

# **AFRICA TODAY**

## **Two African Economies** --- **South Africa and Repression** **Nigeria and Oil**

**VOL. 29, NO. 3**  
**1982 3rd Quarter**

**Published: 14 Mar. 1983**  
**Bookstand price:**  
**\$3.00**

VOL. 29, NO. 3

1982 3rd Quarter

**Africa Today®**  
(ISSN 0001-9887)  
**A Quarterly Review**

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Published quarterly by Africa Today Associates in association with the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado 80208

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Second class postage paid at Denver, Colorado

**Postmaster:** Send address change form 3579 to AFRICA TODAY, c/o Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado 80208.

Founded by: The American Committee on Africa, April 1954.

Subscriptions: indiv.: one year, \$12.00; two years, \$22.00; three years, \$31.00. Students: one year, \$9.00. Instit., one year, \$18.00; two years, \$33.00; three years, \$45.00. Foreign (except Canada and Pan America) add \$2.00 per year. Sterling zone checks accepted. Bulk rates available. Mailed individual copies \$2.50 plus 50¢ postage and handling (U.S.) 75¢ (overseas).

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# AFRICA TODAY

Volume 29 (1982)

Number Three

## IN THIS ISSUE

Editor's Note .....	4
<i>The Political Economy of Repression and Reform in South Africa</i> .....	5
Robert A. Denmark & Howard P. Lehman	
<i>The Nigerian Economy Since the Great Oil Price Increases of 1973-74</i> .....	33
Sayre P. Schatz	
<i>The Other War in the South Atlantic</i> .....	43
James Mittelman	
A Look at Books .....	47
<i>Demythologizing the Role of Minerals in Great Power Conflict in Africa</i> .....	47
Thomas R. De Gregori	
<i>Another Scramble for Africa's Minerals?</i> .....	50
James Cobbe	
<i>Perspectives on Lesotho</i> .....	53
Richard F. Weisfelder	
<i>The Malagasy Republic: A Microcosm of a Planet in Ecological Crisis</i> .....	57
Al Fleischman	
<i>The Saharan War: A Thorough Analysis</i> .....	59
Anne Lippert	
<i>Western Sahara: An Important Reference Work</i> .....	61
Anne Lippert	
<i>Nubian Culture Before the Dam</i> .....	63
Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban	
<i>Southwest Sudan: Historical Questions</i> .....	64
John W. Burton	
<i>The Return of Amos Tutuola</i> .....	65
Nancy J. Schmidt	
<i>Two Francophone Novels of the Post Independence Era</i> .....	70
Janis L. Pallister	
Publications .....	73
Coming Events .....	
Announcements .....	
Books Received .....	
Statement of Ownership, Management and Circulation .....	80

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## Editor's Note

Our thanks to all who responded so generously to our gift appeal. At this writing we have 58 gifts in hand, totalling 13,534, and have received at least an additional \$168 in new subscription and back issue orders as a direct result of the mailing, plus \$226 in early renewals. In all, 74 persons responded in one way or another. Since the mailing reached only 610 individual present and former subscribers or authors we are delighted with this 12% + response. We're still not out of the woods, but we think we see daylight. If you have not yet responded, your gift will still be most welcome.

We're seeing daylight in another sense, too. Our work staff (all part-time) has risen from 3 of us working 40 hours a week to 6 (soon to drop to 5) putting in almost 70 hours, at least raising the hope that our oft repeated promise to catch up on our publication schedule may actually be fulfilled in 1983. This increase, thanks to work-study and an able volunteer, involves no extra expense for the journal, and perhaps a slight decrease in cost in the months to come.

The appearance of this issue two months later than promised in December admittedly does little to augur better things to come, but the decks are cleared and we think you will find 29/4 and 30/1 in your mailboxes before the end of May.

We promised Dan Connell's "Correspondent's Report" on journalism in Africa for this issue, but we have deferred it for one issue to include Jim Mittelman's report on the war in Namibia, written at the time of the Falklands conflict and in Danger of being overtaken by events. Our next issue, in addition to this, will be largely devoted to catching up on recent (and a few not so recent, but important) books, plus, of course, the usual and sections and our annual index. We commend to you both articles in this which bring into focus very differing impacts of events on two national economies.

Edward A. Hawley

### IN MEMORIAM

## CANON JOHN COLLINS 1905-1982

We are saddened to report the death on December 30 of a true friend of Africa, Canon John Collins, founder in 1956 of the International Defense and Aid Fund, and its guiding force until his death. He will be sorely missed in the continuing struggle against apartheid.

## The Political Economy

### of Repression and Reform

### in South Africa

Robert A. Denemark and Howard P. Lehman

The phenomena of revolution has produced a great many very plausible explanations. Revolution may result from persistently inequitable distributions of the social product, from the normlessness and anomie which results from rapid social change or breakdown, or it may be caused by a disparity between the prerequisites of the dominant mode of production and the existing social relations of production.<sup>1</sup> Regardless of its hypothesized genesis, the developmental logic of revolution appears to be much the same. Individuals lose their willingness to be ruled under the conditions imposed by the old order and thus act to topple it and institute a new order. Little more than a "spark" is seen as necessary to initiate this process. And yet in practice such is not always the case. For there is almost no contemporary theory of revolution which would fail to predict such a fate for South Africa. Perceptions of inequality are institutionalized in the legal fabric of the state separating, through the selective provision of social rights and services, the 16 percent of the population which is white from the 84 percent which is not. The alienation which permanent migrant status creates cannot be denied. Neither can a system for the utilization of labor which more closely resembles slavery than anything else be easily reconciled with a modern economic structure which allegedly thrives on efficiency and productivity.

Nor can we attribute the lack of revolution to the absence of the appropriate spark. Nationalist movements in sub-Saharan Africa started gaining independence for their states in 1957 and between 1964 and today

1. The works of Gurr, Johnson, and Marx and his followers, respectively, are most representative of these perspectives. For a quick review of these schools of thought, see A. S. Cohan, *Theories of Revolution: An Introduction* (New York: John Wiley, 1975).

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The authors would like to thank Deborah Lehman-Irli, George Lopez and Michael Stohl for their comments and editorial assistance.

there has been no lull in violent revolutionary struggles in Africa's southern tip. South Africa itself has not been exempt. The uprisings at Sharpeville in 1960 and Soweto in 1976 are most notable in this regard. Yet for all this South Africa remains a relatively secure bastion of white racist rule. How is this to be understood?

We suggest that the problem lies with those conceptualizations of revolution which fail to take account of the ability of the state to use force in successfully maintaining its dominant position. From within such a perspective it is not only the disposition of the masses but also the disposition of the state in the wider political and economic context of the world system which must be considered. Thus we agree with Theta Skocpol's suggestion that "to explain social revolutions, one must find problematic, first, the emergence (not 'making') of a revolutionary situation within an old regime."<sup>2</sup>

In this paper we will review the evolution of South African society and three of its most brutal elements of repression: the system of "internal security" and its enforcement mechanisms; the internal and external use of the military; and the program of "resettlement." An attempt will then be made to measure the costs of these repressive mechanisms and to better understand the problems associated with possible reform. Finally, we will place the question of repression within the wider context of the South African economy and the international economic system.

## The South African Social Order

Many scholars and analysts suggest that the need for non-white labor in the fields, the mines, and the factories underpins the South African social structure and the vast system of racial separation known as apartheid. Thus apartheid is not the cause, but rather the effect, of some two centuries of historical interaction between competing groups. The key to that conflict remains the struggle to manage and control labor — its effect being a set of policies which seek to control every facet of an individual's life.

Violence and repression are clearly the byproduct of such a system. The state moves to make that control easier. As the subject population resists, the state must intensify its violent and repressive acts. The escalation of this conflict and its spread through various levels of society has been most notable within societies inflicted with sharp social and economic polarization. Indeed, the superimposition of racial and economic cleavages increases social polarization and contributes to the intensity of social conflict.<sup>3</sup> In order to more closely examine the network of repression which

has developed we may divide it into its economic, political, and social forms. Of the three elements, the economic form is the most fundamental. The dominant theme of the social structure has been and will remain the manipulation of labor. The job and wage color bars, the migratory labor system, and the resettlement of Africans from so-called "black spots" are the important components of economic repression. Political repression perhaps most visibly reveals the effects of systematic repression. Here attention is focused upon the political institutions created by apartheid, such as the "homeland" strategy and the structure of the military and judicial system. The third component, social repression, reinforces the institutionalization of racial separation. Attempts to control labor mobility are made to extend into residential, educational, and athletic segregation as well. Such restrictions on social interactions are deeply imbedded in a multitude of laws and regulations.

The most active period for the promulgation of security legislation coincided with the emergence of a unified and politically powerful Afrikaner elite. Between 1924 and the 1948 national election, conditions were laid for the convergence of Afrikaner and English capitalist interests. In order to appease the interests of both the Afrikaners and the English, the ruling National Party sought to increase the pool of available investment capital, protect the privileged position of white workers, and generally strengthen the capitalist system.<sup>4</sup> Given the social and economic conditions of South Africa, a successful economic strategy necessitated a penetrative legal system. The state has numerous instruments by which labor control can be achieved. A principal tool, the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), dissolved the Communist Party, provided severe penalties for any member of outlawed organizations, and broadly defined "communism" as any act which upsets the social or industrial order.<sup>5</sup> Following the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, the government passed the Unlawful Organizations Act which banned the main African nationalist groups, the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress. Numerous restrictions are imposed on individuals in order to stifle all resistance to the white regime. Counted among the legal instruments of the state are bannings, detentions, and banishments. The cornerstone of state repression, however, is the reference book and pass system which is most clearly related to the state's control of labor. All personal movement is controlled through a strictly enforced set of rules and regulations.

4. Bernard Magubane, *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979).

5. Muriel Horrell, compiler, *Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa, 1948-1976* (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1978), p. 412.

2. Theta Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 18.

3. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).

According to a 1977 study, the government prosecuted more than 5,800,000 persons for pass law violations between 1966 and 1975.<sup>6</sup> Carter reports in a more recent study the arrests of 272,887 individuals for similar offenses in 1978.<sup>7</sup>

In recent years, the government has pursued more vigorously the resettlement of Africans away from densely populated and potentially disruptive urban areas to "independent" homelands. The displacement of "black spots" from 1960 to 1970 resulted in the resettlement of just under a million tenants and squatters.<sup>8</sup> The long-term objective of the forced removal campaign adheres to the government's plan to maintain a large sector of "controlled" labor. A 1967 government circular noted by Harsch<sup>9</sup> provides the rationale behind the displacement efforts:

It is accepted Government policy that the Bantus are only temporarily resident in the European areas of the Republic, for as long as they offer their labor there. As soon as they become, for some reason or another, no longer fit for work or superfluous in the labor market, they are expected to return to their country of origin or the territory of their national unit where they fit in ethnically if they were not born and bred in the homeland.

The result of the system which has developed has been described by Walsh and Horrell as a process of action and reaction.<sup>10</sup> Each policy move on the part of the state has initiated responses from the African opposition which again give rise to actions by the state. New tactics, more encompassing restrictions such as those now threatening the press and harsher treatment of dissidents of all colors exemplify the expansion of state repression. These changes have far outdistanced the ability of the opposition to organize and engage in effective anti-state action. Indeed, state repression can be viewed as an all-encompassing force whose specific elements have modified in relation to changing historical circumstance and which has remained relatively successful to date.

## Repression and Terror

An attempt to discuss the specific aspects of repression in a society which is so fundamentally imbued with repressive elements confronts us with great difficulties. The problem is not so much where to start as it how to start. We have chosen to highlight three different areas where the repressive actions of the state have been so brutal and relentless that they

may be discussed not simply as repressive, that is, as a general and pervasive attempt to forcefully and systematically mold individual behavior. Indeed, these may be seen as more precise and deliberate acts designed to inflict harm on individuals so as to directly modify both their behavior and that of those in whom the fear of being the "next target" is deposited. Thus these are more than simple acts of repression, they are acts of terror imposed on a subject populace by the state.

The first such area of state terror can be found in the legal and penal systems. In South Africa, the laws are so broadly defined as to offer no real safeguards against arbitrary or inequitable sanctions. Two laws which have been periodically strengthened are the General Law Amendment Act of 1962 and the Terrorism Act of 1967. They both define their respective offense, sabotage and terrorism, in order to facilitate their application to a wide variety of both intended and unintended acts. As Amnesty International notes: "the burden of proof is placed upon the accused to show the innocence of their intentions rather than on the state to prove their guilt."<sup>11</sup> "Terrorism," under the Terrorism Act, is defined as any activity which may "endanger the maintenance of law and order." Section Six of the act enables the indefinite detention without charge or trial of anyone suspected of being a "terrorist."<sup>12</sup>

In the wake of the Soweto riots, the government enacted legislation furthering the erosion of individual civil rights and liberties. The Internal Security Act of 1976 has been effective in limiting the actions of the black opposition. Preventive detentions, the imprisonment of state witnesses in political trials, and the expansion of terms under which banning orders may be imposed are measures applied against those who engage "in activities which endanger or are calculated to endanger the security of the state or the maintenance of public order."<sup>13</sup> Bannings, although the least physically harmful of these sanctions, should also be viewed as an act of terror. An individual is instilled with fear as the forces of the state place severe restrictions on absolutely every aspect of life.

Once incarcerated, the conditions only worsen. In cases of political detention, torture appears to be a general method for the extraction of information. Recent policy changes seem to have increased the number of deaths of political detainees. An average of just over two people died in detention per year between 1963 and 1972.<sup>14</sup> That average has more than

6 Michael Savage, "Costs of Enforcing Apartheid and Problems of Change," *African Affairs*, 76, 304 (July 1977), p. 295.

7 Gwendolen Carter, *Which Way is South Africa Going?* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), p. 38.

8 Carter, *ibid.*, p. 34.

9 Ernest Harsch, *South Africa: White Rule, Black Revolt* (New York: Monad Press, 1980), p. 77.

10 Peter Walsh, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); and Muriel Horrell, *Action, Reaction, and Counteraction*, 3rd ed. (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1971).

11 Amnesty International, *Political Imprisonment in South Africa* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1978), p. 21.

12 Horrell, *Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa*, p. 445.

13 Horrell, *ibid.*, p. 428.

14 Amnesty International, *Political Imprisonment in South Africa*, p. 66.

A second element of state terror considers the role of the military in internal and external affairs. The "external" South African Defense Force includes within its operational jurisdiction the "internal" South African Police. The military is called upon frequently to manage larger-scale disturbances. Whether, in fact, the participants are workers or school children, demonstrations against state policies are met with the heavy weight of the military. The **World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators** ranks South Africa 7 out of the 122 reporting states with nearly 1,000 "political sanctions" committed between 1948 and 1977. This accounts for the deaths of over 1,700 individuals from "domestic group violence." The recent bombings and limited invasions of Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe suggest that all individuals viewed as threats to the state are subject to attack. While ground forces might conceivably be able to select their victims, it is difficult to believe this of air strikes. The deaths of hundreds of civilians and non-combatants verify this statement. The conduct of the military in recent years suggests that the level of state terror, both in general and relative to overall repression, increases as the state apparatus perceives itself to be threatened.

In a less documented, but equally brutal state strategy, the forced removal and resettlement of Africans is the third component of state terror. Such instrumental policies as influx control, resettlement, and the "eradication of black spots," have required the forced displacement of millions of individuals. According to one source, 1.9 million Africans were resettled between 1960 and 1979 and nearly six million were moved as a result of the homeland program.<sup>16</sup> In following the state's goal of maintaining a "controlled" labor force, the regime has also dispossessed many Africans of their plots within the reserves. Most recently the South African state has offered some 3,000 square miles and about one million inhabitants to Swaziland in a move which has led even conservative homeland leaders to predictions of violence.<sup>17</sup> The cumulative effect of these policies has been the disruption, if not the dislocation, of the lives of millions of individuals and the creation of a socially pervasive fear.

The South African state has shown itself to be particularly quick in its utilization of terror to control any challenges to its rule. The elements of this repression and terror do, however, exact a substantial cost. It is to an estimate of that cost which we shall now turn.

<sup>15</sup> Harsch, *South Africa*, p. 138

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77-78

<sup>17</sup> James F. Smith, "South Africa Offers Land to Swaziland," *The Washington Times*, (July 2, 1982) cited in *AF Press Clips* (Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2, 1982) p. 7

## The Costs of Repression

The costs of maintaining this repressive system are great, although measurement and evaluation may be quite problematic. Military, political and social costs are sufficiently interrelated to hamper any clear divisions. A "political" decision can often utilize "military" instruments which elicit or influence "social" phenomena. The difficulty of dealing with the political counterfactual, the problematic nature of gathering reliable data on military expenditures and the often incalculable nature of social losses makes any calculated dollar cost subject to a wide margin of error. Michael Savage, who has attempted to analyze the costs of but one facet of the repressive system, the pass system, lists a dozen areas which require investigation. And even after all that he warns the reader that "it is difficult, if not impossible, to do the arithmetic necessary to assess the fiscal costs of maintaining and perpetuating the pass system."<sup>18</sup> The hidden nature of many of these outlays defies identification, much less precise measurement.

