

AMERICA'S LEADING MAGAZINE ON AFRICA

# AFRICA REPORT

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1986 FOUR DOLLARS

15745  
MARLENE  
ZEROX UNIV  
300 N ZEEB RD.  
ANN ARBOR  
#SAMPLE# ARE315  
HURST  
MICROFILMS  
MI 48106

**NAMIBIA**  
**SWAPO's**  
**20 Years**  
**of Struggle**



1974 TWT

T 78

WA 85

**EDUCATION.  
IT'S A VALUABLE  
COMMODITY IN THE  
JOB MARKET.**

*Coors*

We Believe Open Minds Open Doors

# AFRICA REPORT

America's Leading Magazine  
on Africa

Please enter my subscription as indicated below (six issues per year):

**INDIVIDUAL**

**INSTITUTION**

\$21/1 year

\$28/1 year

—Regular Mail to Canada/Overseas: Add \$6 per year.

\$39/2 years

\$53/2 years

—Air Rate Overseas: Add \$24 per year.

\$56/3 years

\$72/3 years

—First-class within USA: Add \$7 per year.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

CITY \_\_\_\_\_ STATE \_\_\_\_\_ ZIP \_\_\_\_\_

The total amount of my order is \$ \_\_\_\_\_

My check is enclosed (Make checks payable to Transaction Periodicals Consortium).

Please bill my:  MasterCard  VISA

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Expiration Date \_\_\_\_\_ Interbank No. \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_




No Postage Stamp  
Necessary if Mailed  
in the United States

**BUSINESS REPLY CARD**

FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 1129 NEW BRUNSWICK NJ

**AFRICA  
REPORT**

Transaction Periodicals Consortium  
Rutgers University  
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903



**The African-American Institute**

**Chairman**  
Randolph Nugent  
**President**  
Donald B. Easum

**Publisher**  
Frank E. Ferrari

**Editor**  
Margaret A. Novicki

**Assistant Editor**  
Paula Hirschhoff

**Editorial Assistant**  
Andre Astrow

**Production Editor**  
Alana Lee

**Art Director**  
Joe Pomar

**Advertising Manager**  
Terry Rosen

**Interns**  
Deepak Bhargava  
Demetrios Mihailidis  
Clayton Smith

Transaction Periodicals Consortium:

**Production Editor**  
Alex Fundock III

*Africa Report* (ISSN 0001-9836), a non-partisan magazine of African affairs, is published bimonthly and is scheduled to appear at the beginning of each date period at 833 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. Editorial correspondence and advertising inquiries should be addressed to *Africa Report*, at the above address. Correspondence regarding subscriptions, distribution, and other business matters should be sent to Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Dept. 8010, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903. Telephone: (201) 932-2280. Subscription rates: *Individuals*: U.S.A. \$21, Canada \$27, air rate overseas \$45. *Institutions*: U.S.A. \$28, Canada \$34, air rate overseas \$52. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: If this magazine is undeliverable, please send notice to *Africa Report*, Transaction Periodicals Consortium (address above). Telephones: Publisher (212) 949-5719; Editor (212) 949-5731. Copyright © 1986 by the African-American Institute, Inc.

European Distribution by CLIO Distribution Service, 55 St. Thomas' Street, Oxford OX11JG, England.  
U.S.A. Newsstand Distribution by FOUR STAR News Distributors, Inc., 33-30 57th Street, Woodside, New York 11377.



**Stalling on Sanctions**  
Page 20



**U.S. at the UN**  
Page 24



**A United Front**  
Page 66



**Uganda's Peace?**  
Page 75

**Interviews**

Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo and Malcolm Fraser, Co-Chairmen, Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group  
*Interviewed by Margaret A. Novicki*

4

**In Washington**

Reagan and the Limits of Leverage  
*By A Correspondent*

12

**U.S./South Africa**

Toward a New South Africa  
*By George P. Shultz*

16

**European Community**

Under Thatcher's Coattails  
*By Denis Herbstein*

20

**Interview**

Gen. Vernon Walters, United States Ambassador to the United Nations  
*Interviewed by Margaret A. Novicki*

24

Conversation with Luke J. Mwananshiku, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zambia

30

**U.S./South Africa**

Making Foreign Policy: the Congress and Apartheid  
*By Richard G. Lugar*

33

**Document**

The Sanctions Debate  
*By Edward M. Kennedy*

37

**Update**

*Editor: Paula Hirschhoff*  
*Assistant Editor: André Astrow*

41

**Interview**

Sam Nujoma, President, South West Africa People's Organization  
*Interviewed by Margaret A. Novicki*

57

**Namibia**

The Question Still Stands  
*By John A. Evenson*

62

**Reporter's Notebook**

The OAU: A New Militancy  
*By Mary Anne Fitzgerald*

66

**Zimbabwe**

A Mandate for Mugabe  
*By Tendayi Kumbula*

70

**Uganda**

A Delicate Balance  
*By Colin S. Clark*

75

**Tunisia**

A Test for Sfar  
*By Howard Schissel*

79

**Media**

Africa's Shadow Voices  
*By Gerry L. Dexter*

84

**Books**

86

**Photo Credit:**

The cover photo of the first Swapo rally in five years, on July 27 in Katatura, near Windhoek, was taken by J. Liebenberg/NCCT. The photo of Sam Nujoma was taken by Y. Nagata/United Nations.

# Olusegun Obasanjo and Malcolm Fraser

## Co-Chairmen, The Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group

In Washington to present the findings of the Commonwealth's mission to South Africa, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo and Malcolm Fraser were interviewed by *Africa Report* immediately following President Reagan's July policy speech. The former Nigerian head of state and former Australian prime minister outline Western policy options and their likely consequences in light of the deteriorating situation in South Africa.



Camerasax

**Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo:** "The only measure left is economic sanctions which will bite the ordinary white citizens sufficiently for them to bring pressure on their government"

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

**Africa Report:** What is your view of President Reagan's speech and American policy toward South Africa as he outlined it?

**Obasanjo:** To put it mildly, the speech was disappointing. But I see it as the loss of a battle, but not the war because I want to believe that the Congress will come up with a package of sanctions that will go far enough and will be effective to bring the South African government to its senses without necessarily bringing it to its knees. The President's statement will disappoint the black nationalists in South Africa. They will see it as another indication that the West is not interested in the cause for which they are struggling and it will not be too long before the nationalists take the irreversible decision and feel that the way of negotiation is closed and closed for good. But there is still just a very slim chance that the Congress will take action that will not foreclose the path of negotiation for good with the ANC [African National Congress] and others.

Obviously, members of President Reagan's own party in the Senate had all told him to give them something and in that speech, he didn't give them anything. There are some parts of that speech that I find interesting. Listen to this: "Today the Soviet Union is providing that regime [Angola] with the weapons to attack Unita, a black liberation movement which seeks

for Angolans the same right to be represented in their government that black South Africans seek for themselves." If you compare Unita with the ANC and you give Unita weapons, the logical conclusion is that you give the ANC weapons!

**Africa Report:** Although the Eminent Persons Group's mission to launch negotiations with the South African government did not succeed, you did have an impact on international opinion. What impact, if any, has the group had on governmental policies?

**Obasanjo:** Even here [in the U.S.], it hasn't gone unnoticed. In the President's speech, for the first time, he called directly on the South African government to do certain specific things, including singling out Nelson Mandela as a leader to participate in government. I don't believe that the South African government will react to President Reagan's call, but even those things he listed in a little measure are an advancement of his position.

As you rightly said, I think the greatest achievement of the EPG report is raising the whole issue to a new height of awareness. That's one. The second thing is, I believe that the report will have an impact on the final outcome from the Congress. Members of Congress have told us that the report has affected their thinking, their reactions. Third, in Europe, when the EEC met, nine out of the 12 governments reacted positively that they were ready to go and the three that did not react will not be able to resist indefinitely. Even Margaret Thatcher. I want to believe that even Margaret Thatcher will shift. My fear is whether she will shift enough, but I have no doubt that she will shift. The [South African black] nationalists regard our report as a watershed. Even if nothing comes out of it, their position has been vindicated, that the South African government is not a government to be trusted for negotiation. It is intransigent.

**Africa Report:** Was your effort the last chance for negotiation in South Africa?

**Obasanjo:** Yes, the South Africans rejected the negotiating concept which we left and will have to do much more than that now to get the blacks to talk to them. They will have to show good faith.

**Africa Report:** Since that seems pretty unlikely, is your prognosis a very bleak one? Are sanctions now the only option?

**Obasanjo:** What other options? Diplomacy hasn't worked, talking to them hasn't worked. The only other option is violence. I am not against violence. But is there a possible alternative that can avoid the colossal waste of life and property that will be the outcome of a long period of military struggle? The only thing is negotiation. How can you bring negotiation about? We have tried talking to the government and it didn't work. So is there any other measure short of violence, short of military operations that you can apply? Economic sanctions, which will bite the ordinary white citizens of South Africa sufficiently for them to be able to bring pressure to bear on their government, not to destroy the economy, but to give it a sufficient body blow.

**Africa Report:** What types of sanctions would be the minimum necessary to have that effect?

**Obasanjo:** The South Africans are great travelers, either for

business or for recreation. So if you cut off airlinks, that is an irritant that doesn't affect the blacks. As we have been told, it is the blacks who will be hurt most. But it will be irritating for anybody from South Africa who has to travel abroad to go by road to Harare. That would bring it vividly home. And if they change and start negotiating, the air links will be reestablished within 24 hours. We have also suggested that there should be withdrawal of consular services—that a South African citizen who wants to travel to the U.S. will have to apply to Washington for a visa, or again go across to Harare. This measure doesn't destroy anything, but is very irritating. That will have an immediate effect on the traveling white population.

We have talked about looking into the financial sector—there will be other measures that can be taken like denying credit lines for trade, withholding money in overseas banks in the U.S. and Britain belonging to South African corporations or individuals. Then we have talked about a ban on export of bulk commodities from South Africa—iron and steel, uranium, agricultural products, and even the so-called strategic minerals—there are plenty of substitutes outside South Africa and the Soviet Union, because arguments elsewhere have been that if you don't go to South Africa, you will be buying from the Soviet Union. These are some of the areas where we believe sanctions can be effective.

---

**"The South Africans rejected the negotiating concept which we left and will have to do much more than that now to get the blacks to talk to them. They will have to show good faith."**

---

**Africa Report:** Will Britain ultimately be forced into supporting sanctions?

**Obasanjo:** I believe Mrs. Thatcher will go along with sanctions. She will change, but what I don't know is whether she will go along with sufficient sanctions to make them effective. I have no doubt that she will go along eventually. I think she has a sense of history.

**Africa Report:** How much leverage do you think the U.S. really has on the South African government?

**Obasanjo:** P.W. Botha told us that the two leaders in the world for whom he has great regard are President Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher, so those are the two people that can influence him. I would wonder what is the purpose of having friends if you cannot influence them? But whether they can or not, we will have to see. I think Dr. Chester Crocker should admit the abysmal failure of his constructive engagement policy. I think he would do well to admit that he may have been right in theory, but wrong in practice.

**Africa Report:** Are African governments doing enough to support the struggle in South Africa?

**Obasanjo:** I think so. They have all supported the OAU Liberation Committee and at all international fora, they make a contribution. In the case of Nigeria, when I was in govern-

ment, we had to nationalize British interests to bring the thing home. Nigeria has just again spearheaded the boycott of the Commonwealth Games and almost all black African Commonwealth members joined in. I'm not sure that they are not going to consider further measures that can still be taken. I believe they are being supportive within their own limits and inadequacies.

**Africa Report:** Do you expect some concerted approach to come out of the Non-Aligned summit in Harare?

**Obasanjo:** Probably more from the OAU, which is easier than the Non-Aligned. There will be strong condemnation at the Non-Aligned. If sanctions are being seriously considered, if the legislation in the U.S. has reached an advanced stage or has gone through the Congress and for the President's assent, I believe that may also urge the non-aligned to consider certain things which they may want to take to the UN as mandatory.

**Africa Report:** Is there any prospect that the EPG would resume its role if South Africa showed any signs of truly wanting to negotiate?

**Obasanjo:** I will tell you what I think. People have asked the question, "After sanctions, what?" If sanctions are applied and South Africa says it wants to enter into negotiations, the blacks won't come running. In fact, the blacks may want to dig in. So for that reason, you will need a body that can say, "Look the time is right, please come in again and talk." So I have suggested that the EPG should be made dormant, but not extinct because we are now a body that knows South Africa reasonably well. We have established contact, although a bit of that has been soured by the way South Africa aborted the

effort, and I believe that we constitute a fairly honest broker. **Africa Report:** If the West is not supportive of meaningful sanctions, what will be the consequence?

**Obasanjo:** The consequence is that the ANC will get more weapons and put more men into the field. The conflict won't reach its height for the next two or three years, but in another four or five years, it will reach full-scale guerrilla war and that will go on for another five or six years before it is resolved on the bones and ashes of a beautiful country with a fairly developed economy. The government which will emerge—which will definitely be a black government—will be a radicalized government, won't care a damn about Western interests, will probably nationalize all Western commercial, industrial, and financial interests, and of course so-called Western strategic interests. That is the sort of picture we see.

**Africa Report:** Do you have any final words for the readers of *Africa Report*?

**Obasanjo:** I would want to say what the black people in South Africa said to us. Until very recently, all of them looked up to the United States as a model of a racially integrated society that they would want to copy and surpass. With the way that the U.S. government seems to care less about the cause for which they are struggling, they feel there is nothing to look up to in the U.S. That is a pity. I do also know that the black people in South Africa are appreciative of the effort and the awareness and the concern of the ordinary people in this country. I hope that will continue and will make the people of the U.S. bring sufficient pressure on their own government and their legislatures to do what is right, to do what this country stands for in principles and in ideals. □

**Africa Report:** How do you see President Reagan's speech affecting the mounting international efforts to put pressure on the South African government?

**Fraser:** The speech will be counterproductive, there is not the slightest doubt about that. I don't know what was intended, but the speech was obviously badly put together, it was badly prepared, and it did not contain what I was told on good authority it would contain. It had all the hallmarks of having been cobbled together at the last moment in an effort to meet a number of conflicting suggestions and in the end met none of them. A number of senators had spoken to us about what they expected and what they hoped for, and so had other people. Still others who had every right to be consulted about the substance of the speech had been ignored, people who had official positions in relation to the government's policy on South Africa.

So I think the speech was a tragedy and a double tragedy because I really do believe that President Reagan does not understand what's happening in South Africa. I think he has been very badly served and very badly advised. He is a very human and sympathetic person. I don't think for one moment that he likes a situation where one group of people are oppressed or exploited by another and if he saw that happening, I think he would want to do something about it. I have great admiration for many things that President Reagan has done.



**Malcolm Fraser:** "I don't assume that Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan are on the side of P.W. Botha but I do conclude that they are very, very badly advised"

M. Grant/United Nations



I don't want to plead any special knowledge or special experience, but the seven members of the Commonwealth group had over 20 meetings with South African government ministers and we met nearly every African leader, including Nelson Mandela three times. I think our overall experience was greater than any other individual or any other group of people over the last two or three years, and whatever we said was ignored. Gen. Obasanjo and myself had taken the trouble to try and write to Secretary Shultz some time ago. It's been known for a fair while that we were here [in the U.S.]. We were scheduled to meet the Secretary *after* the speech. Therefore whatever we had to say to him was of no consequence whatsoever. There is no point in beating about the bush. I am a great friend of America and support most things America does and contrary to a lot of people, I support what America does in Nicaragua and in Libya. And that maybe establishes some kind of credentials. But what we had to say on this issue was obviously of no consequence.

When we learned that the President was going to speak before we were going to have a chance to see Secretary

---

**“We had been given a job to do, something to carry out and execute. We spoke to an awful lot of people as a consequence and came to certain conclusions and I would have thought that those conclusions and the reasons for them would have been of some consequence to the United States.”**

---

Shultz, the General and I decided that we should write directly to President Reagan, which we did. I wonder if the President saw or read what we said. I doubt it, and so I feel a great sense of sadness and disappointment and that was doubly compounded when we saw Secretary Shultz later this afternoon. I think both my colleague and I felt very much the same because so many of the hopes of people or countries who want to be free rest upon America, and when America doesn't live up to those hopes and expectations, it really is a tremendous disappointment. This isn't somebody speaking as a critic of America, it is somebody speaking as a friend of America.

**Africa Report:** However, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs says U.S. influence on South Africa is “at the margins.”

**Fraser:** Dr. Crocker has guaranteed that U.S. policy and influence are minimal because he has misread the Afrikaner character and he has assumed a posture of deference to South Africa which is demeaning to any American. The very idea that the Afrikaners only listen to words, sweet reason, and common sense surely has been dispelled over the past five or six years when the two most powerful leaders of the free world since the last world war, President Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher, have been only able to achieve a situation in which the condition of blacks is worse than it was when they came

into office because of the punitive systems which have been introduced over the last year or so.

And if that is the result of constructive engagement or active diplomacy, how can we believe that tomorrow the Afrikaners are suddenly going to listen to reason? The historical record shows that the Afrikaner will never and has never altered his view except as a result of pressure. When the blacks in South Africa know this and when the Afrikaners know this, and Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Reagan resolutely refuse to apply any pressure at all and indeed give State President P.W. Botha every assurance that he will be protected from international pressure, then what can we assume? I don't for one minute assume that Mrs. Thatcher and the President are on the side of P.W. Botha, but I do conclude from this that they are very, very badly advised.

There is sometimes an assumption that because the United States has a larger machine and more ambassadors and more support staff than anyone else that they therefore understand what is happening. Well, I would have thought that if people really wanted to understand what was happening, they would have shown interest in what Gen. Obasanjo, who is one of the most remarkable people I have ever met, and perhaps myself would have concluded as a result of the most extensive discussions and negotiations with South Africans, black and white, that any group has ever had. And they are quite patently and quite obviously not interested in any of it. I have been in politics far, far too long to care two hoots in hell what anyone thinks of Malcolm Fraser's opinion as a substance in itself. But we had been given a job to do, something to carry out and execute. We spoke to an awful lot of people as a consequence and came to certain conclusions and I would have thought that those conclusions and the reasons for them would have been of some consequence to the United States. And I find that they are of none.

I wonder how this [the U.S.] government makes its policy, what motivates this government. Is it some ideologue in the White House? Is it some person who is a neo-conservative—and I am a conservative? I came to the United States at one point quite specifically because the White House and the President asked me to support them on Nicaragua. Now if my opinion matters something on Nicaragua, why does it matter nothing on South Africa? There is no achievement of six or seven years of constructive engagement in South Africa, Angola, or Namibia, and indeed the very reverse. I could say a great deal more about this, but I won't because I have learned things in confidence about the assessments within the administration, about constructive engagement and all the rest, but it is not a policy which has any relevance to America's own national interest. I feel this with a great sense of sadness because the views and attitudes of America are terribly important to countries in the free world and I want to see respect for the United States in Africa and in many places around the world. I don't like seeing the reactions that came to the speech from Bishop Tutu and Allan Boesak, who are both good friends of mine, and of many other people—Republican senators. I don't think there has been one who had a good word to say for the speech. Now is everyone wrong? I don't think we all are.

And I don't want to see Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet Union inherit southern Africa, but they are probably going to. That is the irony of American and British policy, that the two most anti-Soviet leaders of the Western world in 40 years give southern Africa to Mr. Gorbachev. But that is what is going to happen because of deficient analysis, inadequate perception, because of ideas that are steeped in a stereotype that is irrelevant. How to get this message across? I've had 30 years in politics and I've ended it and I was asked by my political opponents in Australia to do this job for Australia and the Commonwealth, and I was happy to. I agreed with their views on this subject, but I was disturbed by the President's speech. I was infinitely more disturbed by our half-hour discussion with the Secretary of State. I really was.

**Africa Report:** You said that the U.S. government didn't learn anything from the report of the Eminent Persons Group. Did Britain, as head of the Commonwealth?

**Fraser:** Not at all. In the course of our mission, we had two or three hours with the British ambassador in Angola. We really did speak with an enormous number of diverse people in different areas. I had members of the South African security forces pointing a machine pistol at my stomach. Tony Barber and myself had people pouring out of a Casspir and pointing guns at our car. We saw South African policemen jumping out of a car and just shooting at somebody in the distance. We had an experience which is probably a very unusual one in the current circumstances and if there was any kind of an open mind in Britain, they would have said, "We would like you to come and speak to some of our specialists in South African affairs for a debriefing session which might go on for half a day, to answer questions and bring forward your point of view to see if we can learn some insights." And in the United States, the same.

But no, everyone knows it all, so therefore why were we asked to do the job? I know Prime Ministers Hawke and Mulroney, the frontline states, and others thought there was something constructive to be undertaken as a result of what we were being asked to do and I think it was worthwhile. But whatever Prime Ministers Mulroney and Hawke do, they don't have the trade weight, the Commonwealth doesn't have the trade weight. It depends on influencing Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Reagan.

I also strongly object as a member of the white tribe to having whites who claim to be members of the civilized community behaving as they do to blacks. I think that is an affront to all white people. It ought to be, but it is not, which I regret very greatly. I just wish that there was something more that Gen. Obasanjo and I and the Commonwealth group could do to influence or move the opinions of people in this country. I ought to say that we have been encouraged by meetings with members of Congress and other people within this country, a very diverse land, and whatever the administration has decided, it is not necessarily the last word. A number of Republican senators have made it very plain that they are not happy with the speech, that they do not think that it responds to the needs of America or the requirements of South Africa and I just pray to God that they are able to get the Senate to support some measures which are effective and sensible.

**Africa Report:** Do you see that happening?

**Fraser:** I think there's a good chance it will. Whatever one might say about the United States, there has been a public debate on the issue of South Africa across a broad spectrum in universities, in business boards, in state parliaments, among people who govern pension funds, right across the country, and the very fact that the debate has taken place is to the credit of the United States. The same kind of debate has not taken place in my own country, or in Britain, or in any country of Europe and it is a mark of the health of American democracy that it has occurred here. And I'm quite sure that the members of Congress are conscious that this debate has taken place, that they have a responsibility to their own people. Among senators that we have spoken to of both parties, they want something done. I'm an optimist, so I'm going to be hopeful that they will do something before it is too late.

But I've got not the slightest doubt that the leaders of the blacks in South and southern Africa will now be looking very closely to see what the Commonwealth does, what the United States Congress does or can do into the early weeks of September. If the results are positive, firm, sharp moves to bring pressure to bear on South Africa, well so be it. But if it's not, the blacks are going to decide that they are on their own, that there is no substantive support for their cause from the West and this is a great betrayal and a great tragedy if it works out that way. It is really going to depend on the American Senate and maybe on Prime Ministers Hawke and Mulroney to see whether they can persuade or cajole Mrs. Thatcher into admitting that some other view may be worth considering.

---

**"That is the irony of American and British policy, that the two most anti-Soviet leaders of the Western world in 40 years give southern Africa to Mr. Gorbachev. But that is what is going to happen because of deficient analysis, inadequate perception, because of ideas that are steeped in a stereotype that is irrelevant."**

---

**Africa Report:** So sanctions are the only option available, and negotiations are not in the cards.

**Fraser:** I tried to explain to Secretary Shultz today and so did the General why our attempt to establish a negotiation failed when at one point we thought it was going to be successful. It failed because the hard-liners who thought they could shoot it out with blacks in South Africa won. But why did they win? To explain that, it is necessary to go back a little. The South African government knows it is in trouble internationally and domestically. They have been trying to work out a different dispensation, but it is not a democracy as we would know it. They do think they are more clever than other people. They think that they can say they are pursuing a democratic system



Africa

**"Have we got to such a stage that we accept as normal for racist security forces to kill blacks and that's part of the 20th century?"**

and ending apartheid, while at the same time they are maintaining apartheid and establishing a different kind of apartheid which is not democratic. Many ministers from the South African government over 20 meetings said to us: "Look we are a nation of minorities. We have to exercise our political rights through our own racial groups—white through white, but not black through black, but one tribe through one tribe, Coloured, Asian, Zulu, other kinds of blacks." That is not a democracy! That is enshrining racial divisions when every respectable black leader that we met without exception, including Buthelezi, who said he is South African before he is Zulu, wants to get rid of racial and tribal differences because they know they are divisive and destructive, and they know that they must put them aside and build a new nation with a pride and self-esteem of its own. And I'm sure that the South African government had believed that in a negotiation in which there were ten or a dozen different black views being put, they would be able to persuade or cajole some homeland leaders into supporting their view of a racial basis of a new society.

But when Buthelezi said he would work under Mandela, when Mandela said that he could solve the significant differences between Buthelezi and the ANC if he were free, when Mandela said that a united African view was absolutely essential to a negotiation, the government obviously knew everything that Buthelezi and Mandela were saying to us, and the idea of a united black view being put to them across the negotiating table was something which they had believed to be quite impossible. And they could not cope with it. They couldn't understand it. How could this nation of minorities suddenly coalesce and put one view to the white tribe? From that moment on, a negotiation could serve no purpose for that white tribe, the government. So they turned very sharply against it. That is significant in terms of the attitude that America or Britain should adopt now. It's not just a question of

a difference of opinion over a negotiation, it's something quite fundamental and I think quite serious.

I would like to think that the administration understands these things. But if the president and the prime minister have been pursuing negotiation for a long time and got nowhere, why should they suddenly get somewhere tomorrow or the day after? And they're not going to. The balance of forces has to be altered in South Africa. And President Reagan's speech won't do that—it will reinforce President Botha. He will say, "Ah, my friend Mrs. Thatcher, my friend the President will prevent the Western world from doing anything unpleasant to us, we don't then have to move in directions we don't want to move." And that is the way he argues. And Mr. Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher don't understand that. They really don't. And I think this a very great tragedy indeed.

**Africa Report:** But surely they must understand that and therefore one would wonder whether there might be other motives at play here.

**Fraser:** I don't attribute a malevolent view to the President or to Mrs. Thatcher. I think their views are mistaken. I think their views are wrong and tragic on this issue. But I don't attribute it to any kind of basic ill will to blacks or to anyone else. I think they're just wrong. I think they are fearful of blacks being infiltrated by communists. Neither of them seems to believe that every word they both utter is driving blacks closer to communism. I don't think they understand the issues in Africa.

I probably understand the issues very barely. But since last September, we've spoken to a very large number of people in relation to South Africa. And we maybe have some glimmer of what they feel, what they want. If 1,800 whites had been killed by some regime somewhere in the world, what would England do, what would America do? I don't want to give an answer; I would just like people to ponder it. Have we got to such a stage that we accept as normal for racist security forces to kill blacks and that's part of the 20th century? No, I don't really think it should be.



Odetta Lupis

**Africa Report:** One of the President's concrete proposals was that the State Department and U.S. AID should be looking into economic assistance to the frontline states. However, the United States recently cut aid to Zimbabwe!

**Fraser:** And isn't that a sanction? If a government is opposed to sanctions, why do they do that? That is a sanction. And Robert Mugabe, in spite of the rhetoric, hasn't nationalized any land, hasn't taken over any commercial interests of major corporations. They have a good relationship with the government. And how much of that does this administration understand? And because of some of the things that some members of this administration have said to me, I suspect very little. They believe a great deal of disinformation about Robert Mugabe and understand very little of the history that he personally has been through—his antipathy to the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union. But no credit is given and every blame is ascribed.

Again, I think it's out of misunderstanding, basic misconceptions, the subscription to theories in politics in the late 1980s which are wrong and badly based and which are promoted by an extreme right in this country. The great tragedy is that this kind of mistake on the part of the West can only advance the cause of Mr. Gorbachev. I don't want to see that. I've got a long record in opposing the Soviet Union and its expansion.

**Africa Report:** What do you think, if anything, will come out of the Commonwealth?

**Fraser:** I've got to say, I'm very worried about it because Mrs. Thatcher's made a large number of speeches. She's dug herself into a corner. And where's that going to lead? She didn't make public speeches of this kind just before Zimbabwe. Is she really going to defy the whole Commonwealth? Is everyone else so totally wrong? Is she the only person who is right? I could understand having that kind of conviction on some issues. But I'm sure her own cabinet is not united behind that kind of conviction. Sir Geoffrey Howe has spoken of the need to introduce other or additional measures, which is in marked contrast to the position that she's taken. I think he's in a very difficult position, one that's probably personally embarrassing to him. But the Commonwealth is now on the line!

I don't really think that the issue of black rights in South Africa is a major political issue in Britain, probably because education about the issue is very deficient. But if the issue of rights for blacks in South Africa translates in Britain into the survival or destruction of the Commonwealth, I do think that's an issue about which people in Britain would feel seriously. If

they don't, I no longer want to belong to the Commonwealth. If the British do not feel seriously about that issue, there's no point in me feeling seriously about it. But I think that they will feel seriously about it.

And therefore it will be a significant political issue for Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party—quite different from the issue of black rights in South Africa. But where is that going to lead? We've had more than half the members of the Commonwealth walk out of the Commonwealth Games because Mrs. Thatcher's been talking about sanctions and morality and repugnancy, and for no other reason. The Commonwealth is an instrument of value. Yet Mrs. Thatcher doesn't think it's an instrument of value. I'm sure her predecessors and indeed her successors will. But it could be too late.

**Africa Report:** The Queen clearly thinks it is an instrument of value.

**Fraser:** Well, I don't know. But I think the Queen quite plainly has a role as head of state of Britain or Australia, or whatever—and that's one thing which is understood. But until now, nobody has understood that there is a different and distinct position as head of the Commonwealth. Mrs. Thatcher is not her adviser on that issue. The prime ministers collectively are her advisers on that issue. I don't think that's understood in Britain.

I hope somehow there can be a realization that the Commonwealth and the British should take a just path. Ordinary people are too sophisticated in 1986 to see their governments and their leaders pursue paths that are purely expedient. There are so many people around the world who want to see America and Britain do what they personally believe to be the right thing. And they are enormously disenchanted when they see them do what they believe to be the wrong thing. I don't think there is any excuse or any explanation that makes sense of the stance being taken by America and Britain at the moment.

**Africa Report:** Where do you see things going? If the United States does adopt some sanctions, though presumably they will be mild, and Britain likewise supports some watered-down measures, what will be the impact upon the situation inside South Africa?

**Fraser:** Look, if it's all watered down—if it's America and Britain trying to get to the lowest common denominator to avoid doing anything substantial, but trying to get others to accept what they've done so that the whole thing is abortive—that won't work anymore, that won't be accepted anymore. It will just be a betrayal. The real tragedy is that it is a betrayal of



Anti-apartheid rally in New York City, July 1986: "The black people in South Africa are appreciative of the effort and the awareness and the concern of the ordinary people in this country"

everything the United States stands for and of most of the things that Britain has stood for, and by two leaders who basically do not deny the particular things that these countries have stood for. It really is a question of faulty perception, of a misunderstanding of what the basic values are and of what it's all about. Deficiency of views. And how do you overcome that? I just don't know.

I think the U.S. Senate might support something quite rugged. After two long conversations with Senator Lugar, I'm not sure that his view is much different from mine about that speech. And senators have spoken up very bluntly about it and given the administration a sharp message. It's just not good enough. In terms of getting an effective final result, a speech that offends the Senate might end up with a better result than a speech being inadequate but which seduced a part of the Senate because it went part of the way. This speech didn't go any part of the way. And somebody said, disappointed as he was, that the speech might serve the cause best of all. It's a sad way to achieve a result, if that's what happens.

**Africa Report:** I think that's true. The more extreme a position presented, the more extreme the reaction.

**Fraser:** There was even a bit in the speech which implied half the aid going to Savimbi was going to go to the ANC! He spoke about Unita as a band of people fighting for liberty and the right for representation in Angola just as blacks are fighting

Africa. But the President is giving aid to Savimbi, and equating Savimbi with the blacks in South Africa means that they are both equally deserving in the president's view. And if he's giving military aid to Savimbi, then he should be giving military aid to the blacks in South Africa! I think the sentences were cobbled together so fast that nobody saw the implications of it.

**Africa Report:** But he also used some very harsh language about the ANC, calling them Soviet-armed terrorists.

**Fraser:** Yes, I know. In other parts of the speech, he had quite other views and other sentiments. It's just an indication of the way in which the speech was put together. This juxtaposition of Savimbi and Unita and blacks in South Africa came together in a way which wasn't particularly logical from the administration's point of view.

**Africa Report:** How do you see the future developing in South Africa?

**Fraser:** Well, either somehow over the next month or two we're going to be able to extract from the Western world enough support to give the blacks heart and encouragement, in which case decisions relating to greater violence will be

deferred or postponed or made unnecessary, or they are going to say they're on their own, there's no substantive support from the West. Significant blacks in South Africa have said, "To hell with the West!" as a result of the president's speech.

If that's the ultimate conclusion, it will be the saddest conclusion of all, because they will go to the Soviet Union for guns. They'll end up owing allegiance to their source of arms. They'll make decisions about a military guerrilla conflict. And 10 or 12 years out, they'll win because of numbers and sympathy with the majority of the population. But the emerging government will be anti-West and pro-Soviet, and will nationalize all Western financial interests. I don't think that's in the interest of South Africa or blacks or whites. I think it's a great tragedy if policies which are wrong in America and wrong in Britain push blacks in Africa in that direction.

**Africa Report:** Is there any particular message you'd like to get across to *Africa Report* readers?

**Fraser:** Just that there is great strength in the United States. There's a diversity of views. There are many sources of influence within the American system of government. Whatever a president may do or whatever a Congress may do, I think it's terribly important that Americans realize and understand that in terms of the free world, what America does is enormously important to all of us—whether we come from Australia or Africa or New Zealand or the United States or South America. And if the United States does make some serious mistakes and if there are as a consequence some failures, well all right. But that doesn't mean to say that the United States should give up its efforts or that the American people should give up their effort to serve a useful and sensible purpose in the world, and maybe just redouble efforts.

Not everything America will do will be right. But America tries to do what's right more often than most other great powers. I'm certainly not going to be one who'll condemn America if I think America has made a significant mistake in a significant area. I'll be sad about it and wish it hadn't happened, and I'll argue to try and prevent it. But maybe the important thing is to remember that for the free world, a strong and powerful America, confident in what it is seeking to do, is terribly important not just for America, but for all of us. □

# Reagan and the Limits of Leverage

With mounting congressional and public pressure in favor of sanctions against South Africa, the Reagan administration is finding it increasingly difficult to maintain its current policy toward southern Africa. Nor has it been able to devise a credible alternative, further eroding American influence on the Pretoria government.

BY A CORRESPONDENT

As the confrontation escalates both inside South Africa and between Pretoria and its black neighboring states, a new consensus in the United States, with broad support among the business and political establishment, is reshaping American policy toward southern Africa. The increasing strife and repression inside South Africa combined with American public reaction to events in the region—along with election-year politics—is for the second time in less than a year forcing the Reagan administration to recast its policy.

Since Pretoria launched unprecedented attacks on Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Zambia, in May and then declared a state of emergency in mid-June and imposed tight press censorship, anti-apartheid sentiment and activity have crystallized into a new consensus that tough sanctions should be imposed on the white minority regime.

The swirl of events has overtaken the Reagan administration, which appears bereft of any serious new initiatives, even as both its influence on South Africa and control over its policy dwindle. From President Reagan's first speech

devoted solely to South Africa in July to White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan's remarks about American women suffering a diamond shortage if sanctions are imposed, the administration has appeared defensive and unusually awkward in managing its policy toward South Africa.

The current phase of the downward spiral that started in September 1984 began to snowball in May with Pretoria's raids allegedly aimed at African National Congress (ANC) targets in Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. At the same time, South Africa's ban on television coverage of black unrest added to American impatience with Pretoria's apartheid policies.

What began to push U.S. public opinion over the edge, however, was the state of emergency declared on June 12 and the complete censorship of the foreign press. As the Botha regime rounded up hundreds of black activists and union leaders, the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group issued its findings calling for tough pressure—including economic sanctions—on South Africa if a tragic bloody conflict is to be avoided.

Prompted by the dramatic escalation of repression in South Africa, the House

of Representatives stunned both the Botha government and the administration by passing uncompromising sanctions against Pretoria by voice vote. Less than a week after the state of emergency was declared, the House approved a measure sponsored by Rep. Ronald Dellums (D-CA) calling for a total trade embargo and complete divestment by U.S. firms doing business in South Africa within 180 days of enactment of the legislation.

The Dellums bill surprisingly overtook a more moderate piece of legislation sponsored by fellow Black Caucus member William Gray (D-PA) during the House floor debate on South Africa. Dellums himself confessed, "I'm still shocked by what happened. What we did is going to give a tremendous boost to the anti-apartheid movement in this country."

The administration, then beginning a review of its policy toward southern Africa, denounced the House bill. A White House official stressed, "We are adamantly opposed to punitive economic sanctions." The administration has consistently emphasized the term "punitive" in distinguishing its position on limited restrictions on South Africa. In a preemptive move last October, Reagan

headed off congressionally mandated sanctions by issuing an executive order banning the import of krugerrand gold coins, bank loans to state-controlled firms, and the export of computer and nuclear technology to South Africa.

In sharp contrast, the House bill would cut off all trade—with the possible exception of strategic materials such as chromium and platinum-group metals needed for U.S. defense purposes—unless the President certified to Congress that U.S. defense requirements could not be met by domestic supplies. U.S. trade, which in 1985 totalled \$1.2 billion in exports and \$2 billion in imports from South Africa, would grind to a halt. Similarly, some 280 companies that do \$1.8 billion a year in business with South Africa would be forced to divest or face tough penalties.

Behind the outpouring of sentiment in the House was of course the realization that only a much-diluted version of sanctions would survive passage by the Republican-controlled Senate. But as Rep. Gray explained, the House "looked at the carnage, the violation of human rights that had occurred and said, 'That's it.'"

More than the particulars of the House bill, the breadth of the sentiment which supported it underscored the extent to which South Africa has been transformed from an elite foreign policy issue to a domestic concern. As Senate majority leader Robert Dole (R-KS) concedes, "Let's face it, there's a lot of politics involved." Registering opposition to apartheid—particularly in an election year—is now somewhat analogous to demonstrating support for Israel. South Africa has become an "apple pie" issue in U.S. domestic politics over the past two years, regardless of the abstract policy imperatives considered by administration policy-makers.

In fact, the congressional action merely echoes anti-apartheid activity at local levels and in the private sector. A host of major church bodies from various denominations—including the Catholic bishops for the first time—has come out in favor of some form of sanctions. So far, at least 20 states, some 65 cities, and more than 100 universities have taken some degree of divestment or disinvestment action.

The most dramatic and unexpected recent illustration of the popular groundswell was the reversal in position of California's Republican Governor George Deukmejian, who in mid-July—just days before Reagan's policy speech—proposed a four-year phased total divestment of state funds from companies doing business in South Africa.

The plan will affect some \$10 billion in state investments—pension funds and the like—doubling the amount of funds nationally subject to divestment. Deukmejian is running in a tough gubernatorial race against Democratic Mayor Tom Bradley of Los Angeles, and his divestment move was clearly aimed at removing South Africa as a campaign issue.

U.S. businesses and banks have also gotten on the bandwagon. Since 1984,

---

### **"The congressional action merely echoes anti-apartheid activity at local levels and in the private sector."**

---

60 American companies have disinvested from South Africa—17 in 1986 alone. At the same time, there has been a de facto freeze on bank lending to South Africa, with U.S. bank exposure shrinking from over \$5 billion in 1984 to \$3.4 billion at present. According to the New York-based Investor Responsibility Research Center, 37 major U.S. banks now prohibit lending even to the private sector in South Africa. U.S. firms account for about 20 percent of all foreign investment in South Africa, and hold substantial portions of key sectors, such as 50 percent of the computer and petroleum markets.

Behind the bank and corporate actions is a combination of a poor and highly unstable investment climate and a sense of public relations. The South African operations of most major companies are a tiny portion of total business. However, faced with a negative economic environment and a divestment movement which translates into image

problems at home, an increasing number are finding that staying in South Africa is not worth the effort.

Faced with such realities and the Botha regime's growing defiance, the Reagan administration has lagged sorely behind. In June, it began a policy review that reached at least some tentative conclusions in Reagan's address on South Africa on July 22, followed the next day by Secretary of State Shultz's testimony on the same topic before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

U.S. officials had floated the idea of naming Robert J. Brown, a former Nixon administration official and one of the architects of his "Black Capitalism" program, as the first black ambassador to South Africa. But a host of press reports questioning some of Brown's business activities while in the White House and his ties to Nigerian politician Umaru Dikko (an allegedly corrupt member of the former Shagari government) killed the idea before Reagan could announce the nomination in his policy address.

The idea that such symbolism could quell the growing public mood for tough action reveals much about the absence of any serious new policy initiative. Said one analyst, "The whole notion is photo opportunity passing for foreign policy."

Reagan's speech was the subject of a behind-the-scenes tug-of-war between the State Department, which wanted him to use it to signal firmer opposition to apartheid, and White House hardliners. Much of the struggle revolved around the U.S. attitude toward the ANC. The administration has maintained that the ANC is one of the representative factions which should be included in a dialogue on the future of South Africa, and has repeatedly called for the release of ANC leader Nelson Mandela. But at the same time, the presence of communists among the ANC leadership and long-standing ties to the Soviet Union generate continued ambiguity in the administration.

A lengthy front-page report in the *New York Times* the day after Reagan delivered his speech raised questions about the administration's policy toward the ANC. The story charged that the U.S. shared intelligence with Pretoria on the ANC obtained from its "spy in the sky" satellites. The report also charged

that the administration reversed the Carter administration's policy on sharing intelligence and that it provided Pretoria with intercepted ANC communications. Secretary Shultz pointedly denied the charges, saying that CIA Director William Casey told him they were false.

In any event, Reagan's speech reflected administration ambiguity about the ANC by including the phrase, "The South African government is under no obligation to negotiate the future of the country with any organization that proclaims a goal of creating a Communist state and uses terrorist tactics and violence to achieve it." Reagan also denounced "calculated terror by elements of the ANC." Such language was noticeably absent from Shultz's congressional testimony the following day.

But the heart of Reagan's address was an effort to make the case against sanctions, which he claimed would be an "historic act of folly." Instead, he argued that the U.S. should "stay and work, not cut and run." Reagan delineated the arguments that black South Africans and neighboring black states would be the ones hurt by sanctions, and explained that he has authorized the U.S. Agency for International Development to study how the U.S. can provide more assistance to the frontline states—particularly to expand trade, private investment, and transport.

If there was anything new with regard to U.S. policy in Reagan's speech, it was two elements—one important for its absence. Throughout the 35-minute speech, the term "constructive engagement" was conspicuously avoided. The administration appears to have dropped the term even as it claims to be clinging to the policy.

And for the first time, Reagan outlined what the U.S. feels are necessary steps for progress. These include: a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws, the release of all political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, unbanning black political movements, and the beginning of a dialogue "about constructing a political system based on the consent of the governed."

Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the following day, Shultz reiterated the same basic arguments. He chronicled the decline of the

South African economy and the descent into violence, and emphasized the coordination of U.S. policies with "our principal allies." Explaining the administration view of the ANC, Shultz said: "We have serious questions about the ultimate objectives of the ANC."

But he conceded, "The ANC has emerged as an important part of the South African political equation." Over the years, the U.S. has maintained low-level contact with the ANC, but Shultz, under pressure from legislators in an appearance marked by several heated exchanges, expressed a willingness to meet with ANC leader Oliver Tambo.

