

University of Nairobi
Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

International Transit Migration: the Case of Ethiopian Migrants in Kenya
from 1995-2009 //

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Declaration

I, Endale T. Gebreyes, declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree award in this or any other University.

Signature: ETG Date: 16-11-2012

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Mr. Gerishon K. Ikiara

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Dedication

To my beloved wife, Mizan and my daughter-beautiful little gift of God, Karetina.

Abstract

Within international transit migration and its challenges and opportunities, this paper briefly assesses the case of Ethiopian migrants to Kenya and beyond. Recently, the Horn and Eastern Africa region has become one of the major hotspot of human smuggling and illegal migration in the world. Evidently, Kenya and Ethiopia, which are among the major hubs of such activities in the region, have been affected by international migration in all its manifestations.

Nowadays, it has become a common event to watch and listen on the media and other sources the suffering of Ethiopian victims of human smuggling and illegal migration to Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and other parts of the region. Beyond the apparent problem on migrants, the issue is also negatively affecting the image of Ethiopia which is trying to change the often distorted perceptions about the country. Besides, the problem of human smuggling and illegal migration is causing political, social, security and related concerns for governments of transit and receiving countries like Kenya. However, even in the face of such real and serious challenges, interventions made to address the issue are mostly reactive and often uncoordinated. As a regional as well as global issue, addressing the challenges and opportunities of international migration requires the coordinated effort of all states as well as non-state actors that are directly or indirectly affected by or are involved in issues of international migration. Among other things, such interventions require formulation and harmonization of comprehensive national and regional policy legislations and continued implementation and evaluation of such policies at local, regional, as well as global level. It is also necessary for both sending and receiving countries as well as other non-state actors to properly address the root causes of migration in a sustainable manner. They should also create awareness about the perils of smuggling and illegal migration at community, national and regional levels using local as well as regional media, community and religious leaders, returned victims of smuggling and illegal migration and all other relevant means.

On the other side, in line with the realities, the outcome of this research has also revealed that there are also positive sides of international migration if properly managed. Beyond filling the labor market gap in developed receiving countries, international migration plays a positive role at individual, state as well as regional level in sending countries. Such positive outcomes include resulting in radical changes in the lives of migrants, diaspora engagement in home countries in the form of brain-gain including diaspora knowledge and technology transfer, investment and trade promotion and image building. The positive effect of diaspora remittances in the economies of sending countries is also becoming an important component of economic growth and development in various countries including Ethiopia and Kenya.

Nonetheless, policy interventions and related coordination efforts should be based on empirical research on international migration in the region for such interventions to produce the expected positive outcome in a proper and sustainable manner. However, most of the available data on the subject is out of date, incomprehensive, non-conclusive and difficult to substantiate. Besides, the researcher has made a reasonably thorough search of empirical work carried out in the specific area of Ethiopian migrants in Kenya and found no such data.

Basically, this research is carried out in a view to make some contribution to fill this empirical data gap in the area. The outcome of this research is mainly based on primary data collected from Ethiopian migrants living in Kenya. Most of the outcome of the research has confirmed the perceived realities and experiences about the migrants. Hence, it can be said that this outcome has contributed to providing empirical credence to the perceptions about the challenges of human smuggling and illegal migration in one side and the opportunities of international migration on the other in relation to Ethiopian migrants to Kenya and beyond.

List of Acronyms

ACA-Alien Control Act

AD-Anno Domini

AEDPA-Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

AIDS-Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome

ARRA-Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs

AU-African Unity

BC-Before Christ

CCM-Consultative Committee Meeting

CEWARN-Conflict Early Warning Mechanism

COMESA-Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

EAC-East African Community

ECA-Economic Commission for Africa

EEC-European Economic Commission

EPMAC-Ethiopian Provisional Military Administration Council

EPRDF-Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front

EU-European Union

FDRE-Federal Democratic Republics of Ethiopia

GATT-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GTP-Growth and Transformation Plan

HAS-Homeland Security Act

HIV-Human Immuno-deficiency Virus

IAA-Immigration Amendment Act

IA-Immigration Act

IAMD-Immigration Affairs Main Department

ICT-Information and Communication Technology

IGAD-Inter-governmental Authority on Development

IIRPAPRA-Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act

ILO-International Labor Organization
INA-Immigration and Nationality Act
INAD-Immigration and Nationality Affairs Department
IOM-International Organization for Migration
IRTPA-Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
KADU-Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU-Kenya African National Union
KSH-Kenyan Shilling
MCC-Ministerial Consultative Committee
MDA-Mutual Defence Agreement
NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFD-Northern Frontier District
NISS-National Intelligence and Security Service
OAU-Organization of African Unity
OECD-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PASDEP-Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty
PMAC-Provisional Military Administration Council
RIDA-Real Identity Act
SADC-Southern Africa Development Community
SDPRP-Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program
SNNP-Sothern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples
SPSS- Statistical Package for Social Sciences
TGE-Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TV-Television
UAE-United Arab Emirates
UN- United Nations
UNEP-Unite Nations Environment Program
UNHCR-United Nations High Commission for Refugees
USA-United Sates of America

USD-United States Dollar

USIU-United States International University

USSR-Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

US-United States

WWII-Second World War

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Overview of Causes and Trends of International Migration from Ethiopia

Taking the case of transit labor migration from Ethiopia to Kenya and beyond during the period from 1995 to 2009, this paper tries to examine issues relating to the challenges of human smuggling and illegal migration and the opportunities of international migration with respect to Ethiopian migrants in Kenya. The causes and trends of migration may differ from country to country or region-to-region based on the prevalent political, economic, social and cultural realities of each location as well as the overall global situation.¹ Thus, taking the three (individual/household, state and international) levels of analysis and depending on the specific factors affecting migration, international migration can be analyzed at different levels.

International migration is a global phenomenon caused by a host of national, regional and global economic, political, social, cultural and natural factors.² These factors create push-pull variables that influence the decision of people to migrate abandoning their 'established' life and their family behind in search of 'better' opportunity elsewhere.³ Push factors constitute those negative variables at origin in the sending country that influence the decision of the migrants to think of migrating abroad. These include unemployment or

¹K. Koser, *International Migration: A Very Short Introduction*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2007) pp. 45-69.

²B. Vandererf and L. Heering, *Causes of International Migration*, (Pennsylvania: Diane Publishing, 1996) pp. 96, 181-89.

³L. T. Katseli, et al, 'Effects of Migration on Sending Countries: What Do We Know?', *Population Division*, United Nations Secretariat, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, (2006).

underemployment, lack of education, health and other services, lack of security, bad governance, corruption and impunity, natural calamities and related challenges in the sending country.⁴

On the flip side of the coin, pull factors are those variables in the receiving country that attract the migrants towards those countries. This is the perceived or real availability of opportunities and services mentioned as lacking at home. As the outcome of this research shows, migrants from Ethiopia are greatly influenced by such factors including lack of employment at home as a push factor and intention to get more income in receiving countries as a pull factor. However, the pull factor sides of the dream and the search for a 'better' opportunity are often based more on perceived expectations rather than real experiences.⁵

Nonetheless, the ultimate decision to migrate abroad is made based on the net effect or the net direction of the push-pull factors. However, although national, regional and global push-pull factors influence international migration, the ultimate decision to migrate rests mainly on individual or household level rather than community, state or higher level. Based on the above perspective, the research tried to assess the case of Ethiopian migrants who migrate to Kenya and beyond.⁶

Within the domain of international transit migration within and from Africa, the paper mainly focuses on Ethiopian migrants temporarily or permanently residing in Kenya as the country [Kenya] is the first receiving country, though mostly on a temporary or transit basis.

⁴ H. de Haas, 'Migration and Development: a Theoretical Perspective', *Centre on Migration, Citizenship and Development*, University of Bielefeld, (2007)pp. 16-17.

⁵ C. Brettell, J. F. Hollifield, 'Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines' (London: Routledge, 2000) pp. 1-10, 31-42.

⁶ Opcit., Haas.

Furthermore, as most of the migrants in Kenya later migrate or plan to migrate to South Africa within the African continent and to mostly western countries such as the US outside Africa, the study makes a general assessment of migration trends in these countries.

Landlocked Ethiopia, which shares border with every other state in the Horn, is at the intersection of a complex system of multidirectional regional and international flows of humanity. Consequently, the movement of people within the Horn of Africa is hardly a new phenomenon.

However, migration from Ethiopia to countries beyond the Horn can be linked to the 1974 revolution that overthrew Emperor Haile-selassie and installed a Marxist military regime, the Derg. Before 1974, the few Ethiopians who went abroad were elites who did so mainly to study and then return to their homeland.⁷

Kenya and Ethiopia have been part of and affected by the challenges and opportunities of international migration. As some reports indicate, there are relatively more Ethiopians residing in Kenya (though mostly in temporary basis) than Kenyans living in Ethiopia and the trend of migration inclines more towards the former.

Nonetheless, this trend is not always attributed to real push-pull factors but wrong perceptions that going abroad always brings better fortune than home regardless of the level and situation in terms of living condition at home. This is evident as most of the migrants pay relatively considerable amount of money to human smugglers to migrate which [the money]

⁷ S. A. Getahun., 'Brain Drain & its Impact on Ethiopia's Higher Learning Institutions: Medical Establishments & the Military Academies Between 1970s & 2000', *International Migration Institute*, (2006).

could have been saved and invested at home to support the migrants and their family members.

In line with the above viewpoints the characteristics, trends and underlying causes of migration of Ethiopians to Kenya and via Kenya to other African and western countries may not be fully explained by a single theory or principle of migration. A combination of the different schools of thought should be blended and analyzed in context with the existing political, economic, social and cultural characteristics of sending and receiving countries to explain each issue and challenge.

1.2. Brief Assessment of Diplomatic Relations between Ethiopia and Kenya

Diplomatic relation between Ethiopia and Kenya dates back to the 1950s. Before Ethiopia opened its full-fledged Embassy by appointing its first Ambassador to Kenya in 1961, it established an Honorary Consulate General in 1954. The relation between the two countries was strengthened further after Kenya's independence in 1963 when Kenya reciprocated the former's act by opening its Embassy in Addis Ababa in 1967. These relations are based on good neighborliness, peaceful co-existence and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.⁸

In the course of their long time diplomatic relation, the two countries have signed various bilateral agreements that helped further strengthen their neighborly relations. One of the bilateral agreements which had a lasting and significant impact on cross-border migration

⁸ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 'Bilateral Relations between Kenya and Ethiopia', *Archive Documents*, (2007).

and people to people relation is the 1966 Mutual Visa Abolition Agreement. In addition to this agreement, the two countries have concluded other equally, if not, more important, bilateral agreements such as the 1963 Mutual Defense Pact and the 1970 Border Agreement which evidently played a pivotal role in strengthening relation between the two counties.⁹

1.3. Statement of the Research Problem

In the specific case of Kenya and Ethiopia, the challenge of illegal migration has been an area of concern for both governments. There are different challenges faced by migrants as well as the two governments mostly due to the existence of illegal migration to Kenya, which usually takes place through cross-border human smugglers.

Kenya, as the first point of entry for migration especially to South Africa and beyond, faces the initial burden of illegal migration more than other destinations. However, the migration route also involves other Eastern and Sothern African countries such as Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho. In this course of cross border movement of people, many migrants will end-up in dark and unfamiliar territories and prison cells as most of them do not have the right travel document as well as legal resident permit.

As the writer observed during the past years, the government of Ethiopia has tried to take some measures to curb the problem of illegal emigration including imposition of travel restriction measures at official outlets, using official media like TV and radio to discourage emigration. However, most of the measures being taken are uncoordinated. Such efforts should be based on comprehensive national as well as regional policy prescriptions and

⁹ Ibid.

related instruments. Such policy prescription should also be formulated on the basis of robust and relevant research and empirical/ theoretical foundation. The solution for such challenges requires the coordination of the two countries and other affected actors and stakeholders.

Even though there might exist some written information at different levels to substantiate issues of migration, most of such data is either very specific or incomprehensive and shallow or biased and hence unreliable. Therefore, there is a need for an empirical research that gives relatively comprehensive and reliable information, which will provide some insight for further thorough and robust research.

1.4. Objective of the Research

As the trend of Ethiopian migrants in Kenya and beyond indicates, most of the migrants go mostly to South Africa within the African continent and to the US or other western countries outside Africa as their 'final' destination after staying in Kenya temporarily, for varying periods. In view of this trend, the paper briefly assesses why they do so rather than staying in Kenya permanently, by making migration policies comparative analysis of the two countries - the US and South Africa vis-à-vis that of Kenya as well as Ethiopia in a view to highlight the underlying factors that contribute to this trend.

Based on the inferences drawn from the outcome of the research, this paper tries to fortify the notion that international migration is a complex process influenced by often interrelated push-pull factors in sending and receiving countries and no single theory or

perspective is comprehensive and robust enough to explain fully the essence of transit migration.

In line with the above notion, the paper gives more emphasis to the following issues in a view to addressing the challenges of international transit migration from Ethiopia to Kenya and beyond:

- i. *What are the underlying causes of migration of Ethiopians to Kenya and beyond?*
- ii. *What is the trend and composition of the migration and the migrants?*
- iii. *What are the major challenges faced by the migrants and what should be done to address these challenges?*
- iv. *What are the policy and related challenges associated with illegal migration and migrants for the two governments and how can they be addressed?*

With the general and specific objectives denoted below, the paper concludes by outlining some policy interventions that can be instituted to address illegal migration challenges faced by both the sending and the receiving countries and the migrants as well.

General objective: *To examine and analyze the trend, level, causes and challenges of migration and migrants from Ethiopia to Kenya and beyond.*

Specific objectives:

- i. *To examine the trend and underlying causes migration;*
- ii. *To identify and analyze the major challenges of the migrants and the sending and receiving countries an*
- iii. *To propose some possible policy and related recommendations that could be instituted to curb illegal migration.*

1.5. Justification of the Study

The research project focuses on a fifteen-year migration trend, which covers the period from 1995 to 2009. This period is chosen because it is more suited to obtain relevant data for the research. This is due to the fact that prior to this period, especially from the 1970s to 1990s, the political and economic environment of Ethiopia was highly dominated by socialist system of government.

This period was characterized by civil war as well as cross-border conflicts, forced military recruitment, subjugation of political, civil and other human rights that resulted in mostly political refugees and forced migration as opposed to voluntary economic migrants.

However, during the post socialism era that ushered in relative stability, market economy, easing of civil liberties, democratic and political rights and other positive measures, international migration is mostly attributed to economic and related factors which created a trend of economic and mainly voluntary labour migration rather than forced political migration. Hence, as this study is intended to examine the trend of economic migrants, it covers particularly the post-socialism period.

The topic of this paper is chosen because it is intended to deal with an important area of concern for both Ethiopia and Kenya since the issue of illegal migration and human smuggling as a challenge of international migration on one side and an opportunity on the other, which [the challenges and opportunities] should be addressed through regional policy formulation, coordination in implementing the policies and cooperation of the two countries

as well as other stakeholders, has been a serious challenge for both the two governments as well as the region as a whole.

Evidently, the importance of research data carried out in the specific area of Ethiopian migrants in Kenya and beyond is undeniable as such information is one of the useful input and foundation for formulation and implementation of coordinated and harmonized national as well as regional policies that can address the challenges and opportunities of international migration in sending and receiving countries.

The other importance of such research is the fact that it can be used as a springboard for future thorough and expanded research by other scholars in the field. In addition to the sending and receiving countries, the outcome of the research can also be a good policy and decision-making input for other stakeholders such as non-governmental national, regional and international organizations that are concerned with migration and development issues, refugee agencies and other interested parties.

Thus, focusing mainly on economic migrants, this research tries to put forward some possible policy and related recommendations that will address the above-mentioned challenges of illegal migration and human trafficking on one hand and the opportunities of international migration with respect to the area covered by the topic of this study on the other. Furthermore, this study is conducted to contribute some empirical input which can be used as additional basis to carry out further research on for the specific area of international transit migration.

1.6. Literature Review

1.6.1. Definition of Basic Terms and Concepts in International Migration

Some concepts and terms that are used in discussion of migration are sometimes ambiguous and misleading and it is common to observe such contextually different terms being used interchangeably without considering their difference in meaning. However, such application often creates confusion and contextual conflict. Hence, it is important to clarify the basic distinctions in the meaning of these terms so that they will be used in a relevant and appropriate way.

Migrant Worker and Migrant:¹⁰ The UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants defines a *migrant worker* as a "person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national." From this a broader definition of migrants follows: "The term '*migrant*' in article 1.1 (a) should be understood as covering all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for reasons of 'personal convenience' and without intervention of an external compelling factor."

Inmigration and emigration:¹¹ According to Encyclopedia Britannica, while migration in general refers to movement of people from one country to another, immigration is movement to a country and emigration is movement from a country.

¹⁰ International Organization for Migration, <http://www.iom.org>, (2009).

¹¹ Encyclopedia Britannica, (2006).

Refugee:¹² Article 1 of the 1951 Convention defines a refugee as “a person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution”.

Human Trafficking:¹³ Human smuggling is quite different to human *trafficking* which is defined in the United Nation’s Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, either by the threat or use of abduction, force, fraud, deception or coercion, or by the giving or receiving of unlawful payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having the control over another person”.

Human Smuggling:¹⁴ The United Nation’s Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air defines the *smuggling* of migrants as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.” In most cases, individuals will contact smugglers themselves to realize their objective of crossing a border illegally in search of a better life and improved economic prospects”.

¹² UNHCR, *Essential Papers: Copy of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, (Geneva, UNHCR Media Relations and Public Information Service, UNHCR/2253, 2007).

¹³ UNHCR, ‘Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.’ Geneva, (2010) pp. 14-16.

¹⁴ UN, ‘The United Nation’s Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air.’ (2004) p.2.

1.6.2. Overview of Trends of African Migration and Mobility

African migration seems to offer conflicting behavior. On the one hand, there is a vast literature on rural-urban migration that paints a picture of a highly mobile labor force responding elastically to changing economic incentives between sectors and regions. On the other hand, across-border international migration seems low, given the incentives.

As Western¹⁵ points out, indeed, a third of the African immigrants arriving in the 1990s were classified as close relatives of US citizens; it thus seems likely that the friends and relatives effect is already serving to erode the poverty and/or legislated constraint on potential African emigrants. Most African international migration still takes place within Africa. Although there are political, legal, cultural and geographic barriers to migration between African countries, these are much lower than those between Africa and the OECD.

In his work on African Migration, B. Diki¹⁶ points out that many inter-African migrations involve movement from the more populous and/or less developed countries such as Burkina Faso, Uganda, Lesotho, Mozambique, Mali, Rwanda and Burundi. The receiving countries have included Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Zaire, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria (until recently) and above all the Republic of South Africa. He argues that migrations often take place in response to mineral, oil and other primary commodity booms, and they have typically reversed when economic fortunes changed.

¹⁵ J. Western, 'Africa Is Coming to the Cape', *Geographical Review*, Vol. 91, No. 4, (2001) pp. 617-640.

¹⁶ B. Diki, *International Migration within, to and from Africa in a Globalised World* (2009) pp.9-31.

He further denotes that the decision to migrate is also made at micro (individual/household) level and macro (social or similar) level and influenced by a combination of individual/household, state-level and international-level factors depending on the prevalent push and pull factors influencing and causing the migration.¹⁷

1.6.3. Different Views on Migration

1.6.3.1. The Mobility Transition

The Push-Pull Theory of Migration, which is by some writers referred to as 'Push-Pull Law of Migration', is among the widely accepted and applied models of migration. The push-pull model is basically an individual choice and equilibrium model, and is, therefore, largely analogous to neo-classical micro models. The push-pull model has gained enormous popularity in the migration literature and has become the dominant migration model.

Lee,¹⁸ who is among the more prominent proponent of the theory, has played a significant role in reviving this theory of migration. As shown in the diagram on page 19, Lee states that migration is selective with respect to the individual characteristics of migrants because people respond differently to "plus" and "minus" factors at origins and destinations and have different abilities to cope with the intervening variables.

¹⁷ M. Farrag, 'Managing International Migration in Developing Countries', *International Migration*, (1997) pp.315-336.

¹⁸ E. Lee, 'A Theory of Migration', *Demography*, (1966) pp. 47-57.

Lee revised Ravenstein's¹⁹ 19th century laws on migration and proposed a new analytical framework for migration. In his view, the decision to migrate is determined by the following: factors associated with the area of origin; factors associated with the area of destination, intervening obstacles (such as distance, physical barriers, immigration laws, and so on); and personal factors.

He argues that migration tends to take place within well-defined "streams", from specific places at the origin to specific places at the destination, not only because opportunities tend to be highly localized but also because the flow of knowledge back from destination facilitates the passage for later migrants.

1.6.3.2. Marxism and Neo Marxism

Bovenkerk²⁰ argues that economic factors and a class-based political process shape immigration policies. He asserts that capitalists import migrant workers in order to exert a downward pressure on wages and thereby increase their own profits. According to this view, the migrants constitute an "industrial reserve army of labor," and migration is part of capitalist development and of the international division of labor.

¹⁹ E.G. Ravenstein, 'The Laws of Migration', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, (1885) pp. 167-227.

²⁰ F. Bovenkerk., *The Sociology of Return Migration: a Bibliographic Essay*, (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1974) pp. 14-37.

1.6.3.3. The National Identity Approach

This perspective asserts that the unique history of each country, its conceptions of citizenship and nationality, as well as debates over national identity and social conflicts within it, shape its immigration policies.

In comparison to the other theories delineated here, the "national identity" approach downplays the importance of external and "situational" factors. Much of this literature can be categorized as historical sociology or political sociology, and it builds upon sociological and psychological theories and concepts such as national identity nation building, prejudice, alienation and social closure.²¹

1.6.3.4. Domestic Politics Approach

As Freeman²² notes, domestic politics models (or "society-centered approaches") assume that the state serves as a neutral arena for societal interests: interest groups and parties. Policymaking is the result of bargaining as well as of compromises between these interests, or sometimes it reflects the fact that one or more of these actors has succeeded in capturing the state.

Many studies of migration theory attribute changes in immigration policy to "situational" socioeconomic factors (e.g., recessions and large-scale immigration of dissimilar

¹⁵ K.B. Newbold, 'Counting Migrants and Migrations: Comparing Lifetime and Fixed- Interval Return and Onward Migration', *Economic Geography*, Vol. 77, No. 1, (2001) pp. 23-40.

²² G.P. Freeman, 'Migration Policy and Politics in the Receiving States', *International Migration Review*, (1992) pp.18-29.

racial or ethnic composition contribute to restrictions on immigration), and identify societal actors as shaping immigration policy. Another variant of the domestic politics/pluralist model focuses on local politics and on center-periphery relationships within national politics.

1.6.3.5. Realism and Neo-realism Approach

Taylor²³ points out realism ("classical" realism and neo-realism) is perhaps the most prominent approach in the study of international relations. It depicts international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states.

States pursue their national interests when they restrict labor migration and permanent immigration during recessions, accept labor migration during economic upturns, give preference to immigration of the highly skilled and of investors, and encourage immigration in an attempt to overcome demographic inferiority vis-à-vis potential enemies. Critics of this approach argue that the focus of the Realist approach on sovereign self-interested states seems a good starting point for a discussion of immigration policies. In contrast to neo-Marxist theories, for instance, realism does not neglect the influence of the state.

1.6.3.6. Liberalism and Neo-liberalism

As Meyers²⁴ points out, liberals offer a more optimistic worldview than the realists. They maintain that international economic interdependence, transnational interactions

²³ E. J. Taylor, 'Differential Migration, Networks', Information and Risk, in O. Stark (ed.), *Migration Theory, Human Capital and Development*, Connecticut: Greenwich, JAI Press, (1986) pp. 147-171.

international institutions, and the spread of democracy can promote cooperation and even peace between nations. In contrast to the realists, liberalism assumes that non-state actors, such as international organizations and multinational corporations, are important actors in international relations and that economic and social issues are no less important than military ones.

1.6.3.7. Neo-liberal Institutionalism

Haggard & Simmons²⁵ stress that the Neoliberal Institutional model argues that international institutions and regimes help overcome dilemmas of common interests and common aversions and facilitate collaboration and coordination between countries. Major examples of international institutions or regimes are free or freer trade (e.g., GATT, the EEC, EU) and international security (e.g., NATO and the non-proliferation regime).

1.6.3.8. The Globalization Theory

According to Gurak and Caces,²⁶ during the past decade, some scholars have argued that globalization is challenging the stability and territoriality of the state, as well as its capacity to control its economic and welfare policies.

²⁴ E. Meyers, 'Theories of International Immigration Policy-a Comparative Analysis', *International Migration Review*, Vol. 34, No. 4, (2000) pp. 1245-1282.

²⁵ S. Haggard and B. A. Simmons, 'Theories of International Regimes,' *International Organization*, (1987) pp. 491-517.

²⁶ D.T. Gurak and F. Caces, 'Migration Networks and the Shaping of International Migration Systems', in L.L. Kritz et al, *International Migration systems: A Global Approach*, (Clarendon Press, 1992) pp. 150-76.

