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PRESIDENT SHEHU SHAGARI

n Nigeria

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

IN THIS ISSUE

As Aaron Segal points out in his analysis of bilateral relations, a number of misunderstandings divide the United States and Nigeria, the country which is the focus of this issue of *Africa Report*. He describes the development of the relationship and points to some means of easing the potential for political and economic confrontation. As Segal indicates, southern Africa policies represent a major political difference between Lagos and Washington. We reproduce a speech by President Shagari on this topic.

Looking at Nigeria's internal developments, Larry Diamond sees a sweeping political transformation under way, with implications for the elections scheduled for 1983. Two articles deal with the prospects for Nigerian agriculture, a crucial issue in national development.

Elsewhere, T.R. Lansner describes the economic, military, and social problems facing President Obote in his attempts to bring Uganda back to normalcy after the Amin years.

In a dispatch following the Summit of French and African leaders in Paris, Alex Rondos looks at the new and not-so-new policies of France in the region. He sees potential for both cooperation and friction between Washington and Paris in their respective African activities.

American policy is also the focus of the In Washington column, by Susan Gilpin. Specifically, she looks at the potential impact upon Africa of the Reagan administration's emphasis of private sector roles in furthering economic development in the Third World.

This issue also contains the usual detailed description of developments, and the 1981 index, in African Update, and an expanded book review section.

Nigeria
Shagari's First Two Years — 4
By Larry Diamond

Nigeria/United States
Uneasy Partners — 11
By Aaron Segal

Nigeria
The Way Ahead for Agriculture — 17
By Anne Bolsover

Nigeria Document
Policy Toward Southern Africa — 20
By President Alhaji Shehu Shagari

African Update — 23
Editor: Joseph Margolis
Associate Editor: Margaret A. Novicki
Editorial Assistant: Michael C. Beaubien

Nigeria Document
The Agricultural Situation — 39

Uganda
Can Obote Survive? — 42
By T.R. Lansner

Paris Newsletter
Mitterrand's Africa Policies — 46
By Alex Rondos

In Washington
Reagan's Private Sector Thrust — 51
By Susan Gilpin

Books — 55

Photo Credit
The cover photo of President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria was taken by Nobu Arakawa.

Shagari's First Two Years

BY LARRY DIAMOND

Halfway through the first presidential term of its Second Republic, Nigeria is in the midst of a sweeping political transformation. Haltingly but inexorably, leadership is passing to a new generation of Nigerian politicians. Equally so, the basis of political conflict is moving to a new set of issues, cutting across the ethnic and regional divisions that have for so long been the accepted terms for understanding Nigerian politics. As existing parties and alliances divide and disintegrate, new ones are emerging and fusing. Already, these inchoate political forces of the Second Republic are gathering toward an impassioned and unpredictable electoral confrontation in 1983.

That election will be the first major test of how far the Second Republic has come in containing the stresses and contradictions that haunted the First Republic from independence in October 1960 to the military coup of January 1966. Those turbulent five years saw political competition between the three major ethnic and regionally based parties — of the Yoruba West, the Igbo East, and the Hausa-Fulani North — polarize into intense and recurrent communal confrontation, which continued to degenerate through two successive military regimes into a traumatic four-year civil war. Many have worried that a return to democratic politics would bring back the polarization of ethnic and regional cleavage, and the manipulation of those cleavages by ambitious politicians, that brought crisis and chaos to Nigeria in the 1960s. But a number of developments since the conclusion of the war in 1970 suggest optimism.

The postwar policy of reconciliation and reconstuction pursued by Head of State General Yakubu Gowon went a long way toward healing the wounds of the conflict and reintegrating the Igbo people into the social and economic life of Nigeria. In addition, his reorganization of the old regional system into 12 states, later divided further into 19, has broken the old ethnic and regional solidarities, brought to the forefront the nation's numerous ethnic minorities, and opened possibilities for shifting alliances among states whose needs and resources divide them in ways that cut across ethnicity. And the new constitution has imposed further pressure toward crosscutting cleavage by banning ethnic parties and requiring broad ethnic representation in each party as a condition for formal recognition.

How much the resulting five parties really have transcended ethnicity has been a subject of lively political and scholarly debate. A common Nigerian interpretation compares each of the new parties to a predecessor in the First Republic and sees each as still "tribally" based. By this view, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), headed by President Shehu Shagari, is identified as a northern party, dominated by the Fulani aristocracy; the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), led by Chief Obafemi

Larry Diamond is assistant professor of sociology at Vanderbilt University. His visit to Nigeria in the summer of 1981 was funded by grants from the Vanderbilt University Research Council and the Institute for the Study of World Politics. In addition to his study of politics and social change in the Second Republic, he is currently completing a historical analysis of the failure of the First Republic.

Awolowo, is judged to be a Yoruba party, pure and simple; the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), headed by former Nigerian President Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, is seen as essentially an Igbo party; the Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP), created by a split in the original NPP, is said to be another northern party, based among the Kanuri people of Chairman Waziri Ibrahim's home state of Borno; and the People's Redemption Party (PRP) is seen as a party of the Hausa commoners in the far North, especially in Kano, the home state of the party's president, Malam Aminu Kano. This interpretation is further buttressed by the fact that all five of the above party leaders are political veterans of the First Republic. Chief Awolowo, Dr. Azikiwe, and Malam Aminu headed the earlier parties to which their current ones are compared; President Shagari and Alhaji Waziri were both federal ministers in the party from which the NPN is allegedly descended — the old Northern Peoples' Congress.

But the view that little has changed since 1966 is shallow. It fails to distinguish the mass electoral bases of the parties from their organizational and ideological characters. It fails to note the significant crosscutting trends in the 1979 elections. Most of all, it ignores the deep cleavages and divisions within each of the five parties, the irrevocable splits some of them have experienced, and the profound realignment toward which they are collectively moving.

Ethnicity was undeniably the key force in shaping voting behavior in 1979. All of the parties won in what were seen to be their ethnic bases. But the UPN and NPP each carried an important minority state as well, and four of the seven NPN victories came in ethnic minority states in the "Middle Belt" and the South, not the far North. Moreover, in both its organization and electoral performance, the NPN emerged as the first truly national party in Nigerian history, bringing together in its formation, and subsequently in the distribution of party and government power, not only "Fulani aristocrats" and Hausa men of wealth, but Yoruba, Igbo, and minority businessmen and professionals from every area of the country. The breadth of their political base and the collective weight of their personal wealth and energy showed in the 1979 election returns. The NPN won federal House seats in 16 of the 19 states and Senate seats in 12, and in every state but one, finished second in the presidential balloting if it did not finish first.

THE EMERGENCE OF ALLIANCES

It is precisely because of this diffuse political strength of the NPN that the parties in the opposition have been gradually forging a common front over the past two years. This cooperation began late in the 1979 election; indeed, it probably was the difference in electing a PRP governor in Kaduna State, where the NPN won almost two-thirds of the seats in the State House of Assembly. It has gathered particular force since the bitter and controversial challenge by the UPN to the outcome of the 1979 presidential election. In several unsuccessful legal suits, Chief Awolowo and his party contested the Federal Electoral Commission's declaration that Alhaji Shehu Shagari had obtained the required breadth of votes — "one-quarter of the vote in two-thirds" of the 19 states — to be elected president directly. Official bodies from the Commission of the Supreme Court interpreted this as meaning "twelve and two-thirds" states, or one-quarter of the vote in 12 states and two-thirds of one-quarter, or one-sixth, in the 13th state — just barely giving the NPN a first-ballot victory. Emphatically rejecting this interpretation, the UPN has never fully recognized the legitimacy of President Shagari's election, and the "twelve and two-thirds controversy" has served as the opening round in a continuing struggle between the two parties that has become only more bitter, more personal, and more polarized with time.

Increasingly over the last two years, politics have revolved around the rising tension between the NPN government and the UPN-led opposition. The unity of opposition forces has been forged by the so-called "Nine Progressive Governors"—the nine UPN, GNPP, and PRP state governors, who have been meeting almost every month since the inauguration in regular sessions around the country. Though emphasizing the intergovernmental character of their exchanges and denying any political alliance, the nine governors have been the chief rallying point for the opposition, whose dominant theme has been the NPN's alleged abuse of Federal power. The communique from their March meeting in Kano last year, typical of the increasingly strident tone of their attacks, charged 14 such abuses, including the appointment in each of the 19 states of presidential liaison officers, whom the opposition governors (including those in the NPP) have seen as rivals to their authority; the deportation (overturned in court) of Alhaji Darman Shugaba, GNPP majority leader of the Borno House of Assembly; and the federal monopoly of the mass media.

As opposition forces have been congealing, the ruling party has been extending its own political base. Through the first few months of the Second Republic, this was achieved primarily through a formal accord with the NPP, which ga[illegible] eight ministerial posts, as well as the speakership of the House and the deputy presidency of the Senate, in exchange for its cooperation with the NPN in the National Assembly. But this initial sharing out of federal power was virtually the only instance in which the accord worked as intended. Miffed over exclusion from the regular consultations on national policy it thought it had been promised, the NPP withheld legislative support on critical issues such as revenue allocation. Partly as a result of its growing noncooperation, its promised share of government appointments dwindled after inauguration. On July 6, 1981, NPP leaders gave notice of the party's intention to terminate the accord, and the NPN then swiftly called on it to do so with immediate effect.

As the accord has crumbled and finally disintegrated over the last two years, a patchwork of individual conversions and informal alliances stitched together by the NPN has assumed increasing significance. In the National Assembly, it has greatly enhanced legislative support for NPN programs, recouping in the Senate (though not in the House) the losses incurred by the breakdown of the accord. In a number of states, it has strengthened the NPN's political dominance, as in Cross River State, where three NPP figures of national prominence, including National Vice-Chairman Matthew Mbu, switched to the NPN a year ago. In the wake of the accord's formal collapse, it blunted its political impact, as two of the NPP's eight federal ministers refused to obey their party's orders to quit the government, bolting their party instead. The defection to the NPN of Minister of External Affairs Dr. Ishaya Audu was especially significant, given his rank within the cabinet and his status as the NPP vice-presidential nominee in 1979.

These individual defections from the NPP have been accompanied by the growing cooperation of important factions of the GNPP and PRP, irrevocably splitting each of these parties. In the case of the GNPP, this defiance of Chairman Waziri Ibrahim has resulted in the expulsion of seven of the eight GNPP senators, who have repudiated the chairman's authority and begun to organize an alternative party structure.

In the PRP, the roles have been reversed. Emphasizing the need for national unity and stability in the fragile early years of the new republic, the party's established leadership — including its president, Aminu Kano, and national secretary, S.G. Ikoku — has followed a policy of accommodation with the NPN, while the more radical faction — led by the two PRP governors, Mohammed Abubakar Rimi of Kano and Abdulkadir Balarabe Musa of Kaduna — has argued for direct confrontation with the "party of privilege" and formation of a united front of opposition against it. Their differences came to a head early in 1980 over the issue of the nine progressive governors, whose meetings the two governors insisted on attending, in defiance of directives from Malam Aminu and the PRP National Directorate. Out of the bewildering tangle of expulsions and lawsuits, parallel and bitterly opposed party structures have emerged. Because Aminu Kano's moderate faction has been recognized by the Federal Electoral Commission as the legitimate PRP, the radical faction is now formally in political limbo, though it contains the Kano and Kaduna State governments and a majority of PRP national legislators.

THE PATTERN OF POLITICAL CONFLICT

Over the past two years, a succession of political issues has deepened the cleavage between the alliances of the ruling party and the opposition and given increasing coherence to the disparate elements of the latter. Steadily over the past year, conflict has been reducing to a confrontation between these two alliances. Almost surely, this presages a major realignment of the party system in the months ahead. Quite possibly, it could mean the emergence of a two-party system.

The past year began in heated political controversy over the issue of revenue allocation, the eighth time in 35 years Nigeria has struggled to find a formula for distributing government revenue between levels of government and among the states. Though many lines of interest were evident in the debate, the conflict reduced to a struggle between the opposition and the ruling party over the distribution of revenue between the federal government and the states. The intensity of the issue came not simply from the substantive debate — which, predictably, found the NPN pushing for a larger share of revenue for the federal government than the other four parties wanted — but also from the procedure by which the NPN's position, embodied in the Senate bill, triumphed over the competing version passed in the House.

A Joint Finance Committee of the National Assembly, after endorsing the Senate bill by a margin of 13 to 11, forwarded it directly to the president, who signed it into law. Prominent opposition leaders furiously condemned this action, maintaining that the constitution required the bill first to be sent back to each House for approval. After months of heated dispute and litigation, the Nigerian Supreme Court upheld the constitutional objection of the opposition last October 2, and nullified the act.

The revenue allocation controversy has been significant for several reasons. The Supreme Court ruling was another indication that the judiciary is capable of bold and independent action, as the constitution intended and democracy requires. These assertions of judicial independence, and the ruling party's acceptance of them, are among the more hopeful signs for democracy in Nigeria. On the other hand, the issue became so heavily infused with the rancor of the larger struggle between gov-


Photo: Mike Wells/Camera Press

Lagos: "Nigeria is in the midst of a sweeping political transformation" ernment and opposition that it took the presence of police in the National Assembly last January to prevent violence between legislators disputing the composition of the Joint Finance Committee.

More significant than either of these developments, perhaps, was what the revenue allocation struggle portended in the way of party realignment. In both the National Assembly and in the positions of the state governments, the NPP stood with the three parties of the "Nine Progressive Governors." At the peak of the controversy last January, the three NPP governors joined their nine colleagues in a blistering attack on the NPN, denouncing not only the president's signing of the Revenue Allocation Act but also federal government obstruction of state TV stations, and warning ominously that the stage was "set for a repeat performance" of the tragedy of the First Republic.

It is not only the fact of a unifying opposition but also this marked escalation of its rhetoric that is important. As the opposition parties converge on a common position and the middle ground in Nigerian politics disappears, political feeling intensifies, the rhetoric of conflict becomes more extreme, trust between opposing forces diminishes, and the political stakes rise with each new contest. The process was evidenced dramatically in the events of last year.

If the revenue allocation controversy tore a gaping hole in the frayed fabric of the NPN-NPP accord, the Kaduna impeachment crisis finally ripped it to shreds. It is important to understand why this climax to the long, debilitating political stalemate in Kaduna State so vigorously mobilized national political alliances. On the surface, it was simply the culmination of 20 months of exhausting confrontation between the radical PRP governor, Balarabe Musa, and the conservative, NPN-dominated House of Assembly. The introduction of articles of impeachment by the latter early last May broke a tense impasse in which the Assembly four times rejected the governor's entire list of cabinet nominees, the governor signed virtually none of the Assembly's bills, and court cases mounted right and left. From the earliest months of the new administration, repeated efforts at outside mediation and recurrent pressure from the national parties for accommodation failed.

Nnamdi Azikiwe heads the Nigerian People's party, which broke its alliance with the ruling National party of Nigeria

But something deeper was involved than mere political intransigence. Underlying the political crisis in Kaduna was an escalating confrontation of class forces in the North. In Kano and Kaduna, and throughout the upper North in Nigeria, political and religious authority have historically been hierarchically organized in a network of Islamic emirates, or kingdoms. Economic development and local government reforms have eroded the formal power of the emirs and related nobility in the North, but social inequality remains substantial. NPN political leaders in the North concede there have been injustices in the past but believe the democratization of local government and their plans for improving agriculture and social services will bring reasonable progress. The radicals who form the core of the PRP—most of them *malams*, school teachers, college professors, and other professionals in their twenties, thirties and early forties — charge the rhetoric of the NPN is a sham. They claim the party stands for the defense of a status quo in the North that remains, for the average peasant, oppressive and unjust. They are attempting to organize the peasants and urban commoners of the North, not just to elect PRP candidates, but to demolish the privileged position of the hereditary elite.

The impeachment crisis in Kaduna was a chapter in this larger struggle for control of the far North. It reflected and heightened the contradiction between conservatives who speak of measured progress and young radicals who vow a sweeping social transformation. It similarly exposed the contradiction within the PRP between the moderate faction, which shuns confrontation, and the radicals, who believe, as they wrote in the PRP manifesto, that "the forces of privilege" and "the forces of the people" are now "locked in a grim struggle for survival and ascendancy."

The Balarabe Musa administration in Kaduna, and its sister government in Kano, pressed ahead with policies on taxes, land, and economic and social development designed to transform the existing order and to rally the peasantry against it politically. In Kano, a huge PRP majority in the House of Assembly gave Governor Rimi solid backing for these policy initiatives. In Kaduna, legislative opposition forced Governor Balarabe Musa either to negotiate compromises or to act unilaterally. Repeatedly he chose the latter, and it was this trail of acts that constituted the 10 articles of impeachment. But the impeachment process, and the dramatic vote to remove him from office last June 22, were not fundamentally about constitutional issues. As Mohammed Haruna observed in the federal government-owned *New Nigerian* shortly after the impeachment, "It is . . . not logical to expect the NPN to fold its arms and just watch on while Balarabe rams away at the pillars of its power, namely land and the emirate system."

It is not only Balarabe Musa and the radical PRP who favor a transformation of the social order in the North. Since the inception of competitive politics under British colonial rule 30 years ago, southern progressives have viewed the political and social dominance of the hereditary elite in the North as a brake upon national progress. The old regional system — which enabled

Photo: Mike Wells/Camera Press

Governor Rimi's "query" of the Emir of Kano (*left center, dressed in white*) sparked the riot in July

northern traditional elites to control the federation by controlling its most populous region, the North — is gone. But the states of the far North continue to wield enormous power, and Fulanis of noble birth again hold positions of high rank within the ruling party and the federal government, including the presidency. Resistance of their prominence in national affairs constitutes an important undercurrent in the opposition of the UPN and other "progressives," and a revealing clue to why the Kaduna impeachment was so fully drawn into the vortex of national political conflict.

Beyond this, the impeachment of Balarabe Musa represented for the opposition parties another instance of abuse of power by the NPN. Opposition politicians believe the swift impeachment exercise — from which Balarabe Musa stood aloof as he appealed in vain for judicial relief — was unconstitutional and undemocratic. Not only the UPN and GNPP, but the NPP as well, denounced the process in their newspapers and publicity organs, and sent teams of lawyers to aid the embattled governor. The problem may have been more with the constitution itself — which defines an impeachable offense as whatever two-thirds of a House of Assembly says it is. But this did not diminish the moral indignation that rose as the process sped toward a climax and drew the opposition parties together more closely than any previous issue. It was only two weeks after Balarabe Musa's removal from office that the NPP announced its termination of the accord in a stinging attack that echoed strikingly, in both substance and tone, the March indictment by the "Nine Progressive Governors."

Indeed, the stunning events of last summer followed rapidly upon one another. Hardly had the dramatic news of the accord's termination settled in when, days later, crisis once more erupted in the heart of the North. On July 10, much of the government of Kano State — including the Secretariat (housing five critical ministries), the State House of Assembly, and Radio Kano — was set afire and destroyed in a devastating riot. Also burned were the headquarters of the radical PRP, the site (still under construction) of the state government's new newspaper publishing company, and the residences of many high officials in Governor Rimi's administration, including that of his chief political adviser, Dr. Bala Mohammed, who died in the blaze.

The riot came in reaction to Governor Rimi's terse and impolitic "query" of the emir of Kano, charging nine acts of deliberate disrespect to the state government and giving the emir 48 hours to show cause why he should not be disciplined. But two very different explanations of it have been advanced, coinciding with the lines of national political conflict. Conservatives in the North, and newspapers around the country sympathetic to the NPN, explain the riot as a spontaneous and emotional reaction of the people of Kano to the attempted humiliation of a venerated traditional and religious leader. Politicians and newspapers associated with the opposition, and especially the radical PRP leaders who were the targets of the arson, insist the "query" was merely a cover for a political attack on the Kano government by its enemies in the NPN and the opposing wing of the PRP. They charge the riot was an orchestrated effort to accomplish through violence what could not be done in Kano through impeachment.

The motives of the riot may never be definitively established, but what matters is what people believe, how the crisis is incorporated into the guiding myths of national political conflict. For the NPN and the moderate PRP, the Kano riot signals that the radicals have misjudged the masses and overreached themselves in attacking traditional institutions. By this logic, their political obliteration in the next election can only follow. (In this regard, the significance of Malam Aminu Kano's visit to Katsina last July to pay his respects to the new emir, one of Nigeria's most important traditional rulers, must not be missed.) For the opposition parties, the Kano riot signifies instead an ominous escalation of the necessary confrontation with the "forces of privilege and reaction" in the North. Many politicians in the UPN, the NPP, and the GNPP have taken it as a sign of violence and obstruction to come along the way to the 1983 election. More deeply shaken, the PRP radicals have concluded that the privileged elite in the North will use any means necessary to defend its position, and that their struggle for a social transformation may cost them their lives.

THE NIGERIAN POLITICAL FUTURE

Whatever the actual causes of the Kano riot, its effect has been to heighten the polarization of politics between government and opposition that has been steadily gathering through the first two years of the Second Republic. What is the meaning of this for the future of Nigerian politics?

Two broad trends can be discerned. The first may be considered propitious: ethnicity is being displaced as the organizing force of politics. The primary political conflicts of the Second Republic have taped other lines of cleavage. Underlying the conflicts in Kano and Kaduna has been the growing contradiction between class forces in the North. This is not limited to the North; it was evidenced in a general strike last May and in other instances of labor militancy around the country, as well as in rising concern among politicians and commentators on the left about the growing gap between rich and poor in Nigeria. Related to this are basic differences in ideology that separate in particular the PRP and UPN, whose platforms are socialist and social democratic respectively, from the NPN, which favors larger roles for private ownership and foreign capital, and a more cautious and gradual approach to the expansion of social services. This ideological cleavage has been basic to the political struggle in the North, and to the opposition of the "Nine Progressive Governors." Overlapping with these have been the lines of pragmatic party interest, which have been moving the NPP ever more emphatically into the opposition, and which, along with the particular economic interests of

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states, shaped the various stands on revenue allocation. In a number of states controlled by opposition parties — for example, Ondo (in the West), Anambra (in the East), and Borno (in the North) — strong NPN branches are pressing vigorous political challenges. While subethnic rivalry is sometimes involved, the important fact is that these conflicts cut across the broad ethnic divisions that dominated politics in the First Republic.

Though ethnicity remains the most basic current of division and conflict in Nigerian society, and though it will likely be the most important determinant of mass voting behavior in 1983, its salience in politics is likely to continue to recede. Beyond the political momentum of the other sources of cleavage is the gradual passing from active politics of the old generation of political leaders, who evoke the strongest ethnic identifications, positive and negative. Of the two of the First Republic's "big three" who remain (northern Premier Sir Ahmadu Bello was killed in the 1966 coup), Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe is highly unlikely to seek national office in 1983. His withdrawal, combined with the NPN's likely renomination of Dr. Alex Ekwueme, whose performance as vice-president has earned wide respect, may well produce the most evenly balanced competition for Igbo votes in the history of Nigerian politics, particularly because the leading NPP presidential contender is not an Igbo, but the popular Plateau State governor, Solomon Lar.

This leaves Chief Awolowo. No figure in Nigerian politics evokes such fervent support and such intense political enmity as the UPN leader. No presidential condidate in 1979 drew such overwhelming support in his ethnic homeland, and such widespread opposition as a "tribalist" outside it. Perhaps the most articulate public figure and most able administrator in modern Nigerian history, he has also been the most determined and ambitious politician. Nigerians have difficulty imagining his withdrawing voluntarily. But leading politicians in the PRP, GNPP, and NPP have difficulty imagining a four-party merger so long as he insists on running for president. Significantly, powerful pressure is building for the first time within his own party to urge him to step down.

Should he do so, a four-party merger — uniting the UPN with the bulk of the NPP and the left wings of the GNPP and PRP — would be likely. The obstacles to such a union should not be minimized. Substantial differences in program and ideology separate the NPP and PRP platforms in particular, and even with Chief Awolowo joining Dr. Azikiwe as a grand patron of the new political union, intense competion for its leadership would be inevitable. UPN Governors Lateef Jakande of Lagos State and Bola Ige of Oyo State, as well as Governors Lar of Plateau State and Rimi of Kano State, would probably be the leading contenders. Many other articulate and attractive candidates, including Governors Jim Nwobodo (NPP) in Anambra and Mohammed Goni (GNPP) in Borno, and Senators Obi Wali (NPP) and Jonathan Odebiyi (UNP), would also figure to be considered for a spot on the national ticket.

As in American politics, delicate and difficult dimensions of political balance will present themselves. In particular, a balance between North and South, and between Muslim and non-Muslim, may be essential for success. A ticket that reversed the normal combination of this balance, joining Governor Lar, a northern (Middle Belt) Christian with strong ties both to the Hausa heartland and to the Igbo states, with Governor Jakande, a southern (Yoruba) Muslim who has been a leading voice among the "Nine Progessive Governors," might press a formidable challenge in the next election.

Probably only a formidable ticket and an alliance of the four parties can offer the opposition a reasonable chance of victory in 1983. In addition to all the typical advantages of incumbency, the NPN will boast thorough organization and, as the party most closely associated with Nigerian business, superior finance. It will renominate a president who is regarded by many Nigerians as competent and earnest, by most as honest and sincere, and who is given much credit internationally for moderation and restraint in the face of substantial provocation from Nigeria's neighbors.

Should the opposition merge into a single party, a rather evenly balanced and unpredictable contest is likely. For this very reason, realignment into essentially a two-party system is also likely. Such a realignment is the great promise of Nigerian politics and the longtime dream of many Nigerian politicians and thinkers. It is also the great danger.

This raises the second trend, which is not auspicious. Throughout the country, bitterness, distrust, and violence between partisans of the two broad alliances are on the rise. Thoughtful Nigerians, both in and out of politics, worry that politics are already becoming too polarized. They fear that two-party systems too easily descend into crisis and paralysis and too easily reduce to one-party systems.

Whether a two-party system would be more or less stable, it is clear that polarization of politics around ethnicity is not the only danger to democracy. To a striking degree, Nigerian politicians are agreed that the chief danger to democracy is intolerance of opposition, whatever its basis — the unwillingness to give opposing interests a fair hearing and opposing parties a fair chance, the refusal to play by the rules of the game, the reluctance to risk defeat.

As the realignment of politics proceeds and the contest for power in 1983 draws nearer, the pressure upon the politicians will intensify. Should they be able to eschew the thuggery, obstruction, and fraud that disfigured the democratic process in the First Republic; should the 1983 election end in an outcome accepted as fair and legitimate by all parties, whichever one triumphs, a foundation will have been laid for democratic competition in Nigeria for many years to come. On the other hand, should the election campaign descend into the chaos that attended the struggle between the two grand alliances in 1964-65, it is unlikely that the Nigerian military will wait even as long as it did then to step in. During the next 20 months, how the game is played will be more important for democracy in Nigeria, and in Africa, than who wins and who loses. □

Uneasy Partners

BY AARON SEGAL

During the Carter administration, Nigerian-American official relations were excellent, a dramatic turnaround from the open differences over U.S. involvement in Angola in 1975, and the unwillingness of Lagos to receive then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Between 1977 and 1980, first President Jimmy Carter and then Vice-President Walter Mondale visited Nigeria and, in October 1980, Nigerian President Shehu Shagari reciprocated with a visit to the United States. Hundreds of lesser Nigerian politicians grappling with their new democratic federal system have toured the U.S. for pointers. Trade was brisk, cultural exchanges and relations lively, at least 20,000 Nigerians were studying in the U.S., and all seemed well. Yet beneath the surface there was a growing unease that has become explicit and manifest during the first year of President Reagan's term.

