

# **AFRICA TODAY**

## **Changing Strategies for Rural Development in Africa**

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## Editor's Note

In addition to Guy Gran's creative and provocative proposals for new paths for rural development in Zambia, and Frank Holmquist's report on changes in rural development policy in Tanzania, which we had previously announced for this issue, we are happy to include as well another significant article related more generally to dilemmas of development, an analysis of the role of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the Third World, by Isebill Gruhn. She informs us that her presentation is deliberately designed to be controversial and to promote further study and discussion, and we hope it will evoke comment and further research from our readers that can be published in future issues of *Africa Today*. Our "Look at Books" includes a number of recent titles on rural development and development issues in general.

With the enforced shift of Guy Gran's article from 30/3 on Zambia to this issue we seemed to have moved for the moment into something of a flow pattern on themes. Our next issue "Rural Resettlement Policy for Refugees in Africa" follows naturally from this one. It will be a tribute to Tristram F. (Jimmy) Betts, who died in August 1963. It will contain the last papers from his creative pen and an article on the continuing impact of refugees on the nations of the continent by Shelley Pitterman of Northwestern University. Again we hope to have it in the mail in less than the normal three month interval, as we strive towards a return to a positive correlation of issue dates and publication dates.

We again call your attention to our summer tour, and have placed the ad overleaf from this note to give it maximum attention. Please write for additional copies for distribution to students and others and for bulletin board posting.

Edward A. Hawley

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## From the Official Future to a Participatory Future: Rethinking Development Policy and Practice in Rural Zambia

Guy Gran

The Mission's strategy focusses primarily on these 500,000 traditional farmers who have so far missed the mainstream of development. The Mission envisages two interrelated paths for increasing small farmers' productivity. The first is through the adoption of appropriate technology and the second is through a diversification of the cropping pattern.<sup>1</sup>

... rural development in practice is the result of the interaction of the political interests of local leaders on the intended strategies of the state. The actual impact of state intervention in rural areas is not comprehensible without reference to what might be described as the local politics of rural development.<sup>2</sup>

Eighteen years after independence, most rural Zambians, like most rural citizens in other Third World societies, have not prospered. A recent survey found class and income disparities growing. The rural poor have become relatively poorer, and segments even absolutely poorer in the 1960s and 1970s; half to two thirds of rural households in Zambia have "incomes that are so far below official wages that malnutrition and seasonal famine is a constant fear and too frequent reality."<sup>3</sup> Another recitation of these ills is not going to change the situation. A critique and casting of blame would not alone be very constructive. Posing a different policy will, by itself, fail if the audience has little incentive to learn. There is, however, an alternative. Contemplate a new kind of policy paper, joining politics with metapolitics. This essay is such an attempt.

1. International Fund for Agricultural Development — IFAD, Report of the Special Programming Mission to Zambia (Washington: IBRD, October 1981, 3 vols. Unpublished.)

2. Michael Bratton, *The Local Politics of Rural Development: Peasant and Party-State in Zambia* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1980.)

3. Charles Elliott, *Equity and Growth: Unresolved Conflict in Zambian and Rural Development Policy* (Geneva: I.L.O. WEP 10/6/WP30, 1980.)

Guy Gran is Assistant Professor of African and Development Studies, School of International Service, The American University, Washington, D.C. His book, *Development by People*, was published by Praeger early in 1983. This paper was first presented at the 25th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association Washington, D.C., November 7, 1982.

Several motives impel such an effort. In the Official Future like the Official Past, rural Zambians will eat poorly or not at all. This is not satisfactory. Like many other social analysts, I have been concerned with defining and promoting an operational alternative. My global synthesis of recent efforts, *Development by People*, appeared in the spring of 1983.<sup>4</sup> It argues that participatory development is the only path — as well as the most equitable, efficient, and productive path — to sustained mass development. The operational steps are explored in detail: *consciousness*, development catalysts, the creation and work of base and intermediate organizations, and their role in the ensuing democratization of political and economic life at the regional and national levels. This paper serves as an initial effort to apply the model to a concrete historical situation with all its regional, ecological and cultural complexities.

Policies alone, no matter how logical, do not promote action. Incentive structures have to be built so that either aid agencies, governments or peasants will implement the policies. Several factors are now suggestive for experimenting with authentic participatory development in rural Zambia. Humanist rhetoric aside, the Zambian government is bankrupt and unable to get significant new external investment; scarce resources have to be used more productively. Aid agencies are growing even more aware of the failure of integrated rural development to reverse long-term trends. Some agencies of the UN system are already involved in partially participatory efforts. Zambian peasants, being the real development professionals, will respond to changes which promote greater productivity and greater security and control.

Motivation must be linked to appropriate theory, language, and process. Advocates of the Official Future, as the IFAD quote at the beginning of this article suggests, hold to economic, technocratic solutions and confuse growth and development. It is in part a question of single discipline Western social science training versus the interdisciplinary reality of evolving human systems like household economies. It is also a matter of language, organizational imperatives, and the location of the learner. An effective policy paper has to build the bridge between architects of the Official Future and the real world of politics, culture, and large bulky objects called organizations. That means changing the vocabulary of development work, the learning processes, and thence the theoretical assumptions. Like participatory development itself, this can be provoked from the bottom up.

The overall intention of this paper is to show how to reconceive the practical process of actually producing mass development in rural Zambia. This means first moving the perspective. The Official Future is built by organizational inhabitants who see the marginalized peasants as the prob-

lem. From the reverse perspective, however, it looks to the peasants as though state organizations (as well as local elites and ecology) are the problem. Defining what each see as the problems is an essential initial exercise. Policy makers and others must also face the logic of why the Official Future and its variations won't work. The ground has thus been laid for consideration of the Participatory Future. An operational sketch follows of the first of several stages necessary to reach self-sustaining, participatory results.

### Zambian Rural Development — Who Defines the Issues?

The number of reports from international agencies now involved in rural Zambia is truly staggering. In the last few years FAO, ILO, IFAD, the World Bank, and the Dutch Government (on behalf of the Zambian Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development — MAWD, hereafter) have all produced at least one major survey; US AID has in process yet another. None of these reports come to grips with village and sub-village realities in the way independent scholars like Bratton<sup>5</sup> or Nelson-Richards<sup>6</sup> do. The odd consultant report produced for an official agency project also seems to have little impact on developing knowledge of local realities or incorporating it into the project cycle.

Sitting in offices in Washington, Geneva, Rome, or Lusaka, policy makers almost inevitably view rural development from a remote, top-down perspective. Imprisoned in large bureaucracies, they cannot escape the larger political, ideological and organizational mandates by which their analysis is judged and rewarded. Trained as Western social scientists, they reduce Zambian peasants to economic men who will respond to appropriate market incentives. And as men they do not easily grant cognitive respect to the 30% of all rural households run by women or to the matrilineal kinship system common in several Zambian provinces. Instead, advocates of an Official Future define the problems of their reality as the ones closest at hand, the ones they can see through the above lenses, and the ones they can reach and affect in organizational terms.

The stagnation of rural development is first considered one product of the macroeconomic crisis of the Zambian government. Zambia has endured years of financial hardship. Its export-led growth strategy was based on copper, the price of which dropped 40% in 1974-5, and has not recovered. Production has also fallen, while prices remain low and the

5. Bratton, *op. cit.* (fn. 3)

6. M. Nelson-Richards, *Social Change and Rural Development: Intervention or Participation, A Zambian Case Study* (Washington: University Press of America, 1982.)

4. Guy Gran, *Development by People* (New York: Praeger, 1983.)

global recession/depression looks open-ended. The financial drain of Zambia's role as a Front Line state is admitted, as are the drought in 1979 and a severe deterioration in overall terms of trade. In gross terms "real per capita domestic income is less than 50 percent of its 1965 level."<sup>7</sup> Unsurprisingly such a situation has produced financial crisis.

On one level the crisis is defined and contained in terms of balance of payment deficits, international borrowing, debt arrearages and IMF agreements. There has been functional cooperation between state officials and international agencies on these matters. But on a second level the crisis has rebalanced the forces in this alliance, allowing international creditors to voice strong criticism of how the Zambian government spends its money in pursuit of Kaunda's vision of humanist development. In these criticisms, the World Bank and other agencies re-cast parts of the Official Future in ways that define one path for rural Zambia in the 1980s and beyond, focusing on three elements: bureaucratic ability, market imperfections, and technology.

The Zambian government is faulted first as planner and overspender. The Third National Development Program (1979-1983) was seen by the World Bank in 1981 as "inadequate as an operationally significant document." The TNDP had not planned for the depth of the macroeconomic malaise, had been too optimistic about resource availability, and had not planned alternatives in a functional way.<sup>8</sup> It is, of course, the generic nature of all blueprint planning to fall into such traps; one blueprint planner is not going to teach another one how to do the alternative — participatory process planning. Foreign partners also wanted the Zambian government to live within its means. When earnings went down, it was not a time to add more people to the payroll, raise defense outlays, or enlarge subsidy payments.

