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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

MASTERS OF ARTS IN STRATEGIC AND SECURITY STUDIES

**DETERMINANTS OF EFFECTIVENESS OF INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION AS
A COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY IN KENYA**

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**A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ARTS IN STRATEGIC AND SECURITY STUDIES.**

SEPTEMBER 2022

DECLARATION

I declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented in any other university for consideration of any certification.

Signature..........

Date.....**12/06/2022**..

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Declaration by the Supervisor

This research project was submitted for examination with my approval at the University Supervisor.

Signature 

Date 17th June 2022

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to my children Mercy-Laura and Edwin who supported me throughout this project.

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Special thanks to my supervisor Dr Solomon Owuoche for his advice, guidance and suggestions throughout the project and my classmates for the productive discussion.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQ	Al Qaeda
AT	Anti-Terrorism
EU	European Union
GOK	Government of Kenya
GSU	General Service Unit
IG	Inspector General
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
NCTC	National Counter- Terrorism Centre
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NPS	National Police Service
NSC	National Security Council
NYPD	New York Police Department
PLA	People's Liberation Army
POCA	Prevention of Organizes Crime Act
POCAMLA	Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act
POTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
RAN	Radicalization Awareness Network
U. S	United States
COIN	Counter-Insurgency

ABSTRACT

This study examined the determinants of effectiveness of inter-agency cooperation as a counter-terrorism strategy in Kenya. Specifically, it aimed to determine the effectiveness of information sharing among the security agencies as a counter-terrorism strategy in Kenya, and to establish the effectiveness of joint training as a counterterrorism strategy in Kenya. This study adopted the social contract theory. This study adopted a cross-sectional study, where individuals or groups are observed at one specific point in time survey design was used. This study was conducted in Nairobi County, where it targeted security agencies departments dealing with counter terrorism in Kenya. Purposive sampling method was used to develop the sample of the study. The sample population size (n) was 370 respondents. Both primary and secondary data was used in this study. The Primary data was obtained by administering to the key informants with both open and closed ended structured questionnaire. Secondary data was obtained from examining publications of books, journals, internet websites, government documents, papers presented at conferences, periodicals, reports and academic papers relevant to the study. This study employed the use of quantitative techniques, where systematic scientific numerical information was used. The collected data was converted to numerical information through coding, and then analyzed using Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS) Edition 20.0. Converting the research data into statistical information made it easy to manipulate and interpret under different conditions like charts, graphs, percentages, and frequencies figures. Content analysis was used to analyze the qualitative data into common themes. The study found that majority of the security agencies have intelligence unit within their organizations and they all strongly believe that intelligence sharing is effective in countering terrorism. The most preferred method of information sharing was through formal head of department and formally inter-agency analysts. Joint training enhances effective response to counter terrorism, most of the respondents from all security agencies are aware of

existence of joint training programmes. Frequent conduct of relevant training to qualified and suitable participants yields positive results in responding and coordination of terror attacks. The study concluded that joint training enhances effective response to counter terrorism and that all security agencies are aware of existence of joint training programmes. Frequent conduct of relevant training to qualified and suitable participants yields positive results in responding and coordination of terror attacks. The research recommended that Kenya and other relevant stakeholders develop national counter-violent extremism and terrorism plans that reflect a multi-agency approach among government agencies, NGOs, religious groups, communities, and affected populations. In addition, the report suggests that security agencies be audited and scrutinized to verify that they are well-qualified and trained for their various roles. Furthermore, the study advises lawmakers to reinforce anti-terrorism laws and draft new ones in light of terrorism's evolving capabilities and activists.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Overview

Chapter one entails the background of the studies, which include the statement of the problem, research questions, general and specific objectives, justification of the study, scope and limitations of the study, and definitions of concepts. It provides an overview of the research outlining the objectives of the research, thereby guiding the searcher.

Background of the Study

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), defined terrorism as unlawful acts, intended to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the rationale to inflict fear to the members of the public or group of people, coerce residents or force an administration or a global society to engage in act or omission(United Nations, 2004). During 1970s terrorism had become a major problem for the European community states prompting the European Council to adopt comprehensive counterterrorism initiatives,(Wilkinson, 2005).

After 9/11 attack, the European Union(EU) formulated procedures to combat terrorism; harmonization of laws against terrorism, elimination of barriers among law enforcement authorities to promote information sharing and suspects apprehension, institution of a general meaning of terrorism, an EU arrest Warrant, improved measures to curb funding of terrorism, strengthened boundaries controls and improve airspace security. The EU also worked to strengthen Europol and Euro just, retention of Telecommunications data in 2005,travel document security, adoption of measures to combat terrorist recruitment radicalization(Bares, 2016).In 2008 the EU extended the meaning of terrorism to include: recruitment, training of terrorist and public provocation to commit terrorism via the Internet. In 2011, Radicalization

Awareness Network(RAN) was established and it involved members of the clergy, administrative leaders, security department and academicians in countering radicalization and violent extremism(Archick, 2014).

The fight against terrorism in Africa began in early 1990s after Osama bin Laden planned to kill Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the 1998 bombing in Nairobi Kenya and Dares Salaam Tanzania both targeting American embassies. A chemical plant in Sudan suspected to be manufacturing essentials for chemical weapons for al-Qaeda was bombed by the United States (U.S). (Lawrence,2009). The U.S policy in Somalia was used to search, capture and kill the perpetrators, Africa worked closely with the U.S and in 2002 a joint Task Force was formed in the Horn of Africa, several counterterrorism initiatives for East Africa was made in 2003 by President Bush; New Unified Africa Command (Africom) was established to harmonize counterterrorism programs in the continent (Lyman, 2009), (Lawrence, 2011).

The establishment of Amisom, Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), Trans Sahara counter terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in 2005 in North and West Africa played a major role of countering terrorism in different parts of the continent. (Bureau of Counter terrorism United States Department of State,2017). The Kenyan government relied on several policy changes and legislative tools aimed at fighting terrorism, key among them was the 2010 Prevention of Organized Crime Act (POCA), the 2011 Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAML), the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), the Security Laws Amendment Act of 2014 (SLAA), together providing a powerful authority that support prosecution of terrorism acts in Kenya. It further leads to strengthening of the mandate of Kenya's National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). The NCTC was formed to coordinate the various agencies involved in counter terrorism namely National Police Service (NPS), the National Intelligence

Service (NIS), the Kenya Defense Forces(KDF) and National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism.(Bureau of Counter-terrorism United States Department of State, 2017).

Statement of the Problem

In 1975, 1980 and 1998 terrorist attacks were witnessed in Kenya was as a result of Kenya's relationship with Israel, and the U.S respectively. This has made Kenya vulnerable target for terrorists with its geographical location bordering countries faced with terrorism like Somalia (Nyambura, 2011).The Westgate attack on September 21, 2013, in Nairobi, Kenya, by Somali Islamist insurgent group, Al Shabaab, who claimed responsibility, killed at least 67 people and almost 200 people from different nationalities were wounded in the siege (Blanchard, 2014). NIS claimed that it had provided an intelligence of the same to NPS and other relevant authorities, but nothing was done, the police on the other hand claim that the NIS had not informed them (KNCHR, 2010).

Garissa university attack on April 2015, was first responded by the KDF and were not able to counter the terrorists only for the Recce squad from NPS in Nairobi who were dispatched after some hours due to transportation delay but it took a short time to counter the terrorist who had already killed so many students in the university(Sehmer, Zammit, & Mcgregor, 2017).As a consequence, to the delayed responses to the terrorist attacks, there was a blame game by the various agencies as to who was responsible for the associated failures in countering terrorism in Kenya. It is from this debacle that the government came up with an inter-agency cooperation in2014 as a solution to the disorganization that characterized the fight against terrorism in Kenya.

Even after the establishment of inter-agency cooperation, counterterrorism operations have been hampered by lack of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration among the security services involved in such operations (Ahmed, Belanger & Szmania, 2018). Kenya's

counterterrorism security services' lack of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration frequently has unexpected negative outcomes. There was a lack of intelligence sharing, command and control coordination, and formal information on the stages of counterterrorism operations shared with the public. In the rest of the country's counterterrorism initiatives, security services have comparable roles and jurisdictions. Inter-agency clashes demonstrate that the country's security elites seek personal and agency-specific goals in order to preserve organizational authority over counter-terrorism activities (Nyambura, Otiso & Kaguta, 2019).

These has resulted to frequent terror attacks witnessed in the country, the level of preparedness to respond to terror threats and attacks is wanting, the people of Kenya are living in fear because lives have been lost, property destroyed and economic growth has been on the decline as a result of the frequent attacks that scare investors. This calls for the need for security department to change their response strategy. Thus, this study was timely as it looked into determinants of effectiveness of inter-agency cooperation as a counter-terrorism strategy in Kenya.

Research Question

- i. How effective is information sharing among the security agencies as a counter-terrorism strategy in Kenya?
- ii. How effective is joint training as a counter terrorism strategy in Kenya?

Objectives of the Study

This study examined the determinants of effectiveness of inter-agency cooperation as a counter-terrorism strategy in Kenya. Specifically, this study attempted to:

- i. Determine the effectiveness of information sharing among the security agencies as a counter-terrorism strategy in Kenya.

- ii. Establish the effectiveness of joint training as a counterterrorism strategy in Kenya

Justification of the study

Academic Justification

This study generated new knowledge in the understanding of terrorism and how to handle terrorism challenges, it also acted as a reference material to security professionals and academicians who are studying security related courses, this study was adding cumulatively to the already existing literature on terrorism, the study findings provided basis for research in the future especially those researchers who wish to carrying out counterterrorism related research. This study was of help in advising policy makers on the importance of joint training and information sharing by having committees to discuss on the best mechanisms of countering terrorism.

Policy Justification

Kenya has witnessed several attacks from Somali based Al shabaab terror group. These attacks include the Westgate attack of 2013, the 2014 Mandera Bus and Quarry attacks, the 2015 Garissa University attack and other numerous attacks in Nairobi City and other parts of the country (KNCHR, 2015) which lead to deaths, damage to property and low investment rate.

During the rescue operation in Westgate Mall, the RECCE squad unit from NPS had cornered the terrorists in the mall, but lost control because of lack of management when the army responded and engaged in a gun fight with the Recce squad leading to the loss of an officer and sustaining of injuries to operation commander, due to misunderstanding both teams pulled out to reorganize (NYPD, 2013), leading to delay and more loss of civilians. The NIS claimed that it had provided an intelligence of the same to NPS and other relevant authorities, but nothing

was done, the police on the other hand claim that the NIS had not informed them (KNCHR, 2010)

The response to Westgate attack and Garissa university attack showed a lot of failures among the responding agencies. This state of affairs calls for change on how things need to be done to embrace inter-agency cooperation in countering terrorism. This study was relevant and was of benefit to the inter-agency cooperation in formulating effective policy strategies which was used to combat terrorism and other security challenges in the country. The study findings enabled security agencies to implement appropriate policies in countering terrorism and security challenges in general which enhanced security in Kenya thus promoting investment and economic growth. Security achievement promoted the tourism sector which the country depends on and the Hospitality industry which create a source of employment to the Kenyan citizens.

Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study covers determinants of effectiveness of inter-agency cooperation as a counter terrorism strategy in Kenya. The geographical scope was Nairobi County. The study time scope was three months which were adequate to collect the needed primary data from the security agencies departments dealing with counterterrorism. Hierarchical reporting structures at the NCTC, NIS, KDF and NPS were expected to cause delay in data collection. The reporting structure at the mentioned organizations is pyramidal, where the researcher has to report to someone else within the departments. This reporting structure adds to the bureaucracy and makes communication more difficult. The researcher obtained permission to do study in the region from departmental Security personnel. It was critical for community participation and cooperation. Respondents may have a suspicion that the findings of the study will be used for other objectives. As soon as the request was granted, the researcher employed a letter of

acceptance from the relevant authorities and a cover letter from the university to mitigate this result. Because not everyone took part in the survey, the study used selected samples and made generalizations based on the responses provided by the preferred samples.

Definition of Concepts

The definitions provided below bring an understanding of the key concepts throughout the study.

Counter-terrorism Strategy: According to US Department of defense, Counter-terrorism strategy includes the performance, procedure and techniques that government agencies; military, law enforcement, business, and intelligence department apply to fight terror activities(Airforce, 2015). Counter-terrorism strategy shall mean preventive, defensive and offensive state procedures that aim to contain terrorist actions, by employing Government tools; security agencies, existing law procedures, undercover operations, regulatory controls, and diplomacy. Security-agencies sharing information effectively and carryout joint training by developing a well-trained workforce which enables them to have coordination during operations to counterterrorism.

Effectiveness: Effectiveness in this study means the action taken as strategies to combat terrorists and to deal with the dispute posed by terrorist organizations (Horowitz, 2015). The effectiveness was measured by performance rating of security agencies, track records, Peer appraisals and quality of services rendered to the public.

Inter-agency Cooperation: According to Noonan & Morningstar (2015) Inter-agency cooperation is an equally useful and distinct relationship entered into by two or more individuals or organizations to attain common goals, (Noonan & Morningstar, 2015). Interagency cooperation means the act of working together by security agencies with the aim of achieving security in the country through sharing timely information related to terrorism,

holding weekly meetings to discuss on appropriate ways of how to counter any terrorist threats and having frequent joint training to ensure that they have good coordination skills during operations.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Chapter two covers the literature reviewed in this study. It covers materials studied in the research, which includes books, journals and electronic resources covering relevant topics including historical issues as concerns counterterrorism strategies employed in the global, regional, Africa and even East Africa, information sharing, joint training, the theoretical framework employed in the study and the hypotheses.

Information Sharing in Countering Terrorism

The landscape of the threat of terrorism is constantly changing and such governments need to adapt and adopt information sharing best practices to keep this threat at bay. Globally, Chen (2006), established that there have been concerted efforts among countries with a higher prevalence of terrorist attack to share information regarding major types of terrorists' threats; an effort that has significantly help security agencies to thwart and prevent future attacks thereby saving lives of their citizens. However, despite this laudable move by security agencies from these countries, there are myriads of barriers that have hampered the effort to promote effective information sharing on terrorist activities. Picozzi and Solutions (2017), in their paper, determined that effective information sharing can only be achieved through corporation and standardization of methods through which cooperating agencies receive, share and address challenges that affect information sharing such data breaches.

In 2016, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held a workshop to deliberate on the human factors working for and against the defense of terrorism. The workshop focused on how NATO, its global partners, and other relevant actors in counterterrorism can work together to enhance the effectiveness of information sharing to thwart the threat of terrorism and prevent

further radicalization. Picozzi and Solutions (2017), observed that the workshop was primarily informed by the threat that terrorism had posed of endangering the security of many countries, disrupting international stability and economic prosperity across the globe. Further, they reported that participants at the workshop acknowledged that terrorism is an imminent threat that knows no borders and as such appreciated the role that they must collectively play in ensuring a flow of information that will be capable of tackling the threat of terrorism. Enhanced cooperation and bolstering of information sharing mechanism was touted as a significant step in combating the danger presented by terrorists and cautioning states with weak borders to be alert and anticipate planned attacks.

Albrecht (2014) conducted researched on cooperation between police and community in the fight against radicalization, He found out that the strategy was effective and efficient in identifying, preventing and solving problem thus enhancing security achievement which raises the standard of living of the community members, he further found out that the strategy focused on the gathering, examination and distribution of intelligence which promote intervention of the law enforcement (Albrecht, 2014). This study was however looking at intelligence sharing between security agencies in the fight against radicalization and terrorism, which included police sharing intelligence they may have got from the community with other security agencies to help in countering radicalization, unlike to the latter which involved only the police and the community.

Jing, Shen, and Rui, (2010) determined in their paper that information asymmetry about the capabilities and objectives of the terrorists always put the government at a disadvantage. The interactions of the government and terrorist organizations require an in-depth to address the mitigation of terrorist attacks based on the extent of information asymmetry making it difficult for governments to know whether to change their defenses or not. The paper argues that when

governments working together to fight the scourge of terrorism, they can significantly lower the level of information asymmetry and as such able to detect implicit and explicit signals from terrorist organizations which will serve to improve the and support decisions to respond to real or perceived threats from the terror group. This paper canvasses this aspect of counter-terrorism and was assessing the relevance of information sharing in the elimination of information asymmetry about terror group capabilities and objectives.

The most celebrated action plan formed to enhance information sharing among nations is the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in America. Developed nations who are conscious of the fact that they are the major targets of terror groups partnered to form an alliance through which they could provide mechanisms and increase opportunities to support, cooperate and share critical information to enhance their ability to fight terrorism (Yavuzalp, 2003). The major acknowledgment from the partners was that terrorism was not unique to any country and that they all faced similar security challenges and as such working together to share information was the only way they could combat terrorism.

The G-20 other than forming a global economic alliance of major economic powerhouse in the world have also been cognizant of the need of working together in the fight against terrorism. At end of the last G-20 meeting, the members committed and reaffirmed their solidarity to work together in any capacity to support a collective approach in combating terrorism of all forms wherever it occurs. Cooper and Thakur, (2013), in their book share similar sentiments arguing that since acts of terrorism directly undermine the existence or maintenance of international security and peace; it endangers efforts made by the G-20 to strengthen the global economy and enhance economic growth and development. Accordingly, the authors argue that it is through collaboration to share intelligence on terror groups, global criminalization of terrorist financing, a concerted move to freeze terrorist assets, and supporting financial

sanctions to regimes that fund terrorism would the threat of terrorism be mitigated or eliminated (Pavlidis, 2020).

Bureš (2016) conducted a study on how the E.U share intelligence towards combating terrorism, he found out that the majority terrorist attacks experienced in Europe was due to unrestricted migration of terrorist who transverse Europe and poor mechanisms of exchanging information among the EU. Coordination and information sharing has proved to be difficult due to political, administrative and judicial framework. The same challenges are facing the security agencies particularly in Kenya, thus this study intends to look in to the same. European parliamentary research service did a study on The Cost of Non-Europe in the fight against terrorism, it indicates that the E.U. is in the fore front of combating terrorism with adherence to respect of individual freedoms and supporting its member states measures and exchange to prevent radicalization and recruitment and terrorism financing. This study was majorly focusing on counter-terrorism policies, information sharing and both judicial and cooperation with E.U agencies.

Ramdeen (2017) did a study on fighting terrorism and violent extremism in Africa, and discovered that attempts by governments, nations, regional, and global agencies to integrate counterterrorism and violent extremism policies are underway. Alternative means to countering terrorism and violent extremism must be studied, such as a dual-track approach combining mediation and military involvement, or other soft power measures. Cooperation on maintaining security along national borders, free information interchange, and legal framework enhancement are all part of the strategies. States should take the initiative in establishing dialogues that improve development processes, as well as reaching out to communities to better understand community dynamics. States have a responsibility to establish an atmosphere that encourages youngsters to work. He also discovered that information sharing remains a

significant barrier, and that methods and resources that promote research and information sharing are crucial avenues for combating terrorism and violent extremism, which this study aims to investigate.

The realist theory of international relations espouses the significance of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Otieno (2019), affirms this supposition when he determined in his paper that the survival of nations and capability to counter real and perceived enemies is largely hinged on their ability to nature relations with other states who face similar challenges or have the capacity to counter these security challenges. The study further observed that security threats are not solely from perceived enemies outside the state's borders but also from internally rogue and radicalized forces of destructions. Accordingly, the paper reinforces the need for information sharing among local agencies on all types of threats. To achieve this goal, the paper proposed that states should endeavor to develop and streamline compartmentalized and secretive mechanisms for dissemination, analysis, and collection of data with international partners and through its local security networks.

Munuhe (2019), in his paper, cautions that while international alliances forged to ensure a timely, secure, and systematic flow of information presents a number of advantages in counter-terrorism; the move also poses a significant risk in the increase in transnational attacks, especially among developing countries. In East Africa for example, the paper supposes that increased frequency of terrorist attacks in Kenya could mainly be attributed to its close ties with the United States. The paper observed that developed countries have established almost impenetrable security walls to that keep foreign threats away; however, their international partners in the fight against terrorism bear the brunt of terrorists who are shifting their focus to developing nations working in concert with nations like the USA to combat terrorism. This

statement rings true for Kenya given the deadly attacks witnessed in the last decade in Mpeketoni, Garrisa, and at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi.

Popp, Armour, Senator and Numrych (2004), did a study to establish the role of information technology in improving international cooperation among nations in the fight against terrorism. The authors opine that the 9/11 attacks would have been prevented had the security apparatus in the USA worked closely to gather, analyze, and disseminate information on the impending attacks against the country. Accordingly, the paper identifies modern information technologies as an elemental tool for making sure nations have a focused and accelerated counter-terrorism strategy that has the capacity to anticipate and eventually prevent terrorist attacks. Collective adoption of these tools by nations that have formed counter-terrorism strategies will enable them to better collaborate to gather, analyze and make decisions that serve to solve the complex and complicated problems posed by terrorism more effectively and efficiently.

In Africa, the destabilization of nations in the North and weak security networks of the Sub-Saharan countries has continued to make the threat of terrorism real and growing. Ahmed, Belanger and Szmania (2018), argue that despite this growth in the risk of terrorist attacks, nations in the region have also amplified and mobilized their resources to defeat the scourge of terrorism. They point out efforts by the international community to galvanize their efforts in destroying and rooting out elements of terror in states such as Syria, Iran, and Sudan which have since been classified as terror sponsors nations. The authors argue that developing nations need to acknowledge that the dynamic of terrorism has changed in terms of geographic scope, intent, and capability; as such it through international collaboration and information sharing capacities would these nations be able to strengthen their border security, contain terrorists' access to their source of income and improve law enforcement capability in responding, preventing and countering terrorist attacks.

Joint Training Leads to Effective Counter-Terrorism

The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks infused a sense of fear among many developed countries and many of them increased their budget allocation or refocused a significant amount of resources to fighting terrorism. The findings of Obamamoye (2017), determined that there was an increase in the military budget but also a repurposing of joint training of the security apparatus in developing countries by the developed countries like the USA. The paper cites cases of America invasion in Iraq and Afghanistan where it began training local law enforcement and military officers on best practices to combat terrorism. In Kenya, Nyabura, Otiso and Kaguta(2019), determined that the joint training of the police in contents and programs of counter-terrorism led to a positive but significant association with the nations counter-terrorism strategic frameworks and capability. Further, the study informed that the training was sufficient in improving the nation's capability revolved around factors such as terror detection techniques, skills to respond to such attacks, investigative skills to be applied in terror-related cases, and paramilitary skills to combat terrorism.

