

**EXAMINING LOCAL MALLS DISASTER MITIGATION AND PREPAREDNESS  
STRATEGY AGAINST TERROR ATTACKS IN NAIROBI**


**PRESENTED BY**

**EVERLYNE MWENDE MUTUNGI**

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## DECLARATION

This is my original work done with close supervision of my university supervisor. All sources have been referenced in sections cited and the rest is my own.

**Name:** Everlyne Mwende Mutungi

**Reg. No:** C50/68792/2013

**Signature:** 

University Supervisor Declaration

This work has been submitted with my approval as university supervisor.

**Name:** Dr. Kathleen Anangwe

**Sign:** \_



**Date:** 16.11.2022

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this work to my children, Warren and Tendai, who were my motivation in completing this project. To my late parents Mutungi and Mbeneka, I know you would be proud of me.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to thank God for his sufficient blessings that enabled me to undertake and complete this project successfully.

There are many beautiful souls and special people who walked with me in this process to ensure a successful outcome. I would have loved to acknowledge them all, but due to constraints, I will name a few, but my gratitude is to all.

First, I wish to acknowledge my supervisor Dr. Kathleen Anangwe whose unwavering support, patience understanding, encouragement, and academic guidance has been key in the completion of this project.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

CCTV	Close Circuit Television
CI	Critical Infrastructure

GTI	Global Terrorism Index
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Device
IS	Islamic State
MO	Modus Operandi
TRM	Thika Road Mall
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
NPS	National Police Service
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Authority
DHS	Department of Homeland Security

## **ABSTRACT**

This study was carried out against the backdrop of the Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi and an era of increasing terror attacks on soft targets globally. Notably, additional incidences in Kenya include the Dusitd2 attack of January 2019. Despite the Westgate attack being a key reference learning point for global disaster managers, few studies exist in Kenya on mitigation and preparedness strategies against terror attacks in shopping malls. This study aimed at contributing to knowledge on mitigation and preparedness for terror attacks in shopping malls

using the case study of one of the largest new malls in the city in an affluent neighbourhood, by examining the mitigation and disaster preparedness strategies against terror attacks. The study was guided by the following objectives: the role of mitigation and preparedness strategy for city malls; assess how the setup of security Management Systems of the Mall contributes to the mitigation and preparedness strategy; determine the nature of training offered to the security management team at the Mall and to assess the challenges faced by the mall disaster response department in the implementation of the mitigation and preparedness strategy against terrorism, and their key recommendations. The study used the Rational choice theory (RCT), and the circle capacities theory as a basis for framing the significance of disaster preparedness and mitigation. The study employed a descriptive research design targeting 262 security officers to whom questionnaires were administered and 5 mall managers as KIIs. Stratified random sampling was used to divide the security officers into strata based on role hierarchy from an existing employee database and simple random sampling to select respondents from each strata. Observation method was also used to observe the security management systems deployed at the mall. Quantitative Data collected was analysed by coding and interpreting which was then presented as frequencies, percentages tables, pie charts, histograms, and thematic discussion after content analysis of the qualitative data. The study's major findings and recommendations were noted as follows: The mall's strategy was adequate to mitigate and prepare against a terror attack since the mall has in place an advanced security management system that comprises among others, a large number of CCTV cameras that use revolutionary technology to offer security solutions, and an X-ray screening system that detects any hidden weapons in vehicles and on pedestrians, as well as retractable bollards that ensure that an individual cannot forcefully gain access. The mall has deployed an adequate number of security guards that are complemented by armed police officers to ensure the safety of their customers. The mall management regularly conducts a comprehensive training program that is oriented toward terrorism. Joint emergency and security drills between the mall and other emergency and security agents including international security agents are conducted regularly to enhance the security and disaster response posture of the mall. Some of the challenges noted in the implementation of the strategy include the need for the mall to ensure gender equity in terms of the deployment of its security officers. The high turnover of guards poses a challenge to the training of security guards at the mall, who have to be retrained regularly. The study recommends that city malls enhance the disaster and mitigation strategy against terror attacks through measures such as conducting risk assessments, drafting and implementing emergency plans, deployment of effective security management systems, conducting continuous training and promoting collaboration with security state agents and emergency responders.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background of the Study**

Natural and man-made catastrophes have continued to cause substantial destruction to both human life and property since time immemorial. Disasters as per the United Nations definition, are events that distract the normal occurrences/activities in a community resulting in losses in human life, material, economic and environmental losses, compounded by the lack of resources by the community to manage the aftermath unaided (UNDP).

Disasters , therefore, disrupt the sociology of a community through loss of human life, damage or loss of property, infrastructure, business disruption, environmental damage, on a level that the affected community is unable to cope with. It requires emergency services and response to save human life and restore normalcy after a disaster through proper management and acknowledgment of the disaster cycle - prevention, reduction, preparedness, and response. Disaster preparedness activities should be projected towards ensuring that there is minimum loss of life, and to reduce the downtime of those affected, so that economic activities are least affected, enabling normalcy to reduce in the shortest time possible (Peek, 2012). The success of the strategies spelled out in a disaster preparedness plan is anchored on how well an institution responds to an event as outlined by the disaster cycle

A disaster management cycle is a collection of all compendious actions that are put in place before a disaster strikes, during the disaster and after the disaster (NDMA, 2006). The cycle is essential in ensuring that communities faced with disaster either prevent the occurrence of the disaster reducing the impact or enable the community to recover from the event (Joshi,2008). The disaster cycle is made up of four phases that can be defined as mitigation which refers to the actions taken before the disaster strikes to lessen the aftermath of a disaster, preparedness which

can be described as measures put in place to respond to the disaster, response which are immediate steps taken in the midst and after a disaster with the sole objective of saving lives and minimising injuries, minimising property destruction and ensuring business continuity and recovery, which involves community resumption of normal daily activities (Dynes et.al ,2007).

Mitigation is part of the disaster cycle that comprises of concise steps that are put in place to prevent, deter, or reduce the aftermath of a disaster. The Hyogo Framework for Action posits that mitigation actions that are aimed at significantly reducing loss of life, property, injuries, sociological, psychological, and economic impacts form the core of the disaster management cycle. An understanding of historical occurrences such as previous terrorist attacks, coupled with policies and organizational culture are critical in developing mitigation strategies. Mitigation strategies include target hardening measures such as surveillance, risk assessments, security management systems that make it difficult for terrorist to plan and execute an attack, as compared to the past (Gougelet, 2016). Since terrorism cannot be predicted, mitigation strategies are crucial in cushioning shopping malls against its consequences, as well as increasing the capacity of the mall to respond to disaster should a terror attack occur.

The disaster cycle also comprises of the preparedness phase that can be described as activities such as training, emergency plans, collaboration between various emergency responders, gathering of and sharing intelligence that acts as an early warning system, that a community, or an organisation puts in place to respond to a disaster that was not mitigated (Berke et.al, 2012). Carlsen & Liburd (2008) argue that lack of sufficient preparedness strategies often results in catastrophic outcomes including significant loss of life, injuries as well as socio-economic negative impact in the community.

Contemporary scholars have opined that disasters are an interphase of natural, technological, sociological, or manmade factors (Perry & Quarantelli 2005). Disasters can be classified as natural or manmade. Natural disasters are caused by natural factors such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, drought, fires (GOK, 2009). Examples of natural disasters that have struck the world include Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the earthquake of Haiti of 2010, as well as the Nepal earthquake of 2015 (Deen, 2015). Manmade disasters on the other hand are caused by negligence for instance accidents, or intentional acts such as arson, genocides, and terrorism (GOK, 2009).

Terrorism originating from religious based groups founded on extremist philosophies is a major calamity facing the contemporary world, with terror attacks resulting in mass fatalities, casualties as well as rampant destruction of property and the environment (Rodríguez, Quarantelli & Dynes, 2007). Terrorism can be depicted based on geographical, cultural, political, sociological, economical elements, giving the term a multilayered definition (Purpura, 2007). Terrorism typologies are divided into eight major categories: New terrorism which is denoted by attacks from rebel terror groups both new and upcoming seeking political, religious, or moral validation with the ultimate goal of causing mass casualties. Other types of terrorism include State Terrorism which is terrorism by nations/ governments against perceived enemies, Dissident Terrorism which are terror acts by nonstate agents, religious groups as well as ethnic groups, Religious Terrorism committed for exaltation of a particular belief, considered to be superior/true as compared to other beliefs, Ideological Terrorism that seeks to advance the political ideologies and agenda of a group against another, International Terrorism that supersedes borders of nation states and the target of the attacks is based on nationalism of countries perceived to be enemies or allies of enemy states, Criminal Dissident Terrorism that is

purely acts of terror for economic gain, and Gender-Selective Terrorism where attacks are carried out against either men or women because of their gender. (Martin, 2017).

New Terrorism characterises majority of terror attacks that are carried out in the modern era targeting unarmed civilians in unprotected areas commonly referred to as soft targets (Neumann, 2009). The terror attacks are staged out in countries that are far flung from those in conflict and attacks targeted on 'soft targets' (Martin, 2017). This type of terrorism is unequivocal from other types of terrorism as it seeks to advance goals and objectives that are abstract, concurrently causing mass social, economic and psychological destruction, using independent players that are cell based and often lack hierarchy but are affiliated with a certain terror group. Terrorists carefully select their targets to ensure the advancement of their agenda, whether political, religious, economic. Terror attacks like those witnessed in Kenya in the recent past on unarmed civilians can be classified as New Terrorism.

The Islamic State (IS) has transformed the modus operandi of terrorist attacks from targeting closely guarded government installations using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), to targeting civilians in public spaces, referred to as 'soft targets' using individuals armed with small weapons such as guns, grenades, knives or adorning suicide vests (Sternova, 2017). Soft targets can therefore be described as locations or persons that are portrayed as an easy target to a terror attack due to their actions or inaction thereby increasing their risk profile, while hard targets are people or places whose actions help them minimise or prevent their susceptibility to terror attacks. Soft targets are often a preferred choice for terror attacks as people in these places are unarmed and the lack of situational awareness coupled with the element of surprise produces maximum casualties (Hesterman, 2015). Soft targets include but are not limited to shopping malls, schools, public transport, stadiums, markets amongst others.

Most notable attack on a 'soft target' is the Al Qaeda September 11, 2001, twin tower attack that killed over 3,000, injured thousands and destroyed property worth billions of dollars. Other attacks on soft targets include a 2004 attack on a train in Spain's capital, Madrid that killed 192 people and injuring the 2,000 people. In 2015, ISIS gunmen attack the Bataclan concert hall in Paris during a concert, killing 130 people and left 350 others wounded (Fagel, 2017). Following the 9/11 twin tower attacks, security intelligence reports have indicated that the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks had completed initial planning for further terror attacks against key soft targets in the United States including the Walt Disney, the Mall of America, the Sears Towers and unnamed sports facilities (Merzer, Savino, & Murphy, 2001).

Africa continues to be a target of terrorism attacks from groups with a global footprint such as the Islamic State (IS) and the Al Qaeda as well as local groups such the Al Shabab and the Boko Haram (Beri, 2017). In 2019 for instance, terror attacks globally recorded a death toll of 32,836, a 650% rise compared to deaths recorded in 2018, with Kenya being ranked 21 among countries that are most likely to experience a terrorist attack according to the Global Terrorism Index 2019 (GTI), published by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), marking Kenya as a high-risk country for terror attacks. The existing political, economic, and social-cultural factors are also considered factors leading to numerous terror attacks on civilian populations (Otiso, 2009).

Kenya has had its fair share of terror attacks on soft targets. In September 2013 a terrorist attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Kenya's capital, Nairobi, killed 68 people dead, dozens were wounded, in a siege that lasted for four days (Hesterman, 2015). In January 2019, Al-Shabaab mujahedeen attacked the Dusit D2 complex in suburb Nairobi killing 21 people, injuring dozens others (US Department of State, 2019). Attacks on soft targets not only result in fatalities and injuries, but cause massive destruction of property, disrupt livelihoods through loss of jobs, create fear in the psyche of the citizenry and destroy the social fabric of a community. The Westgate attack in 2013, and the Dusit D2 attack in 2019 are pointers to the



need for strategies for mitigation and preparedness against terror attacks as development of infrastructure takes place.

