

# **AFRICA TODAY**



## **Namibia, South Africa and the West**

**George W. Shepherd, Jr.**  
on  
*Breaking the Impasse*

**Brian Douglas Tennyson**  
on  
*Canada's South African Policy*

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# AFRICA TODAY

Volume 29 (1982)

Number One

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## Canadian Policy Towards South Africa

Brian Douglas Tennyson

Canada, as a member of the western Contact Group currently attempting to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the Namibian issue, has found itself uncomfortably close to center stage as the world community comes to grips with southern African problems. Although the Canadian government, through its membership in the Commonwealth, "discovered" Africa much earlier than the United States government, Professor Matthews was undoubtedly correct when he claimed that prior to 1960 "the public at large and the government itself knew and cared little about that part of the world."<sup>1</sup> Canadian foreign policy was very limited in scope and ambition until the 1950s and concerned itself primarily with Great Britain, the United States and Europe, the promotion of trade and the preservation of peace. South Africa did not then fit into any of these categories to any significant degree.

Since 1960 southern Africa has become an increasingly important area of concern in Canadian foreign policy deliberations, largely because of the importance of South Africa as a relatively powerful, dynamic, pro-western state of considerable economic and strategic value in the cold war. As Europe's African colonies achieved independence, South Africa's symbolic importance concerned Canada no less than the United States and Great Britain, because of the government's continuing determination to build bridges of understanding between the affluent, industrial white nations and the poor, underdeveloped, non-white majority of the world.

In addition, the collapse of the Portuguese regimes in Angola and Mozambique in 1974 radically altered the balance of power in southern Africa, resulting in an escalation of the civil war in what was then called

1. Robert Matthews, "Africa in Canadian affairs," *International Journal* (1975), p. 149.

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Rhodesia and a determination by the South Africans to seek some-form of detente with their neighbors. Finally, the interest being shown in the region by the Soviet Union, China, Cuba and eventually the United States has caused the Canadian government to involve itself more than ever before, not so much because of increased public concern or direct interests there, but because of the government's fundamental goal of reducing tensions and preventing conflict wherever possible as well as its desire to project a sympathetic image to the Afro-Asian world.

This paper attempts to examine briefly the background of Canadian policy towards South Africa, the magnitude and nature of Canadian-South African economic relations, and factors influencing current Canadian policy.

### First Contacts

Canada and South Africa were first brought together in an inter-active relationship by the South African or Boer War of 1899-1902. Prior to 1899, most Canadians were largely oblivious of South Africa's existence, a condition undoubtedly reciprocated by most South Africans.<sup>2</sup> There was some rather tepid interest on the part of businessmen in both countries in developing trade, and a shipping service between Canada and Cape Colony was subsidized by the two governments in the 1890s.

Generally speaking, however, it was the war and the events leading up to it that made Canadians aware of South Africa by focussing their attention on the alleged plight of the Uitlanders. When hostilities erupted, English Canadians generally endorsed the British claim that they were fighting for the civil rights of an oppressed minority. French Canadians were understandably less convinced, with the notable exception of their uncharacteristic leader, Sir Wilfrid Laurier.

Significantly, the racial question which came to overshadow all other factors in the Canadian-South African relationship was present from the outset. It was claimed in 1900, though without justification, that the "excessive cruelty" of the Afrikaners "to the blacks in their so-called employment created in Canadians a feeling that the Boer needed chastisement to bring him to his senses."<sup>3</sup> A decade later, Rodolphe Lemieux, who represented the Canadian government at the inauguration of the Union Parliament, exclaimed: "Le nègre! voilà le déconcertant, l'insoluble problème pour l'avenir."<sup>4</sup> Thus, the racial problem which ultimately would

2. A prominent exception was Dr. George McCall Theal (1837-1919), Cape Colony's eminent historian and archivist, who was a native of New Brunswick. He revisited Canada in 1894 and published a series of articles in *The Cape Illustrated Magazine*, which were reprinted as *Notes on Canada and South Africa* (Cape Town, n.d.).

3. T.G. Marquis, *Canada's Sons on Kopje and Veldt* (Toronto, 1902), p. 24.

4. Public Archives of Canada. Laurier Papers 177723-24. Lemieux to Laurier, 3 December 1910.

force South Africa out of the Commonwealth was appreciated at least by some, at the very time when the Afrikaner republics were being forced into the Empire.

### The Beginning of Current Policies

South Africa's reluctant departure from the Commonwealth in 1961, an event in which the Canadian government played a crucial role, freed Canada and other members of the Commonwealth from any sense of restraint which they may have felt imposed on them by the family relationship. At the same time, they no longer could claim that special relationship as an excuse for avoiding public condemnation of unacceptable policies and practices. Canadian policy since 1961, however, has not altered substantially. The governments of Lester Pearson (1963-68) and Pierre Trudeau have consistently supported United Nations resolutions condemning apartheid and South Africa's refusal to come to terms on Namibia, but have opposed attempts to coerce the republic by means of economic or financial sanctions or military action of any kind. Canada, along with most other western countries, has also resisted proposals to expel South Africa from the United Nations and other international organizations.

At the 1971 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Trudeau condemned racial discrimination as a "moral abomination . . . which . . . poisons the relations between human beings" and endorsed the Commonwealth Declaration which denounced racial discrimination as "a dangerous sickness" and "an unmitigated evil," but rejected coercion as an instrument of policy.<sup>5</sup> At the same conference, Trudeau and his advisers played an important role in defusing the potentially explosive situation created by the British government's decision to sell arms to South Africa.

Canada has also made clear its opposition to South Africa's bantustan policy of granting its blacks "independence" in their homelands because the actual autonomy of the homelands is highly questionable, because of what it regards as the unfair distribution of land, because the territory allocated is fragmented, "poor and incapable of being developed," and because the whole policy discriminates against the urban blacks who have no real ties to the homelands. Canada, along with the rest of the international community, has refused to grant diplomatic recognition to these "nations." The appalling violence at Soweto in 1976, in the Canadian view, reflected "the profound discontent and frustration" of South Africa's blacks and its real

5. Pierre Trudeau, "The situation in southern Africa," Department of External Affairs (DEA) *Statements and Speeches* 71/3. DEA, *The Commonwealth* (Ottawa, 1976), p. 19.



tragedy was the government's negative reaction. Prime Minister Vorster's 1974 promise of an end to racial discrimination had not been fulfilled and it "remained evident . . . that in reality no effort is being made to begin dismantling *apartheid* or removing from it even its harshest and most repressive aspects."<sup>6</sup> Although the government prevented two attempts by the opposition in parliament to introduce resolutions denouncing the South African government, it did join in the United Nations condemnation and expressed its views directly to the South African government.<sup>7</sup>

William Barton, Canada's ambassador to the United Nations, argued in March 1977 that the "key element in the evolution of South African policies" must be domestic pressure from blacks and white liberals. Because the world must support their efforts, however, Canada is contributing to United Nations and other multilateral non-governmental funds that have been established to provide education, training and humanitarian and development assistance to the blacks of southern Africa. The government discourages sporting contact with South Africa by refusing both moral and financial aid to individuals or teams competing in South Africa and to any sporting event held in Canada in which South Africans participate. At the same time, Canada provides development assistance to the frontline states of southern Africa, with a view to making them less dependent on South Africa. The successful evolution of these countries, as Barton told the United Nations Security Council,

will stand as proof that there is no foundation for the racist arguments of minority regimes that stability, justice and civilization will be undermined should the majority African peoples of their countries be permitted a full and equal voice in the government of those countries.<sup>8</sup>

The government also decided early in 1974 to provide humanitarian assistance to African liberation groups in southern Africa through grants by the Canadian International Development Agency to such non-governmental multilateral organizations as Oxfam, the International Red Cross, and the World Council of Churches.<sup>9</sup>

The major review of Canadian foreign policy undertaken in 1970 by the Trudeau government and published in a White Paper entitled **Foreign Policy for Canadians**, advanced three primary objectives: the fostering of Canadian economic growth, working for world peace and security, and promoting social justice. The difficulty is that these interests may conflict with one another, so that practical policies involve decisions as to how far

6. William Barton speech to the UN Security Council, 30 March 1977, reprinted as "Canada reaffirms its abhorrence of *apartheid*," *DEA Statements and Speeches* 77/3.

7. Canada, *House of Commons Debates* (21 June 1976), col. 14682, (30 November 1976), col. 1498, *DEA Annual Review 1976* (Ottawa 1977), p. 6.

8. Barton, *op. cit.*

9. John Saywell (ed.), *The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs 1974* (Toronto, 1975), pp. 325-26.

to pursue one at the expense of another. Clearly Canadian policy towards South Africa has always favored economic growth over social justice, even though Canadian trade with and investment in the republic are relatively insignificant.

## Trade and Investment

How extensive are Canadian-South African trade relations, what is their nature, and how much Canadian investment is there in South Africa? Although Canadian economic relations with South Africa have never been an important factor in determining Canadian policy, it is necessary to review their scale and nature, and to examine the current situation in the light of recent changes in Canadian policy.<sup>10</sup>

Professor Matthews has claimed that "since 1945 South Africa has constituted one of Canada's ten most important markets."<sup>11</sup> While this may be true when markets are ranked, it is also true that at no time since 1945 has South Africa taken more than 2.9% of Canada's exports. That was in 1946, a peak year, and since the early 1950s the figure has declined steadily, from 2.6% in 1949 to 1.4% in 1950, averaging 1.7% during the late 1950s, to 0.6% in 1961. It subsequently rose to 0.9% in 1965 but has since declined to 0.3% in 1980. At the same time, South Africa's rise as a supplier to the Canadian market hovered steadily over the years at approximately 0.2% of total Canadian imports, although by 1980 the figure had risen to 0.5%. It seems likely, therefore, that Professor Wagenberg was correct when he argued some years ago that Canadian trade with South Africa was "not of great enough scope to affect vitally" Canadian policies towards that country.<sup>12</sup>

Similarly, the importance of the preferential tariff arrangement, originally negotiated in 1904 and not terminated until 1979, was easily exaggerated. It was estimated in 1972, by a critic of Canadian policy, that the preferential access to the South African market was worth only 1/50th of 1% of Canada's total export trade.<sup>13</sup> Obviously, its magnitude and impor-

10. For a very thorough examination of Canadian-South African economic relations which agrees in substance with the views expressed in this paper, see Clarence Redekop, "Canada and Southern Africa, 1946-1975: The Political Economy of Foreign Policy," unpublished PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1977, 3 vols. Cf. Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt, "Canadian policy towards southern Africa," in Douglas Anglin, Timothy Shaw & Carl Widstrand (eds.), *Canada, Scandinavia and Southern Africa* (Uppsala, 1978), pp. 164-78.

11. Robert Matthews, "Canada and anglophone Africa," in Peyton Lyon & Tareq Ismael (eds.), *Canada and the Third World* (Toronto, 1976), p. 76.

12. Ronald H. Wagenberg, "Commonwealth Reactions to South Africa's Racial Policy 1948-1961," unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1966, p. 79.

13. Professor G.K. Helleiner, cited in Susan Lee Brown, "Canadian Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Case Study of Canadian-Southern African Relations," unpublished MA thesis, McMaster University, 1974, p. 107.

tance were insignificant as determinants of policy. This fact does at the same time raise the question of why the government declined for so many years to abolish the preference in deference to critics of apartheid.

Exports to South Africa are, however, of greater significance to the Canadian economy than is suggested by their mere magnitude. Whereas raw materials and agricultural produce continue to dominate Canadian exports generally, sales to South Africa are made up largely of fabricated goods. For example, total sales in 1949 of \$77.7 million included at least \$41.9 million worth of such goods. In 1975 more than \$94.9 million of total exports of \$135.9 million consisted of manufactured goods.<sup>14</sup> This situation assumes greater significance in view of the fact that Canada's share of world trade in manufactures was declining during the 1970s.

The Canadian market is rather more important to South Africa. The percentage of total South African exports going to Canada averaged 2.6% during the 1970s. In particular, South Africa's share of the Canadian sugar market rose from 5.3% in 1961 to 25% in 1969 and 29% in 1975.<sup>15</sup> Canada is also a principal buyer of South African wines and citrus fruits. More significantly, Canada along with other western countries, is totally dependent on South Africa for supplies of certain strategic metals which are not available from any alternative source in the non-communist world. According to the United States National Academy of Sciences, a real shortage of five such metals (chromium, gold, mercury, tin and palladium) could occur during the 1980s, and it must be assumed that this fact influences Canadian policy towards South Africa.<sup>16</sup>

In 1960 almost three quarters of Canadian trade with the African continent was with South Africa. By 1974, while total trade with Africa had increased enormously, from about \$100 million to more than \$800 million, South Africa's share had fallen to 25%. At the same time, overall Canadian trade rose similarly during those fifteen years, so that trade with Africa remained in 1974 what it had been in 1960, slightly more than 1% of Canada's total world trade.<sup>17</sup>

More significantly, Canadian exports to South Africa have failed to keep pace with the growth in imports. In 1972 for the first time imports exceeded exports in value — \$58.9 million compared to \$44.5 million. The decline in the growth of exports can partly be explained by South Africa's determination to become more self-sufficient and its conscious attempts to direct its trade towards countries that have been less critical of its domestic

14 These are approximate figures calculated by the author

15 Brown, *op. cit.*; John Paxton (ed), *The Statesman's Year-Book 1977-1978* (London, 1977), p. 1305

16 *The Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax), 14 November 1979; *Time* (21 January 1980)

17 Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 94

policies.<sup>18</sup> Thus, the percentage of South African imports coming from Canada declined from 3.3% in 1970 to 0.9% in 1978.<sup>19</sup>

Total direct investment in Africa by Canadian firms increased from \$20 million in 1949 to \$44 million in 1961 and \$123 million in 1977, the most substantial increase occurring after 1965. Despite this growth in absolute terms, Canadian investment in Africa declined from 2.2% of Canada's total foreign investment in 1949 to 1.6% in 1978, and the most striking feature of this investment in Africa is its growing concentration in South Africa. At the end of 1965, Canadian direct investment in the republic amounted to \$32 million, or 44% of its total direct investment in Africa. By 1978 the \$151 million invested in South Africa constituted 58% of total direct investment in Africa.<sup>20</sup> Total direct foreign investment in South Africa exceeds \$1 billion, however, so this amount is quite insignificant to both countries. By way of contrast, South African investment in Canada rose from \$74 million in 1966 to \$600 million in 1978, equivalent to 0.9% of total foreign investment in Canada.<sup>21</sup> The major South African investors are the Anglo-American Corporation and Rothmans, which control such Canadian companies as Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting, Rothmans of Canada, Carling-O'Keefe Breweries, Jordan Valley Wines, and the Toronto Argonaut football team.

Canadian investment in South Africa, like almost all Canadian foreign investment, is controlled by a very small number of companies. The largest single Canadian investor is Massey-Ferguson, the largest farm implement supplier in southern Africa, whose assets were worth more than \$30 million in 1972.<sup>22</sup> Other large investors include the Aluminium Company of Canada, which operates three plants in the republic, the Ford Motor Company, which has had an assembly plant at Port Elizabeth since 1923, Falconbridge Nickel Mines, International Nickel, Rio Tinto, and Bata Shoes. In addition, Manufacturers Life and Sun Life assurance companies do business in South Africa, though their operations do not involve the investment of Canadian funds.<sup>23</sup>

18. *Ibid.*, p. 95

19. Paxton, *op. cit.*; *ibid.* 1979-1980 (London, 1980), p. 1082

20. Data collected from Statistics Canada, *Canada's International Investment Position 1926 to 1967* (Ottawa, 1971), 68, 70. *Ibid.* 1977 (Ottawa, 1981), pp. 86-88

21. *Ibid.* 1977 (Ottawa, 1981), pp. 86-88; *Statistics Canada Daily*, (7 August 1981), pp. 3, 5

22. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 124

23. Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 99. Sun Life enjoys the distinction of being probably the first Canadian company to enter the South African market. In 1899 it sent a sales representative to explore the potential of Africa generally, and he was in Johannesburg when the Boer War broke out. Joseph Schull, *The Century of the Sun* (Toronto, 1971), p. 34. Sun Life's South African operations do not appear to be very significant. They account for only four out of 189 company branches, 180 personnel out of a total of 7,500 and rather less than 10% of business. *Ibid.*, pp. 103, 132-33.

## Challenges to Trade and Investment Policies

Brian Douglas Tennyson

Western investment in South Africa has come under considerable attack on the grounds that it strengthens the white regime. The corporate argument that foreign companies serve as peaceful agents of change has been rejected as a smokescreen for extremely profitable operations. These firms have been accused of taking advantage of a cheap and controlled labour force to maximize their profits. In Great Britain, Adam Raphael's articles in the *Guardian* revealed that most British firms paid their black workers at rates below the so-called Poverty Datum Line, i.e., a minimum calculated for mere existence but not a minimum living wage. A similar attack was launched on Canadian firms by Hugh Nangle in a series of articles in the *Montreal Gazette* in June 1973. His investigation of six Canadian corporations with subsidiaries in South Africa showed that only one of them (Ford) paid all its workers above the Poverty Datum Line.<sup>24</sup>

The result of these revelations in Great Britain was the establishment of a parliamentary inquiry to investigate the conduct of British firms in South Africa. There was little or no reaction in Canada. On two separate occasions the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchel Sharp, was questioned in the House of Commons on the activities of Canadian firms in South Africa. He responded that the government was concerned with conditions in South Africa and had urged a number of Canadian companies operating there "to act as good corporate citizens in ways that will make the Canadian people proud of them," but beyond that point the government would not go. Ottawa could not be expected either to encourage or to discourage investment in South Africa. Nor could it ask corporations to act in a manner that was contrary to South African law.<sup>25</sup> Professor Matthews concluded:

In short, when opinion at home or abroad was stirred up by the conduct of Canadian corporations abroad, the government would do what it could to minimize the resulting bad publicity, but it was constrained from doing anything more by the ground rules of the economic system, which discourages, even prevents, intervention in corporate affairs.<sup>26</sup>

One very real constraint on the Canadian government is the fact that the bulk of Canadian investment in South Africa is held by multinational corporations, over whose foreign operations it can have little effective control. Canadian companies controlled outside Canada were responsible for 69% of Canadian direct investment in South Africa in 1974.<sup>27</sup> In 1970

24. Matthews, *op. cit.* The six companies were Ford, Aluminum Company of Canada, Massey-Ferguson, Falconbridge, Bata and Sun Life.

25. Canada, *House of Commons Debates* (9 July 1973), col. 5408.

26. Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

the government did instruct Polymer, then a crown corporation, to sell its interest in a South African company.

Until 1977, Canada doggedly adhered to its traditional policy that "we trade in peaceful goods with all countries, even those with whose policies we are in profound disagreement."<sup>28</sup> Canada even continued until 1979 to extend preferential tariff rates to South Africa, arguing that they were not, contrary to public opinion, tied in any way to Commonwealth membership. The government also claimed to believe that any economic measures taken against South Africa would hurt the blacks more than the white minority. Canada did place a voluntary embargo on the sale of military equipment to South Africa in 1963 and in 1970 it extended this embargo to the sale of spare parts for such equipment. The government made no attempt, however, to discourage Canadian trade with or investment in the republic.

