

**ROLE OF PEACE ORGANIZATIONS IN PEACE BUILDING: THE
CONTRIBUTION OF NAIROBI PEACE INITIATIVE AFRICA IN KIBERA,
KENYA: 2008-2015**

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**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
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DECLARATION

I, Lorraine Njuhi Mburu do declare that this project is my original work and has not been presented in any other university for any kind of academic award.

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DEDICATION

This research project is dedicated first of all to God Almighty for providing for my every need required while undertaking this project. Secondly, to my dear parents for their continued support and well-being in my quest for knowledge. Lastly, I dedicate this research project to my supervisor, Dr. George Katete for tirelessly guiding me throughout the entire process.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AACC	All Africa Conference of Churches
AFAP	Africa Alliance for Peace building
AU	African Union
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
FECCLAHA	Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in Great Lakes and Horn of Africa
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NSC	National Steering Committee
PEV	Post-Election Violence
PIP	Partnership for Peace
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nation Development Program

ABSTRACT

This research project attempts to give a critique of the peace building process in Kibera following the 2008 Post Election violence. In particular, the research assesses NPI-Africa's peace building project in Kibera 2008-2015; with the ultimate objective of recommending better and more suitable ways of engaging peace organizations in peace building process epicentres of violence especially urban informal settlements such as Kibera within Kenya.

The methodology and approach used by this research are premised on qualitative data analysed using thematic analysis. They included a preliminary review of global, regional and national literature on conflict early warning and early response systems and interviews with informants and observers.

To ensure reliability, validity and adequacy of the process, equal participation of respondents was facilitated through purposive sampling for their inclusion.

The research findings identified as relevant and viable did not only contribute to the available peace building knowledge, but also offered valuable insights into the current national debate on how to address the 2008 Post Election violence situation in Kibera and further endeavour for a peace loving nation.

Based on the foregoing, the research recommended that there was need for empowerment of and resource-flow to communities living in hostile environments such as Kibera to enhance their effective participation in conflict early warning and early response. Furthermore, there was need for Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI) Africa to develop a clear and shared monitoring and evaluation plan with other peace building entities that are context specific.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Conflicts form an integral part of human life. Defined as the existence of incompatibilities in goals, values and norms between two or more parties¹, a conflict avails opportunities for the parties and authorities concerned re-examine and rectify the said incompatibilities. A better relationship between the parties would then follow. Conflicts also serve as a warning that the rot is starting and can pave the way for remedial action.²

However, whether a conflict offers a silver lining or total gloom depends on a number of factors. A good starting point is the understanding of the meaning of conflict, and peace building. Peace has traditionally been viewed as the absence of overt violent confrontations or direct physical violence.³ This contradicts Galtung's view of peace as the absence of structural violence but existence of social justice that allows for the optimization of one's full potential. According to him, desirable peace is that which is characterized by sustainable

¹ C. R. Mitchell; *The Structure of International Conflict* (London: Macmillan, 1998) pp. 15-25

² A. de REuck, "The Logic of Conflict: Its Origin, Development and Resolution." M. Banks ed. *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective in International Relations*. (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1984) pp. 96-111

³ W. Heinrich, *Building The Peace: Experiences and Reflections of Collaborative Peace building-The Case of Somalia* (Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute, 2006) p.9

social justice, harmony and happiness. The opposite of this is negative peace, which is the mere absence of physical violence unaccompanied by the requisite social justice.⁴

It is imperative to understand the process of peace building; its beginning and ending which is quite complex. According to Lederach, peace building is not necessarily a post-conflict undertaking. Rather, since conflict is endemic in society and the relationship between peace and conflict is cyclic, peace building is also a cyclic and continuous process. More, importantly, peace building is an enormous task which requires multiple players, resources, processes and a comprehensive approach.⁵

The world over, peace building initiatives have brought together government and non-governmental agencies. Peace building organizations have contributed to peace building at some point in one way or another. The outcomes of, and reactions to such engagements are mixed. In spite of the increasing role and influence of peace organizations in the field of peace building, their relationship with the state has not been easy and consensual. In Kenya, conflict and peace building organizations have been aspiring to endeavor to engage in peace building initiatives left out by state agencies but such undertaking has not been without challenges.

⁴ J. Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 3 (1969) pp.167-191

⁵ J. Lederach, "Civil Society and Reconciliation", C. A. Crocker et al *The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 2001). pp. 841-854.

At independence, the Kenyan government inherited conflicts that had emerged and developed during the colonial era.⁶ These conflicts included class, ethnic and regional, and political conflicts. Tense and uneasy relationship between the then main independent Kenya political parties, between the state and political parties, between various political regions or ethnic groups and between the property owning elites and labour providing poor and peasants grew during the first decade of independence.⁷

With time, these conflicts grew in size, issues, actors involved and dimensions because they were never successfully resolved⁸. Consequently, the Kenyan government and communities have continued to suffer the negative impacts of the said political, economic and social cultural conflicts.

As a result of such conflicts, Kenya was treated to settlement-oriented, short term solutions as the government remained the main driver of peace building programs. Considering the nature of conflicts the government was addressing and also because the government was an interested party in the various raging internal conflicts, limited reconciliation and peace building was realized. Positive social activism as advocated for by the peace research paradigm⁹ could only be pursued successfully under the circumstances through appropriate

⁶ R. Maxon, "Colonial Roots", in Oyugi (ed), *Politics and Administration in East Africa* (Nairobi: EAEP, 1994) pp. 33-60

⁷ D. Berg-Schlosser, "Ethnicity, Social Classes and the Political Process in Kenya" Oyugi ed. *Politics and Administration in East Africa* pp.244-278

⁸ P. Wanyande, "The Politics of Coalition Government" in Wanyande et al *Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya* (Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press) pp. 107-129

⁹ Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research" in *Journal of Peace Research*, vol.3 (1969) pp.167-191

partnerships between government agencies and peace building organizations. Such an arrangement was never genuinely pursued during President Jomo Kenyatta rule.

The Moi regime was fundamentally the same as the previous regime.¹⁰ In fact, Moi's highly personalized rule never trusted the civil society, whether they were local based or foreign governmental or non-governmental organizations. As a result, conflicts were never fully resolved. The various conflicting parties were never fully reconciled. Meaningful and real peace was yet to be realized. Kenya as a society was experiencing what Johan Galtung refers to as negative peace as opposed to the ideal and desirable positive peace.¹¹

Ethnic clashes in the run up to and after the 1992, 1997 and 2007 Kenya's General Elections, where government agencies and officials were implicated¹² emphasized the need to fully address the root causes of the conflicts between various social groups and communities in a different way. The need to consider the involvement of peace organizations in peace building and post-conflict reconciliation was made even more relevant by the landmark violent conflict which followed the 2007 General Elections.

The violent conflict experienced after the 2007 General Elections is the biggest the country has ever suffered, in terms of number of victims, intensity and magnitude of the violence and

¹⁰ D. Moi, *Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principals*. (Nairobi: Macmillan, 1986)

¹¹ According to Galtung, positive peace lasts. It is not merely the absence of physical violence but also the condition of a socially just society, with members capable of realizing their full potential.

¹² *Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV)*, Nairobi, 2008

losses suffered.¹³ After contributing to the emergence relief and humanitarian response by local and international, government and non-governmental agencies, NPI-Africa joined other peace organization and embarked on a peace building initiative.

1.2 Problem Statement

Enjoyment of lasting and positive peace in Kenya has not been possible since independence as relative calm continues to be disrupted by political, social and economic incompatibilities which often turn violent and costly. Efforts by the Kenyan government and other actors have not yielded the desired outcome, which is long-term and sustainable positive peace. Furthermore, the conflict situation has continued to assume a complex body with far reaching negative implications, like ethnic clashes now synonymous to General Elections. This study sought to explore solutions to problems of unresolved historical and dynamic conflicts in Kenya, particularly to conflicts frequent in urban informal settlements whereby inhabitants mostly tend to be poor, unemployed and in most cases puppets of politicians.

The Kenyan government alone has apparently failed to ensure sustainable peace especially in instances where the same government is an interested party. There is need to explore the importance of peace organizations in peace building and reconciliation in Kenya and the possibility of a genuine, desirable and formal peace building partnership between the Kenyan government and these peace organizations.

¹³ According to the CIPEV Report the post-2007 election violence claimed more than 1130 lives, more than 620,000 people were internally displaced and more than 600,000 people lost their livelihoods.

This research more specifically endeavours to find out whether NPI-Africa has been able to contribute to peace building and reconciliation in Kibera after the post elections violence conflict.

1.3 Research Question

What is the impact of NPI-Africa in peace building?

1.3.1 Specific Research Questions

1. How does policy formulation by NPI-Africa result in ending conflict in Kibera?
2. To what extent does mobilization of resources by NPI-Africa enhance peace policy formulation in Kibera?
3. To what extent do peace interventions by NPI-Africa mitigate conflict in Kibera?

1.4 Research Objective

The overall objective of the study was to assess the impact of NPI-Africa in peace building in Kibera: 2008-2015

1.4.1 The Specific Objectives of the study

1. To assess NPI-Africa conflict mitigation in Kibera through policy formulation.
2. To identify NPI-Africa peace policy formulation through resource mobilization.
3. To explore how peace interventions by NPI-Africa mitigate conflict.
4. To assess interventions by NPI-Africa in enhancing peace and security in Kibera.

1.5 Justification

Various Kenyan communities have continued to be entangled in different types of conflicts since independence. The government has been attempting to address some of these conflicts,

but it has not been very successful resolving them. Probably due to highly unilateral conflict management by the government, similar or the same conflicts have continued to recur although with variations in context, parties and issues. There has been little research done in the field of peace and peace building particularly in academic institutions. This has thereby hindered the contribution of academia in peace building endeavor, in addition, their engagement with peace organizations particularly in Kenya. This study therefore sought solutions to real problems contributed by learning institutions as well as research institutions to peace organizations that came with perpetual conflicts particularly in Kibera.

This study was more-so timely as the country was gearing up toward 2017 General Elections; a period in which Kenyans coexistence would be put to test as any political, ethnic or socio-economic difference would spark any eventuality of violence.

In addition, the study was a timely undertaking considering that Kenya is currently exploring in matters policy different ways of arriving at a lasting solution to the conflicts which have bedeviled the country since independence. Whereas some ordinary Kenyans and peace practitioners have rooted for forgiveness and reconciliation through a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, a contrary opinion holds that peace can be guaranteed through retributive justice which entails punishing all those who have perpetrated violence against fellow Kenyans. Yet, the criteria of determining victims and perpetrators of injustices, is also shrouded in controversy and debate. The findings of this study were therefore insightful to Kenya's pursuit of sustainable peace.