Two kinds of payments merit attention in the context of rural development. One is the growth of recurrent costs necessary to keep departments and ongoing projects in operation. Particularly affected is the budget of MAWD, which estimated that 40% of its 1982 capital budget might be so consumed. IFAD chronicled how work comes to a halt because of the absence of travel funds, spare parts, feed, fertilizer, and gasoline. The external supply link is made clear.

... Foreign donors or lenders for the agricultural sector contribute to the "RDC crisis" since usually they are not allowed by their terms of reference to underwrite RDC expenditures. They push such expenditure on the Government of Zambia which in turn starves other projects of operating funds, or underallocates for the foreign project in question. Even projects that underwrite

7. IBRD, *Zambia — Country Economic Memorandum*, (Washington: IBRD, February 1981. Unpublished) p. 1.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

their own RDC expenditures, pose the risk of increasing RDC commitments for the government once the donor withdraws.<sup>9</sup>

Both IFAD and the Bank are quite aware of the problem of recurrent department charges (RDC), yet propose more borrowing and more projects. The IFAD report contains a list of MAWD projects involving foreign funding from 1981 to 1985;<sup>10</sup> there are 12 agencies and 42 projects already specified. Four further integrated rural development projects are being prepared by the World Bank; one for Southern province (and an additional one in dairy development) was approved in December, 1981. As with the Zambian government, policy and practice conflict.

Many observers focus much more attention on the accumulation of direct and indirect subsidies creating market imperfections in the agriculture sector. Some argue, in particular, against the existence of parastatals on ideological grounds as socialism; the general 20th century misunderstanding of socialism is treated in *Development by People* and, more definitively in Horvat.<sup>11</sup> Others more properly pinpoint the bureaucratic and political reasons why price policies, subsidies, MAWD, and the parastatals work primarily for the large and small commercial farmers. IFAD, for example, shows how the biases perpetuate stratification and regional imbalance in each area of operation: fertilizer subsidies; extension of credit; distribution of seeds; and general spread of technology. The marketing parastatal, NAMBOARD, was faulted less for distribution of its centers than for the misincentives of rigid and uniform price policies and for its annual deficits.<sup>12</sup> It is not, in sum, a very hospitable larger environment within which to begin analyzing and prescribing any sort of future for the approximately 600,000 rural households involved in small-scale commercial or in subsistence pursuits.

Rough consensus seems to exist among the agencies as to the nature of the plight of poor rural Zambians. The rural economy is described as dualistic; this produces predictable intellectual confusion. On the same page IFAD can argue "no linkages connect the enclave sector with the periphery" and also that "maize is transported over long distances to processing plants along the line-of-rail, only to be returned to the periphery. Much cost is incurred and much value added is lost to the periphery."<sup>13</sup> Many other unequal linkages are sketched. Migration from five disadvan-

9. IFAD, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 140-2.

11. Gran, *op. cit.*, (fn. 4) and Branco Horvat, *The Political Economy of Socialism* (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1982.)

12. IFAD, *op. cit.*, (fn. 1) pp. 49-54.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

taged provinces — especially Northern and Luapula Provinces — is one striking indication of inter-regional and rural-urban disparities. Focusing on this migration also allows conventional analysts to find one major constraint to rural production to be labor shortage, especially in women-headed households.

Assessment of the rural household is conducted on two levels. Impressive tables are constructed to suggest rural differentiation by province and farm size; Table 1 is useful as a general portrait. Jaeger discusses other ways farmers have recently been classified, by landholding or yearly cash sales.<sup>14</sup> His is the only official report I looked at which considered any issues of sociology — Zambia's rapid population growth, 3.1% in the 70s — or anthropology — the problems created for the women and for the young adults in starting or maintaining farm units. His brief glimpse into social issues does not alter the explicit normative bias of an Official Futurist. He dismisses village cooperative strategies to argue "Modern farming is much more a process of individualization and division into separate farming family units. Economic development depends strongly on the initiative and enterprise of individuals."<sup>15</sup>

Table 1. Farm units and farm population by province and by farm level (1980)

Province	Large-scale commercial (> 40 ha)		Medium-scale commercial (10-40 ha)		Small-scale commercial (1-10 ha)		Traditional Farming sector		Total	
	Farms	Pop.	Farms	Pop.	Farms	Pop.	Farms	Pop.	Farms	Pop.
Southern	320	16,000	8,000	76,000	49,900	374,100	7,500	33,900	65,720	500,000
Central	300	15,200	7,630	72,500	21,400	160,500	18,400	82,800	47,730	331,000
Lusaka	90	4,300	1,910	18,100	4,300	32,300	13,400	60,300	19,700	115,000
Copperbelt	-	-	490	4,700	2,000	14,900	17,900	80,400	20,390	100,000
Eastern	20	1,000	3,100	29,500	27,000	202,700	80,900	363,800	111,020	597,000
Western	-	-	-	-	5,450	40,800	85,400	394,200	90,850	425,000
N. Western	-	-	80	800	2,900	21,900	53,600	241,300	56,580	264,000
Luapula	-	-	50	500	2,050	15,300	73,600	331,200	75,700	347,000
Northern	-	-	90	800	7,400	55,500	111,900	503,700	19,390	560,000
Total	730	36,500	21,350	202,900	122,400	918,000	462,600	2,081,600	607,080	3,239,000

Source: D. Jaeger, "Food Strategy Study: Socio-Regional Framework," (Lusaka: Government of Zambia, MAWD-Planning Unit, 1981.)

With these assumptions it is easy for the World Bank, FAO, and others, like participants in the Dutch-funded Food Strategy Study just cited, to see the core of the poverty problem as exclusion from the market. "Emergent farmers" are viewed as the role model and they are to be encouraged with projects to improve inputs and marketing facilities; this topic is the focus of Part II here. As for the really poor majority, the Official

14. D. Jaeger, "Food Strategy Study: Socio-Regional Framework," (Lusaka: Government of Zambia, MAWD-Planning Unit, 1981.)

15. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

Futurists see only a very slow incorporation into the market. "It is recommended to provide assistance only to small-holders who express the need for it; this eventually will awake the need of their neighbors."<sup>16</sup> Other analysts are more willing to recognize that, without adequate labor, technology, or soil, a household cannot even produce its own subsistence adequately, much less react to outside incentives. The solution is obviously labor-saving technology, new crops and perhaps regrouping on better land closer to services, when time and resources permit. The Official Future for two-thirds of the Zambian population is, in sum, little different from their colonial and post-colonial past.

There is another place to stand and contemplate these matters. Let us apply empathy and cross-cultural imagination. What would the Zambian peasants say about the problems and the solutions of the Official Futurists? Honeybone has gently suggested a fundamentally different perspective; he does not think that "broad based increases in productivity are both possible for, and desired in the same way, by a large proportion of the rural population."<sup>17</sup> This collection and most other recent independent reports can be combined to suggest a rather different vision of poverty and development, one from the vantage point of different kinds of subsistence households (itself a misleading word, as will be noted) in rural Zambia. Few peasants can see the entire system at work — ecology, culture, politics, organizations, and exchange relations. But if the goal is self-sustaining development, it will only come by effective mass participation in all aspects of the process. The problems are then definable. What blocks effective participation? How can education and reorganization alter the situation so that available resources (and new ones) can be better used? For rural Zambians, their cumulative impressions might be summed up like this:

Urban capitalists and commercial farmers since the colonial era have sought to draw off labor cheaply and to control resources. African households who try to organize to assure subsistence and improve labor productivity are in a perpetually unequal, losing contest.

Urban food needs can be supplied by a relatively small number of commercial farmers, adequately supported by price incentives, market facilities, etc. The system has little or no need for the great mass of subsistence producers. Without effective empowerment and representation, the situation for the

16. C.A. de Vries, "Food Strategy Study: Food Crop Production," Lusaka: Government of Zambia, MAWD-Planning, 1981.

17. David Honeybone and Alan Marter, *Poverty and Wealth in Rural Zambia* (Lusaka: University of Zambia, Institute for African Studies, Communication 15, 1979.)

poor will not change.

Regrouping and other policies ending shifting cultivation, in the many regions with poor soils, have the effect of facilitating family disintegration and market links, propelling further class formation and underdevelopment.

The same pressures for commercialization create new and deeper sexual stratification in several ways: elitist, male-dominated government agencies enforce norms of subsistence agriculture as women's work and commercial agriculture as man's work; matrilineal societies and their egalitarianism (culturally opposed to unbridled materialism) have been undermined and disintegrated by external processes of social change. Such processes encourage and legitimize men to gain control of a permanent labor force in one domestic unit and hence pursue materialism.

Western education at the local and district levels facilitate the overall cultural evolution, legitimizing inequalities and the marginalization of women by confidence mechanisms common the world over.

Prevailing political organizations and processes — UNIP, national agencies, and local administration — preempt resources, time, and organizational space in Zambian society. They pursue the rhetoric of equity with policies of growth and promote a paternalistic culture wherein villagers are encouraged to define development as based on external aid and to await its arrival. The results effectively prevent the development of competent citizens and a democratic society and economy.