Globalization has also been linked to domestic social changes, and this linkage may help the "national identity" approach to explain concurrent immigration policies, at least in the post-1960s period. He argues that globalization and post-industrial changes exert pressure on national cohesion and produce an emphasis on the politics of identity and citizenship. Consequently, such pressures may lead to restrictions on immigration.²⁷


1.7. Theoretical Framework

Push-pull theory of migration is a neoclassical theory that emphasizes tendencies of people to move from densely to sparsely populated areas or from low to high-income areas, or link migrations to fluctuations in the business cycle. Push factors include demographic growth low living standards, lack of economic opportunities and political repression.

Pull factors are demand for labor, availability of land, good economic opportunities and political freedoms. As shown in the diagram, positive and negative signs signify pull and push factors, respectively. Flows take place between two places but there are intervening obstacles to these spatial movements. In the context of labor migration, such push factors are often characterized by the lack of job opportunities in sending areas/countries, and pull factors are opportunities presented in receiving areas/countries.

²⁷ J. W. Moses, *International Migration: Globalization's Last Frontier*, (London: Zed Books, 2006).

FIGURE 1.1: Everett Lee's push-pull theory



Source: Migration Policy Institute

The flow of migrants between two places may not totally develop if intervening opportunities are created between them. The number of migrants is directly proportional to the number of opportunities at a given place and inversely proportional to the number of intervening opportunities. Therefore, the volume of labour migration from one place to another is associated not only with the number of people in the two places, but also with the number of opportunities in each place.

As Lee²⁸ asserts, the movement of people is a result of the degree of connectivity within a given system, no matter what level of spatial interaction is analyzed. Connections and subsequent interactions among centers imply specific complementarities. This relationship between two points (origin and destination) means that the origin is affected by push factors and the destination point is affected by pull factors, according to Lee's theory.

²⁸ Opcit. Lee.

Sjaastad²⁹ emphasizes that the flow of migrants between two places may not totally develop if intervening opportunities are created between them. The number of migrants is directly proportional to the number of opportunities at a given place and inversely proportional to the number of intervening opportunities. Therefore, the volume of migration from one place to another is associated not only with the number of people in the two places, but also with the number of opportunities in each place.

The movement of people is a result of the degree of connectivity within a given system, no matter what level of spatial interaction is analyzed. Connections and subsequent interactions among centers imply specific complementarities.

1.8. Hypotheses

- i. *There is direct relationship between the easing of travel restrictions such as waiver of visa requirements for migrants and the level of migration, with level of significance, $\alpha < 0.05$.*
- ii. *There is inverse relationship between education level of migrants and the probability of migration, with level of significance, $\alpha < 0.05$.*
- iii. *There is direct relationship between the existence of family/friends networks between sending and receiving countries and the level of migration, with level of significance, $\alpha < 0.05$.*

²⁹A.H. Sjaastad, 'The Costs and Returns of Human Migration', *Journal of Political Economy*, (1962) pp. 80-93.

It would be relevant, at this point, to note that the above hypotheses are framed with respect to the specific discussion of Ethiopian migrants in Kenya and beyond and it may or may not apply to other situations or the reverse correlation may be a valid hypothesis.

1.9. Research Methodology

1.9.1. Sources of Data and Methods of Data Collection

Both primary and secondary data sources are used in this study. However, the study relies more on primary data. The Primary data is collected mainly from a random sample of Ethiopian migrant population in Kenya.

Secondary data is collected from published books, academic journals and periodicals, official reports, internet as well as different government and non-government institutions and related sources.

1.9.1.1. Primary Data

1.9.1.1.1. Questionnaire and Interview

The questionnaire used is mainly closed type of questionnaire and depending on the type of question, the different types of levels of measurement (ratio, interval, ordinal or nominal scales) may be used when framing the different categories or types of questions. The questionnaire, among others, consists of questions regarding the demographic, behavioral and attitudinal information (in their respective order) of respondents and was pre-tested to obtain correction feedbacks that are deemed helpful to refine the questionnaire before it was distributed to the final respondents.

The questionnaire is a self-administered/mailed questionnaire. It was distributed to geographically-dispersed anonymous respondents. The anonymity of the respondents makes it advantageous as it helped avoid interview bias.

As a follow-up mechanism, it was handled through contact persons who have a better knowledge of the population and the places where the respondents reside. The contact persons played a significant role in facilitating the distribution and collection of the questionnaire from respondents. However, they did not participate or interfere with the filling process of the questionnaire in order to keep the freedom and anonymity of the respondents.

Where the respondents were willing and in some occasions to express their views face to face, the researcher had the chance to interview some of the respondents. It was a good coincidence that the researcher was working in a diplomatic mission where it is a daily encounter to see and meet Ethiopian victims of smuggling and illegal migration.

Evidently, such an opportunity has increased the degree of response and reliability from the sample population and reduced the risk of non-response and data error. Besides, there was a regular and rigorous follow-up by the researcher by means of telephone, internet and other means in all the places where the questionnaire is expected to be distributed and physical visits were made in those areas which are located in Nairobi and its hinterland to see the progress of the data collection. For those places which are out of Nairobi, the questionnaire was mailed in the form of soft copy (by e-mail) or hard copy (by post or other method).

1.9.1.2. Secondary Data

Secondary data was collected from different libraries including the online/ J-Store and other sources/ and offline libraries of the University of Nairobi, the UN library at UNEP, USIU library, from internet search of the websites of the above-mentioned and other institutions, from periodic government and other reports and related documents, UN special agencies year-books and other publications.

1.9.2. Population, Sample Size, and Sampling Method

The population of the research is Ethiopian economic migrants in Kenya. Dimensional Sampling method, which is an extension of quota sampling within the category of non-probability sampling, is used to decide the sample size from the population. In this method, the researcher takes into account several characteristics e.g. gender, age income, residence/location, education and ensures there is at least one person in the study that represents that population.

This method is preferred because it, to some degree, balances the problem/cost of not applying probability sampling methods where there is more or less similar chance of representation and the draw-backs of some methods of non-probability sampling such as convenience or voluntary sampling where it is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve equal/proportional representation of the population.

Probability sampling method, though it gives a better chance of representation when compared to non-probability sampling, is not preferred due the fact that the population is very

much scattered in a relatively wide area and this situation makes it difficult, time consuming and expensive to apply such method.

1.9.3. Data Analysis

The data collected from primary and secondary sources was sorted out, compiled and analyzed to obtain the outcome of the research. The primary data was analyzed using SPSS software to get the correlation between the different variables applied during collection of data from the sample population. Some secondary data (with clear indication of its source) was analyzed, mostly in a descriptive form, and included in this research paper as an input due to its relevance to the robustness of the research.

1.10. Scope and Limitation of the Research

As mentioned in the subsequent sections, the scope of this paper is confined to the study of only economic migrants of Ethiopian citizens in Kenya during the past fifteen years. Hence, it can be said, this paper is limited to the specific analysis of just one part of Ethiopian migrants in Kenyan and to the brief comparative migration policy analysis of some countries that are affected by Ethiopian migrants or which in turn affect the trend of the migration of Ethiopians to such countries. Given the existence of many Ethiopian migrants in other parts of the region and presence of other category of migrants, there are significant number of migrants that are not covered in this research.

As official government documents show, in addition to (though few in number) the presence of political refugees, there are Ethiopian migrants who came to Kenya before the

1990s. There are also many Ethiopians who are detained in the prisons of other East African countries such as Tanzania and Malawi or who stay temporarily but illegally in these countries in the hope of arriving to their 'final' destinations. However, this paper does not discuss such category of migrants due to logistical and other resource constraint.

In addition to the narrow scope, this research also has limitations in terms of time and quality of data though these constraints are not to the point that they adversely affect the outcome of the research. Given the resources constraint, it may be exaggerating of the fact to say confidently that the sample and the data collection will full and comprehensively cover the migrant population as the population is highly scattered in different parts of the country [Kenya] and this make it difficult to achieve a full and complete representation.

Furthermore, lack of reliable and complete data from official government and other sources especially information regarding the specific area of Ethiopian migrants in Kenya evidently plays a negative role on the quality and robustness of the research outcome. However, it is the firm belief of the researcher that the outcome of this study will be a useful input for those who wish to carry out further thorough and wider research on the specific area.

Moreover, the outcome of this research will, hopefully, play a positive role in assisting policy makers and other stakeholders to make the right decision and take appropriate measures that will address the challenges and also opportunities of international migration.

1.11. Chapter Outline

The research project covers five chapters.

Chapter One: Introduction

This chapter is devoted to the introduction of the research project. This section covers a general background discussion of the area of research, statement of the problem, objective of the study, justification of the research, review of literature and theoretical framework, hypothesis of the research and the research methodology.

Chapter Two: Overview of International Relations between Ethiopia and Kenya

This chapter gives a very brief assessment of the political, economic, social and cultural aspects of Ethiopia and Kenya and the historical and contemporary relations between the two countries with specific reference to international migration.

Chapter Three: Brief Comparative Migration Policy Analysis of the United States, South Africa, Kenya and Ethiopia

This chapter provides a comparative migration policy analysis of Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa and the US in a view to explain the underlying causes, trends and dynamics of the migration of Ethiopians to these countries.

Chapter Four: Analysis of Findings of the Research

In this chapter, the paper analyzes the primary and secondary data collected and processed in line with the assumptions of the research hypotheses and the theoretical framework that is taken as the basis for the research.

Chapter Five: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

This final chapter is devoted to concluding remarks of the research project and to forward some policy and related recommendations and suggestions that can be instituted to address the challenges of international migration.

In chapter two next, the discussion crosses to the brief discussion of international relations between Ethiopia and Kenya. Focusing on the period after the independence of Kenya, the discussion makes an overview of both bilateral and multilateral relations between the two neighboring countries

CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND KENYA

2.1. Introduction

This chapter is devoted to a brief discussion of the relationship between post-independence Kenya and Ethiopia emphasizing mainly on political and diplomatic aspects of the relation. It will also touch up on the economic cooperation between the two countries highlighting on trade relations. The first part of the chapter deals mainly with how the security concern that was apparent specially during the 1960s and 70s in connection with the irredentist policies of their another common neighbor Somalia brought Kenya and Ethiopia closer to refute Somalia's claim on the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya and on the Ogaden region of Ethiopia between 1963 (the year Kenya won its independence from Britain) and 1974 (the year Emperor Haile-Selassie was deposed).

The second section briefly assesses how the internal political turmoil in Ethiopia during the Dergue (military council) regime (between 1974-1991), when Ethiopia was in the Eastern block of the cold war era, affected relationships between the two countries, and why Kenya's foreign policy towards its northern neighbor assumed a cold attitude. In this regard, the part also examines why the relationship between the two countries gradually declined into a state of affairs characterized by some uneasiness during this period.

A modest discussion is made about the trade relationship and the apparent trade imbalance between the two countries and how this has transformed itself into the political dialogue that ultimately governed their relationship. Finally, the chapter explores the relationship between Kenya and Ethiopia from 1991 to 2009. This section highlights on the policies of the current government of Ethiopia, which came to power in 1991. In this regard, an effort is made to reveal the truly earnest desire of the current Ethiopian government to turn Ethiopia away from the political hot seat it was occupying previously and instead march the country into a peaceful and stabilizing force in the region after the fall of the Dergue regime in 1991.

2.2. Highlights of Pre-independence Kenya

The history of Kenya dates back to the Stone age which is estimated to be over two million years ago. Fossils found in East Africa suggest that proto-humans roamed the area more than 20 million years ago. Recent finds near Kenya's Lake Turkana indicate that hominids lived in the area 2.6 million years ago. As part of East Africa, the territory of what is now Kenya has seen human habitation since the beginning of the Lower Paleolithic. Kenya is among few countries in the world that is endowed with the largest and most complete early human development.¹

According to History World², European and Arab presence in Mombasa dates to the Early Modern period, but European exploration of the interior began only in the 19th century.

¹ *Encyclopedia Britannica Online*, s.v. 'Kenya: History,' accessed October 12, 2006, <http://www.britannica.com>

² *History World Online*, s.v. 'History of Kenya,' accessed May 25, 2010, <http://www.historyworld.net>.

The British Empire established the East Africa Protectorate in 1895 and from 1920 known as the Kenya Colony.

The establishment of the Colony of Kenya increased the racial hostilities that were apparent among the colonizer society and the indigenous people in the region. New legislation on land tenure shamelessly favoured the settlers. In many areas Africans were formally dispossessed of their land and were confined in reservations while the 'white highlands' policy restricted the ownership of the best farming land to the Europeans.

Kenyatta campaigns energetically on a range of linked policies, including land rights, access to education, respect for traditional African customs, and the need for African representation in the legislative council during the 1930s. In 1944 the legislative council in Nairobi becomes the first in any east African colony to include an African member - as yet just a single and lonely representative of the ethnic majority. The number doubled to two in 1946, to four in 1948 and to eight in 1951. In the early 1950s these half-hearted steps towards reform were suddenly overtaken by a much more powerful and alarming challenge to the steady pace of British colonial rule. In 1952 a militant independence movement calling itself Mau Mau made its presence and its demands clear. ³

From 1952 to 1959, Kenya was under a state of emergency arising from the "Mau Mau" insurgency against British colonial rule in general and its land policies in particular. This rebellion took place almost exclusively in the highlands of central Kenya. The first

³ World Book Inc., 'History of Kenya', in *The World Book Encyclopedia 2004*, (Chicago: Scott Fetzer Company, 2004) pp.303-305.

direct elections for Africans to the Legislative Council took place in 1957. Kenya became independent on December 12, 1963.⁴

The independent Republic of Kenya was formed in 1964. Jomo Kenyatta, head of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), became Kenya's first President. The minority party, Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), representing a coalition of small ethnic groups that had feared dominance by larger ones, dissolved itself in 1964 and joined KANU.⁵

Founding president and liberation struggle icon Jomo Kenyatta led Kenya from independence in 1963 until his death in 1978. Following Kenyatta's death, Hon. Daniel Arap Moi assumed the Presidency. He ruled Kenya for 25 years until 2002. During Kenyatta and Moi's regimes, the country was ruled as a single-party state by the Kenya African National Union (KANU). MOI acceded to internal and external pressure to restore a multi-party system, which he did by 1991⁶.

Moi won elections in 1992 and 1997, which were overshadowed by political skirmishes on both the challengers and incumbent sides. During the 1990s, evidence of Moi's involvement in human rights abuses and corruption (Goldenberg scandal) was uncovered.⁷ The Opposition won in 2002 election and the current president of the Republic, President Mwai Kibaki, became the first president from the opposition side. He was also elected for

⁴ G. R. Mugo, *Kenya: From Colonization to Independence, 1888-1970*, (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2005) pp. 4-67.

⁵ CIA, 'The CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2008: Kenya,' CIA, (2009).

⁶ J. A. Widner, *The Rise of a Party State in Kenya: From Harambee! to Nayayo!*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) pp. 39-55.

⁷ J. D. Barkan, 'Kenya's Great Rift,' *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, Council on Foreign Relations, Volume 87, Number 1, Washington D.C., (January/February, 2008).

second term in 2007 in a controversial and highly contested election which resulted in the death of over one thousand civilians due to post-election violence.⁸

2.3. Brief Political History of Ethiopia

Ethiopia is believed to be the origin of humanity. It has yielded some of the oldest traces of humanity, making it an important area in the history of human evolution. After the discovery of "Lucy", a 3.2 million year old human skeleton in Afar area of Ethiopia in 1974, the remains of a five-million-year old human ancestor were discovered in the Awash Valley region of Ethiopia. These are assumed to be the oldest remains of present day human ancestors ever found.⁹

Ethiopia is among the first ancient countries that have a history of early civilization. According to tradition, the Ethiopian kingdom was founded in the 10th century B.C. by the Biblical King Solomon's and Queen of Sheba's first son, Menelik I. However, the first kingdom for which there is documentary evidence is that of the Aksumite (Axumite) Kingdom which emerged around the 1st century AD. This makes Ethiopia the oldest independent country in Africa and one of the most ancient nation in the world. Aksum controlled much of the Red Sea coast and had links with the Mediterranean world.¹⁰

The Aksumite Kingdom was among the most powerful kingdoms in the ancient world and one of the four trading powers of the ancient world at that time. After the fall of the

⁸S. Hanson, 'Understanding Kenya's Politics,' *Council on Foreign Relations*, Washington D.C., (2008).

⁹ H. G. Marcus, *A History of Ethiopia: Updated Edition*, (Berkeley: University of California Press Ltd., 2002) pp. 1-31.

¹⁰ R. Greenfield, *Ethiopia: a New Political History*, (London: Praeger Library of African Affairs, London, 1965) pp. 12-35.

Aksumite Kingdom, the Zagwe Dynasty emerged in 1137 AD and ruled Ethiopia until 1270 AD. It was known for constructing the astonishing rock hewn churches in Lalibela, Ethiopia. Then, the Solomonic Dynasty which is the successor of the Zagwe Dynasty ruled the country from 1270 -1770.¹¹

From the 1700s, there was no central power in Ethiopia for roughly 100 years. It was a period of decentralized power and political chaos known as the Zemene Mesafint ("Era of the Princes"). At the middle of the 19th century, the country was again reunited by Kassa Hailu, who later became Emperor Tewodros II, beginning Ethiopia's modern history. He was succeeded by Emperor Yohannes, who built upon the efforts made by Tewodros. Following the death of Emperor Yohannes the IV, Emperor Menelik II reigned from 1889 to 1913. Ethiopia's borders underwent significant territorial expansion to its modern borders especially during the reign of Emperor Menelik II. Ancient Ethiopian monarchy maintained its freedom from colonial expansion and occupation.¹²

During Menelik's reign, Italy posed the greatest threat. Emperor Menelik signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, infamously termed as "The Treaty of Wuchale" with Italy in 1889. A dispute surfaced over the meaning of Article 17 of the Treaty which Italy claimed gives it a protectorate right over Ethiopia but Ethiopia strongly opposed to this claim and consequently annulled the Treaty in totality. Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1895 but was decisively defeated by Menelik's forces at the Battle of Adwa on March 1, 1896. Later, the Treaty of Addis Ababa which was signed between the two countries in October 1896, the Treaty of Wuchale was annulled formal by both countries and Italy recognized the

¹¹Marcus, loc. cit., pp. 45-64.

¹² S.A. Adejumobi, *The History of Ethiopia*, (Cincinnati: Greenwood Press, 2007) pp. 7-16.

independence of Ethiopia.¹³ The victory of Ethiopia remains famous today as the first victory of an African nation over a colonial power. It was indeed a victory to not only the people of Africa but to all black people.

The Italians again, brutally tried to occupy and colonize Ethiopia during the reign of the Fascist Mussolini in the 1930s until they were defeated again by a coalition the British army and Ethiopian Patriot forces. After the death of Emperor Menelik in 1913, Lij Iyassu was crowned as his successor. However, he was deposed by the Christian nobility in 1916 because of his Muslim sympathies and consequently his predecessor's daughter, Zewditu Menelik became the Empress of Ethiopia at the same time. Zewditu died in 1930, after which her cousin, Ras Tafari Makonnen (1892-1975) was appointed regent and successor to the throne and was later crowned as Emperor Haile-selassie.¹⁴

Emperor Haile-Selassie ruled Ethiopia until he was deposed by a military coup; infamously known as the Dergue in 1974. The Dergue established a socialist state which allied itself with Eastern block of communist USSR. Ethiopia has been with the Western block for the previous centuries. Torn by bloody coups, uprisings, wide-scale drought, and massive refugee problems, the Dergue regime was finally toppled in 1991 by a coalition of rebel forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the current ruling party in Ethiopia.¹⁵

¹³ Ibid., pp. 24-37.

¹⁴ B. Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia*, (Oxford: James Currey, 2001) pp. 140-223.

¹⁵ P .B. Henze, *Layers of Time - A History of Ethiopia*, (London: Christopher Hurst & Co., 2007) pp. 229-334, pp. 158-198.

2.4. Overview of Imperial Ethiopia's Relation with Post-independent Kenya (1963-1974)

As noted above, Ethiopia, which managed to maintain its independence by successfully containing the aggression of European colonialism and its vicious legacies that was apparent in almost all African counties, started diplomatic relation with Kenya even before the latter assumed full independence when Ethiopia opened its Honorary Consulate General in 1954 and appointed its first Ambassador to Kenya in 1961. Kenya reciprocated after six years by opening its Embassy in Addis Ababa in 1967.

Almost immediately after Kenya's independence at the end of 1963, Somalia's irredentist ambitions towards the northern part of Kenya and the south-eastern part of Ethiopia as part of its dream of "Greater Somalia" became a point of concern for both countries.

The obsession with the phantom of "Greater Somalia" shaped the character of the Somalia's newly formed institutions and led to the build-up of the Somali military and ultimately to the war with Ethiopia and fighting in the NFD in Kenya. By law the exact size of the National Assembly was not established in order to facilitate the inclusion of representatives of the contested areas after unification. The national flag featured a five-pointed star whose points represented those areas claimed as part of the Somali nation--the former Italian and British territories, the Ogaden, Djibouti, and the NFD.¹⁶

¹⁶ K. Lake, 'Somalia, Ethiopia and the Ogaden War,' *The Cold War Museum*, (2007).

Moreover, the preamble to the Constitution approved in 1961 included the statement, "The Somali Republic promotes by legal and peaceful means, the union of the territories." The constitution also provided that all ethnic Somalis, no matter where they resided, were citizens of the republic. The Somalis did not claim sovereignty over adjacent territories, but rather demanded that Somalis living in them be granted the right to self-determination. Somali leaders asserted that they would be satisfied only when their fellow Somalis outside the republic had the opportunity to decide for themselves¹⁷.

Somali representatives from the NFD demanded that Britain arrange for the NFD's separation before Kenya was granted independence. Somalia presented this demand at the 1961 London talks which convened to discuss the future of Kenya. However, the British believed that the federal format then proposed in the Kenyan Constitution would provide a solution through the degree of autonomy it allowed the predominantly Somali region within the federal system. This solution did not diminish Somali demands for unification, however, and the issue of federalism disappeared after Kenya's government opted for a centralized constitution in 1964.¹⁸

Moreover, Somalia also refused to acknowledge in particular the validity of the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1954 recognizing Ethiopia's claim questioning the relevance of treaties defining Somali-Ethiopian borders. Incidents began to occur in the Haud within six months after Somali independence. Hostilities grew steadily, eventually involving small-scale actions between Somali and Ethiopian armed forces along the border. In February 1964,

¹⁷ B. Agyeman-Duah, 'The Horn of Africa: Conflict, Demilitarization and Reconstruction,' *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol 16, No 2, (1996).

¹⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Ethio-Somalia Bilateral Relations,' (Archive Documents, Addis Ababa, 1995).

armed conflict erupted along the Somali-Ethiopian frontier, and Ethiopian aircraft raided targets in Somalia. Hostilities ended in April through the mediation of Sudan, acting under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).¹⁹

In the mean time, Ethiopia and Kenya concluded a mutual defence pact in 1964 in response to what both countries perceived as a continuing irredentist threat from Somalia. This pact was renewed in 1980 and again on August 1987, calling for the coordination of the armed forces of both states in the event of an attack by Somalia.

On its face value, the Agreement was designed to embrace other fields of cooperation as well. But the fundamental nature of the relationship at that time between the two countries was primarily military in nature. Ethiopia maintained that the "Agreement of Cooperation and Mutual Defence Assistance"-as it was called-was solely a defence accord which would become operative only in the event that the territorial integrity of either Ethiopia or Kenya was threatened by external forces.

Somalia, expectedly, saw things differently. Mogadishu made the direct assumption that the Ethio-Kenyan Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) was solely directed against the national interest and security of the Republic of Somalia. Consequently, it actively sought the intervention of the OAU on this matter though it did not succeed in preventing Ethiopia and Kenya from forging ahead and implementing the Agreement. Most OAU members were alienated by Somali irredentism and feared that if Somalia were successful in detaching the Somali-populated portions of Kenya and Ethiopia, the example might inspire their own restive minorities divided by frontiers imposed during the colonial period. In addition, in

¹⁹ Ibid.

making its irredentist claims, the Somalis had challenged two of Africa's leading elder statesmen, President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Emperor Haile-Selassie of Ethiopia.²⁰

Evidently, to the disappointment of Somalia, the Pact contributed significantly towards the further strengthening of the Ethio-Kenya military alliance. Consequently, the first Ethio-Kenya MDA meeting took place in Neghelli, Ethiopia in February 1964. Matters discussed at such a meeting fell in to two broad categories-communication and exchange of information.

At the meeting, it was agreed that the Imperial Ethiopian secret code would be made available to Kenya and used by both parties and Ndolo in Ethiopia and Mandera in Kenya would be linked by radio. The two Moyales would also be linked by telephone and radio. What is more, there would be military-to-military link between Neghelli and Garissa. The first regular Consultative Committee Meeting (CCM), at Ministerial level, took place between the two countries in Addis Ababa on June 1964. H.E. Ato Ketema Yifru, the then Acting Foreign Affairs Minister of Ethiopia, declared that cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya was not restricted to only defence matters but also to other areas of general interest between the two countries. However, the Minister underlined the most important issue at hand was that Ethiopia and Kenya maintain a common stand against the expansionist policy of Somalia²¹.

