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

Refugees in Africa

Jake C. Miller

Class & Politics

James R. Scarritt &
Joel Samoff

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APOLOGY

Zed Press is the British Publisher of **Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa** London 1980, in which is included an article by Robert Molteno entitled the 'Hidden Sources of Subversion.'

Robert Molteno and Zed Press wish by this notice to withdraw unreservedly all defmatory imputations contained in the above mentioned article regarding Professors Gwendolen Carter, Gail Gerhart, Sheridan Johns, Thomas Karis, Christian Potholm and Robert Rotberg. Robert Molteno and Zed Press acknowledge that there is no foundation for any of the defamatory imputations made in the above mentioned article, inter alia linking the aforementioned professors with the CIA.

Robert Molteno and Zed Press therefore sincerely apologize for any damage caused.

AFRICA TODAY

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A Tribute To Ruth First

Dennis Brutus

Ruth First, who died tragically in Mozambique on August 17 when a parcel bomb exploded, made an immeasurable contribution to the liberation struggle in South Africa. As a brilliant journalist exposing the horrors of Apartheid as the skillful editor of a radical journal, **Fighting Talk**, until it was banned, as author of major works, including the pioneering **South West Africa** (Penguin) and **Power in Africa** (English title: **The Barrel of a Gun**) she helped elucidate important African issues. She was a tireless and fearless organizer — in South Africa, in England and latterly in Mozambique. She spent years on trial for treason in the '50s, (all the while continuing her political work) and was detained, without charges, under the Preventive Detention Act in the '60s. She wrote movingly of this in **117 days** (Penguin). But she will be best remembered by those who worked with her, for her resolutely critical mind and the brightness of her courageous optimism. Her name will be remembered with praises by the children of free South Africa.

Editor's Note

The gift appeal box elsewhere in this issue will alert you to our financial difficulties. Short staffing and a reluctance to strain the generosity of our creditors (most notably the printer) have badly delayed this issue. We are confident, however, that our readers, as they have always done before, will respond generously to put us back on an even footing.

Volume 29, No. 3 should follow this one in less than a month. Important articles on the Political Economy of Repression in South Africa by Robert A. Denemark and Howard P. Lehman and Nigeria's Economy Since the Oil Price Rise by Sayre Schatz plus a correspondent's report from Dan Connell on western journalists in Africa and an impressive group of book reviews are set in type and ready to be pasted up. 29/4 we hope to have ready no later than February and if our gift appeal succeeds we'll move ahead rapidly on the 1983 issues. Because the next issues will follow so closely we have omitted the "publications" section from this issue. It will appear in 29/3.

All of us at **Africa Today** fully share in Dennis Brutus' tribute to Ruth First that appears above. She will be sorely missed.

Edward A. Hawley

The Homeless of Africa

Jake C. Miller

No sound is more distressing than the plea of the homeless. Their cry expresses the pain of hunger, thirst, and disease, and denotes the fear of death, insecurity, and repression. The cry is not pretense, but a reflection of grim reality. It is an expression of a tragedy occurring daily throughout the world, but especially in Africa where one out of every two refugees resides. Because of the pervasiveness of the problem, and the lack of an adequate response, the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa was convened in Geneva, Switzerland, April 9-10, 1981. Two of its major purposes were (1) to focus public attention on the plight of African refugees, and (2) to mobilize additional resources for programs designed to aid them.[1] The paper attempts to analyse the causes of the problem, and the various methods of coping with it. Although the research focuses primarily upon refugees, as defined by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity conventions on refugees, it gives consideration to the broader issue of homelessness, defined to mean both internal and external displacement.

Causative Factors

Massive displacement in Africa is a result of many factors, including internal conflicts, colonial/racist domination, oppressive governments, foreign invasions, and natural disasters. The problem often is complicated by two or more of these factors at work simultaneously. Because a permanent solution will require an elimination of the causes, the initial phase of this study will focus upon an analysis of causative factors.

1. **ICARA Report**, No. 1, January 28, 1981.

Jake C. Miller is Professor of Political Science at Bethune-Cookman College, Daytona Beach, Florida.

Internal conflicts

Shortly after independence in 1960, the Congo (Zaire) became the scene of a major civil war, the first of many similar disruptions which contributed heavily to the disequilibrium of Africa. Because of the many refugees generated by these crises, we focus here upon civil conflicts which have occurred in Ethiopia, Chad, Angola, Zaire, Sudan, Burundi, and Nigeria.

Civil conflicts in Ethiopia are largely responsible for the refugees in the Horn of Africa. The strife involves secessionist movements in Eritrea and the Ogaden Region. As a result of the Eritrean conflict, which has its roots deep in Ethiopian history, more than 350,000 refugees have fled into the Sudan.[2] The conflict in the Ogaden has caused thousands of ethnic Somalis to flee into Somalia and Djibouti. In February 1981 the Somali Government estimated that more than 1.3 million refugees from Ethiopia, not all ethnic Somalis, were in more than thirty-five camps, and another 500,000 were believed to be residing elsewhere in the country.[3] In addition, thousands were displaced within Ethiopia itself.

Another major conflict contributing to the flow of refugees has been the civil war in Chad. This crisis began in the early 1960s as a struggle between the black population of the South, who controlled the government, and the Islamic-Arabic people of the north.[4] After the northerners had thrown off the rule of the southerners, many of the latter, fearing retribution, fled into neighboring countries. Since 1980 the conflict has been largely a struggle for power between rival Islamic-Arabic groups. As the shifts in power became increasingly complex, some losers from each struggle fled in the Cameroon, Nigeria, and the Sudan.

The civil war in Angola in 1975 involved a struggle of political groups seeking to control the destiny of the new nation. Although the faction led by the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) was able to establish a government which secured general international recognition, internal feuding continues. As a result of this thousands of refugees remain in exile in Zaire, Zambia, and Namibia. Also complicating the situation is the desire of many in Cabinda to secede from Angola, causing more than 40,000 Cabindans to remain in Zaire.[5]

No country in Africa has witnessed as many civil conflicts as Zaire. In

2. See Godfrey Morrison, "The Southern Sudan and Eritrea: Aspects of Wider African Problems," London: Minority Rights Groups (Revised 1976 edition)

3. U.S. Department of State, "African Refugees," **Gist**, April 1981.

4. See Colin Legum, "The Crisis over Chad," **Africa Contemporary Record**, 1980-81, pp. A35-A46; and Samuel Decalo, "Regionalism, Political Decay, Civil Strife in Chad," **Journal of Modern African Studies**, Vol. 18, Mar. 1980, pp. 23-56.

5. See John A. Marcum, **The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare**, Vol. II, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1978.

the original war of 1960, followers of the president and premier engaged in a political struggle which later escalated into a war of secession, with Katanga Province seeking to break away from the rest of the country. The Simba rebellion in the late '60s caused further disruption. In the late '70s Angola-based refugees twice sought to take over Shaba Province (Katanga).[6] These conflicts, and others have been responsible for thousands of Zairian refugees fleeing into Angola, Uganda, and the Sudan.

Although the civil war in the Sudan ended in 1972, thousands of refugees from that conflict continue to live in Ethiopia. Like the internal conflict in Chad, the Civil War in the Sudan involved a struggle between blacks of the Southern part of the country, and Islamic-Arabs of the North, who make up a numerical majority of the population.[7]

In 1972, the Hutus, which constitute 85% of the population of Burundi, attempted to wrest political control away from [illegible] but were unsuccessful. In the aftermath of the abortive uprising, more than 250,000 Hutus were murdered; thus, thousands of others, fearing death, escaped to Tanzania, Zaire and Rwanda.[8] Earlier in a pre-independence ethnic conflict in the latter, thousands of Tutsis had to take flight following the assumption of power by the Hutus.[9] Many of the Tutsis fled to Burundi where the composition of the population is very similar to that of Rwanda.

Perhaps the fiercest internal conflict in Africa was the civil war in Nigeria, which was fought between "Biafra" and the Federal Government of Nigeria. This tragic conflict resulted in the loss of thousands of lives, and left many others homeless.[10] While some refugees from this conflict continue to live in exile, they do not constitute a strain on the resources of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international agencies.

The internal conflicts cited above all involved secession attempts and/or ethnic rivalries for power. Virtually all had their roots deep in African history. When the Europeans staked their claims to the Continent, they did so without regard to ethnic composition; thus, rival ethnic groups often were placed together in a single nation state, or major ethnic groups

6. See Crawford Young, "Zaire: The Unending Crisis," **Foreign Affairs**, Fall 1978, pp. 169-185.

7. See Morrison, **op. cit.**, and Dunstan Wai, "The Afro-Arab Conflict in the Sudan: Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass & Co., 1982.

8. See Warren Weinstein, "Burundi," in Morris Davis's **Civil Wars and the Politics of International Relief: Africa, South Asia, and the Caribbean**, New York: Praeger, 1975, pp. 8-23.

9. See Jacques Cuenod, "The Problem of Rwandese and Sudanese Refugees," in Sven Hamrell's **Refugee Problems in Africa**, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1967, pp. 45-53.

10. See Laurie S.W. Wiseberg, "Christian Churches and the Nigerian Civil War," **Journal of African Studies**, Vol. 2, No. 3, Fall 1975, pp. 297-332.

were divided and placed in several different states. The Somalis in Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya, and the Bakongo in Zaire, the Congo, and Angola are illustrative of the latter. Independent African states agreed to accept the boundaries as they existed prior to independence.[11] Thus, many nations in Africa have found themselves "ripe" for civil conflict, which has been a major contributor to the creation of refugees.

Liberation struggles

Although wars of liberation are considered internal conflicts, we have selected to treat the topic independently, since the African response to them is different. While it is anticipated that African nations will restrict the political/military activities of refugees from neighboring friendly states, they are not expected to do the same in cases of refugees from countries involved in liberation struggles. As liberation struggles were waged in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, problems of displacement took place. Thousands either had to be resettled in neighboring countries, or relocated within the given country.[12] Success was achieved in the former Portuguese-controlled areas during the '70s, but a similar feat was not accomplished in Zimbabwe until 1980. Following the successful effort in the latter, the attempts of the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) to gain independence for Namibia were accelerated. The Namibian efforts were met with retaliatory action by South Africa, causing large numbers of Namibians to take refuge in Angola, either to avoid the fighting, or to better wage the liberation struggle.[13]

Although not as intense, various liberation movements are at work in South Africa, The African National Congress, the Pan-Africanist Congress, and others, but their efforts are being met with continued resistance and acts of repression. In order to prepare for future leadership, and/or escape repression, many young blacks have taken refuge in Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho, while others have gone to more distant African states, Europe and the United States.[14]

Not only are wars of liberation being waged in Southern Africa, but in the north as well. More than 70,000 refugees from West Sahara have fled into neighboring countries as a result of a war being fought between the Polisario Movement and Morocco, which has made territorial claims on the former Spanish colony.[15]

11. See Carl G. Widstrand, **African Boundary Problems,** Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1969.

12. See Richard Gibson, **African Liberation Movements,** New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.

13. See John de St Jorre, "South Africa: Is Change Coming?" **Foreign Affairs** Fall 1981, pp. 106-122.

14. See Margaret Legum, "Problems of Asylum for Southern African Refugees," in Sven Hamrell, **op. cit.,** pp. 54-64.

15. See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, **The Western Saharans,** Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1980.

Internal Oppression

As indicated earlier, many refugee situations are caused by internal oppression. The Uganda case is an illustration of such a crisis, having developed as a result of internal conflicts, a foreign invasion, and oppressive governments. In 1979, a joint military undertaking by Ugandan dissidents and Tanzanian troops led to the overthrow of the regime of Idi Amin. While his defeat caused many of his supporters to seek asylum, it provided an opportunity for many of his opponents in exile to return home. Prior to his overthrow, governmental oppression had caused many Ugandans to take refuge in neighboring countries. In addition to his expulsion of most of Uganda's 45,000 Asians, Idi Amin was responsible for the slaughter, torture, or enforced exile of thousands of Ugandans.[16] With the overthrow of Amin, and the resumption of power by Obote, governmental abuses once again are causing Ugandans to go into exile.

An oppressive political regime also was responsible for massive displacements in Equatorial Guinea. During the administration of President Macias Nguema, torture, government-approved murder, and other acts of repression were considered relatively commonplace, causing thousands of Equatorial Guineans to flee into exile.[17] At the end of 1978, approximately one-third of the population was in exile. The overthrow of the Nguema government, however, has led many Equatorial Guineans to return home.

Although Uganda and Equatorial Guinea were selected as illustrations of cases in which oppressive political regimes contributed to the growing influx of refugees, they do not stand alone. Throughout Africa, there are numerous instances in which governmental acts of oppression have been responsible for increasing the number of refugees.

Natural disasters

Natural disasters — drought, famine, flood, etc. — have also created refugees. In the early 1970s, the expanding Saharan Desert caused drought to bring the lives of many Africans to tragic ends.[18] Many of those who survived did so through having moved to camps, or to less severely stricken areas. While the worst drought conditions existed in the 1970s, we continue to witness such natural disasters during the present decade. On

16. See **Amnesty International Report,** 1979, pp. 37-39.

17. **Ibid.,** pp. 17-18.

18. See Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin, **Seeds of Famine,** Totowa, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun & Co., 1980.

occasion these disasters have forced refugees previously displaced for political reasons to once again be forced to move. In Somalia, thousands of refugees, first affected by the drought, later had to be evacuated because of floods.

As can be seen, the problems creating refugees have existed throughout history. Almost from the beginning of civilization, citizens of one country have fled to another in order to avoid internal conflicts, wars, and repressive governments, or have left their homes because of natural disasters. Having surveyed the causes of African massive displacement problems, attention now can focus upon the efforts to deal with the refugee crises which followed.

Defining The Refugee

The 1969 Convention of the Status of Refugees in Africa expanded the 1951 and 1967 meanings of refugees, as defined by the United Nations instruments, to read:

> Every person who owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.[19]

The Convention, specifically, excludes from the refugee category persons who have committed crimes against peace, war crimes, or crimes against humanity as defined by the various international instruments. It also excludes persons who act contrary to the purposes and principles of the OAU and/or the UN.[20]

Refugees have been categorized by some observers as convention and de facto. A convention refugee was regarded by Paul Weis as one who meets the criteria as stated in the UN Conventions and Protocols relating to the Status of Refugees. De facto refugees, on the other hand, are those who are not recognized as refugees within the meaning of the definition in the documents, but "who are unable or for reasons recognized as valid, unwilling to return to their country of nationality or, if they have no nationality, to the country of their habitual residence." Illustrative of de facto refugees are:

> Persons who have passed through the eligibility procedure in their country of residence and whose applications have been rejected or eliminated but who are unable or, for one of the reasons mentioned, i.e. race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, unwilling to return to their country of origin (political dissidents).[21]

19. **OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,** 1969, Art. 1, Sec. 2.

20. **Ibid.,** Sec. 5.

21. Paul Weis, "Convention Refugees and De Facto Refugees," in Goran Melander and Peter Nobel, **African Refugees and the Law,** Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978, p. 17.

Refugees are not a monolithic group, but individuals with various backgrounds, possessing different motives for their flight. Several observers characterize them in terms of the source of their origin, employing rural and urban categories. Sven Hamrell described the rural refugees as large groups of persons "who cross the borders of their country of origin and seek asylum in a neighboring area, which very often, although not necessarily, is similar to their homeland in respect to climatic and general physical conditions and also from an ethnical and tribal point of view." The urban refugees, on the other hand, were perceived as smaller and scattered urban groups, usually possessing an intellectual or professional background. These refugees often are "disconnected from their original rural environment" in their home countries.[22] The rural-urban classification which also is used by Gilbert Jaeger[23] and Apollo Kironde,[24] is very valuable when used to determine the most effective way in which to accommodate refugees.

Another scheme that also is based upon the source of origin is that of refugees from free African countries and [illegible] from racist/colonialist dominated African countries. Peter Omari utilizes such a classification. After dividing refugees into those from independent and non-independent countries, he proceeds to subdivide the latter into three groups:

1. Those who migrate or leave their country for political reasons.
2. Fugitives from justice.
3. Informers, spies and those engaged in counter-refugee activities.

Since he regards only the first group as genuine refugees, he further subdivides it into:

1. Political activists, including "freedom fighters."
2. Refugees, with or without their families, in search of jobs and economic and social betterment.
3. Youthful refugees who are dissatisfied with local conditions and inferior educational opportunities . . . and who seek better educational facilities abroad.[25]

Coping with the Refugees: The Host Country

Refugees are found in all parts of Africa, but the responsibility for caring for them is not shared by all African nations equally. According to a

22. Sven Hamrell, ed., **Refugee Problems in Africa,** Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1967, pp. 9-10.

23. Gilbert Jaeger, "Determination of Refugee Status under International Instruments," in Melander and Nobel, **op. cit.,** pp. 23-26.

24. Apollo Kironde, "An African Evaluation of the Problem," in Hugh C. Brooks and Yassin El-Ayouty, eds., **Refugees South of the Sahara: An African Dilemma,** Westport, Conn: Negro University Press, 1970, pp. 105-114.

25. T. Peter Omari, "From Refugee to Emigre: African Solution to the Refugee Problem," in Hamrell, **op. cit.,** pp. 85-87.

survey undertaken for the 1981 International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA), there were 1,540,000 refugees living in Somalia, 490,000 in the Sudan, and 400,000 in Zaire. Other countries which reported more than 100,000 refugees were the Cameroon (266,000), Burundi (234,000), Tanzania (140,000), Uganda (112,400), and Nigeria (110,000).[26] The number of refugees in a particular country, however, may be misleading as an indicator of the strain imposed upon it. The percentage of refugees in the total population, the density of population, and economic status of the country perhaps can better serve as determinants. Unfortunately, the burden of caring for the refugees is falling disproportionately on the shoulders of the poorest countries in Africa. According to a report of the World Bank, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania, and Uganda, all of whom have been called upon to accommodate large numbers of refugees, are listed among the poorest countries in the world.[27]

Although some high ranking political leaders have been granted asylum, and have lived luxurious lives, sometimes because of their previous pillage of public funds, this is the exception and not the rule. The average refugee flees his country with few possessions other than the clothes on his back. Because of this, the host country often must strain its already inadequate resources in order to accommodate the newcomers. Providing food, clothing, shelter, and medical assistance is merely the first step. The host country often must strengthen its infrastructure to respond effectively to this new task. Its role will depend upon the characteristics and needs of the refugees it seeks to accommodate.

Often, most of the refugees are younger than fifteen, but of those who are adults, women tend to outnumber the men by far. In an analysis of the 350,308 refugees in Somalia in November 1979, Goran Melander and Peter Nobel found that there were 206,155 children below the age of 15, with slightly more than half of them below school age. There also were 111,802 female adults contrasted with 32,351 adult males. Of the very low 9% male population many were elderly.[28] The small number of males in these refugee camps can be attributed, in large part, to the war between Ethiopia and Somalia, and the subsequent civil strife, in which many were soldiers or became casualties. It is also possible that many males took refuge in the cities to seek work rather than remain in the camps.