Foreign donors assist these aspects of rural underdevelopment by projects and intellectual models defining development as commercialization when the cumulative human results of a rural generation subject to them are chronic malnutrition, widespread marital instability, and alcoholism.

Last and not least, in defiance of provocative international medical research, national and international authorities continue to sanction and encourage the growth and consumption of cassava — while there is serious indication that incompletely cooked cassava deposits in humans the poison HCN which builds up over time to cause a variety of grave ills beginning with goiter, which is endemic in rural Zambia. Also cited are maladies especially harmful to young children, thyroid problems, premature senility, and deterioration of the nervous system.

This is clearly a first sketch. Some detailed, highly participatory research to verify and modify these points is the next step. Specific provincial and local conditions must be added. But both the problem and the solution should be evident. Concentrations of power — elites and organizations using money, technology, law, politics, education, and culture — work to perpetuate poverty. The solution is to break up these concentrations or to develop democratic controls over them. That means the empowerment of effective citizens. Development efforts are those that begin with practical ways to produce more effective citizens organized to end exploitation (without starting new forms like group egotism). If life equality and real development are the goals, social reconstruction precedes any large new inputs of capital and technology.

### The Official Future in Practice

Architects of the Official Future are not opposed to altering patterns of participation and structures of organizations per se. By investigating briefly the planning documents of two current donor agency projects, one can get a sense of what goals participation and structural change are designed to serve in such projects. Is it participation that enlarges control over production and thus raises incentives to invest more labor and produce more? Or is it simply larger scale participation in a market controlled by others? Many such questions are in order beyond what space permits.

Assessing rural development initiatives of any sort in Africa has been made measurably easier by the collection edited by Judith Heyer, *et. al.*<sup>18</sup> In some of the finest case studies in all of development studies, these authors have crystallized and applied the essential questions of systems analysis to rural development. They argue that rural development projects fail because they are designed with two errors of logic: projects posit multiple, mutually incompatible goals; projects also apply methods contradictory to goals. Donors tend to deny that the peasants have a history or the professionalism to direct their own change processes. Instead donors work through governments whose goals are to control or tame peasants, not to develop them. Urban-based governments view peasants as the source of cheap labor and food if the conditions of peasant production and sale can be sufficiently controlled.

The question here is whether rural projects in Zambia contain these built-in contradictions and limitations. The World Bank approved in April 1981 the Eastern Province Agricultural Development Project. It is the first of five area projects scheduled to begin during 1980-83. It proposes to

18. Judith Heyer, *et. al.*, eds., *Rural Development in Tropical Africa* (New York: St. Martin's, 1981.)



spend a total of \$29.1 million, of which \$16 million is in foreign exchange; the World Bank share is \$11 million. The project goal is "increasing agricultural production and hence raising the incomes and levels of living of small farmers in the Eastern Province, through the provision of improved services."<sup>19</sup> Raising production is not the same thing as sustaining increases in life quality. Applying fixes to certain technical flaws in a system does nothing about the social and political flaws. To explore the limits of the Official Future a bit more specifically, several aspects of the project design will be briefly explored.

The project theory is that proven technical packages exist that would appeal to farmers and would raise yields on maize, cotton, groundnuts, and sunflowers. Each scenario requires that a small farmer choose to become significantly more dependent on government services for inputs at an appropriate time and for a predictable market. This does not sound like the extension service described in Bank literature and elsewhere. Peasants are expected to adopt a maize package that will require 135 man days of labor per hectare instead of a current 87 days (what will women do?) at roughly the same net return per day of work. There is an assumption of an idle peasant without the first hand research to verify free time; in other situations the idle peasant has proved a myth. Indeed the figures on number of households, farm size, market surplus and rural incomes are all estimates.<sup>20</sup> Clearly no peasants have been consulted about how they spend their time and how they would like to. Elliott has a disturbing discussion of how limited recent research has been.<sup>21</sup>

The project is to be executed by the Provincial and District Administrations. Also involved will be the cotton parastatal LINTCO, the new Zambian Agricultural Development Bank, and the Eastern Province Cooperative Union. How these organizations will escape the local politics of development is not addressed in the project design. That organizations designed and run by elites will suddenly start working on behalf of small farmers defies common sense. If the poor have no significant policy impact on the episodic workings of the Village Productivity Committees or Ward Development Committee, as Bratton extensively demonstrates (for Kasama District, Northern Province)<sup>22</sup>, it is improbable that the poor will affect even larger and more remote organizations. That defies both the nature of organizations and the nature of politics. By applying only large-scale, non-democratic organizations, creators of the Official Future assure

further incrementalism and marginalization.

Beyond issues of dependency, stratification, politics, and bureaucracy, consider the matters of scale and spread. IBRD planners project that at the end of project year 16 about 26,200 families will have taken part. This is 26% of a projected population of subsistence households. Even if their projections of population growth and adoption of cultivation techniques were proven correct, this project provides no assistance to ¾ of the subsistence households in that region. The Official Future has no answer for them.

IFAD (the International Fund for Agricultural Development), in addition to co-funding this World Bank project, produced a November 1981 paper proposing a project to bring subsistence farmers into the monetized sector by cooperatives.<sup>23</sup> This is a project identification document which does not indicate statistical goals. It is based on an analysis not unlike the preceding effort. Life in the traditional "chitamene" (shifting cultivation) system is seen to be very hard, especially for families without a male between 15 and 50. Hand hoeing on tropical soils is difficult under most circumstances. IFAD proposes expanding the use of oxen and diversifying crops. The interesting aspect of this overall proposal is the use of cooperatives and its implications for participation.

IFAD reviewed the government's Operation Food Production 1980-1990 and was properly dubious of certain capital intensive, high-technology elements relying on parastatals: the 18 proposed State Farms to average 20,000 hectares each; the Rural Reconstruction Centers; and the production units to be run by the Zambian National Service. But there are other more promising plans afoot, including this: "Planned development of producer cooperatives through the aegis of farm training institutes and a national cooperative college."<sup>24</sup> IFAD diplomatically ignores the severe political contradictions among different parts of this food strategy; the incentives created by funding large-scale efforts, for example, work effectively to warp, if not destroy, small-scale initiatives. Ignoring the larger universe of organizations, politics, and world-system agencies, consider how this architect of the Official Future looks at the past and the potential of cooperatives in Zambia.

Agricultural cooperatives in Zambia date from 1948, but it was not until 1966 that a central government began to support them on any large scale. Some 350 cooperatives commenced in response to available loans and tractors. IFAD's analysis of the result is instructive: "Because of poor

19. IBRD, Zambia — Staff Appraisal Report — Eastern Province Agricultural Development Project (Washington: IBRD, April 1981. Unpublished), p. 20.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

21. Elliott, *op. cit.* (fn. 3)

22. Bratton, *op. cit.* (fn. 2)

23. IFAD, *op. cit.* (fn. 1)

24. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

planning and administration, the whole scheme failed. The reputation of the cooperative movement was quite damaged in the process.<sup>25</sup> Historical context is essential, but it must be defensible. The failure of cooperatives cannot be reduced to such simplicities.<sup>26</sup> The inherent conflicts among capitalism, state socialism, and real socialism are central to understanding why that experiment failed. Taking politics out of public administration is a standard activity in the literature of Official Futurists. Just ignore topics that don't fit.

IFAD is more sensitive about the limitations of the current network of about 250 existing primary cooperatives which they wish to expand. About 60% are concentrated in just two provinces — Southern and Eastern. As adjuncts of government agencies like NAMBOARD, they reflect top-down bureaucratic style and elite biases. IFAD does distinguish between this sort of market cooperative and a more genuine and participatory small farmer's group. It admits a possible relationship between the existence of the centralized top-down government structures in rural areas and the "dearth of participatory mechanisms." This leads to a fair statement of the problem:

... participation in development would be involvement in activities that would allow the individual farmer to gain greater control over his (her) relationship with the centralized suppliers of goods and services in the rural areas. All this points to the need for a strategy to promote and develop a new breed of primary cooperatives in the neglected provinces. A major issue in the formation and functioning of these institutions will be the degree of small farmer effective participation.<sup>27</sup>

From this one can see some recognition that power is important.

The limits to IFAD's current vision appear in its feeble efforts to sketch what they view as non-political, functionally-oriented groups. It builds particularly on the 1975-81 experience of the Cooperative Credit Scheme in Eastern Province. IFAD's solution is to build on the existing Cooperative Movement in areas where no coops now exist; the limited coverage of current coops even in the wealthier provinces is not an issue. The serious constraints are seen as absence of formal education and of training in English and business practices. Education campaigns are proposed. The low permissible profit margin needs to be raised. There is here and elsewhere no real connection between politics and economics, no grasp of local realities of culture and conflict, and no sense of the basic antagonisms between bureaucratic imperatives to control and human aspirations for liberation. The Official Future proclaims dualism, "two economies coexisting side by

25. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

26. Stephen A. Quick, "Bureaucracy and Rural Socialism in Zambia," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 15, 3:379-400, 1977.