Four misunderstandings divide Lagos and Washington and generate this atmosphere of unease. The first and apparently the most serious concerns whether and how far Nigeria might go in using its oil as a lever to pressure U.S. action on southern Africa. Washington prefers to believe, more so under Reagan than Carter, that Lagos is bluffing about the use of the oil weapon, while Lagos insists that it is not. The evidence is mixed since the Nigerian government nationalized British Petroleum (BP) oil holdings in 1979 ostensibly for an illegal sale of Nigerian oil to South Africa, and then allowed British-owned BP to re-enter the country in 1981. U.S.-owned Caltex, Standard, and Mobil are particulary vulnerable, with refineries in South Africa and drilling and other operations in Nigeria.

The second misunderstanding concerns whether Nigeria is an oil-rich nation with a talented population of over 80 million and considerable natural resources (the U.S. view), or a very poor nation with a large and growing population and rapidly depleting nonrenewable resources. As a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Nigeria is by U.S. law not eligible for concessional as opposed to fully reimbursable assistance. The prevailing view in Washington is that Nigeria is flush with oil and petrodollars and should pay full cost for whatever it wants from the United States. Nigeria argues that as a poor country, it should be eligible for aid.

The rich versus poor misunderstanding is related to the huge U.S. deficit — over $9 billion in 1980 — in its trade with Nigeria. Washington would like to see Nigeria rapidly increase its private sector and government purchases from the United States. Nigeria prefers to buy from all comers while encouraging U.S. firms to invest in joint manufacturing and agribusiness ventures. American businessmen claim that Nigerian bureaucracy and corruption make doing business difficult. Nigerians claim that U.S. exporters are reluctant to take Nigerian agents and partners. Meanwhile, Nigeria, 99 percent of whose sales to the U.S. consist of oil, has surpassed Japan as the principal source of the overall U.S. visible trade deficit.

The fourth misunderstanding concerns the rate at which Nigeria should be extracting its oil and natural gas and the price it should be asking for it. The U.S. would like Nigeria to maintain high production levels of its quality, low-sulphur crude and to charge prices at or below the OPEC minimum levels. Since Nigeria is second only to Saudi Arabia as a source of U.S. imported oil, and Nigerian oil is considered to be low in transport cost across the Atlantic, of high quality, and politically safe from Middle East conflicts, the United States quietly favors Nigeria in the role of an OPEC dissident.

Faced with a drastic reduction in world petroleum demand during much of 1981, Nigeria dramatically reduced production from 2 million to 800,000 barrels per day, and only reluctantly

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Photo: Michael Evans/The White House

Presidents Shagari and Reagan during the summit in Cancun, Mexico in October

and under tremendous pressure from loss of revenue began in August 1981 to cut prices. The Nigerian preference is for higher prices and low production of a nonrenewable resource that may be rapidly running out. Since the United States consumes about 50 percent of all Nigerian oil production, its pressure for higher production and lower prices runs directly counter to Nigerian objectives.

These four misunderstandings have been around for many years but have grown worse during the conservative Reagan administration. Nigerian-U.S. political relations have had their ups and downs since Nigerian independence in 1960. An alleged U.S. tilt towards Biafra and a refusal to sell arms strained relations during the Nigerian civil war and the administration of President Richard Nixon. Nigerian support for the Angolan MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and opposition to U.S. covert or overt intervention brought relations to a low point in 1975-76, later to be retrieved by the skillful diplomacy of Andrew Young, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and others. In spite of the cordial exchanges and visits under Carter, little of substance was accomplished. A number of bilateral commissions and an annual meeting of vice-presidents was initiated and has been continued under Reagan.

The core of the political problem is what to do about South Africa. President Shagari declared in October 1980 that "the U.S. believes that apartheid South Africa can be talked into stopping its nefarious practices against mankind. I believe it can never be talked into changing. There must be boycotts of all dealings with it. I cannot rule out using our oil or anything else."

The emphasis of the Reagan administration on persuasion rather than coercion with South Africa, the failure to condemn South African military incursions in Angola and Mozambique, and the dismantling of the UN plan for transfer of power in Namibia have caused considerable anguish in Nigeria. At the UN Security Council, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and elsewhere, Nigeria has condemned U.S. policies and called for sanctions against South Africa. As Africa's most important state led by a moderate and cautious government, Nigeria's opposition to U.S. policies has had a wide impact. Discussion of use of an oil weapon has been curtailed by apparent world surpluses, but Nigeria has turned to other possible threats to influence Washington. These include possible African boycotts of the 1984 Olympics scheduled for Los Angeles.

Meanwhile, Nigeria continues to sell to the U.S. six to seven times as much by value as it buys. U.S. exports to Nigeria in 1980 were valued at $1.149 billion, with imports at $10.95 billion — 99 percent being oil. Nigeria's traditional agricultural exports (cocoa, palm oil, and groundnuts) are taking a beating, in part due to an overvalued currency. The United States has emerged as a major supplier of the $1.5 billion in agricultural products imported by Nigeria in 1980, especially rice, dairy products, wheat, and sugar. Yet the U.S. has less than 10 percent of the Nigerian import market, lagging behind the United Kingdom and West Germany.

The U.S. Department of Commerce, in an April 1979 report on marketing in Nigeria, underlined some of the problems that face American and other exporters: "All foreign business representatives face the same situations — endless negotiations, considerable prepayment for services anticipated, and administrative delays — in dealing with

Nigerian customers." The report adds that "Nigeria's tender system, a disjointed and irregular relic of colonial days, is the method by which goods and services are procured on the federal and state levels."

Royalties require difficult-to-obtain Ministry of Finance approval, and franchising is impeded by the "absence of a legal or regulatory framework governing fees, royalties, payments, and protection of parties to an agreement." The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees of 1972 and 1977 require a minimum of 40 percent Nigerian participation in all companies operating in the country, reserve certain enterprises such as passenger buses exclusively to Nigerians, and require 60 percent Nigerian ownership in certain other ventures. Finally, the American businessman in Nigeria is subject to a much stricter U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act than any of his competitors.

Selling to or doing business in Nigeria is no picnic. Few U.S. firms except for the seven oil companies have been willing to invest the time and capital to penetrate the Nigerian market. The termination of U.S. government aid to Nigeria in 1974 has also ruled out the kinds of combined aid, credit, and trade projects that the Japanese and others favor.

Since 1977, the two governments have explored a number of potentially attractive investment areas such as solar energy, development of Nigerian coal, low-cost housing, and agribusinesses, such as rice growing. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical has established a model farm north of Lagos, and the Reagan administration has organized meetings between Nigerians and several major U.S. agribusiness firms, but reluctance persists to invest or even to establish distribution and service facilities. Also pending for several years has been a major U.S. investment in liquefaction of Nigerian natural gas for export, a deal dependent on world, Nigerian, and U.S. domestic gas and oil prices.

One way of partially redressing the lopsided trade would be through arms sales. Nigeria has deliberately limited the purchase of sophisticated weaponry while maintaining an army of over 100,000 men swollen in numbers by the civil war. The U.S. has never sold offensive equipment to Nigeria and its involvement has been confined to military training missions and to the supply of C-130 transport aircraft. The $125 billion 1981-86 Development Plan budgets $6.4 billion for the military, in part a response to Libyan intervention in neighboring Chad. Shortfalls in petroleum revenue may sharply cut Nigerian arms purchases. High-technology U.S. weapons systems would in any instance be hard for Nigeria to absorb.


Photo: Gulf Oil Corp.

Nigerian oil rig worker: How far will Nigeria go in using oil as a lever?

Often overlooked in the discussions over trade balances are Nigerian-U.S. educational and cultural exchanges. Out of an estimated 60,000 Nigerians studying abroad at least 20,000 are in the United States, a majority paying their own way. Engineering, the sciences, and business are the preferred subjects. Whether privately supported or on government scholarships, the Nigerian students make a substantial financial and intellectual contribution to the United States which, in turn, provides a higher education for one out of every five Nigerian university students and nearly half of all Nigerian postgraduate students. Several hundred Americans are currently teaching in Nigeria at all levels, a sharp drop from the 1960s when the Peace Corps provided secondary school staff and the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) supported extensive exchanges between universities such as Michigan State and Nsukka.

The brain drain has not been an issue in Nigerian-U.S. relations. The Nigerian Universities Office for North America, located in Washington, reports that in 1980 it was able to recruit 500 faculty members, mostly Nigerians completing their studies in the United States. Even those Nigerians who actively supported the Biafran cause while remaining in the U.S. have returned home for visits or to accept permanent posts.

Nigerian-American cultural exchanges have blossomed, fostered by the Museum of Nigerian Art, the Nigerian-American Friendship Society, and the African-American Institute. The Treasures of Nigerian Art's stunning exhibit attracted hundreds of thousands of visitors in Detroit, New York, and Washington. Playwrite and poet Wole Soyinka, whose works are often performed in the United States, has become a frequent visitor. Touring Nigerian musicians and actors have also found favor. Black American music and musicians remain immensely popular in Nigeria as witnessed by the reception for the U.S. delegation at the 1976 Nigerian Black Arts Festival. Tennis players such as Arthur Ashe and other American athletes have also been welcomed. And, finally, Babatunde Olatunji, composer, drummer, and orchestra leader, has returned to Nigeria to enter politics, after spending 20 years performing Nigerian music in the United States.

American investment in Nigeria has lagged substantially behind cultural and educational exchanges. Although total U.S. investment is around $450 million, still below the figure for U.S. investments in South Africa, most of it is found in petroleum while 300 major U.S. corporations have established operations in South Africa. The Nigerian government is anxious to increase the value added from its diminishing petroleum by increasing its limited refining capabilities and initiating petrochemical manufacturing. Few U.S. firms have shown interest, given the requirement that the Nigerian National Oil Corporation hold a majority of shares in any new venture. American firms maintain that without a guarantee of higher Nigerian oil production and an exportable surplus that investment in refining and petrochemicals is unattractive.

The Nigerian government has expanded the size of its limited domestic market by taking the lead in establishing the Economic Community of West African States, a regional preferential trading area. Thus manufacturing plants based in Nigeria now enjoy a trade advantage in a rapidly growing regional market. Yet American firms have not been tempted by the possibilities of regional or national import substitution for consumer goods. The problems of doing business in Nigeria seem to outweigh the potential for most U.S. corporations that have examined the situation.

More than 60 percent of U.S. exports to Nigeria consist of high-technology items such as airplanes, telecommunications equipment, and electronics. Subsidiaries of U.S. firms and Nigerian licensees and franchisers are often the importers. The evidence indicates that the U.S. advantage continues to lie in high technology, including agribusiness, rather than in light manufacturing or assembly operations such as automobiles.

The Nigerianization of business, often through combined government and private sector holdings, was substantially completed during the 1970s. The 1980s are expected to be the decade in which Nigeria initiates manufacturing for export (principally refined petroleum, petrochemicals, and consumer durables) to its West African neighbors. It is also a crucial period for increasing Nigerian production of foodstuffs lest a food import bill that has already grown to $1.5 billion annually become unmanageable, politically as well as economically.

Nigeria's imperative task for the next decade will be to extend and consolidate the science and technology infrastructure that was begun in the 1960s with the establishment of new universities and government research institutes. Nigeria needs not just to import technology but to adapt and innovate in order to respond to its own needs. Turnkey projects in which foreigners do all the design work and off-the-shelf proven technology, no matter how convenient, will not do the job. Nigeria needs during the 1980s to acquire its own research and development capabilities and the U.S. should be an active collaborator in that effort.

Nigeria has unique *in situ* agricultural and mineral resources that cannot be developed without technological innovation, adaptation, and improvisation. Organizations such as the U.S. Soil Conservation Service should be used to train Nigerians in soil mapping, not to do the mapping itself. Technology transfers from the United States need to ensure a strong "software" element to train Nigerian human resources.

Similarly, Nigeria must begin now to prepare for the day when the oil and gas run out and the country will have to rely on its own brain-power. Although Nigeria invests about one-third of its federal and state budgets in education at all levels, there has been little planning for a post–fossil fuels era. The growing U.S. experience with solar, geothermal, low-head hydropower, and other alternative technologies needs to be made available to Nigerians.

Present high-technology transfers to Nigeria suffer from horrendous problems of maintenance and service. Nigeria needs hands-on adaptation of imported technologies. Nigerians need to learn to maintain and to repair high-technology imports, to effect improvements in equipment when needed, and to encourage shopfloor innovation and increased efficiency.

Finally, with its youthful population and growing demands for employment, Nigeria needs much more labor-intensive technologies than are generally available in the United States. Whether mini-tractors or biogas digesters, these technologies should be the product of local research.

The major opportunity for the United States to reduce its trade deficit with Nigeria is through U.S. involvement in the Nigerianization of technology. As Nigeria moves to legislate control of technology transfers, U.S. firms can anticipate and cooperate with these moves by investing in Nigerian research and development facilities. These investments will generate even further imports of U.S. high-technology and accompanying services. U.S. firms can increase their usefulness to Nigeria and their profitability by participating in the establishment of Nigerian research capabilities, especially in agribusiness. A possible goal would be for each of the U.S. multinationals with $10 million or more invested in Nigeria to establish a local research center, affiliated where possible with a Nigerian university or technical college.

The debate over whether Nigeria is rich or poor stems from the 1974 U.S. legislation denying aid and trade preferences to OPEC member states. With per capita incomes estimated at $600 in 1980, Nigeria and Indonesia are the poorest of the 14 OPEC members, and also two countries that stood by the U.S. during the 1973 oil embargo. Nor is Nigeria readily classified as a "middle-income" country alongside more economically developed and mature states such as Mexico and Singapore.

Current U.S. public and political dislikes for foreign aid make any change in the 1974 law unlikely. Instead, AID in Nigeria has utilized for several years the loophole of "reimbursable" services to provide a $4 to $5 million per year technical assistance program, paid for in the end by Nigeria. Thus, public sector technology such as health care or education is treated as if it were proprietary technology, only to be transferred when the user can pay full costs. This position loses the U.S. trade to competitors willing to mix credits, aid, and business, confuses the private and public sectors, and fails to recognize the very real poverty of many Nigerian state and local governments, and the enormous pressures on federal funds.

Reimbursable services have been used to train Nigerian customs and immigration officers in the U.S., to fund visits to Nigeria of U.S. environmental experts, and for an ambitious 1978-80

Nigeria hopes that a growing number of American firms will invest

program to educate Nigerian technicans at U.S. community colleges combined with a "supervised occupational experience" in the United States. The use of reimbursable programs has been limited by the lack of U.S. export credits for such efforts, the reluctance of some U.S. government agencies to provide such services overseas, problems involved in working out actual costs, and AID financing and staffing difficulties. There have been discussions concerning reimbursable services for U.S. Soil Conservation Service Staff, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for river basin work, U.S. university planners for new Nigerian universities, and other undertakings.

Saudi Arabia is the prime user of U.S. government technical assistance through reimbursable services, purchasing everything from national park planners to government procurement officers. The Saudis purchase U.S. government services through the U.S. Treasury on a long-term basis; the Nigerians have preferred an ad hoc process.

After several years of fitful experience with reimbursable services, both sides have come to recognize its inadequacies. Instead, it has been proposed that Nigeria and the United States should establish a binational fund or foundation with a flexible funding formula that could support, through joint decisions, mutually beneficial activities. Nigeria and the United States could, for instance, each provide 50 percent of an initial $50 million fund, while each project supported by the fund could have its own formula. The device of joint funds is used by the U.S. to support scientific cooperation with Israel and Yugoslavia where the results have been excellent.

A proposed Nigeria-U.S. foundation could do a better job of matching Nigerian needs and U.S. capabilities than the present AID reimbursable services program. For example, funds could be used to provide Nigerian students in the United States with hands-on repair and maintenance experience with equipment being introduced to Nigeria. As Nigeria develops its graduate schools and programs, linkage arrangements could be funded with U.S. institutions to provide for exchanges of staff, postdoctoral research, and other opportunities. Similarly, a Nigeria-U.S. foundation could match U.S. community and technical colleges with Nigeria's greatest manpower need for middle-level training in polytechnics and technical colleges. Science education at the secondary and primary school levels and continuing education for adults are other areas in which a rich and productive U.S. experience could be made available through flexible funding to Nigerians. Other significant opportunities exist in fields such as health, urban planning, and agriculture.

As proposed, a Nigeria-U.S. foundation would need considerable autonomy based on an initial endowment from both governments and other contributors. It would be able to support projects in Nigeria, the U.S., or both countries. It could "top up" or augment salaries for Americans in Nigeria, provide workshops and work experience for Nigerian students in the United States, and supplement Nigerian resources to contract for American services. It would not replace reimbursable services or foreign aid. Instead it would commit the resources of both countries to mutually agreed projects partly funded out of a common source, rather than separate government budgets. It could resolve the problem of who should pay for what by asking both sides to jointly support meritorious projects for which Nigeria is unable or unwilling to pay full cost. Much of the expenditure would be for American goods and services. Administration of the foundation would be binational as is the case with many of the present U.S. Fulbright Commissions for educational exchange.

Under President Reagan, Lagos and Washington have sharply clashed over what to do about southern Africa. These clashes will probably continue, adding to the long-term misunderstandings over trade, aid, and, in particular, petroleum. Differences over how much petroleum Nigeria should produce and what proportion it should sell to the U.S. at what price should be taken as seriously as conflicts in votes at the UN.

Nigeria earned nearly $24 billion from petroleum in 1980. Its foreign exchange reserves average between $7 and $8 billion, and its external debts are well-balanced and manageable, with U.S. banks very minor debt-holders. Nigeria has been an OPEC price-leader, pushing production to 2.2 million barrels a day in June 1980 and prices to $40 a barrel. It is arguable that Nigeria has been experiencing a case of "petroleum indigestion" and that 1981's lower prices, production levels, and earnings brought about by world market conditions and Saudi Arabian pressure may be beneficial in the long run.

The U.S. sees Nigeria, together with Mexico and Venezuela, as the principal sources of imported oil for the U.S. that are largely "immune" to actual or potential conflict in the Middle East. It would like to reduce its present imports from Libya and replace them with politically safer sources. Thus, in the fall of 1981, Washington placed a five-year contract with Mexico to supply the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and made its pleasure known as Nigeria finally dropped its price to $36 a barrel in defiance of Algeria, Libya, and other OPEC "hard-liners."

While Washington wants high production and low prices from Lagos, Lagos has had problems defining its own objectives. The need for further offshore and inland exploration is imperative, but there are doubts about the actual and future size of Nigerian oil and gas reserves. Most of present production is from 5,000 to 10,000 barrel-a-day wells, unlike the 50,000 barrel-a-day and up Libyan, Mexican, and Saudi supergiants. There are extensive deposits of low-grade coal and some other minerals, but Nigeria is largely unprepared for the day when the oil and gas run out. Previous policies based on high production and high prices may have come permanently unstuck in 1981.

Oil has brought about a private and public sector spending splurge, galloping inflation, accelerated the rural exodus, generated rapid economic growth, and decimated agriculture. The elected civilian government has sought to carefully slow but not stop the oil-fueled economic boom. Like its military predecessor, it has been subject to enormous public expectations and demands. The U.S. as the major client has acted in support of those demands. During the 1980s, Nigeria will need to do a better job of husbanding its non-renewable sources. This in turn may involve producing less than the United States would like, and selling to willing buyers whomever they may be.

Nigeria and the U.S. are uneasy partners. The partnership could dissolve or disintegrate. It could also become firmer and more broadly based. Much will depend on how Lagos and Washington handle the misunderstandings. The Reagan administration needs to offer initiatives on Namibia and South Africa if it seeks to avoid Nigerian disillusionment. Nigeria must carefully nudge the U.S. through its oil weapon without precipitating a crisis. Both sides may wish to avoid forcing the United States to choose between Nigeria and South Africa.

The trade imbalance will not be quickly rectified, especially as the Reagan administration cuts the budget and authority of the U.S. Export-Import Bank. U.S. firms will be even more reluctant to invest in Nigeria without some form of U.S. government support. The worsening bilateral trade balance is not a major problem for two healthy economies with favorable global balances. It could become a problem in a recession where the U.S. adopts protectionist measures, opposed so far by the Reagan free-traders.

The Reagan cuts in bilateral and multilateral aid make the prospects of working out a U.S.-Nigeria understanding on a flexible aid formula unlikely. Without such an initiative, reimbursable services will continue to be inadequate and lost Nigerian-U.S. opportunities for cooperation will abound. Limiting U.S. inputs to proprietary transfers of technology and full-cost services simply prevents Americans and Nigerians from working together in many mutually beneficial areas.

It can be argued that a reduction in oil production and a diversification of exports is in the interest of both countries. The present lopsided and potentially explosive interdependence would be eased if the U.S. bought, for example, 10 percent of its imported oil from Nigeria rather than the 20 percent of 1980, and Nigeria sold one-third rather than one-half of its oil to the United States. The likelihood is that the present volatile mix of oil and politics will continue and perhaps even grow. During the next three years the uneasy partnership may become an unhappy one. □

The Way Ahead for Agriculture

BY ANNE BOLSOVER

Agriculture has always been the basis of the Nigerian economy. Eighty percent of the total work force is engaged in it, producing yams, cassava, plaintains, rice, beans, sugarcane, and citrus fruits to feed the population, and cocoa, oil palm produce, groundnuts, rubber, cotton, and timber as raw materials for local industries as well as export. Under the last military government, "Operation Feed the Nation" aimed to bring Nigeria towards self-sufficiency, and the aims of the so-called Green Revolution under the present civilian government are extremely ambitious.

Recently, a Nigerian government statement on agricultural policy pointed to "the need to increase agricultural output substantially as a weapon against malnutrition and a means of improving the standard of living of every Nigerian." Much money has therefore been spent on providing farmers with fertilizers, pesticides, and other agricultural inputs at heavily subsidized prices. In addition, tractor hire services and land development schemes are being expanded at government expense as an additional contribution to agricultural production. The Nigerian Agricultural Bank, with headquarters in Kaduna in the north of the country, has been established to grant loans, both directly and indirectly, to farmers. The bank also aims to open branches in various parts of the country to bring its services closer to the people. Mixed farming loans enable small-scale farmers and farm institute graduates to borrow up to $1,500, repayable in four years at an interest rate of 4 percent. The Modern Farming Loan allows farmers to either borrow tractors for a four-year period or to purchase them with a 20 percent government subsidy.

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Nigeria's Agriculture Minister Alhaji Ibrahim Gusau: The Green Revolution's target is self-sufficiency in food and cash crops

Nigeria's minister of agriculture, Alhaji Ibrahim Gusau, told me how he saw the Green Revolution: "The Green Revolution means that we should strive to bring Nigeria back to its position in the past where we were able to feed ourselves and we were able to export cash crops all over the world. This is not the case now because 10 years ago oil was found and people started to migrate to the urban areas and farmers found other jobs. Now we must use oil resources to reactivate and revitalize agriculture. We spent a year planning and started operations in 1981." The minister told me that the whole operation had been carefully planned. The target is self-sufficiency in food crops in the next five years and in cash crops in the next seven years, and huge amounts of money will be injected into agriculture to achieve this. Minister Gusau said that the whole country is going to spend about $14.3 billion over the next five years, with the money to be drawn from both private and public sectors. The federal government is to contribute about $5.3 billion of this total, and the 19 state governments around $3.75 billion, with the rest coming from the general public and other interested parties.

The aims of the Green Revolution and the amount of money being made

Fertilizer distribution center at Gusau: The government emphasizes improving agricultural inputs to increase production

available for its success may seem impressive, but what is more impressive is that the federal government has learned from the mistakes of the past. Then agricultural policy sought to increase cultivable areas rather than raising the productivity per man and per unit of the area cultivated by the subsistence farmers who in fact account for over 90 percent of Nigeria's total agricultural output. The Green Revolution aims to improve productivity through improved inputs. Previously, the main inputs were labor and land, while seeds, tools, and animals were often unimproved. The federal government takes fertilizer consumption as a rough index for measuring the level of modernization of production. Significantly, this remains on average very low, at less than two kilograms of plant nutrients per hectare of cultivated land. Minister Gusau told me that, last year, $142.5 million was spent on fertilizer alone, and half this cost to the farmers will be subsidized by the government. They also bought tractors, insecticides, and other natural inputs to be sold to the farmers at half the cost price. But the farmers themselves must be educated to understand the need for Nigeria's self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, for up until the present, even when modern methods were used, their output was still utilized primarily as cash/export crops as opposed to food crops.

It is easy for the Nigerian federal government to speak of nationwide plans, but not as easy to chart overall successes or failures. But a project like the $135 million Kadawa irrigation project presently underway in Kano State is an indication of just how much effort Nigeria is putting into the future of agriculture. Already the irrigation area has been expanded from 1,500 acres to about 15,000 acres. The state government hopes to add 5,000 acres annually until the entire 45,000 acres of the project are under irrigation. The main crops grown are wheat, tomatoes, and maize, and according to the project's manager, if it continues successfully, the project will be able to supply at least 50 percent of the country's requirements for wheat and 100 percent of its needs for tomatoes and vegetables. He described the project as one "executed for the farmer and by the farmer," where the authority develops farm lands, provides irrigation facilities and inputs, and then returns the land to the farmer. The staff running the project is spread all over the area covered by the scheme and gives advice to groups of farmers on how to go about their work and utilize new methods and equipment. The authority's machines, such as tractors and combine harvesters, are also made available to the farmers, although some farmers harvest manually as well. From interviews with some of the farmers, it was found that about 20 bags of wheat are harvested per acre, while 1,200 to 1,400 kerosene tins of tomatoes per acre are collected. A vegetable and fruit processing company is now to be located on the site at a cost of $9 million. And this is just one irrigation project of many.

Significantly, the Green Revolution is bringing together both federal and state governments in a common goal. The federal government this year announced that it will be responsible for clearing half of the total land area it acquires for agricultural purposes from the state governments. About 400,000 farm units are being set up throughout the country this year to boost production of both food and cash crops. Each of these units is expected to produce at least 2,000 tons of farm produce annually.

The minister of agriculture plans to deal with Nigeria's current problem of rice shortages by attempting to make Nigeria self-sufficient in rice by 1984. The federal government will provide assistance to small-holder rice producers to cultivate about 111,150 acres over the country. The government hopes that about 90,000 tons of rice will be produced annually from these small-holder farms, and with some larger scale rice projects, could give the country about 213,000 tons of milled rice a year, once medium and large-scale rice mills have been built. Other ambitious projects deal with assistance to farmers for the cultivation of 2.9 million acres of groundnuts and 148,200 acres of soya beans, from which it is hoped an additional 90,000 total tons can be grown annually. There is also provision for approximately $300 million to be spent on improving the ailing oil palm plantations and further assistance for the establishment of 508,079 acres of nucleus oil-palm plantations and 318,630 acres of small-holder farms. State government forestry projects are to be set up all over Nigeria; for example, about 148,200 acres of plantations will be set up in Anambra state for the production of poles, fuel wood, and industrial wood. The federal government has also allocated a sum of $297 million to livestock programs, and cattle ranches, piggeries, and poultry farms are to be developed.

But the major problem facing the Green Revolution is the lack of a physical infrastructure to support its projects. Transportation is bad in terms of feeder roads, and there is a lack of cold storage depots, marketing facilities, and water supplies. The minister of agriculture sees all these areas as priorities, and cold storage depots are already being set up all over Nigeria by the Nigerian Food Company.

