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**Richard Sherman**

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222 pp., 1980, \$19.95, 0-03-055921-9

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edited by **Warren Weinstein** and  
**Thomas Henriksen**

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222 pp., 1980, \$19.95, 0-03-052756-2

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**Donald G. Baker** and **Marshall Murphee**

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Underdevelopment  
edited by **Guy Gran**

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### Editor's Note

We are grateful to the authors of all the articles and book reviews in this issue for their contributions, but wish to express our special appreciation to Olatunde Ojo and Peter Koehn for their helpful suggestions to each other for the revision of their original manuscripts to eliminate common elements and to provide maximum information and analysis within our space limitations about the Nigerian elections. Each asked us to acknowledge with thanks the other's contribution, which we are happy to do. Special credit goes to Dr. Ojo, who after seeing Professor Koehn's paper recommended that, if necessary, it be included in place of his, also making helpful and detailed suggestions for revisions to fit our space requirements. He also found time during his last week in Denver before returning to Port Harcourt to revise his own article after Peter, who made a special trip to Denver to work on the revision, pointed out that the material would not otherwise be covered. We have seldom witnessed such close and happy collaboration, to the great benefit of the editors and readers. Peter Koehn also acknowledges the useful additional suggestions of Dr. James Scarritt of the University of Colorado. The collaboration of Professor Rothchild and Mr. Gyimah-Boadi in an analysis of the Ghanaian transition enables us to present analyses of events in both countries in which a national and an expatriate have shared their observations.

Once again we have found it took a full three months to produce an issue, so we are as far behind as ever on our publication schedule. I refuse to make any more predictions, but still have hope that we'll catch up soon.

Edward A. Hawley

# **Ghana's Return to Civilian Rule**

**Donald Rothchild and E. Gyimah-Boadi**

Recent trends in constitutional engineering clearly show the "demonstration" or "contagion" effect to be a two-way process. In the 1960s, as military mutinies and coups swept across sub-Saharan Africa, it became apparent that the armed forces in one country learned much of the general frailty of civilian authority systems from the experience of their neighbors. In state after state, civilian "legitimacy" proved no match for well-organized and determined military men. Now this process has reversed. As of late, military regimes have handed over state power to civilian authorities in Ghana and Nigeria, and are making partial moves in this direction in Niger, Togo, and Benin. To be sure, as earlier events in the Sudan, Turkey and Ghana itself make manifest, further turns remain ever-present possibilities. Still the contemporary moves to terminate and modify military hegemony suggest how very risky it is to speak glibly of African proclivities for authoritarian practices.

This essay seeks to assess, somewhat tentatively, the prospects in Ghana for stable civilian rule. Ghana can offer many insights on possible future trends, having run the gamut of authority systems in the post-colonial period. In the main, our concern in this essay is with Ghana's experience with hegemonial military systems and polyarchies.<sup>1</sup> The hegemonial military system, with its tendencies toward concentrated decision-making, low levels of participation, and lack of accountability, is seen as a logical response to an environment of structural dependency and overburdened government. Such tendencies may be utilized at times to bring about change or, alternatively, to obstruct the achievement of state objectives. It is as the hegemonial leader loses his or her legitimacy and

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<sup>1</sup> For a more extended discussion of this model, see Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

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sense of public purpose that various elements within the society — military as well as civilian — push for a change toward polyarchy (or liberal constitutionalism). Polyarchies, by contrast, expand the circle of decision-makers, but at some cost in the process of arriving at decisions, and possibly even in system performance. For the time being, the informed public in Ghana has tired of the military hegemony approach, thereby allowing the newly elected government of Dr. Hilla Limann some short-term space for maneuver. Should this government prove unable to demonstrate an ability to cope effectively with pressing political, economic and social problems, however, public acceptance may erode over time.

### Economic Constraints

A major explanation for Ghana's instability can be found in the country's restricted economic base. All postcolonial regimes have alike encountered increasing economic difficulties and frustrations. Their dilemma reflects a situation of substantial public demands and expectations in a relatively small, dependent country possessing only limited economic options.<sup>2</sup> Ghanaian hopes for economic prosperity at independence were replaced by a mood of disillusionment in the mid-1960s, as the Nkrumah policies brought on consumer scarcities and mounting inflation. In an effort to remove the distortions of a colonially-based economy, the Nkrumah government spent heavily on the manufacturing sector and the State Farms Corporation, policies which contributed more to aggregate growth statistics than to per capita incomes.<sup>3</sup> The National Liberation Council government that replaced the Nkrumah administration in 1966 attempted, in a pragmatic way, to deal with the deteriorating economic situation by means of policies of trade liberalization and fiscal restraint. The NLC's success in reducing the level of inflation and increasing domestic production proved limited at best. The Progress Party government of Dr. Kofi Busia, which was elected to power in 1969, sought to combine this liberalization thrust with a notable expansion in budgetary expenditures. In actuality, the new civilian regime found it difficult to implement the retrenchment measures recommended by such external agencies as the IMF and the World Bank. And as it put policies into effect on currency devaluation, income freeze, and cuts in military spending, Colonel I.K.

2 Maxwell Owusu. *Uses and Abuses of Political Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 268-69; Donald Rothchild. "Comparative Public Demand and Expectation Patterns: The Ghana Experience." *African Studies Review*, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (April 1979), pp. 132-35; and Fred M. Hayward. "Perceptions of Well-Being in Ghana, 1970 and 1975." *ibid.*, p. 111.

3 J. Ofon-Atta. "Sectoral Changes in Income Distribution in the Economies of West African Countries with Special Reference to Ghana, 1960-1969." *Universitas*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (New Series), (November 1975), pp. 74-77; and Tony Killick. *Development Economics in Action* (London: Heinemann, 1978), *passim*.

Acheampong made his fateful decision in January 1972 to assume the powers of state.

Under Colonel (later General) Acheampong's aegis, economic problems proved as intractable as ever. A combination of bad management, misallocation of resources, and adverse weather conditions compounded the problems experienced under previous administrations, bringing the country, according to current President Hilla-Limann, to a condition of near "bankruptcy" by 1979.<sup>4</sup> The major indicators of economic performance pointed to a generally troubled situation: a steadily declining gross domestic product in the 1974-78 period, an exceedingly high rate of inflation, a population increase of 2.8 percent per annum, sharp rises in local food prices, a significant leap in the total money supply, and a deterioration in the country's balance of payments account. Production of gold, diamonds, bauxite, and manganese declined during most of the Acheampong period, as did the output of food crops and key non-mineral export crops, particularly cocoa and timber. The Bank of Ghana, commenting on the inflationary implication of the Acheampong policies at a time of declining GDP, notes: "money supply then assumed an upward trend which continued to the end of 1978. Between 1976 and 1978 in particular the expansion of money appeared to be intractable as the level rose unprecedentedly by C2008.4 million or 165.7 percent to C3,220.7 million at the end of 1978."<sup>5</sup> Increased money supply resulted from loans and credit extended to the government itself as well as to favored business interests. The effect was to bring about an excess liquidity which fuelled the country's already heightened inflation.

The impact of this fiscal mismanagement upon the general public's standard of living was painful in the extreme. Annual inflation rates climbed from 3 percent in 1970 and 10.1 percent in 1972 to 116.5 percent in 1977 and 73.1 percent in 1978. An acute shortage of essential goods and services was experienced, making the most ordinary activities of life highly difficult, and, significantly for the stability of political system, bringing on a mood of considerable gloom and despondency. Certainly with minimum wages rising only slowly and unemployment spreading, the sharp climb in the cost of living (estimated at 16.4 in 1972, 172.1 in 1978, and 261.3 in 1979)<sup>5</sup> proved terribly hurtful to the great majority of Ghanaians.

The fall of the Acheampong government in 1978 brought little relief

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4 See the discussion in Donald Rothchild, "An African Test Case for Political Democracy: President Limann's Economic Alternatives," in Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record 1980-81* (London: Rex Collins, forthcoming).

5 Bank of Ghana, "An Information Paper for the Incoming Government," (July 1979).

to the beleaguered public. Lt. General F.W.K. Akuffo, who took power as Head of State and Chairman of the reconstituted Supreme Military Council, sought to stem the mounting inflation with a policy package that included a 59 percent devaluation, a reduction in public spending, controls on the monetary supply, stringent regulations on overseas travel, and a suspension in the use of the (much abused) Special Unnumbered Licenses for the importation of commercial goods. The public, however, saw little short term benefit from these stringent policies. Not only did the rate of inflation remain excessive, but goods were as unobtainable as ever. Moreover, the average citizen, particularly those in the rural areas, felt aggrieved over the inconveniences and inequities that emerged as the government initiated a currency exchange on short notice, seeking thereby to dampen the activities of currency smugglers and to reduce excess currency in circulation. As citizens sought to exchange their funds at the banks, the upper middle class was able to protect itself by means of "money contractors" while the lower classes waited in endless lines for a service that was often notable in its inefficiency.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, the outcome of the currency exchange was more citizen bitterness than fiscal rectification, a poor trade-off as far as system stability was concerned.

On the surface, it seemed that the intervention of Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings and his colleagues on June 4, 1979 represented some respite from the unyielding effects of the Akuffo austerity program. Rawlings and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, offended by the evidences of widespread corruption on the part of high military officers, sought to lighten burdens by means of a series of "housekeeping" measures. To widespread acclaim, the AFRC put on a series of trials of senior officers (some of whom were convicted of corrupt acts and either executed or jailed), disciplined market traders and hoarders, destroyed (more accurately, obliterated) the Maikola Number 1 Market in Accra (as an alleged center for dishonest dealings), seized the assets of foreign firms charged with illegal types of transactions, and dissolved the Cocoa Marketing Board and Ministry of Cocoa Affairs. Its economic "populism"<sup>7</sup> was most evident in a controversial decision to enforce price controls on a variety of consumer goods. The imposition of price controls (combined with the attack upon hoarding) meant that whatever scarce consumer items existed would be made available to the public at controlled prices; however, in a situation of high inflation, it also entailed a rapid rundown of existing stocks. Short-term benefits were secured, but at a high price for the successor regime of President Limann — the depletion of extremely limited

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<sup>6</sup> See Joyce Y. Tawiah, "Currency Change — Dereliction of Duty," *Legon Observer*, Vol. XI, No. 7 (May 4, 1979), pp. 153-56.

<sup>7</sup> See Denis Herbstein, "Broomstick Revolution," *West Africa*, August 13, 1979, p. 1462.

goods.<sup>8</sup> Thus despite elements of idealism in the Rawlings revolution, his brief administration in fact achieved little in the way of coherent economic policy. And its disdain for consequences was disruptive of both legal procedure and economic productivity.

By the time President Limann had assumed office in 1979, then, it had become all too apparent that the Ghana economy had been reduced to the narrowest straits of postindependence times. Mincing no words, the new head of state described Ghana's economy as "in shambles" — a "bankrupt" country, with no reserves.<sup>9</sup> Although these dramatic words must not be taken literally, they point to underlying structural problems which are unwisely played down. In fact, through no fault of its current leaders, Ghana now encounters a distressing situation of drastically declining cocoa prices (now below £1,000 per ton), escalating petroleum prices, increasing brain drain, and deteriorating economic and social infrastructure.<sup>10</sup> President Limann's response has been most restrained and pragmatic. Seeking realistic solutions to the challenge of economic scarcity, he has placed a high priority upon the agricultural sector, raising budgetary allocations under this general heading to C1.17bn. in the 1980/81 period and emphasizing such policies as price incentives and subsidized inputs to increase food and cash crop output. In both of its budgets, the Limann administration has pursued a cautious spending policy, seeking in this manner to restrain inflation and to improve the country's international economic status. The prices of such items as beer, cigarettes, and gasoline have been pushed up, and taxes have been increased for self-employed persons.

Clearly, the advent of civilian rule was not to be an open door to immediate prosperity. For those who had suffered years of privation in the past, this was a bitter blow — felt more intensely because of election pledges to return consumer items to the shelves in a relatively short period of time. The Limann administration, like its predecessors, is circumscribed by a situation which leaves it few viable short-term options; to use the legitimacy secured in open elections to achieve evident results rapidly enough to meet public expectations is a Herculean task deserving as much external sympathy and support as can be marshalled. For Jerry Rawlings, impatient over the lack of momentum in resolving current economic

8. Correspondent. "The Economic Consequences of Rawlings." *Legon Observer*, Vol. XL, No. 12 (November 16, 1979), p. 286.

9. *Ghanaian Times*, August 18, 1979, p. 1, and September 25, 1979, p. 8, and *West Africa*, September 17, 1979, p. 1714.

10. The Minister of Health, M. P. Ansali, disclosed that some 268 Ghanaian doctors were working in West Germany, with still higher numbers employed in the United Kingdom and the United States. Moreover, 133 of the 200 psychiatric nurses trained at Ankafui had left for Nigeria. *Ghanaian Times*, April 7, 1980, p. 8.

problems, the incoming civilian regime remains on probation. As he warned in an interview: "a revolt is a revolt, and it could happen with or without us."<sup>11</sup> The Limann administration hears this message; nevertheless, its capacity to provide the necessary initiatives remains tightly restricted.

Even recently reported discoveries of gold (estimated at some 2 billion ounces by the Director of Geological Surveys) do not guarantee the survival of the current regime, especially in the short term. Not only does gold display a highly volatile world market price, but it will take some time before the regime can begin to exploit these newly-found deposits effectively. In the meantime public expectations have risen in the wake of the reported discoveries. Such a situation creates a potentially dangerous gap between governmental promises and performance, and, paradoxically, encourages local interventionist forces which might feel that they now have resources which might be utilized to generate the political and economic renaissance of Ghana.

### **Determined Efforts at Legitimacy Engineering**

To note the existence of severe constraints in the Ghanaian economic situation must not blind us to the very real achievements in political legitimacy engineering that have taken place in recent years. In order to show how this has occurred, it will be necessary to retrace our steps and examine the loss of systemic validity under the military regimes. Then we will be in a position to analyze the process by which the country returned to liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law. In the concluding sections we will then look briefly at the dilemmas that have arisen as the Limann administration attempts to work a polyarchical arrangement under conditions of economic scarcity.

The Acheampong regime was handicapped politically from the outset by its inability to win the backing of the core in either of the two wings of the Ghanaian establishment: the Nkrumah/Convention People's Party or the Busia/United Party/Progress Party. In the initial stages of Acheampong's rule, his regime appeared to tilt toward the Nkrumah/CPP element. Acheampong claimed inspiration from Nkrumah's policies and programs and promised to reshape Ghana's African and international policies along the radical lines of the country's first president. Even so, any members of the Nkrumah/CPP elite hoping for a major shift in policy orientation as well as an eventual handover of state authority to their ministrations were soon to be disillusioned, for the military regime carefully

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<sup>11</sup> *West Africa*, February 4, 1980, p. 190.



avoided any well thought out attempts to restructure the economy or to turn over decisive powers to civilian authorities. By the mid-1970s it had gone so far as to jail some of the Nkrumah/CPP spokesmen for an alleged coup plot, including such leading figures as Kojo Botsio and John Tettegah.

The Acheampong regime, as is true for other military regimes generally, faced two basic problems from the time it seized power: the securing of political legitimacy and the manner and timing of its disengagement.<sup>12</sup> Because of the illegitimate means that it used in coming to power, the NRC/SMC regime could only gain validity on the basis of effective performance. However, our discussion above indicates that the Acheampong performance was anything but effective and, in fact, showed a continuing downward trend following two fairly respectable initial years. As a consequence, the Acheampong regime could hardly claim legitimate status on the basis of its economic performance and had little choice but to work toward eventual disengagement. Even so, this option was more difficult than it had been in Ghana's past experience with military government. In this instance the military regime had no alternative party to align with as did the NLC in its relations with the Busia/UP opposition in the post-Nkrumah period. Hence the Acheampong regime lacked a respectable political party that it could turn to and from which it might expect protection of its corporate interests in the difficult transition period following the handover of power. The Acheampong regime had antagonized the Busia/PP group by the fact that it had supplanted them in the coup; efforts at cooperation and appeasement of some members of that former regime had never proved truly successful. In addition, as noted earlier, some members of the Nkrumah/CPP group, who might well have been encouraged to see a coincidence of views and possibly to become heirs to the NRC/SMC, had been alienated. Hence Acheampong found it necessary to develop an alternative political grouping and structure that would enable him to handle the question of disengagement on his own terms.

Yet, the institutional mechanism chosen (i.e., a no-party political system) was alien to the political values of the country's established elite and led over time to a bitter debate which contributed not insubstantially to the undoing of the regime itself.<sup>13</sup> Opposition to the Acheampong regime, which began feebly in 1975 when the Ghana Bar Association made its call

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12. Emmanuel Hansen and Paul Collins, "The Army, The State, And The 'Rawlings Revolution' in Ghana," *African Affairs*, forthcoming.

13. For a discussion of the Union Government proposal and debate, see Donald Rothchild, "Military Regime Performance: An Appraisal of the Ghana Experience, 1972-78," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (July 1980), pp. 463-66.

for a return to civilian rule, developed into a full-scale confrontation by 1977. A large portion of the professional elite and students joined with the alienated politicians of the PP and CPP establishments to challenge the NRC/SMC government. Before long, economic mismanagement became linked — at least in the public perception — to non-democratic politics (i.e., military government). Such less controllable international factors as worldwide inflation, soaring oil prices, and poor weather were downplayed by the regime's opponents while the costs of public mismanagement and misallocation of funds and resources were strongly emphasized. A high point in the public confrontation was reached in 1977 when professional groups of doctors, lawyers, engineers, and university professors withheld their services, forcing the regime to come to some form of reconciliation with civilian elite spokesmen.

The Union Government proposals, designed to placate the Opposition while at the same time protecting the corporate interest of the military, were dismissed by the opposition elite as representing only a half-hearted disengagement on the part of the SMC rulers. The referendum of March 1978 showed that the military regime could not compete effectively with the civilian politicians in the latter's own "game." Despite a very one-sided access to the media, the government managed to gain only an equivocal mandate. With less than half of the registered voters going to the polls, only 56.5 percent of the votes on the basis of much-disputed official statistics, were cast in favor of "Unigov." On a regional basis, three of the subunits (Brong-Ahafo, Ashanti, and Eastern) voted against the no-party proposals, and the outcome in Volta Region remains highly questionable. As Naomi Chazan and Victor Levine conclude: "if the referendum was meant to supply the SMC with some legitimacy for its policies, the results provided very little encouragement."<sup>14</sup>

The SMC regime's alienation from all the significant sections of the Ghanaian elite was now evident. The inadequacies of the regime were exposed and even somewhat exaggerated. Moreover, the regime's attempts, following the referendum, to regain control of the situation by clamping down on opposition elements were a further miscalculation, backfiring on Acheampong himself. The General's colleagues within the SMC quickly realized the futility of such heavy-handed actions, and the danger they posed to the very existence of the military establishment, and moved to displace him. This initiative, which ushered in SMC-II under the leadership of General F.W.K. Akuffo, could be interpreted as an effort to placate the incensed public, and particularly its professional elite.<sup>15</sup>

14. Naomi Chazan and Victor LeVine, "Politics in a 'Non-Political' System: The March 30, 1978 Referendum in Ghana," *African Studies Review*, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (April 1979), p. 198.

15. Following his overthrow, Acheampong dismissed charges of one-man rule and described his dismissal as motivated by personal interests on the part of the other SMC members. *Ghanaian Times*, June 14, 1979, p. 1.

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15. Following his overthrow, Acheampong dismissed charges of one-man rule and described his dismissal as motivated by personal interests on the part of the other SMC members. *Ghanaian Times*, June 14, 1979, p. 1.

The removal of Acheampong raised public hopes both for a revival of the economy and for an eventual return to liberal forms of government. In this, the public was to be disappointed. The advent of SMC-II brought with it economic austerity and hesitancy on measures to reform the political system. To be sure, the Akuffo government attempted to halt the soaring inflation and to encourage economic growth by means of a package of austerity policies. However this harsh program had the short-term effect of squeezing the very public which had anticipated relief from an unbearably high cost of living. What satisfied the IMF, then, became difficult for the man in the street to accept, particularly as the main authors of the economic troubles seemed so untouched by the austerity program they were now putting into effect.