Given the protracted and dynamic nature of terrorism in developing nations, the USA alone increased its national expenditure on defense between 2001 and 2004 by over 50%; a significant portion was dedicated to training law enforcement officers of international partners on counter-terrorism measures (Abrahms, 2008). Abrahms also noted that developed nations have come to agree that with the notions that terrorism anywhere is terrorism everywhere; the proliferation of weapons in the black market has made it plausible that small terror groups could acquire long-range weapons that can be fired from large distances and still cause havoc in their country. Consequently, efforts to bolster security apparatus through joint training are not focused on bettering counter-terrorism among international partners but also indirectly geared to improve the national security of developed nations. Gardner (2017), offers a more

detailed analysis of the importance of joint training in the counter-terrorism agenda. He argues that when deciphering the enormity of terrorism, no one has a complete picture of the enemy; the enemy is not a defined evil with similar characteristics but a system that changes each day to avoid being caught and destroyed. Accordingly, joint training has been significant in equipping law enforcement agencies with skills to combat the ever-morphing threat of terrorism.

The evolution of the threat of terrorism has necessitated the need for multi-national cooperation and standardized training to combat terrorism. Nations are increasingly engaging in bilateral and multilateral agreements to furnish their security agencies with best practices, knowledge, skills, and attitude to weed out financiers of terrorism, locate training camps of terrorists and disintegrate the mechanism through which terrorists disseminate propaganda and radicalize recruits (Ryacudu, 2018). Accordingly, nations have since agreed on critical components of collaboration including the development of a common database to hold information on terror groups, exchange programs with other terrorism-vulnerable on counter-terrorism, and engage in frequent joint training exercises focused on equipping law enforcement agencies with the capacity to detect the objectives of terrorists and ability to muzzle their capability to destabilize security (Gunaratna, 2018).

In meeting its obligation of promoting justice, peace, freedom, and progress, the United Nations (UN) is keenly aware of the threat that terrorism is a critical barrier to their international mandate. In view of this, Nesi, (2016), in his book explores the ways in which the UN is training and engaging policymakers, governments, the media, and the public in joint training exercises to work together in the fight against terrorism. The organization has allocated and spent a lot of resources to research and lobbying governments to adopt best practices of security agencies that have been empirically lauded to be effective in combating terrorism and bolstering counter-

terrorism strategies. Further, Nesi, (2016), expounds on the fact that the UN, being an organization founded on the dictums of diplomacy, is encouraging governments to adopt and strengthen non-military counter-terrorism efforts. As such the UN is working to establish and put in place mechanisms for monitoring non-military counter-terrorism interventions including a robust and standardized international legal framework to bring terror groups to justice.

This study was therefore assessing the impact of joint training on enhancing the counter-terrorism efforts in Kenya. It was determined to whether bilateral and multi-lateral training sessions with allies in the fight against terrorism have emboldened the nation's counter-terrorism efforts. In addition, it was assessing whether joint training has been effective in equipping the law enforcement agencies in Kenya with the necessary knowledge, skills, and capacity to combat terrorism from all fronts. The research was also assessing the place of diplomacy and non-militaristic counter-terrorism strategies championed by the UN in the fight against terrorism.

Gaibulloev and Sandler (2019), established that law enforcement agencies in most terrorism-vulnerable countries lack the proper training and equipment to effectively combat terrorism. Therefore, their capacity to thwart terrorist attacks is significantly diminished and the rise in terror attacks in the countries puts undue pressure on these governments to enhance their counter-terrorism strategies and capability. The paper argues that the most important skills that many of these law enforcement agencies lack is the capacity to gather and analyze information to inform decisive decision making against potential terror attacks. Accordingly, most of these nations rely on partnering with developed countries with advanced capabilities and skills to train their law enforcement officers in relevant programs that are designed to fill the capacity and skill gap. However, Mogire, Mkutu and Alusa, (2017), in their paper on policing terrorism in Kenya found that the law enforcement agencies have not been astute enough to determine

their training needs and as such the training they receive is either ineffective or insufficient to provide them with the requisite knowledge, skills, and attitude to combat the scourge of terrorism.

Anastasia (2017), determined that joint training operations are not limited to developing countries but developed countries like the US also engage in such strategic alliances. Since the 9/11 attacks, more than 1000 police officers from various branches in the US security system have been engaged in joint training exercises with the Israeli law enforcement agencies. Further, the study determined that this strategic alliance is mostly informed by the fact that the USA intends to leverage on the expertise and experience of Israel's counter-terrorism strategies which have been tested for nearly 30 years. The joint training sessions cover factors such as securing of public gathering, identification of terrorist cells, coping, and responding to the aftermath of terror attacks and ways to enlist public support in the fight against the scourge of terrorism. These training missions serve to give invaluable experience to countries that are vulnerable to terrorist attacks and equip law enforcement agencies who are in the frontline of this battle with the necessary skills to combat, respond and deter future terror attacks (Machold, 2016).

In Africa, training of law enforcement agencies has largely been bankrolled by the USA State's Department Counter-terrorism Bureau. Guiora and Joliet (2019), estimates that the department has spent nearly \$280 million in efforts to build the capability of African law enforcement agencies to counter-terrorism. The paper identified that the focus of the department training programs includes improving the law enforcement agencies' ability to mitigate and respond to terror attacks as well as bolstering the nation's capacity on prosecutions and investigation of perpetrators of these attacks. Additionally, the resources and training programs are also designed to help these nations to strengthen their security at their entry point to stop the

infiltration of terrorists. Further, the training also involved equipping security agencies with skills to identify ways in which terror organizations move and raise money and inform on the best methodology to constrain these channels that fund terror groups. The department views this financial and technical assistance as an indirect investment that not only strengthens the counter-terrorism of African countries but emboldens bilateral relationship between the USA and African countries (Gaibullov & Sandler, (2019).

A study by Cozad about People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China on a 5-year plan for modernizing its operational capabilities found out that, the informatization concept relied on intelligence networks to incorporate and control missions aimed at attaining intelligence supremacy thus serves as a major unifying theme in improvement of operational concepts. Also timely information sharing maintains successful accuracy weapon use and a system capable of swiftly deploying and configuring the required forces for a range of environments and contingencies (Cozad, 2016). This interagency training was between PRC's military units in China, unlike to this study which was looking into interagency training amongst the security agencies in countering terrorism in Kenya where little studies has been done.

Eyerman and Strom (2006) conducted a study on comparing interagency coordination between law enforcement and public health in the US, the study was basically identifying coordination barrier and successful strategies and mechanisms used to facilitate interagency efforts. They established that joint training promotes appreciation of roles of other agencies and building of trust among parties enabling them to respond and react collectively. The study identified that there was lack of mechanisms of classified information due to lack of familiarity, lack of supervision with regard to interagency coordination resulting from completion, chain of command and differing of agency structures. All these resulted from lack of unified training which Kenya was also facing the same in countering terrorism among the security agencies,

thus this study was looking into joint training in countering terrorism among security agencies in Kenya.

Louis(2019) found out that law enforcement and regulatory agencies, security and intelligence services and judiciary lack the requisite power to efficiently tackle the challenges due to inadequate training, thus recommends the need to enhance training on investigators techniques and experience of prosecution authorities in dismantling terrorists and their sources of institutions such as Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) to facilitate practice sharing among relevant authorities and to strengthen operational capacities(FATF/OECD, 2013). Kenya security agencies also lack the requisite capacity to counter-terrorism due to inadequate training; hence this study was looking into.

Magogo (2017) conducted a research on the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya and found out that there are underlying root causes of conflicts which promote terrorism such as poverty, unemployment, human rights violation, injustices, corruption, marginalization and impunity which should be addressed by the Kenyan Government, also the security department had inadequate resources ranging from modern equipment, poor funding and poor coordination efforts due to insufficient skills which has affected counter-terrorism in Kenya, thus recommending that audit and scrutiny of security agencies be done, manpower increase and training on modern counter-terrorism technologies and tactics to empower their personnel with the necessary knowledge and skills through training which this study was to address.

Historical Issues as Concerns Counterterrorism Strategies

Measuring effectiveness of counter terrorism measures is often challenging given that the way one perceives and measures progress is crucial to the formulation and implementation of strategy. Perception plays a key role in influencing the way states strategize and apportion resources for fighting terrorism (Ballegooij, & Bakowski, 2018). Measurement of infectiveness

or futility of counter terrorism strategies may be looked at in terms of incidents/events which focus on number of terror attacks in a given period of time. Equally, attitude and trends are key determinants on international terrorism and responses to it.

By and large, strategies to counter terrorism have largely not been effective in the continent. The fact that terrorism has increased in scope is a clear indication that counter terrorism strategies employed are not working. The over-reliance on the use of military and security led responses of using force and disregard for rule of law and human rights contribute to hardening of terrorism and breeds radicalization. More often than not, African states have allowed global narratives of terrorism to dictate the local responses (Blanchard, 2014). For example, the USA, as the main country funding AMISOM operations in Somalia, emphasizes on military-led responses in suppressing al-Shabaab rather than focusing on stable, peaceful and all-inclusive Somalia. At the continental level, African Union (AU) agreed that, as a sustainable strategy to combat international terrorism, member states adopt a comprehensive framework that embraces regional cooperation and commitment to uphold human rights; however, very few countries are observing such reformist strategies.

In Kenya for instance, the government published a bill on Suppression on Terrorism in 2003 but did not succeed as it was vigorously opposed by politicians, civil society and Muslim fraternity, arguing that it contained parameters which can be misused by state functionaries. The second attempt was made in 2006 through the Prevention of terrorism bill, which would allow security agencies to apprehend and search property without court warrants and security agencies to detain terror suspects for three days (Langkos, 2014). The bill was tenaciously contested; leading to protests in the streets for fear that it threatened to dismember the very basics of the country and may perhaps provide a palatable ground for interreligious hostilities and mistrust. The third attempt was in 2012 that finally led to the passing of the Prevention of Terrorist bill 2012 into law, making it Kenya's first legislation on acts of terrorism after the two

previous unsuccessful attempts. The Prevention of Terrorist Act (POTA) 2012 broadly defines terrorism as an act or threat of action that involves endangering a person's life, causing death, serious bodily harm, destruction of property, creating severe threat to the safety and wellbeing of the public.

Counter Terrorism Strategies in Africa

Counter-terrorism refers to the tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments and other stakeholders use to respond to real or imagined terrorist actions. This aligns with the free Dictionary definition of counter-terrorism as activities aimed at preventing terrorist acts or eliminating terrorist groups. Counter-terrorism, in its most basic form, involves proactive actions, policies, and strategies aimed at eradicating terrorist settings and groups. Counterterrorism is a very state-centric activity, as the definition suggests, and as Nzau (2017) points out, because the state is the primary player and guarantor of national security, a development that begs realist thought in the anarchical environment. To prevent terror strikes, this has traditionally been a militarized matter involving technical, political, economic, and human intelligence.

