DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) PRACTICES
PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

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Declaration

This research project is my original work and has not been presented to any other institution or university.

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This research project has been submitted for examination with our approval as the university supervisors.

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Dedication

This research project is especially dedicated to my entire family members for their love, encouragement and support throughout my studies.

Acknowledgement

I most sincerely thank the almighty God for giving me good health to carry out this research. I salute my supervisors Dr. Ochieng who devotedly guided and encouraged me through the project. I am convinced that without their support, this study would not have been a success.

Mostly especially, I am grateful to my family members who encouraged me to move on amid challenges and tight schedules. I greatly appreciate the encouragement of my classmates throughout the programme who were always available with useful suggestions.

Lastly but not least, I thank all my friends even though they are not mentioned as individuals. I appreciate the contribution and supports towards making this study a success.

Abstract

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs during the 1980s come up to manage war to peace transitions. Initially, DDR consisted of a set of activities, interventions and operations carried out primarily by international agencies, particularly the United Nations (from an emphasis on security issues) and the World Bank (from a predominantly development perspective, DDR has evolved from a country-level to a transnational activity. The recognition that regional conflicts may form interlocking political complexes and war economies has led to regionally-focused, multi-actor programs such as the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in the Great Lakes region of Africa which is led by the World Bank in partnership with the United Nations and several bi-lateral donors.

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC, was deployed following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July of 1999. A core pillar of the mission, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs have attempted to address the issue of multiple armed nonstate actors operating, primarily in the country's eastern districts of Ituri, North and South Kivu. MONUC's DDR initiatives can be subdivided into the national DDR program for Congolese combatants and the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups. Although there has been some success in the DDR(RR) programs over the past 12 years of UN deployment, rampant insecurity attributed to the presence of armed groups in the DRC continues to plague the East.

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List of Abbreviation

CNDP   National Congress for the Defense of the People

DDR   Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DDRRR   Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and

Reintegration

DCR   Disarmament Community Reinsertion

DRC   Democratic Republic of the Congo

FAC   Congolese Armed Forces

FARDC   Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo

FAR   Armed Forces of Rwanda

FAZ   Armed Forces of Zaire

FDD   Forces for the Defense of Democracy

FDLR   Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda

FNI   Nationalist and Integrationist Front

FNL   National Forces of Liberation

IDP   Internally Displaced Person

JMC   Joint Military Commission

LRA   Lord's Resistance Army

MDRP   Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program

MLC   Movement for the Liberation of the Congo

MONUC   United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic

of the Congo

NGO   Non-Governmental Organization

TPVM	Third Party Verification Mechanism
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UPC	Union of Congolese Patriots
UPDF	Ugandan People's Defense Force

<center>CHAPTER ONE</center>

<center>INTRODUCTION</center>

1.1 Background of the Study

Following on the heels of the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) first deployed a monitoring force of just over 5,000 personnel. Eleven years later, the renamed United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) shifted its strategy from supporting the transitional government to protecting civilians in the east of the country. In the process, MONUSCO has become the largest and most expensive UN mission to date, totaling 24,378 personnel with an annual budget of just under $1.4 billion.[1] United Nations (UN) peace operations are being deployed in evermore challenging environments.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) balances in limbo between ongoing conflict and peace, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, repatriation and resettlement (DDR(RR)) process is underway[1]. The aim is to provide a viable way of life for former combatants whose main source of survival has been by way of the gun. To date, this process has been focused on addressing the needs of armed men, while less priority has been given to those of women[2]. The ideology of equally including perspectives, impacts and needs of men and women has been evolving at the United Nations through the concept of 'gender mainstreaming'.

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[1] Les Roberts, "Mortality in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Results from Eleven Mortality Surveys," (International Rescue Committee Health Unit, 2001), p. 3.
[2] Vanessa Farr, "The importance of a gender perspective to successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes," Disarmament Forum 4 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2003), p. 25.

This paper argues that gender mainstreaming of DDR(RR) processes is a transformative concept, in which equal attention to women and men in the theory, policy and practical implementation are all crucial to the success of DDR(RR) processes.

[3]Fred Tanner stated that Practitioners on the ground find themselves seeking to implement security and development programming in situations where peace agreements are lacking or non-inclusive; undisciplined armed elements abound and allegiances constantly shift. These settings involve greater levels and diffusion of violence against unarmed civilians, often perpetrated by undisciplined armed groups, such as militia and gangs operating at the subnational level. The conflicts are protracted, destroy social, political, and economic infrastructure, employ large numbers of child combatants, and result in significant population displacements[4].

The non-paper known as the "New Horizon" report, prepared by the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support (DFS) in July 2009, underlined that these increasingly complex settings require new dynamic and innovative models of conducting peacekeeping. In these situations where the peace process is fragile, targeted efforts are required to stave off violence and create the space for a viable process. In the area of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), practitioners have been confronted with situations that required them to develop new and innovative approaches in response to the challenges they face in the field[5].

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[3] Fred Tanner, "Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament," in Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues* (New York, NY: United Nations, 2006), 169.
[4] Humphreys and Weinstein, "Demobilization and Reintegration," "Does Money Work? Cash Transfers to Ex-Combatants in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes," *Disasters*, Vol.30, No.3 (2006), 316;
[5] Joanna Spear, "Disarmament and Demobilization," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M.Cousens, eds., *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 141;

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1.2 Statement of the Problem

Although the Congolese wars are officially over, violence and the suffering of the civilian population in the eastern provinces of the DRC continues, despite the efforts of the national government and the presence of the world's largest UN mission. Confronted with widespread violence perpetrated by multiple armed groups, UN peacekeepers have increased and broadened their DDR activities as a primary tool to reduce violence and restore order. But, as the mission's leadership and strategy change, barriers are emerging that question the efficacy of disarmament and demobilization tactics, challenge the success of the reintegration of ex-combatants, and cast doubt on the viability of DDR as a tool for achieving peace in the eastern DRC. Scholars and practitioners worldwide stand to gain significant insight into successful DDR by understanding how these shifts in DDR strategy came about in the DRC, and what this might mean both for international DDR standards and the success of MONUSCO as a peacekeeping mission[6].

The argument of this thesis is that, once the voluntary approach to DDR(RR) was not achieved, MONUC adopted more coercive tactics. Not only are these tactics often at odds with its mandate to seek voluntary compliance from armed groups, but also, they have not addressed the underlying factors that encourage armed violence in the Eastern Congo. As a consequence, despite the burgeoning scope and cost of the mission, armed groups have proliferated and the security situation for the local population continues to be critical in the eastern provinces of the country.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of national armed groups and Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration (DDRRR) of

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[6] Desmond Molloy, "DDR: A Shifting Paradigm & The Scholar/Practitioner Gap," *Pearson Peacekeeping Centre Occasional Paper*, (Ottawa, ON: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2008): 3.

foreign armed groups operating in the eastern Congolese provinces of Ituri and North and South Kivu were scarcely addressed in the early years of the UN's presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)[7]. Now, they have become the central focus of MONUSCO's mandate. But, as the importance of DDR(RR) activities in the east have gained recognition, so have criticisms of the program's effectiveness, especially as armed violence continues to exact a toll on the civilian population of the DRC. This thesis seeks to examine the growth and evolution of DDR practices both in the context of the complex situation that exists in the eastern DRC and how they measure up to broader UN DDR standards. How have the DDR(RR) programs in the eastern DRC evolved over time?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

i.   To describe the DDRRR programs in the eastern DRC

ii. To understand the current conflict of eastern DRC.

iii. To describe the DDRRR programs in peace building.

1.4 Justification of the Study

Since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations have experienced rapid change in response to the emergence of widespread, protracted intrastate conflict. As mission strategies and procedures adjust to meet the growing challenge of nonstate actors and their use of violence against civilian populations, DDR programs have become increasingly accepted as vital pieces of many mission mandates. Currently administrating thirteen DDR programs worldwide, the United Nations has taken a lead in DDR program development with a comprehensive

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[7] Desmond Molloy, "DDR: A Shifting Paradigm & The Scholar/Practitioner Gap," *Pearson Peacekeeping Centre Occasional Paper*, (Ottawa, ON: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2008): 3.

approach it outlined in its 2006 publication Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards or the IDDRS.

These documents are important since they have been produced by the international organizations, as well as that the initiatives, which have accompanied, supported and tracked the DDR processes around the world during the last twenty years. Between three and five million Congolese are estimated to have perished since 1994, which ranks the DRC among the worst cases of prolonged human suffering since World War II. The central role DDR(RR) currently plays in stabilizing the eastern DRC makes its success highly relevant to ongoing UN interventions and future UN DDR doctrine. Understanding the role of UN DDR(RR) activities in the DRC not only adds value to the ongoing MONUSCO operation, but also will contribute to the operational knowledge in the larger DDR community as a whole.

1.5 Literature Review

The literature review will forces on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Democratic Republic of the Congo east conflict, Peace operation verses Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and finally Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration verses Demobilization, Disarmament, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration at Democratic Republic of the Congo east conflict.

1.5.1 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

The above concepts initially emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s. DDR scholars and practitioners attempted to standardize DDRR practices and addition to the knowledge pertaining to the individual phases of DDRR, a few general characteristics for operations have also emerged. Relevant to the overall success of DDRR operations, these five points of consideration are vital to the overall success of a Traditional DDRR program. Disarmament, Demobilization

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and Reintegration (DDR) is an applied strategy for executing successful peacekeeping operations, and is generally the strategy employed by all UN Peacekeeping Operations. Disarmament entails the physical removal of the means of combat from ex-belligerents (weapons, ammunition, etc.); demobilization entails the disbanding of armed groups; while reintegration describes the process of reintegrating former combatants into civil society, ensuring against the possibility of a resurgence of armed conflict.

Many authors acknowledges that Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), an applied strategy that is used for executing successful peacekeeping operations, especially by the United Nations. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration is critical to the post-conflict reconstruction environment: it "aims to remove the means of violence, such as small arms, from a society and aims to reintegrate ex-combatants into functioning communities."[8] After success in El Salvador, Mozambique, and Namibia and failures in Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua, the United Nations concluded that "without the implementation of the concept of DDR armed conflict is likely to again break out."[9] "No peace process can be successful when armed groups exist that pose a threat to fragile peace efforts." [10]One of the first and most important steps in achieving the goals of sustainable peace and stability in a post-conflict environment is an effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program.

[8] Nicky Hitchcock, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: The Case of Angola," Peacewomen.org: 36, http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Angola/ACCORDDDRAngola.pdf (accessed October 19, 2007).
[9] Chester A. Crocker and Fen Olser Hampson, "Making Peace Settlement Work," *Foreign Policy*, no. 104, (Autumn, 1996): 67; Emanuel Erskine, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Post-Conflict Situations," In *The United Nations 1999 Symposium on Disarmament and Development*, eds. Lucy Webster and Kate Cell, (New York, New York: Economists Allied for Arms Reduction, 1999), 15,
[10] Joanna Spear, "Disarmament and Demobilization," In *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, 141-181 (Boulder and London: Lynnne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

DDR is not a program that should only be implemented in the first or second phase of reconstruction, but rather is part of the entire process[11]. The programs are difficult to execute. In Haiti between 1994 and 1997, a US led DDR program established in the reconstruction process failed, and the current insurgency.7 Haiti is a weak state with rampant gang violence.8 And as intra-state conflicts decline, situations like Haiti may emerge as the new trend and challenge for the international community.9

Many writers, including Krasner and others, argue that in today's world, weak and failed states pose a tremendous risk to both the United States and global security.[12] But for post-conflict reconstruction to be successful, it is absolutely necessary that there be an effective DDR program. In 2000, the UN secretary general concluded that "a process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration has repeatedly proved to be vital to stability in a post-conflict situation." [13]Scholars also agree that an effective DDR process contributes significantly to a fragile peace and reconstruction by facilitating reconciliation and trust building between former combatants and noncombatants; and by laying the foundation for elections, security sector reform, and economic development for the state to move forward[14].

Practitioners and scholars have focused overwhelmingly on examples of cooperative DDR, that is, on situations where there is a peace treaty and where combatants, not criminals, are the disarmament target. This leaves out the cases that are likely to become increasingly relevant

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[11] Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arrangements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," SIDDR, September 26, 2005: 3,

[12] Christopher J Coyne, "Reconstruction Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2, (2006): 343-45; Robert H Dorff, "Failed States After 9/11

[13] Mark Sullivan, "Caribbean Region: Issues in U.S. Relations," *CRS Report for Congress*, April 26, 2006 (updated), RL32160: 4.

[14] Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arrangements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," SIDDR, September 26, 2005: 3,

for the international community: those where no peace treaty exists and where common criminals are the greatest threat to a state. The use of coercive DDR in cases where there was no peace agreement has not been limited to Somalia where it was a disaster. It was used in Haiti between 1995 and 1997 and most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq.[15] Thus, a coercive approach to DDR is not a thing of the past. As preemptive measures become a more common practice, the successful implementation of coercive DDR will become increasingly important.

The final major discussion relating to UN-sponsored DDR in the eastern DRC pertains to the reintegration process. Widely regarded as the most challenging, expensive, time-consuming, but also the most important part of the DDR process, reintegration in the DRC is further complicated by the additional need for repatriation and resettlement of armed foreign groups. While there does exist extensive literature on repatriation strategies,[16] Hans Romkema De Veenhoop provides an excellent summation of the current repatriation activities in the DRC.[17]

1.5.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo East Conflict

The Democratic Republic of the Congo lies in the center of the African continent, situated between the Gulf of Guinea and the great lakes of eastern Africa. Comprising a vast 905,355 square miles, the DRC is roughly the size of the combined area of Western Europe or over 3 times the size of the U.S. state of Texas. Encompassing the majority of the large Congo

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[15] George Packer, *The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq*, (The United States of America: New York, 2005), 193; Alpaslan Ozerdem, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from a Cross-Cultural Perspective," *Third World Quarterly*, 23, no. 5, (October 1, 2002): 972.

[16] Humphreys and Weinstein, "Demobilization and Reintegration," 531; Colletta et al., "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration ," 170–181; Sigrid Willibald, "Does Money Work? Cash Transfers to Ex-Combatants in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes," *Disasters*, Vol.30, No.3 (2006)

[17] Hans Romkema de Veenhoop, *Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament & Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Washington, DC: Multicountry Demobilization and Reintegration Program, 2007).

River basin, the DRC is characterized by dense jungles, a maze of waterways, and the diverse settlement of over 200 ethno-linguistic groups. Experiencing large population growths during the Bantu migrations from present day Nigeria many centuries ago, the people of present day DRC are mainly of Bantu origin, sharing related, but not identical, cultural and linguistic traits.[18] There is a large diversity of ethnolinguistic groups present in the DRC, and many of them straddle borders with other modern African states. The multi-national nature of the country is the result of some population movements since modern African state formation following the decolonization movement of the mid-1900s but is mainly indicative of the difference between how pre-colonial African states and European colonizers viewed state boundaries and power projection. Beginning by briefly summarizing the history of state formation, this chapter will review the current conflict in the east from its origins up to the deployment of MONUC in 1999, and conclude with a survey of the specific demographics of the populations living in the eastern provinces to provide a formative understanding of the different groups and their relationships.

The substantial literature on the DRC reflects the length, complexity, and immensity of conflict. Additionally, a multitude of works regarding UN DDRR activities have been published in response to the numerous UN-led DDRR initiatives around the world. This research is focused on material relevant to UN DDRR activities in the eastern Congolese provinces since the introduction of MONUC in 1999. The three most relevant works pertaining to historical accounts of the conflict are those of Prunier, Stearns, and Autesserre.[19] While Prunier and Stearns each provide comprehensive historical accounts of the conflict beginning with the end of the Rwandan

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[18] Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila* (New York: Zed Books, 2002), 14.