The interdisciplinary approach between disaster and terrorism in shopping malls has piqued the interests of scholars. While Africa has had its own fair share of disasters such as fires, drought and floods, terror attacks in public spaces in urban centres is a growing concern for disaster managers (Tarus, 2017). Urbanisation has culminated in the development of infrastructure such as shopping in line with economic and global development. Architects of shopping malls in Nairobi have revolutionised traditional shopping malls and are redesigning and building modernised malls which are linked to the transport systems where citizens can live, work, shop and play, within the same site (Drabeck, 2010). As a result, Kenya has experienced a mushrooming of shopping malls, with Nairobi hosting the second largest mall in Africa, the Two Rivers Mall. Malls in Nairobi resemble small towns or cities, with a range of activity including international anchor shops, financial organizations such as banks, hotels, fast food franchise, restaurants, play and gaming areas for children, among others.

Shopping malls are characterized by multiple access and egress points which are open to the public, huge traffic of both vehicular and pedestrian population coming in and out, creating a security loophole that terrorists use to camouflage themselves making it impossible to notice them. Other factors that make shopping malls ideal targets for terrorism is that the risk of detection is low, therefore increasing the likelihood of a successful attack. Visitors who frequent shopping malls are often carrying huge packages of shopping, making it ideal for a terrorist to camouflage a weapon under the guise of a shopping bag, successfully launching an attack. Shopping malls are targeted by terrorists due to the high probability of yielding a significant number of fatalities and casualties, coupled with creating fear on the populace which informs one of the key agendas of terrorism (Mirgani, 2017). NATASCO, projects that terror attacks on



installing comprehensive security systems including will enable shopping malls mitigate and prepare for terrorist attacks.

This study therefore sought to examine how well-prepared shopping malls in the capital city of Nairobi are, and to what extent have they implemented the disaster mitigation and preparedness strategy, highlighting the parameters within which they plan and operate with a view of ensuring that disasters are averted or minimized altogether.

## **1.2 Problem Statement**

Globally, terrorism is considered a disaster due to the high probability of mass casualties, possible economic disruption, and sabotage instilling fear among the populace (Mohammed, 2014). These terror attacks on soft targets have become recurrent in recent times. The world over, approximately 60 terrorist attacks have been reported in malls in over 20 countries since 1998 (La Tourette, 2006). Disaster studies research indicates that terror attacks on civilian-centric targets such as shopping malls not only result in massive death, lifelong injuries and psychological trauma such as PTSD, but affect other social, economic and political aspects such as massive job losses, business disruptions and personal loss (Magogo, 2012; Omondi, 2015). The mushrooming of shopping malls in Kenya heightens the risk of being a target for terrorism. The country has experienced terrorist attacks in shopping malls at least on two occasions in large scale at the Westgate mall and Dusitd2 complex and continues to pose a high risk with security officers reporting various attempts. Terrorists target shopping malls as they are easy targets with a high likelihood of success using a simple plan within a short timeline. The Westgate Mall attack was planned within one year, and it achieved the target of the terrorists with significant loss of life and global media coverage (NACASTO, 2015).

The Shop Africa Report (2016) by a company Knight Frank, states that Nairobi which lies in the East African region boasts of the largest development of shopping malls with an existing mall

space of approximately 391,000 square meters in malls spread across affluent and middle level neighbourhoods such as The Junction, Sarit Centre, Two Rivers, The Waterfront, Galleria, The Village Market, Garden City, TRM and The Hub making the Kenyan capital retail market the most expansive in Africa (Shop Africa Report, 2016). Kenya is also host to one of largest malls in Africa, set in the affluent neighbourhood. The mall is host to global brands and attracts shoppers and visitors from across the world. The iconic nature of the mall makes it an attractive target for terrorists, due it's global impact, huge size, and the economic stature that the mall represents for Kenya. Terrorism mitigation and preparedness for the this large mall is a critical concern for disaster and security managers.

Urban shopping malls in places like Nairobi are prone to emergencies including fire, explosions and terror attacks (Hunold, Nwakibu, Wangara, Maingi, Mutiso& Martin, 2018). Whilst the possibilities for terror attacks on soft targets are numerous, Nairobi County and the national government are yet to formulate strategies to respond to terror related disasters in shopping malls (Bersaglio, Devlin & Yap, 2015). During the 2013 Westgate attack lack of a preparedness and mitigation strategy on core issues such as lack of interoperability and collaboration between responders, training of the responders, lack of mitigation strategy by the mall security was evident. The attack that lasted four days and resulted in fatalities and casualties lacked proper coordination between the security responders as Kenya Police Officers shot at their Kenya Defence Forces counterparts, compromising the safety of hostages (Vogt, 2014).

Literature on disaster preparedness, mitigation and response has assessed preparedness and mitigation as the most important components of a disaster cycle. Effective mitigation and preparedness are key in any disaster cycle as shopping malls are in a better position to respond to disasters and their recovery is enhanced, making them more resilient (Mirgani, 2017). As such, some studies on preparedness against terrorism have been conducted in developed nations generally with a view to averting disaster (Davis, 2018). However, in Kenya these studies have

tended to focus on soft targets such as worship centres among other interests (Gafow, 2021). While researchers such as Taabu (2014) had assessed disaster management practices at the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, and Njuru (2015) analysed factors affecting disaster preparedness for fire in Secondary schools; the focus has been varied and failed to address strategies in disaster mitigation and preparedness specifically for terror attacks in shopping malls as an entity.

There is, therefore, a knowledge gap on disaster preparedness and mitigation strategies against terrorism specifically in shopping malls in Kenya (Akinola, 2019). Of the few studies that have been done on malls in Kenya many have concluded that more research on preparedness will in fact ensure that Malls become more attractive to provide business ops and opportunities for social interaction such as family leisure time, and spaces for youth developing a consumer culture.

In support of the need to focus on the two aspects of disaster, Akwiri (2016) speculates that there is little evidence of sociological studies that have been conducted around disaster preparedness in Kenya's shopping malls since none has been documented by the Disaster Management Authority. This study aimed to fill this gap by examining the effectiveness of developing strategies incorporating the two aspects of the disaster management cycle namely mitigation and preparedness in respect to terror attacks in shopping malls.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

The study sought to answer the following research questions;

- i. How effective are Mitigation and preparedness strategies in malls against terror attacks?
- ii. What is the role of security management systems to mitigation and Preparedness strategies?

- iii. How does the nature of training offered to the mall's Security Management Team impact the mitigation and preparedness strategy?
- iv. Why is strategic collaboration between the mall and other emergency responders critical in implementing the mitigation and preparedness strategy against terror attacks?

#### **1.4 Objectives of the study**

The study sought to examine strategies that are in place to avert and facilitate against terror attacks as disasters in a city mall where social interaction is taking place. 7

#### **1.5 Specific Objectives**

The study was guided by the following specific objectives

- i. To examine the effectiveness of a mitigation and preparedness strategy for city malls.
- ii. To assess the role of Security Management Systems of the Mall to the mitigation and preparedness strategy.
- iii. To determine the nature of training offered to the Security Management Team at the Mall on mitigation and preparedness for terrorism.
- iv. To examine the importance of strategic collaborations between the mall and other emergency responders in implementing its mitigation and preparedness strategy.

#### **1.6 Justification of the Study**

There has been an increase of terror attacks aimed at soft targets such as shopping malls globally. These attacks not only cause fear and anxiety amongst the citizenry, but also result in massive business losses, property destruction and loss of lives. The study explored the mitigation and preparedness strategies of shopping malls against terror attacks to cushion the mall against the impacts.

Findings of the study can be used to make recommendations on mitigation and preparedness against terrorism to the various key actors within the mall ecosystem, customers frequenting malls and policy makers such as the National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC), as well as law

enforcement agencies such as the Antiterrorism Police Unit (ATPU). Dershowitz (2002) observes that terrorism persists because of the high probability of success. There is need therefore of putting in place critical guidelines and strategies that impede successful terror attacks. This study is critical as a guideline on mitigation and preparedness against terrorism for other soft targets such as schools, hospitals, religion centres, making them more resilient in the event of a terror attack.

Terrorism aims at creating fear among the populace affecting the socio-economic dynamics of the society. The recommendations from the study, therefore, will be significant in bolstering the confidence of shoppers and investors that the mall is well prepared in mitigation and preparedness of terrorism. The study is pivotal to other researchers who wish to explore disaster mitigation and preparedness strategies for soft targets such as malls, stadiums, and other public spaces as a source of reference.

### **1.7 Scope of the Study**

Onen (2016), describes scope of the study not only as the geographical area where the study is confined, but also as the summary of other aspects of the study including methodology, geographical and theoretical aspects of the study. The study examined the strategies employed by one of the largest new malls in the city, in an affluent neighbourhood in disaster mitigation and preparedness against terror attacks. The study was confined to the mall as a representation of other shopping malls in Nairobi. The mall was chosen due to its large size, and its construction in the post – terror attacks period in Kenya, representing the complexities of securing malls against myriad of threats including these terror attacks. The study used a descriptive survey design and was guided by the rational choice theory and the circles capacities theory. The study also relied on existing literature on disaster preparedness and management of terror attacks on soft targets. The study mainly focused on the mitigation and preparedness strategy, security management systems, the nature of training in place for the security management team at the

mall, and the development of mitigation and preparedness plans as part of disaster strategies put in place by the Mall against terrorism. Data collection for the study was finalised in March 2022 when the exercise was completed using questionnaires, key informant interviews, as well as the observation method. The target population for the study was the Security Management team comprising of managers, supervisors, and officers, both internal- employed by the mall management- and the contracted security team.

### **1.8 Limitation of the Study**

Creswell (2017) defines limitations as the elements that pose challenges in carrying out a study. The study experienced hesitation by the respondents due to the notion that the purpose of the study was to conduct a terrorism risk assessment of the mall for audit purposes. The researcher overcame this limitation by assuring the management of the mall that the study was purely for academic purposes as opposed to a security audit. The study faced challenges from the respondents, especially security officers who were contract employees and opined that the study was a ploy by the mall management conduct a performance appraisal on them and the contracted security firm. The researcher overcame this challenge by seeking the approval of the mall security management, assuring the respondents that the study was for academic purposes and by guaranteeing the respondents of their anonymity. The other limitation to the study was due to the COVID 19 pandemic that saw restrictions placed on conduct of individuals in public places that resulted into the study being delayed. The researcher overcame this limitation by waiting for the government-imposed restrictions to be eased.

### **1.9 Delimitations of the Study**

Elements of a study that are pertinent but are not core to the study are referred to as delimitation (Bryman & Bell, 2015). This study's initial delimitation was the scope of the study which was domiciled within the shopping mall. Delimitation of respondents was also applied, where the



study focused on Security Managers and Security officers, both internal(employed by the mall) and those contracted (from a security service provider).

### 1.10 Assumption of the Study

Onen (2016) describes assumption of a study as the plausibility of a study being conducted regardless of all other variants that may be an obstruction. The study assumed that the Mall had in place strategies towards mitigation and preparedness against terror attacks. The study further assumed that the management of the Mall will be acceptable to the study being carried out at the shopping mall despite the sensitivity of the study. The study also assumed that the respondents will be willing to participate in the study. The study further assumed that respondents would provide reliable and valid information to enable the researcher to provide valid data that will be used to make conclusions in relation to the study. Finally, the study assumed that questionnaires would be completed and returned in due time.