But there are fundamental problems in the agricultural plans of the Green Revolution that may be harder to solve. Some see the present trend of huge technological and engineering inputs as being far from a revolution in terms of the average Nigerian peasant farmer. The writer of an interesting article in the Nigerian newspaper *Financial Punch* took the Green Revolution in Java, Indonesia, as an example of the possible pitfalls facing the Nigerian government in its program. The Indonesian government gave loans to the small farmers to buy high-yield rice seeds and chemical inputs. The poorest farmers in need of cash sold the fertilizers, and because of corruption all the way from government to farmer, the corporations finally succeeded in producing rice for consumers at twice its normal price per unit. The wealthy farmers benefited of course and prevented their part-time workers from adopting the new seeds. This could very well happen in Nigeria, and the small peasant farmer, the backbone of Nigeria's agricultural economy, could well be wiped out by the government's huge mechanized farms. These are really the issues the Nigerian government, both at the federal and state levels, should be considering if the Green Revolution is not to be a devolution. Above all, promises and plans need to be put into practice, and the peasant farmer must be educated to accept and understand the new ways of the future. □


Photo: Yosef Hadar/World B.

A demonstration farm where farmers are trained to grow vegetables

Policy Toward Southern Africa

BY PRESIDENT ALHAJI SHEHU SHAGARI

I wish to pay tribute to Commonwealth governments and leaders who, mindful of the circumstances and the reasons that forced South Africa to withdraw from the Commonwealth in 1961, have not washed their hands of the problems to which the racist policies and practices of that unfortunate country have given rise. Through all the years, these racist policies and their implications have remained of special concern to all of us. The reasons are not far to see.

Of the seven independent African states sharing common frontiers with South Africa, five are Commonwealth members. Since 1965, our preoccupations with southern Africa have mainly centered on the question of Zimbabwe. Commonwealth leaders have always been aware that South Africa has remained the villain on the scene, responsible, first, for the Portuguese and, later, Mr. Ian Smith's stubborn resistance to change in that region. Fortunately, the independence of Zimbabwe is no longer an issue before this conference. We, therefore, have more time to concentrate on other unfinished business of the region, namely, the elimination of the racist policy of apartheid of South Africa and the question of the independence of Namibia. Both issues must be of serious concern to the Commonwealth; one involves a former British colony and the other a former British-mandated territory.

I wish at this stage to congratulate most heartily Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and his compatriots for justifying the tremendous trust the Commonwealth placed in them for the liberation of their country. The price, though high, has been worth it.

The independence of Zimbabwe marked a decisive watershed in the history of southern Africa and, indeed, in the historic confrontation between African nationalism and white-racist minority rule. It came as a severe blow to South Africa. Unfortunately, South Africa has refused to draw the correct lessons from what has happened. I therefore foresee that, before long, the current policies of South Africa, of increasing oppression and repression at home, of unprovoked aggression against neighboring states, of the continued illegal occupation of Namibia, and of arrogant defiance of the entire international community, and the United Nations, may well lead to a tragedy of monumental proportions.

We meet at a time when Africa and the international community are indignant over the wanton destruction of life and property that the unprovoked attacks by South Africa against Angola have caused. We are all the more outraged because these attacks are aimed at replacing the legal government of an independent African state with a puppet regime, so that South Africa can get away with its policy of imposing a sham internal settlement on Namibia, against the will of the majority of the people of that country, and in gross violation of the decisions of the United Nations. I cannot overemphasize the gravity of this development. Those who connive at the present policies of South Africa bear a heavy responsibility. They are not only damaging the authority of the United Nations, they are also fanning the embers of East-West confrontation in Africa.

It took the international community several years of patient and arduous negotiations to get the United Nations Security Council to adopt its Resolution 435. The response of South Africa to that resolution has not only been one of total noncompliance but, indeed, of defiance and deceit. The failure of the preimplementation talks in Geneva last

This is the substantive text of President Shagari's address presented during the debate on southern Africa at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference in Melbourne, Australia, October 1981.

January has nothing to do with any defects, apparent or real, in Resolution 435. After all, South Africa itself, SWAPO, and all the parties concerned accepted that resolution before the Geneva meeting. South Africa deliberately scuttled the Geneva meeting because it did not want a settlement based on the United Nations plan of cease-fire and fair and free elections that would lead to genuine independence for Namibia, and which elections, by their own calculations, would be won by SWAPO.

Regrettably, South Africa has felt encouraged by the new United States administration, intent on linking the so-called issue of Cuban troops in Angola with the question of the independence of Namibia. Needless to say, this American position is as unjust as it is incomprehensible. The question of Namibia's independence long predated American concern over Cuban forces in Africa, even if the Americans choose to ignore the reasons for the Cuban presence in Angola.

During his recent visit to Lagos, the president of Angola personally reassured me, time and again, as he must have assured others, including the Americans, that Cuban troops were in his country only to help defend it against the savage and unprovoked acts of aggression by South Africa. I am confident that the need for these Cuban troops would no longer arise once the threat of South African invasions was removed.

Since Geneva, racist South Africa has not hidden its true intentions. It has seemingly ignored the five-power Western Contact Group. It is seeking to destroy SWAPO militarily. It thinks it can hide its shameful domestic record of rabid racism, and divert attention from Namibia, by drawing the Americans to its side, purportedly to fight communism in Africa. It wants to replace the universally recognized government of Angola with the traitorous renegade Jonas Savimbi, so as to perpetuate its illegal occupation of Namibia even if by proxy. It is against this background that recent debates in the Security Council on South Africa's invasion of Angola and the Special Session of the General Assembly on Namibia were held.

South Africa is on a collision course with Africa and with the entire international community. The idea of according legitimacy to minority groupings in Namibia, to the detriment of SWAPO, which is recognized by the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations as the sole, legitimate representative of the people of Namibia, is entirely unacceptable. Years ago, the United Nations affirmed that any elections, and any administration brought about through so-called elections in Namibia, involving the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) and other internal groups, and conducted without the permission of the United Nations, were illegal, null, and void. I therefore see as misplaced the emphasis being given to the status of the DTA and other internal parties as a precondition for the settlement of the Namibian question.

Whatever standing those internal parties enjoy in Namibia, they can be tested in fair and free elections under the auspices of the United Nations, as it was with the case of the motley groups claiming legitimacy in Zimbabwe before the elections leading to independence. Furthermore, South Africa's recent recourse to widening the conflict through the conscription of local youths and the recruitment of mercenaries is indicative of the fact that it has lost faith in a peaceful solution of the Namibia question.

One aspect of this new situation that has not yet been sufficiently addressed is the impact of a long-drawn-out armed conflict on the future and survival of the Namibian people. Given South Africa's determination to wage war and the unanimous support that SWAPO enjoys among the population, the effect of South Africa's military operations against supporters of SWAPO is increasingly assuming genocidal proportions. This is clearly worrying.

The colonial history of the region, the problems of southern Africa, whether economic, commercial, security, or of racial domination, are closely interrelated. Each impinges on the other. The hopes and aspirations raised by the independence of the states of the region will not be fully realized if South Africa is not restrained in its reckless deployment of its temporary miliary advantage over its neighbors.

What should be the response of the Commonwealth to the challenge posed by racist South Africa to the world? Does the Commonwealth have any role to play in pressing South Africa to withdraw from Namibia? Do we condone the bombing raids and the violations of Angolan, Zambian, and Mozambiquan territorial integrity by South African forces that dangerously threaten international peace and security? Can we contribute to the redress of injustice and inhumanity in South Africa itself, and thereby help to restore peace and stability in the whole region?

Three things, I am sure, we must not do. First, we cannot leave matters in the hands of the racists in South Africa, even if we were to believe that they hold the key to a settlement. Even their best friends do not trust South Africans to voluntarily change their racist ways. We must therefore mobilize international opinion to keep on the pressure, including the imposition of sanctions against South Africa, as the recent Special Session of the General Assembly has requested, in order to compel it to withdraw from Namibia. The Commonwealth must give material and moral assistance to SWAPO in its just struggle against racist oppression.

Second, we cannot afford to abandon the international consensus embodied in the Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 and the UN Plan for the Independence of Namibia. We should welcome the principled stand of the European Economic Community on this issue. I am also glad that even the Americans now realize that Resolution 435 must form the basis of any internationally acceptable settlement of the Namibia question.

Third, we cannot afford to wait indefinitely for independence to come to Namibia. Otherwise, Africa will be engulfed in an East-West global power struggle. A definite timetable must be fixed for Namibia to become free and independent, at the latest by the middle of 1982.

The Commonwealth can also help to break the impasse arising from the difference that now seems to exist within the Western Contact Group following, especially, the U.S. negative vote against the Security Council resolution condemning South Africa's invasion of Angola. We have our most commendable record on Zimbabwe to fall back on to powerfully demonstrate the strength and weight of the Commonwealth.

On the humanitarian level, we should enlarge our present program of assistance to Namibian refugees and students, who, in violation of international law and the Geneva Conventions, have become the regular targets of South African military operations.

We must also seek to translate into action both the Singapore Declaration of 1971 and the Lusaka Declaration of 1979, affirming that racial discrimination is an "unmitigated evil" and that "we share an international responsibility to work together for the total eradication of apartheid and racial discrimination."

There is no political issue more troublesome to the Commonwealth today than the southern Africa question. I have therefore concentrated on it because it is our firm belief in Nigeria that unless a just and meaningful solution is found now to it, the Commonwealth could face the danger of having to justify its existence as a family of equal, friendly, and brotherly nations.

The recently concluded Rugby Tour of New Zealand by the *Springboks* must have given some comfort to the South African racist regime, as it threatened the unity and solidarity of the Commonwealth. Nigeria deeply deplored the fact that the government of New Zealand was unable to utilize the provisions of the Gleneagles Agreement to the full, and in a more effective manner, to have stopped the tour. It was most unfortunate that the Commonwealth, by an overwhelming consensus, found itself—as a very last resort with no other option—shifting the venue of the important annual Commonwealth Finance Ministers meeting away from New Zealand. The Commonwealth was obliged to do this, not simply to show displeasure and disapproval or avoid embarrassment, but to prevent the development of a most serious rift among its members. It also demonstrated to the world its total commitment to the struggle against the evil and pernicious apartheid system in all its forms. Nigeria has been particularly gratified by the show of total commitment to this noble, moral, and humanitarian struggle by the good people of New Zealand. They have demonstrated to their government, and to the whole international community, their commitment to fight against it to the very end. We salute the brave and courageous people of New Zealand. As comrades in arms we share their sincere hope that the good land of New Zealand has seen the last episode of dining with the devil that will be allowed to despoil it, so long as racism and apartheid continue to flourish in southern Africa or anywhere else in the world. Nigeria fully supports and reaffirms its faith in the Gleneagles Agreement. We believe that in the interest of peace, harmony, unity, and solidarity of the Commonwealth, and the positive role and influence for good that it has been playing and will continue to play in our troubled world, also as a manifestation of our determination and commitment to fight the twin evils of racism and apartheid to the finish, all member-states of the Commonwealth should adhere strictly to the provisions of this solemn agreement entered into voluntarily, freely, through general consensus, and with a deep sense of responsibility.

South Africa is afraid that the struggle for the demise of apartheid will peak after the independence of Namibia. I believe that this is our wish and expectation. But our immediate concern is the independence of Namibia. As the Commonwealth heads of state and government stated in the 1978 *Declaration of the Kingston Conference*: "We look to the time when the government and people of Namibia might be welcomed into the Commonwealth." That time will surely come. It is the wish of God. □

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South African businessmen impatient at slow pace of reform

South Africa's leading businessmen, who are considered *verligte*, or enlightened, in the context of Afrikaner politics, greeted Prime Minister Pieter Botha's call for patience over promised reforms with polite impatience.

Botha convened 600 businessmen in November in a follow-up meeting to one two years ago when he told corporation executives that "change is the only alternative to revolution." However, this time Botha asked his audience to "accept that the government is serious in its endeavor to secure effective political participation for all South Africans."

At a closed session after the speech, executive after executive expressed concern at the slow pace of liberalization and the lack of clarity about the direction in which the government is moving.

Mike Rosholt, head of the giant industrial group, Barlow Rand, said afterwards: "Business does not believe, as the government appears to, that there is unlimited time for the process of change."

Businessmen were especially upset over the lack of progress in black housing and education, particularly technical training. Harry Oppenheimer, the Anglo American Corp. chairman, said it was "frustrating" that "practical measures to improve the situation are rejected for what appear to be ideological reasons, as for instance when blacks are refused entry into half-empty [white] technical colleges."

A major thrust of Botha's speech was decentralization—promotion of investment through a public and private sector "partnership" in the black homelands, which are being made "independent."

Decentralization is another word for separate development, the ruling National Party ideology that sees the rural homelands as the answer to black economic and political aspirations. □

Namibia agreement drawing closer?

A U.S. official said in late November that South Africa's "provisional response" to the Namibia independence plan was "positive," following broad approval of the U.S. initiative by the African frontline states and the South-West African People's Organization.

Earlier, Secretary of State Alexander Haig had said South Africa "basically endorsed" the proposals for constitutional principles that were accepted by the Africans. Haig credited Reagan administration diplomacy with "fundamentally" changing Pretoria's attitude toward independence for Namibia.

South Africa's Namibian protege, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, was debating how best to defeat SWAPO in the elections, a development seen as evidence that South Africa may be serious about seeking a settlement.

And SWAPO's secretary-general, Moses Garoeb, made conciliatory statements in November. He said that if SWAPO were elected it would pattern its government on Zimbabwe's, with the key ingredients being "racial reconciliation" and "pragmatism." Garoeb also pledged that SWAPO would not allow the banned South African organization, the African National Congress, to establish guerrilla bases in Namibia. (Johannesburg Radio, November 26, 1981; Johannesburg *Star*, November 21, 1981; Washington *Post*, November 21, 1981.) □

Pretoria acquires low-enriched uranium

The South African government has made good on its boast last April that it has the "capacity" to provide its Koeberg nuclear power station with low-enriched uranium when the plant begins operating at the end of this year.

Pretoria had implied it would enrich the uranium locally, but its enrichment process will not be producing the necessary 50 tons of 3 percent uranium hexafluoride annually until the mid-1980s. Instead, the uranium has been bought from China, through third parties, according to U.S. officials.

Supplying enriched uranium has long been a contentious issue between South Africa and the U.S., which banned the enrichment in 1975 despite a contract, because of Pretoria's refusal to allow inspections or sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which disavows future development of nuclear weapons. Pretoria has always insisted on keeping open the option of nuclear weapons and may already have manufactured and tested nuclear bombs.

The enriched uranium will be made into fuel rods by Framatome, one of three French companies in the consortium building the two one-million megawatt Koeberg reactors. South Africa apparently had little trouble obtaining the enriched uranium because, like the oil it buys with ease in spite of an international embargo, there is a worldwide surplus of uranium supplies. Many countries have scaled back their nuclear power programs in the wake of Three Mile Island and because of the enormous cost of constructing the plants. (Washington *Post*, November 13 and 19, 1981; London *Times*, November 18, 1981.) □

Ciskei homeland battles black union on 'independence' issue

The general secretary of the militant South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU), Sam Kikine, was detained by South African security police on November 27, along with 13 other trade unionists and political activists, in the latest incident in the confrontation between SAAWU and the Ciskei homeland, which Pretoria made "independent" on December 4.

SAAWU has grown in 18 months to a membership of over 20,000, most of whom work in East London but live in the nearby black township of Mdantsane, which is in Ciskei. SAAWU's strength arises from its refusal to register under Pretoria's labor system and its deep involvement in community issues. The union has emerged as the rallying point for deep-seated opposition to Ciskei's "independence," which strips workers of their South African citizenship and makes them "migrant laborers."

As a result, the Ciskei security police have been engaged in a kind of civil war with SAAWU, repeatedly detaining and harassing union officials and members. Ciskei will almost certainly ban the union after independence.

Kikine, the SAAWU general secretary arrested in November, had earlier complained of "continual harassment and psychological intimidation" by the South African security police.

SAAWU's president, Thozamile Gqweta, 29, has been detained without charges four times—twice by the South African police and twice by Ciskei police—since he founded the union early last year. His house in Mdantsane township was burned down in March. Last May, firebombs were thrown at the home of the union vice president, who escaped injury.

On November 1, Gqweta's mother and uncle were killed when their house in Ciskei was destroyed by a suspicious flash fire. At the funeral, Ciskei police opened fire on the crowd of 1,000, made up mostly of SAAWU members and supporters, killing Deliswa Roxisa, Gqweta's 20-year-old girlfriend. A huge funeral was held in the homeland at the end of November for Griffiths Mxenge, a black lawyer murdered in Durban who had advised the union.

Forty-two members of the union were on trial in Ciskei in December. They were arrested after returning from a union meeting on hired buses and charged with incitement to public violence for singing freedom songs, shouting slogans of the banned African National Congress and giving black power salutes. When Gqweta arrived to attend the trial as an observer he was detained by police and questioned for two hours. (London *Times*, November 28, 1981; London *Observer*, November 22, 1981; Johannesburg *Star*, November 7 and 14, 1981.)☐

WESTERN AFRICA

Chad

• The precipitate withdrawal from Chad of 14,000 **Libyan soldiers**, begun on November 4 at the request of President Goukouni Woddeye, left a tenuous state of affairs in the country, as the Chad government awaited the arrival of the full OAU peacekeeping force and Hissene Habré and his rebel Armed Forces of the North (FAN) advanced from the east capturing towns vacated by the Libyans.

As of early December, only the peacekeeping contingents from Zaire and Senegal had arrived in Ndjamena, with the rest of the force, headed by a Nigerian, Maj. Gen. Ejiga, due to arrive by December 17. President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire indicated that Benin, Togo and Guinea would not be sending troops as originally planned, thus he was planning to increase his country's contingent. Nigeria was also readying its battalions to join the undermanned OAU force slated to police the vast country.

A delay in the dispatch of the troops was reportedly due to questions over who will foot the bill. Although the U.S. and France were said to have offered $12 million each in logistical support, the neighboring African countries felt the sum to be inadequate. Another outstanding issue, settled at a late November OAU-sponsored meeting in Nairobi, was whether the peacekeeping force would be empowered to intervene if the civil war re-ignites. The decision was reached that the troops will stay out of any fighting, causing observers to question their eventual effectiveness.

Meanwhile, Habré, who had fled to Sudan when his forces were routed from Ndjamena by the Libyan troops, continued to fill the void left by Col. Qaddafy's troops, capturing the eastern towns of Ati, Adre, Guereda and Abeche. The rebel leader said he would respect the OAU force "if it is truly neutral and does not try to impose a solution," but observers were wary of his claim. And Woddeye, disappointed over the OAU's decision to forbid the peacekeeping force from partaking in any fighting, said he would not hesitate to ask the Libyans to return if the OAU mission failed. (*Christian Science Monitor*, December 1, 1981; London *Times*, November 30, 1981; *Economist*, November 28, 1981; *Le Monde*, November 28, 1981.)

The Gambia

• More than 800 people were scheduled to face **trials** beginning in late November on charges connected with the failed coup attempt against President Dawda Jawara last July. In September, five tribunals were set up under a special division of the Supreme Court to try the detainees and judges from other Commonwealth countries were being recruited as the Gambia does not have enough of its own.

Meanwhile, Jawara called upon Guinea-Bissau to extradite the coup leader, Kukoi Samba Sanyang, and other fugitive rebels who fled the country when the uprising was put down by Senegalese troops. Observers indicated that the rebels' extradition was unlikely because there was no relevant judicial convention between Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia. In late October, the Guinea-Bissau government handed over to the Gambia a large consignment of weapons seized from the coup leaders as a gesture of good will. (*West Africa*, October 5, 12, November 9, 16 and 23, 1981.)

Ghana

• In October, one month after four of Ghana's opposition parties merged to form the All People's Party (AAP) as an alternative to the ruling People's National Party (PNP) it appeared that the **alliance** was crumbling.

First the Action Congress Party refused to join the others, as had originally been planned, leaving the Popular Front Paty (PFP), the United National Convention (UNC), the Social Democratic Front and the Third Force Party as coalition members.

Then leading PFP members Kwame Safo-Adu and Kwesi Lamptey withdrew both from the PFP and the APP, the former to form a new political grouping, the New Ghana Party. Lamptey, also planning to launch a new party, cited "intrigues, back-biting and interminable struggles for leadership within the PFP" as his reason for splitting from the group.

The Ashiedu-Keteke branch of the UNC then broke away in protest over the "un-democratic" way in which the APP was formed and its leadership elected. Saki Scheck, another leading PFP member, resigned from his party and the APP, alleging a conspiracy to impose a PFP leadership that is "clearly unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of the people."

PFP leader Victor Owusu was chosen to head the APP in late September, making him the party's likely presidential candidate in the 1983 elections against President Hilla Limann. However,with the PFP defections, it was believed that there will be no credible united opposition to Limann unless another party encompassing a broad a spectrum of opinion as the PNP arises.

In early October, Limann carried out his second major cabinet reshuffle since taking office two years ago, sacking three cabinet ministers, four regional ministers and two deputy ministers.

Francis Buah, education; Andah, youth and rural development; and M.P. Ansah, industries, were sacked. Buah was replaced by W.C. Ekow-Daniels who was moved from the position of Minister of Interior. K.S. Jantuah, formerly at local government and cooperatives, took over the Interior Ministry, replaced by the former attorney-general and Minister of Justice, Joe Reindorf. The demotion of Reindorf and Ekow-Daniels, indicative of Limann's dissatisfaction with their handling of internal issues, resulted in both their resignations.

The two deputy ministers who were sacked, I.K. Katsrikus and E.L. Nyakoteh, had both been involved in negotiations with the IMF for balance of payments assistance and had reportedly recommended government acceptance of the package, which was said to include a devaluation of the currency. Limann had called the IMF package "suicidal." (*West Africa*, October 5, 12, 19 and 26, 1981.)

Guinea-Bissau

• Following a conference of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) in mid-November in Bissau, a decision was announced to release from prison former President **Luis Cabral** by the end of 1981. Cabral was ousted in a coup in November 1980 by Maj. João Bernardo Vieira. Another outcome of the party conference was the decision to hold presidential and legislative elections in early 1982, following the drawing up of a new constitution.

The conference agreed to retain the name and status of the PAIGC as Guinea-Bissau's ruling party, despite the fact that in response to the coup, Cape Verde changed the name of the party to the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV). The PAIGC expelled from its ranks Aristides Pereira, the Cape Verde President, and all other Cape Verde members who had founded the PAIGC.

During the meeting, Vieira was elected secretary-general of the PAIGC, and his Foreign Minister, Vitor Saude Maria, number two in the party hierarchy. Vieira, addressing the conference, affirmed that the Soviet Union and "other socialist countries" were the natural allies of Guinea-Bissau, but that non-alignment would remain the basis of the country's foreign policy. (*West Africa*, November 23, 1981; Lisbon Radio, November 14 and 15, 1981.)

Ivory Coast

• In early November, a consortium led by **Phillips Petroleum Co.** was negotiating a major foreign loan for exploration and development of an offshore oil field near Abidjan. There was speculation that the consortium had made a major oil find off the shore of the Ivory Coast which could rival the BP Forties field in the North Sea, producing 400,000 barrels a day.

Phillips holds a 57.5 percent interest in the Ivorian Espoir field, with Agip of Italy at 22.5 percent and **Sedco Inc.**, a Dallas-based drilling company, and the Ivory Coast state oil company, Petroci, each with 10 percent.

The Ivory Coast government is also seeking funds from the World Bank to develop the Espoir field and with outside assistance hopes to raise oil production substantially from its current level of 7,000 barrels a day, only one-fifth of its consumption needs. (*Wall Street Journal*, November 4, 1981.)

Liberia

• In mid-November, **Gabriel Baccus Matthews**, the Liberian Minister of Foreign Affairs, became the latest in a series of cabinet ministers to be sacked by Master Sgt. Samuel Doe, although no reason was given for his removal. In mid-October, the Agriculture Minister, Maj. Alfred T. Suah, was dismissed for "failure to adequately pursue the agricultural programs" of the government, and was replaced by Maj. Alfred Fromayn, who had been deputy agriculture minister.

The Minister of Finance, Maj. George K. Dunye, and an assistant minister for fiscal affairs, Lawrence Shanty, also were removed in October, for alleged fraud. And the former Justice Minister, Chea Cheapoo, sacked in September, was arrested near the Ivory Coast border while trying to leave the country. He was detained after he failed to appear at an investigation into his alleged illegal seizure of equipment of the Liberia Overseas Venture Corp.

In order to avert financial collapse, the Liberian government froze all government payments except salaries for the month of November and all foreign payments with the exception of those for oil, debt service, foreign missions and government-sponsored students abroad, for three months.

Beginning in December all allotments to government agencies and public corporations were reduced by 50 percent and the ban on foreign travel by government officials with government funds maintained.

Doe appointed a ten-man committee to review the economy and formulate "an appropriate course of action" to stimulate it. The committee is headed by the Planning and Economic Affairs Minister, Byron Tarr, and includes bankers, economists, and businessmen. (*West Africa*, November 2, 9 and 23, 1981; Monrovia Radio, November 20, 1981; *Africa Research Bulletin*, October 31 and November 15, 1981; London *Sunday Times*, November 15, 1981; London *Guardian*, October 30, 1981.)

Mali

• The Malian Ministry of Industrial Development announced in early November that a new **mining agreement** was signed with the Soviet Union, following the discovery of new gold deposits which may make Mali a major producer of the metal.

The agreement covers the provision of mining equipment worth $4.2 million to be used at the Kalana deposit in the Sikasso region, which is expected to yield two metric tons of gold per year by 1982. The two countries have cooperated in gold mining over the past 20 years. (*West Africa*, November 2 and 9, 1981.)

Niger

• President Seyni Kountche **visited the U.S.** in October where he addressed the UN General Assembly and held talks with Vice President George Bush and other officials.

At the UN, Kountche called upon the wealthy nations of the world to agree to reforms in international economic structures and criticized "theoreticians" who claim that the North needs only to stimulate its own economies to bring about development in the South.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has made $2.3 million in foreign military sales credits available to Niger for purchase of spare parts, engines, and technical assistance for their C-130 aircraft. The U.S. also began an international military training program in 1981 to assist Niger's armed forces. (*West Africa*, October 19, 1981.)

Nigeria

• In early October, Nigeria's Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the **Revenue Allocation Bill**, which governed the distribution of federal government funds to the country's 19 states. The annulment of the allocation bill, signed by President Shehu Shagari in February 1981, resulted in a delay in the presentation of the 1982 budget, scheduled for October, but not expected until the end of December.

The government had spent months working on the allocation legislation, finally reaching a compromise with state governments which sought a larger share of federal revenues than was originally envisioned. Shagari boosted the states' share of funds from approximately 25 to 31.5 percent, thereby reducing the federal government's share from about 76 to 58.5 percent.

The Supreme Court's overturning of the bill was based on a procedural, not substantive issue—that the act had been passed by the Joint Finance Committee of the two legislative houses, although it did not possess the constitutional power to do so. Observers indicated that the annulment of the act will have the effect of reducing the amount of federal funds to the states, reverting to the 25 percent share prior to the bill's enactment.

The 1982 budget, based on the now-obsolete revenue bill, was delayed, causing confusion among government and business planners in Nigeria. Reports indicated that likely elements of the new budget include a cut in total public expenditure by 10 percent and a curb in the country's liberal import policies, due to declining oil revenues.

It was expected that tensions between the state and federal governments will be increasing in coming months as the states depend almost entirely on federal government funds, now reduced by the bill's annulment and by a drop in oil sales since the beginning of 1981. Shagari's deftness at dealing with the issue will be a means by which observers will be measuring his political longevity. (*Economist*, November 21, 1981; *World Business Weekly*, October 19, 1981.)

Senegal

• Of the 28 members of the **opposition** Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) arrested in September for "activities against the state," three were given one month jail terms for "rebellion and violence" against police and then released, two were freed on bail and five others remained in prison as of late November.