[19] Gerard Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Jason K.Stearns, *Dancing with Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011)

civil war in 1994, Autessere presents an in-depth assessment of international intervention in the east. Complementing these scholarly works are a series of reports on the current situation in the eastern DRC, including works from the UN, *Oxford Analytica, Forced Migration Review*, and the Congressional Research Service.[20] While these works disagree in points of analysis and suggestions for successful conflict resolution, they concur that the international community has thus far failed to achieve peace.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is plagued by enduring conflict in its eastern provinces. Formally the second Congolese war came to an end in 2002. However, in practice the conflict drags on and is the deadliest since the Second World War. The victims are civilians, in particular women and girls, and ethnic groups such as the Banyamulenge, the Hutu Banyarwanda, the Hema and the Lendu. Many of the killers and rapists are former genocidists who escaped into the DRC from the Rwandan genocide. Besides the high death rate among vulnerable civilian populations, especially children, and the number of internally displaced persons, there is the alarming trend of rape used as a weapon of war[21]. Sexual violence is aimed at terrorizing and controlling the population. A recent study estimates that nearly two million women have been raped in the DRC, that is nearly one every minute. These atrocities, however, are not limited to women and girls. The fact that also men and boys are victims of rape is often not highlighted. Moreover, sexual violence is not limited to rape. It includes crimes such as abduction and sexual slavery, forced maternity and sexual mutilation. Sexual violence causes

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[20] United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, UN Doc S/2011/20 (January 17, 2011)
[21] Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila* (New York: Zed Books, 2002), 14.

traumas, diseases, rejection and stigmatization. These consequences are aggravated by feelings of hopelessness, shame and abandonment because of the impunity of the perpetrators[22].

The literature concerned with intervention in the DRC is unanimous that the UN mission in the eastern DRC, despite certain areas of progress, has failed so far to fulfill its mandate to protect the populations and organizations in the eastern provinces. An integral part of the overall strategy for creating a lasting peace, the DDR(RR) process has been scrutinized by the academic and peacekeeping communities in order to better understand its role in conflict reduction. The first major theme to emerge in the literature relating to DDR(RR) processes in the DRC is the inability of the international community to tailor a program to adequately address a problem of this magnitude[23]. Utilizing two metrics for measuring success in MONUC's deployment in the DRC, Denis Tull finds that the UN mission's approach to the problem has been both reactive and under resourced. Acknowledging the immense complexities associated with the conflict, and the failure of MONUC's DDR strategy, a body of literature has emerged supporting a locally oriented, or bottom-up approach, in DDR activities, challenging the current focus on top-down strategies[24].

1.5.3 DDR verses DDRRR at Democratic Republic of the Congo east conflict

This section looks at Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration verses Demobilization, Disarmament, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration at Democratic

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[22] Hans Romkema de Veenhoop, *Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament & Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Washington, DC: Multicountry Demobilization and Reintegration Program, 2007).
[23] Denis M.Tull."Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.16, No.2 (2009): 215–230
[24] Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills, and Terence McNamee. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo," *African Security*, Vol.2, No.1 (2009), 29–58

Republic of the Congo east conflict. The process of the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration or resettlement (DDRRR) of the foreign combatants and rebel groups in the Congo forms part of MONUC's mandate,[25] which now also includes the demobilization and the reintegration of former Congolese combatants. The role of the media in this process is very important, even crucial. Here is what Sébastien Lapierre, a Canadian, MONUC's information officer and head of the Radio Okapi station in Bukavu, in South Kivu, has said about it: "Several former combatants have said that they had decided to return to Rwanda with their dependants or their family after hearing a radio report on the successful return of a close family member or an acquaintance". The DDRRR process is one of MONUC's most important tasks. Its mandate, which began in 1999,[26] was primarily to monitor the ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign armies "officially" present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Having accomplished that mission, MONUC has been playing a leading role for the last two years in the far more complex task of disarming and repatriating some 15,000 foreign combatants, based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who had rebelled against their respective governments, namely Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.[27]

Serving as the foundation for the MONUC DDR(RR) programs, UN Security Council Resolution 1291 mandated MONUC to assist the Joint Military Commission with "the comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration of all members of all

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[25] Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills, and Terence McNamee. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo," *African Security*, Vol.2, No.1 (2009), 29–58

[26] Fred Tanner, "Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament," in Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues* (New York, NY: United Nations, 2006), 169.

[27] Denis M.Tull."Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.16, No.2 (2009): 215–230

armed groups referred to in Ceasefire Agreement."[28] The original Traditional DDR process in the east evolved over time to become a more integrated approach incorporating Second Generation DDRR practices. Although initially promising in its timing and intent, a comprehensive DDR program in the DRC did not come to fruition for several years. Even though a comprehensive approach has been in effect for over seven years, MONUC supported DDR and DDRRR has produced mixed results. Affected by an array of exogenous and endogenous factors, comprehensive DDR and DDRRR programs in the east have struggled to provide short and long-term stability and security due to combination of factors[29]. First, the political context into which MONUC deployed was extremely complicated: Congolese state institution were weak to nonexistent; there was a large number of warring parties each with their own political agendas; the presence of foreign troops had greatly destabilized the peace process; finally, the availability of easily extractable minerals financed the arming and training of rebel groups. And if this were not bad enough, DDR programs suffered from MONUC's inconsistent mandate, a lack of coordination, and insufficient resources to provide a force adequate to execute DDR activities.

As with all DDR operations worldwide, timing has been a key issue in the DDR(RR) process as supported by MONUC. Discussed by general DDR theorists as well as case studies concerned with the DRC,[30] timely implementation of a DDR process reduces the number of

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[28] Established in July of 1999 with representatives from all the warring nations who were party to the Second Congo War.
[29] United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, UN Doc S/2011/20 (January 17, 2011)
[29] Denis M.Tull."Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.16, No.2 (2009): 215–230
[30] Eirin Mobekk, "Security Sector Reform," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.16, No.2 (2009), 273–286; Tull, "Peacekeeping in DRC."

weapons and returns former combatants to civil society. The successful implementation of voluntary DDR relies on the adherence by belligerent groups to a comprehensive peace agreement.[31] Because peace agreements failed in the DRC, MONUC forces have struggled to demobilize groups, turning to coercive tactics in some cases. This perceived shift in mandate by UN forces has clearly changed the dynamics of international intervention and challenged the assumption that voluntary engagement in DDR activities is necessary for success. While there exists very sparse literature pertaining to the use of coercive force versus voluntary recruitment in a DDR process, a 2008 Naval Postgraduate School thesis by Shane Doolan[32] is one of the few works analyzing the use of coercive DDR in peacekeeping operations. There is no indepth analysis directly addressing coercive versus voluntary DDR strategies in the eastern DRC. Another constant theme in the literature concerned with DDRRR activities in the DRC has been the interrelationship between DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR). The situation in the eastern DRC presents a unique problem set for UN peacekeeping personnel as violent abuses of the population are carried out not only by the multitude of armed non-state actors, but also by an unruly national army, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), and even by undisciplined UN peacekeeping personnel. Discussing the nexus between SSR and DDR in the DRC, several authors[33] advocate a reevaluation of DDR-SSR processes, such as

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[31] Joanna Spear, "Disarmament and Demobilization," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M.Cousens, eds., *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 141; United States Institute for Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*; Prunier, *Africa's World War.*
[32] Shane R Doolan, "Coercive Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) can it be Successful?" (MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2008).
[33] Mobekk, "Security Sector Reform," 273–286; Renner Onana and Hannah Taylor, "MONUC and SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *International Peacekeeping,* Vol.15, No.4 (October 2008), 501–516; Henri Boshoff, "Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The Numbers Game," *African Security Review,* Vol.18, No.1 (March 2009), 70–73.

integration into the FARDC, rather than disarmament and demobilization of armed rebel groups. But until the FARDC can be trusted as a professional army representative of the country's national interest, DDR of nonstate actors will prove particularly difficult. Likewise, without DDR, SSR will lack an important tool to reduce the means for armed groups to wage campaigns of violence against the government and civilian populations of the east. But while this linkage is clearly indicated by a broad range of publications, the interface of strategies to bridge the gaps between SSR, DDR, and weapons reduction remain poorly understood.[34]

This thesis will focus on how these different areas of DDRR have been addressed in the DRC, what have been the biggest barriers to success, and how the UN mission has adapted its DDRR policy in an attempt to create a successful DDRR program. Specifically, the gaps addressed by this thesis include exploring bottom-up local solutions to problems of reintegration and identifying shifts in MONUC DDRR policy towards more coercive methods in an attempt forcibly to disarm and process combatants.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

In order to reach to these objectives, this paper presents a theoretical review of the most relevant academic work related with DDR processes, especially that worked that has been focused alternative perspectives of reintegration in which the communities and victims which has been affected by violence are taken into account. For this purpose, the theoretical review was

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[34] Robert Muggah, "Emerging from the Shadow of War: A Critical Perspective on DDR and Weapons Reduction in the Post-Conflict Period," *Contemporary Security Policy,* Vol.27, No.1 (2006), 190; Alan Bryden, *Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in Africa* (New York, NY: United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, 2007).

done by referring to the most recent work developed by Muggah[35], Humpreys and Weinstein[36], Pugel[37]. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is a concept that has evolved over time. It first emerged as a necessity of creating certain activities and programs for the veterans of war to accommodate into civilian life after the war was over. In fact, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, DDR emerged as a set of activities "executed exclusively by and for military establishments and shaped by the geo-political imperatives of Cold War cooperation these interventions were ordinarily confined to bilateral partners and focused in the decommissioning and reform of formal military structures in lesser developed countries, including alternative employment schemes for retired officers and veteran pension schemes.

Colleta and others[38], Colleta, Samuelsson, Berts[39], Anders[40] and Jennings[41] who, in addition to refer to previous theoretical framework, create their own concepts of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and reintegration in a comprehensive way. In the same way, the documents produced by the United Nations, World Bank, and the Stockholm Initiative

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[35] Robert Muggah, 2009. "Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction". In: Robert Muggah. *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War.* Routledge Global Security Studies, New York.

[36] Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, 2009. "Demobilization and Reintegration in Sierra Leone: Assessing Progress". *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction.* New York; Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, 2005.

[37] James Pugel, 2009. "Measuring Reintegration in Liberia: Assessing the Gap Between Outputs and Outcomes". In: Robert Muggah. *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War.* Routledge Global Security Studies, New York

[38] Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner and Ingo Wiederhofer, 1996. *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington: The World Bank.*

[39] Nat Colletta, Jens Samuelsson, Hannes Berts, 2008. *Interim Stabilization: Balancing Security and Development in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.* Sweden, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[40] Anders Nilson, 2008. *Dangerous Liaison: Why Ex-Combatants Return to Violence Case from the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.* Sweeden, Uppsala Universitet, Edita Vastra Aros; Anders Nilson, 2005. "Reintegrating Ex-combatants in Post – Conflict Societies". Stockholm, SIDA.

[41] Kathleen M. Jennings, 2008. "Unclear Ends, Unclear Means: Reintegration in Post-War Societies – The Case of Liberia. In: *Global Governance, 14, 2008.*

on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration were used for the porpoises of the theoretical framework.

1.7 Hypothesis

- There is a significant influence of DDRRR practices on peace operations in the Eastern democratic republic of Congo.

- The DDRRR program had enough support from the actors, both local and international.

1.8 Research Methodology

This section will provide a discussion of the outline of the research methodology that will be used in this study. It focuses on the research design, population of study, data collection methods and makes conclusions based on the data analysis and data presentation methods that will be used in this study[42].

1.8.1 Research Design

The research study to be undertaken will examine the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) practices in peace operations in the eastern democratic republic of congo. The type of research design that will be used for this study will be the explanatory design. This will involve explanation of causes and effects of the independent and dependent variables associated with the problem. According to Denscombe, explanatory research is used when asking research questions that deal with causal process[43]. Statistical mean and standard deviation as well as percentages will be used to summarize the responses. In view of the fact that the study will mainly be exploratory in nature, the researcher will be of the opinion that it will be possible to

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[42] Mugenda, O.M and Mugenda A.G. (2003); Research Methods. *Act Press. Nairobi.*
[43] Denscombe, M. (1998), *The Good Research Guide for Small Scale Social Research Projects.* New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited.

draw conclusions without the use of very complicated qualitative statistical tools that might jeopardize a very clear presentation of the findings of the research.

1.8.2 Population

The targeted population for the study will be Democratic Republic of the Congo east conflict. According to Cooper and Schindler, the sampled population is that part of the target population that is accessible and available for sampling[44]. The study makes use of the random sampling method which is suitable in this context. According to Jankowicz, surveys are particularly useful when you want to contact relatively large numbers of people to obtain data on the same issue or issues, often by posing the same questions to all.[45]

1.8.3 Sampling Design

The sampling design is a fundamental part of data collection for scientifically or socially based decision making. A well-developed sampling design plays a critical role in ensuring that data is sufficient to draw the right conclusions. A sound, socially or scientific based decision must be based on accurate information. The handling method and the representation of the data should correspond to the objective of the study. The sampling design will indicate the number of samples taken and will also identify the particular samples (for example, the ministries where particular views of the samples were collected). Along with this information, the sampling design will also include an explanation and justification for the number and responses of the samples.

1.8.4 Data Collection Methods

The study will use both primary and secondary data will be collected from key informants. To achieve this, an interview guide will be used to collect primary data. The

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[44] D. R. Cooper and P. S. Schindler, *Research Methods* (7th ed. New York: Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 2000) p 112

[45] A. D. Jankowicz, *Research Projects* (6th ed. London: Thomson Learning, 2002) p 87

interview will be conducted by the Researcher personally. The interview guide has unstructured questions which will be used so as to encourage the respondent to give an in-depth response without feeling held back in revealing of any information. With unstructured questions, a respondent's response may give an insight to his feelings, background, hidden motivation, interests and decisions and give as much information as possible without holding back.

Secondary data will be collected on attitudes and perception and the importance of the study and cannot be over-emphasized also be collected to augment the studies. The study will also rely on secondary data such as text books, journals, and academic papers that are to be found in the University of Nairobi and other libraries. This instrument of data collection enables the researcher to control the setting; it is flexible as one can probe and in the process get in-depth information[46]. The study will also rely on secondary data such as text books, journals and academic papers that are in various libraries in Nairobi as well as government printers.

1.8.5 Data analysis

The data will be analysed in two fold[47], one general approach will be applying content anysis. Content analysis as a technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of messages and using the same to relate trends. The data will be qualitative in nature, due to this fact, content analysis will be used to analyse the data.

1.9 Chapter Outline

This chapter one presents the introduction and layout of the study as well as the methodology that will used to carry data presentation.

This chapter two will present global perspective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

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[46] Mugenda, O.M and Mugenda A.G. (2003); Research Methods. *Act Press. Nairobi.*
[47] Jankowicz A. D., *Research methods in* social science (6th ed. London: Thomson Learning, 2002) p 87

This chapter three will outline the establishment of DDRRR activities in Democratic Republic of the Congo east conflict and its impact peace's security operation

This chapter four will present a detailed critical analysis of DDR and *DDRRR at* Democratic Republic of the Congo east conflict from the field

This chapter five will present the research findings from the sample population and present analysis. It will look at whether this research approves or disapproves the hypothesis.

CHAPTER TWO

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

2.1 Introduction

This chapter shall review the pertinent available factors on Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The first section focuses on this will be on global perspectives, Africa perspectives and then narrow down to DRC. The study will focused on successful and fail DDR in different region as stated above stating globally level.

2.2 DDR in global perspective

The International Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Congress (CIDDR) is an idea whose time has come. Although the dispensation of former combatants after a war has ended is a problem as old as war itself, DDR first emerged as a coherent set of tools for managing war to peace transitions in the closing years of the Cold War. With the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the numerous proxy wars of a bi-polar era continued to rage, and a host of other dormant conflicts surfaced as outright civil conflicts challenging various state regimes around the globe. The combination of fading proxy-wars and newly-ignited civil conflicts posed enormous risks to the stability and security of the global system. First employed by the U.N. to help support and implement negotiated settlements to civil conflicts, DDR rapidly assumed a central role in the management of war to peace transitions under the new founded United Nation's mandate of Peace Building[48].