In seeking asylum, Africans usually turn first to neighboring countries. By so doing, they follow the course of least resistance, since the journey is shorter and less hazardous. Secondly, since ethnic groups in Africa tend to

26. ICARA, **Refugees in Africa**, Geneva, Switzerland: ICARA, 1981, pp. 12-13.

27. The World Bank, **World Development Report, 1978**, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1978, p. 76

28. Goran Melander and Peter Nobel, "Refugees in the Somali Democratic Republic," (Unpublished paper), 1979, pp. 6-7.

"spill over" national boundaries, the refugees often find that in the country of asylum, they are among people of a similar culture and language. The ethnic Somali of Ethiopia were among kin when they took refuge in Somalia, and the Fangs of Equatorial Guinea experienced a similar situation when they fled into neighboring Gabon and Cameroon.

While there are advantages for the refugees in locating in an adjacent country, the host nation does not enjoy corresponding benefits. Caring for these refugees, although a major task, is merely one of the responsibilities of the country of asylum. It must also regulate their activities to assure harmonious co-existence with nationals. In some cases, refugee allocations have been higher than local earnings, resulting in friction. Competition for jobs also tends to create hostility. In some instances, refugees are ostracized because they are perceived as being "criminally oriented," or "disease infected."

The host government also must restrain the refugees to prevent the disturbing of friendly relations with countries of origin. Some refugees may be supporters of deposed rulers and may not be reconciled to their loss of power. Political and military activities, if tolerated by the host nation, may result in strained relations and may lead to retaliatory action. The granting of asylum by Tanzania to anti-Amin Ugandan refugees led to deterioration of relations and eventual war between the two East African neighbors. Similarly, the relationship between Angola and Zaire has often been hostile, due to refugee cross-border forays from both sides. The inability or unwillingness to regulate refugee activities led to strained relations between Ethiopia and the Sudan during the early '70s. Ethiopia was accused of sympathizing with Sudanese refugees who supported the Anya-nya rebellion, and Sudan was blamed by Ethiopia for encouraging the Eritrean Liberation Front. In still another case, relations between Rwanda and Burundi were strained when Tutsi refugees from Burundi invaded Rwanda. For several years following the incident, "inflammatory radio broadcasts" continued to emanate from both capitals.[30]

The situation of the countries bordering the white-ruled south is somewhat different. As members of the OAU all support the liberation movements seeking an end to minority rule in neighboring countries, but extensive economic ties and the overwhelming superiority of the neighboring armies limit the degree of overt support that is possible. Botswana's

29. Louise W. Holborn, **Refugees: A Problem of Our Time**, 1951-1972, Vol. II, Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press 1975, p. 1374

30. **Ibid.**, p. 1123.

position has been the most delicate, and therefore it provides perhaps the best illustration of a host nation's effort to avoid friction with its neighbors. Liberation movements were not permitted to establish offices in Botswana, and the country's close surveillance of refugees was sometimes frustrating to the Zimbabwean movements, especially the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU), which sought to conduct politically-oriented educational programs in the refugee centers.[31] Botswana's action towards South African refugees has sometimes included the raiding of homes of refugees in search of arms.[32]

While Botswana has been relatively successful in "walking a tight rope" between liberation groups and racist southern African neighbors, the same has not been true with Mozambique, Zambia, and Angola.

Because of Mozambique's steadfast support for the Zimbabwean liberation efforts, Rhodesian forces undertook numerous raids into her territory, including one in August 1976 in which more than 300 were killed, and one in July 1978 when the refugee center at Gondola was destroyed, with a heavy loss of life of women and children who were the main inhabitants of the camps.[33]

Similarly, Zambia, with more than 45,000 Zimbabweans living on her territory, became the victim of raids by Rhodesia. In such a strike in 1978, the Rhodesian Government claimed that more than 1700 guerrillas were killed, and attempted to justify this action as a "retaliatory strike against a foreign base of operation."[34] Both the Zambian Government and Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU, denied the casualty figures but accused Rhodesia of killing innocent refugees. President Kaunda admitted that "Zambia was helpless to defend itself against the far superior Rhodesian forces, armed with South African and Western materiel," and denied that Zambia planned to retaliate, as such action would escalate the war, dragging South Africa and "Western vested interests" in on the Rhodesian side.[35]

In similar raids by South African troops, at least 16 Namibian nationalists were killed in Zambia. According to the South African Government, this action was taken in retaliation of a two-hour bombardment of two towns in Namibia in which nine South Africans were killed. Zambia denied that its troops were involved in the attack, and accused South Africa of killing twelve civilians and wounding sixteen in a Zambian border

31. **Christian Science Monitor**, October 31, 1979.

32. **Washington Post**, July 28, 1977.

33. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), New York: United Nations General Assembly, 1979, p. 21.

34. **Christian Science Monitor**, October 24, 1978.

35. **Washington Post**, October 24, 1978.

town. South Africa also was blamed for the bombing of schools. South African Prime Minister Vorster called upon Zambia to restrain SWAPO, and warned that Zambia "has no other option but to act in such a way in the future that such acts can not easily be repeated." He further warned that "a responsibility also rests upon those countries which make their territory available to SWAPO for its operations."[36]

As a result of its support of SWAPO, Angola also has incurred the wrath of South Africa. South African forces have repeatedly crossed the border from Namibia, and conducted raids deep into Angolan territory, inflicting thousands of casualties. South Africa claimed that most of the casualties were guerrillas, while Angola maintained that the majority were innocent refugees, including women and children. Following an incident in 1979, the United Nations Security Council expressed regret over the "tragic and mounting loss of human life, including that of civilians and Namibian refugees in Angola and other front-line States." South Africa was condemned for "the utilization of the international territory of Namibia as a springboard for armed invasions and destabilization of Angola," and was told to cease her provocative activities.[37] In spite of repeated condemnation by the United Nations Security Council, South Africa has continued to penetrate Angolan territory.

Front-line nations, those bordering Rhodesia and South Africa, accepted great responsibility in permitting liberation groups to utilize their territories as bases of operation. As indicated earlier, however, African nations are expected to give extraordinary support to refugees from colonial/racist dominated areas. The United Nations Security Council, in recognizing the efforts of the front-line states, commended them for their "steadfast support for the people of Namibia in their just and legitimate struggle against the illegal occupation of their territory by South Africa . . ."[38] Members of the United Nations were requested to "extend all necessary assistance to the People's Republic of Angola and other front-line States in order to strengthen their defence capacities."[39]

Refugeeism: Some Alternatives

Refugee status is viewed by nations of asylum as temporary. They anticipate that refugees will eventually be repatriated, integrated into the host

36. **Ibid.**, August 25, 1978.

37. United Nations Security Council Resolution 447 (1979).

38. **Ibid.**

39. **Ibid.**

nation, or resettled in a third country. The approach to use will be determined by events and conditions in the involved countries, and the eventual goal of the refugee, who may be interested only in a temporary refuge, with repatriation as the long-range goal. If there is no hope or desire to return, the goal may be assimilation or the use of the country of initial asylum as the first step in the search for a new home.

Voluntary Repatriation

Of these options, voluntary repatriation is, if possible, the simplest and most desirable. If truly voluntary, it provides a solution that satisfies both the refugee and the country of asylum. In order for this to be effective, the country of origin and the country of asylum must work cooperatively. As indicated by the OAU Convention, the country of origin "on receiving back refugees, shall facilitate their resettlement and grant them the full rights and privileges of nationals of the country, and subject them to the same obligations."[40] It is also anticipated that the country of origin should not penalize the returning refugees for having left.[41]

Realizing the importance of voluntary repatriation, the OAU Convention assigned the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization the duty of conducting a "national information" campaign as a means of assuring the refugees that the "new circumstances prevailing in their country of origin will enable them to return home without risk and to take up a normal and peaceful life without fear of being disturbed or punished."[42]

One of the early repatriation efforts was undertaken following the civil war in the Sudan. Once the Sudanese Government had decided to pursue a vigorous voluntary repatriation program, the first move was to reassure southerners that their interests would be safeguarded by including representatives from that region in the government. Another move was the placing of a radio station in Juba, near the Ugandan border, to broadcast appeals and messages of reassurance by "eminent southern chiefs." The Sudanese embassy in Kampala also was utilized for "contacting the refugees, persuading them to return to their homes." The refugees were reassured that "no punishment will ever be inflicted, and every assistance is given toward their repatriation, including their settlement in new "Peace Villages".[43]

Volunteer repatriation programs were also undertaken in other

40. **OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa**, Art. III, Sec. 3.

41. **Ibid.**, Sec. 4.

42. **Ibid.**

43. Mohamed Awad, "Refugees from the Sudan," in Brooks and El-Ayouty, eds., *op. cit.*, p. 127.

African countries, most of them in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees. In 1978, following President Mobutu's announcement concerning a general amnesty for all Zairians who had taken refuge outside the country, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees issued a special appeal for funds to conduct a one year program to assist the voluntary repatriation of approximately 110,000 people in Shaba Province. So successful was the effort that by the end of 1979, more than 150,000 persons had been repatriated. In order to facilitate the process, the UNHCR provided assistance to individuals, villages, and various institutions.[44]

Another major repatriation effort supported by the UNHCR was undertaken in Zimbabwe. Once a negotiated settlement had been achieved, more than a million displaced persons, within and outside the country, were encouraged to return to their homes. The first major drive, which resulted in the repatriation of more than 33,000 Zimbabweans, was designed to encourage as many refugees as possible to return prior to the 1980 elections. It had been agreed during the Lancaster House Negotiations which led to independence that the refugees of voting age would be allowed to return in order to take part in the elections. This process was aided by the Lutheran World Service, which had been asked by the UNHCR and the Zambian Government to serve as the implementing agency in the repatriation of refugees from Zambia to Zimbabwe. The second wave of refugees included children, pregnant women, and others. During these two campaigns, the UNHCR aided in the transportation of returning refugees and displaced persons, and it assisted in the repair, reconstruction and re-equipment of homes and community facilities.[45]

In Angola, the UNHCR also sought to aid refugees who were seeking repatriation. Initially, the Government of Angola did not appear to be very enthusiastic concerning the proclaiming of a general amnesty, therefore, the repatriation efforts, especially as they related to the thousands of refugees living in Zaire, were slow.[46] Portugal also assisted in the repatriation of approximately 1,100 Angolans.

On July 29, 1981, a general amnesty was declared by the Government of Chad. In order to facilitate the repatriation process which followed, tripartite committees, composed of Chad, the country of asylum and the UNHCR, were established in the Cameroon, Nigeria, and the Central

44. **Report of the UNHCR**, pp. 26-27.

45. International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), **African Refugees**, Geneva, Switzerland: ICVA, 1981, pp. 18-19.

46. Office of the United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, **1979 World Refugee Assessment**, Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1979, p. 47.

African Republic. In spite of the fact that the UNHCR anticipates the voluntary repatriation of approximately 200,000 Chadians, many refugees are choosing not to return, perhaps because of the unsettled nature of the civil conflict.[47]

The UNHCR, also, has been very active in the voluntary repatriation of more than 80,000 refugees who sought to return to Uganda after the downfall of Idi Amin in 1979. It also assisted approximately 265,000 displaced persons in Uganda — including threatened ethnic minorities, destitute widows, and orphans.[48]

Anticipating the return of refugees from the Sudan and Somalia, the Ethiopian Government submitted a request of $56,688,000 to the UNHCR, announcing that it would construct reception centers — with living shelters, clinics, and other needed units, and prepare the returnees for immediate self-sufficiency by providing farmers, herders, traders, and craftmen with the necessities of their occupations.[49] Earlier, Ethiopia had been criticized for her treatment of returning Eritreans, many of whom were sent to reorientation camps "in order to aid them in better understanding the changes which had taken place in Ethiopian society since the revolution of 1975."[50]

Repatriation can be a useful process for both the country of origin and the country of asylum. It relieves the latter of an unwanted financial burden and lessens the friction between it and the country of origin. The country of origin, by being better able to control the activities of the once dissatisfied citizens, reduces the threat to its security, and removes, partially, the stigma associated with large numbers of citizens fleeing their homeland.

Assimilation

Where repatriation is not feasible or desired, assimilation into the nation of refuge may be the preferred option. Article 34 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees requests contracting parties, where possible, to facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. Consistent with this provision, African nations, to varying degrees, have sought to integrate refugees into their communities.

As indicated earlier, because of ethnic "spillover" one may take refuge in a neighboring country and feel as at home as in the country of origin. The Fangs of Equatorial Guinea, who obtained asylum in Gabon and the Cameroon, had little difficulty in adjusting to the culture of their kinsmen.

47. Nicholas van Praag, "Chadians Head Home," **Refugees**, No. 1, Jan. 1982.

48. Office of the United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, **op. cit.**, p. 45.

49. ICARA, **Refugee Situation in Africa: Assistance Measures Proposed**, Washington: UNHCR, 1981, pp. 22-25.

50. **Christian Science Monitor**, March 12, 1981.

Similarly, the ethnic Somalis of Ethiopia, in many cases, became easily absorbed into the community structures of Somalia and Djibouti.

Realizing the unlikehood of many Rwandese refugees returning home in the near future, Burundi sought to integrate them into the national community. As a result of an administrative decree in 1963, "regular resident" certificates were issued to certain refugees, and those not possessing such documents were restricted in movement by the provincial governors of Burundi.[51] While the action could be perceived as a design to accommodate ethnic kin, it also could be viewed as a means of defusing tensions between Burundi and Rwanda.

Tanzania, which has a relatively liberal approach to refugees, also has maintained an active refugee integration program. In 1980, the Tanzanian Government granted citizenship to approximately 30,000 refugees — mostly Rwandese.[52] The case of Rwandese refugees in Zaire, however, was somewhat different. Many Rwandese Tutsis were naturalized, and then allowed to rise to prominence in the government of Kivu Province before later being stripped of their Zairian nationality, and deprived of their positions. Although the edict was later modified, many Rwandese refugees once again found themselves stateless.[53]

Often the assimilation of the refugees into the community can be useful both to the country of origin and the country of asylum. Once the refugee has secured employment, and has been able to partake of other benefits of the community, he is perceived as posing less of a threat to the security of the country from which he had fled, especially if he is contented with the new situation and regards the changing of conditions at home only as a remote possibility. On the other hand, the country of asylum, even though it invested heavily of its scarce resources initially, can recover somewhat by utilizing the talents and skills of the newcomers. Refugees can make contributions to national development, especially those described earlier in this paper as urban refugees, "who are either capable of taking advantage of further education or who are qualified and are already in a position to make a useful contribution without further training . . ."[54] Kironde suggests that it is important both for economic and moral reasons, that the refugee should, as soon as possible, attain a measure of self-sufficiency."[55]

51. Louise W. Holborn, **op. cit.**, p. 1120.

52. ICARA, **op. cit.**, p. 61.

53. **Christian Science Monitor**, July 13, 1979.

54. Apollo Kironde, **op. cit.**, p. 111.

55. **Ibid.**, p. 107.

Permanent refugee status

For some refugees, neither voluntary repatriation nor assimilation has been the solution. Instead, they exist in a state of suspension, hoping someday to return home, but as that goal appears more and more remote, these displaced persons take on the attributes of "permanent refugees," residing in camps throughout Africa. Frustrated at not having achieved their original goal, and unprepared for newer pursuits, they contribute nothing to the host country, while at the same time continuing to draw from its resources, and those of other donors. From almost every refugee migration, a few hard-to-settle refugees remain indefinitely in this category.

Resettlement

Resettlement in a third country, another alternative, is encouraged by Article 28 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. It requests contracting parties to issue to refugees who are lawfully in their territory permits to travel outside the country, unless national security or public order requires otherwise. An important role of the UNHCR has been that of facilitating the printing and distribution of travel documents. Since such documents permit refugees to go beyond the country of first asylum, a "brain drain," in a sense, is created in the refugee areas. In describing the situation in the Sudan, Victoria Brittain of the **Washington Post** observed: "Forged passports are on sale throughout the refugee community, and in desperation the educated are fleeing to West Germany, away from the task of helping the Sudanese administer these camps." She also noted that the large number of United Nations travel documents had enabled many refugees to go to the Gulf states to seek employment since such could not be found in the Sudan.

Expulsion

As indicated earlier, there are several ways in which a nation can deal with its refugee problem. It may repatriate the refugee, assimilate him into the community, provide temporary accommodations, or aid in resettling him in a third country. Another alternative exists. However, it is taken against the will of the refugee. Contrary to the protections provided by the UN and OAU Conventions on refugees, a country may expel unwanted refugees. These documents suggest that when a nation feels that it must expel a refugee who is legally in its territory, it should do so in consistence with practices of due process. In carrying out such expulsion, the nation of asylum should allow reasonable time for the refugee to secure admission into another country.[56]

56. **Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,** (1951), Art. 32, and **OAU Convention, op. cit.,** Art. II.

Generally, African nations have been very generous in accepting and keeping refugees, but there have been isolated instances where refugees have been returned to their homelands, or have been threatened with expulsion. In 1979, several hundred Ugandans were deported following a series of robberies in Nairobi. Since the incident, however, the Kenyan Government has assured the UNHCR that, in the future, no such action will be taken.[57]

Realizing that the strain placed upon countries of first asylum may be so great as to encourage refoulement — the turning away of refugees at the border — or expulsion, the OAU Convention calls upon member states "in the spirit of African solidarity and international cooperation take appropriate measures to lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum."[58]

An International Response

When the Organization of African Unity was founded in 1963, it adopted as one of its major purposes the promotion of unity and solidarity of the African states. The goal could not be reached, however, unless the various nations harmonized their approaches to such critical issues as that of asylum for refugees. Although the Charter does not contain provisions relating to refugees, the Conference of Independent African States which drafted it adopted a resolution which called upon the various states to grant "scholarships, educational facilities, and possibilities of employment in African government service to refugees from South Africa."[59]

A year after the creation of the OAU, African nations found it necessary to give serious consideration to the general issue of asylum. In response to the refugee situation which was created in East Africa as a result of civil unrest in Rwanda, the OAU Council of Ministers established an ad hoc commission to examine ways and means of accommodating refugees, as defined by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The African nations found it practical to distinguish between refugees from independent African countries, whom they considered it necessary to neutralize, and those from colonial/racist states, whom they felt obligated to support in their liberation efforts. At a later meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers, the Commission was requested to draft a con-

57. Office of the United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, op. cit., p. 41. Recently, however, involuntary repatriation of Ugandans has resumed. (**Africa News,** Vol. XIX, No. 17 — October 25, 1982, p. 6.) — Ed.]

58. **OAU Convention,** Art. II, Sec. 4.

