to that region's conflicts, especially since resources alone will not solve those conflicts. Many also question the administration's toughness in base rights negotiations and are concerned that it has unrealistically raised expectations regarding aid levels in other strategically important countries while ignoring the needs of regions like sub-Saharan Africa.

The Erosion of Consensus

Some in Congress fought the trends detailed in table 1, at times successfully. As already noted, Congress funded

U.S. participation in the World Bank's Special Facility. It increased voluntary contributions to some UN agencies like UNICEF and UNDP. It scaled back administration requests for security assistance and sought to slow the distortion in development aid programs by imposing a ceiling on Central American development aid in 1985 and 1986. It limited damage to the Export-Import Bank throughout much of this period, supporting drastic reductions as resources grew scarcer in 1986.

However, Congress is an institution of many voices. Over time, given a determined administration skillful in manipulating shifting congressional coalitions, the priorities of a program like foreign aid can be changed dramatically, as the Reagan administration has demonstrated. Yet, the administration's success in doing so has come at the cost of eroding support for the program within Congress and among its traditional constituencies.

There are, of course, different constituencies for foreign aid in Congress. Conservatives are suspicious of programs designed to promote economic development in poor countries, whether provided bilaterally or multilaterally, since the potential benefits are often seen as long-term and illusory. Many of them will support short-term economic and military assistance when provided to governments cooperating with U.S. policy or perceived to be threatened by revolutionary change. Liberal preferences tend to run in the other direction, toward longer-term development aid provided through multilateral as well as bilateral channels and allocated with strategic considerations and immediate crises less significant.

Over the years, foreign aid was sustained by a consensus between supporters of security and development assistance. Neither group could pass aid legislation by itself. Thus, they were forced to work together to overcome a substantial minority within Congress opposed to all foreign aid. This consensus was reinforced by the absence of polarizing issues in the larger foreign policy arena, strengthened by a view that aid could expand America's trading opportunities, and cemented by a shared commitment to Israel.

It is this consensus that has withered. The administration's priorities have stripped away much of the rationale congressional liberals use to justify their support for the program. Those priorities have also alienated traditional supporters in the business, development, and religious communities without gaining new support for the program among conservatives.

Admittedly, Stockman had little success in cutting funding for multilateral aid during Reagan's first term. U.S. contributions to multilateral organizations increased a modest 11.3 percent between 1981 and 1986. However, that increase reflected circumstances over which the administration had little control. In particular, the United States was still honoring substantial commitments negotiated by the Carter administration throughout much of this period, commitments President Reagan chose not to repudiate. In addition, Congress resisted administration efforts to cut voluntary U.S. contributions to UN agencies.

Still, the administration proved relentlessly hostile to multilateral initiatives to the extent that it could control circumstances, reflecting a position articulated in the 1980 Republican platform. That hostility can be seen in its efforts to scale back funding for the International Development Association (IDA), the soft loan window of the World Bank and a critical source of concessional financing for poor nations.

In 1979, the Carter administration had supported a three-year, $12 billion replenishment of IDA resources. The Reagan administration managed to stretch that commitment over five years, and then forced a reduction to $9 billion in the next IDA replenishment covering the period 1985-1987.

The effect of these decisions has been felt most dramatically in sub-Saharan Africa. Its need for increased concessional resources is well-documented, most recently in reports by the World Bank (*Financing Adjustment With Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1986-1990*) and the Institute for International Economics (*African Debt and Financing*). Yet, when other nations sought to offset the negative effect of reduced IDA funding levels by creating a temporary World Bank Special Facility to channel additional resources to sub-Saharan Africa, the Reagan administration refused to participate.

Appalled by that decision, Congress authorized a $225 million multi-year U.S. contribution to the Special Facility and funded a $75 million initial installment in 1986. The Reagan administration fought both actions every step of the way. When Congress finally overrode its objections, the administration illegally deferred payment of the funds long enough to ensnare the U.S. contribution in the requirements of the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction act. That caused a 4.3 percent reduction in the U.S. contribution.

The administration's hostility to multilateral aid is also demonstrated in its actions delaying a second replenishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) for more than two years, only agreeing to continued U.S. participation after funding for IFAD was cut in half from previous levels. It also announced that the United States would refuse to participate in IFAD's special program for sub-Saharan African countries affected by drought and desertification.

Finally, the Reagan administration has repeatedly sought to cut U.S. voluntary contributions to specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as UNDP and UNICEF, which it views as having only limited utility in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Its budget requests have repeatedly sought less funding for these agencies than Congress appropriated during the Carter years.

The administration has also put countries on notice that their voting records at the UN will be an important factor in the allocation of bilateral U.S. assistance. Two African countries that incurred the wrath of the Reagan administration in this regard, Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso, have seen reductions in the amount of bilateral aid they receive from the United States, in spite of the fact that both have used external resources wisely. Aid to Zimbabwe fell from $75.1 million to $20.8 million between 1982 and 1986; aid to Burkina Faso fell from $11.3 million to $1 million during the same period.

That the Reagan administration has been largely successful in reshaping the foreign aid program during its first term is evident from the data in table 1.

Funding for security assistance programs increased 76 percent between 1981 and 1985, from $5.3 billion to $9.3 billion, with foreign military aid being the primary beneficiary. By way of contrast, the subsidized direct lending program of the Export-Import Bank declined from $5.5 billion to $1.1 billion.

Examined in the aggregate, funding for development aid programs also increased during this five-year period, if only modestly. In 1981, these programs were being funded at a level of $3.6 billion. By 1986, that figure had grown to $4 billion. Yet, because so many programs are lumped together in the development assistance category, table 1 overstates the rate of growth for most development aid programs. In real terms, many experienced negative growth.

While bilateral development aid rose from $2.3 billion to $2.6 billion, this increase was largely concentrated in core development programs administered by the Agency for International Development. In turn, much of that increase was concentrated in a single region of the world, Central America, to which the Reagan administration had become deeply committed. In Central America, development aid was largely an adjunct to security assistance programs.

A comparison of the respective fortunes of Central America and sub-Saharan Africa is revealing. Central America has a combined population of less than 25 million people and an average per capita income in excess of $1000. The 380 million people who inhabit sub-Saharan Africa have an average per capita income of less than half that amount.

The fruits of the administration's strategy began to become apparent in 1986. Under mounting pressure to reduce the federal deficit, Congress enacted the Gramm-Rudman act. Gramm-Rudman set up a confrontation between the president and Congress over how to reduce the deficit. The basic options are spending reductions, revenue increases, or some combination of the two.

Preliminary indications are that the burden of deficit reduction will fall on spending cuts—with foreign aid an inviting target—because of the president's continuing opposition to revenue increases. House action on the 1987 budget should thus be seen as a direct challenge to President Reagan. It is widely believed that defense and foreign aid are among the few programs for which the administration favors increased funding. The president is likely to face a growing assault on both if he continues to insist that additional revenues are out of the question.

As noted, foreign aid fell sharply in 1986. This bothersome development was made tolerable for the administration only because it had been successful in reordering priorities in earlier years. If resources continue to shrink, the administration will be forced to battle each year to retain those priorities; even if it wins those battles, it will lose the war as support for foreign aid erodes further.

The administration may conclude that this is not its problem, but this would be a tragedy for future administrations. Every president since World War II has supported foreign aid as an indispensable tool of U.S. foreign policy. Each has argued that American interests and values are promoted by providing economic and military aid to other nations, and has appealed for sustained bipartisan support for the program.

Congress has responded positively to these appeals. Since 1946, over $300 billion worth of cash, commodities, equipment, and training have been transferred under the program, for activities as diverse as building an army in South Vietnam to constructing an irrigation system in the Sahel. But bipartisan consensus cannot be assumed by any president. It must be nurtured.

The Future of Foreign Aid

What is required from this administration is a recognition of certain key points. First, foreign aid cannot grow substantially while deficits remain high and domestic spending programs are cut. Asking members of Congress to support foreign aid under such circumstances strains political credulity and is only likely to further erode support for the program.

If the administration is not prepared to address the deficit problem realistically but nonetheless continues to insist that the U.S. has a stake in what happens in other countries, it should rethink its hostility to multilateral aid. U.S. contributions to institutions like the World Bank leverage resources from other industrialized nations and thus extend the potential reach of the United States given its influence within those institutions. There is some indication that Treasury Secretary James Baker is more supportive of the multilateral development banks than his immediate predecessor, but thus far that has not been translated into increased resources.

"The administration has put countries on notice that their voting records at the UN will be an important factor in the allocation of bilateral U.S. assistance."

Second, to the extent that foreign aid does grow, rates of growth in different elements of the program have to remain in some kind of reasonable balance if different constituencies are to be satisfied. Foreign aid is not well served by a strategy that alienates traditional supporters of the program. The program already has too few supporters given its stated importance to U.S. interests.

Admittedly, the distinction between development and security aid is not as rigid as sometimes portrayed. For example, a considerable portion of the security-related Economic Support Fund is used for traditional developmental purposes. Similarly, proponents of development aid view those programs as an investment in U.S. security over the long-term.

Few members of Congress challenge the importance of security aid. However, many believe that development aid programs are equally important. From the point of view of U.S. diplomatic interests, moreover, different kinds of aid are often largely interchangeable, a point the administration has failed to grasp.

Within programs, moreover, the administration cannot ignore the needs of regions and countries that many members of Congress are concerned about, such as sub-Saharan Africa. While many senators and representatives have serious reservations regarding U.S. policy toward Central America, few would deny the administration adequate resources to address that region's problems. However, the administration's overall approach to foreign aid has tended to put different regions of the world against one another in a competition for resources. As budgetary pressures mount, the competition is rapidly becoming a zero-sum game in which key members are no longer willing to participate.

This point takes on added importance in view of the recent UN special session on Africa. While the United States reacted favorably in general terms to proposals put forward by the African nations, it remained noncommittal—perhaps wisely so—in terms of providing additional resources to implement those proposals.

The fact is that sub-Saharan Africa is particularly threatened by U.S. budgetary pressures since it ranks relatively low within the overall priorities of the administration. Congress is unlikely to challenge those priorities directly, but many members are increasingly frustrated by the failure to face up to African problems.

One final point is also worth noting. Sustaining bipartisan consensus in favor of foreign aid requires a bipartisan consensus supportive of the larger foreign policy objectives the program is intended to serve. At no time since the Vietnam War, however, has the gulf between an administration and many in Congress been wider.

As the first cold warrior to occupy the White House in years, President Reagan has crystallized important policy differences quiescent throughout the 1970s. His identification of foreign aid with controversial policy objectives, especially his championing of resistance movements in Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua (and, if conservatives have their way, Ethiopia and Mozambique, as well), has eroded support for the program.

These realities are widely recognized in much of Washington, but they have yet to be fully understood by the president and his foreign policy managers. □

Interview

Bolaji Akinyemi
Minister of External Affairs, Nigeria

After several years of receding from its leadership role on the African continent, the Nigerian government has adopted a more dynamic foreign policy under President Babangida. Foreign Minister Akinyemi highlights Nigeria's new approaches within the West African region and vis-à-vis the anti-apartheid struggle, and looks ahead to its role in the post-liberation period.


Margaret A. Novicki

Bolaji Akinyemi: "We've always been conscious that if Nigeria makes it, the dignity and respect that we will attract will spill over into dignity and respect for black peoples all over the world"

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: Nigeria's foreign policy orientation is one of the issues that the Babangida government has opened up to national debate. At a recent conference to discuss foreign policy priorities, the debate seemed to boil down to whether Nigeria's national interests should take precedence—what was called the "Akinyemi Doctrine"—over continental issues in policy formulation. Could you assess the outcome of that debate and what you see as the most important factors in setting Nigeria's foreign policy priorities?

Akinyemi: I think that the striking thing about that conference—which is more an indictment of the media—is the fact that for about the first five days, the airwaves were dominated by the radical left who were probably not more than 30 out of about 300 delegates. But they said the most outrageous things and this is what caught the waves. So if you read the media for the first five days of the conference, you would have come to the conclusion that nothing good had happened in Nigerian foreign policy for 26 years, that everybody was wrong.

Then came the communique at the end of the conference and 96-97 percent of the communique was a vindication of our position. When I say "our position," I don't mean this present government's, but rather that the tradition of Nigeria's foreign policy was vindicated. When it came to drafting the communique, it was no longer a question of coming out with outlandish remarks. Rather, a cross-section of those at the conference brought reality to bear upon its conclusions. That is the opening remark that I would like to make.

I didn't quite perceive the debate that ensued about the so-called Akinyemi doctrine as positing Nigeria's national interests against continental interests. The doctrine was not even phrased that way. What the doctrine sought to do was to lay down parameters for defining Nigeria's national interests *within* its continental and global interests, in the sense that if Nigeria is going to take a position on a particular issue, that position must be determined by Nigeria's leaders. It has to result from the deliberative process of Nigerian decision-makers. Nigeria's role in the world should not be predicated on: If "A" has done this, then we will automatically be there. If I remember very well, I said that we demand to be consulted if the controversy allows for consultation. A lot of the critics have tended to forget the last clause and now regard me as having said that we must be consulted on every issue. That is not what I said.

There are certain issues in Africa and in the world which are determined by a broad consensus that is already formed. There are issues that have come about as a result of consultation and the deliberative process. One such issue is the question of liberation in South Africa. That doesn't call for any consultation. Nigeria was a party to the Lusaka Manifesto and to adopting and ratifying the strategy that is to be used in the liberation struggle. We were also a party to forming the document for economic recovery that was presented at the UN Special Session. Therefore, issues that are ancillary to that document obviously do not need any further consultation.

That was what the doctrine said. It did not define Nigeria's interests in a narrow way. It did not put Nigeria's interest in opposition to Africa's continental interests, or even to global interests. It simply said respect and reciprocity should be the yardstick of Nigeria's foreign policy. Nigeria is too big to put itself in a position where its support is automatically taken for granted, especially given a situation where other people are consulted. We should not be ignored if our support is needed. If our support is not needed, then nobody needs to come and talk to us. But if you're expecting Nigeria to support you on a particular issue, then respect for sovereignty and for the status of Nigeria should dictate that you keep us informed. You hold consultations with us. Other nations do it. The United States consults its Western allies. The Soviet Union consults its Eastern allies. Then why should anyone think that I'm asking for the moon when I say that Nigeria should be consulted?

Africa Report: In line with this position then, what are the foreign policy priorities of your government at this point in time?

Akinyemi: The priorities have not changed since the broad principles were laid down in 1960 by the first government: first, commitment to pan-Africanism. Within that context, I recently announced that President Babangida has already approved Nigeria's sponsoring and hosting the next Pan-African Congress. There's a danger that this movement might die out while we simply concentrate on the OAU. We perceive the Pan-African Congress as the fountain of ideas and values embodying pan-Africanism, of which just one strand led to the OAU. The other strand is still there, and we in Nigeria don't wish to see it die out. The congress we will hold will probably take us a year to plan properly, because it's not going to be a cultural jamboree. We are going to make sure that we seek to infuse and inject new ideas and values into pan-Africanism so that it can continue to be the guiding star piloting African states into the 21st century. So that priority hasn't changed.

Our commitment to the liberation struggle hasn't changed. We were the only country that went beyond verbal denunciation of the recent South African military attacks on the frontline countries. President Babangida directed that within 48 hours, we were to get $10 million worth of aid to the liberation movement and frontline countries. We got about 80 percent of that out within the 48 hours, so we are putting our money where our mouth is. We're fully committed to the liberation struggle and we intend to provide as much resources as we are capable of.

Our commitment to the blacks in diaspora is linked with the Pan-African Congress, because while the OAU is simply an organization of African states, there is still another strand of pan-Africanists out there who are not in Africa. We've always been conscious that if Nigeria makes it, the dignity and respect that we will attract will spill over into dignity and respect for black peoples all over the world. If we fail in Nigeria—because with 100 million blacks, we are the largest country—it will have rather disastrous consequences for the progress of the black race, and consequently for the progress of the human race.

We are still committed to the principles of non-alignment. We feel quite correctly that if Nigeria is to be important in Africa, it cannot play any other role than a genuinely independent one. We are conscious of our strategic location, we have a good track record of being a responsible actor on the international scene, and we intend to maintain this credible image. You are not going to see, at least not under President Babangida, wild fluctuations in the positions we take. We do not intend to inject any emotionalism into our foreign policies. We are going to project a hard-headed quality. We will tell off any nation that needs to be told off, but the reason will be there—it won't be out of some emotional genuflection. We will praise any nation that needs to be praised. We will embrace any proposal that deserves to be embraced because it serves our interests. And we will condemn, irrespective of where it comes from, any proposal that deserves to be condemned because it violates our values.

Africa Report: Some critics have said that after the Obasanjo government, Nigeria used its economic difficulties almost as an excuse to retreat from the very activist foreign policy that was evident earlier on. Will your government be taking a much more activist stand? And was it for economic reasons that Nigeria seemed to retreat from its leadership role in the continent?

Akinyemi: Yes, there was some retreat after the Obasanjo regime, but probably for reasons that have to do with the personality of the decision-makers who took over immediately after him. Obviously under the Babangida regime, things are different. I should draw attention, however, to the following: What constitutes an active foreign policy? It's a different thing from an abusive foreign policy. I get the feeling that a lot of people who say that they want a radical foreign policy for Nigeria are in fact talking about an abusive foreign policy. I don't believe in abuse. I believe along with John F. Kennedy that civility is not a sign of weakness. And more often than not, a subtle reprimand or criticism can be just as cutting as a crude criticism. To that extent, we must be clear on what constitutes a radical foreign policy.

Secondly, to some extent, foreign policy is reactive. Events have to occur. It is true that there are times when you create events of your own and then others react to you. The Angola and Zimbabwe issues under Obasanjo provided opportunities for a sharp injection of resources. We have not been faced with similar issues. But we have continued the aid package to the liberation movement. I just told you that President Babangida directed that $10 million in aid be given. You are going to be seeing more of this kind of aid, and you will not find any weakening of support for the liberation movement under President Babangida.

We reopened our borders which had been shut for about two years. The first countries I visited were countries within the ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] sub-region. We have recommitted ourselves to signing the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of persons, even at a time when Nigerians themselves were asking whether we should, given our recession and unemployment. But to us, it was an article of faith. Whenever Africa has had to make a financial contribution, we have always been in the forefront. Fortunately for the Babangida administration, we can already see the light at the end of the tunnel in the South African liberation struggle, and we know that the light is not the oncoming rushing train.

We are now involved in the whole exercise of trying to fashion out a permanent structure for Nigeria's foreign policy in the post-liberation period, which will lay the foundation for a permanent status for Nigeria within the international system. Our role fashioned out by the liberation struggle has to end when liberation is achieved, but there are other important issues in the world that are going to be more enduring.

The main instrument that we are now seeking to fashion is the idea of a concert of medium powers. If you look at the different regions of the world, you will perceive certain nations that have a credibility, whose policies—both domestic and foreign—have attracted attention and respect. They are listened to with respect even if you disagree with them. One could characterize them as regional powers. I believe that the intervention of each of these regional powers in the international system has been too episodic and not structured enough to make the kind of impact they should. I have been holding consultations with various foreign ministers of perceived regional powers, so that collectively we can stake out positions of responsibility that somehow will present options to the world which will not be tainted by ideological considerations or by narrow selfish interests, but will tend to reflect more universal values than those of either the superpowers or the Non-Aligned Movement. Initial reactions have ranged from cautious to enthusiastic. I will continue to plug on until we have carved up enough areas of consensus to launch it.

Africa Report: Earlier this year, you went to Britain, the United States, and France to open bilateral lines of credit and to discuss various economic issues. Given Nigeria's current financial difficulties, are economic issues playing a determining role in the formulation of your foreign policy?

Akinyemi: Every foreign minister has become a salesman, not just Nigeria's. I must have received about 15 foreign ministers since I myself became one, and economic issues take a large chunk of what we talk about. Foreign ministers are supposed to promote the totality of the interests of the state, of which the economic aspects now loom large for every country. So what I sought to do was in line with that.

Secondly, my mission was not really specifically to open lines of credit, but rather to create the diplomatic atmosphere that would be conducive to a sympathetic and positive appreciation of the Nigerian economic recovery program. My colleagues in finance and national planning have to deal with the more difficult technical aspects of the negotiations. Mine was just to create the ambiance, and I think I succeeded. Some people criticized the mission as hawking Nigeria's budget to Western countries. And my reply has been that it is to the man that I owe money that I will go and explain how I intend to repay it. It would not make any sense for me to try to explain to the man that I don't owe money how I intend to repay what I owe somebody else.

I think that I did get a sympathetic hearing. Editorials in the *New York Times, Herald Tribune, Financial Times, Le Monde* welcomed the Nigerian approach as a serious responsible one, and if you heard the statements that the government representatives made during my visit, they were also positive. So to that extent, I would regard my visit as having been successful. Of course, since then, the situation has changed. The price of oil has dropped drastically and tragically. Obviously, this has influenced in a negative way the perception of our ability to maintain even the interest payments. To that extent, it has now made the negotiations more difficult than they would have been earlier.

Africa Report: To what extent have your relations with Britain and the U.S., for example, been affected by your decision not to sign an agreement with the IMF?

Akinyemi: I don't think our political relations have been affected—what has really affected our political relations has been our diverging views on southern Africa primarily, because we disapprove of the unwillingness of the U.S. and Britain to impose meaningful economic sanctions. The dragging out of the problem of Namibia, American support for Savimbi—these have nothing to do with the economic issues, but are really the things which have affected our relationships. But on the economic front, the issues of rescheduling the debt, opening new lines of credit, etc. have been affected by our position not to take the IMF loan. But the ministers are working at it and I think there will be a meeting of the minds on that issue.

Africa Report: You mentioned your disagreement with American policy in southern Africa. The last time that relations between the U.S. and Nigeria were very close was during the Obasanjo period. How would you characterize your relations with the United States at this time? Can Nigeria bring any influence to bear on countries like the U.S. to change their southern Africa policies?

Akinyemi: There were reasons for the very warm, cordial relationship when Obasanjo was in power and Jimmy Carter was president in the U.S. Under Carter, there was an Africa-oriented policy in southern Africa. The Carter administration went out of its way to get the message across to the South Africans that they could expect no sympathy, no hearing, nothing from Washington unless they mended their ways. The policy of constructive engagement under President Reagan has been exactly the opposite. It has shown no understanding of the issues at stake there. The American support for Savimbi is inexplicable. These policies represent the ideological position of the Reagan administration, and there's very little you can do about changing a man's view of the world that is so deepset. We've just got to outlive it. The future belongs to the just! We hope that the next administration will return to what I would like to call the mainstream of American values in so far as foreign policy is concerned, which is to care for the just, to sympathize with the oppressed.

The United States often wonders why it is that the Soviet Union gets a better hearing in Africa. The answer is a very simple one: The Soviets ask what Africans want and they identify with that. The U.S. says, "This is what we want in Africa, now you Africans come and identify with it." *We* are the Africans, not Washington. It is our problem; the solution is ours. It is for America to identify with us, not the other way around. So to that extent, there is little Nigeria can do to influence Washington or London. As to their positions on South Africa, what we will do and have always done is to reinforce the will of the frontline countries and the liberation movement to resist any pressure to cave in to Washington or London. And we will continue to do that.

Africa Report: Regional relations hit a low point under the Buhari government after the expulsions and border closure. Have your regional relations improved since that time? Are we to expect that Nigeria will play a more active role in ECOWAS?

Akinyemi: We have reopened our borders, we have confirmed that we will implement the protocol on the free movement of persons. President Babangida is the current chairman of ECOWAS and he will shortly be hosting a summit, where his speech will show some of our vision for West Africa. The countries that I first visited after becoming minister were the West African countries to demonstrate our commitment to the region. I think we are back on course as far ECOWAS is concerned. Of course, a period of economic recession is a difficult one to launch major economic initiatives in what is essentially an economic organization. But that notwithstanding, we've paid up our dues; we are not owing ECOWAS, in fact we have advanced money to keep the organization going. There's no weakening of our commitment at all.

Africa Report: It has been said that one of the reasons behind your recent regional diplomacy has been to undercut perceived Libyan influence in West and North Africa.

Akinyemi: We didn't target our diplomacy against Qaddafy. Libya is not a member of ECOWAS. We have a role to play in the ECOWAS region, a role dictated by our national interests and by the tradition of Nigerian foreign policy of commitment to economic and political stability in the sub-region, which goes back to the days of Balewa. We're simply not abdicating that role. As you rightly said, during the Buhari regime, there were setbacks. I think they were concentrating on trying to sort out the internal system. But we've just returned to our activist policies in the ECOWAS sub-region and it is not targeted against anybody. We have a responsibility, we have our role, and we are not going to abdicate that role or that responsibility.



Nigeria-Benin border: "We have recommitted ourselves to signing the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of persons, even when Nigerians were asking whether we should, given our recession and unemployment"

Africa Report: What do you see as the next step in dealing with the Chadian problem?

Akinyemi: The Chadian issue is like an old running sore that simply refuses to heal or be healed. I don't foresee any solution around the corner. You have two antagonistic military presences, one in the north and one in the south. They are realities. I can't wish them away. We are not prepared to get militarily involved because I don't think that the military option is a feasible option. If it were, the Chadian situation would have been solved a long time because people have been trying to attempt the military option. The only time that Chad had a unified government, which had about two years of stability and peace, was when they gathered around the conference table in Lagos and signed an agreement. That's an indication of the road toward which we should be heading.

Of course things have changed since the atmosphere under Lagos. Now we have the antagonistic military presence—and we're not talking about a few hundred soldiers, but soldiers that run to the thousands. How do we deal with this kind of situation? Chad is a terrible danger to the continent because if Chad ends up being a divided nation, it is a syndrome that can crop up in 75 percent of African countries. So it is a very present danger to all African countries. We hope we will be able to persuade the countries involved to see it that way.

Secondly, we are going to seek to persuade the Chadian leaders themselves that to have a divided Chad is terrible for their own dreams and aspirations. We will continue to be actively involved in a non-military way until we are able to resolve the situation. If this doesn't sound like much, I'm sorry, but then it is not a situation that lends itself to dramatic solutions.

Africa Report: In light of the UN Special Session, how would you assess the Western governments' response to Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery?

Akinyemi: I'm not disappointed at Secretary Shultz's statement or for that matter, the general trend after five days of debate. I'm not so disappointed for several reasons. The African recovery program is not just a question of debt rescheduling. I don't even see it in terms of asking for an immediate commitment within that $45 billion resource flow that we're expecting. First of all, we wanted to get positive international focus on African problems, and I use the word 'positive' in a deliberate sense, because for the past two years or so, the international focus has been on Africa, but on what part of Africa? On Ethiopia, Sudan, drought, the dying and emaciated child. But the focus we have received in this past one week has been that yes, this is a continent with problems, but this is also a continent that has adopted a purposeful approach toward resolution of its problems. It is not simply a question of relief aid, but a broad, sophisticated problem that is linked with the economic problems of the rest of the international community. I think we have succeeded in doing that.

Secondly, we wanted to get across the message that we ourselves as Africans agree that the responsibility is ours for returning Africa back to economic health. I think we got across that message. Third, which is even more important, is that on a philosophical level there is a broad consensus between the Africans and the rest of the world, in the sense that it is a problem that will be sorted out by the Africans themselves and will involve the restructuring of their economies, which must provide an atmosphere for private initiatives. All that was in Shultz's speech. But then it was also in my speech and in the speech of Diouf, and it is in the African document of economic recovery.



Offshore oil rig, Nigeria: "What we want is for you to buy more of our oil, and then we'll turn around and buy more of your wheat"

The sticking point had been how much of the $45 billion nations would offer to contribute, and we did not make any headway there. But personally, I wasn't expecting that this would turn out to be a pledging conference. What I was hoping for was that there would be a positive atmosphere generated by this one week of debates and that that atmosphere will now have positive consequences in bilateral and multilateral negotiations months and years down the road.

The fact that countries like Canada, Holland, and Denmark came and announced a moratorium on debts should be regarded as a positive achievement. If there had not been the session, maybe they wouldn't have done so. Nevertheless, I don't think the message is going to be lost, even on the World Bank or the IMF, that we've now gotten over that ideological barrier that there cannot be a long-term moratorium on debt. In the next six or nine months as Africa individually and collectively deals with the IMF, World Bank, or governments on a bilateral basis over debt and resource flows, it will be against the background that there are some important countries in the Common Market and the Commonwealth that have given this kind of concession. That is why I'm saying that we've done a jolly good job here. It hasn't been a wasted effort and we've made remarkable progress. I believe that the last sticking point will also yield, not today or next week, but that you will notice movements along that line down the road.

Africa Report: But in terms of Africa's priority program, with its estimated $9.1 billion in external resources required per year over the next five years, if that money is not forthcoming from the industrialized countries, what will it mean for Africa five years down the road?

Akinyemi: We did say that 75 percent of the expected resources were going to be internally generated. I don't foresee a disaster even if the $45 billion is not forthcoming. But when the economies of the North start to boom and their factories start to produce and there is nobody to buy their goods because there is no buying power in the South, I don't think we will need to preach to Washington or London before they discover that it is in their interest to get that buying power across to Africa. It has never made any sense for them to give us cash for us to turn around and buy American goods. Real buying and earning power is what we are talking about. I still believe that that message is going to get across, but it will not come from our appealing to reason.

Right now, American representatives say to me, "You banned wheat, you're hurting us." And I say that we had to ban wheat because we haven't got the money to pay for the wheat. Confronted with that kind of situation, the United States is going to have to do something. We don't want the money to buy wheat. What we want is for you to buy more of our oil, and then we'll turn around and buy more of your wheat. Then we're talking pure economics, a mutually beneficial economic relationship. And we've banned rice, for example, because we can't produce rice. If you want to sell to us, what are you going to buy from us? Don't advance us money to buy the rice, or the wheat, or the milk. We've got to have real earning power, then we will buy. And that will be more stable. As I said, the message will get across. Maybe I'm being too optimistic, but I find that in this job, being optimistic is what keeps me going. □

Momoh's New Order

Sierra Leoneans looked forward to a break with the past when Siaka Stevens stepped down. Despite his genuine desire to end corruption and reform the country's economy, President Momoh has found it difficult to escape the influence of his predecessor, who retains a powerful role in Sierra Leonean politics.

BY LARRY JAMES

"When I assumed the reigns of the presidency, I soon realized that the vast majority of Sierra Leoneans were really itching for elections. They gave me the impression they wanted a new Parliament. They wanted new men, which indicated to me that perhaps they had seen too much of the old faces, and they wanted an opportunity to bring in new people. I thought that was quite a genuine request."