Yet it is not precise measurement which we argue is necessary. In South Africa the costs of system maintenance are major and a calculation of their magnitude and direction will tell us much about the position, condition, and viability of the state.


In Figure 1 (p. 12) we chart the rise of South African Defence Force expenditures. The high rate of defense spending noted between 1978 and 1980 is even more telling when we note that a major five year defense spending expansion program was scheduled to end in 1978. Manpower has also expanded and consolidated. Reservists, commandos, police, and paramilitary forces along with the regular military number nearly half a million troops.<sup>19</sup> As a percent of GDP, combined defense and public administration costs rose from an average of 8.5 percent during the period 1950 to 1977.<sup>20</sup> And even these figures are likely to be conservative. Recent figures indicate a continuing reliance on military operations with a coinciding increase in the military portion of state disbursements.

A second fundamental pillar of the repressive state is the pass law system. Fragments of material on the costs of this system have been compiled by Michael Savage. After substantial research into the varying categories of pass offenses and the different expenses involved in sustaining this instrumental network of state control, Savage estimates a total

<sup>18</sup> Savage, "Costs of Enforcing Apartheid," p. 296

<sup>19</sup> International Defense and Aid Fund, *The Apartheid War Machine* (London: IDAF Publications, April 1980).

<sup>20</sup> World Bank, *World Tables (Second Edition)* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 26



Sources: "The Apartheid War Machine" (London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1980), p. 10. Figures from 1958/59 to 1973/74 reflect cash votes. Figures from 1973/74 to 1979/80 reflect total defense expenditures as published in the Biennial White Paper of Defense. Non "cash vote" defense expenditures as reported in this White Paper have been rising. The average addition to cash vote funds in FY 1974/75 to FY 1976/77 was 4.63% while for FY 1977/78 to FY 1979/80 it was 10.78%. Figures for 1980/81 are estimates. Rand values were standardized against the Wholesale Price Index presented in the World Bank's *World Tables (Second Edition)*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), and *South Africa 1981: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa*, (Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg) 1970-100.

figure of R112,825,237 (US\$ 169,237,854) for 1974-75.<sup>21</sup> As we treat the military figures as partial and conservative, so we should consider the costs of the pass system in the same light. Savage offers undocumented examples of numerous hidden costs including transportation, labor replacement, and labor time lost to the updating and reissuing of official papers. Furthermore, this total cost should not be taken as an average figure since costs necessarily rise during periods of unrest as enforcement tightens and more infractions occur.

The third principle area of concern focuses on the resettlement and homelands programs. As with other controversial policies, specific expenditures rarely have been made public. Limited research has been directed toward the costs borne by the state. *The Christian Science Monitor*, however, reports that one aspect of the resettlement program, land purchases in rural reserves, has resulted in expenditures of 592 million dollars as of early 1982.<sup>22</sup> One might think that the creation of pseudo-

21. Savage, "Costs of Enforcing Apartheid," p. 296

22. *Christian Science Monitor*, "Black Sash Lashes Out at South Africa's Mere 'Lip Service' to Race Reform," (March 23, 1982), p. 6

autonomous nation-states for blacks would save the South African government the trouble of extending services to that populace. A 1981 report compiled by a Rockefeller Foundation Commission, however, suggests the persistent dependence of the homelands on South Africa for funds to cover their public expenses. During the 1970s, the homelands contributed only 5 percent to their own overall operating costs (including defense).<sup>23</sup> The South African government's outlay for homeland "development" has been rising at an average annual rate of 10 percent. In absolute terms, this figure has risen from R95 million in 1970 to R1,108.7 million in 1978.<sup>24</sup>

From these figures we recognize that a substantial and growing allotment of the state budget sustains terror and repression. A rough estimate of the 1979 state outlay for defense, the pass system, and the resettlement and homeland programs amounts to about R3,600,000,000, over a quarter of all state expenditures or R151 per capita. The per capita figure is equivalent to about 40 percent of the yearly wage of many black workers.<sup>25</sup>

The great increases in the cost of maintaining this repressive apparatus has led Savage to suggest that South Africa must either "prepare to move onto a war footing and continue to implement apartheid or dismantle segregation and use South Africa's resources to deal with the human needs of its population . . ." <sup>26</sup> Indeed, the economic prosperity of earlier periods may become but a pleasant memory. As Hanf, et al., suggest of the 1970s, "as the rate of inflation started to rise and export markets to shrink, South Africa was also sucked into the vortex of world-wide stagflation."<sup>27</sup>

Falling real incomes seriously threaten the range of policy options for the white regime. The costs of the repressive apparatus, however, continue to rise. Economic decline is, in fact, partly responsible for the increasing expenditures of the state and it is these expenditures which, in turn, add to the existing problems of the state. Economic retrenchment is undermining the traditional united white bloc. The 1981 electoral gains by the Progressive Federal Party and the formation in 1982 of the South African Conservative Party suggest deeper polarization and dissension from within the ranks of the ruling white community.

23. The Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. *South Africa: Time Running Out* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), p. 152

24. *Ibid.*, p. 162

25. Savage, "Costs of Enforcing Apartheid," IDAF, *The War Machine*; and South African Information Service, *South Africa: 1982 Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa* (Johannesburg: Chris Van Rensburg, 1982)

26. Savage, "Costs of Enforcing Apartheid," p. 301

27. T. Hanf, H. Weiland, and G. Vierdag, *South Africa: The Prospects of Peaceful Change* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), p. 76.



## The Question of Reform

Even under the current condition of sharpened racial and economic polarization signs of reform are surfacing. However we must treat with some skepticism policy innovations such as those recommended by the 1977 Wiehahn Commission (to extend regulatory laws to black trade unions), or those suggested by the 1979 Riekert Commission (suggesting the easing of residency restrictions on Africans with necessary employment skills), as they only exemplify the government's drive to legitimize and reinforce the present system of apartheid. The movement toward reform is shaped by four forces: the organized African opposition, the cohesiveness of the white community, the degree and content of international pressure, and the economic position of the state.

### *African Resistance*

Three broad African movements have arisen as influential forces for change. First there are the historic nationalist organizations, the African National Congress (ANC), and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). Although South African black political opposition was initially influenced by Gandhi and the strategy of nonviolence, the banning of these two groups led to a reassessment of tactics. Both groups went into exile where they planned for guerrilla war against the white regime. Both retained internal groups which carry out sabotage operations. Yet for ideological reasons, these groups implemented different levels of violent responses. The ANC stressed multiracial unity, a well-organized administrative apparatus, and tend to choose buildings and installations as targets. By attacking property and not individuals the ANC hoped to avoid fighting a racial war. Between its banning and the Rivonia trial of 1963-64 (in which the leaders of the ANC's sabotage wing were tried and convicted), 190 acts of sabotage were committed.<sup>28</sup> The PAC, on the other hand, whose anti-Pass Law demonstrations in 1960 precipitated the Sharpeville massacre, became oriented more toward a spontaneous upsurge from the black population. Its activities were aimed more against white individuals and black collaborators than property or the economic infrastructure.

Since the 1976 Soweto riots there has been an increase in anti-state activity led by these groups. One study, reported by Carter, suggests that psychological changes among blacks toward acceptance of prolonged armed struggle correspond to recent increases in bomb attacks. The study discloses that between November 1977 and March 1978, twenty bomb attacks occurred, 238 people were convicted in security trials, and more than 4,000 South Africans were in guerrilla training camps outside the

28 Edward Feit, *Urban Revolt in South Africa: 1960-1964* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 5

country.<sup>29</sup> Other incidents, such as the November 1979 attack on the Orlando Police Station in which two police officers were killed, the January 1980 siege of a Volkskas bank in Pretoria which resulted in the deaths of three ANC guerrillas and several hostages, and the June 1980 sabotage of a SASOL petrochemical and oil refinery, suggest a potentially new phase in liberation strategy: urban guerrilla warfare.

Two additional opposition forces have arisen within South Africa to place pressure on the state. The leaders of the homeland parliaments express the need to cooperate with the prevailing state apparatus in order to continue the independence process and promote internal reform, yet at the same time they are a source of considerable dissent. The primary homeland movement, Inkatha, is headed by the Kwazulu prime minister, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, and is comprised of 250,000 members. The goals which it seeks have been viewed as incompatible with those of both the militant black movements and the conservative white regime. In April 1980 Buthelezi announced the formation of a commission to prepare a multiracial constitution for Natal Province under the auspices of the Kwazulu Legislative Assembly. Upon the commission's presentation of its recommendations in early 1982, the government quickly and without hesitation rejected them. While slight, the impact of such a turn of events on the frustration of those blacks involved (and on the fear of those whites who view such self expression as threatening), must be noted.

The final important black force, the Black Consciousness Movement, encompasses many of the racial tenets of the PAC. A leader in the South African Students' Organization wrote in 1976 that "radical change and transformation, and the creations of an egalitarian society in South Africa and the birth of a proud Azania, can only come about by blacks coming together and uniting to form a black solidarity movement."<sup>30</sup> This movement seeks liberation from the psychological oppression brought on by the members' own feelings of inferiority. Following the arrest of the SASO executive committee in 1976 and Biko's death the following year, the BCM was reconstituted in the form of AZAPO (the Azanian Peoples Organization). This group, whose initial leaders were immediately banned, declared itself in favor of non-violent opposition to apartheid in order to wrest control from the whites.

Serious questions can be raised regarding both the degree of influence that such groups have and on the potential viability of any forthcoming reforms. Among the more coopted groups, the ability to produce change is

29 Carter, *Which Way is South Africa Going?*, p. 112-113.

30 Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu, "The Meaning of Black Consciousness in the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa" in Dennis Cohen and John Daniels, eds., *Political Economy of Africa* (New York: Longman, 1981), p. 214.

negligible. The government's treatment of Buthelezi's multiracial constitution for Natal is perhaps most instructive. While nobody should have imagined that such a plan would be welcomed with open arms, one should not forget that this was, in fact, a "house organ" with which the government was dealing.

Even if minor changes and reforms were produced, there are questions as to whether they would be at all viable. The pace of reform could never satisfy the demands of the more radical movements nor, we suggest, would reforms sufficient enough to undercut their base of support lead to anything but a heightening of the pressure for a more total social restructuring. And this is a situation which the entire white political system seems pledged to avoid.

#### White Political Opinion

The current white ruled government rose, as we have seen, on the basis of an alliance designed to insure white supremacy and policies favorable to capitalist growth. The polarization of society which has occurred in its wake has led the whites to a position even more fixed, in terms of options, than that of the Africans. Kuper traces the logic of communal conflict and notes the tendency for any middle ground to become increasingly untenable.<sup>31</sup> In South Africa this is certainly no less true for whites than for blacks. Pierre van den Berghe, in a chapter tellingly labeled "The Impossibility of a Liberal Solution in South Africa,"<sup>32</sup> suggests that:

Points of no return are notoriously difficult to determine, except in retrospect. Perhaps Sharpeville was one. In any case, the argument cut both ways; for, if the point of no return was already reached when the warnings were sounded, then it made good sense for the whites to retrench in the *laager* for the final struggle. Rigid, *verkrampte* apartheid was perhaps the most rational way of postponing the racial bloodbath, while concessions and compromise would merely accelerate the demise of the whites.

He concludes:

South African whites have erected a political structure aimed at preserving a vast and complex edifice of privilege which simply cannot survive even moderate, gradualist change along the lines of free enterprise capitalism. . . . What is at stake in South Africa is not simply the skin pigmentation of political office holders. Neo-colonial countries like Ivory Coast or Kenya have shown that white minorities have taken such change easily in their stride, and that whites often find themselves in a more comfortable position than they were before independence. . . . The crux of the matter in South Africa, however, is that the whites have created an economic system so grossly at variance with a free market and have erected so many protective walls for their economic privileges, that even a relatively conservative change in the

31 Leo Kuper. *The Pity of it All* (London: Duckworth, 1977).

32 Pierre van den Berghe, "The Impossibility of a Liberal Solution in South Africa" in van den Berghe, ed., *The Liberal Dilemma in South Africa* (London: Croom Helm, 1979), pp. 61-62.

direction of a capitalist, neo-colonial economy would severely undermine the standard of living of perhaps two-thirds to three-quarters of the white population. . . . the mass of the white population cannot countenance even a transfer of power to a conservative black regime.

Thus we may conclude that indigenous reform movements, be they of black or white inspiration, are not likely to rise to the task of solving South Africa's problems.

#### International Pressures

Indigenous movements, however, are not the only ones putting pressure on South Africa to foment change. International attempts to affect the internal political system date back to 1946 when the first economic boycott (imposed by India), and the first calls for changes in the way South Africa treated her non-white population were heard at the first session of the United Nations.<sup>33</sup> Through the 1960s, efforts on the part of black African states to impose economic and political sanctions have elicited a remarkable amount of unity from that otherwise fragmented group, although numerous breaches and secret agreements serve to minimize the impact of this resolve.

It is in the West, however, where the key to serious intervention lies. The West supports South Africa through its trade, its loans, its investments and its military technology. While perhaps not central to South Africa's existence, these are surely key props in maintaining the South African way of life. In an attempt to balance this potential leverage, South Africa has gone to great pains to place itself squarely in the center of the Cold War confrontation between East and West. The strategic position, raw materials and "stabilizing effect" of South Africa in the region are all marketed in Western capitals in an attempt to offset more radical calls for economic withdrawal or further sanctions. To a certain extent (and added to the profitable nature of business in South Africa), this strategy has been successful and Western leverage appears to have been limited to pressure by such states as France and the United States to take action on matters external to the state itself.<sup>34</sup> Thus limited intervention in Angola, pressures on "Rhodesia" for a quick settlement of their civil war, and moves toward a non-radical, if independent, Namibia are often the only prices exacted for Western acquiescence or support.

In this light current moves taken on the part of the Botha regime seem difficult to explain. The adoption of policies perceived as leading to "power

33 Sam Nolutshungu, "On External Intervention in South Africa" in Anglin, Shaw, and Widstrand, eds., *Conflict and Change in Southern Africa* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978).

34 Richard W. Johnson, *How Long Will South Africa Survive?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).

sharing" have torn South Africa's white community into factions. Some of the more radically conservative of these groups have been able to challenge the National Party in the Afrikaner districts which used to be its stronghold. It is thus difficult to imagine how the impetus for such moves could come from local political or ideological forces alone. Indeed, the absence of any well-organized, popular liberal movement in the white community suggests that the real force behind current policy changes may be coming from international actors who wish to see South African policies moderated so as to avoid both the embarrassment of dealing with such an avowedly racist regime and the development of irreconcilable polarization (and violence) between the various actors. The ferment that even these cosmetic policy suggestions have elicited among the white population, however, raises serious questions about the potential for success of any such efforts.

### *The Economic Context*

The final relationship we will consider is that which some scholars have suggested exists between the rate of economic growth and the degree of liberalization or democratization which exists within a society. Aside from the numerous other problems involved with this hypothesis, most recent observers of the South African economy have detected not growth but a general economic decline. In light of this, only conservatives have been optimistic regarding the chances for economic recovery and the potentially beneficial role of the economic system. Gann and Duignan typify this viewpoint with their assessment of the positive implications of an expanding black middle class, growing consumer sections, and an increasing amount of Western investment.<sup>35</sup>

Representatives of a more moderate perspective view the oscillating cycles of the international economic system as the primary determinant of South Africa's current economic crisis. According to Hanf, et.al., the gradual rise in the price of gold and the rapid expansionary period of the 1960s and 1970s facilitated ambitious investment projects.<sup>36</sup> As the wave of prosperity crested, the industrial sectors required a large infusion of capital and credit along with an expanded consumer market. When this need for a majority of the available capital and credit recedes, they assert, the state will exercise greater sensitivity toward the plight of the Africans and enact and strengthen reformist policies. More radical observers, on the other hand, point to more dire consequences arising from the economy's internal self-destructiveness. The current crisis in the balance of payments, Legassick and Innes argue, emerges from the manufacturing sector's high

inclination to import combined with its low propensity to export. During a period in which the price of gold falls, the crisis is aggravated by the generation of new levels of imports and an increase in international loans and foreign debt. They conclude that "what we are realistically talking about in South Africa is who is going to make the sacrifices: who will bear the economic costs."<sup>37</sup> According to this argument, the political and social reforms being debated in South Africa will not alter fundamental economic relationships nor undermine the imperatives of capital accumulation. By rejecting structural change, Harsch argues, "capitalism in South Africa is producing its own grave digger."<sup>38</sup>

The continual hardship and suffering of the black population and the widening of the economic and social gap suggests that the South African state is not acting to soften the polarized climate. Given, in fact, the growing polarization of society suggested by recent political events and, as we shall observe in the next section, the weakening economic base, the potential for genuine reform may be viewed as limited and the potential for increasing repression and terror as pronounced.

