STATE AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL IN AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT:

The case of Muhoroni Sugar Settlement Scheme, 1960-1980.

A thesis submitted in part-fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, University of Nairobi.

by

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NAIROBI 1981

I, CRISPINE ODHIAMBO-MBAI, do hereby declare that this thesis is my original work, and further that it has not been, and is not currently being, submitted for a degree in any other University.

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This thesis has been submitted with my approval as University of Nairobi Supervisor (Reader)

Signed: ....

DR. MARIA NZOMO
Supervisor

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Now that the writing of this thesis is complete, I feel more relieved to acknowledge some of my friends and institutions without whose efforts this thesis may not have seen the light of day. I feel, however, that it is also here that I may highlight some of the set-backs this thesis suffered during its preparation.

The supervision work of this thesis began in late 1980 under Dr. Anyang' Nyong'o as the main Supervisor, assisted by Dr. Michael Chege. This thesis would have been submitted in late 1981, but then Dr. Chege accompanied his Diplomacy students to a trip abroad. On his return, the Supervisors recommended that some changes should be made on the thesis before it could be approved for submission. It was while I was working on these recommendations, that Dr. Anyang' proceeded on his sabbatical leave abroad, which was supposed to end in June, 1982, thereby leaving me with Dr. Chege as the only Supervisor. It was our hope that if Dr. Anyang' came back in June, 1982, the two Supervisors would sign the thesis for submission. Unfortunately, Dr. Anyang' never came back from his leave as expected. He, on the contrary, later tendered his resignation and ceased to be a member of the teaching staff at the University of Nairobi. And in about July, the same year, Dr. Chege also left for his sabbatical leave abroad, before signing the thesis, although after making his final approval. It was at this stage that Drs. Gatheru Wanjohi and Maria Nzomo were approached to read this thesis and approve it for submission. I hereby thank them very much, indeed, for accepting the task.

But for the successful production of this thesis, I am immediately very grateful to my two Research Assistants - Fred Odula and Charles Nyambok who did the heaviest task of tracing the farmers in the Scheme and interviewing them.

I am also grateful to Mr. Okoth Owiro for introducing me to Mr. William Lucas Oketch who is the Personnel Manager of the E.A.S.I. Ltd. With the help of Mr. Oketch, I managed to have access to the factory workers and to interview them. I am equally very grateful to him.

Mr. Onyango-Omotto provided me with both the accommodation and company throughout my stay in the Scheme. For this, I am very grateful to him indeed.

I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the Agricultural Workers and the poor peasants on the Scheme who readily accepted my interviews.

I am equally very grateful to the Danish International Agency for Development (DANIDA) for generously providing me with a scholarship which enabled me to undertake this study.

This thesis also benefited from keen and dedicated typing of Pamela Adeyo Nyamwaya who typed all the manuscripts, and my comrade Okech-Owiti, who did its final proof-reading. I am thankful to them indeed.

Last, but, of course not least, I am very grateful to my family for providing me with the emotional comfort. In addition, my wife, Margaret, was continuously liaising with those who were responsible for the final submission of this thesis. And my daughter, Atieno at the age of only six months, perservered the lack of parental care necessary for a child of her age.

But for all the ideas expressed in this thesis I take the entire responsibility.

C. ODHIAMBO-MBAI
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
1983

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	-	African Development Bank
AFC	-	Agricultural Finance Corporation
CDC	-	Commonwealth Development Corporation
CLB	-	Central Land Board
C-M-C	-	Commodity-Money-Commodity
EASI	-	East African Sugar Industries
HMG	-	Her Majesty's Government
IBRD	-	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
KADU	-	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	-	Kenya African National Union
KNFU	-	Kenya National Farmers Union
KPU	-	Kenya Peoples Union
KUSPW	-	Kenya Union of Sugar Plantation Workers
M-C-M	-	Money-Commodity-Money
NKG	-	New Kenya Group
SBCU	-	Sugar-Belt Cooperative Union Limited
SSO	-	Sugar Settlement Organization
UK	-	United Kingdom

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ABSTRACT

Using Muhoroni Sugar Settlement Scheme as a single case study, we have attempted in this thesis to inquire into the socio-economic and political consequences of the interaction between state and international capital and the peasantry, under a scheme known as agro-industrial development.

Agro-industrial projects, refers to rural agricultural projects under which peasants are organised to produce cash crops, e.g. tea, coffee and sugar cane, to be processed by a multinational industry established within their midst for the purpose. Such rural projects always involve an alliance of state and international capital, an alliance whereby the state provides the political, ideological and administrative infrastructure while the financial support comes from the international finance capital sources, e.g. the World Bank.

It is argued that the aim of such projects are to create a stabilized 'middle peasantry' capable of reproducing itself adequately from the land and at the same time specialize in commodity production for the interest of capital. The establishment of such stabilized middle peasantry has indeed been successful in some areas and with regard to specific crops. But in some areas, such projects have led to the complete stagnation of the 'middle peasantry', with the majority of the peasantry being transformed into a class of wage labourers.

We argue in this thesis that any conditions on the peasant land ownership relations is a determinant factor on whether or not a 'middle peasantry' will be created. This is because, the intrusion of international capital on the peasant household production has been known to transform peasant land ownership relations. In Muhoroni Settlement Scheme in particular, this was the case.

A work of this nature must of course be treated within an appropriate theoretical framework. Consequently, in Chapter I, we have tried to present some of the recent theories on peasant commodity production. This Chapter also serves as our introduction to the rest of the work. In Chapter II, we provide the historical background of the Scheme, showing the emergence of an alliance between state and international capital, the conditions which were created for the re-settlement process on the Scheme and how these conditions influenced the pattern of the settlement. Chapter III deals with labour process, i.e., the way in which production is organised and the consequence of this on the new settlers. Chapter IV deals with the way in which capital interacts with labour and the patterns of surplus-value appropriation that characterise these interations. This Chapter also analyses the political processes which have accompanied this form of commodity production.

In Chapter V, we arrive at the conclusion that in Muhoroni Sugar Settlement Scheme, the Settlement Charges and Land Development loans which were imposed as the conditions for the peasants acquisition of plots have been the inhibiting factors to the successful establishment of a stabilized 'middle peasantry'. We therefore recommend that these conditions on the peasant land ownership relations be abolished.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Objective:

The main objective of this thesis is to inquire into the socio-economic and political consequences of the interaction between state and international capital and the peasantry under a scheme known as agro-industrial development. Agro-industrial projects refers to large-scale rural projects, under which peasantries are usually organised to produce agricultural cash crops as out-growers, to be processed by an industry built in their midst through the financial support of the international finance capital.

For the past two decades or so, projects of this type have sprung-up in a number of African countries, involving the production of various types of cash crops, including, tea, coffee, pyrethrum and sugar-cane. The aim of international finance capital, through the World Bank, in this regard is to create a stabilized 'middle peasantry' which is engaged and specialized in commodity production for the international markets, in the interest of capital. To facilitate such schemes, international capital usually comes into an alliance with the host state whose role would be to organize the political, ideological and administrative conditions for the penetration of capital into these peasant agriculture.

Given the decline in the returns to capital in areas like the former White Settler large-scale plantations and mines, which in the case of most African countries coincided with the end of colonial rule, international finance capital discovered new sources of higher returns in the intensification of commodity production among the peasantry.

The intensification of commodity production among the peasantry gives higher returns to capital in the form of the appropriation of relative surplus-value as opposed to absolute surplus value which was largely the form of surplus value appropriated from the peasantry during the colonial period. In other words, the intensification of commodity production among the peasantry gives higher returns to capital through the control and better use of the land, higher technological skills in production, the use of better seeds and fertilizers and control of production, as opposed to higher productivity which when required under the colonial system was merely guaranteed by prolonging the peasant working-day.

These higher returns for capital, during the period of monopoly capital, requires a relatively stable 'middle peasantry' engaged in specialized form of commodity production and whose production is controlled by state and international finance capital, not only in quantity but more so in quality. Consequently, such schemes, involving the intensification of commodity production have often been accompanied with vigorous agrarian reforms on the peasant land ownership.

These attempts by international finance capital to create a relatively stable 'middle peasnatry' have indeed been quite successful in some areas and with regard to specific cash crops. But in some areas, such attempts have been failures, i.e. they have led either to the stagnation or even to the deterioration of the 'middle peasantry'.

It is explicitly argued in this thesis that to understand the nature and the direction of the differentiation of the peasantry, it is important to first of all understand the nature of the ownership relations a peasantry has to the means of production, i.e. land. And it is explicitly expressed that the nature and the direction of the differentiation of the peasantry is a function of the ownership relations a peasantry has to the means of production, i.e. land. To carry out this inquiry, we first of all begin at the level of the various debates on the interaction between capital and the peasantry.

The Theoretical Debates on the Peasantry, Capital and the State:

Debate on the consequences of the interaction between capital and the peasantry may be traced back to the famous debates in Russia between the populist Narodniks and the materialists, during the development of capitalism in Russia, or even much earlier, to the period of the freedom of serfs in the Medieval Europe. But the literature on the peasantry or specifically on the peasant-capital interaction, since the above referred to periods, have been so huge that any claim of the capability to present the whole of it here would be quite misleading.

Nevertheless, we would appropriately begin at the level of the conceptualization of the peasantry. According to Teodor Shanin:

> "The peasantry consists of small agricultural producers who with the help of simple equipments and the labour of their families, produce mainly for their own consumption and for the fulfilment of obligations to the holders of political and economic power."[1]

Apollo Njonjo who quotes Shanin's definition in his paper on the "Kenyan Peasantry" asserts that the superiority of this definition lies in its ability to alert us to "certain sociological characteristics of the peasantry upon which rest certain political considerations which set the stage for specifying the political significance of changes in the peasantry as defined".[2]

But Njonjo may not be very right. When one analyzes Shanin's definition, it is immediately noticed that its weakness lies in its inability to help us conceptualize the rural agricultural producers in Kenya's country-side today whom we rightly describe as peasants. In Kenya today, during this period of monopoly capital, the small rural agricultural producers engaged in commodity production in direct interaction with international finance capital, no longer uses merely simple equipments and their family labour for production. On the contrary, in those areas in which a relatively stable middle peasantry, specialized in commodity production has been established, the use of a relatively high technological skills and sophisticated farm equipments, and the employment of wage labour now commonly characterize peasant commodity production.

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1 This definition has been quoted by Apollo Njonjo and is attributed to Teodor Shanin. See Njonjo, A., "The Kenyan Peasantry: A Re-assessment", Review of African Political Economy, No. 20, 1981 p. 27

2 Njonjo, A., op. cit. p. 28

And in those areas where the peasantry has been marginalized by capital, the sale of labour-power as a commodity by the peasantry has now become an inevitable consequence.

What therefore remains of Shanin's definition is of course that the peasantry produce mainly for its own consumption and for the fulfilment of obligations to the holders of political and economic power, although what obligations and how the peasantry fulfils them to the holders of political and economic power is not quite clear.

The major weakness in Shanin's definition therefore, lies in its tendency to conceptualize the peasantry as a homogeneous category whose social features are historically permanent under the various modes of production. And specifically, in its inability to take care of the differentiation taking place within the peasantry in the process of its interaction with capital. Indeed, Henry Bernstein warns that to pose the question of the peasantry by attempting to provide a general definition is a mistaken approach.[1]

According to Bernstein, "rural cultivators that we descriptively term 'peasants' have existed in very different types of society and in different historical epochs - for example, European and Japanese feudalism, the pre-capitalist agrarian empires in India and China or in the many countries of the Third World today where colonialism has been a major historical force in creating peasantries with specific characteristics".[2]

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1 BERNSTEIN, H. "African Peasantries: A Theoretical Framework" in Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, June, 1979. p. 421.

2 Ibid p. 421.

In such circumstances, Bernstein argues, such a general definition of peasants is ahistorical and at best has only a descriptive utility. He states that if such a definition tells us, as typically it does, that peasants are rural producers, securing their livelihood through the use of family labour, it may describe the form of peasant production but gives that category no theoretical (that is, historical and socially specific) content. And that such a general definition cannot help us disti-nguish the social differences between say, peasant in Medieval Europe whose surplus-labour was appropriated in the form of rent by feudal lord owning class, and peasant in Africa today who are exploited through relations of commodity production and exchange which lock them into the international capitalist economy.[1]

In our view, we may therefore, merely describe a peasantry as a rural social category out of which various specific social classes emerge, and a category whose economic activities in relation to the dominant social classes under various modes of production is always dominated by the latter.

It is such social categories that A.V. Chayanov argued could not be subsumed by capital.[2] During the development of capitalism in Russia, Chayanov argued that the village was over-whelmingly homogeneous community, able constantly to reproduce

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1 BERNSTEIN, H. op. cit. pp.421-422.

2 See the main features of Chayanov's arguments in HARRISON, M. "Chayanov and the Economics of the Russian Peasantry", Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 2, July, 1975. pp. 299-414.

itself both economically and socially. Chayanov, therefore, saw the modernization of tradition small farming as lying along neither a capitalist nor a socialist road, but as a peasant path or raising the technological level of agricultural production through agricultural extension work and co-operative organization, at the same time conserving the peasant institutional framework of the family small holding.[1]

But then, in the Russian countryside of the time, there existed observable inequalities among the peasantries. The origins of these inequalities, Chayanov thought, were demographic. He argued that inequalities of family income and farm size depended on family life-cycle. And that inequalities of income and land per head depended on the changing family composition, measured by the dependency ratio which rose and fell through family life-cycle. Consequently, inequality itself was neither reversible nor irreversible but cyclical. Chayanov concluded that inequality within peasant society, far from showing decomposition of peasant society into a rural bourgeoisie and rural working class, emphasised the purely peasant process of a homogeneous family based economy.[2]

Mark Harrison reacted to Chayanov's arguments by stating that although his vision for the future had important political implications for Russia then and for the Third World today, Chayanov's theoretical arguments could not explain peasant inequalities. Harrison argued that through Chayanov's work, one found two types of theory of economic inequality. In one set of theory, economic

1 HARRISON, M. op. cit. p. 390.

2 Ibid, p. 398.

inequality represents leads and lags in historical process. "Rich farms and advanced regions are the standard bearers of the future, while poor farms and backward regions are the other rank who follow up behind. In the other type of theory, some farms and regions are rich and advanced precisely because other farms and regions are poor and backward".[1]

Our view is that Chayanov's theory could not explain inequalities among the peasantry because its approach was mistaken. Indeed, there was no way in which Chayanov could have been expected to explain the inequalities existing among the peasantry when he began from the strong assumptions that "the village community was an overwhelmingly homogeneous community", i.e., when he began from the assumption that there were no inequalities among the peasantry. Chayanov's theory on inequalities was simply contradictory. But more specifically, the weakness with Chayanov's analysis, of the peasantry arose from his mistaken ontological assumptions, i.e. the 'World View" from which he posed his question of the peasantry. The populist Narodniks among whom Chayanov belonged, ideologically championed the peasant course, but they were unable to explain to the peasantry the consequences it faced in its process of interaction with capital. They failed to see that the peasantry household production was inevitably being subsumed by capital.

V.I. Lenin therefore attacked the populist Narodniks from a materialist point of view. Lenin argued that despite the

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1 HARRISON, H. op. cit. p. 407.

assertions of the populist Narodniks, the Russian peasantry were not antagonistic of capitalism, but on the contrary, were its deepest and most durable foundation. "The deepest because it is here remote from all 'artificial' influences and inspite of the institutions which restrict the development of capitalism, that we see the constant formation of the elements of capitalism with the 'community' itself. And the most durable - because agriculture in general, and the peasantry in particular, are weighed down most heavily by the traditions of patriarchal life, as a consequence of which the transformative effects of capitalism (the development of the productive forces, the changing of all social relations, etc.) manifest themselves here most strongly and gradually."[1]

After analyzing the statistical data gathered from some countryside districts that the Narodniks had denied the peasant household production could be affected by capital, Lenin arrived at the conclusions, the major ones being:

(i) That the socio-economic situation in which the Russian peasantry found themselves was that of commodity economy.

(ii) That the question of socio-economic relations existing among the peasantry showed the presence of all those contradictions which were inherent in every commodity economy and every order of capitalism.

(iii) That the sum-total of all the economic contradictions among the peasantry constituted what we call "the differentiation of the peasantry." That the process signified the utter dissolution of the old, patriarchal peasantry and the creation of new types of rural inhabitants.

(iv) That the old peasantry was not only 'differentiating', it was being completely dissolved, it was ceasing to exist, it was being ousted by absolutely new types of rural inhabitants - types that are the basis of a society in which

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1 LENIN. V.I. op. cit. pp. 172-181.

> commodity economy and capitalist production prevail. That such types are the rural bourgeoisie, (chiefly petty bourgeoisie) and the rural proletariat, i.e. a class of agricultural wage-workers.[1]

From the above, it can be said that debates on the interactions between capital and the peasantry have mainly revolved around the schools of thought which maintain that the peasantry is a homogeneous social category whose household production cannot be undermined by capital and the other which argues that the penetration of peasant household production by capital inevitably leads to the subsumption of peasant household production and the differentiation of the same peasantry thr ugh the circuit of commodity exchange relations. However, increasingly, studies on the peasant-capital interactions so far, seems to be shifting from the former school of thought to the latter position. These debates now concentrate on the methods which are employed by capital to extract surplus-value from the peasantry and on the social contents of the differentiation that result from such interactions. This implies that two factors are now quite important in understanding the socio-economic consequences of the peasant-capital interactions. These factors are: (i) The ownership relations that the peasantry has to the means of production. (ii) The types of fractions of capital that specifically interact with peasantry at a given time.

The ownership relations that the peasantry has to land is important because of the strong theoretical assumption that the subsumption of the peasantry involves the concentration of land in the hands of a few rich peasants and the transformation of the

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1 LENIN, V.I. op. cit. pp. 172-184

majority into agricultural wage labourers or rural proletariat who ceases to have any ownership relations to land. On the other hand, the identification of the types of fractions of capital that interacts with the peasantry at any given time becomes paramount because of the assumption that some fractions of capital do not transform peasant household's methods of commodity production as such, but merely extract surplus-value from them through the simple reproduction circuit of the peasantry, i.e., C-M-C e.g., the merchants capital; whereas some fractions of capital vigorously transform the peasant methods of production not only through the modernization of the instruments of production, but also by introducing new agrarian reforms which transforms the peasant ownership relations to land, e.g. international finance capital.

In other words, is the peasant dislocation from the land related in any way to the drastic agrarian reforms financed by international finance capital and mediated on by the state or is it purely as a result of the laws of capitalist development whereby a few rich peasants transform their wealth into capital through investments in means of production, i.e. acquiring more and more land from the poor peasants.

In the case of Africa, Henry Bernstein has provided perhaps one of the most elaborate theoretical frameworks for the study of African peasantries. Bernstein's theoretical arguments may be summarized as follows:

(i) That the initial stage of the penetration of capital into peasant household production required the destruction of natural economy, i.e. the economy under which the peasant was mainly involved in the production of use-values. That this was done through the penetration of commodity relations in a more or less systematic fashion and the colonial rule played a crucial role in this regard. It withdrew labour from use-value production and hence undermined the material reproduction of natural economy. At the same time, it monetised some of the material elements of reproduction of the rural producers into commodity production, either through the production of cash crops or through the exchange of their labour-power for wages.

(ii) That following an initial phase of coercion to establish the conditions of peasant commodity production, the reproduction of these conditions becomes internalized in the simple reproduction cycle to the extent that it cannot take place outside commodity relations. In other words, commodity production becomes an economic necessity for the peasantry. In order to meet its needs for cash, the household produces commodities which become, through the process of circulation, material elements of constant capital and variable capital.

(iii) That processes (i) and (ii) only required the penetration of merchant's capital. Merchant's capital is the form of capital which organizes the circulation of commodities. Because its operations are limited to the sphere of circulation, it can only acquire a profit through unequal exchange, that is by buying commodities below their value and selling them at, or above, their value.

(iv) That since the merchant's capital does not directly transform the peasant methods of production, its continued interaction with the peasantry would lead to simple Reproduction 'Squeeze', on the peasantry. Simple reproduction 'squeeze' refers to those effects of commodity relations on the economy of peasant households that can be summarized in terms of increasing costs of production/ decreasing returns to labour.

(v) That containing the peasant simple reproduction 'squeeze' involves the intensification of commodity production among the peasantry and the creation of a stabilized 'middle peasantry' specialized in commodity production through the use of better methods on land, better seeds and fertilizers, and modernized instruments of production. This mission of intensifying commodity production and creating a stabilized middle peasantry is fulfilled by international finance capital and industrial productive capital through the mediation of the state, to ensure higher returns to capital.

(vi) And finally, that the intensification of commodity production among the peasantry leads to the differentiation of the peasantry. Differentiation in the materialist sense is tied to the conditions in which wealth becomes capital,

> when it is not consumed individually but productively through investments in means of production. It is this which gives a content to the classificaction of 'poor', 'middle' and 'rich' peasants in terms of the relations of production. But this is only <u>one</u> form of the development of the process, not its necessary or sole form of development.[1]

But Bernstein observes that "the further development of commodity relations since independence from colonial rule cannot be discussed without considering the role of the state and has to be located in relation to the possibilities (and contradictions) of accumulation by the ruling classes which have formed since independence, whether they are reproduced and seek to accumulate on the basis of individual or state property (or some combination of the two forms, as in Kenya and Zambia), and in various alliance with international capitals.[2]

He goes on to argue that rural development schemes created on such basis, represents an alliance between state which organises the political, ideological and administrative conditions of this form of penetration of capital into peasant agriculture (including the extension of state apparatuses to the level of the village itself) and the provision of the technical and financial means of this penetration by either private capitals or the particular form of finance capital represented by the World Bank and other aid agencies.

Bernstein, however, concludes his argument by stating that "we are not yet at the stage of providing any definitive theorisation of the relations of production in African peasant agriculture which requires far more analytical and empirical work than has been done to date".[4]

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1 BERNSTEIN, H. <u>op. cit</u>. pp. 421-434.

2 <u>Ibid</u> p. 433.

3 <u>Ibid</u> p. 434

It is within the parameters of this challenge that we may locate the debates on the Kenyan Peasantry which were conceived at the University of Nairobi in 1979.[1] Apollo Njonjo, one of the contributors who submitted a paper o these debates observed that in Kenya, there has been a continued intensification of commodity production among the peasantry since independence and that the main factors which have led to this are: (i) The Swynnerton Plan on agrarian change in Kenya, which was launched in 1954 by the colonial government, and (ii) the independent state has continued to encourage the development of commodity production in the Small Scale Farm sector.[2]

The Swynnerton Plan introduced individualism in the land ownership among the peasantry as opposed to the previous position whereby land belonged to a community and could not be disposed of by an individual peasant household. By removing this bottleneck in the peasant land ownership relations, land itself became a commodity which could be exchanged by the peasantry for money. And by granting individual titles over land, land became a security which a peasant could use to secure loans from a commercial bank or a financial institution.

But Njonjo asks what this intensification of commodity production among the peasantry has resulted into. "Does it lead to the entrenchment of the peasantry or to the development of capitalist agriculture?"[3]

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1 Debates on the 'Kenya Peasantry' are published in The Review of African Political Economy, No. 20, 1981.

2 Njonjo. A. op. cit., pp. 29-32

3 Ibid. p. 32.

From his study of the peasant commodity production in the Central Province of Kenya, Njonjo arrived at the conclusion that neither the extensive entry of the peasantry into the commodity frontier nor its participation in the land frontier has led to the survival of the peasantry. That rather, in both instances, the apparent maintenance of the peasantry on the land has been shown to be only the refracted form taken by the development of capitalism in Kenya. And that unable to reproduce itself on the basis of its independent agricultural production, the peasantry has been driven into (a) commodity production, whose principal conditions of production are set by fractions of international capital and in (b) extensive wage labour. Njonjo further observes that this trend of development marks a decisive point of difference between the form the destruction of the English peasantry took and the form the dissolution of the Kenyan peasantry has taken. That whereas in the former, the peasantry was by and large, driven out of the land to become the basis of industrial working class; in Kenya, the dissolution takes place precisely at the same time as the highly weakened peasantry continues to retain relations to patches of land and hence maintains the illusion of a property owning class.[1]

But before Njonjo arrived at the above conclusion, he offered a strong critique to the views of Colin Leys and Michael P. Cowen on this subject. Leys, he said, had argued that contrary to the sight and sound of Kenya agriculture, developments since the mid-fifties have been leading to the emergence of "a peasant society" and not to the evolution of agrarian capitalism. Leys had asserted that agrarian capitalism is on the run being overthrown by peasant

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1 NJONJO, A. op. cit., p. 39

production.[1]

Michael Cowen also basing his study on the peasant commodity production in Central Province like Njonjo had interestingly arrived at completely different conclusions. Cowen had argued that increased commodity production in the small-farm sector had been socially located upon the middle peasantry. He observed that over-time, this social location is a result of the relocation of production from the capitalist strata to the middle peasantry. This relocation, he further argued is explained through a differentiation of the impact of different types of foreign capital, (i.e. foreign merchant, foreign-productive-industrial and foreign state financial capital), upon pre-existing peasant relations to land.[2]

According to Cowen, the logical tendency of both foreign merchant and state finance capitals is to expand the quantities, the masses of commodities released by production as the subject of their surplus extraction at the level of circulation. Such capitals have no objective interest in the transformation of the labour process, and thus no interest in a reconstitution of the class location of commodity production; their interests being restricted to the expansion of the quantities marketed, no matter which class produces. Cowen further argues that it is industrial productive - capitals, foreign or local that cannot, as a result of its location in actual production, take the existing relations to land as a given. Rather, its tendency is to transform these relations and the labour process so as to facilitate the accumulation of surplus-value at the level of production. Only this form of capital, he observes, is capable of creating an agrarian capitalist social structure through

1 These criticisms of Colin Leys and Michael Cowen are contained in the same Njonjo's paper already cited, see p. 33.

2 NJONJO, A. Ibid, p. 34.

the evolution of both wage-labourers and a class of capitalist producers.[1]

Consequently, according to Cowen, in the Kenya context where the small producer depending on his family labour holds the bulk of the land in the small-farm sector, expansion of commodity production, take an in-situ pattern taking the existing distribution and relations of land as a given. Any alteration in the labour process being simply as a result of the manipulation of prices and inputs.[2] From this position, Cowen like Leys arrives at the conclusion that increased commodity production in the small-farms, rather than leading to the evolution of a capitalist strata, has been tending towards the maintenance and enthronement of peasant household commodity production.[3]

But as we have seen, it is such conclusions that Njonjo is opposed to because there is "no such thing taking place: There is a differentiation of the peasantry due to capitalist development in agriculture with the majority of the peasantry being reduced to owners of patches of land every day".[4]

From our point of view, Cowen has taken for granted (i) peasant relation to land and (ii) he has assumed that there is no industrial-productive-capital in Kenya. As is shown later in this thesis, in Kenya, the agro-industrial development is based on international finance capital and industrial-productive capital.

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1 NJONJO, A., op. cit., p. 34

2 Ibid. p. 34.

3 Ibid. pp. 34-35

4 Ibid. p. 39

Bernstein at least supports us on this.[1] The only problem is that these fractions of capital are foreign. This is why it is argued that if these fractions of capital can lead to the indigenous capital accumulation in agriculture, then there might be a break-through to self-centered development at the prephery based on agro-industrial development. This, indeed, is the central thesis of the self-centered development theorists.[2] On the other hand, Kenya, whose agricultural history is characterised by dispossession of the peasantry from the land during the colonial white settlement and peasant re-settlement during the decolonization period, through agrarian reforms which were supported and financed by big international donors like the World Bank under specific conditions; the idea of taking peasant relations to land as given, is definitely mistaken. It is more, so when such agrarian reforms involve the intensification of commodity production among the peasantry by international finance capital.

Cowen, nevertheless, responded to Njonjo and stated that Njonjo makes great play of the marginalization of households as commodity producers. That Njonjo sees a peasantry becoming proletarianized, not via the expansion of the capital/labour relations, with the growth of household commodity production, but via the classical form of landlessness and the growth of commodity production through the growth of capitalist enterprises.[3] Cowen insists that (i) on the contrary, it is in areas such as Central Province,

1 BERNSTEIN, H. op. cit., pp. 429-430.

2 See for example Samir Amin's article: "Accumulation and Development: A theoretical Model" Review of African Political Economy, Aug.-Nov., No. 1, 1974, p. 10.

