

# **AFRICA TODAY**

## **Dependency Theory, Social Class and Development**

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**William Hansen & Brigitte Shulz**

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## Editor's Note


The single article which we present in this issue is much longer than those we usually publish, but we feel the thoughtful and carefully developed analysis which it presents is one which deserves careful study by all who are concerned by Africa's dilemma of underdevelopment and dependency. The article also focuses less exclusively on Africa than does our usual fare — although there are abundant examples drawn from the African experience. In this case we regard this as a strength rather than a weakness, as the problem under discussion cannot be dealt with adequately within the confines of a single continent. We are grateful to William Hansen and Brigitte Schulz for sharing this important study with us, and with you.

We have learned that it is not always possible to keep our promises. In this issue we have reneged on one in order to try to keep another. You will not find a "Publications" section in this issue, although my editor's note in the Sudan issue promised one. We found that the book reviews already in type and ready to go, plus the article, filled our available space, making it possible for us to get this issue on the press within five weeks of its predecessor. If, as we expect, 28/4 can be produced in a similar time span, we will finally have fulfilled a long-standing promise to catch up on our publication schedule, and that issue will contain both a publications section and a "books received" section, as well as an important exchange of correspondence on Angola, and our annual index.

As you are aware, we were forced to raise our subscription prices on November 1st. Since this issue should have appeared in August, we are offering a final opportunity to readers to enter a new subscription or renew at the old rates, but do it now! We can't accept any orders after December 31st at these rates, and then only those that come on this order form.

Again in this issue, as in 27/3, we are illustrating some of our pages with photographs of recently issued stamps from African countries. The photographs are supplied to us by the Intergovernmental Philatelic Corporation at the United Nations. Collectors may wish to order these series from their local dealers. Featured on this page and page 59 are stamps from Togo for the International Year of the Handicapped. On page 42 Ghana honors World Food Day. A stamp from Cameroon celebrating the 20th anniversary of their reunification appears on page 55. And we wish you all a happy holiday season on page 62 with two stamps from Botswana.

Edward A. Hawley



AFRICA TODAY

## Imperialism, Dependency, and Social Class

William Hansen and Brigitte Schulz

The purpose of this essay is to examine what has become known in the language of post-World War II social science as "dependency theory."<sup>1</sup> Although all variants of this dependency theory are more or less nationalist and anti-imperialist, they are not uniformly socialist or Marxist. That is to say, many of those working within the broad category of dependency theory are not fundamentally anti-capitalist. Thus, they do not articulate a socialist program for breaking the constraints they see as being responsible for poverty, backwardness, stagnation, and underdevelopment.

In the writings of these non-socialist or "bourgeois-nationalist"<sup>2</sup> writers, the problem was seen merely as the domination of weaker economies by stronger ones. If this domination could be removed, so would be the economic backwardness that characterizes most of the Third World. The result would be capital accumulation and an independent, autonomous but nevertheless capitalist development. "Independent" or "autonomous" capitalist development should not be equated with some abstract notion of "absolute autarky." Absolute autarky is here understood to mean the complete severing of all economic links that any particular political-economic formation has that extend beyond its boundaries. It is,

1. This paper was originally presented at the weekly Walter Rodney African Studies Seminar at the Boston University African Studies Center under the title "Dependency Theory and its Radical Critics." We would like to thank the members of the seminar who made comments on the paper. We would like particularly to thank in this regard Irene Gendzier, Azinna Nwafor, Jordan Gebre-Medhin, Bill Freund, Ishwer Ojha, Edouard Bustin, David Massey, Sara Berry and Bill Graf. It should be noted that, while always appreciated, their advice was only sometimes followed.

2. "Bourgeois-nationalist" is the term used by Evers and von Wogau to refer to writers such as Sunkel, Jaguaribe, Furtado and Pinto, among others. T.T. Evers and P. von Wogau, "Dependencia: Latinamericanische Beiträge zur Theorie der Unterentwicklung," *Das Argument*, 79 (1973) 415. Also included in this category would be Raul Prebisch and the UN Economic Commission for Latin America. Also see Ian Roxborough, *Theories of Underdevelopment*, (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1979), pp. 27-44.

William W. Hansen is a Research Fellow at the Boston University African Studies Center and is writing his doctoral dissertation, as is Brigitte Schulz, in the Political Science Department of the same university. Her work is a comparative study of the two Germany's in relation to Africa, while her husband (Mr. Hansen) is writing on Zimbabwe.



however, argued that some degree of autochthonous development is necessary if structural underdevelopment is to be overcome.<sup>3</sup>

This is in distinction to most modern bourgeois development theory — dressed-up versions of Ricardo's law of comparative advantage — which argues that the international economic system is and should be "interdependent," that greater economic integration allows "a greater specialization in a wider division of labor and often a better utilization of the comparative advantages of each region or population group."<sup>4</sup> Thus, what characterizes the existing international economic system is not simply a relationship of dependence on the industrialized countries by the underdeveloped world, but a dependence of both upon each other. While this may be true in the broad overall view, the dependency school argues that this relationship is marked by inequality and domination; that the Third World, rather than being characterized by independent capital accumulation, has been subordinated to the needs of the industrialized capitalist countries.

One of the basic assumptions of dependency theory, whether radical or bourgeois-nationalist, is that the existing international economic system is structured in such a way that most of the "social surplus" produced in the Third World is siphoned off through numerous mechanisms such as the international banking system, various governmental or international lending institutions, and transnational corporations headquartered in Western Europe and North America. The rest accrues to a narrow stratum of the population of any particular underdeveloped country; a stratum whose primary function is to act, as it were, as local representatives of international capital and to facilitate the penetration and continued exploitation of the underdeveloped world.

Neither radical nor bourgeois-nationalist dependency theorists advocate "absolute autarky."<sup>5</sup> It is here, however, that their respective strategies for political and economic development diverge. So far as we know, no one who is involved in the discussion of economic development, with the possible exception of P.T. Bauer,<sup>6</sup> advocates the continuation of that condition that has become known as underdevelopment. Either implicitly or explicitly, any discussion of the origins and nature of economic development contains a strategy for its elimination.

3. Dieter Senghaas, "Dissociation and Autocentric Development: An Alternative Development for the Third World," *Economics*, pp. 18, 7-37. For further references see footnote 67.

4. Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, (Englewood Cliffs, 1978), 259. See also Hermann Seutter, "Underdevelopment and Dependence as a Result of Foreign Trade Interdependence: An Economic Evaluation of Dependency Theory," *Economics*, p. 18 (Tubingen, FRG, 1978) p. 136.

5. The Pol Pot regime in Cambodia is, so far as we know, the only country that has attempted to come close to absolute autarky. Albania, despite its relative isolation, still has significant contacts with the outside world.

6. Peter T. Bauer, *Dissent on Development*, (Cambridge, 1972).

The radical<sup>7</sup> dependency school argues in essence that, given the present state of development of the international capitalist system, a broadly based, autonomous, internally-directed capitalist development in the Third World has become, not merely undesirable, but impossible. They thus assert that the only way in which backwardness, stagnation, and poverty can be overcome is through a socialist revolution in which all but those absolutely necessary links with the existing international economic system are broken. It is primarily with radical (socialist/Marxist) underdevelopment theory that this paper will concern itself.

Underdevelopment theory is generally a phenomenon of the three-and-a-half decades after 1945. Prior to this period, most Marxists had concerned themselves with socialism and the struggle against capitalism as it applied to the working class in Europe and North America and the few enclaves outside that area containing a European working class.

Marx himself, of course, had dealt with the "colonial question" — particularly regarding India and Ireland<sup>8</sup> — but it was primarily from the point of view of the effects of imperialism on the prospects for European revolution. Marx, particularly in his earlier writings, looked very positively on the long-term historical consequences of capitalist penetration of the Third World. Marx's view regarding India was that the railroad and modern industry would advance the productive forces there and, as a consequence, bring about the full proletarianization of the Indian society, thus liberating it from the static condition he labeled "Asiatic Despotism."<sup>9</sup> Marx expressed similar sentiments in *The Communist Manifesto*:

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all nations, even the most barbarian, into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarian's intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst; i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In a word, it creates a world after its own image.<sup>10</sup>

In his later work it does appear that Marx was beginning to change his

7. We use the terms Marxist, socialist and radical interchangeably throughout this essay. Thus, we are not including in the term "socialist" those many varieties of vague, nationalist dogmas that go under such names as "African Socialism," "Arab Socialism," "Guided Democracy," "Third International Theory," etc. Neither are we referring to those West European governments and parties that are often referred to as socialist but have, in the course of the Twentieth Century, jettisoned most of socialism's essentials and adopted policies indistinguishable in fundamentals from those classically bourgeois parties and governments.

8. *Inter alia* see Karl Marx, "The British Rule in India," in *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization*, Shlomo Avineri, ed., (New York, 1968), pp. 83-89; "Letter to Meyer and Vogt" (1870) and "Letter to Dr. Kugelmann" (1869) in *Dynamics of Social Change*, Howard Selsam, ed., (New York, 1970), 135-138; *Capital*, I, (Moscow, 1970) pp. 702-716.

9. Marx in Avineri, op. cit. pp. 83-89.

10. Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, (New York, 1979) p. 13.

views regarding the historically positive effect that imperialism must necessarily have on pre-capitalist or "natural economies."<sup>11</sup>

In his famous pamphlet on imperialism, Lenin did not discuss at length the effect of capitalist penetration on peasant societies as he, too, was examining its effects from the point of view of a European socialist. He did touch briefly, however, on one of the key arguments later propounded by many dependency theorists and that is the notion that the super-profits gained through imperialist ventures are used to bribe at least a sector of the European and North American working class into accepting bourgeois hegemony.<sup>12</sup> Lenin quoted Engels as having written that "... the workers merrily share the feast of England's monopoly of the colonies and world market," and then himself wrote: "The imperialist ideology also penetrates the working class. No Chinese Wall separates it from other classes."<sup>13</sup>

Rosa Luxemburg discussed the effects of imperialism on what she called "natural economies" at some length, but again, it was part of a larger work. Luxemburg, however, did begin to discuss the ways in which developed capitalism required, for continued accumulation, the existence of peasant or pre-capitalist economies:

Yet, as we have seen, capitalism in its full maturity also depends in all respects on non-capitalist strata and social organizations existing side by side with it... The interrelations of accumulating capital and non-capitalist forms of production extend over values as well as over material conditions, for constant capital, variable capital, and surplus value alike. The non-capitalist mode of production is the given historical setting for this process. Since the accumulation of capital becomes impossible in all points without non-capitalist surroundings... capital needs the means of production and the labor power of the whole globe for untrammelled accumulation; it cannot manage without the natural resources and the labor power of all territories.<sup>14</sup>

Luxemburg even anticipated some of the later arguments of dependency theory when she suggested that capital accumulation could take place in a setting where the full proletarianization of labor had not taken place — in what she called "predominantly non-capitalist societies."<sup>15</sup> Likewise, she anticipated the dependency argument concerning the "underdeveloping" effect capitalist penetration has:

Yet if the countries of those branches of production are predominantly non-capitalist, capital will endeavor to establish domination over those countries and societies. And, in fact, *primitive conditions allow of a greater drive and of far more ruthless measures than could be tolerated under purely capitalist social conditions*<sup>16</sup> (Italics ours).

11. Kenzo Mohn, "Marx and Underdevelopment," *Monthly Review*, April 1979, pp. 32-42.

12. V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, (Peking, 1970), pp. 123, 125, 128, 152.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 129, 131.

14. Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital*, (New York, 1968) p. 365.

15. *Ibid.* p. 365.

16. *Ibid.* p. 365.

Much of the impetus for radical underdevelopment theory after World War II stemmed from three sources. First, and most importantly, was the obvious inadequacy of so-called "modernization theory." The forces of anti-colonialism, dialectically created by colonialism itself, were brought to a head by World War II. Before becoming U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles wrote:

When the fighting in World War II drew to a close, the greatest single political issue was the colonial issue. If the West had attempted to perpetuate the status quo of colonialism, it would have made violent revolution inevitable and defeat inevitable. The only policy that might succeed was that of bringing independence peacefully to the more advanced of the 700,000,000 dependent persons.<sup>17</sup>

Thus, between 1948 and 1960 most territories that had been under the direct political and economic control of the Western colonial powers reached independence. Most liberal bourgeois thought argued that, now that the legal constraints of colonialism had been broken, the newly independent countries of the world, if protected of course from communism, would inevitably develop along the lines followed by capitalist development in Europe. With independence would come increasing urbanization and education, the adoption of Western political attitudes and structures, increased Western "aid" and capital investment, the consequence of which would be the promised material advance and a "modern" society. The fact that most of Latin America which had been free of colonial rule for over 125 years had not developed in this manner could, of course, not be explained by this overly optimistic theory.

The second source of dependency theory was a felt need to combat the overly mechanistic "theory of stages" that characterized the thinking of most orthodox Communist Parties. This "orthodox" theory vulgarized much of the Marxian model by attempting to turn it into a series of rigid formulae that brooked no deviation from a series of linear steps that supposedly characterized the economic and social history of Europe. Under this scheme, Europe marched directly from primitive communism through successive modes of production characterized as slave, feudal, and capitalist. By extension, all social formations must follow this route. This analysis led to styling the Third World as being feudal, with the next necessary linear step being that of bringing about the "bourgeois-democratic revolution" — a formulation so vague as to be generally useless.<sup>18</sup> This formulation was to have political consequences such as the

17. John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York: 1950), p. 76, quoted in Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth*, (Harmondsworth, 1973), p. 367.

18. This kind of analysis could lead to absurd politics were it pushed to its logical conclusion. Thus one could, theoretically at least, conceive of the left aligning itself with a putative slave-owning class when confronted with "Primitive communism" on the grounds that the slave mode of production was "historically progressive."

South African Communist Party support for the racist white miners in the Rand strike of 1923 (Africans were pre-capitalist while the striking whites were proletarians); support for Chiang's Kuomintang against Mao's Communists in the late twenties; opposition by the official Communist Party to the Cuban Revolution until shortly before its victory. This attitude was characteristic of most Third World "official" Communist Parties until only recently.<sup>19</sup>

The third of these sources of dependency theory was the need to understand why the optimism expressed by Marx in the **Communist Manifesto** regarding the revolutionary role of expanding capitalism had not resulted in vibrant capitalist economies mirroring those of Europe and North America but instead in economic stagnation, increasing poverty, and *advancing* underdevelopment in most parts of the world.

The first section of this paper reviews some of the dependency literature, followed in the second section by a review of the attacks levelled against it by its radical critics. We do not view these two schools of analytic thought to be inherently antagonistic and conclude the paper with an argument for a synthesis of the two. Just as development and underdevelopment are dialectically related, so internal class relations cannot be analysed without looking to their origins and present articulation to the present global system of capitalist production. To ignore or reject as irrelevant either of them would seem to be a mistake of enormous proportion.

## Dependency Theory

Dependency theory, contrary to conventional liberal analysis, argues that "underdevelopment" — that is, stagnation, poverty, unemployment — is not the natural state. Prior to their incorporation into the world capitalist system these socio-economic formations were *undeveloped* insofar as their productive forces were primitive. This, however, is quite different from the condition of underdevelopment as it is meant by dependency theory. Underdevelopment in this sense of the term denotes a dynamic process; a process which began centuries ago but which is still ongoing. In other words, while bourgeois-liberal ideology sees underdevelopment as the original state and a process taking place whose end result is capitalist development, the radical dependency school sees underdevelopment as a condition that is deepening and becoming more pervasive. Samir Amin describes it in the following way:

What is worse is that this definition (liberal development theory) leads straightaway to an essential error: the underdeveloped countries are seen as being like the "developed" ones at an earlier stage of their development. In other words,

19. See, for example, Fred Halliday, "Revolution in Afghanistan," *New Left Review*, 112, (November-December 1978), pp. 20-28.

the essential fact is left out, namely, that the underdeveloped countries form part of a world system, that the history of their integration into this system forged their special structure — which thenceforth has nothing in common with what prevailed before their integration into the modern world.<sup>20</sup>

This process is subsumed in Frank's well-known phrase — "the development of underdevelopment."<sup>21</sup> The basics of this theory of underdevelopment and dependence — argued by Baran, Frank, Amin, Rodney,<sup>22</sup> as well as many others — are the same:

Economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite sides of the same coin. Both are the necessary result and contemporary manifestation of internal contradictions in the world capitalist system . . . One and the same historical process of the expansion and development of capitalism throughout the world has simultaneously generated — and continues to generate — both economic development (in the industrialized capitalist core states) and structural underdevelopment (in the dependent peripheral states).<sup>23</sup>

This process of underdevelopment is seen to have begun gradually with European mercantile expansion beginning in what Wallerstein calls "the long sixteenth century" — 1450-1640.<sup>24</sup> We do not intend here to discuss the Marxist debate concerning the transition from feudalism to capitalism — that is, whether its central dynamic was the dissolution of feudal society due to contradictions internal to the feudal mode of production itself, or whether this transition was brought about by the "discovery" of mercantile wealth infused into northwestern Europe and England, originally from the Mediterranean and then subsequently from the pillaging of Latin America, Africa and Asia.<sup>25</sup>

Suffice it to say here that large amounts of wealth were transferred from the constantly expanding area of newly incorporated regions to the coffers of Western Europe in the five centuries after 1450. Over a century ago, Marx noted the effect of mercantile capitalist expansion, both on the peripheral areas into which it expanded and on the metropolitan countries that reaped the proceeds of this expansion:

20. Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale*, (New York, 1974), p8.

21. A.G. Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, (New York, 1967), chs. 1 and 3.

22. *Inter alia*, Baran, op. cit.; Amin op. cit.; Frank, op. cit.; Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, (London, 1972).

23. Frank, op. cit., p 9.

24. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, (New York, 1976), ch. 2.

25. Regarding the "articulation debate," for the former position see, Maurice Dobb, "A Reply" and "A Further Comment" and Rodney Hilton, "A Comment" in *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism*, Rodney Hilton, ed., (London, 1978); Robert Brenner, "The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism," *New Left Review*, p 104, (August 1977). For the latter view see, Paul Sweezy, "A Critique" and "A Rejoinder" in Hilton. See also Frank, *World Accumulation, 1492-1789*, (New York, 1979); Wallerstein, op. cit. and also his *The Capitalist World Economy*, (Cambridge, 1979); Amin, op. cit.

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signaled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation . . . The colonial system ripened, like a hot-house, trade and navigation. The "societies Monopolia" of Luther were powerful levers for concentration of capital. The colonies secured a market for the budding manufactures and, through the monopoly of the market, an increased accumulation. The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement, and murder, floated back to the mother-country and were turned into capital . . . Today industrial supremacy implies commercial supremacy. In the period of manufacture properly so-called it is, on the other hand, the commercial supremacy that gives industrial predominance . . . Liverpool waxed fat on the slave-trade. This was its method of primitive accumulation . . . In fact, the veiled slavery of the wage workers in Europe needed for its pedestal, slavery pure and simple in the new world.

and

In the same way, the expansion of foreign trade, although the basis of the capitalist mode of production in its infancy, has become its own product . . . through the innate necessity of this mode of production, its need for an ever-expanding market . . . As concerns capitals invested in colonies, etc. . . . they may yield higher rates of profit for the simple reason that the rate of profit is higher there due to backward development, and likewise the exploitation of labor, because of the use of slaves, coolies, etc. . . . Since the rate of profit is higher, therefore, because it is generally higher in colonial country, it may, provided natural conditions are favorable, go hand in hand with low commodity prices . . . This same foreign trade develops the capitalist mode of production in the home country . . .<sup>26</sup>

Thus, from Marx's point of view, Western Europe enriched itself by siphoning off enormous amounts of wealth from the newly incorporated regions but, more importantly, instead of simply consuming this plundered wealth as had previous imperial expansions, it turned this wealth into capital. From the point of view of dependency theory, this plundering not only contributed, on the one hand, to the development of European capitalism, but, on the other, deprived the periphery of wealth that could have been turned to its own development. Thus, it set in motion the "development of underdevelopment" by gearing these peripheral socio-economic formations into the needs of metropolitan capital and creating a structural condition which prevented any other course than underdevelopment. It is this latter factor, not simply the initial plunder, that is crucial to the dependency argument. As Marx also pointed out in this regard, "They [European capital] also forcibly rooted out, in their dependent countries, all industry, as, e.g., England did with the Irish woolen manufacture."<sup>27</sup> In

<sup>26</sup> Marx, *Capital*, I, pp. 703, 705, 711, 712, and III, pp. 237-239.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 708.

a similar vein Ernest Mandel has noted:

While capitalism has spread all over the world, the greater part of the world has experienced only its disintegrating effects without benefitting from its creative side. Indeed, the unlimited industrial advance of the Western world has been possible only at the expense of the so-called underdeveloped world, which has been doomed to stagnation and regression.<sup>28</sup>

The above point by Marx regarding the conscious destruction of all indigenous industry that could serve to compete with expanding capitalism or act as a pole around which the economy of the area being penetrated could group, has been described numerous times for other areas. Rodney makes this point explicitly with regard to pre-colonial industry in West Africa.<sup>29</sup> Baran, among many others, described the process by which the British systematically debilitated the Indian textile industry between 1780 and 1850.<sup>30</sup> Mandel notes that in 1815, British textile exports to India were valued at only £ 26,000, while Britain consumed £ 1.3 million of Indian textiles. By 1850, the Indian textile industry had been destroyed and India imported 25 percent of all Lancashire's exports:

This [India's underdevelopment] results from the fact that capitalism entered this country under conditions of imperialist domination, which transformed India from a producer of manufactured goods into a producer of agricultural raw materials.<sup>31</sup>

In the earlier period both raw and manufactured Bengali cotton and silk had been transported overland to Gujarati merchants and manufacturers but, because of British colonial policy, began to be exported to Europe. This disrupted Indian internal trade and "rendered indigenous merchant capital idle, forcing it to seek refuge in the acquisition of landed property."<sup>32</sup> Having destroyed the textile industry, the British switched from appropriating Indian production to controlling the Indian market for Lancashire production. The consequence was that "during the second half of the nineteenth century, the modern Indian landlord was created and an alliance was formed between him and imperialism."<sup>33</sup>

Thus, not only was the colonial world plundered, it was underdeveloped. Plunder, in its strict definition or in its more rapacious form, has not been the continuing mechanism for the transfer of value from the peripheral areas into which it expanded and on the metropolitan countries that reaped the proceeds of this expansion:

<sup>28</sup> Ernest Mandel, *Marxist Economic Theory*, II (New York, 1971) p. 441.