### **South Africa's Political Economy**

There is no easy way in which to summarize the political economy of a state as complex as South Africa. Attempts at the creation of a modern industrial economy coexist with a mode of labor appropriation which resembles slavery more fully than any sort of "free market." Further, after a decade of the development of parastatals close to 60 percent of the capital stock of this "capitalist" country is owned by the state.<sup>39</sup> South Africa is the only African country listed among the more advanced capitalist states by the World Bank,<sup>40</sup> yet its balance of payments position rests on the exploitation of its raw material wealth which includes rare and precious metals and stones whose marketing orders are quite unpredictable. All of this is complicated by the confounding problems of a multitiered racialism, by insurgent African nationalism, by inter-EEC and inter-Western rivalries and by the context of the Cold War. There are few if any perspectives from which the South African situation cannot be analyzed, making a clear and concise summary difficult.

The 1948 victory of the National Party cannot be considered the fun-

37. M. Legassick and D. Innes, "Capital Restructuring and Apartheid: A Critique of Constructive Engagement," *African Affairs*, 76, 305 (October 1977), p. 460.

38. Harsch, *South Africa*, p. 167.

39. *Financial Mail*, "In 1980 Public Sector owned 57.7% of Capital Stock of Country," (November 6, 1981), p. 668.

40. Note World Bank, *World Tables* (Second Edition).

35. L. Gann and P. Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981).

36. Hanf, et. al., *South Africa: The Prospects of Peaceful Change*, p. 76.

damental turning point for South Africa that some analysts have suggested. While the new party was inclined to concretize the relations that existed between white and non-white, and while it was also likely to intervene in the economic sector on behalf of the Afrikaners, it can be suggested that the actual direction in which the South African social order was heading was not significantly altered. South Africa's European community would not forever be content with agricultural and mineral wealth. An industrial capitalism had sprung to life around the turn of the century and, as it grew, so did the need for investment capital, for technology and for markets in which to dispose of manufactured goods. As for labor, the blacks of South Africa and surrounding states were more than sufficient to man the mines, work the plantations and keep the factories producing. And while their place in society had not changed with the coming to power of the National Party, it was now being made permanent.

But while South Africa had hitched its wagon to the process of industrial development and to the capitalist world, the path was not to be an easy one. Manufacturing eclipsed 'Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing', 'Mining and Quarrying', and 'Trade' as a percent of the GNP by 1945, but the import substitution industrialization boom of the postwar era was largely over by 1960. So too was the South African's ability to hide among the white ruled colonies of Africa. By 1963 most all of West, Central and Eastern Africa had gained or been granted independence. While almost 20 additional years would go by before the same could be said of southern Africa, enough change had taken place to assure that the policy of apartheid would not go unnoticed either in Africa or elsewhere.

The end of the import substitution industrialization boom in about 1960 left future South African social and economic development dependent on three things: 1) An ability to export raw materials at prices high enough or in quantities large enough to support the import demand necessitated by the process of industrial development; 2) An ability to find markets for manufactured goods and 3) An ability to attract foreign investment or generate indigenous investment capital.

South Africa was in an extremely enviable position as far as its agricultural and mineral wealth was concerned. Unlike many states in Africa and throughout the third world, South Africa had not suffered under a colonial regime which left the state with only one major cash crop or mineral export. South Africa had a secure and modern agriculture capable of both feeding its population and supplying goods for export.

South African mineral wealth was no less than formidable, consisting of a diversity of stable or increasingly valuable commodities. Foremost among these was gold, which, as the basis of the world's monetary system, remained stable in price between 1938 and 1971 and was always in demand. (Gold also remained a quite stable 30 to 40 percent of all exports

from South Africa for the 21 year period between 1950 and 1971.)<sup>41</sup> South Africa also had control of the international diamond market because of its vast reserves and because the South African-owned DeBeers Consolidated Mines Ltd. developed a virtual monopoly over the diamond market which it holds to this day. Under its tutelage the real value of rough diamonds grew consistently between 1934 and 1981. Metals such as copper and uranium along with food crops and canned fruit were also valuable members of the state's export basket.

South African manufactures fared much less well. While manufactured goods had surpassed all others in terms of export revenues by 1978, the South African market was quite narrow. Some 70 percent of all exports (and probably a slightly higher percentage of manufactured goods), went to the EEC, the U.S. and Japan. The market with the largest potential for growth, and thus the one most important in the long run, was Black Africa, and its markets had never really opened to South African goods. In 1960, for example, the 17.6 percent of South Africa's exports which stayed in Africa constituted a plateau which was not to be reached again until 1971.

The final prerequisite on the road to large industrial development is the ability to attract foreign investment. Here South Africa's economic promise was overshadowed by the shortcomings of its social system. The harshness with which apartheid was and is applied brings inevitable black responses. In 1960 it was at Sharpeville. The death of 67 Africans caused an investor panic and a general capital flight large enough to turn the 1960 305 million Rand trade surplus into a foreign exchange crisis which brought the state to the brink of bankruptcy. Only the fact that such harshness quickly restored order, and with it, investor confidence, kept South Africa solvent. The point, however, had been well taken. In the absence of wholesale social reform South Africa's continued existence would depend upon its ability to generate enough wealth to maintain its very expensive system of repression. At least as important as the ability to maintain its repressive mechanisms was its ability to employ a significant number of blacks in the creation of that wealth. The chance to earn more than the subsistence wages of the homelands would serve to keep many under control, but none so much as those who hold more or less permanent positions. These workers may be considered a labor aristocracy of sorts and the vulnerability of their position leaves them less than likely to take action against the system. The threat of anti-state violence is greatly increased if unemployment comes to affect these groups, for not only would this serve

41. Unless specifically noted, the statistical information presented in this section was drawn from the sources listed in Appendix A.

to radicalize a very stable and important sector of the labor force, it would also affect men who are not so easily deported to "homeland" areas. Some 200,000 blacks enter the job market each year and it has been estimated that a growth rate of about 5½ percent per year would be necessary to provide full employment.<sup>42</sup> While full employment is probably not necessary, enough of these newcomers must be employed, and those already established cannot be faced too closely with unemployment if stability is to be maintained. Continued affluence is thus clearly a requirement for the maintenance of the South African state.

In his excellent work on South Africa, Richard Johnson outlines three strategies with which the government has hoped to assure its continued affluence. They are 1) an attempt to open African markets for their manufactured goods; 2) an attempt to increase the value of their raw material and 3) a building up of their ability to survive in an isolated environment coupled with a policy of avoidance where large-scale military involvement in surrounding areas is concerned.<sup>43</sup>

The first of these strategies has met with the least amount of success. Any economic system bent on industrial development requires a market area sufficient in size to make manufacturing profitable. But it also requires the often contradictory maintenance of low labor costs. Thus the internal market may not sufficiently provide the economies of scale necessary to make large scale manufacturing profitable. The obvious solution is to find export markets for such goods. In 1962 this market consisted primarily of the United Kingdom (33.2%), the EEC (21%), and the United States (9.9%). But real profits were to be made, and the government recognized this, in Africa itself. Johnson notes that "the whole of the White Establishment felt the pull of the African market" and he cites a government study which confirms this in no uncertain terms:<sup>44</sup>

Our economic and political objectives in Southern Africa are to harness all natural and human resources from Table Mountain to the border of the Congo River . . . Member countries of the Common Market could complement one another. For example, the Republic of South Africa could manufacture machinery, chemicals and electrical appliances — while the Transkei could produce jute, Swaziland sugar, Botswana beef, and Lesotho water.

In the service of such a grand scheme stood a number of African leaders ready to consider ties with South Africa. By 1970, Zambia, Malagasy, and the Ivory Coast (with whom South Africa had negotiated re-export agreements) were being openly courted. This, it was hoped, would lead other African conservatives to come to terms, at least economically, with

South Africa. Such was not to be. A coup in Malagasy, along with pressure from the more radical states and more radical elements within those states turned the tide against economic normalization. From 1971 to 1978 the amount of trade South Africa did with "developing Africa" was relatively stable but its percent of all trade declined significantly.

At the same time some ominous clouds were gathering over the "developed world" as well. South Africa had been pressured to withdraw from the Commonwealth in 1961. The United Kingdom still served, however, as South Africa's key customer. Two factors were to threaten this market. The first was the great decline in the value of the pound and in the vibrancy of the British economy. This reduced Britain's role as a dependable trading partner. A second and more critical problem was the British request for membership in the EEC. Having withdrawn from the Commonwealth, South Africa would not be granted special EEC status and exports to Britain, especially of manufactured goods, stood to decline. Further, British entry into the EEC stood to worsen Portugal's economic position and thus Portugal's ability to hold Angola and Mozambique as well.<sup>45</sup> The 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the Oil Crisis that followed on its wake may well have been the last straw. A world wide inflation and recession served to show South Africa, along with the rest of the world, that depending on the Western capitalist states for support in their attempts at industrial development was somewhat hazardous. This had already been perceived by South Africa in 1971. The trade surpluses of the 1960s had turned into a substantial deficit. Devaluations followed as did a slowing of the rate of growth and an actual decline in real per capita income. Inflation (here defined as the rate of increase in the consumer price index) rose quickly. Such increases led to serious labor disorder. Strikes spread and the number of protest demonstrations in 1970 all but equaled those taking place between 1963 and 1969. This wave of illegal strikes lasted some two years and included up to 60,000 workers. In 1973, wage increases of 15 to 18 percent ended the strikes. But as the inflation rate continued to outstrip wages the unrest soon returned.

Even these moderate increases, it may be suggested, were only possible given increases in commodities prices which we shall address shortly. Most importantly, one should realize that the existence of the state itself was jeopardized by the tenuous position of its manufacturing sector in the international market. Johnson concludes by suggesting that:<sup>46</sup>

The failure of South African expansion was of critical importance. By the early 1970s the Republic's effort at detente had been sufficiently energetic to create a

42. South African Bureau for Economic Research cited in Joseph Lelyveld, "Gold's Great Fizzle," *The New York Times*, (February 14, 1982), Section 12, p. 44.

43. Johnson's *How Long Will South Africa Survive?* was the source of a great deal of helpful information on South African strategy.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

45. *Ibid.*, Chapter 5.

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

split in the ruling Nationalist party, but South Africa was not much less isolated than she had been a decade before. More serious still were the economic implications of this defeat. South Africa needed to grow and needed military security. These aims could only be achieved by the large-scale import of advanced technology from the West. Through the 1960s these imports rocketed: from R1,821 million in 1963 to R4,114 million in 1971. At the same time South African exports (excluding gold) rose from R1,286 million to R2,178 million. The gap between the two figures was widening alarmingly and so rapidly that even the inflows of foreign capital could not bridge it. It was a matter of desperate urgency to the whole White Establishment that the gap should be bridged, for the alternative could only be an economic crisis of enormous proportions. Even the Republic's military security would be threatened, for how to afford huge imports of arms in the face of a trade gap where imports were already running at twice the level of exports and accelerating away from them? It was absolutely essential that South Africa expand her exports, above all to her natural market, black Africa. By 1972 it was clear that in this most critical direction South Africa had comprehensively failed.

Attempts at trade boycotts of South Africa in the West had been a dismal failure, but the African trade boycott, despite all the gaps in it, had backed the Republic into a desperate corner. How was she to escape from it? The answer came down to one word: gold.

South Africa has great mineral wealth. The state holds 83 percent of the world's platinum reserves, 25 percent of all known uranium reserves, a great percentage of the known gem diamond reserves, 25 percent of all known chrome reserves along with significant amounts of copper, vanadium, fluorspar, iron, and coal. But, it is gold, of which South Africa produces 70 percent of the world's supply, which is of primary importance.<sup>47</sup> As the basis of the world's monetary system gold's price was set and its demand assured: a set of circumstances other raw materials producers would welcome. But as U.S. hegemony in the international economic system began to weaken, and as Western economies began to falter, serious questions were raised about the viability of that system. Such questions could only work in the best interests of South Africa which, as we have seen, was greatly in need of a dynamic source of funds. When the French began their war on the dollar in the mid 1960s they did so through the use of and with an eye on gold. The history of gold's escape from its \$35 per ounce level in the late 1960s and early 1970s is a long and complex one and need not be reviewed here. Suffice it to say that the freeing of the market and the concomitant rise in price came at an extremely fortuitous time for Pretoria. The state had been holding gold off the market in order to boost its price and, while this was a perilous strategy, it was eventually successful. The balance of payments, as we have noted, took a turn for the worse and even with foreign capital investments at an all time high a very serious deficit, inflation, and a devaluation of the Rand were in store in 1971. By June of 1972, however, the

47 Gann and Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive*, pp. 192-193.

price of gold had passed the \$50 per ounce level. Persistent U.S. trade deficits and the preoccupation of the Nixon White House with Watergate would allow the price to rise to \$122 per ounce only one year later. By the end of 1974, the price fell just shy of \$200 per ounce before a serious and concerted effort on the part of a new U.S. administration pushed the price of gold back to an average of \$150 per ounce where it remained between 1974 and 1978. Gold did not reach \$200 per ounce again until 1978. This time, however, the price would reach a January 1980 high of over \$850 per ounce.


For South Africa, no period in its history had been finer. Old mines were able to refine and reopen almost overnight. The value of gold mined rose over 1100 percent between 1970 and 1980, 460 percent between 1976 and 1980 alone, to some 13 billion dollars. The Rand regained its strength. Johnson estimates that for every \$10 the average price of gold rose the GNP rose an additional percentage point.<sup>48</sup> Such wealth signaled more than simply an increasingly wealthy elite. With gold prices rising, the lack of a market for manufactured goods, the rise in the price and the anti-apartheid politicization of oil, and an almost bottomless need for military hardware could all be overcome. Gold revenues would insulate the state from whatever vulnerabilities it may have had and would continue to do so as long as they remained sufficiently high.

Much the same was happening with respect to the price of gem diamonds. Not even the DeBeers monopoly could have done for gem diamond prices what western inflation and the search for hedges against it had accomplished. South African diamond export revenues, as noted in Figure 2, (p. 26) trace the rise which led diamond exports to account for over six percent of all non-gold export revenues by 1979. Large gem prices rose some 600 percent in 1979 and 1980 alone. Platinum, uranium, and other minerals like copper also did well between 1970 and 1980. Platinum prices, in fact, outstripped gold in terms of both absolute price and, especially in early 1980, in percentage increases (see Figure 4, p. 29).

South Africa's great mineral wealth expanded tremendously in the decade of the 1970s and this expansion, as we have noted, made up for various other shortcomings in the state's position. But the South African state could remain stable only so long as this new source of revenue would provide for its growing needs.

The final strategy which Johnson suggests the South African state adopt to assure their survival may be dealt with under the heading of "isolation" and contains two parts. The first is the drive toward strategic

48 Johnson, *How Long Will South Africa Survive?*, p. 81.



Source: South Africa 1981: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa (Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg).

autarchy. Such self-sufficiency was gained during the great rise in gold prices and with the aid of the French. Research in coal gasification and the storing of large emergency stocks of oil were also important components of this strategy. This effort has also been aided by state-owned industries which now predominate in the important strategic sectors of energy production, strategic materials, and weapons and support systems production.

One problem area in this search for autarchy has been the role played by foreign investment. When investors are available the state is hardly in a position to turn them away. Short periods of instability, however, as have occurred in 1960, 1976-7, and 1980, usually signal an exodus of funds leading to a very unstable condition. Unlike the situation in many African states, however, foreign investment constitutes a relatively small portion of gross domestic savings.<sup>49</sup> While cutbacks in these funds can be damaging, a true crisis would occur only if large foreign-owned employers decided to leave the state altogether, and this is not likely.

Finally, prior to 1981, South Africa had been quite hesitant about overtly committing military forces anywhere outside its own borders. Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Angola all "fell" to radical black regimes with only a minimum of military interference even though these revolutions were deemed to directly threaten the security of the state. Successive


49. Gann and Duignan, p. 161.

governments have clearly decided that military intervention in foreign wars would be too great a risk. Such conflicts would inevitably be long, drawn out guerrilla wars which could sap large amounts of resources while drawing attention to the South African social system and tactical situation. Thus even in places where intervention might easily have succeeded (for example, southern Mozambique), it has not been attempted and this (particularly in Zimbabwe) at no small political cost to the regime.