As for Namibia, Canada shifted from demanding international accountability to insisting on self-government and ultimate independence. When the World Court dismissed the South West African cases in 1966, Canada voted along with the vast majority of United Nations to declare South Africa's mandate over the territory terminated as the republic, by its actions, had forfeited the moral and legal right to continue that mandate. In accordance with the Court's 1971 advisory opinion that South Africa's continued presence in Namibia is illegal, Canada informed South Africa that it no longer recognized the republic's jurisdiction over the territory and began advising Canadian businessmen that it could no longer protect them or their interests there. This shift in policy was minimal, however, for a Canadian mining company, Falconbridge, continues to operate in the territory, paying taxes to South Africa and securing tax credits for these payments in Canada. Indeed, it has recently been revealed that Eldorado Nuclear Ltd., a Canadian crown corporation, is routinely processing uranium under contract with foreign electrical utilities which purchase it directly from mines in Namibia, in apparent contravention of the United Nations Security Council's 1970 resolution rejecting trade or other relations with Namibia which might imply recognition of South Africa's illegal control of the territory.<sup>29</sup>

In 1977 it became evident that the then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Don Jamieson, had concluded that Canadian policy was

28. Barton, *op. cit.*

29. *The Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax), 23 October 1981.

no longer adequate. This reflected mounting public criticism of that policy, which Jamieson found increasingly difficult to defend, as well as Canada's election to the United Nations Security Council for a two-year term beginning in January 1977, which had the effect of giving a higher profile to its African policies. Southern Africa had become a major focus of international concern as the long-staleated situations in Namibia and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) moved towards either negotiated settlements or greatly increased violence. Important shifts were taking place in the positions of western countries, especially the United States, as became evident in November 1977 when, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, the Security Council with the support of the western powers adopted a mandatory arms embargo against a member state, South Africa.

After indicating in September that he regarded the traditional policy of separating trade from politics as a "cop-out," Jamieson went on to announce in December 1977 that Canada would back up its criticism of apartheid by ending all government support for commercial relations with South Africa. The government would withdraw its trade commissioners from Johannesburg and Cape Town, close its Consulate General in Johannesburg, and halt all Export Development Corporation aid to companies trading with the republic. The Canada-South Africa preferential tariff agreement would be reconsidered and a code of conduct for Canadian companies operating in the republic would be circulated. Further, all tax concessions to Canadian companies operating in Namibia would be re-examined and South African residents travelling to Canada would be required to obtain non-immigrant visas.<sup>30</sup>

The promised code of conduct was subsequently formulated and distributed to Canadian companies known to be operating in South Africa. Basically, it calls on them to "promote employment practices which are based on the principle of equal treatment for all its employees, and which are consistent with basic human rights and the general economic welfare of all people in South Africa." While companies are expected to report annually to the government, they are not required to do so and no provision was made in any event for any action to be taken if they do not adhere to the code. Indeed, no mechanism was established for determining if they are adhering to the code other than their own optional annual reports.

Mr. Jamieson's apparently bold new initiative took Canadian businessmen and officials of the Departments of External Affairs and Industry, Trade and Commerce alike by surprise. It was soon clear,

however, that the impact of the new policy would be largely moral and that Canadian-South African economic relations would continue much as they were. Similarly, when the short-lived government of Joe Clark in July 1979 terminated the preferential tariff agreement with South Africa, the announcement was made totally without fanfare, though on the eve of Mr. Clark's departure for the Commonwealth heads of government conference at Lusaka, and the government emphasized that the decision reflected the size of the imbalance in preferential trade in South Africa's favour — only 2% of Canadian exports to South Africa benefited from the preference, compared to nearly two thirds of South African exports to Canada — which meant that there was little economic justification from Canada's point of view for continuing the agreement.

That the decision was motivated more by financial than political considerations was clear from the fact that the impetus came from the Department of Finance rather than the Department of External Affairs. Again, however, the impact on trade was expected to be insignificant: the price of South African sugar, which accounted for \$55 million worth of the republic's exports to Canada in 1978, was expected to rise by only about one cent per pound, for example, and most South African wines were not covered by the preference anyway.

The Canadian government, it seems clear, is anxious not to take any action which might be detrimental to Canadian-South African trade relations because South Africa is a valuable if small market for Canadian fabricated goods,<sup>31</sup> and Canada depends on South Africa for its supply of certain strategic metals not readily available elsewhere. It is not anticipated that the changes will have any significant impact on Canadian-South African trade relations, but these actions by the Trudeau and Clark governments did at least reflect a slight tilting of Canadian policy in favour of social justice. Its primary objective, however, remained the same: to preserve peace and stability in an increasingly dangerous part of the world.

### The Impact of the Namibia Question

Canada's election to the United Nations Security Council in 1977 followed the adoption by the Council in January 1976 of Resolution 385, which called for South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia and elections to

<sup>30</sup> Cape Breton Post (Sydney), 23 September, 21 December 1977. Cf. Don Jamieson, "Canadian policy towards South Africa," *DEA Statements and Speeches* 77/23.

<sup>31</sup> 80% of Canadian exports to South Africa are fabricated goods "with substantial labour input — a not unimportant consideration in a country such as ours, with a serious unemployment problem." Georges Blouin, "Canadian policy toward southern Africa: the decision-making process," in Anglin, Shaw & Widstrand, *op. cit.*, p. 151. At the time of writing (1980), Blouin was Assistant Under Secretary of State in the Department of External Affairs.



be held under UN supervision. Canada joined the United States and other western powers in urging the republic to cooperate with the United Nations in the implementation of this resolution. In the context of the Soweto riots and the failure of the all-party conference in Geneva to negotiate a settlement to the Zimbabwean crisis, there was a strong and growing sense of urgency among western governments with respect to southern Africa.

With Canada's election to the Security Council along with the Federal Republic of Germany, the western group was one of the most powerful which could be devised in both economic and political terms. There was also a high degree of similarity in their policies towards southern African issues. Thus, when the African states launched a major initiative at the United Nations early in 1977, calling for mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa, the western members of the Security Council met privately at the Canadian mission to consider their response. The United States suggested an innovative strategy which was eventually accepted by the Five and has since served as the main element in the western approach to South African issues. The American proposal was that the western members should approach the republic, using their good offices as its main trading partners, to see if it would accept a plan, consistent with Resolution 385, to hold elections at an early date in Namibia leading to the establishment of a state that would be recognized by the international community.

Canada fully supported this approach, believing that it would establish a climate in which multilateral initiatives could be characterized less by rhetoric and more by realistic proposals. This initiative also offered Canada the opportunity to demonstrate to African states that it wished to be helpful in efforts to contribute to growth and development by participation in a multilateral initiative to resolve the Namibian question. While the Canadian government recognized the danger that some African states might misunderstand its intentions or motives in aligning itself with countries not considered to be sympathetic to African concerns, on balance it thought that, in light of Canada's excellent relations with the Commonwealth and Francophone countries and the fact that Canada had neither a colonial past nor such aspirations, its participation could inject a progressive element into the initiative and would be seen as such. It was also believed that participation in the initiative would enhance Canada's relations with the other western governments involved by the close and frequent high level contacts necessitated by the initiative's essentially political nature. Finally, it was hoped that the exercise would contribute to Canadian efforts to strengthen the United Nations as an instrument for international cooperation and for conflict resolution.

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A New York 'Contact Group' was established to coordinate the efforts of the Five and in April 1977 South Africa was told that if it agreed to stop its efforts to establish a puppet regime in Namibia, they would seek UN acceptance of a plan for elections consistent with the Security Council guidelines. It was made clear that if South Africa persisted with the Turnhalle proceedings, the new Namibian regime would be regarded in the same light as Transkei. Moreover, it was warned, the western governments could not be expected to continue to resist action against South Africa by the Security Council.

Negotiations were carried on through 1977 until, following intensive official level consultations in Africa and talks at the ministerial level in New York, the five governments presented a plan to the United Nations in April 1978. South Africa accepted this plan and, as a result of 'good offices' intervention by the front line states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) and Nigeria, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) agreed to it as well. In July the Security Council adopted Resolution 431 appointing a special representative charged with the responsibility of devising a detailed implementation plan for bringing Namibia to independence.

When this plan, which was approved by the Security Council in its Resolution 435 in September 1978, was rejected by South Africa as inconsistent with the western proposals, the five foreign ministers travelled to South Africa and succeeded in persuading the new Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, to resume negotiations with the United Nations and SWAPO. Consultations resumed in January 1979 and continue to the present time, with the evidence indicating that South Africa may finally be prepared actually to leave Namibia and take its chances with a representative government.<sup>32</sup> If this is the case, Canadian participation in the western initiative will have contributed to the resolution of a problem which has plagued the international community for more than thirty years. The success of the initiative will also vindicate the Canadian government's policy of moderation and conciliation, although that vindication must be evaluated in the context of the overall situation in southern Africa, which clearly has become sufficiently distressing to the South Africans to force them to reconsider their hitherto uncooperative position.

32. John Kane-Berman, "Drawing up the peace lines," *South* (February 1982), pp. 28-29; *Time* (22 February 1982), pp. 24-25. (For a less optimistic assessment of the possibilities for success of the Western initiative see George Shepherd's article later in this issue. - Ed)



Some have claimed that Canadian policy towards South Africa combines "a highly audible liberal rhetoric . . . with a diplomacy that is either inactive or is quietly pursuing objectives that are narrowly self-seeking."<sup>33</sup> This is certainly reflected in the views expressed by leading officials within the Department of External Affairs. Charles Marshall, then Director General of the department's Defence Relations Bureau, observed in 1974 that "morality is for those who are free to moralize with impunity," while Alan McGill, Director General of the department's African and Middle Eastern Affairs Bureau, believed that Canada could have no real influence on South African policies regardless of whether or not it backed up criticism with economic sanctions.<sup>34</sup>

The reasoning behind these policies has been the argument that the maintenance of contact with South Africa, whether through diplomatic representatives or trade and other economic relations, is more likely to promote progressive changes within that country than its effective isolation from the world. The isolation of South Africa would mean that opponents of the present regime would lose the moral and material support they had previously secured. In addition, such a policy of deliberately isolating South Africa both economically and diplomatically would affect most adversely the very people it was designed to serve, the non-white majority. It has also been argued that even if Canada faithfully carried out the wishes of the UN majority, many other states would not. Thus, while Canadians might pride themselves on their righteous behaviour, others would profit at their expense. Finally, it has been argued that Canada, because of its heavy dependence on trade, cannot afford to break off commercial relations with South Africa, even if its racial policies are abhorrent and even if its trade is relatively unimportant. Besides, so many Canadians are recent immigrants from countries that have repressive regimes that the government would be overwhelmed by demands for similar actions if it were to take any strong action against South Africa.<sup>35</sup>

Why have Canadian policies towards South Africa been so timorous? Clearly, they cannot be explained in terms of the involvement there of any national interest which is of such importance that it has had a determining influence. No major Canadian economic, strategic or political interest is involved in southern Africa. Canadian trade with South Africa is relatively unimportant, and exports to South Africa have actually declined in recent

years as a proportion of total exports. There are a few investments that are important to the corporations involved but, seen nationally, Canadian investment in South Africa "is very nearly negligible."<sup>36</sup> Canadian strategic interests in the security of the Indian Ocean trade routes are insignificant and Canadian ethnic and cultural links with South Africa are tenuous.

Nevertheless, the Canadian government has given closer attention to this issue than to others that also touch no major interests. The reason for this, no doubt, is that racial discrimination is an emotional issue concerning many Canadians. Also, African states tend to judge the sincerity of the commitment of foreign governments to racial equality by their policies with respect to South Africa. The importance of this consideration has been increased by the fact that southern African issues have caused deep divisions in the Commonwealth and Canada has been forced to define its position in more detail than it probably would have done had the issue not had this Commonwealth dimension.

A primary concern of Canadian governments is to maximize Canadian influence and power within the international community. John Holmes has written that "Canada, as much as older nations, has a national interest in maintaining as strong an international position as it can acquire."<sup>37</sup> This requires that Canada maintain cordial relations with as wide a range of countries as possible, the emphasis being much more on developing the capacity to influence events than on the policies that might be pursued with that power. In addition, Canadian foreign policy is closely linked to the promotion of Canadian economic interests, an objective most dramatically demonstrated early in 1982 when the government actually merged the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce with the Department of External Affairs. Other interests, such as promoting social justice or lessening the North-South economic gap, do not seem to be decisive or even important when significant economic interests are involved. Indeed, concern to promote Canadian economic interests influences policy even when those interests are relatively insignificant. The explanation for this, according to Professors Matthews and Pratt, is that

they fix a style and establish a sense of what is appropriate. They result in a conviction that ethical positions, by and large, are to be avoided even in cases where no great interest is involved as they might aggravate states whose support Canada may want on other issues or they might set a precedent which it would be costly to copy on other issues. Therefore, to avoid such possible adverse secondary consequences, it is best, as a seeming 'matter of principle',

33 Cranford Pratt, "Canadian attitudes towards southern Africa a commentary", *International Perspectives* (November/December 1974), p. 39

34 Interviews cited in Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-66

35 Matthews and Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 168

36 *Ibid.*, p. 170.

37 John Holmes, *Canada: A Middle Aged Power* (Toronto, 1976), p. 155

never to allow foreign policy, particularly in its economic dimensions, to be influenced by moral considerations.<sup>38</sup>

Canadian governments genuinely believe in the beneficial consequences of international trade and foreign investment to all who are affected by them. Thus, Canadian officials and government leaders are unreceptive to suggestions that they should restrict trade with and investment in specific countries in the interest of the peoples of those countries. The government also continues to believe that economic development in South Africa will undermine apartheid and contribute to the liberalization of its racial policies. Faced with mounting criticism of this position, however, the government has also suggested that the resolution of South African problems must be left essentially to the main protagonists.<sup>39</sup> The government has embraced the theory that foreign firms operating in South Africa can spearhead important changes by abolishing job reservation, negotiating labour contracts with black unions, introducing equal terms of service regardless of race, and abolishing discriminatory practices generally. The code of conduct adopted for Canadian companies investing in South Africa is not only a set of guidelines but a justification for their continued presence in the republic.

Canada has always tended to support the policies with respect to South Africa of its senior allies, Great Britain and the United States. Their objectives are, of course, shared by the Canadian government: the containment of Soviet and Chinese influence, the maintenance of a political and economic environment receptive to trade and investment, the support of a pro-western regime, and above all, regional stability in an increasingly important part of the world. This Anglo-American influence upon Canadian policy does not imply that Canada meekly follows their lead. Canada no doubt contributes to the development of the overall approaches which it shares with Great Britain and the United States. The value of Canadian support is that it suggests that British and American policies have won the backing of an independent-minded middle power.

As for public opinion, while there are some Canadians who identify with white South Africans and share their feelings towards non-whites, they are outnumbered by liberals who for years have pressed the government to take a stronger stand against apartheid. They are represented by such organizations as the major churches, CUSO, the YWCA, and the Canadian Labour Congress, as well as a number of radical citizen groups. In Parliament there has been general all-party support for a stronger policy. None of these groups has succeeded,

38. Matthews and Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

39. Barton, *op. cit.*; Matthews and Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

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however, in making this issue a matter of widespread public concern. Business interests which trade with or invest in South Africa, although "neither numerous nor in themselves particularly powerful,"<sup>40</sup> do have much easier access to senior government officials than do the spokesmen for anti-apartheid groups. They are represented in such organizations as the Export Development Corporation and they often participate in official Canadian delegations attending economic conferences, as well as working closely with government in the promotion of trade.

Thus, despite the more widely representative character of the organizations urging a stronger policy, the concerned business interests tend to receive the more sympathetic hearing. In the view of Professors Matthews and Pratt, however, the ideological viewpoint of policy makers is "more important" than their responsiveness to lobbying. "Business leaders share the same belief system as the members of the Government and the Department of External Affairs. They are of a common class."<sup>41</sup> In other words,

the Canadian government has not needed to be pushed and prodded into policies which favour Canadian capitalists. We doubt, for example, that Canadian policy would be much different even if no Canadian capitalists were involved with South Africa. We therefore cannot attribute to their direct influence any major influence in policy.<sup>42</sup>

Canadian interest in South Africa would be slight except for the fact that the situation in that country and its involvement in Namibia threaten to generate international war in southern Africa, thereby inevitably affecting Canada's relations with all the Afro-Asian powers and generally increasing international tensions. South Africa became relatively important as a problem in Canadian foreign policy only as the world increasingly demanded that international action be taken to end apartheid and the illegal occupation of Namibia. The Canadian government, largely unprodded by strategic considerations, business interests or public opinion, dodged the issue until it could be evaded no longer. Having acknowledged the necessity for firm speech by 1961, it has since also taken firm action, although the steps taken in 1978 and 1979 do not impose any real cost on either the Canadian or South African economies.

## Prospects for the Future

When Mr. Trudeau returned to office in February 1980, following the

40. Matthews and Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 175.

42. *Ibid.*

brief Clark interregnum, he appointed Mark MacGuigan as Secretary of State for External Affairs. Whereas Flora MacDonald, Mr. Clark's Secretary of State, displayed concern for international violations of human rights, it seems unlikely in the current economic circumstances that this government will take any action likely to reduce Canadian trade, particularly with a market which consumes a high percentage of manufactured goods, and there is no reason to believe that any action is contemplated regarding Canadian investment or the increasingly important question of Canadian participation in major bank loans to South Africa. The fact is, Don Jamieson notwithstanding, that the Canadian government still separates economic considerations from international political questions. That is because Canada's economy relies heavily on international trade — exports account for nearly 23% of the GNP — and besides, Canadians question the effectiveness of such actions, especially with respect to a country like South Africa with which its dealings are so modest.

Thus, the Canadian-South African economic relationship should continue in the near future much as it is: relatively small, not insignificant in its nature, but not a major factor influencing the formulation of Canadian policy. At the same time, both Mr. Trudeau and Mr. MacGuigan have demonstrated a strong interest in advancing the North-South dialogue, as indeed has the influential Deputy Prime Minister (and former Secretary of State), Allan MacEachen. The potential impact, therefore, of mounting pressure from Third World countries to adopt meaningful measures designed to topple the hated apartheid regime, now the last bastion of white minority rule in Africa, in the context of the continuing cold war, should not be discounted.

It is clear, however, that the government wishes that the South Africans would put their own house in order. The resolution of the Zimbabwean problem has increased pressure on the republic and the escalation of the war in Namibia has worsened the instability of the region. International intervention of some sort seems increasingly probable, especially if the western initiative on Namibia fails. Canada will, therefore, continue to support United States and British efforts to resolve the problem and perhaps to contain the disruption when it comes. To the Canadian government South Africa remains what it has always been: not an area of intrinsic interest but a place whose significance to other powers can vitally affect Canada's well-being, and therefore an area for which the Canadian government must continue to display real if limited concern.

## ***Breaking the Namibia Impasse***

**George W. Shepherd, Jr.**

The Namibia issue of self-determination has been on the world agenda as a major item since the formation of the UN, due to the refusal of South Africa, unlike all other mandate powers, to accept the UN Trusteeship Council as the League's legitimate successor. This issue was highlighted in the late '40s by the petition of the Herero Chiefs, through Michael Scott, to the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee.<sup>1</sup> Germany had established the Colony of South West Africa in 1890 and South Africa occupied the territory in 1915, acquiring it as a League Mandate in 1919. While negotiations for independence have moved a great deal, bringing in numerous new actors, the fundamental impasse remains. This is the clash between the human rights of the majority population of Africans with the political, economic, and strategic interests of South Africa and the Western world. The crucial question is: Can the world find a formula to fulfill the right of self-determination for Namibians which is not contrary to these interests? Despite the optimistic statements from Washington, the basic issues do not appear to be resolved by the formulas put forward to date. The war continues to escalate and the right wing upsurge in South Africa poses a very serious threat to any negotiated settlement. A military solution on the Vietnam model is the grim alternative.

### **The Human Rights Claim**

The right of the people to self-determination in Namibia is well established. This is the basic human right recognized in the 20th Century, implicit in the League mandate, incorporated into the UN Charter,<sup>2</sup> and

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1. Roger S. Clark, "The International League for Human Rights and South West Africa, 1945-1957: The Human Rights NGO as Catalyst in the International Legal Process", *Human Rights Quarterly*, Winter 1981.