Reagan's speech and Shultz's testimony appeared to be counter-productive. Republican congressional leaders, including Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Africa Subcommittee Chairman Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), expressed disappointment with Reagan's speech. The President's discourse, said Kassebaum, "gave no new direction to our policies toward South Africa and, perhaps most importantly, offered no renewed vigor in our pursuit of peaceful change there."

In the Democratic response to Reagan, William Gray argued, "How can sanctions hurt black South Africans when apartheid is killing them?" Gray pointed out that the U.S. has imposed sanctions on a number of countries—Nicaragua, Libya, Poland, Cuba—"not because we thought they would bring down those governments, but to disassociate us from all that those governments stand for while raising the cost of behavior we abhor. . . Why not South Africa? Why the double standard?"

The backlash to Reagan's speech and to the general administration posture toward South Africa hastened the Senate's move to join in approving sanctions. On August 1, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved 15-2 a bill fashioned by Lugar which, though far less stringent than the House bill, offered the virtue of broad support to make it veto-proof. After a spirited Senate debate in which the Lugar proposal was modified, the full Senate passed the bill by an overwhelming 84-14 margin. Lugar commented, "We are involved in reshaping foreign policy. This is a very important shift."

The Senate legislation offers the following restrictions on South Africa:

- Bans the import of iron and steel (worth \$293.6 million in 1985).
- Bans the import of coal and uranium (\$3.4 million and \$140 million, respectively in 1985).
- Bans new corporate investment in South Africa and new loans to South African government agencies.
- Prohibits U.S. banks from accepting deposits from any South African government agency.
- Makes permanent the sanctions Reagan imposed in September 1985.
- Bans loans to South African government agencies. This includes a ban on krugerrands and the export of computer equipment and nuclear technology to government agencies.
- Bans textile imports from South Africa.
- Bans landing rights for South African Airways.
- Bans the export of petroleum products or crude oil to South Africa.
- Bans the import of agricultural products from South Africa.

---

### **"Grudgingly, the administration is drifting toward a new policy that concedes the limits of American leverage."**

---

According to the Senate legislation, if South Africa does not make "substantial progress" toward ending apartheid within a year, the President will have to consider additional sanctions. Sanctions against Pretoria would only be terminated if he reports to Congress that the South African regime has done the following: freed all political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela; repealed the state of emergency and released those detained under it; allowed all political parties to operate; repealed the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act; and committed itself to good faith negotiations with "truly representative" black leaders.

Ironically, perhaps the most damag-



ing element in the original Lugar proposal—authorizing Reagan to sell off U.S. gold reserves to drive down the price of gold, Pretoria's number-one export earner—was deleted by an amendment passed during the Senate debate. At the same time, several of the measures, such as the textile ban, dovetail with the strong protectionist sentiment on Capitol Hill. Though liberal Alan Cranston (D-CA) proposed the textile ban amendment, even conservatives such as Jesse Helms (R-NC) could support it.

The textile case further demonstrates the administration's clumsiness: As pressure was mounting on the Hill for sanctions, the news surfaced that the administration's trade negotiators had just reached an accord with Pretoria on a new textile pact.

Though the Senate package clearly represents the minimal restrictions on Pretoria acceptable to Congress, it goes far beyond what is acceptable to Reagan. The White House strategy, apart from stalling for time, is to try to coordinate any action on South Africa with its European allies.

Administration officials say Reagan is even opposed to banning landing rights and intends only to renew the 1985 executive order which expires in September and expand it slightly to include restrictions such as curbing consuls and military attachés. But the European Community was set to approve a sanctions package in September including a ban on iron, steel and coal, new investments, and krugerrands.

Many observers doubt that Reagan will take sufficient action this time around to dissuade Congress from passing a set of sanctions at least as restrictive as those approved by the Senate. If Reagan goes as far as the EEC and adds a ban on landing rights, he might gain enough votes to prevent a Senate override. In either case, the President will have to accept far more stringent sanctions than he has said would be acceptable and consistent with his policies.

Despite the emotional fervor for sanctions, it has become increasingly clear that U.S. influence with Pretoria is at best marginal, and judging from the defiant posture of the Botha regime, diminishing still further. Hyperbole ap-

pears in the rhetoric on both sides of the sanctions debate.

After some four decades of Western investment, trade, loans, and military aid, South Africa has become a powerful regional superpower in its own right. Pretoria is almost self-sufficient militarily, and even oil, the one key raw material it has lacked, is less a problem than it has been in the past. Pretoria's pioneering coal-gasification projects have reached the point where South Africa can produce some 38 percent of its energy needs.

The assumption of both the administration and Congress—that pressure on Pretoria will produce dialogue and a negotiated solution—appears flawed. There is a basic conflict of interest between U.S. national interests and those of the white minority regime in South Africa. None of the reforms that have been offered or appear on the horizon alter the basic structures of apartheid and they fall far short of "one man, one vote."

At an August 12 congress of the ruling National Party, a defiant Botha underscored that the Group Areas Act—the basis of apartheid—will not be repealed. "Granting concessions under conditions bordering on blackmail merely encourages a stronger party to raise its demands," said Botha. In an almost cocky manner, he added that if sanctions come, "We will not just survive, but come out stronger in the end."

Thus it appears that while sanctions will serve to clearly distance the U.S. from the apartheid regime, they are unlikely to press Pretoria to negotiate a solution to the growing conflict. At the same time, the policy of "constructive engagement" pursued by the Reagan administration for the past five years has been overtaken by events. Grudgingly, the administration is drifting toward a new policy that concedes the limits of American leverage.

The scenario for the near future is one of increased violent confrontation in South Africa—both white-black and black-black. The U.S.' distance from the Botha regime may serve as something of an insurance policy to gain credibility with whatever black-run government ultimately emerges. While it is not likely that sanctions will end the U.S. role in

influencing change in South Africa, it is increasingly clear that the driving force for change is a combination of the intransigence of the white minority regime and the growing restiveness and combativeness of the non-white majority. □

*The author is a Washington-based journalist and long-time observer of U.S. policy toward southern Africa.*

## Join Us On Our Magnificent Journey of Exploration...

### Subscribe Now To American Visions

THE MAGAZINE OF AFRO-AMERICAN CULTURE

- We'll give a reading on race relations a generation after the 60s.
- A black economist who backs the bootstrap school of economic development in the black community will square off against an advocate of continued federal efforts on behalf of minorities.
- A series on health will cover problems that most affect blacks.
- We'll take you to Charleston and the South Carolina low country. . . Jamaica. . . Kansas. . . Chicago. . . and points west, to see them from a black perspective.
- You'll visit a Michigan farmer, making it work, in the midst of a family-farm crisis.

Use the coupon below to subscribe now.

Yes...I want to share in this great exploration. Enclosed is my \$18 Charter Subscription to AMERICAN VISIONS, P.O. Box 53129, Boulder, CO 80322-3129.

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_

State \_\_\_\_\_ Zip \_\_\_\_\_

Please allow 6-8 weeks for delivery. 80% of the annual fee is designated for magazine subscription. AR386

# Toward a New South Africa

The American Secretary of State argues that rather than imposing punitive measures against South Africa, the U.S. should maintain a strong presence in southern Africa in order to encourage peaceful change. By remaining involved, the administration hopes to be a moderating force and to help guide South Africa toward a democratic post-apartheid society.

BY GEORGE P. SHULTZ

President Reagan's recent speech on South Africa sets forth what I believe is the true vision and purpose of United States policy toward South Africa:

"... We are for a new South Africa, a new nation where all that has been built up over generations is not destroyed, a new society where participation in the social, cultural, economic, and political life is open to all peoples—a new South Africa that comes home to the family of free nations where she belongs."

Such is our hope for South Africa—one we subscribe to despite some of the events we have witnessed recently.

Our policy toward any region takes changing realities into account. While our goals and basic purposes remain constant, U.S. interests and values, and hence our actions, are directly affected by what happens. We have reviewed the southern African situation; we have concluded that our vision and our influence are more crucial to the region's future than ever.

Everyone knows—or should know—what U.S. policy toward South Africa stands *against*. We stand firmly united in opposition to apartheid. We condemn this abominable institution. But we are equally firm about what we stand *for*.

To understand the situation more fully, it is necessary to describe the forces at work in South Africa and the region, to discuss the broad approach which President Reagan has outlined, and to make clear what actions we think are required in the situation that has emerged in recent months.

## What Must Be Done

First, we must realize that it is the leaders of southern and South Africa and their people, black and white, who bear the major responsibility for change. The fate of southern Africa is in their hands. This is their drama, their destiny, their challenge.

But they are not alone. We are prepared to talk to all of them and to help them talk to each other. We and our allies will engage our influence in every way possible to help them meet the challenges before them. But most fundamentally, it is they who must rise to them.

Second, the nature of the challenge the South African government faces is clear. Progress toward peace requires:

- a timetable for the elimination of all apartheid laws;
- the release of all political prisoners including, particularly, Nelson Mandela;
- the unbanning of black political movements;

- the end to repressive measures, especially the state of emergency;
- the urgent beginning of dialogue among all concerned parties, leading to a democratic system of government in which the rights of majorities, minorities, and individuals are protected by a bill of rights and firm constitutional guarantees.

Third, the choices before black South Africans are equally clear. We call upon them:

- to avoid the descent into violence, terrorism, and extremism;
- to demonstrate by their actions that they understand the need for compromise;
- to remember that they may soon share the responsibility for governing and reconstructing South Africa;
- to seek out and accept realistic openings for dialogue and negotiation with the government.

Fourth, our policies and those of our allies should ensure that expanded political liberties in a post-apartheid South Africa are accompanied by an expansion of economic opportunities for all South Africans. This will require an expanding South African economy that is strong enough to meet South Africa's pressing social and economic needs, healthy enough to raise black living standards rapidly toward those of whites, and

open and vigorous enough to spur economic developments region-wide.

Finally, a free South Africa is essential to the kind of southern Africa we and most southern Africans seek. Only a South Africa which preserves Africa's strongest and most developed industrial economy can galvanize a dynamic and balanced regional economy, mobilize capital and labor, spread advanced technology and management, and strengthen trade and transport ties. Only a South Africa of democratic freedoms can foster such freedoms beyond its borders. There is no place in our vision for South African forces in Namibia or Cuban forces in Angola. Both the South Africans and the Cubans must go home.

These are the objectives to which our efforts—those of the U.S. government, our allies, and the leaders of southern and South Africa—must be directed.

In view of the importance of the issue to all Americans, and pursuant to the president's request, a bipartisan panel representing a number of key constituencies in the U.S. was established to advise me on policy direction regarding South Africa. This distinguished group, which has worked for several months preparing a major study on South Africa and U.S. policy, will present me with their report this fall.

### Current Situation and Its Implications

Current developments are threatening the capacity of any future South African government to address the country's problems. They are causing South Africa's economic base to deteriorate. Skilled manpower is fleeing the country. Domestically generated capital is bleeding away. These developments are looting South Africa of the patrimony on which its reconstruction in the post-apartheid era must rest. They should concern all who hope to see a prosperous, democratic South Africa emerge from the miseries of apartheid; they should concern South African blacks as much as whites.

The market is speaking clearly about where the hardening positions of the South African government and its violent opponents are taking South Africa. South Africa is under siege by self-im-

posed economic sanctions. Foreign capital, technology, and expertise are pulling out. Currency controls, import controls, and import substitution policies cannot replace them.

The index of South African business confidence now stands at only three-fourths of what it was in 1980. Gross fixed capital formation fell by 40 percent in 1985 and continues to decline. The gross domestic product was down by 1 percent in the first quarter of this year. There is net emigration among whites for the first time since 1977.

Over the past year, the book value of American investment in South Africa has fallen by about a third. Investment from other countries is falling by comparable orders of magnitude, and voluntary disinvestment is accelerating. Nearly 200 corporations are in various stages of disengagement from the South African economy.

The commercial rand has depreciated to less than 40 cents, from \$1.28 in 1980. The financial rand, used for offshore transactions, now trades below 20 cents. There is no new lending from abroad. In the past, South African foreign exchange reserves have been sufficient to cover five to six months of imports. Now they barely cover one month's imports. Ninety-five percent of this year's debt service payments have had to be rescheduled.

The turn toward a siege economy only increases the size and cost of gov-

ernment at the expense of productive economic activity and the tax base.

Three-fifths of employed Afrikaners and one-fifth of the English-speaking white workforce already work for the South African government or its agencies. Military call-ups under the state of emergency are diverting additional resources from the productive sector. Recent arrests of labor leaders have brought chaos to labor-management relations, adding further to the economy's woes.

Unemployment among urban blacks now stands at 25 percent, and runs over 50 percent in some urban areas. For the first time since the National Party came to power, white unemployment is a serious problem. From March 1985 to March of this year, 40,000 whites lost their jobs. There are over 250,000 new job seekers in South Africa every year; the economy needs a real growth rate of 5 percent just to keep unemployment at current levels. Without growth the country cannot create jobs for either blacks or whites.

South Africa has costly economic and social problems which cry out to be addressed. For example, 3-4 million new housing units will be required over the next 15 years. Public health demands immediate attention, with only one doctor for every 25,000 people in rural areas. Black education is grossly underfunded. The South African government, to its credit, is trying to increase



**"We intend to raise the level and frequency of our contact with the black opposition, including the ANC"**

Yutaka Nagata/United Nations

the amounts of money it devotes to addressing these problems. But the state of emergency is imposing additional heavy burdens on the country's budget, as are the government's military adventures in the region.

The state of emergency is also causing internal political problems. With so many opponents of apartheid in jail under the state of emergency, leaders on both sides find it hard to meet, much less negotiate. Politics in South Africa is increasingly polarized and shrill; suspicion and mistrust abound. The youth, black and white, are being schooled in a style of politics that sees violent retribution rather than open debate as the natural reaction to any expression of views different from their own. The rising violence provokes terrorism from extremists which in turn elicits more extreme measures by both the government and its opponents.

### Regional Effects of Apartheid

These trends have implications that extend well beyond South Africa's borders and affect all of southern Africa.

In 1985, the regional picture showed signs of hope. Our diplomatic efforts were having clear success. This conflict-ridden region was moving, albeit fitfully, toward negotiated solutions. American diplomatic efforts had brought South Africa, Angola, and other parties within range of a possible accord on Namibia's independence under UN Security Council resolution 435 and on a timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.

After a period of confrontation, the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique created a framework for economic cooperation and good neighborly relations. This agreement contained region-wide potential for reducing the chances of war and for mitigating Mozambique's agony of poverty and strife. Fragile but substantive exchanges were occurring between South Africa and its neighbors to resolve cross-border security problems.

We support continued efforts by South Africa's neighbors to stop guerrilla operations from their territory and have condemned the recent raids by the South African government which took

matters into its own hands while exchanges were going on.

Appeals by African states for mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa represent a political message to us. Yet those states cannot themselves implement such sanctions and would be the first victims of South African counter-measures, some of which already are being levied. The declining pace of economic activity in South Africa itself will have direct and predictable results among its neighbors as capital, expertise, and job opportunities are victims of South Africa's downward slide.

We need to understand clearly that the human tragedy in South Africa is occurring in the economic hub of a region that includes a dozen states with some 150 million people. The damage inflicted on South Africa by the marketplace, by political measures of governments, and—above all—by South Africans themselves is rippling across and dragging down an entire region.

The fundamental cause of all this damage is the system of apartheid and the mounting and inevitable reaction to it. Apartheid must be brought to an end and be replaced by a democratic system of government in which the rights of majorities, minorities, and individuals are protected by a bill of rights and firm constitutional guarantees.

### The Role of the United States

Through several administrations, including this one, U.S. policy has sought the elimination of apartheid and rapid peaceful change to a democratic system. Our voice has, of course, been only one of many urging the South African government to act. South Africans—some inside, many outside the government—have expressed quiet appreciation for the role we have played in opposing forced removal of populations, detention of individuals, and abuse of detainees.

We believe that our support for an end to apartheid has made it easier for the South African government to go forward—in spite of substantial domestic opposition—with the termination of the pass laws, the expansion of rights of residence and private property ownership, and the restoration of citizenship to

those from whom these rights were stripped in an earlier era.

And our role has gone beyond moral suasion. We have acted by bringing black and white South Africans together in the workplace and in our homes on the basis of friendship and equality. American business has spent over \$200 million outside the workplace since 1977 to prepare black South Africans for the post-apartheid society they anticipate. The American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa calls publicly for the end of apartheid. In a recent ad in South African newspapers, it urged, "Instead of a state of emergency, let's declare a state of urgency to remove all discriminatory legislation without delay."

Such action reflects the determination of the American business community in South Africa to significantly increase its involvement in reform. The Sullivan Principles group of American


---

**"Only a South Africa which preserves Africa's strongest and most developed industrial economy can galvanize a dynamic and balanced regional economy."**

---

companies—those adhering to a voluntary set of fair employment practices including desegregation of all facilities—has expanded greatly during the past year, almost doubling in size. These firms are now moving beyond the workplace and the community to require American business in South Africa to confront the authorities in pressing for the dismantlement of apartheid.

At the same time, the U.S. government is engaged in a program which speaks directly to black and other disadvantaged elements in that nation. It has allocated \$45 million in this fiscal year and next to assist private South African organizations to carry out projects in education, community affairs, human rights, and in small business and trade union development. No funds are provided to or through the South African government.



**Pace School funded by U.S. corporations: "American business has spent over \$200 million since 1977 to prepare black South Africans for the post-apartheid society they anticipate"**

The U.S. presence gives us access to various groups and individuals which provide openings for using diplomacy and political and moral persuasion—the most effective tools available to us. We continue to urge the South African government to communicate with all parties, and it makes sense for the United States to do the same, and we will. Like our allies, we intend to raise the level and frequency of our contact with the South African government's black opposition, including—among others—the African National Congress.

We have serious questions about the ultimate objectives of the ANC, as well as about the role in its inner circles of the Soviet-controlled South African Communist Party. We are also disturbed that the ANC appears to be imitating the South African government's preference for violence and intimidation rather than dialogue with its opponents. But the ANC has emerged as an important part of the South African political equation. There is a compelling need to ensure that its leaders—like other opponents of apartheid—hear an authoritative statement of U.S. policies and interests, and we must have equally authoritative insight into theirs. The recent meeting between our ambassador to Zambia and members of the ANC National Executive Committee was an important step in this process.

We are aware, of course, that we must not aim to impose ourselves, our solutions, or our favorites in South Africa; such an intrusion would be unwanted and unwise for any outside party. But we must always be willing to help South Africans in their search for their own answers to their country's ills.

#### Coordination With Our Allies

It is vital to coordinate what we do with our principal allies. American influence in South Africa is limited. But the influence of the industrialized democracies of the European Community, Japan, and the United States as a group is significant. Together we constitute South Africa's major trading and investment partners. Together we embody the values of the democratic world that South Africans of all races aspire to join.

In addition to actions with our allies vis-à-vis South Africa, we are also considering a range of positive measures

---

**"The U.S. presence gives us access to various groups and individuals which provide openings for using diplomacy and political and moral persuasion—the most effective tools available to us."**

---

that would promote economic progress throughout the entire southern African region. South Africa now dominates an economically irrational regional transport network that provides high cost outlets for all of its neighbors except Angola, and which renders them vulnerable to retaliation and economic penalties. These frontline states have other shorter, more economical alternatives, but these routes have deteriorated over the years, are inefficient, and require upgrading.

We and our allies have started working to rehabilitate some transportation links. Similarly, we intend to pursue ways of opening the region to more commerce—developing transportation routes and industry along the major alternative corridors, adding to the locomotive and rolling stock of the frontline states, and stimulating more trade between South Africa's neighbors. Our discussions with our allies began in July. Peter McPherson, administrator of the Agency for International Development, undertook a mission in August to discuss these issues with governments in the region.

#### A Vision of Hope

By its policies, the South African government has isolated itself politically and diplomatically. Its most recent actions are having the effect of isolating it economically as well. If current trends continue, the outlook for South Africa is dismal. In such a South Africa, there will be no winners, only losers.

We have a different vision of South Africa's future. We want a democratic and prosperous South Africa where all races participate politically and economically, at the center of a peaceful and rapidly developing southern African region.

To achieve this, apartheid must go. All South Africans need to be represented in negotiations to determine the system of government that will replace it. Such negotiations are urgent. We cannot prescribe their outcome. But our policies and actions must be calculated to encourage the process of peaceful change and to help it along. □

*George P. Shultz is Secretary of State of the United States.*

# Under Thatcher's Coattails

While the British prime minister may be the most vocal opponent of sanctions, several other European governments have considerable economic stakes at risk in South Africa. Will the 12 members of the EEC be able to put aside individual interests in order to agree upon united measures against Pretoria?

BY DENIS HERBSTEIN

**T**he *Reader's Digest* anti-sanctions piece, "Why South Africa needs time," was fairly predictable. South Africa, it argued, "is entitled to a fair trial period within which to prove its good faith"; it would be disastrous if the world "blocks an orderly turnover"; "No greater tragedy could occur than for the outside world to intrude hastily"; "In the end they will do right. Let us give them a little more time."

The words, perhaps, of a Margaret Thatcher or a Chester Crocker? No, they were penned by Clarence B. Randall, steel magnate and former adviser to President Eisenhower, way back in the summer of 1963. In the intervening decades, apartheid has blossomed into an ugly flower that will not fade. Who knows whether sanctions, full-blooded, honestly enforced, carefully monitored, would have changed anything. It must surely have been worth a try.

Today, Prime Minister Thatcher is the most articulate exponent of the "softly, softly" approach. In European and Commonwealth meeting halls, the "measures" have had to be squeezed out of her painfully and not very effectively. Yet it must be said that behind the criticism of the "iron maiden," several European governments are happy

enough to hide under her coat tails. Not to mention the Soviet Union, which markets its diamonds through the Central Selling Organisation in London, run by De Beers, South Africa's largest industrial conglomerate.

Britain's minimalist line on sanctions has so far set the pace in the European Economic Community. Certainly West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl will keep in step with Thatcher so that the two European nations which dominate trade with and investment in South Africa can place their conservative stamp on the debate. But there are factors, other than economic, which influence the British people and their governments.

---

**"Thatcher's constant harping on the theme that blacks in South Africa and the frontline states would suffer from sanctions might be correct, but it does sound like the white madam telling her servants what's best for them."**

---

The links go back two centuries, when the Cape was first annexed by the British empire. It was a London government which in 1910 ignored the protests of blacks and white liberals and set up the Afrikaner-dominated Union of South Africa. Since then, the white "English" element has climbed to 2 million. Many retain connections with family and friends "at home."

Over 100,000 South Africans have returned to live in the mother country, where they exercise a restraining effect on "silent Britain," for they would be the first to suffer if air links were cut or their families were made to obtain visas to enter Britain. They do not write letters to the editor or demonstrate against apartheid outside the embassy. The Afrikaners may be wild, they will tell you, but the English out there are doing their best to put things right. "Don't make things difficult with talk of sanctions and the ANC," they say.

The man from the KWV, the Cape wine cooperative, tours women's clubs in the British provinces lecturing on "sunny South Africa" and offering a tipple of sherry to round off the evening. Winter and summer, unofficial rugby and cricket teams arrive in Britain—despite the sports embargo—to mingle with the ordinary chaps of middle class England. And Boeing-loads of well-be-

haved South Africans visit Britain (or used to, before the demise of the rand). We meet them on buses, in small hotels, at the theater. Thus are friendships—and attitudes—cemented.

There are two approaches to the sanctions argument in Britain, as in Europe and America. The first goes: "No one loathes apartheid more than me, but. . ." The second loathes apartheid too, but adds: "Therefore. . . I will try and do something to get rid of it." Thatcher belongs to the first, or "cop-out," school. She declares that apartheid is not the cause of violence in South Africa. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia is not the only black leader to question her sincerity. Sonny Ramphal, the Commonwealth secretary-general, asks whether Britain is "serious about inducing change in South Africa."

If the pillow talk school of politics has any relevance, then Dennis Thatcher, with his considerable business and social interests in South Africa, will at least have a niche in his wife's thinking. Old habits die hard. Her constant harping on the theme that blacks in South Africa and the frontline states would suffer from sanctions might be correct, but it does sound like the white madam telling her servants what is best for them.

Beyond these emotional factors lie Britain's enormous economic stake in apartheid, both in the share of its foreign trade and investment portfolio, which far outstrips any other country. The £12

billion (\$18 billion) investment amounts to one-third of all foreign money in South Africa. But far from pulling out, this government would like to get in deeper.

Since Thatcher lifted exchange controls in 1979, British business has invested an annual £250 million in apartheid. As recently as 18 months ago, when all hell was breaking loose in the townships, Colin Brant, British consul-general in Johannesburg, who doubles as director of British trade promotion, declared that "far from being discouraged by the political and economic difficulties," UK firms should take the present opportunity to work up full salés potential in South Africa. Does he know something we don't?

The role of the United Kingdom South Africa Trade Association (UKSATA), which speaks for the 300 or so British companies there, can be more persuasive than any black government. It has published a claim that 250,000 British workers are liable to lose their jobs in the wake of sanctions. The figure has been much touted around, but closer examination shows this to be a considerable exaggeration based on a "worst case" hypothesis of lost exports—when the West is nowhere near to seeking comprehensive sanctions.

The British press—*The Telegraph*, *Mail*, *Express*, Rupert Murdoch's *Times* and *Sun*—now mostly snuggled in the far right of the political spectrum, is vehemently anti-sanctions and prone

to red herrings about the lack of human rights in black-ruled countries. The *Guardian*, to be sure, but most surprisingly, the pink-paged *Financial Times*, read by the very people with cash at risk on the Veldt, have been converted to the cause.

So has Lord Barber, Thatcher's "safe" appointment to the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, whose report made sanctions respectable on the right. Barber, a former chancellor of the Exchequer, once chairman of the Conservative Party, has for a dozen years headed Standard, the second largest bank in South Africa. He must have flown in to Johannesburg many times for board meetings, but only on his Commonwealth excursion did he go and see for himself—visit the Crossroads squatters camp, have explained to him the spider's web of laws governing the daily lives of black people, and meet Nelson Mandela in prison. So he perceived another face of that country. Would that more multinational bosses did likewise.


It is a herculean task to shift British public opinion. The Anglican church, the campuses, most trade unions, the opposition political parties, even housewives in the supermarket—possibly a majority of the citizenry—want sanctions, though when questioned in detail, even the easy options like air links or fruit and vegetables are too tough for them.

Nor is there a black lobby led by a Jesse Jackson or a Randall Robinson. Britain's blacks may comprise 5 or 6 percent of the population, but both their low profile and lack of political leverage

Commonwealth mini-summit, London, August 1986: "In European and Commonwealth meeting halls, the 'measures' have had to be squeezed out of Thatcher painfully and not very effectively."



Stuart Nichol/Sygma



Susan E. Dorfman

"Beyond the emotional factors lie Britain's enormous economic stake in apartheid."

inhibit concerted action. Besides, the black activists are busy with campaigns over bad housing and police harassment.

The bulk of these "immigrants" have arrived since the last world war. Many came from the Indian sub-continent, so that for them, South Africa is not a special case. But Indians, Pakistanis, and West Indians are slowly climbing the political ladder. More have become city councillors, mayors, union leaders, lawyers, and teachers. After the next general elections at least six, possibly 10, black candidates in Labour Party seats will enter Parliament. There are none in the House of Commons now.

Will this persuade a Labour government to do what it has preached in opposition? The Socialists' record on South Africa over the years has been uneven. Harold Wilson's Labour government abstained in the 1966 United Nations vote which revoked Pretoria's mandate over "South West Africa" (the U.S. Democrats voting for). His government introduced sanctions against Ian Smith's UDI in Rhodesia, all the while turning a blind eye as the British oil giants, Shell and BP, evaded the embargo that would surely have ended white rule years earlier.

But it is the conservatives who have been in power for the last seven years. If it sounds like the cult of personality, that is the reality. Thatcher does not have Reagan's worries about a radical Congress. With a giant majority in the House of Commons, she controls both executive and legislative behavior on foreign policy.

And overseas, her word carries special weight (as her allies will remember when she tried unsuccessfully to stop the British Olympic team from going to Moscow, or persuaded—bullied—her Common Market allies into laying off trade with Argentina over the Falklands). Britain is a member of the Commonwealth, the Common Market, NATO, the group of seven most industrialized nations, and a consenting adult in the trans-Atlantic "special relationship." Its role is pivotal. But not all the 11 Common Market neighbors have willingly followed its path.

Other than Britain, only West Germany and Portugal oppose sanctions of any sort. Lisbon's left-of-center government and President Mario Soares (once imprisoned by Pretoria's fascist ally, the late President Salazar) fear that a degeneration of the apartheid economy, or black rule itself, would endanger the

600,000 Portuguese in the Republic. Many moved there when Angola and Mozambique were liberated by Marxists. The last thing the ailing Portuguese economy needs is a flood of refugees. Even so, the hard currency value of remittances from South Africa will have been hugely reduced in the last year.

The Federal Republic has by far the most favorable balance of trade with South Africa, with coal, chrome, and Namibian uranium imports (in 1984) running at £830 million against exports of cars and machinery worth £2 billion. There seems to be little public opinion on South Africa, though atavistic memories are stirred by the old colony of German South West Africa. Franz Joseph Strauss, the maverick czar of Bavaria, is apartheid's best friend in Germany. But few appear to make the link between the Nazi and the Bothas eras.

The Dutch are more like the British when it comes to kith and kin with South Africa. Though many Afrikaners are of German or French origin, they do speak a language which is intelligible in Amsterdam. Yet the Dutch have for a longer time, and more outspokenly, raised their voices against apartheid.

The South African Dutch Reformed Church, which provides the spiritual sustenance to apartheid, has received short shrift from many co-religionists in Holland. The conservative administration, like the right-wing Mulroney government in Canada, does not allow ideology to stand in the way of action—though Joop den Uyl, the Socialist leader surprisingly beaten in the recent elections, had promised to end the lucrative KLM flights to Johannesburg. When the 12 meet again at the end of September, the Dutch will be leading the demand for tougher sanctions.

The French? Behavior ambivalent. They are largely responsible for arming apartheid, they built South Africa's first nuclear power station at Koeberg, outside Cape Town. They have been in the fore in engineering and motor vehicles. Yet last year, the Socialist government precipitately placed a clamp on further investment and withdrew the ambassador from Pretoria. (Gaullist Prime Minister Chirac sent him back immediately after the last elections.)



The British, believing in "Galle Per-fide," suggested the action might have been calculated to defuse Third World anger over French nuclear tests in the South Pacific and the racial strife in New Caledonia. But France's balance of trade with South Africa was worsening—which is why it will not oppose a ban on South African fruit.

Belgium has an even more unfavorable balance of trade with South Africa, accounted for by the gems handled in Antwerp, still the diamond-cutting capital of the world. But it is the Nordic countries which have for longer and more insistently demanded tougher action. Denmark, an EEC member, announced earlier this year that it was cutting off all commerce with South Africa. In 1979, Sweden passed a law prohibiting new investment and loans. These two countries, together with Norway, own the SAS airline, which ended many years of flying to Johannesburg—though the route could not have been all that profitable.

The Irish too, despite sharing with the Afrikaner ancient bonds of anti-British feeling, have been much tougher than their neighbors across the Irish Sea. The country's conscience was stirred by a brave campaign against the Dunn supermarket chain which had sacked some employees for refusing to handle Outspan oranges and Cape apples.

Since 1977, the EEC has attempted to persuade companies operating in South Africa to follow a code of conduct similar to the American Sullivan Principles. But whereas in the United States, corporate disinvestment has taken place

as well, in Europe the code was seen as legitimizing their activities. Some 218 major market companies employ an estimated 131,000 blacks, with the British share accounting for the majority of them.

There is a belief that as the Common Market is unable to organize a credible agricultural policy, with its legendary reputation for constructing butter and beef mountains, an effective stop on South African fruit would be well beyond its capabilities. It will not be helped by a new EEC regulation which allows only the manufacturer's name and not the country of origin to be stated on the can or package. South African exporters have mastered the art of devious labeling.

But fruit and vegetables are a minor part of South Africa's worries. It is likely that the nine pro-sanctioners will persuade the other three to institute a ban on coal, iron, and steel imports, which would present grave problems to Pretoria. But they will be watching to see if Japan, already a huge importer of iron and gold, steps in to mop up the excess.

But the biggest loophole lies right in Europe's heartland, in Switzerland, gold importer and unashamed banker to apartheid and to other regimes, good and ugly.

Perhaps President Botha has a right to be quietly confident that when it comes to sanctions, Europe will never get its act together. □

*Denis Herbstein, a South African exile, is a journalist and author living in London. He writes regularly for The Observer, International Herald Tribune, and New Statesman.*

"West Germany has by far the most favorable balance of trade with South Africa"



William Campbell/Sygnma

## African Politics Crises and Challenges

By J. Gus Liebenow

A sympathetic but hardheaded analysis of the crisis issues common to the continent as a whole: the struggle for national identity, poverty, the unresolved festering issue of white supremacy in Southern Africa, the problem of political community in the African urban setting, and the struggle for popular control over government.

cloth \$32.50 paper \$12.50

## Africa Second Edition

Edited by Phyllis M. Martin  
and Patrick O'Meara

It has been nearly ten years since the first edition of this very successful and widely used book was published. The second edition takes account of many changes and suggestions made by teachers and students in an effort to make this edition even more useful than its predecessor. The volume provides an overview of the continent and its history with special emphasis on the significant themes that relate to Africa as a whole, including the development of early humans, social change, colonialism, and African systems of thought.

cloth \$40.00 paper \$14.95

## Beggar Your Neighbours

### Apartheid Power in Southern Africa

By Joseph Hanlon

The political, military, and economic war being waged by South Africa against its majority-ruled neighbors in defense of apartheid is the subject of this hard-hitting book. This well-researched study of South Africa's regional policy as part of a total strategy for maintaining apartheid emphasizes both the devastating impact of that strategy on and the mixed responses to it by South Africa's neighbors.

\$35.00

Now in paperback

## African Independence The First Twenty-Five Years

Edited by Gwendolen M. Carter  
and Patrick O'Meara

Topics covered include the colonial heritage, the United Nations, ethnicity, regionalism, the military and politics, agrarian malaise, urban growth and rural development, aid, the conflict between ideology and technology, and relations with the world system.

"...an enduring contribution to African studies; it [African Independence] will be widely read and discussed."

—Choice  
paper \$9.95  
Also available in  
cloth \$29.95



## INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Tenth & Morton Streets  
Bloomington, Indiana 47405

# Gen. Vernon Walters

## United States Ambassador to the United Nations

In this *Africa Report* exclusive, Gen. Walters reacts to criticism of American policy toward South Africa, explaining the basis for the Reagan administration's opposition to economic sanctions. He also discusses the impact of Third World voting patterns in the United Nations on bilateral relations with the U.S.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

**Africa Report:** President Reagan's July speech, the culmination of the administration's policy review on South Africa, was met with considerable criticism across the political spectrum.

**Walters:** It was met with criticism on its tone, but not on the facts he gave of how many people would be thrown out of work and who would suffer as a consequence of the sanctions. None of the criticism has addressed that that I have seen. It has addressed principally the fact that he did not announce compulsory sanctions against South Africa. No one challenged the facts that he set forth as to why sanctions would hurt the blacks more than the whites. And I think that's interesting because what he was attempting to do was to give a rational view of why our position is what it is. Now the easiest thing in the world would be for the United States to join the hue and cry and say, "Yes, sanctions!" That would be the popular thing, but it wouldn't be the right thing. The white community [in South Africa] is insulated against sanctions. They've seen them coming for ten years. Why do you think they built the four largest plants in the world to convert coal to gas? They saw this coming a long way back and they are insulated. The black community is not insulated. And that is why the United States opposes sanctions. We feel they have never worked. They didn't work against a weak state like Italy in 1935, they didn't work against a devastated state like Spain in 1945, and they won't work against a highly developed country with enormous mineral resources like South Africa. And those resources are controlled by the whites, not the blacks, and they are going to use them to insulate themselves from the impact of sanctions. The blacks don't have that protection.

**Africa Report:** But the United States has seen the utility of implementing sanctions against other countries.

**Walters:** Such as?

**Africa Report:** Libya for example.

**Walters:** We haven't demanded of anybody mandatory sanctions [against Libya], but that's what we're being asked to do [in the case of South Africa]. You can't buy a krugerrand in the United States, but you can in the European Community. The United States imposed mandatory embargoes on arms and police equipment to South Africa eight years before the United Nations did. Eight years! You go through the South



**Gen. Vernon Walters:** "I am personally convinced that sanctions would cause incalculable misery to the black people of South Africa"

Saw Lwin/United Nations

African armed forces and you'll find equipment from a lot of countries. You won't find any from the United States. Making this issue—either you're for sanctions or you're for apartheid—is bunk! That is a false issue. The United States is violently against apartheid, but we do not believe that the way to dismantle apartheid is sanctions. For that reason, we are accused of being the creatures of Pretoria. Pretoria doesn't think that—you just read the Afrikaner newspapers and see how friendly they are!

**Africa Report:** But the South African government was very pleased with President Reagan's speech.

**Walters:** That's what the media says, but I'm not sure that the media always reproduces the facts. At least it has been my experience that they often don't. In South Africa, you can get a judge to tell the government that it can't do anything. There are not many other places in Africa where that's true.

**Africa Report:** Certainly the views on sanctions cover a wide gamut. There are those in favor of mandatory economic sanctions. . .

**Walters:** But everybody forgets that the largest black community in South Africa—Inkatha, the Zulus, 10 million, nearly half the black population—is also opposed to sanctions. But they are framing it so that the United States and Britain are the only old reactionary colonial pigs who are opposed to sanctions because they love apartheid. That's nonsense.

**Africa Report:** People objected to the President's speech because of the overall message that it got across to black South Africans. The Eminent Persons Group, for example, is not recommending the toughest sanctions, but some measures, such as refusal of landing rights, to send a message to black South Africans that the United States is standing firmly against apartheid.

**Walters:** There are various forms of apartheid. There are a number of dictatorships in the world and they all have landing rights here. I haven't heard anybody taking away their landing rights.

**Africa Report:** Wouldn't you agree that the apartheid system is somewhat unique in the world?

**Walters:** No, I think there are various forms of apartheid. Some are for the color of your skin and others are for the color of your ideas. They are all equally abhorrent. You look at what Bishop Tutu can say and you look at what the Nicaraguan bishops say and they get thrown out of the country! Is there any demand for sanctions all over the world against Nicaragua?

**Africa Report:** There was much buildup to the President's speech that it was to be the result of the policy reevaluation toward South Africa, and a lot of people's expectations were heightened that the President would announce some new measures.

**Walters:** Who told them this would happen? Who raised these expectations? The media, so they could knock them down afterwards and say, "You see, the speech was nothing!"

**Africa Report:** Did the President's speech offer any new initiatives?

**Walters:** For the first time, he asked for the release of Nelson Mandela. For the first time, he demanded a timetable for the dismantling of apartheid. Those have not happened be-

fore. You do understand that there are 31 countries with embassies in Pretoria. The United States is not the only one. The other countries keep very quiet about that and say the U.S. is maintaining relations with Pretoria. Do you know how many countries have landing rights in South Africa and how many countries give landing rights to South African Airways, among those who are criticizing us the most?

**Africa Report:** But doesn't the United States have an obligation to be in the forefront of these international efforts?

**Walters:** We have a constitution that in 1789 said, "All men are created equal." How long was it before they really became equal? We Americans say we're nobler than the others. We're not nobler than the others! It took us 200 years to give our black people their rights!

**Africa Report:** But the toll of violence in South Africa is mounting daily and violence has increased over the past six years of constructive engagement.

---

**"I think there are various forms of apartheid. Some are for the color of your skin and others are for the color of your ideas. They are all equally abhorrent."**

---

**Walters:** Do you think there is more violence in South Africa or Afghanistan? More people are killed every day in Afghanistan than are killed every month in South Africa. And the tragedy in South Africa is that most of the killings are black on black—the black police and the blacks who are judged to be collaborators and so forth. Not many whites are being killed in all of this.


**Africa Report:** That is a by-product of the apartheid system that fuels internal divisiveness.

**Walters:** I agree and we've got to find a way to dismantle this abhorrent system without destroying that infrastructure that can be a powerhouse. You have countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe that are demanding that the U.S. adopt sanctions. Fifty or more percent of their trade is with South Africa! Most of their products that are exported are exported to South Africa. What happens when the South Africans apply counter-sanctions? How many people will starve in those countries? "Oh let them starve, we've got to have our rights!"—that's not a human solution. The human solution is to get your rights and nobody starve and that's what the United States is trying to do and is so misunderstood.

**Africa Report:** The reaction from most black South Africans. . .

**Walters:** No, I challenge that. I say that the Zulus, who represent 45 percent of the population of South Africa, or the Inkatha movement, is opposed to sanctions. The broad acceptance that all South African blacks are in favor of sanctions is a falsehood.

**Africa Report:** The criticisms of the President's speech were wide-ranging among South African blacks. How does the administration view that reaction?



**Walters:** Well, you'd have to ask the administration. I can talk to you from the United Nations point of view and certainly I myself in this assembly must have spoken 15 times and denounced apartheid as a totally archaic idea that has to go.

**Africa Report:** Isn't there any value in sending a message to black South Africans in the form of. . .

**Walters:** I'd be glad to give you my speeches on the subject of apartheid and you would see that a message has been sent to South Africa.

**Africa Report:** Is there not a value in limited sanctions against South Africa such as the ones that the Eminent Persons Group has recommended?

**Walters:** There is a value. You will hurt the black community. You will not hurt the white community.

**Africa Report:** The sanctions recommended by the Eminent Persons Group are targeted specifically at the white community—refusal of landing rights, removal of consular facilities, freezing of bank accounts in overseas banks—and are not intended to hurt the black community.

**Walters:** Well, some of them may be positive and we may have taken some. As I say, we've banned the sale of kruggerands, which a great many of the countries that are screaming for sanctions haven't done. What I would like to know is what happens to the economies of the frontline states when the South Africans clamp sanctions on them. Nobody has given me an answer to that.

**Africa Report:** The leaders of the frontline states that I have spoken to. . .

**Walters:** "Apply sanctions, we don't care!"

**Africa Report:** No, they are very realistic about it. They say that of course sanctions are going to hurt their economies and that they are going to suffer from them, but the fact remains that they are suffering now already.

**Walters:** They are suffering already? Not to my knowledge.

**Africa Report:** Yes, from South African destabilization.

**Walters:** Hundreds of thousands of their people are working in South Africa, saving them from the unemployment in their countries. Nearly all of their exports are exported through South Africa. For instance, the maintenance of the Zambian railways is done in South Africa. People really haven't thought this through. The United States government is better informed than most people. We weighed very carefully the

impact of sanctions. It would be much easier for us to go along with sanctions—they wouldn't give us any credit for it, they'd say we were dragged into it—but nevertheless, it would ease troubles. I wouldn't have the troubles over there that I have and so forth. That would be the popular thing to do, but it wouldn't be the right thing to do. We know frankly better than most other people what the impact of this would be. Let me put it to you this way: The only place a young black South African today can get the kind of technological training that will make him competitive in the free South Africa of tomorrow is by working for a foreign company. You pull the foreign companies out and you know what he's going to do? He's going back to manual labor.

**Africa Report:** But foreign companies are pulling out of South Africa of their own free will anyway as a function of the increasing violence.