The public became frustrated as well over the lack of political reform. Instead of drastic political change, SMC-II seemed to be striving to work out a *quid pro quo* with the civilian politicians under which they themselves would be guaranteed security once the powers of state had been relinquished. Not only were Acheampong and his immediate entourage never prosecuted for alleged acts of corruption and mismanagement, but the Akuffo government inspired the insertion of clauses in the draft constitution to indemnify the members of both SMC I and II. Such mild treatment of the senior officers of the old regime was frustrating not only to the general public but, most ominously, to the junior ranks of the military and, after an abortive attempt, led to the successful takeover of government by Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council on June 4, 1979.<sup>16</sup>

The seizure of power by the AFRC, as noted above, was less a radically-oriented coup than a mutinous expression of populist frustration. Acheampong's political and economic mismanagement and corruption, Akuffo's harsh austerity, and the failure to prosecute errant officers of the Supreme Military Council all acted to establish a revolutionary context in which only the smallest spark was needed to ignite an explosion. Jerry Rawlings, a handsome, courageous, idealistic junior officer who had staged an earlier uprising against the prevailing system the month before, became the symbol around which the AFRC could cohere and light the fires of change. At his trial prior to the AFRC takeover, Rawlings reportedly made a statement to the effect that there was so much corruption in high places that the situation could only be remedied "by going the Ethiopian way."<sup>17</sup> The condition of the economy and society was

16. For an intimate account of the Rawlings coup, see Cameron Duodu, "The Rawlings Story," *Statesman* (Accra), June 15, 1979, pp. 1, 5, 7.

17. *Ghanaian Times*, May 31, 1979, pp. 1, 9.

such as to justify a "bloodbath"; the junior officers and enlisted men were in effect proclaiming their right to use military force against the illegitimate regime led by their senior officers.

If deep and genuine frustration triggered the AFRC strike for power, it did not necessarily provide guidance for coping with fundamental problems: structural dependency, economic development, or basic political reform. The measures invoked under the label of "housekeeping" were less a rebellion against the status quo than a means of purifying the existing system. Hence despite the coup, plans for a general election went ahead as originally scheduled. In its June 5th broadcast after assuming power, the AFRC assured the country that the soldiers had no intention of clinging to power. Instead, it declared its intention of ensuring "a smooth transition to constitutional rule as planned. In this way preparations for the elections should therefore go on uninterrupted."<sup>18</sup> Aware of the conditional nature of the public's support for any military regime and wishing to protect the corporate image and interests of the military, the AFRC leadership prudently combined its "housekeeping" commitment with promises of quick disengagement. Moreover, with economic conditions in the country in serious disrepair, there were no easy and ready solutions available to anyone. The AFRC may well have been aware of this and therefore went along with the continuing elite pressures for a return to civilian-led, polyarchical government.

In fact, Ghana's first civilian elections in a decade were held as scheduled, and Dr. Hilla Limann led his PNP to a convincing, countrywide victory. In the runoff elections for the presidency, Limann defeated his main rival, Victor Owusu (People's National Party) by a sizable majority (1,118,405 votes to 686,132). The PNP's election margin in the parliamentary elections was equally wide; not only did the party secure 71 out of 140 parliamentary seats, but it managed to win seats in all of the nine regions. As shown in Table 1, the PNP won heavily in the north (Northern and Upper Regions) and in Volta and Western Regions; however, it lost substantially in the predominantly Akan areas of Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo.

Certainly the securing of a clearcut majority by the PNP was an impressive achievement. It did much to facilitate the ultimate transfer of power to civilian hands and to buttress the incoming regime with a much needed legitimacy. Yet the voting tallies are not without worrisome aspects in terms of regional and ethnic dissonance. Heavy PNP losses in Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo must not be minimized, as these rich, cocoa-producing areas make critically important contributions to the country's economic well-being. In these areas, as in most other parts of the country, political parties secured their greatest support where their leaders were identified

<sup>18</sup> Quoted in *West Africa*, June 11, 1979, p. 1013.

TABLE 1. PARLIAMENTARY RESULTS, 1979\*

	CENTRAL	GT. ACCRA	EASTERN	ASHANTI	B.A.	VOLTA	NORTH	UPPER	WESTERN	TOTAL
PNP	8	6	11	2	2	11	7	15	9	71
PFP	•	1	6	19	10	•	4	1	1	42
UNC	•	3	4	1	•	5	•	•	•	13
ACP	7	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	3	10
SDF	•	•	•	•	•	•	3	•	•	3
TFP	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	0
IND.	•	•	•	•	1	•	•	•	•	1

\*Source: *Legon Observer*, July 13, 1979, p. 220.

with the area and its peoples. The Ashanti-led PFP was victorious in the predominantly-Ashanti areas; the Fanti-led ACP won handily in Central Region and parts of Western Region — the only sections of the country in which large numbers of Fantis reside. The PNP, moreover, triumphed in the home area of its party leader, i.e., in Upper Region. The consequences of such voting patterns are apparent. Throughout its time in office, the Limann government will have to take special pains to assure ethnic proportionality in the way that it allocates resources and implements policies on political recruitment. Such sensitivity to the ethnic issue inevitably acts to cramp the regime as it seeks to deal with the problems of economic mismanagement and distortions, especially at a time of exceptional public frustration and scarcity of consumer goods and investment resources.

#### Limann's Challenges and Dilemmas

As noted above, the PNP's victory in the general election meant both a mandate for its policies and a measure of legitimacy for its rule — for a temporary period, at least. Nevertheless, major questions arise about its ability to meet the public's substantial expectations after a long period of

deprivation. In this, the PNP must share some responsibility for the way in which it heightened public expectation levels during the general election. In order to win public support, PNP spokesmen made promises of short and long-term economic prosperity which came to haunt the government once it took over the affairs of state. At one stage, the PNP made references to a "master plan" which had been disrupted by the 1966 coup and was now to be brought out, dusted off, and utilized. In mentioning the existence of this plan, the PNP was capitalizing on public perceptions of well-being under Nkrumah and the linkage between the relative standards of life in Nkrumah's time and hopes for a renewal of such seeming prosperity in the years ahead. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Ghanaian public seemed keenly disappointed in 1979 when the government failed to come through with its electioneering promises to flood the market with essential commodities six months after taking office, providing "the best Christmas ever." President Limann's statement that such promises could not be isolated from the need to solve more urgent problems may well have been logical in term of public priorities, but for the long-neglected masses, it appeared as one more retreat on the part of politicians from the commitments made during elections.<sup>19</sup>

Such public pressures have posed serious dilemmas for the Limann administration: whether to pursue short range economic policies that might be politically beneficial at this critically important time or whether to opt for longer term policies which might prove necessary for a transformation of economic relations, even if potentially costly in terms of further public hardships here and now, and consequently highly unpopular. In the abstract, a fundamental restructuring of agricultural and industrial production and distribution seems optimal at this juncture; however, given the public's demands in the real world, there are also strong temptations for generating employment by setting up new government corporations or engaging in public works programs, regardless of their immediate efficiency in the allocation of scarce resources or longer-term consequences. Certainly the limitations of such pragmatism are most obvious. Where the economic challenges are as overwhelming as those encountered in contemporary Ghana, something more basic than a "muddling through" approach seems mandatory.

Not only must the Limann administration cope with the twin problems of public expectations and economic performance, but it must also strive to meet the mandate set by the AFRC on further "housekeeping." This commitment was agreed to by Limann at the time, but whether he can abide by it under markedly different circumstances remains unclear.<sup>20</sup> The

19. *Ghana News* (Washington D.C.), Vol. 9, No. 4 (April 1980), p. 6. Also see the interview with Finance Minister Amon Nkoi in *New African*, No. 156 (September 1980), p. 73.

20. *Ghanaian Times*, July 11, 1979, p. 1.

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PNP's stance on enforcing probity among public officials raised public hopes for more principled and efficient administration; but the PNP, with its commitment to liberal constitutional norms and values, necessarily operates on such matters in a very different manner from its military predecessor, with the latter's populist distrust of institutional restraints. Thus in contrast to the heavyhandedness of military justice, polyarchical government works toward its objective in a cumbersome and slow-moving way. This tendency toward incrementalism, frustrating as it may be to the Ghanaian public, is reinforced by the basic laws under which the regime operates. The 1979 Constitution includes all the usual liberal guarantees against governmental arbitrariness and confers considerable powers on the judicial branch to review actions taken by the executive.<sup>21</sup> Consequently, as the courts make use of these powers, and arrive at lenient decisions on matters affecting corrupt actions on the part of the powerful and the well-positioned, public confidence in the political system as a whole tends to be adversely affected. In many quarters, where the branches are not viewed as separate and distinct from one another, the government suffers from a kind of guilt by association. Although the government could not, and most likely would not, want to interfere in the judiciary's review of punishments meted out to individuals by the erstwhile AFRC, it nonetheless is hurt by the process; members of the public conclude that somehow the government itself is responsible for the reduced sentences and acquittals. The return to civilian-led, polyarchical government is clearly not without its special traumas in contemporary Ghana.

## Conclusion

In brief, the Limann regime currently finds itself with markedly little margin for maneuver or for error. It cannot afford to be seen as ineffective or inactive; yet it lacks the economic or political means to legislate and implement the kind of transformationalist policies necessary to restore the Ghanaian patient to full health. Moreover, and perhaps most seriously, the "sergeant's coup" in nearby Liberia had its own demonstration effect in Ghana, for public officials in Accra spoke warily in May 1980 to one of the authors about a recently reported abortive coup in Ghana and the extensive lists of local leaders who had apparently been marked out for subsequent execution. Whether these rumors have any truth or not, their existence pointed to a perilous unease among a section of the dominant political elite. Any tendency toward "immobilism" at the top, under today's

21. *The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979* (Accra: Ghana Publishing Corp., 1979), especially p. 12, section 114, and ch. 6, section 35.

prevailing conditions of economic scarcity and institutional fragility, would clearly represent an unsettling force as far as the current polyarchical order is concerned.

Quite evidently, the military and other elements within the state-party elite are watching from the wings. Rawlings' warning that the "politicians are on probation" cannot be brushed aside cavalierly.<sup>22</sup> The present constitutional order in effect represents a third attempt at establishing a liberal political system. Should the current government find the constitutional arrangement too cumbersome for effective leadership or should expected levels of economic performance fail to materialize, however, the regime will likely find its electorally-based legitimacy a disappearing asset. As the widespread opposition to the Acheampong leadership style showed so clearly, contemporary Ghana possesses a broad state-party elite committed to some form of polyarchical government. But like all human and finite things, even this may not prove sufficient to resist the authoritarian inclination — unless it can find ways to reduce the political and economic pressures on effective state action.

It should be noted that there are forces within the state-party elite less committed or even totally opposed to the liberal democratic idea. The reports in February 1981 of the arrests of some persons who allegedly plotted to overthrow the Limann government gives yet another indication of the presence of interventionist groups and individuals on the scene. Such forces can be found among the Eastern trained professionals as well as the other professionals who exist on the periphery. It is instructive to remember how professionals trained in the Eastern bloc countries and others in the "Association of Been To's" quickly disassociated themselves from the demands of the dominant majority to oppose the Union Government non-party scheme. The presence of such elements indicates that, apart from the military, there are others inclined to authoritarian practices who might welcome an opportunity to put alternative constitutional forms into practice.

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22 West Africa, February 4, 1980, p. 189

## **Prelude to Civilian Rule:**

### **The Nigerian Elections of 1979**

Peter Koehn

The transition from military to civilian rule has been a relatively rare event. As a result, the body of classificatory and analytical scholarship on the subject is insignificant in comparison to studies that explore the conditions, intervention strategies, and consequences associated with the assumption of political power by military personnel.<sup>1</sup> Recent developments provide occasion to argue that political scientists should devote closer attention to that type of regime change in which civilian government emerges out of "corrective" military rule. In particular, the authority and legitimacy of military regimes are increasingly being challenged in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>2</sup> With the independence of Zimbabwe under Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and the re-election of Dr. Milton Obote in Uganda, all of the former British colonies in Africa now operate political systems controlled by elected leadership.

The Nigerian experience with the transition from a military regime to civilian rule certainly merits careful scrutiny and critical appraisal. Since Nigeria is the most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a powerful military and an oil-boom economy, commentators have heralded its peaceful transformation from a military regime to an unfamiliar form of elected civilian government as a model of political change that is likely to be taken seriously elsewhere on the continent and in the world.<sup>3</sup>

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1. See, for example, Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations* (North Scituate, Mass: Duxbury Press, 1974).

2. See Vaughn F. Bishop, "Prospects for the Return to Civilian Rule in Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, and Upper Volta" (unpublished paper presented at the Twenty-second Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Los Angeles, Oct. 31-Nov. 3, 1979), pp. 4-5. Bishop also argues that military regimes have been no more successful overall in dealing with complex political and economic problems than their civilian counterparts and that the weaknesses of military rule become increasingly apparent the longer officers remain in power.

3. See, for example, Jean Herskovits, "Democracy in Nigeria," *Foreign Affairs*, CCIV (Winter, 1979-80), 314, 326, 335.

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Regardless of whether one views it primarily as a model for others to consider and adapt to their own unique national circumstances<sup>4</sup> or as an important political development in its own right, Nigeria's recent transition experience deserves serious study. The transition approach instituted by the Federal Military Government (FMG) involved two parallel processes (one constitutional, the other political) that reached fruition simultaneously on October 1, 1979, the date by which the military had promised to withdraw completely from politics.<sup>5</sup> The principal objectives of this article are to describe and analyze one major component in the FMG's transition strategy — the 1979 national and state elections — and to consider the likely impact of electoral procedures and outcomes on political behavior in the Second Republic. Such analysis may enhance understanding of recent political developments in Nigeria as well as of the factors which promote or inhibit the realization of military withdrawal from politics.

### Voluntary Military Disengagement From Politics

The Nigerian transition experience lends further empirical support to the propositions regarding military withdrawal from politics formulated by Claude Welch in the early 1970s. According to Welch, voluntary withdrawal depends primarily upon the existence of (1) a strong desire on the part of the military leadership to divest themselves of political responsibilities and (2) popular pressures for a return to civilian rule.<sup>6</sup> The presence of both conditions initially prompted and later sustained the transfer of power from military to civilian hands in Nigeria.

The Nigerian military became increasingly intent on disengaging from politics as the Gowon's government's failure to deal effectively with corruption and critical public policy issues became more obvious at the same time that growing numbers of senior officers recognized that political involvement had adversely affected the professional reputation and performance capacity of the military.<sup>7</sup> These considerations played an

important part in the overthrow of General Gowon in 1975 by ranking military officers committed to returning Nigeria to civilian rule within four years.<sup>8</sup> The assassination of General Murtala Mohammed in an abortive coup the following year produced an even more reluctant political leader in General Obasanjo and less balance and stability within the military leadership.<sup>9</sup> These developments enhanced the eagerness of the military leadership to relinquish political power.

The willingness of the military to uphold a commitment to withdraw from political roles also requires that their leaders believe that the basic conditions or crises which necessitated armed forces intervention no longer prevail, or at least that they be in a position to declare that this is the case.<sup>10</sup> In this respect, the record of the Murtala-Obasanjo administration in addressing major policy issues is directly and crucially related to the outcome of Nigeria's transition experience. Although a review of this record indicates that the Supreme Military Council did not resolve or even reduce the immediate political salience of most of the contentious issues on its policy agenda, the Murtala-Obasanjo government did initiate considerable executive activity and establish a reputation for action on the basis of comparisons with the former (Gowon) administration.<sup>11</sup> These activities, coupled with the country's oil-fueled economy and relatively strong revenue base<sup>12</sup> provided a sufficient corrective rationale to sustain the FMG's commitment to military disengagement throughout the transition period.

Civilian pressures for military withdrawal also constituted part of the Nigerian transition experience. Such pressures resulted from the inability of the Gowon government to resolve outstanding issues<sup>13</sup> and the demonstrated lack of seriousness with which the General treated his own public pronouncements regarding the temporary nature of military rule. Former politicians, civil servants, university staff and students, among others, all forcefully reminded the military (and the public) of its resolve to withdraw from politics and generated mounting pressure for a return to

4. Most countries on the African continent currently under military rule would find it extremely difficult to afford to replicate the expensive kind of transition process undertaken in Nigeria. The estimated cost of the 1979 election exercise alone amounted to nearly \$100 million. Herskovits, "Democracy in Nigeria," 322.

5. This approach enabled the military to retain power both to alter proposed constitutional provisions and to set by decree the rules governing the first set of elections to state and national government positions in the Second Republic. No evidence has come to light indicating that the military rulers seriously considered the alternatives of appointing a civilian caretaker government prior to the elections, or holding state and national elections before a new constitution had been drafted.

6. Claude E. Welch, Jr., "Cincinnatus in Africa: The Possibility of Military Withdrawal from Politics" in *The State of Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa*, ed. by Michael F. Lofchie (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 216-19, 226-27; Welch and Smith, *Military Role and Rule*, p. 140.

7. Ian Campbell, "Army Reorganization and Military Withdrawal" in *Soldiers and Oil, The Political Transformation of Nigeria*, ed. by Keith Panter-Brick (London: Frank Cass, 1978), pp. 68-77; Henry Bienen, "Military Rule and Political Process," *Comparative Politics*, X (Jan. 1978), 210-12, 216-19.

8. Welch and Smith, *Military Role and Rule*, p. 140 had accurately foreseen that "it may be that change will come only through another round of military intervention."

9. Campbell, "Army Reorganization," pp. 92-4.

10. Welch ("Military Withdrawal," p. 227) concludes that "the accuracy of this belief [or assertion] is immaterial. Conditions may not have improved under army rule. However, if the ruling junta tires of its political duties and wishes to step aside, it may airily declare its objectives achieved and leave the political arena."

11. For details, see Peter Koehn, "Return to Civilian Rule: The Nigerian Experience" (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Denver, 26-28 March, 1981), pp. 5-10.

12. Herskovits, "Democracy in Nigeria," 328.

13. Including negative public reaction to the failure to deal with widespread corruption and the excesses of state military governors. See Campbell, "Army Reorganization," pp. 81-2.

civilian rule. These concerns translated into broad popular support for the transition measures adopted by the Murtala-Obasanjo administration in connection with its promise to transfer power to civilian hands by 1979.<sup>14</sup>

The final essential ingredient in voluntary military withdrawals is the existence of a publicly visible group of civilians possessing backgrounds and objectives that the ruling military leaders themselves identify with.<sup>15</sup> In particular, the military must feel confident that its likely civilian successors will not overturn its basic "reforms." During the Nigerian transition, the FMG undertook a series of actions aimed at creating conditions that would guarantee this outcome. First, it directly and indirectly participated in shaping a new constitution that incorporated specific policy provisions and structural features that had been unilaterally determined by the military. Then, the Supreme Military Council stipulated that only those political associations advocating goals and programs consistent with "fundamental national objectives," as set forth in the country's constitutional document, could qualify as political parties with the right to compete for positions of political power in the new civilian regime. Finally, the FMG promulgated broad rules governing the electoral process guided and regulated by its appointed Electoral Commission and closely monitored the conduct and results of the 1979 elections.

As the electoral process unfolded, the nation-wide organizational strength of the NPN became increasingly apparent. Subsequent demonstrations of greatest voter support for NPN candidates at the polls undoubtedly further reassured the military leadership and buttressed their commitment to transferring power since the prospect of an NPN-dominated government heralded few if any major changes in the FMG's policies and objectives.<sup>16</sup>

### The Nigerian Transition Process

Diagram 1 charts the main procedural steps leading to the establishment of Nigeria's Second Republic. The diagram also sketches the roles played by the primary actors at various stages in Nigeria's unfolding transition drama. One observes that the FMG performed the central initiating role in all aspects of the process. The bulk of the most crucial procedural and substantive actions taken by the military leaders are

14. Welch and Smith, *Military Role and Rule*, p. 140; Richard Joseph, "Political Parties and Ideology in Nigeria," *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 13 (May-August, 1979), 81; Bishop, "Return to Civilian Rule," 11.