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[48] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, United Nations Document A/477-277., October 3, 1992, New York.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs during the 1980s come up to manage war to peace transitions. Initially, DDR consisted of a set of activities, interventions and operations carried out primarily by international agencies, particularly the United Nations (from an emphasis on security issues) and the World Bank (from a predominantly development perspective). Those programs aimed to handle the needs of societies in a post-conflict context, yet initially lacked a theoretical framework, a body of principles or a set of technical recommendations for action. They were essentially developed by trial and error in response to crisis situations[49].

The past few years have seen an important accumulation of systematized knowledge regarding the technical components and political demands of DDR, including the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR), and the United Nations' Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS)[50].

DDR has evolved from a country-level to a transnational activity. The recognition that regional conflicts may form interlocking political complexes and war economies has led to regionally-focused, multi-actor programs such as the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in the Great Lakes region of Africa which is led by the World Bank in partnership with the United Nations and several bi-lateral donors.

The first U.N. Security Council-mandated DDR process took place in Namibia in 1989, and was carried out with the support of the U.N. Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG). This initial effort was quickly followed by similar missions in Cambodia, Central America and Mozambique. Since these first missions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, over 60 documented

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[49] Muggah, Robert. 'Listening for Change: Participatory Evaluations of DDR and Arms Reduction in Mali, Cambodia and Albania.' Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2005.
[50] Ibid 2005.

DDR processes have occurred worldwide. In 2007 there were approximately 20 active processes, supporting over 1 million direct beneficiaries, with an annual aggregate budget of $630 million USD[51].

While DDR was first narrowly conceived as a mechanism to support peace processes through the internationally-managed restructuring of security forces, over time it has become clear that DDR programs cannot exclusively address military and security concerns while remaining detached from broader development and human security objectives. Though the core emphasis of DDR remains on reducing and reconfiguring the tools of war, the mechanisms through which DDR is accomplished have evolved to encompass capacity-building, local governance, job creation, post conflict reconstruction, and reconciliation. In short, DDR processes and policies have progressively gravitated into the intersection of security and development, connecting the seemingly disparate worlds of peacekeeping mandates and the U.N.'s Millennium Development Goals[52].

After 30 years of implementation, it is clear that DDR is, at root, a political process. DDR programs no longer treat issues such as the configuration of cantonments, identification of program beneficiaries, and design of disarmament processes as strictly technical matters. Instead, DDR has been recognized as an important political inflection point in the transition from war to peace. Its structure and degree of success may have deep and longlasting influences on the shape of local and national institutions, the alignment of political power in the post-conflict context, and the consolidation of peace and speed of recovery. These facts were clearly recognized in the

[51] Robert Muggah, "Introduction: Emperor's clothes?" in Muggah, ed., Security and Post-conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War, Routledge Global Security Studies 2009, pp. 5-6
[52] Kingma and Robert Muggah. "Critical Issues in DDR: Context, Indicators, Targeting and Challenges", (2009) Background Paper for CIDDR: Cartagena

First International DDR Congress (CIDDR), and will be further assessed below and summarized in the conclusions of the Contribution. The CIDDR consolidates the security and development nexus, bringing into sharper focus the need to address social justice, the rehabilitation of communities, and ensuring a more inclusive participation and equitable distribution of resources and opportunities to prevent conflict in the first instance.

The stakes for successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration are now higher than ever, both for the consolidation of peace processes and for broader regional and global security. The deep economic and political interdependencies created by globalization have been accompanied by the rise of transnational crime, creating very real challenges for the consolidation of peace and development in many post-conflict countries. In such contexts, weak state institutions and porous borders allow for the formation of illicit economies, including the trafficking of high value commodities such as diamonds and narcotics, weapons, and human beings (new recruits, sex workers, illegal migrants, etc.), which may provide former combatants and spoilers with the means to reignite conflict or survive through predation[53].

The failure to successfully reintegrate ex combatants and provide viable legal livelihoods can thus lead to continuing insecurity, crime and violence within post-conflict states, hampering post-war economic growth and development and intensifying transnational security threats[54].

DDR is an applied strategy for executing successful peacekeeping operations, and is generally the strategy employed by all UN Peacekeeping Operations. Disarmament entails the physical removal of the means of combat from ex-belligerents (weapons, ammunition, etc.);

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[53] Muggah, Robert. 'Securing Haiti's Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for DDR.' Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005.
[54] Cfr. Lamb, G., Dye, D.; (2009) Security Promotion and DDR: Linkages between ISMs, DDR, and SSR within a Broader Peacebuilding Framework, CIDDR Background Paper, May 2009, p. 13.

demobilization entails the disbanding of armed groups; while reintegration describes the process of reintegrating former combatants into civil society, ensuring against the possibility of a resurgence of armed conflict. DDR has become an integral part of post-conflict peace consolidation, featuring prominently in the mandates of peacekeeping operations over the last twenty years[55].

The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former fighters is now a well-established feature of the peace and security architecture[56]. Dozens of DDR activities have taken place since the 1990s; their duration, resources, and ambitions have expanded over time. The UN alone has more than 24 agencies involved in DDR around the world, chief among them are the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP)[57].

During the post-conflict period, prevention of new violence depends on the willingness of armed groups to lay down their arms, disband military structures and return to civilian life. When armed groups or warlords do not put down their weapons or disband their structures, peace is not possible. Therefore, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) marks the beginning of long-term transformation processes, demilitarizing economies, communities and lives. DDR provides perhaps the first opportunity for armed groups, political parties and men and women to renegotiate their identities and their relationships. Due to the security imperative of disarming

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[55] Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Uganda's Most Deprived Region, by James Bevan, June 2008. Occasional Paper No. 21

[56] Vlassenroot, Koen and Timothy Raeymaekeres (2004) "The politics of rebellion and intervention in Ituri: The emergence of a new political complex?", *African Affairs* 103(412):385-412.

[57] Hans Romkema de Veenhoop, *Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament & Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Washington, DC: Multicountry Demobilization and Reintegration Program, 2007).

belligerents, DDR efforts have often commenced hastily, or without adequate planning and resources. In the process, they have often sacrificed gender perspectives and community ownership, thus undermining both security and sustainability.

Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on "peace and security" specifically addressed these issues and reaffirmed the relevance of gender issues to DDR processes[58]. In paragraph 13, the Security Council "encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependents." Security Council resolution 1325 recognizes that whether they are combatants, citizens, educators or agents of change, women are an asset to the peace and DDR process and must be afforded their right to participate fully. UNIFEM offers the findings, recommendations and model Standard Operating Procedures contained in this publication towards the goal of implementing the resolution and towards better integrating women's needs and perspectives in the planning and execution of DDR programmes. These materials are informed by broad consultation, field visits, case studies on DDR in Liberia and Bougainville, and a desk review of the UN's involvement in DDR[59]. The practical objective is to learn lessons from past processes so that the knowledge gleaned can inform future efforts, as well as those currently under- way. A broader objective is to ask how commitment to the inclusion of women and women's perspectives in DDR processes can help the UN develop and re-centre its founding goals of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building and post-

[58] Muggah, Robert. 'Securing Haiti's Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for DDR.' Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005.
[59] UNDP. Strategic and Operational Framework of Reintegration Support for Ex-Combatants. Monrovia. 20 April 2004.

conflict reconstruction all stages of conflict pertinent to DDR, which take on quite a new meaning if viewed from a gender perspective.

Each conflict is unique and, accordingly, DDR processes are designed slightly differently each time. Unfortunately almost universally, human and financial resources have been inadequately committed to DDR. That such a crucial transition between war and peace is often funded d through voluntary trust funds and not the assessed budgets of peacekeeping and peace-building missions simply prolongs and worsens the problems that occur when weapons are not collected and when armed groups are not disbanded. Various actors already struggling with post-conflict reconstruction are left to solve these problems. This task has proven difficult and, in some places, impossible to carry out when weapons have not been collected and post-conflict reintegration, rehabilitation and reconciliation phases have been poorly planned and do not enjoy the support and ownership of locals, or build upon their capacities[60].

In the face of a paucity of resources, pragmatic decision-makers have focused DDR efforts on the perceived "real" problem the DDR programmes aim to address; namely, disarming men with guns[61]. This approach fails to address the fact that women can also be armed combatants. Nor does it grapple with the fact that women play essential roles in maintaining and enabling armed groups, in both forced and voluntary capacities. While the narrow definition of who qualifies as a "combatant" has generally been made due to budgetary constraints, leaving

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[60] Philip Alpers and Conor Twyford, Small Arms in the Pacific, Occasional Paper No. 8, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, March 2003, p. 108.
[61] Muggah, Robert. 'Securing Haiti's Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for DDR.' Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005.

women out of the process underestimates the extent to which peace requires women to participate equally in the transformation from a violent society to a peaceful one.

Four years after the passage of resolution 1325, very few would dispute that there is a gender deficit in DDR planning and delivery. The Secretary-General has stated the problem clearly in thematic and country reports to the Security Council. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is revising manuals on gender and DDR in partnership with UNIFEM. The UN Development Programme UNDP) is more systematically including women in weapons collection and development packages. UNICEF is more deliberately reaching out to girl soldiers and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) is increasingly invited into demobilization camps to provide health services, including psychosocial trauma counselling for women ex-combatants. Recognition of the gender-deficit and willingness to address it is the window of opportunity to replace *ad hoc* measures and one-off projects with routine consideration of the different needs and capacities of women and men. If followed, the guidance and insights offered in this publication will make disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes more inclusive and more successful. Successful and inclusive DDR will make peace more likely[62].

2.3 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Colombia's Serial Search for Peace

During Colombia's 42-year internal armed conflict, each successive president has attempted some sort of military victory or, in the face of that impossibility, peace negotiations. While it is beyond the scope of this article to present an exhaustive review of these previous efforts, there are certain key features that warrant our attention and allow us to understand both the great challenges and the possibilities that the current paramilitary demobilization process

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[62] Definitions are taken from the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 11 February 2000 (S/2000/101)

poses. In the glossary of post-conflict reconstruction and peace building three terms are ubiquitous: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. As the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) defines it, in the context of peace processes, disarmament consists of the collection, control and elimination of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons from the combatants and, depending upon the circumstances, the civilian population[63].

Demobilization is the process in which armed organizations (which may consist of government or opposition forces, or simply armed factions) decrease in size or are dismantled as one component of a broad transformation from a state of war to a state of peace. Generally, demobilization involves the concentration, quartering, disarming, management and licensing of former combatants, who may receive some form of compensation or other assistance to motivate them to lay down their weapons and re-enter civilian life. Finally, reinsertion or reintegration consists of those measures directed toward ex-combatants that seek to strengthen the capacity of these individuals and their families to achieve social and economic reintegration in society. The reinsertion programs may include economic assistance or some other form of monetary compensation, as well as technical or professional training or instruction in other productive activities[64]. As suggested, in its traditional formulation and implementation.

DDR was squarely located within a military or security framework. This focus failed to give sufficient consideration to the host communities, and to the need to consider local, cultural or gendered conceptions of what constitutes the rehabilitation and resocialization of ex-

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[63] Muggah, Robert and Keith Kraus. 'Closing the Gap Between Peace Operations and Post- Conflict Insecurity: Towards a Violence Reduction Agenda,' *International Peacekeeping*, 16 (2009): 136–150.
[64] Carlson, Kristopher and Mazurana, Dyan. From Combat to Community: Women and Girls in Sierra Leone. Women Waging Peace. Washington, D.C. January 2004

combatants. Beyond efforts to provide economic support to ex-combatants and other war-affected groups evenhandedly, the challenges of sustainable social reintegration can be met by linking DDR programmes with transitional justice and reconciliation measures but it was a successful program although there is still high level of drug trafficking who are armed.

In recent years, many national governments facing armed conflict have recognized the utility of DDR as a cornerstone for peace and as a complement to existing peace processes[65]. Beginning in August 2002, Colombia began to undertake the demobilization and reintegration of members of illegally armed groups as an effective complement to the Government's Democratic Security Policy (DSP), which seeks to bring an end to the organized violence which has been raging for almost 50 years. The combination of a military approach and an open door for demobilization has yielded the disarmament and demobilization of over 50,000 persons from illegal armed groups[66]. In effect, DDR has provided Colombia with a new and powerful tool to reduce protracted violence by providing a community-based reintegration process for illegal groups that chose to demobilize collectively, while essentially negotiating peace on an individual basis with members Colombia opted for confronting violence without violating the principles of democracy in a way which has yielded important results. So far more than 51,000 persons from illegal armed groups have demobilized, albeit while not yet having achieved a cessation of hostilities with all the terrorist groups which are threatening our democracy. More than 31,000 of

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[65] Mugumya, Geofrey. 'Applying Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E) Approaches to Weapons Collection and Weapons for Development Programmes.' *Conference Report: Problems of Small Arms and Light Weapons of Human Security: Lessons Learned from Field Experiences*, 2002.
[66] Muggah, Robert and Keith Kraus. 'Closing the Gap Between Peace Operations and Post- Conflict Insecurity: Towards a Violence Reduction Agenda,' *International Peacekeeping*, 16 (2009): 136–150.

abovementioned demobilizations were the result of peace talks held with illegal paramilitary groups between 2003 and 2006. The remaining 20,000 have been the result of individual demobilizations through which members of groups who have not entered dialogues with the government take it upon themselves to return to civilian life; this despite the lack of will on the part of their leaders to work towards peace. More than 13,000 compatriots have already abandoned FARC narco-terrorist organization in this way and returned to society[67].

The peace building process in Colombia has been accompanied by the Justice and Peace Law as an integral part of the reintegration process of demobilized persons. This regulation, product of an extensive and profound national and international debate, achieved a great balance between justice and peace; peace without impunity and justice without negation of peace and with the requirement of reparations. Its implementation has not been easy, but every day the Colombian government makes additional efforts to perfect it. On many occasions this effort has been carried out with the accompaniment of the international community which has lent us their experience and knowhow.

The CIDDR and the publication of the Contribution of Cartagena are clear demonstrations that mutual technical support in peace-related matters between countries with similar conditions of development and social order is an important cooperation tool. As a matter of fact, Colombia is currently implementing a technical cooperation strategy in DDR-related matters so as to fully commit itself to this means. Our strategy seeks to obtain concrete results whose impacts are real and measurable. We Colombians are seeking to effectively contribute in this way to achieving the desire of all our peoples for lasting peace.

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[67] UNDP. "Strategic and Operational Framework of Reintegration Support for Ex-Combatants." 20 April 2004.

2.4 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Afghanistan Case

The Afghan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (DDR) was established by the government of Afghanistan to disarm 90,000 former combatants and integrate them into civilian life. Government has said that the mission was completed on July 2005, although only 50,000 soldiers have been captured and integrated into civilian life. There are still an estimated 40,000 soldiers who are loyal to General Muhamod Fahim. The first phase of the operation began July 1, 2003 and focused on Kunduz Province, Bamyan Province, and Khost Province[68].

The government has estimated that as many as 1,870 illegally armed groups exist outside the mandate of the Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP), including tribal militias, community defence forces, warlord militias and criminal gangs, comprising some 129,000 militia members. The Disband Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) programme, initiated in June 2005, has been designed to address this problem. It is likely that this will prove to be a very difficult process, as many of the groups being targeted are engaged in the profitable criminal economy and could come to resist the process with force[69].

On 7 Jul 2005 the Afghan government ended the disarmament and demobilisation phase of the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) as the last ex-militia member was disarmed at a ceremony in Kabul. By that time almost 63,000 former combatants had been disarmed and demobilised, with up to 53,000 having been assisted with reintegration.