2. Charter of the United Nations Organization, Chapter 12, Article 76.

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applied to the people of Namibia through a series of decisions of UN Committees, World Court decisions and declarations of policy by all governments concerned, including South Africa. These, in addition to self-determination, cover a number of basic rights, from that of petition to representation and protection from arbitrary and harmful actions of the South African government. The most decisive implementation of these rights has come through the UN and the politics of associated governments. The series of World Court decisions, culminating in the 1971 Advisory Opinion that upheld the right of the Security Council to terminate the Mandate, established the fact of violation of rights by South Africa.<sup>3</sup>

Not only has the right to self-determination been endorsed by the United Nations and World Court but most states in the world, including all African states, have given de facto recognition to the major political movement, SWAPO (South West African Peoples' Organization), as the principal if not exclusive representative of the Namibian people.<sup>4</sup> Even South Africa has begun to move toward a tribally-based form of representative government for Namibia's people.<sup>5</sup> However, the form in which this will be achieved and the protection of the rights of various minorities as well as the majority are central disputes. Even if a negotiated settlement is achieved, the precedent of many cases of human rights in former colonies indicates that the restructuring of power by the formation of a new government may not necessarily enhance human rights or provide real independence. In Namibia, a real danger exists that Western interests working through a new tributary regime will continue the current pattern of dependence on South Africa and the West. This pitfall SWAPO and the Front Line States have sought to avoid, though it is not fully recognized by many friends of Namibian independence.

### The Tributary Pattern

Colonial territories are one form of the tributary relationship between the powerful states of the core of the international capitalist system and the periphery. Namibia is on the periphery of the periphery, in that South Africa, as the ruling power, is a semi-peripheral middle range power and has, in recent years, become a sub-imperial base of the Western core

<sup>3</sup> Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Council Resolution 276, 1971 JCI 16. In 1966, the UN revoked South Africa's Mandate, General Assembly Res 2145.

<sup>4</sup> The Council for Namibia of the United Nations has recognized SWAPO. However, the existence of other parties is recognized and accepted by many members of the UN. SWAPO was given official Observer Status in Gen. Assembly Res. 3115 in 1973. The UN Council for Namibia has dealt with other representative groups but has since early 1970 believed SWAPO to be the most popular and authentic representative.

<sup>5</sup> R. F. Botha's letter to Sec. Gen. Kurt Waldheim, 20 Feb. 1979 (S/13105).

powers.<sup>6</sup> Namibia has been controlled by racial and tribal elites who have served the sub-imperial interests of South Africa and the Western world. The economy has been exploited through white farmers and multinational corporations whose allegiances are to South Africa and the West. As Richard Green, the economist, saw it, "In its own terms the colonial political economy has been successful. After a slow start, GDP, exports, remittances, settler and corporate incomes have risen precipitately since 1945. For South Africa, the remittances and the captive market (all paid in foreign exchange from globally-oriented exports) have been significant."<sup>7</sup> And the strategic significance of the area as a buffer against the increasing pressures of African nationalism to the North and the control of Walvis Bay for Western naval activity around the Cape is well-known.

Thus, in terms of strategic political economy, South West Africa remains under the rule of South Africa because the dominant forces of the Western world basically support this relationship, though seeking some adjustment in equity and justice. The importance of South Africa to the West over-rides the concerns about growing African hostility and the rising cost of the military occupation of Namibia. The clashes between the Angola Government and the South African forces which have invaded Angola periodically since 1975 have risen along with the casualties in the fighting between the Peoples Liberation Army (PLAN) and the South African army.<sup>8</sup>

The West, operating through the Contact Group of Five (U.S., U.K., Germany, France, and Canada) has, since the mid-1970s, sought to negotiate a settlement that would recognize the human rights of Namibians, while maintaining their commitment to the strategic political and economic interests of South Africa. This contradiction has constantly undercut the diplomatic strategies they have utilized.<sup>9</sup>

South African leaders have skillfully utilized this Western interest and manipulated the conflict to appear to be accepting reform, in favor of rights, while preserving the dependence of Namibia and its tributary role.

<sup>6</sup> Kenneth Grundy, *International Studies Quarterly*, Winter 1976, "Intermediary Powers and Global Dependency: The Case of South Africa."

<sup>7</sup> Richard V. Green, *From Sudwestafrika to Namibia: The Political Economy of Transition*, Research Report No. 58, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1981, p. 8.

<sup>8</sup> *Namibia: the Facts*, (London International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1980) p. 12.

<sup>9</sup> This author stated during the 1979 negotiations on the UNTAG plan that "South Africa has called the Western Five's bluff with its recognition that the West wants economic links more than it wants social justice for Namibians. As a South African newspaper put it, 'South Africa's strategy has gambled successfully on the fact that the West's bark is worse than its bite, that Vance and Co. are really little more than paper tigers, that when the chips are down, they will wield their votes against sanctions resolutions put forward at the UN.' " George W. Shepherd, "No Free and Fair Settlement in Namibia: The Collapse of the Western Five Plan," *Africa Today*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1979, pp. 21-22.



This tributary status is a pattern followed in many (though not all) former colonial territories that continues the basic dominant-subordinate relationship, despite the granting of "self-determination" and sovereignty in the international system. It is established through the transfer of power to an elite or ruling class whose interests are closely aligned to the former colonial power and the international economic and security system. Such elites may have a popular majority or they may not; but the appearance of majority rule has usually been created through political parties and elections. However, the new ruling group maintains intact the existing economic relationship and security system through financial and trade agreements and, frequently, military agreements that preserve bases and external weapons supply. The new military play a key role in preserving internal support for the new regime, as well as a surrogate role for the super-power which has assisted in the birth of a new "independent" nation-state. It is this dependent surrogate role of both class and state that maintains existing profit, resource, and military relationships and provides the essence of the new tributary system. Tribute was the payment for protection to feudal lords, and our international state system despite the spread of international capitalism, remains basically a feudal system, in which the strong protect the weak, if they pay the price. It is a very heavy price and is in no sense determined by democratic or representational methods. In contrast to the nation-state, the international capitalist system has not transformed the essentially feudal relationship on the international level. Quite the contrary, it has reenforced and expanded the inequities and the violation of basic human rights.<sup>10</sup>

Namibia is caught in this tributary system and, if the current trends continue, is apt to become a classic example of the transfer of sovereignty from which the substance of freedom has been extracted by the major powers. The dimensions of this possibility are observable in the structure of the economy and the political groupings, as well as the political maneuvering over the struggle for Namibia. Attempts of the majority of Namibians to achieve independence through armed struggle and other means do not in themselves assure full independence.

### The Subordination of the Economy

Mining and extraction has become the major industry and primary source of wealth and exports for Namibia, although the majority of whites, like the Africans, are engaged in agriculture. The copper, lead, zinc, and coal are mined on the central plateau. Diamonds, copper, and uranium are the primary exports of companies like de Beers, Amax, Newmont, and

10 The theoretical base of this is amplified in the forthcoming George W. Shepherd Jr. *Super Powers and New States*.

Rio Tinto Zinc and account for 90% of all mined wealth. These companies are owned primarily by U.S. and European MNCs, with South Africa a secondary partner.<sup>11</sup>

Thus, the major Western powers own and control the most lucrative sections. The expatriation of profits from diamonds and copper has been over 35%, a very high proportion for a developing country but typical of Western capitalism in South Africa. In fact, the outflow of dividends exceeded the African workers' per capita wage by three times.<sup>12</sup>

The world could function without Namibian exports and, in this regard, only the French would be pressed for the loss of uranium from the Rossing mine. The South African government, however, has earned 60% of its South West African revenue from taxes, and in a time of falling gold prices and drain on the balance of payments, the contribution of Namibia is significant.<sup>13</sup> Thus, South African fears over the loss of Namibian profits and contribution is a factor in the strategic political calculations. Farming is a secondary industry for the white economy. Only 6500 white farms occupy the central plateau.<sup>14</sup> Whites, nevertheless, exercise enormous political leverage because they are of German and Afrikaner origin. Thus, the economy is controlled by external interests and the internal distribution favors the tributary class of whites and a few African local government and central government personnel. While Apartheid has declined in Namibia as a deliberate policy of discrimination, whites run the political economy and a new tributary class of Africans who support the South African presence and MNC development has risen as a participant in privilege.

The security dimension of this tributary relationship has both South African and Western aspects. NATO powers have made defense of the Cape route a major priority<sup>15</sup> and Namibia is located on the Western flank of the Cape with the only deep water port at Walvis Bay, as well as airfields and communications facilities along the coast. South Africa originally

11. In mining South Africa owns only 40% while the U.S. and European interests control the rest. If all production, including farming and fishing is considered, then South Africa owns 75% of production. *To Be Born A Nation: The Liberation Struggle For Namibia*, (London), SWAPO, 1982, pp. 46-48.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

13. South Africa makes a huge gain in foreign currency from Namibia, and South African companies like DeBeers pay only one half of the taxes in Namibia that they pay in Botswana. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

14. People are still forcibly removed from areas to provide for white interests and protection. *Namibia: The Facts*, IDAF, op. cit., p. 22.

15. A confidential document of the U.S. National Security Council proposed a South Atlantic Alliance, including South American countries like Argentina, in order to defend Cape Route. "Reagan Alliance Woos South Africa," in *South*, London, October, 1981, p. 24.



sought the Mandate of South West Africa in 1919 because of Walvis Bay and the strategic prospects of the long coastline. Great Britain had established the enclave in 1878 and transferred it to South Africa in 1922.

Today, Namibia is under military occupation of major South African forces; but in normal times, the South African Navy uses Walvis Bay, as do occasional NATO task forces. A South African air force base at Rooikop is used as a support strike force and patrol area. The second South African Infantry Battalion Group is stationed at Walvis Bay.<sup>16</sup> Its importance is shown by South African refusal to even consider giving up the port city in the current negotiations over Namibian independence. Some Western powers have supported her claims to continued occupation and direct control from Cape Town. But the UN has passed a resolution S.C.432, requesting its reintegration into Namibia.

The military occupation of Namibia by South Africa also reveals the scope of their strategic interest. The war with PLAN of SWAPO has frequently spilled over into Angola and Zambia. South African army and air force bases have been built along the border in Ovamboland and the Caprivi Strip.<sup>17</sup> The objective of defeating the internal SWAPO insurgency along with containing the Angolans, Cubans, and Russians to the North of the border has become a central strategic aim of South Africa. Western powers, while anxious to negotiate the conflict, appear to support South Africa in the objective of containing the spread of Cuban and Soviet influences from moving south into Namibia. South Africa maintains a standing force of 75,000 troops at a cost of nearly a billion Rand a year.<sup>18</sup> (Botha claimed a billion dollars annual cost in April '82.)<sup>19</sup> The cost of this operation has more than offset the economic gains to South Africa, described earlier.

Thus, the strategic political, economic considerations dominate the issue, while human rights considerations are strictly secondary. This conflict of interests should be seen in terms of the policies of the three major actors — the West, South Africa, and SWAPO.

### The Western Contact Group

The West, as represented by the Contact Group of Five, has dissociated itself from the military occupation of Namibia and has sought a negotiated settlement in terms of UN resolutions, particularly S.C. 435,

which calls for a cease-fire and a UN supervised election. However, the reality of their position has been to recognize the legitimacy of South African strategic and economic interests as a part of their own broad strategy of dominance in Southern Africa which they do not see necessarily compromised by a popularly based government in Namibia. South Africa is an important sub-imperial state in their strategy and the basic policy has been to mediate between South Africa, the Africans, and the UN for a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

The central difficulty has been that any fair election would almost inevitably bring to power SWAPO, whom the South Africans regard as a security threat with its links to Angola, the Cubans and Russians. On the other hand, SWAPO has rejected any terms to the settlement which would leave the country under the rule of a tribally based and tributary elite. The situation of conflict is not a parallel with Zimbabwe because SWAPO, while popular, has not succeeded militarily to the degree achieved by the Patriotic Front. Moreover, there is deep distrust on all sides. The South Africans distrust the UN, SWAPO distrusts the Contact Five, and the Reagan "constructive engagement" policy with South Africa has aroused among the Front Line States all their latent feelings against US imperialism. This has led to the impasse because Prime Minister Botha has consistently believed that a UN election will lead to a SWAPO Government which will present a security risk to South Africa.

The Western Five have presented various proposals for settlement since the failure in 1978 of the UN plan for a transitional authority and election.<sup>20</sup> These were based on the concept of a free and fair election which would be preceded by a cease-fire and withdrawal of military contingents, the election of a constituent assembly and the installation of an interim government that would provide for the implementation of a new constitution under an independent Namibia. However, the key underlying issue has been which groups would win the election and control the new government. The latest of the Western proposals has been an attempt to provide for minority protection within the framework of majority rule through a formula of a two-tier representative system. The two-tier system proposed to give two votes to each citizen, one for the party and one for tribal candidates.<sup>21</sup> Because SWAPO rejected this, the proposal has been

16. *Apartheid's Army in Namibia: South Africa's Illegal Military Occupation*, IDAF. (London), 1982, p. 7.

17. The extensive deployment of SADF is outlined in *Apartheid's Army in Namibia*, *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

19. *New York Times*, March 24, 1982.

20. "Proposal for a Settlement of the Namibian Situation," *Objective Justice*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 1978. The Security Council Res. SC 431, July 27, 1978, established the UN Temporary Assistance Group (UNTAG).

21. The original idea was half the members of the Constituent Assembly would be elected on a national basis by proportional representation and half on the basis of single member constituencies. Each voter was to have two votes and this would enable him to vote for regionally based candidates as well as a national party. See "Revised Contact Group Proposal" in *TransAfrica Forum*, *Issue Brief*, Feb. 1982.

modified to count a single vote twice. This would enable small minority parties to gain representation. It has made South Africa unhappy, even though it could mean SWAPO would not have a controlling two-thirds of the Constituent Assembly.<sup>22</sup> However, the problem is that the formula of tribal representation is regarded by SWAPO and the front-line African states as a continuation of the earlier Bantustan policies of South Africa which is rejected by Namibian nationalists as vehemently as it is by blacks in South Africa. In rejecting the proposal of the Contact Group, Theo Ben Guriab, SWAPO's Permanent Representative to the UN stated, "The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and SWAPO find this process fundamentally unacceptable since it is intended to keep Namibian people disunited and separate physically . . ."<sup>23</sup> Thus, they see the Western proposal as connivance with South Africa to prevent the majority party, in this case, SWAPO, from controlling the Constituent Assembly and forming a government. The Western Five, however, argue that their proposal is no more than protection and representation of minority interests which is provided for in many systems of regional government and federal constitutions. However, this attempt to impose a Western formula of democratic representation and protection of minority rights, in order to placate South Africa, was ill-advised. It has not been accepted because the formulas have added credence to SWAPO and Front Line Africans' belief that the West and South Africa are maneuvering to prevent a SWAPO victory; that they fundamentally want to preserve the tributary status of an "independent" Namibia.

An attempt has been made, as a first step, to achieve agreement on a cease fire. The initial agreement in 1978 broke down over the issue of the presence of PLAN contingents in Namibia. A demilitarized zone is acceptable to both parties but the issue of the release of political prisoners held by South Africa on Robben Island and elsewhere remains. This issue may be less important than the question of actual UN administration, since in South Africa the new right wing, led by The Conservative National Party under the leadership of the former Cabinet member Andries Treurnicht, has campaigned against any settlement administered by the UN.

Thus, the Western Five and the UN face an almost impossible situation of distrust, political instability, and periodically escalating conflict.

### South African Policy

South Africa is committed to a continuation of its dominance and

22. Graham Hovey, "Pretoria Said to Agree to Namibia Plan", *New York Times*, Dec. 28, 1978, also update, *African American Institute*, Feb. 10, 1982.

23. *TransAfrica Forum, Issue Brief*, Feb. 1982. *Africa News*, May 24, 1982, carries the full statement of SWAPO views.

control in Namibia under a settlement that will maintain in power the tributary class. There are differences of opinion on how this should be done and particularly how far they need to go in order to satisfy the Western Five that a fair election has been held and a representative system adopted. A UN-supervised cease-fire and election may be acceptable. However, the Botha Government has devolved virtually self-governing power on the currently elected Assemblies of Namibia/South West Africa, which are under the leadership of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. Led by the white liberal, Dirk Mudge, the DTA has only fluctuating African support. This ruling coalition of DTA came unglued in early 1982 when Peter Kalungula, then President, withdrew his Democratic Party, which is mainly based in Ovamboland. Kalungula attacked the DTA as promoting Apartheid.<sup>24</sup> Without his support, the DTA would have little chance to win a free election against SWAPO. Other smaller African-supported parties such as SWAPO Democrats and SWANU of the Namibia National Front, (NNF) have only regional pockets of support. The white Federal party resigned from the NNF in 1979. The white parties on the right are small, such as the National Party of South Africa, with close ties to South Africa. They have been challenged by the Herstigte National Party (HNP) on the extreme right who accuse South Africa of selling them out. An alliance of right wing groups called AKTUR opposes DTA and insists on an ethnic tier for homeland governments in the new Constitution.<sup>25</sup>

Prime Minister Botha considers SWAPO to be "Communist dominated" and untrustworthy, in terms of South African interests. The South African right wing of the Nationalist Party and the new CNP are convinced that the Soviet Union controls SWAPO. These right wing groups have threatened to resist with force any settlement that gives SWAPO an opportunity to form a government.<sup>26</sup> Liberal and progressive opinion in South Africa reject this direct linkage of SWAPO with Moscow but their views have long been disregarded by the Government. South African forces are locked in a deadly combat with SWAPO guerrillas and it is clear that South Africa finds SWAPO unacceptable and therefore persists in seeking a formula which will give the appearance of democratic election but retains a tributary dependence. Thereby, they hope to placate Western and African opinion while holding on to their interests.

24. *Africa News*, Feb. 22, 1982.

25. *Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., pp. 48-50.

26. Joseph Lelyveld, *New York Times*, March 20, 1982.

SWAPO, in the eyes of most informed observers, is the majority-backed party. There is some opposition but most of it is among the smaller tribal groups such as the Herero. The majority African tribe, the Ovambo, have backed SWAPO since the early '60s and the South African occupation and repression has only intensified this attitude. Leaders like Chief Kalungula who have supported the DTA have broken with that party once it became clear that they were intent on maintaining the Bantustan system of tribalism. SWAPO has not been seriously weakened by fragmentation, such as the formation of SWAPO Democrats who participated in a coalition with the Namibia National Front for a time and then also broke away.

SWAPO began their armed struggle in 1965 and have continued with the aid of Angola and other Front Line African States. Non-military aid has been received from Sweden in substantial quantity and the Eastern European States and Cuba. Castro has stated the intention of Cuba to leave Angola once the South African threat to the MPLA Government is withdrawn and the future of Namibia has been settled.<sup>27</sup> Their forces have not been involved in direct support of SWAPO's PLAN; but they have been the major protective force against South Africa's intrusive military actions into Angola. A SWAPO Government would not be a Cuban or a Russian surrogate any more than Angola itself has proven to be. Marxist beliefs are heavily diluted with Christian Western values in the leadership<sup>28</sup> and there would not be a sharp break with existing economic and political ties. However, SWAPO is committed to the control of their own resources and culture, and the change would clearly mean a retention of capital in Namibia for their own development.<sup>29</sup>

South Africans fear that a SWAPO-led Namibia would become a base for the Soviets and the ANC against them. These fears are without foundation and misunderstand the nature of Namibian nationalism. Whites (12%) and "Coloured" (11%) worry about their future. However, SWAPO does not want them to leave, as they contribute to the technical resources and growth of the economy.<sup>30</sup> A SWAPO formed government would, in all probability, continue the basic tributary relationship, while

27. Randall Robinson. *New York Times*, April 22, 1982

28. "Namibia a Nation Wronged": a report of the British Council of Churches. Div. of International Affairs, London, 1982. They found a belief that SWAPO was the "amati" (friends) of the people and "Many of the SWAPO leaders are Christian."

29. These proposed changes have been published in research reports of the United Nations Institute for Namibia, Lusaka, headed by Hage G. Geingob. See *UNIN News*, Quarterly, and other reports such as R.H. Green, *Manpower Estimates and Development*.