The undertakings of Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI) Africa on peace processes have been successful as the organization has not only conducted its peace processes in Kenya alone.

Founded in 1984, the continental peace resource organization has engaged in a broad range of peace building and conflict transformation initiatives in the Horn, East, Central and West Africa. NPI-Africa has in the past conducted peace programs in urban informal settlements such as Kibera in partnership with the Kenyan government through the National Steering Committee and with non-governmental organizations such as UNDP through the umbrella of Partnership for Peace (PFP) where they carried out awareness peace building campaigns.

Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI) Africa is relevant in this study as it strives as a peace organization to enhance harmony within conflicting and hostile communities especially in the wake of the 2007-2008 Post Election Violence. Its peace awareness campaigns were carried out throughout the country particularly in epicentres of violence such as Kibera.

This study was also relevant as it was undertaken at a time when Kenya as a society seem to be reflecting on its historical quest for and pursuit of nationhood and the challenges so far encountered. A debate continues to rage on how unity and legitimate relationships of more than forty ethnic groups or nations can be achieved and sustained in the midst of perpetual ethnicized and politicized internal conflicts.¹⁴

1.6 Hypotheses

The study tested the following hypotheses;

H₀₁: Peace interventions by NPI-Africa mitigate conflict in Kibera.

¹⁴ *Op cit*, Wanyande, 2007. National politics continue to be highly politicized, with political parties serving as medium of ethnic alliances.

Hal: NPI-Africa peace interventions have enabled the realization of peace and security in Kibera.

1.6 Definition of Concepts

Peace

Paul Lederach defines peace as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages needed to transform conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct.¹⁵

Peace building

According to J. P. Lederach, the concept of peace building is essentially premised on the understanding that parties in conflicts often live in close geographical proximity yet are locked into long-standing cycles of hostile interactions.¹⁶

Peace building as defined by Lutherse Kerk is the effort to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict.¹⁷ The overarching goal of peace building is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence.

Peace building aims at building human security, a concept which includes democratic governance, human rights, rule of law, sustainable development, equitable access to

¹⁵ Lederach, Paul (1997). In *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C.: U.S

¹⁶ J. P. Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1997) p. 23

¹⁷ Kerk, Lutherse (2005). *Symposium Report: The Role of Civil Society in Conflict Prevention and Peace building*. 15 November 2005. Utrecht

resources, and environmental security. Peace building may involve conflict prevention, conflict resolution, as well as various kinds of post-conflict activities.¹⁸

The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies defines peace building as the development of constructive personal, group and political relationships across ethnic, religious, class, national, and racial boundaries. It aims to resolve injustice in non-violent ways and to transform the structural conditions that generate deadly conflict. Peace building can include conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and transformation and post-conflict reconciliation.

The Secretary General's Policy Committee of the United Nations describes peace building as involving a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. (Cheng-Hopkins, 2010:5)

Peace building involves a full range of approaches, processes, and stages needed for transformation toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships and governance modes and structures. Peace building includes building legal and human rights institutions as well as fair and effective governance and dispute resolution processes and systems. (Morris, 2013)

1.7 Literature Review

The idea of peace building has at its core, the realization that real, enduring and positive peace is desirable but realized only when a conflict is fully resolved. According to Cockell, peace building involves deliberate efforts and activities in the form of government policies or peace building programs and projects geared towards institutionalizing peace¹⁹. Peace

¹⁸ Amis L., Hodges A. and Jeffery N. (2006) *Development, Peace and Human Rights in Colombia: A Business Agenda*, the International Business Leaders Forum, London.

¹⁹ J. F. Cockell, "Conceptualizing Peace-building: Human Security and Sustainable Peace", in Pugh (ed.)

Regeneration of War-torn Societies. (London: Macmillan, 1999) pp.15-34

building would then be concerned with the total social advancement of the individual in a given social set up as opposed to the “well-being” and security of the State.

While expounding on the concept of human security, Renner²⁰ explains that an individual who can meet basic needs like food, shelter, clothing and education is less likely to feel insecure. Neither is that individual likely to be embroiled in conflicts of big magnitudes to warrant state intervention. Provision of the said basic needs is therefore one way of ensuring and safeguarding peace; but the Kenyan government has not been able to create a conducive environment for the optimization of these basic needs.

Lederach²¹ on the other hand draws similarities between peace building and sustainable reconciliation of highly divided societies. He notes that bringing back the trust and ending mutual suspicion for antagonistic social groups to reconcile is a difficult task. For the long process to go all the way, deliberate efforts and decisions should be made by all interested parties, to safeguard the process through establishment of institutions that command respect and authority. Lederach’s position on this particular issue is that state institutions alone may lack the capacity to initiate sustainable peace building and reconciliation among communities, considering their negative vested interests and limited resources.

Government agencies or state institutions are however fundamental for the sustenance and safeguarding of sustainable peace. The state or its institutions have some unique roles to play

²⁰ M. Renner, “Re-defining Security” in Mwangi & O. Oculi (eds.) *Rethinking Global Security: an African Perspective?* (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2006) pp. 1-11

²¹ J.P. Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1997)

in the transformation of internal conflicts. As Keating and Knight²² explain, there is a big relationship and connection between peace building and governance. Yet only the state exercises the function of governance. In intra-state conflicts, the state may be involved in a conflict as a party with vested interests. The state may also stand accused of omissions or commissions which perpetrated a conflict. Yet, it is the same institution which enjoys important powers and authority including the monopoly of using lawful force and violence. If exercised lawfully, state violence may positively transform a conflict as a step towards reconciliation and realization of peace. A similar scenario obtained from the violent conflict that followed the fiercely contested 2007 Presidential Election results in Kenya.

Where the state or government agencies and officers are deemed partisan or holding vested interests in a conflict, then the state cannot successfully assume its role and place in the lengthy process of peace building and reconciliation. In such a case it may either support an informal peace building and reconciliation process spearheaded by peace organizations which may be international or national. Alternatively, it may collaborate and team up with such organizations intending to positively transform the internal conflict. However, the need to exercise and safeguard sovereignty often discourages state agencies from partnering with peace organizations or even sanctioning and supporting their peace building work. The state is even more hesitant to entertain the involvement of international peace organizations in the management of internal conflicts.

²² T. Keating & Knight, "Recent Developments in Post Conflict Studies: Peace-Building and Governance" in Keating, *Building Sustainable Peace*. (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2004)

The Kenyan government has been widely criticized for taking too long to resolve long-standing and historical issues which are widely seen as the root cause of the violent conflict that followed the 2007 General Elections. According to Walter Oyugi²³, the first post-independence Kenya government started on a wrong footing. Faced with the noble but enormous task of transforming a highly expectant but socially, economically and politically divided and antagonistic citizenry into a prosperous and integrated nation-state, the first government failed to take advantage of available opportunities to promote equitable distribution of scarce resources like land, senior public service positions and prime development projects. This position is supported by Muigai²⁴ and Kanyinga²⁵ more so concerning the thorny and divisive issue of land access, use and ownership.

When the ruling KANU government lost power in December 2002 General Elections, a Coalition government (NARC) made up of previously opposition political parties took power²⁶. Although it was hoped this “reformist” government would not bring the much needed transition into a just government where peace building and reconciliation would be given priority, this would never be the case. The optimism and promise which came with the

²³ W. Oyugi, “The State in Post-Colonial East Africa” in Oyugi (ed.) *Politics and Administration in East Africa*. (Nairobi: EAEP, 1994) pp.3-29

²⁴ G. Muigai, “Kenyatta and Ethno-Nationalist State” in Berman et al, *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa* (Oxford: James Carrey, 2004)

²⁵ K. Kanyinga, *Readings on Inequality in Kenya*. (Nairobi: SFID, 2006)

²⁶ P. Wanyande, “The Politics of Coalition Government” in Wanyande et al, *Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya* (Nairobi: UON Pres, 2007) pp.107-129

popular NARC government was short-lived as the government and its agencies veered off the road to peace building and national reconciliation.

Makumi and Mutie hold the position that although crises and conflicts subsist during government transition period, this does not necessarily mean the said conflicts have been fully and completely addressed. Structural conflicts are also in transition during the transition period, and hence their management becomes problematic in practice.²⁷ This probably explains the apparent failure by successive Kenyan governments to initiate far-reaching societal transformation. But their argument also builds a case for the integration of governmental and non-governmental conflict management.

Even as the presence of peace organizations in peace building and reconciliation continues to expand by the day the political environment in which many such organizations operate affect their performance. According to Slim²⁸ both local and international non-governmental peace organizations have to deal with the politics of formal actors like states, political parties, international organizations and regional organizations in their humanitarian, development and ultimate peace building work. To be effective and successful they must embody political sophistication, the humanitarian principles of independence, universality and operational imagination. They must be non-political but have a detailed political analysis and understanding of the conflict and the role of third parties within it.

²⁷ M. Mwangi & M. Mutie, "Governance and Conflict Management", in Wanyande et al, *Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya*. (Nairobi: UON Press, 2007) pp. 137-154

²⁸ Hugo Slim, "International Humanitarianism Engagement with Civil War in the 1990s: A Glance at Evolving Practice and Theory" in *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (December, 1997) p5-10

The involvement of peace organizations in peace building assumed more importance with the end of the Cold War in early 1990s as the international community realized that a paradigm shift in international relations in general and international conflict management in particular was necessary for peace building and reconciliation efforts to be successful and sustainable. Although a number of conflict scholars and practitioners had already explained the need for a paradigm shift, the United Nations initiated this new thinking and practice before it was embraced by the international community. A report by the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* charted a new and fresh path for conflict management as it officially called for a comprehensive and multi-sectorial approach to conflict management.

Emphasizing the fact that many major conflicts had multiple causes, Boutros Ghali underscored some principles of Galtung's structural understanding of conflict when he stressed the importance of addressing the deepest causes of conflict, namely: economic and social injustice, and political oppression and seclusion.²⁹ The implications of this new thinking on the UN system and its partners in the international system became even more explicit when Boutros-Ghali developed his position further in his 1995 *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*. It was now evident peace building could contribute to preventive diplomacy by creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace.³⁰

Just as the definition of conflict and the conflict cycle imply, peace building could now be understood not necessarily as a post-conflict undertaking but a continuous process logically

²⁹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace Keeping*, 17 June 1992, Para's 15-16.

³⁰ Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, January 1995.

pursued even in times of peace. This new thinking also underlined the position that equity and justice should prevail not only in the pursuit of basic needs like food, shelter and clothing but also optimization of all human needs like individual security, personal and group identity and happiness.