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[68] *Afghanistan*. Available at
http://www.pangea.org/unescopau/img/programas/desarme/mapa/afganistan08i.pdfAfghanistan.

[69] Giustozzi, A. 2008. Bureaucratic façade and political realities of disarmament and demobilization in Afghanistan. *Conflict, Security and Development* 8 (2): 169–192.

The DDR program was created to provide excombatants with hands-on skills, including those related to farming, to facilitate their return and reintegration into civilian life. In addition to the assistance in DDR, the Japanese government has provided Afghanistan with a total of around US$2.35 billion of support since September 2001. This US$2.35 billion covers both humanitarian assistance and reconstruction assistance, including political process and governance improvement, security improvement, and reconstruction[70]. As Afghanistan was traditionally an agricultural country, one of Japan's areas of focus for both DDR and aid has been agriculture and agricultural development. Japanese support has been implemented mostly through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) by sending experts to Afghanistan to instruct local inhabitants in a variety of fields, including agriculture.

In 2001, it was believed that "between 150,000 and 250,000 Afghans were integrated into organized military groups, and that they may be counted as combatants," although many combatants only fought temporarily[71]. "Many were conscripts or forced recruits, sent by the village elders to serve for just a few months[72]". This meant that security remained an important issue.

DDR is needed to transition from conflict to peace building because it disarms the combatants and reintegrates them into civil society. UNAMA and the Japanese government

[70] MOFA .. *Japan's ODA: Rolling plan for Afghanistan*, 2010

[71] Sedra, M. 2003. *New beginning or return to arms? The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process in Afghanistan. In State reconstruction and international engagement in Afghanistan. Joint CSP/ZEF (Bonn) symposium, May 30–June 1, Bonn, Germany.*

[72] Giustozzi, A. 2008. Bureaucratic façade and political realities of disarmament and demobilization in Afghanistan. *Conflict, Security and Development* 8 (2): 169–192.

developed the political resolutions for DDR in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) assumed responsibility for implementing the program. ANBP is an Afghan government organization established for the implementation of DDR, along with the Afghan Ministry of Defense (Uesugi et al. 2006).

The Japanese government provided the majority of the contribution to create ANBP, accounting for more than 65 percent of the total aid[73]. shows the contribution of the donor countries towards DDR. DDR in Afghanistan was a political process both "because it was part of a wider programme of security reform, including the ministries of defence, interior and justice, but also because of the way it was conceived and implemented[74]".

In order to restore public safety and to rebuild the nation under a centralized power, the major objective of DDR in Afghanistan was to demobilize the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) that were scattered over the country[75]. The AMF was "a loose network of military units comprised of men who fought.

2.5 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa

The proliferation of UN peacekeeping operations coincides with an increase in UN-led programs to disarm and disband warring parties, as well as reintegrate ex-combatants into

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[73] MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). 2006. *Evaluation of Japan's peacebuilding assistance policy—a case study: Afghanistan.*

[74] Giustozzi, A. 2006. Interview with employee of the NGO JADA by the author. January 14. Tokyo, Japan.

[75] Uesugi, Y., H. Shinoda, R. Seya, and T. Yamane. 2006. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program in Afghanistan: Its overview and overall examinations. In *HiPeC Research Report Series No. 1.* Hiroshima: Hiroshima University Partnership for Peacebuilding and Social Capacity.

civilian life. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," or DDR programs as they are known to practitioners, have featured in post-conflict reconstruction from Afghanistan to Haiti. But the bulk of DDR interventions twenty-four since 1992 have occurred in Africa. The failure of early DDR programs in Somalia and Liberia, partly attributed to their vague mandates, prompted a shift in recent years toward more focused interventions, now codified in a new set of policy guidelines developed in 2005[76]. Newer DDR programs in Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, and the Democratic Republic of Congo have disarmed hundreds of thousands of combatants, but experts say these programs remain poorly funded, and a lack of research has prevented practitioners from developing better reintegration programs.

Recently, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, through the National DDR Commission, has been conducting consultations in preparation for the launch of the new phase of this DDR programmed. The agreement and collaboration of the main stakeholders, including Government of the Republic of South Sudan, civil societies, and other partners, on the modalities of implementation will be crucial to the success of the new programmed.

2.6 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in DRC

The civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in which various regional countries took part has largely subsided, though large areas of the country, especially in the east, remain deeply unstable and insecure. After years of a bitter and disastrous conflict, a Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement was signed in December 2002 in South Africa. This led to the establishment in June 2003 of a transitional power-sharing government, composed of representatives of the former government and a number of Congolese armed groups that had

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[76] UN, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex- Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment. Principles and Guidelines*. New York: Lessons Learned Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations (1999),

been involved in the conflict. The transitional government had the responsibility of uniting the country in preparation for national elections.

By June 2003 it was estimated that there were between 300,000 and 330,000 fighters in the DRC. One of the objectives of the peace agreement was the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) into civilian life of an estimated 150,000 former fighters and the integration of the remainder into a unified national army, the *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC), (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo)[77].

However, the transitional government has been beset by factionalism and a series of political and military crises. Progress towards unification has been slow on almost every front, including that of military integration, and the country, to some extent, remains divided into different zones of *de facto* military and political control[78].

In three years of transition, from 2003 to 2006, and despite the presence of a thinly-spread UN peacekeeping force, known by its French acronym, MONUC, conflict has continued and serious human rights abuses are still being committed. By early 2006, it is estimated that 3.9 million people have died since 1998 as a result of the direct and indirect consequences of the ongoing conflict. Between 1.4 and 1.66 million people, most of them women and children, are now displaced within the DRC, and an additional 1.3 million 'returnees' are in need of urgent assistance[79].

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[77] Verhey, Beth "Child Soldiers: Prevention, Demobilization and Reintegration", Dissemination Notes: (3): Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, World Bank. (2002),
[78] UN, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex- Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment. Principles and Guidelines*. New York: Lessons Learned Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations (1999),

[79] Verhey, Beth "Child Soldiers: Prevention, Demobilization and Reintegration", Dissemination Notes: (3): Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, World Bank. (2002),

The political parties making up the transitional government have obstructed the implementation of major reforms and the transitional government has been seriously undermined by political, military, ethnic and economic rivalries inherited from the war. The transitional parliament has promulgated important pieces of legislation such as the nationality law, media law, business investment law and the electoral law. However, these laws have often been difficult to implement because of the inefficient structure of government, and the fact that large areas of the DRC continue to escape effective government control.

The integration of the former fighting forces into a unified national army (FARDC) with a single, uniform and accountable chain of command is indispensable not only to the stability of the DRC post the 2006 elections, but also for the improvement of human rights. The demobilization and army reform programme is taking place in a context characterized by serious human rights violations, an apparent lack of political will and ineffective control of troops.

The way that reform of the army is being conducted is symptomatic of a chaotic transition and risks compromising the whole political process and the country's future stability. Urgent measures are required to create a framework that incorporates effective vetting mechanisms to exclude from the army those reasonably suspected of committing human rights violations until cleared by an independent and impartial investigation. In addition, the army reform programmed must ensure that FARDC personnel are provided training in human rights and international humanitarian law.

A failed army reform programmed risks a new cycle of political and military crises that may lead to an escalation of violence and a deterioration of the humanitarian and human rights situation in the war-torn country. The August 2006 fighting in Kinshasa, following the release of the presidential election provisional first-round results, between the Garde Républicaine (GR),

Republican Guard controlled by President Joseph Kabila and a faction of the FARDC controlled by Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba, which left 23 dead, clearly demonstrated the fractious nature of FARDC, and the urgency of an effective and sustainable army reform and integration programmed.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) and army reform programmed in among others, the Ituri, Katanga and Kivu regions of the DRC. It details Amnesty International's concerns over the human rights implications of a flawed and/or failed DDR and army reform programmed, the way the reform is being conducted, the quality of the integrated soldiers and their conduct once deployed.

The government of Rwanda implemented the first phase of the RDRP between 1997 and 2001. About 18,500 government soldiers (including 2,500 child soldiers) were demobilized. This phase was financed by the government, various donors (through a trust fund), and UN agencies. The main achievements of this phase were demobilization, reinsertion, and referral to education and employment opportunities. Reintegration was hindered by the reduction in donor funding after the deployment of government forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)[80]. In addition, there were a number of technical and management issues, including unrealistic expectations among ex-combatants due to inadequate pre-demobilization sensitization, a poorly implemented microcredit scheme, and an unsustainable village established for disabled ex-combatants. As a result of this experience, the government asked the World Bank to lead the

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[80] UN, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex- Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment. Principles and Guidelines*. New York: Lessons Learned Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations (1999),

redesign of the second phase of the program, provide financial assistance (a US$25 million credit), and coordinate donor support[81].

The overall goal of the second phase of the RDRP is peace in the Great Lakes region and reconciliation in Rwanda. The main objectives of the program are: demobilize another 20,000 government soldiers and 25,000 members of armed groups returning from DRC (including 2,500 child soldiers), provide reinsertion assistance to 15,000 soldiers of the previous government, socially and economically reintegrate all phase two ex-combatants and phase one ex-combatants who remain socio-economically vulnerable; and iv) reallocate government expenditures from the defense to the social and economic sectors. The inclusion of combatants from armed groups and the previous government in the program is considered an important reconciliation measure.

The second phase has five components: demobilization, including HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation measures, reinsertion, including the provision of basic needs kits (valued at US$91), iii) reintegration, including a reintegration grant (valued at US$182), access to land, and a vulnerability support window, special groups (women, disabled, chronically ill and child soldiers), and v) institutional development and implementation support. Disarmament takes place outside of the program and is implemented by government forces in Rwanda and the United Nations in DRC. Members of armed groups are screened for crimes committed against humanity. Only those who have not been involved in the 1994 genocide participate in the program.

The total cost for the program (phase one and two) is about US$73 million (US$852 per beneficiary). The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and its Technical

[81] Colleta, Nat J., Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer. 2004. "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration." In *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, 170–18. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Secretariat are responsible for planning, coordinating and implementing the RDRP. They work with 30 District Reintegration Offices who are responsible for reinsertion and reintegration activities at the community level[82].

Conclusion

To assess the impact of demobilization one has to consider the resources involved, the dynamic processes of production, redistribution and the different factors and actors in policy making and implementation. The ultimate objective of demobilization and reintegration efforts should be to improve the welfare of people. Demobilization of combatants frees human potential that can contribute to achieving these objectives[83].

A growing network of researchers seeks to better understanding the environment in which DDR occurs as well as the motivations and means of those who are to be disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated. A more thorough understanding of what animates non-state armed groups, the leaders and followers, and the communities who are to receive them is critical for policy-makers and practitioners alike. Since 2001, the Small Arms Survey has undertaken a range of DDR assessments in Afghanistan, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Macedonia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Sudan, Timor-Leste, and elsewhere.

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[82] World Bank. 2002. "Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration." World Bank, Washington, DC.

[83] United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. *Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards.* New York, NY: United Nations, 2011. *United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.*

ESTABLISHMENT OF DDR ACTIVITIES

3.1 Introduction

The DRC's current unstable government can be attributed mainly to its turbulent history. Since the late 1800's the Congo region has experienced relatively few periods of peace and economic stability. Colonization severely hindered the future development of the Congo region.

First, the political context into which MONUC deployed was extremely complicated: Congolese state institution were weak to nonexistent; there was a large number of warring parties each with their own political agendas; the presence of foreign troops had greatly destabilized the peace process; finally, the availability of easily extractable minerals financed the arming and training of rebel groups. And if this were not bad enough, DDR programs suffered from MONUC's inconsistent mandate, a lack of coordination, and insufficient resources to provide a force adequate to execute DDR activities. This chapter will trace the development of DDR and DDRRR programs in the DRC[84].

3.2 History of DR Congo conflict

When Leopold II of Belgium wins international recognition for the Congo Free State in 1885, it is as his own personal fief rather than a Belgian colony. The king is willing to fund the project from his own resources and from concessions to private Belgian companies. The Belgian government has no interest in what seems likely to be an expensive exercise. In the early years it proves so. In 1890, and again in 1895, the king has to appeal to his government in Brussels for

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[84] United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. *Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards.* New York, NY: United Nations, 2011. *United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.*

help. He is granted large interest-free loans, in return for the right of the Belgian government to annexe the territory if it so wishes in 1901. In 1903 Roger Casement, living in Boma as the British consul to the Congo Free State, receives an encrypted telelgram from the foreign office. It instructs him to travel into the interior to investigate the supposed abuses. He sets off up the Congo in a small steam launch, the Henry Reed, hired from some American Baptist missionaries. What he discovers is blood-curdling[85]. He finds villages depopulated, people terrified, gruesome tales of death and torture, and a strangely large number of victims whose hands have been amputated. The pattern which emerges is one of systematic and brutal exploitation by the concessionary companies, in all of which Leopold has a half share. Their system for boosting rubber production is simple. Villages are given an ever higher quota of latex to be collected as it oozes from the trees in their vicinity or further afield.

Elections take place in May. Lumumba's MNC emerges as the largest single party, with Kasavubu's Abako in second place. Neither succeeds independently in forming a coalition. As a compromise Kasavubu becomes president and head of state, with Lumumba as prime minister at the head of a coalition including a dozen extremely diverse minor parties. Tshombe's party wins control of the provincial assembly in Katanga.

This arrangement seems a certain recipe for future trouble, but there turn out to be more immediate problems. The nation becomes independent on 30 June 1960 as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Just four days later there are early signs of mutiny in the army.

The reason is the fury of the African soldiers that in spite of independence the officers in the Congolese army are without exception white. The fact is not surprising (in the colonial army

[85] Stedman, Stephen John (2003), "Peace Processes and the Challenges of Violence" in John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (eds.), *Contemporary Peacemaking. Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes.* Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Africans could not rise higher than the rank of sergeant-major, and in the rush to independence the first Congolese officer cadets have not yet completed their courses). But it is none the less profoundly displeasing.

Lumumba gives in as the tension rises during the first week of July. He agrees to the dismssial of the Belgian officers and the appointment of Congolese in their place. The role of hastily issuing the new commissions falls to Joseph Mobutu, the minister for defence. This patronage later gives him a powerful role in the evolving army. In the short term no one can control the unfolding chaos. Without any effective chain of command, the army goes berserk in riots against the Belgian population. Priests and nuns in particular are singled out for violence and rape. Before the middle of July 25,000 Belgians flee the country. In the other direction nearly 10,000 Belgian troops fly in to protect European lives and property, particularly in wealthy Katanga.

On July 11 Moise Tshombe takes advantage of the collapse of government control. He declares the independence of Katanga. With the help of Belgian troops he is able to expel all units of the Congolese army. The ingredients for the next stage of the Congo's agony are all in place. With many in the west showing signs of support for Tshombe (mindful of the wealth of his region), Lumumba raises the stakes by asking for Soviet help in recovering Katanga. During August there arrive from Russia aircraft, arms, technicians and military advisers. Within two months of independence the Congo has become a potential flashpoint of the Cold War. The issue dominates debate in the general assembly of the UN. Meanwhile UN forces are on the ground trying to hold the peace. In the event a local coup, still during the first three months of independence, proves a turning point.

On September 4 President Kasavubu announces that he has dismissed Lumumba as prime minister. Lumumba, in response, hurries to the radio station to broadcast that he has dismissed Kasavubu as president. The resulting confusion is only resolved when the 29-year-old minister of defence, Mobutu Sese Seko, declares on September 14 that he is 'neutralizing' all politicians and is temporarily taking over the duties of government in the name of the army[86].