59. **Resolutions of the Summit Conference of Independent African States,** "Apartheid and Racial Discrimination," Sec. 1, Addis Ababa, May 1963, in Colin Legum's **Pan-Africanism,** New York: Praeger, 1965, p. 296.

vention related to the various aspects of the refugee problem. In the meantime, the Heads of States and Governments, who convened in Accra in 1965, reaffirmed the OAU's desire to give all possible assistance to refugees from any member state on a humanitarian and fraternal basis. The various leaders, however, pledged themselves to "prevent refugees living on their territories from carrying out by any means whatsoever any acts harmful to the interests of other states."[60]

Another major milestone in the development of a continental approach to the refugee problem occurred in 1967 when the OAU, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation sponsored the Conference on the Legal, Economic and Social Aspects of African Refugee Problems. Discussions at this meeting led to the establishment of the Bureau for the Placement and Education of African Refugees (BPEAR) — which was designed to facilitate the cooperation of all African countries in the effort to resettle refugees. This conference also accelerated the process of adopting the Convention on Refugees two years later.[61]

The 1969 Convention on the Status of Refugees in Africa, in addition to defining refugee, contained provisions designed to prevent the development of strained relations among member nations of the OAU because of refugee issues. Article II expressly states: "The grant of asylum to refugees is a peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any Member State." Once a refugee has been accepted into a country, however, he is expected to conform to the laws and regulations that are designed to maintain public order. The host nation, in an effort to maintain friendly relations with neighboring countries, is expected to prevent the refugees from attacking the country from which they had fled by any activity, and in particular, by arms, through the press, or by radio.[62] African nations have not observed this provision in their relations with colonial/racist-dominated states, however.

In 1979, the OAU, ECA, and the UNHCR collaborated in the sponsoring of a conference on the situation of refugees in Africa. The conference, held in Arusha, Tanzania, was designed to review accomplishments in the field of refugee policies and to seek constructive approaches to future problems. It emphasized the importance of the principles of "international solidarity" and "burden-sharing" in the approach to the resolving of refugee problems. Recommendations, which were later endorsed by the OAU's Council of Ministers in July 1979, and the United Nations General Assembly in November 1979, related to the following subjects:

60 "Refugees from Independent African States," in Hamrell, **op. cit.**, p. 95.

61 ICARA, **The Refugee Situation in Africa**, p. 3.

62 **Ibid.**, Article III, Sec. 2.

1. The application and implementation at the national level of regional and/or international refugee instruments.
2. The harmonization of asylum procedures, and determination of status of individual refugees and groups.
3. The establishment of proper counseling services.
4. The initiation of adequate resettlement procedures.
5. The effective integration of refugees into the economic structure of the host countries.
6. The promotion of voluntary repatriation.[63]

Consistent with the challenge of President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania that "the refugees of Africa are primarily an African problem, and an African responsibility," most African nations have welcomed refugees freely.[64] Refoulement, expulsion, detention and similar terms have had little practical meaning in referring to African refugees. Paul Hartling, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, applauded the African hospitality, noting that they have not asked that their refugees be settled on another continent, but instead were seeking to accommodate them. He observed. however, that the refugees, for the most part, had become the responsibility of those countries least able to provide for them. Nevertheless, they were and are willingly sharing their meager resources.[65]

Realizing the need for greater international support, the Secretary General of the United Nations, in consultation with the OAU and the UNHCR, responded to General Assembly Resolution 35/42 of November, 1980, and convened the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA) in Switzerland April 9-10, 1981. Attending the Conference were representatives of 99 states, and more than 120 governmental and non-governmental organizations — the latter as observers. In opening the Conference, the Secretary General reminded the delegates that in 1970 there were about 750,000 refugees in Africa, but in 1980 there were approximately 5,000,000. This tremendous increase necessitated an international effort to find both temporary and permanent solutions to the problem. Although he considered the search for a long-range solution to be the desired goal, he admitted that the current top priority had to be given to meeting the "life-sustaining needs" of the refugees.[66]

63. ICARA, **op. cit.**, p. 3.

64. **Ibid.**, p. 2.

65. **Christian Science Monitor**, April 8, 1981.

66. **U.N. Monthly Chronicle**, Vol. XVIII, No. 6, June 1981, p. 31.

A similar observation was made by the High Commissioner for Refugees who noted:

> Traditional African hospitality was being strained to the extreme as large numbers of refugees drew on limited resources. The efforts of the African countries must evoke a vigorous response from the international community, and the Conference offered a unique opportunity to bind efforts together.[67]

Considering the situation as critical, but not hopeless, he observed that twenty years of close cooperation between African governments and the UNHCR had aided large numbers of refugees in finding solutions to their plight.

In preparation for the ICARA, the UNHCR compiled a proposed budget based upon the needs as submitted by the various African governments. An estimate of $1,153,980,292 was perceived as necessary to conduct critical programs for refugees and returnees.[68] According to the submitted budgets, the five countries with the greatest need were:[69]

Somalia	$271,806,800
Sudan	226,639,000
Zaire	88,016,400
Burundi	68,671,688
Cameroon	64,078,430

As can be seen from the above, refugees from the Horn of Africa continue to be in the greatest need.

The international community responded favorably to the financial appeal, pledging nearly $560,000,000. The United States, the largest contributor, pledged $285,000,000. In terms of actual dollars, other large donors were:[70]

European Economic Community	$68,000,000
Federal Republic of Germany	34,523,000
Japan	33,000,000
Saudi Arabia	30,000,000
Canada	18,823,529
Italy	17,000,000

One should not attempt to measure the worth of the gift by the actual size, since the pledges of smaller nations with lesser resources could be considered more sacrificial. Noted for their absence from the list of contributors are the Soviet Union, other Warsaw Pact nations, Cuba, and Libya.

In closing the Conference, the Secretary General expressed appreciation for the roles played by the various participants, noting particularly, the

67 Office of the UNHCR, International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. General Assembly A/36/316, 11 June 1981, p. 9.

68 ICARA, op. cit., p. 7a

69 Ibid., p. 75

70 ICARA Report, No. 6, April 30, 1981

efforts of non-governmental organizations. He observed:

> We came here to answer a cry for help from five million desperate human beings in Africa and from the countries giving them asylum. With your generous support we can now answer that appeal with a promise of commitment and action. To the refugees we now say: "The world is eminently aware of your plight. We stand ready to help. You will not be abandoned."[71]

While the UNHCR works, primarily, with national governments and intergovernmental organizations, it also has maintained a close relationship with liberation movements which are recognized by the OAU and the UN — including the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), and prior to the independence of Zimbabwe, it also interacted with the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).

Although the UNHCR was created by the United Nations as the major international body to provide legal protection and material assistance to refugees, it is supported in the performance of its duties by such member organizations of the United Nations system as the World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Education and Training Program for South Africa (UNETPSA), and the Council for Namibia. As already noted, the UNHCR also interacts with such regional organizations as the OAU.

In meeting the needs of African refugees, voluntary agencies and organizations are called upon to play crucial roles. The UNHCR seeks to maintain a close linkage with the more than a hundred voluntary organizations through such bodies as the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council.

In a document prepared by ICVA for presentation to ICARA, the Secretariat observed that the brunt of the refugee problem was being borne by the citizens of the various countries of asylum, even "to the detriment of their own economic development."[72] In response to the challenge, it noted: "It is precisely at the community level, among refugees and the local population, that the voluntary agencies are most active and informed."[73]

71. Office of the UNHCR, op. cit., p. 13.

72. ICVA, Assistance to African Refugees by Voluntary Organizations, Geneva, Switzerland, ICVA, April 1981, p. i.

73. Ibid.

According to a statement submitted to ICARA, the ICVA noted that "voluntary agencies provide the human element including moral support, orientation, practical advice and friendship which help refugees to face and overcome the challenge of rebuilding their lives."[74] It perceives the people to people approach as being fundamental to the building of a permanent solution to the refugee problem. According to the report, voluntary organizations seek to meet the humanitarian needs of refugees, but they simultaneously deplore the causes of such problems — including "racial, ethnic, religious, cultural, and political intolerance; overt or covert external interference and aggression; and the general worsening of world economic situation and imbalance."[75] Because non-governmental bodies are not restricted by political considerations, often they can go into troubled areas in which no governmental unit would dare penetrate. Thus, voluntary groups have made vital contributions to displaced persons during such crises as the Civil War in Nigeria.

Concluding Statement

Although the general theme of this paper was "homelessness," the major emphasis was on one aspect of that subject — "refugeeism." Refugeeism, although most pervasive in Africa, is not unique to that continent, but can also be identified with Europe, Asia, North America, and South America. Also universal are its causes: internal conflicts, colonial-racist domination, foreign aggression, repressive governments, and natural disasters. While it is desirable, in the long-run, to eliminate the causes of refugeeism, the international community finds that often it must summon its full strength merely to cope with existing emergencies.

This paper has focused on African refugees who remain in Africa. In addition, some Africans and many Europeans and Asians have fled from Africa to Europe, North America and Australia. The end of white dominance in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the uncertain status of Asians in East Africa after independence, and their forced expulsion by Idi Amin from Uganda have been the major contributing factors in the movement away from the continent of non-Africans, while the quest for education or splits in the liberation movements have been the prime causes of African emigration.

Complex as it is, it is much easier to describe the refugee problem in Africa than to propose solutions. Nevertheless, certain guidelines can be posited. Although it is essential, in the long run, to deal with the causes of refugeeism, both the complexity and elusiveness of these problems require

74. ICVA News, July 1981, p. 21.

75. Ibid.

that the first focus needs to be the alleviation of the plight of those who now find themselves refugees.

First of all, let us acknowledge that a great deal has already been done. While the absolute number of refugees has tended to increase over the years,[76] there are probably now more persons in Africa who are no longer refugees after having been at one time included in that category, than are at present counted as refugees. This can be attributed both to successful programs of repatriation in the Sudan, Nigeria, Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe, as well as smaller scale repatriations in other places, and to the successful transition from refugee status to citizenship of Burundians and Rwandans in Tanzania, Angolans in Botswana, and, to some degree and largely on a less formal basis, of ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden in Somalia. Such programs need to be researched further, and, where appropriate, emulated.

It must also be acknowledged that the refugees on the continent have, on the whole, been granted assistance by the receiving countries, by the UNHCR and affiliated UN organizations, and by the voluntary agencies. In the case of the latter there have been some instances of exploitation of the refugees to promote fund-raising and institutional enhancement for the agency but many agencies, notably OXFAM, Catholic Relief Services and Church World Service, have performed valuable and selfless service. This is not to say that aid has always been commensurate with the need, and the complaint, backed by figures, that international per capita expenditures for refugees in Africa has been much lower than on other continents, should not be ignored. But it should also be recognized that this has sometimes been due to the constraints imposed by the low standard of living of the nationals.

In the realm of support of existing refugees it is of fundamental importance to encourage increased support of the recognized international agencies, especially the UNHCR and the related UN bodies, especially by the developed Western nations, whose contributions have not kept pace with the need. The Soviet Union and Eastern bloc nations, whose support of these aspects of the work of the United Nations has been negligible to date, need to be called upon to reverse this policy.

It is also important to encourage increased participation by voluntary agencies, whose "people to people" approach and ability to enlist dedicated volunteers have sometimes enabled them to add the necessary

76. The peak figure to date probably was reached in 1980 or early 1981, at the height of the Ogaden crisis. Recent reports (VOA Broadcast, October 1, 1982) indicate the number of official refugees in Somali camps has declined to about 650,000 after peaking at well over a million.

climate after serious upheaval which has permitted most refugees, including leaders of rebellion, to return. A careful study of such cases, including human rights practices, methods of dealing with ethnic differences, and the handling of dissent, might be one contribution serious scholarship could usefully make in the field.

The resolving of the refugee problem will depend both upon the ability to deal effectively with its causes, and to provide solutions for existing cases of homelessness. For humanitarian reasons, refugeeism should be viewed as an international concern. A nation, in accepting refugees, and the international community, in responding to the challenge which they pose, are acting in accord with a major provision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which emphasizes that "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood."[77] All nations are affected by refugeeism; and thus should play a role in its solution.

77. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 1.

The OAU announces a meeting of the Secretariat and voluntary agencies involved in assisting refugees in Africa to be held in Arusha, Tanzania, January 17 through 22, 1983. **Africa Today** has been invited to cover this meeting. If there is a qualified journalist or scholar interested in attending at his/her own expense we are prepared to provide press credentials and to publish a "correspondent's report" in a future issue. Our telephone is (303) 753-3678.

Relating Classes and Politics: The Contribution of Joel Samoff to the Study of Africa

James R. Scarritt

Joel Samoff, **TANZANIA: Local Politics and the Structure of Power** (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), pp.ix, 286, $20.00.

Joel and Rachel Samoff, "The Local Politics of Underdevelopment," **Politics and Society,** Vol. 6, No. 4 (1976): pp. 397-432.

and the following articles and papers by Joel Samoff:

"Transnationals, Industrialization, and Black Conciousness: Change in South Africa," **Journal of Southern African Affairs,** 3 (October, 1978); pp. 489-520.

"The Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie: Decentralization and Class Structure in Tanzania," **Comparative Studies in Society and History,** 21 (January, 1979): pp. 30-62.

"Education in Tanzania: Class Formation and Reproduction," **Journal of Modern African Studies,** 17 (March, 1979): pp. 47-69.

"Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Power in Tanzania: The Institutional Context of Class Struggle," Paper Presented at the Twenty-second Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Los Angeles, October 31-November 3, 1979.

"Beyond Tanzaphobia: The Progress of *Ujamaa*," **ASA Review of Books,** 5 (1979): pp. 163-69.

"Underdevelopment and its Grass Roots in Africa," **Canadian Journal of African Studies** Vol. 14, No. 1 (1980): pp. 5-36.

"Crises and Socialism in Tanzania," **Journal of Modern African Studies,** 19 (June, 1981): pp. 279-306.

"Class, Class Conflict, and the State in Africa," **Political Science Quarterly,** 97 (Spring, 1982): pp. 105-27.

There is one possible advantage to be gained from allowing a book which one has been asked to review to sit on the shelf unread and unreviewed for several years, even though this practice is not in accord with the canons of the academic profession. If the author continues to publish, the tardy reviewer is able to view the assigned book from the perspective of the author's later publications, and if there has been an expansion of or a change in the author's theoretical, methodological, or substantive concerns, such a perspective can provide a useful critique of

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the earlier work. This review essay will focus on the nature of the theoretical, methodological, and substantive continuities and changes in Samoff's work. While many readers of **Africa Today** are not primarily interested in theory or methodology, all readers of this journal are concerned with such basic questions as what it is we want to know about African politics and society, and how we find out about that which we have decided we want to know.

Shortly after finally reading **Tanzania,** this reviewer read the manuscript of "Class, Class Conflict, and the State in Africa," which was originally prepared for presentation to the African Studies Association. The juxtaposition of these two pieces created the initial impression that there had been a fundamental change in Samoff's theoretical orientation and research methodology, but it will be argued here that an analysis of all of the writings under review reveals that there has instead been an expansion of the approach presented in **Tanzania.** In brief, while there are passages in "Class, Class Conflict, and the State in Africa" which appear to advocate class analysis as a fundamentally different methodology from the eclectic one employed in **Tanzania,** other passages in that article, as well as the predominant thrust of Samoff's other recent articles, point toward class analysis as a necessary supplement to the earlier approach, the utilization of which increase methodological eclecticism. The second major argument to be presented in this review essay is that the use of class analysis as a supplement rather than an alternative to other approaches provides the most powerful explanation of political, economic, social, and cultural change in Africa, and avoids many of the pitfalls encountered by relying exclusively on either the class-dependency-underdevelopment approach or the modernization-development approach.

Tanzania, Samoff informs readers in the introduction, is "self-consciously eclectic in both theory and methodology."[1] The focus is on politics as a process, involving leaders, groups, decisions, institutions, and values which prevent some issues from being raised. Given his awareness of criticisms of the decision-making (pluralist) approach to studies of community power, Samoff takes great care to structure his own work to meet these criticisms: fundamental rather than routine issues are examined, nongovernmental decision-making is examined, the importance of "nondecisions" or "mobilization of bias" is emphasized, and the special characteristics of Tanzanian decision-making are explicitly recognized. The theoretical concerns which predominate in the later writings are not absent in **Tanzania;** politics is seen as closely related to the broader social context, and the book's concluding chapter focuses on the attempt to develop and

1. **Tanzania,** p. 7

implement a strategy of self-reliant development, and the paradox or contradiction encountered in this attempt. This paradox is expressed in terms of leadership role conflict, in which local leaders must resist central directives favoring self-reliance in order to be responsive to well-articulated local interests, and must be responsive to these interests in order to be effective in implementing central directives.

The research methods employed in **Tanzania** are survey research and systematic observation, supplemented by the analysis of primary and secondary sources. Observation is used to describe the setting, the individual and group actors involved, and the decisions made on three issues — primary eduction, liquor licensing, and employment — in Kilamanjaro District, including the town of Moshi. This method is combined with a survey of 107 local political leaders to describe the operation of government and party structures in the district and the town, including the party's then recently established ten-house cells. The survey also investigates background, attitudinal, and behavioral characteristics of the local leaders. Selection of the sample of leaders to be interviewed is made in terms of positions held or identification by other leaders, and it is not assumed that this sample constitutes the local power elite. A separate sample of cell leaders is also drawn, constituting twenty percent of the cell leaders in Moshi town.

The principal conclusion reached from this examination of decisions, structures, and leaders is that there is no cohesive elite in the district, but rather a number of informal networks or factions revolving around particular leaders, which alternatively compete for power and form coalitions. Membership in these factions is restricted to a narrow, although relatively open, stratum of the Kilamanjaro populace, which is thus able to exclude a substantial majority of local people from effective access to leadership positions. Samoff is not willing to say, in this book, that there are clearly defined classes, class interests, and class conflicts in Kilamanjaro, but he implies that there is a definite trend in that direction. It is the effective articulation of these nascent class interests which creates the paradox of self-reliant development discussed above.

A related and also significant conclusion concerns the role of the party — at that time TANU. The party is seen as caught up in paradoxes which are both causes and consequences of the paradox of self-reliant development: conflicting political and economic goals, incompatibility of ambitious goals and humanpower weaknesses, and contradiction between the need for effective local branches and dynamic associated groups and the unwillingness to grant them autonomy. Because of the inability to resolve these

paradoxes, combined with the emphasis placed on strengthening the role of the party, TANU is more an arena within which most conflicts must be resolved than a mechanism for resolving them. Yet Samoff is convinced that the party has had some success in facilitating change, and that it is the organization with unique potential for facilitating more basic change in the future.[2]

Although Samoff's more recent publications emphasize different concepts and do not utilize the same type of detailed field research, they do pursue the general theoretical and substantive questions raised in **Tanzania,** and many of the same specific hypotheses, while adding a very strong concern with class analysis as a necessary, although not fully developed, theoretical supplement. To understand the similarities and differences between his earlier and later work, and to defend the thesis that the latter makes only additions to the former, it is necessary to present a detailed analysis of Samoff's major theoretical statement: "Class, Class Conflict, and the State in Africa." Otwin Marenin has recently written that, in the article, Samoff calls for a fundamental methodological reorientation without developing the nature of this reorientation fully, while at the same time affirming much of the methodology he criticizes.[3] My interpretation is quite similar, but, I believe, is a more complete portrayal of Samoff's position, especially when related points made in his other recent publications are also taken into account. The extent to which the addition of class analysis requires development of the fundamental methodological reorientation which Samoff proposes can be questioned, and this can be done most effectively if the points on which Samoff affirms the broadly positivist methodology utilized in **Tanzania** are discussed first, followed by a presentation of the ways in which he rejects this methodology, and an attempt to synthesize these two sides of his work.