Peace organizations today control huge resources rivaling budgets of less developed countries and reaching more than 300 million people annually. Their operations and programmes now determine in a big way, the success or failure of many countries' development plans including Kenya. This fact has raised questions about their potential to influence government's development plan and policy process.³¹ There are however weaknesses and challenges faced by these peace organizations thus necessitating the call for robust and creative ways of engaging with conflict parties.

As noted, the end of the Cold War was the beginning of initiatives to deal with a completely new and different political environment and international system characterized by among other changes, more civil wars and internal conflicts than ever experienced. The long-held strategist paradigm of international conflict management was on trial. The increased prominence of International Humanitarian Law necessitated a big change of attitude among UN members and other key international actors, from non-interference to active intervention, preventive diplomacy and peace building.³²

This new thinking however, implied an increased role for a resource-strained UN, hence the need for more non-state actors to take up the resultant professional and specialist civil

³¹ *Op cit* Abiew and Keating, 2004

³² *Ibid*, Abiew & Keating, pp.100-101

assignments in peace building. Peace organizations operating in the field of peace building and reconciliation consequently became very useful as they took up assignments on behalf of the UN, donor governments and or as their own programs.

Although the changing international system necessitated a corresponding change in conflict management approaches, other specific factors and new developments in the 21st century have collectively continued to cultivate a role for peace organizations in peace building and reconciliation. Aall notes that international peace organizations have in many cases overshadowed UN agencies in humanitarian intervention and consequent peace building. For instance, World Vision International spent over \$180 million in post-conflict Mozambique between 1993-1994, yet the total five year budget of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for the country was around \$60 million.³³

Abiew & Keating cite the apparent absence, or inability of state authorities to effectively manage internal conflicts or civil wars. Thus, the yawning gap that humanitarian and development non-governmental organizations continue to fill. For instance, peace organizations played central roles in the response to internal conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo and Zaire.³⁴ The absence, or failure of government agencies to end conflicts and initiate peace building and reconciliation programs could be attributed to several reasons from complete state failure in the case of Somalia to vested political interests in Congo DRC and deeply rooted issues calling for resolution-oriented approaches in the Bosnia and Kosovo

³³ P. Aall, "Nongovernmental Organizations and Peacemaking", in C. Crocker ET al eds. *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflicts*. (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 1996) p.435.

³⁴ *Op cit*, Abiew & Keating, p. 95

cases. More importantly, the huge interests held by the state and its ruling elite in internal conflicts often militate against genuine and effective state involvement in positive conflict transformation.

In the case of the 2007-2008 violent conflict in Kenya, government operatives and the political class were viewed as interested parties who could not be trusted to bring about a favorable outcome.³⁵ State institutions like the police, the provincial administration and the judiciary seemed to lack the required impartiality to be trusted with the management of the conflict. This politically charged environment also required a politically sensitive approach informed by a sophisticated political analysis of the obtaining environment.

In addition, the shortage of financial resources and peace building expertise by the side of the governments faced with internal conflicts and the disinterest by donors to finance government peace programs seemed to have collectively led to a diminishing peace building role for the state but a more prominent role for peace organizations. As to whether these peace organization initiatives succeed, other related issues have to be put into perspective.

It has been observed that peace organizations which are familiar with a conflict area are able to apply their prior knowledge of the conflict parties, issues and environment to successfully dismantle prohibitive structures and install desired changes. In the long-running Somalia conflict, both internal and external peace organizations have proved more knowledgeable and useful. They understood the conflict, issues and actors better due to their long presence and operations in that country way before the conflict attracted the attention of the UN. Although

³⁵ Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (Waki Commission), *the Report of Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence*. Nairobi, 2008.

most of these peace organizations were operating in humanitarian assistance and relief fields before the escalation of the conflict, it was easy for them to adjust and join development and peace building efforts. In many such cases, peace building became a natural extension of development and humanitarian relief operations.

Peace organizations have particularly contributed to the peace building process by tackling oppressive socio-economic structures during the reconstruction period, or even in a pre-conflict setting. By building the social capacity of local groups, reassembling the country's economic and social infrastructure, peace organizations are able to avail more economic and related political opportunities which together enable individuals and groups to realize their optimum potential.³⁶

Key information, skills and knowledge of a conflict's issues, parties and environment possessed by particular peace organizations have proved important tools and resources not only to local authorities but also the United Nations and other international formal players in conflict resolution. In the 1990s, peace organizations provided credible information and analyses on the Great Lakes Conflict to the UN and other formal actors. In the case of Somalia, peace organizations provided more reliable and credible information than what the UN Special Representative, Mohamed Sahnoun could avail.³⁷

According to Eliasson, non-governmental peace organizations are easily accepted in a conflict situation by state actors, concerned with legitimacy and sovereignty issues and implications because in the eyes of interested state actors, they lack any formal powers or

³⁶ *Op cit* Abiew & Keating, p.98

³⁷ Alex de Waal, *Famine Crimes* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1998) pp. 179-221.

authority to extend legitimacy to the parties challenging the state or its organs. Although that may be true, the same can be held as strength of peace organizations when engaging belligerent local authorities uncomfortable with formal actors like the UN and other international organizations. As state actors set out to manipulate intervening peace organizations, the latter can use the extended goodwill to positively transform the conflict.³⁸

In summary, the following are widely held as the great strengths and advantages of non-governmental peace organizations; whether local or international involved in peace building and reconciliation: flexibility, speed of reaction, comparative shorter bureaucracy and minimal red tape, optimal operational and implementation capacity, commitment and dedication, relative conflict neutrality and political interdependence.³⁹

The good record of non-governmental peace organizations in development work and their pursuit of positive peace anchored on social justice have encountered several challenges. Some of these challenges can be derived from the inherent qualities and weaknesses of peace organizations as distinct organizations whereas others can be attributed to the highly charged political environment they operate in. However, their weaknesses can be minimized and the challenges may be addressed by applying particular strategies recommended by some peace building scholars and practitioners.

³⁸ J. Eliasson, "Establishing Trust in the Healer" in K. M. Cahill ed. *Preventive Diplomacy-Stopping Wars Before They Start* (New York: Basic Books, 1996) p. 332.

³⁹ M. Griffiths et al, "Sovereignty and Suffering", in J. Harris ed. *The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* (London: Printer Publishers, 1995) p.72

Some non-governmental peace organizations are neutral in their approach as a matter of principle whereas others do not exhibit the slightest sense of neutrality. Moreover, some non-governmental peace organizations are state-sponsored such as USAID, faith-based (World Vision International) or autonomous and non-religious (Medecins Sans Frontiers).

Least developed countries such as Kenya have been uneasy and cautious when dealing with government sponsored international peace organizations because of their perceived tendency to interfere in the internal affairs of the host country. Although the practice by non-governmental peace organizations to disregard state sovereignty and operate without borders may be viewed as a strength, it has also led to unfortunate but avoidable disagreements, with host governments accusing external peace organizations of intruding and meddling in internal affairs.⁴⁰ According to Baitenmann, non-governmental peace organizations can be used by external forces to influence the direction and outcome of conflicts, without their direct involvement.

The fear by African states like Kenya as well as other least developed countries in the south that some peace organizations may use internal conflicts to expand and perpetuate their influence in an increasingly politicized peace building environment and the failure of multilateral peace building operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti among others in the 1990s has raised questions about the effectiveness of peace organizations in peace building and reconciliation initiatives.⁴¹

⁴⁰ H. Baitenmann, "NGOs and the Fagan War: The Politicization of Humanitarian Aid", in *Third World Quarterly*, No. (1996) p. 6.

⁴¹ *Op cit*, Abiew & Keating, pp. 103-104.

However, as Lederach holds, the dynamics, multilateral and comprehensive work that is peace building requires careful balancing and planning. Immediate issues must be addressed without jeopardizing short-term and long-term objectives. All actors, from grass-root level to top leadership through middle range parties and leaders must play their roles harmoniously for peace building and reconciliation to be successfully undertaken.⁴² In addition, more efforts should be directed at coordination and accountability among the multiple actors involved in peace building.

From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that peace organizations have a big role to play in peace building and reconciliation. Indeed, from the time Kofi Annan advocated for information sharing and exchange between peace organizations and other institutional actors like states⁴³, the increase in civil wars and other internal conflicts has meant a bigger role for peace organizations. Peace organizations have to deal with a politically charged environment in their initial humanitarian and subsequent development and peace building work. To be effective, a detailed political analysis of the operating area must inform their work.

In a summarized form, Prendergast⁴⁴ and Smock⁴⁵ propose the following eight guidelines as key to successful peace organizations' engagement in peace building: better planning' more

⁴² J. P. Lederach, "Civil Society and Reconciliation" in Crocker et al, *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 2001)

⁴³Kofi Annan, *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform. Report of the Secretary-General* (New York: United Nations, 1997) pp.207-216.

⁴⁴J. Prendergast, *Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa* (Builder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1996)

⁴⁵ D. Smock, "Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa", in *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (July 1997)

accurate needs assessment; analysis of work environment risks and opportunities; providing strategic assistance; independent evaluation of relief and development programmes; empowering local people and institutions; working closely with line organizations; monitoring and acting on human rights abuses by warring parties.

1.8 Conceptual Framework

This study was anchored on the concept of peace building and reconciliation, which had at its core a principled, comprehensive and sustainable resolution of conflicts, resulting into sustainable desirable change in society.

According to J. P. Lederach the concept of peace building is essentially premised on the understanding that parties in conflicts often live in close geographical proximity yet are locked into long-standing cycles of hostile interaction⁴⁶. Peace building as a concept therefore underlines a flexible and creative yet dynamic way of restoring societal relationships at both individual and community level. It is concerned with all those governmental and non-governmental policies, programmes and associated efforts geared towards the functioning of social, political and economic structures.

Contrary to what the term peace building may suggest, peace building as a concept goes beyond post-conflict reconstruction. Just like the conflict cycle, peace building encompasses “a full array of processes, and stages needed to transform a conflict towards more peaceful

⁴⁶ J. P. Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1997) p. 23

relationships”.⁴⁷ The said processes and activities may precede or follow a conflict. Peace building programs, activities and initiatives may therefore be undertaken before and or after a conflict.

Although peace building as a concept focuses on long term desired change, it appreciates the importance of the need to address immediate issues and relationships before eventually resorting to transforming the entire system through long-term programs and plans. While it pursues the ultimate goal of a desired future, the concept underscores the importance of immediate and short-term plans, emergency and humanitarian operations, crisis interventions, mid-term training and design of long-term social change.