No matter how one calculates the successes and the failures of the South African strategy with regard to these policies, one thing is clear: South Africa has remained a secure if not affluent state. And violence, both by the political opposition and by the state itself, is least likely under such conditions. Recent events, however, have caused the position of the state to deteriorate and this, we suggest, will lead to an increase in violence on the part of all parties.

Firstly, South African manufactured goods have yet to develop a significant market in Africa itself. And even with an increase in purchases by states like Argentina and Japan, merchandise exports have not grown quickly enough to offset the growing costs of imported goods. Secondly, real problems have developed as a result of recent price fluctuations in what had historically been stably priced commodity sectors. Gold declined in value by more than 40 percent between January 1980 and August 1982. This reduced the value of the Rand, created a new balance of payments crisis (a 3.7 billion dollar shortfall in 1981), cut the 1981 growth rate to half the 1980 figure (four percent down from eight percent), and is likely to halve it again during 1982. Inflation rose to 15 percent during 1981 with a 17 percent prime interest rate.<sup>50</sup> As we have noted, the South African economy must grow at a rate of about 5½ percent per year to provide for full black employment. The great decrease in the price of gold has thus threatened the very viability of the state. The situation is even worse if one considers the effect such a downturn will have on the numerous businesses whose conditions are dependent on the health of the mining sector. Some mines have already had to close and other mines will certainly have to cut back production. Figure 3 plots the cost per ounce of producing gold in over 30 major South African mines and the reserves listed as exploitable in those mines. A line representing the costs of profitable production would be located about 30 percent to the right of the cost of production line. Thus we may estimate the reduction in exploitable reserves that occurs as the price of gold falls. It is clear that serious repercussions would be the result if gold prices fell below the \$250 per ounce level.


50. See fn 42.




Source: Mining Journal, "Analysis of Rand and O.F.S. Quartermies," August 6, 1981, November 6, 1981 and January 29, 1982. Average costs of production and known reserves were calculated from July, September and December 1980 and 1981 data from about 35 major mines.

Gold is not the only commodity experiencing losses. Platinum has fallen in value due to a serious crisis in the American auto industry. Even diamonds, a commodity with a 46 year history of growth, have decreased in value significantly. DeBeers halted marketing of gem quality rough to try to control the decline, but a scandal in the Israeli cutters market, the announcement of a major new find in Australia, a decrease in inflation in the West, and the Soviet's use of diamonds to help support the Polish government and the Soviet army in Afghanistan, have reduced prices to levels not seen since the mid-1970s. During the first 10 months of 1980, South Africa reported a 37 percent drop in the value of diamond exports. **Mining Journal** cites data from the South African Minerals Bureau which show that decreases of 20 percent for gold, 42 percent for diamonds, and 39 percent for a basket of other minerals (including platinum, uranium, and vanadium), could be noted in the first half of 1981 when compared to the previous year. Prices did not significantly change for any of those minerals in the second half of 1981.<sup>51</sup>

51 Mining Journal, "South Africa: The Rate of Change," (November 20, 1981), p. 382.




(See p. 30 for sources)



Source: Various brokerage sources. (Based on diamonds of 1.00 to 1.39 carats, round brilliant, H/VVS1.)



While the value of South African exports fell, the cost of imports did not. Imported machinery and industrial supplies are leading a greater percentage of South Africa's GDP into import purchases and debt service. Service payments stood at 9.2 percent of GDP in 1980.



Sources: South Africa 1981: *Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa*, (Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg). 1980 figures are estimates. Rand figures were standardized against the Wholesale Price Index presented in the World Bank's *World Tables (Second Edition)*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), and in South Africa 1981. 1970 - 100. It is unfortunate that no post 1980 data appears to be available as it would be interesting to note the effect of the decline in the price of gold on these patterns.

Finally, South Africa appears more and more unable to refrain from taking a military role in surrounding areas. While recent actions do not necessarily signal a reversal in the strategy of non-involvement, they do suggest that short run (albeit certainly expensive) incursions are viewed as necessary given the situation which currently exists.

The implications of the economic decline of South Africa should be clear: As the costs of repression rise, a softened economy simultaneously increases the bases of dissension and undercuts the ability of the state to afford them. Thus, the structural underpinnings of stability break down and we should detect an increase in violence and state terror.

Sources: (Fig. 4, p. 29) *1981 Community Yearbook* (New York: Commodity Research Bureau), and *Metals Week* (New York: McGraw-Hill). Gold prices expressed in U.S. dollars per troy ounce as reported by the U.S. Bureau of Mines. Platinum prices expressed in U.S. dollars per troy ounce on the New York Exchange.

## Conclusion

South Africa is a state which relies on its ability to physically impose its will on the majority of its population. It does so through a "carrot and stick" approach. The white economy holds the only promise for a better life while the white regime uses its substantial repressive capacity to ensure that the white economy remains, in fact, "the only way out." This system has proved quite resilient over the years, but it is vulnerable to economic downturns: When the state is unable to provide the structural requirements of stability (employment and affluence) the negative reaction of the populace requires the state to use even more repression. Conversely, as employment and affluence decline so too does the state's ability to absorb the increasing costs of this repression.

Granted it has not been possible for us to show a direct relationship between a decline in the fortunes of the state and increasing repression given the data available. But recent large-scale incidents such as those at Sharpeville and Soweto do lend support to the hypothesis that revolutionary violence tends to evolve from the condition of the state itself and not simply from a loss of support of the masses. The reaction to the current crisis situation, if it evolves as we have predicted, will lend it even more support. And full scale revolution will finally result when the state is sufficiently weakened and its opponents sufficiently strong for the sporadic violence of the anti-state forces to overcome the repressive abilities of the state.

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## The Nigerian Economy

since the Great Oil-Price Increases of 1973-74

Sayre P. Schatz

Nigeria's capitalist economy performed modestly and somewhat stodgily until galvanized by the great oil-price increases of 1973-74. These did not change the country's basic nurture-capitalism orientation,<sup>1</sup> but a strong new emphasis emerged by 1974 on using the oil bonanza to accelerate development. In the words of the Fourth National Development Plan, the "basic strategy will . . . be that of using the resources generated by this wasting asset to ensure an all-round expansion in the productive capacity of the economy so as to lay a solid foundation for self-sustaining growth and development in the shortest time possible."<sup>2</sup>

This article examines the performance of the Nigerian economy since the OPEC increases of 1973-74.

### The Impact of Oil

To understand the Nigerian economy it is necessary to appreciate the impact of the oil-price revolution. The price Nigeria received for her oil went from \$3.00 a barrel in October 1973 to \$11.20 in April 1974, i.e. it nearly quadrupled in six months. Production also increased somewhat, so that government revenues from oil nearly quintupled in a nine-month period, rising from \$160 million in September 1973 to \$770 million during May 1974. The increase in oil revenues provided a striking 45 percent increase in the real 1973 gross domestic product (GDP).<sup>3</sup>

1. This author's perception of "nurture-capitalism" and of the Nigerian political economy is presented in his *Nigerian Capitalism* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977), briefly on pp. 3-4 and fully in chapters 1-3, 8.)

2. Federal Government of Nigeria, *Outline of the Fourth National Development Plan 1981-85*, (Lagos, Government Printer, 1981), p. 6.

3. The data in this article are pieced together from many sources: the Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigeria's Federal Office of Statistics, the World Bank, Nigeria's development plans, various official statements by Nigerian government figures, news publications such as *West Africa* and *The Economist*, the author's own works, and others. The source or sources for each figure are not cited in this paper because it would be exceedingly tedious to do so. It remains as true as ever that data estimates for Nigeria are surely at the low end of the international reliability spectrum." Gerald K. Helleiner, *Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth in Nigeria* (Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin, 1966).

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Oil continues to be dominant. Petroleum production was still 35 percent of GDP in 1979, compared to one percent in 1960. Adding in the direct multiplier effects, it is realistic to attribute to oil half the current GDP.<sup>4</sup> Oil has become the major source of foreign exchange earnings; it provided 91 percent of merchandise exports in 1978, compared to one percent in 1960.<sup>5</sup> It also generates the bulk of government income. Since 1974, it has provided approximately four-fifths of all federal government revenues, including the large amounts passed on to the states and to local governments. It has furnished *all* of the actual economic surplus and more: since 1974 oil revenues have more than covered all gross domestic investment — by the federal government, statutory corporations, state and local governments, by all domestic enterprises including all of agriculture and by all foreign-run firms.

### *Insufficiency of Oil*

Nevertheless, Nigeria, unlike Kuwait, is not a sparsely populated area floating on a sea of oil. It has a population of perhaps 90 million. It was a poor country before oil prices rose and it remains essentially a poor country today.

Although foreign exchange receipts from oil increased more than eightfold between 1972 and 1974 (from ₦ 612 million to ₦ 5057 million), resulting in a huge balance-of-payments surplus in 1974 (rising twentyfold from ₦ 153 million in 1973 to ₦ 3102 million in 1974), foreign exchange expenditures soon caught up and already by 1976 Nigeria experienced the first of a series of growing, large balance-of-payments deficits.

A similar pattern emerged with respect to the government budget. The sharp rise in government revenues in 1973-74 generated a huge federal budgetary surplus. The surplus, expressed in annual rates, rose tenfold during fiscal 1973-74 (from ₦ 60 million to ₦ 600 million), and by May 1974, the second month of fiscal 1974-75, reached an incredible rate of ₦ 45,000 million, 75 times greater than nine months earlier. Nevertheless, government expenditures, growing massively, soon outstripped revenues and by fiscal 1975-76 Nigeria already experienced the first of continuous series of federal budget deficits.

Thus, oil did not transform Nigeria into a plutocracy; the resource constraint on Nigerian economic development continues.

4. Standard GDP calculations overstate real growth and thereby understate the oil impact. Any domestic expenditure of the oil revenues by government, including outlays on increased civil servant and military salaries, on administrative activities and on the services of foreign-based construction companies, is added to the GDP. As the government and construction sectors have been the most rapidly expanding major sectors, the upward bias imparted by this statistical artifact is significant.

5. These export figures for oil include earnings from a relatively small amount of tin and other minerals.

### *Early Euphoria*

The quick reappearance of balance-of-payments and budgetary deficits was the result — given Nigeria's footing as a poor country whose poverty was only alleviated by oil — of a euphoric early reaction to the oil bonanza.

Preliminary investment plans and planning procedures that had been arduously worked out many months and years were abruptly dropped. An unrealistically enlarged plan was hastily adopted with little regard for coordinated planning or for safeguards against waste and corruption. It called for investment at a rate approximately seven and a half times the target rate set one year earlier by the official Third Plan Guidelines,<sup>6</sup> a target, incidentally, which the Guidelines considered "huge" and probably beyond the capacity of the country to carry out even if the financial wherewithal were available. By 1975-76, federal government expenditures were more than six times the level three years earlier. The costs of irreligion between projects — were enormous.

Concurrently, in what some have called "Gowon's bribe to the nation," the massive Udoji wage increases were granted. These more than doubled most civil servants' salaries and were accompanied by a huge bonus in the form of a nine month retroactive increase paid in a lump sum in January 1975. Generally comparable increases in the armed forces, the public corporations, other parts of the public sector, and in the private sector soon followed.

As the costs of euphoric planning, and the limited extent of Nigeria's resources relative to its needs became evident, a more sober approach to development expenditures gained ground.

### **Nigeria's Development Effort**

From here on the article will deal with the entire period since the first great oil-price increases. This section examines primarily the intensity of Nigeria's attempt to convert its oil wells into a solid foundation for rapid development; in particular, it investigates the degree to which Nigeria is devoting its resources to investment and considers briefly some issues relating to the productiveness of that investment.

6. Federal Republic of Nigeria. Guidelines for the Third National Development Plan 1975-80, (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction, 1973).

7. On euphoric planning, see *Nigerian Capitalism*, pp. 47-55.

We can divide Nigeria's use of its resources into three broad categories: private consumption, government consumption and investment (both private and government). Investment refers to the formation of capital, the creation of additions to the country's stock of capital goods.

Private consumption has been growing briskly by conventional standards. Its rate of increase in the four years after the oil-revenue surge was more than thirteen times its rate of increase in the pre-Civil War 1960s (more than 8 percent per annum for 1973-77 compared to 0.6 percent per annum for 1960-66). The lion's share of the increase went to the relatively affluent. Although no data are available, it seems clear that the lower forty percent of the population in terms of income benefited relatively little.

Nevertheless, private consumption has been increasing *relatively* slowly, and is sharply shrinking as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP). During the pre-Civil War 1960s private consumption constituted 82 percent of GDP while during the 1970s (data for 1970-77), it was down to 58 percent. Thus, despite the excesses of the rich — the imported champagne and lace — and the consumption gains of some other relatively affluent groups, in the aggregate there has been commendable restraint in private consumption.

However, there was no belt tightening with respect to *government* consumption (i.e., government expenditures for purposes other than capital formation). This portion of GDP has always grown rapidly; it increased at an annual rate of 10.6 percent during the 1950s and 6.4 percent during the pre-Civil War 1960s. Then after the first big oil-price increases it soared. Government consumption tripled (went to 297%) in the four years from 1973 to 1977.

The proportion of GDP devoted to government consumption also grew significantly. See Table 1.

**TABLE 1**  
Government Consumption as Percent of GDP  
Nigeria, 1950-1979

1950-60	4.9%
1960-66	6.1%
1970-77	13.8%
1977	15.9%
1979	10 %

(The 1979 decline to 10 percent occurred during the recession phase of a "petro-political fluctuation"<sup>8</sup> and can be considered temporary and unrepresentative.) Thus Nigeria manifested a much greater degree of indulgence in its government consumption than in its private consumption.

Despite this indulgence, gross domestic investment (which can be con-

sidered the most fundamental requisite for economic development) also increased rapidly. (Curiously, its growth since 1950 has closely paralleled that of government consumption except for the first half of the 1960s.) Investment increased briskly during the 1950s and 1960s, at roughly 11 percent per annum and then took off after the oil-price hike, tripling (301%) between 1973 and 1977. As a percent of GDP, it shot up from 11.7 percent in the 1950s and 15.7% in the pre-Civil War 1960s to 31 percent for the years 1977 and 1979.

**TABLE 2**  
Gross Domestic Investment as Percent of GDP  
Nigeria, 1950-1979

1950-60	11.7%
1960-66	15.1%
1970-77	24.1%
1977	31.1%
1979	31 %

These figures suggest a diligent development effort by Nigeria, but some interpretation is required. On the one hand, the investment figures understate the development effort in that some government consumption expenditures can be considered as productive investment in human capital (e.g., recurrent expenditures on education). On the other hand, this is more than outweighed by two other factors. First, we can distinguish conceptually between productive investment and investment for the purpose of consumption (e.g. investments in parliamentary buildings, theaters or stadia and, partially, in roads in Lagos or in the construction of Abuja). This investment-for-consumption exceeds, it is my guess, the human capital adjustment mentioned above. Second, *effective* productive investment has been reduced by waste and corruption.

All things considered, the intensity of Nigeria's development effort is moderate. On the one hand, a gross domestic investment rate of 31 percent is certainly substantial. It significantly exceeds the 23 percent rate of the industrial market economies as a group. On the other hand, Nigerian investment is about equal to that of the rest of the group of countries in which the World Bank places Nigeria (the oil exporting, mid-income developing countries), and a significant portion of that investment has not been productive.

### Developments in the Nigerian Economy

Nigerian investment has generated or contributed to a number of developments in the economy. These will be described briefly.

8. Sayre P. Schatz, "Nigeria's Petro-Political Fluctuation," *Issue*, Spring/Summer, 1981, Volume XI, Numbers 1/2.

Economic growth has clearly accelerated. The annual growth rate of GDP including oil more than doubled in the 1970s (3.1 percent per annum in the 1960s, 7.5 percent per annum in the 1970s). On a per capita basis, the annual growth rate, 1960-1979, was 3.7 percent, sufficient to double average income over the first two decades of independence.

However, in appraising the economy's growth-generating performance, it is best to leave aside oil production and revenues, for these represent a windfall, and to calculate GDP excluding oil. Its growth, adjusted for inflation, accelerated from 4.2 percent per annum in the pre-Civil War period 1958-1966 to more than 12 percent per annum in the period 1974-78, although it then slackened during the recession phase of the petro-political fluctuation. The per capita annual increase rose from about 1.4 percent (1958-66) to 9.3 percent (1973/4 - 1978/9), which would result in a doubling of average income in less than eight years.