3 COWEN, M., "The Agrarian Problem: Notes on the Nairobi Discussion" Review of African Political Economy, No. 20, 1981, p. 63

where the classical form of the differentiation of the peasantry might be expected to be most obvious, that household commodity production has become most entrenched. And that it is areas such as Western Province, less directly affected by the penetration of the most advanced forms of international capital, that the peasantry has been marginalized on the boundary of commodity production. And that (ii) there is no simple causal connection between the proportion of household consumption which is realized out of revenues from production, and that which is realized through wages from migratory labour. Wages from employment can, and have been, used to finance commodity production on the small holding. However, direct production on the small holding realizes money to reproduce subsistence and permits wages from employment, which in turn can be used as revenue to finance non-agricultural enterprises.[1] Cowen, therefore, contends that Njonjo's 'patches of land' for producing food applies most forcefully to the case of Western Province household producers.[2]

From our point of view, we have no quarrel with these divergence in views on which region the marginalization of the peasantry is being felt most. It does not matter to us here whether it is in Western Province or Central Province. Indeed, this divergence of views confirms the Marxist theoretical position on capitalist development, that capitalist development is uneven both regionally and within social formations. But what remains unsettled is the nature of peasant relations to Njonjo's 'patches of land'. Are there any conditions attached to the peasant ownership of the

1 COWEN, M. op. cit., pp. 63-64.

2 Ibid. p. 64

'patches of land'? Is the peasantry not intensifying commodity production on these 'patches of land' because these conditions inhibit his abilities to utilize the land effectively? In other words, why is the peasantry not speci·lizing and stabilizing itself in commodity production yet he owns at least some 'patches of land'? Answers to these questions will differ from region to region.

Anyang' Nyong'o who also presented a paper on these debates, on the development of a middle peasantry in Nyanza argued along the above lines but fell short of carrying out his argument to its logical and theoretical conclusion. Anyang' observed that unlike the Central Province, the development of agrarian capitalism was very much delayed in Nyanza.[1] The reasons he gave for this included delays in the introduction of cash-crops which could successfully be produced by the peasant household in Nyanza. Cotton, for example, was introduced in 1908 but it failed for one reason or another and sugar cane was for a long time, until 1960, confined to the Asian-owned sugar estates, mainly around Miwani. Anyang' also observed that since there were better ways to earning money by the peasantry, than growing cotton, e.g. the selling of labour-power for wages, Nyanza immediately became a reservoir for labour to either the state or private employers in agriculture and commerce.[2]

But the main reason, Anyang' gave for the delay in the development of agrarian capitalism in Nyanza was the late advent

1 ANYANG' NYONG'O, P. "The Development of a Middle Peasantry in Nyanza", Review of African Political Economy, No. 20, 1981, p. 108.

2 Ibid. pp. 108-109

of individual titles in land in the Nyanza Province. He observed that although the Kenya Land Commission of 1933 had recommended the growth of cash crops by African households, noting that wages for which the labour from Nyanza was working within the region or elsewhere were too meagre to be saved for the development of capital; the Commission had not been all that enthusiastic about the changing of land tenure system, (i.e. production relations) in Luoland.[1] Coupled with the pressures from the 'Nyanza populists' who resisted the introduction of individual titles to land, the process of land registration and consolidation remained largely unimplemented in Nyanza until after independence. Consequently, "as it eventually turned out, mere encouragement to grow cash crops cannot result in a higher 'purchasing power' if the relations of production inhibits the growth of such cash crops".[2]

In contrast, Anyang' observes that by the end of the 1950s, the program had been largely completed in Kikuyu country, and it had been followed up by the provision of extension services and credit facilities, and, most important of all, by the removal of the ban on African-grown coffee. "Thus land consolidation in Kikuyu country accelerated and expanded commodity production by African households".[3]

Up to this stage, Anyang' admits the importance of the nature of peasant relations to land in determining the success of expanded commodity production among the peasant households.

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1 ANYANG' NYONG'O, P. op. cit., pp. 110-111.

2 Ibid. p. 111.

3 Ibid pp. 115-116

We note that the intrusion of international finance capital into Nyanza social formation by encouraging extensive production of sugar cane among the peasant households and by establishing a sugar industry in Muhoroni, in mid 1960s among other places, coincided with the completion of the land registration and consolidation in Nyanza Province; yet as Anyang' argues, this international finance capital intrusion has not led to the establishment of a stabilized 'middle peasantry' in Nyanza. On the contrary, it has led to the stagnation of middle peasant agriculture.[1] But why hasn't international finance capital led to the establishment of a successful middle peasantry as it has done in other areas, e.g. Central Province and some parts of Rift Valley? Anyang' me ely concludes that expansion of commodity production in Nyanza seems not to have led to the development of a middle peasantry, because "in Nyanza there seems to be an ossification of the small and poor peasants in both the highly commercialized sector of Nyanzan agriculture - the Sugar Belt - and the former subsistence sectors. And that land consolidation has therefore changed the land tenure system and hence created individual private property in land, but has not created well-to-do landowners who can farm the land productively".[2]

It is our view that Anyang' fell short of bringing out clearly the new conditions on the peasant relations to land which were introduced with the intrusion of the international fianance capital into the Nyanza social formation.

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1 ANYANG' NYONG'O, P. op. cit., p. 27

2 Ibid. p. 118

When sugar-cane growing Settlement Schemes were created in the lake basin region through the financial support from the big international donors like the World Bank, and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), the settling of farmers was conditioned to each farmer meeting in cash a certain amount of deposit and entering into long term loan agreement with the state on the acquisition of each settlement plot. The loan repayments were extended to cover a period of thirty years and were to be recovered from each farmer's farm proceeds, twice annually, at 6% cummulative interest p.a. on the original amount.[1]

It is therefore our view that these new conditions on the peasant relations to land have been the major inhibitions to successful formation of a stabilized 'middle peasantry'. We therefore propose the following:

(i) The formation of stable 'middle peasantry' is a function of the conditions on peasant land ownership relations.

(ii) These conditions on the peasant land ownership relations act as the variables which determine whether or not a stable 'middle peasantry' will be formed during the process of the interaction between capital and the peasantry.

The Object of Analysis:

This study focuses on the Muhoroni Sugar Settlement Scheme within the Nyanza Lake Basin and the sugar industry which was established in its midst during the early part of 1960s. The Muhoroni Sugar Settlement Scheme is a part of the giant One Million Acre Settlement Programme which was launched during

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1 The Sugar Settlement Organization records at Muhoroni.

Kenya's decolonization process to solve the problems of African landlessness. It is the establishment of White Settlement in Kenya during the period of colonial rule which led to the dispossession of quite a large number of peasant households from the land particularly from the higher areas, later came to be known as "the White highlands". Thus, the resettlement programme, of which Muhoroni Scheme was a part, involved a process whereby a Land Control Board was to be established to purchase land from the White Settlers with the funds borrowed from or donated as grants by the World Bank, CDC, the British and West German governments. Such land would be transformed into schemes for the re-settlement of the African landless.

The initial aim was to purchase million acres of land from the European farmers at a rate of 200,000 acres of land per annum over a period of 5 years. This is what came to be known as the "Million Acrea Settlement Programme". The aim of the international finance capital in this regard, was to create a stabilized peasantry capable of earning a living from the land by producing his subsistence from a part of his plot and utilizing the remaining portion to produce cash crops for the World Market. This is the category that we refer to in this thesis as the 'middle peasantry'.

Although in Nyanza, the degree of White Settlement had been quite minimal, and had been merely confined to the Miwani and Muhoroni areas, where a few Asian families had developed some sugar cane estates; a settlement scheme was created in the same area to settle largely the Luos from Nyanza, and sugar cane was recommended as the cash crop to be grown by the new settlers.

 LCB
land Control Board.

But the conditions for the new settlers were that each had to pay a deposit of KShs. 1000 to the LCB and each had to enter into loan agreement with the same board for a Settlement Charge and Land Development Loans, both to be recovered within a period of 30 and 10 years respectively, in two annual instalments and at a rate of 6% cummulative interest per annum on the original amount, for the whole period. The recoveries were to begin immediately from the first farm proceeds.[1]

It is our argument in this thesis that these new conditions on the peasant ownership relations to land have led to the stagnation of the 'middle peasantry' rather than to its stabilization. Consequently, arising from our propositions, we may now posit the hypotheses thus:

(i) In the Muhoroni Sugar Settlement Scheme, the unsuccessful development of a stabilized 'middle peasantry' is a function of the Settlement Charges and Land Development Loans which were imposed by state and international finance capital.

(ii) These Settlement Charges and Land Development Loans which were imposed on the peasantry by capital act as the variables which determine the unsuccessful formation of a stable 'middle peasantry' during the process of the interaction between the state and international capital and the peasantry.

<u>Methodology of Study:</u>

This work is based on a single case study and the data which was used to compile it was gathered through quantitative and qualitative methods, i.e from the available records and questionnaire surveys.

1 Sugar Settlement Organization records at Muhoroni.

We began our preparatory research on this work by consulting the available records on the Settlement Schemes in public libraries. This was to enable us have a background on the history of Settlement Schemes. From here, we moved to the Scheme itself where at the Scheme's administrative headquarters, we went through a sample of the farmers' individual records kept at the station.

At the Muhoroni Sugar Settlement Organization Headquarters, the organization maintains a file on every plot onwner in the Scheme. Such files contain important relevant information like the acreage of the plot, the amount of Settlement Charge and Land Development Loans initially advanced to the farmer, the rates of payments, the number of loan recoveries already made, records on harvests and other outstanding maintenance loans pending against the plot owner. In other words, these individual files contain the history of each plot.

Since Muhoroni Scheme has a total of 489 plots, we felt that this number was too big to be handled effectively within the available period, and, also due to lack of adequate manpower. We therefore decided to randomly select 125 plots which is roughly 25 per cent of the total number of the plots. We also felt that the percentage was representative enough to provide us with the general tendency of the d velopment in the Scheme It was from these 125 individual files that we gathered the relevant information using a stan ard form which we had prepared (Appendix II).

After obtain ng the history of each individual farm, from the available records, we embarked on the next stage of going into the field to trace each and every farmer from our sample of 125 to have an oral questionnaire interview with them. Our questionnaire schedule which was prepared for the purpose is at Appendix III. However, when we went to the field, we discovered that some of the 125 farmers could not be traced for one reason or another. We finally ended up interviewing 72 farmers out of our sample of 125.

Since the main reason for not finding the remaining 53 farmers on their farms was because, as we gathered, majority of them were 'absentee farmers', i.e. those farmers who do not live on their plots; we felt that this was an important characteristic of sugar cane farming in the Scheme which would form part of our argument in the thesis. Furthermore, we were still convinced that 72 farmers intervived was representative enough.

On top of interviewing the farmers, we selected a controlled random sample of 100 rural labourers engaged in the cane and sugar production in the Scheme. It was a controlled sample because, we tried to select equal number of let's say 5 workers from each type of work, e.g. cane loaders, cane cutters, transporters, weeders and the various categories of the factory workers. It was a random sample because each category was selected without considering any specific quality of the individual selected. These workers were therefore interviewed using the questionnaire schedule at Appendix IV. All the data so gathered, through the questionnaire schedules were thereafter coded and computerized, and organized for the analysis that we present in this work.

Methods of Validation of Findings:

Our findings in this thesis will be validated by the use of the computerized data which were gathered from interviews conducted among the Muhoroni Sugar Scheme farmers and workers and by the use of available data collected from the libraries and other relevant institutions.

In computerizing our questionnaire data then, we mainly employ frequency counts. Thus for example, we count how frequently a farmer hires wage-labour or the number of farmers that own tractors. These frequency counts when computed into percentages should help us to arrive at a common phenomenon with regard to a particular variable. For example, if we discover that only 5% of farmers on the Muhoroni Scheme engage wage-labour on their plots, then we could conclude that peasant commodity production in the Scheme does not depend on wage-labour but rather on some other form of labour process, e.g., family labour.

But apart from the frequency counts, the available data either from research already carried out in other related fields or the statistical data gathered from the official records, e.g. Economic Surveys and the oral interviews with the government officials is expected to help us confirm or disconfirm our research findings.

An Overview of the Kenya Sugar Industry:

The production of white sugar in Kenya can be traced back to early 1920s, particularly among the Asian Settlements which had been established in the early 1900s, in the lowlands of the Lake Basin. In 1924 an Australian enterpreneur called G.R. Mayers, established a factory at Miwani in the Lake Basin of Nyanza Province and in 1927 another factory was began by a Messers Vithaldas Haridas Ltd. at Ramisi in the Coast Province.

The two factories were individually owned mainly by the Asian families. The family of Devjibhai Hindocha has owned the Miwani Sugar Mills since 1947, while that of Laximidas Madhvani began the ownership of Ramisi from the same date before abandoning it to the EMCO (Kenya) Ltd. in 1965. Both factories were supplied with cane from the large nucleus estates, also owned by these Asian families and also by cane purchased from the Asian farms which adjoined these factories. In very rare cases was cane purchased from the African farmers who might have been growing it by then.

Throughout the colonial period, therefore, sugar industry remained basically an Asian affair with very minimal African involvement. The extent to which it can be said that the Africans were involved in the sugar industry was with the provision of labour both at the factories and the Asian farms. Even in those areas where Africans grew cane, as is the case with most parts of Western Kenya, it was supplied mainly to the various Asian owned 'Cottage' industries for the production of Jaggery. Produced officially for cow feeds and for export to be used in the manufacture of chocolates, jaggery, later turned out to be a very useful ingredient in the production of the African local gin 'Chang'aa', an illicit drink which is ruining the lots of poor peasants and workers in the sugar belt, as we shall show later.

Throughout the same period the growth of sugar industry remained stagnant in comparison to other cash crops like coffee and tea which had proved quite successful in the highlands. According to D.P. Nyongesa, this stagnation was as a result of steady availability of sugar from Uganda, the depression of 1930s and the Second World War.[1] Although the rate of consumption outstripped production, the excess demand was satisfied by imports from Uganda where the Mehta Family had proved quite successful in the sugar industry.

Serious African involvement in cane farming and the over-all increase in sugar production began in the early 1960s as a result of the establishment of Muhoroni and Chemelil Sugar Factories. Muhoroni was established in November 1966 with a rated capacity of 1,200 tonnes of cane per day and Chemelil in 1968 also with a capacity of 3,000 tonnes of cane per day. Both factories were established in an area which had previously been a mixture of Asian and European Settlement. Each is served with a nucleus estate and African growers were set up to supply the factories with cane (as out-growers) to supplement production from the nucleus estate.

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1 NYONGESA, D.P. "Factors in the Historical Development of the Sugar Industry in Kenya". Egerton College Agricultural Bulletin Vol. 4, No. 1, May 1980.

Whereas during the colonial period, the industry was restricted to private capital particularly from the Asian origin, the establishment of Muhoroni and Chemelil marked the introduction of monopoly capital into the sugar industry. The construction of Muhoroni Sugar Factory was entrusted to the Messers East African Sugar Industries Ltd. (EASI) with the Mehta Group as managing agents on 10 year renewable management contract. Chemelil on the other hand was entrusted to the Bookers Agricultural and Technical Services of London also on a 10 year renewable management contract.

Since then, three more factories have been established, all in Western Kenya on a more or less similar arrangements. In 1973, the Bookers established another factory at Mumias in Kakamega District with a capacity of 2,000 tonnes of cane per day and a nucleus estate of 3,200 hectares. After full expansion, Mumias has now a capacity of 6,000 tonnes of cane per day. This, now makes it the largest sugar factory in the country. In October 1978, a French Company, Techniscucre, also established a factory at Nzoia in Bungoma District with a rated capacity of 2,000 expandable to 3,000 tonnes of cane per day and a nucleus estate of 3,200 hectares. The latest factory to be established is the Sony Sugar Factory at Awendo in South Nyanza District also with a rated capacity of 2,000 expandable to 3,000 tonnes of cane per day and a nucleus estate of 3,400 hectares. Its chief financers include the World Bank, European Investment Bank, African Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of America and the Government of Kenya. The management is, however, contracted to the Mehta Group.

After initial problems in the industry which were brought about mainly by poor planning, the production of sugar has in recent years increased tremendously, especially after the establishment of the three latest factories. Table I below reveals this more clearly.

TABLE: I

SUGAR PRODUCED IN KENYA - 1965-1978 (metric tons) BY FACTORY

YEAR	MIWANI	RAMISI	MUHORONI	CHEMELIL	MUMIAS	NZOIA	TOTAL
1965	24,269	3,775					28.044
1966	24,741	9,580	975				35,296
1967	29,957	11,392	18,203				59,552
1968	35,005	14,493	19,998	10,148			79.634
1969	38,114	13,185	28,655	34,774			116,730
1970	37,725	15,610	33,010	44,412			130.757
1971	30,347	14,236	34,197	28,102			106.882
1972	26,221	9,793	25,430	28,410			89.854
1973	37,036	12,192	32,590	35,676	20,314		137,808
1974	30,239	19,798	28,450	39,059	55,700		164,426
1975	26,772	7,505	26,355	39,921	59,208		159.761
1976	25,236	6,062	26.228	46,146	63,699		167,371
1977	22,283	10,751	23,094	43,806	81,273		181,207
1978	36,610	11,508	42,348	47,269	92,500	7,294	237,529

Source: Egerton College Agricultural Bulletin, Vol. 4 No. 1 May, 1980 p.21

And in 1979, mainly as a result of the establishment of the factory at Awendo, the total amount of can being crushed increased from 3,147,580 tonnes to 3,987,429 tonnes in 1980. This tremendous increase has made Kenya an exporter of sugar According to the Economic Survey of 1981, Kenya has been a sugar expo ter since 1979 and during 1980 about 38,950

TABLE: II SHARE OF CANE SUPPLY AS BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF HOLDINGS (1971-1976)

	1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976	
	TONS	%	TONS	%	TONS	%	TONS	%	TONS	%	TONS	%
Nucleus Estate	431,270	31.5	351,967	33.1	534,132	34.6	622,056	36.2	551,752	33.3	487,328	29.5
Farms	532,155	38.6	452,399	42.6	570,595	36.9	228,358	13.3	124,721	7.5	138,353	8.4
Small Farms	411,577	29.9	257,929	24.3	440,335	28.5	368,669	50.5	978,110	59.2	1,514,344	62.1

Source: Economic Surveys 1975-1977

TABLE: III CANE SUPPLY (IN TONS) FROM DIFFERENT TYPES OF HOLDINGS (1977-1980)

	1977	1978	1979	1980
Factory Estates	584,248	628,467	920,595	940,350
Large Farms	239,649	282,260	379,618	556,604
Small-Holders	630,374	846,854	1,228,876	1,772,458
Co-operative Societies	278,345	351,079	231,680	309,668
Settlement Schemes	155,524	242,548	386,811	408,348
TOTAL:	1,88,140	2,349,206	3,147,580	3,987,428

Source: Economic Survey: 1981

tonnes of sugar were exported earning the equivalent of K£7.16 million in foreign exchange.

But although basically sugar is a plantation crop the world over, in Kenya small scale farmers have successfully been incorporated into the industry and they are indeed the major suppliers of the factories. This is also revealed more clearly by Tables II and III.

It may be seen from Table II that the percentage share of cane supply from the small farms, after stagnation from 1971 to 1973, began to increase in 1974, and by 1976 the small holders were accounting for as much as 62.1% of the total supply of cane to the factories. Table III also shows that there has been a relative increase in the share of cane supply from the small-holders. This is if we also take into account the fact that the majority of farms in the settlement schemes and those grouped under Co-operative Societies belong to the small-holders.

Given these trends of development, therefore, the history of these factories cannot be treated as a single history. There are marked differences between these factories not only in the way in which production is organized but more particularly in the way in which capital interacts with labour and even in the number of agencies through which surpluses are extracted from both the poor peasantry and wage-labourers. These marked differences do not only represent the various stages of the development of monopoly capital, they also demonstrate the different patterns or ways in which monopoly capital expands into a 'Third World' country. This also means that studies carried out among the peasants atached to these factories will reveal different results as concerns the development of Agrarian capitalism in this country but more particularly in relation to the differentiation of the peasantry.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MUHORONI SETTLEMENT SCHEME.

The History of Settlement Schemes in Kenya:

The history of Settlement Schemes in Kenya is dialectically related to the history of the establishment and expansion of White Settlement. This is because, it was as a result of an attempt to solve the problems of the landlessness and the unemployment, during the period of transition to political independence that the idea of Settlement Schemes for Africans was introduced.

By 1960, the total amount of land which had been alienated for White Settlement totalled to about eight million acres.[1] This represented approximately two-thirds of the potentially rich agricultural land for the peasant economy which was predominantly subsistence. This alienation, therefore, huge as it was had resulted into landlesswess and hence into the disruption of the peasant economy.[2] Coupled with this was the nature of the colonial capitalist system which having encouraged commodity production by various means, including the introduction of taxes and new imported commodities into the Kenyan market had led to the dislocation of the able bodied Africans from the land into search for employment to earn

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1 For the history of White Settlement in Kenya see for example SORRENSON, M.P.K. Origins of European Settlement in Kenya. OUP, Nairobi, 1968. pp. 1-154.

2 For the effects of the colonial capitalist Economy in the Peasant Economy in Kenya. see for example VAN ZWANENBERG, R.M.A. Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya, EALB, [illegible], 1975, pp. 210-[illegible].

money so as to meet their demands for both these taxes and goods.[1] This also led to unemployment particularly in these areas where land alienation had not been so acute.

By the beginning of 1950s, the situation had become so acute particularly in the Central Province where the effects of land alienation had been felt more than any other part of the country. This resulted into the so-called 'Mau-Mau' uprising. The 'Mau-Mau' was indeed a movement representing both the poor peasants and the proletarized agricultural labourers in the European farms to whom life had been made unbearable by the colonial capitalist system. Efforts to strengthen and consolidate the 'Mau-Mau' into a broader national movement by linking it to the other scattered resistant movements in other parts of the country failed to be realized when the colonial state finally crushed it with a brutal force. This was followed by the declaration of state of emergency on October 20th, 1952.

This period of emergency, between 1952 and 1959 however, created an opportunity for the British Government to introduce constitutional changes leading to the rise of middle class party politics in the late 1950s and early 1960. Both the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic

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1 See also BRETT, E.A. Colonialism and Underdevelopment in E. Africa, Heinemann, 1973, pp. 163-216.

Union (KADU) were formed in the early 1960 after attempts in the late 1950s, mostly by the members of the middle class to form a single broad party representing various interests which had hitherto been articulated through various District Associations against the White Community and the Colonial State had failed.[1]

The failure of these attempts can largely be attributed to the regionally imbalanced nature of the development of the colonial capitalist system which affected some regions more than others and partly to the manipulative politics of the White Community towards the ranks of the African middle class. Both the selective provision of educational facilities and heavy recruitment into the labour market of the Luo and the Kikuyu coupled with huge alienations of the agricultural land particularly among the Kikuyu led to faster political awareness among the two African peoples which also happened to be the two major ethnic groups in the country. The propaganda circulated by the White Community as a result of this and the one which became readily acceptable to the members of the other so-called minority ethnic groups was that an alliance of the Kikuyu and the Luo would dominate them and that it was only through regional autonomy, (which also happen to correspond to the ethnic boundaries), that they could guarantee their democratic political participation and economic equality in an independent Kenya.[2] Consequently,

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1 For a discussion of these events see OGINGA-ODINGA, Not Yet Uhuru, an autobiography, Heinnemann, London 1971, pp. 193-196.

2 Ibid p. 194.

whereas KANU advocated for a strong central government, KADU preferred a loose Federation with strong Regional governments. This, indeed, came to be the major difference between KANU and KADU and hence formed their basis of negotiations even on the question of land during the Lancaster House Conference.

Nevertheless, these landless restlessness coupled with the nationalist pressures finally forced the colonial state, the British Government and the White Community (the majority of whom had been very adamant on the idea of African self-government) to the conference table to bargain for Kenya's political independence.[1]

The groundwork in connection with the establishment of Settlement Schemes was laid in the years 1960-1962 during the two Lancaster House Conferences which were convened to bargain for Kenya's political independence.

From the very beginning of the negotiations, the immediate concern of the White Community in Kenya was the fate of the "White Highlands". The most preferable solution to them on this issue was that whereby the security of those settlers who preferred to remain in Kenya could be guaranteed and those who opted to leave the country could be compensated fairly.

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1 For the History of the Decolonization Process in Kenya see WASSERMAN, G. Politics of Decolonization: Kenya Europeans And the Land Issue 1960-1965, Cambridge University Press, London, 1976. pp. 46-161.

A guarantee for security to the remaining Whites was only possible if the acute demands for land by the poor peasants and the unemployed could be met. Similarly, a 'fair' compensation to those leaving the country was only possible if there was least disruption in the already established colonial capitalist economy. This, therefore, became the paradox of the continuity of the colonial capitalist economy in the post-independent Kenya. It is no wonder, therefore, that Kenya's political independence was granted in various stages particularly after the White Community and the Colonial State had neutralized and absorbed most of the militant views of the African Nationalist on the key issues such as land.

For the purposes of the bargain the interests of the White Community were represented by various pressure groups including the Convention of Associations, the Kenya Coalition, the Kenya National Farmers Union (KNFU) and the New Kenya Group (NKG).

The Convention of Associations had been established in 1910. It brought under its umbrella all the scattered European District Associations so that it could act as their formidable forum, dessiminator and representative of the European Opinion. Similarly the Kenya Coalition which was formed in 1960 by Cavendish-Bentinck who had resigned as Speaker of the Kenya Legislative Council in protest against the British for abandoning their past pledges to the settlers aimed at promoting greater co-operation among the Europeans. It also aimed at representing all endangered minority interests. Bentinck described it as a 'movement' stressing more on economic issues rather than as a 'party' seeking political office. The Kenya National Farmers Union, on the other hand had started operating in 1948 basically as a white farmers' lobby. Throughout its life in colonial Kenya, it argued for guaranteed prices for produce, more money for agricultural research, long-term and easy credit facilities and for their committees to have control over agriculture. And the New Kenya Group was the Whites party which was formed by the liberal European politicians to spur their communities to slow adoption of multi-racial reforms.

These groups had, however, by mid 1960 re-grouped the European Community into two fairly distinct groups. The one representing the majority was the conservative group composed largely of the rural farming interests. And the other was the liberal group which mainly supported the transnational corporate interests.

When the first Lancaster House Conference of February 1960 ended without any clear resolution on the fate of the European land holdings and when towards the end of that year, the order in the council announced the openning of the White Highlands to non-Europeans for the first time, the KNFU decided to make a direct representation to the British Secretary of State for Colonies. Its Executive Committee agreed on three main points which came to form the basis of their negotiation, The three points were:

(a) European farmers' anxiety as to the future of land values could lead to forced sales, a slump in land values, a slow down of development, subsistence farming, monoculture and the collapse of the economy.

(b) Confidence that land values would remain stable, both pre-independence and post-independence would enable the normal business of farming to continue - the European farmer being assured that if he ever wished to sell for any reason he would be able to do so at a fair and reasonable price.

(c) This could be achieved by Her Majesty's Government (HMG) guaranteeing a line of credit over a period of years, in the hands of trustees separate from the Kenya Government for the purpose of purchasing land at a fair price.[1]

Their plan also demanded for setting up a Land Trust Fund with financial backing guaranteed by HMG, spread over several years and available for the resettlement of all races. These finances were later divided into two inter-related parts: development and stabilization. Development funds were to come from the World Bank, and its affiliates, and the Commonwealth Development Corporation. Whereas those for the purchase of farms and stabilization were to be provided by the British Government. The amount of money the project would require was not clearly stated, but it was estimated to be between £25 to £30 million.