Both Lederach and Cockell⁴⁸ are in agreement that relationships and sustainable peace are critical components of the concept of peace building. According to Cockell, the unique challenges posed by post-Cold War conflicts have given relevance and prominence to this concept, which ideally addresses internal and dynamic conflicts by targeting and uprooting their root causes. Drawing from the postulation of Galtung⁴⁹, Cockell also holds that peace building is fundamentally about ending structural violence by eliminating inhibitive and unjust societal structures which may be political, social or economic.

⁴⁷ J. P. Lederach, “Civil Society and Reconciliation”, in Crocker et al, *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001) pp. 841-855.

⁴⁸ J. Cockell “Conceptualizing Peace building: Human Security and Sustainable Peace” in M. Pugh (ed.) *Regeneration of War-torn Societies* (London: Macmillan Publishers, 2000).

⁴⁹ Johan Galtung, “Three Approaches to Peace: Peace Keeping, Peace Making and Peace building”, in Galtung, *Peace, War and Defense; Essays in peace Research*, vol. 2, 1976, pp.282-304.

The need for a shift from rigid and inadequate state-centric approaches which dominated a bigger part of the 20th century was underlined by the landmark 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace* by the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In this report, Boutros Ghali called for “an integrated approach to human security” to address “the deepest causes of conflicts: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression”.⁵⁰ In his 1995 *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali backs Lederach’s position that peace building as a concept is not confined to post-conflict activities. Rather, as a conflict management concept, peace building should be defined by its activities and objectives, not its sequencing in the peace building process.⁵¹ Peace building should therefore entail “the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace”.⁵²

According to Lederach, the following key ingredients are mandatory for successful sustainable peace building: peace building must run simultaneously at numerous levels of society; short-term needs (such as ending physical violence) and long-term vision (such as equal opportunities) must be linked; critical issues must find immediate response while broader structural change is envisioned.⁵³ In summary, the concept of peace building is long-term oriented, visionary, comprehensive and focuses on the whole rather than part of the whole. As one sets out to stop what is undesired and seeks solutions to particular

⁵⁰ Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace Keeping*, 17 June 1992, paras. 15-16.

⁵¹ J. Cockell, *op cit* p.17.

⁵² B. Boutros Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, 3 January, 1995 para. 49.

⁵³ J. P. Lederach, “Civil Society and Reconciliation”, in Crocker, *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 2001) pp. 841-855.

incompatibilities, peace building demands that all those initiatives should build into a desirable whole, which would be restoration of mutual and legitimate relationships.

The concept of peace building goes hand in hand with reconciliation. Although reconciliation hints at a post-conflict environment, the continuous and dynamic process which defines peace building would then contribute to the failure or success of reconciliation. Successful peace building prevents the occurrence or recurrence of conflict. Yet post-conflict reconciliation without successful peace building is at best unsustainable and at worst impossible. Moreover, both peace building and reconciliation have the need to heal and restore interpersonal relationships at their very core. Reconciliation is therefore a dynamic and adaptive process aimed at building and healing interpersonal and community relationships. It is about building relationships among real people in real life situations who must move forward together.

As a dynamic process, peace building can only lead to reconciliation if it is undertaken successfully. Although force and other elements of state power may be deployed to address and respond to immediate issues and concerns systematic transformation of the systemic and underlying economic, social and political structures leads to long-term positive change, and sustainable or positive peace. According to Lederach, this task is even heavier in societies deeply divided by long-running conflicts. Things get even more complex and tricky where the state has been sucked into an internal conflict and or it is suspicious and resistant to external intervention.

Whereas peace agreements deal with interests and issues of substance, peace building and reconciliation seek to understand and address deeper emotional, and psychological and

subjective aspects often based on generations of pain, loss and suffering. Individuals and communities are called upon to reconsider their images of self, community and the enemy. These are definitely long and engaging processes requiring enormous skills, creativity and resources, which can only be mobilized through a multi-sectored and inclusive approach.

Although it may be difficult to bring about reconciliation and peace, some peace and conflict scholars and practitioners hold that peace building and reconciliation is the surest way to a desired and sustainable future among previously conflicting communities. According to Lederach, successful reconciliation depends on a unique, dynamic and practical balance of four key ingredients namely: truth, mercy, justice and peace.⁵⁴

Truth is a disclosure of wrongs, those behind it and their reasons. More important is the acknowledgement by the wrong doers. It is therefore an important beginning of the healing process. After the truth, the difficult journey of forgiving and showing mercy the guilty and seeking a united fresh start begins. Justice contributes to mercy and peace by restoring and compensating through restorative justice losses and injustice suffered and preventing a recurrence. Peace is thus the result of a successful balance of truth, mercy and justice. As past pain and loss ends, people build new, legitimate and dynamic relationships-the desired future.

According to Cockell, the concept of peace building is progressive since it gives prominence to human security as opposed to state security. The focus is therefore on the individual right from the analysis of a conflict's root causes, the obtaining context and the options available for sustainable resolution and reconciliation. The human security approach is thus in

⁵⁴ *Op cit Lederach*, pp. 848-853.

harmony with the peace building concept because it cites the following as the basic parameters for sustainable peace building programs: focus on the root causes, context-specificity, sustainability and persistence, mobilization of indigenous and people-centered resources.⁵⁵

From the foregoing discussion, peace building is then an integrated, multi-sectoral and comprehensive undertaking which, of necessity requires the engagement of combinations of multi actors like state/government agencies, peace organizations and international non-governmental organizations. Moreover, the central threats to sustainable peace may be addressed by applying the following specific yet related strategies: political security and governance; community security and societal stability; personal security and human rights; economic security.⁵⁶

The highly engaging and comprehensive work of peace building clearly requires long-term planning and enormous resources, which may be availed by a multi-sectored team resulting from a strong and genuine governmental and non-governmental partnership. Abiew and Keating have observed that the contribution of both development and humanitarian peace organizations in all phases of peace building including advocacy and actual service delivery in the field is too significant to be ignored.⁵⁷ The performance of these peace organizations which operate in different conflict environments using different approaches may be best investigated and assessed using the peace building concept.

⁵⁵ *Op cit* Cockell pp. 20-23.

⁵⁶ *Ibid* Cockell, pp.24-26.

⁵⁷ K. Abiew & T. Keating, "Defining a Role for Civil Society", in T. Keating & Knight (eds.), *Building Sustainable Peace* (Tokyo, UN University Press, 2004) pp. 93-117, p.93.

Although the concept of peace building began to enjoy international policy limelight as a key part of the post-Cold War global changes, its definition and meaning in policy and operational terms continues to be debatable. Whereas Keating seems to limit peace building to activities addressing post-conflict issues, Lederach is emphatic that peace building is continuous since it may be undertaken before or after a conflict provided that it aims at achieving desired long-term change. There is however reasonable consensus that the distinctive feature of the concept of peace building is its emphasis on addressing the root causes of conflict within societies⁵⁸. Galtung emphasizes that peace building is basically about the abolition of structural violence oppression and domination but not merely ending direct violence physical harm and warfare⁵⁹. This key understanding of the concept then provided the foundation and defined the boundaries of this study.

1.9 Research Methodology

Research Design

This study looked into the role of NPI-Africa in building peace in Kibera. The research design employed in this study was descriptive research survey. The major purpose of descriptive research design is to describe the state of affairs as it is at present.⁶⁰ A descriptive research is a process of collecting data in order to answer questions concerning the current

⁵⁸ *Op cit* Cockell p.16.

⁵⁹ *Op cit* Galtung pp. 285-287.

⁶⁰ Kothari, C. R. (2004). *Research Methodology* (2nd ed.). New York: Free Press.

status of the subjects in the study.⁶¹ By investigating the contribution of NPI-Africa in peace building in Kibera, this study aimed at establishing the possible role, strength and challenges faced by peace organizations in peace building in Kenya's conflict hotspots.

Target Population

The study was conducted in Nairobi, Kenya at NPI-Africa as well as in Kibera. The target population was the specific population about which information was desired. Ngechu (2004) defines a population as a well-defined set of people, services, elements and events, group of things or households to be investigated. Thus, the study focused on management and employee of NPI-Africa who had knowledge on the role of NPI-Africa in peace building. The study also focused on community leaders in Kibera who had engaged in one way or the other with NPI-Africa in enabling peace particularly during the 2008 Post Election violence. Residents of Kibera were also considered while conducting this study particularly the Nubi community that had experienced some form of injustice in Kibera. Members of the District Peace Committee of the NSC were also investigated.

Sample size

A sample of 30 was drawn from the population for the study. The sample consisted of NPI-Africa management and staff; as well a provincial administration, the Nubi community as well as other Kibera residents all residing in Kibera. This was in an attempt to draw relevant information regarding the relevance of peace building initiatives by peace organizations such as NPI-Africa in conflict epicentres such as Kibera. As indicated in the table below, a total of 30 respondents were selected to gather information.

⁶¹ Mugenda, M., & Mugenda, G. (2003). *Research methods: Quantitative and qualitative approaches*. Nairobi: Acts Press.

	NPI-Africa management & staff	NSC Management & Staff	The Nubi Community	Kibera Residents
Interviews	3	2	5	5
Questionnaires	2	3	5	5

Sampling Design

Purposive sampling design was employed as it helped target the respondents with the right knowledge required for the study. Data was collected using questionnaires and guided personal interviews for primary data. This primary data helped the researcher get first-hand information from the respondents. Self-administered questionnaires with set of questions were issued to the respondents who were given ample time to answer the questions. The questionnaires used closed ended questions, this was in an effort to ensure time and money conservation as well as help in facilitating an easier analysis since information was easily deduced.

Secondary data was sorted from journals, government reports, internet websites, unpublished and published materials, newspapers and newsletters.

Data Analysis

The study generated qualitative data which was used to draw conclusions and make recommendations. Qualitative data was categorized into various thematic concerns and

analyzed to offer clarifications, verifications and explanation. Intensity or frequency of an idea or theme served as a pointer to its importance.⁶²

1.10 Scope and Limitation

The case study approach adopted would be limiting since the interventions of NPI-Africa in Kibera was likely to offer a completely different outcome and experience from that of NPI-Africa engagements in other parts of Kenya. Resource limitation would not allow the study to cover the entire Kibera but only sections that experienced a high magnitude of violence.

General and nationally applicable sources like government reports and policy documents on peace building and reconciliation referred to, would nonetheless give the study reasonable uniformity for generalization, as their wider perspective minimized this limitation. Moreover, Kibera conflicts' causes, issues and dynamics would not be the same but were similar to those of other conflicts particularly conflicts in the Rift.

This study was carried out eight years after the historic 2008 Post Election Violence. Some of the residents most affected by the violent conflict no longer resided in Kibera and would therefore not be interviewed. This meant the study would not factor in their views on how peace building had been managed so far. However, the use of purposive sampling techniques minimized that limitation by ensuring that available key respondents were interviewed.