15. Claude E. Welch, Jr. "The Dilemmas of Military Withdrawal From Politics: Some Considerations From Tropical Africa," *African Studies Review*, XVIII (April 1974), 213-17; Welch and Smith, *Military Role and Rule*, pp. 140-41; also see Peter Koehn, "Ethiopian Politics: Military Intervention and Prospects for Further Change," *Africa Today*, XXII (April-June 1975), 21.

16. Joseph, "Political Parties," 89-90.

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concentrated near the mid point in the transition period. Between May 1977 and September 1978, the FMG created the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), established the Constituent Assembly, amended and promulgated the new constitution, and lifted its prohibition on political party activity: Prior to this time, the Constitution Drafting Committee (C.D.C.) constituted the primary forum of transition activity and, subsequently, another body appointed by the FMG (FEDECO) assumed the lead decision-making role (with regard to electoral matters). In short, the process which culminated in establishment of the Second Republic can be divided into three analytical categories: the formative constitutional period from September 1975 through April 1977 (dominated by C.D.C. deliberations); the pivotal middle decision-making phase from May 1977 through September 1978 (dominated by the FMG); and the final electoral politics period from October 1978 through September 1979 (dominated by FEDECO acting in a regulatory role). The principal concern of this article is with the final stage in the transition process.

### The Electoral Politics Period

In October 1977, the FMG issued an Electoral Decree<sup>17</sup> which provided broad guidelines for the forthcoming national and state elections. Among other provisions, the Decree determined the electoral system to be used in choosing a president and state governors, set minimum age qualifications for candidates for various posts, and established the criteria to be employed in evaluating applications for registration.<sup>18</sup>

With these broad electoral and political guidelines in place and FEDECO firmly established, General Obasanjo lifted the ban on political parties and revoked all post-coup decrees suppressing political activities (including the declaration of a state of emergency) on the same date (September 21, 1978) that the Supreme Military Council formally promulgated the new constitution which would take effect in another year.<sup>19</sup> From that time onward, the FMG refrained from directing the


17. No. 73 of 1977, subsequently amended to conform in part to provisions in the Constituent Assembly's Constitution by the Electoral (Amendment) Decree No. 32 of 1978.

18. Mohammed Audi and R.K.W. Goonesekere, "Legal Background to the Nigerian Elections, 1979" (unpublished paper presented at the National Conference on Return to Civilian Rule held at the Institute of Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 26-30 May 1980) [henceforth cited as Civilian Rule Conference], pp. 14-16; Claude Phillips, "Nigeria's New Political Institutions, 1975-9," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, XVIII (March 1980), 14. Section 17 (1) of the Electoral Decree also mandated that writs for conducting the first elections to legislative seats in the Second Republic had to be issued to FEDECO by the Head of the FMG. The last direct procedural decision taken by the FMG under this provision involved determining the month the elections would commence.

19. The FMG later issued decrees on public security and public order that gave the military and police power to control the conduct of public meetings, assemblies, and processions at the state level. Audi and Goonesekere, "Legal Background," p. 12; Phillips, "Political Institutions," 10, 17; Herskovits, "Democracy in Nigeria," 318.

DIAGRAM 1


KEY PROCEDURAL STEPS AND DATES LEADING UP TO ESTABLISHMENT OF NIGERIA'S SECOND REPUBLIC



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DIAGRAM 1

KEY PROCEDURAL STEPS AND DATES LEADING UP TO ESTABLISHMENT OF NIGERIA'S SECOND REPUBLIC



The first column, "Constitutional Drafting Committee," is omitted on this page, whose work had been completed.

time of FEDECO's early June deadline for the submission of their nominee's names and documents, although only the NPN came close to fielding candidates for all of the available positions.<sup>29</sup>

On April 1, 1979, the FMG finally announced that elections would commence in July. The presidential candidates all mounted serious nation-wide campaigns, devoting considerable attention to the states where their organization and popular base of support appeared to be weakest.<sup>31</sup> While campaign strategy and styles differed depending upon the orientation of the party leadership, public speeches and use of the mass media constituted a common feature of the presidential contest.<sup>32</sup> Each party also issued a manifesto highlighting its priorities and promises. The NPN emphasized agricultural development (a "Green Revolution"), public housing projects, and the provision of a wide range of rural amenities. The UPN presented the most easily understood manifesto to the electorate in the form of four "cardinal programs": (1) free education and textbooks at all levels; (2) integrated rural development; (3) full employment and a higher minimum wage; and (4) free health care. The disproportionate attention which the UPN and its opponents devoted to the first of these proposals led to its being labelled the "free education" party. Some people also believed that a UPN government would press most resolutely to eliminate inefficiency, waste, and corruption. The PRP clearly constituted the most radical party that contested the 1979 elections.<sup>33</sup> The PRP placed the transformation of Nigerian society in a socialist direction at the forefront of its campaign and openly criticized the power of multi-national corporations in Nigeria in a manner consistent with its opposition to neo-colonialism.<sup>34</sup>

Each party's campaign also revolved around the personal appeal of the individual at the top of its ticket, with varying degrees of success in different sections of the country. One part of this strategy involved ticket balancing on a regional basis with respect to the presidential election

29. For the 1347 available state house of assembly seats, for instance, the NPN fielded 1334 candidates, the UPN entered 1005, the GNPP contested 998 seats, the NPP presented 588 nominees, and the PRP concentrated on 405 positions. Aliyu and Payne, "The 1979 Elections," p. 11; *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

30. The lateness of this date and the fact that the elections coincided with the rainy season surprised many observers. However, it did allow more time for campaigning. Phillips "Political Institutions" 18) finds it likely that the elections were deliberately scheduled to take place while university classes were not in session.

31. Takaya, "The 1979 Elections," pp. 9-10.

32. Ekong, "The 1979 Elections," p. 3.

33. On the failure of explicitly socialist political associations to build an effective national party apparatus during the registration exercise, see Joseph, "Political Parties," 79-81.

34. *Ibid.*, 83, 86-90; Herskovits, "Democracy in Nigeria," 329; Ekong, "The 1979 Elections," p. 2. See the positions set forth by each party with respect to the economy and agriculture in the *New Nigerian*, July 3, 1979, pp. 1-IV; and July 4, 1979, pp. 1-IV. The manifestos of the GNPP and the NPP appear in the 6th and 19th January 1979 issues of the *New Nigerian* (p. 5).

contest. The NPN most explicitly engaged in this practice by officially adopting a pre convention formula (known as "zoning") under which its presidential candidate in the first election would come from the north, his running mate from the east, and the party chairman from the west. The NPN claimed that it adopted this zoning policy in order to ensure that the party would reflect the "federal character of Nigeria." Since the other parties all had a single and obvious presidential aspirant at the time they formed; they did not enact similar formulas. However, all four practiced regional ticket balancing in any event, with the end result being that an Ibo vice presidential candidate ran with the four non-Ibo presidential nominees and the NPP selected a Hausa running mate for Dr. Azikiwe.<sup>35</sup>

Sharp differences existed in the organizational and financial strength of the five parties. The UPN entered the campaign possessing a widely acknowledged advantage in the area of organizational structure due to the tight discipline exercised by the leadership over party rank-and-file and the intense dedication of its local party activists. The NPN filled its ranks with prominent lawyers, businessmen, and First Republic politicians, won the covert support of many traditional rulers, and made the most impressive inroads in establishing effective local organizations in areas outside the "natural" base of its support.<sup>36</sup> The belated split of the NPP into two parties (NPP and GNPP) which destroyed the loose coalition of aspiring former Constituent Assembly members, ex-NCNC politicians from Anambra, Imo, and Lagos states, and personal supporters of Waziri Ibrahim dealt both groups a severe organizational setback. The success of the NPN in recruiting many former NCNC stalwarts in the southern states further weakened the NPP's organizational base. The PRP stood on a much weaker financial footing than the four other parties. Moreover, the PRP, which barely managed to secure registration by FEDECO after supporters of Aminu Kano broke away from the NPN in the initial stages of party formation in September 1978, never developed a strong organizational network outside of a few northern states. In the south, for instance, undistinguished politicians "who saw their chances of being nominated for desired electoral offices foreclosed in the other parties" comprised the bulk of the

35. Ahmed, "First 100 Days," 7; Joseph, "Political Parties," pp. 86, 84; Herskovits, "Democracy in Nigeria," 320, 324.

36. Richard Joseph (Political Parties, 84) criticizes the success of the NPN in this regard by drawing attention to the extent to which this party (as well as the others in varying degrees) relied upon promoting and legitimizing patron-client relationships as a basic campaign strategy during the elections. Under the "You Chop I Chop" principle employed as part of this approach, the electorate is encouraged to "vote for their sons-of-the-soil who promise to deliver the goods to their people in the way of roads, schools, water-schemes, scholarships, and public appointments" and who will also be expected to pocket "their ten per cent of any proceeds meant for their community." From a different point of view, A.B. Ahmed suggests that forging links with influential local leaders is a vitally important component in a strategy aimed at building a strong party apparatus on a nationwide basis. He also maintains that the 1976 local government reform "greatly minimized if not completely eradicated the menace of political victimisation through the use of traditional rulers and their administrative machinery." Ahmed, "First 100 Days," F.

PRP's leadership and membership.<sup>37</sup>

During the campaign period, both the FMG and FEDECO felt obliged to intervene on certain occasions. The actions taken by the Electoral Commission, in particular, generated considerable controversy and uncertainty over electoral affairs.

Direct military participation in electoral politics primarily consisted of attempting to arbitrate inter-party conflicts and cautioning civilians to adhere to established rules of conduct. In these efforts, the FMG endeavored to avoid creating the impression that it favored a particular party(ies), candidate(s), or platform.<sup>38</sup> The military played an overt paternalistic role on two specific occasions during this period. On December 28, 1978, the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Major-General Shehu Yar'adua, summoned the five presidential contenders to Dodan Barracks in Lagos. At that meeting, Major-General Yar'adua warned against the bitter personal attacks which had already surfaced in the campaign and extracted a pledge from each of the leaders that they would endeavor to be fair, would refrain from personal abuse, and would abide by the verdict of the electorate. When General Obasanjo called all the presidential candidates to another conference at Dodan Barracks on March 31, 1979, he repeated criticisms of their personal attacks on one another and specifically instructed each to cease making statements to the effect that there would be "no Nigeria" in the event that they did not win the election. The implicit message delivered at both meetings was that the military was closely monitoring the campaign and would not tolerate excesses that threatened national unity and harmony.<sup>39</sup>

The FMG initially left the responsibility for regulating and policing public campaigning activities to the 19 state Military Administrators. In the face of the complicated and diverse set of requirements enforced at the state level, however, the military leadership promulgated Decree No. 5 on February 16, 1979. The Public Order Decree established a common set of rules governing the conduct of public assemblies, meetings, and processions and granted the police powers to enforce the Decree's provisions at the local level. Throughout the remainder of the campaign period, the police ardently exercised their authority to ban campaign rallies and break up licensed assemblies when they suspected that public disorders might occur and to prevent two or more political parties from holding meetings in the same town at the same time.

In addition to responsibility for arranging election logistics, the military

37. Joseph, "Political Parties," 82-6; *New Nigerian*, January 22, 1980. There were several notable exceptions, however. The NPP encountered the same problem in several states outside of the east. See A. B. Ahmed, "Party Politics: The Count-Down Begins," *New Nigerian*, April 28, 1979, p. 5.

38. Bishop, "Civilian Rule," p. 9.

39. Phillips, "Political Institutions," 19-20; Ahmed, "Count-Down," 5.

delegated to FEDECO authority to determine who qualified to stand for national and state office. In deciding such questions, the appointed, authoritarian Commission exercised its most powerful regulatory role over the electoral process. Under the terms of the Electoral Decree, candidates who had not paid income taxes when they came due over the preceding three years, or had been found guilty of corruption or other offense by any tribunal or commission of enquiry established by the FMG (or of corrupt election practices by a court) would be disqualified from standing for office in the 1979 election. The eligibility decisions reached by FEDECO in applying these provisions generated some of the most heated controversies of the campaign period.<sup>40</sup>

The issue of candidate disqualification first surfaced in April when FEDECO ruled that two presidential aspirants, Dr. Azikiwe and Aminu Kano, would not receive additional security protection because they had failed to pay income taxes when they came due.<sup>41</sup> The Commission Chairman stressed that this preliminary decision did not amount to a rejection of their nomination papers, but Aminu Kano's name later appeared on the list of disqualified candidates issued by FEDECO in June. After FEDECO had challenged the status of their candidacies, the affected presidential nominees filed separate actions in High Court seeking declarations that they had paid income tax for the years at issue in accordance with state tax law and the Electoral Decree. Eventually, the High Courts ruled in favor of the petitioners and the Electoral Commission abided by this decision, even though the Court of Appeal had subsequently found that the Electoral Decree did not require FEDECO to honor the High Court's ruling. By the time Dr. Azikiwe's case had been resolved, however, less than three weeks remained before the August 11 presidential election. FEDECO certified Aminu Kano's nomination at the last possible moment, on 1st August 1979.<sup>42</sup> As a result of the involved and prolonged nature of these tax appeal cases, then, most of the election process had already elapsed before the voting public knew for certain who the presidential candidates of the NPP and PRP would be.

The scope and importance of FEDECO's role in regulating the electoral process became even more apparent when it announced the complete and final results of its candidate screening process on June 22, 1979. The Commission examined the papers submitted by a total of 8,728 candidates and ruled 1,027 (12%) of them ineligible to stand for office,

40. Phillips, "Political Institutions," 14-17, 21; Audi and Goonesekere, "Legal Background," pp. 12, 18.

41. *New Nigerian*, April 18, 1979, p. 1.

42. Audi and Goonesekere, "Legal Background," pp. 19-21; Herskovits, "Democracy in Nigeria," 321.

primarily for defaulting on tax payments.<sup>43</sup> Those disqualified included 34 gubernatorial nominees (36% of the total possible number of candidates), 129 senatorial candidates (27%), and 661 nominees for the federal house of representatives (29%).

The PRP (275) and NPP (254) again suffered the greatest losses in terms of rejected candidates for national office. The figures on candidate disqualifications presented in Table 1 reveal the differential extent to which FEDECO's action affected the five political parties. While less than 10 per cent of the NPN nominees for elected national office appeared on the rejection list, FEDECO disqualified about half of the NPP and PRP candidates. Irrespective of the fairness or lack thereof with which the Commission treated the candidate certification exercise,<sup>44</sup> its actions constituted a major intervention by the appointed body that affected the outcome of the electoral process. Even though FEDECO agreed to accept qualified candidates as substitute nominations up to 10 days before the date of each election, these deadlines allowed parties all of 5 days to find suitable candidates for the senate contest and only slightly longer for the other races.<sup>45</sup> The PRP and the NPP clearly faced more serious logistical problems in this regard than the other parties due to the much greater number of their candidates who had been ruled ineligible to stand for office. This late development undoubtedly exerted a particularly adverse impact on the electoral performance of these two parties even in the constituencies where they managed to find a qualified substitute candidate at the last minute.

TABLE 1

FEDECO Disqualifications of Candidates for Governor, Senator, and House of Representatives: by Political Party

Political Party	# Candidates Disqualified	% Total Possible No. Candidates (563)
NPN	32	6%
UPN	129	19%
GNPP	157	28%
NPP	254	45%
PRP	275	49%

Source: Adapted from Phillips, "Political Institutions," p. 20.

43. *New Nigerian*, June 23, 1979. P. 1: Bishop, "Civilian Rule," p. 9; Audi and Goonesekere, "Legal Background," p. 19.

44. Complaints centered on the role played by the Inland Revenue Department rather than FEDECO. The most common allegation charged staff of the Department with failing to process the required tax papers for candidates of certain parties on time, while they moved swiftly to provide another party's nominees with tax clearance statements.

45. Audi and Goonesekere, "Legal Background," pp. 18-19.

FEDECO had fixed and announced dates for the national elections in April 1979. In a move that demanded a great deal of commitment from the electorate, the Commission scheduled staggered elections for five different Saturdays over a six week interval. The senatorial election came first on July 7, followed by elections to the House of Representatives on July 14, contests for state houses of assembly on July 21, gubernatorial elections on July 28, and, finally, the presidential election contest on August 11.

Several of the electoral procedures devised and implemented by FEDECO merit special attention and comment in light of their impact on the conduct and outcome of the 1979 elections. In the first place, the Commission devoted considerable attention to security considerations.<sup>46</sup> The combined efforts of FEDECO and the police in this area led to one of the most peaceful national elections in Nigeria's volatile political history.<sup>47</sup>

The Federal Electoral Commission compiled a more variable record of success in dealing with the difficult logistical problems inherent in the conduct of such an ambitious and novel elections process. FEDECO had to overcome a number of serious barriers in order to carry out efficient and fair national elections. First, it faced the onset of elections only days after the final list of candidates had been prepared. The five elections occurred within such a short interval; moreover, that Commission staff found themselves burdened with making final arrangements for the next contest at the same time that they raced to certify and release official results from the elections held the previous week. FEDECO also had to engage in a major effort to inform and educate the public and political parties regarding ballot procedure and proper versus illegal electoral practices. Finally, the Commission had to plan, organize, and staff 97,167 polling stations.<sup>48</sup> This required recruiting at least 97,167 polling clerks, as well as presiding electoral officers and other supervisory staff. Although FEDECO managed to secure (on loan, or secondment) the services of many local government officials to assist in these capacities, this temporary arrangement made even more difficult the tasks of ensuring the impartiality and monitoring the performance of elections staff.<sup>49</sup>

Large numbers of voters turned out for the senatorial elections only to discover that the electoral machinery set in place by FEDECO did not

46. See "Law and Order & Electoral Offenses: Guide to Election Participants" (guidelines issued by FEDECO reprinted in the *New Nigerian*, June 30, 1979 pp. 8-9).

47. See Audi and Goonesekere, "Legal Background," p. 27; Welch and Smith, *Military Role and Rule*, pp. 122-4; Takaya, "The 1979 Elections," p. 10.

48. The Electoral Decree required that one polling station be available for every 500 voters.

49. Audi and Goonesekere, "Legal Background," pp. 24-5.

perform flawlessly. Some polling stations failed to open until long after the scheduled time for voting to commence. In Kano, some election staff members reportedly conducted a strike over pay and in Lagos a number of presiding elections officers never showed up at their polling stations.<sup>50</sup> Political parties did not send representatives to every station to oversee the voting. Voters encountered difficulty locating the (occasionally distant) polling place holding their registration, and queues moved forward slowly in many areas.<sup>51</sup> The Commission instituted steps to rectify these shortcomings and the number of complaints decreased somewhat following subsequent elections.<sup>52</sup> Nevertheless, some disgruntled party spokesmen alleged that FEDECO and even the FMG had shown partiality in the conduct of certain elections and/or in tabulating the results.<sup>53</sup> Chief Ani categorically denied these charges, but FEDECO did admit the existence of serious defects in its electoral arrangements and election tribunals eventually overturned 25 election outcomes due to voting irregularities.<sup>54</sup>

#### *Impact of Electoral Procedures on Voting*

The electoral procedures devised and implemented by FEDECO clearly effected turnout and voting behavior. The recurring logistical problems encountered in connection with running the national elections, coupled with the early date (January 1978) on which it conducted the registration exercise, account in part for the relatively low percentage turnout recorded in July and August 1979.<sup>55</sup> Only one-fourth (25.8%) of

50. Heavy rains and transport problems compounded the election difficulties encountered in Lagos and in Borno. See "Task Force on Polls Set Up in Lagos," *New Nigerian*, July 10, 1979, p. 1; Audi and Goonesekere, "Legal Background," p. 26; "Chief Ani Disappointed," *New Nigerian*, July 9, 1979, p. 1.

51. On the accomplishment side of the ledger, more women voted in these elections in the northern states than ever before partly as the result of a FEDECO scheme whereby men and women cast ballots in separate buildings and queued at right angles stretching in opposite directions. Herskovits, "Democracy in Nigeria," 322.