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1 WASSERMAN <u>op. cit.</u> p. 47

This plan was opposed by the Liberal "New Kenya Group", the Colonial Government with which the Group was closely allied and the African Nationalists. NKG, called for the establishment of an authority to buy land in the Scheduled Areas. This authority, a forerunner of the Land Development and Settlement Board, was to consist of a majority of farmers from the Scheduled Areas. It was to use private and public funds to maintain an economic price for agricultural land, resettle Africans from over-populated areas and make better use of land. For these purposes .ery much more fund were needed from HMG for purchasing land. The NKG's plan as summarized by Wasserman read:

> (a) We believe the private enterprise is the right instrument to develop land in the national interest.
>
> (b) We advocate the support of land values by the purchase of farms in the settled areas, by the Land and Agricultural Settlement Board, for the creation of Yeoman Farmers, and pledge ourselves to do our utmost to serve the necessary finance.
>
> (c) We advocate the greatest possible development of agriculture particularly in the African land unit.
>
> (d) We advocate the Creation of Schemes under proper administrative control for small holders to relieve pressure from the landless.
>
> (e) We pledge ourselves to whatever measures may be required to secure land titles.[1]

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1 WASSERMAN *op. cit.* p. 57

However, despite these apparent differences, the White Community agreed on one thing; i.e., the "necessity for preserving the economic assets and system of colonial Kenya" According to Wasserman, "the essential difference between the liberals and Conservative European was one of strategy rather than goals."[1]

It is no wonder, therefore, that the plan which had been prepared by Mr. Oates the leader of the Convention together with Lord Dalamere and sent to the Convention Executive during the Second Lancaster House Conference was given very encouraging reception. The plan was described as having received tremendous support in both Houses of Parliament in Britain.

The plan was the basis for the origin and the implementation of the Million-Acre Scheme. It concentrated on the conversion of the mixed farming area of 2,1000,000 acres. Without underscoring the economic importance of the mixed farms, it called for the initial buy-out of fifty per cent of the mixed farmers (one million acres) over three years at a rate of £15 per acre with no buying of loose assets. On this about 100,000 African families could be settled. Thereafter sufficient money (some £30 million over the next five years) would be needed from the British Government for all the mixed farming land after the initial period (at 300,000 acres per annum). And that £3.6 million in loan money from the Kenya Government was to provide subsistence to African tenants in their first year.

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1 WASSERMAN <u>op. cit.</u> p. 71.

The plan, however, made it clear that the ranches (some 3.6 million acres) were unsuitable for immediate African occupation and could contribute meat produce of all kinds for canning, export or local consumption. It also stated that the plantations (tea, coffee, pyrethrum, covering two million acres) provided the main export wealth and hence should also be left alone. For settlement purposes, "it called for the creation of land authority which was to be given maximum African participation particularly in the matter of settling the people on the land after its purchase from the present owners."[1]

Throughout the negotiations the position of the African Nationalists did not in any fundamental way negate these ideas. For KADU, the centralization of land purchase under Central Land Board whose membership would include the Regional Presidents and the vesting of the Regional Presidents with the authority to select the potential settlers to any land purchased in their region was basically going to serve their philosophy of regionalism. Similarly, KANU, partly as a result of the eagerness of some of its members to form a government lost most of its militant views on land. Quoting an article entitled "KANU policy for Second Lancaster House Conference", Wasserman has for instance, stated that in this article, Kenyatta summarized the reformist views on land he hoped KANU would pursue. He said:

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1 WASSERMAN op. cit. pp. 110-119

> "KANU will recognize and respect right in private property. As I have often stated, the African people are not robbers. However, it is no use pretending that thousands of Africans can go on suffering from landlessness, poverty, hunger and unemployment while vast areas of land lie completely idle and undeveloped. While we shall maintain and assist farmers who develop their land and who assist the economy of our country, we shall vigorously pursue a policy of land reform."[1]

And Odinga has confessed even much more blantly when he said:

> "We must admit that KANU pursued without question land and compensation policies embarked upon before we were in power."[2]

But most importantly, it was also during these negotiations that the international finance capital found its root in the execution of these transfers. These finances, which were to be channelled through the Kenya Government were supposed to come from the World Bank, the British Exchequer, CDC and West German Government. Indeed both the World Bank and CDC had been involved in these transfer schemes as from the beginning of 1960. According to Wasserman, "the British Government sought their involvement especially of the World Bank, not only to ease the financial burden on its government but also to help make the Schemes less 'political', and to tie the World Bank into Kenya's future economic policies."

And infact when the idea of the Million-Acre Settlement Scheme was put into reality, writes Mr. C.P.R. Nottidge,[3] who was one of the first Settlement Controllers in the programme, the source of the development loans to the farmers came to be the major distinguishing factor, particularly among the small-holder Schemes. The two types of the low density Schemes whose targets were to provide each individual owner with an annual income of £100 cash in one and £250 in the other, both on top of subsistence and annual land and development loan repayments, were being financed by Development Funds from the IBRD and CDC. The other High density

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1 WASSERMAN <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>. p. 119.

2 OGINGA-ODINGA <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>. p. 257

3 NOTTIDGE, C.P.R. <u>The Million-Acre Settlement Scheme 1962-1966</u>. Dept. of Settlement, Nairobi. p. 6

Schemes with annual income targets of £25; £40 and £70 to the farmer on top of subsistence, plus loan repayments and their source of development loans from the money loaned by the British and West Germany to Kenya Government.

The involvement of the World Bank as the major source of funds for the Scheme also meant accepting World Bank advice and advisors and the discipline of repaying the funds through the increased surpluses garnered from the settlement areas.[1] Consequently, from the beginning of the Settlement Schemes, it was the World Bank which had to provide planners and advisors and recommendation of what factories to be built for what crops, grown in a particular Scheme. In Nyanza, a Sugar Scheme was planned at Muhoroni.

The Case of Muhoroni Scheme and its Settlement Process:

Muhoroni Sugar Settlement Scheme occupies a major part of the Nyando Valley in Kisumu District of Nyanza Province. It is one of the seven Schemes together with Songhor, Tamu, Koru, Fort-Ternan, God-Abuoro and Oduwo, that occupy the whole of the valley. Forming a compact block across the valley, they boarder, Nandi and Kericho Districts of Rift Valley Province, on the North and East respectively. On the South, they are boardered by East Kano and on the West by West Kano Locations of Kisumu District. The seven Schemes combined, cover an area totalling to about 56,736 acres of land. Muhoroni Scheme alone covers an area of 7,612.

Before opening it for both the Asian and European Settlement in 1902, this area was basically a battle ground of the inter conflicts between the Luo of Kano, the Nandi and Kipsigis of the Kalenjin Group. Narrating the long trek of the Luo from Southern

1 WASSERMAN op. cit. p. 138

Sudan, Prof. B.A. Ogot has for instance, quoted Mr. H.R. Montgomery the Provincial Commissioner for Nyanza in 1932 as having said of the area thus:

> "Before the laying of the railway line it is probable that a few Joluo lived near the Nandi Escarpment but it is certain that it was chiefly a fighting ground between Nandi and Luo and near Kibos between Luo themseves, Kajulu and Kano. When railway reached Kisumu in 1902, it made the boundary and any native between the line and the Escarpment were moved back to make way for the Indian farms which were made open for alienation in 1903".[1]

Prof. Ogot has observed, however, that before the arrival of the Luo in the Eastern shore of Lake Victoria, this place was occupied by the Gusii people who were also on constant migration to their present homeland. The Luo of Kano who now occupy the area adjoining these Schemes had by then crossed the lake over to South Nyanza District. But as a result of the natural increase in population, the Luo of Kano started expanding northwards into these areas. And that in the process of their expansion, they came across the Kipsigis whom they drove eastwards. They started expanding northwards in the direction of Fort-Ternan until they were halted by the Nandi. This area, it is also said, proved too cold for the Luo Settlers and as a result, they

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1 OGOT, B.A. History of the Southern Luo, EAPH, Nairobi, 1967 p. 238

moved westwards in two waves to occupy the Kano Plains. Here they found the remnants of the Gusii and gradually absorbed them into the Luo society.[1] But Ogot has noted that the war between the Luo and the Nandi continued unabated with the frontier swinging forward and backward. This, precisely is the reason why the colonial administration found it difficult to determine the boundary between the two people when they arrived.[2]

Nevertheless, when it was decided to turn the area into a Settlement Scheme, it was placed under the Regional President of the Nyanza Region and it was earmarked for settling the potential Luo settlers. This was indeed aimed at serving the Government'spolicy underlying the creation of these Schemes. According to Nottidge, the areas selected for the Schemes were not chosen necessarily for their agricultural suitability alone but also to satisfy the demands of various peoples whose land units adjoined the former Scheduled Areas.[3] "These demands, Nottidge continues, were not necessarily made by population pressure within the tribal land unit but in many cases, were made on historical claims."[4] It follows that the basic criteria for selecting a potential settler was whether he was a Luo or not. It is no wonder, therefore, that nearly hundred per cent of the plot owners in Muhoroni Scheme are Luos.

1 OGOT op. cit. pp. 236-238

2 Ibid. p. 237

3 NOTTIDGE op. cit. p. 6

4 Ibid. p. 6

Muhoroni Scheme is one of the Low Density Schemes whose finances for Development Loans to the farmers come from the IBRD and the CDC. Its target was to provide each individual farmer with an income of £100 cash per annum, plus subsistence and ability to repay back the loans. It has a few 'yeoman farms' although it is basically small holding with the average farm size per farmer being 11.6 acres.[1]

One of the factors which characterized the settlement process of Muhoroni was the slow way in which the potential settlers came forward to acquire farms. Muhoroni Scheme was opened in early 1964 but by the end of the year only about 27 people had been settled. Mr. Jeremiah Nyagah, the then Parliament Secretary for Lands and Settlement who revealed this figure, during a Parliamentary Session in answer to a question by Mr. Odero-Sar, the then Member of Parliament for Ugenya Constituency, stated however, that the intention of the Ministry had been to settle some 99 people by the end of May that year. And that this target had not been realized because of the failure of the President of Nyanza Region to make available all the people chosen to be settled.[2] This answer came after a few months earlier, Mr. Marrian who was also a Parliamentary Secretary for Lands and Settlement had also informed the Parliament during a similar Parliamentary Session that about only 11 Luo people had purchased farms in the Scheduled areas.[3]

Had it not been for the Nyando River which as a result of

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1 NOTTIDGE op. cit. p. 8

2 HANSARD, 1964 Vol. 3 pt. 1 pp. 376-378

3 HANSARD, 1963-64 Vol. 2. p.277

heavy rains had over-flown its banks and flooded out a large proportion of the Kano people from their homes, destroying crops and livestock; this slow response to take-up farms in the Schemes would have been explained partly by lack of serious squatting problem.

According to Van Zwanenberg, pressure of population upon the land was highly localized throughout Nyanza. Quoting Prof. S.H. Ominde, who used the 1948 population statistics to carry out the first accurate population survey of the area, Zwanenberg has noted that the only mention of any population movement was from Alego location to Sakwa location which adjoined it and also from Nyakach Southwards. But he also notes, however, that "neither area was shown as heavily populated in the 1948 census by comparison with other locations and that reference do show that Nyanza people could move from District to District without fear of being moved on".[1]

Secondly, even if population later increased, the heavy dependence of the Luo around the Lake on fishing, coupled with the out-migration of quite a large number of the Luo labour to the urban areas in search of wage employment must have relieved population pressure on the land and made it possible for a small unit of the land to maintain a large number of people. Indeed, the then Parliamentary Secretary for Natural Resources, Mr. Argwings-Kodhek, reacting to the slow response of the Luo to take-up the farms, charged that the people should

1 VAN ZWANENBERG pp. 234-235

be educated not to be too incordinately interested in fishing alone, but they must be convinced to move out from the Lake shore to the hills and cultivate new Shambas.[1]

But the Nyando River floods of 1962 had tremendously increased pressure on the land. By July of the same year it was claimed that about 2,300 people had already been rendered homeless.[2] Furthermore, these floods were apparently becoming a permanent feature. It was becoming obvious that whenever Nyando River flooded its banks as a result of the frequent rains on the Kipsigis Highlands, where the river has its source, the people of Kano plains were bound to be flooded out of their homes. Logically this phenomenon should have increased the demand for land particularly on the Schemes and thereby speeded the settlement process. It turned out that this was not the case. On the contrary the flood victims were encamped at the Ministry of Works Depot around the area called Kibigori.

After about sixteen months, when it was still apparent that no solution was forthcoming to these flood victims, Mr. Oselu-Nyalick the Member of Parliament for the area complained that the deposit required from the potential settlers before they could be settled was too high and that, that was the explanation to why the people were slow in their response to take-up the plots in the Scheme.[2] For an intending settler to be settled in the Scheme, he had to pay a deposit of Shs. 1000. On top of that he had to convince the District Commissioner's

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1 HANSARD 1963 Vol. 1 p. 556

2 HANSARD, 1964, Vol. 3 pt. 1 p. 378.

Settlement Committee that he was agriculturally knowledgeable and was therefore able to undertake intensive agricultural production on his farm.

The then Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Mr. Tom Mboya reacted to Mr. Nyalick's claim by saying that Muhoroni Scheme which required an intending settler to pay a deposit of Shs. 1000 was never meant for the flood victims, neither was it meant for the poor landless and the unemployed. Songhor Scheme, which required an intending settler to pay a mere stamp-duty of Shs. 145 was the one which was meant for the poor landless and the unemployed. Furthermore, to solve the problem of the flood victims, the government was making available 3,000 acres of land to be divided into 7½ acre plots which would absorb 400 families. These plots Mr. Mboya made it clear required no money from the settler at all.

All these were indeed very true. Muhoroni Scheme, according to the policy of the entire settlement enterprise is one of those low density schemes which was aimed at integrating the middle class into the already established colonial capitalist economy by making them acquire landed property. And so if Muhoroni was not fulfilling the requirements of the flood victims, it is not because it was failing to serve the purpose but rather it was because it was sticking to the policy for which it was created. It is no wonder, therefore, that according to our sample, a mere 18% of the people interviewed claimed to have been actually landless, squatters or former colonial

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1 HANSARD, 1964 Vol. 3 pt. 2 pp. 3054

agricultural workers. This figure could even be further reduced if we take into consideration the fact that about 49% of the respondents found on the farms and actually interviewed claimed no legal ownership of the farms on which they were residing.

Secondly, the 3,000 acres of land earmarked to settle the 400 families of the flood victims was created. What is not very clear, however, is whether the settled families were the true flood victims. It is here that the majority of the poor peasants who supplement their subsistence production by selling their labour power to the Sugar Factory and farms within the Scheme come from. Finally, what Mr. Mboya failed to reveal is the fact that Songhor Scheme which was the only high density Scheme already created then next to Muhoroni, for the poor peasants and the unemployed had also been invaded by the members of the middle class and majority of them were infact acquiring plots there. In other words it was Songhor which was failing in its policy for which it was intended.

But even once such economic and legal barriers had excluded the majority of the landless and the unemployed from acquiring plots in the Scheme, the acquisition of plots in Muhoroni had involved some elements of corruption. Mr. Okuto-Bala, who was the Member of Parliament for the area during the settlement process, for instance, claimed in Parliament that many people "were using the pretext of Shs. 1000 deposit requirement to acquire more than one plot by paying deposits for their children, their wives, their mothers and their fathers".[1] It is indeed a common phenomenon to find one person with more than one plot in the Scheme.

Consequently, given the nature of the Settlement process that took place, the majority of the owners of the 489 plots created in Muhoroni Scheme have been recruited from the ranks of Civil-Servants, Primary and Secondary teachers, University Lecturers, businessmen, politicians and some rich peasants.

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1 HANSARD, 1966 Vol. 10 pt. 1 p. 788

CHAPTER III

THE LABOUR PROCESS IN MUHORONI

(The Social Conditions Under Which Cane is Produced in the Scheme)

Plots Ownership and their Actual Settlement

The social conditions under which cane is produced within the Muhoroni Sugar Settlement Scheme has largely been influenced by the socio-economic background of the legal plot-owners; the actual settlers on these plots and the type of agricultural inputs involved in the production of cane in the Scheme.

In the first place, the fact that nearly a half of the total legal owners of the plots within the Scheme do not live on their plots and have either left on these plots Managers or Care-takers (some of whom are their relatives) or none at all to shoulder the direct responsibility of organising production on these farms, means that this large number of legal plot-owners are not directly involved in the cane production in the Scheme. Furthermore, this also means that for this category specially, cane production within the Scheme is merely a secondary means of earning a living.

Secondly, the fact that it was made possible for the plot-owners to acquire most of the farm inputs including labour on loan basis and also to be able to hire most of the farm machinery, e.g. ploughing tractors and horrowers from the State Organization e.g., the Sugar Settlement Organization (SSO) and the East African Sugar

Industries Company (EASI), also on loan basis, has made it possible for most of the plot-owners to operate production within their plots without actually living on those plots. This phenomenon specially has led to a situation whereby a large number of these new Settlers remain largely uninvolved in the cane production within the Scheme and appear merely as those who have leased their plots both to the State and International Capital.

According to our total sample of 125 farmers selected at random through their records held at the SSO headquarters in Muhoroni, only 36 legal owners of the plots could be found on the plots and interviewed. Other 35 respondents, also found on the plots and interviewed were either Managers/Caretakers or relatives (wives, sons or brothers) of the legal owners of the plots. This means that at the end of the interview exercise, a reasonably detailed information could only be gathered on the 72 out of the total sample of 125 farms. It follows that 53 out of the total sample were 'absentee' farmers who could not be traced, majority of whom had failed even to construct residential houses on their subsistence plots. It is also from this category of farmers that it was possible to find the abandoned plots or those plots that have been left to lie fallow over the years. Table IV may help to clarify the situation.

Table IV: LEGAL OWNERSHIP COMPARED TO ACTUAL OCCUPATION

LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF PLOTS	FARMERS	
	No.	%
YES	36	50
NO	35	49
NO RESPONSE	1	1
TOTAL	72	100

Source: Interviews conducted by the author in the Scheme in 1980.

Table V: ROLE OF OCCUPANTS

ROLE IN THE PLOT	RESPONDENTS	
	No.	%
Wife of the Plot Owner	10	14
Manager/Care-Taker	21	29
Relative (Son or Brother)	5	7
Owner	34	47
No Response	2	3
TOTAL	72	100

Source: Interviews conducted by the author in Muhoroni Scheme in 1980.

From Table IV above, it may be seen that 36 or 50% of the 72 respondents admitted that they were the legal owners of the plots, whereas 35 or 49% denied. There was 1 respondent who failed to respond to this particular question. And from Table V, it can be seen that when we enquired on the role of each respondent on the plot, 34 or 47% of them claimed to be the legal owners of the plots; 21 or 29% were Managers or Care-takers of the legal owners and 15 or 21% were related to the owners of the plot.

When the information from the above two tables is taken together, then it can be seen that three categories of the organization of Cane production within the Scheme clearly emerge. (i) There are 36 farms on which the legal owners are also the ones who organize production. (ii) There are 35 farms on which Managers/Care-takers or relatives of the legal owners are the ones who organize production, and (iii) there are 53 farms on which the legal owner or Manager/Care-taker or a relative of the legal owner organize production by visiting the farm occassionally. This also means that there are 88 plots out of the total 125 sample on which production are organized by persons other than their legal owners or by mere occasional visits. In short, there are 88 farms on which their legal owners are not actively involved in the organization of Cane production.

It is apparent that more than half of these 88 farms belong to those who were either businessmen, Civil-Servants, politicians, or some rich peasants at the time of acquiring them or are still the members of the above categories to this day. This is partly illustrated by the Table below.

Table VI: SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF PLOT-OWNERS

SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE PLOT OWNER	F A R M E R S	
	No.	%
Businessman	12	17
Civil-Servant	11	15
Subsistence Farmer	24	33
Squatter, Worker (other)	13	18
House Wife/Schooling	7	10
No Response	5	7
TOTAL	72	100

Source: Interviews conducted by the author in the Scheme in 1980.

From Table VI, it can be seen that 23 or 32% of the 72 respondents were either businessmen or Civil-Servants. Logically these 23 were also the legal owners of the plots on which they were found and interviewed. In other words, they could not have been merely Managers/Care-takers or relatives of the real plot owners but rather the real owners of those plots. 24 or 33% of the respondents claimed to have been subsistence farmers. It should be noted however, that some of these 24 respondents could as well have been

Managers/Care-takers or relatives of the actual owners of the plots who having been pushed out of their ancestral pieces of land as a result of their population increase vis-a-vis the amount of land their ancestors held have now been provided with accommodation on these plots by their legal owners in exchange of their labour as Managers or Care-takers. In short, for these 24 respondents, the possibilities of some of them being Managers/ Care-takers or relatives of the legal owners of the plots cannot be easily dismissed.

But on the other hand, the possibility that the majority of them could well be the legal owners of those plots is quite understandable because as subsistence farmers, there is a high likelihood that most of them decided to settle on their plots. Furthermore, some of the 13 or 18% of the respondents who claimed to have been squatters or workers might have still been the workers of the legal plot-owners who carry out for them the Managerial or Care-taker duties in relation to the organization of production on the plots. Finally, the majority of 53 plots of the total sample on which nobody lived at all belonged to either the Civil-Servants, politicians, businessmen or some of the rich peasants.

Consequently, from whichever way it is viewed, either from the point of view of the 35 plots that had Managerial/Care-taker or relatives of the plot-owners, or from the point of view of the 53 plots that had nobody living on them at all, it still becomes obvious that the majority of the 88 plots referred to above, belonged to those who had been either businessmen, Civil-Servants politicians or rich peasants. This evidence is also supported by the fact that even at the time of acquiring these plots most of those who succeeded in acquiring them had other pieces of land elsewhere. Table VII illustrates this more succinctly.

Table VII: OWNERSHIP OF LAND PRIOR TO ACQUISITION OF SCHEME PLOTS

HAD LAND BEFORE	FARMERS	
	No.	%
YES	42	58
NO	29	40
NO RESPONSE	1	2
TOTAL	72	100

Source: Interviews conducted by the author in the Scheme in 1980.

Table VII reveal that 42 or 58% of the respondents had land at the time of acquiring plots in the Scheme. Only 29 or 40%, most of whom we must logically assume belong to the Managerial or Care-taker category, claimed not to have had any land at the time of acquiring plots in the Scheme.

Given the above ownership relations, and the actual way in which these plots are settled, three forms of organizing cane production has also emerge within the Scheme.

One of the three forms of organizing cane production is that of the category of farmers who neither live on their plots nor have left any Manager/Care-taker or a relative to organize production. For this category of farmers, the organization of cane production in their farms is done through occasional visits which they make to the Scheme.

From the very beginning both the SSO and the EASI Ltd. held a monopoly over the ownership of almost the entire farm inputs, (e.g. ploughing tractors, harrowers, seed cane, fertilizer, etc.) on the Scheme. Likewise, the Scheme's Co-operative Society had also the monopoly of organizing labour of its members. It was also made possible from the very beginning for the farmers to acquire almost the entirety of these farm inputs including labour on a hire and loan basis without actually possessing the cash to purchase them. All the expenses estimated and actually incurred by the above organizations on rendering the necessary services on these plots could be deducted from the incomes at the harvesting time. This resulted in a situation whereby plot holders would merely consult with the SSO, EASI Ltd. and the Co-operative officials to have work done for them on their plots and to be invoiced on the amount of the expenses. This trend has persisted to this day.

For a farmer belonging to this category, given the above possibilities, he need not be permanently settled on his plot. He might have remained on his former piece of land if he is a rich peasant, or he might be at his business or place of work if he is a businessman or a Civil-Servant or a politician. He could then occassionally visit the Scheme. It is during these occassional visits that he consults with the SSO, EASI Ltd. and the Co-operative officials on the nature of work he intends to be done for him on his farm. A field uperintendent of either of the organizations he has consulted assisted by a field Supervisor assesses the work and estimates the actual amount it will cost. After which, it consults the Co-operative Society to organize labour and agrees on the date on which the work may be done. And once the occasion has been agreed upon, the plot-owner concerned is informed. He may avail himself if he so wishes. Nevertheless, the work is done for him on the farm whether he is available or not because even the actual supervision of the labour that does the work is done by the officials of the same organization. The immediate financing of the expenses incurred, e.g., the labourers' wages is met by the organization which the farmer consulted. It is this again that makes these occasional visits by this category of farmers quite adequate.

This type of arrangement cover almost all the nature of farm labour needed by the plot-owner, on his plot, be it land preparation, cane planting, weeding, fertilizer application, harvesting or cane transportation to the factory. But another reason why occasional visits are considered adequate by this category of farmers is because of the duration which Cane takes to mature. It takes approximately 22 months for Cane to be mature from the date of its planting. In between this period, the farm activities required by Cane, e.g., weeding and fertilizer application are not continuous activities and this category of farmers feel that such activities can easily be supervised by occasional visits and hence the persistence of this type of arrangement.

The other form of production arrangement is that of the category of farmers who have left on their plots either a Manager/ Care-taker or a relative. Essentially, the nature of organization is similar to that one described above. The difference, however, comes about in view of the fact that in this category of plots an immediate organizer is left on the plot to take care of the organization, although the owner of the plot like in the case of the above category, occasionally visits the plot.

Most of these Managers/Care-takers or relatives are in actual fact the workers of these plot-owners. They have been left on these plots by their owners to take charge of the supervision work on these plots. They, therefore, work as the intermediaries between the Settlement Scheme authorities and the plot-owners, i.e., as those who make the plot-owners aware of what the authorities require in connection with the plot. In this regard they may as well consult with the SSO, EASI Ltd. or the Co-operative Society officials to brief them on the nature of work necessary on the plot. They are also the witnesses of the plot-owners who confirm to them that the actual work required by the plot-owner and promised by the SSO, EASI Ltd. or the Co-operative Society has been performed. However, in normal circumstances, they should be performing the general farm duties required on these plots. Indeed, when the Co-operative Societies bring in labour to work on these farms, they too may join the Society's labourers in carrying out those farm duties.

But the employment relationship between these Managers/Care-takers or the relatives of the plot-owners and the plot-owners is largely determined by the fact that these plot-owners have provided them with accommodation on these plots. For all practical purposes, most of these Managers/Care-takers or the relatives of these plot-owners earn their immediate living on these plots. They have constructed their residential huts on the subsistence plots of these plot-owners. It is on the same piece of land that they have cultivated most of their food-stuffs. Some of them do not have any legal ownership or claim of land elsewhere. And as a result, some of them even live on these plots with the members of their families, i.e. with their wives and children.

Given such relationship, the wages most of them earn is neither adequate nor regular. It either depends on when the plot-owner visits the plot, which might be after several months or it might come in bits whenever the plot-owner visits the plot. And because the plot-owners who engage them do not stay around in the plots to have a direct and constant supervision over them, most of them prefer to sell their labour under the umbrella of the Co-operative Societies or the individual labour organizers on other farms to supplement these meagre and irregular wages. Table VIII illustrates the situation.

Table VIII: LABOURERS' WAGE RATE

LABOURERS WAGE RATES IN KSHS.	FARMERS	
	No.	%
Between KShs. 100-KShs. 150	14	37.8
Between KShs. 151-KShs. 200	11	29.8
Between KShs. 201-KShs. 250	5	13.5
Over KShs. 250	4	10.8
No Response	3	8.1
TOTAL	37	100%

Source: Interviews conducted by the author in the Scheme in 1980.

From Table VIII it may be seen that of the 37 plot-owners who claimed to have their own wage-labour, 14 or 37.8 pay each of their workers in the range of between KShs. 100-150. The other 11 or 29.8% pay each of their workers at the rate of between KShs. 151-200. Only 9 or 23.3% of them claimed to be paying each of their workers at the rate of KShs. 201 and above. But it should be noted, however, that even KShs. 201 and above is still a very meagre wage given the present high cost of living in Kenya.

This group of people, therefore, form part of the labour force which is found to be abundant in the Sugar-belt and is being organized by either the Co-operatives or the individual labour organizers. We deal with this category of labour in the next Chapter.

Finally, there is the category of farmers who live on their plots and personally carry out the organization of cane production on their plots. The majority of this lot are those who were either actually landless at the time of acquiring these plots or those who were merely poor peasants. They go about supervising whatever farm activities take place on their plots and are sometimes involved in actual labouring in them. Very few of them have managed to employ permanent workers. This means that they too rely on the farm inputs and labour provided by the SSO, EASI Ltd. and the Muhoroni Co-operative Society. Consequently, their arrangement is much similar to that of the first category of farmers, of consulting the SSO, EASI Ltd. and the Co-operative Society and waiting to be provided with the farm inputs.

But the reason why this type of production arrangement whereby the farmers remain almost uninvolved in the actual farm duties and have not even taken the initiative to invest in the farm inputs, e.g. tractors, harrowers and labour, can largely be explained by the way in which the State launched cane production in the Scheme. At the time of launching cane production in Muhoroni Scheme, the State acted as the direct agent of international capital, both in the initiation and the promotion of the whole enterprise and thereby alienated the new Settlers from the actual involvement into the production process. And once production was set in motion, this specific form of commodity production was to take its own course which is, not necessarily similar to commodity production in other parts of the country.