30. There are white and coloured members of SWAPO in Namibia. SWAPO's racial view is similar to the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe which seeks progressive non-African participation in self-rule.

initiating steps for a new international order of a more equitable system of exchange and a shift from South African strategic ties to non-aligned links with the OAU and the Front Line states.<sup>31</sup>

The necessary principles of an agreement cannot be arrived at by the shuttle diplomacy the Contact Five have employed. A face-to-face meeting of the conflicting parties needs to be arranged in a "Geneva-type Conference," as proposed by SWAPO. The attendance of both major parties at such a conference will be a sign that they are indeed ready to negotiate. Representation of the DTA and other parties of Namibia can be arranged through South Africa, and other issues of representation can be worked out by the UN. There is no way in which the ultimate authority of the UN can be by-passed in the peaceful settlement since under international law it now has full responsibility. While the Contact Five have enormous influence, they cannot replace the UN as this would be unacceptable to the Africans. Thus, the UN must become the major implement of whatever basis of agreement emerges from the preliminary negotiations.

### To Break the Impasse

The negotiation impasse stems from the underlying realities of strategic, political, and economic interests of the contending parties described in this paper. The impasse can be broken in favor of a negotiated settlement rather than a military solution, only if the Western Contact group adopts a new policy. This policy will have to shift away from a primarily strategic bias to a fully developed human rights priority. What is involved is not a token gesture but a genuine breaking of new ground.

A settlement will not be possible unless it simultaneously recognizes the interests and rights of the parties involved while moving them all to a new relationship. This new relationship must create the prospect of the fulfillment of the aspirations of the majority while protecting the rights and interests of the minorities and the external parties. The basic principles derived from a human rights strategy are: 1) majority rule with constitutional protection for minorities, 2) economic justice and development for all, and 3) strategic self-reliance.

The commitment to majority rule by the outside world, as expressed through UN and World Court decisions, is well founded. There is no valid reason to backtrack on this with a complex voting formula such as the dual vote proposal of the Contact Group. South African fears of the damaging consequences of a SWAPO majority victory are the reflection of the

31. The principle of special seats for minorities is well established in constitutional government. SWAPO is not committed to any formula but there is no reason to believe they would not be reasonable.

interests of minority parties, who will probably lose in a free and fair election, and also a projection of anti-communist paranoia in South Africa that has no basis in reality. Many conservatives in South Africa have recognized this and they have simply been bludgeoned by the far right on this issue. A UN administered free and fair election under S.C. 435 is the best way to initiate this principle on a majority one person-one vote principle with provision for minority group representation and protection. This can be written into the Constitution through special seats, in an upper house, or through regional government Councils, provided they do not destroy majority rule.<sup>32</sup> International guarantee of these rights should be made through a special treaty relationship with South Africa and the creation of an International Commission of Arbitration between the two states. Minority rights in land, resource access, and political liberties need to be given constitutional and legal protection in Namibia, as in all African societies. The lack of such protection has often led to authoritarian repression. The difficulty has been how to guarantee these in the face of majority tendencies to over-ride them. In this case, a special tribunal or ombudsman should be created by treaty between Namibia and South Africa, with the continuing participation of the UN. Thus, a land dispute or an issue over representation could be appealed directly to the Commission if the individual or group plaintiff should maintain that its rights had been violated by either Government within the domestic legal system. Precedents exist in United States-Latin American relations, such as Article 21 of the Treaty of Guadeloupe-Hidalgo of 1848 which provided for arbitration of disputes, and in numerous other dispute settlements before tribunals and special commissions.<sup>33</sup> In situations where states cannot be relied upon to protect human rights, access of individuals and groups is desirable. In this case, South African violations are just as possible as Namibian. South African interests and the Western MNCs would be both protected and limited through such an International Commission.

Namibian interests of the majority against their powerful neighbor would also be protected. Thus, the kinds of disputes that would be likely subjects of arbitration are:

1. South African military withdrawal from such areas as the Capivi Strip and Walvis Bay, and any future establishment of foreign military bases.
2. The return of political prisoners and treatment of Namibians in South Africa.
3. The property rights and political rights of minorities in Namibia.
4. Corporate concessions, taxes and trading rights, and compensation for nationalization.

32 The single party system of African governments is not noted for its protection of minority political views. SWAPO is committed to the vanguard party strategy of scientific socialism, which limits opposition of rival groups and parties.

33 The American-Mexican Commission established in 1868 handled more than 2,000 claims. The famous "Alabama case" was a result of the Washington Treaty of 1871. Gerhard von Glahn, *Law Among Nations*, (New York), MacMillan, 1963, pp. 461-62.

5. Namibian and South African access to employment, transportation and port facilities.
6. The long-term status of Walvis Bay.

Thus, the new Namibian Government could protect the interests of the majority, for example, in the total withdrawal of all South African forces. And South Africa could actively appeal issues affecting minority populations and corporations if rights are violated. Namibian sovereignty would be fully recognized, as this would be a treaty ratified between two states who agreed upon the international arbitration procedure. Since Namibia was born in the womb of the United Nations, such a continuing international interest is well justified, and would provide assurances needed to clear the road for a settlement.<sup>34</sup>

While the UN Commission for Namibia would not continue after a settlement, the UN Commissioner for Namibia might well be the means for administering an arbitration procedure that would be a legal authority operating according to the rules of international law.

The second major settlement principle is economic justice, which must accept the need for external economic interests to make a greater contribution to the development of Namibia. A majority-based government will require the reinvestment of profits and the retention of taxes in the country. Basic shifts will doubtless be gradual, as in Angola, in either the ownership or trade patterns. But an independent Namibia will follow a New International Economic Order strategy of African states and shift from a total dependency on the West and South Africa to a relationship with other regional agencies such as the nine-state Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). African wages obviously cannot remain at one-quarter to one-half of the Poverty Datum Line (PDL). Managerial positions are almost entirely White or Coloured.<sup>35</sup> South Africa cannot continue to drain taxes and MNCs must not siphon profits from diamond, copper, and uranium out of the country, with very little payment to Namibia. Unsettled disputes over the nationalization and redirection of resources should be equitably worked out and referred to the arbitration commission. As long as this commission performed its task with judicious equity it would retain support of all sides.

The security uncertainty of South Africa and the West is related to continuance of bases and access rights in an independent Namibia. The issue of Cuban presence in Angola is not a long-term concern once the

34. The Ombudsman idea has emerged in human rights as a product of UN dispute settlement.

35. *To Be Born A Nation*, op. cit., pp. 77-78. The PDL is a measure of minimum income needed for an average family to survive developed by the ILO in 1977.



Namibian conflict is settled and South Africa ends her incursions into Angola and support for UNITA. The Cubans are anxious to terminate this costly responsibility and have made no commitment to provide logistic support for the African National Congress of South Africa. The Namibians, while sympathetic to the ANC, are no more likely to provide base facilities for an ANC guerrilla army than Botswana or Swaziland have done, and SWAPO has indicated that its sole intent is the liberation of its own country, while South Africa is a problem for the South Africans.

A very difficult problem is Walvis Bay which South Africa has indicated they will retain. The territory clearly belongs to Namibia. However, the Namibians might agree to a short term solution for the present, and, in exchange for sovereignty and generous economic concessions, give South Africa a ten-year lease under a treaty relationship. Such an agreement would remove a major obstacle in South African thinking about a genuine transfer of authority, and leave to the not-too-distant future the realization of total withdrawal of South African forces. Namibia, under a SWAPO Government, or any representative rule, will opt to move away from South African and Western dominance toward collective self-reliance in association with other African states such as Angola and Zambia. This will provide minimum security for the new state and help dissuade South Africa from a re-occupation of the country.

### Conclusion

For a negotiated settlement, innovative alternative policies are needed. The old diplomacy of security and confrontation politics will only contribute to escalating warfare. The confusion of dependence economies, tributary security considerations, racial fears, and a rising tide of popular resistance to South African occupation make an almost intractable crisis. Yet, there are positive alternatives for transnational groups and non-dominance political parties to support, leading to full independence. Perhaps, more than anything else, we need to realize that liberation is not the result of an election but must be a new process of negotiation from strength of outstanding issues and disputes.

These policies obviously do not provide all the answers. But they open the road to a South African withdrawal and a ten-year transition to what can be an independent Namibia. Many African states do not fully possess independence in the terms suggested here. Namibia brings out clearly the difficulties for all weak states seeking freedom from colonial dominance.

The concept of human rights is the key to a successful transition. While the UN has faithfully upheld these ideas, the U.S. and the West have constantly pursued a policy of protecting South Africa which has only

led to greater intransigence. South Africa will make a compromise needed for an independent Namibia only when the West fully adopts a human rights strategy. In the past, the South Africans have pursued their own interests because the U.S. and the West have identified in practice, if not in principle, with these strategic and economic interests. As all good sub-imperial states, who have no place else to go, the South Africans will come around, once the writing is clearly on the wall. It is questionable that any U.S. Administration has ever fully accepted the idea of a SWAPO Government in Namibia and the Reagan Administration has made this very clear.<sup>36</sup> By linking its acceptance of a settlement in Namibia to a Cuban withdrawal from Angola it has simply made explicit the security reservation of the U.S. and other Western powers.

Thus, in the negotiations, the proposals for a constitutional settlement reflect the underlying realities of strategic and economic interests that restrict human rights implementation. The division of Namibia by ethnic and racial groups provides a framework in which these Western as well as South African interests can be preserved. The debate does not represent minority interests except so far as these needs are tied to the interests of external powers. It must be realized that Western policy over Namibia and South Africa is primarily a strategic policy and is not in any real sense a human rights policy. This is why the UN plan of 1978 for a "free and fair election" and internationally policed transition failed. This was not simply due to South African intransigence. At times the rhetoric has been greater for human rights, for diplomatic reasons, but the basic interface of U.S. and Western strategic, political and economic interests with South Africa has been the warp and the woof of the design of policy. The Reagan Administration has simply been more blunt and less sophisticated in its policy than its predecessors.

Until this changes, the existing impasse over a negotiated settlement will continue.

36. The Reagan Administration believed that a Namibia settlement would result if the Cubans would withdraw from Angola and therefore remove their support for SWAPO. They have not attacked SWAPO directly but have backed schemes that would block SWAPO.





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**A Look at Books**



*Elizabeth Storey Landis*

On the occasion of her investiture with the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws by Mount Holyoke College, her alma mater, on May 23, 1982.

**The Namibian Struggle**

**as seen by The Churches and SWAPO**

Elizabeth S. Landis

**NAMIBIA IN THE 1980s.** (London: The Catholic Institute for International Relations and the British Council of Churches, 1981.) 84 pp., £1.00.

**TO BE BORN A NATION: The Liberation Struggle for Namibia.** Department of Information and Publicity, SWAPO of Namibia. (London: Zed Press, 1981.) 357 pp. £4.95.

Namibia in summary or in extenso: that is the main choice between these two new books.

Although they were produced for different organizations, organize their contents differently, and stress different aspects of what is euphemistically called the "Namibia question," the two books reach substantially similar conclusions as to the origin and nature of the struggle in Namibia and as to its appropriate resolution.

And although both were in print before representatives of the British Council of Churches and of the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference, in separate visits, investigated conditions in Namibia, the men of the cloth have confirmed the books' conclusions as, unhappily, still true today.

Thus all agree that it is the South African army — not the alleged SWAPO "terrorists" — that is feared by the people in the north. It is, they concur, the illegal occupation of Namibia which is the source of the trouble — not any purported SWAPO "invasions" of the Territory. And it remains South Africa, they all assert, which, despite concession after concession granted to it, frustrates the international calls for Namibian independence — not SWAPO.

Elizabeth S. Landis is a New York-based international lawyer who until recently was the Senior Political Affairs Officer in the office of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia.

Namibia in the 1980s was prepared as a "position paper" for the Catholic Institute for International Relations and the British Council of Churches, joined by various organizations of churches in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Canada, and Ireland. It reflects, the foreword states, the opinions of a wide range of experts as well as of black and white Namibians, at home and in exile, particularly members of the Christian community, "which has increasingly played a leading role in the nationalist struggle . . ."

The text of the study is about 60 pages long and is supplemented by another 20 of appendices. The foreword indicates that the booklet is intended to: (i) draw attention to the gravity of the situation in Namibia and to the West's obligation to "return the territory to legality;" and (ii) to provide a concise account of how the present impasse arose and what the future is likely to bring.

In fact, the booklet approaches the first goal somewhat circuitously and only after providing an historical perspective.

The first chapter, entitled "The Blocking of Namibian Independence" — an accurate reflection of its contents — runs about half the length of the text. It spends nine pages on Namibian history from the colonization of southern Africa to 1974-75. The remainder deals with the Turnhalle conference and South Africa's continuing attempts to work out an "undeclared UDI."

This instant history chapter is followed in order by "Namibia: A Political Economy of Theft," a brief but telling analysis of economic, social, political, and military conditions in Namibia; "A Future for Namibia," which discusses the aftermath of the abortive Geneva "pre-implementation" conference of January 1981 and summarizes SWAPO's program for post-independence Namibia; and "Conclusions," a brief critique of South African and Western attitudes and purposes and their likely outcome.

The theme of the book is the illegality of South Africa's continuing occupation of Namibia and its devastating effect on all southern Africa. Nevertheless, a somewhat ambiguous tone is sometimes apparent.

Thus, the West's refusal to press sanctions against Pretoria, even after the latter had sabotaged the 1981 Geneva conference, seems somehow less serious when followed in the same chapter by a summary of SWAPO's plans for independent Namibia. Similarly, the conclusion as to South Africa's intention to retain effective control over Namibia in any settlement seems somehow less unqualified in the light of the preceding discussion of the high cost to Pretoria of the never-ending war in which it is embroiled in Namibia.

Perhaps this feeling of slight equivocation is no more than Christian hope or charity breaking through. If so, less pious readers may find it difficult to share the virtue in the light of recent events, particularly the ruthless American attempt to compel SWAPO and the Front Line States to accept an electoral system they consider both unfair and unworkable.

In considering the tone of the conclusions it may also be noted that three more publications on Namibia are planned by the church groups, all to address various post-independence problems that will face the Territory. It may be supposed that unrelievedly gloomy conclusions in the present book would render the projected pamphlets irrelevant before they could be written.

*To Be Born A Nation* is published on behalf of the SWAPO Department of Information and Publicity. It runs to 300 pages of text, plus some 50 of appendices, including a chronology, a bibliography, and a "resource list." Unfortun-

ately, like Namibia in the 1980's, it is not indexed.

According to the foreword,

We have deemed it important and necessary to communicate with as many people as possible about the situation in Namibia and our liberation struggle . . . to widen international understanding and seek international solidarity for our cause.

It is in this spirit that we have produced this book, *To Be Born A Nation*. The title is taken from a saying of the Mozambiquan liberation struggle — 'to die a tribe and be born a nation.' It encapsulates the drive for unity and the bonds forged through common endeavour and sacrifice that are such vital elements of the national liberation struggle. Our intention is to provide the widest possible documentation on Namibia and on the role of SWAPO in the liberation struggle against the South African occupation regime. Moreover, at this crucial stage in the history of our people's resistance, we felt it imperative that SWAPO itself should provide a comprehensive analysis and authentic version of our history.

Following a short introductory chapter, the book is divided into two parts of almost equal length.

The first deals with Namibia under colonial rule, a shocking story of economic exploitation, social degradation, physical repression, and political trickery.

There is a brief summary of "traditional" (i.e., colonial) history, sketching in necessary names, dates, and events. Then the emphasis shifts to how colonialism has affected the people of Namibia.

Here the book presents a wealth of economic data, much of it unavailable except to the most indefatigable researcher. It begins with an analysis of the structure of the economy and its exploitation by South Africa and its capitalist partners. It then takes up in detail the conditions under which Namibians live — "survive" would be a more accurate term. It demonstrates how racial discrimination pervades every facet of Namibian life, including, inter alia, labor, health, education, and the situation of women.

These chapters are larded with useful tables, charts, graphs, and maps to make the figures meaningful. In addition, throughout the whole book there are numerous photos and boxed materials, including portions of treaties, speeches, SWAPO programs, etc.

The first part also analyzes the recent South African approach to Namibia as embodied in the continuing evolution without progress of the Turnhalle conference. It spells out the role of the West in supporting that fraud.

The second part of the book covers the history of more or less traditional forms of resistance to colonial oppression — from insurrections and strikes to Territory-wide political organization and unionization, and ultimately to the war of national liberation.

The book stresses nationwide, organized activity and the lessons learned from the failure of limited or local action — all naturally pointing to SWAPO as the effective national organization in the liberation struggle.

The full history of the ways in which individuals or groups of Namibians have challenged white domination over the years can, of course, be recounted only when an independent Namibian government encourages the necessary

research; and it will require a far larger book than the one under review. In any event, for most readers, including many experts, the cited history of Jonker Afrikaner, Jacob Morengo, and Jacobus Christian, among others, will be a revelation, as will the Peace Treaty of Hoachanas, the first attempt at unified Namibian opposition to early German intruders, dated 1858.

A certain number of readers have complained about the use in the SWAPO book of terms which, although technically accurate, have become identified with Marxist writing: for example, "peasant," "imperialist/ism," and "class exploitation." It would be a crying shame if this limited suspect vocabulary, along with the bitter attacks on the Western powers — whose conduct vis-a-vis Namibia has certainly been deceitful and shameful — were to prevent anyone from reading this book and pondering its contents. It is loaded with valuable information; and it explains valid grievances, which have the potential to bedevil Western relations with this mineral-rich country in the future if changes in Western attitudes are not made in the present.

These two books should both be in every Africanist's library.

*To Be Born A Nation* is the most valuable source book of its kind today, and it presents the viewpoint of SWAPO, which will no doubt form the government of an independent Namibia. It should be in college libraries — as well as in foreign ministries everywhere — and used as a textbook.

Namibia in the 1980s should be available in quantity in church and union libraries, at meetings, and in all places where literature on Africa is given away or sold at cost to the general public.

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## Radicalism and Africa:

### Is Explanation Enough?

Ahmed I. Samatar and Saka S. Mahmud

Claude Ake, *A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA*, (London: Longman, 1981), pp. 196, \$8.50.

Okwudiba Nnoli, ed., *PATH TO NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENT*, (Dakar: Codesria Book Series, 1981) pp. 264, \$9.95.

Until the late 1960s, the study of Africa and its acute problems were approached from an orthodox perspective. Exemplified, at a general level, by the works of Almond, Powell, Coleman, McClelland and Rostow, and, more particularly in the Africa case, by the writings of such scholars as Pye, Apter and Zartman, the orthodox school traces its intellectual roots to classical thought and the subsequent growth of Occidental wisdom.

Inspired by the neo-classical economic perspective and enriched by Weberian concepts such as "meritocracy" and "rationality," conventional scholarship acquired "a set of domain assumptions" which defined the nature and the methods of investigation.

In addressing the problems of African development, scholars of this persuasion talked about such concepts as "stages of growth," "political development," and "nation-building" — all components of the process of "modernization" and notable for their emphasis on functionalism. They theorized that Africa's underdevelopment was largely due to the tension between creeping "modernization" and obstinate "traditionalism" — the first an engine for "development," the latter a fetter on "progress." Orthodox scholars argued that the encouragement and active promotion of capitalist political economy would gradually triumph over the lethargy of tradition.

After more than a century of debilitating impoverishment in much of Latin America, and nearly ten years of dismal showing in Africa, the conventional school was confronted with a series of major anomalies — i.e., ineffectiveness of decolonization and westernization, devastating internal wars, haunting specters of mass hunger, and crippling indebtedness. As a consequence, a counter-thrust (Frank, Amin, Rodney, Wallerstein, Saul, Kay, etc.) emerged.

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Without getting sucked into the labyrinth of academic exegesis,<sup>1</sup> we can say that radical critics of the orthodox credo postulated that Africa's poverty, misery and subservience were the fall-out from the very process that conventional scholars advocated — capitalist penetration.