52. In one of its more notable accomplishments, FEDECO managed to print 50 million new ballots and distribute them to all polling stations in the country after it discovered that forged presidential ballot papers were in circulation only ten days before the date of the presidential vote. Audi and Goonesekere, "Legal Background," p. 38h.

53. See for instance, "Chief Awolowo Addresses UPN Congress," *New Nigerian*, December 18, 1979, pp. 1-III; "NPN Chief Accuses Electoral Officials," *New Nigerian*, July 10, 1979, p. 1. Akin Fadahunsi asserts, however, that "most of the accusations have come from areas where the party accused of cheating [rigging] would almost certainly have won whether they cheated or not." Akin Fadahunsi, "The Nigerian State and the Party of the President" (unpublished paper presented at the Civilian Rule Conference), pp. 5-6; also see Ekong, "The 1979 Elections," p. 3.

54. "Ahi Says FEDECO Had Free Hand," *New Nigerian*, January 22, 1980; Herskovits, "Democracy in Nigeria," 325. The political parties did not always challenge FEDECO certification of election results in the tribunals partly because they all "agreed that bad elections were better than no elections," partly because the Electoral Decree provided that no election "conducted substantially in accordance with" its procedures could be declared invalid, and partly due to lack of information regarding shortened deadlines for filing appeal petitions. Audi and Goonesekere, "Legal Background," pp. 26-7, 30-1.

55. Some analysts suggest that the low percentage turnout figures are primarily a function of inflated voter registration lists. Herskovits, "Democracy in Nigeria," 324; Takaya, "The 1979 Elections," pp. 3-4. However, the validity of this assertion is

the registered electorate voted in the first (senatorial) elections.<sup>56</sup> The turnout rate jumped to 30.7 per cent for the federal house of representatives elections, and then continued to rise slightly each week through the last (presidential) contest when 34.7 per cent of the registered voters cast valid ballots. Measured by voter turnout rates, then, the Nigerian electorate demonstrated greater interest in contests for state governor and house of assembly (32.0% and 31.2%) than they did in races for the national legislature (25.8% in the senate elections and 30.7% in the house of representatives elections).

The rate of voter participation also varied considerably by state. In terms of overall average turnout for all five elections, the voters in two states, Anambra and Bauchi, registered levels in excess of 40 per cent (41.3% and 40.4%, respectively), while less than 30 per cent of the electorate voted in Kano (20.7%), Borno (22.8%), Oyo (24.7%), Gongola (27.8%), and Cross River (27.8%). The other twelve states recorded voter turnout levels between 31.5 per cent (Plateau) and 37.4 per cent (Ogun). Voters broke the 50 per cent turnout mark on only one occasion; i.e., when 53.8 per cent of the registered electorate in Ondo state participated in the presidential election.<sup>57</sup> Three different trends emerge when turnout results are examined on a state-by-state, election-by-election basis. First, most states follow the nation-wide pattern of slightly increasing voter participation with each subsequent election. One state (Kwara), however, experienced a decline in turnout between the senatorial (36.7%) and presidential (32.0%) elections. Finally, relative to participation in the presidential contest, voters turned out in greater numbers for the state house of assembly elections in Benue and Imo, for the gubernatorial race in Rivers and Sokoto, and for both state elections in Plateau, Cross River, and Gongola states. These results indicate that only several state elections contests rivaled the presidential race in terms of voter interest.

The electoral procedures devised and carried out by FEDECO, particularly the design of the ballot itself, exerted a more fundamental impact on voting behavior than they did on turnout. Although the Electoral Decree (before its amendment) specified that each candidate's name and party should appear on the ballot paper, the late date upon

difficult to assess in the absence of reliable current population census data. See Aliyu and Payne, "The 1979 Elections," pp. 14-15. Moreover, uncontested races (where no elections were held) lowered the turnout rate for senatorial, house of representatives, and state house of assembly elections in some states. The official turnout figures reported in Fedeco (Report) apparently do not include the sizeable number of invalid votes cast and are generally lower than the figures reported in Nigeria, Fedeco, *The General Elections 1979* (Lagos: Fedeco, 1979).

56. Voter turnout figures are reported in Fedeco, *Report*, pp. 67-71.

57. The lowest turnout figure was recorded in Borno, for the senatorial election (17.5%). The largest deviation in turnout rates occurred in Rivers between the senatorial contest (19.0%) and the gubernatorial election (48.1%).

which FEDECO completed the candidate (and substitute candidate) certification process made it impossible to comply with this requirement in time to have the basic documents printed in advance of the election deadlines. Consequently, the official ballots finally issued by the Electoral Commission only showed the name and symbol of all five political parties. This action had the effect of amplifying the importance of political party consideration during the elections at the same time that it dramatically reduced the salience of other factors (especially candidate personality and background), particularly in contests for legislative office. In one Kano constituency, for instance, FEDECO disqualified the PRP nominee for the federal house of representatives during the candidate screening exercise. Although the PRP failed to nominate an approved substitute candidate, voters in this constituency still cast more votes for that party than for any of the others.<sup>58</sup>

This admittedly unusual case suggests that party identification played the most influential role in shaping voting behavior during the 1979 elections. Further support for this position can be adduced from a rough constituency by constituency analysis of results, which indicates that voters expressed relatively consistent party preferences over the course of the five elections.<sup>59</sup> Table 2 lists the percentage vote cast for each party's candidates in a cross-section of five states selected on the bases of wide geographical distribution and the diverse party affiliation of their elected chief executives.<sup>60</sup> The results reveal a remarkable degree of consistency in voting patterns from one election to the next. The largest deviation in voter support for a particular political party over the five elections is 24 per cent in Kaduna (PRP candidates for state house of assembly, governor). In no other case in the five states considered does the differential in party support reach 20 per cent. In the states which likely reflect the most common pattern, Ondo and Niger, the maximum deviation in voter party preference does not exceed five per cent over the five elections.<sup>61</sup> The largest differential is only 14 percent in Gongola (GNPP), and 19 per cent in Imo (NPP). It should be emphasized that the deviations experienced in voter support by the other political parties in each state usually are

58. Aqdi and Goonesekere, "Legal Background," pp. 25-6.

59. The major exception occurs in the case of the election of the PRP candidate for governor in Kaduna State. Alhaji Abdulkadir Balarabe Musa. The NPN won a majority of the senatorial, house of representatives, and house of assembly seats and a plurality of the votes cast for president in Kaduna. The personal attributes and reputation of the two principal gubernatorial candidates appear to have been decisive with the voters in this instance. In Gongola, the NPN presidential candidate, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, narrowly won the election in a state in which voters had given greater support to GNPP candidates in the previous four elections.

60. Results from Gongola and Kaduna have been deliberately included in this table since the widest deviations in political party electoral performance are expected to exist in these two states.

61. The largest differential in Ondo is five per cent (UPN) and in Niger is four per cent (NPN). Aggregate nation-wide voting results over all five elections reveal maximum deviations ranging from 1 per cent for the NPP to 5 per cent for the UPN, with the maximum variation for the other parties falling between these two figures. Fedeco, Report, pp. 67-71.

TABLE 2

Percent Vote Cast for Each Political Party in Each Election;  
Five Selected States

State (Contest)	Party				
	GNPP	UPN	NPN	PRP	NPP
<b>Imo</b>					
Senate	10.0	.9	14.3	1.0	73.8
House of Representatives	8.9	1.4	19.2	1.2	69.2
State Assembly	11.0	1.7	21.0	1.1	65.4
Governor	5.4	.7	11.2	1.9	80.6
President	3.0	.6	8.8	.6	84.7
<b>Ondo</b>					
Senate	.9	89.2	8.8	---	1.1
House of Representatives	.3	91.6	6.8	.1	1.2
State Assembly	.4	91.5	6.5	.1	1.5
Governor	---	94.8	4.6	---	.6
President	.3	94.5	4.2	.2	.9
<b>Niger</b>					
Senate	19.4	3.8	74.6	2.2	.1
House of Representatives	20.2	4.3	71.1	3.3	1.1
State Assembly	20.2	3.3	72.4	3.4	.7
Governor	19.6	3.1	74.1	3.1	---
President	16.6	3.7	74.9	3.8	1.1
<b>Gongola</b>					
Senate	37.2	20.8	33.8	5.1	3.2
House of Representatives	35.6	21.3	34.6	4.5	4.1
State Assembly	37.7	20.5	35.2	3.4	3.3
Governor	47.6	11.2	34.6	2.5	4.1
President	34.1	21.7	35.5	4.3	4.4
<b>Kaduna</b>					
Senate	22.0	8.0	37.9	26.3	5.8
House of Representatives	20.2	7.0	39.6	28.8	4.4
State Assembly	21.1	6.5	46.1	21.1	5.4
Governor	10.4	---	44.4	45.1	---
President	13.8	6.7	43.1	31.7	4.7

Source: Fedeco, Report, pp. 67-71.



considerably smaller than the maximum figure. In addition, the two parties which recorded the largest nation-wide vote totals, the UPN and NPN, show the smallest maximum deviations across the five states.

Further analysis indicates that the variance in party performance is even narrower when the gubernatorial and presidential contests are excluded from consideration. As earlier results became available and these final two elections drew nearer, the leaders of the UPN and GNPP openly explored the idea of combining forces for the explicit purpose of electing the candidate with the best chance to defeat the NPN nominee. It appears from the data presented in Table 2 that this strategy may have been decisive in the victory achieved by the GNPP candidate for governor in Gongola state.<sup>62</sup> Similar inter-party maneuvering may have had some effect on the outcome of the Kaduna gubernatorial contest as well. In short, party politics is even likely to have been responsible for an important measure of the few sizeable deviations encountered in Table 2, particularly with respect to the gubernatorial election results.

These findings indicate that political party loyalty constituted the most salient feature of the 1979 national elections in Nigeria. The nature of the ballot format adopted by FEDECO and voting results indicating that participants expressed remarkably consistent party preferences over the course of six weeks and five elections strongly support this assessment. Other factors certainly also played some role in influencing voting behavior, and political party affiliation cannot be understood independently of such considerations as ethnic, regional, and religious identification, loyalty to the party standard bearer, ideology, and campaign promises and expenditures.<sup>63</sup> It is our contention, however, that the variable of political party loyalty provides the most meaningful and fruitful basis for analysis of the 1979 election results and political behavior in the Second Republic.

### Election Outcomes

The results of the elections held in July and August 1979 show that one political party dominated electoral politics in 17 of the 19 states. The NPN captured at least a majority of the available senate, house of

62. The Gongola branch of the UPN later publicly asserted that "the GNPP controlled government of Gongola State knows full well that without the support of UPN in the last gubernatorial election, success would have eluded them." "UPN Terminates Working Accord with GNPP," *New Nigerian*, January 8, 1980. Also see "How Waziri Will Contest Next Election," *New Nigerian*, March 5, 1980, p. 3.

63. These "other" factors figure prominently in most early treatments of the Nigerian elections, including Herskovits, "Democracy in Nigeria," 322-3; S.Y. Aliyu, "The Nature and Composition of the Legislature: Some Selected States" (unpublished paper presented at the Civilian Ruel Conference), pp. 11-23; Joseph, "Political Parties," 78; Ekong, "The 1979 Elections," pp. 16-19; Aliyu and Payne, "The 1979 Elections," pp. 13-14, 19-21, 36; Takaya, "The 1979 Elections," pp. 1, 4, 10.

representatives, and house of assembly seats and a majority of the votes cast in the gubernatorial and presidential contests in 7 states. The UPN replicated this feat in five states, the NPP in three, and the GNPP and PRP in one state apiece (see Table 3). In each of these states, with the

TABLE 3

1979 Election Outcomes: Single Party Dominant and Competitive States

State and Contests	(1) UPN-Dominated States				
	UPN (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	NPN (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	NPP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	GNPP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	PRP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)
<b>Ondo (92.3%)*</b>					
Senate	5	0	0	0	0
House of Representatives	22	0	0	0	0
House of Assembly	65	1	0	0	0
Governor	94.8%	4.6%	.6%	--	--
President	94.5%	4.2%	.9%	.3%	.2%
<b>Ogun (91.3%)*</b>					
Senate	5	0	0	0	0
House of Representatives	12	0	0	0	0
House of Assembly	36	0	0	0	0
Governor	93.6%	6.4%	--	--	--
President	92.6%	6.2%	.3%	.5%	.3%
<b>Lagos (82.6%)*</b>					
Senate	5	0	0	0	0
House of Representatives	12	0	0	0	0
House of Assembly	36	0	0	0	0
Governor	81.5%	6.6%	9.9%	.6%	.5%
President	82.3%	7.2%	9.6%	.5%	.5%
<b>Oyo (81.3%)*</b>					
Senate	5	0	0	0	0
House of Representatives	38	4	0	0	0
House of Assembly	117	9	0	0	0
Governor	84.2%	14.4%	.5%	.6%	--
President	85.8%	12.8%	.6%	.6%	.3%
<b>Bendel (48.4%)*</b>					
Senate	5	0	0	0	0
House of Representatives	12	6	2	0	0
House of Assembly	34	22	4	0	0
Governor	53.0%	38.3%	7.9%	--	.8%
President	53.2%	36.2%	8.6%	1.2%	.7%

\* Unweighted average of state-wide percentage vote captured by dominant party over all 5 elections.

(Table 3 continued next page)

exception of Bendel, the dominant party obtained an unweighted average vote over all five elections in excess of 53 per cent of the total vote cast.<sup>64</sup> Only two states, Kaduna and Gongola, cannot be classified as single-party dominant on the basis of the 1979 election results. The NPN won a majority of Kaduna's senate, house of representatives, and state house of assembly seats and a plurality of the votes cast in the presidential elections, but the PRP captured the governorship of the state. In Gongola, the most competitive state in the federation, voters elected roughly equivalent numbers of candidates from three parties (the GNPP, NPN, and UPN) to national and state legislative offices. The GNPP candidate for governor in Gongola won a plurality of the votes cast (48%), while the NPN candidate for president achieved this honor in the final election despite only securing 36 per cent of the total vote cast (see Table 3).

64. Excluding Bendel, the UPN produced the highest unweighted averages in the states it dominated (over 80 per cent in Lagos and Oyo and over 90 per cent in Ondo and Ogun).

**TABLE 3 (continued)**  
**(2) NPP-Dominated States**

State and Contests	NPP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	NPN (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	GNPP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	UPN (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	PRP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)
<b>IMO (74.7%)*</b>					
Senate	5	0	0	0	0
House of Representatives	28	2	0	0	0
House of Assembly	79	9	2	0	0
Governor	80.6%	11.2%	5.4%	7%	1.9%
President	84.7%	8.8%	3.0%	6%	6%
<b>Anambra (73.8%)*</b>					
Senate	5	0	0	0	0
House of Representatives	26	3	0	0	0
House of Assembly	73	13	1	0	0
Governor	76.0%	18.4%	2.1%	8%	1.2%
President	82.9%	13.5%	1.7%	8%	1.2%
<b>Plateau (55.1%)*</b>					
Senate	4	1	0	0	0
House of Representatives	13	3	0	0	0
House of Assembly	35	10	3	0	0
Governor	65.0%	27.6%	3.0%	1.6%	2.8%
President	49.7%	34.7%	6.8%	5.3%	4.0%

\*Unweighted average of state-wide percentage vote captured by dominant party over all 5 elections. This note applies to continuation of chart on next page also.

**(3) NPN-Dominated States**

State and Contests	NPN (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	GNPP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	NPP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	PRP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	UPN (# Seats or % Vote Cast)
<b>Niger (73.4%)*</b>					
Senate	5	0	0	0	0
House of Representatives	10	0	0	0	0
House of Assembly	28	2	0	0	0
Governor	74.1%	19.6%	--	3.1%	3.1%
President	74.9%	19.6%	1.1%	3.8%	3.7%
<b>Benue (72.8%)*</b>					
Senate	5	0	0	0	0
House of Representatives	18	0	1	0	0
House of Assembly	48	6	3	0	0
Governor	75.4%	4.5%	16.5%	1.7%	2.8%
President	76.4%	8.0%	11.8%	1.4%	2.6%
<b>Rivers (63.2%)*</b>					
Senate	3	0	2	0	0
House of Representatives	10	0	4	0	0
House of Assembly	27	0	15	0	0
Governor	77.0%	9%	21.1%	3%	8%
President	72.7%	2.2%	14.4%	5%	10.3%
<b>Sokoto (60.2%)*</b>					
Senate	5	0	0	0	0
House of Representatives	31	6	0	0	0
House of Assembly	92	19	0	0	0
Governor	62.8%	34.5%	--	2.7%	--
President	66.6%	26.6%	9%	3.3%	2.5%
<b>Cross River (56.5%)*</b>					
Senate	3	2	0	0	0
House of Representatives	22	4	0	0	2
House of Assembly	58	16	3	0	7
Governor	60.2%	22.5%	6.6%	--	11.4%
President	64.4%	15.1%	7.7%	1.0%	11.8%
<b>Bauchi (53.4%)*</b>					
Senate	5	0	0	0	0
House of Representatives	16	2	1	1	0
House of Assembly	45	9	4	2	0
Governor	53.3%	26.4%	2.2%	16.2%	3.1%
President	62.5%	16.4%	4.7%	14.3%	3.0%
<b>Kwara (53.0%)*</b>					
Senate	3	0	0	0	2
House of Representatives	9	0	0	0	5
House of Assembly	25	2	0	0	15
Governor	51.9%	--	--	--	48.1%
President	53.6%	5.7%	5%	7%	37.5%

TABLE 3 (continued)  
(4) GNPP-Dominated State

State and Contests	GNPP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	NPN (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	PRP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	UPN (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	NPP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)
<b>Borno (54.0%)*</b>					
Senate	4	1	0	0	0
House of Representatives	22	2	0	0	0
House of Assembly	59	11	2	0	0
Governor	55.2%	35.2%	5.8%	2.8%	.9%
President	54.0%	34.7%	6.5%	3.4%	1.4%

(5) PRP-Dominated State

State and Contests	PRP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	NPN (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	GNPP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	UPN (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	NPP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)
<b>Kano (74.9%)*</b>					
Senate	5	0	0	0	0
House of Representatives	39	7	0	0	0
House of Assembly	123	13	2	0	0
Governor	79.0%	19.0%	1.3%	.7%	--
President	76.4%	19.9%	1.5%	1.2%	.9%

(6) Competitive States

State and Contests	NPN (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	PRP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	GNPP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	UPN (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	NPP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)
<b>Kaduna</b>					
Senate	3	2	0	0	0
House of Representatives	19	10	1	1	2
House of Assembly	64	16	2	3	6
Governor	44.4%	45.1%	10.4%	--	--
President	43.1%	31.7%	13.8%	6.7%	4.7%
<b>Gongola</b>					
Senate	1	0	2	2	0
House of Representatives	5	0	8	7	1
House of Assembly	15	1	25	18	4
Governor	34.6%	2.5%	47.6%	11.2%	4.1%
President	35.5%	4.3%	34.1%	21.7%	4.4%

\*Unweighted average of state-wide percentage vote captured by dominant party over all five elections.

TABLE 3 (conclusion)

(7) Totals

Contests	NPN (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	UPN (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	NPP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	GNPP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)	PRP (# Seats or % Vote Cast)
Senate	35	29	16	8	7
House of Representatives	167	111	78	43	50
House of Assembly	490	331	226	156	144
Governor	7	5	3	2	2
President	33.8%	29.2%	16.8%	10.0%	10.3%


Source: Constructed from Ekong, "The 1979 Elections," pp. 8, 12; Aliyu and Payne, "The 1979 Elections," pp. 9, 24; and Fedeco, Report, pp. 70-1.

