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GHANA: Life Under Rawlings

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

IN THIS ISSUE

Economic questions and their interaction with foreign policy provide the major thrust of this issue. Dr. Bernard Chidzero explains why American investors should feel comfortable in working together with Zimbabwe's self-proclaimed socialists. He also frankly discusses his country's relationship with South Africa.

David Rockefeller uses the occasion of an interview with *Africa Report* to propose greater U.S. understanding and support for African states, including socialist countries. He believes such contact will help to convince these countries of the failure of the communist system, compared with the promise of capitalism.

Dr. Chedly Ayari proposes greatly increased economic cooperation between Arabs and Africans as a basis for enhanced political and cultural cooperation between their peoples. Susan Gilpin examines American dependence upon African minerals and its implications for U.S. foreign policy.

Following the analysis of Rawlings' coup in Ghana in the last issue, a correspondent in Accra has filed a report on what life in the country is really like during these early days of the air force officer's second intervention.

From Washington, Richard Deutsch describes the storm caused by the administration's decision to change its approach to Ethiopians living in this country. We also have an expanded section of book reviews and of books received.

Photo Credit
The cover photograph of Jerry Rawlings was taken during his trip across Ghana in February to explain the meaning of his second revolution to the populace. The photo was taken by Genevieve Chauvel/Sygma.

Bernard Chidzero,

Zimbabwean Minister of Finance, Economic Planning, and Development

INTERVIEWED BY ANTHONY J. HUGHES AND MARGARET A. NOVICKI

AFRICA REPORT: Mr. Minister, how would you characterize Zimbabwe's relations with the United States under the Reagan administration?

CHIDZERO: I don't think that our relations with the United States have changed dramatically with the new administration. We are a nonaligned country and we keep lines open for cooperation with any country that respects our hard-won independence and our sovereignty, and, equally, we don't interfere in the internal affairs of other states. We are aware of some new directions in the policy of the United States, whether one is thinking in terms of Reaganomics or in terms of relations with South Africa, and, to some extent, regarding Namibia. But these are questions that we must leave to the Americans to decide. We will negotiate accordingly.

On the economic front, we continue to cooperate fairly effectively with the United States. At the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) last year, the United States made one of the biggest pledges for assistance to Zimbabwe. There have been no real hitches, although it has taken time to negotiate the instruments for the disbursement of the funds. We are now signing one of the agreements which will provide that some $50 million, which will come as a grant, will be made available to Zimbabwe under the Commodity Import programs. The United States has been very imaginative towards the efforts we have deployed for the reconstruction program (the reconstruction of schools, dip tanks, clinics, and so on), and quick disbursement is taking place.

We are looking for trading opportunities with the United States and there is already some growth in trade. We have a number of large American companies operating in Zimbabwe, particularly in the mining sector, and that relationship grows. We have found the United States fairly sympathetic to our development policies, even though they may not agree 100 percent with us, just as we don't agree 100 percent with them. So there is a give-and-take relationship that must rule the situation. We believe the United States has a great deal to benefit from farsighted policies in terms of investment in Zimbabwe, in terms of trade relationships. We don't believe that our socialist policies should be an obstacle to effective cooperation.

But on the political front, I am least qualified to discuss the issues. We trust that on Namibia, the United States will not influence things in a contrary direction, i.e., against Security Council Resolution 435. We hope that the United States realizes that its long-term interests lie not so much with South Africa as with the independent sovereign states—that is, black states—in Africa. Change there must be in South Africa eventually and we hope that the United States is farsighted enough. Equally, we hope that the United States will not be influenced by ideological postures that are cast in rather academic terms—that socialism means communism, or that South Africa is the only bastion of U.S. security, and of the things that the Americans believe in. We believe that is not so. We would hope that the United States can stand squarely on the side of freedom, democracy, and human dignity.

AFRICA REPORT: Mr. Minister, you mentioned your socialist policies. But how do you see the role of foreign private investment in Zimbabwe's development and especially American investment? What is your opinion of the Reagan approach favoring private investment in developing countries apparently at the expense of official development assistance?

CHIDZERO: We have made it quite clear in our economic policy statement, "Growth and Equity," and the points have been made clearer still in our three-year transitional development plan, that while it is our prerogative to define our policy objectives and the direction of development, we nevertheless welcome the cooperation of the international community in various directions—private investment, for instance, which is an important element in the process of development. There is room for private investment in Zimbabwe, there is room for the private sector to operate in Zimbabwe, but this must be in accordance with government policy directives.

Now what are these policies that we are talking about? We are talking about transforming the economy of Zimbabwe from an enclave that benefits a minority of the population to one that benefits every citizen of Zimbabwe. This does not mean that we are going to distribute a diminishing cake; our redistributive policies are not based on equity alone, but they are based on growth. In other words, we have to expand economic activities and we have to invest in various sectors of the economy. For this to be done, a great deal of saving has to be entertained by government itself, and also by the private sector. Equally, we would hope that foreign investment would be forthcoming so that we can have a more rapid and sustained rate of growth.

The fact that we are adopting a socialist policy doesn't necessarily mean that we intend to eliminate the private sector. On the contrary, we believe that the private sector has a role to fulfill. Our socialist policies, which imply more socialized means of production and distribution—that is, democratization of the production and distribution processes—do not necessarily mean that there is no room for private initiative and private capital. But we would want to see a situation in which economic and industrial activities are not based solely on the profit motive in terms of maximization of profit. We recognize that there must be a fair return on investment. We recognize that there must be security of investment. We also recognize that there must be remittability of earnings, and these things we honor and respect. Indeed, under our constitution we are obliged to do so and we accept that constitution. But we also recognize that there are many areas of the economy that are not attractive to private investment, either because the risks are too high or because the returns are long term. That is particularly the case with regard to investment in the rural areas where most of our people live. Government has to take a hand in pioneering development in those areas. We also recognize that, to the extent that we are experimenting with new forms of government, there must be question marks on the part of investors, particularly foreign investors, concerning the direction we are taking. We can assure them that we have nothing up our sleeves. We are just as plain a people as you can imagine.

We have made it quite clear that it is not government policy to nationalize the private sector, though it is clearly government policy to participate with industry in the private sector. This necessarily means that we would welcome joint ventures. We recognize that the government has to be involved in the private sector, either by way of joint venture or by buying shares of one kind or another, which we have done. But let me say that in our national development plan, we expect the public sector to invest *more* than the private sector. About 55 percent of the investment will come from the public sector, mainly in infrastructure development—roads, railways, power, and also rural development. But we have provided room for the private sector to invest as much as 45 percent of a total of $6 billion of investment over the next three years. That's an indication of the role that the private sector has to play.

AFRICA REPORT: Critics point out that Zimbabwe does have a socialist ideology, its political structure is split along regional/ethnic lines, and its economic future is hostage to a hostile neighbor to the south. Why should a prudent capitalist invest in Zimbabwe?

CHIDZERO: I would have thought that a prudent capitalist takes calculated risks. If he doesn't invest in Zimbabwe, someone else will invest. And if the private sector is afraid to invest in Zimbabwe, then that private sector has really no right to exist in Zimbabwe. It is really a parasite if it doesn't contribute. If it is to contribute, then it must take the necessary risks. We are aware that we have a big brother to the south, but we are not captive to that south. We have trading relations, economic relations, with South Africa, which we have inherited and which are the consequence of our geographical contiguity and the economic realities. We have no political contacts or relations with South Africa, nor diplomatic relations with South Africa, but the economic reality is there. We are conscious of our very high degree of dependency on South Africa—rail connections in particular. But we are doing everything we can to disengage as constructively as we can by cultivating closer ties with neighboring countries within the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). For this, we have mobilized resources, which amounted to about $600 million pledged at the November 1980 conference in



Maputo. Some $270 to $300 million of this has already been committed or used on transport communications to improve contacts between the different countries, and we hope this relationship opens up new possibilities for investment, not only infrastructure development but industrial development, energy development, industrial rationalization, food production, and so on.

As to ethnic and geographical divisions, these are passing phenomena. They are not as deep and stubborn as people make them out to be. We are one people in Zimbabwe. True, we have our own regional differences, our own ethnic differences, but who tells me they don't have those problems? The United States doesn't have those regional problems? The United States doesn't have ethnic problems? They are there, and yet you still have Americans talking and speaking and acting as Americans. A Georgian is not the same as a New Yorker. They are completely different people. A black American doesn't think the same way as a white American. And yet they comprise one nation, one ethos, and they work together. So are we trying to evolve one nation in Zimbabwe that transcends color considerations. The white people of Zimbabwe are welcome to stay in Zimbabwe and contribute decisively to its future, and there is no persecution of the white community. The different subgroups among the black population, whether they are Shonas or Ndebeles or they come from the north or the east—we are forging new lines of cooperation as one nation, but why should people exaggerate realities of life which we are trying to reconcile, which we are trying to remove? And we are succeeding.

Photo: Nobu Arakawa

Bernard Chidzero: "The United States has a great deal to benefit from far-sighted investment policies toward Zimbabwe"

AFRICA REPORT: Are you then satisfied with the level of foreign private investment to date?

CHIDZERO: We are not satisfied with the level of foreign private investment to date, because people have been slow in coming. We are satisfied with the level of public support that we have received. At the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development, for instance, nearly $2 billion was pledged. Of this, some $400 million is already committed and we hope that at the end of our plan period, by 1985, we will have used all the money that was pledged at ZIMCORD. We have had tremendous support from governments and international organizations. The private sector has been slow in coming, that is, the *foreign* private sector. Our own private sector has not been that slow, they've been very active in the opening of new projects, expanding their activities. They've shown more confidence in the future of Zimbabwe than foreigners. And for us, that's much more important. We would hope, however, that foreign investors will be imaginative enough to come and join hands with us.

AFRICA REPORT: Prime Minister Mugabe has named 1982 the year of national transformation, aimed at putting Zimbabwe further on the socialist path. Can you tell us some of the concrete steps to be taken in that direction?

CHIDZERO: The year of transformation, which can only be the beginning, marks the watershed in this process. You don't transform overnight; you have a process of transformation. What are some of the things we are doing to transform our society? To understand what I am going to say, you must bear in mind the history of Zimbabwe, the major characteristics of the economy, and the imperative for change. Take land for instance. We have launched a massive program of resettlement of our people. It will necessitate the resettlement of at least 162,000 families which, multiplied by an average of about five people per family, will give you some 800,000 people who have to be resettled on land that hitherto has been reserved exclusively for white settlement. That program will transform the lives of these people by giving them new challenges, new possibilities for development. It will transform the society by relieving pressure on the so-called communal lands, formerly known as tribal trust lands, where there is over-population on poor soil, so that there will be new opportunities for development in those areas. That's transformation in the productive sense.

We have also decided that education shall receive the largest share of development capital. Indeed, under the present arrangements, nearly 19 percent of total government expenditure is on schooling, which is very high by any standard. This is because we need to educate our people at all levels. Similarly, we have made education free at the primary school level and we hope to move to the secondary level as soon as we can. We believe that people who are equipped intellectually with skills, and productive skills in particular, can transform their own societies. And that is terribly important for us—education and training. We are also taking development into the rural areas. Under our three-year development plan, priorities were to be given to extension of railway connections, of roads, of telecommunications into the rural areas to open up the whole area so that our people can become integrated into society rather than remain, as hitherto, outside the pale of the development process. That's terribly important. We are going to involve our people more fully in the development process, in the decision-making process. This will be done partly through community development projects, but also in bringing them into a state of consciousness about their productive ability and the role they play in industry and mining. Therefore, their participation in industry through workers' committees, for instance, and possibly various schemes in which they can profit or benefit from the returns of their production—this we are not forcing, we are leaving the private sector to cooperate with us to find ways in which the population can be integrated into the productive process, particularly at the level of decision-making and management, and so on.

We have embarked on a scheme of narrowing the income gap between the poor and the rich by various devices that are misunderstood outside. Thus, we have increased the minimum wage. The lowest-paid worker in Zimbabwe now cannot earn less than $65 a month. This is a revolutionary process in terms of income. We hope that this will be accompanied by increased productivity, which means we have to train and educate our people that the more they receive, the more they have to produce. At the same time, we have put a temporary freeze on higher wages, on higher incomes—temporarily—we will review it ev[illegible] view to narrowing the gap. We are conscious that we can't put the freeze or restraint on too long because it would lead to a loss of skills. But nevertheless, we want to create an egalitarian society and we have to take the necessary measures.

So transformation can be understood in terms of changing the structures of government or economy through reallocation of resources. Priorities have to be determined. It should be understood in terms of the decision-making process that the people are involved in determining their own lives. It must be understood in terms of the degree to which people share fully in the benefits that shall accrue to our common efforts. Transformation also means the establishment of new institutions to assist in the process. We are going to establish a Zimbabwe Development Corporation, which will spearhead government development efforts. We are establishing a Zimbabwe Development Bank that will mobilize resources for development purposes. These are some of the changes we expect to launch. But transformation is not a discreet, once-for-all effort. It is a dynamic process that we have launched and 1982 sees the intensification of that effort, which will spread over a period of time.

AFRICA REPORT: What is the government's policy on public ownership of your major economic resources—agriculture, minerals, and industry? Critics allege that you will alienate international business and deter future investment by imposing government controls such as the Mineral Marketing Board.

CHIDZERO: We are aware of those fears but I think people don't understand the realities of our situation. First and foremost, we have a constitution that guarantees property rights. It is as watertight as any constitution you can ever imagine. We cannot therefore expropriate or nationalize without compensation, and, if we do, it requires changing the constitution and it is not very easy to change the constitution. We have accepted that constitution and we live by it. Therefore, we respect property rights.

Second, while the public sector is going to grow as I have indicated, and it must grow, it is not going to grow necessarily at the expense of the private sector. There are many things that are not being done by the private sector that have to be done by the public sector.

Thirdly, there is growing up a sort of partnership between the private and public sectors. Thus, for instance, we have moved into banking, we have acquired majority shares in the former Rhobank, which we call Zimbank (the Zimbabwe Banking Corporation). But we have not touched the other banks that exist in Zimbabwe that are completely private-owned—Barclays Bank, Standard Bank, Grindlays, and so on. We have moved into another banking enterprise with the Bank of Commerce and Credit of Zimbabwe (BCCZ), in which we own a minority share. We are negotiating the possibility of acquiring a minority share in a pharmaceutical company, a company that is one of the biggest in the country. And that is the sort of relationship we have, where the private and public sectors operate together.

There will be areas in which the public sector will own

Photo: Darquennes/Sygma

Education is receiving the largest share of Zimbabwe's development capital

Railway bridge linking Zimbabwe and Zambia: "We are cultivating closer ties with our neighbors within SADCC"

100 percent, and this is already a reality. We didn't invent those things or bring them into reality ourselves. Air Zimbabwe is 100 percent owned by government—we found it already there. Zimbabwe National Railways is owned by the government. Post and Telecommunications is owned by the government. Zimbabwe Steel Corporation is 49 percent owned by the government. The Willowvale Motor Factory, which was a Ford factory, was nationalized by the previous regime and we are maintaining its 100 percent ownership by the government. In other words, there are areas where government already has a majority ownership and, in others, it is in partnership. And the process will grow because there is a dialectical relationship between the public and the private sector. And in the dialectical process, we shall see who is more imaginative, who is stronger, who is fairer, and who is more in tune with the realities of the new Zimbabwe. So I do not therefore believe that there is any real fear on the part of the private sector.

Now I will go back to a point made earlier concerning the Reagan administration's preference for promoting the private sector. We realize the American system prefers the private sector. Fine, that is their policy and we don't challenge them. If they want to use their aid to promote the private sector, fine, we will use it in Zimbabwe. In fact, we are using some of the American aid to allocate foreign exchange to the private sector, because that is what the administration wanted. But they must leave to us the decision how we use that money, how we allocate it. So we have decided we will allocate American aid, Commodity Import programs, for purchasing spare parts that are much needed in the private sector, replacement of equipment in the private sector, re-importation of raw materials that are required by private sector industries (fertilizers, for instance), which the whole economy requires and that strengthens the economic activities of the country and, incidentally or directly, strengthens the private sector. But it is to the national good, and we have determined the priorities. It will be quite one thing if they came to interfere directly with our priorities. To the extent therefore that there is a meeting of the minds on this, we foresee no real problems.

AFRICA REPORT: Returning to your relations with South Africa, it is a fact that over half of your trade is with or via South Africa. What are you doing either individually or through the SADCC to reduce that dependence?

CHIDZERO: It is true that South Africa is our biggest single trading partner in terms of exports and imports. It is also true that about 60-70 percent of our total traffic, in terms of exports and imports beyond South Africa, goes through South African ports, which is a reversal of the situation that existed up to 1974, that is, before the closure of the border with Mozambique, when about 70 percent or slightly more, of our traffic was through Mozambican harbors. It is now the reverse. We are aware of that. So what are we doing?

First, our own national efforts—reconstructing the rail connections to Mozambique and taking deliberate measures to convince our traders and business people that it is more economical to use Mozambican harbors. Distances are shorter, and so on. This is a psychological issue as well as a political issue. Psychologically, in the sense that most of our traders and importers and exporters still have to be adjusted to the new regime in Mozambique. They have their own suspicions, so we are disabusing them of these suspicions. It is political in the sense that some of our traders, importers, and exporters may have their own political preferences. But again we hope they won't be determined to maintain those preferences.

Then we are cooperating with Mozambique within the SADCC framework to improve the port facilities, both in Maputo and Beira. Therefore, there are studies now within the SADCC framework for the dredging, widening, and expanding of the harbor facilities at Beira, just as there are efforts going on now to improve the handling facilities in Maputo within the SADCC framework. The Southern African Transportation and Telecommunications Commission is based in Maputo in which we participate fully in the schemes to improve the facilities through Maputo. And that, we hope, should lead us over a period of time to returning to the previous position where most of our trade routes were through Maputo and Beira. So that's as far as communications and transportation goes.

Trade is a little bit more difficult to change suddenly because to the extent that there are markets in South Africa, you can't create artificial markets in neighboring countries. People export where they can export and we are not interfering with the process of exportation. South Africa gave notice last year to terminate the present preferential trade agreement with us. We did not say anything. We didn't conclude that agreement, we found it in existence. We saw no reason for terminating it, but if South Africa wants to terminate it what can we do? It's within their right. But we hope that good sense will prevail, that you can be completely diametrically opposed, ideologically or politically, and yet still cooperate economically. I suspect that there is a great deal of cooperation between the United States and a number of countries who hold completely different political views or ideologies. These are the realities of life. It's not total isolation, it is selective isolation or cooperation, if you want to put it more positively. That's what we are doing.

Beyond our neighbors, we are looking for markets elsewhere. We have acceded to the Lomé Convention, and the European Economic Community, and there are market possibilities that we are now exploring in the EEC countries themselves, for some of our raw materials but also in particular some of our manufactured products. There are real possibilities there that we will be able to make a breakthrough. We are going beyond, we are exploring possibilities for exports under the Generalized System of Preferences with the United States and with the other OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, with Canada for instance. And it will surprise you perhaps that our second largest importing partner at present is West Germany. After South Africa, the West Germans are taking most of our products. Now that's a new breakthrough, and we hope this process will continue.

AFRICA REPORT: Can you assess the government's progress on the rural development plans and the obstacles involved in proceeding with the program?

CHIDZERO: On the rural development program, we can categorize the activities and the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts and the actual development projects. On reconstruction, we have rebuilt virtually all the schools that were destroyed during the war. It has been done largely with the support of a number of countries that have brought in a great deal of assistance, including the United States, the EEC countries, and some of the developing countries. We have rebuilt the schools, the clinics, and the roads—it has been a gigantic effort with international support. We have also rebuilt the dip tanks for animals for disease control. That is one thing on rural development, that life is returning to normal. We have resettled the refugees with the efforts of

Photo: P. Davis/United Nations

Zimbabweans are being resettled from the former "Tribal Trust Lands" where there was overpopulation on poor soils

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, with the support from the international community.

Then you have the development side, which is distinct from restoring what was there before—building new structures and development projects. What we have done here first is to integrate the institutional framework. Previously we had the Ministry of Agriculture in Zimbabwe, which was for all practical purposes a ministry for white commercial farmers. Today the Ministry of Agriculture, through its "Agritex" unit, provides extension services, marketing facilities, and credit facilities for *all* farmers, without discrimination. That's a major point many people don't realize, that we now have one national ministry that deals with the problems of agriculture overall. Then we have the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Development that is acquiring new land in areas where there is unutilized or underutilized land, in the formerly all-white areas. We have resettled to date some 7,000 families in those areas and it is not just taking people and dumping them, it means opening up access roads. It means putting up new water wells, it means putting up schools. So there is a whole development taking place that is an achievement in its own. We have projects that have been supported largely by European countries—the Norwegians, the Danes, the Dutch—for construction of rural water supplies in villages so they can get clean water. That's been done, a tremendous project.

I talked earlier about primary school education being free, but it really has largely benefited the rural areas because in the urban areas, this was more or less a fact, where people could afford it, but in the rural areas, this was not so. There is a tremendous burst of activity at the educational level in that respect. That's the sort of thing that's going on in the rural areas.

But beyond that there is the conscientization of the people to engage in self-help schemes, in building their own schools, in combining to build roads and so on. That process is going on. We have a Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs that is very active in that field, as is our Ministry of Sports and Recreation, in which young people are being mobilized and trained to move to the rural areas.

So, in summary, there is now an integration effort to bring the two agricultural systems together—commercial farmers, who were predominantly white, and communal lands, which were exclusively black—integrating the services and the supplies. And the development projects, such as the resettlement of people, which is taking place. The marketing, the pricing system, is now uniform and there is no distinction between producers.

AFRICA REPORT: Is there anything we have not covered in our questions, or you in your responses, that you think you'd like to say with regard to Zimbabwe's economy, as far as an American audience is concerned?

CHIDZERO: Yes, there are three things that I would like to say that are subject to considerable misunderstanding. There seems to be a feeling in this country and in other parts of the world that the government of Zimbabwe is spending too much money—such as government expenditures on health and education—and that there is no investment, no development. That is not true, we are making up for the opportunities that were lost in the past, so we are spending more on education and health because that is the way we can build a strong nation—healthy, intellectually alert, and trained. At the same time we are investing. In the national transitional plan that will be published in July, we expect to spend in the neighborhood of \$6 billion on development projects—power and railways, as well as actual productive projects, like irrigation and so on. When we issued the policy statement, "Growth with Equity," the very title was pregnant with meaning. It was *growth*, but with equity. The emphasis is on growth, with equity as the accompanying factor. It is not equity and then growth as a sideline—that is important.