In order to move their arguments from elucidating anomalies and "crises," radical scholars proceeded to the business of digging the foundation and constructing the main beams of the "new" paradigm. In the words of one of its members:

The new paradigm stresses the interconnectedness of development and underdevelopment, of traditional and modern, and indeed of everything in general (the concepts of 'totality' and 'dependence'); it sees many conflicts and clashes of interest in the development process, both between nations and between social classes with underdeveloped countries; it stresses historical factors, specifically the active creation or development of underdevelopment; it speaks of 'imperialism' and 'capitalism' of 'social formation,' and 'mode of production' and 'class,' in the language of Marx; it sees development as a revolutionary break rather than a continuing evolution from the present; it advocates socialism.<sup>2</sup>

The two works under review are a contribution to this radical approach. They seem to complement each other — Ake's is concerned with the whole continent, while the Nnoli book is specifically focusing on Nigeria. Below, we will briefly comment on them from the following angles: ontological (statements about the nature of African reality); epistemological (how they tell us what there is); and axiological (alternatives and what there ought to be).

To begin with, Ake's *A Political Economy of Africa* is the more ambitious of the two. The objective is to give a theoretical overview of how Africa's present condition "has come to be, and how it might change." In his attempt to explain the nature of the problem, Ake, one of the continent's leading intellectuals, argues that a cursory examination of every country in the continent — drone peripheral capitalism and bounded socialism notwithstanding — will put into clear relief the depressing present, and the grim prospects of the future. As a consequence, Ake rapidly moves to tell us how this condition came to pass.

He divides the opus into seven chapters, with a sense of chronological order. For example, while the first chapter outlines his procedural and theoretical axes, the following chapters examine colonialism and capitalist penetration; the post-colonial economy; the forces at play in contemporary African "social formations;" and, finally, a closer look at prevailing "contradictions." Epistemologically, then, Ake proposes that the method of "dialectical materialism" is the centerpiece of his analysis. This methodology, he argues, has three distinct characteristics: first, it puts a premium on the fundamentality of material conditions. Further,

Once we understand what the material assets and constraints of a

society are, how the society produces goods to meet its material needs, how the goods are distributed, — we have come a long way to understanding the culture of that society, its laws, its religious system, its political system and even its modes of thought. (p. 2)

Second, emphasis is placed upon the fluidity and "dynamism" of the reality under explanation. Third, it encourages the investigator to think systematically, relationally, historically, structurally and wholistically.

Ake postulates that, in order for him to fruitfully utilize the method, it is imperative to give a predominant role to the "concept of labor" and the "labor process." As a result, the discussion moves on to explain how the proper application of those two concepts would lead us to the historical encounter between capitalism, imperialism, and the African "social formations." If one follows that trajectory, argues Ake, we can unmask the secrets underpinning Africa's current descent into the "politics of anxiety" and "fascism."

In the realm of axiology — i.e., visions of the future and possible strategies for actualization — the author thinks that understanding the nature of the problem is the immediate intellectual responsibility and that "our fixation on what might be" needs to be seriously curtailed.

There is little doubt that Professor Ake's newest intellectual endeavor is a dramatic change from his earliest and conventional scholarship.<sup>3</sup> This latest work is also a continuation of the intellectual path taken in his *Revolutionary Pressures* where some of the conundrums raised at the end of that analysis are given an answer now.<sup>4</sup> While the current book does not mark the "conversion" of Professor Ake, it certainly demonstrates how a brilliant and sagacious scholar can retool when "his" old paradigm begins to sway under the weight of accumulated anomalies.

The eleven chapters of the Nnoli book, which includes articles by B. Onimole, A.N. Eterg, T.V. Nwale as well as the editor, encompass — among others — critiques of peripheral capitalism; imperialism and Nigeria; the paucity of an ideology of development in that country; and, perhaps most importantly, a succinct and biting exposition of class struggle in black Africa's "most promising" nation.

The focus of all the contributors is this question: Why such "a nation with tremendous human resources and massive income from its petroleum industry" continues to bear signs of severe underdevelopment? All the writers agree that the seeds of this problem are rooted in Nigeria's integration into the capitalist system and the subsequent internal disarticulation. Methodologically, these scholars approach their different topics from a radical perspective. Underneath their analysis lie the assumptions and, though not as articulated, methods we already ascribed to Ake. Commenting on the possibility of a "third path" to Nigerian development, Nnoli thinks that such a proposal is in reality "a support for the present capitalist path." (p. 8)

1. For an excellent exposition on this, see Stephen Katz, *Marxism, Africa and Social Class: A Critique of Relevant Theories*, McGill University (Montreal, 1980), also see William Hansen and Brigitte Schulz, "Dependency Theory, Social Class and Development" *Africa Today*, (Vol. 28, No. 3, 1981) pp. 5-36.

2. Aidan Foster-Carter, "From Rostow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment" *World Development*, (London, Pergamon Press, vol. 4, No. 3, 1976), pp. 167-180. The quote is from p. 175.

3. See Ake's *A Theory of Political Integration*, (Homewood: Dorsey, 1967).

4. Ake, in commenting on the choice between "socialism" and "barbarism" which he raised in *Revolutionary Pressures*, asserts that we are now eyeball to eyeball with "fascism" in many African social formations.



In evaluation, then, though both books are lucid and insightful, they suffer from a number of deficiencies: methodologically, they are, particularly Ake's, monistic. Though Africa's impoverishment and Nigeria's fragmented economic development ought to be compelling issues of study, the analyses presented in these books are overly economic.<sup>5</sup> Such monism, we think, overlooks other oppressive social institutions such as patriarchy and authoritarianism. Second, though only in the Ake book, there is the danger — perhaps inescapable — of generalizing from the more than 50 states in the continent. For example, without becoming fundamentalists about modes of production, is there an observable difference between capitalist penetration in Liberia — with its unique experience with slavery — and Somalia — pastoral society with almost no known encounter with it? Did Africans, by and large, respond the same way to the twin processes of capitalism and imperialism? More importantly, what about the various responses to the prevailing "politics of anxiety?" Is there not a discernable difference between Mozambique and Kenya, Tanzania and Zaire, and Algeria and Morocco? We think a book of this ambition and scope should attempt to illuminate on these questions.

Third, and axiologically speaking, though we acknowledge the indispensability of understanding what there is and why, we do not accept Professor Ake's cavalier dismissal of axiological thinking, nor Nnoli and his contributors' tangential comments on the contours of the socialist development path. Explaining the predicament over and over again can, probably, give one a chance to demonstrate his/her intellectual prowess, but without an axiological component, critical social theory is not complete. In our opinion, an analysis that stops short of this could become a case of "fiddling while Rome is burning." It seems, then, that a persistent and crucial question facing African thinkers is, to borrow from Gramsci, "how to weld the present to the future, satisfying the urgent necessities of one (while) working effectively to create and anticipate the other?"<sup>6</sup>

From our vantage point, both books demonstrate a dearth of emancipatory pedagogy — pedagogy that can help map out viable strategies for the struggles ahead. We think this can be achieved only through a serious "fixation" on revolutionary thought — a prelude and detonator of the African and Nigerian revolutionary forces. More specifically, we suggest that Africa's radical intellectuals have, among others, two salient responsibilities: to expose the pedigree and the nature of the present oppressive structures — i.e., invariant aspects in our societies reproduced over and over again by the changing realities. Second, and we believe this is becoming increasingly crucial, to wrestle mightily with the formulation and articulation of theory (ies) and strategy (ies) of Liberation.

This plea need not be construed as an excuse for abnegating scholarly responsibilities or a license for mindless advocacy. Rather, like Marx, we suggest that the spirit of praxis should be situated at the center of the African radical intellectual culture. In sum, barring these shortcomings, both books are meaningful additions to this growing tradition.

5. For an incisive critique of economic determinism, see E.P. Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory*, (New York, Monthly Review, 1978), pp. 360-361.

6. Quoted in Gwyn Williams, *Proletarian Order* (London, Pluto Press, 1975), p. 104.

## **Views From The Diaspora: African Dependency Analyzed**

Sanford Wright

Aguibou Y. Yansane, editor, *DECOLONIZATION AND DEPENDENCY: Problems of Development of African Societies* (Westport, Connecticut, London England. Greenwood Press, 1980) pp. 321, \$27.50, hardcover.

Aguibou Y. Yansane, Assistant Professor in the Afro-American Studies Department at the University of California, Berkeley, has selected contributions from a recently held colloquium on decolonization which featured articles from a multi-disciplinary perspective of the topic by scholars from the African diaspora.

The introductory presentation by the editor is followed by ten articles which center around four basic themes: Global Perspectives, including contributions by St. Clair Drake, Elliott Skinner and Ali Mazrui; Regional Perspectives, including contributions by G. Wesley Johnson, A. Yansane, and Bade Onimore; Southern Africa, with contributions from Sam Nolutshungu and David Abernathy; and Non-capitalist Perspectives, with articles by Clive Thomas and Tetteh Kofi.

In the introductory article Aguibou Yansane presents the major themes and then conducts an in-depth analysis of neo-colonial relationships, the theories of underdevelopment, and dependency relationships. The historical/analytical approach is effectively utilized to trace the theory of imperialist expansion from Lenin to the more recent contributions of Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank, Amilcar Cabral and others. His fundamental hypothesis is that decolonization and development are organically linked to under-development, and he concludes with an analysis of reformist and radical economic models, theories, and strategies. His analysis is extensive and adequately covers the topic.

St. Clair Drake, Emeritus Professor of Anthropology at Stanford University, presents "Prospects For Total Decolonization in West Africa." In this article he takes the position that "unless the overwhelming majority of the African people want total decolonization, the prospect for its ever occurring is very remote." Aspects of decolonization and dependency are examined with particular reference to the People's Republic of the Congo. He reaches the

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conclusion that the possibilities for total decolonization are remote, particularly because of the substantial payoffs from partial decolonization. Unfortunately, even the most cursory examination of African countries would tend to substantiate his dismal prediction, although the payoffs from partial decolonization have been less than substantial. Also, it should be noted that it is not necessarily true that Africans do not want decolonization; what is probably lacking is an effective means of implementation.

Ali Mazrui, who is one of the most prolific of African scholars, is currently Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the African and Afro-American Research Center at the University of Michigan. The title of his contribution is "Beyond Dependency in the Black World: Five Strategies For Decolonization." He begins by dividing dependency into either structural or cultural types and then proceeds to examine their characteristics and differences. His major thesis is that "We must first redefine development in the Third World to mean modernization minus dependency," which is to be achieved by indigenization, domestication, diversification, horizontal interpenetration, and vertical counterpenetration. These processes basically mean effectively utilizing local resources, diversification of production, greater inter-African trade and skill transfers among third world countries. As such, these measures do not represent a radical departure from previous economic development thinking; however, effectively implementing them would certainly aid the development process.

Aguibou Yansane's second presentation is "The Political Economy of Decolonization and Dependency of African States of French Colonial Legacy, 1945-75." He makes a particular reference to the Lome Convention signed in 1975, and utilizes Guinea as a case study.

Sam Nolutshungu, a native of Cape Town, has published several studies on South Africa and is currently a lecturer in Political Science at Manchester. The title of his article is "External Intervention in South Africa," which outlines the scope, likely purposes, and consequences of an external intervention. The relationships of African countries, the Soviet Union and the United States are analyzed. Six military interventionist options by the United States and its allies are presented and their consequences are considered; he concludes his presentation with an analysis of the interests of capitalism. In assessing his article, it should be noted that any military intervention into South Africa by the United States is highly unlikely, if not totally implausible, as the negative consequences of such an action would far outweigh any conceivable advantages. In fact, the substantiation of direct military support by the United States would result in condemnation by Third World Countries, Socialist Nations, and the Black American community that would last well into the indefinite future.

If the motivation for such intervention were to preserve capitalism, rather than to maintain an illegitimate government, the prospects for intervention become even more unlikely, as the appendages of capitalism have developed the ability to maintain their interest in even the more radical of African countries, rendering intervention both undesirable and unnecessary. In addition, the major powers are continually developing the art of intervention by proxy.

Clive Thomas is currently Professor of Economics at the University of Guyana, and is well known for his publications on underdevelopment. "The 'Noncapitalist Path' as Theory and Practice of Decolonization and Socialist-

Transformation" is the title of his contribution, in which the noncapitalist path is defined as being a transition that obviates the need for prior establishment of an indigenous capitalism. Tanzania, Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Somalia and Mozambique are presented as examples. This paper was originally presented and published in 1976, and consequently needs to be revised. Certainly the paths to socialism must be varied, as there are obviously significant differences among even his six examples. The real difficulty lies in developing means to strengthen the viability of just a few African socialist states, including the examples that he gives.

In the concluding article, Aguibou Yansane points out that the roots of neocolonialism lie in the entire international economic system; factors that could aid decolonization would be the development of a military that was not linked to the middle class for its control, and the revitalization or elimination of inefficient bureaucracy.

Taken as a whole, the articles achieve the editor's objective of presenting a multi-disciplinary perspective of dependency and development in African countries. This is an extremely difficult undertaking, as both of these concepts are relatively new, multi-faceted, and consequently are still in the initial stages of being subjected to serious research. What is needed is research presenting solution formations based on an in-depth analysis of specific countries or groupings of countries. For example, the military regime in Ethiopia is certainly not based on the middle class; research is needed to determine the causal factors for its ability or inability to aid development and eliminate inefficiency. In addition, the elimination of corruption may be somewhat easier and far more important than the elimination of inefficiency. Although it is plausible to assume that ECOWAS will lead to greater independence, future studies are needed to determine the extent to which real independence is generated. As we enter 1982 it is time to assess realistically the benefits of the Lome Convention signed in 1975. It should be noted that until African countries are able to control such destabilization actions as coups d'etat, wars, and military interventions, it is highly unlikely that any developmental measures will be effectively sustained.

This publication could be effectively utilized as an introductory text to present varied viewpoints from the diaspora which introduce the concepts and problems of dependency and development, including an in-depth analysis of the theory of underdevelopment. It also would have the advantage of introducing the reader to some of the major contributors to the field. A paperback edition would greatly enhance utilization for this purpose.

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## Exploring Cultural Determinants of Foreign Policy

James R. Scarritt

Pat McGowan and Helen E. Purkitt, **DEMISTIFYING "NATIONAL CHARACTER" IN BLACK AFRICA: A Comparative Study of Culture and Foreign Policy Behavior** (Denver Monograph Series in World Affairs, Graduate School of International Studies, 1979), pp. 76, \$3.90.

In this monograph McGowan and Purkitt begin to explore the cultural determinants of foreign policy in Black Africa. Their work is methodologically elegant and substantively thought-provoking; it makes a significant contribution to the study of African politics. In the spirit of the exploratory nature of the authors' research, this review will analyze in some detail the utility of the paths which might be explored in the future.

Since there has been so little research of any kind (and even less systematic research) on the cultural determinants of foreign policy anywhere (and even less in the African context), the authors had to start by selecting and precisely defining those aspects of culture and foreign policy which they would analyze. Their selection and definition of foreign policy concepts relies heavily on McGowan's previous work, which in turn relied on the very substantial body of literature in this field. With regard to culture, the present work is of necessity more innovative in conceptual selection and definition. Some guidance was given by McGowan's previously developed framework for the comparative analysis of foreign policy, which specifies cultural predictor variables as one category of national level attributes, along with governmental, economic, social, physical, and linkage predictors. This set of categories differentiates culture — which is composed of values and norms — from social structure, with which it is frequently confused. The boundary between culture and politics is unclear, however, because only the governmental portion of politics is included among national attributes; other aspects of politics are group attributes and are not analyzed in this study. This last point involves an unexplained change in the framework as it was originally presented. Additional guidance in the selection and definition of cultural concepts was given by the authors' heavy reliance on the **Black Africa Handbook**<sup>2</sup> for indicators of cultural variables. This framework and these indicators both have significant consequences for the way in which culture is analyzed.

First, the author's variables tap cultural heterogeneity rather than national character. The latter is not so much demystified as ignored, except for the use of religion (the strength of Islam and the weakness of Christianity) as a measure of "Afro-Asianness." Second, the number of political parties, the extent of legislative factionalism at the time of independence, and the size of the opposition vote in the last election prior to independence are used as indicators of the salience of ethnic politics, on the assumption that "... African political

1. Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro, **The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings** (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 40-50, 75-91.

2. Donald George Morrison, Robert Cameron Mitchell, John Naber Paden, and Hugh Michael Stevenson, **Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook** (New York: Free Press, 1972).

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parties frequently articulate ethnic-culture group interests . . ." (p. 20). While this assumption is usually correct, and thus political competition is often a good indicator of ethnic politics, this is not always the case. (Lesotho, Somalia, and Sudan are the strongest exceptions revealed by the authors' data.) What is being measured directly is political competition, and a set of national attribute categories which included the political rather than merely the governmental would have led the authors to at least consider the desirability of using competition as a political predictor rather than as an indirect measure of a cultural predictor, as well as the desirability of treating the political salience of ethnicity as being on the boundary between politics and culture. Third, the difficulty of drawing a sharp distinction between culture and social structure is illustrated by the authors' use of structural indicators (largest ethnic unit as percent of population, hierarchy of community structure above the family, type of authority system, etc.) of cultural pluralism. Fourth, language pluralism is defined in terms of the amount of difference among languages rather than in terms of the number of languages spoken. The latter correlates more strongly with size than with the other indicators of language pluralism.

The factor analysis procedures which the authors employ on their data show that their measures of political and economic dependence are not highly correlated, and thus they analyze these two aspects of dependence as separate variables. It is worthwhile to speculate on the reasons for this counterintuitive discovery. One possible explanation can be seen in the high (.62) correlation between political independence and participation. At least two of the authors' indicators of political independence (numbers of diplomats and of diplomatic missions) could equally well be indicators of participation. Another possible explanation might be the limited variability in the data gathered for various aspects of dependence. Political and economic dependence might be more strongly related over a longer time period. Given this possibility, the authors' satisfaction with their cross-sectional research design and rejection of a longitudinal design may be premature. As they indicate, culture variables change slowly, but foreign policy variables may change more rapidly. The third possible explanation for the weak relationship between political and economic dependence — that they are truly unrelated, at least in Black Africa — may well be the correct one, but further evidence is necessary before the other possible explanations are rejected.

The hypotheses which the authors select for testing concern the absolute and relative influence of cultural predictor variables and capabilities (measured by size and modernization) on various aspects of foreign policy behavior. These hypotheses are based on several highly plausible assumptions which are carefully spelled out by the authors, and, except for the two hypotheses about dependence, the relationships between specific hypotheses and underlying assumptions are also quite plausible. McGowan and Purkitt hypothesize that when controls are introduced, capabilities but not cultural predictor variables will be associated (positively) with political independence, but capabilities, heterogeneity, and Afro-Asianness will be associated with economic independence (the latter two negatively). The authors assume that the assertion of both types of independence requires a relatively high level of capabilities, and that economic but not political dependence could rationally be chosen as a strategy to mitigate the tensions engendered by cultural heterogeneity because economic dependence is likely to have short run benefits that political dependence presumably does not have. It is not clear to this reviewer that, aside from the few unusual cases mentioned by the authors, economic

dependence has such benefits or that political dependence cannot have them. As indicated above, the long run utility of separating the two types of dependence has not been firmly established, and the authors' indicators of political independence are correlated with their indicators of participation. When these facts are added to the authors' mixed (although predominantly positive) findings regarding the relationship between various predictor variables and the two types of dependence, a good case can be made for a more thorough analysis of the whole topic of dependence.

Given the fact that many Afro-Asian states are dependent, and the assumption that culturally similar states are likely to undertake similar foreign policies, the authors hypothesize that the more Afro-Asian countries in their sample will be more economically dependent. But this appears to be a semantic confusion because all states in their sample possess the characteristics of Afro-Asianness which are associated with dependency by dependency theorists — penetrated economies and solidifying class structures — and the authors' single indicator of Afro-Asianness — religion — is not relevant to this type of dependence. That the authors' hypothesis is supported by their findings can possibly be explained by the correlation of religion with modernization, language pluralism, participation, and other sociocultural variables not included in this study.