<sup>29</sup> Rodney, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

<sup>30</sup> Baran, *op. cit.* pp. 277-285.

<sup>31</sup> Mandel, *op. cit.* pp. 446, 447.

<sup>32</sup> Ranjit Sau, *Unequal Exchange, Imperialism and Underdevelopment*, (Calcutta, 1978), p. 38.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 38-40.



this transfer have changed as the needs of capital have changed. Thus, by the last quarter of the nineteenth century, one could distinguish three broadly different circumstances by which this transfer was effected. In Latin America, legally independent since early in the same century, the transfer was brought about on the basis of seeming equality; that is, between seemingly independent national states. In places like India, the Caribbean, Indonesia, and Indochina value transfer was mediated through the colonial state which generally represented only latent force and under conditions of free wage labor. However, in Africa, except for the old coastal enclaves, the process was the same as it had been two and three centuries earlier in Latin America; plunder and forced labor brought about by Europe's capacity to bring to bear superior force. By the end of World War II the mechanisms of control in Africa were similar to those utilized in India three-quarters of a century earlier. Within another two decades Africa, post-colonial Asia, and Latin America (that is, those countries that had not undergone radical change) were all nominally independent but still subject to the transfer-out of value — no longer by outright plunder and pillage or even the forced exchange with the colonial mother country, but indirectly through "free trade" and the mechanism of unequal exchange.<sup>34</sup>

Although much of the social surplus is transferred out, some remains in the form of capital investments such as railroads, industrial plants, mines, and other forms of fixed investments. However, from the dependency perspective, underdevelopment has much more pervasive features: it is the *structure* of the economic system and the *type* of capital accumulation that results which constitutes dependency and continuing underdevelopment; that is, the lack of an *indigenously-oriented* process of accumulation of self-expanding value.

Dependent and underdeveloped economies are generally characterized by three structural features:<sup>35</sup>

(1) Unevenness of productivity between sectors. That is, that underdeveloped countries are characterized by relatively small, highly capitalized sectors on the one hand, and low productivity, backward agricultural sectors on the other. At the same time, the low productivity sectors are subordinated to the world market rather than existing independently as "traditional economies." These backward sectors articulate with the world market in two ways. Firstly, they produce primarily for the capitalist market (exchange values) and only secondarily for their own consumption (use values). They are forced to sell the commodities produced by their labor in order to reproduce themselves. Their subsistence production is not sufficient

34. For various discussions of the concept of unequal exchange, see Sau, *op. cit.* ch. 3; Roxborough, *op. cit.*, chs 4 and 5; Semir Amin, *op. cit.*; Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange*, (New York, 1972).

35. This typology follows that specified in Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale*, pp. 15-20.

to constitute ownership of their own means of reproduction. They are, as it were, semi-proletarianized. Secondly, they constitute in more classically Marxist terms, a reserve army of labor that serves to depress the wages of those working in the highly capitalized sector. Amin argues that in most of the Third World between 65 and 80 percent of the population is engaged in rural agriculture, while in those same countries agriculture constitutes 40 percent or less of the GDP.<sup>36</sup>

(2) Disarticulation of the economic system. That is, that the various sectors of the economy have few if any intersectoral exchanges. Thus, agricultural production is geared into exports rather than for the nation's food consumption requirements. Accordingly, countries with 80 percent of their population engaged in agricultural production are forced to import food. Raw materials are not produced for the consumption of indigenous industry but are instead exported. Indigenous industry, on the other hand, must import most of its capital goods and raw materials.

(3) Domination from the outside. That is, that most production — whether agricultural, mining, or industrial — is geared to conditions obtaining in the world capitalist system as a whole. Foreign capital generally controls the decisive sectors of the economy and the economic decisions of Third World countries are generally circumscribed by externally owed debts and the constantly recurring need to borrow further. Describing financial dependence generally, Amin has written:

The fundamental cause of this is that investments of foreign capital in the underdeveloped countries automatically engender a flow of profit transfer in the opposite direction. With an average rate of return of twenty to twenty-five percent, the flow of profits back to the advanced countries soon exceeds the flow of capital investments . . . .<sup>37</sup>

The local bourgeoisie that developed in the periphery in this process of capitalist penetration was not a "true bourgeoisie," at least in the sense that it did not fulfill the same progressive historical function as had the European middle class in the first three centuries of the development of capitalism. This class did not accumulate, innovate and invest. Instead it functioned primarily as an agent of metropolitan capital to facilitate imperialist penetration. It is what Cabral has called:

. . . . A pseudo-bourgeoisie, controlled by the ruling class of the dominating country . . . thus the local pseudo-bourgeoisie, however strongly nationalist it may be, cannot effectively fulfill its historical function; it cannot freely direct the development of the productive forces; in brief it cannot be a nationalist bourgeoisie.<sup>38</sup>

36. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

38. Amilcar Cabral, "The Weapon of Theory" in his *Revolution in Guinea*, (New York, 1969) p. 101.

Fanon referred to the historical mission of this class as being that of "intermediary":

Seen through its eyes, its mission has nothing to do with transforming the nation; it consists, prosaically, of being the transmission line between the nation and a capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the masque of neo-colonialism . . . Because it is bereft of ideas, because it lives to itself and cuts itself off from the people, undermined by its hereditary incapacity to think in terms of all the problems of the nation and seen from the point of view of the whole of that nation, the national middle class will have nothing better to do than to take on the role of manager for Western enterprise, and it will in practice set up its country as the brothel of Europe.<sup>39</sup>

Having developed a dependent relationship, this bourgeoisie was never able to operate independently; that is, as a bourgeoisie proper. The distorted structure of peripheral capitalism prevented this. Frank has argued, regarding Latin America, that only on those occasions in which the metropolises were experiencing economic contraction was an independent, nationalist bourgeoisie in the peripheral countries able to appear that had intentions of inward-directed capitalist development. However, as soon as the period of contraction ended and world capitalism began another period of expansion, this nascent (true) bourgeois class was shunted aside either through the simple economic power of metropolitan capital and its local allies, or, on those occasions when it was necessary, through the use of force.<sup>40</sup>

### The Critics of Dependency Theory

Just as dependency theory grew out of a dissatisfaction with the explanatory capacity of modernization theory, its radical critics see it as being incapable of explaining the new realities of the post-colonial world. In their attempts to explain such differences in levels of development as those, for example, between Brazil and Nicaragua or Zimbabwe and Nigeria, etc., they have focussed their attention on the historically specific ways in which internal class structures have articulated with imperialism and possible ways in which formal independence has altered these configurations. They have looked more closely at the ways in which local bourgeois classes have promoted their own interests through the use of state power. Finally they have re-opened the traditional Marxist debate discussed briefly in the introduction of attempting to find the locus of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe which gave birth to an aggressive system of expansion and the role which the non-capitalist world played in this expansion.

39. Frantz Fanon; "The Pitfalls of National Consciousness" in his *The Wretched of the Earth*, (Harmondsworth, 1969) pp. 122, 123.

40. Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, op. cit., 65, 66 and *Lumpenbourgeoisie - Lumpen-development*, (New York, 1972), pp. 51-56, 75-91.

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In these attacks the critics argue, *inter alia*, that dependency theory:

1. fails to take into account the internal class and productive structures of the periphery that inhibit development of the productive forces;
2. tends to focus attention on the metropolises and international capital (the existing international division of labor), as they are "blamed" for poverty, stagnation, and backwardness, instead of on local class formation. This misdirects political activity, producing pessimism and political complacency on the part of actual or potential revolutionary classes;<sup>41</sup>
3. fails to differentiate capitalist from feudal (or other pre-capitalist) modes of controlling the direct producer and appropriating the surplus;
4. ignores the productivity of labor as the central point in economic development and thus locates the motor force of capitalist development and underdevelopment in the transfer of the economic surplus from the periphery to the core. This not only distorts history but Marxist theory as well;
5. encourages a "third-worldist" ideology that undermines the potential for international working class solidarity by lumping together as "enemies" both the metropolitan bourgeoisie and working class;
6. holds out the "utopia" of autarky instead of socialism;
7. is static, in that it is unable to explain and account for changes in underdeveloped economies over time;
8. holds that industrialization and thus "development" cannot take place in the Third World, in the face of growing evidence to the contrary;
9. forecloses the possibility that an independent, indigenous bourgeoisie involved in the sphere of production and the accumulation of capital locally can develop.

While many of the above-listed criticisms overlap, it seems that most of the substantial criticisms of dependency theory are covered. For the purpose of discussion, these can be divided into two broad areas; theoretical and empirical. In the former we would include the first six of the above; the last three being empirical objections.<sup>42</sup>

It does seem accurate to say that early dependency writing tended to view underdevelopment in a mechanical and undifferentiated way. The entire world was divided into two categories — the core industrialized capitalist countries of Western Europe and North America and the peripheral countries of the rest of the world. (The socialist countries, of course, were excepted from this scheme.)

In a similar way, the term "Third World," which has been used

41. A Sudanese doctoral student, with a Brazilian colleague nodding in agreement, once emphatically asserted to the authors in all seriousness that Andre Gunder Frank was to be blamed for the 1973 coup in Chile. His argument was that Frank's writings had convinced the Allende government to pay primary attention to American imperialism, thus ignoring Pinochet's thugs who, as it were, sneaked up from behind and overthrew the government. This is not only absurd and slanderous, but also downright stupid.

42. This typology clearly has its deficiencies. Number 6, for example, is primarily a criticism of a political strategy for bringing about a socialist revolution and subsequent socialist construction. Numbers 2 and 5 do much the same. Similarly, critiques that have been placed in one category most of the time include criticisms that have been placed in the other.



throughout this paper, has little specific explanatory value. It is a term whose origins lie in the early Cold War period and was used to refer to all those countries not considered directly a part of the two great Cold War factions — the industrialized capitalist countries and the socialist industrial countries. All those other nations *tended* to be poor, to have a low level of productive forces, and to have a work force involved primarily in agricultural production. Clearly, this kind of a residual typology falls very short of any kind of an accurate description of what this enormous and quite differentiated mass of countries is like. Thus, to include in the same category Brazil with a population of nearly 120 million and 3.3 million square miles of territory and, for example, Tuvalu which consists of 9.8 square miles and a population of 10,000, is clearly approaching absurdity.

Accordingly, dependency theory tended to ignore the vast differences existing between underdeveloped countries. An attempt to deal with this failing has been the concept of semi-periphery. Dependency theory, particularly in the work of Frank, with his concept of a chain of exploitation beginning in the financial centers of world capitalism and extending all the way to a Bolivian peasant, blurred the differences that should be made between geographical relationships and class relationships. Thus, the relations of exploitation existing between, say, the United States and Brazil as national states were seen to be the same as those existing between General Motors and its workers as well as between a Brazilian landowner and the peasants who worked on his land.

However, despite some of these deficiencies, the purpose of the radical dependency model was to develop an explanation as to why, for example, Chile and Brazil after a century and a half of independence were still largely poor, underdeveloped, and satellites of Western capital. That is to say, it attempted to explain why neither the Marx of *The Communist Manifesto* nor bourgeois development theory had been proven correct, not only in Brazil and Chile, but in most of the rest of the world.

### *The Theoretical Critique*

What we have labelled the "theoretical" criticism of dependency theory is, as mentioned above, closely associated with the so-called "articulation debate" — i.e., the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Most of the radical dependency school have argued that the expansion of European merchant capital, beginning in the sixteenth century, set in motion the "underdevelopment" of Latin America; and then subsequently Asia and Africa. This was brought about through a systematic transfer out of the social surplus of these newly incorporated countries, contributing to the further development of the core capitalist countries of Europe and later North America. This out-transfer of the economic surplus has continued

until the present with the result of further underdevelopment, on the one hand, and further development in the core countries on the other.

This view, the critics argue, mislocates the dynamic of capital accumulation which is properly situated in the separation of the direct producers (the peasants) from the means of production (the land). This separation (primitive accumulation) is the result of class struggle internal to the feudal mode of production; that is, the inability of the landlords to increase feudal rent in the face of peasant resistance and ultimately the gaining of freedom by the peasants from feudal dues altogether. The result of this struggle was the appearance of free labor — that is, labor power as a commodity. This appearance of labor power in commodity form allowed (forced) it to be purchased by capital, breaking the resistance inherent in feudal production to technical innovation that could increase the productivity of labor. It allowed the productivity of labor to be increased relatively rather than absolutely and in turn brought about the vast expansion of commodity production characteristic of the capitalist epoch — *development!*

In the words of Robert Brenner, "It is the question of the transformation of class relations and whether or not they are favorable or unfavorable to the development of the productive forces which becomes the central question in analyzing economic development and underdevelopment."<sup>43</sup> In this view, dependency theory is manifestly incorrect in maintaining that underdevelopment in the periphery is brought about by a transfer of surplus to the core which facilitates the core's development. On the contrary, underdevelopment is caused by class relations in the periphery that fetter the development of the productive forces by preventing the complete emergence of free labor power as a commodity. Thus, it is the persistence of feudal (or other pre-capitalist) class relations that have inhibited development in Latin America.<sup>44</sup>

It is this aspect of underdevelopment — the nature of the class forces existing in the peripheral economies that inhibit development — that dependency theory allegedly ignores. Frank, for one, has specifically addressed this criticism:

It is more important to define and to understand underdevelopment *in terms of classes*. However, . . . underdevelopment in a dependent region such as Latin America cannot be understood except as the product of a bourgeois policy formulated in response to class interests and class structure, which are in turn determined by the dependence of the Latin American satellite on the colonialist, imperialist metropolis.

and:

It must be said that . . . dependence should not and cannot be considered a

43. Robert Brenner, "The World Economy: some Problems," paper presented at the *Three Worlds of One? Conference*, Berlin, June 1979, p. 3.

44. Ernesto Laclau, "Capitalism and Feudalism in Latin America," *New Left Review*, 67, (May-June), pp. 19-38.

purely "external" relationship imposed on Latin Americans from abroad against their wishes. Dependence is also, and in equal measure, an "internal," integral element of Latin American society. The dominant bourgeoisie in Latin America accepts dependence consciously and willingly but is nevertheless molded by it. If dependence were purely "external," it could be argued that objective conditions exist which would permit the "national" bourgeoisie to propose a "nationalist" or "autonomous" solution to the problem of underdevelopment. But in our view, such a solution does not exist. . . .<sup>45</sup>

A similar analysis is emphasized in Frank's discussion of "Who is the Immediate Enemy?"<sup>46</sup>

The brilliant Guinean revolutionary theorist, Amilcar Cabral, makes much the same point when he argues that the principal contradiction facing the underdeveloped world is the struggle against neo-colonialism which he defines as "rationalized imperialism" or imperialism's indirect domination maintained through a class of "native agents."<sup>47</sup> Cabral makes it plain that "internal" and "external" factors inhibiting progress do not exist independently of each other; that even after the national flag is raised this dual struggle must go on — thus, the slogan of revolutionary Lusophone Africa — *a luta continua*.

The political result of the dependency view, the critics say, is to turn attention away from the internal class relations of any particular underdeveloped country and focus it on the metropolises which are held responsible for existing poverty. This gives rise to a "third worldist" ideology which locates the struggle on an international plane of the underdeveloped world against the metropolises (which includes the metropolitan working class as they also benefit from the transfer of surplus) rather than that of a struggle of all the world's proletarians and peasants against the bourgeoisie, whether it be metropolitan or peripheral. Given the analytical schema, which states that incorporation into the capitalist world system necessitates underdevelopment, Brenner (as well as others) argues, ". . . the logical antidote to capitalist underdevelopment is not socialism, but autarky."<sup>48</sup>

As mentioned earlier in this paper, we do not intend to go at length into the "articulation" debate. The dependency critics argue that Marx was indisputably clear about what he saw as indispensable to the development of capitalism; that is, the appearance of free labor power as a commodity. In the first line of *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, Marx writes: "One of the prerequisites of wage labour and one of the historic conditions

45. Frank, *Lumpenbourgeoisie — Lumpendevlopment*, op. cit., pp. 1, 3.

46. Frank, "Who is the Immediate Enemy?" in *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution*, (New York, 1969), pp. 371-409.

47. Amilcar Cabral, "Brief Analysis of the Social Structure of Guinea," and "The Weapon of Theory," op. cit. *passim*, but especially pp. 64, 73, 100, 103.

48. Robert Brenner, "The Origins of Capitalist Development," pp. 91, 92.

for capital is free labour and the exchange of free labour against money . . ."<sup>49</sup> However, later in the same work Marx also writes, in discussing the dissolution of pre-capitalist forms:

The process of dissolution which turns a mass of individuals in a nation etc. . . into potential free wage labourers does not presuppose the disappearance of the previous sources of income or (in part) of the previous conditions of property of these individuals. On the contrary, it assumes that only their use has been altered, that their mode of existence has been transferred. . . .<sup>50</sup>

For Marx, it seems, it was not simply the outward forms of labor control but also the underlying relationship to the dominant mode of production that had to be considered. Thus, Laclau's supposed refutation of the dependency thesis<sup>51</sup> simply because Latin America failed to reflect the appearance of free labor power as the dominant form, seems to be a rather mechanical reading of Marx similar to that done by those whom Petras calls ". . . dogmatic Marxist fundamentalists who spend most of their time counting the number of modes of production in a social formation."<sup>52</sup> This imposition on the Third World of the particular historical circumstances surrounding the rise of capitalism in Europe seems manifestly incorrect. Does the simple existence of non-wage payments (for example, to African migrant workers or South African miners) preclude the existence of capitalism? The rather crude argument that makes wage labor the single defining element of capitalism everywhere seems deficient and ". . . an error of historical proportions."<sup>53</sup> A more adequate and comprehensive definition would seem to be that used by Petras:

The process of bringing together labor, capital, and machinery to produce surplus value defines the capitalist mode of production, not the particular forms within which the relations of production are organized.<sup>54</sup>

Regarding the "motor force" behind the transition from feudalism to capitalism, it seems much more accurate to say that Marx saw two factors — an internally-generated primitive accumulation resulting from class conflict and a trade-created externally-accumulated surplus — as having a symbiotic relationship. That is to say, they interacted with each other in the

49. Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, (New York, 1965), p. 67.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 105. See also *The German Ideology*, (New York, 1972), p. 84.

51. Laclau, op. cit.

52. James Petras, *Critical Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World*, (New York, 1978), p. 10.

53. Petras, "Class Formation in the Periphery," in *Critical Perspectives*, p. 66.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 67. This definition by Petras has been criticized on the grounds that it could equally apply to socialist economies. It would seem to us that the use of the term "surplus value" precludes this criticism. Surplus value, in the sense of that term as it is used by Marxists, would not exist in a socialist economy. However, to avoid this criticism we would add to the definition that the surplus value is appropriated privately.

genesis and development of the capitalist mode of production. Clearly, Marx attached great importance to the expansion of trade after the beginning of the sixteenth century. Likewise, it seems indisputable that over the last five centuries an enormous surplus has been transferred out of what is today called the periphery. Even Brenner, one of the dependency school's strongest critics, is forced to concede this.<sup>55</sup>

It is, it seems to us, a question of necessary and sufficient causes. Neither was sufficient in isolation, but both were necessary in combination. Marx argued that "Likewise, as the capitalist mode of production progresses, the expansion of foreign trade, *although the basis of the capitalist mode of production in its infancy, has become of the innate necessity of this mode of production, and through its need for ever-expanded markets*"<sup>56</sup> (our italics). From his early writings to those that were not published until after his death, Marx seems to have made this point clear. In *The Germany Ideology* he wrote: "Trade and manufacture created the big bourgeoisie." He similarly noted that both accelerated the accumulation of movable capital and that both brought about the dissolution of the feudal community.<sup>57</sup> It was Marx's contention that production and commerce had a reciprocal relationship. Only when commerce had secured a world market for large-scale production was "the permanence of the acquired productive forces assured." The impetus for the expansion of the textile industry was provided by commercial capital which, "wrenched it out of the form of production hitherto existing."<sup>58</sup>

Marx, time and again, refers to the extension of commerce consequent upon the discovery of America and the sea route to the East Indies as bringing into Europe new products, including gold and silver, and completely changing existing class relationships which dealt destructive blows to feudal property. The demand created by this new world market was instrumental in calling large-scale industry into existence.<sup>59</sup>

In a similar way, Marx describes the effect of money accumulated through usury and mercantile profits. This wealth in money form he describes as being a prerequisite for capital; in fact, it is money capital accumulated in this way that turns into industrial capital.<sup>60</sup>

Marx was certainly not unwilling to refer to enterprises as capitalist that had been created in the periphery as a result of European expansion,

55. Bréhner, NLR, p. 84.

56. Marx, *Capital*, III, p. 237. Re-translated from the German by Brigitte Shulz.

57. Marx, *The German Ideology*, pp. 79, 75, 80.

58. *Ibid.*, pp. 72, 73.