The second point that is very greatly misunderstood is the question of inflation—that we have hiked all wages, that we have frozen prices, and the whole thing is blowing up in inflationary flames. We are conscious of the fact that we have an inflation problem, but we have going about it as realistically as we can. We estimate that during the plan period, inflation might rise to 15 percent. But it is within manageable proportions. Any growing economy such as ours is bound to run into inflationary problems. After all, in 1980, the economy grew by 14 percent in real terms. Now this means a lot of money in the hands of people; it means considerable activity has been generated. Last year, the economy grew by about 8 percent. Demand for imports, for consumer goods, for capital goods—that whole thing has been generated. But we have taken measures to reckon with this: on money supply, we are controlling it; on consumer demand, by raising interest rates, we are taking measures; on the productive side, to see that there are no shortages, we are increasing producer prices to provide incentives for production, particularly of consumer goods, foodstuffs, and so on. So we are taking realistic measures.


Photo: Nobu Arakawa

Chidzero with Richard Patton from the American company H.J. Heinz, at a New York meeting on investment in Zimbabwe

Zimbabweans are encouraged to participate in self-help schemes

Then there is the notion that Zimbabwe is importing more than it is exporting, and that this is really a decline in the economy because, even during the Smith regime, there was always, on the visible trade, a positive balance. Yes, there was a positive balance, the economy wasn't growing! Between 1974 and 1979, it was declining sharply. But the economy is growing now, as I have indicated. Therefore, there is a greater demand for capital goods. Our imports grew in 1980 by nearly 50 percent. Our exports went up by 35 percent. But there are other factors that are militating against us. We had had transportation problems that we didn't create. Our railway system was going down because there were no spare parts, no locomotives, etc. But we have come in imaginatively. The World Bank has given us $42 million to rehabilitate our railway system, to train artisans, etc. We have recruited temporarily some 200 Indian artisans to assist us while we are training our own people to take over. We have, through various schemes, Kuwait, the United States and Canada, purchased some 60 new diesel locomotives that are going to provide the necessary motive power and shorter turnaround periods; 25 of them have already arrived, which means we can export more, whereas our railways system wasn't able to cope with the problems. So in terms of volume, we weren't able to export as much. Given the fact that the world was depressed and there were lower prices, it meant we couldn't make up for prices with volume.

The fact that the world economic situation is depressed and commodity markets are fetching very low prices, particularly on the minerals side, is not our responsibility; it's a world phenomenon. So we are exporting, but getting less for what we export. A typical example is that in 1980, gold was fetching some $700 an ounce, where today it is about $390. Who can help that? And gold is a big foreign exchange earner for us.

So there is this misunderstanding that we are mishandling the economy, we are bungling everything. The fact of the matter is that the economy is in ferment, we are moving forward, it is thrustful. And in that sort of situation, there are bound to be imbalances. But I believe that disequilibria are the very force and basis for progress. Where there is tranquility, there is no change, there is no growth. □

LETTER FROM ACCRA

Ghana's "Holy War"

FROM A CORRESPONDENT



"Holy War Declared": the headlines in Accra's dailies proclaim the second coming of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. When he led the June 4 revolution in 1979, Rawlings beguiled the population with his populism. During his brief stint as head of state, he worked to institute changes that would resuscitate a bankrupt economy. When he voluntarily relinquished power to Dr. Hilla Limann, he warned the newly elected president of the Third Republic that he would return if Limann did not lead the country with honesty and help guide Ghana out of economic chaos.

Dissatisfaction with Limann's administration spawned a series of attempted coups during November and December of 1981. On December 31, following a New Year's party at Burma Camp (the military barracks), Rawlings, technically retired from the armed forces, commandeered the Recce tank troops, ushering in the era of the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC). In an early address to the nation, Rawlings asserted that he had not led a military coup as such, but an "action" that would create "an opening for real democracy, government of the people, by the people, for the people."

ECONOMIC RUIN AND THE GAME OF *KALEBULE*

Prior to the revolution, the shortage of foreign exchange and the government's consequent inability to import many necessities encouraged smuggling. The official exchange rate had stood at 2.75 cedis to the dollar for a

The author of this newsletter, an American living in Ghana and with many years of experience in the country, has requested anonymity.

number of years. During the autumn of 1981, the black market rate rose to 50 cedis to the dollar. Goods were purchased outside Ghana at the unofficial rate and then priced accordingly for sale in internal markets. Workers could barely afford to feed their families.

Kalebule means quite simply a lot of money chasing few goods, resulting in inflated prices. Denounced as evil, *kalebule* was practiced not out of wickedness but as a means of survival. Everyone traded on the side. A story current in Accra tells of a tin of sardines that passed through seven different sellers before it was opened for supper. The sardines were rotten, but when the disgruntled buyer went back to the woman who sold them to him, she exclaimed, "Hey, they're not for eating, they're for trading!"

High-level corruption was legion. Hundreds of thousands of cedis meant for public expenditure were syphoned off and deposited into private accounts; cases of foodstuffs, building materials, and household items targeted for public consumption were appropriated for personal use. As former officials admit their wrong-doing, the reaction of working people in Accra has been unanimous: "You see how our leaders chop our money?"

SIGNS OF THE "REVO"

The thrust of the new government is couched in revolutionary rhetoric. Ghana must throw off the yoke of imperialism that has blocked its progress. The domination by exploiters must be stopped. In the fight for the common man, leadership is sought among the masses through grass-roots organizing.

There are "exercises" in which citizens are encouraged to participate. Seven Saturdays have been dubbed "volu" cleanup days. Town criers come through the night before: "Everybody, everybody, a message from the PNDC." Neighborhood residents are asked to pool their labor and clean out gutters, clear away garbage, remove refuse. Classes at the universities have been recessed, so that students can join task forces to evacuate the thousands of bags of cocoa rotting in the bush.

Other exercises are not voluntary. On February 5, the PNDC announced the withdrawal of the 50 cedi note from circulation. Everyone had one week to turn in said currency to any bank, in exchange for which they would receive a receipt marked "50 cedi." The day before the exercise was announced, when the Family Planning organization withdrew its payroll of 19,000 cedis, the bank paid it out in 50 cedi notes. ("You see," say many, "the government and the banks are out to cheat the people.")

Early in March, in accordance with a "clean up Accra" ultimatum, store owners were busily painting their storefronts and roadside mechanics walling in their businesses and carting off jalopies, to beat the three-day deadline.

The news media provide a platform for propaganda and revolutionary zeal. Stories report that policies will lessen the burden of the common man, without indicating what those policies are. Articles extoll the workers' appropriation of leadership roles. Lists published daily enumerate who must appear before investigating committees and the fate of those who already have. The virtual news blackout has led to the propagation of rumors. While the media have offered no explanations for the 50 cedi exercise, at least four are mentioned around town: virtually no 50 cedi notes came into the bank during the past year; too many were printed during the Limann administration; many were counterfeit; out of a nine billion cedi money supply, only three billion was in current accounts.

While the military presence in Accra is not marked, soldiers do oversee the sale of control-priced commodities and patrol the streets in anticipation of trouble. Sometimes tensions are translated into action. A carload of soldiers followed a driver into the parking lot of the International School and in front of a crowd of gaping students beat him, ostensibly because he had passed them on the road.

Another signpost of change is the institutionalization of price controls. Prior to the coup, people were distressed because they could not afford basic commodities. Now that the prices have been slashed, the distress continues, because canned milk, fish, meat, sugar, bath and laundry soap, and bread have become so scarce. Every day, queues form around the city as people hear of the sale of one item or another. Ghanaian women are snazzy dressers who love to display the colors of Dutch Wax cloth; now that its price has been reduced from a high of 1200 cedis to 250 cedis, there is none in the market. The shortages affect everyone; a chief justice cannot buy soap, a PNDC secretary has no toilet paper. The PNDC has begun house-to-house searches for hoarded goods. A Hausa woman worries that soldiers will come to her compound and confiscate as hoarded the cloth she has laid away for her granddaughter's dowry. There are tales of women dumping bags of flour in the bush to avoid selling them at a loss. When such goods are uncovered, they are turned over to accredited stores, out of the reach of the market women.

The government is demanding communalism. During cleanup days, if volunteers are insufficient, passers-by are drafted. A group of people queing up for fresh meat in central Accra were asked to move inside of the gates at the side of the building. Then the gates were locked and the prospective buyers taken off in waiting buses to unload cocoa.

Thus, daily routines are regularly disrupted. During the 50 cedi exercise, everyone had to abandon normal activities to stand in long bank lines. Devoid of pedestrian and car traffic, Accra had the air of a dead city. Each new rumor carries with it more dislocation. The day before Ghana's Silver Jubilee celebration, when it was known that Rawlings would speak to the nation, the market women refused to accept 20 cedi notes, having "heard" that they were to be withdrawn.

One of the more obvious inconveniences is the curfew — dusk to dawn during the first five days of the revolution, 8 PM till 5 AM for the next thirteen, and since January 20, 10 PM till 5 AM. Although Accra's nightlife has not ceased, it has been dramatically curtailed. Discos are operative only on the weekends, opening at 3 PM and closing at 9 PM. While Ghanaians may make light of the curfew, all are indoors when the siren sounds. In fact, owing to scarce nighttime transport, the streets are generally empty by 9 P.M. People have become accustomed to the restriction. Some women say they now see more of their husbands; others say they no longer fear thieves in the middle of the night. But many also complain of cabin fever and sleepless nights.

There is no question that certain positive steps have been taken by the fledgling government, and these do provide a sense of progress. The badly gutted roads, within and outside cities, are being repaired for the first time in years. Street lights installed five years ago are finally fitted with bulbs. Blatant examples of tax evasion and business malpractice are being rectified. Public transportation is more affordable.

RESPONSES TO THE COUP

At first, the predominant reaction was one of ambivalence. Some, primarily students, were enthusiastic; others were dismayed. But even those who condemned the takeover admit that the economic chaos was so great that something had to be done. However, the jubilation that accompanied the June 4 revolution is absent. And now, even workers ask: "Can Rawlings succeed? That is the question."

There are traces of tribalism and xenophobia. Those hostile to Rawlings claim that he is loading his government with fellow Ewe. Others worry that "northerners" (many of whom are money changers) are being singled out for harassment. A Zabrama asks how it is that he and his brothers, drafted for the West African Frontier Force during World War II, could have fought so valiantly then as Gold Coast recruits and be regarded now as enemies.

Classism is rampant. Anyone who exhibits signs of material success is assumed to be a criminal. One senses that a professional should have nothing to show for 20 years of gainful employment. Furthermore, in a country that has long revered the power of education, the word *educated* is now besmirched. Workers with neither educational nor managerial training are entrusted with policymaking roles. Those who have suffered penury and unemployment now feel they have their chance. When a University of Ghana lecturer entered the university branch of Ghana National Trading Corporation (GNTC), he was told to leave, because "this is now a peoples' store."

Many feel insecure with the PNDC at the helm, because there is so little information and everything is so unpredictable. Anyone with property fears he or she will be called before the Citizens' Vetting Committee, found guilty of some impropriety, and levied a stiff fine.

Among those for whom the civilian government carried great hope, there is now despair and resignation. "Will we never be allowed to change government through the democratic process?" they ask. Others are vociferous in their anger. Businessmen grumble that Rawlings has "spoiled the country." Many of them are idle, because the goods they normally deal in have vanished or because their assets have been frozen. Many, as a consequence, are clamoring to leave, following in the footsteps of those who fled immediately following the coup.

There are demonstrations of support. Late in January, following news accounts of planned invasion by the United States, Britain, Nigeria, and other "imperialist" countries, students took to the streets. Busloads and truckloads of Student Task Forces sang and chanted on their way through town. The Ministry of Information is busy printing posters: "Get Involved," "Power to the People." An official in the ministry's publications' department explains that these and others will show foreigners that support for the government is genuine, not elicited from behind the barrel of a gun.

FLAVOR OF THE PNDC

As during the June 4 revolution, part of Rawlings's power base lies within

Photo: Ghana Info

Market in Accra: Kalebule means a lot of money chasing few goods

the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS). Initially the most vocal supporters of the PNDC, they were also the most radical. They have since been joined by workers. Each of these two sectors of the population has its special input.

On January 21, the PNDC announced the appointment of 17 ministerial heads, no longer to be known as ministers but as PNDC secretaries. Four of the men, for years active in opposition party politics, were branded "bourgeois reactionaries" by the radical wing of NUGS. They insisted that problems would result from introducing the controversial four since they were not of the same mind as the others, having been indoctrinated over the years with capitalist ideas. Chairman Rawlings said, "Give them a chance," and the students backed off.

The People's Defense Committees (PDCs), based in localities and workplaces, are organizing centers for the revolution. They are watchdogs of the PNDC, which expects them to maintain a check on existing structures, such as trade unions, district councils, and village development committees. Top levels of management are expressedly barred from PDC membership. Some workers who have joined get carried away periodically, abusing officials, beating them, demanding their ouster. Some have joined only to avoid being labeled "enemies of the people." Some have refused to join because they view the PDCs as "Big Brother" organizations that use empty and abstract rhetoric inappropriate to the Ghanaian context. Some have not joined but watch from the sidelines to avoid the disapproval of members.

Photo: Ghana Info

An earlier currency-changing exercise: The PNDC removed the 50 cedi note from circulation

CHANCES FOR SUCCESS

Rawlings has become an invisible leader. In 1979, after the June 4 coup, he was seen everywhere, addressing various constituencies. Now, he is rarely photographed outside of his Burma Camp headquarters. People wonder if he is really in charge and point to the curfew as evidence of an as yet fluid political environment. The first week of March, a rumor circulated in several different social milieus that a military countercoup had been attempted and the guilty six summarily executed.

Rawlings's popularity with other governments, as with his own citizenry, is mixed. People here say that in the context of West Africa, Ghana's governmental turns are infectious. If it has a coup, others will as well. If it chooses democracy, others will follow suit.

Relations with Nigeria are strained. On the one hand, Ghana accuses Lagos of plotting to overthrow the PNDC. On the other hand, Ghana is dependent on Nigeria for oil. Towards the latter part of February, Accra took on the look of a city beset by a gas crisis. Saturday morning lineups at individual gas stations contained as many as 85 cars. While it is true that Ghana owes Nigeria about $100 million, close to its credit ceiling, some wonder whether the credit period cutback, which translates into a cutback in oil, has an economic or political justification, for the same cutback occurred after Rawling's first coup.

It is primarily from Libya that Rawlings has sought ideological advice and financial aid. Some say that Qaddafy was behind the holy war. Others say that even today, Rawlings is guarded by members of Libya's military. Following exchange visits by officials of both countries, Libya agreed to send Ghana oil. There is also some hope for foodstuffs. But how, muses a local economist, can a country of three million living in the desert provide food to a country of 14 million living in the forest zone?

A kind of nostalgia for the past is now present. In the villages, elders remember the 1950s as the golden age of Ghana. They wonder if life might not improve if the country were returned to white rule. It is just this attitude that Rawlings wants to eradicate. He wants to take his country back in time, but prior to the days of colonialism: he wants to rekindle the pride of its African heritage.

Many people have left, but many too have stayed. The characteristic patience that has facilitated the social and economic disintegration of the country has also enabled the Ghanaian to survive. Individuals have resurrected old networks to aid one another. And as a newly appointed ministerial secretary sadly noted, "How can I leave? I have no other country." □

Minerals and Foreign Policy

BY SUSAN GILPIN

Photo: S. Lwin/United Nations

South Africa exports 87 percent of its manganese, but extensive reserves are found in deep sea nodules

Susan Gilpin is an American freelance writer who formerly worked in Africa for six years. She is currently in Washington, D.C., specializing in economic and development issues.

In March of this year, the South African Embassy ran advertisements in 15 leading newspapers across the United States. "South Africa's strategic position alone, quite apart from its mineral resources, makes it of vital importance to the United States and the West," the advertisements read, quoting Frank R. Barnett in *Optima* magazine. *Optima*, of Johannesburg, South Africa, is distributed free to the shareholders of Anglo-American, which mines South African platinum, manganese, and vanadium.

The key phrase in the advertisement is "vital importance." South Africa is important to the United States and the West. Whether South Africa is vital — indispensable, essential to the continuance of life — is debatable. Also at issue is whether continuance of a white minority regime in Pretoria is a necessary requirement for ensuring uninterrupted supplies. Conversely, would the present South African government hold back supplies if the United States backed away from the apartheid regime?

South Africa's mineral exports to the United States arouse considerable interest because of the policies those minerals can be used to justify. This article examines U.S. reliance — short-term and long-term — on African nonfuel minerals, separating South African minerals from southern African and other African minerals. It does not deal with gold, which plays an important role in the world economy, because U.S. domestic production is sufficient for industrial needs. Nor does it consider industrial diamonds, which are not regarded as of critical importance by the U.S. Bureau of Mines.

Interpretations of mineral supply and demand affect a broad range of policies. In foreign policy, reliance on mineral imports affects the U.S. approach to mining the deep sea and diversifying suppliers, as well as supporting suppliers in Africa, especially southern Africa. Domestically, ensuring adequate mineral resources affects stockpiling, subsidizing marginal mines and processors, exploiting reserves in national forests and other protected areas, and encouraging technologies to conserve valuable minerals and recover them after use.

The U.S. Bureau of Mines defines 27 minerals as critical. The United States relies on imports for 75 percent or more of its supply of 8 of the 27. Africa supplies over half of U.S. consumption of four of the eight. They are chromite, cobalt, manganese, and the platinum group minerals, led by platinum and palladium.

The group Barnett has presided over for 20 years, the National Strategy Information Center, has as its purpose "to encourage civilian military partnership." What worries the group, and many industrialists and naval strategists, is this: What if mineral imports from Africa, especially South Africa, are cut off, or supplies drop and the price goes up, as happened with oil? Can U.S. industry maintain production?

Quoting Barnett, the South African advertising campaign uses U.S. reliance on imported minerals to argue for U.S. support of the present South African government. But South Africa is only one of several African countries that supply the United States with critical minerals.


Photo: John Seymour/International Defense and Aid Fund

South African mine workers: "Is continuance of the white minority in Pretoria necessary for uninterrupted mineral supplies?"

AFRICAN MINERAL SUPPLIERS

Charts accompanying this article show that South Africa is the major U.S. supplier of platinum, ferromanganese, and chromium. Zaire is the major source of cobalt, and Gabon is the major source of manganese.

Examination of mineral reserves — identified resources that have a reasonable potential for becoming economically available — as shown in the chart reveal that in the long run, several alternatives to South African suppliers exist. Zimbabwe could supply all U.S. needs for ferrochrome, J.W. Rawlings of Union Carbide in New York said in 1981. Australia, Gabon, and Brazil have hundreds of years' supplies of manganese.

As the box on individual minerals shows, substantial recycling and substitution possibilities exist for chrome and platinum, the minerals for which South African sources are most important. Domestic sources exist for chrome, cobalt, and platinum, whereas manganese and cobalt are concentrated in deep-sea nodules.

South Africa emerges as an important mineral supplier in the short run, along with several other African countries. In the long run, alternatives to continuing reliance on South African minerals are plentiful. Policymakers must take both time frames into consideration.

POLICY

Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, put the question of African mineral supplies in a nutshell when he asked, "What can the U.S. do in pursuing its southern Africa policy to reduce the chance of a damaging denial of strategic minerals or extreme price manipulations?"

Bankers, professors, industrialists, naval strategists, diplomats, and interest groups have all proposed alternative policies. Proponents of the theory of resource war hold that the Soviet Union intends to impede U.S. access to strategic minerals in southern Africa for one of two reasons: either because the Soviets need to seize them for themselves by military means or because they intend to prevent African governments from supplying minerals to the West. Securing southern African, es-

Strategic Minerals Imports Recycling & Stockpiles (U.S., 1980)



*An additional 1 mil. troy ounces is continually being recycled and does not appear in any other statistics here.

Source: Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodity Summary, 1981.

pecially South African, resources must be the primary aim of U.S. Africa policy, resource warriors maintain.

The worst-case scenario envisioned by speakers at the 1980 World Affairs Council Forum in Pittsburgh was a "super cartel." As reported in council proceedings published as *The Resource War in 3-D,* "the U.S.S.R. and a disaffected, denatured, and dominated South Africa would control world reserves and production of chromium and platinum and significant shares of manganese, gold, and diamonds." R. Daniel McMichael, president of the council, viewed a super cartel with alarm: "Were we to lose access to these minerals, it could mean massive shocks to our economic system and current lifestyles." Herbert Meyer, conference rapporteur and an associate editor of *Fortune,* envisioned disaster: "Unless we can assure continued access to strategic minerals, both abroad and here at home, our civilization in its present form may not be able to survive." A conference panel suggested that to prevent the scenario's realization "South Africa must be viewed from a geopolitical perspective, with raw materials a central consideration."

Jim Santini (D-Nev.), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Mines and Mining and a conference participant, has been trying to publicize strategic minerals dependency for years. "We must have a resource-oriented foreign policy," he agreed at the conference.

One conference panel drew a distinction between what it called "strategic" and "reactive" dependency. Reactive mineral dependency relies on stockpiles and substitution and was unacceptable to the panel. Strategic dependency includes a national mineral policy, a resource-oriented foreign policy, and diplomatic and military capabilities to secure the U.S. "world share" of resources. Specific applications follow:

1. A tri-oceanic alliance.
2. Special relations with Saudi Arabia and South Africa.

Strategic Minerals, Reserve Base*
(in terms of one year reported U.S. consumption)



*Reserve base: In-place demonstrated resource with reasonable potential for becoming economically available.
Source: Bureau of Mines, *Mineral Commodity Summary*, 1981.

3. A Presidential Resource Advisory Board.
4. U.S. naval and military presence in the Indian Ocean and nearby base rights.
5. Increased defense spending.
6. The Rapid Deployment Force.
7. A resource security mission for U.S. armed forces including mine and plant protection and operation.

Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., testifying before the House Subcommittee on Mines in 1980, stated that "the era of 'resource war' has begun." Haig recommended that a nonfuel mineral policy for the U.S. and its allies include the following measures to reduce import dependency: "(1) revitalized U.S. leadership within NATO..., (2) stepped-up exploration and development of domestic deposits..., (3) accelerated efforts in conservation and substitution..., (4) updated stockpiles...."

The House Africa Subcommittee held a special hearing to examine the resource war theory. Professor Robert Legvold of Columbia University told the subcommittee that the term is premature: "There is little evidence that the Soviets have developed a coherent, explicit, high-priority resource denial strategy.... The Soviet interventions in Africa have been too discontinuous, too chaotic, too unsystematic to suggest an ambition as purposeful as resource denial."