With the possible exceptions noted above, the author's findings and interpretations are both sound and theoretically significant. Their finding that any single cultural or capability variable is a poor predictor of foreign policy behavior supports the prevailing view that the explanation of political behavior requires complex theories. The confirmation of all of their expectations about which aspects of foreign policy would be most strongly influenced by capabilities and which aspects would be most strongly influenced by culture indicates that their theorizing is indeed "on the right track" (p. 50), although low correlations once again indicate that other variables need to be included in a complete explanation of foreign policy. The much more incomplete confirmation of the authors' expectations about which type(s) of predictor variables (capabilities, culture, or both) would continue to be associated with which aspects of foreign policy behavior when controls were introduced provides additional evidence that more complex explanations would be desirable, especially for aspects of foreign policy behavior such as state-building and centralization of decision-making. Finally, the summary finding that "cultural variables are associated with patterns of Black African foreign policy behavior more strongly and more frequently than are . . . capability attributes . . ." (p. 58) indicates that further inquiry into cultural variables and their interaction with other predictor variables would be extremely fruitful.

The authors explicitly recognize the need for further research and more complex explanation. They suggest that investigation of elite culture, linkages to the former colonial power, and policies of outside nations toward Africa might be especially fruitful. McGowan and another co-author have already demonstrated that other variables, especially the type of leadership, are significant determinants of foreign policy.<sup>3</sup> Many additional avenues of exploration exist, and Africanists can undoubtedly look forward to further stimulating publications which carry forward the analysis presented in this monograph.

3. Patrick J. McGowan and Klaus-Peter Gottwald, "Small State Foreign Policies: A Comparative Study of Participation, Conflict, and Political and Economic Dependence in Black Africa," *International Studies Quarterly*, 19 (December 1975): 469-500.



# Tanzania's Foreign Policy: The First Decade

Klaas Woldring

Zuberi Mwamba, *TANZANIA: Foreign Policy and International Politics* (Washington: University Press of America, 1978), 164 pp., \$8.75 (paper)

Dr. Mwamba's book is based on a revised doctoral dissertation written for Howard University, submitted in 1972. It is a competent account of several aspects of Tanzanian foreign policy in the sixties. Regrettably it has not been updated to 1976 when the book was completed.

Mwamba states in the Introduction that examination is limited to three main topics: (1) the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, (2) the break of diplomatic relations between Tanzanian Government and the U.K. Government and (3) the recognition of Biafra by Tanzania. Mwamba agrees with H.M. Othman's view that Tanzanian foreign policy is based on the "Triangle Principles", i.e. African unity, non-racialism in Africa and the total liberation Africa. He has sought to build the book around those three principles quite successfully on the whole.

There can be little doubt that the topic deserves thorough and sympathetic academic treatment. The significance of Tanzanian foreign policy can hardly lie in the very moderate physical and military resources of that country. It is in fact largely the result of the exceptional insights, diplomacy and moral stature of "Mwalimu" Nyerere, as this book convincingly demonstrates. Regrettably, my copy is marred by the absence of print on eight pages in the Introduction which detracts greatly from the historical background described in it. Another problem is that the style has not been significantly adapted to appeal to a wider readership. It still reads as a dissertation in which the candidate systematically develops his thesis step by step to convince his examiners of the logic and quality of his work. There are also several typographical errors which should have been picked up by proofreaders. Footnotes are provided as one would expect for a dissertation but seem to be excessive for a small book. In my copy there is no table of contents. Chapters include the Decision-making process, Institutions of Foreign Policy Mechanism, the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union (which deals especially well with the various explanations for it and includes valid criticism of the western press), Tanzania's policy toward the two Germanies and the Western plot, Biafra, and one on U.D.I.

The chapter on the two Germanies, whilst demonstrating the exercise of Tanzania's sovereignty, is more typical of descriptive political history than it is illustrative of the author's thesis.

With all the pages complete this book can fruitfully be used as a text in African politics and courses.

\*Editor's note: We have checked with University Press of America and have been assured that issues in stock do have these pages printed. They have sent us a copy containing the full text.

Dr. Klaas Woldring, when this review was written, was in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Zambia, but now has returned to his permanent post at The Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education at Lismore, New South Wales, Australia.

# Education and Indigenous Colonialism

Joseph M. McCarthy

Agrippah T. Mugomba and Mougo Nyaggah, eds. *INDEPENDENCE WITHOUT FREEDOM: The Political Economy of Colonial Education in Southern Africa* (Santa Barbara, ABC-Clio, 1980) 289 pp., hard cover, \$27.50.

Most of the papers contained in this collection were first presented at the International Conference on Colonial Education and Contemporary Conflict at the University of California at Santa Barbara in November 1977. Often, when conference papers are published, the result is an unfocused jumble bound together only by a rather strained title, but such is not the case with this volume. All of the papers it contains analyze the linkage of colonial educational forms with the continuing political and economic problems facing southern African nations. The burden of the book is that colonial education, because it has been a vehicle of metropolitan domination and social control, has inculcated docility and enforced a materialistic-individualistic ethic, thus contributing notably to neocolonial dependence and underdevelopment.

The book's first section is devoted to regional perspectives. David Chanaiwa's essay, "African Humanism in Southern Africa," traces the emergence of mission-educated elites which envisioned a utopian world of universalism, nonracialism and moralism, but which, by condemning African history, customs, beliefs and values, "psychologically weakened the African's capacity to resist colonialist propaganda and hindered the development of a truly African historical, racial, and liberationist consciousness" (p. 34). A paper on African mind-processing by Agrippah T. Mugomba extends Chanaiwa's insights by describing the process by which the socialization of Africa's elites provided a neocolonial leadership model by which African leaders have been co-opted into playing the decolonization game by rules formulated by the capitalist colonial powers to insure that colonialism imposed from without would be succeeded by indigenous colonialism.

The second section, entitled "Philosophic Foundations of Colonial Education," presents three historical models for training Africans. Mougo Nyaggah's paper, "Apartheid and Second-Class Education in South Africa," compares pre-apartheid education to the Nationalist educational policy formulations and implementations to demonstrate how post-1948 policy clearly aims at denying non-whites the educational opportunities provided to whites. In "Producing the Good African," R. Hunt Davis, Jr. recounts the interest South Africans showed in the Penn School of South Carolina, which operated on the assumption that blacks needed a separate education fitted to their presumed group peculiarities. The third essay in the section, "John L. Dube and the Politics of Segre-

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gated Education in South Africa," by Manning Marable, describes the founding of Ohlange Institute on the Tuskegee model.

"Comparative Perspectives on Colonial Education," the book's third section, is concerned to trace the experience of other parts of the region, the High Commission territories, British Central Africa and the former Portuguese colonies. Bridglal Pachai, in "A History of Colonial Education for Africans in Malawi," points out that the quantity and quality of educational effort in colonial Nyasaland resulted from African initiatives in the face of official indifference and religious competition. In "Colonial Education and African Resistance in Namibia," Christopher A. Leu credits the inefficiency of the educational system, the influence of the churches and the rise of political consciousness among contract laborers with preventing the total implementation of apartheid. Jack Bermingham's "Perspectives on Colonial Education in Botswana," presents a case study of the way in which colonial attempts to educate "legitimate" nationalist leaders in Bechuanaland gave emerging leaders the tools to analyze colonialism, resist dependence upon South Africa, and adopt a nonracialist stance. The section ends with complementary essays on Mozambique, Mario Azevedo describing a century of colonial education and Agrippah T. Mugomba explaining how post-colonial Mozambican education aims to produce new individual and national identities freed from colonial ideas and values, to decolonize Mozambican minds and institutions alike, and to link education positively with national development.

To this point, *Independence Without Freedom* has presented a variety of insights and examples bearing on the central notion, how controlling and co-opting colonial education policies and practices have created mental and physical structures which prevent the full liberation of Africans, leaving them independent without freedom, forced to rely intellectually and economically upon the First World. Had the book ended here, the reader would still have been sated, but the best wine has been saved for last: an extremely well-executed synthesis by David Chanaiwa which not only recapitulates the major constituent elements of the central thesis but also identifies a number of important patterns that would otherwise have a fair chance of escaping notice. This essay, in tandem with Agrippah T. Mugomba's piece on post-independence Mozambique, sets an agenda for further thought and study: the development of the philosophical foundations of genuinely decolonized educational institutions for post-independence southern Africa. Those foundations must be sought in the rich cultural traditions of African communities and must be developed with the aim of purging all traces of both exogenous and indigenous colonialism. To do this fully and completely would, of course, be most difficult for intellectuals trained in the analytic methodologies of the industrialized world, and it is at least a minor fault of this book that it does not address the problem of such transformation in any sustained and penetrating fashion. Yet that is a minor blemish, and in general I cannot improve upon Chanaiwa's evaluation of *Independence Without Freedom*: "The anthology makes an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the history, economics, sociology, politics, and legacy of European colonialism in southern Africa in particular and Africa in general (p. 227)."

## ***The Algerian People and Revolution***

Dalvan M. Coger

Pierre Bourdieu, *ALGERIA*, 1960, translated by Richard Nice. (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979) pp. viii, 158; \$19.95.

Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, *REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978) pp. xvi, 178; \$10.95.

Pierre Bourdieu's book consists of three essays, the longest and most valuable of which is "The Disenchantment of the World," 94 pages in length. The other two selections deal with the Berber sense of honor and the symbolism in the citing and architecture of rural farmsteads in the Kabyles. The major essay is concerned essentially with the "economic dispositions" of a precapitalist society, in this case the rural Kabyles.

The hopelessness of the Berber worker as he moved into a modern economy, frequently subsisting on the margins of society, is analyzed sympathetically. The translation from the French original is unfortunately often unnecessarily abstruse.

Primarily, however, all three essays are useful in developing understanding and insights as to the difficulties inherent in altering the nature of a society. Simple innovations meant to change one element in the economy may merely fail, while more severe changes may not stop short of altering the whole life style and ethos of a people. Bourdieu's analysis of the difficulties of the rural Berber adjusting to urban conditions provides an insight into one of the causes of the revolution in Algeria.

Martha Hutchinson's dispassionate description of terrorism as it was practiced in Algeria by both the Arabs and the French is analytical. Using historical material from many parts of the modern world, she constructs a model for her study that is extremely thorough. Indeed, her work is a tour de force. It is also a review of the political effectiveness of FLN policies over the course of that war.

Her observations on the social origins and attitudes of the revolutionary leaders illustrate the thoroughness of her analysis:

"The origins of the revolutionaries were relatively modest; most came from small towns or villages. Their educations were equally modest, although most (not all) of them had attended secondary school. The politicians (or moderate nationalists) were better educated and had come from more privileged backgrounds. The occupations of the revolutionaries were generally lower in status or nonprofessional." (p. 7)

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She also shows the importance of the course of French history generally on the Algerian revolutionary leadership. She notes that a number of them, including Ben Bella and Krim, had served in the French army, gaining, in addition to military expertise, a sense of self-respect arising from having successfully competed with Frenchmen and having been fairly treated in the process." (p. 7) The vulnerability of French power was also recognized, as a result of the French defeat and humiliation in World War II and in Indochina. The events of Setif in 1945 added frustration and underscored the stark contrast between army egalitarianism and the discrimination of the colons.\*

In the Algerian environment the final consequence of terror was to solidify support for the revolutionaries. The reaction on the part of French officials and civilians against the Algerian people drove them into the arms of the revolutionary establishment. "Terrorism" the author concludes, "is often effective because both the violence itself and the fear and horror it produces in the direct audience result in secondary responses in indirect audiences." (p. 147)

Nothing harmed Western support for France more than the publicity given to the torture used to interrogate suspected terrorists. The comments here are trenchant:

"Opinion on the efficiency of torture as a means of intelligence gathering were sharply divided. Most of the *guerre-revolutionnaire* theorists considered torture the only valid response to insurgent terrorism. Colonel Trinquier argued that 'the use of terrorism as a weapon of war inevitably provokes the utilization of its antidote, torture. It is a reality which the rebellion should take into account.' He insisted that it is rarely necessary to use torture, however, since the threat of it is often enough to make suspects talk. Either the value of torture as a threat was low, or most interrogators were incapable of subtlety, since the army commonly practiced physical torture of suspects. Another proponent of torture, the chaplain to General Massau's paratrooper regiments, regarded its use as necessary to 'disarm' the terrorist of his knowledge because he intends to 'kill unjustly.'" (pp. 122, 123)

While terrorism has its function in the early days of the war, Ms. Hutchinson finds it generally was not that important in Algeria:

"The final criterion for judging the effectiveness of FLN terrorism is the question of whether terrorism was necessary to the FLN's ultimate victory over the French . . . Eight years of struggle exhausted the French politically, if not materially. The war became intolerable to a metropolitan population that had allowed decisions about Algeria to be dictated by the colon lobby while [i.e., as long as] those choices cost France nothing." (p. 151)

She concludes, therefore, that "the importance of FLN terrorism lay in its influence on French politics." (p. 152)

Both of these books are valuable contributions to Algerian studies.

\*At Setif in May, 1945, a demonstration celebrating the allied victory over Germany got out of hand. Some Frenchmen were killed. The French reacted by conducting an almost indiscriminate slaughter in retaliation.

## African Christianity in the Transition to Independence

W.L. Avery

E. Fashole-Luke, R. Gray, A. Hastings and G. Tasie, editors, **CHRISTIANITY IN INDEPENDENT AFRICA** (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1978) 630pp. \$27.50.

Adrian Hastings, **A HISTORY OF AFRICAN CHRISTIANITY 1950-1975**, No. 26 in "African Studies Series" (Cambridge: University Press, 1979) 336pp., \$34.50 hardcover, \$9.95 paper.

These two books cover basically the same period of African Christian history, but with different approaches; the first is essentially thematic while the second is more chronological. Christianity in Independent Africa results from a research project of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, to survey the evolution of Christianity in post-independent Africa, which culminated in a Conference at Jos, Nigeria, in September 1975. This book is a selection (40) of the over 200 papers presented and discussed both at the Jos Conference and at the seminars and conferences held in Africa, U.S.A., and Britain in connection with this research programme which lasted over two years.

Christianity in Independent Africa is divided into two Parts. The theme of Part One is "Religious and Secular Structures" and that of Part Two is "Traditional Religion and Christianity: Continuities and Conflicts". In their "Introduction" to Part One Tasie and Gray point to the tremendous changes that have taken place in Church structures and Church-State relations in the past two decades, observing that one of the most significant such shifts has been the move towards Africanizing Church leadership.

The papers in Part One deal not only with the Church (mainline-missionary and indigenous-African) but also with such varied topics as Islam, education, the press, and political parties — undoubtedly because all of these share in the (power) structures of Africa.

Part Two focuses on Traditional Religion and its relationship with Christianity. As Fashole-Luke notes in its "Introduction", these studies are "pointers" to contemporary African Church History and he hopes that they will

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"give fresh impetus to the quest of the churches to discover how they can be authentically African and yet remain integral parts of the universal Church" (p. 363). These papers consider African Theology and African liturgy and how these are enriched by their cultural context.

One of the noteworthy features of *Christianity in Independent Africa* is that most of its studies are quite specialized, dealing with a rather delimited area and/or topic. Thus, they are commendably free of the sweeping generalizations that all too frequently characterize writings about Africa.

A bonus is the inclusion (as an Appendix) of the Opening Address by Professor E.A. Ayande, Principal of the Jos Campus of the University of Ibadan when the Conference was held there in 1975. It appropriately sets the tone by calling for an "African Christianity."

In *A History of African Christianity 1950-1975* Hastings has a brief Introduction followed by four main chapters. The first one comprehensively surveys the situation in 1950; then come, in quite chronological progression, three chapters, each dealing with a period of eight years: 1951-1958; 1959-1966; and 1967-1975. A final chapter makes some general concluding observations, without, however, succumbing to prediction about the course which African Christianity is likely to follow.

Each of the four main chapters is divided into three sections: A, B, and C. A on "Church and State" surveys the political history of the period and Church-State relations. B on "The Historic Churches" outlines the work of the mainline Protestant and Roman Catholic Mission Churches; and C on "Independency" looks at the emergence and development of independent African Churches.

Chapter One opens with this sentence: "In 1950 Africa was predominantly a colonial, and even a quiet continent." Hastings goes on to document that statement in a quite convincing manner. For me, whose introduction to Africa came about a decade into the independence era (1969) it is revealing to be reminded of how colonial Africa was at the middle of the twentieth century. Although hinting at the nature of things to come (e.g. "It was the Gold Coast which was to be Africa's pace-setter during the next decade and Nkrumah its most messianic figure: the Pan-African liberator" p. 14), Hastings concentrates on the situation in 1950, especially the close connection between Church and State, most notably in South Africa. Where necessary, Hastings draws upon the past to illuminate the present and to enhance the reader's understanding of why, for example, most whites in Africa — in spite of some protests by both whites and blacks — were determined to maintain the *status quo*.

In 1950 the mainline denominations were very much dominated by missions and missionaries. Parallel to these "mission Churches" were the Independent Churches; these latter had sprung up beginning at the end of the nineteenth century; although these groups were not primarily protests against missionary Christianity, Hastings notes, with considerable insight, that "the general absence of Africanisation in the leadership of the main churches provided a fertile field for new religious movements" (p. 69). These indigenous Churches sought to reflect an authentic African Christianity, incorporating many aspects of traditional culture.

The twenty-five years after 1950 witnessed remarkable changes. Beginning in 1957 with Ghana (Gold Coast), country after country with relentless advance moved on to independence. With a remarkable command of the sweeping

political and religious ramifications of this phenomenon, Hastings proceeds to detail the shift to African leadership in the Churches which basically paralleled the political changes.

One interesting aspect of the 1967-1975 period was the significant decline in "mission work" in Africa by the main "historic churches" of Protestantism (Lutheran, Anglican, Methodist and Presbyterian) — aided, among other things, by the promoters of a "Moratorium on external assistance in money and personnel", as adopted by the 1974 Assembly of the All Africa Council of Churches. But coupled with that decline was a widespread rise in the number of "Evangelical" North American missionaries. The Roman Catholic Church of this period was seriously Africanizing its leadership but still relying very heavily upon missionary priests and nuns.

Hastings believes that by 1975 the "golden age" of independent Churches was past and suggests that they no longer constitute a "major ecclesiastical phenomenon in African Christianity" (p. 257). That may be true of some parts of Africa but my experience and research in Sierra Leone and Nigeria show that independent Churches are "alive and well" and continuing to grow.

In his concluding chapter Hastings discusses "two contrasting poles of experience" — prayer and politics — with and between which the Churches have to live. It is by pursuing and promoting the devotional life, without ignoring the political realities, that African Christianity continues not only to survive but also to make its own significant contribution to the religious life of this vast continent.

Hastings has produced a masterful survey of twenty-five years of recent African Church History. Furthermore, his extensive footnotes and bibliography facilitate the process for those who want to follow up any of his points.

These two books are indispensable for any student of Christianity in Independent Africa, and in the decade or two which immediately preceded the end of the colonial period. They contain a wealth of information which is available nowhere else in such a compact survey. For anyone interested in twentieth-century Christianity — especially in Africa — these volumes should be "required reading".

## **Theoretical Approaches to African Ethnology**

Janet L. Stanley

Harold K. Schneider, *THE AFRICANS: An Ethnological Account* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1981). x, 278 pp., \$9.95, paper.

*The Africans* offers a theoretical view of African ethnology which the more common descriptive surveys of African society do not attempt. The author seeks to set forth the "social facts" in context with "culture history" in a "non-Marxist economic approach." (preface ix-x). The outline is familiar enough: Material Economics; Marriage, Descent and Association; Kinship; Power and Authority; Religion and Philosophy; Contemporary Africa. His aim is not to be exhaustive — art and music are excluded as are discussions of the interesting but numerically peripheral Pygmies and San — but to erect the theoretical framework on which ethnographic data and analyses are arrayed. In constructing this framework, he draws representative examples from many particular groups of people, citing or restating earlier research in these areas (e.g., Max Gluckman on the Lozi, Victor Turner on Ndembu color classification or his own research on the Pokot). Such an approach facilitates the understanding of the directions anthropological research has taken in the past, and conversely, reveals areas it has avoided or ignored. Thus, for example, we can see the extent to which anthropologists have ignored the study of thought processes as they concentrated instead on social processes (p. 181); or that African traditional law has not been consistently examined (p. 152); or that ethnologists were generally naive about economics and consequently paid scant attention to it (p. 162).