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 74, 77.

60. Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, pp. 107, 108. See also pp. 109-119.

despite the fact that they organized their labor force using pre-capitalist forms. In his mind, the existence of these forms was simply an anomaly:

If we now talk of plantation owners in America as capitalists, if they are capitalists, this is due to the fact that they exist as anomalies within a world market based upon free labour.<sup>61</sup>

An anomaly these forms clearly were and, insofar as they continue today, still are. However, their anomalous existence notwithstanding, to refer to a social formation exhibiting these forms of labor control as feudal in an epoch in which the dominant form of production is capitalist seems to us to be an egregious analytical error.

Furthermore, Marx argued that colonial investment yielded higher rates of profit because "the rate of profit is higher there due to the *backward development*, and likewise the exploitation of labor, because of the use of slaves, coolies, etc."<sup>62</sup> Clearly, from Marx's point of view, the use of "slaves and coolies" not only did not prevent capital acculation, albeit in the metropole, but actually enhanced it. In other words, accumulation was greater *because* of circumstances that allowed the exploitation of unfree (not fully proletarianized) labor, not despite it. A few lines later, Marx posits a theory of unequal exchange so integral to the dependency school, when he says, "The favored country recovers more labour in exchange for less labour, although this difference, this excess is pocketed, as in any exchange between labour and capital, by a certain class." Marx follows this with a statement that could have been written by a post-war dependency theorist, "This same foreign trade develops the capitalist mode of production in the home country . . ." <sup>63</sup> Marx goes on to say that in the long run, this foreign trade has the opposite effect because it promotes overproduction in relation to the capacity of the foreign markets to consume. However, no radical dependency theorist, so far as we know, has argued that capitalism is not fraught with contradictions that will eventually bring about its demise.

Marx is quoted here so extensively because it is with his work and based upon his authority that some writers have bludgeoned dependency theory. The use by these writers of Marx's authority to claim that capital accumulation on an extended scale could not take place in a condition not characterized by fully proletarianized labor<sup>64</sup> is refuted by the fact that Marx saw foreign trade, colonial investment, and the use of "slave and coolie"

61. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

62. *Capital*, III, p. 238.

63. *Ibid.*, pp. 238, 239.

64. Brenner, *The World Economy*, p. 2.

labor as one of the specific ways in which capital attempted to arrest the falling tendency of the rate of profit and thus extend the accumulation process.<sup>65</sup>

The criticism leveled at the dependency school that it advocated "autarky" instead of "socialism" seems to be simply incorrect. Even a cursory glance at the writings of the radical dependency school should be sufficient to point out this fact. Frank, for example, has, on numerous occasions, pointed to the Cuban example as being one in which the relations of dependency that had characterized pre-revolutionary Cuba were being broken. (Brenner would presumably respond that Cuba is an example of what he calls "the strategy of semi-autarkic socialist development" and "the utopia of socialism in one country."<sup>66</sup>)

Dieter Senghaas, a West German specialist on economic development, has argued persuasively in a series of articles that all real economic development has been what he calls "autocentric."<sup>67</sup> Senghaas notes that England alone developed an industrial economy in an atmosphere free of more advanced industrial states. In a discussion of the theories of the nineteenth century German political economist, Friedrich List,<sup>68</sup> Senghaas writes:

List's criticism of the world-wide free-trade system advocated especially by Britain . . . was based on practical observations and the systematic deduction that within such a tiered, asymmetrically structured world market system [that is, England at the top of the hierarchy, with Germany, France, and the USA on the second tier — the authors] the less developed society must necessarily get the worst of it in the long-run. Without protectionist measures, the second-tier societies could not check the flooding of their markets with cheap manufactured goods from the more advanced British industry; the ruin of emerging industrial societies was programmed into a free-trade system with unequally developed productivity levels.<sup>69</sup>

Senghaas goes on to argue that this policy of semi-autarky has been and is being followed by every industrialized and industrializing state from the mid-nineteenth century to the present; from protective tariffs and the German *Zollverein* to autocentric Soviet economic policy after 1917, to the post-war policies of socialist Korea and China. Senghaas' contention is that autocentric development policies are critical during the early stages of

65. Marx, *Capital*, III, pp. 237-240.

66. Brenner, "The Origins of Capitalist Development," p. 92.

67. Dieter Senghaas, "Friedrich List and the New International Economic Order," "Dissociation and Autocentric Development: An Alternative Development Policy for the Third World," with Ulrich Menzel, "Autocentric Development Despite International Competence Differentials: Why Did the Contemporary Metropolitan Economies become Metropolitan and Not Peripheral Economies?"; in respectively, *Economics*, pp. 15, 18, 21. (Tubingen, FRG., 1977, 1978, 1980); Also see "Types of Autocentric Development," *Three Worlds or One? Conference*, Berlin (June, 1979).

68. Friedrich List, *Das Nationale System der Politischen Ökonomie* (Tubingen, 1841).

69. Senghaas, "List and the New Economic Order," pp. 81-82.

industrialization and that, after a certain level of internal coherence and income distribution is created, any particular socio-economic formation can afford, without the concomitant negative of "underdeveloping" effects, to participate more fully and with a semblance of equality in the international trading system.

As all students of American economic history will know, it was with protectionism and "autocentric" development that Alexander Hamilton concerned himself much of the time in his contributions to the *Federalist Papers*. Later, when Hamilton, as the first U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, was in charge of the country's economic policy, he in fact put into operation a program designed precisely to bring about that kind of development.

### The Empirical Critique

As mentioned earlier, it is difficult, if not impossible, to divide the radical critiques of dependency theory into two strictly delineated categories. Similarly, what we have listed as the nine most common criticisms are often merely different aspects of the same criticism and the list, thus, tends to a certain degree of repetitiveness.

For example, Bill Warren's attack on the dependency school is in the "empirical" category because his argument is based almost completely on a mass of statistics which purport to show that:

Empirical observations suggest that the prospects for successful capitalist development (implying industrialization) of a significant number of major underdeveloped countries are quite good; that substantial progress in capitalist industrialization has already been achieved; that the period since the Second World War has been marked by a major upsurge in capitalist social relations and productive forces (especially industrialization) in the Third World . . .

At the same time, Warren's argument reflects point number one above (the lack of class analysis in the dependency model) when he writes:

Insofar as there are obstacles to this (capitalist) development, they originate not in current imperialist-Third World relationships, but almost entirely from the internal contradictions of the Third World itself.<sup>70</sup>

Warren's use of the word "current" to describe this relationship would seem a serious mis-reading of the dependency argument, since what is crucial to the dependency view is the fact that these relationships, and the consequent class structures, are the result of a long historical process. Warren seems to insist on some sort of a monocausal view; that is, that the obstacle to development must be *either* imperialism *or* internal contradic-

70. Bill Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization," *New Left Review*, 81, (September-October 1973), pp. 3, 4.



tions. It cannot be both. Thus, he seems to be unable to conceptualize the point that the process of incorporating the periphery over a period of four centuries implanted, created, or facilitated the growth of certain class structures (internal contradictions) that then symbiotically interacted with imperialism (external structures)<sup>71</sup> in accordance with the changing needs over time of both the metropolitan and peripheral bourgeoisie.

Thus, while some of the early dependency writings have tended to be "overly schematic" or mechanical in the way in which the satellite-metropolis relationship was described, it comes close to being a purposeful distortion of the theory to attack it as though its advocates were somehow arguing that the relationship has not changed from the Conquistadore-Inca relationship in the sixteenth century to the present one of, say, Volkswagen using cheap labor in Brazil to produce automobile engines for export to the United States.

Nicola Swainson, among others, makes a similar distortion of the argument when she insists that the dependency concept is simply one of the core importing raw materials from the periphery and, in turn, exporting luxuries to the periphery.<sup>72</sup> Many who would be classified as part of the dependency school have made the exact opposite point. While they more or less agree that the "dependent" nature of the relationship has been maintained over several centuries, the way in which this dependency has manifested itself has changed radically.

In the early period it was simple plunder being replaced, at different times and depending upon geographical specificity, by the production of agricultural products and then other raw materials for metropolitan consumption with the periphery allowing the market for these manufactured goods to expand quantitatively as it was at the same time expanding qualitatively in the core. In the post-war period, the manufacturing process itself (at least certain sectors of it) has been moving to the periphery, allowing the form of domination to be the control of technology rather than that of the production process itself.<sup>73</sup> As Raul Fernandez has pointed out, "the key industries can and do vary from time to time."<sup>74</sup> In noting that steel production no longer has the central importance it once had, Fernandez quotes the president of Mexico's state-owned Sidermex as remarking: "Steel is really a nineteenth century activity.

71. We use the word imperialism here in its broad sense; that is, to describe the relationship — colonial and otherwise — that has existed between the "core" states of Western Europe (and later North America) and the periphery as it has been gradually incorporated into the modern capitalist system. This is to distinguish from the strict Leninist sense of the term, which applies only to the period of monopoly capital characteristic of the last 80-100 years.

72. Nicola Swainson, "The Rise of a National Bourgeoisie in Kenya," *Review of African Political Economy*, 8, (January-April 1977), p. 39. See also in the same issue, Paul Kennedy, "Indigenous Capitalism in Ghana," p. 21.

73. Samir Amin, *Unequal Development*, p. 4.

74. Raul Fernandez, "Third World Industrialization: A New Panacea?," *Monthly Review*, (May 1980), p. 16.

That's why you see the developed world falling back and the developing world moving into it."<sup>75</sup>

A failure in emphasis in much of the dependency literature, it seems to us, is the tendency to dismiss the fact of independence as being simply inconsequential (that is, according to Amin, unless there is an immediate transition to socialism).<sup>76</sup> In part, this has been an understandable reaction to Latin American history that has seen the reality of formal independence vitiated by of a continuing process of underdevelopment. Although much of the post-1945 experience in Africa and Asia has tended to corroborate this view, certain geopolitical circumstances, beginning with the October Revolution, have to some extent circumscribed the freedom with which the imperialist powers can act. Warren argues, correctly, we think, that:

The term "neo-colonialism," although possessing certain merits in stressing the continuance of imperialist domination and exploitation, is thus misleading insofar as it obscures the new and dynamic elements in the situation, both as to causes — concerning the role played by the achievement of formal sovereignty itself — and as to its effects.<sup>77</sup>

However, Warren goes on to say:

Formal political independence gives underdeveloped countries a degree of manoeuvre and initiative which over time, must inevitably come into play, and which is conducive to economic advance.<sup>78</sup>

One feels compelled to ask, how much time? It would seem that the Latin American experience — or that of Ethiopia and Liberia, or China before the revolution, or Turkey — clearly calls into question the inevitability of Warren's assertion.

On the other hand, one would have to ask what Warren means by economic advance. He specifically states that he will not "discuss the most immediate problem which underdeveloped countries face today: the backwardness of their agriculture and its consequences: the unevenness and imbalance of their economies."<sup>79</sup> The refusal to discuss these aspects — particularly that of agriculture — would seem to be a critical omission, particularly in light of the absolutely crucial role played by the rationalization of agricultural production in the "economic advance" of Western Europe. Having, in this manner, blithely passed over the factors of backward agriculture and uneven and imbalanced economies, Warren goes on to assert that, "indeed, 'stagnation' in the Third World is largely a myth.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

76. Amin, *Unequal Development*, p. 349.

77. Warren, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

There has been very substantial growth of capitalist social relations of production throughout the Third World . . . ”<sup>80</sup>

Warren defines (tautologically) what he means by capitalist development:

(It) is here understood as that development which provides the appropriate economic, social and political conditions for the continuing reproduction of capital, as a social system representing the highest form of commodity production.<sup>81</sup>

At the same time, just two sentences later, Warren dismisses the importance of “the adequacy of development as a process satisfying the needs of the masses.”<sup>82</sup> Having dismissed “adequacy” of development; the “needs” of the masses; acknowledged the backwardness of agriculture and the uneven and imbalanced economies; Warren then asserts that capitalist development is taking place. This argument is then buttressed by masses of statistics which purport to refute the dependency argument. Warren makes no attempt to clarify the nature of the capitalist development he claims is taking place, but what he seems to mean is that there has been a marked increase in the number (not only absolute but also relative) of fully proletarianized wage workers in the Third World. So what!

Warren’s statistics, methodology, and consequent interpretation of his data have been attacked on several occasions.<sup>83</sup> Fernandez has noted the following about this alleged spurt of Third World industrialization:<sup>84</sup>

- (1) it has been largely limited to about a half-dozen countries and thus shows no clear-cut trend toward Third World industrialization overall;
- (2) much of it is of the “assembly” type;
- (3) it has seen the terms of trade for industrial exports deteriorate faster than for primary products, thus doing nothing to alleviate enormous debt problems;
- (4) it has maintained an export pattern that has primarily remained within the sphere of influence of the metropolitan countries;
- (5) it has not changed the reality that Third World exports fluctuate between 0.5 and 2.0 percent of total world-wide manufactured exports.

For example, about half of the Third World’s manufactured exports come from only four countries — South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.<sup>85</sup> The vast bulk of Third World industrial production is in cheap

consumer goods such as processed foods, textiles, clothing, footwear, luggage and electrical goods.<sup>86</sup> Along with the above-mentioned four countries, Brazil, Mexico and India produce most of the rest of the Third World’s industrial exports. Already the effect of these cheap exports is having an impact which is producing resistance to their capacity to grow significantly in the future. These goods, on the one hand, tend to flood the market of other Third World countries, inhibiting or destroying their attempts to industrialize; on the other hand, they threaten older, less efficient industries in the metropolises. The consequence of these is a sharp rise in protectionist pressures.<sup>87</sup>

The attraction for international capital to produce in the Third World is the virtually unlimited supply of cheap labor available there, and the fact that in many sectors, production in western Europe and North America is simply no longer as profitable as it is in the underdeveloped world.<sup>88</sup> This is due primarily to the high wages paid to workers in the industrialized world — high wages brought about through past class struggles. However, the workers in the metropolitan countries cannot be expected to sit idly by and watch their jobs be exported to low wage countries.<sup>89</sup>

Between 1973 and 1977, the growth rate of developing countries’ exports has declined from 6.4 percent to 3.6 percent annually, and a decline in the terms of trade for these exports has “more than offset the growth in their export volume, resulting in a decline in the purchasing power of their exports.”<sup>90</sup> As Abellatif Benachenhou has noted: “But the stagnation of the developed capitalist economies and the consequent protectionism have exposed the commercial fragility of these export-oriented industries.”<sup>91</sup> What Warren and others like him have done is to mistake a short-run expansion of industrial production for a long-term trend that already seems to be running out of steam.

86. Frank, “Unequal Accumulation: Intermediate, Semi-Peripheral and Sub-Imperialist Economies,” in *Review*, II, 3, (Winter 1979), p. 293.

87. World Bank, *World Development Report, 1980*, (Washington, D.C.), p. 19.

88. Folker Frobel, Jürgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, “Export-Oriented Industrialization of the Underdeveloped Countries,” *Monthly Review*, (November 1978), pp. 23, 24.

89. A recent study by Ann Seidman and Phil O’Keefe has shown a radical decline in manufacturing employment in New England with many of these industrial jobs being moved to the Third World. General Electric, for example, the largest unionized employer in Massachusetts, by mid-1979 held about 25 percent of its directly-owned assets, hired about 25 percent of its workers, and reaped about 25 percent of its profits overseas. Seidman and O’Keefe, “The U.S. and South Africa in the Changing International Division of Labor,” The (now Walter Rodney) African Studies Seminar, 9 April 1980, Boston University, African Studies Center.

90. World Bank, *World Development Report, 1979*, (Washington, D.C.), p. 4.

91. Abellatif Benachenhou, “For Autonomous Development in The Third World,” *Monthly Review*, (July-August 1980), p. 45.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

83. Anne Phillips, “The Concept of Development,” *Review of African Political Economy* 8, (January-April 1977), p. 13; James Petras, *Critical Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World*, (New York, 1979), ch. 4; Raul Fernandez, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

84. Fernandez, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

85. *New York Times*, 13 May 1979.



The import substitution strategy for industrial development was the one followed in the early post-war period until, in the mid-sixties, its failure became manifest. Instead of importing consumer goods, the countries pursuing this strategy imported machinery, spare parts, and other capital goods from the industrialized countries. Most of these imports were financed by an ever-growing mountain of foreign debt. Limited by an extremely narrow internal market, these industries tended to produce, instead of mass consumption items geared toward a broad internal market such as existed in the metropolises, more or less luxury items for a thin middle and upper class. In the words of Fernandez: "In the end, the Latin American countries were far deeper in debt, and a greater portion of their resources had to go to service debts and remit profits of foreign investors."<sup>92</sup>

The result was that the internal markets soon reached the saturation point. With the failure of import substitution, the next strategy was to pursue "growth" through an export-oriented strategy that clearly already seems to have reached its peak in the early seventies, as shown, for example, by numerous World Bank figures.

The argument of Warren *et al*, that a massive technology transfer will accompany this rapid industrialization is simply not borne out by the facts. In high technology fields such as petrochemicals, motor vehicles, precision machine tools, and computers, there has been little or no transfer. As the World Bank has noted: "Developing countries still depend heavily on industrialized nations for new industrial processes and techniques." The Bank estimates that 95 percent of all money spent on research and development is spent in the already industrialized world.<sup>93</sup>

Thus, what has been pictured by some as "capitalist development" seems more and more to be "capitalist underdevelopment." The industrialization of the Third World has been accompanied by a massive debt burden, rising unemployment, continuing agricultural stagnation, inflation, and enormous poverty and suffering.

Brazil's *Wirtschaftswunder*, which has been held up as a model for Third World development, has been showing cracks for several years. It, like most of the rest of the Third World's "economic miracles" was forced to borrow heavily in order to finance its industrialization. Brazil currently has an external public debt of \$56 billion and is expected to have to borrow another \$16 billion in 1981.<sup>94</sup> Its debt service ratio is over 60 percent and the cost of its imports jumped 50 percent in 1980 to go along with an inflation rate of 110 percent. After subtracting last year's oil import costs and

foreign debt payments, much of which is owed to American banks (Brazil accounted for more than 10 percent of the earnings of Citibank and Chase Manhattan last year, the world's second and third largest banks) Brazilian President Figueiredo noted that the country "has nothing left over for development!"<sup>95</sup> In global terms, the level of Third World indebtedness has reached such proportions that more and more Western banks now seem openly reluctant to reschedule debts.<sup>96</sup>

At the same time, the real wages for the mass of workers in Brazil, as in similar countries, has been drastically cut to about 45 percent of their 1964 levels — the year the generals came to power.<sup>97</sup> As the Brazilian workers and peasants have seen their economic conditions deteriorate drastically, they have also seen their political rights eliminated under the oppressive heel of an authoritarian, corporatist state — a condition characteristic of all the other so-called rapidly developing capitalist countries.

To repeat, then, dependency theory does not argue that the last five centuries have not been characterized by the advance of capitalist development. What has been under debate, however, has been the question as to the *nature* of this capitalist development. The argument is not that capitalist development has been "adequate" for the working class in the metropolitan countries, but that it has never in the past, is not doing so now, and seems incapable in the future of providing for Third World workers even that level of subsistence available presently to the North American and Western European working class. Simply measuring the extent of proletarianization in the Third World does not, to us, refute the dependency argument.

Warren, as mentioned earlier, is one of the critics who merely attempts to measure the extent of proletarianization; that is, employed wage labor. He suggests that, "Some of the new ruling groups are showing signs of an ability and will to utilize the new economic and political conditions, to begin to restructure their economies along lines more suited to a

95. *Ibid.*

96. Between 1974 and 1978 the external debt of Third World countries increased from \$142 billion to \$376 billion. Similarly, massive balance of payments deficits in 1980 are characteristic of those countries lauded for their "miraculous" growth: Brazil \$11 billion; Argentina, \$2.7 billion; Turkey, \$2.5 billion; Thailand, \$2.4 billion; the Philippines, \$2 billion; South Korea \$1.7 billion. New York Times, 14 and 20 April 1980 and David Rogers, "IMF: Banker for World's Poor Nations," *Boston Globe*, (November 1980), pp. 11-13.

97. Frank, "Unequal Accumulation," *Review*, p. 292.

92. Fernandez, *op. cit.* p. 13.

93. *World Development Report*, 1979, p. 65.