—Joseph Saidu Momoh
29 May 1986
State House

On June 11th, President Joseph Momoh announced his new cabinet, but it contained few new faces. Only seven of the 20 men named to the body are newcomers and all of the top spots remain occupied by those associated with the old regime of Siaka Stevens, the man whose 18-year rule is blamed for bringing the country to the verge of economic collapse. The promise of a new order has yet to be fulfilled and skepticism is deepening about Momoh's commitment to the political and economic reforms Sierra Leoneans desire.

Momoh came to power last November in a mood of national euphoria. At last, what the people saw as Stevens' corruption and mismanagement would end, and the nation would begin realizing its potential. At the time, political observers were cautiously optimistic about the new president's chances—knowing that Momoh faced a formidable task. Their optimism was buoyed somewhat by the widespread public support Momoh earned during a nation-wide tour conducted before he took office, which was designed to make him familiar to the majority of Sierra Leoneans.

As former force commander, Momoh's name may have been recognized, but most aspects of his personality were question marks. The image that began to emerge was of an honest man who sincerely wanted to see a change. Unfortunately, over the course of his first six months in office, the new president's slowness to act has effectively eroded his popularity. His cabinet appointments have eaten away at what remained of the optimism which characterized the early days of his presidency, and are seen by some as proof that while Momoh may be president, Siaka Stevens still runs the government.

Even the new president admits that his predecessor plays a powerful role in Sierra Leonean politics. Stevens was instrumental in the process of selecting candidates to contest the 105 seats at stake in the special parliamentary elections Momoh called for May 30th. Skeptics said that as long as Stevens sat on the reviewing panel which approved candidates, the elections would be a sham. Momoh, however, claims Stevens' influence does not extend into the government.

"My relationship with Siaka Stevens is as it has always been—very, very cordial. It is quite understandable. We have worked together a very, very long time, since 1968. This is not the sort of relationship one would expect to fizzle out overnight," President Momoh told journalists at State House.

"In terms of political matters, especially in terms of the one and only All People Congress party (APC), it is just impossible to get Siaka Stevens out of it. In any party political matter, Siaka Stevens has to feature prominently. But then that is altogether different from governmental matters. When it comes to governmental matters, that is my own business and Siaka Stevens has no hand in it."

However, not everyone in Sierra Leone thinks it is so easy to separate Stevens' power in the APC from his subsequent influence on governmental decisions.

"One wants to give him the benefit of the doubt," said one prominent academic. "But he is moving too slowly to bring about the kind of reforms this country needs."

Momoh says old habits must change. "We cannot go on like this," he says. "We have been making far too many mistakes to the detriment of all of us as a nation."

But he says that the changes must

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come from within each citizen through a concept he calls "constructive nationalism." He points out that the country didn't arrive at its present condition overnight and no one individual is to blame. "Everyone must learn to start putting the country ahead of their own selfish interest," Momoh says. "Unless they do, we will never bring corruption to an end and we'll never build the kind of society I believe all Sierra Leoneans want."

But the people are looking to their leader to show the way. They believe that if Momoh really wants to see change, he doesn't have to wait—he can do something about it right now. Momoh counters that changes must come slowly.

"People don't give up wealth and power easily," says Christopher John, a government diamond assessor. "And most people don't believe the government is serious about stopping corruption if all the officials ever do is just talk about it.

"You have to decolonize the leadership," John says. "And you have to make people feel like they are in charge of their own destiny."

The one area in which the president has drawn universal praise is the parliamentary elections which Momoh called a year ahead of schedule. In this case, even his harshest critics admitted that Momoh meant it when he said the elections would be free, fair, and non-violent. Before the voting began, Momoh took the bold step of disqualifying four candidates, including the minister of lands and mines, for allegedly inciting violence against opponents.

When election results were questioned, he did not hesitate to void the vote and order new balloting. In one instance where the results strained belief (Alex Stevens, the son of the former president, was at first reported to have won 2,151 votes to seven for his opponent), Momoh's Elections Commission invalidated the count and ordered new voting.

A few violent incidents marred the voting, but the atmosphere was mild compared with previous elections. And while the Elections Commission was roundly criticized for its inept handling of the process—polls opening late, ballots not arriving on time, unqualified polling officials—the president drew praise for insisting that improprieties not be tolerated.

Everyone agrees that Sierra Leone's political power structure must be rearranged if the country is going to come to grips with its economic crisis.

In the middle of a world-wide oil glut, Sierra Leoneans wait in long lines to buy gasoline. Stations sell to a maximum of 40 cars per day, and daily life is scheduled around frequent jaunts in search of petrol. That is not to say that fuel is unavailable. For those willing to pay the black market rate, there is plenty of gasoline.


Camerapix

"In any party political matter, Siaka Stevens has to feature prominently"

When Momoh took over from Stevens, the leone was officially valued at six to the U.S. dollar—the black market rate was 10 to the dollar. Six months later, the official rate had dropped to less than five leones to the dollar, while it now took 20 leones to buy one dollar at the black market price.

As the country awaits the official implementation of an International Monetary Fund agreement, those with dollars and other hard currencies are hoarding them. No one wants to be caught holding a bag full of leones when the currency is floated. There are predictions that the official rate could end up as high as 30 leones to the dollar once currency controls are ended.

On June 12th, in his first address to the new Parliament, Momoh announced that his government had come to terms with the IMF. Details of the agreement have not been released, but the president said he would take "appropriate steps" to improve what he called "the country's goodwill and financial credibility."

The loan may total as much as $80 million, but will be contingent on Sierra Leone's ability to repay all outstanding IMF loans, currently valued at close to $20 million. The country must also pay back interest arrears of another $4.8 million. The deadline for that repayment is set at July 16th.

The IMF also expects the Momoh government to show its "serious" intention to deal with the country's underlying economic and financial problems by floating the currency and ending subsidies on rice, gasoline, and other petroleum products, in addition to making a major reduction in the national wage bill. Sierra Leone is to meet donor countries in Geneva this September, and an IMF agreement is considered crucial if any additional financial help is to be expected.

Observers point out the obvious. There is no reason for the economic malaise afflicting the country. The problems are all clearly man-made. Sierra Leone's natural resources abound—gold, diamonds, bauxite, iron ore, and rutile (a substance used in paint pigment). The fisheries industry is the envy of most of the continent and other agricultural exports could be significant. The country does not suffer the burden of overpopulation or drought. The human and physical resources exist. There are no great ethnic or religious rivalries. The country boasts a good number of accomplished bureaucrats. Yet, despite Sierra Leone's great potential, it remains officially bankrupt with no source of credit and very grim prospects for the future. The people want to know why.

The answer offered most often is: "The system under Stevens was corrupt. When he came to power, there really were some resources to plunder and he did a pretty good job of it."

The chief complaint is that Stevens allowed himself to be manipulated by a small group of Lebanese merchants who monopolize all the country's exports and thus the foreign exchange earnings. When Momoh first took office, many questioned his ability to fight the powerful commercial interests in the country. Now many are beginning to feel that he lacks the desire to make those changes.

One of his first acts as president was to create the Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO) which was to better manage the exploitation of the country's richest mineral resources and bring an end to smuggling which, according to GGDO, may amount to $100 million annually. The move was applauded as a good first step.

However, when Momoh selected Jamil Said Mohammad to run the GGDO, there was general disbelief. Jamil is widely blamed by Sierra Leoneans for having illegally enriched himself. He is the most important businessman in the country with a conglomerate of companies which have major shares across the economic spectrum. He is thought to be the country's biggest diamond exporter and is rumored to control all gem sales in the country. The saying goes that if a diamond changes hands in Sierra Leone, Jamil either bought it or sold it and in either case made a profit.

This opinion is shared by some in government who feel that it is important for Momoh to move quickly to change the perception that under his administration, business is as usual.

"The Government Gold and Diamond Office has no future in its present form. We need an open system," says diamond assessor John. "We don't need Jamil."

Jamil does not accept blame for the poor performance of the GGDO in its first six months of operation. He promised the president that under his leadership, the GGDO would bring in $10 million to $12 million a month. It will be lucky to bring in one-fourth of that. The government has the option of replacing Jamil as head of the GGDO, but has shown no inclination to do so, claiming that the decision rests with the organization's board of governors.

Margaret A. Novicki

Freetown coastline: "There's no reason for the economic malaise afflicting the country, the problems are all clearly manmade"

Jamil rejects the notion that he is enriching himself at the country's expense.

"I have no defense against rumors," he says. "I have to answer to the law of the country and the truth of the operations I am doing. I am willing to be subjected to any type of investigation if there is any need for it. The question of what people think is not for me to say."

There are charges that Jamil is chiefly responsible for the foreign exchange crisis by failing to turn over to the Central Bank 75 percent of the foreign currency acquired in his business dealings as required by law. Jamil denies those charges, citing a letter from the Bank of Sierra Leone which acknowledges he has "satisfied all the requirements."

The average Sierra Leonean remains unconvinced of Jamil's claim of honest dealings. His palatial residence high in the hills of the capital city with its private tennis courts, swimming pool, and government security guards stands in stark contrast to the harsh realities of daily life for most Sierra Leoneans in Freetown, where many homes lack running water or electricity.

Those who were willing to give the new president the benefit of the doubt say that he must distance himself from private business interests such as Jamil, if for no other reason than to avoid the appearance of impropriety.

Most Sierra Leoneans still believe Momoh is basically an honest man who wants to do the right thing. But they say he is also a nice guy who wants to be liked—a weakness which can be fatal to any politician. They complain he is not cunning and has no political power base. Of his chief advisers, A.K. Toureh is seen as a loyal and useful public servant who also lacks a power base—his only source of power being Momoh. Sam King, another Momoh insider, suffers from the same deficiency and everyone else is just a politician in the Sierra Leonean definition of the term.

President Momoh says there are limits to how fast he can move in both the economic and political areas without risking further turmoil. The question remaining is how long Sierra Leoneans are willing to wait for him to live up to his promise of a new order. □

Interview

Simbarashe Makoni

Executive Secretary, Southern African Development Coordination Conference

Outlining SADCC's achievements and difficulties over the past six years, Executive Secretary Makoni argues that as long as Pretoria continues in its efforts to destabilize its neighbors, politics and economics will remain inseparable in southern Africa.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: Could you summarize SADCC's major accomplishments over the last five years?

Makoni: I would place SADCC's major achievements in three categories. The first one is the inculcation of the regional identity. It's not a tangible achievement, but a very strong unity has developed among our nine member-states. Very often now, you will hear people in the different parts of the region—government officials, businessmen, ordinary people—talk about Botswana and SADCC, Angola and SADCC, the country and the region. There's a family spirit, a togetherness, which was not there at all before SADCC was formed. This is a necessary prerequisite for effective practical cooperation because if there is no faith and trust among the cooperating parties, even if you have very clear and viable practical projects, then you can't move forward.

But we have also made significant progress in the program area. Our SADCC program of action covers seven broad economic sectors of cooperation. The single highest priority sector right from the beginning has been transport and communications. We also have programs in food and agriculture which span about six sub-sectors: food security; agricultural research; livestock production and animal disease control; forestry, fisheries, and wildlife; and soil and water conservation and land utilization. We have programs in energy, industry, mining, and in manpower development which is critical to all the other operations. One of our newest sectors is cooperation in tourism.

Across these different sectors, we have been able to elaborate nearly 400 disparate projects, ranging from large multi-million dollar railway and port projects to small feasibility studies. Altogether, our program of action is costed in 1985 terms

Victoria Kaufman

Simba Makoni: "The single largest threat to economic development in southern Africa is apartheid and South African destabilization" at about $5 billion, the largest component of which is in the transport and communication sector. Out of that, we have been able to actually secure and commit about $1.1 billion and we have another $1.16 billion at various stages of negotiation. So we can safely say that about 50 percent of the total financial requirements of our program of action is secured.

To put these figures in some perspective, we are talking about projects such as the dredging and deepening of the port of Beira in Mozambique to enable it to receive more ship loads than it can handle at the moment. One of our single largest projects is a $90 million rehabilitation program for the Nacala railway from the port of Nacala in Mozambique to Malawi. We have programs involving earth satellite stations to establish telecommunications links directly between all member-states. Before SADCC, six out of our nine depended on telephone, telex, and telecommunications transit through South Africa.

We have a 25-year research program in drought-resistant and pest-resistant strains of sorghum and millet, with a large central research program located in Zimbabwe and satellite stations in the other eight member-states. We have large programs of hoof and mouth disease control which was debilitating large herds of cattle in Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. We have literally eliminated hoof and mouth disease from the SADCC region in the last two and a half years.

Margaret A. Novicki

UNITA damage at agricultural institute in Chianga, Angola: "Our member-states are suffering already from commando raids, invasions, and sabotage by bandits of the MNR and UNITA"

There is a new, very exciting program area in the field of energy where we are interconnecting national electricity grids. We are in the curious position where globally the SADCC region has massive surplus power-generating capacity. But we also have critical deficits in some of our member-states and even the ironic situation where Mozambique, with the single largest power-generating capacity in Cahora Bassa, is itself importing power from South Africa. We are now engaged in interconnecting the Mozambican and the Swazi national grids, Mozambique with Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe with Botswana, Botswana and Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania—so that we can send power out of the Cunene hydroelectric power station in Angola, Cahora Bassa in Mozambique, or Kariba in Zimbabwe to deficit areas in Tanzania, for example.

The third area is the international support and understanding that we have secured. I think here SADCC has been a little bit ahead of the rest of Africa, because right from the beginning one of our basic objectives was to secure international understanding and support for the regional strategy for economic liberation. We have secured very enthusiastic responses from the international community. That $1.1 billion committed and $1.2 billion under negotiation I quoted earlier represent financial assistance being extended to SADCC by the international community.

In the $5 billion, we include the resources that our own governments are mobilizing, but the bulk of that sum will be mobilized from outside the SADCC region, notwithstanding the fact that our governments are committed to a program of collective self-reliance. The magnitude of the task that we are implementing cannot be carried out without substantial international support.

Africa Report: Regional economic cooperation has been attempted many times in Africa before, but usually unsuccessfully. In fact, SADCC is perhaps the most viable of the regional organizations on the continent. What is different in SADCC's approach that has made it successful thus far?

Makoni: I think that I would pin it down to two basic factors. The first one is the commitment of our governments. There is a very strong, direct, active involvement of our member-states, the lack of which has somewhat hampered meaningful progress in earlier efforts not only in Africa, but outside. If your governments are fighting each other across the border, for territory or other reasons, how can you build cooperative ventures together? So the political commitment, and unity which exists between our member-states is one real cornerstone of the success of SADCC.

The second factor is our practical approach. SADCC's programs are not based on some kind of theoretical formulation, but rather on the basis of practical needs. We don't have a central bureaucracy that sends economists and experts down to Lesotho and Zimbabwe to say this is what is good for you. We say to the Zimbabwe government: You are the people who know what you need and want. You must generate the projects and programs which will address your needs and then bring them to the family of nine. That pragmatic orientation has not only enabled us to address the more pressing needs of our member-states and our peoples, but it has also generated a sense of confidence with our international friends.

Another factor is the structure of our organization. We operate a very lean bureaucracy. The secretariat which I head is comprised of four officers. We have adopted a strategy of decentralization of responsibilities. We allocate responsibility for the coordination of our activities in the different sectors to our different member-states. So Mozambique is our sector coordinator for transport and communications, Zimbabwe for food security, and Angola for energy.

This has two advantages. The first is that we keep our countries directly involved. If things don't happen in energy, the government of Angola and the nine cannot point at me and say, "Executive secretary, things are not moving in energy." I'd say, "Ask the government of Angola." If things don't happen in industry, we go to the government of Tanzania, and say "This is your responsibility, why are things not moving?"

Secondly, you also insure an equitable share of not only the benefits of regional cooperation, but also its costs. We don't have the problem which many other organizations have had—a budget is drafted for the central secretariat and in two years, member-states are in arrears—because the major operatives within SADCC, apart from the small secretariat, are officials of our national governments. So if I am an electrical engineer in Angola, and Angola has responsibility for coordinating our work in energy, I'm already on the payroll of the Angolan government. There's no separate budget, there's no separate expenditure, and as long as the Angolan national budget has a provision for the salary of the electrical engineer, then we know that the SADCC operative is also being paid. And we have no problems with member-states falling in arrears with their contributions. We have no problems of programs being unfinanced because the governments have not mobilized the resources required for their implementation.

When SADCC was being formed, our member-states undertook a deliberate, long process of evaluation. We looked at the East African Community, the Central African Federation, and at other experiences in West Africa, the Caribbean, and the Far East. We saw that one of the things that has hindered effective cooperation is a large central bureaucracy, which is a kind of a supra-national authority dishing out dictates to governments. You alienate your governments and by so doing, you remove them from the center of activity. You cannot motivate them to become actively involved when they are only subjects of dictates.

Africa Report: What effect does the existence of other economic units in southern Africa, such as the Preferential Trade Area for East and Southern Africa [PTA], the South African Customs Union, and the Rand Monetary Area, have on SADCC's work?

Makoni: Not very adverse effects. Let me discuss the PTA first. We are following broadly similar objectives, but we started from two different perspectives. PTA's major thrust—at least in the initial phases—is on increasing trade within the region, through the more orthodox formulae of reduction of tariffs, removal of various barriers, and integration of markets. After all, they are aiming at a regional free trade area or common market.

We started from the opposite end, as we are primarily concerned with the production of goods and services. This has even influenced our approach to cooperation in trade. We find that both from a theoretical analysis of the experiences of other free trade areas and more particularly from experiences in Africa, it doesn't help much to reduce or even eliminate trade barriers when you have nothing to trade. We are saying that we must produce the goods first. We must provide the infrastructure—transport, communications facilities, energy inputs, the manpower—which will make sure that the goods and services, whether they are agricultural or industrial, are there first. And then you can ask which markets to put these goods in.

From our perspective, production will push trade. The PTA is saying that trade will pull production. That is the basic point of departure in our approaches. Ultimately, hopefully when their trade has been able to pull enough production and our production has been able to push enough trade, we might converge at the end in terms of activities. But because we

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have begun this way, we have found that most of our programs do not conflict with each other.

After its first two or three years, the PTA has embarked on a program of elaborating projects in agriculture, industry, transport, and communications, and we are beginning to see substantial overlap in some of the areas. But fortunately we have a very good working relationship, whereby we have agreed that if a project already exists in the SADCC program of action, there is no need for the PTA to duplicate it, and vice versa, particularly in the context of the southern African region where six of SADCC member-states are also members of the PTA.

But the PTA is a much larger area than SADCC—there are at the moment 15 member-states, theoretically there should be 20—and there are a larger number of PTA member-states who are not within SADCC. Therefore, we could not say everything which is on the SADCC program of action should not go on the PTA program because what we are doing in southern Africa will not affect Kenya, Djibouti, Comoros, and Seychelles. But what has worked effectively so far is that insofar as the southern African region is concerned, if we already have a program and the PTA has a proposal along the same lines, we tell them that there's no need for it because this is already being looked at in the context of the SADCC program of action.

The Customs Union and the Rand Monetary Area are a different kettle of fish altogether. We have three member-states of SADCC who are members of the Customs Union with South Africa and we have two that are members of the Rand Monetary Area. We have no relationship whatsoever with these two institutions. We accept why Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland have to relate with South Africa in the way in which they are at the moment. But we look at that as the justification for what we are doing—in order to place Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland in a position where they don't have to be married to South Africa in a customs union or in a monetary area.

We take due recognition of the fact that the economies not only of the wider region but more particularly of these three countries have been integrated into the South African economy for a long time. Our programs are intended to progressively disengage them or at least reduce this integration. But we accept that it takes time, and certainly what has been entrenched for over 110 years cannot be undone in a mere six years.


Margaret A. Novicki

"For those who are arguing that sanctions will hurt the peoples of southern Africa, they need only look at the fact that for the last 10 years the Benguela railway has hardly carried a ton of goods to the port of Lobito"

Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland have not found their obligations to the Customs Union and the Rand Monetary Area a handicap to their cooperation within SADCC. But basically we have no formal links, although there are those of our member-states who out of necessity have to continue to relate to South Africa in the Customs Union. We recognize and accept that we operate on the basis of the national interests of our member-states and SADCC cannot dictate to Botswana what is in its best interests.

Africa Report: SADCC has come out very strongly in favor of international economic sanctions against South Africa. If sanctions were to be imposed, can you estimate what sort of costs would in turn be levied upon SADCC member countries? Hasn't SADCC proposed an insurance scheme to protect its members in the event that they suffer from South African reprisals?

Makoni: Sanctions are a very complex subject. To put the matter into perspective, it is important to understand that the economies and even the territories of SADCC member-states are threatened by four distinct factors, of which sanctions is only one. The activities which are now underway in South Africa—the popular opposition to apartheid—reflected in strikes, boycotts, and riots, are already a threat to the economies of SADCC member-states to the extent that if the South African railway workers decide to go strike, not a single ton of Botswana beef will get to Cape Town, not a single bale of Zimbabwean tobacco will get to Port Elizabeth. So that's one factor which could harm SADCC economies.

The second factor is the intensification of the armed struggle. Our countries, together with the rest of Africa, are urging the liberation movements to intensify the armed struggle. We all know that the first targets of any armed insurrection are strategic economic infrastructures—the railways, the power stations, power pylons, etc. If the liberation movement in South Africa intensifies the armed struggle, as indeed it is doing, our economies could suffer further.

The third factor is South Africa's punitive actions—aggression and destabilization. Our member-states are suffering already—not only from commando raids like May 19 in Harare, Gaborone, and Lusaka and invasions like in southern Angola, but from sabotage by bandits of the MNR and UNITA and economic squeezes like the blockade of Lesotho, and the slowdown of movement of traffic on South Africa's railways. Those are very potent weapons which have already threatened the health of the economies of SADCC member-states without the international community imposing a single iota of sanctions.

So when people talk about the possible hardships which will come to the economies and the peoples of southern Africa as a result of sanctions, they must appreciate that we are already threatened and that we are already carrying a very heavy burden on account of apartheid. In our view, sanctions are not really the critical factor. The greater danger to southern African states is not so much from the direct effects of sanctions themselves as from the retaliatory measures which the Botha regime has threatened to take against our member-states. The mere fact that our countries are urging the international community to impose sanctions and that we will not do anything to undermine the effectiveness of American, German, or British sanctions imposed against South Africa is itself a factor which is putting the Botha regime in a position of threatening retaliation against us.

The second point is what is to be done in the event of sanctions being imposed. It's very difficult to quantify measures which need to be taken to minimize or to cushion the effects. We cannot entirely eliminate the effects of the deteriorating situation in South Africa, because of geographic proximity and the social and economic linkages which exist between our economies. What we are saying is that the world must take measures that will minimize the adverse effects of sanctions and the deteriorating situation within the South African borders themselves on our economies and our member-states.

What will need to be done will really depend on the nature, form, and content of the sanctions measures which the international community may effect and secondly, the punitive measures which the South Africans may take against us. The SADCC program of action is itself already a contingency measure against the deterioration of the South African economy. We are talking about rebuilding our transportation routes so that we can get the Zimbabwean tobacco, Botswana beef, and Zambian copper out of Cape Town and Port Elizabeth into Dar es Salaam, Beira, and Maputo. We are talking about improving our own energy supply systems, so that Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Swaziland don't have to depend on South African energy supplies, so that those who are getting their food supplies out of South Africa don't have to if our agricultural production is improved. We won't have to import goods and services from South Africa—our greatest area of dependence—if we establish and consolidate our own industries, manufacturing services, and financing institutions.

We don't think that the world should approach sanctions, and more particularly the counter-measures in support of our member-states, separately from the SADCC program of action which already exists. In the context of that program of action, we already have a response to South African retaliation; if our railways are working to Lobito or Dar es Salaam, then it won't hurt us as much if South Africa closes the port of Durban and its railway line to our goods. We are calling for a speeding up of the implementation of these programs and projects, particularly in transport and communications, our most critical area of vulnerability at the moment.

We haven't really put forward a counter-sanctions plan because we don't want the world to think that we are making a plan specifically in answer to sanctions. The regional program of action is a program for the re-ordering and realignment of economic relationships in the immediate, and more importantly in the future, post-apartheid South Africa. We think that it would be self-defeating and very short-sighted to work out an elaborate plan of action only to address the sanctions question without looking at what happens afterward. Our answer to sanctions, to our historical dependence, and to new post-apartheid relationships is the current SADCC program of action.

The only other point which we would like to emphasize is that for those who are arguing that sanctions will hurt the economies and the peoples of southern Africa, they only need look at the fact that for the last 10 years, the Benguela railway line has hardly carried a ton of goods to the port of Lobito. They need to look at the blockade of Lesotho, the blowing up of the Luanda refinery, the blowing up of the port of Beira and the fuel tankers there, and the various other costs which we have elaborated in the paper, "Illustrative Costs of Destabilization." We conservatively estimate the more direct effects of South African destabilization at $10 billion in five years—more than the total official development assistance which all our nine member-states have received in the same period. It's roughly about one-third of total export revenues, whether Zambian copper, Tanzanian coffee, Mozambican cashews, Zimbabwean ferrochrome, Malawian tea, Botswana beef and diamonds—a third has been blown up into ashes by South African destabilization.

So for those who argue that not imposing sanctions will save us from suffering, they must ask themselves how much more suffering they are hoping to save us from. We're suffering already! We feel that even if it takes much more suffering, if we are assured of genuine and effective changes in South Africa, then we are prepared to take it. Those who feel pity, sympathy, and charity for these poor Africans who will suffer from sanctions against South Africa must look back—and these things are on their television screens and on front pages of their newspapers—at the suffering of a poor footballer who is sleeping in his room and is blown to mincemeat in the early hours of the morning! What kind of suffering are we being saved from!

Africa Report: One of the centerpieces of SADCC's efforts is the development of the "Beira Corridor" through Mozambique. To what extent has South African destabilization of Mozambique thrown this plan into disarray and what effect has it had on SADCC's overall aims in the region?

"For those who argue that not imposing sanctions will save us from suffering, they must ask themselves how much more suffering they are hoping to save us from. We're suffering already!"

Makoni: SADCC has identified five regional port-transport systems, which comprise a port, the roads, the railways, and the communications which feed it. We have the Beira, Lobito, Dar es Salaam, Nacala, and Maputo port-transport systems which constitute the SADCC regional transport network. Since 1984, we have adopted the strategy of placing special emphasis on the development of particular transport systems in response to the short-term and immediate needs of regional traffic movements.

We started off with the port of Dar es Salaam and the Tazara railway. We had a technical coordination conference for Tazara and Dar es Salaam in April 1985 where we invited a number of our cooperating partners to look at the specific needs of the system. In April this year, we convened a similar technical coordination conference in Beira to look at the 10-year development plan for the port of Beira and the systems which serve it. After Beira, we'll probably go to Nacala or Maputo. So Beira is not special in the sense that we singled it out—it's part of an integrated program of the five regional port-transport systems.

But Beira is special in the sense that it is the most economic port which can serve five of our member-states—Mozambique itself, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana. We can get goods from all these five countries into Beira. It's a short distance from the Zimbabwean border to the port. It is a port with infrastructure that can be developed and brought into operation fairly quickly. In looking at the possibility of quick and substantial capacity increases, Beira lends itself as a very viable option.

The extent to which Beira, Maputo, Lobito, or any other port will be able to fulfill our needs depends on our ability to secure the port—to defend and protect it. And this is the million dollar question in southern Africa at the moment. Our problems are not the lack of viable projects or cooperative spirit between our member-states. Our problems are that we have not been able to effectively neutralize South African aggression and destabilization.

The port of Maputo, which is the largest port in the region with a capacity capable of handling all the bulk commodities we export, is literally unoperational at the moment because the railway line has been subject to sabotage by the MNR and South Africa. The same applies to the port of Lobito and the Benguela railway line. The port of Beira offers better prospects in the sense that because it is a shorter distance, it is possible to implement effective security measures. The experiences of the cooperation between Zimbabwe and Mozambique over the past year have shown us that it is possible to put effective security in the Beira corridor, which would be very difficult on the 800-kilometer Limpopo valley railway line, the 600-kilometer Lobito line, or the 1000-kilometer Tazara railway line. This is not to say that we will not defend these lines, we will! But in terms of priorities and looking at returns on defense measures, the Beira corridor lends itself to more effective security than the other areas at the moment. This is why we have given it high priority.

But even in light of Zimbabwean and Mozambican cooperation, the MNR and the South Africans still manage to place landmines and undertake sabotage activities in the port of Beira itself, the railway line, pipeline, or the road that feeds the port. So I don't think we can give a 100 percent guarantee that the port, the railway, and the infrastructure that serves it will be secured. But we will have to try. To do otherwise will be to surrender to the South Africans and their bandit puppets, and we can't do that. This is a point which we really must bring to the fore with our cooperating countries.

At the recent Beira technical coordination conference, we mobilized about $150 million out of a $200 million priority program, covering cold stores in the port of Beira, new handling equipment, warehouses, the rehabilitation of the railway, roads, new telecommunications, etc. But it is nonsensical for U.S. AID, which is involved with us at the moment in Beira to the tune of $5.5 million, to help us re-lay 25 kilometers of railway line and put in 400-ton cranes in Beira and then tell us the question of defending these infrastructures is none of their business. We can assure them that the South Africans will wait for us and the American engineers to finish re-laying that railway and they will come the following day and blow it up into ashes. And $5 million of American money will have gone into nothing.


Margaret A. Novicki

Kariba Dam, Zimbabwe: "SADCC is now interconnecting national electrical grids so that we can send power out of Kariba in Zimbabwe, for example, to deficit areas in Tanzania"

It doesn't make sense to disengage politics from economics in southern Africa, because what the South Africans are doing is not just political destabilization but economic aggression and destabilization. They are hitting those central targets which are critical to the economic development and security of our member-states. For the United States to come and say, "We would like to help you rehabilitate the Beira corridor, but we are not prepared to talk to you about the security and protection of the Beira corridor" doesn't make sense. We are not asking the American forces to come and fight the South Africans. What we are saying is that the United States must accept that politics and economics in southern Africa are so intertwined that you cannot divorce one from the other.

Africa Report: At SADCC's Harare summit, the American delegation seemed to be saying that the organization has become too politicized. How would you assess the American government's position toward SADCC at a time when the trend in American assistance is toward bilateral relationships as opposed to multilateral approaches? What has been their response in terms of actual financial support?

Makoni: It's a very interesting position. The United States was one of the first countries to acknowledge the usefulness and relevance of regional cooperation in southern Africa, so they gave quite early support in political terms. In absolute financial terms, the U.S. is one of SADCC's major supporters. But relative to the resource endowment of the United States, I think U.S. support to SADCC is the smallest. They have committed about $15 million for the sorghum and millet research program over the next five years, plus the $5.5 million I referred to for the Beira project. They have given a total of $5 million to various technical assistance activities, $1.5 million to my secretariat, $1 million to the coordinating unit in food security and manpower development, and various sectors. All together, I think it would add up to about $30 million.

