

# AFRICA TODAY

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## Editor's Note

This issue has been in the making for some time. Tilden LeMelle visited Libya in 1982. He was impressed with the internal changes that had been wrought since the coup and in the following year proposed that we develop an issue that would highlight this relatively unknown side of the Libyan story. In this issue Sami Hajjar and Kieron Swaine analyze the philosophical roots of the *Green Book* which forms the basis for these changes, and Mohamed El-Khawas describes the changes themselves. Because it took longer than we had hoped to produce the issue we invited Dr. El-Khawas to update his contribution. While few substantive changes were found to be needed in the paper as originally drafted in early 1983, a new concluding section has been added which readers will find to be sharply filled in tone from the earlier sections. What seemed then to be a revolution filled with promise now shows serious stresses that may negate that promise. Whether these flaws were indigenous to the original vision, or have been caused either by external circumstances or improper execution are questions that call for further research. Whether they can be overcome or will cause the collapse of the dream remains to be seen. But unless the vision and the efforts towards its implementation are understood these questions cannot be properly approached. It is with this aim that we present this issue. A third article on Libyan foreign policy, it is in the works, but problems both of space and updating have required that it be held for a later issue.

One unusual editorial problem that we faced in producing this issue is the lack of consensus among western scholars, journalists and editors as to the proper English transliteration of the name of Libya's leader. Purists agree that the proper spelling should be Qadhafi, but an examination of the articles, reviews and footnotes will reveal no less than ten variants that have been used by writers and editors, and we have seen at least five others elsewhere. Even those publications emanating from Libya failed to agree. Its sparse use in the literature indicates that Qadhafi seems too awkward to the eye, so after some deliberation we decided to let each author choose which spelling to use and to forego consistency.

Edward A. Hawley

### AFRICA TODAY GIFT APPEAL

Five future issues are well-defined. Articles and reviews for some are already type-set, others are in final manuscript stage, and all have the basic articles commissioned or in hand. All could be in print by the end of the year to bring us up to date if adequate funds are in hand. It has been almost two and a half years since we appealed to our readers for their help, but we need it again now. All gifts to Africa Today are tax deductible. Some large gifts are needed, but no gift will be too small to be promptly acknowledged. Please act now. Checks should be made out to Africa Today and sent to Africa Today, c/o G.S.I.S., University of Denver, Denver, Colorado 80208.



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## Social Justice:

### The Philosophical Justifications of Qadhafi's Construction

Sami G. Hajjar and R. Kieron Swaine

Mu'ammarr Al-Qadhafi is perhaps one of the most controversial contemporary political actors to have occupied the international stage during the past decade. An aspect of the controversy surrounding him is related to the generally unconventional tenor of Libya's foreign policy which has been characterized in certain quarters, mainly western, as a policy of adventurism and support of 'terrorist organizations and movements' in all parts of the world. Additionally, the controversy focuses on his intellectual work embodied in the **Green Book**, published in three parts beginning in 1976.<sup>1</sup> The essence of this latter controversy is predicated on whether Qadhafi's thought has been inspired by the traditional body of Islamic thought and heritage, or by secular theories.<sup>2</sup> The style of sweeping generalizations and unsubstantiated conclusions allied with seemingly extravagant claims of 'ultimate' and 'final' solutions to man's problems have undoubtedly contributed to the confusion as how properly to interpret the **Green Book's** prescriptions.

In view of the fact that Qadhafi offers little or no arguments to justify the manner by which he proposes the reorganisation of modern society, this article seeks to identify the philosophical arguments that can be employed to justify Qadhafi's conclusions, and to point out that his vision of a reorganized society is one whose roots are embodied in the main philosophical traditions of western thought.

1. English translations of the **Green Book** has been published by a variety of publishers, with the three parts sometimes appearing as separate volumes, and sometimes combined in a single work. Part One is entitled "The Solution of the Problem of Democracy," Part Two "The Solution of the Economic Problem — socialism," and finally Part Three entitled "The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory." Quotes in this article are from the text published in London by Martin Brian and O'Keefe.

2. Among those who argue that Qadhafi's thought has its origins in Islamic and Arab realities are M. El-Shahat, *Libya Begins the Era of **Jamahiriyat*** (Rome, 1978), and Raymond N. Habiby, "Mu'ammarr Qadhafi's New Islamic Scientific Socialist Society," *Middle East Review* (New York), 11, 4, 1979. On the other hand Sami G. Hajjar has traced Qadhafi's political and economic thought to the writing of J.J. Rousseau and Karl Marx. See Hajjar, "The **Jamahiriyat** Experiment in Libya: Qadhafi and Rousseau," in *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (Cambridge) 18, June 1980, pp. 181-200 and "The Marxist Origins of Qadhafi's Economic Thought," in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 20, 3 (1982) pp. 361-375.

Sami G. Hajjar is a professor and R. Kieron Swaine was at the time of writing a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming 82071 U.S.A. Mr. Swaine has subsequently received the M.A. degree. He is now enrolled in the Ph.D. program at the University of Maryland.

To accomplish this task, we shall focus our analysis on the overall thrust of the **Green Book** and each of its three constituent parts. We perceive this thrust to be a generalized attempt to reorganize modern society along the lines of a theory of social justice designated by Qadhafi as the Third Universal Theory, specifically expressed in political, economic, and social terms structurally congruent with the three parts of the **Green Book**. As his publisher indicates, Qadhafi's thoughts are designed in particularistic fashion to address and solve problems experienced by the "tormented, oppressed, and grief-stricken."<sup>3</sup> As such, their ultimate aim is the discovery and establishment in society of the socio-economic and political arrangements and institutions that could engineer solutions to these problems and usher in an era of social justice — the overarching concept which in the final analysis conjoins the three parts of the **Green Book**. Thus it is our contention that Qadhafi's conclusions in the realm of social justice are not unlike those offered by other western thinkers who preceded him and who have consistently attempted the realization of similar goals.

## II

Before providing a brief summary of the overall thrust of the **Green Book**, the reader familiar with this work will recall that Qadhafi's analysis begins with a description of existing political, economic and social configurations as he perceives them to exist in the modern world. He then proceeds to illustrate how such societal structures have failed to remedy the problems facing mankind. Pointedly, he suggests that the scope and complexity of these problems are insoluble within the confines of conventional ideologies identified dichotomously as liberal-democratic capitalism and communism-socialism and their concomitant social and economic structures. His solution is the Third Universal Theory, third to distinguish it from the other two while at the same time dialectically linking it to them, as the final and ultimate solution to these problems.

The problems confronting contemporary man are diagnosed as the loss of freedom, the lack of economic dignity, and a deviation from natural norms, functions, and evolution. Abrogation of freedom is the political problem which, for Qadhafi, is manifested in the world today by the ubiquitous absence of genuine democracy. Consequently, and by definition, the lack of genuine democracy entails the absence of individual freedom. He argues thus:

All political systems in the world today are the product of the struggle for power between instruments of governing . . . where . . . the result is always a victory of the instrument of governing, i.e., the defeat of genuine democracy.<sup>4</sup>

3. See back jacket of the English edition of Part III of the **Green Book**.

4. **Green Book**, Part I, pp. 8-9.

He goes on to show that genuine democracy has been defeated by both liberal-democratic and socialist-communist systems, whereby, in either case, a minority inexorably asserts its rule over the majority.<sup>5</sup> His solution is the political expression of the Third Universal Theory referred to as *Jamahiriyta*, meaning the direct authority of the masses. Interestingly, it is a concept similar to Rousseau's notion of the General Will, but more importantly for our purposes, Qadhafi regards it as the ultimate salvation of human problems precisely because it establishes the general equality of all individuals. In so doing Qadhafi's precondition for general freedom is met; freedom will inevitably exist because the structure of freedom, political inequality, has been dismantled. Unfortunately for the reader, however, he offers no justifications for this apparently crucial conclusion — one which has been the source of intense and often acrimonious debate in the annals of western thought.

The lack of economic dignity is brought about by the existing system of "work and wages" regarded as the ~~essence~~ of the contemporary economic problem. Such a system creates ~~dependency~~, whereby the livelihood of one man is dependent on another, the practical application of which is a modern form of slavery. Additionally, Qadhafi's analysis led him to the observation that neither capitalist nor conventional socialist solutions have effectuated a decisive response to this problem. Under both systems individuals continue to labor and to be wage-earners:

All attempts which have concentrated ownership have not solved the problem of producers. They are still wage-workers, even when ownership has been transferred from the extreme right to the extreme left, or has been given various intermediate positions.<sup>6</sup>

To the author there is little difference who pays the wage; whether it is a private corporation or the socialist state the ill-consequences are the same. The Third Universal Theory in its economic manifestations advocates the abolition of the wage-labor system seeking instead the creation of a socialist partnership "in which producers are partners in production."<sup>7</sup> The recurring themes of liberty and equality are clearly evident in this proposal. Partners (i.e., members of society) are by definition equals and, insofar as it is a socialist partnership providing each member his basic economic needs in exchange for his contributions to the production process, the implication is that there is no employer and hence economic freedom and dignity.<sup>8</sup>

5. See Hajjar 1980 op. cit. pp. 189-193.

6. **Green Book**, Part II, pp. 10-11.

7. **Green Book**, Part II, p. 76.

8. For a detailed discussion see Hajjar, 1982 op. cit.

At the social level, deviations from natural norms, functions, and evolutions are evident, implies Qadhafi, in the realms of natural social structures, the role of social groups, and in the area of social activities. He believes in a progression of social structures from the natural units of family to tribe to nation and finally to world community, with the confusion in the world today anchored precisely in the mixing up of the functions of these structures. Thus he writes

... the powerful individual who respects himself and is aware of his own responsibilities is important and useful to the family, just as a strong respectable family which is aware of its importance is socially and materially useful to the tribe. Equally useful to the whole world is the progressive, productive and civilized nation. The national political structure is damaged when it descends to the lower social level, namely the family and the tribe and attempts to act in their manner and to adopt their view.<sup>9</sup>

But, more important for Qadhafi, is the understanding and recognition of the distinction between nation and state, the former being a natural structure and the latter an artificial one whereby "the social factor will inevitably triumph over the political factor."<sup>10</sup>

The Third Universal Theory proposes that at the level of social groups there must be a realization of the observable natural differences between the sexes that in turn define the proper societal role of gender; the acknowledgement of the rights of minorities in cultural, political and economic senses; and awareness of the natural historical tendency which determines that the black race, thus far oppressed, will ultimately become dominant.

Finally, the Theory argues for universal and free involvement in such social activities as education and sports so that education is freed from any subject restrictions and sports are no longer limited to the few.<sup>11</sup>

From this rather brief summary of the major conclusions embodied in the Third Universal Theory, it is apparent that Qadhafi's aim is the reorganization of society — politically, economically, and socially — a restructuring which would ensure social justice by restoring to man his liberty, by acknowledging his equality, and by redirecting his social life to its original natural roots. The question is, how to justify philosophically these noble goals? The approach we have adopted will, it is hoped, answer this rather vexing question. Our structure is one which integrates broadly delineated philosophical concepts with the body of Qadhafi's thought. Hence there is a necessary preoccupation with conceptual clarity, the absence of which must necessarily result in ambiguity and ultimately irrelevance. It is from this perspective that we approach the central concept of social justice.

9. Green Book, Part III, p. 19.

10. Green Book, Part III, p. 24.

11. See the last sections of the Green Book.

### III

The concept of social justice and its realization has been a perennial source of debate in the history of political thought ever since the time of the classical Greeks. It has been described as a concept which is "often voiced but rarely understood,"<sup>12</sup> and as such it is an idea whose longevity is matched with a corresponding eclecticism. Thus, for instance, classical liberals and scientific socialists espouse conceptions of social justice that are at once nominally coterminous and substantively variegated. The very nature of the concept is amorphous, and one endeavors to offer a definition with a degree of trepidation. However, terminological clarity is necessary, and we employ Frankena's broad formulation which takes social justice "not as a property of individuals and their actions, but as a predicate of societies — and of their acts and institutions."<sup>13</sup> This broad conceptual definition provides a sound base upon which our discussion will proceed to erect a detailed superstructure encompassing the implied notions of equality and liberty in their economic, political and social manifestations through the medium of Qadhafi's thought.

The analytic path in the area of social justice has been signposted most clearly perhaps by Brian Barry. Barry offers a conceptual dichotomy between the distributive and the aggregative principles of justice. The former is commonly associated with the sharing of "good and bad things, benefits and burdens"<sup>14</sup> amongst individuals in a particular societal group; while the latter presumes to encompass the totality of good, bad, benefit, and burden experienced by the community as a whole.<sup>15</sup> Applicable to our discussion of Qadhafi is the distributive principle of justice and its basis, the principle of equality. It should, at the outset, be made clear that justice and equality are not synonymous; connected yes, identical no. An illustrative anecdote was related by Lucas whereby:

Lord Halifax, during the war, found there was a leak from the Foreign Office, which could be tracked down to a certain typing pool, but no further to any particular individual. Lord Halifax went to the pool, and said, "I am going to do something very unjust, but necessary in the interests of national security. There has been a leak from this pool. I do not know which of you it is. And therefore I am going to sack you all."<sup>16</sup>

12. David Miller, *Social Justice*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.) Preface.

13. W.K. Frankena, *Some Beliefs About Justice*. Lindley Lecture, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1966. p. 1.

14. J.R. Lucas, *On Justice*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.) p. 163.

15. This dichotomy, although formally attributed to Brian Barry in *Political Argument* (London 1965), has been considerably clarified by David Miller in his work *Social Justice* op. cit., particularly his chapter on "The Concept of Social Justice."

16. Lucas op. cit. p. 171.1.

Halifax had demonstrably treated everyone equally yet unfairly. Other examples would include the payment of all members an equal yet inadequate wage, or the forced amputation of everybody's right ear. Justice, therefore, is not identical to equality, although the latter, as Qadhafi correctly argues, is essential to the former.

Critical to our ultimate understanding of social justice and of Qadhafi's arguments is the meaning of equality dichotomized to mean equality of opportunity and equality of condition. The ideal of equality of opportunity may be conceived of as a polity in which each person, without regard to material circumstance or accident of birth, may reach a position in the societal pyramid commensurate with his abilities. Indeed, noted academic S.M. Lipset has been moved to apply the label 'egalitarian' to societies, such as the United States of America, which promulgate the notion of equality of opportunity as a central tenet of public ideology.<sup>17</sup>

The major implication of this idea is its non-threatening nature in terms of the existing hierarchy of inequality. Equality of opportunity is, therefore, in this sense a doctrine of inequality. The European idea of equality of condition represents a significant step further: concerned as it is with the "eradication of all significant divisions of power, wealth, and security."<sup>18</sup> What we perceive, therefore, are two conceptions of equality as fundamental bases of distribution, the first arising from allocation according to merit, the second concerned with distribution on the basis of need. Of themselves, the above assertions offer little in the way of philosophical validity, and we shall remedy this as we proceed in our analysis.

In the case of Qadhafi a superficially curious paradox begins to emerge. Thus in critiquing the existing structures of ownership which characterize both capitalist and non-capitalist societies because of their failure to solve the problems allegedly inherent within the wage-labor system, Qadhafi clearly opts for the levelling process commonly associated with equality of condition or outcome. In his system, equality of condition represents the equal satisfaction of the basic shared needs (a house, a vehicle, and an income) common to all members of the socialist society. Such needs cannot be violated, for "to allow private production for the purpose of acquiring savings that exceed the satisfaction of need is exploitation itself." At the social level, equality of condition refers to the primacy of naturalism; in the political sense such a notion decrees equality of citizenship. Qadhafi ties it together thus

By virtue of its national structure, each group has common social needs which must be collectively satisfied. These needs are in no way individualistic. They

17. See John Westgaard and Henrietta Resler, *Class in a Capitalist Society* (Pelican, 1978), pp. 280-313 and *passim*. They, from a Marxist perspective, strongly criticize pluralists such as Lipset and the notion of equality of opportunity as manifested in the U.S.A.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 282.

are collective needs . . . bound by a single nationalism.<sup>19</sup>

In a structural sense, therefore, Qadhafi's construction has at its base equality of condition predicated upon the satisfaction of basic needs and socialist ownership of the means of production. However, he suggests that distributive differentiation will exist and be encouraged. What is the basis of merit? What he is suggesting is that merit and need are not mutually exclusive bases of distribution. Within the framework of the *Green Book*, this is an eminently valid conclusion. That framework enables the reader to discover the manner in which Qadhafi harnesses the notion of meritocracy to deal with the dimension of surplus distribution. In this context Qadhafi's debt to Aristotle is considerable. We may recall the Aristotelian distinction between 'arithmetical' equality and 'proportionate' equality. The former posits a situation whereby 'everybody is to count for one, nobody for more than one.'<sup>20</sup> Equal shares for one and all regardless of merit. Aristotle, however, promulgates a system of allocation based on merit and proportionality, 'providing equal shares to equal persons and unequal shares to unequal persons.' What Qadhafi appears to advocate is the welding of Aristotle's arithmetical and proportionate forms of equality. However, although Qadhafi clearly utilizes a degree of Aristotelian analysis his meritocratic prescriptions do possess a sliver of originality. Thus while Aristotle's conception of merit may be thought of as embodying general excellence (intellectual or moral or both),<sup>22</sup> Qadhafi is considerably more concrete. He specifies two particular categories which may legitimately brook the principle of uniform needs-based equality. These are first those who fall under the aegis of certain ascriptive conditions such as sex differentiation; and second those whose achievements particularly in the 'public service' are judged to be singularly outstanding. In terms of the former determinant what Qadhafi has in mind is largely the role of gender. He concludes that: "Discrimination between man and woman is a flagrant act of oppression without any justification,"<sup>23</sup> and hence implies that male and female are to be accorded equal status by virtue of their common human characteristics. They are nevertheless, such equality notwithstanding, to be differentiated. This is justified in terms of adherence to the natural or inherent biological differences between the sexes manifested most obviously by the reproductive division. From

19. *Green Book*, Part III, p. 7.

20. D.D. Raphael, *Problems of Political Philosophy*. (London: Methuen, 1976.) p. 173.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Taken from Frankema, *op. cit.*

23. *Green Book*, Part III, p. 26.

this Qadhafi concludes that women in order to fulfill properly their biologically, that is to say naturally, determined function must be released from the encumbrances of material production. Therefore, any such role mixing, according to Qadhafi, is "an absolutely uncivilized attitude,"<sup>24</sup> which is by definition "hostile to the laws of nature." Additionally, to impose material tasks upon women is to curtail their freedom — a freedom to pursue their natural role as defined by Qadhafi. His logic and solution are encapsulated in the following passage whereby he proposes:

A world revolution which puts an end to all materialistic conditions hindering woman from performing her natural role in life and driving her to carry out man's duties in order to be equal in rights.<sup>25</sup>

The second determinant of surplus distribution, that based on achievements, is squarely within mainstream tradition of Western political economy. Specifically, he posits the notion that the rendering of a public service may be rewarded in a manner not necessarily congruent with need, but in concert with the particular value of the service rendered. Thus:

Differences in individual wealth are only permissible for those who render public service. The society allocates for them a certain share of the wealth equivalent to that service.<sup>26</sup>

Hence the industrious renderers of service to the public may justifiably accrue both elevated status and economic advantages. Just what constitutes a public service is left somewhat vague. This caveat notwithstanding, the original point remains intact. In a sense Qadhafi partially subscribes to the idea that the achievement of excellence or merit is individually based. In pursuing this line of reasoning we reach the conclusion that to reward the inferior equally to the superior is not only unequal but manifestly unjust. Consequently, unequal rewards for unequals in proportion to their inequality is viewed as a form of equality by those such as Aristotle who believe that it "equates benefits and responsibilities with the worth of the recipients."<sup>27</sup> Now this would appear to rest on the assumption that the merit on which distribution is based is the totality of merit each individual is capable of attaining. It is clear that the triumph of pure merit, in the Aristotelian sense, can be achieved only if every individual springs, so to speak, from the same starting block. It is this underlying principle of equality which distinguishes Qadhafi's meritocratic distribution from the Aristotelian version.