Mobutu is secretly in Kasavubu's camp (both act with the encouragement of the CIA, alarmed by Lumumba's Soviet policy). One of his first actions is to close down the Soviet embassy. In February 1961 he returns the government to Kasavubu, who appoints him commander of the army. Meanwhile Lumumba has been murdered, in circumstances which remain mysterious. In November 1960 he unwisely leaves Léopoldville, where he has been living under UN protection. He is captured by forces loyal to Kasavubu and is sent in January 1961 - presumably with only one purpose in mind - to Katanga.

He is last seen on arrival in Katanga being transferred, blindfold and handcuffed, from the plane to a waiting car. No more is heard of him. He is believed to have been murdered either by Katangan police or Belgian mercenaries. Evidence emerges years later to suggest that both President Eisenhower and the Belgian government were party to plans to eliminate this left-wing African leader. During 1961 and 1962 the urgent question in Congo is whether Tshombe can sustain an independent Katanga. He has the support of the powerful mining company, Union Minière, and his army is strengthened by the continuing presence of Belgian troops (by now removed again from the rest of the country) and by the addition of European mercenaries. But the UN and the majority of international opinion is against the secession of Katanga.

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[86] Walter and Jack Snyder (eds), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Outbreaks of warfare and bursts of urgent UN diplomacy alternate during this period (the UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld dies in a plane crash in 1961 when flying to negotiate with Tshombe). But Tshombe has a habit of reneging on promises when it suits him.

The turning point comes late in 1962, when UN policy moves from a neutral peacekeeping role to active intervention against Katanga. After strong initial resistance, the Katangan army gives up the fight in January 1963. Tshombe flees into exile in Spain. But this is not yet the end of Tshombe's involvement in the Congo. President Kasavubu, faced in 1964 by continuing unrest in the eastern provinces, attempts to resolve the issue by inviting Tshombe to return from exile as the nation's prime minister. New elections for the national assembly are held in April 1965. Tshombe's party seems to win a majority (the results may be unreliable), but in the aftermath of the election he is dismissed from his post by Kasavubu[87].

Tshombe returns to Spain, leaving the Congo in continuing political chaos. But a new strong man is waiting to strike. Mobutu, now commander in chief, has been strengthening the Congolese army and with it his own power. In October 1965 he stages a coup, dismisses Kasavubu, and takes on the role of president. Mobutu: AD 1965-1997 Mobutu rapidly puts in place the apparatus of dictatorship, forming in 1966 the MPR (Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution) as the only permitted political party. He also sets about asserting the African identity of his nation. The colonial capital, Léopoldville, becomes in 1966 Kinshasa. Five years later the nation itself acquires an appealing new name, Zaire (relating to the Congo because it derives from an African word for river). An order is given for all citizens to adopt African names. The president himself, previously Joseph Mobutu, becomes Mobutu Sese Seko Koko Ngbendu Wa Za Banga ('the all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win,

[87] Koyama, Shukuko. 'Comparative Analysis of Evaluation Methodologies in Weapon Collection Programmes.' Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2006.

sweeps from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake'). There are frequent threats to Mobutu's rule, most of them centring on Katanga. In the early years they are widely assumed to be orchestrated by Tshombe. Tshombe is kidnapped in Spain in 1967 and is taken to Algeria, but Algerian officials refuse Mobutu's request to have him extradited to the Congo to stand trial for treason (he dies in Algeria in 1969).

In 1977 and 1978 there are major invasions of Katanga (now renamed Shaba) by an opposition group, the FLNC (Front de la Libération Nationale Congolaise), operating from Angola. Mobutu recovers control with help from Morocco and France, but only after thousands of casualties on both sides. While retaining the support of western nations, Mobutu presides over a massive decline in Zaire's economy (by 1994 it has shrivelled to the pre-independence level of 1958, even though the population has trebled in the same period). At the same time he salts away a vast personal fortune.

By 1990 the mood of the times forces upon Mobutu at least the semblance of democracy (though the nature of his rule remains all too evident when protests at Lubumbashi university in this same year are suppressed with the deaths of between 50 and 150 students). A national conference in 1991 elects a government headed by an opposition leader, Etienne Tshisekedi. Mobutu accepts Tshisekedi in the role of prime minister, but during the next four years - to a background of strikes, riots and outbreaks of tribal warfare - there is a continuous struggle betweeen president and prime minister for the reins of executive power. The economy comes to a standstill. In 1994 the World Bank closes its office in Kinshasa and declares the country bankrupt. The internal chaos is soon increased by an eruption of violence across the border. In 1994 a million Hutu refugees flee into Zaire from Rwanda. By 1995 their camps are controlled

by the Hutu militia responsible for the massacre of Tutsi in Rwanda. Their presence leads to attacks on Tutsi resident for generations on the Zaire side of the border.

The sympathy of the Mobutu government is with the Hutu. A decree is passed expelling all ethnic Tutsi from the army and civil service. Tutsi property is looted in riots in Kinshasa. This ethnic conflict between Hutu and Tutsi, spilling over into Zaire, is the force which finally ends Mobutu's thirty-two years of self-serving dictatorship. In the eastern province of Kivu the Tutsi, fighting back against Hutu aggression, find a very effective leader in a local politician, Laurent Kabila. When Kabila and his men start winning a succession of local victories, Mobutu sends the Zairean army against him - to no avail. Kabila astonishes the world by announcing, early in 1997, that unless Mobutu resigns within two weeks his regime will be overthrown by force. Kabila: AD 1997-2001 During the early months of 1997 Mobutu (suffering by now from cancer) takes panic-stricken measures in Kinshasa, appointing and dismissing ministers in a desperate attempt to avert the crisis. Meanwhile Laurent Kabila, with his army of Tutsi soldiers (most of them well trained in Rwanda and Uganda), advances west at an astonishing speed. He is helped by the defection to his side of Zairean troops and by offers of support from western commercial interests - two groups sensing an imminent transfer of power.

In May Kabila enters Kinshasa, meeting relatively little opposition. Mobutu flees to Morocco, where he dies a few months later. Kabila assumes the office of president, taking full executive and military powers. He changes the name of the country from Mobutu's favoured Zaire, reverting instead to the original Democratic Republic of Congo. Ironically the new president inherits in the late 1990s the identical problem confronting his predecessor, Lumumba, when the Democratic Republic first became independent in 1960. The richest province in the nation, Katanga, is once again threatening to go its own way. In 1993 the governor of Shaba has

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claimed total autonomy, changing the name of his province back to Katanga and running it exclusively for local benefit. In the political chaos of the time, no one has the power to gainsay him. Kabila's ability to do so is limited by more immediate problems in the neighbouring Kivu region, his own original power base (during the 1970s he has ruled a small semi-independent Marxist enclave here, surviving on the local trade in gold and ivory).

The Tutsi of Kivu, largely responsible for Kabila's rapid capture of power, are dissatisfied by his subsequent behaviour in office. In 1998 they launch a new rebellion. At first it is almost as successful as its 1997 predecessor, developing rapidly into the status of civil war. But Kabila, unlike Mobutu, is able to obtain assistance from neighbouring states. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia send troops, tanks and aircraft to support the Congo government in a crisis which shows no signs of abating. A cease-fire plan agreed in Lusaka in 1999 comes to nothing, while evidence begins to emerge of genocidal massacres in rebel-held areas in the northeast of the country. Support for the rebels by Uganda and Rwanda effectively transforms the civil war into an international conflict. The situation becomes even more chaotic when Kabila is assassinated in January 2001. His place at the head of his warring nation is taken by his son Joseph Kabila.

The First Congo war was largely the effect of the presence of large numbers of hostile ex-FAR soldiers and Intrahamwe in Kivu provinces paired with the decay of Mobutu's Zaire. Spearheaded by the former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, a coalition of heads of state from Rwanda, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Angola met to determine the downfall of Mobutu who they perceived as "the shame of Africa." Through largely Ugandan and Rwandan material, logistical, and training assistance, Laurent-Desire Kabila and his AFDL invaded eastern

Zaire in late October of 1996. Assisted by armed militias and Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers, the AFDL fought their way to Kinshasa by May of 1997.[88].

But Kabila's tenure as president of the newly anointed DRC was to be short lived. Adopting many of the corrupt, authoritarian, and dynastic qualities of Mobutu's rule, Kabila lost popular support among Congolese and, more importantly, alienated his Rwandan backers and his Tutsi allies in the AFDL.[89] The subsequent fallout was to be catastrophic. Acting out of national interests ranging from providing border security to financial interests in the abundant resources present in the DRC, a multitude of regional states, including state-backed rebel groups, flooded into the Congo basin in what has since been coined Africa's World War. Concerned with securing their borders, and arguably, interested in mineral deposits, Uganda and Rwanda, with their respective rebel allies the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), invaded eastern DRC in late 1998 with the intention of securing the north and eastern regions of the DRC and disposing of Kabila's regime. Meanwhile, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola entered the fray. Economically motivated, Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe was principally concerned with securing timber and mineral concessions[90].

What makes the DR Congo conflict extremely complex is the historical involvement and interwoveneness of multiple political and military parties. For example, a report by the International Rescue Committee identifies three patterns of violence: Along the frontline a conventional war is fought between the foreign armies and their Congolese allies. Elsewhere, the

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[88] Cammaert, Patrick." A Peacekeeping Commander's Perspective: From Headquarters and the Field: Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies." *RUSI Journal*, Vol.153, No.4 (2008): 68–71.

[89] Roessler and Prendergast, "Democratic Republic of the Congo," 236.

[90] Willibald, Sigrid. "Does Money Work? Cash Transfers to Ex-Combatants in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes." *Disasters*, Vol.30, No.3 (2006): 316.

national wars of DRC's neighbours are fought out on Congolese soil. And finally, under the destructive influence of violence, pre-existing tensions between different Congolese communities have erupted in horrific bouts of ethnic bloodletting.

In academic and policy research, the conflict in DR Congo is, almost without exception, described as an outcome of colonialism and the exploitation of natural resources. For example, Congolese scholar and activist Nzongola-Ntalaja argues that Congo's strategic position in the centre of Africa and its enormous natural wealth "have made it a prime candidate for imperial ambitions and the envy of adventurers, mercenaries and looters of all kinds".

One of the earliest and most notorious accounts on DR Congo's exploitation is Joseph Conrad's 1902 novel *Heart of Darkness*. The book is motivated by Conrad's encounter with the atrocities committed under Belgian colonial rule while commanding a steamship in Congo in 1890. According to the historian Adam Hochschild, Conrad's book is "one of the most scathing indictments of imperialism".

According to Nzongola-Ntalaja, [91]Congo's post- independence crisis largely relates to the power vacuum that exists between the poor masses and Congolese elitist leaders, which was most notoriously the case during the 1965-1997 presidency of Joseph-Désiré Mobutu. Nzongola-Ntalaja puts it like this: The state has revealed itself as being primarily a simple tool of repression and wealth extraction for top officials and their foreign allies. It has been incapable of assembling the essential means and capabilities with which to generate economic
growth and improve the living conditions of the masses.

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[91] Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Politics Of Citizenship In The DRC, presented at States, Borders And Nations: Negotiating Citizenship In Africa Annual International Conference (May 19-20 2004).

This view is supported by Kibasoma who describes Congo as an extremely vulnerable country that has, due to total political collapse, "lost the capacity to defend its people, its borders and its resources".[92] But more than just the result of a 'colonial legacy', as argued by Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers who studied the Ituri conflict in eastern Congo[93], there is a deliberate strategy at play that aims to disconnect central state control from local power by exploiting ethnic differences. They say: Regional forces thrive on the continuing weakness of the Congolese state to create an open war economy. To be successful, and consolidate their hold on the ground, these military entrepreneurs have recruited ethnically embedded local militias. Rather than developing a shared ideological reference that focuses on a renewed process of state-building, the resulting networks are guided by shifting ethnic and/or pecuniary considerations and are, as a consequence, constantly fragmenting.

Despite the Lusaka peace agreement, signed in 1999 by the Congolese state, oppositional rebel groups and Congo's neighbouring countries, many sources of violence remain unsolved. Human Rights Watch states that the peace process is doomed to fail "unless attention is focused on the underlying causes of the conflict and serious attempts made to cut the links between conflict and natural resources extraction". However, the successfulness of such attempts depends for a large part on the amount and nature of media coverage on the DR Congo conflict and, more generally, on Africa at large.

3.3 DDR in Congo

As the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) balances in limbo between ongoing conflict and peace, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, repatriation and

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[92] Kibasoma, "Women and Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo", p. 24.

[93] Vlassenroot, Koen and Timothy Raeymaekeres (2004) "The politics of rebellion and intervention in Ituri: The emergence of a new political complex?", *African Affairs* 103(412):385-412.

resettlement (DDR) process is underway. The aim is to provide a viable way of life for former combatants whose main source of survival has been by way of the gun. To date, this process has been focused on addressing the needs of armed men, while less priority has been given to those of women. The ideology of equally including perspectives, impacts and needs of men and women has been evolving at the United Nations through the concept of 'gender mainstreaming'. This paper argues that gender main streaming of DDR processes is a transformative concept, in which equal attention to women and men in the theory, policy and practical implementation are all crucial to the success of DDR(RR) processes.

The DRC is a threshold case in this context, as the UN mission, since March 2002, has a Gender Unit actively contributing to the inclusion of gender considerations in the DRC's DDR(RR) process. Despite ongoing fighting in the eastern regions of the DRC, several developments in recent months have sparked new hope for post-conflict recovery, including the adoption of a national DDR plan and the move towards a nationally integrated military structure. Therefore, the moment is ripe to assess ways in which gender mainstreaming can be further incorporated into this DDR process.

Currently Congo is experiencing tension as M3 are terrorisng residents again. The March 23 Movement (M23) largely comprises former members of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), an ex-rebel force that was integrated into the army under a 2009 peace pact. Earlier this year they deserted the army in a new revolt, and fighting between the two sides has displaced more than 300,000 people. Since May the mutineers have held part of the verdant Rutshuru territory in North Kivu province, on the border with Rwanda and Uganda.

People living in the city of Goma and elsewhere in the entire North Kivu such as in Butembo or Beni some 400 kilometres in the north are daily stoically braving the danger of

losing their lives particularly since the M3 rebel movement uprising started six months ago. The current situation of no war no real peace is visibly becoming unbearable in the entire province. For the general opinion, anything that can lead to death is likely to happen anytime and anywhere to everybody. Killings are occurring every day in the three cities mainly by armed attacks in the homes but sometimes by natural phenomenon such as thunderbolt or drowning. People are really traumatised.

DDR as a coherent and sequenced activity has not taken place in the Republic of Congo. Rather, between 1999-2003, three independent and overlapping processes have been carried out in relation to 'disarmament' and, in some cases 'reintegration'. The Comité de Suivi, established by the GoC after the Ceasefire Accords (1999), carried out a large-scale 'disarmament' initiative (buy-back) and some registration of excombatants. The UNDP-IOM ex-combatant project – administered between July 2000 and December 2002 carried out 'disarmament' (weapons collection and destruction) and 'reintegration'.

The initial framework for the peace process and the DDR of combatants in the DRC was founded in the 1999 Lusaka ceasefire agreement that supposedly ended the second Congolese war. This accord focused on the withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular armed groups from the DRC. It stipulated that foreign armies were to return to their countries of origin and that foreign armed groups, including former Rwandan army elements and the *interahamwe* Hutu-militia, were to be disarmed by the UN mission (MONUC), repatriated, and processed through respective receiving country reintegration programs or justice systems.

Hostilities continued however and it was not until the Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition, signed by all key Congolese stakeholders in December 2003, that a comprehensive national program for the restoration of peace and national sovereignty (during a

transition period of two years) was endorsed. The parties agreed that the personnel of all the Congolese armed groups including the existing 'loyalist army' (*Forces armées Congolaises*, the FAC), would be incorporated into a new national army, the FARDC. It was also agreed that this new army would immediately undergo a process of integration (*fusion and restructuring*) that would involve: (i) the reduction of numbers through an offer of voluntary demobilization, and (ii) the re-training and re-equipping of the remaining forces before re-deployment.