The PDS members were detained following information given to Senegalese authorities by Amadou Fall, who it was alleged was a PDS member, and had been arrested on fraud charges.

Police searched homes of party members looking for weapons caches or documents proving that the PDS was financed from abroad. Five of the arrested included aides of PDS secretary-general Abdoulaye Wade.

Wade, in a Paris press conference, denied that the PDS was involved in any kind of plot against the government and said that Fall was never a PDS member. The government, he claimed, was using Fall's "revelations" as a pretext for action against the party.

The PDS issued a statement in early October admitting that it had sent militants to Libya for "bodyguard training," required because of the numerous attacks on Wade's life. Wade said he was not aware of the militants who had infiltrated his party, having gone to Libya at the time.

Wade visited Libya in August 1981 to "demonstrate [PDS] solidarity with the Libyans following the U.S. provocation over the Gulf of Sirte." (*West Africa*, October 19, 26, and November 16, 1981; *Africa Research Bulletin*, October 15, 1981; *Le Monde*, October 9, 1981.)

• The governments of the Gambia and Senegal agreed to form a confederation to be called **Senegambia**, during a visit to Banjul in mid-November by Senegal's President Abdou Diouf. The agreement, initialed by the two countries' presidents and still to be ratified by their respective parliaments, provides for an integration of their armed forces and security forces, an economic and monetary union and coordination of foreign policy.

Diouf will be President of the confederation with the Gambia's Dawda Jawara as Vice President. Other details of the union were not clear, however, as a provision of the agreement stated that "each of the confederal states shall maintain its independence and sovereignty." The issues of whether there will be a common currency or whether English or French will be the preferred language have yet to be worked out.

The decision to proceed with the integration of the two countries came as a result of a coup attempt against Jawara in July, forcing him to call in Senegalese troops to put down the rebellion. Following his meeting with Diouf, Jawara said that a gradual approach toward confederation would be taken and that a referendum was not required because the sovereignty of the Gambia was not affected. (*West Africa*, November 23, 1981; *Financial Times*, November 16, 1981.)

Sierra Leone

• At a convention of the All People's Congress (APC), Sierra Leone's only party, in October, President Siaka Stevens announced that he will **retire** from the government to make way for a younger man following general elections in early 1982.

Stevens also announced that at least two and not more than three candidates, selected by the APC, will be allowed to stand for election in each of the country's 85 constituencies, to "give the people a chance to make a choice." Civil servants, previously barred from office, will also be permitted to run, provided they resign their posts three months prior to the elections.

Some observers indicated that the labor unrest in Sierra Leone in September may have provided Stevens with an impetus to call general elections in early 1982, as a means of providing the government with a fresh mandate. A state of emergency was imposed after the Sierra Leone Labor Congress (SLCC) called a general strike to force government action on a range of issues, particularly food prices.

In October, the government released from prison about 180 people who were detained in connection with the labor unrest. SLLC secretary-general James Kabia and other unionists were among those freed. The government did, however, set up a commission of inquiry which began investigations in early November into "the status, administration and activities" of the SLCC from 1976, and into all aspects of industrial relations in Sierra Leone. (*West Africa*, October 12, 19, November 9 and 16, 1981.)

Upper Volta

• Col. Saye Zerbo, Upper Volta's head of state, announced on national radio in early November that **strikers** were banned "until further notice." Zerbo said the measure "is neither a suppression of the trade unions nor of trade union freedom. . . It is simply the suppression of a luxury which our country cannot allow in the difficult world situation." He added that some individuals want to strike "in order to appease their anarchistic schemes."

The military overthrew the government of President Sangoule Lamizana in November 1980 after a series of protracted strikes led by the teachers' union, and guaranteed the rights of the country's powerful trade unions, although all public meetings were banned.

Tensions between labor and the Zerbo government have been increasing over the past year, however, and in late October, the general secretary of the Voltaic Trade Union Confederation (CSV), Soumane Toure, attacked the government in very strong terms. He said: "No measures have been taken by the Military Committee in favor of the workers," and that "...the Military Committee... just like some Ministers in Lamizana's Third Republic, deliberately refuse to receive representatives of the unions to discuss with them and to find solutions to their problems."

The Minister of Civil Service and Labor warned Toure that "We say no to anything that appears like subversion," and said it was the last warning the unionist would receive to curb criticism of the government. In late November, it was reported that the police were searching for Toure, who union officials in Ouagadougou said, had disappeared. Meanwhile the CSV called for a general strike in early December if the ban on strikes was not lifted. (*West Africa*, November 9, 16, 23 and 30, 1981.)

EASTERN AFRICA

Comoros

• A former Foreign Minister of the Comoros was **arrested** in November on his return to the islands after five months in exile, along with several hundred of his followers, according to Comoran exile organizations.

Mouzadir Abdallah was accused of leaving the country clandestinely in June and of leading "subversive actions" outside the Comoros since then. Abdallah was in the government of the late Ali Soilih, who was deposed in a mercenary-led coup, and had been confined to house arrest since the coup. (*Afrique-Asie*, November 23, 1981.)

Djibouti

• Six leaders of the banned **opposition** Djiboutian People's Party, who were among 13 officials arrested on September 7, were released on October 25.

According to a government spokesman, the six were freed as part of President Hassan Gouled's "policy of conciliation" and the rest will be released when conditions permit. The released officials, including former Prime Minister Abdallah Kamil, had been accused of distributing leaflets of their party, which the government has barred from legal registration. Another former Prime Minister, Ahmed Dini, remained in detention.

In mid-October, the constitution was altered to restrict the 65-member parliament solely to Gouled's party, thus making Djibouti a one-party state. (*Le Monde*, October 23 and 28, 1981.)

Ethiopia

• The Ethiopian army launched a new offensive against **Eritrean guerrillas** near the Sudanese border on November 11, but, according to an Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) spokesman, had to withdraw about a week later, after suffering more than 1,000 casualties.

The area of the offensive, in southern Eritrea, had previously been controlled by another guerrilla group, the Eritrean Liberation Front, which fled into Sudan last summer. Sudan's recent rapprochement with Addis Ababa reportedly has cut off the EPLF's supply lines into Sudan.

According to the EPLF, the Ethiopian army was regrouping in late November and preparing for another assault. (London *Guardian*, November 21, 1981; *Le Monde*, November 14, 1981.)

Kenya

• The Kenyan government in November increased by 18 percent the prices oil companies will charge for all their **petroleum products**, including kerosene, which many Kenyans use for cooking and for lighting their homes.

At the same time, the Minister for Energy, John Okwanyo, announced that the government had established the Kenya National Oil Corp., which will be responsible for the purchase of foreign oil. Okwanyo said the aim of the state-owned company was to lessen reliance on private companies "whose prime objective is profit."

Kenya now spends 37 percent of its foreign exchange on oil and one economic priority is figuring out a way to reduce dependence on imports of crude. Off-shore oil exploration is currently under way.

Many Kenyans were upset at the increase in prices of kerosene, which had been excluded from previous increases.

The oil price rise and the recent devaluation of the shilling have contributed to rising inflation, thus reducing purchasing power, and have prompted the Central Organization of Trade Unions (Cotu) to seek higher wages.

In November, there was a spate of strikes, particularly in Nairobi. Employers have blamed shop stewards for these wildcat strikes, which were not sanctioned by Cotu. Juma Boy, the Cotu secretary-general, said a review of the wage structure was "imperative" because the cost of living has risen sharply in the last year. (Kenya *Weekly Review*, November 13, 1981; Nairobi Radio, October 28 and November 4, 1981.)

Madagascar

• Eighty-six young people were arrested in November following two days of **violence** in the capital, Antananarivo, in which 20 stores were looted and burned.

The demonstrations began after a soccer match but were linked by observers to Madagascar's severe economic problems, which have caused shortages of rice, the staple food, medicines and soap. According to one report, the outbreak of streetfighting, which necessitated the calling out of troops to protect the presidential palace, was preceded by a week of bizarre rumors. (*Le Monde*, November 11 and 16, 1981.)

Seychelles

• Troops flown in from Tanzania were helping the Seychelles' 1,000-strong army reassert control over the Indian Ocean archipelago in December following the widely publicized botched **coup attempt** by white mercenaries.

The army was hunting down several mercenaries and local sympathizers who took to the hills on Mahé island after the mercenaries fled back to South Africa. The government of President Albert René, which has twice before claimed to have foiled bids to topple the leftist regime, said the heavily financed attempt was well-planned despite the seeming ineptitude of the mercenaries, who reportedly were mainly former members of crack South African and Rhodesian army units.

The coup was supposed to be timed to coincide with René's visit to France, and would have included seizure of the radio station and broadcast of a tape recording in which former President James Mancham (overthrown in a 1977 coup by Rene) would have announced his return to power.

South Africa's role in the plot, if any, was unclear, although the government dismissed charges against 39 of the mercenaries and freed on bail five others after they were arrested in Durban following the hijacking of an Air India plane in the escape from the Seychelles.

The five were charged only with kidnaping, but later Justice Minister Kobie Coetsee said all 44 could still be charged with hijacking. The U.S. State Department had protested the leniency directed at the mercenaries and noted that an international agreement calls for cessation of all flights to any country that refuses to extradite or prosecute persons who have hijacked an airplane. (London *Observer*, November 29 and December 6, 1981; London *Sunday Times*, December 6, 1981; London *Guardian*, December 4, 1981.)

Somalia

• Three Somali dissident groups announced in mid-October that they have formed a united **opposition** to the regime of President Mohamed Siad Barre, called the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia.

The front was founded by the Somali Salvation Front, whose leader, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad, became chairman of the new group, by the Somali Workers' Party and by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia.

The front pledged itself to overthrow the government and establish a "democratic administration" through free elections.

President Siad Barre said on October 20 that 5,009 prisoners had been released under an amnesty celebrating the 12th anniversary of his military government. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, October 31, 1981; "Radio Kulmis," October 18 and 27, 1981.)

Tanzania

• The **World Bank** has advised Tanzania that it must cut back its socialist programs to make the economy pick up.

Alden Clausen, World Bank president who visited the country in November, said, "Our advice to Tanzania would be to put more importance on the individual entrepreneur." Along with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank has urged Tanzania to devalue its currency by about 50 percent, eliminate price and import controls, raise interest rates and cut back on government spending. President Julius Nyerere has in the past adamantly refused to reduce state welfare programs.

Wide-scale food shortages are considered likely in Tanzania early this year and there may be famine. An official of the government said

1981 Index

AUTHOR INDEX

Arnold, Guy, "New directions for the 1980s", May-Jun 58
Ballance, Frank C., "Rural reform in Zimbabwe", Jul-Aug 9
Beaubien, Michael C., "Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, Zimbabwe Minister of Information and Tourism" (interview), Jul-Aug 48
Butcher, Goler Teal, "Aid as foreign policy", Nov-Dec 43
Carter, Gwendolen M., "Southern African reactions to Reagan", May-Jun 43
"Zimbabwe: The first year", May-Jun 62
Cook, Gayla, "Working with African women: Options for the West", Mar-Apr 43
"Teurai Ropa Nhongo, Zimbabwe Minister of Community Development and Women's Affairs" (interview), Mar-Apr 49
Crocker, Chester A., "The United States and Africa" (document), Sept-Oct 6
"Namibia/Angola linkages" (document) Nov-Dec 10
Crocker, Chester A., *et al.*, "Southern Africa: a U.S. policy for the '80s", Jan-Feb 7
Deutsch, Richard, "Reagan and Africa", Jan-Feb 4
"Thozamile Botha, South African trade union leader" (interview), Jan-Feb 42
"Africa from a strategic perspective", Mar-Apr 47
"Reagan's unruly review", May-Jun 23
"Building an Africa policy", Jul-Aug 44
Dos Santos, José Eduardo, "Reaction to the South African invasion" (document), Nov-Dec 9
Easum, Donald B., "Nigerian-American relations", (document), Jul-Aug 52
Gray, William H., "Major policy issues for the 1980s", (document), Mar-Apr 22
Gregory, Carole, "Who will speak for the African woman?" (book review), Mar-Apr 60
Grenville-Grey, Wilfrid, "South Africa: What prospects for human rights?" Sept-Oct 41
Greznes, Mario *et al.*, "Southern Africa: a U.S. policy for the '80s", Jan-Feb 7
Gusau, Alhaji Ibrahim, "Nigeria's green revolution", Jul-Aug 19
Harfoush, Samira, "Non-traditional training for women in the Arab world", Mar-Apr 51
Hartling, Poul, "An African tragedy", Jan-Feb 39
Henderson, Robert *et al.*, "Southern Africa: a U.S. policy for the '80s", Jan-Feb 7
Holdcroft, Lane E., "Agriculture: The role of external aid", Jul-Aug 15
Hughes, Anthony J., "Reagan and Africa: Policy options in the Horn", May-Jun 4
"Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Aden, Somali Minister of Information and National Guidance" (interview), May-Jun 12
"Mohamed Diriye Urdoh, secretary-general of the Western Somali Liberation Front" (interview), May-Jun 15
"Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum, chairman, Senate subcommittee on Africa" (interview), Jul-Aug 35
"Donald B. Sole, South African ambassador to the United States" (interview), Sept-Oct 14
"Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress of South Africa" (interview), Sept-Oct 20
"President Moi's delicate mission", Sept-Oct 50
"Nairobi press notebook", Sept-Oct 55
"Congressman Howard Wolpe" (interview), Nov-Dec 4
Isaacman, Allen, "Response to Luis Benjamin Serapiao", Jan-Feb 56
Isaacman, Allen, and Barbara Isaacman, "Mozambique: Creating a new legal system", Jan-Feb 19
Jackson, Henry F., "South Africa: Reagan's policy rupture", Sept-Oct 9
Johns, Sheridan, "South Africa: A new direction?" (book review) Sept-Oct 58
Kaba, Lansine, "Guinea: Myth and reality of change", May-Jun 53
Kazadi, F.S.B., "Zaire 1981: Recovery or relapse?" Jul-Aug 40
"Trade, tourism, and mild repression", Nov-Dec 39
Kraus, Jon, "The multinationals controversy: Exploitation or development?" (book review), Jan-Feb 52
Lichenstein, Charles M., "The American veto" (document), Nov-Dec 10
Lycett, Andrew, "New hope for the Sudan", Jul-Aug 37
Marshall, Peter, "Tourism: Tanzania's controversial industry", Nov-Dec 52
Mazrui, Ali A., "Africa between Republican and Democratic administrations" Jan-Feb 46
Mboukou, Alexandre, "U.S./Congo: Pragmatic relations", Nov-Dec 12
McCaffrey, Kathleen, "African women on the screen", Mar-Apr 56
Mkapa, Benjamin, "Major policy issues for the 1980s" (document), Mar-Apr 24
Mortimer, Robert A., "Politics in trans-Saharan Africa", May-Jun 47
Nguza, Karl-I-Bond, "The situation in Zaire" (document), Nov-Dec 19
Norman, David, "Agriculture: Progress or catastrophe in Africa?" Jul-Aug 4
Nyang, Sulayman S., "The Gambia: After the revolution", Nov-Dec 47
Okeyo, Achola Pala, "Reflections on development myths", Mar-Apr 7
Parry, John, "The search for commodity stability", Jan-Feb 15
Rothchild, Donald, "The two senses of ethnonational self-determination" (book review), Nov-Dec 56
Seiler, John, "Reagan and Africa: Which way in southern Africa?", May-Jun 17
Serapiao, Luis Benjamin, "Letter to the Editor", Jan-Feb 55
Tau, Mildred Malineo, "Women: Critical to African development", Mar-Apr 4
Thompson, Carol B., "U.S. companies in South Africa" (book review), Jul-Aug 54
Tinker, Irene, "Policy strategies for women in the 1980s", Mar-Apr 11
Tsongas, *Senator* Paul, "Time IS running out", Sept-Oct 39
Tutu, *Bishop* Desmond, "The future of South Africa", Sept-Oct 4
Uys, Stanley, "South Africa: Is partition the answer?", Sept-Oct 45
Whan, Linda L., "Perspectives on third world women" (book review), Mar-Apr 59

SUBJECT INDEX

Agriculture
African Update, Jan-Feb 27, 28, 32, 35; Mar-Apr 31, 37, 42; May-Jun 30, 31, 33, 35
"Progress or catastrophe in Africa?", by David Norman, Jul-Aug 4
"Rural reform in Zimbabwe", by Frank C. Ballance, Jul-Aug 9
"The role of external aid", by Lane E. Holdcroft, Jul-Aug 15
"Nigeria's green revolution" (document), by Alhaji Ibrahim Gusau, Jul-Aug 19
African Update, Jul-Aug 25, 26, 28
"New hope for the Sudan", by Andrew Lycett, Jul-Aug 37
African Update, Sept-Oct 26, 27, 29, 31, 36; Nov-Dec 26, 27, 30, 33, 38

Aid
African Update, Jan-Feb 25, 28, 30, 32, 35, 38
"Refugees: An African tragedy", by Poul Hartling, Jan-Feb 39
African Update, Mar-Apr 30, 39, 40
"Working with African women: Options for the West", by Gayla Cook, Mar-Apr 43
African Update, May-Jun 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 42
"Agriculture: The role of external aid", by Lane E. Holdcroft, Jul-Aug 15

African Update, Jul-Aug 26, 31; Sept-Oct 28, 29, 33, 36; Nov-Dec 27, 31
"Aid as foreign policy", by Goler Teal Butcher, Nov-Dec 43

Books
Alexander, Yonah, and Robert E. Friedlander, eds., *Self-determination: National, Regional and Global Dimensions*, reviewed by Donald Rothchild, Nov-Dec 56
Biersteker, Thomas, *Distortion or Development?: Contending Perspectives on the Multinational Corporation*, reviewed by Jon Kraus, Jan-Feb 52
Bledsoe, Caroline, *Women and Marriage in Kpelle Society*, reviewed by Carole Gregory, Mar-Apr 60
Carter, Gwendolen M., *Which Way is South Africa Going?* reviewed by Sheridan Johns, Sept-Oct 58
El Saadawi, Nawal, *The Hidden Face of Eve: Women in the Arab World*, reviewed by Carole Gregory, Mar-Apr 60
Kofele-Kale, Ndiva, ed., *An African experiment in nation building: The bilingual Cameroon Republic since reunification*, reviewed by Donald Rothchild, Nov-Dec 56
LeVine, Sarah and Robert, *Mothers and Wives: Gusii Women of East Africa*, reviewed by Carole Gregory, Mar-Apr 60
Lindsay, Beverly, ed., *Comparative Perspectives of Third World Women: The Impact of Race, Sex, and Class*, reviewed by Linda L. Whan, Mar-Apr 59
Ronen, Dov, *The Quest for Self-Determination*, reviewed by Donald Rothchild, Nov-Dec 56
Schmidt, Elizabeth, *Decoding Corporate Camouflage*, reviewed by Carol B. Thompson, Jul-Aug 54
Strobel, Margaret, *Muslim Women in Mombasa*, reviewed by Carole Gregory, Mar-Apr 60
Urdang, Stephanie, *Fighting Two Colonialisms: Women in Guinea-Bissau*, reviewed by Carole Gregory, Mar-Apr 60
Weinrich, A.K.H. *Women and Racial Discrimination in Rhodesia*, reviewed by Linda L. Whan, Mar-Apr 59
Rogers, Barbara, *The Domestication of Women: Discrimination in Developing Societies*, reviewed by Linda L. Whan, Mar-Apr 59

Development
"Africa in world development" (document), Jan-Feb 48
"The multinationals controversy: Exploitation or development?" by Jon Kraus (book review), Jan-Feb 52
"Women: Critical to African development", by Ambassador Mildred Malineo Tau, Mar-Apr 4
"Reflections on development myths", by Achola Pala Okeyo, Mar-Apr 7
"Policy strategies for women in the 1980s", by Irene Tinker, Mar-Apr 11
"African Training and Research Centre for Women: Its work and program", by the staff of ATRCW, Mar-Apr 17
"Working with African women: Options for the West", by Gayla Cook, Mar-Apr 43
"New directions for the 1980s", by Guy Arnold, May-Jun 58
"Progress or catastrophe in Africa?", by David Norman, Jul-Aug 4
"Rural reform in Zimbabwe", by Frank C. Ballance, Jul-Aug 9
"Nigeria's green revolution", by Alhaji Ibrahim Gusau, Jul-Aug 19
"New hope for the Sudan", by Andrew Lycett, Jul-Aug 37
"Trade, tourism, and mild repression", by F.S.B. Kazadi, Nov-Dec 39
"Aid as foreign policy", by Goler Teal Butcher, Nov-Dec 43

Economics *see also African Update*
"The search for commodity stability", by John Parry, Jan-Feb 15
"U.S. Firms and South African divestment" (document), Jan-Feb 45
"The multinationals controversy: Exploitation or development?" (book review), Jan-Feb 52
"New directions for the 1980s", by Guy Arnold, May-Jun 58
"Zimbabwe: The first year", by Gwendolen M. Carter, May-Jun 62
"Zaire: Recovery or relapse?", by F.S.B. Kazadi, Jul-Aug 40
"U.S. companies in South Africa" (book review), by Carol B. Thompson, Jul-Aug 54
"U.S./Congo: Pragmatic relations", by Alexandre Mboukou, Nov-Dec 12
"After the rebellion", by Sulayman S. Nyang, Nov-Dec 47

Human rights
African Update, Mar-Apr 29; May-Jun 31
"What prospects for human rights?", by Wilfrid Grenville-Grey, Sept-Oct 41
African Update, Nov-Dec 27

International Monetary Fund
African Update, Jan-Feb, 35; Mar-Apr 40; May-Jun 29, 31; Jul-Aug 31, 32
Agriculture: New hope for the Sudan", by Andrew Lycett, Jul-Aug 37
African Update, Sept-Oct 31, 33; Nov-Dec 27

Interviews
"Thozamile Botha, South African trade union leader", Jan-Feb 42
"Teurai Ropa Nhongo, Zimbabwe Minister of Community Development and Women's Affairs", Mar-Apr 49
"Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Aden, Somali Minister of Information and National Guidance", May-Jun 12
"Mohamed Diriye Urdoh, secretary-general of the Western Somali Liberation Front", May-Jun 15
"Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Africa", Jul-Aug 35
"Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, Zimbabwe Minister of Information and Tourism", Jul-Aug 48
"Donald B. Sole, South African ambassador to the United States", Sept-Oct 14
"Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress of South Africa", Sept-Oct 20

Media
African Update, Jan-Feb 27, 28, 37; Mar-Apr 27, 28
"African women on the screen", by Kathleen McCaffrey, Mar-Apr 56
African Update, May-Jun 36; Jul-Aug 28, 31
"Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, Zimbabwe Minister of Information and Tourism" (interview), Jul-Aug 48
African Update, Sept-Oct 28, 29, 30, 37, 38; Nov-Dec 28, 29, 32

Military aid and equipment
African Update, Jan-Feb 25, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36; Mar-Apr 30, 32, 40, 41, 42; May-Jun 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41; Jul-Aug 23, 24, 26, 29
"South Africa: Reagan's policy rupture", by Henry F. Jackson, Sept-Oct 9
African Update, Sept-Oct 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 35, 38; Nov-Dec 23, 24, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37

Mining
African Update, Jan-Feb 38; Mar-Apr 29, 40; May-Jun 29, 37, 41; Jul-Aug 25, 26; Sept-Oct 27, 33, 34, 38; Nov-Dec 29, 38

Nuclear power
African Update, Jan-Feb 29; May-Jun 38, 39; Sept-Oct 38

Oil
African Update, Jan-Feb 28, 29, 33; Mar-Apr 28, 31, 38; May-Jun 30, 33, 36, 37, 39, 42; Jul-Aug 27, 31, 32; Sept-Oct 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36; Nov-Dec 28, 31, 34

Organization of African Unity
African Update, Jan-Feb 26, 30, 35, 36; Mar-Apr 28, 29; May-Jun 29; Jul-Aug 23, 24, 25, 32; Sept-Oct 25, 28, 30, 31, 34, 35
"President Moi's delicate mission", by Anthony J. Hughes, Sept-Oct 50
"Nairobi press notebook", by Anthony J. Hughes, Sept-Oct 55
African Update, Nov-Dec 30, 35

Refugees
African Update, Jan-Feb 32, 35, 38
"An African tragedy", by Poul Hartling, Jan-Feb 39
African Update, May-Jun 35; Sept-Oct 37; Nov-Dec 31, 36

Tourism
African Update, May-Jun 35; Nov-Dec 35

"Trade, tourism, and mild repression", by F.S.B. Kazadi, Nov-Dec 39
"Tanzania's controversial industry", by Peter Marshall, Nov-Dec 52
Trade unions
African Update, Jan-Feb 29, 30, 37
"Thozamile Botha, South African trade union leader" (interview), Jan-Feb 42
African Update, Mar-Apr 40, 41; May-Jun 40; Jul-Aug 25, 27, 28, 31, 33; Sept-Oct 29, 30, 32, 33, 38; Nov-Dec 24, 29, 38

Women
"Women; Critical to African development", by Ambassador Mildred Malineo Tau, Mar-Apr 4
"Reflections on development myths", by Achola Pala Okeyo, Mar-Apr 7
"Policy strategies for women in the 1980s", by Irene Tinker, Mar-Apr 11
"African Training and Research Centre for Women: Its work and program", by the staff of ATRCW, Mar-Apr 17
"Working with African women: Options for the West", by Gayla Cook, Mar-Apr 43
"Teurai Ropa Nhongo, Zimbabwe Minister of Community Development and Women's Affairs" (interview), Mar-Apr 49
"Nontraditional training for women in the Arab world", by Samira Harfoush, Mar-Apr 51
"African women on the screen", by Kathleen McCaffrey, Mar-Apr 56
"Perspectives on Third World women" (book review), by Linda L. Whan, Mar-Apr 59
"Who will speak for the African woman?" (book review), by Carole Gregory, Mar-Apr 60

COUNTRY INDEX

Algeria
African Update, Jan-Feb 34, 36; Mar-Apr 40, 41; May-Jun 37, 40
"Politics in trans-Saharan Africa", by Robert A. Mortimer, May-Jun 47
African Update, Jul-Aug 24, 27, 31, 33; Sept-Oct 34, 35, 36; Nov-Dec 34

Angola
"A U.S. policy for the '80s", by Chester A. Crocker *et al.*, Jan-Feb 7
African Update, Jan-Feb 36; Mar-Apr 42; May-Jun 40; Jul-Aug 23, 33
"Nigerian-American relations" (document), by Donald B. Easum, Jul-Aug 52
African Update, Sept-Oct 23, 36
"Congressman Howard Wolpe" (interview), Nov-Dec 4
"Reaction to the South African invasion" (document), by José Eduardo dos Santos, Nov-Dec 9
"Namibia/Angola linkages" (document), by Chester A. Crocker, Nov-Dec 10
"The American veto" (document), by Charles M. Lichenstein, Nov-Dec 10
African Update, Nov-Dec 23, 28, 31, 36

Belgium
African Update, Mar-Apr 39; May-Jun 37; Sept-Oct 33

Benin
African Update, Jul-Aug 25, 26; Nov-Dec 25

Botswana
African Update, May-Jun 41

Britain
African Update, Jan-Feb 30, 32; May-Jun 31, 32, 38; Jul-Aug 24, 25, 29; Sept-Oct 23, 30, 31, 32, 38; Nov-Dec 31, 34, 38

Burundi
African Update, Sept-Oct 31

Cameroon
African Update, Jan-Feb 32; May-Jun 36; Sept-Oct 32, 33
"The two senses of ethnonational self-determination" (book review), by Donald Rothchild, Nov-Dec 56

Canary Islands
African Update, Sept-Oct 25

Cape Verde
African Update, Jan-Feb 24, 25; Mar-Apr 29, 30; May-Jun 29; Sept-Oct 25

Central African Republic
African Update, Jan-Feb 32; Mar-Apr 39; May-Jun 36; Jul-Aug 30; Sept-Oct 32; Nov-Dec 32

Chad
African Update, Jan-Feb 25; Mar-Apr 28, 32, 41; May-Jun 29, 33, 38
"Politics in trans-Saharan Africa", by Robert A. Mortimer, May-Jun 47
African Update, Jul-Aug 24, 25, 27; Sept-Oct 25; Nov-Dec 24, 25, 35

China
African Update, Jul-Aug 23; Nov-Dec 27

Comoros
African Update, May-Jun 34; Nov-Dec 30

Congo
African Update, Jan-Feb 26; Mar-Apr 39; Jul-Aug 30
"U.S./Congo: Pragmatic relations", by Alexandre Mboukou, Nov-Dec 12

Cuba
African Update, May-Jun 41; Jul-Aug 23, 33; Sept-Oct 25; Nov-Dec 36

Diego Garcia
African Update, Sept-Oct 30

Djibouti
African Update, Jan-Feb 30; May-Jun 34; July-Aug 28; Sept-Oct 30; Nov-Dec 30.