Robert M. Price, professor of political science at the University of California at Berkeley, told the subcommittee that resource war is unlikely because African states are as dependent on exporting minerals as the U.S. is on importing them: "In the real world we find that states of southern Africa, Marxist and conservative alike, striving to attract Western investment and technology so as to expand the export of minerals to the only customers that exist for them — the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan. Any government in South Africa, whatever its ideological coloration, would be locked into selling its industrial materials to the West, just as the West is locked into buying them. Ironically, this would be especially true for a radical African regime, which would, one must assume, attempt to satisfy the social welfare demands of the population."

South Africa does depend on export markets for its minerals: 100% of platinum group minerals are exported, 93% of ferrochrome, 87% of manganese, and 57% of chromite.

Many observers believe that long-term planning for mineral supplies must take into account the development, be it smooth or chaotic, of majority rule in South Africa. In its book *South Africa: Time Running Out*, the U.S. Study Commission on South Africa takes this approach: "Whatever the government of South Africa does to perpetuate the status quo, in the long term black forces inside the country will alter it. This judgment is central to our analysis." The study commission recommends stockpiling, substitution, and developing alternate suppliers for minerals imported from South Africa to minimize potential for supply disruptions and price increases. The disruptions it envisions would be partial and temporary, resulting from civil war if reformist trends in South Africa do not prevail.

Like the study commission, TransAfrica, a black lobby organization for the Caribbean and Africa, takes a long-term view. It recommends that the United States not be seen to support apartheid. Such support would jeopardize national mineral interests. "As the conflict escalates in southern Africa, there is the danger that other African countries might impose their own oil and mineral embargoes against the U.S. if the U.S. policy is perceived as supporting white rule," TransAfrica spokesman Sala Rahim told *Africa Report*. "By emphasizing South Africa's strategic importance to the West as a basis for friendship," he continued, "the U.S. ignores its own interests in the long term, when majority rule is achieved. The experience of other newly independent countries in southern Africa is clear: mineral exports fuel their economic growth. Any government that comes to power in South Africa will find orderly marketing of minerals to the world in its own interest."

Ideology is not an impediment to business, David Rockefeller, retired chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, told reporters in Zimbabwe on March 2. "We have found we can deal with just about any kind of government, provided it is orderly and responsible. The more I've seen of countries which are allegedly Marxist in Africa, the more I have a feeling it is more labels and trappings than reality."

ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

With the range of policy alternatives above, actions and statements of the U.S. government can be evaluated for their impact on supply and demand of chrome, cobalt, manganese, and platinum. There is no indication of administration preparedness for any mineral supply and demand situation apart from the current one. Without preparations that have yet to take place, the U.S. government has no policy flexibility, no alternative to supporting current suppliers, including the South African government. All the eggs are in the military basket, projecting power to preserve the status quo.

Stockpiles are not a priority. Of the $100 million available in fiscal 1981 for buying stockpile minerals, $78 million was spent to purchase 2,500 tons of electrolytic cobalt, the purest category, suitable for jet engines. The purchase made up only 10 percent of the shortfall in cobalt stockpile levels.

One bright spot is that conservation and recycling technologies do exist and are the subject of research by the Bureau of Mines. Manganese and cobalt research are directed to exploiting deep-sea nodules; chrome and platinum research emphasizes recycling; and chrome, cobalt, and platinum conservation technologies are also being developed.

Domestic mining is perceived as an environmental or budgetary issue rather than as part of an overall mineral supply policy. A recent decision by budget director David Stockman highlights administration reliance on the marketplace. In 1981, the Federal Emergency Management Administration asked the Reagan administration to resume subsidies for mining cobalt and three other minerals. Subsidies to domestic mining companies are available under Section III of the Defense Production Act, which Congress passed in 1950 during the Korean War. Under that act, the Madison mine in Missouri and the Blackbird mine in Idaho produced cobalt. In response to an inquiry from Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.), Stockman wrote, "We do not plan to make use of Title III authorities to subsidize domestic industry. Instead the administration intends to rely on the marketplace to improve the competitiveness of our industries and help reduce our dependence on foreign sources of critical materials."

Military initiatives to secure imported minerals are underway. They include increasing U.S. military spending, pressuring NATO members and Japan to follow suit, negotiating facilities agreements around the Persian Gulf, sending more ships to the Indian Ocean, and training and equipping the Rapid Deployment Force, as seen in the Bright Star exercises in North Africa.

Recent developments in relations with African mineral suppliers are controversial and sometimes difficult to evaluate. Morocco, whose cobalt output may increase, is one of the few African countries slated to receive increased assistance in the administration budget for fiscal 1983. Morocco has recently agreed to allow U.S. forces access to its military facilities, although no formal agreement has been signed. So far Moroccan cobalt "hasn't played a high-level role" in U.S. policy formation, a State Department source told *Africa Report*.

Because of its cobalt production, Zaire continues to receive substantial U.S. assistance despite congressional awareness of the Mobutu regime's shortcomings. The House Interior Committee reported in July 1980 as follows: "The West, vitally dependent on Zaire's cobalt (roughly 60% of world production) has no identifiable alternative to Mobutu's regime in Zaire. . . . The U.S. should refrain from

The Minerals

CHROME

Chromium is used to produce stainless steel and to plate metals.

Ferrochromium is a refined form of chromite ore. Two and a half tons of ore produce one ton of ferrochrome.

Import dependence for chromium is 91%; recycling produces 9%.

Government stockpiles hold four years' supply of chrome, with industry holding another two years' supply.

U.S. Reserves not being exploited include an estimated 8 million tons of chromite ore in Stillwater, Montana, and along the Pacific Coast. The Bureau of Mines has developed technology for using domestic ore, but production and transportation cost out at three times the current world price. Processing chromite ore into ferrochrome, the form in which it is used to make stainless steel, is an obstacle to domestic production because processing furnaces are closing down.

Alternative Sources to South African chrome are led by Zimbabwe, which supplies an increasing proportion of U.S. chrome, up from 9% in 1980 to 14% in 1981. With sufficient investment and transport through South Africa or Mozambique, production could continue to increase.

Recycling possibilities are excellent, and *alternative technologies* already exist. The National Minerals Advisory Board reported in 1978 that 30% of chromium usage can be saved by substitutes currently available and that within 10 years, research could reduce consumption another 35%. The remaining 35% of consumption is irreplaceable.

COBALT

Cobalt is used as an alloy in aerospace and electrical products. It resists heat and wear.

Import dependence for cobalt is 92%, with recycling producing the remainder of supplies. South Africa is *not* a significant supplier.

Government stockpiles are at two and a half years' supply, although as much as a year's worth is below grade.

U.S. reserves not being exploited include the Blackbird mine in the Blackbird National Forest in Idaho, the only mine in the world outside of Morocco that has been mined primarily for cobalt. Production may resume if the cobalt price resumes its 1978 high, twice the current price. Other reserves lie in Duluth, Minn.; Cornwall, Pa.; Madison, Mo.; and the Gasquet Mountains in California.

Alternative sources include the deep sea and Morocco. The Bureau of Mines reports that deep-sea nodules and domestic reserves together could someday yield "total U.S. independence in cobalt." Last year the Moroccan government held a conference aimed at interesting U.S. and other foreign investors in Moroccan cobalt, and the U.S. Agency for International Development's Trade and Development Program has already sent a team of geologists to Morocco to look at the deposits that can be developed.

Recycling attracted increased interest in the U.S. when the price of cobalt rose in the late 1970s. Foreign processors already recover cobalt from mixed scrap. Jet engines and spent petroleum catalysts are new sources of secondary material.

Alternative technologies being developed emphasize reducing the percentage of cobalt in alloys rather than eliminating it. Jet engines with less cobalt are already being produced.

MANGANESE

Manganese is used to make batteries, chemicals, and, in the form of ferromanganese, to harden steel.

Import dependence for manganese is 97%

Government stockpiles hold over a year's supply of manganese ore and eight months' supply of ferromanganese, with private inventories at eight months' supply of manganese ore and three months' supply of ferroalloys.

U.S. reserves are all under 20% manganese, and the minimum content of imported manganese is 35%. The two deposits best suited to production are in Aroostook County, Me., and the Cuyana Range, Minn., but the National Minerals Advisory Board concluded in 1976 that they "should not be developed except in a dire emergency." At least three years lead time would be necessary, the Bureau of Mines reports.

Alternative sources to South African manganese include Brazil, where production is expected to expand as iron ore deposits in East Brazil are developed; and Australia, where deposits "are particularly suited to rapid expansion and large-scale operation," according to the U.S. Study Commission on South Africa. Namibia is the source of 10% of South African manganese, according to British investigators Barbara Rogers and Brian Bolton. Deposits of manganese in the deep sea are extensive.

Recycling of manganese is only incidental to reclaiming iron from slag and scrap.

Alternative technologies have produced no substitute for manganese in steel making.

PLATINUM

Platinum group minerals are used as catalysts and in the production of nitrogenous fertilizers. A little is used for jewelry in the United States.

Import dependency for new platinum supplies is 84%, with 16% supplied by recycling. In addition to the two million troy ounces on U.S. markets in 1980, one million troy ounces are constantly being recycled (referred to as "toll-refined secondary").

Government stockpiles could supply almost a year's consumption, and private industry holds three months' supply.

U.S. reserves in Stillwater, Mont., between two national forests, are being explored and could come into production in two or three years. Stillwater could supply most of the U.S. demand for palladium and one-fourth of platinum requirements.

Alternative sources to South Africa and the Soviet Union have not been found.

Recycling has great potential. The Bureau of Mines predicts that during the 1980s, recycling catalytic converters could recover 200,000 ounces of platinum-group metals annually, about 10% of sales.

Alternative technologies may phase out the demand for platinum in catalytic converters, the biggest single use in the U.S., by the year 2000 because of improved engines and fuels and the manufacture of electric cars.

Photo: P. Vauthey/Sygma

Zaire's Kolwezi mines: Zaire receives substantial U.S. assistance because of its cobalt production

undermining Mobutu, but at the same time apply pressure toward a cure for his 'Zairian sickness'.... The subcommittee recommends that U.S. assistance to Zaire emphasize mineral development." Despite opposition, aid to Zaire was not cut.

In the case of South Africa, the House Subcommittee on Mines and Mining recommended "closer ties with South African mineral industries," and "more carrot and less stick" for Pretoria in its 1980 report on sub-Saharan Africa. There are no indications that U.S. policy has run counter to subcommittee recommendations.

Acceptance of South African requests for visas for military visitors, Coast Guard training, exchange of military attaches, and export licensing revisions to allow high technology sales all indicate increasing U.S. cooperation with the South African government.

These recent decisions indicate that short-term mineral supplies weigh heavily in policy arenas. Throughout Africa, according to State Department spokesmen, mineral supplies are a major consideration. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker put minerals up front in a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on October 5, 1981. In his opening remarks, he said: "The countries of sub-Saharan Africa are the source of many minerals which are vital to our own development and defense. These nations supply the majority, and in some instances, virtually all of our requirements for chrome in our automobile and defense industries, manganese for the steel industry, cobalt for jet engines and mining equipment, copper, industrial diamonds, and mica, to cite but a few." Crocker went on to draw the policy implications of American interests in Africa: "The first great area of mutual interest is economic.... A second important sphere where African and U.S. interests intersect is in the search for peace and security."

State Department spokesman Mike Wygant told *Africa Report* that "strategic minerals is one of a number of important areas, along with investment and humanitarian concerns." But unless the U.S. deliberately arranges for flexibility in mineral supplies and production technologies, the short-term need for strategic minerals will outrank longer-term State Department objectives of peace, security, investment, and humanitarian concerns. Military, industrial, and South African pressures converge on support for the status quo. South Africa's minerals will be important determinants of U.S. policy as long as policymakers allow them to be. □

AFRICAN UPDATE

Monitoring economic and political developments around the Continent

May-June 1982

New complications threaten to set back Namibia negotiations

More complications in the protracted Namibia independence negotiations have once again threatened to jeopardize the whole process.

Chester Crocker, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, was in Angola early in April, along with his French counterpart, Jean Ausseil, for talks with representatives of the front-line African states and the leader of the South-West African People's Organization, Sam Nujoma. However, Nujoma did not show up but sent a substitute to receive the West's new variation on the disputed double-vote system for the proposed UN elections. The African states and SWAPO had rejected the double vote as too complicated for Namibian voters.

The West's refinement calls for one vote, which will be tabulated twice, once to choose a party and the second time to pick a candidate in the two-tier assembly. Immediately afterwards, the South African government announced that the variation would cause a delay in the negotiations.

SWAPO, which a week earlier had called for face-to-face negotiations with South Africa (rejected by Pretoria) then proposed an all-parties international conference.

Another complication was the appointment of a new UN commissioner for Namibia, Brajesh Chandra Mishra of India, named by the new secretary-general, Javier Perez de Cuellar.

Mishra is seen by the Western contact group as a "disaster" because he is anti-Western on Third World issues. Moreover, the contact group—the U.S., Britain, France, West Germany and Canada—had explained to Perez de Cuellar that they would like to see the post, which has been vacant for several months, remain vacant for a while. The West reportedly fears that South Africa will use Mishra's appointment as an excuse for delay.

In Namibia itself, the Pretoria-backed Democratic Turnhalle Alliance threatened to pull out of the independence process, after implying that South Africa is now dumping it. The DTA leader claimed that a new Ovambo-based party, led by Peter Kalangula, who broke with the DTA in February, had discussed party financing with South African army officials. Kalangula also met with Prime Minister Pieter Botha in Namibia.

And following South Africa's mid-March raid into Angola, in which the army said 200 SWAPO guerrillas were killed, the Angolan government charged that Pretoria was preparing a massive raid aimed at the capital, Luanda, with the aim of wiping out economic targets, attacking Cuban troops and killing the country's leaders. (*Economist*, April 3, 1982; London *Times*, March 31, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, March 27, 1982.) □

Zimbabwe tries to reassure investors

With only about $40 million in direct private investment since independence two years ago, Zimbabwe is trying to attract Western capital and technology.

Foreign investors say they are reticent because of worries particularly about ownership, taxes and sending home profits. They have asked the Zimbabwean government to write an investment code which spells out the conditions for overseas private investment or to sign agreements with a U.S. agency that grants political risk insurance to American investors.

At a conference in New York in March, sponsored by the African-American Institute and the American Bar Association, Zimbabwe's Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development tried to assuage U.S. businessmen's fears. The minister, Bernard Chidzero, said that Zimbabwe had recently changed its policy to allow remittance of up to 50 percent of after-tax profits. He said the government was not interested in nationalization of companies but in local participation—not control.

In April, **Heinz Inc.**, the food-processing company, was reported close to a deal to buy 51 percent of a Zimbabwean food firm, with the remaining 49 percent to be held by the government.

Businessmen are also concerned about Zimbabwe's attempts to distance itself from South Africa, which nonetheless was negotiating a renewal of a preferential trade agreement with Salisbury *(see page 38)*. Some 70 percent of land-locked Zimbabwe's exports travel through South Africa and Zimbabwe has been trying to bolster the alternate trade routes through Mozambique.

Recently, David Rockefeller visited Zimbabwe and other African nations and reported that Prime Minister Robert Mugabe "seemed to me quite prepared to accept the private sector." The former chairman of **Chase Manhattan Bank** urged U.S. businessmen to look beyond "the fact that some of these leaders talk in rather inflammatory terms" and added that "African socialism is no threat." (*Financial Times*, February 19, and April 8, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, April 5, 1982; *New York Times*, March 10, 1982; *Business Week*, March 8, 1982.)

WESTERN AFRICA

Chad

• The February 28 deadline for ceasefire set by the OAU ad hoc committee on Chad at a Nairobi meeting earlier in the month passed with the two main combatants—the troops of President Goukouni Woddeye and those of rebel leader Hissene Habré locked in **battle** for control of the oasis town of Oum Hadjer.

The OAU meeting had come up with a new plan to achieve peace in Chad, calling for a ceasefire by the end of February, negotiations between the rival forces to begin by March 15, presidential elections in May or June, and the withdrawal of the 3,500-strong OAU peacekeeping force on June 30.

Woddeye stormed out of the OAU meeting shouting, "I am betrayed!", and later his spokesman said the Chad government rejected the committee's proposals, despite Habré's subsequently stated willingness to go along with the recommendations. What Woddeye objected to was the OAU's tacit recognition of Habré's rebel group, the Armed Forces of the North (FAN), by its calling for negotiations between the two sides—a seeming reversal of prior policy which focused on the legitimacy of Woddeye's government.

The new OAU policy, pressing for a negotiated settlement, was apparently borne out of concerns that the organization's undermanned peacekeeping force, costing an estimated $163 million a year (beyond the OAU's meager resources) could be caught up in the seemingly endless conflict.

Woddeye was angered that the OAU force was not empowered to fight FAN, which has been advancing on the capital, Ndjamena, ever since the withdrawal of Libyan troops late last year, but were to serve only as a neutral buffer. FAN's military prowess and longevity, along with the costs of the peacekeeping force, apparently convinced the OAU to reconsider its policy of recognizing the legitimacy of the government only.

France suspended arms deliveries to the Chad government in February, apparently in hopes of forcing Woddeye to negotiate. However, it appeared in late March that after the government troops failed to recapture Oum Hadjer, perhaps only further military setbacks would cause a change in heart. Ahmat Acyl, the Chadian foreign minister, said that his government "will never sit around a conference table with Habré" and that the only viable solution to the conflict is a military one.

In late March, Robert Ouko, the Kenyan Foreign Minister, said the OAU would seek UN financing to overcome the cash shortage for the peacekeeping troops. The Chad government finally lent its support to the request, thus enabling the proposal to go through the proper channels at the UN. However, unless some progress toward a solution is reached, it appears unlikely that the OAU troops will remain in Chad past June 30. (*Financial Times*, April 5, 1982; *New York Times*, April 1, 1982; *West Africa*, March 1, 15, 22, and 29, 1982.)

Ghana

• Ghana marked its 25th **anniversary of independence** in March with a military parade instead of the celebrations which had been planned by the former Limann government, overthrown by Flight Lieut. Jerry Rawlings last New Year's Eve.

Rawlings issued a somber message to Ghanaians, saying the "anniversary was in a spirit of national self-appraisal and stock-taking for the future," and that the coming year would require "ensuring basic needs through hard work." The chairman of the ruling Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) said the first priority of the government is the recovery of the economy.

Several steps aimed at putting Ghana on a sounder economic footing have been taken over the last three months. One of Rawlings' first actions was to make the 50 cedi note, the largest currency bill in circulation, illegal in order to shrink money supply to curb Ghana's runaway inflation (estimated at 120 to 150 percent a year). The 1981-82 budget was suspended, recurrent expenditure frozen and 13 of Ghana's 43 embassies abroad closed to lessen massive budget deficits.

A "holy war" on corruption was launched, and the PNDC undertook a cocoa evacuation exercise in January, enlisting students to remove cocoa rotting in the bush. Some 110,000 tons of the commodity, a major foreign exchange earner, were brought to Ghanaian ports for shipment, although the 1981-82 crop of 220,000 tons was down from the previous year's 255,000 tons.

To ease a looming oil crisis, Libya sent two tanker-loads of petroleum to Ghana in early March, as only six weeks' reserves were left. Libya is negotiating a long-term concessionary supply contract with Ghana, promising that the financially strapped government will not have to pay shipping costs if the deal is finalized.

And Nigeria agreed to resume oil sales to Ghana in mid-March, suspended for two months because the PNDC owed $150 million. Instead of the $30 million Lagos was demanding as a precondition to resupply, $21 million was accepted.

In mid-March, the PNDC announced that all trade union applications for wage increases should be withdrawn because of the state of the economy. The government did, however, reduce rents, transport fares and the prices of some basic goods.

Tough measures to stamp out corruption and "kalabule," or black-marketeering, are being employed. Those suspected of such acts must face "citizens' vetting committees" before which large bank balances and tax payments must be accounted for.

Despite Ghana's economic woes, Rawlings has ruled out assistance from the IMF, because in return for loans, the government would probably have to undertake a drastic devaluation of the currency, increase the price of consumer goods, and cut back social welfare programs. Every Ghanaian government which has devalued the currency has paid for it by being overthrown. The prevailing opinion in Accra seems to be that once corruption is rooted out, the currency will regain strength. (*Financial Times*, March 3 and April 6, 1982; *West Africa*, March 8, 15 and 22, 1982; London *Guardian*, March 16, 1982; *Economist*, March 13, 1982.)

Guinea

• The Guinean government led by President Sekou Touré is looking increasingly to Western investment in its economy, despite its socialist orientation, according to **David Rockefeller**, former Chase Manhattan Bank chairman, who completed a ten-nation tour of Africa in March.

Rockefeller said the Guinean leader believed the Soviet development model had been a failure in the country and that Guinea was dissatisfied with arrangements whereby Russian assistance was provided for a bauxite mine in return for ore deliveries. Another bauxite mine, operated by West European and American interests, provides Guinea with more than three-quarters of its hard currency.

"While [Touré] may continue to use all of this socialist terminology, I don't think there is any question that he would like to see massive private investment from overseas, particularly from the U.S.," Rockefeller said. He had similar observations concerning Zimbabwe and Angola, which he also visited, in addition to Cameroon, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and Zambia.

"African socialism is no threat," said Rockefeller, "I really am convinced that socialism for most of the African leaders I talked with meant a very specialized thing and has little to do with Marxism."

Further evidence of Touré's interest in Western investment was demonstrated by a February visit of seven government ministers, led by Ismail Touré, the Minister of Mines, to the European Commission in Brussels to seek European interest in developing iron ore reserves at Mount Nimba. Additional funds are also being sought for the Mifergui mining scheme to get underway, and the Guinean ministers were investigating the possibility of a loan from the European Investment Bank.

The European Commission is financing a study involving the construction of a hydroelectric dam on the Konkouré River, which could supply power for an aluminum smelting plant. Participants are being sought to invest the $2 to $3 billion needed for the Konkouré scheme. Most of the EC aid to Guinea under the Lomé II convention is for agriculture. (*West Africa*, March 22, 1982; *New York Times*, March 10, 1982; *Le Monde*, March 5, 1982.)

Guinea-Bissau

• President João Bernardo Vieira paid an **official visit to Cuba** in March, ironically where his predecessor, Luis Cabral, is currently living in exile. Vieira overthrew Cabral in November 1980, and the former head of state was under house arrest in Guinea-Bissau until late last year. Vieira also visited Panama.

Accompanying the President were the Ministers of Natural Resources, Justice, Education, Rural Development, and Posts and Telecommunications. Vieira held talks with the Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, and five agreements were signed: on consular affairs, trade, reciprocal judicial assistance, cultural cooperation and cooperation between the Cuban Communist Party and the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC).