The World Bank has moved Nigeria from the low to the mid-income category of developing nations. Its 1979 GNP per capita was \$670 compared to, e.g., \$400 for Ghana (which once was higher than Nigeria) and \$110 for Chad (the lowest African country) or to \$250 for both Benin and Sierra Leone.<sup>9</sup>

#### *Lesser Increase in Living Standards*

The general standard of living has improved much less than the GDP figures would suggest. There are several reasons, the first two of which have already been mentioned. First, individual consumption has grown much more slowly than GDP. Second, the income distribution has become more unequal. Third, official GDP data are unreliable and the figures tend consistently to exaggerate growth. (To prevent the long-run figures from getting blatantly out of touch with reality, retroactive corrections — which go completely unnoticed — are made some years later. For example, official Nigerian data for 1956-1966 showed a 6.1 percent annual increase in GDP. I was considered unduly skeptical by some for calculations indicating a 4.7 percent increase.<sup>10</sup> Now, the most recent World Bank figures show an even lower growth rate of 4.3 percent for that period). Fourth, the very nature of national income accounting, which tends to undercount non-market contributions to true GDP in any given base year, and then counts fully the market-economy increments in GDP, builds in an exaggeration of GDP growth.<sup>11</sup>

9. The World Bank's population estimate of 79 million for Nigeria in 1977 is on the low side, so its per capita income figure may be high.

10. Schatz, *Nigerian Capitalism*, pp. 9-18.

11. See also footnote 4.

Other indicators are less comforting than GDP figures. For example, Nigerian life expectancy at birth in 1979 was 49. In the countries immediately above and below Nigeria in a world ranking by GNP per capita, life expectancy was 63 (El Salvador) and 58 (Peru). The Nigerian expectancy was not much better than that of unfortunate Chad (41), whose per capita income was one-sixth of Nigeria's. Another example: calorie supply per capita has actually decreased slightly in Nigeria, from 91 percent of estimated requirements in 1960 to 89 percent in 1970 and 88 percent in the World Bank's most recent estimate. Moreover there is the prospect of a grim race. While known oil reserves are expected to last 15 years,<sup>12</sup> the population is expected almost to double between 1980 and the year 2000.

#### *Spasmodic Structural Change*

A normal development pattern unfolded in most sectors: e.g., manufacturing (which normally expands faster than GDP in developing countries) grew at a 12.8 percent annual rate, 1960-66, and a 13.4 percent rate 1970-77, and rose from 10.2 percent of GDP in 1973 to 11.1 percent in 1977. However there was sudden, even spasmodic, structural change in three major sectors of the Nigerian economy. (1) Construction's share of the GDP almost doubled in five years (going from 5.8 percent in 1972 to 10.9 percent in 1977). (2) The portion of GDP attributable to public administration and the military almost tripled in the same period (going from 4.5 percent in 1972 to 12.1 percent in 1977). (3) A slow decline in the relative importance of agriculture is to be expected, but the agricultural contribution to GDP simply plummeted. Agricultural production fell from 60 percent to 30 percent of GDP (including oil) between 1960-65 and the last half of the 1970s. Agriculture provided 81 percent of export receipts in 1960 and was down to 6 percent in 1977. These figures perhaps overdramatize the decline, but even more sober figures showing the agricultural portion of GDP excluding oil show a sharp drop, from 58 percent in 1960-65 to 36 percent in 1977.

Each facet of the spasmodic change has involved problems. The government-sector expansion neglected to ask whether substantial increases in government consumption and military expenditures were what Nigerians most want or Nigerian society most needs. The increase in construction was accompanied by great waste and corruption. The decline in agriculture was associated with considerable discontent among the many in simple farming and also with balance-of-payments problems and the enormous costs and pressures of urbanization.

12. Of course, oil reserves are generally estimated very conservatively.

disagreements about emphasis and interpretation are inevitable when dealing with a work of such great scope. They in no way detract from the wholly noteworthy achievement embodied in the bibliography. Hopefully, users will heed the authors' request for information about errors, omissions and newly published items. Given the indisputable quality of the present volume, the publishers would be well advised to print the revised editions or supplements which the compilers have so rashly promised us!

Those familiar with the plethora of recent articles from Colin Murray's prolific pen will find much that is familiar in *Families Divided*. Nevertheless, this revised version of Murray's doctoral dissertation is an exciting synthesis linking materials on the regional political economy of Southern Africa with analysis of labor migration, family patterns and rural productivity in Lesotho. It demonstrates the fallacy of many prior studies which have treated each of these subjects in isolation instead of recognizing them to be interlocked parts of complex, historically based interactions. Chapters focusing on economic history, migrant labor, land management, class formation, family structure and marital strategy are integrated through a final section on women's roles. In each segment, Murray provides relevant case studies to demonstrate how various households have responded to the inescapable challenges imposed by the labor reserve setting.

Murray makes especially cogent assaults on the "misplaced orthodoxies" (p. 86) that income distribution in rural Lesotho has remained unusually equitable and that migrant labor earnings supplement farm income. Instead he offers compelling evidence that migrancy has become the independent variable financing most private investment in agriculture. Similarly, he demonstrates that sharp inequalities among rural households and complex processes of class formation are the product of differential access to migrant income closely linked to cycles of individual household development and decay. His analysis of the role of bridewealth (bohali) reinforces these points by showing how the intertwining of cultural, economic and political factors in marital strategy permits households to mitigate some of the dysfunctional social pressures engendered by the labor reserve format. Murray is particularly effective at identifying significant points of disagreement with prior authors and in explaining the conflicting assumptions which have sustained these differences.

On the whole *Families Divided* is well organized and well presented. The most visible weaknesses are an unnecessarily descriptive beginning which belies the analytic forcefulness to follow and a rather arcane digression into abstract academic debate about domestic labor which lessens the impact of the conclusion. These minor concerns cannot obscure the very fundamental contribution made by the book. Certainly no one who has read it could ever fall prey to South African propaganda that labor migration is somehow beneficial or reflects implicit acceptance of the apartheid system.

Sandra Burman examines the era of Cape Rule where colonial rulers aligned with missionaries and traders in attacking Basotho political and social patterns which appeared to thwart their respective objectives. This process coincided with the initial steps leading to the establishment of the labor reserve pattern dissected by Murray. Given the pervasive impact of the larger Southern African political economy upon Lesotho, Burman's decision to exclude such

Richard F. Weisfelder

factors due to "limitations of length" (p. 2) seems rather questionable. Indeed, Murray's work demonstrates the grave dangers of trying to isolate highly dynamic questions of custom, social structure and political power from the economic milieu in which they are operative.

*Chieftom Politics and Alien Law* provides a thorough evaluation of the attitudes, behavior and policies of the Cape magistrates who administered Basutoland during the reign of Letsie I. It painstakingly traces the justifications for and political and social consequences of deliberate attempts to alter Sesotho customs, family law and political authority. The book devotes as much attention to the early successes of the magistrates as to the often recited blunders which eventually precipitated the Gun War and the return of Basutoland to imperial control. Hence, Burman has given us the first comprehensive micro-analysis of the period most crucial to understanding why the Basotho were not incorporated into South Africa like the Pedi, Xhosa or Zulu. Her work is based on a host of primary sources including correspondence and memoirs. Moreover, her publishers have included photographs of the protagonists and maps that make the personalities and events far more accessible to the interested student or casual reader.

Within her analysis, Burman rightly emphasizes the crucial role of personality factors in determining the degree of success of individual magistrates and in understanding the role of Masopha, Moshoeshoe's talented and tenacious third-ranking son. Persuasive capacity was undoubtedly extremely significant for an understaffed colonial administration constantly compelled to break new ground in establishing its authority. However, Burman's marked preference for the judgments of mature and experienced magistrates and missionaries on the scene seems to lead to some oversimplification of the interests and issues at stake. "Blind obstinacy" (p. 131) and incompetence may indeed explain much of the counterproductive behavior of the Cape Government, but the author's Basothocentric focus cannot substantiate this verdict. Otherwise inexplicable policies may make far more sense if the political economy of the Cape Colony and its simultaneous relationships with Britain and African societies are taken into account. Similarly cliches like "conservative chiefs" (p. 188) may be avoided if the behavior of these traditional authorities is portrayed as a series of complex adaptations to a changing political economy, even if cloaked in the garb of national renaissance.

Although Burman asserts that trade was a major motivation for Cape rule (p. 57), she provides insufficient evidence of its scope and impact on chiefs, magistrates, missionaries, the traders themselves and the society at large. Neither does she probe sufficiently deeply into the increasingly complex character of missionary interests beyond their readily apparent philosophical and philanthropic objectives. Most of these weaknesses derive from the initial decision of the author to abstract political and administrative transactions in Basutoland from the more comprehensive political economy of which they were a part. However, the serious nature of the issues raised here reflects the importance of Burman's work in synthesizing significant materials and stimulating meaningful discussion.

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Al Fleischman

Alison Jolly, *A WORLD LIKE OUR OWN: Man and Nature in Madagascar.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.) 272 pp. \$29.95

Madagascar has 9.5 million persons, half of whom are under 20 years of age, living in an uneven distribution pattern around the island. This overabundant population inhabits all areas of the nation, including all the wild places, the stressed habitats, the spiny southern desert with its lacerating vegetation and limited water supply where women walk 20 kilometers daily to obtain this necessity of life. Yet these same agricultural people will try to bear as many as a dozen children each, to help populate the nation. Access to medical technology is helping to alter the ancient reproduction cycle and change the shape of family structure. Millions can no longer find arable land in this unstable ecosystem. Deforestation, desertification, soil erosion and a long list of other detrimental processes force the Malagasian to renew the deadly cycle of ecological destruction by executing all remaining forest. Ms. Jolly sees hope "if we can one day learn why and how a rain forest, or even a cactus desert, maintains tens or hundreds of times as much living matter on the same ground as does human agriculture." Another skill of Ms. Jolly lies in her acute observational powers to notice detail, to compare and contrast the behavior of man and his distant evolutionary cousin, the lemurs, from birth to death.

Why should a book of ecology be of interest to political scientists with a strong orientation towards Africa? For this reviewer, Ms. Jolly has attempted to plot a future for Madagascar which takes into account the uniqueness and the sense of wonder which this remote Indian Ocean island has held for generations of naturalists. Madagascar is a world heritage holding in trust a flora and fauna of unequalled value for future generations. This giant island, or micro-continent, broke away from the African continent more than 50 million years ago and by the process of continental drift moved from Kenya and Tanzania to its present day location. This separation allowed the plants and animals of the island to evolve in comparative isolation. For example on Madagascar there are 9 kinds of baobab trees while all of continental Africa has just one species. All but one of Madagascar's 97 species of ebony grow only on the island. Only two of the 130 palm species live elsewhere. In the animal kingdom, of the 235 reptile species found here, only ten survive outside of the island. All of the 155 types of frogs evolved here. Even among birds 50% of the 238 species are endemic. Four bird families exist nowhere else on this planet. 50% of the 26 varieties of bats fly nowhere else. All of the 66 species of land mammals are

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3rd Quarter, 1982

restricted to Madagascar. The same richness exists in the fish and insect life. How many of us can even imagine an animal that has "independently evolved bat ears to listen for insect crepitations within wood, beaver teeth to rip off the bark, and an elongate, clawed finger to extract the juicy grubs." We are speaking of the aye-aye. How many are familiar from zoos or other media with the following Malagasian wildlife: fossa, mouselemurs, piebald indri, coua, lemurs, sifaka, tenrec, vanga? What can a nation be permitted to do within its own borders when that action will decimate an irreplaceable genetic pool?

As the author travels about the island, a journey the reader can follow on the single map in the book, she skillfully interweaves, often with a touch of poetic prose, the enormous economic, educational and environmental problems the peasants face in their fight for food. One can follow along as she visits the various biotic communities of Madagascar with some Malagasy friends and scientists. Thus, Ms. Jolly is allowed to enter the world of the normal, Malagasian peasant villagers, who relate their stories to survive.

Ms. Jolly, a primatologist by training, poses many problems which are commonplace in developing nations for which there are no satisfactory solutions. Scientists in advanced nations are aware of the dilemmas but have yet to come up with viable answers. Man does not have a map of his future, but the way in which various nations are traveling will only lead to disaster unless their path is altered. Each generation accumulates the errors of his forefathers and they are difficult to erase.

It's time for a change in the way things are being done. Third World countries are continually bargaining from a position of weakness and relative poverty against trading partners who are rich and powerful. Poor people are staying as poor or becoming poorer. "The most discouraging part of our job," the forester continued, "is that we build dams and irrigation projects, and find that no one will use them."

Yes, no one will use them, perhaps, because a people's baffling cultural variables may not have been fully understood. Malagasy relations with the deceased are unusual. Villagers have been known to dig up the bones of the dead and dance with them. The rich role of mythology and religion is often expressed in strong Malagasy beliefs about their dead, culminating in one tribe's belief that the "chief goal of life is a worthy death." Just as we do not yet know all the inter-relationships between the Malagasy living and the Malagasy dead, we err in judging that change is obviously a good thing.

One may argue that Madagascar is a world unlike our own, for we have neither a similar geological history, nor a flora and fauna that is 95% unique, which means it exists nowhere else on this planet, nor is our peopling pattern similar. Yet, if anything, the main purpose of this book is to explain what is happening in Madagascar is not unique but nearly universal. Man in changing the face of the natural landscape is devastating the earth and seriously depleting an irreplaceable genetic bank. Two thousand years ago Madagascar was richly forested, today the forests have been removed from 80% of this island, more than twice the size of California. The author shows no anger, nor is there a bitter diatribe against the Malagasians for what has occurred; instead her study is scientific, scholarly and surprisingly pleasant, provocative reading. A solid bibliography appears at the close of the work.

## ***The Saharan War: A Thorough Analysis***

Anne Lippert

Maurice Barbier, *LE CONFLIT DU SAHARA OCCIDENTAL*, (Paris, L'Harmattan, 1982) 420 pp., 130 francs.

In the body of literature now being published about the conflict in Western Sahara, Maurice Barbier's book, *Le Conflit du Sahara Occidental*, stands out as a well-documented, thorough study of the issues. In his foreward Barbier notes that his purpose is to analyze the conflict in as complete a fashion as possible so as to provide an explanation for and/or interpretation of it. He has succeeded in providing a meticulously researched study.

Barbier starts with an introduction, "The Stakes in the Conflict," and talks about the territory itself, its population, and its resources. He follows this up with Part One, a historical background to the conflict, in which he discusses the period of pre-colonization, from the fourteenth century to 1884. Of particular importance is his discussion of the involvement of Moroccan sultans in the Sahara and international treaties referring to the Sahara from 1767 to 1895, since these form the bases of Moroccan legal claims to the Western Sahara. In ending this section, Barbier concludes that despite occasional operations in the Sahara, Moroccan sultans did not control the area in any kind of continuous fashion, and that Morocco neither penetrated nor occupied the Seguiet el Hamra and the Rio de Oro because Moroccan expeditions did not go beyond the Sous and the Noun which lie within contemporary Moroccan territory. He asserts that international treaties concluded by Morocco in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the exception of the Agreement of 1895, confirm explicitly that the authority of the Sultans was not exercised beyond the Noun.

Barbier continues his systematic study of the conflict in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, in which he describes Spanish colonization from 1884 to 1974. Detailed in these sections are agreements of European states concerning the boundaries of the territory which date from 1884 to 1912; attitudes of neighboring countries, 1956 to 1970; and the evolution of the political awareness of the Saharawi inhabitants.

Part Two deals with the explosion of the conflict and includes a detailed study of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission in 1975, the consultative opinion of the I.C.J., diplomatic activity of 1975 including the Green March and the Madrid Accords, Moroccan and Mauritanian occupation of the Western Sahara and the resistance by the Polisario Front. Although much of this material has been covered before in a variety of articles and books, of particular interest is the author's careful discussion of the split of the Saharawi Djemaa and his ability to give a clear chronology of events.

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Part Three discusses the development of the conflict to the present and thus describes the creation of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, the Saharawi State, that State's organization, the guerrilla war, the internationalization of the conflict with emphasis on developments in the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, the withdrawal of Mauritania from the conflict and the Algiers Accord, changes in attitudes of other States on the international scene. Among documents not used as extensively in other works to date are letters of interested parties to the Security Council of the U.N., all of the resolutions on the question by the U.N. General Assembly as well as resolutions by the Security Council and the Committee on Decolonization (1963-1980); other official documents of the U.N.; all resolutions from the Organization of African Unity; and the *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*.