### 1.11 Definition of Key Terms

<b>Terrorism</b>	Premeditated use of violence against unarmed civilians intended to coerce/intimidate governments.
<b>Disaster Preparedness</b>	Is a continuous cycle of Pre – Terror disaster activities such as planning, equipping, exercising,evaluating and improvement of activities aimed at improving the level of readiness or operational capability of a shopping mall in the event of a terror attack
<b>Shopping Malls</b>	A large building that is closed to traffic and that houses various shopping stores, restaurants, and other activities such as accommodation, hotels, family meeting points, cinemas.
<b>Emergency Responder</b>	Individual with specialized training that are expected to arrive first at a scene disaster and offer emergency assistance. Responders include first aiders, fire fighters and security officers.
<b>Emergency Drills</b>	Are training exercises, that are simulated to resemble a real-life emergency, practiced by people in order to familiarise with actions that they should take, should an emergency occur.

<b>Stakeholder</b>	An individual that has a role to play in the emergency response of a mall, including emergency responders, public members, tenants and consumers
<b>Security Officers</b>	An individual engaged by the government or private entity responsible for protecting assets, human life from any threat.
<b>Interoperability</b>	Is the ability of different emergency responders to provide services to and accept services from other emergency responders under one command in a coordinated way during an emergency.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews selected literature of studies focusing on terrorism related disaster preparedness and mitigation for soft targets, with emphasis on shopping malls. The chapter includes a theoretical and conceptual framework in the areas of disaster preparedness and management.

#### 2.1 Disaster Management Cycle

Disasters are sudden calamitous events that can result in great damage, loss, injury, and death. They can occur naturally, such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornados, tsunamis, or wildfires, or they can be caused by human error or intervention. Natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes usually occur suddenly and are often uncontrollable but are somewhat predictable. This predictability is due to their ability to cluster temporally or geographically, for instance landslides can be predicted based on topography while weather patterns can predict cyclones, hurricanes, or drought (Handbook for Emergencies, 2007). Manmade and Technological Disasters Anthropogenic disasters on the other hand include acts of terrorism, explosions, chemical releases, etc, directly associated with human action which are unpredictable (FEMA, 2015).

The disaster management cycle is made up of four phases that can be defined as mitigation which refers to the actions taken before the disaster strikes to lessen the aftermath of a disaster; preparedness which can be described as measures put in place to respond to the disaster. The response phase refers to immediate steps taken in the midst and after a disaster with the sole objective of saving lives and minimising injuries, minimising property destruction and ensuring business continuity, while recovery phase involves community resumption of normal daily

activities (Twigg, 2004). Institutions are better prepared to manage disasters if collective actions are carried out during each phase of the disaster management cycle (Warfield, 2008) These actions encompass policies and plans, strategies, and management systems that create resilience in a community or an institution through mitigation, ultimately reducing the impact of the disaster.

### **2.1.1 Disaster Mitigation**

The mitigation phase in the disaster management cycle focuses on eradicating where possible the plausibility of a disaster occurring or minimizing the effects of the disaster should eradication fail, through the development of strategies. Mitigation strategies include public awareness, building codes, risk assessments, emergency plans, policies, and procedures (Joshi, 2008 ). Mitigation is the most significant phase of the disaster management cycle, which if properly implemented, can prevent or largely reduce the impact of a terror attack (Freilich et al, 2018).

### **2.1.2 Disaster Preparedness**

According to Cannon (2012), disaster preparedness refers to measures taken to adequately cater for and minimise the impact of disasters. That is, where possible employ an early warning system to forecast and, if foreseeable, prevent disasters, or reduce their impact on vulnerable populations such as psychological and physical trauma, respond to and effectively address their consequences on the affected population. The Kenya National Policy on Disaster Management defines disaster preparedness as a collection of precautionary measures, taken in advance of an imminent threat to help people and institutions respond to and cope with the effects of a disaster. (KNDM, 2000).

Disaster preparedness provides an opportunity to develop effective, realistic, and well-coordinated efforts and increase the effectiveness of disaster preparedness and response efforts by states and disaster management practitioners (FEMA, 2015). Disaster preparedness activities

should be projected towards ensuring that there is minimum loss of life, and reduce the down time of those affected, so that economic activities are least affected, enabling normalcy to reduce in the shortest time possible (Peek, 2012).

Disaster preparedness encompasses deliberate measures and strategies that are critical in ensuring the ability of an organisation/facility /government/community to prevent, respond and recover from a disaster. The success of the strategies spelt out in a disaster preparedness plan is anchored on how well an institution responds to an event as outlined by the disaster cycle. Disaster preparedness is thus a complex and integrated process that requires continuous review of the strategic plan including training of security operators, emergency responders, health care institutions as well as the public (Allen, 2010). Organisations can achieve effectiveness in disaster preparedness through a developing emergency plans, training and carrying out drills accompanied by the procurement of equipment and apparatus to support emergency response (Gillespie and Colignon, 1993).

### **2.1.3 Legal and Institutional Framework of Disasters**

During the United Nations (UN) 56<sup>th</sup> General Assembly, Kenya in solidarity with the world, following the September 11 attacks offered its support in a bid calling for unified and strengthened international cooperation in dealing with terrorism. In addition to previous conventions and treaties that Kenya had endorsed in relation to Terrorism, Kenya has since adopted the 2002 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for Purposes of Identification and the 2005 Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Ibid). On the regional front, Kenya in solidarity with other African Countries in the fight against terrorism has sanctioned the African Union (AU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 1999 and its 2002 Protocol ([www.redress.org](http://www.redress.org)).

In 2003, Kenya adopted the Suppression of Terrorism Bill of 2003 in a bid to implement the ratified conventions was meant with opposition by the Muslim Community, who saw the bill as an attempt to stigmatize them for their religion beliefs (Atta-Asamoah, 2008). However, on 5<sup>th</sup> January 2019, Kenya ascended into law the Prevention of Terrorism Act that spells out the mandate of the Counter Terrorism Centre. The act delineates state agencies that are part of the CTC, including the Antiterrorism Police Unit (ATPU) under the National Police Service as constituted by law, the Ministry of Foreign affairs, the Director of Public Prosecutions, The Kenya Civil Aviation, The Kenya Wildlife Service and the Kenya Prisons Service ([www.capitalfm.co.ke](http://www.capitalfm.co.ke)).

Kenya also has in place a National Policy for Disaster Managements that focuses on Disaster Risk Reductions (DRR) including early warning systems, preparedness, mitigation, and prevention. The Policy also establishes the National Disaster Management Authority that is mandated with coordinating disaster as well as fostering partnerships between various stakeholders (Ye Rang Nam, 2012).

## **2.2 Terrorism Concept**

There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, given that one man's terrorist is another man's hero (Dershowitz, 2002). The elusiveness surrounding the intended purpose of attack, the variability of the types of terrorism as well as the nature of the attackers, makes it elusive to have a unifying terrorism definition (Otiso, 2009). This study relied on a United Nation Panel in 2004, definition of terrorism 'an act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or unarmed population with the purpose of creating fear within a populace or coercing a state or a multinational organization to omit or commit to certain demands. (UNODC).

As the world advances in science and technology, making new discoveries in military warfare equipment and other technological advancements, so have terrorists made advancements in their

operations. Globally, terrorist activities have not only increased but have also become more aggressive in nature by using new techniques and strategies, employing the use of advanced communication, sophisticated military weapons (National Disaster Management Guidelines—Management of Chemical Terrorism Disasters, 2009). The September 2001 twin tower attacks have radically changed the global perspective on terrorism in every aspect of life socially, culturally, economically, and politically (Jackson, 2016).

Kenya remains an attractive target for global terrorism due to its economic, political, geographical, regional, and socio-cultural factors that predispose it as a target for terror attacks. Such factors include a porous border, the geopolitical complexities with its neighbour Somalia seen as a base for Al- Shabab, political ties with countries from the west that are terrorist targets (Otiso, 2009 p.111-113). The invasion by the Kenyan Military forces into Somalia have also exponentially increased the risk of terrorist attacks in Kenya. In 2014 for instance, the Al-Shabab carried out an approximated 80 attacks as compared to 37 attacks that had been carried out in the previous year (START, 2014). Kenya is also seen as an economic hub in the East African Region, due to its strong economy, well developed infrastructure further aggravating the likelihood of terrorist attacks (Maina, 2004).

### **2.3 Sociology of Terrorism**

Dershowitz (2002) postulates that terrorism persists since its success rate eclipses its failure rate, presenting serious sociological ramifications to societies globally. Whitehead (1987) argues that all social communities that are political are probable targets of terrorism. The quintessential objective of terrorism is to create vulnerability and chaos through violence in the community, ultimately leading to citizens questioning the validity of a government that they feel cannot protect them. As a social phenomenon, terrorism is defined as the use of ideological violence with an aim of coercing governments, international organizations, and religious groups to make

certain decisions, while intimidating civilians, ultimately, causing a shift in behaviour and opinions (Ranković, 2004).

Terrorism presents social and economic complexities to sociologists. Due to its amorphous nature, terrorism as opposed to other forms of disaster is unpredictable, causing fear among the citizenry of the countries affected (Efobi & Asongu, 2016). Terrorism takes away the fundamental human right, the right to live from its victims. The Boko Haram terror group in Nigeria has claimed the lives of over 10,000 individuals since 2009 (Nwachukwu et.al, 2018). The unpredictable nature of terrorism coupled with a history of previous terror attacks negatively impacts the economic status of a country (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2021). Terrorism affects the economy of a country due to large losses as a result of property damage and loss, as well as the cost of repairing infrastructure. During the Westgate Mall terror attack, millions of dollars were lost through property damage, alleged theft during the terror siege, and the cost of renovating the mall (Mirgani, 2017).

There is a plethora of long-term economic impacts of terrorism including destabilizing financial markets and decreasing the GDP growth rates of affected countries. In 2015, Tunisia's GDP rate dropped from 3% to 1% after the ISIS terror attacks in the country, while Kenya dedicated 0.3% of its GDP in 2015 towards security enhancements after the 2015 Garissa University attack (Ale, 2015). In 2014, the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) estimated the cost of terrorism globally to be 52.9 billion dollars (GTI, 2015). Tourism is a critical component of the global economy. Terrorism has negatively impacted tourism, as tourists will shun destinations that have a high probability of terrorist attacks. Mirgani (2017) observes that following the Westgate attack in Nairobi, Kenya's tourism, and related industries such as hospitality and aviation suffered significant financial losses including employment losses, with countries issuing travel advisories against Kenya.





and other types of consumer entertainment in an enclosed space that is well synchronised all under one roof (Frat & Venkatesh, 1993). Shopping malls are often characterised by an anchor departmental shop popularly known as supermarkets in an enclosed structure that features other speciality shops such as international designer shops, eateries, entertainment areas and a full enclosure of the pedestrian area, giving access and egress control to the management of the structure referred to as a mall (Gruen,1977). Entertainment and leisure activities in the malls provide for social interface that have popularised malls world over, with consumers patronising the malls in large numbers to partake in the experience ( Bednar, 1989).

While there is no official definition of soft targets in relation to terrorism, the term is used to refer to places characterised by a high number of people and a *laissez-faire* attitude towards security making them vulnerable to attacks (Kalvach, 2017). Soft targets can therefore be described as locations or persons that are portrayed as an easy target to a terror attack due to their actions or inaction thereby increasing their risk profile, while hard targets are people or places whose actions help them minimise or prevent their susceptibility to terror attacks. Soft targets include but are not limited to shopping malls, schools, public transport, stadiums, markets amongst others.

The emergence of the Islamic state has since transformed the modus operandi (MO) of terrorist attacks inspired by religion from targeting military and government installations known as Critical Infrastructure (CI) to attacking the public in what is described as '*soft targets*' such as carrying out attacks on the street, schools, shopping malls, sports arena, marketplaces amongst others ( T. Sternova, 2017). As opposed to CI where security measures are high, and thereby the likelihood of planned terrorist attacks on such installations to be intercepted are high, soft targets are characterised by a high number of people, and the security measures are low, making a terrorist attack more successful (Kalvach, 2017).