Map 1 fixes the specific identity and geographic locus of the single party dominant and mixed party states. In the cases where a second political party made a respectable showing in terms of winning legislative seats in states dominated by one of the other organizations, that party's initials appear underneath those of the dominant one on the map. The map indicates the concentration of PRP strength in the north and of GNPP strength along the eastern boundary of the country. The UPN's political base tends to be located in the west and the NPP's in the south, with one exception in each case (Gongola and Plateau). The NPN clearly possesses the broadest geographic distribution of support based upon the outcome of the 1979 elections.<sup>65</sup>

The NPN won the largest proportion (37%) of the total number of national and state election contests held in 1979, with the UPN and NPP finishing second and third respectively in terms of their cumulative electoral performance record. At the state legislative level, voters elected nearly 500 NPN candidates. This figure amounts to 37 per cent of the total number of state assembly positions in the country, and the NPN ended up in control of an identical proportion (37 per cent) of the state governments (7 of 19). At the national level, however, the NPN failed to capture a majority of either legislative body, although the party won more than one-third of the senate (35%) and house (37%) seats (Table 3).

65. Also see Aliyu and Payne, "The 1979 Elections," pp. 7-8, 11-12, 21-2, 25-8; Ekong, "The 1979 Elections," pp. 4-17. By mounting a serious challenge to the NPN in several northern states the GNPP and PRP may have indirectly promoted the image of the NPN as a national party.

MAP 1  
STATES OF NIGERIA IDENTIFIED BY POLITICAL PARTY  
PERFORMANCE IN 1979 ELECTIONS



The most dramatic moment of the 1979 elections arose when the results of the August presidential election contest became known. Following provisions which had been written into the new constitution, the FMG had required<sup>66</sup> that a victorious first-ballot candidate for president of the federation demonstrate *national* popular support by capturing the largest total number of votes and also obtaining at least 25 per cent of the votes cast "in each of at least two-thirds of the states." In the event that no candidate fulfilled both parts of this requirement, another Electoral (Amendment) Decree<sup>67</sup> provided that the members of both national and all state legislative bodies would constitute an electoral college and select (by simple majority vote) either the candidate who had received the largest nation-wide share of the popular vote or the second place contestant<sup>68</sup> as

66. Electoral (Amendment) Decree No. 32 of 1978.

67. No. 3 of 1979, promulgated on July 23, 1979.

68. That is, the candidate who obtained "the majority of votes in the highest number of states." Audi and Goonesekere, "Legal Background," pp. 27-9, 34; Herskovits, "Democracy in Nigeria," 325.

president. Post-election results showed that Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the NPN presidential nominee, had garnered 5,688,857 votes (33.8% of the total number cast) or roughly 770,000 more votes than his closest rival, Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the UPN, received.<sup>69</sup> Alhaji Shagari also secured 25 per cent or more of the vote in 12 states, but only 20 per cent in a 13th (Kano).<sup>70</sup> In its most controversial ruling, FEDECO liberally interpreted the "each of at least two-thirds of the 19 states" requirement to mean twelve and two thirds rather than thirteen.<sup>71</sup> Arguing that the NPN candidate had satisfied this condition by obtaining 25 per cent of two-thirds of the vote cast in Kano State, FEDECO declared Alhaji Shagari the winner of the presidential election contest.<sup>72</sup>

Chief Awolowo immediately went to the courts to challenge this decision, which had effectively voided his chance to win the presidency at the electoral college. First the Special Presidential Election Tribunal (by unanimous decision) and then the Supreme Court (in a 5-2 decision handed down only 5 days before the scheduled return to civilian rule) upheld the validity both of FEDECO's interpretation of the section in the Electoral (Amendment) Decree under dispute and Alhaji Shagari's certification as the first president of Nigeria's Second Republic.<sup>73</sup>

Thus, the 1979 elections ended under a cloud of controversy regarding the procedural role played by FEDECO in the electoral phase of the transition process. Chief Awolowo publicly charged that FEDECO had possessed an "unbridled desire to see Shagari win the Presidential race by hook or by crook" and alleged that the Commission had acted in collusion with the FMG to ensure his rival's election by deceptive and treacherous means.<sup>74</sup> In reply, the Chairman of FEDECO, Chief Ani, insisted that the Commission had operated independently of any influence from the military and defended the fairness and impartiality of its actions.<sup>75</sup> In any

69. Chief Awolowo obtained 4,916,651 votes, or 29.2 per cent of the total number cast. Fedeco, Report, p. 71.

70. Shagari finished with the most votes in 9 states and with the second largest vote total in 9 of the other 10 (all but Lagos). Loc. Cit.; Aliyu and Payne, "The 1979 Elections," pp. 13-14; Ekong, "The 1979 Elections," pp. 11, 15.

71. The announcement made by the Chief Returning Officer for this election stated that "the candidate who scored at least one-quarter of the votes cast in 12 States and one-quarter of two-thirds, that is, at least one-sixth of the votes cast in the 13th State satisfies the requirement." Cited in Audi and Goonesekere, "Legal Background," p. 30; also see Herskovits, "Democracy in Nigeria," 325.

72. The NPN publicly advocated the same interpretation prior to the date on which FEDECO announced its ruling. See "NPN's Formula on 2/3 Majority," *New Nigerian*, August 15, 1980, p. 1. Chief Ani later asserted that FEDECO did not base its decision on the NPN formula. *New Nigerian*, January 22, 1980.

73. The judgment of the Special Tribunal is reprinted in the 16 October 1979 issue of the *New Nigerian*. The texts of the Supreme Court opinions (majority and dissenting) appear in the *New Nigerian*, October 26 and November 3, 1979. For a careful analysis, see Audi and Goonesekere, "Legal Background," pp. 30-3.

74. *New Nigerian*, December 18, 1979, p. 1.

75. *New Nigerian*, Jan. 22, 1980.

event, the military leadership upheld its promise to withdraw from politics on October 1, 1979 and Nigeria's second experience with civilian rule commenced on schedule.

## Conclusions

The FMG adopted and pursued a multi-faceted approach to the transfer of political power from military to civilian officials that incorporated corrective policy actions, electoral procedures, and constitution drafting. In each aspect of its transition strategy, the overriding preoccupation of the military leadership (as well as most civilian participants) concerned formal structural rearrangements or realignments.<sup>76</sup> This emphasis reflected the ruling authorities' conviction that the weaknesses in civilian institutions that contributed heavily to the downfall of the First Republic by eroding its base of support and legitimacy<sup>77</sup> can be overcome by promulgating improved regime rules governing the distribution of authority among government branches and jurisdictions, and the conduct of political affairs.<sup>78</sup>

The FMG's formalistic, rule-centered orientation to political change is apparent from its approach to party organization. In the first place, the military rulers relied on the unrealistic assumption that national political parties could be legislated into existence merely by requiring compliance with broad criteria set down by decree and administered through FEDECO. Moreover, the FMG's decision to set aside three years for constitution writing but only twelve months for electoral politics is indicative of the greater value and priority it placed on formal, legal change over institutional development. The compression of electoral activities into a single year forced political parties to struggle to meet the most unrealistic deadlines involved in the entire transition process. Providing three months for the purpose of organizing parties at the national, state, and local level in a country where collective civilian political activity had been banned for 13 years and allowing the five certified parties only a few weeks to field and campaign for candidates substituted for those disqualified by FEDECO on 22 June 1979<sup>79</sup> gave rise to the most serious institutional constraints

76. Valerie P. Bennett and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, "Back to the Barracks: A Decade of Marking Time," in *Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria*, ed. by Keith Panter-Brick (London: Frank Cass, 1978), p. 14.

77. Robin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960-67* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 201-2. Welch, "Military Withdrawal," p. 219.

78. Bishop, "Civilian Rule," pp. 7-10. For instance, Murtala Mohammed's charge to the C.D.C. emphasized the role of constitutional provisions in developing consensus politics; eliminating cut-throat political competition; depoliticizing the population census; establishing public accountability, free and fair elections, and an independent judiciary; reducing the concentration of power; and creating genuine and truly national political parties. Phillips, "Political Institutions," pp. 3-4.

79. See Audi and Goonesekere, "Legal Background," p. 19. Moreover, FEDECO's decision to recognize five rather than two political parties may have contributed to ethnic-based party competition.

encountered as a result of the narrower strictures placed by the FMG on the electoral time frame.

Most importantly, the military leadership avoided dealing with the difficult matters of political culture, political economy, and collectivity mobilization that shape and condition political behavior far more directly than legal alterations in governmental structure and electoral processes.<sup>80</sup> Attention to these underlying and decisive dimensions of political change would have led those committed to the long-term success of the transfer to concentrate their efforts on the paramount task of promoting the development of mass-based multi-ethnic political associations capable of performing in ways that engender increasing popular support for the institutions themselves as well as for the value of civilian rule.<sup>81</sup>

This assessment leads one to forecast that the FMG's transition strategy will have a cosmetic impact on Second Republic politics. The surface changes in governmental structure and policy, formal regime rules and procedures, and political party organization initiated during the terminal stage of military rule are not sufficient to overcome prevailing political attitudes<sup>82</sup> and modes of behavior that have in the past undermined the legitimacy of the Nigerian political system.<sup>83</sup> Neither the constitutional provisions established for the new regime, the electoral procedures in effect during the late transition period, nor the 1979 election results can be counted on to transform Nigerian politics. This is likely to become increasingly evident from the ways in which contentious issues and crises are treated by the principal political actors in the new republic. In the absence of more fundamental changes than those introduced as part of the military's transition process, civilian leaders (particularly elected politicians) will still tend to behave independently of formal structures and regime rules. In this event, their actions would erode rather than bolster the fragile legitimacy of Second Republic institutions.

80. See Bennett and Kirk-Greene, "Back to the Barracks," p. 14; Joseph, "Political Parties," pp. 80-81; Ali D. Yahaya, "The Creation of States," in *Soldiers and Oil*, pp. 220-1; James R. Scarritt, ed., *Analyzing Political Change in Africa: Applications of a New Multidimensional Framework* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 1-39; 344-51.

81. Welch, "Military Withdrawal," pp. 230, 236; Luckham, *Nigerian Military*, p. 227.

82. Including the military's orientation toward civilian authority.

83. Bennett and Kirk-Greene, "Back to the Barracks," p. 14; Joseph, "Political Parties," pp. 80-1.

Nevertheless, the transition record compiled by the Nigerian military leadership compares favorably to certain other military regimes. See, for instance, Maxwell Owusu, "Politics Without Parties: Reflections on the Union Government Proposal in Ghana," *African Studies Review*, XXII (April 1979), 89-108; Diddy R.M. Hitchens, "Toward Political Stability in Ghana: A Rejoinder in the Union Government Debate," *African Studies Review* XXII (April 1979), 171-6.

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## The Impact of Personality and Ethnicity on the Nigerian Elections of 1979

Olatunde J.B. Ojo

Admst the general emphoria and optimism that greeted Nigeria's 1979 elections and smooth transition to civilian rule, there has been the sagging thought that the new institutions which the military meticulously fashioned might not be "permitted to survive by a civilian government"<sup>1</sup> and that "a long civilian rule in Nigeria (is) very doubtful,"<sup>2</sup> perhaps because of the realization, after the ban on politics was lifted, that military rule had changed little or nothing of consequence and that the "Military interlude had been a bad dream, the country would (now) get back to 'politics as usual'."<sup>3</sup> The 1979 elections and post-election politics have exacerbated this feeling. One element of the similarities which may have found particularly disturbing is the ostensible tribal pattern of the voting which conjures up the image of post-election tribal politics with its virulence and immoderation.<sup>4</sup>

Explanation for this dichotomy lies in the exaggeration of the impact of the military on society, and of the persistence of the view that the existence of tribes is dysfunctional, the bane of political development. The two mask the true scope and significance of the changes brought by the military and thus confuse analysis and understanding of contemporary Nigerian politics. This article offers an analysis of the 1979 elections which attempts to

1. See Claude S. Phillips, "Nigeria New Political Institutions, 1975-9," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 1 March, 1980), pp 1-22 at p. 2

2. Oyeleye Oyediran, "Civilian Rule for How Long?" in Oyeleye Oyediran (ed.), *Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966-1979* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979) p. 287.

3. Claude Phillips, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

4. Cf. The various television analyses of the election results by Nigerian academics and also Moses E. Akpan, "The Tribe Is Still The Thing," *Quest* (Calabar, Nigeria) (September 1979), pp. 113-15.

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get away from the tribalism framework — seeking to demonstrate that this framework conceals more than it elucidates, is becoming increasingly anachronistic and its continued use can only lead to self-fulfilling prophecy.

The argument is that tribes and tribalism, though still prominent features of the map of the social universe, do not totally determine political behaviors; personality, issues, and inchoate class interests have become equally important in some parts and at some levels of the Nigerian political landscape. This argument is developed in two stages: by discussing the salient characteristics of the 1979 elections and subsequent developments and by attempting to pinpoint the impact of personalities and socio-economic issues and programmes and thus showing that the electorate are motivated by a rationality that transcends crude tribalism.

### Salient Characteristics of the 1979 Elections

From the 1979 election results, four immediate changes are apparent in the pattern of Nigerian partisan politics — apparent because none represents an entirely new departure. First there is the emergence of minorities as kingmakers in the sense that they, rather than the larger ethnic groups which dominated the First Republic politics, now determine the balance of political power and, in particular, which candidate for the Presidency shall be victorious. Their votes put Shagari in office. They replace the Ibo in that role. Secondly, and as a corollary of the first change, there appears to be increased “tribalism” of the major ethnic groups because they voted more overwhelmingly for candidates of their own ethnic origin than at any time in Nigerian history. Thirdly, and as a concomitant of the first two changes, there is the emergence of three candidates from different ethnic groups from the North for the Presidency rather than a single candidate, conclusively challenging the monolithic conception of Northern Nigeria as a Hausa-Fulani fiefdom. Finally, and in sharp contrast to the above, there is the emergence of “national parties,” each with a “national” base and outlook in contrast to the former ethnic-based parties with parochial ethnic outlook.

One explanation that could be offered for these developments and the contrast is the impact of creating first twelve and then nineteen States out of the former four regions. The creation of more States could be said to give minorities autonomy which, under the new and different electoral regulations of 1979, they were able to exercise in such a way as to become another permutation in the regional and ethnic struggle for power and influence at the federal center. It enabled them to become the “balancer,” the Eastern ones breaking from Ibo hegemony, those in the North from

Fulani hegemony and then competing on an equal footing for control of the Center.<sup>5</sup> It also heightened tribalism via statism as each State became more nearly coterminous with particular tribes and thus State loyalty and tribal loyalty for the most part vitually coincided. This meant, of course, that political parties now had to have a national base exceeding the boundaries of a tribal group and have to think in terms of national interests, not simply because the electoral law required it but because it is the only way to ensure electoral victory. The result is the emergence of five “national” parties.

This explanation, while plausible, is unsatisfactory because it obviously begs the question of compatibility and transcendence between increased tribal thinking and loyalty on the other hand, and thinking in terms of national interests on the other. Indeed it is arguable that state creation and hence “statism” have increased the potentials for partisan politics to be colored by state/tribal sentiments and the more violent type of political cleavages.<sup>6</sup> Two pertinent examples are the attempt to whip up Kanuri nationalism in Borno state with all its post-election tendency towards political immobilism and the incessant demands for new states by “new” minorities now suddenly claiming cultural, historical and ethnic differentiation from groups of which they had hitherto been part and parcel.

Moreover, while state creation might have made it easier, it is not a full explanation of the emergence of three presidential candidates from the North nor of the emergence of minorities as kingmakers. For one thing the absence of the Sarduana, Sir Ahmadu Bello, and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (the leader and deputy leader of the NPC and Premier of the North and Prime Minister of the Federation respectively, both killed in the January 1966 coup) as the Northern counterparts to Awolowo of the West and Azikiwe of the East, created a vacuum. For another, minorities have always exercised their autonomy by attempting to be the “balancer” or kingmakers, a fact well understood by the political leaders of the First Republic and accounting, for instance, for the Action Group’s concentration of its efforts on the minority areas in the 1959 elections. If the minorities did not appear to succeed at that time it was in part because they divided their votes almost evenly among the three major parties’ and the

5. The minorities in the West had become free of Yoruba hegemony since the creation of the Mid West region in 1963 (later renamed Bendel State)

6. Cf. The deportation of the majority leader of the Borno State Assembly came to be seen as a punitive action by the NPN-controlled Federal Government against the GNPP-controlled Borno. On the other hand meetings of the nine governors of the GNPP and its allies, the UPN and the PRP, became a cause celebre, with the NPN charging the governors and the parties they represented with secessionist plots.

7. See K.W. Post. *The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). pp. 350-375.

present electoral rule — that a winning candidate for the Executive office must, in addition to a plurality, show the highest geographical (State) spread — did not then obtain.

Furthermore, as we shall presently see, the emergence of the minorities as kingmakers in 1979 is but an epilogue to the drama that began which began with Azikiwe's sudden announcement that he would run for President. Until that announcement the widely held expectation was that Zik (as he is popularly called) would keep to his word and, as the self-proclaimed "Father of the Nation," keep out of active partisan politics. Azikiwe gives as the reason for his change of mind his desire to ensure that the military would not return to politics after the transition to civilian rule. It is not clear how his candidacy offered such a guarantee unless one accepts the implicit assumption that in a four-cornered battle pitching Awolowo against three Northerners, Awolowo would win, that this would be unacceptable, and the ensuing crisis would provide a pretext for military intervention.

But there is ample evidence, and indeed a precedent, to suggest that concern for the place of the Ibos in the new dispensation was equally, if not more, important. The experience in 1959 and subsequently was that the Ibos might not win a federal election but they were indispensable in forming a government, a role which confers power and patronage out of proportion to their number. In the circumstances of 1979 — with the Ibos having lost the civil war and therefore their prominence in the scheme of things, a fact not lost sight of when none of the leading parties at the time saw the Ibo as other than a running-mate — the Ibos had to recreate 1959. Only then could they be certain to "stop Awo." The thinking appeared to be that with Zik as the presidential candidate of the NPP, there would be one or two Northern candidates pitched against one from the East and one from the West and no candidate would emerge victorious in the first ballot, given the more stringent conditions of 1979, making the double play of 1959 inevitable: extract maximum payoff for agreement to support another candidate at the electoral college, and have the last laugh by throwing support to a Northern candidate and thus stopping Awolowo.

Moreover running for President seemed to afford Zik an opportunity to salvage his somewhat tarnished reputation among some Ibos for allegedly wavering during the civil war. In helping to salvage Ibo honor and primacy he would be rehabilitating his own. This is the significance of the "If I were not Ibo" speech soon after announcing his candidacy in which he alleged official discrimination, on the ground of his ethnic origin, in the use of facilities he, as Premier of the East, conceived and built. He at one and the same time introduced tribal sentiments and, perhaps unwittingly, elements of the cult of personality into the campaign.

Whatever the explanation for Zik's change of mind, his decision to run for President led to the split in the NPP. Waziri Ibrahim led away what became the GNPP and Zik ultimately headed what was left of the NPP. The ostensible reason for the breakup was that Waziri, contrary to party constitution, refused to surrender one of the two offices he held — Presidential candidate and Chairman of the Party. In actual fact Waziri had sensibly realized that his was a Hobson's choice — to be Chairman and play second fiddle to Zik. For if he chose the Presidential candidacy, he would most likely have been eased out of that office eventually, given Zik's decision to run for the Presidency. The ostensible reason of course would be that it was politically and tactically unwise for the party to have its Presidential candidate from the North since the rival NPN had already decided to choose a Northerner.

### The Impacts of Personality And Ethnicity

Until the candidacy of Azikiwe and of Aminu Kano who, meanwhile, had broken away from the NPN ostensibly because of the "insulting appointment" as its publicity secretary, it was widely believed that the election would be a three-cornered contest between the NPN, the UPN and the NPP led respectively by Shagari, Awolowo and Waziri and that voting would be based more on personalities than ideology or even ethnicity.<sup>8</sup> Within that context much depended on the voting in the East and particularly on the two populous Ibo-speaking States of Anambra and Imo since Awolowo has traditionally not had a large following in the far North outside the minority areas. Significantly the UPN chose its Vice-Presidential candidate from among the Ibo and Awolowo was to reveal later that he had difficulty finding a running-mate from the North.<sup>9</sup> This "opening to the East" policy precipitated a scramble among other parties for Ibo Vice-Presidential candidates. Paradoxically it was the attendant awareness of possessing the trump in the election outcome and yet being regarded as "second class" citizens only good enough to be deputies to others that prompted Azikiwe, in addition to forestalling a North-South turn of events that could destabilize the nation and to "stop Awo," his arch rival, to become a candidate himself.