Proportionate to the U.S. resource endowment however, I think this is peanuts. I have made this point to my AID friends, to the State Department, and to the few contacts we've made on Capitol Hill. If we take Indian support, for example, relative to its resources, the Indian program for SADCC is much bigger than the U.S. program. In these terms, American support for SADCC is still unsatisfactory. I would like to make this point—and I have made it before with government officials—to those who are accessible to your media to know that we are not ungrateful, but we think that the U.S. is not doing enough. When we look at what the United States can mobilize—President Reagan's $100 million commitment to the Contras—$30 million for nine countries which are facing one of the world's most brutal systems is pathetic!

I'd like to come back to your comment about the attitude of our friends who were at the Harare conference who feel that SADCC is becoming too politicized. I think this comes from an unfortunate lack of understanding of the practical realities of southern Africa. My chairman in Harare described President Reagan's reception of Jonas Savimbi as placing the U.S. in league with South Africa in destabilizing the member-states of SADCC. The Americans who were in Harare were extremely annoyed. But if you read the communiqué of the annual conference in Harare, it said that the single largest threat to economic development in southern Africa is apartheid and South African destabilization. And the American delegation was party to that communiqué. We are not saying anything new. We said this in Maputo in 1983.

What we find really puzzling is that the United States is trying to have its cake and eat it too. This we find extremely worrisome. They will come to SADCC and say they want to support us. But I can tell you that senior officials within this administration have said to me: "Can't you find a way of cooperating with South Africa in the economic field without talking politics with them?" In the same vein, people within the administration have said to me: "It is not viable for the countries of southern Africa to talk about economic cooperation without South Africa, because South Africa is the regional powerhouse."

So, we have this dilemma, where people who deep down in their hearts and minds don't believe that what we are doing is not only viable, but that it will succeed. And at the same time, they are coming and saying that they want to support us and that they agree with what we are doing. We don't know which is the true United States position! There is already a strong economic basis for viable regional cooperation without South Africa, not as a counter to it, but to place the regional economy in a more balanced relationship. There are those within the U.S. administration who agree with this, but unfortunately at the moment there are more who think that we should cooperate with South Africa, ignore apartheid, forget about the Casspirs in the streets of Soweto, the blockades of Maseru, the Gaborone attacks, and go and talk to the economic people to see how the bank of South Africa can help stabilize the currencies of the region!

We find that extremely naive to put it mildly. But I can say that the United States will not succeed either by carrot or by stick to persuade the countries of southern Africa to acquiesce to apartheid, or to tolerate deliberate South African aggression against our very limited economic cooperative measures. South Africa has made it a point to attack the cornerstones of SADCC regional cooperation. We don't think it is fair or realistic for the United States to come and say to us, "We will help you build this railway line, but don't talk in the annual conference about the MNR coming to blow it up with mines supplied by the South African defense forces." We will refuse to separate politics from economics in southern Africa because they are inseparable.

Those who argue that SADCC is becoming more politicized do not understand the true situation in southern Africa. They are developing policies on the wrong premise and they will not succeed. This is why constructive engagement has failed—because Chester Crocker built it on the assumption that South Africa is so powerful that it can browbeat and cow down the independent states of southern Africa. It will not. I said to Chester Crocker: Is it really more important for this great democracy that the United States purports itself to be that the defense of the Cape Sea route against so-called communist threats should predominate over the welfare of the poor Angolan villagers in Mavinga who for the last 25 years have never known peace?

The United States is supporting people who are blowing up bridges and railway lines and kidnapping mineworkers and villagers who are trying to grow food for themselves. At the moment, Angola continues to need food, as does Mozambique, not because the rains have not come but because the MNR and UNITA are prohibiting peasants from producing food for themselves. And we are asking the United States: Is it of greater American interest that we should keep these peasants destitute and suffering in order to stop "Soviet expansionism?" □

UPDATE

Thousands detained in massive emergency crackdown

The South African government declared a state of emergency in mid-June on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the Soweto uprising, imposing virtual martial law on black townships and detaining several thousand persons. Blacks have launched wildcat strikes in protest or fled underground to escape arrest.

The police dragnet—justified as a means to forestall violence on the June 16 anniversary—drew in leaders of unions, township associations, and organizations including the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Soweto Youth Congress, and the Azanian People's Organization. Also arrested were attorneys who have defended political prisoners, doctors who have treated victims of police violence, and even entire congregations attending church services. The Institute of Race Relations estimated that more than 3,000 were thrown in jail.

Hundreds and perhaps thousands of activists have gone underground, abandoning their jobs and moving from home to home to elude the police, while keeping in close touch with their organizations. Several UDF leaders briefly emerged from hiding to announce a rent boycott in Port Elizabeth townships to protest the state of emergency.

The government also cracked down on the media with restrictions described by the Foreign Correspondents' Association and attorneys in South Africa as the harshest in the world. Journalists were prohibited from firsthand reporting on events in black townships, scenes of unrest, or police and army operations. The South African Broadcasting Corporation was forbidden from transmitting live news by satellite for foreign television.

Pretoria's newly-created propaganda arm—the Bureau for Information—is now the only government agency authorized to purvey the news, but reporters question whether "news" is the word to describe what Bureau spokesman Brigadier Leon Mellet disseminates at the daily briefings. According to Percy Qoboza, editor of *City Press*, "What the Bureau of Information tells us bears little resemblance to what we see with our own eyes but we are prohibited from reporting." Reporters were unable to verify the Bureau's assertion that violence had significantly decreased since the onset of the emergency, which it claimed thwarted plans by the African National Congress to launch a "massive popular and multi-pronged offensive."

Despite widespread confusion over the vaguely worded media restrictions, the Bureau refused to respond to inquiries about them, instead advising journalists to hire lawyers. The *Sowetan*, *The Star* and the *Weekly Mail* used blank spaces to alert their readers that their news pages were not reflecting actual current events. The government soon served notice on the *Sowetan*, however, that the blank spaces were subversive.

Meanwhile, strikes broke out at 60 retail chain stores in the Johannesburg and Pretoria areas to protest the detention of union leaders. Within days, the strikes spread to other work sites. White business leaders warned the government that wage negotiations could be jeopardized by the continued detention of union leaders.

Continued on next page

Pretoria charges to Savimbi's rescue to thwart Angolan military offensive

South Africa has once again come to Jonas Savimbi's rescue by stepping up its military intervention deep inside Angolan territory in a bid to repel a major three-pronged offensive by Luanda government forces against Unita rebels.

In early June, a South African naval force attacked the key southern Angolan port of Namibe, sinking a Cuban ship, damaging two Soviet vessels, and hitting three petrol storage tanks. A patrol boat armed with Israeli-made Scorpion missiles entered the harbor—a vital supply point for Angolan army units in the offensive against Unita—to spearhead the missile and underwater sabotage mission. While the launch destroyed the storage tanks, South African frogmen planted limpet mines on the three ships docked at the port, including the Cuban vessel which was unloading a full cargo of food.

The Soviet Union warned South Africa that its attack on the Cuban and Soviet merchant ships could have "far-reaching and dangerous consequences." The official government statement concluded, "Actions of this kind cannot be left unpunished." But Pretoria denied responsibility for the raid, saying only, "It is very easy for a country torn by civil war to blame everything on South Africa."

Since Unita has no known seaborne capability, however, South Africa's denial is hardly credible. In past years, South African frogmen have been used in Angolan sabotage attacks on several occasions. Most recently, a commando group was foiled in March 1985 while on a mission to destroy U.S.-owned oil facilities in Cabinda province that was designed to appear like a Unita operation. The captured South African soldier, Capt. Wynand du Toit, revealed that he had previously taken part in similar missions which had been attributed to Unita.

Continued on next page

Crackdown. . . continued

In late June there were signs that Pretoria was preparing to lift the state of emergency. The President's Council, a group of white advisers, passed legislation enabling the government to declare "unrest areas" where police would have almost unlimited powers, including detention without trial for six months. This would serve the same purpose as the state of emergency which could then be called off.

Trade embargo passes easily

International outrage over the emergency crackdown has sharply intensified pressure on the U.S. and European countries to adopt sanctions against South Africa. In a move that startled observers at home and abroad, the U.S. House of Representatives passed by voice vote legislation that would impose a trade embargo on goods from South Africa—except for minerals that the president deemed strategically important—and require complete divestment by U.S. firms and citizens of their South African holdings. The bill would also mandate U.S. companies to close their operations in the country 180 days from the time the bill was signed into law.

The House had been preparing to vote on a milder sanctions package, but when Rep. Ron Dellums (D-CA) introduced his hard-line bill, passage came swiftly. The bill, however, is less likely to pass in the Senate where it probably won't come up for a vote until September.

European heads of state were preparing for a vote on sanctions at a meeting at The Hague in July. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's continued opposition to sanctions, however, presaged a radical change in Britain's relationship with its former African colonies. Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have announced plans to close their British high commissions, and Ghana and Uganda intend to back collective retaliatory moves by African states if Thatcher does not agree to sanctions at the Commonwealth's mini-summit in August. ■

Savimbi. . . continued

President José Eduardo dos Santos announced in mid-June that the government had successfully foiled a major Unita raid on "economic targets" in the town of Cabinda, close to the oil refineries. The rebels subsequently claimed to have blown up three buildings—the provincial government center, the state security ministry, and the town hall. Sabotage of the oil-rich Cabinda enclave, which accounts for 90 percent of Angola's foreign exchange earnings, has long been one of Unita's main goals, but neither Savimbi nor his South African backers have succeeded in destroying the well-guarded installations.

In fact, since the start of the long-awaited offensive by Angolan government troops in late May, Unita rebels have had trouble holding their ground. The Angolan army, reinforced with new Soviet military hardware, has attacked Unita on three fronts, two from Luena in eastern Moxico province and another from Menongue in Kuando Kubango province toward the strategically important town of Mavinga. Last August, Unita—with considerable South African assistance—beat back a similar offensive near Mavinga in what proved to be a serious blow to the dos Santos government. Once again, Luanda's primary objective is believed to be the destruction of Savimbi's Jamba headquarters in southern Angola.

Although Unita has maintained that it is prepared to resist any government offensive, thanks to the Reagan administration's recent shipment of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, rebel sources admitted in early June that they had lost control of the town of Cangumbe located on the key railway line leading to the port of Benguela. Unita also disclosed that during bitter fighting to the west of Luena, the commander-in-chief of its "territorial defense forces" had been wounded. Given that in the past, Unita has been reluctant to divulge such losses without prompting from other sources, some observers believe it could be a new Savimbi strategy to broaden South African intervention while encouraging the Reagan administration to expand its economic and military assistance. ■

WESTERN AFRICA

Nigerian student deaths spur protest

More than 20 institutions of higher learning were closed and all demonstrations banned in June, following clashes between Nigerian police and students leading to an estimated 40 deaths. It was the first serious rioting since President Ibrahim Babangida seized power in a military coup in August 1985.

Violence erupted at Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) in the northern town of Zaria, but quickly spread throughout the country. Unrest on the campus has been linked to attempts by university officials to prevent men and women students from visiting each other in residence halls, which some students viewed as an effort to impose Islamic rules barring contact between the sexes. There is also said to be growing anxiety on Nigerian campuses over the government's lack of progress in improving the quality of higher education, although most students have supported Babangida since his takeover.

The immediate impetus for the recent clashes, however, was a peaceful university gathering in April to commemorate ABU students killed by police in a demonstration eight years ago. Students attempted to rally support for the event in a women's dormitory. Two student leaders were subsequently suspended for violating the regulation against the mingling of sexes in residence halls.

The students' protest of the expulsions soon focused on criticism of ABU's Vice Chancellor Ango Abdullahi for alleged misappropriation of university funds and his intolerance for student union activities. ABU students have not had an official union since 1981 when Abdullahi expelled union leaders.

Fela lets establishment hear the music

In a turn of events which sent shock waves through the Nigerian judiciary, the controversial Nigerian musician Fela Anikulapo-Kuti was released from prison in late April. After serving nearly 20 months of a five-year sentence on charges of currency smuggling, Fela regained his freedom following disclosures by his family that Justice Gregory Okoru-Idogu had confessed to convicting him under pressure from high-ranking government officials.

Fela, whose distinctive "Afro-beat" music and politically charged lyrics have earned him international acclaim, revealed that Okoru-Idogu paid him a surprise visit last September to apologize for the verdict. The judge reportedly told Fela that he had been a "victim of circumstances," after receiving directives from Maj.-Gen. Tunde Idiagbon—the number two man in the ousted administration of Maj.-Gen. Muhammadu Buhari—to find him guilty.

The allegations of judicial wrongdoing prompted President Ibrahim Babangida to order a special investigation into Fela's trial. Within a week it established that Okoru-Idogu was guilty of "improper and unethical conduct." According to a government spokesman, "The misconduct of Justice Okoru-Idogu in this case has raised a doubt about the impartiality of the court's decision. In all such cases, such doubts are resolved in favor of the accused person." The judge was forced to retire with immediate effect.

Okoru-Idogu provided a sequel to the affair when he protested to Babangida that his story had been misrepresented and that his retirement was the result of a frame-up. He denied having been under pressure from the Buhari government and claimed he had merely visited Fela—who was ill at the time—to express sympathy and tell him that he had only been doing his job when he ordered the conviction.

Fela was arrested in September 1984 as he was embarking on a U.S. tour with his 42-person entourage. A customs official questioned him about $1,800 he had withdrawn from a London bank four days prior to his scheduled departure. Fela's currency declaration form disappeared in the course of the interrogation, and he was subsequently charged and convicted for currency violations.

The charges provoked a storm of international protest and were seen by many observers as a pretext to silence the popular singer's criticism of government policy. But the prison term did not dampen Fela's anti-establishment fervor. At his first news conference following the release, Fela wore a prison uniform as "a symbol to show we are all in prison." He condemned conditions in Nigerian jails and the practice of chaining prisoners to each other "like slaves" when being transferred between jails.

When asked if he would be less critical of the Babangida government because it had ordered his release, Fela shot back, "I am going to criticize any government that does anything bad. This government has not done me any favor. Releasing an innocent man is no favor. I am still not going to thank anybody."

Protest activity remained peaceful until May 22 when a group of students went to Abdullahi's home and office and demanded to meet with him. He reportedly called the police who fired tear gas and rubber bullets into the crowd. The next day the police returned to campus and shot, beat, and raped students. Although the government did not deny initial press reports of up to 20 deaths at the university, it later placed the death toll at four.

Demonstrations of support for the ABU students quickly broke out at other universities. Students in Lagos went on a week-long rampage, burning police barracks and government vehicles and attacking law enforcement officers. University of Ife students broke into the local prison and freed more than 200 inmates. At the Kaduna Polytechnic, they razed police barracks. Lynch mob violence and police control measures pushed the total death toll to over 40, according to the Nigerian press.

The Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC) and the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) were among the national groups expressing outrage at the police attacks on students. The ABU shootings were "barbaric, and reminiscent of the horrendous practices in apartheid South Africa," said ASUU officials. An NLC demonstration scheduled for June 4 to protest the shootings, however, was cancelled under government pressure.

The NLC, student organizations, and other groups have demanded the dismissal of Abdullahi, Minister of Education Jubril Aminu, and the Kaduna State police commissioner, whom they blame for the recent bloodshed. They also condemned the belated government response to the crisis.

Babangida assigned a five-man commission to investigate the immediate and underlying causes of the violence and the extent of the damages. It was to report back by the end of June with recommendations on how to avoid similar unrest in the future. ■

GHANA
Plots, plots, and more plots

The latest in a series of plots to overthrow the government of Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings was foiled in late May when Ghana's security forces captured Capt. Edward Adjei-Ampofo and a group of armed dissidents who had infiltrated the country from neighboring Togo.

Adjei-Ampofo, a former military intelligence officer who had already been condemned to death *in absentia* for his part in a June 1983 coup attempt, was arrested with other dissidents as they made their way to a hideout on the outskirts of Accra. After the 1983 plot was thwarted, he had escaped to Lomé where he again conspired to overthrow the Rawlings government in December 1984.

The capture of the Lomé-based rebels came after Ghana's secretary for foreign affairs, Obed Asamoah, met with Togolese President Gnassingbé Eyadema and Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny to protest the use of neighboring territories for subversive activities against Accra. Asamoah provided Eyadema with the names of 15 Ghanaian dissidents in Lomé plotting against the Rawlings government and requested that they be expelled.

Togolese Interior Minister Kpotivi Djidjogbé Laclé subsequently issued a statement saying that 11 Ghanaians on the list had been located and asked to leave the country. He added, "Togo would never permit its territory to be used as a base for subversion against a neighboring state."

Although Ghanaian dissidents have been operating from Togo for years, Eyadema now appears more willing to cooperate in tracking them down, in return for a similar commitment from Accra. Eyadema has often accused Ghanaian authorities of harboring members of the Paris-based opposition Togolese Movement for Democracy (MTD), which claimed responsibility for a series of bomb explosions in Lomé last year.

For their involvement in another scheme to overthrow the Rawlings government, nine people—including two members of the armed forces—were sentenced to death by firing squad in mid-May. Evidence presented to the public tribunal against the accused suggested that much of the planning for the aborted coup last September had been initiated in Lomé between 1984 and 1985.

Several of the dissidents, led by Godwin Mawuli Kofi Dra-Goka and Eric Goka, had allegedly served as couriers between Lomé and Accra to obtain local arms and to recruit soldiers from the Ghanaian army. The Goka brothers had purportedly planned to kill Rawlings and several of his closest associates in what could have been the most violent attempt yet to overthrow the present government. The seven plotters held in detention were subsequently executed by firing squad.

In yet another aborted plot by Ghanaian dissidents, eight American mercenaries and one Argentine who had been arrested in Brazil aboard a freighter carrying six tons of weapons in March were found guilty on charges of arms contraband. The captain of the *Nobistor*, Eduardo Gilardoni, and the leader of the American contingent, John Dee Early, were both sentenced to five years imprisonment in late June by a Brazilian federal court. The seven remaining mercenaries received sentences of four years each. Godfrey Osei, the Ghanaian dissident who had allegedly masterminded the coup attempt which was to culminate in an assault on the Rawlings government by sea, was not among those captured.

Meanwhile, a U.S. federal judge declared a mistrial in the case against Joseph Henry Mensah, leader of the London-based opposition Ghana Democratic Movement, who was detained last December for conspiring to purchase missiles and anti-aircraft guns to arm a rebel army in Ghana. Mensah, who was finance minister under the Busia government, was to be retried in July after the jury was unable to reach a verdict.

Federal prosecutors, however, disclosed that two of his colleagues, John Boateng and Kwasi Baidoo, had sought to buy weapons and pay the shipping costs during a meeting with a customs agent posing as an arms dealer. They were convicted of conspiring to buy weapons and face a maximum of five years' imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000. ■

GUINEA
Grumbling grows louder

As President Lansana Conté's economic reforms begin to take hold, the recovery program is attracting praise and assistance from the international community, in contrast to growing criticism at home.

Following the signing of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund for a 13-month standby in February, Guinea received a $43 million structural adjustment loan from the World Bank and $75 million in assistance from bilateral donors, including the U.S. and West Germany.

Government officials then met


Richard Everett
Conté: Praise from the world community

with the Paris Club of Western creditors for the first time in history and arranged a debt rescheduling under terms considered highly favorable to Guinea. Repayment will be at 2 percent interest over 10 years with a five-year deferral. The government is also working to negotiate its debts to Eastern bloc and Arab countries.

Meanwhile, the skyrocketing price of basic foodstuffs and the expansion of the French expatriate community have become sources of growing domestic discontent, particularly in Conakry.

Economic reforms, especially substantial increases in agricultural producer prices and the massive devaluation of the Guinean franc, have quadrupled the price of imported rice and trebled the cost of petrol in recent months. The price of other basic goods and services, including cooking oil, fish, and public transport, are also on the rise.

Conté has attempted to ease the hardship on government employees by periodically raising their pay. In late May, he announced an 80 percent salary increase, but the news was tempered by a reminder that the government intends to reduce the size of the civil service, estimated at 84,000 according to a census late last year.

Conté is encouraging voluntary departure through the use of bonuses and bank credits—with which former government employees are supposed to establish themselves in the private sector. But the incentives are apparently inadequate since few civil servants have taken advantage of them. Conté has also warned that selection tests will be administered to the entire civil service, and only the best employees will be retained. Action will have to be taken soon, since the IMF is calling for the termination of some 20,000 government positions this year.

The growing French presence in Conakry has also drawn public censure. Paris has sent technicians to advise government ministries, particularly on economic affairs, while French business interest in Guinea has revived. Certain French companies that were active in colonial times are said to be supplanting local businessmen in the distribution of basic foodstuffs, including rice, sugar, and flour.

French intervention in the military and police forces has provoked the most resentment among Guineans who still cherish their country's history as the only French colony where a majority of the voters rejected membership in a French community of overseas territories and where cutting ties with the former colonizer became a matter of strong national pride. ■

Sport Aid runs to Africa's rescue

In what turned out to be the largest single fund-raising event in history, Sport Aid's six-continent "Race Against Time" in late May generated tens of millions of dollars to be used for emergency relief operations and development projects in Africa.

Co-sponsored by Unicef, British Airways, and Bob Geldof's Band Aid Trust, the global sporting effort was designed to raise not only funds but also public awareness to coincide with the United Nations special session on the African economic crisis. Said Geldof, "We need to show the world's politicians that they must act now so that Africa never has to go through another disaster. It puts pressure on the people in the UN to come to terms politically and morally with Africa's problems."

The aid drive reached its pinnacle when Sudanese long-distance runner Omar Khalifa ignited an Olympic-style flame at the UN in New York, thus concluding a 10-day journey that began in El Moweileh relief camp outside Khartoum. The end of his marathon, which took him through 14 countries and 12 European capitals, signalled the start of the "Race Against Time" for 20 million people in 76 countries. Some 700 million people worldwide watched the fund-raising extravaganza on television.

Proceeds, estimated as high as $150 million, will be divided equally between Unicef and Band Aid Trust. Unicef plans to allocate its share to its $100 million emergency fund to address urgent needs in 16 targeted countries, while Geldof's group intends to fund many small-scale development projects throughout Africa.

A major disappointment for Sport Aid organizers was the failure of the event in the U.S., where only 4,000 people participated in New York City. One reason cited was that the effort clashed with the better publicized Hands Across America endeavor, organized to raise money for the hungry and homeless in the U.S. Nick Cater, spokesman for the Sport Aid venture, however, denounced American egocentricity saying, "I think America has demonstrated that they are the largest island in the world."

Despite its overall financial success, Sport Aid has prompted some observers to question whether the new trend in fund-raising, as manifested in such projects as Band Aid and Live Aid, can really address massive global economic inequalities. Burkina Faso President Thomas Sankara, who organized the local event and ordered all his cabinet ministers to join him in the run, also warned of other dangers.

"The recipient population should not be given the impression that through this aid they are being looked down upon, or that it is an attempt to impose the donor's will or is an expression of a superiority complex. Aid should not be used as a means to purchase a good conscience." As Sankara concluded, "Sport Aid will only have a true meaning if it really brings out the drama of the African continent—not only to the Africans themselves, but also to those who would like to assist Africa."

LIBERIA
Doe gives an inch

In a determined bid to defuse political and social unrest and to satisfy U.S. concern over human rights violations, President Samuel Doe announced in early June that he had pardoned 34 political prisoners accused of conspiring to overthrow the government.

Among those granted "a complete and unconditional pardon" was Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, former finance minister and leading member of the opposition Liberia Action Party (LAP), who was being tried for treason and allegedly implicated in the aborted coup of November 1985. Doe called his decision an "act of mercy" to show that "We harbor no evil intention against any of our citizens, including those who wish us ill."

In more practical terms, Doe was attempting to head off calls in the U.S. Congress to suspend aid to Liberia because of human rights abuses including widespread detention, torture, and executions of political opponents. The release of political prisoners should guarantee that Doe will receive the $93 million in proposed U.S. aid for 1986. The Reagan administration has withheld a sizeable portion of the funding earmarked for the Liberian government, adding to the country's financial woes.

The effects of a deteriorating economy and the growing opposition to Doe's political maneuvers has provoked a series of anti-government demonstrations and strikes by large numbers of workers and students. In early June, doctors and nurses in state-run hospitals in Monrovia ignored a government threat to sack them if they did not return to work immediately. Medical personnel at government clinics pressed Liberian authorities for payment of salary arrears and improved working conditions but said there was no sense in returning to work since hospitals lacked adequate medicine and facilities. ■

SIERRA LEONE
Voters cast out veterans

More than half of the old-guard politicians considered close to former President Siaka Stevens lost their parliamentary seats in late May and early June in the most peaceful elections that Sierra Leone has seen in many years.

President Joseph Momoh, who had been criticized for not purging the government of officials loyal to his predecessor during his first six months in office, said he called the elections one year early to allow the people to select their own leaders.

Those ousted from the 105-member Parliament include nine founders of the ruling All People's Congress (APC). Two cabinet ministers who lost their seats—Joe Jackson (education) and Tom Smith (social welfare and rural development)—had served in Parliament for 10 years without facing an electoral challenge. Voters also ousted other powerful ministers including Kawusu Conteh (interior) and Sembu Fionah (information). However, Momoh appointed only five newcomers to his cabinet in mid-June.

Election fraud was still widespread, forcing the government to reschedule voting in 17 constituencies. But the bloodshed that characterized elections during Stevens' 18-year tenure was largely absent this time, except for scattered incidents. The Momoh government enforced a strict code of conduct, disqualifying candidates who resorted to violence, including Minister of Mines and Labor Sanie Sesay, two former ministers of state, and a former secretary to Stevens. Most of the losers accepted defeat graciously in sharp contrast with past practice.

The Election Commission—which included the former president—controlled the nominations, granting the party's red rising sun symbol to some 350 candidates from a total of more than 500. The government took the precaution of centralizing the nominations in Freetown to avoid personal attacks and kidnapping of candidates that had occurred in the past.

A number of candidates who formerly ran uncontested had to learn how to campaign for votes. There was little policy debate, despite the overwhelming problems facing the country, but many campaigned house to house and held political rallies. Some even resorted to food hand-outs. One activist remarked that he managed to eat four free meals a day during the campaign—one from each of the candidates in his community. "I shall eat them clean as I may never see them again until it's time for the next general election," he said.

Public response to the elections was enthusiastic, with crowds lining up as early as 6:30 a.m. on election day, although due to fuel shortages and the inefficiency of the election commission, many polling places did not receive their ballot boxes until noon. A number of voters were casting ballots for the first time since the APC gained an electoral majority in 1967 shortly before Stevens came to power. Most have bitter memories of the 1982 election, which was marked by such violence and destruction that thousands fled across the border to Liberia, and Stevens sent in the army to restore order.

In addition to holding early elections, Momoh has made other efforts to improve government operations and demonstrate his independence from Stevens. He has reduced the size of the cabinet, enforced punctuality in the civil service, ensured timely payment of government workers for the first time in years, and deported four Lebanese and two Indian businessmen for financial irregularities. He set up government commissions to examine the operations of parastatals, including the National Diamond Mining Company, Sierra Fishing, Sierra Leone Airlines, and the Port Authority. ■

EASTERN AFRICA

Mini-boom brightens Kenya's outlook

Rising coffee profits and falling oil prices are contributing to an economic boom in which Kenya's GDP growth of more than 4 percent is expected to outstrip the increase in population for the first time in several years.

An abundance of high-grade arabica—in particularly high demand due to the 1985 Brazilian drought—is the key to the turnaround. Kenya sold more than 1 million bags in the first half of the current 12-month coffee cycle, a rate which could set a record if it continues through August, according to Agriculture Minister Odongo Omamo. Rising tea prices and a harvest which reportedly broke records have also contributed to high expectations for a boom year, although Kenya Tea Growers Association Chairman G.R. Corse said 1986 profits are difficult to predict.

Meanwhile, the proportion of total export earnings consumed by oil—more than 50 percent in recent years—is expected to drop sharply this year. If the government decides to implement price reductions on petrol products, farmers will benefit from cheaper fertilizers, pesticides, and other petrol-based chemicals, while manufacturers' production costs are likely to drop sharply.

The last growing season's excellent rains led to increased production in pyrethrum, cotton, and other export commodities, a much welcomed upswing after the devastating 1984 drought. The rains also contributed to a bumper harvest of food crops. The maize surplus this year is expected to set a record, following the introduction of a new government pricing policy that included increases in producer prices. This is not entirely good news, however, given Kenya's acute grain storage problem. Much of that surplus may have been spoiled after exposure to recent heavy rains.

Thanks to the rosy short-term economic prospects, Kenya is expected to service its debt without additional borrowing until early 1988. Meeting in Paris in late April, some 20 creditors of the World Bank Consultative Group on Kenya praised the government for reestablishing financial stability, particularly through an increase in foreign trade, despite the effects of the worst drought in many years.

Finance Minister George Saitoti emphasized that Kenya's good fortunes, following nearly a decade of disappointing economic performance, would be managed conservatively. "The government intends to set aside gains from coffee and petroleum toward economic stability," he recently told Parliament, adding that the central concern is to generate more rapid growth to regain the economic buoyancy of the 1960s.

Government officials recognize, however, that economic prospects are not sufficiently promising to offset long-term problems posed by the rapidly expanding population and labor force. There is widespread concern that agricultural yields will not keep pace with population growth, as Kenya's population of 20 million is expected to double by the year 2000. ■

ETHIOPIA
Defects in relief program

Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam's government suffered another embarrassing blow to its credibility when Deputy Commissioner of Relief and Rehabilitation Berhane Deressa announced in early June that he was quitting his post and would not return to Addis Ababa. Several weeks earlier, Ethiopian authorities had confirmed the defection of Dawit Wolde-Giorgis, the commissioner of the relief unit, who had been the key government figure directing the famine emergency effort.

Deressa explained that he had come to this decision because "serving my country and serving a regime—especially a regime whose primary purpose is implanting a foreign ideology and an alien socio-political system—is not only a contradiction in terms but also diametrically opposed to what I have always believed in: service to my country."

Wolde-Giorgis was more specific in an exclusive interview with *The New York Times*, claiming that the government's policies were as responsible as the drought for the famine of 1984-85. "We called it a drought problem but it was more of a policy problem. Drought only complicated the situation. If there is no change in our policies, there will always be millions of hungry people in Ethiopia," predicted Wolde-Giorgis, who is now seeking political asylum in the U.S.

He also criticized the government for continuing to direct the greater part of its agricultural investment to collective and state farms, "which have proved to be a failure," he

"Reagan Doctrine" focuses on Ethiopia

The Ethiopian government of Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam is likely to be the next target of the "Reagan Doctrine" in an ever-widening interventionist effort to roll back alleged Soviet gains in the Third World.