²⁰ African Affairs General Directorate, 'Assessment of Ethio-Somalia Relations,' (Archive Documents, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Addis Ababa, 1994).

²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Ethio-Kenyan Consultative Committee Meeting: Addis Ababa,' (No.1, Archive Documents, Imperial Government of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, June 1965).

The second meeting of the Consultative Committee (CC) was convened in September 1965. The meeting entailed joint operations, signal communication, setting up a police post in Sololo town and disarming border tribesmen. Moreover, taking up non-military issues for the first time, the meeting addressed the possible construction of a ferry along the Omo River, landing rights at Jinka, the use of the Nairobi-Addis Ababa highway by tourists, the possibility of having a border market and other related issues²².

However, the highlight of the meeting was still the issue of security and defence cooperation between the two countries. Issues of concrete economic cooperation received only lip-service.

During the third CCM, which convened in Nairobi in April 1967, economic cooperation matters were not given the deserved attention. However, the issue of the Nile River was given more emphasis during the meeting. The Ethiopian delegation informed its Kenyan counterpart that Ethiopia had the intention to build a 70 million USD dam over the Blue Nile and to utilize the waters of the Wabi Shebelle River for irrigation.²³

At the fourth CCM which took place in June 1967, a perceptible pattern of close cooperation was manifested when the Kenyan delegation led by the then Defence Minister Mungai briefed the Ethiopian side on the development of the East African Community (EAC) and expressed Kenya's wish for Ethiopia to join EAC. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda founded the tripartite Commission for East African Co-operation in 1967 as the EAC. Ethiopia was also very eager to join the new block.

²² Ibid., No. 2, Addis Ababa, September 1965.

²³ Ibid., No. 3, Nairobi, April 1967.

Kenya, again, vigorously expressed its wish to see Ethiopia join the group. However, the issue of joining of EAC did not evoke much of an intensive discussion on either side during the fifth CCM that was convened in February 1968. The two delegations merely agreed that the Ministers of Commerce and Industry of both countries meet and conduct further discussions on the matter.²⁴

There were signs of some progress during the fifth meeting on the equitable use of the Nile waters. Ethiopia suggested that the two delegations agree that the source countries should be involved in a joint Nile Policy that would respect the rights and interests of each riparian country and that the development of the Nile Basin should be integrated in order to harness the potentials of the river for maximum and effective utilization.

It is possible to presume from the above point that Ethiopia's stand on the issue of Nile was beginning to get the attention it rightfully deserved. Even more importantly, Ethiopia was according due recognition to the fact that enlisting the support of Kenya and other countries was, indeed, a prudent way of advancing its vital national interests. No significant development took place during the sixth CCM which was held in August 1968. The meeting was, nevertheless, dominated by the Somali issue. Issues regarding the Nile waters and membership of the EAC were glossed over.

Ethiopia formally presented its application to join the EAC at the seventh CCM which convened in December 1968. In addition to this important issue, matters pertaining to other

²⁴ Ibid., No. 5, Nairobi, February 1968.

economic cooperation areas including railway link between the two countries, locust control and other issues were discussed. By the time the eighth and ninth meetings took place in November 1969 and May 1970 respectively, Kenya and other members of EAC were still considering Ethiopia's application for membership.²⁵

In retrospect, joining the EAC was not really a very appealing and viable option for Ethiopia or conversely to the other member countries given the economic, political ideology, social, cultural, linguistic and related differences between Ethiopia and the other three members of the EAC. While working out the fundamentals of establishing a common market would have been a positive step for all concerned, the most important road-map for such a grand scheme should have been to integrate national markets stage-by-stage. The fact that the EAC that was established by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda did not last and disintegrated in 1977 gives further credence to the above view.

The ninth CCM meeting of November 1969 addressed with renewed vigor the Somalia factor and how the new government in Somalia led by General Siad Barre, who came to power through military coup in 1969, was going to handle relations with Ethiopia and Kenya. News coming out of Somalia immediately after the coup was not encouraging, particularly on the question of liberation movements. However, the new government in Somalia deceitfully tried to refute the fears of its neighbors. The fact that the new government in Somalia appointed the former pro-irredentist Ambassador to Addis Ababa as Foreign Minister, thereby resurrecting the existing fears of its neighbors, fortified the concern of

²⁵ Ibid., No. 9, Addis Ababa, May 1970.

Kenya and Ethiopia towards their common neighbor, Somalia. The official was reputed to be a hawk on the cause of 'Greater Somalia'.²⁶

Both Kenya and Ethiopia had reported then that their relation with Somalia until the coup d'état of 1969 was showing signs of improvement. The Kenyans went so far as saying that, in fact, the Rural Development Minister of Somalia and some Kenyan parliamentarians were exchanging visits –with the later attending the Ninth Anniversary of Somalia's independence during which they were warmly greeted. Immediately after the coup, Mogadishu radio was talking of congratulatory messages being received from 'liberation movements' in the NFD, the Ethiopian Ogaden region and Djibouti. But later, the new Somali government officially regretted such reports, possibly in a view to calm down the suspicion of its neighbours. The ninth Consultative Meeting adjourned its session by indicating that Kenya and Ethiopia should give the new government in Somalia the benefit of the doubt.²⁷

The relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya in one hand and Somalia on the other remained unchanged for the ensuing few years. Nonetheless, Ethiopia and Kenya continued to harbor suspicions of their common neighbor. However, Emperor Haile-Selassie's visit to China in 1972 underscored the degree of suspicion that was still prevalent. The Emperor expressed to his Chinese hosts that Somalia's territorial claims on both Kenya and Ethiopia contradicted the fundamental interests of Africa. The Ethiopian government repeatedly warned Soviet leaders also that lending support to Somalia's claim can only exacerbate the situation.

²⁶ Ibid., No. 8, Addis Ababa, November 1969.

²⁷ Ibid.

However, military build up in Somalia continued in spite of the warning given to the soviets by Ethiopia. For Kenya and Ethiopia, it was time to forge even closer relations as Somalia's military build up mean meant only one thing-war. In January 1973, the then Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, Dr. Minassie Lemma, opened the tenth meeting by disclosing Ethiopia's attempt to encourage cooperation with Somalia. However, Somalia rejected all Ethiopia's gestures of goodwill. Kenya's approach towards Somalia fared no better. The Kenyan government was alarmed at the rate at which Somalia was arming itself, and to add insult to injury, former shiftas were also being trained in Somalia in the open.²⁸

To summarize, the main driving force for the relatively stronger relation between Kenya and Ethiopia between 1963 and 1974 was the mutual security and territorial sovereignty concern of both countries that emerged due to the irredentist policy of their common neighbor, Somalia and the resulting the 'Agreement of Cooperation and Mutual Defence Assistance' that was signed and implemented to contain this concern.

To a lesser degree, there were also other issues that had contributed a great deal towards tightening bilateral relations between the two countries. But in retrospect, these were only supplementary to the main strategy mentioned earlier. For example, the projected construction of the Nairobi-Addis Ababa highway and the prospect of integrating the Ethiopian economy with that of the EAC was one of them.

The highway, once completed, was expected to enhance trade and tourism in both countries. Kenya still has not completed its part of the linking highway. The issue of joining

²⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The Ethio-Somalia War', (Archive Documents, Addis Ababa, 1989).

the common market was really never an option for Ethiopia, because the idea itself was apparently created in rush and was doomed to failure at its very inception. Ethiopia never did become a member of EAC and, in 1977, the EAC was disintegrated. However, it is worth to mention at this point that the EAC was later re-established by the three original founding members and at the moment it has expanded to include Rwanda and Burundi as full members. Ethiopia is yet to join this sub-regional integration block.

2.5. Relations between Socialist Ethiopia and Kenya (1974-1991)

Emperor Haile-selassie, who ruled Ethiopia closer to half a century, was dethroned in a military coup in 1974. The infamous Dergue regime which ruled the country with iron fist for 17 years not only removed from power the last Feudal Monarchy in the modern political history of Ethiopia but also changed the political course of the country from the US-led Western Capitalist block to the Eastern Socialist system forging a strategic alliance with Communist Soviet Union. This radical change in the political course of the country was also followed by one of the cold-war hot conflicts of the Ethio-Somali war in the 1970s.²⁹

After the overthrow of the Imperial regime by the infamous Dergue military coup in 1974, the new military leaders formed the Ethiopian Provisional Military Administration Council (EPMAC) to govern the country 'temporarily'. A new Constitution was adopted, and the country was renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1987. Following the adoption of the new Constitution, a 'civilian' government (where Mengistu Haile-Mariam

²⁹ Adejumobi, op.cit., pp. 124-129.

who was the leader of the PMAC and the country and other surviving members of the Dergue were retired from the military to serve as civilians) was established afterwards.

The first CCM with the new government took place between the Socialist government of Ethiopia and Western block-oriented Kenya in April 1975. At the meeting, H.E. Ato Kifle Wodajo, the then Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, went to some length to assure the Kenyan delegation in Nairobi that the relationship between the two countries remained the same, notwithstanding the revolution and the resulting political ideology change in Ethiopia.³⁰

During this meeting, matters of mutual interest with particular emphasis on joint development ventures in the areas of water development, wildlife resources and the control of animal diseases along the common border were discussed thoroughly. The Ethiopian government especially emphasized on the issue of wildlife resources. The government of Ethiopia presented its request to Kenyan to explore the possibility of using wildlife facilities in Kenya for training Ethiopians in the management and conservation of wildlife. Other issues of economic cooperation were raised during the meeting.

However, as mentioned above the relation between the two countries was mainly focused on security and military cooperation issues and economic matters of were secondary. Nonetheless, Ethiopia was able to strongly express its concern on the issue of lack of viable economic cooperation between the two countries during the second meeting which convened in July 1976. Ato Demeke Zewdie, the then Minister Trade of Ethiopia, went to some length

³⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *loc.cit.*, CCM, No. 10, Nairobi, April 1975.

to illustrate the extreme lopsidedness of the trade statistics between the two countries by revealing some interesting statistics.³¹

The picture with regard to international trade between the two countries during the 1970s was not that much encouraging. According to the trading data from the Ministry of External Trade of Ethiopia, Ethiopia's export to Kenya during the period from 1970 to 1975 was very small. The average export per year was worth less than half a million USD during this period and it was around USD eight hundred thousand in 1975-the highest for the period under consideration. But, the magnitude of export stood only at around 275 thousand USD in 1975. Commodities exported to Kenya during this time were limited and included hides and skins, live animals and fresh vegetables. In contrast, exports from Kenya were quite high. On average, during the six years (1969-1975), Kenya's average export per year was over 2.4 million USD. Commodities imported from Kenya to Ethiopia also tended to be more diversified.³²

Though the total magnitude of trade between the two countries was very negligible, the above figures clearly show how the trade imbalance between the two countries was widening and how Kenya used its comparative advantage of diversified commodities to its advantage.

No meeting took place between the two countries during the period August 1976-1980, presumably due to the tense internal situation and political chaos in Ethiopian. What is more, Ethiopia was pre-occupied with defence matters related to Somalia which by 1977, had

³¹ Ibid., No. 11, Nairobi, July 1976.

³² Ministry of External Trade, 'Overview of Ethio-Kenya Bilateral Trade,' Addis Ababa, (1976).

reached its military peak and was advancing rapidly into Ogaden. The American disengagement from Ethiopia in the mid-70's, and the pursuant refusal of the Americans to deliver the paid-for jet fighters which in turn prolonged the outcome of the war between Ethiopia and Somalia, was also one of the factors contributed to the side-tracking of attention to Ethio-Kenyan relations.³³

In March 1980, the two countries met in Mombasa, but the meeting had more hot air than real substance. The pressure imposed on Ethiopian government both internally and externally was beginning to assume a formidable shape.³⁴ Some informal meetings of that kind took place intermittently until the fourth regular CCM in March 1987. Nothing important was discussed at this meeting except for the growing concern of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) on refugee-related issues. The Ethiopian side reported that there were refugees and dissidents in Kenya who were engaged in illegal and subversive activities, which the Kenyan side agreed to look into.

The lack of interest of the Ethiopian government in bilateral relationship with Kenya was indicative of the inordinate preoccupation of the Ethiopian military officers with the simmering rebellion in the north of the country-in Eritrea and Tigray in particular. Practically, every other outstanding issue was put in the back seat.

In the mean time, the Ethiopian Ministry of Trade was churning out some sobering statistics regarding the trade imbalance between the two countries in the 1980s and early 90s.

³³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The Effect of Somalia War on Ethio-Kenya Bilateral Relations,' Archive Documents, (Addis Ababa, 1980).

³⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, loc.cit., CCM, No. 12, Mombasa, March 1980.

The Ministry pointed to the deteriorating trade relationship between Kenya and Ethiopia as shown in table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1: Summary of trade between Kenya and Ethiopia from 1980-1990 (in millions of USD*)

Year	Export	Import	Total Trade	Balance of
1980	**0.61	7.53	8.14	-6.92
1981	0.96	5.88	6.84	-4.92
1982	0.20	5.23	5.43	-5.03
1983	0.84	4.71	5.54	-3.87
1984	0.74	4.54	5.28	-3.80
1985	0.27	3.91	4.19	-3.64
1986	0.49	6.99	7.48	-6.50
1987	0.74	11.48	12.22	-10.74
1988	0.52	9.05	9.57	-8.53
1989	0.72	22.44	23.16	-21.72
1990	0.91	18.31	19.22	-17.40
Total	7.00	100.07	107.07	-93.07

Source: Ethiopian Customs Authority, Annual Customs Statistics, December 1990.

*The prevalent official rate of exchange during the respective years indicated in the table is applied to convert Ethiopian Birr (the official local currency) to USD.

**Figures are rounded to the nearest tenth.

As it can be inferred from the above table, looking at the magnitude of trade for each year and the total of over a decade, the volume of trade is so minimal that it is difficult to put it as the outcome of international trade between two countries. The cumulative trade activity between the two countries was on a downward spiral especially during the period 1980-1985.

Furthermore, the trade imbalance was in favor of Kenya though the magnitude of trade imbalance was somewhat steadily but minimally decreasing during this period. But after the mid-1980s, Ethiopia's import from Kenya has increased significantly compared to the first half of the decade though the export for the same period was almost stagnant. Consequently, the trade gap has also increased dramatically during this period.

This trend might be due to the fact that Kenya had many privately-owned efficient companies which are permitted by law to import from any country unlike Ethiopia where such activities were restricted and most of the trading companies were inefficient government owned enterprises. Besides, Ethiopia does not have the competitive edge and the sophisticated marketing strategy necessary to lure away Kenyan consumers from buying Western goods. Evidently, the devastating drought that hit Ethiopia in 1984 had resulted in a serious negative on the economy of the country thereby affecting its international trade.

The Ethiopian government tried to identify and properly address the problem of low-level of trade and highly-skewed trade imbalance between the two countries. However, the government lacked the political will to address those issues seriously, much less find solution for them. As mentioned above, due to the Socialist ideology that Ethiopia was following during the time, most companies were government-owned and inefficient as result of lack of proper management and real sense of ownership.

Meanwhile, the two countries decided to renew the "Mutual Defence Agreement" in July 1988. The renewal of the Agreement took place outside of the usual auspices of the annual Consultative Meetings. The implication of the hasty consent by the Kenyan side for the renewal of the Agreement, as it can be reasonably be presumed, was the apparent concern of Kenya over Somalia's claim of the NFD.

From the Ethiopian vantage point, even though agreements were signed between Ethiopia and Somalia to maintain amicable relation, Somalia had demonstrated its unswerving allegiance to the concept of 'Greater Somalia' and it was not willing to cancel

out this conceptual clause from the Constitution of Somalia even after tensions were 'defused' and relations were 'normalized' between the two countries.

Thus, the renewal of the Defence Cooperation Agreement with Kenya would evidently induce Somalia to subscribe to the fundamental principles of other agreements between the two countries. It would also serve as a deterrence force or can be applied as a coercive factor to squash Somalia's never-dying irredentism intensions and dream of 'Greater Somalia'. Renewing the Agreement with Kenya would also curb the activities of shiftas (bandits) directed at using the NFD in Kenya as a springboard for guerilla warfare against Ethiopia. Ethiopia could also use the Agreement as a basis for exchanging vital military and security information with Kenya.

The fifth CCM took place in Nairobi in December 1988. This was also the last meeting the Socialist government held with Kenya. The Ethiopian Foreign Ministry had raised many points discussed at previous CCMs. More importantly, border security issues and the activities of subversive elements based in Kenya to 'destabilize' Ethiopia were dealt up on thoroughly during the meeting. However, the response from the Kenyan side especially on the issue of subversive activities was not as positive and swift as expected.³⁵

Highlighting the degree to which the PMAC was frustrated with the apparent Kenyan cold reaction to the afore-mentioned Ethiopian demands, the Foreign Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry underlined that although it had been a positive outcome that the Socialist government in Ethiopia was able to revive the discontinued CCM with Kenya, the

³⁵ Ibid., No. 14, Nairobi, December 1988.

fact that almost none of the points raised during the past meetings have been implemented on the ground was a discouraging signal and frustrating reality that needs be addressed properly if relations between the two countries are to bear concrete and sustainable results.

Presumably, the overall Foreign Policy attitude of Kenya towards the Dergue administration suggested a state of uneasiness due to the fact that Ethiopia was precipitately moving towards the Communist block from 1974 onwards, which in turn pushed Kenya to the West both militarily and politically. Besides, the resounding victory of Ethiopia over Somalia in 1977/1978 contributed to Ethiopia's diminishing relevance for Kenya, as after the war, Somalia's military threat against Kenya was reduced considerably.

2.6. Relations between the EPRDF Government of Ethiopia and Kenya (1991-2009)

The military government that ruled Ethiopia with iron fist for 17 years was finally deposed from power in May 1991 by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) after 16 years (1975-1991) of armed struggle. From June to August 1991, the EPRDF continued to administer the country forming caretaker government called the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) which would continue to govern the country until the May 1995 national election.³⁶

The newly-established government made public its desire to base its relations with neighboring countries on the pursuit of peace, equality, friendship and common interest. The TGE also made it clear that its top priority, as far as its foreign policy is concerned, was to

³⁶ US Department of State, 'Background Note: Ethiopia', accessed April 23, 2010, <http://www.state.gov>.

consolidate friendship with neighboring countries. The new government also stated to its officials that it would not be content with the regular run-of-the-mill way of doing things. It envisaged a concrete, realistic and result-oriented approach on bilateral agreements with Ethiopia's neighbors.³⁷

Subsequently, the government initiated a number of meetings with neighboring governments including Kenya. One such meeting took place in Addis Ababa in November 1991 between Kenya and Ethiopia, in which The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed replacing the previous Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed in January 1979. This was a promising beginning for both countries.³⁸

The Foreign Affairs Ministry of Ethiopia requested from other stakeholder ministries reports about where the country stands with Kenya. Obviously, the Ministry of Foreign Trade had the most to report specially on economic cooperation and related bilateral issues and relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. By all accounts, the Ministry did not give the relationship a clean bill of health. In its report, the Ministry underscored that the poor performance on bilateral trade and other areas of economic cooperation between the two countries was still not showing improvement and hence the new government needs to assess the relation with Kenya with serious attention and the deserved emphasis.

The ministry also emphasized that although, on the face of it, border trade between the two countries looked to be all right, but in truth, much work needed to be done

³⁷ Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, *Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy*, (Addis Ababa: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002).

³⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, loc.cit., CCM, No. 15, Nairobi, November 1991.

especially the control of illegal trade. It also stressed that Kenyan heavy duty transport vehicles, which regularly unloaded their goods in Moyale, were pushing the idea to deliver all the way to Addis Ababa. The Kenyan government had on various occasions requested the Ethiopian government to agree to that proposal. But that, until then, Ethiopia did not accede to the demand.³⁹

As shown in table 2.1 above, the overall picture on the performance of bilateral trade during the Dergue regime and its predecessor was obviously below expectation and the trade gap from Ethiopian side was steadily widening in favor of Kenya. Other issues of economic cooperation between the two countries were not also encouraging. There was also widespread illegal trade especially in boarder areas of the two countries. The security situation among communities sharing border areas of the two neighbors was also deteriorating. Even most bilateral economic cooperation and other agreements signed between the two countries had not been implemented, adding to the frustration of both parties.

In light of such grim but realistic facts, the Ministry of Trade noted that the Ethiopian government needed to urge Kenya to work with Ethiopia to stop the illegal trade in cattle, coffee and gold along the common border. There was also a common stand from the Ethiopian side that Kenyan should halt its heavy-duty transport vehicles entering Ethiopia's territory and delivering their goods within Ethiopia without having the proper license to do so or agreement between the two countries.⁴⁰

³⁹ Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State, 'Ethio-Kenya Border Commission Meeting Documents', (Archive Document, Awasa, 2010).

⁴⁰ Ministry of Trade, 'Notes on Bilateral Trade between Kenya and Ethiopia,' (Archive Documents, Addis Ababa, 1992).

Kenya was also blamed for not fulfilling her part of the bilateral agreement to build an asphalt road from Nairobi to Moyale. The road from Addis Ababa to Moyale had been completed. Ethiopia had, therefore, to apply the necessary pressure on Kenya to complete its own part of the projected highway. Obviously, the delay in the completion of the linking road had impeded the facilitation of trading and other economic cooperation activities between the two countries.

On the issue of security, curiously enough, the new government of Ethiopia found itself in the same position as its predecessor on the issue of subversive activities going on inside Kenya against the TGE. The complexity of this issue posed great difficulties for both governments. This time the persons in questions connected with subversion were ex-Dergue officers and their sympathizers, who were apparently using Kenyan territory as a springboard to work out their activities.⁴¹

Ostensibly though, Kenya, at least at the beginning, was viewing Ethiopia's brand of federalism as being unsustainable and simultaneously contagious. This may explain partly why Kenya was somewhat apprehensive about Ethiopia's system of government, especially of how this may affect the peoples of the NFD in Kenya.

Meanwhile, the energy and dedication shown by the Ethiopian government in preparation for the first CCM with the EPRDF government meeting could not be reciprocated. Although presidents Meles of Ethiopia and Moi of Kenya had agreed to hold the meeting at the end of April 1992, that was cancelled by Kenya on 28th April 1992 for reasons of prior commitments. The Ethiopian government then suggested to its Kenyan counterpart that the

⁴¹ Ministry of Interior, 'Notes on Ethio-Kenya Security Issues,' (Archive Documents, Addis Ababa, 1992).

CCM should be convened in November 1992; but again the later declined the offer stating that due to the multi-party elections that were to be held in that year, it would not be possible to hold the meeting.⁴²

Table 2.2 shows the summary of bilateral trade performance between the two countries during the current EPRDF government in Ethiopia. Yet again, the fact that the total trade between the two countries for over a decade is less than half a billion USD shows the extremely low-level of bilateral trade performance. The trade imbalance that was apparent during the previous governments has also not changed and, in fact, it has widened as the import from Kenya has relatively increased compared to the previous decades. Mostly, thanks to the sound economic policy that the new government had put in place, there was a very encouraging performance of the import component in 1997 as the figure has risen to 16.9 million USD. This was really a very impressive outcome given the below one-digit annual performance during the previous years.

However, the impressive beginning vanished suddenly from 1998 and during the first decade of the new millennium as the annual import performance was mostly either below one million USD or within a single digit. The sudden and dramatic decline can be attributed mainly to the negative impact of the Ethio-Eritrean war which started in 1998 and the subsequent border conflict that is not yet solved.

Besides, the effect of the on and off elnino-related and man-made drought that hit Ethiopia during this period has also adversely affected the economic performance of specially the agricultural sector which is the back-bone of the county's economy. Evidently, this had a

⁴² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Ethio-Kenya Bilateral Relations,' loc.cit. 2010.

negative impact on the international trade performance of the country including the bilateral trade with Kenya.

To conclude, it would not be far from the fact to summarize the relationship between Kenya and Ethiopia during the past half century as one which was characterized by a mix of cordial and strong relations as well as uneasy state of affairs. During the Imperial regime,

Table 2.2: Summary of trade between Ethiopia and Kenya from 1997-2009
(in millions of USD*)

Year	Export	Import	Total Trade	Trade Balance
1997	16.95	21.62	38.57	-4.67
1998	4.13	17.45	21.58	-13.32
1999	0.36	15.47	15.83	-15.11
2000	1.95	20.51	22.46	-18.56
2001	0.65	13.80	14.45	-13.15
2002	0.02	14.30	14.32	-14.28
2003	0.82	23.00	23.82	-22.18
2004	0.53	21.71	22.24	-21.18
2005	2.97	24.02	26.99	-21.05
2006	2.93	40.77	43.70	-37.84
2007	4.51	35.00	39.51	-30.49
2008	3.73	29.64	33.37	-25.91
2009	3.79	30.63	34.42	-26.84
Total	43.34	307.92	351.26	-264.58

Source: Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority, Addis Ababa, 2009.