Azikiwe's candidacy turned the election into a North versus East versus West issue as in 1959, with all its ethnic overtones. Yet steps that would have prevented such a development failed adoption. The Consti-

8. Africa Confidential (20 October, 1978); New African (November, 1978), p. 26.

9. A. D. Yahaya, "The Struggle for Power in Nigeria 1966-79," in Oyeleye Oyediran, op. cit., pp. 259-75 at 270.



tuent Assembly, in an apparent attempt to prevent Awolowo's candidacy, had proposed the controversial Section 207 to the draft constitution, barring from holding political office any public officer who had been found guilty of corruption or abuse of office since independence. The military amended that section in the final constitution, barring only those found guilty during the military rule. In a similar effort the FEDECO, under the regulation concerning regular payment of tax when due for the previous three years, found Zik and Aminu Kano unqualified. But the courts, despite the provision in the decree establishing FEDECO that the latter shall not be "subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority," held that Azikiwe and Kano had not defaulted on their tax payment. This ruling lent credence to Azikiwe's charges that FEDECO was in collusion with other political parties (or under instruction from the Military Government, some believed) to persecute him.<sup>10</sup> The intervention by the military and the courts in favor of the candidacy of Zik, Awo and Kano defused potential widespread crisis and possible bloodshed that would have truncated efforts to restore civilian rule. At one and the same time it underscores the military's limitations and epitomizes the continuity with, and evolution from, the past; for the military had consciously attempted to ensure a clean break with the past and to start the Second Republic with men untainted by the politics of the past.

With the ethnic complexion introduced by the candidacies of the "Old Patrons," only the outcome among the minorities was in doubt. And the inert distribution of the votes would seem to justify the verdict of "tribe is still the thing." But when juxtaposed with the 1959 distribution the results reveal an interesting phenomenon which crude tribalism alone does not satisfactorily explain. In 1959, the "Ibos remained solidly in support of the NCNC which received more than 90% of the votes in sixteen constituencies and between 80 and 90% in eleven more." Action Group candidates in all but two of these constituencies forfeited their deposits. By contrast, among the Yoruba the Action Group rarely received over 60% of the votes (fourteen constituencies) and was more apt to receive between 40 and 59% (thirty-two constituencies) whereas the NCNC not only won eight constituencies, it received 30 to 59% of the votes in twenty-five others. In other words in "its 'home' area the NCNC was thus much stronger than the Action Group in Yorubaland" or, to put it bluntly, the Ibos were much more tribalistic.<sup>11</sup> In 1979, however, while the Ibos remained solidly in support of Azikiwe with 84.8% of their votes (Awolowo received only 0.69%) thus replicating 1959, the Yorubas this time gave Awolowo 90% of their votes with only 0.58% going to Azikiwe,

10. *New African* (June 1979), pp. 18-19.

11. K. W. Post, *Nigerian Federal Election of 1959*, op. cit., pp. 359-66.

a sharp contrast to 1959 when Awolowo's Action Group received 49.5% of the Yoruba votes to Azikiwe's NCNC's 40.2%.

To attribute this change simply to tribalism is to suggest that the Ibos have remained as tribalistic as they were twenty years earlier, that the Yorubas have finally caught up with the Ibos in tribalism and, in effect, support the theory that tribalism increases with modernization<sup>12</sup> or, as Gowon put it, that the country is worse off in terms of "moderation and self-control in pursuing sectional interests."<sup>13</sup> Such a verdict could be rationalized on the ground that the civil war might have made the Ibos more tribalistic and that "the Yoruba remember vividly the politics of the First Republic when they were excluded from power and their part of the country was made the literal battleground during the elections of 1964 and 1965."<sup>14</sup>

Yet, such a verdict would contradict everything that has happened in the country in the last fourteen years: the very survival of the country, the defeat of the extreme tribalism symbolized in Ibo secession and the higher cohesion of the military whose previous tribalism had precipitated the worst bloodshed in the country's history. It would be at variance with the historical and contemporary reality of intra-Yoruba "feuds and clan and lineage conflicts (especially those over succession and chieftancies that had long roiled their politics) which make their factional politics not easy to manipulate and control."<sup>15</sup>

I suggest that Azikiwe's and Awolowo's track records in the East and the West respectively (and this may hold true for Aminu Kano with respect to Kano and Kaduna States and Waziri with respect to Borno) and their personalities are a key to a fuller explanation. The two surviving leaders of modern Nigerian nationalism, Azikiwe and Awolowo, headed the governments of their respective regions throughout the 1950s which laid the foundations of the socio-economic development of the 1960s and 1970s. Their policies and achievements at a time when "oil boom" was a pipe dream and government literally had to pull shoe-strings would make their military successors' vaunted achievement pale by comparison. For in spite of the oil boom, there have been few concrete benefits to the masses beyond what they knew under "Zik" and "Awo." This was even more so in the East where the gigantic task of post-war reconstruction seemed to

12. Paul Anber, "Modernization and Political Disintegration: Nigeria and the Ibos," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 5, 2 (1967), pp. 163-79.

13. Cited in Leo O. Dare, "Nigerian Military Governments and the Quest for Legitimacy," *The Nigerian Journal of Social and Economic Studies*, XVII, 2 (July, 1975), pp. 115-16.

14. Jean Herskovits, "Democracy in Nigeria," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter, 1979-80) pp 316-35.

15. Henry Bienen, "Military Rule and Political Process," op. cit.

absorb every naira.

In the West the burden of financing children's education, especially at the secondary level where the fees were already much higher than the Universities, had become unbearable for parents. The military regime's attempt first to peg the tuition fees and then to eliminate them became a farce as boarding fees and "development" charges doubled, making a longing for Awolowo's competence and know-how come vividly alive. He had successfully launched the Free Education scheme way back in 1955; he could repeat the feat for secondary education. Also important, a whole generation born after 1955 have passed through this scheme, fondly called "Awo Free School." Along with those already of school age in 1955 who pioneered the scheme, they constituted over fifty percent of the electorate in the Western States, thanks to the lowering of the voting age to eighteen. When Richard Akinjide, the NPN gubernatorial candidate in Oyo State, publicly denounced Awolowo's free education scheme as having "produced nothing but armed robbers" there was hardly any family, including his own, which he had not thereby insulted.<sup>16</sup> The consequences of alienating so large a section of the Western electorate and telling them in effect that a coveted scheme would be abolished under an NPN government are reflected in the polls.

In this regard the results in Lagos are particularly revealing. The fact that Awolowo took 82.3% of the votes in a State where over half the population is non-Yoruba attests to the importance of party programs and confidence in track records of party leaders vis-a-vis tribe in that State. The issue of free education was overpowering in metropolitan Lagos, now the largest and fastest growing city. Moreover the UPN's four cardinal principles were expected to appeal to labor groups and did. The party's votes came largely from the large urban areas where labor groups are highly concentrated. In this regard it is not surprising that the party did best in the Western States, which are also the most urbanized in Nigeria.<sup>17</sup>

In the East personality and track records also played a significant role. Here, unlike the West, Awolowo did not win many votes even in the urban centers for reasons of cool calculations of economic interests. It was Awolowo who as Commissioner for Finance under Gowon announced that starvation was a proper instrument of war to be used to crush the secessionists. Before then he was already in Ibo bad books for allegedly edging them on to secession by declaring that if the East was allowed to secede the West would follow, a promise he never tried to fulfill. And during the electioneering campaign he frightened and insulted many by his

16. Indeed his opponent in the television debate, the UPN candidate, retorted with, "How many in your family?" at which point the debate abruptly ended.

17. 15 of the 24 principal cities (62.5%) are in the Western States. *Africa South of the Sahara 1980-81* (Europa) p. 770.

promise to stop the importation of stock fish and second hand clothes because they were not fit for human beings. These are two major items of commerce for the Ibo, as important to the local economy as petroleum is to the national one. The Ibo vote went to Azikiwe who had done for them what Awo had done in the West. But the "minorities" of the Cross River and Rivers States who, rightly or wrongly had accused Azikiwe of discrimination during his tenure as Premier of the East, gave him scant support. Instead their votes went to Shagari.

The high votes for Shagari in the minority States are due to cool calculations of economic and political interests and not, as Herskovits suggests, to their lack of "favorite sons,"<sup>18</sup> for there is no Nigerian community without its favorite sons. What had happened was that the favorite sons had simply decided that their being winners and of getting a better economic deal while assuring national stability were much better with Shagari and the NPN than with any other leader or party.

Nothing perhaps better illustrates the impact of the personality of Azikiwe, Awolowo and Kano, who have literally become historical institutions, than the fact that relatively unknown figures who happened to be NPP, UPN and PRP candidates defeated the so-called "political heavyweights" and "men of timber and calibre" of the same tribe who belonged to other parties. Crude tribalism does not explain this coat-tail syndrome. Moreover in Kaduna State, where the NPN controls sixty-four of the ninety-nine State Assembly seats (to the PRP's sixteen) the State Governorship, by a wide margin of votes, went to the PRP candidate. What all this amounts to is that with other things held constant except the candidacies of Awolowo, Azikiwe and Aminu Kano, the veterans, the pattern of voting would have been decisively different. In this context the **New African's** observation is to the point:

The general feeling is that the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) is likely to be the main beneficiary of the disqualification of Alhaji Aminu Kano in States like Kano and Kaduna while Zik's disqualification could bring in some additional votes into the ballot boxes of both the NPN and Great Nigeria People's Party (GNPP) in Imo and Anambra States. The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo as well as Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim's GNPP stand to gain crucial votes from disillusioned NPP and PRP supporters in States like Benue, Plateau, Gongola, Rivers and Cross Rivers.<sup>19</sup>

When Awolowo and Zik finally leave the political scene there are bound to be new party-political alignments of individuals and groups that will affect the present five-party system and reveal how far Nigerians have come away from tribalism.

18. Jean Herskovits, op. cit.

19. *New African* (June, 1979), p. 19.

It must be stressed that the point is not to deny tribalism at all. That would be silly. The most prominent features of the map of the social universe are still the tribes: they occupy large chunks of territory, with interactions limited largely to their trader elements and the educated strata and, on a limited basis, in business, predominantly in the cities, where residence is still largely segregated ethnically. Classes, to the extent that they exist,<sup>20</sup> often do not effectively transcend ethnic barriers. Where they do, invariably in the form of class organizations such as trade unions, they are numerically weak (the estimated Nigerian unionized work force of about 500,000 belong to forty-two different unions) and ideologically divided. In short the tribe remains the single pervasive meaningful unit of organization which rolls into one the idea of nation and nationalism and of class and social status. Given such a universe, what is surprising is not that there is tribalism at all (and it is silly to complain that tribes, one's building blocks, make nation-building difficult or impossible) but that it is not much more virulent.

Obviously, the tribes are moved by concerns other than tribal loyalty. Like the "responsible electorate" described by V.O. Key Jr., with respect to the United States,<sup>21</sup> the Nigerian mass electorate is a good deal less irrational, ill-informed or sheep-like than the fashionable crude tribalism argument would lead us to suppose. They are moved by questions of national and local public policy, of governmental performance and of executive personality. In other words the Nigerian electorate behaves rationally and responsibly or at least as rationally and responsibly as could be expected given the structure of society and limited access to information.

It is true, of course, that in the past the political elite, lacking any other meaningful bonds to the masses except tribe, often appealed to tribal bonds for support in the inter-elite struggle for power. The technique was to bestow the benefits of power in the form of disproportionate share of government expenditure on the target tribe, or, if out of office, to explain the tribe's comparative underprivileged position in terms of the ill-will or "tribalism" of the elite faction currently in power. But over the years, elite polarization within the same tribe, the bloodshed in which the masses are always the victims and the increasing gap between the masses and the elite (civilian before 1966, and civil-military thereafter) all have begun to convince the masses either that their salvation does not depend on politics<sup>22</sup> or, if it does, then certainly not upon "tribal politics" but on

leadership they can trust regardless of its tribal origin, supplemented as opportunity arises with a touch of "class" politics. The Agbekoya agrarian populist rebellion of 1968-9 with its overt class manifestations is a clear demonstration of the trend in new awareness. In this sense General Obasanjo's observation is apropos: If the political classes have not changed, he said, the "Nigerian they will be talking to has changed in his level of awareness" and hence his belief that "ethnicity and tribalism will be pushed more and more to the ground."<sup>23</sup> There is an implied suggestion here of the possibility of a link between modernization and elimination or transformation of tribalism.

## Conclusions

Our analysis shows that much political behavior, especially voting behavior, attributed to tribalism (or the euphemistic ethnic loyalties and rivalries) as an explanatory tool or concept appears to need rethinking. For one thing it is, at best, becoming increasingly out of date and out of touch with reality. At worst it can only exacerbate the danger of self-fulfilling prophecy, defining tribalism as real and thereby making it real in its consequences. For another thing the concept impairs our perspective and healthy feelings about the workings of our own system. We think nothing of it that a Jimmy Carter should carry his home state of Georgia and the other southern states in a Presidential election in the U.S. Indeed his failure to do so will be regarded as a personal failure. Yet it is literally regarded as a crime when an Azikiwe carries (or even thinks of carrying) his home States of Anambra and Imo. No eyebrows are raised for a Ted Kennedy to carry Massachusetts and other New England states or to "go for the Irish vote;" this is taken for granted and even deemed healthy for the American political system. But when an Awolowo carries Ogun State and goes for the Yoruba votes, this is regarded as "tribal" politics, wrong and unhealthy for the political system.

How significant this problem is can be seen in the concern which led, on the one hand, to decreeing "national" parties into existence though as election results clearly reveal, these are yet to emerge in the true, intended sense; and on the other hand, to entrenching the phrase "federal character" in the Constitution. Defined as "the distinctive desire of the peoples of Nigeria to promote (and) foster national unity" by giving citizens a sense of belonging to the nation regardless of his ethnic origin, the

20. For a lively discussion of whether classes exist in Africa, see Gavin N. Kitching, "The Concept of Class and the Study of Africa," *African Review* Vol. 2.3 (1972), pp. 327-50; Robert Miller, "Elite Formation in Africa: Class, Culture and Coherence," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 12.4 (1974), pp. 521-42.

21. V.O. Key, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1966).

22. This probably accounts for the 35.5% voter turnout compared to 79.5% in 1959, though it is also likely that registration figures were inflated. The almost fourteen years of no partisan politics, with little or no effect on their fortunes may buttress this belief.

23. *Africa Report* (July-August, 1979), p. 49.

concept entails ethnic/State balancing in the composition of the Federal and State governments and their agencies. As such "federal character" is reviving crude tribalism as it becomes the new justification for the deprivation of certain groups (non-origines of States) vis-a-vis others (indigenes).<sup>24</sup> Paul Anber, Paul Mercier and Robert Miller among others have suggested that it is political fissions arising from perceived inequalities which trigger off ethnic conflicts and separatism.<sup>25</sup> The concept of federal character may be deemed to avoid that. But it is also the case that political fissions based on tribe can easily become absolute or total and therefore the more virulent. The use to which some States are putting the concept of federal character encourages just that. If stability ensues, it will not be because of "Nigeria's new political institutions," important though these are, but because of self-restraint arising from the general wish to avoid a return of the military to overt politics. As Awolowo recently put it, "A major crisis is an ill-wind that blows no one any good. I pray that there is no military coup in this country again, because if there should be one, it will be bloody."<sup>26</sup>

24. For a fuller discussion and examples of this development. See Olatunde Ojo. "Inter-Governmental Relations Under the Constitution," paper for the Workshop on the Making of the 1979 Constitution. Political Science Department, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. (1980).

25. Paul Anber op. cit.; Paul Mercier. "On the meaning of Tribalism in Black Africa" in Pierre van der Berghe. *Africa: Social Problems of Change and Conflict* (San Francisco, 1965) p. 495; Robert Miller. "Elite Formation in Africa: Class, Culture and Coherence" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 12, 4 (1974) pp 521-42.

26. *Washington Post* (Sunday, 28 December, 1980) p. A27.

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## **Peripheral Capitalism in Ghana**

David H. Groff

Rhoda Howard, **COLONIALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN GHANA** (New York: Africana, 1978), pp. 244; \$22.50.

Recent studies of economic and social change in colonial Africa tend to fall into two categories. On the one hand, there are studies emphasizing the rational responses of African farmers and entrepreneurs to market opportunities opened up or expanded under colonial rule. Such studies normally assume a purely local focus, concentrating on particular groups of Africans.<sup>1</sup> Their underlying theme is the development of African capitalist enterprise. On the other hand, there are studies written from a more "macro" perspective. These studies generally argue that however rational the African response to market opportunities during the colonial era, the overall effect of colonialism was to

1. The classic studies of this type are Polly Hill's *The Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), Jan Hogendorn, "The Origins of the Groundnut Trade in Northern Nigeria" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1966), and Sara Berry, *Cocoa, Custom and Socioeconomic Change in Rural Western Nigeria* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.)

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create a set of economic structures subordinating African economies to the needs of the industrial capitalist countries and thereby all but foreclosing the possibility of an indigenous African capitalism.<sup>2</sup>

While at first glance these two approaches may appear to be mutually exclusive, they are at least potentially reconcilable. One need not deny African economic responsiveness to accept the view that colonialism had a stultifying effect on African capitalism. One of the tasks of current research is to find ways of analyzing the interaction between African entrepreneurial initiatives and the growth of colonial underdevelopment. Rhoda Howard's *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana* addresses this challenging task with energy and imagination. This study, covering the period c. 1885 to 1940, provides a well documented account of how British colonialism shaped and constrained the economic activities of the people of present-day Ghana.

Howard's overall approach reflects the influence of the "world systems" perspective of Immanuel Wallerstein.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, she places colonial Ghana within the context of an expanding world capitalist system with its characteristic set of core-periphery political economic relationships. Unlike some proponents of world systems analysis, however, Howard rejects the notion that the spread of capitalist trade relations involved a concomitant diffusion of the capitalist mode of production. Instead she follows Ernesto Laclau, Samir Amin and others who argue that the growth of the world economic system involved the incorporation of pre-capitalist social formations whose particular modes of production became articulated with and subordinated to the needs of the capitalist mode of production.<sup>4</sup>

This theoretical perspective clearly informs Howard's overall thesis. Her argument is that the integration of the colonial economy of Ghana into the world capitalist system during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries involved two contradictory processes. On the one hand, Ghana rapidly developed as a peripheral capitalist economy based on the export of cocoa, gold and other industrial raw materials. On the other hand, its potential for becoming a full-blown capitalist economy was progressively weakened by the very structures promoting its integration into the world capitalist system. What emerged in Ghana by the late 1930s was an amalgam of capitalist and pre-capitalist forms, a hybrid economy whose internal structure placed severe constraints on Ghana's possibilities for development.

Using data drawn primarily from government and import-export company archives, Howard develops this thesis by analyzing the specific mechanisms responsible for maintaining and deepening Ghana's economic dependency. The first such mechanism was the highly oligopolistic organization of the trading, banking and shipping sectors. By the late twenties, these sectors had fallen under the sway of a handful of British companies, most notably Lever's United Africa Company and the Elder Dempster shipping line. This cartel not only manipulated the prices of Ghanaian exports and imports, but also restricted the opportunities available to Ghana's indigenous traders and entrepreneurs. This argument is, of course, not new, but seldom has it been so well documented or

2. See, for example, Samir Amin, *Neo-colonialism in West Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), and E.A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa* (New York: Nok, 1973).

3. For a summary of this approach, see Terence K. Hopkins, "The Study of the Capitalist World Economy: Some Introductory Considerations," in *The World System of Capitalism: Past and Present*, ed. by W. Goldfrank (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979).