Egypt
African Update, Jan-Feb 34; Mar-Apr 41; May-Jun 29, 38; July-Aug 32; Sept-Oct 34, 35; Nov-Dec 23, 35

Equatorial Guinea
African Update, May-Jun 36; Jul-Aug 30; Sept-Oct 32; Nov-Dec 32

Ethiopia
African Update, Jan-Feb 30, 31; Mar-Apr 37
"Policy options in the Horn", by Anthony J. Hughes, May-Jun 4
African Update, May-Jun 31, 34; July-Aug 28; Sept-Oct 30, 31; Nov-Dec 30

France
African Update, Jan-Feb 32, 33, 36; Mar-Apr 28, 32; May-Jun 36,38; Jul-Aug 26, 29, 30; Sept-Oct 23, 27, 28, 32, 33, 38; Nov-Dec 25, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34

Gabon
African Update, Jan-Feb 32, 33, 35; May-Jun 36; Sept-Oct 32; Nov-Dec 33

Gambia
African Update, Jan-Feb 26, 35; Mar-Apr 29, 41; May-Jun 29; Sept-Oct 25; Nov-Dec 25, 29
"After the rebellion", by Sulayman S. Nyang, Nov-Dec 47

Ghana
African Update, Jan-Feb 26, 35; Mar-Apr 29; May-Jun 29; Jul-Aug 25, 26; Nov-Dec 26

Guinea
African Update, Jan-Feb 26, 27; May-Jun 30

"Myth and reality of change", by Lansiné Kaba, May-Jun 53
African Update, Jul-Aug 26; Sept-Oct 27, 36; Nov-Dec 35

Guinea-Bissau
African Update, Jan-Feb 24; Mar-Apr 30; May-Jun 29, 30; Jul-Aug 26; Sept-Oct 25; Nov-Dec 26

Ivory Coast
African Update, Jan-Feb 27; May-Jun 30; Jul-Aug 26; Sept-Oct 27; Nov-Dec 26

Kenya
African Update, Jan-Feb 31; Mar-Apr 37,38
"Policy options in the Horn", by Anthony J. Hughes, May-Jun 4
African Update, May-Jun 34; Jul-Aug 23, 24, 28; Sept-Oct 30,31, 34, 35
"President Moi's delicate mission", by Anthony J. Hughes, Sept-Oct 50
"Nairobi press notebook", by Anthony J. Hughes, Sept-Oct 55
African Update, Nov-Dec 30

Lesotho
African Update, May-Jun 41; Sept-Oct 36; Nov-Dec 36

Liberia
African Update, Jan-Feb 27; Mar-Apr 30; May-Jun 31; July-Aug 26; Sept-Oct 27; Nov-Dec 26

Libya
African Update, Jan-Feb 25, 26, 34, 36; Mar-Apr 28, 30, 31, 32, 41; May-Jun 29, 31, 38
"Politics in trans-Saharan Africa", by Robert A. Mortimer, May-Jun 47
African Update, Jul-Aug 25, 27, 32; Sept-Oct 25, 34; Nov-Dec 24, 25, 27, 31, 32, 34, 35

Madagascar
African Update, Mar-Apr 38; May-Jun 35; Jul-Aug 29

Malawi
African Update, Mar-Apr 42; May-Jun 42; Jul-Aug 33; Sept-Oct 36

Mali
African Update, Jan-Feb 28; Mar-Apr 30; May-Jun 31; Sept-Oct 28, 36; Nov-Dec 27, 35

Mauritania
African Update, Mar-Apr 30; May-Jun 32, 40; Jul-Aug 24, 27; Sept-Oct 28, 36; Nov-Dec 27, 35

Mauritius
African Update, Jan-Feb 31; May-Jun 35; Sept-Oct 30; Nov-Dec 31

Morocco
African Update, Jan-Feb 35, 36; Mar-Apr 42; May-Jun 32, 38, 39, 40
"Politics in trans-Saharan Africa", by Robert A. Mortimer, May-Jun 47
African Update, Jul-Aug 24, 32; Sept-Oct 28, 35, 36; Nov-Dec 32, 34, 35

Mozambique
"Creating a new legal system", by Allen and Barbara Isaacman, Jan-Feb 19
African Update, Jan-Feb 25, 36
"Serapião criticizes review" (letter), Jan-Feb 55
African Update, Mar-Apr 42; May-Jun 42; Sept-Oct 23, 37; Nov-Dec 37

Namibia
"A U.S. policy for the '80s", by Chester A. Crocker *et al.*, Jan-Feb 7
African Update, Jan-Feb 23; Mar-Apr 29
"Which way in southern Africa?" by John Seiler, May-Jun 17
African Update, May-Jun 27; Jul-Aug 23, 24, 33
"In Washington: Building an Africa policy", by Richard Deutsch, Jul-Aug 44
African Update, Sept-Oct 23
"President Moi's delicate mission", by Anthony J. Hughes, Sept-Oct 50
"Congressman Howard Wolpe" (interview), Nov-Dec 4
"Reaction to the South African invasion" (document), by José Eduardo dos Santos, Nov-Dec 9
"Namibia/Angola linkages" (document), by Chester A. Crocker, Nov-Dec 10
"The American veto" (document), by Charles M. Lichenstein, Nov-Dec 10
African Update, Nov-Dec 23, 28, 30, 36

Niger
African Update, Mar-Apr 31; May-Jun 32; Jul-Aug 27; Sept-Oct 28; Nov-Dec 27

Nigeria
African Update, Jan-Feb 28, 35; Mar-Apr 31; May-Jun 32
"Nigeria's green revolution", by Alhaji Ibrahim Gusau, Jul-Aug 19
African Update, Jul-Aug 25, 26, 27
"Nigerian-American relations" (document), by Donald B. Easum, Jul-Aug 52
African Update, Sept-Oct 28, 32, 36; Nov-Dec 25, 27, 35

Portugal
African Update, Jan-Feb 33; Jul-Aug 26; Sept-Oct 38; Nov-Dec 36

Rwanda
African Update, Jul-Aug 30, Sept-Oct 31

Sao Tome and Principe
African Update, Jan-Feb 33; Sept-Oct 33

Senegal
African Update, Jan-Feb 26, 29, 35; Mar-Apr 32, 41; May-Jun 32, 33; Jul-Aug 28; Sept-Oct 25, 29; Nov-Dec 25, 28

Seychelles
African Update, Jan-Feb 31; May-Jun 35; Jul-Aug 29

Sierra Leone
African Update, Jan-Feb 30; May-Jun 34; Jul-Aug 25, 28, 32; Sept-Oct 29, 36; Nov-Dec 29, 35

Somalia
African Update, Jan-Feb 30, 31, 34; Mar-Apr 38
"Policy options in the Horn", by Anthony J. Hughes, May-June 4
"Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Aden, Somali Minister of Information and National Guidance", (interview), May-Jun 12
"Mohamed Diriye Urdoh, secretary-general of the Western Somali Liberation Front" (interview), May-Jun 15
African Update, May-Jun 34, 35; Jul-Aug 28, 29; Sept-Oct 31; Nov-Dec 31

South Africa
"A U.S. policy for the '80s", by Chester A. Crocker *et al.*, Jan-Feb 7
African Update, Jan-Feb 23, 24, 25, 29, 33, 37
"Thozamile Botha, South African trade union leader" (interview), Jan-Feb 42
"U.S. firms and South African divestment" (document), Jan-Feb 45
African Update, Mar-Apr 27, 29
"Which way in southern Africa?", by John Seiler, May-Jun 17
"Reagan's unruly review", by Richard Deutsch, May-Jun 23
African Update, May-Jun 27, 38, 35, 41, 42
"Southern African reactions to Reagan", by Gwendolen M. Carter, May-Jun 43
African Update, Jul-Aug 23, 24, 33, 34
"In Washington: Building an Africa policy", by Richard Deutsch, Jul-Aug 44
"U.S. companies in South Africa", by Carol B. Thompson (book review) Jul-Aug 54

"The future of South Africa", by Bishop Desmond Tutu, Sept-Oct 4
"Reagan's policy rupture", by Henry F. Jackson, Sept-Oct 9
"Donald B. Sole, South African ambassador to the United States" (interview), Sept-Oct 14
"Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress of South Africa" (interview), Sept-Oct 20
African Update, Sept-Oct 23, 24, 37
"Time IS running out", by Senator Paul Tsongas, Sept-Oct 39
"What prospects for human rights?", by Wilfrid Grenville-Grey, Sept-Oct 41
"Is partition the answer?", by Stanley Uys, Sept-Oct 45
"President Moi's delicate mission", by Anthony J. Hughes, Sept-Oct 50
"South Africa: a new direction?" (book review), by Sheridan Johns, Sept-Oct 58
"Congressman Howard Wolpe" (interview), Nov-Dec 4
"Reaction to the South African invasion" (document), by José Eduardo dos Santos, Nov-Dec 9
"The American veto" (document), by Charles M. Lichenstein, Nov-Dec 10
African Update, Nov-Dec 23, 24, 28, 30, 31, 36, 37

Spain
African Update, Nov-Dec 27, 32

Sudan
African Update, Jan-Feb 35; Mar-Apr 41; May-Jun 39; Jul-Aug 28
"New hope for the Sudan", by Andrew Lycett, Jul-Aug 37
African Update, Sept-Oct 30, 35, 36; Nov-Dec 23, 34, 35

Swaziland
African Update, Jan-Feb 38

Tanzania
African Update, Jan-Feb 32; Mar-Apr 38; May-Jun 35; Jul-Aug 29; Sept-Oct 30, 31, 36, 37; Nov-Dec 31, 35
"Tourism: Tanzania's controversial industry", by Peter Marshall, Nov-Dec 52

Togo
African Update, Jan-Feb 26, 27
"Trade, tourism, and mild repression", by F.S.B. Kazadi, Nov-Dec 39

Tunisia
African Update, Jan-Feb 36; Mar-Apr 41; May-Jun 40; Jul-Aug 33; Sept-Oct 35; Nov-Dec 35

Uganda
African Update, Jan-Feb 32, 33; Mar-Apr 38; May-Jun 35; Jul-Aug 29; Sept-Oct 30, 31; Nov-Dec 31

United States
"Reagan and Africa", by Richard Deutsch, Jan-Feb 4
"A U.S. policy for the '80s", by Chester A. Crocker *et al.*, Jan-Feb 7
African Update, Jan-Feb 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 36
"U.S. firms and South African divestment" (document), Jan-Feb 45
"Africa between Republican and Democratic administrations", by Ali A. Mazrui, Jan-Feb 46
"Major policy issues for the 1980s" (excerpt from a speech), by Congressman William H. Gray, Mar-Apr 22
African Update, Mar-Apr 30, 31, 37, 41
"African from a strategic perspective", by Richard Deutsch, Mar-Apr 47
"Policy options in the Horn", by Anthony J. Hughes, May-Jun 4
"Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Aden, Somali Minister of Information and National Guidance" (interview), May-Jun 12
"Which way in southern Africa?", by John Seiler, May-Jun 17
"Reagan's unruly review", by Richard Deutsch, May-Jun 23
African Update, May-Jun 27, 29, 31, 32, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42
"Southern African reactions to Reagan", by Gwendolen M. Carter, May-Jun 43
African Update, Jul-Aug 23, 24, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34
"Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum" (interview), Jul-Aug 35
"Building an Africa policy", by Richard Deutsch, Jul-Aug 44
"Nigerian/American relations", by Donald B. Easum (document) Jul-Aug 52
"The United States and Africa", by Chester A. Crocker (document) Sept-Oct 6
"Reagan's policy rupture", by Henry F. Jackson, Sept-Oct 9
"Donald B. Sole, South African ambassador to the United States" (interview), Sept-Oct 14
African Update, Sept-Oct 23, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38
"Time IS running out", by Senator Paul Tsongas, Sept-Oct 39
"President Moi's delicate mission", by Anthony J. Hughes, Sept-Oct 50
"Congressman Howard Wolpe" (interview), Nov-Dec 4
"The American veto" (document), by Charles M. Lichenstein, Nov-Dec 10
"U.S./Congo: Pragmatic relations", by Alexandre Mboukou, Nov-Dec 12
"U.S. policy toward Zaire" (document), Nov-Dec 22
African Update, Nov-Dec 23, 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36
"Aid as foreign policy", by Goler Teal Butcher, Nov-Dec 43

Upper Volta
African Update, Jan-Feb 30; Mar-Apr 32; Sept-Oct 29; Nov-Dec 29

USSR
"A U.S. policy for the '80s", by Chester A. Crocker, *et al.*, Jan-Feb 7
African Update, Jan-Feb 25, 31, 37, 38; Mar-Apr 39
"Policy options in the Horn," by Anthony J. Hughes, May-Jun 4
"Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Aden, Somali Minister of Information and National Guidance" (interview), May-Jun 12
African Update, May-Jun 29, 38, 39; Jul-Aug 27, 28, 30, 32; Sept-Oct 23, 26; Nov-Dec 24, 30, 31, 32, 36

Western Sahara
African Update, Jan-Feb 35, 36; Mar-Apr 40, 41; May-Jun 32, 38, 39, 40
"Politics in trans-Saharan Africa", by Robert A. Mortimer, May-Jun 47
African Update, Jul-Aug 24, 27, 32; Sept-Oct 28, 35; Nov-Dec 34, 35

Yemen
African Update, Jul-Aug 28

Zaire
African Update, Jan-Feb 33; Mar-Apr 39; May-Jun 37; Jul-Aug 31
"Recovery or relapse?", by F.S.B. Kazadi, Jul-Aug 40
African Update, Sept-Oct 33
"The situation in Zaire", by Nguza Karl-I-Bond (document), Nov-Dec 19
"U.S. policy toward Zaire" (document), Nov-Dec 22
African Update, Nov-Dec 33

Zambia
African Update, Jan-Feb 33; Mar-Apr 40; May-Jun 37; Jul-Aug 29, 31; Sept-Oct 23, 33; Nov-Dec 33

Zimbabwe
"A U.S. policy for the '80s", by Chester A. Crocker *et al.*, Jan-Feb 7
African Update, Jan-Feb 23, 36; Mar-Apr 27, 42
"Teurai Ropa Nhongo, Zimbabwe Minister of Community Development and Women's Affairs" (interview), Mar-Apr 49
African Update, May-Jun 27, 42
"Southern African reactions to Reagan", by Gwendolen M. Carter, May-Jun 43
"The first year", by Gwendolen M. Carter, May-Jun 62
"Rural reform in Zimbabwe", by Frank C. Ballance, Jul-Aug 9
African Update, Jul-Aug 23
"Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, Zimbabwe Minister of Information and Tourism" (interview), Jul-Aug 48
African Update, Sept-Oct 23, 24, 37, 38; Nov-Dec 37, 38

170,000 metric tons of imported food will be needed to tide the country over till the next harvest in June. Western officials said they were baffled as to why the government, as of November, had made no formal requests to foreign governments for food aid. (London *Guardian*, October 28 and November 26, 1981.)

Uganda

• Paulo Muwanga, the Vice President and Defense Minister, acknowledged in November that the **Ugandan army** was responsible for some "incidents," namely the killing and torture of thousands of civilians that reportedly has helped fuel the guerrillas seeking to overthrow the government of President Milton Obote.

Muwanga also inaugurated the first vigilante group of 600 men who are supposed to report the presence of "wrong elements" to the army.

There were more reported "incidents" in November involving the army—the massacre by troops of 15 villagers in Kikandwa, only 43 miles from Kampala and the killing by troops of about a dozen village elders in Karamoja district who had protested against excesses by the army. In Kampala, foreign diplomats urged to the government to improve security following 30 violent hijackings of diplomats' cars in a two week period. The cars are sold across the border in Zaire for as much as $50,000 each.

American correspondent Thomas Lansner, who spent 11 days visiting anti-Obote guerrillas outside Kampala, claimed they enjoy "widespread and solid support of the people among whom they live" and that the guerrillas "feed on the discontent caused by the brutality of the Ugandan army" (*see also page 42*). (London *Guardian*, November 26, 1981; London *Observer*, November 15 and 22, 1981; Kenya *Weekly Review*, November 13, 1981.)

CENTRAL AFRICA

Cameroon

• Discussing Cameroon's fifth five-year **development plan**, introduced in late October, President Ahmadou Ahidjo said that agriculture is the key sector of the economy, employing 70 percent of the working population, and maintains a 30 percent share of gross domestic product, earning 70 percent of its foreign exchange.

Ahidjo said seven main objectives with regard to agricultural development will be the focus of the development plan, including new structures to govern relations between the administration and farmers, improvement of living conditions in rural areas, definition of an agricultural pricing policy to increase farmers' incomes, and intensification of training for field staff working in rural areas.

The Cameroon President, in a speech inaugurating the Song-Lulu hydroelectric dam, said Cameroon is almost self-sufficient in energy, producing 95 percent of its needs in electrical power. Oil production was expected to reach 80,000 barrels per day in 1981 and 100,000 in three years.

According to a Douala-based weekly, *La Gazette*, the cost of living has increased sharply since mid-1981, particularly in the cities of Douala and Yaounde. The prices of rice, cocoyams, plantains, fish, meat and palm oil have doubled or tripled since July. School fees and the price of books and uniforms have also increased (*West Africa*, November 2, 9 and 23, 1981; Yaounde Radio, November 4, 1981.)

Central African Republic

• Gen. André Kolingba, commander of the Central African army who overthrew President David Dacko last September, said his government has taken on the tasks of relaunching the **economy** and "creating conditions favorable for the exercise of real democracy." He said the army has no intention of holding onto power, but that his government would only accomplish its mission when it had implemented "the machinery of a healthy economy allowing a decent standard of living."

In October, Kolingba condemned certain state sectors of the economy for "serious mismanagement" and said sanctions will be imposed upon the guilty, who were said to include the directors of the Central African national bank and investment bank. All state and mixed economy enterprises are to be inspected for losses.

Kolingba's economic policies are centered on reducing public expenditure and improving agricultural production. He announced austerity measures to avert "economic catastrophe," freezing civil service wages until the end of 1982 and retiring 1,000 civil servants. Priority is to be placed on creating jobs in the private sector and infrastructure is to be improved. (*West Africa*, October 5 and 12, November 16, 1981.)

Equatorial Guinea

• Equatorial Guinea is believed to hold promising petroleum deposits, reportedly interesting at least eleven U.S. oil companies including **Texaco**, **Exxon** and **Mobil**, and the French Elf Aquitaine and Compagnie Française des Petroles. The international companies are expected to bid for exploration permits in the near future.

Spain, Equatorial Guinea's former colonial power, has taken the lead in the emerging oil industry, as its state-owned oil company, Hispanoil, began exploration in Guinean waters shortly after the overthrow of dictator Macias Nguema in 1979.

An oil industry source said, "Hispanoil is very confident that they're going to find oil," and "is already talking about having a rig operating there full-time by the end of [1982] and starting development in 1983."

In early 1980, Hispanoil formed a joint venture with the Equatorial Guinean government, called GEPSA, and is believed to have been granted the choicest lease for exploration—an 800 square mile area north of the island of Bioko (Fernando Póo).

The government of Col. Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo also recently approved a petroleum law, written by World Bank personnel, offering very liberal terms to oil companies in order to attract needed capital. (*West Africa*, November 23, 1981; *Business Week*, November 9, 1981.)

Gabon

• Gabon's President Omar Bongo said recently that he seeks to increase his country's stake in three **French-controlled companies** from the present 10 percent to approximately 25 to 30 percent, indicating a cooling in Gabon's relationship with its former colonial power. The companies involved are Elf Gabon, a subsidiary of Elf Aquitaine; Compagnie Minière de l'Ogooue, a manganese producer part-owned by **U.S. Steel** and the French government; and the French state-controlled Compagnie des Mines d'Uranium de Franceville.

The three companies represent over 90 percent of Gabon's industrial assets.

Bongo has reportedly been angered over remarks about him in the French press—what he characterized as "the campaign of calumnies against my person and my government."

In late October, he embarked on a European tour to Italy, Luxembourg and Belgium seeking to diversify Gabon's trade, and also met with a British delegation of exporters. British and American firms were said to be favored to build a new airport in Libreville and the British contractors, Taylor-Woodrow and Wimpey, were expected to be retained for the second phase of the trans-Gabon railroad, worth about $800 million. (*West Africa*, November 2, 1981; *Economist*, October 24, 1981.)

Rwanda

• Maj. Theoneste Lizinde, a former head of security, and Alphonse Kagenza received death sentences in November, after having been accused of **plotting** to overthrow the government of President Juvenal Habyarimana. In addition, 23 others were sentenced to jail terms of from two to 23 years, and 24 were acquitted. (London *Times*, November 27, 1981.)

Zaire

• In early October, President Mobutu Sese Seko dismissed his entire **cabinet** and replaced nearly half of the 26 with new ministers. Bomboko Lokumba, the deputy prime minister and Foreign Minister, was replaced in the first post by Vunduawe Te Pemako. The new Foreign Minister is Yoka Mangono. The Prime Minister, N'singa Udjuu, retained his post.

Observers alleged that the cabinet reshuffle was intended to consolidate Mobutu's regime in the face of increasing criticism from within and outside the government. The Roman Catholic Church recently accused the government of "kidnapings, arbitrary arrests, settling of scores and even torture."

Former Prime Minister Nguza Karl-I-Bond, in exile in Brussels, has been very vocal in criticism of the Mobutu regime, warning the West to cease its support. Nguza visited Washington in September where he testified before the House subcommittee on African affairs. Mobutu, reportedly seeking additional military assistance from the U.S. government, was also in Washington in late November and held talks with President Reagan, Secretary of State Haig and other high officials.

And, according to a recent report, the director of finance at the National University of Zaire, Bihise Kajunju, on leave to complete studies in the U.S., said he was leading an underground group in Zaire, "Odelife," which hopes to overthrow Mobutu. He said Odelife was formed under a false name in 1979 and is legally recognized by the Zairian government as a self-help organization. It has 4,000 members which are said to include students, businessmen, government and military leaders.

Kajunju, who has applied for political asylum in the U.S., said, "We want to disintegrate the dictator's authority within his own political organizations and put various pressures on him to force him to resign. We do not use deadly weapons, we use peaceful political means." (Kenya *Weekly Review*, October 16 and November 11, 1981; *West Africa*, November 2, 1981.)

Zambia

• Following the release of the chairman of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Frederick Chiluba, after three months in detention, President Kenneth Kaunda achieved a **truce with the unions** during a joint seminar in late October.

Chiluba and three other labor leaders were detained after a series of copper mine strikes earlier in 1981 for alleged conspiracy to incite labor unrest aimed ultimately at taking over the government.

Kaunda, in a speech before an economic seminar of government and union officials, said that no one outside Zambia could solve the nation's problems, apparently a reference to claims that the ZCTU had received assistance from Western organizations. He said, "It is we in the labor movement and in the party, either as leaders or members, acting together that will solve the problems of the nation."

In early November, Newstead Zimba, general secretary of the ZCTU; Chitalu Sampa, his deputy; and Timothy Walamba, deputy chairman of the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia, were also freed.

Meanwhile, in early November, the hearings of 13 men charged with plotting to overthrow the government were adjourned until the end of the month to allow defense lawyers to prepare their cases. Troops armed with rocket launchers and sub-machine guns sealed off the court where the hearings were being conducted. Those charged include Edward Shamwana, a lawyer, Valentine Musakanya, former governor of the Bank of Zambia, and three army officers. (London *Guardian*, October 30, November 2 and 14, 1981; London *Times*, November 3 and 10, 1981.)

NORTHERN AFRICA

Algeria

• President François Mitterrand paid an **official visit** to Algeria in early December, only the second time a French President has visited the country since the eight-year war which ended over a century of French colonial rule. Mitterrand's trip was designed to achieve a reconciliation between the two countries after years of bitterness.

Former French President Giscard d'Estaing's 1975 state visit to Algiers was hailed as the beginning of a new era of cooperation. However, the meeting marked little improvement in relations.

Thousands of Algerians turned out to cheer the arrival of the socialist president, who held discussions with Algerian President Chadli Benjedid and addressed the country's national assembly. The French President told legislators that it was time for the two countries "to establish exemplary relations at last," possible because of the "new climate" between them "arising from our common commitment to the socialist ideal and our attachment to national independence." Mitterrand also praised as heroes the men who fought France for independence.

On one major issue of contention between Algeria and France—the price Algeria will charge for its liquefied natural gas (LNG)—a tentative agreement was reached between the two presidents. Negotiations between Sonatrach, Algeria's state-owned oil and natural gas company, and Gaz de France, had been going on for nearly two years and were deadlocked over Algeria's insistence on aligning the price of its gas to that of its crude oil. Details of the tentative accord were not released. (*Financial Times*, November 30, December 1, 2, and 3, 1981; London *Guardian*, December 1 and 2, 1981; London *Times*, December 1 and 2, 1981.)

Egypt

• Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak outlined the **priorities** he has set for his government in a speech to the parliament one month after the October assassination of his predecessor, Anwar Sadat. Differentiating himself from Sadat, who had placed a major emphasis on foreign policy issues, Mubarak said Egypt's serious economic problems would be his focus. "Our greatest challenge is simply whether we are to be or not to be," he said.

Economic and social justice in an "equal society, not a society of privileges and class distinctions," must be the basis for "peace and stability" in Egypt, he said.

Mubarak emphasized a basic needs approach for the Egyptian economy, placing priority on projects for public housing, clothing and medicine. Subsidies on essential items, costing the government \$2.3 billion per year, will be reshaped to benefit the truly needy and expenditure by both private and public sectors curbed. Imports will be controlled to place emphasis on domestically produced goods.

Mubarak reiterated his commitment to Egypt's peace agreement with Israel, and also warned the Egyptian society must "cleanse itself of the plague" of religious terrorism. About 750 religious extremists have been arrested since Mubarak became president, and the trials of the men detained for the assassination of Sadat were continuing in December.

In late November, Mubarak released from prison 31 prominent politicians and journalists jailed by Sadat. Those released included five former cabinet ministers, including Mohamed Heikal, Minister of Information under Gamal Abdel Nasser and former editor of *Al Ahram*.