27. IFAD, *op. cit.* (fn. 1), p. 60.

side with little or no linkages between them."<sup>28</sup> The Alternative Future, one in which Zambians eat, will have to address not just that sort of analytical naivete. It's going to have to design a practical way around the blockages of political economy, bureaucratic imperatives, and cultural marginalization that will simultaneously attract the peasants to action and elites to acquiescence if not modest support.

### Starting the Alternative Future for Rural Zambia

It is, of course, presumptuous and non-participatory to make policy suggestions from afar without field research. It is, however, more than presumptuous to design and implement develop programs — spend public money and affect human lives in non-democratic ways — devoid of both local knowledge and of any scientifically valid theory of social change. Coming to grips with systems theory resolves the latter issue (see **Development by People**<sup>29</sup>); here the concern is to outline a path for a second, more participatory stage of activities: initial dialogues with representative samples of poor Zambians in a specific province.

Participatory development, the process for building the Alternative Future, begins with practical processes to accomplish three things: consciousness raising and education relevant to growing from subject to citizen; the formation of base-organizations of 12-20 households as sub-village entities which the poor control and use toward democratically decided goals; the creation of intermediate organizations (not coterminous with village level authority structures) to defend and assist base organizations. Not all the practical and normative problems of transforming non-democratic cultures and their typical apathy toward mass politics can be touched on here. Rather my intent is to begin to Zambianize the overall model. In addition to the general themes and strategies there are more specific elements of which interested n.g.o. representatives or iconoclasts in official agencies must be cognizant of as they begin to discuss actual institution building and the training of development catalysts with Zambians at the local and district levels.

The curriculum for *consciousness* contains universal elements and country-specific topics as well as the history of conflict of a specific location and the people involved. The more general themes have been treated elsewhere<sup>30</sup> and will be merely catalogued here: human needs and their

28. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

29. Gran, *op. cit.* (fn. 4)

30. *Ibid.*, Chapter 6.

hierarchy; conflict; process and relationship; nuclear social relations; community relations; and the hierarchy of needs as they relate to work, technology, and human satisfaction. The eight points at the end of Part I, suggested as an initial synthesis of peasant concerns that would develop as did political consciousness, reflect the kinds of country-specific topics suitable. A few applications show how sophisticated this curriculum and education process need to be.

Nelson-Richards has just issued a critical evaluation report of Chiringa Irrigation Scheme, 18 km from Lusaka.<sup>31</sup> Among many useful insights, he demonstrates how historical context conditions present possibilities. Political and philosophical differences leading to non-cooperation between the project organizer and the local Chief were traced to several factors. The project organizers had been active UNIP supporters in the independence struggle and came with official support to this locale. The Chief had fought for another political contender in the 1960s. He saw the organizers as people of a foreign cultural background — i.e., a different regional origin. The project appeared as another attack on his authority, part of a long process inspired by central authorities. Cultural and class gaps were obvious. The Chief's response was to withdraw all forms of cooperation feasible, leaving the village divided and the project to stumble along.<sup>32</sup> The project organizers, the role I term development catalysts, had failed to do the depth and breadth of historical research necessary to successful communication in that specific place. At the least different, less alien people could have come from different institutional auspices to play the catalytic roles.

There are a number of available reports to document why peasants have reason to distrust any central government development initiative. Part of any *conscientization* curriculum must be re-creations of the wreckage of past development failures; from this peasants develop a historical consensus. Maud S. Muntemba, in several articles and a dissertation, has studied the underdevelopment of peasant agriculture to Kabwe district over more than a century. In one article, she traces the government efforts between 1964 and 1970 to create cooperatives and raise production.<sup>33</sup> Unequal structural connections with urban markets stymied and stifled every avenue to raise local living standards despite some rise in productivity and production. The mechanisms could be discussed in detail, and the resulting pessimism is easy to understand: "You people in town will continue to get

31. Nelson-Richards, *op. cit.* (fn. 6)

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 66-68.

33. Maud S. Muntemba, "Expectations Unfulfilled: the Underdevelopment of Peasant Agriculture in Zambia: The Case of Kabwe Rural District, 1964-1970," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 5, 1.

rich; we shall continue to get poor."<sup>34</sup> An outsider will have to begin with authentic cognitive respect and understanding of this historically-grounded antagonism. It is improbable that most products of what Dumont<sup>35</sup> calls the town culture will do this. So seek the new generation of development catalysts from among rural people.

The initial development curriculum is also going to struggle with questions of male/female relations, especially in the matrilineal areas. The investigations of Karla Poewe have raised some very sober challenges to Western ideas about modernization.<sup>36</sup> In Luapula Valley he demonstrates severe social conflicts created by the incompatibility of matrilineal norms and capitalism. The traditional culture avoided sexual or class stratification because, while individuals owned their own means of production, their economic surplus was distributed through clans and lineages. The result was sexual parallelism, not subordination in politics and economics. The system was not, however, well suited to cope with the combination of individualism, materialism, and chauvinism brought by external links. Some younger men, stymied from earning immediate fortunes, opted for Protestantism, withdrawing labor from the lineage in pursuit to private fortunes. This led to a four part class system with two classes of men and one of women developing economic incentives to reject matrimony.

The resulting conflicts were exacerbated by new tensions to already stressful marital ties. In the traditional system exclusive long-term emotional investment was culturally discouraged and people had relations and children with several individuals in an adult life. Protestantism and most sects attacked this social arrangement and pressured for conventional Western ties. Traditional women saw this as enslavement. Lack of local development possibilities left about 75% of the women in one of two roles: brewing beer for a living and trying to hold on to matricentric units through unstable marriages; or living at the fringe by gardening and day labor and with brittle marriages. If Zambian national rhetoric about participation and socialism had translated into authentic practice, matrilineal lineages might have socialized the means of production and developed comfortable ties with a larger world. In the present situation, a great deal of *conscientization* must take place to create a new cultural consensus on male-female links in

34. *Ibid.*, p. 85. See also Maud S. Muntemba, "Women in agricultural change in the Railway Region of Zambia: Disposition and Counter-Strategies, 1930-1970," in Edna G. Bay, *Women and Work in Africa*, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982) pp. 83-103.

35. Rene Dumont and Marie Mottin, *Towards Another Development in Rural Zambia* (Lusaka: Government Printers, 1980).

36. Karla Poewe, *Matrilineal Ideology: Male-Female Dynamics in Luapula, Zambia* (New York: Academic Press, 1981).

the different spheres. Most women will not comfortably accept the kinds of subordination the larger system offers. The society badly needs all its citizens to be more productive. Conflict and stratification mean many less productive people.

Three brief tastes of local complexities and historical context in rural Zambia drive home the crucial point, education for critical consciousness cannot be left to elites, alien economists, or supposedly impartial forces like the market system. Poor rural Zambians do not have to be the prisoners and victims of outsiders. But they need both educational tools and catalysts. This suggests that part of the work of the next stage would be preparation of elementary case books based on the themes developed in field research and combining practical and political education.

Such education processes demand a degree of local organization and motivation that will imply some outside resources for a finite period and also the selection and training of development catalysts, subjects treated elsewhere.<sup>37</sup> Here it is important to understand the nature and depth of opposition to collective effort and how its costs and benefits have been assessed. Particularly illustrative are the concerns uncovered after conflictual, elite directed resettlement efforts in the early 1970s.

In Serenje District (NE corner of Central Province) peasants reported the following grievances about regrouping: it diminishes the ease of hunting; it dramatically changes agricultural patterns and forces investment in permanent housing; it threatens polygamy wherein the man needs mobility to visit his wives; it permits more effective political and economic interference in daily life; it opens many new possibilities for witchcraft; some local leaders felt threatened; some peasants wanted to stay on ancestral land; schooling was disrupted by both practical matters and witchcraft; people correctly perceived that the government would renege on promised services; demands for compensation were ignored; and implementation problems abounded — lack of funds, communication, transport, and planning officers.<sup>38</sup> Here is a sample parody of how and why peasants are consistently turned off by group efforts. It is quite logical to avoid participating in large-scale activities with dubious benefits when one has little say over the design or implementation of the activity.

Alone, however, isolated and marginalized rural poor cannot in most cases raise their life quality very far very quickly, if at all. They are consistently overbalanced by concentrations of political and economic power as many analysts have demonstrated. Organizing and controlling their own organization is therefore the critical step for the poor, the only operational

37. Gran, *op. cit.* (fn. 4)

38. Honeybone, *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, (fn. 17), pp. 98-103.

route to the democratization of politics and economics essential to maximum productivity, equity, and human welfare.

Ollawa is the only recent analyst to try to understand why it has proven so hard for poor rural Zambians to organize.<sup>39</sup> He gives a little weight to cultural and subjective issues but stresses primarily an individual cost benefit analysis: will expected benefits outweigh anticipated costs? A peasant applying such reasoning to regrouping or other village level activities logically decides to refrain. Ollawa's surveys found that people blamed the government for economic ills and were waiting for its assistance to change the situation; this feeling was higher in regions where there had been aid projects. People minimally committed to a central government and its policies are not going to contribute much to community projects. The leaders are so rich, why should a poor person put in voluntary labor? Agricultural credit from government projects is treated as a reward for past political support, not a loan.