**Walters:** A great many are not. People live in violent climates, it doesn't bother them. If there's money involved, they'll stay. The American firms there are all equal opportunity employers. Last year, the United States gave \$15 million to train young South African blacks. The President in his speech promised additional aid on teaching technology to blacks. That was completely overlooked in the criticism. No one picked that out of the speech. It would be very easy for us to say sanctions. It would also be very wrong. Frankly, we do know more about what's going on there than most other people do, than a group of "eminents" who comes in, spends two weeks, and comes out.

**Africa Report:** The EPG did have very extensive discussions across the political spectrum in South Africa.

**Walters:** Is that comparable to having an embassy that's been there for years and that has hundreds of contacts?

**Africa Report:** I would assume that most of their governments also have embassies in South Africa.

Ray Ellis

**Walters:** Yes, but I quite frankly think that the United States has a greater ability to collect this sort of information, to evaluate the economic consequences.

**Africa Report:** I believe that the EPG came about the closest as anybody has to starting up a negotiating process.

**Walters:** Well, no one is trying harder to get a negotiating process than we are.

**Africa Report:** But is that possible at this point in time?

**Walters:** I think we are moving in that direction. The whites only on the beaches and in the hotels and in transportation is gone.

**Africa Report:** Not completely.

**Walters:** Almost. The hated pass system is gone. Really the two remaining restrictions—and they are big ones—are where the blacks can live and the participation in the political process. How long was it before our blacks began seriously to participate in our political process?

**Africa Report:** But that doesn't make it right.

**Walters:** But you've got to be a little reasonable about it. It's not something you can do overnight even with a free democracy like ours. It took us a very long time before we came to giving our black people anything like equality, a very long time, and that was giving a 10 or 11 percent minority, not an overwhelming majority. So the spectacle of the United States casting stones when its own record isn't all that good bothers me just a little bit.

**Africa Report:** However, I think most of the world looks up to the United States as the upholder of certain values and principles.

**Walters:** I haven't found many people in Africa who look up to the United States, let me be honest with you.

**Africa Report:** I have found just the opposite.

**Walters:** I find exactly the same thing—that the United States loves apartheid, that the United States is supporting Pretoria, that the United States is this, that, and the other, which is emotional and which I understand, except that it isn't factual.

**Africa Report:** I think one has to give some weight to Africans' views on these subjects. Clearly they feel that very deeply.

**Walters:** I do too. But let me just put it to you another way. I'm a Catholic. There are a hundred priests, including the 86-year-old bishop of Shanghai, in jail in China for 40 years. Who's demanding sanctions against China? There are various forms of apartheid but not all of them relate to the color of the skin. Don't you think that Andrei Sakharov in Gorki is a victim of apartheid?

**Africa Report:** But the system of apartheid is an anomaly. It is the only system that legally enshrines racism.

**Walters:** I think it is too. Some people legalize it and some people just practice it in various forms.

**Africa Report:** But the United States is . . .

**Walters:** . . . is holier than thou and therefore should be different. That's nonsense. We're not. Our crime rate is one of the highest in the world. Who are we to sit on a virtuous pinnacle and lecture everybody?

**Africa Report:** But we do in other cases.

**Walters:** We do in some cases, but not in others.

**Africa Report:** What makes the South African situation different from the others?

**Walters:** Let me give it to you in one thing. With all the cruelty of apartheid, with all the moral repugnance of apartheid, black workers are still flowing into South Africa for jobs there. In Cuba, 2 million people have fled the country. Who's for sanctions against Cuba?

**Africa Report:** In terms of the number of black southern Africans who are required to go into South Africa for work, a large part of it is due to the way the southern African system has been built to be dependent upon South Africa.

**Walters:** When we put on sanctions and the South African economy slows down, who are going to be the first fired? The white workers? I understand emotion. If I were black, I would probably feel differently, but as I try to look at it in a realistic way, do we want to literally throw millions of black workers out of work? They get very little margin in their life sustenance. In the U.S. if there is a strike or something, people belong to unions, they have unemployment insurance, etc. These people are not even South African citizens. They don't have any of that protection. They are going to be thrown out of work, probably expelled back to the countries of their origin and what's going to happen to them? I don't want my country to be a party to the creation of that much misery. I'd rather see it in there fighting to dismantle apartheid, a medieval idea

---

**“I don't think the way to dismantle apartheid is by picking up your marbles and saying I'm leaving the game, I'm not having any more to do with them. You've got to stay in there and press change and press change and press quick change on them.”**

---

which has no place in this century. But I don't think the way you dismantle apartheid is by picking up your marbles and saying I'm leaving the game, I'm not having anything more to do with those pigs. You've got to stay in there and press change and press change and press quick change on them.

**Africa Report:** For example, if you take Senator Kassebaum's remarks in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, she is not one to advocate just cutting and running. But she was very clear about stating that it is time that the United States sent a message that unless South Africa comes up with a definite move to change. . .

**Walters:** But is South Africa the only country in the world to send a message to about wrong things? These issues exist elsewhere! In Romania, practically every Catholic church is closed and nearly all the bishops are in jail! Where is the thrust of people saying we must do something about this? It seems to me that if we have a position, it has to be coherent and not a selective thing of sanctions and non-sanctions. I am personally convinced, apart from being a member of this administration, that what we are doing is right, that if we were to change this

policy, it would cause incalculable misery to the black people of South Africa, not to the whites, who have enough margin in their economy that they would suffer no real hardship, at least for many years.

**Africa Report:** I still maintain that given the criticism of the President's speech, the Congress is calling for some sort. . .

**Walters:** You understand that in the media, criticizing the President is one of the top national sports. It exceeds both baseball and football.

**Africa Report:** Nevertheless, we can't ignore the bipartisan criticism of the President's speech and that is indicative of a wide-spread feeling that it is time for the United States to take some measures that will apply pressure on South Africa.

**Walters:** The United States has long before anybody else did. You are just disregarding facts and pushing them aside as though they didn't exist! The United States in 1962—24 years ago—embargoed all arms sales to South Africa. And you're talking about giving a signal. The United States has been giving signals long before anybody else!

**Africa Report:** But the signals that have been coming out of the constructive engagement policy have been perceived as the United States giving Pretoria the benefit of the doubt.

**Walters:** That's bunk! Read the Afrikaner press, what they say about the United States—betrayal, siding with the blacks against their white brothers, disgraceful, disgusting! What African state do they want us to pattern ourselves on? Read the Afrikaner press sometime.

**Africa Report:** The administration seems to be sending contradictory signals concerning the African National Congress. On the one hand, the President called for the release of Nelson Mandela and unbanning of all political parties and Secretary Shultz said he would meet with Oliver Tambo, and on the other hand, the President made some harsh references to the ANC. . . He said, "The South African government has no obligation to negotiate the future with an organization that proclaims a goal of creating a communist state," and condemned the "Soviet-armed guerrillas of the ANC" for terrorism. What is the administration's policy on the ANC?

**Walters:** I don't think there is any contradiction in that. We meet with the Soviets. They have a system that is abhorrent to us. We meet with them all the time. So what's the contradiction? You talk about the President's criticism. The harshest anti-American language I have ever heard across the street did not come from the Soviets, it came from the ANC representative and it was filled with Marxist clichés. Do we really want the South African people to go from a regime of apartheid to a regime of totalitarian dictatorship? Is that the only two alternatives we have? We think there's a third, where you can get the people to live together like you have in Kenya, for instance.

**Africa Report:** Are you saying then that if the ANC comes to power, it will be a totalitarian dictatorship?

**Walters:** I don't know. I fear that there is a very powerful totalitarian influence in the ANC and I don't think they deny it.

**Africa Report:** People felt the same way about Robert Mugabe and he didn't turn out to be a totalitarian dictator.

**Walters:** Is it a democracy? Is there more than one party there? I don't believe in one-party states.



Susan E. Dorfman

**Johannesburg:** "The American firms there are all equal opportunity employers"

**Africa Report:** According to the Eminent Persons Group, even Gatsha Buthelezi has said that he would be prepared to work under a government led by Nelson Mandela, and that he holds him in very high regard.

**Walters:** Well, I think that's a high expression that he believes in a multi-party state. Have we heard from the ANC that they believe in a multi-party state?

**Africa Report:** Given that black South Africans don't even have the right to participate politically. . .

**Walters:** Bishop Tutu can stand up and say anything he wants, and there are not many countries in which you can do that.

**Africa Report:** But a lot of other people can't. Look at the number of people who were arrested under the state of emergency!

**Walters:** But I would estimate that in the Soviet Union, there are 500 times as many people arrested as are arrested in South Africa.

**Africa Report:** Bishop Tutu probably hasn't been arrested by virtue of his international prominence. Look at the number of labor leaders. . .

**Walters:** Do you read the South African opposition press? Do you know many dictatorships where the opposition press can say the things they say? Listen, apartheid is an immoral and dreadful thing and it must go, but I must make the point that there are several kinds of apartheid, not all of which are related to the color of the skin, and the victims of the other kind of apartheid suffer just as much as those of South African apartheid. And yet I see no mobilization, no call for sanctions against people who are persecuting people under the other kind of apartheid. And it seems to me that one of our great efforts should be to be coherent. We want to help the South African community, not destroy it, and we want the blacks to be able to live and use the infrastructure of that country to be a locomotive for the whole of southern Africa, and if you encour-

age the violence as the ANC encourages violence, it will be difficult.

**Africa Report:** The ANC's history has been non-violent, and it only turned to violent means when it felt there was no other option.

**Walters:** Well, I've got to follow 158 countries and I don't follow as much as that, but I have looked into the question of sanctions and apartheid, and I must say that I agree with the U.S. government's position. I think it would be a cruel thing to the black population of South Africa for the United States to apply economic sanctions. The white community—they are cushioned, they can stand it. The blacks can't. You take all these exports of food from South Africa—what happens to the black agricultural workers who farm those? You've got to live with realities. Emotionally you say, "Let them starve and then we get freedom." It's not that easy.

**Africa Report:** Turning to another issue, the United Nations, do the U.S. reductions in its financial commitments to the UN indicate that it is questioning the utility of the organization?

**Walters:** I would point out that those reductions do not come from the administration, they come from Congress. President Reagan has been here [at the UN] four times, he will come a fifth time I hope. No president of the United States has ever come that often. The United States is the only country in the United Nations whose ambassador is a member of the cabinet. Donald Regan made a speech recently to the UN Association in which he referred to the importance the U.S. attaches to the United Nations. No, the United States is not withdrawing from the United Nations. The United States is not even asking that its contribution be reduced.

**Africa Report:** Do you agree with the Kassebaum amendment which calls for weighing votes according to financial contributions?

**Walters:** Well, it's the law of the land. Whether I agree with it or not is immaterial—it is the law of the land and as such I must apply it.

**Africa Report:** The administration has made it very clear that how a nation votes in the United Nations will have an impact upon bilateral relations.

**Walters:** I don't think it has. I have mentioned it in Congress, but I don't think the U.S. government per se has made any such statement.

**Africa Report:** As far as Africa is concerned. . .

**Walters:** You know that no country in Africa votes more than 25 percent of the time with us. It's difficult to be wrong 75 percent of the time! It really is.

**Africa Report:** But according to the study that the U.S. Mission to the UN put out, the U.S. was outvoted most of the time by most of the countries. What I am questioning is, why some countries, such as Zimbabwe or Burkina Faso for example, have suffered aid cuts in connection with voting patterns at the United Nations, whereas other countries. . .

**Walters:** I would say in the case of Zimbabwe, and I may be wrong, it's rather more its human rights and its one-party nature that have caused the cuts rather than its voting pattern in the United Nations.

**Africa Report:** But Zimbabwe did suffer an immediate cut

after its vote on the Korean airliner incident.

**Walters:** Yes, I believe it did. I believe the Congress was very irritated at that.

**Africa Report:** But there are other countries which vote against the U.S. nearly as often which don't seem to suffer the same effect on their aid levels.

**Walters:** Really? That's very interesting. I don't know, but I don't think very many countries received as much aid as Zimbabwe did, certainly on a per capita basis.

**Africa Report:** Take Egypt for example.

**Walters:** Yes, Egypt gets a lot of assistance—it's a special situation related to the Middle East—and Egypt doesn't have that good a voting record.

**Africa Report:** What is your view of the UN Special Session on the African economic crisis?

**Walters:** I think that was a tremendously positive success. I think that for the first time, they understood that the primary problems of Africa are food. Food makes everything else possible. You can't be educated if you're hungry. Food is what does everything. For the first time, they turned away from this dream of everybody having a steel mill—it's producing food to feed the people.

But on this question of political voting patterns, let me just explain to you that probably no country votes against the United States more than Ethiopia.

**Africa Report:** I think Angola does.

**Walters:** The United States last year gave Ethiopia \$1 billion in food, as much as the whole rest of the world put together. I don't think the United States has anything to be ashamed of in its relationship to Africa. I think the United States has shown extraordinary concern for Africa. The President I believe said in his speech that we will apply \$45 million to the black community in South Africa.

You're right—Angola is the worst, followed by Algeria, Mozambique, Libya, Benin, and Ethiopia. The top is the Ivory Coast, which votes with us 27 percent of the time.

**Africa Report:** On the special session, some critics felt that Africa came away with empty hands, that they had taken all these very realistic policy measures, but were expecting the international community to be more forthcoming.

**Walters:** Just like a Marshall Plan. I was one of the nine people who went to the Marshall Plan with Mr. Harriman. We didn't promise anybody anything except that we would try and help them. When they got together and came up with positive programs that would benefit their economies, we gave them \$44 billion. That's what we are hoping will happen now. That the Africans will get together—you have starvation in one country, you have plenty in another, because you can't cross the border. The border was fixed by Europeans in the first place, it has nothing to do with African ethnic reality.

Everybody forgets one fundamental fact. The United States is the fifth largest black power in the world. Only Nigeria, Brazil, Ethiopia, and Zaire have more black people than we do. The welfare of the black people is very important to us. We all know that we live in the middle of them and they're our friends. We want them to get their rights and we think that we're doing it the right way. A lot of people may not think so, but we think this is the right way to go. □

# Conversation with Luke J. Mwananshiku Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zambia

## **On the future of South Africa:**

The United States government should look at the problem of South Africa in a slightly different way than it is at the moment. Because of misrule by the colonial powers in Angola and Mozambique, we have ended up with a situation where Marxists have taken over. We may well end up with exactly the same situation in South Africa—because the American government is not being helpful to the people who are struggling. The British government is not being helpful to the people who are struggling. On the contrary, the two governments are standing on the side of injustice and have even refused, until recently, to meet with the African National Congress and Swapo, to just have a word with them so that they can explain what their aspirations are.

As long as the major countries take that position, the people have absolutely no way of looking to them for support and guidance. Instead, what's happening is that the people are looking to the other countries, principally to Eastern Europe, for support and assistance. And they are now being blamed for looking to the East after the West has rejected them. We know very well that in South Africa, we will end up with a very, very difficult situation. When you look at the funerals in South Africa, it was the flags of the African National Congress that were prominently displayed. But now, people have moved away from that. You now see more of the hammer and sickle at the funerals, which says that the black people are moving to the left.

If there is no movement in South Africa, both on the Namibia issue and on the internal situation, you may find that when the time comes to hand over power to the black majority, power will be handed over to Marxists. And if South Africa becomes a Marxist state, there is no way a country such as Namibia, even after independence, can withstand its power. There is no way Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, and even Zimbabwe and Zambia can stand up to South Africa. So we may well get the entire southern African region all turned Marxist—not because the people want to go that way, but because they haven't been given support by the Western countries. This is our greatest worry and our greatest concern.

## **On Western opposition to sanctions:**

The positions that have been taken by both Britain and America are what we regard as short-sighted. They have

taken those positions basically because they want to protect their heavy investments in South Africa. We recognize those investments ourselves, and that's why we are pleading that the transition in South Africa should be as peaceful as possible. This is why, as Africans, we invested so much in the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. It was our hope that the group would succeed, and then the interests of the United States and Britain and our interests would be served all at the same time, because in a sense all these interests are identical.

But in the event that our American and British brothers don't assist us, they will not be capable of controlling the situation in South Africa. The momentum that has started in South Africa cannot be arrested by what is happening in Washington and London. The chances are that what is happening in South Africa itself will produce the results. But what is worrying us a great deal is that when the change comes, the U.S. government, the British government, and the West German government will completely be irrelevant to the situation on the ground. In those circumstances, their interests will be at risk.

When these governments are identifying themselves so closely with their investments and throwing justice aside, there is no way you can expect the Africans of South Africa, who have suffered so much under apartheid, to be as malleable as the Africans of Zimbabwe were. In Zimbabwe, we were all reasonable. Although we lost 50,000 people, at the end of the day, the agreements were signed and everybody was shaking hands with each other. But one doesn't see that situation being repeated in South Africa. The conditions in South Africa are completely different. One doesn't see how, for example, the ANC will be indifferent to what has happened.

It is true that we need the external pressure, but the internal pressure is quite considerable, and it could be backed up eventually by considerable support from outside. That is the problem. There is a way in which the actions of the governments of the Western countries are becoming irrelevant to what is going on in South Africa.

## **On British policy toward South Africa:**

We hope Prime Minister Thatcher changes her position. I reckon that she doesn't understand how strongly we feel about the whole problem of apartheid. I think this is probably her difficulty—that she just doesn't understand how strongly we feel about it! The people who are dying are our own



brothers, you see. Some of our languages are identical with the people, we are completely interchangeable. So, we feel strongly about it. Sanctions for us is not a matter of sentiment. It's not something that we call for easily or lightly because we know that they will affect us very, very strongly. We know that they will also affect the black people in South Africa. But one has to count costs. Is it better for us to go on as it is at the present moment—a situation of oppression and death? That's the alternative we have to look at. For Mrs. Thatcher, her alternative is different. Her alternative to sanctions is getting more money out of South Africa.

Our objective is completely different. We want apartheid to be abolished, not only because of the problems that our colleagues in South Africa suffer from, but also because of the whole regional politics in southern Africa, and even more importantly—and this has to be stressed—because the white population of South Africa needs to be saved too, because at the moment they are taking a headlong dive toward a ditch and they just don't know how to handle the situation. We have said as far back as 1969 that the white population of South Africa belongs there, they have to live there. We don't want them to leave. We have no way of pushing them out at all.

Even our colleagues in Zimbabwe are willing to accept back those people who left Zimbabwe and went to South Africa. They are willing to accept them because we believe in the principle that it is not the white people we are fighting against—we are fighting against the system. Once the system has been abolished, then we'll all be free to live as human beings, as equal partners in a free society. That's all we are fighting for. So we don't want the American and British governments to complicate our politics. We want to prevent injustice in South Africa and we also want to save the white population in South Africa.

I went to the university in Rhodesia. I spent three years there. At that time, the conflict between the black and white populations was such that you almost saw it on the street. I could never go into a place and buy a Coke. I would be told to go and drink outside because I am black. You felt that kind of bitterness and tensions among the various racial groups. But when I went to Zimbabwe recently, I found a whole different place. Everybody feels free, everybody's just an individual—that's all. You go into a shop and everybody says good morning. You feel confident, you feel that everyone is just a human being. Never should a person be judged by his color.

That is eventually what one wants to see emerge in South Africa—a situation where they can live side by side, not where we see the white people driven out by whoever gets into power in South Africa. That is not our policy. And we have explained that to the ANC, and they have accepted it. We really want to remove injustice, but also to make it possible for our white brothers and sisters to live in peace with us. That's really what we are striving for.

It's quite clear that Margaret Thatcher just doesn't understand how intensely we feel about the problems in South Africa. In some ways we understand, because she hasn't gone through this same process. Never in her life has she been

discriminated against, and she has actually been on the side of those who have been benefitting from the system. Therefore, she doesn't understand our problem or try to sympathize with what we are saying.

### On the Commonwealth and South Africa:

What we want Mrs. Thatcher to do is to agree that we take some measures which will have the effect of weakening the economy of South Africa. We all know that apartheid is being maintained by the economy of South Africa. All governments are maintained by taxation that comes from the economy. We must take some measures—some substantive measures—not just banning the sale of krugerrands, but something that is substantive, something that will help us to move South Africa. What in fact we want is not to impose sanctions to destroy the economy of South Africa. That's not our business or our desire. We want sanctions which will persuade South Africa to come to the conference table. Nothing else. That's all. They come to the conference table and sit down with authentic leaders of the black population, and they agree on something—what that something is, that's not our business to determine. But we want a situation where everybody can live in peace, in justice, and without discrimination. That's all we are asking.

If Margaret Thatcher agrees to some measures which will enable us to put more pressure on South Africa, then we will be able to parley. But as we have said already, it's very, very difficult for us to sit with her as if nothing has happened, because she has now joined sides with South Africa. And if you see the statements she has made, you are just amazed how she's completely callous and indifferent. I understand it because she hasn't gone through the situation, but we have. One good hotel in Lusaka before independence had a notice outside the door saying, "Africans and dogs are not allowed." We have gone through this kind of thing, you see.

And so, Mrs. Thatcher should at least give us the benefit of the doubt that we are concerned about this and that we are genuinely not interested in destroying the economy of South Africa. We thought that the Commonwealth group made a lot of progress and that it would encourage South Africa to come to the conference table. If they had been able to do that, all of us would have been very, very pleased to say, "We all can now move forward and be at peace, one with the other."

In southern Africa, we have serious problems to resolve. The Mozambican economy, for example, is being ground to a halt by South Africa, right now. And Margaret Thatcher speaks about these things as if there's nothing happening on the ground. All our routes to the sea are under attack by South Africa's agents. It's a very, very serious problem for us. But at the end of the day, all we want is for South Africa to be in peace. It's not our intention to urge the ANC or any other group in South Africa to say away with the white population. It's not practical. There are more white people in Kenya after independence than before. There are more white people in Zambia now than before independence. We want them to live in peace. □



**...great revolutions...** *"We know lots of revolutions, great revolutions, and magnificent people, who after taking over power, produced systems that were much worse than the ones they destroyed. We don't want to make this mistake. We will not."*

--Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa in a "Morning Edition" interview in Gdansk, Poland, with National Public Radio's European correspondent Neal Conan.

**"I never share blame, I never share credit, and I never share desserts. It's just not my style."**


--Beverly Sills, New York City Opera general director, in an interview on National Public Radio's "Morning Edition."

**"Drunk they (the Russians) defeated Napoleon. Drunk they beat Hitler. Drunk they could win against NATO."**

--Edward Luttwak, defense analyst and author of "The Pentagon and the Art of War," talking with National Public Radio's "Morning Edition" host Bob Edwards about Soviet military strength.

**"We are so different, and yet, we are all one."** *"I've never seen so many women, of so many different ages, colors, sizes and shapes, and I think it's amazing. We are so different, and yet, we are all one."*

--A delegate to the United Nations' World Conference on Women, talking with National Public Radio's "All Things Considered" co-host Susan Stamberg in Nairobi, Kenya.



National Public Radio brings you the comments of the people who make the news. And the people who interpret it. With "Morning Edition" weekday mornings. "All Things Considered" every evening. And now, "Weekend Edition" on Saturdays.

Tune in for news that takes you beyond the headlines and into the minds of thoughtful people.

For a list of the more than 300 NPR member stations, call toll-free 800-822-2300 or 202-822-2331. Or send a postcard to: STATION LIST, National Public Radio, Audience Services, 2025 M St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. And tell us where you saw this ad.

**National Public Radio**  
**Worth every minute.**

# Making Foreign Policy: the Congress and Apartheid

The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee discusses what has caused American legislators to alter the course of U.S. policy toward Pretoria, arguing for a more rigorous application in the South African context of the moral principles basic to the American democratic system.

BY RICHARD G. LUGAR

Congressman Parren Mitchell stared at me across the large conference table. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee room in the Capitol was packed with senators, congressmen, and staff trying to work out a compromise on legislation imposing sanctions against South Africa. Television lights splashed the room with an intense glare as everyone focused on Mitchell.

"I am a very, very proud man," the Maryland Democrat said. He had been in the vanguard of the civil rights movement all his life. When he was a boy, blacks in America were still lynching victims. Now in his last term in Congress, Mitchell said he was asking for a favor.

"I'm pleading with you today, you and your Senate conferees. I'm pleading with you to take that one quantum step so that this nation can hold its head high in the international community."

The one step Mitchell wanted was a ban on the import sales of the South African gold coin, the krugerrand. It was a key issue dividing the House and Senate in 1985 when we attempted to initiate a new policy toward the racist government of South Africa.

South Africa is a political issue full of symbolism and intense emotion for Americans. It is a foreign policy issue strongly tied to our own troubled racial history.

At that conference meeting in 1985, I considered the arguments of astute critics who charged that the krugerrand ban was superficial tokenism, and would have no effect. One Republican con-

gressman at the conference contended that thousands of South African black miners would become unemployed, with a ripple effect impoverishing thousands more, if we stopped American imports of the South African gold coin.

Yet Parren Mitchell knew, and I knew, that those South African gold coins symbolized wealth, mined by black men into a stream of government export treasure and prestige, used to maintain the hated status quo.

Late in the afternoon, I said "yes" to Parren Mitchell. In the hour following his deeply moving plea, I had concluded that if the House and Senate Conference Committee and substantial majorities of Republicans and Democrats in both houses were to agree on our country's policy toward South Africa, inclusion of the krugerrand import ban was the necessary bridge. Somehow, I had to convince the president that this important signal action would make a difference in our relationship with South Africa.

President Reagan did agree to ban krugerrands and take a number of other actions against South Africa the next month. But the issue did not go away. South Africa was back on the political agenda in 1986 in Congress and will



**"The important goal for us must be reform of a friendly country with whom we want to remain in close association"**

probably stay there for some time to come.

The campaign demanding congressional action against South Africa began on Thanksgiving in 1984. At least three Americans a day thereafter deliberately protested "too closely" to the South African embassy in Washington and were routinely arrested for trespassing, led away by police, and then promptly released.

The protesters received national publicity, but most Americans outside of Washington were initially confused about or indifferent to their activity. After a long election campaign, the country was in a placid mood during the transition from election to inauguration.

One view was that Americans who were exercised about human rights should get their priorities straight: the Soviet Union's treatment of its citizens and its satellites is worse than apartheid. In Africa itself, the predominance of cruel, authoritarian regimes suppressing people who subsist in dire poverty and on the brink of starvation fueled the arguments of Africa observers who pointed out that people were striving to get into South Africa and not the other way around.

We are seldom able to see totalitarian Communist suppression of human liberty before our eyes. There is no nightly television coverage of the brutal treatment of religious dissidents and political prisoners in the Soviet Union. Nor have we seen the slaughter of 3 million people by the Khmer Rouge regime in Kampuchea because American television cameras are no longer in Indochina.

By contrast, until late in 1985 when South Africa enforced a ban on television coverage of troubled areas, we watched the daily conflict between the South African government and South African blacks. Apartheid became an important American political serial, and it could not be talked away.

South Africa is an emotional issue to Americans because it evokes the memory of racial conflict in our own country and recalls how recently blacks were denied equal opportunity. Americans empathize with South African blacks and embrace them as suffering brothers.

President Reagan's policy toward South Africa has been called "construc-



**June 14, 1986, rally in New York City: "A foreign policy issue strongly tied to our own troubled racial history"**

ive engagement." It has meant quiet diplomacy, a vigorous behind-the-scenes attempt to enlist South Africa's help in gaining independence for neighboring Namibia, resolving conflict in Mozambique, and forcing Cuban troops from Angola. The Carter administration was very critical of South Africa's white regime. The Reagan administration wanted to use South Africa to stop Communist insurgency throughout southern Africa—a policy that had some success.

The Reagan policy, however, was not a success at ending apartheid. In contrast to the Carter administration's attacks on South Africa, the Reagan administration hoped that friendship and quiet pressure would convince the South African government to reform its racist domestic policies. Both policies, while full of good intentions, failed to change the attitudes of white South Afri-

cans or the miserable plight of blacks in that country.

Racial unrest in South Africa is not new to Americans. Violent protests in Soweto over the course of many years focused our attention there. But by late 1984, the South African apartheid issue offered a rallying point for black and white citizens who wanted to make a dramatic statement about racism in the political dialogue of this country. To black Americans and many whites, constructive engagement became a code word for American support of apartheid. They argued that the United States should end all support for South Africa through business disinvestment.

Black South African Bishop Desmond Tutu, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984 for his opposition to apartheid, called constructive engagement "an evil policy." He charged that United States policy had led the South African government to take the United States for granted in confidence that we would not protest in any significant

Odette Lupis

way—either about apartheid or other repressive actions against South African blacks.

I have made the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the stage for the debate on South Africa. The foreign policy problem is how to take action as a country, administratively or legislatively, publicly or privately, that would bring pressure on the dominant white government of South Africa to change promptly and to negotiate power-sharing with black South Africans.

My preparation for this initiative began in 1964 in Indianapolis, where I first served on the School Board and then as mayor. American cities were hit by civil disorder and rioting in the mid-1960s, when many blacks turned to violence because of segregation and frustrated opportunities.

On April 4, 1968, Martin Luther King was assassinated in Memphis. Cities all across the United States exploded with black protests. On that night, in Indianapolis, New York Senator Robert F. Kennedy planned a large outdoor rally in an extremely volatile section of the city. As the new mayor, I was deeply concerned about Kennedy's safety. He was running for president in the May 7 Indiana Democratic primary, which he won, only to be assassinated a month later in California.

I had been meeting on street corners and in church basements of my city for a long time, holding hands with black leaders and dissidents, seeking reconciliation, praying for a future together in equality and prosperity.

Indianapolis did not blow up that night and never did. The lines of communication kept anger and frustration in check. I listened and tried to respond promptly to every street corner scheme in those days. Many were poorly thought out, but they represented the simple emotional strivings for expression and recognition that were a natural response to the anger and frustration of the times.

The problem in South Africa is that no one in power is listening. That is why the United States and the other democracies of the world have to.

As we debate policy initiatives for the future, we must understand some basic elements of economic and political change in South Africa. The white gov-

ernment has made South Africa almost self-sufficient. Although the South African economy would be severely crippled by an international trade embargo, the political will of the white minority leadership is such that they may "circle the wagons and stick to their guns."

Economic sanctions may not bring change, but they do send a strong message. The message is that change must occur. Neither the United States nor any other country can dictate to South Africa. What we can do is show support for those demanding and working for democratic reform, and possibly provide a framework for that reform. New political institutions will be established only by negotiations between racial groups. Only South African whites, blacks, and all the various ethnic groups can discuss power-sharing and a possi-

---

**"The American people are a strong determinant of foreign policy, when moral issues such as freedom and human rights become an argument, and cannot be ignored by policy-makers."**

---

ble constitutional structure. Only South Africans can establish a peaceful and orderly future for themselves.

Four important political figures in South Africa today could be significant instruments of that change. One is P. W. Botha, or whoever succeeds him as leader of the National Party. The second is Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, leader of the Zulu tribe. The third is Nelson Mandela, who has been in prison for 21 years. He is a powerful, legendary figure, and what he would do if he came out of prison no one knows. The fourth is Dr. Frederick van zyl Slabbert, leader of the Progressive Party.

State President P.W. Botha may move cautiously to mitigate the severity of the influx laws and to begin some form of black political participation in local affairs in an overall unitary state framework. The release of Mandela

from prison would accelerate either conflict or negotiations, and probably both. Dr. Slabbert, a vigorous moderate Afrikaner who now leads the official white opposition party, has forged an alliance with Chief Buthelezi. Their activities are encouraging to all outside of South Africa who are searching for a glimmer of hope.

Slabbert has called for the unconditional release of Mandela, for granting blacks complete freedom of movement, and for restoring freedom of association and creating a constitution based on one citizenship without entrenched racial domination. That constitution would have to be drafted in such a way as to protect the existence of each race. It would recognize that there are equally democratic ways to run one-person, one-vote elections other than the British parliamentary mold which assists majority domination and does not well serve multi-ethnic societies, particularly one with South Africa's history of racial hatred and violence.

However, both extremist white and black power centers in South Africa still feel confident of *total* victory. The next few years are likely to be filled with violent action and suppression. Whites feel confident that they have the guns. They have barely begun to demonstrate how ruthless and determined they are prepared to be. Nonetheless, some whites have already started to leave South Africa for Australia, Argentina, and the United States. Blacks are confident that they have the numbers and simple justice on their side; that the tide of history is strongly in their favor on the African continent.

How should American foreign policy address South Africa in the future? I believe our actions need to consider the following points:

- Moral outrage over perceived injustice in the world plays a strong part in our foreign policy. It is as important as our strategic and economic interests. The American people are a strong determinant of foreign policy, when moral issues such as freedom and human rights become an argument, and cannot be ignored by policy-makers. This idealistic factor in American foreign policy makes our interests much more universal and often causes us to act alone.

- The cause of freedom and justice in the world is strong. If the United States does not ally itself with those movements demanding human rights, the Soviets and other totalitarian ideologies will manipulate them for their own purposes. Just as the United States lends support to freedom fighters against Soviet-backed regimes, we should help friendly but authoritarian countries become more democratic. This is the case not only for South Africa, but also for the Philippines and Chile.
- After we decide to try to change the human rights conduct of another government, we must consider the geopolitical situation and its effect on U.S.-Soviet relations. The Carter administration's preoccupation with the human rights issue and the early Reagan administration preoccupation with Soviet relations were both potentially disastrous in the South African case.
- Economic sanctions send a strong message to those countries whose human rights policies we dislike. Even if sanctions are often ineffective, and even costly to us, they are an expression of political morality basic to America's de-

mocracy and our role in the world.

- When possible, as with South Africa, economic sanctions should be carefully targeted. They should address how fundamental governmental and social reform in a friendly country might be assisted without destabilizing the country and leading to a less desirable alternative.
- We should use our influence and our economic assistance in South Africa in a "hands-on" manner to support those community, commercial, and legal interests working for equal opportunity and treatment.
- We should reject calls for total disinvestment, total withdrawal, and total economic sanctions. Although the emotional appeal to treat South Africa as we do Cuba, Libya, or the Soviet Union is strong, the important goal for us must be reform of a friendly country with whom we want to remain in close association. We want to be involved in change while the situation is still fluid.
- We cannot force one-man, one-vote government on South Africa or any other multi-ethnic society. While this has great emotional appeal in our coun-

try, in its pure form it is truly non-negotiable in South Africa. Our demands for fundamental human rights, economic and political freedom, and citizenship which must include universal individual voting, still leaves room for a unique constitutional system in which one-man, one-vote principles could be utilized by a South African government.

- We should use our influence to keep open as many options as possible. Political polarization and economic decline hurt the chances for a peaceful solution in South Africa.
- Simple luck plays a role. By attempting to be a trusted and stable friend to both white and black South Africans and to encourage their progress because it helps our progress, we risk being pushed off the tightrope act by righteous and emotional persons in both countries who claim that they would feel better with conditions leading to total civil war. We need to try to stay involved in writing a peace treaty before, and not after, the war. □

*Senator Richard G. Lugar, Republican of Indiana, is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.*

## BLACK LIBERATION THEOLOGY



### AFRICAN CRY

by JEAN-MARC ELA

Jean-Marc Ela, a Cameroonian theologian lays bare his vision of how the Catholic Church can become truly African: by breaking with a colonial culture, by assuming the condition of the "damned of the earth," and by embracing the justice-making God of the Exodus. Ela offers a constructive program for the renewal of African church and society.

"Ela . . . shows that he is a committed African theologian, in search of a renewal sadly needed in contemporary Africa."  
—*Bulletin of African Theology* \$10.95

### THE UNQUESTIONABLE RIGHT TO BE FREE

#### Black Theology From South Africa

Edited by ITUMELENG J. MOSALA and BUTI TLHAGALE

" . . . we discover the clarity of the gospel message ringing true in the struggle against apartheid." —JAMES H. CONE

"The most significant collection on black theology to come out of South Africa in the last fifteen years." —JOHN DE GRUCHY  
\$11.95 pbk

### HEARING AND KNOWING

#### Theological Reflections on Christianity in Africa

by MERCY AMBA ODUYOYE

Mercy Amba Oduyoye attempts to liberate African Christians from "pre-digested theologies" and to stimulate theological talk that is relevant to Africa's cultural heritage and socio-political realities. "Oduyoye's writings are like a breath of fresh air to women in ministry and in the church."

—KATIE CANNON, Episcopal Divinity School \$9.95

### BLACK AND AFRICAN THEOLOGIES

#### Siblings or Distant Cousins?

by JOSIAH U. YOUNG

Young has written a comprehensive study on the concerns of black theology in North America—liberation from white oppression—and African theology—indigenization.

"A brilliant contribution to scholarship on African theology and black theology." —GLORIA WADE-GAYLES, Spellman College  
\$12.95 pbk



At bookstores or from the publisher

**ORBIS BOOKS**  
Maryknoll, NY 10545

VISA and MC orders accepted

# The Sanctions Debate

In the course of a three-day congressional hearing on South Africa in late July, Senator Kennedy testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the need to apply strong economic sanctions against Pretoria. He also argues for increased aid to the southern African nations vulnerable to South African reprisals.

BY EDWARD M. KENNEDY

I am here to urge the members of this committee to act quickly to approve legislation imposing strong economic sanctions against the government of South Africa. I support a federal law mandating divestment by U.S. corporations in South Africa, and imposing an embargo on U.S. trade with that nation. I hope that this committee will follow the lead of the House of Representatives and adopt the legislation we have proposed to achieve this goal. Diplomatic pressure is not enough. Constructive engagement has failed. Strong economic pressure—in the form of comprehensive sanctions against the apartheid government of South Africa—is now imperative.

As Bishop Desmond Tutu said in June: "There is no guarantee that sanctions will topple apartheid, but it is the last nonviolent option left."

Many of us regret that Congress did not act last year. We cannot let another year go by. The policy of the administration is a disgrace and an embarrassment. The Congress must act to put the United States back on the right side of history and human rights.

There are several reasons why Congress should move now to require U.S. companies to sever their ties with South Africa.

Whether we like it or not, whether *they* like it or not, American business is propping up apartheid and playing into the hands of the racist regime. American dollars invested in South Africa and American profits re-invested in that economy contribute to the care and feeding of the institutions of apartheid.

It is true that American corporations in South Africa have worked to improve the conditions of their employees; it is true that they are attempting to use their influence to end apartheid. But their presence and their profits speak louder than their protests. Lesser steps have failed. The time for immediate comprehensive divestment has come. It is time for the United States Congress to say that American business has no business in South Africa.

Our continued involvement in the economy of South Africa only implicates us deeper in apartheid in the eyes of the black majority. So long as American corporations prominently participate in the economy of apartheid, the United States will be held responsible for the continuation of apartheid. It is time for us to say enough is enough. We will no longer be part of a system that systematically oppresses 26 million people.

Without strong action from the United States, the other Western nations will also delay. The eyes of the world are on the United States. With Canada and Europe, we account for 96 percent of all direct investment in South Africa; with the United Kingdom and West Germany, the United States accounts for 65 percent of that investment. Acting alone, we can make a significant difference; acting with other nations, we can make an even greater difference. But first we must lead the way.

The situation in South Africa over the past year has gone from very bad to much, much worse. Over 2,000 people have died since September 1984; over 100 have been killed in the last 30 days alone. Even as we speak, South Africa is descending into what could be the longest and bloodiest civil war in history.

The violence and brutality of the current repression in South Africa is unparalleled even for that brutal regime. Since the state of emergency was imposed on June 12, over 4,000 political leaders have been arrested and detained. The entire leadership of the black South African trade unions is in jail or in hiding.

Imagine what the impact would be in the United States if 4,000 of our leaders were suddenly arrested and imprisoned by the government. This is the policy of a government that is not interested in negotiation or reconciliation. It is the policy of a government that is interested only in maintaining power whatever the cost in human life and suffering.

The experience of the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group is instructive. The group was formed under the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa agreed to



U.S. Senate

by the heads of government of 49 nations meeting in Nassau in October 1985. The group made a courageous effort to mediate between the South African government and its opponents. But the government was unyielding.

According to the report of the EPG: "We draw the conclusion that while the South African government claims to be ready to negotiate, it is in truth not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change, nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, nor to face the prospect of the end of white domination and white power in the foreseeable future."

In the face of such intractability by the South African government, it is no surprise that the EPG reached the conclusion that concerted action by all Western nations in the form of stiff economic sanctions is necessary.

Apartheid is the greatest moral challenge in the world today. But our response to that challenge has been shameful and unworthy.

If there were cause to hope that persuasion might work, if there were reason to think that the apostles of apartheid might change course voluntarily, if there were evidence to suggest that our pleas for justice might be answered, our current policy of constructive engagement might suffice. But there is no sign that constructive engagement is succeeding.

To the contrary, constructive engagement has become synonymous with aid and comfort to racism in South Africa. Instead of the last best hope on earth, the United States of America has become the last best friend of apartheid.

In June, by declaring the broadest and most ruthless state of emergency yet, President Botha of South Africa delivered a final blow to the policy of constructive engage-

July congressional hearings on South Africa. Senators Sarbanes, Kennedy, and Weicker with Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo and Malcolm Fraser, Eminent Persons Group co-chairmen

ment. No matter what the South African government does—no matter how many innocent people are killed, no matter how many neighboring nations are invaded, no matter how many children are tortured, how many peaceful demonstrators are arrested, how much censorship imposed, how many journalists are expelled, how many deceptions are foisted on U.S. diplomats—the administration clings to a bankrupt policy that puts the United States on the side of apartheid and transforms our country into the second most detested government in the eyes of all of Africa.

If the leaders of the administration are unwilling to change their policy of constructive engagement, then Congress must change it for them. To do less means that we too are implicated in their policy of racism and in the violence of apartheid.

The opponents of economic sanctions say that sanctions will not work. But Bishop Tutu responded to this argument in his commencement address at Hunter College last May. He said then: "But if they don't work, why oppose them so vehemently? If they don't work, why did Margaret Thatcher apply them to Argentina during the Falklands war? Why did the United States apply them to Poland and to Nicaragua? Why was President Reagan so annoyed that his European allies did not want to impose sanctions against Libya? If sanctions are so ineffective, why does the United States still maintain a blockade of Cuba? But we have all this wonderful sophistry when it comes to South Africa."



In fact, the failure of the international community to adopt economic sanctions only encourages the architects of apartheid to increase their repression. As the Eminent Persons Group pointed out, "It is not *whether* economic sanctions will compel change; it is already the case that their absence, and Pretoria's belief that they need not be feared, deters change."

Second, the administration argues that sanctions will be counterproductive, because they will exacerbate the pathological siege mentality of the South African government. But as the co-chairman of the Eminent Persons Group, Prime Minister Fraser, said, "We reject completely the argument that international pressure will force the South African government to withdraw into itself. This commonly held view is masterly disinformation. It has hitherto been successful in persuading major states not to take substantive measures or sanctions against South Africa. The Afrikaners have, in fact, only changed course when under extreme pressure."

Third, the administration suggests that economic sanctions will injure the very people they are intended to help, the black majority in South Africa. But that argument has been consistently rejected by black South Africans. Recent surveys report that 70 percent of all blacks in South Africa support economic sanctions. According to Bishop Tutu, "Blacks are saying, 'We are suffering already. To end it, we will support sanctions, even if we have to take on additional suffering.' I must ask, to whom is the international community willing to listen? To the victims and their spokesmen, or to the perpetrators of apartheid and those who benefit from it?"

Finally, there are those who say that sanctions will destroy the South African economy and leave that nation in a financial and economic morass. But if the South African government continues on its present course, then with or without sanctions, the South African economy will be destroyed by the violence and bloodshed that are now threatening to explode into all-consuming civil war.