4. Ernesto Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America," *New Left Review* No. 67 (May-June 1971), 19-38 and Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale* vol. 1 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).

so systematically developed.<sup>5</sup>

Howard also analyzes the role of the colonial state in creating and sustaining Ghana's peripheral capitalism. She shows how the British colonial administration, through its concessions, fiscal, monetary and transportation policies, functioned to fulfill the economic needs of the British Empire. To her credit, she distinguishes these needs from those of British capital, although in most instances the two coincided. The relative autonomy of the colonial state was manifest in efforts to mediate the conflicting interests of different groups of metropolitan capitalists, and in its occasional attempts to arbitrate disputes between these groups and the indigenous petty bourgeoisie of traders and intellectuals. Overall, however, the state served primarily to maintain the structures of Ghanaian dependency.

Yet Howard does not confine her analysis to the willful actions and policies of the colonizers. She also shows how African responses to these actions and policies also tended to reinforce Ghanaian underdevelopment. With a fine sense of historical irony, she describes how the successful struggle of the African coastal elite and upcountry chiefs against British attempts in the 1890s to introduce a system of freehold land tenure ultimately contributed to the retardation of Ghana's internal productive forces. Howard suggests that the Aborigines Rights Protection Society, the African standard bearer in this dispute, had little choice in the short run but to act as it did. To have accepted the Lands Bill would have been to acquiesce in a policy clearly intended to benefit colonial business interests. Moreover, under the unequal competitive conditions created by colonial rule, the African petty bourgeoisie, the principal social base of the ARPS, saw the old communal land tenure system as a means of guaranteeing its own access to land and limiting that of its white competitors. Nevertheless, in the long run, the ARPS victory impeded the development of a land market and hence the emergence of fullblown rural capitalism.

The social evolution of Ghana between 1885 and 1940 also reflected and reinforced the process of underdevelopment initiated by the colonizers. Social stratification proceeded apace but did not lead to the clearcut emergence of either a bourgeoisie or a proletariat, the classes most typical of capitalism. Foreign control of international trade coupled with Ghana's role as a consumer of light industrial products prevented the potential petty bourgeoisie of traders, professionals and bureaucrats from consolidating itself into a capitalist class. In the countryside clearcut divisions between rich farmers, intermediate and poor peasants and migrant laborers emerged, but the absence of freehold land tenure and the persistence of seasonal migrant labor impeded the development of the capital-labor relationship. By 1940 Ghana's social structure, like its economy, mirrored its peripheral status within the world capitalist system.

In general, this reviewer finds Howard's analysis persuasive. Her use of documentation and statistical tables is impressive and her prose, though rather ponderous, is clear and easy to follow. Her principal achievement is to describe and analyze the ways in which British colonialism placed severe constraints on the development of Ghana, constraints which formed the context within which African economic actors undertook their initiatives.

5. For other versions of this general argument, see Edward Reynolds, *Trade and Economic Change on the Gold Coast, 1807-74* (London: Longman, 1974) and Susan B. Kaplow, "The Mudfish and the Crocodile: Underdevelopment of a West African Bourgeoisie," *Science and Society* 41 (1977), 317-333.

## **A Sensitive Novel About Expatriate Life in Central Africa**

Sheldon G. Weeks

V.S. Naipaul, *A BEND IN THE RIVER* (London. Andre Deutsch. 1979.) 296 pp. (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979. \$8.95)

This is a brilliant novel. Naipaul, who is famous for his writings about the West Indies, Europe and India, has written about Africa before in *In A Free State*. His latest novel, *A Bend In The River*, is unique and different from the others. Naipaul is noted for his humour and biting satire. In this tale he is much more gentle. It is set in a town on the rapids at the bend in the river (Kisangani, ex-Stanleyville, but never named).

Naipaul's approach is different because the story is told in the first person by Salim. This style limits the whole range of expression, but not what Naipaul has been able to accomplish. The time period is from the early 60s to the late 70s. Salim is a Kenyan Asian from Malindi who is sold a business in the town at the rapids on the bend in the river in that newly independent state west of Uganda (Zaire, but again never named).

Salim's existence revolves around a few friends and his servant Metty who escapes from Malindi to join him. Different views of life in this neo-colonial town are perceived through these characters. There is Zabeth, an African matriarch and trader, and her son Ferdinand whom Salim befriends at her request — he becomes the 'educated African', one of the new elite, and saves Salim from prison, blackmail and worse fates. We also have Mahesh and Shoba, a fellow expatriate Asian businessman and his wife, but with a very different life style, withdrawn, fatalistic, and opportunistic; Father Huisman who identifies with the bush and is murdered by the Africans he professes to love; Yvette, a young Belgian housewife whom Salim has an affair with, and Raymond, her husband, 30 years older, the President's 'Whiteman,' the Africanist scholar and recluse who is on the way out.

Salim is introduced to the white expatriate couple by Indar, a fellow Kenyan Asian from Malindi who has become an entrepreneur dealing in expatriate academics and who shows up in the city at the bend in the river to help establish a polytechnic in the Domain, a new town created by the President. Though he never appears the Big Man is ever present and dominates life and events.

Always in the background is the city, the river, the rapids, and the immense bush. The city is the key character in this novel and Naipaul sketches it in soft pastels with a backwash of solid reality — gone is the harsh satire found in *Guerrillas* or *In A Free State*. Salim tells his tale his own way, and through conversations with his friends. It is very convincing. His ennui reflects what is happening in the city, the tropical stupor, the perpetual motion of the river.

Naipaul has captured what it means for a small group of people to live in a neo-colonial backwater caught up in rebellion, corruption, 'development' and change. It is a story well told and worth the reading.

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Sheldon G. Weeks is Director of the Educational Research Unit at the University of Papua-New Guinea. He has previously held posts in Tanzania and Uganda.

AFRICA TODAY

## **Exploring a Riddle**

C.H. Mike Yarrow

Kenneth David Kaunda, *THE RIDDLE OF VIOLENCE* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981) pp. 184: \$9.95. edited by Colin M. Morris.

It is a rare privilege to have the reflections of the head of a new African state on such basic moral-political problems as violence, revolution, war and racism, deep issues that speak to the heart of humanity. All the greater is the privilege in having such reflections from a Christian Humanist of such broad vision who writes directly from the experience of leading a non-violent revolution to the seats of power and then undertaking the immensely difficult task of creating a new nation on the rubble of colonialism.

One should not look here for political, administrative, or economic lessons. These will have to come from other writers. Rather one finds the sincere grappling of a devoted Christian with the moral dilemmas that come from trying to do the right thing for the people in what Kaunda calls "a fallen world."

To say that Kaunda led the liberation movement of Northern Rhodesia along Christian, Gandhian paths to success, only to turn his back on pacifism and espouse the way of violence, is a much too simple assessment, one to which pacifists are all too prone. His writing shows that he is still at heart a Christian pacifist, one who has felt called to take center stage in the political arena, rather than withdraw to the role of a saint or prophet who keeps his witness pure but does not deal with the practical realities of government. Agonizing over the conflicting ways of the politician and the saint he realizes the value and necessity of both and finds no solution, only an easing of spirit in the paradox of repentance and forgiveness.

In delineating his moral, religious, political pilgrimage he has many wise things to say about the illusions of peaceniks, warmongers, colonial oppressors and revolutionaries. He shows that passive resistance may be hard to distinguish from passivity when the most important thing for oppressed people in asserting their humanity is to break the chains forcibly and openly. He pointedly attacks the notion of a "just war" in Christian theology, or a "just revolution." He reveals the hypocrisy of the colonial system which metes out terror day by day, hour by hour in legalized oppression, while denouncing guerrilla forces as terrorists and criminals.

Kaunda's work, excellently edited by his long term friend and associate Colin Morris, is more valuable as the insights of a statesman out of his own experience, than as a logical, thorough study of violence and non-violence. Thus his critique of passive resistance or non-violence is not the last word and a Gandhian could fault his assumption that passive resistance depends on winning the goodwill of the oppressive power. Nor would the recent non-pacifist theorists of civilian defense, citing the Nazi occupation of Norway, agree with his thesis that non-violence does not work against an iron-handed ruler.

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C.H. Mike Yarrow is the author of *Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation* (see *Africa Today*, 27/3, p. 72, item 19). For 21 years a staff member of the American Friends Service Committee, he is now retired, but remains active at many levels of The Society of Friends locally, nationally and internationally.

1st Quarter, 1981

More forceful are Kaunda's arguments against the possibility of running a new state on pacifist principles. Even before the new government was installed he had to deal with the Lumba sect, the fanatic, schizoid followers of the self-proclaimed "holy mother" Alice Lenishina Mulenga. Reason and persuasion were of no avail and the violence of the Lumba sectaries against the police and their neighbors had to be vanquished by superior force. And this was just an indication of the schisms and splits that assailed the new nation as the Independence Party tried to hold everything together.

Kaunda is most eloquent in portraying the transition from revolutionary movement, when all are united against a common foe, to functioning government, when suddenly all the problems of the past rose up to haunt him and the people were restless, dissatisfied, and pursuing conflicting goals. "Once I had incited the people to refuse to pay taxes to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland whose existence we refused to acknowledge: now I must insist that my fellow tax-dodgers pay up to support the State of Zambia." One cannot ignore, he says, the levers of power, one can only hope to use them to the best good and the least damage. The only thing worse than refusing to use power is to become enamoured of it for its own sake. "It is the sheer power of the state, and the inevitability of that power which awes the new leader. And yet, should he ever lose that sense of awe and become matter of fact about power, or even develop an appetite for pulling those levers, then he is a menace — there is a mad man, in political terms, at the helm."

Next to the realities of statecraft, the liberation movement directed against Rhodesia has been of great influence in modifying Kaunda's original pacifism. He argues most aptly that there would never have been the necessity of a protracted civil war in Rhodesia if Britain had acted with force and speed to halt Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The 14 years of suffering, imprisonment, torture and massive dislocation of the blacks in Rhodesia and the strains on the economy of Zambia with punitive military raids added would have been avoided, says Kaunda, if Harold Wilson had acted against the rebellion in 1965. The racial aspect of Wilson's announced decision to abjure military methods and use only economic and military sanctions are not lost on Kaunda. And to make matters worse, the British government put on blinders when oil companies, including an English firm, bypassed the sanctions, thus fueling the planes that Smith used to bomb ZAPU refugee camps and Zambian people.

Kaunda's chapter on the World Council of Churches grants to humanitarian needs of liberation movements is a must for all who have been involved in that tangled argument. His remarks on South Africa are particularly gloomy as they come from a born optimist. His writing is absorbing and vivid as he uses analogies from his African background — "Welensky's army dashed around the place like columns of enraged ants" — and speaks simply and intimately from the turmoil of his own day to day decisions.

In addition to being an important political document, it is also an important Christian statement. Theological implications derive from his practical experience in trying to follow the way of Christ. At one point he cries out, "Dear Lord! How does one run a country by the letter of Jesus's teaching?" and he concludes, "As a political leader I cannot accept that Cross as the standard for my public life; as a penitent sinner I cannot evade it. I know of no way out of that awful predicament."

And so the riddle of violence is not solved, but it is intensely illuminated.

## Vigorous New South African Short Stories

Robert B. Boeder

Mtutuzeli Matshoba, *CALL ME NOT A MAN*, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press in association with Rex Collings, 1979), pp. 176, R2.50 in paperback.

Some vigorous new fiction writing is coming out of South Africa. In the wake of Soweto and its aftermath, Mtutuzeli Matshoba has published an arresting book of short stories.

Born in Soweto, "the vice-polluted giant matchbox city," in 1950, Matshoba was educated at boarding schools in Cape Province and Natal; was jailed briefly for fighting with African police reservists; spent a year at Fort Hare listening to Steve Biko; was expelled for taking part in a strike; worked as an assistant draughtsman in a die-cutting factory; then returned to Fort Hare where "June 16, 1976 exploded in my face."

It was then that he began to write. Two years later, Matshoba published his first story, "My Friend, the Outcast," in *The Voice* newspaper where Mthobhi Mutloatse encouraged him. Since 1978, he has been writing for *Staffrider* magazine where publisher Mike Kirkwood of Ravan Press has been a sympathetic supporter.

The volume contains seven stories. Most are autobiographical. The first, "My Friend, the Outcast," describes how white location administrators line their pockets by squeezing bribes from the desperate ones waiting for lodging in bursting African areas. A widow, Mrs. Nyembezi, and her family are forced either to pay exorbitant rent or give up their precious hovel. When they cannot pay, their belongings are thrown into the street. But when the middle class African who paid the bribe turns up to discover a poor family being evicted he refuses to take the house he has been waiting for. The story ends inconclusively, with the furniture still in the backyard.

The next tale, "Call Me Not a Man," describes a brief but very violent encounter with the brutal African police reservists who patrol Soweto's seamy streets, harrassing poor people while searching for individuals without passes. Scenes take on tremendous tension as the reservists hand out their gratuitous punishment to migrant workers long inured to accepting physical beatings as a way of life.

"A Glimpse of Slavery" is another savage experience with white South Africa's methods of controlling the black majority. A fight with a white co-worker ends with the African narrator sentenced to three months hard labor on a farm. This is a common South African form of punishment for petty offenses. Local farmers take on the responsibility for looking after prisoners who in turn work off their sentences in the fields. This provides farmers with cheap labor while white society takes on a vested interest in perpetuating black crime. For a while the street-wise hero of the tale takes his drubbing philosophically, but after realizing he may not survive, he escapes back to the relative freedom of the city.

"A Son of the First Generation" is the touching account of a tragic love story. Monde rescues Martha from a licentious existence of drunken one-night stands. Their sober plans for marriage are ruined by an incident at an

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employees' Christmas party where Martha is serving drinks. Dawie, a young Afrikaner whose only experience of mother love was with his African nannie, overimbibes and he and Martha end up in each other's arms. Nine months later Monde is shocked by the appearance of a coloured child. The marriage arrangement is terminated abruptly; two lives are shattered. But in an epilogue, the author welcomes the child produced by a "marriage of the races, above man-made laws" to an uncertain future. Throughout the book, Matshoba has only warm words for his coloured brethren, South Africa's limbo people.

"A Pilgrimage to the Isle of Makana" is the story of Matshoba's trip to visit his brother, Diliza, incarcerated for two years on dreaded Robben Island. It contains the book's most powerful writing, constituting a spiritual and physical journey from the black-white battleground of Johannesburg to the surreal dreamland of the Cape with its non-stop multi-racial partying. This is rather unsettling, but anyone who has been to the Western Cape will find Matshoba's description of its wild ocean waves evocative indeed.

When the ferry docks at Cape Town, a take on its Robben Island passengers, one of the island inmates, possibly Robert Sobukwe, is carried off on a stretcher, his body emaciated and broken but still breathing. Matshoba's description of the feelings evoked by his glimpse of the old man near the end of his earthly sufferings is the book's high point.

The interview with his brother turns out to be an anti-climax. The two are allowed only 15 minutes to talk, politics as a topic of conversation is excluded, a Xhosa-speaking guard listens with telephones at each ear. The message Matshoba leaves is that although inmates of Robben Island are physically in jail, their spirits remain free.

"Three Days in the Land of a Dying Illusion" recounts the city-reared Matshoba's trip to his independent "homeland," the Transkei. Various characters are met — migrant workers, their women living traditional lives. Then the author embarks on a remarkable tale within a tale about Nongqause, a young Xhosa woman of a century before, who had a vision that South African peoples could only be saved from white domination by unity. This meant abandoning witchcraft, sharing together and cultivating the land. This is precisely what the homeland policy is designed to prevent. White South Africa is simply adding a new twist to the old story of divide and rule while repeating the pattern established in other independent Southern African nations of educating a small black elite while the vast majority lives in squalor dependent on migrant labor earnings. Matshoba was actually relieved to return to South Africa.

The final short story, "Behind the Veil of Complacency," is a brief one of an encounter between a black man and woman and a racist white storekeeper told within the larger framework of a love story. Two idealistic young Africans try to ignore the vicious realities of everyday life in Johannesburg while nurturing their love for each other.

There is plenty of action in these stories. They are full of life. Full too of horror and the authentic voice of black African rage. But, like Fugard's plays, what animates them is hope. Remarkable as it may seem, there is enormous energy in the "dog kennel city." One gets the feeling that confronted with such overwhelming vitality the grim grey stone face of Afrikanerdom must crack and disintegrate. But after 300 years it is still there, as unyielding as ever. In future we hope to welcome a more sustained performance from Matshoba — perhaps a novel.

## Publications

1. A special 16 page issue of *FOCUS on Political Repression in Southern Africa*, the News Bulletin of the *International Defence and Aid Fund* presents documentation from the second session of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes of the Racist and Apartheid Regime in Southern Africa, held in Luanda from January 30 through February 3, 1981, under the title *ANGOLA: FIGHTING APARTHEID*. It is Special Issue 2, dated April 1981, and was mailed to subscribers with the May-June issue of *FOCUS*. The commission, chaired by Sean McBride and including Ramsey Clark in the U.S. delegation, took extensive testimony from deserters from the South African Buffalo Squadron, made up of ex-FNLA soldiers under mercenary officers who were formerly in the Rhodesian army. Delegations from the commission also visited sites of recent South African attacks in southern Angola and reported back to the entire commission. Copies of this special issue are available at \$2.00 each from International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, P.O. Box 17, Cambridge MA 02138 U.S.A. They are also available from IDAF Publications, 104 Newgate Street, London EC1A 7AP England, but we do not have the price in British currency. *FOCUS*, which is published six times a year, provides the most comprehensive information available anywhere on political arrests, detentions, bannings, banishments, trials and repressive laws in South Africa and Namibia. Subscriptions are \$10 per year for individuals or \$25 for institutions if ordered in the U.S. or Canada from the Cambridge, Massachusetts, office, or £3 UK sterling (£5 air mail) for subscribers elsewhere who should order through London. Subscriptions are for the calendar year, so if you order now, you should receive the issues already published in 1981, including the special issue described above.

We have also received two other new items from *International Defence and Aid Fund*. The first is No. 1 in a new series of occasional papers entitled *BRIEFING PAPER on Southern Africa*. This one, "South Africa: 1980 School Boycott," 4 pp., dated March 1981, is available from the North American office for US 60¢. We seem to have mislaid the covering letter from London that gave the British price and some indication of future plans for this series. The other new release is *PORTRAIT OF A PEOPLE: A personal photographic record of the South African liberation struggle*, by Eli Weinberg, 198 pp., UK 4.00, US \$10.00. Mr. Weinberg, who left South Africa in 1976 and now resides in Tanzania, was active in the South African Trade Union movement, the Communist party, and many Congress-related organizations from his arrival as an immigrant from Latvia in 1929 until his exile. While many of his negatives were destroyed before he could recover them from South Africa following his exile, he has compiled a gripping book of photographs under the headings Housing, Labour, Trade Unionism, Women, Children and Education, and Campaigns, Events, and Solidarity, with a short concluding section, *What of the Future?* An appropriate brief text accompanies the photographs.

2. Another report from the International Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes of the Racist and Apartheid Regime in Southern Africa (see first section of item 1 above) can be found in NOTES AND DOCUMENTS 2/81 from the *United Nations Centre Against Apartheid*, which reproduces a 40 page report of an international mission sent by the Commission to Angola in August 1980. The mission visited areas in southern Angola which had been subjected to attack by South African forces, and took testimony documenting the extent of South African military activity in the country. Attacks at 56 different points are documented, and many are illustrated by photographs. Other issues in this series which we have recently received are: 25/80 "Life and Labour in Transnational Enterprises in South Africa, by John Gaetsewe, 27 pp., 4/81 "Resolutions on Apartheid adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1980," 47 pp., 6/81 "Opposition to Apartheid in the Federal Republic of Germany," by Lenelotte von Bothmer, 16 pp., 11/81 "The Role of Gold in the Economy of Apartheid South Africa," by Veda Pillay, 29 pp., and 12/81 "The United Nations Education and Training Programme for Southern Africa," 30 pp. Orders for specific titles or requests to receive the series regularly should be addressed to your nearest UN Information Centre. In the US the address is 2101 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

3. OIL TANKERS TO SOUTH AFRICA is the title of a 90 page report by Franz Janzen and Bernard Rivers containing the results of a year's research into the source of South Africa's oil supplies through an intensive analysis of movements of the world's tanker fleet. The report is published by the *Shipping Research Bureau*, a foundation established by two Netherlands based organizations, The Holland Committee on Southern Africa (formerly the Angola Committee) and the Working Group Kairos. The report was completed in December 1980 and delivered to Ambassador B. Akporode Clark, chairman of the U.N. Special Committee Against Apartheid, who then sent copies to the governments of certain countries whose support of the OPEC embargo against South Africa may have been undercut by the shipments discussed in the report. It was released to the press and the public on March 11, 1981. The report lists 150 tankers that called at South African ports between January 1979 and March 1980, and calls special attention to 23, including 15 that sailed directly from countries supporting the embargo, that can with the greatest degree of certainty be assumed to have off-loaded oil while in South Africa. Shell, Mobil and Texaco all figure prominently as owners or charterers of the tankers under discussion. Readers wishing to obtain the full report should send \$7.50 to the Shipping Research Bureau, P.O. Box 11898, 1001 GW Amsterdam, The Netherlands. The price for organizations or institutions is \$15.00.