Even if Ollawa's surveys are a little askew, an obvious overall point emerges. People will not allocate time to elite-led or defined activities. With participatory development there is no necessity to do this. Start with small, self-defined activities with tangible results. This is indeed the best way to crystallize a base organization. The changed historical circumstances of the research-poor 1980s should serve to diminish the dependency perspective of some rural Zambians. Others never shared in handouts and don't expect to. Intermediate organizations and donors outside need to end most forms of grant aid. Salaries of development catalysts, their training, and the work of intermediate organizations will have to be met for 8-12 years until base organizations take over financial and political control.

Some local chiefs will feel threatened even if base organizations move slowly toward discrete developmental goals. Intermediate organizations need to build defensive alliances with kindred spirits in the bureaucracy. Given the rhetoric of UNIP, local organizers will find many policy documents on which to base their activities. As productivity rises various government agencies will find vested interests in local success. In contrast, the Official Future will produce neither the production gains nor the improvements in life quality that the society needs.

Quick is correct to suggest the many macropolitical obstacles to participatory development: the processes of participation; the many weaknesses of macro organizations and their limited notions of rural realities; Kaunda's utopian populism mystifying the practical needs of the

39. Patrick E. Ollawa, *Participatory Democracy in Zambia: The Political Economy of National Development* (Devon: Arthur H. Stockwell, 1979.)

situation; the pro-capitalist elites inflicting their evaluative norms; and generic elite fear of mass political participation.<sup>40</sup> The beauty of participatory development is that it does not ultimately depend on these forces. It depends on a few people becoming better citizens. With a little financial assistance and a few trained organizers, it could start anywhere. Even a major donor agency, as a comparative experiment, could proceed with such a strategy.

The Participatory Future is not a quick fix or magic cure-all devoid of problems. But it does address the broad range of human needs properly defined. It does work toward a just and sustainable society. The Official Future does neither. In both financial and human terms the Zambian poor cannot afford such a choice. Neither can the rest of us.

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40. Quick, *op. cit.*, (fn. 26) pp. 396ff.

## Correspondent's Report:

### Tanzania's Retreat From Statism in the Countryside

Frank Holmquist

"The government has been stolen from us and we want it back." According to an informed observer this was the essence of collective complaint by villagers to President Julius Nyerere and other leaders when they toured the countryside in 1979. The peasant complaint points up one of two interrelated crises of the Tanzanian state — crises of political legitimacy and of accumulation. By the end of the 1970s the state had to decide what to do in the face of a long-term economic crisis aggravated by the war in Uganda and coupled with inchoate political disaffection. A comprehensive 1982 International Labour Organization report pointed to the vicious economic cycle that Tanzania had, to some degree, entered.<sup>1</sup> With stagnant to slowly rising export volume over a number of years, coupled with the rising cost of necessary imports, there was a serious shortage of foreign exchange, despite the state's historical ability to obtain large amounts of foreign aid on concessionary terms, and despite tight import controls. With many necessary inputs to industry lacking, industry ran at 20% to 30% of capacity, and this meant that there were spot shortages of virtually all basic consumer items in the countryside with correspondingly less incentive for producers to produce exports despite a vigorous parallel market. Hence the vicious cycle was complete.

1. *Basic Needs in Danger: A Basic Needs Oriented Development Strategy for Tanzania*. Report to the Government of Tanzania by a Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa Basic Needs Mission (Addis Ababa: International Labour Organization, 1982). An account of the World Bank role is found in Cheryl Payer, "Tanzania and the World Bank," *Third World Quarterly* 5:4 (October 1983). A searching internal study of the agricultural situation is Task Force on National Agricultural Policy, *The Tanzania National Agricultural Policy* (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Agriculture, October, 1982). The most recent policy paper is *The Agricultural Policy of Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: The United Republic of Tanzania, Government Printer, March 31, 1983).

Frank Holmquist is Acting Dean of the School of Social Science and Associate Professor of Political Science at Hampshire College, Amherst, Massachusetts. He writes: This paper attempts to report and broadly interpret some observations made during a brief trip to Tanzania (June 27-July 19, 1983), where I had previously taught and done research in 1973-75. This visit occurred under the auspices of a Fulbright grant. The paper is not presented as a piece of polished research, but as a gathering together of information concerning a package of events, not hitherto widely publicized, which may turn out to be as significant as previously recognized benchmark policy such as ujamaa vijijini, decentralization, and villagization. My thanks to several informants, and for comments on a prior draft I am grateful to Patrick Allis, Nelson Kasfir, Kabiru Kinyanjui, Njuguna Ngethe, Joel Samoff, and Jan Kees Van Donge.

A bright spot on the horizon is a projected good 1983 cotton crop, but economic trends and the most recent data for 1982 do not paint an optimistic picture.<sup>2</sup> Real GDP dropped by 3.2% while the manufacturing sector recorded a 25.4% fall in volume which follows successive drops of 27.4% and 18.8%. It also appears that the special National Economic Survival Program met only 58% of its 1982 export earnings target, while the public foreign debt is now estimated at about \$2.5 billion. As of the end of July 1983, talks with the IMF that could yield a long-term IMF and World Bank Loan of about \$600 million are stalled.<sup>3</sup> Government has devalued the Tanzanian shilling by 20% against the dollar and raised prices of major export crops about 40% in July 1983, but the IMF reportedly wants a devaluation of up to 75%, a 45% export crop price rise, a 25% rise for food crops, a ceiling on government borrowing, and a doubling of interest rates. President Nyerere has balked particularly against measures which will hurt the urban poor and also pose a grave short run political risk for the regime.

State response to the twin crises included an attempt to, in a sense, give government back to the people — to revive district councils and cooperatives (Local Government Act and Cooperatives Act, 1982) which were abolished in the 1970s. The measures are only now being implemented but both institutions will expand the arena of peasant political space. They are mass-influenced (councils) or mass-based (cooperatives), if not mass-led, and the expanded participation may improve the quality of local administration as well as enhance the production and distribution of export crops in order to break the debilitating cycle mentioned in the ILO study. The institutional changes can be seen as a significant reversal of a 15 year (1967-1982) trend toward statist policy in the countryside, portions of which have proved to be unpopular and unproductive. The term "statism" is here used to connote state policy that puts an expanding array of economic activity under central government control while diminishing avenues of popular participation. This paper will describe the institutional changes as well as attempt to explain and assess their significance in light of Tanzania's recent history.

### The Rise of Statism in the Countryside

In order to understand the current retreat from statism in the countryside we need a basic understanding of the rise of statism and subsequent difficulties. Those familiar with the writings of President Nyerere and Party

2. The following data is taken from the Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mozambique, No. 3, 1983.

<sup>3</sup>These negotiations are still proceeding. An IMF team was in Tanzania for discussions in January 1984. — Ed.

documents are also familiar with their participatory rather than statist thrust. Nyerere has, after all, virtually defined development in terms of mass involvement. The 1971 **Guidelines** of the Party made this point in extreme fashion.

Any action that gives them (the people) more control of their own affairs is an action of development even if it does not offer them better health or bread.

The irony is that while the Tanzanian state has brought extraordinary progress in the realm of basic needs, esp. primary education, health, and water supply, few would argue that it provided the people with "... more control of their own affairs . . .," and hence the growing volume of complaint reaching the President's ears by the late 1970s.<sup>3</sup>

But why, we might ask, were district councils and cooperatives abolished in the first place in the context of an ideology of participation? We should note at the outset that both institutions did not suffer sudden death so much as slow attrition in the face of state intrusion which made their abolition somewhat anti-climatic. Many district councils evolved chronic debts in the 1960s, and there were frequent allegations of inefficiency and corruption.<sup>4</sup> There was also considerable tension between councillors, council staff, and functional officers of ministries in the districts. The state explained its escalating intrusion into council affairs in terms both of dealing with these problems and of asserting the power of the center over subordinate units of government. Central control was asserted primarily through regional and area commissioners whose clout was considerable because they were presidential appointees and representatives of both party and government. The Local Government Service Commission acted as the recruiting agent for council staff and, hence councils were no longer able to hire and fire their employees. In 1965 the power of the ruling party was inserted into council affairs by making the elected district party chairperson the automatic chairperson of the council. And in the same year technical ministry personnel were brought into the councils' planning committee. From 1966 the party vetoed the nominations of district councillors much as it did with candidates to the National Assembly. In 1969 responsibility for education, health, and district roads was taken away from councils and, with these responsibilities removed, local tax rates and pro-

3. Louise Fortmann, p. 117, concludes her judicious and well documented study of state and peasant relations in the following manner: "The most obvious conclusion from this study is that the policy of participatory socialism has not really been implemented in Tanzania. To be sure certain formal structures of participation have been established. But it has been shown that these structures at best provide for pro forma participation. Indeed, they sometimes serve primarily as a tool of a central government in directing village activities." *Peasants, Officials and Participation in Rural Tanzania: Experience with Villagization and Decentralization*. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Rural Development Committee, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1980).