The Beginning of Cane Production in Muhoroni: Direct State intervention in the Commodity Production:

The way by which the production process in Muhoroni Scheme was brought under the direct domination of the international capital was through the loans and the Settlement charge which set the basic conditions for alloting farms to the new Settlers. For this purpose, the State provided the political infrastructure through its agencies. According to Nottidge, once land had been purchased by the Central Land Board (CLB), it remained the duty of the Trustees to take appropriate steps to develop Settlement Schemes.[1] In the case of Muhoroni the Trustee charged with that duty was called Sugar

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1 NOTTIDGE, op. cit. p. 5

Settlement Organization (SSO). However, the issuing of letters of allotment was yet to be done by the CLB.

Every incoming Settler was supposed to sign a binding letter of allotment specifying the amount of the Settlement charge and the Land and Development Loan both of which depended on the category of the plot on which the new Settler was being settled. The three A, B and C categories of plots were created through the process in which the planners undertook to transform these former large-scale farms into the small-scale farms which could be suitable for the peasant economy. However, two factors apparently influenced the planners in this process. One, was the target number of the landless and the unemployed to be settled in the area and, two, the permanent improvements which had already been done on the land.

These areas were White-Settlements for at least 40 years and it was obvious that there were some pieces of land upon which permanent improvements had been done in the forms of housing, cattle deeps, trees, etc. For such permanent structures it was argued that large pieces of land should also be curved around them so that an intending Settler who finally moves in could purchase, not only the house, but also large piece of land around it. Indeed, on May 11, 1964, J.H. Angaine, th then Minister for Settlement, announced the Government decision to reserve the former European housing along with 100 acres for a single Settlement plot.[1]

The 'Z' plots, as hey were known, Wasserman notes, were used

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1 WASSERMAN, op. cit. p. 155

not only to prevent the destruction of the homes and to reward high level party faithfuls, but also as a means of providing leadership in the Settlement Schemes and tying the community closer to the government and the Schemes.[1] In the case of Muhoroni, these are the plots which were classified as the category C plots. Apart from the permanent improvements, their sizes range between 50 to 100 acres. And according to one of the longest serving Settlement Officers in Muhoroni, the initial aim behind these plots was to have them developed into ranching Schemes. The category B plots on the other hand are those whose sizes range between slightly over 10 but are below 50 acres of land. Their sizes, apparently is the main difference between them and the C plots, although most of them do not also have the permanent improvements found in the C plots. But like the C plots they were also meant for the rich peasantry and other members of the African middle class. The A plots, on the other hand are those whose sizes range between 10 and slightly above 10 acres of land. They are the ones from which a few landless and the unemployed acquired plots.

The Settlement charge for the category A plots was KShs. 3,700, whereas the Land and Development Loan was Shs. 4,300. And for the Category B plots, the Settlement charge was Shs. 5,600 and the Land and Development Loan was Shs. 7,716. But for the category C plots, it is apparent that these charges and loans depended on the permanent improvements already done and the actual size of the particular plot.

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1 [illegible], op. cit. p. 155

This could have meant, therefore, that the bigger the plot and the more the permanent improvement already done, the higher the Settlement charge and Land Development Loan. But as has been pointed out by the 'Secret Report' of the 'Van Arkadie Mission' of 1960, complaints had been raised to the fact that most of these farms had been purchased in non-competitive prices,[1] implying that some of the new Settlers purchased these plots at prices far much lower than their value. The Report complained that most of these plots were owned by Ministers, Members of Parliament, Permanent Secretaries and Provincial Commissioners and that these owners were not living on them or developing them in a significant way.[2]

Indeed, such a disparity in pricing existed in the case of Muhoroni. For example, in 1965, for the same category C plots, a plot-holder called T. Okello Odongo was charged a Settlement charge of Shs. 64,000 and offered a Land and Development Loan of Shs. 15,436 whereas another plot-holder called C. Opondo Osewe was charged a Settlement charge of Shs. 12,000 with a Land and Development Loan of Shs. 13,610. This was also the case with another plot-holder called R.E. Alai who despite holding a category C plot was charged Shs. 5,600 for Settlement with a loan of Shs. 7,716, both charges being equal to those effected on the category B plot-holders.[3]

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1 WASSERMAN, op. cit. p. 156

2 Ibid. p. 156.

3 The SSO Records in Muhoroni

These Land and Development Loans and the Settlement charges were, however, never offered or expected from these new Settlers in cash. The Land and Development Loan was broken down in terms of the initial farm inputs and infac these materials were supposed to define the nature of the production process and the pattern of life each new Settler would pursue as had been imagined by the planners of these Schemes.

For the category A plot-holders who were offered the Land and Development Loans of Shs. 4,300, Shs. 1,875 was in the form of the initial Cane Establishment; Shs. 255 for fertilizer and cultivation; Shs. 570 for housing, fencing and tools, Shs. 1,100 for 2 dairy cows and Shs. 500 for the first two years capitalized interest. And in the case of the 'new Settlers' whose Land and Development Loan was Shs. 7,716, Shs. 1,875 was in the form of the initial Cane Establishment, Shs. 180 Cane fertilizers; Shs. 75 cultivation; Shs. 3,300 six Dairy Cows; Shs. 500 two Haifers; Shs. 373 Fodder cultivation; Shs. 100 Napper Grass transport and Shs. 913 first two years Capitalized interest.[1]

But for the Category C plot-holders whose Land and Development Loans differed from plot to plot, depending on the permanent improvements, farm size and other factors mentioned above, there seemed to have been a wider latitude of freedom on the choice of the farm materials upon which this loan could be broken down into. For example, out of his Land and Development Loan of Shs. 15,436, Mr. T. Okello-Odongo decided to accept

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1 The SSO Records *op. cit.*

Dairy Cows worth Shs. 9,525; Shs. 1,200 for inter-row cultivation, Shs. 600 for fertilizers and transport and Shs. 4,110 in the form of initial Cane Establishment, whereas Mr. C. Opondo Osewe accepted a breakdown of his Shs. 13,610 Land and Development Loan in the forms of Shs. 8,710 initial Cane Establishment; Shs. 700 Fodder Crops and Shs. 4,200 for the Dairy Cows.[1]

Both the Settlement charge and the Land and Development Loans were supposed to be paid back to the State by the plot-holders within a period of 30 and 10 years respectively from the date of the plot acquisition at the interest rate of 6% p.a. each. And their payments were due after every six months, i.e., twice annually.

Once the Settlement process was complete, the SSO moved in fully equipped to begin the task of transforming these pieces of land into Sugar-Cane Plantations. The organization was very well equipped with all the necessary mechanized farm inputs for cane production. It was equipped with tractors, motor vehicles for its field officers, jembes, pangas, etc. It was also well staffed with the agricultural 'experts'. It started carrying out extensive research on cane production to identify the various cane species which could be most suitable for the Schemes. For this purpose, a Sugar Research Centre had been established at Kibos in Kisumu District.

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1 The SSO Records *op. cit.*

It started cultivating the initial portions of the plots which were to be planted with cane, it harrowed them, provided the initial Cane Seeds and transported Cane Seeds to those portions of the plots which were ready for planting. It organized their weedings, fertilizer application, harvesting them and transported them either to the factory or utilized them again as Cane Seeds for other farmers. Its officers travelled among the farmers, advising them on the forms of farm techniques and encouraged them to take the new enterprise more seriously. So during the initial stages, the SSO performed virtually all the tasks needed by the farmers on the alloted plots.

This, the SSO did by organizing and financing the labour in collaboration with the Muhoroni Co-operative Society under which each and every new Settler had been registered. As it were, every plot-holder was expected to have his farm duties performed through the Co-operative Society. What the farmer had to do when he felt that he had work to be done for him on his plot was to forward his application to the Society, identifying his plot and the nature of the work. The officers of the Society would then organize labour and inform the SSO. The SSO field Superintendent assisted by a field Supervisor would then assess the work and give back their reports which the SSO would use to finance the work. The immediate boss to the field Superintendent is the Executive Controller, an agriculturalist who otherwise does mostly administrative duties including the formulation of the immediate policies on the day-to-day organization of the work with the Scheme. He is answerable directly to the Director of Settlement Schemes under the then Ministry of Lands and Settlement. Most of the field Supervisors are, however, supposed to be Diploma graduates in agriculture from the various agricultural institutions in the country.

In the beginning, the SSO financed the work done on these plots through the Land and Development Loans in the forms into which they had been broken down as has been elaborated above. To facilitate this process, each plot, particularly those of Category A had again been segmented into three portions. According to the arrangement a Category A plot-holder of approximately 10 acres had to reserve his 2.5 acres for residence and subsistence. It was within this 2.5 acres that a farmer was supposed to put up his house, grow his subsistence crops e.g., maize, vegetables, fruits etc., and it was in the same place that he was supposed to rear his livestock. The remaining 7½ acres, segmented into A, B and C portions of 2.5 acres each was to be left exclusively for cane. The SSO was initially only supposed to finance the development of the first A portions to each and every Settler through the Land and Development Loans. Thereafter, any farmer who intended to develop the remaining portions had either to use his own means or apply for further loans which have come to be known as the Maintenance Loans.

Maintenance Loans are the loans which a plot-holder intending to develop his undeveloped portion of the plot may apply for. They are also given to the farmers for other minor farm inputs and labour e.g., fertilizers and weeding. Unlike the Land and Development Loans which were given once and at a fixed rate depending on the category of the plot, Maintenance Loans may be applied for seasonally. Indeed, there are some farmers who manage to acquire this type of loan even twice seasonally.

These Maintenance Loans are also chanelled through the SSO although their sources are various. Infact most of the agencies of the state finance capital participate in administering these loans. Such agencies include the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), the Commercial Banks and the Co-operatives. But apart from these agencies of state capital, these loans are also provided by the agencies of International Capital. The Mehta Group, for instance, has contributed quite a large share of these Maintenance Loans.

This, however, did not apply to the Category B and C plot-holders. It seems that this category of farmers reserved their rights to develop their farms in anyway they felt although through consultation with the SSO and the Ministry of Agriculture.

It is apparent that the first cane proceeds which were harvested from these plots before Muhoroni Factory started producing sugar, i.e., between 1966-1967 were mainly utilized as Cane Seeds to other farmers whose plots had not been planted with Cane. However, even at this stage, it is the SSO which transported these Cane Seeds to those plots which needed them. And when the factory started crushing Cane in 1967, it is again the SSO tractors which were utilized to transport Cane to the factory. In Short, from the beginning, it is the State which provided the political or administrative infrastructure in the form of SSO through which these supposed to be peasant production was broken into. This went on until 1970 when it was decided to form a broad co-operative union to encompass the entire Sugar-belt. But at this stage, the SSO was also satisfied that at least every plot-holder had had his first portion of the plot planted with cane.

<u>An Attempt to involve the New Settlers in the Production Process:</u>

<u>State intervention through the Co-operative Union Movement:</u>

When the SSO intervened in the Schemes, its immediate pre-occupation was to survey the area; create plots into various categories; administer loan provisions to the farmers; advise the farmers on cane production; organize and finance labour and to recover the initial loans it had advanced to these farmers. It was being argued by the SSO planners, therefore, that the SSO had done most of these duties; i.e. it had set the process of cane production within the Scheme into motion. The only pre-occupation it was going to be left with was to recover the loans. The exercise did not require the large staff the Organization had then. The size of the staff would be reduced to a smaller number to carry out this duty.

However, the other side of the argument was actually the need to have the new Settlers actively involved into the whole enterprise of Cane production in the Scheme. The initial direct involvement of the SSO into the whole business had alienated the new Settlers, most of whom began to view these farms merely as 'State farms' to which the only binding thing they had with them was the letter of allotment they had signed at the time of acquiring them. And once the Settlement charges and the Land and Development Loans had been paid off, they woul acquire title deeds and thereby gain exclusive rights over their plots. In effect they felt that at the moment they were more or less leasing them to the State and International Capital.

These arguments encouraged the idea of the formation of the Sugar-Belt Co-operative Union (SBCU) in 1970. The SBCU was to take over most of the functions which had hitherto been performed by the SSO except for the loan recoveries. Arrangements were that since each and every farmer had been registered or was supposed to be under his Scheme's Co-operative Society, it was the Societies which were to become affiliate members of the SBCU. The Union would employ its own agricultural field officers, it would have its own tractors and trailors both for cultivation, harrowing and transportation. It would organize labour or in fact it would have its fully permanently employed labour under their pay-rolls which would weed, apply fertilizers, load cane on the trailors and transport them to the factory. The SSO would, however, still be at standby to negotiate loans with the international agencies for the Co-operatives.

The SBCU was indeed launched in 1970 fully equipped to take up the challenge. It was equipped with the cultivating tractors, harrows, transportation trailors and it provided motor-bikes to its field officers. And the SSO actually stayed around to carry-on with the loan recoveries from the farmers..

What, however, is often ignored is the fact that in Capitalist dominant social formations, Co-operative Unions have never been successful agents for development to their members. On the contrary, they have largely been agents of primitive accumulation for their management on the one hand and on the other hand they are mere instruments through which States syphon surpluses from the peasant economies.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the history of the SBCU like all other histories of most co-operative unions in this country was dismal. After a short period of about three years, this Union collapsed. Efforts in 1973 to have it re-organized and strengthened failed to materialize. Poor management coupled with embezzelment of funds pushed it into financial bankruptcy which finally led to its collapse.

It collapsed so fast that only after a short period of its collapse, not even the physical traces of its existence could be found. Once again the SSO was being called upon to re-absorb these duties. It is apparent that the SSO had by then lost both the psychological and physical orientation to re-absorb its duties. Most of its machines had either depreciated or had been transfered to other Settlement Schemes within the country.

The most pressing problem, however, at the time was that of transportation. By mid-70s, virtually every plot in the Scheme had cane on it. Some of the plots had even had their second crops harvested. This means that the supply of cane to the factory was very promising. Coupled with this was the fact that the Mehta Group of Companies which manages Muhoroni Factory had expanded the factory to its full capacity. The factory which had began its production with a capacity of 600 tons of Cane per day in 1967 was by now crushing Cane at its full capacity of 1,200 tons of Cane per day.

The implication of this is that quite an extensive amount of investment had taken place. And hence quite a large amount of surplus had been generated. Any interference with cane transportation to the factory was going to jeopardize the position of the capitalists, i.e. the Mehta Group. But the capitalists were not going to sit idle and watch their investments turn into ruin. Indeed, the rationale behind every capitalist investment is to extract surpluses.[1] This problem prompted the Mehta Group to begin thinking seriously in terms of transportation. If need be, they would have even began investing in transportation.

This interlude provided an opportunity for the emergence and direct involvement of private capital into the Sugar business in the Muhoroni Scheme and in all other Schemes in the Sugar-belt.

The Introduction of the expanded Private Capital in the Production Process:

The Emergence of Large Private Cane transporters in the Scheme:

Once this cane agro-business got under way within the Settlement Schemes, it gave 'false' indications of its being lucrative. Most plot-holders through external sources of Incomes, i.e. incomes not actually earned from the cane proceeds of their first harvests, got induced to expand their plots with Cane. Obviously, this led to high short-term demand of the mechanized farm equipments e.g., tractors, harrows, trailors etc., above their supply. This inturn encouraged individual private investments in trac ors, trailors, harrows etc. Most

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1 "------ this bou less greed after riches, this passionate chase after exch ge-value, is common to the Capitalist and the Miser; t while the miser is merely a capitalist gone mad the cap talist is a rational miser" Marx, *Capital*, I, op. cit. p 151.

farmers who managed to get any reasonable incomes from their first harvests immediately started approaching financing agencies to negotiate for loans to purchase tractors and trailors.

But that was not all. Infact, since most of the plot-holders were of the 'middle class' social background, some of them could still manage to purchase these tractors and trailors without necessarily relying on their incomes from the cane proceeds. In any case cultivation and transportation was soon going to turn into a lucrative business. Even those who did not possess any plot in the Schemes were getting induced with these demands and were purchasing tractors. Soon these private tractors and trailors started flooding the Sugar-Belt. They got involved in all manner of duties including cultivation, harrowing and transportation.

Consequently, when the SBCU collapsed and with the SSO not in a position to re-absorb its duties, the Mehta Group had the easiest task of merely organizing these private tractors and trailers to transport for it Cane to the factory. In 1976, the Mehta Group took up this task. Most of these private tractors got registered with the factory for the purposes of transportation. The SSO in collaboration with the co-operative societies could organize labour needed for harvesting the Cane. Most of the tractor owners have employed their own loaders, i.e., that category of workers whose main duty is to load these trailers with cane. Once cane has been harvested, a registered tractor with the company is dispatched to go and fetch it. The rate of payment depends on the number of tons each tractor transports to the factory each day. Logically, this depends on the number of trips a tractor makes and hence the distance the tractor travels and the speed at whcih it is loaded.

But the tractor owners transfer most of the expenses of running their tractors to their workers, i.e., the drivers of these tractors and cane loaders. The process is simple: most of these drivers and cane loaders are paid according to the number of tons of cane they deliver to the factory and hence the number of trips they make from the farms to the factory with cane and actually recorded as accepted by the factory.

Transportation business has managed to be very lucrative and most tractor owners have managed to thrive from it. To this, one point needs to be made. Although transportation business was not the main aim behind the establishment of sugar industry within the Scheme, it has turned out to be more lucrative than even the growing of cane itself. This has now led to a situation whereby most people within the Lake Basin even those without farms in the Scheme, to re-direct and concentrate their investments in transportation. In other words, transportation business is becoming more successful out of sugar industry than the growing of cane itself.

It might now be possible for any petty-bourgeouisie who might not even be having a plot in the Sugar-Belt or any connection with the factory to invest into business and to develop into a successful capitalist. A good example of such men is a Mr. Shariff who operates one of the most elaborate transport businesses in Muhoroni. Mr. Shariff entered into the business during its initial stages. He now manages a very big fleet of tractors, trailors, and harrows which are being used for the purposes of not only cultivating, harrowing and transportation, but also for transporting Molasses for the brewing of the African alcohol, gin, "Chang'aa".

An Attempt to Prop up a Stable 'Middle Peasantry' or a Class of Agricultural Capitalists: A Success or a Failure?

The aim of the Scheme when it was created was to prop up a stable 'middle peasantry' which could replace the previous European mixed farmers of the Colonial economy or even to create a class of Agricultural Capitalists particularly on the B and C plots.

According to one of the longest serving SSO officers interviewed on the Scheme, the items into which the initial Land and Development Loan was broken, were actually provided to the farmers. In the case of housing and fencing, both the iron sheets and barbed wire were provided. The initial portion of the plots were cultivated. Cane seeds, fertilizers and dairy cows were also provided.

When providing these materials, it was imagined that a Category A farmer, for instance, moving into the farm would build himself a small iron roofed house on his subsistence portion of 2.5 acres, fence it and within it rear his Dairy Cows. The Dairy Cows, it was hoped would after some period reproduce themselves to provide milk both for the farmers' consumption and even for sale. The initial 2.5 of the remaining 7.5 acres meant for cane production would be cultivated for the farmer and Cane Seeds provided against the initial loans. After about 2 years, from the date of Settlement, a farmer would harvest his first Cane proceeds and with the incomes accruable to him from these proceeds, he would pay the first instalments of the Settlement charge and the loan. From them, he would develop the remaining portion of his farm with Cane. He would apply for the maintenance loans and he would even suplement them with the incomes earned from the milk of his dairy cows. In short, the ground was being set for the emergence of a rich small-scale farmer. And in the case of the Category B and C plot-holders, given the freedom they had in developing their plots, it was expected, the majority of them would emerge as agricultural capitalists. The start could not have been more false.

From the outset, it became very clear that these Settlement charges and loans had brought the new Settlers under the grip of both the State and international capital independent of their will. Both the Settlement charge and the Land and Development Loans tied them to the international capital via the State for a minimum period of between ten and thirty years respectively. And the Maintenance Loans apart from tying them to International capital and State capital, has acted as a mechanism for reproducing this connection.

Huge deductions which began to be effected against the 'Settlers' shortly after approximately two years of plot acquisition and some of which even became cumulative because some of the farmers had not even managed to harvest any proceeds from their farms made it quite difficult for most of these farmers to take-off. In the case of Category C farmers, it had been discovered that most of them were neither living on their farms nor developing them in any significant way. The Van Arkadie 'Secret Report' of 1966 had added that loan repayments on these plots were worse than any other type of Settlement with some of the most prominent of these plot owners also being the worst defaulters.[1]

The whole process has, therefore, placed most of the plot-holders into a vicious circle, a circle in which a farmer oscillates between the state and international capital and a circle whose breaking out of, he has found out to be very difficult.

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1 WASSERMAN, op. cit. p. 156

Most of the farmers who realized this predicament in the early stages of this development got discouraged and have since then ceased to take any keen interest in the development taking place on their farms. But some of the farmers have no alternative. These plots provide their only homes and provide perhaps, their only source of income . They have to stay on them and to struggle to make a living on them just as any other poor peasant involved in production for the sake of subsistence.

However, there is a small minority of these farmers who thrive from this form of commodity production. They have managed to improve their standard of living. They manage to provide better education to their children,they have purchased a tractor, housed and clothed themselves and the members of their families relatively well and they have managed to open up some businesses. Nevertheless, this category is indeed a minority.

We may argue that other factors held constant, three major factors play an important role in the differentiation process taking place within a peasantry involved in petty-commodity production and hence defining the social content of the various categories emer ing out of this differentiation. The three factors are: (i) the amount of investments a peasant places on the inst uments of production,(ii) the amount of wage-labour each peasant farmer involves in production and (iii) the amount of land ceased in active production.

After more than one and half decades since the emergence of this agro-industrial complex in Muhoroni, only 7% of the farmers within the Scheme claimed any ownership of those instruments of production which would define them as having progressed. The 7% owned tractors and harrows. About 81% owned mere hoes, pangas and jembes. This means that most of these farmers hire tractors and harrows. Indeed about 94% of the farmers who responded to this question justified it even further by admitting that they neither borrowed these tractors and harrows from relatives or friends. Table IX reveals this phenomenon more succinctly.

Table IX: IMPLEMENTS OWNED BY FARMERS

IMPLEMENTS OWNED	FARMERS	
	No.	%
Tractor/Harrow	5	7
Hoe, Jembe, Ox-Plough	7	10
Hoe, Panga, Jembe	58	81
No Response	2	3
TOTAL	72	100

Source: Interviews conducted by author in the Scheme in 1980.

About 51% of the farmers admitted employing wage labour. But this figure must take into consideration the fact that nearly all the work being done within the Schemes is done by wage labourers organized largely by the Co-operative Societies and the EASI Ltd. Furthermore, it must take into consideration the fact that nearly a half of the farmers are 'absentee' farmers who have left behind on their plots Care-takers, relatives and watchmen who are indeed their workers, but who because of lack of close supervision from their immediate employers, offer their labour on other farms through the Co-operative Unions and the EASI Ltd. The implication, therefore, is that the rate of employment of permanent wage labour by these farmers, solely for agricultural purposes is quite minimal.

Neither is the size of land actively engaged in cane production by these farmers a convincing factor of their social mobility. In the first place, inspite of the immediate factors which might have influenced the Survey team creating plots in this Scheme, when it finally completed its work, it discovered that over 90% of the 439 plots created were those of Category A. The possibility of some Settlers in this category acquiring more than one plot not withstanding, what this means is that most of the farmers in Muhoroni are those of Category A. Even in terms of the total acreage they occupy, this category of farmers is still dominant. According to the Economic Review of Agriculture of 1975, the Muhoroni Nucleus Estate occupies 2024 Hectares; large-scale farms 1214 Hectares, and the small-scale farms 6475 Hectares; all representing 20.8; 12.5 and 66.7% respectively.[1]

But about 40 of the farmers admitted that their pieces of land under Cane at the moment do not exceed 5 acres. An

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1 Economic Review of Agriculture, Vol. 7, No. 1 1975 p. 12

equal number or percentage of farmers also claimed that they had between 6 and 10 acres under cane. However, about 65% of this latter category admitted that their pieces of land under cane may not exceed 8 acres. Only a meagre 13% of the farmers claimed that at present their pieces of land under cane may exceed 10 acres. We must, however, bear in mind that the amount of land under cane is independent of the type of cane in question. It does not specify whether the 5, 10 or more acres of land is under cane upon which some hope may be placed, for it is not uncommon to find these specified acres of land to be having over-mature cane, burnt cane, un-weed and neglected cane.

We may therefore, conclude that since the establishment of the sugar industry, the above mentioned three factors have served to prove the stagnation or even the deterioration of the middle peasantry within the Scheme. This may be explained by the following factors:

To begin with, most of these farmers did not use the iron sneets provided, to build themselves houses within the subsistence plots, neither did they use the barbed wire to fence them. According to the longest serving Settlement Officers interviewed on the Scheme, the majority of them must have used these items to build themselves houses in their original homes to which 54% of them still claimed close attachment. For the dairy cows, it was only a short period before most or all of them were wiped out of the Schemes. They either died because of lack of the deeping facilities or they were stolen from their owners by the Kipsigis and Nandi people bordering the Schemes. Cattle rustling had been a common phenomenon especially within the Schemes created between the bordering peoples.

For example, in 1966 when Mr. Mokene Ombese complained in Parliament of the constant raids by the Kipsigis people of the grade cows belonging to the Kisii who had been settled in Sotick Settlement Scheme between Kisii and Kericho Districts, the then Minister for Home Affairs Mr. Arap Moi replied that a similar problem was prevalent throughout the country. It was found between Kajiado and Ukambani, between the Masai and Kuria and between the Kisii and the Kipsigis.[1] And so it could be found between the Muhoroni Scheme Settlers and the Kipsigis and the Nandi.

But even if these cows had survived, marketing facilities seemed to have been a major problem during the initial stages to those who had been settled into various Settlement Schemes. The implication being that most of these farmers might not have gained very much from their dairy products.[2]

The major snag, however, came after the first two years of the Settlement when the first instalments of the Settlement charge and Land and Development Loans were to be deducted.

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1 HANSARD, 1966 Vol. 10 pt. 1 p. 826

2 See for instance, [illegible]. Anyieni's complaints of lack of Arrangements for Marketing facilities to the 'New Settlers' of the Settlement Schemes in HANSARD, 1963, Vol. [illegible] p. 566.

Apart from the first 2 years capitalized interest attached to the Land and Development Loan, there were other numerous deductions. A complete list of deductions for a Category A farmer, for example included: Cane Establishment; Annual Levy; Transportation and Harvest charges; Loan Repayment; Retention; Co-operative Cess; Fertilizer, Equipment Hire and Water charges.

In most cases, the amount deducted for each item fluctuated. In the case of quantifiable items, e.g. Fertilizer and Cane Seeds it depends on the amount used by the farmer. For Transportation and Harvests, it depends on the tonnage of the Cane either harvested or transported. And for Loan Repayments and Co-operative Cess, it depends on the number of outstanding instalments not yet paid. But the amount of Annual Levy, Retention and Water charge to the SSO seems to have been fixed at Shs. 750; 650 and 96 respectively.

For example, a typical complete list of deductions for a Category A farmer in a single harvest is something as follows: Cane Establishment, Shs. 1682; Annual Levy, Shs. 750; Transport, Shs. 4004.15; Harvesting, Shs. 1167.85; Co-operative Cess, Shs. 100; Fertilizer, Shs. 560; Advance, Shs. 1050; Loan Repayment, Shs. 400 and Water Charge Shs. 96.[1]

Consequently, after the first two years, most of the farmers seemed to have been caught up into a deficit. This

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1 Mr. Thomas Cadu's Farm Records at the SSO Headquarters Mohoroni.

prompted most Members of Parliament especially those who hailed from the areas where Settlement Schemes had been established, to plead with the government to at least waver some of these loans. In 1966, for example, the Member of Parliament for Butere Constituency, Mr. Martin Shikuku, complained in Parliament that some of the people who had been settled in Western Province were finding it difficult to pay back their instalments after the six-months period and that they were as a result selling their plots to those with money and "were running away".[1] The then Assistant Minister for Lands and Settlement, Mr. Gachago who replied Mr. Shikuku did not deny the claim. He infact affirmed that he was aware. What he said he was not aware of, however, was whether the 'New Settlers' were selling their plots and were "running away".