Lastly, some of the respondents would respond in a standard or stereotypic way. To mitigate this limitation, questionnaires were designed in a manner that hindered stereotype answers.

⁶²*Op cit* Kombo & Tromp, 2006. p. 119

1.11 Chapter Outline

This study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction to the study. It involves the background of the study, statement of the problem, research objectives and questions, hypothesis, scope and limitation of the study, literature review, conceptual framework and research methodology.

Chapter two of the study gives case scenarios of involvement of peace organizations in peace building. This chapter identifies countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia that have in the past undergone civil wars and were in need of peace interventions by non-state actors as their states were in some way involved in these civil wars.

Chapter three of the study is on NPI-Africa policy formulation in ending conflict in Kibera, assessing how NPI-Africa's resource mobilization enhances peace policy formulation. In addition, it also looks into peace interventions by NPI-Africa and how they mitigate conflict in Kibera, as well as assessing how these interventions enhance peace and security in Kibera.

Chapter four presented the data analysis, presentation and interpretation. Analysis of data was done and then interpreted in an effort to answer the research questions in the study.

Chapter five summarizes the whole study. It comprises the summary, discussions, conclusion and recommendations as drawn from the results in chapter four.

CHAPTER TWO

PEACE ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACE BUILDING IN SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES

2.0 Introduction

Since the late 1980s when the international system experienced a far reaching change of conflict actors, issues and the overall political environment, the previously supreme role of the State in International Conflict Management and politics continues to be challenged. Not only did the end of the Cold War herald a more inclusive and democratic international political process, it also marked an increased demand for human rights and international humanitarian principles observance, enhanced human welfare and a reduced role for the State in public affairs.⁶³

Moreover, as the Cold War came to an end in the early 1990s the political arena (both nationally and internationally) was opened up. African regimes which had received unconditional support from either the Capitalists or Communists now had to contend with both internal and external criticism of their political, economic and social development policies. Most significantly, it is the "humanitarian tragedies of the 1990s" that opened up a new chapter for the concept of Peace Building and Reconciliation in Africa and other less developed parts of the world.

According to Stephen J. Stedman the 1990s was dominated by humanitarian tragedies which necessitated a big response from humanitarian and development peace organizations. Stedman notes that between 1991 and 1993, 400,000 Somalis died from war and induced famine. In 1994, approximately 800,000 Rwandese fell victim to genocide. In four years of

⁶³ S. Stedman, "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa". In M. Brown ed., *International Dimensions of Internal Conflicts* (Cambridge: Centre for Science and International Affairs, 1996) pp. 235-266, p. 243

Civil war, Liberia had seen nearly half of its population of 2.5 million die or flee. In Sudan nearly 1.2 million people died from famine and civil war. Additionally, in 1993, over 100,000 people lost their lives in Burundi during a one month ethnic blood-letting.⁶⁴

In all the Post-Cold War internal conflicts in Africa, the State as an institution and the ruling political elite were implicated. It therefore, became difficult for the same State or its agencies to successfully take up the subsequent tasks of peace building, reconciliation and general reconstruction. Moreover, systematic ethnicization of society, regional divisions and other forms of social exclusion, led to the emergence and gradual development of a civil society role in peace building and reconciliation.⁶⁵

2.1 Peace Organizations in Action: An Overview

The proliferation of internal conflicts in Africa in the 1990s resulted into humanitarian, social and economic crises which necessitated urgent and comprehensive response. The State and other formal institutions often lacked the capacity, will and moral authority to engage constructively and positively. It should however be noted that peace organizations and other Civil Society Organizations have played significant roles in emergency relief and humanitarian operations, as well as long term development programmes aimed at building peace in Africa, Asia, Europe and South America.

As Abiew and Keating observe, international peace organizations have performed a variety of tasks in multilateral peace building and relief operations. In many cases, such peace organizations have come to the rescue of overwhelmed governments, regional organizations

⁶⁴ *Ibid* Stedman p. 235

⁶⁵ M. Omosa et al, *Theory and Practice of Governance in Kenya: Towards Civil Engagement* (Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 2006) p. 62

and international organizations like the United Nations.⁶⁶ Where peace organizations have been on the ground implementing development programmes long before the outbreak of conflict as was the case in East Timor, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Iraq their contributions in post-conflict peace building has been more remarkable.⁶⁷ This is mainly because of their wealth of experience, knowledge of the operating area and its key issues, and actual or potential partners available.

In most parts of the world, the effectiveness of peace organizations in peace building has continued to be determined and influenced by a combination of factors, ranging from resource constraints to politico-official impediments and the operational environment. Conflicts in a transition context have been known to pose serious management problems because of the obtaining change in characteristics, social environment and other militating realities.⁶⁸ There is therefore need to consider changing management mechanisms of old conflicts during a political transition period. Kenya has undergone changes of government and political system but structural (social, political and economic) conflicts have been constant. This state of affairs is attributed partly to the continued application of same, old conflict management mechanisms even during transition periods.⁶⁹

Resource availability has also been a major determinant of the outcomes of peace building initiatives by peace organizations. Huge budgets, competent and committed personnel and information-based interventions have often made all the difference. In post- conflict

⁶⁶ F. Abiew & T. Keating: "Defining a Role for Civil Society" in Keating and Knight eds. *Building Sustainable Peace*. (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2004) p. 96

⁶⁷ *Ibid* Abiew & Keating pp. 96-97

⁶⁸ M. Ottaway, "Mediation in a Transitional Conflict: Eritrea", in *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 518, *Resolving Regional Conflicts: International Perspectives* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1999)

⁶⁹ M. Mwangiru & P. Mutie, "Governance and Conflict Management", in P. Wanyande et al, *Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya*. (Nairobi: UON Press, 2007) pp. 131-154: p. 138

Mozambique, World Vision International spent over \$ 180 million in two years, while the total five year budget of UNDP was around \$ 60 million. In early 1990's Afghanistan, peace organizations came in to support the UNHCR, the government of Pakistan and the USA in addressing emergency, humanitarian and development concerns occasioned by 3.5 million Afghan refugees. As the 1994 Rwanda crisis unfolded, "an unprecedented number of NGOs responded" with more than 100 organizations operating in DRC Congo's Goma and North Kivu, and 169 others based within Rwanda.⁷⁰

In Kenya, NGOs gained prominence in the quest for far-reaching structural changes after it became evident that elections and changes of government were mere change of figure-heads while unjust regimes remained in place courtesy of same structural apparatus.⁷¹ Both national and international NGOs thus joined the push for structural and sustainable positive change in Kenya by advocating for justice, democracy and good governance practices. Over the years, the NGO world became "an important part of the structure of public conflict resolution" which would be incorporated in government peace building and conflict management strategies.⁷²

Consequently, since early 1990s peace organizations and Civil Society Organizations have played the following key roles in peace building in Kenya; humanitarian support during ethnic and other civil conflicts, community development, shaping of public agenda, civic education and community mobilization.

According to Omosa, far reaching structural changes in Kenya would then lead to reconciliation, comprehensive and lasting peace. This is because injustices are deeply

⁷⁰ *op cit* Abiew & Keating pp. 95-97.

⁷¹ *op cit* Mwangi & Mutie p. 137

⁷² *Ibid* Mwangi & Mutie p. 148

entrenched and historical as they started with the colonial regime but consecutive governments advanced various forms of structural and cultural violence. The colonial government initiated political, social and economic seclusion, and racial segregation. Kenyatta's regime worsened economic injustices whereas Moi's era aggravated despair in most Kenyans with worse cases of tribalism, corruption and mismanagement of public resources experienced. Although Kibaki's rule rekindled hope, this hope was not sustainable. Nepotism, negative ethnicity and corruption continued. In fact, Kibaki's NARC party "failed to reconcile even with itself. Instead, it established itself as a serious disappointment to most Kenyans"⁷³

Going by the long history of injustices and incompatibilities mentioned, one can appreciate consequent enormous peace building tasks, which had to, of necessity incorporate both government and non-governmental initiatives.

In Uganda, internal conflicts started taking shape soon after independence. Although the Idi Amin coup d'etat caused far reaching economic, social and political upheavals, both within Uganda and the entire East African region, the regime of Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) took Uganda's internal conflicts to another level. As Museveni's rule perpetrated physical violence and extra-judicial killings, Obote's people and other communities in the North were the most affected. They felt victimized and marginalized.⁷⁴ A huge ethnic conflict was therefore gathering momentum and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency in the North (perceived as legitimate self-defense) would result into a major humanitarian and political crisis that would suck in neighbouring

⁷³ M. Omosa et al, *Theory and Practice of Governance in Kenya: Towards Civil Engagement* (Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 2006) pp. 99-100

⁷⁴ A. Adedeji ed., *Africa Conflict, Peace and Governance Monitor* (Ibadan: Dokun Publishing House, 2005) p. 63

governments, and both local and international peace organizations. It is estimated that 1.8 million people from the Acholi and Lango ethnic groups of northern Uganda have been displaced from their homes and communities.

According to Rose Othieno, women NGOs have contributed in a big way to peace and reconciliation work in Uganda, more so through NGOs advocacy, education and structural reforms programmes. Over 40 women groups under the National Association of Women's Organizations (NAWOU) worked together to co-ordinate peace campaign projects and activities.⁷⁵ Citing the deadly outcomes of physical violence over the years, women NGOs in Uganda lobbied for peaceful means of setting conflicts. Dialogue forums were organized right from the grass-roots level, urging parties embroiled in violent conflicts to pursue peaceful methods of resolving their incompatibilities. Organizations like Uganda Women Network (UWONET), Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE), Uganda Media women Association (UMWA), Action for Development (ACFODE), propagated peace messages through the mass media.⁷⁶

Moreover, women through ACFODE trained and built the capacity of peace NGOs in the North and rehabilitated child soldiers following the 1980s Civil Wars. CECORE organized and conducted trainings for women peace workers who would then act as mobilizing agents and entry points to peace NGOs at the grass-roots level.