4. This discussion of the history of district councils follows the very useful paper by Gelase Mutahaba, "Organization for Development: Tanzania's Search for Appropriate Local Level Organizational Forms," mimeo, n.d.

A bright spot on the horizon is a projected good 1983 cotton crop, but economic trends and the most recent data for 1982 do not paint an optimistic picture.<sup>2</sup> Real GDP dropped by 3.2% while the manufacturing sector recorded a 25.4% fall in volume which follows successive drops of 27.4% and 18.8%. It also appears that the special National Economic Survival Program met only 58% of its 1982 export earnings target, while the public foreign debt is now estimated at about \$2.5 billion. As of the end of July 1983, talks with the IMF that could yield a long-term IMF and World Bank Loan of about \$600 million are stalled.<sup>3</sup> Government has devalued the Tanzanian shilling by 20% against the dollar and raised prices of major export crops about 40% in July 1983, but the IMF reportedly wants a devaluation of up to 75%, a 45% export crop price rise, a 25% rise for food crops, a ceiling on government borrowing, and a doubling of interest rates. President Nyerere has balked particularly against measures which will hurt the urban poor and also pose a grave short run political risk for the regime.

State response to the twin crises included an attempt to, in a sense, give government back to the people — to revive district councils and cooperatives (Local Government Act and Cooperatives Act, 1982) which were abolished in the 1970s. The measures are only now being implemented but both institutions will expand the arena of peasant political space. They are mass-influenced (councils) or mass-based (cooperatives), if not mass-led, and the expanded participation may improve the quality of local administration as well as enhance the production and distribution of export crops in order to break the debilitating cycle mentioned in the ILO study. The institutional changes can be seen as a significant reversal of a 15 year (1967-1982) trend toward statist policy in the countryside, portions of which have proved to be unpopular and unproductive. The term "statism" is here used to connote state policy that puts an expanding array of economic activity under central government control while diminishing avenues of popular participation. This paper will describe the institutional changes as well as attempt to explain and assess their significance in light of Tanzania's recent history.

### The Rise of Statism in the Countryside

In order to understand the current retreat from statism in the countryside we need a basic understanding of the rise of statism and subsequent difficulties. Those familiar with the writings of President Nyerere and Party

2. The following data is taken from the Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mozambique, No. 3, 1983.

<sup>3</sup>These negotiations are still proceeding. An IMF team was in Tanzania for discussions in January 1984. — Ed.

documents are also familiar with their participatory rather than statist thrust. Nyerere has, after all, virtually defined development in terms of mass involvement. The 1971 **Guidelines** of the Party made this point in extreme fashion.

Any action that gives them (the people) more control of their own affairs is an action of development even if it does not offer them better health or bread.

The irony is that while the Tanzanian state has brought extraordinary progress in the realm of basic needs, esp. primary education, health, and water supply, few would argue that it provided the people with "... more control of their own affairs . . ." and hence the growing volume of complaint reaching the President's ears by the late 1970s.<sup>4</sup>

But why, we might ask, were district councils and cooperatives abolished in the first place in the context of an ideology of participation? We should note at the outset that both institutions did not suffer sudden death so much as slow attrition in the face of state intrusion which made their abolition somewhat anti-climatic. Many district councils evolved chronic debts in the 1960s, and there were frequent allegations of inefficiency and corruption.<sup>4</sup> There was also considerable tension between councillors, council staff, and functional officers of ministries in the districts. The state explained its escalating intrusion into council affairs in terms both of dealing with these problems and of asserting the power of the center over subordinate units of government. Central control was asserted primarily through regional and area commissioners whose clout was considerable because they were presidential appointees and representatives of both party and government. The Local Government Service Commission acted as the recruiting agent for council staff and, hence councils were no longer able to hire and fire their employees. In 1965 the power of the ruling party was inserted into council affairs by making the elected district party chairperson the automatic chairperson of the council. And in the same year technical ministry personnel were brought into the councils' planning committee. From 1966 the party vetoed the nominations of district councillors much as it did with candidates to the National Assembly. In 1969 responsibility for education, health, and district roads was taken away from councils and, with these responsibilities removed, local tax rates and pro-

3. Louise Fortmann, p. 117, concludes her judicious and well documented study of state and peasant relations in the following manner: "The most obvious conclusion from this study is that the policy of participatory socialism has not really been implemented in Tanzania. To be sure certain formal structures of participation have been established. But it has been shown that these structures at best provide pro forma participation. Indeed, they sometimes serve primarily as a tool of a central government in directing village activities." *Peasants, Officials and Participation in Rural Tanzania: Experience with Villagization and Decentralization*. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Rural Development Committee, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1980.)

4. This discussion of the history of district councils follows the very useful paper by Geisse Mutahaba, "Organization for Development: Tanzania's Search for Appropriate Local Level Organizational Forms," mimeo, n. d.

duce cesses were later abolished. It was mere formality to abolish the councils altogether in 1972.

Cooperatives were similarly accused of fostering corruption and inefficiency and of being run by, and primarily for, wealthy peasants. Some argued that they were simply exploiting institutions.<sup>5</sup> Cooperative unions like district councils, were led by the rural petty bourgeoisie and were also something of a political threat in post-Arusha Declaration Tanzania.<sup>6</sup> As with the experience of district councils, a variety of government intrusions did not rectify the situation, and all the while the state rather surprisingly mandated more roles for cooperatives to perform. Increasingly, cooperatives became agents of state institutions and member involvement and commitment declined. In May 1976 Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa abolished cooperative unions while primary societies were already redundant by 1975 because newly created villages were designated basic collection points for specialized crop authorities.

But while district councils and cooperatives were on their way out, two new state thrusts were supposed to expand mass participation. A highly touted 1972 government decentralization — bringing government to the people — did just that, but did not augment participation. Virtually every observer has noted that the basic structure was dominated by a more numerous, if better coordinated, bureaucracy. A great deal of effort was put into bottom-up planning which usually meant that villages forwarded lengthy "wish lists" of projects in hopes that they might get one or two. Usually after a considerable period of time government would indicate its choices (not necessarily village priorities) and villagers were then expected to contribute labor and perhaps material and money. Villagers thus became auxiliaries of government projects. As a result there were little incentive for locally initiated self-help activity because government was seen to give what it decided to give when it wanted to give. The chairperson of one village summed it up as follows: "It is better we wait for them (government) to plan things for us rather than (we) plan things they do not want."<sup>7</sup>

A second participatory thrust came in the aftermath of a frankly coercive effort to create villages in the years 1973-1975 after ujamaa vijijini fail-

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ed to develop a popular dynamic. Under the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of July 1975 all adult members of a village constitute the Village Assembly which elects a Village Council while the chairperson and secretary of the local party branch serve respectively as chairperson and secretary of the council.<sup>8</sup> The Councils meet regularly and, coupled with the party cell system, the result is a highly organized countryside with an embryo socialized sector. Roughly two-thirds of the villages have small communal farms and usually other communal activity like a shop or a maize grinding mill.<sup>9</sup> The structure is fine as far as it goes but the atomized character of villages, and the lack of significant higher level participatory structures, means that peasants do not gain the tactical autonomy vis a vis the state that some want, while their influence does not really aggregate and make itself felt at higher levels. Elected Party officials and M.P.s act as village advocates in self-help activities, but their power is hemmed in by the planning structure and they are primarily expected to implement higher level policy.

Crop authorities and regional trading corporations took over the marketing and distributing roles of the cooperative structure. But it was one thing to service 1,300 primary societies and another to service the now over 8,600 villages. And this had to be accomplished with limited capital and management resources. For these reasons, and those associated with a deteriorating economy, the system frequently broke down: produce was occasionally not collected; nor inputs provided on time; and payment to producers was occasionally delayed.<sup>10</sup> Meanwhile producers had no structures through which to voice complaints, and allegations of mismanagement and misappropriation of funds in crop authorities soon rivaled their predecessors.<sup>11</sup>

8. The Act is reprinted in Fortmann, op. cit. Village managers with at least Form IV education were recruited and sent to villages beginning in 1977 but they apparently have not made much of an impact and may be phased out, perhaps when cooperatives are operational. A good history and assessment of the impact of village manager policy in Singida Region is Robert Magala Mayaya, "Public Policy Implementation in Tanzania: The Case of Village Managers Policy," unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, September, 1981. The story illustrates the worst aspects of overly hasty policy formation and implementation: The first phase of 4000 managers could not refuse their appointment and were sent without training and without consultation with receiving villages — and all in three weeks. The author argues that the managers augmented state power in villages; but his description of the distance between managers and their villages makes the former appear more irrelevant than effective arms of state power.

9. Report on Village Survey 1981. Dodoma: Cooperative Development Department, Office of the Prime Minister and Nordic Project for Cooperatives and Rural Development in Tanzania, August 1982.

10. The lack of complaint structures and its multiple effects including, the author argues, lower prices to producers, are documented in Edwin H. Mushi, "Peasants' Participation Under the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU) and the Coffee Authority of Tanzania (CAT)," unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, July 1980.