By 2004, given the ongoing conflicts in DRC and the multiple peace agreements, four separate but linked DDR processes were in place: The Lusaka accord emphasized the withdrawal of all foreign armies from the DRC and the removal of non-Congolese armed groups with a focus on the FDLR (*Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda*). While the number of foreign armed groups in the DRC was unclear, the FDLR was estimated to number about 20,000 combatants and dependents.

Under the Global Accord and a national DDR program (the PNDDR) that followed, the following groups were targeted for army integration and DDR: 100,000 FAC; 45,000 RCD-Goma; 10,000 RCD-National; 15,000 RCD-K/ML; 30,000 MLC and 30-50,000 mai mai.2 These forces were the main beneficiaries of the PNDDR, which was financed by the MDRP and the World Bank.

Despite the relative success of the Global Accord, armed conflict continued in northeastern DRC in Ituri province between at least seven additional factions and some 50,000 combatants.3 With the intervention of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia and additional diplomatic pressure, the parties signed a separate peace agreement in Dar es Salaam in May 2003. Factions that were not signatories to the Global Accord were part of a more informal DDR process, which was led by UNDP and financed by MDRP and other donors.

During the war, all parties used children as part of their armed forces either directly in military combat or in supporting roles. In accordance with international law as well as the different peace agreements, the various armed groups committed to the release of children. Over the transitional period from Dec. 2002 to Oct. 2006, the Government, with support from the MDRP and other partners such as UNICEF and specialized NGOs, reintegrated some 30,000 children associated with armed forces.

International partners agreed to support these national processes as well as put their weight behind attempts to extricate all foreign armed groups from the DRC. In view of the regional nature of the war and the need to provide coherent and concurrent solutions across a number of countries in the sub-region, international partners proposed a novel regional approach to tackle DDR. Indeed at the time, Angola, the Republic of Congo (RoC), the Central African Republic (CAR), Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi were in the process of resolving their respective conflicts in ways that also required support for DDR.

Seven countries of the sub-region and international partners thus agreed to establish the MDRP, which was funded by a MDTF and complimentary IDA, and a Secretariat to manage the program, which was located at the World Bank. Under the MDRP approach, national governments would establish and run their individual DDR programs (the exception was CAR). Thirteen donor partners and the Bank contributed US$560 million (including US$260 million from the MDTF, US$64 million from bi-lateral financing and US$240 million from IDA). The largest proportion of this funding was allocated to the DRC (US$200 million) which also had the largest DDR caseload. The project designed to finance the PNDDR is called the EDRP. In 2008, after financing from the EDRP had been exhausted, the World Bank and the AfDB mobilized an

additional US$75 million to complete the DDR process (US$50 million came from IDA and US$25 million from the AfDB).

3.4 Challenges of supporting DDR

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) highlights the challenges of supporting DDR and SSR in a conspicuously non-enabling environment. Residual conflict, lack of basic infrastructure and ongoing security threats have resulted in shifting emphasis between DDR and SSR according to the key priorities of the moment. In practice, this generated short-term measures directed toward operational activities with immediate impact. Strategic analysis of the longer-term consequences that DDR may have on SSR and vice-versa has been lacking. Vincenza Scherrer demonstrates the consequences of not taking into account the relationship between DDR and SSR. This includes security vacuums in areas where police reform is not undertaken with the challenges of the DDR programme in mind and heightened tensions where ex-combatants have not been able to enter the DDR process due to funding gaps for army reform[94].

One of the major challenges of the DDR process in DRC was the absence of a peace agreement and ceasefire framework that included all parties. Fortunately, military disarmament and demobilization have been largely successful by most accounts. Despite this, economic issues, regional instability and the pending full political settlement have hampered the longterm reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants. The delay in carrying out the reintegration process put many ex-combatants in debt resulting in their selling reintegration packages for cash. There was also a very limited absorption capacity within the civilian economy in practice, it

[94] Colletta, Nat J., Jens Samuelsson Schjørlien, and Hannes Berts. 'Interim Stabilization: Balancing Security and Development in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding'. Stockholm, Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2008.

would have been helpful to undertake enhanced market surveys to identify the few options available and to link reintegration programmes to longer-term economic recovery programmes. The dominant view is that reintegration contributed to security problems at the community level leading to some demobilised combatants joining the FNL, while other ex-combatants are reported to be contributing to the violence in North Kivu in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

According to the Multi- Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), to date the project has demobilised almost 94 000 ex-combatants. The Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (Conader) has closed all orientation centres (COs) and is using mobile units to handle the fi nal wave of demobilisation (under the plan de relance), which is supposed to be completed by 31 December 2007. This plan envisions to process up to 44 000 ex-combatants. Although the project was expected to demobilise 118 000 ex-combatants by the end of 2006, the process was not completed because of lack of funding. The planned demobilisation of a further 70 000 combatants has not taken place yet because of a change in the strategy of the Congolese government. The government decided to fi rst integrate the forces in the east into mixed brigades before starting the demobilisation.

This process has also failed and the possibility of war in North Kivu looms large. Some 25 000 children who were involved in the fi ghting have also been demobilized through special projects implemented by Unicef and specialised NGOs. These projects were scheduled to close by 31 December 2006, at which point an estimated caseload of 8 700 children would still need to

be demobilised. Because of a lack of funds no further demobilisation of children has taken place except for some 300 children from General Nkunda's brigades[95].

Political constraints to completing the DDR and army integration process continue to this day. For political reasons groups such as the Republican Guard and residual troops refuse or are unable to enter the process and continue to pose a security risk in the country. Twenty-five thousand ex-combatants in Kinshasa and 11 300 in other military regions have not gone through the National Programme of Disarmament, Démobilisation and Reintegration (PNDDR) process and 36 000 ex-combatants still have to be processed in terms of the plan de relance. The PNDDR's budget of US$200 million was either disbursed or has been committed for ongoing project activities. The available budget is only suffi cient to cover demobilisation of and reinsertion payments for 103 000 ex-combatants and reintegration support for 68 500 ex-combatants.

Many other non-combatants have died of malnutrition and disease. For example, between 1998 and 2004 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, an estimated 3.9 million people died from all conflict-related causes of mortality. Researchers at the World Bank argue that the ability of groups to control lucrative economic sectors determines whether they can launch and sustain a campaign. There are, however, counterexamples that indicate that the material requirements needed to sustain a rebellion may be very low: The Mayi-Mayi in the Democratic Republic of Congo provides one example of a low-tech, low-cost but longlasting rebel movement. As a

[95] Coletta, Nat J., Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer. 'Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Lessons and Liabilities in Reconstruction'. In *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, edited by Robert Rotberg. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2004.

recent report in Scientific American demonstrated, small arms can be very cheap sometimes as little as $15 for an AK-47. And so can labor[96].

In cases where there is local support for the actions of rebel groups, as with Chechyan rebels, the Viet Cong, and the IRA, it may be possible for people with regular employment to serve as "part time guerillas."118 In other cases, particularly where rebel groups do not benefit from local support, high levels of financing may be required.

The primary means of financing considered by econometric research and in policy responses is wealth derived from control over valuable natural resources such as drugs, oil, timber and "conflict diamonds." However, case study research indicates that this is too narrow a focus: in fact rebel groups also rely heavily on agricultural products such as cashew nuts, tangerines, hazelnuts or bananas to finance their campaigns Such agricultural goods require continued production, often over extended territories, and have different implications for the ways that rebels interact with local economies and for policy responses aimed at stemming financing.120 As yet however agricultural products remain largely ignored. For example, between 1998 and 2004 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, an estimated 3.9 million people died from all conflict-related causes of mortality[97]

The integrated combatants have been organized in 18 brigades, which are mostly deployed in the east of the DRC. Most are in bad shape and are not staffed according to the original planning. Most soldiers are more concerned with their survival and have hardly any training. Commanders also need logistical support to deploy the brigades in operations against

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[96] Collier, Paul and Jan Gunning. 1995. "War, Peace and Private Portfolios." World Development, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 233-241.

[97] Berman, Eric G. 'African Regional Organizations' Peace Operations: Developments and Challenges'. *Africa Security Review*, 11:4 (2002),

rebels and militia. Living conditions in brigades and of dependants must also be improved substantially in order to maintain security[98]. Recent conflict in North Kivu has shown that the integrated brigades do not have the capacity to counter the rebels without the support of Monuc. To try and address this problem Monuc has proposed, together with the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP), a support plan that consists of the following elements: A consolidation of the brassage by financially supporting the integrated brigades and their dependants.

A conceptual approach to give advice to the Congolese authorities on future format of new military at the organisational level Support at the tactical level by temporarily funding for every brigade, estimated at US$290 000 per month per brigade for salaries Operational and logistical assistance provided through the UNDP rapid response mechanism. It is thus clear that the DDR process must be completed, and must include the Presidential Guard, the Kinshasa Garrison and the residual of Bemba's soldiers. The process of SSR can only start after the DDR process has been completed and the new Congolese cabinet has been appointed. The only way to get the programme on track is to complete the DDR process and adopt a global approach involving all role-players, national and international. SSR is not only about the reform of army, police and justice, but should include the intelligence sector, border control, and customs.

3.5 Conclusion
The need to foster synergies between DDR and SSR cannot be reduced to a simplistic sequential relationship. This is because both DDR and SSR involve a combination of activities – many of them overlapping – that entail highly distinct challenges depending on the specific

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[98] Fitzgerald, Valpy. 1997. "Paying for the War: Macroeconomic Stabilization in Poor Countries Under Conflict Conditions." Oxford Development Studies. 15:1. pp. 43-64.

context. In unpacking the relationship between DDR and SSR it is essential to take into account their different objectives, timelines, stakeholders and interests. However, informing wider DDR planning with insights and expertise from SSR can The DDR-SSR Nexus: Concepts and Policies facilitate the wider 'design' of a society's future security sector[99]. The security sector governance focus to DDR and SSR can enhance the legitimacy of programmes and their outcomes through emphasizing the need for transparent, nationally-driven decision making. An important point of departure for this volume is the inherently political nature of both DDR and SSR. This reflects the sensitivity of issues that touch directly on sovereignty and national security as well as the fact that decisions in both areas necessarily generate 'winners' and 'losers.' At the heart of the DDR-SSR nexus is therefore the need to recognize and engage these sensitivities and carefully balance international assistance with respect for the principle of local ownership. Applying a security sector governance framework allows practitioners to better situate DDR-SSR activities within complex and often highly contested post-conflict transitions. This perspective is further developed in the concluding chapter of this volume[100].

Improving the effectiveness of DDR and SSR practice can have a significant, positive impact on states emerging from conflict. In order to design and implement programmes that contribute effectively to security and development goals, approaches need to be grounded in an informed understanding of specific political, socio-economic and security framing conditions. The ability to develop a nuanced and sophisticated understanding of 'what the market will bear'

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[99] Berdal, Mats. 'Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars'. Adelphi Paper 303. London, Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996.

[100] Fitzgerald, Valpy. 1997. "Paying for the War: Macroeconomic Stabilization in Poor Countries Under Conflict Conditions." Oxford Development Studies. 15:1. pp. 43-64.

in distinct, challenging environments is therefore essential. This volume is intended to contribute to that important goal[101].

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) are acknowledged pillars of the international community's commitment to post-conflict peacebuilding and sustainable development. While a growing community of experts and academics have emerged to support and promote both activities, the policy and programming linkages between DDR and SSR remain under-developed. This is partly because both sets of initiatives are frequently pursued autonomously, independent of one another. As a result, artificial epistemic and bureaucratic silos have emerged that frustrate productive exchange. Opportunities to build on synergies and strengthen positive outcomes in both sets of activities are therefore often missed.[102]

Disarmament is an urgent priority in the Republic of Congo. With an estimated 41,000 small arms still circulating in the Republic of Congo, their availability remains a very real threat to sustained security and stability. The wide availability of military-style assault rifles and grenades particularly in the hands of ex-combatants, undisciplined security sector forces and civilians – presents a menace. The evaluation team notes that especially high concentrations of weapons caches are in the homes and common properties of the northern neighbourhoods of Brazzaville, and districts in Niari, Lekoumou, Bouenza and Pool. Individual cache sizes range from 1 to 75 weapons in Brazzaville – though as high as 400 weapons in Pool. Though some

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[101] Berdal, Mats. 'Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars'. Adelphi Paper 303. London, Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996.

[102] Hunt, W. Ben. 1990. "Port Access and Arms Sales: The Unspoken Quid Pro Quo" The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 2. (June), pp. 335-365.

suspicion of the GoC persists, there appears to be considerable willingness among ex-combatants and civilians alike to dispose of their weapons.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a country the equivalent size of Western Europe and over the past twelve years has been ravaged by one of the most devastating wars since World War Two. This conflict has involved at least nine other African countries leading it to be termed "Africa's First World War". The death toll currently sits at around 5.4 million and continues to increase with approximately 45,000 people being killed each month from starvation and disease1, rape is used as a weapon of war with the UN reporting that 27,000 sexual assaults were reported in the South Kivu province alone in 2006[103]. Peace agreements and ceasefires have been signed between various belligerents with the latest being signed on the 23rd January 20083 but violence continues to sporadically erupt. The country now has for the first time since 1960 a democratically elected president and parliament. Yet the government remains corrupt4; impunity is rife both within the governing elites and rebels who control the rest of the country5; for many Congolese the peace in the east is nothing more than words.

The First Congolese War broke out in 1996 and can be seen as the direct result of the failures of international interventions in Rwanda during and after the genocide7 when one million Hutu refugees fled across the border to escape the advances of the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). It replaced the kleptocratic ruler Mobutu who had allowed the Congolese state to disintegrate due to state funds being diverted from social services into the pockets of the governing elite and who had supported the genocidial regime in Rwanda giving it refuge in the

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[103] King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa by Adam Hochschild 1999

eastern Congo. In response to continuing ethnic violence and attacks, Rwanda and Uganda backed the rebel group the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) lead by Laurent Kabila, in the hope of improving their own security by removing anti-Ugandan rebels and the remnants of the genocidaires of the interahamwe/ex-FAR as well as securing economic resources in the eastern parts of the Congo.

Mobutu was toppled after a few months of vicious fighting but the new president Kabila proved no different than his predecessor and continued to incite ethnic tensions in the east of the country. Rwanda and Uganda wanted to ensure their own security by replacing Kabila with a more favourable ally and remove the rebel threat but they also sought to benefit from the economic resources widely available in the east, so began the Second Congo War with Rwanda and Uganda backing the rebel groups – the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) and the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC)[104]. However after appealing to the South African Development Community (SADC), Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia decided to provide Kabila's regime with thousands of troops in return for lucrative mining contracts. Their intervention ultimately forced a military stalemate between government backed forces and the Rwandan and Ugandan backed forces and thereby encouraging the belligerents to seek a solution through political dialogue. Other commentators argue that this was also due to international pressure and the „mutual concern for protecting Congo's territorial integrity and its sovereignty" but international pressure had failed in twenty other previous attempts by United Nations, OAU and SADC; it is more likely that failure at the military level forced belligerents to accept some sort of peace process in order to achieve their aims. The result was the Lusaka Ceasefire

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[104] The War in Congo: Transnational Conflict Networks and the Failure of Internationalism, L Juma, Gonzaga Journal of International Law (2006) 97 Vol 10:2

Agreement 199914 which brought the major belligerents (Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and the Congo) and major rebel groups (RCD and MLC) to agree to a ceasefire and ensured the removal of foreign troops as well as dealing with „negative forces" such as interahamwe and UNITA[105]. The peace process culminated with the Sun City Agreement in 2002 which agreed to the formation of a power sharing government and subsequently elections were held in 2006 and 2007 leading to the election of the first democratic government for the Congo.