As previously noted, Qadhafi's meritocratic distribution, while philosophically related to the Aristotelian mode of distribution, operates as a superstructure erected upon the base of the equal satisfaction of needs

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24. Green Book, Part III, p. 40.

25. Green Book, Part III, p. 39.

26. Green Book, Part II, p. 73.

27. Raphael, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

of the members of a society. Thus, for Qadhafi, merit cannot be conceived of as an independent principle of distribution, but as one which operates against a background provided by the principle of equality. Merit for Qadhafi is, therefore predicated upon a conception of equality, namely equality of condition. Interestingly, the manner in which Qadhafi has formulated his base, equality of condition, and superstructure, equality of opportunity, enables his vision of social justice to sidestep the charges generally levelled at meritocratic theorists by egalitarians. (Of course Qadhafi is not a meritocratic theorist in the strictest sense but elements of this notion are consistently present in his Third Universal Theory.)

First, such critics contend that birth, occupation, and social position conjoin to make light of the attractive notion of equality of opportunity. As Tawney has suggested equality of opportunity obtains "only in so far as each member of a community, whatever his birth, or occupation, possesses in fact . . . equal chances of using to the full his natural endowments."<sup>28</sup> As noted previously, it is Qadhafi's intention to dissolve existing social, political, and economic inequalities through the dual solvents of 'socialist ownership' and satisfaction of basic shared needs. If such equality is achieved whereby opportunities to rise are diffused and generalized the premises of the egalitarian critique melt away and their arguments are rendered specious.<sup>29</sup> Second, it is suggested that the practical application of this ideal in a society characterized by social and economic inequality constitutes the reinforcement and perpetuation of inequality of outcome. Thus it does not recommend itself as an acceptable basis for egalitarian social justice. Again Qadhafi is on solid ground exactly because, to reiterate, his *Jamahiriyah* will not be characterized by social and economic (or political) inequality, on the contrary, such equality will be the primary societal paradigm. Third, it is argued that meritocratic distribution promotes a society based on excessive competitiveness with a concomitant diminution of human dignity.<sup>30</sup> More specifically, it is excessively competitive in its method of separating and pitting individuals or groups against one another, whereby one's qualities are defined in the rather superficial manner of overcoming others. It devalues human dignity because it fosters the same desire to overcome but offers no 'external justifications for failure.' In terms of this criticism the Third Universal Theory may be somewhat lacking in its rebuttal, in that although the *Jamahiriyah*, common ownership, etc., will undoubtedly, in Qadhafi's mind,

28 R.H. Tawney. *Equality*. London: G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1951. p. 106

29 *Ibid* p. 109

30. This argument has been articulated by a variety of scholars. Here we make reference to a recent work by William A. Galston entitled, *Justice and the Human Good*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.), pp. 180-185.



promote fraternity, his provisions for the violation of equality of condition do, within the context of the above criticism, sow the seeds of competition and its various implications. However, an equally valid interpretation is one which views Qadhafi as rejecting the notion that competition within the human community is ineradicable. After all, the philosophical validity of the notion that humanity is naturally competitive in all spheres of activity is a dubious one. The **Green Book** illustrates that Qadhafi's view of post-revolutionary social relations indicates a decidedly Marxist emphasis whereby the dismantling of existing relations of production and their replacement by *Jamahiriyah*, socialist ownership, etc., will stimulate the growth of man as social being ('species-being') rather than the self-interested individualist and incessant competitor. He writes: "The purpose of the socialist is the happiness of man which can be realized only through material and spiritual freedom."<sup>31</sup> It will, in short, restore man's natural equality and, by implication, his liberty. The nature of this relationship, in the context of the Third Universal Theory, is explored in the succeeding section.

#### IV

The complex debate surrounding the problems associated with the reconciliation of individual liberty and the necessity for social order is intimately intertwined with the historical development of Western political thought. Rousseau, for example, perceived the problem in the following fashion:

Where shall we find a form of association which will defeat and protect with the whole common force of each associate, and by which every person, while uniting himself with all, shall obey only himself and remain as free as before?<sup>32</sup>

Now it is clear that liberty is, as Isaiah Berlin suggests, a rather protean concept. To overcome this we shall think in terms of negative and positive liberty. The former simply proposes 'the absence of external restraints' whereby the existence of moral imperatives, constraints, or ends is rejected. This contrasts with the latter notion which supposes that 'freedom cannot be discussed apart from some moral end.'<sup>33</sup> In other words, to be free for rather than free from something. It is clear that Qadhafi's *Jamahiriyah* or popular sovereignty embodies an expression of positive liberty in which the 'sovereignty of the people is indivisible'<sup>34</sup> and its practice 'indisputable and non-controversial.'<sup>35</sup> Thus representation in the conventional negative state characterized by negative liberty is replaced by the positive state, positive

31. **Green Book**, Part II, pp. 80-81.

32. J.J. Rousseau, **The Social Contract** (New York: Hafner Press, 1947), pp. 14-15.

33. Brian R. Nelson, **Western Political Thought**. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1982) pp. 198-200.

34. **Green Book**, Part I, p. 33.

35. **Green Book**, Part I, p. 57.

liberty and direct, therefore genuine, democracy. Hence policies are formulated, executed and evaluated by the social body that is the people:

Thus, both the administration and the supervision become popular and the outdated definition of democracy as the supervision of the government by the people, comes to an end. It will be replaced by the right definition: 'Democracy Is The Supervision Of The People By The People.'<sup>36</sup>

Furthermore, adherence to the general 'indisputable' moral sovereignty of the people through participation in the *Jamahiriyah* and conformity to its system is itself a moral act and, by definition, an act of liberty.

At a general level, Qadhafi's concern with liberty is more essentially political and social in its concerns, whereas his conception of equality tends to concentrate to a greater degree on economic matters. It is important, however, to recognize their intrinsic interrelation and complementary basis within the context of the Third Universal Theory. Such interdependence provides one of the major philosophically-based objections to Qadhafi's conception of social justice, the objection to the overall principle of equality which asserts its incompatibility with liberty. However, Qadhafi (squarely in the mainstream of Western tradition) through the medium of the **Green Book** indicates quite clearly that his conception of social justice is one in which there can exist no freedom without equality because inequality is by definition oppression. For example, a negative libertarian might argue that a free society is one in which choice is protected and maximized, such as in health care and education. Thus liberty is characterized as the ability to choose freely from among a substantial range of alternative options. As Qadhafi indicates this assumes in the first instance free or uncoerced choice. And while it is conceded that within the confines of a legal-bureaucratic framework free choice exists, Qadhafi implies that this must be distinguished from effective free choice, a situation whereby individuals have the power, economic or otherwise, to make their choices effective. Quite obviously, the variations in effective choice will be numerous under the capitalistic mode of production based, as it is, on inequalities of rewards and consequently condition. Thus, concludes Qadhafi, liberty conceived of as the protection and promotion of rights denied to the majority of the population is not liberty at all. Liberty, in this instance, is confused with privilege. At the economic level it is only through the establishment of socialist ownership, the concomitant abolition of the wage-system and the consequent reduction in general inequalities that an extension of liberty for the majority will occur:

Attainment of such freedom depends on the extent of man's ownership of his needs; ownership that is personal and sacredly guaranteed . . .<sup>37</sup>

36. *Green Book*, Part I, p. 62.

37. *Green Book*, Part II, p. 81.

Thus, in terms of effective choice, the Third Universal theory predicates liberty upon the restoration of equality.

Similarly, at the political level, it is the inequality legitimized through 'an instrument of governing' that has acted as the conduit for the denial of genuine democracy (that is to say genuine or positive liberty), Qadhafi's genuine liberty in the political sphere rests upon the implied assumption of the equality of men whereby "Man is the same everywhere. His physical constitution is the same and so is his instinct."<sup>38</sup> Since by definition all men are equals, any individual or group which exercises power in the name of a government such as a class or party inevitably erects a structure of inequality which in turn curtails liberty. For Qadhafi, therefore, it is apparent that only by recognizing intrinsic equalities can true liberty be obtained.

### Conclusion

In this paper we have attempted to justify, in a philosophical sense, Qadhafi's theory of social justice. To that end it is apparent that the Third Universal Theory rests on a number of assumptions, including equality of condition as opposed to opportunity; and positive as opposed to negative liberty. In light of these assumptions, arguments were advanced to illustrate that the Western political tradition, both practical and philosophical, utilizes similar assumptions. Indeed the central debate in that tradition revolves around adherence to one or other conceptual construction. Obviously, Qadhafi falls into this camp — and consequently into the corpus of literature in these areas. It is this attribute which, in the final analysis, constitutes the philosophical justification for his thought. In so far as this is true, the **Green Book** should be considered as a serious proposal for the restructuring of modern society and for the restoration of individual freedom.

38. *Green Book*, Part I, p. 71.

## **The New Society in**

### **Qaddafi's Libya: Can It Endure?**

Mohamed A. El-Khawas

On September 1, 1969, Colonel Mu'ammarr Al-Qaddafi ousted King Idris Al-Sanusi and declared Libya a republic. This coup, however, was only a first step in changing the features of a society in which the majority of the people had long been deprived of power and wealth. Within a few years, Qaddafi began to revolutionize Libya to create a truly democratic, socialist, egalitarian society based on his Third Universal Theory. This was not an easy task, as it would require a major structural transformation of society, including changes in roles and functions, in attitudes and behavior.

The purpose of this article is to examine Qaddafi's efforts to restructure the political, economic and social life of Libya in accordance with his theory. He rejects both Western democracy and communism because they have kept the masses away from any meaningful opportunities to rule themselves and have concentrated power and wealth in the hands of a privileged class or state. This assessment will, in particular, seek to shed light on the ways in which his controversial theory has been implemented in Libya.

### **The Early Years**

In his initial steps to harness the aspirations of the people to the task of developing a viable political and economic entity, Qaddafi found it necessary to let the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), under his chairmanship, be the supreme authority in Libya. Until the late 1970s, the RCC functioned as the state's chief legislative and executive body and was assisted by a Council of Ministers, which carried out the RCC policies and supervised the day-to-day administration of the government.<sup>1</sup> From the outset, Qaddafi emerged as the initiator and orchestrator of all RCC actions and activities.

Qaddafi's realism led him to recognize that democratization could not be achieved overnight in Libya and that the people would first have to be

1. Henri Hobb, *Libya: Past and Present*. (Malta: Edam Publishing House Ltd., 1979.) pp. 146-147.

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politicized in how to fulfill the role that he envisioned for them in policy formulation and in assuming the functions of government. Because the Libyans had been deprived of power for so long under colonialism and the monarchy, they could not be expected to assume their new leadership role right away. Therefore, he frequently invited the masses to discuss issues with him in public sessions, often long and televised. These sessions were used as a forum for politicization where opinions could be aired prior to his making final decisions.<sup>2</sup> He also directed the RCC to lay the foundations for wide-scale political participation and, in 1971, established the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), not as a political party but as a mass organization that was to encompass all people, in the cities, villages and desert alike. It was intended to provide the masses with "an opportunity to participate politically in planning and supervising future policies."<sup>3</sup> The ASU thus became Libya's primary forum for political participation. In its operation, it sought to enhance national unity and to remove the destructive influences of party politics which, in the past, had only engendered regional, factional, and tribal rivalries. In Qaddafi's view, such party squabbles had betrayed the nation's cause as well as the Arab Revolution, and he saw no need to experiment with alien political systems or ideologies that contradict Libya's Arab-Islamic heritage.<sup>4</sup> He contended that most ideologies, whether to the extreme right or left, have caused fragmentation and have widened the gap between governments and the masses. He thus insisted that no political system would be sound unless it was based on people's participation and their direct involvement in running the country.

It is for this reason that the ASU was a mass, national organization, created specifically to "bring about collaboration among the popular working classes . . . and unite (them) with the revolution against one-class dictatorship."<sup>5</sup> Although the working classes formed 50 percent of the ASU leadership, the experiment failed to mobilize and politicize the masses. This was primarily because traditionalism proved to be much stronger than originally predicted. The ASU was unable to dislodge the close ties between the people and the traditional leadership or to "destroy public trust and loyalty to traditional institutions and leaders."<sup>6</sup> Another factor was the complex organizational structure of the ASU which confused the populace and discouraged them from active participation in the political process.

Frustrated by the failure of the ASU, Qaddafi launched his popular

Revolution on April 15, 1973. In a major speech at Zwara, he announced a five-point program to revolutionize the administrative structures of the government by turning the masses on the inefficient, corrupt bureaucracy and by abolishing the out-dated laws which had hindered the march of the revolution. He declared that

- all existing laws are to be repealed and replaced by revolutionary procedures;
- the country shall be purged of those who are politically unhealthy;
- civil liberties shall be accorded to the proletariat but not to those who disdain the masses of common people. Consequently, arms will be distributed to many sectors of the people who do not belong to either the armed forces or the militia;
- all those who belong to the caste of parasitic bureaucrats will be removed by the people, who . . . will be the instrument for the destruction of the bureaucracy; and
- the Cultural Revolution against all that is reactionary, misleading and ruinous to young people's minds is proclaimed.<sup>7</sup>

At this juncture, Qaddafi's aim was to remove the bureaucrats from<sup>8</sup> their positions of authority and to weaken the bourgeois hold on the society; in his view, these groups "formed a barrier between the revolution and the masses."<sup>8</sup> This was a necessary step to prepare the people for the new role he envisioned for them in the new political structure based on the Third Universal Theory. As one observer put it: The Zwara speech was intended "to take the people of Libya a first step forward towards the institution of a novel order of governing (,) based on the complete decentralization of power." It set in motion a series of changes and put into practice Qaddafi's theory which sought "to give power to the people so that they would be able to govern themselves by themselves."<sup>9</sup>

### Popular Democracy

Under Qaddafi's "popular democracy," the people as a whole are not only directly involved in the political process but also become the instruments of government, thus replacing representatives, deputies or intermediaries.<sup>10</sup> He proposes a horizontal reorganization of the society from the grass roots upward. People's committees and popular congresses are to be formed at the local, regional and national levels to ensure direct mass political participation at all levels and in all matters.<sup>11</sup>

2. Ruth First, *Libya: The Elusive Revolution*. (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books Ltd. 1974.) pp. 124-125.

3. Habib, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-154.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 156; First, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-124.

5. Omar I. El Fathaly, Monte Palmer and Richard Chackerian, *Political Development and Bureaucracy in Libya*. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1977.) p. 95.

6. *Ibid.*

7. M. El-Shahat, *Libya Begins the Era of the Jamahiriyyat*. (Rome: International Publication House, 1978.) pp. 34-35.

8. El Fathaly, *op. cit.* p. 96.

9. Frederick Muscat, *September One: A Story of Revolution*. (N.A.: Link Books, 1981.) p. 14.

10. Muammer Al Qadafi, *The Green Book, Part I*. (London: Martin Britan & O'Keefe, 1976.) p. 24.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

In 1973, Qaddafi moved a giant step forward to implement his belief that a true popular revolution must be ruled by the people. He called upon the masses to form People's Committees in every village, city, college, institute and factory.<sup>12</sup> He urged them to take over the administration in all fields of work and production, including local governments.<sup>13</sup>

People were slow to respond to Qaddafi's call for People's Committees. In fact, students at the Faculty of Law at Gar Unis University in Benghazi were the first to set up a committee, which took charge of the administration and management of their college. Workers were slower in forming committees. Qaddafi had to speak out to encourage labor groups to put authority and power in their own hands by establishing People's Committees in their factories and companies.<sup>14</sup>

These committees are to be elected openly and democratically by the people in each unit or area and not by governors, directors or any other authority. Their leadership is to be collective; decisions would be made by unanimity and responsibility would be shared jointly. Because of these committees, the people as a whole would become the source of power in Libya. They would elect these committees and hold them accountable for translating their wishes into realities.

Since October 1973, People's Committees have become the official authority in the governorates and municipalities. The chairman of each committee has taken over the functions previously held by a governor or mayor. Directors in each governorate are elected directly by the people and are no longer appointed by the central government. This change has resulted in shifting responsibility to the masses, who now must keep a watch on these directors and hold them responsible for their performance.<sup>15</sup>

Similarly, People's Committees have taken over the management of institutions, public corporations and companies, including their board of directors, which are now headed by the chairman of the People's Committee for each unit. University councils have been taken over by People's Committees, which include students, faculty and staff; each committee chairman has assumed the functions of the president of the university and the chairman of the faculty council has become the dean of faculty. Other public institutions such as hospitals and government printing presses have elected their People's Committees to administer and manage their operations.

12. Muscat, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

14. Habib, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-174.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 176-178.

At the beginning, members of the People's Committees did not receive salaries. Serving on these committees was seen as a privilege, one that carried heavy weight, however, because their performance was closely watched by the people. This proved to be administratively inefficient, however. Salaries are now given to the chairman of the People's Committee, to the Committee secretariat and their assistants so that they can devote their full-time attention to carrying out their administrative duties. The membership term on the People's Committee is limited to three years, however, and a committee member can be removed at any time by a two-thirds vote. Resignation must be accepted and approved by the committee.

Currently, there are People's Committees everywhere in Libya. They have become an important political instrument under popular leadership that has made a strong effort to democratize the administration and to promote the goals of the Al-Fateh Revolution. Shortly thereafter, the Basic People's Congresses (BPC) were established "as a higher authority and a means of supervision of the whole people over its parts as embodied in the popular committees."<sup>16</sup>

#### *Basic People's Congresses*

To help get the people involved in the political process at the grass roots level, Basic People's Congresses (BPC) were formed locally, according to place of residence, so that all people would be members of a congress. These congresses elect their secretaries which, in turn, constitute the Municipality People's Congresses (MPC).

Qaddafi, the architect of the new political system, made a point to attend the first BPC that was held at Tawergha in 1976. He went out of his way to explain the principles underlining his direct people's democracy and instructed the masses on what to do every step of the way. First, he stressed that BPC membership was not only limited to men or political activists but open for all the people, including women, who constitute fifty percent of the population. He warned that the exclusion of women would not only keep the society divided but would also make a mockery out of the Third Universal Theory. Under no circumstances, should decisions be made by only half of the people; it must be made by all the people in the BPC's area of jurisdiction. Realizing that social traditions might come in the way of women's participation, Qaddafi suggested that they could meet in separate chambers to express their views on issues before the BPC if traditions did not allow women and men to assemble in a single hall.<sup>17</sup> He emphasized

16. El-Shahat, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

that it is important for both men and women to participate in the decision-making process on all matters that affect their lives.

Second, Qaddafi did not want professional politicians and political activists moving from one BPC to another manipulating the political process and infringing on residents' rights to deliberate on issues before them. He therefore pointed out that only citizens in the BPC area would be allowed to participate in its work. This means that "anyone who did not belong to the Municipality should not be admitted to the assembly."<sup>18</sup> Instead, they should attend congresses in their own areas. To give some order to the process, Qaddafi proposed that BPCs issue identification cards of different colors and with distinctive markings for their members. He also stipulated that these cards should be checked as people are admitted to the meetings, to ensure that attendance is limited only to people living in that municipality.

Third, Qaddafi proposed that a national agenda be drawn up, normally consisting of seven items, in order to ensure that similar issues were debated throughout the country. This means that each BPC was expected to abide strictly by the agenda and proceed to examine it item by item. This was done in order "to prevent the basic people's (congresses) from degenerating into formless assemblies without purpose or discipline."<sup>19</sup> After discussion, the BPC would offer recommendations and resolutions, which would become policies binding on the people of the area.