Although peace NGOs in Uganda may not have conclusively addressed all the internal conflicts, their contribution was nonetheless notable. Much would have been achieved had

⁷⁵ R. Othieno, "Women's Contribution to Peace and Reconciliation in Uganda", in Heinrich Boll Foundation, *Towards Sustainable Peace-Civil Society Dialogue Forum for the Horn of Africa* (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2001)

⁷⁶ *Ibid* Othieno p. 228

the Ugandan government and other State actors succeeded in disarming all the rebel units and militias. LRA's Joseph Kony continues to avoid negotiations by shifting goal posts and evading mediation efforts. Moreover, the implication of the Ugandan government in the "more than two decades state terror, civil war and inordinate human rights abuses" made peace building initiatives quite challenging.⁷⁷

Soon after independence, Sudan fell under the grip of costly Civil wars and internal conflicts, which were political and resource-based, but later on took other dimensions. According to Hassan Abdel, "except for the very short period of peace following the Addis Ababa agreement in early 1970s", Sudan has largely been a civil strife zone.⁷⁸ The coming to power of the 1989s Salvation military rule escalated the conflict to the western and eastern parts of Sudan as the main northern opposition, National Democratic Alliance (NDA) joined the South's Sudan People Liberation Army in fighting the government. In addition to other negative outcomes of the Civil War, around 6 million people were displaced.⁷⁹ Contending issues changed from structural injustices and bad governance to religious and ethnic differences as the government called for a holy war against opposition forces.

As the conflict issues and dynamics moved outside the realm of political leadership and government military command, religious jihadism and martyrdom worsened already existent deep social cleavages. Although more actors were drawn into the intensifying conflict, the imposition of restrictions on NGOs' activities in early 1990s jeopardized NGOs' efforts to positively transform the now complex conflict.⁸⁰ However, the year 1999 proved to be the

⁷⁷ *Ibid* Othieno pp. 228-229

⁷⁸ Hassan Abdel, "The Sudan Conflict", in *Towards Sustainable Peace- Civil Society Dialogue Forum for the Horn of Africa* (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2007)

⁷⁹ *Ibid* Abdel p. 130

⁸⁰ *Ibid* Abdel p. 130

turning point when the ruling party suffered internal divisions. Most of the parties to the conflict (Khartoum government, NDA and SPLA) called for national reconciliation and post-conflict peace building as they realized that the Sudan problem would not be solved militarily but through peaceful negotiations.

When the regime barred political parties and other Civil Society Organizations like trade unions and imposed restrictions on NGOs in the 1990s, only national NGOs could continue engaging the conflicting parties. Their success in humanitarian intervention had already earned them trust, recognition and legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens, foreign donors, and State actors. National and international NGOs then operating in Sudan also possessed valuable information, knowledge, experience and links (internal and external) established and developed over the years.

As the democratic and civil space opened up, NGOs mobilized civil groups made up of youth, women and professional associations to apply the much needed pressure on conflicting parties to move to the negotiations table. This was informed by the NGOs' quest for "a comprehensive solution that addresses the root causes of the problem". These efforts partly contributed to the re-awakening of more civil and human rights groups like child rights organizations, women movements, and overall internationalization of humanitarian concerns. Fatigued actors including regional formal entities like Egypt, Libya, Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD), IGAD partners, were also re-energized by the NGOs' programmes.⁸¹

⁸¹ *Ibid* Abdel p. 135

Consequently, peace organizations placed the pursuit of real peace through peaceful resolution of the conflict as the ultimate long term desired goal. The guiding points were: basic civil rights for all as provided in the United Nations rights convention, democracy and civil liberties, freedom of thought, expression, and cultural diversity as a way to peaceful co-existence.

The contribution of NGOs to the Sudan peace process encountered several challenges but the most formidable were the acute crisis that engulfed the political, social and economic systems, lack of commitment to negotiations and unwillingness to accept negotiation outcomes. These strategic and crucial challenges curtailed the positive contribution of the NGOs in the Sudan peace process.⁸²

In conclusion to the overview of NGOs' peace building programmes and operations, it should be noted that in addition to the external challenges suffered, these peace/conflict NGOs also exhibit inherent and internal impediments and weaknesses. Most African NGOs enjoying funding from developed countries have been justifiably accused of selfishly perpetuating their existence, lacking patriotism and advancing "unrealistic goals."⁸³ In some instances, national NGOs' leaders have been sucked into domestic conflicts and politics thus becoming active parties to the conflicts they seek to resolve. This has led to pessimism concerning "perceptions about the sincerity of the agenda setting and neutral role of the civil society".⁸⁴

On the contrary, Harbeson insists that NGOs provide the key to sustained political reform, conflict (structural) resolution, legitimate states and governments, viable state-society and

⁸² *Ibid* Abdel p. 135

⁸³ *op cit* Abiew & Keating pp. 104-106

⁸⁴ *op cit* Mwagiru & Mutie p. 149

state-economy relationships, and ultimate prevention of political failures.⁸⁵ With this in mind, the challenge for NGOs is probably to ensure continuous improvement, re-invention and re-energization, which would then enable sustainable standard-setting, dialogue supporting and community mobilization of community and other resources for peace building and reconciliation.

2.2 The Sierra Leonean Conflict and Peace Building Efforts

Three decades after gaining independence in 1961, Sierra Leone found itself embroiled in a brutal Civil War as a rebel movement; the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) engaged three successive governments in fierce violent conflicts. This conflict turned violent when RUF fighters attacked Bomaru in Kaitahun District from Liberian territory in March 1991, with the implicit support of President Charles Taylor.⁸⁶ Although RUF initially seemed to target Joseph Momoh's dictatorial and long one-party regime, the internal conflict would soon assume an organic life of its own, similar to other African cases like Uganda (1979-1986), Sudan (1973-2005) and Congo DR (1999-2005).⁸⁷

Although the violent opposition to Momoh's rule could initially be attributed to civil disobedience and rebellion brought about by a long period of bad governance and misrule, state complexity and systemic corruption would help perpetuate the conflict. Corrupt and unprofessional Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) often collaborated with RUF militias to prolong the war and benefit from illegal gold and diamond mining.⁸⁸ This

⁸⁵J. Harberson, "Civil Society and Political Renaissance in Africa" in Harberson et al, *Civil Society and the State in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994)

⁸⁶ T. Abdullah, "Introduction", in Abdullah ed. *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004), P.2

⁸⁷ *Ibid* Abdullah p.3

⁸⁸ *Ibid* Abdullah p.4

internal conflict and subsequent failure of state organs and systems was deeply entrenched that in 1997 RUF and Major Koroma's Armed Forces Ruling Council jointly fought Tejan Kabbah's democratically elected Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) government.

The reconciliation and peace building process would expectedly draw in internal and external, formal and non-formal actors, as the long Civil War resulted into complicated economic and socio-political structural conflicts. As the hurting conflict drew frustrations and desperations in the late 1990s, western powers and NGOs compromised long-term real peace objectives to end the violence by drafting the 1999 Lome Peace Accord, which elevated RUF's Foday Sankoh and Johnny Koroma to Chairman of Diamond Management Committee and Chairman Committee to Consolidate Peace respectively.⁸⁹

Some of the local NGOs which fought the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) which came to power after the May, 1997 *coup* include Sierra Leone Labor Congress (SLLC), National Union of Sierra Leone Students (NUSS), Women's Peace Movement (WPM), and Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAT). SLAT sustained a media campaign underlined by the rallying call, freedom and liberty only possible with a democratic constitution and the realms of rule of law.⁹⁰ By bravely opposing the ruling junta and upholding the public view of the sanctity of a democratically elected government, SLAT shaped and reflected the dissenting public opinion.

It is imperative to note that post-conflict peace building and reconciliation work is often confronted by many challenges, which may be surmounted by adopting an inclusive and multilateral approach. In such a setting, state institutions may partner with non-state

⁸⁹ O. Gordon, "Civil Society Against the State: The Independent Press and the AFRC-RUF Junta", in Abdullah, *Between Democracy and Terror* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004) pp 180-196: p. 181.

⁹⁰ *Ibid* Gordon p. 187

organizations to seek long-term solutions to incompatibilities. In a failed state, the said state institutions are non-existent and the state cannot therefore undertake its peace building role and functions. According to Zartman, this situation arises when the state is unable to perform its most basic functions of protecting the lives and properties of its citizens against internal and external aggression, or even controlling the exploitation and use of state resources.⁹¹

Considering that for ten years, consecutive governments were unable to neutralize RUF, and rebel government soldiers openly colluded and collaborated with rebels and militias to loot prime resources like gold and diamonds, Sierra Leone then exhibited qualities of a failed state as postulated by Zartman. President Kabbah had to rely on the militia groups like Kamajors and private security companies like Executive Outcomes to hang on to power.⁹² In such a political governance scenario, post-conflict peace building understandably faces numerous systematic challenges.

As Joseph Momah's All Peoples Congress (APC) could not provide the much needed executive leadership in managing this deadly conflict, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), UN and Commonwealth peace initiatives also failed as RUF remained disinterested and suspicious to mediators and the whole peace process. Amidst all this gloom, International Alert, a London based conflict resolution non-governmental organization personally connected to Sankoh and his friend; Liberian President Taylor, was able to exploit its informal setup, strengths and networks to engage the warring parties. International Alert however lost its neutrality to the conflict as one of its senior officers called Ayaaba Addai-

⁹¹ W. Zartman: *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, Co. Lynne Reinner, 2004) p.5

⁹² Se, A. Abraham, "The Elusive Quest for Peace: From Abidjan to Lome" in Abdullah ed. *Between Democracy and Terror*, pp. 199-208

Sebo joined RUF as Sankoh's advisor and "warned RUF against dealing with imperialist organizations like UN and the Commonwealth."⁹³

The UN and other international actors however pushed on with the process, leading to the February 1996 election of Kabbah and SLPP to power, and the November, 1996 Abidjan Peace Accord. The signing of this Accord was the culmination of a desperate peace process which failed to focus on truth, justice and forgiveness as the long-term desirable goals. Instead, it sought to reach a settlement that would stop the physical violence by appeasing Sankoh and RUF with lucrative and prestigious positions. This Peace Accord protected RUF and the military National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from any restorative or retributive justice as it was silent on truth, justice and reconciliation.⁹⁴ Apart from detaining Major Karomah, Sankoh (in Nigeria) and other few RUF/AFRC leaders, no comprehensive long term measures were taken to resolve the now deeply entrenched structural causes of the conflict. The structural conflict would then be triggered into a violent one in January 1999 when AFRC and RUF, supported by neighboring Liberia's President Taylor, attacked Freetown. Within days, more than 3,000 children were missing and over 5,000 people reported dead.⁹⁵

The July 1999 Lome Agreement was again kind and inclusive to RUF as it was allocated 4 ministerial posts and Sankoh was made the Chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development. A Truth Commission was proposed without provision for justice or punishment to the RUF. NGOs condemned the Lome Agreement for providing unconditional amnesty to RUF as a violation

⁹³ *ibid* Abraham p. 202

⁹⁴ *ibid* Abraham pp. 205-210

⁹⁵ *ibid* Abraham p. 211

of international humanitarian law and a case of “peace without justice”.⁹⁶ Although virtually excluded from the peace process, NGOs supported the Kabbah government but strongly opposed any power sharing arrangements with the RUF/AFRC. Towards the Leone agreement however, the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL) was instrumental in initiating dialogue with the RUF and Charles Taylor of Liberia, and continued to play a supporting role in the implementation of the agreement.⁹⁷

On the sidelines of all the agreements however, various CSOs were very instrumental in mobilizing, shaping and propagating public opinion in favour of peace, justice and democratization. The IRCSL in particular stood out as an effective NGO bridge builder between the government, warring factions and a war-ravaged population. Representing Muslims (mainly) and Christians (20 %), it mobilized churches and mosques to preach against violence but also reconciliation for all, as it remained neutral to the conflict but supportive of the mediation process.⁹⁸

Achievements of the Peace Process

Within a year of the end of the Civil war, Sierra Leone established a positive record by achieving a growth rate of 6%, and inflation rate 0%. Over 300,000 IDPs and refugees were resettled and more than 70,000 combatants disarmed and demobilized.⁹⁹ The government also committed itself to addressing long-term development challenges, like social inclusion

⁹⁶ *ibid* Abraham p. 213

⁹⁷ F. Kaikal, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration in Post-war Sierra Leone, in A. Ayissi ed. *Bound To Cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone* (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2000) p. 123

⁹⁸ T. Turay, *Civil Society and Peace Building: The Role of the Inter-religious Council of Sierra Leone*, Internet Site: www.c-r.org/accords/s-leone.