*The prevalent official rate of exchange during the respective years indicated in the table is applied to convert Ethiopian Birr (the official local currency) to USD.

**Figures are rounded to the nearest tenth.

Kenya and Ethiopia enjoyed close and cordial relationships. Among other factors, this strong relationship is mainly attributed to the common concern of both countries on Somali irredentism and the resulting shared interest to contain their mutual enemy.

However, the relation between the two countries during the Dergue military era can be expressed as uneasy state of affairs, to the list. This could be attributed to the obvious facts that the Dergue was allied to the Soviet Communist Bloc and this caused Kenya, which was partner to the Western Capitalist block, to distance itself from Ethiopia as a result of the ideological and political differences. Moreover, from the Kenyan side, the relevance of Ethiopia as an indispensable partner began to diminish because the latter decisively won the war against Somalia (1977/78), thereby, removing the prevalent threat Somalia posed on Kenya.

With regard to the nature and direction of relations between Kenya and Ethiopia during the current regime, it will no be wrong to argue that, with a radical departure from its somewhat hegemonic predecessor, the current government in Ethiopia has unequivocally turned over a new leaf in the way relations with its neighbor, Kenya are viewed. The basis of Ethiopia's Foreign Policy has been advancing bilateral and multilateral relations with its neighbors including Kenya and other partners the based on mutual respect and interest. Ultimately, this boils down to ascertaining national security and preservation of sovereignty.

Within the above Foreign Policy domain, the EPRDF government has been very keen to promote political, economic, social and cultural cooperation with Kenya though there has been some reservation, at least during the 1990s, on Kenya's response to reciprocate its neighbor's high expectation and gestures to strengthen relations. However, relations between the two countries are improving significantly during the past decades as areas of cooperation in security, economic and other issues of common concern have been increasing from time to time.

As to present and future relations and prospects between the two countries, Ethiopia and Kenya share strong people to people and bilateral relations since the independence of Kenya. The two countries have a common understanding on such issues as cross-border terrorism, piracy, regional Both countries have consistently demonstrated their common interests at various bilateral and multilateral forums like IGAD, the AU, the UN and others institutions.

Kenya and Ethiopia have worked together to bring lasting peace in Somalia and showed their commitment by organizing several Somali national reconciliation meetings under the auspices of IGAD and other sub-regional and regional forums. Ethiopia is playing a leading role in this organization and attaches much importance to its stability to at least prevent the deterioration/proliferation of some of the conflicts in the sub-region. Kenya's activities in this area are equally promising, but its attention is divided with related activities to countries east and south of Kenya.

Ethiopia has also been exploring the possibility of using Mombasa as a port, and is taking a keen interest in the discussions about the creation of a new port at Lamu and the possibilities of rail links with other areas. One major new project has been the development of the Omo River valley which some 'conservationists' in Kenya and beyond say will have negative impact on Lake Turkana. However, the Ethiopian government asserts that the dams will benefit both countries as a significant amount of the electricity being generated on the dams in the Omo Valley will go to Kenya. It is also believed to help regulate the flow of water to Lake Turkana thereby saving the community living in the area from unexpected flood and damage.

As a closing remark, current cooperation between the two countries ranges from political to economic and cultural matters. Hence, both nations should enhance contact among the various structures through improved, reliable, timely, and credible information sharing. Trade and other Economic cooperation activities, border security and people to people relations should be supplemented by firm and sustained political support. They should also strengthen joint cross border peace structures as well as regional peace and security with a view to improving coordination and response to issues of border conflict among communities dwelling in border areas of the two countries in particular and the region as a whole.

In the subsequent chapter, the discussion travels through a brief comparative policy analysis of four countries which are directly or indirectly affected by Ethiopian migrants and vice versa. Taking Ethiopia as sending country and Kenya, South Africa and the United States as either transit or destination countries, the chapter goes over current and historical migration legislations of the four countries.

CHAPTER THREE

BRIEF COMPARATIVE MIGRATION POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH AFRICA, KENYA AND ETHIOPIA

3.1. Introduction

Globally speaking, migration today has risen to an unprecedented level. The root causes of migration are multitude since a complex web of factors underlie the process. As noted in the previous and subsequent sections, the Push-Pull Theory of Migration provides insight into the various factors that cause international migration. Poor socio-economic conditions, low wages, high levels of unemployment, poverty and lack of opportunities are the main economic factors that fuel emigration in the African continent particularly in the Horn and East Africa region.

These factors are usually brought about by a mismatch between the rapid population growth and the available resources, limited capacity of the economy to create employment at the origin. Additionally, various political and social factors create fertile grounds for migration.

As push factors, poor governance, corruption and impunity, political instability, internal and cross border conflicts and civil strife are among the major causes of international migration. Usually perceived and sometimes real opportunities for a better life, greater security, better quality of education and healthcare in receiving countries influence decision to migrate as pull factors. Lower costs of migration, improved communication, greater

information presence of and the need to join relatives, families and friends are among the factors which compound with push-pull factors.¹

Today, the movement of people-voluntary or forced, legal or undocumented, within or beyond borders constitutes a complex process. Consequently, it is presenting some of the most intricate challenges for governments to formulate migration policies and to address migration-related problems. Given the increasing trend of migration and the resulting rise in the number of migrants as well as challenges of human smuggling, issues of international migration have become serious concern for States. Moreover, in the process of family re-union in destination countries, the existence of high number of illegal migrants in a countries like USA and South Africa and their offsprings in these countries in one hand and other family members at home countries on the other is creating heated debate and challenges during formulation of migration policies.²

Obviously, well-managed migration has the potential to yield significant benefits to both sending and receiving countries. Evidently, labor migration has played an important role in filling the gap in labor markets in receiving countries like the US and Western European countries in agricultural, construction and other sectors.³

On the flip-side of the coin, the benefits of migration to sending counties in terms of generating badly-needed foreign currency in the form of remittances, knowledge and skill

¹ J. V.Hook & M. Fix, 'The Demographic Impact of Repealing Birthright Citizenship,' *The Pennsylvania State University*, (2010).

² K. Bales, *Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy*, (Los Angeles: the University of California Press, 2000) P. 18-24.

³ M. Reisler, *By the Sweat of Their Brow: Mexican Immigrant Labour in the United States , 1900-1940*, (Cincinnati: Westport, Greenwood Press, 1976) PP. 29-43.

transfer and return migration have in some cases made major contributions to economies of origin countries.⁴ Recognizing the current positive effect of migration most developing countries including Ethiopia and Kenya have started to incorporate Diaspora engagement in their development policies.

However, mismanaged or unmanaged migration can have serious negative consequences for both sending and receiving countries and migrants as well. Mismanaged migration can also lead to tensions between host communities and migrants, and give rise to xenophobia, discrimination and other challenges to the migrant population. The case of South Africa is a good example.⁵

Combating illegal migration and establishing comprehensive migration management systems including formulation of migration policy can contribute to enhancing national and international security and stability.⁶ Thus, efficient migration policy framework is a core element of migration management and requires a comprehensive approach to facilitate legal international migration. It also fosters interventions targeting the control of human smuggling and illegal migration.

Currently, both developing sending countries and developed receiving countries are according recognition to the challenges of illegal migration and human smuggling. On the

⁴ K. Kuschminder & M. Hercog, 'The Power of the Strong State: a Comparative Analysis of the Diaspora Engagement Strategies of India and Ethiopia,' *Maastricht University, Graduate School of Governance*, Maastricht, (2011).

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ T. R. Jimez. 'Immigrants in the United States: How Well are They Integrating into Society?', *Migration Policy Institute*, (2011).

other hand, they are also devising mechanisms on how to properly utilize the opportunities of international legal flow of migrant labour.

Consequently, issues of international migration are taking center stage in the legislative agenda of these countries and migration interventions are being made in terms of migration policy formulation and implementation at national level in addition to the regional and international migration policy-related initiatives and interventions. Below is a brief comparative analysis of some countries' migration legislations.

3.2. United States and South Africa

Conventionally, nations respond to international migration from the perspective of their national interest; particularly they adopt migration policies that favor the best interest of domestic labour and economic markets. In this regard, the current migration legislation trends both in the US and South Africa show similar pro-restrictive and inward-looking migration policies.

The migration legislations of most destination countries are not conducive to receive large numbers of migrants, unless they enter through already existing admission categories. Typically, destination countries admit persons to fill labor markets gaps or to reunify with family members. Employment-based admissions are usually based upon the labour market needs of the receiving country. The United States and South Africa have some similarities in this regard.

The history of formal migration policy legislations in the US and South Africa goes back prior to 1900s. Before WWII, during which laissez fair policies were adopted, international migration was limited in both countries. Generally, from the 1900s onwards, migration policies of both countries were discriminatory and were based on nationality selection and origin based preference.

In 1901, the US Immigration Restriction Act established the White Australian Policy which was aimed at promoting migration of white Australians. Actually, it was only officially terminated in 1973. In 1902, the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) was introduced and a permanent ban enacted. This marks the first time the United States restricted immigration on the basis of race or nationality. Others include the Immigrant Act of 1924 that was introduced to exclude Japanese migrants, Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934) that was enacted to exclude Filipino migrants.⁷

The same condition also can be seen in the international migration legislations of Apartheid South of Africa. The main aim of the first nation-wide immigration legislation passed in South Africa, the Immigrants Restriction Act of 1913, was to exclude Indian immigrants. The 1950 Population Registration Act (on racial classification), the 1962 Commonwealth Relations Act (that ended uncontrolled trans-border movements in Southern Africa) and the 1955 Departure from the Union Regulation Act (requiring an authorization to depart from South African territory) were generally anti-immigrant and protectionist migration policies. All had discriminatory intent.⁸

⁷ M. R. Rosenblun & K. Brick, 'US Immigration Policy and Mexican/ Central American Migration Flows: Then and Now,' *Migration Policy Institute*, Washington D.C. (2011) p. 7.

⁸ M A B Siddique, 'South African Migration Policy: a Critical Review,' *the University of Western Australia Business School*, (2004).

In the US, a migration promotion initiative program termed as ‘The Bracero Program’ was introduced during the early periods of the past century. The main objective of the program was to fill the gap in labor market in the US by signing agreement with the government of neighboring Mexico and importing cheap labor into the US labor market. This program was also origin-based and somewhat discriminatory.⁹

However, the expiry of the program in 1964 brought major reforms in the migration policy of the US. Following the expiration of the program, US Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) was introduced in 1965. This act established the basic outline of US immigration law that remain in place today. This law was meant to modernize US immigration by eliminating the 1924 race-based national origin system.

It has also created a seven-tier preference system for rationing visas for countries. In the Immigrant Act of 1965, the seven-tier preference system eliminated immigration quotas, establishing new criteria for immigrants. It removed 'natural origins' as the basis of American immigration legislation and was framed as an amendment to the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act.

The 1965 Act specified the following seven preferences for Eastern Hemisphere quota immigrants: (1) unmarried adult sons and daughters of citizens (2) spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent residents (3) professionals, scientists, and artists of exceptional ability (4) married adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens (5) siblings of adult citizens (6) workers, skilled and unskilled, in occupations for which labor was in short supply

⁹ Ibid.

in the United States and (7) refugees from Communist-dominated countries or those uprooted by natural catastrophe.¹⁰

The current US migration policy clearly stipulates that it is illegal to aid or harbor illegal immigrants, but it implicitly tolerates business firms from being liable under the law for hiring or employing illegal migrants. This provides business firms with unfairly cheap labor as most illegal migrants are paid much less hourly wage than what the local legal migrants or citizens get. Obviously, such practices encourage illegal migration, create strong incentive for unauthorized employment and exacerbate the exploitation and unfair treatment of migrants.¹¹

Following the infamous 9/11 terrorist attack in the US and the emergence of chain of events globally after that, many changes have been introduced to the country's immigration policy legislations. In a view to fighting terrorism and related challenges, most of these policy interventions are initiated towards restricting the rights of non-citizens, especially illegal migrants and migration. Ironically, most of the terrorists who participated in the 9/11 attack were legal immigrants who came to the country through 'legal' process.

Among the recent legislations adopted in the US, the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996(IIRPAPRA) are the major ones. The changes introduced in these acts include provisions for mandatory detentions to certain categories of migrants and asylum

¹⁰ J. S. Passel and D.V. Cohn, 'US Unauthorized Immigration Flows,' *Pew Hispanic Center*. Washington, DC, (2010).

¹¹ Ibid.

seekers during removal and/or asylum proceedings and the applications of “expedited” removal procedure for categories of migrants considered inadmissible. In addition, the AEDPA and the 2001 Patriots Act introduced new procedures that can be initiated against immigrants based on the security grounds.¹²

Following the dynamic shift resulted since the 9/11 terrorist attack on US, the government enacted new laws which focused wholly or partly on tougher immigration enforcement and border control. The Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 and the US Protocol Act of 2002 enhanced border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, the Real ID Act (RIDA) of 2005 and the Secure Fence Act of 2006 are some of such legislations introduced after 9/11.¹³

Obviously, such new and additional restrictive migration policy interventions have resulted in more challenges for both legal and illegal migrants in the country. However, it is important to highlight the role such strict policy interventions play in tackling human smuggling and illegal migration.

In the 1968, the US ratified the 1967 UN Protocol on the Status of Refugees and by extension become bounded by the 1951, UN Convention Related to the Status of Refugees. The US Refugee Act of 1980 incorporates the principles and norms contained in above international instruments in to the US domestic laws.

¹² R. E. Wasen & K. Easter, ‘Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues,’ *Washington DC*, (2006).

¹³ *Ibid.*

However, the refugee definition of this domestic legislation excludes many categories of persons at risk of prosecution and violence. US refugee law denies asylum to migrants who fail to file for immigration proceedings within one year of arrival. It also penalizes those most in need of protection such as survivor of torture. Its refugee law also defines the risk of being tortured very narrowly.

Despite the commitments made to abide by international migration conventions and treaties as well as domestic migration legislations, the system in the US often fails to protect the human rights of migrants. Certain domestic laws discriminate between citizens and migrants, or between documented and undocumented migrants, especially in the provision of basic social services.

Migrants encounter prejudice and intimidation in the workplace and in society at large. It is common to observe unequal access to basic services such as healthcare, housing, and education. There are occasions where it is common to observe the arbitrary infringement of migrants' civil liberties and the denial of their fundamental rights to due process.¹⁴

However, it is also necessary to control human smuggling and illegal migration by introducing and applying discouraging policy and other interventions. Conversely, there should not be any ambiguity that international as well as national migration legislations that protect the rights and dignity of migrants must be upheld and migrants should be treated humanely.

¹⁴ C. C. Haddal, 'Refugee and Asylum Seekers' Inflows in the United States and Other OECD Members States,' *Congressional Research Service*, Washington D.C., (2009) pp. 80-89.

In the case of South Africa, especially during the Apartheid regime, a central tenet of the country's immigration legislations were protective and discriminatory, favoring only whites. During Apartheid which constitutes the period before 1994, the then government introduced a migration legislation termed as was the Aliens Control Act.

This act was the main manifestation of the then government's objective which was meant only to control the entry of aliens into the country. Section 4 (1) of the Aliens Control Act states unambiguously that a person could only immigrate to South Africa if that person's 'habits' of life are suited to the requirements of South Africa. This did not mean, however, that black Africans from neighbouring countries were not allowed to migrate into South Africa. But, their entry was highly restricted and they were solely allowed to enter as migrants labourers.

The country again passed the Aliens Control Act (ACA) in 1991. Nicknamed 'Apartheid's last act', became the basis of South African immigration legislation during the 1990s. The Act was introduced in a view to unify and simplify all previous immigration laws since 1937 as well as to mark a break-away from the past.

However, in its content, the Act did not make the expected departure from the previous racially charged and divisive migration legislations. As a result, the Act became contradictory to the realities in South Africa right from the advent of the 1994 democratic regime. In contradiction with the 1993 Interim Constitution and the 1996 Constitution in many respects, the 1991 Aliens Control Act was then declared unconstitutional 2002. This

intrinsic contradiction played a great role in the decision to reform the country's immigration legislations.¹⁵

Nevertheless, there is one positive outcome from the ACA. As noted above, the pre-ACA migration legislations in the country were highly racially based and over-protectionist towards migrants from other especially non-white origins that these policies prohibited the granting of permanent resident status to migrants who were not readily assimilable by the white inhabitants or who threatened the language, culture or religion of any white ethnic group. Such provisions effectively barred black migrant workers from securing the social protection that resident status provides.

Consequently, migrants seeking to live in South Africa had only two real options: temporary work under multiple, successive short-term contracts or illegal status. Neither provided significant social protection nor did any route to improved benefits. However, the ACA of 1991 repealed such extreme restrictions somewhat creating a relatively relaxed migration environment.¹⁶

Hence, similar to the early years of the US migration legislation, during the Apartheid era, the trend and practice of South Africa's migration policy was discriminatory that prompted racially induced migration environment favoring whites. But the migration policy environment and the general perceptions towards migration as well as migrants started to

¹⁵ A. Wa Kabwe-Segatti, 'Migration in Post-apartheid South Africa: Challenges and Questions to policy-makers,' Research Department, *Agence Française de Développement*, (2008) pp. 32-39.

¹⁶ A. Bernstein and M. Weiner, 'Migration and Refugee Policies: An Overview,' *Centre for Development and Enterprise*, South Africa, (1999). pp. 2-17.

change after the complete demise and fall of the minority apartheid rule and the emergence of new black African majority government in 1994.

In the new administration, discriminatory migration practices were abandoned and new trends and perceptions towards migration started to emerge. However, the government did not adopt new migration legislations immediately. The first migration related legislation to be passed after 1994, was the Refugee Act of 1998. However, the Act only became active in 2000, following the publication of implementing regulations.

The case of Migrants was governed by the racially-inclined and protective ACA of 1991 even after the fall of Apartheid. The inherited ACA of 1991 remained into force until 2002. In 2002, the government introduced the Immigration Act of the Republic of South Africa as the new migration policy of Apartheid-free South Africa.

The ACA was designed to control and prevent migration, not facilitate it, though it had introduced some positive provisions compared to the migration policies that preceded it. As a result, migrants and their employers both became increasingly frustrated with the inability to gain legal access to South Africa to work. Hence, the main objective of the Immigration Act of 2002 was to reverse this situation and to actively facilitate mainly skilled and semi-skilled contract-based labour migration. In 2004, the new Immigration Act (IA) was amended by the Immigration Amendment Act (IAA), evidently to incorporate new developments in the country as well as international migration.¹⁷

¹⁷ ibid

Although the post-apartheid migration policies of South Africa made quite a significant departure from the previously race-based and highly divisive migration legislations, the current policies are far from being somewhat relaxed and inviting to migrants. Obviously, economic, political, social and cultural realities of each country affect the trend and outcome of migration policies. Thus, it is reasonably rational to argue that the recent migration policy trends both in South Africa and the US are somewhat restrictive and inward looking.

Apparently, the trend of legal migration is so restrictive especially to unskilled and semi-skilled migrants from countries in the region including Ethiopia that such a situation is encouraging human smuggling and illegal migration to these countries. Hence, it is important for the governments of both sending and receiving countries to address the issue in a coordinated way so as to tackle the challenge of human smuggling and illegal migration and also to maximize the mutual benefit of legal labor migration in the region and beyond.

3.3. Kenya and Ethiopia

Kenya and Ethiopia are located in the Horn and East African region which is one of the hotspots of human smuggling and illegal migration in the world. Ethiopia is one of the migrant sources sending country and Kenya is either transit or receiving country especially with respect to Ethiopian migrants.

However, both countries do not have comprehensive, coordinated and well founded national as well as regional migration policies. The trend and pattern of migration in Horn

and East Africa shows distinctive feature such as preferring certain migration routes running through particular countries. Kenya is one of the migration routes preferred by migrants.¹⁸

Most of the time, Ethiopian migrants who migrate to South Africa use the Ethiopia-Kenya-Tanzania-Malawi-Mozambique-South Africa, the Ethiopia-Kenya-Tanzania-Malawi-Zimbabwe-South Africa or the Ethiopia-Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania-Mozambique-South Africa routes. In all the migration routes, Kenya is the one of the intersection destination countries. Consequently, the country is directly or indirectly affected by human smuggling and illegal migration.¹⁹

Even though Ethiopian is seen as mostly a source country of labour migration to Kenya and beyond like most countries in the Horn of Africa, the country is both a sending and receiving country of Migration. International migration from Ethiopia is considered as an economic hardship coping strategy though it can also be a reflection of socio-political issues.²⁰

Ethiopia does not have a comprehensive migration policy. Currently, laws and directives relevant to migration in the country include the 1994 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Unlike its predecessor (the 1987 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Ethiopia), which was enacted during the military government, the current Constitution lays down a legal basis for freedom of movement.²¹

¹⁸ UNHCR, 'UNHCR Global Appeal 2008/2009', (2009).

¹⁹ UNHCR, 'Kenya: Fundraising Reports,' (2007).

²⁰ UNHCR, 'Ethiopia Country Operations Plan,' (2008).

²¹ E. Kebede, 'Ethiopia: An Assessment of the International Labour Migration Situation: the Case of Female

By implication, this includes migrating abroad for any Ethiopian citizen regardless of the reason to travel abroad whether one has fulfilled all the requirements to travel or migrate to his/her country of destination. As far as the travel is made 'legally or nothing is confirmed to the contrary' at the time of departure, any Ethiopian citizen can migrate abroad. To some degree, the Constitution is blamed to be one of the factors contributing to migration by playing as a pull factor for migrants.

The basis of the argument is that because it allows for any citizen with a valid passport to travel to anywhere he/she wishes to go, it encourages migration. On the other side, however, free movement of people is one of the alienable rights of citizens in a country and hence any government should not deny this right to free movement. Nonetheless, governments should devise a way on how to balance the pulling effect of such factors by availing better opportunities at home. Migrants would not decide to migrate just because they have the right to do so unless there are other underlying causes which forced them to migrate.

The 1969 Proclamation regulating the issuance of Travel Documents and Visas, and Registration of Foreigners in Ethiopia is the other migration-related document in the country. It had stipulations on the conditions of entry to and exit from the country and provision of legal status to persons permitted to stay in the country on a temporary or permanent basis. The Proclamation Regulating the Issuance of Travel Documents and Visas and Registration of Foreigners in Ethiopia, which regulates the issuance of travel documents, visa and registration of foreigners in Ethiopia, requires that all foreigners residing in Ethiopia must be

Labour Migrants,' *GENPROM Working Paper No. 3, ILO Series on Women and Migration, Gender Promotion Programme, ILO, Geneva, (2002).*

registered with the Immigration Affairs Main Department (IAMD) (currently called Immigration and Nationality Affairs Department/INAD/).²²

The 1994 Directive Issued to Determine the Manner of Employment of Ethiopian Nationals Abroad, the 1995 Proclamation on Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority Establishment, the 1998 Proclamation on Private Employment Agencies, the 2002 Proclamation on Providing Foreign Nationals of Ethiopian Origin with Certain Rights to be Exercised in Their Country of Origin are but some of the migration legislations and other regulations aimed at addressing the issue of migration, diaspora engagement and domestic employment of foreigners and related matters.

Obviously, such legislations have played a positive role in streamlining migration-related issues. However, the lack of comprehensive and uniform migration legislation has also created confusion among the different institutions implementing the above regulations and directives.

In addition, the Criminal Code of Ethiopia, which sanctions human smuggling and trafficking and the forgery of public documents, the 2004 Directive on the Establishment and Operation of Foreign Currency Account for Non-Resident Ethiopians and Non-Resident Ethiopian Origins of Other Countries' Citizens, the 2004 Directive Issued to Determine the Residence Status of Eritrean Nationals Residing in Ethiopia are the other migration-related documents introduced to address the challenges of international migration and also to

²² International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 'East Africa Migration Route Initiative: Gaps & Needs Analysis Project Country Reports: Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya,' Vienna, (2008).

maximize the opportunities from the Ethiopian diaspora abroad, as a positive side of international migration.

Ethiopia is a founding member of various regional and international organizations which are directly or indirectly involved in issues of international migration and can influence regional migration policy formulation, the fight against human smuggling and illegal migration. These include but not limited to the UN, OAU/AU, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The country also hosts the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), as well as several UN regional bodies and organisations for Africa.²³

Ethiopia is also party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, which provides for the rights of migrants to get translator, to work and to get primary education as non-binding provisions. The country is also signatory to the African Union's 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa which gives a wider definition of refugees than stipulated in UN Conventions by including those migrants that are forced to leave their home country due to natural disasters and related calamities.

The 2004 Refugee Proclamation of Ethiopia establishes a procedure to apply for asylum and prohibits the government from refusing entry to refugees or asylum seekers and returning them to a country where they would be at risk of persecution. According to the Proclamation, migrants can submit their application for asylum to Office of the National

²³ J.Prendergast and T.J, 'Blowing the Horn,' *Foreign Affairs*, (March/April, 2007).