African countries can choose to exploit soft power and/or hard power strategies to counter terrorism. Hard power which refers to the use of military strength to influence the behavior of other actors is defined by Joseph Nye describes as the "ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to compel others to adhere to your wishes (Nye, 2004). Essentially, as far as counter terrorism is concerned, hard power entails use of coercive military force as a strategy to combat terrorism. Soft power on the other hand focuses on use of, diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, inter alia, rather than using force or coercion. Nye considers smart power, a combination of hard and soft power, with the right mix, as an effective

strategy to combat terror (Langkos, 2014). He further notes that national security pivots around winning hearts and minds as well as winning wars.

Maluki (2015) identifies some of the counter terrorism strategies which have been utilized by Africa governments as explained below. Firstly, one of the strategies governments have commonly used is military deployment. For instance, Kenya deployed her military in Somalia in 2011, teaming up with the Ethiopian forces to stabilize the country against the al Qaeda offshoot, AlShabaab. They have since been joined by Uganda, Djibouti and Burundi as part of the AMISOM. In January 2013, Nigeria provided troops and gave logistical support to the ECOWAS effort in Mali. Secondly, initiatives on Anti-Money Laundering to curb financing of terror activities have been explored by some African countries. For instance, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa are members of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), an associate member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which aim at curtailing terrorists in accessing financial support.

Thirdly, many African countries engage in regional collaborations as a strategy to improve its counterterrorism capacity. For instance, Ethiopia is a member of IGAD and Partnership for Regional East Africa Counter-terrorism (Lyman, 2009). Kenya on the other hand remains one of Africa's largest beneficiaries of the US government's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program which aims at creating capacity for law enforcement in border security, investigations, crisis response, as well as prevention and timely response to terror activities (Langkos, 2014). Fourthly, legislating Anti-terrorism mechanisms remains one of the major endeavors of many African countries in combating terror. Ethiopia's Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (ATP) legislation enacted in 2011 has been instrumental in apprehending, prosecuting and convicting individuals associated with terror activities. The Kenya Prevention of Terrorism Act together with the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act offer a robust legal framework for prosecuting terrorists.

Fifthly, training and capacity building is also one of the measures used to improve counterterrorism capacity. Ethiopia is a beneficiary of the United States' Regional Strategic Initiative and Anti-Terrorism Assistance program meant to develop capacity on controlling and managing, border security, and skills on developing investigative capacity. Nigeria as well enjoys cordial relations with the US on counterterrorism cooperation (Mogire, & Mkutu Agade, 2011). With US training and assistance, the Kenya government established an Anti-terrorism Police Unit, a National Counter-Terrorism Centre, and a National Security Advisory Committee.

Sixthly, Economic empowerment and development initiatives form part of the soft power some countries are using to mitigate terrorism phenomenon. For instance, Nigeria has developed an all-inclusive strategy to resolve Boko Haram grievances, focusing on development efforts aimed at reducing appeal by the group to the local communities, whereby they have been able to tackle genuine concerns of the people of northern Nigeria, and safeguard the human rights for all the residents (Noonan, & Morningstar, 2015).

At the same time, Nigeria continues to engage with national and local leaders through US-funded projects which aim to train the youth on vocational skills, as a strategy to prevent them from engaging in violent extremist. Counter terrorism measures deduced include poverty alleviation programmes, economic development, education and social reforms (Ramdeen, 2017).Seventhly, many African governments are now modernizing their forensic Science and Surveillance initiatives as a strategy to combat terror. For instance, Tunisia has acquired an Automated Fingerprint Identification System and keeps fingerprint records for identification cards, criminal records, and latent prints.

Status of Counter Terrorism in Africa

The fight against terrorism has increasingly become a great concern not only to African countries but also the world at large, thus making counter terrorism efforts and attainment of international peace and security an enormous challenge. International terrorism does not only undermine peace and tranquility but also make the countries lose development prospects. Counter-terrorism options include anything from the use of force to non-military operations like repression, diplomacy, and the use of the law(Noonan, & Morningstar, 2015). Military strikes on terrorist targets, as well as the accompanying covert operations, are examples of use of force. Intelligence gathering, economic sanctions, diplomacy, and concessionary measures are all non-military possibilities.

Using law enforcement and enacting counter-terrorism legislation to prohibit terrorist conduct, legal responses strengthen the rule of law. In recent years, the scenario for combating domestic and foreign terrorism in Africa has shifted, with many African governments suffering from a lack of competence to combat terrorism. In Somalia, for example, significant swaths of the country are ungoverned, providing fertile ground for Al-Shabaab breeding. Following 9/11, the United States and other Western countries have become increasingly prepared to partner with Africa in combating terrorism, both in relation to training and finance (Ramdeen, 2017). The UN has also attempted to assist African countries in establishing the required legislative structures and building capacity for essential organizations in order to address critical components of counter-terrorism, such as terrorist funding and money laundering.

Despite significant efforts to combat terror threats, Africa continues to face numerous security difficulties, including intra/inter-state conflicts, increased radicalization, competing objectives, and the political sensitivity of counter-terrorism(Sehmer et. al. 2017). As a result, the region's

vulnerability to terrorism is due to a variety of factors, including poor governance, porous borders that facilitate the movement of undesirable people and illicit arms, radical religious ideologies, indoctrination of vulnerable sections of society, and harsh socio-economic conditions that provide a fertile environment for terrorism to thrive.

Counter-terrorism methods and procedures have aided in restoring some semblance of peace and security in the international system in several countries. For example, despite having troops in Somalia, Ethiopia's counter-terrorism policies appear to have succeeded, and no cases of terrorism against its people can be predicted (Senam, & Akpan, 2014). This is in contrast to the scenario in Kenya, where Al-Shabaab has been attacking Kenyan interests due to Kenyan forces stationed in Somalia. So, how has Ethiopia differed from other countries in terms of counter-terrorism strategies?

In many ways, the Ethiopian Doctrine on Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Counter-Insurgency (COIN), according to Maru (2017), differs from other countries' methods: in Ethiopia, politics takes precedence over the military components of the CT and COIN strategies (Horowitz, 2015). In other words, when it comes to CT methods, politics comes first, followed by the military and criminal justice systems, with the Ethiopian Doctrine focusing on liberating territories for local communities so that they may fight back against terrorists. This strategy relies on the government establishing trust, comprehending worries, and sharing a common vision with local residents.

This technique aids in the formation of close-knit neighborhood watch groups that provide community-based peace and security under the supervision of the state. This technique makes it extremely difficult for both foreign and domestic terror groups to establish themselves and operate in communities in a stealthy manner (Abbas, 2018). Above all, a single agency acting alone will not be able to effectively combat terrorism; rather, it will require collaboration and

participation from an extensive range of local, regional and global institutions, with Organization, Cooperation, and Coordination being the keys to success.

Challenges of Counter terrorism in Africa

Some of the counter terrorism strategies employed by some countries in Africa have not been effective due to the fact that they are not homegrown solutions, but have been imposed on them by powerful states such as the USA (Abbas, 2018). Some countries have strategically embraced the anti-terrorism rhetoric meant to serve different interest, some partners have been hesitant, while some repelled against foisting of such counter terrorism measures which they perceive to be discordant with their national interests. For instance, Uganda joined the US war on terror so that it can secure international assistance to fight and contain rebels domiciled in the northern part of the country. For the case of Tanzania, domestic counter-terrorism laws were passed to honor international obligation, but appears reluctant to implement those provisions. A government may be more willing to comply with the international counterterrorism regime if their leaders believe that the country is a possible target or has been a victim of terrorist attacks and believe that it can be attacked again (Anastasia, 2017). However, some leaders amplify the dangers of terror to either substantiate or maintain influence or validate external funding.

Counter Terrorism Measures in Kenya

Legislative Action

Kenya produced a draft Suppression of Terrorism bill on April 30th, 2003, to guide its future reaction to terrorism. To cope with the terrorism threat, Kenya has used a variety of legislation, including the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, the Police Act, and other elements of Kenya's penal code (Blumer, 2017). This is also being done extensively with the country's broad executive authorities. The recent passing of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes

Act is especially likely to help close a major loophole in the country's vulnerability to terrorism caused by corruption of the police, immigration, and customs authorities. The Security Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2014, was just sent to parliament by the Parliamentary Committee on National Security and Administration. The bill includes numerous revisions to 21 legislations that were passed by parliament but afterwards overturned by the courts (Boussard, 2018). The bill was deemed illegal and a violation of Kenyan citizens' rights and freedoms. Some of the sections of the bill that was rejected were deemed to be in violation of the constitution.

Police and Military Action

The country has increased security measures, with its soldiers even carrying out risky missions in Somalia to apprehend terrorist suspects. Border patrols have been beefed up, particularly along the troubled Kenya-Somalia border (Daily Nation on the Web, Wednesday, June 25, 2003) and joint Kenya-US navy patrols of Kenya's Indian Ocean territorial waters (Wabala and Wandera, 2013), in order to prevent terrorists from infiltrating Kenya and to control proliferation of arms, smuggling of narcotics and illegitimate immigration. Additionally, the US has been intensifying security patrols on Kenya-Somali coastal borders, which are becoming unpopular with local inhabitants who are concerned that the US is gradually establishing a base in Kenya (Mango, 2013).

Such fears may be unfounded, as Nairobi and Washington have a long-standing agreement allowing US military to use Kenyan air and sea bases on a regular basis (Daily Nation on the Web, Monday, July 7, 2003). Military exercises between Kenya, the United States, and the United Kingdom are also considered as counter-terrorism measures. The training of military personnel and special police units in Israel (Mango 2013) was seen as a helpful move in equipping Kenyan forces with the tactical capability to deal with terrorism. According to Mango (2013), the war on terror was brought to Kenyans' doorsteps, and the conflict would be

conducted both within the country and in neighboring Somalia. The Kenyan population found it impossible to distinguish prospective enemies from loyal Kenyans. This circumstance has demanded severe actions that have been deemed to be violations of the rights of innocent Kenyans.

Anti-terrorism police units around the world, such as Scotland Yard, are assisting and educating their local counterparts to better confront the danger (Wabala and Wandera 2013). The US has also provided additional security assistance to Kenya in the form of counter-terrorism efforts such as practical teamwork in bomb discovery and disarming, providing security to government leaders, and hostage negotiations, \$30 million in counter-terrorism aid as part of a \$100 million initiative involving five East African countries (Chen, 2006). The United States has also provided Kenyan airports with computer systems that allow each traveler's identity to be instantly checked against an updated terrorism watch-list. A US government has partnered with Kenyan government to find out means to end terrorist funding in the country's shadows.

Socio-Political Solutions

The use of force to reduce Kenya's terrorism danger is supplemented by socio-political measures aimed at reaching out to local populations to assist in the identification of terrorists and to inspire the continued coexistence of Muslims and Christians in the country (Chen, 2006). To that purpose, the government has attempted to reach out to social groups such as the Muslims, who are concerned about new anti-terrorism legislation, (anti-terrorism bill). The government has vowed to rewrite the draft anti-terrorism bill to remove religious stereotypes that were present in the initial draft, assuring Muslims of its commitment to neutral administration of the law regardless of religion. The recently finished draft review of Kenya's Constitution has also included Muslim perspectives (National Constitutional Conference 2004).