According to a recent report in *The Washington Post*, the Reagan administration is actively considering stepping up covert CIA support for anti-communist dissidents seeking to overthrow the Soviet-backed Addis Ababa government, following its success in approving a $15 million paramilitary program to assist Unita rebels in Angola. Although no official decision has yet been made, the White House has carried out several preliminary studies to determine how best to escalate CIA support for Ethiopian rebels, evaluating the costs and expertise required for an effective insurgency campaign.

The major dilemma facing Reagan, however, has been to identify a moderate resistance faction that is neither sympathetic to Marxism nor fighting for secessionist ends. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Tigréan People's Liberation Front—the two guerrilla groups with the largest popular backing—do not meet the administration's stringent criteria for assistance.

Instead, the U.S. has provided $500,000 a year since 1981 to the London-based Ethiopian People's Democratic Alliance (EPDA) which has the appropriate right-wing credentials but no military clout and virtually no following within Ethiopia. Reagan signed a presidential "finding" under the National Security Act, authorizing the CIA to contribute to a "non-lethal" campaign against the Mengistu government by improving the anti-communist group's resistance tactics.

The CIA's efforts were largely confined to supplying the EPDA with written, audio, and visual propaganda which was shipped in diplomatic pouches to Addis Ababa where dissident members could distribute the material. But the CIA's campaign was undermined by factional fighting within the opposition group and was left in tatters when Ethiopian authorities uncovered the main EPDA cell in late 1983, subsequently arresting 18 people.

The security police reportedly captured a CIA agent hiding in a cupboard at the home of an EPDA member and held him captive for more than a month. He was subjected to extensive torture, suffering a fractured skull, chipped vertebrae, and dislocated shoulders in what intelligence officials said was "one of the worst attacks by a foreign government on a CIA officer working as an accredited diplomat." He was freed in February 1984, *The Washington Post* revealed, when then ambassador-at-large Vernon Walters flew secretly to Addis Ababa and met with Mengistu to obtain his release.

It was apparently his testimony which led to some of the arrests in early 1984 and the expulsion of three Americans—the CIA station chief at the embassy, the deputy station chief, and another CIA officer—who were operating under diplomatic cover. The victim had been accredited as a commercial attaché in the embassy where he was allegedly "deeply involved" in fomenting unrest through the small resistance network. The CIA had hoped a propaganda campaign would eventually produce a broad political opposition that could establish an army to overthrow Mengistu. This scheme having fizzled, it appears that a more ambitious plan may now be envisaged.

said. Wolde-Giorgis pointed out that hunger and malnutrition had become increasingly widespread in rural regions well before Ethiopia was hard hit by drought.

For many years one of Mengistu's close and trusted allies, Wolde-Giorgis said that very little famine aid from the West, however, had been lost through corruption or diverted to the military, asserting, "We can be proud of that." He also rejected claims by Western relief officials that up to 100,000 Ethiopians had died as a result of the government's controversial resettlement program, describing the estimates as greatly exaggerated.

Nevertheless, Mengistu called Wolde-Giorgis' defection "lamentable" and accused him of embezzling hundreds of thousands of dollars. Authorities in Addis Ababa then arrested the Ethiopian ambassador to the United Nations, Berhanu Dinka, for alleged involvement with Wolde-Giorgis in the misappropriation of international famine relief funds. The money was allegedly diverted from bank accounts operated by missions in London and New York.

Apparently concerned that the negative publicity could adversely affect further aid from the West, Mengistu said in late May that he wanted to improve Ethiopia's strained relations with the U.S., but that the Reagan administration would first have to curb its "blind hatred" for his policies. "Unfortunately, the U.S. government, out of its dislike for the social-economic system we have adopted to free ourselves from underdevelopment—and also out of sheer arrogance—has taken this unfriendly stance against us," argued Mengistu. He stressed, however, that relations were not "irreparably ruptured," and encouraged "well-intentioned" members of the Reagan administration to look into what was really happening inside Ethiopia. ■

Tanzanians ponder economic policy

National debate over the extent to which the country should compromise its socialist principles has mushroomed in the months since President Ali Hassan Mwinyi took office. For the first time, the role of socialism in Tanzania's future is being openly discussed in marketplaces, homes, meetings, and academic settings.

At a recent seminar sponsored by the University of Dar es Salaam, academics demanded that politicians take a firm stand on whether the country should pursue a capitalist or socialist path. They sharply criticized the Arusha Declaration, the country's socialist development plan adopted in 1967. Under the plan, commercial banks and many industries were nationalized, rural development was redirected through community villages rather than large farms, and education was reorganized to serve the masses.

Critics charge that the declaration—which they say was adopted without adequate consultation with government workers—has been a complete failure. Tanzanians who share this view often compare their country's progress with that of Kenya to the north. The two countries were at roughly the same level of development in the years directly following independence, but diverged in the late 1960s after the Arusha plan was adopted. Now Kenya's living standard is estimated to be 40 percent higher, while its agricultural and industrial growth rates have far outpaced those of its neighbor. Even life expectancy is higher in Kenya, critics say.

Advocates of the policies pursued during the 24-year tenure of former President Julius Nyerere claim that the international recession and natural crises such as the drought have played a major role in Tanzania's economic plight. They also point out that Tanzania has a far higher rate of adult literacy—79 percent compared to 47 percent in Kenya, more extensive rural health services, better nutrition among the lowest-income families, and more equitable income distribution. And they charge that calls for dramatic change are inspired by individuals in academic and elite circles who would enjoy personal gain under free-market capitalism.

Meanwhile, President Mwinyi has proceeded with steps to liberalize the economy. He recently announced that the government would give "full backing to large-scale private farming" as long as it remains far removed from Ujamaa farms. Twenty-four of Tanzania's sisal estates—the prime revenue producer in the 1960s—were transferred to the private sector in March. And the government told exporters that they will be allowed to retain part of their foreign exchange earnings in order to import raw materials and spare parts. Observers remain skeptical about the impact of such a measure, however, since exporters were unable to obtain their share of foreign exchange from the central bank when the policy was first implemented in 1984.

KENYA
Taboo topic keeps popping up

Government efforts to stifle the spread of information about Mwakenya—the clandestine dissident group—have been relatively unsuccessful so far.

Government employees have found copies of *Mpatanishi*, the group's journal, scattered in public places and offices when they arrive at work in the morning. In Thika, 13 factory workers were detained for possession of the "seditious" publication in late May. When a stack of *Mpatanishi* was spotted on a Kisumu street corner, however, pedestrians refused to touch it for fear of being arrested. And when bundles of the literature were dumped in Nyeri, the mayor warned that his clean-up crews had better things to do than collecting such "rubbish."

President Daniel arap Moi has attempted to suppress discussion of the subject with an order against the mention of Mwakenya in the press and at public rallies. When those accused of involvement with the group are taken to court, officials are forbidden from describing Mwakenya publications in detail, and only the magistrate can read the full texts.

The president has also tried to turn public opinion against the dissidents. He recently condemned "social and political misfits who have allowed themselves to be deceived by their foreign masters to promulgate ill-conceived ideologies."

In a speech in Nairobi a few weeks earlier, he said that education was to blame for the entire affair: "When people acquire an education, they think they have migrated to a new planet. Are the Ugandans who are suffering all over the world, roaming from one place to another, ordinary Ugandans? No, they are not. They are educated people. . . Who caused the chaos in Uganda?. . . It was these same people. That is why I thank ordinary Kenyans, common men. I have no problems with the ordinary citizens and neither am I a problem to them. It is the educated people. Even robberies are planned by the educated people."

Camerapix

Moi: Blaming education

Many of the 19 persons who have received prison terms for being involved with the organization—as well as about two dozen being held without charge—are instructors or students at the University of Nairobi and other institutions of higher learning. The best known student is Julius Mwandawiro Mghanga, a former University of Nairobi student leader, who was sentenced to five years in prison after pleading guilty to possessing seditious publications and attending Mwakenya meetings. At least half of those serving prison terms or detained without charge are from Kenya's largest ethnic grouping—the Kikuyu.

Additional background about Mwakenya surfaced when noted author and publisher, Gakaraar Wanjau, arrested in connection with the group, issued a press statement after being released from custody. Wanjau, winner of the all-Africa Noma book award two years ago for an account of his detention as a Mau Mau fighter, said that Mwakenya is a continuation of the Twelfth of December Movement (DTM), which was active in the months preceding the aborted coup of August 1982. Earlier that year, a number of Kenyans had been imprisoned for possession of DTM's journal, *Pambana*. However, the court martial following the coup attempt gave no indication that DTM had anything to do with it, according to Kenya's *Weekly Review*.

Wanjau's statement also revealed that most Mwakenya activists have been involved in other leftist political activities in recent years. Wanjau, however, said nothing about the oaths of secrecy that members of Mwakenya are allegedly forced to take or the method of organizing "cells" of two or three persons who know nothing of other members.

The group was reportedly planning to form a socialist or communist party in Kenya, with the first party congress to be held later this year. One of the leaflets condemned Moi for dictatorial rule and accused him of "economic mismanagement, corruption, forced family planning, and tubal ligations to unsuspecting mothers." ■

TANZANIA
Prolonged resistance crumbles

The Tanzanian government has reached an agreement with the International Monetary Fund, four years after negotiations began under former President Julius Nyerere and six years after the last financial package with the Fund fell apart.

The agreement, considered the first step toward the country's economic recovery, will entail major policy changes including a two-thirds devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling, implementation of currency auctions similar to the system now operating in Zambia, and a series of measures to open the economy to market forces.

In return, Tanzania will receive a massive injection of credit to service its estimated $2 billion foreign debt and to finance imports of raw materials, spare parts, and commodities. Serious shortages of basic consumer goods have thwarted past efforts to increase productivity. Raising producer prices, for example, failed to stimulate production since farmers found little to purchase in the marketplace. Shortages of fuel, transport equipment, and spare parts have hampered the collection of crops and the distribution of seeds, fertilizer, and farming equipment.

The impending agreement succeeded in procuring substantial pledges of loans and bilateral assistance at a donors' meeting on Tanzania held in Paris in June—the first such gathering since 1977. Donors pledged $130 million in aid and promised to release $400 million in past commitments that had been stalled by the IMF stalemate. In addition, the World Bank agreed to a $100 million loan.

During his last years in office, former President Julius Nyerere had resisted the IMF's harsh prescriptions, arguing they would cause severe hardships for the poor and lead to social unrest. His government instead launched an alternative structural adjustment program in 1982 which incorporated elements of IMF and World Bank recommendations. Once President Ali Hassan Mwinyi took office last November, however, many observers predicted the government would finally come to terms with the IMF. ■

UGANDA
Museveni's economic challenge

In its first major economic policy statement, President Yoweri Museveni's government unveiled a wide-ranging economic package in late May, designed to bolster exports while clamping down on a flourishing black market.

Finance Minister Ponsiano Mulema introduced a two-tier exchange system allowing for a "priority" rate of 1,400 shillings to the dollar for basic consumer goods and raw material imports, as well as traditional exports such as coffee, tea, and tobacco. A second "market" rate of 5,000 shillings to one dollar is to be applied to all other transactions—a move intended to undermine the growing black market in currency and consumer goods. Mulema said the dual exchange rate would reflect actual supply and demand in the economy with the exception of goods considered essential to the country's recovery.

The government also announced that it was virtually doubling coffee producer prices in an attempt to boost exports. Low prices for coffee, which earns 94 percent of Uganda's foreign exchange and 70 percent of government revenues, have encouraged smuggling to neighboring countries. In addition, Mulema said he would increase interest rates on bank deposits from 18 to 25 percent in a bid to draw the large quantities of currency in use on the black market into the formal banking sector.

To help stabilize security, the Museveni government imposed a temporary dawn-to-dusk curfew in Kampala in June, as troops and police raided houses and manned road-blocks in search of illegal weapons. Since the end of the civil war which brought the National Resistance Movement (NRM) to power, the government has been concerned with the inordinate number of weapons remaining in civilian hands. Within days, the NRM disclosed that over 1,200 weapons as well as large amounts of ammunition and military clothing had been uncovered in the capital where nighttime shootings had still been a common occurence.

Although security has markedly improved in past months, the government has been busy denying press allegations that Museveni had foiled a coup attempt. A bi-weekly paper, the *Weekend Digest*, published speculative articles in late May claiming that "disenchanted personalities" holding responsible government positions wanted to overthrow the president. According to the paper, the plot was financed by the Italian and West German governments through the intermediary of a church leader, Cardinal Emmanuel Nsubuga.

A government spokesman categorically denied the report, announcing that authorities had been compelled to ban the paper after gathering evidence that "it is one of the fronts through which the enemies of the NRM are trying to destabilize the country." Two *Weekend Digest* editors, Wilson Wandera and Jesse Mashate, were subsequently arrested after being summoned to the president's office. ■

CENTRAL AFRICA

Zairean-Belgian ties take a nosedive

For the second time in as many years, the seizure of an Air Zaire cargo plane in Belgium has strained the already poor relations between Brussels and Kinshasa. The rift prompted Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans to visit the Zairean capital in late April where he announced several measures designed to revive the traditionally privileged ties between the two countries.

A communiqué issued at the conclusion of Tindemans' trip reported the establishment of a direct telephone hot-line between the governments and the creation of a special Zaire unit within the Belgian cabinet charged with monitoring relations with Kinshasa. A joint Zairean-Belgian commission was scheduled to meet in July to iron out any remaining problems.

The diplomatic dispute over the impounding of the Air Zaire DC-8 in Ostend had followed a Belgian court order handed down in connection with a $90,000 lawsuit filed by a Belgian pilot, Pierre van Impe. He claimed that his dismissal by the Zairean airline had violated the terms of his contract. Kinshasa denied the allegations, pointing out that he had received compensation equal to that of other expatriates laid off during the restructuring of the company.

In retaliation, President Mobutu Sese Seko's government announced that it had revoked the landing rights of Belgium's national airline, Sabena, and would transfer Air Zaire personnel from Brussels to Paris.

Although a Belgian judge subsequently lifted the seizure order on the Air Zaire aircraft, Mobutu said he would never take back the plane, sarcastically dubbing it "a gift from Zaire to Belgium." The Zairean press agency justified Air Zaire's move to Paris by indicating that Zaireans "can no longer understand and cope with the series of humiliations meted out to Zaire by the former colonial power."

Mobutu went further: "It appears that all Belgians, irrespective of the political party they belong to, deep down have never really accepted our international sovereignty. Every time they have an opportunity to create problems for us, they do so without hesitation. On the contrary, Belgian politicians take great pleasure in walking over Zaire."

In recent years, a string of incidents has alienated the two governments. A similar lawsuit filed by a former Air Zaire pilot in 1984 had led to the seizure of a Zairean plane in Ostend and retaliation against a Belgian DC-10 in Kinshasa. The stalemate was finally broken when a Belgian court reversed the decision to impound the Zairean plane. ■

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Kolingba acts to ease unrest

Three of 12 Bangui University students arrested for participating in an illegal campus demonstration and charged with "threatening state security" were released in mid-May.

President André Kolingba subsequently announced that he would dismiss the magistrates who presided over their trial and ordered a special tribunal to investigate the cases of the nine other students.

The arrests had provoked secondary school and university students in Bangui district to boycott classes and hold additional unauthorized protests. Central African Republic students attending universities in Côte d'Ivoire had responded by occupying their embassy in Abidjan to demand the release of the activists.

Camerapix

Kolingba: Forms a new political party

Students had begun demonstrating in the capital in March ostensibly to protest government scholarship cuts and poor job prospects for graduates. Government officials charged, however, that the agitation was aimed at destabilizing the government and inducing the departure of the estimated 2,500 French troops based in the country since 1983 as part of "Operation Manta" in the Chadian war.

Observers linked the student strikes to the surge of anti-French demonstrations provoked by the crash of a French Jaguar bomber in a Bangui suburb in March. The aircraft, stationed in the Central African Republic and involved in the fighting in Chad, had crashed into a school, killing 35 people, most of them children.

To mitigate the unrest and reassert control, President Kolingba announced the formation of a new political party, the Central African Democratic Rally (RDC), which he said would encompass existing parties, although all political activity in the country is currently banned. He also announced a forthcoming referendum on revisions in the constitution that will give wider powers to the head of state and provide for a national assembly. ■

CONGO
Oil crisis prompts about-face

The government of President Denis Sassou-Nguesso is reportedly close to an agreement on a standby arrangement with the International Monetary Fund, after steadfastly opposing the use of this "imperialist tool" in the past.

Due to the steady drop in oil prices, the IMF and other lenders have demanded increasingly stringent austerity measures before approving future loans. Further cuts in the operating and investment budgets, a freeze on civil service wages, and the sale of unprofitable state companies are among the measures pending.

The government has accepted IMF supervision of a multilateral rescheduling of the external debt, representing a break from its past policy of dealing with creditors on a bilateral basis. Discussions are underway with the Paris Club and the London Club.

The oil price slide and the considerable depreciation of the dollar forced the government to further slash the 1986 budget in March, after draconian cuts in December. The new austerity budget of $615 million contains only about half of the original spending.

The austerity drive represents a drastic turnaround for a country that was known for "champagne Marxism" during the oil boom of the 1970s. Congo's relative prosperity in those days encouraged extravagant spending and excessive borrowing for projects which may now have to be scrapped. Foreign exchange earnings from oil have dropped from 90 percent to under 50 percent in the past year.

The economic crisis has dashed hopes for completing much of the 1982-1986 development plan which was to prepare the nation for a not-too-distant future when oil reserves are exhausted. Among the projects likely to be abandoned are new road construction, health care improvements, renovation of the central hospital in Brazzaville, and additional mineral exploration.

The government maintains that some areas will remain unaffected by the austerity measures, particularly private sector investment and efforts to diversify the economy. Foreign investors are being wooed to help develop the country's tropical hardwood resources, wood-processing, fisheries, and agro-industries. Forestry and agriculture are considered Congo's best prospects for future growth. Only about five percent of the country's arable land is under cultivation, while a large expanse of tropical hardwood forest in the north remains virtually untapped. ■

GABON
Troubles blamed on foreigners

A recent campaign against foreign workers has unsettled Libreville's expatriate community. In response to immigration—which President Omar Bongo has described as exceeding "tolerable limits"—the ruling Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) has demanded new restrictions on foreigners, including quotas by nationality, expulsion of unregistered aliens, and the replacement of foreign workers by Gabonese.

Major increases have been imposed on tariffs for visas and other immigration papers. Repatriation fees now cost the equivalent of a return ticket to the immigrant's country plus a 20 percent administrative charge. New "unfalsifiable," magnetized residence permits became mandatory for all foreigners in late May.

The demands of the PDG—Gabon's sole political party—had a familiar ring. Calls for "Gabonization" of the economy are made periodically, most recently in 1985 when Bongo authorized security forces to review the status of aliens and to expel anyone whose papers were not in order.

The President is also calling for "a return to the land"—particularly for those who were drawn to urban areas during the period of growth in the oil industry, which has provided 85 percent of foreign revenues. Due to the precipitous decline in world oil prices, however, production has been reduced and many jobs have been cut.

The country's 140,000 immigrant workers are now being accused of taking jobs from the local workforce. They are often blamed for other problems as well. A government statement issued in late April denounced European immigrants for "behavior verging on racism and apartheid," accused Syrians, Lebanese, and North Africans of corrupt business practices, and criticized other African immigrants for introducing "serious crime and sorcery" to Gabon.

Foreigners with legitimate papers will not be forced to leave the country, but they may lose their jobs. The 25,000 French expatriates, who hold many high-level technical and administrative posts in the public and private sectors, could be hard hit by the new drive to "Gabonize" employment. The high cost of the new residency permits will be particularly burdensome to African immigrants, and many may eventually have to leave the country.

Meanwhile, during a visit to Libreville in early May, French Minister of Cooperation Michel Aurillac assured Bongo that French technical and financial assistance would continue. Aurillac reaffirmed French financing of university, hospital, and telecommunications projects, and announced that Paris would help retrain some 2,500 workers who are to be laid off next year after termination of the Transgabon railway project. Some observers took the relative cordiality of the meeting as a sign that the new immigration policies might be applied more stringently to African immigrants than to Europeans.

Strong opposition to the new measures has come from several quarters, including the immigrant labor force, foreign businessmen who will have to purchase costly exit visas for trips abroad, and multinational corporations concerned about the repercussions on their hiring programs. ■

Women need to work less, produce more

Debate on the role of women in African food production has entered a new phase. That women produce some 80 percent of Africa's food is a now widely acknowledged fact. The more urgent consideration has become how to alleviate their workload while increasing productivity.

This was the message that Eremina Mvura, a Zimbabwean farmer and agricultural extension agent, brought to a symposium entitled, "Food Security: the African Woman Farmer," held at the United Nations in May to prepare for the General Assembly's special session on Africa's economic crisis.

Mvura, who received an award on behalf of all African women farmers, said that widespread misconceptions about women's role in agriculture have seriously limited their access to services and facilities intended to help Africa attain food self-sufficiency. For example, the African household is mistakenly viewed as a "homogeneous unit headed by a male who controls all labor assets and income; thus, the complimentarity of men's and women's roles in agriculture is sadly ignored," she said.

She described daily life at home in Mashonaland West Province to illustrate the steadily increasing burden on women farmers. It is well known, she said, that women in Zimbabwe and other developing nations have not only their traditional duties within the home and fields to attend to, but are now being asked to shoulder the burden of community programs, including conservation, well digging, primary health care, immunization programs, and other self-help schemes. At the same time, their greatest helpers—their children—are now required by law to attend school.

She acknowledged that governments have encouraged the adoption of technology to lessen the burden and drudgery of women's work, but noted that in peasant farming, mechanization has occurred mostly in areas dominated by a male workforce. Most machines are developed with men in mind, and it is men who make the decisions on investments in capital goods, she said. Furthermore, "technology is introduced to agricultural production only, while the domestic role of female farmers is ignored," Mvura said, adding that their multiple roles call for a range of appropriate technologies for the home and the farm to relieve their overwhelming workload.

She recognized the Zimbabwean government's efforts to improve women's position in society, including the recently enacted legislation which gives women majority status under the law. This law, which calls into question traditional family power relations, is still widely debated throughout the country, but it has been an important tool for eroding institutionalized inequality between men and women. However, until they have access to land and capital, women will not benefit greatly from their new legal standing, Mvura said.

SÃO TOMÉ & PRÍNCIPE

A rebel group's fishy story

A group of 76 dissidents claiming to belong to the opposition National Resistance Front of São Tomé and Príncipe (NRFST) recently landed their fishing boat in the Namibian port of Walvis Bay after being expelled by Cameroon.

Rebel spokesman Sergio Cordoso said in early May that he would accept military aid from South Africa and training with Pretoria-backed Unita forces in Angola to help depose the São Tomé government of President Manuel Pinto da Costa. "Our dream is to get [military] assistance, but if the South African government says no, we will not get help from other African countries," Cordoso pointed out.

Swapo Information Secretary Hidipo Hamutenya, however, denounced the dissidents' arrival in Namibia as part of a South African scheme to provide mercenary support for Unita. Cordoso admitted that the NRFST leadership had been in contact with Unita representatives in Portugal but said that the group was now awaiting a message from its leader, Manuel Alfonso Rosario dos Santos, who was "somewhere in Europe." The NRFST's main objective, he added, was to restore the economy of São Tomé to a free market system, and to oust foreigners from the country, namely Angolan soldiers.

Yet NRFST officials in Libreville, Gabon, denied that the rebels were still associated with the opposition group. They had allegedly already been expelled from the dissident coalition for clandestinely organizing a military training camp in Gabon under the cover of fishing activities. Cordoso and his co-conspirators had then fled to Cameroon but were again forced to flee. São Tomé Foreign Minister Frederico Menzes confirmed they were not part of the country's official opposition, branding them "opportunists." Said Menzes, "They have just been expelled from Cameroon and now through personal ambition they have taken refuge with the South African racist regime." ■

ZAIRE
Mobutu looks the other way

President Mobutu Sese Seko's government has gone to great lengths to deny allegations that Zaire has been directly involved in shipping U.S. military equipment to the South African-backed Angolan rebel movement, Unita, despite mounting evidence to the contrary.

According to *Afrique-Asie* magazine, diplomatic sources in Kinshasa confirmed that Mobutu had promised President Reagan to "look the other way" while the U.S. supplied Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Jonas Savimbi's forces by way of southern Zaire, circumventing the usual but politically more sensitive route through South Africa.

In return, the White House reportedly agreed to substantially increase U.S. economic aid to Zaire in the near future, and more importantly, to put pressure on the International Monetary Fund to adopt a more lenient attitude toward Kinshasa if creditors are not entirely satisfied with the government's economic performance.

The decision to use Zaire as the gateway for arming Unita followed the late February recommendation of an interagency committee, made up of senior representatives from the State Department, CIA, Defense Department, and National Security Council, to provide state-of-the-art anti-aircraft missiles to Savimbi. CIA Director William Casey subsequently visited Pretoria to present Washington's new position to the P.W. Botha government, allegedly to ensure that South Africa would be "hermetically sealed off"—as one American official described it—from any possible connection with the U.S. program.

Camerapix

Mobutu: No Stingers in sight

In supplying Savimbi with U.S. arms rather than largely Soviet or Chinese-made weapons bought on the international arms market, the Reagan administration views Zaire as a valuable intermediary for the "covert" aid. Casey allegedly met with Savimbi in Kinshasa to confirm that the Stinger missiles were on their way through the Zairean conduit—a report vehemently denied by Mobutu's officials.

Nevertheless, in late April, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, who is also chairman of the frontline states, publicly accused the U.S. of using Zaire to deliver weapons to Unita as it is known to have done in the mid-1970s. Zairean authorities called Kaunda's allegations "gratuitous lies" and denounced him for "openly trying to join a campaign of denigration and malicious propaganda without saying why or offering the slightest proof."

On the contrary, the Mobutu government declared, Zaire has scrupulously respected the defense and security agreements it has signed with Angola, pledging not to engage in any subversive activities against the other. Claimed Mukamba Kadiate Nzemba, the Zairean ambassador to London, at a press conference called to "formally deny" the charges, "Zaire will never accept the transit of arms to be used against our brothers." ■

ZAMBIA
Short-term debt to be settled

President Kenneth Kaunda's government is moving into a new phase of its far-reaching economic reform program with plans for action on the short-term external debt. Trade debts of under $4,000 will be paid in full in 1987, while nine-year promissory notes at 5 percent interest will be issued for larger debts.

For several years, the government has taken no action on some 40,000 short-term claims—some of them dating back to the early 1970s. The backlog now totals more than $430 million. Even after the rescheduling, debt service will consume at least 40 to 50 percent of Zambia's export earnings and more if copper production forecasts prove overly optimistic. Some Zambian officials fear the plan will create additional obligations that will eventually cancel out any relief gained by the rescheduling.

Others hope that the effort will encourage foreign private investment in the agricultural sector—which the government is promoting as the prime hope for future economic growth after Zambia's copper resources are exhausted within the next decade. In the past, investors have been discouraged by Zambia's failure to remit profits and dividends owed to foreign firms.

A 20 percent increase in maize production this year boosted expectations for agricultural progress. The improvement was due primarily to the end of the intermittent drought that has foiled farmers' efforts to increase production. However, rainfall continued after the wet season, threatening the bumper harvest with rot disease and spoilage. Thousands of tons of maize are wasted each year because of inadequate storage facilities.

Meanwhile, Zambia Consolidated Cooper Mines, the country's largest employer after the government, has embarked on massive employee layoffs. Three thousand mining jobs will be terminated this year. ■

NORTHERN AFRICA

U.S. raid stirs trouble for Bourguiba

President Habib Bourguiba's government has come under fire from a growing domestic opposition in the aftermath of the mid-April U.S. air raid on Libya.

Tunisian opposition groups, including the Socialist Democratic Movement (MDS), the Tunisian Communist Party (PCT), the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), and the Popular Unity Party (PUP), expressed their solidarity with Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafy by holding large anti-American demonstrations in Tunis. Police dispersed the demonstrators, however, and Bourguiba remained the only Arab leader to refrain from openly criticizing the U.S. aggression.

Ahmed Mestiri, MDS general-secretary, was sentenced to four months in prison for unlawful assembly after having led an orderly demonstration protesting the U.S. attack. Opposition members denounced the jail sentence, accusing the government of campaigning to make the former interior minister ineligible to run in the parliamentary elections in November. Tunisian officials countered that Mestiri had erred in calling an anti-U.S. demonstration that could lead to violence "at a particularly inopportune moment."

The Bourguiba government seized three publications that criticized the U.S. raid, and later in May banned *Al Moustaqlal* (MDS) and *Tariq el-Jadid* (PCT) for six months for "disseminating false information." Tunisian authorities also clamped down on campus protesters who condemned the raid at the University of Tunis, detaining more than 1,500 students. Once released, many were ordered to immediately fulfill their military obligations. The death of MTI militant Othmane Ben Mahmoud in a clash with police fueled tensions leading to the closure of the university's humanities school for 10 days.

The growing unrest induced the Bourguiba government to announce the latest in a series of cabinet changes, appointing Zine El Abidine Ben Ali as the new minister of the interior, taking over from Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali. In keeping with his reputation as a hard-liner, Ben Ali is expected to take a tougher stand against Islamic political activists and other opposition militants in a bid to restore stability.

The ministerial changes have renewed speculation over the succession issue, however. Although Mzali remains the designated successor to the 83-year-old president, the prime minister has seen his authority seriously undercut with the sacking of three of his closest associates this year, including his right-hand man, Mezri Chékir, the former civil service minister. ■

ALGERIA

Gas glut forces price cut

Sonatrach, the state-owned oil and gas company, has launched a price war with its competitors on the European market. European customers are getting a better deal on Algerian gas, but the fall in prices augurs ill for Algerians, whose relative prosperity has increasingly come to depend on the profits from liquified natural gas (LNG).

The prices that Sonatrach charges two of its most important customers—Gaz de France and Enagas, the Spanish gas company—were cut by 10 to 15 percent in April, making Algeria's gas more than 30 cents per million BTUs cheaper than the $3.50 rate of its two chief competitors—the Soviet Union and the Netherlands. The Gaz de France deal is part of a provisional agreement that is to be renegotiated in the second half of the year. Sonatrach is also negotiating new pricing agreements with Belgium and with Italy—which receives Algerian LNG via a Mediterranean Sea pipeline.

Until recently, Sonatrach had linked LNG prices to OPEC's official price system despite the precipitous fall in market prices for oil. European customers had reluctantly paid the premium price for Algerian gas, but U.S. customers balked. Sonatrach's last U.S. customer, Distrigas of Boston, suspended deliveries in 1983, and potential deals with other American firms failed to materialize.

The failure to acquire U.S. outlets and the settlement last year of a long-standing dispute with Spain—which allowed Enagas to purchase far less LNG than originally called for in its contract—were serious blows to Sonatrach's marketing plans. But it was an oversupply of LNG on the European market that finally forced the state hydrocarbon company to offer more competitive prices.