⁹⁹ The World Bank, *Peace Recovery and Development in Sierra Leone* (New York, The World Bank Group, 2004)

issues, good governance, decentralization, equity and sustainable growth through private sector partnership and reviving agriculture and mining sectors.¹⁰⁰

Although the Lome Agreement was criticized by NGOs for not serving any form of justice against the perpetrators of violence and other forms of injustices, it provided for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC was mandated to record violations of human rights and humanitarian law, to address impunity, to assist the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation, and to prevent a repetition of the abuses. A separate Special Court was later proposed to try those bearing the greatest responsibility for the abuses.¹⁰¹

Major Challenges

The Sierra Leonean peace process expectedly faced major challenges, partly attributable to the extensive use of brutal violence and terror during the 10 years Civil war.

According to the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSU) the rebel incursion into Freetown in January 1999 resulted into about 6,000 deaths, at least 2,000 of whom were civilians.¹⁰² Systematic rape and other forms of sexual abuse would need long term psycho-social intervention. Up to 200,000 people were displaced in and around Freetown, as thousands sought refuge in Guinea and other neighboring countries. About 90% of buildings were destroyed in Freetown. ECOMOG forces and Civilian Defense Forces (CDF)

¹⁰⁰ *ibid* , The World Bank, 2004

¹⁰¹ *op cit* Abraham p. 217

¹⁰² Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Recommendations to the International Contact Group in Sierra Leone*, (New York, 1999) p.2

supporting President Kabbah also committed human rights violations but in a smaller scale.¹⁰³

The country may therefore easily address economic and general infrastructural reconstruction but psycho-social, cultural and personal violence aftermath issues proved quite challenging to the NGO fraternity in the entire process.

2.3 An Overview of the Liberian Conflict and NGOs' Peace Building Efforts

Liberia was established as an independent republic in 1847 after it became a center for freed slaves from America in 1821. Although the 197,754 square kilometer area now known as Liberia, was already inhabited by several ethnic groups, descendants of freed slaves referred to as "Americo-Liberians" would dominate the country's political and economic realms for more than a century. Thus, economic, political and social injustices had a long and deep history by the time the country was engulfed by violent conflicts. Incompatibilities among the Liberian communities were deeply entrenched when in 1980, army Master Sergeant Samuel Doe led a bloody *coup*, in which president William Tolbert was killed.

Although Doe's *coup* was widely accepted as a justified way of purging the dominant and overbearing minority Americo-Liberian *elite*, he favoured his Krahn ethnic group as his ethnic and ruthless regime intensified the conflicts between indigenous groups in search of state power.¹⁰⁴

As the case was in neighboring Sierra Leone, what started as a struggle for good governance and justice had now taken dangerously divisive, emotional and often illogical ethnic conflict

¹⁰³ *ibid*, Amnesty International p.4

¹⁰⁴ E. Berman & K. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (Geneva, UNIDIR, 2000). P. 83

dimensions. An attempted *coup* in 1985 saw Doe government's forces kill about 3,000 Mano and Gio civilians.¹⁰⁵ Continued persecution of rival ethnic groups by Doe's regime galvanized other ethnic groups and opposing forces into forming the Charles Taylor-led National Patriotic Force of Liberia (NPFL). In 1989, Taylor- a former government minister backed by Gio and Mano ethnic groups, launched a guerrilla war against Doe.¹⁰⁶

Doe had previously successfully resisted several *coup* attempts during his turbulent rule. However, desperate victims of his unjust and ethnic government joined Taylor's campaign in large numbers and soon they captured Monrovia.¹⁰⁷ But Taylor's campaign expectedly increased the level of ethnic divisions among Liberians, in addition to escalating the political and humanitarian crises not only in Liberia but the entire region. This state of affairs partly informed the Nigeria-led ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) humanitarian intervention. By this time, the civil strife had claimed about 5,000 lives and turned half of the country's population into IDPs and refugees.¹⁰⁸

The ECOMOG intervention force managed to keep NPFL/INPFL forces at bay and established an interim government but Doe was captured in 1991 and killed by Prince Johnson's INPFL.

Post-Conflict Peace Building and Reconciliation

Liberia's vast mineral resources like diamond and gold played a crucial role in fuelling and prolonging the conflict. In fact, the Liberian case shares a lot of similarities with the Angola,

¹⁰⁵ H. Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping", in E. Michael et al (eds.) *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997) p.3

¹⁰⁶ L. Schuster, "The Final Days of Dr. Doe", *Granta*, No. 48, (Summer 1994), p.66

¹⁰⁷ *ibid*, Schuster pp. 67-68

¹⁰⁸ C. Basse, "Nigeria and Regional Security in the West African Sub-Region: Lessons from Monrovia", in *Nigerian Forum*, January-February 1994, vol. 14 Nos 1-2

Sierra Leone and Congo DRC conflicts, where control over natural resources like timber, water bodies and minerals helped to finance various factions and parties engaged in the conflict.¹⁰⁹

Managing this conflict and the post-conflict peace building work would therefore never be easy.

The peace process begun in 1990, with the intervention of ECOMOG. With the passing of resolution 866, the UN stepped in through the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMN) in September 1993 to assist ECOMOG implement the Cotonou Peace Agreement.¹¹⁰ This process however proved more intense and dynamic than envisaged as it went beyond 2002. As Taylor and the National Patriotic Party won over 75% of the votes in the July 1997 elections, government agencies could not support NGOs' peace building and reconciliation efforts since the government was busy fixing internal weaknesses and dealing with armed insurgency and banditry.

Among other challenges, disarmament of combatants and reintegration child soldiers, took a big chunk of the peace building and reconciliation process. Out of the estimated 60,000 fighters involved in the conflict, UNICEF estimated that 10% were children under 15 years while 20% were between 15 and 17 years.¹¹¹ A Liberian NGO, Children's Assistance Programme (CAP) was one of the main organizations which ran rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. The crucial contribution of such NGOs in the peace building process was limited by the government's restrictions and controls. For instance, President

¹⁰⁹ United Nations, *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, Report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Security Council*, 16th April, 1998.

¹¹⁰ R. Hay, *Peace-building During Peace Support Operations: A Survey and Analysis of Recent Missions*. (Canada, DF ATT, 1999) p.7

¹¹¹ Human Rights Watch/Africa, *Easy Prey: Child Soldiers in Liberia*, 1994. p.2

Taylor's Kiss FM was the only countrywide radio FM station. Media control laws enacted during Doe's reign served to constrain the social and political spaces left for NGOs to contribute to the peace building process. In spite of this government hostility, a few NGOs ran justice and peace programmes, like the Catholic Peace and Justice Commission. Together with other women's organizations it helped an estimated 25,000 women who had been raped and abused during the conflict, by availing legal and psycho-social support.¹¹²

Peace building Achievements

A few peace building organizations operating in difficult and hostile environments managed to counsel and reintegrate sexually abused women. CAP and UMCEF rehabilitated former child soldiers although it was not conclusively done.

Political and economic reforms supported by the UN and several economically developed states like the USA contributed to the October 2005 democratic ascendancy to power of Ellen Sirleaf Johnston-the first woman president in Africa. A national debt burden which stood at \$3 billion at one point had also been lessened.

Failures and Challenges

Disarming, rehabilitation and reintegration of rebels and child soldiers stood out as a great challenge to the player in the peace building process. Long after fighting was stopped in 1996, renewed rebel activities were reported in 2002, probably to serve as a reminder of the incomplete peace building work.¹¹³ Reigning in of rebel units, disarmament and ensuring

¹¹² O. Agbu, "Sub-regional Dynamics of the Resurgent Conflicts in Liberia", in *Nigeria Forum*, Vol. 23. Nos. 9-10 (2002) p. 275.

¹¹³ *ibid* Agbu p. 278.

security in all parts of the country after such a long and violent conflict was understandably challenging.

Considering that this conflict was largely militarized and necessitated a largely military response through ECOMOG and UNOMIL, one appreciates the minimal role played by NGOs in peace building. Moreover, successive NGO-hostile and restrictive regimes discouraged potential national and international NGOs from venturing into the peace process. Yet, as Kofi Annan's observes, the dominant role of informal actors in any peace process should not disregard the noble role of NGOs in sustainable peace building.

CHAPTER THREE

NAIROBI PEACE INITIATIVE AFRICA PEACE BUILDING IN KIBERA, KENYA

3.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter shifts the focus to the core subject of this study; the contribution of Nairobi Peace Initiative Africa in peace building in Kibera following the 2007-2008 post-election violence.

3.1 Brief Profile of Kibera

Kibera is an urban informal settlement located just about 5 kilometers away from the Nairobi city center. “Kibera” is a corruption of the Nubian word “Kibra” which means forest. While discussing this informal settlement one has to highlight the historical connection between Kibera and the Nubian community.