94. *New York Times*, 8 December 1980.

successful indigenous capitalism, less subordinated to the needs of the imperialist countries."<sup>98</sup> Peru, Zambia, and Nigeria are cited by Warren as three among many examples. The nationalist military officers governing Peru since 1968 (the new ruling group to which Warren refers) were overthrown by a more "orthodox" military clique within a few years. When the military withdrew from power in July, 1980 in favor of a civilian government supported by the officer class, it was succeeded by Fernando Belaunde, the same person overthrown by Warren's "new ruling group" twelve years earlier. *Plus ça change, plus c'est ça meme chose*. Since then, under what many Peruvians are calling the "Chicago boys" in deference to Milton Friedman, food and gasoline subsidies have been eliminated along with protective tariffs and a 17.5 percent tax on domestic and foreign sales. At the same time the government has begun selling off nationalized industries to private investors while simultaneously raising interest rates that make it difficult, if not impossible, for local interests to borrow the necessary capital to participate.<sup>99</sup>

The result will be that the weaker Peruvian industrial sector which benefitted from the former policies will be overwhelmed by imported goods from the United States, Western Europe and Japan. Unemployment in a country that even now has only four out of every ten members of its work force in stable employment is expected to rise. Even that paragon of capitalism and free trade, *Business Week*, has written, "Predictably, the poor have been the hardest hit by the free market policies. Since the food subsidies were lifted in January (1981), the prices of such essentials as bread, milk and sugar have risen by more than 60 percent in that month alone."<sup>100</sup>

Zambia's economy has been a well-known disaster area for many years, and hardly exhibits a "ruling group" capable of anything more than deepening the disaster and increasing its dependence on South Africa and, through the *apartheid* state, on Western capital in general. A recent study has characterized the Nigerian economy as "drone capitalism"<sup>101</sup> and concluded that, "The Nigerian road to development has been and remains an unambiguously dependent capitalist one."<sup>102</sup>

98. Warren op. cit. p. 13.

99. *Business Week*, (9 March 1981), p. 40.

100. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

101. The term "drone capitalism" is that of E.A. Akeredolu-Ale and is quoted in William D. Graf, "Political Economy, Political Class and Political System in Rectivillanized Nigeria," paper presented at the Rodney African Studies Seminar, Boston University, December 1980.

102. Graf, op. cit., p. 8. Also see Ankie Hoogvelt, "Indigenisation and Foreign Capital: Industrialisation in Nigeria," *Review of African Political Economy*, 14, (January-April 1979), pp. 56-57.

Swainson's argument attempts a more sophisticated approach. Where Warren's thesis depended primarily upon a simple quantitative increase in manufacturing employment and production, Swainson attempts to prove that an indigenous and independent national bourgeoisie is developing in Kenya. She emphasizes the role of the Kenya bourgeoisie and its capacity to use the post colonial state to further its own accumulation, often in competition with metropolitan capital. Her argument hinges on the fact that this local capitalist class, after accumulating some capital through commercial activities, agriculture, and land speculation, has begun slowly to enter the sphere of production.<sup>103</sup> Her own figures, however, indicate the backward nature of this activity. The only activity in which African companies predominate is in agricultural production and distribution. What manufacturing they are involved in is food and clothing.<sup>104</sup> Unless one expects another textile-industry-based take-off a la eighteenth century England, the outlook for indigenous capitalism in Kenya looks decidedly grim.

While Swainson spends a substantial portion of her work allegedly refuting dependency theory, she is forced to conclude: "However, this type of indigenous capitalism is obviously not operating independently of the international capitalist system. Nor does the localization of productive capital which is beginning in Kenya, portend any kind of autonomous capitalist development."<sup>105</sup> Faithful to the end of her political position, if not to the facts she herself has presented, Swainson finds if necessary again to misrepresent the model she has decided to attack by suggesting a few lines later that, "The constant emphasis by radicals and the petty bourgeoisie on identifying the principal contradiction as imperialism operating from *outside* the social formation is a prescription for political complacency. For if the specifics of class formation are lost, then so is political strategy."<sup>106</sup>

Probably the best response to Swainson's rather self-serving comment was provided by the editors of the journal in which her article appeared, who noted wryly:

Here it is worth saying as a preface that political sense is not automatically a monopoly of those whose analysis is more theoretically consistent or closest to the purity of the original Marx. Thus, Gunder Frank, whose first analysis is now routinely attacked for the simplicity of its metropolis-satellite picture, was not

103. Swainson, op. cit., p. 55. Swainson's doctoral dissertation submitted to the London School of Economics in 1977 amplifies this argument quite extensively. It was read by the authors in manuscript form and is to be published shortly.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

using this model to argue for backing the national ruling class but to urge the need for an immediate struggle for socialism in circumstances where there would be no bourgeois democratic revolution. Nothing in the evidence of Swainson and Kennedy leads us to reject Frank's important proposition that an independent national capitalist development is just not on.<sup>107</sup>

## Conclusion

Radical criticisms of the dependency model have correctly served to focus attention on its inadequacies, particularly those of the early dependency writings. Thus, in order to understand and develop a proper strategy for anti-imperialist political activity, one must, for example, have an understanding of the class relationships of any particular peripheral social formation and the ways in which these structures articulate with international capital on the one hand, and the producing classes in the underdeveloped world on the other. To dismiss Third World ruling classes, for example, as mere puppets whose interests are always mechanically synonymous with those of metropolitan interests is to ignore the realities of a relationship much more complex than that. The very unevenness and contradictory nature of the capitalist development process necessarily produces a constantly changing relationship.

Likewise, it would be very inappropriate to look at the so-called Third World as an undifferentiated and equally dependent mass of countries. These countries already differed vastly from one another in terms of their individual histories and cultures, size of their populations, natural resources, etc., several decades ago when the rather simplistic term "Third World" was coined. Since then, a deepening of these differences has occurred to the extent that the terms fourth and fifth world have been used by some to give recognition to this fact. The countries of the periphery thus have not remained static but have followed their own specific historical paths. Some have experienced socialist revolution while others, which have remained within the capitalist system, are now considered semi-industrialized.

What this paper has attempted to show is that what is commonly referred to as dependency theory does not need to be, and in fact is not, incompatible with these developments. Its great contribution has been to focus attention on the way in which the periphery articulates with the core capitalist countries and on the way in which this articulation affects economic and political conditions in the periphery. It has pointed to the importance of core/periphery relationships over the past several centuries and the way in which these have affected internal class configurations in

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the periphery. Thus, while the critics concentrate on internal class relations, dependency theory tends to concentrate on the way in which a country as a whole and its ruling class articulates with international capital. We agree with those who argue that a synthesis of the two is both possible and necessary. In fact, the two are complementary.

Finally, the most incorrect and, we think, dangerous misinterpretation is that which ascribes a political position advocating pessimism and complacency to those who identify imperialism as the primary obstacle to Third World liberation and progress. Whatever one may think of the analysis, for example, of the Sandanistas one can hardly accuse them of political passivity. It was their contention that the Somoza regime was maintained in power by American imperialism. Recent Nicaraguan history, for example, gives short shrift to the passivity argument as is underlined by Ernesto Cardenal, the Nicaraguan poet and revolutionary in a poem directed specifically against US imperialism, of which the following is a short fragment:

### National Song for Nicaragua

To invest capital in Nicaragua and, once invested, to protect it was the role of the State Department. Political expansion with reference to economic expansion and economic expansion because capital was insufficiently productive in the United States or less productive than in Nicaragua.

That is: Imperialism

intervention for investments or vice versa.

Diplomacy subjugated the country via the banks the banks enriched themselves via diplomacy.

United, in their evening suits, the dark vultures around the Gross National Product.

Like the shark, once it has smelled the blood.

Foreign intervention was favored by disorganization and corruption in the country thus it happened that intervention favored and promoted disorganization and corruption (as clearly as a bird's eye)

Thus:

Imperialism as an interference factor, as disorganization, underdevelopment, corruption in Nicaragua has violated and desecrated contracts, constitutions; legal rulings

107. Lionel Cliffe and Peter Lawrence, "Editorial," *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 8, p. 5.

has kindled civil wars, manipulated and bribed elections  
 has covered up thefts, prostituted politics, impoverished the people,  
 thwarted unity left its agents in power against the will of the people,  
 increased the cost of living, defended oppression, brought death.  
 Nicaragua had (When Sandino rose) sold  
 a part of its territory, had high foreign debts,  
 its finance under the control of a syndicate  
 of New York banks  
 and no progress whatsoever . . . .

Nicaragua with out the National Guard, I see the new day.  
 A country without terror. Without dynastic tyranny.  
 Zanata Clarinero, the whistler, sings  
 no beggars, no prostitutes, no politicians  
 There is no freedom as long as there are the wealthy,  
 as long as the freedom exists to exploit others.  
 As long as there are classes, there is no freedom.  
 We were neither born to be handymen nor gentlemen,  
 but instead to be brothers.

We were born to be brothers.  
 Capitalism — what else but the purchase and sale  
 of human beings<sup>\*</sup>  
 What type of a journey is this, brothers,  
 to where are we headed with our first and third class tickets<sup>\*</sup>  
 Our nickel is awaiting the new human being  
 our mahagony trees are awaiting the new human being  
 livestock of good breed awaits the new human being  
 all that is still missing is the new human being . . . \*

Ernesto Cardenal

\* Original in Spanish; translated from German to English by Brigitte Schulz. This translation was originally published as a quotation in an article by Jorg Becker "Socio-Cultural Information: Results and Pre-requisites of International Relationships" in *Symposium '80 — International Cultural Relationships: Bridges Over Borders*, published and copyrighted by The Institute for Foreign Studies in Stuttgart, in cooperation with the Institute for Scientific Cooperation with the Third World of the University of Tubingen — reprinted by permission. The German version of this fragment can be found in the German edition of the above. It is taken from Ernesto Cardenal's *Orakel uber Managua, Nationalled fur Nicaragua, Reise nach Nueva de Nicaragua*; *Seleccion y Prologo de Ernesto Cardenal, Cuadernos Latinamericanos/15*, published by Ediciones Carlos Lohle, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

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## A Look at Books



### **Development Cooperation in the Sahel: Some Unresolved Dilemmas**

Derek Winstanley

Noel V. Lateef, *CRISIS IN THE SAHEL: A Case Study in Development Cooperation*. Westview Press Special Studies in Social, Political and Economic Development. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980) 287 pp. hardcover \$25.00.

Drought in the Sahelian region of Africa in the early 1970s created a crisis not only in the countries themselves, but also in international development cooperation. It focused world attention on the plight of some of the poorest countries in the world which lacked basic infrastructures, were overwhelmingly dependent on agriculture, had few natural resources and faced problems of environmental deterioration and high population growth rates. The challenge to the governments of the Sahelian countries and to the international community was first to relieve the disaster and then to formulate policies and devise strategies that would lead to development of the region. The United States was a major aid donor and influential participant in development planning. Noel

Derek Winstanley holds a Ph.D. in Climatology from Oxford University, and has extensive experience in climate-related projects in both East and West Africa. He is currently a visiting scientist at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, Colorado.



Lateef reviews the resources of the Sahelian region, including the constraints to the effective use of these resources and to development, and documents the international program of rehabilitation. There is particular emphasis on the official U.S. response, of which he was a part.

However, he goes much further than merely documenting the record of international response, suggesting that it has a "predictive value about the kinds of synergistic measures that can be orchestrated to ward off future threats of famine abroad." This raises two points which the author does not adequately consider in order to support his view. The first is that the Sahel is a unique region and, therefore, the extent to which measures applied here could be applied successfully to other areas experiencing famine is extremely debatable. The second point is that the author has a strong positive bias toward the USAID approach to development issues which, it is important to realize, has many critics; this raises the question of the desirability of applying similar measures to other areas in the face of substantial controversy over their effectiveness and appropriateness.

One of the major elements in the Sahelian crisis was the low level of rainfall during the years 1968 to 1973, but it does not appear that the author has a great deal of authoritative knowledge on the subject of climate. For example, there is no consensus among climatologists that drought in the Sahel is part of an emerging global pattern of extreme climatic variability that will persist for several decades, as we are told in the Introduction. On page 181 the author states that favonian weather conditions began in 1966. Climatologically this is incorrect: but "favonian" is also an example of the author's use of obscure words which at times make comprehension difficult. The meaning of a sentence such as "Development cannot afford to collapse result into process" is also not clear. The statement on page 2 that the agricultural food output in the Sahel is only 8.5 tons per year is a blatant error.

The problems associated with development in the Sahel are multitudinous, interrelated, and complex, and Lateef has attempted to deal with everything from climatic change to conceptual tectonics and philosophy. However, I felt bombarded with a plethora of issues which lacked integration and cohesion. My main impression is that the author is basically ambivalent about appropriate strategies and the potential for development in the Sahel; that he has not resolved this ambivalence, nor openly admits to it, seems to be a fundamental cause of the lack of cohesion. For example, we are told on the one hand that the Sahel could be transformed into a greenhouse and play an important role in meeting future worldwide food requirements. This is to be achieved by means of coordinated, comprehensive, long-term, regionally integrated planning and high economic growth rates, as propounded by USAID. In contrast to this utopian view, we are told that the Sahel is especially unsusceptible to the importation of ready-made western "solutions" and there is criticism of many instances where agencies have attempted to overlay an extremely complex system on a traditional culture, where the imposed system is little understood by or suitable to the needs of the traditional cultivators.

Throughout the book there is an underlying, unresolved dilemma between what is technically feasible in this world and what is socially desirable and what can realistically be expected to be achieved. It is a dilemma of the unequal world in which we live, a dilemma which has not been resolved in the Sahel, nor in this book. For anyone interested in development problems in the Sahel, it would be advisable to read this book in conjunction with others, rather than in isolation.

## **Cooperation for Development:**

### **Possibilities & Pitfalls**

A.Y. Yansane

John P. Renninger, *MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AFRICA*. (New York, Oxford, Toronto, Sydney, Frankfurt, Paris: Pergamon Press for UNITAR, 1979) xiv, 162 pp., \$16.00.

Most of the sixteen states forming the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have followed, since independence, the pragmatist, basically capitalist path of development, though three (Benin, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau) have, with varying degrees of consistency, followed a socialist and at times revolutionary pattern. Almost all show some common features: increased state ownership, Africanization of the civil service, private sector indigenization, and trade expansion based on increased production of cash crops and minerals for export, using the proceeds to import capital goods.

Short of continental African Union, which still remains a long term goal for most renascent Africans, West Africa's present leaders see the necessity to retain and expand regional economic integration as a strategy of development. It is not surprising therefore that they have devoted much attention to the establishment of ECOWAS.

While many development theorists fail to consider economic integration as a vehicle for development, John P. Renninger's *Multinational Cooperation for Development in West Africa* does it in the proper light. He focuses attention on the dynamic effects of integration on development, in particular the "Increases in productivity and structural changes that will allow self-sustaining growth to be achieved and maintained." But he also identifies the key issues of cooperation, among them the competitiveness of economies rather than their complementarity and the problem of equitable distribution of the benefits of cooperation. He suggests that all the population must be involved in the cooperative endeavor in order to reap the benefits.

A.Y. Yansane is Assistant Professor of Afro-American Studies at the University of California at Berkeley.



Renninger emphasizes the multilateral aid links of ECOWAS with UN specialized organizations such as UNDP, UNCTAD etc. analyzing the standard questions on aid-giving, tied vs. untied, multilateral vs. bilateral and including several achievements and realizations. Yet the critical questions and their answers are missing. 1) Will bilateral aid from the former metropolises continue at a significant level? 2) Will the former metropolises be willing to extend significant aid through ECOWAS, in view of long standing relationships through older associations, such as the Union Monétaire de L'Ouest Africain (UMOA), Communauté Economique de L'Afrique de L'Ouest Africain (CEAO) and the Commonwealth? 3) Will the elements of external control of the newly established integrative industries lead to an increase in unnecessary luxury goods made more marketable by the expansion of the effective market area due to the lack of tariff barriers within ECOWAS? 4) Will the member states succumb to the temptation for competition to outdo each other in incentives for transnational corporations to set up plants in their territories?

Renninger apparently has the implied answers to some of these questions in mind when he writes "We have come to the conclusion that ECOWAS is not an ideal instrument for the achievement of collective self-reliance in the West African subregion." (p. 97) But coming, as it does, after his second discussion on the validity of self-reliance as a strategy, and particularly after his plausible premise that each "integration movement has a dynamic of its own" (p. 96) it is disappointing to find that he explains ECOWAS' weakness and posits its possible failure primarily on the basis of the lack of political will on the part of its leaders. From this reviewer's perspective the role of the complex and involved interplay between the former colonies and the metropolises in working against the success of cooperative ventures is not adequately taken into consideration.

Nevertheless, John P. Renninger's study and espousal of multinational cooperation in West Africa is a clear, dispassionate primer on the relevance of multinational cooperation. I recommend it for reading by all interested in West African affairs.



## Geographical Aspects of Kenya's

### Development: Two books

John P. Powelson

R.A. Obudho and D.R.F. Taylor, eds., **THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF DEVELOPMENT: A Study of Kenya**, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press-Replica Edition, 1979), 315 pp., hardcover \$24.75.

Arne Bigsten, **REGIONAL INEQUALITY AND DEVELOPMENT: A Case Study of Kenya**, (Hampshire, England, Gower Publishing Co.; Brookfield, Vermont: Renouf USA, Inc., 1980) pp. vii, 191, \$44.00.

The two books under discussion here both deal with Kenya and the problems of disparities of development in the various regions of the country. Both present useful insights, but neither succeeds fully in coming to terms with the complexities of the topic.

The best way to present the scope of the book edited by Obudho and Taylor is to list the titles to its thirteen essays:

1. Spatial aspects of the development process
2. The geography of modernization: a radical appraisal
3. Regional disparities and the employment problem in Kenya
4. Deriving planning regions for developing countries: Kenya
5. Urban primacy in Kenya
6. A comparative analysis of the functional structures of central business districts in East Africa
7. Location and functional structure of shopping centers in Nairobi
8. An analysis of the variation in modern sector earnings among the districts and major urban centers in Kenya
9. Patterns of spatial interaction in Kenya
10. Distance and development in Kenya
11. Housing innovation in the Kiambu district
12. Spatial variation in oil prices in Kenya: A case of peripheral exploitation
13. Meru district in the Kenyan spatial economy: 1890-1950

The only topic that *all* the essays have in common is that they are about Kenya. Spatial structure? Yes, some of them are about that; other authors have stretched the topics they wanted to write about in order to give them some spatial dimension; while a few paid no attention even to that nicety. As the titles suggest, the authors ranged from how to locate shopping centers in Nairobi to the inequalities of income and employment distribution throughout the country.

The author of the introductory chapter (Taylor) does a valiant job of trying to tie the whole work together. After he has discussed the contents of several of the essays, however, he has to ask: "What are the implications of all this for

spatial development?" And well he might, for it is not always obvious. Although growth poles and growth centers are discussed, along with regional division of labor and problems of urban congestion and rural poverty, transport and communication questions, most of the time we do not see a concerted effort to relate essay topics to any theory of spatial development.

Nevertheless, several of the essays are of high quality and are cogent on their respective topics. Ominde's essay (no. 3) outlines distinguishable zones, and it points to reasons for emerging regional disparities. He argues persuasively for the decentralization of planning. Soja's essay (no. 2), which deals with transport, communication, urbanization, and a number of other imbalances, comes closest to this reviewer's concept of spatial development; he concludes that the spatial organization has been powerfully shaped by capitalist and imperialist forces. House and Rempel (essay no. 8) find significant differences in remunerations for the same occupations in different regions. These authors examine whether the disparities are explained by a different occupational mix, known as the "mix effect," or by other differences among regions (cultural? institutional? reluctance to move?), which become the "area effect" (measured by taking the differences as they would be if mixtures of occupations were the same). They conclude that the "area effect" dominates the "mix effect." Ferguson's essay (no. 12) criticizes the pricing policy for oil, found to be discriminatory against poor districts (in that excess prices are not justified by costs of distribution).

In sum, the book will be useful to two types of readers: those interested in Kenya for whatever reason; and those concerned with particular topics covered by the authors, who are somehow able to discover that the essays are in this book. Students of spatial development might also find some interesting points in some of the essays.

In a revision of his doctoral thesis, Arne Bigsten has presented a regional input-output model of Kenya, to test the proposition that regional inequalities widen with development. He initially expresses his confidence in the Kuznetz hypothesis of the inverted-U, that aggregate inequalities widen in the early stages of national development, narrowing later. Since it is only the early stages that the author is studying, he confines his observations to the first part of the inverted-U. His conclusion: regional disparities do indeed widen.

Do they? The case hinges on the technical aspects of the model. The author reveals himself as an accomplished modelmaker. He is aware of the many deficiencies of his model, virtually all of them due to forces beyond his control: lack of data. He is required to apply national technical coefficients to regional input-output tables, to assume regional consumption to be the same function of regional income as national consumption is of national income, and we presume the same relative structure of products demanded. These seem to this reviewer to be tall assumptions. (Those more sympathetic might call them heroic assumptions).

Given these limitations, the model is impeccably done. If this reviewer were the professor of econometrics deciding whether the author should have his degree, he would surely have passed. Except that we would have asked him one question: what were the measures of dispersion (such as t-scores) for his independent variables, and what were the R's of his regressions? None of these is revealed. Our own experience with the Kenya economy is that national-product-type regressions since independence present such high degrees of disper-

sion (owing to the volatility of government policies.) That, with the added fact of the small number of years available since independence, statistically significant observations are very hard to come by. We therefore must conclude that the model is a worthy try, but the case is not made.

Since the book is short, centered around the model, there is little else one can say in a review. There are some sections on the background of Kenya, its regional disparities, and a bit about its economic history. But all these are only sketches directly related to the author's work, and if a reader is interested in this kind of information, the present book is not the place to go (nor was it intended as such).