In his concluding chapter where he analyzes the meaning of the conflict, Barbier points out that since World War II, most armed conflicts have occurred in the Third World and that these are more or less directly tied to colonial conditions, the process of decolonization, or the poverty of underdevelopment. What he sees specific to the conflict in Western Sahara is that opposing nationalistic commitments in Morocco, Algeria, and the Polisario Front have led to the conflict itself and to its duration. For Morocco, with its long history as a State, its long-standing claims to parts of Algeria and Mali, all of Mauritania and the Western Sahara, the religious character given to its annexation and the economic advantages sought through it, the struggle in Western Sahara is considered by Barbier to be a means of nation-building. For that reason, according to Barbier, a great deal of unanimity has persisted in Morocco about this goal. Algeria's attitude is explained by Barbier as the need of that State to preserve its national frontiers, in particular, the disputed territory that lies between Morocco and Algeria, and its own recent history, a long war for independence which has fostered a national commitment to liberation struggles on the African continent. The Polisario Front, says Barbier, despite the fact that it includes a number of different tribes with similar customs and one language, has been formed by the conflict into a unified people, in fact, into a State, which has been forced to protect the goods of the S.A.D.R., the State, by attacks on fishing boats in S.A.D.R. waters and on the phosphate mines at Bou Craa.

The author notes that the consequences of this war are severe for Morocco. Forty percent of its national budget is being spent on the war, which has delayed development in that country and has helped exacerbate the economic problems that plague it. He believes that the army which threatened the throne in 1971-1972 has assumed even greater importance in that nation and that Morocco has been isolated on the international scene to a large degree because of its policy vis-a-vis the Western Sahara. Barbier underlines the difficulty King Hassan has in withdrawing from the war and the dangers to his throne if the war were to end even in victory for Morocco. According to Barbier, the nation's peoples and parties might then focus on the economic problems, perhaps causing a destabilization of the government because no external enemy would remain to unify the nation and focus attention away from these problems. The author also discusses consequences of the war for the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, for Mauritania, and for Algeria.

What is Barbier's conclusion after over 400 pages of rigorous examination? The sole means to resolution of the conflict in Western Sahara is the recognition of the rights of the Saharawis and the S.A.D.R. to establish an independent

State, maintaining good relations with all neighbors, he says. Unless this is done, he sees neither peace nor political stability in the region.

An extremely well organized and annotated bibliography of 44 pages follows Barbier's text. Documents contained in the bibliography and used in the study are in Spanish, French, Arabic, English, German, Italian and Portuguese.

Barbier, who currently teaches at the University of Nancy II, has published a number of works dealing with related topics including a thesis on the Decolonization Committee of the U.N. (1974) and studies on the problems of the decolonization of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Western Sahara.

## **Western Sahara:**

### **An Important Reference Work**

Anne Lippert

Tony Hodges, *HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF WESTERN SAHARA*, (African Historical Dictionaries, No. 35, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1982) 473 pp. \$28.50

Tony Hodges' *Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara* is an indispensable tool for those studying the conflict in Western Sahara. It follows the general format of the Scarecrow Press dictionary series: aids to those using the dictionary, a chronology of events, an introduction that briefly summarizes the known history of the area, a dictionary of persons, places, events and things, and a bibliography.

Hodges' dictionary is particularly impressive because of his detailed, yet concise entries that provide an accurate summary of information. For example, under Petroleum he has a three-page entry which describes oil exploration in the territory, names the consortia involved, brings the status of exploration up-to-date. He does the same with phosphates and with the other natural resources of the region.

Of greater importance, perhaps, is Hodges' entry on Tribes, a six-page summary of Saharawi tribes and fractions, the major part of which is a four-page chart. For those who have tried to find out who the Saharawi were prior to the recent conflict, this section and cross-referenced individual notes on each tribe is invaluable. Among other items covered in the dictionary are slavery; the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, including the S.A.D.R. constitution; the Moroccan-Mauritanian Conventions of April 14, 1976; the efforts of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations in the decolonization process of the territory; the Moroccan political parties, including the Istiqlal Par-

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ty, and the claims of "Greater Morocco," historical figures in the territory; major battles in the struggle for the territory, and liberation movements in the Western Sahara.

One of the difficulties in any book on an on-going conflict is that there must be a cut-off point. Hodges' point, since the book was published in early 1982, is late 1981, that is after the October 13 battle of Guelta Zemmour. What is not covered in the dictionary, therefore, is the recent increase in U.S. support for Morocco, the new U.S.-Moroccan Joint Military Commission, the admission of the S.A.D.R. to the O.A.U. and the subsequent difficulties in the O.A.U. over that admission and the decision by the O.A.U. Executive Committee in April 1982 not to hold the special summit requested by Morocco concerning the O.A.U. admission of the S.A.D.R., but to hold the regular meeting of the O.A.U. Heads of State in Tripoli in July 1982, which, of course, failed to take place due to lack of a quorum.

What the dictionary provides the user is a concise summary of the dynamic history of the Western Sahara, of its peoples and some of its customs. The book also provides clarification for other articles and books dealing with this subject. Much of the kind of detail it supplies has not appeared in print in any one work, nor has it appeared in such an accessible manner. The sixty-one page bibliography is excellent.

If there is a weakness it lies in the lack of material on Saharawi women. There are only two entries, one on women in general, the other on the National Union of Saharawi Women. Saharawi women played an important role in the organization of the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara prior to the departure of the Spanish. In the refugee camps the Saharawis have named dispensaries after women martyrs, for example, Chaia Ahmed Sein. Some women were involved in military operations during the withdrawal of much of the population to Algeria in 1975-76, for example, Mueina Chijatu. Saharawi women play a role in the external affairs functions of the Polisario Front, and the School of the 27th February in the camps is a school established for women and run by them. After saying all that, it must still be noted that Hodges' volume is well-done and fills a void in the literature on the conflict in Western Sahara.

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## Nubian Culture before The Dam

Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban

John Kennedy (ed.), *NUBIAN CEREMONIAL LIFE: Studies in Islamic Syncretism and Cultural Change* (University of California Press and American University in Cairo Press, 1978) 257 pages, 30 black and white photographs, hardcover \$30.

Rarely is a collection of articles in an edited volume held together with some substance and purpose, however this volume is an exception. Kennedy and his five co-contributors are a team who blend well together both in the field and on paper. In 1961, prior to the erection of the High Dam at Aswan which resulted in the massive resettlement of Nubians, Research Associates at the American University in Cairo saw clearly the opportunity for research, and for a stellar, intensive but all too brief period Nubian society and culture was chronicled. This was all done very much in the spirit of what we call "salvage anthropology", conducted under the pressures of time before the flooding of the High Dam caused the resettlement of 50,000 Egyptian Nubians and as many Nubians in the Sudan. The book deals exclusively with Egyptian Nubians and it is one of its central weaknesses that the literature on Nubians in the Sudan is not well-represented except for the somewhat dated *Burri al-Lammaab* by Harold Barclay (1964). Accounts of Sudanese resettlement are to be found in H. Dafalla's *The Nubian Exodus* (1975) and with Gunnar Srb's study of the failures at Khashm al-Girba (1977). R. Lobban and S. Hale have made studies of contemporary Sudanese Nubians in Khartoum (1971 and 1979).<sup>1</sup> The book is more properly titled "Nubian Ceremonial Life in Egypt."

The foregoing is not to detract from the excellence of the research and its reporting in this volume; indeed a number of Kennedy's articles in the book are reprinted from earlier publications in the *American Anthropologist* and *Human Organization*. The sub-title — *Studies in Islamic Syncretism and Cultural Change* — reveals that much of Nubian ceremonial life is focused around the observance of Islam as it was accepted by Nubian culture, formerly Christian and matrilineal, thus presenting a unique Nubian expression of Islamic ritual and social life. Each essay by the other contributors, including Hussain Fahim on the prayers and *Dhikr* rituals, Nawal al-Messiri on the Sheikh cults, Fadwa on the Armgard Grauer on the Nile spirits, and Samiha al-Katsha on wedding ceremonies, takes a Nubian theme or institution, describes its history and current status and attempts to make some cultural statement using the example. Each researcher has the kind of thoroughgoing knowledge of her/his subject stemming from their rich field experiences and obviously benefiting from a collective effort headed by Robert Fernea, Head of the Nubian Ethnological Survey and Laila Shukry al-Hamamsy of the Social Research Center of the American University in Cairo. Their research, as evidenced in this volume, is clearly a fine chapter in the history of the Social Research Center itself.

Kennedy, currently with the Department of Psychiatry at UCLA, has articles in the book on supernaturalism and taboo, circumcision rites, the *Zar*

1. See opposite page for fuller listing of references.

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ceremonies and death rituals. In each of these he shows a penchant for psychological explanations viewing the popular *zar* or spirit possession ceremonies as a form of psychodrama. There is likewise a whole section on the psychological effects of circumcision rites; however in this case and in the others, this is offered in the context of excellent ethnographic description.

While there is a good introduction to the book giving details of Nubian cultural history and religious background, there is no final summation or drawing together of the various threads of Nubian ceremonial life which are so well depicted in the volume. Likewise there is no epilogue which gives the reader an updating as to what has become of Nubian culture now that resettlement has been completed and nearly a generation has passed since the events associated with the construction of the High Dam. These are questions, no doubt, the next generation of researchers must address.

## Southwest Sudan: Historical Questions

John W. Burton

Fr. S. Santandrea, *Ethnogeography of the Bahr-el-Ghazal (Sudan)*. Foreword by Richard Gray. (Bologna: Museum Combonianum no. 37, 1981) pp. 168; L20,000.

The Reverend Stefano Santandrea has previously made valuable contributions within the field of African Studies, particularly on the languages and traditional customs of peoples of the western Southern Sudan. As Richard Gray suggests in his introduction to the present volume, entries of this sort may be among the more significant contributions missionaries have made for posterity. The topic Santandrea addresses entails problems well-known to anthropologists and historians whose interests focus on Africa, namely, the reconstruction of ethnological relationships for peoples who traditionally participated in non-literate traditions. Santandrea ought to be recognized for his sustained efforts in this difficult field, but it must be stated that his results have a decidedly antiquarian tenor. The results of his present researches are questionable, if not suspect. This consequence is not due to his lack of knowledge about the peoples in question (he has worked in the Southern Sudan for approximately thirty years) but because of theoretical naivete, and errors in methodology and nomenclature. "Tribes" are not pool balls which migrate, and the reconstruction of peoples' migrations in the absence of indigenous texts which document their movements make Santandrea's conclusions (if these merit that term) possibilities instead of definitive statements. His discussion of the association between "the Jur", "the Shilluk" and "the Dinka" (pp. 140-42) is a classic just-so story. Equally suspect is his discussion of cannibalism. Of the Banda he writes, "Careful discrimination must be made between subtribe and subtribe, for there reigns great difference in all fields, cannibalism included. . . . All agree in saying in some tribes it was practiced on a very limited scale. . . . only old men with grey or white hair, were allowed to share the meat". On the basis of this evidence(!) Santandrea opines that this argues against their eastern origin (p. 122). Such is the character of this book.

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## The Return of Amos Tutuola

Nancy J. Schmidt

Amos Tutuola, *THE WITCH-HERBALIST OF THE REMOTE TOWN* (London: Faber and Faber, 1981) pp. 205, £6.50

Thirty years ago Amos Tutuola startled the English-speaking literary world with his fictional narrative, *The Palm Wine Drinkard*. In the next two decades Tutuola wrote five more narratives that were easily identified as uniquely his. Since the publication of *Ajaiyi and His Inherited Poverty* in 1967, (reviewed in *Africa Today*, 15,3 (1968) 22-24), there has been a silence of fourteen years. This silence has now been broken with the publication of *The Witch-Herbalist of the Remote Town*, a fictional narrative that is easily identified as Tutuola's work, but which in some respects is significantly different from his earliest book-length narratives.

Faber and Faber published Tutuola's other book-length narratives without special editorial assistance, but Molaria Ogundipe-Leslie helped prepare Tutuola's manuscript of *Witch-Herbalist* for publication. In view of what Ogundipe-Leslie has written about Tutuola's narratives, one can only wonder how many of the differences between *Witch-Herbalist* and Tutuola's other narratives are Tutuola's creations and how many are the editor's alterations. Faber and Faber apparently was seeking the approval of a Nigerian literary scholar for the publication of another narrative by Tutuola, after the hue and cry from some Nigerians and other Africans over whether Tutuola's other narratives should have been published at all.

*Witch-Herbalist*, like Tutuola's other narratives, is based on a quest. The hero chooses to go to Remote Town to obtain soup from the Witch-Mother to make his wife pregnant,

because a woman or a man without even one issue would, in fact, have no respect or honour among his or her friends and neighbors, but he or she would live a sorrowful life throughout his or her lifetime. And a person no matter how poor he or she was but with even one issue would live with happiness. This was a very serious custom of my town.

Although this quest is considered worthy in the hero's town, Rocky Town, it is considered with ambivalence elsewhere. The Long-Breasted Mother of the Mountain berates the hero for not being satisfied with his barren wife and for "wandering about both day and night seeking for treasures" which the creator had not given him. The other people who reach Remote Town have needs much

1. Omolara Ogundipe-Leslie, "The Palm-Wine Drinkard: A Reassessment of Amos Tutuola," *Presence Africaine* 71 (1969) 48-56. The name is spelled Molaria in *Witch-Herbalist*.

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greater than the hero's, such as hideous physical deformities and uncontrollable epilepsy. Although the hero greets these "burdensome people" cheerfully, they cannot answer his greetings "because their burdens were so severe that they were unable to open their mouths and reply." The Witch-Mother's chiefs even mock the hero because his own father, "a chief priest and pagan," could not make his wife pregnant. However, the Witch-Mother considers his quest just, for nothing can be done "without the approval of God Almighty."

The ambivalence associated with the hero's quest is found in other parts of the narrative. Although the hero goes to Roadside Town to greet the king and request permission to travel through his town, his physical appearance is "more or less of a habitual mad man" and "exactly like that of a devil." This leads to his being considered an enemy, captured in a net, and bound in chains. To save himself the hero throws one of the thunderbolts his mother gave him. The lightning flashes so continuously that "the mighty pillars of the palace began to fall down and break into pieces at the same moment" and the town is engulfed in a "big fire." "So willing or not, and in this tumultuous moment, he (the King) permitted me to pass through his town to the road of the Remote Town against his wish." What begins as the expression of a customary courtesy results in the devastation of Roadside Town. The hero has no concern with the fate of the townsmen, but is simply "happy that at last the king permitted me by force to pass through his town."

Equally ambivalent is the concluding sequence of the narrative when the hero and his wife are sacrificed to the god of the river.

Having seen that I as a man had conceived like a woman, the whole of the oldest people of the town invited my mother, father, and my wife's father to the state hall. They told my father who was their chief priest and pagan of the gods, etc. and my wife's father who was the progenitor, that it was contrary for a man to conceive like a woman and that it was very bad luck for the other people in the town when a man like my father's son conceived. These oldest people said further that in order to bring peace to the town they would sacrifice me and my wife and all of our property to the god of the river within a few days.

When the hero and his wife reach the "beautiful town which is under that river," the god and goddess of the river are dismayed.

Thou shalt not sacrifice the children of the god of the river to the god of the river! It is forbidden! The people of your town were wrong to sacrifice both of you to us!

The hero "ransoms" all of those who had been sacrificed to the god of the river in exchange for two "removable heads" of a monster that he had acquired en route to Remote Town. The former "deads" return to Rocky Town where the townsmen:

... once they had heard that there was to be no more human sacrifice, they shouted greatly with joy which cannot be described. After that they apologized for sacrificing my wife and me to the god.

Then they went out from the hall to the town, and great merriment began in every part of the town and it lasted for seven days. But it ended in front of my father's house in order to show that I was the hero who had put a stop to the human sacrifice.

There is also ambivalence within the hero himself. Unlike the heroes of

Tutuola's other narratives, the hero of *Witch-Herbalist* neither goes on his quest alone, nor in the company of human companions. Rather, he is accompanied by his first mind and second mind which frequently disagree on what action he should take; his memory which reconciles differences between his two minds, gives advice when his minds fail, and keeps a record of his minds' behavior; and his Supreme Second which serves him when all else fails. The hero's mental counterparts introduce uncertainties about how the hero should behave, as well as add excitement to the narrative by either increasing the dangers encountered by the hero or saving him from what seems to be certain death.

Although Tutuola includes numerous proverbs and proverbial references in *Witch-Herbalist*, as in his other narratives, they are not used to reinforce a consistent moral message. Rather, they are used in a variety of narrative contexts to support different moral values, instead of as chapter headings and reinforcements of Tutuola's major moral messages, as in *Ajaiyi* and *His Inherited Poverty*. Good and evil, right and wrong, are not consistently defined in *Witch-Herbalist*.