Algeria holds the fourth largest reserve of natural gas in the world—106 trillion cubic feet. Yet it has cornered only 11 percent of the European market, where the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, and Norway provide stiff competition. Price modifications and other changes create greater waves in the gas market than in oil because of the long-term nature of LNG contracts—which are negotiated for 20 or 25-year periods—and the enormous sums that producers must invest in processing plants, pipelines, and special tankers. Algeria's LNG plants currently operate at only 50 percent of capacity while some of its gas tankers are sitting idle, imparting a need for new customers.

A 40 percent drop in oil and gas income from the $12.5 billion revenue level of 1985 is forcing the government to push through a far-ranging austerity program, including major reductions in imports and the termination of a number of projects including the construction of a metro in Algiers. However, oil experts have noted that President Chadli Benjedid has tended to exaggerate the severity of the crisis so that its actual impact will seem less severe. ■

Farm recovery brings little rejoicing

Despite the impressive ongoing recovery from the 1984 drought, inherent problems continue to plague Kenya's agricultural sector.

The record 1985 maize harvest is causing headaches for farmers and the government. The country's grain storage facilities are inadequate to handle the surplus of 1.5 million metric tons. Thousands of bags of maize lie at collection depots throughout the country, covered only by thin tarpaulin. Chief Agriculture Secretary Simeon Nyachae recently lamented to Kenya's *Sunday Nation*, "The truth of the matter is that we are faced with more maize than ever before—so much maize that we cannot handle [it]."

The National Cereals Produce Board, which oversees grain production and marketing, has embarked on a program to invest some $67 million in grain storage facilities by 1989. Delays and mismanagement, however, have undermined the plans for construction and upgrading. Agriculture Minister Odongo Omamo has urged farmers with surplus maize "to do their best to store as much of it as possible on their farms."

Parastatals and cooperatives that control the purchasing and auctioning of produce have been accused of serious financial irregularities. Funds that should have gone to farmers are often spent on unnecessary office construction. The Kenya Tea Development Authority has allegedly kept nearly $5.2 million owed to farmers to build offices and tea depots in Nairobi's industrial area—even though most of Kenya's tea is produced in the western region.

While President Daniel arap Moi has repeatedly urged cooperatives and parastatals to make prompt payments, delays often last for months. Some coffee farmers have complained of waiting two years for payment from the National Coffee Board. Artificially low prices for crops such as pyrethrum and cotton have also riled farmers, who are already indebted by the high costs of pesticides and fertilizers. In protest, crops have often been left rotting in the fields.

Morale has plunged at the Ministry of Agriculture. Fiscal belt-tightening in Nairobi has seriously affected the ministry's budget and performance, with district office accounts recently slashed by one-third. Leave allowances from 1985 have yet to be paid, and travel allowances for overnight field extension are now virtually non-existent. Frustrated mid-career officers are leaving for lucrative contracts in the private sector. While money is scarce for rank and file employees, the ministry continues to spend large sums on unproductive projects. The much publicized Bura irrigation scheme, for example, drains millions of shillings yearly from the budget.

Low-salaried extension workers have little incentive to man their village posts or to leave their immediate work areas to visit farmers. Even district agricultural officers often cannot obtain travel funds to inspect locations outside their district headquarters.

—James Eastleigh
Maua-Meru, Kenya

EGYPT
Religious fervor on the rise

The government of President Hosni Mubarak is finding it increasingly difficult to meet the growing challenge of Islamic fundamentalism—ranging from the traditional Muslim Brotherhood to the most radical faction, the Islamic Groups. Zaki Badr, the new minister of the interior, who came to office with a reputation as a hardliner with previous success in clamping down on fundamentalists, has thus far failed to put a stop to the escalating religious violence of recent months.

In late May, Badr suffered a setback when the supreme state security court upheld its decision to release the near-blind religious leader, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, and 55 other Muslim fundamentalists, despite objections from the interior minister. They had been arrested following clashes between religious extremists and police who sought to prevent the controversial cleric from addressing a Muslim rally in Aswan.

In April, Rahman and thousands of fundamentalists had occupied a mosque in Assiout, south of Cairo, following an anti-government demonstration in what amounted to a major show of force by the Muslim community. Badr subsequently fired four high-ranking security officials in Assiout for their leniency with the religious protesters.

Assiout has for many years been a center for Muslim radicalism, although half the city's 500,000 residents are Coptic Christians. In the aftermath of President Anwar Sadat's assassination in October 1981, more than 60 people died when Islamic militants in Assiout attempted to stage a popular uprising.

A government official admitted that in the weeks leading up to Ramadan this year, serious incidents with fundamentalists occurred "every two days." Tensions in Assiout rose to the boiling point when a policeman killed a university student, Shaaban Rashed, while he was putting up posters for a religious rally. According to the authorities, the incident occurred when police officers who tried to intervene were attacked by students belonging to the Islamic Groups.

Mubarak took the extraordinary step of sending a plane to bring the student to Cairo for treatment, but his subsequent death provoked an angry response by local Muslim fundamentalists, who ransacked grocery stores selling alcohol in downtown Assiout. Members of the Islamic Groups protested at the university and demonstrated their influence on campus by keeping the institution closed for a week. This was only the latest of more than 350 reported clashes and incidents involving fundamentalist students throughout the country over the past year. ■

LIBYA
Fiat's unwanted passenger

Reagan administration pressure on European allies to break all ties with Tripoli has proved particularly embarrassing for many Italian companies, including Fiat, the country's largest privately-owned industrial group. Italy is Libya's major trading partner and has much to lose in commercial interests, but it is Fiat which the White House is pressuring to sever its connection with Tripoli.

Fiat Chairman Giovanni Agnelli revealed in early June that the government of Col. Muammar Qaddafy had rejected an Italian plea to sell its 15 percent stake in the conglomerate. Agnelli acknowledged that although "we would be very happy" if the state-owned Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (Lafico) were willing to dispose of its shares in Fiat, the firm was in no position to do any "arm twisting." He added that there was little the Italian government could do short of nationalizing the Libyan stake, which was not only unlikely but also "unethical and illegal."

Tripoli gained its hold in Fiat—the largest single Libyan asset in Italy—a decade ago at a time when the Qaddafy government had a better reputation abroad and when the Italian company was in the midst of a serious economic crisis. In 1976, Lafico invested $400 million in Fiat amid considerable fanfare in Rome, leading Agnelli to declare, "This is a golden deal for Italy." Since then, however, Fiat has bounced back, increasing the value of the Libyan investment to about $3 billion on the stock market. In 1985, Fiat's net profit more than doubled to $891 million, earning Tripoli a dividend of $28 million.

Attention to the Lafico stake in the Italian company grew in mid-May when U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger suspended a $7.9 million agreement that would have enabled Fiat to supply 178 combat bulldozers to the U.S. Marine Corps. Explained one Pentagon official, "Our concern is that Libya might get some money out of this contract." Weinberger also suggested that the group could be banned from future military sales because of its Libyan ties, including the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Agnelli, who has been an outspoken supporter of the Star Wars program, indicated that Fiat would continue negotiations with representatives from Tripoli, even offering a premium on top of the current market value of the Libyan stake.

However, critics of the U.S. pressure to buy out the Libyans claim this could be counter-productive. They point out that the large sum which the Libyan shares would command would ironically benefit the Qaddafy government the most—as it would provide a big boost to the Libyan economy which has been seriously undermined by the slump in world oil prices. ■

SOUTHERN AFRICA
Harare spars with human rights groups

An ongoing battle between Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's government and human rights groups came to a head in early June when Home Affairs Minister Enos Nkala signed an arrest order for two leading members of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace. Mugabe, however, avoided a likely storm of international protest by immediately stepping in to overrrule the senior cabinet minister and ordering their release.

Police arrested the commission's chairman, Michel Auret, and acting director, Nicholas Ndebele—who have spoken out strongly on several occasions against alleged human rights abuses—for reportedly possessing "prohibited documents." But the real reason for their detention, Auret claimed, was because Nkala suspected them of supplying sensitive information to Amnesty International (AI) and the New York-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.

Ndebele was first arrested on May 22, the day after the committee released a controversial report, "Zimbabwe: The Wages of War," which concluded, "The government's campaign to suppress armed dissidents in Matabeleland has resulted in grave and persistent abuses of human rights," including murder, torture, and abductions. Said one legal expert of Ndebele's detention, "Coming just after the Lawyers Committee report, this is not just a simple attempt to harass the Justice and Peace Commission. Nkala seems to be putting everyone on notice that they should not talk to foreigners or else."

Ndebele was charged with photographing restricted buildings and having contacts with "enemy countries" to which he had supplied information on the "security situation of Zimbabwe." However, the High Court subsequently released him because the state failed to produce sufficient reason for his detention. Nkala promptly overturned the decision and had Auret arrested and Ndebele rearrested.

The Catholic commission, the country's top human rights monitoring group—and a resolute critic of Ian Smith's white minority regime before independence—has repeatedly come under fire for participating in what the government calls a smear campaign against Zimbabwe. Nkala has accused AI of recruiting and paying anti-government dissidents to supply the commission with information, and has charged different human rights groups of conspiring with foreign journalists and Western diplomats to discredit Zimbabwe internationally.

In fact, Mugabe dismissed AI's earlier study as a "pack of lies," regularly denouncing the group as "Amnesty Lies International." Said Nkala recently of church groups who provide information for such critical reports, "I might have to hammer them." ■

SADCC's Struggle for Economic Liberation

Although there have been few successes in regional economic cooperation in Africa, SADCC has emerged as the continent's most viable effort. Despite drought, destabilization, and world recession, it has succeeded in laying the foundations for a self-sufficient and productive southern Africa.

BY CAROL B. THOMPSON

As the battle for majority rule in South Africa heats up, another much less publicized one is raging in the region—the battle for economic liberation. Waged by the independent states of southern Africa, its fronts are political, economic, and military, as South Africa fights to maintain its regional economic dominance.

Formed in April 1980 on the eve of Zimbabwe's independence, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is now entering the second half of its first decade as a unique entity on the African continent. SADCC emerged from the poignant lessons learned by the frontline states in their support of the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle that political independence can be almost meaningless without national control over the economy.

The independence of Zimbabwe, with its central geographical location and economic strength, provided the opportunity for the frontline states to coordinate their economic efforts. To incorporate all the independent states in the region, Malawi, Swaziland, and Lesotho were invited to join.

The diversity of the economies of southern Africa almost defies coordination. SADCC includes states which adamantly support free enterprise, a kingdom whose royal council is the largest national corporation, governments which advocate state capitalism, and others which are trying to promote socialism.

SADCC reflects this diversity, but also the commonality of its members' experiences. Its four objectives, as stated in the 1980 Lusaka Declaration, are:

- the reduction of economic dependence, particularly but not only, on the Republic of South Africa [All but Angola and Tanzania are dependent on South Africa.];
- the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration [SADCC emerged from a rejection of highly centralized economic coordination which seemed only to benefit the strongest, e.g. Southern Rhodesia in the Central African Federation, Kenya in the East African Community, and South Africa in the Southern African Customs Union.];
- the mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate, and regional policies [Southern Africa has a long colonial history of mobilization of its resources, especially minerals, for overseas factories.];
- a concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of its strategy for economic liberation.

Before analyzing the organization's progress toward these goals, it is important to understand SADCC's unique structure. Its name signals that no supra-national authority was created—SADCC is more a sequence of conferences than a tenth state in the region. The secretariat has been kept very small to avoid the problems encountered by other regional economic groups on the African continent. For example, operating from its $10 million headquarters, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) cannot get its members to implement programs, and only two of 11 protocols have even been signed.

In contrast, SADCC policy is planned at the highest ministerial levels and decisions are made by consensus. For example, after the heads of state set policy, agricultural strategy is planned by a standing committee of officials and by the agriculture ministers. A specific project or technical problem is then discussed at consultative technical meetings. At each level, all nine members are present. The coordinator for a particular

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sector, such as Zimbabwe for food security, acts as the executive to propel the technical questions through the network and then to implement the decisions.

This highly decentralized model is not the only distinguishing characteristic. SADCC explicitly rejects the customs union approach to coordination. Trade among members is only 4.5 percent of their total, but SADCC analyzes that the barriers to trade are not tariffs, but inadequate infrastructure and low levels of production. Coordination to increase production will increase trade, not the reverse, which is the premise of customs unions.

SADCC is also distinctive in that it is explicitly political—the members reject the notion that economic decisions are only technical. In response to World Bank and International Monetary Fund pressure to privatize agricultural marketing in the region, the states reply that southern Africa has never had a "free market" system. Its economies are tied to South Africa, its railroads and telecommunications built through South Africa, and its production planned to provide for South African or overseas factories, not by any free market logic, but by decades of military aggression and economic chicanery.

Further, in choosing projects, SADCC is not totally directed by technical "cost-benefit" analysis—under colonialism such criteria meant high cost and low benefit for Africans. It is not cost-effective, for example, for Botswana to grow maize. Thus, it is directing its resources to research on sorghum and millet. Nevertheless, Botswana is planning irrigation schemes to increase maize production, striving toward self-sufficiency in grain production so as to avoid relying on its diamond or beef exports to buy maize from South Africa.

What has SADCC achieved in its infancy? Despite international economic recession, the three-year drought in the region (five years for Botswana, parts of Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe), and destabilization by South Africa, SADCC has not only survived but flourished. It has established its identity on the continent and in the international community. At its summit in Addis Ababa in July last year, the Organization of African Unity called on other members to consider the SADCC administrative model as an option for their regions.

Participants in SADCC meetings say they now not only know their counterparts in other member-countries, but have begun to appreciate their particular difficulties. What seems logical from Harare may be viewed differently from Maseru. Even with its agricultural successes of the past two years and its surplus grain to feed other members, Zimbabwe regularly comes under criticism on agricultural issues. Debate is lively and participation keen.

The internal dynamic has encouraged links with other regional organizations.

"SADCC is also distinctive in that it is explicitly political—the members reject the notion that economic decisions are only technical."

SADCC is the first regional group to sign a region-to-region accord with the Nordic nations. The agreement includes increased trade, investment, technological transfers, and cultural exchanges. The Nordic countries want to increase their investment in the region, and SADCC agrees that Nordic capital is less threatening than larger international capital investment. Projects will be kept small and the technology appropriate.

The European Economic Community has also signed a region-to-region accord with SADCC, its first with any regional group of the African-Caribbean-Pacific states. This agreement pledges that aid will be directed toward SADCC priorities, one of the organization's goals.

The sector which is most important to SADCC, for its projects receive almost two-thirds of total allocations, is the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC), coordinated by Mozambique. Of its 111 projects, 28 are fully funded, 30 partly funded, and 40 are under discussion. Seventeen construction-rehabilitation projects have been completed such as the road from Malawi to Mbeya, Tanzania, and on to Dar es Salaam port, offering a northern alternative route to Malawi from the Nacala, Mozambique line which is sabotaged by the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR). The commission has been so successful in planning and training that if SADCC were to disperse tomorrow, SATCC would probably continue.

SATCC's organizational success, however, is overshadowed by its failure to develop three important port systems: Maputo and Nacala in Mozambique, and Lobito in Angola. The other two port systems are Dar es Salaam and Beira, Mozambique, for which extensive 10-year plans are underway.

The failure of the three projects is totally due to South African sabotage. Both the MNR and UNITA, financed by South Africa, regularly target the roads and rail lines to these ports. To protect its transport dominance, South Africa has chosen to bomb the routes which might compete with its own. Even by providing incentives like discount rates, the South African Transport System (SATS) cannot compete for traffic with most SADCC members.

To cite just one statistic, it is 840 kilometers from Blantyre, Malawi, to Nacala, but 3,342 kilometers to Durban. As a result of South African destabilization, SADCC has increased, not decreased its transport dependence on South Africa (from 26 percent of all trade going through South African ports in 1981 to 31 percent in 1984). In contrast, under SATCC's aegis, there are now 60 direct telecommunications links among the members, whereas in 1980 only 14 were direct, with 30 through South Africa, and 16 through Europe.

Agricultural research, coordinated by Botswana, is a major success story. The Southern African Centre for Coordination of Agricultural Research (SACCAR) does not conduct research, but coordinates what is done in the region. In Matopos, Zimbabwe, a sorghum-millet station is growing over 6,000 varieties to develop strains for the various ecological zones. Similar stations for cowpeas, grain-legumes, and groundnuts—all drought-resistant, peasant-produced food crops—are planned. Not long ago, regional agricultural research was coordinated by South Africa.

The major goal of the food security

sector is to achieve national/regional self-sufficiency in food production. From 1978-82, only Swaziland of the nine states increased per capita food production. Reflecting SADCC pragmatism, no single food policy for the region will be developed; rather, the programs are aimed at removing obstacles to national production. An early warning system to monitor weather conditions is in place in all nine. Other projects address questions of reduction of post-harvest losses, food processing, and marketing.

As a group, SADCC can be an energy exporter, for it produces twice as much oil and more electricity and coal than needed. Now under implementation is the interconnection of all national electricity grids, such as from Botswana north to Zimbabwe, to reduce dependence on South Africa.

In industry, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Botswana have achieved rapid growth in the export of manufactured goods to other members. The industry sector, with Tanzania as coordinator, promotes production complementarity in priority areas. Each country produces textiles, but only Botswana and Tanzania will produce textile chemicals. Coordinated production of phosphate and ammonia fertilizers in different states will also avoid duplication.

As SADCC moves into the second half of its first decade, it has also begun to correct some of its mistakes. Critics point out that initially many sectors simply proposed a shopping list of projects for donors to fund. At the Harare conference in January, however, each sector presented a five-year plan. For the first time, concrete goals were set by which to measure progress, e.g. increases in the number of trained personnel or in sorghum-millet yields. Further, a regional economic survey was written by SADCC nationals, the first attempt to outline a regional overview and to collect comparable statistics according to SADCC priorities, not those of an outside agency like the IMF.

SADCC's achievements in light of the region's development needs are indeed modest. However, although they are only the first steps on a very long road, successful SADCC projects are clearly a threat to South Africa, which has imposed economic sanctions and declared war on SADCC.

As early as 1981, South Africa saw SADCC's agenda for economic disengagement as a challenge to its regional dominance. The organization defies two of Pretoria's regional objectives—to maintain, and even deepen, its neighbors' economic links with South Africa and to moderate their criticism of apartheid.

As can be seen from the above discussion, SADCC is not attempting any transition to socialism; that would be antithetical to the wishes of several members. As a diverse group of economies, SADCC simply wants to turn production to the benefit of its own people, but South Africa does not tolerate its goal of economic liberation. The "partnership" South Africa seeks is what Lord Malvern described as existing in the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland: a white rider on a black horse.

While the West debates whether sanctions should be imposed on South Africa, South Africa has already imposed sanctions on its neighbors. From 1981—when South Africa withdrew locomotives loaned to Zimbabwe—to 1986, delays and interruptions in the flow of essential goods have been used against every member with rail links to South Africa.

To cite just a few examples, Zimbabwe and Botswana have frequently been told that there were "technical" problems with moving their steel and beef exports. Since Mozambique's independence in 1975, South Africa has reduced its traffic through Maputo port by more than 85 percent. By January this year, the apartheid regime had imposed a total economic blockade on Lesotho, creating conditions for a coup d'état.

Most dramatically, South Africa has

B. Wolff/United Nations

Dar es Salaam: "SADCC has extensive plans underway at the port systems of Dar es Salaam and Beira"

attacked SADCC projects in its attempt to bomb members into submission. The regime states that its invasions and sabotage are in response to its neighbors' support for the African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas who infiltrate South Africa.

whose average annual output is approximately $500 per capita.

The human cost of destabilization is 250,000 dead, with over 100,000 displaced persons crossing borders to seek refuge. By mid-1986, Zimbabwe was planning a fifth camp for Mozambicans,

Margaret A. Novicki

Agricultural cooperative, Zimbabwe: "The U.S. reluctantly agreed to a triangular arrangement for 7,000 tons of Zimbabwean white maize, less than one-tenth of the amount of yellow maize sent directly from the U.S."

Two years after the Nkomati Accord, that excuse is fully exposed. The Mozambicans followed the accord to the letter, reducing the ANC presence to 10 in a diplomatic mission. Yet South Africa continues unabated in its support of the MNR. By attacking the rail line to Maputo, a major outlet to the sea for Zimbabwe, the MNR keeps Mozambique in disarray and dampens any notion that the viable Zimbabwean economy might be an alternative investment opportunity to the chaos of the apartheid economy.

At last year's OAU summit, SADCC documented the cost of South African military aggression: $10.1 billion (1980-1984), or more than all the aid (bilateral and multilateral) to the members in the same period. By the end of 1985, the loss was running to $4 billion per year, or $70 per capita for a group of countries and Angolans were still crossing into Zambia. However, the internal displacement of up to 5 million people is even more costly in terms of lost production.

SADCC has called upon the international community to impose comprehensive, mandatory sanctions and has commissioned studies on the impact of possible South African retaliatory measures in the region.

In terms of possible transport sanctions, Angola and Tanzania would be unaffected; Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, and Malawi could survive economically using presently functioning routes. SADCC is advancing the Beira Corridor project to enable the port to service Zimbabwe more fully. At present, Lesotho and Botswana would be totally vulnerable. With respect to petroleum transport, however, only Lesotho could not be supplied, assuming the Beira and Dar es Salaam pipelines are functional.

South Africa is a major source of imports for several countries, but in every case, alternative sources exist and often at a lower cost. South Africa is not the principal market for exports for any member except Lesotho. Even the demise of the South African Customs Union for Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland could be fully offset by upgrading existing national customs and excise services. Zimbabwean commercial houses could pick up the trade administrative tasks.

From SADCC's view, it is hypocritical to speak of the costs to southern Africa of imposing sanctions on South Africa when the costs of co-existing with apartheid are already high. Further, the alternative links set up to resist sanctions would promote their longer-term program for economic liberation. As the president of the SADCC Council of Ministers, Peter Mmusi, stated, "The abolition of apartheid will be the single greatest contribution which could be made to the economic development of this region." And SADCC sees sanctions as the only peaceful way to encourage that abolition.

Critics of SADCC donors say that they have used the organization as a "soft option"—a way to show concern for the independent states without having to break economic links with apartheid. Simba Makoni, SADCC executive secretary, has said, "The U.S. and Britain are standing with one foot on each bank. . . It is not possible to say you are with the independent states of southern Africa and also be with South Africa."

American grants to SADCC focus on the agriculture and transport sectors. The U.S. is the major donor for the Zimbabwean food security unit, the SACCAR research center, and the sorghum-millet research station. It also supports the Beira railroad and rehabilitation of the Zimbabwe-Zambia road link. From 1980-1985, total U.S. assistance was over $80 million, and new commitments for fiscal 1986 total about $15 million.

Early this year, however, the U.S. has tilted its support away from SADCC by providing aid to UNITA. As Mmusi stated at the January conference, funding Savimbi "runs counter to American professions of friendship and cooperation with the independent states of southern Africa. This now places the United States clearly in league with South Africa in fomenting instability in the region." Another SADCC official observed, "The U.S. gives us money to build one SADCC railroad [for the Beira line] and then gives money to have another blown up [Savimbi's sabotage of the Benguela line]."

Further, U.S. aid does not always follow SADCC objectives. The original sorghum-millet grant in 1983 excluded Tanzania, Angola, and Mozambique from receiving any benefits from the research. (Angola and Mozambique were prohibited from receiving U.S. aid for political reasons, and Tanzania was in arrears on debt repayment.) The SADCC Council of Ministers rejected the exclusionary clause; the grant was rewritten and other donors picked up the cost of the three, after more than a year delay.

The U.S. also joins the World Bank in pushing for privatization of agricultural marketing when SADCC has made it clear that it rejects the analysis that a "free market" is a panacea for agricultural development.

This year, Zimbabwe is purchasing wheat from the U.S. and wanted to pay for it by shipping its surplus white maize to Mozambique which could then become part of the U.S. food aid to Mozambique. The U.S. Department of Agriculture reluctantly agreed to the triangular arrangement for 7,000 tons of Zimbabwean white maize, less than one-tenth of the amount of yellow maize sent directly from the U.S.

A U.S. AID official in Harare stated, "The goal of food aid is to make the people of southern Africa change their preference from white maize to yellow maize in order to create a market for U.S. yellow maize." Yet the U.S. professes to be helping SADCC produce more grain and to increase trade.

SADCC has been criticized for its reliance on Western aid, but all the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) except Hungary attended the January conference. In addition, Makoni has now visited several capitals in Eastern Europe, and East Germany and the USSR are promoting region-to-region aid from Comecon to SADCC.

All SADCC states are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and as they gather for the conference in Harare at the end of August, South African destabilization will be high on the list for discussion. Other non-aligned states, such as India, Nigeria, and Kuwait, have contributed to SADCC to show support for its goals of economic liberation.

SADCC has survived its first five years during a world recession, a drought, and continuing attacks from the apartheid regime—not a small accomplishment. Shortly after the organization's formation, the apartheid regime decided it could not co-exist with SADCC. Five years later, it is now clear which of the two has the international prestige and commitment to development necessary to survive and prosper. Certainly, SADCC has already offered lessons for regional economic coordination on the African continent. □

Margaret A. Novicki

Workers wounded in South African bombing in Lubango, Angola: "The human cost of South Africa's destabilization is 250,000 dead, with over 100,000 displaced persons crossing borders to seek refuge"

The War in the South

It was hoped that Sudan's new civilian leadership would be more successful than its predecessors in finding a solution to the civil war. However, with more and more of the south entering the war zone, negotiations between the government and Col. Garang's SPLA seem less likely than ever.

BY CAROL BERGER

The talk was of returning soldiers and recent landmine deaths the day that I visited the mission school outside Wau town in southern Sudan. More than 500 soldiers and civilians who had fled the nearby town of Rumbek as rebels advanced were expected to arrive the following day. The stories which had preceded them were grim and warned of further hardships for towns under government control.

And then there were the bodies to be buried. Four men had died when their vehicle struck a landmine on the main road to the north of Wau. That afternoon the drums would sound as local people met to mourn their dead, their gatherings ending before curfew at sunset.

The men who sat under the awnings of the low mission buildings were middle-aged—old by African standards—and had seen it all before. When they were young, the country had suffered 15 years of civil war. But this time, as I was repeatedly told, it was different. This time the young men fighting in the bush had sophisticated weaponry and training. They wondered aloud if the young rebels' motivation matched that of their predecessors who had challenged northern Sudanese rule with nothing more than spears in the early years of the 1955-72 war.

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Caroline Penn

Wau, southern Sudan: "Schools have remained closed due to the instability of the war zone"

As they spoke, the sound of low organ music could be heard from the adjoining mission school chapel. There, in the sweltering heat, two young men took turns playing an aged pump organ. The still air and midday heat left their faces beaded with sweat. Kisiaro, taking his turn at the organ, stared at an empty music stand as he flawlessly played a European hymn, music brought to his territory by a succession of European and American missionaries.

These idle young men represent a major concern for the town's community leaders. Some 1,500 of Bahr el Ghazal region's brightest youth sat for their final secondary school examinations in early April. In the past three years, almost all of the region's schools have been closed, initially because they were unable to feed their students. But they have remained closed due more to the instability of the war zone and the desertion of large numbers of students and teachers.

The war now prevents students who have completed their education from returning to their home territories. Nor is it safe for them to travel to the south's main city of Juba where their studies could be continued. Without work in the town, the fear is that they will join the rebel forces which gather outside the town's garrisoned outskirts.

Church leaders, still recognized as the backbone of the community, have sought to organize football matches and a town-wide sanitation program in an attempt to give purpose to the students' long days. But their efforts take place against a background of rising tension and a hardening of attitudes. Unlike their greying elders, the young men have little to say. Perhaps their thoughts are on friends and relatives who have already joined the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

In the month of March alone, more than 30 civilians are known to have died inside Wau town, the capital of Bahr el Ghazal. Their deaths coincided with the arrival of 2,000 soldiers from bases in northern Sudan. The worst excesses reportedly occurred in the first weeks of the garrison's reinforcement. Many of the dead were young men, but children and women were also victims. The killings, allegedly carried out by the mostly young and inexperienced soldiers, brought fears of more widespread retaliatory attacks to a new pitch. Each night, families inside their grass-walled compounds could hear the sound of sporadic automatic gunfire.

In the days leading up to the mid-March curfew declaration, several townspeople died. Seven fishermen were hacked to death with machetes and knives during an army sweep on a wooded area in the town. A middle-aged retired army officer and his young daughter were shot dead inside their home. Four young men were dragged from a garden adjacent to the town's Catholic mission and then shot. A young schoolmaster who had fled fighting in the nearby town of Tonj months earlier was shot inside his home. From outside the town came reports of still more civilian deaths. Forty-eight tribesmen were killed during a late February army raid on a cattle camp 12 miles east of Wau. The camp, known as Wiuncum, was inhabited by unarmed peasants.

"Whether or not you are armed, you are all the same. If our color was the same, I don't think there would be this killing of civilians. Even we people here in the town, we are fearful. They [the army] see us all as supporters of Garang [leader of the SPLA]," said Bishop Nyekindi Joseph, a well-regarded community leader in Wau.

In recent months, as northern Sudan's military leaders have pressed for a harder line on southern unrest, the conflict has become more racially charged than ever before. In the weeks before the May handing over of power to civilian rule, the out-going military regime publicly identified the Ethiopian-backed rebel army as a predominantly Dinka group. The Dinkas, Sudan's largest ethnic group, live in the interior southern regions of Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile, as well as the southernmost areas of what is officially termed "northern" Sudan. Members of the Nilotic tribal grouping, the Dinkas are described as "blue-black" in color.

For the young soldiers transferred from bases in the Muslim north, the south and its African peoples represent a foreign country more than an extension of Sudan's multi-racial territory. In the narrow streets of Wau, young, relatively fair-skinned troops carried semi-automatic weapons. Their rough uniforms often in a state of disarray, they seemed uneasy and even aggressive as they walked in small groups through the town's commercial areas. Most of the young recruits had tied numerous *hijabs* around their waists and upper arms to ward off misfortune. The *hijabs,* small leather pouches containing sections from the Koran, are prepared by religious men throughout northern and western Sudan.

Two years of repeated military defeat have left the regular troops demoralized. In neighboring Upper Nile region, bordering with Ethiopia, undermanned garrisons have routinely fallen under rebel siege. With calls for reinforcement left unanswered, troops often had no option but to attempt dangerous retreats or succumb to hunger and rebel assault.

While students at the University of Khartoum, led by the fundamentalist National Islamic Front (formerly the Muslim Brotherhood), demanded last April that the government allow volunteers to fight in the south, the army's rank and file remain bitterly divided over their precarious role in the war-torn region.