Our understanding of African cultures is deepened by the parallels drawn between African and European societies as, for example, comparing African sacrificial rituals with the Christian eucharist. This pedagogical technique becomes a little more ponderous when anthropological models are the basis of comparison. The author justly forewarns the reader of an intensive chapter on kinship — an area about which he is obviously quite knowledgeable — but it is a bit out of proportion to the rest of the volume with somewhat protracted comparisons of American Indian and other models of kinship classification to African systems of kinship. Thus, Iroquois is equivalent to Lozi and Omaha equals Igbo and so forth. Yet, this very chapter offers precisely the in-depth analysis of kinship structure that similar books tend to avoid. So if it is a careful, detailed exposition of African kinship models that is sought, then here is the right book.

The book is sparingly illustrated, has a 9-page bibliography linked to text references, and is well-indexed. It reads stylistically rather like a lecture and indeed is written in part in the first person singular — not altogether inappropriately so, since *The Africans* is intended for the college-level audience accustomed to professorial lecturing.

On the whole, this text is recommended as a complement to the empirical studies of African societies and cultures which are becoming widely available.

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## **Creoles in Sierra Leone: Power and Culture**

Otwin Marenin

Abner Cohen, *THE POLITICS OF ELITE CULTURE: Explorations in the Dramaturgy of Power in a Modern African Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981) xxii, 257pp. \$6.95 paperback, \$20.00 cloth.

The two central propositions Cohen wishes to investigate and show to be correct are these: "power is everywhere mystified," and "every state is governed by a 'village at the top'—a group of men and women who interact informally" to run public affairs. Cohen is fascinated by groups and the mechanisms they employ, by design or non-consciously, to achieve and maintain cohesion, power and privilege in circumstances which threaten their collective and thereby their individual interests; he wants to show how this process of maintaining the group combines, dialectically, pragmatic and utilitarian concerns of power and resource distribution with moral imperatives enshrined in culture, symbolism and ritual.

Cohen details, lovingly and with compassion, the cultural and social practices of the creoles of Sierra Leone as he observed them in 1970 to make his argument, and to extract from participant observation meanings not apparent to the actors themselves. Their rituals often mystify even the creoles, as they also serve to ensure their privileges by mystifying others. Cohen argues that neither power (control of the economy and of politics) nor culture (control of symbols) alone is enough to ensure dominance and status and that to understand how a group really, in its day-to-day affairs, manages to protect itself involves an analysis of the dialectical relationship between the two orders of the power and culture. Each shapes the other, and without the other neither can be effective as a means of control. The book is a study of the dynamics of consciousness and 'hegemonics', to use Gramsci's phrase.

The creoles of Sierra Leone are a small group, less than 2% of the population, who have managed to hold on to privilege and power in a political environment (free elections) where numbers are almost everything. Cohen dissects, in order to reveal the functional and structural underpinnings of day-to-day life, the cultural, symbolic and dramaturgical devices which bind creole to creole—their ceremonies and cults of the family and the dead, kinship and patronage networks, the role of women, fraternal organization and church groups, public rituals, all combining to create a "network of amity" which knits

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each creole into the community of creoledom and creates the capacity for sustained informal interaction and decisions.

Creoles are caught in a basic contradiction. Small in number, they cannot afford to organize politically and formally as a group since they would lose in a **straightforward contest with other groups; they must protect themselves** by hiding their corporate identity under a guise of service to all, by espousing in symbol and deed universal norms of education, free speech, neutrality and merit recruitment into the civil service which can only undermine the pillars on which their influence rests—control of the professions and the bureaucracy of the state. As Cohen repeatedly points out, the creoles do not control the economy nor the government, and hold only limited property, though that is mostly in the capital city, Freetown. They are powerless, for their influence depends on occupying positions and occupations which others control—they are hired and they can be fired.

As a group, then, the creoles are enmeshed in numerous paradoxes. Their size is an obstacle for corporate participation in politics yet also facilitates intensive informal interaction. Their identity as creoles is essential to the protection of privilege and status yet is also the greatest threat in the long run, **should it become an issue in political controversy. They must protect specific interests, yet need to utilize universalistic symbols as means to that end.** They are the embodiment of "structural time" yet also "functional strangers". The group is essential for achieving individual selfhood yet the group also constrains the individual's choices.

Their culture, the private and public dramas they perform for others and for themselves, ensures that these paradoxes do not destroy their cohesion as a group. Without their culture they would be little; yet with their culture and the claims they make for its superiority they also expose themselves in the envy of others less privileged than they are. By their actions they claim 'we are better'; by their symbols they wish to say 'we work for the good of all'. The mix of particularistic and universalistic values of their cultures spans cleavages within the groups and justifies the group to outsiders.

Cohen's book is more than a description of the dynamics of culture change. In his interpretation Cohen recasts interest group theory into a structuralist mode of analysis to show how practices which the creoles pursue and change over the years protect their interests whether individuals aim to do so or not. He addresses the crucial issue of consciousness and in descriptions of simple ceremonies reveals the process which shapes consciousness and thereby mystifies. The creoles do not conspire in their Masonic lodges to run the government for their own benefit (though they certainly prosper) for they do not know that they are conspiring. Their rituals seem perfectly innocent and natural to them, the normal way consensus should be reached or decisions taken in an atmosphere where like-minded people think like thoughts. If the book were cast in terms of class analysis Cohen would have described the dynamics of cultural and ideological hegemony in a way which Marxists could profitably imitate.

There are some aspects of the analysis which Cohen could have elaborated. There is the problem of time. The creoles are a small island, and island which is being nibbled away as their land is bought out and other groups gain access to education and careers; the foundations on which their influence rests must

vanish with time. How will they fare then? Secondly, Cohen argues that they are indispensable for the running of government, that the state cannot do without them, yet says very little about the precise linkages of creoles and creoledom to the state. There is very little political history discussed in the book. Lastly, he argues that creoles not merely claim to but do perform a universal function, that they benefit all by their service for the state—but is this really so? Does the government present the universal interest of all and is the government seen by others to be concerned with the common good? The question would seem to be more complicated than his curt dismissal of Marxian analyses indicates.

This is an impressive book, beautifully written, replete with nuanced arguments as it combines empirical evidence and theorizing. It will stand as a significant contribution to the analysis of privilege and the role of consciousness in the affairs of power.

## **The Changing Society of the Nyakyusa**

Simon D. Messing

Monica Wilson, **FOR MEN AND ELDERS: Change in the Relations of Generations and of Men and Women among the Nyakyusa-Ngonde People 1875-1971.** (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc. — Africana Publishing Co., 1977) 209 pp., \$23.00.

The Nyakyusa of what is now Tanzania have long been famous among anthropologists and other social scientists for appearing to have solved the problem of the generation gap, through their tradition of teen-agers gradually setting up their own separate villages. Monica Wilson began her research there in the 1930s and published them in her widely-read books **Good Company, Rituals of Kinship among the Nyakyusa and Communal Rituals of the Nyakyusa** (Oxford University Press). Now she has followed the process of change by revisiting the field and consulting library documents.

She finds that the old values have rapidly disintegrated under the impact of modern developments: "Returning to BuNyakyusa in 1955 after leaving in 1938, I was astonished not by certain radical changes which had occurred, but by the fact that the former pattern was all but forgotten (p. 25) . . . Up until 1938 most

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pagan women wore only bark-cloth: their covering was exiguous but they were as fussy about it as a Victorian woman about her crinoline (p. 26) . . . The women who wore cloth were christians, muslims and the wives of a few sophisticated men . . . by 1955 all this had changed when Nyakyusa men who had served in the army returned, and felt it indecent to see their wives and mothers uncovered. So they insisted on their wearing cloth, but at the same time they did not all wish to pay for the cloth, so it was said that women must grow millet, brew beer and buy themselves cloth . . . I was affronted by sniggers of teen-age boys looking at photographs in *Good Company*, which, when taken, were perfectly 'decent' and conventional, but by 1955 were no longer so" . . . Since then it has become a goal among females to earn money to repay their fathers for the bridewealth that had to be returned when the young lady opted for divorce. They no longer accept polygyny and oppose early betrothal.

Relations between elders and young men have become ambiguous, to put it mildly. Labor migration, land shortage and other economic pressures have greatly affected the traditional functions of the kinship system, and while the author still lovingly diagrams them on 5 sheets attached to the book in a pocket, they serve more as history than as current social analysis.

Indeed the main value of this book appears to serve archival purposes. Chapter 3, "Kinship Is Cattle" might perhaps be more accurately expressed in the past tense, particularly since the 1965-9 period when elopement became frequent to reduce the expense of marriage (p. 62).

The 65 brief case histories may be of value to social psychology as well as to history and ethnography, for they can be read without necessarily accepting Monica Wilson's recent pessimism and distaste for change, which, while not explicitly stated, permeates the book frequently. The romantic reader who had long admired the Nyakyusa for having solved one of mankind's nearly universal problems, generation conflict, through gentle separation of fathers and sons, may deplore the fading of that solution. But those concerned with health and family planning services may be encouraged by Monica Wilson's recognition that such services mean a limitation in the number of pregnancies "desired or endured" (p. 29), and that technical changes which eliminate the back-breaking tasks of hoeing, cutting and carrying firewood and drawing water make the elderly less dependent upon the able-bodied (ibid).

## To the Future via the Past:

### The Dilemma of the African Novelist

James P. Gilroy

Itala Vivan, *INTERPRETI RITUALI: Il romanzo dell'Africa nera* (Bari: Dedalo Libri, 1978) pp. 248, Lira 4,000.

Professor Vivan's work confronts the reader with the phenomenon of a literary and sociocultural analysis of the African novel. The analysis is written in Italian with even quotations from the originals translated into the language of Dante. Despite the general nature of the title which promises a comprehensive study of sub-Saharan fiction, the author has limited the scope of her book to the works of five English-speaking novelists (Chinua Achebe, Amos Tutuola, Wole Soyinka, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, and Ezekiel (now Es'kia) Mphahlele while making only an occasional reference to the many talented French-speaking African novelists.

Within these limitations, Vivan has written a study which offers intelligent and often illuminating insights into the unique problems and aspirations of the African writer. The latter finds himself in the difficult position of giving written expression in European languages and through what is usually considered a European genre to the ethoi of peoples whose literary heritage has been oral and expressed in languages which until very recently had no formulation in writing. He is the spokesman for African values but necessarily writes for a largely non-African audience, because of large-scale illiteracy and political repression. He has the immense responsibility of preserving a splendid cultural heritage which is rapidly disappearing before his eyes. He is engaged in the political happenings of his time and would make of his writings an instrument of human understanding and liberation, yet often becomes an outsider among his own people, an outcast, a political prisoner, even an exile.

The African writer of today is caught up in the social and political realities of modern African life, and even his most intimate soul-searchings reveal the collective mind of his compatriots. Like his fellow Africans, the novelist must come to grips with historical facts — i.e., slavery and colonization — which have irrevocably changed the face of Africa and have made forever beyond reach the communal harmony and esthetic beauty of Africa's ancient civilizations. The sense of something having been lost permeates not only the

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novels of the fifties, where the struggle for independence is a major theme, but even more acutely those of the sixties and seventies which decry the injustices of neo-colonialistic native regimes. The attainment of independence would seem to have contributed little to the freedom and prosperity of the average individual, while the development of industry and the resultant urbanization have only accelerated the destruction of traditional African ways of life. Moreover, the oppressed peoples of South Africa have not even had the luxury of this kind of disillusionment, since age-old barriers and racial injustices continue to exist.

One wonders what message of hope could be communicated by writers who find themselves in such a bleak present-day situation and with nostalgic longing as their only link with the past. The major theme of Vivan's study is precisely how the African novelists in their works overcome the traumatic present through their vision of a dynamic future revitalization of the cultural and moral principles of the past. The heroes of Achebe, Soyinka, Ngugi, and Tutuola are steeped in their sense of the past, and the implied meaning of their adventures is that only with the values of the past can the African create the future. Of course, each author realizes that it is impossible to return to the idyllic social forms of the past. Yet they feel that if modernity is inescapable, it must be humanized through a reaffirmation of the social cohesion, the feeling of oneness with the natural universe, and the sense of the divine within man and beyond him which have always characterized the African worldview. In the novels of Achebe, the past makes its presence felt in the epic stature and strength of the patriarch Okonkwa and the high-priest Ezeulu, while in those of Tutuola it is the folkloric tradition which makes the past live on in the present. Soyinka and Ngugi have a deep appreciation for their peoples' mythologies. The protagonists of the former's *The Interpreters* are modern incarnations of ancient African divinities who also have an important role to play in the creation of the society of the future. From Ngugi's point of view, there is hope only if the African peoples are able to reactivate the sense of collective unity that was once theirs. Only through participation in a collective struggle of the working masses can Africans attain freedom and dignity. There is a more pronounced feeling of hopelessness in the novels of Mphahlele. Here the past is associated with the country village where the author spent his childhood and serves mainly as a contrast to the present squalor of the urban environment where he grew to young manhood. Even here, however, the African soul manifests itself in the spirit of community of the Black ghetto-dwellers.

Ultimately, Professor Vivan shows how these authors have transformed the English language and the novel genre, making of them unique and original vehicles of expression. They have succeeded in imparting to English prose the rhythms and modes of feeling of their African nations.

## Publications

1. Due to a severe financial crisis, the *South African Institute of Race Relations* has been forced to increase the charges for its publications substantially. The annual *SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS*, again edited by the distinguished Muriel Horrell, will now cost R 15. The 1981 issue is in print. Annual subscriptions to *RACE RELATIONS NEWS*, in a new, smaller format, will be R 2.50 in Southern Africa. R 3.50 elsewhere. Also available through SAIRR is *DWEP, How it Grows, a Kind of History*, by Sue Gordon, R 3.00 plus postage, the story of the Domestic Worker's and Employer's Project. A photo of the newly refurbished bookstore in the January-February issue of *Race Relations News* indicates that VISA and Mastercard facilities are now available. If these systems can be used for overseas business it may greatly facilitate ordering by overseas customers, as the additional postal charges, which are often not mentioned, can be added to the credit card charge when the order is received. The address of SAIRR is P.O. Box 97, Johannesburg 2000 South Africa.

2. *JIPEMOYO: Development and Culture Research 3/1980*, 127 pp., is now available. The first two volumes in this series were described in AT 27/3, page 74, item 26. The Bagamoyo Research Project Team, a joint project of the Ministry of National Culture and Youth of Tanzania and the Research Council for the Humanities of The Academy of Finland, which operated from 1975-1979 in the Bagamoyo district of Tanzania, is the source of these reports, and this volume contains the final papers of the project, which sought to explore the role of culture in the restructuring process of rural Tanzania, using a participatory research approach. This issue is available at SEK 25:- from the *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies*, P.O. Box 2126, S-750 02 Uppsala, Sweden.

3. Also from the *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies*, address above, is *Research Report No. 61, FROM SOCIALISM TO ISLAM? Notes on Islam as a Political Factor in Contemporary Africa*, by David Westerland, 62 pp., SEK 20:-. The author's thesis is that the resurgence of a more fundamentalist Islam is challenging and perhaps replacing Islamic socialism, with its many affinities to the classless "African socialism" proclaimed in other parts of the continent, as distinct from "scientific" or Marxist socialism.

4. A new film on Namibia, *A CRY FOR FREEDOM*, 22 min. produced by the Rev. John Evenson, focuses on the role of the church in the Namibian struggle. It is available for sale at \$325 or for rent at \$22 plus postage from Villon Films, P.O. Box 14144, Seattle, WA 98144, Telephone 206-325-8610.

5. A 27 minute 16 mm. film, *AFRICA: A NEW LOOK* was released last November by the International Film Foundation, Inc., 200 W. 72nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10023. We have not previewed it, but the descriptive material, promising a focus on the people and politics of modern Africa, indicates it might be useful in introductory courses. A concluding section focuses on South Africa and Namibia. No rental or sale prices were given in the material sent to us.

6. A documentary film on the war in the Western Sahara, **BLOOD AND SAND**, produced by Sharon Sopher, was shown on many Public Television stations in the U.S. in April and May, through the June 1982 issue of the **SPSC Newsletter** (see **Africa Today**, Vol. 27, No. 4, p. 70, item 14) that rental or purchase of this film can be arranged through Ms. Sopher at Developing News, Inc., 315 West 57th Street, Suite 5D, New York, N.Y. 10019.
7. The most recent issue, No. 43, of **COMMENT**, the occasional publication of the Catholic Institute of International Relations, 22 Coleman Fields, London N1 7AF England, is entitled *Southern Africa Under Threat*, 16 pp. and is an examination of the economic crisis confronting the nine states in The Southern African Development Coordination Conference due to efforts at disruption by South Africa. A single copy price is not given, but all five issues each year, plus other CIIR publications, are available at £ 10, including air mail delivery, overseas. Bulk rates are available on request.
8. Since the primarily English language **IMPACT**, the journal of South Africa's *Progressive Federal Party*, frequently carried articles in Afrikaans we were unaware that the party also published an Afrikaans paper, **DEURBRAAK**. Now the two monthlies have merged as a bi-lingual paper, under the latter title. All party members receive **DEURBRAAK** free, but others may subscribe at R 1.80 for 6 issues or R 3.60 per year. These, we assume, are internal rates. Overseas subscribers may be asked to pay additional postage. Orders should go to The editor, **DEURBRAAK**, P.O. Box 1475, Cape Town 8000 South Africa.
9. We have received the **SOUTHERN AFRICA LITERATURE LIST 1982** (Spring) from *The American Committee on Africa and the Africa Fund* and note a number of publications not previously mentioned in these pages. These include **BLACK UNIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA**, by Sandy Bayer, 8 pp., 60¢ each; over 20 30¢ each; **SOUTH AFRICA: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON DIVESTMENT**, by Gail Morlan, 4 pp., **LEGISLATIVE ACTION AGAINST APARTHEID: A Study of the Connecticut Campaign**, 4 pp.; **NAMIBIA FOR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE**, by Theo Ben Gurirab, 4 pp.; **SOUTH AFRICA FACT SHEET**, by Richard Leonard, 4 pp., and **THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES: A Critical Look at the U.S. Corporate Code in South Africa**, 4 pp. All these four page leaflets are 30¢ each or 15¢ each for orders of 20 or more. In addition, an important new study by Ruth Kaplan, **ANGLO AMERICAN CORPORATION OF SOUTH AFRICA: Investments in North America**, 25 pp., is available to individuals for \$5.00, to institutions for \$25.00. Write for the complete list of ACOA-Africa Fund, 198 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10038.
10. The **Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Information Center (MAGIC)**, 34 Percy Street, London W1P 9FG, England, continues to publish **PEOPLE'S POWER in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau**, a quarterly containing articles on developments in the three countries (and Cape Verde). The lead article in Number 18 is "People's History in Mozambique" by Richard Gray. Subscriptions are £ 3.50 (or \$12.00) within the U.K. or by surface mail, £ 4.50 (or \$15.00) air mail. Select back issues are available. Also available is a five design postcard set, *Viva Angola*, 75 pence per pack, one-third discount for bulk orders of five or more.
11. The *United States Committee of the International Defense and Aid Fund for South Africa* has launched a new publication, **IDAF NEWS NOTES**, published every other month, beginning in February of this year. Four of the eight pages in the first and five in the second are used to publish a "South African News Calendar" for the two months preceding the issue. In addition there are news stories of anti-apartheid actions in the U.S., book reviews and interviews. The April issue reports the opening of the committee's first branch office, in Michigan, with strong support from the churches. The branch office staff consists of Mrs. Phyllis Jordan, a well-known black South African, and Mr. Kano Smith, a Detroitite who lived in Africa. The branch office address is IDAF, Rosa Parks Community Center, St. Agnes RC Church, 7601 Rosa Parks Boulevard, Detroit, MI 48206. No subscription price is listed for **IDAF NEWS NOTES**, but a contribution to IDAF sent to P.O. Box 17, Cambridge, Massachusetts, will certainly put you on the mailing list.
12. The London office of *International Defence and Aid* announces the publication of **ISLAND IN CHAINS**, *Ten Years on Robben Island* by Prisoner 885/63, by Indres Naidoo as told to Albie Sachs, 278 pp. Published by Penguin Books, Ltd., this volume may be available through your bookstore, but can also be ordered through The Publications Department, IDAF, 104 Newgate Street, London EC 1A 7AP, at £ 1.95 (including postage UK only), or from The United States Committee of IDAF, address in item above, for \$4.50. Also available through the IDAF Publications Dept. in London are two Zed Press books: **TO BE BORN A NATION — The Liberation Struggle for Namibia**, by The Department of Information & Publicity, SWAPO, 357 pp., £ 4.95, and **LET US DIE FIGHTING — The Struggle for the Herero and Nama against German Imperialism (1884-1915)**, 278 pp., £ 4.95. These volumes are also available through The U.S. Committee at \$11.00 each. Increased subscription rates for IDAF's important periodical **FOCUS** will rise January 1st, 1983 to £ 6 surface & £ 10 airmail, double the present rates. It's still a bargain.
13. The *Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights* includes two reports from Africa in the December 1981 issue of **THE ANTI-SLAVERY REPORTER** (Vol. 13, No. 1). Both are taken from the Transcripts of the UN Working Group of Experts on Slavery. They are on "Slavery in Mauritania in 1980" and "Forced Labor in Humera" (Ethiopia). Both are followed by statements of the representatives of the government concerned. Earlier issues of similar size are listed at £ 1 each, but we found no price for this issue. Another recent publication of the Society is **LAND ALLOCATION AND HUNTER-GATHERER RIGHTS IN BOTSWANA: THE IMPACT OF THE TRIBAL GRAZING LAND POLICY**, by Liz Wiley, No. 4 in the "Human Rights & Development Working Paper" series, £ 1.50. The society's address is 180 Brixton Road, London SW9 6AT England.
14. An updated 10th anniversary edition of Frances Bates Lappe's **DIET FOR A SMALL PLANET**, 498 pages, \$3.95 (paper) was released by Ballantine Press on June 4th, and is available through the Institute for Food and Development Policy, 2588 Mission Street, San Francisco, CA 94110.