Information and Security Service (NISS), Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA) or to any designated police station within 15 days of arrival.²⁴

It also authorizes the head of NISS/ARRA to designate classes of persons as prima facie refugees under the African Refugee Convention definition. It requires NISS/ARRA to issue identity cards to refugees and asylum seekers and prohibits prosecution as a result of illegal entry or presence of migrants seeking asylum. Apparently, the government issues identity cards to asylum seekers and refugees in urban areas but not to those in camps. In general, Ethiopia does not allow refugees to work. The government has only granted work permits to foreigners when there are no qualified nationals available. It has, however, tolerated some refugees with special skills working illegally, as well as refugee participation in the informal sector, including trading in private businesses or doing other piecemeal jobs.²⁵

On the other hand, the Ethiopian government acknowledges the value of mobilizing the Ethiopian Diaspora for the development of the country. A reference to the role of Ethiopian expatriates as development partners is incorporated in Ethiopia's Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) of 2001-2005 and has been reiterated in the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) for 2006-2010 and also in the current ambitious five-year (2011-2015) Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP).

The government has also taken some legislative measures to facilitate the mobility of diaspora members living abroad and attract their investments. It introduced Ethiopian Origin

²⁴ E. Yoseph, G. Mebratu & B. Reda, 'Assessment of Trafficking in Women and Children in and from Ethiopia,' IOM, (2006).

²⁵ Immigration and Nationality Affairs, 'Archive Documents', (Addis Ababa, 2009).

Identity Card for diaspora members. The purpose of the ID was to be used as an alternative to granting dual citizenship and hence passport.

The card gives the same rights as citizens with the exception of voting rights and participation in any political activities and affairs of the country, working as civil servant in government institutions including in National Defence, Security and Foreign Affairs. Since 2001, diaspora members and other returnees have the right to import certain goods free of duty. Initially, this included duty free vehicles. However, this privilege was revoked in 2006 as a reaction to abuse. The government has also provided land for the construction of residential buildings for diaspora members.²⁶

Like Ethiopia, Kenya does not have comprehensive national as well as regional migration policy. However, there are various citizenship and migration-related legislations and related laws, regulations and directives which directly or indirectly deal with migration issues. Such documents include the Constitution of Kenya, the Constitution of Kenya Review Act, the Penal Code, the Citizenship Act, the Births and Deaths Registration Act, the Immigration Act, the Aliens Restriction Act, the Refugee Act, the Sexual Offences Act, the Children's Act and the Administration Police Act.²⁷

Like Ethiopia, Kenya is also a member of regional and international organizations which are either directly involved in migration-related issues or can influence regional migration policy formulation and other migration interventions. Such institutions include

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ K. Muli and M. Rutten, 'Findings, Views and Policies on Migration in Kenya,' Research Group: Migration and Development, 'Migration and Development' Report no. 10, 2006, Radboud University, Nijmegen, (2006).

IGAD, EAC, COMESA, AU, and UN. The country also hosts the Interpol sub-regional bureau for Eastern Africa.

Due to a combination of various elements, Kenya's regional attraction has made it become an important country of origin, transit and destination. Consequently, human smuggling and illegal migration to Kenya has become a concern for Kenyan authorities. Kenya in general and Nairobi in particular have become important illegal migration hubs towards South Africa, North America, Europe and beyond. Human smuggling networks operating along migration routes including Kenya facilitate the movement of migrants in various directions. Taking full advantage of the leniency of law enforcement officers to control human smuggling and illegal migration in the country, the smuggling groups operate in complex networks and various routes

Kenya has ratified the UN Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants in 2005. The Aliens Restriction Act, Cap 173 [Kenya]. No. 5 of 1973; Cap 173. 18 May 1973, provides for the right of the Minister in a situation of imminent danger of emergency to impose restrictions on aliens, such as prohibiting them from entering or leaving the country. The most specific legislation, the Immigration Act, Cap 172 (last amended 1972) [Kenya]. No. 25 of 1967; No. 6 of 1972; Cap 172, 1 December 1967, provides for stipulations to prohibit entry to certain categories of persons. It also makes references to persons involved in human trafficking but does not mention smuggling.²⁸

²⁸ Government of the Republic of Kenya, 'Immigration Act, Cap 167,' [Kenya], No. 25 of 1967, Nairobi, (1967).

It also states that the presence in Kenya of any person who is not a citizen of Kenya shall, unless otherwise authorized under this Act, be unlawful, unless that person is in possession of a valid entry permit or a valid pass.²⁹

Section 7 of the Act stipulates that any fraud entry permit, pass or certificate, shall be deemed void and without effect. According to Section 8 of the Act, a person unlawfully or a person in respect of whom a recommendation has been made be removed to the place from whence he came or to a place in the country to which he belongs, or to any place to which he consents to be removed if the Government of that place consents to receive him. Such illegal migrant may be kept in prison until departure. Moreover, Immigration Officers or Police Officers may arrest persons suspected to be unlawfully present in Kenya without a warrant.³⁰

Kenya acceded to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1966; to the 1967 Addition Protocol to the Convention in 1988; and to the 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa in 1993. In 2006, Kenya adopted its first Refugee Act after ongoing discussions for some thirty years..³¹

Generally, the current trend towards migration in the above four sending as well as receiving countries briefly discussed in this section is that all these countries tend to view the irregular and illegal movement of smuggled migrants through their territories as a threat to national security. Accordingly, they are trying to address the challenge by responding by adopting legislations that focus wholly or partly on tougher migration enforcement instruments and boarder control. For instance in recent months, South African border officials

²⁹Government of the Republic of Kenya, 'Immigration Act, Cap 172,' [Kenya], No. 6 of 1972, Nairobi, (1972).

³⁰ Opcit., Muli and Rutten.

³¹ ibid

have started denying entry to migrants and refugees including those from Ethiopia based on the principle that they should have sought asylum in the first safe country they arrived.³²

On the other hand, the increased restrictions at the borders of receiving countries including restrictive legal entry measures being adopted by destination countries such as the US and South Africa have become incentives for the flourishing of illegal activity of human smuggling and illegal migration. Such a situation is also exposing migrants to the perils of international migration. Moreover, the incrimination and detention of migrants by receiving countries under the pretext of illegal entry heightened the systematic violation of human rights of migrants.

Hence, it is necessary for both sending and receiving countries to develop amicable migration management mechanism that ensures the rights of all migrants, regardless of their legal status as well as addresses the concerns of these countries. It is also important that destination countries broaden legal migration channels to reduce dependence on smugglers and illegal border crossings. Thus, greater regional cooperation on migration issues, improved national as well as regional migration policies and other laws and national and regional harmonization of migration legislations should be the means and mechanisms that sending and receiving governments institute to properly address the challenges of human smuggling and illegal migration and the opportunities of international legal migration.

Chapter four, next, migrates to the discussion of the research outcome. In this section, the paper explains and analyses the result of primary data response obtained mainly from Ethiopian migrants in Kenya.

³² African Union Executive Council, 'The Migration Policy Framework for Africa,' Banjul, (2006).

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH

4.1. Introduction and Summary of Findings

As shown in the analysis section of the research findings following this summary, most of the questions and hence the responses were structured in such a way that the outcome addresses the objectives and hypotheses of the research. Besides, the collection of primary information from the migrants themselves is given the utmost emphasis more than any other source. Evidently, as victims of the perils and challenges of migration, nobody understands the issue of migration better than the migrant population. Thus, the researcher believes that the primary data collected from the migrant population and its outcome is robust and reliable enough to reasonably reflect the true picture of Ethiopian migrants in Kenya and beyond.

To get a reasonable degree of representation of the migrant population residing in Kenya, the questionnaire was distributed in all the major refugee camps and various residential districts of Nairobi where it is believed many Ethiopian migrants are living. These include Kakuma and Dadab refugee camps outside Nairobi and Eastleigh, Mathare, Langata, Kirinyaga and Kibira sub-cities within the city of Nairobi.

In the study, 160 questionnaires were distributed constituting the total population of the research. Out of this, 127 questionnaires were completed and returned. Accordingly, the rate of return is around 79% and it is considered satisfactory.

Two-third (67%) of the respondents are male and the remaining one-third are female migrants. 96 (76%) of the respondents indicated that they live outside refugee camps such as in rented houses, with their employers and other places whereas 31 of the migrants live in refugee camps.

Among the respondents, 54% are married and 72% are either married, divorced or widowed. Given the high probability that such migrants will have family to support, it will not be wrong to argue that family burden may be one of the factors which forced them to migrate. Furthermore, the fact that one of the reasons noted by the respondents as the underlying cause for migration was the inability to support their family gives credence to the above argument.

68% of the respondents lived in Kenya not more than a year, the outcome supporting the argument that most of the migrants stay in Kenya for a relatively short period and often use Kenya transit purpose to later migrate to other countries of 'final' destination. On the other hand, the fact that 20% of the migrants responded to have lived in Kenya for over a decade shows some of them stay in the country for a long time, some even settle permanently. Over 80% of the respondents do not have family in Kenya understandably so as most of them migrate leaving their family behind at home.

From the respondents over 80% constitute Christians and 17% Muslims, which is similar to the reality as the two largest religions in Ethiopia are Christianity and Muslim religions and most of the time, Muslims migrate to Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi

Arabia, UAR and Kuwait via Djibouti, Somalia, Yemen and similar routes instead of through Kenya where most of the migrants travel to Southern Africa, Europe and North America.

The three major Ethnic groups from the respondents are 41% from Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP), 28% from Oromiya and 27% from Amhara regions. Except for the Amhara region which is in the northern part of Ethiopia, the fact that most of the migrants are from the two regions which share boarder with Kenya indicates that proximity plays a role in influencing migration as a push-pull factor from the sending and receiving countries perspective respectively.

48% of the respondents speak Amharic and 23% Oromifa (Oromigna) local languages. 53% and 43% can speak English and Kiswahili international languages respectively. The outcome corresponds to the reality as Amharic is the national and most spoken language by all regions of Ethiopia and Oromifa is the mother tongue of one of the largest ethnic groups in the country.

English is the most-widely spoken foreign language in Ethiopia. However, the fact that relatively high proportion of the migrants can speak Kiswahili shows the extent to which the migrants are intermingling themselves with and adapting to the local community in the receiving country.

The education level of most of the migrants is relatively low as most (over 76%) fall between those who have no formal education at all and those (very few) who managed to complete high school. In fact, only 17% of out of the respondents are able to complete high school. Those that have Associate Degree and above constitute only around 5%.

This outcome, beyond reflecting the general trend, also supports the hypothesis of this research which argued that there is a strong relationship between education level of migrants and the level of migration, but the association between the two variables is inverse relationship.

Out of the total respondents, 45% were unemployed before coming to Kenya. Even the remaining 55% (22% government and 33% privately employed) who noted to have some kind of employment were low-income families due to the fact that most of them have low-level of education. The monthly income of most of the respondents who were 'employed' was less than USD40 which by Ethiopian standards will not be enough to cover even basic necessities. Obviously, with low qualification, the probability that one gets a better-paying income is very low, especially in developing countries like Ethiopia where the capacity of the economy to create employment is very limited.

In Kenya, 54% of the migrants responded that on average they earn between USD100-200 per month, which by most accounts is a relatively good income. Besides, the outcome indicates that, in terms of income earning, the migrants are better off in Kenya than they were in Ethiopia.

A majority (73%) of the respondents noted that the underlying cause which forced them to migrate abroad is to earn more income to support their family and themselves. 26% responded that inability to feed their family and similar reasons have greatly influenced their decision to migrate.

70% of the migrants said they have networks of family members and friends abroad, 75% of which live either in Europe or North America. The majority (75%) agreed that the presence of such networks has greatly influenced their decision to migrate to the above and other countries. This outcome fortifies the result of the hypothesis test that confirmed one of the hypothesis of this research that postulated there is a strong and direct relationship between such networks and the level of migration.

Overwhelming 92% of the respondents assented to the fact that ease of travel restrictions such as waiver of visa requirements between Kenya and Ethiopia is one of the main factors which influenced their decision to use Kenya as either transit or permanent destination point of migration. Again, this outcome has also supported the other hypothesis of this research which asserted that there is a strong and direct relationship between ease of travel restrictions among sending, transit and 'final' destination receiving countries and the level of migration.

71% of the migrants came to Kenya by road through the port of Moyale using road transport and 15% were smuggled through illegal border entry points. 74% confirmed to be assisted by smugglers (46%) and family members (28%) to come to Kenya and of course 100% of the smugglers were paid between USD100-500.

72% of the respondents said they do not have passport, 45% of them giving the reason that their passport is lost, 31% said it is damaged while in their possession, 5% claimed it is taken by their smugglers and the remaining gave different reasons. Apparently, this will affect their legality as migrants in Kenya.

Highlighting some of the challenges the migrants face during the course of their stay in transit and 'final' destination countries, 39% of the respondents confirmed to be imprisoned of which 66% said they have been to prison up to three times during their stay in Kenya.

56% of respondents noted that they were imprisoned for living illegally in the country and 33% claimed they did not know why they were taken to prison. The majority (90%) claimed they have not been taken to court after imprisonment. Overwhelming 90% of the imprisoned migrants alleged that they bribed law enforcement officers to get out of prison. Evidently, the above outcome signifies there are some issues that call for the attention of concerned parties to properly address the challenges that are apparent in law enforcement institutions which deal with the migrant population.

88% of the respondents said they are registered with UNHCR though 59% admitted that they do not have Alien ID card that is issued by the receiving country. A relatively small section (20%) confirmed to receiving financial, food and a combination of both from UNHCR.

Asked if they intend to stay in Kenya in the future, 93% disclosed their intention that they plan to migrate to North America, Europe and other regions, confirming the view that most of the migrants use Kenya as temporary transit destination to migrate to other countries. 37% of the respondents also mentioned that they have enjoyed their stay in Kenya but 63% of them replied to the contrary reflecting the challenges and hardship the migrants face in the course of their life as migrants.

Life as migrant is not always gloomy as 26% of the migrants have some success story to tell in their life as migrants in Kenya. From this successful group, 17 revealed that they run their own successful business, 3% claimed they have an attractive job with rewarding income and 6% said they achieved a good education in Kenya.

Finally, the respondents forwarded their suggestions on measures that need to be taken to properly address the challenges of illegal migration. 80% suggested that controlling human smuggling in some way is very important to curb the problem. 20% of them underlined that addressing the root causes of migration at national and regional levels and taking other related measures are equally, if not, more important to properly address the problem of human smuggling and illegal migration.

4.2. Primary Data Response Outcome Analysis

Table 4.1: Gender composition of the migrants

	Frequency	Percent	Valid	Cumulative
Valid Male	85	66.9	66.9	66.9
Female	42	33.1	33.1	100.0
Total	127	100.0	100.0	

Source: Survey data

Table 4.1 above shows a representation of the gender composition as well as place of residence of the migrants. According to the outcome, out of the total population of 127 respondents, closer to 67% (85) constitute male migrants and over 33% (42) are female migrants. The outcome clearly shows the reality that most of the migrants especially those transiting to South Africa via Kenya using the Kenya-Tanzania-Malawi-Zimbabwe-Botswana-South Africa migration route are mainly men.

Chart 4.1: Domicile composition of the migrants by Gender




Chart 4.1 above shows a representation of the gender composition as well as place of residence of the migrants. From the total population of migrants, around 76% (96) live out of refugee camps such as rented houses and 24% (31) reside in refugee camps.


When we analyze the cross-tabulation of the respondents based on gender vis-à-vis place of domicile, 97% (31) of the sample from the refugee camp constitutes male migrants and 3% (1) women migrants. The sample from the rental houses constitutes 57% (54) male and 43% (41) female migrants.

The outcome indicates that most of the migrants live outside refugee camps. This also coincides with the reality as, after registering at the refugee camps, most of the migrants go back to Nairobi and other cities in search of better opportunities and living conditions.

Furthermore, the fact that most of (closer to 98%) the female respondents live out of refugee camps can be taken as an indicator of a higher probability of getting local jobs for female migrants in such areas as house maids, small businesses and similar fields in Kenya

than their male counterparts. The result might also imply that female migrants are more inclined to avoid living in relatively inconvenient and harsh living environment of refugee camps than male migrants. Apparently, the result confirms the reality being witnessed in Kenya.

Figure 4.1: Marital status of the migrants




Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know the marital status of the respondents in the study. The figure above shows that closer to 54% are currently married and around 72% either are married, divorced or widowed which constitutes the majority of the respondents. Around 28% are never married. Among those who live in refugee camps, 94% were married, 3% widowed, and another 3% had never been married. Of those who live in rental houses, 40% were married, 10% widowed, 7% divorced and 38% had never been married.

The fact that the majority of the migrants are married, divorced or widowed may indicate that the probability that such migrants have family members to support is higher and hence family burden could be one of the push factors forcing them to migrate in search of better opportunities. It could also be the pulling factor effect of the presence of family members abroad which might lure the migrants to migrate to other countries where their family members are enjoying better living conditions.

Figure 4.2: Length of stay in Kenya of the migrants



Source: Survey data


The researcher sought to know the length of period the migrants have been in Kenya. As figure 4.2 above indicates, of those living outside refugee camps, 23% had been in Kenya for less than six months, 47% had been in Kenya for between six months and one year, 21% had been in Kenya for between eleven and fifteen years while 9% had been in Kenya for over fifteen years. For those in the refugee camps, 10%, 52%, 35% and 3% had been in Kenya for less than six months, for between six months and one year, for between one and five years and for between six and ten years respectively.

This outcome indicates that closer to 68% of the migrants have been in Kenya not more than a year, which constitutes a significant portion of the response. This result strengthens the notion that most of the migrants stay in Kenya only for a short time until they travel to their 'final' destination countries such as South Africa and the US.

On the other side, the fact that over 20% of the migrants have lived in the country over a decade shows that some of the migrants settle in the country and stay for a relatively longer period of time instead of transiting to other countries. This might be as result of

finding a better opportunity in Kenya or due to delay in/failure of travel to the 'final' receiving countries of the migrants.

Chart 4.2: Presence and number of dependants in Kenya of the migrants




Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know the number of dependants the migrants had in Kenya, for those in rental houses, 5%, 3%, and 19%, had seven and above, six, three dependants, while for those in refugee camps had no dependants in Kenya.

From the outcome, it can be inferred that most of the migrants do not have family members as almost all of them migrate alone in search of better opportunities abroad to support their families at home. Besides, none of the respondents living in refugee camps have any family member living with them. This might be due to the fact that the migrants who are registered and are living in refugee camps migrate to Kenya alone leaving their family members, if any, at home understandably due to the relatively harsh condition and increased challenge to live in refugee camps with family members.

Given the challenging living environment and the resulting burden to sustain family in refugee camps, it is also difficult to establish a family after arriving Kenya. However, those of the migrants who are living outside refugee camps, where in most cases living conditions and opportunities are better than in refugee camps, tend to live with family members who came to Kenya with them or even establish family after arriving to Kenya.

Chart 4.3: Religious preference of the migrants




Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know the religious preferences of the migrants. Chart 4.3 above is a revelation of the findings where 75% and 100% of those staying outside and inside camps respectively were Christians. 23% of the migrants in rental houses are Muslims, 2% atheist and 1% had other religious affiliations.

The outcome corresponds to the reality as most of the migrants especially those who are planning to migrate to South Africa come from Southern and Northern Ethiopia where the

community is predominantly a follower of the Christian religion. Usually, followers of Muslim religion tend to migrate to Middle Eastern countries such as UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar via directly from Ethiopia.

Figure 4.3: Ethnic group composition of the migrants



Source: Survey data

The ethnic group of the migrants as revealed in the diagram above was as follows: For those living outside refugee camps, 5%, 30%, 10%, 2%, 33%, 4%, 6%, 3% 5% and 2% were from Amhara, Oromo, Tigre, Garaghe, Sidama, Burji, Benishangul Gumuz, Hadiya/Kembata and Keficho ethnic groups respectively. Those in the refugee camps are mostly from the Amhara ethnic group constituting 74%. Oromo and Tigre cover 20% and 3% respectively.


According to the outcome of the research, Oromo, Sidama and Amhara ethnic groups constitute the top three migrant sources respectively when the resulted is analyzed in terms of real figures (not per cent age). Given the fact that these ethnic groups are among the top

communities within the total population of Ethiopia and considering the thumb rule of proportionality, it will not be wrong to argue that the outcome of the research does not contradict the reality.

However, it is usually perceived that the origin of most of the migrants in Kenya is mainly from Southern and Oromiya regions of Ethiopia as both regions share common border with Kenya and consequently the probability that people migrate to the country is higher due to proximity. The relatively high number of refugees from the Amhara ethnic group, which is mainly from the northern and central part of Ethiopia, could be attributed to push factors such as lack of opportunities at home and the resulting urge to migrate abroad in search of better opportunities and the choice of Kenya as an initial point of migration due to ease of travel restrictions such as waiver of visa requirements.

The study has a composition of respondents with the ability to speak the following local languages. 33%, 30%, 6%, 2%, 6%, 2%, 1%, 15%, 2% and 3% of those living in the rental houses speak Amharic, Oromigna, Tigrigna, Guragigna, Gamballe-Anywak, Nuer, Mazenger, Komo, Opo, Hadiya/Kembata, Burji, Sidama, Wolayta and other unnamed local languages respectively. Among those who live in the refugee camps, 94% speak Amharic, 3% speak Tigrigna and 3% Wolayta local languages. The fact that most of the migrants living inside the refugee camps identified themselves as from the Amhara ethnic group also corresponds to the language outcome that most from the refugee camps speak Amharic.

Figure 4.4: Local language ability composition of the migrants



	Amharic	Orimigna	Tigrigna	Guragigna	Gamballe-Anywak, Nuer, Mazenger, Komo, Opo	Hadiya/Kembata	Burji	Sidama	Wolayta	Other
■ Rental House	33.0	30.0	6.0	2.0	6.0	2.0	1.0	15.0	2.0	3.0
■ Refugee Camp	94.0		3.0						3.0	

Source: Survey data

Evidently, the fact that most of the migrants can speak Amharic is clearly corresponds to the reality as Amharic is the national language. Moreover, a significant number of the respondents also speak Oromigna as it is the local language/mother tongue of one of the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia. The outcome also mostly corresponds to the result of the ethnic group composition of the migrants indicated in figure 4.4 above.

Table 4.2: International language ability composition of the migrants

Place of residence			Percent
In refugee camps	Valid	English	96.8
		Kiswahili	3.2
		Total	100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	English	39.6
		French	1.0
		Kiswahili	56.3
		Arabic	1.0
		Italian	1.0
		Total	99.0
	Missing	System	1.0
Total		100.0	

Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know the ability of the migrants in international languages. 97% of those who are in refugee camps could speak English and 3% of them could speak Swahili. Those in rental houses had 40% ability to communicate in English, 1% French speaking ability, 56% Swahili speaking ability, 1% Arabic speaking ability, and 1% Italian speaking ability.

Evidently, the outcome shows that the two major languages that the migrants are knowledgeable are English and Kiswahili. More migrants who live outside refugee camps speak Kiswahili language than those who live in refugee camps. Understandably, this is because the former have more chance of meeting and mingling with the local Kiswahili

speaking community as opposed to the later who live mostly with nationalities of other countries where the medium of communication is mainly English. On the flipside, the same analogy explains why most of the migrants living in refugee camps speak English more than other languages.

Table 4.3: Level of education of the migrants

Place of residence			Percent
In refugee camps	Valid	No formal education	6.5
		Elementary school	29.0
		Junior high school	25.8
		9 th -11th grade	22.6
		12 grade not completed	9.7
		High school graduate	3.2
		1 or more years of college	3.2
		Total	100.0
Outside refugee camp	Valid	Junior high school	7.3
		9 th -11th grade	15.6
		12 grade not completed	26.0
		High school graduate	20.8
		Some college credit	4.2
		1 or more years of college	10.4
		college or technical school certificate	6.3
		college or technical diploma	2.1
		Associate degree	2.1
		Bachelor's degree	2.1
		Master's degree	2.1
		Professional degree	1.0
		Total	100.0

Source: Survey data


The researcher sought to know the level of education among the migrants in Kenya. Table 4.3 above is a presentation of the findings. It shows that 7%, 16%, 26%, 21%, 4%, 10%, 6%, 2%, 2%, 2%, 2%, and 1% of the migrants who live outside refugee camps have

education level as junior high school, 9th to 11th grade, 12th grade not completed, high school graduate, some college credit, 1 or more years of college or technical school certificate, college or technical diploma, Associate degree, Bachelor's degree, Master's degree, and professional degree respectively as the highest level of education attained. For those living in refugee camps, 7, 29, 26, 23, 10, 3 and 3 per cent constitute migrants with no formal education, elementary school, junior high school, 9th -11th grade, 12th grade not completed, high school graduate and 1 or more years of college respectively as the highest level of education attended.