4. Book One of Volume 18 (1980-81) in *The Monograph Series in World Affairs* from the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver is THE MANPOWER APPROACH TO PLANNING: *Theoretical Issues and Evidence from Zambia*, by Massiye Edwin Koloko, XVI plus 94 pp., \$5.00. In addition to a carefully researched text, the information on Zambia's manpower situation is summarized in 27 tables and charts. The conclusion is that complete and authentic localization cannot be expected before 1990, ten years later than the government's original target. Even in 1990 the author estimates that the percentage of localization will have risen only from 66% to 80%. Details for ordering, and mention of other recent African titles in this series, can be found in the ad inside the back cover of this issue of AFRICA TODAY.

5. We have been somewhat slow to note that the journal of the *Centre for Developing-Area Studies* at McGill University is appearing under a new name and in a new format. Formerly called *Manpower and Unemployment Research*, LABOUR CAPITAL AND SOCIETY (TRAVAIL CAPITAL ET SOCIETE) is a bilingual, biannual journal in a 5" x 8" perfect bound format with articles, book reviews and notes dealing with labor related issues in all parts of the Third World. The two 1980 issues contain articles of interest to Africanists on labor in the Northern Rhodesian copperbelt 1926-1933, on migration in Upper Volta, and apprentices in Nigeria. Each issue also contains Peter Gutkind's Bibliography on Unemployment. In addition, the journal publishes an annual separately bound supplement REGISTER OF ONGOING LABOUR RESEARCH. Subscription are Canadian \$7.00 per year for institutions, or Cdn. \$4.50 per year for individuals. A special rate of Cdn. \$2.50 per year is available to subscribers in Third World countries. Order from the Centre for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University, Macdonald-Harrington Bldg., 815 Sherbrooke St. West, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 2K6.

6. Research report No. 54 from the *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies* is entitled DIVERSITY REGIONALISM AND NATIONAL UNITY, by Mohamed Omer Beshir, 50 pp., Skr 10/-. While the early pages deal with cultural diversity throughout the continent, the principal focus is on the author's own country, the Sudan, perhaps the most culturally diverse in Africa. We hope to include a review of this title in our special issue of the Sudan later this year. The address of SAIS is P.O. Box 2126, S-750 02, Uppsala, Sweden.

7. Two titles recently reviewed in AFRICA TODAY are now available in paperback. ANGOLA UNDER THE PORTUGUESE: *The Myth and the Reality*, by Gerald J. Bender (University of California Press), reviewed by John Marcum in 27/1, pp/47-49, and DISTORTION OR DEVELOPMENT? *Contending Perspectives on the Multinational Corporation*, by Thomas J. Biersteker (MIT Press), reviewed by Richard Sandbrook in 27/4, pp/45-46, are each priced at \$7.95 in the paperback edition. Your bookseller should have them or be able to order them for you.

8. Rex Collings, Ltd. has launched a new booklet series under the title NEXUS BOOKS in the field of Commonwealth literature. Each booklet deals with a single work by a Commonwealth author, containing an introduction to the text and a varied selection of reference and classroom material relating to the title under discussion. The first three booklets deal with works by Nigerian authors. In 01 Alistair Niven writes about Elechi Amedi's THE CONCUBINE. No. 02 is a discussion of Wole Soyinka's THE LION AND THE JEWEL by Martin Banham, and in 03 John Pepper Clark's SELECTED POEMS are presented by Kirsten Holst Petersen. These three, together with 04, an analysis of Caribbean author Edward Braithwaite's MASKS by Robert Fraser, are scheduled for release on May 21, 1981. The UK price for each is £1.00. Rex Collings address is 6 Paddington Street, London W1M 3LA England, but your bookseller should be able to order these titles for you.

When ordering items listed here or in the advertisements please mention AFRICA TODAY.

9. The most recent issue, No. 58, of *Munger Africana Library Notes* is **ELSA JOUBERT'S THE LONG JOURNEY OF POPPIE NONGENA: Significance, Synopsis, Reviews**, 36 pp., \$2. Ned Munger's opening article "Poppie and Her Boswell" suggests that this novel, now translated into English by the author from the original Afrikaans, may become the South African equivalent of **UNCLE TOM'S CABIN**. It has already sold more copies in South Africa than any other Afrikaans novel, other than those prescribed for reading in schools. For those who have not read the book the author's husband, Klaas Steytler, provides a seven page summary of the plot, if a reworking of hours of taped personal recollection by the principal character, fictionalized primarily in name, can be called a plot. While some of the photocopied reviews are hard to read, those interested in the impact of literature on society will want to read this pamphlet. Order from Munger Africana Library, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125 USA.

10. *The National Anti-Apartheid Action Campaign*, P.O. Box 11376, San Francisco CA 94101, is calling for United Nations action instituting an oil embargo against South Africa. They have available a six page brochure **DEMAND AN OIL EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA** as well as copies of a petition calling for U.S. support for this action addressed to the President and Congress of the United States.

11. **CIRCLE OF POISON: Pesticides in a Hungry World** is the title of a new 101 page paperback by David Weir and Mark Shapiro. This account of the sales of chemical pesticides, many illegal in the United States, to Third World companies by multinational corporations was published in mid-March, two months after President Carter had banned such sales by executive order and one month after President Reagan rescinded the order. Single copies are \$3.95 from the publisher, The Institute for Food and Development Policy, 2588 Mission, San Francisco CA 94110. Discounts are available for bulk orders.

12. The *United Nations Development Programme* publishes a journal and has launched a new series of papers that will be of interest to many of our readers. **TCDC NEWS** is a quarterly journal devoted to Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries. The current issue (April-June 1981) is No. 9, but the only one we have examined is No. 8 (Jan.-Mar.), which carries the subhead "Bridges Across the South," carries news from UNDP, a number of articles of inter regional interest, a special section on Communication Initiatives, three regional sections (Africa, Americas, Asia and Pacific), as well as brief reports of co-operative efforts and a list of new publications. The paper series appears under the title **DEVELOPMENT ISSUE PAPER FOR THE 1980s**. We have received the following papers: No. 1, "The 1970s — Inventory of World Development Needs Resources and Relationships," 11 pp., No. 2 "Commodities at the Crossroads: The Issues," 13 pp., No. 12, "Women and the New International Economic Order," 17 pp., No. 13, "Women and Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries (TCDC)", 15 pp. Both the journal and the papers, we gather, will be sent on request, as will an 18 page listing of other materials. Write to UNDP, Division of Information, One United Nations Plaza, (DC-1972), New York, N.Y. 10017, or Information Section, UNDP European office, Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10 Switzerland.

13. After a long silence, the *Liberation Support Movement* is again in print. The work of the movement has undergone a significant transformation since the discontinuation of LSM news and other publishing ventures two years ago. No. 1 of a new newsletter **APOIO (SUPPORT)** outlines these changes. After a merger with the Glad Day printing collective of Ithaca, New York, the movement is now operating a commercial printshop, Sequoyah Graphics, in Oakland, California, and using the proceeds to support various projects. The newsletter contains a report of a successful completion of the **SWAPO Printshop Project** and of the visit of two members of the collective, Steve Goldfield and Candy Wright, to Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique in late 1978 and early 1979. LSM will be willing to put you on the **APOIO** mailing list if you send \$1.00 to cover postal costs to them at P.O. Box 2077, Oakland CA 94604 USA. Copies of many earlier LSM publications are still available for sale.

14. Although the election is already history, some readers may wish to write for a new **CEDIMO** analysis paper (No. 4) entitled "Background on the South African General Election, 29th April: Crisis of the 'Total Strategy,'" 6 pp. Order from **CEDIMO** (National Documentation and Information Centre of Mozambique, C. P. 4116, Maputo, R. P. Mozambique).

15. Two sets of 35mm microfilm tapes with printed guide and index of special interest to Africanists were released May 1 by *University Publications of America*, 44 North Market Street, Frederick MD 21701. They are **AFRICA: 1941-1961 (Part XIII of O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports)**, 11 reels, \$540, and **AFRICA: SPECIAL STUDIES, 1962-1980**, 7 reels, \$360. Also new is a 22 reel set, **PAPERS OF THE NAACP, PART I: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual Conferences, Major Speeches, and Special Reports, 1909-1950**, \$1040.

16. **LA LITTÉRATURE ORALE AFRICAINE — BIBLIOGRAPHIE ANALYTIQUE** by Veronika Gorog Karady, 400 pp., can be ordered between now and September 30 for the pre-publication price of 88 French francs from Editions G.-P. Masionneuve et Larose (service librairie), 15, rue Victor Cousin, 75005 Paris, France.

## Announcements

The campaign against bank loans to South Africa was boosted on March 19, 1981, when Dr. William Howard, President of the National Council of Churches, and Dr. Leon Sullivan, author of the "Sullivan Principles" released a joint statement opposing such loans and announcing plans to encourage churches, unions, foundations and universities to obtain policy statements from their banks and to withdraw funds from banks continuing to extend loans to South Africa. Copies of the statement and the supporting remarks of both principals can be obtained from Dr. Howard's office at the National Council, 475 Riverside Drive, New York N.Y. 10027. Further evidence of the progress of the campaigns against loans and investments is contained in an undated news release (received here March 26th) from Joshua Nessen at the *American Committee on Africa* (198 Broadway NY 10038) describing divestment actions at Harvard, Colby, Eastern Michigan, Williams, Mt. Holyoke and UCLA. But at Northwestern, reported to have more invested with firms doing business with South Africa than any other university, the issue remains unresolved. Following protests and demonstrations in 1978 by AGENISA (the ad hoc group to end Northwestern investments in South Africa) the administration promised to convene a conference to explore the issue. Nothing happened until early this year, when the administration announced that the conference would be held May 27th and 28th. The major invited participants were, however, perceived by AGENISA leaders, who had not been invited to participate in the initial planning, to be pro-investment. After extended discussion and negotiation AGENISA leaders decided not to participate in the conference and have instead organized a teach-in on investments for May 22nd and 23rd, preceding the conference. (Northwestern information supplied by Dennis Brutus.)

The State Department *Scholar-Diplomat Seminar Program* enters its twelfth year this autumn. Scholars interested in spending an intensive week of study and observation in the department, paired with an officer in the scholar's field, should request application forms or further information from the Scholar-Diplomat Seminars, National Capitol Division, Office of Public Programs, Bureau of Public Affairs, Room 5831, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520 (tel. 202-632-3340).

The 1981 winner of the \$3,000 *Noma Award for Publishing in Africa* is Felix C. Adi, a Nigerian professor of medicine, for *HEALTH EDUCATION FOR THE COMMUNITY*, published by Nwamife Publishers, Enugu, Nigeria. A special citation went to Ngugi wa Thiong'o for his Kikuyu novel *CAITAANI MUTHARABA-INI*. Five other titles received honorable mention. Author or publishers wishing to propose titles for the 1982 competition (books published in Africa by African authors) should write for information to Hans Zell, Editor, African Book Publishing Record, P.O. Box 56, Oxford OX1 3EL England.

A *Center for the Study of Francophone Literature of North Africa* has been established at Temple University. For more information write Eric Sellin, Director, CELFAN, Department of French and Italian, Temple University, Philadelphia PA 19122 USA.

## Coming Events

The *American Committee on Africa* is sponsoring A TRIBUTE TO GEORGE HOUSER on Wednesday June 17, 1981 from 7:30 to 9:45 PM at the Community Church, 40 E. 35th Street, New York City, honoring his 28 years of service to the cause of African liberation as executive director of ACOA. Ozzie Davis and Ruby Dee, Nigerian drummer Olatunji and James Farmer are among the featured participants. Tickets are \$5.00 and may be ordered by mail or phone from ACOA, 198 Broadway, New York, NY 10038(212) 962-1210. The program, which will include music, film and messages from African leaders, will be beamed live to Africa via satellite through the UN Communications Network and relayed by the transmitters in Dar es Salaam, powerful enough to reach the Cape of Good Hope. Proceeds go to the ongoing work of ACOA. On July 1st, when George's retirement begins, ACOA will welcome the second executive director in the history of the organization when Jennifer Davis, long time director of research for the Committee, assumes the post.

The Annual Meeting of the *African Studies Association* will be held October 21-24 at Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana. The theme is African Humanities. While the deadlines for nominations for panels and papers will be past by the time you read this write to Program Chairperson Ivan Karp, Program in African Studies, Woodburn Hall, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405, if you have an urgent proposal.

The Sixth *Ibadan Annual Literature Conference* will be held July 27-Aug. 1, 1981 at the Conference Center, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. The coordinator is Dr. Isidore Okpewho, Department of English, University of Ibadan.

# RAL

The "chief journal in the field of African literatures."—*Book Forum*, Vol. II, No. 2.

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*Fortcoming in RAL:* Sjaak van der Geest on *The Image of Death in Akan Highlife Songs of Ghana* • William Bascom on *African Folktales in America: VIII. Deer's Hoof and Ear; IX. Dog and Dog Head* • Kolawole Ogungbesan on *A Long Way from Vrededorp: The Reception of Peter Abrahams's Ideas* • Clarisse Zimra on *In Her Own Write: The Circular Structures of Linguistic Alienation in Assia Djébar's Early Novels* • Research Notes • Conferences • Book Reviews

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## Research in African Literatures

The University of Texas Press  
Journals Department  
P.O. Box 7819  
Austin, TX 78712

## Books Received

Starred titles have been sent to reviewers. Others may be requested by qualified reviewers.

### Political Science

ADMINISTRATION IN ZAMBIA. William Tordoff, ed., (Manchester University Press, University of Wisconsin Press 1981) 306pp.; hardcover \$30.00.

AFOCHA: *A Link Between Community and Administration in Harar, Ethiopia*. Peter Koehn and Sidney R. Waldron. (Syracuse University Foreign and Comparative Studies Program 1978) 120pp. paperback \$4.50.

THE AFRICAN-ARAB CONFLICT IN THE SUDAN. Dunstan M. Wai. (Holmes and Meier: Africana 1981) 234pp.; hardcover \$35.50.

\*AFRICAN SOCIALISM IN TWO COUNTRIES. Ahmed Mohiddin, (Barnes & Nobles Books, 1981) 231pp.; hardcover \$25.00.

\*AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL: *An Annotated Bibliography*. Mark W. Delancey. (Westview Press, 1981) 365pp. hardcover \$26.50.

AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: *The Stakes and the Stance*, Second Edition, Rene Lemarchand, ed. (University Press of America, 1981) 513pp. paperback \$12.50.

\*AN ANALYSING ACCOUNT OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE AFRICAN REFUGEE PROBLEM ARUSHA, MAY, 1979. L.G. Erikson, G. Melander and P. Nobel, eds. (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1981) 233pp. hardcover, n.p.

\*ERITREA: *Africa's Longest War*. David Pool. (Anti-Slavery Society, 1979) 78pp.; paperback L1.50.

FROM THE FRONT LINE: *Speeches of Sir Seretse Khama*. Gwendolen M. Carter and Philip E. Morgan, eds. (Hoover Institution Press, 1981) 339pp.; hardcover, \$26.95.

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS: *Public Policies, Comparative Measures and NGO Strategies*. V.P. Nanda, J.R. Scarritt and G.W. Shepherd. (Westview Press, 1981) 381pp. hardcover \$30.00.

IMPERIALISM AND REVOLUTION IN UGANDA. D. Wadada Nabudere. (Onyx Press Ltd., 1980) 376pp. paperback L5.50.

\*THE INDIAN OCEAN IN GLOBAL POLITICS. Larry W. Bowman and Ian Clark, eds. (Westview Press, 1981) 260pp. \$25.00.

RACE AND ETHNICITY: *South African and International Perspectives*. H. Van Der Merwe and R. Schrire (Rowman and Littlefield, 1981) 237pp. paperback \$12.95.

\*SOUTH AFRICAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 5 1979. H. Booysen and D.H. Van Wyk, eds. (Institute of Foreign and Comparative Law, 1979) 274pp. hardcover R 17,00.

\*A SOVIET VIEW OF AFRICA: *An Annotated Bibliography on Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti*. Colin Darch. (G.K. Hall & Co., 1980) 200pp.; hardcover \$30.00.

TRIBESMEN AND PATRIOTS: *Political Culture in a Poly-ethnic African State*. Ndiva Kofele-Kale. (University Press of America, 1981) 359pp. paperback \$12.75.

UP AGAINST APARTHEID: *The Role and the Plight of the Press in South Africa*, Richa Pollak. (Southern Illinois University Press, 1981) 157pp. hardcover \$12.95.

WHY SOUTH AFRICA WILL SURVIVE: *A Historical Analysis*. L.H. Grann and Peter Duignan. (St. Martin's Press, 1981) 305pp. hardcover \$27.50.

## History/Geography

AFRICA: A Modern History (1800-1975). J.O. Sagay and D.A. Wilson. (Holmes and Meier: Africana, 1981) 425 pp. paperback \$14.50.

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES: *The Economic Geography of Nine African States*. Harm De Blij and Esmond Martin. (Methuen, 1981) 264pp hardcover \$19.95.

ASANTE EMBASSY ON THE GOLD COAST: *The Mission of Akyempon Yaw to Elmina 1869-1872*. René Basjou (Afrika-Studies Centrum, 1979) 250pp.; paperback L6.00.

FROM SLAVES TO SQUATTERS: *Plantation Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya 1890-1925*. Frederick Cooper. (Yale University Press, 1980) 328pp. hardcover \$25.00.

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF ALGERIA. Andrew Alf Heggoy. (The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1981) 223 pp. hardcover \$12.50.

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF MOROCCO. William Spencer. (The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1980) 152pp. hardcover \$11.00.

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF SENEGAL. Lucie G. Colvin. (Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1981) 339pp. hardcover \$17.50.

## History/Geography (cont.)

A HISTORY OF AFRICA 1840-1914. Michael Tidy with Donald Leeming. (Holmes & Meier, Africana, 1981) 188pp. paperback \$12.50.

THE HORSE IN WEST AFRICAN HISTORY: *The Role of the Horse in the Societies of Pre-Colonial West Africa*. Robin Law (Oxford University Press, 1980) 224pp. hardcover \$37.50.

\*MIGRANT KINGDOM: *Mzilikazi's Ndebele in South Africa*. Kent R. Rasmussen. (Rowman and Littlefield, 1978) 262pp. hardcover \$19.75.

THE RAINBOW AND THE KING: *A History of the Luba Empire to 1891*. Thomas Reefe. (University of California Press, 1981) 306pp. hardcover \$24.95.

REACTION AND PROTEST IN THE WEST AFRICAN PRESS. A Collection of Newspaper Articles on Five Nineteenth Century African Leaders. Georgia McGarry, ed. (Afrika-Studiecentrum, 1978) 179 pp. paperback L6.00.

THE REVOLT OF THE HEREROS. Jon M. Bridgman. (University of California Press, 1981) 192pp. hardcover, \$14.95.

\*SLAVE SOLDIERS AND ISLAM: *The Genesis of a Military System*. Daniel Pipes. (Yale University Press, 1981) 246pp. hardcover \$25.00.

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