Opponents of sanctions also claim that such steps will do economic harm to the frontline states. It is clear that the nations of southern Africa are vulnerable to economic retaliation—as well as military retaliation—by the government of South Africa.

But yesterday, Senator Weicker and I heard the testimony of the UN ambassadors representing Zambia and Botswana. Zambia is the leader of the frontline states; Botswana, one of the nations most vulnerable to South African pressure, is the chairman of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), composed of nine southern African nations which are heavily involved with and economically reliant upon South Africa.

Their testimony on this subject was powerful and persuasive. They concede that South Africa has the power to do serious damage to the economies of the other nations in the region. But they are unanimous in their support of sanctions.

As the ambassador from Botswana said: "If we must choose between the suffering of apartheid and the suffer-

ing of sanctions, we are prepared to accept sanctions. Any measure that can be applied that will end the pestilence of apartheid should be applied, regardless of the consequences."

He pointed out that the apartheid system already imposes serious economic costs on the neighboring states today, because of the refugees fleeing from South Africa and the economic dislocation resulting from South Africa's efforts to destabilize its neighbors. SADCC has estimated the cost of apartheid to be approximately \$10 billion over the past five years, or \$2 billion a year.

The ambassador from Botswana also appealed to the West to listen to the view of the nations in the area that are most involved. He said, "It is unseemly for nations thousands of miles away, who will not suffer from sanctions, to substitute their own judgments for the nations of the region who will. We are willing to accept the hardship that will be necessary to end that evil system."

And the ambassador from Zambia delivered an equally powerful message: "To those who oppose sanctions because they will damage the economies of the frontline states, I say, 'You are not protecting us; you are protecting apartheid.'"

Steps can be taken to ameliorate the impact of sanctions on other nations. I believe that the United States, in conjunction with other nations of the West, should join together to implement such measures as we impose sanctions against South Africa.

For example, the SADCC nations depend heavily upon rail transport through South Africa to the ports of Durban, Port Elizabeth, and Cape Town for exports. A group of private businessmen and government representatives from Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique have formed a consortium to seek alternative outlets for their products.

A delegation from that group came to Washington last week with a plan for the reconstruction and improvement of the Beira-Harare railroad—which they call "the Freedom Corridor." They claim that by 1989, this rail link to the port of Beira—which is being re-built and expanded by the Netherlands—can accommodate 100 percent of the tonnage that presently passes from the SADCC nations through South Africa.

The overall cost of the Freedom Corridor is \$250 million. The consortium has asked the United States to provide \$30 million in the form of locomotives and rolling stock, in order to improve this important rail link, increase its capacity, and reduce dependence on South Africa. I urge the committee to support their request as part of any plan for sanctions against South Africa.

In sum, the case for comprehensive economic sanctions is clear. Quiet diplomacy has failed; only strong economic pressure from the international community—combined with peaceful pressure inside South Africa—can stop the descent into violence and persuade the apartheid regime to change course. The challenge to both Congress and the administration is clear, and I look forward to working with the committee as we seek to meet our responsibility. □

**Disinvestment, the Struggle, and the Future**  
**What Black South Africans Really Think**

Mark Orkin

Orkin, Director of the Community Agency for Social Enquiry, working in association with the Institute for Black Research, analyzes an independent sample survey conducted in the major urban regions of South Africa in September 1985. His study accounts for current black opinion on a range of controversial issues surrounding disinvestment: unemployment, non-violent and violent strategies for change, the major political tendencies favored by blacks, and possible economic and political arrangements for a free South Africa.

1986/78 pp./Paper \$7.95/Ravan ISBN 0-86975-305-3 (82-96238)

**Building Tomorrow**  
**Today**

**African Workers in Trade Unions, 1970-1984**

Steven Friedman

Against managerial intransigence, the Apartheid state, and waves of recession, African unions in South Africa since 1973 have not only held their own but have continued to expand and to challenge both "managerial prerogative" and now, increasingly, the state. Friedman, a labor journalist, traces the growth of the new unions, their historical precedents, their organizational strategies, the potential impact of the "homeland" governments, and the political implications of this increasingly powerful movement.

1986/500 pp./Paper \$19.95

Ravan ISBN 0-86975-287-1 (82-96147)

**Two Dogs and Freedom**

(Banned in South Africa, August 1, 1986)

"In its continuing crackdown, the Government today banned the importation or distribution of the book *Two Dogs and Freedom*, a compilation of essays and drawings by children from the country's black townships . . . In the essays, the children write about violence by the police and soldiers who patrol township streets and of arrests and detentions. There are also stories about the violence of the so-called comrades, militant black youths who often clash with the authorities or other blacks in enforcing school or job boycotts to protest apartheid."—*New York Times*, August 2, 1986

1986/55 pp./Paper \$7.95

Ravan ISBN 0-86975-301-0 (82-96204)

**30 Years of the**  
**Freedom Charter**

(Banned in South Africa, July, 1986)

Jeremy Cronin and

Raymond Suttner, editors

Thirty years after the Congress of the People, in which the revolutionary organizations of South Africa declared the Freedom Charter as their political manifesto, the Charter continues to be a most significant force in South Africa, influencing the political and social aspirations of millions of people. This book explores the Charter's relevance in today's South Africa for women, workers, the churches, education, and numerous other segments of South African society.

1986/288 pp./Paper \$15.95

Ravan ISBN 0-86975-299-5 (82-96220)

**South African Journal**  
**of Human Rights**

Vol. 1, parts 1, 2, 3

This new journal provides a forum for exchange of information about human rights conditions and developments affecting justice in South Africa. While addressed primarily to the legal community, volume one treats issues of wide public interest, such as the judiciary and state security, detention without trial and solitary confinement, and a common citizenship for all South Africans.

1986/c. 100 pp./Paper \$9.95

Ravan ISBN 0-86975-277-4 (82-96154)

**South African**  
**Review Three**

Edited by South African

Research Service

The third *South African Review* explores recent developments in labor, economy, politics, and resistance, the state and capital, and rural areas. It offers the perspective of thirty prominent South African writers on their country's conflict-ridden present, past, and future.

1986/300 pp./Paper \$24.95

Ravan ISBN 0-86975-289-8 (82-96105)

**Media and Dependency**  
**in South Africa**

**A Case Study of the Press**

**and the Ciskei "Homeland"**

Les Switzer

Focusing on the privately-owned, commercial press, its relationship to the state, and its role in helping to form a consensus among constituent groups to accept and, indeed, reify the political, economic, and ideological values of the ruling alliance, Switzer presents a study of how South Africa's communications industry promotes dependency among the African population.

1985/85 pp./Paper \$9.00

Ohio University Monographs in  
International Studies

Africa Series No. 47/ISBN 0-89680-130-6  
(82-91999)

**American-South African**  
**Relations 1784-1980**

**Review and Select Bibliography**

C. Tsehloane Keto

Keto cites the periodical sources, monographs, books, reports, theses, and dissertations published before July 1983 that describe and analyze developments up to 1980. He also cites useful American and South African groups, organizations, research centers, and libraries with extensive collections in this field.

1985/165 pp./Paper \$11.00

Ohio University Monographs in  
International Studies

Africa Series No. 45/ISBN 0-89680-128-4  
(82-91973)

Send for a complete catalog of recent and forthcoming titles

Ravan Press books are distributed in North America by

**OHIO UNIVERSITY PRESS**

**SCOTT QUADRANGLE/DEPT. AS/ATHENS, OH 45701**

## Sanctions backlash squeezes Zambia, Zimbabwe

Pretoria launched economic reprisals against Zambia and Zimbabwe even before the two countries announced their strategies for implementing sanctions against South Africa. The retribution began immediately after the Commonwealth nations adopted a sanctions package at their London mini-summit in early August.

South African border checks on road and rail cargo have caused lengthy delays of goods bound for Zambia and Zimbabwe. A new requirement for import licenses on goods from Zimbabwe has been holding up traffic going the other way. In addition, a 125 percent surcharge on the normal customs duty, payable only in rands, was imposed on Zambia's imports coming through South African ports.

Pretoria said the surcharge is refundable upon receipt of written confirmation that the goods have reached their destination. However, indefinite delays in South African ports are anticipated, since forwarding agents are not likely to pay the levy, and it is almost impossible to obtain payment from Zambian importers, given the country's severe shortage of foreign exchange.

South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha acknowledged that these steps were directly due to the prominent roles played by the Zambian and Zimbabwean leaders in convincing the Commonwealth to adopt sanctions. Pretoria is retaliating "particularly because of Zimbabwe's attitude and Zambia's attitude; they must put their money where their mouths are," he said at a press conference. He added, "South Africa does not believe in sanctions and boycotts. But in view of the sanctions against us, we have to introduce measures to protect our suppliers and make sure we know what is passing through South Africa."

Meanwhile, Zambia and Zimbabwe

have initiated plans to blunt the sanctions backlash. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda met with Gavin Relly, head of Anglo American Corporation, to map out alternate means of delivering equipment vital to operations at Zambia's copper mines. And Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe said that rehabilitation will be stepped up on alternative routes to the sea through Mozambique and Tanzania.

The corridor from Mutare, Zimbabwe, to the port of Beira is the one semi-safe route through war-torn Mozambique, due to protection by joint Zimbabwean-Mozambican forces. Currently it is underutilized, but restoration is now underway with Western donor assistance. Port facilities at Dar es Salaam and the northern Mozambican town of Nacala are also being upgraded. Four international oil companies—Caltex, Mobil, Shell-BP, and Total—have promised to back Mugabe's efforts to secure alternate transportation routes and supply sources.

The six frontline nations, meeting in Luanda in late August, praised Zambia and Zimbabwe for their strong stand against Pretoria but did not take a group position in favor of sanctions. However, the Tanzanian government has offered its "full" assistance to landlocked frontline states to help ease the impact of South Africa's countermeasures, while the Ugandan government has promised to provide food supplies. Some observers anticipate that over the long-term, these plans could accelerate the Southern African Development Coordination Conference's ongoing efforts to reduce its member-states' dependence on Pretoria.

Nonetheless, the movement of goods from South African ports to Zimbabwe and Zambia had already been reduced to a trickle by mid-August, and severe shortages of essential goods were anticipated by the end of the month. Almost 90 percent of Zimbabwe's foreign trade and nearly 50 percent of Zambia's passes through South Africa.

*Continued on next page*

## Zimbabwe's independence not for sale, Mugabe warns the White House

The Reagan administration announced that economic aid to Zimbabwe was indefinitely suspended following sharp criticisms of Washington's policy of "constructive engagement" by Youth, Sport, and Culture Minister David Karimanzira during a July 4 reception at the U.S. embassy in Harare. Karimanzira's speech, delivered on behalf of Foreign Minister Witness Mangwende, prompted visiting former President Jimmy Carter and U.S. acting Ambassador Gibson Lanpher to lead a walkout of Western diplomats after five minutes of what Carter described as a "vituperative attack on my country."

In an indictment of U.S. policy toward South Africa, Karimanzira charged that the West was doing nothing to combat apartheid because of its "massive and profitable investments" in the region. He went on to accuse the U.S. of hypocrisy for its reluctance to impose sanctions against Pretoria while demonstrating a great willingness to do so against Libya, Nicaragua, and Poland.

The Reagan administration, he said, chose to ignore the terrorism practiced by South Africa and preferred instead to bomb Tripoli. Concluded Karimanzira, "What we are

*Continued on next page*

Sanctions . . . continued

Mugabe said that if Pretoria continues its retaliatory measures, Zimbabwe will ban remittances of company profits and dividends to South Africa as well as pensions to thousands of white Zimbabweans now resident there. He warned, "When an economic war has been declared against you . . . you don't go crawling to those who are waging the war. You fight back."

The conciliatory approach

Meanwhile, Lesotho and Swaziland reaffirmed their opposition to economic sanctions against South Africa in August. The two tiny nations are almost entirely dependent on South Africa for trade as well as markets for their surplus labor. Income from the South African Customs Union plays a crucial role in both economies.

Sanctions "would be mortal for Swaziland even before they affected South Africa," said Swaziland Prime Minister Prince Bhekimpi Dlamini. Another Swazi government official recently remarked of South Africa, "If they wanted, they could put out the lights. I doubt whether we would last a month."

Indeed, Pik Botha has warned that Pretoria would probably expel its foreign workers in response to economic sanctions. Lesotho relies on remittances from its 140,000 citizens working in South Africa for more than half its GDP. Swaziland has 160,000 workers—12 percent of its workforce—employed there.

Some observers have forecast that Pretoria might expand its use of Lesotho and Swaziland as a "back door" through which to channel trade, thereby actually boosting their economic development. But the two are preparing for the worst. Both governments have warned their workers in South Africa to keep out of politics and avoid all signs of trouble. And they have proposed to the international community that those governments pushing for sanctions should be prepared to reimburse the southern African states for subsequent damage to their economies. ■

White House . . . continued

hearing is nothing but platitudes and apologies for apartheid. As the American people celebrate freedom from colonial rule and unrepresentative government, millions of the wretched, poor, and oppressed in South Africa will be answering for their desire for freedom with their lives."

But Carter, who was visiting Harare with a non-governmental aid group, considered the address "an insult to my country and me personally," calling it "completely inappropriate" for the occasion. However, as a critic of the Reagan administration's policy toward southern Africa, he did acknowledge that the remarks "weren't off the mark . . . much." "It wasn't what he said, it was the way and time he said it." As Carter conceded, the attack was "representative of the attitude of the whole world—that we're not doing enough in Washington to help end apartheid in South Africa."

The White House demanded an official apology from Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's government and suspended payment of the \$13.5 million in aid remaining for this year—including \$9 million targeted for family planning and agricultural development projects. In imposing its own form of selective economic sanctions, the Reagan administration also threatened to cut U.S. aid to Harare slated for next year.

Although this diplomatic snafu has brought relations between the two countries to a new low, it is not the first time that the White House

has used economic measures against the Mugabe government for failing to toe the line. In 1983, the U.S. cut Zimbabwe's aid from \$75 million to \$40 million for its refusal to support a United Nations resolution condemning the Soviet Union for shooting down a South Korean airliner.

Relations subsequently deteriorated further in light of increased U.S. military aid to South African-backed Unita rebels in Angola and the opening of a private office in Washington, D.C. by Renamo rebels from Mozambique. More recently, several Zimbabwean ministers have accused the CIA of aiding armed dissidents within the country, while other government officials have alleged that Washington has been helping to fund "Radio Truth," a clandestine station that calls for Mugabe's overthrow.

While Mugabe acknowledged that Carter deserved an apology for any embarrassment caused to him personally, he stressed that he fully supported the content of Karimanzira's speech. "We cannot apologize for criticizing Mr. Reagan for refusing to impose sanctions against South Africa." Mugabe lashed out against the economic bully-boy tactics of the U.S. and warned that Zimbabwe would not be blackmailed: "The position has been made abundantly clear to us. Unless you play the tune of the Reagan administration, you stand the risk of being denied the aid that has been promised. Let it be known that when we fought for our independence, we never meant to sell it at all." ■

WESTERN AFRICA

Lagos set for two-tier foreign exchange

In a keynote nationwide broadcast, President Ibrahim Babangida recently unveiled a comprehensive reform package designed to revive the collapsed economy by devaluing the naira. After intensive debate within the Armed Forces Ruling Council in late June, Babangida said the government had decided to set up the Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM)—a strategy

which has the approval of foreign creditors, although it falls short of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) demand for a more drastic devaluation.

The SFEM will produce a *de facto* devaluation through a free auction market for all foreign exchange dealings except payment of outstanding government debt. The central bank is to auction the availa-

ble hard currency each week at a rate determined by bidders, which is likely to reflect the current black market exchange of three to four times the official rate. Explained Finance Minister Chu Okongwu, "The policy is to merge the two tiers within one year. The adoption of a realistic exchange rate policy is seen as a major step that will eliminate bureaucratic controls on foreign exchange and trade."

The government is expected to provide funds for the SFEM through the open auction of the nation's stock of foreign exchange, although private individuals and organizations will also participate. The World Bank has agreed to supplement the stock with \$400 million, making an estimated \$1 billion available to the market for the remainder of the year. However, there are concerns in Lagos about whether there will be enough hard currency in subsequent years for the auction system. According to experts, the government's ability to subsume the all-important black market is dependent on the availability of adequate hard currency.

The introduction of the SFEM is likely to put the government on a collision course with the Nigerian elite who have manipulated the over-valued naira to their advantage, thus gaining access to luxury imports and foreign travel. Until now, foreign exchange at the official rate has been available only to the privileged, while the public has had to buy it on the black market and pay market prices for most imports, including some staple foods.

As a result of Babangida's "structural adjustment" of the economy, many imports will become significantly more expensive, and goods that wealthy Nigerians have taken for granted will now be out of reach. The new measures are intended to reduce the country's excessive reliance on imported goods and to encourage domestic production leading to a growth in exports. As National Planning Minister Kalu Kalu explained, "By not producing and importing, we create a problem. One way to discourage importation is to make sure of paying the right price for importation. This is where

the issue of the exchange rate becomes critical."

The effective devaluation of the naira could pave the way for an agreement with the IMF, leading to a rescheduling of the country's external debt. Although Nigerians rejected a deal with the IMF during the "great debate" last December, the slump in oil prices since then has forced the government's hand. The fall in the price of oil—which accounts for 95 percent of export earnings—has reduced imports to



Babangida: A structural adjustment

an estimated \$6 billion this year, compared to \$19.1 billion in 1981. In the past, observers have assumed that \$7 billion was the rock bottom level to cover the country's import needs.

Banks and Western government creditors have indicated that a debt rescheduling is conditional on agreement with the IMF about a recovery program. Such a deal would entitle the country to an IMF loan of \$1.5 billion and World Bank support worth up to \$1 billion. Babangida has reiterated, however, that he will not accept an IMF credit, as domestic opposition is widespread. ■

## BURKINA FASO

### The ball's in the other court

As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague began its deliberations in June to help resolve the 26-year-old territorial dispute

between Bamako and Ouagadougou, Burkinabè ministers warned that the buildup of Malian troops, MiG fighters, and French artillery along the border could provoke another war between the two countries. Said Burkina's Interior Minister Ernest Ouédraogo, putting his country's case to the ICJ, "If Mali continues to buy MiGs and tanks, forcing Burkina to amass SAMs and other rockets, then peace will remain hypothetical in the region."

Last December, more than 50 people died during the five-day Christmas war when Malian troops penetrated deep into Burkina Faso territory and occupied the Agacher strip—the contested 90-mile area largely administered by Ouagadougou but claimed as Malian soil. A cease-fire was negotiated at an extraordinary summit of the Non-Aggression and Defense Assistance Agreement (ANAD)—the sub-regional security organization—after Presidents Moussa Traoré and Thomas Sankara agreed to put an end to hostilities, pending a ruling by the ICJ.

In late June, Burkina Foreign Minister Basile Guissou cautioned that conditions along the border were similar to those prevailing on the eve of the Christmas war, and disclosed that Sankara had personally expressed his concern to several heads of state within ANAD. In particular, Sankara urged Mauritanian leader and acting ANAD President Col. Maaouya Ould Sid' Ahmed Taya to help avert "Malian preparations for war." In the meantime, Burkina recalled all officers and troops on assignment or on leave and consigned them to their barracks, anticipating a possible conflict.

Regional tensions continued to run high as Sankara informed leaders of neighboring states in mid-July that he had received word of an international plot aimed at overthrowing his government. The conspiracy, he claimed, was to be financed by France and allegedly involved Zairean mercenaries operating from Malian territory. Government officials in Paris and Bamako, however, denied all knowledge of such an intrigue.

The recent strains between Bamako and Ouagadougou follow several efforts to repair relations since the war. Both sides agreed to abide by the ICJ's final arbitration and demarcation of the common border. The court's verdict is expected by the end of the year. Other reconciliation efforts have included the reopening of their respective embassies, a meeting of government delegations from both countries in Koro, Mali, to discuss the border conflict, and a visit by Burkinabè officials to Bamako's biennial cultural festival.

In an effort to avert a new round of hostilities, Ouagadougou has appealed to Malian authorities to resist manipulation by "imperialist forces" who are using the border issue as a "pretext for war" to destabilize the Sankara government. Ouédraogo expressed the senselessness of the dispute, which led to war in 1975 and again last year, in his address to the ICJ: "These two poor countries have twice fought a conflict that is fratricidal, aberrant, stupid, and useless," he said. ■

## GHANA

### Farmers surpass goals

Ghanaian farmers have recently boosted their production of key commodities, exceeding some of the targets set by the government of Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings, which has been trying to resuscitate the agricultural sector for several years.

Small-scale farmers significantly increased their rice output—enough to satisfy the country's needs this year. After last year's promising harvest, the government banned the importation of rice, a decision expected to save the country \$30 million a year in import costs.

While the maize harvest wasn't due until the end of August, a substantial increase over recent output was anticipated. Self-sufficiency has also been achieved in two other staples of the Ghanaian diet—cassava and yams. The 80,000 tons of palm oil produced this year exceeded expectations by 30,000 tons, producing a surplus that sent the government scrambling for markets in neighboring countries.

## Advancing dunes imperil capital city

The problem of desertification has become so severe in Mauritania that it threatens the very survival of the capital city.

Blowing sands have formed at least 13 massive ochre-colored dunes within the Nouakchott city limits. In recent years, the dunes have toppled walls, homes, and an administrative center. Fed by fresh sands blown in daily from the surrounding Sahelian desert, the vast ridges advance by an average of 65 feet per year.

Each new construction project triggers the formation of new dunes. The northern periphery of the multi-million dollar *Port d'Amitié*, a gift from the Chinese government that will triple Nouakchott's port capacity, often has to be shoveled out from under the sand.

In the neighborhood known as Ksar, a mountainous V-shaped dune nudges the walls of the presidential palace grounds. It is there that a 10-year-old effort to halt the destruction is beginning to make headway.

Waist-high fences of euphorbia and prosopis branches criss-cross the dune over two-thirds of its surface, providing a natural barrier against the blowing sands that account for dune movement. In some sections, the sands have been so effectively stabilized that a new microclimate has evolved, prompting the growth of dozens of varieties of indigenous plants.

So far, up to half of Nouakchott's 20,500 hectares of moving dunes have been stabilized in this way. But the project, known as the *ceinture verte* or green belt, requires back-breaking labor, a fair amount of guesswork, and what Project Director Mohamed Ould Abby calls a "race against time."

More than a third of Mauritania's population of 1.7 million lives in Nouakchott. Over half are nomads, who have settled around the city limits because the Sahelian pastureland where they formerly roamed has turned into desert. Their dwellings are the most frequent casualties of the dunes' perpetual movement.

With continued funding from the United Nations and the World Lutheran Project, it is hoped the dunes threatening Nouakchott's vulnerable ports, water storage facilities, and airport will soon be stabilized.

Also planned is protection of the 687-mile *Route de l'Espoir*, the country's only paved east-west road, where sands blowing across the highway form mountainous traffic barriers.

But Abby is not optimistic. "To beat something you have to understand what you're fighting," he said. "And we don't."

Some experts argue desertification is a temporary phenomenon, while others suggest it is part of a permanent climatic shift. Proponents of the latter view suggest desertification feeds on itself—that as vegetation disappears, either through overgrazing or drought, more solar heat is reflected off the earth, thus altering the atmosphere in a way that suppresses rainfall.

Although some rain was recently recorded in Nouakchott, a locust plague quickly destroyed the vegetation it produced. In recent years, Mauritania has averaged less than an inch of rain annually.

—Heather A. Peck  
Washington, D.C.

A little-known product called sheanuts was this year's dark horse, emerging as one of Ghana's top earners of foreign exchange. The production of sheanuts—from which butter, oil, body lotion, paint, and other products are made—rose from 25,000 tons in 1984-85 to 40,000 tons this year.

Over the past three years, Ghana's

Cocoa Board (Cocobod) has exported 34,000 tons of sheanuts to the UK, Japan, and the Netherlands. Cocobod has established a new system for sheanut marketing, bypassing the middlemen who used to smuggle the product and offering the farmers incentives such as soap, sugar, matches, and other scarce consumer goods.

Meanwhile, cocoa production also rose significantly. At 220,000 tons, this year's harvest was the best since 1981-82, although still less than half the levels of the 1960s and 1970s. As the country's most important export crop, cocoa employs 24 percent of the active labor force. In Ghana, it is produced mainly by small farmers who turned to other crops when producer prices dropped in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Various Ghanaian governments have tried to revive the industry, but only in the past several years have these efforts gone much beyond rhetoric. As part of its campaign to raise producer prices, Cocobod has laid off 19,000 workers.

Despite the recent agricultural successes, a number of problems plague production and the economy as a whole. Swollen shoot virus is spreading rapidly through the cocoa-growing regions, and the government has ordered all infected trees cut down. The maize and sheanut surpluses have highlighted the serious shortage of storage silos in the countryside.

And while farmers are now better off, living conditions have not improved as much as urban dwellers, professionals, and military employees would like. While inflation dropped from 123 percent in 1983 to 10 percent in 1985, real wages are only 25 percent of the level of a decade ago. ■

## GUINEA-BISSAU Coup leaders put to death

Six political leaders were executed by firing squad in July for attempting to overthrow the government of President João Bernardo Vieira in October 1985.

The six, who had been charged with high treason for leading the aborted coup, included former first Vice-President Paulo Correia. All had been part of the group that helped Vieira seize power in 1980.

Following international appeals for clemency from the Pope, Amnesty International, the African Commission of Jurists, and Portuguese President Mario Soares, Vieira commuted six of the original 12 death sentences.

A military court had sentenced 44 other convicted plotters to prison terms ranging up to 15 years at hard labor. Four others were acquitted of all charges. Almost all the conspirators were members of the minority Balante ethnic group.



Vieira: Settling the score with plotters

Margaret A. Novicki

Six of the original detainees have died in prison since last November, according to government authorities. State Prosecutor Joseph Turpin announced that five died from heart problems and blood disorders. Prison guards killed the sixth while he was allegedly trying to escape.

The coup attempt was one of several since Vieira ousted President Luis Cabral, ostensibly to put a stop to government abuses such as mass executions of political dissidents. Prior to the attempted coup last year, Correia and his supporters had been openly critical of the president's economic stabilization program in which widespread austerity measures had been imposed to check the decline of the economy. ■

## LIBERIA Opposition efforts quashed

Three opposition party leaders were jailed in early August on charges of contempt of court for holding a press conference and issuing a public statement in June. They were sentenced to \$1,000 each or imprisonment, despite their law-

yers' efforts to refute the charges with a 15-point rebuttal.

Wesley Johnson, acting secretary-general of the United People's Party (UPP), led by Gabriel Baccus Matthews, was the only one to pay the fine within the 72-hour limit. Police subsequently arrested Jackson Doe, leader of the Liberian Action Party (LAP)—who many observers believe actually won the election last November. The other two—Edward Kesselly of the Unity Party and William Gabriel Kpolleh of the Liberia Unification Party—turned themselves in the next day. They have since been transferred from Monrovia to Belle Yalla, a military prison in northwest Liberia.

An organization called the Concerned Women of Liberia protested the detentions on constitutional grounds, delivering a petition to the Supreme Court, and held a prayer service at the Methodist Church in Monrovia on August 18. Police and soldiers, deployed outside the church, fired tear gas into the crowd of women after they left the service. On the same day, bricks were hurled through the windows of LAP activist Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's home and her mother's house next door several hours after task force members of President Samuel K. Doe's ruling National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) were seen at the site.

The Supreme Court ruling is linked to the parties' efforts to operate as a coalition. The Justice Department prohibited the four parties from holding a mass meeting last March, and the Supreme Court subsequently ruled that their coalition could not operate as a political party because it had not registered with the Special Elections Commission (SEC).

In the meantime, negotiations between the opposition parties and the NDPL collapsed in June, following the president's rejection of their 10-point proposal for further talks. Doe called the proposal one-sided and told the Liberian Council of Churches to terminate its role as mediator in the negotiations.

In the proposal, the parties had called for government recognition of the UPP and Amos Sawyer's Li-

berian People's Party. Both were banned prior to the elections, because of their alleged socialist or communist connections. Opposition sources said the talks were doomed from the start because Doe had no serious intentions of negotiating.

The UPP's decision to pay the fine signals a break with the coalition. Matthews, who had been living in the U.S., recently criticized the coalition as ineffective in a speech in Charlotte, North Carolina. The opposition parties have "missed the boat which is sailing on with Samuel Doe," he said. Some observers viewed his comments as an effort to initiate a reconciliation with Doe's NDPL. Matthews has since returned to Liberia but declined to participate in a merger effort of the opposition parties.

Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to delay \$28 million in Economic Support Funds to Liberia for the present fiscal year. However, \$8 million in development assistance, \$11 million in food assistance, and less than \$1 million for military uniforms and barracks has been obligated, according to a State Department spokeswoman. The funds have been blocked due to the Brooke Amendment, which denies U.S. aid to countries that have defaulted for more than one year on their U.S. loans, as well as for bureaucratic, political, and economic reasons, she said. ■

## NIGERIA Politics taboo for Shagari

Former President Shehu Shagari and his deputy, Alex Ekwueme, have been permanently banned from public office and political activity. The two were released in July after 30 months in detention but are restricted to their home areas. The government is closely monitoring their activities and permitting them no public statements or contacts with the media.

Many others who served under Shagari are still in prison awaiting trial on corruption charges. The cases of more than 1,000 detainees are described in a 107-page report released in early August by a federal

judicial panel. One of them reportedly received \$59 million for contract work that he apparently never intended to carry out. Two suppliers to the Youth Services Organization each received \$28 million for contracts that were allegedly never fulfilled.

The government also clarified the 10-year blanket ban on political participation by former officials of the Shagari administration, announced by President Ibrahim Babangida in June. Fifty people, including 11 state governors, are banned for the rest of their lives, while 15 are banned for 10 years, effective in 1990—the date when the government is scheduled to be turned over to civilian rule. In announcing the ban, Babangida said it was time for a new generation to take over the country's leadership.

The release of Shagari and Ekwueme revived public controversy over their possible involvement in corruption. Some Nigerians are still convinced the two were aware of or involved in the improprieties of the Shagari administration. Others question the legality of their long detention. The Catholic Archbishop of Lagos, Anthony Okogie, suggested the two might have a right to sue for unlawful detention, since the government has determined there was insufficient evidence to try them. ■

## TOGO International plot unearthed

President Gnassingbé Eyadéma's government announced in mid-August that it had thwarted an "international terrorist plot" allegedly intended to destroy the U.S. embassy in Lomé. Addressing a gathering of international journalists at the headquarters of the ruling Togolese People's Rally (RPT), Interior Minister Kpotivi Têvi-Djidjogbé Laclé revealed that in late July authorities had arrested nine Togolese and Beninois nationals implicated in the affair.

Laclé told reporters that Togolese security forces, in close collaboration with the Beninois government, had seized two briefcases containing "very powerful explo-

sives"—one destined for the U.S. embassy, the other for the open-air market in central Lomé. As evidence, Laclé displayed the briefcases packed with 14 kilos of plastic explosives, along with three grenades, a knife, an automatic pistol, and a handful of cartridges, apparently found in the plotters' possession. The grenades were allegedly to be hurled into local movie theaters.



Laclé: A convoluted plot

Confessions from the detainees, said Laclé, suggested the explosives had been smuggled into the country from Benin across the Mono river by a group of Togolese and Beninois nationals who had been supplied by "a member of the Libyan embassy in Cotonou, with the aim of using them in Lomé." While the interior minister singled out the Libyan government as the mastermind behind the plot, he admitted that Togo had not lodged a formal protest to Tripoli for lack of evidence. Further complicating the affair, added Laclé, was the fact that the pistol and cartridges were sent by a Togolese individual residing in Burkina Faso.

According to the Togolese government, those detained may be part of a larger international plot to destabilize other countries in the region. Laclé said he knew of at least two other nations—one in West Africa, the other in Central Africa—who were the targets of planned at-



tacks. He declined to name the countries in question for security reasons, but said Lomé had warned them that suitcases containing explosives had already been brought into their territories.

These revelations dominated a quadripartite mini-summit in Yamoussoukro, hastily convened by Côte d'Ivoire President Félix Houphouët-Boigny in mid-August. Gabonese President Omar Bongo and Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko met with Houphouët-Boigny and Eyadéma to discuss "African problems of the hour," and in particular promised to "wage a war against international terrorism." They were joined by the armed forces ministers of Cameroon and Senegal.

In the past year, security has become an important issue for the Eyadéma government. In August 1985, a series of bombs exploded in Lomé, causing considerable prop-

erty damage but few reported casualties. Despite the ensuing security crackdown in which at least 30 people were detained and several put on trial, bombs again went off in Lomé later in the year. Although no one has claimed responsibility for the bombings, Western observers generally believe that one of the various Togolese opposition groups in exile was behind the attacks.

The government, however, has preferred to characterize such dissident activity as the work of a handful of disgruntled elements rather than an organized bombing campaign by the opposition. Along these lines, Laclé said there was "definitely no connection" between last year's bombings and the latest plot, stressing that those detained were not motivated by internal politics. More specifically, concluded Laclé, the discovery of the explosives is a "victory in the battle against international terrorism." ■

## EAST AFRICA

### Trade links revive as EAC books close

As the presidents of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda closed the accounts of the East African Community (EAC) in July, they stepped up cooperative efforts designed to realize some of the goals of the long-defunct regional organization.

The final division of EAC assets came after World Bank mediator Viktor Umbricht spent nine years straightening out the tangled finances. One of the last issues to be settled was pension payments to former EAC employees, most of whom were British.

As he concluded the project, Umbricht remarked that the EAC was "an imaginative concept but about a century ahead of its time." The members were not ready to concede enough sovereignty to make it succeed, he said.

Smaller scale regional cooperation has recently accelerated, however, through visits by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi to Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi in June. The three had earlier held a mini-summit in Entebbe.

Museveni and Moi have attempted to reestablish trade relations similar to those existing prior to the collapse of the EAC. In early July, a Kenyan cargo train crossed into Uganda for the first time in nine years, the harbinger of a twice-daily rail cargo service between Nairobi and Tororo, Uganda.

In addition, the two countries decided to extend the Mombasa-Nairobi oil pipeline to Uganda. A feasibility study has been completed on extending the line as far as western Kenya, and Uganda will research the possibility of continuing it across the border. Nairobi has also agreed in principle to Uganda's participation as a shareholder in Kenya Petroleum Refineries.

In a related development, leaders of the three states and Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, and Zaire have agreed to develop joint strategies to deal with common security problems. Tanzania, for example, recently refused political asylum to seven members of Mwakenya, a clandestine dissident organization that has been the target of a harsh

crackdown by the Kenyan government in recent months.

At a summit in Nairobi in mid-July, the seven nations agreed to maintain regular contacts to prevent dissidents from conducting activities against their countries of origin in neighboring states. ■

## ETHIOPIA

### Dodging regional demands

The draft constitution recently unveiled by Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam sidesteps a crucial issue facing the country: the demand for greater autonomy or self-determination by the various nationalities.

Proclaiming Ethiopia as a unitary state consisting of autonomous regions, the proposed constitution offers few details on the nature of regional powers or the relationship between the regions and the national government. Observers doubt whether the areas will have much autonomy, since the real power will be vested in the ruling Workers Party of Ethiopia.

The constitution, which was drafted by a commission led by Mengistu, warns that "chauvinism and narrow nationalism," will be fought while the unity of all workers of all nationalities is promoted. Accordingly, the National Assembly will define the powers and duties of the regional assemblies, decide their boundaries and sources of revenue, and issue decrees by which they will be governed.

Such terms are not likely to satisfy the liberation fronts and nationalist groups operating in the regions of Oromo, Tigré, and Eritrea—where guerrillas have been battling for independence for the past 25 years.

The 120-clause constitution, which took at least a year to develop, was broadcast over radio stations in 15 Ethiopian languages and presented to the people in mass seminars at 25,000 locations throughout the country in June, according to government spokesmen. The final step will be approval in a referendum.

While the government asserts that the document will replace military rule with a people's democratic

republic, in practice the constitution will likely serve to legitimize the power of Mengistu and the ruling Dergue.

The National Assembly, based on the Soviet model, will be elected on the basis of proportional representation and will in turn elect the president and cabinet and establish a council of state which will have legislative power when the National Assembly is not in session.

Socialist principles are the bedrock of the economic system, according to the draft, and private ownership will be permitted only under state guidance. The draft contains guarantees of religious freedom but notes that it may not be exercised "in a manner contrary to the interests of the state and the revolution, public morality, or freedom of other citizens." Another clause states that women have the right to participate equally in political, economic, social, and cultural sectors.

The initial timetable called for the declaration of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia by September 12—the anniversary of the revolution—but it appears that the referendum and proclamation will be held later in the year or even in 1987, followed by elections for the National Assembly.

At a London press conference in July, Ethiopian Justice Minister Amanuel Amde Michael explained that the wars in Eritrea and Tigré are a major reason Ethiopia has taken a relatively long time to draw up a civilian constitution. ■

## KENYA Calling for Kenyanization

President Daniel arap Moi's declaration that foreign control of joint ventures should be limited to 49 percent will not affect existing foreign investors nor alter Kenya's current liberal investment code. Government officials recently issued this clarification after some foreign investors expressed fears for their future in the country.

The president's announcement had been preceded by promises to accelerate the process of replacing expatriate workers with Kenyans. The government intends to revital-

## Swarms of grasshoppers plague Africa

The worst locust infestation in 60 years is threatening most of sub-Saharan Africa. In early August, swarms of the crop-devouring insects were reported in 16 countries including Botswana, Chad, Mali, and Sudan which have been hardest hit. The fast-growing swarms could cause serious food shortages and starvation as they eat their way through croplands.

Heavy rains following the drought last year created favorable breeding conditions for the "Senegalese grasshopper," which infested large areas of Mali in August 1985. Although control measures were largely successful last year, the survivors' descendants could cause far greater damage this year as they sweep across Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.

The successful breeding of the Senegalese grasshopper has coincided with an upsurge of four other major species for the first time in many decades. Red locusts are devouring crops in Tanzania, while a brown variety from South Africa is swarming into Botswana. Locusts from Sudan have invaded Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia—which has also been hit by swarms flying in from Saudi Arabia.

The last time locusts posed such a threat was in the early part of the century, when they swept across Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, and Burkina Faso, although they struck again with force in 1974, when crop losses of 20 to 30 percent were reported.

Swarms of millions of locusts can devour up to 80,000 tons of food per day—enough to feed 400,000 people for a year. Locust infestations are seldom short-lived, since one female can produce up to 500 offspring. Experts from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) anticipate that it will take several years to bring the current crisis under control.

The U.S. State Department recently added \$5 million to the \$2 million it had already provided to combat the locust threat. Several European countries have also contributed toward the \$8 million requested by the FAO this year. The projected aid requirement for 1987 is \$10.6 million, and for 1988, \$5.7 million.

An African organization—the Joint Operation for the Control of Locusts and Bird Pests (OCLALAV)—has been fighting the threat for 20 years, but lagging contributions from member-states have forced it to depend on foreign aid, thus decreasing its effectiveness. The most comprehensive research on locust control is presently being carried out by the French Programme for Interdisciplinary Research on the Acrididae of the Sahel, which has a permanent team in the field to study projects ranging from genetic engineering to aerial spraying.

Locust control is a formidable task. The insects often breed in unpopulated, inaccessible semi-desert regions and their eggs can lie dormant and undetected for up to six months during droughts. They attack all kinds of crops, descend with little warning, and often shift locations quickly. Moreover, locusts adapt easily to different foods and climates, and have been genetically strengthened by the use of insecticides. The lack of coordination between researchers and farmers has inhibited the development of improved control measures.

ize Kenyanization programs and establish a bureau in the Labor Department to seek employment for citizens in positions currently held by foreigners, Moi told Kenyans, whose soaring unemployment rate assures the continuing popularity of this issue. The Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) has ordered all directors of its affiliates to

compile lists of expatriates, recommending which ones should be replaced.

These pronouncements represent an ongoing effort rather than new policy, according to government spokesmen. In 1985, the immigration laws were amended to mandate work permits for expatriate professionals such as attorneys, adminis-

trators, and accountants, who had previously been exempt from this requirement.

More significantly, Kenya recently undertook a reassessment of its foreign aid, partly to restrict donor control over investment programs. A desire to limit the large portion of aid budgets devoted to expatriate staff costs was a major concern of the review. The government estimates that expatriate advice and supervision consumes 40 percent of all foreign aid budgets.

The public clamor is not expected to significantly reduce the number of foreign employees in the near future, however, just as the call for local control of business is not likely to produce rapid change. The present number of expatriate workers is estimated at just under 10,000. The drop of about 8,000 in the past decade is due more to economic conditions than to Kenyanization programs.



Moi: Striving for 51 percent

The government usually grants a potential investor a certain number of expatriate work permits as part of the investment package. Companies generally present at least the appearance of Kenyanization by offering training programs for local employees and appointing token Kenyans to visible positions. Some companies, including Mobil Oil and Firestone, have recently turned over key positions to Kenyans.

The Kenyanization process also involves a drive for foreign companies based in Kenya to go public. Barclays Bank of Kenya issued 5 million shares or 30 percent of its equity to the Kenyan public in April. It was said to be the largest floatation in the history of the Nairobi Stock Exchange, and bank officials reported an enthusiastic public response. The top-ranked commercial bank in East Africa, Barclays handles 30 percent of commercial bank savings in the country.

Behind Moi's push for indigenous control of joint ventures is a desire to increase trade with members of the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) of eastern and southern African states. The PTA requires that preferential trade status be granted only for goods produced in companies having at least 51 percent local control.

This rule was modified in April to give some preference to goods from companies in which local ownership ranges from 30-50 percent. Full preferential treatment will still be reserved for firms with at least 51 percent local control. The modifications will expire after five years, however, and the government wants to make progress in the interim toward the 51 percent goal that will qualify Kenyan goods for preferential treatment in 1991, according to a spokesman at the Kenyan Mission to the UN. ■

## MAURITIUS

### "Amsterdam boys" haunt cabinet

Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth's coalition government, wracked by dissension since the arrest of four members of parliament at Amsterdam airport for drug trafficking last December, suffered another major setback when three cabinet ministers resigned in late July. Their departure from the government leaves the dominant Militant Socialist Movement (MSM) in a precarious position numerically, despite Jugnauth's frantic attempts in recent months to preserve a parliamentary majority.

Agriculture Minister Nunkeswaringsingh Deerpalsingh, Works Minister Rohit Niemo Beedassy, and Local

Government and Cooperatives Minister Rashidally Soobadar walked out of a cabinet meeting after Jugnauth accused them of dissident activity and charged that they had refused to accept the principle of collective cabinet responsibility. They subsequently resigned, criticizing the prime minister's ability to lead the country. Although the coalition still commands a slim majority, further revolt in the MSM ranks could topple the government.

The drug scandal has continued to be a thorn in Jugnauth's side and has provided Paul Berenger's opposition Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) with ammunition to support its allegations that the government is plagued by corruption. Berenger has repeatedly called for the coalition's resignation, demanding an early general election, but Jugnauth has made clear that he would not stand down as long as he maintained a parliamentary majority. Said the prime minister, "I can't resign when I have a mandate to fulfill until 1988. It would be sheer cowardice on my part. My government is constitutionally elected and I have no intention of laying down my office like that."

To maintain the coalition's slim numerical superiority, Jugnauth has allowed three of the MPs implicated in the drug scandal to regain their parliamentary seats following their release from prison. Sateanand Pelladoah, the fourth member of the "Amsterdam boys"—as they have become known to Mauritians—still awaits trial in Holland for the possession of 21 kilos of heroin found in his luggage, and has been the target of furious protests in the House by opposition leaders.