Fourth, Qaddafi told the people that were assembled in the BPC at Tawergha that they were in charge of "every aspect of the life of the people, ranging from municipal services and economic development to foreign policy and the defense of the country."<sup>20</sup> He stressed the seriousness of the task ahead because their recommendations and resolutions are "final and inviolable." As he put it: "No individual, body or institution would be entitled to alter or interfere in any way with these recommendations and resolutions, either by omission, addition, amendment or alteration." He made it clear that their decisions would be "the effective and final policy of their areas of jurisdiction." This is in line with his theory that "the people and the people alone have the prerogative and indeed the authority to (make) decisions."<sup>21</sup> This means that there is no veto over the people's power.

It was not an easy task for the people to shoulder the new responsibilities of running the government. From the founding of the Republic in 1969, they had been accustomed to let the RCC, headed by Qaddafi, conduct the business of government in a dictatorial fashion. Qaddafi, having dismantled

the traditional form of government, was now asking the Libyans to control and direct the instruments of government in a way that had never before occurred in the country.

Qaddafi was concerned about people's apathy and passivity, which could threaten the implementation of his Third Universal Theory in Libya and could put a damper on its future anywhere else. There was a need to motivate the people to take their new responsibilities seriously to ensure the success of his experiment. He therefore attacked passivity among the Libyans, especially as evidenced by a small turnout in the BPCs. Some people stayed away because they were not familiar with his theory or were skeptical about the outcomes. Others attended the BPC sessions but failed to take an active role in its deliberation, probably because they were not sure that they were indeed in charge of local and national policies and that their decisions were binding on the state. To overcome this apathy, Qaddafi reiterated that "their decisions will be binding not only on the institutions of the state but (also) on him personally."<sup>22</sup> He also criticized citizens who chose not to attend the BPC sessions, stating that there is no place for those "who default on their political responsibilities."<sup>23</sup> In his view, failure to participate in the BPC is a betrayal for both the individual and the nation. He made it clear that BPC decisions are binding whether a person attended or not and whether he liked or opposed the decisions. This was intended to motivate people to attend BPCs and to take part in the political process, which should be based on people's participation at all levels of the decision-making apparatus. Qaddafi wanted to ensure that the BPC would function at the local level since it represents the backbone of the political structure of his direct popular democracy.

#### *General People's Congress*

At the national level, Qaddafi established the General People's Congress (GPC), which includes representatives from all social groups within the country. It is the highest political authority and instrument of government in Libya. It is empowered "to study, discuss and approve the policies of the state, its general planning, budget, peace and war treaties and to check and to guide the executive and popular authorities."<sup>24</sup> The GPC's broad powers mean that no other body — such as a parliament or other formal institution — is needed.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

24. *The Human March in the Libyan Arab Republic*. (L.A.R. Department of Information and Cultural Affairs, 1976), p. 35.

The General People's Congress has a broad base of representation. Its membership currently includes the leadership of the Basic People's Congresses, the People's Committees, the unions, the syndicates and the professional associations.<sup>25</sup> These diversified groups act as a check and balance on each other, offering one way to ensure that no group, class or individual will absorb power and dominate the political system.

In November 1976, Qaddafi found himself in a head-on collision with the General People's Congress over "The Draft Declaration on the Establishment of the People's Power." The draft called for the abolishment of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which, under Qaddafi's chairmanship, had ruled Libya, controlling both executive and legislative functions of the government. In addition, the declaration advocated "the dismantling of the government," including the presidency, the cabinet and all political and administrative structures that are commonly found in conventional forms of government. Instead, it suggested "the immediate transfer of power" to the General People's Congress.<sup>26</sup>

Qaddafi was eager to take the final step to complete the structure of his direct people's democracy. The GPC, on the other hand, was not ready to act on the draft, which would have immediately overhauled the entire political system that had existed in Libya since 1969. When it became evident that the GPC would put off the decision for a year, Qaddafi "threatened to relinquish power unilaterally."<sup>27</sup>

However, Qaddafi was persuaded to change his mind on the argument that the draft should be taken through the process he set up in accordance with his Third Universal Theory. The draft must first be submitted to the Basic People's Congresses, which would act on it and formulate their recommendations. Then, it would be forwarded to the General People's Congress to finalize the decision. As a compromise, it was agreed to call "special extraordinary sessions" for the Basic People's Congresses to consider the draft between January and February 1977. Then, the General People's Congress was to be convened to act on their recommendations.

The draft raised some serious issues: How much power would the GPC secretary-general have? Should Qaddafi be exempted by granting him extraordinary powers to keep the Revolution on its march? What role would the Revolution's leaders play in the new structure? What was the future of the RCC? These issues caused a heated exchange between Qaddafi and the GPC. At the end, however, Qaddafi got his way as the GPC bowed to his wishes, in deference to his role as the architect of the experiment in direct people's democracy.

The GPC was against the proposal limiting the authority of the secretary-general since everyone expected Qaddafi to be elected to the post. It was inconceivable that the Congress would curtail Qaddafi's authority in the new structure. In their view, such action was "tantamount to giving up the Revolution."<sup>28</sup> It preferred to make an exception for Qaddafi by granting him extraordinary powers in order to push the Al-Fateh Revolution forward.<sup>29</sup>

Qaddafi, on the other hand, argued against giving expanded powers to the secretary-general of the GPC. He was determined to prevent any individual from accumulating too much power in the future, thus becoming a dictator and infringing on people's power. He was unwilling to make an exception for himself out of fear that it might set a precedent, undermining the essence of his theory. In his view, there is a definite relationship between the amount of power held by an individual at the top of the hierarchical system and the amount of power exercised by the people. As he put it: "the people's power is curtailed in direct proportion to the amount of authority held by a single individual."<sup>30</sup> When he persisted in his opposition, the GPC decided to endorse his proposal and to limit the authority of the secretary-general.

Qaddafi and the GPC also disagreed on the role of the Revolution's leaders and the future of the RCC. The GPC did not support the abolishment of the RCC, whose membership was comprised of the free officers who led the Revolution in 1969 and who dominated the political scene since that time. It was suggested, instead, that the RCC continue to carry out the same functions as it had since 1969, regardless of the changes introduced in the political system.

Qaddafi could not agree to the continuation of the RCC, since it would undercut his experiment of putting the instruments of government in the hands of the people. Its existence would rob the masses of an opportunity to rule themselves.

As the stalemate continued, it was obvious that the GPC did not want to dismantle the RCC unless its members were chosen to serve on the GPC general secretariat, which would provide the political leadership for both the congress and the nation. This meant that Qaddafi would become the Secretary-General of the GPC, while the other four members of the RCC — Major Abd El-Salem Jaloud, Lt. Colonel Abu Bakr Unis, Colonel Mustapha El Kharroubi and Major Khweildi El-Hemeidi — would be elected to the General Secretariat.<sup>31</sup>

25. Qadafi, *The Green Book, Part I*, p. 35.

26. El-Shahat, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

This compromise broke the deadlock and the RCC officers came to occupy the highest offices in the nation. Thus, no change was made in the national leadership since the same players continued to dominate the political process regardless of the changes in the political structure. The real changes, however, would have to wait until the membership of the general secretariat was changed in future elections.

In addition to the general secretariat, it was decided to create a General People's Committee to parallel the popular committees at the local level and to direct the work at the national level. That decision resulted in another round of disagreement between Qaddafi and the GPC. The General People's Congress wanted the four RCC officers to serve on both the general people's committee and the general secretariat of the GPC in order to keep the Al-Fateh Revolution on the right path.

Qaddafi was vehemently against the proposal, arguing that "just as one individual is not allowed to hold two positions at the level of the BPC, so it is inadmissible for an individual, no matter how illustrious, to hold simultaneously two positions at the top."<sup>32</sup> In his view, no one should be permitted to serve on both the general people's committee and the general secretariat. He was not willing to make an exception in this critical period of formation out of fear it might set a precedent that would undermine his theory of direct popular democracy. Qaddafi, along with the RCC officers, refused the proposition of combining the two posts at the national level. As Qaddafi put it: "The combination of the General Secretariat and the General Popular Committee was out of the question."<sup>33</sup> He therefore asked the GPC to nominate a chairman for the General People's Committee. When the Congress failed to do so, Qaddafi nominated Abd El-Ati El-Obeydi and, when the voting was inconclusive, he named him as chairman.<sup>34</sup>

It seems likely that Qaddafi went beyond his power when he named the chairman of the General People's Committee. He did so, however, because he wanted to set up a structure at the national level that would ensure the proper functions of the political process. It would have been a setback if he went along with the GPC stance of allowing individuals to combine more than one post at the national level. Thus, he was forced to overrule the GPC for the sake of preserving his theory of people's power, upon which the experiment in Libya was built.

The adoption of the Declaration on the Establishment of the People's Power in March 1977 ushered in the beginning of the era of the masses (*Jamahir*) in Libya. Qaddafi went to Sebha and announced the birth of the

Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The General People's Congress now possesses both legislative and executive powers for the whole country. It formulates decisions, reviews policies submitted to them by the Basic People's Congresses and supervises their implementation.

The General People's Congress openly and democratically elects a chairman to preside over sessions, to sign its laws and to accept the credentials of ambassadors.<sup>35</sup> It also elects a General Secretariat to carry out its resolutions and recommendations, to make preparations for holding its sessions and to draw up its agenda. The Secretariat includes a Secretary General and a number of Secretaries, each of whom supervises one section of activities in the state. They are held accountable to the Congress which can dismiss them or accept their resignations.<sup>36</sup>

Thus, the functions of the previous Council of Ministers have been taken over by the General Secretariat of the Congress. However, its function is different. Neither the Secretary General nor the Secretaries make decisions to determine the general policy of the state. Their main duty is to implement decisions made by the General People's Congress. Further, they are responsible for carrying out the wishes of the Congress, which can terminate their services at any time if it is dissatisfied with their records of performance.

#### *Revolutionary Committees*

At the current time, Qaddafi does not hold any executive or administrative post in the government, both of which he has renounced in order to devote his time to revolutionary activities. In response to his call, Revolutionary Committees have been formed everywhere in Libya by those individuals who are committed to the Al-Fateh Revolution. Their function is to incite continually the popular congresses to intensify their ideological work, to help the masses make progressive decisions and to get these decisions implemented by the People's Committees.<sup>37</sup> The Revolutionary Committees are the vanguard of the Revolution; they are committed to the attainment of its goals, freedom, socialism and unity. They do not seek power, nor to control the instruments of government. They are only a tool to remind the people of their revolutionary tasks and to encourage them to shoulder the responsibility of authority and leadership. Their duties have been outlined

35. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

36. "Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Libyan Papers No. 12. (New York: Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of the United Nations, 1979.)

37. "Celebrations Mark the Eleventh Anniversary of the Great First of September Revolution." Speech delivered by Mu'amar Al Qaddafi. (Published by People's Bureau, Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Press and Information Section, Washington, D.C., September 1, 1980.) p. 3.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

34. *Ibid.*



as follows:

- Inciting the masses to exercise authority.
- Firmly establishing the people's authority.
- Practicing revolutionary supervision.
- Agitating the popular congresses.
- Leading the popular committees and the secretariats of the congresses to the right way.
- Protecting, defending and propagating the revolution.<sup>38</sup>

Revolutionary Committees are in charge of combatting reactionaries, enemies of the Revolution and foreign ideologies which might seek to undermine or destroy the accomplishments of the September 1 Revolution. Fascists, nepotists and saboteurs, for instance, must be dealt with firmly by the people whose consciousness has been heightened by the Revolutionary Committees. Agitation is used as a tool to incite the masses against those who are "antagonistic to the people's power and the new socialist transformation." Yet, Qaddafi insists that agitation must be reasonable: "No one is allowed to take an individual or unlimited initiative except in extreme situations where defense of the Revolution and the people's authority is called for." He also warns against "blind popular domination" because it can destroy the masses' interest. He told the Revolutionary Committees to equip themselves with administrative know-how and political consciousness in order to enable them to guide the people to set up a socialist society "devoid from political, economic and social diseases."<sup>39</sup>

### Economic Socialism

Although Qaddafi's ultimate goal was to set up socialism in Libya, his immediate task was to liberate the Libyan economy from foreign domination and influence in order to turn it into a national productive economy. For this reason, foreign-owned banks and insurance companies were the first to be nationalized in Libya. In 1969, foreign banks were given the choice of either converting into joint-stock companies or closing down their operations and pulling out of the country altogether. Barclays, for instance, opted to close down. Libyans have been allowed to own shares in such institutions in amounts not exceeding £5,000, while the government owns at least 51% of the capital in all banks.<sup>40</sup> To Libyans, such nationalization was a necessary step, first as a way "to gain control and direction of the banking activities" so that they can be placed in the service of the national economy and, secondly, in order to break the linkage between Libya's economic in-

terests and foreign monopoly and the consequent subjugation of its monetary system to decisions made abroad.<sup>41</sup>

In the following year, foreign insurance companies were given a year to convert into joint-stock companies that would have a majority of Libyan shareholders and be partly government-owned. All petroleum distribution facilities were also nationalized at that time along with the British Petroleum Company. In 1973, all oil companies were nationalized, allowing Libya to take control of this national wealth and to use its oil resources for development and social progress.<sup>42</sup>

These measures paved the way for Qaddafi to implement his socialism, which sought to wipe out economic exploitation through a wide and just distribution of wealth among the broad spectrum of people. His objective is to satisfy the material needs of man "through the liberation of these needs from outside domination and control" but "without exploiting or enslaving others."<sup>43</sup> In the Jamahiriya today, man "works for himself to guarantee his material needs, or works for a socialist corporation in whose production he is a partner, or performs a public service to the society which provides his material needs."<sup>44</sup>

### Public and/or Private Ownership

Qaddafi did away with the "vertical ownership" of capitalism where wealth could be monopolized by a few individuals or by private corporations. Instead, he favored "horizontal ownership" where all productive sectors of the economy are jointly owned and directed by a broad base of people.<sup>45</sup> In his view, joint public ownership provides a sound base for development because people are in charge of the economy and, consequently, are motivated to step up production to increase their income. He is therefore against the establishment of large corporations, whether they are owned by individuals or by the state. Instead, such conglomerate companies are to be converted into socialist corporations and so that the public can be given equal rights to buy and own shares in these enterprises.

It should be noted, however, that Qaddafi has not done away with private ownership entirely. He has encouraged the development of the private

41. Habib, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

42. Mohamed S. Abugassa, "Oil in the Political Economy of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya." Paper presented at the African Studies Center, Howard University, Washington, D.C. April 1980, p. 4.

43. Muammar Al Qadhafi, *The Green Book, Part 2*. (England: Astmoor Litho Ltd., no date.) p. 17.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

45. *The Human March*, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43.

38. "No Democracy Without Popular Congresses," Revolutionary Committees. Publication obtained from People's Bureau, Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Washington, D.C., (1980).

39. "Celebrations Mark the Eleventh Anniversary," *op. cit.* p. 5.

40. *First, op. cit.*, p. 172.

sector and has established laws that guarantee its existence as long as it is non-exploitative in nature. He stresses self-reliance by urging individuals to undertake any production or service through their efforts to satisfy their needs but without exploitation of others. Private ownership therefore is not expropriated from one group and given to another, nor is it taken over by the state as long as there is no exploitation. However, he insists that all possessions that are beyond the satisfaction of individual needs should become the property of the people through joint ownership.<sup>46</sup>

Qaddafi argued that "limitation of property means that whenever capital oppression arises, the state has the right to curb it" through appropriate measures.<sup>47</sup> Accordingly,

some people . . . have had their properties expropriated, for they had no right to own, as anything they owned proved harmful to human society. On the other hand, we left others (to) own what they had as long as this ownership has been beneficial to society and has not harmed others. We have also taken away a certain amount of property from others when it was proved(n) that their properties have reached the level of exercising harm to others.<sup>48</sup>

Under such a system, there is no room for large conglomerates, trade chains or stores because of their exploitative nature, based on maximizing profit by controlling prices and by manipulating the market to their advantage. They create artificial shortages in the market, for instance, by withholding the supply in order to push prices up. Although governments have taken measures to regulate trade, merchants have managed to use loopholes and other means to avoid complying with these regulations. Qaddafi's solution is to abolish private trade and replace it by "popular trading circuits in which the people sell to the people commodities at cost price." It is only under such an arrangement that "speculation will disappear . . . once and for all."<sup>49</sup> Also, exploitation is ended because no one manipulates the market to get richer through monopoly or black markets. Prices are fixed with no room for speculation.

In Tripoli today, retail stores are boarded up, new supermarkets are stacked with a variety of commodities. Customers find it easy to shop in these trade centers because most of the goods are found under one roof. In addition, prices are the same in all stores — a situation that has eliminated manipulation of prices. The only private enterprises still in business are those that do not employ workers and are based on a technical skill, including barbers, carpenters, plumbers, interior decorators, etc. These shops are not considered exploitative in nature because they provide services rather than sale of goods.

46. Qathafl. *The Green Book*, Part 2, pp. 24-26.

47. Text of the address delivered by Mo'amar El-Qaddafi in the opening session of the Euro-Arab Youth Conference held in Tripoli on May 14, 1973. (Libya Arab Republic: Ministry of Information and Culture, 1973.) pp. 48-49.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

49. *Commentary on the Green Book*. (Tripoli: World Center for Researches and Studies of the Green Book, 1983.) p. 80.

### "Partners, Not Wage-Earners"

Qaddafi's socialism has ended the exploitation of workers, which had been caused by the fact that their wages were not commensurate to their labor and efforts in production. He has accomplished this by abolishing wages and by establishing a new partnership where workers are considered partners, not wage-earners, in the production process.<sup>50</sup>

In the Jamahiriya today, workers receive no wages but instead get a share in profits that is equal to their effort, capacity and efficiency. This means that their income fluctuates depending on their contribution to the production effort. Thus, their gains or losses are commensurate with their labor. Such a system has not only eliminated labor exploitation by employers but has also put an end to labor unrest. Libyan workers see themselves as an integral part of the production cycle and control their own destiny by working for themselves.

It should be noted, however, that there is no guarantee that this new partnership can result in an immediate increase in production. In fact, it is likely that production will go down at the beginning, if Libya has the same experience as several other countries in the aftermath of nationalization. The success of his model depends on whether workers are ready to shoulder their new responsibility and are ready to take advantage of the new opportunity provided by socialism. Another factor is that, because its work force is very small, Libya's industrialization relies heavily on skilled foreign labor and technicians to fill its shortage in manpower. This might complicate the task of implementing socialism in Libya.

Nevertheless, Qaddafi put his socialism in motion by calling upon workers to take over factories and companies, becoming part of the management of production units. They have elected People's Committees out of their ranks to be in charge of the socialist corporation "whether (the tasks) are company concerns, production matters or workers' problems."<sup>51</sup> People's Committees have replaced the capitalist or state bureaucratic management. These committees have promoted the welfare of the working people rather than the welfare of an individual or state. To ensure sound economic policies, production unit congresses have been established to make collective decisions, which are carried out by People's Committees in each unit of production.

It is generally acknowledged that it is not an easy task to ask the workers to take over factories and start managing production units. In Libya, it took

50. Qathafl. *The Green Book*, Part 2, pp. 7-12, 19.

51. *Commentary on the Green Book*, op. cit., p. 207.

a whole year to explain the concept of "partners, not wage-earners."<sup>52</sup> It was only then that the workers marched on factories and took over the management. Such a system requires the politicization of workers who have been accustomed to the traditional relationship between employers and employees. Political education is needed to ensure that workers understand their new responsibilities and shoulder their duties brought about under the new partnership in the production process. They must guard against sabotage by those elements who are against the socialist system. Workers also have to double their efforts to "show exceptional prudence in the management of its productive units, try to maintain productivity, and ensure that work is well organized and constant." This is essential for the success of the workers' revolution since former employers "would do all they could to sabotage the revolution and recommence their oppression and tyranny of the workers."<sup>53</sup>

### "In Need, Freedom Is Latent"

To make people "masters in their own castles," Qaddafi believes that every citizen must have the opportunity to satisfy his basic needs — food, clothing, shelter and means of transportation — without relying on someone else. These needs must be liberated from outside control and domination in order to enable individuals to work to meet their needs by themselves. He urges that economic activity should be solely directed toward fulfilling these needs and not toward accumulating more wealth, which is always done at the expense of others who are deprived from meeting their necessities.<sup>54</sup>

In his view, housing is a basic need and therefore should not be rented out or owned, whether by the state or by individuals. It is a necessity that "no one, including the society . . . is allowed to have control over."<sup>55</sup> He rejects the concept of rental housing because of the inherent exploitative relationship between tenants and landlords. Tenants are treated like slaves because they are under the whim of the landlords who can put them out in the street if the rent is late or for any other reason. Rents also can go out of control because the landlords are in the housing business for profits. Because of this exploitative element, Qaddafi insists that "no one has the right to build a house, additional to his own or that of his heirs, for the purpose of renting it, because the house represents another person's need, and building it for the purpose of rent is an attempt to have control over the need of that man."<sup>56</sup>

52. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 212.

