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Canada and Namibian Uranium

Taskforce on The Churches and Corporate Responsibility

Canada is one of the five-nation Contact Group which in 1977 assumed responsibility for bringing about a peaceful and just independence for Namibia.¹ Unwilling to back armed resistance, and in an effort to avoid a Security Council sanctions resolution, the Contact Group asked for time to seek South Africa's cooperation in a settlement for Namibia. The five years of inconclusive negotiations have given South Africa time to consolidate its administrative and military hold over Namibia, and the West a tactical excuse to ignore United Nations resolutions concerning Namibia.

Wide international participation in the removal of Namibian mineral resources casts a question mark over the impartiality of the Contact Group. All five nations have powerful corporate interests involved in various aspects of the resource sector in Namibia, especially in the uranium industry. Their continued gain from the extraction of depletable resources without change in the conditions under which these resources are supplied, would appear to require the continuation of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia.

Canada's Response to International Law

The Canadian Government's official position is that it does not recognize South Africa's jurisdiction over Namibia, but the position is not supported by consistent action and regulation.

Termination of the Mandate, 1966

Canada voted in favor of the General Assembly resolution in 1966 which terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia, on the grounds that it had failed to fulfill its obligations. However, Canada has not accepted the

1. Canada, Britain, the United States of America, France and West Germany are the members.

The Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility is an ecumenical coalition of the major Christian churches in Canada. This paper was presented at the conference by Moira Hutchinson, Associate-research for the Taskforce.

implications of this action as expressed in further actions of the General Assembly and the Security Council

The UN Council for Namibia, 1967

When the General Assembly in 1967 established the UN Council for Namibia to administer the territory until independence, Canada abstained.

Considering the proposed Council's mandate unrealistic in view of the continued South African occupation of the territory, and questioning whether the interests of the United Nations would be well served by setting up a council to perform an impossible task, Canada abstained in the vote on the resolution, which was nevertheless adopted.²

Security Council Actions, 1970

Security Council resolutions 276 and 283 in 1970 called upon states to avoid actions which would legitimize South Africa's presence in Namibia. States were asked to end commercial, industrial and investment activities in Namibia by their state controlled companies; to withhold government loans, credit and other forms of financial support from other companies involved in trade or commerce with Namibia; and to discourage companies from investing or obtaining concessions in Namibia by withholding protection of such investment against claims of a future lawful Namibian government.³

Because of the refusal of South Africa to withdraw from Namibia, the Security Council sought the opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1971. It confirmed that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal and that members of the United Nations were obliged to refrain from any acts which would imply recognition of the legality of, or lend support to, South African administration of Namibia.⁴

However, Canada took the position that the Security Council resolutions were not mandatory. In spite of the opinions of the International Court, Canada in its United Nations Act provides only for the implementation of Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and phrased in a mandatory fashion by the use of the word "decides." Security Council resolutions 276 and 283 did not meet these criteria.⁵

2. Canada and the United Nations, 1965-1975, at 100 (Department of External Affairs, 1976, Ottawa), quoted in Livia Meret, "Canada and Namibia," *The Canadian Yearbook of International Law*, XVII, p. 315 (1979).

3. Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Vol. III, General Assembly Official Records: 35th Session, Supplement No. 24, 1981, p5 (hereafter Report).

4. Report, pp. 6-10.

5. Livia Meret, "Canada and Namibia," *The Canadian Yearbook of International Law*, XVII, p. 317 (1979).

If Canada had been disposed to do so, it might have carried out some of the provisions of the resolutions without the use of the United Nations Act. The 1977 Security Council resolution which called for an arms embargo on South Africa is viewed to be enforced in Canada by action at the Ministerial level through the use of the Export and Import Permits Act.⁶ The same Act could be used to control or forbid exports and imports of goods to and from Namibia.

However, Canadian policy against economic measures was justified on the following grounds:

There are two reasons: first we want to be very sure that we do not penalize Canadian companies that may have been active in that country for legitimate and perfectly acceptable purposes . . .

There is a second reason why we are withholding, for the time being, any further action. We continue to hope that there is a peaceful and satisfactory solution for Namibia, one that will bring about equality — one man, one vote. We hope this can be done through negotiations and the process in which Canada is participating, which relates to the five Western members of the Security Council talking with the Government of South Africa and other parties concerned.⁷

The Canadian Government still allows Canadian corporations operating in Namibia to deduct as business expenses taxes paid to the South African administration.⁸ But the provision of such tax credits constitutes a recognition of the legal jurisdiction of South Africa in Namibia and an incentive for the expansion of Canadian foreign investment.

United Nations Decree No. 1, 1974

Namibia is rich in mineral deposits. After the termination of South Africa's mandate, and the Security Council resolution notwithstanding, western mining companies continued to operate under the illegal administration, revenues and taxes continued to be paid to the Pretoria government, and no legal criteria existed to prevent the export of Namibia's mineral resources.

In 1974, United Nations Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia was enacted by the UN Council for Namibia and ap-

6. *Ibid.*, p. 320.

7. Hon. Donald Jamieson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Current Issues of Concern to Canada and the International Community*, No. 77/24, December 19, 1977.

8. The issue was discussed by the Taskforce with the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of State for Trade most recently on July 15, 1981. The Ministers indicated that the Department of Finance advises that such tax concessions are applied throughout the world, and Namibia could not be singled out for exemption.

proved by the General Assembly. The Decree establishes that the permission of the UN Council for Namibia must be granted for the exploration, mining, processing, selling or exporting of any Namibian resource. Resources taken without permission and the vehicles carrying them are subject to seizure and forfeiture by or on behalf of the UN Council for Namibia.⁹

The Canadian Government does not recognize Decree No. 1.¹⁰

The Hearings on Namibian Uranium

The General Assembly requested the UN Council for Namibia to examine the exploitation of and trade in Namibian uranium by foreign economic interests, and Hearings were held in July 1980.¹¹

The Report on the Hearings established the extensive involvement of some states and their cooperations in the extraction, processing and sale of Namibian uranium at the fastest possible rate, even in excess of their actual needs, as a hedge against the time when Namibia and South Africa could soon account for as much as 50 percent of the total uranium in market-economy countries available for export without supplier restrictions on end use. Namibia is also a cheap source of uranium, because of low wages, and low production costs made possible by inadequate health and environmental protection.

The Report also concluded that South Africa, which has neither oil nor adequate uranium supplies within its own territory, is using Namibian uranium to develop its nuclear program. In addition, the uranium provides taxes paid by the mining companies and foreign exchange derived from exports. Finally, Namibian uranium appears to give South Africa a degree of political and economic leverage in the formulation of foreign policy towards South Africa by the countries involved with Namibian uranium.¹²

Canada and Namibian Uranium: Extraction, Exploration, Processing, Sale

Canadian uranium reserves are among the largest in market economy countries. Canadian involvement in Namibian uranium is, therefore, not related to security of supply. Canadian corporations are, however, involved in the extraction, exploration, processing and sale of Namibian uranium. After the Hearings on Namibian uranium, the UN General Assembly asked

9. Report, pp. 10-11.

10. Report, p. 62.

11. Report of the Panel for Hearings on Namibian Uranium, Part Two, United Nations Council for Namibia, 30 September, 1980 (Dunster, Hearings).

12. Report, pp. 31-33.

Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Britain and the United States of America, to prohibit their state-owned and other corporations from all dealings in Namibian uranium.¹³ Canada has not heeded the request.

Extraction

The Rossing mine is the only active uranium mine in Namibia. In 1966 Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ) obtained the rights to the uranium deposits at Rossing, and in 1970 Rossing Uranium Ltd., the world's largest mine, was formed. Rossing's major equity holders are RTZ, of the United Kingdom, 46.5%; Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) of South Africa, 13.2%; Rio Algom of Canada (a subsidiary of RTZ of South Africa), 10%; Total-Compagnie minière et nucléaire of France, 10%; General Mining and Finance Corporation (GMFC) of South Africa, 6.8%. Through the weighted voting power of different classes of shares, effective voting control is in the hands of the South African shareholders.¹⁴

Rio Algom's part ownership of the Rossing mine involves it in responsibility for the working conditions in the mine, and in cooperation for the defence of the mine with the South African military.

Working Conditions: The working conditions at Rossing provide compelling reasons for supporting the United Nations position that corporations should not mine Namibian resources during the illegal South African occupation of Namibia. Wages, housing, and medical services are all organized in accordance with the apartheid system.¹⁵ There is no union, and black spokesmen for unionization were arrested after a brief strike in 1978. These are the conditions despite the fact that Rossing is apparently attempting to establish a reputation as a good employer.¹⁶

The Rossing mine is located in the middle of a large desert area, so that environmental and health problems arise from airborne radioactive dust particles from the open pit mines and from uncovered mill tailings. Evidence presented to the Hearings on Namibian Uranium aroused concern about health hazards at Rossing in comparison with the dangers associated with uranium mining elsewhere. As South Africa is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the International Atomic Energy

13. "Update on Namibia," *International Legal Materials*, Vol. XX, No. 2, March 1981.

14. Report, p. 14.

15. Report, p. 25.

16. Peter Cahmet, "Huge uranium mine fights to survive," *Southern News*, June 17, 1981.

Agency, has no access to Namibia or to information about health and safety standards in the mine.¹⁷ The lack of trade unions and of an open political system are conditions which make it unlikely that Rossing workers have been protected to the extent possible from the serious health hazards associated with uranium mining. Even in Canada, with its trade unions and a relatively open political system, Ontario's Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of workers in mines found that Rio Algom and other companies at Elliott Lake had hidden the hazards in the working environment from the employees.¹⁸

Military Links. Rio Algom's part ownership of Rossing also makes it a partner in the military defence of the South African occupation of Namibia. Under the terms of South Africa's National Key Points Act, 1980, a company vital to military production is required to collaborate with the armed forces through the provision of personnel for a militia unit and the storing of arms on its property, to protect the industry in case of civil disturbance. Information on companies designated as key points industries is secret under the Act.

The Report of the Hearings indicates that the Key Points Act has been extended to Namibia. A document describing the Rossing mine's participation was made available to the Hearings by SWAPO. The document described military procedures to be effected by a paramilitary unit stationed at Rossing. The 69-man unit was described as having at its disposal automatic weapons, including 24 automatic rifles and 4 sub-machine guns, and ample rounds of ammunition.¹⁹

Exploration

While the Rossing mine is the only active mine in Namibia, extensive uranium prospecting by other mining firms is taking place.

Falconbridge of Canada which already operates the Oamites copper mine in Namibia (in a 75-25 partnership with the South African Development Corporation) has claims in the Rossing area, and is also involved in prospecting in Koekaland. Exploration in Koekaland in the far north-west of Namibia was stimulated by the decision of the South African administration in 1978 to open the so-called "homelands" to prospecting. Present political and military conflict, and the decline in demand for uranium make investment in production facilities unlikely at the moment.²⁰

17. Report, p. 26; Hearings pp 16-24.

18. Report of the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of Workers in Mines — Province of Ontario, 1976, pp. 77-78.

19. Report, p. 33; Hearings pp. 43-44.

20. Hearings, pp. 59-60.

Processing

Customers for Namibian uranium are based in France, West Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan. In addition, other companies and countries are involved in the conversion of Namibian uranium into hexafluoride, its enrichment, fabrication into fuel rods, and sale as nuclear fuel. Only some of the companies involved have been identified because the secrecy normally associated with the uranium and nuclear industries was intensified through the apprehension that shipments of uranium might be seized by a country willing to uphold Decree No. 1.²¹

In September 1981, press reports, later confirmed by Eldorado Nuclear Ltd. and the Department of External Affairs, revealed that Namibian uranium is being imported to Canada for processing by Eldorado Nuclear Ltd., a crown corporation, on behalf of Rio Tinto Zinc.²² The uranium was destined for Japanese utilities.²³

The Hearings on Namibian uranium had been informed that Kansai Electric Power Company in Japan had signed, in 1970, an advance purchase contract for delivery between 1977 and 1986 of Namibian uranium, but that after adverse publicity, the Japanese Government stated in 1977 that the uranium was nevertheless being imported by a Japanese trading company through a Rio Tinto Zinc sales subsidiary in Switzerland.²⁴ She suggested that:

In this case, uranium from Namibia could be mixed with uranium from Canada and Australia since Japan also imports from these two countries, so that no one is able to trace where the ore had been originally shipped from or which ore was from Namibia.²⁵

Japan's long-term purchase contracts included contracts with Denison and Rio Algom of Canada. The Panel was informed that Japan had been using United States facilities for enrichment of uranium. No mention was made of Canadian processing of Namibian uranium.²⁶

21. Report, pp. 20-25.

22. "Namibia ore issue will be reviewed," *Globe and Mail*, September 17, 1981; "Ottawa official defends Eldorado-Namibia deal," *Toronto Star*, September 18, 1981.

23. Information obtained from import permits by Greenspace researchers.

24. Japan has since informed the Council, 31 August, 1981, that Kansai Electric Power Company has postponed receipt of the uranium following the publication of Decree No. 1 in an official bulletin of the Japanese Government. Part of the UN Council for Namibia, Vol. 1, October 21, 1981, p. 113.

25. Yoko Kitazawa, *Japan's Nuclear Deals with South Africa*, Pacific-Asia Resources Center, 1977, p. 2. (See also Hearings, pp. 156-163).

26. There are other cases of "mixing" of Canadian and Namibian uranium. When Britain contracted to buy Namibian uranium, the Cabinet thought that the source of supply for contracts with RTZ was to be Rio Algom in Canada. However, when correctly informed, succeeding cabinets were unwilling to terminate or change the contract. (Alan Roberts, *The Rossing File*,

In response to the information that Eldorado was processing Namibian uranium, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, stated:

There is no infraction of any national or international law, nor any policy of the government that has been established with respect to the action.

He suggested that one

has to take into account that the settlement attempt by the contract group of five is proceeding very well. This is a much better way to deal with Namibia's problems than concentrating on this one incident.

When pressed as to the morality of the issue, he expanded:

I am concerned about the morality of the situation. The law does not always immediately adjust to morality, and we are in a situation now where there is a reasonable chance of proceeding to a settlement of the Namibian problem in a very short time.²⁷

Clearly the Canadian Government takes the view that there are no legal impediments to the import, processing, and export of Namibian uranium. The Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility takes the view that Canada's legal as well as moral position is less clear than asserted.

Inquiries about the implications of Canada's processing of Namibian uranium were made by the Taskforce to the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB); Eldorado Nuclear Ltd.; the Departments of External Affairs; Industry, Trade and Commerce; Energy, Mines and Resources; and Revenue Canada, Customs and Excise.

Responses made it clear that Canadian and non-Canadian (e.g. Namibian) ore are physically mixed at Eldorado Nuclear, similar to the mixing of oil going in to a pipeline.²⁸ Less clear is the way Namibian ore is described in the various paper transactions which are necessary for its import, processing and export. Namibian uranium is described as South African on import permits. On export after processing in Canada, the uranium is considered Namibian or South African by the Department of External Affairs, while it is considered Canadian by the Department of Revenue, Customs and Excise.

The Department of External Affairs stated that there are no impediments in Canada to the importation and processing of Namibian uranium.

Canadian Crown Corporations, like Eldorado Nuclear, are also entirely free to handle Namibian origin uranium, as long as their activities do not stand in contravention of the government's policy not to recognize South African jurisdiction over and occupation of the territory of Namibia.²⁹ (emphasis added)

26. (cont.) *The Inside Story of Britain's Secret Contract for Namibian Uranium*, 1980, pp. 22-32.)

Also, Namibian and Canadian uranium are physically mixed during processing at the British Nuclear Fuels' Springfields plant before going to the Soviet Union for enrichment. A Soviet spokesman told the UN last year that his Government was "taking great care to assure that no uranium of Namibian origin is allowed to enter the USSR for enrichment." (Martin Bailey, "Namibian Uranium Fuels Soviet Power," *African Business*, January, 1982.)

27. Hon. Mark MacGuigan, House of Commons Debates, October 31, 1981, pp. 12348-12349.

28. Telephone conversation, Mr. Hugh Spence, AECB.

29. Letter to the Taskforce, December 8, 1981, from J.R. Groves, Director, International Energy Policy Division, Department of External Affairs.

The fact that the permits issued to Eldorado Nuclear Ltd. for the import of Namibian uranium list South Africa as the country of origin,³⁰ would seem to contradict the Canadian position of not recognizing South African jurisdiction over Namibia.

The Department of External Affairs also indicated, concerning export procedures, that

The uranium exported is placed under normal IAEA safeguards. As the material is not of Canadian origin, the Canadian Government does not impose additional national controls on it.³¹ (emphasis added)

A spokesman for the AECB confirmed that when non-Canadian ore is processed to uranium hexafluoride, it is not a sensitive enough process to attract the Canadian label. Canada has more stringent safeguard requirements than those required by the International Atomic Energy Agency under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The implication is that Canada's imposition of strengthened safeguards to meet the threat of diversion of uranium for military purposes does not apply to Namibian uranium processed in Canada, even though processing is as essential to the nuclear fuel cycle as the mining and milling of uranium. Why should Canada not be as concerned about the diversion for military purposes of Namibian uranium which it has processed, as it is about uranium mined and milled in Canada?

Eldorado Nuclear Ltd., as the importer, is also the exporter for processed Namibian uranium. An export permit issued by the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce is reviewed for compliance with Canadian nuclear export policies for uranium by the Uranium Exports Review Panel.³² Although information received was inconsistent, it appears that the permit does not state any country of origin unless the ore is Canadian. It states the origin of the ore when it is Canadian so that the more stringent Canadian safeguards are applied on export. The export permit is a temporary document, apparently for use only by Canadian Customs, to indicate that an item is authorized to leave Canada.³³

Revenue Canada uses a different set of principles than External Affairs for describing Namibian uranium processed in Canada. The instructions for the Customs Export Declaration form B13 indicate that after processing in Canada, Namibian uranium would be considered to be Canadian. This

30. Telephone conversations, Mr. Hugh Spence, AECB, and Terence Longegan, Department of External Affairs.

31. *Ibid.*

32. The Panel is composed of representatives of the Departments of External Affairs, Industry, Trade and Commerce, and the AECB, and chaired by the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources.

33. Telephone conversation with Mr. Ian Fraser, AECB. Inconsistent information on these points was received in other conversations with spokespersons for the International Energy Policy Division, Department of External Affairs, and the Office of Special Trade Relations, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce.

was confirmed by a spokesman for the Department.³⁴ The information on an Export Declaration is of significance because it "directly affects the balance of trade figures, an important element in determining national economic policy."³⁵

The Canadian government, therefore, considers Namibian ore processed in Canada, South African or Canadian, as suits its purpose. The Taskforce has been unable to determine, through questions to the government departments and Eldorado Nuclear Ltd., whether the departments' designations of the processed ore as Canadian or non-Canadian would be information made available to the buyer and to the importing country. However, an External Affairs spokesman said that it would not be of concern to the Canadian government if Japan was misled as to the origin of processed uranium coming from Canada, as Canada does not consider itself bound by Decree No. 1.³⁶

The potential for deliberate confusion about the source of uranium ore, given the impossibility of ascertaining its origin once it has been processed, was addressed at a UN Council for Namibia seminar in June 1981 on the legal aspects of the implementation of Decree No. 1. It was recommended that it become standard practice for all raw uranium to display a certificate of origin, and that nuclear processing and enrichment plants be required to verify such certificates of origin under penalty of prosecution.³⁷ Such a procedure would require the cooperation of the Canadian government.

Transportation

Evidence placed before the Hearings on Namibian Uranium revealed that because Decree No. 1 provides for the seizure of any Namibian resource taken in violation of the Decree, transportation of the uranium has been clandestine. In customs declarations, the uranium was designated as "other non-ferrous and concentrates metal ores."³⁸

Subsequently, Greenpeace investigators in the Spring of 1981 found that shipments of Namibian uranium from South Africa to Canada were taking place in ships operated by Kerr Steamships (Canada) Lines. The ore was shipped to Montreal and trucked to Port Hope by Davis Transport. The investigators were told that it was not until October 1980, after shipments had been taking place for a number of years, that the port con-

34. Mr. David Kent, Revenue Canada, Customs and Excise.

35. Memorandum D22-1, "Export Documentation," Revenue Canada, Customs and Excise.

36. Telephone conversation with Mr. Terrence Lonergan, International Energy Policy Division, Department of External Affairs.

37. United Nations Council for Namibia, Report of the Delegation of the Council to the Seminar on Legal Issues Concerning the Question of Namibia Held at The Hague from 22 to 24 June, 1981, 9 October 1981, pp. 5, 9.

38. Report, pp. 17-20. The Hearings received information about the secret routes used for the delivery of uranium to Europe and Britain. No notes were given to the governments concerned that aircraft were carrying dangerous substances over their territories.

troller and inspector knew that they were moving uranium ore. The manifest described the shipments as "ore concentrate" and the shipper in Cape Town (James Estate, an agent for RTZ) did not use any labels warning about the radioactive contents. Somehow, port officials discovered that radioactive material was involved and insisted on proper labelling and permits for the movement of the ore.

The transport of uranium is itself a serious hazard, but because of the clandestine nature of the transport, the possibility of accidents was enormous.

None of the departments of government addressed by the Taskforce responded to the charge that the Namibian uranium was imported to Canada in this clandestine fashion.³⁹

Sales

None of the government departments⁴⁰ or Eldorado would answer the Taskforce's questions concerning dates and quantities of imports and exports, ownership, purchasers, or continuing contracts for processing. However, import licenses list Rio Tinto Zinc as the supplier of South African ore (later acknowledged by Eldorado Nuclear to be Namibian) for processing at Eldorado Nuclear Ltd. for Tokyo Electric Power Co. and Kansai Electric.⁴¹

Rio Tinto Zinc, incorporated in 1962 in the United Kingdom, is one of the largest uranium producing companies in the world with holdings in Canada, Australia, Namibia and South Africa, and handling approximately one quarter of the uranium trade of market economy countries. It currently holds 52.8% of the outstanding shares of Rio Algom Ltd. of Canada.

Because the South African Atomic Energy Act prohibits revealing the details of uranium contracts, only limited information is available about the purchasers of Namibian uranium. The Hearings on Namibian uranium revealed that Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan were the major buyers of Namibian uranium through long-term contracts, reportedly well below world market prices.⁴² After Canada, South Africa is the second most important supplier to the countries of the European Economic Community.⁴³

39. Letters were sent between November 10 and 13, 1981, to the Departments of External Affairs; Industry, Trade and Commerce; Energy, Mines and Resources, and to the Atomic Energy Control Board.

40. The Department of Energy, Mines and Resources has not yet responded to a letter of November 13, 1981, or to two subsequent telephone calls.

41. Information from import licenses was made available by researchers from Greenpeace.

42. Report, pp. 22-25.

43. "European Parliament Worried Over Dependence on South African Uranium," Nuclear Engineering International, July, 1978, p. 11, quoted in UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Declassification of Africa, 9 September 1980, Annex p. 10.

It is not clear what effect the formation of the uranium producers' cartel, in which Canada was a participant, had on profits from the Rossing mine. The Japanese and British contracts were signed before the formation of the cartel in 1972, although later contracts would have been affected by the rise in prices.

However, revelations of the close collaboration between corporate and government cartel members, which included South Africa, France, Australia and the British RTZ as well as Canada, have cast further doubt over the seriousness of these countries in seeking an end to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia.⁴⁴

44. Some cartel investigators believe it was RTZ which conceived of the cartel, and through officers in its Canadian subsidiary, Rio Algom, got the Canadian Government to seek the participation of other Governments. See June Taylor and Michael Yokell, *Yellowcake: The International Uranium Cartel*, Pergamon Press, 1979. Speculation on why the Canadian Government refuses to release documents on the cartel includes the possibility "that Canada made some political concessions to South Africa in order to acquire its support in the cartel, for uranium mining in South Africa was never as seriously affected by American protectionist policies as it was in Canada. One possible area could have been a lessening of Canada's criticism of South Africa's apartheid laws." See Larry Stewart, "Canada and the Uranium Cartel," *International Perspectives*, July-August, 1980, p. 25.