In late June, Jugnauth suspended the leader of the opposition Socialist Workers Front (FTS), Sylvio Michel, and four MMM deputies who argued that constitutionally, Pelladoah's seat should have been declared vacant after he was absent from parliament for three months. House Speaker Ajay Daby's announcement that the coalition had granted Pelladoah an "overseas leave of absence" provoked angry protests from opposition leaders. Jugnauth pushed through a motion

suspending the MPs indefinitely and even called in the anti-riot unit armed with clubs and tear-gas to physically remove Michel from his seat. As Jugnauth warned recently, "I shall not hesitate to take any drastic measures if my government, which is constitutionally elected for a five-year mandate, is challenged by any subversive action." ■

**UGANDA**

**Refugees head for home**

Tens of thousands of Ugandan refugees are returning to the northern provinces, motivated by increasing insecurity and possible drought in southern Sudan.

Most left the West Nile and Madi districts in the early 1980s, fleeing the abuses of former President Milton Obote's army. The estimated 300,000 refugees became a major force for development in southern Sudan, opening schools, building roads, and introducing new farming ideas, according to a UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) representative in Juba.

Severe food shortages, due largely to the Sudanese civil war, and successive attacks last April and May on east bank refugee camps—allegedly by members of the Sudanese People's Liberation

Army—helped convince the refugees that it was time to go home. Under a UNHCR program, they are eligible for temporary shelter, food, and medical assistance while waiting in transit centers to be sent home. They are also entitled to longer-term aid in the form of seeds, farm tools, and household equipment to sustain them until the harvest in January 1987. However, with an estimated 200,000 still to be resettled, UNHCR resources are reportedly stretched thin.

Ugandans are also gradually returning to the Luwero triangle, the war-devastated area north of Kampala that was the National Resistance Army's stronghold in its guerrilla struggle against successive Ugandan governments. In response to Museveni's appeal for \$160 million to rehabilitate the region, international donors have committed an estimated \$100 million.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) is initiating a \$5.8 million grant program to help farmers revive the rural economy of the area. A similar plan will be implemented in the Western Nile region to assist some 50,000 refugees who have returned from Zaire. A larger AID program (\$18.2 million) has been implemented for the rehabilitation of agribusiness. ■

Although discontent over low pay among officers and officials may have played a role in motivating the plotters, Spanish sources speculated that domestic hostility to the growing French presence in the country was the decisive factor. Obiang Nguema's latest trip to Paris followed an official visit to France in June 1985 when he said, "I have come to encourage the French private sector to invest in Equatorial Guinea." ■

Highlighting the strong ties that have developed between the two countries in recent years, France intends to set up a branch of the International Bank for West Africa (BIAO) in Malabo later this year, following an agreement between Finance and Economy Minister Felipe Hinestrosa Ikka and BIAO General Manager Jean Dromer. The new bank is expected to help attract foreign investment to Malabo. ■

**CAMEROON**

**Bid to boost image flops**

An effort to polish Cameroon's image abroad recently backfired on President Paul Biya. Cameroonian officials had hired French journalist Jacques Tiller, a reporter for *Journal du Dimanche*, to write favorable articles on the country, countering the prevailing view of Africa as a starving and underdeveloped continent.

In addition, Tiller was supposed to track the activities of Cameroon's first president, Ahmadou Ahidjo, who reportedly resides on the French Riviera. Ahidjo ruled from independence in 1960 until 1982, when he handed the reins of power over to Biya, then his prime minister and right-hand man.

In a widely quoted interview with *Le Matin*, Tiller acknowledged that he had been collaborating with the Biya government for the past year and a half, receiving approximately \$30,000 quarterly for his services. He said he had never concealed these activities and indicated that such extracurricular work is not unusual among French journalists. "I am not the only journalist to collaborate with the president of an African country," he said.

**GENERAL AFRICA**

**Obiang Nguema survives family plot**

A plot to overthrow the government of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema was foiled in late July when loyalist forces intercepted a group of 30 civilians and military personnel as they attempted to seize control of the presidential palace in Equatorial Guinea.

Several leading members of the government were implicated in the aborted coup, including Deputy Prime Minister Fructoso Mba Onana—the president's uncle—who allegedly masterminded the operation. Also involved were Planning Minister Marcos Mba, National Bank General Director Damian Ondo, and the head of military liaison, Santiago Eneme.

The plotters, who were arrested

with little resistance, attempted the takeover as Obiang Nguema was returning from Paris where he had attended France's July 14 national festivities. Calm was quickly restored in the streets of Malabo, where a heavy police presence was reported in the days that followed.

Western diplomats in the capital characterized the incident as a "family plot disguised as a coup d'état," but the authorities have yet to reveal the identity of those detained. According to *West Africa* magazine, an Equatorial Guinean government official even denied that there had been a coup attempt, claiming that the "stirring" in Malabo had been to welcome the president home from his trip abroad.

He also maintained that surveillance of the former president was done in a "purely journalistic manner." The information collected would be included in an upcoming book on Africa, he added. Some observers maintain that tracking Ahidjo in this manner constitutes a form of spying, however, as Tiller's contract was with the national security agency.

The Cameroonian media covered the matter extensively. The government-run daily, the *Cameroon Tribune*, hinted that the scandal could be part of a French plot against Yaoundé to retaliate for Biya's recent visit to Germany.

Cameroon has attracted considerable media attention through the affair, though perhaps not the kind it was seeking. The French weekly, *Evénement du Jeudi*, published an article critical of both the former and current presidents.

Ironically, Western media coverage of Cameroon is often relatively favorable. *The Washington Post*, for example, ran a three-part series on Cameroon in July, stating that the country "has made more economic and agricultural progress than most other African nations." The second article in the series began: "Cameroon, a prosperous nation among Africa's many that are not, may soon need to request more for aid." And a number of publications quoted President Reagan when he called Cameroon's economy "a shining example for Africa" during Biya's visit to the White House early this year. ■

## CHAD

### GUNT falls apart at the seams

Former vice-chairman of the opposition Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) Col. Wadal Abdel Kamougué announced in early August that he would negotiate with President Hissène Habré only through general discussions involving all major Chadian leaders, ruling out speculation that his return to Ndjamena was imminent. Kamougué's defection in June—the latest in a series of setbacks for the Libyan-backed GUNT—nonetheless represented another victory for

Habré, who has successfully consolidated his rule over the last year.

Kamougué said he favored the "organization of a roundtable conference of all opposition leaders to help find a solution and to make concrete proposals to the Ndjamena government." He stressed, however, that he would not be "leaving one camp for another," and called on France and Libya, the two countries "responsible for the implicit partition of Chad," to help the Organization of African Unity (OAU) produce a lasting solution to the crisis.



Kamougué: Favors roundtable

Kamougué, whose influence within the GUNT had declined sharply in recent years, said he resigned because of Goukouni Oueddei's "unreasonable" refusal to attend the reconciliatory conference with Habré in Brazzaville under the auspices of the OAU in March. The GUNT promptly condemned Kamougué for choosing "the enemy camp of the Chadian people" and said that his defection should cause neither surprise nor regret given his lack of political coherence, his continued absence from northern Chad, and his penchant for living in luxury.

In contrast, Habré welcomed Kamougué's decision as "an act of courage" and urged him to return to Ndjamena for consultations. The Chadian president did not specify whether he was prepared to offer

Kamougué a government post, although it is likely that he would be handed a position similar to that of Justice Minister Djibril Djogo, the former leader of the opposition Democratic Front of Chad (FDT).

With the growing success of the government's national reconciliation policy and the parallel disintegration of the GUNT, Habré has veered away from the pursuit of roundtable negotiations in favor of a military solution. In late July, Habré said, "We will not permit the OAU nor any head of state to interfere in our domestic affairs," and protested the organization's renewed mandate to resolve the conflict under the direction of Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso.

Explained Habré, "At one time, we had considered the OAU's assistance necessary, and we know what happened. Today, we believe it is up to us to resolve our problems, although we do not rule out the help of certain African leaders. In this respect our position is categorical, and from now on we intend to deal with our problems ourselves." ■

## ZAIRE

### Mobutu promises to investigate

Tensions between the governments of Zaire and Angola eased in July when President Mobutu Sese Seko visited President José Eduardo dos Santos in Luanda.

Press reports that Zaire is directly involved in shipping U.S. arms to Unita, the South African-backed rebel movement in Angola, had strained the already poor relations between the two countries.

Zairean spokesmen vehemently denied the charges, while Mobutu and dos Santos reaffirmed defense and security links dating back to an accord signed by Mobutu and the late President Agostinho Neto in 1978. Mobutu and dos Santos also agreed to cooperate on rehabilitating the Benguela railroad, the link between Zairean mines and the Angolan seacoast which has repeatedly been a target of sabotage missions by Unita and South African troops.

During the visit, Mobutu was informed that the Angolan government has evidence that Unita guerrillas are being trained in Zaire. It is generally acknowledged that the rebel group operates in Zaire and that Mobutu is versed on its activities. Mobutu promised to investigate the evidence and issued a communiqué announcing that he intended to make life difficult for Unita bandits in Zaire.

Mobutu's appointment of Mandungu Bula Nyati as foreign affairs minister in a recent cabinet reshuffle was also construed as a conciliatory gesture toward Angola. Mandungu, who trained in the Soviet Union at the same time as dos Santos, espouses strong anti-American views.

Relations between Zaire and Angola have been uneasy since Mobutu sent troops to help Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)—one of three nationalist factions vying for control of the country in 1975. Roberto found asylum in Kinshasa after the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was victorious. Rebel attacks on Shaba Province launched from Angolan territory in 1977 and 1978 fueled Zairean hostility toward Angola. ■

## ZAMBIA

### Travelers' treatment protested

British, Swiss, and West German authorities have lodged strong protests with President Kenneth Kaunda's government following recent arrests of Europeans traveling

through Zambia. The Austrian government has advised its citizens not to travel in the country.

Since South Africa's raid on a refugee camp outside Lusaka last May, Zambian police and security forces have detained a number of foreigners suspected of spying for Pretoria. Some have reportedly been maltreated and detained for days or weeks.

Six Swiss nationals and one Austrian traveling through Zambia from Cape Town were arrested in late July and held near the Tanzanian border. They were reportedly beaten and threatened, and one of them—a Swiss woman—said she was a spy for South Africa after being blindfolded and driven in a car for several hours. An Austrian woman arrested in July "confessed" to spying after being tortured. In late July, three British students were detained for a week on suspicion of spying and allegedly mistreated in a prison in northern Zambia.

Zambian police and security forces in the area had been on the alert following Kaunda's warnings that another invasion from South Africa might be imminent. The president had predicted that the attack would come from the north.

In early August, Kaunda accused Western leaders of poisoning race relations throughout southern Africa by supporting Pretoria. He also said he did not believe the stories about Zambian police mistreating foreigners, but that if they were true, those responsible would be punished. ■

business leaders, who want to maintain the garrison town of 75,000 inhabitants in Spanish hands and prevent Muslims from gaining Spanish nationality under the aliens law, spearheaded the backlash.

But most of the 27,000 Muslims in Melilla, who have no official national or civic status, claim the introduction of the new code unjustly classifies many of them as "aliens" in their own country and ratifies their position as second-class citizens. Said Muslim leader Aomar Mohamedi Dudu, "The law is intended to legalize slavery in Melilla. It will make us foreigners forever in our own city." Following widespread protests earlier this year, the Spanish government produced a more liberal version of the law, but Muslim activists point out that the authorities have approved a mere 100 applications for Spanish nationality out of 5,000 so far.

The latest conflict in Melilla erupted in the wake of a Spanish victory in an early round of the football World Cup. Stone-throwing Christians assembled outside Dudu's home, waving Spanish flags and shouting "Death to the Moors" and other anti-Muslim slogans. Muslims organized a counter-demonstration, but a major riot was averted when Andres Moreno, Spain's representative in the enclave, rescued Dudu with the help of the police who used tear-gas and fired rubber bullets. The two then toured Muslim quarters appealing to people "not to yield to provocation."

To the displeasure of Spanish right-wingers, Moreno allowed the Muslim community—which has no voting rights—to hold an unofficial election in the mosques, and provided police protection for Dudu who gained an overwhelming vote of support. About 1,000 Spaniards gathered outside the government delegate's residence demanding his resignation and eventually clashing with police units. Although several protestors were arrested, including Carlos Benet, a right-wing candidate in the national elections, Police Chief José Luis Cervino and several other officers refused to obey orders to attack the demonstrators.

## NORTH AFRICA

### Views harden in North African enclaves

Simmering tensions between Muslims and Christians in the Spanish-occupied enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta reached a boiling point in late June when local Spaniards, bitterly opposed to integration with the Muslim community, led a right-wing backlash during Madrid's national election campaign.

The two north African territories—claimed for years by Morocco—have been a source of con-

flict since Spanish President Felipe Gonzales' Socialist government unveiled a new aliens law last year directly affecting the status of the Muslim community.

In the election campaign, marked by five days of street clashes between hard-line Christians and local Muslims, Manuel Fragas' right-wing Popular Coalition swept all three Melilla parliamentary seats from the Socialist Party. Melilla's

They were later dismissed by Moreno.

King Hassan of Morocco, careful not to upset his good relations with Spain, has told King Juan Carlos that the crisis in the enclaves must be resolved through "dialogue and persuasion." Evidently such restraint has provided little comfort to local Spaniards who fear the government will relinquish the last foreign bases administered by the Spanish army. Continued control of the enclaves has strong sentimental value within right-wing circles, as it was from Ceuta that General Franco launched the Spanish civil war in 1936. ■

## ALGERIA

### When a deal is not a deal

Faced with the precipitous drop in revenue from liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, Sonatrach, Algeria's state-owned oil and gas company, finally settled its long-standing dispute with the Houston-based Panhandle Eastern Corporation in late July. The deal—making Sonatrach the largest shareholder in the U.S. company with an 11.7 percent stake—was concluded when Panhandle proposed a \$465 million after-tax charge to settle a multi-billion dollar legal battle arising from its ill-fated venture to import Algerian LNG three years ago.

Under the terms of the agreement, Sonatrach will receive \$200 million in cash and 6 million shares of newly issued corporate common stock in Panhandle. The Algerian company has the option to sell the shares back to the U.S. firm at any time within the next two years at prices ranging up to \$55 a share. The claim against Panhandle—alleging breach of the gas purchase and transportation deals—was in arbitration and could have forced the U.S. company to pay Sonatrach an estimated \$850 million annually through the year 2002.

The contract for Algerian LNG was signed in 1975 when energy prices were soaring and natural gas pipeline companies feared that U.S. reserves were running dangerously low. In what became known as the Trunkline LNG project, Panhandle

## Close encounters of the Third World

Ever since the late Chinese premier Chou En-Lai completed his groundbreaking tour of Africa in 1964, Beijing has cultivated its reputation as a leading non-aligned supporter of black Africa, and successfully expanded bilateral aid agreements with countries throughout the continent. But a violent confrontation between Chinese and African students at Tianjin University recently has fueled accusations by African leaders of racism within China itself and strained Sino-African relations.

The clash between 400 Chinese students and two dozen Africans in Tianjin, south-east of Beijing, was sparked by a lively campus party celebrating African Liberation Day. A group of Chinese pupils besieged the foreign students in a five-hour rock and bottle throwing fracas that left seven people injured.

More than 250 African students responded by staging an unauthorized solidarity demonstration in early June, marching through the street of Beijing to protest what they called "intolerable conditions" in China. The students, who assembled at the Beijing Institute of Foreign Languages, proceeded to the Chinese Ministry of Education chanting slogans that called on the authorities to put a stop to racial discrimination and demanded that their safety be guaranteed.

Solomon Tardey, a student spokesman, said that those Africans studying in Tianjin who had fled to Beijing would not return because they feared for their lives. He charged that teachers gave preferential treatment to other foreigners over blacks and that during classes, "Nobody sits near me. Nobody even dares to speak to me." Concluded Tardey, "We want the education commission to tell school authorities that they have racial discrimination against African students and that they must stop it."

In the past few years, there have been several such incidents between Chinese and African students. At Shanghai University, Chinese students twice rioted against Africans—first in 1979 and again in 1982. More recently, attacks in Shanghai, Nanjing, and Beijing have heightened concern among the 1,600 Africans studying in China—one of the largest foreign contingents in the country. In June of this year, Africans in Nanjing occupied a university president's office to protest the expulsion of an African student accused of fighting. Meanwhile, four Chinese youths assaulted a Moroccan student walking in Beijing with his Japanese girlfriend.

For many African students, the Tianjin melee merely highlights the prejudice and harassment they endure on a daily basis. Authorities in Beijing, however, have been at pains to describe it as "an isolated incident" that had "nothing to do with racism."

Chinese officials called a rare press conference in an effort to correct what they claimed were misperceptions about what had occurred. "It is the consistent and long-term policy of the Chinese government to oppose racism," said education ministry spokesman Yu Fuzhen. He predicted that the rift created by the incident would soon be resolved and added that it would "not affect the friendly relations China enjoys with the countries from which the students come."

built a \$567 million re-gasification plant in Lake Charles, Louisiana. At the time, experts saw the deal—which required importation of 165 billion cubic feet of gas a year for two decades from Algeria—as an astute move by Panhandle.

Within a year after the first shipment arrived in September 1982, however, domestic natural gas reserves became plentiful and energy

prices tumbled. This prompted Panhandle to suspend its \$14 billion contract with Sonatrach, whose LNG was priced far above the market rate, making it virtually unsellable in the U.S.

As a result of the recent settlement, Panhandle and its pipeline subsidiaries have announced that they will initiate "good faith negotiations" with Sonatrach aimed at de-

veloping new arrangements for joint marketing of LNG in the U.S. by the end of the year. Panhandle's chief executive, Robert Hunsucker, said he was pleased that "this difficult and complex problem has been satisfactorily resolved" and predicted that the settlement "creates the opportunity for us and Sonatrach to develop a marketing plan that would make LNG a viable long-term source of energy for the U.S." ■

## EGYPT

### Mubarak lobbies for leniency

In an effort to bolster Egypt's flagging economy, President Hosni Mubarak has been campaigning for more favorable conditions on a standby loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and lower interest rates on the country's \$4.55 billion military debt to the U.S.

During a whirlwind tour of West European capitals in July, Mubarak secured promises from several heads of state to prevail on the IMF for greater flexibility in its negotiations with Egypt over a standby facility. When the IMF recently eased its stringent requirements in granting a standby to Mexico, Egyptian authorities hoped it would pave the way for similar tolerance toward their country. Mubarak also sought bilateral reschedulings and increases in aid from British, French, German, and Italian leaders during his European tour.

Reagan administration officials have appeared amenable to a reduction in the interest rate on Egypt's loans under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, which could save the country millions of dollars through reduced interest rates. Possible problems such as the precedent-setting nature of such a step were under discussion in the administration. Mubarak was pressing for a lower interest rate from the current 12-14 percent to 7 percent. Debt service on Egypt's FMS loans totals \$550 million a year, but since the payments are now 12 months in arrears, more than \$900 million is due in 1986.

When Vice-President George Bush visited Cairo in early August,

## Crossroads makes a run for its money

When *Le Carrefour du Développement* (Crossroads of Development) was created by former French Minister for Cooperation Christian Nucci in 1983, its official role was to "alert public opinion to development problems" in Third World countries—particularly in Africa. Today, it has become synonymous with a political scandal in which millions of dollars of Carrefour's funds have disappeared, seemingly to be used for rather less noble causes.

While the case of the missing money unfolds and threatens to severely tarnish President François Mitterrand's Socialist Party, an interesting aspect of the affair has been the light it sheds on France's paternalistic ties to its former African colonies. Theories abound as to where the funds went, although investigations have pointed to a spicy combination of beneficiaries: various ministerial advisers in search of extra pocket money, mercenaries in Africa hired by the government, and undetermined officials whose identities were concealed through the creation of bogus companies.

More tangibly, at least \$3 million in funds earmarked for development purposes was diverted to buy a 40-room country château. Originally meant to be used for training African civil servants, it became a private retreat for a high-ranking French government official. Carrefour was also used to finance politically sensitive projects like the lavishly-funded 1984 Franco-African summit meeting in Burundi.

The key figure in the scandal is former *chef du cabinet* Yves Chalier—Nucci's top aide and Carrefour's treasurer—who jumped ship in April and resurfaced in Paraguay, one step ahead of an international arrest warrant for embezzlement. It appears that Chalier devised a complex system of fraudulent accounting by over-invoicing, which enabled him to pocket a substantial portion of Carrefour's funds.

When Nucci's Conservative successor, Michel Aurillac, uncovered irregularities in the accounts which he has described as "a bath of filth," Chalier fled and promptly implicated his former boss in the scandal. Nucci proclaimed his innocence, but speculation continues that other government officials know more than they have so far admitted.

Chalier claimed that one of his major functions was to set up a secret budget in 1984 to allow the government to finance an extravagant \$8 million operation for the three-day summit in Bujumbura without being asked embarrassing questions. According to the Burundi embassy in Paris, "Each time the Franco-African summit is organized in Africa, France makes a greater or lesser contribution depending on circumstances, providing notably to the host country material aid in the form of grants and assistance from specialized personnel."

Thanks to Carrefour's creative accounting system, the meeting was blessed with all that and more. France donated a fleet of 105 limousines for the heads of state, repaved roads around the presidential palace, extended the airport's runway to accommodate Mitterrand's Concorde, and provided a secret anti-terrorist brigade to combat alleged Soviet and Libyan infiltration into Burundi.

By keeping the funds deliberately obscure, it was fairly easy for Chalier and his accomplices to syphon off a percentage of the budget for their lavish lifestyles. As one French newspaper put it, Carrefour was "the crossroads of a crazy world" primarily concerned with having a good time.

Mubarak asked for an increase in the cash proportion of U.S. aid to Egypt, from \$115 million to \$500 million out of a total of more than \$800 million in economic aid this year. The four-day meeting ended, however, with neither Bush nor Mubarak able to claim success in

their principal goals. Bush refused to commit the U.S. to more cash assistance, while Mubarak refused to compromise regarding Egypt's dispute with Israel over Taba, a tiny patch of land in the Sinai peninsula. Support for an increase in Egypt's cash aid has been relatively strong



among members of Congress, but only if Mubarak agrees to comprehensive economic reform measures.

Both the IMF and the U.S. have repeatedly pressed Egypt to carry out drastic reforms to ease the budget crisis, brought about by severe reverses in Egypt's four major sources of revenue: oil, foreign worker remittances, Suez Canal fees, and tourism. But Mubarak, concerned about provoking public discontent, remains reluctant to slash subsidies that keep down the prices of consumer goods and basic commodities but cost his government almost one-third of the annual budget.

Instead, he has continued his policy of gradual and piecemeal measures, such as the unannounced 25 percent increase in the price of petrol in July. The cost of flour and cigarettes has doubled over a one and a half year period, while the cost of electricity has increased by 37 percent. The 1986-87 budget contained a 12 percent reduction in government subsidies but an overall increase of 5.9 percent in civil service wages. New employees were to absorb most of the wage increase, since the government is legally bound to give jobs to all new graduates.

The government has been considering methods to target the subsidies more directly to the poor. Ration cards now available to 97 percent of the population could be limited to the poorest families, for example, but such measures would likely antagonize public sector workers whose wages lag far behind those of laborers or semi-skilled workers. A laborer makes four times more than a first-year teacher or doctor. As a result, civil servants often work only two or three hours a day at their government jobs and devote the rest of their time to earning supplementary income to help their families survive. ■

**SUDAN**

**Leaders talk as war rages on**

While Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and Col. John Garang, leader of the Sudanese People's Liberation

Movement (SPLM), met for the first time on July 31 near Addis Ababa, civil war raged on in the three southern provinces where millions are facing starvation.

Mahdi reported that nothing new came out of the nine-hour meeting, although representatives of the two sides met for several days in early August to discuss terms of the Koka Dam Declaration, a document mutually signed last March outlining preconditions for a national constituent conference.

Meanwhile, Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) stepped up its activity in the south, laying siege to the town of Juba for the first time and shooting down a civilian aircraft. The Sudan Airways plane crashed shortly after takeoff from the provincial capital of Malakal, 420 miles south of Khartoum. Sixty people were feared dead.

Both sides are using hunger as a weapon in the war. With its siege of Juba, the SPLA is apparently trying to starve out the government forces garrisoned there. The airport was closed down, forcing the termination of famine relief airlifts. Road travel from the Ugandan border has also been cut off.

The government, relying on traditional rivalries among the southern peoples, is providing groups of nomads with military support to raid villages around Wau, the stronghold

of the Dinka people who comprise the bulk of the SPLA. The surrogate government forces have increasingly relied on "scorched earth" tactics, burning crops and storehouses. They have also destroyed homes, tortured and killed men, and raped and abducted women. They have reportedly stolen 250,000 head of cattle.

An estimated 300,000 southerners have taken refuge in Ethiopia and Uganda, while thousands more have fled to the north. The three southern provincial capitals—Juba, Wau, and Malakal—are jammed with tens of thousands of starving, displaced persons. In early August, Juba Airport reopened and a small supply of grain arrived. The Combined Agencies Relief Team—a coalition of charities working in southern Sudan—renewed their hazardous task of transporting food to surrounding villages. Banditry and warfare have made relief efforts almost impossible in the Upper Nile and Bahr Al Ghazal provinces, however. The Red Cross launched an emergency airlift from Entebbe, Uganda, to Wau in mid-August, but it was suspended in the aftermath of the airliner attack.

International aid agencies, who have repeatedly called for a food truce to allow supplies to reach civilians, estimate that from 2 to 3 million persons are threatened with starvation. ■

**SOUTHERN AFRICA**

**Angola turns to diamonds and coffee**

The government of President José Eduardo dos Santos is struggling to revive its failing diamond and coffee industries in an effort to offset the precipitous decline in oil prices.

Diamang—the state diamond company founded in 1917—has been dissolved in favor of a scheme dividing Angola's diamond fields into blocks and contracting them out to foreign companies under production-sharing agreements with the government. The plan is based on Angola's successful oil exploration and production arrangements with private corporations.

Diamang's former shareholders have been invited to negotiate agreements, and several other firms have shown an interest, including Lonrho, RST International, and the Minerals, Metals, and Trading Company of India, according to government spokesmen.

Angola's diamond fields are still rich with top quality gems, which could provide desperately needed revenues for the war-strapped economy. But productivity dropped from 2 million carats a year in the early 1970s to only 714,000 in 1985. This year, the mines have been operating at a loss.

Operations have been almost impossible to maintain in the face of repeated attacks on the isolated mines in the northeast Lunda Norte province by South African-backed rebels. Unita forces have kidnapped mining personnel and ambushed vehicles going to and from the mines. They also smuggle out an estimated 50 percent of the output—an activity likewise pursued by local people who trade the diamonds for food and clothing. Portuguese diamond traders who worked in Angola before independence control the smuggling from the Zairean side of the border.

The government had contracted with the Mining and Technical Services Company—owned by De Beers Diamond Mining Company—to operate the mines and clean up the illegal trade. The task proved too formidable for MTS, however, and its contract was not renewed.

The government is also appealing to the private sector to help rehabilitate the coffee industry—once ranked fourth in the world. The departure of Portuguese plantation owners and the collapse of their marketing system after independence, coupled with wartime hardships, led many coffee farmers to revert to subsistence farming. Many farms have been abandoned and allowed to deteriorate.

In the last two years, however, there has been a modest recovery. Under the government's rehabilitation plan, farms will be offered to foreign interests, including the former owners, or converted to co-operatives. Incentives in the form of scarce consumer goods will be given to peasant farmers. To reinforce this effort, the UN World Food Programme has initiated a \$14.25 million food-for-work program in which 10,000 workers in 14 state coffee companies will receive 40 percent of their wages in food.

Angola's chances of diversifying its economy partly by attracting foreign investment are considered somewhat better than those of other oil producers despite the negative impact of the war. The country did not borrow heavily during the oil boom years, so its external debt is relatively manageable. Nearly half

the debt is for military loans from the Soviet Union, which has reportedly agreed to a two-year moratorium. ■

## **MOZAMBIQUE** A first for Maputo

President Samora Machel announced in mid-July that the People's Assembly had appointed Planning Minister Mário da Graça Machungo to become the country's first-ever prime minister—a move designed to help the government combat destabilization efforts by South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) rebels.

Machungo will preside over the cabinet and People's Assembly and assume responsibility for all civilian and domestic government functions. The 46-year-old Machungo has held a variety of government posts since independence in 1975, and since March of this year had become one of three "super ministers" in a major cabinet shake-up, taking responsibility for eight portfolios, including finance, banking, trade, and industry. Meanwhile, Machel will remain head of state, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and leader of Frelimo—the ruling party.

The creation of the prime ministerial post is intended to free Machel from administrative burdens, allowing him to concentrate on directing the war against Renamo, whose destabilizing activities have gathered momentum in the last year. The key responsibility for reviving the economy will now shift to the new prime minister.

Said Machungo in explaining the strategy adopted by the People's Assembly, "We are living at a delicate moment in which economic, social, and military problems are interlinked. We must redouble our efforts in order to reply effectively to the attacks of imperialism." He went on to emphasize the magnitude of his task in rejuvenating Mozambique's sagging economy, pointing out that GNP had dropped by 33 percent in the 1982-85 period. Although the fall could largely be attributed to "South African aggres-

sion through the bandits," Machungo admitted that other factors came into play, including "serious shortcomings in the management of the economy."



*Machel: Focusing on the war*

Margaret A. Novicki

A major test facing the government in coming months will be its ability to successfully hold the country's second general election while containing Renamo's efforts at sabotage and disruption. Voting for a new assembly is being held over a three-month period from mid-August to mid-November. The present assembly was elected in 1977, and local assemblies were voted in three years later. As before, the forthcoming elections will be held in stages, with candidates directly elected to local people's assemblies throughout the country, which in turn will choose members for city, provincial, and ultimately national assemblies.

Whether such an elaborate electoral process can be carried out will depend on how effectively the government can neutralize Renamo, which often claims to dominate 80 percent of the countryside. Secretary of the People's Assembly Marcelino dos Santos, however, recently presented a report which indicates that the claim is greatly exaggerated, as about 1,050 of 1,341 local assemblies elected in 1980 are still functioning. ■

# Sam Nujoma

## President, South West Africa People's Organization

At the International Conference for the Immediate Independence of Namibia, convened by the United Nations in Vienna in July, Sam Nujoma spoke to *Africa Report* about the current state of Swapo's struggle to achieve Namibia's independence and its relationship to events inside South Africa.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

**“T**he issue of Namibia's independence is no longer on the backburner of international attention,” said one long-time UN observer. “Rather, it has fallen off the stove.” In recognition that one of the most enduring and intractable international issues—Namibia's long-delayed decolonization and independence—threatens to be completely obscured by the explosive tragedy of apartheid South Africa, the United Nations convened the International Conference for the Immediate Independence of Namibia in Vienna, Austria, from July 7-11.

Attended by 128 governments and over 65 non-governmental organizations, the conference was one in a series of UN-sponsored meetings designed to exert pressure not only on the South African government to dismantle apartheid and allow Namibia's independence, but also on the Western countries which have failed to enact punitive measures against Pretoria.

A prelude to the UN General Assembly Special Session on Namibia, which will take place in New York in late September, the conference served to remind the international community that

**Sam Nujoma: “What is the decisive factor is the struggle that is being waged on the ground inside Namibia by the Namibian people”**



20 years have elapsed since the United Nations revoked South Africa's mandate over “South West Africa.”

After scores of resolutions and an unprecedented international consensus on a plan to achieve Namibia's independence—via Security Council resolution

435 which provides for free and fair elections under UN supervision—Namibia is no closer to being freed from the repression and indignities of South African occupation.

In fact, as conference delegates noted, it may be further away from that

goal than at any time since the UN plan was launched in 1978, given the hardening of positions in southern Africa, continued American-South African insistence on the linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola with South African withdrawal from Namibia, and Reagan administration support for Jonas Savimbi's Unita, which guarantees the Cuban presence in Angola.

The United States, along with its four co-members of the now-defunct Western Contact Group—Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada—participated in the Vienna meeting only as observers. On the receiving end of expected near-universal condemnation of its policies by conference participants, the American delegation spent much of its time lobbying other Western allies to

express reservations on the conference's final declaration and program of action.

Squabbles over "name-calling" in the final conference documents—i.e. the singling out of countries and their policies in southern Africa for having delayed Namibia's independence—seemed a rather petty postscript to a meeting designed to muster the resources and moral commitment of the international community behind renewed efforts to secure Namibia's freedom from South African domination, one of the only issues before the UN upon which there is virtually total agreement.

That Namibia remains as the last vestige of colonial occupation on the African continent and that its people have had no

option but to resort to armed struggle for over 20 years should have been enough to rekindle the efforts of every member of the United Nations—which remains legally responsible for securing Namibia's independence.

As the Vienna conference's president, Tanzanian Foreign Minister Benjamin Mkapa, said in his closing address: "If the revocation of South Africa's mandate over Namibia had been enforced 20 years ago, there would be now a generation of Namibians voting for a Namibian government who had not known life under South African racist rule—a generation of truly free Namibians. There should have been. That there is not must be to the eternal—not just regret—but shame of the community of nations."

**Africa Report:** What does Swapo hope to achieve out of this conference which will contribute to accelerating Namibia's independence?

**Nujoma:** This international conference on Namibia is taking place at a critical moment in our struggle. It is significant in our view because it has been convened as a result of a decision of the 40th session of the UN General Assembly, a clear indication that the armed struggle has the overwhelming support of the international community. This conference is important because it reminds the member-states of the United Nations once again of their responsibility toward Namibia and the fact that 20 years have elapsed since the General Assembly terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia.

Up to this date, Namibia is not yet free. The Namibian people are still being massacred in cold blood by the South African racist regime. After the termination of the mandate, the racist regime of South Africa imposed its military occupation, strengthened and entrenched it, and today Namibia is occupied by over 100,000 South African troops. This is excluding the mercenaries—the Unita bandits who have been trained, armed, and transported into Angola to kill Angolan civilians and destroy the economic infrastructure of that country, as well as the South West Africa Territorial Force, which was created after the passage of Security Council resolution 435 in 1978, and the special murder squads such as the Koevoet.

These special units fall directly under the responsibility of the South African state president. Under martial law, they are empowered to shoot on sight, kill people, break into their houses at night, destroy their property, and shoot cattle, goats, and sheep as they are grazing. Many repressive laws, such as AG-8, AG-9 up to 100 something, and recently the District Security Act are being enforced in Namibia. The District Security Act forbids journalists and people sympathetic to Namibian independence from traveling north, east, or west of

Windhoek, so as to try and hide the truth—the atrocities, the killings, maimings, and torture of the Namibian people at the hands of South Africa's racist army.

There are no international correspondents based in Namibia. Even the local ones are not allowed to issue statements about the war situation without the approval of the SADF [South African Defence Force]. So the political and military situation in Namibia, as well as in South Africa itself, is very critical. This is what we wanted the member-states of the United Nations to consider seriously. We are calling upon them in this conference to impose comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions in order to compel the Boer regime to accept implementation of UN Security Council resolution 435 and the holding of free, fair, and democratic elections in Namibia.

**Africa Report:** Are sanctions the only means available to force South Africa to comply with resolution 435? Given that the United States and Britain remain very opposed to sanctions, what else can the international community do?

**Nujoma:** I don't think American and British opposition to economic sanctions is the decisive factor in the people's struggle for freedom and independence in Namibia. What is the decisive factor in this respect is the struggle that is being waged on the ground inside Namibia by the Namibian people. For the last 20 years, the brave Namibian men and women of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, the military wing of Swapo, have been battling at many fronts against the South African racist regime. Today we are proud to report to the world that over the long period of 20 years of armed struggle, we have created confidence in the minds of the Namibian people that the struggle for their liberation first and foremost is their own responsibility. This is very, very important.

Therefore we demand that the international community should assist us by intensifying economic sanctions. There are those who have already taken some action in this direction in



Liebenberg/NCCT

**Windhoek, Namibia: Police assaulting a Swapo supporter**

order to avoid further bloodshed, loss of lives, and destruction of property. But the struggle will continue despite the economic and strategic interests of the major Western powers, particularly the United States and Britain. Only two decades ago, the continent of Africa was occupied by various colonial powers—the British, French, Belgians, Portuguese, Spaniards—but today we are all proud to note that the entire continent is free with the exception of occupied Namibia and apartheid South Africa.

So the people's struggle depends on their determination to free themselves and to break the chains of slavery. This is exactly what Swapo does in Namibia today. Even the minority white racists in Namibia are convinced that without solving the problem of the genuine freedom and independence of Namibia

by South Africa accepting the holding of free, fair, and democratic elections as envisaged in Security Council resolution 435, certainly there will be no peace. Already, racist South Africa has admitted that 40 percent of the minority white settlers have fled Namibia to South Africa and other parts of the world because of the intensification of the armed liberation struggle.

Furthermore, we are aware of the maneuvers and intrigues being deployed by the Pretoria racist regime. For instance, in 1975, [former South African Prime Minister] Vorster established the so-called Advisory Council composed of puppet elements whom he picked from all the regions of Namibia and brought to Windhoek as so-called councillors. And later on these councillors developed into the so-called DTA [Democratic Turnhalle Alliance] government, council of ministers, and national assembly. All these neo-colonial institutions

which the Vorster regime intended to impose on the Namibian people collapsed as a result of the intensification of the armed liberation struggle and other political actions within Namibia. So to us that is the decisive factor.

Again when the puppet DTA government collapsed, Botha repeated the same mistake as Vorster by instituting the so-called Multi-Party Conference and interim government. Those puppets involved in this deceptive exercise are exactly the same ones Vorster used. They have no supporters among the Namibian people. They were hand-picked and put in positions as so-called ministers and therefore they do not represent the interests of the African majority in Namibia. They are completely isolated and now they are even being removed from the African residential areas, established on the basis of apartheid policy, to the areas normally reserved for whites. So only by protracted armed liberation struggle will the whole colonial administration be overthrown by the Namibian people. Then, these puppet elements will certainly collapse as their masters will not be there to prop them up.

**Africa Report:** Does the United Nations still have a constructive role to play in helping to achieve Namibian independence, given that over the years, UN efforts were first hijacked by the Contact Group and subsequently by the U.S. and South Africa with their insistence on linkage?

**Nujoma:** To us in the liberation movement, it is not new for the imperialists to support the enemies of the people of Africa. All along, the United States and Britain defended the interests of the Ian Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, and racist South Africa. The people's struggle will certainly be intensified whether or not the U.S. or Britain support racist South Africa.

We do, however, appreciate the efforts of the international community in supporting the struggle we are waging inside Namibia. The struggle should be seen in this direction, not vice versa that it is the United Nations that is waging the struggle. The struggle is being waged by the oppressed people of Namibia and the United Nations is supporting the cause for the liberation of Namibia. In this respect, we are grateful for their support.

We feel that we are not alone, that we have behind us the majority of mankind—countries and peoples who believe in freedom, human rights, and equality. So this assures us of our final victory. So many countries in the world, particularly in Africa in the early days, like Kenya for example at the time of Mau Mau, have had to struggle for their freedom. They struggled single-handedly and in the final analysis they won. It was the same thing in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique. Now we have the support of the frontline states whose people have just recently succeeded in overthrowing the yoke of colonialism and foreign domination in their respective countries.

**Africa Report:** As the situation inside South Africa has become more and more violent, South Africa is reacting more and more violently against the frontline states. How will this effect your struggle inside Namibia? Some observers say as South Africa becomes more involved in defending apartheid inside, it will be harder for it to defend apartheid in Namibia. Others say it won't be until South Africa achieves majority rule

that Namibia will attain independence.

**Nujoma:** In our view, in any colonial situation, as we have seen in the past, the people will always struggle if they are reacting to oppression. So we cannot sit idly by in Namibia and wait for the South African majority to overthrow the yoke of apartheid and then Namibia will be free. I think the armed struggle we have been waging for the last 20 years has actually stimulated the uprisings in South Africa which started about a year ago.

In Namibia today, there is a different situation from before. The war we are waging has forced the apartheid regime to change, though cosmetically, the outward signs of apartheid. For example, the post office in the center of Windhoek used to have two doors, one for blacks and one for whites. Today it has only one door. The doors of restaurants and hotels are open to Africans, although the owners reserve the right of admission. The puppets who are imposed on the Namibian people and are now referred to as ministers sitting together with the racist Boers are being used as instruments to deceive the Namibian people. All these things have not just come about because the racists have become good masters! It's because they are afraid! They know the people will take stern actions against them. So the fear is there, and this fear has been created by the war we have been waging. The people of South Africa, the majority oppressed, are seeing what is happening in Namibia and the sacrifices that the Namibians are making.

**Africa Report:** Do you see any role for the United States in resolving the Namibian issue?

**Nujoma:** We in the liberation movement in Africa make distinctions between the Reagan administration and the people of the United States. I must say from the beginning that in successive administrations right from the days of Woodrow Wilson when the mandate was formed, the United States stood on the side of the oppressed people of Namibia. Were it not for the United States, South Africa would have been given Namibia as a Christmas gift by the British because the Boers and the British colonialists in South Africa participated in the war to defeat Germany in South West Africa, then a German colony. When you look in the record of the United Nations, many U.S. administrations supported the placement of the mandate for South West Africa under the United Nations. During the late 1940s and 1950s, the U.S. always voted in favor of what the Namibian traditional leaders demanded—that Namibia be placed under the UN trusteeship system. It was only in 1960 when Swapo was formed, rallying all the masses of the Namibian people, that the struggle was really taken up by the Namibians themselves.

Recently, American members of Congress have initiated bills in both houses intended to impose economic sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa because of its intransigence and its refusal to implement resolution 435. That is very, very clear. In addition to that, we have support from the non-governmental organizations in the U.S., scholars, student groups, and individuals who are playing a very vital role in support of our cause for freedom and independence. So there is a difference between the U.S. administration and the American people.



Susan Dorfman

**SWATF soldier, Windhoek, Namibia: "Under martial law, they are empowered to shoot on sight"**

We in the liberation movement are aware that in each and every country we have friends, so we only urge these friends to mobilize on a larger scale—that workers refuse to load vessels carrying South African goods or South African aircraft that are landing at their airports. They should intensify the campaign of boycotts to pressurize their government to cease insisting on the linkage issue—linking Namibia's independence with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the People's Republic of Angola. The distinction between the Reagan administration and the people who are supporting us is clear.

**Africa Report:** How has the Reagan administration's supplying Unita with Stinger missiles affected your struggle inside Namibia, given that Angola is a very important logistical base for Swapo and that the southern Angolan region is much more militarized?

**Nujoma:** We, the liberation movement in Africa, consider the decision by the Reagan administration to give weapons, including Stinger missiles, to the Unita bandits, as an interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign and independent African state, Angola, and this must be condemned and rejected with the contempt it deserves. We see this intervention by Reagan as an effort to prolong the suffering and agony of the oppressed people of Namibia and those of South Africa because basically, these weapons are given to South Africa.

Let's face reality here. The weapons go first to the hands of the racist regime of South Africa before they come to Namibia, where they are given to the Unita bandits.

So in this case, the Reagan administration is supporting South Africa militarily, economically, financially, politically, and diplomatically. As we have seen in the past six months, the Reagan administration exercised vetoes in the Security Council to frustrate efforts of the United Nations in imposing economic sanctions against the Pretoria regime. So I call upon the people of the United States to stand up against the Reagan administration because its intervention is harming the relationship between the peoples of the United States and the peoples of Africa.