Prior to this, Mr. Ronald Ngala, had gone as far as tabling a motion in Parliament to this effect. He moved:

> "That in view of the need for immediate development on farms that are newly acquired or being developed through the Central Land Board, Agricultural Land Bank or Agricultural Finance Corporation, this House urges the government to grant a five-year grace period before repayment of such loan commence inorder to enable the large or small-scale farmers to prepare themselves for the instalments."[2]

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1 HANSARD. 1966 Vol 9 pt. 1 p. 397

2 HANSARD. 1965 Vol 6 p. 1140

After a long debate in Parliament, this motion was passed and it was supposed to be formulated into Law. If it became a Law then in principle, it would have meant that most of the farmers in Muhoroni would have stayed for at least five years from the date of plot acquisition before they could have started paying back the loans. Unfortunately, the government refused to formulate this Motion into Law. Sometimes later during the same year, a certain Member of Parliament, Mr. Makone, enquired from the Ministry of Lands and Settlement how long it was going to take to implement the motion which had been passed in the House authorising the government to grant a five year period of grace to farmers before starting to repay the loan.

To this, the then Assistant Minister for Lands and Settlement, Mr. Gachago, responded by saying that "although the Motion was passed by the House, the government rejected it all through and put it clearly to the House that to grant a five-year moratorium would be disastrous, it would cause a grave set-back to the attitude of repayment which is improving after much hard work by the organization concerned."[1] He went on to state further that, "the government has therefore not found a way of implementing the Motion into Law, and at any rate, is not bound to do so by the terms of the Constitution".[2]

Given this poor start, therefore, most farmers began to involve themselves into further loans, i.e. the Maintenance Loans, to improve the remaining portions of their plots. But

1 HANSARD, 1965 Vol. 7 p. 874
2 Ibid. p. 874.

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1 HANSARD, 1965 Vol. 7 p. 874
2 Ibid. p. 874.

even these Maintenance Loans have not been distributed equitably among the farmers. The SSO Annual Report of 1979 which revealed this fact said in part:

> "It does appear that there was a tendency to favour certain cadres of applicants more than the others, which realized a situation where the well to do became more richer whereas the others remained stagnant."[1]

On top of these, a number of complaints which are mainly managerial have also been lodged with the government.

In 1966, for example, Mr. Okuto Bala enquired in Parliament from the Ministry of Co-operative Societies whether he was aware of the hardships experienced by African Co-operative Societies in Central Nyanza in transporting of their sugar cane to the milling factories and if so, what action he was taking to provide lorries, either for hire in the form of loans, repayable in a reasonable period. In reply to this question, the then Minister for Co-operatives, Mr. Ronald Ngala, insisted that he was not aware of hardships as such. He however, admitted that he was aware of a short period transport problems owing to Weather Conditions".[2]

Again in 1967, Mr. Bala referred to the same transportation problems in Parliament when contributing to a Motion tabled to approve a loan by a German Firm to build another Sugar Factory

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1 SSO Annual Report, 1979 p. V as adopted from the Preliminary Results of a Research being conducted by the Danish International Agency for Development, entitled: Agro-Industrial Production and Socio-Economic Development, 1980. MOGENS B.H.

2 HANSARD, 1966 Vol. 10 Pt. 1 p. 1304

within the Schemes. He said:

> "Last time when the Minister visited the area I was with him together with some of my colleaques. He heard that in that particular area, the majority of farmers were complaining that they were asked to plant Sugar Cane without actually planning how the Sugar Cane was to be transported to the factory."[1]

It is apparent that by 1969 the government had recognized the existence of the transportation problems. And in 1970 an Economic Survey by the government officially admitted the presence of the problem when it said in part:

> "The problem of transporting Cane to the factories noted in last year's Economic Survey has not yet been completely solved although considerable progress has been made. The first phase of a K£ 2.8 million Sugar roads development programme was nearly completed by the end of the year and a more efficient transport system was operating."[2]

Although these complaints do not indicate precisely which section of the entire transportation system the problem was, i.e., whether the problem was as a result of poor weather roads or whether it was because of scarcity of tractors and lorries, they, however, indicate a definite existence of the transportation problems. These delays in transporting the Cane to the factory in turn created further problems. The untransported cane was now left in the fields either to over-mature or to rot.

For example, in October 1980, one of the local dailies quoted the Co-operative Officer for Nyanza Province, Mr. Abner Ochieng as saying that "an estimated 1.2 million of tonnes of

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1 HANSARD, 1967 Vol. 12 p. 2725

2 Economic Survey, 1970 p. 65

Cane worth about Shs. 160 million in the Nyanza Sugar-Belt Co-operative Union are over-mature and are now rotting in the fields, and that as a result farmers were finding it difficult to repay their loans.[1] According to Ochieng, problems facing Cane farmers in the Sugar-Belt were mainly due to poor planning. "People kept planting more and more Sugar-Cane while roads were not planned in various Cane growing areas."[2]

Given these problems a stiff competition among the farmers to have their Canes transported to the factory ensued. According to the recommendations of the SSO and the EASI Ltd., Cane to be delivered to the factory may be burnt before it is harvested. This is meant to clear them of weeds, snakes and other wild animals which might be residing in them, so as to ensure 'secure' and easy work to the harvestors. So before a farmer harvests his Cane he needs to make an application for a "firing order" with the SSO or the EASI Ltd. Once permission is granted a farmer may set fire to his Cane and wait for the Co-operative Society to send labour to harvest it. Cane harvested through such a process has a higher probability of being accepted by the factory.

But there are also some accidental cases, i.e., case where mature Cane or Cane about to be mature get burnt.

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1 Daily Nation, October 21st, 1980

2 Ibid

The SSO or the EASI may listen to the complaints of their owners. More so if the owner of such a cane happened to have loans against which he is expected to pay from the proceeds of that harvest. In such cases applications already received and granted may be postponed to avoid congestions at the factory. This practice has led most of the farmers to set fire to their Canes under the pretext of accidents. It is also true, however, that some farmers get their canes burnt as a result of personal conflicts among themselves. This practice has also contributed to large amount of losses being experienced by the Sugar-Cane farmers in the Scheme.

In 1967, for example, when Mr. Bala asked the then Minister for Lands and Settlement to tell the Parliament how many acres of Sugar-Cane were burnt in Muhoroni and Koru Settlement Schemes from January 1966 up to January 1967 and how many estimated tons of Sugar-Cane it constituted, Mr. Angaine, the then Minister for Lands and Settlement, stated that, 101 acres of Sugar-Cane were burnt in the Muhoroni Complex from January 1966 to January 1967 and 2,525 tons were the estimated losses as a result of burning.[1]

But whichever way these problems are viewed, they basically question the nature of planning involved in the production of Sugar within the Schemes. Unlike industrial products,

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1 HANSARD, 1967 Vol. 11 p. 841

agricultural products can sometimes be over-produced beyond the intended supply. This is precisely because production in the agricultural industry tends to be influenced mostly by the natural factors over which man has limited control.

Given a reasonable amount of rainfall in any one year, Cane, for example may be over-produced to the extent that it outstripes the crushing capacity of the factory. This may indeed lead to multiple problems being felt at the various branches of production of that particular commodity. The problem may manifest itself within the transportation section. But that may only be so, if the amount of labour for harvesting the cane and crushing capacity of the factory is capable of meeting the total amount of Cane produced in a given year.

On the other hand, if there is enough transport and a minimal crushing capacity to cope with the amount of cane produced, then the problem will manifest itself at the Crushing Section, if there is enough labour to harvest it. This also applies to labour, if it is short in supply should the other two factors be held constant. But the problem may even go beyond these factors to include the nature of roads utilized for transportation. If they are impassable during the rainy seasons, then it means that there will be problems in transporting Cane from the farms to the factory in time, during the rainy seasons.

However, with a well integrated plan these inter-related factors may be harmonized to achieve an intended production target without incurring unnecessary losses in any particular section of the production process. Unfortunately, in the case of Muhoroni, these factors have not been harmonized. The SSO seems to be working very independently. The major agencies involved in the Sugar Industry within the Schemes, i.e., the SSO, the EASI Ltd., the Co-perative Unions and other various government Ministries seem to be working independently on their own without close consultation with one another. Transportation is largely in the hands of private entrepreneurs and hence their control either by the SSO, the Co-operative Unions or the EASI Ltd., under whose company they are registered is very minimal. These problems beset sugar production within the Schemes, and they have persisted to this day. Indeed, they have largely contributed to the failure of these Schemes to prop up the rich agricultural middle class or the agricultural capitalists.

But to confine our arguments and explanations to these maladministrative tendencies, particularly to transportation from which, it appears, other related problems originate, is to simplify the whole study of commodity production within a specific form of Monopoly Capital.

For example, despite persistent complaints from the farmers and their leaders that transportation facilities are scarce, the factory has continued to receive enough Cane and to meet its crushing capacity of 1,200 tons of Cane per day except on the rare occasions when it might be having its own technical problems.

Neither, has there been complaints from the factory management to these effects to qualify the farmers' and their leaders' complaints. The implication is that the problem is much wider and more complex than actually meets the eye.

Central to any form of commodity production is the problem of surplus generation and hence its distribution. The peasantry engaged in any form of petty-commodity production might be very successful in contributing to the generation of surpluses, but whether the share of this surplus it appropriates is capable of promoting it to that category of rich, middle or to a class of agricultural capitalists largely depends on the nature and number of agencies of capital which struggle with it in the process of these surpluses distribution.

Within the Sugar Settlement Schemes, the way in which monopoly capital intervened, the way in which it formed an alliance with state capital and hence the number of the agencies of capital which struggl with the plot-holders in the appropriation and distribution of surpluses generated from Sugar has made it rather difficult for the plot-holders within these Schemes to appropriate enough share of these surplses which would have ensured their social mobility. At the international level, there is the FASI Ltd., and the Wo ld Bank. At the national level there is the SSO, the Co-operative Unions; the private transporters and the tate itself through its various forms of taxation. All the e agencies have converged together within the Schemes and are now waging a struggle with the plot-holders and agricultural workers and hence defining the pattern in which surplus generated from Sugar is distributed.

It is no wonder, therefore, that immediately after the first harvests, the plot-holders realized that the prices they were being offered for a ton of Cane were not economical and hence were not going to make it possible for them to prosper. Through their representatives,in Parliament they launched a campaign for an increase.[1] In 1968, Mr. Bala complained to the Ministry of Lands and Settlement to review the Levy deduction of Shs. 750 and Shs. 190 for the high and low density Schemes respectively because these levies were contributory factors to the zero returns of Sugar-Cane farmers.[2] Mr. Malinda, the then Assistant Minister for Lands and Settlement who responded to this question contended, however, that it was not true that some farmers get nil return after harvesting their Sugar-Cane. "The truth is that such farmers pay off their outstanding debts with the proceeds from their Sugar-Cane which, in some cases, deplete these proceeds to the last shilling.[3] In 1969, Mr. Bala repeated the same appeal. This time he went further to enquire whether there was any other Settlement Scheme in Kenya which paid Levy and if there was how much it paid.[4] In the same year, Mr. Bala again demanded to know the way in which the surplus per ton of Cane was being distributed between the EASI, the State and the plot-holder.[5] Not satisfied with the way in which the

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1. HANSARD, 1966 Vol. 10 pt. 1 p. 1304
2. HANSARD, 1968 Vol. 16 pt. 3 p. 5030
3. HANSARD, 1969 Vol. 18, p. 280.
4. HANSARD, 1969 Vol. 18 p. 289
5. HANSARD, 1969 Vol. 18 p. 214

government was handling the issue, Mr. Bala now tabled a Motion in Parliament calling for the institution of a Commission of inquiry to investigate the way in which the Settlement Schemes were being administered.[1]

All these complaints were pointing out that in the entire process of surplus appropriation the farmer was and is still being cheated. Indeed, the farmer has been and is still being cheated and given the trend of this development, it is highly doubtful whether he will prosper.. Table X demonstrates this phenomenon

According to Table X, the rate of Sugar consumption in the country has since 1965 remained higher than production. Secondly, the consumption rate has continued to increase above that of production both relatively and absolutely. Thirdly, given the changes which tend to take place in the consumption patterns of most of the households in this country, Sugar seems to have become no longer a luxury but a necessity. At the same time, population is steadily increasing. All these factors combined have made it possible for the retail prices of Sugar to increase tremendously relative to the international market. Mr. Odera Odada who carried out a research in the Sugar Industry in 1979 observed that at the moment a Kenyan consumer pays much higher for his kilogram of Sugar than the price being offered at the international market.[3]

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1 HANSARD, 1969, Vol. 18 pp. 263-64

2 Although Table X has not been given a rigorous statistical analysis in relation to the theory of value vis-a-vis, the trend of International economic development, as it were, it may still suffice to portray and justify the case we are putting forward.

3 ODADA, J.E.O. "The Role of the Sugar Industry in the Kenyan Economy: 'A case study of the Lake Victoria Basin." Seminar Paper on Lake Victoria Basin No. 4, IDS, 1979.

Table: X

CANE PRODUCTION IN MUHORONI: 1965-1978

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Production of Sugar/ 1000 tons	29.1	36.4	60.4	81.5	115.0	125.3	123.9	88.0	139.7	164.3	159.6	167.1	180.8	201.0
Consumption of Sugar/1000 tons	112.3	121.4	121.4	132.5	142.0	157.6	188.2	192.5	215.4	224.6	195.3	179.2	198.2	-
Marketed output of Sugar Cane 1000 tons	515	515	706	918	130[illegible]	1451	1378	1062	1545	1719	1655	1653	1888	2349
Price per ton Cane to the producers KShs.		40	40	45	45	45	45	50	52	62	89	105	133	133
Production by Factory Muhoroni 1000 tons	-	0.7	18.4	20.3	28.7	33.0	34.2	27.0	32.6	28.5	26.4			42.3
State Revenue from Sugar Excise Duty Mill KShs.							54.6	38.8	61.6	72.5	70.4	120.4	180.8	210.0

Source: Adopted from the Preliminary Results of a Research being conducted by DANIDA "Agro-Industrial Production and Socio-Economic Development" MOGENS, B.H., 1980

Yet these increases have not been reciprocated to the Sugar Cane farmers within the Schemes at the same rates. While it is true that the gross prices offered to the farmers per ton of Cane delivered has been increasing, it has, however, tended to stagnate during some years, particularly between 1968 and 1972. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether these increases have been on the relative terms i.e., relative to the amount of revenue the government is earning from the sale of sugar. On the contrary, the state revenues from sugar and the production of the Muhoroni Factory and hence its absolute incomes have tended to increase steadily year after year.

This trend of development has led to a serious problem within the Settlement Scheme in relation to the Sugar-Cane production. Most farmers have been frustrated and as a result, there is an apparent decline in Sugar-Cane production from the out-growers within the Schemes. In December 1980, for example,, the then Chairman of the Kenya Sugar Authority Mr. I.S. Cheluget was reported in one of the local dailies as saying that although the World Market for Kenya's Sugar looks bright in the next ten years, an acute shortage of Sugar-Cane is feared during the 1981/82 period. Mr. Cheluget noted specifically that there was likelihood of a substantial shortfall in the Cane supply in the following year in Muhoroni and Miwani factories unless certain recommendations which the Sugar Authority had made to the government were implemented without delay.[1] And in the same

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1 The Standard, 20th December 1980

month, the Member of Parliament for the area Mr. Onyango Midika, also claimed that the small-scale Sugar Cane farmers in the Nyanza Sugar Belt had decided to abandon Sugar farming and were now utilizing their field as grazing land because the World Bank loans which had been expected to finance farm improvements and the expansion of the three factories in Nyanza had not materialized.[1]

These declines have, however, been obscured by the developments taking place in other Sugar factories in the Sugar-Belt. These include factories at Mumias, Nzoia in Western Province and at Awendo in South Nyanza District. This was proved by the above statement by Mr. Cheluget which seems to have contradicted what he had said in 1979. In 1979, Mr. Cheluget had said that a Sugar-Cane supply prevails in the Nyanza and Western Provinces, and that factories for crushing the Cane in the area had more Cane than they could handle at the moment despite the fact that they operated at full capacity and as a result, factories could not accept more Cane.[2]

But be that as it may, declines in Sugar-Cane production particularly among the out-growers within the Schemes feeding Muhoroni factory of which Muhoroni Scheme is one was confirmed in September 1980 by the then EASI Ltd. out-growers Manager, Mr. Omala at one of the meetings of the District Development Committee concerned with the Settlement Schemes.[3]

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1 Sunday Nation, 28th December 1980

2 The Standard, 3rd December, 1979

3 DDC Meeting of 25th September 1980

At the moment, the yearly mean production of the Category C farmers in Muhoroni is estimated at 259 tons. For the Category A farmers is 71.3 tons, with a median of 64 tons per year. And for both categories combined, it is estimated at a mean of 97.5 with a median of 65 tons per year. This gives a mean and median distribution of the net-revenues for the Category A farmers of Shs. 2,623 and Shs. 2,100 per year respectively.

How Does this Social Category Survive?

Farmers in Muhoroni Settlement Schemes who grow Sugar-Cane do not grow it for the purposes of chewing it. They may chew it, but first and fore most it is grown as a commodity. As a commodity, the farmers who grow it and are hence involved in the whole enterprise of commodity production are expected to depend on it for their livelihood. They are expected to be largely dependent on the incomes which are earned from these proceeds to educate their children, to cloth them, to feed them, to shelter them and even to invest a part of it in the instruments of production. It is its being a commodity which explains why most of the plot-holders turned even their subsistence plots of 2.5 acres into Sugar-Cane immediately production had been set into motion.

But the picture of the whole process as potrayed above is very gloomy. It becomes even gloomier when we take into consideration the fact that most of these plot-holders have very large families. And the majority of the members of these families are "dependants", i.e., below 15 years of age.

About 78% of these plot-holders have the members of their families concentrated within this category. Over 57% claimed that none of their family members earns any wage. And the 60% of these plot-holders who admitted the possession of other pieces of land elsewhere, submitted that those pieces of land are also engaged in Cash-Cropping. The implication being that for their foodstuffs they largely depend on the incomes earned from these Cash-crops. This emphasizes further the extent to which commodity production has had an impact on food production within the country. Given the above pattern and size of income distributions, the immediate issue is the survival of these people. Yet they have managed to 'survive', i.e., no any serious famine claiming peoples lives has been reported from these Schemes.

These people have managed to survive largely because of the following reasons: to begin with an estimated 42% of these plot-holders are 'absentee' farmers. The implication being that all or most of them have other sources of income or livelihood of which Sugar production within the Schemes is only secondary. According to our sample, there is a probability of 0.65 chance that a plot-holder in the Scheme was either a businessman, a Civil-Servant or a subsistence farmer before he acquired a plot. About 58% of the plot-holders admitted having had land before. Only 18% found within the plots and interviewed claimed they had been either Squatters or agricultural workers before they came into the Schemes. But some of them might still be squatters or agricultural workers because some of our interviewees were infact workers, i.e., Care-takers, watch-men, etc. of the actual owners of the plots. The implication of all these is that, there is a certain category of these plot-holders to whom Sugar-Cane production and hence incomes accruable to them is secondary. They have other primary sources of livelihood. These other sources might be small business, a formal wage employment or other large and more profitable pieces of land elsewhere.

Secondly, there is a small minority of these plot-holders who have actually managed to thrive from Sugar-Cane production within the Schemes. They have managed to build themselves better housing. They have managed to invest in the instruments of production, particularly they have managed to purchase tractors and have now joined the transportation and cultivation business which as we have noted seems to be lucrative. From these they have managed to open up petty-business e.g., retail shops, bars, taxi operations (Matatus) etc.

But there is yet a small minority which depends exclusively on their plots for their entire livelihood. They have not managed to gain much from Sugar-Cane production. But given no alternatives, for these plots form their only homes, they have to struggle to make a living on these plots just as any other poor peasantry in the countryside. This category may supplement his income earnings by offering his labour to the agencies of capital within the Schemes. However, as long as he owns a piece of land in which his house has been constructed and some food stuffs can be grown he is assured of 'tomorrow'.

Nevertheless, the larges majorit, of people in the Settlement Schemes are the agricultural workers. These are those who toil day-in-day-out to maintain the momentum of capital expansion by creating surplus value. Given the way in which labour is organized, they are the ones with whom capital interacts directly and are hence the ones engaged directly in the production process. It is to this social class that we must now turn.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN CAPITAL AND LABOUR IN THE MUHORONI SCHEME:

(Forms and Nature of the Appropriation of Surplus-Value)

The Organization of Labour in the Muhoroni Settlement Scheme:

From the very beginning of the establishment of the Muhoroni Settlement Scheme and the emergence of Sugar production in the same, one of those factors which was in abundant supply is labour, i.e. labour supply. The plot-holders within the Scheme or the E.A.S.I. Ltd. complained of the scarcity of other things e.g. transportation facilities, cane seeds, low crushing capacity of the factory, etc. But at no time has there been complaints on the low supply of labour. This has been mainly because of the regional imbalance in the nature of the development of capitalism, i.e. its tendency to affect some parts more than others whenever it develops.

During the development of colonial capitalism in Kenya, the rectruitment of labour through force became a necessity if European agricultural production had to be sustained.[1] But this was only necessary during the initial stages. Once a large section of the peasantry had been alienated from their pieces of land, forced labour ceased to be a necessity. The expropriated peasants were turned into squatters or wage labour. For them to survive, they had no alternatives, but to sell

1 VAN ZWANENBERG, op. cit. pp 104 - 137.

their labour power to the European capitalists for wages.[1] This trend of development unevenly proletarianized the peasantry. The peasantry proletarianized thus, becomes a revolutionary social category. This, in essence is the central thesis of the 'Mau-Mau' uprising in Kenya in the early 1950's. The parts mostly affected by this trend of development were the Kenya Highlands, particularly, the Central Province of Kenya.[2]

But this was not the same case with the Lake Basin, particularly Nyanza Province. In Nyanza, the use of forced labour seems to have been largely confined to public works, e.g. the building of roads, administrative centres, deeps, carrier corps, etc.[3] Even when the colonial state introduced various forms of taxes, the number of the local population which actually went out to sell their labour-power to meet these taxes must have been quite minimal, for in most cases, these taxes were paid by the sale of livestock which the colonial state raided now and again.[4] Van Zwanenberg has, for instance noted in the case of Nyanza, that there is no doubt that a large proportion of taxes were paid with cash derived from the sale of cattle. He has particularly quoted one Luo chief to have remarked during 1936 that "for some years now his people had

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1 VAN ZWANENBERG, The Agricultural History of Kenya, P.41.

2 SORRENSON, M.P.K., "Counter Revolution to Mau-Mau: Land Consolidation in Kikuyuland, 1952-1960" E.A. Institute of Social Research, Conference, Kampala, 1963, pp. 1-6.

3 VAN ZWANENBERG, op.cit. pp 104 - 137

4 Ibid pp. 94-95.

looked upon and called the tax a cattle tax as they had to dispose of their cattle in almost every instance to meet the tax"[1]

Two factors have, therefore, largely contributed to abundant supply of wage labour in Nyanza. One is commodity production and the other is land consolidation and registration. To begin with, the intervention of capitalism in Kenya did not only introduce money economy, it also availed into the markets various commodities some of which soon became necessities. The acquisition of these commodities required money. But given the nature of the economy in which the local people of the Lake basin were involved, i.e., largely subsistence, the acquisition of these commodities was only possible if these people went out and voluntarily sold their labour-power for wages.

In Nyanza, the establishment of White Settlement had been quite minimal and hence the number of cash crop plantations where such labour could be sold was very limited. Although Miwani Sugar Factory had been established in the 1920's, both its capacity and organization could not make it possible to provide enough wage employment for all those who might have been forced to sell their labour. Consequently, in most cases, those who might have wanted wage employment tended to migrate into those areas where White Settlement and agro-industrial complexes had had a longer

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1 VAN ZWANENBERG, op.cit p. 94.

history and hence a stronger socio-economic impact. Such areas are found within the Kenya Highlands. Most people from Nyanza tended to have migrated into Kericho District (where tea industry had long been established) to pick tea. This fact had been observed as early as 1955 by Mr. Swynnerton when launching a plan for African Agriculture. He said:-

> A number of substantial and financially cash crop industries will be developed. The output of stock products will be increased. Just as the Kipsigis in Kericho now employ large number of Luo labourers, so will this farming development provide substantial employment for African Labour.[1]

During the initial stages, these people moved out into these areas as 'target' workers, i.e., those who temporarily go out to sell their labour-power for wages to purchase specific commodities which they might want e.g., oxen ploughs, bicycles, bride-price, etc. After earning wages enough for the aquisition of such products, they would return back to their homes until such time that they would want to acquire other commodities.

However, with the emergence of various sugar factories within the Lake Basin, it is apparent that most of this type of labour has decided to sell their labour locally rather than migrate into adjoining areas. It is therefore not suprising that for sometimes now most of the middle and rich peasants involved in the growing of tea in Kericho District have experienced an acute shortage of labour for picking tea, as

1 SWYNNERTON, R.J.M. A plan to intensify the development of agriculture in Kenya, Nairobi, Government Printers, 1954, p. 10

was observed by one of my colleagues who did a research in the area.[1]

Well over 95% of the workers in the Scheme came from within the lake Basin. About 65% of the total workers interviewed have been in the Scheme for at least five years or more. And 68% of this 65% have been working in the Settlement Scheme for at least ten years or more now. Even the majority of this remaining 5%, who might not be real origins of the lake Basin are those who the Settlement Scheme found there as having been squatters in the European and Asian farms. In short, for some-times now, the trend of development has been that of reverse migration with the sale of labour very much localized within the agricultural industry. Table XI below illustrates this phenomenon.

Table XI: PERIOD OF STAY IN SETTLEMENT SCHEME BY AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

NO. OF YEARS ALREADY STAYED IN SETTL.	WORKERS	
	No	%
Below 5 Years.	32	34.78
Between 5-10 Years	19	20.66
10 Years And Above	41	44.56
Total	92	100.00

Source: Interviews conducted by the author in the Scheme in 1980.

1 My fellow M.A. student, Mr. Peter Wanyande did his research among the tea growers in Kericho District and observed that the major problem of these tea growers was the labour shortage for picking tea.

From the above Table, it may be seen that a total of about 60 workers or 65% out of the total sample of 92 workers had been in the Settlement Scheme for at least five years. And 41 workers or 68% of these 60 workers have been in the Sche e for at least ten years.

Another factor which must now be taken seriously as having contributed to wage labour is land adjudication. Although the exercise had been introduced in Kenya through the Swynnerton plan in 1956, it remained confined mainly into those areas which White Settlement had had greater impact, particularly in the Central Province.[1] In Nyanza, it is apparent that the exercise did not succeed for quite sometime. According to the figures quoted by Dr. Ahmed Mohiddin from the African Land Development Records, in his discussion of the colonial background of the African Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, the land registration figures for Nyanza were nil as late as 1962.[2] In contrast, the number of farms registered in the Central Province was 163,254 whereas those of Rift-Villey Province was 1,909 during the same period. Indeed, there are quite a number of areas in the Lake Basin where the exercise has not been completed up to now. However, as from mid 1960's the exercise has been accelerated at an alarming rate.

Despite the fact that White Settlement did not affect Nyanza very much the pressure on land relative to the population

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1 SORRENSON. "Land Consolidation in Kikuyu-land, 1952-1962", conference E.A. Institute of Social Research 1963, Kampala.

2 MOHIDDIN, A. "Notes on the Colonial Origins of Sessional Paper No. 10" East African Universities Social Science Council 1972, Vol. 2

is recorded to have been relatively high even during those periods of White Settlement precisely because migrations had remained largely localized.[1] However, with the introduction of Land adjudication, the pressure on land seems to have been intensified. It now means that once each household has consolidated and registered its land it might not find it enough to divide it to all members of the household. The implication of all these being that for the unfortunate members of the household who might not acquire land, there is no alternative but to either buy land else where or go out and fetch wage employment from which they may subsist. Indeed, most of the workers interviewed confessed that for their subsistence, they have to depend much on the wage employment for they do not have enough land back in their homes on which to grow the subsistence crops.

Consequently, immediately after the Settlement Schemes were established and cultivation got under way, labour also started to flood the schemes. During the initial stages, the method of recruiting labour was quite simple. Both the field officers of the E.A.S.I. Ltd and the SSO would go out into the adjoining areas particularly East and West Kano Locations in tracks and advertize the availability of work in the schemes. They would in the process specify various 'points' from which those intending to work would be collected and

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1 VAN ZWANENBERG, "Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya 1919 - 39" op.cit P.234.

provided with transport. The able-bodied, eager for wage-employment would then go out and wait for transport at these 'points' from where they would be collected and ferried into the farms to work.