54. Qaddafi, *The Green Book*, Part 2, pp. 25-28.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

Qaddafi's solution is that every occupant should have the right to own the shelter in which he or she lives. In 1970, consequently, government-owned houses were sold to the public. To encourage families with low income to purchase these units, they were only charged 10 percent of the cost if their income was less than \$150 a month.<sup>57</sup> In addition, low-income families have received government grants to buy their housing units. Middle-class families have been given government loans to purchase their homes but are expected to pay them back in installments.

Qaddafi believes that if a citizen wants to build a house or set up a farm for his own personal use, he should be entitled to do so because land is "the collective property of all Libyans" and does not belong to anyone.<sup>58</sup> Land therefore cannot be sold, it can only be used to benefit the people by working, farming or pasturing. Accordingly, "everyone has the right to exploit (the land), by one's own effort and without employing any worker."<sup>59</sup> In this respect, Qaddafi does not accept land reform laws which fix the acreage that can be owned by an individual or a family. This is primarily because he rejects the concept of private land ownership which leads to exploitation of farm workers and competition to increase individual holdings at the cost of someone else. He prefers to give "equal opportunities for all farmers" and to allow them to use as much land as they can toil by their own effort without relying on hired labor.<sup>60</sup>

Qaddafi insists that land belongs to those who toil it and cannot be owned or monopolized by foreigners. Accordingly, in 1970, 369 plantations totalling 37,000 hectares owned by the Italian community were nationalized. The nationalization of these Italian-owned plantations took care of the largest land-owning class in Libya. The average Libyan had only 20 hectares, with only 3 percent of the population holding as much as 100 hectares.

In 1973, some of the nationalized land was distributed among worker-farmers who had large families, very little income and some knowledge about farming. Each worker-farmer was given 10 hectares.<sup>61</sup> The government has also been generous in extending loans, subsidies and technical assistance to serious farmers who are interested in increasing their land's productivity.

57. Farouk A. Sankart, "Al-Qaddafi's 'Economic Solution' and Some Achievements Since the 1969 Revolution." Unpublished paper, January 1969, p. 8.

58. "Celebrations Mark the Eleventh Anniversary," *op. cit.*, p. 4.

59. *Commentary on the Green Book*, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Habib*, *op. cit.* pp. 211-212.

Qaddafi's stress on a self-sufficient economy made it necessary to seek ways to increase food production and to put an end to his country's heavy reliance on importing foodstuffs from abroad. Agricultural development has been given top priority, first because that sector was neglected under the monarchy during the years following the oil boom and also because 70 percent of the active labor force is engaged in agriculture.

Qaddafi thus directed that one-sixth of the 1971-1972 development budget, a fivefold increase over 1966 figures, be allocated to agricultural development and agrarian reforms. Most of these funds went to water and soil preservation as well as to loans and subsidies for farmers.<sup>62</sup> Later, the Five-Year Plan, 1976-1980, allocated about 855 million dinars for agricultural development, which includes developing approximately 607,000 hectares to increase the amount of arable land.<sup>63</sup> This is an ambitious plan because only 5 percent of the arable land, totalling 165,000 hectares, was under irrigation. The objective is to shift from subsistence, conventional farming to modern sophisticated farming as a means of rapidly increasing production through expansion.

Qaddafi has called for revolutionary measures to fully utilize all national resources, among them to reclaim arid land, to increase the land under cultivation, to establish industrial pasture land and to develop animal resources. An ultimate goal is to make Libya self-sufficient in food production, that is, to feed the people without relying on foreign imports. Qaddafi stresses self-reliance by encouraging all citizens to satisfy their food and consumption needs through individual effort. It is his firm belief that "there is no independence for people who receive their food needs from outside their borders."<sup>64</sup> Libya's agricultural policy is designed to achieve the following objectives: "(1) to guarantee a minimum income, to ensure that a farmer has a decent living standard, (2) to have self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, and (3) to control prices for export and import." These objectives can be achieved by "(1) land redistribution, (2) reconsolidation of fragmented ownership, (3) subsidies and loans to farmers, (4) marketing of surplus products, and (5) establishing new farms [that use] minimum underground water resources and [that instead use] a maximum of rain and [surface water]."<sup>65</sup>

To become self-sufficient in meeting consumption needs, Qaddafi has also initiated a development program for the industrial sector. Its dual purpose is to broaden the base of the national economy by moving it away

from its dependence on a single commodity — petroleum — and to end the country's heavy reliance on imported goods to meet the daily consumption needs of the people. His development program includes distributing national wealth among the broad spectrum of people, diversifying sources of income, and placing major industrial projects in the hands of the public sector. The long-term goal is to transfer Libya from a "consuming" country relying heavily on imports into a production-oriented, possibly self-sufficient manufacturing society. Thus, there has been considerable attention to the development of large-scale industries in such critical areas as oil, gas and related industries (e.g., petrochemicals and fertilizers). Industry received the second largest allocation in the 1971-1972 development budget, representing a sevenfold increase over the 1966 figures.<sup>66</sup>

Under Qaddafi's leadership, economic activities have been directed toward making his country self-sufficient over the long term. The Three-year Plan (1973-1975) and the Five-Year Plan (1976-1980) were designed to move the national economy away from its dependency on a single commodity, petroleum. Secondly, they have sought to reduce inequalities of income and wealth and to narrow regional differences, while preserving the social fabric of the society. Thirdly, they have intended to increase manpower skills and efficiency through vocational training and education.<sup>67</sup>

### Social Reconstruction

To complete the task of setting up his socialist, egalitarian society, Qaddafi systematically initiated measures to end exploitation, oppression and injustice in Libya — all of which, in the past, had led to the hegemony of one class over another and the rise of different forms of discrimination. His solution to societal problems was to set up a new social structure based on equality, freedom and a return to religion. His emphasis on religion was largely due to the fact that, in his view, it is "a fundamental factor in the life of man and is reflected (in) so many social considerations."<sup>68</sup>

Qaddafi used the Quran as a basis to achieve social justice and to satisfy individual spiritual needs. In the national context of Libyan society, his emphasis on Islam was natural because religion has always been strong in Libya and has been an important part of the Libyan search for self-identity as well as for a national expression of their struggle against foreign domination and control.

62. First, *op. cit.* p. 153.

63. Abugassa, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

64. *Ibid.*

65. Habib, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

66. First, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

67. "Development of the People," *Africa Report*, vol. 22, no. 4, July-August 1977, p. 28.

68. Muammar Al Qadhafi, *The Green Book*, Part 3, (London: Martin Brian & O'Keefe) p. 25

Qaddafi believes that social relationships are best guided by an unwritten social code that cannot be enforced by law. Such ethical relationships can be influential only when they emanate from within individuals. This explains the emphasis he places on religion, which provides the general outline for the relationship between God and man, between man and man, and between man and society. In his view the rights of parents, children, husbands, wives, elders, youngsters, individuals and society toward each other "are well defined in the Holy Quran." Furthermore, "all these rights are considered holy and are fostered in religion"<sup>69</sup> in Libya. As he put it: "We, here, do not need drugs or sedatives and we don't have to commit suicide. We do not suffer from psychological anxiety, we do not suffer from any confusion of mind."<sup>70</sup> In his view, these unhealthy conditions exist in other human societies because religion is not upheld in these communities. The lack of religion leads to emotional instability and social illness. To do away with these conditions, religion must guide people in their daily activity. It is only then that exploitation will be eliminated and the world we live in will be much better.

Qaddafi's revival of Islam is intended to liberate the Islamic heritage and to free the Arab mind from the destructive influences of alien cultures that were imposed during European colonialism under the pretext of modernization or Westernization. He argues that social classes were abolished by the Quran long before communism ever mentioned it. Classes are alien to the Islamic heritage and to Arab culture because there was no such tradition in Muslim societies prior to the coming of Europeans. Classes are un-Islamic because Islam is based on equality and brotherhood, allowing individuals to rise to power through ability and training. A return to Islam, he believes, is the fastest way to eliminate the alien and artificial classes that were a by-product of European colonialism. Thus, his pragmatism makes it imperative to liquidate class differences by merging them peacefully and gradually in order to achieve an orderly transformation to a more egalitarian society. Unlike communism, he does not advocate class struggle out of fear that such action would disrupt the fabric of the society and hinder national development. He favors a gradual elimination of class differences through evolution, accomplished by a wide distribution of wealth among the broad spectrum of people. He expects the masses and their popular organizations to act reasonably and responsibly to dissolve class differences harmoniously. He does not believe that law alone can do the job, but laws can be respected and obeyed only when people are in charge of their enactment and enforcement.<sup>71</sup>

69. Address delivered by Qaddafi, May 14, 1973, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

71. *Habib, op. cit.*, pp. 29, 133-137.

### Minorities, Women and Society

In the Jamahiriya, there is no room for any form of discrimination, whether it is based on color, sex or creed because Islamic values and principles are enforced. Qaddafi sees no justification for one race to despise another or for a person "to boast at the expense of another."<sup>72</sup> Thus, discrimination or segregation is morally wrong because human beings are created equal. As he explained, "We believe that all of us are the sons of Adam and Eve and do not discriminate between whites and non-whites."<sup>73</sup> He therefore argues that there should be no discrimination based on color.

Similarly, Qaddafi considers sex discrimination to be "a flagrant act of oppression without justification" because all human beings have descended from Adam.<sup>74</sup> As the Quran put it: "Fear your God who created you from one being, and from this being he created his spouse and from these two he made many men and women go out." The Quran further states that "He (God) created for you, from ourselves, spouses so that you live together."<sup>75</sup>

Although there are biological differences between man and woman (i.e., menstruation, pregnancy, miscarriage, delivery, etc.), there is a role for each to play, matching their differences. In his view, the question of whether or not women should work is "a ridiculous materialistic presentation."<sup>76</sup> Society must provide work for all men and women who need work, "but on condition that each individual should work in the field that suits him (or her), and not be forced to carry out unsuitable work."<sup>77</sup> All human beings are created equal and free. Freedom, however, means that every person gets the type of education which qualifies him or her for doing appropriate work. In his view, although there is no difference in rights between man and woman, "there is no absolute equality between them as regards their duties."<sup>78</sup>

Qaddafi has paid special attention to the plight of women in Libya. In 1970, under his leadership, the RCC invited all women to a special congress to air their problems and needs. He participated in the session and later saw that their resolutions were implemented. He has encouraged women to organize themselves politically and to actively participate in the political

72. Qaddafi's Thesis, (Ottawa, Ontario: Jerusalem International Publishing House, October 1981, 4th Edition.) p. 29.

73. Address delivered by Qaddafi, May 14, 1973, *op. cit.* p. 65.

74. Qaddafi, *The Green Book*, Part 3, p. 26.

75. Mohamed Al Jarah, "Review of the Third Part of the Green Book." Published in the *International Colloquium in Benghazi: The Green Book*, 1-3 October 1979, Vol. II. (Tripoli, Libya: Foreign Liaison Office, General Secretariat of the General People's Congress, no date.) p. 181.

76. Qaddafi, *The Green Book*, Part 3, p. 41.

77. *Ibid.*

78. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

process as part of his drive to put the instruments of government in the hands of all the people. Women are now participating on an equal footing with men in the popular congresses and people's committees.

As a result of the Revolution, women have made some important advances in Libyan society. All professions are open to them. For example, in 1973, eight women were trained as pilots. Women are now working in the field of communications. The *Majalat Al-Beit*, a major magazine, has a female editor. Three women were included in the Libyan delegation responsible for drafting a constitution for the ill-fated proposed union with Egypt. Qaddafi and his colleagues on the RCC had also done much to bring about greater participation by women in the political life of the country. Many laws have been made to grant women equal rights. Women now receive equal pay for equal work and have been granted equal rights in legal procedures for divorce.<sup>79</sup> Currently, they serve in the rank and file of the armed forces. Female students in both public schools and universities receive military training as part of their curriculum. The objective is to equip women to serve with men side-by-side to defend their country against foreign threats. Education is widely used to provide women with opportunities to become economically independent and to gain training that will help liberate them from past bondages.

Despite these gains, change is coming slowly because of the traditional way of life in the Libyan society. Most women still regard the family as the cornerstone of the Libyan society and, consequently, family comes first. As Mrs. Rabab Adhams, an educator and principal of a girls' high school, put it, for example, "the family is my empire."<sup>80</sup> So far, she has managed to balance the family and the career but if there is a conflict, the job will have to go. Under no circumstances would she be willing to sacrifice the family. This seems to be the attitude of most educated Libyan women — an attitude that is grounded in Islamic values. The majority of Libyan women do not want to imitate Western feminist movements by demanding equality. They instead ask for "equal consideration and reciprocal confidence."<sup>81</sup>

Although there is still strong resistance to granting full equality because of the traditional nature of the populace, the concept of allowing women to work is slowly being accepted. There is, however, a division of opinion on what limitations Libyan traditions place on women. It may be a matter of time before the total liberation of women takes place, since it requires a major transformation in attitudes and roles. However, this change has already been put in motion by Qaddafi's bold moves to set up an egalitarian, socialist society.

79. Habib, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-25.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

81. *Ibid.*

## Emerging Contradictions in the Drive toward Socialism

Qaddafi's rise to power in 1969 was a turning point, ushering in a new era for Libya. From the beginning, he directed the RCC's efforts to politicize the masses and encourage their participation in the political process. He often invited the people to debate him and other Unionist officers in televised sessions in order to raise political consciousness. These public debates were held prior to making decisions and were designed to prepare the masses for the participatory role he envisioned for them. In 1971, he organized the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) as a national, mass organization to train the working people to take part in the political deliberations and in the nation's decision-making apparatus. Shortly thereafter, Qaddafi began to dismantle the traditional organs of government, paving the way for putting his Third Universal Theory into practice.

Qaddafi has thus set up a bold experiment in popular, direct democracy, in which the instruments of government are placed in the hands of the people as a whole. People's committees and popular congresses have been formed to facilitate direct mass political participation at all levels and in all matters.

Despite all of these steps, Qaddafi still is the undisputed leader in charge even though he does not hold an official post in the government and even though the people theoretically control and direct the government through popular congresses and committees. As the country's self-appointed thinker and leader of the Al-Fateh Revolution, Qaddafi orchestrates all policies by setting the framework of both legislative and executive decisions when he delivers his annual address to the General People's Congress (GPC). He expects the GPC to comply with his directives and to keep the march of the revolution on the right path.

Over the years, Qaddafi has functioned as Libya's president or head of state, even though there is no such position in the political structure. He has conferred with foreign envoys, decided on the levels of aid given to other countries, and determined Libya's relations with foreign powers. He holds the key to war or peace. An example is Libya's direct military intervention in Chad's civil war. It was Qaddafi's decision to intervene in Chad and the GPC was not even allowed to debate the issue or react to the decision. Another example was Qaddafi's ill-fated attempt, in 1982, to become the chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) — a position that is held only by an African head of state.

His one-man style of leadership has gained him the animosity of some public officials. Many of these officials have quit their posts, have spearheaded opposition and have formed a dozen anti-Qaddafi groups abroad. The most

vocal group is the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, which has initiated an armed struggle to end Qaddafi's rule; the overall objective of these groups is to oust Qaddafi and dismantle his system of government in favor of a Western-style democracy.<sup>82</sup> They are concerned about his "reckless expenditures" of the country's oil revenues to support his policy of intervention and subversion. They have accused him of spending millions of dollars to impose his revolutionary ideology on neighboring countries, to finance his military intervention in such nations as Uganda and Chad, and to bankroll revolutionary activities of such groups as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines.<sup>83</sup>

In addition, there is growing opposition to Qaddafi's socialism. The merchants and middle classes have opposed his socialist programs, in large part because they were directly affected by his economic policies. They specially resented his 1980 decision to "liquidate the middle class and its parasites,"<sup>84</sup> which culminated in a virtual outlawing of private enterprise, confiscation of property, freezing of bank accounts, and televised trials for persons accused of corruption. Most merchants suffered financial losses when they were forced to close their stores to make room for people's supermarkets. They are unhappy over the loss of their businesses and of their economic independence as well, since most are now employed in the supermarkets. Some of these merchants left the country; others are beginning to show a violent response to Qaddafi's socialism. A recent example, apparently, was the firebombing of one of the supermarkets in Tripoli.<sup>85</sup>

However, this attitude is not shared by the working classes, who have benefited from Qaddafi's socialism and its attempts to wipe out all forms of economic exploitation. Workers are no longer considered as wage-earners, but instead as partners in the production cycle. They are an integral part of the production process and are put in charge of the management of their units. Consequently, as has been noted above, the wage system has been abolished; workers are given a share in the profits of what they produce. Their share is commensurate to their effort in production.

Public ownership is a dominant feature in Qaddafi's socialism; large businesses have been turned into joint-stock companies with the public having the right to buy and own shares in these corporations. The private sector, on the other hand, has been drastically reduced and it is not allowed to exist unless it is non-exploitative in nature. Qaddafi insists that what is beyond individual needs should be owned jointly by the public for the benefit of the whole.

82. *The Washington Post*, May 10, 1984.

83. Libya: *Daring to Hope Again*. (Munich, West Germany: National Front for the Salvation of Libya, April 1984.) pp. 5-6.

84. Zdenek Cervenka, "The World of Muammar Qaddafi," *Africa Report*, vol. 27, no. 2, March-April 1982, p. 14.

85. *The Economist*, vol. 291, no. 7341, May 12, 1984, p. 46.

Qaddafi's socialism has been accompanied by a drive to set up an egalitarian society where classes are eliminated peacefully and gradually by a wide distribution of wealth among the broad spectrum of people. Every citizen is entitled to work for himself to make a decent income and to own his shelter and means of transportation — all of which are basic necessities that must not be monopolized by individuals or by the state in order to ensure the well-being of every citizen. In the Jamahiriya today, Libyans are not permitted to accumulate wealth beyond their needs since it cannot be accomplished without exploiting others.

His egalitarian drive has been accompanied by the revival of Islam in an effort to get rid of alien elements which had been injected in the Libyan culture over the years. Qaddafi has used Islam as a means to wipe out all forms of discrimination, because the Islamic religion preaches equality and brotherhood. Islam also enforces morality and therefore motivates individuals to behave in a manner conducive to promoting social cohesiveness, stability and unity. Thus, religion strengthens the social fabric of the society and solidifies national unity. The emphasis on Islam in Libya is understandable because it is the dominant religion and has long played a major role in the search for national self-identity and in the struggle against colonialism.

Despite Qaddafi's emphasis on Islam, he has been opposed by Muslim fundamentalists and other religious groups that believe socialism contradicts the teachings of Islam. They also have a pragmatic concern that socialism might effect the *Waqf* — the endowment of private property for the upkeep of mosques and their personnel. Some Ulama have opposed Qaddafi's move against private ownership which, in their view, contradicts Islamic tradition.

In the face of such diverse opposition, Qaddafi has taken stern measures to eliminate independent sources of power that could challenge his ideology and leadership. The Ulama, because of their strong influence among the populace, especially were an important target. Religion has always been strong and religious leaders have enjoyed a privileged status in Libyan society. For this reason, the Ulama's power base — the mosque — was taken away by the People's Committees under Qaddafi's instigation.