A joint communique issued at the end of Vieira's visit stated the "firm and unshakeable support, that its people . . . and the government of Cuba give to the people, the PAIGC and the government of Guinea-Bissau. . ." Vieira was awarded a Cuban decoration, the Order of Jose Marti, and was honored as "a true hero of the war of liberation of Guinea-Bissau, one of the most outstanding forgers of the independence of his fatherland. . ."

But according to a late March report in the *Christian Science Monitor*, there were rumors of a foiled coup attempt while Vieira was in Cuba. The newspaper reported that a tank commander was killed in the barracks of Guinea-Bissau's main armored unit near the capital during Vieira's absence. Also fueling the rumors of a coup attempt was Vieira's surprise, unannounced return to Bissau a day earlier than scheduled. Upon his arrival he reportedly convened several high level meetings to discuss the internal situation and ordered the arrests of several army officers. (*Christian Science Monitor*, March 30, 1982; Prensa Latina, March 17, 1982; Havana television, March 12 and 16, 1982.)

Ivory Coast

• President Felix Houphouët-Boigny announced the re-opening of Abidjan University in early March, one month after it was closed over **student unrest** and a teachers' strike.

The unrest began after the government banned a scheduled university lecture on the theme, "Youth and Politics." Students began a protest march toward the center of Abidjan, but were intercepted by police who reportedly arrested at least 100. The students were also said to have been angered by an article on exam cheating which appeared in the national daily, *Fraternité Matin*, in February, and had also marched on the newspaper offices. Police were called in to disperse them.

The Union for Research and Higher Education (SYNARES), composed of university teachers, launched a support strike, to which the government reacted by ordering the union dissolved, characterizing it as "illegal" because it did not follow "the normal procedure for the settlement of conflicts."

When the university was reopened in early March, university grants were re-instituted and faculty salaries restored. However, the ban on SYNARES was maintained as well as a prohibition on political conferences on-campus. All university clubs and the student newspaper, *Campus-Info*, remained suspended.

Observers indicated that unrest among Abidjan's 15,000 students is uncommon, as they receive grants 20 percent above the minimum wage, accommodations at low rents, subsidized meals and free transport to the campus. However, longstanding problems of graduate unemployment and demands for greater democracy in the political system were said to have set the stage for the unrest.

The aging Houphouët-Boigny has yet to name a vice president or successor, and at the last elections in 1980, for the first time, several candidates contested each legislative seat. Only 20 of the 147 deputies were re-elected to the national assembly, all of whom must be members of the ruling Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast. (London *Guardian*, March 6, 1982; *Le Monde*, February 11, 12, 15 and March 5, 1982; *West Africa*, February 22, 1982.)

Liberia

• Earlier in the year, the head of state, Samuel Doe, spared the lives of six **student activists** only hours before their scheduled execution. The students, including Ezekiel Pajibo, acting president of the Liberian National Students' Union (LINSU), and the union secretary-general, Alaric Tokpa, were arrested in late January for breaking a government ban on political activities on campus. LINSU had petitioned Doe to reconsider the ban, which in the government's view was itself a breach of the prohibition on political activities.

The students were tried by a special military tribunal and, with Doe pledging not to interfere in the course of justice, were sentenced to death. With tensions mounting in the hours before the scheduled executions, Doe announced a pardon, citing the "gallant role that students played in our revolution," and said to them, "You have the capacity to become future leaders of Liberia." Doe had previously accused the student of "seeking to promote socialist ideology."

Thousands of Liberians took to the streets to celebrate the reprieve and demonstrate support for Doe's measure. The released students, who were permitted to return to school, held a press conference urging moderation by their colleagues and patience until 1985 when Liberia is scheduled to return to civilian rule.

Other members of the military, however, did not fare as well as the students, as four army officers, formerly government ministers and deputy ministers, were retired from active service. Four other officers were executed in February for alleged participation in an ambush of an army payroll jeep in which three men were killed. And in March, the director of the Special Security Service, Gbaku Wright, and the government's senior accountant, Gibson Sackor, were dismissed for alleged embezzlement of public funds. Wright reportedly fled into the Liberian countryside upon his dismissal and Doe has taken over supervision of the security system.

And in a late development, Gabriel Baccus Matthews, sacked in November 1981 from his position as Foreign Minister, was named secretary-general of the government. (Monrovia Radio, March 29, 1982; *West Africa*, February 8, 15 and March 29, 1982; *Africa Now*, March 1982; Kenya *Weekly Review*, February 5, 1982.)

Mali

• In late February, the second congress of the **Democratic Union of Malian People** (UDPM) was held in Bamako, to breathe "fresh life" into Mali's sole political party, according to President Moussa Traore. During the meeting, eight of the 19 members of the party's central executive bureau were replaced. Traore is secretary-general of the party.

The UDPM was created in 1979 with the stated aim of replacing the military government. However, observers indicate that its formation has not yet resulted in a democratization of the political system. Student dissatisfaction with the political situation was manifested by over a year and a half of unrest, which was met by a harsh government crackdown. Partly in response to increasing discontent, Traore convened the first UDPM congress in February 1981.

Significance was attached to the fact that, at the recent congress, three of the most senior party officials—Sory Coulibaly, political secretary; Mamadou Dembele, secretary of external affairs; and Amadou Thiam, administrative secretary—were replaced in their posts. They were said to have been behind the repression of the student demonstrations. (*West Africa*, March 8, 1982; Bamako Radio, February 25 and 27, 1982; *Afrique-Asie*, February 15, 1982.)

Mauritania

• In early February, an **alleged coup plot** against the Mauritanian head of state, Mohamed Khouna Ould Heydalla, was foiled when the plan was discovered in advance.

According to *Jeune Afrique*, Heydalla learned of a plot to arrest or assassinate him just hours before he was scheduled to leave for Nairobi for an OAU meeting on the Western Sahara from Nouakchott Airport. The aim of the coup was said to be to put in power Lt. Col. Mustafa Ould Salek, former president of the Military Committee of National Salvation and author of the coup which overthrew President Moktar Ould Daddah in 1978.

Salek was arrested along with former Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ould Bneijara; Baham Ould Laghdaf, former Minister of Interior, and other army officers.

Mauritania has experienced four successful coups d'etat since 1978 when Daddah was overthrown, as well as five failed attempts, most recently a year ago when Mauritanian officers, allegedly with the complicity of the Moroccan government, attacked the presidential palace but were apprehended.

Le Monde indicated that the February attempt was carried out by pro-Algerian officers who were seeking to increase Algiers' influence in Mauritania, particularly since the 1981 coup attempt. Morocco and Mauritania had been allies in the Western Sahara war until 1979, when Nouakchott withdrew from the war and signed a ceasefire with Polisario, Morocco's adversary. (*Jeune Afrique*, February 24, 1982; *Le Monde*, February 11, 1982.)

Niger

• The government of Niger, led by President Seyni Kountché, restored **diplomatic relations with Libya** in early March, more than one year after they were broken off.

Relations between the two countries began deteriorating in late 1980 and were severed in January 1981. The military intervention in Chad by Col. Muammar Qaddafy's troops and a statement made by the Libyan leader that Niger's desert nomads, the Tuaregs, could consider themselves Libyan, caused the Niamey government to break diplomatic relations. No reason was given, however, for the resumption of ties.

And in March, Kountché visited Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he held talks with King Khalid and other government officials. Niger is scheduled to host an Islamic Conference meeting of foreign ministers in June, and Khalid is current chairman of the organization.

Kountché's visit to Riyadh was to discuss bilateral relations, as Saudi Arabia has provided aid for an electricity supply project in Niger, and Afro-Arab cooperation. (*West Africa*, March 8 and 22, 1982; *Le Monde*, March 3, 1982.)

Nigeria

• In mid-February, President Shehu Shagari carried out the most extensive **cabinet reshuffle** since he and his civilian government came to power in 1979, apparently to strengthen his hand in preparation for the 1983 presidential elections. Two cabinet ministers were fired and the portfolios of 13 were changed.

The most significant move was that of Alhaji Adamu Ciroma, a former governor of the central bank, from the Ministry of Industries to Agriculture, exchanging posts with Alhaji Ibrahim Gusau. Gusau's replacement by Ciroma was said to be because of the importance the government attaches to the "Green Revolution" program, to boost crop production, and its less than sterling performance thus far.

The Minister of Communications, Isaac Shaahu, and the Minister of Interior, Iya Abubakar, were both sacked and replaced by Audu Ogbeh and Alhaji Ali Baba, respectively. A new Ministry of Information was created, headed by Mallam Garba Wushishi, formerly the junior Minister for Transport. And Alhaji Iro Dan-Musa, former Minister of State for Finance, was named Minister for the Federal Capital Territory, with responsibilities for the construction of Nigeria's new capital at Abuja. The Ministers of Finance, Defense, External Affairs, Justice and Transport remained unchanged.

With the Shagari government gearing up for the 1983 elections, the four opposition parties—the Nigerian People's Party, the Unity Party of Nigeria, and factions of the Great Nigeria People's Party and the People's Redemption Party—signed an agreement in Maiduguri in mid-March to "come together, stay together and move forward."

While the parties will each retain their separate identities until after next year's election because of the Nigerian electoral laws, they will go under the umbrella name, Progressive Parties' Alliance, and will cooperate, not opposing each other at any level. At Maiduguri, the parties did not finalize who will be the alliance's presidential candidate. It is believed, however, that Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the UPN, will contest the presidency, and Nnamdi Azikiwe, head of the NPP and another strong candidate, will be named the chairman of the alliance.

While Shagari is said to be seriously concerned about the party alliance's chances in the 1983 elections (in 1979, he polled less than six million votes, while the four opposition candidates together polled over 11 million), he faced another internal threat in February—a foiled coup plot.

A Nigerian businessman, an army officer and several soldiers were arrested and charged with "conspiring to commit a felony by the incitement of soldiers to commit a mutinous act." According to Nigerian newspaper accounts, the businessman, Alhaji Zama Mandara, paid a major and several soldiers a large sum of money to overthrow the government. (*Economist*, March 20, 1982; London *Times*, February 16 and 20, 1982; London *Guardian*, February 20, 1982; *Financial Times*, February 16, 1982; Lagos Radio, February 15, 1982.)

• In late March, Nigeria found itself at the forefront of problems faced by oil-producing nations because of the international **oil glut**. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), of which Nigeria is a member, decided at a March meeting to set the price of the country's oil at $35.50 per barrel—despite the fact that similar grades of North Sea oil are available for up to $6 less on the spot market—to preserve the cartel's pricing structure.

The price differential means that Nigeria is having difficulty finding buyers, resulting in a slump in production from 1.4 million barrels per day in January to between 600,000 and 700,000 in late March (production stood at 2.1 million barrels per day in early 1981), and a concomitant loss in foreign exchange. Foreign exchange reserves fell by two-thirds to just over $3 billion, just enough to cover six weeks of imports. Oil accounts for more than 90 percent of export earnings and 80 percent of government revenues.

In response to the loss in revenues, Nigeria's central bank suspended all letters of credit and import registrations and blocked the issue and restricted the use of the permit needed by importers to remit foreign exchange, measures which had the effect of halting imports. The tightening of import restrictions will result in massive shortages of consumer goods. President Shehu Shagari said in late March that the import ban would only last until mid-April, but that foreign reserves would thereafter be utilized for "essential" goods, presaging a return to import restrictions operative under previous military governments.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia was threatening strong sanctions against international oil companies cutting shipments from Nigeria. Failing Saudi Arabia's measures, observers indicated that Nigeria may have no other choice than to break ranks with OPEC and unilaterally cut its oil price, rather than risk a potentially explosive situation within the country caused by the adoption of further austerity measures. (*Business Week*, April 12, 1982; *Christian Science Monitor*, April 9, 1982; *Financial Times*, March 27 and 29, 1982; *Economist*, March 27, 1982.)

Senegal

• Diplomatic relations between **Angola** and Senegal were established in mid-February, to be followed by an exchange of ambassadors. A process of rapprochement between the two countries was begun when former Senegalese President Leopold Senghor retired in 1980.

Senghor had refused to recognize the Angolan MPLA government because of his objections to the presence of Soviet and Cuban troops in the country and because neither the FNLA nor Unita, the two opposing guerrilla groups, were included in the government at independence in 1975.

Senegal was the only OAU member state which did not recognize the Angolan government, and had also offered support to Unita. It is expected that Unita's office in Dakar will now be closed.

Cape Verde President Aristides Pereira initiated a meeting in Praia between Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Senegalese President Abdou Diouf in late 1981, which paved the way for rapprochement. (*West Africa*, March 1, 1982; Dakar Radio, February 16, 1982.)

Sierra Leone

• Approximately 2.5 million voters were eligible to vote in Sierra Leone's **general elections**, scheduled for some time in April. The elections were to be the first under the one-party All People's Congress set up by President Siaka Stevens in 1978. Representatives to the 104-member parliament are elected for a five-year term.

Stevens has said that he plans to step down from the presidency after the general elections, although he has not committed himself to a specific date. His mandate does not run out until 1985. (*West Africa*, February 15 and March 1, 1982.)

• In mid-March, the Taju Dean Commission of Inquiry, set up last October to investigate the "status, activities and administration of the **Sierra Leone Labor Congress** (SLLC) from 1976," following labor unrest last fall, met in emergency session and dissolved the SLLC executive and suspended its secretary-general, James Kabia.

According to the chairman of the commission, a special session was required because the term of office of the SLLC executive had expired last October. Also a "New Year's Message," sent by Kabia to affiliate unions in February, was considered by the commission to contain "inflammatory and inciting remarks."

Lawyers for the SLLC said, in rebuttal to the commission's charges, that the union could not have held a congress when the delegates' terms of office expired because many of its executive members, including Kabia, were in prison at the time. When they were released, the commission to investigate them was convened.

Copies of Kabia's "New Year's Message" were also sent to various government ministries. The letter said that the trade union situation in Africa continues to be cloudy and that there have been many violations and suppressions of union rights.

"We have no intention to engage in . . . illegal acts of subversion, but we have a right to protest and to withhold our labor if the wages we earn cannot help us to achieve the standard of living expected of every true Sierra Leonean," the statement read.

It went on to condemn the detentions of labor leaders and the disparities in living standards between the majority of workers and the "men at the top" who are working towards the "destabilization of the Sierra Leone economy."

Kabia told Reuters in late March that his passport was confiscated by immigration officials at Freetown's Lungi airport when he was preparing to depart for the U.S., thus effectively banning him from leaving the country. (*West Africa*, March 1 and 22, 1982.)

Upper Volta

• In late February, Col. Saye Zerbo rescinded a ban on **strikes**, imposed last November, in response to widespread pressure from labor and student groups. The new order details how labor disputes should be settled, with the right to strike only "in defense of legitimate collective interests." Government and parastatal administrators, the army, police, prison services and customs are still prohibited from striking.

In a related event, four members of the leftist Patriotic League for Development (LIPAD) were freed in February after having spent nearly a month in prison because of "an administrative inquiry with relation to the editorial direction of the newspaper *Le Patriote*." The newspaper is published by LIPAD and its circulation of 2,000 is nearly as large as that of the independent *L'Observateur*.

A recent issue of *Le Patriote* contained a photo of Soumana Toure, secretary-general of the Voltaic Trade Union Confederation, which had been suspended. Toure has reportedly been in hiding because he is being sought by the authorities for possessing secret documents which could "compromise state security." He also allegedly broke the law by calling for an illegal strike. Inside *Le Patriote* was said to be a "call to arms" signed by 13 trade unions. (*West Africa*, February 27 and March 8, 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, February 15, 1982.)

EASTERN AFRICA

Comoros

• Following his dissolution of the preceding government in late January, President Ahmed Abdallah announced a new ten-member **cabinet** in February. The former Foreign Minister, Ali Mroudje, was named Prime Minister, replacing Salim Ben Ali, who was appointed special adviser to the President.

Legislative elections followed in late February and early March. The new government was appointed to carry out the economic revival policy called for by Abdallah.

In addition, the government set up the Comoran Development Bank (CDB) to provide loans, guarantees and equity participation for small and medium-scale projects. The majority of CDB loans are expected to go to the industrial and agro-business sectors. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, March 15, 1982; *Le Monde*, March 11, 1982.)

Djibouti

• Of the 13 leaders of the **opposition** Djiboutian People's Party arrested last September, six were freed in mid-October and the remaining seven were released in January by order of President Hassan Gouled. Among those released was former Prime Minister Ahmed Dini. Gouled's decision was reportedly in the interests of national unity and a more relaxed political atmosphere. (*Afrique-Asie*, February 1, 1982.)

Ethiopia

• In late March, the **Eritrean** People's Liberation Front claimed to have repulsed "ferocious attacks" by the Ethiopian army as Addis Ababa's major offensive involving about 100,000 troops was well under way.

Government forces were in complete control of most of the towns in the secessionist province, according to two Agence France Presse journalists who toured the area. The reporters found that not only was the army in full control of Massawa, Asmara and Keren, but also there were few security restrictions, indicating that the military feared no action from the guerrillas.

Only Nafka is controlled by the EPLF and it is subject to frequent air attacks by the government forces. The EPLF claimed that the Ethiopians have used poisonous gas in some of their attacks. (Gulf agency, March 31, 1982; London *Observer*, March 28, 1982; London *Times*, March 12, 1982.)

Kenya

• President Daniel arap Moi reshuffled his **cabinet** in late February, moving around the two most influential ministers in an apparent attempt to reduce their power.

The two, Vice President Mwai Kibaki and Charles Njonjo, the Minister for Constitutional and Home Affairs, had, with Moi, dominated Kenyan politics. However, their intense rivalry was viewed as distracting the government from resolving the country's serious economic problems.

Kibaki, lost his finance portfolio and was named Minister for Home Affairs. Njonjo retained the constitutional affairs portfolio. The new Finance Minister, Arthur Magugu, was formerly Minister of Health and is not generally known as a finance expert. (*Financial Times*, February 26, 1982.)

• **Ngugi wa Thiong'o**, the internationally renowned Kenyan author, was in trouble with the authorities again in March.

His new play, *Mother Sing for Me*, performed in the Kikuyu language, was prevented by the government from being staged at the National Theater in Nairobi, with no explanation given. Some critics—the play was seen by 10,000 people in previews—believed the work was "seditious"; others noted that Ngugi now writes only in Kikuyu, not one of Kenya's two official languages and therefore not meriting performance by a national troupe.

The authorities also demolished the open-air theater 30 miles from Nairobi that is closely associated with Ngugi—after canceling its registration.

Ngugi, who is the author of the novels *Petals of Blood* and *Grain of Wheat*, has for years been openly critical of the government, citing what he calls "imperialist foreign domination of our economy, politics and culture." He was detained without charges for 12 months in December 1977. (Kenya *Sunday Nation*, February 28 and March 21, 1982; *Economist*, March 20, 1982; London *Times*, March 20, 1982.)

Madagascar

• A series of **riots** in the northern part of Madagascar in late February and March resulted in at least five deaths and probably more when troops were called out to quell the disturbances.

The original demonstrations were apparently staged by students angered at the reinstatement of Georges Diny as the head of the northern province of Antsiranana. Diny reportedly had been dismissed on corruption charges.

But the violence was also linked to Madagascar's economic crisis, which has caused shortages of essentials such as rice, sugar and medicine. (*Le Monde*, March 11, 1982.)

Seychelles

• A UN inquiry into the **attempted coup** against the Seychelles last November by white mercenaries has concluded that the South African government probably knew about the plot.

The UN commission said: "Given the tight and effective control exercised by the security authorities in South Africa, and the nature of the preparations for the mercenary operation of November 25, 1981, in South Africa, particularly the procurement and test firing of the weapons, the commission finds it difficult to believe that the South African authorities did not at least have knowledge of the preparations in this matter."

South Africa has denied any complicity in the botched coup, while acknowledging that an exile Seychellois group had asked Pretoria for backing for a coup try but had been turned down.

Meanwhile, Seychelles' President Albert Rene said France was sending a small team of military experts for training the army to avoid similar mercenary attacks. Rene also said he had not been able to raise the money needed to replace the airport's electronic equipment knocked out in a firefight between the mercenaries and the islands' army. (London *Times*, March 26, 1982; Kenya *Sunday Nation*, February 21, 1982; Johannesburg Radio, February 10, 1982.)

Somalia

• President Mohamed Siad Barre was in Washington in March for meetings with President Reagan and officials of the World Bank, the IMF, the Overseas Private Investment Corp. and the Chamber of Commerce in efforts to obtain more **aid** for Somalia.

After his talks with President Reagan, Siad Barre said he was not satisfied with the level of U.S. economic and military aid. He reportedly sought a speed-up in delivery of promised weapons, as well as an increased amount. The Reagan administration has requested some $90 million in economic, military and refugee aid for Somalia.

At the same time as Siad Barre visited the U.S., the opposition Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) mounted a publicity campaign against what it called the "tyrannical military dictatorship." An SSDF delegation visited the U.S. and executive committee member Dr. Hassan Mirreh told **African Update**: "People are no longer afraid of the regime. The northern part of the country is in disarray."

There has been fierce rioting in the north, where Berbera, the air and naval base the U.S. has been granted access to, is located. At least three mutinies by soldiers have been crushed by forces flown in from the south.

A week before Siad Barre visited Washington, he lifted the state of emergency imposed 16 months ago and reshuffled his cabinet. (Kenya *Sunday Nation*, March 14 and 21, 1982; SSDF radio, March 13, 1982; *Economist*, March 6, 1982.)

Tanzania

• Tanzania's **economic problems**, which received international attention with the hijacking of an Air Tanzania jet in February, have forced the suspension of development projects in the 1982-83 fiscal year. President Julius Nyerere said the country's small amount of foreign exchange earnings would instead be used to pay for spare parts and other essentials.

Observers said that shortages had reduced Tanzania's small manufacturing sector to 30 percent of capacity, and that there were widespread shortages of such essentials as flour, sugar and cooking oil. Inflation is running between 40 and 60 percent annually.

Although Nyerere had refused IMF demands to devalue the Tanzanian shilling, the currency was in fact devalued by 10 percent in March. The IMF had sought a 50 percent devaluation.

The hijacking was seen as an embarrassment for Nyerere because the young hijackers had cited Tanzania's economic plight and called for the President's resignation. Also embarrassing was the decision by a dozen passengers on the hijacked domestic flight to seek asylum in Britain.

Shortly before the hijacking, the head of the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar, Aboud Jumbe, who is also Tanzania's Vice President, ordered a $5 million executive jet, despite the scarcity of foreign exchange. (London *Times*, March 1 and 27, 1982; Kenya *Sunday Nation*, February 14, and March 14, 1982.)

Uganda

• The Ugandan government unveiled in March a $600 million investment plan, to be financed by international donors, as the army was rounding up suspected dissidents in a drive against anti-government **guerrillas**.