International donors, like United States, are bolstering the fight against terror by increasing aid to Kenya's Muslim in Coastal and North Eastern region (Cooper, & Thakur, 2013). Clinics are being renovated, classrooms are being built, bridges are being repaired, drinkable water is being provided, and medical services are being donated, all of which are helping to improve the quality of life in these areas. Many of these services are given by the US military through civil action, which allows the troops to take on interaction with Muslims (Crenshaw, 2018). As expected, there have been stumbling blocks hindering development aid, such as the recent Muslim denouncing of US sponsor to Islamic schools, fearing that the offer was made with intend to influence the curriculum (The East African, February 24, 2004).

In Kenya, there are also efforts to encourage inter-faith interaction. Although religious violence has been rare in Kenya, there have been a few worrying episodes in recent decades in Wajir, Nakuru, Nyeri, Mombasa, and Nairobi (Gardner, 2017). Inter-faith conversation, according to Oasis of Truth, is the best approach to reconcile and prevent enormity between Christians and Muslims from escalating into full-fledged war. The 1984 Wagalla massacre, which culminated into the deaths of 1,600 Muslims after a referendum revealed the population's choice to be a part of Somalia, is one example of this tension. After the bombing of the American Embassy in Nairobi in August 1998, religious tensions reached a crescendo. The Kenyan Muslim community was singled out for blame and victimization (Gaibulloev, & Sandler, 2019). Five Muslim non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were de-registered. The Oromo Liberation Front troops marched into Kenya in the same year, killing 300 Muslims in Baggala, North-eastern Province.

In Nakuru, violence erupted in 1998 when Muslim youth in Wajir retaliated against an evangelist's remarks about Prophet Mohammed by torching a church and publicly stripping a Catholic nun. Six Muslims were slain by police officers in a mosque in Kwale in 1999. It was interpreted by the Muslim community as an anti-Muslim act by a mostly Christian police force

(Oasis of Truth, 2007-8). To combat this disturbing tendency, organizations such as Oasis of Truth have begun to teach basic courses on peaceful conflict resolution to Kenyans of diverse religious beliefs. Some religious leaders and groups are also leading the charge in the country to promote inter-faith dialogue (Nyamai 2014).

Diplomatic Solutions

The major diplomatic thrust of Kenya's anti-terrorism operation is the support of peace in Somalia and Sudan. Political unrest in Somalia and Sudan is a major contributor to Kenya's terrorism risk, prompting this initiative. As a result, Kenya has hosted peace talks between the two countries for a long time (Gaibulloev, & Sandler, 2019). The most recent Sudan peace talks took place in Naivasha, while the Somali talks took place in Eldoret and later Nairobi. Both peace talks have made substantial improvement recently. The conflicting parties signed a document integrating six previously negotiated protocols into one framework deal at the start of the final session of their peace talks in Nairobi in June 2004, providing the Sudanese peace effort a significant boost. Similarly, a promising breakthrough has been reached in the Somali peace talks (Duggan, & Devenery, 2019). If these peace talks result in treaties that are enforceable, they could help to politically stabilize these two countries, making them into respectable neighbors whose security will benefit Kenya tremendously.

Success and Challenges of Counter-terrorism Strategies in Kenya

Success of Counter-terrorism Strategies

The success of a strategy's adoption and implementation is determined by how well the plan fulfills its intended aims. This includes communicating, interpreting, adopting, and implementing the intended methods (Nzau, 2017). Each of them cannot be separated, even though they do not necessarily follow each other. Kenya's government has made many

measures to combat terrorism. These include establishing special supports units such as ATPU and the NCTC as well as training and employing police personnel.

The NIS has been effective in both identifying and averting terrorist acts. The failure to prevent the terrorist strikes of 2002 and subsequent terrorist attacks in the country has been attributed to a lack of competent intelligence and law enforcement (Langkos, 2014). In problematic areas, the government has improved safety measures, including additional security manpower. Extra trainings are frequently held to provide populaces with the necessary skills and knowledge to combat terrorism. Scholars both locally and globally have endorsed the usefulness of drills.

In Kenya, the use of equipment to advance security has boosted the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts; technological advancements such as the deployment of CCTV camera surveillance and metal detectors have considerably reduced the likelihood of terrorist attacks (Mogire, & Mkutu Agade, 2011). As the area has become safer, the number of attacks has decreased dramatically. Residents have been able to overcome their phobias and resume their everyday routines as a result of this. As a result of these improved actions, business activity has also normalized.

Though, the mechanisms applied to combat terrorism have been ineffective in terms of execution. Specifically, particular people claim that only Muslims and ethnic Somalis are unfairly targeted, while the rest of the population is ignored (Noonan, & Morningstar, 2015). As a result, the core reasons of the terror threat, such as radicalization, poverty, and unemployment in many areas, are not completely addressed. Furthermore, it was reported that some police officers engaged in immoral behaviors such as accepting bribes, limiting their effectiveness because culprits are likely not to be taken to.

Challenges of Counter-terrorism Strategies

The global evolving nature of terrorism demands a comprehensive approach to the problem. Terrorists' weapons of mass destruction, including; chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, continue to be a source of concern (Ramdeen, 2017). As a result, despite the development of multiple methods, states and areas remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks in the future. As a result, there are problems that operate as a roadblock to fully combating terrorism. The availability of proper cash and resources is highly important for the development of any given firm, and this is one of the hindrances to the execution of counter-terrorism tactics in Kenya (Sehmer et. al. 2017). Firms with a lot of money have the easiest time adopting and implementing ideas. They can also extend their operations to their maximum potential and meet their goals. As a result, businesses with limited capital struggle to exist and are at a significant risk of becoming insolvent and collapsing.

In this sense, the primary impediment to the execution of combating terrorism initiatives is a lack of funding (Senam, & Akpan, 2014). Despite the fact that the Kenyan government has been proven to adequate allocation of finances through the yearly financial plan to ensure safety is achieved, the strategies remain underfunded. Despite the fact that the cops have recently received a pay raise, their incomes are still insufficient to meet their needs. When compared to other security agencies and public authorities, police remuneration is extremely low, and some officers have used this as a pretext for engaging in illicit acts such as corruption and criminal facilitation (Horowitz, 2015). This emphasizes the importance of devising systems to ensure proper fund management.

Trainings that are effective contribute in the development of professional officers with skills. It aims to correct misunderstandings. Nevertheless, a review of most security professionals in crime prevention and control finds that police officers are underpaid and underequipped for

their given obligations, which leads to gaps in appropriately reacting to incidents (Abbas, 2018). They are unaware that, in today's dangerous atmosphere, terror suspects are sophisticated, employing advanced weapons, and the schemes are well-thought-out. According to Davenport and Saunders (2002), these issues may occur as a result of policymakers catering to equip the law enforcement officers through training programs. As a result, the training is modest, focusing primarily on riot simulations rather than paramilitary operations.

The presence of poor performance among police officers has also been proven by researchers. Furthermore, security officers have been unable to incorporate new technologies into their work. This can be related to their aversion to change from the old manual methods (Blumer, 2017). As a result of the delayed pace of infrastructure modernization and resistant to change law enforcement policies to enable adequate innovation of service delivery is low. It was also discovered that a lack of full collaboration from community members is a problem (Boussard, 2018). The duty of counter-terrorism is mostly perceived by the public as being solely the responsibility of officers.

As a result, people make only rudimentary steps to be vigilant, particularly in the face of terrorism. Despite the launch of the Nyumba Kumi initiative, which tries to increase community participation, this is still the case. The majority of persons designated as ambassadors are unfamiliar with their responsibilities and lack motivational incentives (Wabala and Wandera, 2013). Community members are unskilled in terms of their role in policing, as they do not fully understand the importance of collaborating with the police in order to maintain security. As a result, they refuse to assist with security in supplying critical information that will aid in the fight against terrorism in the region.

2.6 Summary of Literature Review and Research Gaps

Albrecht (2014) evaluated cooperation between police and community in the fight against radicalization. The study found out that the strategy was effective and efficient in identifying, preventing and solving problem thus enhancing security achievement which raises the standard of living of the community members; he further found out that the strategy focused on the gathering, examination and distribution of intelligence which promote intervention of the law enforcement. This study was however looking at intelligence sharing between security agencies in the fight against radicalization and terrorism, which included police sharing intelligence they may have got from the community with other security agencies to help in countering radicalization, unlike to the latter which involved only the police and the community.

Jing, Shen and Rui (2010) evaluated the relevance of information sharing in the elimination of information asymmetry about terror group capabilities and objectives. The study found that the interactions of the government and terrorist organizations require an in-depth to address the mitigation of terrorist attacks based on the extent of information asymmetry making it difficult for governments to know whether to change their defenses or not. The study relied on secondary data only while the current study was principally based on primary data.

The study by Bureš (2016) on E.U intelligence towards combating terrorism found out that the majority terrorist attacks experienced in Europe was due to unrestricted migration of terrorist who transverse Europe and poor mechanisms of exchanging information among the EU. Coordination and information sharing has proved to be difficult due to political, administrative and judicial framework. The study was done in a developed country where the level of innovation is far advanced unlike Kenya which is third world country struggling with innovation and infrastructure.

Crenshaw (2018) did a study on the Cost of Non-Europe in the fight against terrorism. The study discovered that information sharing remains a significant barrier, and that methods and resources that promote research and information sharing are crucial avenues for combating terrorism and violent extremism, which this study aims to investigate. This study was majorly focusing on counter-terrorism policies, information sharing and both judicial and cooperation with E.U agencies. The same challenges are facing the security agencies particularly in Kenya and no study has been conducted in this area.

Ramdeen (2017) investigated the fighting terrorism and violent extremism in Africa. Findings show that attempts by governments, nations, regional, and global agencies to integrate counterterrorism and violent extremism policies have made positive strides over the last 10 years. There was a research gap in that alternative means to countering terrorism and violent extremism needed to be studied, such as a dual-track approach combining mediation and military involvement, or other soft power measures.

The ongoing shows that there are a number of studies done in the area of determinants of effectiveness of inter-agency cooperation as a counterterrorism strategy. However, despite this commendable move by security agencies and researcher from the case area, there are myriads of barriers that have hampered the effort to promote effective information sharing on terrorist activities that were not investigated in the reviewed studies. Most of the studies were conducted outside the territories of Kenya leaving a research gap which the current study addressed.

Theoretical Framework

Social Contract Theory

This study adopted the social contract theory. The proponents of social contract theory are namely; Thomas (1651), Locke (1690) and Rousseau (1762). They focus on the link between the state and society/ individual. The social contract theory idea states that in the beginning

man lived in a state of nature with no Government and there were no laws to control them, the sections of the society/ individual experienced hardships and oppressions. With time the situation of nature become unbearable forcing people to enter into agreement, both the strong and the weak sought to protection of their lives and property by surrendering their sovereignty and as a result of it a state was formed. The society/ individual entered into a social contract with the state, the contract gives the state the power and authority over the people, where the state makes laws that would guarantee that all lived in peace and harmony. The state ensured security for all (Elahi, 2012).