*Witch-Herbalist*, like all of Tutuola's narratives, combines elements of Yoruba oral literature with the realities of the modern world. The contemporary political world is evident from the opening sentences of the narrative.

In the Rocky Town, the inhabitants worshipped only the god of iron, god of thunder, god of oracle, and god and goddess of the rivers. All kinds of images and idols and the "god of the state" which belonged to the government of the Rocky Town were also worshipped.

However, contemporary politics are not as explicitly a part of the action in *Witch-Herbalist* as in *Ajaiyi* and *His Inherited Poverty*, although they are implicitly a part of the background of the action. There are numerous references to townspeople and "wild" people of the jungle, each with their assumed superiority over the other. In addition, customs of numerous different "races" are mentioned, and specific references are made to the Tiv, Igbo, and Yoruba. The problems of political ethnicity are clearly implicit in Tutuola's narrative to anyone familiar with contemporary Nigerian politics.

The fusion of Yoruba and Christian religious elements is also evident in *Witch-Herbalist*, as in Tutuola's other narratives. Although there is no explicit institution such as the Methodist Church in the Bush of Ghosts found in *My Life in the Bush of Ghosts*, the fusion is evident in the person of the Witch-Herbalist and her Hall of Assembly. The Witch-Herbalist is called Omnipotent, Omnipresent, and Omniscient Mother; she speaks the language of birds, beasts, and all human groups, so she has no need of an interpreter. Yet she has "fearful" characteristics so typical of Tutuola's monsters, being so old as to be "a deathless old woman" and very young and beautiful at the same time, many different kinds of voices, a "strange and fearful," "beautiful" frock that includes no woven cloth, and she rests her feet on two tigers.

In the Hall of Assembly of the Witch-Herbalist or the Omniscient Mother there is an altar and a "mighty organ." The organist looks like a big red bird. A "mighty bell" that sounds "like that of the church," calls the "burdensome people" to the Hall. In the Hall the people "did not pray to the witches but to the God Almighty" and sing from the Gospel Hymn Book. The people also make sacrifices, dance, and are served "delicious food and drinks" from the "kit-

chens" which are not too far away. The rituals that the Witch-Mother performs are those of an herbalist, often accompanied by speeches that combine Christian rhetoric and Yoruba proverbs.

The style in which *Witch-Herbalist* is written will be familiar to readers of Tutuola's other narratives, yet there are some subtle, and perhaps significant stylistic differences. The creatures that the hero meets on his journey to Remote Town are described in familiar Tutuolan terms with thick veins protruding from their necks, smelling sores, long, bushy beards, terrible cries, etc. The "etc." has become an increasingly frequent part of Tutuola's descriptions; the descriptions are shorter and more is left to the reader's imagination. Although Tutuola describes colors associated with a creature's appearance or dress in his other narratives, in *Witch-Herbalist* he often uses the term "multi-color" instead of designating colors, or simply says "different kinds of colors," instead of naming any colors. Furthermore, the hero meets some of the creatures more than once, including the Abnormal Squatting Man of the Jungle and the Crazy Removable-Headed Wild Man, thus reducing the variety of creatures that Tutuola describes. Few of the creatures are described in as vivid detail as those in the *Palm-Wine Drinkard* or as the Satyr in *Simbi and the Satyr of the Dark Jungle*.

Tutuola often uses two synonymous words as a repetitive stylistic device of oral narrative and, perhaps, to clarify the meaning of his story. However, in *Witch-Herbalist*, Tutuola actually defines words in parenthetical sentences. For example, "a half-twinkling or thirty seconds . . . (In the Yoruba language 'twinkling' means minute)," and "AYO is a kind of Yoruba game; also called warry." Although twinklings are counted throughout the narrative and the meaning is self-evident from the context, Tutuola nevertheless defines twinkling. However, he does not define the concept of abiku, either in the frequent references to born and die babies or in the chapter about the Town of the Born and Die Baby. Why he chooses to define some Yoruba terms and not others is not clear, but the definitions suggest either that Tutuola is becoming increasingly removed from an audience with whom he shares a common cultural background or that his editor introduced the definitions. Although the definition of Yoruba terms is present in *Ajaiyi and His Inherited Poverty*, it is even more conspicuous and is sometimes intrusive in the narrative in *Witch-Herbalist*.

The characters in Tutuola's narratives are interested in counting and often refer to things as "uncountable." In *Witch-Herbalist* "uncountable" is one of a number of words including "terrible," "multi-color," "horrible," "race," "lovely," "etc." that is used excessively. Whereas the hero of *Witch-Herbalist* is positively obsessed with counting twinklings, whether they be in the hundreds or "sixtieths of a twinkling," he rarely makes references to calendar time. As a result the reader is occasionally told that some event happened two years ago, when the preceding narrative seems to have covered a few days or weeks at most. Such inconsistencies are not common in Tutuola's other narratives where counting is developed into a "fine art."

*Witch-Herbalist* continues some stylistic trends found in *Ajaiyi and His Inherited Poverty*. As the quotations included in this review show, Tutuola's grammatical constructions continue to become more in line with standard Oxford English. There are only a few grammatical "errors" in *Witch-Herbalist*.

More significantly, there are fewer unusually constructed words of the type that are so common in Nigerian chapbooks and which so intrigued European reviewers of *The Palm Wine Drinkard*. Many descriptive terms used in his other narratives are simply reused in new contexts in *Witch-Herbalist*. It appears that either Tutuola's creative imagination is flagging or his editor felt compelled to standardize and homogenize his English.

Tutuola's presence is very evident in *Witch-Herbalist*, but the strength of his presence and his imagination are not as strong as they once were. His narrative skill is still evident in the smooth, rapid flow of much of the narrative. However, the return journey from Remote Town is lacking both in descriptive and narrative interest, as well as in events that explain why the hero drinks the soup the *Witch-Herbalist* had prepared for his wife and forbidden him to drink. The concluding incident when the hero returns from the dead following his pregnancy and sacrifice to the god of the river is anticlimactic. Although the concluding incident restores the hero to his status as hero of Rocky Town, it contributes to the diffuseness of the latter part of the narrative, as well as to the moral ambivalence of the narrative. Neither Tutuola nor his hero seem to be able to take a consistent moral stand, a characteristic that is distinctly different from Tutuola's other narratives.

The differences between *Witch-Herbalist* and Tutuola's other narratives probably are related to many factors. They may reflect contemporary Yoruba culture, Tutuola's changing attitude toward Yoruba and Nigerian cultures as well as his changing position in Yoruba and Nigerian cultures, the difficulties of writing an oral narrative for an audience to whom oral narratives are becoming less familiar and less related to daily behavior, and the editorial policies for publishing African fictional narratives in the 1980s.

## Two Francophone Novels of the Post-Independence Era

Janis L. Pallister

Francis Bebey, **KING ALBERT** (London, England: Zed Press; Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1981). Translated from the French by Joyce A. Hutchinson. 167 pp. Paper, \$5.95.

Alioum Fantouré, **TROPICAL CIRCLE** (London: Longman House, 1981). Adapted into English by Dorothy S. Blair. 259 pp. Paper, \$4.95.

These two novels, both of the seventies, and both translated from the French in 1981, have several things in common. Both are satires of the societies they portray, the first a gentle one of Cameroon on the eve of independence, the second a trenchant one of Guinea (??) in the post-Independence era. Both novels, too, make use of symbols; they make heavy use of irony; both put religion to question; both have a binary construction; both seem technically flawed, but one of them is in my opinion definitely far superior to the other.

**King Albert** — in French called *Le roi Albert d'Effidi* (Yaounde: Cle, 1976) — deals with the conflict of generations brought about by the amorous and political rivalry between the middle-aged Albert and the village cut-up Bikounou (who, because of his motorcycle, is called the *Vespasian*). The locus is the village of Effidi, which is experiencing both good and evil as a result of the road that connects it to the larger city of Nkool. The road, then, is a metaphor, indeed a symbol, of the progress that comes about with technology; but it also represents the sometimes unfortunate collapse of tradition that can come with such progress. Bebey, in presenting a charming series of portraits of the village of Effidi, has, with warmth and discreet irony, touched on the major concerns of Cameroon surrounding the era of Independence: the breakdown of tradition in which the elders are no longer "in charge," the conflict between capitalism and marxism, the place of women in a changing society, the annoyance of a persistent paternalism on the part of the whites, and the presence of a class struggle unknown in Classical Africa, but established during the reign of European colonialism.

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Janis L. Pallister is University Professor of Romance Languages at Bowling Green State University. She has published several book reviews and poems in translation with *Africa Today*, and is the translator and editor of a collection of African and Caribbean poems entitled *The Bruised Reed* (Sherbrooke, Quebec: Naaman, 1978).

Clearly the better of the two novels, **King Albert** presents a series of character sketches tied together with a sustained plot and crowned with a surprise ending. (At least for me it was a surprise.) Scattered throughout the book are several very beautiful lyric passages that are nonetheless well fused to the overall tone of humor and irony. On the less positive side, the book projects an omniscient narrator who distractingly refers to the reader at times as "you," as if the author were imagining a listener to whom he were telling a story. One realizes, of course, that Bebey means to give us the illusion that he is the traditional African griot or story-teller — but somehow one remains unconvinced. More seriously, the book is divided into two very unequal parts, making the novel appear somewhat lop-sided. Finally, there are several long passages scattered throughout the novel in which the author indulges in meditations on dance and music (said to restore man to his natural state) and digresses to make aesthetic and philosophical pronouncements that are not well soldered to the story line (e.g., pp. 34-36). These mini-essays have the effect of making the book seem a trifle *décousu*, an unfortunate flaw in an otherwise near-perfect novel, which will, despite any perceived shortcomings, and despite some awkward and unidiomatic translations, afford the reader a great deal of pleasure and considerable insight into the nature, concerns and problems of a modern African nation.

**Tropical Circle** — in French, *Le Cercle des Tropiques* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1972) — deals with the rise of a brutal and repressive tyrant, Bari Kouli, dubbed the Messiah-Koi, who is elected leader when the Tropical Circle gains independence. The Tropical Circle is an imaginary land, which can represent any former European colony, though Fantouré is most familiar no doubt with Guinea. The Messiah-Koi, who makes us think at times of Idi Amin, and at times of Jim Jones, inaugurates a regime of terrorism, murder, suppression, repression and censorship under the general politics of "Messiah-Koism." Inhabitants of the Tropical Circle, who, prior to Independence, were already preoccupied with questions of justice and the rights of workers, are soon subjected to even more abuse than they had ever known under white rule. They experience dehumanization, political imprisonment, exploitation, the reintroduction of forced labor, rigged elections, purges, and the harassment of corrupt officials. Though at the end of the novel Bari Kouli falls, we are left with doubt as to whether there can be any real hope for this nation, which emerges as a *panier de crabes* under any circumstances.

Like **King Albert**, **Tropical Circle** works in terms of images (pp. 15, 60, 77) and metaphors. The very word Independence is personified in the early parts of the book. **Tropical Circle**, too, contains lyrical passages that are well fused to the story line and that do not jar with the overall tone of trenchant sarcasm and, even, at times, fantasy — of the sort we find in **The Palm Wine Drinkard**. The characters are well drawn, and the introduction of Dr. Maleke into the novel is especially happy, for through him the author has the opportunity to discourse on modern medicine versus traditional African medicine, and on the role of superstition in "healing." Through Maleke, Fantouré can also relate the unhealthy and the unsafe conditions in which poor citizens must work in the post-Independence regime of Bari Kouli. Moreover, Maleke, an intellectual reminiscent of the physician Rieux in **La Peste**, is one of the first to revolt

against Messiah-Koism, and fearlessly at that. (That Maleke is mysteriously assassinated at the very end of the work, even though Bari Kouli appears to have fallen, reinforces the reader's sense of hopelessness, already instilled in him by the narrator's assertion, on the page just before, that he had heard an internal whisper which he identified as "Hope." But to this he adds: "And yet ...")

Beginning as a sort of African picaresque, the novel for the first hundred pages or so is extremely engaging. As our narrator moves from one job to the next and from experience to experience, he portrays the whole spectrum of pre-Independence problems regarding justice, workers' rights, etc., as well as the clash between the Peoples Workers Association (to which our narrator belongs) and Bari Kouli's Socialist Regeneration Party, which ultimately wins out. The pathology of the society clearly unfolds, making the installation of a leader like Bari Kouli completely plausible.

But this novel, also divided into two parts — entitled "Port Equator" and "The Zinc Coffin" (after a poem of Brecht) — is much more seriously flawed than King Albert. The device of the first person narrator, through whom the whole first part of the novel is successfully conveyed, seems to collapse in part two, where long passages occur in which the perspective of the first person narrator is lost and a type of omniscient narrator seems to be in operation. The point of view shifts, then, making for difficult reading and for problems of aesthetics. Triteness also mars some parts of the book (e.g., p. 161), while there are long passages of this novel that are, to be blunt, very boring. (This suggests that there is something wrong with the thrust and the economy of the style, as well as with the overall structure of the work.)

Doubtless through no fault of Fantouré, there are also many distracting typographical errors and, more seriously, mistakes in English grammar (e.g., p. 150; p. 197). Run-on sentences slow the reader down (e.g., pp. 226, 230, 242, 248), while the British-style English is an impediment to the American reader attempting to get the flavor of an African nation. As there are no doubt many more potential American readers than British, an American adaptation — even of the British translation — would be desirable.

All in all, then King Albert is, in my opinion, the more finished work, the more intriguing to read, and, in the long run, the more memorable of these two novels. This is not to say that Tropical Circle will not be of interest to many readers, too. For it is certainly not without merit, despite some serious problems, as delineated above.

## Publications

1. The United Nations Centre Against Apartheid has issued nine new publications in their NOTES AND DOCUMENTS Series. Two special issues include "Bank Loans to South Africa," by Beate Klein, documenting nearly \$2,756.8 million in loans to South African borrowers (80 pp.) and "Publications of the Centre Against Apartheid" (39 pp.). Other issues we have recently received are: No. 10/82 "African Group at the United Nations Observes 70th Anniversary of African National Congress of South Africa" (35 pp.); No. 14/82 "Arabs and Africans: The Common Struggle Against Apartheid" by the League of Arab States (11 pp.); No. 15/82 "South African Propaganda: How the Contagion of Racism is Spread" by John C. Laurence (26 pp.); No. 16/82 "Over Two Thousand Mayors From Fifty-four Countries call for the Immediate Release of Nelson Mandela and Other South African Political Prisoners" (27 pp.); No. 17/82 "The European Parliament and South Africa" by Ernest Glinne (9 pp.); No. 19/82 "The Trade Union Congress and the Isolation of Apartheid" by Len Murray, General Secretary, Trade Union Congress, United Kingdom, (5 pp.); and "Let 1983 Mark The Turning Point in the International Action Against Apartheid," containing the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee Against Apartheid in its report to the 37th session of the United Nations General Assembly (31 pp.). Orders for specific titles or requests to receive the series should be addressed to your nearest U.N. Information Centre. In the U.S. the address is 2101 L Street N.W. Washington D.C. 20037.

The United Nations has published the sixth edition of the AFRICAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1980. The compilers decided to include data for 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980 in one edition. As in the previous editions, the yearbook is divided into four parts: Part 1 is North Africa, part 2 is West Africa, Part 3 is Eastern and Southern Africa, Part 4 is Central Africa and others in Africa. The statistics are presented in 48 tables and the following nine chapters: Population and Employment; National Accounts; Agriculture; Forestry and Fishing; Industry; Transport and Communications; Foreign Trade; Prices; Finance; Social Statistics.

The United Nations has also published a 35 page book entitled PLUNDER OF NAMIBIAN URANIUM, a report on the major findings of the hearings on Namibian Uranium held by the United Nations Council for Namibia in July 1980. The book outlines the scope of illegal uranium mining in Namibia, the names of transnational corporations and their subsidiaries involved in the mining, dangers to the health and safety of Namibian workers; the collaboration of certain western governments with the South African regime and the development of South Africa's nuclear war capability. Both of these publications can be ordered from your nearest U.N. Information Centre — see above.

2. We have received a 60 page book of Namibian Poetry entitled IT IS NO MORE A CRY, edited by Henning Melber. Melber writes a 14 page introduction entitled "Colonialism, Culture and Resistance: The Case of Namibia." The poetry is written by Namibian students at the United Nations Institute for Namibia in Lusaka, Zambia. The book is published by Basler Africa Bibliographien, Postfach 2037 CH-4001, Basel, Switzerland.