4.2 DDR(RR) Infrastructure in the DRC

It is the responsibility of the DRC's Transitional Government to plan and coordinate the implementation of the national DDR programme. In October 2002, President Kabila requested the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to support the government in coordinating the DDR(RR) exercise during the Interim Phase. Although mistrust in the all-inclusive government delayed progress, mechanisms for DDR(RR) were established, including the national committee for planning and coordination (CTPC)56 and the national commission for demobilization and reintegration (CONADER) responsible for all combatants, including child soldiers.

In the case of DRC, the MDRP has identified 'special target groups' for assistance, including female soldiers, abducted civilian women, and dependents. [106] However, there have been reports that the DDR program does not recognize women who have performed non-combat roles and services (such as cooking or nursing), and that family members accompanying ex-

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[105] Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural resources and Other Forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc S/2001/357

[106] Farr, "The importance of a gender perspective to successful DDR processes", p. 28.

combatants may be denied aid and other services. [107]Cynthia Enloe has critiqued the idea of 'camp followers', in that "focusing exclusively on the much touted craftiness of camp-followers is analytically and politically risky…underestimating the explicit need military commanders had for these working women." [108]Evidently, a re-definition is required for who qualifies as a 'target group' for DDR, and hence, therefore who is a 'worthy' recipient of such benefits.

In December 2002, after seven years of war, marked by large-scale foreign intervention, and after a number of failed peace attempts, the parties to the conflict in the DRC signed a peace agreement in Pretoria, South Africa. Particularly affecting the eastern provinces, the war left an estimated 2.5 million dead, three million displaced, and 300,000 refugees in neighboring countries. The war was characterized by a very high incidence of human rights abuses, particularly rape and other forms of gender-based violence, as well as the abduction of children to serve as combatants or concubines. The Pretoria agreement called for the withdrawal of foreign forces, the establishment of a transitional government incorporating all of the rival factions, the integration of all military forces and DDR for around 150,000 to 200,000 armed combatants not selected for engagement in the unified armed forces. The UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) has been in operation since 1999. Over time, their mandate has expanded from observing a six-country cease-fire to ensuring the cease-fire, promoting DDR in eastern Congo, enforcing an arms embargo, and improving security.

Within eight months after the signing of the agreement, a large number of foreign troops were withdrawn, the transitional government had been set up, and a single military command structure had been established. However, there have been long delays in initiating DDR, which

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[107] Cynthia Enloe, Maneuvres. The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives. (California: University of California Press, 1999), p. 39.
[108] Smythe, "Women, Peace and Security: a cry from the battlefield".

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was to primarily be funded through the MDRP. The delays are due to disputes over the size of the new army and distribution of leadership roles, as well as logistical challenges. Although security in the majority of the country has improved significantly, certain areas in eastern DRC remain plagued with fighting, human rights abuses, and banditry by combatants. A recent census now shows an estimated 150,000 combatants still operating in DRC. Despite delays, the DDR process began to gain momentum with the opening of assembly centers and the creation of seven mixed brigades for the national army in 2004 and 2005.

4.3 Fundamental Problems

Despite ongoing fighting in the eastern regions of the DRC, several developments in recent months have sparked new hope for post-conflict recovery, including the adoption of a national DDR plan and the move towards a nationally integrated military structure. Therefore, the moment is ripe to assess ways in which gender mainstreaming can be further incorporated into this DDR(RR) process. Serving as the foundation for the MONUC DDR(RR) programs, UN Security Council Resolution 1291 mandated MONUC to assist the Joint Military Commission with "the comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration."[109] The original Traditional DDR process in the east evolved over time to become a more integrated approach incorporating Second Generation DDR practices. Although initially promising in its timing and intent, a comprehensive DDR program in the DRC did not come to fruition for several years. Even though a comprehensive approach has been in effect for over seven years, MONUC supported DDR and DDRRR has produced mixed results[110]. Affected by an array of

[109] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1291*, UN Doc S/RES/1291 (February 24, 2012),
[110] *United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resources Centre.* www.unddr.org (accessed August 3, 2011).

exogenous and endogenous factors, comprehensive DDR and DDRRR programs in the east have struggled to provide short and long-term stability and security due to combination of factors.

In the Congo before the peace process there was four main underlying problems - economic exploitation, ethnicity, impunity, and dealing with militias, demobilisation and poverty. These problems continue to subsist since they have failed to be properly addressed or inadequately tackled by the peace process and the Congolese government and threaten to undermine the fragile peace.

4.3.1 Economic Exploitation

Since King Leopold II declared the Congo his own private fiefdom in 1885[111] the Congo has been exploited for its natural resources being rich in both minerals and timber. The recent wars in the Congo have proved no different with economic exploitation being the main impetus for continuing the war. Both Rwanda and Uganda have been fighting their own war in the east to secure precious resources such as coltan, diamonds and gold; and have even been fighting amongst themselves killing numerous civilians in the process. Although Rwanda and Uganda troops left the eastern provinces of the Congo in 2002 they continue to arm groups in the Congo and export illegal mineral resources from the Congo.

The failure of the international community to prevent Rwanda and Uganda from exploiting Congolese resources continues to cause problems as the proxy militias which control the east of the country remain outside the law and groups like Nkunda"s CNDP can commit gross violations of human rights which the Congolese army is unable to prevent due to its ineffectiveness and under funding. The UN Panel of Experts set up to investigate the

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[111] Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural resources and Other Forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc S/2001/357

exploitation, said that the resource exploitation is „one of the main sources of funding for the groups involved in perpetuating the conflict." The Panel concluded that the illegal exploitation will „never be halted because the "necessary networks have already become deeply embedded to ensure that the illegal exploitation continues, independent of the physical presence of foreign armies"."

The International Court of Justice in 2005 did issue a judgement for Uganda"s role in the Congo finding it guilty of illegally exploiting the natural resources of the DRC and not to the benefit of the local populace. However the ICJ failed to find jurisdiction under a similar case against Rwanda, this is a disappointing result considering the destabilising effect Rwanda involvement has had on the Congo though it is hard to think that the effect of such a judgement could have on preventing such exploitation and with most trade using illegal networks it hard to think how the international community can prevent such exploitation. The Congolese army itself needs to conduct the unpleasant job of tackling these illegal networks which is something the UN"s MONUC peacekeeping force is unwilling to do, until the Congolese army does so these militias will continue to be a thorn in the side of peace in the eastern Congo and are „sabotaging a hard-won peace". Even though a peace deal was signed in Goma in January 2008 violence continues to abate amongst rival groups. The army's inherent weakness and its failure to integrate the armed militias in its mixage process have ensured that minority groups and militias are in a better position to protect and govern themselves than the government as well as ensuring the exploitation networks which provide them with a form of employment and income in the face of the prevalent poverty and lack of public services

4.3.2 Ethnicity

Ethnicity was the main motivating factor for Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda's involvement in the First Congolese War and was their apparent motive for getting involved in the Second Congolese War. The wars themselves allowed militias to rise up to protect their own ethnic group or to attack others and foreign armies such as Rwanda and Uganda who used such groups to terrorise civilians.

In Rwanda the political fallout of the genocide was one of the main causes of the war in the Congo and the failure to ensure some sort of post genocide agreement with the genocidaires or ensuring some sort of political dialogue has guaranteed ethnic strife for the foreseeable future for the region. The fears of many Hutus propagated during the genocide became true through massacres which occurred in the wake of the war instilling and ensuring a culture of hatred amongst Tutsis and Hutus for years to come in the region. The ethnic Tutsi Banyamulenge still feel the ripples of genocide in the east of the Congo where the remnants of the genocidaire interahamwe (the FDLR) continue to kill Tutsis and launch attacks into Rwanda after nearly fifteen years since the genocide. The Congolese army is currently trying to remove the FDLR from its strongholds in the east but previous military interventions by the Rwandan army to remove the FDLR failed. Maybe it is time to engage in political dialogue with the FDLR to at least start negotiations that may lead to better conditions for both Congolese and Rwanda civilians and remove the menace that it currently poses. By excluding the FDLR from the peace process they have nothing to gain from demobilisation and forced expulsion back to Rwanda to face genocide trials and yet they have everything to fight for or at least against. I do not believe that there should be impunity for their actions but that some sort of compromise is inevitable in order to remove the threat that they pose and highlights the almost Catch 22 of conflict resolution

that in order to ensure peace you may have to compromise the interests of justice. This sort of compromise was at the heart of the Lusaka Agreement which allowed rebel groups to be in government even though they had committed gross violations.

Uganda in the eastern province of Ituri, which it created, has stoked ethnic tension in order to destabilise the region. Although there is relative peace in the Ituri province, the underlying causes such as land distribution and ensuring equality amongst Hema and Lendu groups to economic resources have not been adequately addressed. Indicting and removing warlords by the International Criminal Court is a short term solution, it attacks the symptoms not the causes by failing to address the underlying issues of the conflict however it does encourage some form of deterrence to further atrocities in the region by ensuring there is no impunity for gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law yet this so called deterrence has failed to stop massacres in neighbouring regions.

Ethnicity is a major problem in the east of the Congo especially due to the spill over effect from the Rwandan and Burundi conflict between Hutus and Tutsis; however most Congolese see ethnicity as a second identity with Congolese being their first. The failures of the „mixage" process and the ethnic tensions that remain in the east show that the issue is far from resolved. Many commentators have called for a „regional solution to a regional problem" and this ideally is what is needed considering the ethnic forces involved. However the ethnic conflict boils down in the Great Lakes region to basically land distribution and equality, and as the events in Kenya recently have shown is that it is a more widespread problem not specific to the Great Lakes Region and an inevitable consequence of growing populations and limited resources. The return of peace to the region and the return of displaced persons can only exacerbate the problem.

4.3.3 Impunity

Impunity goes to the heart of the conflict in the Congo after the spill over from the Rwandan genocide in the Congo, both wars saw massive human rights violations with civilians taking the brunt of violence[112]. Accountability is necessary in post conflict societies to ensure new government with „legitimacy but to also to ensure the „interests of victims preventing future atrocities." Redress and justice have been low on the Congo's agenda compared to countries like South Africa and Sierra Leone. Instead the Congo has been looking to secure peace at all costs with justice and accountability being left to the international community and cosmetic reforms such as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission which has proved fruitless due to its opposing membership and lack of funding or corollary enforcement powers, has failed to achieve any results. The Congolese courts themselves are inadequately funded and inherently weak45 after years of under funding and as the Kilwa and Kahwa trials have shown the courts are unable to hold violators to account.

Impunity in the Congo continues to prevail both within government and in rebel movements even in the face of the peace process, leading one human rights worker in Kinshasa to comment that "impunity greased the gears of the transition." Human rights abusers have been included in the government such as RCD and MLC, and in the case of the army criminal behaviour has been rewarded with warlords being presented with promotions of general or colonel. As Stearns points out in contrast with appointments post conflict in the Balkans, Liberia and East Timor there was a vetting process to „exclude human rights abusers from security forces" this has clearly been absent in the Congo both within the army and government. One

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[112] Malkki, Liisa H, *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania,* Chicago/London, University of Chicago Press, 1995.

diplomat explained that "if we start bringing people to justice, where do we stop? Some of the worst abusers are at the top."

The lead on prosecution has been taken on by the ICC however in the long run it will prove to be ineffective in dealing with the plethora of violators as the experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has shown. The ICTR and Rwandan courts have shown that the pursuit of justice can result in the „collectivisation of guilt" of Hutus, who are seen as the guilty group rather than individuals. There is a need to ensure reconciliation while ensuring accountability such as in Sierra Leone with its Special Court and Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The imposition of a „half truth commission" would severely hamper the credibility of a judicial intervention. The plethora of violators and the widespread use of child soldiers has resulted in amnesties already been used in the Congo. These amnesties do not extend to include war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide much like the amnesty used in Burundi55 But the failings of the court in the Kahwa trial to adhere to it have shown it ineffectiveness in distinguishing those most responsible for gross violations and has compromised the criminal justice system[113]. As long as impunity remains there will be no deterrence and will rather perpetuate further conflict as victims interests remain unaddressed by the government forcing them to redress the situation themselves. The use of rape as a weapon of war in the Congo has ensured a bitterness and horror for many women, which is only compounded by seeing their abusers act without remorse and impunity ensuring that such actions will continue until the problem is addressed.

[113] Malkki, Liisa H, *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania,* Chicago/London, University of Chicago Press, 1995.

The role of justice in post conflict is important in contributing to the process of national reconciliation and peace as recognised by the Security Council in the formation of the ICTR and the Sierra Leone Special Court. The government and armed forces as well as rebels groups needs to faces the challenges of accountability in order to ensure legitimacy, the lessons learnt from Rwanda is that failure to prevent those responsible to evade facing accountability caused the subsequent wars in the Congo as the interahamwe continued their cycle of violence in almost impunity. The role of the ICC in the Congo could be important in bringing the belligerents in the east to accept peace or else face criminal prosecution but at the same time the warlords in the east are now asking for an amnesty so as to undermine the ICC"s jurisdiction and retain their impunity. Hopefully the Congolese governments will stick to its legislation to only grant amnesty conditionally to those not responsible of war crimes, crimes against humanity and and genocide.

4.3.4 Militias, Demobilisation and Poverty

The militias in the Congo have sprung up from the wars in the Congo and the inability of the Congolese army to protect their people or region, or to prevent them from acting as a private army. With dozens of militias able to self sustain themselves through resources exploitation and feeding off neighbouring communities in their region as well as their ability to act with impunity for their crimes such as murder and rape, there is little need for them to adhere to a peace process thereby making the peace harder to secure. The failure of the national Congolese army has ensured that the militias are able to continue their operations and act with impunity until this is addressed militias will continue to be a „ thorn in the side" of the Congolese peace process.

In the wake of two wars and after a decade of fighting that has left thousands of soldiers in the Congo, with unemployment at the staggering rate of 80% and many families surviving on

one meal a day59 the demobilisation program run by the MONUC faces an uphill struggle. 60% of soldiers chose demobilisation over integration and were put on a year long donor program to fund their living expenses60 but when this ends it will be hard to resist the temptation to return to fighting in order to survive in a country where the government provides little or no social services. The demobilisation program carried out by the MONUC forces requires rebels to give up their arms voluntarily and groups like the FDLR and CDNP are likely to continue to keep their arms until they are forcibly removed or the reasons for them to keep their arms, i.e. to protect their communities or threat of prosecution, have been allayed by the government.

The problem could be more endemic amongst child soldiers who have grown up fighting will have a hard time breaking the cycle of violence and puts enormous pressure on the demobilisation programs to ensure that it works. Many again may find that they are „unwilling to face poverty at home' and with demobilisation programs lacking the funds to provide emotional or gender based support it is likely that those who fail to integrate will become „fully fledged soldiers or become prime targets for recruitment by terrorist groups.

Investment into the Congolese economy will prove vital to ensure that there is another way of life than poverty or conflict that can ensure long lasting stability to the Congo. The experience in Northern Ireland has shown that investment can „cement the peace"63 and the experience in the Congo should be no different as Stearns points out the inclusion of RCD and the MLC rebel groups into government has allowed them to receive lucrative government salaries encouraging them to work within the peace process64. This process can be extended to the rest of the country as the Congo is the most mineral rich country in Africa and if it resources were managed properly it could ensure that the majority of its citizens are removed from poverty

and provide citizens with an interest in ensuring the success of continuing economic prosperity and peace.

4.3.5 The Congolese Peace Process

The Congolese peace process was brought about by the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the „genius" of which was to recognise the overlapping layers of interstate and intrastate actors involved in the war, and it legitimated the serious concerns of Rwanda, Uganda and Angola regarding insurgency movements". Most importantly the Agreement provided for an Inter Congolese Dialogue (ICD) which was to give a national dialogue amongst the government, the armed opposition the MLC and RCD and the unarmed opposition and shall lead to a new political dispensation and national reconciliation in the DRC" as well as addressing the need for the ICD to deal with the formation of a new Congolese army. It also mandated for the UN to provide peacekeepers to ensure the ceasefire amongst the parties.