It was with this context that the study argues that initially security agencies worked independently; each agency conducted training, collected intelligence and carried out operations on their own. The formation of inter-agency under the established NCTC umbrella is aimed at addressing security; terrorism. Any state that cannot guarantee security for its citizens is not state and with terrorism becoming a challenge in the country, NCTC security agencies had to come together and jointly work to counter terrorism through sharing of information and undertaking joint training.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework illustrates how the variables of this research relate towards countering terrorism.




Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework

Source: Author (2019)

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Chapter three covers the research methodology. This outlines how the research was carried out. This includes subjects such as research design, study area and population, sample design, data collection and analysis, reliability, validity, ethical considerations and research limitations of the project.

Research Design

This study adopted a cross-sectional study, where individuals or groups are observed at one specific point in time, survey design was used. The design enabled the researcher to identify and describe certain features of the study; it included such aspects as the important determinants of effectiveness of inter-agency cooperation as a counter terrorism strategy in Kenya. This was useful in assisting the researcher in obtaining and analyzing information. The advantages of using the survey design for this research includes its cost effectiveness, flexibility and efficiency in collecting large amounts of data for statistical analysis, and quick turnaround in the data collection phase.

Study Area and Population

This study was conducted in Nairobi County, where it targeted security agencies departments dealing with counter terrorism in Kenya, this was because of the close proximity of the research sites enabling the researcher to collect data in shortest time and incurring minimal cost, the researcher was able to meet the intended respondents from different levels; operational, managerial and policy. The target populations were officers from institutions dealing with security specifically dealing with counter-terrorism and are with relevant and adequate information on the area of study. According to the State Department of Interior and

Coordination of National Government, (2020) the target population of this study was 1310, comprising of the NCTC, Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), National Intelligence Services (NIS), and NPS (NCTC, 2020).

Sample Design

Sample design is the entire framework to be followed in identifying a sample from the targeted population (Selvam & SDB, 2017). Sampling is the extraction of a selected sample from a population (Alvi, 2007). Purposive sampling method was used to develop the sample of the study. Purposive sampling is a deliberate choice of cases, believed to be knowledgeable with respect to the research objectives (Mugenda & Mugenda, 1999). Despite of Purposive sampling being prone to bias, it enables the researcher to explore the research questions in depth because the cases selected are the best and has a low margin of error. Homogenous sampling was used to enable a comprehensive study of the group and allows the investigator to gather more thorough data. According to Madson (2011), sample size is a flexible design as dictated by the common procedure under study. Since this study involved different security Agencies and due to security reasons it derived its sample size as a matter of convenience and applicability room (Meyer, 1979) suggested range of population and the corresponding sample size to derive there from. This is appropriate when the population is definite (Senam & Akpan, 2014). The study used the following formula proposed by Using Yamane (1973) to determine the sample size;

Using Yamane (1973) formulae

$$n = N / (1 + N * (e)^2)$$

Where

n = sample size

N = the population size

e = the acceptable sampling error (5.2%) at 94.8% confidence level

Thus;

$$n = 1310 / (1 + 1310) (0.06)^2$$

$$n = 370$$

Therefore, the sample population size (n) was 370 respondents. The approximate sample size for this study was 370, which was divided among the security agencies as follows:

Table 3.1: Responding Agencies Distribution

Security Agencies	Number of Respondents
NCTC	46
NPS	120
KDF	133
NIS	71
Total	370

Source: Author (2019)

The respondents were chosen based on their understanding, interaction and proficiency in relation to the area of study (Langkos, 2014) and were officers from security agencies ranging from policy, managerial and operational level. When an individual unit is analyzed will be stressing developmental factors on the area of study which will be detail, richness and

completeness, because the selection was based on the respondent's expertise and experience, the organization as a whole is autonomous, each agency working on their own hence interviews was conducted separately but they work jointly.

Validity

During questionnaire and interview creation, various validity checks were conducted to ensure the instrument measures what it is supposed to measure. The researcher conducted validity tests that included content validity, face validity and construct validity. To ensure content validity, the instruments are formulated and operationalized as per the study variables. This ensured adequacy and representativeness of the items in each variable in relation to the purpose and objectives of the study. Further, content validity was verified through expert opinions from supervisors and practitioners. Face validity was achieved where the instruments was subjected to expert analysis and opinion from two external experts who; thoroughly checked the representativeness of the research instruments at face value and ensure they measured the constructs of the study. Further construct validity was ensured through restricting the questions to the conceptualization of the variables and ensured that the indicators of each variable fall with the same construct

Reliability

This is the level to which a research tool yields regular outcome after repeated trials. The study is said to be reliable when the study is subjected under the same circumstances and yields the same results. A test re-test procedure was used to approximate the consistency of the tool by subjecting the same test twice to the same group of respondents who was identified for this purpose. The generation of data was done as it was in the questionnaire and analysis made as per the appropriate methods.

Data Collection

Data Collection is acquiring valuable information from a key quality characteristics through a systematic way (Williams, 2009). Both primary and secondary data was used in this study. The Primary data was obtained by administering to the key informants with both open and closed ended structured questionnaire. Secondary data was obtained from examining publications of books, journals, internet websites, government documents, papers presented at conferences, periodicals, reports and academic papers relevant to the study.

Ethical Considerations

A letter of permission to conduct research from NACOSTI was acquired and another letters of acceptance from relevant authorities was presented before the respondents and the respondents were explained on the purpose of study to get rid of suspicion and fear among respondents to enable them to choose to participate in the study or not, also they were at liberty to discontinue in the study at any stage. The participants were assured that the data will be handled with care and privacy from reaching an unauthorised population as well as other respondents, the confidential information was accessed by the researcher and the supervisor. Destruction of the used questionnaires after the study was guaranteed and the participants were assured that the study was purely for academic purpose.

Data Analysis

The quantitative and qualitative data acquired was used to give a broad understanding of the study. This study employed the use of quantitative techniques, where systematic scientific numerical information was used. Coding is the procedure of quantifying answers to limit number of groups of responses suitable to the research objective(Mathiyazhagan & Deoki Nandan Mohanmeet kholsa, 2010).The collected data was converted to numerical information through coding, and then analyzed using Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS)

Edition 20.0. Converting the research data into statistical information made it easy to manipulate and interpret under different conditions like charts, graphs, percentages, and frequencies figures. For the qualitative data content analysis was employed where collected data was analyzed according to common themes.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF STUDY FINDINGS

Introduction

Chapter four covers data analysis collected from the field through use of a questionnaire which was presented to the respondents to fill according to their knowledge and interpretation was done based on analyzed tables and figures. Three hundred and seventy respondents were chosen from 4 government security agencies within Nairobi. The study area was divided into three sections; A, B and C. Each section had 370 respondents responding to the questions asked. Section A covered the name of the Organization, Gender, Designation and Level of education as shown in table 4.1. Section B covered Information sharing as shown in table 4.2 and section C covered Joint training as shown in table 4.3

General Information of the Respondents

Table 3.2: Organizations profile

Group	Frequency	Percentage
Security agencies		
NPS	120	32.43
NIS	71	19.19
NCTC	46	12.43
KDF	133	35.95

Gender		
Male	226	61.06
Female	144	38.92
Designation/position/rank		
Junior management level	265	71.62
Middle management level	47	12.70
Senior management level	38	10.27
NA	1	0.27
Missing	19	5.13
Level of education		
O-level	143	38.65
Diploma	114	30.81
Graduate	96	25.95
Postgraduate	5	1.35
Missing	12	3.24

Source: Author (2019)

Majority of the respondents were from KDF (35.95%), followed by NPS with 32.43%, then NIS with 19.19% and NCTC with 13.43%. From the findings, it showed that there were more male than female respondents thus a third gender rule was however observed hence the gender of respondents was fairly representative. Majority of the respondents were from the junior

management level (71.62%), followed by the middle management level (12.70%) lastly senior management level with 10.27%. 0.3% of the respondents indicated that it was not applicable to state their designation and 5.14% of the respondents didn't indicate their designation. This distribution is dominated by lower level and midlevel managers who are the major drivers in policy implementation as they are in direct contact with lower cadre officers and senior managers and directors. They are perceived to have a lot of information concerning their respective organizations in relation to service delivery. The distribution of levels of education reveals that majority of the respondents are o-level (38.6%), followed by respondents with diploma (30.8%), 25% were respondents with degree, respondents who are post graduate were (1.4%) and 3.2% of the respondents never indicated their level of education.

Descriptive Statistics on Information Sharing

Existence of Intelligence Unit in the Organization




Figure 4.1: Existence of intelligence unit in the organization

Source: Author (2019)

98.65% of the respondents agree to have an intelligence unit which deals in collection of information related with terrorism activities in their organization, while 1.35% of the respondents feel that they don't have intelligence unit in their organization. This depicts that

there was an intelligence unit which deals in collection of information related with terrorism activities in their organization as also supported by social contract theory. Picozzi and Solutions (2017), in their paper, determined that effective information sharing can only be achieved through corporation and standardization of methods through which cooperating agencies receive, share and address challenges that affect information sharing such data breaches.

A respondent stated that....” *In our security organization exist intelligence unit that is in charge of collection of information related with terrorism activities. The unit obtains the information from the various sources with an aim of ensuring that terrorist activities are dealt with in the appropriate manner”.*

Information Sharing with Other Agencies




Figure 4.2 showing distribution of information sharing

Source: Author (2019)

One of the objectives of this research was to find out how intelligence sharing aids in fight against terrorism, 97.57% of the respondents stated that the security agencies share information among themselves, 1.08% felt that the security agencies do not share information, 0.27% of the respondents are not sure whether security agencies do share information or not and 1.08% never indicated thus meaning they are not aware. This depicts that the security agencies share information among themselves.

One of the respondents stated that....*”In our organization police share intelligence they have gotten from the community with other security agencies to help in countering terrorism”.*

Extend of Sharing Information Regarding Terrorism




Figure4.3: Extend of sharing information regarding terrorism

Source: Author (2019)

Figure 4.3 shows the extent to which security agencies share information regarding terrorism and it’s evidenced as follows; 45.1% of the respondents felt that security agencies always share

information, 37.6% of the respondents believe that security agencies share information regarding terrorism to a considerable degree, 5.9% of the respondents felt that security agencies occasionally share information regarding terrorism, 1.9% of the respondents believe that security agencies seldom share information regarding terrorism, 0.3 of the respondents are not aware whether security agencies share information regarding to terrorism and 9.2% of the respondents never indicates their opinion. This depicts that security agencies always share information. This was supported by sentiments from one of the respondent who stated that....

” The strategy of sharing information was effective and efficient in identifying, preventing and solving problem thus enhancing security achievement which raises the standard of living of the community members. The respondent further stated that out that the strategy focused on the gathering, examination and distribution of intelligence which promote intervention of the law enforcement”.