The released were among 1,500 arrested in September in a crackdown against dissidents Sadat had accused of instigating strife between Moslems and the Coptic Christian minority. Mubarak's release of the men was taken as a favorable indication of his commitment to national reconciliation. (Washington *Post*, November 13 and 26, 1981; *Financial Times*, November 9, 1981; *Wall Street Journal*, November 9, 1981.)

Libya

• **Exxon**, the largest American oil company, announced in November that it was pulling its operations out of Libya, reportedly for a combination of economic and political motivations. On the economic side, because of the high price Libya charges for its oil, the country's output has fallen during the past six months from two million barrels per day to less than 700,000 per day. Exxon's oil production in Libya had correspondingly fallen to a quarter of what it once was.

Mobil Oil Corp. announced that it halted its oil production in Libya on November 1 and that it was reviewing its operations there. Neither Mobil nor Exxon would cite reasons for their actions, however.

On the political side, relations between the U.S. and Libya have been deterioriating steadily during the Reagan administration, which regards the Muammar Qaddafy regime as the main source of international terrorism. Washington has been seeking various means of exerting pressure on Qaddafy and isolating him in world public opinion.

Morocco

• A series of high-level **American delegations** visited Morocco in November and December, indicating the Reagan administration's aim to strengthen what it perceives as moderate Arab and African nations to offset the influence of Libya. The meetings also demonstrated a turnaround on U.S. policy toward Morocco with regard to the war in the Western Sahara, in the American willingness to supply the country with additional arms.

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger met with King Hassan and other Moroccan officials in Fez in early December, returning to Washington with "a lot of messages" for President Reagan. Secretary of State Alexander Haig was expected to visit Hassan in late December, and the Moroccan monarch was slated to meet Reagan in Washington early this year.

In November, a 23-member high-level U.S. military team headed by the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, Francis West, paid a three-day visit to Rabat and left a renewed assurance of American backing for Morocco in its war against the Polisario front for control of the Western Sahara.

In October, Morocco suffered what was regarded as a defeat by Polisario forces at the Moroccan garrison of Guelta Zemmour. Hassan's government was said to have been shaken by the reversal, in which four planes were lost and Polisario was reported to have used for the first time T-54 tanks and sophisticated Soviet-built ground-to-air missiles.

It is believed that Hassan is seeking American equipment to allow Moroccan forces to reconnoiter the Sahara without being shot down by Polisario missiles or anti-aircraft fire. West confirmed that the U.S. would assist Moroccan ground and air forces with a military training program and with radar detection and jamming equipment, but denied that Rabat had requested AWACs planes. West added that Polisario's escalation of the war was likely to obstruct Hassan's proposal for a ceasefire and referendum for the Sahara, and that it gave "a new and added urgency" to the American military visits.

Meanwhile the new U.S. ambassador to Morocco, Joseph Verner Reed, said upon presenting his credentials to Hassan in November: "The leadership of the Reagan administration has stated that your country's concerns are my country's concerns. The U.S. will do its best to be helpful in every area of need that may arise. Count on us. We are with you."

The Reagan administration's emerging policy is a reversal of that of its predecessor, which had linked arms sales to progress in reaching a diplomatic settlement to the conflict. (*Wall Street Journal*, December 4, 1981; New York *Times*, November 19 and 23, 1981; Washington *Post*, November 5 and 10, 1981.)

Sudan

• In early November, President Gaafar al-Nimeiry fired his entire cabinet and implemented an IMF-sponsored economic recovery package which included reducing food subsidies and devaluing the currency in return for a $230 million credit.

Nimeiry blamed his cabinet for its inability to improve the state of the economy and vowed to appoint a new one which would carry out the harsh IMF prescriptions designed to stem economic collapse.

The new cabinet, named in late November, was reduced in size from 23 to 19, and nine ministers were re-appointed to the same posts, including those in charge of the interior and foreign affairs. Nimeiry took over himself the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources. The ministries of planning and finance were merged into one to be headed by Ibrahim Mansour. Former Finance Minister Badr Eddin Suleiman and former Planning Minister Nasr Eddin Mustapha were excluded from the new cabinet.

In return for the 12-month $230 million IMF stand-by credit, Nimeiry devalued the Sudanese pound by 12.5 percent and instituted a 40 percent tax increase on oil and 10 percent tax rise on imports, part of an 18-point recovery plan.

Another measure which was expected to be volatile was the abolition of the government subsidy on cooking oil, and a gradual phasing out of the subsidies on wheat and sugar. Nimeiry had previously refused to do away with the subsidies, mindful of the 1977 food riots in Egypt when subsidies there were cut. The subsidies had reportedly been costing the Sudanese government over $1 billion per year.

Despite the IMF support, Sudan has a public debt of $3 billion, which Western creditors agreed to reschedule in 1979 and were likely to do so again late in 1981, and a trade deficit of $500 million. Although the Sudanese government was quick to warn of the Libyan threat after the death of Anwar Sadat, most observers see the desperate state of the economy as the main potential source of instability in Sudan.

Sudan already receives $215 million in economic and military aid from the U.S. government—more American assistance than any other sub-Saharan African nation—but with the Reagan administration's preoccupation with the Libyan regime of Muammar Qaddafy, particularly in the wake of Sadat's death, it was expected that the amount of aid to Khartoum would increase. (Kenya *Weekly Review*, November 13 and 27, 1981; *Economist*, November 14, 1981; London *Times*, November 11, 1981; Washington *Post*, November 11, 1981.)

Tunisia

• An electoral alliance between the ruling Socialist Destour Party (PSD) and the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT)—the National Front—swept the country's first multi-party legislative **elections**, winning all 136 seats amid charges of vote fraud by the opposition parties.

The Movement of Social Democrats, the Movement for Popular Unity and the Communist Party held a joint press conference during the November 1 balloting to announce that they were withdrawing their observers from the polling places to protect voting irregularities.

Among the opposition parties' complaints were: intimidation of voters, arrests of opposition candidates, harassment of their meetings by government-paid thugs, and a refusal by the authorities to allow the majority of their observers access to polling stations and counting of votes.

The Interior Minister, Driss Guiga, said the election had taken place "in normal conditions" and blamed the opposition groups for their observers not being present at the voting places. He said their names and addresses had not been given to the authorities in time.

Few observers, however, believed that the official results of the election were an accurate reflection of voter preference, given, for example, that Social Democrat leader Ahmed Mestiri received only 1,600 votes out of a possible 78,000 in his own constituency. Mestiri, in the election's aftermath, said: "I formally accuse the Minister of Interior and his agents of having fixed the elections and falsified the results."

And in late November, Habib Achour, former secretary-general of the UGTT, was pardoned by President Habib Bourguiba, and immediately returned to his post at the head of the union. Achour had been imprisoned in the labor unrest in January 1978 and was released from jail in 1980; however, he remained under house arrest which prohibited him from engaging in any union activities. *Le Monde* indicated that the President's action was probably also intended to defuse increasing social tensions marked by a series of strikes over price increases while salaries remained frozen for over eight months. (*Le Monde*, November 2 and December 3, 1981; *Economist*, November 7, 1981; London *Times*, November 4, 1981; New York *Times*, November 2 and 4, 1981.)

Western Sahara

• The biggest **battle** in the six-year war between Morocco and the Polisario front for control of the Western Sahara took place in mid-October at Guelta Zemmour, a Moroccan garrison, and was regarded as a major setback for King Hassan. Although both sides claimed victory in the battle, Polisario shot down four Moroccan aircraft with ground-to-air missiles and took the Moroccan garrison by surprise using Soviet-made T-54 tanks for the first time in the war.

According to a late November report, the Moroccan army, after having recaptured the Guelta Zemmour garrison in late October, abandoned it and another key outpost, Bir Anzaran, to Polisario. The posts were evacuated and all military installations dynamited because they had reportedly become "undefendable" after the October battle.

The latest escalation in hostilities between Morocco and Polisario put to rest hopes that Hassan's conditional acceptance of a ceasefire and referendum for the Sahara, part of the OAU peace plan, would come to fruition.

In late November, however, Hassan met with Algerian Foreign Minister Mohamed Benyahia—the highest level contact since Morocco severed diplomatic relations with Algeria over five years ago because of Algerian support for Polisario—reportedly to defuse the tension in the Western Sahara. (New York *Times*, November 29, 1981: London *Times*, October 15 and November 28, 1981; *Financial Times*, October 22, 1981; London *Guardian*, October 22, 1981.)

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

• Angola's only oil refinery, the Petrangol plant near Luanda, was the target of **sabotage** in late November, in which powerful bombs destroyed two fuel tanks and "thousands of liters" of oil. The 31,000-barrel a day refinery, owned partly by the Angolan government and Petrofina, the Belgium-based oil company, was not affected by the blaze, although it was expected that Angola will have to import some oil products for a time.

The Angolan government said the saboteurs were white mercenaries employed by South Africa and were trying to cut off oil supplies to Angolan troops fighting the South African army in the south of the country. Lt. Col. Pedro Van Dunem, the Oil and Energy Minister who replaced Jorge Morais in November, said the bodies of two white men who blew themselves up in the attack were evidence.

Meanwhile, Jonas Savimbi, leader of the anti-government Unita rebels, in the U.S. to meet with high-level officials in December, said his organization had carried out the refinery attack. In a reversal of Carter administration policy, the Reagan administration agreed to hold talks with Savimbi because, according to a State Department spokesman, the government "has stated that the U.S. considers Unita to be a legitimate political force in Angola which must be taken into account." (Washington *Post*, December 4, 6 and 10, 1981; New York *Times*, December 3, 1981; *Financial Times*, December 2, 1981.)

Mozambique

• Portuguese President Antonio Ramalho Eanes received a warm welcome from Mozambique, Portugal's former colony, when he paid an **official visit** to Maputo in late November along with his Foreign Minister, Andre Goncalves Pereira, and other officials and businessmen.

Relations between the two countries had been tense since Mozambique's independence in 1975, aggravated by the fact that all but 20,000 of the 200,000 Portuguese living in the former colony left, leaving gaps in the new nation's civil service, industry and agriculture. In the past two years, however, a growing number of Portuguese officials, teachers, agronomists and financial experts have traveled to Mozambique offering their services.

Portugal has also waived for the time being settlement of claims for compensation for Portuguese assets nationalized by the Mozambique government after independence.

Several economic and cultural agreements were signed by Eanes and Mozambique President Samora Machel, although the rapprochement was nearly scuttled by a disparaging remark Machel made about Pereira, who had served under the Salazar government, at a farewell banquet for Eanes. Only the Portuguese President's intervention requesting an apology from Machel, who complied, saved the progress made by the visit. (London *Times*, November 25 and December 3, 1981.)

South Africa

• The security police acknowledged in mid-November that 111 people were in **detention**, 108 of them jailed under the indefinite detention without charges law, Section Six of the Terrorism Act, which is used for interrogation. On November 27, 14 trade unionists and others were arrested under the 14-day detention law.

Among them are: Sam Kikine, general secretary of the South African Allied Workers' Union; Emma Mashinini, general secretary of the Commercial Catering and Allied Workers' Union; Samson Ndou and Rita Mdzanga, executives of the General and Allied Workers' Union.

The figures released to opposition parliamentarian Helen Suzman differed from those compiled by the independent Institute of Race Relations, which estimated that as many as 220 people are in detention. Under the security laws, police do not have to reveal who is being detained, only those people whose names are specified. Police said an additional 23 persons were being detained as witnesses in impending security law trials.

About a dozen people were released in late October and early November after having spent up to seven months in detention.

Zimbabwe

• **Minimum wage increases** of up to 67 percent and a pay freeze for those earning above $27,500 took effect in Zimbabwe on January 1.

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe said the pay package was aimed at narrowing the gap between rich and poor. The poorest paid workers, in agricultural and domestic service, will now earn a minimum of $70 a month. Industrial workers and miners got increases of 23.5 percent to a monthly minimum of about $150. Mugabe said price controls were also being considered to ensure that commerce and industry did not pass on the higher labor costs to consumers.

Businessmen were generally dismayed by the increases. A Zimbabwe Tobacco Association spokesman called the increases "untimely and mammoth."

The pay rises followed a week of strikes in October by black teachers and nurses, who work for the government and earn between $130 and $635 monthly. About 80 teachers were fired and some 800 demonstrating nurses and teachers were arrested under recently enacted emergency regulations designed to cover political activity. (*Financial Times*, December 4, 1981; London *Guardian*, October 21 and 24, 1981.)

The Agricultural Situation

THE ECONOMY

Moderate economic expansion took place during 1980, as Nigeria's new civilian Government, headed by President Shagari, completed its first full year. Real economic growth continued at 6 to 7 percent, with OPEC price increases boosting the economy. Real GDP is estimated at $87.6 billion, of which agriculture accounts for $9 billion. Inflation plagues the economy, and though the rate is officially estimated at 10 percent it may be closer to 25 percent for food, transportation, and housing. The interim 1980 budget for April 1-December 31 has provisionally registered a small deficit, but final figures later this year may show some changes. The 1981 budget has been formulated at $22.8 billion.

During 1980, Nigeria maintained oil output of around 2 million barrels per day. A steady flow of petroleum earnings elevated foreign exchanges reserves to a record $10 billion and put the debt service ratio at a favorable level. Although the Government intended to maintain oil output at over 2 million barrels per day, output for the first six months of this year has averaged only 1.6 million. The decline in world demand has caused this production drop and has reduced oil export earnings. Proceeds for 1981 were projected at $24 billion, but will likely fall short of this. As of the end of May, foreign exchange reserves stood at $8 billion.

The huge foreign exchange reserves accumulated during the later part of 1979 and early part of 1980 allowed Nigeria to increase its monthly import bill from $1.03 billion to $1.7 billion between October 1979 and September 1980. Over this period, capital goods comprised $9.5 billion, intermediate goods such as consumer products accounted for $4.5 billion, and raw and processed food products accounted for $3.1 billion of the total import bill. The liberalization of import restrictions allowed these imports to rise so rapidly.

To offset increasing imports, expansion of manufacturing and food production are the stated aims of the Fourth Development Plan announced in early 1981. As part of the plan to increase industrial and agricultural production, the Federal Government has begun to liberalize restrictions on foreign equity ownership in joint ventures in agriculture. To increase investment in the agricultural sector, the Nigerian Government signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the U.S. Government in July 1980. The agreement established the Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee (JACC) comprised of representatives from various American agri-business firms and their Nigerian counterparts. The role of the JACC is to promote joint ventures and investments by U.S. firms in the Nigerian agricultural sector, especially in large-scale farming, food processing, and agricultural infrastructure. In addition, the MOU includes provisions for a soil survey and future technical and scientific training to be carried out by the U.S. Government.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Total grain production in 1980 increased by 295,000 tons, 3 percent over 1979 levels. Generally favorable weather throughout the country accounted for the good harvests. Production of sorghum, a major staple crop in the north, increased slightly to 3.81 million tons in 1980. The official producer price was raised from $210 per ton to $364 per ton for the 1980 season, but the market price dropped well below this level. Millet production failed to increase because of a long dry period following rains at the beginning of the season. Prodction was uanchanged from the 1979 level, 3.13 million tons. The official producer price for millet was increased from $210 a ton to $381, but

This is the text of the Nigeria section of *Agricultural Situation: Africa and the Middle East; Review of 1980 and Outlook for 1981*, published in August 1981 by the U.S. Department of Agriculture as supplement no. 7 to WAS 24.


Photo: Gulf Oil Corp.

Earnings from oil production fuel Nigeria's development plans

the market price was actually well above this level. The huge demand for millet, an important staple during the hungry period in August, induced clandestine trade of the bumper crop from Niger.

Wheat production increased from 10,000 tons to 15,000 in 1980. Because of climatic limitations, Nigeria will never become a substantial wheat producer and will have to depend on imports to meet its continually expanding demand.

Corn production increased to 1.72 million tons in 1980. Increased area, greater availability of fertilizers, and use of improved seed accounted for this increase. The official producer price was raised from $250 to $346 per ton, as the Government attempted to promote production.

Paddy rice production increased by 19 percent to 1.03 million tons, on an area of 550,000 hectares. The producer price was increased from $460 to $570 per ton, as rice is also a crop strongly encouraged by the Government. Although rice production has nearly doubled over the past 5 years, domestic demand has increased faster, necessitating ever-growing imports, estimated at 600,000 tons for 1981.

Peanut production increased, mostly because of favorable weather. Supplies bought by the Groundnut Marketing Board are estimated at 30,000 tons, resulting from an increase in the producer price paid by the Board. Nevertheless, much of the peanut production is traded through unofficial channels or consumed on the farm, leaving Nigeria considerably short of its vegetable oil needs. Production of palm oil remained at the 1979 level of 510,000 tons.

Cocoa production for 1980/81 is estimated at 169,000 tons, a slight decrease from 1979/80, although the latter crop was 21 percent over the previous year. This year's lower crop is due to unfavorable weather and continued decline in the productivity of the aging cocoa trees. The producer price for the 1981/82 season has been increased by 26 percent to $1.10 per pound, slightly above the current world price. Beginning in 1982, new production is expected to come from young trees planted as part of World Bank cocoa rehabilitation projects. However, little overall increase in production is foreseen as the new output will be offset by the reduced production from older trees.

Production of raw sugar for 1980 was 32,194 tons, a 10-percent increase over 1979. Preliminary estimates for 1981 indicate an increase to 42,000 tons, as a second large plantation and mill will come into production. The 1980 production increase halted a 5-year decline caused by labor problems and a shortage of spare parts. A new mill located in Gongola State is expected to begin production this year, and including the currently operating Bacita Sugar Estate, total capacity will be 140,000 tons. Even though all of the sugar production goes for domestic consumption, imports of up to 520,000 tons are necessary to satisfy demand.

The Nigerian Cotton Marketing Board reported 1979/80 production at 55,733 tons, a 50-percent decrease from the previous year. Several reasons have been offered for this decline. Nigerian farmers have available improved varieties, but widesparead adoption has not taken place. When improved varieties are used, they are planted late, contrary to recommended practice because cotton has a lower priority than food crops in planting schedules. Its planting is determined by the progression and labor requirements of other crops. Under these conditions, yields on improved varieties decline. Traditional varieties are often preferred. In addition, the shortage of buying and grading facilities has made it difficult for farmers to sell to the Cotton Marketing Board, so some farmers may have reduced their plantings to avoid the marketing problems.

The livestock sector accounts for 5 percent of GDP. The demand for livestock-based protein products is steadily increasing, but domestic production has been unable to satisfy the demand completely. Modernization of the sector is of great importance, but the traditional nature of the system, in which the Fulani control 90 percent of the cattle herd, has made progress difficult. Some improved operations have been established, but mostly outside of the traditional sector. Few reliable current figures exist on livestock.

The poultry industry is one of the fastest growing in Nigeria's agriculture. Although much of the nation's production is from traditional systems where indigenous fowl scavenge for feed, lay few eggs, and provide only local subsistence needs, the growing modern industry provides increasing amounts of poultry meat. As incomes rise and urbanization continues, the demand for poultry will continue to increase.

AGRICULTURAL POLICY

President Shagari is placing major emphasis on the improvement of agriculture and has instituted a program known as "the Green Revolution." Inattention to agriculture by previous Governments makes his efforts essential, especially since population and demand for food products are rising so sharply. The stabilization of consumer food prices is of primary importance to the Government, and ample supplies help attain this stability. Recent increases in producer prices demonstrate Shagari's intention to increase domestic production, and so does the liberalization of investment and trading policies.

To implement "the Green Revolution," resources are being devoted to agriculture from both the Federal Government's 1981 budget and the Fourth National Development Plan (1981-85). Of the Federal Government's budget of $22.8 billion, nearly 13 percent, or $2.9 billion, is to be devoted to agriculture and water resources. The Plan calls for an investment of $152 billion over the next 5 years, with about 10 percent expected to go for agriculture. The plan has targeted a 7.2 percent annual growth rate in real GDP, assuming a certain rate of oil export earnings throughout the life of the plan. The annual growth rate for the agricultural sector is targeted at 4 percent, but the absorptive capacity of the whole economy and the agricultural sector will determine how much of the planned investment can be expended.

The plan emphasizes the revitalization of the small land holders through integrated rural development projects similar to those implemented by the World Bank. In addition, the establishment of large-scale farms by private entrepreneurs will be encouraged. Members of the JACC could provide technical assistance and capital investment. Other investments by the JACC could be in agro-industries, processing plants, flour mills, feed mills, poultry or livestock operations, or other agricultural infrastructure projects.

AGRICULTURAL TRADE

Nigeria's agricultural imports reached $3.1 billion for 1980. As population increases, so does urbanization and demand for food. To satisfy demand, imports of rice, wheat, and feed corn have been necessary. Demand for all kinds of processed foods provided mostly from the European Economic Community, has also risen. The loosening of import restrictions will allow much more grain to be imported.

U.S. agricultural exports to Nigeria in 1980 totaled just over $348 million, a 65-percent increase over 1979. Wheat exports amounted to 1 million tons and should reach almost 1.3 million tons in 1981, at a value close to $290 million. The European Economic Community is expected to furnish between 200,000 and 300,000 tons of wheat flour. Currently, higher imports are constrained by milling capacity, which is being increased. By 1982, it is expected that Nigeria will be importing close to 2 million tons of wheat. Although domestic rice production has improved substantially large imports are necessary to supply Nigerian consumers. The demand for rice has risen quite sharply in recent years. Rice imports have been restricted by government policy, but this year import quotas have been raised to 600,000 tons. Of this, the U.S. should supply at least 300,000 tons, as compared with 190,000 tons in 1980. The value of U.S. rice exports will increase to $150 million. As the growth in the poultry sector continues and the concomitant demand for feed corn increases, corn imports should double to 300,000 tons. The U.S. will supply almost all of this. Products imported from sources other than the U.S. in 1980 include 350,000 tons of bulk refined vegetable oil, usually "mixed oils" from the EEC.

U.S. agricultural imports from Nigeria amounted to $73.7 million in 1980, $56 million in cocoa beans. The U.S. agricultural trade surplus with Nigeria totaled $274 million. Although total U.S. exports amounted to $1.15 billion, the U.S. imports 17 percent of its oil from Nigeria, and this resulted in a trade deficit of $9.75 billion in 1980. This is second only to the deficit with Japan.

OUTLOOK

The Nigerian economy will continue to grow modestly during 1981, despite the decline in oil export receipts in the first half of the year. Although these receipts have fallen below projected levels, no immediate adverse effects on the economy are expected. However, if this trend continues it may be necessary for the Government to make adjustments in its budget and development plans. Current foreign exchange reserves are sufficient to cover imports for six months. U.S. exports, particularly of agrcultural products will continue to increase and should reach $500 million by 1982. The creation of the JACC will provide opportunities for U.S. investment in Nigerian agriculture that could enhance future U.S. exports.

Although the Nigerian markets look promising for U.S. agricultural exports, they should not be taken for granted. Movements in the Nigerian market are ruled not only by population increases and income effects, but equally by government policies. Though President Shagari has committed himself to improving domestic agricultural production, particularly food production, at the same time he must allow rice, wheat, and corn imports to rise in order to satisfy Nigeria's food needs. The control of domestic production, as well as import trade and ultimately the marketing and pricing of agricultural commodities, is of great political importance and has in recent months begun to create domestic tension. Thus the nation's food policy has much to do with the internal political situation, and both bear close watching. □

Can Obote Survive?

BY T. R. LANSNER

Reconciliation and no revenge were keynotes of Milton Obote's campaign speeches in the run up to Uganda's first elections in 18 years in December 1980.

Obote, after a decade in exile after being overthrown by Idi Amin, pledged that his Uganda Peoples Congress party (UPC) would follow policies to heal the wounds of the dictator's brutal rule and allay traditional tribal hostilities.

Many observers believed Obote the best hope to restore Uganda's shattered economic and social life. A capable and experienced administrator, he was accepted as one African leader who had not used his position to enrich himself personally.

As well, he was thought the only leader capable of bringing the army, dominated by Nilotic northerners of his Langi tribe and of the Acholi tribe, under control to guarantee the survival of a civilian administration. Obote promised no overnight miracles to cure Uganda's manifold ills, but most people expected a competent government under his stewardship to make steady progress in reharnessing Uganda's natural and human resources, which are among Africa's richest.

T.R. Lansner is an American freelance journalist who has spent the last 14 months in Uganda.


Photo: T.R. Lansner

President Obote: The reconciliation he promised is no closer than when he came to power

Over the past 12 months, significant economic advances have been made, but are being overshadowed, and perhaps ultimately crippled, by increasing insecurity in Kampala and other parts of the country, and by rampant corruption.

Army indiscipline, apparently curbed during Obote's first months in office, is again rampant. Much of it is surely a result of the paltry official rewards of soldiering. Soaring prices caused by inflation mean, as for other salaried workers, that a soldier's monthly pay packet is unlikely to see him through a week's frugal living, or less if he has a family. With soldiers both armed and hungry, violent robbery is inevitable.

Atrocities against civilians in the West Nile region, 300 miles northwest of Kampala, and in the Buganda countryside around the capital, in reprisal for guerrilla attacks, are at least partially tribally motivated. But some of the activity, especially in Kampala itself, seems the result of friction within the military. A spate of daylight gunpoint heists of diplomatic vehicles — over 30 in November alone — coincided with reports of a widening rift between Acholi and Langi factions within the army.

It is from these two tribes and the eastern Teso that Obote's ruling UPC draws most of its strength. In last December's elections, which opposition politicians complained were rigged, the UPC won 74 seats, mostly in northern and eastern Uganda. The opposition Democratic party (DP) took 51 seats, all of them among the Bantu tribes of southern and western Uganda. Though Democratic party leader Paul Ssemogerere has never fully accepted the election results, he encouraged his party to enter Parliament as the official opposition. "We fear," he said at the time, "that our rejection of participation would cause more disaster than our country could afford"; and hopes remained high that Obote's offers of no revenge were genuine.

Although a Commonwealth team said the conduct of the elections under a pro-Obote interim administration was reasonably free and fair under the circumstances, many diplomats, journalists, and other independent observers agree with the opposition's assessment.

The promised reconciliation never

seemed to take hold. A wave of arrests and harassment of opposition politicians began almost immediately after the election. Dozens of leading members of the Democratic party and the small Uganda Patriotic Movement are in detention, including three DP members of Parliament. Also, five opposition newspapers have been banned and others prevented from publishing because of threats against printers by police.

Conditions for detainees vary, but credible reports of torture and murder of political prisoners are many. Estimates of people detained over the past year vary from 1,000 to 3,000 or more, but the figures are impossible to verify. Red Cross officials are denied access to military barracks and "informal" detention centers where eyewitnesses say the worst of the abuses take place.

The repression has certainly reduced the willingness of many people to fully cooperate with the government, making the task of rehabilitation that much more difficult. It has also sparked active resistance by three opposition movements now waging a guerrilla struggle against the Obote government.

In Kampala and the surrounding areas, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) are staging hit and run attacks, ambushes, and acts of sabotage.

In the West Nile region, where civilians have suffered most from army atrocities, remnents of Idi Amin's army have reorganized into the guerrilla Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF). Led by the former UPC secretary-general, Felix Onama, and Amin's one-time finance minister, Brigadier Moses Ali, the UNRF is estimated to have nearly 3,000 men under arms. Equipped with several artillery pieces as well as small arms, they are mostly natives of the area, which borders on the Sudan and Zaire.

The UNRF guerrillas are most active in the area north of the district capital of Arua, which was in June abandoned by government troops who mutinied over lack of pay and food. Since then, the army has made only a few tentative attempts to reassert its control, which were easily discouraged by guerrilla ambushes.