The reason why East Kano particularly became the major reservoir for labour was not because it was the nearest adjoining place within reach for the officers who went out o recruit labour, but rather because of the floods which had swept the location in 1960, killing both the livestock and rendering the majority of the population homeless.

One condition which these officers who went out to recruit labour made quite clear was the fact that any intending worker who wanted to work into the schemes had also to bring along with him not only his labour-power to sell, but also his own instrument of labour, i.e., a panga or a hoe, which he would use to work. The implication here is that these workers were being doubly exploited. By bringing along with them the instruments of labour, they also contributed to the formation of capital by sharing with the capitalist his task of availing the constant part of capital.

This method of recruiting labour by demanding a worker to come along with his own instrument of labour must have proved quite successful to the E.A.S.I. Ltd. for in 1979 when the same company was commissioned to open another factory in South Nyanza District at Awendo, it repeated the same process.

Nevertheless, in Muhoroni, the process was only short-lived for after some struggles, the workers managed to win the battle. They managed to force the company to purchase these instruments of labour so that workers who later got recruited could only carry along with them into these farms their labour-power to sell. As one of the workers interviewed put it: "One of the achievements of our Union has been to make it possible for us to work on these farms by using the tools purchased by the company".

However, this was not the only method through which the settlement schemes soon came to be known as an area where wage employment was abundant and could be got whenever a worker availed himself. Since most of those who acquired plots within the schemes came from within the Lake Basin,they too introduced workers into the schemes by either employing some or by merely engaging their relatives on their plots as watchmen, care-takers, etc.

Most of these wage employments which have been abundant have mostly been heavy farm duties, e.g. cane planting, weeding harvesting, loading etc., which largely depend on the strength of the worker rather than 'formalized skills'. Skill in such duties came about however, through experience, i.e. through ever-repeated performance of same work over a long period of time.

The reason why these farm duties seem to be in abundance not only within the schemes but even in other areas in Kenya where agro-industrial complexes have sprung up is because of the way in which labour is paid. Since in most instances, a worker is paid according to the amount of work he has done, - measured arbitrarily e.g. by the number of lines of the cane he has weeded or harvested or by the amount of tea he has picked, rather than on the basis of the length of time he has spent working, it does not bother a capitalist as to the number of people who have availed themselves to share in the harvesting or weeding the single line of the cane as long as the price of labour for weeding or harvesting that line remains constant or even declines. Indeed the faster the work is done the better for the capitalist.

The recruitment of these various categories of labour thus, i.e., by the officers of the SSO or the E.A.S.I. Ltd. going out to fetch them was really necessary during the initial stages. Once these Schemes had been brought under the co-operative unions, the unions undertook it upon themselves to begin recruiting labour for their members on a more or less permanent basis. This they do by registering a specific number of workers in their official pay-rolls. All those workers who are employed by the co-operative, thus, are officially supposed to earn a wage of Shs. 6.00 for each day's task. The E.A.S.I., also once it started to develop and expand its nucleus estate, saw the need of engaging some of these workers in a similar way. It too registered a specific number of workers in its official pay-roll. The company pays these workers at a rate of Shs. 14.25 per day. This in principle is the lowest rate E.A.S.I. Ltd. pays its workers.

A part from these two agencies, there has emerged within the sugar-belt particularly within the Schemes, a group of people who might be described as 'labour merchants'. These are individuals whose basic duty is to organize labour for the E.A.S.I., the Co-operative unions or individual farmers. Most of these individuals might have started just as cane cutters, weeders or loaders. or as supervisors. But after some while, they have either managed to accumulate some capital or build some strong influence with the management of the company or the co-operative unions which has now made it possible for them to engage in this form of business.

These 'labour merchants' operate in the following manner: They begin by making a contract with the owner of the task for which a relatively large number of labour might be required on short notice. The contract involves bargaining with the owner on the cost of performance in the task. Once they have arrived at the cost, he goes out and organizes labour to do the work. This labour he pays on the basis of the amount of the work done - measured arbitrarily e.g. by counting the number of lines of the cane each worker has weeded or harvested. Since he pays these workers on 'floating' rates operating within the schemes e.g. shs.3.00 for weeding or harvesting a line of the cane, it is definite that this labour merchant remains with a reasonable amount of money for himself as his profit. And this profit he must remain with for this is what he is guarding against.

If the whole exercise sounds primitive, then, it merely lay bare the nature of primitivity in which the primitive accumulation of capital takes place.

Organizing labour in this manner has not been difficult for these 'labour merchants' precisely because of the maladministration of the co-operative unions and hence their financial mismanagement which has made it impossible for them to employ wage labour for their members on a real permanent basis and secondly, because of the E.A.S.I. Ltd's reluctance to employ labour in large numbers on a permanent basis.

Consequently, most of these workers who have flooded the Schemes keep on oscillating between the co-operatives, the E.A.S.I. Ltd. and these 'labour merchants' merely as casual workers. In fact, it is because these 'labour merchants' have managed to organize labour thus, that the E.A.S.I. has not found it absolutely necessary to employ these categories of workers on a permanent basis.

It is precisely because of this oscillation process that we must argue that labour interacts with both the fractions of capitals, i.e., State and international capital, directly. The presence of the 'labour merchants' does not in any way alter this interaction for these 'merchants' do not only work in the interest of these fractions of capital, the money they use for recruiting these labour is also advanced to them by the agencies of these fractions of capital, i.e., by the co-operative unions and the E.A.S.I. Ltd.

A few individual plot-holders have also employed their own wage labour whom they pay on a monthly basis. Wages paid to such workers depend on the agreement between the worker himself and the employer but they range between Shs. 150.00 and Shs. 300.00. See Table VIII above. Finally those people who own tractors and have involved them in cane transportation also employ their own drivers and cane loaders. In most cases drivers are paid on a monthly basis. But the cane loaders are paid on the basis of the amount of cane they load each day and is accepted by the factory.

However, it is only the above category of workers engaged in those heavy farm duties, i.e, cane planters, weeders, loaders, etc. who get recruited thus. The other category of labour for which 'formalized skill' is required e.g. drivers, mechanics, clerks etc. have been recruited on the basis of those skills irrespective of how and where they have been acquired.

Nevertheless, what is important is that all these categories of workers, irrespective of how and where they have been recruited, be they Cane planters, Weeders, Loaders, Drivers Crushers and Boiler Attendants Baggers, Technicians and Mechanics, all work in co-operation to reproduce and expand capital both for the state and the multinational Company in the interest of international capital. Through this co-operation more surplus-value is even created as a result of a unified form of power.[1] It is these individuals which occupy the above categories of labour that we refer to as workers in this study. We reject the idea of referring to the category of Managers, Personnel Officers, Supervisors and all those who occupy similar ranks as workers. Or as Marx has remarked:

> "An industrial army of workmen, under the command of a capitalist, requires a real army officers (Managers) and Sergeants (foremen, overlookers) who, while the work is being done, command in the name of the capitalist. The work of supervision becomes their established and exclusive function ---- It is not because he is a leader of industry that a man is a capitalist, on the contrary, he is leader of industry because he is a capitalist".[2]

[1] Marx says " when numerous labourers work together side by side, whether in one and the same process, or in different, but connected process, they are said to co-operate or to work in co-operation-----. Not only have we here an increase in the production power of the individual by means of co-operation, but the creation of a new power, namely, the collective power of masses." Marx, Capital I, op.cit pp. 308-309.

[2] Marx, Capital I, op.cit, p. 314; see also BRAVERMAN, op.cit p. 25.

The Extraction of Absolute And Relative Surplus-Value:

In the case of sugar production in Muhoroni, the extraction of relative surplus-value is more concentrated within the factory system whereas that of absolute surplus-value is more observable at the sugar cane farms. Let's begin, therefore with the way in which the latter is extracted.

We stated above that within the schemes, the co-operative unions, the E.A.S.I. Ltd., the 'Labour Merchants', transport owner's and a small minority of the plot-holders are all involved in the recruitment of those labourers who do not possess any 'formalized skills', to perform the heavy farm duties e.g. Cane planting, weeding, harvesting, loading, etc. on the sugar cane farms. But when it comes to the payment of these labourers, all these recruiting agencies, on the surface, seem to have different rates for each day's task. However, what is uniform about the way in which all these agencies, except for the small minority of the plot owners who pay their workers on a monthly basis, is that all these workers they recruit are paid first and foremost on the basis of the amount of the work they have done rather than on the length of time they have toiled each day. It is very obvious that this amount of the work they do each day and for which they are paid is done within a given time. So it does not make any difference.[1] An individual worker may still know the average length of time, i.e. the number of hours he labours each day. On this basis, he may go a head t compute the amount of wage he earns each second, each minute, each hour and hence each day.

1 "Wages by the piece are nothing else, than a converted form of wages by time just as wages by time are a converted form of value or price of labour-power". Marx Capital, op.cit p. 516.

But again for the method or basis in which this labour is paid, the relationship between the labour-time and the amount of money paid for the labour-power expended within that specific time is obs cured and hence the relationship between wages and time becomes superflous. This makes it quite difficult to determine the average price of labour-power. This partly explains why it has always beeen very difficult or even impossible to quantify the rates of surplus-value appropriation in the concrete phenomenon of agricultural industry.

Be that as it may, the co-operative unions within the schemes have brought under them, in their pay-rolls some workers who on the surface appear to have been employed permanently. What makes them appear as if they are permanently employed is the fact that they have been registered in the pay-rolls of these co-operative unions. However, the contract between them and their employers, the co-operative unions end just there. This is precisely because the registration makes it possible for these workers, merely to be confident that each day, the co-operative union will find for them a task to perform and that each day's task performed will be paid by the union. But if a worker decides to absent himself, he knows pretty well that he forefeits his wage of that particular day. And when he resumes work he continues as if nothing had happened. It is no wonder, therefore, that at month ends when they have earned their monthly wages, most of them decide to absent themselves even for a week's period.

The co-operative unions pay their workers at a rate of shs.6.00 for each day's task. A day's task may be either weeding or harvesting one or two lines of the cane depending on the arbitrary measure taken by the supervisor, although irrespective of the amount of weeds to be weeded or cane to be harvested within that line of the cane respectively. It does not mean, however that once a worker sets out to work each morning, he will drag from morning till evening performing only that task he has been measured and that should constitute his day's task. On the contrary, he may complete his, day's work even before mid-day so that he remains with the other part of the day in which he does what he decides. If he decides to continue working he might do extra tasks on top of his day's task from which he will also earn extra money. Indeed, some of these workers intensify their labour from morning till evening and at the end of each day's toil earn well over shs.10.00. But this is exactly where the actual extraction of absolute surplus-value takesplace.

It is obvious that shs.6.00 is a meager amount in comparison with the needs of the labourer to themselves and their families each day. Most of these workers, therefore, tend to struggle to intensify their labour to do extra tasks. This whole process of labour intensification forcesvirtually all these workers to exhaust the natural limits of the working - day, i.e., to work from day break till evening when it is naturally impossible for them to continue with either the weeding or harvesting. We know too well that given level of capitalist development in Kenya, the socially necessary labour - time in which a worker can labour to reproduce himself and his family cannot be a whole day. Indeed even Garvin Kitching who rejects, the concept of surplus-value has recognized the fact that in the pre-capitalist Kenya, a lot of surplus-labour time was 'wasted'.[1] The implication here being that if with the simplest farm equipments, the Kenya's pre-capitalist peasant could afford to produce enough to reproduce himself and his family within a short socially necessary labour time and still manage to 'waste' surplus-labour time, then it means that with relatively sophisticated farm inputs he might now even be able to half his socially necessary labour time in which he produces enough to reproduce himself and his family and hence double his surplus labour time in which he may do what he pleases to do. It follows, therefore, that even without exact quantifications, the length of surplus labour time is very much over extended and hence the amount of absolute surplus-value extracted from these workers through this method of paying for their labour-power is enormous.[2]

The E.A.S.I. Ltd., on the other hand pays its workers of this category, who it has registered, at the rate of Shs. 14.25. This on the surface is the lowest rate that the company pays its workers. However, for a Cane Weeder or Harvester to earn this amount of money per day he will have to complete the task which he has been assigned. Most of them claimed that

1. KITCHING, G. Class And Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of An African Petit Bourgeoisie 1905-1970, Yale University Press, London, 1980, p. 14

2. MARX has said for instance, "From the Law: 'the price of labour being given, the daily or weekly wage depends on the quantity of labour expended', it follows, first of all that, the lower the price of labour, the greater must be the quantity of labour, or the longer must be the working-day for the labourers to secure even a miserable average wage. The lowness of the price of labour acts here as stimulus to the extension of labour-time" Marx, Capital, op. cit. p. 512

it may take as long as two days to complete a task worth Shs. 14.25. It follows that if it takes such a worker two days to complete a task worth Shs. 14.25, then he infact earns a wage of about Shs. 7.15 per day irrespective of the number of hours worked. This actually means that the difference between this wage and what the co-operative unions offer is quite minimal.

But understandably these workers may not want to earn a meager wage of Shs. 7.15 per day so they have to intensify their labour. They too have to exhaust the natural limits of a working day if they have to earn their entitled Shs. 14.25 a day. In other words, there is no any difference between these workers and those registered under the co-operative unions. They have even to extend the length of the surplus labour-time. And in so doing an enormous amount of absolute surplus-value is extracted from them.

The next category of workers are those organized by the 'Labour-Merchants'. These 'Labour-Merchants' having made a contract with the owners of the task for which they organize this labour, take up the money for the task and in turn pay the workers at the 'floating' rates within the Schemes.

Given some 'vague' law of primitive accummulation, it has become generally accepted that weeding or harvesting a line of the cane costs Shs. 3. Depending on the amount of weeds to be weeded or the amount/size of cane to be harvested, this price may rise or decline, but only after a serious bargain between the worker and the 'Labour Merchant'. Neither is the "Labour Merchant' ignorant of this, for when he settles a contract with the owner of the task, this is the trick he guards against. These are the 'floating' rates we refer to here, for they are never fixed.

However, irrespective of the amount which the 'Labour-Merchant' finally accepts to pay the workers, he must remain with a reasonable lump-sum as his profit. But this lump-sum, which the 'Labour-Merchant' finally remains with, is not what we are very much concerned with. On the contrary, what concerns us, is the fact that most of these workers struggle to maximize their daily earnings. And when they maximize, they exhaust the natural limits of the working-day. As in the other cases already described above, these workers prolong their surplus-labour-time. And in the same process an enormous amount of absolute surplus-value is extracted from them.

But the most exploited of these workers are actually the Cane loaders who have largely been employed by the transport owners. These workers are paid on the basis of the amount of cane they load each day. That amount of cane loaded must at the same time be accepted by the factory and hence weighed first. In any cas . it is only after it has been accepted by the factory and wei hed that its tonnage is determined. It is at this level that 'naked' exploitation is exercised.

Since once a worker has started to load cane on the trailor and has hence started to expend his labour-power he might not determine whether the cane he is loading will finally reach the factory and be accepted, it simply means that in the event of his cane not reaching the factory or not being accepted by the factory then the worker labours for nothing.[1] This is not uncommon phenomenon in Muhoroni Scheme. It has been happening and it continues to happen within the Scheme. And so those workers for which it happens expend labour-power whose value is never reciprocated by the capitalist.

Secondly, this tendency of paying these workers on the basis of the amount of the cane they load has also resulted into cheating and stiff competition among these workers themselves. Since these workers know just too well that the more they load, the more they earn each day and that the cane they have loaded has to be accepted by the factory first before they may hope for any wage, a 'natural' tendency has therefore, developed among these workers to conspire with the trailor drivers to take them mostly to the closer farms to the factory and particularly to those farms with cane which is likely to weigh more tons. The reason why these trailor drivers make sure that they struggle for closer farms to the factory is because they want to catch the queue at the weighing bridge before it gets too ng. But in the process of such competitions, these workers ave to intensify their labour and exhaust

1 MARX, Says, "As soon as his Labour actually begins, it has already ceased to belong to him, it can therefore no longer be sold by him." Marx K. Capital I, op. cit. p. 503

themselves throughout the day from Monday to Monday and thus being vulnerable to the extraction of an enormous amount of absolute surplus-value from them by the capitalist.[1]

Patterns of Extracting Relative Surplus-Value:

The extraction of relative surplus-value, as we have stated above, is concentrated within the factory system where the actual production of sugar takes place.

To begin with, factory system under capitalist production of commodities has never made work easier to a worker. It is indeed true that the use of machinery makes it possible for a worker to produce a relatively large amount of products within a shorter time and on the surface the use of machinery makes it appear as if work which would have been quite strenuous is now made quite easy. But this is exactly where the trick of the extraction of relative surplus-value lies. A factory system of production require that specific number of workers have to be placed at the various stages of production. And it also requires that workers having been placed at these various stages of production have to operate at a given rythm so as to avoid lags at some stage which would lead to wastage in the means of production. In the process of this struggle to keep such a

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[1] Marx says, "Given piece-wage, it is naturally the personal interest of the labourer to strain his labour-power as intensely as possible; this enables the capitalist to raise more easily the normal degree of intensity of labour. It is moreover now the personal interest of the labourer to lengthen the working-day, since with it his daily or weekly wage rise" Marx, Capital 1, p. 519.

rhythm, a worker becomes a slave of a machine. He has to make sure that the machine does not operate ahead of him. He has to compete with it and keep its pace.

This has been revealed very succinctly by an elaborate work which was carried out by Frederick Engels[1] on the conditions of the Working-Class in England during the initial stages of the development of capitalism there or by observations made by Karl Marx on the production of surplus-value. Marx has, for instance quoted John Stuart Mill as having observed that 'it is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day's toil of any human being'.[2] And Marx adds:

> "That is, however, by no means the aim of the capitalistic application of machinery. Like every other increase in the productiveness of labour, machinery is intended to cheapen commodities, and, by shortening that portion of the working-day, in which the labourer works for himself, to lengthen the other portion that he gives, without an equivalent to the capitalist. In short it is a means for producing surplus-value."[3]

Such a process does not only force a worker to intensify his labour to produce larger amount of commodities within a shorter time. It also cheapens the commodities produced by the worker and hence his labour-power.

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1 See ENGELS, F. The Condition of the Working-Class in England, Progressive Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 9.

2 MARX, Capital 1, op. cit., p. 351.

3 Ibid, p. 351.

In Muhoroni, the factory within which the actual production of sugar take place, operates 24 hours, crushing 1,200 tons of the cane which is also supposed to produce the similar amount of sugar. It follows that all those who have been placed at the various stages of the whole process have to work in shifts throughout the 24 hours to keep the factory operating. However, what is important is to observe the way in which these workers placed at the various stages struggle to keep pace with the machines with which they are working.

Those workers at the crushing point, for example, have to make sure that the crusher does not run idle without Cane to crush. At the boiler, the boiler attendants have to see to it that the heat for boiling the sugar juice is kept within a specific temperature. They have, therefore, to keep on feeding the boiler with firewood. This means that those providing the firewood have to keep a constant supply. And at the bagging section, the baggers, i.e. those who bag the finally produced sugar have to be ready all the times and continuously with the bags to bag the final product, sugar. Coupled with the stiff competition in which the Cane loaders are involved and the hurry in which the trailor drivers are, the whole process becomes that of constant utilization of labour - a real intensification of labour. The whole exercise is both repetitive and continuous and at the end of 24 hours, the amount of relative surplus-value extracted from each individual worker is enormous.

But that is not the only extent to which the extraction takes place within the factory system. There is on top of that another broad way in which the exploitation of this labour employed by the E.A.S.I. Ltd. takes place. We have stated that most of these workers employed within the factory system are those who require some form of 'formalized skills', e.g., drivers, technicians, mechanics, plumbers etc. Indeed, it is on the basis of such expertise that they are employed. When they are being employed, where and how they have acquired these skills may not bother their employer, E.A.S.I. Ltd.

There are quite a number of people in Kenya today who possess such expertise without any strong foundation in formal education, i.e., without advanced literacy. These are the people who might have for a long time worked in some manufacturing firm, power plants, etc. During those periods, they acquired some skills in both the technical and mechanical work. Except for the theory behind those machines, they can effectively operate and repair most of those machines. And despite the lack of the theoretical knowledge, they can operate and repair those machines just as those with the theoretical and practical knowledge of those machines. On top of that they can work for the same length of hours and with the same capacity or even greater.

The majority of workers employed by the E.A.S.I. Ltd. Company belong to this category of people. About 22 or 24%

of our total sample of the 92 workers interviewed had no formal education. A very large number, about 73% claimed to have acquired some primary school education. Noneof them ever attended any training institution. And only 3 or 3.3% of them attained secondary school level of education. Table XII below demostrates this more succinctly.

Table XII : LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

LEVEL OF EDUCTION	WORKERS	
	No.	%
NIL	22	24
Primary Standard	66	73
Secondary Standard	3	3
TOTAL	92	100

Source: Interviews conducted by the author in the Scheme in 1980.

Yet these workers have managed to keep the factory system running and the entire process of sugar production possible. They have made it possible for capital to reproduce and to expand itself at a tremendous rate.

But when it comes to their renumeration, their formal education background is considered. And because they have little formal education or noneat all, the E.A.S.I. Company argues that their salaries must be low. In other words, education standard is now regarded as the yard stick for measuring skills and non skills. And when anybody with a higher formal qualification applied for these jobs, either he would be disqualified on the basis of lack of experience, experience here being measured on the basis of the number of years one has operated and repaired such machines.

During my trips in the Sugar-Cane farms I was assigned to a certain field Superintendent to take me around the farms to meet workers and farmers. According to the duties involved, the position of a field Superintendent requires a person with at least a Diploma in Agriculture from one of the various recognized Agricultural institutions in the country. This is because among other things, a Field Superintendent is expected to advise the farmers and the management on the proper husbandry of the canes. He is expected, for example, to provide proper advise on when, how and what type of fertilizer needs to be applied to what type of cane.

Yet this particular field Superintendent had no such 'qualification' neither had he even a secondary school education. However, he had worked in the factory for quite along time. He had started working in the factory at some subordinate position and as a result of his acquired experience, he had now been promoted to a field superintendent. And he could do what was expected of him, for after some experience he had learned to know when fertilizers are usually applied on the farms and what type of cane are usually grown within the Schemes.

But when it comes to paying him for these duties, his salary was relatively low compared to the other officers of similar rank on the pretext that he has no adequate education. However, the most interesting thing is that, he seemed to have been satisfied with the status irrespective of the economic benefits attached to such a status. He could not in any way see anything wrong with such blatant cheating. In short both education and experience are here being used to create and perpetuate the paradox between skill and unskilled labour and hence exploit it.[1]

It is obvious that any worker who does his work efficiently and with an acquired expertise produces to the capitalist much more than the capitalist pays him back.[2] In other words the capitalist extracts from him relative surplus-value. This is, therefore, what this paradox of education/experience vis-a-vis skill and unskilled labour within Muhoroni Factory leads to. Irrespective of their educational standards or the experience required of them or where and how they have acquired these expertise, what is important and the E.A.S.I. Company knows this just too well, is that these workers produce the requir d amount of sugar or even more each day. Those 'low' education standards or

1 Marx says: "The distinction between skilled and unskilled labour rests in part on pure illusion or, to say the least, on distinctions that have long since ceased to be real and that survive only by virtue of a traditional convention in part on the helpless condition that prevents them from extracting equally with the rest of the value of their labour-power." Marx, Capital 1, op. cit. p. 192.

2 BRAVERMAN, op. cit. pp. 45-58

experience have never sufficed to cut down on the daily production nor have they led to a higher depreciation rate of the machines used by these workers in sugar production.

But if all what is said above sounds unbelievable then one needs only to examine the trend and rates of capital turn-out in Muhoroni Factory as presented in Table XIII below, to believe.

Table XIII: EAST AFRICAN SUGAR INDUSTRIES: SUGAR PRODUCTION 1967-1980

COLUMN 1	COLUMN 2	COLUMN 3	COLUMN 4	COLUMN 5	COLUMN 6
YEAR	ANNUAL PRODUCT OF SUGAR IN TONS	ANNUAL GROSS INCOME IN KSHS,	ANNUAL NET INCOME IN KSHS.	ANNUAL EXPEND. ON WAGES AND MAINTENANCE OF FACTORY IN KSHS	% OF NET INCOME OVER EXPENDITURE
1967	18,133	29,919,446	16,552,195	3,377,557	490
1968	19,988	27,372,002	18,363,153	3,197,173	574
1969	28,655	37,783,434	25,944,862	3,436,881	754
1970	33,090	45,631,321	29,846,213	3,758,269	794
1971	34,197	46,116,321	30,960,131	3,716,504	833
1972	25,431	38,100,231	26,450,566	2,626,960	1006
1973	32,428	49,552,500	35,095,269	3,342,555	1049
1974	28,490	47,115,580	34,497,376	4,193,223	822
1975	26,355	59,533,505	48,058,275	7,028,229	683
1976	26,100	76,429,029	59,766,617	8,753,875	682
1977	23,031	86,371,958	62,750,417	9,032,880	694
1978	42,331	161,832,165	118,572,163	14,702,166	806
1979	47,000	177,820,400	131,139,634	18,809,996	697
1980*	24,933	94,657,014	69,811,914	9,219,000	757

*Up to and including 30th June, 1980.

Source: Records of E.A.S.I. Ltd., Muhoroni.

In the above Table, Column 2 give us the total turn-out of capital each year. It gives us the total amount of commodities which both the constant and variable capital have transferred their values into. This is converted into money form in column 3. Column 3 is therefore, the value of the means of production, i.e., constant capital on the one hand, and variable capital, i.e., labour-power, plus surplus value, on the other. In Column 3, we have not only commodities as such, but also commodities which have realised their exchange value.

Consequently, the money form of these commodities in Column 3 is definitely higher than their value, i.e., the value of those constituents which have been mixed to produce them in Column 2, the value of the machines in the factory, Sugar cane and labour-power. Through the law of capital, Column 3 does not only provide the value of Sugar-Cane which have been turned into sugar, it also provides the value of labour-power and surplus-value, although we may not say exactly the amount of this money form of this total tons of sugar that exclusively constitute surplus-value.

However, in Column 5, we have been given the money value of the total labour-power used up each year and the expenses of maintaining the machines on their running conditions. These expenses include the buying of spare parts and servicing of the Factory. But the wear and tear of the machines are not lost as such, they are merely transfered into sugar produced and hence their value are realized in Column 3. Column 4, therefore remains the exclusive profits of the capitalists, the E.A.S.I. Company.

This amount should not be confused with that which is used by the capitalist to reproduce himself, i.e. to subsist on. This is precisely because if we add Column 4 and 5 and subtract it from Column 3, then we find, not only that amount of money which the capitalist uses to reproduce himself, i.e. to subsist, but also that amount which he shares with his fellow capitalists in the form of taxes, rent, insurance, etc.

Let us take 1968, for example. During that year, the amount of money which the E.A.S.I. Ltd. used to purchase labour-power and to keep the factory in its running conditions was about Shs. 3.2 million only. The amount of profit which it earned that year was about Shs. 18.4 million. These added together comes to Shs. 21.6 million. If we deduct this from the total amount of capital turn-out including Surplus-Value, then we remain with Shs. 5.7 million. This is the amount which the Company shares with other capitalists in the form of rents, insurance, taxes, etc., and which its capitalist class, i.e., the Management uses to reproduce itself, i.e. to buy clothing shelter, food and other various luxuries.

Given the analysis of these figures thus, we may go ahead to show the enormous rate of the exploitation of this labour-power. In actual fact, a quantification rate of surplus-value could be provided by dividing the surplus-value by variable capital, i.e., the total value of labour-power, or by surplus-labour over necessary-labour. But since we do not have exclusive figures for these categories, we may show this rate of exploitation by taking the rate of profit accumulation vis-avis the expenses for the purchase of labour-power and the maintenance of the factory.

Column 6 of Table XIII provides us with the percentages of this rate of exploitation. It can be seen that the net profits over the total expenditure on labour-power and the factory maintenance which was already very high, at 490%, at the time of the inception of the factory in 1967, continued to rise steadily and has since never reduced below this initial figure.