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Namibia and Government of France

Jacques Marchand

May 10, 1981 raised many hopes for those fighting for the independence and liberation of Namibia. The ascension of Francois Mitterand to power and the formation of a Socialist government had been hailed by SWAPO, "as the opening of a new chapter in the relations between France and Africa." Francois Mitterand on the eve of his election declared:

A new policy towards South Africa must consist of two parts: On the one hand, economic sanctions against this regime, notably a total cessation of all State and parastatal French investment and of all support for private investment. On the other hand, developmental and security aid to the Front Line states and political support to the liberation movements, as well as assistance in the economic and training sectors. (April 23, 1981, *Le Continent*)

The appearance of Claude Cheysson, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Africa Day event held during the 1981 Paris Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa, and especially the proposals of Lionel Jospin, First Secretary of the Socialist Party, at the inaugural plenary session of the Sanctions Conference had concretized the change and heralded a much tougher attitude towards Pretoria. Let us recall the words of Lionel Jospin on May 20, 1981 at the Sanctions Conference:

The Socialist Party has always been in favor of applying sanctions against South Africa, and I remind you in particular that we support:

- The total halt of all trade with Namibia and notably the importation of uranium, uranium.
- The reduction, taking into account technical constraints, of French raw material imports under South African label.
- The cessation of all public investment and all support of private investment.
- With, needless to say, a total arms embargo.

Where are we today?

Certainly, the French diplomatic attitude towards the Contact Group of five Western nations has been positive. Jean-Francois Lionnet, advisor

Jacques Marchand is a past president of the Movement Anti-Apartheid of France. The English translation was prepared by Joshua Nesson of the American Committee on Africa. We present only the middle section of his three part paper, presented under the title "The French Namibian Connection." Part I deals with "France and Namibian Uranium" and Part III with "Solidarity with SWAPO in France," describing the work of the Movement Anti-Apartheid.

on African Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Relations declared to the Mouvement Anti-Apartheid:

Priority is now being given to the Namibian question and to efforts to quickly resolve it on the basis of a rigorous timetable. We in the Government firmly believe that there will be an independent Namibia by December 31, 1982.

In fact, several Presidential advisors have travelled to Angola, French ministers have gone to southern Africa and Francois Mitterand has met with several southern African heads of state either in Paris or at the French-African summit of Kinsasha. All these things indicate that French diplomacy is more conscious of southern African problems.

France had finally chosen to remain in the Contact Group of five Western nations during Summer 1981. We hoped that Paris would be able to counteract the United States within the group. But since November 1981 Francois Mitterand has been saying that "France considers that its presence in the Contact Group should not be used as an alibi for unending negotiation." And in October 1982 in Dar Es Salaam, Claude Cheysson stated that all the probable technical problems for a ceasefire and the organization of the election in Namibia had been resolved. What everyone understood was that the French Government was pointing out the fact that only the Americans and the South Africans were responsible for delaying an agreement; the Americans by their exorbitant demand for the departure of the Cubans from Angola, the famous "linkage," and the South Africans by their determination to prevent the almost certain political victory of SWAPO if the elections were held. Despite these French "efforts" to achieve an agreement on Namibia, one has to wonder whether the French Government has really been consistent in its handling of the Namibian question.

One thing is clear about the attitude of the French government and of Socialist officials: in their analysis of the situation in Namibia they always underestimate South Africa's determination to block indefinitely the process leading to Namibian elections, until an alternative to SWAPO is in place. This attitude continues to place France in what I will call a pious role in the negotiations. In effect, in the absence of tougher talk and sanction measures against South Africa, France has not given itself the means to apply its own policy. How can the Government have been so naive as to underestimate South African hypocrisy in the Namibian negotiations?

Even more seriously, the absence of any move to apply sanctions only indicates that the Socialist Government is not willing to take a stronger stand against the racist South African government than its conservative predecessor.

In terms of sanctions against South Africa on April 2, 1982 Minister Jean Pierre (COT) declared before the EurAfrican Press Association that:

... We are reorganizing our relations with the South African Republic. We are strictly applying the arms embargo, and in terms of other measures I will say that we are involved in reexamining all aspects of our relations. We have on occasion stated that we do not believe in the effectiveness of a blockade in such a situation. But we are seeking on our own to be less involved in these exchanges with South Africa. This is a long-term problem which must take into account the dependence of the French economy on its trade with South Africa, notably imports of certain raw materials.

In fact, outside of this beautiful but very careful declaration, everything makes it appear that French governmental authorisation of the ANC and SWAPO offices in Paris was used as a cover for its total abandonment of a policy of sanctions against Pretoria. In effect, the counterpart of some recognition of the ANC and SWAPO seems to have been maintenance of the status quo in the nuclear, banking and oil sectors. The South Africans know how to adapt to the situation and already five years ago they declared, "It is always necessary to distinguish between what France says and what she does." (The Star, April 1977)

We have reviewed what France has said. We now turn to a survey of what has been done. (1) In 1982 the Economic Expansion section of the French Embassy in Johannesburg organized approximately 20 trade missions to South Africa for French industrialists. This Economic Expansion section was the most active of any equivalent section attached to French embassies worldwide. It plays a key role in arranging any contract between South Africa and French businesses.

(2) A subsidiary of CGE-Alsthom, Stein-Industries, signed a contract with the German firm EVT, for 6.5 billion Francs to provide six furnaces for the projected giant Matimba central power plant in the Transvaal. (3) CGE-Alsthom itself is going to furnish a reactor for Matimba under a contract worth 1.75 billion Francs. (4) On July 22, 1981 the nationalized Renault firm signed a new contract for the production and sale of R5 automobiles in South Africa. This company had already sold 8000 R5 automobiles in South Africa during 1981.

(5) In October 1982 the Paris Chamber of Commerce (a consular entity legally under state control) signed the largest contract of any western Chamber of Commerce to date with the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce. (6) In August 1982 a French delegation representing several public French institutions (Gaz de France, the National Center for Scientific Research) participated in a conference on the conversion of coal into oil

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organized by the South African Council For Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).

(7) French banks, all of which are nationalized, continue to provide loans backing trade with Pretoria. (8) In November 1982 the French representative to the IMF voted in favor of a \$1.1 billion loan to the South African Government.

(9) CFP-Total, which is 40% state-owned, continues to transport crude oil to South Africa despite the embargo decreed by the OPEC countries, and also refines and distributes oil throughout South Africa. With 12% of the South African market, CFP-Total was reported in 1976 to have a monopoly on oil sales to the South African police. (10) COFACE, the French Insurance Company For Foreign Trade which is controlled by the State, continues to insure the entire range of commercial transactions with South Africa. The only change is that now guaranties can last no longer than five years instead of seven, not exactly a major change certain to discourage trade with South Africa! (11) The state-controlled ATIC Association which is importing more than 8 million tons of South African coal — available at 30% below the price of coal from other sources because of the cheap wages paid to African workers — confirmed in February 1982 that "it still had not received any government order to halt contracts with South Africa." Yet a study by Mouvement Anti-Apartheid proved that alternative suppliers exist at almost the same prices because of the international economic recession.

(12) Finally to end this overview of new contracts entered into under the Mitterand Government, there is the shocking news that appeared in the French press of November 16, 1982:

France, having sold and constructed two nuclear reactors of 900 MW at Koeberg and then defied international pressure by selling the processed fuel for these reactors, is now contemplating the sale of two other nuclear reactors to South Africa. (emphasis added)

Contacts and discussions have been taking place for weeks within the Government. It appears that three powerful ministers are backing the deal (those of Finance, Commerce and Industry). Although no decision has yet been made there is every reason to be extremely worried when one is aware both of the business and Pro-South African lobby in Paris and of the outlook of the French Government which says that it is technically impossible to use the nuclear reactors for military purposes.¹

The South Africans already felt reassured about the Mitterand Government several months ago. They sense that there is nothing to fear.

1. To the best of our knowledge, negotiations between Framatome, the French nuclear corporation, and the government of South Africa are still continuing as we go to press, but no contract has as yet been signed. — Ed.

On January 19, 1982 the South African Broadcasting Corporation commented very favorably about Francois Mitterand: "He is a man with whom it is quite possible to deal. He is seeking constructive relations with Pretoria."

Conclusion

This review of French policy towards South Africa leads us to a very clear and troubling conclusion. There has been almost no change from the Giscard d'Estaing Government: Business continues as usual. *This French business remains concentrated in the large South African state projects designed to reinforce the infrastructure of apartheid and to reduce the effectiveness of international pressures and campaigns for sanctions against South Africa.* Such is the privileged but criminal role of French collaboration with South Africa.

When the first contract for the sale of a nuclear reactor was signed with South Africa, the African National Congress had declared: "France has become the most dangerous enemy of the African Continent." We reaffirm that today France remains the most dangerous enemy of the African continent.

To end our analysis let us examine the only area in which the French Socialist Government had committed itself: The total embargo on arms sales to South Africa. On October 6, 1981 the French Secretary of Defense had reaffirmed to the Mouvement Anti-Apartheid that the arms embargo was being applied with extreme rigor. We have reason to doubt this rigor, given the following facts: (1) In October 1981 the *London Times* revealed that Israeli technicians in South Africa regularly service French-built airplanes, using spare parts sold by France to Israel for its Mirages. (2) The Government has taken no action to stop the fabrication of French arms under license in South Africa. It has always refused to give us the details of license contracts, notably if these contracts still involve the sale of certain essential materials by France. (3) SWAPO has numerous times emphasized the use of French arms (Mirages, tanks, and helicopters) against the Namibian people and remains persuaded that South Africa receives French spare parts via third countries. (4) Finally, among the markets that the French Embassy in Johannesburg suggests for French industrial investment is the South African market in electronic television surveillance equipment which is developing, "because of the resurgence of sabotage actions during the last months," according to the report of the Economic Expansion section of the French Embassy.

Such is the reality of French policy towards South Africa: Absence of a well-defined interministerial policy on South Africa, refusal to impose sanctions, and continuation of the dichotomy of the Giscard d'Estaing Government in which French diplomats make angry gestures against apartheid while French businessmen remain free to sign contracts with South Africa.

In effect, we notice within the French government and within the Socialist Party a struggle between those who feel that the French foreign trade deficit comes before any other consideration (The Ministers of Finance, Commerce, and Research and Industry) and those who are conscious of the serious threat to French-African relations posed by continued French economic and nuclear collaboration with South Africa. The activity of the pro-South African lobby, which is now extremely active in Paris and Brussels, combined with the pressures from the business sector, have been enough to tilt the balance in favor of continued collaboration with apartheid.

The United States and the South African-Namibian Uranium Option

Ronald W. Walters

In a 1978 article, this writer argued that there was a growing interdependence between the United States and Namibia, based on the urgent problems of energy in the U.S. and the availability of abundant uranium stocks in Namibia at favorable prices. Even though the U.S. was first in production, reserves and consumption of uranium, the economic situation led to the foreign policy objective of retaining a "Namibian uranium option."¹ We regard this argument as even more valid today than when it was made, and will present further evidence regarding the U.S.-South Africa/Namibia uranium trade.

Domestic Production and Consumption

The use of nuclear power for electricity generation in the United States accounts for an estimated 13 percent of all sources, but it grew by only .9 percent between 1980 and 1981 and by 1.0 percent between 1981 and 1982 (est.). Coal, by comparison grew at a rate of 1.6 percent and 1.9 percent respectively in the same periods.² Behind the relatively slow growth of the nuclear sector is the fact that between 1972 and 1974 105 nuclear reactors were ordered in the U.S., however, between 1975 and 1980, 56 more reactors were cancelled than were ordered. This has had a chilling effect on the domestic production of raw uranium which fell 15 percent between 1980 and 1981, and which is estimated by NUEXCO, a California based uranium consulting organization, to fall an additional 10 million tons in the period 1981-1982.³ By 1983, it is estimated that U.S. production

1. Ronald W. Walters, "Uranium Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy in Southern Africa," *Journal of Southern African Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 3, July 1979.

2. *Nuclear Industry*, Vol. 29, No. 7, July 1982, p. 23.

3. George White, Jr., "Uranium: Producer Purchases and Utility Sales Lead to Unstable Equilibrium," *Engineering and Mining Journal*, March 1982, p. 115.

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will fall below consumption.⁴ As a result the price of uranium has fallen from a strong market price of \$43 per lb. to the spot price of \$23.50 in 1982.⁵

Imports

The lack of favorable prices for uranium has led to the closure of three of 23 conventional mills, and the industry in the U.S. is operating at about 75 percent of capacity. All of these factors, including accompanying decreases in expenditures for exploration amounting to \$20 million for the 1979-1980 period and an additional \$300 million for 1981, will increase the market share of foreign-source uranium in the U.S. This has been occurring through the increases in purchases of foreign-source uranium by uranium producers, traders and nuclear utilities.

The case of United Nuclear Corp. Mining and Milling is exemplary. In May of 1982, it was operating the Church Rock Mines in New Mexico at a modest profit, but the greater part of operating profit came from the sale of purchased uranium.⁶ This purchasing occurred because prices were lower than UNC production costs. By August, the company decided to suspend production completely and place its mining operations on standby status. Company officials estimated that this step would improve operating profits by about \$16 million and cash flow by \$24 million over the next two years.⁷ The case of UNC is important because of its previous attempts to export enriched uranium to South Africa, a relationship which would make South African/Namibian uranium a prime source for import by this country.

American utilities also have increasingly made purchases of foreign-source uranium. In 1974, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission promulgated new criteria for the importation of foreign-source uranium, providing for increases up to a level of 40 percent of total enrichment for domestic end-use by 1981.⁸ Actual imports since 1975 are shown in Table 1 (next page). Already, in the 1980-81 period, it will be seen that the combined total of 5,100 tons imported equals exactly the amount exported in the same period.⁹

South Africa has become increasingly important as a place of origin of foreign-source uranium imported into the United States. The United States imported 500 tons of South African uranium in 1977 (representing 17% of the total) and Table 2 shows the prevailing pattern of imports with regard to the amounts delivered to the Department of Energy for enrichment and use in American utilities.

4. Ibid.
 5. Rand Daily Mail, "End to Uranium Market? Stamp may be on the Horizon," October 28, 1981.
 6. Engineering and Mining Journal, May 1982, p. 140.
 7. Engineering and Mining Journal, August 1982, p. 45.
 8. Federal Register, Vol. 39, No. 208, Friday, October 25, 1974, p. 38017.
 9. Survey of United States Uranium Marketing Activity, U.S. Dept. of Energy, July 1982, Table X, p. 14.

Table 1
Imports of Foreign-Source U₃O₈ into the U.S. by Tons

1975	700
1976	1,800
1977	2,800
1978	2,600
1979	1,500
1980	1,800
1981	3,300

Source: Survey of Uranium Marketing Activity, U.S. Dept. of Energy, June 1981, Table X, p. 14.

Table 2
Estimates of D.O.E. enriched U.S. Imports of South Africa-Source Raw Uranium (1977-1981) by Tons

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	total
S.A. Alone	83	69	237	85	166	640
S.A. — France	32	133	167	148	0	480
S.A. — Canada	46	23	15	46	108	238
Unknown	54	67	0	82	56	259
Total	215	292	419	361	330	1617
% total foreign source D.O.E. enriched U ₃ O ₈	22	40	26	22	24	30

Source: Raw data from Survey of United States Uranium Marketing Activity, U.S. Dept. of Energy, July 1982, Table XII, p. 17.
 S.A. — Alone (Baltimore Gas and Electric; Duquesne Light; Northern States Power; S. Carolina Electric and Gas; System Fossil)
 S.A. — France (Carolina Power and Light; Consumer Power)
 S.A. — Canada (Southern Company Service; Yankee Atomic)
 Unknown (Iowa Electric and Power; Nagen Mohawk Power; Sacramento Municipal Utility; Toledo Edison; Westinghouse)

Before 1977, some companies were essentially buyers of foreign-source uranium for re-export, but this overall pattern of imports by utilities shows widespread domestic end-use. It is worth noting that a large group of utilities chose to import uranium from South Africa alone and that this number should be augmented by the estimated percentage share of major foreign suppliers (Canada — 50%; France — 20%; Unknown — 30%) We have assigned a value of 50 percent to the "Unknown" category, since many importers would not want it publicly known that their imports were of South African origin.¹⁰ It may be safely estimated, then, that imports of South African/Namibian uranium into the U.S. constitutes about 15 percent of the

10. Ibid, June 1981, p. 14.

uranium market of suppliers at present, with the largest proportion being from South Africa and a lesser amount from Namibia.

At the moment, imports of foreign-source uranium are running at only 10 percent rather than the allowable 40 percent, according to a study by the D.O.E. in 1981.¹¹ However, NUEXCO Vice President, T.A.S. Boydens has suggested that U.S. production, under current conditions, could decline from 37 million pounds in 1981 to 14 million by 1990, despite growing U.S. consumption.¹² The effect of this has led Michael J. Connor, President of Nuclear Resources International to suggest that by 1984, 100 percent of the uranium market could be non-U.S., while Don R. de Halas, President of Colorado Nuclear Corp., has said:

All this leads us to believe there will be a rather appreciable penetration of imports into the U.S. market. Something on the order of 40 to 50 percent of total U.S. demand by the time we get into the mid-1990s would be our best estimate.¹³

Some evidence for this position comes from surveys of utility attitudes toward future purchases of foreign-source uranium, gathered by the U.S. Dept. of Energy.

Table 3
Utility Attitudes About Future Purchases of Foreign Uranium (1980-1981) Percent

	1980	1981
uncertain about future purchases of foreign source uranium	20	7
possible future purchases	33	42
current purchases	2	2

Source: Survey of United States Uranium Marketing Activity, U.S. Dept. of Energy, July 1982, Table XV, p. 19.

Just as it is evident from this survey that attitudes of utilities toward the importation of foreign-source uranium are changing from uncertainty to possible future purchases, it is almost as certain that, barring domestic limitations, a substantial portion of this import trade will be from South African/Namibian supplies of raw uranium.

In fact, efforts to limit imports of foreign-source uranium are underway by a combination of forces, both those interested in the maintenance of a domestic nuclear industry and those interested in preventing U.S. national security from being tied too closely to dependence upon foreign sources of strategic minerals. In May 1982, Congresspersons Samuel Stratton (D-N.Y.) and Marjorie Holt (R-Md.) wrote to President Reagan requesting support for

11. "Uranium Planting, Buyers Few," *Nuclear Industry*, Vol. 28, No. 10, October 1981, p. 26.

12. "Uranium Remains in Oversupply," *Nuclear Industry*, Vol. 29, No. 1, p. 18.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

legislation limiting uranium imports to 20 percent, on the basis that they would otherwise create "dependence" which would call "into question our future capacity to obtain uranium for military purposes."¹⁴ These efforts, and a Senate initiative by Senator Peter Domenici (R-NM), failed. When the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act (PL 97-415) was signed into law on January 4, 1983, the only remaining restrictive provision was an instruction to the Department of Defense to revise the criteria for enrichment services offered if foreign imports reached a level of 37.5% in two consecutive years.

Despite the effort to limit imports of foreign uranium, we have established, without much fear of contradiction, that sufficient demand exists in the U.S. market which, because of a combination of economic and political factors (such as the growing anti-nuclear mood), cannot be satisfied by U.S. supply, opening the way for increased participation by suppliers such as South Africa/Namibia.

Production & Supply of Namibian Uranium

Uranium continues to be important within the context of the Namibian economy, since over 50 percent of the GDP of \$900 million ('79) and \$1.7 billion ('81) was accounted for by diamond and uranium mining.¹⁵ Profits from mining activity at the Rossing plant, for example, were up from \$64 million in 1979 to \$123 million in 1980.¹⁶ Full production of 4,767 tons was reached by 1980, moving from 3,000 tons in 1977.¹⁷ Regardless of such profits, however, the South African Government has indicated that outlays for the territorial administration could reach \$3 billion in 1982.¹⁸

The major reason why such activity as mining does not contribute more to the GDP of Namibia is that South Africa has maintained extremely liberal terms for the participation of those firms involved in mining, according to the Report of the Commonwealth Secretariat, "The Mining Industry of Namibia: Perspectives for Independence."¹⁹ The report indicates that prof-

14. *Nuclear News*, Vol. 25, No. 10, August 1982, p. 62.

15. "SA Mining Industry Unique", *SA Mining & Engineering Journal*, November 1978, pp. 60-61. "Mineral Outlook for the Year," *Ibid.*, May 1982, pp. 60-61. *New York Times*, July 23, 1978.

16. Miller W. Ellis, "The Mineral Industry of Namibia (Territory of South-West Africa)," *Mineral Yearbook*, Vol. III, Area Reports, International. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1980, p. 697.

17. *Ibid.*

18. "Independence for SWA: Crucial Issues face the Mining Industry," *SA Mining and Engineering Journal*, Vol. 90, no. 4146, January 1979, p. 41. *New York Times*, July 23, 1978.

19. *Ibid.*

pecting is encouraged by generous write-offs, low license fees, royalty rates and taxation and the granting of large grants for prospecting. Only 25 percent participation by locals of either South Africa or Namibia is required for the establishment of a mining investment by an outside firm (except for uranium and strategic minerals).²⁰ It has been suggested that such liberal terms for prospecting minerals as well as in the expansion of operations suits South Africa and its investors for a "fast track" exploitation of the mineral resources of Namibia, a policy geared to anticipate the arrival of political independence.

The United States participates in the exploitation of Namibian minerals through a number of firms and 59 percent of American capital controls Tsumeb, the second largest employer in the country with 6,043 employees. Yet Tsumeb, a non-uranium producer, reportedly "was not a heavy taxpayer (\$12.9 million) despite its declared sales of \$161.9 million" in 1980.²¹ Because of expansionary investments, Tsumeb's profit decreased 35 percent to \$18.2 million by 1981.²² It can be seen that firms such as Tsumeb are greatly facilitated by South African financial policies in the mining sector, indeed, Rössing itself paid no taxes in 1980, despite its profits reported above.²³ Thus, the financial control of Namibian uranium resources, embedded within the overall colonial control of the country, gives South Africa effective control over the marketing of uranium resources in international trade.

The secrecy surrounding the trade figures for Namibian uranium and other minerals, and the active position of South Africa in the market itself, means that surely Namibian uranium is being traded through the South African network as one source of supply combining that of both countries.²⁴ One way of detecting the export of Namibian uranium would be that of evaluating South African export figures against known production activity and estimated domestic usage. This done in the case of lithium exports from South Africa showed that where "a number of countries record imports from 'South Africa', which in total quantity, considerably exceeds the reported output of the Republic of South Africa . . . presumably include shipments from Namibia."²⁵ However, South Africa, in responding to the depressed international market for uranium at the moment, is regarded to have considerable flexibility and is stockpiling supplies of excess uranium inventory. Therefore, such a method would be unworkable. In addition, South Africa

has classified both sources of data such as exports of uranium by amount and country of destination. Consequently, it will be necessary to regard (an unknown quantity of) South African exports as potential exports from Namibia as well.

The linkage between South African and Namibian uranium activity appears to be exceptionally close as its production increased 29 percent in the period 1979-1980, the same period in which Rössing reached full production level. South African earnings from uranium sales increased by \$112,000 (37%) in the same period.²⁶ South Africa would thus seem to have an excellent supply of uranium available for export, and considering its low labor and electricity costs, at comparatively low prices. Although price data is also classified, it is estimated to be near or below the world price in 1981 or \$23.50 per lb. when production rose only by 3.1 percent. The average 1982 price for raw uranium in the U.S. by contrast was in the \$30 per pound range, a rate which it was indicated "has not proved a benefit to utilities."²⁷

Finally, evidence continues to present itself that U.S. firms are participating at all levels in the uranium industry and while their immediate objective is the maximization of company profits in the international market, such activity also helps support the Namibian uranium option for the United States. One example is Tektronics, a firm which makes precision oscilloscopes and data processing equipment.