Most importantly, the government troops, who are accused of murdering thousands of civilians in the area, including 55 men, women, and children huddled in a mission compound at Ombachi, near Arua, in June, enjoy no sympathy from the local population. The guerrillas, natives of the area, move easily among their relatives and friends, and the army has neither the resources, nor seemingly the inclination, to track them down.

In the lush green hills around Kampala, guerrillas of the National Resistance Movement also enjoy significant civilian support. Here — with camps within 10 miles of the city center, close to main roads and virtually in the shadow of major military barracks in densely populated areas — backing of the local populace is even more crucial.

An 11-day journey with these guerrillas during the first two weeks of November covered over 100 miles in night marches and took me to seven guerrilla encampments within 45 miles of Kampala. I met with over 400 fighters and some 200 of their civilian supporters.

Almost all the guerrillas of the NRM are Bantu people from southern and western Uganda. Some said the belief that Obote's election victory was rigged was their reason for fighting. Many more, though, and the civilians who help them, described repression and army atrocities after the election as their motivation.

The civilians are organized into "resistance committees," which co ordinate deliveries of food and other essential supplies to the guerrilla camps. Just as importantly, they provide vital intelligence on the activities of government troops and agents in the areas. "They are our eyes and ears," one guerrilla commander explained. "When we have a problem, it is because we are not close enough to the people."

The chairman of the NRM is Yusufu Lule, a Muganda traditionalist who was Uganda's president for just 68 days after Idi Amin's ouster in April 1979. Lule has joined forces with the left-leaning Yoweri Museveni, a Mozambique-trained guerrilla fighter and former minister of defense who fought against Idi Amin. Both men have undertaken extensive tours seeking foreign assistance for their fighters, but with little apparent success. Inside Uganda, the NRM guerrillas are so short of weapons they cannot arm the approximately 1,000 men now in their camps and are turning away new recruits by the score.

Even with their limited weaponry, the guerrillas have seriously harassed government forces around Kampala. Several police stations have been destroyed, military camps overrun, army vehicles destroyed by mines or rockets, and about 300 soldiers have been killed or wounded in the past four months.

The guerrillas claim that all their weapons have been seized from government forces, and there were none I saw that were not of standard Uganda army issue.

More than 100 miles from any border, the NRM guerrillas' problems in acquiring a regular supply of weapons are formidable. The rebellion now appears entirely self-supporting, but will not grow quickly unless foreign assistance is rendered. The NRM leaders, though, feel time is on their side. Without local cooperation, the army will never discover the expanding network of guerrilla camps and resistance committees that is encircling Kampala.

Erya Katagaya, the NRM political and diplomatic secretary and a former minister of commerce, believes establishing political support in the countryside essential while moving militarily. "Everyone thinks of a coup," he explained at a guerrilla camp about 15



miles north of Kampala. "They want us to chop the head off this regime. We will move more slowly. We will strangle it. But in the end it will be just as dead."

While the NRM has been organizing in the countryside, the Uganda Freedom Movement has been more coup-oriented. With former Internal Affairs Minister Andrew Kayiira and former Democratic party Secretary General Francis Bwengye among its leading members, the UFM has staged several sabotage attacks and attempted assassinations in Kampala itself, as well as an abortive attack on the Luzira maximum security prison outside Kampala in February.

There is presently no tactical cooperation among the three guerrilla groups, though all three claim they eschew ideology and are fighting to remove the Obote regime.

But even as Obote's military and political opponents gear up against him, he and his government are struggling to institute economic reforms that they hope will restore at least some measure of prosperity and reduce the attraction of the insurgent movements.

The economy Obote inherited was truly in shambles. Industrial production was down to 15 percent of capacity. Exports of cotton, tobacco, tea, and copper had ceased. Coffee collection and processing were almost at a standstill. Tourism, a leading earner of foreign exchange at the time of Obote's overthrow in 1971, was nil. To this grim picture was added a $40 million debt to foreign oil companies and a severe lack of spares for the industrial and communications infrastructure, which had deteriorated during Amin's rule or suffered destruction or looting in the war that ousted him. As well, a raging inflation which made the salaries and wages of most Ugandans virtually worthless had promoted pandemic corruption on all levels of society.

In spite of doubts about his ideological and international positions and about the manner in which he came to power, most Western governments apparently decided to accept Obote as the leader with the best prospects for holding the country together.

Sizable foreign aid did not begin to arrive until after Obote instituted free-market economic policies in May and June 1981. In May, Obote announced his first concrete steps: raising producer prices for commodity export crops and also hiking the official price for gasoline, already sold at far higher prices on the black market. On June 1, after long consultations with officials of the International Monetary Fund and other economic experts, Obote announced the "floating" of the Uganda shilling. This effectively devalued the Uganda currency by 1000 percent, from 8 to 80 per U.S. dollar.

In a speech that would have made even disciples of Reaganomics bullish on Uganda, Obote also announced further producer price increases, the removal of most price controls, and the tightening of government revenue collection.

In August, he doubled the minimum wage and said his message to the traders of Uganda was, "Trade more and earn more," a dramatic shift from the socialist policies he expounded in the late 1960s.

The IMF responded almost immediately to Obote's reforms, releasing the first of four tranches of a $197 million package. Loans and grants projected from the World Bank, European Economic Community, United Nations Development Program, and other donors totaled about $500 million during 1981, though it is not clear the Ugandan economy has the capacity to absorb it all.

Much funding is directed at improving export crop performance, with the British government and British companies particularly involved in the cotton and tea industries. Tea exports resumed late in 1980 and Ugandan cotton should reach world markets by late 1981.

The EEC financed a report on how best to revive the coffee industry, as well as a feasability study on the rehabilitation of the copper mine at Kilembe in western Uganda. The possibility of building a smelting plant to produce the estimated billion dollars worth of cobalt tailings at the mine site is also being explored.

West Germany is the largest bilateral aid donor and, along with Britain, has agreed to cancel all of Uganda's outstanding debts. The approximately $40 million in American aid that went to Uganda in 1980 and 1981 was in large part Title Two food aid under PL 480, which was distributed by CARE and other voluntary agencies.

Other funds were used to import steel for the manufacture of hoes in Uganda's second largest city, Jinja, and for vocational training.

In November, Uganda received another economic boon when creditor nations meeting in Paris agreed to reschedule much of the country's public debt and included a six-year grace period in the package.

While the Western aid Uganda is receiving is not what might have been expected during the more liberal 1960s and 70s, it may be sufficient to at least restore the production that Uganda's industry and agriculture were capable of a decade ago. "The critical time for us is the next year and a half," the ambassador in the president's office and defacto finance minister, Ephraim Kamuntu, explained in an interview in his office. "By then we should not be so desperate for foreign assistance. We have planted, but we have not reaped the harvest yet. During this time, we will need balance of payment support and some commodity assistance."

The confidence of Kamuntu and

Photo: T.R. Lansner

Paul Ssemogerere, leader of the opposition Democratic party: Dozens of the party members are in detention

other economic planners stems from the resource wealth of Uganda that is now barely tapped. Plentiful hydroelectric power is available from the Owen Falls Dam on the Nile at Lake Victoria. Copper, cobalt, tin, tungsten and probably gold can be mined in commercial quantities, according to the minister of mines, Max Choudry.

Abundant arable land makes the country self-sufficient in food, save for the northeastern Karmoja region. Even there, though, it was a combination of drought and massive cattle raiding that brought on famine in 1980.

The rich agricultural land can also produce cotton, tea, tobacco, sugar, and, most importantly, coffee, for export. Coffee presently provides over 95 percent of Uganda's earned foreign income. One of the genuine accomplishments of the Obote government has been to revitalize the coffee industry.

In June, officials of the parastatal Coffee Marketing Board were privately very pessimistic whether Uganda's export quota set by the International Coffee Organization (ICO) could be met. A strike by coffee factory workers, shortages of transport, smuggling, and the simple refusal of farmers to sell coffee for which they were paid next to nothing (because of the decline in value of the inflation-ridden Uganda shilling), combined to cause a disasterous decline in coffee exports. If the ICO quota was not met, Uganda would face an almost certain cut in its allowance for the second consecutive year.

A shake-up of Coffee Marketing Board management went some way in speeding up coffee shipments. Far more important was the arrival in Uganda of several hundred trucks to help transport coffee and an increase in the number and regularity of coffee shipments by rail through Kenya to its Indian Ocean port of Mombasa.

By late August, Cooperatives Minister Yona Kanyomozi announced Uganda had met its 1980-81 quota, and armed with this accomplishment won an increase in Uganda's 1981-82 quota at the ICO's annual meeting in London in September.

Although the United States has traditionally been the largest market for Uganda's coffee, American interest in Uganda has been limited, mainly concerned with how conditions there might affect events in neighboring countries considered more strategic to U.S. interests: the Sudan, Kenya, and Zaire.

Photo: T.R. Lansner

National Resistance Movement guerrillas display captured weapons at a camp 15 miles from Kampala

The far-flung provinces of southern Sudan and eastern Zaire, which border Uganda, saw rebellions against their central government in the 1960s and are again today areas of increasing tensions.

The oil-rich southern Sudan is simmering over Khartoum's plans to build the country's refinery at Kosti, in the northern part of the country. Unconfirmed reports that anti-Mobutu dissidents of the *Front National de Liberation de Congo* are receiving weapons and training in the Rwenzori Mountains on the Zaire-Uganda border are causing disquiet among some Western and African diplomats. "We should take some more trouble with Uganda," one U.S. diplomat warned, "because an unfriendly government there could certainly cause more than a little trouble for us."

Regionally, Obote has met with the leaders of all of Uganda's neighbors, encouraging at least talk of regional economic and political cooperation. Uganda is a vital corridor for goods transiting to or from Rwanda, Burundi, eastern Zaire, and southern Sudan via Kenya's Indian Ocean port of Mombasa.

The agricultural potential that inspires confidence in both Ugandan and foreign economic planners cannot be unnoticed by neighboring Kenya and Tanzania. Both these nations have recently succumbed to what will probably be chronic food deficits and are importing grains from other African countries and the West. Uganda, if political stability allows economic growth, should soon be a net exporter of food, and it will be a political as well as economic decision where the food will be sent.

But whether that political stability, which has eluded Uganda for the past 12 years, will soon be achieved is far from certain. Milton Obote is a clever and astute politician, but while the Idi Amin buffoonery is now a thing of the past, the repression and brutality he introduced to Uganda are not.

Obote, or anyone who succeeds him, faces more than the difficult task of removing violence from Uganda's society. *Magendo*, a catchall term for black marketeering or other corruption, has become necessary for most people, simply as a matter of survival, during Uganda's economic collapse over the past three years.

Sadly, the reconciliation Obote promised, and which Ugandans hoped would reduce the ubiquitous violence and corruption that mar their lives, is today no closer — and probably further away — than it was when he come to power. □

Mitterrand's Africa Policies

BY ALEX RONDOS

In August 1981, three months after he became president of France, François Mitterrand, normally guarded in his public comments, was outspoken in his disagreement with U.S. policies in Africa. Washington, he implied, was more concerned with securing strategic points from a military perspective than with paying adequate attention to Africa's economic problems. Washington, he added, seemed in the midst of a rapprochement with South Africa "without being too concerned with what happens in the rest of Africa."

The two boldest stands the new Socialist government of France has taken in Africa run against the Reagan administration's thrust in that continent. Those stands involve a clear commitment to a certain type of economic development, and the abhorrence of the regime in South Africa, ruling out association with Pretoria against a perceived communist threat on the continent. The essence of the disagreement is profound, if politely expressed. In the two capitals, administrations have come to power with views that have been strongly held and for a long time neglected by their electorates. So in the flush of victory, each has stuck closely — Washington more so — to its campaign rhetoric, but is inching back as reality sets its constraints.

Where, then, does France under President Mitterrand stand? What were the policies proposed by the Socialists? How have these measured against events since assuming power? And to what extent do the French policy decisions since May 1981 signify a change, first, in policy compared to its predecessors; secondly, with regard to France's standing in Africa; and third, in its relations with other Western powers?

It is well to admit that one cannot be conclusive. The elasticity of ideological commitment when faced with hard reality takes its toll on any elected government, be it in Paris or Washington. However, certain things are already clear about the relationship between France under President Mitterrand and Africa. As the latest Summit of French and African Heads of State in November 1981 (formerly known as the Franco-African Summit) has shown, France is still the only Western power that retains an influence in Africa sufficient to have a catalytic effect on the continent. The Socialists are aware of this and intend to maintain that link. The question is, given their sincere opposition to the records of previous French governments in Africa, how do they propose to deploy their influence? There is also the catch: Whatever novelty President Mitterrand may wish to inject into France's African policy will have to be weighed against the past 20 years of obligations accrued to African governments, the neglect of which could seriously damage France's international interests and stature.

Before his election, President Mitterrand's views about French policy in Africa were clearly defined. The erstwhile example was Chad, where French policy had vacillated between active military engagement and withdrawal, and a switching of support among potential leaders. France was to avoid policies, Mitterrand said, which would place it in a similar situation again. The Chadian debacle — every candidate from far left to the right was united in its criticism of former President Giscard d'Estaing — was the "logical result of a form of 'cooperation' incapable of attacking the roots of instability in Africa." Mitterrand castigated his predecessor for his military interventions in Africa, describing them as the "politics of a pyromaniac fireman."

The thrust of his argument was that there had been too much talk interrupted by sudden kneejerk reactions to crises. What Mitterrand and his party sought was a longer term solution, which lay in confronting the true causes of Africa's problems: "insufficient development, regional disequilibria, and South Africa." African solutions must be supported, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) should be helped, and regional organizations encouraged.

Then and only then should the government of France be forced into indulging in military cooperation with any regime. France should achieve the United Nations minimum standard for foreign public aid to African countries of 0.7 percent of gross national product. In Mitterrand's view, it was the failure to carry out such policies that had perpetuated and even enhanced instability in Africa and thus paved the way for intervention from the Eastern bloc.

At the time of his election, President Mitterrand had stuck closely to the pronouncements on Africa of his own party. The statements had been very critical of France's association with President Mobutu of Zaire and had called for an end of all economic links with Namibia, especially in the purchase of uranium. To carry out these policies, the president clearly set himself at the pinnacle of African policy-making.

Mitterrand's association with Africa stretches back over 30 years. In 1950, he was minister for Overseas France and was instrumental in drawing President Houphouët-Boigny, then the leader of the Ivory Coast's section of the nationalist *Rassemblement Democratique Africain*, away from his alliance with the French Communist party. In 1956, again as minister in one of the Fourth Republic's numerous governments, he worked closely with Houphouët-Boigny, Leopold Senghor, and other African nationalists represented in Paris in drawing up the *loi cadre*, the framework for French decolonization. His years in opposition did not prevent him from retaining a discreet contact with those colleagues who later became presidents. As his foreign minister, he chose Claude Cheysson, who had made such an impression as commissioner for development at the European Commission. For minister of cooperation, he picked a younger politician, Jean-Pierre Cot, from an intellectual background and with little experience in Africa. The Ministry of Cooperation, as he had promised before the elections, was then moved under the authority of the now renamed Ministry of External Relations.

Given the extent and depth of France's presence in Africa, it did not take long for a series of challenges to emerge to put campaign rhetoric to the test. Watching closely were not only Washington, but African countries whose interests in French policy diverged radically. Zaire, Gabon, and the Central African Republic, which had become the favorites of President Giscard d'Estaing, knew that they had been the objects of intense criticism by the Socialists in France. Ivory Coast, under President Houphouët-Boigny, the doyen of the older generation of France's allies who are concentrated in West Africa, was pleased to have Mitterrand back in power. Nigeria, which had become France's leading trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, still regarded the French with extreme suspicion on the political front. Angola saw in France a potential ally in its struggle for recognition in the face of constant attack across its southern frontier by South Africa.


Photo: United Nations

President Mitterrand's policies on Africa run against the thrust of the Reagan administration

A minor irritation, which passed quickly, was the incident in May 1981 between Cameroon and Nigeria. For the briefest period, it seemed as though there might be fighting. Sense prevailed, but the uneasy issue of France's military cooperation agreement with Cameroon remains, though it seems highly unlikely that Paris would have wanted to anger the preeminent country in Africa, Nigeria, with which the new government wants a closer political association. In August, the Senegalese intervened in The Gambia for the second time in less than a year to put down a rebellion against President Dawda Jawara's government. The French made it clear that they had absolutely nothing to do with the intervention, and President Abdou Diouf of Senegal went so far as to say that he had hoped for more support for his initiative. It was with some relief that the unimpressive President David Dacko of the Central African Republic fell at the end of August. The whole affair was carefully orchestrated with the military, led by the army chief of staff, General André Kolingba, who slipped into power with no problem. If the French government knew this was going to happen, which is more than certain, there is no evidence that they had a hand in the events.

Throughout July, South Africa had launched a full-scale attack into southern Angola. While Britain abstained from a UN Security Council resolution condemning the invasion, the United States vetoed it and France voted in its favor.

On the economic front, the French government set itself as the standard-bearer for the UN targets and Paris hosted the special conference on the least-developed countries in September, where it was announced that these nations would receive 0.15 percent of French GNP as aid. The French have pressed for a replenishment of *Stabex*, the export stabilization scheme agreed to under the Lomé Convention between the European Economic Community and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific States, which has run out of funds. Cot has called for negotiations on international commodity agreements, a position that African heads of state, notably Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast, still smarting from the poor performance of world cocoa prices, have rapidly endorsed. The Ivorian leader called on the French, at the Heads of State Summit in Paris, to represent African interests in international meetings.

In October, the French government decided to devalue the French franc against the currencies of the European monetary system by five percent. This was not to have a dramatic effect on the franc zone countries whose currencies are guaranteed by the French franc and freely convertible at a fixed parity, because the major commodity exports are sold in dollars. There remained the question of consultation. African governments were informed the day before the announcement and Paris begged the indulgence of the countries concerned, noting that such a policy has to be implemented with the utmost discretion. President Mitterrand is on record as saying that while the franc zone serves to bolster African economies at times of crisis, the system "limits the economic sovereignty" of member states and overvalues their currency, attracting the import of large quantities of smuggled goods.

By the time of the Heads of State Summit in early November, Chad had become the principal issue and dominated discussions during the summit. While France had been opposed to the Libyan presence in Chad, the French were set on avoiding any action that might have been seen as interference in internal African affairs. At the OAU summit in Nairobi in June, it was decided that an African peace-keeping force should be sent to replace the Libyans in Chad. The French tactic was to offer Chadian President Goukouni Woddeye room to maneuver. His authority seemed in danger of becoming more nominal than real in the face of Libyan influence and rebel activity in the East supported by Sudan. When Woddeye visited Paris in August, he was informed that France was ready to offer assistance to Chad unconditionally.

During the Cancun summit in Mexico, the French took the initiative with a vigor that a year ago would have met with the disapproval of a number of African states, especially Nigeria. President Mitterrand issued an appeal to the chairman of the Organization of African Unity, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, to hasten the long overdue arrangements for the dispatch of the OAU force. A few days later the French government also announced that it had been sending small arms and other light military equipment to President Goukouni. Then on his return from Cancun, the Nigerian president, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, announced that he was prepared to sent Nigerian troops to Chad. Effectively, France had interfered verbally and materially in OAU affairs, but the close cooperation with Nigeria that was beginning and continues at the time of this writing, nullified criticism of the French. In fact, French diplomacy was seen to have gained a resounding victory when, at the end of October, Goukouni called for the withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad. Col. Qaddafy, with characteristic unpredictability, withdrew all his forces by mid-November.

President Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast endorses the French call for negotiations on commodity agreements

The French policy had been to adhere rigidly to the OAU stand that supported the legally nominated president of Chad. Until the precipitate organization of the OAU force towards the end of November, Washington had been relatively silent about Chad and correspondingly more engrossed in its public commentary on the potential threat posed to the Sudan and Egypt by the Libyan presence in Chad. By supporting the Sudan, Washington was seen to be tacitly encouraging the Chadian rebel Hissene Habre, who had been the defense minister of the Transitional Government of National Unity in Chad until he broke away in early 1980. The opening offered by the withdrawal of Libya from Chad was eagerly taken up by the United States since the military proximity of Libyan troops to the Sudanese frontier had receded.

The Libyan announcement that it was evacuating its troops from Chad came at the beginning of the Heads of State Summit in Paris in the first week of November. It was timely, for this summit brought together over 30 African states, 20 of them represented by their heads of state. Unshackled by the prolix that bears down so heavily on the effectiveness of OAU summits and without a formal agenda, Paris, for the first time, was able to orchestrate a meeting, the importance of which matched the OAU. Such a suggestion was of course strenuously denied by President Mitterrand. For the first time, eastern and southern African states were represented at the meeting. The Angolan ambassador in Paris attended. A representative from the office of the Nigerian president, with special responsibility for Chad, happened to be in Paris during the meeting, although Nigeria did not formally attend. Egypt and Tunisia were also represented by their foreign ministers. Rumors that President Mobutu had been offended by the change in venue for the meeting (it was to have taken place in Kinshasa) were nimbly sidestepped by the French president's perfectly reasonable explanation that this was his first opportunity to meet all the gathered heads of state (some of whom might not have gone to Kinshasa), and that he wished to do so under his own roof. For the first time the radical Francophone states of Benin and Congo attended, represented by their presidents. Guinea continued to avoid the summit and Cameroon's President Ahidjo has studiously prevented too close an associaiton with the Francophone bloc.

What conclusions can one draw from the Socialist track record, short as it is? Far more important at the moment than active results has been the change in attitudes detected in French policy. President Mitterrand seems eager to please. But in so doing, he has to contend with the aspirations of those who seek to gain from a Socialist presence in Paris and those who have benefited from the French policies of the last 20 years.

The November summit in Paris proved most illustrative, especially in considering that intantible quality of personal relations that has suffused the French presence in Africa. The seven years of President Giscard d'Estaing's government had seen an important and, for many, an unwelcome transformation in this very delicate area. Giscard was thought to have neglected those very presidents who had been the pivot of French control in Africa — Presidents Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast and Senghor of Senegal. He adopted the shakier and much more dubious personalities of Bokassa of the Central African Empire, Mobutu of Zaire (not even a member of the intimate Francophone family), and Bongo of Gabon. Behind this radical personal shift lay the policy that France should "globalize" its involvement with Africa and make commerce the priority of French policy in stark contrast with the political and strategic priorities of Charles de Gaulle.

For the latter, the exclusive link with the Francophone states through the cooperation agreements and personal relations with senior presidents, especially from West Africa, was to be the platform for France's international standing as a medium power. In moving away from that, President Giscard d'Estaing diluted the warmth within the family; the upwardly mobile and heavily indebted cousins from central Africa who had great mineral potential were incorporated. When the most odious of the cousins, Bokassa, fell afoul of the patron, he was dumped upon the elder statesman, Houphouët-Boigny, much to the latter's disgust.

President Mitterrand also wants a globalization of sorts, but not at the expense of those leaders with whom he has a personal affinity, especially the Ivorian president. It was therefore striking that at the Paris summit, Mitterrand's opening speech was directed mainly to his Ivorian counterpart, and was warm, personal, and couched in humble language to which most African leaders are unaccustomed from Western, even French, presidents. While the Socialist party, with Giscard's central African escapade in mind, had called for a rejection of personal relations between heads of state and recommended "state-to-state" relations, Mitterrand set about creating the types of links with fellow heads of state in Africa that were entirely in keeping with the Gaullist strategy, though lacking the outmoded imperiousness of de Gaulle. It is worth noting, however, that Mitterrand has reshuffled his ambassadors in Africa, replacing incumbents with envoys more in tune with his views.

The president's economic policies toward Africa satisfy everyone, for the moment. His concept however diverges widely with that of Washington. From the French point of view, the new American propagation of the gospel of free market forces as the solution to the problems of development, with what is seen to be an attendant parsimony, is a recipe for the perpetuation and even aggravation of the continent's crises. Without the necessary infrastructure for industrialization, those favored few who have arisen in Africa will be able to run amok at the expense of the disadvantaged majority. With the exception of the British, whose financial contribution in Africa is geographically very limited, it is noteworthy that the EEC takes a very similar view to that of the French government as far as U.S. thinking on aid to the Third World is concerned.

The challenge to President Mitterrand is clear and has already been pointed out by some of his political opponents. France's financial resources are limited. An expansion in quantity of available finance risks eroding the previously exclusive direction of aid to the Francophone countries. Before Mitterrand assumed office, agreement had been reached with the Senegalese government to cut back the vast number of French citizens employed in advisory and technical capacities throughout the economy and in education. It was costing Senegal too much, and Ivory Coast is also following suit. For financial reasons, therefore, the cultural link between France and the most prominent Francophone countries is already under


Photo: Camerapix

Chad President Woddeye: Chad dominated the discussions during the French-African summit

severe pressure. However, the argument that he is spreading himself too thin can be countered by the support that France will give to regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States and perhaps by the acknowledgement that in the long term, there is a limit to France's ability to retain its grasp on its former colonies. It is already evident that the latter have begun to diversify their commerce and their sources of foreign assistance. France is not capable of financing so many countries and the latter have to a large extent signaled the fact that they are outgrowing France. Indeed, the conceptual differences in aid policy between France and the United States disguise the simple fact that the American and World Bank proposals for a loosening of state control in the economic sectors have already been in operation in a number of countries — Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali (to a certain extent), Guinea (in the mineral sector), and even the Congo. U.S. banks and other investors are gradually creeping into Francophone Africa, and one is inclined to wonder when the trickle will become a flood, and why, given Washington's views about a more aggressive commercial policy in Africa, this is not already reflected more substantially in the Francophone countries.

If there is to be the inevitable loosening of French economic influence in Francophone economies, Mitterrand has gone out of his way to reassure those leaders who feel threatened on the political level. All military agreements are to be honored. This has set at rest the anxieties of several Francophone leaders whose countries have military cooperation agreements with France that include secret clauses concerning French military protection. Where uncertainty will continue to lie is over internal political disturbances. Will Mitterrand bring French forces onto the streets of Dakar, Abidjan, or Libreville? On this point, the French president has been evasive. His party's policy is not to exclude military agreements but that these must have as their only aim "the protection of states from external threats and not the unconditional protection of regimes or governments."

The concept of *francophonie*, and a Francophone commonwealth that had been so cherished by Leopold Senghor, the Senegalese president who resigned at the end of 1980, has been shelved. The political impetus of the cultural bloc is retained by the approach adopted by Mitterrand so clearly at the Paris summit. Institutional devices are not necessary when, at the highest level, personal relations are good.

Retaining the link with Francophone Africa is a priority for any administration in Paris. It is the cost of retaining the link in the old form to the image the present government of France wishes to project that will call for skillful diplomacy. Having decided to consolidate the move away from the aggressively parochial policies of the Gaullist era, and given the move to an ideological position that will prove most palatable to a number of countries that had previously been peripheral to French African interests, the Mitterrand government will have to placate those countries that have been the foundation of French preeminence. Those countries are also very useful. President Omar Bongo of Gabon is certainly one of the Francophone leaders least favored by the Socialists in Paris. However, it was he who arranged for a series of meetings between Goukouni Woddeye and the French presidential adviser, Guy Penne, which heralded the restoration of French policy toward Chad to an equilibrium. President Mobutu of Zaire has rushed to make himself useful by dispatching his troops to Chad well before other African troops arrived in the Chadian capital, Ndjamena.

Financial considerations are taking their toll on the intensity of the relationship between France and its ex-colonies. A new generation is emerging to whom the link with France is not what it once was for its elders. Many look askance, as the Socialists in France claim to do, at the manner in which past French cooperation seems to have done little more than serve to continue France's preponderant influence in those countries, and to have propped up regimes whose pretense to legitimacy stretched even the wildest imaginations.