Today, the humanitarian situation in eastern Congo is among the worst in the world, despite the country's vast natural wealth and an historic election in 2006 that allowed people to vote freely for their leaders for the first time. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) balances in conflict and peace, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, repatriation and resettlement (DDR(RR)) process is underway. The aim is to provide a viable way of life for former combatants whose main source of survival has been by way of the gun. To date, this process has been focused on addressing the needs of armed men, while less priority has been given to those of women.

The DRC, formerly Zaire, has been in political turmoil for years. In May 1997, the Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), with the support of Rwanda and Uganda, marched into Kinshasa and ousted longtime dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. The

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is plagued by enduring conflict in its eastern provinces. Formally the second Congolese war came to an end in 2002. However, in practice the conflict drags on and is the deadliest since the Second World War. Estimates of the dead range from three to five million persons. The victims are civilians, in particular women and girls, and ethnic groups such as the Banyamulenge, the Hutu Banyarwanda, the Hema and the Lendu. Many of the killers and rapists are former genocidists who escaped into the DRC from the Rwandan genocide.

Besides the high death rate among vulnerable civilian populations, especially children, and the number of internally displaced persons, there is the alarming trend of rape used as a weapon of war. Sexual violence is aimed at terrorizing and controlling the population. A recent study estimates that nearly two million women have been raped in the DRC, that is nearly one every minute. These atrocities, however, are not limited to women and girls. The fact that also men and boys are victims of rape is often not highlighted. Moreover, sexual violence is not limited to rape. It includes crimes such as abduction and sexual slavery, forced maternity and sexual mutilation. Sexual violence causes traumas, diseases, rejection and stigmatization. These consequences are aggravated by feelings of hopelessness, shame and abandonment because of the impunity of the perpetrators

The ideology of equally including perspectives, impacts and needs of men and women has been evolving at the United Nations through the concept of 'gender mainstreaming'. This paper argues that gender mainstreaming of DDR(RR) processes is a transformative concept, in which equal attention to women and men in the theory, policy and practical implementation are all crucial to the success of DDR(RR) processes.

An estimated 5.4 million have lost their lives since 1998, most of them from preventable diseases and one in three children are not able to go school. While the elections were an important development for the country, they could not fix all of Congo's problems The illegal exploitation of mineral wealth, the weak state authority across large parts of the east, and armed groups taking advantage of this vacuum have helped fuel ongoing conflict. And with porous borders, weapons flow into the country with ease.

This has fed cycles of violence, with civilians both caught in the crossfire and directly targeted by a range of armed groups. This long-term instability and insecurity has left much of eastern DRC with almost no modern infrastructure, virtually no industry, and limited opportunities for education and jobs. The resulting poverty further fuels the violence, by giving many young men an economic incentive to take up arms.

4.4 The fighting continues

In late 2008, a new surge of fighting exploded around Goma in the eastern province of North Kivu, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes. One year later, the situation in the region has grown worse, the result of a UN-backed Congolese military operation against a militia known as the FDLR. The offensive, intended to disarm the militia, has led to a massive increase in violence against civilians, carried out by all sides, including deadly attacks by the Congolese army and revenge raids by the FDLR.

Though the operation has the support of the US, France, and the UK, it has triggered widespread suffering. Since the initiative was launched in January, 2009, there have been: More than 1,000 civilians killed About 7,000 women and girls raped. Oxfam believes that all militia groups, including the FDLR, must disarm, but the current strategy is failing: The trauma civilians are bearing is out of all proportion to the number of combatants who have been disarmed. In

northern Congo, new waves of suffering are now afflicting villagers as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which was originally from northern Uganda, intensifies the violence.

4.5 Actors on DDR

Main actors in the DDR(RR) in DRC are MONUC, the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), UNDP, and the UN Fund for Children (UNICEF), forming a DDR Technical Group. The Group's functions are to (a) voluntarily disarm and register combatants, (b) offer immediate resettlement assistance, and (c) engage in community reintegration. MONUC is to register the details, and send the data to the CTPC, through which a UNDP-led logistical rapid response mechanism (MRR) offers immediate support to reintegrate individuals into the community. In the case of child soldiers, UNICEF interviews and evaluates them before reintegration. There are three manners of military structure for DDR: units or contingents, whether army, aviation, engineering corps, or support units; military observers, including MILOBs and disarmed officials made available to mission member states for a period of approximately one year; and officials who are members of the military as specialists. The duty of military observers is to assist in creating preventative alertness and to provide and disseminate information. The provision and dissemination of information, which may not at first glance seem a concern of the military, is in fact of the highest importance because of the military's countrywide reach[114].

UN led DDR(RR) efforts in the eastern DRC continue to evolve to meet the demands of the conflict environment. As the UN mission enters its thirteenth year, a review of the national DDR and DDRRR of foreign combatants reveals programmatic evolution in reaction to events

[114] Malkki, Liisa H, *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania*, Chicago/London, University of Chicago Press, 1995.

on the ground. Experiences made with peace processes and DDR programmes show that in this context the intervention of peace forces can only then be successful when they are able to build up a considerable threat potential thus have the sufficient number of troops available and act with sufficient authority. Extensive PSOs with a robust Chapter VII mandate have succeeded in Afghanistan and Bosnia with great effort to guarantee a minimum of security whereas in Haiti and the DR Congo despite the presence of UN troops a situation of general violence prevails where not even the most immediate security goals (ceasefire, weapons-hand-in activities) are attained.

Disarmament as a component of DDR varies from case to case and can involve turning in of weaponry, its storage and destruction, the physical relocation of ex-combatants (from cantonment areas to other locations of choice), distribution of incentive packages to ex-combatants such as clothing, food, cash settlements or tools and seeds for farming, and training in various vocations.

Disarmament as part of peace operations is usually undertaken under one of three possible scenarios: as part of the negotiated settlement, after the victor initiates the process, or when a third party initiates the process.

The first type of disarmament is often a large-scale programme, which forms part of a comprehensive peace plan, usually under the auspices of the UN. United Nations operations in Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador are all examples. These types of disarmament programmes form an integral part of the peace process and as such depend on the political will and commitment of the parties involved in the peace agreement. Thus any changes in the political process will have a direct impact (positively or negatively) on the pace of disarmament.

The linkage between politics and disarmament in UN-brokered peace processes is both useful and controversial. It is useful to understand this linkage because it allows for proper planning of disarmament during the earliest possible stages of the peace process. It also results in an understanding that the political process and disarmament should run parallel to each other and that political actors should be made aware of the impact of their political actions on the pace of the disarmament process.

Founded on a Traditional DDR framework, MONUC supported DDR(RR) efforts have incorporated many of the aspects present in Second Generation DDR. While many successes have emerged, the absence of a comprehensive peace and the reliance on a voluntary framework has continued to plague the success of the programs. Armed militias, like the Mai Mai, continue to operate in the eastern districts of the DRC, resistant to the DDR(RR) programs present there, because the Congolese government and MONUSCO are incapable of maintaining a secure environment, necessary to facilitate voluntarily DDR. Additionally, foreign groups like the FDLR and LRA face barriers to their repatriation that Congolese programs cannot address. These groups have shown, time and time again, a total disinterest in repatriation to a society that will undoubtedly prosecute them for their crimes. And they are not welcome in the Congo where their presence is the source of continued violence and illegal resource extraction. Thus poor coordination at the national, international, and local level, the failure in SSR to create a viable Congolese defense force, and the UN's continued focus on voluntary methods of DDR(RR) have stalled the progress of the DDR(RR) programs and allowed for the continued presence of armed nonstate groups in the east.

Seen as "each conflict is unique"[60] a detailed analysis of the context of each case is of utmost importance. But it is not only the nature of a (current, stemmed or terminated) conflict

which determines the peace the securing of which DDR wants to contribute to. It is also the economic and social situation of the respective post-conflict societies, the structure and organisation of the units to be demobilised or the means and interests of the intervening actors that have a major influence on the possibilities and conceptions of DDR.

4.6 Conclusion

It is obviously not the same to demobilise the Angolan UNITA after a military defeat and an agreed transformation to a political party, or to disarm an innumerable amount of militias in the anarchy of the 'Democratic' Republic of the Congo and to re-establish a certain amount of state control. Neither can reintegration programmes for the disciplined, mostly well-trained members serving under strict command structures of the Eritrean army be transferred to members of the infamous, drug-addicted "Small Boys Units" of the Liberian warlord Charles Taylor.

Fund management committee, the Committee for the Administration of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion Funds (CGFDR) was created to provide financial oversight and funds allocation to the DDR programs. Although these bodies were positive developments in the organization of DDR activities by the Congolese government, they did not become immediately functional. The three organizations made sense structurally; however, the process lacked a coherent overall strategy. This problem was rectified with the creation of the National DDR Program (PNDDR), developed with the assistance of the UNDP, MONUC and Belgium in June 2004.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter present summary of data findings, conclusions based on the findings and recommendations there-to.

5.2 Summary of findings

From the data findings, there are indeed efforts was made to create a fund management committee, the Committee for the Administration of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion Funds (CGFDR) was created to provide financial oversight and funds allocation to the DDR programs. Although these bodies were positive developments in the organization of DDR activities by the Congolese government, they did not become immediately functional. The three organizations made sense structurally; however, the process lacked a coherent overall strategy. This problem was rectified with the creation of the National DDR Program (PNDDR), developed with the assistance of the UNDP, MONUC and Belgium in June 2004.

In Improving the effectiveness of DDR and SSR practice can have a significant, positive impact on states emerging from conflict. In order to design and implement programmes that contribute effectively to security and development goals, approaches need to be grounded in an informed understanding of specific political, socio-economic and security framing conditions. The ability to develop a nuanced and sophisticated understanding of 'what the market will bear' in distinct, challenging environments is therefore essential. This volume is intended to contribute to that important goal[115].

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[115] Berdal, Mats. 'Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars'. Adelphi Paper 303. London, Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) are acknowledged pillars of the international community's commitment to post-conflict peace building and sustainable development. While a growing community of experts and academics have emerged to support and promote both activities, the policy and programming linkages between DDR and SSR remain under-developed. This is partly because both sets of initiatives are frequently pursued autonomously, independent of one another. As a result, artificial epistemic and bureaucratic silos have emerged that frustrate productive exchange. Opportunities to build on synergies and strengthen positive outcomes in both sets of activities are therefore often missed.

Disarmament is an urgent priority in the Republic of Congo. With an estimated 41,000 small arms still circulating in the Republic of Congo, their availability remains a very real threat to sustained security and stability. The wide availability of military-style assault rifles and grenades particularly in the hands of ex-combatants, undisciplined security sector forces and civilians – presents a menace. The evaluation team notes that especially high concentrations of weapons caches are in the homes and common properties of the northern neighbourhoods of Brazzaville, and districts in Niari, Lekoumou, Bouenza and Pool. Individual cache sizes range from 1 to 75 weapons in Brazzaville – though as high as 400 weapons in Pool. Though some suspicion of the GoC persists, there appears to be considerable willingness among ex-combatants and civilians alike to dispose of their weapons.

5.1 Conclusions

DDR is fundamentally concerned with the promotion of security and stability. Security and stability are, naturally, variously defined and measured. The UNDP-IOM and HC projects

sought to target the 'causes' of insecurity through initiatives designed to disarm and reintegrate ex-combatants.

The need to foster synergies between DDR and SSR cannot be reduced to a simplistic sequential relationship. This is because both DDR and SSR involve a combination of activities – many of them overlapping – that entail highly distinct challenges depending on the specific context. In unpacking the relationship between DDR and SSR it is essential to take into account their different objectives, timelines, stakeholders and interests. However, informing wider DDR planning with insights and expertise from SSR can The DDR-SSR Nexus: Concepts and Policies facilitate the wider 'design' of a society's future security sector. The security sector governance focus to DDR and SSR can enhance the legitimacy of programmes and their outcomes through emphasizing the need for transparent, nationally-driven decision making. An important point of departure for this volume is the inherently political nature of both DDR and SSR. This reflects the sensitivity of issues that touch directly on sovereignty and national security as well as the fact that decisions in both areas necessarily generate 'winners' and 'losers.' At the heart of the DDR-SSR nexus is therefore the need to recognize and engage these sensitivities and carefully balance international assistance with respect for the principle of local ownership. Applying a security sector governance framework allows practitioners to better situate DDR-SSR activities within complex and often highly contested post-conflict transitions. This perspective is further developed in the concluding chapter of this volume.

Improving the effectiveness of DDR and SSR practice can have a significant, positive impact on states emerging from conflict. In order to design and implement programmes that contribute effectively to security and development goals, approaches need to be grounded in an informed understanding of specific political, socio-economic and security framing conditions.

The ability to develop a nuanced and sophisticated understanding of 'what the market will bear' in distinct, challenging environments is therefore essential. This volume is intended to contribute to that important goal[116].

The coordination and harmonisation of DDR programmes with measures for the build-up of an efficient and responsible security system, with compensation projects for isadvantaged and vulnerable persons, with programmes for reconstruction and development, is so important. It is the task of DDR to contribute to minimising the effects of the compromises and trade-offs, and to not losing track of the longer-term aims.

UN DDR(RR) programs in the eastern provinces suffered from an array of operational problems. Coordination of DDR funds was poorly managed and in some cases negatively impacted the process. Additionally, the link to SSR, in the form of brassage, was poorly thought out and was used as a "shortcut" around full demobilization. The setbacks experienced from failed attempts at army integration have been the catalyst for renewed violence and have damaged the legitimacy of both the as protection of the civilian population became a priority for the mission, MONUC was forced to take robust military actions against armed aggressors. These actions often conflicted with the stated voluntary framework for DDR(RR)

Geography also presents a major obstacle to security and effective DDR. Dense forests, high mountain ranges, and a lack of transportation infrastructure create an environment where large forces can disappear and hide with relative ease. Additionally, the geographic area of focus of DDR activities is vast in the DRC. This has presented barriers to voluntary enrollment in DDR

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[116] Berdal, Mats. 'Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars'. Adelphi Paper 303. London, Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996.

as many combatants have to travel far, and often outside the safety of their host community, to reach a cantonment zone or DDR center. In addition to providing barriers to movement, the geography of the eastern DRC is rich in easily extractable mineral resources. A blessing to a state that enjoys a monopoly of power over its borders and a healthy economy, the abundant resources in the DRC has been a curse.

5.2 Recommendations

Although the DDR need for the dismantling of rebel armies and militias coincided with the SSR objective of creating national armed forces, the process of brassage proved to create as many problems as it solved. While FARDC brigades were stood up in a relatively small amount of time, brassage has compromised the force's integrity and functionality. The eastern provinces are far removed from army headquarters in Kinshasa. The Great Lakes conflict system is also defined by rampant insecurities and community level conflict that the brassage process has failed to recognize. Thus FARDC units that have been assembled through brassage have only occasionally represented the needs of the nation and have often been perpetrators of egregious acts against the population. The current FARDC force, intended to relieve the expensive MONUSCO mission of peacekeeping and security tasks, has proven inadequate.

The realization of the political value of weapons in DRC Congo conflicts means that disarmament programmes need to apply new ways of removing weapons. For example, the issue of decommissioning weapons where conflicts are ongoing and there is still a political vacuum (which inevitably impacts upon disarmament programmes and processes) needs to be considered, perhaps as part of building confidence between opposing sides.

In addition, there is no substitute for comprehensive planning of DDRR programme. Planning should involve setting out clear guidelines and delegation of responsibility between

various actors. There needs to be a lead agency to the process which needs to set out the programme as well as specify its relationship with Community, military, other UN agencies such as UNDP, UNICEF, the UN mission and NGOs. Such planning should also ensure sustainability of the process through the mobilization of resources and keeping the momentum and commitment of international partners on course.

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