Shopping malls and terrorism are two sides of the same coin, with the malls representing the socioeconomic opulence of a nation through globalized capitalism, while terrorism respond to this very fact of globalization to adverse its agenda beyond borders (Mirgani, 2017). Shopping malls are a representation of global economic dynamics, with global brands setting up in these malls. As part of promoting the capitalistic nature of malls as part of patriotism, Malls have adapted names that equate them to national symbols such as the Mall of America, the mall of India, Dubai mall, inevitably increasing their threat matrix for terrorism (Schulz et.al. 2011). As a result of this globalization of malls, international interests have been confined in these spaces, making them an attractive target for international terrorism to localise their agenda, against global targets. (Pate, 2009). Victims of the Westgate attack in 2015 for instance, were a representation of the global nature of terrorism from 13 countries including Kenya, China, India, Britain, France amongst others.(Mirgani, 2017) .

Shopping mall development in urban areas further presents an economic and social hub that offers an increment in local employment and an opportunity for investors making them key infrastructures for the community. Studies have demonstrated that it this economic symbolism of shopping malls that predisposes them to terror attacks. Indeed, during the Westgate attack, the Al-Shabab twitter page indicated that if Westgate was an emblem of Kenya's opulence, it was now an indicator of its weakness (Sheikh et.al.2013).

Hesterman (2018) observes that emergency responders including security agents have used terror attacks on international malls to mitigate and prepare against terror attacks on shopping malls. For instance, the Westgate attack in Kenya, remains a key resource for various emergency responders including the United States, who have studied the attack to mitigate and prepare for a similar attack in the United States soil. The Westgate shopping mall attack in 2013 for instance, awakened the world to the terrorism threat facing shopping malls with the FBI and Homeland Security agencies in the United States of America putting in place extreme mitigation and

preparedness measures for shopping malls (Hesterman, 2015). The terrorism threat on shopping malls has resulted in some malls taking serious mitigation and preparedness measures against terror attacks. For instance, the Mall of America has a well-staffed counterterrorism unit, known as Risk Assessment and Mitigation Unit (RAM), in a bid to thwart any terror attacks (Schulz, 2011).

## **2.5 Mitigation and Preparedness Strategy against Terror Attack in shopping malls**

The mitigation and disaster preparedness strategy are anchored on interoperability and collaboration between various key emergency responders. The impact of terrorist attacks globally has highlighted the importance of networking between emergency managers, the security forces, policy makers and other stakeholders in disaster preparedness for terrorist attacks (Hoffman, 2001).

In Kenya, lack of effective interoperability framework between various levels of government at various levels, has hindered effective disaster management efforts (Kiongo, 2012). During the Westgate attack rescue operations, lack of effective communication between the state security agents of the National Police Service (NPS) and the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), led to the shooting the state agencies shooting at each other and at citizens, killing one police officer and gravely injuring other soldiers (Stewart, 2015).

Coordination between state security agents and the mall agents is critical to the mitigation and preparedness strategy of shopping malls (Fagel& Hesterman, 2016). Developing and maintaining working relationships between mall security and other state and emergency responders promotes mitigation and preparedness awareness for terrorism attacks (Scheitle & Halligan, 2018). The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) conducts mitigation and response simulation activities against terror attacks when shopping malls close in America, enhancing their coordination and relationship with the mall security agents (Karimi, 2015). During the

Westgate attack, there was a standoff between the mall management and the security agents, when state security agents abandoned their posts and refused to continue in the response operations (Dickey, 2013).

An effective mitigation and preparedness strategy entail intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing between the mall security team and the state actors. While protecting intelligence and information that state security players is critical, it is imperative for the state to share relevant information with the shopping malls (Gafow, 2021). An effective collaboration and liaison relationship between mall security management and state emergency responders is critical to ensure effective network between the private sectors. In Israel for instance the security agents and the emergency responders often conduct joint and comprehensive drills that include fire responders, ambulance, state security and the shopping malls. The state security agents also share intelligence on terrorism with the mall security team, in meetings held monthly (Davis, 2016).

It is important that shopping malls develop a security clearance matrix on sharing information based on a need-to-know basis within their strategy to enhance the integrity of intelligence and information shared while avoiding information glut (Combs, 2017). In the United Kingdom, shopping malls have advanced their intelligence gathering efforts through developing partnerships with state security agents such as ‘Operation Lightning’ to gather and analyse intelligence on terror threats ( La Tourrette. et al. 2006). Analysts of the Westgate attack indicate that the Kenya Government had intelligence of an impending terror attack on a soft target, with the Nairobi Governor during that period, claiming that he had information that the shopping mall would be attacked (Mirgani, 2017).

## 2.6 Security Management Systems

A security system is composed of various components that function together systematically, creating an appropriate level of protection (Gill, 2006). Shopping malls will be able to thwart or significantly reduce the impact of terrorist attack through enhancing a multi-layered security system that features layered countermeasures. FEMA outlines the key components of an effective security management systems as security polices and plans, physical barriers, security operations, security systems and equipment . The strategic objectives of security of an institution are outlined in the security policies, which set out to assign roles and responsibilities to various stakeholders. Security policies are key in ensuring that roles do not overlap, and that the security team embodies the vision of the institution in terms of security.

Security procedures often referred to as standard operating procedures are essential in laying the foundation of performance of security roles. They are developed to ensure standardization of routine roles, form the basis of performance evaluation and to offer guidance to role players, when in doubt. Procedures include job post orders, patrol procedures, surveillance procedures, search plan procedures, access control procedures, and may include checklists such as for suspicious mail, threatening phone calls and memoire aids. The purpose of the security systems, policies and procedures is to act as deterrence to would be attackers, build confidence to the public that the mall is adequately secured, and thereby increasing the general performance of the mall.

While security experts argue that even the most rigorous security system can be infiltrated by terrorists, target hardening measures are aimed at making it less desirable for the terrorists to attack a target (Jacoby, 2016). Given the unpredictability of terrorist attacks, one key aspect of preparedness is target hardening of the soft targets such as shopping malls, thereby making the shopping malls less attractive targets to terrorists, creating resilience, or reducing the impact of the attack. Target hardening is described as fortifying, reinforcing, upgrading, and tightening

controls. Target hardening is achieved through bolstering physical barriers and enhancing the security systems and equipment.

Target hardening seeks to manipulate the physical design of a structure to increase its security posture using by exploiting security measures such as using blast proof or bullet proof barriers, bollards, under vehicle surveillance searches (UVSS), automatic cullet proof doors, , increasing surveillance through closed circuit television (CCTV), increasing armed guards, use of robotics, reducing fragmentation and shrapnel by use of shatter proof windows (Jashari, 2018).

Target hardening of soft targets against terrorist attacks does not only entail of reinforcing the physical design of the building and securing the perimeters, but also includes the deployment of extra security guards, evacuation procedures, access control, technology and psychological countermeasures, two-point verification points, security assessments that can be applied as a protection measure in soft targets (Fagel & Stovall, 2017).

## **2.7 Nature of Training**

Training is a core element of the mitigation and preparedness strategy against terrorism, cognizant of the erratic nature of terror attacks (Nemeth, 2017). Training equips the security and emergency responders with the requisite skills to mitigate or respond to a terror attack, including dealing with armed attackers, fatalities, casualties, and victims that need rescuing (McIlhatton et al. 2018). Hesterman (2018) observes that lack of training during the Westgate terror attack, resulted in erroneous decisions, such as the security guards asking the victims to hide, instead of running, falsely believing that the target was a short stint. Kinney, Davis & Zhang (2018) note that inadequate training of emergency responders can result in costly errors such as loss of life, trauma in victims and damage of property.

Security officers should be trained on the *modus operandi* of terrorist attackers to equip them with the necessary knowledge on how to respond during a terror attack (Burrioni, 2018). Recent terror

attacks against soft targets have been carried out using semi/automatic weapons, with the attackers doubling up as suicide bombers (Burke). During the Westgate shopping mall attack in 2013, security guards were unable to mitigate the incident, when the terrorists destroyed the access barriers, took advantage of the confusion to bypass the mall's security systems such as the sonic signifiers, architectonics gaining access to the mall (Moore, 2012).

Refresher courses and training are key in enabling security officers and management to accustom to the best practices in terms of actions that could potentially save lives during a terror attack (Gafow, 2021). Hesterman (2018) notes that individual that are in positions of responsibility such as security officers and safety responders must continuously be trained and tested on crucial aspects such as first aid, response procedures and their knowledge on using of equipment such as fire extinguishers, automated doors as well as the facility layout.

To ensure effective disaster preparedness for terrorism related attacks, there is need to have security officers and local responders that are well trained and prepared, as well as ensuring that the training provides employee awareness, responder awareness, operations technicians, specialists, and incident command (Downs, 2002). Due to employee turn- over, all new employees should be, trained on employment as well as ensure refresher courses to the community at risk, in this case the public that frequent shopping malls.

While having in place well documented emergency response plans is critical to any disaster preparedness, it is important to note that the risk postures of facilities are subject to change over time, and the performance skills of previously trained personnel may be forgotten when not exercised. Training, therefore, must be a continuous processes in order to establish and maintain emergency preparedness (Daines, 1991; Buckle et al., 2000). This being the case there is little indication that such continuous training of security in malls has occurred. It is also important to ensure that the emergency plans, training and exercise are specific to terrorism disaster in



shopping malls (Kanwar, 2008: 163). Drills and other exercises such as tabletop exercises must be employed to test out the Emergency Operation Plans as well as continuously improve them. Fagel and Hesterman (2018) have argued that prior to the Westgate attack, the shopping mall had only carried out one drill, and this lapse in training could have resulted in more casualties during the attack. This situation may be the case at the shopping mall.

## **2.8 Development of Mitigation and Preparedness Plans**

Emergency plans that contain the policies and procedures of how an evacuation will be carried out in the event of a disaster are critical in any disaster management response. The laid -out procedures, policies and protocols are tested through training and exercises/drills ensuring the continuous improvement of the emergency plans (Lindell and Perry, 2002).

## **2.9 Theoretical Framework**

The rational choice theory (RCT) and the circle capacities theory informed the theoretical framework of this study. The rational choice theory was key in understanding how terrorists select their target, while the circle capacities theory examined how institutions can access resources to effectively mitigate and prepare against terror attacks.

### **2.9.1 Rational Choice Theory**

Founded by Adam Smith (1776), argues that individuals will make their choices based on a cost-and-effect analysis and choose the option that presents the highest benefit to them. This theory presupposes that all human actions are guided by costs and rewards, that the reward from the action must surpass the cost of the action, and finally that people will use resources at their disposal to maximise their preferred outcomes. Although widely used in economics, Stein & Raymond (1967) evaluates the impact of terrorism on the economy, the theory has gained acceptance amongst sociologists in explaining decision making in disaster management. Ariely

(2008) argues that disaster managers will make rational choices based on factors that will have maximum positive outcomes based on the present factors. Altay & Green (2006) argue that disaster managers will make the rational choice of prioritising the mitigation and preparedness phases of disaster management, since the two phases have a higher probability of minimising or effectively responding to a disaster event if well managed, thereby maximizing the possible outcome.

The theory is important in this study in highlighting how rational choices by shopping malls impact the implementation of their mitigation and preparedness strategy against terrorism. The theory evaluates how shopping malls employ mitigation and preparedness strategies such as training, security management systems, and collaboration of emergency responders in maximising their posture against terror attacks while minimising the impact of any attacks against the shopping malls. The theory further propagates that shopping malls would utilise the resources available to them such as investing in integrated security systems as well as collaboration with other emergency responders to maximise a positive outcome against terror attacks.