The level of salaries has risen along with growing opposition to active field service. Today a soldier posted in the south can expect to earn up to 600 Sudanese pounds a month, equivalent to $150. Even at the bottom end of the scale, salaries are higher than those of senior government ministers.

In the first week of March, the SPLA captured the strategic town of Rumbek, the provincial capital of Lakes province, 135 miles southeast of Wau. In a shift from earlier policy, the outgoing military government publicly announced their "retreat" and said they would retake the town. By mid-March, after several high-level visits to Tripoli, new military supplies began arriving for use in the troubled south. The aid came in conjunction with the "military protocol" signed by Libya and Sudan shortly after the overthrow of former President Gaafar al-Nimeiry in April 1985. Under the banner of "Arab unity," Oman, Jordan, and Egypt followed with still more support.

The most contentious of these provisions was the Libyan government's loan of two Soviet-made Tupelov bombers. In mid-March, the bombers began making high-altitude strikes against the area surrounding Rumbek. Humanitarian agencies in Khartoum described the bombings as "indiscriminate." The missions, including strikes against Upper Nile region, continued throughout the following month.

"It's almost becoming an international affair now and nobody is talking. Many innocent people are dying. We are already cut off. We have no connection with the outside world now," said Bishop Nyekindi of the bombing campaign.

The SPLA offensive came as the long-awaited multi-party elections began. Rebel leader Col. John Garang had condemned the election plans and said polling would not be held in southern Sudan. It was widely understood that both the northern-led army and the rebels would seek to strengthen their military positions before the elections closed. If there were to be negotiations with the newly elected civilian government, the SPLA intended to have a strong bargaining position.

When the election results were announced in late April, northern Sudan showed a high voter turnout, while less than half the south's constituencies had participated. In areas where the vote was held, charges of corruption were widespread. Two leading candidates were killed during the voting, and in one sharply divided constituency, polling agents for one party were missing. In a remote border post, constituents were so few that the northern army commander nominated himself as a candidate. In still another army-controlled town, government troops stole ballot boxes on the last day of voting and the headquarters of a local party were ransacked.

In addition to the instability and poor organization, the poverty of many areas led to widespread charges of "vote-buying" by northern parties backing small local groups. Allegations were consistently directed against the extreme right-wing National Islamic Front. The party successfully backed several candidates in the predominantly Christian south.

In most southern zones, election officials were unable to leave the main towns to complete rural voter registration. They resorted instead to estimates from local tribal leaders who had moved from the countryside to the safety of the towns. This meant that official accounts of where voting would take place were not consistent with reality on the ground. Among the voting areas listed were zones where the government had had no presence in years. Voting, for all purposes, was an impossibility.

In addition to fighting between government troops and the SPLA, large areas of southern Sudan are virtually impenetrable. Lacking the simplest of roads or communications, the remote area has remained untouched by a succession of government administrations.

And, while the soon-to-be Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi announced that "90 percent" of the country was ready to vote, the stage was being set in Bahr el Ghazal for a major confrontation between government troops and the SPLA.

The rebel capture of Rumbek came after more than three months of siege. In December, the SPLA had cut the town off and mined all surrounding roads. In the next month, the rebels began shelling the town. Conditions inside the town were described as severe. An undermanned garrison was unable to respond to the SPLA's attacks while food supplies dwindled.

Commissioner of Lakes Province and commander of the Rumbek garrison, Brigadier Martin Makur Shagai, spoke with me the day after his return to Wau. He and his men had fled by foot and truck to the town of Maridi, south of Rumbek. At least 1,500 people are known to have left the town in the final days before SPLA troops entered.

According to Shagai, 30 people—mostly women and children—died in the nine to 12-day walk south. Other sources put the number of dead at several times higher. The journey was grueling; it was two days before the refugees reached a source of fresh water, and some spoke of drinking urine to survive. Others died when the military began its retreat. Several civilians were reportedly killed when a military vehicle struck a landmine.

Said Shagai, "We left not because of the SPLA threat. For the past three years Rumbek has been hit by drought. The government in Khartoum declared the south a disaster area in 1985; yet nothing was sent to us.

"There is no food at all. We were surviving on green mangoes and wild roots. And it is going to happen here [in Wau] unless they [the army] make proper operations to open routes."

Shagai said that almost half of Rumbek's police force, prison, and wildlife wardens—all armed civil staff—had deserted. "Of course, with the starvation, the lack of ammunition, and fear, some decided to join the SPLA," he said. The brigadier estimated rebel strength around Rumbek at between 4,000 and 5,000 men. The largest group was said to have come from the veteran Shark and Rhino battalions formerly operating in Upper Nile region.

When the 500 troops and police returned to Wau on May 27, their very arrival led to more deaths. More than 13 civilians were killed when the group released a sustained blaze of celebratory gunfire in the town's main streets. At ten o'clock that morning, the southern edge of Wau town exploded with the sound of gunfire. I was at a police post on the town's northern outskirts when the firing began. At the first sound of shots, a score of police threw themselves into trenches while one of them distributed ammunition. It was almost half an hour later before an army officer arrived at the post to say that the gunfire came from their own side. Amid much backslapping and laughter, it was apparent that the relief was considerable.

Shagai himself died on May 18 when the Buffalo transport plane in which he was traveling was downed over Rumbek. Earlier in the month, government troops had succeeded in breaking through rebel lines. It is understood, however, that the town was not fully under government control. The plane was reportedly shot down by an SPLA ground-to-air missile.

The military plane was reportedly carrying food aid to the hard-pressed town. In the government's assault, large numbers of people had been displaced in the area immediately surrounding Rumbek. While the Wau hospital had admitted several gunshot victims following the army's three-mile-wide ground sweep through the rural countryside, conditions around Rumbek itself were expected to be far worse. Among the dead were John Malau, the Anglican Bishop of Wau and a leading member of the sole local relief group, and Mark Fletcher, a British field worker with the Band Aid agency.

The local relief group was originally formed after several thousand destitute people from neighboring areas began arriving in Wau. The churches, unable to provide support, began appealing for outside aid. By early March—against the recommendations of Western diplomatic missions in Khartoum—an aid convoy carrying food grains and medical supplies was being organized through private voluntary agencies.

According to the U.S. embassy, such convoys can no longer travel safely. It was generally acknowledged that the main land routes were mined, but one road, leading west and then south, appeared safe. By early April more than 600 tons of relief goods had reached the town. Shortly after, however, the agencies announced that the project would be discontinued. While not denying that the U.S. was pressuring the agencies to end the convoy, the aid agencies said the impending rainy season ruled out continued land travel.

The refugees, estimated at more than 30,000, have come from the war-torn areas of Tonj and Yirol (in the line of Wau-Rumbek fighting) and to the north of Wau from Gogrial district. It is the latter group which has been hardest hit by a new wave of interethnic fighting. In Gogrial, along the sensitive north-south boundary line, Dinkas have traditionally clashed with Arab nomads known as the

Missiriya. In the past four years, however, fighting has accelerated, becoming more political in nature.

No longer simply competing for grazing territory, the Missiriya have acquired sophisticated arms. The raids are now viewed more in the context of attempts to stop the further spread of the SPLA and as a means of commercial gain for the Missiriya. The raiders are known as the *Marahlin* or militia.

In the mid-1970s, the central government, in response to growing unrest between neighboring tribes, formed an armed militia. The group's task was to respond quickly to disputes involving arms. But in the nature of regional politics, the people entrusted with keeping the peace were from the same ethnic groups making attacks on their cattle-owning neighbors to the south. It was only a matter of months before the *Marahlin* began traveling with the northern-led army. A short time later, the attacks increased. And according to area leaders, the army is playing an active role in providing both arms and manpower to the raiders.

In late 1985 and early this year, the *Marahlin* made attacks of unprecedented atrocity on the people of Twic in northern Gogrial. Crops were burned, stored grains either destroyed or stolen, young men killed and mutilated, and women assaulted. Official reports also indicate that more than 120 children were kidnapped and thousands of cattle were stolen.

Earlier attacks in July of 1985 in the sensitive north-south boundary area of Abyei led many young men in the region to join the SPLA. As in other areas, the rising threat of attack by neighboring groups such as the Missiriya encouraged more young men to join the rebel forces.

"There is a strong feeling that this is the policy of the northern government—to depopulate the Bentiu triangle and push those north of Bentiu south of the Bahr el Ghazal River," said one long-time Western resident.

Certainly the local people believe that their continued displacement is part of official policy. Some senior officials I spoke with referred to plans to "exterminate" the Dinka people.

While the fighting between southern Sudanese rebels and the government army accelerates, still more areas are being brought into the war zone. Only a year ago, the city of Juba, in southernmost Equatoria region, was considered outside the area of conflict. Now it too suffers from a tightening net of insecurity—some of which can be traced to the SPLA and some of which results from the infusion of arms and traditional tensions.

With the formation of a new civilian government, there were initial hopes for an end to the civil war. To date, however, the "north" and "south" appear more polarized than ever. In the first official sitting of the new government, members from African and non-Muslim areas walked out in protest over the Umma party's exclusion of their regions from the main seats of power. The coalition government—bringing together the Umma and Democratic Unionist parties—represents the north's two largest Muslim sects. Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi has warned that an "Arab counter-offensive" is inevitable unless southern unrest stops. For many in southern Sudan, that reality has already arrived.

In recent meetings between northern civilian groups and the SPLA at the latter's Addis Ababa headquarters, some promise of future negotiations has been attained. But, as Sudanese are prone to say, while the last war's first peace talks began in Paris in 1962, it was not until a full decade later that peace was achieved with the Addis Ababa Agreement. In the current climate, the strategy of both sides would appear to be an exclusively military one. □

Caroline Penn

The late John Malau, Anglican Bishop of Wau, died after the military plane in which he was riding was reportedly shot down by an SPLA missile

Reporter's Notebook

Sudan's Shifting Alliances

With the election victory of Sadiq al-Mahdi's Umma party, the stage was set for a reassessment of Sudan's relations with its neighbors and its Western allies. The new government's ties with Libya may cause a realignment of foreign policy priorities, with unexpected consequences on U.S. policy.

BY CAROL BERGER

Even before voters went to the polls in early April, Sudan's foreign policy orientation had shifted markedly. Under the direction of the outgoing military government, the country moved further into the Libyan camp and began what could be a radical distancing from the United States.

The 15-man transitional military council, led by Maj.-Gen. Abdul Rahman Sawar-Dahab, was originally due to hand over power to a civilian government on April 26. Delayed returns from remote constituencies and formation of the coalition government led to a 10-day extension of military rule. While delivering its promise of a return to civilian government, the military used its last weeks in power to pave the way for a re-thinking of Sudan's relations with its neighboring states.

In early April, the council cancelled the 1983 agreement with Egypt on political and economic integration. Only days later, the military announced that Libya was initiating a "political union" with Sudan. On April 10, the Libyan government announced that Sudanese would have the right of residence and land ownership in the southeastern Libyan province of Kafre. In return, Libya said it expected a similar arrangement for Libyans in the neighboring Sudanese province of Darfur.

Western diplomats tried to play down these developments in the days which followed. But on April 17, when up to 10,000 Sudanese protested in Khartoum against the American raid on Libya, there no longer seemed much point to American statements of confidence in the Sudan-U.S. relationship. Reflecting a rising tide of anti-American feeling, most of the country's political parties, student organizations, and trade unions from northern Sudan took part in the demonstrations.

During the previous month, the military government had turned to Libya for immediate support in its war against anti-government rebels in southern Sudan. In mid-March, Libya sent two Soviet-made Tupelov bombers for use in the war-torn south. The high-altitude bombings, described by humanitarian organizations as "indiscriminate," continued throughout April.

The targets included the town of Rumbek in Bahr el Ghazal region, held by rebels of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and the border with Ethiopia in Upper Nile region. While bombing campaigns in the south have been carried out for the past four years, the use of Libyan planes indicated a hardening line in Khartoum.

According to Western sources, up to 1,000 Libyans have been based in Sudan since the April 1985 overthrow of former President Gaafar al-Nimeiry, several hundred of which are reportedly trained in terrorist skills. In the first months after Nimeiry's ouster, relations between northern Sudan's military leaders and Libya were considered uncertain. There were several unpublicized incidents of what were considered interventionist actions by Libyan agents in Sudan.

One delegation of Libyan "agricultural" workers was asked to leave the country when it was learned that their research had taken them into the war zone in southern Sudan. And while authorities tolerated the formation of "Revolutionary Committees" along Libyan lines, remnants of the Sudanese state security organization kept the Libyan workers under close surveillance. There were also obvious attempts to discredit recruitment with widespread stories of cash inducement to the new members.

In the year following Nimeiry's re-

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moval, however, the country was characterized by a power vacuum. Western observers warned that the absence of authority was leading to growing interference by outside powers. Of particular concern to the West, these included Libya, Syria, and several factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

With the 1982 evacuation of PLO fighters from Beirut, more than 800 men were brought to Sudan. While many of them were neither Palestinians nor active fighters, their welcome to Sudan marked a strong foreign policy statement by Nimeiry. In the months following their arrival, several hundred of the men are known to have left Sudan with Egyptian-issued passports to points beyond.

Following the Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in early 1986, new attention was given to the PLO camp in northeastern Sudan. As informed sources report, the number of men training at the PLO's camp at Erkowit began to increase. According to PLO statements, the Tunis bombing meant that the Sudan posting would be upgraded.

In late April, when the U.S. embassy in Khartoum launched an evacuation of non-essential staff and dependents, it quickly became apparent that the "voluntary" departure of several hundred Americans was intended largely to influence the newly-formed coalition government led by Ansar leader Sadiq al-Mahdi.

Only hours after the American raid on Tripoli and Benghazi, a communications employee at the U.S. embassy in Khartoum was shot and seriously wounded. The man was reportedly returning to his home in the affluent diplomatic residential quarter of Khartoum when a car pulled alongside his and fired five shots. One of the shots struck him in the head.

While Western embassies advised their nationals to avoid night-time travel and to stay indoors, the U.S. began a high-profile evacuation of several hundred Americans to the neighboring Kenyan capital of Nairobi. Among the first to leave were embassy staff dependents and American aid workers. As tensions rose, American officials directed relief workers from refugee camps in eastern and central Sudan to return to Khartoum for flights out of the country. The directive soon spread to American employees of the UN working in Sudan.

According to one senior American diplomat, the threat to U.S. citizens in Sudan was real. He also acknowledged that the evacuation of large numbers of American aid and relief workers would put pressure on the new government to consider the price of continued relations with Libya.

Caroline Penn

"Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi has strong links going back to 1976 with Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafy"

The few Western journalists present for the first planeload of American evacuees witnessed an unusual display of antagonism between the U.S. and a country considered more actively engaged in the support of terrorism than Libya.

According to advance information, the 172 Americans were to depart from the Khartoum airport at four o'clock one April morning. Earlier, a convoy of vehicles entered the airport and proceeded to the airstrip at high speed. The convoy, including Sudanese soldiers and numerous American security agents, had picked up the evacuees from pre-arranged sites in the capital. While journalists wondered over the plane's failure to take off as planned at 4 a.m., two souk lorries arrived at the airport terminal.

Stopping at the single entrance to the airstrip used by the convoy, the lorries unloaded more than 60 poorly dressed men of Arab origin. While journalist enquiries were angrily rebuffed, the men stood in a solid group adjacent to the entry point. While one man said they were bound for Libya, the absence of luggage in the traveling group and their obvious nervousness gave American officials at the airport cause for concern.

It was later learned that the men were Syrian military technicians bound for the southeastern Libyan garrison of El Koufre. They had arrived in Khartoum several days earlier. It was also learned that the American plane had taxied to the end of the airstrip as planned for its scheduled take-off but had been delayed clearance by airport staff. The passengers were to sit for more than an hour in the airplane while senior embassy staff argued with Sudanese officials over what was seen as an orchestrated delay.

The contingent of Syrians remained outside the terminal until the plane's eventual departure. When a second planeload of Americans left the country later that week, yet another Syrian delegation was present at the airport during its pre-departure period.

* * *

The April election resulted in the formation of an uneasy coalition government between northern Sudan's two oldest and largest political parties. The Umma party, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi and representing the Ansar sect, and the Democratic Unionist party, its supporters from the north's second largest sect, known as the Khatmiyya, have a long history of tensions and unresolved disputes.

One area of difference between the parties is relations with Egypt. The Democratic Unionists support continued links with Egypt, while the Umma looks to new Arab alliances. Criticism of Egypt has been growing in Sudan and it now seems likely that some change will occur in the two nations' links, which include a defense pact.

Once sentenced to death in absentia by then-President Nimeiry, Sadiq al-Mahdi has strong links going back to 1976 with Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafy, and while cultivating Western ties, he will be hard-pressed to alienate the Libyan leader. Western Sudan has long had a close cultural and economic relationship with its Libyan neighbors, and politically the region has posed serious challenges to Khartoum rule in the past. Qaddafy could easily exploit the underlying opposition to central government. Given Sadiq's tenuous hold over the coalition government, he will be forced to walk a cautious line with Libya.

Until Nimeiry's removal, Libya supported the southern rebels based in Ethiopia with both military training and financial support. Qaddafy announced an end to that aid following the 1985 takeover by the military. But there is still some doubt whether Qaddafy has ended all support for the SPLA. Even though Libyan trainers are reported to have left the rebel sites in Ethiopia in 1984, some sources say that limited financial support has continued.

For the Western nations, it is understood that the U.S. will have a significantly lower profile in Sudan in the coming months. Some observers have said that the U.S.-Sudan relationship is unlikely to recover in the near future. Throughout the year of transitional military rule, a succession of state trials on corruption and the transport of Ethiopian Jews from Sudan to Israel revealed damaging links between American aid and excesses by the Nimeiry government.

But like Libya, the U.S. has the opportunity to play both sides in garnering influence in Khartoum. In the months leading up to the April elections, U.S. statements on the spreading civil war in southern Sudan were consistently supportive of northern Sudanese policy decisions. While critical of poor military decisions in the war zone, American officials increasingly presented southern rebels as "Marxist insurgents" and stressed the involvement of Libya and Ethiopia in the accelerating warfare.

With the introduction of Libyan bombers last March to the southern war zone, U.S. statements on the southern rebels are markedly softer in tone. One senior official acknowledged that the U.S. would continue to monitor the changing situation and was maintaining links to the Ethiopian-backed SPLA. If the northern government reinforces its relationship with Libya, a shift in U.S. policy toward the southern war is expected. □

"The April election resulted in the formation of an uneasy coalition government between northern Sudan's two oldest and largest political parties"

Retrenchment in Tripoli

Col. Muammar Qaddafy is confronting a difficult period in light of falling oil prices and austerity-induced discontent. The U.S. air raids on Tripoli and Benghazi, however, have had the unintended result of gaining domestic and international support for the controversial leader.

BY GEORGE HENDERSON

On June 11, just two days after the end of the Muslim month of Ramadan, Libya celebrated the 16th anniversary of the expulsion of U.S. forces from Mellaha, the old Wheelus Field air base just to the east of Tripoli, and one of the targets of the recent U.S. air raids. Unlike previous anniversaries which have been a time for major demonstrations of support for the Qaddafy government, the celebrations this year were very subdued.

The 30 Western journalists invited to attend found that instead of the usual mass parades in Tripoli's Green Square, at which Col. Muammar Qaddafy traditionally delivers a blistering attack against the U.S., the closest they got to the Libyan leader was to watch the colonel, who was obviously suffering from exhaustion, give a rambling two-hour speech on Libyan television.

It was not clear whether the speech was live or pre-recorded, and diplomatic sources in Tripoli speculated that the colonel was unwell. There was also speculation that he was still suffering from the aftermath of the U.S. raids on Tripoli and Benghazi in mid-April which had apparently come as a complete surprise.

George Henderson has specialized in North Africa for many years. He is a frequent contributor to the BBC and specialized publications on Morocco and Libya in Britain and Europe.

In his speech, Qaddafy asked for donations of up to $300 from every citizen to buy arms for national defense, and he warned the people to anticipate further U.S. attacks, assuring them that Libya had the means to retaliate. Although Libya did not have the planes to attack London or Washington, he said, "We have suicide squads, so there is a deterrent." He went on to attack Arab states for their lukewarm support, singling out Jordan for special mention, and promised that Libya would align itself more closely with the Soviet bloc.

The celebrations in Tripoli itself were also subdued, and apparently ignored by most of the city's inhabitants. No doubt the reason was that Libyans had been told the day before that there would be no national holiday to commemorate the occasion, as had been the case in the past.

The cancellation of the holiday was evidence of growing austerity and of the sacrifices the regime is calling on Libyans to make. Even the traditional Aid al-Fitr feast which marked the end of Ramadan two days before had taken place in an atmosphere of shortage. Celebrations were dampened by a lack of supplies in the shops and store windows were reportedly broken by angry and frustrated shoppers.

Economic Austerity

The austerity evident to anyone visiting Tripoli today is not simply a consequence of economic mismanagement by the Qaddafy government, however, although that has played a significant role. Despite 17 years of efforts to promote economic development on the basis of its burgeoning oil revenues, Libya still lacks an adequately diversified economic base.

The nascent industrial sector, which is still a centerpiece of development planning, provides only about 3 percent of gross domestic product. Apart from petrochemical and chemical complexes around the gulfs of Sirt and Sidra, consumer industry has been located around Tripoli and Benghazi. However, with the exception of some vehicle assembly and other light manufacturing, the major activity is food processing, and most essential consumer goods have to be imported.

Despite massive investment in schemes to make the desert bloom at Kufrah, Sarir, and Maknoussa, agricultural growth—a miserable 3 percent annually—has not kept pace with population growth. It still contributes only 2 percent to total gross domestic product, and in the major agricultural areas of the Jefara plain around Tripoli and the Jabal al-Akhdar behind Benghazi, production has fallen because of saline contamination of the water table. The result is that about 70 percent of all the food consumed in Libya has to be imported. Even the intensive dairy, poultry, and stock-raising schemes are heavily dependent on imported feed.

The problem, however, is that imports have to be paid for by oil revenues, which have steadily fallen from the 1980 maximum level of $21 billion to around $10 billion in 1984, and probably as little as $8 billion in 1985. In 1986, they are expected to dip as low as $5 billion.

Yet imports for 1986, according to the budget approved in March by the General People's Congress (GPC)—Libya's equivalent of a Parliament—are to reach $4.77 billion, a 6.3 percent fall from the previous year. Nor is this proposed import budget excessive. The GPC itself underlined this by warning that imports were to be restricted to essential goods—"basic commodities, medicines, medical equipment, foodstuffs, spare parts, and equipment needed to operate factories and agriculture."

Cutting Back Development

One consequence of the radical drop in oil revenues has been that the elaborate development projects of the past, planned to cost $55.5 billion between 1981 and 1985, with agriculture receiving 17 percent and industry topping the list at 22 percent, have been ruthlessly pruned in recent years. All projects that do not contribute to export earnings or are not of vital national importance have been abandoned since 1982, when the investment budget was cut by 90 percent to $1.3 billion.

Since then it rose to $5.74 billion in 1985 and is projected to remain at that level in 1986—although informed observers doubt whether such commitments can be sustained, regarding the latest $52 billion five-year development plan as little more than a figment of the government's imagination.

As a result of the cutbacks, only the Ras Lanuf export refinery and the Ksar Ahmed steel complex have been allowed to continue to completion. The Zuwara aluminum complex has been postponed—although there are now rumors that Algeria may be prepared to contribute toward building costs as part of its current rapprochement with the Qaddafy government.

The second phase of the $1 billion Sirt fertilizer complex has been postponed and may soon be abandoned. Several power generation projects have also been abandoned, while construction projects, particularly in the Gulf of Sirt and at Misurata, have been severely trimmed.

The one project which has not suffered from cuts has been the massive $3.29 billion Great Manmade River, designed to bring fossil water from the vast subterranean reserves, which run under the Sahara from the Ethiopian highlands toward the Mediterranean coast, to the urban and agricultural littoral areas of Libya. The first phase, constructed by the South Korean Dong Ah Corporation, is nearing completion and the foreign exchange costs have already been met. Domestic expenditure is being funded through an annual levy of one month's salary on the Libyan workforce.

The overall project is expected to cost $18 billion—if it is ever finished. It is vital to Libya's survival, however, if urban life is to be sustained and industrial development continued, and if Libya is to overcome the effects of salinity in its coastal water supply and the consequent damage to its fragile agricultural base.

But even at reduced levels of development spending, Libya faces financial problems. Payments to contractors have been delayed and for some groups, this has become a serious problem. In Turkey, for example, a major construction group crashed because of its unpaid bill in Libya. Italian and Greek contractors have faced similar problems, and although the bills were eventually paid, many companies will no longer consider taking up contracts in Libya. Currently, it is estimated that Libya has over $4 billion worth of short-term trade debt.

Over recent months, the Libyan authorities have sought ways of reducing the outflow of capital because of these problems. In response to Qaddafy's repeated calls, steps were taken in late 1985 to reduce the number of foreign workers in the country. They have fallen from a peak of about 400,000 in 1981—36 percent of the workforce—to less than 200,000 today. Expenditure on remittances is expected to fall from the 1983 peak of $2.045 billion to around $1 billion in 1986, a comfortable savings for the government.

The expulsions have done little to improve relations with Libya's neighbors, however, who had to integrate large numbers of expelled workers virtually without warning—over 30,000 Tunisians and 8,000 Egyptians were expelled in August 1985.

Nor has the quality of life in Libya improved, for the workers who left provided essential consumer and public services, as well as being active in the agricultural sphere—activities which Libyans themselves are not willing to undertake. The result is that streets are unswept, garbage is uncollected, consumer repair services have vanished, and farm labor has been severely cut back.

The Effect of Economic Embargoes

One factor which in theory should have worsened Libya's position is the economic embargo imposed by the Reagan administration in 1982 and significantly strengthened in January this year. The initial effect of the sanctions was very limited, however. Although Libyan crude could no longer be exported to the U.S. and American trade with Libya fell dramatically, the country was able to compensate for the loss by exporting elsewhere. The departure of American technicians was made up for by Europeans who were happy to move to Libya, given the economic recession in Europe.

Problems did exist—Libyan Arab Airlines was increasingly unable to maintain its fleet of Boeing aircraft, for example, nor buy European alternatives such as the Airbus, which also had American-made components and thus came under the embargo regulations.

Nonetheless, U.S. companies continued to tender for development contracts and to operate in Libya in joint ventures with the Libyan National Oil

Company, where the U.S. companies—Occidental, Grace, and the Oasis Group—held up to 49 percent of the equity and were able to lift a corresponding percentage of equity crude for their own purposes.

Other companies, such as Kaiser Engineering, were able to tender for the Zuwara aluminum smelter project, the Great Manmade River project, and the Sirt fertilizer project. American citizens also returned, and by the end of 1985, up to 1,000 were working in Libya.

The decision in January to strengthen the embargo had far more direct effects, however. Most U.S. technicians have left—since to stay meant facing jail sentences of up to 10 years—but Europeans have taken their posts. Even Britain, otherwise America's most fervent supporter over sanctions against Libya, has recently shamefacedly admitted that its exports to Libya rose by 26 percent in the first quarter of 1986, as it took up the slack.

The crucial area is oil. Six specialized oil service companies have already left and the other five U.S. oil companies will no longer be allowed to operate in Libya under a law passed by Congress in mid-June, even if they have not disposed of their assets there as required under the January embargo regulations.

The companies now accept that they will have to abandon their Libyan assets which are worth, they claim, between $400 million and $1 billion. The Libyan authorities have apparently been sympathetic to their plight and there does not appear to be any danger of expropriation. Negotiations over eventual sale of the assets to Libya have been lackadaisical, however, and Libya apparently hopes that no sales will actually be concluded so that the companies can eventually return once the crisis blows over.

The U.S. administration has argued that in theory, compensation for lost assets could be recovered from Libyan assets frozen in the U.S. under the January restrictions. However, if the previous experience of Iran's frozen assets is a guide, such a procedure may create more problems than it solves. Furthermore, although administration sources have claimed that the amounts frozen total around $800 million, Libya itself has argued that they represent no more than 4 percent of its foreign reserves—or about $238 million. In short, it seems unlikely that U.S. oil companies can look forward to much compensation for their losses in the near future.

The effect of the U.S. action on Libya is unlikely to be significant in the short-term. The Libyan National Oil Company will be able to operate the oil fields, for the staff of the American companies was virtually all Libyan. The services required will be replaced from Europe or Canada.

However, the real problems may be longer-term. In recent years, Libya was persuading the oil companies to undertake extensive exploration programs as part of attempts to ensure its long-term access to crude (which is currently expected to last for a maximum of 60 years, once the huge $2 billion offshore Bouri field is developed). The American companies' role here was crucial, and it is no doubt for this reason that Libya hopes to eventually woo them back. It is also undoubtedly for this reason that Libya has been careful not to offend the international oil industry in recent years and is currently being punctillious in submitting to international arbitration over Mobil Oil's $312 million claim against it.


Le Matin/Sygma

"Since mid-1984, women have been expected to take a full part in military activities"

Guns and Butter

Quite apart from these externally induced economic problems, however, the Libyan government suffers from several self-inflicted wounds that make life particularly difficult for its citizens. One of the problems is the Qaddafy regime's insistence on maintaining its arms import policy. No one really knows how much this costs, although most estimates assume that arms imports are equivalent to at least 40 percent of the total civilian import budget.

According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, between 1979 and 1983, Libya spent $12.095 billion on arms—more than any other country in the Middle East except Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Its standing army, however, is only 68,000 and cost a staggering $4.2 billion to maintain in 1983—equivalent to 26.6 percent of central government spending.

Arms imports alone were equivalent to 25.7 percent of total imports and cost $1.9 billion. Over the period under review, the Soviet Union alone provided $5.8 billion worth of arms, with France and Italy coming second and third, with $850 million and $700 million respectively. Since then, although the Soviet Union has maintained its role as an arms supplier, Brazil has moved into a leading position.

Until recently, the regime resolutely refused to consider cutting its arms imports, in pursuit of its claim to lead Third World and Middle Eastern resistance to neo-colonialism and Western imperialism. The result has been that as oil revenues have ineluctably fallen, Libya has begun to run up significant arms debts, mainly to the Soviet Union.

By the end of 1985, these are estimated to have totalled between $4 billion and $5 billion. The Soviet Union takes 150,000 barrels a day of Libyan crude in partial settlement, but the total debt continues to grow. The weapons corrode in the desert sun as Libya does not have sufficient technicians to service them. Although the Soviet Union does supply technicians to train Libyan personnel—there were said to be 2,000 in Libya prior to the U.S. raids in April—the process of training staff is slow and Soviet technicians do not take part in active operations—the reason, no doubt, for the relative ineffectiveness of the new SAM-5 missile batteries during the Gulf of Sirt raids by the U.S. Sixth Fleet in March.