In the period 1966 to 1973 when the investigation of the Rössing deposit was conducted by Rio Tinto, it was discovered that the sampling methods to determine the uranium content of the ore were sufficient for long-term mining plans of 20 years, but "for short-term planning it was found that little reliability could be placed on the ore-reserve grade zones derived from the original widely-spaced diamond drill boreholes".²⁸ Accurate short-term analysis of uranium samples is related to profitability since uranium with high calcium content is unrecoverable. However, the Tektronics 4052 Computer is capable of reconciling the data from the original borehole drillings and the new data from the finer drillings to determine tonnage, grade, and calcium content for each block drilled, providing better short-term planning.²⁹

Tektronics is a Beaverton, Oregon company founded in 1946, with \$1.2 billion in sales in 1981 and \$80.2 million in net income. In 1980 and 1981,

20. *Ibid.*21. Miller Ellis, *op. cit.*22. *Ibid.*23. *Ibid.*24. Alan Roberts, *The Rössing File: The Inside Story of Britain's Secret Contract for Namibian Uranium*, Namibia Support Committee, London, 1980.25. Miller Ellis, *op. cit.*, p. 699 (footnote).

26. Miller Ellis, "The Mineral Industry of the Republic of South Africa, Minerals Yearbook, Vol. III, Area Reports, International, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1980, p. 671.

27. *Nuclear Industry*, January 1982, *op. cit.*, p. 18.28. "Rössing Uranium," *Mining Magazine*, November 1978, pp. 466-469.29. *Engineering and Mining Journal*, September 1982, p. 140.

it attracted U.S. Government contracts of \$20.9 million from the Navy and \$48 million from the General Services Administration.³⁰ Its main products are oscilloscopes and other precision instruments, video display terminals, design automation systems and signal-processing equipment for TV studios. But it is an undisputed leader in manufacture of precision electronic instruments such as oscilloscopes where 50 percent of its sales are concentrated, amounting to 63 percent of the market.

Conclusion

In summary, we have presented further evidence in support of the thesis that the U.S. maintains a "uranium option" in the case of Namibia, by strongly suggesting that U.S. demand for foreign-source uranium is increasingly being supplied by South African sources which undoubtedly include Namibian sources. The major conclusion, in view of the facts presented, is that what was once an "option" is, because of the economics of the uranium trade and the political reaction of anti-nuclear forces, becoming a chosen strategy. Since attractive pricing of uranium is also responsible for attracting the U.S. market, we also conclude that an equitable labor wage rate would prevent South African undercutting of the American industry. Although we have not dealt with the labor situation, we note that although the South African Government reports an increase of 14.3 percent in 1980, these rates were still below the amounts considered necessary for an African family to meet minimum subsistence needs.³¹ In this regard, the labor situation at Tsumeb (Amax and Newmont Mining) are among the worst in all of Namibia.³²

Then, we have also shown U.S. involvement in the assurance of the availability of South African/Namibian uranium supply by the direct participation of American firms in the Namibian uranium industry. We were not, however, able to present an extensive picture of the activity, including the uranium prospecting underway.

One obvious conclusion is that in order to compel U.S. compliance with Decree No. 1 of the U.N. Council of Namibia on the protection of Namibian resources, South African imports of raw uranium to be enriched in the U.S. for domestic end-use should be prohibited. Here, three tactics are suggested: (1) temporary coalitions between anti-Apartheid groups and others, such as the AFL/CIO which is also opposed to the importation of foreign-source uranium into the U.S. for its own reasons; (2) sponsoring programs of awareness concerning the degree to which South African uranium has

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already penetrated the American market, to the extent that many Americans are consumers of "Apartheid electricity" through nuclear utilities; (3) greater integration of this issue with the American and the international anti-nuclear movement. The U.S.-South African/Namibian uranium trade presents one more powerful reason why citizens should be opposed to this dangerous form of energy.

A final conclusion is that there should be continued follow-up to the ground-breaking work by NARMIC concerning the role of American computers in automating Apartheid. In this regard, we continue to place emphasis, in proposing programs of non-cooperation with Apartheid and South African colonialism in Namibia, on the technology which is disseminated by the West to South Africa, the essential trading relations and the many levels of integration among them in terms of ownership and sales. It is the discovery of these relationships which helps to clarify the larger political behavior of Western states in shaping political settlements, and especially the foreign policy behavior of the United States.

30. Wall Street Journal, February 24, 1982, p. 20; July 27, 1981, p. 22.

31. Desai Myers III, U.S. Business in South Africa: The Economic, Political, and Moral Issues, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1980, p. 227.

32. Michael Tanser, The Race for Resources: Continuing Struggles Over Minerals and Fuels, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1980, pp. 174, 175.

The Namibia Seminar Documents

The following is a complete list of papers and other documents of the International Seminar on The Role of Transnational Corporations in Namibia, Washington, D.C., November 29-December 2, 1982. Researchers and others interested in obtaining copies of papers not included in this issue of *Africa Today* should write the American Committee on Africa, 198 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10038.

Number Title

- NS-1 **Banks and Namibia** by Terry Shott, ELTSA (End Loans to South Africa) United Kingdom
- NS-2 **Canada and Namibian Uranium** by The Taskforce on Churches and Corporate Responsibility, Canada
- NS-3 **Multinational Companies Operating in Namibia: An Overview** by Brian Bolton, Transport and General Workers' Union, United Kingdom
- NS-4 **Report on the Research and Organizing Work of the American Friends Service Committee Southern Africa Program** by Elizabeth Groff, American Friends Service Committee, United States of America
- NS-5 **Saskatchewan and Namibia; The Uranium Connection** by Sterling Bjorn-dahl, Inter-Lutheran Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Canada
- NS-6 **Education and Mobilization around Namibia** by The Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSA), Canada
- NS-7 **Labor Conditions in the TNCs**, paper presented by the Research, Information and Publications Department of the International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa. Presenter: Wilfrid Grenville-Grey, International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, United Kingdom
- NS-8 **Breaking the Economic Links with Namibia's Exploiters: Divestment Action in the United States** by Gall Hovey, American Committee on Africa, United States of America
- NS-9 **Scandinavia and Namibia: Policies and Actions** by Eric Erichsen, Danish Association for International Co-operation, Denmark, Bertil Hogberg, Africa Groups of Sweden, Sweden, and Arne Tostensen, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Sweden

- NS-10 **Background Paper on Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Namibia as occupied by the armed forces of South Africa** by Gottfried Wellmer, Anti-Apartheid Bewegung, Federal Republic of Germany (Distributed in four parts)
- NS-11 **Paper Presented to the "International Seminar on the Role of the TNCs in Namibia"** by Jan Van Heuvelom, Afdelingscomité Zuidelijk Afrika, Belgium
- NS-12 **Report on Japan** by Ms Yoko Kitazawa, Pacific Resource Center, Japan
- NS-13 **The Role of Transnational Corporations in Namibia** by David de Beer, The Netherlands
- NS-14 **A Short Introduction to Namibia** Foreningen by Namibia Association, Norway
- NS-15 **A Report from the Lutheran Coalition on Southern Africa** by Kim Zalent, Lutheran Coalition on Southern Africa, United States of America
- NS-16 **Namibia, the Karakul Industry and the Hudson's Bay Company** by Susan Hurlich, Oxfam-Canada
- NS-17 **An Overview of American Corporate Investments in Namibia** by Allan D. Cooper, Assistant Professor of Political Science, St. Augustine's College, United States of America
- NS-18 **Recent North American Corporate Activity in Namibia** by James Cason, Southern Africa Committee, United States of America
- NS-19 **Tripoli Declaration on Namibia**. Calculated at the request of Theo-Ben Gurirab, SWAPO, Namibia
- NS-20 **"Educate to Liberate"** by the Southern Africa Task Force of Houston, United States of America
- NS-21 **The Namibian Fishing Industry** by Richard Moorsom, United Kingdom
- NS-22 **The Namibia Concerns Committee - Wartburg Seminary, Dubuque, Iowa** by Solveig Kjeseth, Namibia Concerns Committee, United States of America
- NS-23 **Statement by Mr. Abdul Hamid (Indonesia) of the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid**
- NS-24 **Campaigning in Britain against Economic Collaboration with the Illegal South African Occupation of Namibia** by Chris Child, British Anti-Apartheid Movement, United Kingdom
- NS-25 **The International Monetary Fund and Namibia** by Jim Morrell, Center for International Policy, United States of America
- NS-26 **Address by H.E. Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria)**, Vice-President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, November 29, 1982

- NS-27 **The International Trade in Namibia's Uranium (An overview of the expropriation of Namibia's uranium resources)** by Alun R. Roberts, United Kingdom
- NS-28 **The U.S. and South African/Namibian Uranium Options** by Ronald W. Walters, Ph.D., Professor, Howard University, United States of America.
- NS-29 **Presentation by Peter Sluiter, Komittee Zuidelijk Afrika (Holland Committee on South Africa)**
- NS-30 **Shadows of the Past: The Consequences of Colonisation and German Colonial Rule in Namibia** by Henning Melber, Federal Republic of Germany
- NS-31 **Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia** by Gay J. McDougall, Director, Southern Africa Project, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, United States of America
- NS-32 **Documents from Amnesty International: Human Rights Violations in Namibia — An Amnesty International Briefing, September 1982; Namibia: A Country Under the Control of South Africa where Detention Without Trial, Torture of Political Detainees, Extrajudicial Executions Occur by Amnesty International and Urgent Action: Namibia: About 25 Arrests. (UA 268/82) by Amnesty International, November 26, 1982. Presenter: Susanne Riveles, South Africa/Namibia Coordinator, Amnesty International, United States of America**
- NS-33 **Campaign to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa (COBLSA): Report on Activities and Some Proposals** by Carole Collins, National Coordinator, Campaign to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa, United States of America
- NS-34 **Southern Indiana United Methodists Support Southern Africans** by Pat Kyle, Southern Indiana United Methodist Churches and Others in Support of Southern Africans (SUMOSSA)
- NS-35 **The French-Namibian Connection: I) France and Namibian Uranium II) The French Government and Namibia III) Solidarity With SWAPO in France** by Jacques Marchand, Mouvement Anti-Apartheid, France (translation: Joshua Nessen, American Committee on Africa, United States of America)
- NS-36 **International Capital and the Crisis in Namibia's Mining Industry** by Brian Wood, Namibia Support Committee, United Kingdom
- NS-37 **Opening address to the International Seminar on the Role of Transnational Corporations in Namibia** by Sean McBride, President, International Seminar on the Role of Transnational Corporations in Namibia
- NS-38 **Report of the Working Groups of the International Seminar on the Role of Transnational Corporations in Namibia adopted by the concluding plenary session I) Political Action II) Economic Action III) Material Aid IV) Information**

- NS-39 **Address by Theo-Ben Gurirab, Permanent Observer to the United Nations, SWAPO of Namibia, November 29, 1982**
- NS-40 **Address by Francesta Farmer, Executive Director, Congressional Black Caucus, November 29, 1982, United States of America**
- NS-41 **Address by Randall Robinson, Executive Director, TransAfrica, December 2, 1982, United States of America**
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- NS-44 **A Message to the People of the United States and the Final Declaration of the International Seminar on the Role of Transnational Corporations in Namibia**
- NS-45 **Transnational Corporations and the Republic of South Africa as Partners in the Exploitations of the People and Economy of Namibia**, by Wilfred W. Asombang, United Nations Institute for Namibia, Zambia

A Message to the People

of the United States

From the **International Seminar on the Role of Transnational Corporations in Namibia**, Washington, D.C., November 29-December 2, 1982
November 29-December 2, 1982

We, as representatives of non-governmental organizations from twelve countries, met in your capital city from 29 November to 2 December. We were reminded of your struggle for independence and self-determination. We gathered to discuss the plight of the people of Namibia who aspire to the same rights for themselves and who have been struggling both politically and militarily to achieve them.

Justice, equality, freedom, and the rule of law are values for which Americans continue to struggle; they are at the very heart of democracy. Namibians have been denied these rights, first by Germany and later by South Africa. They suffer violations of individual and political rights, arbitrary detention without trial, torture, imprisonment for political beliefs and military rule, all at the hands of the South African government, which rules them illegally by force. There is no case in international law where a more decisive judgement as to the illegality of occupation of a land by a foreign power has been rendered.

We are distressed that a combination of economic interests and political misconceptions by the Government of the United States has caused it to take actions which have prolonged the struggle of the Namibian people for their independence and delayed the holding of free elections by the United Nations in Namibia. It introduced demands that the Angolan government expel its Cuban allies before a cease fire can take place between South African forces and Namibian patriots fighting under the leadership of SWAPO. Yet it condones South Africa's constant attacks on Angola, and in 1981 was the only Government to veto a Security Council resolution condemning South Africa's invasion of Angola.

We appeal to you to reject a policy of collaboration with racism and violent repression and to call on your government to support the aspirations of the Namibian people for independence and self-determination, including the holding of free elections under United Nations supervision and control.

We urge you to demand that your Government:

- (1) Insist that the South African Government bring about an immediate cease-fire and the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 designed to bring Namibia to internationally-recognized independence.
- (2) Separate completely its concern about the presence of Cuban troops in Angola from the just claim of the Namibian people, for independent nationhood as upheld by the United Nations and by international law.
- (3) In the event of South Africa continuing its intransigence in the matter, support mandatory sanctions in the Security Council of the United Nations.
- (4) Give effect in the United States to the Decree of the United Nations Council for Namibia for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia.

Final Declaration

Of the **International Seminar on the Role of Transnational Corporations in Namibia**, Washington, D.C., November 29-December 2, 1982

We, as representatives of non-governmental organizations from twelve countries, affirm that the basic problem concerning Namibia is the illegal South African occupation of the territory, in defiance of the decisions of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. The just struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO is the response of people seeking their freedom, and deserves the fullest international support.

The Role of Transnational Corporations

Information provided at the Seminar showed conclusively that the South African regime has, in recent years, and with the collaboration of transnational corporations, accelerated the process of the exploitation of Namibia's natural resources. Their activities have gained momentum despite strong protests by the international community and numerous resolutions of the United Nations against such exploitation.

The transnational corporations most active in Namibia are of North American, West European and South African origin. Their activities are directed at the major sectors of the Namibian economy, in the mining, financial and agricultural sectors.

Mining in Namibia has proved highly profitable for the transnational corporations. The easy repatriation of profits has allowed the home countries of the transnational corporations to systematically remove thousands of millions of dollars of Namibia's wealth from the country. The Namibians themselves have not benefitted from their enormous mineral wealth. But the shareholders of companies such as Consolidated Diamond Mines (South Africa), Rio Tinto Zinch (British) and AMAX and Newmont Mining (American) have made spectacular profits, out of all proportion to their original investment. These intensive mining operations are depleting the mineral resources of Namibia, which can never be replaced. The uranium mining has been done with minimal safety and health provisions, resulting in the slow poisoning of both land and people.

The involvement of foreign banks in Namibia has assisted the South Africans in financing their illegal administration of the territory. This has resulted in the expansion of the oppressive administrative structures, and is also used to attract new foreign investors to Namibia to share in the exploitation of the country.

In the **fishing** sector the desire for excessive short-term profits by transnational corporations has led to the virtual collapse of the Namibian fishing industry, the exhaustion of another of Namibia's natural resources. Karakul sheep and cattle **farming** have led to excessive overgrazing resulting in the creeping extension of desert areas, further damaging Namibia's natural environment.

Throughout the years the transnational corporations have benefitted from the apartheid labor laws and customs enforced by South Africa in Namibia. They have been allowed to underpay and neglect the social conditions of their employees. This direct and brutal exploitation of Namibian workers is also part of the negative influence transnational corporations have had in Namibia.

In the light of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, the Seminar found that the continuing operation of the transnational corporations has serious **political and strategic** consequences. All mining operations in Namibia occur in defiance of Decree No. 1 of the United Nations Council for Namibia which prohibits mining operations while the territory is illegally occupied. This means that the transnational corporations collaborate with South Africa in defying U.N. decisions, and that the transnational corporations fear that an end to the illegal occupation will mean an end to their excessive profits. In addition, the political influence of the transnational corporations in their home countries and in some cases the strategic importance of their operations in Namibia, as for instance the production of uranium, has led the governments of such countries to obstruct the struggle

for Namibian independence. The involvement of the transnational corporations with South Africa has also strengthened South Africa's military capacity. All five members of the Western Contact Group have major transnational corporate involvement in Namibia. The lack of progress by the Contact Group since 1978 has not only prevented Namibians from attaining their independence, but has also given the transnational corporations the chance to operate unhindered for a few more years in an illegally-occupied Namibia.

The Tripoli Declaration

We welcome the Tripoli Declaration on Namibia issued by thirty-one African heads of state on 26 November 1982 and we commend this declaration as an expression of Africa's concern with the lack of progress in the negotiations by the Western Contact Group. It particularly "rejects all attempts to establish any linkage or parallelism between the independence of Namibia and any extraneous issues, in particular the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and emphasizes unequivocally that the persistence of such attempts would only retard the decolonization process in Namibia."

The Western Contact Group

Considerable concern exists in Africa and throughout the world over the activities of the so-called "Contact States": U.S.A., Britain, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany and France. The activities of these five NATO states have not only failed to achieve the stated objectives but served to permit further procrastination by South Africa. Accordingly this International Seminar calls upon the United Nations Council of Namibia to resume its full responsibility concerning the future of Namibia, including matters arising from the negotiations. The liberation of Namibia pursuant to the decisions of the United Nations and international law is the sole responsibility of the United Nations; it should not permit these five "Contact States" to usurp the functions of the Council for Namibia.

The International Seminar urgently recommends to the U.N. Council for Namibia to take effective measures to secure the implementation of U.N. Decree No. 1 for the protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia. With this end in view, it is recommended that a Special Prosecutor, or Prosecutors, be appointed to direct and supervise the implementation of the Decree. It is further recommended that groups of lawyers should be formed in different countries to assist in the implementation of the Decree at national level; such lawyers' groups should work in contact with existing Namibia support groups.

Recommendations

The working groups of the conference examined the opportunities open to governments, United Nations agencies, and primarily Non-Governmental Organizations for political and economic action, for material aid to SWAPO, and for the exchange of information.

Political action should be aimed at isolating South Africa on all levels, ensuring political support for SWAPO and the Frontline states, pressurizing the Contact Group countries to drop the linkage of Angolan politics to the Namibian liberation question, and ensuring recognition of the U.N. Council for Namibia as the legal authority of Namibia until independence.

On the national and local level political campaigns on Namibia should be centered on the local presence of transnational corporations operating in Namibia, and strategic harbor facilities. The information presented to this conference should be edited, indexed, and presented for consideration to the United Nations and Organization of African Unity Conference on Namibia to be held in Paris in April 1983.

Economic action should be aimed at forcing corporations to cease their activities in Namibia, especially in regard to the expropriation of Namibia's mineral resources, and campaigning for mandatory comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa. The mandatory arms embargo must be strictly enforced and extended.

Further campaigning issued on policies of divestment, an oil embargo, South Africa's links to the International Monetary Fund, etc. should also include local trade union participation.

Material aid to SWAPO should be stepped up in this crucial phase of the struggle. Aid projects should be aimed not only at supplying essential food and medicines, but also at assisting SWAPO in building up its structures in line with its responsibilities as a national liberation movement.

A system for the exchange of **information** on political developments, political and economic action and material aid programs should be established.

Enforcing Decree No. 1 in the Domestic Courts of the United States

David J. Stephenson, Jr., Jocelyn Sedney, and Jean-Paul Prentice

Issues and Conclusions

1. Does Decree No. 1 confer standing on either individual citizens or the Council for Namibia?

Yes, probably both a citizen stockholder and the Council for Namibia would have standing because each could show a tangible injury that is logically related to a valid claim for relief.

2. Is customary international law self-executing in the United States courts?

Yes, customary international law has the same status as treaty law and is self-executing in United States courts.

3. Is Decree No. 1 customary international law?

Yes, Decree No. 1 has a solid basis in customary international law by virtue of several U.N. resolutions, decisions by the International Court of Justice, and official statements by the U.S. Department of State.

4. Is Decree No. 1 a self-executing treaty obligation of the United States?

Probably Decree No. 1 is not a self-executing treaty obligation since Decree No. 1 vests enforcement power in the Council for Namibia.

5. Is an alleged violation of Decree No. 1 a non-justiciable political question?

It is arguable that enforcing Decree No. 1 primarily raises a legal question, rather than a political question, and therefore that it is justiciable, even though the Department of State has expressly declined to recognize it as legally binding.

6. Does a stockholder state a valid claim for relief against a corporation and its directors by alleging breach of a fiduciary duty for investing in Namibia?

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Since a corporation's investment in Namibia violates public policy, as embodied in customary international law, stockholders can state a valid claim for relief by alleging director breach of a fiduciary duty of care.

7. Has the United States Department of State taken a position in support of Decree No. 1?

Although the State Department has expressly not approved Decree No. 1 itself, the Department has repeatedly taken positions supporting the basic tenets of Decree No. 1.

Factual Background

South West Africa was renamed Namibia by the United Nations General Assembly on June 12, 1968.¹ Its post-renaissance history commences with the 1878 British claim on Walvis Bay, its only deep-sea port and shipping lane. Six years later the Kaiser claimed the rest of the territory as a German Protectorate.²

South Africa's conquest of South West Africa in 1915 resulted in a League of Nations "C class" Mandate, whereby South Africa, as Mandatory, was able to administer and legislate for South West Africa as an integral part of itself.³

Between 1920 and the drafting of the United Nations Charter in 1945, South Africa was able to entrench its apartheid practices and ideology, interlock economies, and achieve favorable juxtaposition to ensure control over the Territory, and hopefully annex South West Africa as a fifth province of the Union.

The League of Nations failed to formally transfer its Mandate to the United Nations in April 1946. However, in 1950, the International Court of Justice issued a *Status Opinion* stating that the League's Mandate continued in force with supervision to be exercised by the United Nations General Assembly.⁴

In June 1955, the International Court issued a *Voting Procedure Opinion*,⁵ which confirmed the right of the United Nations General Assembly to adopt resolutions on South West Africa by a two-thirds majority.

In 1962, South Africa responded to charges in the International Court of Justice brought by Ethiopia and Liberia that the Union failed to perform

the obligations of the Mandate. On December 21, 1962, the International Court found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute.⁶ Nevertheless, on July 18, 1966, the Court found that Ethiopia and Liberia did not establish any legal right or interest pertaining to their claims against South Africa.⁷

Partially, in response to the International Court of Justice Opinion, in 1967 the U.N. Council for South West Africa was created to administer the Territory and to act as Trustee over its natural resources.⁸

In 1969, the Security Council formally recognized General Assembly termination of South Africa's Mandate, followed by a request for an advisory opinion on the question of South Africa's continued presence in Namibia from the International Court of Justice.⁹

The Security Council request culminated in the *Namibia Opinion*, wherein the Court stated as follows:

- (1) That the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory;
- (2) That states members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration;
- (3) That it is incumbent upon states which are not members of the United Nations to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph (2) above, in the action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia.¹⁰

This advisory opinion was adopted by the U.N. Security Council in Resolution 301, October 20, 1971.¹¹

In September 1974, the U.N. Council for Namibia adopted *Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia*, which was approved by the General Assembly in December 1974.¹² *Inter alia*, Decree No. 1 vested complete control of Namibian natural resources in the United Nations Council for Namibia.

1. G.A. Res. 2372, 22 U.N. GAOR (1967 1st mtg.) U.N. Doc. A/L. 546/Rev. 1 (1968).

2. Elizabeth S. Landis, *Namibian Liberation: Self-determination, Law and Politics* (Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, 1982), p. 2.

3. Mandate for German South West Africa, Geneva, December 17, 1920, League of Nations Doc. [20-31-96D] (1920).

4. 1950 I.C.J. 81.

5. 1955 I.C.J. 67.

6. 1962 I.C.J. 319.

7. 1966 I.C.J. 1.

8. G.A. Res. 2248 (S-V), (1518th Mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/L. 516/Rev. 1 (1967).

9. 25 U.N. SCOR (1550th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/9891(1970).

10. 1971 I.C.J. 16.

11. 26 U.N. SCOR (1598th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. 3/10372/Rev. 1 (1971).

12. 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 24A) para. 84, U.N. Doc. A/9624/Add. 1.

Discussion

Issue No. 1: Does Decree No. 1 confer standing on either individual citizens or the Council for Namibia?