From 1967 to 1973, the rate of exploitation steadily increased from 490% at an average of 88% per annum, reaching its highest of 1049% in 1973. From 1974, it decreased sharply to 822%, and it has since then, remained more or less stagnant, fluctuating between 682% in 1976 and 822% in 1974, but it has not decreased below 490%. However, during the same period, the absolute increase in the annual net incomes has been enormous. This means that although there has been some increase in the expenses on labour and factory maintenance, relatively this increase is uncomparable with the rate of increase in the annual net incomes.

For example, the annual net income increase of about Shs. 11 million between 1975 and 1976 cannot be compared with the increase of a mere Shs. 1 million in the expenses on labour and the factory maintenance. Neither can we compare the enormous increase of about Shs. 56 million of annual net incomes between 1977 and 1978 with the mea ger increase of about Shs. 5 million on labour and factory maintenance during the same period.

And since these rates of profit accumulation continue to rise, while the expenses on labour-power and factory maintenance continue to decline, we have no other reason to prevent us from concluding that this increase is largely attributed to the growing efficiency among the workers. The implication being that the rate of relative surplus-value extracted from them continuously increases. The other reason of course being that the exchange-value of sugar, i.e., sugar prices have also been increasing continuously.

The Social Conditions of Workers in Muhoroni:

But such a high rate of capital turn-out and hence its expansion cannot be made possible without its own costs. Indeed, whenever capital reproduces and expands, it is the human beings that get sacrificed.[1] This is where the conditions of these workers in the Scheme, involved in the production of Sugar comes on the surface. It needs to be pointed out that the exploitation of these workers has not been confined merely to the prolongation of their working-days or to the intensification of their labour-powe i.e., to the production of absolute and

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1 Marx for instance says, "If money, according to Augier, comes into the world with a Congenital blood stain on one cheek", Capital comes dripping from head to foot from every pore with blood and dirt", Marx, Capital 1, op. cit. p. 711

relative surplus-value described above. It has also involved on the one hand their deprivation of the basic necessities of life, e.g., housing and medical care, and on the other hand the harsh conditions under which these heavy duties are done.

A combination of these factors have largely contributed not only to the general depreciation of the workers but also to the decline of their moral standards. Their low moral standards are demonstrated very clearly through their behaviour, either during their working pe ods or when they are on their way home from their places of work. For example, it is a fact generally known within the Schemes, not only by the top management of the E.A.S.I. Company, the administrators of the SSO, the field superintendents and the supervisors, but also by the farmers and the members of their families, that cane loaders and harvesters are 'rogues'! Not only are they likely to abuse you at will even when you are in the company of those you respect, but that they may also even assault young women. As a result of these, cane loaders and harvesters have become a feared lot. They are regarded as those individuals whose mental capabilities are close to insanity.

However, while it might be quite easy to observe such behaviour and arrive at such conclusions, it has not been quite easy for either these top management of the E.A.S.I Company, the administrators c the SSO, the farmers and members of their families or even the overseers who oversee them to explain why these workers behave the way they do.. They may not have even found out whether it occurs that once a worker arrives in the Schemes and is recruited for these duties he begins to behave thus immediately.

The only reasonable explanation why these workers behave this way must be found in the nature of their work and the conditions under which they do them. Both the conditions and the nature of their work dehumanizes them continuously and this in turn is expressed in their behaviour. Such behaviour reinforces back to those conditions and the nature of the work of which such behaviour are a product. In the final analysis, both the nature and conditions of the work and the behaviour of these workers appear as the integral part of one thing, a whole whose distinction between the nature of the work and its conditions on the one hand and the behaviour on the other is totally obs cured and becomes difficult to separate. It becomes a repe titive and a continuous process, with each circle reinforcing on the previous one and a new process becoming multiplied and more intensified. And all these represent the general dehumanization and depreciation of the labourer himself by capital. A brief description of how the whole process operates might suffice to reveal the situation.

To begin with, according to our sample, the majority of workers in Muhoroni Scheme are still young men. As many as 45 or 49% of them out of the total sample of 92 workers fall between 20 and 29 years of age. 22 or 24% of them are between 30 and 39 years old and the remaining 24 or 27% are 40 years old and above. This age distribution gives a mean age of 32.5 years with a standard Deviation of 9.9. Table XIV below illustrates this more clearly.

Table XIV: AGE LEVEL OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

AGE DESCRIPTION	WORKERS	
	No.	%
Below 20 years old	1	1
Between 20-29 years old	45	49
Between 30-39 years old	22	24
Between 40-49 years old	17	19
50 years and above	7	8
TOTAL	92	100

Source: Interviews conducted by the author in the Scheme in 1980.

Furthermore, since about 65% of these workers claim to have been in the Schemes for at least 5 years or more (see Table XI) and particularly 68% of this 65% claims to have been in the Schemes for 10 years or more, it means that most of these workers must have come into the Schemes when they were still quite young.

Secondly, about 83% of the total sample interviewed claimed that they had a family, at least a wife. And about 86% of this 83% claimed that they had children, 53% of them having between 1 and 4 children and the remaining 32% at least 5 children or more. The two Tables XV and XVI below illustrate the situation.

Table XV: MARITAL STATUS OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

MARITAL STATUS	WORKERS	
	No.	%
Married	76	83
Single	16	17
TOTAL	92	100

Source: Interviews conducted by the author in the Scheme in 1980.

Table XVI: FAMILY SIZE OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

FAMILY SIZE	WORKERS	
	No.	%
Families with no child	11	15
Families with between 1-4 children	40	53
Families with between 5-9 children	18	23
Families with 10 and above	7	9
TOTAL	96	100

Source: Interviews conducted by the author in the Scheme in 1980.

Only 25% of these workers with children had some of their children above 15 years of age, an age which we may regard as that demarcating the category of dependants and none dependants. It follows, therefore that only 25% of these workers admitted that some of their children have passed the dependant age.

Thirdly, about 53% of these workers have children in schools to educate. Meanwhile only 6% of them had extra wage-earners in their families apart from the worker himself. And of the 83% of the workers with families, over 60% of them claimed that they lived together with the members of their families, i.e., with their wives and children within the Schemes. The rest 23% admitted that they had left their families at their original homes.

Yet when it comes to the provision of residential houses to them, only 28% admitted that their employers provided housing. The majority of this 28%, belong to the category of workers with formalized skills, e.g. mechanics, technicians, plumbers, etc., who are employed by the E.A.S.I. Ltd. Table XVII below illustrates this more clearly.

Table XVII: NATURE OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS ACCOMMODATION

NATURE OF ACCOMMODATION	WORKERS	
	NO.	%
A rented house	17	19
House provided by employer	26	28
Stays with a relative	9	10
Has built his own house	40	43
TOTAL	92	100

Source: Interviews conducted by the author in the Scheme in 1980.

Another chief characteristic of this category of workers is that they have worked much longer with the Company. So the Company has seen it more logical to provide them with housing, most of which are mere single rooms.

However, the remaining 72% of these workers have been provided with no housing. They have either rented houses of their own at the various market centres within the Schemes or built their 'own' houses on the 'special plots'[1] or on the portion of land which belongs to the E.A.S.I. Ltd. Company and on which the Company should actually build better houses for its workers. In fact the majority of workers, about 43%, for which no accommodation is provided at all, belong to this category. The remaining 10% admitted that they were accommodated by relatives. It is no wonder, therefore that when we put a question to these workers to state whether their employers provided them with housing or not, only 63% responded negatively. Some of them must have assumed that since the plots on which they build their 'own' houses are properties of their employers, it must also mean that granting permission to build a house is similar to providing accommoda--tion.

Nevertheless, most of these workers who have built or rented houses of their own or are staying with their relatives belong to the unskilled category of workers. Most of them are cane weeders, loaders and cane harvesters. They can be said to be the most exploited and dehumanized of all these workers in the Schemes. Most of these houses they have acquired are grass thatched and mud walled.

1 These are plots which during the planning of the Settlement process, were saved for the building of public facilities, e.g., schools, health centres or markets, etc. but have not so far been utilized for such purposes.

But to state that these houses are grass thatched and mud walled may confuse one to think that there is nothing peculiar about them, for even in Kenya's countryside today the majority of the peasants live in grass thatched and mud walled houses. However, this is not the case. What is peculiar about the Muhoroni huts is the way in which they are built and the conditions in which most of them are in (see Photograph I and II). Incidentally, it should be remembered that it is the occupants of these miserable houses that reproduce that enormous amount of capital we have alluded to earlier.

Most of these houses have been so poorly thatched to prevent any rains. Their walls have big holes on them which makes privacy difficult to most of these workers. And on top of that most of them have been grouped together to create a site which is in actual fact a slum. In quite a small place, quite a large number of houses with miserable limited spaces in them have been put up for a relatively large population. This has indeed created difficulty in the free gaseous exchange between these human-beings themselves on the one hand and nature on the other.

These sites are indeed pathetic, that in 1975, immediately after his election, the Member of Parliament for the area, Mr. Onyango Midika, complained in Parliament to the government about the conditions of these houses. He said:

I

Above: A Section of the grass-thatched houses in which some of the Sugar Agricultural Workers within the Scheme live.

Below: A Section of the corrugated-iron-roofed houses occupied by Factory Workers employed by E.A.S.I. Ltd.

II

Source: Taken by the author during the field research in 1980.

> "We have some houses, Mr. Speaker, like those of Sugar Agricultural Workers whose owners infact share with Snakes. Their lives are every night constantly threatened by these Snakes and so they have to stay awake for the most part of the night guarding themselves against the Snakes. For the night shift workers, the situation is made even worse because this means they cannot afford to enjoy complete rest and feed after sleepless night."[1]

In October the same year, a local daily, the Standard Newspaper also reported:

> "Kenya's Industrial Court Judge, Mr. Saeed Cockar, his deputy, Mr. Tom Okelio Odongo and a Member Mr. John Carroll, at the weekend received a rousing welcome from Sugar Workers in Nyanza and Western Province when they went there to check on the housing situation classified as that of being of 'slavergy conditions".[2]

It added:

> "The Court began its mission at Muhoroni where Mr. Midika described the conditions as shocking ---. The Court saw the Chemillil sewarage system and lagoons which drain into River Nyando from where the workers reportedly draw their drinking and cooking water."[3]

The Court seemed to have been convinced that the sites were inhuman, for in November the same year the Court's Judge, Mr. Saeed Cockar, approved the Court's award to the Muhoroni workers. The Standard Newspaper reported thus:

> "While announcing the Court's award yesterday, Judge Saeed Cockar recalled that the Court had visited the Country's Sugar-belt in Western Kenya and saw the working and living conditions of the workers at first hand. Way back in 1969, the Court had warned that

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1. HANSARD, 1975/76 Vol. 40 pt. 2 p. 676

2 The Standard, 13 October, 1975

3 Ibid

sanitary conditions in some of the places it revisited this year were 'of the worst kind' and if urgent measures were not taken there was a grave danger of an outbreak of an epidemic."[1]

But apart from being in these pathetic conditions, these houses are also very vulnerable to fire which is very frequent in the Schemes. And when they get burnt down, there is never any insurance compensation. Only charitable organizations, (organizations which infact are products of capitalist systems everywhere) came forward to donate blankets, clothing, etc. to these victims. An example of such cases is the one reported by one of the local dailies about the Miwani Sugar Factory not very far from Muhoroni. The report read:

"Workers of Miwani Sugar Company at Kambi Kokech Estate, whose houses were burnt have been presented with blankets and clothing donated by the Kisumu Branch of the Kenya Red Cross Society. Gifts worth Shs. 8,855/- were presented to the victims by branch Chairman, M.C. Wamubeyi who is also the Kisumu DC. The fire burnt down 115 houses and caused great damage to property. Nearly 500 persons were left homeless. Addressing the victims, the M.P. for Nyando, Mr. Onyango-Midika appealed to Miwani Sugar Mills to put up permanent buildings for its staff instead of grass thatched structures."[2]

It is from these pathetic houses that each morning these Cane weeders, harvesters and loaders wake up to begin their long daily's toil. Since most of the farms in which they work are not necessarily closer to their residence, the E.A.S.I. Ltd, Company, has organized some form of transport

1 The Standard, 28th November, 1975

2 Daily Nation, 6 January, 1981

to ferry them to the farms. But these transporting facilities have their specific points from which these workers may take them. This means that, these workers have still to wake-up as early as 5 a.m. or even 4 a.m. to travel to these points to catch these transport facilities. After they have been ferried into the farms each worker now has to depend on his strength and the type of work which he decides to expend his labour-power on. And this is where one observes the real depreciation of labour taking place.

For example, one needs to observe a cane loader during the moment when he is involved in the actual process of loading the Cane on the trailor to realize this. From the moment a Cane loader begins to load the cane on the trailor his true social relation seems to cease. He is not only hostile to any stranger or the Supervisors that might interfere with him in his work, but even the nature of words which come out of his mouth are oppressive to the ears of those who might happen to be strangers. After removing his shirt, he gathers a reasonable heap of Cane, he carries it and places it on his shoulders. He expertly takes on the steps of the wooden ladder, which has also been improvised by them to make their journey with the Cane from the ground into the trailor possible, and places his load in the trailor. Such a ladder is necessary because, once a reasonable heap of the cane has been loaded, the trailor becomes too high for any worker to reach while standing. So for them to load more Cane on top of those already loaded, they need the ladder (Photograph III below).

III

Above: A loader climbing a ladder to load Cane on a tractor while others bundle Cane for loading

Below: Cane-cutters harvesting Cane on one of the farms in the Scheme.

IV

Source: Taken by the author during the field research in 1980.

The process is repeated several times until, the trailor gets full. These workers have to accompany the driver of the tractor to the factory to do the unloading. Although, the factory system provides machines for unloading, such machines can only unload upto a certain limit. The remianing pieces of the cane in the trailor which cannot be unloaded by the machine, have to be unloaded by these workers. And given the competition among these workers themselves to load more and hence to maximize their earnings, these prolong their working-day from morning till evening. A worker who has done this kind of work for a time begins to develop unnaturally strong muscles on the neck. His eyes also turn red and he thus looks terribly frightening. He is indeed getting dehumanized.

But this does not happen to the Cane loaders alone. The Cane harvesters also undergo more or less similar experience. We stated above that all the cane which is harvested for the Muhoroni Factory have to be burnt first. The reason for this burning is apparently to clear both the heavy weeds and wild animals including snakes which might hide in them. Once they have been cleared thus, the cane harvesters, then intervenes with their pangas. Since it is their intention to maximize their earnings, they struggle to do the work with the greatest speed, And in the process of all these they do not only risk their feet being punctured by the pointed remains of the harvested cane, but they also brush themselves against the canes still unharvested (see Photograph IV above). On top of these, they continuously inhale the dust blown up from the remains of the burnt weeds and cane leaves. One worker, for example, lamented that "after involving oneself in Cane harvesting for sometimes, a worker must begin to develop lung problems."

However, during mid-day there is a lunch break, for the overseers must also go back for their lunches. But with their homes so far away, these workers, have to depend on the light meals like porridge, sold by the women who have found this kind of business also to be very lucrative. Infact some workers have tried to organize themselves by contributing to a common fund. Once they have collected a given amount of money, they turn it over to a particular woman who make for them porridge on the farms regularly (see Photograph V below).

Nevertheless, after each-day's toil which ends relatively late in the evening, these workers are again provided with transport back to the points from which they were collected in the morning. When they arrive back in their houses, they are definitely a tired lot. And with no recreational facilities, their pre-occupation becomes that of beer drinking, especially the strong African alcohol gin 'chang'aa'. For example, in 1975 during a debate in Parliament, Mr. Midika, demanded to know from the Minister of Commerce who was responsible for issuing licences for the buying and selling of molasses. Midika felt that those were the people who were responsible for the high rate of 'chang'aa' drinking in the Schemes. He said:

A group of farm labourers waiting to have their lunch of porridge on one of the farms. With them is the woman who prepares the porridge.

V

Source: Taken by the author during the field research in 1980.

> "The Minister should know that it is those who buy molasses are the ones brewing changaa which is very dangerous to human health. Most of my people have been ruined by the illicit drink to the extent where some of them can no longer father children."[1]

On top of that sex naturally becomes the next recreational option. It is no wonder, therefore, that the birth rate among these young workers is relatively high.

But such harsh conditions should not be seen as being confined to the Sugar Cane farms only. Inside the factory is the other place where serious dehumanizing conditions may be observed. Apart from the strenuous capacity of the machines themselves, and the workers' struggle to compete with them as we have seen above, there is yet the uncomfortable atmosphere in the factory. Both the noise from the running engines and the heat from the boiler is sickening. The noise dulls the nerves and the heat highly de-hydrates. Indeed, a clerk within the factory to whom I was assigned to introduce me to the workers informed me that a certain engineer had done a research on the conditions within the factory and had recommended that air conditioning facilities be introduced. However, when I visited the factory no such facilities had been installed, and this clerk reckoned to me that despite those unhealthy conditions, it is the workers themselves who resisted their installation.

But what is most disheartening and painful is that while all this naked exploitation, frustration and dehumanization of labour goes on within these Schemes, there has never emerged any serious leadership of the labour union to realistically change the conditions of the workers. These workers have either been victims of left-wing populist leadership which not only falsely radicalizes them but which also through mistaken views on the social development obscures the reality to them. On the other hand, they have been led by the right-wing populists who do nothing better than to merely ally with the very capitalists who exploit these workers, but whom they purport to be fighting.

As a consequence, any active struggle from these workers has been suffocated. Such leadership has hijacked that collective force for a struggle from these workers. It has rendered them inactive. It has only left them with the individual force. So given these dehumanizing conditions of the work, these workers demonstrate such individual force by abusing, raping and beating any strangers that might interfere with them in their places of work. They also express them by inflicting losses to individual farmers who might anger them by either poorly harvesting or loading their canes.

In Muhoroni Settlement Scheme, therefore, labour interacts with capital directly and the major fraction of capital that interacts with them is the international capital through the E.A.S.I. Company. The state on the other hand provides both the political infrastructure and the administrative machinery, e.g. the Co-operative Union through which this interaction takes place. This direct interaction comes about mainly because of lack of involvement of the plot-owners in Sugar-Cane farming and hence their minimal investments in the farm inputs, e.g. tractors, harrows and labour. The consequence of this interaction, however, is the thorough extraction of surplus-value from and the dehumanization of the Muhoroni workers described above. And this enormous extraction of surplus-value and the thorough dehumanization of labour is largely aided by the fact that there is abundant labour supply in the Scheme.

CHAPTER V

THE POLITICAL PROCESSES IN THE SUGAR-BELT

(The Forms and Nature of Class Struggles since 1960).

Since the beginning of 1960 most parts of Nyanza Province and particularly the Nyando Constituency within which the Muhoroni Sugar Settlement Scheme falls, have largely remained the strongholds of the left-wing populism. In Nyando Constituency particularly, this massive support for the left-wing populism has been boosted precisely because of the fact that Parliamentary politics also coincided with Trade Unionism and the Sugar Plantation workers who subscribe to this Union also happen to be the majority of voters within the Constituency.

Generally, the term populism is used to refer to the ideologies of 'popular movements'. Such movements are often popular with the exploited and the oppressed masses precisely because of their tendency to simplify to them their problems and thus offer non-comprehensive suggestions to the solutions of these problems which also become readily appealing to these masses and hence their popularity. Left-wing populism particularly, tend to emphasize the problems of the exploited and oppressed masses merely in terms of foreign domination which in its extreme takes a racial form. To this category of ideologies, the economic exploitation and the political oppression of the masses can simply be solved by ending foreign domination and transfering both the economic and political power into the hands of the masses. In short, to this category of ideologues, a class analysis of societies so as to come up with a comprehensive programme of action on which a society could be organized is both alien and unrealistic.

In his discussion of populism and political control of working class in Brazil, Erickson Kenneth has, for instance described the term as referring to a type of nationalist political movement which appears when incipient industrialization brings on rapid social change. According to Erickson, nationalism, stemming from political and economic dependency, marks all populist movements. These movements have always arisen in underdeveloped countries (or regions, as in the United States), where they constitute a reaction of increasingly apparent domination by developed capitalist countries. Erickson also argues that "their philosophical value aside, most populist platforms are programmatically and rhetorically similar, again because they arise in economically and/or politically dependent nations. They seek to limit dependence upon foreign capitalism through domestic industrialization and the nationalization of key economic sectors. And that political rhetoric suggests that the evils of capitalism, a foreign economic system, will vanish under economic development guided by the state and managed by the national bourgeoisie - an apparent contradiction in terms, but one which raises few objections during populist heydays."[1]

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1 ERICKSON, K.P., "Populism And Political Control of the Working Class in Brazil" in Ideology And Social Change in Latin America, ed, Gordon And Breach, N. York, 1977, pp. 200-216

He concludes that these movements because they seek a social base in the lower class and their rhetoric emphasizes economic nationalism, state enterprise, and equitable distribution of goods and services, are sometimes confused with socialist ones. However, they are not socialistic because they fail to address themselves to the two important aspects of production, i.e., the issue of social relations of production - particularly the role of the worker as a producer and because they see workers merely as consumers and thus focus mainly on distributing goods and services to them.[1]

And Franco Venturi also in his analysis of the roots of Revolution in Russia has made more or less similar observations. According to Venturi, Russian Populism is the name not of a single political party, nor of a coherent body of doctrine, but of a widespread radical movement in Russia in the middle of the nineteenth century. Venturi observes that these populists looked upon the oppressed and the exploited agricultural workers who formed over 90% of the Russian population as the "Martyrs whose grievances they were determined to avenge and remedy, as embodiments of simpler uncorrupted virtue, whose social organization (which they largely idealized) was the natural foundation on which the future of Russian Society must be rebuilt."[2]

In the process, they failed to grasp the fact that the Russian peasant commune called the <u>mir</u> which they relied upon

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1 ERICKSON, K.P., <u>op. cit.</u> p.207.

2 VENTURI, F., <u>Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in 19th Century Russia</u>, Grosset and Dunlop, New York, 1966 pp. VII-XXV.

to be "the ideal embryo of those socialist groups on which the future society was to be based", were themselves being destroyed by capitalism which was then fast developing in Russia.[1]

Similarly, in Kenya, left-wing populism has manifested itself in a number of instances since the periods of the struggles for political independence and even in the post-independence period. During the later years of the struggle for political independence, the stronghold of left-wing populism became the Kenya African National Union (KANU) against the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) which was essentially a comprador party struggling to preserve colonial interests and foreign domination in an independent Kenya. After the merger of KANU and KADU into KANU in 1964, the left-wing populism again emerged in 1966 out of KANU in the form of the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), leaving KANU with largely comprador elements.

KPU was banned in 1969, but pockets of left-wing populism survived and expressed their sentiments through the radical groups of the elected Members of Parliament. This trend has remained recurrent in the Kenya's post-independent parliamentary politics to this day. Lastly, left-wing populism can be said to have briefly surfaced again in 1977 when there emerged "the change the constitution group". elaborately discussed by Joseph Karimi and Philip Ochieng.[2] During this period, it can

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1 VENTURI, F., _Op. cit._ p. XV

2 For a discussion on this see Karimi, J. and Ochieng, P., _The Kenyatta Succession_. Transafrica. Nairobi, 1980

be argued that, those who supported the change of the Kenya's Constitution so as not to make it automatic for the Vice-President to assume the position of the Presidency when the President dies, represented the broad section of the left-wing populism, whereas those who opposed the move represented largely the comprador elements.

But in Nyando Constituency, the rise and persistence of the left-wing populism can largely be explained on one hand by the rise of Oginga Odinga in Kenya politics as the first elected member of Parliament for the former Central Nyanza Constituency (now comprising Kisumu and Siaya Districts) in 1957, of which Nyando Constituency became part when it was later created; and on the other hand by the influx of the agricultural workers into the Constituency (who generally, because of lack of any alternative socialist movement, readily offer their support to the left-wing populism) and the ascendancy into the leadership of their Sugar Plantation Workers Union by Members of Parliament who are largely left-wing populists. Indeed, Erickson has, for instance, observed that "populist movements enjoy mass support among the lower classes, espouse apparently anti-establishment policies, but are organized and led by politicians from the ruling class."[1]

The Nyando Constituency covers the whole of the seven Settlement Schemes referred to in Chapter II (see also Appendix I),

1 ERICKSON, K.P., op. cit. p. 200

including Muhoroni Settlement Scheme and East Kano Location. It is bordered on the north and west by Tinderet Constituency and on the south and south-west by Winam Constituency. On the east, we have Kericho East Constituency. Before its creation in 1963, the whole area now occupied by the Settlement Scheme fell within the White Scheduled area and was therefore represented by the Colonial Settlers. But East Kano Location which now forms a part of the Constituency, was upto 1963 represented by Oginga Odinga as a part of his Central Nyanza Constituency. And when the whole of former Scheduled Area was turned into a Settlement Scheme and combined with East Kano Location to form the Nyando Constituency, it was administratively brought under Kisumu District which also happened to have been a part of Odinga's Central Nyanza Constituency, together with Siaya District. In effect, therefore, Odinga could be said to have been the first Parliament Representative of the whole of this area including Nyando Constituency, because the majority of the new Settlers in the Schemes were actually recruited from his former voters.

Oginga Odinga entered Parliament as an elected Member for the first time after the 1957 Parliamentary Elections. Before joining politics, he had involved himself in an extensive business. He was instrumental in the launching of the Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation in 1947 which was supposed to be a shining example of the African economic nationalism.[1] According

1 OGINGA-ODINGA, op. cit. p. 78

to Odinga, the Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation, was itself a strategic instrument through which political power could be achieved from the colonial authorities.[1] It was aimed at showing the Colonial Administration that Africans could well compete against the Whites and Asians if given an opportunity. Or as he put it at the time:

> "I was convinced that to start the battle against White domination we had to assert our economic independence. We had to show what we could do by our own effort ---- We had to show we were capable of enterprise and development in the fields beyond our Shambas."[2]

Odinga also argues that it was because of this that the Luo Union East Africa was started, both to unite the Luo Community and to serve as an instrument for recruiting the members of the Luo Community into the Trading Corporation so as to give it a strong financial backing.[3]

But all these ideas were in themselves the brands of left-wing populism. The best such a Trading Corporation could have achieved was to create and expand national capital and thereby provide an opportunity for the rise of a national bourgeoisie. The paradox, however, was that a nation had not been created and given the structure of the economy then, which was predominantly racial, the success of such a venture was not possible. Kenyatta was therefore right when he convinced Odinga to abandon

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1. ODINGA ODINGA, op. cit. p. 76
2. Ibid. p. 76.
3. Ibid. p. 86

the conviction "that Africans had first to attain economic independence for themselves". Kenyatta said:

> "That will come when we have political power. Until we had snatched the reigns of government we would not control the products of our efforts."[1]

Indeed, Odinga soon discovered that his conviction of economic independence within a colonially dominated political system was not possible. He said:

> "It seemed that even in business I could not be independent if I fell out with the government. I was growing increasingly sceptical of the advice we heard from the government that we had to seek economic advancement before political power could be given to us: Wherever we turned government - made obstacles seemed to loom in the way of our economic advance."[2]

However, through the two movements, i.e., the Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation and the Luo Union East Africa, Odinga had successfully managed to create a base for left-wing populism in most parts of Nyanza. And Odinga himself turned out to be the most formidable representative of the left-wing populism both personally and institutionally. In 1957, he successfully compaigned his way into Parliament from this base and from the platforms of the two movements he himself had created. He says to have compaigned thus:

> "As for the Luo Union and the Luo Thrift, which were the organizations which the people had supported under my leadership up to the time of

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1 OGINGA ODINGA, _op_. _cit_. p. 100

2 _Ibid_, p. 97.

> this election, I said that these two bodies were like heifers: they needed a bull to produce calves and milk. The bull was political power and a say in the government."[1]

Consequently, in the 1963 elections, when most of the constituencies were created out of the former larger Central Nyanza Constituency which had been represented by Odinga, virtually all those who were elected to represent these constituencies were left-wing populists. It is no wonder, therefore, that in 1966 when KPU emerged, nearly all the representative members of the constituencies (perhaps with an exception of the Member of Parliament for Winam Constituency, Mr. Oselu-Nyalick, who otherwise had managed to be elected in a by-election following the death of the first representative, Mr. Otieno Oyo, himself a populist) joined it.