### **2.9.2 The Circle of Capacities Theory**

The circle of capacities theory refers to the reserve a community or an organisation has access to, that equips it with the ability and skills to effectively prepare, mitigate, and recover from a disaster (Gaillard et al., 2010). Proponents of the theory argue that capacity not only intimates the assets the community has in hand, but also the ability of the community to gain access to other required funds or reserves to cushion them when disaster strikes, and thus there are no hapless victims in reference to a disaster. The resources include but are not limited to social, economic, political, natural, physical, among others (Wisner et al, 2012). The Mall has access to


privately sourced emergency response resources such as private owned ambulances, command centres, private and national security agents among others.

This theory is important in understanding how access to resources and assets through mutual aid assistance plays a critical role in disaster preparedness and mitigation. While shopping malls may face an impediment in their quest to employ effective preparedness and mitigation measures to cope and recover from terror attacks due to cost implications and return on investments, the access to other resources and assets not necessarily those within the shopping mall, to enable them to achieve the level of preparedness desired.

## **2.10 Conceptual Framework on Terrorism Disaster Preparedness in shopping malls**

The conceptual framework will provide an outline of how the study variables will interrelate. In this study, the dependent variable shall be terrorism preparedness in shopping malls. The independent variables will include Emergency Operation Plans, Training & Drills, return of investment, legal and institutional framework, and facility infrastructure and security equipment.

**Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework**



Source: Research Data (2022).

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

This chapter illustrates the methodology that was used to carry out the study and establishing the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. It further offers a comprehensive overview of the research design, research site, target population, unit of analysis, unit of observation, study sample, sample size and sampling procedure as well as data collection and the data collection tools that were employed. The chapter also examined the viability of the study through a pilot test, reliability of the data collection tools, and the validity of the data analysis and presentation of the study. The Legal and ethical aspects that guided this study are also considered. The methodology taken was relevant in addressing the four main objectives of this study.

#### **3.1 Site selection and Description**

Although Nairobi has over 30 malls, the study was carried out at one of the largest new malls in the city in an affluent neighbourhood. The mall has been de-identified due to the sensitive nature of the study. It was selected due to its large size, the mall its architectural designs that includes residential units and over 100 retail stores, high end hotels and a theme park. The mall has a significant monthly foot fall making it an attractive target for terrorism due to the large numbers. The mall is located in an affluent neighbourhood and is therefore a prime target for terror attacks making it ideal for the study in regard to preparedness and mitigation against terror attacks. The mall is host to numerous international brands with Carrefour, the French retailer as the anchor store. Other brands premised at the mall include Burger King, Aladdin, Nike,

Swarovski amongst others. The mall is managed by a managing director, together with a team of senior managers that include a security manager, an investments manager, an accounts manager, a marketing manager amongst other key positions.

### **3.2 Research Design**

The study makes use of the descriptive research design. This design gives the basis to conduct research including, information gathering, measurements and interpretation as well as data presentation with an aim of answering the research questions (Kothari, 2003). The descriptive research design is used as a method to gather perceptions, attitudes, values and beliefs of people on certain existing social issues (Orodho, 2009). This design was relevant to this study as a basis of gathering relevant data to address the research questions on mitigation and preparedness strategy against terror attacks in shopping malls. The study relied on both the quantitative method by administering questionnaires to security officers and qualitative method through the use of key interview guides for the senior mall management and open-ended questionnaires for the security officers.

### **3.3 Unit of Analysis**

The unit of analysis will be the mall, its security program and policy, and the disaster and mitigation preparedness strategy against terror attacks that is in place.

### **3.4 Unit of Observation**

The unit of observation for this study was focused on the management of the mall, the security team, their protocol, and the management of the mall infrastructure. The researcher sought to observe the security management systems in place such as CCTV cameras, screening technology, presence of security guards, their posture and attitude towards shoppers as well as security protocols such as patrols, use of sniffer dogs deployed at the mall.

### **3.5 Target Population**

Williamson (2011) defines target population as the totality of elements that has one or more characteristics in common while Mugenda & Mugenda (2003) a research population is also known as a well-defined collection of individuals or objects known to have similar characteristics that the researcher will use to generalise the outcome of the study. Therefore, all individuals or objects within the targeted population will usually have a common, binding characteristic or trait. The population target for this study comprised of the mall management and the security officers who are 850 in number.

### **3.6 Validity**

According to Bryman and Bell (2015), validity determines whether the research instruments truly measure what it is intended to be measured or how truthful the research results are. In the context of the study, the researcher used face validity. Face validity is a subjective decision of whether measures of a certain concept will appear to measure what is intended to measure. The researcher conducted a pilot test to test and retest the validity of the study. In this regard, the researcher gave the data collection instruments to the supervisors and fellow researchers to be able to get their feedback on whether these measures were relevant in measuring the intended objectives. The researcher then amended and aligned the research instruments. The content validity of the questionnaire used in this study was determined by the literature review. Face validity was also adjusted for the study.

### **3.7 Reliability**

Research experts and a statistician assessed the instrument and the homogeneity of the variables before it was used. Reliability was further ensured through conducting a pre-test.

### 3.8 Pilot Testing

Flick (2015) defines pilot testing as the pre-testing of a data collection tool such as the questionnaire to enable the researcher to spot any errors and correct them before the actual study. Pilot testing of the research instrument is important as it establishes practice through which one can identify errors and on the same note very useful in mastering the instruments that are appropriately used in the study. The researcher carried out a pilot study using a sample 10 respondents drawn from the security officers using questionnaires. The pilot questionnaires as well as the sampled respondents for the pilot survey were excluded from the final analysis for the study. The results obtained from the pilot study helped shape the final questionnaire in terms of the questions' content validity and duration of administration.

### 3.9 Samples Size and Sampling Procedure

Kothari (2003) defines sampling as the process of gathering data of an entire population, by examining a select group of the target population. A sample therefore is a small part of the population that represents the characteristics of the larger population (Kothari, 2004). In cases whereby the study population is less than 10,000, a sample size of between 10 and 30% is sufficient to represent the entire population (Mugenda, 2003). The study relied on Yamane (1967) formula to calculate the sample size for security guards from the total population of 800 security officers and managers, both outsourced and employed by the mall.

The sample size was calculated as follows;

$$n = \frac{N}{1+Ne^2}$$

Where,

n= sample size

N = the size of population

e= the error of 5 percentage points



The sample size for the security officers and managers was calculated to be 267 respondents. By using a precision error of 5% and a confidence coefficient of 95%, the study was calculated as below;

$$n = \frac{800}{1+800(.05)^2} = 267$$

The total population of the security and management team was obtained from the mall's human resource management database. The data collection for the security officers' questionnaires was distributed throughout one month, with an average of 5 questionnaires per day, to make a sample size of about 262 security officers. The key informant interviews for the 5 management respondents were conducted during the period of the study dependent on the availability of the managers. The survey targeted security officers deployed by the mall management, as well as those who are deployed by the tenants.

The study espoused the use of stratified sampling to cater for the two subgroups of managers and security officers, forming two strata as per their designation. For the managers, the researcher used the purposive sampling procedure as per the management schedule available at the human resources office. The researcher also employed the use of simple random sampling for the second strata of security officers. This sampling method was relied upon as it offered an even chance for all respondents under this strata to be selected.

**Table 3.1: Sample Distribution of Respondents**

Population	Population Size	Percentage %	Sample Size
Security Officers	785	33.3	262
Mall Management	15	33.3	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>800</b>		<b>267</b>

Source: Research Data (2022).

### **3.10 Data Collection Methods**

This study adopted the use of questionnaires to security officers, key informant interviews for mall management, and observation security protocol and infrastructure in place at the mall as data collection tools. Mugenda (2003) defines a questionnaire as a series of questions asked to individuals to obtain statistically useful information about a given topic anonymously, in a short period of time and are easy to administer.

The study relied on the questionnaire to collect the primary data. The questionnaire was divided into sections, an introduction, the background information section and other sections based on the research objectives of the study. The questionnaires were semi-structured and comprised of open ended and closed ended questions and were administered by the researcher. The open-ended questions were used as a channel to enable the study to collect the views, opinions, and suggestions of the respondents. The study relied on close ended questions for specific responses. The study also relied on the use of key informant interviews to gather data from the policy makers of the mall that was relevant to the study. The key informant interview was unstructured but was based on an interview schedule to guide the researcher on the objectives and questions of the study. The interviews were pivotal in enabling the researcher gather in-depth data from the management team, as well as validate data from the questionnaires.

The researcher used observation method to observe the physical environment of the mall, as well as the security systems in place in a bid to determine measures put in place towards mitigation and preparedness of terror attacks. This was guided through the use of an observation checklist that listed security infrastructures deployed by the mall.

### **3.11 Data Analysis and Presentation**

The data analysis is defined by Kothari (2011) as the process of packaging the collected information putting them in order and structuring main components in a way that the findings

can be easily and effectively communicated. After all the necessary data had been collected, editing, coding and tabulation was carried out. Data was analysed both qualitatively and quantitatively for the unstructured and structured questions respectively as administered through the questionnaire. Qualitative data was also analysed from the interviews administered from the mall management respondents and reported through the use of narratives. The qualitative data generated was categorised in themes in accordance with the objectives of the study and reported as narrative to support the quantitative data. The quantitative data from the structured questions was translated into numerical codes and statistical analysis was done through Microsoft Excel. Data was presented using bar graphs, pie charts and tables.

### **3.12 Ethical Considerations**

Streubert and Carpenter (1999), postulate that there are certain legal and ethical considerations that a researcher must take into consideration while conducting a study. Respondents must also be given an opportunity to be autonomy and self-determination, to enable them respond to the questions of the study without influence or coercion (Polit et.al.1999). All ethical and legal considerations were considered, with the researcher first obtaining an introduction letter from the University of Nairobi. The researcher also sought permission from the regulating authority NACOSTI and obtained the relevant authorisation. The mall was de-identified due to the sensitive nature of the study. To ensure that the study is conducted under research ethical guidelines, consent of the respondents was obtained before proceeding with the study. Respondents were assured of their anonymity, if they so wished, and the confidentiality of their responses. Respondents were also informed that the information gathered will be subjected to high level of integrity, and that the data gathered was not manipulated in any way or used for any other purpose besides this study.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION

#### 4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary of analysed data from the field research. The data is presented along the research objectives of the study which aimed at examining disaster mitigation and preparedness strategy against terror attacks in the largest mall in Nairobi. The data was gathered using questionnaires, key informant interviews and observations as the research instruments. The questionnaire featured both structured and unstructured questions. Data was interpreted based on the research questions and study objectives. Data analysis was conducted using descriptive statistics, and the findings of the data presented in form of frequency tables, percentages, histograms, and pie charts.

#### 4.1 Questionnaire Response Rate

From the study, out of the two hundred and sixty-two (262) questionnaires administered, two hundred and forty-eight (248) were returned for analysis. This represents a 94.6% response rate. This positive response rate was realised due to the survey tool being physically administered as opposed to the respondents self-administering. The key informant interviews targeted five respondents. The researcher was able to secure four interviews representing an 80% response rate. The questionnaires and key informant interviews that were not administered were due to operational factors that resulted into the unavailability of the respondents.

The response rate as per the strata are illustrated in table 4.1 below.

**Table 4.1 Strata Response Rate**

Strata	Sample Size	Response
Security Officers	262	248
Mall Management	5	4
Total	267	262

Source: Research Data (2022).

From the table above, the total response rate from the strata sample of 267 was 262 which represents 98.1%. This was an acceptable return rate for the study.

#### 4.1.2 Social Demographics of Respondents

This section focuses on analysis and interpretation of basic information of the respondents. This data is presented with regards to gender, age, designation, working experience in years and the highest level of education.

The study was interested in the gender of the respondents. The respondents were therefore required to indicate their gender by ticking on the spaces provided in the questionnaire. 61% of the respondents were male, while 39% were female. This gender balance was key to the study, as it indicates a gender distribution a key indicator in the sociology of disaster management. Mirai et. Al. (2021) indicates that institutions are better placed in developing mitigation and preparedness strategies when they take into considerations gender variations and strive to attain gender equality.