The three requirements for establishing the standing of the party seeking relief are:

- (1) Sufficient personal interest to insure concrete adverseness;¹³
- (2) The complainant is within the zone of interests;¹⁴ and
- (3) There is a "logical nexus between the claim asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated."¹⁵

Applying these three standards to Congressmen Diggs', Conyer's, Rangel's, and Stokes', and complainants M'Gabe's, Vidal's and The Council for Christian Social Action's complaint that the Byrd Amendment conflicted with Security Council resolutions on Rhodesia, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found that these complainants had standing.¹⁶ The four congressmen complainants had sought to travel in Rhodesia, but had been refused entry because of their race. The other complainants had similar, but not identical complaints. For example, the Council's missionaries had been subject to arrest and deportation. The Court found that these complainants suffered tangible injuries from action by Southern Rhodesia and that the prospects for relief from the United States, even though not a certainty, were logically and substantially enough related to the injuries to support standing.¹⁷

A review of the companion Diggs case shows that the district court conferred standing on plaintiffs,¹⁸ and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's subject matter jurisdiction dismissal on a ground "analytically distinct" from standing.¹⁹

Hence, either Decree No. 1, or the customary international law underpinning Decree No. 1, may confer standing if the complainants can show a tangible personal injury that is logically linked to their claim for relief. For example, a suit by a corporate stockholder alleging director breach of the fiduciary duty of care would probably confer standing since the United States has expressly stated that it would not protect corporate activity in Namibia and because such investment is at least widely disapproved, if not illegal,

13. *Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp*, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 90 S. Ct. 827, 25 L. Ed.2d 184 (1969).

14. *Id.*

15. *Flast v. Cohen*, 392 U.S. 83, 102, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed.2d 947 (1967).

16. *Diggs v. Schultz*, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).

17. *Id.* See Note, Standing, 9 *Texas International L.J.* 114 (1974).

18. 14 *Intl. Legal Materials* 797 (1975).

19. *Diggs v. Richardson*, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

internationally.²⁰ Such investments arguably violate public policy.²¹

Similarly, a suit by the Council for Namibia would be analogous to a suit by a trustee on behalf of beneficiaries. The Council on Namibia would have an interest comparable to, and in some ways more tangible than, the Council for Christian Social Action. There is a logical nexus between the outcome of an action by the Council for Namibia and the interests of its Namibian citizen beneficiaries.

Issue No. 2: Is customary international law self-executing in the United States courts?

Customary international law is "self-executing," enforceable in the federal courts of the United States independent of congressional action.²² In *Filariga*, two Paraguayan citizens filed an action in New York against a former Paraguayan policeman for wrongful death by torture.²³ The Second Circuit reversed a district court dismissal, holding that official torture violates the law of nations and that the law of nations forms "an integral part" of the United States common law.²⁴ Customary international law, "must be ascertained and administered" by the United States federal courts.²⁵ It has the same status as treaty law and "supersedes inconsistent state and local laws and prior inconsistent federal laws."²⁶

Issue No. 3: Is Decree No. 1 customary international law?

Filariga relied on early Supreme Court precedent to identify appropriate sources of International Law:

The law of nations may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law. *United States v. Smith*, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61, 5 L. Ed. 57 (1820); *Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder*, 225 F. Supp. 292, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1963).²⁷

20. See *infra*.

21. See *infra*.

22. *Filariga v. Peno-Italo*, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2nd Cir. 1980).

23. *Id.*

24. *Id.* at 886.

25. *The Paquete Habana*, U.S. 677, 700, 20 S. Ct. 290, 293, 44 L. Ed. 320, 323 (1900).

26. K. Barlas, et al., *International Human Rights Law: What It is and How It Can Be Used in State and Federal Courts* (June 9, 1983), Human Rights Advocates, Inc. at 37, citing RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §§ 102, 131(1), 135(1) (Text. Draft 1980).

27. *Filariga*, op. cit. at 880.

Filartiga noted that the sources identified by the *Smith* court were reaffirmed in *The Paquete Habana*,²⁸ and in 1945 by the International Court of Justice.²⁹

The *Filartiga* court relied on the following sources to find that official torture is prohibited by customary international law:

- (1) Affidavits by distinguished scholars;³⁰
- (2) A judicial opinion by the European Court of Human Rights;³¹
- (3) The U.N. Charter and two General Assembly Resolutions;³²
- (4) Multilateral treaties;³³
- (5) The pronouncements of nations;³⁴
- (6) Statements by the U.S. Department of State.³⁵

There is evidence that the United States State Department has taken a position consistent with Decree No. 1 discouraging corporate investments in Namibia.³⁶

Decree No. 1 is itself essentially a reaffirmation by a United States Council of two tenets of international law: (1) the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence; and, (2) the right of that people to permanent sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources.³⁷

The first tenet is set forth in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960.³⁸ The second tenet is specifically set forth in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of December 14, 1962.³⁹ The legal basis for these Resolutions themselves was established by the June 1955 *Voting Procedure Opinion* of the International Court of Justice, which confirmed the right of the General Assembly to adopt resolutions on South West Africa by a two-thirds majority, and by the 1950 *Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South West Africa*, authorizing the succession of authority from the League of Nations to the General Assembly of the United Nations.⁴⁰ In 1966, the General Assembly almost

28. 175 U.S. 677, 20 S. Ct. 290, 44 L. Ed. 320 (1900)

29. *Filartiga*, op. cit. at 881, n. 8.

30. *Id.* at 879.

31. *Id.* at 884.

32. *Id.* at 883.

33. *Id.* at 883-84.

34. *Id.* at 884, n. 15.

35. *Id.* at 884.

36. See the issue re: State Department infra.

37. 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 24A) para. 84, U.N. Doc. A/9624/Add. 1.

38. 15 GAOR (947th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/L. 323/Add. 1-6.

39. 17 GAOR (1194th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/5344/Add. 1, A/L. 412/Rev. 2.

40. 1950 I.C.J. 81.

unanimously revoked South Africa's mandate to administer South West Africa, Resolution 2145 (XXI), and undertook to administer it itself pursuant to article 81 of the U.N. Charter. On May 19, 1967, the General Assembly created the Council for South West Africa (later Namibia) to take over trusteeship functions pursuant to article 22 of the U.N. Charter.⁴¹

General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) of 1966, terminating South West Africa's mandate, was confirmed by Security Council resolution 276 (1970).⁴²

Both General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) of 1966 and 2248 (S-V) of 1967 were upheld by the International Court of Justice in its 1971 *Advisory Opinion Concerning the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)*.⁴³

When the International Court of Justice reviewed these General Assembly Resolutions, it noted that:

It would not be correct to assume that because the General Assembly is in principle vested with recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting, in specific cases within the framework of its competence, resolutions which make determinations or have operative design.⁴⁴

This *Advisory Opinion* was then adopted by the Security Council.⁴⁵

Security Council Resolution No. 276 states in pertinent part that "all states" having economic or other interests in Namibia should refrain from dealings with South Africa that are inconsistent with its continued illegal presence there.⁴⁶ This portion of Resolution No. 276 was also held "binding on all states members of the United Nations, which are thus under obligation to accept and carry them out . . ."⁴⁷

Therefore, by relying on traditional sources of customary international law, it can be shown that Decree No. 1 has a solid basis in customary international law. These sources include: two U.N. General Assembly resolutions; three opinions by the International Court of Justice; two U.N. security council resolutions; statements by the U.S. Department of State; and Decree No. 1 itself, which is an authoritative statement by a United Nations

41. U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 2248 (S-V), (1518th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/L. 516/R/1 (1967).

42. 25 U.N. SCOR (1550th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/9891/1970.

43. 1971 I.C.J. 16.

44. 1971 I.C.J. at 50, n. 5 (para. 105). General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) of 1966 had such an "operative design." *Id.* at 16. Therefore, it is legally binding and effective in all member states.

45. 26 U.N. SCOR (1598th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. 3/10 372/Rev. 1 (1971).

46. U.N. Doc. S/9891/1970 at Paras. 2 and 5.

47. 1971 I.C.J. at 16.

Council. Since Decree No. 1 has the force of customary international law, it is both binding and self-executing in United States courts.

Issue No. 4: Is Decree No. 1 a self-executing treaty obligation of the United States?

Courts have applied ambiguous standards to determine whether international agreements to which the United States is either directly or indirectly a party are self-executing. The *Filatiga* court ambiguously stated that the United Nations Charter is not "wholly" self-executing — implying that it may be "partially" self-executing — because it is so "broad."⁴⁸ The *Filatiga* court also cited several scholarly treatises on the legal effect of resolutions by the U.N. General Assembly to imply — but not expressly state — that since the resolutions are authoritative statements they are binding on U.N. members.⁴⁹

In *Diggs v. Richardson*,⁵⁰ the court relied on the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations § 154 (1965) in finding that whether an international agreement is self-executing is a matter of interpretation for the courts.⁵¹ *Diggs* held that United Nations Security Council Resolution 301, concerned with the dealings of member states with South Africa that are inconsistent with the rights of the Namibian people⁵² was not self-executing and hence conferred no rights on individual citizens.

The *Diggs* Court based its interpretation of the resolution on *Sei Fujii v. State*,⁵³ i.e., it held that the relevant considerations for a court deciding whether a treaty is self-executing are the "intent" of the parties and, vaguer still, the "circumstances" surrounding its execution.⁵⁴ The court found that the resolution was concerned with matters traditionally left to executive discretion, i.e., it was not justiciable.

The *Diggs v. Richardson* decision has been solidly criticized by Frank Newman for relying so heavily on a California Supreme Court decision decided 30 years ago in a political and legal climate that stultified human rights considerations.⁵⁵

48. *Filatiga*, op. cit. at 883.

49. *Id.*

50. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

51. *Id.* at 851.

52. See *supra*.

53. 38 Cal.2d 718, 721-22, 242 P.2d 617, 620 (1952).

54. *Id.* at 851.

55. Proceedings: Conference on Human Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 17 U. San Francisco L. Rev. at 5 (1982).

Further, even though the *Diggs* court found that applying the pertinent Security Council Resolution was not justiciable, on remand the Department of Commerce held that the resolution was enforceable by individuals as international customary law.⁵⁶

Since Decree No. 1 calls for specific action (unlike the U.N. Charter), a court following the *Filatiga* reasoning might find it self-executing. A court that applied the *Sei Fujii* analysis used by the *Diggs v. Richardson* court would probably rely on language in the decree vesting enforcement power in the Council for Namibia to find that the Decree, as a treaty, is unenforceable by individuals.

Issue No. 5: Is an alleged violation of Decree No. 1 a non-justiciable political question?

In *Diggs v. Schultz*, the D.C. Circuit held that an alleged violation by the Executive branch of the government of a treaty obligation is a non-justiciable political question.⁵⁷ While holding that Security Council Resolution 301 is not self-executing, the D.C. Circuit implied that complainants had again raised a non-justiciable political question in *Diggs v. Richardson*.⁵⁸ Both decisions emphasized that the conduct of foreign relations is traditionally left to executive discretion.⁵⁹

An action by either a stockholder or the Council for Namibia against a corporation for an alleged violation of Decree No. 1 might raise a political question, since it would question the expressed reluctance of the Department of State to consider Decree No. 1 binding law. However, the State Department is on record as stating that it would not protect investments in Namibia.⁶⁰

Moreover, a compelling argument can be made that any actions by the Executive that contradict Decree No. 1 contravene either a treaty obligation or customary international law, or both.⁶¹ It follows that such an allegation raises a purely legal question, not a political one, since the real issue is whether the Executive is acting *beyond* its authority, rather than within its discretion, in interpreting and implementing Decree No. 1.⁶²

56. See *supra* and *infra*. *Id.* at 9.

57. 470 F.2d at 461.

58. 555 F.2d at 850.

59. See *supra*.

60. See *infra*.

61. See *supra*.

62. See Note, *The Importance of Diggs v. Schultz*, in *International Human Rights* (R. Lillich & F. Newman, eds. 1979) at 473.

Issue No. 6: Does a stockholder state a valid claim for relief against a corporation and its directors by alleging breach of a fiduciary duty for investing in Namibia?

In *Miller v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.*,⁶³ the Third Circuit held that, under New York law, illegal acts committed by the directors of a corporation may breach a fiduciary duty *even if the acts have been committed in order to benefit the corporation*. In *Miller*, the stockholders brought a derivative action against AT&T and all but one of its directors for failing to collect a \$1.5 million debt owed by the Democratic National Committee.⁶⁴ Plaintiffs alleged, *inter alia*, that the debt was a political contribution in violation of a federal prohibition on corporate campaign spending.⁶⁵ The *Miller* court cited precedent to support its holding that directors may be legally restrained from engaging in activities that are against public policy, as embodied in the law, even if it ultimately benefited the corporation.⁶⁶

Decree No. 1 specifically prohibits any corporate involvement in Namibia that is not authorized by the Council for Namibia, and it permits the Council to seize any resources illegally taken from Namibia. Hence, since a corporation's investment in Namibia violates public policy, as embodied in customary international law, stockholders can state a valid claim for relief by alleging director breach of a fiduciary duty of care.

Issue No. 7: Has the United States Department of State taken a position in support of Decree No. 1?

In 1970, the United States reiterated its protest of South African policies towards Namibia and instituted the following steps:

- (1) The U.S. will henceforth officially discourage investment by U.S. nationals in Namibia.
- (2) Export-Import Bank credit guarantees will not be made available for trade with Namibia.
- (3) U.S. nationals who invest in Namibia on the basis of rights acquired through the South African Government since adoption of General Assembly Resolution 2145 October 27, 1966 will not receive U.S. Government assistance in protection of such investment against claims of a future lawful government of Namibia.
- (4) The United States will encourage other nations to take actions similar to these.⁶⁷

At the same time the United States rejected mandatory economic sanctions

63 507 F.2d 759 (3rd Cir. 1974)

64 *Id.*

65 *Id.*

66 *Id.* at 762-3. See also *Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities*, 27 Bus. Law 1 (1972); Annot. 29 ALR 3d 660 (1970); Note, 36 Notre Dame L. 343 (1961).

67 Yost, "The U.S. Stake in an Effective United Nations," 60 Dep't. St. Bull. 705, 709 (June 3, 1970).

against South Africa because of enforcement difficulties.⁶⁸

The State Department discouragement of investment in Namibia has been restated while continuing to press South Africa in diplomatic channels.⁶⁹ The Department of State maintains that the choice of whether to invest in South Africa is up to the American investors:

We make certain they are aware of the controversy about such investment, explain our official neutrality, note the moral and social as well as economic and political problems of working in an apartheid society, and urge that if they do invest they give priority attention to the matter of fair employment practices.⁷⁰

The United States abstained from voting on a draft resolution,⁷¹ concerning the program of work of the United Nations Council for Namibia because of reservations concerning the practical authority of the Council.⁷² At the same time reservations were expressed as to whether it is feasible and legally appropriate to require member states to enforce the provisions of Decree No. 1 of the United Nations Council for Namibia.⁷³

The United States' policy of no protection to post-1966 American investments in Namibia in the event claims are pressed by a future legitimate Namibian government has remained uncontradicted since 1970. While in 1981, the Department of State said that "South Africa is an integral and important element of the global economic system . . ." ⁷⁴ investment in Namibia has not been specifically mentioned in the past three years.

Although the State Department has not upheld Decree No. 1, but rather expressed reservations about its enforcement, the Department has, since 1970, consistently discouraged investment in Namibia.

Following is a year by year synopsis of the search through Department of State publications concerning Namibia.⁷⁵

1982. The Department of State stresses not only the exercise of self-determination by Namibians but the security of her neighbors as well. This

68 See *Id.* at 709

69 Moynihan, "U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on Situation in Namibia," 74 Dep't. St. Bull. 243, 244 (February 23, 1976).

70 Schaufele, Jr., "United States Relations in Southern Africa," 76 Dep't. St. Bull. 464, 470 (May 9, 1977).

71 A/C 4/31/L. 31 [A/RES/31/147]

72 Hess, "U.S. Reaffirms Commitment to Self-Determination and Independence for Namibia," 76 Dep't. St. Bull. 43, 45 (Jan. 17, 1977).

73 See *Id.*

74 81 Dep't. St. Bull. 24, 26 (October, 1981)

75 The original version of this paper contained an appendix for each of the cited years, giving the complete text of the documents summarized. This information is available on request.

is coupled with a concern over Cuban involvement in Angola and a coinciding communist presence in Namibia. The State Department claims not to have made Cuban withdrawal from Angola a precondition to the settlement of the Namibian question but considers the two problems inseparable. Potential for increased U.S. investment in Namibia is mentioned and stressed as a mutual interest between South Africa and the United States. The Reagan administration sees a quiet evolutionary change as preferable to an immediate solution.

Restrictions on sales to South Africa were relaxed because of the alleged inconsequential effect on South Africa's military build-up.

1981. The position of the State Department is portrayed as one of confidence and friendship towards South Africa rather than isolation. The goal is voiced that Namibia will be free of foreign presence or foreign troops. Soviets are identified as the suppliers of SWAPO, an organization characterized as an element that inflicts terror and bloodshed upon the populace of Namibia.

The regional policy in Africa includes support for open market opportunities and access to key resources. The flow of trade between United States and South Africa is seen as reinforcing a solid basis for mutual trust. The idea of "walking away" from South Africa and economic ties with that country are flatly rejected. Fostering trade and investment is seen as a means to a solution of the Namibian problem.

1980. The State Department addresses U.S. corporations in South Africa and notes that they play an important role in leverage for social and political change. U.S. firms operating in South Africa are urged to institute, maintain, and expand enlightened employment practices for their black employees, including improvements in wages, working conditions, fringe benefits and opportunities for advancement. It is noted that 135 U.S. companies have signed the "Sullivan Principles," a set of principles for fair employment practices by U.S. companies doing business in South Africa. Those corporations employing fair employment practices had restrictions eased by the Export-Import Bank.

1979. Economic relations with South Africa are seen as a positive force for promoting change in that society, provided that the companies operating there act as agents for positive change.

1978. The State Department is hesitant to impose sanctions on South Africa fearing this will result in loss of trust. The U.S. leaves the determination of Walvis Bay to post-independence negotiations, refusing to take a stand.

1977. The Department of State explains U.S. voting against several draft resolutions on Namibia in the U. N. Arms embargoes and tacit approval of

armed struggle were both rejected. The United States abstained on the Resolution regarding the work of the Council for Namibia since previous reservations about the implications of the Resolution and the practical authority of the Council were still not resolved.

The U.S. also abstained on the draft resolution condemning economic relations with South Africa because of reservations as to whether it is feasible and legally appropriate to require member states to enforce the provisions of Decree No. 1 of the United Nations Council for Namibia. The State Department does see the minority governments of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Namibia as violating fundamental human rights spelled out in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.

The State Department reaffirmed the discouragement of the government effective since 1970 of all American investment in Namibia. Export-Import Bank facilities are not available for trade with the territory, and no future investments made on the basis of rights acquired from the South African Government following termination of the Mandate would receive U.S. government protection against the claims of a future legitimate government in Namibia. Firms already doing business in Namibia are urged to conform with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The State Department emphasizes its neutral role as far as investment in South Africa goes. If asked for information, the businesses are provided with information on controversies in the region, and warned of moral, social, economic and political ramifications of working in an apartheid society.

At the Maputo Conference, Andrew Young, representative to the United Nations, spoke. A declaration was adopted at that conference by consensus encouraging nations to follow Decree No. 1.

1976. The State Department continues to dissuade investment in Namibia as it has since the 1966 Resolution in the U.N. dissolving the South African trusteeship. It also continues to withhold U.S. protection of businesses established in Namibia after 1966. Shipments of arms and military equipment is prohibited. Secretary Kissinger urges businesses to practice in the same way they would at home, i.e., not to practice apartheid.

Conclusion

Earlier articles in this issue have established the status of Decree No. 1 in International Law, and demonstrated that major nations, including the U.S., have largely ignored the decree, or failed to act upon its implications. As U.S. citizens, the authors of this paper, originally prepared as a legal brief, have sought to trace the means whereby enforcement might become effective, if appropriate officials or concerned citizens have the will to take

the necessary steps, within the legal jurisdiction of the United States.

A peaceful solution can only come through understanding the issues and addressing human rights concerns, international law, and self-determination for the peoples of Namibia. To a large extent, the means and methods employed by the international community in this dilemma will determine those used to resolve future international conflicts of similar nature, the international posture toward the maintenance of state sovereignty against military occupation by another state and self-determination for the world's remaining dependent territories.

Letters to The Editors

An Exchange of Views on Namibia

The Editors, Africa Today:

I have just read with great interest Volume 29, No. 3 (1982 3rd Quarter) copy of "Africa Today."

Your publication is a laudable and worthy exercise which deserves support. I realize that all of the opinions expressed are not necessarily those of your organization or the University of Denver, but nevertheless, I would like to say that I do feel that the article by James H. Mittelman entitled, "Correspondent's Report: The Other War in the South Atlantic" is so nearly a pure piece of propaganda that it has little factual worth. It simply was not well researched, is replete with misstatements and was obviously written to be presented to a biased audience, namely the United Nations Council for Namibia.

To demonstrate what I am referring to, the author states on page 45 that, "the fact is that Cuban troops were dispatched to Angola in 1975, after South Africa, the U.S. and Zaire had aided the two losing factions in the civil war and Moscow had backed the winner."

This statement is not true since South Africa did not send its defense forces to Namibia until October in response to the arrival of the first Cuban troops in Angola in the month before, September. This followed the visit of President dos Santos of Angola to Havana in July. My authority for this is the chapter, "The New Political Offensive" in the authoritative book by Cord Meyer, editorialist and former Deputy Director of the CIA, entitled, *Facing Reality From World Federalism to the CIA*.

Sincerely,
Marion H. Smoak
Ambassador of the U.S. (Ret.)

The Editors, Africa Today:

It is not surprising that a retired spokesman for the United States government disputes my interpretation of the turn of events in the South Atlantic (*Africa Today*, 1982 3rd Quarter), which cudgels Washington's policy in the region. However, in dubbing my article "a pure piece of propaganda," Ambassador Marion H. Smoak goes no further than to assert his view of the timing of the movement of South African and Cuban troops into Angola. The ambassador betrays his biases in citing only one source — "the authoritative book" by a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Ambassador Smoak's letter sidesteps the core of my comments concerning the misdirected path of American policy in the South Atlantic. Rather, in dealing with bibliography rather than substance, he invokes a tired stalking-horse: the Angolan imbroglio is part of a Soviet global plan, not primarily an African issue. On this point, Ambassador Smoak's authoritative source, Cord Meyer, is unequivocal:

Throughout (1975 and 1976), the Soviets were able to derive a critical advantage from being able to mask with secrecy large movements

of troops and armaments and to depend upon the secret discipline of Communist parties. Here, then, as clearly as I could reconstruct it in London, is the story of how the Soviets brought their queen, Castro's Cuban troops, into play on the Angolan chessboard to win a decisive victory and to prepare the way for future successful adventures in Africa.

Quite clearly, the ambassador's source of information is an interested party in the conflict seeking to justify a government agency's covert action program. Perhaps Ambassador Smoak ought also to consider John Stockwell's *In Search of Enemies*. This book, by the CIA's Angola Task Force chief from July 1975 to December 1976, makes clear that the agency began supporting Holden Roberto's FNLA long before Cuba first introduced regular army units into Angola in 1975. Moreover, Stockwell indicates that the CIA has persistently fed false information to the U.S. Congress and the public about foreign intervention in Angola.

Given the quality of information provided by the agency during the Vietnam War and immediately before the seizure of the hostages in Iran, one would expect Ambassador Smoak to cite accounts other than Cord Meyer's. For example, there is Seymour Hersh's disclosure in the *New York Times* (December 19, 1975): "The Ford Administration's initial authorization for substantial Central Intelligence Agency financial operations inside Angola came in January 1975, more than two months before the first significant Soviet build-up, well-informed officials report." To be sure, for many years the CIA, South Africa, and Zaire had been backing the FNLA and UNITA, and the Soviet Union had supported the winner, the MPLA. But the critical decision was made in January 1975, when the Forty Committee gave Holden Roberto \$300,000 in covert funds, according to Hersh.

Undoubtedly it is difficult to unravel the tangle of events in 1975. Nathaniel Davis, U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs in the spring and summer of 1975, says that South African troops occupied the Cunene Dam complex in southern Angola in August 1975, adding that one must go back much further in time to detect the original interventions. But it is clear that in summer 1975, former Secretary of State Kissinger secretly channeled \$32 million in aid to the factions favored by Washington. Shortly thereafter — Stockwell maintains in October — Cuba's regular troops arrived. Secretary Kissinger turned to Congress for a 10-fold increase in aid, but the Congress scotched his bid. By this time, Davis had resigned, disagreeing over his boss' uncompromising stance in Angola, and Kissinger doggedly refused to account for the prior involvement of the U.S. and South Africa in the war.