I would also like to appeal to the Reagan administration, the Kohl government in West Germany, and the Thatcher government in Britain to cease their support to the minority white racist regime. We call upon them to support comprehensive, mandatory economic sanctions as the only way of achieving freedom and independence in Namibia through the implementation of Security Council resolution 435, which calls for free and fair elections. Resolution 435 has not been implemented because of the intransigence and continued refusal by the racist Botha regime. We in Swapo are ready to sign a ceasefire to pave the way for the implementation of 435. But Botha fears that once free, fair, and democratic elections take place under UN supervision, their puppets will certainly be defeated. □

# The Question Still Stands

International attention on events in South Africa has overshadowed the still-unresolved issue of Namibia's independence. Twenty years after the UN revoked South Africa's mandate over the territory, the South African Defence Force's repression of Namibia's civilian population continues unabated—and largely unreported by the Western press.

BY JOHN A. EVENSON

**P**ortius Blasius is 15 years old. He attends what passes for a secondary school near his home village of Onhema, in the "operational zone" of northern Namibia. On June 6 after school, he was sitting outside a closed liquor store when 12 soldiers from the South African Defense Force (SADF) drove up in a truck. Portius was ordered to open the shop. He tried to explain that the owner was away and he had no keys, but the soldiers were not satisfied. They seized the boy, threw him into the truck, and drove away.

"They took me to an unknown place where they accused me of being a 'stupid little Swapo' and asked me about Swapo fighters. Some soldiers started to beat me while others, pulling my hair, held my face against the exhaust pipe.

"Although I was screaming very loudly, those merciless white devils did not care, and even left me there in the bush with much pain."

Portius was helped by a neighbor to the closest medical facility, the state-owned Oshakati hospital. A photographer for *The Namibian*, an independent English-language weekly, was in the region and went to the hospital, but medical personnel tried to keep him from seeing the boy. After some hours of persistence, he managed to get to Portius' bedside, where he found the boy

lying in dirty, unwashed sheets, waiting to be treated for his burns.

For the past two years, events in the Republic of South Africa have often dominated the foreign and domestic news pages. But during this period, the ostensible reason for the U.S. policy of "constructive engagement," the independence of Namibia, has been conveniently forgotten. Even in the early days of the Reagan administration—days punctuated by over-optimistic reports from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker and his aides—very little was said about what was actually happening inside the 318,261 square mile territory.

Instead, we were treated to an endless litany of "progress is being made", "a breakthrough is near", and "prospects are reasonably good", as reporters dutifully took down the words of U.S. and South African officials. The United States had embarked on a negotiating policy that regarded South Africa as the aggrieved party in the Namibian affair, and life for Namibians under South African rule went on as usual.

There is little to suggest that Washington's policy-makers have ever had much concern about the "*sitz im leben*" of South Africa's occupation of the territory. While the exhaust pipe incident is but one of thousands of acts of arbitrary

"In the main, the SADF and the local forces it recruits are hated and feared"



Link/NCCT



violence occurring each year in the territory, it would appear that our current policy has been to disregard the valid human rights expectations of the Namibian people in favor of South Africa's insistence on the imposition of an East-West scenario.

And yet it is the human rights expectations of the Namibian people that are at the core of the struggle that is Namibia. To disregard or to treat lightly these legitimate yearnings has resulted in a devaluation of America's moral pretenses as leader of the "free world."

Listening to Namibians from all walks of life, there is an overwhelming consensus that independence is long, long overdue. The trust mandate granted by the League of Nations to "His Britannic Majesty, to be administered by the Union of South Africa" was revoked by the United Nations in 1966. The mandate revocation was upheld by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1971. There is no serious dispute over the standing of Namibia in international law. The fact can be simply stated: South Africa is illegally occupying the territory of Namibia.

The mandate was revoked for a reason. South Africa was no benevolent trustee. It had applied the full weight of apartheid in its rule of the territory, resulting in the predictable gross differences in infant mortality, life expectancy, education, and income between black and white.

To insure that its laws are upheld and its sovereignty protected, South Africa has installed an army and police force of considerable size in the territory. This army, especially in the northern "operational zone" (where one-half of Namibia's 1.4 million people live), is given full military powers. Like other armies of occupation, it has purchased the cooperation of a minority of the population, but in the main the SADF and the local forces it recruits are hated and feared.

There are two principal movements opposing the South Africans in Namibia. The first is the South West Africa People's Organization (Swapo), a multi-ethnic liberation movement with wide support whose small army, PLAN, has been attacking South African installations in the country since 1966. The second is the Christian church, which



Liebenberg/NCCT

**"The churches are a potent force because they have overcome both ethnic and theological differences"**

like its counterparts in the Philippines and Poland, has taken a clear stand on the side of the common man and woman against a totalitarian ruler.

The lightly armed Swapo guerrillas have concentrated their attacks on South African installations and mobile troops. Trained and armed by the Eastern bloc, these young people have found help and sustenance in the homes of rural Namibians. They are "the boys," the sons of friends, the hope of a new Namibia. Thousands left the country in the late 1970s as teenagers. Now they are returning, and if the body counts of the SADF are to be believed, many to almost certain death. But they continue to return home to try and dislodge the South African army of occupation.

There is a certainty about their effectiveness, not in defeating the South Africans in open battles, but in their ability to harass, to make the occupation costly, and to show that there are Namibians willing to die for freedom. Landmines are planted, telephone poles blasted, and rockets launched into white areas of South African administrative and military centers. In recent months, Swapo soldiers have attacked numerous bases, including the SADF headquarters at Oshakati, and have shot down at least one South African helicopter.

The South African response to Swapo "incursions" has been to increase its repression of the civilian population. Thus on July 23, President Botha stepped into the legal process in Windhoek to quash a murder trial against four white SADF soldiers who had killed a 48-year-old father of five last November. The trial was halted because it was "not in the national interest."

—To Namibians, it is the SADF, the "Koevoet" death squad, and the troops of Unita who train in Namibia who are the terrorists. The people of the north say evening prayers in their kraals, asking God to "defend us from all the perils and dangers of this night." As many Namibians from "the operational zone" have told the author: "We are always thinking, is this the night that the Boers will come again?"

In a war, there are casualties among the military and civilians alike. But in the war in Namibia, methods of brutality against the civilian population are clearly associated with the repression of an unwilling populace. Bishop Kleopas Dumeni, leader of Namibia's large Evangelical Lutheran church, said that the level of violence had increased dramatically this past June. While he recognized that

the violence came from both sides, Dumeni stated that the killings continue "simply because the South African government refuses to sign a ceasefire agreement between its troops and Swapo."

That is the opinion of most Namibians. They see one basic reason for their suffering: the continued illegal occupation of their country by the government of South Africa. In the minds of the vast majority of Namibians, there is no other issue. They are not afraid of Cuba, nor of Angola, and they are certainly not afraid of their political party of choice—Swapo.

Swapo's importance in the struggle for independence has never been in doubt, except for those who have swallowed South Africa's story that the movement is a terrorist organization controlled by the Soviet Union. Swapo's roots are in the anti-colonial feelings that have been passed down from grandparents who remembered life before the Germans came in the 19th century. The Namibians did not need a European textbook to teach the difference between justice and injustice.

Like many other liberation movements, Swapo went first to the West in its search for aid. And as with other liberation movements, the United States, Great Britain, and France showed Swapo the door. The West's trusted ally, the Republic of South Africa, was the "bird in the hand," and a white bird after all. But the Swapo leaders who went into exile found help from churches and individuals even in these countries—assistance and support that continues to this day.

Funds for its refugee work (more than 60,000 Namibian refugees are currently in Angola and Zambia) and education bursaries come from churches, aid agencies, the United Nations, and a diverse list of Western, non-aligned, and Eastern bloc countries. Young Namibians attending school in Europe, North America, Africa, and Asia are trained in a variety of trade and scientific skills, preparing for the needs of an independent Namibia.

Swapo's leader, Sam Nujoma, is an old-time patriot, a now grandfatherly figure who has kept the movement together through many difficult trials.



Criticized by Chester Crocker's staff as not having the intelligence or sophistication of a Robert Mugabe, one suspects that Nujoma has the common sense, rural directness, and clarity of purpose that foreign service officers cannot manipulate.

South Africa has tried many means to cripple Swapo. It repeatedly establishes "governments" to create the illusion that the territory is self-governing without Swapo. Each dispensation of this ploy, little different than the homeland governments it has set up in the Republic, has floundered for want of popular support. The current government, appointed June 17, 1985, has suffered from continuous squabbling between anti-Swapo black Namibians who need some changes in the apartheid laws to establish their credibility, and "baster," white, and Coloured ministers who like things just the way they are.

The parties that make up this "interim government" would likely win no more than 15 percent of the vote in any free election. The largest component is the white National Party, and most other groups in the "Multi-Party Conference" are rooted in tribally based homeland governments financed by South Africa.

To convince others of its democratic inclinations, the interim government passed a "bill of rights" early on. But to its consternation, Swapo and the churches have used this legislation to overturn some of South Africa's laws restricting freedom of assembly. Apart from the fact that it is not representative of the people, the interim government lost any credibility it might have had by

assuming responsibility for implementing South Africa's draconian detention laws.

Coupled with this attempt to politically isolate Swapo are the military adventures of the SADF in Angola. Since 1975, South Africa has maintained a presence in southern Angola, both with its own battalions and through its support for Jonas Savimbi's Unita troops. Neither South Africa nor Unita has any compunction as to whom they attack, be it unarmed civilians, church mission stations, or refugee camps. Many families in Namibia learn months later that a child or brother or sister has died in Angola in an attack by the SADF or Unita.

South Africa's one-two punch of censorship and heavy investment in propaganda has paid dividends in Western capitals. By restricting journalists' movements in northern Namibia, the story of its repressive measures is not being told. Instead, compliant reporters are flown to Oshakati, the main SADF base in the operational zone, and shown the bodies of Swapo "terrorists" and stacks of captured weapons. Outside the SADF fortresses—unreported—Namibians are mourning their dead.

South Africa has also financed a propaganda effort specifically supporting its government in Namibia. Under the direction of Sean Cleary, former South African diplomat and chief of staff of Botha's administrator-general in Namibia, public relations offices in Bonn, Paris, London, and Washington provide a steady stream of "anti-communist" stories hailing the interim government as Namibia's answer to apple pie.

Through right-wing organizations



Liebenberg/NCCCT

**First Swapo rally in five years, July 1986:  
"There is an overwhelming consensus  
that independence is long, long overdue"**

such as the International Society for Human Rights, South Africa has attempted to mount a campaign citing human rights violations in the Swapo camps. Except with extremist politicians in West Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, these flimsily documented attempts at smearing Swapo have not met with any success. But the communist label they have bestowed on Swapo has frightened off many otherwise sympathetic legislators.

Inside Namibia, where it counts, events continue to show that there is overwhelming support for parties and groups that refuse to collaborate with the interim government. One indicator, the churches, are a potent force because they have overcome both ethnic and theological differences to work together for independence and human rights.

More than 70 percent of the 1.4 million population are active members of Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Anglican, and African Methodist Episcopal churches. Through the Council of Churches in Namibia, they have a history of publicly attacking the human rights violations of the SADF, the police, and the various interim governments. As far back as 1971, immediately following the ICJ decision, the two major Lutheran churches issued a scathing open letter to then-Prime Minister Vorster challenging South Africa's activities in the country.

As bishops, pastors, and priests have continued to reveal South Africa's human rights violations, the Church has not gotten away unscathed. British, Finnish, and German missionaries have

been deported, priests imprisoned, church services disrupted, church buildings destroyed, and active lay officials detained and tortured. The headquarters of the Council of Churches was fire-bombed last January, and the government refuses to grant some church leaders travel documents.

The churches' influence extends into the Swapo ranks in exile. Swapo refugee camps in Angola and Zambia are staffed by chaplains from Lutheran, Roman Catholic, and Anglican churches. Many Swapo soldiers receive instruction in the faith, and many have been baptised by pastors serving the refugee community.

The churches have strongly reacted to South Africa's claim that in fighting Swapo it is resisting communism. Says Bishop Dumeni: "It is propaganda. Who is Swapo? Let me tell you. Swapo are members, men and women, daughters and boys of our families, members of our churches. They are Christians. But the question is why they left the country. Precisely because of the hardships of the war situation, apartheid, separate development, and injustice."

Last April, under the aegis of Dr. Abisai Shejavali, head of the Council of Churches, the leaders of all the anti-colonial parties, major churches, and women's groups, including the YWCA, signed an anti-government statement called the Ai-Gams declaration. Swapo, the largest and most inclusive political party, was a full signatory. Since then, Ai-Gams (literally "Hot Springs," the ancient Nama designation for Wind-

hoek) meetings have been held all over the territory, save in the operational zone. Even at rural Karasburg, in the desolate south, 1,400 people trekked in from the farms to attend a rally against South Africa and its interim government.

But the most dramatic indication of what would occur if free elections were held came in July. Sometimes, even in Namibia, white judges can surprise the government. On July 3, the Windhoek Supreme Court threw out a 1981 law that effectively banned public meetings of Swapo. On July 27, free from fear of arrest, more than 13,000 people gathered in Katutura, the black township outside Windhoek, to attend the liberation movement's first legal meeting in many years.

In the mid-1970s, when the UN General Assembly was demanding sanctions because of South Africa's intransigence, the Western members of the Security Council stepped in and assumed responsibility for Namibia's independence. With the adoption in 1978 of UN Security Council resolution 435 and its accompanying detailed plans for a ceasefire, peace-keeping force, and elections, Namibians had real hope that their independence was near. After all, as one church official said: "The leaders of the free world had taken an interest in our cause."

Eight years later, Namibians are still dying, living under apartheid, and seeking the implementation of the Western plan for their independence. But now they have no champion for their cause among the leaders of the free world. Namibian independence is not even on the agenda of the sanctions debate. The United States has not only given South Africa a reason for not leaving Namibia, namely the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, but has even made that irrelevant condition impossible to fulfill by becoming a partner of Jonas Savimbi, South Africa's surrogate in Angola.

In a Swapo refugee camp, a young Namibian said to me: "I've read your declaration of independence. That's what we want. Why won't America help us?" The question still stands. □

*John A. Evenson is a journalist and director of the Namibia Communications Centre, a London-based news agency working with the churches in Namibia.*

# The OAU: A New Militancy

In contrast with past summits, this year the OAU heads of state set aside internal political disputes to focus attention and resources on the struggle against apartheid. The new OAU chairman, Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso, will lead the organization's efforts to marshal support for the liberation movements and keep the issue at the forefront of international concern.

BY MARY ANNE FITZGERALD

The Organization of African Unity's 22nd heads of state summit, held in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa (July 28-30), was dominated by one topic—sanctions against South Africa. The annual meeting was held against a background of mounting frustration and anger at Western reluctance to adopt effective measures to pressure the Pretoria regime.

It was clear from the outset that Africa is determined to utilize whatever means possible to topple the government of South African President P.W. Botha. African leaders consistently enjoined fellow members to increase support of southern African liberation movements—the ANC, PAC, and Swapo—and to unite in exerting pressure on their Western allies to take positive steps toward dismantling the structure of apartheid.

The mood of militancy was apparent not only in delegates' speeches but also in the resolutions that were adopted. Its position on South Africa was the strongest stand the OAU has taken on any issue in its 23-year history. The organization condemned five countries by name—the United States, Britain,

France, West Germany, and Israel—for collaboration with the Pretoria regime and took the unprecedented step of urging punitive action against Britain for its perceived intransigence on the sanctions issue.

This was formalized in a series of stiffly worded resolutions which not only expectedly blasted Pretoria, but also castigated Africa's Western allies in the bluntest of terms for their failure to quickly enact punitive measures against South Africa's white government.

Unlike previous occasions, when tensions tended to be introverted, focusing on the disputed outcome of Africa's civil wars and guerrilla insurgencies, this gathering switched its axis of attention south to Pretoria and the frontline states and north to the United States and European countries.

Lacking any real leverage of its own, the OAU acknowledged that without Western backing on the sanctions issue, international condemnation of Botha's government is meaningless. Therefore, the OAU strategy is to accelerate momentum in its campaign to bring about comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

The 50-member organization, which speaks for the African and Arab coun-

tries of the continent, intends to voice its demand in increasingly important fora, thus encouraging a groundswell of global opinion that it hopes will ultimately force the hand of sanctions' detractors.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher have already made their opposition to an embargo abundantly clear.

---

**“The OAU strategy is to accelerate momentum in its campaign to bring about comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa.”**

---

But France and West Germany will also register strong resistance if the European Community decides to go ahead with its version of sanctions.

The OAU's views had already been heard in conferences convened in Paris and Vienna in June and July where the international community dealt with sanctions and Namibian independence,

respectively. The Addis meeting further entrenched the organization's position that the time for dialogue with South Africa is over. The consensus was that even though the continent is undergoing an economic crisis, no cost is too high to provide moral and material support for the liberation of South Africa.

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and President Kenneth Kaunda took Africa's viewpoint with them to the mini-summit of seven Commonwealth leaders that opened in London on August 3. While Mugabe and Kaunda failed to re-

its demand for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa before the Security Council. The Council's reaction will be pivotal in steering international influence on the course that South Africa will take. A previous African-sponsored call for sanctions was vetoed by the United States and Britain, and there is a strong likelihood that this scenario will be repeated.

Even so, the outwardly uniform stance on South Africa lends more weight to the OAU than it has previously enjoyed. The summit outcome also

States for its invasion of Libya was axed, illustrating the conference's intensive focus on southern Africa. At earlier meetings, the OAU would almost certainly have debated the topic at length. The U.S. linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to Namibian independence also came under fire. And another resolution condemning U.S. support of Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels, who have been waging a long-standing insurgency against the Angolan government, was included at the last minute.

Further broadsides against the United States and some of its allies surfaced in the resolution on South Africa. This hardhitting section predictably contained a litany of grievances directed toward Pretoria. They included the re-imposition of the state of emergency, press censorship, mass arrests, detention without trial, and the killing of political and trade union activists. Pretoria was perpetrating "terrorism and genocide" through its army, police, and "black murder squads," it said.

The OAU also lambasted the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and Israel for their "continued economic and nuclear collaboration" with Botha's government. While the other governments maintained an official silence on the criticism that had been levelled against them, West Germany reacted strongly to the accusation, distributing a denial to reporters at the meeting.

However, it was Britain which came in for the toughest attack. Thatcher's government was "vehemently" condemned for its refusal to impose sanctions against South Africa. To observers' surprise, the OAU called on member-states and non-aligned countries to goad Thatcher into changing her mind by voluntarily taking disciplinary steps against Britain, such as punitive economic measures, sports boycotts, and the severing of diplomatic ties.

The harshly worded resolution, which emerged from a preceding ministerial meeting, was not expected to survive or at the least, to be diluted. The fact that it rode through the summit untouched was at least partially attributable to Nigeria's hardline lobbying.

The Nigerian deputy vice president, Commodore Ebitu O. Ukiwe, said the



Cameroon

**Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, OAU chairman: "The outwardly uniform stance on South Africa lends more weight to the OAU than it has previously enjoyed"**

ceive an official mandate to speak on the continent's behalf, they were armed with ample ammunition to press their case for an imposition of sanctions by the Commonwealth.

Next on the itinerary is the annual summit of the non-aligned countries, scheduled to be held in the Zimbabwean capital of Harare in late August. Here African delegates were expected to renew the appeal made at the OAU summit for non-aligned states to take punitive action against Britain and to "increase their moral, political, diplomatic, and material support" of the South African liberation movements.

The final assault will be made when the United Nations General Assembly convenes in the fall. The OAU resolved that the UN African Group would place

proved to be a victory for states such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Congo, whose president, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, succeeded Senegal's Abdou Diouf as OAU chairman.

Several specific references to the United States and Britain underscored the indignation that is felt toward the Reagan and Thatcher governments. The lead resolution was a condemnation of the United States for its refusal to impose sanctions. Reagan's key policy speech of July 22—where he opted for negotiation with Pretoria rather than action against it—was still fresh at the time of the meeting. It was censured as "an apology for this inhuman system of apartheid," representing "covert support for racism."

A proposal to condemn the United

# Sam Nujoma

## President, South West Africa People's Organization

At the International Conference for the Immediate Independence of Namibia, convened by the United Nations in Vienna in July, Sam Nujoma spoke to *Africa Report* about the current state of Swapo's struggle to achieve Namibia's independence and its relationship to events inside South Africa.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

**“T**he issue of Namibia's independence is no longer on the backburner of international attention,” said one long-time UN observer. “Rather, it has fallen off the stove.” In recognition that one of the most enduring and intractable international issues—Namibia's long-delayed decolonization and independence—threatens to be completely obscured by the explosive tragedy of apartheid South Africa, the United Nations convened the International Conference for the Immediate Independence of Namibia in Vienna, Austria, from July 7-11.

Attended by 128 governments and over 65 non-governmental organizations, the conference was one in a series of UN-sponsored meetings designed to exert pressure not only on the South African government to dismantle apartheid and allow Namibia's independence, but also on the Western countries which have failed to enact punitive measures against Pretoria.

A prelude to the UN General Assembly Special Session on Namibia, which will take place in New York in late September, the conference served to remind the international community that

**Sam Nujoma: “What is the decisive factor is the struggle that is being waged on the ground inside Namibia by the Namibian people”**



20 years have elapsed since the United Nations revoked South Africa's mandate over “South West Africa.”

After scores of resolutions and an unprecedented international consensus on a plan to achieve Namibia's independence—via Security Council resolution

435 which provides for free and fair elections under UN supervision—Namibia is no closer to being freed from the repression and indignities of South African occupation.

In fact, as conference delegates noted, it may be further away from that

Cametrapix

goal than at any time since the UN plan was launched in 1978, given the hardening of positions in southern Africa, continued American-South African insistence on the linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola with South African withdrawal from Namibia, and Reagan administration support for Jonas Savimbi's Unita, which guarantees the Cuban presence in Angola.

The United States, along with its four co-members of the now-defunct Western Contact Group—Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada—participated in the Vienna meeting only as observers. On the receiving end of expected near-universal condemnation of its policies by conference participants, the American delegation spent much of its time lobbying other Western allies to

express reservations on the conference's final declaration and program of action.

Squabbles over "name-calling" in the final conference documents—i.e. the singling out of countries and their policies in southern Africa for having delayed Namibia's independence—seemed a rather petty postscript to a meeting designed to muster the resources and moral commitment of the international community behind renewed efforts to secure Namibia's freedom from South African domination, one of the only issues before the UN upon which there is virtually total agreement.

That Namibia remains as the last vestige of colonial occupation on the African continent and that its people have had no

option but to resort to armed struggle for over 20 years should have been enough to rekindle the efforts of every member of the United Nations—which remains legally responsible for securing Namibia's independence.

As the Vienna conference's president, Tanzanian Foreign Minister Benjamin Mkapa, said in his closing address: "If the revocation of South Africa's mandate over Namibia had been enforced 20 years ago, there would be now a generation of Namibians voting for a Namibian government who had not known life under South African racist rule—a generation of truly free Namibians. There should have been. That there is not must be to the eternal—not just regret—but shame of the community of nations."

**Africa Report:** What does Swapo hope to achieve out of this conference which will contribute to accelerating Namibia's independence?

**Nujoma:** This international conference on Namibia is taking place at a critical moment in our struggle. It is significant in our view because it has been convened as a result of a decision of the 40th session of the UN General Assembly, a clear indication that the armed struggle has the overwhelming support of the international community. This conference is important because it reminds the member-states of the United Nations once again of their responsibility toward Namibia and the fact that 20 years have elapsed since the General Assembly terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia.

Up to this date, Namibia is not yet free. The Namibian people are still being massacred in cold blood by the South African racist regime. After the termination of the mandate, the racist regime of South Africa imposed its military occupation, strengthened and entrenched it, and today Namibia is occupied by over 100,000 South African troops. This is excluding the mercenaries—the Unita bandits who have been trained, armed, and transported into Angola to kill Angolan civilians and destroy the economic infrastructure of that country, as well as the South West Africa Territorial Force, which was created after the passage of Security Council resolution 435 in 1978, and the special murder squads such as the Koevoet.

These special units fall directly under the responsibility of the South African state president. Under martial law, they are empowered to shoot on sight, kill people, break into their houses at night, destroy their property, and shoot cattle, goats, and sheep as they are grazing. Many repressive laws, such as AG-8, AG-9 up to 100 something, and recently the District Security Act are being enforced in Namibia. The District Security Act forbids journalists and people sympathetic to Namibian independence from traveling north, east, or west of

Windhoek, so as to try and hide the truth—the atrocities, the killings, maimings, and torture of the Namibian people at the hands of South Africa's racist army.

There are no international correspondents based in Namibia. Even the local ones are not allowed to issue statements about the war situation without the approval of the SADF [South African Defence Force]. So the political and military situation in Namibia, as well as in South Africa itself, is very critical. This is what we wanted the member-states of the United Nations to consider seriously. We are calling upon them in this conference to impose comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions in order to compel the Boer regime to accept implementation of UN Security Council resolution 435 and the holding of free, fair, and democratic elections in Namibia.

**Africa Report:** Are sanctions the only means available to force South Africa to comply with resolution 435? Given that the United States and Britain remain very opposed to sanctions, what else can the international community do?

**Nujoma:** I don't think American and British opposition to economic sanctions is the decisive factor in the people's struggle for freedom and independence in Namibia. What is the decisive factor in this respect is the struggle that is being waged on the ground inside Namibia by the Namibian people. For the last 20 years, the brave Namibian men and women of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, the military wing of Swapo, have been battling at many fronts against the South African racist regime. Today we are proud to report to the world that over the long period of 20 years of armed struggle, we have created confidence in the minds of the Namibian people that the struggle for their liberation first and foremost is their own responsibility. This is very, very important.

Therefore we demand that the international community should assist us by intensifying economic sanctions. There are those who have already taken some action in this direction in



Liebenberg/NCCT

**Windhoek, Namibia: Police assaulting a Swapo supporter**

order to avoid further bloodshed, loss of lives, and destruction of property. But the struggle will continue despite the economic and strategic interests of the major Western powers, particularly the United States and Britain. Only two decades ago, the continent of Africa was occupied by various colonial powers—the British, French, Belgians, Portuguese, Spaniards—but today we are all proud to note that the entire continent is free with the exception of occupied Namibia and apartheid South Africa.

So the people's struggle depends on their determination to free themselves and to break the chains of slavery. This is exactly what Swapo does in Namibia today. Even the minority white racists in Namibia are convinced that without solving the problem of the genuine freedom and independence of Namibia

by South Africa accepting the holding of free, fair, and democratic elections as envisaged in Security Council resolution 435, certainly there will be no peace. Already, racist South Africa has admitted that 40 percent of the minority white settlers have fled Namibia to South Africa and other parts of the world because of the intensification of the armed liberation struggle.

Furthermore, we are aware of the maneuvers and intrigues being deployed by the Pretoria racist regime. For instance, in 1975, [former South African Prime Minister] Vorster established the so-called Advisory Council composed of puppet elements whom he picked from all the regions of Namibia and brought to Windhoek as so-called councillors. And later on these councillors developed into the so-called DTA [Democratic Turnhalle Alliance] government, council of ministers, and national assembly. All these neo-colonial institutions



which the Vorster regime intended to impose on the Namibian people collapsed as a result of the intensification of the armed liberation struggle and other political actions within Namibia. So to us that is the decisive factor.

Again when the puppet DTA government collapsed, Botha repeated the same mistake as Vorster by instituting the so-called Multi-Party Conference and interim government. Those puppets involved in this deceptive exercise are exactly the same ones Vorster used. They have no supporters among the Namibian people. They were hand-picked and put in positions as so-called ministers and therefore they do not represent the interests of the African majority in Namibia. They are completely isolated and now they are even being removed from the African residential areas, established on the basis of apartheid policy, to the areas normally reserved for whites. So only by protracted armed liberation struggle will the whole colonial administration be overthrown by the Namibian people. Then, these puppet elements will certainly collapse as their masters will not be there to prop them up.

**Africa Report:** Does the United Nations still have a constructive role to play in helping to achieve Namibian independence, given that over the years, UN efforts were first hijacked by the Contact Group and subsequently by the U.S. and South Africa with their insistence on linkage?

**Nujoma:** To us in the liberation movement, it is not new for the imperialists to support the enemies of the people of Africa. All along, the United States and Britain defended the interests of the Ian Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, and racist South Africa. The people's struggle will certainly be intensified whether or not the U.S. or Britain support racist South Africa.

We do, however, appreciate the efforts of the international community in supporting the struggle we are waging inside Namibia. The struggle should be seen in this direction, not vice versa that it is the United Nations that is waging the struggle. The struggle is being waged by the oppressed people of Namibia and the United Nations is supporting the cause for the liberation of Namibia. In this respect, we are grateful for their support.

We feel that we are not alone, that we have behind us the majority of mankind—countries and peoples who believe in freedom, human rights, and equality. So this assures us of our final victory. So many countries in the world, particularly in Africa in the early days, like Kenya for example at the time of Mau Mau, have had to struggle for their freedom. They struggled single-handedly and in the final analysis they won. It was the same thing in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique. Now we have the support of the frontline states whose people have just recently succeeded in overthrowing the yoke of colonialism and foreign domination in their respective countries.

**Africa Report:** As the situation inside South Africa has become more and more violent, South Africa is reacting more and more violently against the frontline states. How will this effect your struggle inside Namibia? Some observers say as South Africa becomes more involved in defending apartheid inside, it will be harder for it to defend apartheid in Namibia. Others say it won't be until South Africa achieves majority rule

that Namibia will attain independence.

**Nujoma:** In our view, in any colonial situation, as we have seen in the past, the people will always struggle if they are reacting to oppression. So we cannot sit idly by in Namibia and wait for the South African majority to overthrow the yoke of apartheid and then Namibia will be free. I think the armed struggle we have been waging for the last 20 years has actually stimulated the uprisings in South Africa which started about a year ago.

In Namibia today, there is a different situation from before. The war we are waging has forced the apartheid regime to change, though cosmetically, the outward signs of apartheid. For example, the post office in the center of Windhoek used to have two doors, one for blacks and one for whites. Today it has only one door. The doors of restaurants and hotels are open to Africans, although the owners reserve the right of admission. The puppets who are imposed on the Namibian people and are now referred to as ministers sitting together with the racist Boers are being used as instruments to deceive the Namibian people. All these things have not just come about because the racists have become good masters! It's because they are afraid! They know the people will take stern actions against them. So the fear is there, and this fear has been created by the war we have been waging. The people of South Africa, the majority oppressed, are seeing what is happening in Namibia and the sacrifices that the Namibians are making.

**Africa Report:** Do you see any role for the United States in resolving the Namibian issue?

**Nujoma:** We in the liberation movement in Africa make distinctions between the Reagan administration and the people of the United States. I must say from the beginning that in successive administrations right from the days of Woodrow Wilson when the mandate was formed, the United States stood on the side of the oppressed people of Namibia. Were it not for the United States, South Africa would have been given Namibia as a Christmas gift by the British because the Boers and the British colonialists in South Africa participated in the war to defeat Germany in South West Africa, then a German colony. When you look in the record of the United Nations, many U.S. administrations supported the placement of the mandate for South West Africa under the United Nations. During the late 1940s and 1950s, the U.S. always voted in favor of what the Namibian traditional leaders demanded—that Namibia be placed under the UN trusteeship system. It was only in 1960 when Swapo was formed, rallying all the masses of the Namibian people, that the struggle was really taken up by the Namibians themselves.

Recently, American members of Congress have initiated bills in both houses intended to impose economic sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa because of its intransigence and its refusal to implement resolution 435. That is very, very clear. In addition to that, we have support from the non-governmental organizations in the U.S., scholars, student groups, and individuals who are playing a very vital role in support of our cause for freedom and independence. So there is a difference between the U.S. administration and the American people.



Susan Dorfman

**SWATF soldier, Windhoek, Namibia: "Under martial law, they are empowered to shoot on sight"**

We in the liberation movement are aware that in each and every country we have friends, so we only urge these friends to mobilize on a larger scale—that workers refuse to load vessels carrying South African goods or South African aircraft that are landing at their airports. They should intensify the campaign of boycotts to pressurize their government to cease insisting on the linkage issue—linking Namibia's independence with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the People's Republic of Angola. The distinction between the Reagan administration and the people who are supporting us is clear.

**Africa Report:** How has the Reagan administration's supplying Unita with Stinger missiles affected your struggle inside Namibia, given that Angola is a very important logistical base for Swapo and that the southern Angolan region is much more militarized?

**Nujoma:** We, the liberation movement in Africa, consider the decision by the Reagan administration to give weapons, including Stinger missiles, to the Unita bandits, as an interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign and independent African state, Angola, and this must be condemned and rejected with the contempt it deserves. We see this intervention by Reagan as an effort to prolong the suffering and agony of the oppressed people of Namibia and those of South Africa because basically, these weapons are given to South Africa.

Let's face reality here. The weapons go first to the hands of the racist regime of South Africa before they come to Namibia, where they are given to the Unita bandits.

So in this case, the Reagan administration is supporting South Africa militarily, economically, financially, politically, and diplomatically. As we have seen in the past six months, the Reagan administration exercised vetoes in the Security Council to frustrate efforts of the United Nations in imposing economic sanctions against the Pretoria regime. So I call upon the people of the United States to stand up against the Reagan administration because its intervention is harming the relationship between the peoples of the United States and the peoples of Africa.

I would also like to appeal to the Reagan administration, the Kohl government in West Germany, and the Thatcher government in Britain to cease their support to the minority white racist regime. We call upon them to support comprehensive, mandatory economic sanctions as the only way of achieving freedom and independence in Namibia through the implementation of Security Council resolution 435, which calls for free and fair elections. Resolution 435 has not been implemented because of the intransigence and continued refusal by the racist Botha regime. We in Swapo are ready to sign a cease-fire to pave the way for the implementation of 435. But Botha fears that once free, fair, and democratic elections take place under UN supervision, their puppets will certainly be defeated. □

# The Question Still Stands

International attention on events in South Africa has overshadowed the still-unresolved issue of Namibia's independence. Twenty years after the UN revoked South Africa's mandate over the territory, the South African Defence Force's repression of Namibia's civilian population continues unabated—and largely unreported by the Western press.

BY JOHN A. EVENSON

**P**ortius Blasius is 15 years old. He attends what passes for a secondary school near his home village of Onhema, in the "operational zone" of northern Namibia. On June 6 after school, he was sitting outside a closed liquor store when 12 soldiers from the South African Defense Force (SADF) drove up in a truck. Portius was ordered to open the shop. He tried to explain that the owner was away and he had no keys, but the soldiers were not satisfied. They seized the boy, threw him into the truck, and drove away.

"They took me to an unknown place where they accused me of being a 'stupid little Swapo' and asked me about Swapo fighters. Some soldiers started to beat me while others, pulling my hair, held my face against the exhaust pipe.

"Although I was screaming very loudly, those merciless white devils did not care, and even left me there in the bush with much pain."

Portius was helped by a neighbor to the closest medical facility, the state-owned Oshakati hospital. A photographer for *The Namibian*, an independent English-language weekly, was in the region and went to the hospital, but medical personnel tried to keep him from seeing the boy. After some hours of persistence, he managed to get to Portius' bedside, where he found the boy

lying in dirty, unwashed sheets, waiting to be treated for his burns.

For the past two years, events in the Republic of South Africa have often dominated the foreign and domestic news pages. But during this period, the ostensible reason for the U.S. policy of "constructive engagement," the independence of Namibia, has been conveniently forgotten. Even in the early days of the Reagan administration—days punctuated by over-optimistic reports from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker and his aides—very little was said about what was actually happening inside the 318,261 square mile territory.

Instead, we were treated to an endless litany of "progress is being made", "a breakthrough is near", and "prospects are reasonably good", as reporters dutifully took down the words of U.S. and South African officials. The United States had embarked on a negotiating policy that regarded South Africa as the aggrieved party in the Namibian affair, and life for Namibians under South African rule went on as usual.

There is little to suggest that Washington's policy-makers have ever had much concern about the "*sitz im leben*" of South Africa's occupation of the territory. While the exhaust pipe incident is but one of thousands of acts of arbitrary

"In the main, the SADF and the local forces it recruits are hated and feared"



Link/NCCT

violence occurring each year in the territory, it would appear that our current policy has been to disregard the valid human rights expectations of the Namibian people in favor of South Africa's insistence on the imposition of an East-West scenario.

And yet it is the human rights expectations of the Namibian people that are at the core of the struggle that is Namibia. To disregard or to treat lightly these legitimate yearnings has resulted in a devaluation of America's moral pretenses as leader of the "free world."

Listening to Namibians from all walks of life, there is an overwhelming consensus that independence is long, long overdue. The trust mandate granted by the League of Nations to "His Britannic Majesty, to be administered by the Union of South Africa" was revoked by the United Nations in 1966. The mandate revocation was upheld by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1971. There is no serious dispute over the standing of Namibia in international law. The fact can be simply stated: South Africa is illegally occupying the territory of Namibia.

The mandate was revoked for a reason. South Africa was no benevolent trustee. It had applied the full weight of apartheid in its rule of the territory, resulting in the predictable gross differences in infant mortality, life expectancy, education, and income between black and white.

To insure that its laws are upheld and its sovereignty protected, South Africa has installed an army and police force of considerable size in the territory. This army, especially in the northern "operational zone" (where one-half of Namibia's 1.4 million people live), is given full military powers. Like other armies of occupation, it has purchased the cooperation of a minority of the population, but in the main the SADF and the local forces it recruits are hated and feared.

There are two principal movements opposing the South Africans in Namibia. The first is the South West Africa People's Organization (Swapo), a multi-ethnic liberation movement with wide support whose small army, PLAN, has been attacking South African installations in the country since 1966. The second is the Christian church, which



Liebenberg/NCCT

**"The churches are a potent force because they have overcome both ethnic and theological differences"**

like its counterparts in the Philippines and Poland, has taken a clear stand on the side of the common man and woman against a totalitarian ruler.

The lightly armed Swapo guerrillas have concentrated their attacks on South African installations and mobile troops. Trained and armed by the Eastern bloc, these young people have found help and sustenance in the homes of rural Namibians. They are "the boys," the sons of friends, the hope of a new Namibia. Thousands left the country in the late 1970s as teenagers. Now they are returning, and if the body counts of the SADF are to be believed, many to almost certain death. But they continue to return home to try and dislodge the South African army of occupation.

There is a certainty about their effectiveness, not in defeating the South Africans in open battles, but in their ability to harass, to make the occupation costly, and to show that there are Namibians willing to die for freedom. Landmines are planted, telephone poles blasted, and rockets launched into white areas of South African administrative and military centers. In recent months, Swapo soldiers have attacked numerous bases, including the SADF headquarters at Oshakati, and have shot down at least one South African helicopter.

The South African response to Swapo "incursions" has been to increase its repression of the civilian population. Thus on July 23, President Botha stepped into the legal process in Windhoek to quash a murder trial against four white SADF soldiers who had killed a 48-year-old father of five last November. The trial was halted because it was "not in the national interest."

—To Namibians, it is the SADF, the "Koevoet" death squad, and the troops of Unita who train in Namibia who are the terrorists. The people of the north say evening prayers in their kraals, asking God to "defend us from all the perils and dangers of this night." As many Namibians from "the operational zone" have told the author: "We are always thinking, is this the night that the Boers will come again?"

In a war, there are casualties among the military and civilians alike. But in the war in Namibia, methods of brutality against the civilian population are clearly associated with the repression of an unwilling populace. Bishop Kleopas Dumeni, leader of Namibia's large Evangelical Lutheran church, said that the level of violence had increased dramatically this past June. While he recognized that

the violence came from both sides, Dumeni stated that the killings continue "simply because the South African government refuses to sign a ceasefire agreement between its troops and Swapo."

That is the opinion of most Namibians. They see one basic reason for their suffering: the continued illegal occupation of their country by the government of South Africa. In the minds of the vast majority of Namibians, there is no other issue. They are not afraid of Cuba, nor of Angola, and they are certainly not afraid of their political party of choice—Swapo.

Swapo's importance in the struggle for independence has never been in doubt, except for those who have swallowed South Africa's story that the movement is a terrorist organization controlled by the Soviet Union. Swapo's roots are in the anti-colonial feelings that have been passed down from grandparents who remembered life before the Germans came in the 19th century. The Namibians did not need a European textbook to teach the difference between justice and injustice.

Like many other liberation movements, Swapo went first to the West in its search for aid. And as with other liberation movements, the United States, Great Britain, and France showed Swapo the door. The West's trusted ally, the Republic of South Africa, was the "bird in the hand," and a white bird after all. But the Swapo leaders who went into exile found help from churches and individuals even in these countries—assistance and support that continues to this day.

Funds for its refugee work (more than 60,000 Namibian refugees are currently in Angola and Zambia) and education bursaries come from churches, aid agencies, the United Nations, and a diverse list of Western, non-aligned, and Eastern bloc countries. Young Namibians attending school in Europe, North America, Africa, and Asia are trained in a variety of trade and scientific skills, preparing for the needs of an independent Namibia.

Swapo's leader, Sam Nujoma, is an old-time patriot, a now grandfatherly figure who has kept the movement together through many difficult trials.



Criticized by Chester Crocker's staff as not having the intelligence or sophistication of a Robert Mugabe, one suspects that Nujoma has the common sense, rural directness, and clarity of purpose that foreign service officers cannot manipulate.

South Africa has tried many means to cripple Swapo. It repeatedly establishes "governments" to create the illusion that the territory is self-governing without Swapo. Each dispensation of this ploy, little different than the homeland governments it has set up in the Republic, has floundered for want of popular support. The current government, appointed June 17, 1985, has suffered from continuous squabbling between anti-Swapo black Namibians who need some changes in the apartheid laws to establish their credibility, and "baster," white, and Coloured ministers who like things just the way they are.

The parties that make up this "interim government" would likely win no more than 15 percent of the vote in any free election. The largest component is the white National Party, and most other groups in the "Multi-Party Conference" are rooted in tribally based homeland governments financed by South Africa.

To convince others of its democratic inclinations, the interim government passed a "bill of rights" early on. But to its consternation, Swapo and the churches have used this legislation to overturn some of South Africa's laws restricting freedom of assembly. Apart from the fact that it is not representative of the people, the interim government lost any credibility it might have had by

assuming responsibility for implementing South Africa's draconian detention laws.

Coupled with this attempt to politically isolate Swapo are the military adventures of the SADF in Angola. Since 1975, South Africa has maintained a presence in southern Angola, both with its own battalions and through its support for Jonas Savimbi's Unita troops. Neither South Africa nor Unita has any compunction as to whom they attack, be it unarmed civilians, church mission stations, or refugee camps. Many families in Namibia learn months later that a child or brother or sister has died in Angola in an attack by the SADF or Unita.

South Africa's one-two punch of censorship and heavy investment in propaganda has paid dividends in Western capitals. By restricting journalists' movements in northern Namibia, the story of its repressive measures is not being told. Instead, compliant reporters are flown to Oshakati, the main SADF base in the operational zone, and shown the bodies of Swapo "terrorists" and stacks of captured weapons. Outside the SADF fortresses—unreported—Namibians are mourning their dead.