As a first point of affirmation, Samoff emphasizes that he remains an empirical scientist, but believes that he is now a better one. Second, as a scientist he wishes to explain in terms of theory, although he now demands that theory be truly dynamic. Such theory takes the form:

> . . . if the gravitational force operates in a certain way, then certain results should occur. To the extent that the expected results do not occur, theories must be either modified or rejected and alternative formulations that can incorporate the perceived events must be developed.[4]

2. I have used **Tanzania** as an important source for developing generalizations about party structures and functions in Anglophone Africa in my "The Diffusion and Invention of Legislative and Party Structures in Anglophone Africa," in Scarritt, ed., **Analyzing Political Change in Africa** (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 164-77 and fn. 48, 60, 64, 71, 72, and 77.

3. Otwin Marenin, "Essence and Empiricism in African Politics," **Journal of Modern African Studies,** 19 (March 1981): 17-19.

4. "Class, Class Conflict, and the State in Africa," p. 114. Samoff's commitment to science is expressed in **Ibid,** p. 113, and in "Crises and Socialism in Tanzania," p. 282.

Put slightly differently:

> The study of class and class conflict requires a process of making approximations and drawing inferences, repeated in successive iterations. A hypothesis about the nature of fundamental relationships is matched against the available data (themselves in part a function of that and other hypotheses). The original hypothesis is then corrected, refined, and amended, and again matched against the data. The best-fitting and most-encompassing hypothesis can be accepted as tentatively confirmed, and then used to generate further data. Those data then serve for further checking and refinement.[5]

Marenin states that: "The method of reiterative approximations seems remarkably non-distant from normal science . . "[6] I would only add that there is disagreement among "normal scientists" over the role of deduction and induction, and Samoff rejects the strong inductivist position.

Third, Samoff states in a number of different ways that class does not explain everything, and that it must be related to other forms of organization and conflict to attain complete explanation. Prominent among these other forms are ethnicity, politics, and culture (education-socialization-ideology). Classes are defined in terms of their role in production and their opposition to other classes. This opposition may be predominantly ethnic, political, or cultural, as well as economic. "Politics, as one dimension of human behavior, requires its own analysis, neither losing sight of its intersection with other dimensions nor subsuming it within other dimensions."[7] Since each dimension is capable of being dominant in particular situations, the analysis of class, dependency, inequality, or alienation requires examining all dimensions. "The very notion contradiction would make little sense if there were no tension between economy (base) and polity (superstructure) and if it were not possible for the polity to dominate the economy."[8] "The state is always relatively autonomous"; it is also becoming more important in the productive process; and politics in the broader sense, which includes mass participation, is crucial in generating change in the absence of a revolutionary situation.[9]

Fourth, Samoff makes a number of specific suggestions about ways in which class analysis can be carried out, and most of these involve relating class to other concepts which are similar to those utilized in **Tanzania:**

5. "Class, Class Conflict, and the State in Africa," p. 123.

6. Marenin, p. 18.

7. "Class, Class Conflict, and the State in Africa," p. 117. The related points in this paragraph are found on pp. 109-11, 117-18, and in "The Local Politics of Underdevelopment," p. 402, "Transnationals, Industrialization, and Black Consciousness," pp. 505-6, and "Underdevelopment and its Grass Roots in Africa," pp. 31-2.

8. "Class, Class Conflict, and the State in Africa," p. 117.

9. "Ibid, p. 123, and "Crises and Socialism in Tanzania," p. 282.

levels of analysis, conflict, collectivities, alliances, and institutions.[10] Classes exist at various levels, from the world system down to local communities. They are manifested somewhat differently at different levels, creating the need for a series of nested explanations which relate class to the other specific factors relevant at each level. In contrast to some dependency theorists, Samoff identifies the major locus of class conflict in the contemporary African situation as being within nation-states.

Since classes are defined partly in terms of opposition, they can be seen most clearly in conflict situations, especially those involving fundamental conflict over material resources, power, or ideology. Since every conflict is not a class conflict and only parts of classes are usually involved in conflicts, class and conflict are separate concepts. Because they are parties to conflicts, classes must be collectivities rather than merely the sum of individual attributes. They are not decomposable into discrete individuals, according to Samoff, because this would eliminate the (largely conflictual) internal and external relationships which define a collectivity. The presence of internal conflicts within the ruling class is to be expected because this class is always in fact an alliance of classes, and there are constant pressures working to split up this alliance, as well as other pressures working to hold it together. These conflicting pressures are a major reason for the significance of the polity. Institutions, especially political institutions, are both the arena for, and an important outcome of, class conflict; their complex relationship to classes can thus be studied empirically.

Finally, Samoff is quite critical of mechanical class analyses, such as that of Issa Shivji, which do not take into account the relationships spelled out in the two preceding paragraphs, and which claim that all events contribute to the maintenance of existing class relationships.[11] But Samoff also criticizes Shivji for defining class in static and positional rather than dynamic and relational terms, reminding us that we need to examine the other side of the former's approach: his assertion of the need for a fundamentally different methodology.

This call for a new methodology is based on Samoff's acceptance of Marx's philosophy of internal relations, as explicated in detail by Bertell Ollman.[12] In this approach classes are relations, not in the "normal science" sense of being composed of related but separate variables or of being related to other separate aspects of social life, but rather in the sense

10. These suggestions are made in "Class, Class Conflict, and the State in Africa," pp. 113-19. "Education in Tanzania," pp. 68-9, "The Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie," pp. 54-6, and "Underdevelopment and its Grass Roots in Africa," pp. 25-7.

11. "The Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie," pp. 47-51. Shivji's major work is **Class Struggles in Tanzania** (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1976).

12. Bertell Ollman, **Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society**, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, London, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

of being, by definition, part of both their own "parts" and the other aspects of social life to which they are related. Class and mode of production cannot be treated as separate concepts; neither can class and opposition, class and the state, class and ethnicity, or class and culture. Since the complex set of relations which makes up social life at various levels of analysis (levels which overlap because they are also relations) is constantly changing and contains many contradictions, the definitions of various concepts must also constantly change, and must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate contradictions. Thus a class cannot be adequately defined positionally because both the mode of production and opposition from other classes are constantly changing and internally contradictory. The nature of these changes and contraditions cannot be understood apart from the context of the total set of relations. The analyst must focus simultaneously on structure and movement, but must not confuse true dynamics with commparative statics. Thus the purpose of explanation through reiterative approximations is to clarify relations so defined, a purpose very different from that of "normal science." A further difference is that the fit of an explanation " . . . has to do not only with matching reality but also with facilitating movement," an indication of the unity of theory and practice.

Adherence to the philosophy of internal relations does indeed require ". . . entirely different concepts, categories, definitions, and even rules for scientific inquiry" from those utilized in positivist methodology.[13] Samoff suggests that this must be a dialectical methodology in which the variables are non-parametric, discontinuous, and non-linear (which also excludes multi- and curvilinear); they are not observed directly, but their effects are ascertained through inference in the process of reiterative approximation. Both variables observable only through inference from their effects and non-parametric variables (those not assumed to have a known distribution of values, often a normal distribution) are commonly employed in positivist methodology, and a technique such as interrupted time series analysis is designed to analyze discontinuity in the values, although not the definition, of variables. Complete non-linearity, however, is the absence of a stable relationship among variables. As Marenin points out:

> Putting the three traits of variables in the new paradigm together, we get the argument that all variables, and the concepts which they represent, are fluid, non-stable, open-ended, and that all relationships among them are possible. A cause can have all effects, and all effects can have the same cause. No proof or disproof is possible, because the nature of variables and their relations

13. This side of Samoff's approach is presented in "Class, Class Conflict, and the State in Africa," pp. 111-14, 118-21, 123-24. The quotations are from pp. 123 and 113.

cannot be stated except contextually, and since all contexts are unique, a failure to find a hypothesized relationship is no disproof, nor can finding the relationship be proof. How data are used to correct, refine, and amend, except in fairly arbitrary ways, is again unclear. Concepts which are non-parametric and discontinuous, and have non-linear relationships to each other, are immune to data.[14]

Since these consequences are so different from either side of Samoff's conception of explanation, as presented above, and because the philosophy of internal relations presumes the existence of relationships, I conclude that Samoff does not mean to espouse completely non-linear variables. His development of this point is apparently in its early stages, as he indicates that it is difficult to identify a substantial body of work in political science that focuses on the methodology needed for such variables.

Samoff does not develop his point about observation by inference beyond suggesting that the effects of class are most obvious in conflict situations, but he does give examples of what he means in his later empirical publications and in his criticisms of Shivji. The latter infers the presence of ruling class interests simplistically in every event, while Samoff believes that the effects of class are complicated by its previously discussed relationships to other variables. Thus a partial synthesis between the two sides of his work would take the form that the process of politics as described in **Tanzania** (and similar processes of economics, ethnicity, and education-socialization-ideology formation) is both real and significant, and can be studied by positivist methodology, but that beneath this level of reality is another (essential) level-class — which must be studied by a dialectical methodology.

I would go further and say that the wholism and complexity encompassed in the philosophy of internal relations could be translated into a complex set of relational (in the "normal science" sense) concepts and hypotheses, including many of those presented in **Tanzania** and the concept of role defined in terms of behavior, without any significant loss of meaning. Class as a collectivity comprised of roles could then be studied — still through inference and approximation — utilizing selected positivist methods, although there would have to be considerable innovation of specific techniques. Samoff's theoretical position would, of course, deny this possibility, but I suggest that he comes close to realizing it through the way in which he utilizes the above-mentioned positivist aspects of his methodology in his recent empirical work. I will conclude this review essay be examining some of that work briefly from this perspective.

Most of Samoff's recent publications continue his substantive focus on Tanzania. but he has also turned his attention to South Africa and to

14. Marenin, p. 19.

regional-local underdevelopment in comparative perspective. Because of space limitations and my focus on comparing his later work with **Tanzania,** I will analyze only his work on Tanzania, but his other recent writing could also be used to make the same point.

Samoff's position in the debate over what is really happening in Tanzania is somewhere in the middle. He now says that there are classes in Tanzania, and that they are crucial to the explanation of events in that country, but the class system is both fluid and complex. A bureaucratic class rules rather tenuously at the national level. It was initially an organized collectivity consisting of those who operated the state machinery, but became a class when it used this machinery to build an economic base consisting of control of public corporations supplemented by limited private wealth. It is intermediary between transnational corporate capital and various potential allies within Tanzania, among whom it is closest to the petty bourgeoisie, both urban and rural (kulaks). There is conflict within the bureaucratic class over which alliance should be dominant. The local petty bourgeoisie in Kilamanjaro and other regions is divided by a similar conflict, often between its commercial and political branches, over whether to align with the bureaucratic class or with national reformers and local smallholders and workers.

In this situation there are pressures for a transition to socialism, which come " . . . from a relatively few socialist militants, or perhaps anti-capitalist revolutionary democrats, both within and outside the small bourgeoisie"[15]; from President Nyerere's moral force exercised through the interpretation of ideology; and, most significantly, from the defensive radicalism of the ruling class — the espousal of an undefined socialism designed to convince potential domestic opponents that meaningful change is taking place. Samoff stresses that, in contrast to "Tanzaphobes," he believes that some significant changes have taken place, especially when the short time period since independence and the immensity of the obstacles encountered are taken into account. These changes include economic growth, the reduction of inequality, restraint on ruling class accumulation, substantial nationalization, regional reallocation of resources, the unseating of numerous local leaders, and enactment of the participation-engendering TANU Guidelines. The switch from a liberal to a radical strategy, which accounted for many of these specific changes, took place while the bureaucratic class petty bourgeoisie alliance was consolidating its

15. "Crises and Socialism in Tanzania," pp. 286-7. This summary of Samoff's recent writings on Tanzania is based on all of that article, as well as on "The Local Politics of Underdevelopment," pp. 411-32, "Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Power in Tanzania," pp. 7-24, "Education in Tanzania," pp. 57-68, "The Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie," pp. 30-57, and "Beyond Tanzaphobia," pp. 163-68.

position. Surviving recent economic crises is seen as additional evidence of vitality, even though these crises have created an impasse in the radical strategy.

In contrast to "Tanzaphiles," Samoff clearly recognizes that the ruling alliance has successfully minimized change in a number of respects. For example, decentralization, which many hoped would increase mass participation in development efforts, has instead institutionalized and legitimized a technocratic view of development and thus the power of technocrats. Cooperatives and villagisation have increased the kulaks' control of agricultural production. Political and administrative consolidation has been the dominant trend in recent years. The effects of Nyerere's ideology have been limited by counterinterpretations which favor bureaucratic and petty bourgeois interests.

Yet the hegemony of the ruling alliance is far from complete, the tension between participation and control remains unresolved, and both innovation and conflict continue to be prominent features of the Tanzanian scene. The recent setbacks in the radical strategy should not be viewed as its final failure. It is often necessary to delay some conflicts in order to prevail in others, and the current trend toward consolidation coexists with a reaffirmation of the transformationist strategy. More specifically:

> Between each renewal of [the] commitment to participatory decision-making, the critiques of whatever was the current arrangement — pointing out the practical exclusion of most lower level participation — percolated through both the local and international media. That in itself is testimony to the openness of Tanzania's political system, and its continually renewed dedication to monitoring and self-evaluation . . . As each initiative in the direction of socialist construction begins to take form, its opponents — both those structurally disadvantaged by it, and those whose original support (their defensive radicalism) was never solid — seek to divert and distort the outcomes. As those diversions become clear, as Tanzania's openness enables subordinate groups to manifest their discontent, an alliance able to begin a new initiative emerges. As changes occur, opponents regroup and reassert themselves.[16]

Samoff believes that, although it is undermining its mass base by minimizing participation, the bureaucratic class-petty bourgeoisie ruling alliance can remain in power for some time as the coexistence of contradictory tendencies continues.

If this summary of Samoff's recent writings on Tanzania accurately portrays their theoretical premises as well as their substance, it demonstrates that the underlying reality of class is crucial to his explanation of events, that this explanation does involve inference, and that making logical (and positivistic) inferences integrates class very effectively into the network of collectivities and roles which constitutes Tanzanian

16. "Crises and Socialism in Tanzania," pp. 304-5.

society without using a fundamentally new methodology or relying on the philosophy of internal relations. In my view this is the best route to powerful and valid explanation of African politics and society, and therein lies the greatest significance of Samoff's work. But whether class and politics are to be studied by the same or different methodologies, Samoff has made a substantial contribution by showing the complex ways in which they are related.

On Class, Paradigm, and African Politics

Joel Samoff

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Since Professor Scarritt has been in general quite fair to my work in his review, and since most of that work has been published, both the work and the review should stand on their own. The participants in this debate are many, and each will find points of agreement or disagreement. I want here to address several of the major themes in Professor Scarritt's discussion.

Professor Scarritt's major analytic concern is to highlight the advantages of a theoretical eclecticism in the study of African politics, and particularly the use of class analysis as a supplement to other approaches, and thus to reject my claim of the incompatibility of paradigms. As he presents it, his case is quite strong. Why not consider the analysis of class a welcome addition to our analytic tool kit? And, my comments on incompatibility notwithstanding, is that not what I have done over the several publications he has reviewed?

Perhaps. But I think not. To respond to these questions, it is important to recapture the context of the argument that I presented in "Class, Class Conflict, and the State in African Politics."[1] My starting point, influenced by Kuhn's work on the nature of intellectual change in the physical sciences,[2] is the sense that western social science is currently in a

1. **Political Science Quarterly** 97, 1(Spring 1982): 105-127. Note that this is a revised, and somewhat abridged, version of the earlier paper, "Class, Class Conflict, and the State: Notes on the Political Economy of Africa" (African Studies Association Annual Meeting, 1977).

2. Thomas Kuhn, **The Structure of Scientific Revolutions**, 2nd edition, (University of Chicago Press, 1970)

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period of paradigmatic change. I take the prevailing paradigm to be positive social science.[3] In this perspective, the host of approaches often labeled paradigms, including, for example, systems theory, structural-functionalism, and interest group pluralism, are understood as the very rich and broad variation within normal science. In recent years, many of those approaches have been challenged. The challenges have been both intellectual (focusing on flawed assumptions and logic, on narrowness and ethnocentrism, and on the inadequacies of empirical analysis) and political (stemming from turmoil in actual political systems, especially following decolonization, and from the insistence by political actors that the dominant approaches cannot adequately explain the reality with which they are grappling and which they are trying to change). Within those challenges to particular approaches there are the seeds of a more fundamental challenge to the prevailing paradigm itself and the accompanying efforts to devise an alternative paradigm.

The challenges are, I think, sufficiently advanced to produce a crisis of theory. That crisis is visible in the efforts to study the contemporary Third World, where a focus on development and modernization has been challenged from both within and outside its assumptions, and where the challengers have focused on underdevelopment and dependence. Although the development and modernization orientation continues to be widely employed, it is, as I have argued elsewhere, decaying and likely to be discarded. Kuhn's work on paradigmatic change is important here in its stress on the non-scientific nature of the process by which paradigms are discarded and adopted. Within the prevailing paradigm there are always practitioners of normal science whose findings challenge that paradigm. But paradigmatic change does not result from the incremental accumulation of those challenges until some threshold is reached where the overwhelming weight of scientific evidence forces the adoption of a new paradigm. Not at all. A prevailing paradigm has active practitioners and staunch defenders right up to the moment of its displacement, and perhaps beyond. The transition from one paradigm to another is fundamentally a political process, and has to do with conflict and power at a particular historical moment. That moment cannot be predicted in advance. What can be clear, however, is the increasing intellectual conflict and disarray as the challenges to the prevailing paradigm mount. In that crisis of theory, that moment of paradigmatic change, there are openings for many new approaches, most of them heavily influenced by the prevailing paradigm and most of them claiming to be *the* new alternative. That is necessarily a chaotic moment, since the ambiguities and inconsistencies of the new paradigm are not resolved until it has become the

3. I find useful as framework the broad theoretical overview of Alvin Gouldner, especially in **The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology** (New York: Avon, 1970).

prevailing paradigm (and even then, never fully). (We must be careful not to confuse the systematic and orderly process by which we reconstruct past intellectual developments with the chaotic, even anarchic, process by which major intellectual developments take place.) It should not surprise us, therefore, that in a period of paradigmatic change alternatives are not clearly developed, that there is a good deal of borrowing among approaches, and that the debate among scholars is strident and ascerbic.