The first Member of Parliament to be elected for the Nyando Constituency in the 1963 elections was Okuto Bala. Okuto Bala himself had been a close associate of Mr. Odinga during the latter's leadership of the Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation. And when Odinga stepped down from the leadership of the Corporation in 1957 to contest for the Central Nyanza Parliamentary seat, he surrendered the leadership to Mr. Bala.[2]

Mr. Bala served as the Member of Parliament for Nyando Constituency until he was detained in October 1969 together with

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1 OGINGA ODINGA, op. cit. p. 139

2 Ibid, p. 138

other KPU members. When Mr. Odinga formed KPU in 1966, Mr. Bala was one of the first members of Parliament to cross the floor to join it. And in the 1966 Mini-General Elections which immediately followed the formation of KPU, Mr. Bala contested on the KPU ticket and successfully defended his seat. The success of Mr. Bala on a KPU ticket, therefore, sealed the reality that Nyando Constituency had become a stronghold of left-wing populism.

During the 1969 General Elections which immediately followed the ban of KPU and the detention of its members, most of those who contested the seats which had formerly been held by the KPU members in most parts of Nyanza Province, easily won these seats precisely because they had managed to identify themselves with the personalities of the KPU members who had held those seats. During these elections, most campaigns were characterized by the general slogan that the new contestants were seeking parliamentary seats both to fight for the release of the detained KPU members and to temporarily occupy their seats until they were released. In short, the platform for a successful campaign to parliament was still KPU and its members who had been detained, i.e, left-wing populism. In the case of Nyando constituency, Mr. Tom Ogalo on his parliamentary campaign on this platform and served the contituency as a Member of Parliament until 1974.

It is apparent, however, that during the first election in the constituency in 1963, the KPU mini General Election of 1966 and even the 1969 elections, most of the voters who participated in the Nyando Constituency elections were imported from the adjoining locations outside the Constituency. In 1963, since the settling of the new Settlers had not been effected in Muhoroni Settlement Scheme and the other Settlement Schemes in the Constituency, it is obvious that those who participated in the elections of the Constituency were basically those recruited from East Kano Location which is also a part of the Constituency. The remaining lot must have come from other locations outside the Constituency. But during the 1966 Mini-General Elections and the 1969 General elections, although the new Settlers had been settled on the Schemes, their high propensity to vote in the Constituencies of their original locations, still could not make it unnecessary to import voters into the constituency. The trend started to change in 1974. And the population of the Constituency started to become more and more stable mainly as a result of the complete Settlement of the Schemes and the influx of the agricultural workers.

Whereas in 1969 elections, Mr. Tom Ogalo who won the Nyando Constituency seat polled 7, 735 votes against the total votes of 14,378, in 1 74 Mr. Onyango Midika who won the seat polled 8,966 votes against the total votes of 17,069. There was therefore an increase of about 2,961 votes cast in 1974. This is revealed by Tables XVIII and XIX.

Table XVII: 1969 GENERAL ELECTIONS: CANDIDATE/VOTING

1969 GENERAL ELECTIONS	
CANDIDATES	NO. OF VOTES
TOM OGALLO	7,735
A. MBECHE	2,172
OLIECH ONGUDHA	1,481
S. OPIADA	1,298
J.H. OYAMO	425
KITOTO ADEL	335
J.H. OBIERO	932
TOTAL	14,378

Source: NGWENO, H. ed. Election Handbook, 1979, Stellescope, Ltd., Nrb., 1974.

Table XIX: 1974 GENERAL ELECTIONS: CANDIDATE/VOTING

1974 GENERAL ELECTIONS	
CANDIDATES	NO. OF VOTES
ONYANGO MIDIKA	8,966
TOM OGALLO	7,630
JACOB ONGUDHA	235
OGINDO OYAMO	133
TOTAL	17,069

Source: NGWENO, H. ed. Election Handbook, 1979, Stellescope Ltd., Nrb. 1974.

This increase, it may be argued, could have been brought about by the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18 years which was done in 1974 and by the mobilization and the general improvement in the administration of the voting system. However, in the case of Nyando Constituency, this increase can largely be attributed to the increase in the number of Agricultural Workers who were migrating into the constituency. In the first place, the high tendency of the plot-holders to vote in their former constituencies is a phenomenon which has not been curbed up to now. Secondly, given the fact that most of the plot-owners do not live with the members of their families on these plots and that most of them have left most members of their families in their original homes, some are in schools, others are living with their parents in their places of work in Urban Centres and others are wage earners in Urban Centres, the lowering of the voting age cannot be regarded as a major factor in explaining this increase, particularly in the Schemes.

This differs with the case of the Agricultural Workers. According to our sample, about 87% of the workers interviewed claimed that Nyando Constituency has been their voting Constituency. This can be seen in Table XX below.

Table XX: VOTING CONSTITUENCY OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

VOTING CONSTITUENCY	WORKERS	
	No.	%
NYANDO	79	87
OTHER	10	11
NO RESPONSE	2	2
TOTAL	91	100

Source: Interviews conducted by the author in the Scheme in 1980.

From Table XX above it can be seen that of the 91 workers interviewed, 79 of them claimed that Nyando Constituency is their voting Constituency. Only 10 stated that they voted in constituencies other than Nyando.

The Agricultural Workers began to have serious impact in the politics of Nyando Constituency in 1974 when they played a major role in voting into Parliament Mr. Onyango Midika during that year's General Elections. In that election, Midika beat Tom Ogalo who had represented the Constituency since 1969. The reason why Midika beat Ogalo was largely because of his previous role in the Scheme before he joined politics. Before contesting the seat, Mr. Midika had been a Personnel Manager with the Chemilil Sugar Factory in the Constituency. During his tenure as a Personnel Manager, Mr. Midika had demonstrated his left-wing populist tendencies, characterized by hostilities against the Asian and European staff members of the Management. In the process, he managed to create an impression among the workers of being one of those who advocated the Africanization of the Industry. This earned him admiration from the workers as one of those who 'represented' their interests in the Management. Indeed, it is from this left-wing populist plat form he created, that Midika went ahead to capture the leadership of the Sugar Plantation Workers Union in 1975.

Midika's Parliamentary election victory in 1974 and his election as the Secretary-General of the Sugar Plantation Workers Union in 1975, therefore, created a coincidence of Parlimentary politics and Trade Unionism in the Sugar-Belt. During his first term in Parliament, between 1974 and 1979, Midika constantly complained in Parliament and through the Press about the social and economic problems of the Sugar Plantation Workers. This, Midika had to do because he was the Secretary-General of the Sugar Plantation Workers Union and because the majority of these Workers also happened to be his constituents. Consequently, when the 1979 Parliamentary elections came, Midika easily defended his seat and demonstrated that he had become a formidable representative of the area as can be seen from the results in Table XXI below.

Table XXI: 1979 GENERAL ELECTIONS: CANDIDATES/VOTING

1979 GENERAL ELECTIONS	
CANDIDATES	NO. OF VOTERS
M.C.O. Midika	17,233
J.A. Owuor	6,849
T.O. Ogada	4,849
W.K. Adel	405
TOTAL VOTES CAST	29,539
SPOILT	200

Source: The Weekly Review, November 10. 1979.

After this election, Midika confessed to the Workers in the Scheme that it was because of them that he had won the seat. He stated that more than half of his 17,233 votes had come from them. Whether this was merely a populist propaganda to lure more votes in the Union elections which were soon to follow or not, is in itself not very important. What is important, however, is the fact that the Workers went ahead to support Mr. Midika in the Union elections which followed in 1981. And in that election Mr. Midika again managed to re-capture his seat as the Secretary-General of the Sugar Plantation Workers Union.

However, the domination of the left-wing populism in the Nyando Constituency has not survived unchallenged. Various attempts have been made particularly by the Management of the Sugar Factories in the Sugar-Belt by sponsoring the comprador elements or the right-wing populists to snatch the leadership of the Sugar Plantation Workers Union from these left-wing populists. These are done through organized 'coups' especially when the general elections of the Union are approaching with the hope that when the elections actually take place, the new members may be endorsed. Nevertheless, these attempts have not managed to dislodge the control of the left-wing populists.

In 1974 for instance, it was reported in one of the local dailies that the then General-Secretary of the Union, Mr. Denis Akumu had been constitutionally dismissed from the post. The paper said:

> "The General-Secretary of the Kenya Union of Sugar Plantation Workers, Mr. Denis Akumu, was constitutionally dismissed at an emergency Central Council Meeting, the Union's Chairman-General Mr. Elly Rao, claimed in Nairobi yesterday. ------ The newly appointed Secretary-General, Mr. Ogada Rao, said it was a clear fight between him and Mr. Akumu and other Unions should keep clear of the issue."[1]

Mr. Akumu himself had been a strong KPU supporter and later a Member of Parliament for Nyakach Constituency in Nyanza Province. But when the KUSPW elections were called in 1975, Mr. Rao failed to survive his 'clear fight' against Akumu. In that election, Mr. Midika won the seat of the Secretary-General.

Again in June 1979 a similar take-over was reported also through a local daily. This time the Standard Newspaper reported that Mr. Evans Kamire had taken over from Mr. Midika as the new Secretary-General and that the case had gone upto the Court and Mr. Kamire had been recognized as the Secretary.[2] As a result of this, the Deputy Registrar of Trade Unions ordered for the elections of the Union. And in the March 1981 elections which followed, Mr. Midika again recaptured the seat. The Standard Newspaper reported:

> "The General-Secretary of the Kenya Union of Sugar Plantation Workers, Mr. Onyango Midika has recaptured the seat which he lost during a 'coup' in the Union two years ago. He polled 39 votes against the incumbent Mr. Evans Kamire's 25 votes. ---- The election battle which was mainly between Midika's faction and Kamire's faction saw Midika's group win all the seats."[3]

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1 Daily Nation, 8th February, 1974

2 The Standard, 20th June, 1979

3 The Standard, 16th March, 1981

The reason why the Agricultural Workers have managed to become the major determinants of the Nyando Constituency politics cannot necessarily be attributed to their number alone. On the contrary, the reason can also largely be the fact that Workers can easily be mobilized. Unlike the plot-owners, most of whom are in the Urban Centres as either bureaucrats, professionals or businessmen or are still having closer affinities with their original homes, the Agricultural Workers see most of their immediate and genuine problems to be confined within the Constituency. Here is where they have their immediate employer, the E.A.S.I. Company, whom they can identify and easily confront. They have a 'single' employer and are hence sharing identical economic and social problems in most cases. But above all they live and work together most of the time. In short, they can easily be mobilized for a joint action.

Unfortunately, neither the left-wing populists who have dominated the Union leadership and the Parliamentary politics in the Constituency, nor the right-wing populists who have attempted to snatch the leadership of the Union, have managed to organize these Workers adequately so as to change their social and economic conditions for the better. Indeed, it is typical of populist movements by their very nature of lack of any comprehensive ideology, to offer any realistic solution that could improve the social and econom conditions of the Working class as a whole. Erickson for insta ce, has particularly observed with the case of Brazil that during its era, populism provided few material benefits for workers. On the contrary, it "hindered the development of strong and autonomous working class organizations."[1] At best, what populism can and often does is to offer utopian suggestion to the solution of workers problems.

In the case of Muhoroni Sugar Settlement Schemes, Mr. Onyango-Midika as the Secretary-General of KUSPW in 1975 for instance offered such a suggestion. The Nation Newspaper reported him to have said:

> "Sugar Workers want to buy out the industry from foreign hands. --- The Union Secretary-General Mr. Onyango-Midika MP told the Nation his 10,000 Member Union has resolved to contribute 10/- per member per month to give it a net capital share of £5,000 every month and a net yearly share capital of Shs. 1,2000,000."[2]

The implication of this argument is that economic problems of the workers could be improved if the industry were Africanized. But needless to say, Chapter III and IV has revealed to us quite clearly that given the nature in which production is organized and the way in which capital interacts with labour, it does not matter who owns capital, it will still subject the workers into those very conditions if it has to reproduce itself.

This poor populist leadership has also been characterized by low recruitment and poor organization of the workers into what is supposed to be their Union the KUSPW. According to our sample, only 28% of the workers interviewed belonged to the Union. The remaining 72% were un-Unionized. The figures are as follows:

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1 ERICKSON, K.P., op. cit. p.202

2 Daily Nation, 1(h May, 1975

Table: XXII MEMBERSHIP OF KUSPW IN MUHORONI SCHEME.

MEMBERSHIP OF THE SUGAR UNION	WORKERS	
	No.	%
YES	26	28
NO	66	72
TOTAL	92	100

Source: Interviews conducted by the author in the Scheme in 1980.

With such a low recruitment, it follows that the majority of the Workers cannot be organized. And with a poor organization, it means that they cannot be properly educated on their legal rights within the Union vis-a-vis the capitalists. Since most of the Workers live together in the camps within the Schemes which otherwise lack any recreational facilities, genuine leadership would have substituted the lack of such facilities with education for its members. This would have also helped in reducing the rate of 'chang'aa' drinking which now seems to be the only alternative of spending the free periods, after work. This would have also helped in the improvement of the health of these Workers which is currently being ruined by the illicit drink.

In the Muhoroni Sugar Settlement Scheme, therefore, the predominance of th left-wing populist politics has made it difficult for the orkers to be strongly organized and hence to be educated on the nature of their problems vis-a-vis their employers. Instead, these populists have only managed to falsely radicalize them. Both the poor organization, lack of education and false radicalism have resulted into the decline or total lack of a collective form of struggle among these Workers. They have therefore been left with individual struggles expressed in the form of individual violent behaviour. But in the process and as a result of all these, the social and economic conditions of these Workers continue to deteriorate rather than improve.

THE CONCLUSIONS

The main idea behind the creation of the Million Acre Settlement Scheme Programme, of which Muhoroni Settlement Scheme is a part was to settle the former landless peasants and the unemployed whose number had increased tremendously during the colonial settlement and who therefore posed a serious threat to the peaceful transition to political independence in Kenya. But for the colonial settlers and the British Government, their aim was also to co-opt the emerging Kenyan 'middle Classes' who were soon replacing the colonial administrators as key policy makers into the Kenya's colonial economic system, and also to commit Kenya's economic future to the international capitalist development. This is why the international donors including the World Bank were encouraged to support and finance the Programme.

Various cash crops were introduced for different settlement schemes and marketing facilities were also organized for the same cash crops. In the case of Muhoroni Settlement Scheme, sugar cane was introduced for the new settlers who were each holding a plot of land averaging to about 11.6 acres and each plot segmented into three equal portions for the purposes of organising production. A processing industry was also established at Muhoroni by a multinational company as the sole buyer of cane from the new settlers. The Programme was expected to provide each plot holder with subsistence, plus annual land and development loan repayments and a £100 cash income per annum. In a nutshell, this was a situation where both the state and the international capital intervened to initiate the formation of a stable 'middle peasantry' capable of reproducing itself adequately from the land and also serving the interest of capital through commodity production relations. However, the start would have not been more false.

The immediate bottleneck in the whole programme was the legally binding agreement of a Settlement Charge and Land Development Loans which each and every settler had to enter into with the state before being allocated a plot. For the plot-holders, holding an average of 11.6 acreas of land, (and who actually form the majority) the Settlement Charge was KShs. 3,700 and the Land Development Loan was KShs. 4,300. These are to be repaid in a period of 30 and 10 years respectively, at a rate of two annual instalments of Kshs. 600, with a cumulative interest of 6% per annum on each.[1]

The technicality involved in this arrangement is that a plot holder cannot legally claim the ownership of the plot he has been allocated, at least until some 30 years later from the date of the agreement and only after he completes repaying back to the state, the Settlement Charge and the Land Development Loans. This also means that the farmer cannot be issued with an individual title on the land which would legally entitle him to the plot he has been allocated.

The lack of individua land titles has made it almost impossible for the farmers to enter into any form of credit negotiations with the commercial banks an other financial institutions to obtain loans on the security of thei plots which a farmer could negotiate at his own advantage. The commercial banks and other financial institutions

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1 Sugar Settlement Organization Records at Muhoroni.

are rightly reluctant to enter into such negotiations with the farmers because their plots cannot be legally accepted as securities. The consequence of this is that the sources of credit facilities to the farmers have been reduced to mainly the state financing institutions, e.g. the agricultural co-operatives and other parastatal bodies, like the Agricultural Finance Corporation which in most cases would not provide the farmers with a wider options for bargain.

Furthermore, the recoveries on the Settlement Charges and Land Development Loans were began almost immediately after the allocation of the plots. But since in most cases, it was not possible for the farmers to meet these recoveries immediately as they were to rely on the proceeds from their first harvests, these recoveries were accumulated such that when the proceeds from the first harvest came, they were depleted, in most cases to nil returns. The consequence was that most farmers could not manage to develop the remaining portions of their plots or even to maintain the already planted portions in terms of weeding, etc.

It was at this stage that both the state and the East African Sugar Industries Company came up with the idea of the maintenance loans. The maintenance loan is supposed to assist a farmer in maintaining the already developed portion of the plot and also to develop the remaining portion. Its main sources have been the E.A.S.I. Ltd., and the Sugar Settlement Organization. In most cases, it has been readily available to the farmers, although not without some forms of discrimination in its distribution among the farmers. But the main disadvantage with this type of loan is that in most cases, it is offered in kind rather than in cash. For example, if a farmer requires his plot to be ploughed, he would negotiate with either the SSO or the E.A.S.I. Ltd. to provide the necessary machines and labour to do the work and then invoice the farmer. The bill would then be recovered from the farmer's proceeds after the harvests.

Through this mechanism, the maintenance loans serves the interests of the state and the E.A.S.I. Ltd. more than they serve the interest of the farmers. First, they ensure a continuous and steady supply of cane to the factory regardless of whether a farmer earns anything from the harvest or not. Secondly, it is not possible to default in repaying back this loan because it is recovered from the proceeds of the harvests even if it means that the recovery will deplete the proceeds to nil. Thirdly, the process makes it profitable for the E.A.S.I. Ltd. to invest in the farm inputs, particularly the agricultural implements and transport because the Company is optimistic that the investment will repay back. The farmer on the other hand is placed in a position in which his decision-making power is limited and he is also discouraged and he is financially incapable of making similar investments.

The above facts combined, frustrated any efforts from the farmers from the outset and reduced them to mere paupers who merely lease their plots to both the state and the international capital with remote hopes that they may even earn something from the proceeds after the notorious recoveries have been made.

At another level, the renumeration of the farmers in terms of the prices offered for sugar cane per ton has been very poor. Although the prices of cane per ton to the producer has steadily increased since 1972, the rate of the increase has been quite low to compensate for the high costs in production incurred by the producers. Furthermore, there has been a tendency for the E.A.S.I. Ltd. Company to inflate the costs of their services to the farmers whenever, the prices of cane are announced such that the increases in the price of cane in the final analysis benefit the E.A.S.I. Ltd. Company rather than the farmers. But even in comparison with other cash crops in the country, e.g. coffee, tea and pyrethrum, the pricing of sugar cane has been very poor to motivate and encourage the producers. Such facilities like the bonuses earned by farmers of other cash crops, e.g. tea, have not been similarly organised to the sugar cane farmers.

Finally, the whole programme has also suffered from the lack of efficient and dedicated administrative leadership in the organization of production. This has mainly been brought about by the duplication of roles between the SSO and the E.A.S.I. Ltd., Company.

When, for example, the SSO attempted to wind up out of the Scheme and to hand over most of its duties to the Sugar Belt Co-operative Union in the early 1970s, and when the SBCU failed to take root and soon collapsed, an administrative and leadership vacuum was created which was not re-occupied properly by the SSO when it took over again. These roles were in a way divided between the SSO and the E.A.S.I. Ltd. without specifying clearly which ones were to be handled by the E.A.S.I. Ltd. and which ones by the SSO. It is now not easy to identify which institution is supposed to provide guidance in the policy making in relation to the development of cane production in the Scheme. Each institution perform every role and does it inadequately because of the confusion between them.

The immediate consequences of this adminstrative confusion are the common complains voiced by the farmers about delays in the harvesting and transportation of the cane. This adminstrative confusion has brought about a situation whereby it would not be very easy to predict the trends of cane production on the Scheme.

The above factors combined together with the ones already enumerated are the main causes of the failure to prop-up a category of a stable middle peasant farmers as was intended when the Programme was launched. The consequence, on the contrary, has been the stagnation or even the deterioration of the peasantry on the Scheme to the extent that majority of them are turning into agricultural labourers by also selling their labour power to the E.A.S.I. Ltd. farms or to the factory, to supplement their subsistence.

And in a situation where commodity production cannot be located among the 'middle peasantry', the peasantry can only be said to be actively involved in commodity production as a wage labourer who sells his labour power, either full time or part time to capital. Such is the peasantry that is said to have been marginalized by capital. And a peasantry so marginalized, begins from a weaker position when capital confronts him at the market place to purchase his labour power. The consequence is that he is thoroughly exploited. That is the Muhoroni situation.

At the political level, the political processes operating on the Scheme are not capable of solving the problems of the peasants who are engaged in producing cane on the Scheme. Politically, this category is poorly organized and hence very weak. It does not seem to have an impact on the Parliamentary representation of the constituency. This is because the majority continue to retain strong affinities and loyalties to their ancestral homes and indeed vote in their former constituencies. The only category with political impact on the Parliamentary and trade union representation are the agricultural workers, most of whom are also the members of the Sugar Cane Plantation Workers Union. Unfortunately, it has fallen a victim of the left-wing populism politics whose tendencies have been known to only misguide and cannot organize workers into programmes which can bring about any constructive change. Since 1963, the agricultural workers have only been electing such left-wing populist leaders both in Parliament and in the Trade Unions, yet no improvements on their conditions of work have been noticed. On the contrary, their conditions continue to deteriorate and the rate of their exploitation has continued to increase.

In a nutshell, this study has then demonstrated that in the case of the Muhoroni Sugar Scheme, the intervention of international capital in alliance with state capital has not led to fast capital formation among the indigenous producers, thereby creating indigenous capitalists. Instead it has led to complete stagnation and even to the total lack of capital formation among the indigenous producers and thereby turning the majority of them into impoverished poor peasants and agricultural workers whose social and economic status continuously deteriorate.

However, it is our belief that the situation may be rectified if the following recommendations are taken into consideration:-

(i) The Settlement Charges and Land Development Loans should be abolished and individual titles for the plots be issued to farmers. This would make it possible for the farmers to negotiate loans from the commercial banks and other financial institutions on the security of their plots.

(ii) The accumulated loans so far unrecovered as a result of poor harvests or nil returns by the farmers should be written off by the state to enable the farmers to regain a new lease of life, motivation and initiative to at least put some efforts in developing their plots.

(iii) There should be constant review of the sugar cane prices vis-a-vis the costs in production so as to establish prices which could be benefitial to farmers. Bonus schemes should also be introduced so as to encourage and motivate the lazy farmers to increase their efforts in cane production.

(iv) The administrative organization of producing cane on the Scheme should be streamlined such that clear roles to be performed by the SSO and those to be performed by the E.A.S.I. Ltd., would be clearly specified. The dangerous tendency which is also developing in the Scheme whereby the E.A.S.I. Ltd., seems to be monopolizing most of the adminstrative and managerial roles on the Scheme, should be discouraged because as a Multinational Company, the E.A.S.I. Ltd. if left to monopolize such roles would only serve its own interests at the expense of the farmers. The government should therefore step in to demand the sharing of the managerial roles with the Company even within the factory.

Appendix I



Fig. I: THE REGIONAL MAP OF THE SUGAR-BELT SETTLEMENT SCHEMES

CODE: MUHCRONI

FARMER:

TOTAL ACREAGE:

Under Cane 1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1979

LOANS	AMOUNT	YEAR	PURPOSE

Settlement Charge:

Land and Development
Loans:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Maintenance Loans:	AMOUNT	YEAR	PURPOSE

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Repayments (accumulated) before 1. harvest .... Ksh.
2. "
3. "
4. "
5. "

PRODUCTION

Year	Harvest Tons	Price Per Ton	Cross Revenue	Purpose for Deductions	Amount.	Net Revenue

APPENDIX III

FARMERS INTERVIEW

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Plot No
2. Size
3. Name
4. Age
5. Sex
6. Are you the owner of this plot?

   Yes

   No

7. If not, what is your role in this plot?
8. Who manages this plot?
9. When did you acquire this plot?
10. Before you came here where were you?
11. What were you doing?
12. Did you own any piece of land?
13. What other jobs do you do?
14. Do you have any other pieces of land else where?

   Yes

   No

15. If, yes who lives on it?
16. Into what use have you put it?
17. What implements do you use for farming?

   (i)
   (ii)
   (iii
   (iv)
   (v)
   etc.

18. Which ones are your own?

19. Which ones do you hire?

20. Which ones are provided by friend, relatives etc.?

21. Do you employ wage labour?

Yes

No

22. If yes, how many labourers do you have?

23. How much do you pay each of them per month?

24. How many times a year do you hire casual labour?

25. How many times have you harvested since you settled on the farm?

26. How much do you pay them each time you hire them?

27. Do you offer yourself as a casual/wage labour to other farmers/ factory?

28. How much land is under can now?

29. Do you involve your family on farm labour?

30. What is your average income each time you harvest?

31. What is the size of your family? i.e. the number of wives and children.

32. How many members of your family are below 15 years of age?

33. How many are above 15 years of age?

34. How many are in school?

35. How many are wage earners?

36. Do all members of your family live on the farm?

Yes

No

37. If not, where do others live?

38. How many people in total live on this farm?

39. How many of them are wage earners?

40. How many are dependants, i.e. below 15 years of age/disabled?

41. Since you settled on this farm how many times have you voted for a parliamentary candidate?

42. How many times for a council candidate?

43. How many times has your candidate won a parliamentary seat?

44. How many times for a council seat?

45. What factors have influenced you to vote for this parliamentary candidate?

46. And for a council candidate?

47. What problems have these candidates helped to solve?

48. Have you taken part in Sugar Union Elections?

Yes

No

49. If yes, what factors influence you to vote for a particular candidate in the Union?

50. What is your education standard?

* Select at least 20 farmers; 5 from the poor peasantry; 5 from the middle peasantry; 5 from the rich peasantry and the remaining 5 randomly and instruct them to keep a record, either in the form of reciepts or recorded somewhere, of how much they spend to reproduce each day. Instruct them that you will collect these records after a week from the day of the interview.

WORKERS INTERVIEW

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Name
2. Age
3. Sex
4. For how long have you been in the settlement schemes?
5. What type of work do you do in the Sugar Industry?
6. How many hours a day do you work, i.e. from what time to what time?
7. How many days a week?
8. For how long have you been working like that now?
9. How much do you earn per hour/day?
10. How much do you earn per month?
11. Do you own a farm in the settlement?

    Yes

    No

12. If yes, how big is the farm?
13. What do you grow/keep in the farm?
14. Who manages it for you?
15. Who lives on it?
16. What is the size of the population that live on it?
17. How many people are below 15 years of age?
18. How many are above 15 years of age?
19. Do you work on that farm?

    Yes

    No

20. If yes when do you work on it?
21. Do you have a family?

    Yes

    No

22. If yes, how big is the family, i.e. the number of wives and children?

23. How many of your children are below 15 years of age?

24. How many are above 15 years of age?

25. How many are in school?

26. How many are wage earners?

27. Where does your family live?

28. Where do you live?

29. Does the employer provide you with accommodation?

30. How much do you pay for your accommodation?

31. What other provisions do you receive from the employer?

32. Since you attained your voting age where have you been voting for both the parliamentary and civic elections?

*If Nyando consitituency proceed with the interview.

33. How many times have you voted for a parliamentary candidate?

34. How many times for a council candidate?

35. How many times has your candidate won a parliamentary seat?

36. How many times for a council seat?

37. What factors have influenced you to vote for this parliamentary candidate?

38. And for a council candidate?

39. What problems have these candidates helped you to solve?

40. Do you belong to the Sugar Union?

41. For how long have you been a member?

42. Do you take part in the Sugar Union elections?

43. How many times have you taken part in elections?

44. How many times has your candidate succeeded to secure a seat in the Union leadership?

45. Why have you supported this particular candidate at different times? State why you have supported each of them.

46. What notable contributions can you identify as having been been achieved by the Union? Enumerate.

47. Would you vie for any position in the Union leadership?

48. What is your education standard?

49. Do you enjoy your work?

50. If not, why?

* Select about 20 workers randomly. Instruct them to keep a record, either in the form of receipts or written somewhere of how much they spend to reproduce themselves each day. Remind them that you will collect these records after a week from the day of the interview.

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