The Table 4.1.2 below shows majority of the security personnel indicated that they were aged between 31 – 40 years (39%), those aged between 21 -30 years were 37.5%, 22.4% indicated their age as between 41-50 years, and those above 50years were 2.3%. The study found no respondent that was aged 20 years and below. The results depicted indicate that the respondents age was well distributed.

**Table 4.1.2 Age of the Respondents**


Age Bracket of Respondent	Frequency	Percentage %
20 years and below	0	0
21 - 30 years	102	37.5
31 - 40 years	102	39
41 - 50 years	56	21.3
50 years and above	6	2.3

Total	262	100
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Source: Research Data (2022).

Figure 4.1.3 below indicates the distribution of security officers in terms of designated roles for senior managers, middle level managers including team leaders and supervisors as well the subordinate staff that 6% of the respondents were senior level managers, 17% were middle level managers while 79% formed the bulk of the respondents as subordinate employees. The inclusion of all the employment designations was critical to the study, as it merges the perspective of policy formulation and implementation from the senior and middle level management with that of the implementors, in this case subordinate security officers. This is important in assessing the effectiveness of the strategies that have been employed by the mall's management in disaster mitigation and preparedness against terror attacks.

**Figure 4.1.3 : Showing Designation of the Respondents**



Source: Research Data (2022).

The study aimed to establish the period the respondents of all designations had been deployed at mall. Through the longevity of employment at the mall, the study would determine the depth of

understanding on key issues such as training, understanding of security systems as well as familiarity of the policies, procedures, and post orders, that the study was focusing on. Table 4.1.4 below shows the duration of work of the respondents.

**Table 4.1.4 Showing Duration of Work Experience**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage %</b>
0 - 3 Years	65	25
3 - 5 Years	105	40
5 Years and Above	92	35
<b>Total</b>	262	100

Source: Research Data (2022).

From the table 4.1.4 above it is worth noting that 25% of the respondents had worked at the mall for 0-3 years, 40% had been working at the mall for 3 - 5years while 35% of the respondents had been working for more than 5 years.

The education level of the respondents was critical to the study to determine their literacy competency and their ability to comprehend and respond to questions posed to them. Table 4.1.5 below indicates the level of education of the respondents.

**Table 4.1.5 Showing Education Level**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Masters Level	35	13
Degree/Graduate	65	25
College/Diploma/Certificate	106	40
Secondary School Level	56	21
<b>Total</b>	262	100

Source: Research Data (2022).

Table 4.1.5 above indicates that 13% of the respondents had attained master’s level in their education. Those who had attained a degree were 25%, respondents with a post-secondary education in terms of either college/diploma/certificate were 40% while 21% had a O level certificate.

#### 4.2 Disaster Mitigation by the Mall

The perception of the respondents on the effectiveness of the strategy of the mall to mitigate and prepare against terror attacks. This was assessed in terms of the of the perceived level of preparedness against terror attacks by the respondents. The study also examined the parameters that informed the perceived level of preparedness by the respondents.

**Table 4.2.1 Perception of the level of mitigation against terror attack by the mall**

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Very Good	125	48
Good	102	38
Fair	25	10
Poor	10	4
<b>Total</b>	262	100

Source: Research Data (2022).

Table 4.2.1 above indicates that 48% of the respondents were very positive that the Mall was adequately prepared to mitigate to a terror attack. 38% of believed that the strategy employed by the mall to mitigate/ prepare against terror attacks was good, while 10% of the respondents indicated that they perceived the mall to be averagely prepared to mitigate/prepare against terror attacks. A small number of the respondents representing 4% felt that the mitigation and preparedness strategy of the mall was poor.



Respondents were further required to indicate the reasons for the perceived rating they had accorded to the Mall. The study established that respondents who perceived positively the mitigation strategy of the mall against terror attacks attributed their responses to factors such as the advanced security system in place, a strong working relationship between the mall management, law enforcement and emergency responders' presence of police officers at the mall, training and regular emergency drills. Some of the responses were captured as below;

*'Once you walk into the mall, we are always watching physically and through a large number of cameras distributed throughout the mall'*

*'We are keen very keen on procedures such as screening and always remain alert, especially guards that are deployed at the entry positions. We also conduct patrols together with armed police officers around the facility'*

*'There is always presence of police officers at the mall. The mall also conducts drills with police officers and international security partners'*

Respondents who scored the mall poorly believed that the advanced security system did not in any way contribute to being prepared against terror attacks since they are unpredictable and therefore can occur anytime. Other respondents only state agents could mitigate an attack and the private security mall can only assist. A respondent noted as below;

*'Terror attacks are beyond private security, and only police officers are in a position to mitigate a terror attack'*

The study assessed the open-ended question on security processes that the respondents carried out as part of the strategy of mitigation and disaster preparedness. The respondents indicated that they carried out patrols around while in uniform and in civilian gear around the mall. The patrols also comprise police officers and trained canines. Respondents also indicated advanced surveillance by the Security Control Room that integrates the sophisticated security system of the mall. Respondents indicated that they carried out access procedures thoroughly using the technology provided by the mall.

A respondent indicated;

*'We carry out regular patrols because the mall is expansive to complement the CCTV coverage around the mall and in the parking areas. While on patrol we observe any individual who exhibits unusual behaviour, like loitering, abandoned luggage' (Source: Team Leader 1)*


*We are well-trained on the security procedures of the mall, and we know what action to take when we spot something out of the ordinary as per existing policies*

*Maintaining alertness and carrying out regular processes diligently is key in ensuring the safety of the mall through the security systems ( Source: Security Supervisor 1)*

The study asked the responders what type of terror attack they perceived to be most likely against the mall. Majority of the responders at 40% indicated an active shooter attack, 36% thought suicide bombing as the most likely form of attack, 20% rated bombing as a likely attack while 4% of the respondents believed that bio-chemical attack would be used against the mall.

Figure 4.2.2 below illustrates the responses as analysed.

**Figure 4.2.2 Likely forms of terror attacks**




Source: Research Data (2022).

### 4.3 Security Management Systems

One of the objectives of the study was to assess the security management systems that are in place to enable the mall to mitigate and prepare against terror attacks. Security managements

systems examined, include awareness of security policies and procedures by the respondents, technology employed by the mall through observation. Figure 4.3.1 illustrates the findings.

**Figure 4.3.1 Showing awareness of Security Policies and Procedures**



Source: Research Data (2022).

The finding of the study indicated that Respondents 89% of the respondents also indicated that they were aware of the security policies and procedures to be deployed to mitigate or respond to a terror attack, while 10% of the respondents indicated that they were not aware of the security procedure in place, a paltry 5% indicated that they were unsure if the security procedures existed. The respondents who did not know of the security procedures in place had been deployed to the mall recently at the time of the study. One of the respondents indicated

*'I was deployed at the mall 3 days ago, and I am still undergoing training on what needs to be done'*(Source: Security Officer 5)

A respondent who was unsure if there were security procedures in place indicated

*'As a reliever, I am aware that there are policies and procedures in place. However, I am yet to be posted in some areas, and hence not familiar with the procedures for those posts'* (Source: Security Officer 6)

In examining the security management systems, the study assessed the knowledge matrix of the mall’s policies and procedures by the respondents. When asked to enumerate security procedures and policies that they were familiar with, the respondents listed down vehicle screening policy and procedure, access control procedures, patrol procedures, escalation procedures, suspicious behaviour procedures and search plan procedures, which are part of their daily routine. A respondent indicated as below;

*‘Part of our procedures illustrate monitoring unattended luggage and the time frame of escalation; in the event the luggage is still lying idle’ (Source: Security Team Leader 1)*

*‘The mall has vehicle screening procedures for service delivery vehicles that are different from those of regular clients to the mall’ (Source: Security Officer 6)*

#### **4.3.1 Effectiveness of Security Policies and Procedures**

The study was set to find out the effectiveness of the security systems, procedures policies as part of the mall’s strategy in preparedness/mitigation against terror attacks. The results are tabulated as Table 4.3.1 below;

**Table 4.3.1 Awareness of Effective of Security Policies and Procedure**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Yes	252	96
No	4	2
Don’t Know	6	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>262</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Research Data (2022).

From the table 4.3.1, 96% of respondents indicated that the security procedures in place at the mall were effective in mitigation and preparedness against terror attacks, 2% disagreed on the effectiveness of the policies and procedures, while another 2% were unsure. This finding is in line with Fagel & Hesterman (2016) assertion that institutions can effectively mitigate against

terror attacks if they implement a security master plan that comprises of elaborate security policies and procedures.

The researcher also made observations of the security measures in place at the mall. Among the measures observed include CCTV cameras such as domes, bullets, PTZ's, Xray screening machines, Plate recognition readers, automated vehicle access systems. Table 4.3.2 below shows the observation checklist.

**Table 4. 3. 2 Observation Checklist**

Resource	Available	Not Available	Comment
Vehicle Screening Technology	✓		
Automated vehicle access system	✓		
Integrated CCTV System	✓		
Advanced Facility Lockdown Mechanism	✓		
Use of bullet proof barriers	✓		
Search Kiosks for pedestrians	✓		
Xray Screening Machine	✓		
Use of Under Vehicle Surveillance Systems and vehicle screening procedures	✓		
Use of Bollards at the entry points	✓		
Use of sniffer dogs around the mall	✓		

Source: Research Data (2022).

#### 4.4 Training Frequency

The study set out to establish the impact of training as part of the mitigation and disaster preparedness strategy through establishing the frequency of the training. Table 4.4. illustrates the findings.

**Table 4.4. Training frequency in the last 3 years**

<b>Year of Training</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage%</b>
<b>2019</b>	247	93
<b>2020</b>	238	91
<b>2021</b>	257	98

Source: Research Data (2022).

When asked how frequent respondents had been trained in the last three years, The study established that the mall had achieved over 90% training of all security personnel deployed at the mall had been trained on emergency preparedness/mitigation for terror attacks. In 2019, 93.2% of all the security officers received the training, in 2020,91.01% were trained while in 2021, 97.75% were trained.

**4.4.1 Training Assessments**

Respondents were asked to assess various aspects of their security training used by the mall. The aspects of training that were being evaluated and their responses are illustrated on Table 4.4.1 below parameters;

**Table 4.4.1 Frequency of Training Assessments**

<b>Statement</b>		<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Unsure</b>
Security Officers receive special training in mitigation and preparedness in terror attacks	Frequency	258	0	2
	Percentage%	98	0	2
Disaster mitigation and preparedness training enhances prevention and response to terror attacks	Frequency	256	6	0
	Percentage%	98	2	0
The security management carries out training assessments to determine the need of security officers	Frequency	248	4	10
	Percentage%	95	3	2
The training offered is based on the outcome of the training needs assessment	Frequency	252	8	2
	Percentage%	96	3	1
The training methods employed are appropriate for adult learning	Frequency	232	12	10.1
	Percentage%	88	9	3

Source: Research Data (2022).

The findings indicated that 98% of the respondents had received special training in mitigation and preparedness for terror attacks. When asked whether disaster mitigation enhances prevention and response to terror attacks, 98% of the respondents agreed that the training was key in enhancing their response in the event of a terror attack, while 95% of the respondents indicated that the security management carried out training assessments to determine their training needs. On whether the training methods employed were appropriate for adult learners, while 88% of the respondents strongly agreed while 9% indicated that the methods in use were inappropriate.

An interviewee, when responding to this question made the following remarks,

*‘We have been trained on spotting individuals who might tour the mall with the ill motives of gathering intelligence, through profiling of certain behaviours and using basic gestures such as the ‘power of hello’’( Source: Security Supervisor 3)*

#### 4.4.2 Emergency Operation Plans

The study evaluated the respondents on awareness of emergency operation plans by the mall as an element of the nature of training. Table 4.4.2 shows the finding.