3. Issue 65/66 (August 1982, 35 pp.) of MUNGER AFRICANA LIBRARY NOTES features an article by Dr. E.P. Makamber entitled, "African Protest Movements in Southern Rhodesia Before 1930." Issue 64 (July 1982, 37 pp.) is written by Herman A. Regusters, an engineer who is currently working at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory on the Saturn Orbiter. "Mokele-Mbembe: An Investigation into Rumours Concerning a Strange Animal in the Republic of the Congo" is the story of Regusters' expedition into the Northern Likuala region of the Congo. The purpose of the expedition was to collect tangible evidence relating to the existence of a strange monster said to inhabit the Congo Basin. Dr. Jusef Lule, president of Uganda from April through June, 1979, has written issue 67, (November 1982, 34 pp.) and his article is "Human Rights Violations in Uganda under Obote." Munger Africana Notes are available through *Munger Africana Library*, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, 91125. Subscriptions are \$15.00 per year. 64 and 65/66 are \$7.00 each if ordered separately. We found no price on no. 67, but we assume it is also \$7.00.

4. Colin Legum has recently been developing a weekly syndicated column called THIRD WORLD REPORTS, which is now being subscribed to by selected newspapers, embassies, foreign ministries and diplomats. Legum's work focuses largely on Africa and the Middle East but also covers other areas, particularly reporting on Third World developments. The subscription is £100 a year for a guaranteed fifty issues airmailed weekly, which usually consist of at least 2 pieces of comment on current affairs and occasional longer pieces of background information. The address is CSI Syndication Service, 15 Denbigh Gardens, Richmond, Surrey, England.

5. The Centre for Developing Area Studies at McGill University has recently produced CHANGING PATTERNS OF WORKER RELATIONS IN ZIMBABWE: CONFERENCE Report, edited by Rosalind E. Boyd. This 138 page English and French book is a summary of the main presentations and discussions that took place during a three day conference on this topic held in April 1981 at McGill. The objectives of the conference were to understand the current labor conditions in Zimbabwe and recent government policies concerning labor; to communicate this information to researchers, labor leaders and the public in Canada; to offer a forum for discussion to the Zimbabwean participants and to identify research needs in Zimbabwe. Each workshop was opened with a presentation from a Zimbabwean government representative or one of the Zimbabwean trade unionists. Write the Center for Developing Area Studies, 815 Sherbrooke St. West, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 2K6. The book costs \$2.50 for those in developing countries and \$4.50 for everyone else.

6. The Holland Committee on South Africa and Holland's Mondlane Foundation are performing an important service for the English speaking world by undertaking to publish MOZAMBICAN STUDIES, an English edition of ESTUDOS MOCAMBICANOS, the journal of the Centre of African Studies at Universidade Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo, Mozambique. The original Portuguese edition started at the end of 1980, and three issues have been published so far. The first four issues of the English edition should be finished by mid-1983. The 112 page first English edition is on the theme "Underdevelopment & migrant labor," and includes articles by Marc Wuyts "The Political

Economy of Portuguese Colonialism"; Luis deBrit "Colonial Defence and Regional Integration"; Carlos Serra "Colonial Capitalism in Zambesia"; Judith Head "Sena Sugar Estates and Migrant Labour" and Migueis Lopes Junior "Capital Accumulation in South Africa and Southern Mozambique". This issue can be ordered at \$4.00 a copy (plus postage) from Mozambican Studies, Da Costastraet 88, 1053 ZR Amsterdam, Holland. Subscriptions (4 issues) are \$22 for individuals, \$30.00 for institutions, surface postage included. Air mail is \$8.00 extra.

7. The Michigan State University African Studies Center has recently published the first complete directory to film and videotape concerning Africa in the United States, titled AFRICA ON FILM AND VIDEOTAPE, 1960-81; A Compendium of Reviews. Designed for educators in U.S. colleges, universities, schools and communities, the 550 page volume contains over 1500 references to educational and documentary resources including 770 in-depth reviews of the films, a directory of distributors of the films across the nation, a bibliography of filmographies, a list of fictional feature films set in Africa and a 75 page comprehensive index of titles, topics, nations, languages, series, etc. This publication can be ordered at \$35 from The African Studies Center, 100 Center for International Programs, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824.

8. The latest publications from the *International Defence and Aid Fund for South Africa* include UNITY IN ACTION, a 160 page photographic history of the African National Congress of South Africa; AKIN TO SLAVERY: Prison Labour in South Africa, by Allen Cook (81 pp.) and APARTHEID, THE REAL HURDLE: Sport in South Africa and the International Boycott, by Sam Ramsamy (112 pp.). UNITY IN ACTION is available for £5.00 or \$12.95 and AKIN TO SLAVERY costs 50p or \$1.25; APARTHEID THE REAL HURDLE COSTS £1.80 or \$4.00. Write International Defense and Aid Fund, 104 Newgate Street, London EC1 England, or IDAF, P.O. Box 17, Cambridge, MA 02135.

9. Readers who are particularly interested in the marketing of minerals may find useful a 36 page pamphlet by Istvan Dobozi, "Projected Funds of World Raw Material and Energy Markets until 2000." No. 110 in the series STUDIES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. This publication contains the statistical data and analysis of world raw material and energy markets for the next two decades. The pamphlet is published by the Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and can be ordered by writing Kultúra, H-1389 Budapest, P.O. Box 149, or ordered through a number of world-wide distributors.

10. The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University has recently published a book entitled INVOLVEMENT, INVASION AND WITHDRAWAL: Qadhdhafi's Libya and Chad, 1969-1981 by Benyamin Neuberger. This 78 page book is No. 83 in the Center's "Occasional Papers" series. The book analyses the historical connection between Libya and Chad, the link between internal Chadian politics and Libya's policies in Chad as part of Qadhdhafi's "Grand Strategy" in the African and Arab world. Copies can be obtained by writing the Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Ramat Aviv, P.O.B. 39012 Tel Aviv 69978. No price was indicated on the copy we received.



11. The Solidarity Committee of the German Democratic Republic in cooperation with the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid has published a 91 page book, LUTULI SPEAKS, a compilation of statements and addresses by the late Albert J. Lutuli, President-General of the African National Congress of South Africa. This book can be ordered from your nearest U.N. Information Centre.

12. An abridged Dutch version of The AFRICA TODAY article by William Hansen and Brigitte Schulz, "Imperialism, Dependency and Social Class" (Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 5-36) appears in the June 1982 issue of DERDE WERELD. Mailing address is Guyostrat 66524 AV Nimegen, Holland (See Africa Today, Vol. 28, No. 4, item 33, p. 60, for a fuller description of this journal.)

13. The American Committee on Africa has published a new 52 page book, NAMIBIA'S STOLEN WEALTH *North American Investment and South African Occupation*, by Gail Hovey. This book can be ordered for \$2.50 through The Africa Fund, 198 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10038.

14. David Pool has a new revised edition of his book ERITREA: *Africa's Longest War*, which was reviewed in AFRICA TODAY, Vol. 28, No. 4. This 79 page book can be ordered for \$3.00 from the Anti Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights, 180 Brixton Road, London SW96AT England.

## COMING EVENTS

The African Literature Association will hold its 9th Annual Conference April 6-10, 1983, at the University of Illinois in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois. The theme will be, "Freedom Voices: African Literature in its Social and Political Dimensions." For more information contact: Evelyne Accad, French Department, 2090 Foreign Language Building, 707 S. Matthews, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801 USA, (217) 333-4887

The Center for Minority Studies and the Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures at Northern Illinois University are planning a workshop on Swahili instruction, including Swahili instruction for varying student groups, and skill goals for Swahili courses at different levels. The conference format will emphasize roundtable discussions and workshop presentations, although papers and panels are also invited. The goal of the conference is to bring together Swahili instructors from a wide range of institutions to discuss current issues, priorities, and common concerns. The conference is scheduled for April 5-6, 1983, two days immediately preceding the African Linguistics conference at the University of Wisconsin and the African Literature Association meeting at the University of Illinois. For more information contact Ann Biersteker, Center for Minority Studies or Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois 60115, (815) 753-1709.

The 1983 annual meeting of the Western Association of Africanists will be held at the University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming on Thursday, April 14 through Saturday, April 16. Dr. Oladipupo O. Adamelekum, Department of Public Administration, University of Ife, Nigeria, is the featured speaker. For more information and registration write Dr. Sami G. Hajjar, Program Chairperson, Department of Political Science, Box 3197, University Station, Laramie, Wyoming 82071.

The Twenty-sixth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association will be held at the Park Plaza Hotel in Boston, Massachusetts between December 7 and 10, 1983. Papers and panels on all aspects of African Studies and from every discipline in the Arts, Humanities and Sciences are encouraged. The Program Director is Professor Edouard Bustin, African Studies Center, Boston University, 125 Bay State Road, Boston, Mass. 02215. (617) 734-4920. Paper and panel proposals should be sent along with typed abstracts as early as possible for full consideration. The deadline for submission of proposals and abstracts is April 15, 1983. For further information contact: African Studies Association, 225 Kinsey Hall, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024.

## ANNOUNCEMENTS

The AntiApartheid Movement for Freedom in Southern Africa now has a new address for their headquarters: 13 Selous St., London NW1.

The Selection Committee of the Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies has chosen the International Rice Research Institute to be the recipient of the Foundation's annual Third World Prize. The Prize is conferred on individuals or institutions for outstanding contributions to Third World development, particularly in the economic, social, political or scientific fields. The International Rice Research Institute, which was established in 1960 in the Philippines as an international scientific research center, has developed a series of rice varieties with yield potential double or triple that of varieties previously available to Third World farmers.

The 1982-83 DIRECTORY OF VISITING FULBRIGHT SCHOLARS doing lecturing and research in the U.S. includes 45 African scholars from 14 countries out of a total of more than 600 scholars from 80 countries. Of the 45, 28 are in the Humanities, Social Science and Education and 17 are in the Sciences. Unfortunately, by the time this reaches our readers, only 17 of this group will still be in the U.S.

The names, country, field, location and month of departure are listed below.

Koffi Babacauh, Ivory Coast, Biology, Pennsylvania State U., June.  
Faiz F. Bebawi, Sudan, Biology, USDA Whiteville Center, August.  
El-Sayed H. El-Mashak, Egypt, Biology, Johns Hopkins, June.  
Ilesanmi Erinle, Nigeria, Botany, Univ. of Wisconsin, June.  
Ahmed Z. Mehrez, Egypt, Biology, Univ. of Florida, June.  
Donald Ekong, Nigeria, Chemistry, Cornell Univ., September.  
Mohamed A. El-Far, Egypt, Chemistry, Univ. Calif. at Davis, June.  
Radamis Fahim, Egypt, Chemistry, Arkansas State Univ., June.  
Victor K. Albert Osaghae, Nigeria, Engineering, Rennselaer Polytech, June.  
Alaa D. Radwan, Egypt, Engineering, Virginia Polytech, June.  
Mohamed S. Badrawi, Egypt, Language, Georgetown, June.  
Maurice M. Iwu, Nigeria, Medicine, Ohio State Univ., August.  
Bolanle Williams, Nigeria, Medicine, New York Blood Center, August.  
Omar E. Badawy, Egypt, Physics, Univ. Calif. Berkeley, June.  
Merlyn C. Mehl, South Africa, Physics, Univ. Calif. Berkeley, May.  
Mostafa M. Saif, Egypt, Pol. Science, Univ. Maryland, June.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

Starred titles have been sent to reviewers. Others may be requested by qualified reviewers.

### Political Science/Area Studies

ARMS FOR AFRICA: *Military Assistance and Foreign Policy in the Developing World*. Bruce E. Arlinghaus, ed. (Lexington Books, 1983) 232 pp. hardcover \$26.95.

CHANGING REALITIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: *Implications for American Policy*. Michael Clough, ed. (Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1982) 318 pp. paperback \$12.50.

\*AN INTRODUCTION TO NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS. Billy Dudley. (Indiana University Press, 1982) 367 pp. hardcover \$25.00.

NAMIBIA: *Political and Economic Prospects*. Robert I. Rotberg, ed. (Lexington Books, 1983) 133 pp. hardcover n.p.

NIGERIA IN MAPS. Michael K. Barbour, et. al., eds. (Africana Publishing Co., 1982) 148 pp. Paper (oversized). n.p.

PERSONAL RULE IN BLACK AFRICA: *Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg. (University of California Press, 1982) 316 pp. cloth, \$25.00; paperback \$9.95.

PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM: *The Nigerian Challenge*. Eddie Madunagu. (Zed Press, 1982) 116 pp. paperback \$9.95.

\*SENEGAL: *An African Nation Between Islam and the West*. Sheldon Gellar. (Westview Press, 1983) 145 pp. hardcover \$16.50.

SOUTH-SOUTH RELATIONS IN A CHALLENGING WORLD ORDER. Jerker Carlsson, ed. (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1982) 166 pp. hardcover, n.p.

STATE VERSUS ETHNIC CLAIMS: *African Policy Dilemmas*. Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola, eds. (Westview Press, 1983) 356 pp. hardcover \$25.00, paperback \$11.95.

THE STRUGGLE FOR AFRICA: *Conflict of the Great Powers*. Gerard Chaliand. (St. Martin's Press, 1980, English translation 1982) 121 pp. hardcover, \$16.95.

WAR IN UGANDA: *The Legacy of Idi Amin*. Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey. (Lawrence Hill & Co.; Zed Press, 1982) 244 pp. hardcover \$16.95; paperback \$9.95.

### History/Geography

FALASHAS: *"Black Jews" of Ethiopia*. Simon D. Messing. (Balshon Printing & Offset Co., 1982) 134 pp. paperback n.p.

MODERN ETHIOPIA: *From the Accession of Menilek II to the Present*. Joseph Tubiana. (A.A. Balkema, Rotterdam, 1980) 556 pp. hardcover \$45.00.

### Economics/Development

DRY GRAIN FARMING FAMILIES: *Hausaland (Nigeria) and Karnataka (India) Compared*. Polly Hill. (Cambridge University Press, 1982) 322 pp. hardcover \$39.50; paperback \$16.95.

ENERGY IN THE TRANSITION FROM RURAL SUBSISTENCE. Miguel S. Wionczek, et. al. eds. (Westview Press, 1982) 208 pp. hardcover \$22.50.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHEAP LABOUR SYSTEM. Norman Levy. (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982) 367 pp. hardcover n.p.

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: *A Bibliographic Handbook*. Linus A. Hoskins. (University Press of America, 1982) 112 pp. paperback \$7.75.

THE POLITICS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY: *The Nigerian-Biafran War*. E. Wayne Natziger. (Westview, 1983) 251 pp. paperback \$19.50.

### Anthropology/Sociology/Religion

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#### STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION

1. Title of publication: Africa Today
  2. Publication No. 008960
  3. Date of filing: October 1, 1982
  4. Frequency of issue: Quarterly
  5. No. of issues published annually: four
  6. Annual subscription price: \$12 indiv.; \$18 inst.
  7. Complete mailing address of known office of publication: c/o Graduate School of Int'l Studies, Univ. of Denver, Denver, CO 80208
  8. Complete mailing address of the headquarters of general business offices of the publishers: c/o Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, CO 80208
  9. Names and address of publisher, editor, and managing editor: Africa Today Associates, c/o Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, CO 80208. Executive Editor: Edward A. Hawley, c/o Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, CO 80208. Managing Editor: Same as Executive Editor.
  10. Owner: Africa Today Associates, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, CO 80208 and 198 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10038. Board of Directors: George W. Shepherd, Jr., 2370 S. Franklin, Denver, CO 80210; George M. Houser, Sky View, No. 45, Pomona, N.Y. 10970; Tilden LeMelle, 17 Argyle Ave., New Rochelle, N.Y. 10804; Akbarali H. Thobhani, 14447 Ellsworth Place, Golden, CO 80401; James R. Scarritt, 1770 Sunset Blvd., Boulder, CO 80302; Richard Lapchick, 150 W. 87th Ave., Apt. 90, New York, N.Y. 10970; Robert S. Browne, 214 Tryon Ave., Fearnick, N.J. 07666.
  11. Not applicable
  12. Exempt Status for Federal income tax purposes: The purpose, function, and non-profit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes have not changed during the preceding 12 months.
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|---|--|--|
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| 1. Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors and counter sales | 524  | 188  |
| 2. Mail subscription  | 1571   | 1566   |
| C. Total paid circulation   | 2095   | 1744   |
| D. Free distribution by mail, carrier or other means                    |  |  |
| 1. Samples, complimentary and other free copies                         | 102  | 74   |
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| 1. Office use, leftover, unaccounted, spoiled after printing            | 183  | 482  |
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