## **A Communication Model for Liberia's Community Education**

Ferdinand O. Fiofori

Abdular Vandí, *A MODEL OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A Liberian Perspective* (Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1979) 184 pp., Paper — \$8.85

The capacity of the mass communications process to maintain a complex and highly interdependent pattern of activity to enhance national development is determined in part by its capability to handle new theoretical and practical mechanisms necessary for its coordination. The greater the perceived tolerance of the mass communications process to allow for the infusion of new theories, models, paradigms and methodologies, the greater will be the efficiency of this discipline to be used in national development programs. Abdulai Vandí's Ph.D. dissertation (turned into a book) tests the capability of the mass communications process in handling new models which are tailor-made for usage in a developing country, in this case Liberia.

The data used for diagnosis were secondary; the methodology is basically historical and analytical — one which students of communication and development studies will recognize as part of their classroom experience. In viewing Vandí's prescribed model as a process scheme for national development, one finds it enlightening, especially within the realm of communication as a dynamic interactive, transactional process. Although the generalizability of this model for use in other developing countries was not explored nor developed by the author, inference is made that such a model might be used to "free many

Ferdinand O. Fiofori, Ph.D., is Director of Research and Analysis, Myriad Enterprises, Inc., Denver, Colorado, and is a Communications and International Business consultant.

nations, including Liberia, from the budgetary constraints on mass education."

The value of this book lies in the presentation of models which have the power to communicate the essential visual aspects of existing and planned organizational objectives. The book is designed as a comparative examination of the effectiveness of community education programs through mass communications in countries such as the United States, Canada, Japan, El Salvador, India, and the Ivory Coast; and to help examine the extent to which mass media can help the educational system of Liberia. While the author discusses varying mass media approaches from the highly structured correspondence courses of Japan to the flexible use of videotapes in Alaskan villages in the United States, discussion is also presented and the cost effectiveness pointed out of the use of instructional television in the classroom in Third World countries like El Salvador and the Ivory Coast. India is also shown to have effectively combined interpersonal and electronic media to promote education.

As pointed out by the author, there are numerous limitations in replicating models and educational systems used by many developed countries within developing countries. These limitations include variations in development, climate, literacy problems, lack of linguistic uniformity, inefficient and inadequate mass media facilities, as well as inadequate methods of application and evaluation. Hence, this Model of Mass Communications and National Development: A Liberian Perspective, was written. The basic conceptual structure of the model consists of six components: mission, objective, technology, procedures, personnel, and evaluation. Interacting components of this model are shown as both a series of means-end relationships and generally as a series process.

Vandi demonstrates that the experience of other countries has shown that educational technology can be applied to a variety of situations. He presents his model to help multiply technology and benefit Liberia's education where manpower is limited. He agrees that technology per se is not a panacea for Liberia's educational problems, but sees it as effective only insofar as it is integrated properly with the software that is at the country's disposal.

The author has not only joined the growing number of social scientists who have been looking for new models and systems to help disseminate symbolic content like cognitive education to large heterogeneous and widely dispersed audiences, but he has also fittingly used a developing country, Liberia, as his unit of study and analysis. The book is a useful exploratory tool for examining some available models, and in the process developing new models to help transfer technology to other Third World countries, as Vandi has done for community education in Liberia. It is a good book to be used by mass communications students involved with national development, especially in developing countries, and also for students in area African studies and community education.

## ***Slice of Economic History from Angola***

Irving Leonard Markovitz

W.G. Clarence-Smith, **SLAVES, PEASANTS AND CAPITALISTS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, 1840-1926** (Cambridge University Press, New York and London, 1979) pages xii, 132, price \$17.95.

In barely more than a hundred pages of text, W.G. Clarence-Smith's, *Slaves, Peasants and Capitalists in Southern Angola 1840-1926*, the most recent addition to the distinguished African studies series of Cambridge University Press, makes a contribution far more important than do many tomes of far greater length.

Rather than a conventional account of the colonial conquest of Southern Angola in which all of the "bad guys" are on one side and the "good guys" are on the other in a native v. settler confrontation, this historical study emphasizes the evolution of local Portuguese and African economic and social structures and in doing so takes into account the impact of external world forces.

Portugal intensified its incorporation of South Angola into its colonial empire only after 1840 as a result of the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade. It created a new strategy of raising revenue by "legitimate taxation" of Africans and the stimulation of a plantation sector. The author focuses on the history of the town of Mocamedes which the Portuguese founded in 1840 in order to control a growing trade in ivory. He enables us to understand the nature of the conflict between the plantation and peasant sectors of the economy and how a tiny minority of successful African farmers and traders sometimes cooperated and sometimes conflicted with local Portuguese capitalists who were in turn occasionally in vigorous opposition to metropolitan and foreign interests. The main objective of the settler, however, was to gain control over the local state and to use that power to extract labor and commodities from African societies. One of the most valuable contributions of this study is that Clarence-Smith enables us to understand how, although African peasant societies provided these necessary commodities and services, they nevertheless retained a degree of autonomy and maintained ongoing social structures.

The point of the book is to show how over time capitalism came to dominate the indigenous peasantry despite their sustained resistance. The colonial state perpetuated slavery and forced labor down into the second decade of this century and when this type of the crudest control became impossible still managed to turn African societies into reserves of cheap migrant labor.

During the course of his analysis Clarence-Smith rejects two influential schools of historiography current in the 1960s, which he labels "the African nationalist" and the "uneconomic imperialist" approaches, and he also

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Irving Leonard Markovitz is Professor of Political Science at Queens College of the City University of New York at Flushing.

materially. Nor was there any less reason to learn from African culture those ethical values and esthetic perceptions that could enrich French civilization (p. 202)."

Conquest and colonization have been virtually universal experiences in the history of mankind. Among American historians it was more than a century before the "imperial school" reassessed the American revolution as primarily a failure of the British system of governance rather than a uniquely American, freedom inspired overthrow of "British tyranny." Not surprisingly, Africans looking at their history tend to take a different view of events than those generally expressed here. Gann and Duignan have wisely asked A.E. Afigbo of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, to contribute to this volume. This he does in a ten page essay, "Men of Two Continents: An African Interpretation." While it could be anticipated that he would be critical of the approach of the non-African scholars here, he sometimes seems to overlook the obvious in his arguments. In criticizing the pageantry of a Royal Governor's progress, Afigbo views it as establishing a precedent that has been followed by the new African rulers. He seems to forget that pageantry and conspicuous consumption were a part of the African tradition before colonialism. Likewise, in defending the rights of the African nomadic people to "walk away from an oppressive and tyrannical state or community," he makes no attempt to reconcile that right with the modern state system. He overlooks the efforts of the modern state to deal with the same problem. Countries as different as Algeria, Tunisia and Kenya all have programs to change the life style of their nomadic groups. One is, indeed, reminded of American colonial criticism of Royal policy towards the Indians, a policy that the colonists in turn made even more harsh.

But Professor Afigbo is on the weakest ground, perhaps, when he argues of these men "that most of the colonial governors needed Africa more than Africa needed them. But for the opportunity that Africa offered, few, if any, of them would have earned an entire paragraph in a serious book of history." As well to argue that, but for circumstances, Andrew Carnegie would have served out his life as a telegraph operator.

Gann and Duignan have produced outstanding work, and Professor Afigbo's thought-provoking analysis, my criticisms notwithstanding, should prove useful in stimulating new research. The last word hasn't been written on the colonial period of African history. Each generation will reinterpret the significance of the European contribution, inevitably. And that is as it should be.



## Background to The Saharan War

Anne Lippert

Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, **THE WESTERN SAHARANS: Background to Conflict**, (New Jersey: Barnes & Noble, 1980) 348 pages, \$27.50.

In their book, *The Western Saharans*, Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff propose to describe the area of the western Sahara (Mauritania, southern Morocco, and the former Spanish Sahara) and the effects of nationalistic movements, in particular, the latest of these movements, the Polisario Front, on the area. The study is divided into five parts: Mauritania, The Spanish Sahara, Morocco, The Polisario Front and the Partition, The War's Repercussions on Mauritania and Morocco. A good deal of valuable information about the history and inhabitants of these areas is provided as well as about relationships between and among the parties to the present conflict.

In providing historical and ethnological information about these areas, Thompson and Adloff's book is particularly valuable. In the areas of conjecture and interpretation of events, however, there are some weaknesses in their volume, namely, in not clearly differentiating between conjecture and fact in some cases, and failing to footnote some sources. A final difficulty for the writers is that while they were writing and editing the book, new facts emerged as is certain to occur in an on-going situation. Hence before the book was printed, it was in some aspects already outdated.

One example is that the authors place some emphasis on the fact that Libya had not recognized the R.A.S.D. (the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic — The abbreviation is from the French) because of the fear that it would disrupt the "Arab Nation." They talk about this on page 26, mention it again on page 177, and discuss it at length on pages 258-260. By July 1980, however, four months before the American publication of the book, Libya had extended recognition.

An example of a different type of weakness is Thompson and Adloff's discussion of the World Court's opinion on the status of the Spanish Sahara at the time of colonization. One of the earliest commentators on that decision, Charles Vallee, a Maitre-Assistant at the University of Paris (*Maghreb/Machrek*, Jan.-Mar, 1976), claimed that the Court's decision was ambiguous. Thompson and Adloff reiterate this judgment, as have others, without fully researching the legal questions which were before the Court. An understanding of these questions is integral to comprehending the attitudes of most non-aligned nations and the majority of African nations about the former Spanish Sahara, as well as Spain's repeated statement that she was transferring administrative rights, not sovereignty, in the Madrid Accords. (It is true,

Anne Lippert is Chairperson of The Department of Foreign Languages at Ohio Northern University, Ada, Ohio, and also chairs the Saharan Peoples' Support Committee.



in the case of the African states, that a major consideration is also the principle of respecting former colonial boundaries, a basic commitment of the O.A.U. since its foundation.) Although Thompson and Adloff have had access to some materials printed in the U.S. (Note their mention of Dr. Peter Duignan, Professor Carl Rosberg, and Dr. Andrew Jameson in the Acknowledgements), they appear unaware of Thomas Franck's discussion of the Advisory Opinion (American Journal of International Law, October, 1976) or Jeffrey Schulman's study of the Advisory Opinion, the Madrid Accords, and the status of the R.A.S.D. (U.S. Policy and Conflict in the Western Sahara, House of Representatives, 1979). Both Franck and Schulman argue that the ICJ Opinion was, in fact, both direct and clear, in contradiction to Thompson and Adloff's contention that the Court had no clear-cut position (p. 177). Further, when the authors discuss the statement by the Spanish that that nation had not transferred sovereignty over the Saharan province and criticize that stance as causing "greater discord in an already troubled area," (p. 22 & p. 150), and when the writers equate their suggestion of a referendum for the Touareg in Algeria with the referendum called for by the U.N. and the O.A.U. in the former Spanish Sahara, they indicate that they are confused at best about the basic legal issues in the question: 1) the sanctity of boundaries inherited from former colonial powers in Africa; 2) the fact that Spain was an administering power only in the Spanish Sahara and never had sovereignty (ICJ Opinion); 3) the paramount right to self-determination in the decolonization process (ICJ Opinion, series of Resolutions by the U.N. and the O.A.U.).

Thompson and Adloff do discuss very thoroughly the long history of Moroccan irredentism, the dynamics of that irredentism in a colonial and post-colonial context in Northwest Africa, and consistencies and inconsistencies in Mauritanian, Moroccan, and Algerian positions vis-a-vis the Spanish Sahara. (They hold that Algeria has been the most consistent of these three nations in holding (long-term) to its views that the Saharawis should exercise their rights to self-determination by a referendum and that one of the options should be independence.)

At one point in the book the authors talk about the "Polisario's Marxist stance" (p. 27), and their "doctrinaire creed" (p. 251), but they note that historically "independence and Islam are the only two themes that have consistently rung true for the Tribesmen of the Western Sahara." (p. 251) The authors also state that "in terms of nation-building, their strongest moral assets are courage, austerity, and self-reliance." (p. 251) Despite apparent conflicts in these statements, the authors seem to indicate in this section and others (which supports conversations this writer has had with Polisario leaders at different times), that the Polisario movement is primarily a nationalistic movement and that the essential issue is decolonization. Those issues may, however, be clothed by Polisario spokesmen to suit particular audiences.

A long-term issue raised again by Thompson and Adloff is whether a Polisario State (the R.A.S.D.) could be a viable state. The authors raise the question first on page 26, then refer to it periodically, particularly in Parts IV and V of the book. Thompson and Adloff say that they do not see how the present generation of guerrilla fighters and refugee camp dwellers will be able to administer an independent R.A.S.D., develop its resources, and create the structures of a "viable state." The authors admit that some efforts to develop personnel and organization are occurring in the refugee camps. Perhaps their inability to visit the Saharawis in their camps, within the territory of the

R.A.S.D., and elsewhere (as they note in the Introduction), colors their perceptions about the viability of the R.A.S.D. as an independent state.

Thompson and Adloff admit that the territory of the R.A.S.D. has sufficient resources (other than food) to support a state, but argue that the Saharawis are traditionally neither fishermen nor farmers (although some Saharawis have done and/or are doing both). Certainly a war that is going on its sixth year has done for Saharawi consciousness what the eight-year Algerian conflict did for Algerians in building some consciousness of nationhood. Similarly those who objected to Algerian independence claimed that trained personnel to run the vineyards, to manage the ports, to provide trained labor, didn't exist in that country. And, initially, after independence, these did not exist. While Thompson and Adloff express an underlying regret that nomadism is not going to be an option to the Saharawis after the war, they do indicate that this is as much a result of natural phenomena as the fact of the war itself.

The authors state that "some sort of Saharaoui (sic) state is almost certain to emerge from the present conflict." (p. 301) They list as positive factors for a peace settlement "the absence of active intervention . . . by the Superpowers." (p. 302) (It will be interesting to see if the Reagan Administration which has approved additional arms sales to Morocco will be convinced of this.) The authors conjecture, however, that the Polisario has no intention of adhering to the borders of the former Spanish Sahara. The logic of this argument is that Polisario leaders (some, anyhow, for this, too, is qualified in another section of the book) are nomads and nomads don't concern themselves with borders (p. 304). This last conjecture is in direct opposition to a number of official statements by Polisario leaders in the U.N. and before other world bodies.

It would be interesting to read an up-date of the author's assessment of the Moroccan situation now that the U.N. General Assembly has called for direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front. The authors claim a "moral" gain for Morocco through the war (p. 30), but do not explain how Hassan's monarchy can be saved. Forty-six nations, including over one-half of the African members of the O.A.U., now recognize the R.A.S.D. as opposed to the 19 reported in the book. When nations which have not yet recognized the R.A.S.D. but accept the Polisario Front as the legitimate political representative of the Sharawi people are added to these totals, the support level rises to two-thirds of the memberships of both the O.A.U. and the U.N. General Assembly.

Thompson and Adloff's book is an excellent sourcebook. In addition to a bibliography and an appendix which describes some of the tribes of the western Sahara, there is also a glossary, an explanation of acronyms used, and an index. Thompson and Adloff have succeeded very well in fulfilling the subtitle of the book, Background to Conflict. If they have not succeeded as well in some interpretations (particularly in the Introduction and in Part V) perhaps that is due to limited or no access to Polisario representatives and documents and limited access to some sources in the U.S., Great Britain, and France.

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## ***Kpelle Women in Liberian Communities***

Nancy J. Schmidt

Caroline H. Bledsoe. **WOMEN AND MARRIAGE IN KPELLE SOCIETY** (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980). 217 pp. \$16.50.

In the last two decades the Kpelle of Liberia have been the subject of several studies by anthropologists and an educator influenced by anthropological methods and theories.<sup>1</sup> Yet none of these studies, or Bledsoe's, has the broad ethnographic scope of D.H. Westermann's, *Die Kpelle: Ein Negerstamm in Liberia* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1921) an old fashioned German ethnography based on inadequate fieldwork by contemporary standards, or John Gay's ethnographic novel, *Red Dust on the Green Leaves* (Thompson; Conn.: Inter Culture Associates, 1973), which compares the "traditional" and acculturated worlds in which Kpelle youth are socialized.

The primary foci of recent anthropological studies of the Kpelle have been socialization and acculturation. Bellman, Cole, Erchak, Gay, and Okorodudu focus on formal and informal education in the Kpelle/Liberian cultural context. Bellman and Cole are more theoretical in their concern with cognition in general and learning strategies and cosmological categories in particular,<sup>2</sup> whereas Erchak, Gay, and Okorodudu are more descriptive in their concern with children in different but complementary contexts of home, school, work,

1. Beryl L. Bellman, *Village of Curers and Assassins* (The Hague: Mouton, 1975); Michael Cole et al. *The Cultural Context of Learning and Thinking* (New York: Basic Books, 1971); Gerald M. Erchak, *Full Respect: Kpelle Children in Adaptation* (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1977); John Gay and Michael Cole, *The New Mathematics and the Old Culture* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967); James L. Gibbs Jr. *The Judicial Implications of Marital Instability Among the Kpelle* (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1960); Corahann Okorodudu, *Achievement Training and Achievement Motivation Among the Kpelle of Liberia* (Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1966).

2. Bellman also has conducted research on Kpelle responses to films and videotapes, Beryl L. Bellman and Bennetta Jules-Rosette, *A Paradigm for Looking: Cross-Cultural Research With Visual Media* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing Co., 1977).

Dr. Schmidt is Librarian of Tozzer Library, Peabody Museum of Archeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.



convincingly demonstrates the utility of recent Marxist theory, particularly contributions made by English and French anthropologists. The author himself modestly claims no theoretical contribution, and indeed, the major interest of this very specific case study lies in the concrete detail which vividly illustrates the utility of class analysis.

Mr. Clarence-Smith rejects those who focus on the unity of African nationalism and who make the withdrawal of European rule the fundamental point of historical reference because they cloud our understanding of how the economic interests of specific African and European classes and fractions of classes conflicted, cooperated, or adapted in order to further their perceived interests.

Mr. Clarence-Smith also convincingly refutes the influential school of historiography which contends that Portuguese colonialism in the 19th and early 20th century was not economically motivated but rather stimulated to expand for reasons of humiliated national pride or for other noneconomic, social, political and ideological gratifications. He points out first that the lack of economic returns — admittedly colonies were constant and heavy burdens on the finances of an already poor country — does not logically prove a lack of economic motivation. The fact that they weren't successful does not disprove their intent in the endeavor. More importantly, taxes which paid for colonialism came from other groups and classes than those which benefited. Finally, the expansion of capitalism in Portugal as a whole in the late 19th century owed a great deal to the existence of protected colonial markets which also produced the raw materials for metropolitan industries. The vigorous group of colonial capitalists in Angola needed control of the state apparatus to guarantee their security, expand into the interior, develop "infrastructure" and enforce a system of exchange which facilitated profit making.

On the African side, the author discusses four ways that lineage societies in southern Angola responded to the intensified pressures of capitalism during the period before the consolidation of colonial rule: "Social" banditry; a "tendency" towards feudalism; the development of "mission theocracies" and the rise of an independent peasantry. These responses to external factors, to the expansion of triumphant 19th century European capitalism, varied according to "certain minor differences" in the internal structures of peasant societies and according to the precise nature in timing of the pressures to which these societies were subjected. Analyzing these variations he goes on to show how from the 1900s the consolidation of colonial rule swept away feudal nobles, social bandits, mission theocrats and independent peasants alike and created a relatively uniform subject peasantry in the sense of a class forced to produce commodities or labor power on terms dictated by colonial officials.

In discussing the controversy of whether this process resulted in the development of a "true proletariat," his purpose is not merely to engage in sectarian discourse but to better understand how large numbers of Africans became steady workers in a capitalist economy. "Working class" he finds too vague a term, for it does not allow us to comprehend the degree to which the workers were cut off from their traditional means of production and became subject to the laws of the market place. Until 1913, slavery rapidly and precociously produced a "proletariat" where the slaves were uprooted from their communities, lost all rights in peasant societies, and became totally dependent on wage labor in the "colonial nucleus" once they were freed. The slower, more "normal" African pattern of proletarianization involved the

Irving Leonard Markovitz

absorption of migrant labor into capitalist "relations of production" as wages assumed great importance for the subsistence of peasants and their families.

Mr. Clarence-Smith contributes also to the understanding of a second issue, namely the nature and roots of ethnic and racial antagonism. He argues that both types of conflict sprang largely from the economic insecurity of "petty bourgeois elements" in colonial society who were constantly threatened with proletarianization and struggled to break out of a vicious circle of debt. They sought to increase their security at the expense of others and it was through this process that race became important.

Mr. Clarence-Smith is anxious that the conceptual framework used to clarify these and other matters be useful for the People's Republic of Angola in attempting the task of socialist reconstruction. Not only are the problems of the transition to socialism different in the more industrialized central ex-colonized society in comparison to the "tributary peasant societies" but also "the structure of exploitation" of peasant societies by the central society did not disappear with independence. The author argues that "the structure of exploitation" must be adequately conceptualized in order to be resolved. However, it is in his understanding of "the vexed problem of the nature of pre-capitalist or non-capitalist relations of production in peasant societies" that I had the most difficulty with Mr. Clarence-Smith's ideas.

In his analysis of the "lineage mode of production" he stresses the "communal ownership means of production," that is, "the apportioning of labor power according to kinship and the relatively egalitarian system of redistribution." Even in "as extreme a case as the Ovambo" which "others might mistake as feudal," he emphasizes the absence of classes. Indeed in a very neat distinction he argues that the "central historical process" within such societies was not the class struggle "as such," for he does not believe constituted classes existed. Nevertheless "certain groups" tried to turn themselves into an exploitative class as "other groups" resisted, and this was a "key fact." In still another twist he argues that colonial policies buttressed the indigenous resistance to class formation — really internal class differences among the Africans — because the major colonial interest was simply in securing a satisfactory flow of cheap migrant labor, not in the creation of class allies.