15. The Spring, 1982, issue of DAEDALUS, The Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, is devoted to the theme "Black Africa: A Generation After Independence." A distinguished list of authors, including Willard R. Johnson, Ernest Wilson III, Es'kia Mphahlele, Colin Leys, Crawford Young, Jan Vansina, J.F. Ajayi, and many others have contributed to this 273 plus xvi page issue that most Africanists will want to have in their libraries. A useful 16 page preface summarizes the major themes of the articles. Single copies at \$5.00 may be obtained from The Daedalus Subscription Office, 1172 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, MA 02134. The bulk order rate (5 or more copies) for those who may wish to consider the issue for classroom use, is \$4.00 per copy. Overseas orders should include an additional \$1.00 per copy for postage and handling.
16. Another periodical issue of special interest to many of our readers is TARIKH 25 (Vol. 7, No. 1), the journal of *The Historical Society of Nigeria*, distributed in the United States by Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J. 07716. The theme is "Grass Roots Leadership in Colonial West Africa," and the 73 page issue is guest edited by La Ray Denzer. The papers are drawn from a symposium held in honor of Thomas Hodgkin at Northwestern University in 1977. Copies may be obtained for \$3.50 each from Humanities Press.
17. We mentioned a useful source for those planning to accept an overseas appointment in Africa in our last issue, The Royal Commonwealth Society's NOTES AND CONDITIONS (AT 28/4, p. 57, item 19). We now learn that an American publisher also is providing such materials for those planning to live overseas. *Intercultural Press, Inc.*, 70 West Hubbard Street, Chicago, Illinois 60610 offers SURVIVAL KIT FOR OVERSEAS LIVING *For Americans Planning to Live and Work Abroad*, by L. Robert Kohls, 88 pp., order no. 306, \$5.95. They also offer a series of UPDATES on specific countries, by Alison R. Lanier, each volume approximately 110 8<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>" x 11" pages, \$27.50 each. However, only two of these, Egypt (order no. U402) and Nigeria (order no. U411) deal with African countries.
18. AFRO-PUB, Doblhoffg. 5/9, A-1010 Wein (Vienna) Austria, publishes a number of books and pamphlets and distributes issues of several Africa-related journals, in German, French & English. R. Ohly's SWAHILI-*The Diagram of Crisis*, 190 pp., AS 200, jointly published with University Press, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, is perhaps the title listed in their recent catalog of most interest to our readers. Write for a complete listing.
19. The AFRO-SCHOLAR NEWSLETTER published by the Afro-American Studies Program at the University of Illinois in Champaign-Urbana announces that it will be distributed on a subscription basis only when it begins its third year in September 1982. Annual rates are \$10 for individuals and \$15 for institutions. While the predominant focus of most issues is on U.S.-related Black Studies there is usually an ample amount of Africa-related material. Order from The Editor, AFRO-SCHOLAR, Afro-American Studies and Research Program, 1204 W. Oregon, Urbana, Illinois 61801.
20. With the Winter 1982 issue (Volume 8, No. 1) the former newsletter of the *African Literature Association* becomes the ALA BULLETIN, and adopts a new format, printed and similar in page size to AFRICA TODAY. All who pay their ALA dues (\$12 for individuals, \$18 for institutions, \$4 for students, retired or unemployed persons) will receive the four quarterly issues automatically. Payment should be sent to Stephen Arnold, ALA Bulletin Editor & ALA Sec'y-Treasurer, Department of Comparative Literature, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2E6. Three volumes of papers from annual ALA conferences, DESIGN AND INTENT IN AFRICAN LITERATURE (1979), DEFINING THE AFRICAN AESTHETIC (1980) and CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN LITERATURE, 1960-1981 (1981) were due to be published by Three Continents Press this spring and summer. The pre-publication prices for paperback editions were \$8, \$8, \$10, for cloth \$14, \$14, & \$18, but these may be higher now if the promised publication dates have been achieved.
21. We have received the first two issues of TOPIC, the journal of the World Press Institute, and hope they keep coming. Published at Macalester College in Minnesota, this quarterly is primarily designed to provide a means of communication among alumni and friends of the Institute, which brings a small group of professional journalists to the U.S. for study, work and travel each year. Both of these issues contain Africa related articles, a report by an Australian journalist on a visit to Eritrea, a Ghanian writing about reporting from East Africa, a South African black journalist in exile reporting on the hazards of the profession in that land, and a book review of Pollack's UP AGAINST APARTHEID. Distribution is free. The address is World Press Institute, Macalester College, 1600 Grand Avenue, St. Paul, Minnesota 55105.
22. The United Nations Centre Against Apartheid has published six new titles in its NOTES AND DOCUMENTS series. No. 1 carries Resolutions on Apartheid adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1981. The General Assembly adopted on 17 December 1981, 16 resolutions on apartheid unanimously or by overwhelming majorities. The texts of these resolutions and the records of votes are reproduced in this issue. The resolutions deal with the "Situation in South Africa," "International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions Against South Africa," "Acts of Aggression by the apartheid regime against Angola and other independent African States," "Comprehensive and Mandatory Sanctions against South Africa," "Arms Embargo against South Africa," "Oil Embargo against South Africa," "International Conference of Trade Unions on Sanctions against South Africa," "Academic, Cultural and Sports Boycotts of South Africa," "Political Prisoners in South Africa," "Women and Children Under Apartheid," "Public Information and Public Action against Apartheid and Role of the Mass Media in the Struggle Against Apartheid," "Relations between Israel and South Africa," "Programme of Work of the Special Committee against Apartheid," "Investments in South Africa," and "United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa."
- No. 2 is entitled "The International Impact of the South African Struggle for Liberation" by George Houser. This paper was published at the request of the Special Committee against Apartheid. Mr. Houser was Executive Director of

When ordering items listed here or in the advertisements please mention AFRICA TODAY.

the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) from 1952 to 1981 and Executive Secretary of the Committee of Racial Equality (CORE) from 1944 to 1952.

No. 3 is entitled "The Legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and the Campaign for Sanctions against South Africa" and it reproduces the statements made by the Chairman of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, H.E. Mr. Alhaji Yusuf Maitama-Sule (Nigeria) that visited Atlanta from 12 to 15 January 1982 to participate in the celebration of the 53rd birthday of the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The World Medical Association (WMA) decided in September 1981 — ignoring appeals by the UN Special Committee against Apartheid and others — to readmit the Medical Association of South Africa and of the so-called "independent" state of Transkei. The Special Committee then requested the World Health Organization (WHO) to discontinue relations with WMA. The WHO Executive Board decided on 27 January 1982 — by a vote of 27 to one (United States of America) with one abstention — to discontinue relations with WMA. The WMA may be readmitted on application, "if it reverses its position regarding readmission of the Medical Association of South Africa, and the admission of the Medical Association of the so-called 'independent' homeland of Transkei". No. 4/82 reproduces (a) the text of the message sent to WHO by the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid, H.E. Alhaji Yusuf Maitama-Sule (Nigeria); and (b) the Statement before the WHO Executive Board by the representative of the Special Committee, H.E. Mr. James Victor Gbeho (Ghana).

The Africa Centre, London, in cooperation with the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, organized a series of eight lectures from 13 January to 3 March 1982 in observance of the International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions against South Africa. The first lecture was delivered on 13 January by H.E. Mr. James Victor Gbeho, representing the UN Special Committee against Apartheid and is reproduced as No. 5/82 entitled "Africa's Call for Sanctions against South Africa." Ambassador Gbeho is chairman of the Special Committee's Sub-Committee on the Implementation of UN Resolutions on Collaboration with South Africa.

No. 6/82 entitled "The Crucial Need for United Action by the International Community," is a statement by Mr. Oliver Tambo, President of the African National Congress of South Africa, published at the request of the Special Committee against Apartheid, made at a meeting of the Special Committee held at headquarters on 12 January 1982 to launch the International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions against South Africa. The International Year was proclaimed in resolution 36/172 B of 17 December 1981 which invited "all Governments, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and institutions to participate effectively in the observance of the Year in cooperation with the United Nations."

In addition to the above six titles the NOTES AND DOCUMENTS series also published a Special Issue which reproduces "Resolutions by the UN Security Council Concerning Acts of Aggression by South Africa." These resolutions were adopted upon complaints made by Zambia and Angola, respectively, against aggressive acts by South Africa.

23. Four issues of *Munger Africana Library Notes* have reached us since we last mentioned this series in AT 28/1, p. 72, item 9. No. 59/60 is an important combined issue on SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS 1949-1976, by Jack Birmingham and Edwin Clausen, 40 pp., \$7. No. 61 contains two articles, one by former prime minister Muzorewa's personal secretary, J. Kamusikiri, on "Mugabe's Zimbabwe: Lessons and Problems," and the other an interview with Sam Nujoma by white South African journalist Colleen Hendrik, 16 pp., \$3. No. 62 AIME CESAIRE: SOME AFRICAN POEMS IN ENGLISH, reprints translations by Clayton Eshleman and Annette Smith on facing pages with Cesaire's French original, 15 pp., \$3. No. 63, PRIMITIVISM AND OTHER MISCONCEPTIONS OF AFRICAN ART, by Ekpo Eyo, 25 pp., \$6, reprints an address given at a library seminar in 1981, and includes a transcript of the question and answer period following. Dr. Eyo is the author of TWO THOUSAND YEARS OF AFRICAN ART, and both expands on that book's thesis and responds to its critics. The address for Munger African Library is 1201 E. California Blvd., Pasadena, CA 91125.

24. We have received from CIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency, a copy of an attractive well-illustrated 64 page booklet entitled OLD NALEDI: THE VILLAGE BECOMES A TOWN, an *Outline of the Old Naledi Squatter Upgrading Project, Gaborone, Botswana*, by John van Nostrand. It describes a cooperative effort by CIDA and the Republic of Botswana to provide legal land-tenure and access to affordable urban-standard housing in a squatter village that grew up on the southern fringes of Botswana's new capital. The involvement of the residents in planning and execution, and the renovation of an existing community with limited disruption of its historic form make this project of special interest to urban planners and community developers elsewhere in Africa. Copies can be obtained from the Human Settlements Section, CIDA, 200 Promenade du Portage, Hull, Quebec, Canada K1A 0G4. No price is given. They may be available on request.

25. We have received "Cha Kwanza, Tol. 1" (Vol. 1, No. 1) of DARAJA, which must be the first periodical entirely in Kiswahili to be published in the United States. "Daraja" means "bridge" and the cover also carries the phrase "Vuka daraja, uone dafina" (Cross over the bridge and see the scene). The 24-typewritten pages contain a number of original articles and short stories. Order from DARAJA, 2601 University Avenue, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712. The fact that this issue is labeled "Majira ya kupanda" (spring) leads us to assume that quarterly publication is planned. No price is given.

This section has been compiled by Edward A. Hawley and Mustapha Pasha, with assistance from Joseph Gitari and Noah Midamba.

## Coming Events

The 1982 convention of the American Political Science Association will be held September 2-5, 1982, in Denver, Colorado. As usual, a number of panels will focus on Third World and African issues. For more detailed information, write Conference Information, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036.

A conference on Women, Health and International Development will be held October 22-23, 1982 at Michigan State University, cosponsored by the African-Studies Center and the Office of Women in International Development. For details write Dr. Margaret Aguwa, Department of Family Medicine, Fee Hall, MSU, East Lansing MI 48824.

The annual meeting of the African Studies Association will be held in the Capitol Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C. Nov. 4-7, 1982. The theme is "U.S. and Africa: Adversaries or Partners in Development." The program chairman is Prof. Nzongola-Ntalaja, African Studies Program, Howard University, Washington, D.C. 20059.

The Association for the Advancement of Policy Research and Development is sponsoring a conference on "Partnership in Third World Development" at the Sheraton Newport Hotel, Newport Beach, California from November 18-20, 1982. More information is available from Mikki Mtewa, Howard University, Washington, D.C. 20059 (202-636-6720) or George O. Roberts, School of Social Science, University of California, Irvine CA 92717 (714-833-6582).

The African Heritage Institute offers its third study tour to Africa from January 4 to January 25, 1983. Countries to be visited are Senegal, Morocco, and Egypt. Exact cost will be determined nearer the date, but is estimated at approximately \$2000. Participants may earn 4 credit hours. Write the director, Dr. Akbarali H. Thobhani, Department of Afro-American Studies, Metropolitan State College, 1006 11th Street, Denver, CO 80204, for more information.

## Announcement

The rules and conditions have been announced for the Noma Award for Publishing in Africa for the 1983 competition, and they are essentially unchanged from earlier years. The \$3000 award will be given to a work by an author indigenous to Africa released by a publisher domiciled on the African continent during 1982 or with a 1982 imprint in any of these categories: scholarly or academic, books for children, or literature and creative writing. Entries, which may be in any of the indigenous or official African languages, must be submitted before December 31, 1982 by the publishers to the administrator of the awards, *The African Book Publishing Record*, P.O. Box 56, Oxford OX1 3EL England. See AT 28/4 p. 63 for information on the 1982 awards, for works published in 1981.

## Books Received

Starred titles have been sent to reviewers. Others may be requested by qualified reviewers.

### Political Science/Area Studies

AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM. Timothy M. Shaw and Solo Ojo. eds. (University Press of America, 1982) 301 pp.; paperback \$12.25.

AFRICA FACES THE WORLD. Richard A. Fredland. (Monograph Publishing Carrollton Press, Inc., 1980) 200 pp.; n.p. paperback.

THE ANGUISH OF THIRD WORLD INDEPENDENCE: The Sierra Leone Experience. George O. Roberts. (University Press of America, 1982) 351 pp.; paperback \$13.25.

ASCENT AND DECLINE IN THE WORLD SYSTEM. Edward Friedman, ed. (Sage Publications, 1982) 303 pp.; hardcover \$25.00; paperback \$12.50.

BLACK MIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA: A Selection of Policy-Oriented Research. W.R. Bohning, ed. (International Labor Office, 1981) 184 pp.; hardcover \$17.10; paperback \$11.40.

CRISIS IN AFRICA: Battleground for East and West. Arthur Gavshon. (Penguin Books, 1982) 320 pp.; paperback \$6.95.

GLOBAL RIFT: The Third World Comes of Age. L.S. Stavrianos. (William Morrow & Co., 1981) 890 pp.; paperback \$15.00

A CONTINENT BESIEGED: Foreign Military Activities in Africa Since 1975. Daniel Volman. (Institute of Policy Studies, 1980) 30 pp.; paperback n.p.

4 JUNE: A Revolution Betrayed. Barbara E. Okeke. (Ikenga Publishers, 1982) 185 pp.; paperback \$7.50.

GUINÉE EQUATORIALE: De la Dictature des Colons à la Dictature des Colonels. Max Liniger (Les Editions du Temps, 1982), 228 pp.; n.p.

\*LAW DEVELOPMENT AND THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION. Paul H. Brietzke. (Bucknell/Associated University Press, 1982) 378 pp.; hardcover \$39.50.

THE MASS MEDIA IN THE STRUGGLE FOR ZIMBABWE. Elaine Windrich. (Mambo Press, 1981) 112 pp.; paperback n.p.

TOM MBOYA: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget. David Galsworthy. (Heinemann/Africana Publishing House, 1982) 308 pp.; hardcover £13.00.

\*MODERN MAURITIUS: *The Politics of Decolonization*. Adele Smith Simons. (Indiana University Press, 1982) 242 pp.; hardcover \$22.50.

THE NAMIBIAN ISSUE, 1920-1980: *A Selected and Annotated Bibliography*. Elna Schoeman. (G.K. Hall & Co., 1982) 245 pp.; hardcover \$38.00.

NIGERIA IN SEARCH OF A STABLE CIVIL-MILITARY SYSTEM. J. Bayo Adekson. (Westview Press, 1982) 164 pp.; \$23.75.

\*NIGERIA: *Power and Democracy in Africa*. Jean Herskovits. (Foreign Policy Association, 1982) 72 pp.; paperback n.p.

THE O.E.C.D. AND WESTERN MINING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA. Wellington W. Nyangoni. (University Press of America, 1982) 228 pp.; paperback \$10.75.

PERSONAL RULE IN BLACK AFRICA: *Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg. (University of California Press, 1982) 316 pp.; hardcover \$25.00.

POST-INDEPENDENCE SUDAN. Centre of African Studies. (University of Edinburgh, 1980) 227 pp.; paper \$11.00.

\*PRESCRIPTIONS FOR DEATH: *The Drugging of the Third World*. Milton Silverman, Philip R. Lee and Mia Lydecker. (University of California Press, 1982) 208 pp.; hardcover \$16.95.

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## Letter to the Editor

### The Editors, AFRICA TODAY:

Last year after I'd received a copy of Louise Crane's letter I'd sent you a telegram requesting that you note that the title "A Sensitive Novel" was the editor's, not the author's.

I am therefore distressed that her letter was published on page 79 of Vol. 28, No. 3, 1981 without such an acknowledgement.

Could you please print an apology in your next issue. Crane has launched an ad hominem attack against me when the words she is reacting against were not mine. Nowhere in my review did I use the word "sensitive." I do not disagree with Crane's views, but the charges of "ignorant!" and "insensitive" are both scurrilous and uncalled for.

Sheldon G. Weeks

Dr. Weeks' point is well-taken. The title was mine, and not his, and the word "sensitive" appeared only in the title. We did receive his telegram, and had intended to comply with his request, but somehow the telegram, which had been attached to the letter to remind us to acknowledge our culpability became detached before we were ready to go to press. Our sincere apologies for allowing the charges of "ignorant" and "insensitive" to be directed at Dr. Weeks when they should have fallen on my shoulders. However, we feel the letter made an important point not emphasized in the review, one, knowing Dr. Weeks, we feel sure he would have made if not operating under the constraints of brevity imposed by our guidelines. Novels by expatriates about expatriates too easily, as this one does, distort or fail to reveal the situation and feelings of the Africans who are at the center of the real life drama within which the novelist's little plot is laid.

Edward A. Hawley  
Executive Editor

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