It is in that context that I think the major tasks for students of African politics are critique and synthesis. Critique requires using the insights and tools of the prevailing paradigm to understand it thoroughly, to identify its incapacities, and to reach beyond it. Synthesis requires transcending the critique, and thus incorporating the insights and tools of the prevailing paradigm in the construction of its successor. A new synthesis will draw its strength from, and contribute to, efforts to remake society, both locally and globally.

Within the critique that has concerned me in the works reviewed by Professor Scarritt, I have attempted to make two major points, each addressed to a different set of students of African politics. On the one hand, my concern was to speak with those involved in positive social science. My point there was to suggest that to detach key critical constructs from their theoretical roots and analytic frameworks transforms them so fundamentally that even though the same terms may be used, the subsequent discussion is no longer about the original constructs. For example, the construct *class* is used by particular authors (those who work within what might loosely be called the marxian tradition) to characterize groups in society by reference to their role in production and their opposition to other such groups. These scholars start with the notions that conflict is a normal feature of human society and that the relationship between humans and their material world is a fundamental one. They also posit that in a society dominated by a capitalist mode of production major conflicts will be organized around the efforts of competing groups to control wealth (value) and therefore production (the creation of value) and the organization of production (the distribution and appropriation of value), and that the behaviors of those groups are dynamic engines for social change. From those starting points, these analysts focus on class and class conflict. Their primary concern, however, is not to develop descriptive categories or to construct typologies, but rather to identify sources of structural change.

To redefine class as stratum (a slice of society organized hierarchically according to some convenient principle), however useful a description of social stratification may be, is to lose the analytic power of the original con-

struct. In the first sense, class is a relationship, defined simultaneously by structure and process, and studied indirectly by focusing on its behavior. In the second sense, class (stratum) is a concrete category, whose membership can be defined explicitly and which can therefore often be studied directly. In the first sense, class is understood to be a collectivity, with an existence only as a collectivity in opposition to other collectivities. The study of class in this sense can only rarely make use of available techniques for manipulating quantitative data, since most of those techniques depend on the existence of discrete and independent variables that can be arrayed on ordinal, ratio, or interval scales. In the second sense, class (stratum) can often be decomposed into its constituent individuals, whose attitudes, values, and behaviors can be surveyed and aggregated. The study of class in this sense can often make use of the techniques for manipulating quantitative data, since the relevant variables can be defined discretely and independently, since the basic unit of analysis can be the individual, and since relevant data can be arrayed on ordinal, ratio, or interval scales.

Dependence, a key construct in the critique of the prevailing paradigm, offers another example of the confusion that results when an analytic construct is detached from its theoretical roots. Employed in its most powerful form, dependence has to do with peripheralization, or peripheral incorporation, in a global system. It offers a characterization of the world at a particular moment, stressing the extent to which choice within particular states is constrained by the nature of their incorporation into the global order and by the process by which that incorporation is itself internalized within each dependent state. In this sense, dependence is a construct for linking the structure of the economy to the organization of power, to the stratification of society, and to the elaboration of particular ideologies. In this sense, dependence is neither a theory (it is a constuct that seeks to capture the state of affairs within a theoretical framework that might be called underdevelopment, or more broadly, marxian) nor a variable (notions of degrees of dependence, like degrees of pregnancy, make little sense in terms of the underlying phenomenon, even though we may find it convenient in everyday discourse to talk about both more-or-less dependent states and more-or-less pregnant women). Dependence may be construed as a relationship, whose varying forms are important to study, but even this variation is little amenable to the requirements for interval scales. This is not to say that there are no important differences among, say, Chad, Nigeria, and South Africa. Nor is it to say that modest and subtle variation and differentiation are unimportant. Rather, the major value of the construct dependence is to assist us in identifying the extent and nature of the constraints on ideas and politics (as well as patterns of production and trade) in those states, constraints whose character differs

fundamentally from similar processes in the United States, Belgium, and the Soviet Union.

It certainly makes sense in the English language to say that Chad is dependent on France, or that Nigeria is less dependent now than it was before there was significant exploitation of petroleum resources. And it might well be possible to devise suitable indicators of those dependences (extent of reliance on single export, concentration/dispersion of trading partners, and so on). Such an effort might make us much better informed about Chad, or Nigeria, or South Africa, and it might strengthen our understanding of dependence in this sense. But dependence in this sense is not at all the same construct as that discussed earlier. To detach dependence from its theoretical roots, to convert a construct for characterizing a system or key relationships within a system into a variable, to confuse the variable with its indicators (that is, to take trade concentration and the rest as dependence), and to produce scales of dependence is to lose the analytic power of the original construct, which requires us to address, and attempt to understand, fundamental structural relationships among states and classes on a global scale.

The publications reviewed by Professor Scarritt have addressed a second critique to those scholars who work within the critical orientation, who emphasize notions of conflict, class, contradiction, underdevelopment, and the like, and who claim to reject the prevailing paradigm. The point here is that transcending the prevailing paradigm is not simply a matter of politics. Rather, that transcendence requires a methodological, as well as political break. That is, it is insufficient to say "I shall self-consciously identify myself with a more Africa-centered perspective and thus focus on underdevelopment rather than development, but in doing so I shall continue to use the same general approach and methodology, since the scientific method is a matter of science, not politics." My argument is that this position is ultimately self-defeating, since its analytic deficiencies and flawed findings result more from the paradigm employed than from the scholar's politics. Those scholars who focus on the political elite in Africa (understood as a stratum defined by position, or by level of education, or by socio-economic status, or by some combination of all of those), whether they emphasize depoliticization or participation, authoritarian rule or democracy, international or national concerns, or institutions or ideas, all lose the insight gained from a conceptualization of class and class conflict because the methods employed to study strata are inadequate for studying classes. These two — the study of class and the study of stratifi-

cation — are not incompatible (indeed, careful research on class conflict will draw on the insights derived from elite studies), but they are not the same. Students of stratification and class conflict each attend to the others' concerns, but in doing so they each assign those concerns to a subordinate role in the theoretical framework.

Kuhn is again helpful, stressing the paradigm-dependence of approach and method. There is not, nor can there be, a scientific method, defined and understood independent of paradigm (in Kuhn's sense of grand scale unifying construct and world view). Each paradigm includes specifications for a scientific method, including rules for verification and validation. Those specifications make little sense when removed from their paradigmatic context. Notions of internal relations, the assertion of the impossibility of separating fact from value, and cause from effect, and the insistence that the observer be involved in the phenomenon being observed make little sense in positive social science. So indeed do notions of the independence of phenomena, the assertion of the necessity of separating fact from value and cause from effect, and the insistence that the observer be detached from the phenomenon under observation make little sense in marxian social science. Critics of the prevailing paradigm who fail to make the methodological break, I am arguing, are unlikely to proceed beyond critique toward synthesis.

For both of these points — that constructs rooted in marxian social science make little sense when detached from their intellectual roots and that an effort to go beyond the prevailing paradigm requires different methodological constructs as well as a different sense of priorities or a different priority order for concepts — there is a corollary, and that is that the resulting theoretical orientation must avoid both a mechanical determinism and an unbounded voluntarism. People make choices about their societies, and those choices matter. But those choices are not made in an empty field, and the nature of the field also matters.

The effort to speak to both of these sets of scholars highlights the frustrations of attempting to nurture the debate on these issues. It is not uncommon for those who work within the prevailing paradigm and those who begin by criticizing it to find they have difficulty talking together. The one says, put your research in scientific terms and we can discuss it fruitfully, while the other says, it is your work that is ideological. This difficulty of discussion should not surprise us, since even the language of discourse is to a significant extent paradigm-specific, especially when the discourse is about scientific method, validation, and verification.

Professor Scarritt's quotation from Marenin makes this difficulty to communicate poignantly clear. As well, it helps to explain my sense that qualitative improvements in the study of African politics require a metho-

dological break and not simply adding new constructs to those already available in a framework of theoretical eclecticism. Marenin says that the logic of my argument means that a cause can have all effects and all effects can have the same cause. Quite so. That is precisely what the study of internal relations is intended to elucidate. To fail to recognize these interrelationships is, in terms of the theoretical orientation in which the notion of internal relations is developed, quite unscientific and ideological. Marenin goes on to say that the logic of my argument makes proof and disproof impossible and thus makes the argument immune to data. Here, too, we miss each other. The theoretical framework within which my argument is elaborated not only stresses internal relations, but it also asserts that the reciprocal connections among phenomena are logically prior to notions of casuality. Hence (to switch to terms that are more common in contemporary academic discourse) I am concerned with clarifying and elucidating relationships, and not with establishing casuality in the framework of positive social science. For to establish that sort of casuality requires defining discreetly and exclusively the objects of study (that is, separating cause from effect). From my starting point, those discreet and exclusive definitions require dissecting the object of study from its context, which not only makes it harder to see but which also transforms it in fundamental ways. As well, from my starting point, those discrete and exclusive definitions make it impossible to study systematically those reciprocal effects that constitute the core features of human society.

That is, it is precisely what are usually called rules of science (those that have to do with cause and effect, proof and disproof) that make science (understood in the framework in which I am working) impossible. Marenin takes me to task for paying too little attention to issues of cause and effect and of proof. His implicit assumptions are that we, like all competent social scientists, I presume, share the same understanding of cause, effect, and proof in the scientific enterprise. But it is on those basic assumptions that we disagree. Our debate is not about findings, but about method, and the logic of his argument is that since I cannot demonstrate my case effectively in his terms, my case is probably wrong but surely not worth hearing. Hence, in developing his critique of my work, Marenin shows the inconsistency between my injunctions and what he understands as science, and he presumes that to have done so shows clearly the importance of rejecting that work. From the perspective I am advancing here, what Marenin has shown is the difficulty he and others share in recognizing the possibility of alternative paradigms, in communicating across the paradigmatic divide, and in accepting that what he takes to be science is

scientific only within a paradigm that came to be dominant through a very non-scientific process.[4]

It is useful at this point to turn, very briefly, to recent studies of Tanzania.[5] Much of the recent writing on Tanzania revolves around two puzzles, or rather, two different orientations toward the same puzzle. From one perspective, how is it that the apparent hope and promise of Tanzania in the 1960s — the prospect that a dedicated and honest leadership could mobilize a population of rural farmers to construct a new social order based on cooperation and self reliance, without the violence and trauma of a revolution and without the discord and destruction of a class struggle — has led to a Tanzania in the 1980s apparently unable to feed itself and more dependent than ever on foreign aid and capitalist states? From another perspective, how can we explain the apparently inconsistent ideology and behavior of the Tanzanian leadership — stressing self reliance but increasing dependence, attacking imperialism but wooing the World Bank, mobilizing peasants in self-help programs but suppressing locally-rooted peasant organizations, achieving universal primary education more rapidly than many richer countries but maintaining elitist attitudes among the most educated, creating more and more participatory institutions but leaving effective control to the bureaucrats and technicians, and promoting Tanzanian socialism but at the same time allying with international capital to block socialist construction? Put simply, there seem to be basic inconsistencies between what Tanzania's leaders say and what they do, and incompatibilities between one set of policies to advance a socialist transition and a simultaneous set of policies to protect peripheral capitalism.

Many careful scholars have proposed solutions to this apparent puzzle (that is, they have offered explanations of the Tanzanian political economy). Some focus on the leadership itself, finding it to be more self-serving and less honest than its rhetoric suggests. Some focus on the constraints imposed by the low level of development of Tanzania's productive base (resulting from both the pre-European era and the legacies of European rule): inadequate capital, technology, skills, and

4. I find this especially frustrating, since Marenin, like Professor Scarritt, has offered important insights into the nature and practice of African politics.

5. My concern here is to render the discussion a bit more concrete, but in doing so it is clearly impossible to address systematically and carefully the extensive scholarship on Tanzania. In two recent papers I have developed further some of the themes outlined here and introduced in the work cited by Professor Scarritt. "Pluralism and Conflict in Africa: Ethnicity, Interests, and Class in Tanzania" (Brussels: Round Table on Government in the Plural Societies of Black Africa, organized by the Research Committee on Socio-Political Pluralism of the International Political Science Association, 1982) is concerned with the theoretical, analytic, and political connections among different patterns of social organization. "Socialist Construction and Class Struggle in Tanzania" (Rio de Janeiro: XII World Congress of the International Political Science Association, 1982) argues that a socialist transformation results more from struggle than from planning and includes references to several recent major studies on Tanzania.

entrepreneurship. Some stress the fragility of Tanzania's ecology, especially the impact of drought on rainfall-dependent agriculture. Some argue that socialism is inherently unviable in Tanzania and that therefore the current state of affairs results from efforts to move in an impossible direction. At the same time, others consider contemporary Tanzania to be like much of the rest of post-colonial Africa, governed by a dependent bureaucratic bourgeoisie more concerned with integrating itself into an international bourgeoisie than with promoting autonomous local development, and thus suffering not from too much socialism, but too little. All of these orientations can contribute to our understanding, but they are generally unsuccessful in sorting out the systematic relationships among ecology, organization of production, structure of power, and stratification of society. As well, they find it difficult to explain the apparent inconsistencies and shifts of direction. At base, they are forced to argue that the leadership has been incompetent, or unskilled, or trapped by unfortunate circumstance, or dependent and self-interested.

My argument is that a theoretical framework that focuses on conflict, that assumes there are systematic connections among production, power, stratification, and ideas, that asserts that outcomes are neither largely structurally determined nor largely the result of individual behavior, that regards history as dialectical and contradictory, and that presumes that both the dialectic and the contradictions can be understood, offers a powerful vehicle for studying Tanzanian (and African) politics. Such a framework can help us understand how a genuinely nationalist, dedicated, and honest leadership can pursue policies that perpetuate poverty. It requires us to go beyond appearances, to differentiate, for example, between the crisis of accumulation that slowed foreign investment in the mid 1960s and the crisis of realization that slowed foreign investment in the mid 1970s. It insists that we uncover the roots of an ideology of development that favors technique and administration over politics and mobilization in the nature of the governing class, whose base in the bureaucracy requires a technocratic orientation to protect its own legitimacy. It points us toward the (not accidental) process by which institutions designed to promote popular participation are created (a step toward self reliance and socialist transition) and subsequently reoriented toward the consolidation of bureaucratic rule (a step away from self reliance and socialist transition). And it enables us to understand the shifts and apparent inconsistencies in policy in terms of the struggle for power, locally, regionally, and globally.

This framework is sometimes dismissed as hopelessly removed from local events and dogmatically deterministic (everything is explained as the evil results of external manipulations), and in the hands of some authors it

is. But in large measure that stems from the very concerns I have been discussing here — the practice of detaching major constructs from their theoretical roots (for example, equating dependence with trade concentration and ignoring the internalization of international capitalism within an African country) and the failure to recognize that to go beyond the critique of dominant orientations, alternative perspectives must make a methodological as well as a political break from the prevailing paradigm (for example, to distinguish class from stratum and to recognize that class-as-a-collectivity-that-exists-in-conflict requires a methodology quite different from that used to study horizontal-segments-of-society-conveniently-organized). Far from being distant or deterministic, used creatively and carefully, this framework permits a much more nuanced understanding of Tanzanian politics, precisely because it insists that there are connections among different structures, disparate events, and distant arenas, and that those connections can, and must, be studied.

What I have characterized here as an alternative approach is, of course, neither complete nor unflawed. Nor, if I am right that contemporary social science is in a period of paradigmatic change, could it be. As I have been arguing, what marks its differences from the most common approaches, and what underlies its power, lies not in its politics, but rather in how it goes about framing questions and seeking answers. A critical social science, as it develops its critique of ideas that are widely accepted, both transcends and draws on the insights of those ideas and the wisdom and tools of their practitioners. In that sense, it is not simply a new addition to the intellectual mainstream, like a new and better brick, or architectural drawings that reflect a new esthetic orientation, that open-minded and far-sighted skilled craftspeople can use in their on-going construction project. Rather, a critical social science incorporates the intellectual mainstream as it transcends it, rather as the general theory of relativity maintained Euclid's geometry all the while recognizing and clarifying its limits.

Dialogue remains difficult. Those whose orientation lies close to the intellectual mainstream and who wish to address the issues raised by a critical social science and to challenge its findings will need to recognize that they must study a new language, one that was born in the effort to escape from the constraints of the old language and one whose esthetic motif and grammatical rules seem unfamiliar, implausible, and even unacceptable. Those whose orientation lies within the intellectual counter-currents will need to recognize that to escape from the limitations of contemporary social science they will have to challenge its paradigmatic base as well as its findings. Both of those are major tasks.

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A Look at Books

Clouded Crystal Balls

Peter Koehn

Colin Legum, I. William Zartman, Steven Langdon, and Lynn K. Mytelka, AFRICA IN THE 1980s: A Continent in Crisis. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1979) pp. xiii • 232, $6.95 (p/b).

Africa in the 1980s is part of a series of regional and topical studies commissioned by the 1980s Project of the Council on Foreign Relations. These volumes are aimed at "policy makers and potential policy makers and those who would influence the policy-making process . . . " (p. viii). The Council's past success

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in reaching an influential readership in the United States through publications such as **Foreign Affairs** suggests that **Africa in the 1980s** is indeed likely to be taken seriously by those in key policy-shaping positions. At first glance, therefore, it is intriguing to note that the volume on Africa presents three divergent perspectives on the continent's political dynamics, including one selection (by Langdon and Mytelka) that employs the type of political economy approach that a growing number of scholars in various disciplines have found fruitful in analyzing African conditions and prospects.

When held up against the ambitious objectives set by the Council's 1980s Project, however, **Africa in the 1980s** turns out to be a disappointing book. The stated objective of "identifying goals that are compatible with the perceived interests of most states . . . " (p. viii) receives scant attention between the covers of this volume. Contrary to expectations raised in the introduction by Catherine Gwin (p. viii), no consensus emerges on what constitutes "desirable change" or the principal constraints blocking such change. Although all of the authors attempt to predict the future, the inconsistent and at times contradictory results of this exercise are never resolved in an integrated and persuasive fashion. Moreover, other potentially more valuable objectives of inquiry (such as formulating alternative political strategies for overcoming obstacles to change) are not given sustained recognition in this work. In the end, then, **Africa in the 1980s** begs taking a position on most of the crucial issues facing the continent, a shortcoming made even more apparent by the failure to provide a conclusion to the volume.[1]

In reviewing this book on its own terms, the contributions selected for inclusion in **Africa in the 1980s** can be treated as contending methods of analysis and forecasting. This requires an assessment of the completeness and utility of the alternative explanations and insights afforded by each author's approach. In addition, an effort should be made to reveal how each contributor's predispositions have affected the outcome of his/her prognostication. Forecasts must be based on considered (if not empirically grounded) assumptions and involve specific, unambiguous predictions or propositions regarding issues of major current or future import that are related to one another and to an overall conceptual framework in a reasonably consistent fashion and that stand up over time in the face of events and case study findings. In short, a useful approach should identify and explicate the crucial relationships that will determine the course of change in Africa over the next decade, and serve as an aid in determining the precise significance of observed developments for the future direction, rate, and extent of change. In general, the selections encountered in **Africa in the 1980s** fail to meet these modest expectations. The forecasts proffered in each chapter are impaired by unidimensional analysis, and the Legum and Zartman contributions are characterized by the absence of any systematically developed theoretical grounding.[2]

1. In fairness, this aspect of the book reflects, in particularly striking fashion, the complacency that currently prevails among Africanists with studies that explore phenomena of individually defined interest from whatever more or less explicitly stated perspective the author finds personally appealing.