The outcome shows that the maximum education level of closer to 70% of the migrants living outside refugee camps and 97% of those who live in refugee camps is up to high school and a significant portion of them do not even complete high school. This constitutes over 76% of the total migrant population that participated in the research.

Obviously, the probability of getting opportunities and attaining relatively better living conditions for uneducated and un-skilled migrants is less whether it is at home/the sending country or receiving country. Consequently, lack of better education and the resulting challenge to get better opportunities at home can be taken as one of the push factors forcing the migrants to leave their country of origin.

Chart 4.4: Past employment history of migrants before coming to Kenya



Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know the employment status of the migrants before they came to Kenya. As shown on the above chart, over 55% of the respondents were employed in some way. However, relatively few of them had full-time jobs, if we exclude house wives/husbands. Although the positive and significant economic contribution of house work as housewife/husband is undeniable, it is often not considered as part of the formal employment sector especially in third world economies like Ethiopia where the processing and utilization of economic data is usually a big challenge. Consequently, it is difficult to collect, sort, analyze, measure and value employment data of house work.

Though, the 55% rate of employment, if taken, at face value, looks a significant figure, it can be presumed from the education level outcome of the migrants noted on table 4.3 above, that most of the migrants have low level of education and hence most of them were employed in low-skilled small salary or income employment sectors which cannot support their livelihood and create better future opportunities. Hence, it will not be wrong to argue that such a situation is one of the factors that contributed for migration to other places where the

migrants think there are better opportunities than their home country. Moreover, the fact that over 40% of them were unemployed is obviously one of the push factor that forced the respondents to migrate to Kenya and beyond, understandably in search of employment opportunities.

Table 4.4: Ex-employer of the migrants in Ethiopia

Place of residence			Percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Government employee	48
		Self-employed in own business	42
		Working without pay in family business	3
		Total	93
	Missing System	7	
	Total		100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	Government employee	10
		Self-employed in own business	25
		Working without pay in family business	4
		Total	39
	Missing System	63	
	Total		100.0

Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know the employment sector, if any, of the migrants while they were in Ethiopia. Though some of them did not respond to this question, possibly for fear of disclosing their personal information, the outcome from the respondents has resulted in that closer to 50% of the migrants were not employed when they were in Ethiopia. Moreover, due to their low level of education (as disclosed on table 4.3 above) and the resulting lack of the required skill to get employment in a relatively high salary/income generating sectors, it can be presumed that even those employed were low-income families. Besides, given the low level economic development of Ethiopia, government sector salary

scales are relatively low even for better-educated civil servants let alone for those whose level of education is high school completion or below.

Consequently, it is a big challenge for such low-income families to support their livelihood and these challenges will definitely force the families to migrate. Hence, both lack of employment and low-income employment which cannot enable the migrants sustain their livelihood can be among the push factors that influence migrants to make the difficult and life changing decision to migrate abroad in search of better opportunities.

Table 4.5: Past income level of the migrants in Ethiopia (in Birr)

Place of residence			Percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Between 201-500 Birr	45
	Missing	System	55
	Total		100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	Between 201-500 Birr	35
		Between 501-1000 Birr	7
		Between 1001-1500 Birr	4
		Between 1501-2000 Birr	2
		Above 2000 Birr	2
		Total	50
	Missing	System	50.0
Total		100.0	

Source: Survey data

The researcher wanted to find out the monthly income level of the respondents while they were living in Ethiopia. Although there is some degree of non-response to this question, again possibly for wrongly feeling uncomfortable to disclose their personal information, the outcome of the response clearly shows that closer to 50% were low-income families earning not more than Ethiopian Birr500 (less than USD40) per month which in Ethiopia's living standard hardly covers monthly household expenses. Thus, it can be presumed that low-level

of income is one of the main factor that forced the respondents to migrate to Kenya and beyond.

Table 4.6: Current monthly household income in Kenya of the migrants (in KSh)

Place of residence			Frequency	Valid percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Between 1001-2000	1	3.2
		between 2001-4000	2	6.5
		between 4001-7000	14	45.2
		between 7001-11000	10	32.3
		between 11001-15000	3	9.7
		above 35000	1	3.2
		Total	31	100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	between 2001-4000	2	2.3
		between 4001-7000	4	4.6
		between 7001-11000	20	23.0
		between 11001-15000	20	23.0
		between 15001-21000	11	12.6
		between 21001-27000	7	8.0
		between 27001-35000	7	8.0
		above 35000	16	18.4
		Total	87	100.0
			Missing	System
	Total		96	


Source: Survey data

Table 4.6 above shows the current income per month level of the migrants. As noted on the table, most (over 54%) fall in the income level group between KSh7,001-15, 000 (around USD100-200) which is a relatively very good income even by Kenyan standards where the minimum salary for civil servants at the time of this research was between KSh 7,000-10,000.

Evidently, some of the migrants especially those who live outside refugee camps get monthly allowance in the form of remittance from family members and friends living abroad. Hence, some of the income source may not be from actual economic activities carried out in Kenya such as earned salary as a result of employment or income from running private businesses and other related sources.

It is also possible to see from the outcome that more migrants residing outside refugee camps earn over KSh 21,000 (around USD300) compared to those who live in refugee camps. Understandably, this outcome may be as a result of the higher probability of getting better paying employment opportunities in and around big cities like Nairobi than refugee camps. In general, we can deduce from the outcome of the research that regardless of the source of income, the migrants are better off with respect to income earning compared to their situation in the sending/home country.

Figure 4.5: Underlying reasons for migrants to leave Ethiopia



Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know the reasons as to why the migrants left their mother country. 100% of the respondents living in refugee camps sited search of more money as a

reason for leaving their country. 65% of the respondents who live outside refugee camps noted the same reason as above, 5% of them left because of natural disaster, 16% left to avoid forced labour and 5% sited inability to feed family as a reason for leaving Ethiopia.

The outcome of the research clearly shows that most (over 73%) of the respondents left their home country in search of better income. This result signifies that some of them had some source of income while they were in Ethiopia but it was not sufficient enough to cover their cost of living and improve their living condition which has evidently forced them to migrate. Besides, the fact that over 26% of them were not bale to secure employment or sustain themselves for various reasons is also a significant reason for migrating abroad in search of better opportunities abroad.

Table 4.7: Presence of the migrants' family members/friends outside Ethiopia

Place of residence			Percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Yes	100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	Yes	60
		No	40
		Total	100.0

Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know if the migrants had any of their family members outside Ethiopia. 100% of the respondents in refugee camps had one or more of their family members outside Ethiopia. 60% of the respondents in rental houses had a member or more of their family members outside Ethiopia. Evidently, the outcome is similar to the reality as most of the migrants have either family members or friends living abroad and it is possible that such a situation can be one of the pull factors contributing to the migration of the respondents.

Table 4.8: Countries in which the migrants' family members/friends are living

Place of residence			Frequency	Valid percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Kenya	5	16.1
		S Africa	8	25.8
		USA	10	32.3
		Europe	1	3.2
		Other	7	22.6
		Total	31	100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	Kenya	1	1.7
		S Africa	3	5.2
		USA	19	32.8
		Canada	14	24.1
		Europe	15	25.9
		Other	6	10.3
		Total	58	100.0
	Missing	System	38	
Total		96		


Source: Survey data

The researcher further sought to know the countries in which family members of the migrants are living. Those respondents residing inside refugee camps, 16%, 26%, 32%, 3% and 23% said that members of their families are living in Kenya, South Africa, USA, Europe and other unlisted countries. For the respondents living outside refugee camps, the figures are 2%, 5%, 33%, 24%, 26%, 10% in Kenya, South Africa, USA, Canada, Europe and other unlisted countries respectively.

The research outcome shows that closer to 75% of the respondents have family members or friends living in either Europe or North America which is clearly in line with the reality and these are the countries that a significant number of the migrants are planning to migrate. However, it is a paradox that those who responded to have family members in

Kenya are the ones who are living in refugee camps not outside refugee camps though it is expected otherwise as they are presumed to live with or at least closer to their families. In general, however, the fact that most of the migrants having family or friends connection abroad can be taken as another pulling factor influencing the migrants to decide and migrate to Kenya and other countries and regions of destination including South Africa, North America and Europe.

Figure 4.6: The role of presence of family members/friends outside the Ethiopia as a motivation to migrate abroad



Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know if presence of family members/friends of the migrants abroad might have motivated them to leave their home country. 39% and 33% of those living in refugee camps and outside respectively strongly agreed that they were motivated by the presence of family members in other countries. 26% and 14% of those in refugee camps and outside respectively noted that they agree with fact.

In general, the result clearly shows that the majority (over 77%) of the migrants are motivated and influenced by the presence of their family members outside Ethiopia to move

out of their home country. This result further fortifies the hypothesis of the research which argued in support of the above outcome.

Table 4.9: The role of ease of travel restrictions between Kenya and Ethiopia as one of the pull factor to choose Kenya as initial point of migration

Place of residence			Percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Strongly agree	100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	Strongly agree	24.0
		Agree	52.0
		Somewhat agree	14.0
		Disagree	9.0
		Strongly disagree	1.0
		Total	100.0

Source: Survey data

Table 4.9 above shows that 100% of the migrants in the refugee camp chose Kenya as a destination country because of ease of travel restriction. Over 90% of the respondents living outside refugee camps have also cited ease in travel restrictions as a reason for choosing Kenya as initial point of migration.

The outcome is overwhelmingly in support of the research hypothesis and the reality that over 92% of the respondents confirmed the very strong relationship between ease of travel restrictions and level of migration and the resulting influence it has played in motivating the migrants in decision to migrate to Kenya.

Table 4.10: Means of transportation used by the migrants to travel to Kenya

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	By air (Through JKIA)	18	14.2	14.2	14.2
	By road (Through Moyale)	90	70.9	70.9	85.0
	On foot (through illegal boarder entry)	19	15.0	15.0	100.0
	Total	127	100.0	100.0	

Source: Survey data

Table 4.10 above shows the means through which the respondents had come to Kenya. 14% of the respondents indicated that they came by air transport, those who came by road through Moyale were the majority at 71% and the remaining 15% noted they came by road through illegal border.

This outcome is also similar to the reality as most of the migrants come to Kenya through Moyale port of entry as the monetary cost of road transport is cheaper for the migrants as well as from the smugglers than the cost of air ticket. It is also interesting to see from the result that some of the respondents came to Kenya by crossing illegal borders. Understandably, this is mainly the work human smugglers which are said to be highly involved especially in the smuggling of migrants from the region to Southern Africa.


Table 4.11: Whether the migrants were assisted to come to Kenya

Place of residence			Per cent
In refugee camps	Valid	Yes	100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	Yes	65
		No	35
		Total	100.0

Source: Survey data

The researcher wanted to know if the migrants were assisted during their migration to Kenya. 100% and 65% of the migrants living in refugee camps and outside respectively responded to have been assisted to come to Kenya. This constitutes closer to 74% of the total research population which is a significant outcome by any standard and this outcome is, again, similar to the reality.

Chart 4.5: Parties who assisted the migrants to come to Kenya



Source: Survey data

On the question on who assisted the refugees to get to Kenya, 55% and 46% of those who live in refugee camps and outside camps respectively were assisted to get to Kenya by human smugglers, 45% and 22% of those in refugee camps and rental houses respectively were assisted by family members, 2% of those in rental houses were assisted by district authorities and 7% were assisted by friends who live in Kenya.

Table 4.12: Whether the migrants paid any money to smugglers to migrate to Kenya


Place of residence	Valid	Yes	Percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Yes	45
		No	55
		Total	100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	Yes	55
		No	45
		Total	100.0

Source: Survey data

Table 4.12 above is a presentation of the findings of the study which shows that 45% and 55% of the refugees who live inside and outside refugee camps respectively paid some money to human smugglers to get to Kenya. This constitutes over 50% of all the respondents.

Cross-referencing this outcome with the result of table 4.11 above, in which 47% of the migrants responded to have been assisted by human smugglers, it is clear that all of those migrants who migrated through the involvement of human smugglers have paid money to the smugglers. Obviously, this outcome is not surprising as the migrants pay relatively huge amount of money to smugglers to migrate to Kenya and beyond.

Figure 4.7: Amount paid to smugglers (in Ethiopian currency-Birr)



Source: Survey data

The researcher further sought to find-out how much money was paid to the smugglers. As shown on figure 4.7 above, 32%, and 20% of those living inside and outside refugee camps respectively said to have paid between KSh 1,000 and 10,000. 10% from each side noted to have paid between KSh11,000 and 20,000 to the smugglers while 3% and 17% paid between 21,000 and 30,000 to the smugglers. 7% of those living outside have also confirmed that they have paid between KSh 31,000-40,000.

This outcome also corresponds to the response given on table 4.13 above as over 47% of the migrants responded to have paid some money to smugglers. The fact that the major part of the monetary value of the payment made to smugglers falls within KSh30,000 ceiling also shows the reality as it is also indicated from other sources that most of the migrants pay from USD300-400 for smugglers.


Table 4.13: Presence of a valid passport of the migrants

Place of residence			Percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Yes	65
		No	35
		Total	100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	Yes	17
		No	83
		Total	100.0

Source: Survey data

Table 4.13 above is a presentation of the findings of the study showing whether the migrants are in possession of valid passports. 65% and 17% of the refugees living in and outside refugee were in possession of valid passports. On the other hand, 17% and 83% of the respective group said to living without any passport. This closer to 72% of the total number of respondents which is a very significant number.

Figure 4.8: Reason for not having valid passport of the migrants



Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know the reasons as to why some migrants do not have valid passports. Figure 4.8 above reveals that 39% and 47% of those living in and outside refugee camps respectively had lost their passports. 7% and 5% respectively had their passports taken by human smugglers. 40% and 29% of the respective group pointed out that the passports got spoilt while in their possession. The outcome shows most of the migrants either lost their passports or the passports are damaged. Though it is not a substantial figure, the fact that the passports of some are taken by smugglers and immigration and security officers for various reasons reinforces the claim raised in some circles that it is indeed realistic. Generally, the outcome has revealed that most of the migrants are somewhat careless in handling their travel documents properly.

Table 4.14: Whether the migrants have been imprisoned since arrival to Kenya

Place of residence			Frequency	Percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Yes	27	87.1
		No	4	12.9
		Total	31	100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	Yes	23	24.0
		No	73	76.0
		Total	96	100.0

Source: Survey data

To further find out some of the challenges the migrants face during their stay in transit and receiving countries, the researcher sought to know if any of the respondents had been imprisoned since arrival in Kenya. Table 4.14 above shows that 87% and 23% of those living in and outside refugee camps respectively had been imprisoned for various reasons as noted on table 4.15 below. This constitutes over 39% of the total respondents which is more than one third of the migrants. This can be taken as one of the challenges the migrants face during the course of their life as migrants.

Table 4.15: Frequency of imprisonment of the migrants

Place of residence			Frequency	Valid percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Once	10	37.0
		Twice	12	44.5
		Three times	2	7.4
		Four times	1	3.7
		More than five times	2	7.4
		Total	27	100.0
		Missing System	4	
Total	31			
Outside refugee camps	Valid	Once	3	13.0
		Twice	3	13.0
		Three times	8	34.8
		Four times	2	8.7
		More than five times	7	30.4
		Total	23	100.0
		Missing System	73	
Total	96			

Source: Survey data

Further, the researcher sought to know the number of times those who had been imprisoned have been imprisoned. The table above reveals that 37%, 45%, 7%, 4%, and 7% of those who live in refugees' camp had been imprisoned once, twice, three times, four times, and more than five times respectively. Among those who live in outside refugee camps, 13%, 13%, 35%, 9%, and 30% had been imprisoned once, twice, three times, four times and more than five times respectively. Generally, over 66% have been imprisoned between 1-3 times. Regardless of the reasons, this outcome also reveals the challenges that migrants face.

Table 4.16: Reasons for imprisonment of the migrants

Place of residence			Frequency	Valid percent
In refugee camps	Valid	I was illegal immigrant	14	51.9
		I committed wrong deeds	2	7.4
		For reasons I do not know	11	40.7
		Total	27	100.0
	Missing System	4		
	Total		31	
Outside refugee camps	Valid	I was illegal immigrant	14	60.9
		I committed wrong deeds	2	8.7
		For reasons I do not know	7	30.4
		Total	23	100.0
	Missing System	73		
	Total		96	

Source: Survey data

The reasons for imprisonment was also of concern to the researcher, table 4.16 is a presentation of the findings. 50%, 7%, 43% of those in refugee camps had been imprisoned for being illegal immigrants, for committing wrong deeds and unknown reasons respectively. Among those who live in rental houses, 61%, 9% and 30% had been imprisoned for being illegal immigrants, for committing wrong deeds and unknown reasons respectively.

The outcome, not surprisingly, revealed that over 56% of those migrants who said have been imprisoned went to prison because they were illegal immigrants and the result is in accordance with the reality as most of the migrants stay in Kenya long after their entry visa are expired and without any proper resident permit.

On the other side, the fact that over one-third of the imprisoned migrants have been imprisoned for reasons they did not understand calls for attention from the relevant parties as it is a minimum requirement from law enforcement institutions to provide full clarification as to why the migrants have been imprisoned.

Table 4.17: Whether the migrants have been taken to court upon imprisonment

Place of residence			Frequency	Valid percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Yes	2	7.4
		No	25	92.6
		Total	27	100.0
	Missing	System	4	
		Total	31	
Outside refugee camps	Valid	No	21	91.3
		I don't know	2	8.7
		Total	23	100.0
	Missing	System	73	
		Total	96	

Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know whether in accordance to Kenyan law, those imprisoned have been taken to court. The table above shows the findings that only 7% of those who live in refugee camps and have been imprisoned have been taken to court.

The outcome of the research revealed almost all (over 90%) were not taken to court. This can be as a result of one of or combination of the following reasons: either due process

of law was not followed that the prisoners were held for a longer period of time than the law stipulates without being taken to court and later released in some way or most of the prisoners were released within a day of imprisonment for lack of evidence to take them to court or the prisoners have managed to leave prison in an illegal way such as by bribing prison officials. Regardless of the reason, this outcome also begs for further attention from the relevant bodies to identify the underlying cause for such an outcome and devise possible solution.

Table 4.18: Means used by the migrants to get out of prison

Place of residence			Percent	Valid percent
In refugee camps	Valid	pardoned by Kenyan authority	1	3.7
		Bribed law enforcement authorities	26	96.3
		Total	28	100.0
	Missing	System	4	
		Total	31	
Outside refugee camps	Valid	bribed law enforcement authorities	23	100.0
		System	73	
	Total	96		


Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know from those who had been imprisoned on how they got their way out of prison. The table above shows that 96% and 100% of those who live in refugee camps and outside refugee camps respectively had their way out of prison by bribing the law enforcement authorities. This constitutes over 99% the imprisoned migrants.

The outcome of the research shows due process of law was not followed during the imprisonment and realizing of those migrants who said have been taken to prison. The result also reinforces the claim of the respondents noted on table 4.18 above.

Evidently, relating this outcome with that of table 4.17 above, the fact that over 90% of the imprisoned migrants were not taken court (table 4.18) in one side, and over 99% of them claiming to have paid money to get out of prison (table 4.18) on the other, implies the problem of not following due process of law is more apparent in the non-courts part of law enforcement institutions. Again, this outcome signals that there are issues that need to be addressed in law enforcement areas.

Figure 4.9: Whether the migrants are registered with Kenyan government and are in possession of Alien Identity Card




Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know how many of the migrants are registered and in possession of alien identity card which is being issued by Kenyan Government. 61% and 35% of those who live in and outside refugee camps respectively have alien identity cards.

Evidently, most (65%) of those who live outside refugee camps and closer to 59% of the total population of migrants participated in the research do not have a formal local ID card possibly due to the fact that most did not go through the formal refugee registration

process with the relevant Kenyan authorities. Consequently, this scenario contributes to the illegality of the migrants.

Figure 4.10: Whether the migrants are registered with UNHCR



Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know if the refugees are registered by UNHCR. The figure above reveals that 97% and 85% of those who live in and outside refugee camps respectively went under the formal registration process with the UNHCR. The irony here is all of the migrants who registered as refugees do not satisfy the requirements of a ‘refugee’ as most of them are economic migrants who left their home country willingly in search of better opportunities abroad. However, the fact that at least most of the migrants have gone through some kind of formal registration process with one of the relevant institution in the receiving country definitely contributes to the legality of their migrant status in Kenya.

Table 4.19: Whether the migrants receive assistance from UNHCR

Place of residence			Frequency	Percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Yes	21	67.7
		No	10	32.3
		Total	31	100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	Yes	4	4.2
		No	92	95.8
		Total	96	100.0

Source: Survey data

Table 4.19 above shows that 68% of those who live in refugee camps and only 4% of those who live in rental houses receive assistance from the UNHCR. In general, the outcome shows only one-fifth of the migrants receive assistance from the organization.

Understandably, the fact that very few of those who live outside refugee camps receive assistance from UNHCR is an indication that most of them are not registered for assistance with UNHCR as they live outside camps. On the other hand, there seems to be a contradiction with the expectation that even some of the migrants who are allowed to live in refugee camps said do not get assistance from UNHCR. This might be as a result of the migrants not being qualified for assistance.

Table 4.20: Nature of assistance given to the migrants by UNHCR

Place of residence			Percent	Valid percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Financial	2	9.1
		Food	9	40.9
		Combination of financial, food and shelter	11	50.0
		Total	22	100.0
	Missing	System	9	
	Total	31		
Outside refugee camps	Valid	Financial	1	25.0
		Combination of financial, food and shelter	1	25.0
		No assistance	2	50.0
		Total	4	100.0
	Missing	System	92	
	Total	96		

Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know the kind of assistance the migrants receive from UNHCR. Table 4.20 above shows that 9%, 41%, and 50% of those who live in refugee camps receive financial assistance, food and a combination of both food and financial assistance respectively. Those who live outside refugee camps had 25% as having received financial assistance, and another 25% to have received a combination financial and food assistance.

The outcome of the research which revealed that the majority (over 70%) of refugee camp resident migrants getting some kind of assistance from UNHCR but very few (less than 5%) of those migrants who live outside refugee camps receive assistance is clearly in line with the expectation.

Table 4.21: Intention of the migrants to stay in Kenya in the future

Place of residence			Frequency	Valid percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Yes	6	19.4
		No	25	80.6
		Total	31	100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	Yes	3	3.1
		No	93	96.9
		Total	96	100.0

Source: Survey data

The study sought to find out if the refugees are willing or planning to stay in Kenya in the future. 19% of those in refugee camps would want to stay in Kenya in the future and only 3% of those in rental houses would want to stay in Kenya in the future. The result is conclusive that the majority (closer to 93%) of the migrants plan to leave Kenya for other receiving countries of 'final' destination. This outcome is noticeably confirms the assumption of this research which argues that most of the migrants use Kenya as transit destination and hence they stay in the country only temporarily until they manage to leave for their 'final' destination country.

Table 4.22: If intention is not to stay in Kenya, countries and regions the migrants intend to go

Place of residence			Frequency	Valid percent
In refugee camps	Valid	USA	12	48.0
		Canada	12	48.0
		Europe	1	4.0
		Total	25	100.0
	Missing System	6		
Total			31	
Outside refugee camps	Valid	USA	25	26.9
		Canada	23	24.7
		Europe	31	33.3
		Other	14	15.1
		Total	93	100.0
	Missing System	3		
Total			96	

Source: Survey data

For those who do not want to stay in Kenya in the future, the researcher sought to know where they would opt to go. 48% and 27% of those in refugee camps and outside the camps respectively would like to go to the USA. 48% and 25% respectively would wish to go to Canada. 4% and 33% of the same group respectively would wish to go to Europe. The remaining 14% from those who live outside refugee camps plan to go to other countries and regions mentioned above, possibly to Southern Africa and similar destinations.

The outcome of the research on the above specific area is also similar to the assumptions of this research and the reality on ground as most of the migrants in Kenya travel mostly to South Africa within the African region and either to Europe or North America outside Africa as their 'final' destination.

Table 4.23: Whether the migrants are enjoying their stay in Kenya

Place of residence			Percent	Valid percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Strongly agree	7	22.6
		Agree	10	32.3
		Somewhat agree	11	35.5
		Disagree	2	6.5
		Strongly disagree	1	3.2
		Total	31	100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	Strongly agree	1	1.0
		Agree	5	5.2
		Somewhat agree	13	13.5
		Disagree	63	65.6
		Strongly disagree	14	14.6
		Total	96	100.0

Source: Survey data

The researcher sought to know from the migrants if they have been enjoying their stay in Kenya. The result is somewhat mixed for those who live inside refugee camps and outside. As shown on table 4.24 above, while the majority (over 90%) of the migrants living in refugee camps said they are enjoying their stay in Kenya, it is only one-fifth of those who live outside responded similarly.