More than 10,000 people were arrested by the army by early April, and scores of civilians reportedly were murdered by the army in reprisal for the February 23 guerrilla attack on Kampala's main military barracks. It was the biggest clash since opposition groups began their guerrilla actions more than a year ago.

President Milton Obote denied that the army was carrying out reprisals, but he did apologize to the Roman Catholic archbishop of Kampala more than two months after armed soldiers stormed the cathedral and forced out priests and worshippers. The army was looking for guerrillas who had fired mortars at the barracks from the vicinity of the cathedral. (*Washington Post*, April 8, 1982; *Financial Times*, February 28 and March 25, 1982; London *Guardian*, February 26, 1982.)

CENTRAL AFRICA

Cameroon

• According to the Minister of Economy and Planning, Bello Bouba Maigari, Cameroon is experiencing improved **economic growth**, and the fifth Four-Year National Development Plan covering 1981-1985 predicts an annual growth rate of 7 percent, expected to double the gross domestic product by 1986.

Two of the strongest engines of growth in the Cameroon economy are its agricultural sector and its rich endowment of natural resources.

Increases in exports of coffee, cocoa, cotton and rubber since 1979 have resulted in a 16.5 percent growth in the agricultural sector. Development of natural gas, uranium and oil deposits also point to an optimistic economic future.

In March, French and American companies were competing for a $25-30 million contract to construct a natural gas liquefaction plant. According to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Malcolm Baldrige, "Our technology is very clearly superior to the French, even if their financing conditions are superior to ours."

A subsidiary of the French Elf Aquitaine, Elf Serepca, announced in March that the first onshore oil deposits were discovered in the south-west part of Cameroon. It is not yet known whether the deposits are commercially viable. Cameroon currently produces about 95,000 barrels of oil per day from its offshore fields, earning the country $200 million last year.

And Cameroon is receiving technical assistance from West Germany to explore the extraction of uranium from northern Cameroon. German firms will have the first option on concessions. (*West Africa*, February 22 and March 22, 1982; *Le Monde*, March 9, 1982.)

Central African Republic

• In late March, Ange Patasse, leader of the **opposition** Central African People's Liberation Movement (MPLC), and allegedly the mastermind behind a failed coup attempt against President Andre Kolingba in early March, was offered political asylum in Togo.

Patasse, who had been in France since former President David Dacko surrendered power to Kolingba in September last year, returned to the Central African capital, Bangui, only four days before the attempted coup. He fled to the French embassy in Bangui after the coup attempt failed, where he was given asylum.

Kolingba, however, issued an ultimatum demanding that Patasse be turned over to the Central African authorities. He guaranteed Patasse's safety, saying "I am not a killer," but said that the rebel must be punished by the judicial system. "I do not at all implicate France in the coup affair," Kolingba said, and he pledged that the incident would not mar future relations between the Central African Republic and France. Guy Penne, the French President's African affairs specialist, was dispatched to Bangui to work out a compromise between the respective governments.

The former French government of Giscard d'Estaing had been instrumental in the coup by David Dacko which overthrew Jean-Bedel Bokassa in 1979. French influence in the country is still dominant; French economic aid in 1980 amounted to 80 percent of the budget, and in 1981, 63 percent. There are 65 French military advisers in Bangui and about 1,200 combat troops.

Apparently as a compromise between the French and Central African governments, it was agreed that Patasse be permitted to seek refuge in another African country, most likely Togo.

Five people reportedly died during the coup attempt and more than 30 were wounded. Of the 60 detained in the wake of the foiled plot, 20 were released in mid-March. (*Le Monde*, March 9, 10, 11, 13, and 24, 1982; *New York Times*, March 17, 1982; London *Guardian*, March 11, 1982.)

Congo

• According to a late March report in the London *Times*, responsibility for a **bomb** which exploded in a Brazzaville cinema, killing 15 people, was claimed by an organization calling itself the "Patriotic Armed Group of the Congo."

The group said they are seeking clarification on the murder of former head of state Marien Ngouabi in 1977 and the imprisonment of President Joachim Yhombi-Opango in 1979. (London *Times*, March 25, 1982.)

Equatorial Guinea

• In early March, assets of Equatorial Guinea's Central Bank held in Spain's Banco Exterior were frozen following an unspecified complaint by a **Spanish businessman**, heightening tensions between the two governments.

Earlier in the year, Spain's $23 million three-year plan for its former colony, to provide assistance to keep it from the brink of bankruptcy, was rejected by Malabo because it was conditional upon the inclusion of three Spanish economic consultants in the Equatorial Guinean ministries of finance and budget.

An emergency meeting of the joint cooperation commission was scheduled for late March in Malabo to discuss future options.

In the meantime, however, a verbal dispute at Madrid airport between departing Equatorial Guinean government officials and staff of the Spanish airline, Iberia, over the refusal of the deputy chairman of the Supreme Military Council to pay for excess baggage, soured relations even further. The Spanish Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had to be summoned to resolve the dispute. (*West Africa*, March 8 and 22, 1982.)

Gabon

• Gabon's Commerce Minister, Etienne Moussirou, announced in March that Libreville will not host the 1983 **UN Conference on Trade and Development** (UNCTAD) summit, following the government's reassessment of the financial costs involved and unsuccessful attempts to elicit Western financial support.

Gabon's oil-fueled economy only recently emerged from a five-year financial crisis, stemming from its hosting of the 1977 OAU summit, which left it with a reported $1 billion bill for the construction of the conference center, roads and other infrastructural development. The cost for holding the UNCTAD conference was estimated at $100 million.

The government has, however, earned praise from the IMF recently for adhering to the fund's stringent stabilization package. The 1981 balance of payments was expected to show a $56 million surplus, the state budget is balanced and the level of public debt dropped 20 percent from 1980's level, to $1.15 billion. (*West Africa*, March 22, 1982; *Financial Times*, February 22 and March 8, 1982.)

Rwanda

• In February, following the formation of Rwanda's first national assembly since 1973, President Juvenal Habyarimana reshuffled his **cabinet**, bringing in two new ministers. François Habiyakere will head the Ministry of Civil Service and Labor, and Maj. Ndindiliyimana, Youth and Sports.

Three ministers changed portfolios, including Edouard Karemera, formerly Civil Service and Labor Minister, who was named Minister at the Presidency of the Republic. He will share responsibilities for the departments of economic and financial affairs, political and administrative questions, and government relations with the National Development Council with Simeon Nteziryayo, who holds a similar post.

Felicien Gatabazi, formerly Minister of Youth and Sports, was named to replace Andre Ntagerura as Minister of Social Affairs and Community Development. Ntagerura becomes Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, replacing Maurice Ntahobari, elected president of the national assembly earlier in the year. (*West Africa*, February 15, 1982.)

Zaire

• Zaire was granted a **$120 million loan** under the IMF's Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) in mid-March, staving off an economic crisis following the Banque du Zaire's announcement in February of the country's inability to meet the performance criteria of the IMF's $1 billion three-year assistance program, set up in June 1981.

Due to low international prices for Zaire's principal mineral exports—copper, cobalt and diamonds—which earned an estimated $1.5 billion in export receipts in 1981, below the projected $1.9 billion, the country's external debt repayments are some $120 million in arrears. Debt service payments amounted to about 27 percent of export revenue last year.

Zaire's $4.5 billion in external debt was rescheduled last July by its major Western creditors, the Paris Club. However, with the IMF's approval of the CFF loan a further rescheduling of Zaire's commercial bank debt is likely, as the measure is seen as an indication that the country is still in good standing with the fund. (*West Africa*, February 22 and March 29, 1982; *Financial Times*, February 25 and March 19, 1982.)

• Following late January **student demonstrations** at the University of Kinshasa and the National Teaching Institute for higher grants and improved living conditions, the two institutions were closed down and 85 protesters were conscripted into the army to be "re-educated." Teachers who undertook a support strike and defied an order to return to work were sacked.

In reaction to the government's measures and to alleged human rights violations at home, Zairian students in Geneva and Paris staged demonstrations to rally foreign governments' condemnation of President Mobutu Sese Seko's actions. France's ruling Socialist Party criticized the Zaire government's drafting of students as a violation of human rights.

Mobutu, criticizing France for "interfering in sovereign affairs," said all Zairians over age 18 were required to do military service and none of the "wreckers" had yet done so.

In a related event, a March report in *Le Monde* said that leaders of the Catholic Church in Zaire have been the targets of violent intimidation. Four prelates—a bishop, cardinal and two archbishops—were, according to the report, attacked by armed men last December and robbed and beaten. The Catholic Church has been a major critic of the regime, and has accused Mobutu of corruption.

Meanwhile, 11 members of the central committee of the ruling People's Revolutionary Movement (MPR) were expelled from the group and "put at the disposition of justice" for "serious lacks of discipline and of commitment to the party's ideals" in late March. The central committee also announced that all Zairian students would be required to undertake one year of military service on their campuses.

Mobutu, at an earlier meeting of the MPR central committee, dispelled rumors of permitting the formation of another party, saying, "There will never be a second party in Zaire as long as I live." Legislative elections, originally slated for May, were rescheduled for September. (*Le Monde*, February 3, 4, and March 18, 19 and 26, 1982; *West Africa*, February 15, 22 and March 1 and 22, 1982.)

Zambia

• A mid-March meeting of the Zambia-Zaire permanent **border commission** culminated in an agreement to evacuate both countries' troops from the border areas.

The meeting followed a border clash in the disputed Copperbelt region in northern Zambia in early March, allegedly initiated by Zairian soldiers, in which three Zairians were killed in an exchange of fire. The skirmish caused thousands of Zambians to flee their villages and temporarily closed the border at Sakania. (*West Africa*, March 8 and 22, 1982; *Le Monde*, March 5, 1982; London *Times*, March 3, 1982.)

• Zambia is running into trouble meeting the terms of the IMF's $900 million **economic stabilization program** signed last May, which may delay Lusaka's drawing of the third tranche of funds.

Zambia is facing acute foreign exchange problems because of low world prices for its major exports, copper and cobalt, and transportation problems which have left 100,000 tons of copper stranded between the mines and the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam.

If Zambia is not allowed to draw its third allotment of money from the IMF, due in May, because of the Lusaka government's failure to stay within domestic credit ceilings and to bring arrears on external payments down to agreed levels, its economic problems will be exacerbated.

A team of IMF officials was due to arrive in Lusaka in April for discussions with the government. (*Financial Times*, March 26 and April 1, 1982.)

• President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia said in March he wants to meet with South African Prime Minister Pieter Botha to discuss the Namibia negotiations and the "potentially explosive" chance of racial conflict in the white-ruled nation.

"Catastrophe is coming in **South Africa** and if the lid does blow off we will all get hurt," Kaunda said. "When the conflict comes it will be racial. There will be no good people and bad people—only black and white."

Botha, reacting to the opportunity of ending South Africa's almost total diplomatic isolation in Africa, said his government had "always been willing to discuss matters of common concern with leaders of other countries." He added, "Judging from the reports of President Kaunda's remarks, he is not correctly informed on South African conditions."

In the interview with the Johannesburg *Star*, Kaunda said Botha's proposed "cosmetic changes" were not nearly enough to avert disaster. "You, our brothers, sometimes make colossal mistakes, gigantic errors of judgment, and it is a great pity," he said. (Johannesburg *Star*, March 20, 1982.)

NORTHERN AFRICA

Algeria

• Algeria's second **general elections** since independence in 1962 were held in early March and with a 72.6 percent voter turn-out, representatives to the National People's Assembly were chosen. All candidates were selected by Algeria's sole political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN).

Only 68 of the 281 deputies were re-elected; among them, Rabah Bitat, president of the assembly, and two former Vice Presidents, Djelloul Malaika and Abderrahmane Belayat. Bitat was re-elected to the presidency of the assembly during the legislature's first session in March, and according to the constitution, is the second-ranking government official after President Chadli Benjedid, replacing him in the event of temporary or permanent vacancy from office. (*Le Monde*, March 9 and 16, 1982.)

• The Algerian government has promulgated a **new investment code**, designed to encourage the development of the private sector, and is expected to present it to the national assembly for approval.

The new code, replacing the obsolete 1966 version, provides government financial assistance, both for existing private enterprise and for the promotion of new ventures, with conditions for access to credit contingent upon the extent to which the business' activities merge with the priorities of the national development plan.

The text of the new code is based upon recommendations made by the December session of the National Liberation Front (FLN) central committee. The national private sector is to act as a complement to the state sector's activities. Small scale enterprise will be promoted, contrasted against the Boumedienne era's concentration on heavy industrialization. Artisanry and traditional art and handicraft for export will also be assisted via special credits for purchase of equipment and other needs. (*Le Monde*, March 19, 1982.)

Egypt

• Egypt is facing **serious economic problems** and its citizens will have to work harder to put the economy on an even footing, according to President Hosni Mubarak. In mid-March, the Egyptian President told members of parliament that "prosperity is not within easy reach . . . Our population is increasing at an alarming rate, the continuation of which will lead to an economic disaster."

Mubarak also noted that Egypt has a huge budget deficit, estimated at $3 billion for the current fiscal year, up from $1.2 billion in 1980-81. Fuad Mohieddin, the Prime Minister, added to the dismal economic picture drawn by Mubarak, noting that revenues from tourism, the Suez Canal, oil and remittances from Egyptians working abroad had fallen off. The two leaders' assessment of the state of the economy confirmed what had been discussed at a February national economic conference in Cairo.

The meeting of Egyptian economists and businessmen came up with a series of recommendations which were sent to Mubarak. Among the policies they proposed were:

• retention of subsidies on basic goods, despite their nearly $3 billion cost to the government;

• maintenance of the open-door policy initiated by the late President Anwar Sadat in 1974, but directing it more towards productive projects than consumer-oriented ones;

• continuance in decreasing government dependence on foreign loans;

• reassessment of investment priorities in industry, housing, agriculture and public utilities;

• more freedom to the public sector in the areas of administration and finance;

• increase of some income taxes to narrow the gap between rich and poor;

• expansion of job opportunities and stemming of population growth.

In a related event, it was announced in mid-March that **Chase Manhattan** is to raise the first public loan for Egypt since 1977 to fund its growing current account deficit. The $200 million loan is to be in the form of a standby revolving credit, meaning Egypt can draw on the funds on demand provided repayments are made.

Chase is asking other major banks to participate in the loan to deter further deterioration of Egypt's external finances. Foreign debt totals about $12 billion, and the balance of payments situation has moved from a positive $1.5 billion in 1980 to equilibrium in 1981 to a deficit this year. To improve the situation, the economic planning and budget committee of the national assembly recommended in February that only strategic and capital goods be imported. (London *Times*, March 20, 1982; London *Guardian*, March 11, 1982; *Economist*, February 27, 1982; *Financial Times*, February 18 and 22, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, February 17, 1982.)

Libya

• The Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafy, embarked on an **image-polishing campaign** in February and March, mending fences with Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba and Malta's Prime Minister Dom Mintoff, and paying an official state visit to Austria.

In preparation for Tripoli's hosting of the OAU summit in August, Qaddafy is seeking to temper his image as an international troublemaker, according to observers. A visit to Tunisia in late February to repair relations with Bourguiba, which soured in 1974 following a premature announcement that Tunisia and Libya were to form a union, was seen in that light. Qaddafy held discussions with the Tunisian head of state and other government officials.

And in March, he made an unexpected stopover in Malta where he had brief talks with Mintoff, culminating in the two countries' ratification of an agreement to take an off-shore oil exploration dispute to the International Court of Justice. A joint commission will be set up to revive industrial, commercial, agricultural, tourist and cultural schemes suspended because of the dispute.

In Vienna in mid-March, Qaddafy told Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky that Libya wants to enter into a new relationship with other European countries. Kreisky gave Qaddafy assurances that Austria will probably approve arms deliveries to Libya, provided it is not conducting a war against any other country.

Qaddafy used his visit to Austria to slam Reagan administration policies towards his country, warning that the "economic war" the U.S. is waging against Libya would hurt others, and appealing to West Europe to stand by him.

The Reagan administration, just prior to Qaddafy's Austria trip, had imposed new sanctions against Libya for "violating accepted international forms of behavior," banning all future U.S. imports of Libyan oil and restricting sales of high technology equipment to its oil and gas industry.

Relations between the U.S. and Libya reached a further low when Qaddafy warned that if the U.S. violated his nation's territorial waters, Libya would go to war. "If America enters the Bay of Sirte, war in the full sense of the word will begin between us and them, war with planes, navies, missiles and everything," Qaddafy said in March.

American fighters shot down two Libyan air force jets over the Gulf of Sirte last August during U.S. naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean. The U.S. Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, said in mid-March that the American Sixth Fleet will probably conduct exercises in the disputed gulf within the next few months. "We will not be intimidated in our international rights by statements by Qaddafy," he said.

Qaddafy ended his visit to Vienna with one positive note with regard to relations with the U.S. He said he hopes to open contacts with other Western nations, including the U.S., after his "very positive" trip to Austria. Visits "proved that dialogue and direct contact are the best ways of solving international problems," he said. "I do not rule out similar visits, even to the U.S." (*Fi-*

nancial Times, March 11, 15 and 23, 1982; London *Guardian*, March 17, 1982; London *Times*, March 5 and 15, 1982; *Washington Post*, March 15, 1982.)

Morocco

• King Hassan granted **clemency** in late February to Abderrahim Bouabid, secretary-general of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces; Mohamed El Yazghi, a USFP deputy from Kenitra; and Mohamed Lahbabi, an economist and USFP member.

All three, members of the political bureau of the USFP, were sentenced to one year in prison last September for criticizing Hassan's agreement to OAU proposals for the holding of a referendum in the disputed Western Sahara. (*Le Monde*, March 1, 1982.)

• American Secretary of State **Alexander Haig** visited Morocco in early February and concluded an agreement with King Hassan on a joint military commission and on other measures which will, in all likelihood, lead to transit rights for American military forces.

The decision to form a joint military commission stemmed from "the growth in the U.S.-Moroccan military relationship to the point where a more formal structure is required to address security matters of mutal interest," a joint statement read.

Haig said he and Hassan "discussed the potential availability of transit facilities for U.S. forces" on Moroccan territory, but that "no decisions were made." The two bases said to be under discussion are at Kenitra and Sidi Yahia.

Haig also expressed sympathy with regard to the Moroccan position in the Western Sahara—a dangerous situation because of "the actions of Libya, the high level of armaments provided by the Soviet Union and the recurrence of these arms in various destabilizing actions."

The Reagan administration has taken a more active policy of cooperation with Morocco, aimed at drawing the country into the "strategic consensus" the U.S. is attempting to create throughout the Middle East—a series of arrangements with pro-Western states that share American concerns of Soviet expansion.

Over the past several months, a stream of American officials including Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Admiral Bobby Inman, deputy director of the CIA, and Francis West, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, has visited Morocco, discussing ways of assisting the country in its war with Polisario for control of the Western Sahara. Even former President Richard Nixon was in Rabat in late March and held talks with Moroccan officials.

Observers indicate that Hassan has little choice but to cooperate with the Reagan administration to gain badly needed economic and military aid, as Morocco's formerly strongest financial backer, France, has slowed assistance.

The Reagan administration has pledged to promote American private investment in Morocco and the U.S. ambassador there, Joseph Verner Reed, said he would be a "salesman for America." King Hassan was expected to visit Washington before the summer. (*New York Times*, February 12, 13 and March 25, 1982; *Washington Post*, February 13, 1982.)

Sudan

• In mid-March, 13 Western creditor countries—the Paris Club—agreed to reschedule $500 million of Sudan's official **debt**, as the final phase of a $1 billion rescheduling program.

The IMF approved a $225 million one-year standby credit for the financially strapped Sudan last October after the government of President Gaafar al-Nimeiry agreed to adopt a recommended austerity program which included cutting government subsidies on basic goods and devaluing the Sudanese pound. While the implementation of the IMF measures cleared the way for the rescheduling of Sudan's debts, it also provoked anti-government and anti-IMF riots and demonstrations which led to the closure of Sudan's universities and secondary schools in January.

The latest debt rescheduling, however, gives Nimeiry an economic breather, as it provides for the spreading of debt repayments over a ten-year period with four years' grace.

Sudan's total external debt is estimated at $6 billion, and the current account deficit for this fiscal year stands at $600 million. The $1 billion rescheduling, the first half of which was completed last December, is intended to give Nimeiry room to push through the rest of the IMF program.

In January, Sudan's aid donors, including the United States and Saudi Arabia, put together a $350 million aid package to ease the country's balance of payments difficulties. The IMF is scheduled to pay out its first tranche of $80 million soon, and Saudi Arabia agreed in February to provide Sudan with three months' oil supplies free of charge. (*Financial Times*, March 8 and 19, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, March 18, 1982; *Christian Science Monitor*, March 5, 1982.)

Tunisia

• To mark the 26th anniversary of Tunisia's independence in late March, the country's four principal **opposition** groups issued a joint declaration calling for "an improvement in the political climate."

The statement was signed by the Movement of Democratic Socialists, the Tunisian Communist Party, the Movement for Popular Unity and the Islamic Movement. Among the measures the groups recommended in their declaration were: abrogation of unconstitutional laws, halting of political trials, freeing of political prisoners, promulgation of a general amnesty law which would also apply to Tunisian opposition members abroad, recognition of political parties still awaiting official approval, permission to publish suspended or new journals and a revision of the press code.

While the statement represents a general consensus among the Tunisian opposition on issues of basic human rights and individual liberties, it reportedly was not to be seen as a common political platform. The four diverse groups harbor fundamental differences in their approaches to social and economic issues, and it is unlikely that they could unite under a more general platform. (*Le Monde*, March 24, 1982.)

• Tunisia's Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali announced a general salary increase for workers in mid-February after several weeks of complex negotiations with **labor** groups. Workers in industry, agriculture and the public sector benefited from the measure, which was retroactive to February 1.

Negotiations between labor and government followed a series of strikes earlier in the year by teachers and agriculture, automobile industry and railway workers.

The General Union of Tunisian Workers had appealed to the National Transport Society of Tunis to call off its "unlimited strike" in early February so as not to plunge "the nation into a crisis" and "to safeguard the national interest."

The minimum weekly salary for workers in industry was raised by 30 percent from $129 to $171, and the daily wage of farmers was increased from $4 to $4.82. All other minimum salaries were raised from $40 to $60 per week. (*Le Monde*, February 4, 6 and March 1, 1982.)

Western Sahara

• The **OAU** was still reeling from the repercussions of the decision of its secretary-general, Edem Kodjo, to seat the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), Polisario's self-proclaimed government for the disputed Western Sahara, at the 38th meeting of the OAU council of ministers in Addis Ababa in February.