The fundamental issue raised in my article, which Ambassador Smoak evades, is not the chronology of events in Angola but the premises of American policy toward southern Africa. Our policy in Angola tells us more about anti-communist preconceptions in the U.S. than it does about problems in the sub-continent. A careful examination of the policy demonstrates that American insistence on linking South African and Cuban troop withdrawals from Angola gives South Africa a pretext to linger in Namibia. It raises the larger question of whether the U.S. government will cease to support the forces of reaction, ride the tide of history, and adopt a position that is morally right — initiate constructive engagement with the black majority in the white redoubt.

Sincerely,
James H. Mittelman

Dean, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver

The Editors, Africa Today:

As a correspondent covering Africa for 20 years, the last seven of those for an American wire agency, I was fascinated by Dan Connell's "Return of the Ugly American" in your 4th quarter issue of last year.

I've yet to stay in a Hilton: most hotels I've stayed in on my many travels have been seedy, run-down joints where running water is rare and cockroaches common. A Range-Rover I'm yet to drive: budget restrictions usually stretch to a battered 20-year-old taxi that surprises one if it doesn't break down or, at best, a two-door rental. Bottled water, in countries where it is recommended by the WHO or the local health authorities, is scarcely a luxury. And translators, themselves an invaluable link to local people, are often useful to those Africa correspondents yet to master all of the continent's hundreds of languages and dialects.

But, then, perhaps I've been unlucky. Yet I'd be interested to know where I could use an American Express card, if I had one, in Ouagadougou, Timbuktu, Likasi or Beira?

Mr. Connell clearly has met the wrong type of foreign correspondent in his own journeys. He also has evidently read the wrong books. For *The Ugly American*, on which his whole smear is based, was written by Bill Lederer and Eugene Burdick and not by Graham Greene who in fact wrote *The Quiet American*.

Sincerely,
John Edlin

Footnote: I have no particular interest in defending U.S. journalists as I am a New Zealander.

Editor's Note: Responsibility for the confusion between *The Quiet American* and *The Ugly American* is mine, not Dan Connell's. His original draft referred only to "The 1950's novel *The Ugly American*," and the attribution of authorship to Greene was made by me when I asked him to expand the reference to make it clear that the American in the novel did not correspond with the stereotype with which the phrase has become associated in popular usage. My apologies. EAH.

Correspondent's Report:

Africa and the World Council of Churches

Elizabeth M. Davies

The World Council of Churches held its sixth general assembly in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, in the summer of 1983. This is the first time the general assembly has met on the North American continent since the second assembly in Evanston, Illinois, in 1954. African participation was evident from the beginning, when at the opening worship a Zimbabwean mother made a dramatic presentation of her baby at the altar as a symbol of life.

The African region has the highest membership in the World Council of Churches (WCC) with sixty-one churches as members. The next highest region is Asia, with fifty-eight member churches. Roughly one fourth of the delegates to the sixth general assembly of the WCC came from Africa. These delegates came in addition to such people as Chief Justice Annie Jagge of Ghana, Dr. Allan Boesak and Bishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa, and the Reverend Maxime Rafransoa of the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC). These people and yet other Africans came in the capacity of visitors, advisors and presidents.

The AACC had a strong presence at the assembly. Some of its officers came as visitors and others as delegates from their churches, and some of the staff were hired by the WCC to work at the assembly. The AACC is not a member of the World Council because it is already a collective organization, but the two organizations have a close relationship, working on each other's projects together and attending each other's meetings.

When asked what the World Council of Churches means to Africa, Bishop Manas Buthelezi of South Africa answered that the question could be taken on various levels. One, a WCC assembly gives the churches in Africa a chance to meet other churches in the world because they are all together in one place. Second, it provides a place where people can air their fears, or as he put it, "a political forum for the voiceless." Third, it responds in specific ways to African issues, which makes the church real to Africans. The best example of this in his view is the Programme to Combat Racism, a division of the WCC, which provides material aid to people who are branded as "terrorists" in some circles but who are seen as family members by many Africans. His last point was that the WCC provides a means to take problems for which Africans may not have solutions and make them international, which gives some hope.

In the context of these purposes, the African churches in cooperation with each other made their requests at the Vancouver assembly in the areas of development, knowledge, transnational corporations, the environment, and refugees. These requests were for WCC material aid, primarily, although specific requests for money were never made. Rather, the churches asked for "support" for projects which they enumerated according to "area of concern."

The requests for help in development included requests for encouraging dialogue and exchange of personnel and experience both within Africa and among all Third World regions. There was also a request that the WCC "study ways and means of achieving real, just, participatory and sustainable development which will benefit the people, especially the most deprived sections of the population."

The African churches asked the WCC to help improve access to knowledge, especially scientific and technical knowledge. The African churches asked the WCC to shoulder the responsibility of dissemination of information by means of information bulletins and seminars. The WCC should also assist the churches in creating centers for "study, adaptation, development and improvement of technologies." The African churches are also interested in seeing indigenous technologies put to use.

Also in the area of knowledge, the Africans requested aid for programs already initiated by the African churches for the development of literacy and reading. They asked the WCC to help these programs by training personnel and equipping program centers with the means for production and distribution of books, and giving aid in the development of the churches' mass media.

The WCC and the African churches had scheduled a conference on transnational corporations which failed to take place. In light of this, "the churches of Africa request the continuation of this program along the lines recommended by Central Committee in July 1982 and that its implementation priority be assigned to the African region; and that the African churches and leaders be closely associated in it at all levels."

Concerns of the African churches regarding the environment include both the depletion of natural resources and what they term "the unprecedented deterioration of the environment." They attribute this deterioration to the activities of multinational corporations and the policy of the industrial countries, which the African churches accuse of turning Africa into "a dumping ground for dirty and pollutive industries and nuclear waste." The aid requested from the WCC in this area entails wide publicity of the problem and help in organizing communications between the churches in order to begin protecting the environment.

The requests for aid to refugees were the most extensive. These requests centered around appeals to governments to end conditions which produce refugees, and to help with either repatriation of refugees or help in settling persons who elect not to return home. The WCC can help most in this area by making these appeals international. There were also demands for even more vigorous denouncements of the South African government, and complete solidarity, materially, morally, and politically with the oppressed populations of South Africa and Namibia.

With significant impact from African delegates the Assembly adopted a statement on Southern Africa that strongly condemned apartheid, noted widespread violations of human rights in South Africa and the Bantustans, commended the South African Council of Churches and other Christian witnesses, many banned and imprisoned, and opposed South Africa's efforts at destabilization in neighboring countries. It also endorsed the strong stand of the Christian Council of Namibia in opposition to South Africa's illegal occupation of the Territory and the acts of oppression and terror resulting from it, and called for the immediate implementation of UN resolution 435 for the independence of Namibia. It specifically requested churches in the countries of the western contact group to intensify pressures on their government to give urgent and effective support to such implementation.

The contribution of Africa to the WCC goes far beyond the role of its churches in making the human needs of the continent known to the wider church. The bias in favor of the poor and oppressed, implicit in Christian doctrine but easily ignored by the more affluent churches, is made concrete by the presence in the WCC of representatives of the churches in Africa and other parts of the Third World.

Africa has provided many of the more respected leaders of the WCC. The newest leader from Africa is Bishop Walter Makulu. Bishop Makulu is Anglican Bishop of Botswana, president of the AACC, and a South African exile. The Vancouver assembly elected him to be one of the WCC's new presidents. African leaders from all parts of the continent serve in important positions on the staff, the Executive Committee and the various commissions and agencies of the Council.

Two of the World Council's most respected spiritual leaders are Dr. Allan Boesak and Bishop Desmond Tutu, both South Africans. The very fact that some of their most loved members know persecution has had an important hand in directing WCC's alliance to all of the politically voiceless in the world. It is enough to bias the sympathies of the WCC that some of its leaders are persecuted, but it is also important simply that these men are leaders. As leaders they are able to direct resources, moral and material, into helping victims of the South African system. By setting precedents, this action assures that the resources of the WCC will continue to go to victims all over the world.

A Look at Books



The Making of a Revolutionary: A Compelling Namibian Autobiography

Elizabeth S. Landis

BATTLEFRONT NAMIBIA. John Ya-Otto, with Ole Gjerstad and Michael Mercer. (Lawrence Hill and Co., 1981) 151 pp. \$6.95 paper.

If John Ya-Otto, the gifted child of poor but aspiring people, had grown up in the United States, his story would probably have followed a conventional line: young, bookish scholarship winner survives the rituals and agonies of adolescence and young manhood, struggles for acceptance by the establish-

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1st & 2nd Quarters, 1983

ment, and ends as the holder of an endowed chair at a university or the presidency of a professional society.

But because he was born in Namibia, his story is political: his education — a series of lessons in black and white; his rituals — organizing and confronting authority in the cause of national liberation; and his achievements — imprisonment, torture, and exile. Today he is SWAPO's Minister of Labour — recognition of his skill and devotion —; but he is minister in exile, waiting like his comrades, for the diplomatic or military victory that will allow them to return home.

The book may be roughly divided into two parts by Ya-Otto's arrest, at the age of 28, for "terrorism." The first half describes his political awakening, education, and development; the second his survival under torture, trial, and continuing persecution until he finally, unwillingly, flees Namibia.

John Otto's account of his youth is filled with ostensibly non-political memories: of his energetic aunt, laundress by day and "shebeen queen" on Saturday nights, who smuggled him as a baby from Ovamboland, where he was born, to her home in the south of Namibia; of his happy year on the farm of his Uncle Rheinholdt, where his linguistic gifts were first recognized and rewarded; of his early adolescence with his uncle Isak, the poor evangelist, in the location at Tsumeb; of his education at Augustineum College, the only high school — such as it was — for Africans in the Territory.

Yet from each of these memories he distills some political lesson, some experience that contributed ultimately to his decision to devote himself to the liberation of his country.

When he graduated, valedictorian, from Augustineum, however, he was still unpolarized, respectful of authority, anxious to devote himself to teaching. In his naivete he came close to permanently estranging himself from the community.

At that time the local authorities were trying to persuade the Africans who lived in the ramshackle "Old Location" of Windhoek to move to Katutura, a new "improved" ghetto to be built for them further from town. Ya-Otto assisted other teachers in taking the school children on a government-sponsored tour of Katutura; then, under the guidance of a senior instructor, he conducted a census of Ovambo children to prove that they were numerous enough to deserve their own school — a school which would, he was later told, of course be built in Katutura. The parents exploded in wrath and called the school staff to account at a public meeting. Sam Nujoma led the inquisition, but refrained from leveling charges at the frightened Ya-Otto, who shrank under his "stern gaze."

Subsequently Nujoma deliberately requested the conscience-stricken young teacher to translate for him at meetings with community leaders in central and southern Namibia. John Otto remained leary of joining OPO (the predecessor of SWAPO) but was drawn bit by bit into the organization's proposed boycott of municipal services to protest official plans to move the Africans to Katutura. He was at the scene on December 10, 1959, when the police fired volley after volley into an angry, but unarmed, crowd near the municipal beerhall. Ya-Otto's companion, who had gone with him because "it might be dangerous down there," died with a bullet in his back.

From that day Ya-Otto became a SWAPO militant, organizing, speaking, jousting with the authorities, and slowly moving into a leadership position as senior members were forced to flee the Territory.

It should be noted, incidentally, that the chapter on "The Windhoek

Massacre" explains better than any sociologist's thesis Sam Nujoma's continuing rapport with his people. While outsiders condescendingly compare his simplicity and lack of formal education with Mugabe's sophistication and plethora of advanced degrees, Ya-Otto demonstrates, through his own case, Nujoma's great gift of judging people and inspiring them to deeds of courage and sacrifice. Thus SWAPO's president exonerated the young teacher and gradually persuaded him to commit himself to the liberation movement. Nujoma's great political skills and judgment are documented in the same chapter. For example, it is noted, almost as an aside, that the Herero Advisory Board that called the teachers to account had been created — like the Advisory Boards for other "ethnic groups" — to hand down government policy to the "natives," but had been converted, largely through Nujoma's political skill, into a body representing the community. Later Ya-Otto points out that while he and other SWAPO members gloated over the first public meeting on Katutura, in which white officials fled the dais to escape public derision, "Sam was not smiling. 'You can't make fools of the Boers,' he said pensively. 'Sooner or later they are going to make us pay for this.'"

The end of Ya-Otto's activities came, after a series of warnings, in December 1966. Arrested at school as he was passing out exam questions, Ya-Otto was flown to Pretoria along with a group of SWAPO comrades. There he endured weeks of vicious torture in the notorious Kompol, Pretoria Local Prison.

He survived, but barely. When he was finally released from "interrogation" to a regular prison cell, he was comatose, suffered temporary paralysis and blurred vision, and was unable to sleep due to the pain from the burns and bruises that covered his body. For months he was kept in solitary confinement without reading materials, exercise, or word from his family. As his mind cleared, he wondered whether his young wife would be true to him in his long — possibly lifelong — absence; and he questioned whether he should have devoted all his time to SWAPO and virtually none to her.

Finally he was brought to court with 36 other Namibians, to plead to charges under the Terrorism Act — which had been passed with retrospective effect to cover acts they were accused of committing years earlier. The law created an all-inclusive crime of terrorism, presumed guilt instead of innocence, permitted retrial on the same charge after acquittal, and generally violated all the standards for criminal trials developed in the Western World.

From John Otto's viewpoint, the "terrorism trial" which followed pitted the defendants' advocates (barristers), who were concerned about minimizing sentences (and thereby maximizing their professional reputations), against the defendants, who were more concerned about bringing their cause to public notice than about reducing penalties. (It seemed a foregone conclusion that all would be convicted under the law, which made "terrorism" a capital offense and set five years as the minimum sentence.) Ultimately the group reluctantly agreed to most of the compromises pushed by their lawyers. But they refused to tone down the words Hermann Ja-Toivo addressed to the court on behalf of all of them at the end of the trial. In a free Namibia this moving speech will undoubtedly have a special place of honour.

It was in the midst of these disputes with the advocates and of a general feeling of doom that Ya-Otto learned that his baby son had died soon after he was arrested and the prison authorities had withheld the news from him for months. His anguish, rage, and despair are conveyed in a single paragraph that

is perhaps the most moving in the entire book.

Of all the defense counsel only Joel Carlson, the attorney (solicitor), won Ya-Otto's ungrudging admiration. He brought the defendants food and clothing, notified their families, and understood their desire to use the trial to make a political statement, although he was unable to convince his professional colleagues on the last point. More importantly, he went to Europe and the United States during a trial recess and rallied public interest and support. Messages from around the world reached the accused, raising their spirits and inspiring more active participation in their defense; foreign press and diplomatic observers began to attend the trial daily, forcing the authorities to modify their behavior. To those who know Mr. Carlson, Ya-Otto's reference to his "broken Afrikaans" will be a source of great amusement.

In fact John Otto was one of four defendants that benefitted personally from the defense lawyers' tactics. Because the evidence was so slim against him, he was found guilty, under a compromise worked out with the prosecution, of a lesser offense under the Suppression of Communism Act. He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, of which all but one month was suspended.

Deported to Ovamboland when he left prison, Ya-Otto was hounded out of every job he took by sycophantic chiefs. When he was at his lowest ebb financially and psychologically, the authorities tried to humiliate him further by offering him a clerk's job in the local "pass" office. But he held out and eventually managed to rebuild his life. He participated in the general strike of 1971-72 that shut down the entire territory.

As he succeeded in reestablishing himself, however, he came into increasing danger from the authorities. When in 1974 the police came looking for him once more, his friends and family persuaded him to flee to save his life. The memoir ends as he sadly slips through the barbed wire border fence, picks up his suitcase, and joins "the line of dark figures heading into the bush, walking north."

This book is must reading for anyone who wants to understand the Namibian experience. It should be on the bookshelves of every Africanist and every human rights advocate, to give substance to the abstractions of academic and professional discourse.

More importantly, of course, this book should be read in Washington by those who guide our foreign policy. But if the Administration is unwilling to read (or comprehend), copies of Ya-Otto's autobiography should be sent by concerned citizens to their Congresspersons with the injunction to read and then to recast American relations with southern Africa.

Gold and Labor in South Africa:

The Early Period

James Cobbe

Norman Levy, *THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHEAP LABOUR SYSTEM*. (London, Boston, Melbourne & Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982). 367 pp., \$32.50

It is widely known that gold mining is, and has been, one of the most important pillars of the South African economy. It is also well known that, throughout its history, the gold mining industry of South Africa has been heavily dependent on cheap labor for its profitability. This book is a detailed account of how the gold mining industry, and the cheap labor system established on the Witwatersrand between the 1880s and the early twentieth century.

The book has its origins in a London School of Economics dissertation; these origins show. It is far from brilliant, and many of its stylistic features of a dissertation remain, making the book physically unattractive. However, it is a well researched and interesting account, discussing other weaknesses of the industry.

As a narrative account, it is a very well researched and interesting account. The statistical material on wages, and the economics of the industry, are unlikely to be improved upon. The book is supported by a wealth of official documents of the industry.

Furthermore, the subject is of great interest. The technical achievement of the industry is impressive. The growth of the industry in five years, is impressive. The role played by low wages, and the struggles and the role of individual mines, the role of the Department of Mines, and the role of the industry in providing adequate supplies of low cost labor. This story involves not only the relationship between mines and later cooperation through monopsonization, but also the establishment of formal patterns of temporary labor recruitment, from rural areas in both British and Portuguese Africa, the attitude of governments in all those territories, and in the aftermath of the Second World War the importation of Chinese labor on indenture contracts. This is a highly interesting one, and Dr. Levy has compiled a careful and interesting account of it.

However, the weaknesses of the book, apart from those of style and publisher's niggardliness, tend to outweigh its strengths, and imply that the book will become a reference on library shelves rather than an influential account

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in its own right. The problems involve scope and timing. There has been a substantial delay between writing and publication, indicated indirectly by the dates of citations to the secondary literature — none of them later than 1978, the majority much earlier. More importantly, Dr. Levy's intellectual objectives were modest, and this limits the scope of the argument. Essentially — some might argue in more senses than one for an LSE doctorate — the objective of the book is to provide a narrative account illuminated by standard economic reasoning. As Donald Denoon noted with some vehemence in his review in *African Affairs* (82:327, April 1983, p. 297), "the historiography of Transvaal gold mining is now a substantial discipline of its own," and one which has been changing fairly rapidly. Significant contributions to the literature of early gold mining in South Africa have been made over the last decade by writers who not only examine the economics of the industry, but also approach the problems of explanation through the tools of class analysis. The most telling criticism of Dr. Levy's book is that it to a very large extent evades the questions raised by these recent contributions, and thus makes itself largely irrelevant to the current concerns of specialists.

However, at the risk of repetition, it should still be stressed that the facts are mostly all here. Specialists will still find it useful as a reference, and non-specialists who want to know the facts and are uninterested in the theoretical debates of specialists can find them here.

South Africa's Beleaguered Press

Christian P. Potholm and Alison Leavitt

Richard Pollock, *UP AGAINST APARTHEID: The Role and Plight of the Press in South Africa* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981), pp. 157; \$12.95.

Richard Pollock depicts the press in South Africa and notes that it is severely hampered by the stringent controls placed on its activities by the present Nationalist government. In his view, the English language press is the "lone megaphone of dissent" continually attacking the government and its policy of apartheid even though these attacks put the individual reporters and editors at great risk.

Outlining various government activities, including the massive propaganda scandal known as "Muldergate," Pollock sees the English speaking press as a tempting target for the government and its continual efforts to mute criticism of its policies. Moreover, he contends that the government of Prime Minister Botha has increased rather than decreased the legal harassment of journalists.

Although these points are fairly well made, there is little new here for the student of South Africa politics, and Pollock has clearly missed many of the substantial differences which exist within the Afrikaans speaking press with regard to both governmental policies and the various self-images with regard to the press' view of its proper role in society.

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Afrikaner History and Culture

J. Alton Templin

Barbara Villet, *BLOOD RIVER: The Passionate Saga of South Africa's Afrikaners and of Life in their Embattled Land*. (New York: Everest House, 1982.) 255 pp., \$16.95.

This study captures very well the historical context of South Africa since 1652, as well as the deep concerns and tensions which punctuate the Apartheid culture. The latter is the capitalist society of the white minority (17%) built on the legislated segregation of the majority (83%) of the various Banti tribes, plus Asians and Colored (of mixed races). The author balances historical narrative, interviews with key figures from several significant groups within the culture, and contemporary critique. This is a journalistic account, and does not have any footnotes nor bibliography. There are sufficient references, however, and quotations from primary sources to indicate that the study rests on considerable historical research and contemporary analysis.

For example, the author summarized a conversation with an "angry young dominee" (Dutch Reformed minister) which reflects the unwritten "creed" of the dominant Nationalist party of South Africa. "God, he had insisted, had made all and made them unequal in accordance with His inscrutable Will — some to be saved, some to be damned. God has preordained the spheres of human endeavor and the spheres of human society from before all time, marking some for mastery and others for servitude in accordance with His own divine plan, and to question His order was . . . blasphemous" (p. 33). This was then developed into a "civil religion" following the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902). "It was inevitable, therefore, that Afrikaner nationalism would reemerge from the ashes of the war like the proverbial phoenix and that, reborn in defeat and nurtured on tales of martyrs and heroes in the bitter postwar years, it would prove more militant, more absolute, and more dangerous than ever before" (p. 187). Especially when the Nationalist Party won the election in 1948 and after South Africa declared itself a Republic in 1961 (no longer part of the British Commonwealth) the rhetoric of civil religion seemed to be justified. There are two remaining problems, however.

First, the financial success of the Afrikaner culture, based especially on diamonds, gold and other minerals, raised the standard of education, the wealth and the culture not only of the white minority who had always been in control, but of the African majority as well. The latter, while paid only approximately 1/10 the wages of a comparable white worker, nevertheless gained some slight economic advantage over those who lived in the "homelands." In addition, the paternalistic white government provided certain rudimentary education for many African citizens. This was necessary if white Apartheid technology was to continue expanding. This points to a continuing problem. While Africans are segregated as lower-class citizens, they are nevertheless needed in industry to

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do the work that the white "masters" do not wish to do. Thus, we see that Apartheid in social relations is regularly being breached because of economic necessity. How long can cultural Apartheid and economic inter-mixture of races continue side by side? African workers, who may have only a limited vision of what their future could hold, are nevertheless restive under a repression which they resent even more strongly than in the past.

A second continuing problem is: whereas the present "verligte" (enlightened) Prime Minister, Piet Botha, would like to make minor changes in favor of the majority African population, the "verkrampte" (restricted) group, led by Andries Treurnicht, has broken with the Nationalist majority to form an even more repressive and reactionary "herstigte" (reconstituted) Nationalist Party. Ways to ameliorate the tensions do not seem to be forthcoming.

This study reads very smoothly, represents an authoritative and accurate cultural interpretation, and reflects both primary research and contemporary interviews. Reading this would be a way for the interested beginner to attain a quick grasp of many crucial factors in the complex development of South Africa. It is not, however, a research document, and adds nothing which is not analyzed in greater detail in the standard studies of the culture.

One major caveat is necessary, however. Outside the white minority government, which is right-wing and anti-Communist, there is confusion in analysis of political developments in many neighboring countries, as well as within South Africa itself. Our author fails to realize the aspirations of various African groups. She borrows the South African government rhetoric at this point, and calls the Zimbabwe and Mozambique governments "quasi Marxist" (p. 239), and groups such as SWAPO (in Namibia) and the African National Congress (in exile outside South Africa), both "Soviet-backed" (p. 232). The Pan African Congress (also in exile outside South Africa) is labeled "Marxist-Leninist" (p. 232). She assumes that there is a real alternative between the minority UNITA party in Angola, backed by the United States CIA, and the majority MPLA which has much support among the people (p. 228).