Drawing upon the brilliant theoretical study of Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production*, the author makes a convincing case for the almost now cliché-like contention that one must not simply impose Western categories like that of feudalism on African instances. He argues, for example, that in Southern Angola "the permanent separation of the direct producers from the means of production was not achieved." But whether this was indeed "the most fundamental characteristic of a feudal mode of production" seems to me highly debatable. If one rather focuses on the system of domination, a different picture emerges. The author has distinguished himself by the ingenuity with which he argues the case for the communal nature of these Southern Angola societies, but he also shows how a "dominant class extracted tribute by force from the majority of the population," and then went on to use this tribute to maintain and equip a standing army. This army, in turn, perpetuated the extraction of tribute which enabled the "dominant class" to engage in "a fair amount of conspicuous consumption." For example, the chief of the Kwambi seized the cattle of his subjects to finance the building of a

medieval castle which he filled with "a curious assortment of imported goods from fiddles to wagons." Among the Kwamyama the chiefs and other lords possessed beautiful horses and the most expensive modern rifles and drank the best champagne and cognac imported at a time when "all around, their people were starving and dying in one of the worst famines ever known." (page 78)

Although I am sure that the author would share my skepticism about the claims of western liberal societies that inheritance taxes have leveled social differences, he asserts that in Southern Angola "long term concentrations of cattle were avoided by the very egalitarian manner in which cattle were distributed through inheritance." The author claims that "one can say the cattle were owned collectively by the clan and were only entrusted to a man during his life span." (page 73) One could also say that the captains of industry from Jay Gould to J.P. Morgan acted merely as the trustees of the people in enmassing their great wealth and acted for the social good in creating massive modern industry.

Again, while the author admits that "considerable inequality" existed between elders and juniors this "temporary inequality" could not become frozen into a hereditary class structure because, he claims, 1. "no elder could pass on his advantages to a single heir" and 2. "all juniors could be expected to become elders in their turn." Now these are matters of fact as well as of logic or theory and while I would be prepared to accept the author's facts he advances none for this and related matters.

He also argues that although chiefs and headmen acted as judges and law enforcers, a "state" did not exist in the "strict sense of a specialized apparatus used by one class to maintain and reproduce its domination over another." (page 73). He does not deny that these authorities decided matters including life and death in their "authoritative allocation of values" but this merely fulfilled certain "necessary functions of organization in coordination." (page 73) Even though this involved "considerable violence" it was not "the violence of one class exercised against another." Rather it was "the violence of the social formation exercised by its agents against deviant or perceived to be deviant individuals, who threatened the reproduction of the social formation as a whole." (page 73)

Philosophers and kings have always insisted that rulers merely provide an indispensable function for the community. Our own Talcott Parsons has explained dissent in advanced industrial societies as caused by the dissenters, that is by deviant individuals who have peculiar personal problems. But in the absence of hard evidence, I find it difficult to accept a type of analysis as being true for southern Angola that I would not accept for an accurate understanding of the United States or Great Britain.

These issues are important because to comprehend the contemporary conflicts in Angola, as Mr. Clarence-Smith would be the first to agree, requires knowing the truth about class in indigenous societies. This is not an esoteric matter but crucial for determining the success of modern socialist efforts.

Despite possible arguments, however, about theoretical interpretation of pre-colonial class structures, the author has succeeded in showing how the Portuguese and their African allies turned southern Angola into a vast labor reservoir. He helps us understand the process whereby African peasant societies were originally autonomous but were slowly subjugated to an externally imposed process of exchange. He thus adds both to our knowledge of colonialism and the development of a world capitalist system and at the same time to our appreciation of the changing nature of traditional social structures.

## **South Africa's Alliance with Chiefs and New Elites in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland**

Stanley B. Andrews

Donald Kalinde Kowet, *LAND, LABOUR MIGRATION AND POLITICS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978) pp. 243; \$14.50 paper.

Development specialists in Southern Africa as well as desk-bound academicians should start their area orientation by reading this volume. Dr. Kowet has provided a refreshing departure from more conventional analyses of political economy and dependence networks. Unfortunately, the attention of the reader is constantly interrupted with spelling, punctuation and grammatical errors. The author moves beyond an indictment of colonialism and capitalism to a Real Politik which allies traditional leaders, new black managerial elite, and South African socio-economic interests in the maintenance of the *status quo*.

Professor Kowet's analysis is based upon Samir Amin's three-part typology of colonial penetration in Africa: first, those countries of the colonial economy; second, countries administered by the concession-owning companies; third, labor reserve networks. These include: South Africa, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, Swaziland, Lesotho, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique and Angola.

Amin, a noted social theorist, has examined underdevelopment as a natural consequence of reducing large land areas into labor reserves for European colonial and capital penetration. Professor Kowet builds from this functional premise in analyzing "push-pull" forces between South Africa and the labor reserves of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Early Afrikaner and indigenous conflict over land (1800 onwards) is identified as a major cause of dispersal and concentration into uneconomic 'reservations'. Between 1820 and 1870, British colonial intervention further accelerated the consolidation of power in the hands of selected chiefs.

The allocative power of selected chiefs over land is identified by the author as the main reason for the relationship between land, labor migration and politics in Southern Africa. Chiefs were responsible for controlling access to land, which in turn affected labor migration and the allocation of political power within traditional family-based systems.

With increased scarcity of land, local chiefs allied themselves with paramount chiefs and they in turn with colonial administrators and the industrial power structure. Chiefs would coerce and send labor to the gold mines of South Africa so as to maintain their own economic and political self-interests. This alliance became an institutional escape valve.

Stanley B. Andrews is a Project Research Specialist in The School of Technical Careers at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.

The author has pointed out that contemporary political and economic progress on the periphery of cores such as South Africa and Britain has become subordinated to economic self-interest. In particular, Dr. Kowet has noted the failure of reforms in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland since independence. This is attributed to the self-interest of chiefs, as well as to the new black elite of civil servants, teachers and managers. Indeed, many of the development initiatives introduced by external international assistance agencies appear to have been subverted by the alliance of chiefs, new black elite, and expatriate elite.

This analysis has important implications for future progress in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland as well as in the "Homelands" of South Africa. Explosive population growth, rural-urban migration, unemployment, scarce land, and uneven economic development continue to widen the gap between the rich and the poor. Before further assistance efforts are made, Kowet suggests the question of whether these programs will have a realistic chance of success, given the constraints, must be faced.

## **Background to Transition in Zimbabwe**

Christian P. Potholm

W. H. Morris-Jones (ed.), **FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House**, (London, England; Totawa, New Jersey: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1980) hard cover 123 pp; \$25.00

**From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe** is a well balanced and intrinsically interesting set of essays dealing with the events, personalities and historical forces which moved Rhodesia to become Zimbabwe.

Roger Riddell's "Zimbabwe's Land Problem" focuses on the continuing dilemma of national relocation efforts while John Day accurately portrays the extent to which tribal forces have been exaggerated as determinant of national (and international) policy. James Barber puts Zimbabwe in its proper context of southern Africa and indicates the limits on its espousal of a truly radical foreign policy, while A.R. Wilkinson examines the physical and psychological impact of the fifteen year old struggle.

Three other essays by Colin Stoneman, D.G. Clarke and Richard Hodder-Williams probe various aspects of the Zimbabwe's economic situation, potential and the relationship between economic and political goals.

All in all, readers interested in the complex and convoluted situation in southern Africa will find **From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe** well worth their attention, both as an historical record and as a guide to the future.

Christian P. Potholm is Professor in the Department of Government and Legal Studies at Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine.

## **A Survey of White Prejudice**

A.K.H. Weinrich

G.C. Kinloch, **RACIAL CONFLICT IN RHODESIA: A Socio-historical Study** (University Press of America, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1979) pp. 321, \$10.75

In his book **Racial Conflict in Rhodesia** Kinloch sets out to analyze white Rhodesian racial attitudes as these emerge from newspaper accounts, parliamentary debates and other documents. His study is relatively unique that he attempts to piece together white attitudes from letters to newspaper editors since the beginning of the colony of Southern Rhodesia until almost its end, for Kinloch published his book only one year before the country became independent and replaced its name, Rhodesia, by Zimbabwe, a name reflecting its cultural heritage.

This observation indicates that the book is dated, an awareness Kinloch seems to have had himself when he published his work, for he dedicated it to "people and places that now exist in memory only." (p. iii).

But the book is dated in an even more important sense. As he wrote up his material, the author took as his standpoint that of the white settler community, although he does not state this explicitly. He admits that the views collected reflect white rather than black thinking, but he attributes this solely to the scarcity of information on African thought. Plenty of information on black reactions could, however, have been assembled, had the author consulted the publications of the liberation movements and the writings of black Zimbabweans in exile. An assembly of such data would have given a very different orientation to this book.

The book, as it is written, lacks sensitivity to the feelings of Zimbabweans, not only in its quotations of white prejudice, but also in Kinloch's own choice of words when he does not quote white Rhodesians. Thus he speaks of the "native rebellion," "riots," "subversion" and "black terrorism" whenever he refers to African resistance to white aggression and oppression, but he never uses similar words when describing the subjugation of the indigenous population and the institutionalized violence with which the settler regime tried to keep in bondage the people of the land.

Kinloch's book falls into three parts. In the first part he introduces his conceptual framework and defines some terms, for example "colony," an "emigrant elite" from its mother country, "pragmatism" and the like without, however, throwing new light in these terms. He also summarizes theories about race relations, such as those of Manoni and Fanon, and a spectrum of previous

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We erroneously reported in 27/4 that A.K.H. Weinrich was with the University of Zimbabwe. That is not the case. Since independence she has been serving on the new government's Commission of Inquiry on Incomes, Prices and Conditions of Service, which recently completed its work. She is now a member of a new Commission created to delineate new constituency boundaries.



studies of race relations in Rhodesia. Then he groups together dominant themes, paying particular attention to demographic and occupational trends among Africans and Europeans. These he elaborates in greater detail in the second part of his book. Kinloch's presentation of economic trends, however, is misleading, since he gives only the number of each race in each occupational category without indicating the different earning potentials of blacks and whites. Consequently the trends he establishes tell far less than could be assumed.

In the second and longest part of the book, chapter 4 to 12, Kinloch quotes separately for each decade the dominant stereotypes held by whites of the African people. It is in this part that he relies most heavily on the local press and popular views expressed through this and related media. The headings given to these chapters epitomize Kinloch's view of the "racial frontiers" crossed in each of these decades, such as conquest, labour exploitation, cultural control, or a combination of several of these.

One problem the author faced was that the shift in emphasis from decade to decade was gradual and hence the overlap great. Consequently the constant quotations of "natives as savage, melancholy, worthless as labourers, wily, aggravating, childish and generally unclean" (p. 79) and worse, make rather unpleasant reading and in their accumulated form provide, though seemingly without intention, the most condemning picture of white settlers that has ever been drawn.

As stated above, this book is predominantly descriptive and the endless repetition of negative stereotypes of Africans greatly tires the reader. For in spite of Kinloch's attempt to work out a theoretical framework, his level of abstraction is rather low.

A further weakness is that Kinloch sees Rhodesia too much in isolation and that he ignores the constant racial influence emanating from South Africa, especially in regard to racial legislation. Thus when he quotes the Master and Servant Act or pass laws, he never refers to related earlier legislation in South Africa which served as models for Rhodesian laws.

From the 1930s onward, Kinloch quotes some African views in race relations. These, however, are drawn from a very small, and rather unrepresentative, section of the African people, such as black members of parliament or a few western oriented blacks who aspired to inclusion into the white elite. No priority of widespread African aspirations and values can be gathered from statements like: "African reaction focuses on the importance of trade unions, *Lobola* problems, the land issue, need for racial tolerance and hospitality and the importance of the welfare of African women as they assume new roles." Only a person familiar with Rhodesia or with similar societies could surmise from the above quotation that the overriding concern was not with trade unions or marriage customs, but with the land issue. For it was this concern which led both to the first uprisings against white settlers and to the final liberation war.

Whenever Kinloch refers to Africans, except in the context of "terrorism," he describes them as purely passive and receptive, and as grateful recipients of white culture, as well as men ashamed of their own heritage. In no instance does he capture the dominant sentiments of the African people.

Kinloch's incomprehension of African reaction is shown in innumerable places throughout his book; one quotation may suffice. Writing about the 1970s, he observes:

This decade brings us to the highest level of racial conflict in

A.K.H. Weinrich

Rhodesia and the "circle of history" in that present guerilla incursions may be viewed as the reverse migration of the indigenous population, in a somewhat parallel fashion to the original colonial migrants. (p. 194)

If this statement is meant to reflect a neutral, dispassionate stand, then no greater distortion of history can be visualised than such neutrality.

In the third part of his book, in which Kinloch tries to analyse his data, he draws on yet a further source of information, similar in content to that presented in Part Two, namely on parliamentary debates. These do not reveal new trends, but merely repeat the general assessment of white attitudes already presented in Part Two. Thus the reader is taken for a third time through the history of racial attitudes in Rhodesia, and in chapter 14, he does so for a fourth time.

The problem with this section is that the attempted analysis, inspite of its statistical form, remains at the descriptive level and does not deepen the reader's insight. For Kinloch merely states the obvious, for example, that the raise of nationalism economic and social problems among Africans give way to a concern with political issues. (p. 236)

Kinloch concludes his book with the observation that in successive decades changing demographic and economic trends caused a shift in race relations and that in this interplay of demographic and economic changes a "dialectic" could be perceived; for as members of the subordinate African culture tried to come to terms with the dominant white culture which claimed to have brought them civilization, slight changes in race relations occurred among both Africans and Europeans. Thus "race relations represent the dynamic interaction of cultural and demographic-economic factors as they operate within the colonial context over time." (p. 291)

This book is about Rhodesia, Rhodesia as it was at its worst. I do not think that it will be widely read in the new Zimbabwe.





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## Deciphering The Rosetta Stone of Modern African History

David H. Groff

Timothy C. Weiskel, **FRENCH COLONIAL RULE AND THE BAULE PEOPLES: Resistance and Collaboration 1889-1911** (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 323: \$49.50.

In the introduction to this stimulating study, Timothy Weiskel observes that resistance movements constitute the "Rosetta stone of modern African history." By this metaphor, Weiskel seeks to underscore the extent to which resistance studies have served to define, directly or indirectly, the themes of the past one hundred years of African history. The study of resistance movements has provided historians with fresh insights into the complexities of pre-colonial African polities, the nature of European colonial rule and the origins of African nationalism. So far, however, most resistance studies have been political in emphasis. Weiskel seeks to go beyond this relatively narrow focus and inquire into the broader socio-economic basis of African responses to the initial colonial encounter.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, he analyzes not only the interplay between resistance and collaboration in the Baule response to the French conquest, but also the ways in which this interplay helped create both the socio-economic and political contexts for subsequent Baule history.

**French Colonial Rule and the Baule Peoples** is a case study of the initial encounter between the Baule peoples of central Ivory Coast and their French colonizers. In his treatment of this "micro-history," Weiskel combines a structural analysis of late nineteenth century Baule society with a narrative history of the French conquest. In places, Weiskel's attention to historical detail seems overly meticulous. Fortunately, however, the study as a whole avoids becoming simply a tedious chronicle of events. For the most part, the author succeeds in blending a great deal of disparate evidence culled from French colonial documents and Baule ethnography into a subtle analysis of the conflict between the structural dynamics of Baule society and the imperatives of French colonial expansion in the Ivory Coast.

According to Weiskel, the pre-colonial Baule were a politically decentralized people living largely beyond the reach of the world capitalist system. Unlike their neighbors to the south and east, they maintained no direct commercial ties with the European traders on the coast. They did not, however, live in economic isolation. Their production system based on horticulture, cotton cloth weaving and gold mining yielded a sufficient surplus to support an

1. For recent discussions of resistance studies see Allen and Barbara Issacman, "Resistance and Collaboration in Southern and Central Africa, ca 1850-1920," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 10, 1 (1977) 31-62; and T.O. Ranger, "The People in African Resistance: A Review," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 4, 1 (1977) 125-146.

David H. Groff is Assistant Professor of History and the Humanities at Reed College, Portland, Oregon.

elaborate network of local trade relations. Labor was the crucial factor in all these economic activities and control over labor became the main determinant of power and status in Baule society. Such control was exercised through pragmatically determined cognatic descent groups headed by male elders who competed and cooperated with one another to increase their personal followings. This continuous effort on the part of Baule leaders to maximize their personal followings supplied the dynamic element in Baule society. As Weiskel portrays it, the regional political economy defined by this dynamic was persistently viable, and could not be easily incorporated into the late nineteenth century world economy.

Yet incorporation of the Baule into the world system was precisely what the French had in mind when they moved into the central Ivory Coast in the late 1880s and early 1890s. One of the strengths of Weiskel's study is that it casts into sharp relief the explicitly economic motives behind the French conquest of the Baule. According to Weiskel, the French objective was not the Baule's land or their mineral wealth but their labor. Since they did not yield commodities demanded by the world market, existing Baule productive activities were of little interest to the French. Baule labor, on the other hand, was needed to build the infrastructure of empire. Herein lay the main cause of the Baule resistance: French demands for porters, construction laborers and eventually cash crop producers threatened to disrupt the Baule production system and undermine leaders' control over their followers.


Patterns of Baule resistance and collaboration as described by Weiskel were therefore largely a function of French labor demands. The waxing and waning of such demands gave rise to what Weiskel calls an "archetypal sequence of events" in each of the three phases of Baule resistance: 1893-1895, 1898-1903 and 1909-1911. As French demands for labor intensified, collaborative relations broke down and armed resistance erupted. The more intense the demands, the more violent the resistance and the more brutal the resulting repression. Thus, according to Weiskel, the most violent phase, that of 1909-1911, began when the colonizers moved beyond simple demands for porters and construction laborers to a systematic attempt to force the Baule to become cocoa producers. This attempt posed a particularly severe threat to the integrity of the Baule political economy because it involved the wholesale reallocation of labor from traditional activities, still regarded as remunerative by the Baule, to a new activity that had not yet proven its viability. Viewed from Weiskel's perspective, the ferocity of Governor Angoulvant's campaign of repression in 1910 and 1911 becomes understandable. As this hard-nosed imperialist clearly perceived, the old Baule political economy had to be broken in order for commercial agriculture to become viable.

In developing his argument, Weiskel moves beyond the level of "micro-history" to address some of the larger issues of modern African history. He obviously has much to say about the motives behind French expansionism in West Africa. Most historians have tended to depict France's intrusion into West Africa as a classic case of military imperialism fueled by the ambitions of junior officers. If this formula has a certain plausibility when applied to the Western Sudan in the 1880s, it has little relevance to the Ivory Coast in the 1890s and early 1900s. Here, as Weiskel makes clear, civilians were in control, civilians who were pursuing essentially economic objectives. The destiny of the Ivory Coast, in their minds, was to become a source of raw materials and markets for French industry.

David H. Groff

Weiskel's treatment of this aspect of the Baule case has implications for our understanding of imperialism as a general phenomenon. In his final chapter he suggests that his analysis can help point the way toward a more comprehensive version of the "peripheral" theory of imperialism of Robinson, Gallagher and Fieldhouse. If, as these authors argue, colonial conquest can best be seen as a reflex response of the metropolitan powers to crises on the periphery of informal empire, these crises themselves can best be understood as the result of changes in local economic and political conditions precipitated by the unilateral actions of European agents. As Weiskel's study makes crystal clear, we cannot hope to understand European expansionism in Africa without examining these local conditions. This point is of course not new but rarely has it been made with as much clarity and documentary support as in *French Colonial Rule and the Baule Peoples*.

Weiskel's study also has much to say about the extent to which early colonial rule refashioned African economic, social and political institutions. Following the lead of A.G. Hopkins, historians in recent years have tended to minimize the economic and social impact of early colonial policy. Such a view makes a good deal of sense when applied to the coastal West African societies with long-standing commercial links with Europe. But it is misleading when applied to inland peoples like the Baule which had no such links prior to the advent of colonial rule. For these peoples, it was the implementation of colonial policy more than anything else that precipitated their integration into the world economy. The French colonial administration's efforts to extend the coastal trading system into the Baule homeland and to force the Baule to become cash crop producers had far-reaching effects on Baule institutions. Weiskel's study demonstrates conclusively that for the Baule, at least, the imposition of colonial rule had a revolutionary impact. As he puts it, the "'Great White Umpires' not only changed the rules; they changed the game entirely."



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**The European Proconsul in Africa**

Dalvan M. Coger

L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, editors. **AFRICAN PROCONSULS: European Governors in Africa** (New York; The Free Press, Macmillan; Stanford; The Hoover Institution, 1978) pp. xii. 548; \$29.95.

Mention of the great proconsuls of the colonial period in Africa usually elicits images of empire builders like Rhodes, Lyautey and Cromer. It is to the credit of the editors that they have ignored that already well-studied group and concentrated on governors typical of the administration of the different colonial powers, though an obvious exception to this is the inclusion of John E. Flint's essay on Frederick Lugard.