**Table 4.4.2 Awareness of Emergency Operation Plan (EOP)**

<b>Emergency Plan</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage%</b>
Yes	245	93
No	11	4
No Response	6	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>262</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Research Data (2022).

When asked if they were aware of written emergency plans in place to respond to a terror attack, 94% of the respondents responded affirmatively, while 5.6% of the respondents indicated that they were not aware if there was any written emergency plan in place.

#### 4.4.3 Counterterrorism Emergency Drills

In relation to emergency drills, respondents were asked to indicate how frequent they had participated in counterterrorism emergency drills.

**Table 4.4.3 Emergency Drills in the last 3 years**

<b>Year of Drill</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>2019</b>	238	90
<b>2020</b>	0	0
<b>2021</b>	257	98

Source: Research Data (2022).

When asked if they had participated in terror related emergency drills as opposed to other forms of drills such as fire drills/ first aid drills, 90% of the respondents indicated that they had participated in a terrorism related emergency drill in the year 2019, and 98% of the respondents had participated in an emergency drill in 2021. Due to the Covid pandemic, no drill had been carried out in the year 2020.


#### 4.5 Collaboration with Key Stakeholders on Emergency Drills

Collaboration with key stakeholders is a vital requirement for an effective mitigation and preparedness strategy for terror attacks. The study further sought to establish if the mall integrated other emergency responders in conducting the drills.

Respondents were asked if the mall had integrated other emergency responders in conducting drills. Findings are illustrated as per Figure 4.5.



**Figure 4.5 List of Emergency Responders**



Source: Research Data (2022).

The results indicate that mall conducts emergency drills with key stakeholders who participate in the exercises, with an average of 80% of respondents indicating that they had participated in an emergency drill that comprised of other stakeholders such as the KDF, the NPS, fire responders and the medical emergency responders.

#### **4.6 Interoperability and Collaboration between Mall management and Emergency Responders**

From the study, 52.8% of the respondents indicated that the mall has a good working relationship the National Police Service. 57.3% of the respondents indicated that there were regular police patrols around the mall, while 53.35 indicated that the mall security had a good working relationship with emergency responders. 48.3% of the respondents indicated that the security mall had a rapport with the local community, which was crucial in getting early warnings of suspicious individuals around the mall. However, the majority of the respondents,

58.4% indicated that the mall did not have a joint communication system with the other emergency responders.

**Table 4.6. Collaboration between Mall Security and Emergency Responders**

Statement	5	%	4	%	3	%	2	%	1	%
The mall has a good networking relationship with the National Police Service	94	52.80	10	35	8	4.4	10	5.61	4	2.2
The police regularly patrol the mall and the surrounding areas	10	57.30	42	24	15	8.4	14	7.86	5	2.8
The mall has a good working relationship with emergency responders	95	53.37	45	25	12	6.7	15	8.42	11	6.1
The mall has a networking relationship with the local community to alert you on suspicious characters or activities around the mall	86	48.31	35	20	30	16.	19	10.6	8	4.4
The mall has an interagency communication platform that links the communication channels of mall security with other emergency responders.	10	5.618	18	10	8	4.49	104	58.4	38	21.3

Source: Research Data (2022).

#### **4.7 Challenges of Implementing the mitigation and preparedness strategy**

When respondents were asked to enumerate some of the challenges, they face in implementing the strategy, the following was noted,

*The architectural design of the mall is complex, and customers keep getting lost and even forgetting where they have parked. Sometimes it's difficult to differentiate genuine customers from an individual with ill intent pretending to be lost*


*The mall is frequented by the affluent in the society, and sometimes you are faced with the dilemma of stopping an individual that appears suspicious in fear of offending "someone big"*

*There is a need for the industry to consider standardizing and increasing our salaries for guarding companies. We experience a high turnover due to guards leaving to search for greener pastures, hampering our trained and experienced resources (Source: Supervisor 6)*

**4.8 Recommendations to improve mitigation and preparedness of terror attacks at the Mall**

Respondents were asked to give suggestions on how the mall could further improve its strategy of mitigating/preparedness against terror attacks. Suggestions given are as per the below Figure ;

**Figure 4.8 Recommendations to improve mitigation/preparedness of terror attacks at the Mall**



Source: Research Data (2022).

The figure above illustrates that 86.51% of the respondents indicated that creating awareness to the members of the public on what to do in the event of an attack training would positively impact efforts by the mall to be better prepared to deal with terror attacks. 49.43% indicated that improved hiring standards of the security officers would improve the mitigation/preparedness strategy. Background checks of the tenants were a recommendation given by 76.4% of the respondents, while 62.92% of the respondents opined that increased police patrols around the mall, would improve the mall’s strategy against terror attacks. 82.02% of the respondents suggested arming the private security guards deployed around the mall, while 94.38% of the

respondents indicated that improved emoluments of the security officers would be crucial in mitigation/preparedness strategy against terror attacks.

#### **4.9 Key Informant Interviews**

Data from the key informant guides were collected and organised in meaningful order to allow the researcher to make an analysis and draw conclusions.

##### **4.9.1 Effectiveness of the mitigation and preparedness strategy by the mall**

The key informants were largely optimistic that the mall was adequately prepared to mitigate and prepare against terror attacks. This perception was attributed to a comprehensive elaborate modern security system, the deployment of a vast and well-trained guard force as well as conducting of regular risk assessments. One of the key informants stated as follows;

*‘The mall is very secure against terror attacks; in fact, it is one of the most secure mall in the country. We have implemented the best practices globally to enhance the safety of our clients. We want the mall to be a safe haven, where those who visit are assured of their safety’(Source: Key Informant 3)*

*The mall has a robust system of gathering and sharing security intelligence from state agents as well as the neighbouring community. It enables us to be aware of what is happening in security circles’(Source: Key Informant 1)*

##### **4.9.2 Key measures put in place by the mall to mitigate against terror attacks**

Some of the key measures that the mall has in place to mitigate against terror attacks include improved hiring standards for the security guard force, conducting background checks on our security officers as well designating management roles, and assigning specific duties to each role. Adequate budgetary allocation towards security was also noted as a key determinant in improving measures. When responding to this question, the key informant noted;

*'We have an allocation of a security budget that enables us to put the necessary measures in place to mitigate against terror attacks' (Source: Key Informant 1)*

*'We have, as part of a security contract with the security guarding company agrees on hiring guards that meet certain parameters as one of our key performance indicators. This is meant to avoid hiring individuals who cannot grasp the vision and objective of the security of the mall' (Source: Key Informant 3).*

Other measures enumerated include good housekeeping that ensures that luggage is not left unattended, washrooms and bins are cleaned regularly, as well as conducting background checks for all the mall tenants.

#### **4.9.3 Collaboration and interoperability of emergency responders**

Respondents indicated that the mall has a good working relationship with stakeholders such as the NPS, KDF, and other emergency first responders. The mall is able to conduct joint drills with these responders as well as gather and share intelligence that is crucial for mitigating terror attacks.

#### **4.9.4 Nature of Training**

The Key informants indicated that security safety and customer care officers have undertaken rigorous terrorism training including mitigation and preparedness. The trainings are conducted regularly, and training assessment carried out to ensure that trainees are adequately trained. Notable training courses indicated by the responders include emergency evacuation, working with KDF and NPS, and securing the mall in case of impending danger.

*'We incorporate terrorism trainers from the KDF, NPS, and security officers from global partners to train our security officers on antiterrorism techniques' (Source: Key Informant 4)*

#### **4.9.5 Security Management Systems**

The mall has in place an enhanced and advanced integrated system that connects different technologies such as CCTV, access, and plate recognition system, X-ray screening machine to a central command centre where monitoring is real-time. Other measures indicated under this indicator include an elaborate guard force, deployment of police officers both in uniform and in civilian clothes to complement the mall security team. A key responded indicated as follows;

*The mall has integrated the comfort of the client with the need for security. To avoid intrusion into the privacy of our clientele screening of individuals is conducted through an advanced Xray screen that picks out any weapons through thermal technology (Source: Key informant 4)*

*The mall has in place one of the best security system in the world that is used by the some of the best militaries in the world and was installed at the cost of over 5 million USD’(Source: Key Informant 1)*

#### **4.10 Chapter Summary**

Data collected using questionnaires, key informant guides and observation was sorted and analysed and presented together with the views of the respondents. The findings presented indicate that the Mall has an effective mitigation and preparedness strategy against terror attacks. The assessment of key indicators such as training, emergency response plans, security systems indicated that the mall had indeed made considerable effort in implementing its strategy against terror attacks.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.0 Introduction**

This final chapter presents the summary of the major findings of the study, conclusions, and recommendations of the study based on the objectives, as well as suggestions for further research to improve the disaster mitigation and preparedness strategy against terrorism on soft targets such as shopping malls.

#### **5.1 Summary of the Findings**

The study aimed at examining the strategies used by local malls in disaster mitigation and preparedness strategy against terror attacks in Nairobi. The case of the one of the largest new malls in the city, in an affluent neighbourhood was used. This mall provides advantages such as its expansive size, multiple access points and its affluent neighbourhood, which attracts foreigners to mall, all of which make it a lucrative soft target. Findings of this study can then be generalized to other malls in the city and beyond. The study was guided by four objectives, namely: to assess how effective is the strategy n mitigation and preparedness against terror attacks; assess the security management systems in place at the mall; determine the nature of training, including emergency plans, and drills; to establish how security systems influence terrorism mitigation and preparedness strategy and to determine the challenges faced by the mall in implementing their mitigation and preparedness strategy.

The study which used descriptive research design targeted security officers deployed at the mall and the management team of the mall. Sampling was conducted through stratified sampling and

purposive and simple random sampling procedures applied. A sample size of 267 respondents was selected. Data was collected via questionnaires, key informant guides and observation methods. Analysis of quantitative data was done through descriptive statistics, and presented as frequencies and percentages in tables, charts and histograms. Qualitative data from the questionnaire and the key informant guide was reported as verbatim, and an observation checklist was presented.

## **5.2 Discussion**

### **5.2.1 Effectiveness of the preparedness and mitigation strategy against terror attacks**

The study established that respondents were optimistic that the strategy on mitigation and preparedness deployed by the mall was efficient. The mall has in place a robust strategy modelled around the best practices globally, that encompasses risk assessments, intelligence gathering and sharing, investments among other factors. The mall has a platform of sharing intelligence with the state security agents and relevant antiterrorism intelligence is shared with the mall. Findings indicated that the mall management had invested heavily on the security systems in place and considered securing the mall as part of the investment. The mall's strategy of a robust visible system is hinged on largely mitigating terror attacks through deterrence. The presence of a multi-layered approach of security officers that includes complementing mall security with state agents is also part of the mall's strategy of mitigation.

### **5.2.2 Presence of Security Management Systems**

The mall also has in place facility hardening measures such as advanced integrated advanced CCTV systems with over 800 cameras using modern technology, bollards, X ray screen that serve to deter would be terrorists from targeting the mall. The system is converged through a central command centre. Respondents indicated that the mall had sufficient security and safety policies and procedures that are critical in protecting the mall against terror attacks. Such



procedures include surveillance procedures, access procedures, luggage procedures. The security system in place is also meant to boost customer confidence, by assuring clients of the mall that their safety and security is guaranteed.

### **5.2.3 Training, Drills and Structured Emergency Plans**

The findings indicated that the mall has in place written emergency response plans, that have been cascaded down to security officers. It was the findings of the study that the mall does carry out joint emergency terror drills with responders such as the fire response team, the National Police Service, the medical response team.

The study findings indicated that the mall had in place antiterrorism training focussed on recognising and responding to terror attacks. Respondents had been consistently trained in the last three years to ensure that the training is entrenched and to close the training gaps that is caused by a high turnover especially in guarding companies. Emergency training for terror attacks positively impacted on disaster preparedness of the mall. The training conducted enabled the security officers better mitigate and respond to terror attacks. The training assessment carried out ensured that the training offered was in line with the role of security officers. The training offered is aimed at closing the individual knowledge gaps of terror emergency response as per the training assessment conducted. The content of the training is suitable for adult learners. The training course includes human surveillance, identifying suspicious packages, identifying suspicious behaviour, communication protocols, working with emergency responders.