Religious leaders have strenuously opposed Qaddafi's campaign to weaken their influence as part of his drive to concentrate power in his own hand. By weakening the Ulama, Qaddafi has made himself the sole interpreter of Libya's religion. Qaddafi has accused religious leaders of harboring old-fashioned ideas that, in his view, may hinder the march of the revolution. Qaddafi's move against religious groups was necessary to implement his Third Universal Theory, which has made no mention of Islam, except a return to religion in general.

The latest group to join the opposition is the intelligentsia, who are disillusioned by the excessive, "watch-dog" activities of the Revolutionary Committees. The founding of these committees — handpicked rather than elected — is in itself an indication of the failure of Qaddafi's popular form of government; their main functions now appear to be to incite the masses and to prod people's congresses into shouldering their responsibilities in order to keep the revolution on the right track.

Qaddafi has encouraged the formation of Revolutionary Committees everywhere and has become increasingly dependent on them to overcome his people's apathy and failure to live up to his revolutionary expectations. Over the past few years, these committees have usurped a great deal of power, effectively becoming Libya's instruments of government<sup>86</sup> while weakening the political structure that was modeled after Qaddafi's Third Universal Theory. Their activities are blessed by Qaddafi, who has given them a mandate to protect the revolution from counter-revolutionary forces and reactionary elements which, he believes, are waiting for an opportune time to wipe out the popular gains from the socialist revolution. Consequently, the Revolutionary Committees have become a tool to curb any disloyalty to Qaddafi. They have set up people's tribunals and have sent "suspected enemies of the Revolution" to public execution. In several cases, they have taken the law into their own hands, acting as both jurors and judges with complete disregard to the country's judicial system.

The most recent example was the public hanging of two students at Al-Fateh University in Tripoli on April 16, 1984 — an incident which caused a vocal opposition at home and an outcry of protest among Libyan exiles abroad. This incident triggered violence at the University: Two members of the Revolutionary Committee, who were responsible for the execution, were found murdered on campus and the university auditorium was burned in protest.<sup>87</sup> There was also a reaction overseas. The National Front organized a peaceful demonstration in front of the Libyan People's Bureau (Embassy) in London to protest the execution of the students. A person inside the building opened fire, killing a British policewoman and wounding eleven demonstrators. This shooting resulted in the breaking of diplomatic relations between London and Tripoli and an anti-Qaddafi demonstration by Libyan students in Washington, D.C. Shortly thereafter, a bold attempt on Qaddafi's life was staged in Tripoli, resulting in a five-hour shootout with Libya's security forces less than a mile from his official residence and headquarters.<sup>88</sup> Although the plot was foiled, it led to a massive crackdown on opponents and to the arrest of about 200 persons, including government

officials, army officers and students. The Revolutionary Committees have been allowed to round up anyone who is suspected of being "an enemy of the revolution," a charge that may carry a death penalty or lead to permanent disappearance.

Thus, a drive to safeguard the revolution might lead to further oppression and intimidation at the cost of sacrificing freedom. This fits well with Qaddafi's own definition of freedom, which he enunciated in his historic speech at Zwara in 1973. As he put it: "Freedom should be for all Libyan people and not for their enemies. If there are ten persons, freedom must be for nine at the expense of one and not vice-versa."<sup>89</sup> To stamp out opposition, Qaddafi has also relied on the secret police, which has become increasingly oppressive. "A lot of people are frightened," a foreign student has commented and "Whatever is said about people's democracy, this is a rough, tough dictatorship."<sup>90</sup>

Qaddafi was angered by the recent attempt on his life. He accused Tunisia, the Sudan, the U.S. and Britain as well as the Muslim Brotherhood of being behind the plot to overthrow his regime. In retaliation, he has formed "death squads" to liquidate his opponents abroad, particularly in the U.S. and Britain. *Al-Zahf Al-Akh'dar* newspaper, in an editorial on May 21, 1984, reiterated that "the Libyan people are ready to carry out the death sentence against the terrorists and stray dogs (Libyan exiles who oppose Qaddafi)." It added that "the Libyan people are also ready to carry the battle into America and Britain."

American and British officials are not taking Libyan threats lightly, because some Libyan ex-patriates were assassinated in several European cities in 1980 in response to Qaddafi's call for physical elimination of his opponents. The recent threats have aroused anxiety abroad over the direction of the Al-Fateh Revolution, especially Qaddafi's policy of "intervention, subversion and terrorism" that does not show respect for the sovereignty of other nations or the norms of international law. For example, on June 11, 1984, Qaddafi warned the Reagan administration that "we can assassinate and set fires inside the territory of the United States." He also gave American allies in the area "until September 1 to change, or 'revolution' will begin."<sup>91</sup> In a speech in Tobruk on March 28, Qaddafi threatened to "upset the balance" of power in the region unless the U.S. ended its support for Egypt and the Sudan. He admitted that Libya has been supporting

86. *Ibid.*87. *Ibid.*; and the *Washington Post*, May 9, 1984.88. *The Economist*, May 12, 1984, p. 46.89. *The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: The Basic Facts*, (McLean, Va.: The People's Committee for Students of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, September 1982.) p. 61.90. *The New York Times*, December 2, 1981.91. *The Washington Post*, June 13, 1984.



"with all our strength" Egyptian and Sudanese "military and civilian revolutionaries" who are working inside these countries.<sup>92</sup>

## Conclusion

All in all, although Qaddafi has sought to redistribute Libya's national wealth and to bring the masses into the political process, something has gone wrong with his revolution, as there is evidence of growing opposition among the populace. Moreover, recent events have revealed that this opposition is no longer confined to Libyans living abroad; it has also established itself inside the country. It has come from various groups, each harboring its own grievances. In large measure, the opposition is a reaction against Qaddafi's unlimited power. This development has shaken the foundations of the Jamahiriya system, which Qaddafi has laboriously built to reflect his Third Universal Theory; it presents the first serious challenge to Qaddafi's leadership since he seized power in 1969 and has raised doubts about whether his system of government will survive a change in the country's leadership. It seems that his revolution can only be sustained by silencing opposition through intimidation and oppression. It also puts a damper on his claim that his theory is applicable to other nations; his theory has not led to political stability and national unity in his own country.

92. *Ibid.*, April 1, 1984.

## A Look at Books



### **The United States and Libya since the Coup**

Mohamed A. El-Khawas

P. Edward Haley, **QADDAFI AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1969** (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 364 pp., \$34.95.

Since the early 1970s, Libya and the United States have been at odds with each other, taking conflicting stands based on their national interests, political ideologies and policy objectives. Muammar Al-Qaddafi, a revolutionary, nationalist leader, has pursued a militant pan-Arab, pan-Islamic policy that has resulted in a head-on collision with the U.S. in the Middle East and Africa. His nationalism has led him to oppose American military bases or facilities in the region. He has also carried out a systematic campaign to turn the Arab masses against the U.S. and has blamed America's unlimited support of Israel for the lingering Palestinian problem and for the continuing occupation of Arab territories captured by Israel in the 1967 war. Throughout his time in power, Qaddafi's activities have reflected an ingrained ideological dislike of U.S. policies and a readiness to undermine Western interests and allies in the area. The

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resulting, highly mercurial relations between Libya and the U.S. is a subject of thorough, critical scrutiny in Haley's timely book — *Qaddafi and the United States Since 1969*.

Haley's work is the first major scholarly publication probing Qaddafi's foreign policy, a subject which has long been ignored. Haley's contribution is illuminating and is significantly different from John K. Cooley's *Libyan Sandstorm*, which was written by a Middle East correspondent. The controversial nature of Qaddafi's stance gives this book greater importance than most other analyses of Arab and African leaders. Its significance stems both from the questions it asks, and from the answers, however tentative and debatable, it provides.

The book is well written and full of descriptive detail on a broad range of issues. It offers an analysis that is critical to understanding Qaddafi's foreign policy and to assessing the U.S. actions or reactions. This is a herculean undertaking because of Qaddafi's unusual activism in the international arena and the unconventional ways he has promoted his political objectives. Haley seeks to untangle the web of Qaddafi's foreign policy, which has created dilemmas for the U.S. over the years. In doing so, he has analyzed the three different phases in the U.S.-Libya relations: conciliation (1969-1973), restraint (1973-1980), and opposition (since 1980).

The dominant impression that emerges is that U.S. policies led nowhere between 1969 and 1980 and that, since the coming of the Reagan administration, the U.S. has initiated a tough policy toward Qaddafi's Libya. Haley contends that the shift in U.S. policy has come about as a result of (1) Qaddafi's revolutionary nationalism, which manifested itself in increasing hostility to both the U.S. and Israel; and (2) his failure to achieve his policy objectives by conventional means. At the beginning, Qaddafi's turn to "terror" was ignored by the U.S. Later, it forced the U.S. to alter its approach in order to safeguard American interests in the Middle East, to defend its regional allies without getting militarily involved in local conflicts, and to find ways to persuade or coerce Qaddafi to change his policy so that normal diplomatic and economic relations could be maintained. The change in policy, however, has not led to improved relations between Washington and Tripoli as both governments continued to pursue conflicting interests and different political objectives.

The book is divided into three parts, each of which covers a different phase in U.S.-Libya relations since 1969. It offers a microscopic examination of Qaddafi's foreign policy and of U.S. reactions. Part 1 — the briefest — deals with the period between 1969 and 1973, when the U.S. extended a hand of friendship to Qaddafi. It discusses the conflicting theories — conspiracy or blunder — about the U.S. involvement in putting and keeping Qaddafi in power, at least in the early years, and also covers Nixon's refusal to back the oil companies in dealing with demands for higher oil prices by Qaddafi in 1970 and the Shan of Iran in 1971. The account is inclusive because each theory has its merit. It was obvious that the U.S. was interested in working with Qaddafi, who was seen at the time as "a sincerely religious man and an intense Arab nationalist." In addition, American diplomats in Tripoli suggested that "nothing should be done to interfere with what they saw to be Qaddafi's 'natural' anti-Soviet bias" (pp. 4-5). The U.S. also wished to preserve the dominant position of American oil companies in Libya. It was within this context that the U.S. agreed to evacuate its Wheelus Air Force base. Yet, soon after the evacuation was complete, it became evident

that "Libya could never have friendly relations with the United States because of U.S. support for Israel" (p. 24). Finally, in 1972, the relations "soured so badly" that Ambassador Joseph Palmer asked to be recalled because "the Libyan government refused to deal with him" (p. 24). His departure brought an end to this conciliation phase and the U.S. continued to have no ambassadorial representation in Tripoli until diplomatic relations were severed in 1981.

Part 2 is the longest and the most controversial, for it addresses the consequences of Qaddafi's resort to "terrorism, subversion, and intervention." Haley's analysis reveals that 1973 was the key turning point in Qaddafi's foreign policy. P's humiliation at his failure to play a major role in the October War and the oil embargo led him to move toward "terror" to promote his policy objectives. This coincided with his move closer to the Soviet Union which, in the past, he had considered an "imperialist power" (p. 60). This marriage of convenience was hastily arranged to break the isolation Libya had imposed upon itself and to help it acquire more and better arms from the Soviet Union. The latter subject is given a thorough examination in Chapter 4, including a comparison between the military buildup in Libya between 1974 and 1978 and that of such other countries as Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel. The bottom line is that the Soviet Union and, to a much lesser extent, France have supplied Qaddafi with a huge arsenal, far in excess of his country's security needs or of the capabilities of his armed forces.

Haley provides a lucid, if somewhat uncritical, account of Qaddafi's heavy financial and logistical support for armed rebellions in other countries (e.g., the Irish Republican Army and the Muslim secessionist movement in the Philippines) and for terrorist groups that have committed random acts of terror (e.g., the Red Brigades, Baader-Meinhof, etc.). His account is filled with the bizarre tales and speculations espoused by Claire Sterling and John Amos about Qaddafi's linkages with the international terrorist network and the relationship between the Palestinian resistance and revolutionary and terrorist organizations in Europe. Haley relates with relish several James Bond-like stories of Qaddafi-backed activities by the notorious Carlos (Ilich Ramirez Sanchez), the Black September, and several European terrorist groups that were plotting to overthrow Western democracies.

To Haley, Qaddafi's motives for supporting terrorism were clear: "He wished to strike at Israel (and) the West" (p. 49). Thus, cooperation with international terrorism was intended to aid the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel by weakening the West through "the propagation of irrational violence against the West throughout the 1970s" (p. 51). To support his thesis, Haley marshals evidence to demonstrate Qaddafi's strident opposition to Israel, the United States and, later, Egypt. Qaddafi's opposition was intensified when Sadat moved away from the Soviet Union and worked with Kissinger's step-by-step approach to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Qaddafi vehemently opposed Sadat's peace initiatives, including his historic visit to Jerusalem. Qaddafi also was instrumental in founding the Steadfastness and Rejection Front to sabotage the U.S. peace process. He spearheaded the campaign to impose sweeping political and economic sanctions against Egypt for signing the Camp David Accords engineered by President Carter; further, he aggressively campaigned to overturn the accords.

According to Haley, there was another side to Qaddafi's practice of terrorism, a side that was directed towards his enemies among the Libyans, both at home and living abroad. Haley contends that Qaddafi resorted to repression and terror when internal opposition was on the rise. This violence often spread as Qaddafi sought "the physical elimination of the enemies of the revolution abroad" (p. 124). The assassination of some Libyan expatriates in several European cities unravelled the secrets of the Libyan "death-squads" and Qaddafi's strange relationship with Edwin P. Wilson and Frank Terpil, former CIA agents who sold him terrorist technology and know-how. It's alleged that they provided Qaddafi's own terrorist group with training and explosive devices to carry out their activities. This subject is given a thorough examination in Chapters 7 and 8 and is partly based on Seymour Hersh's article published in the *New York Times Magazine* in mid-June 1981.

Haley briefly presents several cases to demonstrate that Libya's intervention in Africa since late 1977 reveals "the sharp 'tilt' toward the Soviet Union that Qaddafi had given his country's foreign policy" (p. 96). He describes the close ties between Qaddafi and Uganda's Idi Amin between 1977 and 1979 that eventually led to Libya's military intervention. In mid-February 1979, 2,500 Libyan troops equipped with tanks and armored vehicles were sent to Uganda to help Idi Amin repel the joint invasion by Ugandan exiles and Tanzanian forces. This Libya rescue mission failed as they, along with Idi Amin, were forced to quit Uganda on April 6-7. A second example was Qaddafi's intervention in Chad, which has been on the rise since 1978. Qaddafi threw his weight behind the National Liberation Front (Frolinat), which was fighting the government of President Malloum. Qaddafi's involvement in Chad's civil war continued until, in 1980, he sent his troops into the war-torn country. A third example was Qaddafi's backing of Algeria's role in the Western Sahara dispute. He provided financial and material assistance to the Algeria-backed Polisario (Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro), which has been waging an armed struggle against Morocco. Haley's valuable but brief account in Chapter 6 sheds light on the extent of Qaddafi's intervention in Africa, which has been increasing in frequency and intensity since 1977.

Haley's analysis shows that the United States paid little or no attention to Qaddafi's policies of terrorism, subversion and intervention between 1973 and 1980. In fact, U.S.-Libya relations were dismal, as the U.S. remained at an arms-length. Both Republican and Democratic administrations expressed their displeasure by imposing mild sanctions against Libya and by increasing military assistance to America's friends in the areas that were directly threatened by Qaddafi. The Ford administration, for example, promised Sadat that it would deter Soviet intervention if Egypt went to war with Libya, a promise that was withdrawn by Jimmy Carter after he took office. Like other administrations, Carter insisted that if normal relations were to be restored, Libya must cease its support for international terrorism and begin to work for a Middle East settlement. Because Qaddafi could not accept those conditions, the U.S. continued to refuse to send its ambassador back to Tripoli and refused to deliver the eight C-130 transport aircraft that Libya had purchased in 1973. In response, Qaddafi solicited the services of Billy Carter and Robert Vesco to cajole American officials to obtain the release of the aircraft. Qaddafi's strange relationship with Billy Carter is covered in detail in Chapter 9.

Haley concludes that "by the fall of 1979, the sources of tension between the

United States and Libya were numerous. They included Libya's attempt to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador in Cairo Herman Eilts; Libya's violent opposition to Camp David; the air skirmishes; the campaign of intimidation and assassination against Libyan nationals living in the United States; Libyan intervention in central and west Africa; and the Billy Carter affair and Libyan efforts to influence U.S. officials. These disagreements had led to a complete diplomatic rupture in everything but name" (pp. 227-228). He further contends that Libya's invasion of Chad in 1980 was the straw that broke the camel's back; it forced the U.S. to change its Libyan policy regardless of the outcome of the 1980 presidential election.

Part 3 of the book chronicles the sharp change in U.S. policy in the 1980s. The Reagan administration initiated a more direct, tough policy that proceeded from its fundamental decision to treat "Qaddafi . . . and his country as enemies" (p. 248). According to Haley, this stemmed from Reagan's commitment to combat "international terrorism." Haley gives a detailed illustration of Reagan's step-by-step campaign "to end Libyan interference with U.S. interests" (p. 248). He argues: "Considered together, the various steps taken to implement the new approach amounted to a coherent set of measures which were systematically applied" (p. 248). American objectives were "to isolate, embarrass, and weaken Libya" (p. 248). If the destabilization campaign "led to Qaddafi's overthrow, so much the better" (p. 248).

In preparation for the campaign against Qaddafi, American officials unsuccessfully tried to persuade their Western allies to join the efforts to isolate Libya and to make Qaddafi's life uncomfortable. This failure occurred partly because European governments do not wholly share American views on Qaddafi's terrorism. For example, France which has been repeatedly trying to avoid a military showdown with Qaddafi in Chad, stated that "it would be an error" to have no relations with Libya. French officials referred to Libyan troop withdrawal from Chad in 1981 as proof that "Libya was no longer expanding into foreign countries" (p. 267). Time eventually proved that the French assessment was erroneous, as Libyan forces invaded Chad again in 1983.

Haley discusses Reagan's get-tough campaign that was initiated to promote U.S. policy objectives. He analyzes the diplomatic, military, and economic measures which eventually led to the severance of diplomatic relations, the aerial clash over the Gulf of Sidra, the preparation for and the imposing of economic boycott as well as the bizarre stories about the Libyan "hit-squad" sent to assassinate top American officials (including the U.S. president), and the alleged CIA plot to get rid of Qaddafi. As he states, "the United States also brought severe pressures on Libya by strengthening its military cooperation with Egypt and Sudan" (p. 279). This cooperation took place prior to and after Sadat's assassination.

This tougher response to Qaddafi's adventurism was taking place for the first time since 1969. Haley's analysis is that the new policy paid off well. "Qaddafi's decision to withdraw from Chad (in December 1981) was only the beginning of a series of defeats and embarrassments that he would have to endure for the next eighteen months. . . . By late 1981 the Libyan dictator had united the United States and so many African, Arab, and European governments against him that he lost all his international leverage." In his isolation, Qaddafi "was compelled

to suffer manipulation and punishment at the hands of others." He was forced to wait for the opportune time "to escape the international strait jacket he had so laboriously fitted for himself" (p. 301). To support his argument, Haley details the many setbacks that Qaddafi has suffered in recent years, including the forced evacuation of the PLO from Beirut following the Israeli invasion in June 1982; the overthrow of the Libya-backed government of Goukouni Oueddidi in Chad by Hissene Habre, "acting with the strong support of Egypt, Sudan, and the United States" (p. 302); and his failure to assume the chairmanship of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

In time, Qaddafi decided to strike back at the U.S. and Israel. He financed Syria's purchases of Soviet missiles; brought about closer coordination with the Soviet Union; invaded Chad again in 1983; and shipped weapons to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Haley comments that his military assistance to the Sandinistas "showed his determination to confront the United States in a way that hit close to home and was particularly galling to the Reagan administration" (p. 316).