The African possessions of Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain and Portugal began to assume their modern forms as nation-states as a result of the administrative decisions of a most able and competent group of officials. Doctrinaire determinists to the contrary, men like Heinrich Schnee, Sir Andrew Cohen and Robert Delavignette did more to shape the future of the African peoples than the great banks at the center of the first world. This is not to say that conditions might not have been immeasurably better had the European governments been more generous with their funds.

The great strength of this volume is in the catholicity of its contributors. Each section, devoted to a different metropolitan power, begins with an overview of the governors of that section. William B. Cohen writes of the French officials, Anthony H.M. Kirk-Greene of the British, Douglas Wheeler of the Portuguese and L.H. Gann of the Belgians and the Germans. The biographies themselves read like a Who's Who of historians of the colonial period; Harry A. Gailey, Peter Duignan, Brian Weinstein and Ronald Robinson, to name only a few. Cohen's biography of "Robert Delavignette: The Gentle Ruler," assess his contributions to French colonial policy:

"Insisting on the fact that the French had contributed to the history and development of modern Africa, Delavignette had also been instrumental in advancing French knowledge of Africa. His writings conveyed to Frenchmen a better understanding of the traditional aspects of Africa, the world of the black peasant, and of the new and evolving continent with its modern cities, universities, dams, and ambitions for the future. Delavignette had seen in the French empire an institution that affirmed the unity of men by creating a symbiosis between various cultures. After the collapse of empires built upon force, he saw the opportunity of building new relationship on universal human values (p. 202)."

Cohen also says, "Decolonization had not diminished the moral obligation of a richer and more technically advanced society to help those less well-endowed

Dalvan M. Coger is Associate Professor of History at Memphis State University, Memphis Tennessee.

materially. Nor was there any less reason to learn from African culture those ethical values and esthetic perceptions that could enrich French civilization (p. 202)."

Conquest and colonization have been virtually universal experiences in the history of mankind. Among American historians it was more than a century before the "imperial school" reassessed the American revolution as primarily a failure of the British system of governance rather than a uniquely American, freedom inspired overthrow of "British tyranny." Not surprisingly, Africans looking at their history tend to take a different view of events than those generally expressed here. Gann and Duignan have wisely asked A.E. Afigbo of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, to contribute to this volume. This he does in a ten page essay, "Men of Two Continents: An African Interpretation." While it could be anticipated that he would be critical of the approach of the non-African scholars here, he sometimes seems to overlook the obvious in his arguments. In criticizing the pageantry of a Royal Governor's progress, Afigbo views it as establishing a precedent that has been followed by the new African rulers. He seems to forget that pageantry and conspicuous consumption were a part of the African tradition before colonialism. Likewise, in defending the rights of the African nomadic people to "walk away from an oppressive and tyrannical state or community," he makes no attempt to reconcile that right with the modern state system. He overlooks the efforts of the modern state to deal with the same problem. Countries as different as Algeria, Tunisia and Kenya all have programs to change the life style of their nomadic groups. One is, indeed, reminded of American colonial criticism of Royal policy towards the Indians, a policy that the colonists in turn made even more harsh.

But Professor Afigbo is on the weakest ground, perhaps, when he argues of these men "that most of the colonial governors needed Africa more than Africa needed them. But for the opportunity that Africa offered, few, if any, of them would have earned an entire paragraph in a serious book of history." As well to argue that, but for circumstances, Andrew Carnegie would have served out his life as a telegraph operator.

Gann and Duignan have produced outstanding work, and Professor Afigbo's thought-provoking analysis, my criticisms notwithstanding, should prove useful in stimulating new research. The last word hasn't been written on the colonial period of African history. Each generation will reinterpret the significance of the European contribution, inevitably. And that is as it should be.



## Background to The Saharan War

Anne Lippert

Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, **THE WESTERN SAHARANS: Background to Conflict**, (New Jersey: Barnes & Noble, 1980) 348 pages, \$27.50.

In their book, *The Western Saharans*, Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff propose to describe the area of the western Sahara (Mauritania, southern Morocco, and the former Spanish Sahara) and the effects of nationalistic movements, in particular, the latest of these movements, the Polisario Front, on the area. The study is divided into five parts: Mauritania, The Spanish Sahara, Morocco, The Polisario Front and the Partition, The War's Repercussions on Mauritania and Morocco. A good deal of valuable information about the history and inhabitants of these areas is provided as well as about relationships between and among the parties to the present conflict.

In providing historical and ethnological information about these areas, Thompson and Adloff's book is particularly valuable. In the areas of conjecture and interpretation of events, however, there are some weaknesses in their volume, namely, in not clearly differentiating between conjecture and fact in some cases, and failing to footnote some sources. A final difficulty for the writers is that while they were writing and editing the book, new facts emerged as is certain to occur in an on-going situation. Hence before the book was printed, it was in some aspects already outdated.

One example is that the authors place some emphasis on the fact that Libya had not recognized the R.A.S.D. (the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic — The abbreviation is from the French) because of the fear that it would disrupt the "Arab Nation." They talk about this on page 26, mention it again on page 177, and discuss it at length on pages 258-260. By July 1980, however, four months before the American publication of the book, Libya had extended recognition.

An example of a different type of weakness is Thompson and Adloff's discussion of the World Court decision on the status of the Spanish Sahara at the time of colonization. One of the earliest commentators on that decision, Charles Vallee, a Maître-Assistant at the University of Paris (Maghreb/Machrek, Jan.-Mar, 1976), claimed that the Court's decision was ambiguous. Thompson and Adloff reiterate this judgment, as have others, without fully researching the legal questions which were before the Court. An understanding of these questions is integral to comprehending the attitudes of most non-aligned nations and the majority of African nations about the former Spanish Sahara, as well as Spain's repeated statement that she was transferring administrative rights, not sovereignty, in the Madrid Accords. (It is true,

Anne Lippert is Chairperson of The Department of Foreign Languages at Ohio Northern University, Ada, Ohio, and also chairs the Saharan Peoples' Support Committee.



in the case of the African states, that a major consideration is also the principle of respecting former colonial boundaries, a basic commitment of the O.A.U. since its foundation.) Although Thompson and Adloff have had access to some materials printed in the U.S. (Note their mention of Dr. Peter Duignan, Professor Carl Rosberg, and Dr. Andrew Jameson in the Acknowledgements), they appear unaware of Thomas Franck's discussion of the Advisory Opinion (American Journal of International Law, October, 1976) or Jeffrey Schulman's study of the Advisory Opinion, the Madrid Accords, and the status of the R.A.S.D. (U.S. Policy and Conflict in the Western Sahara, House of Representatives, 1979). Both Franck and Schulman argue that the ICJ Opinion was, in fact, both direct and clear, in contradiction to Thompson and Adloff's contention that the Court had no clear-cut position (p. 177). Further, when the authors discuss the statement by the Spanish that that nation had not transferred sovereignty over the Saharan province and criticize that stance as causing "greater discord in an already troubled area," (p. 22 & p. 150), and when the writers equate their suggestion of a referendum for the Touareg in Algeria with the referendum called for by the U.N. and the O.A.U. in the former Spanish Sahara, they indicate that they are confused at best about the basic legal issues in the question: 1) the sanctity of boundaries inherited from former colonial powers in Africa; 2) the fact that Spain was an administering power only in the Spanish Sahara and never had sovereignty (ICJ Opinion); 3) the paramount right to self-determination in the decolonization process (ICJ Opinion, series of Resolutions by the U.N. and the O.A.U.).

Thompson and Adloff do discuss very thoroughly the long history of Moroccan irredentism, the dynamics of that irredentism in a colonial and post-colonial context in Northwest Africa, and consistencies and inconsistencies in Mauritanian, Moroccan, and Algerian positions vis-a-vis the Spanish Sahara. (They hold that Algeria has been the most consistent of these three nations in holding (long-term) to its views that the Saharawis should exercise their rights to self-determination by a referendum and that one of the options should be independence.)

At one point in the book the authors talk about the "Polisario's Marxist stance" (p. 27), and their "doctrinaire creed" (p. 251), but they note that historically "independence and Islam are the only two themes that have consistently rung true for the Tribesmen of the Western Sahara." (p. 251) The authors also state that "in terms of nation-building, their strongest moral assets are courage, austerity, and self-reliance." (p. 251) Despite apparent conflicts in these statements, the authors seem to indicate in this section and others (which supports conversations this writer has had with Polisario leaders at different times), that the Polisario movement is primarily a nationalistic movement and that the essential issue is decolonization. Those issues may, however, be clothed by Polisario spokesmen to suit particular audiences.

A long-term issue raised again by Thompson and Adloff is whether a Polisario State (the R.A.S.D.) could be a viable state. The authors raise the question first on page 26, then refer to it periodically, particularly in Parts IV and V of the book. Thompson and Adloff say that they do not see how the present generation of guerrilla fighters and refugee camp dwellers will be able to administer an independent R.A.S.D., develop its resources, and create the structures of a "viable state." The authors admit that some efforts to develop personnel and organization are occurring in the refugee camps. Perhaps their inability to visit the Saharawis in their camps, within the territory of the

R.A.S.D., and elsewhere (as they note in the Introduction), colors their perceptions about the viability of the R.A.S.D. as an independent state.

Thompson and Adloff admit that the territory of the R.A.S.D. has sufficient resources (other than food) to support a state, but argue that the Saharawis are traditionally neither fishermen nor farmers (although some Saharawis have done and/or are doing both). Certainly a war that is going on its sixth year has done for Saharawi consciousness what the eight-year Algerian conflict did for Algerians in building some consciousness of nationhood. Similarly those who objected to Algerian independence claimed that trained personnel to run the vineyards, to manage the ports, to provide trained labor, didn't exist in that country. And, initially, after independence, these did not exist. While Thompson and Adloff express an underlying regret that nomadism is not going to be an option to the Saharawis after the war, they do indicate that this is as much a result of natural phenomena as the fact of the war itself.

The authors state that "some sort of Saharaoui (sic) state is almost certain to emerge from the present conflict." (p. 301) They list as positive factors for a peace settlement "the absence of active intervention . . . by the Superpowers." (p. 302) (It will be interesting to see if the Reagan Administration which has approved additional arms sales to Morocco will be convinced of this.) The authors conjecture, however, that the Polisario has no intention of adhering to the borders of the former Spanish Sahara. The logic of this argument is that Polisario leaders (some, anyhow, for this, too, is qualified in another section of the book) are nomads and nomads don't concern themselves with borders (p. 304). This last conjecture is in direct opposition to a number of official statements by Polisario leaders in the U.N. and before other world bodies.

It would be interesting to read an up-date of the author's assessment of the Moroccan situation now that the U.N. General Assembly has called for direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front. The authors claim a "moral" gain for Morocco through the war (p. 30), but do not explain how Hassan's monarchy can be saved. Forty-six nations, including over one-half of the African members of the O.A.U., now recognize the R.A.S.D. as opposed to the 19 reported in the book. When nations which have not yet recognized the R.A.S.D. but accept the Polisario Front as the legitimate political representative of the Sharawi people are added to these totals, the support level rises to two-thirds of the memberships of both the O.A.U. and the U.N. General Assembly.

Thompson and Adloff's book is an excellent sourcebook. In addition to a bibliography and an appendix which describes some of the tribes of the western Sahara, there is also a glossary, an explanation of acronyms used, and an index. Thompson and Adloff have succeeded very well in fulfilling the subtitle of the book, Background to Conflict. If they have not succeeded as well in some interpretations (particularly in the Introduction and in Part V) perhaps that is due to limited or no access to Polisario representatives and documents and limited access to some sources in the U.S., Great Britain, and France.

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## ***Kpelle Women in Liberian Communities***

Nancy J. Schmidt

Caroline H. Bledsoe. **WOMEN AND MARRIAGE IN KPELLE SOCIETY** (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980). 217 pp. \$16.50.

In the last two decades the Kpelle of Liberia have been the subject of several studies by anthropologists and an educator influenced by anthropological methods and theories.<sup>1</sup> Yet none of these studies, or Bledsoe's, has the broad ethnographic scope of D.H. Westermann's, *Die Kpelle: Ein Negerstamm in Liberia* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1921) an old fashioned German ethnography based on inadequate fieldwork by contemporary standards, or John Gay's ethnographic novel, *Red Dust on the Green Leaves* (Thompson; Conn.: Inter Culture Associates, 1973), which compares the "traditional" and acculturated worlds in which Kpelle youth are socialized.

The primary foci of recent anthropological studies of the Kpelle have been socialization and acculturation. Bellman, Cole, Erchak, Gay, and Okorodudu focus on formal and informal education in the Kpelle/Liberian cultural context. Bellman and Cole are more theoretical in their concern with cognition in general and learning strategies and cosmological categories in particular,<sup>2</sup> whereas Erchak, Gay, and Okorodudu are more descriptive in their concern with children in different but complementary contexts of home, school, work,

1. Beryl L. Bellman, *Village of Curers and Assassins* (The Hague: Mouton, 1975); Michael Cole et al. *The Cultural Context of Learning and Thinking* (New York: Basic Books, 1971); Gerald M. Erchak, *Full Respect: Kpelle Children in Adaptation* (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1977); John Gay and Michael Cole, *The New Mathematics and the Old Culture* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967); James L. Gibbs Jr. *The Judicial Implications of Marital Instability Among the Kpelle* (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1960); Corahann Okorodudu, *Achievement Training and Achievement Motivation Among the Kpelle of Liberia* (Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1966).

2. Bellman also has conducted research on Kpelle responses to films and videotapes, Beryl L. Bellman and Bennetta Jules-Rosette, *A Paradigm for Looking: Cross-Cultural Research With Visual Media* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing Co., 1977).

Dr. Schmidt is Librarian of Tozzer Library, Peabody Museum of Archeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

secret society initiation, and intragenerational change. Gibbs, Bledsoe's dissertation advisor, focuses on law and marriage. His study of the Kpelle of Panta Chiefdom provides the point of departure for Bledsoe's monograph on "traditional" and "modern" Kpelle marriage.

Bledsoe examines what marriage means to African women by placing primary emphasis on the "ways Kpelle women and men use all available resources to their own advantage, especially in conjugal and domestic situations." (p.4) The resources that she examines are primarily political and economic. This is related to her focus on the Kpelle "wealth-in-people" system that binds people to their superiors by marriage, filiation, and clientship, and economic. Her focus on the Kpelle "wealth-in-people" system that binds people to their superiors by marriage, filiation, and clientship, and her comparison of what she calls "traditional" and "modern" marriage, e.g. marriages in Liberian "towns" and "villages," (in size comparable to villages and hamlets elsewhere in Africa) result in what Bledsoe admits is an accentuation of the self-seeking aspects of marital relationships and a de-emphasis on affective relationships among spouses and their consanguineal and affinal kin.

Bledsoe's study, like all previous studies of the Kpelle, makes no attempt to survey Kpelle life in Liberia. Rather, it focuses on a few communities in Fuama Chiefdom, where her husband was also conducting anthropological fieldwork and where there was a Peace Corps project which provided them with living accommodations. Most of the data were collected with the assistance of male and female Kpelle research assistants in 1974, with only brief additional fieldwork in 1975 and 1978. More emphasis was placed on census surveys and questionnaires than on participant observation. Bledsoe found it difficult to get Kpelle to discuss marital strategies, so she had to make inferences about her primary topic of investigation from statistical sources, folklore, law cases, and gossip. The very nature of the data upon which she relied most heavily precluded her learning about the affective aspects of marriage.

Bledsoe's description of Kpelle marriage is preceded by a chapter that briefly reviews recent Kpelle and Liberian history and describes the salient features of economic, social, and political life in Fuama Chiefdom. A second chapter on relevant background discusses Kpelle social stratification and values as they are related to the Kpelle "wealth-in-people" system. Bledsoe illustrates the pervasiveness of the "wealth-in-people" system as it applies to legal institutions, kinship, personal status, sex roles, clientship, wardship, pawnship, secret societies, and midwifery. She attributes the lack of female solidarity within the Sande Society to the "wealth-in-people" system that gives priority to lineage and age group over female solidarity. In contrast to other observers of the Kpelle Sande Society, Bledsoe presents the Sande as exploiters of the initiates and low status women, who manipulate what is supposed to be an institution for female solidarity for their own political ends.

Bledsoe devotes two chapters to marriage. The first is on "traditional" marriage, which clearly is not traditional in the literal sense of the term, since Kpelle marriage is influenced by Liberian national culture in many ways. The chapter on so-called "traditional" marriage is really about marriage in Kpelle hamlets in the mid-1970s. The chapter on "modern" marriage is about Kpelle who live in villages where the influence of Liberian culture is more extensive than in hamlets. The descriptions in these two chapters are supported by twenty statistical tables in an appendix on marital status. The statistics summarize the

marital status of women and men in each community that Bledsoe studied, as well as the marital status of house owners and non-house owners, and wealthy and nonwealthy individuals.

The data on Kpelle marriage are generally predictable from data on marriage elsewhere in West Africa. Despite limited economic and educational opportunities, women in villages are more involved in the cash economy than are women in hamlets. As a result, village women are more independent in forming, manipulating, and breaking marital ties than are hamlet women. In both villages and hamlets the major sources of female wealth are sex and children, but the cultural contexts of sexual and familial behavior are quite different in the two kinds of communities. Bledsoe shows the different ways in which the value of "wealth-in-people" is realized in hamlets and villages and its varying significance for middle-aged and older women. In contrast to much recent women's studies research, Bledsoe compares the marital goals and status of women and men, rather than focusing only on women.

The primary value of *Women and Marriage in Kpelle Society* is its ethnographic description which adds new data both to the ethnography of the Liberian Kpelle and women in contemporary Africa. Bledsoe discusses both her methodology and theoretical assumptions, and presents sufficient descriptive support for her generalizations so that scholars can evaluate her data in relation to their particular interests.

Bledsoe clearly did not intend for *Women and Marriage in Kpelle Society* to make a contribution to contemporary women's studies, since she neither cites nor discusses any of the relevant anthropological theories or methodological approaches. However, she does relate data on Kpelle women to other recent studies of African women.

Bledsoe does intend for *Women and Marriage in Kpelle Society* to be a contribution to Kpelle studies, since she makes numerous comparisons to the data collected by Cole, Gay, and Gibbs. However, she completely ignores the research of Bellman, Erchak, and Okorodudu, even though data that they collected are directly related to her research.

Okorodudu is a Kpelle scholar who not only conducted research in Fuama Chiefdom, as did Bledsoe, but also collected data in households on Dobl Island, one of the "towns" studied by Bledsoe. Okorodudu collected his data in 1961 and 1962 in a study of the relationship between household structure and the need achievement of school age children. Bledsoe discusses the difficulties of obtaining data on Kpelle marital strategies, yet Okorodudu collected extensive data through participant observation on the structure of nuclear, polygynous, and mother-child households and on the daily interaction between household members. Not only does Okorodudu's study include extensive data on the affective relationships of Kpelle families that complements Bledsoe's data he collected even more statistical data on household composition, economic behavior, and familial relationships than did Bledsoe. Despite the focus of Okorodudu's study on the theoretical ideas of John and Beatrice Whiting and David McClelland, his statistical findings have direct relevance for Bledsoe's study, both as historical background and for comparison between two different samples of the Dobl Island community.

Bellman collected data in Sucromu, an inland Kpelle "town" from 1967 to

1969, whereas Erchak collected data in Nyafokwele Chiefdom in 1970 and 1971. Both Bellman and Erchak discuss aspects of the Poro and Sande Societies that are relevant for Bledsoe's study. By using their work she could have given more data directly pertaining to the Kpelle Sande Society, rather than extrapolating from data on the Mende Sande Society. Furthermore, Erchak indicates that the Poro and Sande Societies have lost most of their significance in many Kpelle areas. This either calls into question Bledsoe's attribution of political significance to the Sande Society for high status Kpelle women or requires an explanation of why the Sande Society continues to be so important in the communities that Bledsoe studied.

Although Erchak's study focuses on the socialization of children, it includes data about Kpelle marriage and family life. Much of the data in Erchak's study supports Bledsoe's findings, for example, that "women palaver" is the most common kind of case in Kpelle courts and that throughout their lives both men and women have stronger ties to their mothers than to their fathers. Erchak's study also complements Bledsoe's in describing the childhood origin of such behavior as the emotional ties between mothers and their children and the greater self-reliance of women than men. In addition, there are some data in Erchak's study that differ from those in Bledsoe's, for example, the typical residence pattern for polygynous marriages.

As the most recently published of seven monographs on contemporary Kpelle culture in Liberia, *Women and Marriage in Kpelle Society* would have made a more significant contribution to Kpelle studies had Bledsoe thoroughly utilized relevant data collected by other anthropologists within the last two decades.

## ***African Fiction Explained for the Western Reader***

Janis L. Pallister

John D. Erickson, *NOMMO: African Fiction in French South of the Sahara* York, South Carolina: (French Literature Publications Company; 1979), 285 pp., \$17.00.

In the execution of this outstanding study of the African *conte* and novel, Professor Erickson presents conclusions drawn not only from his own close reading but also from interviews he has conducted with such outstanding authors as Birago Diop, Camara Laye, and Bernard Dadié, among others. While plumbing these two sources, his stated purpose is "to seek universal constants of African literature written in French as well as to explore particular temporal and spatial variables that will enable us . . . as Westerners and strangers to broaden our perspective, understanding and appreciation." (My italics.)

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Janis L. Pallister is University Professor of Romance Languages at Bowling Green State University (Ohio). Her reviews and her translations from African poetry have frequently appeared in *Africa Today*.