### **5.2.4 Strategic Collaboration with local emergency responders**

The study indicated that the mall has a good working relation with other emergency responders, strategic collaborations between the mall security officers and emergency responders improves disaster mitigation and preparedness of terror attacks, mall security officers collaborated with

medical and fire responders in preparing and responding to terror attacks. Findings also indicated that the mall has a mechanism in place to collaborate with the local community to alert mall officers on suspicious individuals or activities around the mall.

### **5.3 Conclusions from the study**

Based on the analysis of findings and summary above, this research in its examination of shopping malls concludes that the strategy on disaster mitigation and preparedness against terror attacks found in the Mall indicates the presence of robust counter terror measures in place. The case of the Mall is a template worth adapting because it is anchored around best practices globally and is centric on ensuring the safety of the customers and neighbouring community.

First the study gives evidence of an existing expansive strategy on mitigation and preparedness against terror attacks. The strategy comprises of a huge investment on the security system and a budget allocation for the security operations of the mall. Other elements of the strategy include risk assessments that are conducted regularly, a multi-layered presence of a large contingent of security officers, an open intelligence sharing forum with state agents.

Secondly, the strategy shows a sustainable pattern of conducting trainings, emergency drills that are terrorism specific, to ensure that the actions of security officers are well elaborated. Training is conducted regularly, and training assessment needs factored in modelling the training. The findings of the study indicate that increased training will enhance the ability of the security officers to mitigate and respond to terror attacks.

The strategy gives evidence of an advance security management system that features state of the art cameras, an integrated security system of CCTV's and access control technology enhancing the security of the mall through surveillance, patrols and deployment of policies and procedures. This system acts as a deterrence for individuals who have ill intent but is also critical in preventing terrorists from carrying out a successful attack.

The findings of the study give evidence of strategic collaborations between mall security officers and other emergency responders. Enhance collaborations between state security agents and mall security enable the mall security officers to gain access to relevant intelligence on predicted terror activity, as well as ensure that in the event of a terror attack, response efforts are well coordinated between security officers and other emergency responders.

Findings from the study provide that the mall has in place emergency plans for mitigating and preparedness against terror attacks. The findings also indicate that the mall conducts annual training of all security officers deployed at the mall, and emergency drills and joint exercises with other emergency responders are carried out there is a common understanding between mall security and the responders on the emergency process.

The study further indicates that parameters such as background checks of security officers and mall tenants are crucial in ensuring the effectiveness of the mall's disaster mitigation and preparedness strategy. Other parameters include better emoluments for the security officers, improve hiring standards and increasing police patrols around the mall.

#### **5.4 Recommendations**

The study recommends that the by extension other soft targets adopt the Mall's strategy on mitigation and preparedness against terror and do the following;

1. Emergency Operations Plans: Shopping malls should ensure that all security officers are familiar with the emergency plans in place. This emergency plans should be shared with the mall's tenants and clear roles on evacuation and communication between security officers and mall tenants be spelt out. Joint Emergency drills with other emergency responders to be conducted regularly to ensure that the security officers are well prepared in the event of a terror attack. Drills should also be used to test the security officer's knowledge of the emergency plan, and the outcome used to improve training. For instance, terror attack drills carried out in collaboration with the National Police Service

would indicate the effectiveness of the emergency plan, and response procedure by the mall. The study also recommends the standardization of the Emergency plans for shopping malls across the country. Standardizing the emergency protocols for terror attacks in all shopping malls would enable emergency responders and mall security to effectively respond to terror attacks should they occur.

2. **Training:** Shopping malls should train their security officers on the Anti-terrorism laws and the National Disaster policy. The government should draft a standardised training that incorporated both the private security officers and the government security agents. There is need for the legal framework to mandate trainings of all security officers on Disaster mitigation and preparedness against terror attacks of all security guards deployed at shopping malls. The study further recommends that trainings that are specific to mitigating and responding to terror related threats be conducted monthly.
3. **Provide protocols or develop Protocols:** The study recommends that the mall puts in place working protocols with other emergency responders to ensure that functional interoperability between mall security and other emergency responders is enhanced. The National Police Service should establish ways of working the private security officers to incorporate them in mitigation and response efforts for terror attacks. Sharing of intelligence with the private security officers will enhance mitigation and
4. **Security Management Systems:** The study recommends that shopping malls enhance their security management system through human and technological strategy to mitigate and prepare against terror attacks, such as installing a Under Vehicle Surveillance System (UVSS) system and bollards to deter car bombs threats against the mall. Increased human surveillance would also be critical in deterring terrorists from targeting the mall.

5. Background checks: The study recommends conducting background checks of security officers before hiring and for mall tenants before space allocation to deter terrorists from infiltrating shopping malls. There is also a need to create awareness on the importance of certain security procedures to the mall management, tenants, and consumers. This will enable them to appreciate certain implications like restrictions to certain areas of the mall, longer queues at search and screening points.

### **5.5 Suggestions for further research**

The study was conducted in a shopping mall in the city of Nairobi. There is need for research to be conducted on other soft targets such as sports stadia, universities, and transport hubs. The researcher therefore recommends the following;

- i. Further study to be conducted on assessing how soft targets can respond and recover from terror attacks.
- ii. A comparative study on the strategy of disaster mitigation and preparedness against terrorist attacks among shopping malls in the upmarket areas and those in lower class neighbourhoods to provide insight into the the socioeconomic dynamics of terror attacks.

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## APPENDIX I

### SHOPPING MALL MANAGEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

#### RESEARCH PROJECT BY MUTUNGI EVERLYNE MWENDE-C50/68792/2013

The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect data which will be used to examine the Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness Strategy against terror attacks of the mall. The information provided through this questionnaire will be used purely and exclusively for academic research purpose and will be treated confidentially. Your cooperation and assistance will be highly appreciated.

You are kindly asked to fill out this questionnaire by putting an “X” in front of the applicable answer or in the applicable cell or fill the blanks with the appropriate response for each item.

#### SECTION A: Respondent background information

1. Name (optional): .....
2. Designation: .....
3. Age [ ] 21 -30 Years [ ] 31-40 Years [ ] 41-50 Years [ ] 50 Years and above
4. Gender Male [ ] Female [ ]
5. Education Level  
Secondary level [ ] Certificate level [ ] Diploma Level [ ] Degree level [ ]  
Masters Level [ ] PhD Level [ ] Others [ ] Specify.....
6. How many years have you worked at the Shopping Mall?  
Less than 5 years [ ] 6-11 years [ ] 12-17 years [ ]  
18-23 years [ ] 24-29 years [ ] above 30 years [ ]

**SECTION B: PERCEPTION ON TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS BY SHOPPING MALLS**

7. How would you rate the level of preparedness for terrorism related disaster by the Shopping Mall?

Very good [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very poor [ ]

8. Why do you rate it as above?

**SECTION C: SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS**

9. Do you have written security procedures in place to address the threat of terrorism

Yes [ ] No [ ]

10. If no, why?

11. What are some of the security processes and systems do you carry out that are critical in mitigation and preparedness of the mall against terror attacks?

ii. How effective are the security procedures and policies

**SECTION D: Training and Drills**

iii. Have you read the Emergency Preparedness Plan on terror attacks for the mall?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

iv. Does the Mall carry out joint drills on terror attacks to rehearse the protocols as set out in the emergency plan?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

v. If yes, have you participated in an emergency drill with any of the following agencies?

Agency	Yes	No
National Police Service		
Kenya Military Force		
Medical Responders		
Fire Rescue Team		
Others		

vi. Have you been trained on the Emergency Plan in the last three years?

2019 [ ] 2020 [ ] 2021 [ ]

vii. Please outline some of the key courses that you have undertaken as part of antiterrorism training.

viii. The below are several statements on emergency training on terror attacks. Kindly indicate the extent of your agreement with each of these statements. Use a Likert scale of 1-5, where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree and 5=strongly agree.

No	Statement	5	4	3	2	1
1.	Employees in Disaster emergency response have been trained on terror attacks emergency protocol					
2.	Disaster mitigation and preparedness training enhances responses to terror attacks					
3.	The security management carries out training assessments to determine the need of security officers					
4.	The training offered is based on the outcome of the training needs assessment					
5.	The training methods employed are appropriate for adult learning					
6.	employees receive special training on preventing and responding to terrorism					

### SECTION E :Mitigation and Preparedness Strategy

In this section, you are requested to tick (√) against the number in the Lickert scale with regard to the statement provided. The scale options are:

Strongly agree [5] Agree [4] Indifferent [3] Disagree [2] Strongly disagree [1]

No	Statement	5	4	3	2	1
1.	The mall has a good networking relationship with the local police force					
2.	The police regularly patrol the mall and the surrounding areas					
3.	The mall has a good working relationship with health emergency responders (EMT)					
4.	The mall has a working relationship with the local Fire emergency responders					
5.	The mall has an intelligence sharing platform with the state security agents on terror threats					
6.	The mall has a networking relationship with the local community to alert you on suspicious characters or activities around the mall					
7.	The mall has an interagency communication platform that links the communication channels of the mall security with other emergency responders.					

## **SECTION F : MITIGATION AND PREPAREDNESS PLANS**

1. Does the mall have a mitigation and preparedness plans in place for terror attack?  
Yes    No    I don't Know
2. Are you informed by management of any reviews in the plan?  
Yes    No    I don't Know
3. In your opinion, what are the challenges that you face in implementing the mitigation and preparedness plan of the mall?
4. Please suggest ways of improving the disaster and mitigation strategy against terror attacks by the mall.

**Thank you for your Time**



## APPENDIX II

### OBSERVATION CHECKLIST

<b>Resource</b>	<b>Available</b>	<b>Not Available</b>	<b>Comment</b>
Vehicle Screening Technology			
Automated vehicle access system			
Integrated CCTV System			
Advanced Facility Lockdown Mechanism			
Use of bullet proof barriers			
Search Kiosks for pedestrians			
Xray Screening Machine			
Use of Under Vehicle Surveillance Systems and vehicle screening procedures			
Use of Bollards at the entry points			
Use of sniffer dogs around the mall			

### APPENDIX III

#### Key Informant Interview Guide for Security Officers


1. What is your perception of the level of mitigation and preparedness for terror attacks by the mall?
2. What are the key measures that have been put in place by the Mall in mitigating and preparing against terror attacks?
3. What is the biggest hurdle in implementing the shopping mall's mitigation and preparedness strategy against terror attacks?
4. What measures have you put in place to promote interoperability, and correspondence between the mall security team, state security agents, and other emergency responders?
5. What is the nature of training offered to the mall's security team in line with mitigation and preparedness against terror attacks?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
6. What are some of the key features of the security management systems that are in place as per the mitigation and preparedness strategy against terror attacks?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
7. Does the shopping mall have in place mitigation and preparedness plans for a terror attack? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
8. Who developed the Plans? \_\_\_\_\_
9. How often are the plans reviewed?
10. Do you have any recommendations on the mitigation and preparedness against terrorism for shopping malls?


**APPENDIX IV**  
**INTRODUCTION LETTER**



# APPENDIX V


## NACOSTI PERMIT

  
REPUBLIC OF KENYA

  
**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR  
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION**

Ref No: **753829** Date of Issue: **27/January/2022**


**RESEARCH LICENSE**




**This is to Certify that Ms. Everlyne Mwendu Mutungi of University of Nairobi, has been licensed to conduct research in Nairobi on the topic: EXAMINING LOCAL MALLS' DISASTER MITIGATION AND PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY AGAINST TERROR ATTACKS IN NAIROBI for the period ending : 27/January/2023.**

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