The irony here is those who are living outside refugee camps are expected to enjoy life more than those living in a secluded and relatively harsh environment of refugee camps as the former have a better chance of getting more choice of goods and services and choosing their lifestyle. Possibly, the outcome could be as a result of the contradiction between higher expectation vis-à-vis the reality of ever-increasing cost of living for those who live outside refugee camps. In general, however, the fact that 63% the migrants responded that they are not enjoying their stay in Kenya only highlights the extent of challenges that they face during the course of their life as migrants.

Table 4.24: Success story of the migrants in Kenya

Place of residence			Frequency	Valid percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Managed to go school; undergraduate and/or higher level	4	12.9
		Established my own business	10	32.3
		I am employed with attractive salary	2	6.5
		No success story	3	9.7
		Other	11	35.5
		Total	31	100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	managed to school; undergraduate and/or higher level	3	3.1
		Established my own business	12	12.5
		I am employed with attractive salary	2	2.1
		No success story	6	6.3
		Other	70	72.9
		Total	96	100.0

Source: Survey data

Table 4.24 above shows the result of the research on migrants' success story during the course of their stay in Kenya. Over 50% of those living in refugee camps and closer to 18% of the migrants living outside refugee camps have some success story to tell during their stay in Kenya. Out of the total respondents, closer to 17% have managed to establish their own business, 6% achieved good education and 3% are employed with attractive salary.

It is really a positive outcome that over one-fourth of the respondents from the total number of migrant population of the research are able to achieve some kind of success in Kenya despite the fact that most of them are staying in the country temporarily and are planning to migrate to other countries. The result also shows that there are opportunities in

Kenya if the migrants work hard and improve themselves to get better chance of economic engagement.

Table 4.25: Measures to address the challenges of illegal migration

Place of residence			Frequency	Valid percent
In refugee camps	Valid	Create awareness	2	6.5
		Control human smuggling	29	93.5
		Total	31	100.0
Outside refugee camps	Valid	Control human smuggling	74	77.1
		Implement regional migration policy	2	2.1
		Address root cause of migration at national level	12	12.5
		Address root cause of migration at regional level	7	7.3
		Other	1	1.0
		Total	96	100.0

Source: Survey data

Finally, the researcher wanted to get the opinion of the migrants themselves as they are victims of the peril and challenges migration. As shown on Table 4.25 above, the majority of the respondents (95% of those living in refugee camps and 77% of those living outside) noted that human smuggling should be controlled in some way by the respective governments of sending, transit and receiving counties and other relevant intuitions.

From the total population covered by this research, over 80% suggested that there should be human smuggling controlling mechanism as an important measure to curb the problem of illegal migration. 15% of the outcome from the total population of respondents constitutes the second measure forwarded by the migrants as a possible solution to control illegal migration is addressing the root causes of the issue both at national and regional levels.

Evidently, controlling human smuggling in some way takes a centre stage in addressing illegal migration. However, specially sending countries shall devise a mechanism to create more opportunities for their citizens and address pushing factors properly so that people will not be forced to migrate in search of better opportunity abroad. Moreover, there should be collaboration among sending, transit and receiving countries and other multilateral and regional institutions to address the challenges of human smuggling and illegal migration.

4.3 Outcome of Hypotheses Testing

Taking the research/alternative hypothesis as H_1 and the null hypothesis as H_0 , the outcome of the hypotheses testing for the three hypotheses formulated in the research paper is presented as shown below.

Table 4.26: Easing of travel restrictions and level of migration relationship cross tabulation and hypothesis testing

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	67.447 ^a	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	13.522	4	.009
Linear-by-Linear Association	10.949	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	127		

Source: Survey data

The Pearson Chi-square value for the test of *direct relationship between the easing of travel restrictions such as waiver of visa requirements for migrants and the level of migration* is 67.447 with a p value of .001. The p value is less than 0.05 which shows that there is a statistically very strong relationship between the number of migrants and ease of travel restrictions. In line with the assumption of the research hypothesis, the outcome of the Chi-square Test indicates that there is a statistically *significant and direct* relationship between easing of travel restrictions such as waiver of visa requirements fro migrants and the level of

migration which is in line with the presumption of the research hypothesis. Evidently, the above relationship result fortifies the presumption that when travel restrictions between sending and receiving countries are eased, there is a higher probability of more migrants travelling to receiving countries if they decide to do so. Accordingly, there is a *very strong evidence* to reject the null hypothesis H_0 and to accept the alternative hypothesis H_1 . Therefore, the null hypothesis H_0 is rejected and the research/alternative hypothesis H_1 is accepted.

Table 4.27: Education level of the migrants and the probability of migration relationship cross tabulation and hypothesis testing

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	68.349 ^a	13	.000
Likelihood Ratio	13.871	13	.383
Linear-by-Linear Association	9.452	1	.002
N of Valid Cases	127		

Source: Survey data

The Chi-square value for the test of *inverse relationship between the education level of migrants and the probability of migration* is 68.349 with a p value .001. The p value is less than 0.05 which shows that there is a statistically *significant* relationship between education level of migrants and the probability of migration. This outcome is different from the assumptions of the research hypothesis which presumed that there is *inverse* relationship between the two variables.

It can, therefore, be inferred from the result that the less educated individuals are the higher the propensity to want to leave their country of origin for varied reasons. The outcome from table 4.3 also strengthens the above argument and the result of the hypothesis test as the majority (76%) of the migrants have lower level education not above high school of which

who completed high school are very few. Some even do not even have formal education at all. Those at the top of the pyramid with education level of Associate Degree and higher constitute just above 5%.

Evidently, lack of better education and qualification generally leads to difficulty to find better opportunities and achieve success in life. Hence, whether in the sending country or other places, it is usually a big challenge for migrants with lower education level to find jobs and create income that can sustain their livelihood and create steady positive change in their life. Thus, this could be a pointer to the fact that migrants would be forced to leave their countries of origin in search of better education, employment and living conditions.

As noted above, in line with the assumptions of the research hypothesis, the outcome of the Chi-square test has resulted in a statistically *significant* relationship between the level of education of migrants and the probability of migration. Accordingly, there is a *very strong evidence* to reject the null hypothesis H_0 and to accept the alternative/research hypothesis H_1 . Therefore, the null hypothesis H_0 is rejected and the research/alternative hypothesis H_1 is accepted.

Table 4.28: The presence of family/friends networks between sending and receiving countries and the level of migration relationship cross tabulation and hypothesis testing

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.759 ^a	1	.029		
Continuity Correction ^b	1.969	1	.161		
Likelihood Ratio	4.902	1	.027		
Fisher's Exact Test				.088	.088
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.722	1	.030		
N of Valid Cases	127				

Source: Survey data

The Chi-square value for the test of *relationship between the existence of family/friends networks between sending and receiving countries and the level of migration* is 4.759 with a p value .029. The p value is less than 0.05 but positive which shows that there is a statistically acceptable *direct* relationship between the presence of network of family/friends between sending and receiving countries and the level of migration.

This shows that many migrants would be influenced to leave their country of origin by the mere fact that part of their family members or friends have managed to get out of their mother countries and are enjoying relatively better living conditions. More importantly, the result may also indicate that if there is a network of family and friends living abroad, migrants will get material as well as information assistance from friends and family members living abroad which evidently facilitates their migration to receiving countries.

In line with the presumption of the research hypothesis, the Chi-square test indicates that there is a *statistically acceptable* degree of *direct* relationship between the existence of family/friends networks between sending and receiving countries and the level of migration. Accordingly, there is *some evidence* to reject the null hypothesis H_0 and to accept the alternative hypothesis H_1 . Therefore, the null hypothesis H_0 is rejected and the research/alternative hypothesis H_1 is accepted.

Chapter five in the next section is the final destination as far as the discussion of this research is concerned. The chapter presents the summary, conclusions and recommendations of the research project.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Summary

This research project briefly discusses issues relating to Ethiopian migrants in Kenya within the domain of international transit migration. The project focuses on a fifteen-year migration trend, which covers the period from 1995 to 2009. This period is chosen because it is more suited to obtain more relevant data for the research, which focuses mainly on economic migrants as opposed to political refugees.

During the pre-1995 period, especially from the 1970s to early 1990s, the political and economic environment of Ethiopia was highly dominated by Socialist system of government, which was characterized by civil war, internal and cross-border conflicts, forced military conscription, subjugation of political, civil, and other human rights. Consequently, many Ethiopians were forced to leave their country and become political refugees in neighboring and other countries.

However, during the post Socialism era that ushered in relative stability, market economy, easing of civil liberties, democratic and political rights and other positive measures, international migration is mostly attributed to economic and related factors which created a trend of economic and mainly voluntary labour migration rather than forced political migration.

The topic of this paper is chosen because the issue of illegal migration and human smuggling as a challenge of international migration has been a serious concern for both Ethiopia and Kenya as well as the region and beyond. Unfortunately, there is hardly a relatively comprehensive empirical data specifically focusing on the subject area on which the research is dealing with. Thus, the importance of research carried out in the specific area of Ethiopian migrants in Kenya and beyond is undeniable.

International migration is a complex process influenced by often-interrelated push-pull factors in sending, transit and receiving countries and no single theory or perspective is comprehensive and robust enough to explain fully the essence of transit migration. Hence, migration of Ethiopians to Kenya and beyond could not be fully explained by a single theory of international transit migration but based on a combination of the different schools of thought on the discipline. Nonetheless, migration is always attributed to real push-pull factors and often wrong perceptions that going abroad always brings better fortune than home regardless of the level and situation in terms of living condition at home.

The role of proximity and close relation between neighboring sending and receiving countries is one of the important factor that influence the trend of migration. Kenya and Ethiopia are close neighbours sharing a vast border. They have the same social, cultural, political, and economic realities especially among communities living along the shared borders.

The two countries have a long history of diplomatic and bilateral relation dating back to the 1950s. Ethiopia started its official diplomatic relation with Kenya when it established an Honorary Consulate General in 1954 and this was upgraded to full-fledged Embassy in

1961. Kenya reciprocated by opening its Embassy in Addis Ababa in 1967. Besides, the fact that the two countries have the first and longest bilateral consultative committee in Africa shows the strength of their cordial relation.

The two countries have signed various bilateral agreements including the 1966 Mutual Visa Abolition Agreement. Evidently, this agreement has greatly influenced the trend of migration from Ethiopia to Kenya and beyond. The two countries have also concluded other equally, if not, more important, bilateral agreements such as the 1963 Mutual Defense Pact and the 1970 Border Agreement which evidently played a pivotal role in strengthening relation between the two countries.

Kenya, as the first point of entry for migration especially to South Africa and beyond, faces the initial burden of illegal migration more than other destinations. The outcome of this research indicates that most of the migrants go mostly to South Africa within the African continent and to the US or other western countries outside Africa as their 'final' destination after staying in Kenya temporarily. There are different challenges faced by migrants as well as the two governments mostly due to the existence of illegal migration to Kenya, which usually takes place through cross-border human smugglers.

In this course of cross border movement of people, many migrants will end-up in dark and unfamiliar territories and prison cells as most of them do not have the right travel document as well as legal resident permit. As the writer observed during the past years, the government of Ethiopia has tried to take some measures to curb the problem of illegal emigration including imposition of travel restriction measures at official outlets, using official media like TV and radio to discourage emigration.

However, most of the measures being taken are uncoordinated and are not based on comprehensive national as well as regional policy prescriptions and related instruments. The solution for such challenges requires the coordination of the two countries and other affected actors and stakeholders.

To get basic theoretical and literature background on international migration, the paper attempted to have an overview of literatures on theories of international transit migration. Some of the theories discussed include the Push-pull Model of Migration Theory which states that migration is basically an individual choice, greatly influenced by push-factors in sending and receiving countries respectively. According to this approach migration is selective with respect to the individual characteristics of migrants because people respond differently to pull and push factors at origins and destinations and have different abilities to cope with the intervening variables.

This school of thought has gained enormous popularity in the migration literature and has become the dominant migration model. The analysis of this research is also mainly based on this model, which is more suited to explain the case of Ethiopian migrants in Kenya. As noted above, however, other theories and views on migration have to be blended to fully explain the essence of migration.

The other contending view on migration is the Marxism and Neo Marxism theory of migration, which argues that economic factors and a class-based political process shape immigration policies. Capitalists import migrant workers in order to exert a downward pressure on wages and thereby increase their own profits. According to this view, migrants

constitute an "industrial reserve army of labor," and migration is part of capitalist development and of the international division of labor.

The National Identity Approach as another school of thought on migration asserts that the unique history of each country, its conceptions of citizenship and nationality, as well as debates over national identity and social conflicts within it, shape its immigration policies. As opposed to Push-pull Theory of Migration, this view downplays the importance of external and "situational" factors.

The Domestic Politics Approach assumes that the states serve as a neutral arena for societal interests. Hence, policymaking on migration and the trend of migration depend on the result of bargaining as well as of compromises between these interests, or sometimes it reflects the fact that one or more of these actors has succeeded in capturing the state.

The Realism and Neo-realism Approach assumes that states play the primary role on migration. They pursue their national interests when they restrict labor migration and permanent immigration during recessions, accept labor migration during economic upturns, give preference to immigration of the highly skilled and of investors, and encourage immigration in an attempt to overcome demographic inferiority vis-a-vis potential enemies.

As opposed to the Realism Theory of Migration, the Liberalism and Neo-liberalism Approach argues that international interdependence between nations promotes cooperation including facilitation of migration from part of the world to another. The Neo-liberal Institution School of Thought and the Globalization Theory of Migration also assert that

international institutions and globalization affect global migration policies and trends across different countries and regions.

To get a more robust outcome, the paper mainly focuses on primary data collected from Ethiopian migrants in Kenya using a comprehensive questionnaire, which is structured to cover the major issues relating to the migrants. The questionnaire is framed to also get as comprehensive and reliable information as possible to address the objectives and hypotheses of the research.

The primary data analysis has resulted in some interesting outcomes. Firstly, the result has confirmed the validity of the general view on Ethiopian migrants in Kenya that most of the migrants constitute male transit migrants, the majority of whom staying in Kenya for a short period only until they transit to their 'final' destination. This includes South Africa and similar countries within the African region and mainly to Europe and North American regions outside the African continent.

In line with the objectives of the research, the outcome has also indicated that the migrants face different challenges in the course of their path as migrants. Most of them pay a relatively large amount of money to human smugglers to migrate to Kenya and beyond. Some have migrated to Kenya illegally by crossing illegal borders after traveling through hundreds of kilometers in dangerous territories and facing grave perils. Others have gone to different prisons repeatedly mostly due to their illegality in receiving and transit countries and in other times for reasons they do not know and they have bribed law enforcement officers to get out of prisons. Some have lost their passport to human smugglers and became illegal migrants in the receiving country. On the positive side, there are some success stories as a section of the

migrants have educated themselves, own businesses and secured attractive employment which enabled them to get better income and to employ and support others.

Most of the migrants responded that search for better income and inability to support their family has forced them to migrate, confirming the perception that the underlying cause of migration of Ethiopians to Kenya and beyond is economic hardship. The migrants also suggested controlling of human smuggling on national and regional levels as a solution to address illegal migration and significant others highlighted that governments should address the root causes of migration to properly manage the problem.

The outcome has also strongly supported the hypotheses of the research that argued the existence of a strong and direct relationship between ease of travel restriction among sending, transit and receiving countries and regions and level of migration. The research also hypothesized that there is a strong and direct relationship between the existence of network of family and friends abroad and the level of migration while the relationship between level of education of migrants and the level of migration is indirect, the relationship is strong.

The research outcome can be used as an initial input for formulation of coordinated and harmonized national as well as regional policies that can address the challenges and opportunities of international migration in sending and receiving countries. More than that, the outcome, the researcher believes, can be a good springboard to carry out further thorough and comprehensive study on the subject matter covering the region and beyond. Obviously, international migration is not confined to just two (one sending and another receiving or transit) countries but it encompasses a host of sending, transit and receiving countries along

the migration routes and countries the migrants use and stay. Hence, it has both regional and international implication as opposed to merely bilateral issue between two countries.

5.2. Conclusions

Migration of people among nations and regions is an ongoing phenomenon, one that carries global economic, social and cultural concerns. People migrate for a variety of factors. One cause of migration is the effect of push-pull factors in sending and receiving countries respectively.

Push factors refer to negative aspects of sending countries, while pull factors are positive aspects of the receiving countries and regions. Push factors include unemployment or underemployment, lack of education, lack of proper health services, and lack of basic means of survival, the negative effect of highly skewed resource distribution between the rich and the poor and related factors. Pull factors include such variables as the migrant's positive perceptions of the physical, economic, social and political wellbeing in the receiving country.

These perceptions tend to be based on what the migrants may have heard or read, rather than on what they have really experienced. As noted in the previous sections, the analysis of this research is mainly based on the push-pull theory of migration as it explains the case of Ethiopian migrants in Kenya and beyond. The research outcome shows that the underlying causes for Ethiopian migrants to leave their home country are push factors related to the vices of poverty at home and pull factors such as the existence of network of family and friends abroad, relative ease of travel restrictions, perceptions that there are better opportunities in receiving countries and related variables.

Migration involves both selective and non-selective migrants. Selective migrants leave their country of origin for a better opportunity that is pulling them out. Push factors can also be a factor for selective migrants, but not nearly under the amount of hardship as nonselective migrants. Nonselective migrants are people facing difficulty within their country of origin. They are not actively choosing to leave, but conditions are pushing them out.

In the case of Ethiopian migrants, most of them fall in the non-selective category. The research outcome reveals that the majority, if not all, of the migrants are forced to leave their country of origin because economic hardships such as inability to support themselves and their family.

Migrants are more likely to perceive push factors more accurately than pull factors, because they are more familiar with the place where they are living than the place that they are moving too. As noted above, poverty and the resulting economic hardship is one of the push factors affecting migration of Ethiopians to Kenya and beyond. The research has clearly shown that the majority of the respondents who migrated to Kenya did so to get better income so that they can improve their living conditions and support their family.

In recent years, the trend of migration is increasing. This trend is a result of several factors including economic reasons such as hardships and increased unemployment in sending countries, among others. The surge in labour migration is also a result of pull factors such as globalization and regional integration processes, easy communication due to ICT revolution and liberal migration policies pursued in some receiving countries. In the case of

Ethiopian migrants, the trend is mainly attributed to push factors at home though the role of pull factors mentioned above cannot be underestimated.

The root causes of migration have not changed so drastically over time. They include the desire to seek a better quality of life and the desire to escape hunger and related challenges. The result of this research has also confirmed this view that most of the migrants from Ethiopia disclosed the desire to get better income and inability to support their family as the underlying reasons that forced them to migrate.

Economic globalization has accelerated the movement of goods and services across borders. Consequently, many nations have embraced economic globalization by reducing or eliminating tariffs and lowering other trade barriers, even though nations have been less enthusiastic about liberalizing their immigration policies especially in recent years, evidently due to the rising economic crisis in many receiving countries.

To some degree, the flow of Ethiopian migrants to South Africa via Kenya and other Eastern and Southern African Countries can be attributed the pulling factor of the availability of better economic opportunities and the high probability of securing some kind of employment in the receiving country. Evidently, this is a result of economic development and increased globalization in South Africa and in the region as well. It is also relevant to mention, at this point, the role of somewhat eased travel restrictions and availability of better communication and travel facilitation (whether by smugglers or family/friends of the migrants living in the receiving countries) as other pull factors that influenced the rise in the trend of labor migration to different countries and regions.

Other factors such as advances in communication and transportation technology have driven globalization forward, allowing people to live in a world where distances between countries and travel time are no longer as significant an obstacle. Additionally, disparities between developing and developed nations have accelerated with globalization. These disparities among countries combined with limited opportunities for employment that provides high enough wages to care for one's family has stimulated increased migration from developing to developed nations. To some degree, this phenomenon explains the case of Ethiopian migrants.

Ethiopia is one of the poorest developing countries where economic opportunities are very limited and highly skewed. As a result, the capacity of the economy to employ the active labor force is extremely low and the excess active labor is forced to migrate abroad to developed and middle-income countries where it is perceived there are better employment opportunities and living conditions. As revealed in the research outcome, most of the migrants decided to leave their home country due to lack of employment that enables them to support their family and themselves and to improve their living condition.

The demand for especially skilled and semi-skilled labor from some receiving countries can also be taken as one factor that resulted in increased migration. The southern hemisphere including Ethiopia specifically and the African region as a whole has idle labor force searching for employment, while the northern hemisphere which includes Western Europe and North America has demand for labor, though the demand is limited especially after the current world economic crisis.

Furthermore, aging populations and low fertility rates in industrialized countries have resulted in a substantial decline in replacement workers entering the workforce, while also creating greater demand for service-sector jobs and low-skill employment. However, due to the recent global economic crisis and the resulting domino negative effect on labor market, the demand for cheap labor from developing countries has dramatically declined. In fact, many countries in the northern hemisphere are tightening their immigration control to reduce the influx of migrant labor from the south.

Regarding the effect of migration on receiving countries, it is often perceived, may be quite wrongly, that migrants drive down wages for all workers. On the other hand, it also means that these migrants represent a source of inexpensive labor for domestic corporations, which in turn lowers production costs and lower prices for consumers. In addition, many migrant workers take low-paying jobs that many native-born workers do not want.

This reality also suggests that, generally, migration has little negative effect on the economic well-being of native populations and most of the time, the positive impact of migration is greater than its negative consequences. However, especially after the current global economic crisis, the negative and phobic sentiment towards migrants has increased and in some countries has become even violent.

A case in point is the recent attack of migrants from East African countries including migrants from Ethiopia and Kenya by the local population in South Africa though, as it was claimed by the media, the attack was targeting mainly migrants from Zimbabwe and other neighboring countries. In various countries, including the US, Canada and some western

European countries, the issue and policy of migration is taking a centre stage in the agenda of political parties and national elections.

The effect of migrants on receiving countries as well as the effect of migration on migrants are many fold. Migrants enhance the ethnic and cultural diversity of the countries to which they immigrate. However, migration may fuel a backlash in the form of anti-immigrant political parties that equate immigration with such problems as crime, terrorism and unemployment.

The culture shock from migration is also a serious challenge for migrants and their family members including children who migrate with the head of the family. Since the migrants face new living environment, culture, societal values and norms, it is often a big challenge to cope up with the new environment and harmonize themselves with the receiving country.

Migration can also cause identity crisis especially on children as they face completely alien environment and conditions in receiving countries. Migration can result in a lasting negative impact on children whose parents migrate abroad leaving the children at home, as the children miss the nurture and love of their parents. Generally, choosing to or being forced to leave one's homeland and family can be a traumatic experience, whether the move is resulted because of push or pull factors.

On the positive side, though, migration can offer people new opportunities, better economic opportunities and safer political conditions. Migrants will have the opportunity to educate themselves and secure better employment opportunities in receiving countries. This

in turn helps them dramatically improve their living conditions and the lives of their family members at home. As revealed in the outcome of this research, even those migrants who are staying in Kenya temporarily to later migrate to their 'final' destinations managed to have a relatively better income and living condition than they were at home. In fact, some of them have managed to establish businesses that can create employment to other people.

Nowadays, the effect of economic benefits that migrants are creating in their home countries in the form of remittance, diaspora investment, knowledge transfer, image building and related areas is tremendous. In many countries, yesterday's brain drain is becoming today's brain gain as most migrants who left their home country years ago are returning back to their country of origin and investing in different sectors.

In various developing countries, diaspora remittance is changing the lives of millions and becoming the main component of national income. Migrant communities are also playing a positive role, becoming image-building ambassadors in receiving countries and promoting the good image of their home countries. Diaspora investment is also gaining prominence even in countries like Ethiopia as the migrant community abroad is involving itself in the growth and development of the country by making some important investments in various sectors of the country's economy.

However, the diaspora community is also making a formidable impact by lobbying foreign governments and other international actors to influence the direction and outcome of government policies on political, economic, social and related issues in the home country. In some countries, migrant communities abroad are becoming highly vocal opponents and arch rivals of governments in their country of origin although there are equally devoted supporters.

The case of Ethiopia, in this regard, is a good example. Of course, the effect and direction of such influence will depend on the direction and magnitude of the influence as well as at whose angle and perspective such influence is perceived.

Generally, it is not difficult to, at least, presume from the current political and economic environment that though the trend of migration is increasing from sending countries, understandably due to the increased economic hardship and other push factors, the perception and towards migrants and the migrants population in receiving countries does not seem welcoming . Consequently, immigration policy in these countries is becoming quite a controversial issue and subject of serious debate among different interest groups.

Regardless of the trends, underlying causes, effects, challenges, opportunities and perceptions of international migration, it is possible to reasonably judge from the above bird's-eye-view discussion of the subject that international migration is a global issue, which involves and engages various states and non-state actors. Thus, to address the challenges and opportunities of international migration properly and in a sustainable manner, it requires the individual and collective effort, shared responsibility and coordinated intervention of the different actors.

5.3. Recommendations

Migrants decide to leave their home country because either they do not have the means of survival and hence are forced to migrate or they have the basic means to survive and can live in their country but they hope for something better abroad. Either way, practical solutions need to be found to respond to these aspirations. Migration is necessary for people

and governments as they respond to different needs. Hence, measures should be taken at each level to address the challenges and opportunities of migration.