Haley's scrutiny of Reagan's resort to hostility sheds light on the measures taken by the U.S. to limit Qaddafi's ability to damage U.S. interests. He concludes that "the policy of calculated hostility and stern retribution adopted by the Reagan administration is more effective in curbing Qaddafi than the previous approaches of the U.S. government, which were based on friendship and indifference" (p. 322). He believes that "Qaddafi can cause too much harm to be ignored." He therefore recommends that "the only real choices . . . appear to lie between the all-out hostility of the Reagan administration and a policy more akin to that of the French — downplaying the areas of disagreement, not throwing the survival of Qaddafi's regime into question, stressing a willingness to return to business as usual after each collision" (p. 322).

Although the book is informative, there are some major shortcomings. First, the formal division of the study is arbitrary and gives rise to some inconvenience. The second shortcoming related to the book's source material is more serious. The author relied mostly on material printed in English, and made extensive use of interviews with American officials, especially in the State Department. No Arabic sources were utilized except those already translated into English. No interviews with Qaddafi or other Libyan officials were conducted to seek their clarification or interpretation of the U.S.-Libya relations. This raises questions about whether the analysis is balanced or whether it is influenced by the judgment of American officials who had plenty of opportunities to express their views.

Despite these limitations, the book provides a useful account of Qaddafi's foreign policy and the U.S. reactions. Although he furnishes no startling new information, he accomplishes what he set out to do: to add his voice to the growing criticism of Qaddafi in the U.S. This excerpt from the Introduction is quite revealing:

Libya is a small country. Whatever its wealth or the ruthlessness of its leaders it has not and will never play a leading role in Middle Eastern and African affairs. The description of Qaddafi's foreign policy in this book will in itself lay to rest many of the exaggerated fears of Qaddafi (p. 12).

This statement is debatable because Qaddafi's sympathizers use the same data and reach a very different conclusion.

## ***A Contrast of Two North African States:***

### ***Morocco and Libya***

Paul E. LeRoy

William Spencer, *HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF MOROCCO*, African Historical Dictionaries, No. 24 (Metuchen, N.J. and London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1980), pp. 152, \$11.00, hardcover.

Lorna Hahn, with the assistance of Maureen Muirragui, *HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF LIBYA*, African Historical Dictionaries, No. 33 (Metuchen, N.J. and London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1981), pp. 116, \$10.00, hardcover.

These two volumes, part of the ongoing helpful series entitled *African Historical Dictionaries*, edited by Jon Woronoff, published by the Scarecrow Press, are designed to assist Africanists and especially new students by supplying carefully prepared basic introductory reference materials and informative data, heavily stressing relatively recent current events. These generally start with stated objectives, a listing of abbreviations and acronyms, a very sketchy but usually helpful chronology and a table of contents; most include a short but interesting historical and cultural introduction. But by far the most important parts are the dictionaries and the bibliographies, not all of which, regrettably, are annotated. Sometimes the volumes end with several appendices. If there is any major weakness it tends to be a lack of an adequately prepared overall historical perception.

Two lands could not be more alike and yet different than Morocco and Libya. The former has a long continuous line of independent Moslem Arab Berber achievements that stretch from Idris I as Imam and King of the very first Moroccan Dynasty all the way to the present Sultan King Hassan II. The latter on the other hand was never truly a united political or national identity until the accidents of rival diplomacy of World War II. At best it had both an autonomous status and a Sanusi Religious brotherhood only to be later suddenly transformed by the 1969 coup led by Qaddafi into a strange blend of socialistic Islamic Pan-Arabism fed by the wealth of new-found oil. Both states are very strategically

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located with resources of significance to the West. Both are a part of the Arabic Moslem and African worlds. Both had been under the control in varying degrees of European political and economic sovereignty. Both today have enlarged meaning to the United States; Libya due to its foreign policy and oil, Morocco due to its phosphate and key location.

William Spencer and Lorna Hahn have in their respective volumes supplied future students of Africa and Islam with considerable helpful introductory data, particularly with their dictionaries and bibliographies. Spencer's volume is of particular value in his careful list of the dynasties of Morocco, his glossary, his elaborate chronology and in his balanced annotated bibliographic references. Both have very solid listings in their dictionaries. Hahn, especially, appreciates the significance of geographical influences and has several informative appendix materials. She also seems to have a more balanced if sympathetic view, whereas Spencer seems to be a little too optimistic regarding the Polisario and the possibilities of a violent overthrow of the monarchy.

Morocco, so enriched by a lengthy heritage amply endowed with numerous historic cultural sites, complex sophisticated customs, refined arts and architecture and innumerable written records, is a fine case study for Americans unaware of that part of the world, for whom it still calls up the romantic legends and myths of the Hollywood Casbah and the movie "Casablanca." Hopefully a meticulous use of Spencer's volume will redress these with more accurate facts and analysis.

Spencer through his list of dynasties, his chronology and his introduction carefully traces the roots of Morocco dating from Idris I. Briefly explaining the Roman heritage (but not Carthaginian or Phoenician) he presents the reader with the Islamic penetration, the clash of Arab-Berber cultures, the rise and fall of other dynasties, the interlude of European controls and finally the birth of independent modern Morocco under Mohammad V and Hassan II. Particularly sensitive to the interplay of the attempts of the distant Caliphate to perpetuate Arab supremacy over remote provinces and non-Arabic peoples, he establishes the basis of Berber revolt and discontent, which needed and found a religious and political leader in Idris as King and Imam. He describes the rise of Fez but fails to mention the meaning of the site of Moulay Idris, the first truly Moslem Moroccan town and the tomb of the dynasty's founder! There are always difficult problems of selecting and omitting data — places, events and persons — in a work of this scope, it is regrettable that he leaves out the role of the Sanhaja Chief Yahya and of the conquests of Abu Bakr in the sudden dramatic rise of the Almoravides climaxing with Yusuf Ibn Tashfin [Tashufin]. Passing rapidly through the cyclical rise of the Almohades of Ibn Tumart he traces the later dynasties, large and small, but virtually ignores the Saadian whose brilliance founded Meknes, ousted the English from Tangier and even temporarily seized distant Timbuktu on the Niger! His treatment of the Alawi is far more accurate and comprehensive. The bulk of his well written introduction describes the late 19th-20th centuries conquest and rule by France and Spain but fails to explain the role of Marshal Lyautey following the signing of the Treaty of Fez. He then traces rather more carefully the rise of resistance noting Abd al Karim, the rise of the Sultan, the Berber Dahir and the exile and return of the Sultan. The rest deals with the problems inherited by Hassan II with his constitutions, his political opponents, the attempted coup of 1971 and finally the "Green March" culminating in the Polisario establishing the de facto Sahrawi Republic. He was wrong

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however to state that Morocco was the 'last' African state to have been seized by Europe — in view of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia.

The dictionary which follows is one of the better comprehensive listings inclusive of important biographical sketches, explanations of leading terms, parties and institutions, and descriptive thumb sketches of key places and battles. But though some of the items tend to be well rounded like the careers of Abd al Aziz, Abd al-Karim and Al Maydani Glawi or the descriptions of places or institutions such as Agadir, the Architecture, Education and the city of Fez, some others were either too sketchy, notably those on the Al-Andalus, the Almoravids, the Jews and the career of Ibn Khaldun, and some were left out altogether, including many of the French Resident Generals, key Berbers like Yahya and Abu Bakr, and the site of Moulay Idris. There is moreover one key error, p. 98, where he confused Ibn Tumart with Yasin on the Sanhaja Almoravid.

Spencer's bibliography, with its numerous works in English and French, is well organized and supplemented by use of some Arabic sources. Their value is enhanced by helpful annotations. He has carefully combined fine if dated histories, pamphlets, articles, magazines, travel descriptions, documents and research guides as well as bibliographies. But several key works are omitted, including Paul Azan's *L'Expédition de Fez (1924)*, Robin Bidwell, *Morocco Under Colonial Rule (1973)*, Marshal Lyautey's *Du Role Colonial de L'Armée (1900)* and Rene Leclerc's *L'Armée Marocaine (1905)*.

Unlike Morocco which has retained so much of its traditional Berber and Moslem ways, Libya has been severely uprooted by both the sudden impact of the wealth of oil and the output of the intriguing mind of the fiery Muammar Qaddafi. Therefore the task of Lorna Hahn has been to somehow overcome potential Western hostility by presenting a fair account, without appearing overly sympathetic. This is not an easy task in view of the extreme emotions born of Muammar Qaddafi's alleged connections with global terrorism, financed by oil resources and ironically with the earlier participation of the U.S. C.I.A., or at least its present or former agents.

Opening with a brief list of acronyms and a chronology of political events that begins with the date 24 December 1951, Hahn follows with an abbreviated historical introduction containing too many gaps. The importance of Libya's geographic stage with its three key regions of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan, as well as the problems associated with aridity and high temperatures are noted. This is followed by a rather too sketchy survey of the coming of the Phoenicians and the Greeks but virtually ignores the link to the west via Tunisia starting with the Carthaginians and the more limited link to the east to the Sais dynasty of Egypt, which continued in the Ptolemy era. Not carefully acknowledging that Rome conquered and administratively ruled Libya in two parts, with very little penetration to the south, she notes the coming of the Vandals but omits the later Byzantine return or the presence of early Christianity led by St. Augustine in Tripolitania or of the Jews in eastern Cyrenaica. Observing the coming of the initial Arab conqueror under a wrong date of 630, she fails to mention either Amr ibn al As who conquered Egypt for the Caliphs or even his nephew Uqba Ibn Nafi. Then, completely ignoring the Aghlabid rise and influences, she turns to the Fatimid and their satellite the Zirids, emphasizing the tragic consequences of the destruction caused by the nomadic Bani Halal and Bani Sulim

sponsored by the Fatimids [who had moved to Cairo] as an act of revenge against the Zirid revolts. She practically by-passed the Turkish conquests to center upon the reign and significance of Ahmed Karamanlis' autonomy. With no reference to the War with the U.S.A. in 1803 or even the years of piracy, and their consequences, Hahn by-passed Turkish reassertion of authority and the subsequent events of the Turkish Italian Wars that terminated in the vague terms of the Treaty of Lausanne. Ironically there was not a single mention of the rise of the Sanusi order in the Introduction; though to be fair these gaps are in part later covered in the body of the text of her dictionary. Observing the long bitter resistance led by Idris I as well as the events of World War II, the best and clearest part of her introduction deals with the coming of independence [minus Adrian Pelt], the rule of Idris I, the coup of 1969 and the Third International Treaty of Qaddafi as published in the *Green Book*.

The dictionary, the major portion and purpose of this volume and series, is far more solid, informative and clear. The subject contents attempt precision, if at times sketchy and at other times rather repetitive, covering important topics, crisis, events, personalities, places and ideals. Particular key stress is placed upon post Independence 1951 with a large proportion therein dealing ably with Qaddafi, his officials, his staff and his *Green Book*. It is here that Hahn is at her best, doing fine descriptive summations not presented in or almost passed over in the introduction.

Since Libya attracted relatively little attention prior to the Al Fateh 1969 coup, Hahn's bibliography overwhelmingly stresses recent political events that are updated. The greatest weaknesses here are lack of adequate reference materials dealing with the earlier era or of materials and references from medieval, Turkish or even American Jeffersonian works. The references in the bibliography after an all too brief general section are divided into history, essentially Turkish, Italian, the U.S. role, and King Idris; politics, domestic, international and official publications; economics inclusive of oil; social sciences; sciences; and finally bibliographies and references. Her series of books, documents, articles, basically English, were introduced by a brief review. It is unfortunate that the interesting Libyan Saadstorm, *The Complete Account of Qaddafi's Revolution* by John K. Cooley came too late. A number of references are somehow left out by Hahn like the journal *Jeune Afrique*, John K. Cooley, Baal, Christ and Mohammed: Religion and Revolution in North Africa, Christopher Rand, Making Democracy Safe for Oil, John Mason, *Island of the Blest: Islam in a Libyan Oasis Community*, or even basics like *Facts on File* or *Keesings Contemporary Archives*.

Hahn's work ends with two appendices, one on current officials and the other on the proclamation of the People's authority March 2, 1977. All in all the work is helpful, thorough and stimulating — a must for all libraries.

## **Libya's Oil:**

### **Multinationals, OPEC and the State**

Alex E. Esparza

Frank C. Waddams, *THE LIBYAN OIL INDUSTRY* (London: Croom Helm, Ltd., Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, 1980) 338 pp. hardcover \$30.00.

In this book Frank Waddams develops a thorough and objective analysis in the economic, political and social context of the Libyan oil industry. Of key importance to the author are the relationships among the multi-national oil companies, OPEC and Libya. As Libya became aware of its world status as one of the premier producers of light weight sulfur-free crude oil, it moved to make major changes in international oil development practices, pricing strategies for the OPEC nations, and an improved standard of living for Libyans, as well as develop and maintain the activities of a socialistic and military state.

One of Waddams' primary topics is an in-depth discussion of the negotiating processes between the Libyan government and the oil companies. This discussion shows how complex and difficult Libyan laws and customs are. Initially, the oil companies gained the advantage in Libya's oil development policies and practices, but during the early 1970s Libya assumed increasing control of its oil resources. The independents who had not paid their share of royalty payments in the early 1960s and who had limited oil production outside of North America were seen as easier targets by the Libyans and were the first to be forced to leave. However, Libya realized that the major oil companies were needed to discover and manage the production of its oil resources, so Libya granted them favorable treatment. The most notable results from this policy were the discovery of the Augil and Idris oil fields by Occidental Petroleum.

Throughout the book Waddams depicts the Libyan economic and political process as a series of intuitive decisions with the results almost always being favorable. In the early 1960s Libya gained entrance into the western European markets by being the lowest priced oil exporter. Later, the environmental properties of low-sulphur fuel were realized by the United States and an additional market with a premium price became available. Another major economic event which affected the Libyan economy positively was the appreciation of the Libyan dinar relative to an inflating U.S. dollar. Since Libya set oil payment in dinars, real oil receipts increased. For the other oil exporting countries who pegged payments to the U.S. dollar, an erosion of real oil receipts was experienced.

Libya was instrumental in the development of OPEC by showing the oil exporting countries how to organize and gain control of their oil resources through political pressure. With OPEC gaining control of oil price setting, the role of Libya

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was directed toward remaining competitive in the world oil market. Through OPEC Libya was able to coordinate its price levels with other members thereby enabling Libya to pursue a desired sales volume.

The author briefly reviews the economic performance of Libya and identifies the reason for its modest growth despite a stable and significant source of oil income. Limitations to Libyan growth include lack of capital, limited fertile and well watered land, and a poor political climate to attract skilled labor and managerial expertise. Probably more important is the decision by Libya to expend substantial sums of money for military equipment.

Future prospects for Libya's oil industry indicate that fundamental changes are on the horizon. With the demand for oil falling, the limited potential for an effective oil embargo, declining Libyan oil production and little incentive to explore Libyan oil reserves by oil companies, Libya will probably experience increasing economic and political instability.

## **The Legality of Libya's Claim to The "Aouzou Strip" Examined**

Victor T. Le Vine

Bernard Lanne, TCHAD-LIBYIE, La querelle des frontieres. (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1982), 251 pp., 68 F.F., softcover.

Part of the background of Chad's interminable civil war is Chad's boundary conflict with its northern neighbor, Libya. Libya's military intervention in Chad has focussed on the so-called "Aouzou Strip," but the issue is much broader and goes back much further than 1973, when, with President Tombalbaye's acquiescence, the Libyans occupied the Strip. At the beginning of the 19th Century, Libya constituted the last vestige of the Ottoman empire's African holdings. When France and Britain were delimiting their respective zones of influence in North Africa, the Turks made counter-claims which, however, no one took seriously at the time. The same claims were advanced by Italy, then by the regime of King Idris I, and today, Col. Khadafy, in turn, argues Libya's "historic rights" in the region.

Lanne traces the complex permutations of the Chad-Libyan frontier dispute, including a detailed examination of the various treaties concluded on the subject, and argues that Libya's claims are without foundation.

The value of this book lies in the fact that this is the first full-scale treatment of the subject. Though Lanne's discussion is almost entirely legalistic — readers seeking analysis of the Chadian war must look elsewhere — the book does help in an understanding of the reasons for Libya's involvement.

Victor T. Le Vine is Professor of Political Science at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri.

## **The Other Sadat**

Shawky S. Zeidan

David Hirst and Irene Beeson, SADAT (London: Faber and Faber, 1981) 384 pp., \$19.95, hardcover.

During his tumultuous eleven years as Egypt's President, Anwar Sadat stunned the world by a series of spectacular foreign policy surprises. Lionized in the West as an indefatigable peace seeker, he won the Nobel Prize in 1979. Nowhere did his star shine more brilliantly, however, than in the U.S. where he became "something of an American hero" (p. 296). President Carter praised him as "the world's foremost peacemaker" (p. 297). And Henry Kissinger, who once dismissed him as a "bombastic clown," now pronounced him "the greatest since Bismarck, extraordinary" (pp. 152, 350). To be sure, the ascendance of "Egypt's donkey" (p. 48), as he used to be called, to the ranks of eminent world leaders was an impressive saga.

Yet, in this extremely critical volume, completed just before Sadat's assassination, an altogether different story is told. Its British authors, Middle East correspondents to the *Guardian*, paint a bleak picture of the Egyptian leader, a picture scarcely known in the West.

On a personal level, in the first place, Sadat's claim to be a simple *fellah* (peasant) scrupulously guided by the "ethics of the Egyptian village," is refuted by the authors' cogent argument that, in fact, he had an obvious "predilection for all things monarchic . . ." (pp. 219, 212). Thus, whereas Nasser continued to live in the same modest house as before the Revolution, Sadat had ten villas in various parts of the country. In contrast to his predecessor's simple tastes and impeccable integrity, he was an eccentric, flamboyant showman who was implicated in some questionable financial deals. His flexibility, admired by some, is here condemned as opportunism and cynicism. In sum, the authors conclude:

Sadat the man had certain shallow gifts. He was an actor. He had the gambler's flair. But, above all, he was the consummate opportunist. For . . . there was no diety that he would not dethrone, no principle that he would not abjure, no direction change, friend abandon, enemy embrace. He struck no attitude of which, in his real self, he was not the antithesis. He was constant only in his inconsistency. (p. 354).

In the economic sphere, Nasser's Arab Socialism was superseded by Sadat's "Infitah" (the Opening) or laissez-faire. Arab capital plus Western technology plus Egyptian labor would lead to economic growth, Sadat believed. But, regardless of inducements and assurances, foreign investors were deterred by Egypt's proverbially sluggish bureaucracy, her inadequate communications

1. Sadat's "guiding principle," another observer writes, is "the acquisition of power." [Michael I. Handel, *The Diplomacy of Surprise: Hitler, Nixon, Sadat* (Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 253.]

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system, and, not least, by the still volatile political climate. Moreover, Sadat's separate peace with Israel led to Egypt's isolation in the pan-Arab system and the cessation of aid from oil-rich countries. This was offset, however, by Western aid, oil exports from recently recovered Sinai fields, tourism, Suez Canal revenues and remittances from expatriate labor. In 1980, in fact, there was a balance-of-payments surplus, the authors acknowledge (pp. 334-335).

Yet, the gulf between the "haves" and "have-nots" grew even wider. Income maldistribution was so skewed as to make a mockery of Sadat's promise that "Peace plus *Infitah* equals Prosperity" (p. 233). Indeed, the regime's unbridled free enterprise system spawned a rapacious "new class" of profiteers, unscrupulous middle men, and "parasites" whose ostentatious lifestyle and conspicuous consumption contrasted starkly with the increasing pauperization of the vast majority (p. 230). At the upper levels of the new class stood the "fat cats," a narrow stratum of "exceedingly wealthy men" (p. 217). At its apex were the few Presidential intimates such as construction tycoon Othman Ahmad Othman, a.k.a. "Sadat's Bebe Rebozo" (pp. 213, 216). Nepotism, corruption and decadence were the hallmarks of the regime, the authors argue. This contention is bolstered, I think, by recent press accounts of indictments against some key figures including the President's own brother, Ismat.