Contribution of Information Sharing to Containment of Terrorism




Figure 4.4: Contribution of information sharing to containment of terrorism

Source: Author (2019)

Figure 4.4 reveals that Respondents from agencies with intelligence units strongly believed that intelligence sharing is effective in containing terrorism as evidenced as follows; 45.1% of the respondents feel that information sharing has highly contributed to containing terrorism, 37.6% of the respondents feels that information sharing has contributed to containing terrorism to a considerable degree, 5.9% of the respondents feels that information sharing has occasionally contributed to containing terrorism, 1.9% of the respondents feels that information sharing seldom contain terrorism, 0.3% of the respondents feels that information sharing doesn't contributed to containing terrorism and 9.2% of the respondents didn't indicate whether information sharing has contributed to containing terrorism. This depicts that intelligence sharing is effective in containing terrorism which is as stated by social contract theory. A respondent stated that....” *In my opinion sharing of information has contributed to the end of terrorism activities in the country. The intelligence has been able to track down any terrorist activities which have been thwarted and the perpetrators arrested*”. This agrees with a study by Albrecht (2014) who found out that the strategy was effective and efficient in identifying, preventing and solving problem thus enhancing security achievement which raises the standard of living of the community members, he further found out that the strategy focused on the gathering, examination and distribution of intelligence which promote intervention of the law enforcement.

Process used in Information Sharing




Figure 4.5: Process used in information sharing

Source: Author (2019)

Figure 4.5 shows the distribution process used in information sharing which reveals that 45.1% believe that the most preferred method of sharing information is through formal head of department, 48.1% of the respondents feel that formally inter-agency analysts is the best process used in information sharing, 3.0% of the respondents prefer informally head of department as the process used in information sharing, 2.9% of the respondents feel that informally inter-agency analysts was the process of sharing information. Despite the effectiveness of intelligence sharing in containing terrorism, most of the respondents felt that there are no well-defined procedures for sharing information and mistrust exist among the security agencies. A respondents indicated that...” *there have been concerted efforts among*

countries with a higher prevalence of terrorist attack to share information regarding major types of terrorists' threats, an effort that has significantly help security agencies to thwart and prevent future attacks thereby saving lives of their citizens. The respondent further indicated that despite this laudable move by security agencies from these countries, there are myriads of barriers that have hampered the effort to promote effective information sharing on terrorist activities”.

Rating the Information Process Sharing




Figure4.6: Rating the information sharing Process

Source: Author (2019)

Figure 4.6 shows the distribution process used in information sharing which reveals that 39.8% of the respondents believe that the information sharing process among the security agencies was very good, 47.8% of the respondents felt that the information sharing process among the security agencies was very good, 10.5% of the respondents are of the opinion that the information sharing process among the security agencies was acceptable, 0.8% of the respondents feel that the information sharing process among the security agencies was poor, 0.3% of the respondents feel that the information sharing process among the security agencies

was not applicable, 0.8% of the respondents never indicated their opinion on the information sharing process among the security agencies. This depicts that majority of the respondent agree that the information sharing process was very good. The landscape of the threat of terrorism is constantly changing and such governments need to adapt and adopt information sharing best practices to keep this threat at bay. A respondent indicated that...” *effective information sharing can only be achieved through corporation and standardization of methods through which cooperating agencies receive, share and address challenges that affect information sharing such data breaches*”.

Challenges faced by Security Agencies during Information Sharing




Figure4.7: Challenges faced by security agencies during information sharing

Source: Author (2019)

From the above figure 4.7, 54.6% of the respondents believe that there are challenges during information sharing process, 43.8% of the respondents believe that there are no challenges during information sharing process, 0.5% of the respondents believe that information sharing process is not applicable and 1.1% of the respondents didn't indicate whether there are challenges faced during information sharing process. This depicts that there are challenges during information sharing process. A respondent indicated that...” *while international alliances forged to ensure a timely, secure, and systematic flow of information presents a number of advantages in counter-terrorism; the move also poses a significant risk in the increase in transnational attacks, especially among developing countries. In East Africa for example, the paper supposes that increased frequency of terrorist attacks in Kenya could mainly be attributed to its close ties with the United States*”.

Types of Challenges Faced by Security Agencies during Information Sharing




Figure 4.8: Types of challenges faced by security agencies during information sharing

Source: Author (2019)

Figure 4.8 shows various challenges faced by security agencies during information sharing and it's evidenced by the following; 15.14% of the respondents felt that breach of confidential information was a major challenge experienced by the security agencies, 9.19% of the respondents felt that withholding information was a challenge, 3.51% of the respondents felt that incorrect information shared was a challenge among security agencies, 11.62% of the respondents felt that lack of trust among officers from security agencies remains a major challenge, 5.41% of the respondents felt that lack of proper coordination during information sharing was problematic among security agencies, 1.08% of the respondents felt that inaction of information shared was a challenge, 0.99% of the respondents felt that lack of proper communication infrastructure was a challenge, 4.86% of the respondents felt that lack of resources which promote information sharing among security agencies was a challenge, 1.08% of the respondents felt that political interference was a challenge to information sharing, 10.81% of the respondents felt that there were no challenges faced during information sharing and 36.22% of the respondents never indicated any challenge faced during information sharing among security agencies. This depicts that breach of confidential information was a major challenge experienced by the security agencies. A respondent indicated that...” *Terrorism attacks can be prevented if the security apparatus work closely to gather, analyze, and disseminate information on the impending attacks against any country. Accordingly, the respondent states that modern information technologies as an elemental tool for making sure nations have a focused and accelerated counter-terrorism strategy that has the capacity to anticipate and eventually prevent terrorist attacks*”.

Appropriate Mechanisms to Address Information Sharing Challenges




Figure 4.9: Appropriate mechanisms to address information sharing challenges by security agencies

Source: Author (2019)

Figure 4.9 shows appropriate mechanisms to address information sharing challenges by security agencies and it's evidenced as follows; 9.46% of the respondents felt that there needs to timely share information for easy response of the same, 15.14% of the respondents felt that administering oath of secrecy will promote trust among security agencies, 3.5% of the respondents felt that there is need to verify information before disseminating to avoid acting on a wrong information, 12.16% of the respondents felt that sensitizing officers on proper information sharing mechanisms will enhance proactive response to terrorism, 6.4% of the

respondents felt that embracing technology by security agencies will promote effective information sharing, 5.41% of the respondents felt that allocating more resources to the relevant agencies for information sharing will enable security agencies to have quality information, 1.08% of the respondents felt that cultivating political goodwill will promote information sharing among security agencies, 10.45% of the respondents felt that there was no appropriate mechanisms since they had stated that there was no challenges faced during information sharing and 36.22% of the respondents never indicated any appropriate mechanisms as they had never indicated challenges faced during information sharing among security agencies. This depicts that administering oath of secrecy will promote trust among security agencies.

Descriptive Statistics on Joint Training

4.4.1 Joint Training among the Agencies




Figure 4.10: Joint training among the agencies

Source: Author (2019)

Figure 4.10 shows joint training, where majority of the respondents strongly believe that effectiveness of training helps in effective countering of terrorism. This is evidenced by the following: 91.6% agree that they do have joint training, 7.3% says there is no joint training, 0.3% says joint training was not necessary and 0.8% of the respondents never indicated whether joint training existed or not. This depicts that effectiveness of training helps in effective countering of terrorism. One of the respondents stated that...” *Joint training has been significant in equipping law enforcement agencies with skills to combat the ever-morphing threat of terrorism*”.

Number of Joint Training Conducted




Figure4.11: Number of joint training conducted

Source: Author (2019)

Frequent conduct of training yields positive results when it comes to responding and coordination to a terror attack. Figure 4.11 shows the frequency at which joint training was conducted and was responded as follows: 30.54% of the respondents indicated that majority of

the training was conducted quarterly, 26.76% of the respondents indicated that most of the training was conducted annually, 23.51% of the respondents indicated that most of the training was conducted monthly, 5.14% of the respondents indicated that most of the training was conducted bi-annually, 4.05% of the respondents indicated that most of the training was conducted weekly, 9.73% of the respondents never indicated when training was conducted and 0.27% of the respondents were not sure whether training was conducted or not. This depicts that majority of the training was conducted quarterly .A respondent stated that....” *Law enforcement agencies in most terrorism-vulnerable countries lack the proper training and equipment to effectively combat terrorism. Therefore, their capacity to thwart terrorist attacks is significantly diminished and the rise in terror attacks in the countries puts undue pressure on these governments to enhance their counter-terrorism strategies and capability”*.

Joint Training Related to Counter Terrorism




Figure4.12: Joint training related to counter terrorism

Source: Author (2019)

Joint training is very important in the response to terror attack as it promote coordination of the responding agencies, but what is much important is the relevance of the training to the intended objective. Figure 4.12 shows the number of joint training related to counter terrorism as evidenced as follows; 36.76% of the respondents indicated that out of the trainings conducted two are related to counter-terrorism, 25.41% of the respondents indicated that out of the trainings conducted one is related to counter-terrorism, 21.89% of the respondents indicated that out of the trainings conducted three are related to counter-terrorism, 6.76% of the respondents indicated that out of the trainings conducted four are related to counter-terrorism, 8.92% of the respondents never indicated the number of trainings conducted related to counter-terrorism as they had never indicated when training was conducted and 0.27% of the

respondents were not sure of trainings conducted related to counter-terrorism as they were initially not sure whether training was conducted or not. This depicts that that out of the trainings conducted two are related to counter-terrorism which is as aligned by the review of social contract theory. A respondents stated..." *that the law enforcement agencies have not been astute enough to determine their training needs and as such the training they receive is either ineffective or insufficient to equip them with the necessary knowledge, skills, and attitude to combat the scourge of terrorism*".

Containment of Terrorism Threats Through Counter Terrorism Related Joint Training




Figure 4.13: Containment of terrorism threats through counter terrorism related joint training

Source: Author (2019)

Majority of the respondents strongly believe that effectiveness of training helps in effective countering of terrorism. This is evidenced by the following: 36.76% of the respondents indicate that CT related joint trainings has highly contributed to containing the threats of terrorism, 34.86% of the respondents indicate that CT related joint trainings has extremely contributed to containing the threats of terrorism, 19.46% of the respondents indicate that CT related joint trainings has moderately contributed to containing the threats of terrorism, 0.54% of the respondents indicate that CT related joint trainings has slightly contributed to containing the

threats of terrorism, 8.11% of the respondents never indicate whether CT related joint trainings has highly contributed to containing the threats of terrorism as they had not indicated initially existence of training, and 0.27% of the respondents were not sure of trainings conducted related to counter-terrorism thus were unable to respond to whether CT related joint trainings has contributed to containing terrorism threats. This depicts that CT related joint trainings has highly contributed to containing the threats of terrorism.

To support these findings a respondent stated that.....” *The joint training of the police in contents and programs of counter-terrorism led to a positive but significant association with the nation’s counter-terrorism strategic frameworks and capability. Further, the respondent indicated that the training was sufficient in improving the nation's capability revolved around factors such as terror detection techniques, skills to respond to such attacks, investigative skills to be applied in terror-related cases, and paramilitary skills to combat terrorism*”.

Challenges faced while conducting CT related Training




Figure 4.14: Challenges faced while conducting CT related training

Source: Author (2019)

Figure 4.14 shows whether there are challenges faced in conducting CT related training, majority of the respondents (51.62%) believe that there are challenges while conducting CT related training, 40.81% of the respondents believe that there are no challenges while conducting CT related training and 7.57% of the respondents never indicated. This depicts that there are challenges while conducting CT related training. In addition, a respondent supported these arguments by stating that...” *some of the counter terrorism strategies employed by some countries in Africa have not been effective due to the fact that they are not homegrown solutions but have been imposed on them by powerful states such as the USA. Some countries have strategically embraced the anti-terrorism rhetoric meant to serve different interest, some partners have been hesitant, while some repelled against foisting of such counter terrorism measures which they perceive to be discordant with their national interests*”.