She writes with approval of the South African occupation of Namibia, although this has been strongly condemned by the United Nations (p. 234). She fears that certain African groups who agitate for equality are or will be led by "radicals" (p. 239). She also accepts South African propaganda that the homelands are really "fully independent" and "self-governing" (p. 235). South Africa cannot be fully confident of her position, however, for she is spending \$2,000,000,000 annually for defense.

Some slight errors crept in. For example, on p. 33 she states that the Calvinist doctrine of predestination was first put forth in 1534! Actually, the first edition of the *Institutes* came only in 1536, but even so the predestination doctrine is not part of the first edition. On p. 164 she states that the Jameson Raid came from the north toward Johannesburg, when actually it came from Botswana from the west. On pp. 234 and 243 she uses the word "mysticism" erroneously, for there was no mysticism involved here.

A Significant Contribution to Historical Reconstruction in South Africa

William F. Lye

R. Kent Rasmussen, *MIGRANT KINGDOM: Mzilikazi's Ndebele in South Africa*. (London: Rex Collings; Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1978). 262 pp. \$19.75.

Africanists will surely appreciate the appearance of this detailed historical reconstruction of the early career of one of the most interesting and important state builders to arise out of the conflagration which inundated Southern Africa in the early nineteenth century. Mzilikazi, a one time subject of Shaka, the great Zulu founder, rebelled and fled into the interior high plateau north of the Vaal River with a handful of followers, there to establish himself as a dominant force for a generation until he was expelled by the encroaching European Voortrekkers. Even after his defeat, he succeeded in collecting anew the fragments of his state into a new kingdom which survived north of the Limpopo River until it, too, was conquered by advancing British imperialism at the end of the century. The remarkable military accomplishments of Mzilikazi were no more significant than the political innovations which he adopted to incorporate numerous people of varying cultures who already occupied the lands which he conquered. The Ndebele kingdom which he created demands attention from all those who would understand the preconditions existing in the interior of South Africa which enabled the rather rapid and easy expansion of white settlement in a land reputed to be the home of numerous African people. This book recreates the story of the first phase in that history to the time of Mzilikazi's expulsion north of the Limpopo River in 1837.

Rasmussen's stated objectives were to recreate the narrative of Mzilikazi's migrations during that early period, providing details omitted by previous reconstructions, and to correct erroneous assumptions promulgated by both popular and scholarly writers. The need for such a corrective becomes apparent to anyone who examines any two of the existing historical and fictional accounts currently available. He brings to his task an impressive collection of new information, particularly from the National Archives of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) to supplement the more frequently used missionary and government sources in South Africa, Britain and America. The result is a thoroughly argued case for refining our understanding about such matters as the routes of migration taken by the Ndebele, the location of their settlements, and the chronology and ordering of events. Having personally researched the same subject matter in relation to my own study of the *Diqaane* amongst the Sotho victims of the Ndebele, I acknowledge with satisfaction many of the points of clarification and fuller understanding which he provides. His arguments about the Ndebele having settled on the Vaal River are particularly useful, as is treatment of the Pedi conflicts. While I do not concede every point of revision in his version, the author certainly demands serious consideration by the rigorous

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analysis of his material.

This volume is not likely to appeal to the casual reader. It is not merely a narrative of Mzilikazi's career, but is a narrative frequently interrupted by the author's elaborate explanations as to why he has deviated from alternate versions of the story. Further, the book is thin on narrative description and on social analysis. However, the scholar is provided generously with the evidence needed to assess the author's claims, or to further pursue issues. The footnoting is particularly exhaustive, making it an invaluable resource for those interested in pursuing the subject further.

Rasmussen seems to have greater confidence in his conclusions than do most scholars who attempt to recreate the history of a preliterate society; most would postulate more tentative conclusions. He is also prone to intrude value judgments of questionable merit. For example, on a single page he speaks of the Ndebele in this way, "For them to have mastered horsemanship would have required a jump in aptitude for which they were quite unprepared." And of the Griqua, "Against such stupid enemies, Mzilikazi's skepticism about the value of guns was well-founded." (pp. 82-83) His judgments about the source and value of A.A. Campbell's (Mziki's) writings also seems quite arbitrary. (Note 54, Chap. I, and Appendix B.) He also makes certain generalizations which are questionable and cast a shadow on otherwise careful scholarship. For example, he states that "Mzilikazi's uniqueness lay in his being the only Nguni ruler to build a state system on the highveld among predominantly Sotho Tswana-speaking peoples." (p. 135) He thus overlooks the very similar attempts by Mpangazita of the Hlubi and Matiwane of the Ngwane, who attempted with varying success the same thing in the Caledon River Valley amongst the people of Moshweshwe. While he introduces several useful new insights, he occasionally neglects to credit ideas to previous writers, as for example the claim that Mzilikazi probably did not learn his methods from Shaka, but that "such ideas must have derived from an older and broader pool of common Northern Nguni practices to which Shaka himself was an heir." (p. 80) This concept was proposed in a source of my own which he cites elsewhere.

The author also makes his contentions appear more significant by misrepresenting existing arguments, as for example, when he rejects my explanation for the early estimate of the population of the Ndebele state, saying that I did not attempt to reconcile the disproportion between the size of the army and the estimated total population, which was precisely the objective of the source he cited. (His note 195 for p. 93). I would further add that the size of the residual population left when Mzilikazi fled north supports my contention better than it does his claim.

For one whose goal is to correct errors, Rasmussen leaves us with some serious problems himself. On p. 74 he locates Philippolis south of the Orange River, and when referring to Mzilikazi's flight north he suggests the Ndebele crossed the Vaal in many small bands. Surely he means the Marico. (p. 150 and map on p. 148) It is also irritating to discover an author still citing the work of Thomas Arbousset as if it were written by him and his colleague, F. Daumas, though it is clear that the two names are part of the title and not the authorship of the work. (p. 28 and *passim*.)

Lest the reader of this review doubt the value of this book, let me quickly reassert that this is an impressive and challenging new reconstruction. It contains many important correctives. The scholar will undoubtedly find this work a useful point from which to begin a study of the Ndebele people.

Perceptions of the Ties that Bind

David H. Groff

Josephine Moraa Moikobu, *BLOOD AND FLESH: Black American and African Identifications* (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1981) xii, 226 pp., \$25.00 cloth.

What is Africa to me:
Copper sun or scarlet sea,
Jungle star or jungle track,
Strong bronzed men, or regal black
Women from whose loins I sprang
When the birds of Eden sang?
One three centuries removed
From the scenes his fathers loved,
Spicy grove, cinnamon tree,
What is Africa to me?

In this poignant passage from his poem, "Heritage," first published in the 1920s, Countee Cullen eloquently poses the question that has haunted generations of Afro-Americans. In her book, *Blood and Flesh*, Josephine Moraa Moikobu, a Kenyan expatriate sociologist, seeks to provide a partial answer to Cullen's question through a survey of present-day Afro-American and African student attitudes. The result is an argument for the traditional black nationalist postulate of a common, worldwide black identity, an argument that is at once tantalizingly suggestive and frustratingly incomplete.

The genesis of Moikobu's study lies in her experiences as an undergraduate in various American universities in the 1960s. Upon her arrival in this country, she was immediately struck by the lack of contact between Afro-Americans and African students like herself. When she asked her white American colleagues about this curious state of affairs, she was invariably told that she had nothing in common with "Negroes" who in any case were not interested in making her acquaintance. Puzzled by such responses and challenged by the Civil Rights Movement then at its zenith, Moikobu committed herself to the task of learning more about Afro-Americans and their attitudes toward Africa and Africans. Returning to the U.S. in the early '70s, after several years back in Kenya, she discovered that Africans and Afro-Americans had begun associating with each other. The contrast between this situation and that which had prevailed previously led her to survey existing literature on African/Afro-American relations in the hope of uncovering some clues as to the nature of what by this time appeared to her to be a vital yet enigmatic relationship. To her dismay, she found that most of the works she read had rather little to say about interaction between Africans and Afro-Americans, and where they treated such interaction at all they tended to characterize it as "strained." Dissatisfaction with the

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shallowness of this literature prompted Moikobu to undertake her own empirical study of African and Afro-American views of one another.

Moikobu divides her study into two complementary parts: a survey of the literature dealing with relations between Africans and Afro-Americans, and an analysis of the findings of her own survey of African and Afro-American student attitudes toward one another. In her discussion of the existing literature, she distinguishes between what she calls Eurocentric and Afrocentric views. The former, exemplified by the work of such social scientists as Myrdal, Frazier, Glazer and Moynihan, emphasizes the differences between Africans and Afro-Americans and dismisses the idea that black Americans have created their own distinctive cultural patterns rooted in their African past. In this view, Africans and Afro-Americans have only their color and distant ancestral links in common. In sharp contrast, proponents of the Afrocentric view, ranging from social scientists like Herskovits and scholar-activists like Dubois to nationalists like Garvey, stress that the two groups share not only a common racial identity and cultural heritage but also a common experience of racial victimization. Moreover, in this view, Afro-Americans have developed unique cultural forms representing a blend of African and Euro-American elements. For proponents of the Afrocentric view, the existence of such cultural forms together with a common racial identity and shared experience of oppression create a strong basis for mutual understanding and identification between the two groups. To these observers the existence of strains between Africans and Afro-Americans result less from intrinsic differences between them than from the intervention of whites operating consciously or unconsciously on the basis of Eurocentric assumptions.

Moikobu clearly prefers the Afrocentric view and relies on it in formulating the second and larger part of her study, her attitudinal survey of African and Afro-American students. The questions she put to her random sample of forty black American and forty African students at one of the campuses of the State University of New York reflect her desire to determine the degree of social interaction and mutual identification uniting the two groups. Thus roughly half of her questions seek to identify perceived points of commonality between the two groups and the ways in which these perceptions affect inter-group relations. The rest of her questions probe perceived strains and differences between the two groups. In general, Moikobu's findings support her contention that a healthy relationship exists between the two groups, a relationship grounded in a strong sense of mutual identification. Thus the majority of her respondents from both groups maintained that Africans and Afro-Americans share not only a common color and ancestry but also elements of a common culture and certain mutual political, economic and social interests. Moreover, while most respondents identified certain cultural differences between the groups, they considered such differences relatively minor and not, in themselves, constitutive of an unbreachable gap between Africans and Afro-Americans. What is more significant from the point of view taken by Moikobu, most respondents, whether African or Afro-American, attributed strains between the two groups to the actions and attitudes of whites particularly as these affect Africans. In this regard, Moikobu's findings support the oft-repeated black nationalist charge that whites as a group remain as committed as ever to a policy of divide and rule in their relations with blacks.

For the most part, Moikobu's findings and the overall argument they support are convincing as far as they go. However, certain questions remain.

Although as a historian relatively untutored in the intricacies of quantitative methods, I am not equipped to comment extensively on Moikobu's methodology, I cannot resist the temptation to question the limits of her sample. Moikobu's decision to confine her survey to college students is both reasonable and understandable. Higher educational institutions provide a primary arena of African/Afro-American interaction in this country. College students are, moreover, articulate and easily accessible to the researcher, and their attitudes obviously represent an essential barometer of African/Afro-American relations. Nonetheless, one wonders what would have been gained by extending the study to include other groups, for example, older Afro-Americans who have visited or resided in Africa, and African expatriates long resident in the United States. To what extent, if any, would such groups express attitudes at variance with those of the students? An attempt to develop a broader range of informants and a more comparative perspective would, I suspect, have greatly enriched Moikobu's study, though it also would have complicated it and rendered it much more time-consuming.

A second, more substantive question concerns Moikobu's analysis of intergroup strains perceived by her respondents. Moikobu is correct to reject the way past Eurocentric researchers have treated such strains, but her own treatment strikes me as somewhat superficial. The contention that perceived cultural differences between Africans and Afro-Americans do not create an unbreachable gap between the two groups is probably true, but it requires greater development than Moikobu gives it. The main thrust of current studies of Afro-American history and culture is in the direction of identifying the ways in which black people have forged their own unique cultural synthesis, a synthesis that is rooted in the African past but which has taken on an autonomous life of its own. Moikobu's argument that "deep down inside, blacks all know that they are one people" would have taken on greater power had she engaged in a more nuanced and probing form of cultural analysis. Only such an analysis can provide a solid basis for interpreting the attitudinal data generated by Moikobu's survey.

One final question has to do with the nature of Moikobu's intended audience. My reading of *Blood and Flesh* suggests some ambiguity on this point. The book's subject matter and Afrocentric argument commend it to a popular readership, particularly among Afro-Americans. Yet its rather turgid, social scientific style make it palatable primarily to academic readers. This is most unfortunate since the issues Moikobu raises deserve attention outside the academic community. As an example of a small but growing number of studies of Afro-America by African authors, *Blood and Flesh* provides a unique and welcome perspective. One can only hope that Moikobu will someday remold her personal experience and sociological findings into a work of broader appeal.

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British Colonial Governors

Dalvan M. Coger

Anthony H.M. Kirk-Greene, *A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNOR*. Volume 1: (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980) pp. x, 320; \$31.95

Kenneth O. Hall, *IMPERIAL PROCONSUL: Sir Hercules Robinson and South Africa, 1881-1889*. (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1980) pp. viii, 226. \$10.50. (Modern Africa Series, No. 3)

As Peter Duignan says in his introduction to the Kirk-Greene volume, however much British Governors differed, they collectively "helped to determine the shape of British colonialism in Africa; wittingly or unwittingly, they contributed to the foundations of post-colonial Africa." Understanding the governors is thus crucial to understanding current history.

It is our good fortune that Anthony H.M. Kirk-Greene was the compiler of this dictionary. As a Senior Research Fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford, and a long-time Africanist, he is aware of the general ignorance of Americans regarding British higher education, the matter of honours and knighthoods, and the differences between the Colonial Service and the Sudan Political Service. Consequently, his 50 page introductory essay is extremely valuable. For each of the Governors of African territories (197 by my count) he has collected a remarkable amount of information. (Even more remarkable when we realize how few governors made it into the DNB.) This volume is a model of everything a biographical dictionary should be.

If there is one omission that the reviewer could wish amended, perhaps in some subsequent volume of the series, or in an article, it would be an explanation of what is known of the selection process by which the nabobs in the Colonial Office selected the "bright youngsters" being groomed for Governor. Was there an efficiency rating scheme? Were there boards of promotion which screened their personnel records?

Hall's study of Sir Hercules Robinson is extremely detailed. The author assumes a highly specialized knowledge by the reader. While the work is ideal for the researcher in imperial history, it deals only with his official actions. It is difficult to see the man behind the administrator.

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Research on officials such as Robinson is at the cutting edge of modern African historical studies. The emphasis in the last two decades has been on the history of South Africa's indigenous inhabitants, the "natives." This shift away from history focused narrowly on European settlers was long overdue. But colonial history was also a matter of interaction and there is much to be learned from a close scrutiny of the administrators. Hall's study is extremely thorough, but suggests new questions for the researcher.

Two areas in particular intrigue me. While it has been mentioned in passing before, Hall emphasizes that Robinson and his superiors at the Colonial Office felt in the 1880s that time was on their side in the Transvaal. In the debate on whether the northern republic should be allowed to annex Swaziland, Robinson pointed out that there were only 7,000 adult male Transvaalers, while the gold miners exceeded 5,000. "It is evident," he said, "that if the Swazi goldfields should support even a moderate population of miners the effect of the annexation would be to give a clear majority to the mining population." The fact was, of course, that Kruger and his advisors could count too, and had no intention of granting the franchise to the newcomers. But how widespread was the illusion that the miners would soon outnumber the burghers? A thorough search of the documentation should produce an interesting study. The other subject is suggested by the quotation Hall includes from the Cape Argus, concerning the new "imperial breed," represented by Gordon, Lord Wolsey, Kitchner and Warren. These "mob nominees," as the paper termed them, "have not been above taking a line embarrassing to their immediate superiors . . . so long as they have public opinion behind them." The hallmark of men such as Robinson was their pragmatism and their acceptance of discipline. Why the new breed? Were they a product of the mass media? That is, had they not appeared previously in imperial history because the means of reaching, of creating in a sense, the "mob" were non-existent?

Finally, there is Hall's indictment of all the imperial and colonial figures of the time. He is brutally frank. While there were humanitarians who proposed various forms of administration that would have modestly benefitted the Africans of South Africa, the tragedy of such reformers was that "they refused to reject any of the fundamental assumptions of nineteenth century imperialism. They accepted African inferiority, they supported a policy of African subordination, they saw no conflict between English colonization and African interests, and, more important, they thought the goal of self-supporting colonies was a legitimate one." At the same time, Robinson and his opponents both "regarded Africans as savages whose society was unable to cope with any large influx of Europeans." The only quarrel between the two groups was over how much African society should be changed and who had the responsibility to make the change, the colonists or the imperial administrators.

Both of these books belong on the shelves of those historians working in British colonial African history.

Strategies for Development

Thomas J. DeGregori

Heraldo Munoz, editor, *FROM DEPENDENCY TO DEVELOPMENT: Strategies to Overcome Underdevelopment and Inequality*. Westview Special Studies in Social, Political and Economic Development (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1981), 336 pp. \$12.95 paperback.

The traditional precepts of economic development were predicated on a unilinear conception of history that assumed that the less developed countries were not as far down a common path of economic progress as their more industrial neighbors. Dependency theory challenges this conception by arguing that development and underdevelopment were simultaneous creations, with the first being the cause of the second. The unilinear model provided the framework or a prescription for initiating and sustaining development, i.e., follow the path charted by those economically in the lead. If in fact the underdevelopment of some is caused by the development of others, there is no common path to follow, and the development strategy of one's predecessors is not a viable option for today's developing countries. For two decades or more, the literature of dependency theory has been rich and voluminous. The analyses of the historic and contemporary development have been crisp and critical. Though long on theory and analysis, the dependency theory literature has been woefully short and weak on development prescriptions to overcome dependency.

From Dependency to Development seeks to move from critical analysis to development policy strategies. The introduction and the first two essays stress the history and evolution of dependency theory. Its origins are with Latin American political economists. Since their earlier works were written in Spanish and not translated until much later, most of the non-Spanish readers first encountered the thesis in Andre Gunder Frank's *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (1967). The opening essays give an excellent overview of the history and dimensions of dependency theory. The next two essays (Part 2) deal with contemporary issues and recent developments in the context of Central and South America. The closing section consists of nine selected strategies for overcoming dependency. As with the rest of the book, the essays are by a variety of authors and include some of the best on the subject. Some of the essays have been published previously; others are original for this volume. Most of them are not specific to any region; where there is a regional focus, it is Latin America and the Caribbean. Though some of the best writing on the subject is within an African context, the African issues of dependency are not joined in this volume.

The strategies for overcoming dependency are many and varied. Gustavo Lagos calls for a "revolution of being." It is not exactly clear what policy procedures African and other third world countries would follow in pursuing this revolution. Most African leaders concerned about dependency are not particularly

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concerned about reading exhortations on how to create a new moral order.

John Galtung's essay on "The Politics of Self-Reliance" is a useful contribution, but it is questionable to what extent it is applicable to Africa or to most of the third world. Galtung's work is being favorably received in Europe (particularly France) where it probably has more relevance. Control over the basic technical means of one's existence is certainly a basic condition of life. The question is how precisely do you define control. Larger industrial countries can command a range of scientific and technical means to essentially control their own lives and destinies. For smaller African countries a narrow concept of self-reliance is compatible with only the simplest technologies, which perpetuate low levels of living, dependency, military and political vulnerability.

Mahbub ul Haq and Jan Tinbergen, in their essays, seek to overcome dependency by transforming the world order in which dependent nations operate. Theirs is the main agenda of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). This is clearly a strategy that is being pursued by the vast majority of African and other third world countries. It neither precludes simultaneously pursuing other strategies nor does it require a theory of dependency for its advocacy. This latter is illustrated by the fact that Haq and Tinbergen are two distinguished economists and development planners who are not particularly noted as dependency theorists. The dependency theorist in this volume most known to Africanists is Immanuel Wallerstein. He appears to be pessimistic about any meliorative changes in the world order as long as the fundamental nexus of international relations is capitalist. Global transformations of various profound kinds may be necessary, but for leaders of nations there are issues of less basic national and international change that must be addressed to keep their countries functioning and, it is hoped, developing.

The most provocative essay in this section is by F.H. Cardoso. He has long been one of the leading Latin American theorists of dependency. He deals with realities as they have existed since World War II. He seeks to combine morality and practicality and believes the "utopian" can be made operative. He has an agenda of analysis with indicators of injustices and an agenda for actions. Useful though these may or may not be, it is questionable whether they would lead to very much development. Redistributive policies in countries such as those in Latin America can contribute to solving problems of injustice. International redistribution could solve even more. But, as the lack of momentum in the negotiations for NIEO show, the developed countries are not going to give much. However wrong traditional theories may be, if dependency theory is to provide a viable option for African countries, it is going to have to define a pathway to development, in addition to showing the historical path that led to underdevelopment. It is essential to be told what paths not to travel, but if we are not to be immobilized, we also need to find one to follow.

This book is highly recommended for those interested in dependency analysis in Africa, either as champion or critic. It has some of the clearest statements in English on the history of the meaning of the theory. Taken together, the essays on the central theme of finding a development strategy are highly unsatisfactory. This does not reflect adversely on the selectivity of the editor nor on the quality of the authors but rather on the paucity of literature on the subject. This could also reflect the concentration on Latin America when so much of the good work on dependency is being done in and on Africa. One useful purpose of this volume would be to stimulate a similar book with a strong focus on Africa.

The Sahel Drought:

The Poverty of the Official Version

Robert Schware

Rolando V. Garcia, *DROUGHT AND MAN: The 1972 Case History*, Vol. 1, *NATURE PLEADS NOT GUILTY* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981), pp. xiv, 300 £25.00, \$60.00.

Rolando V. Garcia and Jose C. Escudero, *DROUGHT AND MAN: The 1972 Case History*, Vol. 2, *THE CONSTANT CATASTROPHE: Malnutrition, Famines, and Drought*, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. x, 204, £20.00, \$45.00.

When the tragedy of famine to millions of inhabitants in the West African Sahel climaxed in 1972, a year also characterized by drought in other continents and a "world food crisis," development specialists, policy makers, and pundits generally blamed either the precarious climate situation or worsened population pressures. For example, the *Report on Climate and Food*, published by the United States Academy of Sciences, claimed that "in 1972, a year when the climate was particularly unfavorable for food production, millions of people starved throughout the world." To cite another example, Roy Jackson, speaking on behalf of the Director-General of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization at the World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974, expressed a widely accepted view that "in almost 40 percent of individual developing countries food production has failed to keep up with population growth . . ."

Drought and Man was intended as an international study of the political, social, and economic impacts of the 1972 drought. A few months after the start of the 38-month study conducted by Rolando Garcia along with a blue-ribbon, transnational, interdisciplinary group of some fifty contributors and participants to the project, a picture began to emerge that brought into question the validity of the methods, arguments, and conclusions of other investigations (some of which were officially inspired) of various aspects of the 1972 situation. Indeed, the "official" or generally accepted conclusions — e.g., that the food-population balance can be maintained only by decreasing the population growth or by increasing the capacity of developing countries to produce more food — seemed not only to be highly misleading, but appeared to have had a pernicious influence upon development policies.

The "logic" of these so-called "official versions" of the crises confronting the Sahelian states and other important agricultural regions of the world — often so subtle, so compelling, and so deceptive — is described, analyzed, and then

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torn to shreds in convincing detail. The development of an alternate "conceptual frame," within which the facts of the 1972 case study can be detected, the causes of the situation analyzed, and phenomena explained, became the principal aim of these volumes. Fortunately, the authors admit early on their own preconceptions. "We believe that there are many societal, political, and economic factors that must be included along with the physical factors to provide adequate insight into the evolution of events in which physical factors certainly do play a role. But we are not satisfied that the physical factors are the driving mechanisms. They may be powerful triggering events, but the real driving forces are societal. It is their nature that determines what will happen, where, and to whom" (Vol. 1, p. 6). The books make a major contribution to conceptualizing the dynamics of the interrelated forces at play in 1972.

Although the heart of the texts lie in the chapters dealing with the social dimensions of drought and providing a new "reading" of the 1972 "food crisis," other aspects of climate-society interactions are also included. There is a long chapter in Vol. 1 that critically assesses the conduct and impact of international and multilateral food aid programs. Another two chapters deal with the climatic dimensions of drought. A brief chapter reiterates some of the important points and caveats of Volume 1. It also offers concrete recommendations for further research on major issues relating to drought and for monitoring programs concerned with malnutrition and health in developing countries.