11. Koeraard Verhagen, "Change in Tanzanian Rural Development Policy, 1975-1978," *Development and Change* 11 (1980), p. 293. A valuable theoretical discussion of African parasitism in general with illustrative material from Tanzania is in Goran Hyden, op. cit.

5. The "Report of the Prime Minister's Commission of Inquiry into the Possibility of Re-establishing Comparative Unions, May 1961," which I have not seen, allegedly suggests that cooperatives were not so bad after all, or that alongside their liabilities were several assets: cooperative unions were useful links between crop authorities, peasants and corporations for the provision of services; the cooperative structure gave peasants a chance to know the market situation, discuss economic issues, and voice their complaints and points of view, and cooperatives were usually well-prepared in advance of crop collection and hence there were few problems with the collection of produce and payment to peasants.

6. See Goran Hyden, *No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective*. (London: Heinemann, 1963), p. 116, for further discussion of this point. This paper makes a distinction between the rural petty bourgeoisie (wealthy peasants, African commercial elements, and local immobile civil servants) and the bureaucratic element of the same class (transferable party officials and government civil servants).

7. Cited on p. 18 of Frederick E.G. Mallya, "Decentralization and Population Participation: The Case of Iliad District, Dar es Salaam Region," unpublished B.A. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, 1977.



With the arrival of the 1980s a minimal consensus — though not without continuing opposition — emerged at the highest level of the regime and found statist policy in the countryside wanting. While political complaints did percolate up from below, debate over policy was largely confined to official circles and especially at the top. There may have been a coherently joined struggle over the direction of state policy, or there may have been a policy shift almost by default. Prior policy had obvious economic and political flaws and it is possible that the very fiscal poverty of the state prompted thinking about ways to raise revenue for public purposes which the state was unable to mobilize. For whatever reasons district councils and cooperatives appeared to offer an answer. They presented problems in the past, but they would probably be an improvement over their successors.

At the same time that these changes were on the drawing board another important legal measure was taken to divorce government and party roles which were formerly combined in the area and regional commissioners. This move was advocated by some intellectuals at the top as an important shift toward democracy. When the commissioners wore two hats there was considerable opportunity for abuse of power. The party was also implicated in all major decisions in the countryside and hence it could not act as a "watchdog" to criticize those decisions if necessary. The separation will, it is argued, foster a more "pure" party that can be better used as an avenue of complaint and critique from below.<sup>12</sup>

But what will the reincarnated district councils and cooperatives look like? Unfortunately by mid-1983 the picture was not at all clear. The revival of district councils is officially explained as an extension of "incomplete decentralization." Explaining the change in terms of continuity is partly a face-saving device but the councils will build upon the administrative changes of decentralization in 1972 and will apparently result in a far more radical devolution of power than existed in the post-colonial Tanzanian council system, or that exists on most of the continent. The new councils will be responsible for all major ministry functions except law and order. If, for example, the Ministry of Agriculture has a nationwide project on rinderpest control, each council will have to be convinced to support the program. Although senior ministry personnel will be recruited and

allocated by the Local Government Service Commission, they will be employees of councils and will be hired and fired by them. Councils will also raise their own revenue, probably by poll taxes (a possible continental trend should peasants withdraw from state controlled markets as in Tanzania), and the central government will also contribute a portion of the total budget with an eye to encouraging regional equity.<sup>13</sup> In other words districts with a limited economic base will receive a greater portion of their budget from the central government.

Although the new council system officially went into effect July 1, 1983, several crucial questions remain. The electoral process for the councils must be worked out. "How will the districts quickly raise funds without alienating the population? How will the central government contribution be calculated? To what extent will the central government control council budgets? Can the apparently extreme divorce of local officers from parent ministries — a problem cited in prior decentralization arrangements — be dealt with under a structure that appears to divorce the relationship even further?"<sup>14</sup> And will councils be as frugal as some officials hope? In other words will the councils have an interest in saving money because the money is "theirs" and not the "central government's", or will they hire brothers, sisters, and friends to the point of redundancy? Also, if many of the councils were financially weak in the past there is no particular reason to suppose they will not have similar problems in the future unless perhaps, as Gelase Muthaba suggests, government devolves functions differentially according to a district's capacity to sustain various activities.<sup>15</sup>

In the proposed cooperative structure primary societies will service one or more villages while second tier cooperative unions will service primary societies by marketing products, providing inputs, credit, financial advice, etc. The structure is capped by an apex organization of union representatives. The legislation, it should be said, gives considerable latitude for the state to intervene in cooperative affairs if it so desires. The relevant Minister or Registrar of Cooperatives may appoint party members

13. The world economic crisis, subsequent fiscal crises in African states, and low prices to peasant producers make it likely that peasants will partially withdraw from the market thereby depriving states of revenue derived from state marketing of produce. As a result there is an incentive for states to return to poll taxes that were previously abolished as political liabilities and colonial relics. The new poll tax will, like the old, serve as a stimulus to cash crop production. The best discussion of peasant withdrawal in Tanzania is Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

14. Louis Picard, "Socialism and the Field Administrator: Decentralization in Tanzania," *Comparative Politics* 12:4 (July 1980).

15. Muthaba, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

<sup>12</sup>These elections are in process and near completion. Town and city councils have been elected and rural council elections are under way. — Ed.

12. Verhagen, *op. cit.*, p. 294, poses the dangers of rising statism and the general absence of avenues of redress. After arguing that village administration allows for widespread participation at that level he then suggests that "... familiarity with the law and with actual events show that the Party and Government have appropriated such a degree of authority to themselves that little opportunity remains for participation in policy making at the base. The people also have virtually no protection against misuse of power from above."

in key cooperative positions; the Registrar must approve cooperative appointments and may fire employees as well; and the Registrar may direct a cooperative committee to invest in cooperative funds. Although at the time of writing the details of marketing arrangements are being debated, the major export crops will probably be sold to parastatal crop authorities, while non-controlled crops will be sold however the cooperatives wish. The cooperatives may act as a kind of insurance against peasants shouldering the burden of occasional crop authority breakdowns and interruption of services. If, for example, crop authorities fail to pick up the produce, by hook or by crook, the cooperatives, with their transport capacity, will probably sell the produce in a timely fashion rather than see it spoil.

Another vital detail that has to be worked out is whether cooperative membership will be voluntary or not. At the start there was agreement that voluntarism was necessary in order to garner peasant commitment. This position was supported by the Commission looking into the re-establishment of cooperatives, the Cabinet, the National Executive Committee of the party, and by Scandinavian donors and a post-legislation team from the U.S.A. Then, to the surprise of all, a hot Parliamentary debate resulted in a change making cooperative membership compulsory. But, the last word on the issue is still to come.

The practical problems of re-establishing the cooperative structure are, of course, formidable. It is unclear how the cooperatives will be capitalized when the debts of the pre-1976 ones have yet to be settled. And since the crop authorities took over much of the capital of the earlier cooperative unions, will some of it now be returned? And how will trained staff be quickly recruited? The former staff was absorbed into a variety of governmental structures and it is unclear whether they can be enticed back to autonomous cooperatives especially when they may be currently remunerated at a higher rate than cooperatives can afford.

The revived district councils and cooperatives are the formal institutional focus of what I have termed Tanzania's retreat from statism in the countryside. But there is an important third arena that is likely to be revived in its wake, and that is self-help. Indeed some proponents of the formal institutional changes explicitly hope and expect that self-help processes will take on a new vitality.<sup>16</sup> The core reason for Tanzania's somewhat lacklustre self-help performance to date is related to the structure of power in the countryside. The bureaucratic and geographically mobile element of the petty bourgeoisie gradually consolidated their position in party and state apparatus after independence and effectively dominated public life to the detriment of the locally rooted rural petty

16. The ILO report, *op. cit.*, Chapter 14, "Popular Participation and Decentralization," argues that self-help performance has not been what it could be and makes a strong case for its revitalization.

bourgeoisie which was usually allied with the broad mass of the peasantry in self-help activity.<sup>17</sup> Tanzania's bureaucracy was, of course, led by a socialist ideology which delivered on that ideology in the form of an extraordinary amount of social amenity expenditure. But unlike the rural petty bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy in the late 1960s and 1970s did not, as we have argued, welcome self-help outside "the plan."<sup>18</sup> Although there is some merit to bureaucratic complaints about self-help waste, duplication, inferior quality, regional inequality, etc., reserving initiative to the bureaucracy of party or state fundamentally undermined the participatory thrust of regime ideology. As the state vigorously pushed its own agenda in what is often termed a "campaign style" from the late 1960s on — i.e., ujamaa vijijini, decentralization and planning, villagization, and universal primary education — bureaucratic initiative inevitably pre-empted peasant initiative.