The admission of the SADR as the OAU's 51st member state resulted in one of the most serious crises in the organization's 19-year history and was threatening to jettison not only this year's heads of state summit scheduled for Tripoli, Libya, in August, but possibly the viability of the organization itself.

At the 1980 OAU summit in Freetown, Sierra Leone, the SADR gained the support of the requisite number of member states—a simple majority—to qualify for admission to the organization. However, a compromise plan put off the SADR's admission for another year. At the 1981 summit in Nairobi, Morocco's King Hassan pulled off a diplomatic coup by announcing he would go along with organization proposals for a ceasefire and referendum for the disputed territory, thus scuttling the issue of the SADR's entry once again.

Since the Nairobi summit, however, meetings of the OAU special committee on the Western Sahara, empowered to work out modalities for the referendum, have ended without progress. Morocco's intransigence in refusing to negotiate directly with Polisario frustrated any new initiatives on the vote.

Kodjo's decision to seat the SADR at the February meeting was taken without consultation with the current OAU chairman, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, or with his Foreign Minister, Robert Ouko, who was chairing the council of ministers session.

More than one-third of the member states, 19, boycotted the closing meeting to protest the SADR's admission. Morocco, leading the protest, sent letters to the OAU chairman and the secretary-general, calling the decision "in flagrant violation of all the formal and substantive rules governing the OAU," and "obviously null and void." The Moroccan government has requested the convening of an emergency OAU meeting to resolve the crisis prior to the August summit.

A meeting of OAU information ministers in Dakar, Senegal in March was adjourned early because 13 or the 27 delegations in attendance walked out to protest that the Senegalese government turned away the SADR delegates when they arrived at the airport. And Morocco and eight other countries boycotted a meeting of OAU labor ministers in Salisbury, Zimbabwe, in early April over the presence of the SADR representatives.

The SADR Labor and Information Minister, Mohamed Salem Ould Salek, said the 19 countries which oppose recognition of his government are those under the economic influence of the U.S. He said the U.S. was putting economic and political pressure on those states, threatening them with aid reductions if they did not support Morocco's position. "It's the U.S. that encourages Morocco in its acts of aggression against the Saharan Republic," he said.

The issue which will have to be resolved if the OAU's viability is not to be jeopardized centers on the legality of Kodjo's decision to recognize the SADR under the OAU charter. The operative clauses are sufficiently vague and open to interpretation that resolving the thorny issue will require all the diplomacy the OAU can muster. (London *Guardian*, March 29 and April 1, 1982; London *Times*, March 27, 1982; *Le Monde*, February 24 and March 17, 1982.)

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

• The official visit of Portugal's Foreign Minister, Andre Goncalves Pereira, to Luanda in March, to be followed by a similar trip scheduled for April by Portuguese President Antonio Ramalho Eanes, marks a continuing policy of **rapprochement** between the former colonial power and its African ex-colonies. Pereira's trip to Angola was the first by a Portuguese foreign minister since the former colony achieved independence in 1975. Eanes has already been to Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Mozambique.

Portugal and Angola recently signed a major economic agreement following weeks of talks in Luanda between the Portuguese Finance Minister, João Salguiero, and Angolan officials. Portugal is Angola's second largest supplier of non-military goods after France, and in 1981, Angola's imports from Portugal rose 55 percent to nearly $200 million.

One visible sign of increased cooperation between the two countries was the recent decision by Portugal's oil monopoly, Petrogal, to participate in a consortium to drill for onshore oil in Angola. Petrogal's 10 percent stake in the partnership, headed by Agip of Italy and including Elf of France and two Yugoslav companies, represents its first involvement in exploration abroad. Its $8 million investment, although modest, is seen as a first step in strengthening economic ties between the two nations and may facilitate Portugal's purchase of Angolan oil. Portugal is heavily dependent on imported oil which accounts for 25 percent of all its imports. During Pereira's visit, a request to purchase Angolan oil was reportedly made.

And a consortium of Portuguese builders and civil engineers agreed in March to assist Soviet personnel in building the Kapanda Dam on the Quanza River in Angola, the first such association between Portuguese companies and an official Russian body, Technoexport. Four Portuguese companies will build the dam, substations and power lines, open access roads and carry out geological work, while Technoexport will equip the dam.

One problem area in relations between the two countries is the issue of compensation for Portuguese nationals whose assets in Angola were nationalized or confiscated at independence. Pereira's plans to raise the issue during a scheduled meeting with President José Eduardo dos Santos reportedly caused the Angolan head of state to cancel it, marring an otherwise positive visit. (*Financial Times*, March 29 and April 7, 1982; *West Africa*, March 22 and 29, 1982, *Christian Science Monitor*, March 10, 1982.)

Botswana

• The Minister of Finance, Peter Mmusi, forecast "an exceptionally bleak outlook" for the Botswana **economy** as he presented his 1982-83 budget to the national assembly in late February. Mmusi cited a depressed diamond market as responsible for Botswana's balance of payments dropping from a $74 million surplus in 1980 to a $62 million deficit in 1981. Diamonds are Botswana's most important export product, accounting for 60 percent of its export earnings in 1980.

The Selebi-Pikwe copper and nickel mines, which account for approximately 20 percent of Botswana's exports, are also experiencing financial difficulties. Owing to low world mineral prices, the mines have rescheduled debt payments and have sought funds to cover operating costs.

The new budget introduced a sweeping austerity program, including a public sector wage freeze and the authorization of only 80 percent of the government's projected spending for 1982-83 fiscal year. In addition, taxes may be raised later this year.

In other news, a spokesman for the National Railways of Zimbabwe announced that Botswana has agreed to take over the railway line running from Botswana's southern border with South Africa up to the Botswana-Zimbabwe frontier as of 1986. Botswana has agreed to compensate the railways for its assets and is studying a trans-Kalahari line linking the land-locked state to the port of Walvis Bay in Namibia. In addition, Botswana has been named as the permanent home of the secretariat of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The secretariat, with a Zimbabwean secretary-general to be announced, will become operational in July when the second SADCC summit is held in Botswana. (*Africa Now*, March 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, February 28, 1982; Johannesburg Radio, February 24 and 25, 1982; *Financial Times*, February 24, 1982; Salisbury Radio, January 28, 1982.)

Lesotho

• The Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), the military wing of the exiled **opposition** Basotho Congress Party (BCP), reportedly blew up three electricity pylons in the northern Leribe district of Lesotho in late February, a few weeks after the BCP leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, threatened more acts of violence and sabotage if Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan did not accede to demands for a UN-supervised general election.

And in mid-March, a series of explosions rocked the capital, Maseru, part of an attack launched from South Africa, according to Radio Lesotho. The Lesotho government has repeatedly accused Pretoria of harboring the BCP rebels. The attacks were said to have been in the area of the barracks of the Lesotho paramilitary force, which returned fire. (*Sowetan*, February 22 and March 12, 1982.)

Malawi

• Attati Mpakati, leader of the opposition Socialist League of Malawi (Lesoma), was deported from **Zambia** in March, as part of a warming trend in relations between the governments of Malawi and Zambia.

Relations between the two countries were traditionally stormy because of Malawi's ties to South Africa. However, a subtle rapprochement has been developing as southern African states seek to break dependence on South Africa through the framework of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

Mpakati entered Zambia in January where he was said to have a large base of support among Malawians resident there. The exiled opposition leader was previously based in Mozambique and then Tanzania.

Upon Mpakati's deportation, the Zambian government said that its policy "as an independent and nonaligned state is not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries." And in December another leading exiled opponent of Malawian President Kamuzu Banda, Orton Chirwa, was arrested inside Malawi's territory, according to the government. Chirwa's relatives maintained, however, that he did not enter Malawi and had been abducted from a meeting in the Zambian border town of Chipata.

Another exiled opposition leader, Kanyama Chiume, a former Malawian cabinet minister, now heading the Congress of the Second Republic, left Zambia recently, possibly because he came under pressure from the Lusaka authorities. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda visited Malawi in late February for the first time since the two countries became independent in 1964. (Johannesburg *Star*, March 20, 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, March 15, 1982.)

Mozambique

• The first national **party congress**, convened by the Frelimo central committee in mid-March, reaffirmed Mozambique's socialist commitment to "eliminate the underdevelopment in which we are living" by calling for a "mobilization of militants and workers." However, Frelimo's fourth party congress, to deal with Mozambique's development strategy and specifically its economic relations with the West, was postponed until April 1983.

The March meeting was primarily concerned with strengthening party ideology and planning for the 1983 congress. The government, meanwhile, has been increasingly concerned with the reorganization of Mozambique's military forces in the face of continuing activity by the South African-backed Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM). In February, President Samora Machel appointed military commanders for each of the country's provinces and offered to arm citizens of the southern Inhambane province to counter the rebels' activities.

In addition, Machel arranged for Tanzanian military advisers to replace some Soviet personnel to combat the MRM. The importation of 200 Tanzanian advisers does not indicate a shift in Mozambique-Soviet relations, according to observers. Rather the advisers were requested in line with the long history of military cooperation between Mozambique and Tanzania, as the latter has assisted in the defense of its neighbor's borders in the past.

In March, Portuguese workers on a hydroelectric project in central Mozambique asked to be repatriated because of the deteriorating security situation arising from MRM sabotage attacks. Mozambique also presented further documentation of South Africa's support for the MRM, via documents recovered from a captured resistance base at Garagua. The papers reportedly confirmed that Orlando Cristina, the first Portuguese secret police agent to infiltrate Frelimo in Tanzania in 1964, is acting as the "linkman" between the MRM and South Africa, and that Zoabostad, 75 miles south of the Mozambique border in the northern Transvaal region of South Africa, is an MRM training base.

The Mozambique government believes that the MRM is regrouping in Malawi since the destruction of the Garagua base last December, despite an agreement between the two countries last year. (London *Guardian*, March 13, 24 and 30, 1982; Maputo Radio, March 5 and 20, 1982; Dar es Salaam Radio, February 26, 1982; *New York Times*, February 23, 1982.)

South Africa

• Three black trade unionists, members of the Motor Assemblers and Component Workers Union in the Port Elizabeth area, where the auto industry is centered, were **banned** in March for two years each after being released from nine months' detention. They are Sipo Pityana, Maxwell Madlingozi and Zandile Mjuza.

A student at the University of the Western Cape, Ebrahim Patel, was detained in March for the third time in three years. Patel was held for four months in 1980 under the Internal Security Act and for three months under Section Six of the Terrorism Act in 1982. (*Sowetan*, March 25 and April 1, 1982.)

• Eight young whites were released in March after six months' **detention** without charges and will appear as state witnesses against three other white detainees who will be charged under the Terrorism Act.

Among the freed detainees is Dr. Liz Floyd, the woman who lived with Dr. Neil Aggett, the trade unionist who died in police detention in February.

The trial defendants are Barbara Hogan, 30, Alan Fine, 28, and Cedric Mayson, 54.

According to figures compiled by the Institute of Race Relations, about 200 people from all over South Africa, including the homelands made "independent" by Pretoria, are being detained without charges. In the first three months of 1982, more than 40 people were detained. (London *Guardian*, March 27 and 30, 1982; *Sowetan*, March 19, 1982.)

• South Africa is expanding its military **draft** to include all white men aged between 17 and 60, almost doubling the size of the armed forces.

At present, the government requires every white male to serve two years of full-time active duty followed by regular call-ups of 30 days annually for the next eight years.

Now, the call-ups will be extended to 12 years, at the end of which every white man will be liable for call-up as a reservist or required to serve in At present, the government requires every white male to serve two years of full-time active duty followed by regular call-ups of 30 days annually for the next eight years.

Now, the call-ups will be extended to 12 years, at the end of which every white man will be liable for call-up as a reservist or required to serve in the local guard units, the commandos. Currently, there are 65,000 active duty soldiers and 100,000 active reservists. This will rise to 250,000 and the commando and other forces subject to mobilization could make a total of 800,000 men.

The Defense Minister, Gen. Magnus Malan, said one of the main reasons for the expanded call-up is the possibility of a conventional military attack on South Africa from neighboring countries.

Initially, the draft legislation had included a plan to conscript Coloureds (mixed-race people) and Indians, but there was strong opposition to this idea and it was dropped. Prime Minister Pieter Botha said there could not be compulsory military service for Coloureds because "they have no political rights at present." (London *Guardian*, March 24 and 27, 1982; Johannesburg Radio, March 24 and 25, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, March 20, 1982.)

• With about 25 **strikes** recently in the metal industry in the East and West Rand, the region where Johannesburg is located, an employers' group has circulated guidelines in dealing with black labor unrest.

The Steel and Engineering Industries Federation (Seifsa) has advised companies employing altogether some 44,000 workers against the "overhasty use of ultimatums" and instead has stressed negotiations.

"It may be necessary to live with the stoppage until a negotiating body has been appointed by strikers and the nature of the grievances is known," Seifsa advises.

Black union officials suggested the guidelines reflected a greater willingness toward defusing tensions rather than confrontation.

According to the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (Mawu), which is involved in many of the strikes, the stoppages have centered on wages and a rejection of industry-wide bargaining through the government set-up industrial councils.

A Mawu spokesman said: "Although some employers have granted increases, the majority in the metal industry have refused until after the industrial council negotiations." Mawu, like all unions affiliated to the Federation of South African Trade Unions, insists on plant-level bargaining. "The old, discredited system cannot just be imposed from above and be expected to gain credibility," said the spokesman. (Johannesburg *Star*, March 27, 1982; *Sowetan*, March 24, 1982.)

• **Harvard University,** which had been considering altering its policy of automatically selling off bonds and certificates of deposit in banks which lend money to the South African government, has reaffirmed the policy.

The move followed several weeks of student protests and a vote by a committee of students, faculty and alumni that said the policy should remain. (*New York Times*, March 16, 1982.)

• The Nieman Foundation at Harvard University has awarded its Louis Lyons Award for conscience and integrity in **journalism** to a banned black South African journalist.

Joe Thloloe, 40, banned from working as a journalist in January 1981, is the first foreign national to receive the award. Thloloe was also detained twice in the late 1970s when he worked for the *World*, now banned, and the *Post*, closed under threat of banning in 1980.

The black journalists' union, the Media Workers' Association of South Africa, said in a statement: "Mr. Thloloe is indeed a journalist of international standing and it is in many ways a sad commentary on this country that it will not celebrate his success." (*Sowetan*, March 24 and 26, 1982.)

• The South African government unveiled an $18 billion austerity **budget** for fiscal 1983 last month that holds spending increases to 11.5 percent, within the inflation rate of 14 percent.

As usual, the biggest chunk of spending is on defense, $2.7 billion, but that is only 8 percent over last year's expenditure. Allocations for the police, however, jumped 38 percent to $482 million. Ten years ago, the government spent only $260 million on defense.

Although the budget will not hit hard at low-income whites and blacks, it followed a series of measures that already have: increase of the sales tax to 5 percent, higher Post Office charges and a big jump in the price of gasoline.

Spending for education was increased, with blacks' share rising $100 million to $476 million. And pensions received an increase, with blacks getting an extra $9 for $49 monthly, whites getting $16 for $138 monthly, and Coloureds (mixed-race people) and Asians receiving $12 more for $83 a month. (Johannesburg *Star*, March 27, 1982; *Sowetan*, March 25, 1982.)

Swaziland

• The Swazi **sugar complex**, Simunye, will receive an estimated $10 to $16 million in aid from the government under the 1982-83 budget because of the precipitous drop in world sugar prices.

Ninety-five percent of Swaziland's sugar is exported and the commodity accounts for about one-half of the country's export earnings. The two-year-old parastatal faces a $5 million drop in revenue this year, down from $13 million in 1981 to a projected $8 million.

The Swazi government has had to provide Simunye with the working capital for its economic viability—amounting to $25 million in the last two years—to satisfy conditions of the company's 12 shareholders which include **Coca-Cola**, the Nigeria government, Tate and Lyle, the Commonwealth Development Corporation, as well as the Swazi government.

Simunye has come under criticism for its contribution to employment opportunities and its growing drain on public funds. According to a background document to the Swazi budget, "the expansion of sugar production may not have been in the best interests of the country." (*Financial Times*, March 10, 1982.)

Zimbabwe

• South Africa has renewed a preferential **trade agreement** with Zimbabwe, but at the same time it has been gradually repatriating Zimbabweans on the expiration of their labor contracts.

The trade agreement covers almost two-thirds of Zimbabwe's exports of manufactured goods to South Africa. Zimbabwean businessmen had said that ending the agreement would have "serious and far-reaching effects" on industry. Western diplomats said that pressure from the Reagan administration contributed to South Africa's decision to renew after Pretoria had given notice it was terminating the arrangement.

About 4,000 Zimbabweans have been repatriated since last year and another 16,000 are expected to be deported from South Africa by the middle of 1983. The South African government claims that the repatriations are the "wish of the Zimbabwean government" because it failed to renew a labor agreement.

However, the Zimbabwean government has said it ended only the agreement for recruiting Zimbabweans to work in South Africa's mines and did not take steps affecting workers in commerce or industry or farm workers and domestics. South Africa has included these categories in its repatriations.

Zimbabwe's Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, Kumbirai Kangai, said, "This is part of the price we must be prepared to pay for the liberation of Africa. It is quite clear that the apartheid regime is taking unilateral action to abrogate legal contracts of workers."

Sheena Duna, an official of South Africa's Black Sash service organization, said that black Zimbabweans are "being discarded" in contrast to the treatment of white Zimbabweans fleeing their country who are given permanent residence in South Africa. (*Financial Times*, March 19, 1982; *Sowetan*, March 16, 1982.)

David Rockefeller,

Retired Chairman, The Chase Manhattan Bank

INTERVIEWED BY ANTHONY J. HUGHES

AFRICA REPORT: Does Africa represent a fruitful field for American investment? In broad terms, what are the positive and negatives aspects of such investment?

ROCKEFELLER: The short answer is that Africa does, indeed, represent a fruitful field for American investment. Having said that, let me add that, in many instances, realizing on that investment may take some time.

Clearly, many nations in Africa are rich in agricultural and mineral wealth. Several, such as Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, and Nigeria, also have oil wealth. So for the long term, I am optimistic.

For the short term, however, African economies are suffering along with the global economy. Commodity prices are severely depressed. Oil prices have leveled off and are declining. Inflation has become a global phenomenon. And developing countries, in general, have not sustained the growth rates of the 1960s and are burdened by growing debt service.

I believe the key element in riding out the current depressed condition and expanding African economies over the longer term is their commitment to give as free rein as possible to the private sector and to establish a healthy balance between private and public sector development.

AFRICA REPORT: You recently completed a 10-nation tour of Africa. How did you determine which 10 countries out of over 50 to visit? Could you comment briefly on the economic situation in each of the 10 countries and prospects for U.S. investment?

ROCKEFELLER: Our three-week, 10-nation tour was truly eye opening. I made the trip in my role as chairman of the International Advisory Committee of the Chase Manhattan Bank. The trip was planned by Don Palmer, Chase senior vice-president and director for Africa. In addition to Don, I was accompanied by Frank Stankard, Chase's executive vice-president and director of the bank's International Department, as well as several other senior officials. Each of the countries we visited were ones with whom the bank does business.

While the economic situation in each country differed from place to place, I came away with the distinct feeling that all would be happy to have more private investment, particularly investment from the West. Nations like Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Cameroon already have substantial foreign investment. By the same token, encouraging greater foreign participation also seemed very much on the minds of government leaders in Zimbabwe, Guinea, and Angola.

Agriculture is a key issue everywhere. Generally speaking, the ability of the African nations to be self-sufficient in food production has declined since their independence. The area of agriculture may be a prime one where outside assistance from both public and private sources can be beneficial.

In this context, I stressed to the leaders I met that if they want more private investment, an essential first step is to create a climate that would make such investment attractive.

AFRICA REPORT: One country you did not visit was Zaire. How do you view its political and economic future?

ROCKEFELLER: Since we did not visit Zaire, I am less familiar with the current situation there. Obviously, Zaire, like several other nations in Africa, is experiencing economic difficulties—particularly due to depressed commodity prices. To right itself, Zaire will have to adopt a rigorous program of economic belt-tightening. Given their dependence on copper imports for foreign exchange, they would greatly benefit from an increase in the world price of copper.

AFRICA REPORT: How would you like political and economic relations to develop between the United States and Angola? How do you feel about dealing with Marxist and other socialist states in Africa and elsewhere? Should the U.S. government back subversion against the Angolan authorities?

ROCKEFELLER: I fully support the current efforts of the United States government to meet with the Angolan government toward the ultimate normalization of relations between the two countries. I think this would be in everyone's best interest. In such a normalization of relations, the role of South Africa in supporting UNITA and the presence of Cuban troops and Soviet advisors must be dealt with by our two governments.

As to African socialism, I am convinced that socialism for most of the African leaders I talked with meant a very specialized thing, namely social justice, which has little to do with Marxism. Indeed, I think socialism in Africa is more labels and trappings than reality. Most of the government leaders with whom we talked are very much in favor of foreign private investment.

As to the U.S. government's role in Angola, I believe that is an issue that should probably be addressed by our government rather than by any private citizen.

AFRICA REPORT: What is your view of apartheid in South Africa? How can the West help to end this system? What is your view on disinvestment? Should the United States back subversion against the Pretoria government?

ROCKEFELLER: Apartheid in South Africa is anathema to all the nations of black Africa. Unless Namibia becomes independent in a relatively short period of time, the risks of mounting tension in southern Africa seem inevitable. A peaceful solution in Namibia in which the United States plays a positive role, however, would be seen very favorably in the rest of Africa and would go some distance in making our role with South Africa more acceptable.

I think most people in the United States abhor apartheid. The Chase Manhattan Bank, for example, has had a policy for a number of years not to loan money to the South African government or to its parastatals.

I would not favor an economic boycott of South Africa or disinvestment. I do not think this would help the non-whites in South Africa. Indeed, Chase Manhattan helped finance a private institution, established to make loans to those wishing to purchase homes in Soweto. This kind of investment, in my judgment, is in the best interests of the black people in South Africa. I fear that sanctions against the South African government would only encourage it to become more intractable in its positions.

I personally believe that the current U.S. policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa could prove to be effective.

AFRICA REPORT: How do you see the future of Namibia? Would you expect to do business there if there is a SWAPO government?

ROCKEFELLER: Here again, I believe the United States wants, just as much as the African Frontline states do, to see a peaceful Namibian settlement. I believe our State Department is working toward that goal.

As to doing business with whatever government ascends to power in Namibia, that will very much depend on the government's own view of the importance of foreign investment in its country and the climate for investment that is created.

AFRICA REPORT: The Reagan administration is reducing aid to developing countries and would like to see private sector initiatives make up the difference. How do you view that policy?