Photo: Camerapix

Zaire troops during Shaba rebellion: What will Mitterrand do when faced with pressure to intervene in Africa?

In the meantime, Mitterrand is still able to have his cake and eat it too with regard to Africa. To the more conservative governments, he is able to present a policy that does not offend politically and satisfies economically. To the progressive governments, there is the definite impression of goodwill in Paris that is being reciprocated. Ironically, the new French government can speak of "decolonizing" its cooperation policies and get away with it. On the global stage, therefore, France under its Socialist government can present itself as being already intimately linked with Africa but without the blemishes of association with the last 20 years of French policy.

Nigeria is, and will be, a constant test of the image any new French policy will project. If the economic ties with Nigeria can be consolidated by an improvemant in political relations, France's position will be greatly enhanced in Africa. If France's traditional Francophone allies, especially those in West Africa who have in the past, partly at the instigation of France, displayed considerable suspicion of Nigeria's size and wealth, can accept the new French policies, and if Paris can continue to accommodate their fears, France will be the most powerful Western country with respect to Africa. However, France's relationship with the U.S. must also be taken into account. Without the cooperation of the United States and the understanding that had been reached in aspects of African policymaking between Washington and Paris, the French intervention in Shaba Province of Zaire in 1978 might not have taken place. Given the divergence of attitudes between Paris and Washington, President Mitterrand will have to face difficult choices when confronted with pressures to intervene militarily in Africa. □

Reagan's Private Sector Thrust

BY SUSAN GILPIN

Economic development, President Reagan maintained at the World Bank Annual Meeting last September, depends on three factors: freedom, the magic of the market place, and putting one's house in order.

African central bank governors and ministers of finance attending the Washington meeting were looking for solutions to their common economic problems: foreign exchange shortages, food shortages, and declining rates of economic growth. What they got was advice. President Reagan told them that their "problems can never yield to grandiose schemes."

"No American contribution can do more for development than a growing, prosperous U.S. economy," Reagan said. "The domestic policies of developing countries are likewise the most critical contribution they can make to development. Unless a nation puts its own financial and economic house in order, no amount of aid will produce progress." He continued, "My own government is committed to policies of free trade, unrestricted investment, and open capital markets. . . . Low-income countries can benefit from international trade," Reagan said, "but they also depend on our aid."

Minister of Finance S.S. Banya of Sierra Leone, a slow-growing low-income country with less than two months' reserves of foreign exchange, found Reagan's emphasis on private capital depressing. He told this reporter, "Reagan talks about the magic of the market place. What is the view of the market itself? The payoff for investment in our countries is long term. Private money is not interested."

A month after the World Bank Annual Meeting and a week before the Cancun international meeting, Reagan outlined a program for action that flows from the beliefs voiced in Washington. In a speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, he emphasized the role of private investment. His five-point strategy for global growth follows:

1. Stimulating international trade by opening up markets.
2. Tailoring particular development strategies to individual countries and regions.
3. Guiding assistance toward the development of self-sustaining productive capacities, particularly in food and energy.
4. Improving in many of the countries the climate for private investment and the transfer of technology that comes with such an investment.
5. Creating a political atmosphere in which practical solutions can move forward.

Across the Atlantic, British minister for overseas development, Neil Marten, shares Reagan's faith in self-help. Martin wrote in the *Crown Agents Quarterly Review* (autumn 1981): "The greatest contribution which we can make to growth in poorer countries is to stimulate growth in our country. . . . The main responsibility for progress in the poor countries lies with those countries themselves."

Along with equity, population control, and basic needs, Marten explained that government policies should address the concerns of producers. "Are the governments discouraging private investment by appropriating assets and not paying compensation? . . . Are they discouraging production by low farm prices?" he asked.

So far, the U.S. private sector has not invested heavily in Africa. U.S. investment in Africa in 1980 was one-tenth of its investment in Latin America. Asian countries have attracted six times as much investment in manufacturing as African countries. The \$3.7 billion U.S. direct investment in Africa (except South Africa) at year-end 1980 was only 1.7 percent of U.S. direct investment abroad. Petroleum, mining, and metals accounted for 75 percent of the total. U.S. investment in Africa increased 25 percent from 1979 to 1980, the increase spread evenly across investment categories. For comparison, U.S. investment in South Africa is \$2.3 billion, less than the rest of Africa combined but more than in any other single country. U.S. money in South Africa is concentrated in manufacturing.

International investment trends do not foretell much growth for U.S. investment in Africa. In a speech before the UN Association in September, Robert D. Hormats, assistant secretary of state for economic and business affairs, traced the growth of international investment from the early twentieth century. In the early 1960s, international investment flowed into natural resources, Hormats said. When demand for metals and minerals slackened in the 1970s, mineral investment stagnated and capital tended to flow into manufacturing. Manufacturing affiliates of U.S. firms in developing countries are concentrated in Brazil, Mexico, and other Latin American countries where both income and reinvestment of earnings have been high.

Hormats indicated several policies developing countries can adopt to attract foreign investors. He said that determining factors will be "clear and consistent investment-related laws and regulations, in conformity with the principles of international law, and according most-favored nation and nondiscriminatory treatment of investment."

Another important incentive would be bilateral investment treaties "establishing a common frame of reference and legal base to deal with the entry and duration of investment, compensation, and arbitration in the event of expropriation, treatment of established investment, repatriation, and other transfer of assets, and dispute settlement." As disincentives, Hormats cited "performance requirements by host governments. He objected to such "unfortunate distortions of free-market principles" as "minimum employment and export levels, local value-added and content requirements, technology specifications, buy-back and marketing arrangements."

Performance requirements will be of great interest to the U.S. at the 1982 ministerial meeting on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) "In the GATT," Hormats said, "we have proposed action on trade-related performance requirements." Reagan referred to "future talks" in his opening address at Cancun, saying that "we will suggest an agenda composed of trade liberalization, energy and food resource development, and improvement in the investment climate."

U.S. government initiatives to increase U.S. private investment in developing countries, Hormats said, include support for the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the Caribbean Basin consultations, which could serve as a model for other regions.

OPIC, which insures U.S. investments in developing countries against political risks, underwrote more loans in the last quarter of fiscal 1981 than in the first three quarters combined. OPIC President Craig Nalen said optimistically, "We believe it reflects a new confidence generated by the Reagan administration's recognition of the critical importance of competing in the world's fastest-growing markets." President Reagan endorsed OPIC in October by signing a bill that strengthens and extends its authority through 1985.

The Export-Import Bank has fared less well. Ex-Im provides credits to foreign governments, and loans and loan guarantees to U.S. suppliers, which finance million-dollar sales of capital equipment. The authorization for Ex-Im financing is down 15 percent from 1981. Interest rates are up, but so are those of all the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) foreign sales credit schemes. It is the reduced total that will hurt U.S. business abroad. "We lose lucrative contracts for lack of support," one multinational complained privately. "If aid is under financial limits, why cut trade assistance as well?" The administration argues that Ex-Im borrowing on private capital markets is inflationary.

Among the international financial institutions, the World Bank has not noticed any increased U.S. support for its activities; in fact; the major concern the bank voices at virtually every press conference is administration foot-dragging. World Bank President A.W. Clausen referred in his address to the annual meeting to "those in the developed nations who are skeptical about the value of the International Development Association [IDA], the bank's soft-loan window.

U.S. contributions to IDA originally scheduled for three years are being stretched over four, leaving IDA so strapped that it is no longer lending money. The World Bank is casting about for alternative financing. "We have to look at alternatives for IDA VII funding," a bank spokesman said. "In the present aid climate, we should tap every available source."

Both Reagan and Clausen advocate co-financing to supplement concessionary investments. Experience shows that co-financing of World Bank loans has concentrated in the industrial and power sectors, according to a World Bank review. Opportunities for co-financing in the energy and mineral sectors are likely to grow. Only five agricultural development projects of the World Bank have been co-financed to date.

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) was singled out by Reagan in Philadelphia as one of "the international activities that foster the private sector." The IFC finances private enterprises that are profitable and have an economic impact on developing countries. The United States is regularly paying its subscriptions to a capital increase agreed upon in 1977. The IFC has not asked for any increase since, although it is planning to increase its lending.

Sixteen IFC investments went to projects in Africa in 1981, totaling 15 percent of IFC investments. The IFC has a policy of increasing its activities in smaller, low-income countries. Energy and food sectors are receiving greater emphasis. Four small African investments went into food and food processing. The two biggest investments were a fertilizer factory in Senegal and a coal mine in Zimbabwe, part of whose output will be used to generate electricity.

Within the federal government, Jerry Feldman, Department of Commerce regional marketing manager for Africa, told *Africa Report* that Reagan's emphasis on the private sector hasn't made any change in his activities. "I can't point out any case in which our approach has been any different than in the past," he said. "I don't think anybody knows what the implications of the new emphasis are."

One area where change is apparent is in the Caribbean basin, where a number of government initiatives converge. The speed, a congressional observer suggested, is due to strategic concerns.

The time required to translate ideas into policy and then into action may explain why other forms of government involvement in developing countries have yet to be affected by the administration's avowed support. "We have become increasingly concerned over the serious political, social, and economic problems faced by many countries in Central America and the Caribbean," Hormats told the UN Association. "The United States will focus on enhancing the role of the private sector in these economies."

Jamaica is central to U.S. plans for the Caribbean. After the election of Prime Minister Edward Seaga, U.S. AID sent four private sector advisers to Jamaica to screen investment proposals and facilitate contacts. Consultation between Mexico, Venezuela, and Canada about the Caribbean began in July. In early November, OPIC sent a team led by Nalen, who was joined by a representative of the international marketing division of the Department of Agriculture and an informal group from the Bureau of Private Enterprise, a new agency within AID. Coming so swiftly, government initiatives to encourage private investment in Jamaica may give some early indication for African countries of what Reagan's policy has in store for them. The results are not in yet, however.

Those African countries that have the most to gain from the emphasis on private investment are the middle-income countries. As British Minister for Overseas Development Marten said, "Private investment flows are overwhelmingly directed at the middle- and upper-income developing countries."

Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe are the African countries with the best possibility of increasing their volumes of manufactured exports, according to the World Bank *Agenda for Africa*. Manufactured exports are the fastest-growing sector for U.S. investment capital in developing countries. It is not surprising, then, that AID's Bureau of Private Enterprise has chosen Kenya, Ivory Coast, and Zimbabwe for initial attention.

The Bureau of Private Enterprise is intended to develop and coordinate AID programs and policies to facilitate private sector involvement in the developing world, AID Administrator M. Peter McPherson told a congressional committee. He gave an example: "A developing country desires to export packaged or processed vegetables.... What the country lacks is packaging, processing, and export marketing know-how.... This is an opportunity for AID to help put the project together combining technology that the United States can offer with indigenous resources of land, labor, and entrepreneurial talent."

Deputy Assistant Administrator Ed Harrow of the Bureau of Private Enterprise told *Africa Report* that his agency will concentrate on countries where the private sector is already doing well. "Our job is not to start a train, it's to help the train along the way."

The mission to Kenya is slated for mid-January. Dick Eney, AID desk officer for Kenya, explained why Kenya was chosen: "Kenya can absorb several hundred million dollars without disturbing the industrial balance because they are already making a start. They e[illegible]ge free enterprise and have h[illegible] own industries."

Promoting private enterprise is not new to AID, Harrow recalled. In the 1960s under President Eisenhower, AID had an office of private sector development that started industrial banks, development banks, stock markets, and the guarantee scheme that later became OPIC. Private sector encouragement faded in the 1970s with the emphasis on basic human needs, Harrow said.

The current emphasis on the private sector corresponds with a decline in foreign assistance levels. Development assistance for fiscal 1982, according to the administration budget, will be down 12 percent across the board. Military-related aid, foreign military sales, and economic support funds are not affected. African countries of strategic importance to the United States can depend on continued aid.

The trick, of course, is to encourage private investment in those sectors most important to development. Private capital discriminates among economic sectors as well as among countries. While industry is attracting international investment now, it is agriculture that must be expanded both to feed African nations and generate development.

The World Bank *Agenda for Africa* says that agriculture is "the centerpiece of any production-oriented strategy." The role of the private sector should be enlarged, the agenda recommends, in the importation, production, and distribution of agricultural inputs. Transport and marketing of outputs are also suitable for the private sector.

Overseas private capital, a World Bank spokesman told *Africa Report*, is unlikely to flow into primary agricultural production outside of a plantation setting. But the supply of indigenous capital should be adequate as long as government agricultural policies provide sufficient incentives.

U.S. investments in citrus, fruit, and vegetable production and processing, milling, agricultural input manufacturing and supply, and integrated livestock and poultry operations are currently under consideration in Nigeria.

Faced with a growing food deficit, the Nigerian government in 1980 invited U.S. agribusinesses to consider investing in agricultural production and processing. The initiative became JACC, the Joint Agribusiness Consultative Committee. It started under President Carter and has now developed to the point where several U.S. companies have submitted project proposals. A senior U.S. Department of Agriculture official said that JACC's success points to the importance of government-sponsored prefeasibility studies in interesting investors. "Good investment projects don't just trickle out of developing countries," the official said. "A well-defined, well-documented, organized approach is necessary to get word to the private sector."

Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Chester Crocker told the Council on Foreign Relations that JACC is "a major effort to bring our agribusiness skills to bear on Nigeria's food problem. Progress has been very encouraging." Another official told *Africa Report* that government employees have a lot to learn in dealing with businessmen. "Many people in government who have never come face to face with the private sector are doing it now for the first time. Hopefully the government is learning to deal with business."

Business has its own agenda of government policies that it says would promote private investment in developing countries. Especially in Africa, U.S. companies feel a disadvantage compared to European investors whose experience may go back to colonial days.

Codification of bilateral investment treaties would be helpful, one businessman said. Performance contract conditions are not unique to developing countries. Codification, not elimination, was the goal he suggested.

Mixing foreign policy considerations with business provoked anger from one investor, who criticized U.S. government efforts to discourage businesses operating in Angola and Libya. "Free enterprise and free trade are supposed to be just that," he said. "The government has its own policy tools."

It is still too early to assess the impact on Africa of Reagan's emphasis on private sector involvement in development. Nigeria and the Caribbean basin will provide some early indications, and the GATT ministerial meeting bears watching. Overall, the middle-income African countries are the most likely to benefit, with industry receiving the bulk of private capital and agriculture being the sector monitor. Low-income African countries are likely to receive little investment and less aid unless they are of strategic importance.

The state of the U.S. economy will affect private investments in Africa as much as anything, and will receive even more of President Reagan's attention. He pointed out the linkage in Philadelphia, saying, "The way we can provide the most opportunity for even the poorest of nations is to follow through with our own economic recovery program. Every one percent reduction in our interest rates improves the balance of payments of developing countries by $1 billion. By getting our own economic house in order, we win, they win, we all win."

What's bad for business is bad for investment in developing countries. As Ahmed Abdallah of the Kenya delegation to the World Bank's annual meeting said, "The whole climate of business in America and Britain is one of extreme caution. You can't expect a businessman to be enthusiastic about investing far away under such conditions." □

Books

ETHNICITY AND CLASS FROM A NIGERIAN PERSPECTIVE

Okwudiba Nnoli, *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd., 1978.

Critics often contend that the literature on the Third World by Western authors is Eurocentric. To take a single example, modernization theory (the dominant tradition in the social sciences in the 1960s and 1970s), the point is simply made. The theory derived its standards of development from the American system. Today most modernization writers readily concede this point. But is it fair to ask what is distinctive about Third World scholarship? Are scholars in the Third World devising new and better constructs for understanding the dilemmas facing their own countries?

A recent volume, written by a Nigerian and published by an African company, focuses on the critical juncture of ethnicity and class. Okwudiba Nnoli's point of departure is a critique of both the mainstream Western literature, which highlights the symptoms of conflict without sufficient analysis of underlying causes, and the ultraleftist writings, which emphasize class and neglect ethnicity. Understood as "a social phenomenon associated with interactions among members of different . . . social formations distinguished by the communal character of their boundaries," ethnicity is an ideology that, by itself, lacks explanatory power and thus is not a crucial variable, according to Nnoli.

Ethnic identification is double-edged: it provides solace for members but also deflects attention from class struggle and broad cultural similarities among compatriots. Interethnic animosities, stimulated by colonialism, degrade the African and promote the interests of locally dominant classes, which have opposed the racism of the metropolitan power with nationalism, their own self-serving ideology. Under colonialism, this animosity primarily surfaced in urban locales, the contact points among migrants driven there by the pressures of the new order. At the hour of Nigerian independence, in 1960, various classes sought to aggrandize power and wealth in their own region as well as to use regional dominance as a springboard for the control of national resources. There has followed a protracted and intense period of alliance formation and of appropriation of public funds by the few, ably tracked by Nnoli through civil war, military rule, and dependent state capitalism fueled by oil revenues.

The most original contribution of this volume is its analysis of regional variations as well as of the differences between ethnicity in Nigeria and social conflict in other African countries. The author forecasts that ameliorative measures, such as the creation of new states, will not remedy festering ethnic violence in Nigeria. Nnoli, calling for fundamental structural change, shifts the *problématique* of ethnic conflict to the plane of production relations. Recent evidence concerning the disposal of oil wealth and the hemorrhaging agricultural sector, increasingly disconnected from other sectors of the economy, lends new credence to Nnoli's stark thesis.

This book has its weaknesses. There is considerable repetition and unevenness of style. More important, after arguing that a socialist transformation is "inevitable," Nnoli calls for a new political movement to direct Nigeria along that path. But if history is foreordained, there is no need for a political movement to organize a revolution. Socialism, in this study, is viewed as a magic remedy for all the ills of capitalist life without in-depth analysis of the concrete processes that would give rise to a transition to a new order. There is empirical evidence that subaltern classes are now actively engaged in struggles over state power, but this information must be fleshed out.

Nnoli, much to his credit, surveys the most valuable liberal writings on ethnicity. Yet, surprisingly, he fails to interrelate the Nigerian experience and the rich theoretical debates in Marxism on the national question. Nor does Nnoli, concerned as he is with class consciousness, ponder the major contributions of such writers as Georg Lukács and António Gramsci.

This book is at its best in correcting misimpressions about "tribalism" in Africa, taking its stance in the critical field of political economy; it is weaker on theory and the practicalities of a strategy of transformation. The limitations of this book, however, are less important than its substantial achievements. Readers may not agree with all of its arguments; but this unblushing and flexible Marxist account marks new directions in scholarship emanating from Africa and deserves our careful consideration.

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THE PRESS IN NIGERIA: ITS DEVELOPMENT, ITS FUNCTION

John Anamaleze, Jr., *The Nigerian Press: The People's Conscience*, New York, Washington, Atlanta, and Hollywood: Vantage Press, 1979, 142 pages, index and bibliography, $6.95.

Nigeria is the most populous state in Africa. Its growing role in African affairs has been identified with petrodollars and an aggressive and self-assertive foreign policy. Apart from the period of military rule from 1965 to 1979, its reputation abroad has been linked with its mass democracy and its outspoken journalists.

The book represents "an attempt at a closed understanding of what factors had a powerful and determining influence on the growth of the press." The author traces the history of newspapers from their earliest beginnings in colonial Lagos to the 1978-79 period, when Nigerians were concerned with the impending federal elections and the return to civilian rule.

In the first chapter, which Mr. Anamaleze has entitled "Perspective," he suggests that the Nigerian press was a major instrument of national liberation during colonial days and one that can help Nigerians in their attempts to forge a new democratic republic during the remaining years of this century. The author notes that different patterns of newspaper ownership can be identified. Most newspaper owners in the colonial era were doctors and lawyers, men whom Dr. E.A. Ayandele called "Hybridized Africans." Regardless of their position in colonial Nigeria, they were ready to employ their fledgling newspapers as battering rams against the colonial ramparts of the British empire-builders in Lagos. Besides these individually owned newspapers, which provided their readers with a constant and steady diet of anticolonial rhetoric, there were others owned and operated by church groups and political parties. Among the former were the very first papers, such as *The Eagle and Lagos Critic*, first published in 1883, and John Payne Jackson's *Lagos Weekly News*, which appeared for the first time a decade later. The political press, on the other hand, was represented by the *Lagos Daily News*, originally started in 1925 by one Mr. Bababunmi and later taken over by the doyen of Nigerian nationalists, Mr. Herbert Macaulay, and by papers belonging to Nnamdi Azikiwe's National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) and Obafemi Awolowo's Action Group. This trend continued, and today all Nigerian political parties find it advantageous to have their own mouthpiece in the national press.

The religious press, whose arrival constitutes a landmark in Nigerian journalism, has been represented by the *African Challenge*, the *Catholic Herald* (Lagos), the *Leader* (Owerri), the Muslim publication the *Truth*, and many others.

All these newspapers fall under the three identifiable patterns of ownership. The only major exception, in the 1960s and early 1970s, was the *Daily Times*. Orginally a privately owned Nigerian paper, it was taken over by the Daily Mirror Group of Cecil King of London, in the 1930s. It subsequently passed back to Nigerian ownership. Anamaleze tells us that with the devolution of political power to the political parties of the three major regions of pre-independence Nigeria the new phenomenon in newspaper publishing developed. Each of the regional governments started its own newspaper as a mouthpiece of the party government in power.

In addition to his discussion of the patterns and forms of ownership, he also examines the development of the press since independence. He believes that the journalists in Nigeria have had a hard time defending and consolidating their constitutional right to print accounts of events as they observe and understand them. This effort was best dramatized during the debates on press freedom in the National Constituent Assembly, the body set up by the former military rulers to draft Nigeria's current constitution. To Anamaleze, the assembly's rejection of the journalists' plan for constitutional guarantees was a setback, but it has not prevented them from maintaining their reputation for lively independence and even sensationalism.

Anamaleze also addresses himself to the role of the journalist in nation building. He shares the general view in Africa that the press has a duty to promote national unity and to avoid stirring up controversies. He reports that, with the exception of the civil war years, the Nigerian press has maintained a reputation of promoting national unity.

He notes with satisfaction the triple gain for the press in growing literacy in Nigeria, in increasing numbers of politically conscious fellow citizens, and in accelerated socioeconomic progress. At the same time, however, he laments the problems of newspaper distribution due to the poor infrastructure, the lack of adequate training facilities, and the apparent unwillingness of risk-taking private businessmen to invest in the media.

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BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT

Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Western Saharans*, Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, and London: Croom Helm, 1980, 348 pages.

The Thompson-Adloff partnership ranks among the most productive in the political historiography of Africa. In terms of sheer output even Gann and Duignan have been surpassed, while Oliver and Fage trail far behind. Their encyclopedic *tours d'horizon* of former French Equatorial Africa, West Africa, Djibouti and the Horn of Africa, and Madagascar, not to mention their earlier works on Southeast Asia, have been a major ingredient in the intellectual diet of many generations of Africanists. Their most recent foray into the politics of the Western Sahara provides yet another example of their monkish labors. The book fills an important gap in the English-speaking literature on Africa, and as such merits the attention of anyone interested in this little-known area of the continent.

Here, compressed in some 300 pages, is a mass of valuable historical, social, economic, and political data, from which the discerning reader will gain an idea of the complexity of the issues involved in the Western Sahara crisis. One wonders, however, whether more than a highly impressionistic picture can be sifted out of this avalanche of facts. What we have here is a hodgepodge that wants to be a book; at best it is four books digested into one. The first deals with Mauritania, the second with the Spanish Sahara, the third with Morocco, and the fourth the Polisario. By way of a conclusion the reader is clued in on "the war's repercussions on Mauritania and Morocco." In piecing together their story the authors have drawn extensively from the archives of the Centre des Hautes Etudes de l'Afrique et de l'Asie Moderne (CHEAM), but with no effort to engage in a critical interpretation of their sources. Thus, the tone and substance of their argument is often tediously evocative of colonial administrative reports, a genre hardly destined to sustain the reader's interest. Scarcely any attention has been paid to recent scholarly research on Mauritania and Morocco; nowhere is any mention made of the problems of interpretation and analysis inherent in the nature of their sources. And much of the historical evidence presented to the reader is open to debate. Thus, we are told on page 34 that "upon the conquered people [of Morocco] the Almoravids imposed Islam, to which they themselves had been converted by the Arabs ten centuries earlier," which suggests that the conversion of the famous "soldier monks" of Ibn Yasin had occurred in the first century!

For those of us already familiar with the works of Attilio Gaudio, Ahmed Baba Miske, Elsa Assidou, and Robert Rezette, the Thompson-Adloff volume has at least the merit of remaining relatively immune to the kind of special pleading that characterizes much of the French language literature on the Western Sahara. The accompanying glossary, annex, and bibliography also provide a useful *vade mecum* through the complexities of Western Sahara politics.

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ANALYZING KENYAN CAPITALISM

Gavin Kitching, *Class and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of an African Petite-Bourgeoisie 1905-1970*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1980, xx, 479 pages, £15.00 (hardcover).

Nicola Swainson, *The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya 1918-1977*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980, 306 pages, $20.00 (hardcover), $8.50 (paperback).

Gavin Kitching's book is co-recipient of the Herskovits award for 1981. It is a massive work based on long and painstaking research, and it certainly deserves its distinction. The central issue concerns the main process or mechanism of class formation and polarization in Kenya, perceived to be "the use of off-farm income to expand land holdings and to commercialize agricultural production" (p. 3). Kitching is able to demonstrate that "off-farm income is used as a primary source of savings, [and that] from these savings investments are made in a variety of economic ventures, of which the purchase of land, support investments for agricultural production, and other forms of trade and business are all different varieties" (p. 364). We also learn that off-farm income is mainly generated by "straddling," that is, "privileged access to the monetized form of the surplus product" (p. 451); and that this is how capital accumulation was [and is] carried in Kenya by the African petite bourgeoisie. Kitching estimates that as a result of widespread "straddling," "the creation of a job in higher-income occupations creates very nearly five jobs . . . for the poor" and predicts that "the crucial key to the future prospects of the Kenyan economy, and indeed the likelihood of political stability there, is the speed at which higher-income [off-farm] occupations can be created" (p. 409).

Nicola Swainson's work is about accumulation in a "peripheral" economy. The answer to the main question asked in the book: Is the emerging local capitalist class autonomous or dependent? is the following: "In post-colonial Kenya, local capitalists have extended their sphere of accumulation into manufacturing which has brought them into *collaboration and competition* [her emphasis] with foreign capital" (p. 287). Therefore, she concludes: indigenous capitalist development, "at the present phase of imperialism," is neither autonomous nor dependent but interdependent.

In my view the main weaknesses in both books derive from the inherent difficulties attached to the application of Marxist class analysis in the African context. Kitching himself, for example, realizes that in Africa, class categories that are "source of surplus value" and those that are "appropriators of surplus value" are not "mutually exclusive" (pp. 442-5) and gives an example that is quite typical in this respect: "A worker in a Coca-Cola plant in Nairobi provides a certain amount of 'surplus labour' for the Coca-Cola corporation, but his wife, as manager of his home farm, pumps out 'surplus labour' from the six agricultural labourers she hires" (p. 449). Dr. Swainson's book raises questions about whether her emphasis on interclass — as opposed to intraclass or interethnic — conflict is entirely justified. For example, the competition or even confrontation between the Northern (Nyeri) and Southern (Kiambu) Kikuyu is very important in power relations. Furthermore, the role of individual leaders such as Kenyatta, Mboya, Koinange, Njonjo, and the rest has been a determinant in the shaping of modern Kenyan history. This appears to have been overlooked by both authors.

Despite their shortcomings, however, both books deserve to be read, primarily because they are serious and detailed studies that provide new insights on Kenyan historiography, and also because they help us to understand the complexities, paradoxes, and contradictions in African development today.

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

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