Types of challenges faced while conducting CT Related Training.




Figure 4.15: Types of challenges faced while conducting CT related training

Source: Author (2019)

Figure 4.15 shows challenges faced while conducting CT related training and this is evidenced

as follows; according to 38.7% of the respondents believe that lack of resources is a major challenge which needs to be addressed before conducting training, 6.8% of the respondents indicate that the selected participants are not interested with the training probably not suitable hence not interested, 0.3% of the respondents felt that technological challenges affect the training offered, 1.6% of the respondents felt that breach of information is a factor which affects the training, 2.2% of the respondents believe that lack of cooperation among security agencies do pose challenges in training since achievement of the objectives are not realized, 0.3% of the respondents felt that unreliable specific mode of communication affects the trainees thus unable to acquire the knowledge and skills imparted to them, 0.3% of the respondents felt that mistrust among security agencies contributes to improper training to the trainees since they are not free to share experiences from their quarters, 0.3% of the respondents believe that there is disorganization in the training due to improper planning, 11.4% of the respondents never indicated any challenge faced during training since they believe that there are no challenges faced and 38.4% of the respondent never indicated the challenged faced during training. This depicts that lack of resources is a major challenge which needs to be addressed before conducting training. A respondent indicated that... ” *given the protracted and dynamic nature of terrorism in developing nations, the USA alone increased its national expenditure on defense between 2001 and 2004 by over 50%; a significant portion was dedicated to training law enforcement officers of international partners on counter-terrorism measures*”.

Suggested Appropriate Mechanisms for Addressing Challenges




Figure4.16: Suggested appropriate mechanisms for addressing challenges

Source: Author (2019)

Figure 4.16 shows suggested appropriate mechanisms for addressing challenges and the following were what the respondents had to say, 38.7% felt that there was the need to allocate adequate resources for successful training, 6.8% of the respondents felt that selection of qualified and suitable participants to attend the training, 0.3% of the respondents believe that there is need to embrace technology in training since terrorism activities are becoming more sophisticated, 1.6% of the respondents felt that there is need to sensitize participants on code of conduct during training in relation on matters of service delivery, 1.9% of the respondents felt that there is need to promote trust and encourage cooperation among security agencies

during training which will intern enhance good relationship, 0.5% of the respondents felt that centralization and dissemination of information should be cultivated to all security agencies to promote quick responds to the same, 0.3% of the respondents believe that inter-agency cooperation should be exercised, 11.6% of the respondents were not aware of any mechanism to address the challenges affecting the training mechanism to address the challenges affecting the training and 38.1% of the respondents never indicated since they had no challenges affecting training initially. This depicts that that there was the need to allocate adequate resources for successful training.

Data Summary and Findings

The study tested two hypotheses which included:

H₀. Timely sharing of intelligence enhances effective counterterrorism

H₁. Existence of inter-agency joint training enhances effective counter-terrorism efforts.

The findings accept that hypothesis that timely sharing of intelligence enhances effective counterterrorism. This is supported by the findings that security agencies have intelligence unit within their organizations and they all strongly believe that intelligence sharing is effective in countering terrorism. The most preferred method of information sharing was through formal head of department and formally inter-agency analysts. The study further accepts that the hypothesis that existence of inter-agency joint training enhances effective counter-terrorism efforts. This is supported by the findings that joint training enhances effective response to counter terrorism, most of the respondents from all security agencies are aware of existence of joint training programmes. Frequent conduct of relevant training to qualified and suitable participants yields positive results in responding and coordination of terror attacks.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Chapter five covers summary of chapter four findings, draw conclusions and give recommendations based on findings for policy and management implementation.

Summary of the Findings

Target respondents were sourced from NPS, KDF, NIS and NCTC according to their level of participation in countering terrorism, gender distribution was fairly represented. Majority of the respondents were from junior and middle level as they are drivers in policy implementation and perceived to have information concerning their respective organizations in relation to service delivery, in terms of education level, most of the respondents are from o-level then diploma level and small numbers with degree and above. Majority of the security agencies have intelligence unit within their organizations and they all strongly believe that intelligence sharing is effective in countering terrorism. The most preferred method of information sharing was through formal head of department and formally inter-agency analysts.

However, there are challenges of sharing information among agencies where there are no well-defined procedures of information sharing and mistrust among security agencies leading to withholding of information. Joint training enhances effective response to counter terrorism, most of the respondents from all security agencies are aware of existence of joint training programmes. Frequent conduct of relevant training to qualified and suitable participants yields positive results in responding and coordination of terror attacks. However, there are challenges faced during training and some of these challenges are insufficient training recourses, lack of collaboration among security agencies and poor selection of qualified and suitable participants

in the training. Most of the respondents highly and strongly agree that effectiveness of joint training helps in countering terrorism and it brings security agencies together thus promoting trust among themselves.

Conclusion

Based on the study topic on determinants of effectiveness of inter-agency cooperation as a counter-terrorism strategy in Kenya, the study concludes that there is timely sharing of counterterrorism information albeit some challenges. With establishment of NCTC it has brought together the security agencies, the NCTC should establish clear guidelines on how the agencies ought to work together. Despite the challenges the respondents generally believe that information sharing is an important factor in CT efforts, therefore, the government should come up with clearly defined procedures and protocols of sharing intelligence among security agencies. Joint training should be encouraged among security agencies to enhance cohesion and trust, which will be an important factor in joint CT response.

The study concluded that joint training enhances effective response to counter terrorism and that all security agencies are aware of existence of joint training programmes. Frequent conduct of relevant training to qualified and suitable participants yields positive results in responding and coordination of terror attacks. However, there are challenges faced during training and some of these challenges are insufficient training recourses, lack of cooperation among security agencies and poor selection of qualified and suitable participants in the training. The study also concluded that effectiveness of joint training helps in countering terrorism and it brings security agencies together thus promoting trust among themselves.

The study will therefore contribute to the body of knowledge in the area of determinants of effectiveness of inter-agency cooperation as a counterterrorism strategy in Kenya. In theory, the study contribution is through social contract theory with a conclusion that laws that will

guarantee that all live in peace and harmony. In practice, the security management and personnel are expected to improve on attacks through improved communication and coordination in order to save the public lives effectively as per the recommendations provided.

Recommendations

The report presents a number of recommendations based on its results. To begin, the research suggests that security agents should be annually trained on matters of security in order to secure greater public participation in anti-terrorism efforts. This will allow security organizations to meet with people and form positive relationships, allowing them to understand more about the community and gather intelligence more effectively. The study also suggests that more efforts be made to increase manpower and train police and military personnel in new counter-terrorism technologies and methods. As a result, the available staff will have the necessary knowledge and expertise to deal with terrorist circumstances.

The research also suggests that Kenya and other relevant stakeholders develop national counter-violent extremism and terrorism policies that reflect a modern multi-agency approach among government agencies, NGOs, religious groups, communities, and affected populations. In addition, the report suggests that security agencies be audited and scrutinized to verify that they are well-qualified and trained for their various roles. Furthermore, the study advises lawmakers to reinforce anti-terrorism laws and draft new ones in light of terrorism's evolving capabilities and activists.

There is need to establish proper mechanism for sharing intelligence among security agencies as per the strategic plan timelines. There is need to establish a structured curriculum for joint training of security agencies involved in CT response. Because all successful counter-radicalization and counter-extremist activities are local, the study suggests that county governments can address radicalization by implementing preventive measures such as

livelihood investments in at-risk adolescents. In addition, diversification of counterterrorism methods is recommended in this study. As a result, both classic and typical measures for combating terrorism, such as diplomacy and legislation, may be deployed.

Despite of the fact that the study met its aims, the following issues developed, necessitating future research. The report advises that a comparison study be carried out in other African countries like Somalia in order to compare the findings. The proposed study will be determinants of effectiveness of inter-agency cooperation as a counterterrorism strategy in Somalia. Another study is proposed in Nigeria which is facing terrorist related attacks from Boko Haram. This will allow for the identification of any similarities and differences, as well as bolster the battle against terrorism in Africa. There is need to do additional research at a later date to see if the situation has altered.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE

I am a Student pursuing Master of Arts in Strategic and Security Studies at the University of Nairobi. Carrying out a research on *Determinants of Effectiveness of Inter-agency Cooperation as a counter- terrorism Strategy in Kenya.*

You have been purposefully selected as one of the respondents in this questionnaire owing to your personal experience in the security matters within your organization. This will take a few minutes of your time.

Highest degree of confidentiality and the information acquired from the discussion will be used solely for academic purpose. You are not required to write your name on any part of this document

Your participation is highly appreciated.

Section A: Personal and organizational profile

1. Name of your organization
2. What is your gender? Male Female
3. Designation/ position/ Rank
4. Level of education: 0 level Diploma Graduate Post Graduate

Section B: Information sharing

1. Does your organization have an intelligence unit? Yes No

If yes does it receive or share information with other security agencies? Yes No

2. If yes to what extend to you share information regarding terrorism with other security agencies?

- Often
- Sometimes
- Seldom
- Never

3. How has information sharing contributed to containing terrorism?

- Almost always
- To a considerable degree
- Occasionally
- Seldom

4. What process do you use in sharing information?

- Formally Head of department
- Formally inter-agency analysts
- Informally Head of department
- Informally inter-agency analysts

5. How would you rate the information sharing process in Question 2?

- Very good
- Good
- Acceptable
- Poor
- Very poor

6. Do you face challenges during the information sharing process? Yes No

7. If yes what are the challenges.....

.....
.....
.....

8. Suggest the appropriate mechanisms for addressing these challenges?

.....
.....
.....
.....

Section C: Joint training

9. Do you hold joint training amongst security agencies? Yes No

10. If yes how often do you conduct the joint training?

- Weekly
- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Bi-annually
- Annually

11. How many of the joint training are related to counterterrorism?

- One
- Two
- Three
- Four

12. How have the CT related joint trainings contributed to containing the threats of terrorism?

- Extremely
- Highly
- Moderately
- Slightly
- Not at all

13. Are there any challenges in conducting CT related training? Yes No

14. If yes what are the challenges?

.....
.....
.....

15. Suggest the appropriate mechanisms for addressing these challenges?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

= END =

Thank you for your time and participation

APPENDIXII: TIME FRAME PLAN

Time	Jan	Oct	Nov	Sept	Jan	March
Activity	2019	2019	2019	2020	2021	2022
Writing of the Proposal						
Presentation of the proposal						
Correcting the Proposal						
Proposal Submission						
Collection of Data						
Analysis of Data						
Writing of the Final Report						
Final Report Submission for review						

APPENDIXIII: THE RESEARCH BUDGET

No.	DESCRIPTION	COST(Kshs.)
1.	Subsistence and Travel	20,000
2.	Bundles for internet	29,000
3.	Typesetting and printing	30,000
4.	Proposal photocopies	3,500
5.	Logistics in Data collection	10,000
6.	Tools for Data analysis	15,000
7.	Miscellaneous	10,000
GRAND COSTS		117, 500