Interventions that are made to tackle the challenges of international illegal migration and human smuggling in one side and to properly utilize the opportunities of international labor migration on the other, should be analyzed both at state as well as regional/international levels. Hence, it is important for governments of sending, transit, and receiving countries and other stakeholders to take unilateral as well as collective measures by coordinating their efforts towards fighting illegal migration and promoting legal and required movement of people and labour from one country or region to the other.

Consequently, in the case of Ethiopian migrants in Kenya and beyond, it will be more relevant to categorize and analyze the possible measures of addressing international migration at two levels. Firstly, it should be assessed in terms of those measures that should be taken by governments of the sending and receiving countries at national/local level.

Secondly, international transit migration is a phenomenon that simultaneously involves cross-border countries, regions as well as other non-state actors. Hence, it is also necessary to examine the interventions that ought to be addressed by regional governments and other international actors (both bilaterally and multilaterally) at international/regional level. However, this does not mean individual level analysis is irrelevant as there may be circumstances where it gives a better perspective to analyze challenges of migration in terms of individual migrants depending on the issues.

5.3.1. National-level Measures

As discussed above, the issue of addressing human smuggling and illegal labor migration has not attained the priority it deserves among governments in the region including Ethiopia and Kenya. In such countries where governments are engaged in addressing more pressing and competing issues such as tackling chronic poverty which is one of the main, if not the main, underlying cause of labor migration, trying to improve backward healthcare system, fighting the HIV/Aids pandemic, containing occasional conflicts and related challenges, migration is usually a secondary issue.

Following the recent increased trend in migration in the horn of African sub-region, it is becoming a common media event to witness the suffering and death of migrants from the region while they are trying to migrate to South Africa and similar countries within the African region and mostly to Western Europe and North America regions outside the African continent. Obviously, beyond affecting the migrants, such events are creating a lasting damage on the political, economic and social images of sending countries like Ethiopia. Consequently, the issue is forcing the concerned governments to give more attention to the problems of smuggling and illegal migration and device mechanisms to address the problem. However, it will be wrong to argue that the issue of human smuggling and illegal migration has been given the deserved attention and addressed properly in the region and beyond.

Intervention at national level should start from properly identifying the root causes of migration and trying to address each cause in a sustainable and coordinated manner. Obviously, this requires establishing and strengthening efficient government institutions which specifically deal with migration issues; engaging non-state actors working on

migration and human smuggling areas; putting in place comprehensive migration policy and other complementary political, economic and social policies and coordinating the different government institutions and non-state actors.

In addition to this, the full and continued political backup and resource provision from the governments of sending and receiving countries is equally important and necessary for any initiative to be successful. Hence, the concerned governments should provide human, financial and technical resource and political support to migration-related institutions to properly implement the above policies and address the challenges and opportunities of international migration.

It is also important for the respective governments to harmonize national migration and related policies with regional as well as international migration and labor conventions and treaties by addressing existing legislative gaps in sending, transit and receiving countries and regions with respect to such conventions and laws. These include ILO Migration for Employment Convention, Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, Forced Labour Convention, Abolition of Forced Labour Convention and other international human rights treaties related to ensuring and enhancing the rights and protection of migrants.

In the case of Ethiopia, the country does not have comprehensive national as well as regional migration (immigration and emigration) policy beyond piecemeal, scattered and sometimes conflicting laws and regulations that are applied in the different migration-related institutions and offices in the country and Ethiopian Diplomatic Missions abroad. Obviously, Migration policy should be a comprehensive policy which deals not only with the entry and

exit handling of persons coming to the country or migrating abroad but a host of other areas of migration, human smuggling and trafficking.

With respect to coordination of the different actors involved in migration issues, there is limited or no proper coordination among the different government institutions within the government structure. The cooperation with non-government institutions is also not different. Sometimes, there are situations where contradictions and conflicts arise among the different government bodies in addressing migration issues.

Hence, the government needs to establish a formal and sustainable system of coordination within the government structure and with non-state actors in the country. The system should have clear chain of command and responsibility as well as exchange and flow of information where migration-related issues are managed with timely and proper decision-making.

The coordination should involve all migration handling institutions at the federal level including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Department of Immigration and Citizenship Affairs and related institutions. At regional level, it should involve all offices of the regional governments with special attention to those regions such as Oromiya and SNNP which share border areas with Kenya along the migration route.

At the federal level, it is necessary to engage the different branches of the institutions noted above. This should include the various Ethiopian Diplomatic Missions abroad under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the different branches of Immigration Department which are

located at the ports of entry and exit such as Bole International Airport, Moyale Port of Entry and other places where the migrants are said to use to migrate abroad. The regional level should include district offices which are affected by or used for human smuggling and illegal migration.

The active involvement of community and religious leaders and other officials from the communities where the migrants are coming is also vital for any intervention in addressing the problem of human smuggling and illegal migration. To avoid conflicts and ambiguity in decision-making and handling migration-related issues, it is imperative for all the above institutions to work be based on comprehensive, one and proper source and uniform set of laws, regulations and procedures.

It is also necessary for the government in Ethiopia to regulate and formalize legal labor migration to other countries and regions including Kenya and beyond. Evidently, this requires cooperation and agreement with receiving countries and regions. As an issue of bilateral and multilateral nature, this intervention will be discussed more in the subsequent section.

Interventions should also be made in proactive manner before the problems actually occur. In the case of Ethiopia, however, migration-related and human smuggling issues are usually handled reactively in a spontaneous manner after the problem has occurred. There is no proper preventive mechanism put in place to pro-actively manage the root causes and challenges of human smuggling and illegal emigration in a systematic manner.

It is, therefore, necessary for the Ethiopian government to address the above policy-related and institutional issues in order for the government to tackle the problem of human smuggling and illegal migration. The reality of Kenya with respect to the above migration issues is not far from Ethiopia. Hence, as a migrant receiving as well as transit country, Kenya needs to do more with respect to controlling human smuggling and illegal migration, addressing complaints of migrants related to migration-related and law enforcement services and other issues of migration.

The other important mechanism to address the problem of human smuggling is awareness creation in the community where the migrants are originating. In the case of Ethiopian migrants, it is common to observe that from sympathizing to moral, technical and material support, migration is promoted and facilitated by the community the migrants are coming from. These sympathizers and supporters range from family members to community and religious leaders. Sometimes, even government officials in the community and especially those who are working along migration routes (who are actually expected to discourage and control human smuggling) are said to support migration in some way. Most of the time, such issues are connected to lack of awareness about the risks and perils of smuggling and illegal migration.

Hence, awareness creation should be one of the main area that the governments of sending and receiving countries including Ethiopia and Kenya focus to address the challenges of smuggling and illegal migration. It is also useful to show that there are people who can manage to live relatively comfortably at home with the same opportunity and living conditions as some of the migrants who have decided or are planning to abandon the opportunities they have and the life they built at home.

Most of the time, such migrants constitute those migrants termed as selective migrants who usually decide to migrate abroad in search of 'better' opportunities, which usually is based on false perceptions and highly exaggerated expectations. It is, therefore, necessary to carry out a case study of the life of those resilient and industrious people in the community who managed to change their life for the better using limited opportunities and meager resources at home.

The outcome of the case study can be showcased to the local community at grassroots level using the media, local elders, religious institutions and any other relevant means. It is also useful to promote and reward such people who influence and change the wrong perceptions of the community at large and that of specific would be migrants and returned victims of smuggling who were and are aspiring to migrate despite the availability of opportunities at home.

The other equally important awareness creation mechanism is using those returnee victims of human smuggling and illegal migration to tell their story about the perils and challenges of illegal migration. Most of such victims face horrifying experiences during their life as illegal migrants.

Furthermore, such awareness creation campaign should be matched with concrete and attractive opportunities that there are better opportunities than those offered by human smugglers and life as migrant abroad. Sending country governments like Ethiopia should create actual employment opportunities and put in place economic and related policies that engage the population at the bottom of the economic pyramid. Evidently, due to lack of

employment opportunities and means of survival, it is usually this section of the society which is prone to economic hardships and human smuggling.

With respect to integration of victims of illegal migration, any meaningful re-integration process should include a component addressing the push and pull factors that contribute to the problems. Victims of smuggling often face isolation and lack acceptance within their families and in the wider community upon reintegration.

Hence, it is vital for returning victims of smuggling and illegal migration to be offered better opportunities to improve their lives. Rehabilitation programmes should be coordinated and sustainable. Governments in sending countries like Ethiopia should establish a formal and sustainable mechanism where returning victims of human smuggling and illegal migration can be rehabilitated and reintegrated with their families and communities.

As witnessed in the Ethiopian migrant community in Kenya, it is often common to see returned victims of illegal migration and smuggling to come back to Kenya after they are deported to Ethiopia. This is mainly due to lack of proper government mechanisms that address the problems of returning migrants by providing them financial, psychological and other necessary assistance so that the migrants can integrate with their family and community relatively smoothly.

Since most of the migrants sell all their belongings and abandon whatever means of livelihood they had when they decide to migrate, it is very difficult for the migrants to return to the same family and community without any positive outcome after the failure of their

dreams and aspirations. Hence, they need some face saving assistance as means of starting their 'new' life in the community.

The other factor affecting smuggling is the presence of third party actors who are engaged in the smuggling and illegal migration process. Such actors which include air, land and sea travel companies and agents, hotels, house renting agencies and owners and other actors cooperate with the smugglers intentionally or unknowingly. Hence, it is necessary for both governments of sending and receiving or transit countries including Ethiopia and Kenya to approach and create awareness in the form of training and exchange of information in such areas so that these intermediaries will not be facilitating human smuggling and illegal migration.

5.3.2. Regional Interventions

As noted above, human smuggling in East and the Horn of Africa including Ethiopia and Kenya is closely linked to several factors including poverty, lack of access to education, unemployment, weakness or absence of interventions, policies and laws addressing human smuggling and illegal migration.

International migration occurs within and across international borders and hence it involves and affects at least two countries. Thus, beyond national measures, interventions to address international migration (whether transit or permanent) require the cooperation and coordination of regional states and non-state actors. Some of these actors which mainly involve states are affected by international migration either directly or indirectly as receiving and transit or receiving countries. The other category involves non-state actors such as the

UN, UNHCR, ILO, IOM and others. These institutions are affected by international migration mainly because they are engaged in addressing and managing issues related to international migration including human smuggling and illegal migration as components of international migration.

Regional level interventions that are aimed at tackling the problem of human smuggling and illegal migration in one side and properly utilizing the opportunities of international migration on the other, should be constituted both at bilateral and multilateral levels. At bilateral level, Kenya and Ethiopia are neighboring countries sharing a common boarder along the migration routes. As noted in the previous sections, Ethiopia is considered as mainly sending country and Kenya is mostly a receiving or transit country for migrants. Hence, the two countries need to coordinate their efforts in addressing the challenges and opportunities of migration.

In this regard, it is necessary for the two countries to harmonize their migration policies and priorities in addition to devising mechanisms on how to formulate and implement a common migration policy. Furthermore, strengthening cooperation on economic and other sectors should include establishing common labour policies between the two countries and the region as well. Although, realization of such policy might take time given the current level of cooperation between the two countries and the region as a whole, the benefit of such cooperation is undeniable as it helps to harmonize the labor market among the respective countries thereby fostering legal labor migration in the region.

The two countries also need to strengthen their cooperation in fighting human smuggling and illegal migration along their common borders. This needs coordination of

regional districts and border commissions with other migration-related institutions of the two countries. There should be regular exchange of information through formally established system among the concerned offices.

Border commissions and other relevant stakeholders should hold regular meetings and evaluate common policy implementation targeted towards addressing migration issues between the two countries. All these efforts will not be successful, however, if there is no political backup and resources provision from both countries. Thus, governments of the two countries should accord the deserved attention to the challenges and opportunities of migration and provide continued support to initiatives aimed at addressing issues of migration.

At multilateral level, regional economic community of states need to formulate and implement common migration and labor market policy to harmonize the labor market across regions. In this regard, common employment policies and standards should be encouraged to allow greater opportunities for migrant labour to move freely across borders. To improve labour mobility, all governments and regions that are involved in migration should gradually relax visa and permits requirements. In this regard, it is useful to strengthen trade unions so that they play a positive role in defending the rights of migrants and in promoting decent migration policies and practices.

It is also necessary for the different countries along the migration routes of the migration which include (but not limited to) Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi, Mozambique, Botswana and South Africa in addition to Kenya and Ethiopia to coordinate their efforts in fighting human smuggling and illegal migration and regulating legal flow of migrant labor in the region.

These and other states and non-state actors need to establish formal forums and mechanisms for exchange of information; experience-sharing; common and complementary policy formulation, implementation and evaluation; legalization and standardization of labour markets and the flow of labor in the region; and related issues. Such matters can be facilitated and handled through regional economic and political cooperation forums such as IGAD, CEWARN, EAC, COMESA, SADC, AU and related institutions.

In such forums, migration issues can be one of the mainstream agendas to be discussed during regular meetings. As governments often yield to peer pressure, there should also be regular peer-review mechanisms and forums in place on which the respective governments and other stakeholders discuss and evaluate their performance on migration issues and take necessary further measures to address the challenges and opportunities of international migration.

Many times, there may be some disconnect between programmes run by international organizations and those run by states or local organizations working with communities at grassroots level. Such a scenario might occur even between states that are involved in addressing similar issues of migration. It is, therefore, necessary to coordinate and streamline interventions in one direction in order to avoid duplication of efforts and wastage of resources

Interventions in addressing human smuggling and illegal migration can succeed if there is proper coordination between state and non-state actors. Especially during policy formulation and evaluation, the full participation of non-state actors including the different UN and other international organizations engaged in migration issues, representatives of

religious and local communities and other stakeholders is vital. Engaging civil society organizations can also assist in monitoring and helping governments in implementing existing migration-related as well as human right conventions and related documents. They could also help in pressuring governments to implement migration and related policies.

Human smuggling and forced labour are fluid and dynamic. There exists the 'push down-pop up' phenomenon where when action is taken in one area, smuggling changes its pattern and mode and re-emerges. Hence, it is important to create continued and all inclusive network of human smuggling and illegal migration control systems along the different migration routes and the various sending, transit and receiving countries.

The other very vital but often ignored issues is enacting comprehensive and effective laws that enable states and other relevant bodies to charge human smugglers in the court of law and sentence them with the deserved degree of punishment . Most of the laws, if any, in the respective countries including Ethiopia are weak. Even the existing laws of criminalizing human smuggling and illegal migration are scattered across penal codes, labour and immigration laws. Thus, it is necessary for states to formulate and harmonize comprehensive migration laws at both national and regional levels.

With regard to law enforcement, immigration enforcement systems must reflect accepted values and of due process and civil rights for all people in line with the UN Charter and other Conventions and protocols on safeguarding the rights of migrants. Due process and fundamental rights for all migrants must be upheld. Alternatives to detention should be considered and special protections provided for vulnerable populations. Detention should be a last resort and there must be legally enforceable detention standards.

To summarize, for interventions that are aimed at addressing the challenges and opportunities of international labour migration to yield the expected success, respective governments should properly address the root causes of human smuggling and illegal migration. This involves creation of employment and better opportunities at home for migrants in one side and devising mechanisms to discourage and eventually control human smuggling and illegal migration on the other.

Besides, coordination and cooperation among governments of sending, transit and receiving countries and regions has to be strengthened. There should be gradual and targeted introduction of labour mobility among the different countries and regions to properly utilize the opportunities of international migration. Finally, there is no substitute for political back up of the respective governments and allocation of adequate resources for migration policy objectives to succeed and yield the expected result in addressing issues of international migration.

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Annex

Questionnaire

Instruction: Please choose and circle the most appropriate **one** answer which you think **best** describes/explains the question.

1. What is your gender?
 - a) Male
 - b) Female

2. What is your marital status?
 - a) Now married
 - b) Widowed
 - c) Divorced
 - d) Separated
 - e) Never married

3. How long have you lived/stayed in Kenya?
 - a) Less than 6 months
 - b) Between 6 months-1 year
 - c) Between 1 year-5 years
 - d) Between 6-10 years
 - e) Between 11-15 years
 - f) More than 15 years, please mention _____

4. How many dependent family members were there under your responsibility in Ethiopia?
 - a) None
 - b) 1-3
 - c) 4-6
 - d) 7 and above, please mention _____

5. How many dependent family members are there under your responsibility living with you in Kenya ?

- a) None
- b) 1-2
- c) 3-4
- d) 5 and above, please mention _____

6. What is your religious preference?

- a) Christian
- b) Muslim
- c) Traditional believer
- d) Atheist
- e) Other /no religious affiliation

7. What is your ethnic group or from which part of Ethiopia is your family root?

- a) Amhara
- b) Oromo
- c) Tigre
- d) Guraghe
- e) Sidama
- f) Wolayta
- g) Gambella
- h) Burji
- i) Beni Shangul Gumuz
- j) Hadiya/Kembata
- k) Hadere
- l) Keficho
- m) Other, please mention _____

8. In which national/local languages are you *most* qualified?

- n) Amharic
- o) Orimigna
- p) Tigrigna
- q) Guragigna
- r) Gambella – Anywak, Nuer, Mazenger, Komo, Opo
- s) Hadiya/Kembata
- t) Burji
- u) Sidama
- v) Wolayta
- w) Other, please mention _____

9. In which international languages are you *most* qualified?

- a) English
- b) French
- c) Kiswahili
- d) Arabic
- e) Italian
- f) Russian
- g) German
- h) Spanish
- i) Other, please mention _____

10. What is your level of education?

- a) I did not attend any school/ I do not have any formal education
- b) Elementary school (grades 1-6)
- c) Junior high school (up to grade 8)
- d) 9th, 10th or 11th grade
- e) 12th grade, not completed

- f) High school graduate - high school diploma or the equivalent (for example: ESLCE)
- g) Some college credit, but less than 1 year
- h) 1 or more years of college, no certificate or diploma
- i) College or technical school certificate
- j) College or technical school diploma (2 years or above)
- k) Associate degree (for example: AA, AS)
- l) Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, AB, BS)
- m) Master's degree (for example: MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA)
- n) Professional degree (for example: MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
- o) Doctorate degree (for example: PhD, EdD)

11. Where do you live in Kenya at present?

- a) In refugee camp
- b) In rented house
- c) In other person's or company's house/ with my employer as a dependent
- d) In my own house
- e) I don't have any place to live/ I am a street dweller

12. What was your employment status when you were in Ethiopia?

- a) Full time employed
- b) Part time employed
- c) Self-employed
- d) Housewife/husband
- e) Unemployed
- f) Retired

13. If your answer to question number 12 is employed, please describe your work.

- a) Government employee
- b) Self-employed in own not-incorporated business, professional practice, or farm
- c) Working without pay in family business or farm

14. What was your total household income per month in Ethiopian Birr when you were in Ethiopia?

- a) Less than 200 Birr
- b) Between 201-500 Birr
- c) Between 501- 1000 Birr
- d) Between 1001-1500 Birr
- e) Between 1501-2000 Birr
- f) Above 2000 Birr, please mention_____

15. What is your current employment status in Kenya?

- a) Full time employed
- b) Part time employed
- c) Self-employed
- d) Housewife/husband
- e) Unemployed
- f) Retired

16. What is your main source of financial support here in Kenya?

- a) My income (paycheck or income from businesses)
- b) Family/friends' support from abroad
- c) Refugee benefit

17. What is your present total household income per month in Kenyan shillings at present in Kenya?

- a) Less than 1000 KSH
- b) Between 1001-2000 KSH
- c) Between 2001- 4000 KSH
- d) Between 4001-7000 KSH
- e) Between 7001-11000 KSH
- f) Between 11001-15000 KSH

- g) Between 15001-21000 KSH
- h) Between 21001-27000 KSH
- i) Between 27001-35000 KSH
- j) Above 35000 KSH, please mention _____

18. Why did you leave Ethiopia?

- a) Wanted to earn more money
- b) Natural disasters (e.g. drought, flood, earthquake)
- c) To avoid forced labor
- d) Lack of work/job/employment
- e) Could not feed myself/ my family
- f) Other reasons, please mention _____

19. Do you have family members/ friends leaving outside Ethiopia?

- a) Yes
- b) No
- c) Do not know/not sure

20. If your answer to question number 19 is yes, in which countries/regions do you have family/friends?

- a) Kenya
- b) South Africa
- c) USA
- d) Canada
- e) Europe
- f) Other countries, please mention _____

21. With a scale of 1-5 from *disagree to agree*, the presence of network of family/ friends in the above countries has encouraged me to leave Ethiopia.

- a) Strongly agree
- b) Agree
- c) Somewhat agree
- d) Disagree
- e) Strongly disagree

22. With a scale of 1-5 from *disagree to agree*, the easing of travel restrictions such as waiver of visa requirement to Kenya have influenced my decision to migrate/come to Kenya.

- a) Strongly agree
- b) Agree
- c) Somewhat agree
- d) Disagree
- e) Strongly disagree

23. How did you come to Kenya?

- a) by air via Jomo Kenyatta International airport/JKIA/
- b) by motor vehicle through Moyale port
- c) on foot through illegal boarder entry
- d) by bus and on foot

24. Did u get help from anybody to come to Kenya?

- a) Yes
- b) No

25. If yes, who helped you?

- a) Human smugglers
- b) Family member/s
- c) County or district authorities
- d) A friend/friends who live in Kenya

- a) Strongly agree
- b) Agree
- c) Somewhat agree
- d) Disagree
- e) Strongly disagree

22. With a scale of 1-5 from *disagree to agree*, the easing of travel restrictions such as waiver of visa requirement to Kenya have influenced my decision to migrate/come to Kenya.

- a) Strongly agree
- b) Agree
- c) Somewhat agree
- d) Disagree
- e) Strongly disagree

23. How did you come to Kenya?

- a) by air via Jomo Kenyatta International airport/JKIA/
- b) by motor vehicle through Moyale port
- c) on foot through illegal boarder entry
- d) by bus and on foot

24. Did u get help from anybody to come to Kenya?

- a) Yes
- b) No

25. If yes, who helped you?

- a) Human smugglers
- b) Family member/s
- c) County or district authorities
- d) A friend/friends who live in Kenya

26. Did you pay any money to smugglers to come to Kenya?

- a) Yes
- b) No

27. If yes, how much did you pay in Ethiopian Birr?

- a) Less than 1,000
- b) Between 1,000-10,000
- c) Between 11,000-20,000
- d) Between 21,000-30,000
- e) Between 31,000-40,000
- f) Between 41,000-50,000
- g) More than 50,000, please mention _____

28. Do you have valid passport?

- a) Yes
- b) No

29. If no, why not?

- a) It is lost
- b) It was taken by human smugglers when I came to Kenya
- c) It was taken by the police or immigration authorities when or after I came to Kenya
- d) It is damaged and became invalid while it was in my custody

30. Have you ever been imprisoned after you arrived in Kenya?

- a) Yes
- b) No

31. If yes, how many times did you get imprisoned?

- a) once

- b) twice
- c) three times
- d) four times
- e) more than four times

32. Why were you imprisoned?

- a) I was illegal immigrant
- b) I committed wrong deeds
- c) For reasons I do not know

33. If you were imprisoned, were you taken to court according to Kenyan law?

- a) Yes
- b) No
- c) I do not know

34. If you were imprisoned, how did you get out of prison?

- a) Served my prison term fully
- b) Pardoned by Kenyan authorities
- c) Bribe law enforcement authorities

35. Are you registered with the Kenyan government and given Alien identity card issued by the government?

- a) Yes
- b) No

36. Are you registered with UNHCR?

- a) Yes
- b) No

37. If your answer is yes to question number 36 above, do you receive any assistance from UNHCR?

- a) Yes
- b) No

38. If your answer is yes to question number 37 above, what kind of assistance do you receive?

- a) Financial
- b) Food
- c) Shelter
- d) Combination of the above

39. Do you intend to stay in Kenya in the future?

- a) Yes
- b) No

40. If no, where are you planning to go to?

- a) South Africa
- b) USA
- c) Canada
- d) Europe
- e) Other, please mention _____

41. With a scale of 1 to 5 from disagree to agree, you are enjoying your life in Kenya.

- a) Strongly agree
- b) Agree
- c) Somewhat agree
- d) Disagree
- e) Strongly disagree

42. What is your success story in Kenya?

- a) I have managed to educate myself at undergraduate /BA/ and higher level
- b) I have established my own business
- c) I am employed with attractive salary
- d) I do not have any success story to tell
- e) Any other success story not mentioned above _____

43. Which measure do you think is most important to address the challenges of illegal migration and/or human smuggling?

- a) Creating awareness at local and national level where the migrants are coming from
- b) Controlling human smugglers' chain from migration source sending countries to destination receiving countries
- c) Formulating and implementing regional migration policy which involves both sending, transit and receiving counties
- d) Addressing the root causes of migration at national/country level
- e) Addressing the root causes of migration at sub-regional, regional and international level
- f) Any other suggestion _____

44. Any other comment you would like to add _____