Janis L. Pallister

*Nommo* is without question a valuable reference book for the general reader as well as for the specialist; it supplements Gerald Moore's *Seven African Writers*, which, having been published in 1962, does not consider the sixties or seventies; and, moreover, Professor Erickson's book is one of the few if not the only one that carefully analyzes the intrinsic and extrinsic value of the key works of African fiction in English. The analyses of the short story include a focus upon the *Contes d'Amadou Koumba* (Birago Diop), and *Le Pagne noir* (Bernard Dadié), but the bulk of the book is devoted to detailed and penetrating studies of eight African novels, among which one finds treatment of *Batouala* (René Maran), *Le Regard du roi* (Camara Laye), *Le roi miraculé* (Mongo Beti), *L'Aventure ambiguë* (Cheikh Hamidou Kane). While the foregoing novelists are regarded as "patriarchs" and as African artists caught in the mesh of colonialism, Sembène Ousmane (sic!) with his *Bouts de bois de Dieu* is termed a "spanner of generations," leading to reborn African fiction characterized by an "emergence from myth." In the cadre of this reborn Africa, Professor Erickson studies *Le Devoir de violence* (Yambo Ouologuem). He limits his study to works appearing between 1920-1970, finding the trajectory of the most recent works not yet clear enough to be meaningfully analyzed. Indeed, Erickson finds the future of the Francophone African novel precarious, in view of its reduced quantity and lowered quality during the past decade.

Professor Erickson provides for each author a bio-bibliographical sketch followed by a study of a key work by that author. One must point out that frequently the analytical portions of these studies fall into synopsis intertwined with sociopolitical commentary or with discussion of the main themes. While these are excellent, and are useful in explicating the works to the Western reader who is not conversant with African fiction, (therefore achieving their goal), the specialist will no doubt find too little attention given to fictional innovation, to technique, style, structure and language, these being subjects about which even the most general reader inclined to read this work would be apt to be curious. One might also quibble with some of the translations or interpretations. For example, is the *pagne* of Dadié's story (discussed on page 86) really a "loincloth?"

Be this as it may, *Nommo*, (drawing its title, which means "the magic power of the word," from Janheinz Jahn's *Muntu*) is a useful book, both in its own right and for its excellent scholarly apparatus, including an extensive bibliography of primary and secondary sources.



## Criticism of Nigerian Literature

Nancy J. Schmidt

Claudia Baldwin, *NIGERIAN LITERATURE: A Bibliography of Criticism 1952-1976* (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1980) pp. xvi + 177, \$19.50.

One hundred and forty-eight works by fifty-one Nigerian creative writers are covered in this bibliography. The compiler lists 1510 citations in English from books, dissertations, and 238 periodicals available in the United States. For each author there are three or four kinds of citations: articles about or interviews with the author, criticism, reviews of books and, where relevant, reviews of performances. Criticism and reviews are listed separately for each title written by an author. The compiler does not provide criteria for distinguishing criticism from reviews. Far more reviews are listed than are critical essays or books. A small number of the entries are briefly annotated, but the annotations add little to the value of the bibliography.

A section of 170 entries on criticism of Nigerian literature in general precedes the listing of works for individual authors. It will come as no surprise that half of the citations are on three authors: Wole Soyinka, Chinua Achebe, and Amos Tutuola. In contrast there are eleven authors for whom there is only one entry. There are indexes of titles and critics. The bibliography is clearly arranged, well-produced from camera-ready copy, and has a sturdy binding that will withstand frequent use.

It is difficult to determine the audience for whom this bibliography was compiled. On the one hand, it is too comprehensive for beginning students, since many of the resources cited are available only in specialized collections such as the Melville J. Herskovits Library of African Studies at Northwestern University. On the other hand, it is inadequate for scholarly research. By excluding non-English criticism and African-published periodicals unavailable in the United States, it excludes much material relevant for research. The study of Nigerian literature has become an international, multilingual enterprise, a very important component of which is criticism by Africans published in Nigeria and read by Nigerians. Scholars must use this bibliography in conjunction with at least two bibliographies compiled by Bernth Lindfors: *A Bibliography of Literary Contributions to Nigerian Periodicals 1946-1972* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1975), and *Black African Literature in English: A Guide to Information Sources* (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1979).

Dr. Schmidt is Librarian at Tozzer Library, Peabody Museum of Archeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

## Conversations with African Writers

James P. Gilroy

Phanuel Akubueze Egejuru, *TOWARDS AFRICAN LITERARY INDEPENDENCE: A Dialogue with Contemporary African Writers*, Contributions in Afro-American and African Studies, Number 53 (Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1980) pp. 173; \$23.95.

Professor Egejuru's book is an engrossing investigation into the literary philosophies and aspirations of nine contemporary African writers. The work is based on interviews conducted by the author with each of the writers during the early 1970s. Each one of the eight chapters presents that portion of every interview which dealt with a particular issue facing these African poets, novelists, and essayists. The latter responded to the author's questions concerning, respectively, the authenticity of an African literature written in European languages, the problems they have encountered in finding the right publishers and getting their books distributed, the writers and literary traditions which have most influenced their own writings, the question of what distinguishes a writer as being peculiarly African, the efficacy of using a Western genre like the novel to give expression to an African ethos, the apparent monopoly of Africa itself as the subject for literary works written by Africans, and finally their underlying purposes in writing their works.

Of the writers interviewed, six write primarily in French, while the three others write in English. Although the majority are from West Africa, other parts of the continent are also represented. The writers who met with Professor Egejuru include the poet Léopold Sédar Senghor, the novelists Ousmane Sembene and Cheik Hamidou Kane, and the scholar Pathe Giagne, from Senegal; the late novelist Laye Camara of Guinea; the Algerian novelist Mohammed Dib; and also three Anglophone novelists: Chinua Achebe from Nigeria, Ezekiel (now Eski'a) Mphahlele from South Africa, and Ngugi wa Thiong'o from Kenya.

The interviews are preceded by a highly informative introduction in which the author traces with great insight the development of modern African literature. This literature began with the *Négritude* movement in Paris in the early 1930s. This movement, whose principal aim was to make the world aware of the unique contributions of African civilization, shaped the destiny of African literature for several decades. A second phase, reflected in the works of novelists of the 1950s and early '60s, took a critical look at the colonial system and exposed its injustices. As Egejuru points out, most of these writers "dwelt on the themes of cultural conflict and the plight of those caught between two cultures" (p. 5). The third phase has directed this critical approach toward the native regimes of the newly independent African states and has revealed the continued exploitation of the African peoples by governments in partnership with external economic powers.

Egejuru rightly points out a noticeable decline in African literary production during the past decade. Moreover, several writers are turning to genres

James P. Gilroy is Associate Professor of Foreign Languages and Literature at The University of Denver.

like the theatre and films in order to reach a greater number of the illiterate masses instead of writing for European and Europeanized intellectuals. Not a few are writing works in their native African tongues or at least introducing many more African terms and locations into their French or English texts.

The basic question at the heart of all the discussions is that of the precise nature of the audience for which these authors are writing. The interviewer continually implies, though her respondents seem loath to admit, that the "African" literature they have created is accessible to what amounts to a very small percentage of the Africans, firstly because only an elite knows French or English, but also because most of the people cannot read. The question then arises whether the word "African" can really be used to describe a body of works which are read by (and written for) non-Africans. Interestingly, several of the interviewees seem to feel that this "symbiotic" (Senghor's term) literature about African life written in European languages represents but a transitional phase and that their goal is the eventual creation of an African literature in African languages. This will not be possible, however, until the native languages replace the European ones as the vehicle for instruction in schools.

A dichotomy of points of view between the Francophone and Anglophone writers is revealed in their opinions concerning the concept of *Negritude*. Mphahlele in particular is critical of what he considers to be a useless philosophical generality which fosters an unreal idyllic African stereotype and which does little to solve the practical social, economic, and political problems Africa faces today. It is an attitude which, in addition, fails to recognize the important differences between the national cultures within the African world. *Negritude* represented the bitter revolt of a few uprooted African intellectuals against the French colonial policy of assimilation. Since a comparable policy did not exist in the English colonies and since the vast majority of Africans remained unassimilated, the *Negritude* writers cannot be paid to address the issues which are of concern to most contemporary Africans.

The most encouraging aspect of what comes across in these interviews is the sense of artistic freedom expressed by all these writers. Many of the interviewer's questions concerning audience, subject matter, and literary form seemed to imply that African writers should or should not be doing certain things, addressing certain problems, appealing to a certain public, etc. All the writers replied politely but assertively that the literary artist must in the end create that work which best expresses the sentiments and ideas within his own being which he feels the need to voice. As Laye Camara puts it: "One has something to say. One is seized by the urge to express it in order to liberate oneself. At that moment one doesn't think of an audience but of oneself. At that moment one doesn't think of an audience but of oneself" (p. 21).

They also feel that being African is based on an indefinable way of looking at the world, it is a state of mind which place of birth and language of expression do not alone determine: "It is the vital experiences, in sensitivity, in rhythm, in style" (Hamidou Kane, p. 89); "There is a peculiarity and a manner of presenting things which belong to the African" (Ousmane Sembene, p. 86).

They express as well the idea that there is no real contradiction between writing about African life and attaining truths of universal significance. In fact, the greatest writers have always captured the eternally human through a faithful commitment to what Ngugi calls their own "local situation" (p. 113). The Kenyan writer adds: "What is a greater theme than the struggle of a people to liberate themselves? In fact, this is a struggle in essence to liberate man" (p. 114).

## A Potpourri of Angolan History

Al Fleischman

Phyllis M. Martin, *HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF ANGOLA* (Metuchen: N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1980) 174 pp., index. (African Historical Dictionaries, No. 26), \$11.00.

This is the 26th volume in Scarecrow's African Historical Dictionaries series. The concept of a small dictionary, or rather a glossary, with key tables, charts, and maps, followed by an extensive bibliography is still a valuable addition to scholarship; but, as produced by Scarecrow it remains a rather tepid example of the craft.

One of the reviewer's hopes is for the publisher to improve the quality of this series. The contents of the book include: (1) foreword (2) note on orthography and terminology (3) abbreviations and acronyms (4) chronology of Angolan history (5) introduction (6) maps, tables (7) dictionary — main body of the book (8) bibliography (9) index.

In the foreword, we learn Dr. Martin is Associate Professor of History at Indiana University, who "has written an amazingly complete and objective book." This tells us less than we need to know. Dr. Martin's name will be recognized by most Africanists, but adequate information about the author for the nonspecialist should be provided. A paragraph or two, explaining her interest in Africa, especially Angola, would have been reassuring. When was she last there? In what capacity? How long was her visit? In which library/ies and with the help of how many colleagues and/or graduate assistants was this work pieced together?

The proliferation of acronyms is one of the curses of contemporary scholarship. How many books prior to the mid-twentieth century began with a list of acronyms? Readers of current events must sometimes conclude that robots are responsible for articles abundant with abbreviations and acronyms. Too many acronyms corrupt the language. One of the rules of modern scholarship ought to be that all acronyms printed in an article be explained.

Dr. Martin deals with this by placing the acronym section (3) before the main body of the book. But her list excludes many political groups. For example, FCPA (Front Commun des Partis Politiques de l'Angola), CSRSA (Comite Secreto Revolucionario do Sul de Angola), DA (Democratas de Angola). This section would have also been a good place for a brief mention of the purpose of these organizations. Many defined acronyms are not mentioned in the dictionary section (7): ALLIAMA, AMA, JFNLA, JMPLA.

Al Fleischman is a librarian at Merritt College in Oakland, California, specializing in reference works, maps, atlases and periodicals.

The chronology of Angolan history (4) is also amiss. Why are there no entries between 1968-1970, 1972? In 1968, Portugal was bombing Angola, or is that not significant? Both Vice President Hubert Humphrey and Senator Edward Brooke were denouncing Portugal's military rule and threatening to cut off military relations with Portugal. By 1972, Portugal realized it was facing a losing situation and sought to compromise by making Angola a state. How can there be years of no chronology, no history in a nation?

A few pages later, three sketch maps appear (6) and a chart showing new name changes. As there is no index to the maps, it is quite difficult to find place locations. As the maps are not dated, one does not know whether the names used are the new names or the old. It would have been helpful to date the maps and include the old name with parenthesis, under the new name. The "principal resources" map (p. 12) shows ten items ranging from hydro-electric power to sugar but left out are timber, tobacco, fish, etc. Not one of the three sketch maps show Angola's physical relief or transportation system. How fine it would have been to have had an historical trade route map. Looking up some of the resources from the map (hydro-electric power, sisal) in the dictionary section (7) the reader draws a blank. No further information is given throughout the work, though one notes in (table 6, principal products exported) a tremendous increase in the value of sisal exported between 1973 and 1974.

In the main section, the dictionary (7), short paragraphs explain most of the significant persons and events in recent Angolan history. There are under 175 entries in 65 pages. Think about the paucity of a nation if it has such a limited number of people, places, resources, political movements, etc. of importance. The emphasis is on recent (not historical) political and economic occurrences. With under 175 entries, a topical index would have been helpful to sort political figures, places, ethnic groups, political parties, economic resources, and Portuguese terms such as "Guerra Preta," "Feira," or "Donatario." A few odd entries appear. Ivory is particularly striking since the treasures of Angola's wildlife are not mentioned, except for the elephants shot for ivory. What has happened to the eland, giant sable, mountain zebra? Do black rhinoceros and leopard still exist in Angola? No mention is made of the Angolan environment in the chronology or dictionary. The tsetse fly has influenced population location as surely as streams.

A look at important political figures show expected entries for Holden Roberto, Jonas Savimbi, and Augustinho Neto. Yet, where are such "historical" tribal figures as Ekuikui II, King of the Umbundu in the latter part of the 19th century, or his successor Numa II? These would be the type of entries one would expect to find in an historical dictionary. The same criticism applies to cities and towns of Angola. Most are not listed, except for the few, for which there is already an abundance of information. Thus, we have Luanda, the capital, but not Luena, Benguela but not Saurimo, both important provincial towns in Eastern Angola. Where are entries about race relations?

The latter part of the book is a 70+ page bibliography; rather large, for a book which totals 174+ pages. The first few pages are presented in the form of a bibliographic essay and lead the reader to further sources of current information. It is encouraging to see a list of organizations included with addresses. Many times organizations are so small they are difficult to trace.

Starting with section II in the bibliography, we are given a list by large subject areas (the emphasis is placed upon the beginning sections of historical, political, economic; scientific — which makes no reference to articles about wildlife but does include plants and forests; social — anthropology, education,

sociology; cultural — archaeology, linguistics, literature). This list contains nearly a thousand items, both books and periodicals, primarily in English but with references when necessary to material in other languages. It fails to include writings from the Russian press, even those translated into English, about the recent civil war and struggle for nationhood.

This bibliography must be used with caution, as it is abundant in entries but is neither comprehensive or evaluative. There is no author entry index. A guess has to be made to locate Basil Davidson's *In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People* in (a) history or (b) political — nationalism and guerrilla warfare. It appears in the latter. In the dictionary section (7), there is mention of Dr. Boavida's book (pamphlet) "Five Centuries of Portuguese Exploitation," but this work does not appear in the bibliography under economics, or political. Other books and periodical articles were not listed either, but selectivity is always a problem. No mention was made of various translations by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Office of Technical Services. The Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) has translated many articles after 1976 from the Angola newspaper "Jornal de Angola," Luanda. Recent articles published abroad by Mr. Basil Davidson were not included. Newspaper articles are also lacking, especially a series that appeared in the Washington Post in 1977.

For those readers that might want a quick reference source, I would suggest using the area handbook series for Angola (1979) published by the Department of the Army under contract with the American University. Yet, after all the above criticisms, *Angola: An Historical Dictionary* can be useful as a quick guide; and it should be acquired by most Africana collections.

## Malawiana Bonanza

Janet L. Stanley

Robert B. Boeder. MALAWI. World Bibliographical Series, No. 8. (Santa Barbara: Clio Press, 1979) pp xviii, 165; \$28.50

Cynthia A. Crosby. HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF MALAWI. African Historical Dictionaries Series, No. 25. (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow, 1980) pp 169; \$14.00.

Malawi has been well served — bibliographically-speaking — in the past two years. In 1980 the African Historical Dictionaries series published its Malawi volume which contains a fifty-page bibliography, and in 1979 the Library of Congress' African Section issued a compilation of University of Malawi Publications. The third and most important entry in this trilogy is

Janet L. Stanley is Librarian at The Museum of African Art Smithsonian Institute, Washington, D.C.



Robert Boeder's *Malawi* whose broad scope and captivating annotations make it a highly informative and useful compilation of English language materials.

Cynthia Crosby's *Historical Dictionary of Malawi* follows the prescribed format of earlier volumes in the series which includes a chronology of historical periods and events, an overview essay on the country, the dictionary proper, a short bibliographical essay and the main country bibliography. The entries in the dictionary proper are biographical, geographical, historical, political (e.g., Cabinet crisis 1964), and topical (e.g., foreign aid). Most entries are brief, but some are mini-essays, such as that for Kamuzu Banda or Nyasaland African Congress. The biographical entries are particularly useful since they pull together information not easily accessible elsewhere. Emphasis throughout is understandably on recent history and development — nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The Boeder compilation, while not claiming comprehensiveness, is certainly thorough and can easily form the nuclei for fuller bibliographies in each subject area or provide a sound point of departure for anyone pursuing Malawi studies in any area of specialization. History and religion are the most substantial subject areas, reflecting the significant role that missionary activity played in Malawian history — or at least, its written history. There are 557 entries, but many more publications are referred to in the annotations, and they are indexed, too. These descriptive annotations are exceptionally informative and well written. Even for someone only casually familiar with Malawi, they will be entertaining; for those with a more substantive acquaintance, they constitute a valuable bibliographic *vade mecum*. Authors are usually identified in the annotations so that this becomes a brief biographical directory of "Malawi hands." Dissertations and theses on Malawi are listed separately, although why this should be so is not clear unless they were appended as an afterthought — which would explain why they are not indexed.

The opening bibliographical essay on the state-of-the-art of Malawi studies analyzes these various areas of strength and weakness in existing scholarship on the country. It notes, too, the predominance of Scottish authors represented here — a natural reflection of the preponderance of Scottish missionaries and colonial officials in Malawi.

There is a brief section in the bibliography on Malawi periodicals and newspapers which ought to be supplemented by the much more extensive listing for Malawi found in *Periodicals from Africa: A Bibliography and Union List of Periodicals Published in Africa* (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1977), pp. 158-168. To the section on bibliographies, one should by all means add the *Accession List: Eastern Africa* published by the Library of Congress' Nairobi Field Office which regularly lists new publications from Malawi. There is also an index of authors, key subjects and selected titles, and a table of place name changes.

Everyone enjoys coming forth with additions to another's bibliography (less in a critical spirit than to demonstrate familiarity), so let us begin by appending three: Ralph Mthawanji, "Urbanisation in Malawi," pp. 190-199 in *Shelter in Africa*, edited by Paul Oliver (New York: Praeger, 1971); B. R. Rafael, *A Short History of Malawi* (Limbe: Popular Publications, 1980); and D. Elmslie, "Folk Tales of Central Africa," *Folklore* 3: 92-110, 1892 [Nine narratives from Malawi].

Other African countries covered so far in this World Bibliographical Series are Lesotho, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, South Africa and Uganda.

## Another Look at V.S. Naipaul's

**Sensitivity:**

### **A Letter to the Editors**

#### **The Editors, Africa Today:**

I would like to voice my extreme dismay over the review in your June 1981 issue by Sheldon G. Weeks of V.S. Naipaul's *A Bend in the River*. Nothing could be more misleading than the title of the review, "A Sensitive Novel About Expatriate Life in Central Africa". Naipaul, in spite of his credentials as a writer, is anything but "sensitive" to the Africans of whom he writes so glibly and Weeks' review indicates he, too, learned little during his residence in Uganda and Tanzania.

As another "expatriate", born and grown up in Zaire, the locale for *A Bend in the River*, I will give credit to Naipaul for very accurate descriptions. Even with some literary license — e.g. relocating the "Domain", Mobutu's showpiece, at Kisangani rather than where it actually is, on the outskirts of Kinshasa (Nsele) — these are places and people familiar to anyone who has been there. The problem is with what Naipaul left out. Not one of his characters is anything but weak, opportunistic or corrupt. The Asians, whom he obviously knows, come off better than the African characters, who are for the most part one-dimensional. Scarcely anything is revealed of the personal thoughts and feelings of people like Zabeth and her son Ferdinand — only the cool front they put up to the expatriates. Particularly lacking is the sense of humor, rarely missing among Zairians, even in the direst of circumstances.

The uneasy relationship between the Asian, Salim, and the young African, Ferdinand, is clear but Mr. Naipaul skims over the cause of Ferdinand's resentment, the continued domination of his country by outsiders. From his experience in Uganda Mr. Weeks should be especially aware of Africans' feelings toward Asians who monopolize their economy. Though there is plenty to be pessimistic about in Zaire, Salim's (Naipaul's?) ennu and cynicism seems to stem more from his feelings about himself — a man without a country — than about a country going through a difficult period.

A similarly negative view of Africa is in the recent book, *North of South*, by Shive Naipaul, V.S. Naipaul's brother. He, too, writes well and with accurate detail, but again with the jaundiced eye of the rootless. There is a need for Africans and Africanists to respond to such books. I'm just sorry Mr. Weeks did it so ignorantly, and insensitively.

Louise Crane, Outreach Coordinator  
African Studies Program, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign



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