2. For a more comprehensive approach to the study of political change in Africa, see **Analyzing African Political Change: Applications of a New Multidimensional Framework**, ed. by James R. Scarritt (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980).

Colin Legum's contribution ("Communal Conflict and International Intervention in Africa") emphasized ethnicity as the central variable in African political relations. Although the author warns that "African politics are much less one-dimensional than misinformed Westerners realize . . . " (p. 32) and acknowledges that "the tribal factor is only one element in a complex struggle for power among competing pressure groups or even classes" (p. 30), these qualifications have little effect on the essentially single factor analysis he employs. Legum's preoccupation with ethnic rivalries and conflicts[3] leads him to perceive political instability as "the dominant reality of present-day Africa" and to conclude that "political instability will, if anything, be greater in the 1980s than in the two previous decades" (pp. 36, 65). He also regards African politics as largely contingent upon the orientations held and actions taken by the individuals who temporarily occupy the position of head of state. Thus, on the basis of the trite observation that "there is no certainty whatsoever that any of the present leaders will survive the decade of the 1980s," Legum reaches the conclusion that "*fluidity in Third World political directions is likely to remain a dominant reality in future international relations*" (p. 49; emphasis in original). Aside from its obvious failure to appreciate the breadth and depth of commitment in Africa to such policies as nonalignment, terminating white minority rule in southern Africa, and enhancing economic independence, the shallow nature of this argument is revealed by adopting a broader comparative perspective. The fact that political directions have been more consistent in Kenya after Kenyatta, Senegal after Senghor, and Nigeria after Obasanjo than in the United States after Carter and France after Giscard d'Estaing is directly contrary to what Legum's discussion (e.g., pp. 62-3) leads us to expect.

Such superficial assertions, moreover, comprise the principal "forecasts" found in this selection. At one point (p. 36), Legum maintains that "there is no possible way of evaluating the likely direction of change." This is a curious admission from an author who has agreed to contribute 43 pages to **Africa in the 1980s**. This concession quite starkly reveals the limitations and frustrations encountered when one undertakes to address the challenging topic of change without the benefit of a conceptual framework linked to specific propositions as a guide to analysis and forecasting.

In the second section entitled "Social and Political Trends in Africa in the 1980s," William Zartman initially elects to emphasize problems of resource mobilization on the continent. He expects the "tension between population growth and resources, particularly food" to generate "conflicts that seem to be ethnic or class-based but are fundamentally economic" (p. 70). Zartman never draws a clear distinction between class-based and economic conflicts, although he implies that the latter relate to mobilization and expansion of the resource base and ventures that richer countries "will do better" in this regard than relatively poorer ones (pp. 82-3). Even such simplistic forecasts involve contradictions which Zartman does not fully explore. For instance, he acknowledges that the kind of "development" process he envisions occurring in a few favorably positioned countries "will produce a wide gap between the growing

3. For an extreme version of this position, see his "The Tragedy in Nigeria," **The Observer** (London), October 16, 1960.

modern sector and the rest of the population" (p. 97), without considering the impact of such an outcome on class formation and conflict. Moreover, he maintains that "Africa can increase its agricultural productivity only with truly massive imports of capital (for seed and fertilizer, among other things) and technology . . . " (pp. 80-1). This prescription not only is at odds with what Zartman himself elsewhere identifies as the increasing tendency for African states to seek indigenous solutions to the problems they confront (pp. 71, 107), but its Green Revolution inspiration also holds out little long-term promise of improving living conditions for the landless, addressing environmental threats, reversing existing dependency relations, or benefitting the small-scale cultivators and pastoralists who generate the overwhelming share of Africa's food production.

Zartman also adopts an essentially subjective and impressionistic approach to forecasting. He offers two scenarios for the 1980s, "one 'uneventful' and relatively optimistic, the other 'eventful' and pessimistic" (p. 72). There is no point in reviewing these scenarios in detail. It suffices to note that the "uneventful" one devotes considerable attention to a "Djibouti war" in the early 1980s that ends in a stalemate, and that the "eventful" scenario for the decade provides for a full-scale war in South Africa that results in splitting that country into two parts, and the overthrow of Nigeria's civilian regime by junior military officers, among other major developments. By the end of the 1980s, according to Zartman's "eventful" portrayal, "quarreling breaks out everywhere, economies stagnate and authoritarian regimes multiply . . . " and "the external world decides that Africa is not worth the conquest, . . . leaving the continent a ghetto to fight its own battles" (p. 118).

Zartman's attempt at forecasting is flawed in a number of respects. In the first place, the scenarios he presents are not based on theoretically informed insights, penetrating empirical analysis of current trends and policy directions, or considered treatment of relationships among major change agents and forces. Reflecting little more than pure speculation over "pivotal" events, Zartman's crystal ball gazing is as likely (or unlikely) to anticipate a particular outcome as anyone else's guess. Zartman's projections also appear to have been heavily influenced by the misguided assumption that political dynamics on the African continent are primarily shaped by the status of U.S.-Soviet relations. One of the more obvious pitfalls of this position (which is so popular among the global strategists in control of U.S. foreign policy) is the exaggerated role in the unfolding of both scenarios which Zartman affords to the fate of the Big Power detente (p. 109). In another case, the author portrays subregionalism as "one of the predominant patterns of inter-African relations in the 1980s" (p. 95). Subregional economic associations, however, are projected to break up in his "eventful" scenario and only to take shape slowly in his "uneventful" one (pp. 117, 112-3). In sum, questionable assumptions along with inconsistent and unsupported predictions render entirely unconvincing Zartman's concluding assertion (p. 118) that "each of these scenarios has a *realistic logic* of its own that makes such outcomes most likely" [emphasis added].

Finally, readers may be disappointed by Zartman's failure to take and develop a firm position regarding the probability that one or the other of his scenarios will prevail. His attempt to address this issue is limited to stating (p. 72) that "it is unlikely that the history of the 1980s will closely follow either scenario, but it does appear likely that it will incorporate events from both in some proportion, probably shifting back and forth from one to the other." The

ambiguous and thoroughly qualified nature of this statement reveals the author's own lack of conviction in the utility of his forecasting endeavors. Contemporary political scientists can and should be expected to meet much higher standards of analysis and prognosis than those exhibited in this selection without imposing unattainable demands for predictive accuracy.

In their lengthy chapter on "Africa in the Changing World Economy," Steven Langdon and Lynn Mytelka employ a political economy perspective which focuses on international dependency relationships and class relations on the continent. In contrast with the previous contributors, these authors have presented a cogent conceptual framework (pp. 124-6) and applied it consistently and fruitfully in analyzing constraints on change. Specifically, Langdon and Mytelka identify the continuing process of transnational integration "by which certain periphery groups are drawn more fully into the dynamic core of the international capitalist economy . . . " as a central constraint on rapid transition to new internal political and economic arrangements. According to the authors (pp. 126-7), such linkages are responsible for "increasing segmentation and inequality in many African countries, . . . growing employment problems, and . . . ongoing poverty for most Africans."

In the ensuing application of the political economy approach, the authors carefully distinguish between processes of underdevelopment and development (p. 124) in the historical and contemporary African contexts. Their analysis of post-colonial Africa (pp. 151-88) is particularly solid and persuasively supported with statistical evidence and scholarship drawn from a broad range of country studies and familiar and less widely cited or unpublished literature. It also includes several important contributions to political economy studies, including a critical analysis of the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (pp. 179-88) that seriously undermines Zartman's facile contention (pp. 71, 104) that sub-regional associations "will be able to deal effectively with the North . . . ," and a thorough exposition (pp. 196-200) of the ways in which the Lome Convention perpetuates an extractive role for African economics at the same time that it facilitates direct foreign investments by EEC multinational corporations in ACP countries.[4] The main weaknesses in their treatment of post-colonial African political economies are an inexplicable neglect of the role of labor and the impact of sweeping land reforms, and a failure to define in concrete terms (with reference, for example, to Nigeria or Ivory Coast) the conditions under which a national bourgeoisie attains sufficient "critical mass" to be classified as "large enough to be in competition with the MNC sector . . . " (pp. 190-1).

In their effort to explore directions which self-reliant development strategies might "best take," Langdon and Mytelka call for the expansion of labor-intensive, domestically owned and organized export manufacturing (pp. 200-1), the pursuit of a comprehensively defined "basic needs" approach to rural development (p. 209), the diffusion of technological improvements that are more tightly and effectively linked to the indigenous structure of production (p.

4. These case studies also challenge Legum's assertion (pp. 65-6) that "the achievement of genuine detente between the West and the Soviet bloc will lessen the interests of the major powers in the continent . . . "

210), and the expansion of South-South trade links (pp. 210-11). The authors realistically tie success in the latter realm on the African continent to the overthrow of white-run regimes in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa.

From the quality and quantity of attention devoted to the two endeavors, one can only conclude that Langdon and Mytelka find their framework less useful in forecasting than in prescribing alternative strategies. Thus, the authors oscillate between an optimistic and a pessimistic outlook regarding prospects that obstacles to change will be overcome on the African continent in the 1980s. On one hand, they conclude that "a set of social and economic forces already apparent in the African environment is pushing many African countries toward self-reliant development strategies . . . " (p. 123) and expect "many" governments "to be pushed, by domestic political forces" and by bitter struggles to react against the constraints of periphery capitalism and to adopt alternative approaches that will "benefit the great majority of Africans" (pp. 207-8, 211). Elsewhere, however, Langdon and Mytelka emphasize the "close symbiosis" that exists between "the dominant local classes of such countries and multinational enterprise" and foresee that "local policy is very unlikely to restrict multinational export manufacturing and to try to organize domestic alternatives to it" (p. 204). Given that "significant restructuring of African economies, with wide dynamic advantages for African majorities, cannot be expected to emerge" and the requisite restructuring of the international economy is most unlikely to occur (p. 194), the authors then conclude that "the chances of extensive change . . . appear very limited" (pp. 204-6). The caution and confusion reflected in these contradictory forecasts stems both from the authors' scant attention to micro-level evidence that would allow a more decisive assessment of the relative potency of different trends and from the weaknesses inherent in a conceptual framework that inadequately provides for and explicates the crucial relationships among multiple and diverse sources and directions of change.

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A Survey and Preview of Southern African Politics

Sylvester Cohen

John Seiler, ed., SOUTHERN AFRICA SINCE THE PORTUGUESE COUP (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980) pp. xix, 252; $25.75 hardcover.

In this volume, editor John Seiler and thirteen other experts examine the April 1974 coup in Portugal as "a decisive and irreversible turning point in the political development of Southern Africa." (Introduction, p. xvii) Assessing developments from April 1974 to 1979, they show how the withdrawal of Portugal from Angola and Mozambique, a result of the Portuguese coup, intensified conflicts in the region. According to Seiler's Preface, the collected essays show that outstanding regional conflicts were "no closer to peaceful resolution in late 1979 than they were in early 1976." (p. xv) However, in the case of Zimbabwe, events since the publication of this book have already contradicted Seiler's own scenario for the transition to an independent Zimbabwe, which he posits in the final section, the Conclusion. Since a "massive breakdown of civil order" did not occur during the transfer of power — despite the enmity among black nationalist forces of Zimbabwe — neither the United Kingdom nor its allies had to contend with the issue of unilateral intervention; the former adversaries, the Patriotic Front and the Zimbabwean-Rhodesian forces, cooperated in maintaining order. Thus, "international differences about whom to support" did not arise to "exacerbate the internal fighting" and as Seiler had feared, "extend it to South West Africa/Namibia and South Africa." (p. 235) The one article about Zimbabwe that Seiler includes in this volume has proven more accurately optimistic than Seiler's own Conclusion. In "Zimbabwe and Southern African Detente," C. Munhamu Botsio Utete foresees that the U.K. Conference would lead to Zimbabwean independence. Yet, indeed, as regards the rest of Southern Africa, the other contributors substantiate Seiler's thesis; they address conflicts that remain intractable.

In collecting varied articles "that speak directly to the basic conflicts" in the region, Seiler has preferred academic essays, assessments that relate "detailed descriptions of recent events" to "long-term patterns." (p. xv) These scholarly analyses of past and relatively current events present a credible scenario for the future of the region: Africa and the West will have to contend with Cuban and Soviet influence in the region for a long time to come; with the

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presence of outside influences and other contributing factors, the issue of Namibian independence will not be settled in the foreseeable future; the white power of the apartheid state will remain a key factor in the affairs of Namibia and the rest of Southern Africa; while Pretoria will forge ahead in granting independence to the so-called tribal homelands, it will resist any efforts to bring about meaningful change in its apartheid system and any pressures to relinquish its control of Namibia to the South West African People's Organization.

Seiler organizes the thirteen essays of **Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup** in to six loosely ordered sections. Part One, "The Triggering Event," contains a single essay, Douglas L. Wheeler's "Portuguese Withdrawal from Africa, 1974-1975: The Angolan Case." Wheeler astutely assesses the failures of the Portuguese policies in Angola during the interim between the coup and independence, explaining how Portugal's internal politics and her Angolan colonial officials facilitated the development of the Angolan civil war.

In describing the power vacuum left by the failing Portuguese regime, Wheeler provides a context for Part Two, "The Internationalization of Regional Conflicts: Angola and Its Aftermath." Part Two analyzes Cuban and Soviet efforts to help the MPLA establish control in Angola. Maurice Halperin's "The Cuban Role in Southern Africa" characterizes the evolution of Cuba's interest in Africa, focusing on Cuba's alliance with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) during the civil war. Halperin offers several reasons why Cuba's involvement in Angola will not remain as significant to the region as it initially appeared.(1) Because Cuba hopes to normalize relations with the United States, it is not likely to involve its military forces at a significant level elsewhere in the region; (2) Cuba has to keep its military casualties in Angola and the region to a minimum to avoid unfavorable domestic reactions; and (3) Cuba recognizes "the growing disenchantment of many African governments with imposed 'solutions' to African problems." (p. 41) Christopher Stevens' "The Soviet Role in Southern Africa" explains the evolution of the Soviet Union's interest in Africa, especially its alliance with the MPLA. According to Stevens, the Soviet Union's victory in Angola has enhanced its image in Southern Africa; the African states now see the Soviet Union as a reliable ally, who provides military assistance to its friends in time of need. Stevens suggests that the Soviet Union might request some refueling privileges in return for its support of the governments of Angola and Mozambique.

Part Three, "Territories in Transition? Zimbabwe Rhodesia and South West Africa/Namibia," discusses the two neighboring colonies most affected by the Portuguese coup. In "Zimbabwe and Southern African Detente," Utete describes how Pretoria, acting as the de facto colonial power, unsuccessfully used a carrot-and-stick policy with the frontline states and Ian Smith's government, in trying to forge a settlement of the Rhodesian conflict. He characterizes the later U.S. and British efforts to bring about a resolution of the Rhodesian conflict as efforts that eventually produced the Muzorewa government. Utete astutely analyzes how in 1979 the untenable military situation of the Muzorewa government led to the U.K. Conference. Reviewing Zimbabwe's nationalist politics, Utete clarifies the disputes among the ZIPA insurgents and among various Zimbabwean nationalist leaders, all parties vying for power during the civil war.

After Utete's essay on Zimbabwe comes a discussion of the territory even more affected by the outcome of the Portuguese coup — Namibia; since 1976 it has come under increasing pressure from nationalist insurgents operating primarily from Angolan territory. In "South West Africa," Seiler and Gerhard Totemeyer analyze the political evolution of the Namibian conflict during the mid and late seventies, evaluating the roles played by the various political groups and interested parties.

Both parts Four and Five on South Africa illustrate the continuing centrality of white power in the region. In "South Africa's Regional Role," the one essay of Part Four Seiler discusses South Africa's regional economic and political policies before and immediately after the Portuguese coup. His assessment is clear except in his remarks about one issue, the conditions surrounding "SADF units were at least holding their own against reinforced MPLA and Cuban troops" and that the SADF left Angola "ready to make changes in operations, logistics, equipment, and training to improve SADF performance," Seiler claims "The SADF soundly defeated Cuban forces in their few direct encounters." (pp. 104, 105)

Part Five "The Widening Conflict Within South Africa," contains four essays which deal with the South African internal politics. In "Afrikaner Nationalist Policies," Mary Simon concludes that the Portuguese departure from the region has encouraged the South African government to accelerate its political repression and militarization.

Corroborating Simon's thesis, Roger Southall sees the acceleration of the independence process for the Bantustan homelands as a part of South Africa's efforts to strengthen apartheid after the decolonialization of Portuguese Africa. In his essay, "Independence for the Transkei: Mystification and Diversion on Model Bantustans," Southall says, "officials in Pretoria have no intention that Transkei should become economically autonomous or ever free itself from subordination to the South African economy." (p. 141) Southall goes on to characterize Pretoria's strategies for maintaining the Transkei as a cheap labor source for the South African economy. According to Southall, these strategies instituted after the independence included establishing a black elite composed of civil servants, tribal chiefs, politicians, and small businessmen whose interests parallel those of South Africa.

Assessing South Africa's strategies for racial domination, Donald Baker describes the probable ways South Africa will move to meet the increasing pressures for black participation in the political system of the Republic in "Retreat from Challenge: White Reaction to Regional Events Since 1974." To focus his discussion of two possible directions of South African politics, Baker compares the views of two South African specialists, Heribert Adams and R.W. Johnson. Adams sees South Africa moderating its rigidly defined racial system as it comes under increasing political and economic pressure, which means the *Verligte*, the enlightened wing of the Nationalist Party, will maintain power. However, Baker argues convincingly in favor of Johnson's view that as pressure for black participation in the South African political system increases, *Verkramptes* will come to dominate South African politics.

A slightly more positive view of the South African situation is provided by Noel C. Manganyi's "The Baptism of Fire: South Africa's Majority After the Portuguese Coup." Manganyi characterizes the asymmetrical power relationship between whites and blacks in the South African social structure. In this fascinating psychological study, Manganyi argues plausibly that Afrikaner racial attitudes and behavior have evolved in South Africa according to a "dialectical relationship between social reality," the rationalized institutions and norms of apartheid, and "social fantasy," shared unconscious myths of racial supremacy.