South Africa has also financed a propaganda effort specifically supporting its government in Namibia. Under the direction of Sean Cleary, former South African diplomat and chief of staff of Botha's administrator-general in Namibia, public relations offices in Bonn, Paris, London, and Washington provide a steady stream of "anti-communist" stories hailing the interim government as Namibia's answer to apple pie.

Through right-wing organizations



Leibenberg/NCCT

**First Swapo rally in five years, July 1986:  
"There is an overwhelming consensus  
that independence is long, long overdue"**

such as the International Society for Human Rights, South Africa has attempted to mount a campaign citing human rights violations in the Swapo camps. Except with extremist politicians in West Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, these flimsily documented attempts at smearing Swapo have not met with any success. But the communist label they have bestowed on Swapo has frightened off many otherwise sympathetic legislators.

Inside Namibia, where it counts, events continue to show that there is overwhelming support for parties and groups that refuse to collaborate with the interim government. One indicator, the churches, are a potent force because they have overcome both ethnic and theological differences to work together for independence and human rights.

More than 70 percent of the 1.4 million population are active members of Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Anglican, and African Methodist Episcopal churches. Through the Council of Churches in Namibia, they have a history of publicly attacking the human rights violations of the SADF, the police, and the various interim governments. As far back as 1971, immediately following the ICJ decision, the two major Lutheran churches issued a scathing open letter to then-Prime Minister Vorster challenging South Africa's activities in the country.

As bishops, pastors, and priests have continued to reveal South Africa's human rights violations, the Church has not gotten away unscathed. British, Finnish, and German missionaries have

been deported, priests imprisoned, church services disrupted, church buildings destroyed, and active lay officials detained and tortured. The headquarters of the Council of Churches was fire-bombed last January, and the government refuses to grant some church leaders travel documents.

The churches' influence extends into the Swapo ranks in exile. Swapo refugee camps in Angola and Zambia are staffed by chaplains from Lutheran, Roman Catholic, and Anglican churches. Many Swapo soldiers receive instruction in the faith, and many have been baptised by pastors serving the refugee community.

The churches have strongly reacted to South Africa's claim that in fighting Swapo it is resisting communism. Says Bishop Dumeni: "It is propaganda. Who is Swapo? Let me tell you. Swapo are members, men and women, daughters and boys of our families, members of our churches. They are Christians. But the question is why they left the country. Precisely because of the hardships of the war situation, apartheid, separate development, and injustice."

Last April, under the aegis of Dr. Abisai Shejavali, head of the Council of Churches, the leaders of all the anti-colonial parties, major churches, and women's groups, including the YWCA, signed an anti-government statement called the Ai-Gams declaration. Swapo, the largest and most inclusive political party, was a full signatory. Since then, Ai-Gams (literally "Hot Springs," the ancient Nama designation for Wind-

hoek) meetings have been held all over the territory, save in the operational zone. Even at rural Karasburg, in the desolate south, 1,400 people trekked in from the farms to attend a rally against South Africa and its interim government.

But the most dramatic indication of what would occur if free elections were held came in July. Sometimes, even in Namibia, white judges can surprise the government. On July 3, the Windhoek Supreme Court threw out a 1981 law that effectively banned public meetings of Swapo. On July 27, free from fear of arrest, more than 13,000 people gathered in Katutura, the black township outside Windhoek, to attend the liberation movement's first legal meeting in many years.

In the mid-1970s, when the UN General Assembly was demanding sanctions because of South Africa's intransigence, the Western members of the Security Council stepped in and assumed responsibility for Namibia's independence. With the adoption in 1978 of UN Security Council resolution 435 and its accompanying detailed plans for a ceasefire, peace-keeping force, and elections, Namibians had real hope that their independence was near. After all, as one church official said: "The leaders of the free world had taken an interest in our cause."

Eight years later, Namibians are still dying, living under apartheid, and seeking the implementation of the Western plan for their independence. But now they have no champion for their cause among the leaders of the free world. Namibian independence is not even on the agenda of the sanctions debate. The United States has not only given South Africa a reason for not leaving Namibia, namely the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, but has even made that irrelevant condition impossible to fulfill by becoming a partner of Jonas Savimbi, South Africa's surrogate in Angola.

In a Swapo refugee camp, a young Namibian said to me: "I've read your declaration of independence. That's what we want. Why won't America help us?" The question still stands. □

*John A. Evenson is a journalist and director of the Namibia Communications Centre, a London-based news agency working with the churches in Namibia.*

# The OAU: A New Militancy

In contrast with past summits, this year the OAU heads of state set aside internal political disputes to focus attention and resources on the struggle against apartheid. The new OAU chairman, Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso, will lead the organization's efforts to marshal support for the liberation movements and keep the issue at the forefront of international concern.

BY MARY ANNE FITZGERALD

**T**he Organization of African Unity's 22nd heads of state summit, held in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa (July 28-30), was dominated by one topic—sanctions against South Africa. The annual meeting was held against a background of mounting frustration and anger at Western reluctance to adopt effective measures to pressure the Pretoria regime.

It was clear from the outset that Africa is determined to utilize whatever means possible to topple the government of South African President P.W. Botha. African leaders consistently enjoined fellow members to increase support of southern African liberation movements—the ANC, PAC, and Swapo—and to unite in exerting pressure on their Western allies to take positive steps toward dismantling the structure of apartheid.

The mood of militancy was apparent not only in delegates' speeches but also in the resolutions that were adopted. Its position on South Africa was the strongest stand the OAU has taken on any issue in its 23-year history. The organization condemned five countries by name—the United States, Britain,

France, West Germany, and Israel—for collaboration with the Pretoria regime and took the unprecedented step of urging punitive action against Britain for its perceived intransigence on the sanctions issue.

This was formalized in a series of stiffly worded resolutions which not only expectedly blasted Pretoria, but also castigated Africa's Western allies in the bluntest of terms for their failure to quickly enact punitive measures against South Africa's white government.

Unlike previous occasions, when tensions tended to be introverted, focusing on the disputed outcome of Africa's civil wars and guerrilla insurgencies, this gathering switched its axis of attention south to Pretoria and the frontline states and north to the United States and European countries.

Lacking any real leverage of its own, the OAU acknowledged that without Western backing on the sanctions issue, international condemnation of Botha's government is meaningless. Therefore, the OAU strategy is to accelerate momentum in its campaign to bring about comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

The 50-member organization, which speaks for the African and Arab coun-

tries of the continent, intends to voice its demand in increasingly important fora, thus encouraging a groundswell of global opinion that it hopes will ultimately force the hand of sanctions' detractors.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher have already made their opposition to an embargo abundantly clear.

---

**“The OAU strategy is to accelerate momentum in its campaign to bring about comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa.”**

---

But France and West Germany will also register strong resistance if the European Community decides to go ahead with its version of sanctions.

The OAU's views had already been heard in conferences convened in Paris and Vienna in June and July where the international community dealt with sanctions and Namibian independence,

respectively. The Addis meeting further entrenched the organization's position that the time for dialogue with South Africa is over. The consensus was that even though the continent is undergoing an economic crisis, no cost is too high to provide moral and material support for the liberation of South Africa.

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and President Kenneth Kaunda took Africa's viewpoint with them to the mini-summit of seven Commonwealth leaders that opened in London on August 3. While Mugabe and Kaunda failed to re-

ceive an official mandate to speak on the continent's behalf, they were armed with ample ammunition to press their case for an imposition of sanctions by the Commonwealth.

proved to be a victory for states such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Congo, whose president, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, succeeded Senegal's Abdou Diouf as OAU chairman.

Several specific references to the United States and Britain underscored the indignation that is felt toward the Reagan and Thatcher governments. The lead resolution was a condemnation of the United States for its refusal to impose sanctions. Reagan's key policy speech of July 22—where he opted for negotiation with Pretoria rather than action against it—was still fresh at the time of the meeting. It was censured as "an apologia for this inhuman system of apartheid," representing "covert support for racism."

A proposal to condemn the United

States for its invasion of Libya was axed, illustrating the conference's intensive focus on southern Africa. At earlier meetings, the OAU would almost certainly have debated the topic at length. The U.S. linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to Namibian independence also came under fire. And another resolution condemning U.S. support of Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels, who have been waging a long-standing insurgency against the Angolan government, was included at the last minute.

Further broadsides against the United States and some of its allies surfaced in the resolution on South Africa. This hardhitting section predictably contained a litany of grievances directed toward Pretoria. They included the re-imposition of the state of emergency, press censorship, mass arrests, detention without trial, and the killing of political and trade union activists. Pretoria was perpetrating "terrorism and genocide" through its army, police, and "black murder squads," it said.

The OAU also lambasted the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and Israel for their "continued economic and nuclear collaboration" with Botha's government. While the other governments maintained an official silence on the criticism that had been levelled against them, West Germany reacted strongly to the accusation, distributing a denial to reporters at the meeting.

However, it was Britain which came in for the toughest attack. Thatcher's government was "vehemently" condemned for its refusal to impose sanctions against South Africa. To observers' surprise, the OAU called on member-states and non-aligned countries to goad Thatcher into changing her mind by voluntarily taking disciplinary steps against Britain, such as punitive economic measures, sports boycotts, and the severing of diplomatic ties.

The harshly worded resolution, which emerged from a preceding ministerial meeting, was not expected to survive or at the least, to be diluted. The fact that it rode through the summit untouched was at least partially attributable to Nigeria's hardline lobbying.

The Nigerian deputy vice president, Commodore Ebitu O. Ukiwe, said the



Cameraspix

**Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, OAU chairman: "The outwardly uniform stance on South Africa lends more weight to the OAU than it has previously enjoyed"**

The final assault will be made when the United Nations General Assembly convenes in the fall. The OAU resolved that the UN African Group would place

Next on the itinerary is the annual summit of the non-aligned countries, scheduled to be held in the Zimbabwean capital of Harare in late August. Here African delegates were expected to renew the appeal made at the OAU summit for non-aligned states to take punitive action against Britain and to "increase their moral, political, diplomatic, and material support" of the South African liberation movements.

The final assault will be made when the United Nations General Assembly convenes in the fall. The OAU resolved that the UN African Group would place





Margaret A. Nowicki

"Mugabe and Kaunda took Africa's viewpoint with them to the mini-summit that opened in London on August 3"

possibility of his country imposing unilateral sanctions against Britain was under review, leaving the threat hanging over the conference. Despite a majority of moderates within the organization, Nigeria marshalled the numerically smaller radical faction sufficiently well at the Arusha OAU Liberation Committee meeting and the foreign ministers meeting that preceded the Addis summit for its line of thinking to prevail. If Nigeria does implement some form of embargo against Britain, British Caledonia flights to Lagos—reportedly the airline's most profitable route—may well be the target.

It was Nigeria that shepherded through resolutions calling for the imposition of sanctions against South Africa by countries outside the NATO sphere. One resolution urged oil-exporting countries to abide by an often flouted 1981 UN embargo on oil shipments. The second, fuzzily worded and far more controversial, urged African states to deny landing rights and berthing facilities to aircraft and ships.

Whether the resolution referred to South African aircraft and vessels or simply those destined for South Africa was unclear. Delegates appeared to interpret it in the latter sense. Liberia indicated it was willing to deny its flag to vessels sailing to Cape Town and Durban. President Omar Bongo of Gabon said simply that he had no objections to the idea because his country was not affected by it.

Kenya would be hardest hit by this aspect of the campaign to isolate South Africa. The airport at Nairobi refuels 38 flights to and from Johannesburg a week, bringing in estimated annual revenues of \$25 million to \$50 million.

Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi did not attend the summit. Privately, he claimed his stand on South Africa had already been clarified and pointed out that no other substantive topics would be discussed at the meeting. His absence also conveniently relieved Moi of being placed in the invidious position of opposing Thatcher's government.

Like many OAU members, Kenya

has long enjoyed a cordial and economically fruitful relationship with its former colonial master. Britain is one of Kenya's largest aid donors and a major trading partner.

Indeed, the paradox of black Africa's trade routes and political axes, often at odds, was not lost on delegates. The Western nations that came in for criticism are the same countries that represent Africa's staunchest trading partners and aid donors. If international sanctions were imposed against South Africa, the already economically embattled frontline states would turn to the United States and Europe for additional aid to survive. Yet none of the Western nations have indicated that they are prepared to commit such assistance.

The goal of black franchise for their southern neighbors—South Africa and Namibia—is an emotional issue for African states, nearly all of which have undergone the often painful transition from colony to independent state. Yet in order to achieve this, they must seriously address the underlying issue, only briefly touched upon at the summit, of whether it will be white or black Africa that comes under siege if sanctions are imposed.

The OAU has always opposed trade and political ties with South Africa. Only pragmatic Malawi has a diplomatic mission in Pretoria. Yet it is black Africa itself, not Botha's laagerlike regime, that will be the first victim of sanctions. Trade between the two parts of the continent is over \$1 billion a year and escalating.

Two of the strongest advocates of an embargo, landlocked Zimbabwe and Zambia, have more at stake than most. Zimbabwe has said that while it endures sanctions, its monolithic trade route with South Africa, where it buys 70 percent of its imports, prevents it from adhering to an embargo. Zambia's position is equally precarious, with South African trade on the increase as losses from its copper exports steadily mount.

Lesotho and Swaziland, engulfed by their white neighbor, and landlocked Botswana are entirely dependent on South African goods and goodwill for their survival. All three countries remained understandably quiet on the



Sygyra

subject of sanctions at the summit.

Two countries that did not, however, were Zaire and Côte d'Ivoire. Zaire enjoys considerable trade with South Africa, while in the past Côte d'Ivoire has secretly accorded landing privileges to South African airplanes. On several occasions, one or the other unsuccessfully called for the softening of resolutions pertaining to South Africa.

In the end, the bottom line in the continent's efforts to achieve its objective of "the total liberation of Africa" remains its hard-pressed economies. Outgoing chairman Abdou Diouf, who won international respect as Africa's spokesman at the UN Special Session on Africa last May, said, "The organization is at a turning point. It is moving in the direction of the factors that unite us—the struggle against apartheid and the promotion of our economic development."

Diouf referred to the five-year economic recovery program that was initiated at last year's summit. It required "strong and massive support" from the international community, he said.

Indeed, the OAU has made little headway in achieving its economic targets. A decision reached in Lagos, Nigeria, 16 years ago to form an African economic community has seen no results. And the UN-sponsored Economic Commission for Africa reports no brightening of Africa's economic prospects.

Collectively, Africa's 450 million people have logged a foreign debt of over \$175 billion, much of which they are incapable of repaying. The continent contains 25 of the world's 34 poorest countries. Per capita incomes range from \$80 a year to \$3,950 a year in Gabon.

The parlous state of OAU finances, depleted by hefty arrears in subscriptions, forestalls any real leverage against South Africa. No more than 40 percent of the budget has been contrib-

---

**"The OAU called on member-states and non-aligned countries to goad Thatcher into changing her mind by voluntarily taking disciplinary steps against Britain."**

---

uted at any one time, and the OAU's Liberation Fund for financing armed opposition to the existing South African and Namibian regimes is \$15 million in arrears. As an indication of its poverty, during the past year OAU Secretary-General Idé Ouanarou cut nearly 200 secretariat jobs.

Thus the suggestion of a pan-African rapid deployment force to counter South African military attacks into bor-

**Victims of explosion in Johannesburg, June 1986: "The new expression of hostility signals the possibility of escalating terrorist activity within South Africa's borders"**

dering countries was quashed early in the conference. The OAU dispatched peace-keeping troops from Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire to Chad in 1981. They were withdrawn the following year because the organization lacked the funds to maintain its military presence there. Nigeria reported it lost \$82 million on the exercise.

Instead, the OAU has decided to bolster opposition to Botha's administration with undisclosed bilateral and voluntary contributions of money and arms. "Africa should be the first to organize internal resistance by training the youth," said Diouf.

Nigeria reported that it has already contributed \$10 million to liberation movements this year. In his opening address at the summit, Ethiopian leader Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam pledged to train and equip 10,000 freedom fighters. This new expression of hostility toward Pretoria may be the most effective, signalling as it does the possibility of escalating terrorist activity within South Africa's borders. □

*Mary Anne Fitzgerald, a journalist based in Nairobi, writes regularly about East Africa for the Financial Times, The Economist, The Sunday Times of London, The Christian Science Monitor, and Macleans. She also contributes to The Washington Post and The International Herald Tribune.*



Margaret A. Novicki

parties have yet to be resolved.

At this time, there is speculation that Nkomo and senior Zapu officials will perhaps be named to positions within an expanded Zanu (PF) structure—such as the 90-member policy-making central committee and the important 15-member political bureau. One scenario has Nkomo being appointed second vice-president, behind the current vice-president and second secretary, Simon Muzenda, who is also the deputy prime minister.

It is also likely that some Zapu members, though not necessarily Nkomo, would be given cabinet positions, as was the case after independence. The current cabinet line-up has only one non-Zanu (PF) member—white member of Parliament Chris Andersen.

Unity would also make it possible for some detainees to be released, including several prominent Zapu leaders such as former Zipra (Zapu's military wing) leader Dumiso Dabengwa. Such releases would no doubt lower the political temperature and induce some exiles to return. They would also further undercut the remaining support for the dissidents in Matabeleland.

This year, dissident activities have been considerably reduced. Without the witting or unwitting support of some

**"Mugabe sees national unity as a prerequisite for development"**

Zapu supporters, the dissidents would slowly die out, becoming nothing more than a nuisance. Even with South African support, they would find it very difficult to continue their activities without back-up on the ground in information gathering about the deployment of the security forces and provision of food, shelter, and moral and material support.

A united base at home would give Mugabe greater credibility abroad as he becomes chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement. He would no longer be distracted by domestic political problems at a time when South Africa is likely to attempt to destabilize Zimbabwe and the other frontline states which advocate economic sanctions against the recalcitrant Botha regime. Last May, South Africa flexed its muscles by raiding alleged African National Congress facilities in Harare.

Before the 1990 elections, Zimbabwe will probably undergo a number of major political changes. Under the Lancaster House constitution that ushered in independence, the white minority was guaranteed 20 special seats in the country's 100-member Parliament. But on April 18, 1987—Independence Day—Parliament

will be able to end that special representation with only a 70 percent majority. Negotiations between Zanu (PF) and the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ), which represents a majority of the 20 white legislators, have so far failed to resolve the question of what is to be done about the reserved white seats.

In the present Parliament, Zanu (PF) commands the support of 66 seats, just short of the 70 needed to amend the constitution. On almost every issue, the government can count on 67 votes, including that of Chris Andersen who as a minister, votes with the government although he doesn't belong to the ruling party. Zapu and CAZ each have 14 members of Parliament, the Independent Zimbabwe Group holds three seats, the Zimbabwe African National Union one, and there is one white independent.

When Zanu (PF) and Zapu unite, they will control 80 seats, 10 more than the number required to amend the constitution. Virtually any aspect of the constitution can be amended with the support of 70 percent of the members of Parliament—which Zanu (PF) could gain by luring away four more legislators from Zapu, CAZ, or the independents.

It could also be achieved by the unification of Zanu (PF) and Zapu, making the country a de facto one-party state, because the white groups will wither away by the time of the next election. It is also conceivable that some white members will follow the lead of Charles Duke, who became the first white Zanu (PF) member of Parliament after leaving Smith's party.

There are only two areas under the current constitution that cannot be amended except by the unanimous vote of all 100 MPs: the declaration of rights and the continued existence of the white voters' roll. As long as CAZ exists, it is unlikely that those two key aspects of the constitution will be changed before 1990.

The white roll for electing the 20 white seats can remain in effect until 1990 because it can only be abolished if all 100 members agree. However, the 20 white seats themselves can be abolished as early as next year by a 70 percent majority, creating an interesting

constitutional irony.

For now, the white political groups are virtually idle spectators while Zanu and Zanu (PF) discuss plans for unity. By all accounts, the talks have reached an advanced and delicate state. With both Mugabe and Nkomo pronouncing unity at every turn, it looks as though it may finally be achieved. There is a new sense of seriousness and purpose about the on-going merger discussions: The question is no longer "if" but "when" unity will be accomplished and what effect it will have on the ordinary Zimbabwean. "Letters to the editor" of the country's newspapers are filled with hopes for national unity.

There are many precedents in Africa for the emergence of single party states. In some countries, such as Kenya and Zambia, the opposition parties were simply legislated out of existence. In others, such as Tanzania, the opposition parties faded away from lack of support. Mugabe's goal of a voluntary merger rather than the forcible destruction or acquiescence of Zanu seems to be the most sensible approach, for it would bring together Nkomo and Mugabe (who worked together in the old Zanu) and pave the way for substantive rather than cosmetic unity.

It would also end previous efforts to promote tribalism, i.e. to regard Zanu (PF) as Shona and Zanu as Ndebele. Such distinctions often result from the lazy analyst's inability to understand African politics outside the realm of tribal

ism.

Such observers fail to understand that from the earliest days, Nkomo always surrounded himself—consciously or otherwise—with Shona lieutenants such as George Nyandoro, James Chikerema, and Robert Mugabe. His last vice-president, the late Josiah Chinamano, was a Shona, as is Joseph Msika, current vice-president. Both in his party and in his cabinet, Mugabe has ap-

---

**"All signs are propitious that the current round of unity talks will lead to a one-party state, a move that will represent another bone of contention between Harare and Washington."**

---

pointed prominent Ndebeles, such as Enos Nkala and Callistus Ndllovu.

Neither Nkomo nor Mugabe are politically naive. Both are acutely aware of the dangers of tribal polarization and the damage it has done in other African countries. Neither wants to carry the stigma of having sacrificed national unity on the altar of personal or tribal ambition.

All the signs are propitious that the current round of unity talks will lead to a

one-party state, a move that will represent yet another bone of contention between Harare and Washington, further straining a relationship that has had more than its share of bumps.

Led by former President Jimmy Carter, the walkout by Americans attending a July 4th reception in Harare was only the latest manifestation of the difficult relations between the two countries. The American diplomatic snub followed a Zimbabwean minister's stinging attack on American policy toward South Africa.

Although bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and the U.S. have been on the whole relatively good, the two countries have been at loggerheads on the issue of South Africa. Zimbabwe advocates tough economic sanctions against Pretoria and the total isolation of the Afrikaners. The U.S. prefers to continue talking to Pretoria and opposes "punitive" sanctions.

Under pressure from Congress and public opinion, the Reagan administration may opt for limited sanctions against Pretoria and begin discussions with the African National Congress. But there would be no applause from Harare for such tentative steps, for Mugabe wants Washington to be more forceful. Thus with both sides digging in their heels, improvements in the Washington-Harare relationship are unlikely. □

*Tendayi Kumbula is assistant editor of the Zimbabwe daily, The Herald, and a former reporter for the Los Angeles Times.*

## NEW PENGUIN BOOKS ON AFRICAN CULTURE



**SUN CITY:** *The Struggle for Survival in South Africa* by Artists United Against Apartheid. Rock Critic Dave Marsh tells the inside story of the making of the protest album "Sun City" by the 54 musicians (Little Steven Van Zandt, Miles Davis, Bob Geldoff, Bob Dylan, et al) who formed the group Artists United Against Apartheid. Contains color photographs, plus a 30-page insert of facts and black & white photographs depicting the somber reality of life in South Africa. \$8.95.

**THE AFRICA NEWS COOKBOOK**, compiled by the Africa News Service, contains a wonderful selection of regional African dishes—exotic, delicious and easy-to-prepare—that can be adapted to Western kitchens using readily available ingredients. \$12.95.

**THE APARTHEID HANDBOOK**, Revised Edition by Roger Omond, unfolds the chilling reality of a society in which 73% of the people—the entire black population—remain disenfranchised. Presented in a clear readable Q and A format that covers topics such as • race classification • interracial sex • pass laws • detention without trial • banning orders and more. \$5.95.

I enclose a check for \_\_\_\_\_ for A) **SUN CITY**; B) **THE APARTHEID HANDBOOK**; C) **THE AFRICA NEWS COOKBOOK** (include \$1.50 for postage and handling. Residents of the following states please add sales tax: CA 6½%, NJ 6%, NY State 7%, NY City 8¼%.)

NAME \_\_\_\_\_ Return to: DEPT CWA  
ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_ Viking Penguin, Inc.  
40 West 23rd St.  
New York, N.Y. 10010  
CITY \_\_\_\_\_ STATE \_\_\_\_\_ ZIP \_\_\_\_\_





Margaret A. Novicki

parties have yet to be resolved.

At this time, there is speculation that Nkomo and senior Zapu officials will perhaps be named to positions within an expanded Zanu (PF) structure—such as the 90-member policy-making central committee and the important 15-member political bureau. One scenario has Nkomo being appointed second vice-president, behind the current vice-president and second secretary, Simon Muzenda, who is also the deputy prime minister.

It is also likely that some Zapu members, though not necessarily Nkomo, would be given cabinet positions, as was the case after independence. The current cabinet line-up has only one non-Zanu (PF) member—white member of Parliament Chris Andersen.

Unity would also make it possible for some detainees to be released, including several prominent Zapu leaders such as former Zipra (Zapu's military wing) leader Dumiso Dabengwa. Such releases would no doubt lower the political temperature and induce some exiles to return. They would also further undercut the remaining support for the dissidents in Matabeleland.

This year, dissident activities have been considerably reduced. Without the witting or unwitting support of some

#### **"Mugabe sees national unity as a prerequisite for development"**

Zapu supporters, the dissidents would slowly die out, becoming nothing more than a nuisance. Even with South African support, they would find it very difficult to continue their activities without back-up on the ground in information gathering about the deployment of the security forces and provision of food, shelter, and moral and material support.

A united base at home would give Mugabe greater credibility abroad as he becomes chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement. He would no longer be distracted by domestic political problems at a time when South Africa is likely to attempt to destabilize Zimbabwe and the other frontline states which advocate economic sanctions against the recalcitrant Botha regime. Last May, South Africa flexed its muscles by raiding alleged African National Congress facilities in Harare.

Before the 1990 elections, Zimbabwe will probably undergo a number of major political changes. Under the Lancaster House constitution that ushered in independence, the white minority was guaranteed 20 special seats in the country's 100-member Parliament. But on April 18, 1987—Independence Day—Parliament

will be able to end that special representation with only a 70 percent majority. Negotiations between Zanu (PF) and the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ), which represents a majority of the 20 white legislators, have so far failed to resolve the question of what is to be done about the reserved white seats.

In the present Parliament, Zanu (PF) commands the support of 66 seats, just short of the 70 needed to amend the constitution. On almost every issue, the government can count on 67 votes, including that of Chris Andersen who as a minister, votes with the government although he doesn't belong to the ruling party. Zapu and CAZ each have 14 members of Parliament, the Independent Zimbabwe Group holds three seats, the Zimbabwe African National Union one, and there is one white independent.

When Zanu (PF) and Zapu unite, they will control 80 seats, 10 more than the number required to amend the constitution. Virtually any aspect of the constitution can be amended with the support of 70 percent of the members of Parliament—which Zanu (PF) could gain by luring away four more legislators from Zapu, CAZ, or the independents.

It could also be achieved by the unification of Zanu (PF) and Zapu, making the country a de facto one-party state, because the white groups will wither away by the time of the next election. It is also conceivable that some white members will follow the lead of Charles Duke, who became the first white Zanu (PF) member of Parliament after leaving Smith's party.

There are only two areas under the current constitution that cannot be amended except by the unanimous vote of all 100 MPs: the declaration of rights and the continued existence of the white voters' roll. As long as CAZ exists, it is unlikely that those two key aspects of the constitution will be changed before 1990.

The white roll for electing the 20 white seats can remain in effect until 1990 because it can only be abolished if all 100 members agree. However, the 20 white seats themselves can be abolished as early as next year by a 70 percent majority, creating an interesting

constitutional irony.

For now, the white political groups are virtually idle spectators while Zapu and Zanu (PF) discuss plans for unity. By all accounts, the talks have reached an advanced and delicate state. With both Mugabe and Nkomo pronouncing unity at every turn, it looks as though it may finally be achieved. There is a new sense of seriousness and purpose about the on-going merger discussions: The question is no longer "if" but "when" unity will be accomplished and what effect it will have on the ordinary Zimbabwean. "Letters to the editor" of the country's newspapers are filled with hopes for national unity.

There are many precedents in Africa for the emergence of single party states. In some countries, such as Kenya and Zambia, the opposition parties were simply legislated out of existence. In others, such as Tanzania, the opposition parties faded away from lack of support. Mugabe's goal of a voluntary merger rather than the forcible destruction or acquiescence of Zapu seems to be the most sensible approach, for it would bring together Nkomo and Mugabe (who worked together in the old Zapu) and pave the way for substantive rather than cosmetic unity.

It would also end previous efforts to promote tribalism, i.e. to regard Zanu (PF) as Shona and Zapu as Ndebele. Such distinctions often result from the lazy analyst's inability to understand African politics outside the realm of tribal-

ism.

Such observers fail to understand that from the earliest days, Nkomo always surrounded himself—consciously or otherwise—with Shona lieutenants such as George Nyandoro, James Chikerema, and Robert Mugabe. His last vice-president, the late Josiah Chinamano, was a Shona, as is Joseph Msika, current vice-president. Both in his party and in his cabinet, Mugabe has ap-

---

**"All signs are propitious that the current round of unity talks will lead to a one-party state, a move that will represent another bone of contention between Harare and Washington."**

---

pointed prominent Ndebeles, such as Enos Nkala and Callistus Ndlovu.

Neither Nkomo nor Mugabe are politically naive. Both are acutely aware of the dangers of tribal polarization and the damage it has done in other African countries. Neither wants to carry the stigma of having sacrificed national unity on the altar of personal or tribal ambition.

All the signs are propitious that the current round of unity talks will lead to a

one-party state, a move that will represent yet another bone of contention between Harare and Washington, further straining a relationship that has had more than its share of bumps.

Led by former President Jimmy Carter, the walkout by Americans attending a July 4th reception in Harare was only the latest manifestation of the difficult relations between the two countries. The American diplomatic snub followed a Zimbabwean minister's stinging attack on American policy toward South Africa.

Although bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and the U.S. have been on the whole relatively good, the two countries have been at loggerheads on the issue of South Africa. Zimbabwe advocates tough economic sanctions against Pretoria and the total isolation of the Afrikaners. The U.S. prefers to continue talking to Pretoria and opposes "punitive" sanctions.

Under pressure from Congress and public opinion, the Reagan administration may opt for limited sanctions against Pretoria and begin discussions with the African National Congress. But there would be no applause from Harare for such tentative steps, for Mugabe wants Washington to be more forceful. Thus with both sides digging in their heels, improvements in the Washington-Harare relationship are unlikely. □

*Tendayi Kumbula is assistant editor of the Zimbabwe daily, The Herald, and a former reporter for the Los Angeles Times.*

## NEW PENGUIN BOOKS ON AFRICAN CULTURE



**SUN CITY:** *The Struggle for Survival in South Africa* by Artists United Against Apartheid. Rock Critic Dave Marsh tells the inside story of the making of the protest album "Sun City" by the 54 musicians (Little Steven Van Zandt, Miles Davis, Bob Geldoff, Bob Dylan, et al) who formed the group Artists United Against Apartheid. Contains color photographs, plus a 30-page insert of facts and black & white photographs depicting the somber reality of life in South Africa. \$8.95.

**THE AFRICA NEWS COOKBOOK,** compiled by the Africa News Service, contains a wonderful selection of regional African dishes—exotic, delicious and easy-to-prepare—that can be adapted to Western kitchens using readily available ingredients. \$12.95.

**THE APARTHEID HANDBOOK,** Revised Edition by Roger Omond, unfolds the chilling reality of a society in which 73% of the people—the entire black population—remain disenfranchised. Presented in a clear readable Q and A format that covers topics such as • race classification • interracial sex • pass laws • detention without trial • banning orders and more. \$5.95.

I enclose a check for \_\_\_\_\_ for A) **SUN CITY**; B) **THE APARTHEID HANDBOOK**; C) **THE AFRICAN NEWS COOKBOOK** (include \$1.50 for postage and handling. Residents of the following states please add sales tax: CA 6 1/2%, NJ 6%, NY State 7%, NY City 8 1/4%.)

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

CITY \_\_\_\_\_

STATE \_\_\_\_\_ ZIP \_\_\_\_\_

Return to: DEPT CWA

Viking Penguin, Inc.  
40 West 23rd St.  
New York, N.Y. 10010



# THE Black American

Vol. 26, No. 35

August 28th thru September 3rd, 1986

50¢

**Zulu Stooze  
Kills Two  
Freedom  
Fighters**

**Tutu To  
The West:  
Go To  
Hell!**

**The  
Prince  
And  
The  
"Cherry"**

**CIA Has  
Big Feet,  
& Dirty  
Hands**

**Soviets  
Zap  
Castro**



***The Mandelas Resist S. African Fascism***

"The Black American" is like no other newspaper. If you read it once, you will discover for yourself that it is the best damn paper around.

**THE BLACK AMERICAN**  
545 Eighth Ave., # 12 S.W.  
New York, NY 10018  
(212) 564-5110

- 3 months (12 issues) ..... \$8.25
- 6 months (24 issues) ..... \$18.00
- one year (52 issues) ..... \$33.00
- one year foreign ..... \$50.00

Name: \_\_\_\_\_  
Address: \_\_\_\_\_  
City: \_\_\_\_\_  
State: \_\_\_\_\_ Zip: \_\_\_\_\_  
Country: \_\_\_\_\_

# A Delicate Balance

After years of instability, Uganda has attained a fragile peace under President Yoweri Museveni. However, the government will be required to assure security throughout the country before its overwhelming development needs can be addressed.

BY COLIN S. CLARK

A letter to the *Equator* newspaper in Uganda put one of the country's economic problems simply: "Dear Sir, The country has a great battle to fight against such people as those cheating with services of telephone and electricity. . . We cannot go on like this forever."

But for at least the last 10 years, Uganda has gone exactly like that. Power, and its concomitant, security, have always been the first concern of its field marshals and presidents. The only reason Uganda has survived for so long is the casual and abiding fertility of the land.

Makerere University, on the edge of Kampala, once turned out dozens and dozens of internationally recognized scholars and researchers. Even when Luzira prison's reputation became better known than the university's, up-country secondary schools were still educating the young. And around both the university and the secondary schools, it was easy to find ripe paw-paw, mango, or cassava.

But the expectations of Uganda's people have shot up since the National Resistance Army (NRA) of President Yoweri Museveni captured Kampala last January. A recent issue of the government newspaper, *New Vision*, ran a lead

story headlined, "Elephants back from hiding." The director of Uganda's national parks, Ponsiano Ssemwezi, said about the pachyderms: "Instinctively now, they have sniffed a reign of peace in the country and herds of both big and small game are returning to the parks."

Today when driving into Luwero—

the scene of tens of thousands of systematic executions during the tumult of former President Milton Obote's reign—one sees brilliant red and yellow flowers planted along the median and edges of the road.

After the government of Tito Okello was defeated in January, the United Nations Children's Fund made a survey of the Luwero triangle. They discovered a region without any fresh water pumps. In the last few months, Unicef has sunk or rebuilt 120 bore-holes in the region, an unprecedented record, according to Kampala Unicef Director Sally Fagan.

But what is more important: Uganda's security or rebuilding the country? The premise of this article is that simple peace and quiet must come before any serious effort is made to restore "the pearl of Africa" to something near its former luster.

Uganda is not yet at peace. During a recent trip through central and northern Uganda, it was obvious that President Museveni's men are now an army of occupation—not an army of liberation. Troops are stationary, based in the same barracks that soldiers of previous governments occupied. In Kampala, gunfire cuts through the night again. Resistance army troops have begun to ask for cigarettes and money at the road blocks which once again measure one's progress through the country.



Camerapix

"The expectations of Uganda's people have shot up since the National Resistance Army of President Yoweri Museveni captured Kampala last January."



In the north, there are more serious breaches of peace. Doctors in two of Gulu's hospitals said they were receiving an average of three or four gunshot victims each week. It was possible to confirm seven shooting deaths in and around the town. Residents spoke of another 15 or 20 deaths which could not be confirmed. These reportedly occurred over an 18-day period.

The people in Gulu believe that troops recently transferred to the north were responsible. They pointed out that many of the replacements were from one of the armed groups that participated in the previous government. Diplomats and international relief workers said that the shootings started soon after "FEDEMU" and "UNLA" troops joined the resistance army. The NRA's political commissar in Gulu sent a cable to Kampala about the increasing problems of discipline. He hoped "something would be done soon."

(It should be noted that news reports on the situation described above were censored by the NRA commander in Gulu. This analysis was written in Kenya.)

In the north, shops had little other than soda pop and Kenyan beer for sale, while stores in Kampala and its environs had ample supplies of most goods. At the Acholi Inn, Gulu's most impressive hotel, looters from the previous government had left only 10 rooms with beds or furniture. Food was plentiful at the bustling Gulu produce market, reliant on local goods.

Gulu is not only the administrative and commercial capital of northern Uganda. It is also the pivot on the only route that is still open to southern Sudan, where an estimated 3 million people face starvation this year.

Each week the customs officer in Gulu clears hundreds of truck drivers for the trip to Sudan. This began in June after the new resistance army commander in Gulu had ordered a number of trucks carrying World Food Programme (WFP) grain to offload their cargoes.

Why? The consensus among aid workers in Uganda and Kenya is that the Gulu commander believes WFP, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the International Committee for the Red Cross are supplying

troops loyal to the former government with food, weapons, and ammunition. In several conversations with the commander, he repeatedly made this assertion.

For two weeks after that incident, every truck bound for Sudan that reached Gulu had to turn south to Kampala to await instructions. The Kenyan government filed a protest when it learned that at least 80 vehicles—all with Kenyan registration—were sitting in and around the capital.

The WFP reacted angrily to BBC and Voice of America news reports about the fiasco, but apologized the next day on learning the full extent of the problem. Finally, sources close to several of the transport companies allege that some grain was stolen from the trucks during the "security check."

Since then, the convoys have proceeded on their way with conditional clearance from the resistance army's military intelligence. Each vehicle is allowed to transit Uganda on condition that it is "not a threat to Uganda's security." During a recent weekend, more than 75 trucks carrying food relief and commercial goods passed through Gulu.

Such needless complications have become part and parcel of doing business in Uganda because the country has two

separate governments. On the one side are the NRA functionaries; on the other, the civil servants.

The NRA commanders and special district administrators can veto any action in their areas and have direct access to President Museveni. Civil servants, who after seven governments are loathe to act on any policy, can appeal only to their minister. Complicating the picture further is the distrust exhibited by both sides. President Museveni went so far as to say he regards some ministries as "enemy territory."

There are also clear signs of a power struggle in the upper echelons of the resistance army. The most obvious bone of contention is the budget. Uganda has not had a budget for two years, and Museveni's government has not yet made a clear statement of its priorities. While there has been a great deal of generous talk concerning African socialism and the efforts of small businessmen and farmers, it is not at all clear what this means.

At the center of all debate is the "Wakiso incident." In early July of this year,

**NRA soldier at a roadblock outside Kampala: "Resistance army troops have begun to ask for cigarettes and money at the road blocks which measure one's progress through the country"**



Camerasix



Camerepix

seven people enrolled in a "political education school" were killed when government troops from Bombo barracks launched a dawn attack. The camp was run by Commandant Rowland Kokoza and supervised by Gyagenda Kibirango, political commissar and head of the resistance movement's political education department. Both men were arrested soon after the shooting.

Kokoza is well known for his leftist economic beliefs, having been jailed by Obote because of them. Under the NRA, he was also responsible for a television program described by one relief worker as "The A-B-Cs of Marxism." During the second week of July, Museveni announced an investigation into the incident and promised a report within one week. Kokoza, along with four other NRA members, awaits trial in Luzira prison, although no charges have been filed against him.

I spoke at length with one of the NRA's best known field commanders about the "Wakiso incident." He said: "We should have arrested Kokoza a long time ago. All those people have are ideas in their heads—nothing practical." In conversations from Atiak to Kampala, many Ugandans voiced similar sentiments, often citing as evidence the problems associated with sugar distribution.

**"Until Ugandans are free of such overwhelming fear, there is little prospect for rebuilding the country"**

One day, a minister stood up in Cabinet and without prior notice announced a cut of nearly half in the price of sugar. In fear and confusion, merchants pulled sugar off their shelves throughout the country. Museveni denounced this "conspiracy," stating that a small group of businessmen were out to undermine him. Sugar remained off the shelves, causing growing popular discontent.

---

**"Peace and quiet must come before any serious effort is made to restore 'the pearl of Africa' to something near its former luster."**

---

Reacting without rational policy guidelines, the president announced that the government would henceforth be responsible for the sale and distribution of sugar through local national resistance committees. Unfortunately, almost no resistance committees existed at the time. Soon after, the government issued a list of 21 categories of goods that would be sold at an artificial ex-

change rate of 1,400 Uganda shillings to the dollar. This was, in effect, a substantial government subsidy since the rough market rate of the shilling (recognized by the government for all other transactions) was 5,000 shillings to the dollar.

Such policies are believed to have been among the legacies of those arrested in the "Wakiso incident." Commander Kokoza and his followers supported the idea that Uganda should be free to use foreign aid in any way the government thought best. With this fairly common populist approach went a strong degree of xenophobia, expressed largely in racist terms.

"Foreigners have money. They don't give it to us. Foreigners are white. White people are bad." While an obvious simplification, diplomats long resident in Uganda, missionaries, and doctors remarked frequently about the rise in hostility toward all foreigners among residents of Kampala. Many of them ascribed this change in attitude to propaganda sponsored by Kokoza and his supporters.

The conventional wisdom among Western diplomats is that Kokoza espoused a vaguely Maoist economic doctrine. If so, this should be seen in light of the fact that the NRA appointed a mélange of Arusha Declaration socialists, conventional monetarists, and Keynesian policy exponents to write policy recommendations for the upcoming budget.

Add to this the softly spoken belief that the "Wakiso incident" was a botched attempt to destroy the NRA's left wing. Note finally that Kokoza's television program was cancelled the day after his arrest. The budget recommendations in the report from Canada's International Development Research Center were presented to Museveni at the same time that Kokoza and his followers were arrested.

However, Kokoza's downfall has not stilled all the jostlings for influence. Diplomats in Kampala were told to be ready for a two-day briefing on Uganda's new budget late in July. But the diplomats were not briefed, and the government still has not set a date for the budget's release.

When the budget is released, what will it look like? Sources close to the

World Bank in Nairobi told *Africa Report* that at the very least, the Uganda shilling must be devalued and the "explosive growth of government expenditure" curbed if Uganda is to get access to international credit.

International economists in Kenya and Uganda agree that while Uganda's balance of payments appears to be in fairly good shape, government expenditure far outstrips revenue. Most analysts assume that the country's weekly receipts from the sale of coffee are used immediately to provide short-term liquidity.

In a recent interview, Prime Minister Samson Kisseka restated his government's commitment to the private sector and hinted at large cuts in the number of civil servants. One of the more enduring stories in Kampala concerns the large number of dead men still receiving—and cashing—civil service pay checks.

Although characteristic of much of Uganda's gallows humor, such stories also refer to the corruption and bad records which cripple the country after so many years of civic anarchy. There is no reliable figure for the gross national or domestic product. The World Bank has

---

**"During a recent trip through central and northern Uganda, it was obvious that President Museveni's men are now an army of occupation—not an army of liberation."**

---

an official statistic, but admits the number has little meaning. Until the government of Uganda is in office long enough to prove to its people that they do not

have to fear for their lives or property each day, such numbers will remain chimeras.