That Sadat's spectacular foreign policy mesmerized the West is evident. But this "marathon, one-man show" (p. 214) did little to alleviate the poverty, urban congestion, housing shortages and other problems of the people. As "trick followed inferior trick," they write, it became difficult for the President and his "galla-galla men" — as his aides are disparagingly referred to here — to assuage popular discontent by yet more propaganda, slogans, and make-belief. (p. 141). "Oh Hero of the Crossing," demonstrators were shouting during the 1977 riots, "Where is our Breakfast?" [sic] (pp. 231, 244). Without doubt, this was an ominous portent of the regime's festering economic problems.

In the political realm, Sadat boasted with considerable exaggeration, of having established "a state of institutions" where competitive elections, a multi-party system, and a free press assured "freedom and democracy" (pp. 182, 243, 246, 333). In reality, Hirst and Beeson argue, his political system was merely an "arbitrary form of democracy-by-decree" (p. 246) where the press parroted governmentally approved lines, and political parties were intermittently suppressed or banned. As to the frequent referenda, the authors scoff at the predictable outcomes of such inane exercises. While not disagreeing with these criticisms, I still attach some significance to Sadat's experimentation with a multi-party system for the first time since the mid-1950s. Overall, the authors' discussion of political change leaves a lot to be desired, in my opinion.

By contrast, the authors present a penetrating analysis of Egyptian foreign policy. Sadat is commended for his deft orchestration of the concerted Arab effort during the October 1973 War. But they are severely critical of his inability to properly exploit the resulting "shift, at Israel's expense, in the balance of power..." (p. 168). His blunders in the post-war negotiations, Hirst and Beeson argue convincingly, stemmed from certain weaknesses of his personality. For example, Kissinger's masterful stroking worked wonders on his peculiarly susceptible subject. Characteristically impetuous, Sadat too quickly accepted the American step-by-step formula which called for a territory-for-peace tradeoff between Israel and her Arab adversaries. Instead of courting Moscow as a

counterweight to Washington, he put all his eggs in the American basket. A compulsive gambler, he was betting everything on the ability and willingness of the U.S. to extract adequate concessions from Israel. But, in view of America's "deep-rooted predilection for Israel" (p. 173) and the powerful Zionist lobby, Sadat's gambit was enormously risky, and probably naive.

Furthermore, Sadat's impatience and his penchant for dramatic solo performances had disastrous consequences for Egypt, the Middle East region, and the chances of comprehensive peace. Characteristically, he took such momentous decisions as the Jerusalem visit without consulting his advisors, Parliament, or other Arab leaders. In Israel, by contrast, "every decision required the approval of the Cabinet, and eventually the Knesset" (p. 182). His "stealthy, go-it-alone diplomacy," the authors argue, polarized and enfeebled the Arab World, isolated Egypt, and made Israel more intransigent (p. 170). When the Syrians, PLO or other Arabs criticized him, he responded intemperately, with "sneers and insults" (p. 338). His detractors, he insisted, were mere "dwarves and ig-noramuses" (pp. 341-342, 347).

It was understandable, then, that most Arabs reacted to his assassination with "unrestrained jubilation" (p. 12). In sharp contrast to Western shock and grief, Egyptians themselves remained surprisingly calm, even indifferent. When Nasser died, it is instructive to remember, millions filled the streets in "unforgettable scenes of spontaneous, tumultuous grief and lamentation" (p. 14). Whatever might be said of mass fickleness, this is a sobering testimony. It must be most disquieting to those who see Sadat as a prophet of peace and paragon of morality.

Several criticisms must now be made. In my view, the volume's most serious flaw is that by constantly accentuating the negative aspects and slighting the positive ones, it presents an unbalanced account of Sadat. At times, the authors' reliance on flimsy evidence leads them to outlandish conclusions, for example that "Sadat was a hired assassin of King Farouk himself" (p. 73). In other instances, their contentions seem dubious or unconvincing, for example their statement that "Nasser never really trusted him." (p. 77). That Sadat, the impetuous gambler and adventurer, was in the movies during the 1952 Revolution may be ironic, but to suggest that this was a "precautionary guile" (p. 78) on his part seems unwarranted and untenable. Finally, I found the hypothesis of Sadat's "Nasser complex" (p. 59) rather intriguing. Unfortunately, it is presented far too sketchily. In general, the weakest sections of the book are those discussing Sadat's childhood and his relationship with Nasser.

In summary, Hirst and Beeson have written a fascinating, engrossing and readable book. Despite some shortcomings, it merits serious consideration. In the final analyses, it represents a useful antidote to the exaggerated praise that masquerades as so much objective, unbiased political analysis.



## Oral Histories of Urban Egyptian Women

Connie L. Shoemaker

Nayra Atiya, *KHUL-KHAAL* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1962), 177 pp., \$11.95, paper; \$20, cloth.

## A Study of Moroccan Ethnopsychiatry

Aaron Segal

Vincent Crapanzano, *THE HAMADSHA, A Study in Moroccan Ethnopsychiatry* (Berkeley: University of California Press; 1981) 258 pages, \$8.95 paperback.

The Hamadsha are one of many Moroccan religious brotherhoods. Their devotees and followers specialize in a form of public ceremonial therapeutic healing based on dance and music which helps individuals to achieve ecstatic trances, sometimes involving self-mutilation. The Hamadsha are followers of two mostly legendary 17th century saints whose tombs near the city of Meknes are the subject of annual religious pilgrimages. The saints possess *baraka* or good fortune through blessings which the Hamadsha adepts are able to help transfer to the ill, many of whom once cured become Hamadsha followers or members.

First published in hardbound in 1973 and now available in paperback, this book is both excellent ethnography and stimulating medical anthropology. It contains a detailed and graphic account of Hamadsha pilgrimages, and ecstatic dances (*hadras*), an incisive analysis of the differences between the Hamadsha groups based in the Meknes bazaar and the more flamboyant and less sex-segregated groups that have sprung up in the Meknes shantytowns where rural attitudes prevail, and a clear account of the psychic forces and beliefs that drive the Hamadsha, especially the mythic she-demon figure of Aisha Qandisha, source of evil and suffering, whose powers are transformed into beneficence by the hadra.

The Hamadsha cure works for a variety of non-organic illnesses including paralysis of the limbs, depression, infertility, and menstrual difficulties. The author speculates that the Hamadsha are able to relieve the tension in an extremely male-dominated society between a son's total dependence on his father and the ideal of male self-assertion. Those cured normally join the Hamadsha and periodically repeat the dance, trance, and self-mutilation; thus adding to their status among the Meknes poor but arousing scorn among educated Moroccans. It is good to have this sensitive and fascinating book in paper but the publisher should have asked the author to update the new edition.

Aaron Segal is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Inter-American Studies at the University of Texas at El Paso.

*Khul-Khaal* comprises five oral histories which document the struggle of women to survive in the economic and social battles of the most heavily-populated city in Africa. Written by a native Egyptian who spent her teen and early adult years in the U.S., the stories are told by contemporary Cairene women who are members of the city's impoverished lower to lower-middle classes. The book includes the histories of Dunya, whose impetuous marriage and subsequent divorce lead to a childless second marriage; Om Gad, who cares for her seven children in addition to assisting her husband with his work of polishing and cleaning cars; Suda, a literate Sudanese woman who works as a housekeeper in an upper-middle class Egyptian home; Alice, an educated Christian woman who engages in charity work but professes a "blind hatred for men, in general"; and Om Naeema, the fifty-year old wife of a fisherman who relates not only her own story but also that of her daughter's failed marriage.

Since these histories are fairly literal translations of tape-recordings made over a period of the author's acquaintance with the five women, they are episodic in style with repetitions and re-workings of important incidents which are reminiscent of inscriptions on Pharaonic tombs, representing a tableau of everyday scenes, a progression of birth, life and death events.

For all of these women, the true business of life begins with marriage, symbolized by the *Khul-Khaal*, the ankle bracelets of heavy silver or gold which are worn by married women. With the complicity of female relatives, young girls are prepared for marriage by the clitoridectomy. As Dunya explains, "We are told that circumcision is necessary because drinking the water of the Nile as a child makes a girl passionate when she grows up. So this helps her get hold of herself so that she doesn't tire her husband or need these things if she's widowed or divorced."

The intricacies of arranging a suitable marriage are climaxed by the ritual display of virginity when the bridegroom punctures his bride's hymen with a gauze-wrapped finger. "Blood has to come out. It stands for honor . . . a girl's honor is worth the world. Her happiness is built on it," Om Gad states. Childbirth, the desire for male children, the death of babies in their first years, the failure of some women to conceive — all of these events are reiterated by the women who have experienced them, women whose potential for understanding "is born into them from the beginning." Their understanding of life is tempered by a fatalism which emerges only after the women have exhausted possible solutions to their problems.

Connie Shoemaker is a founder of the Spring Institute for International Studies, Denver, Colorado, and author of *Ma'alesh: Verses from Egypt*.

It is evident through these histories that Cairene women differ from other women in the Moslem world in that economic necessity has led some of them into the world of work. Men in Egyptian society would seldom admit to performing any part of a woman's role, but a woman can perform the earning function if it is necessary or if she has time after family duties are completed. Both Om Gad and Om Naeema help to bring in family income and Dunya and Suda also work. These women, however, do not necessarily consider work an advantage for "it is better for a woman to stay home. If a husband cares for his wife properly, he never lets her go out of the house to do anything."

Although these stories do not represent all of Egyptian society, which includes some of the most educated and liberated women in the Arab world, they do allow lower-class Egyptian women to speak for themselves in voices that are both proud and anguished. These rich, personal histories, with the addition of a perceptive and detailed Foreword by anthropologist Andrea Rugh, make Khul-Khaal an important contribution to the growing number of publications which seek to promote an understanding of Arab women's roles.

## ***The Changing Sahara: An Extended Overview***

Richard L. Smith

J.A. Allen, ed., *THE SAHARA: Ecological Change and Early Economic History*, (Wisbech, England: Middle East and North Africa Studies Press, 1981; Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983) 145 pages, illus. \$13.50, paper.

This volume consists of papers presented during a seminar at the School of Oriental and African Studies, the University of London, in October, 1978. It first appeared in England in 1981 and as of May, 1983, has been distributed in the United States by the Westview Press. Under the list of participants there are fifty-three names but the volume contains only seven papers, three under the heading of Ecological Change and four under Early Economic History of the Sahara, accompanied by an introduction from the editor. The focus ranges from the broad synthesis of Alayne Street and Francoise Gasse's "Recent Development in Research into the Quaternary Climatic History of the Sahara" and Thurstan Shaw's "The Late Stone Age in West Africa," to reports from specific research sites such as that of C.B.M. McBurney in northeast Libya and A. Gautier in southwest Egypt. Most of the evidence comes from geological and archaeological sources, although in her contribution, Sharon Nicholson makes good use of historical accounts.

\*Before Present

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The theme underlying most of this collective work is that the Sahara's climate is not static: from the origin of the desert core in the late Pliocene, through the Pleistocene, Holocene, and historical periods, there have been a number of long term climate cycles containing many short term fluctuations, with large departures in temperature and rainfall from year to year and over short distances. These articles focus on the three most recent cycles beginning with a dry one from about 35,000 to 15,000 B.P. during which the desert encroached as far as 10°S and dunes extended into the Niger and Senegal Rivers. This was followed by a wet cycle lasting until about 4,000 B.P. during which lacustrine conditions existed and there was a great expansion of animal, plant, and fish life into the Sahara. In the final cycle the Sahara entered the process of desiccation once again. However it must be remembered that these are very general trends: Street and Gasse make the case for a wet period around 24,000 B.P., Gautier finds four oscillations between 9100 and 5800 B.P., and Nicholson notes numerous episodes of wetter or drier conditions from the sixteenth century to the present. It should be noted that the causes of these changes are not a major topic — the only substantial reference is to the relationship between glacial expansion and drier conditions.

The second half of the book examines man's adaptation to the changes in the Sahara with the most interesting suggestions coming from G. Barker and Shaw. Barker speculates that the deterioration of the Sahara beginning around 4,000 B.P. forced men to turn from hunting and gathering to cattle pastoralism as a more efficient way of using grazing and water supplies. Shaw sees a similar change, this one being from fishing and grain gathering to grain farming. Of course in both theories the adaptation proved to be temporary as the continued desiccation later forced both new economies out.

This is a useful work but a note of caution, if not criticism, should be included. In the forward the editor states: "The present selection of essays offers some of the work for a wider audience." This should not be construed to mean that this book will appeal to a wide audience. It contains much information on the nature of the evidence and how the evidence was used, but much less than what a wide audience might expect on what the evidence means. After all, reading a series of papers that have been presented at a seminar is not usually the most direct way to extract basic information.

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## *The Unhappy Legacy*

### *of Contemporary Uganda*

R.A. Obudho

G.N. Uzoigwe (ed.), *UGANDA: The Dilemma of Nationhood* (New York: NOK Publishers, 1982), 373 pages, Paper U.S. \$8.75, Hard Cover U.S. \$20.00

This is one of the latest in a series of books about the increasingly important country that has attracted world attention since former President Idi Amin ruled Uganda in the 1970s. *Uganda: The Dilemma of Nationhood*, is a micro-study of the phenomenon of keeping a nation-state together. According to the editor, "it is the agonizing story of the making of an African nation through sixty-eight years of British colonial rule and eleven years of political sovereignty under indigenous rulership... (the book also) explains what happened by recreating the historical movements that made possible the rise of Idi Amin." (p. xi) The book supplements and up-dates Kenneth Ingham's *The Making of Modern Uganda* (1958) and David Apter's *The Political Kingdom of Uganda* (1961) only up to 1973. For the analysis of the social and economic forces that were responsible for the rise and fall of Idi Amin, one has to read Uzoigwe's book with Mahmoud Mamdani's *Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda* (London: Heinemann, 1983) in order to appreciate the political geography of Uganda into the 1980s.

In order to achieve the above mentioned objectives, Uzoigwe divided the book into three major parts, namely, background: a political and historical survey; the making of Uganda; and the agony of nationhood. The three sections are further subdivided into ten chapters. The book also has an introduction by the editor, extensive notes and subject and author index, but lacks both a bibliography and place name map of Uganda.

The book was written around the following themes which transcend the whole text, namely, the Buganda problem; traditionalism versus modernism; African lingua franca; ethnicity; the encroachment of socialism, and military politics. Chapter one on Uganda society and politics, and chapter two on the historical geography of Uganda up to 1900, are both written by Donald Denoon. Both give historical background to the major themes outlined above. The three authors

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3rd Quarter, 1984

have a succinct analysis of the geopolitical history of Uganda. In chapters three and four, the editor analyzes, in greater detail, the constitutional and political developments in the former kingdoms of Buganda, Toro, Ankole, and Bunyoro-Kitara against the background of their colonial histories. Uzoigwe focused his analysis on the Agreements of 1900 (Buganda and Toro), 1901 (Ankole), 1933 (Bunyoro-Kitara) and 1955 (Buganda and Bunyoro) as well as how these agreements affected Britain's declared policy of developing Uganda as a unitary state.

In chapters five and six, Oliver Furley discusses the historical, political, and constitutional developments of the Uganda Legislative Council from 1921 to 1961. He shows how the legislative council could have been made to work hand-in-hand with the pre-colonial legislative bodies or councils. Benoni Turyahikayo-Bugyema traces the development of mass nationalism in Uganda from 1952 to 1962. He concludes that the British discouraged mass political movements in Uganda at the national rather than local level. But with the onset of independence in early 1960's, the Kabaka Yekka (King only), Uganda Peoples Congress, Uganda National Congress, and Democratic Party, were the major political parties that ushered Uganda into independence. The internal self-government of Uganda from March 1961 to October 1962 is analyzed by Phares N. Mutibwa in chapter eight, while in chapter nine, Dent Ocaya-Lakidi discusses in detail the administration of non-kingdom states of Uganda from 1949 to 1972. Lastly, in chapter ten, Martin R. Doornbos concludes the book by analyzing the military politics of Uganda, which was initially introduced by Milton Obote's "move to the left" via the Common Man's charter. It is Obote's move towards socialism that helped General Idi Amin's rise to power.

I would say it was his effort to unite the country which culminated in removal of the four kingdoms and the Kyabazingo of Busoga that led to Amin's rise to power. Amin was given special powers as the head of the army not only to tear down the physical evidence of the kingdoms but also to suppress any element of opposition. The move towards socialism was made by Obote to justify his actions on the kingdoms and to stay in line with his friend Nyerere's Arusha Declaration.

Except for a few minor weaknesses which the editor explained very well in the preface, this welcome addition to the burgeoning literature on Uganda is objective and scholarly. The book is edited well, and by Uzoigwe, who is not only the authority on Uganda history, but also the general editor of the 'Studies in East African Society and History' for the NOK Publishers International. Perhaps the editor should consider writing a book on the topic instead of editing one. Hopefully, Uzoigwe will help to establish a new trend of scholarship that will fill this academic gap and thus help African scholars to better understand the growth of statehood of Uganda from a combination of the four pre-colonial kingdoms and other diverse ethnic groups. I highly recommend the book to all students of African history and geopolitics.

## **Neo-Colonialism and the Fascist State:**

### **Amin's Uganda**

David S. Cownie

Mahmood Mamdani. *IMPERIALISM AND FASCISM IN UGANDA*. (Trenton, N.J., Africa World Press, 1984), pp. 115; \$15.95 hardback, \$6.95 paperback.

Eight years of rule by terror were ended in 1979 when Ugandan rebels and Tanzanian troops toppled the Amin dictatorship. After nearly a decade of economic decline, severe state repression, and terrible personal insecurity, the fascist regime had fallen. Because the Amin regime has been the subject of a number of studies, many are familiar with the horrors it unleashed upon Ugandans. The complete disregard of the Amin government for human life and liberty is well documented. Yet Mamdani has not given us another book detailing the atrocities committed by Amin and his henchmen. He has not dwelt on the sensational. Rather, he has provided us with an historical discussion of the factors which led to the rise of fascism in Uganda, and how it managed to survive as long as it did. In the course of this discussion he issues a damning indictment of neo-colonialism, the argument all the more effective coming from someone who has suffered, and has seen other Ugandans suffer, from its effects.

Mamdani opens his presentation by detailing the underdevelopment of Uganda through British colonial rule. Economically, this entailed turning Uganda into a reservoir of cheap raw materials (mostly cotton and coffee) for Britain while serving as a market for its finished goods. The effects of this were the rise of labor migration, the alienation of peasants from their land, the destruction of local crafts industries which competed with British exports, and the siphoning of surplus from Uganda to England. Politically, underdevelopment entailed the establishment of a state structure which would ensure continuity in British-Ugandan relations. Mamdani effectively documents the transformation of Uganda from a colony to a 'neo-colony', characterized by continuity in the relationships between the former colony, Uganda, and the metropole, England. The relationship is maintained, according to Mamdani, both by internal class structures and continued Western imperialism. His argument is fairly well-substantiated by the evidence he presents, and is consistent with the findings of a number of other Africanists. Yet Mamdani takes the argument one step further when he deals with the rise of fascism in Uganda. Fascism, he argues, arises from crises which occur in the capitalist world system, and can surface in either imperialist countries or, as in the case of Uganda, in a neo-colony. It is a final effort by imperialism to resolve its internal crises before revolutionary change occurs. In Uganda, ex-

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exploitative classes linked with imperial interests vied for power while brutally repressing threats from dominated classes. The ultimate outcome was the fascist Amin dictatorship.