Part Six, "Black African Governments in Regional Politics," appraises the role of black African governments in Southern African politics. "Independent African States and the Struggle for Southern Africa" by Ali Mazrui and David Gordon evaluates the various forms of support given to the liberation movements in Southern Africa. In this essay, Mazrui and Gordon illuminate key contemporary African political concepts and goals. Convincingly they conclude that through the Organization of African States and the United Nations, the African states succeeded in bringing an end to the international acceptability of institutional racism and assuring pressure for its eradication in Southern Africa. In "The Portuguese Coup and Zaire's Southern Africa Policy," Crawford Young views Mobutu's foreign policies in the region during the 1970s. Young offers a rare assessment of the traditional hostility between Zaire and the MPLA. Young describes how the fluctuating economic fortunes of Mobutu's government afflicted Zairian regional policy during the seventies. His assessment could serve as a model for understanding how the changing economic and political fortunes of an African state can rapidly alter its stature and foreign policy. Economic and political problems are also the main focus in Keith Middlemas' essay, "Independent Mozambique and its Regional Policy." He examines the difficulties FRELIMO encountered after being thrust into power by the Portuguese coup. Middlemas captures the essence of the cool and complex relationship between South Africa and Mozambique necessitated primarily by mutual economic interests. The problems Mozambique encountered as host of ZIPA (ZANU) guerrillas during the Rhodesian conflict are realistically appraised in this last essay.

Seiler's final section, the Conclusion, is not an attempt to synthesize the viewpoints of his contributors. Rather, it presents Seiler's own recommendations for Western policy in Southern Africa, significantly toward South Africa. The Conclusion does echo some of the contributors' acknowledgement that all Southern African nations desire regional stability, in Seiler's words, "in order to secure a measure of internal security and the opportunity to concentrate their energies more fully on developmental priorities." (p. 236) However, none of his contributors finally recommends — as Seiler does in the Conclusion — that the West should acknowledge South African "bona fides" as a way of securing regional stability. According to Seiler, the United States in particular should accept using existent "ethnic-based politics and institutions" as a base for the reform of internal racial policies and should encourage more U.S. bank and business investments "in urban and rural development projects backed by South African government investment guarantees." (p. 237) Since he plainly presents this proposal as his own, Seiler is not concerned to say whether his contributors might agree or disagree that the United States should make this "move away from pressure to a posture of constructive criticism vis a vis South Africa." (p. 237) In his brief Conclusion, Seiler does not indicate how a short-term Western policy of accepting tentative change under apartheid would acknowledge his own idea of the most important implication of the 1974 Portuguese coup: that the coup points to the sure end of white hegemony over the region "no matter what residual role or power whites may keep in Zimbabwe Rhodesia, South West Africa/Namibia, and South Africa itself." (p. xviii) In light of this anticipated end of white rule, how might the Seiler policy of constructive criticism provide for long-term stability in Southern Africa?

Nevertheless, Seiler's volume of essays presents the kind of thoroughly-researched analyses that encourage other scholars to continue studies beyond the period which **Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup** covers and to formulate their own conclusions and recommendations. More edited works of this quality would be welcome additions to Southern African scholarship.

A Survey of the Economic Geography of Selected African States

R.A. Obudho

Harm de Blij and Esmond Martin (eds.) **AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES: An Exchange of Essays on the Economic Geography of Nine African States** (New York: Methuen, 1981), pp. xxxviii + 264, Hardcover, $19.95.

The reader contains articles covering the economic and political geography of nine African countries, namely, Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Nigeria, Swaziland, Namibia, and the Republic of South Africa. Except for the chapter on Mozambique, the articles are original contributions that were solely written for this book. According to the editors, the main purpose of publishing these exchange essays was to " . . . bring together the personal, individual, and diverse views of eleven geographers, most of them citizens or long term residents of the countries about which they write and places these opinions before the reader without undue editorial intervention." (p. xi) While the reviewer does not question this noble objective, a casual inspection reveals that the only African contributors are M.O. Filani and J.O.C. Onyemelukwe of Nigeria. Personally, I do not care where the contributors hail from, as long as they are good scholars!

Dr. R.A. Obudho was until recently lecturer of Africana Studies, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey. He is now with the Department of African and Afro-American Studies at the State University of New York at Albany. He has written extensively on urbanization and spatial planning in Africa.

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The reader is organized into nine chapters with an introduction which summarizes the major historical, sociological and econo-political aspects of the countries covered within a microscopic perspective. It has 69 well-drawn figures, author and subject indexes, and extensive notes at the end of each chapter. A bibliography would have been a welcome addition to these essays.

The book may be tedious reading because each chapter tries to cover every aspect of the history, geography, geology, economics, population, sociology, and politics (to mention only a few) of the country covered with a broad sweeping brush. The descriptive materials are held together only loosely by an inadequate conceptual structure. Africa is too large a continent to be covered adequately in a single edited volume, unless the book is topically oriented or the selection of the countries has a regional balance. A chapter on any country in Arab and/or Maghreb Africa would have been a valuable addition to the book. On the whole, this is a very useful and informative collection, valuable mainly for its geographical descriptions of the selected countries rather than any theoretical contribution or the suggestion of implementable development strategies.

Although all contributors mention "development processes" in passing, none of them have prescribed the development remedies. All of the contributors to the volume have succeeded in giving us a long list of spatial problems which are causing the national and regional inequalities in particular and underdevelopment in general, but have not suggested spatial development strategies which we can use to remedy the situation. The spatial problems in Africa, which the contributors have analyzed so well, are due mainly to the type of planning process that has been adopted over the years. In the cases of the nine countries covered in the reader, planning has been mainly from above, with inadequate participation by those most directly affected.

The book makes an important contribution to the literature of African geography and economic development by raising some of the problems facing Africa today. It is well written, and I strongly recommend it to all serious African scholars.

The Free Press – Fair Press Debate

W.A.E. Skurnik

Philip C. Horton, ed. **THE THIRD WORLD AND PRESS FREEDOM** (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), pp. xv, 237, bibliography, $25.95.

Smith, Anthony. **THE GEOPOLITICS OF INFORMATION: How Western Culture Dominated the World** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), index, pp. 181, $13.95.

A significant and strident dispute over the meaning and implications of Third World calls for a New International Information Order has been brewing for many years; but Western media have only recently paid some attention to it. That "interest gap" alone demonstrates western insouciance about the aspirations and demands of developing states and Horton's book could not be more topical.

The Third World has long complained about the news it gets from western wire services — A.P. and U.P.I., Reuter, Agence France Presse — on which it depends for most of its information about the world. [Tass is the other large international agency.] Criticism has centered on two subjects. One is the quantity of news from the Third World, leading to charges of an imbalanced news flow. The proper "balance" remains undefined, but means an acceptable amount of information about developing states. The second criticism, also partially valid, concerns the content of news. Complaints have singled out sensationalistic and simplistic treatment of Third World developments at the expense of analysis, explanation, and discussion of trends; biased and/or ignorant correspondents; the importation of alien values which, according to some, "threaten the peace and security of all nations . . . " (Horton, p. 28); and assaults by neo-colonial multi-national business enterprises, tools of the economic interests controlling capitalist societies. The dissatisfaction with western wire services led to the notion of "developmental journalism," which asserts that reporters must support national development objectives and be agents of change, "soldiers of development." It was inevitable that this notion brought to the forefront the concept of freedom of the press, which in its western incarnation looks askance at government control. Much of the debate has, in fact, centered on press freedom, and added a new dimension to world conflict by polarizing a minority — western nations — against the rest of the world along a kind of North/South cum Socialist axis.

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Much of the discussion about press freedom seems theoretical and removed from reality. Developmental journalism is not very different from the western notion of "social responsibility," except for the matter of ultimate control over the media: development journalism favors government control, whereas the social responsibility thesis favors less direct, societal control. Non-western government spokesmen hold that press freedom is a luxury which developing states cannot afford because of the fragility of social and political systems. Given the many and sometimes severe government constraints under which media must operate in most countries, one might ask how much more control these governments might want. Many practicing Third World journalists in fact view government controls as unwarranted shackles; one of them writes that "a government-controlled press is by its very nature a mouthpiece of those in power" (Horton, p. 131), and that a policy of government handouts, however distributed abroad, would curtail rather than enlarge the flow of news from and about the Third World. While this is undoubtedly a valid complaint, the practical problem is that conditions necessary for a free press — including private financing — simply do not exist in most developing states; hence government financing, and concomitant control, appear inevitable.

The **Third World and Press Freedom** grew out of a 1977 conference at the Edward R. Murrow Center at Tufts University, and goes a long way to review and evaluate the entire controversy from its inception. The two chapters which strike this reviewer as most significant are those of Roger Tatarian, who provides an overview of news flow in the Third World, and Mort Rosenblum, who writes about the western wire services and their operations in the Third World. The editor of the Nairobi **Weekly Review**, Hilary Ng'weno, contributed a brief but succinct plea for greater press freedom, and a chapter by Leonard Sussman of Freedom House details the ideological content of developmental journalism.

Two chapters are devoted to press censorship (in India under Indira Gandhi and in South Africa); nine chapters discuss global and regional news agencies; and one chapter makes explicit suggestions on how to improve the present news flow. The writers seem agreed that smaller, regional news agencies are supplements, rather than substitutes, for the western agencies. Since news media are chiefly national, and solutions to present problems are not viable without government cooperation, proposals for improvement focus on greater public international cooperation — for example material and training assistance by the affluent — and on the need for greater sensitivity by western agencies to the needs of developing states. The overall assessment emerging from this book is that the situation is not nearly so bleak as it might appear. Most western wire services have special services tailored to specific geographic regions — A.F.P. and Reuter for Africa, and A.P. and U.P.I. for Latin America, for instance.

One might add that foreign news coverage in newspapers is a function of determinants other than materials received from wire services. Newspapers are first and foremost national enterprises, and hence foreign news coverage reflects the national interest of the country in which a paper is located. This applies to papers in and outside of the Third World. Something like half of all foreign news published in the last three or four years by international "prestige" papers like **Le Monde** or the **New York Times** covers Third World events, and most Third World papers devote over half of their foreign news hole to developing states, although mostly about their own geographic region.

In sharp contrast to the Horton volume, Smith's **The Geopolitics of Information** ranges far afield on a basis more of stream of consciousness than systematic analysis. The vista encompasses western civilization since its beginning and its [select] relations with other cultures, and the treatment is at times imaginative and provocative. Yet, a 3-page conclusion illustrates the reader's difficulty: search hard to extract questions, answers, and how these interplay.

Some chapters by themselves are worth reading. The first reviews the sweep of European exploration, suggests that the world "has come to be locked . . . into the conceptual embrace of the West," and draws the inference that "modern reporters and the . . . information order . . . " arose from "these mental habits" (p.22). (The chapter also reviews UNESCO's recent activities.)

Next, a chapter on "Cultural Dependence" reviews Canadian-American relations as an example of the "culturally and politically debilitating effects of media dependence"; the substantive discussion is instructive, but no linkage of cultural dependence is demonstrated, and its relation to the Third World is tenuous at best. This chapter, as does much of the book, promises but does not deliver. Discussion about cultural dependence is couched in plausible generalizations, but these rest on self-assertion, **Time** and **Reader's Digest**, for instance, cause "all who are influenced by them to be drawn powerfully into the centre core of American values" (p. 59). ("All who are influenced"? Aside from having questionable meaning, such assertions border on hyperbole.)

Chapter 3, "News Imperialism?" is a competent review of the arguments heard for a decade about print media. One insight is worth noting: that "the newspaper can be the most ethnocentric of media," (p. 68), as anyone familiar with Third World papers can attest. But the chapter's tone is set by the notion that, because of the dominance of western news sources, a more favorable self image of the Third World must be subordinate to changing the West's image of the Third World. That reminds me of the tolerant amusement on the lips of African journalists confronted with examples of western foolishness. Do they really need western help to assume greater self-confidence, or is this suggestion a bit paternalistic?

The chapter also presents an interesting history of the growth of news agencies. It suggests a culpable structural link between the growth of capitalism and of information; this merely begs the question if such links do not exist with other economic systems. One of the unforeseen developments of modern technology is that it silently slips across national political borders almost at will. This "will present a challenge to the autonomy of every institution in modern society," and national sovereignty " as currently understood" will not survive for long (p. 137). Chapter 4, on the New Electronic Order, surveys the political problems attached to the use of inexhaustible communication resources (the electro-magnetic spectrum and geo-stationary satellites), and shows how these affect not merely the UN but even the International Telecommunications Union. Satellites equipped with sensors collect information about natural resources and climate (next year's harvest?); the data are available to anyone at nominal cost, but many developing states do not know about or do not get the information and complain about increased exploitation by large economic firms. The author suggests that the gap and dependence in this kind of technology between rich and poor (and within rich) states will be greater and

have more nefarious consequences than the economic gap. Developing states in the 1980s will seek to cooperate increasingly with each other (and this development, one might add, will increase the present trend toward less global interdependence and greater fragmentation).

In his discussion of "double standards of freedom" (ch. 5), the author reviews well-known material and adds a few frank insights about journalism. The limits on what journalists write, he says, include "the prevailing sense of the plausible, the instinct for what is salient" (p. 151), and these are much more potent than executive or legislative edicts. Moreover, "western, professional standards" are held responsible for the Third World journalists' inability to come to terms with their own society (a phenomenon not different from that affecting physicians, lawyers, or the military, incidentally); yet it is government/party controls which turn them into internal emigres. Here, as elsewhere, two questions are raised implicitly but not answered. One is: is modernization identical with westernization? The other is: are the professional values of journalists universal outside the context of such a discussion? Smith quotes, with approval, Ghana's Essah Commission to the effect that "unpleasant facts do not disappear by being swept under the carpet. They merely fester" (p. 150). Smith's heaping of opprobrium on the West at times borders on the naive. The credibility of western news sources in the eyes of Third World audiences, for instance, may be ascribed not so much to its "superior professionalism" (p. 155) as to less biased — yes, less biased —, more varied, more accurate, and more complete information. Western ideological preconceptions may be heartwarming; but they can also act as blinders. African audiences and journalists are a sophisticated lot, and may not require repeated doses of western paternalism or accounts of their countries which omit the existence of competing elites. The Third World is beginning to reap rewards from a barrage of western values turned against the West; in the West a new breed of observers is coming to life which has laid aside some of its critical faculties. The author does point out, correctly, that "no one expects the Third World pressures to diminish in the 1980s" (p. 173). Smith also recognizes that the demands for a new international information order have been "mean in spirit, ungenerous in sentiment, obsessively petty, insistent upon the obligations of others and . . . niggardly in ascribing difficult duties to its own adherents" (p. 175). Perhaps the January 1982 meeting of UNESCO in Acapulco, Mexico is a harbinger of things to come: ideological fervor was toned down, and the West responded by suggesting that if this continues, its contribution to the development of independent media in the Third World will grow.

Western Imperialism in the 1930s

Colin Darch

Stephen U. Chukumba, **THE BIG POWERS AGAINST ETHIOPIA: Anglo-Franco-American Diplomatic Maneuvers During the Italo-Ethiopian Dispute, 1934-1938** (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977) pp. 496: $11.25.

The Big Powers Against Ethiopia is an extensive treatment of relations between the United States, Great Britain and France on one hand, and Italy on the other, during the Fascist political and military aggression against Ethiopia in the mid-1930s. It covers the period from the Wal Wal incident in late 1934 up to British recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia in November 1938.

Unfortunately the book is far from satisfactory. The collusion of the imperialist powers during the Italo-Ethiopian crisis (curiously described as a "dispute" in Stephen Chukumba's title) is a subject of considerable interest, and one which has not escaped the notice of earlier writers. We have already had such studies as Laurens' monograph on French policy, Harris on the United States' position, and the comprehensive diplomatic history of George Baer, now some 16 years old.[1] There is a substantial periodical literature.

Chukumba offers no critique of this existing literature, nor any justification for his own work in terms of the inadequacy of the previous historiography.[2] He simply asserts that "no serious attempt has, so far, been directed from the African perspective at a comparative study of the role of the three world powers . . . during the entire dispute" (p. ii). This is not true, except at the most literal level: Baer's work is exactly that, although admittedly Baer is not an African. It is not clear, in fact, what Chukumba means by "the African perspective," since the first writer to try to analyse the Ethiopian war as a question of African history rather than of international relations in Europe was the Italian Angelo Del Boca[3]: for Chukumba to return so firmly to the problematic of diplomatic history and then to claim that he writes from an African perspective is bizarre.

The book is written in a wooden narrative style, moving ponderously forward from incident to incident, laboriously footnoting the most obvious points even from secondary sources, reproducing undigested chunks of documentation, and displaying at times an alarming naivete about the nature of imperialist states and their behaviour:

1. F.D. Laurens. **France and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis 1935-36** (The Hague, 1967); Brice Harris Jr., **The United States and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis** (Stanford, Calif., 1964); George Baer, **The Coming of the Italo-Ethiopian War** (Cambridge, Mass., 1967).

2. The review copy contained no bibliography, although the contents page indicates the existence of one.

3. Angelo Del Boca, **The Ethiopian War 1935-1941** (Chicago, 1969).

Colin Darch is a researcher and documentalist at the Centre of African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University, Mozambique.

> One of the most recurrent, and in a way, very unfortunate characteristics of Italo-Ethiopian relations, and, to some extent, of Ethiopian relations with the major European nations prior to 1935, was the lack of mutual trust, which, not unnaturally created difficulties in the way of executing some, if not most, of the provisions of those agreements that were apparently entered into with the best of intentions . . . It is hard to believe that side by side with the proclamation of renewed Italo-Ethiopian friendship [in 1928] and a new determination for economic cooperation between the two countries, was an Italian preparation for a possible armed invasion of Ethiopia (p. 38).

To describe Ethiopian mistrust of the European powers — after Maqdala, Adowa and the partition of Somalia and Eritrea — as "unfortunate" is startling; but to believe that the Italians were incapable of signing cooperation agreements while simultaneously plotting aggression is astonishing. The history of colonialism is full of exactly this kind of duplicity by all the European powers involved; but this is not the place to catalogue examples. Chukumba's attribution of such singleness of purpose to the many agencies of the Italian state shows a certain innocence of factional infighting, even assuming the "best of intentions."

Chukumba approaches his subject with only the most sketchy of theoretical frameworks. He argues correctly that colonialist ideology played an important role in preparing the way for a general acceptance in European eyes[4] of Italy's right to conquer and "civilize" the "backward" Ethiopians, but he fails to relate this perception either to the crucial and very specific politico-economic characteristics of Italian colonialism in the Horn, or to international relations as a world system. The crisis of 1934-8 can be seen as the culmination of a long struggle for hegemony between an indigenous feudal ruling class and the weak national capital of Italy, frustrated in its colonial ambitions, in the context of the struggles between French, British, Belgian and Portuguese capitals for the control of the rest of Africa. Italy's brief and partial success in 1936 can only really be understood when it is related to Anglo-French fear of a reemergent Germany, as well as to the internal dynamic of Ethiopian feudalism and the consolidation of the colonial system during the period.

Chukumba dismisses the first part of this thesis as "unhistorical," without putting forward any substantive counter-argument. Similarly, he describes the war as "a test case for America's moral influence in the world;" such sweeping irrelevancies actually impede our knowledge of the problem.