In a recent interview, Museveni said his first priority is to bring peace, "which we have succeeded in doing, and the second priority is to ensure that the economy starts picking up." While the security situation is better today than it has been for years, the NRA army of occupation is vulnerable to isolation and its brother, fear.

Soon after Museveni claimed to have brought peace to Uganda, an Acholi woman in Gulu, patting her swelling stomach, said: "We pregnant women don't want to have male children. We know they will die." Until Ugandans are free of such overwhelming fear, there is little prospect for rebuilding their country. □

---

*Colin S. Clark reports from Nairobi for the London Guardian, Radio Australia, and the Voice of America.*

## Books Received

(Inclusion in this list does not preclude the review of a book at a later date.)

- Adam, Heribert, and Moodley, Kogila. *South Africa without Apartheid: Dismantling Racial Domination*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, 263pp., \$18.95.
- African Association for Public Administration and Management. *The Ecology of Public Administration and Management in Africa*. New York: Advent Books, Inc., 1986, 286pp., \$40.
- Batsa, Kofi. *The Spark: Times Behind Me—From Kwame Nkrumah to Hilla Limann*. London: Rex Collings Ltd., 1985, 137pp.
- Bell, Morag. *Contemporary Africa: Development, Culture and the State*. New York: Longman Inc., 1986, 204pp., \$18.95.
- Bhagavan, M. R. *Angola's Political Economy: 1975-1985*. Uppsala, Sweden: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1986, 89pp., \$4.20.
- Boone, Sylvia Ardyn. *Radiance from the Waters: Ideals of Feminine Beauty in Mende Art*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986, 248pp., \$35.
- Chileshe, Jonathan H. *Third World Countries and Development Options: Zambia*. New York: Advent Books, Inc., 1986, 198pp., \$32.50.
- Courtney-Clarke, Margaret. *Ndebele: The Art of an African Tribe*. New York: Rizzoli International Publications, Inc., 1986, 195pp., \$45.
- Crummey, Donald (ed.). *Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa*. Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann Educational Books Inc., 1986, 393pp., \$27.50.
- De Gruchy, John. *Cry Justice! Prayers, Meditations and Readings from South Africa*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986, 253pp., \$6.95.
- Ela, Jean-Marc. *African Cry*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986, 139pp., \$10.95.
- El-Khawas, Mohamed. *Qaddafi: His Ideology in Theory and Practice*. Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1986, 183pp., \$9.95.
- Entelis, John P. *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, 212pp., \$30.
- Erich, Haggai. *Ethiopia and the Challenge of Independence*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1986, 258pp., \$32.50.
- Feinberg, Richard E., et al. *Between Two Worlds: The World Bank's Next Decade*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1986, 174pp., \$12.95.
- Frederikse, Julie. *South Africa: A Different Kind of War*. London: James Currey, 1986, \$4.65.
- Gordon, David F. *Decolonization and the State in Kenya*. Boulder, Colo.: 1986, 256pp., \$22.50.
- Grundy, Kenneth W. *The Militarization of South African Politics*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1986, 113pp., \$18.95.
- Hanlon, Joseph. *Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1986, 352pp., \$35.
- Haysom, Nicholas. *Mabangalala: The Rise of Right-Wing Vigilantes in South Africa*. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986, 141pp., \$3.75.
- Hesselberg, Jan. *The Third World in Transition: The Case of the Peasantry in Botswana*. Uppsala, Sweden: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1986, 223pp., \$11.
- Hone, Joseph. *Africa of the Heart: A Personal Journey*. New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1986, 287pp., \$16.95.
- Howard, Rhoda E. *Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa*. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986, 229pp., \$34.50 cloth, \$12.95 paper.
- Jinadu, L. Adele. *Fanon: In Search of the African Revolution*. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986, 241pp., \$16.95.
- Johnson, John William. *The Epic of Son-Jara: A West African Tradition*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1986, 220pp., \$35.
- Kahama, C. George; Maliyamkono, T.L.; and Wells, Stuart. *The Challenge for Tanzania's Economy*. Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann Educational Books, Inc., 1986, 331pp., \$40.
- Kelley, Michael P. *A State in Disarray: Conditions of Chad's Survival*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, 140pp., \$28.50.
- Laitin, David D. *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba*. Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1986, 205pp., \$30 cloth, \$13.95 paper.

# A Test for Sfar

In the latest of Tunisia's continuing palace intrigues, Rachid Sfar has replaced President Bourguiba's one-time heir apparent, Mohamed Mzali, as prime minister. Not associated with any party clan, Sfar may represent the best hope of calming the political scene and implementing needed economic reforms.

BY HOWARD SCHISSEL

Being President-for-Life Habib Bourguiba's official dauphin is no easy task. Dismissed in July after six years in office, former Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali was the latest victim of the fratricidal succession struggle within the ranks of the *Parti Socialiste Destourien* (PSD), which seemingly monopolizes most of the time and energy of the Tunisian elite often to the detriment of governmental affairs.

Until the legislative elections scheduled for November, the newly appointed premier, 53-year-old Rachid Sfar, a technocrat known for his economic acumen, will benefit from a period of grace. However, if he is confirmed in office after this date, he too will have to face the various coalitions jockeying for position in the succession race.

Officially 83 years old, but probably closer to 90, Bourguiba has dominated the country's political life over the past half-century. In spite of his failing health, the *Combattant Suprême* still has the final word in all key party and governmental deliberations. He is also the focal point in the decision-making process.

Indeed, power and influence in the Tunisian political system depend on access to the presidential office. Except when political crisis spills over into the streets—as it has three times since 1978—it is at the presidential palace in



The newly appointed prime minister, Rachid Sfar, a technocrat known for his economic acumen, will benefit from a period of grace.

Carthage, a Tunis suburb, or at Bourguiba's summer residence at Monastir, his home town, that Tunisia's fate is decided.

Over the last two years, President Bourguiba has unexpectedly begun to play a more active role in state affairs. This has coincided with intensifying palace intrigues and a deteriorating social climate and economic situation. While remaining the ultimate guarantor of stability, the Tunisian patriarch's stubborn determination to shape the course of events has paralyzed the political system, engendering deep tensions which

may set the stage for turmoil in the post-Bourguiba era. Moreover, the precariousness of Tunisia's security, given the shifting alliances in the Maghreb and the Israeli raid against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) offices near Tunis, has further worsened this malaise.

Mzali came to office in 1980 just after Tunisia experienced two other traumatic events—the 1978 working class uprising known as “Black Thursday” and the attack by Tunisian dissidents against the southern town of Gafsa two years later. His program was based on a political overture designed to reduce tensions. A limited multi-party system was introduced, relations with the trade union, *Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens* (UGTT), were gradually normalized, and press and cultural liberties were broadened.

During his first few years in office when hopes were still high, Mzali worked toward consolidating his position and placing supporters and allies in strategic governmental and party posts. But clans within the PSD worked constantly against his efforts, even trying to sabotage elections. His popular support began to wane as the promises of his liberalization process failed to materialize and economic growth slowed.

The actual start of Mzali's downfall dates from the January 1984 “bread riots” which shook the regime to its foundations. It was the prime minister who

gave the go-ahead for the near doubling of the price of bread and other basic foodstuffs in the context of an economic reform program inspired by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The announcement of these measures sparked wide-scale rioting as crowds in the principal cities denounced the premier and his government. Mzali's opponents sought to use his *faux pas* to have him removed from office. They failed and the situation turned against them as Minister of Interior Driss Guiga was dismissed and forced into exile.

---

### **"The army's role as the regime's ultimate buttress could give its leaders a strong hand in the post-Bourguiba period."**

---

Although Mzali's powers were strengthened after the "bread riots" when he became minister of interior, his image was severely tarnished in the eyes of the average Tunisian. In addition, Bourguiba returned to the forefront of the political scene by announcing that the price hikes were to be rescinded. This probably reinforced the president's view of himself as not only the "father of the nation," but also its savior during times of distress.

Since then, Bourguiba has more directly intervened in political life in a way that counteracted the principles of his prime minister's government. Meanwhile, machinations in the presidential palace further inflamed the political atmosphere. Mzali scored some major points when he had long-time Bourguiba confidante Allala Lauoiti retired from his post at Carthage Palace last year.

Family affairs also envenomed the situation. The president's once-powerful wife, Wassila Bourguiba, fell from grace and amid rumors of impending divorce, went to the United States for "medical treatment." Habib Bourguiba, Jr. was also removed from his position as presidential special adviser, although he remains a PSD political bureau member.

But a new group of presidential faithfuls emerged, playing an important role in Mzali's political demise. Mansour


Skhiri, a native of Monastir, was appointed director of the presidential cabinet with ministerial rank, making him effectively the number-two figure in the regime. With a reputation as one of the rare political figures willing to tell the complete truth to the president, Skhiri has emerged as one of the prime candidates for the succession. The new "first lady," presidential niece Saida Sassi, has also broadened her influence. Finally, Mahmoud Bel Hassine, the enigmatic presidential adviser, has a prominent say in political affairs.

In the months leading up to the twelfth PSD Congress in June, a number of Mzali's closest supporters were thrown out of the government, particularly former Minister of Education Mohamed Frej Chedli. The congress itself was a cruel trial for Mzali—as Bourguiba publicly renewed his confidence in him, but failed to acknowledge him from the tribune as his official successor. When Mzali's wife was shuffled out of the government at the end of the congress, the premier's days were obvi-

1984 bread riots, Tunis: The risk is that the party barons, preoccupied with their own careers, will become increasingly cut off from the country's realities.



Sygrina



Former Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali: "Victim of the fratricidal succession struggle"

cent of which is under 21 years old. If the opposition is prevented from expressing itself and the elections are carried out as if Tunisia is still a one-party state, then the stage will certainly be set for the next political earthquake on the streets.

Security will undoubtedly be reinforced in coming months under the iron hand of Gen. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the new minister of the interior. Trained in France and the United States, Gen. Ben Ali, 49, is not new to the Tunisian political scene. He has the reputation for being a hardline law and order advocate, having played a central role in the repression of the 1978 labor demonstrations. He has already introduced stricter security procedures, for example, by setting up police posts on the university campuses. He is both feared and respected.

Gen. Ben Ali's ministerial portfolio—the first time that an army officer has become a full-fledged minister—consecrates the new prominence of the armed forces in public affairs. Gen. Ben Ali's position was bolstered even further when he was also named to the PSD political bureau. Unaligned with any political clan, he has now emerged as a potential presidential candidate. Although his family was not originally from Monastir, he was born there. For Bourguiba, this is an important factor.

Probably the first target of a crackdown will be the Muslim fundamentalist movements. In July, several extremists were sentenced to death and others to long prison terms for conspiracy. In collaboration with European and Middle Eastern secret services, efforts are being made to track radical Tunisian Muslims belonging to the Parti de la Libération Islamique (PLI). It remains to be seen what attitude the government will adopt toward the MTI, which acquired a certain legitimacy at the end of Mzali's regime by preaching a pragmatic line. MTI leaders have already been in prison.

Linked to this question is the Arabization of Tunisian life, especially the school system. Mzali had favored the priority given to Arabic in the schools, to the detriment of French. Results in the educational system were far from satisfying, however. Only 13 percent of the students were awarded high school diplomas last June, to the consternation of the government and the public. It is rumored that a reform program will soon be introduced to give greater priority to French in teaching. This goes against the fundamentalists' credo of expunging Western influence from Tunisian life and could be yet another bone of contention with the government.

In the meantime, however, the most pressing problem is the economy—and that is where Premier Sfar will have leeway to act. Although Tunisia is not a major oil producer like its neighbors, hy-

drocarbons still represent the single most important source of hard currency earnings. With production already declining, the fall in the price of oil will deprive Tunisia of badly needed revenues. It is estimated, for instance, that in 1986, oil earnings could plummet by some \$170 million and the budgetary deficit rise to over \$100 million. To make matters worse, weak oil prices hardly encourage foreign firms to invest in oil exploration, despite a recent sweetening of contract terms. This means that output will diminish faster than foreseen from the present level of some 100,000 barrels a day.

Most of the other sectors of the economy are not flourishing either. The phosphate and phosphoric acid industry has been affected by weak prices and slack demand. The country's incipient manufacturing industries are menaced by the enlargement of the Common Market to include Spain and Portugal, as one of Tunisia's main export markets could gradually become more difficult to penetrate. The same holds true for its exports of citrus fruits and olive oil.

After declining in 1984, tourism seems to have picked up a bit in 1985 and 1986. Nevertheless, the transfer of funds from Tunisian workers abroad has slowed down. Transfers represented some 17 percent of the value of total exports, or Tunisian dinar 346 million, in 1984. Last year, they were reportedly down about 30 percent.

---

**“While remaining the ultimate guarantor of stability, the Tunisian patriarch's stubborn determination to shape the course of events has paralyzed the political system.”**

---

Tunisia had been counting on aid and investment from its friends in the Arab world. With the oil crisis, however, this assistance will certainly slow to a great extent. Tunisia has not attracted a substantial amount of private Western investment outside the hydrocarbon sector. Thus, the country may find itself



William Graham/World Bank

increasingly short of funds to spur development and repay its debt obligations. It is estimated that at the beginning of 1986, Tunisia's foreign debt stood at \$5.7 billion, a sum equal to around 68 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). In per capita terms, Tunisia owed \$830 compared with \$600 for Morocco. With the sparsest resources of the North African nations, Tunisia may find this burden hard to support.

In 1986, Tunisia must repay almost \$800 million in capital and interest, representing about 45 percent of exports and 30 percent of earnings on current accounts. Western banking sources are convinced that Tunisia will be obliged to seek a rescheduling of its debt obligations in the near future. This will imply the application of a stringent economic rehabilitation program under the aegis of the IMF and the World Bank.

The Tunisian dinar, which has fallen in value since the beginning of the year, was devalued by 10 percent in August. The IMF has been insisting on further cuts in food and other subsidies, but this entails a substantial risk for the government. The World Bank has helped prepare the outline of a 1987-88 economic program calling for further moves to liberalize the economy, while downgrading the emphasis placed on tourist development and oversized industrial projects.

Sfar's maneuvering room is extremely limited. Austerity measures

World Bank irrigation project. With the sparsest of resources of the North African nations, Tunisia may find its debt burden hard to support.

over the past two years have cut into living standards and oil revenues will no longer be sufficient to fuel even modest economic growth. As Tunisia's increasingly well-educated youth leave school, pressures on the government to create new employment opportunities will intensify. Traditional safety valves such as emigration abroad—principally to France and the Middle East—have been largely blocked by the economic crisis. Economists reckon that the projected 4 percent annual growth rate in the new 1987-91 five-year development plan is overly optimistic given Tunisia's clouded economic outlook.

With dwindling resources, Tunisia has been obliged to spend larger amounts on security and defense. In the last eight years, for example, military expenditures have doubled to 3 percent of GDP, with per capita spending rising from \$15 to \$35.

Foreign assistance has been crucial in strengthening Tunisia's military potential. Since 1979, the United States has provided around \$600 million in military hardware, including C-130 Hercules transports, F-5 fighters, Chaparral missiles, and M-60 heavy tanks. In the 1987 budget, the Reagan administration requested \$40 million in grants under the Military Aid Program and commercial

sales of another \$27 million worth of equipment are anticipated. Tunisia's military debt to Washington totals \$500 million, with \$61 million due to be reimbursed in 1986.

France too has gone out of its way to supply modern equipment for the Tunisian armed forces, concentrating on an anti-aircraft radar system and Exocet missiles. Paris has also furnished light tanks and Milan anti-tank missiles and naval patrol vessels. Both France and the United States actively train Tunisian officers. Tunisia is viewed in Paris and Washington as a vital bulwark against Libyan Col. Muammar Qaddafi's expansionist policies in North and sub-Saharan Africa. The French utilize listening posts in southern Tunisia to monitor Libyan operations in Chad. While Tunisia's army may never be a match for Libya's, it is becoming a potent force for countering domestic dissent.

Having intervened three times, in 1978, 1980, and 1984 to restore order, the army's role as the regime's ultimate buttress could give its leaders a strong hand in the post-Bourguiba period. The army has traditionally been apolitical, but if order broke down and politicians proved incapable of providing leadership, the armed forces could emerge as the guarantor of national unity and sovereignty. This factor presently reinforces Gen. Ben Ali's hand.

Tunisia has counted on Western

backers to assure its security, mainly against possible aggression from Libya. That is why Tunisian officials and public opinion were so traumatized by the Israeli attack against the PLO headquarters in the Tunis suburbs and the lack of open criticism of Tel Aviv's action by Tunisia's Western allies. President Reagan at first even publicly endorsed the raid, before the State Department belatedly added a certain nuance to the presidential declarations. In any case, the Israeli raid obliged Tunisian officials to reassess their security arrangements. The country is too small, however, to be able to play an independent role in North African and Mediterranean diplomacy.

Relations with Libya are still problematic. Tunisian authorities suspect Qaddafi of financing subversive activities, especially in the poor southern part of the country. Among sectors of the country's youth, the mercurial Libyan leader has a positive image, reinforced by the American raid against Libya last spring. To counterbalance Libya's intentions in the Maghreb, Tunisia has carried out a rapprochement with Algerian President Chadli Benjedid; since 1983, it has been a member of a tripartite co-

operation and friendship pact with Algeria and Mauritania.

The weeks running up to the November legislative elections will be an important test for the coherence of Tunisia's political institutions and the solidity of the PSD. While many observers do not expect Rachid Sfar to remain in the prime minister's post after the formation of the new government at the end of the year, it is highly unlikely that any other candidate among the leading party barons can rally even a modicum of consensus given their intense rivalries. Sfar therefore appears to have a fairly good chance of remaining in office. Not associated with any particular PSD political clan, the new prime minister is the first dauphin not to come from Monastir. However, Sfar has family ties with the *Combattant Suprême*, as his father was closely linked to Bourguiba during the pre-independence period.

Sfar represents a good choice to calm the political scene and cobble together a credible economic program capable of attracting foreign support. Since he is not yet perceived as a serious threat in the succession race because he lacks a political base, Sfar could benefit, for the moment at least, from the benevolent

neutrality of most of the top contenders. This could provide him with precious time to reinforce his own position within party and government circles through judicious alliances. If he can engineer an economic recovery in the near future, his image would be strengthened in the public eye.

Of course, Tunisia's political future remains contingent on Bourguiba's health and humor. As the country faces daunting social and political problems, the many uncertainties will make the prime minister's position—no matter who occupies it—an ungratifying one. The only political constant from the recent past likely to be perpetuated is the ongoing cabals involving a handful of individuals within party circles. As one Tunisian intellectual noted, the risk is that the party barons, preoccupied with their own careers, will become increasingly cut off from the country's realities. He added: "This could make the task of organizing the transition to the post-Bourguiba period even more problematic." □

*Howard Schissel is a Paris-based freelance journalist specializing in French-speaking Africa as well as questions relating to African natural resources.*

## Books

- Lancaster, Carol, and Williamson, John (eds.). *African Debt and Financing*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1986, 215pp., \$12.
- Leach, Graham. *South Africa: No Easy Path to Peace*. New York: Methuen Inc., 1986, \$29.95.
- Lovejoy, Paul E. *Salt of the Desert Sun: A History of Salt Production and Trade in the Central Sudan*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 284pp., \$42.50.
- Low, Allan. *Agricultural Development in Southern Africa: Farm Household-Economics and the Food Crisis*. Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann Educational Books Inc., 1986, 191pp., \$35.
- MacGaffey, Wyatt. *Religion and Society in Central Africa: The BaKongo of Lower Zaire*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986, 251pp., \$45 cloth, \$15.95 paper.
- Mathabane, Mark. *Kaffir Boy: The True Story of a Black Youth's Coming of Age in Apartheid South Africa*. New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1986, 352pp., \$19.95.
- Moock, Joyce Lewinger (ed.). *Understanding Africa's Rural Households and Farming Systems*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, 215pp., \$18.85.
- Moore, Henrietta L. *Space, Text and Gender: An Anthropological Study of the Marakwet of Kenya*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 195pp., \$39.50.
- Naudé, C. F., Beyers, and Sölle, Dorothee. *Hope for Faith: A Conversation*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1986, 38pp., \$3.95.
- Neuberger, Benyamin. *National Self Determination in Postcolonial Africa*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1986, 119pp., \$20.
- Neuhaus, Richard John. *Dispensations: The Future of South Africa as South Africans See It*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1986, 319pp., \$16.95.
- Nkosi, Lewis. *Mating Birds*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986, \$13.95.
- Oduoye, Mercy Amba. *Hearing and Knowing: Theological Reflections on Christianity in Africa*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986, 149pp., \$9.95.
- Omond, Roger. *The Apartheid Handbook: A Guide to South Africa's Everyday Racial Policies*. New York: Penguin Books, 1986, 272pp., \$4.95.
- Onwuka, Ralph I., and Aluko, Olajide. *The Future of Africa and the New International Economic Order*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986, 319pp., \$29.95.
- O'Toole, Thomas. *The Central African Republic: The Continent's Hidden Heart*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, 151pp., \$28.50.
- Paden, John N. *Ahmadu Bello: Sardauna of Sokoto—Values and Leadership in Nigeria*. Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann Educational Books Inc., 1986, 726pp., \$12.50.
- Pellow, Deborah, and Chazan, Naomi. *Ghana: Coping with Uncertainty*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, 238pp., \$28.50.
- Perkins, Kenneth J. *Tunisia: Crossroads of the Islamic and European Worlds*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, 177pp., \$26.50.



# Africa's Shadow Voices

BY GERRY L. DEXTER

It begins with a bird call. Then, a few moments later at exactly half past the hour, a female voice advises, "This is Radio Truth. We welcome you to our daily half-hour broadcast in English."

Radio Truth is not licensed by any government. It is one of Africa's secret voices, speaking from the shadows, from a hidden location. It is a voice with a mission: to bring about the downfall of the government of Zimbabwe. It claims to be the voice of anti-Marxist Zimbabwean nationalists and has been airing its message since shortly after the current government took power in Harare.

Radio Truth has many cousins—over a dozen of them—operating along the periphery of the continent's hot spots

but those populations to which they preach.

Governments use official stations to propagandize against other governments—as with the Voice of America and Radio Moscow—on an official, above-board basis. Clandestine broadcasters live in the dark places, move along the back alleys of broadcasting and politics, their voices heard but their substance and shape indistinct. Perhaps the most famous of today's clandestine stations is Radio Venceremos operated by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in opposition to the current government of El Salvador and often quoted in news items from the area.

Clandestine broadcasters fall into three basic categories. In the classic model, a legitimate, often armed resis-

government involved.

In its third form, clandestine radio is essentially a program rather than an actual radio station. In these cases, it may be that the resistance group does not have the funds to set up a station of its own or cannot find a suitable location. Therefore, the resistance group will simply produce programs which governments sympathetic to its cause will then air openly on their own national radios as part of the regular program schedule. All three types of clandestines are operating in Africa today.

Unfortunately, the evidence about which government is supporting what resistance group's radio, or where a clandestine transmitter is actually located is largely circumstantial. Governments do not admit supporting these

Across the continent, wherever a government is opposed by an organized movement that can find the money or facilities to broadcast its grievances, clandestine radio stations will continue to transmit their messages to captive audiences.

and areas of political conflict. Each makes its own call for change; each seeks supremacy for its own cause.

These secret stations, commonly called clandestine broadcasters, are in operation all over the world; wherever a group in power is opposed by an organized opposition movement that can find the money or facilities to support such broadcasts.

The concept of clandestine broadcasting dates back to the second world war, when the Axis and Allied powers used the technique to sow doubt and weaken morale on the other side. Since then, clandestines have hovered around the world's trouble spots like so many mosquitoes at a picnic. They come and go as wars, revolutions, or political alignments change. The war of words they wage goes largely unnoticed by all

tance group or guerrilla movement operates its own radio station, broadcasting from a secret location within rebel territory or from a site safe within the borders of a friendly neighboring nation. Second, a friendly country may give an opposition group airtime on transmitters owned by the host government, although in such cases, the government providing the facilities often has as much or even more control over the broadcasts as the resistance group itself.

Indeed, the friendly government may on occasion initiate the idea—even to the point of creating a resistance group that exists in little more than name only. This is done to lend the broadcasts an air of legitimacy and to distance them from the sponsoring government. In either case, such hospitality and assistance usually goes unacknowledged by the

stations and the groups themselves have no desire to provide information about their location, for obvious reasons. Secret broadcasting is, after all, secret.

Nonetheless, even circumstantial evidence can be compelling. Often the existence of a broadcast or a secret station has a direct bearing on the political situation between governments with opposing viewpoints. It does not take a private detective to deduce that South Africa must have been supporting the Voice of the Mozambique National Resistance when that station left the air shortly after the Nkomati Accord was signed between Pretoria and Maputo.

There is a small group of radio hobbyists involved in searching out clandestine stations and attempting to uncover who is behind them and the locations

from which they operate. These monitors and researchers offer at least tentative answers to many of the questions surrounding African secret radio. Their conclusions are frequently based upon reports of radio monitors located closer to the scene, on the political situations involved in any given case, on the content of monitored broadcasts, and on the knowledge of how radio broadcasting works.

For example, a host government may allow a genuine resistance group or one it has created as a front organization several hours of broadcast time on one of its transmitters. Most African gov-

---

**“Clandestine broadcasters live in the dark places, move along the back alleys of broadcasting and politics, their voices heard but their substance and shape indistinct.”**

---

ernments control all of the broadcasting within their country and operate more than one program service over a number of different channels or frequencies. The frequency used by the resistance broadcasts may have previously been commonly used for the government program and it becomes fairly obvious that the government service has vacated the channel in favor of the resistance program.

It is common practice for governments to have multiple transmitting and antenna systems at one location, with separate programs fed from there over the airwaves. Occasionally a broadcasting engineer may push the wrong button and send the government program out over the resistance program channel instead, thus exposing this radio shell game.

In Africa, examples of secret broadcasting abound. On a per capita basis, Africa probably has more clandestine stations in operation now than anywhere else in the world, with the possible exception of Central America.

Jonas Savimbi's Unita forces fire verbal broadsides at the government of Angola on a daily basis. In fact, there are two such Unita-operated clandestine stations: *A Voz de Verdade* (The Voice of Truth) and *A Voz do Resistencia do Galo Negro* (Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel). Both stations broadcast from the Transvaal area of South Africa. If not officially supported by South Africa, the stations are at least left to themselves. South Africa says the stations are unlicensed and are operating in violation of South African law, but does nothing to close them down.

A third anti-Angolan station is more mysterious. Using the name *Cubanos en Africa*, the station airs programs in Spanish aimed at Cuban troops serving in Angola. At one time, the anti-Castro group *Agrupación Abdala* claimed responsibility for the broadcasts. However, monitors in South Africa say the announcers do not have Cuban, or even Spanish accents. Additionally, the programming and music played are non-Cuban in nature. A South African monitor believes the station is run by Angola expatriates. *Cubanos en Africa* is believed to operate from the same base as the two Unita stations.

In turn, South Africa is the target of broadcasts by Radio Freedom, the program produced by the African National Congress. Radio Freedom is aired over government-owned stations in Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Angola daily on some, weekly on others.

South Africa's occupation of Namibia comes under attack by the Voice of Namibia, operated by the South West Africa People's Organization (Swapo). This too is a resistance program rather than a full-fledged station and is broadcast by government stations in Congo, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Angola.

The long guerrilla campaign by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) which seeks independence for that Ethiopian province, is supported by the EPLF's Voice of the Broad Masses of Eritrea, believed to be operating from EPLF-held territory near the town of Orotta in the Eritrean north. This station also provides airtime for the Voice of the Tigré Revolution operated by the Tigré People's Liberation Front, which

is also seeking independence from Ethiopia.

Somalia, which supports independence for these two Ethiopian provinces, aids the cause by providing time on its government transmitters for the Voice of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Eritrea.

Ethiopia, in turn, responds with Radio Halgan, carried over government transmitters in Addis Ababa. The broadcasts oppose the Somali government's designs on the Ogaden region and claim to be the official views of the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia and the Somali National Movement.

Radio SPLA, operated by the Sudan People's Liberation Army and Sudan People's Liberation Movement, has been bounced around some in the past few years. Originally, the broadcasts were supported by Libya and were aired over its transmitters, but that ended with the 1985 coup in Khartoum which brought to power a government more to Libya's liking. Radio SPLA then relocated to Ethiopia. Initially, its broadcasts focused on the struggle for independence in southern Sudan, but in recent months the emphasis has shifted to include demands for change throughout the country.

---

**“Often the existence of a broadcast or a secret station has a direct bearing on the political situation between governments with opposing viewpoints.”**

---

Col. Qaddafi has a long history of creating or supporting clandestine radios. In addition to hosting Radio SPLA at one time, his government transmitters devoted several hours per day to the broadcasts of the Voice of the Sudanese Popular Revolution. These transmissions were suspended shortly after the Sudanese coup. Libya has also hosted broadcasts directed at Lebanon during the civil war, as well as an anti-Egyptian station when Anwar Sadat was in power.

Libya continues to support—perhaps control is a better term—a station known as Radio Bardai or Radio Chad, which claims to be the voice of the Chadian National Liberation Army and opposes the government of Hissène Habré. The station announces itself as operating from the northern Chadian town of Bardai, but in reality the programs are aired from a high-power transmitting complex from within Libya.

Qaddafi is also believed to have been the silent hand behind the station calling itself the Voice of Vengeance—the Voice of Holy Hatred—which had perhaps a month's lifespan during the spring of 1985. The station called upon Arabs living in the Maghreb to kill any Jews living nearby and confiscate their property, claiming that the Koran justified such actions. After meetings between Qaddafi (who denied any knowledge of the station) and Morocco's King Hassan II during which the subject of the station was placed on the table, the broadcasts ceased.

Qaddafi and his government are opposed by the Voice of the Libyan People, operated by the National Front for the Salvation of Libya. Initially these broadcasts were thought to come from Sudan, but they continued after that

country's coup. Suspicion now centers on Egypt and/or Saudi Arabia. Morocco is the target of broadcasts by the Polisario Front's Voice of the Free Sahara, which are aired regularly over Algerian government radio opposing Rabat's control of the Western Sahara.



To return to Radio Truth, its broadcasts have been instrumental in the Zimbabwe government's decision to create a larger, more powerful government radio station in order to "combat propaganda coming from South Africa." Radio Truth's broadcasts are believed to originate from the same South African site as the anti-Angolan emissions.

Many of the clandestine broadcasts from Africa can be received with varying regularity and clarity in North America, since most of the stations operate on the shortwave radio frequencies enabling them to be heard at great distances. Only two or three of the stations broadcast in English, however. Even so, such stations are not only a source of endless fascination for the casual or serious monitor of shortwave bands, but also a fairly accurate reflection of the current state of political alignments on the continent.

Since the end of World War II, barely a day has passed without one or more clandestine broadcasters in operation somewhere in the world, and they are unlikely to ever stop completely. They may change and take on different colors of the political rainbow; they may die off as peace comes to one troubled area, only to spring up again as conflict arises somewhere else. The secret voices will always be there in the shadows, transmitting the troubles and complaints of Africa and the world. □

*Gerry L. Dexter, a freelance writer, is author of the monthly "Listening Post" column in Popular Communications magazine and the book Clandestine Confidential (Universal Electronics, Columbus, Ohio) which discusses the clandestine scene on a worldwide basis.*

## Whatever happened to Namibia?

# Books

Isaak I. Dore, *The International Mandate System and Namibia*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985, 230 pp, \$24.50.

Tore Linné Eriksen with Richard Moorsom, *The Political Economy of Namibia: An Annotated, Critical Bibliography*, Oslo: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1985, 423pp, \$12.50.

Robert S. Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy*, Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1985, 114pp, \$7.75.

Richard Moorsom, *Walvis Bay: Namibia's Port*, London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1984, 93pp, £1.50.

Geisa Maria Rocha, *In Search of Namibian Independence: The Limitations of the United Nations*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984, 192pp, \$21.50.

Given the heightened and continuous media preoccupation with South Africa since November 1984, it is ironic that

Namibia has receded even further from American attention and interest. It may even turn out that this vast, sparsely settled, impoverished, and beautiful country will be the last beneficiary of African political independence, linked increasingly as its fortunes are with the inclinations of Pretoria's white leadership.

These books remind us that a Namibian solution would have many advantages. The central one would be to provide some stimulus for at least marginal economic development. In addition, the installation of a Swapo government in Windhoek would contribute to regional stability and restore

some esteem to both UN and U.S. regional policies.

But no solution is in sight, nor has it been since at least January 1981 at the time of the abortive Geneva conference. At that meeting, Brian Urquhart, former UN under-secretary-general for special political affairs, offered South Africa's then-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Brand Fourie a package put together by Swapo and regional black governments which disarmed Fourie with its accommodation. But, as Urquhart and others have pointed out, Fourie was not able to persuade his political superiors in Pretoria to accept these terms, probably because they were buoyed by Reagan's election and because no pressure was forthcoming from Chester Crocker or anyone else in the State Department.

Of course, in the intervening five years, prospects have diminished in large part because of Washington's explicit articulation of linkage between South African withdrawal from Namibia and Cuban withdrawal from Angola and more recent moves to provide "covert" aid to Unita. In addition, the South African government has become increasingly convinced that it need not change its present posture toward Namibia in the absence of any substantial pressure from Washington or other Western governments, or military pressure from Swapo.

All that might change as Pretoria's control over its internal security nears collapse, but until that occurs, Namibia will remain a festering problem. Despite the formal installation of a Namibian administration to replace the administrator-general, South African Defence Force (SADF), and senior officials from Pretoria surely retain effective power, not only in Windhoek but especially in the northern "operational zone." Incompetence and corruption are undoubtedly still chronic, tempered by those few SADF commanders whose ironic distaste for politicians of any color impels them to take over de facto administrative control in various ethnic areas. And the pattern of repression by the police and military has probably widened and deepened in both urban and rural.

None of these books addresses Namibia's immediate situation, although the lack of recent access explains that shortcoming. In the case of the Lore book, however, the failure is more serious. Like too many practitioners of international law, he focuses exclusively on legal issues without giving any consideration to their political context.

Rocha's book is much more useful. She believes in the applicability of international law and mandates, but her UN tenure made her painfully alert to the many inadequacies

of that institution in coping with Namibia. She appreciates that politics matter, indeed are pivotal, and convinces us that UN politics more often than not vitiate whatever impact that institution might have on resolution of the Namibian question. Most tantalizingly, she writes a bit about the interaction during the Carter administration among the UN Secretariat, Washington, D.C., other governments involved in Contact Group negotiations, and Pretoria itself.

Jaster has little to say about the Contact Group part of the negotiation process, but he does provide a valuable analysis of South African perspectives, motives, and tactics in Namibia in recent years. In his own work, he relies on and generally agrees with analyses by Deon Geldenhuys, Andre du Pisani, and John Barrett—those few South African critics whose proximity to official circles often gives them more insight into details of policy-making than any foreign observer could hope to achieve.

Given the stagnation pervasive in Namibian governmental and economic policies, it may seem irrelevant to raise questions about future development prospects and priorities. It does require an act of faith to believe that Namibian development will be acted on in the foreseeable future. Both Eriksen and Moorsom reflect that faith.

Eriksen's annotated bibliography, to which Moorsom contributed several sections, might seem at first glance to be a dry-as-dust archival source, and admittedly, it springs to life for me because of my own recognition of the limited availability of U.S.-published works on Namibia and the difficulties of research access to contemporary issues of governance and development in Namibia.

As Eriksen makes clear, both data and analyses are available. In Namibia itself, Dr. Kenneth Abrahams and his wife, Ottilie, have written and encouraged others to write a number of critical studies. At the UN Institute for Namibia in Lusaka, additional analyses have been made. [Editor's note: The UN Institute for Namibia has just published its comprehensive 1008-page study, *Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development*, which is available from the United Nations.]

And further afield, anti-apartheid groups, like the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa in London, have sponsored strikingly sober and non-polemical studies, of which Moorsom's own monograph on Walvis Bay is an outstanding example.

Less apparent is the wealth of books and monographs coming from academics in both West and East Germany. Eriksen also

makes us see how little useful work has come from South Africa itself—with the exceptions noted earlier—due primarily to the perceptual blindspot shared by most Afrikaner scholars and many English-speaking South African scholars about Namibia and even more about SWAPO.

The annotations themselves are a wonder of insight and balance. Eriksen is well to the left of center, as gauged by his discomfort with Wolfgang Thomas' economic views and his preferences for Reginald Green's, but his assessment of both writers and of a wide range of other analysts is lucid enough that any reader can decide for himself on the quality of a given work, regardless of its orientation.

Reading step by step through comments on works on such "apolitical" topics as fisheries, agriculture, and education, it becomes painfully clear that the best depiction of Namibian "development" is one of neglect by a colonial power compounded in recent years by the physical and psychological ravages imposed on northern areas by the South African Defence Force, the South African police, and local authorities. As Eriksen notes, even occasional official reports make clear repeated failures of implementation and a profound lack of imagination and willingness to take any risks in policy-making—not even to mention the pervasive impact of (usually tacit) racism underlying almost everything South African officials do or do not do in Namibia.

—John Seiler  
Poughkeepsie, New York

---

## ERRATUM

Due to a production error, the article "Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics: Reagan, Congress, and the Erosion of Consensus" by Gary Bombardier in the July-August 1986 edition was misprinted. On page 22, beginning with paragraph four ("Admittedly, Central America. . .") through paragraph five on page 23 (which ends with ". . . U.S. contributions to UN agencies.") is out of sequence. This entire section should appear on page 24, following paragraph four in the second column (which ends with ". . . income of less than half that amount").

We deeply regret the error and the inconvenience it has caused the author.

---

# NDEBELE

## The Art of an African Tribe



*Photographs and text by  
Margaret Courtney-Clarke*

Noted photojournalist Margaret Courtney-Clarke, South African by birth, has created a beautiful photo essay about the remarkable art of the Ndebele tribe, primarily mural art, painted on the walls of their homes in striking geometric forms. The South African government's apartheid policy of "relocating" the Ndebele is forcing them to abandon their homes, leaving their art to deteriorate. Ms. Courtney-Clarke's book is both a stunning collection of photographs and an important document of a dying art form. Her 180 vibrant pictures capture the brilliant color, powerful graphics (all drawn free-hand), and charming inventiveness of Ndebele art. In the introduction, South African photographer David Goldblatt pays tribute to the author for producing a book of great integrity, deeply respectful of its subject. "A beautiful and moving book. The author's photographs need no justification beyond the artistry of their subjects. But an awareness of the circumstances surrounding the art makes the achievement of Ndebele women even more powerful."—*New York Times*.

208 pages. 180 color photographs. 11" x 11". \$45

**"Margaret Courtney-Clarke's book is a revelation of a glorious continued existence—under the most destructive forms of hardship imaginable—of an artistic culture at the very centre of life itself."**

— Nadine Gordimer



At all fine bookstores or from

**RIZZOLI**  
597 Fifth Ave • New York, 10017

Banned in South Africa . . . available in the U.S.

# The Anti-Apartheid Campaign You Can Dance To.

Critics hailed "Sun City" as a powerful musical statement against apartheid. The all-star collaboration features 54 artists, including Little Steven, Bruce Springsteen, Jimmy Cliff, Miles Davis, Bob Dylan and Run-DMC. Together they created a song, an album, a music video, a book and now a 51-minute video cassette.

Now, you can obtain all of these items to inform yourself and others about the struggle for freedom in South Africa. The non-profit Africa Fund, the agency that is distributing the monies raised by "Sun City" offer the records, book and video at a substantial educational discount: 50% off. There's even a teacher's guide to help stimulate discussions in classrooms and communities. It's an ideal way to turn people on to learning more and acting against apartheid.



	OUR PRICE	×	QUANTITY	
Africa Fund Teaching Guide	\$1.00		\$_____	
"Sun City" Book (122 pages, 8½ × 11, Penguin)	\$6.95		\$_____	
"Sun City" <input type="checkbox"/> Album or <input type="checkbox"/> Cassette;	\$6.95		\$_____	
12" Single (Manhattan)	\$3.95		\$_____	
Music Video and "Sun City" documentary, <input type="checkbox"/> VHS or <input type="checkbox"/> Beta format (51-minutes, Karl-Lorimar)	\$16.95		\$_____	
Add 10% postage & handling	TOTAL		\$_____	

"SUN CITY" CURRICULUM PACKAGE (includes all but 12" single; specify album or cassette and video format above). Postage & handling include . . . \$34.95

I'm adding a tax-deductible contribution to Africa Fund "Sun City" Projects of \_\_\_\_\_ \$5 \_\_\_\_\_ \$10 \_\_\_\_\_ \$25 \_\_\_\_\_ more.

Mail your order with check or MO to: THE AFRICA FUND, 198 Broadway, New York, NY 10038.

Please allow 6-8 weeks for delivery

# SUN CITY

ARTISTS UNITED AGAINST APARTHEID





# AFRICA REPORT

America's Leading Magazine  
on Africa

Please enter my subscription as indicated below (six issues per year):

**INDIVIDUAL**

\$21/1 year

\$39/2 years

\$56/3 years

**INSTITUTION**

\$28/1 year

\$53/2 years

\$72/3 years

—Regular Mail to Canada/Overseas: Add \$6 per year.

—Air Rate Overseas: Add \$24 per year.

—First-class within USA: Add \$7 per year.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

CITY \_\_\_\_\_ STATE \_\_\_\_\_ ZIP \_\_\_\_\_

The total amount of my order is \$ \_\_\_\_\_

My check is enclosed (Make checks payable to Transaction Periodicals Consortium).


Please bill my:  MasterCard  VISA

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Expiration Date \_\_\_\_\_ Interbank No. \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_





No Postage Stamp  
Necessary if Mail  
in the United States

**BUSINESS REPLY CARD**

FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 1129 NEW BRUNSWICK NJ

**AFRICA  
REPORT**


Transaction Periodicals Consortium  
Rutgers University  
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903





The roots of American soul food go back to West Africa. When you go there you'll find greens, yams and barbecue galore.

A typical dinner from *Chez Valentin* in Treichville, Ivory Coast, might offer an appetizer of country pate, smoked salmon, or a mound of chunked lobster in a delicious cream sauce. For an entree you might enjoy a rack of baby lamb or "Veal Africain," which is a veal cutlet wrapped around a banana and topped with a delicate curry sauce. As for dessert, perhaps a flaming rum omelette filled with fruit, or a baked Alaska. As you can see, the pleasures of the palate prevail in West Africa. Bon Appetit!



In many of the West African countries, women dominate the retail distribution business. Many of these "market women" have considerable wealth and exercise important political influence.

# Baked Alaska in Africa?

Hunger for shrimps and prawns? Then take Air Afrique to West Africa. Our coasts yield prawns in abundance. In fact, the name for Cameroon comes from the Portuguese word for prawns: *camarões*.

If your experience of the peanut is limited to an occasional handful of roasted robbers or the fond memory of a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, you've got new worlds to discover in West Africa. Start with a flavorful chicken groundnut stew, then move on to a score or more of delicious dishes that feature these luscious legumes.

Since the beginning of time, West African mothers have been teaching their daughters the secrets of good cooking. For example, to tenderize tough meat, the young cook merely wrapped it in papaya leaves. They're nature's own tenderizer.

Now what are you waiting for? Isn't it time you discovered West Africa? Just call your Travel Agent or your Air Afrique / Air France office today. Hurry!

**AIR AFRIQUE**

Africa begins with Air Afrique.  
And it's just seven hours to the New Sun...  
West Africa.

West African cooks took the versatile okra plant to the heights of culinary excellence and gave the world a soup called gumbo.