The costs of this military extravagance are not limited to arms imports alone. In addition to having the highest per capita expenditure on arms in the world, Libya is also one of the most militarized societies. Everyone is obliged to participate in the popular militia, the concept of the armed masses that Qaddafy has set as an alternative to professional armed forces.

Schools and universities are considered military establishments and weapons training forms part of the curriculum. Adults are expected to consecrate part of their free time to military training. Since mid-1984, women have been expected to take a full part in military activities and attend special women's military academies. In addition to the resentment that such a policy arouses, there are significant economic consequences. Businesses find it difficult to cope with sudden and prolonged absences as staff leave for regular periods of military training.

Libyans realize, however, that one reason for the emphasis on universal military service is that the government is deeply distrustful of the regular armed forces. Col. Qaddafy has not forgotten that he came to power through an army-based conspiracy in 1969, nor that the army has spawned most of the plots against him. Quite apart from an abortive move against the new regime in early 1970 by disaffected senior officers loyal to the monarchy which had just been overthrown, there was a major army-inspired coup attempt in 1975. Organized by Col. Mahaishi, a member of the Revolutionary Command Council—the Nasserist-inspired military government of Libya at the time—the abortive coup resulted in the execution of more than 30 officers.

Since then, the army has been very carefully watched. Officers are under

Bernard Bisson/Sygma

Damage from the bombing of Tripoli: "Libyans were horrified and enraged that they should have been made victims for the errors of their leaders"

constant surveillance and special units exist to counter any further moves against the regime—the deterrent battalion under the commander of the Tripoli military region to protect the regime, and the presidential guards drawn from his own ethnic group, the Qadhadhfa, to protect Col. Qaddafy himself.

Qaddafy abandoned his formal governmental role in March 1977, when Libya became the *jamahiriyah*, the "state of the masses," that idiosyncratic construct of coercive radicalism and popular democracy which forms Libya's unique political system today. Instead, he is the revolutionary guide, the philosopher of the Libyan revolution, and its guardian through his control of the revolutionary committee system.

Disaffection with Radicalism

Indeed, for most Libyans, it is the radicalism of the government under which they have lived for the past 17 years which grates most severely. The *jamahiriyah* system intrudes into everyday life and the demands made on personal commitment—attendance at popular congresses to decide policy or popular committees to administer day-to-day affairs in all walks of social and economic life—are massive. The result is that most Libyans simply do not participate, and the eight years since the proclamation of the *jamahiriyah* system have been marked by a growing popular disinterest.

Yet even disinterest does not protect most people from the obtrusiveness of the political system, for since 1980, the shock troops of the revolution have been the revolutionary committees. These, unlike the popular committees and congresses, are elite groups of committed radicals directly under the control of Qaddafy and the small group around him. Most of their members are young—for the Qaddafy government has placed an almost jesuitical trust in youth, particularly those who were under 10 years of age when the regime came to power in 1969—and until last year, membership in the movement was clandestine.

The result was that the average citizen never knew quite who was responsible for ensuring political conformity, and the committees had real and unpleasantly arbitrary power. In 1980, they were charged by Qaddafy with protecting the revolution and with eliminating the "stray dogs"—those Libyans who had rejected the political and moral principles of the Qaddafy government, both at home and abroad. In the summer of 1984, it was the revolutionary committees which carried out summary executions of persons suspected of being involved in the abortive coup attempt of May 1984, 11 of which took place in public and were later shown on Libyan television, *"pour encourager les autres."*

Since 1985, however, the revolutionary committees have been more publicly in evidence, for they have been charged with the task of dynamizing Libyan economic life. Young members have been placed in charge of the administration and industry, with the duty of forcing greater efficiency, in an attempt to solve Libya's economic problems by political means.

Of course, the frustrations of failure will only incite further attempts at radical political solutions—and will further irritate the vast majority of Libyans who are victims of these measures. Even the latest measure—whereby a new control system was placed in charge of the revolutionary committee movement itself—will only worsen the disaffection of the population at large.

The irony is that although Libya has acquired a set of radical political institutions, the government's policy of wealth distribution has created a popular ethos which is anything but radical. When it achieved independence, Libya was the poorest country in Africa. But since the early 1960s, oil wealth has radically improved standards of living.

One of Qaddafy's policies has been to ensure general access to the benefits of oil wealth. However, conspicuous corruption is certainly not unknown in Libya, particularly among those who control the levers of power. It is also true that since 1978, private business activities have been banned and personal wealth has been officially limited to $33,000 per person. In addition, the government has made sure that everyone has adequate housing and transport, as well as egalitarian wages. The result is that Libyans have acquired an interest in material comforts, benefits, and possessions. In such circumstances, radicalism holds little attraction for most people.

In this environment, the economic difficulties of recent years have contributed significantly to widespread disaffection with the government. Shortages of consumer goods are a source of daily frustration—for which the government is increasingly blamed. This is compounded by the government's own



Christine Spengler/Sygma

Celebrating anniversary of Libya's revolution: "In addition to having the highest per capita expenditure on arms in the world, Libya is also one of the most militarized societies"

actions, for shortages have been made worse by inefficiency and dogma.

In the early 1980s, in pursuance of the goal of removing "wage slaves"—employed labor—in favor of a cooperative system, the government decided to replace the traditional marketing system, with its local shops and markets which were as much social centers as points of commercial exchange, with a series of remote and vast hypermarkets to be run by local popular committees. The results could have easily been foreseen. Daily shopping became far more complex and irritating, as the distances involved were increased and as inefficiency ensured that essential goods were often not available.

The shortages of recent years have vastly worsened the situation and the daily round of shopping is now the major occupation of most Libyans. Since Libya is still an extremely conservative society, it tends to be the men who shop. Thus, offices are abandoned for long periods every day in the search for consumer essentials.

The discontinuity between the ambitions of the regime and of the Libyan population at large is intensified in the field of education. Whereas the government sees education as a tool to ensure political radicalism and conformity, most Libyans see it as a means for personal and social advancement. The result has been a growing official interventionism in schools and universities which has increased divisions within the student body and intensified popular anger over what many see as the most important aspect of modernization in Libya—access to literacy and education.

More recently, the universities have become the centerpiece of the government's retaliation against its foreign opponents. In the wake of the April raids, for instance, an attempt was made to destroy the libraries of the English and French departments at Al Fateh University in Tripoli.

Students resisted and a compromise was worked out whereby it was agreed that no further action would be taken to destroy the libraries, although English and French would eventually be removed from the university curricula. Since then, Qaddafy announced that English teaching in schools is to be discontinued in favor of Russian, as part of his campaign against Western influences. The Soviet Union is unlikely to appreciate the implied compliment, since the Gorbachev government, like its predecessor, has been careful not to become too involved in the politics of a government that it considers unreliable and mercurial.


Bernard Bisson/Sygma

Benghazi: "The U.S. raids did more to rally support for Qaddafy than anything else could have done"

For example, Libya has not been accorded the treaty of friendship that it has sought since 1973 and which Syria and South Yemen enjoy. Indeed, Soviet links with Libya are strictly limited and depend more on commercial than political considerations. Moscow, after all, did not warn Tripoli of the U.S. raids, although it knew of them in advance.

For Libyans, however, the politicization of the educational system is deeply resented, whatever the justification. Many see it as parallel to the government's interference in Islam, for since 1978, after a noisy confrontation with the religious hierarchy in Tripoli, Qaddafy has decreed his own version of Islam.

In Libya, the Koran is now the sole source of religious orthodoxy—even though orthodox Muslims regard such a view as heretical. The official attitude toward Islam is a source of acute embarrassment to Libyans and only increases their sense of estrangement from the rest of the Arab and Muslim world. Indeed, this too is a further cause for disaffection, for Qaddafy has always justified his policies on the grounds that he is dedicated to Arab unity. Yet Libya today is isolated within the Arab world—largely as a result of the radicalism of its leader and his propensity for attacking other Arab leaders for their betrayal of the ideals he believes the Arab world should hold. All in all, Qaddafy's domestic popularity is at an all time low.

Open Opposition

Against this background of popular disaffection and unrest, it may seem surprising that the Qaddafy government has survived at all. In part, the answer is that Libyans have always been surprisingly tolerant of their leaders. At the same time, the opposition to Qaddafy is fragmented and ineffective. There are at least six major opposition movements abroad, some with pedigrees extending back to 1969, when Qaddafy came to power. They have been unable to form a joint program of action or to organize effective resistance inside Libya itself.

The most dramatic attempt—the May 1984 coup attempt organized principally by the National Salvation Front for Libya, the most effective of the opposition groups—resulted not only in the deaths of the activists involved but also in the complete dismantling of the support structures in the country. In any case, it is generally agreed that the government can only be removed by the sole alternate source of power—the army.

Yet here the opposition groups have been singularly unsuccessful in creating an effective support base, while army officers have been rendered impotent by the regime's careful control. They could clearly create the climate for change if they wished, as they demonstrated last August when both army and air force officers refused to attack Tunisia during the crisis over the expulsions of Tunisian workers from Libya. However, until they are convinced that there is an effective alternative, they are unlikely to move.

Another reason for the apparent stability of the government is the way in which it has been organized. Although to the outside world, it appears to be a radical regime based on an ideology of revolution and coercion, domestically power is retained on a highly traditional basis. Qaddafy, for instance, has ensured that many of the crucial positions in the state structure are filled by his own kinsmen or by members of his ethnic group. They are tied to him not by ideology or political role, but by more tangible bonds of kinship and patronage.

This personalized nature of power is reinforced by two other factors—the relationships of the small group that shares real power with the colonel and their close identity with his own political philosophy.

Ultimately, power in Libya is controlled by the rump of the old Revolutionary Command Council of which four members still survive—Major Jalloud, Qaddafy's closest collaborator, in charge of the day-to-day management of the revolutionary committee movement; Khawaldi Al-Hamaidi, who controls the popular militia and handles internal affairs; Abu Bakr Yunis Jabr, army chief of staff; and Mustapha Al-Kharroubi, who runs the security services and is army inspector general.

It is this group which has recently been cited as a "junta" now attempting to push the colonel into the political shadows. However, like Qaddafy, they are closely associated with the actions of the government and they also know that without the colonel they cannot survive. They have also placed their clients and kinsmen within the power structure and each has his ethnic clientele. Major Jalloud, for example, represents Maghara interests and depends on their support. They know that it is inconceivable for them to survive without Qaddafy and they have always depended on his dominance of their collective leadership.

Around this central core float lesser luminaries, many of them related to Qaddafy—figures such as Khalifa Khanaish, Abdellah Ibrahimi, Said or Aghmed Qaddafy Adhm, and Abdelhafid Messaoudi. Although they also owe their pre-eminence to Qaddafy, they do not have the close ties associated with collaboration in the original revolution which overthrew the monarchy, as do the members of the old Revolutionary Command Council.

It is here perhaps that individuals willing to overthrow Qaddafy may be found, as resentment over the activities of the senior leadership increases. Indeed, such a move was recently attempted when late last year Hassan Ishkal apparently contacted the Egyptian authorities to see if they would support a new government in Libya which he would head. However, the dangers attendant on such a move were underlined last December when Hassan Ishkal was killed—in a motor accident according to official sources—by gunfire at Qaddafy's headquarters, according to the opposition.

In any case, the question must be posed: Would any successor originating from such a background be preferable to the government currently in power? After all, its leaders would differ very little from those in power now, having been trained in the same political school.

Any such successor government is likely to be as chaotic as its predecessor in terms of its domestic organization of power, as viciously repressive of domestic opposition, as opposed to Western policies in the Middle East, and as likely to justify its use of terrorism as a weapon against Libyan dissidents abroad or as a defense against Western hostility both to its own interests and to those of the Arab world.

Given the generalized and often unjustified hostility to Libya and all it represents in the wider world, both in the Middle East and in the West, such an outcome would hardly be surprising. Libyans often feel—with justification—that they have never been treated seriously, neither by their brother Arabs nor by the West—even before the current wave of hostility over terrorism began. In those circumstances, it would hardly be surprising if any new Libyan government should demonstrate the same truculence and populist radicalism of its predecessor—and find support among the Libyan population who would feel obliged to rally around it in the face of universal hostility in the outside world.

Indeed, this is perhaps the greatest irony and tragedy of the Libyan situation. Despite their disaffection with Qaddafy, despite their detestation of policies based on arbitrary terrorism, particularly against their own nationals abroad who disagree with the government (for these have been Qaddafy's real victims, whatever Reagan may claim), most Libyans see no alternative to reluctant support for their mercurial leader in current circumstances.

It is a situation that has been intensified by the raids, for Libyans were horrified and enraged that they should have been made victims for the errors of their leaders. They recall that until 1978, at least, the U.S. was one Qaddafy's strongest supporters. They also believe that the problems in the Arab world, including terrorism, are at least as much the fault of the West, and its refusal to act seriously over the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Palestinian problem, as of Arab irresponsibility or radicalism.

They see the raids as further evidence of Western arrogance and disinterest in the real causes of the problems of the Middle East. In those circumstances, they are hardly likely to rally against a leader who, whatever his faults, has always warned of Western indifference and hostility to their common interests.

In that atmosphere, the U.S. raids on Tripoli and Benghazi last April did more to rally support for Qaddafy than anything else could have done. Despite U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's hopes, Libyans today are less likely than they were before the raids to move against their ruler and the U.S. action may ironically have helped Qaddafy to survive a little longer. □

Chad

"On the Battlefield"

Despite continuing OAU peace efforts, recent defections from the GUNT, and some progress toward national reconciliation, Chad remains a divided country with little prospect for an end to hostilities, let alone a negotiated settlement of the war.

BY FRANZISKA JAMES

Chad's future will most likely be decided "on the battlefield, not the negotiating table"—a sober message from President Hissène Habré as he celebrated his fourth anniversary in power this June in the southern city of Moundou. A realistic assessment, many would say, pointing to the fact that Chad has known little peace in its 25 years of independence.

Sporadic fighting, first between north and south, later among various northern factions, and always with some foreign involvement, has dominated Chadian life for the past two decades, and as one high-level diplomat in Ndjamena said recently, "After 20 years, war has become a way of life here."

Some view the war in Chad as a classic East-West conflict, with France and the United States as the major backers of the Habré government, and Libya and more indirectly some Eastern bloc countries supporting the rebels loyal to Goukouni Oueddei. Others who have followed events in Chad over the years see the war at the local level, as a struggle for power among various "warlords." Whatever the view, it is difficult to find any serious observer of Chad who foresees either a negotiated settlement or an early end to the fighting.

Franziska James is an American journalist based in West Africa who covers events in West and Central Africa for a major American news organization. She was in Chad just shortly after clashes between rebel and government forces last February and March.

Yet during the last four years under the leadership of Hissène Habré, the situation in the country has improved. Chad has gone from almost total chaos and destruction to a semblance of stability, and some say, even a sense of national identity. The country, while still considered among the poorest in the world, has managed to pull through one of the worst droughts in history. President Habré himself has gone from his earlier status as just another Chadian factional leader to recognition by most Chadians, the Organization of African Unity, and the international community as the legitimate head of state of this vast central African nation.

Even in bullet-riddled Ndjamena, changes are underway. Much of the city is being rebuilt, with walls plastered over and painted to erase the telltale signs of the fierce fighting that swept through here in the early 1980s, killing thousands of civilians and driving thousands more from their homes.

Now there is a healthy hustle and bustle in the market, and while luxury items may be rare, food, clothing, and gasoline are readily available at reasonable prices. Yet security is tight along the Chari River at entry points into the country. There is a noticeable presence of fully armed soldiers around public buildings and always the whispered presence of the secret police—indications that Chad is still at war.

Despite some progress toward national reconciliation, Chad today remains a divided country with Libyan-backed rebels of the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) holding the northern third and the Habré government controlling the rest.

A long stalemate in the fighting was interrupted earlier this year by a fresh round of clashes as GUNT forces, made up mostly of Libya's "Islamic Legion" recruited very often forcibly from Chad and surrounding African countries, moved south from their bases around Fada and Faya-Largeau.

The rebels attacked various government outposts around Oum Chalouba, Kaleit, Ziguey, and Kouba Oulanga. During the fierce fighting which followed, several hundred soldiers were killed, according to sources in Ndjamena, most of them reportedly on the rebel side. A month later, Ndjamena reported several other rebel forays.

While the clear government victory in these clashes may have provided a psychological and political boost for Habré, the fighting also brought France directly back into the action in Chad. Within weeks after the first clashes, close to 1,000 French soldiers with sophisticated radar equipment, weapons, and jet fighters were once again entrenched on Chadian soil. For weeks, the tiny airport at Ndjamena looked more like New York's "JFK," as military planes landed and took off day and night ferrying supplies.

Soon after their arrival, the French sent a clear message to Libya in the form of fighter planes to bomb a Libyan-built rebel airstrip at Ouadi Doum. The

Libyans sent back a similar message, by dispatching a Soviet-built Tupelov-22 to bomb the runway at Ndjamena airport. The lines once again were drawn.

Many observers explain France's quick re-entry into the Chadian scene by its somewhat embarrassing accord with Libya in 1984, under which both nations agreed to disengage their forces from Chad. While France complied, Libya did not, withdrawing its forces only to the far northern reaches of the country, leaving the French with the appearance of having been duped.

As one Frenchman in Ndjamena remarked, "After that agreement [with Libya], we had to come back strong." When asked, French military sources in Ndjamena made it clear that theirs was to be a strong defensive role, noting that they were not eager or willing to support a possible Habré offensive north. While rumors have persisted that Habré would move to regain his hometown of Faya-Largeau from rebel hands—and his recent comments have clearly indicated that he would like to do so—thus far he has heeded the French advice.

Over the years, France has supported various Chadian governments, including that of Goukouni at one time. Then in 1983, France found itself on Habré's side, defending his government against a Libyan-backed rebel onslaught. "Operation Manta" engaged 3,000 French troops in Chad and cost the French government an estimated $500,000 per day.

It seems clear that France does not wish to embroil itself in the Chad conflict any more than absolutely necessary. It is also clear that Paris will not back out—particularly under the more conservative French government, and at a time when the United States and European countries are taking a tougher stance against Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafy.

It is the irony of politics that France now supports Habré, who in his early days as a guerrilla leader was behind the kidnapping of several French citizens, the most prominent of whom were Major Gallopin, who was killed by the rebels, and French anthropologist Françoise Claustre. It was also Habré who once called for the expulsion of all foreign forces from Chad, meaning mainly the French.

It is no less ironic for Habré, whose rebel political platform once called for the adoption of a "national democratic people's government" and a "socialist road to development," to now find himself so closely allied with and dependent on France.

The United States has openly lent its support to the Habré government, having recently increased its military assistance from $6 million to $10 million. Washington has shipped in considerable military equipment and caused a stir in Ndjamena in March when one of its giant "Galaxy" military cargo planes delivered French supplies.

American diplomats in Ndjamena maintain that the U.S. is playing an indirect role, secondary to France. In the words of one American official, "The French have been here a long time and will be here long after we're gone, so

Camerapix

GUNT leader Goukouni Oueddei: "His alliance with Libya has cast doubts on his nationalistic credentials" we're not going to get in their way." There is also almost a sense of envy for the French position, with one American official remarking, "We could never do what the French are doing [bringing in troops and supplies] without the whole world on our back."

The U.S. government's rallying cry in Chad is clearly "Qaddafy," and if backing President Habré hurts Libya, so much the better. After the skirmishes earlier this year between government and rebel forces, there was much speculation in Ndjamena that the U.S. might actually be pressuring both Habré and the French to take the offensive, although U.S. officials flatly deny this.

There are indications, however, that the U.S. would not object to any moves against Col. Qaddafy, viewing Chad as a sort of "weak underbelly" of Libya. While Washington may remain in the background, the U.S., especially after its own recent clashes with Libya, will be watching developments in Chad even more closely.



Patrice Habans/Sygma

President Hissène Habré: "Under his leadership, Chad has gone from almost total chaos to a semblance of stability and even a national identity"

For Libya, Chad has at various times represented an opportunity and more recently perhaps, a problem. Historic ties between the peoples of Libya and northern Chad long predate Col. Qaddafy, France's role in Chad, or any Libyan-American conflict.

More recently, Libya has played a fairly constant role in the Chadian conflict. Libyan forces occupied and annexed the far north of Chad—the mineral-rich Aouzou strip—in 1973. Libyan troops supported the government of Goukouni Oueddei in 1980. Three years later, in fighting between Habré and Goukouni forces, they introduced heavy aerial bombardment into the Chad conflict for the first time.

Tripoli has consistently supplied weapons and some soldiers to the rebel forces. A young Libyan captain captured in the fighting around Oum Chalouba earlier this year confirmed that Libyan advisers operate with each rebel unit. With a number of rebel factions shifting to the Habré side in the past year or so, GUNT forces have dwindled, and Col. Qaddafy has been hard-pressed to recruit troops for his "Islamic Legion." He has reportedly also met resistance from within his own military over the continuing war in Chad.

Where Libya goes from here, no one can tell. Tripoli is not likely to give up the Aouzou strip, and it cannot back down in its support of the rebels as that could mean a tremendous loss of face among African and other Third World countries.

Yet with falling oil prices and economic constraints at home, supplying the GUNT may prove to be an increasingly unwelcome burden. With the U.S. and France taking a harder line against "Libyan adventurism," it is also unlikely that Col. Qaddafy would make any sudden moves in Chad, although he certainly has shown no indications that he might be inclined to come to the negotiating table.

Where has all this left Goukouni Oueddei, one-time president and Habré ally, and last son of the "Derdei" (the Muslim religious leader of the Toubou people)? At this point, certainly in the shadow of Libya. Goukouni's relations with Chad's richer northern neighbor have seesawed, like those of Habré. He has spoken out against Libyan expansionism and asked Libyan troops to leave his country in 1981 after they helped install him in power. At the same time, however, he has been all too willing to accept Libyan assistance—his supporters say out of necessity, others say his alliance with Libya has cast serious doubts on his own nationalistic credentials.

Whatever the case, Goukouni's influence has waned substantially as a number of his important supporters have come over to Habré. Djibril Djogo represents a case in point: Formerly GUNT chief of staff, he is now justice minister in the Habré government. While President Habré has managed to substantially broaden his power base, the GUNT has been plagued by serious factional in-fighting, and most observers now agree that it could not stand alone without strong Libyan backing. On June 19th, Col. Wadal Abdel Kamougué resigned from his post of vice chairman of the GUNT.

The rebels' decision not to attend the most recent reconciliation effort in Congo last March has further isolated Goukouni and Qaddafy, drawing sharp criticism from many African countries. It also proved a boost to Habré, who presented this as "proof" that Goukouni is really just a "Libyan puppet" and that Libya and the rebels are not interested in negotiating.

Habré's statement that the Chad civil war will most likely be decided on the battlefield not the negotiating table, is certainly not far-fetched. Indeed, thus far negotiations have proved fruitless—from the Kano and Lagos accords in 1979, which set up the GUNT in the first place, to the OAU's futile efforts to keep peace in 1982, to subsequent efforts by the OAU and individual African countries to mediate in the war.

Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso in particular has made numerous attempts to bring the warring factions together, thus far to no avail. A negotiated settlement may be impossible because the two main adversaries—Habré and Goukouni—are not likely to last in one government, since what each wants precludes the other—to rule Chad. Behind each stand foreign powers with vested economic and political interests. While Habré would never publicly refuse to negotiate, he may not in reality be eager to do so, many observers note, as he is in a stronger position than Goukouni.

Since ousting Goukouni and coming to power in 1982, Habré has managed to consolidate his power base. His efforts at "national reconciliation" have met with some success. A number of important rebels, particularly in the south, have come over to his side. While just one year ago, Habré still faced a serious rebellion in the south, the celebration of his fourth anniversary in power in the southern city of Moundou was a strong symbolic gesture.

Aside from some sporadic incidents, the south is now relatively quiet, although that goal was not achieved without some very harsh reprisals by government forces, against not only the rebels, but also civilians suspected of supporting rebel groups. Relations between the Habré government and southerners are quite fragile. Security is still tight throughout the region, and much of the historic distrust between north and south still prevails.

Still, Habré is credited with having restored some semblance of order to the country. He is generally recognized at home and abroad as the legitimate head of state and he has secured the commitment of a strong outside backer, France. Many ask why Habré should negotiate when he knows that with French support his chances are better on the battlefield.

There is another factor, however, which threatens the country's security—the economy. According to World Bank statistics, Chad is the poorest country in the world. Its total budget for this year is just over $68 million, one-half of which is spent on the war effort, with another 18 percent slated for servicing the country's debt. That leaves little to spend on domestic services or any kind of development. Chad remains heavily dependent on foreign aid donors and international agencies to carry out development programs. France continues to provide major development assistance and will make up most of Chad's budget deficit this year.

Chad will also look to France to rescue its failing cash crop, cotton, which brings in over 80 percent of the foreign exchange. The industry is on the verge of collapse due to the drop in cotton prices on the world market. The country's cotton producer, "Cotontchad"—jointly owned by France and Chad—is expected to run a deficit of over $100 million this year.

Chad has no significant mineral wealth, aside from uranium in the Aouzou strip which is under Libyan control. There are some known petroleum deposits in other areas, such as Kanem, but at this time of low world oil prices, they are too costly to exploit.

Most economic analysts agree that by Western standards, Chad should be on the verge of economic collapse. Experts familiar with Chad's situation say the "modern" sector of the economy is indeed in bad shape, but they note that its "traditional" and unregulated sector is doing just fine.

A visit to Ndjamena's central market serves as testimony to that assertion. There is an abundance of locally produced fruits, vegetables, and meats. Chadian shoppers can also select from an assortment of reasonably priced canned goods, much of it imported illegally from neighboring countries. Gasoline from Nigeria and Cameroon is also readily available and not too expensive.

The country has just managed to pull through one of the worst droughts in history, which seriously affected at least half the population. Massive relief efforts saved thousands of lives, and thousands of displaced persons have gradually been able to return to their homes.

Good rains last season have been a boon to agricultural production and according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Chad will be self-sufficient in food production this year. Agricultural experts say Chad has the potential to not only feed itself, but also become a substantial food exporter to some of its neighbors.

Yet all of this will depend on some kind of political stability, and that in Chad seems very hard to come by. □

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

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Taya at the Helm

After years of political instability, Mauritania may be entering a new era under President Taya, who has won the confidence of the country's diverse ethnic populations and maintained a neutral position in the Western Sahara conflict. However, correcting economic abuses will be the most difficult test for his government.

BY HOWARD SCHISSEL

In the 18 months since President Maaouya Sid Ahmed Ould Taya's December 1984 palace coup, his government has achieved a badly needed domestic political detente, taken the first steps to get Mauritania's economy out of the trough, and adopted a more balanced approach to regional diplomacy. This initial grace period, however, is rapidly coming to an end. The Mauritanian head of state must now come to grips with a number of fundamental problems bedeviling the rapidly evolving society and hammer out a longer-term political and social design to assure the country's future stability.

Taya does not have an outgoing personality and in person he appears timid. Although he has held many important posts in recent years—from commander-in-chief of the armed forces to prime minister—observers did not generally credit him with a driving political ambition. In fact, he always appeared loyal to ex-President Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, even saving his regime from a coup attempt in 1981. But the last months of his predecessor's rule were characterized by growing abuses and a general *laisser-aller* which jeopardized Mauritania's fragile political and diplomatic equilibrium.

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Scandals broke out in many key sectors of the economy. Much of the banking sector was paralyzed by bad loans granted to presidential cronies. Funds for special projects disappeared. Policies placing priority on the rural economy were never enforced. Little progress was made in limiting the abuses in the highly promising fisheries sector. Much of the food aid donated to Mauritania in the 1982-84 period failed to reach its destination. Tribalism was exacerbated, as were the ever-present racial tensions between the Moorish population of Arab-Berber descent and the black African inhabitants in the southern part of this vast desert nation. To make matters worse, all dissent was severely repressed during Haidalla's presidency.

It is little wonder then that Haidalla's overthrow was greeted by demonstrations of joy in the streets. Calls rang out for an end to economic anarchy, greater social justice, and other essential reforms. Although Taya has proceeded cautiously, he seems determined to end practices which could undermine the credibility of his government. Late last year, for example, businessmen from his own ethnic group were arrested after revelations of their involvement in a massive customs fraud.

Mauritania has been plagued by political instability since the military overthrew former President Moktar Ould Daddah in July 1978 because of the country's involvement in the Western Sahara war. In the last eight years, there have been four presidents, three prime ministers (before the post was abolished), and frequent cabinet reshuffles. As a result, Mauritania has appeared to be a rudderless ship. When the country urgently needed strong leadership, the necessary authority and political consensus were lacking.

Taya's ability to consolidate power is bolstered by several factors. For one, he is from the small Smasid tribe of Atar, whose well-known commercial acumen should allow the president broader alliances than achieved by his predecessors. He has been careful not to exclude any region or ethnic group from ruling circles. While promoting younger technocrats, Taya has included older guard politicians, even recalling certain individuals from the pre-1978 period. Significantly, he is one the few Moorish politicians to have the confidence of most of the country's black population. The new Mauritanian leader has also won recognition on the international scene both in Africa and in the Arab world.

It is extremely difficult to assess Taya from a political viewpoint. He makes few public statements, and these are often very general. A Mauritanian intellectual with long experience in ruling circles notes, "Essentially, Taya is a pragmatic nationalist whose ambition is to reform Mauritanian society and contribute to the construction of a strong and

Cattle feeding station in southern Mauritania: "A vast transfer of wealth has accrued as government functionaries and traders have purchased large herds for a pittance from destitute nomads"

modern state." Mauritanian leaders are often rightly or wrongly tagged as either "pro-Moroccan" or "pro-Algerian," but Taya has managed to avoid such a Manichean classification thus far.

While stressing that economic rehabilitation is currently more important than a return to civilian rule, the Mauritanian leader has taken a number of steps to revitalize the country's moribund administration and to curb outstanding abuses. For instance, the appointment of Dr. Mohammed Sidya Ould Bah to head the Food Aid Commission has given the body responsible leadership.

Donors have been drawn into the management of food aid distribution to assure that abuses of the recent past are not repeated. Saleck Ould Heyne, the new director of the key state mining company, Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière (SNIM), is respected for both his technical proficiency and his professional demeanor. SNIM's iron ore exports account for over 50 percent of Mauritania's foreign currency earnings.

Bringing the fishing industry under control has been a more difficult task. It is estimated that up to $1 billion worth of fish are harvested from Mauritania's territorial waters annually, but the state exchequer only receives between $30 million and $40 million a year. Most of the funds are netted by illegal fishing boats from European and Asian nations and Mauritanian nationals working through Spanish middlemen in the Canary Islands capital of Las Palmas.

Taya has called for "an end to the anarchic policies in the fishing sector which have led to the flourishing of fictitious companies and all other sorts of irregularities." Cleaning up the fishing industry, based in the port of Nouadhibou, will be a crucial test for Taya's government, obliging it to challenge powerful vested interests to put its reformist rhetoric into practice.