To support his argument, Mamdani turns to a discussion of the policies of the Amin regime and its links with imperial powers. Attention is focused first on the evolving nature of class interests within Uganda, from the expulsion of the Asian population to the rise of the *majumangi* — those who enriched themselves from the declared 'economic war', and secondly on the subsequent economic, social and political crises. This is followed by a review of the changing links between the dominant classes and the imperial powers. Mamdani outlines the growing dominance of the United States in the Ugandan export market, the growing links of the Soviet Union with the Ugandan military, and U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and British intelligence links with the infamous State Research Bureau and Public Safety Unit.

Yet such ties are only attempts to control the direction of a fascist regime, a task which becomes harder to accomplish as the regime begins to devour itself. This is why, Mamdani asserts, fascism is a last resort solution imposed by imperial interests attempting to undermine revolutionary tendencies in a neo-colony. It cannot long serve the interests of imperialism, and thus loses its support base. Ties with other neo-colonies, such as Uganda's well-known Libyan connection, simply delay the downfall of a fascist regime. In this respect Mamdani's assertions may have a degree of external validity which contain frightening implications for other countries in Africa and elsewhere, for fascism is the product of factors not internal to a country such as Uganda, by rather the product of contradictions in the capitalist system itself.

Despite the provocative nature of Mamdani's book, readers will be discouraged with its brevity; those who have had the opportunity to read other works by Mamdani will be especially disappointed. The book could easily have been three times its present length of just over one hundred pages. Readers are frequently left wondering what the thrust of the argument is, and are often forced to make uncomfortable conceptual leaps.

These limitations aside, Mamdani gives the reader an intriguing account of the evolution of Uganda as a neo-colony, and provides a challenging thesis regarding the origins and survival of fascist regimes. It serves as satisfactory support material for the serious study of the phenomena of fascism in Uganda and elsewhere in the periphery.

## **The Overthrowing of Idi Amin:**

### **An Analysis of The War**

Peter F.B. Nayenga

Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey: *WAR IN UGANDA: The Legacy of Idi Amin* (London: Zed Press and Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Company, Inc., 1982) xviii + 244 pp., \$16.95 hardcover, \$9.95 paper.

This work traces the origins, course, and effects of the war that broke out between Uganda and Tanzania from October 9, 1978 to June 3, 1979.

By 1978, Amin had turned against individuals who were once so close that they were considered untouchable. At the center of the conflict was the Vice President Mustafa Adrisi's desire to rid the army and government of non-Ugandan elements, particularly Sudanese. There was also the deteriorating state of the economy which made it difficult to import luxury consumer goods for the army.

Amin ordered an invasion of Tanzania in October, 1978, allegedly because the latter planned to overthrow his government, but more likely, to divert attention from internal problems. Tanzania, at the time preoccupied with the "Rhodesian question," had assumed that the Mogadishu Agreement signed in 1972 had ended hostilities between the two countries and was taken unaware. Consequently, Amin's soldiers easily occupied the Kagera salient and systematically killed Tanzanians and destroyed their property.

What started as a border clash now turned into a full-fledged war. The Tanzanians' first responsibility was to repel the invaders. This operation proved difficult because the destruction of the Kagera River bridge at Kyaka meant that repairs had to be made before the Tanzanians could recross the river. Once the bridge was repaired on November 24, 1978, it became relatively easy to expel Amin's soldiers from Tanzania.

There was, however, the question of ensuring that the Ugandans would not repeat their invasion. It was partly out of that consideration that President Julius Nyerere ordered his forces to cross into Uganda on January 21, 1979, and secured the high ground at Mutukula, over-looking the Kagera salient. This operation, which took three weeks, provided two important lessons to the Tanzanians: that since a friendly civilian population could provide important intelligence information, loss of civilian lives and property had to be minimized and secondly, the disorganization and cowardice of the Ugandan soldiers showed that Amin's army was not invincible.

Perhaps if the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had met President Nyerere's demands that Amin renounce his claims over Tanzanian territory, apologize for the invasion, and pay for the damage inflicted in the Kagera salient, and had condemned him for his invasion, the war could have ended at this point.

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However, President Nyerere also faced pressure from Ugandan exiles based in Tanzania who had been fighting Amin since 1972 and saw this as a golden chance to topple his regime. There was also the danger that should Tanzanian forces withdraw, the Ugandans who had welcomed them would be killed. These forces motivated Tanzanian soldiers and Ugandan exiles to pursue Amin's soldiers into the interior of Uganda.

The war was carefully planned before any attack on strategic positions. Because the Ugandan army was mechanized the Tanzanians used tactics that made Amin's troops ineffective. For example, the Tanzanian invasion of Masaka followed this strategy:

There were two routes from Minziro, where the 207th was located, to Katera. The first, and easiest, was down the main road, but this would have brought the Tanzanians directly into the gunsights of Amin's tanks. The second route, the one that was chosen, was via the narrow footpath through the swamps on the edge of the lake. (p. 70).

By following a careful and cautious strategy, the Tanzania People's Defense Forces (TPDF) overwhelmed Amin's troops, and in succession, took the important towns of Mbarara, Masaka, Lukaya, Mpigi, Entebbe, Kampala, Bombo, Jinja, Tororo, Mbale, Soroti, Lira, Hoima, Fort Portal, Gulu and Arua, moving from the southwest in a wide circle to the east, then back to the extreme northwest.

The war cost Tanzania \$500 million and 373 men. The Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) which assisted the Tanzanians lost 150 soldiers. The rough estimate of Amin's casualties (including the Libyans who fought on Uganda's side) was 1,600 killed. Additionally, Tanzania lost approximately 1,500 civilians in the Kagera salient and "about 500 Ugandan civilians were killed accidentally or intentionally by both sides during the course of the war." (p. 196)

There was also property damage. The towns of Mbarara and Masaka, for example, were almost completely destroyed, and in the euphoria which followed the fall of Kampala on April 11, 1979, jubilant Ugandans looted shops and offices previously owned by Amin's people.

Prisoners were set free because the Tanzanians did not have the food to feed them and because some had been jailed only for political "crimes" committed against Idi Amin. However, as the authors note, the release of hardened criminals contributed "heavily to the state of lawlessness that was to prevail in Uganda for years after the fall of Amin." (p. 151)

On the political front, the Tanzanians' desire to avoid being perceived as a foreign army of occupation made them urge Ugandans to form a government under the umbrella of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLAF). The UNLAF constitution "provided for a weak presidency, with the real power including that of making ministerial appointments, resting with the National Consultative Council." (NCC, p. 197)

This is a well-written book, largely devoid of misspellings of African names and places. Considering the amount of material covered, it contains no serious factual errors. The provision of a glossary, maps, and a good index further simplifies what otherwise would be a complicated story to follow.

The book is a tribute to the Tanzanians and Ugandans who liberated Uganda from Amin's bestial rule. The authors clearly highlight the various roles played

by individuals and organizations in toppling Amin's government. The book also makes the important observation that those who fought deserve special commendation because it had become clear that no amount of external political or economic pressure or moral condemnation was likely to end the internal oppression.

While the authors do an excellent job examining the central role played by the TPDF, their analysis of the UNLA's role is sometimes sketchy. One reads more of its mistakes than its initiatives or successes.

Amin's internal and external support explains why his government could not have otherwise been overthrown without force. The book reveals in detail the network of Amin's foreign supporters which included Kenya, Libya, Britain, Israel, Russia, and the USA. (p. 25) This assortment of strange bedfellows provided the necessary lubricants to sustain Amin's system between 1971-1979.

The authors' analysis of the role played by foreigners in Amin's Uganda would have been strengthened considerably had they clearly identified the individuals they interviewed, cited the information collected from local newspapers and Amin's dreaded State Research (SRB), referred to some of the numerous earlier publications on Amin's Uganda, and provided a select bibliography at the end of the book.

The book also glosses over or ignores individuals who were critical to Amin's internal support system, Amin's ruthless henchmen, Isaac Maliyungu, Ali Towellii, Hussein Marella, Farouk Minawa, Abdul Nasur, Kasim Obura, and Francis Itabuka, are either briefly mentioned or omitted altogether, and yet their knowledge (or lack of it) of the local situation made it possible for foreign donors to identify Amin's potential and imaginary enemies.

The authors, however, dispel successfully the thesis that President Nyerere wanted from the outset to install Dr. Obote as leader of Uganda. They argue convincingly that Dr. Obote's ascendancy to power was due to the inability of Yusuf Lule and Godfrey Binaisa to handle the NCC and Dr. Obote's own charisma and nationalistic outlook which appealed to a large spectrum of voters during the 1980 election. In other words, Nyerere was presented with a *fait accompli* and was left with the nasty choice of ordering the TPDF to fight the UNLA — individuals with whom they fought Amin's forces.

Unfortunately, the authors fail to examine why some Ugandans have gone to the "bush" to fight against President Obote's government. Are their grudges based on old hatreds or on post-Amin politics? This question is particularly important because the Commonwealth observers who monitored the 1980 election certified that it was "fair." There is also the fact that some of the individuals fighting against Dr. Obote's government were not defeated at the election by Dr. Obote's Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC), but by the Democratic Party (DP).

These shortcomings notwithstanding, this work remains one of the best books written on contemporary Uganda. The authors must be congratulated for writing an objective book on Uganda, a most difficult task because it involves discussing emotional contemporary issues many of whose partisans are alive and either friends or enemies of the authors. The governments of Tanzania and Uganda deserve commendation for allowing the authors to conduct their research unmolested and publish the book unedited.



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## Publications

1. **WORK FOR JUSTICE** is the title of a thoughtful eight page quarterly produced in Lesotho by *Transformation: A Resource Centre for Justice and New Community in Southern Africa*. The first issue appeared in July 1983 and No. 5, published in November 1984 carried the sad news of the road accident deaths in July that year of *Transformation's* founders and guiding spirits Jimmy & Joan Stewart. The remaining three members of the collective are persisting in publishing the newsletter, sponsoring conferences throughout Southern Africa, and carrying on the humanitarian work for justice and peace that the Stewarts pioneered. Articles cover a wide variety of subjects — forced relocation, refugees, dependency, hunger, self-help, labor organization, etc. The orientation is socially concerned Christianity. Subscriptions to **WORK FOR JUSTICE** are available for "a small donation; a photograph; a suggestion for an article; ideas; comments; references . . ." "Since each issue received in the U.S. comes with a colorful 40s Lesotho stamp, we suggest that overseas readers make that small donation at least \$10. The address is Transformation Resource Centre, P.O. Box 1388, Maseru 100, Lesotho.

2. Recent new publications of the *International Defense and Aid Fund* are a reprint of Robben Island life-timer Govan Mbeki's 1964 classic, **SOUTH AFRICA: The Peasant's Revolt**, which is available both in hardback at £7.50 or US \$16 or paper at £3 or US \$6.70; and **MASSACRE AT MASERU: South African Aggression Against Lesotho**, which is *Fact Paper on Southern Africa No. 12*, 36 pp., 50 p. or £1.35. An earlier release (1983) which we failed to announce at the time is **CLASS AND COLOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA 1850-1950** by Jack Simons, 702 pp., £5 or \$12. Also available are a poster of the Freedom Charter (23 3/4 x 17 1/4 inches), 75 p. or £2.20; and an LP recording of traditional & political Namibian songs, entitled "Namibia Will Be Free" by SWAPO's Onyeka (The Torch) Cultural Group, £5.50. All items with dollar prices can be ordered in North America from IDAF US Committee, P.O. Box 17, Cambridge MA 02138. Readers elsewhere, and anyone ordering the recording, should order from IDAF Publications, Canon Collins House, 64 Essex Road, London N1 8LR England.

3. The *Centre of African Studies* at the University of Edinburgh has a new "Occasional Papers" series, the first four titles are: **THE END OF EDUCATIONAL SELF-RELIANCE IN TANZANIA?** by Kenneth King (36 pp.); **A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICA**, by Chris Allen (41 pp.); **EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN EASTERN AFRICA**, by Kenneth King (30 pp.) and **THE PERCEPTION AND UTILIZATION OF MORAMA AND OTHER FOOD PLANTS BY THE NHARO OF WESTERN BOTSWANA**, by Alan Barnard (53 pp.). All papers are £1.50 (US \$2.50) including postage except the last paper, which is £2.00. Write: The Secretary, Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, Adam Ferguson Building, George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LL, Scotland. Also inquire about the Centre's publication list for 1984-85.

4. The monthly bulletin of the *Research and Information Centre on Eritrea, ERITREA INFORMATION*, provides up-to-date news and analysis of the war in the Horn of Africa. **RICE** also distributes Books, Bibliographies and other materials on Eritrea. A subscription for "Eritrea Information" is \$8.00. For more information or to place a subscription order write: Research and Information Centre on Eritrea, P.O. Box 1295, Cathedral Station, New York, NY 10023.

5. We have just become aware of *Africa Communications Institute, Inc.*, a non-profit tax-exempt organization created to coordinate and disseminate news and information on Africa. The Institute has a monthly publication, AFRICA PRESS INTERNATIONAL, which uses correspondents in Africa and North America and print and broadcast media as sources of information. In addition, the Institute sponsors conferences and seminars and advisory services on Africa. Subscriptions for AFRICA PRESS INTERNATIONAL are \$37 for individuals, \$150 for institutions. Dr. Inyessah A.S. Iyator is the contact person and the address is 1377 "K" Street, Washington D.C. 20005.

6. *Oxfam America's* latest publication in its FACTS FOR ACTION series in "Southern Africa: The Price of Freedom." This 12 page publication discusses the effects of both apartheid and the drought, and links together the political, economic, and environmental pressures facing the region. Copies are available for 50 cents each, and for orders of 10 or more, 30 cents each. Order from: Oxfam America, 115 Broadway, Boston, MA, 02116.

7. PRIORITIES: A REVIEW FOR DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVES is a new magazine published by the *Interdisciplinary Study Group on Development and Underdevelopment* at the Department of Political Sciences at York University. The first issue (Spring '84) of this biannual magazine is 51 pages, and includes, among others, the following articles: "On Carrots and Sticks: The Vertical Axis of Containment" by Fernando Garcia; "Spaces of Hope: Reassessing Democracy and Development" by Alejandro Rojas; "Cooperation as a Strategy for Rural Development" by Philip Chilome and "Imperialism and National Liberation in Africa" by Munyonzwe Hamalengwa. Each issue is \$4.00. Write: Managing Editor, Priorities, Dept. of Political Science, York University, 4700 Keele St., Downsview, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3.

8. A new publication, SWAHILI LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY: NOTES AND NEWS has been created as a communication network for all those interested in Swahili. The newsletter is edited by members of the *School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*, and the *Institute for Afrikanistik, University of Vienna*. The newsletter will appear once a year in August, containing personal and professional news submitted by readers. Subscriptions are Austrian Shs. 50/per copy, although SLS may be sent free of charge to those who find it difficult to finance a subscription due to foreign exchange restrictions. Write: Swahili Language and Society: Notes and News, c/o Institut für Afrikanistik der Universität, Dohihoffg. 5/9 a 1010 Wien, Austria.

9. Those interested in the study of Kiswahili who are also conversant in Italian may wish to acquire KISWAHILIUNA LINGUA PER L'AFRICA DI DOMINI by Gian Luigi Martini which is available at L6.000 from E.M.I. della Cooperativa "Servizio Missionario", Via Roncati 32, 40134 Bologna, Italy.

10. Also of interest to linguists is a series by Routledge & Kegan Paul, *Languages of Asia and Africa* in 1981 with the SWAHILI LANGUAGE: *A Descriptive Grammar*, by E.N. Myachina, 86 pp., as Volume 1. The price is \$15.00. It should be available through booksellers.

11. An 11 page report entitled HUNGER IN AFRICA is available from the *American Friends Service Committee* for \$1.00 per copy or \$.75 per copy in orders of 10 or more. The report includes subheadings on historical factors, famine and development and implications for U.S. citizens. Write: American Friends Service Committee, Information Services Department, 1501 Cherry St. Philadelphia, PA 19102.

12. The *Africa Fund* has a 5 page pamphlet entitled BLACK DISPOSSESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA: *The Myth of Bantustan Independence*, as part of their *Southern Africa Perspective* series. This particular publication focuses on Bophuthatswana. No price is indicated on the pamphlet, so we assume it is available free of charge. Write: The Africa Fund, 198 Broadway, New York, NY 10038.

## Announcements

The *Association for the Advancement of Policy, Research and Development* invites you to attend a series of international conferences to be hosted by this Association during 1985. Presentations of research papers and panel proposals are solicited from individuals or organizations that want to share their ideas and research on the Third World. For further information, write to: Dr. Mekki Mtewa, Executive Director, Association for the Advancement of Policy, Research and Development, P.O. Box 24234, Washington, D.C. 20024 or call (301) 585-4480.

The *Joint Committee on African Studies of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies* administers a program of activities to advance social scientific and humanistic research in and on sub-Saharan Africa. One component of that program is a set of research planning projects initiated and administered by the committee. The Committee invites proposals for Committee support/sponsorship of research planning activities. For more information write to: Social Science Research Council, 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 or call (212) 661-0280.

A new way to see Africa is offered by *Bicycle Africa*, David Mozer, Director, 4247 135th Place Southeast, Bellevue, Washington 98006; Telephone (206) 746-1028. Tours are planned, beginning in October, for Cameroon, Liberia, Niger, Tunisia and Kenya.



## Coming Events

An exhibition of *African Masterpieces from the Musée de l'Homme* is at the National Museum of African Art, Smithsonian Institute, 318 A Street N.E., Washington, D.C. 20560. The brochure we received gives only April-June as the dates, but the last announced special program is June 10th.

The *Canadian Association of African Studies* will meet jointly with The Canadian Association of Latin American & Caribbean Studies May 15-17, 1985 at McGill University, Montreal, Quebec. The theme is "South/South." For more information contact South/South Secretariat, 3450 University Street, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 2A7; Telephone (514) 392-6744; Telex 05268510.

California State Polytechnic University, Pomona will hold a major conference on *African Agricultural Development: Technology, Ecology and Society*, May 28-June 1, 1985. For more information contact African Agricultural Development Conference, c/o School of Arts, California State Polytechnic University, 3801 West Temple Avenue, Pomona, California 91768-4051 USA.

The *Eighth Annual African Studies Association of Australia and the Pacific Conference* is to be held at Bergman College, The Australian National University from noon on Saturday, the 24th August, 1985 to the evening of Monday, 26th August. The Annual General Meeting will be on Sunday evening and the Conference Dinner on Monday evening. For further information regarding the upcoming conference, contact conference organizer, Dr. David Dorward, History Department, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria 3083, Australia.

The *Black Woman Writer and the Diaspora: Hidden Connections* is the theme for an international literary conference to be held at Michigan State University, October 27-30, 1985. The deadline for paper or panel suggestions is April 15, 1985. Address submissions and suggestions to Professor Linda Susan Beard, Department of English, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824.

The 28th Annual Meeting of the *African Studies Association* will be held jointly with the Middle East Studies Association at the Hyatt-Regency Hotel in New Orleans, Louisiana from November 23rd through November 26th, 1985. The Program Chair is Professor Edmund Keller, Black Studies Department, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106. (Phone 805-961-3847.) The proposal deadline was April 15, 1985. For further information write ASA Annual Meeting, 255 Kinsey Hall, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024. The 1986 ASA Dates and location are October 30-November 2 at the University of Wisconsin, Madison

## Books Received

### Political Science

AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS edited by Domenico Mazzeo. (Cambridge University Press, 1985) 265 pp. cloth \$42.50.

BLACK AND REFORMED: *Apartheid, Liberation and the Calvinist Tradition*. Alan Boesak. (Orbis Books, 1984) 167 pp. paper \$8.95.

THE IMPENDING CRISIS IN KENYA: *The Case for Land Reform*. Diana Hunt. (Gower Publishing Co., 1984) 314 pp. cloth \$38.95.

PRETORIA'S PRAETORIANS: *Civil-Military Relations in South Africa*. Philip H. Frankel. (Cambridge University Press, 1984) xxii + 215 pp. cloth £22.50.

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