Having suggested a conceptual framework in the first volume to analyze the vulnerability of developing countries to the impact of a particular type of climatic anomaly known as drought, Garcia and Escudero concentrate in the second volume on health and nutritional policies and how these policies can increase vulnerability towards natural catastrophes. The experiences of other countries, such as India, China, Argentina, Brazil, and the United Kingdom (during World War II) are discussed in informative and technical appendices.

These are important books, deserving of a readership beyond those interested in climate-related impact studies. They are informative, and a significant addition to the literature. However, it should be pointed out that the chapters are lacking in references; a bibliography dealing with many of the important ideas and development issues in the books would also have been useful, especially for researchers.

The wheels of publishing often squeak along at a painfully slow and expensive pace. These volumes have suffered from unfortunate delays in publication; a third volume is still in the works. Like most books published by Pergamon Press, these volumes are outrageously expensive; far beyond the reach of many researchers in developed countries who ought to read them and most libraries, institutions, and research facilities in developing countries. This is particularly unfortunate because the study received generous support from the International Federation of Institutes for Advanced Study, UNEP, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Lilly Endowment, Deere and Company, and the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies.

Lusophone African Literature: Commitment and Struggle

Janis L. Pallister

Donald Burness, ed., **CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LUSOPHONE AFRICAN LITERATURE.** (Washington, D.C.: Three Continents Press, 1981) 309 pp., paperback \$10.00; hardcover \$20.00.

Critical Perspectives is a versatile book that will serve as a source for those who up until now have neglected this body of literature, but even more as a tool for its few scholars. As editor Donald Burness asserts in his introduction, because of limited translations (which, incidentally go uncited), and because Portuguese is not widely studied, Lusophone African writers have not reached a wide audience. While the present book will certainly help us to become more familiar with the writers of Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde, it obviously will not remedy the problems of translation and of Portuguese as an understudied language. The critical essays contained herein, then, may for the most part draw the attention of scholars already familiar with these works, or of scholars of other African literatures wanting to familiarize themselves with this body of work (with which they are all too often unacquainted). For the latter the work will be extremely useful, because of the depth of the criticism and since the translation of all quotations makes ignorance of Portuguese a minimal impediment in collecting the content of these essays.

Indeed, the most celebrated authorities on the subject of Lusophone African literature figure in this collection, some being represented by a reprinting from other previous articles or chapters from books, one of which originally appeared in *Africa Today*. These notables include Burness himself, as well as Russell G. Hamilton, Gerald Moser and Richard Preto-Rodas. Professor Burness has very appropriately included essays in Portuguese, sometimes by rather well-known artists turned critics, such as Onésimo Silveira, Ray Duarte de Carvalho and Uanhenga Xitu, and sometimes by critics such as Manuel Ferreira, Henrique Guerra and José Martins Garcia.

These inclusions in Portuguese are one of the highlights of this attractive book. Not only do they make the work more useful by filling in lacunae in previous books on Lusophone literature, but, as Professor Burness contends in his introduction, by offering materials for Portuguese-speaking people. On the other hand, all articles in Portuguese are preceded by a precis in English. (Does it not follow that the usefulness of the book to Portuguese-speaking people would have been even further enhanced by a precis in Portuguese of all English language entries?)

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As is the convention with most books on this subject, the various essays (other than two of a general nature) are subsumed under the geographical provenance of the author, and since Lusophone literature very frequently reflects the commitment and struggle of a given poet or writer for the independence of his or her own particular nation from Portuguese colonialism, the classifications by geographical rubrics hold some water. And yet, other types of classification such as racial and ethnic identity, politics and the writer, etc., suggest themselves to this reader, and might have caused certain themes common to this group of writers to surface. Indeed, modern critical methods as well as syncretic and mainstreaming approaches to this literature impose themselves as crying needs, and Burness himself in his article on Agostinho Neto indicates the desirability of a thoroughgoing comparative study on Neto and Leopold Senghor: why not on the Lusophone versus the Francophone literatures of Africa, a question already touched upon by Russell Hamilton in his magisterial *Voices from an Empire*? (See *Africa Today*, 23/3, 1976 for my review.)

The Burness edition is, notwithstanding, extremely competent, and offers many new things. The impressive roster of contributors assured us of this and of quality besides; and such essays as Gerald Moser's "The Lusophone Literatures of Africa Since Independence," (p. 31 ff) introduce us to many new authors and trends surfacing since 1974. Moreover, thematic approaches are taken in the treatment of individual authors, as evidenced in Burness' depiction of Agostinho Neto's work as a "poetry of combat" or, in his overall view of Angolan writing as "an arm of liberation." Here Lusophone poetry of Africa as an arm of revolution, as an expression of commitment and struggle, becomes altogether apparent. In this essay not only the political drive but also the lifelong suffering of Neto are told in sober but moving detail. (The claim that Senghor unlike Neto never had experience with prison strikes a wrong chord, however, for those of us familiar with the several famous poems by Senghor the war prisoner: certainly this was a type of political imprisonment that under the circumstances was not without roughly similar implications. Burness' other differentiations between the two poets seem well drawn, however.)

Russell Hamilton's clear and penetrating article on "Mozambique's Modern Literature" pursues the theme of commitment and struggle while raising for us the perennial question of revolutionary rhetoric versus poetic quality — one of the great aesthetic problems revolving around some, but certainly not all, poetry emanating from the African praxis. Here Professor Hamilton analyzes the question in terms of certain assertions and assumptions of the Mozambican critic Eugénio Lisboa. Equally interesting is Hamilton's article entitled "Mozambican Literature: Contemporary Trends and Prospects," in which he seeks a militant Mozambican poet who equals the Angolan Agostinho Neto and who, in an authentic African voice, rebels effectively against an imposed language and culture. It would seem that Hamilton's candidate, at least for the present, is Jose Craveirinha: "Symbolically, Craveirinha is Caliban, and his distortions of Prospero's language constitute an aesthetically formulated curse" (p. 116). And Hamilton certainly brings forth quotations from Craveirinha that convincingly document his point.

The issues of ethnic identity in Cape Verde and São Tomé are dealt with by Richard A. Preto-Rodas whose book on Negritude in the poetry of the Portuguese-speaking world is well known to students of this field. Indeed, here, too, he discusses the themes of Negritude, whereas in a subsequent article

Russell Hamilton turns to Cape Verdean regionalism and to the themes of departure and social stagnation that prevail in the literature of this area. But in this long and complex article Hamilton additionally deals with matters of militancy, protest and combativeness, as he had in previous articles in this book. The Cape Verdean picture is rounded out by Norman Araujo's articles — one on Baltazar Lopes and his *Chiquinho*, another on the celebrated review *Claridade*, which spawned a group of poets called the *Claridosos*. The aim of those poets was to express sensitivity toward what has, by an irritating cliché among these critics, come to be called "the Cape Verdean reality . . . or realities." The elaborate history of this journal as presented by Araujo is too detailed to deal with here, but will doubtless be of substantial use to poets, teachers and scholars alike. The final English-language article in the collection, also by Araujo, deals with a more recent literary journal entitled *Raizes*, which the author finds to be in the "heroic tradition" of other Cape Verdean reviews, such as *Claridade*, *Certeza*, and the like.

Part II of the collection offers articles in Portuguese by Manuel Ferreira ("On Being a Negro . . ."); Mário António ("Towards a Crioule Perspective"); José Martins Garcia ("Luandino Vieira: Anti-Apartheid"). Part III contains brief essays by Manuel Ferreira on six journals, including again, *Claridade* and *Certeza*. One may say summarily that Parts II and III of the book inevitably pick up the questions of militancy, acculturation, alienation, revolution, commitment and struggle that have formed the leitmotifs of the essays found in Part I.

Critical Perspectives presents examples of the best critical writing being done today on Lusophone African literature. It will be useful (despite its lack of index and its tendency toward repetitiveness) to a wide variety of readers. The bibliography updates that found in Russell Hamilton's *Voices from an Empire*; and we are, moreover, informed of a forthcoming bibliography on Portuguese-speaking Africa compiled by Gerald Moser and Manuel Ferreira, both of whom have already provided us with tentative bibliographies on the subject in the past.

Above all, this book, *Critical Perspectives*, introduces us to many exciting poets and writers of fiction coming from Lusophone Africa, inviting us to seek out and read the texts; and, since that should perhaps be the main result of such a book, it richly deserves our praise and our attention.

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African Writings in French:

An Historical and Critical Overview

James P. Gilroy

Dorothy S. Blair, *AFRICAN LITERATURE IN FRENCH: A History of Creative Writing in French from West and Equatorial Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976; paperback edition, 1981) pp. xx + 348; \$14.95.

Dorothy Blair's book is a highly comprehensive critical analysis of the development of sub-Saharan African literature written in the French language from the early nineteenth century to the 1970s. She divides these writings into the categories of folkloric and historical fiction, drama, poetry, and the novel of the pre- and post-independence eras. Although she studies a great variety of representative works in each genre by a large number of authors, her keen literary insight enables her to distinguish the truly outstanding from the mediocre. She thus accords primary importance to Birago Diop for fables inspired from traditional African folklore, to Senghor and Tchicaya U Tam'si in the area of lyric poetry, to Camara Laye, Mongo Beti, and Sembene Ousmane in the novel, and to Bernard Dadie in all genres, including his recent achievements in both historical (*Béatrice du Congo*) and satirical drama (*Sidi, Les Voix dans le vent*).

An innovative aspect of Blair's study is her use of purely literary criteria to make judgments concerning the relative merits of the works discussed. She obviously feels that there are universal artistic standards by which one can measure the quality of written literature and that these standards apply to the literatures of all peoples and cultures, including the African. An epic work is supposed to accomplish certain ends, convey a particular heroic vision of man, be the characters Trojan or Malinke warriors. The same principle holds true for lyric poetry, which communicates feelings to the soul and not just ideas to the intelligence, as well as for the other genres. To emphasize this underlying universality of the literary imagination, she frequently compares African plays and novels to European counterparts, whether to illuminate some facet of the African work for the Western reader or because of the direct influence of a French classic on an African author educated in the French school system.

It can be gathered from the above that for Blair militant commitment, be it to a socio-cultural movement like Negritude prior to Independence or to a political ideology, Marxist or other, following Independence, does not of itself make for the artistic success of an African literary work. It would seem, in fact, that polemics often get in the way of creativity, thereby marring a work's immediate impact and ultimately contributing to its lack of further relevance when the wrongs it sought to combat have been remedied. A case in point is the career of the late Guinean novelist Camara Laye, whose early masterpiece,

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L'Enfant noir (1953), was criticized by many fellow Africans because of its atmosphere of idyllic serenity and the absence of a direct condemnation of the colonial regime. His second work, *Le Regard du Roi* (1954), also aroused hostile reactions for its description of a mystical quest which transcends Africa by its universal implications. Blair defends Laye's freedom to express his vision of life in a literary form of his own choosing, and she attributes his long silence after the second novel to the intolerance of a certain public which tried to dictate particular themes and stances to African writers. When Laye finally broke his silence in 1966 with *Dramouss*, a *roman engagé*, the result was disappointing from a literary point of view. He had attempted to please his critics by writing a politically oriented work of social realism, a style completely alien to his poetic imagination. Blair concludes that in order to achieve greatness, any work of literature, even a polemical one, must say something about mankind and human life which extends beyond the context of a particular time and place. To her mind, the African writer who has best succeeded in uniting political commitment with a universal humanism is Sembene Ousmane, particularly in *Les Bouts de bois de Dieu* (1960).

One of the more enlightening parts of Blair's study is her section on the development of a French-language drama in West and Central Africa, for here she explores a subject relatively untouched by earlier commentators. Despite an early start in the improvised dramas performed in French-African secondary schools in the 1930s, the theatre as a literary form developed quite late in the comparison with poetry and fiction. This was due to the fact that the at first small and scattered public for African literature in French could be reached more readily through works written to be read rather than performed. This trend has been reversed since independence, however, since writers are trying increasingly to address a native, largely illiterate, audience, and theatre (as well as cinema) enables them to do so. Contemporary African drama thus has much the same function as the medieval European drama and, like the latter, its repertory can be grouped into plays based on traditional sacred themes and others of a moralizing, satirical inspiration drawn from everyday life. The didactic element pervades both types of African dramatic works and is sometimes detrimental, especially in the historical-legendary plays where the dramatist often seeks to forcibly extract a lesson in contemporary politics out of events of the past. More successful are the satirical works which depict the difficulties of adjusting to Westernized modernity on the part of a rural population that is only beginning to emerge from the old order.

In the final segment of her book, Blair provides some revealing insights into the works of novelists who have begun publishing since independence. What is most striking about writers like Evembe, Malick Fall, Ahmadou Kourouma, and Ouloguem, is the sense of despair, political frustration, social upheaval, and general anguish pervading their novels.

The problems attendant upon independence have replaced protest against the colonial system as the principal theme of the African novel. Moreover, the anguish portrayed seems in many instances to go beyond the African situation and to embrace all of human life. Thus contemporary African writers give voice to a very modern awareness of the world's absurdity and of the inseparability of human destiny and suffering, an awareness which makes their works transcend the local and attain the universal.

A Structural Theory of African Literature

Nancy J. Schmidt

Sunday O. Anozie. **STRUCTURAL MODELS AND AFRICAN POETICS: Towards a Pragmatic Theory of Literature** (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 338 pp. \$37.50.

Titles of books are often more general than their contents. This book, however, has wider theoretical relevance than the title implies, for it deals with African world views and arts in general, even though its primary focus is on literature. Although Anozie intends for his approach to be applicable to oral and written literature throughout Africa, his examples are almost all West African, and primarily Igbo. In this sense, the title states an ideal that Anozie feels is achievable, rather than indicating the specific content of his discussion.

Anozie, like many other critics of African literature, feels that African literary criticism has been dominated by subjectivity in the absence of a rigorous methodology that takes into account the socioliterary context of African creativity. A great weakness of African literary models, in Anozie's view, is their failure to consider African languages and systems of communication in the broadest sense of the term (e.g. semantic, iconic, etc). Anozie feels that an interdisciplinary theory of communication in Africa must underlie literary criticism. This communications theory must take into consideration the ethnic pluralism and multilingual nature of African societies and encompass both vernacular and European languages. It must cover the pragmatic contexts of speakers and hearers, writers and readers, which are indispensable for understanding verbal and written communication of all kinds, not just oral and written literature. Literature is, after all, just one segment of a system of communication.

Anozie feels that Africans have ignored structuralism as a theory both because it is not clearly defined and because it has not been related to political options and goals in African contexts. He feels that structuralism can provide one method, but not the only method, for answering the questions of modern literary criticism posed for African literature which have eluded critics because of the inadequacy of existing analytic and theoretical tools of literary criticism. Anozie is well-aware of the limitations of structuralism and admits that "the structuralist approach in its present non-standard versions does not . . . offer any final solution or appeasement to the complex questions of meaning, comprehension and interpretation posed by literature in general, and by culture and creativity in particular."

Most of *Structural Models and African Poetics* is devoted to a critique of "traditional" structuralism as it is applied to African contexts, a delineation of those aspects of post-structuralism which are relevant in African contexts, and

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the expansion of structuralist approaches by semiotic approaches that Anozie feels are necessary for building an adequate theory of African poetics. Due to the detail of Anozie's arguments and density of his examples his ideas cannot be adequately summarized in a short review. Suffice it to say, the scope of his argument is broad, ranging over the ideas of the best-known French and English structuralists, and supported by an extensive bibliography. He also discusses Senghor as West Africa's first structuralist philosopher, negritude as a philosophy of structuralist humanism, and makes a structuralist analysis of Senghor's poem, "Le Totem." The applicability of structuralism beyond literature to the broader socioliterary context is shown in chapters on the iconography and poetics of African masks and on the applicability of Roman Jakobson's linguistic analysis to African drum languages. In the former chapter, Anozie offers the stimulating hypothesis that "because the mask is an icon, to the extent that it may embody, though implicitly, a principle of African aesthetics and creativity, it can also through a detailed semiological or iconographical study reveal to us the potential base and the lexicon (that is, the meta-language) of African poetics."

As the preceding hypothesis illustrates, structuralism and semiotics are closely interrelated in Anozie's discussion. He also devotes a chapter to the relevance of Roland Barthes' semiotic criticism for African poetics, with specific reference to African food and masks as analyzed analogously to "langue" and "parole" in language. Literature, food, and masks all may be the subject of structuralist analysis because of their property of syntagm, the arrangement of signs in a linear and irreversible order.

Pre-text is the concept that Anozie introduces as being essential to the extension of structuralism for use in African contexts. Following analogies to linguistics, Anozie considers pre-text to be a unifying principle of narrative competence that underlies African creativity. Anozie views pre-text as a more flexible basis for analysis than binary opposition, which is assumed to exist by structuralists, but which has been shown not to be universal in human thought. The concept of pre-text is related both to systems theory and to linguistic theories of grammatical appropriateness. It encompasses both the context-of-utterance (e.g. the oral or written literary text) and the sociocultural context of the speaker or writer. Anozie introduces the concept of pre-text to add constraints to structuralist analysis of meaning in literature, but as defined by Anozie, pre-text is as all-encompassing as structuralism itself. "First, it envisages its domain of interest in African theoretical poetics to include all the texts produced in Africa, i.e. the total universe of verbal and non-verbal discourse in Africa. Second, it limits its investigations to the (socio-cultural) truth conditions which determine the textual pragmatic 'happiness,' or 'grammaticalness,' — as well as unfitness. It thereby also enables one to recognize how, why and which cognitive structures (e.g. metaphors, figures, rhetoric, images, proverbs, riddles, etc.) specifically and integrally become a part of the African universe of discourse."

Like all structural theories, Anozie's modification of "traditional" structuralism as applied to African literary criticism is far removed from reality. His delineation of a modified structural method to be used by African literary critics could never be applied to all African literature. Nevertheless, Anozie has written an important book that should be read, and because of its verbal density must be reread, by both structuralists and non-structuralists, for Anozie discusses important intellectual aspects of the socio-cultural context of African literature that must be considered in valid criticism of African literature.

Structuralists and semioticians may wish to fault Anozie on technical details

of his argument. I will leave such criticism to others. Critics of African literature would find Anozie's work more useful had he discussed his methods and theories in relation to those of others concerned with the sociocultural context of African literature. After all, Anozie is not the first one to postulate methods for studying the socio-cultural context of African literature; he is simply the first structuralist to do so. If Anozie used less structuralist, linguistic, and semiotic jargon and presented his ideas in "plain" English, it would also be more evident how his ideas are related to those of other critics of African literature. Literary critics also would benefit from a more explicit discussion of aesthetics, which Anozie largely subsumes under other topics, since aesthetics have assumed a primary place in controversies about criticism of African literature.

Finally, *Structural Models and African Poetics* is an important contribution to the sociology of knowledge. As a critique of widespread western theories by a third world scholar, it belongs with the works of Samir Amin, Ali Mazrui, Walter Rodney, Leopold Senghor, and others who have internationalized western models of thought by considering them in African contexts and from African perspectives.

Early Fictitious Impressions of Africa

Charlotte H. Bruner

Nancy J. Schmidt. *CHILDREN'S FICTION ABOUT AFRICA IN ENGLISH* (Buffalo: Conch, 1981) pp. 248. \$35.00 cloth, \$17.50 paper.

Nancy Schmidt is both an anthropologist and a professional bibliographer. She has published extensively. Her concern with juvenalia is broad in scope, her bibliographic research in the field is extensive, and her judgments are humanistic in implication. For these reasons her study, *Children's Fiction about Africa in English*, is important not only for school librarians, educational specialists, and Africanists, but for the general reader as well. "While fiction is a creation of individual's imaginations, all individuals live in culturally defined worlds which influence the directions in which their imaginations develop." (p. 194) Consequently, the adults who select literature for children have, themselves, been influenced as children in ways they may not understand, leading to stereotypic categorization, emotionally charged images of the *other*, biases toward romanticized exoticism. Schmidt concludes with a quotation from Nicholas Tucker that justifies her own thematic analysis of the one specialized area of children's literature: "We pay a high price in human feeling if all possible social consequences of literature are persistently ignored, perhaps especially so far as children's literature is concerned." (p. 194)

Schmidt conscientiously defines the limit of her survey: 542 novels and 51 collections published before 1977, mainly those available in the United States.

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Because she concentrates on Subsaharan Africa, existing fiction about North Africa, European colonizers, and imaginary white-child heroes in South Africa is avowedly "underrepresented." Schmidt's main focus is the contrast between fiction written for Euroamerican children and for African children, whether by Euroamerican or by African authors.

Part I sets out in four introductory chapters the historical and intellectual background of authors, publishers, and illustrators. These chapters alone provide important insights as to the general effect children's literature has had on us all. For example, today's adults were probably unconsciously influenced by stereotypes of Blacks, based on literary and pictorial images anthropologically outdated even when imposed a generation ago.

Publishers determine what fiction becomes available to readers, in children's literature just as in adult fiction. "More books have been published by Europeans than have been published by Africans for themselves . . . publishing in Africa was originally for missionary and government purposes." (p. 29) The possible literary biases implicit here are obvious. Outside publishers could sell romantic exoticism, and local publishers were subsidized to print didactic pedantry or reinforcement of government policy — even of Apartheid. Realism and humanism were not primary concerns for publishers.

Euroamerican authors, many poorly informed, described Africa erroneously. Frequently a story with an African setting would appear as tokenism in a school series about children from other lands. "Most authors who write fiction for Euroamerican children have no special knowledge of Africa." (p. 37) A few well known African writers like Cyprian Ekwensi produced an occasional story for children. Nonetheless, at an Ife conference in the 1970s, all discussants concurred that generally children's fiction was not taken seriously, either on the literary or educative level.

Schmidt's conclusions on illustrations and illustrators are particularly illuminating. From the premise that "In picture books, illustrations are the core of the book," (p. 47) she ably concludes that the illustrations of any book have an oblique, unperceived, and persistent effect on the viewer, all the harder to disprove because the image is not put into words. Illustrations of the popular *Doctor Doolittle*, a classic series of the 1920s "distort the realities of Africa and are offensive for their racism . . . The Africans have fat bodies and highly exaggerated negroid facial features, appearing apelike or grotesque." (p. 51) Although these vaunted illustrations were formative for today's adults, all too little change has occurred since. A recent seminar in Lagos advocated improvement of illustrated children's books. Admittedly, the impact of poor or misleading pictures is hard to assess, yet "an adult observer can readily see the great potential of illustration in fiction for providing a distorted view of Africa." (p. 56)

Part II comprises a systematic thematic analysis, with plot resumes and evaluative comment, of children's fictional genres in works on Africa: local life stories; adventure stories; animal and safari stories; historical fiction; fantasy, and school stories. An appendix details series publications, including children's fiction about Africa, and two bibliographies, one general, and one on children's books, follow.

Part II provides interest for various specialists. School librarians might scrutinize the holdings available to them in the light of Schmidt's analyses of authenticity, racial bias, representation of outdated or contemporary points of view, language suitability, etc. Certainly order librarians and teachers seeking outside-reading materials can also profit by checking titles here. Curricular ex-

perts could cross-check "world view" anthologies and series texts. Both English teachers and social scientists will readily recognize the propagandistic import of the weighted terminology of adjectives commonly describing the African in much Euroamerican children's fiction: *queer, frenzied, heathen, dirty, naked, passionate, bloodthirsty, simple, barbaric, quaint, hideous, black, ugly, strange, mysterious, unbelievable, cruel, primitive, weird, grotesque, romantic, wild, frightful, hostile, instinctual, splendid, inhuman, dangerous, formidable, faithful, dark, stupid, surly, crafty, greedy, ecstatic, backward, melancholy and terror-stricken.* (p. 65)

When reviewing the list of existing children's fiction set in Africa, the Africanist will note a disparity in locale: 45 pieces set in Kenya, 69 Nigeria, one Rwanda, two Algeria, none for Mali, Mauretania, Guinea. The ethnic group coverage is even more spotty. The most common hero, unrealistically, is a village boy, hunter or chief's son, "despite the fact that less than five percent of the African ethnic groups have gained their subsistence from hunting during the period and that most ethnic groups do not or did not have chiefs." (p. 64)

Historians may not be surprised that very little historical African fiction for children exists, perhaps because the "dark continent" supposedly had no history. In contrast, specialists in comparative education find that the school novel, predominantly a British nineteenth-century genre, reappears as: "The only type of fiction which consistently depicts Africa and Africans favorably," probably because the writers were enthusiastically involved in the idealism of the post-independence educational expansion.