ROCKEFELLER: I very much agree with President Rea-

Photo: Kenya Info

"Agriculture is a key issue everywhere," and outside assistance from public and private sources can be beneficial



David Rockefeller meeting with President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia in Lusaka

gan's statement at the Cancún Summit that the economic freedom of the individual is perhaps the most vital ingredient in economic success. I do not believe that America's renewed emphasis on private investment spells an end either to our commitment to direct aid or our support for the great international lending institutions. On the contrary, our economic well-being, our strategic requirements, and our ethical values all continue to compel us to work to combat poverty and hunger through multilateral and direct bilateral means.

I personally believe the greatest benefits accrue when private, bilateral, and multilateral institutions offer assistance together—ideally in a coordinated manner.

AFRICA REPORT: Many poor African states have chronic deficits. Some African countries are facing debt repayment problems. How do you see these problems being resolved?

ROCKEFELLER: I guess the short answer is that I see these problems being resolved slowly and painfully. Clearly, the debt problems of some nations will take a long time to work out. However, with the mineral and agricultural resources that many of these nations possess, they have the ability—given more favorable economic conditions—to work their way out of their problems.

AFRICA REPORT: Do you have any comments to make about your African trip that have not been covered in previous questions?

ROCKEFELLER: Much has been surmised about the extent of communist influence in Africa. The clear impression I got from speaking with leaders in places like Zimbabwe, Angola, and Guinea was that these nations increasingly are becoming disillusioned with the Soviet Union. Indeed, virtually all of the leaders we spoke with seek closer economic and commercial ties with the United States.

Given the importance of Africa economically today, the United States—both government and business—has paid, I believe, too little attention to that vast continent. We know too little of what is going on there. Indeed, when someone pays African nations a visit, their leaders and their people respond warmly, apparently realizing that there are much greater opportunities in working with the West than with the Soviets. Accordingly, they seek more understanding and support from the United States. And in my view, given the tremendous, long-run potential of the nations of Africa, I think our country should be willing to provide the kind of understanding and the degree of support that will convince these nations of the failure of the communist system compared to the promise of the free enterprise system. □

What Future for Cooperation?

BY CHEDLY AYARI

In the course of the past few years, Afro-Arab cooperation, a "horizontal" partnership of two communities of people belonging to the Third World, has witnessed unprecedented progress. In spite of unfavorable financial and monetary circumstances, political conflict among the Arab as well as among the African countries and of a campaign of sabotage conducted by hostile forces, Afro-Arab cooperation has continually drawn its strength from the awareness shared by the Arab and African people of their common destiny as well as their being part of the developing world. The results of this cooperation are now plain to see in the international arena.

The Arab and African assemblies have at their highest levels consistently paid tribute to and voiced appreciation of the progress and achievements of cooperation that only began very recently. Those assemblies of heads of state and government or at the level of foreign ministers or other officials have demonstrated by their resolutions that Afro-Arab cooperation is no longer a dream or a promise, but a tangible reality, notably in the area of development aid. Those achievements have only been possible thanks to the dedication shown by both parties, Arab and African, and the positive and serious commitment of the bilateral and multilateral Arab and Islamic agencies concerned, such as the Islamic Development Bank and OPEC Fund for International Development. Such institutions have committed their human and financial resources for the benefit of African development.

As may be seen from a recent study of "Afro-Arab Cooperation Program for Development in Africa" (BADEA Khartoum, February 1981), Arab aid to Africa over the past six or seven years is estimated to have amounted to about $6 billion. The study gives details on the sources of this aid as well as its sectoral and geographical distribution. It highlights the economic and financial advantages of Arab aid compared with assistance supplied by the rich industrial countries, which nonetheless bear the historical responsibility for helping Africa. The expansion of Arab aid commitment to Africa in 1980 to almost $1.5 billion provides additional evidence of the dynamic approach and serious commitment given to this cooperation by the Arabs, as the extent and rate of the aid go well beyond anything expected at the time of the first Afro-Arab Summit Conference in Cairo in March 1977. The role of Arab Gulf States deserves special mention as their continuous financial and moral support for the cooperation gives yet another proof of their spirit of generosity at a time when aid to Africa from the rich industrial countries falls short of meeting the basic needs of the continent.

Africa in fact has emerged as a new dimension to Arab aid to the developing world. Africa has not yet completed its process of political, economic, and cultural renaissance. Africa suffers from drought, famine, malnutrition, disease, poverty, and illiteracy. It is very much in the crossfire of ideological conflicts while the forces of international rapacity gain new momentum as the two superpowers compete to grab the continent's rich and unexploited natural resources. The question must indeed be put as to how political stability, peace, and justice can be achieved as long as the Africans find themselves in such conditions. How can firm unity be brought about among the Third World countries, the South, if Africa remains a bargaining counter for the big powers and even for the "small" powers?

For us, however, the question is posed differently. How can we involve Africans and Arabs into a common venture for mutual friendship and solidarity based on the great economic, financial, cultural, and human resources of the two peoples? We would not be able to do so if Africa were to be left alone to face its dangers and challenges.

If the capitalist West and the communist East in the long run plan to bring Africans and Arabs into their camps

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and try to impose on them their respective political and social philosophies, would it then not be logical and reasonable that the Arabs and Africans should jointly resist these schemes and work out a long-term political and economic partnership? Such a question may seem superfluous to those who believe that Afro-Arab cooperation is indispensable and who perceive the reality of the emergent partnership and the importance and influence it has already been exerting on Arab international attitudes, especially in regard to the Third World. The idea is not that the Arab countries should replace the West or East or the international community as a whole, in ensuring development and security to Africa, or that Afro-Arab cooperation should be directed against other countries. In my view no grouping of countries can achieve success unless it is open to others, including the Western and Eastern industrial countries that are historically, politically, and morally responsible for helping development and social political stability in Africa. The unity we have all been waiting for so long, the strength and international influence to which we aspire, can only be achieved by the Afro-Arab group with the help of a long-term action plan, a program that takes account of the true situation and potentialities. Such a plan must also have the support of appropriate institutions and machinery and be sustained by well-coordinated policies. It is no simple matter to work out and implement such a plan. Tangible results will certainly not be achieved by turning out mere blueprints.

Both Arab and African groups of states have highly developed collective and regional organizations as well as ties with outside agencies and groupings. They also now have specific joint organs designed to encourage and strengthen relations between the two communities. It stands to reason that no systematic or planned Afro-Arab cooperation is possible without a full involvement of the political authorities and their respective organizations.

The first Afro-Arab Summit Conference held in Cairo in March 1977 created a number of organs and a joint Afro-Arab consultation machinery to implement the program of cooperation adopted at the conference to cover political, economic, financial, social, cultural, and information fields. Two of these joint institutions are the Coordination Committee and the Standing Commission. The Coordination Committee comprises the secretary-generals of the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity, the head of the Arab Group of Ministers of the 12 countries constituting the Arab partner in the Standing Commission, and the head of the African group of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 12 countries constituting the African partner in the commission. Also participating in the deliberations of the Coordination Committee are Arab and African agencies concerned with Afro-Arab cooperation, including the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA). The principal

Photo: Camerapix

President Shagari of Nigeria (*left*) with King Khalid of Saudi Arabia: "Afro-Arab cooperation is a tangible reality, notably in the area of development aid"

function of the Coordination Committee is to follow up the progress of Afro-Arab cooperation. It is also charged with convening the Ministerial Standing Commission. Since 1977 the Coordination Committee has held five meetings, the last in Khartoum in March 1981.

The importance and weight of the Coordination Committee have been further enhanced by the fact that other joint institutions for Afro-Arab cooperation, in particular the Afro-Arab Summit Conference and the Standing Commission, were unable to meet because of political reasons. After the Baghdad Arab League Summit Conference that decided inter alia that no Afro-Arab meeting be held with the presence of the Egyptians, the Coordination Committee remained the only institution with the important task of maintaining a link between the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the areas of consultation and coordination of various political, economic, and information activities. The Coordination Committee meetings afford a good opportunity for the representatives of the two groups to discuss issues of common interest and to reaffirm the determination of the two brotherly communities to reinforce their mutual cooperation. We strongly believe that this important committee should be given moral as well as financial support in the present circumstances. Such support would strengthen relations between the Arab League and the OAU and would result in joint activities financed by both organizations. The Afro-Arab Coordination Committee is first of all a political assembly. At the moment it is the only joint political organ that is active in the field of Afro-Arab cooperation. It is also the only organization enabling the two parties to follow up joint actions and undertake consultations about urgent economic and political issues.

The Standing Commission of Afro-Arab Cooperation is the main organ for political and economic coordination between the two groups. Although it has been possible to maintain contacts with the help of the Coordination Committee, the freezing of the Standing Commission activities after the Arab Baghdad Summit has created a large political vacuum, since for over three years the 24 African foreign ministers have not had the chance to meet and discuss joint Afro-Arab activities in the political, cultural, and development fields. It is true that the conferences of the League of Arab States, those of the OAU, or of the United Nations or the movement of nonaligned countries, have been providing the opportunity for the Arab and African representatives to meet and discuss matters of mutual interest. Yet the freezing of the Standing Commission, which is the main organ of cooperation between the two communities, has slowed down the political momentum needed to carry on a strong program of action.

However much we may agree with the importance given to cooperation for development as a means of achieving the objectives set by the two communities, the partnership should not be confined to financial transfers, no matter how large or generous. While, in our view, good cooperation involves the supply of financial resources it should also entail close ties in the political and cultural fields. If the Afro-Arab partnership were to rely solely on Arab financial aid this would mean that mutual cooperation will decline when the transfers diminish, as they well might. The cooperation ought indeed to be rooted in a political commitment, springing from an unshakable awareness shared by the partners of their common destiny and interests. It also means a joint endeavor by the two communities, the Arab and the African, knowing that such cooperation will be a source of political, economic, and cultural challenges they face. Any cooperation would be doomed to failure if it were to lack the indispensable spiritual and human content or the political depth.

Furthermore, if such cooperation is to provide a basis for joint Afro-Arab activities, it must necessarily branch out into the areas of joint ventures and trade and should bring into play the private sectors of the two sides. But this calls for appropriate political decisions made at the right time. In order that a comprehensive concept for such cooperation may be implemented, activities ought to be launched in the two respective regions to highlight the issues facing each other. It would also be important to encourage mutual contacts between the young people of the two sides as well as between African and Arab institutions of higher education. This too requires political decisions. The responsibility for carrying out these tasks rests with the Standing Commission—this being the main political body.

Before suspending its activities, the

Photo: A Holbrooke/United Nations

BADEA has prepared a study for Arab action to aid the Sahel drought zone

Standing Commission had met four times, in certain Arab and African capitals. The commission did not actually attempt to solve any substantial issues pertaining to Afro-Arab cooperation, but it represented an important link whose absence over the past three years must be a matter of regret. The reason why the commission's activities were discontinued was the presence of Egypt, an Afro-Arab country, in the group of 12 African countries. This led to a boycott on the part of the Arab group of all meetings of the commission as long as Egypt remained a member of the African delegation. Without debating on political considerations we believe it is very important, and indeed quite natural, that the African side should carry out a reshuffle of its representation, as this appears to be a problem standing in the way of future Afro-Arab cooperation. A change of membership in the group would give other African countries an opportunity to participate. This, incidentally, has been normal practice on the Arab side where membership in the Standing Commission is periodically reviewed. Fortunately the OAU Summit held in Nairobi in July 1981 accepted the replacement of Egypt and Algeria by Tunisia and Morocco as African members of the Standing Commission. Thus, the two chief Afro-Arab assemblies should now be reactivated and the serious political vacuum filled; Afro-Arab dialogue would then be resumed and strengthened. While it appears to be inconceivable that an Afro-Arab Summit Conference could be convened under the present circumstances, this should not prevent an intensive political dialogue from taking place in the said two assemblies or political decisions being taken to consolidate the political, social, cultural, and economic cooperation between Africans and Arabs. The Standing Commission's role is that of a bridge between the Arab League and the OAU as well as between Afro-Arab Summit Conferences, these being the supreme decision-making organs. For these reasons the Standing Commission deserves, in our view, to be reactivated on a sound basis and enabled to perform its functions.


Photo: Camerapix

1981 OAU summit in Nairobi: The OAU wants a pledging conference of Arab states to help implement the Lagos Plan

JOINT AFRO-ARAB WORKING PROGRAM

We should now like to put forward broad principles and guidelines for Afro-Arab cooperation in the coming year. The Afro-Arab working program should rest on the following propositions:

- The "Lagos Plan of Action" for Africa development (April 1980) and the "Amman Plan" accepted by the 11th Arab Summit Conference as regional development program, to be adopted as basic documents of reference in charting Afro-Arab economic cooperation.
- Joint action to be intensified with special emphasis on African subregional groupings and taking into consideration the degree of development (or lack of it) in the African countries concerned.
- Joint action to be particularly concentrated on agriculture, energy, and development of African human resources.
- Strengthening commercial exchanges and studying private sector potential in Afro-Arab cooperation.
- Developing stronger Afro-Arab links in the areas of culture and information.

The Extraordinary African Summit Conference held in April 1980 in Lagos adopted a comprehensive development plan for the continent, extending until the year 2000. The plan contains a detailed strategy for African economic and social development and represents an important guideline for joint Afro-Arab action in the political as well as in the economic field. In fact, the Lagos Plan is a very ambitious development program, embodying Africa's dreams. It can, it is true, be criticized for not being sufficiently realistic and for not providing a reasoned analysis of the available resources for aid, which are far less than required, either to implement the huge program for infrastructure, industry, and agriculture programs, or to fulfill the great design of an African Common Market in 2000. In spite of its shortcomings, however, the Lagos Plan of Action does represent an important strategy for development, in that it is the first essay of a comprehensive development plan for Africa, and it represents an important document of reference for Africa's development needs and for the economic and social priorities of the continent for the next 20 years. The secretary-general of the OAU has appealed to all Arab countries to convene a "pledging conference" in order to help implement the Lagos Plan. But in our opinion this kind of conference would be premature as the plan requires a detailed and thorough study. It would also be necessary to relate the plan to the present and future development potentials and translate it into workable programs that can be implemented in stages, in a suitable manner.

The 5-year Amman Plan for Arab Economic Integration provides an example of an inter-Arab economic and social action. In comparison with the African Plan it is less ambitious and less costly. But like the African program it needs more studying in order that aspects of integration in the fields of agriculture, nutrition, industry, and services can be specified and analyzed in depth. Seeing that the Arab countries now have their integrated development plan and the African countries have drawn up their development strategy to the year 2000, it is only logical that the two parties should familiarize themselves with each other's plan. We suggest that a symposium of African and Arab intellectuals and economists be held in order to examine the two plans and indicate the directions in which joint action and cooperation should proceed. This indeed is what the African group had proposed and what was endorsed by the Coordination Committee at its meeting in Khartoum in March 1981. After the study has been completed a working paper will be submitted to the League of Arab States and to the Organization of African Unity. The councils of the respective organizations should first examine the proposals and then submit them to the Standing Commission.

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL GROUPINGS IN AFRICA

According to the UN and the World Bank statistics the majority of the world's poor and needy countries are to be found in Africa. These countries are marked by extreme poverty, famine, illiteracy, malnutrition, and economic stagnation. This is also the reason why Africa has been attracting particular attention of multilateral and bilateral development agencies. Although all the African countries share the problems of poverty, low income, and underdevelopment, they differ in the size of population, economic progress, and in the rate of nutritional, health, and educational standards. Indeed, the diversity of the problems faced by these countries has led them to form regional groupings and organizations in order to tackle development problems in line with prevailing local conditions. Thus, the Inter-State Committee for the Control of Drought in the Sahel (CILSS) was set up to group eight African countries suffering from a lack of resources and recurrent drought.

Photo: Pavlovsky/Sygma

President Diouf of Senegal arriving for the Islamic Conference in Saudi Arabia: "Afro-Arab unity can only be achieved by a long-term action plan"

A number of important subregional groupings have recently emerged, such as the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community for West Africa (ECWA). There are similar organizations for southern African countries and the Great Lakes countries. The latter organization comprises Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda.

These subregional groupings are of special significance to Afro-Arab cooperation in two respects. First, they provide ready-made structures to which external assistance can be channeled as these groupings have been set up with the objective of achieving coordinate policies and development programs among African countries of similar economic conditions. This also means that joint regional development projects can be drawn up involving two or more countries in the subregion. Secondly, these groupings are in a better position to supply the aid-givers with detailed economic information on the countries concerned and act as data banks for economic and social information as well. Cooperation with these subregional organizations will in no way replace bilateral relations between individual Arab and African countries, but will give such relations wider scope and a deeper dimension.

As an example, the Arab cooperation with the CILSS countries has in December 1980 registered remarkable progress, illustrated by the conference, hosted by Kuwait, of the Sahel countries and Arab and non-Arab development agencies concerned with the subregion. At this conference the international aid strategy to the Sahelian countries, including Arab-Sahelian cooperation, was discussed. BADEA was asked to prepare an economic report on the Sahel and a perspective plan for Arab action in the zone over the coming years. BADEA has now completed the study and will shortly submit it for review to the Arab aid agencies. The aim of the study is to explore the development requirements in a number of African countries regarded as among the poorest and least developed in the world. Its purpose is also to project a program of cooperation between the Arab and Sahel countries in the coming years. This should help bring about joint development action for the benefit of the countries concerned as part of an agreed, realistic Afro-Arab plan with a long-term outlook. If such approach proves to be adequate, it should also be adopted in establishing aid programs for other subregional groupings in Africa, however different may be their problems and their ability to absorb capital.

Our interest in African subregional groupings stems from the fact that we believe in their utility. We should encourage these groupings by supplying them with financial and technical assistance, making this a permanent feature of Afro-Arab cooperation for development. Yet, it should be recognized that Africa's need for Arab aid varies from country to country. There are countries that are unable to safeguard a minimum standard of living for their populations, which is the case, among others, of Mali, Senegal, Equatorial Guinea, Cape Verde, Comoros, Madagascar, and Uganda. Hardly a day passes without a fresh warning being sounded by international organizations about the gravity of the situation, the serious incidence of malnutrition, and low levels of health and hygiene. Stability and welfare of these countries spell out stability and welfare of the entire continent as the countries concerned occupy geographical positions that are politically, culturally, and strategically important not only to the rest of Africa but to the world as a whole. These countries desperately need intensive aid in order to meet their urgent and long-term needs, although it is the former that Africa as a whole is now regarding as a priority. Afro-Arab cooperation, inspired by an integral moral outlook and an awareness of a common destiny for the two communities, is called upon to respond to this challenge. What is required is not only an increase in the level of the present aid effort, but also a comprehensive joint plan to redress the worsening situation. Furthermore, a strong and consistent Arab initiative and action would create the right climate for non-Arab aid to flow in. What is most important is the identification of the neediest countries that require a special approach in aid-giving and special aid programs.

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, HUMAN RESOURCES, ENERGY

Like any other developing region Africa needs comprehensive and total economic development, especially in the fields of agriculture, industry, infrastructure, services, and social development. Yet, there are three major development areas where action is particularly urgent for the survival of African countries: food and agriculture, human resources, and energy.

The desperate need for improvement of agriculture and increase of domestic food supplies scarcely needs emphasis by us. Studies made by international financial organizations, especially by the World Bank and FAO, provide alarming figures on the shortfalls in African food production and the resulting deficits in the payments of these countries. Grave shortfalls in agricultural and food production are not confined to Africa; they also quite commonly occur in several Arab countries. But failures of agricultural production are particularly disastrous in Africa where they affect human beings with a terrible intensity. This situation has made the problem of food supplies for Africa the foremost concern of international organizations for development, notably the UN agencies and the World Bank. Shipment of thousands of tons of food to Africa can only be a palliative and, while meeting part of the current requirements for human nutrition, is certainly not the correct solution from a long-term point of view.

Although the Arab countries may not have the agricultural wealth or surpluses of food to send to African brothers, they do have financial resources and agricultural land that would make possible the implementation of an integrated agricultural and food production program. But Afro-Arab agricultural plans should not be viewed in isolation from the rest of the world. Western as well as Eastern countries ought to be associated with this endeavour, particularly by providing technological and technical assistance. What is urgently needed in this respect is to start a long-term joint action in the area of agricultural and food production and take all the necessary measures for the development of the sector. Arab countries in fact have a wide experience in farming and now possess individual and regional organizations operating in this field.

We suggest that an Afro-Arab conference be convened especially for agricultural development and food production under the aegis of the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development (AOAD) and the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The meeting would discuss both short- and long-term solutions. In order to give the conference due political weight it

The "Amman Plan" was adopted as an Arab regional development program at the 11th Arab Summit in Jordan

should be sponsored jointly by the League of Arab States and the OAU. Several proposals could emerge from the conference, such as:

- To devise urgent measures to stamp out famine in Africa. This could be achieved by devising a policy and a plan to ensure urgent shipment of foodstuffs, in the shortest time and the most efficient manner possible.
- To study large- and medium-scale agricultural projects in Africa, with the aim of achieving long- and medium-term food security for the African nations.
- To establish a policy aimed at integrating food and agricultural production in the Lagos and Amman plans.

Development should aim not only at construction of huge buildings, modern factories, giant dams, and up-to-date airports. Even more important is the development of African human resources by providing African people with adequate drinking water, hospitals, schools, healthy living conditions, clothes, cultural and recreational facilities, as well as good employment opportunities. In fact, aid programs should pay due attention to social services for which part of their assistance should be allocated.

We have more than once had the opportunity of challenging what had been said or published about energy crisis in Africa and the real effect of this crisis on the balance of payments of African countries. We have many times confronted the insidious campaigns conducted by the world press (and sometimes even African media) regarding the real impact of higher petroleum prices on African economies. We do not, of course, wish to deny the adverse effect the oil price increases have had on some African countries, but a close look at the balance-of-payments situation of the oil-importing countries will show that more serious causes for the deficits are to be found in imports of foodstuffs, raw materials, industrial equipment, and services, as well as in the hold exerted by large international companies on external trade. We have also shown that Arab aid to Africa exceeds any deficits in the balance of payments caused by the larger oil import bill. The subject of energy, including petroleum, is a very sensitive one in Africa. After all, any industrial development needs energy supplies. When we talk of energy, we should have in mind all types of power — oil as well as alternative sources. Arab and African countries have large and varied energy potentials and considerable experience in the field of energy production and trade. This calls for Afro-Arab cooperation in the area of energy. We suggest that the Organization of Arab Producing and Exporting Countries (OAPEC) convene a meeting of energy experts from both Arab and African sides to discuss the subject with the view of drawing up a technological, financial, economic, and commercial Afro-Arab cooperation program in this sensitive field.