In the years since the downfall of Haile Selassie small but significant advances have been made in the construction of a materialist history of the Horn of Africa. The national question in Ethiopia, the process of state formation and class formation, the relationship of the local ruling classes to imperialism, and the agrarian question, have all at long last appeared on the agenda. The Italo-Ethiopian crisis is clearly a central conjuncture in such an historiography. Chukumba's work, however, remains squarely within a highly conventional diplomatic problematic. Not only is Baer's book a much better example of the genre; but unhappily for Chukumba, the genre itself was overtaken by the events of 1974, which demanded and are receiving the reconstruction *de novo* of Ethiopian history.

4. The war's impact on West African nationalist politics was substantial: see S.K.B. Asante, **Pan-African Protest: West Africa and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis, 1934-1941** (London, 1977).

A Guide to Soviet Literature on the Horn

Paul E. LeRoy

Colin Darch, **A SOVIET VIEW OF AFRICA. An Annotated Bibliography on Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti.** (Boston, Mass., G.K. Hall & Co., 1980) hardcover 200 pp. $30.00.

This volume is a useful though not comprehensive reference work by a scholar who for several years served as acquisition librarian at the then Haile Selassie I University (Addis Ababa University), initially under Mrs. Rita Pankhurst and later Dr. Mitikou Ourgay. Among his responsibilities was to cooperate with the Institute of Ethiopian Studies seeking Ethiopiana in any language or form. It was then he began to take note of materials in Russian. He follows the Library of Congress transcription system without ligatures while acknowledging that he was not an Ethiopian linguist. His annotations have in part been based on the work of other commentators. Since he did not himself examine all listed items he lists references to those sources. The list includes manuscripts, printed monographs, periodical articles, and book reviews in Russian and collections which cover at least partially history, linguistics, social sciences, geography, and sciences in the Horn of Africa. Materials in non-Russian published in the Soviet Union are noted under the Russian editions if applicable. Materials either in Amharic or non-Russian published in the Soviet Union are listed in the several appendices. Most of his compilations were based on references such as S. Abramova, **African Studies in the USSR; Africa in Soviet Studies; Bibliografiia Vostoka;** George Black, **Ethiopica and Amharica;** Central Asian Research Center, **Soviet Writing on Africa 1959-61;** Fumagalli Giuseppe, **Bibliografiia Etiopica;** List of Books, Pamphlets and **Articles on Africa Published in the USSR;** Harold G. Marcus, **The Modern History of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa;** and a number of others such as Ladislav Venys and Vlastimila Venys, **A Select Bibliography of Soviet Publications on Africa in General and Eastern Africa in Particular.**

After an introduction that points out his own commitment to the materialistic perspective as well as his reservations by which it has been manipulated in the Soviet Union, while noting that false theory led to false practice and vice versa, he explains that there are three main reasons for "looking specifically at the Russian literature on different aspects of Ethiopian and Somali life and culture." Firstly, that foreign scholars of any culture should

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not ignore other foreign insight ". . . from the third corner of a triangle with differing views." Secondly, contrary to the uninformed Western image of Soviet interest in Ethiopia being very "recent and deplorable" there have been links for a long time. Finally, and to Darch the key, the study of Russian literature on the Horn shows Soviet scholarship of historical materialism is neither monolithic nor overly schematic. In other words, there can be value to Soviet works, even if a tendency to stress the Soviet experience not as an object to study but "as a model for revolutionary emulation." Darch carefully stresses their collective rather than individualistic contributions, with their emphasis not on research or local studies but upon generalities and interpretations with a high degree of "sborniki." Russians were willing to utilize material and research gathered by the "bourgeois" to sustain and support Marxist reinterpretations of Africa. It is also evident that the institutional history on Africa in the USSR is relatively new. (But the same can largely be stated of the West.) Africa is studied in the 'context' of a world dominated by imperialistic economic powers, a theme too abstract. The key year was 1959 when Haile Selassie visited the Soviet Union and when African scholarship was separated from oriental studies, even if Ethiopia itself continued to be ambiguous. Ironically, though feudalistic, the Emperor was viewed with friendship essentially because of his record on world affairs. It should be pointed out Darch does not limit materials to Soviet times. He includes a considerable number of works dating back to the 1860s, even from Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis of earlier centuries inclusive of the journey of Ewostatewos and Afansay Nikitin.

He starts off with a list of periodicals somewhat weakened by lack of any annotation, but the overwhelming part of the book deals with "classified bibliography" with numerous categories. While he does follow a scheme, there tends to be some lack of logic and coordination, in that a number of categories duplicate each other and seem strangely scattered through the body of the text. Organization along more along topical lines would have facilitated its usefulness for most students.

It also has to be mentioned that a large number of references have unduly short comments, if any — while others are perhaps (though of interest) too lengthy. Here I would cite M.V. Rait, **Narody Efiopii**, I.I. Vasin, **Kolonial naia politika Anglii, Frantsii: Italii v Efiopii v post lednel chetverti XIX veka**, and especially Iu M. Kobischchanov, **Axum**. His appendix I includes useful reviews in other tongues but with regretfully little annotation. Appendix II deals with Soviet Ethiopiana in Languages other than Russian, again with far too little annotation. Appendix III is simply "Selected Press Reports about Ethiopia in Soviet Newspapers, 1945-1978." All in all I recommend this volume to students with serious interest in the Horn who value and understand the need to coordinate, compare and contrast views to sharpen insight and understanding.

Correspondent's Report

Peace Returns To Asmara

Richard Pankhurst

A visitor to Asmara would see little to suggest that the capital of Ethiopia's northernmost province, Eritrea (once an Italian colony), was barely two years ago a beleaguered city encircled by separatist armies. During a visit to Ethiopia in the spring of 1982 a British Parliamentary delegation was able to witness this remarkable return to normal life, and the disappearance from the streets of any very obvious military presence.

Landing at Asmara's international airport, which still bears the name of Yohannes IV, the last Ethiopian emperor of that part of the country, the four Members of Parliament were soon in the city which a century ago was the military headquarters of his heroic commander Ras Alula. Eight years after my last visit I found myself walking with the MPs down the familiar main avenue lined with palm trees, peering into the old Catholic Cathedral packed with worshippers, drinking *capuccinos* in crowded Italian-style cafes, and jostling my way through the teeming market. In order to appreciate the fact that Asmara is not just "a small Italian town transplanted into the heartland of Ethiopia" we drove on to Abba Shawl, part of the old "native quarter" in which the local population was segregated during the Italian occupation. Some of our young Eritrean friends told us they wished to keep part of this wretched "shanty town," like a museum, as a reminder of the colonial past. During the late 1930s schooling for "natives" beyond the third grade was prohibited and inter-racial marriage or even "co-habitation" was a punishable offense, believed to endanger the "defence of the race."

In the evening, since the curfew, formerly at 7 p.m., now began only at 11 p.m., we were able to stroll freely through the bush streets, without a guide, let alone a guard, and, like the inhabitants themselves enjoyed the peaceful atmosphere. We rarely caught sight of any soldiers, and the few we did see, walking in twos or threes, also seemed relaxed.

Professor Richard Pankhurst, currently Librarian of the Royal Asiatic Society in London, lived in Addis Ababa from 1956 to 1976, teaching in Haile Sellassie I — later Addis Ababa — University and serving for twelve years as Director of its Institute of Ethiopian Studies. He is the author of numerous works on Ethiopian history and culture, the most recent being **History of Ethiopian Towns** (1982). He was for many years co-editor of the **Journal of Ethiopian Studies** and **Ethiopia Observer**.

There is no reason to doubt official Ethiopian Government statements that the city's population is now larger than before the recent conflict. Driving south on the road to Decamare we saw crowds of countryfolk travelling in and out of the city, some on foot, perhaps driving a donkey or some livestock, some in carts and others crowded in buses. On entering or leaving the city people still have to pass through check-points, but the searching seemed perfunctory.

During our stay we had the opportunity of visiting three out of the city's four centres for returned separatist fighters. Some 4,000 such refugees have arrived in Asmara, and a further 13,000 in centres in Serae and Akkala Guzay. These young men and women, many of them barely out of their teens, are provided with food and shelter, and are given a three-month orientation course. There was visibly some "positive discrimination" in their treatment in that the men were crowded into old warehouses, and in most cases slept on the floor, while the women, fewer in numbers, were in a villa supplied with beds. At the end of their courses returnees are free to leave, though those unable to find work or schooling may remain at the centres beyond that time. Several of those with the necessary educational qualifications are proceeding to Addis Ababa University. About three-quarters of the young men and women I spoke with had formerly been with the Eritrean Liberation Front (E.L.F.), a large proportion of them from Serae district, while others were war-weary, or disillusioned, deserters from the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (E.P.L.F.). When we visited the mountain-fortress of Keren, site of a major battle in World War II and of scrupulously-kept British and Italian war-graves, we saw building workers busily mixing cement for an entirely new settlement and school for returnees who are now arriving in that part of the country in increasing numbers.

Though new buildings are noticeable by their absence, Asmara today presents an appearance of optimism. Many factories, such as the Melotti brewery, which the MPs visited, are again fully in operation; cars, taxis and buses ply the streets, for ther is no petrol rationing as in Addis Ababa; and Eritrean businessmen are beginning to drop in from Europe and the Middle East to investigate possibilities of operating once more in their own country.

Asmara, which has a long tradition of municipal government, is now divided, like other Ethiopian towns, into a number of areas, each administered by its own democratically elected *kebelle*, or local association. There are over 100 such bodies in the city, responsible *inter alia* for literacy. As in other parts of Ethiopia the literacy campaign is making great strides — and is based entirely on the local language, in this case Tigrinya. One result of the literacy programme, for which Ethiopia was awarded a

UNESCO prize, is a substantial increase in Asmara's newspaper readership.

On visiting the city's palatial University, founded in 1958 by an Italian missionary organization, Pia Madri della Nigrizia, we found that great changes were in progress. What had been criticized in the 1960s as little more than a glorified mission school is fast emerging as a secular institution of higher learning. Now headed by Engineer Tekeste Ahderom, an Eritrean academic who had previously taught at Addis Ababa University, it now has four faculties (science, social science, economics and administration, and languages), as well as an Institute of African Studies which in June this year took the enterprising step of establishing an **Ethiopian Journal of African Studies.** The University possesses modern laboratories, a small museum, and a modest but expanding library. This consisted in the past mainly of works in Italian but as a result of the University's integration into the Ethiopian system of higher education (where English is the main language of instruction) these have in recent years virtually all been replaced by books in English. Knowledge of the language is, however, far from universal, as one of the Parliamentarians discovered. Tired on his arrival at his hotel, he thought he would take a nap before dinner, and phoned down from his room in a strong Scottish accent, requesting a wake-up call that evening at "seven o'clock." Believing that, after some difficulty, he had succeeded in getting the message over, he retired to bed, but was awoken a few minutes later by a knock at the door. He opened it, whereupon a waiter solemnly walked in, balancing on his tray seven bottles of Coca Cola.

Student enrollment at Asmara University in 1980-1 was over 1,200, almost double the pre-1974 revolution figure; the Ethiopian teaching staff has increased from 7 in 1971-2 to 41 at the end of the last academic year. Plans are afoot to found several new faculties, among them one of Arid Zone agriculture, important in view of drought conditions in north-East Ethiopia, Marine Biology, relevant in view of Eritrea's thousand-mile coastline, and Intermediate Technology, also appropriate for Asmara which after Addis Ababa is the main centre of most of Ethiopia's light industries.

The British council still operates a small but heavily used library, which, like the University, never closed down, despite the emergency. With a stock of 10,000 books it last year effected over 20,000 lendings. Simplified English readers are in such demand, librarian Gabre Heywot reports, that they fall apart on average after four months.

Interesting developments in Asmara's cultural field include the founding of a new journal, the **Quderni di Studi Etiopici,** devoted largely to history and linguistics, and the opening of a cultural centre. Once a comfortable Italian club, with spacious rooms, it has been given over to the city's writers, artists and musicians, each group having their own area in which to work, rehearse, or perform.

One left Asmara, a town much highlighted in the foreign press during the fighting, but now seemingly forgotten, with the impression that the years of conflict have passed. Its enterprising and talented citizens can at least be seen to be devoting their energies to economic and social reconstruction.

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Coming Events

The *Association for the Advancement of Policy, Research and Development in the Third World* has issued a call for paper abstracts and panel proposals for a conference to be held in Washington, D.C. June 2nd through 4th, 1983. Submit all proposals or write for a list of proposed topics and sessions to Mekki Mtewa, Ph.D., Association for the Advanc ment of Policy, Research, and Development in the Third World, P.O. Box 24234, Washington, D.C. 20024. Telephone: (202) 636-6720/21.

The Second Annual Conference of the *Sudan Studies Association* will be held during the weekend of March 25-27, 1983, at Howard University's Armour J. Blackburn University Center. The theme of the conference is The Sudan: Perspectives on Diversity and Change. Arrangements for housing accommodations for the conference can be conveniently made through the Howard Inn, 2225 Georgia Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001. Telephone: (202) 462-5400 or call Toll Free: (800) 368-5729. All prospective papers, proposals, suggestions and inquiries should be addressed c/o Ms. Joanne Zellers, P.O. Box 3385, Falls Church, Virginia 22043. The deadline for submission of abstracts is December 15, 1982.

Announcement

The following resolution regarding the proper relationship between Africanists and the Defense Intelligence Agency was passed unanimously by the Board of Directors of the African Studies Association at their spring meeting at the University of Chicago, April 2-3, 1982:

"The Board of Directors of the African Studies Association notes with deep concern the recent establishment of a program to support academic research in Africa and other Third World regions by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Both educational institutions and individual scholars have been invited to apply to the Agency for such support.

"Believing that the credibility and integrity of American university-based scholarship in the African Studies field depend upon arrangements which ensure the independence of academic research and publication from the military and political interests of the Government; and

"Being convinced that the basis of such independence is undermined by direct patron-client relationships between the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Africanist community;

"The Board calls upon Africanist scholars to refrain from participation in that program by their universities and research institutes."

Books Received

Starred titles have been sent to reviewers. Others may be requested by qualified reviewers.

Political Science/Area Studies

AUTOMATING APARTHEID: *U.S. Computer Experts to South Africa and the Arms Embargo.* NARMIC/American Friends Service Committee. (NARMIC/American Friends Service Committee, 1982) 107 pp.; paperback nonprofit & individuals 1-9 copies $3.50; corporations & others 1-9 copies $10 each.

CANADIAN RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA: *A Diplomatic History.* Brian Douglas Tennyson. (University Press of America, 1982) 238 pp. paperback $11.00.

*CHANGING SOUTH AFRICA: *Political Considerations.* Sam C. Nolutshungu. (Africana Publishing Company, 1982) 219 pp. paperback $12.50; hardcover $19.50.

ERITREA: *Africa's Longest War.* David Pool. (London: Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights, 1980; revised 1982) 79 pp. paperback $3.00.

THE FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES OF THIRD WORLD STATES. John J. Stremlau. (Westview Press, 1982) 174 pp.; hardcover $15.00; paperback $8.00.

FREEDOM FOR MY PEOPLE: *The Autobiography of Z.K. Matthews: Southern Africa 1901 to 1968.* Z.K. Matthews. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield/Rex Collings London, in association with David Philip, Capetown, 1981) 253 pp. hardcover $26.50.

FROM THE CONGO TO SOWETO: *U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960.* Henry F. Jackson. (William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1982) 324 pp. hardcover $13.95.

OPPRESSION AND RESISTANCE: *The Struggle of Women in Southern Africa.* Richard E. Lapchick & Stephanie Urdang. (Greenwood Press, 1982) 197 pp. hardcover $25.00.

PAN AFRICANISM OR NEO-COLONIALISM: *The Bankruptcy of the O.A.U.* Elenga M'buyinga. (Zed Press, 1982) 236 pp. hardcover $31.00; paperback $9.50.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA. B.O. Nwabueze. (St. Martin's Press, 1982) 558 pp. hardcover $45.00.

PRESIDENT AND POWER IN NIGERIA: *The Life of Shehu Shagari.* (Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1982) 276 pp. hardcover $25.00.

SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE: *Labour, Railways, and Trade in the Making of a Relationship.* (Manchester University Press/Humanities Press, 1982) 178 pp. hardcover $15.75.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GAME: *Sport and Racism.* Robert Archer & Antoine Bouillon. (Lawrence Hill & Co./Zed Press, 1982) 352 pp. hardcover $33.00; paperback $9.95.

*SOUTHERN AFRICA: *The Continuing Crisis*. 2nd edition. Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds. (Indiana University Press, 1982) 404 pp. hardcover $35.00; paperback $9.95.

TANZANIA: *An African Experiment*. Rodger Yaeger. (Westview Press, 1982) 136 pp. hardcover $18.50.

UGANDA: *The Dilemma of Nationhood*. G.N. Uzoigwe, ed. (NOK Publishers Ltd., 1982) 373 pp. hardcover $20.00; paperback $8.75.

U.S. ECONOMIC POWER AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN NAMIBIA, 1700-1982. Allan D. Cooper (Westview Press, 1982) 222 pp. paperback $22.00.

History/Geography

BLACK AMERICANS AND THE EVANGELIZATION OF AFRICA 1877-1900. Walter L. Williams. (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1982) 259 pp. hardcover $27.50.

THE SEYCHELLES: *Unquiet Islands*. Marcus Franda. (Westview Press, 1982) 140 pp. hardcover $18.00.

THE SHAPING OF SOMALI SOCIETY: *Reconstruction of the History of a Pastoral People. 1800-1900*. Lee V. Cassanelli. (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982) pp. hardcover $25.00.

*BLOOD RIVER: *The Passionate Saga of South Africa's Afrikaners and of Life in Their Embattled Land*. Barbara Villet. Photographs by Grey Villet. (Everest House Publishers, 1982) 255 pp. hardcover $16.95.

Economics/Development

FARMING SYSTEMS IN THE NIGERIAN SAVANNA: *Research and Strategies for Development*. David W. Norman, Emmy B. Simmons, and Henry M. Hays. (Westview Press, 1982) 275 pp. paperback $22.00.

COUNTING THE CAMELS: *The Economics of Transportation in Pre-Industrial Nigeria*. Gabriel Ogundeji Ogunremi. (NOK Publishers International, 1982) 238 pp. hardcover $18.50; paperback $7.95.

*SOUTHERN AFRICA: *Toward Economic Liberation*. Amon Nsekela, ed. (Rex Collings/Rowman and Littlefield, 1981) 274 pp. hardcover $28.50.

Anthropology/Sociology/Religion

KHUL-KHAAL: *Five Egyptian Women Tell Their Stories*. Nayra Atiya. (Syracuse University Press, 1982) 177 pp. cloth $20.00; paperback $11.95

WIVES FOR CATTLE: *Bridewealth and Marriage in Southern Africa*. Adam Kuper. (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982) 202 pp. hardcover $24.95.

*TIN AICHA: *Nomad Village*. American Friends Service Committee. (The American Friends Service Committee, 1982) 231 pp. paperback $8.95.

Language/Literature

AFRICAN LITERATURE TODAY 11: *Myth and History*. Eldred Durosimi Jones, ed. (Africana Publishing Co., 1980) 231 pp. paperback $18.00.

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