In short, Nancy Schmidt's thematic analysis of a relatively small segment of a body of literature usually ignored or misprised by adult readers and scholars provides a significant, many-faceted study of the works in question. She thus determines likely sources for much contemporary prejudice and misunderstanding among peoples of the Third and First World. By designating root causes for such problems, Schmidt suggests we can, by judicious selection of stories for children, eradicate fallacies about the African for our children in their formative years.

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Suspense in a Tale of Imperial Injustice

Peter LaSalle

J.M. Coetzee, **WAITING FOR THE BARBARIANS** (New York: Penguin Books, 1982) pp. 156, \$3.95.

Many readers will recognize that the title of this new novel by the South African J.M. Coetzee is taken from that of a poem by Constantine Cavafy, who died in his native Greece in 1933. Such borrowing seems appropriate, because in its careful language and narrative intensity, the slim book does read very much like a poem.

Coetzee sets his tale in the harsh, semiarid frontier of a major power called the Empire. An aging man in charge of a settlement there, the Magistrate, is content to live out his days quietly, administering over the small community, visiting a gentle prostitute at the local inn, and collecting anthropological artifacts on casual digs manned by his soldiers. But Colonel Joll, from the Empire's police, arrives for an investigation of supposed plotting among the "barbarians," peaceful tribes who dwell beyond the settlement. He "interrogates" barbarians taken as prisoners; eventually a beaten boy gives him a story that his people are organizing for war, the child fabricating the information, obviously out of sheer fear. Joll leaves and the prisoners are released, all except for a young barbarian woman who stays behind, half blind and with near-crippled bloody feet, another victim of Joll's interrogations. The compassionate Magistrate develops a strange fascination for her and brings her into his own chamber, as he bathes and oils her body nightly in a ritual of sorts and nurses her back to health. When he sets out on an expedition across the frozen, treacherous outlying wastes in March to return her to her people, and when the Empire, acting on Joll's findings, dispatches a young officer in the lilac-blue uniform of the Third Bureau of the Civil Guard to organize a march against the barbarians, the Magistrate is charged with consorting with the enemy. His agonizing, but defiant, downfall follows, in a long series of humiliations and tortures.

This is a very powerful piece of writing, haunted by Kafka, with the creation of a mythic setting that gives it a sense of the surreal and, in turn, the symbolic, and haunted by Conrad, with the probing of just how dark the human heart must sometimes be to act on the absurd hatred that has dictated so much of history. Because Coetzee is South African and because the details of the novel (the uniforms, the horses for the soldiers, etc.) seem of the nineteenth century, it would be easy to view this only as a story from his own troubled land's past. But, again, there is something larger about the material here, and it also has echoes of the American West, where the American Indians were seen as the "barbarians," or even of Vietnam, where the Communists often were seen as the same. Much of the comment cuts to the bone in its universality. For instance, when the Magistrate is frustratedly heartbroken at the sight of the bat-

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tered prisoners, he tries to imagine the way the leaders of the Empire think: "It would be best if this obscure chapter in the history of the world were terminated at once, if these ugly people were obliterated from the face of the earth and we swore to make a new start, to run an empire in which there would be no more injustice, no more pain."

The first-person narration is masterfully paced, seething in its suspense. In Coetzee's first book, *Dusklands*, which contained two novellas, he demonstrated a striking ability to describe the physical, often in all of its bodily rankness, and that ability is as evident here. The scenes involving the Magistrate and the young barbarian woman work so well, each character emerging as a convincing jumble of strong, and sometimes contradictory, needs and emotions. In short, the book does deserve the appellation tour de force, and I suppose that for me the sole problem, albeit a minor one, is a tendency to overdo and get heavy-handed with a dream of a child in the snow that the Magistrate repeatedly has.

In the end of Cavafy's poem "Waiting for the Barbarians," the people in an unnamed land don't know what is going to happen to them; the barbarians never showed up, and having the barbarians to think about offered "a kind of solution," gave them something with which to occupy themselves. In the end of Coetzee's novel, the situation is somewhat similar. Is our lot as supposedly civilized human beings hopeless, and is Coetzee trying to tell us that we need, and always have needed, somebody to persecute and hate? Or is the Magistrate, the figure Joll charges with trying to make a name for himself as "the One Just Man," a valid hope? Can we believe in the individual who, because he won't be broken, even after brutally inhuman treatment, can prove that history isn't an unfeeling and frightening machine, and it doesn't have to repeat itself, after all — if somebody just takes a stand and argues for a saner way?

Publications

1. The GORDIMER STORIES, a series of films based on seven short stories by the renowned South African writer Nadine Gordimer, are available from *Teleculture, Inc.* Each story is set in South Africa and presents critical issues in the lives of black and white South Africans, revealing the intricate ways in which racism permeates even the most intimate relationships. The series is supplemented with a half-hour interview with the writer herself. The films were made in South Africa by entirely South African crews and six different South African directors. They have not been released in South Africa due to their politically controversial nature, but the films have enjoyed a tremendous response in West Germany and Great Britain where they were shown on television. For more information, contact: Linda Duchin, *Teleculture, Inc.*, 420 Lexington Ave., New York, NY 10017, (212) 490-0630.

2. Recent publications of the *United Nations Centre Against Apartheid* NOTES AND DOCUMENTS series include: No. 2/83 "Resolutions and Decisions Adopted By the United Nations Security Council on the Question of Apartheid 1960-1982" 17 pp.; "Register of Sports Contacts with South Africa, January 1, 1962-June 30, 1982" 22 pp.; "International Policy Options" by Robert Hughes, 17 pp.; "'Now You have Touched the Women': African Women's Resistance to the Pass Laws in South Africa 1950-1960" by Elizabeth S. Schmidt, 47 pp.; and "European Parliamentarians Call for Sanctions Against South Africa" 10 pp. Orders for specific titles or requests to receive the series should be directed to your nearest U.N. Information Centre. In the U.S. the address is 2101 L Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

3. The *Library of Congress* has recently issued *ABUJA; THE NEW NIGERIAN FEDERAL CAPITAL: A Selected List of References*, the second title in its *Africana Direction Series*. The guide, compiled by Beverly Ann Gray, brings to attention works on planning and developing the new city, the site of Nigeria's 22nd Independence Day celebration that marked the beginning of the transfer of the nation's capitol from Lagos. The 14 page list contains 87 annotated entries and a map of Nigeria. Also available from the *Library of Congress* is the latest in their *Maktaba Afrika Series*, *LIBERIA DURING THE TOLBERT ERA*, compiled by Beverly Ann Gray and Angel Batiste. This bibliography represents a selection of government documents of the Republic of Liberia and books, pamphlets, periodical articles and dissertations about the country during the administration of President William R. Tolbert, Jr., July 1971 to April 1980. The 79 page partially annotated guide is divided into some 20 sections by subject and contains 451 entries. Copies of either bibliography are available free upon request from the *Library of Congress*, African and Middle Eastern Division, African Section, Washington, D.C. 20540.

When ordering items mentioned in these pages, or advertised in this issue, please mention *Africa Today*.

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4. The *World Bank's* WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1983, is now available to the public. The Report contains up-to-date statistics drawn from data collected by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations. Statistical data is arranged for cross-country comparisons and there are 57 tables and color-key graphs. Analysis sections include such topics as: "The Outlook for Developing Countries"; "The Role of the State"; "The Search for Efficiency"; "National Economic Management" and "Managing State Owned Enterprises." The Report is available in hardcover or paperback editions. Prices vary according to language editions available: English; Arabic; Chinese; Bahasa Indonesia; French; Spanish; German and Japanese. For more information write: World Bank Publications, P.O. Box 37525, Washington, D.C. U.S.A. or World Bank Publications, 66, Avenue D'iena, 75116 Paris, France, or contact your local distributor.

5. A new comprehensive guide to the world's minerals, WORLD INDEX OF STRATEGIC MINERALS, by David Hargreaves and Sarah Fromson, has recently been published by *Facts on File*. This 300 page book profiles 37 key minerals, from the most common, such as iron and aluminum, to the more esoteric, such as cadmium, cobalt and indium, which are increasingly used in high level warfare and electronic applications. Details are given of occurrence and production, processing and transport, trade flows and history. A cross-reference to leading mining and mineral companies is also given, with an assessment of their share of world output. The study also examines 34 countries where most strategic minerals are mined and refined. For each country a profile is given of mineral output, as well as social, political and economic factors which affect the security and future prospects for supply. This book is a major reference work for both business and political groups. The price of this book is \$95.00 (hardbound). Write: Facts on File, Inc., 460 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016.

6. The *Africa Letter*, in behalf of the *World Fund for Assistance to African Children* will publish THE 1984 AFRICA DESK DIARY AND GUIDE. The Desk Diary contains over 200 pages with colorful photos by world-famous photographers depicting the life of the African child. It includes information about each African country, geography, climate, currency and the people, as well as a map of the continent and an extensive list of hotels. The diary will also contain dates of holidays, a time reference chart, information about transportation, and space for making notes and appointments. The proceeds from the Diary will go to the *World Fund for Assistance to African Children* for projects for the welfare of disadvantaged children in Africa. The publication price of the Diary will be \$10.00 plus \$2.00 shipping. Information and orders for the Diary are being handled by *The African Letter*, 1170 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10001.

7. The *American Committee on Africa* has issued a 4 page publication, "Human Rights Violations in Apartheid South Africa," by Gail Hovey. The unit price is 30¢, and 20 or more can be purchased for 15¢ each. Add 15% for postage. Order from ACOA, 198 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10038.

8. AMERICAN CIVILIZATION ON TRIAL: *Black Masses as Vanguard*, the statement of the National Editorial Board of *News & Letters*, is now available as a 4th Expanded edition. This 41-page pamphlet succinctly outlines the political position of philosopher-activist Raya Dunayevskaya and the National Board of *News & Letters*. This expanded edition includes, "A 1980s View of the Two-Way Road Between the U.S. and Africa," by Dunayevskaya plus and appendix on "Black Caucasians in the Unions," by Charles Denby. The pamphlet is a useful contribution to the growing literature on the vanguard role of blacks in the United States and the strategic relationship between American blacks and the disinherited of the African continent. Readers may order this pamphlet by sending \$2.00 to *News & Letters*, 2832 E. Grand Blvd., Detroit, MI 48211.

Coming Events

The 6th National Third World Studies Conference will be held October 27-29, 1983 at the Peter Kiewit Conference Center, the University of Nebraska at Omaha. The inter-disciplinary format of the Conference will include such topics as "Western Media and the Third World: Is the Coverage Adequate?"; "The Developmental Syndrome: Technology and Resources"; "Nationalism, Regionalism and Internationalism: Interdependence and the Domestic/Foreign Policy Nexus"; Civilization as Hostage: Violence, Terrorism and Human Rights"; "The World Economy: Transition or Disintegration?"; "Nuclear Spread and the Third World"; "Food, Agriculture and Appropriate Technology." For more information write: Third World Studies Conference, The University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, Nebraska 68182, or phone 402-554-2391.

The Twenty-sixth Annual Meeting of the *African Studies Association* will be held at the Park Plaza Hotel in Boston, Massachusetts between December 7 and 10, 1983. For further information contact: African Studies Association, 225 Kinsey Hall, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024.

Announcement

Munger Africana Library is requesting contemporary and historical epigrams, *bon mots*, and other quotes on Africa south of the Sahara. The Oxford book of quotations has only five entries on Africa and none by Africans. Send them your favorite quotes by Africans or about Africa. Pithiness preferred. They seek not traditional proverbs but insightful quotes from speeches, articles, and books. Contributions will be acknowledged in the book. Write to Munger Africana Library, Pasadena, CA 91125.

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Books Received

Political Science

AN ANATOMY OF GHANAIAN POLITICS: *Managing Political Recession, 1969-1982*. Naomi Chazan. (Westview Press, 1983) 429 pp. hardback \$27.50

APARTHEID: *The Facts*. (International Defence and Aid Fund, 1983) pp. 112 paperback £3.00

BLACK DESTINY. Stanley J. Goodwin. (Northland Publications, 1983) pp. 70, paperback \$2.40

DIE MENSCHENRECHTSPOLITIK DER USA: *Amerikanische Außenpolitik zwischen Idealismus und Realismus 1972-1982*. Friedbert Pflunger. (R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1983) pp. 405, hardback n.p.

INTEREST GROUPS AND THE SHAPING OF FOREIGN POLICY: *Four Case Studies of United States African Policy*. F. Chidozie Ogene. (St. Martin's Press, 1983) pp. 224, hardback \$27.50

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD: *The Experience of Tropical Africa*. Philip Mawhood, ed. (John Wiley and Sons, 1983) pp. 261, hardback n.p.

MILITARY COUPS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: *How to Justify Illegal Assumptions of Power*. Staffan Wiking. (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1983) pp. 144, paperback n.p.

THE THIRD WORLD: *Premises of U.S. Policy*. Scott W. Thompson, ed. (Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1983) pp. 319, paperback \$8.95

Economics/Development

DEVELOPMENT BY PEOPLE: *Citizen Construction of a Just World*. Guy Gran. (Praeger Publishers, 1983) pp. 480, paperback \$9.95, cloth \$33.95

FOOD PRODUCTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: *Case Studies*. James Lynch and Edward B. Tash. (Praeger Publishers, 1983) pp. 360, hardback \$37.95

THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: Mike Muller. (Faber & Faber, 1983) pp. 224, paperback \$15.95

*IDEOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: Crawford Young. (Yale University Press, 1983) pp. 376, paperback \$11.95

INTEGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND EQUITY: *Economic Integration in West Africa*. Peter Robson. (Allen Unwin, 1983) 181 pp., cloth \$28.50

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WORKING CONDITIONS AND ENVIRONMENT: (International Labor Office, 1983) pp. 81, paperback 12.50SF

History/Geography

BLACKS IN SCIENCE: *Ancient and Modern*. Ivan Van Sertima, ed. (Transaction Books, 1983) pp. 302, paperback \$15.00

THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA: *State, Capital, and the Incorporation of Organized Labor on the South African Gold Fields, 1902-1939*. David Yudelman. (Greenwood Press, 1983) pp. 315 hardback \$35.00

*LA NAMIBIE. Gerard Cros. (Presses Universitaires de France, 1983) pp. 127 paperback n.p.

SHADOWS IN THE GRASS: *Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918-1956*. Robert O. Collins (Yale University Press, 1983) 494 pp. hardback \$40.00

VOLKSKAPITALISME: *Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 1934-1948*. Dan O'Meara. (Cambridge University Press, 1983) pp. 281, hardback \$44.50

Sociology

*THE AFRICAN CHILD AND HIS ENVIRONMENT. (UNEP Studies, Volume 3) R. Ogonna Obuche and Barriabas Otaala, eds. (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1981) 97 pp., paperback, n.p.

APARTHEID AND SOCIAL RESEARCH: John Rex, ed. (Paris: The UNESCO Press, 1981) 199 pp., paperback, n.p.

Reference

*AFRICA CONTEMPORARY RECORD: 1981-1982 Annual Survey and Documents. (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1981) approx. 1000 pp. hardback, n.p.

SOUTH AFRICAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: (Pretoria: The VerLoren Themaat Centre for International Law, 1981) 227 pp., hardback R18.00

Literature

FIREFLAMES. Oswald Mtshali. (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1980) 63 pp., paperback, n.p.




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Three sections of the working class are differentiated in terms of the sector of the economy in which they are employed: modern, agricultural, and informal. The first section has five fractions: mining, manufacturing, construction, power and transport, and services, all but the relatively homogeneous mining group containing a number of diverse elements. Plantation and seasonal workers are the two fractions of the agricultural section of the working class, and the seasonal fraction can be divided into migrant, seasonal, and itinerant elements. The informal section of the working class has two fractions: highly marginalized (domestic servants, market vendors, and self-employed craftsmen) and wholly marginalized (criminals). Rich, middle, and poor comprise the three sections of the Zambian peasantry; they are often called improved, emergent, and subsistence farmers respectively.¹⁶

To further implement his prescriptions, Mudenda then describes three periods of class struggle and alliances since independence. The first of these lasted from 1964 until 1971, and can be characterized as a period of adjustment from the preceding nationalist period, in which an alliance of classes, led by the African petty bourgeois elite, fought against colonialism and various forms of racial discrimination. In the readjustment period this alliance began to split as the petty bourgeoisie consolidated its control of the state and thus became a bureaucratic bourgeoisie. In order to consolidate their power further they adopted Humanism as the national ideology, combining elements of nationalism, socialism, Christianity and "tradition," and they enacted an economic nationalization program which attempted to satisfy their interests and those of multinational capital, while at the same time conforming to widespread nationalistic sentiments.

The second period lasted from 1972 until 1978. It was characterized primarily by the use of the one-party system, incorporating official party dominance over government and a constitutional status for Humanism, to conceal from the public the concessions that were being granted to foreign monopoly capital and contain class struggle by appearing to make popular mass interests dominant. This strategy for ruling class consolidation could not contain increasing class formation, especially given sharp economic decline and the end of the intense external threat from Rhodesia. The current period, which began in 1979, is characterized by open class struggle, in which other sections of the bourgeoisie, as well as workers and peasants, advocate alternatives to the present organizational bourgeois leadership, their policies, and the form of government they have evolved.¹⁷

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 98-105.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-14.

The most detailed and sophisticated discussion of class formation in Zambia is found in the work of Carolyn Baylles and Morris Szeftel. Much of their research was conducted collaboratively, they adopt the same theoretical framework, and they have published one important article under joint authorship. Most of their work has appeared under single authorship, however, and points made therein will be attributed to the appropriate individual author.

For Baylles and Szeftel class "... refers to a collectivity of individuals sharing a common position in the production process relative to ownership of the means of production. It does not necessarily imply consciousness of collective position nor political behavior based on such consciousness."¹⁸ They specify four classes in Zambia, each comprised of positions with carefully specified characteristics: capitalist owners, petty bourgeoisie, proletariat, and peasantry, each of which is internally divided either vertically or horizontally. They present a substantial amount of data which show that the size of the former two classes has grown substantially since independence, and especially since the economic reforms, even though the true bourgeoisie is still minute (91 identifiable households in the mid-1970s). Members of these classes tend to come from relatively privileged social backgrounds.¹⁹

Following Erik Olin Wright, Baylles emphasizes the importance of transitional or intermediate positions between these basic classes, and places those who are unemployed or are outside of productive relations for other reasons outside the class structure. She indicates that high level bureaucrats are neither automatically members of the bourgeoisie nor comprise a class or even a fraction of their own, although they may use their bureaucratic positions to acquire capital and thus become members of the bourgeoisie. Top parastatal officials occupy intermediate positions between regular state bureaucrats and the bourgeoisie. Their enterprises, although government-owned, are managed in accordance with capitalist principles; yet control of these enterprises does not allow their managers to reproduce themselves as a class.²⁰

Given their concept of class firmly rooted in production Baylles and Szeftel assume that the relationship between economic class and politics may vary widely within theoretically determined limits.

18. Carolyn Louise Baylles, "The State and Class Formation in Zambia," Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1978, p. 28.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 496-505, 677-828; Morris Szeftel, "Conflict, Spoils and Class Formation in Zambia," Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1978, pp. 416-432; and Carolyn L. Baylles and Morris Szeftel, "The Rise of a Zambian Capitalist Class in the 1970s," *Journal of Southern Africa Studies* 8 (April 1982), pp. 189-96.

20. Baylles, "The State and Class Formation in Zambia," pp. 28-29, 66-74, 965-68.

In a fundamental and ultimate sense political relations are a reflection of relations of dominance in production. But in each individual instance and in manifestation of political activity, there is no necessary identity of political and production relations. It is this precise manifestation of the relations between class structure and political activity which must be the subject of analysis, not assumed.²¹

Or, put in another way:

And when a dominant class is the subject of analysis, criteria for its identification are not always explicit or uniformly applied. Certainly, there is little agreement about whether or not dominance should be taken to refer to economic or political position or leverage, or to some combination of them. Indeed it is precisely confusion on this point which has led to the formulation of polyglot categories which combine together a number of strata on the basis of life style, proximity to the state or orientation to public policy, and infer from these a common class position. We would suggest instead that the analytical separation of economic and political position and influence for purposes of investigation of the precise manner in which they interact is essential for an understanding of the ongoing process of class formation and an assessment of the social and political importance of class forces.²²

Baylies and Szeftel ask to what extent the Zambian owning class is a ruling class, to what extent it is tied to and dependent on the state, and to what extent the state is autonomous from it or any other class. They find that the owning class is highly influential in determining the pattern of public policy, as will be discussed in the following section of this article, but falls short, by a substantial margin, of being a ruling class. Dependence on the state is "by far the most important" relationship characterizing this class, . . . both in the sense that a substantial proportion of those with the most extensive holdings had come from, or continued to occupy, the upper ranks of the Party, Government and parastatals, and in the sense that many had benefitted as recipients of loan funds from government institutions.²³

Baylies and Szeftel also find that state autonomy, while declining from its early post-independence high point, is still relatively great in comparison with the late colonial period in Northern Rhodesia-Zambia or with advanced capitalist societies. Baylies suggests that relative autonomy can be measured in terms of a combination of: the origin of state funds, formal pressure by interest groups representing a potentially dominant class, informal pressure exerted through individual contact by prominent members of such a class, the location of effective decision-making power, the strength of neutral bureaucratic norms, and the class membership of state personnel,²⁴ and both authors present data on the values assumed by these variables in Zambia.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

22. Baylies and Szeftel, "The Rise of a Zambian Capitalist Class in the 1970s," p. 188.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 200.

24. Baylies, "The State and Class Formation in Zambia," pp. 17-21.

John Courtney Saxby's analysis parallels that of Baylies and Szeftel with regard to the petty bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and the peasantry, but instead of capitalist owners he sees the top class as a "political class" or "ruling petty bourgeoisie," defined primarily in terms of political practice within the interventionist state of the post-independence period. This class is divided along several overlapping dimensions, but

. . . Kaunda and a coterie of supporters (the latter, too, diverse and changing) have remained the dominant fraction, enjoying control of the highest echelons of state power . . . These tendencies . . . have emerged from intense political competition between and within the different classes of Zambian society.²⁵

Several writers do not attempt to delineate Zambian class structure and processes in their entirety, but focus instead on the formation and subdivisions of one class and the conflicts and alliances in which this class and its subdivisions are involved. Ronald Libby and Marcia Burdette focus on fractions of the bourgeoisie. Libby argues that:

there is a major division within Zambia's dominant class between a political or a state bourgeoisie and a subordinate, indigenous capitalist-owning class fraction and that MNCs allied to the dominant state bourgeoisie are able to outcompete MNCs allied to the indigenous capital-owning bourgeoisie in terms of receiving preferred government treatment.²⁶

In Libby's analysis the two copper mining companies long involved in the ownership and management of Zambian mines fall into the former category, while all other MNCs fall into the latter category. This distinction appears to be highly arbitrary, as many other MNCs are also in partnership with the Zambian government, usually through parastatal corporations, but Libby raises the significant question of the differing transnational alliances of fractions of the Zambian bourgeoisie and their relation to fractional conflict.

Burdette also specifies two fractions of the Zambian bourgeoisie, which she labels the "political class," but her division of this class is different from Libby's. Focusing on the negotiations with the international copper companies for the initial nationalization of the mines in 1969 and for greater control of their operations by the Zambian government in 1973, she distinguishes between "nationalist" and "technocrat" fractions of the political class. The former is composed of individuals who are usually employed by the bureaucracy or the party and thus, being strongly depen-

25. John Courtney Saxby, "The Politics of Education in Zambia," Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1980, pp. 515-38. The quotations are from pp. 536 and 538.

26. Ronald T. Libby, "Transnational Class Alliances in Zambia," *Comparative Politics* 15 (July 1983), p. 379.

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