On the regional diplomatic front, Taya has attempted to steer an even course in the Western Sahara conflict. Having suffered greatly from the war until signing an August 1979 peace treaty with Polisario, Mauritanian officials are still wary that their country could be on the losing end of any peace settlement. A Moroccan ally during 1974-78 in the division of the former Spanish Sahara, Mauritania gradually drifted into the Algerian camp under former President Haidalla's leadership, eventually signing the Treaty of Fraternity and Concord with Algeria and Tunisia and joining the majority of Organization of African Unity countries in recognizing the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Nevertheless, Mauritania has made great efforts to patch up its relations with Morocco while maintaining its friendship with Algeria.

Mauritania withdrew its troops from Saharan territory in mid-1979, but still maintains a garrison in the port city of La Guera. Mauritanian officials stress that they will continue to occupy this strategic location, only two miles from Nouadhibou, until a peaceful solution to the Saharan crisis is found. In this way, Nouakchott hopes to assure its neutrality and guarantee its long-term interests.

Mauritania is still wary of its security. The Moroccans have extended their system of defense walls to within miles of the Mauritanian frontier in the northern part of the country, a strategy intended to force Polisario troops to use Mauritanian territory to attack the wall. If Polisario forces are present in the difficult-to-patrol northern third of Mauritania, their presence is not essential to the war effort. Morocco has shown a certain "comprehension," and over the past few years, it has avoided verbal attacks on Mauritania or military pressure. The conflict could spill over into Mauritania, however, in which case, continued French support for Mauritania's territorial integrity would be vital.

The evolution of the situation in the Western Sahara will play an important role in Mauritania's future. There is a fear that a compromise peace plan could eventually propose a federation between Mauritania and part of the Western Sahara under Polisario leadership. While currently rejected by both parties, such an arrangement would probably upset Mauritania's tenuous ethnic balance. That is one reason why Mauritania also emphasizes its black African connections. Although no longer a member of the franc zone—unlike most of its southern neighbors—Mauritania plays an active role in most West African regional bodies. Taya, for instance, recently took over the presidency of the troubled West African Economic Community.

In the immediate future, the government's principal task is to revive the economy. Figures are somewhat misleading. Thanks to its iron ore and fishing exports, Mauritania's per capita gross domestic product officially stood at about $370 in the mid-1980s, placing it in the "intermediate" range of underdeveloped countries. A closer look at economic realities shows that conditions in Mauritania are often worse than in many countries classified by the World Bank as "relatively less developed." These states, for example, have an average infant mortality rate of 94 per 1,000, against 170 for Mauritania, and a life expectancy of 57 years compared to an estimated 43 years in Mauritania.

The country is in the midst of a 1985-1988 economic and financial recovery program adopted late last year under the aegis of the World Bank's Consultative Group for Mauritania. After years of drought, the impact of the Western Sahara war, the international economic crisis, and poor management, the economy is in particularly poor shape.

According to the diagnosis contained in the Consultative Group report, "Mauritania is currently faced with a multiplicity of economic and financial problems which are assuming such proportions that they could seriously compromise its future if appropriate solutions are not found." The report adds that "growth performance over the recent years has been weak: per capita GDP declined by 0.6 percent in real terms between 1980 and 1984, despite a very high investment rate (32 percent of GDP on average)." These factors inevitably led to appreciable budgetary and balance of payments deficits accompanied by external indebtedness more than double the country's GDP.

Indeed, at the end of 1985, Mauritania's overseas debt was pegged at $1.7 billion, a sum equal to about 240 percent of the GDP. This proportion—practically a record among Third World nations—reveals the weakness of past economic management. For many years, Mauritania received loans on relatively favorable terms from its friends in the Middle East. Now that Arab funds are drying up, the country has to face harsh realities. Debt rescheduling undertaken in 1985 will be needed again this year and periodically throughout the rest of the decade. Now that the international donor community is watching closely, Mauritania will have to strictly adhere to economic performance criteria and adopt more stringent and painful stabilization measures.

Already, the Taya government has undertaken considerable belt-tightening. Imports were cut back to reduce the trade deficit, while efforts were made to promote exports from the modern sector. Wages in the state administration have been practically frozen. The state has begun to disengage from the public sector where possible, and parastatal subsidies have been gradually eliminated. All this has led to a deterioration in the already low living standards.

Taya has identified himself with the success of the economic recovery program. While preaching austerity and greater civic involvement, he does not have much maneuvering room in which to carry out the reform measures. Vested interest groups still dominate the country's economy and are subtly blocking or retarding the plan's application. Corruption is still pervasive and badly needed tax and fiscal reforms are hamstrung.

More than a decade of Sahelian drought has engendered deep social mutations. Mauritania is traditionally a nomadic society. In 1965, 83 percent of the population was nomadic, while 17 percent was sedentary. By 1985, this ratio was completely reversed: Over 75 percent of Mauritania's 1.7 million inhabitants are now sedentary. It is estimated that nomadism as a way of life will be practically extinct by the end of the century. The drift from the bush to the city has devastated Mauritania's pastoral economy and concentrated an increasingly large number of poor and landless people in the urban *bidonvilles*.

At independence in 1960, Mauritania was virtually self-sufficient in food. Today, it is one of the most dependent states, relying on international food handouts for survival. The country requires roughly 250,000 tons of grain a year. During an excellent crop year, Mauritania can produce up to 60,000 tons of diverse grains, but persistent

Karen Durlach

Mauritanian nomads: "The drift from the bush to the city has devastated Mauritania's pastoral economy"

drought has brought average yields down to some 25,000 tons. As a result, Mauritania must import over 200,000 tons of grain per year. Food aid covers half of Mauritania's grain needs, the highest proportion in West Africa.

Another reason for low harvests has been the comparative neglect of rural development by successive governments, despite official declarations calling for priority to be accorded to agricultural projects. Only a fraction of potentially irrigable land—mostly along the Mauritanian shore of the Senegal River valley—is cultivated using modern techniques. And, some of the larger and more expensive irrigation schemes, like the Gorgol Noir project, have been costly white elephants. The state agricultural extension agency, SONADER, is far from efficient.

Another problem facing the rural economy is the need for land reform. Many large landowners are Moorish emirs or other feudal potentates. They usually use former slaves, known as *harrantines*, to cultivate their land as sharecroppers. This system provides little incentive for farmers to invest in improved techniques or work harder for larger yields. Without sweeping reform in land ownership and utilization, Mauritania will be unable to fully harness its limited agricultural potential. Land reform legislation has been pigeonholed for years because of the stiff opposition it is likely to generate from feudal forces and their allies in the state administration.

According to Minister of Rural Development Messmoud Ould Belkair, "The principal aim is to convince all concerned that the land reform program does not intend to transfer land from the former master of ex-slaves, but rather to those who will work the land." He added, "If serious bottlenecks develop to prevent the land reform measures from being applied, then the state will be intransigent." Therefore, the land reform issue will be another crucible by which to judge the sincerity of Taya's reformist bent.

In the past, cattle raising was the backbone of the pastoral economy. However, the drought and its long-term effects have devastated the herds. A vast transfer of wealth has accrued as government functionaries and traders have purchased large herds of camels and cattle for a pittance from destitute nomads. These herds are generally kept within a 50-mile radius of the towns, especially Nouakchott. After settling their families in the *bidonvilles*, former nomads often become poorly paid shepherds.

The impoverishment of the Mauritanian population has led to a massive exodus to surrounding West African countries, the Middle East, and even Europe. It is estimated that as many as 600,000 Mauritanians seek their livelihood outside the country. Mauritanians carry out almost all the petty commerce in Senegal, and over the last 10 years, in Ivory Coast as well. Mauritanian traders are also found in Central African nations.

During the oil boom, many Moors were able to find employment as police or customs officials in the Gulf region. The black population, for its part, has sought work in France. As the young men left the villages in the Senegal River valley, particularly the Sarakollé area, a shortage of manpower to work the land has developed. Although the migrant workers send money home, it is often used more for essential consumer goods than for investment to improve local productive capacities.

The economic and social problems facing the Taya government are awesome, all the more so as the regional political climate is still tainted by the Saharan conflict. Beyond assuring Mauritania's territorial integrity and shoring up the economy, it remains to be seen if Taya has long-term political ambitions and a master plan for mobilizing popular energies.

For the moment, a return to a civilian government is ruled out, although local elections are planned for the second half of 1986. In any case, the task of harmonizing institutions with new social realities and forging a credible modern state will not be easy. Prudent by nature, Taya must soon prove by his actions that his "new deal" consists of more than rhetoric. Otherwise, the coalition of forces which brought him to power may start to crack, leaving Mauritania on the dangerous path to political destabilization. □

United Nations

Sun-dried fish: "Cleaning up the fishing industry will be a crucial test for President Ould Taya's government"

The Privatization Drive

An initial success in Togo's program to privatize its public enterprises—the takeover of a steel mill by an American industrialist—has encouraged the government to continue with its ambitious plans. Yet the potential drawbacks to investing in the country's manufacturing and industrial sectors may limit further Western interest.

BY PAULA M. HIRSCHOFF

Due to an electrical outage, our tour of Togo's recording studio was conducted in the dark. After groping past the console and rec[illegible]ers, we toured the record pressi[illegible]nt which turned out nearly 325,[illegible]ms in 1983. The facilities are i[illegible], but they have been gathering [illegible]ust since October—one of the state-run enterprises that was closed down due to inefficient operations and heavy indebtedness.

Togo's steel mill, on the other hand, bustles with purposeful activity. The first of the public enterprises to be privatized, the mill began producing revenues for the government in 1985, the year after American industrialist John Moore negotiated a 10-year leasing agreement. Moore heads the Société Togolaise de Sidérurgie SA (STS) which produces reinforcing bar and scrap metal for domestic sale and export. An employee wage incentive plan helps keep production on target, and plans are underway for additional products and enterprises, including the proposed purchase of the state galvinized roofing firm, which Moore would like to integrate with the steel mill.

The path from silent studio to prosperous steel mill is fraught with delays and difficulties. Togo was one of the first African states to turn to privatization, but only a dairy, an oil storage depot, a farm implements factory, and the mill have been leased to foreign interests so far.

Government officials nonetheless express high hopes for additional takeovers. Some 18 other public enterprises are up for sale—many of them constructed during the spate of industrial development activity spurred by the mid-1970s phosphate boom that quickly went bust. By the early 1980s, these industries had become such a drain on the economy that the government, under growing pressure from international financial institutions, decided to privatize some of them.

The Dairy Deal

Describing his efforts to privatize Togo's dairy plant, Danish businessman Niels Holm remarked, "We're giving it a try while knowing it is not an easy matter. At least it's an interesting challenge." Holm is director general of Fan Milk SA, the African branch of Emidan, a Danish export company. Fan Milk began leasing the plant from Soprolait, the state-run dairy enterprise, in January.

Soprolait had opened the dairy in 1981, but a government directive to sell its pasteurized products below cost soon led to losses. The major problems were stiff competition from Peak Nigeria Ltd., lack of import controls, and problems of quality control. The dairy closed down after only two years, having incurred a substantial debt.

According to Holm, a major "educational" effort will be needed to persuade Togolese consumers to purchase Fan Milk products. While the government wants the dairy to produce unsweetened evaporated milk (popular for mixing with tea and coffee) in competition with Peak, Holm was waiting for the results of a feasibility study before proceeding with that venture. However, production of yogurt, ice cream, and chocolate milk has begun.

Fan Milk also faces competition from local yogurt producers. Although the homemade product may be inferior in quality and packaging, the price is right for Togo's consumers whose already low purchasing power has steadily declined under the austerity measures of the past several years. Holm noted that another strong deterrent to foreign investment in Togo is the size of the market—a population of under 3 million people. Markets in Ghana and Nigeria are not considered reliable, as Togo's relations with these countries continue to be strained.

To offset some of these difficulties, Fan Milk and the government worked out what Holm described as an "attractive deal." The dairy is also benefiting from the donation of new machinery under an aid package from the Danish International Development Agency. Like the recording facility, Soprolait's equipment had been standing idle in the warm coastal air. Due to the resulting deterioration and plans for a somewhat different product line, the machinery had to be replaced, Holm said.

Fan Milk's agreement with the government is based on the deal that STS negotiated, according to Holm. The plant will be leased for 10 years, with Soprolait assuming responsibility for the outstanding debts. The steel mill agreement, which most observers describe as highly favorable to STS, guarantees the company the right to import raw materials duty-free, the right to free selection of personnel, maintenance of a 41 percent tariff to protect against competitive imports, and a formula that allows STS to raise domestic prices every six months in line with increases in the cost of raw materials. If the lease is not renewed at the end of 10 years, the government is committed to purchasing the improvements that STS has made at the plant.

Negotiations are reportedly progressing on several other state-owned industries. Two French textile firms, Schaeffer and Texunion, are bidding on the Togolese Textile Company (Togotex) and the Togolese Textile Industry (ITT), which the government is offering as a package deal. Bidders have been more interested in ITT, which still produces high-quality printed cloth, than in Togotex, which is closed down. The textile plants, as well as a palm and cottonseed oil plant, on which negotiations are underway, have the advantage of relying on domestically grown cotton. Bids are also pending on the marble and building materials industry and the plastics industry.



Paula M. Hirschoff

Steel worker in Lomé: "An employee wage incentive plan helps keep production on target"

According to John Moore, prospective investors need to be alert to several other potential drawbacks. First, Togo's legal system is based on the French Napoleonic Code, which is unfamiliar to most American businessmen and attorneys. In addition, on-the-spot management is imperative. "The size of these deals is not anything a multinational would look at. They couldn't make it with absentee management," he said. He also stressed the importance of good market research to ensure domestic profits.

In view of the many problems, investors have been eager to conclude deals with tax and tariff provisions highly favorable to their own interests—a source of growing concern to some critics who believe that Togolese interests are being sacrificed. The Ministry of State Corporations, which is directly responsible for progress on parastatal privatization, worked out the Fan Milk deal under the old investment code, rather than the new one approved in January 1985.

The Ministry of Plan and Industry, however, would have preferred application of the new code, which is "flexible enough to meet our needs with no modification," according to Minister of Plan and Industry Yaovi Adodo. "We're now in a situation as far as privatization is concerned that is not quite in tune with the code," he said.

Seeking Local Involvement

While the Ministry of State Corporations calls for guarantees and advantages to be granted only to those investors who provide for participation by Togolese private shareholders, local investment is likely to be limited, at least initially. Few Togolese have the capital to make such investments. As Togolese Chamber of Commerce officers explained: "All investment is generated by the state because of the recession. The private sector does not have the money and is not well organized. The banks do very well, but they are very reluctant to make loans for local investment." Interest rates are very high, and Togolese banks demand extravagant guarantees on local credit applications.

Lack of experience in large-scale investment may also discourage local investors. Togo's entrepreneurs are active in smallscale trading and real estate. But investment in operations such as the parastatals can appear to be a risky venture.

Nonetheless, when STS offered 30 percent of the steel mill stock to the public in May, local investors including several wealthy market women, government ministers, and heads of state agencies quickly purchased $500,000 worth of the shares or 50 percent of the offering. The remaining 50 percent was made available to European investors.

The government also expects foreign investors to undertake "the systematic employment and training of Togolese senior staff." The training program at the steel mill rotates its 140 employees from task to task to broaden their experience. Still, Togolese workers are not likely to move into the top management spots in the near future. The quality of the expatriate management staff is the key to the success of a parastatal takeover, according to Moore.

Any grumbling among local residents about possible negative effects of privatization is generally done quietly. The National Confederation of Togolese Workers (CNTT) did protest the closure of some parastatals, according to CNTT Secretary-General Nangbog Barnabo. "The workers didn't agree with the closings," he said, but after meetings with government officials, the union, which is controlled by the ruling party, agreed not to fight the decision. Positions of hundreds of public employees were terminated. When a parastatal reopens under new management, the staffing level is generally much lower. The steel mill, for example, now employs 140 local workers, compared to about 300 formerly.

Paula M. Hirschoff

Loading tubing at plastics factory, one of the public enterprises that Togo is trying to sell

Plans are underway to improve the performance of those parastatals in which the government has decided to maintain an active role, such as water, electricity, harbor, and social security services, as well as agriculture, mining, and tourism. With a technical assistance credit from the International Development Association, the World Bank's soft loan window, the Ministry of State Corporations intends to upgrade the administration of these parastatals, reducing their operational expenses and restructuring their financial organization.

A key component of this effort is a two-year training program to improve management capability in the parastatals, the Ministry of Plan and Industry, the Ministry of Rural Development, and the High Commission of Tourism. Austerity measures, including a two-year freeze on salaries and hiring and mandatory retirement at age 55, have sapped administrative talent. The need for new blood has become so acute that the the IMF was encouraging the introduction of incentives, such as modest salary increases, during recent standby negotiations.

"We are amazed that civil servants are not more up in arms about salaries," remarked an IMF official, adding, "We are impressed with their patient attitude despite the onerous conditions of their work."

President Gnassingbé Eyadéma is holding the line on salaries, however, with the likely intention of bestowing raises on government employees in conjunction with the celebration of the 20th anniversary of his coup next January. He has also maintained the 5 percent solidarity tax on workers' wages that was to have lasted only one year when it was imposed in 1983.

While the sale or lease of even a few of the parastatals will relieve the drain on Togo's resources, other efforts to stimulate the private sector are likely to have a more immediate impact on the economy. The government has implemented major price increases to farmers that have spurred the production of cash crops, particularly coffee and cotton. Coffee production in 1985 was 30 percent higher than in 1982-83, while the export of unginned cotton more than doubled over the 1984 level.

More recently, Minister of Rural Development Koffi Walla said in a speech in March that export licenses to private traders would henceforth be granted more freely as a means of encouraging the export of food crops. The government also announced recently that it would dismantle import monopolies on certain essential goods and decrease import duties on various consumer goods. Both actions are expected to promote private trade.

Turning the Economic Corner

Early signs of a recovery have buoyed hopes that these reforms, coupled with the harsh austerity measures of the past several years, are the medicine needed to heal the economy. After four years of decline, Togo's economic growth resumed in 1984-85, with GDP registering 5.5 percent increase in real terms, due primarily to expanding agricultural production. "This is very, very good by African standards," said Minister of Plan and Industry Adodo, a view echoed by the IMF and World Bank. Real per capita income is expected to continue declining through 1990, however, and GDP growth to be somewhat more modest through the end of the decade.

In addition, the public deficit was reduced from 14 percent of GDP in 1979 to 2 percent in 1985, and the balance of payments current account deficit from 25 percent to 7 percent over the same period, reflecting major improvements in the government's internal and external financial positions.

Fresh waves of economic assistance have followed in the wake of these promising indicators. In April, the IMF and Togo reached agreement on a 23 million SDR standby to support the next 22-month phase of Togo's fiscal austerity program. An IMF representative cited privatization as an important factor in the relatively smooth negotiations for the loan.

World Bank officials are no less enthusiastic, describing privatization as vital to economic growth prospects, and a "key piece in Togo's structural adjustment program." The second tranche of $28 million in the Bank's current loan to Togo is still pending, however, along with $10 billion from the Bank's Special Facility for Sub-Saharan Africa.

Togo has been selected to receive one of four 1986 grants under the U.S. African Economic Policy Reform Program—the Reagan administration's plan to encourage "a climate in which supply and demand forces operate more freely." The award will reinforce agricultural self-sufficiency and promote the export of grains through the development of a local storage system to reduce the high rate of grain spoilage and to enable Togolese farmers to sell directly to local communities. The funds will also help establish a trucking fleet to facilitate exports to neighboring countries, including Burkina Faso, Niger, and possibly Mali.



Paula M. Hirschoff

Togo's record pressing plant: The plant printed almost 325,000 albums in 1983, but it has been idle since October

The government's unusual decision to forego a Paris Club rescheduling on its debt to Western creditors this year is regarded as further evidence of the success of the structural adjustment efforts and the relatively high level of donor support. IMF and World Bank officials forecast that if Togo continues to forego reschedulings over the next five years, the economy may revert to a situation in which development projects can take priority over debt-servicing. "By the end of the decade, we may see the light," a World Bank representative remarked.

It may take far longer, however, for parastatal privatization to have a significant impact on the economy, much less on the average citizen. The 320 million CFA in revenues that the steel mill generated for the government last year from the lease and taxes is a relatively modest sum considering the enormous debts outstanding on most of the public enterprises. And while the steel mill is a much-touted success story, no one anticipates that future takeovers will proceed as smoothly.

Aside from providing potential investment opportunities for wealthy Togolese, parastatal privatization is not likely to do much to boost the well-being of a people whose per capita income averages less than $300 a year and whose country ranks among the 10 poorest in the world—at least not in the near future. How much it can contribute to the long-range revitalization of the economy is difficult to gauge, partly because a great deal of parastatal accounting still occurs outside of the official budget. The phosphate industry subsidizes weaker enterprises, for example, and the agricultural marketing board bails out some of Lomé's unprofitable luxury hotels.

But there is a strong faith among Togo's government and donor community officials that the public enterprises represent a vital resource that should not be abandoned and that their revival will play an important role in stimulating economic growth. Most observers conclude that it is better to have them operating under foreign management than continuing to drain government resources or sitting idle as sad testimony to the mistakes of the past. □

Economies

The Public-Private Debate

Pressures by international lenders to reform unprofitable parastatals are causing many African governments to turn to privatization. Will the continent's leaders succeed in surmounting the technical and social barriers inherent in lessening state intervention in their economies?

BY ERNEST

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ization proposals. In populous Oyo State, the new Ibadan-based commissioner for economic development and finance stated in an interview that after education, privatization is the most pressing issue before government.

• Kenya has sold some government interests to the private sector, and a high visibility panel is exploring ways to strengthen public-private sector relations.

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erated. Rather than contributing, they have depleted national resources. All too many public enterprises sit like huge white elephants over the African landscape, voraciously consuming what has been produced by others.

There are some important exceptions—in agriculture, the power sector, and banking. Many PEs were created for good reasons: to provide infrastructure or to substitute for absent local entrepreneurs. But now they have grown in size and inefficiency out of all proportion to governments' capacity to prop them up.

The economic crisis that grips the continent is the second reason for governments' reassessment of the parastatals. In 1986, GNP per capita in many countries has slid back to 1960 levels. Indeed, the aggregate macro-economic figures are becoming as distressingly familiar as the images of children suffering from th effects of drought and starva-
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Ernest J. Wilson, III, a 1986 Council on Foreign Relations fellow at the Petroleum Finance Company in Washington, D.C., teaches at the University of Michigan. He has recently lectured in Africa on privatization and is completing a book on public enterprise reform.

bank that they are now forced to slash their loans for projects that could generate employment and growth simply because there is no more money in the till. Fully 70 percent of Benin's long-term borrowing is tied up in loans to the inefficient public enterprise sector, and the interest payments alone seriously burden the government.

The sustained pressure of international lending institutions, including private banks and the International Monetary Fund, is another reason governments are turning to "privatization." To convince governments to reform, the World Bank offers carrots (loans and technical assistance) and sticks (termination of access to capital).

Clearly, external pressure has played a major role through Fund programs and the Bank's structural adjustment loans. U.S. bilateral programs push in the same direction. But while the IMF and the World Bank have been visible and ideologically charged contributors to this sea change, there are other macroeconomic, micro-economic, and domestic political factors pushing in the same directions.

Growing consumer discontent with PE performance has also pressed governments to allow more room for private suppliers and to shrink the relative size of the public enterprise sector. In Dar es Salaam, for example, the much-criticized public monopoly over bus transportation has given way to public-private competition. Finally, the rising interest in reform and privatization springs from a new assertiveness by local private interests, often expressed through their chambers of commerce.

Forms of Privatization

Asset divestiture is "privatization" in its purest form. It refers to the government sale of assets and/or equity in a PE to one or more private buyers. It is very often discussed, but difficult to achieve. Still, it has occurred in Kenya, where the government has sold Kenya Fisheries and put its long-haul transport company up for sale. In Mozambique, six light industrial facilities previously run by government will be turned over to private firms, including a radiator factory and a truck and railroad car parts factory.

At times, a losing enterprise cannot be sold for lack of buyers, yet it continues to be a terrible drain on the public purse. Government may simply liquidate and close down the PE, as Ivory Coast did with two of the six sugar complexes that made Ivorian sugar among the most expensive in the world. Benin closed seven national and 48 provincial companies. Zambia shut down several PEs in fact, if not in legislation, keeping a skeleton office crew but abandoning the companies as ongoing enterprises. Niger, Somalia, and Zaire have each liquidated at least three state companies.

Through the use of management contracts, government retains full or partial ownership of the enterprise's equity, but hires a private management firm or a "technical" or operating partner to turn the company around. This strategy has enjoyed some success for breweries in Zambia and a new hotel in Benin. Sometimes the managing partner will also take a minority share in the enterprise. A study of 44 parastatals by a Cameroonian scholar reveals that companies in that country with 100 percent government ownership had the worst financial performance; companies with mixed ownership (and probably management) performed the best. Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Togo, and Zaire have all tried management contracts in their PE sectors.

A few African governments (and many outside the continent) contract with private providers of services. The government offers franchises or concessions, specifies the population to be served and the quantity and quality of the service, and hires a private firm to provide it. Abidjan's water is supplied through such a concession, and Kenya uses private contractors for road maintenance work.

In many African countries, increasing the competition between former government monopolies and private buyers and sellers is one of the most important public-private reforms. Rice agencies in Madagascar and Sierra Leone and cereals marketing boards in Mali have been liberalized in this way. In Nigeria, customers claim that Nigeria Airways' domestic services have already improved since private planes have been permitted to compete between Lagos and Benin City. This kind of competition can provide tangible benefits to consumers as well as energize complacent and poorly performing parastatals. Benin has permitted private firms to compete with its Alimentation Générale du Benin, and several companies have opened stores in areas where there were none before.

Almost all African governments have attempted to rehabilitate their public enterprises to some degree. Ivory Coast President Félix Houphouët-Boigny launched a massive reform campaign as long ago as 1978, appointing his minister of the interior to the new post of minister of public enterprise reform. After carefully categorizing the PEs by their commercial or service orientation and their financial performance, the government began an extensive house cleaning and efficiency campaign that continues today.

Like all countries that successfully restructure their public enterprise sector and improve their performance, the Ivorians improved financial controls within the enterprises, rationalized relations between government (ministries) and the parastatals, and improved procedures for pricing, hiring, and investment.

A Bundle of Policy Tools

The lesson of reform movements in Africa today is that for "privatization" to be successful, it must encompass all of the above reforms. Successful reform consists of a package of economic policy tools that African governments can employ in different mixes to restart their faltering economic growth. Different tools are needed for different sectors. Indeed, focusing exclusively on the ideological term "privatization" may dissuade as many as it convinces.

By themselves, equity sales are unlikely to work well in Africa. Few governments try to privatize the railroad or power supply, as these sectors respond best to rehabilitation. On the other hand, manufacturing PEs may work better through equity sales and management contracts. Increased competition from private farmers and traders can improve both marketing board performance and agricultural production.

The gains from Africa's successful reform efforts can include greatly reduced government expenditures; increased government earnings from the immediate sale of assets; more revenues over the medium-term as newly efficient PEs start to pay taxes and dividends; and improved delivery of goods and services to the population. These gains are not automatic, of course. There are dangers that equity and efficiency after the reforms could be as bad as or worse than before. But pushed to the financial wall, most governments are taking some initial steps to make their reforms viable. In Zambia and Ivory Coast, PEs operating in the red have been turned around to work efficiently.

Although there are real benefits to public-private reform, there are also tangible reasons why it hasn't gone further in Africa. In many countries, privatization faces strong political opposition. Labor unions, youth groups, and some intellectuals have declared it a sellout to imperialism or to local capitalism. Nigerian labor leaders issued a pamphlet entitled, "Nigeria Is Not For Sale."

Some feel that privatization or reform will benefit only the wealthy, further skewing wealth and income distribution and corrupting the development process. Others respond politically when public-private reform threatens their own personal interests—civil servants may lose jobs and senior government officials may lose access to opportunities for political influence and personal income.

There may also be sectional disputes over economic reform. In Nigeria, for example, there are some strong pressures in the southern part of the country for an asset divestiture privatization strategy, using the Lagos Stock Exchange to sell and buy PE stocks. Others, especially in the north, would prefer a "commercialization" strategy that emphasizes reforming parastatals to make them work better, rather than selling them off to the highest bidder. Some fear privatization via equity sales would benefit the south more than the north. Conversations in Nigeria and the many new reports and editorials on this subject express real concern about the threat to regional balance if the PEs are sold only through Lagos rather than through a scheme more cognizant of Nigeria's federal character.

There are also institutional and social barriers to reform. Most African governments lack a strong finance ministry with the experienced and highly trained staff necessary to adequately control the PEs. Few countries possess sophisticated stock exchanges with enough capital depth to conduct a full-scale equity sale, and many lack local firms with the investment banking or managerial skills necessary to arrange the sales of millions or even billions of dollars worth of public assets.



Paula M. Hirschoff

Chamber of Commerce, Dakar: "The rising interest in privatization springs from a new assertiveness by private interests—often expressed through chambers of commerce"

Perhaps most important are the sizeable social barriers. African countries like Zambia or Tanzania have many educated civil servants but relatively few local businessmen with enough capital to purchase privatized PEs. De facto equity privatization would mean selling PEs to non-Africans, perhaps Lebanese in West Africa and Asians in the East, outcomes unappealing to nationalist-minded African politicians. Even where there are local buyers, politicians fear the new power of the commercial class. Finally, governments too often want to sell the losers and retain the money-makers, something no businessman will find attractive. Thus, there are real barriers against public-private sector reform, but they are counter-balanced by the many pressures pushing for change.

There are perhaps three lessons to be drawn from the study of economic reforms in Africa. First, there are no substitutes for political will and commitment at the top. Where these programs are successful, the head of state is directly involved and invests a lot of his own personal prestige on public enterprise sector reform. Second, the people who wield the power to carry out the reforms are close to the head of state. Also, implementation is assigned to one agency, not a string of committees, advisory groups, or ministries. Finally, public-private reforms must be country-specific; they must involve a range of policies; and they take time to do well.

Africa badly needs economic reform to halt its decline and recover its forward momentum. Government leaders, however, face serious opposition to reform. Indeed, they face a kind of double dilemma. On the one hand, they must push hard and enthusiastically for public support to get PE reform past reluctant but entrenched civil servants and party officials. On the other hand, they must recognize that overselling privatization—an inherently time-consuming and difficult process—will surely lead to disappointment and the danger of even more state intervention when the promised fruits of reform do not ripen immediately. Many governments have begun the long march toward economic reconstruction, but good public-private reform takes years. The distance still to travel is great. □