There are several reasons why self-help is likely to re-emerge with some vigor despite possibly severely limited cash reserves at the village level. First, the rise of district councils and cooperatives is likely to shift the balance of power in the countryside. In other words the power of the state and party machinery will be somewhat diminished as the power of the rural petty bourgeoisie rises accordingly. Regular elections for the councils and cooperatives will provide incentives for that element to lead and support the most popular form of rural development which is social amenity development in the domain of self-help. In other words on top of M.P.s and elected party officials who have, though not always very effectively, been the natural allies of peasant initiated self-help, there are now many more that will be involved in the same game. This expanded rural petty bourgeois leadership will control council and cooperative money, limited though it may be, that will almost certainly be used in clientelist fashion in support of peasant initiated self-help as it was in the past. The entire process will help free self-help from the bureaucratic planning apparatus whose prior monopoly of extra-village funds insured the imposition of its development agenda.

17. This argument is sketched out in more detail in my "Class Structure, Peasant Participation and Rural Self-Help." In Joel Barkan with John Okumu (eds.), *Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania*. (New York: Praeger, 1979) and in a revised edition forthcoming.

18. Aside from the question of whether there really were sufficiently disaggregated plans in the 1960s and early 1970s, by the middle 1970s infrastructure decay, institutional uncertainties, and a growing internal budgetary crisis made it less likely that the government would keep its plan promises. There are hints that the very unreliability of the state made a mockery of plans and increasingly upset the peasantry. Examples of villager disillusion in one area is found in D. D. Peterson and T. T. Peterson, "The Village Profile Exercise: Background Information, Impressions and Perceptions," for the Arusha Planning and Village Development Project and the Regional Development Directorate, Arusha (Arusha: Regional Commissioner's Office, 1980). Fiscal unpredictability has also clearly upset the smooth provision of the expanded social services. The lack of a full complement of medical and school supplies is frequently mentioned.

A second reason self-help will probably revive is the weak financial position of the state coupled with high popular demand for something to happen. If the government cannot afford construction costs, then only self-help remains. As a result of a push for universal primary education, Ministry of Education officials claim that 71.4% of eligible children were enrolled in primary school in 1981. As a result, there is an enormous pent-up demand for secondary education. The same officials say that only 2.2% of primary school leavers go to 85 government aided, heavily foreign aid supported, and tuition free secondary schools. With the 61 so-called "private" (but better termed, self-help) secondary schools which charge fees, plus 23 seminaries, only 4.2% will go to secondary school. Since government revenue is so precarious at the moment, government attitude toward village initiative in the building of secondary schools and other social amenity facilities will be more permissive.<sup>19</sup> Conversations with government officials suggest that the self-help ideology will be elevated and it will conflict with prior interpretations of the planning ideology as a vehicle of control.

A third reason to anticipate self-help revival lies in the 1981 reestablishment of the Department of Community Development located in the Prime Minister's Office. For the first time since 1972 there is deployment of extension staff emphasizing an ideology of local initiative. Also Rural Development Fund monies, which were all diverted to ujamaa vijijini activity under Regional Development Directors after 1972, are now targeted to support general self-help under Regional Community Development Officers.

## Conclusion

The institutional changes discussed here were primarily designed to deal with pressing problems: political disaffection, state fiscal crisis, the quality of local administration, and the marketing of crops — especially of export crops. But there are broader issues at stake. The change of political structure probably was not a result of a broadly and coherently joined struggle between representatives of classes or fragments of classes. But the result, to the extent that anticipated change amounts to real change, will affect the nature of struggle over control of the state: over which elements of society will have primary access, and which will amass the primary benefits. Very different results may be imagined. There could be an

19. The figures and the prediction come from officials in the Ministry of National Education. In July 1983, a directive from the Ministry was imminent on how to start "private" secondary schools.

enhancement of the power of the rural petty bourgeoisie or of the peasantry, or some combination of both.

The rural petty bourgeoisie will rise as the fortunes of their bureaucratic counterparts decline. The former will be elected to the most prominent roles in the district councils and the cooperatives. If history is any guide they will distribute some of those institutions' resources to kin and followers in clientelist fashion, and they will appropriate resources for their private use (though in probably no more egregious fashion than the centrally controlled bureaucracy). It is very possible that the big winners of the institutional shift may be only the rural petty bourgeoisie. They could monopolize a substantial portion of the resources that make a difference in rural society, shield themselves from centrally mandated redistribution policies, and establish themselves as the hegemonic element in the countryside.

Another possible winner as a result of the institutional changes may be the peasantry. In lieu of extensive study of peasant consciousness we must rely on fragments of evidence and rather sweeping generalizations. We might note, however, an assessment that posits a current comparatively high level of peasant political consciousness. Samuel Mushi sees significant recent changes in peasant attitudes.

At the policy level, the norms of 'popular participation' have been emphasized in various party documents and speeches of the central leadership . . . Although these norms may not greatly have altered official behavior, there is some evidence of greater self-confidence in the villages and more courage to confront or bargain with the authorities than in the sixties. This courage has been reinforced by the radio — which has often reported cases of leaders who have been expelled for bad leadership or for mistreating the people.<sup>20</sup>

Mushi goes on to say that electoral participation has steadily risen where there are opportunities as in village and national elections. This pattern is attributed to the party mobilizational capacity and also to villagization that brought together once isolated homesteads.<sup>21</sup> Other factors encouraging participation might also include the rapid expansion of primary education and a very successful adult literacy program. With the peasantry's consciousness and apparent eagerness to vote and voice their opinion, the return of councils, cooperatives and a more vigorous self-help will greatly expand the arenas of participation and may bring forth a leadership more representative of the majority than in the past.

20. Samuel S. Mushi, "Community Development in Tanzania," in Ronald Dore and Zoe Mars (eds.), *Community Development: Comparative Case Studies* (London: Croom Helm and Paris: UNESCO, 1981), p. 220.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

Another prediction sees the winners as a coalition of the rural petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry that may occasionally act in concert against the bureaucracy of the party and the state. In this scenario the councils, cooperatives, and a likely revival of self-help, all invite the peasantry to exert somewhat greater management and control over their own affairs. The change will expand the number of elective, competitive, and partially accountable political roles that will enhance to some degree the peasantry's and the rural petty bourgeoisie's bargaining power with the state across a range of issues. The revived institutions will help overcome village atomization and fill some of the political void between the very participatory village councils and higher levels of the bureaucracy. The institutions are, then, valuable peasant political space.<sup>22</sup> District Councils are not mass-based but they can be mass-influenced and they are likely to be important support structures for peasant defined needs. The cooperatives and self-help are among the few mass-based, if not always mass-led, institutions oriented toward state policy that have potential influence over a variety of key everyday policies such as crop pricing, agricultural input and marketing services, as well as the amount, design, timing, location, and maintenance of social amenities. Contrary to the opinion of some Tanzanian civil servants, it is doubtful that expanded self-help will be a cost-saving device for the state. While self-help may allow the state to save on construction costs, the state will be hit hard with rising recurrent costs for teachers, nurses, medicine, etc. After the state has gone to great lengths to meet basic needs, a more vigorous self-help is likely to force the state to spend more rather than less. The fact of peasant self-help initiative may also encourage a somewhat more responsive bureaucracy and a more aggressive and capable local leadership structure.

But the reader may ask if all this institutional experimentation in Tanzania has not simply brought them back to square one and the basic rural institutions inherited at independence. There is of course an element of "return" to the "retreat." But things are not the same as they were before. This is true in several arenas but may be particularly significant in the realm of leadership. The changes mark a resurgence of the rural petty bourgeoisie, but the Leadership Code barring capitalists from political office has made a difference. Although it is dodged by some through family and friends, it has tended to take the most wealthy at all levels of the political system out of formal political roles. Thus the return to councils (I am less clear about cooperatives, and I doubt self-help) does not

necessarily mean a return to old style leadership. This time around the leadership may be a bit more petty than bourgeois.

Despite the promise of these changes, however, one should interpret them with great caution. They reflect, after all, more a shift of personnel and policy prominence at the top than a sustained pressure from below. And while the lengthy delay getting these measures off the ground no doubt reflects the great complexity of the enterprise, it also reflects several references by observers to those with vested interests in the former institutions who will resist giving ground to councils and cooperatives. Regional Development Directors will probably lose much of their coordinating role to the councils; regional trading corporations will find their formerly dominant position in distribution threatened by cooperatives; and crop authority functions will be peeled off or cut back.

A great deal depends both upon the final details that are worked out, and upon the general spirit in which they are implemented. The legislation reviving both the councils and the cooperatives leaves wide discretion for the state to intervene if it chooses to do so. But at the very least the new rural institutional structures mark a decided shift away from an almost linear move toward statism in the countryside. The changes indicate a shift of intellectual breeze away from the state as almost the sole institution of initiative, accumulation, and regulation in the socialist collectivity, to a recognition of the value of non-state collectivities in production and politics. There is also the implied recognition that these institutions are fully compatible with the participatory brand of socialism President Nyerere has promoted so eloquently. A long term observer of his country's rural development process cautioned me not to view these changes as a kind of "new Jerusalem." They are, in his view, small but significant steps forward. But after a long conversation it was also clear that he had not felt so optimistic in years.

22. I try to make a case for the utility for peasants of cooperatives as political space in the face of almost continent-wide post-independence political demobilization. "Defending Peasant Political Space in Independent Africa," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 14:1 (1980).