STRENGTHENING COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES AND STUDYING PRIVATE SECTOR POTENTIAL IN AFRO-ARAB COOPERATION

We have already said that Afro-Arab cooperation should not be confined to financial transfers, however large and generous these may be. Although the participation of Arab countries in African development project is an important and basic element in this cooperation, the economic partnership should concern other fields as well, including trade and private investment. Data concerning commercial exchanges between the Arab and African worlds are scant, but they spell out unmistakably the very narrow volume of trade. The Cairo declaration and Afro-Arab cooperation program called for encouragement of trade. In this respect, and in response to requests made by the Standing Commission, the Arab League, and the OAU, BADEA has drafted a working paper on the terms of reference of a study on the ways and means to strengthen the commercial exchange between Arabs and Africans. The Afro-Arab Coordination Committee meeting in March 1981 in Khartoum discussed the subject and accepted the proposal of the Arab League that $250,000 should be allocated for the study.

The subject of private investment is still under discussion between the two parties. Cooperation on the private sector should complement that between the governments, because at a time when Arab development agencies have been devoting billions of dollars in the form of soft loans or grants for improvement of infrastructure, transport, communication, agriculture, and industry in Africa, non-Arab interests, particularly Western, do profit from the opportunities offered by the African private sector. Of course, the Arab help for infrastructural and other development schemes in Africa has itself provided good prospects for foreign private Arab businessmen in Africa, with the aim of setting up joint projects in agriculture, industry, and services, although these contacts have so far not resulted in any concrete business deals. The reason for lack of success so far is the ignorance of economic, social, and political environments both in Africa and in the Arab world. The Arabs are not sufficiently familiar with investment codes and guarantees in Africa. Administrative experience too has been lacking. Moreover, Arab capital is offered high rates of return in investment in the Arab countries themselves or in the Western countries.

The fate of any joint Afro-Arab operation will depend on the creation of the right atmosphere, the establishment of the necessary contacts between individuals and organizations, and the availability of the required guarantees and the right technical and marketing know-how. In spite of the fact that some Arab investment ventures in Africa have failed, there is scope for joint ventures in the private sector, because Arabs and Africans together have a large and unexploited potential for profitable investment, thanks to a good technical experience, a network of efficient institutions, and adequate financial resources. Our proposal, then, is that the question of Afro-Arab cooperation in the private sector should be reactivated and a conference convened in the near future to discuss the matter. The conference should be held under the auspices of the Pan-Arab or any individual Arab chamber of commerce with the participation of similar African institutions. Such a conference could itself set up an Afro-Arab chamber of commerce, which would be given the task of organizing the cooperation in the private sector. □

The Ethiopian Controversy

BY RICHARD DEUTSCH

"We are unsettled and we don't know what's going to happen in the future. Most Ethiopians in the United States are afraid to go back home. There is no security in Ethiopia," says one Ethiopian refugee, summing up the concerns of thousands who have sought refuge in the United States. Because of a recent change in the U.S. immigration policy, many may soon be forced to leave.

The Reagan administration's new policy appears to have sparked intense anxiety within the Ethiopian community in the United States and has become a source of political controversy in Washington.

Since the mid-1970s, Ethiopians already in the United States have been allowed to remain indefinitely because of widespread human rights violations, civil war, and political persecution in their own country. The 1974 Marxist revolution in Addis Ababa made it impossible for those associated with the Haile Selassie regime to return home. Others feared persecution for their religious and political beliefs if they returned. Aware of this, the State Department issued a "blanket exemption" for those Ethiopians who could not qualify to remain in the U.S. under existing immigration laws. Technically known as a "voluntary departure program," the blanket exemption for Ethiopian immigrants was routinely reviewed and kept in force during the Ford and Carter administrations.

In August 1981, the State Department concluded that "conditions within Ethiopia are not comparable to conditions in existence during the previous seven years." Without public discussion or comment, the blanket exemption was ruled "no longer justified" and withdrawn. Suddenly, thousands of Ethiopians faced the possibility of deportation.

Officials in Washington do not know how many individuals are threatened by the new policy, which does not affect Ethiopians legally classified as refugees or those with permanent residency permits. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service says only 3,000 Ethiopian immigrants were registered under the now defunct voluntary departure program. However, thousands more are thought to have let previous registration expire or not to have registered at all once their student visas ran out, simply because it was generally known that Ethiopians were not being forced to leave. These immigrants, as well as those 3,000 registered, now must either apply for political asylum or prepare for deportation.

Ethiopian embassy officials in Washington also say they don't know how many of their countrymen will be affected by the new U.S. policy. But a spokesman for the Washington-based Ethiopian Immigration Committee puts the number at 20,000-40,000.

The present situation has its roots in the close ties between the United States and Ethiopia during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie, overthrown by the military in 1974. Worsening relations with the dergue reached a low point in 1977 when American arms deliveries to Addis Ababa were suspended because of the dergue's record of human rights violations. Subsequently the Soviet Union replaced the United States as Ethiopia's military supplier. With this support the dergue strongman, chairman Haile Mengistu, succeeded in defeating widespread internal and external threats to his regime. The United States, in the meantime, has moved closer to President Siad Barre of Somalia, once a Soviet protégé, whose nation has an historical territorial dispute with Ethiopia.

Some observers see the change of

policy toward Ethiopians in this country as closely related to U.S. and Soviet jockeying for influence with the government in Addis Ababa. Others saw little, if any, connection.

Clearly, the Ethiopian government appears satisfied with the Reagan administration's shift on immigration policy. Ethiopia's chargé d'affairs in Washington, Tesfaye Demeke, says: "We are prepared to welcome with open arms all those who are willing to return, provide them with accommodation, and jobs in line with their competence. It is the responsibility of every Ethiopian to go home and assist in the reconstruction and development process." Tesfaye adds that his government is willing to take back even those exiles once engaged in "counterrevolutionary activities." He says there will be no discrimination against those exiles who spent years in the United States or Western Europe.

These claims are categorically dismissed by many Ethiopian immigrants as "propaganda for the consumption of the international community." One immigrant says some of his friends took the government at its word and went home: "They were in jail, that's what I heard. Some of them died — were executed. Some managed to leave the country again. I personally lost some of my good friends."

Summing up what appears to be a general feeling among Ethiopian immigrants, another says: "Most of us who are here, we've been opposing the human rights situation in Ethiopia all along, the massacres, the killings. If we go home, we fear serious interrogations would follow, perhaps torture as well. Certainly there would be no opportunity to get a job. For us, the danger extends from jailings and harassment, up to and including execution."

Duke Alston, a spokesman for the Immigration Service, says cancellation of the blanket exemption program for Ethiopians "does not mean that every Ethiopian should be automatically or immediately returned to Ethiopia. It means the overall program is withdrawn, but every case will be evaluated on an individual basis." Alston stresses that immigrants have legal rights even though they are not U.S. citizens. He points out there is a long series of legal procedures an immigrant can use to contest deportation: "He could apply for political asylum and it would be up to him to establish a well-founded fear of persecution upon return. That would be one way he could stay. Another way would be for him to request a discontinuance of deportation proceedings and go before an immigration judge and plead his case. If he didn't like the judge's decision, he could take his case to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Should that decision be unfavorable, he could even take the case to the federal courts."

The most promising legal route for Ethiopian immigrants affected by the end of the blanket exemption is to apply for political asylum, which the State Department contends is not difficult to obtain. A department spokesman says: "Any Ethiopian can be given asylum if he can show a well-founded fear of persecution on his return to Ethiopia."

However, immigrants say it is extremely difficult for them to prove they will be persecuted once they return. Immigrants point first to their own government's public denial that returning exiles are mistreated. Questioned on this point, Chargé Tesfaye says typically: "Not one single Ethiopian has been arrested in recent years for political persecution." Ethiopian immigrants say individual persecution is also difficult to prove because of the low level of communication between the governments in Addis and Washington. Exchange of information is limited even on significant bilateral issues, much less on the fate of individual political exiles. One immigrant, whose story appears typical, says: "I came here before the revolution broke out, and I've been here all along. It's very difficult for me to present some kind of 'wanted list' with my name on it, or a newspaper clip that says the government wants me for some kind of offense." Another immigrant dismisses what he calls State Department "misunderstanding" that there is an official "wanted list" in Ethiopia: "They don't do it openly. They don't advertise it. They have all sorts of quiet ways of getting rid of you. They just send you out to the countryside on some kind of work assignment and you get lost. There are thousands of missing people who are not reported."

State Department figures recently presented to Congress show political asylum is not as easy to obtain as U.S. officials claim, nor is it "practically impossible" as immigrants suggest. In fiscal 1981, approximately 1,300 Ethiopians applied for political asylum. By the end of the calendar year, 175 had been approved, 260 denied.

Reagan administration officials stress that the end of the blanket exemption simply brings U.S. immigration procedures for Ethiopians in line with those applied to immigrants from other nations. U.S. officials also contend, "we were finding Ethiopians who had only recently arrived in the U.S. Some of these people clearly had the approval of the Addis government to leave. That indicated to us that the blanket exemption for Ethiopians was subject to some abuse."

But the primary official justification for the new U.S. immigration policy is the contention by the Reagan administration that in Ethiopia "the mass terror of the years 1974-78 no longer exists, and that is why we don't let the Ethiopians stay here indefinitely. We have begun treating them as we treat other aliens."

The Reagan administration's assessment that human rights conditions have significantly improved in Ethiopia is vigorously contested by Amnesty International. Amnesty has previously charged that tens of thousands of Ethiopians were executed for political reasons during the "Red Terror" of 1974-78. The human rights organization has also accused the government in Addis of murdering thousands of school children and the systematic use of torture on its political opponents.

"Our concerns for this year are not very different from our concerns in earlier years," says Larry Cox, deputy director of Amnesty U.S.A. "There is a large number of people being detained without trial, widespread use of torture, disappearances particularly of people whom we knew were in captivity, political killings, harsh prison conditions, and the use of the death penalty."

Cox says there has been "some improvement" in human rights in Ethiopia over the past two years, but that "our primary concerns remain the same and these concerns are very serious indeed."

Ethiopian chargé Tesfaye labels these charges "absolutely ridiculous." Tesfaye, who denies there are any human rights violations in Ethiopia, says the situation there is "normal, the talk is not of violence, but of peace and development."

Amnesty spokesman Cox points out, however, that Ethiopia will not allow international investigation of its human rights situation. This refusal and reports of continuing violations in Ethiopia, Cox says, led Amnesty to take the position that it is not yet safe for most exiles to return to Ethiopia.

The State Department's own 1981 human rights report does not differ drastically from Amnesty's view of the current situation in Ethiopia, although it opens with the assessment that "because the government has consolidated its control over most of the country, the level of human rights abuses is now significantly lower." But the report goes on to say that "there are no enforceable legal protections for the civil and political rights of the individual.

In Eritrea, the report cites "a continuing pattern of arbitrary arrests, reported torture, and summary execution." In the rest of Ethiopia: "Torture is still used occasionally on military and political prisoners." In addition, 1981 saw "increased repression and harassment directed against churches associated with foreign missionaries." Last year, the report continues, there were "occasional disappearances," poor prison conditions, and reports of forced labor.

The state of political freedom in Ethiopia is apparently little better: "Government control over speech, nonreligious assembly, the media, trade unions, and other forms of expression is absolute and firmly enforced — many journalists have been arrested for political reasons over the past several years."

Most significantly, the State Department's human rights report directly addresses the question of what happens to returning exiles. "The government has proclaimed mass amnesty decrees for Ethiopians living abroad. In addition, it has issued individual invitations to return. The decrees and invitations lack guarantees and are not unconditional." The State Department's documentation of specific human rights violations in Ethiopia, along with Amnesty's testimony, appears to call into question the Reagan administration's assertion that "it is now possible for Ethiopians who are not on their government's 'wanted list' to return without fear of falling victim to persecution."

The Reagan administration's position on the issue began to arouse political controversy following a speech last October by United Nations Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick. Citing Amnesty International's report, Kirkpatrick denounced the "savagery" of the Addis government before the UN General Assembly. In particular, Kirkpatrick charged that 300 to 400 arrests a week are still being carried out in the Ethiopian capital and that "many of those arrested simply disappear and are presumed executed." Kirkpatrick's speech prompted press accounts implying the Reagan administration has shown "policy inconsistency." In addition, both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* quoted administration officials as saying the new immigration policy is partly designed "to stem new migration" from Ethiopia to the United States.

These news reports led, in turn, to charges of racism and political opportunism on the part of the Reagan administration. One nationally syndicated columnist speculated that the State Department may be seeking "an opportunity to improve its relation with Addis Ababa by cracking down on its foes in this country." Benjamin Hooks, head of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, told a news conference early this year that the new immigration policy "rings of national hyprocrisy and international racism." Other black American leaders, noting the Reagan administration's concern for repression in Poland, charged: "If you are white and fleeing communism, asylum is yours for the color of your skin. If you are black, Ethiopian, and consider yourself oppressed by communism, you are rejected apparently because of the color of your skin."

Later in February, the issue was taken up at a joint hearing of the Human Rights and African subcommittees in the House of Representatives. Human Rights Subcommittee Chairman Don Bonker (D-Wash.) challenged the administration's position: "It's fairly certain that if these people are deported back to Ethiopia, many of whom are strongly pro-American, they would be put to instant death or at least imprisoned."

But Elliott Abrams, the top U.S. official for human rights, testified: "No one is suggesting that the human rights situation in Ethiopia isn't bad. It is bad. The question is whether regular immigration procedures should be suspended forever in the case of Ethiopians — anyone who gave the slightest proof he would face death or imprisonment would be entitled to asylum."

"So we can be assured," asked Congressman William Goodling (R-Pa.), "that we aren't knowingly sending people back to be slaughtered?"

"That's right," replied Abrams. "We have resumed a case-by-case review. We had a blanket exemption. Now we're going back to the system used for all countries."

In the aftermath of the hearing, congressional sources say, the new policy will remain in effect. Apparently, there is not enough political opposition to induce the Reagan administration to reconsider. Sources say members of the African and Human Rights subcommittees intend "to monitor the situation, to make sure people really do get to apply for asylum" and get a fair individual hearing.

At the same time, an Ethiopian immigrant committee has privately begun to press the administration to grant a blanket amnesty for Ethiopians now in the United States. A spokesman for the committee says the State Department has come to an "honest misunderstanding of the situation in Ethiopia." He says his group is confident the United States will not continue to apply "one standard for Ethiopians, another for Poles or Jews escaping the Soviet Union." The spokesman says that his group is currently trying a "low profile" approach, marked by quiet appeals to the administration. But he warns that if this tactic fails, "we definitely will have to take our case to the American public."

State Department officials says privately they have no indication a general amnesty will be granted for Ethiopians. But publicity of the Ethiopians plight may be forcing the department to bend on the issue: "We are being very generous in the granting of asylum. Original complaints about the new policy are now unfounded," says one official.

Nevertheless, many Ethiopians now face the possibility of deportation. Interviews with immigrants in Washington indicate that few, if any, will go home. Some will undoubtably find ways to remain illegally in the United States. Others will be forced to choose another course, explained by one immigrant: "Well, eventually I'll have to apply to other countries, you know, look for a democratic country to live and work in. I'm afraid if I go back home, there is no guarantee for my rights, my independence, my political beliefs." □

Books

BEYOND UJAMAA IN TANZANIA

Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry*, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980, 270 pages, $8.95, paperback.

In a nutshell, Goran Hyden's main thesis in this book is that the state or the ruling class(es) in sub-Saharan Africa have been largely unable to "capture" the peasantry and that this is the primary reason for the prevailing underdevelopment. Development, or modernization, as is well-known, requires the generation of a "surplus," usually from the peasantry. In Marxist theory this is referred to as "primitive accumulation," which may include the emergence in rural areas of a rich farmer (*koulak*) class — which eventually expands into other economic ventures such as trade, transportation, real estate, etc., and which can eventually be taxed by the government; and the simultaneous "proletarianization" of the small farmers who find themselves obliged to sell out and who either "out-migrate" to the urban areas or stay to become agricultural laborers and workers.

In the Tanzanian case, the government attempted to extract a surplus from the peasantry *directly*, using a parastatal system, which is a monopoly buyer for both food and cash crops. The attempt has failed, Hyden tells us, because the peasantry refused to produce at the low prices fixed by the government. The peasants exercised their "exit" option, i.e., went back into an "economy of affection" in which subsistence farming and family/clan ties are the determining factors and not relations with the state. They were able to do so because they are "powerful" whereas the state is "weak." In precapitalist economies, relations of "reproduction" (of the family/clan) are determinant rather than "relations of production" in the Marxist sense.

Goran Hyden makes an original and stimulating contribution to the political economic thought on Africa. His approach has, however, its serious limitations. First, peasants in Africa are far from being universally "uncaptured"; in countries such as Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, and even Kenya, they appear to be pretty well "captured." Secondly, in some countries other factors may be more relevant: the oil boom in Nigeria and the absence of an infrastructure in Zaire, for example. Thirdly and even more significantly, even in the Tanzanian case, the "power" of the peasantry appears to have been exaggerated by Hyden. As Susanne Mueller (cf. "Landing the Middle Peasantry: Narodism in Tanzania," Boston University, 1979) points out: "Tanzania's peasants are as "captured" by the etatist management of their syncretic articulation to the world economy as any other African peasantry. What most distinguished them from the peasantry of central Kenya . . . [is] by far the larger percentage of the world market price for their crops that they have to resign to the state's marketing boards." Mueller argues that in Kenya marketing boards were "settler-oriented" and that the Kikuyu farmers have a legacy of Mau Mau rebellion that translates into a more "sharply critical political awareness." It is true that low producer prices paid to farmers were the primary cause of the severely declining agricultural production in Tanzania, as Frank Ellis clearly shows in his articles on pricing policy (cf. "Agricultural Pricing Policy in Tanzania, 1970-79: Implications for Agricultural Output, Rural Incomes and Crop Marketing Costs," University of Dar es Salaam, 1980). But, and this is important, peasants moved to defend their interests and in doing so they used not one but *many* strategies as emphasized by Ellis and also by Robert H. Bates (cf. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: the Political Basis in Agricultural Policies*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1981): "[Peasants] tried, as much as possible, to bypass the government controlled markets; . . . [they] alter[ed] their production mix to take advantage of shifting relative prices; . . . [or] they left the countryside in search for employment in the towns: farmers can use the market for labour to defend themselves against the market for products."

Hyden is uneasy and somewhat confused in his final evaluation of the "economy of affection" and his proposals for the development of Tanzania: Is the "economy of affection" good or bad? He seems to agree reluctantly that it is not all that good. If modernization is a necessity as it does so emerge in the end from his book, to what extent is then the "exploitation" or even the "coercion" of the peasantry justified? He appears to argue that capitalism is unlikely to be successful in transforming the "peasant mode of production," while his book, in large part, is a catalog of the difficulties encountered while trying to implement socialist policies in Tanzania. Despite its flaws, however, Hyden's book has one big merit: it stresses the centrality of the "peasant question" in Africa. It is a *cri de coeur* for the mobilization of the enormous potential of productive forces that the peasantry represents.

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ANALYZING POLITICAL CHANGE IN AFRICA

James R. Scarritt, ed., *Analyzing Political Change in Africa: Applications of New Multidimensional Framework*, Westview Press; Boulder, Colordo, 1980, xv, 360 pages.

Parsonian sociology is hardly the most suitable tool for coming to grips with conflict situations: its functionalist framework offers a rather weak handle for grasping the highly personalized and coercive features of the African environment; its emphasis on systemic variables (i.e., values, symbols, norms) entails too many reductions to properly convey the complexities of the African landscape; and its forbidding terminology often acts as a barrier between the landscape and the observer. For those of us who thought the Parsonian approach to African politics had long been discredited, Scarritt's book stands as a stark reminder of the continuing hold of structural-functionalist dogmas on the minds of some Africanists.

Perhaps the principal merit of Scarritt's effort is to make plain to the uneducated reader just how little analytic leverage can be gained from the application of the Parsonian scheme to African phenomena. The editor's ruminations range from the tautological ("the stronger the values and norms of innovativeness in a society or political system, the more likely it is that change will take place," p. 19) to the obscure ("ideas and values relatively unconnected to any other structural framework are more easily transmitted, especially between systems, than ideational elements which do have such connections, or than the other structures themselves," p. 20), yet the key properties of his "control and facilitation" framework — the conceptual base on which everything else reposes — can be easily summarized. According to this framework, political change in Africa is reducible to interactions among four subsystems, i.e., the "pattern socialization and control subsystem [that] maintains or changes the pattern of values, norms, collectivities and roles of which the society if composed," the "integrative subsystem [that] adjusts or fails to adjust relations among all structural units of the society," the "goal attainment subsystem," and the "adaptive subsystem" (p. 6). Which in turn enables the author to offer the following definition of a political system: "In this framework the political system of a society or a local community consists of the goal attainment subsystem and its interchange relationships with the other three subsystems" (p. 7). One thing that Scarritt's prose leaves unambiguously clear is the sheer futility of his intellectual enterprise. Indeed at this level of discourse it becomes a question whether anything very meaningful can be said about the events, personalities, ambitions, and conflicts that together form the basic ingredients of politics in much of Africa.

Offered a choice between Parsonian reductionism and their own eclectic preferences, some contributors to the volume have happily chosen the latter course. The best chapters in the book are precisely those that are least encumbered by theoretical consistency. Thus, Kathleen Lockard's chapter on "Religion and Politics in Independent Uganda" contains one of the best discussions I have seen of the role of Islam under Idi Amin. John M. Cohen's analysis of the "Green Revolution" in the Chilalo subprovince of Ethiopia, though dated, tells us a great deal about the capitalist dimension of rural development under the monarchy, and by implication about the motives behind the 1975 land reform. Kevin Maguire's piece on "Prospects for Reactionary and Revolutionary Change in Zimbabwe" offers a prophetic diagnosis of the limited chances of success faced by the Smith-Muzorewa alliance in their effort to create a viable legitimacy formula. While these are certainly among the most valuable contributions to what otherwise might be described as an intellectual grab bag, the impression one gets from this volume is that it does not add up to a very coherent whole. The problem in part lies with the inadequacy of the Parsonian apparatus developed by the editor, and in part in the lack of unifying focus among the several case studies explored by his contributors. As the editor himself persuasively argues, "the road from interpretive case studies to systematic hypothesis testing is long and difficult when dealing with a set of phenomena as complex as African political change." No one travelling that road in Scarritt's company will take issue with his conclusion.

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(Inclusion in this list does not preclude the review of a book at a later date)

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Tijani, Amince, and David Williams, editors, *Shehu Shagari: My Vision of Nigeria*, London, Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1981, $25.00, 424pp.

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