Kibera’s history as an informal settlement dates back to colonial Kenya when Sudanese fighters from the Nubian community who had fought alongside the British army in the World War I, were rewarded by being settled in a vast land adjacent to present day Ngong road and Mbagathi way. Then, the area was deemed unproductive and of lower value by the colonial authorities compared to prime settlement and agricultural areas like present day Karen, Dagoretti and Westlands.¹¹⁴ This gesture of goodwill by the colonial authorities was however never formalized. The first independent Kenya government also never formalized the land offer to the Nubians. Meanwhile, as rural-urban migration began in earnest and the demand for affordable housing increased, many low-income workers found their way to Kibera. Moreover, the government initiated some planning and formal housing projects, most of

¹¹⁴ Mwangala J. M., Interview with Sebit Yusuf, Nubian Elder, Kibera D.O’s Office, October, 2010.

which ended up displacing many Nubians as they were alienated from what they held as their rightful and historical settlement.¹¹⁵

Rapid urbanization and population increase in Nairobi suburbs, coupled with government housing projects in Kibera which produced housing estates like Jamuhuri, Karanja, Fort Jesus, Olympic and Ayany Estates and acquisition of land for public utilities like hospitals, offices, schools and law courts, then laid the roots of what would later turn out to be complicated conflicts revolving around land use, access and ownership rights, poverty and ethnicity in Kibera.¹¹⁶

Currently, Kibera is inhabited by various ethnic groups but the majority are Nubians, Luos, Kikuyus, Kambas and Lughyas although members of other ethnic groups like the Mijikenda, Taita, Kalenjin, Borana, Somali, and Maasai are also settled in this affordable and conveniently located informal settlement. These communities live in small units which make up the big informal settlement known as Kibera. The ethnic settlement pattern is often mixed but some villages are dominated by particular groups. For instance, Makina is home to Nubians, Gatwikera and Kisumu Ndogo are dominated by Luos, Laini Saba and Soweto East villages are mostly inhabited by Kikuyus and Kambas, whereas Kichinjio is inhabited by Luhyas.¹¹⁷

Kibera's political fluidity combined with a mass of poor, idle and desperate youth, has often resulted into heightened tension and actual physical violence in Kibera. Indeed, the area was hardly hit in the 2007 Post Election violence and was categorized as a hotspot in the run up to the 2010 Kenya Referendum on the proposed constitution and in the 2013 General Elections.

¹¹⁵ Kibera Land Committee (KLC), *Memorandum on Nubian Land Presented to Lands Minister*. Nairobi, 2009.

¹¹⁶ Mwangala J.M Interview with Mr. Gore Mohammed, Makina Councilor and former KLC Secretary, Kibra, May 2010.

¹¹⁷ R. Onyango, *Conflict in Kibera: An Analysis for Care Kenya* (Nairobi: Care-International in Kenya, 2009) pg 6-

A larger part of Kibera is packed with small and unplanned temporary houses or structures. It lacks basic infrastructural services like roads, sewerage system, formal electricity and water supplies. This area is currently made up of four administrative locations namely Kibera, Sarangombe, Mugumoini and Lainisaba, three of which fall under Kibera Division. It is not clear how many villages make up Kibera slum because villages keep cropping up. However, there are thirteen main and well known villages; Kambi, Lainisaba, Makina, Sarangombe, Mugumoini, Kisumu Ndogo, Gatwikera, Soweto West, Soweto East, Kianda Mashimoni, Silanga, Raila, and Kichinjio.¹¹⁸

The population of Kibera slum is shrouded in controversy. Whereas previous surveys by some institutions reported that the slum is inhabited by approximately 1 million people, the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census surprised many residents, NGOs and other interested parties when it came up with a figure of 120,000 people.¹¹⁹ Poverty levels are high with more than 70% living in congested and dirty environs, in addition to living on less than a dollar per day. Suppressed demand forces have however led to the thriving of a tiny budget, a market situation whereby high demand for household items in smaller units is prevalent.

3.2 NPI-Africa Policy Formulation in Ending Conflict in Kibera

Prior to the December 2007 General Elections in Kenya, various initiatives were undertaken by both State and non-state actors such as the civil society organizations, the media, UN agencies to name a few, to encourage peaceful campaigns and elections. Following the violence that broke out with the announcement of the disputed Presidential Election results, further initiatives were immediately undertaken aimed at averting the escalation of violence

¹¹⁸ *op cit* Onyango p.6

¹¹⁹ Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, *2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census* (Nairobi: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2010) p. 34.

and encouraging the resolution of the electoral dispute through dialogue. The Post-Election Violence (PEV) in Kenya provided an opportunity for stakeholders to reflect on the status of peace, causes of conflicts, probable interventions as well as the need for preparedness aimed at preventing and or managing conflict.¹²⁰

Among the numerous responses to the crisis by various actors, NPI-Africa, in its role as the regional secretariat of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) in Eastern and Central Africa, commissioned a study titled *Mobilizing Early Response Project-Kenya (MERP)* to identify causes of conflict particularly in selected regions that were very volatile during the 2007 elections and to start developing a multi-stakeholder prevention plan for future interventions.

NPI-Africa recognizes economic development and prosperity as means towards the expansion of people's choices, thus enhancing the quality of life and diminishing the likelihood of destructive conflict.

NPI-Africa through its Strategic Plan 2012-2016 ensured to contribute towards the deepening and advancement of peace in Africa through three interlinked strategic priorities. They included: Actions for Peace; Research, Learning and Policy; and Organizational Development and Institutional Strengthening. NPI-Africa aim was to strengthen its role as a strategic facilitator in contributing to peace praxis and policy formulation by ensuring its interventions were informed by a thorough contextual analysis, involvement with selective emerging or ongoing peace processes, and strong linkages with strategic actors.

¹²⁰ NPI Africa & NSC Secretariat (2012). *A Validated Report of the National Conflict Mapping and Analysis with Recommendations for Actors*.

This strategic plan called for NPI-Africa's actions to be analytically astute, generating knowledge that informed sustainable peace and working collaboratively with a wide range of stakeholders.

3.2.1 Actions for Peace

Through this strategy, NPI-Africa responded to emerging crises and addressed long-term structural issues that had potential for violent conflict. In collaboration with key decision and policy makers at various levels of society, this strategy put into operation through a series of activities, which included designing intervention strategies, building capacity, facilitating dialogue and reconciliation processes, contributing to early-warning and early-response mechanisms and strengthening strategic partnerships.

During this strategic phase, it is viewed that the capacity-building component of NPI-Africa's work offered specialized trainings in conflict transformation and peace building, in collaboration with tertiary institutions and training centres such as African Nazarene University. In particular, collaboration with institutions of higher learning would provide an avenue for participants' interaction between theory and praxis, leading to formal recognition of NPI-Africa's training products through certification and increased organizational visibility as well as continued impact.

NPI-Africa's rich networks and strategic partnerships would remain instrumental in lobbying and advocating for actions toward the realization of a peaceful society. Building on these partnerships would amplify NPI-Africa's voice and provide critical advantage within the policy community at national, regional, continental, and global levels. These partnerships would include GPPAC, AU, Afap, FECCLAHA, AACC, ICGLR and COMESA as well as

close working ties with the Kenyan Ministry of Education and the National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management. NPI-Africa in addition sort to include women and youth leaders in its peace processes at all levels of society.

3.2.2 Research, Learning and Policy

The complex and multitudinous challenges facing peace and stability in Africa require a thorough understanding of the political, economic and socio-cultural dynamics at play both internally and externally. This strategy would therefore involve the systematic questioning and documentation of emerging political, economic, and socio-cultural events and trends that had potential for peace or conflict; a case scenario being the aftermath of the 2007-2008 Post Election Violence that saw institutional changes as well as reforms. Components of this strategy would include reflection and generation of new knowledge.

Prior research work undertaken in the areas of truth commissions, transitional justice, youth unemployment and conflicts particularly in epicenters of violence such as Kibera would continue to inform NPI-Africa's engagement on issues of justice and the youth.

As a learning institution, NPI-Africa continued to promote reflection on topical issues that had a bearing on peace. This was to be done in collaboration with strategic partners such as the Greater Horn Horizon Forum (GHHF), Afap and GPPAC. The reflections and research dissemination took the form of conferences, symposia and colloquia. (NPI-Africa, 2012)

3.2.3 Organizational Development and Institutional Strengthening

During the NPI-Africa's strategic plan period, the institution sort to ensure values and culture, people, systems, and processes were aligned to achieve the stated strategic goals.

This included strengthening human resource capacity by reviewing the needs of the organization, hiring and retaining competent and motivated staff, and strengthening individual performance management and staff development processes.

As part of the commitment to becoming a learning organization, NPI-Africa implemented Planning Monitoring and Learning (PML) tools to facilitate continuous performance assessment against set objectives. NPI-Africa also did pursue a plan for rigorous resource mobilization and organizational sustainability, ensuring a high degree of accountability to stakeholders.

3.3 Financial Plan and Resource Mobilization Strategy

The successful attainment of the ambitious results projected in NPI-Africa's Strategic Plan was dependent on the generation and availability of adequate resources to implement the activities under its strategic priorities. NPI-Africa developed a financial plan that reflected the projected budget for the period 2012-2016. To pursue its financial plan, NPI-Africa engaged in activities such as: raising funds from long-standing funding partners; marketing NPI-Africa pro-actively, and raising resources and support from potential new donors, including local sources and in-kind contributions; and developing strategic alliances with other organizations to access back-donor funding jointly; ensuring cost-effective use of financial resources and efficient accountability.

3.4 NPI-Africa Peace Interventions in Mitigating Conflict

The February 28 2008 National Reconciliation Accord forced a new coalition government made up of Mwai Kibaki's party of National Unity (PNU) and Raila Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). Mwai Kibaki retained the presidency while Raila Odinga

became the Prime Minister. The new government, now under heavy international supervision, established four non-judicial commissions to facilitate the consolidation of the National Accord as well as stabilize the country in the long run. Two of these sought to establish the facts around the disputed presidential election results and the subsequent violence. There were the Independent Review Committee (IREC), chaired by South African Judge Johann Kreigler known as the Kreigler Commission which investigated the conduct of the disputed elections; and the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) chaired by Kenyan High Court Judge Philip Waki otherwise referred to as the Waki Commission. The other two commissions were intended to promote healing, national reconciliation and social cohesion. There were the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC). While the first three of these commissions were relatively transient with short-term mandates of between 3 months (IREC and CIPEV) and 2 years (TJRC), the NCIC was conceived as a long-term commission for the promotion of ethnic and national integration. The 2008 Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government (National Accord)¹²¹ also outlined a reform agenda to address the fundamental root causes of recurrent conflict and long-term issues and solutions.

The 2007-2008 Kenya post-election violence that erupted as a result of disputed presidential election results brought to the fore various challenges and questions relating to conflict management on one hand, and revealed opportunities for the realization of peaceful coexistence on the other. One such opportunity is recognizing the repository power that dwells within humanity, and the brevity and initiative shown by the individuals who chose to

¹²¹ www.dialoguekenya.org

protect their fellow Kenyans in the midst of violence. While many people during this period withdrew into their ethnic and/or other sectarian cocoons, there are those who chose conscientiousness, those who acted honorably and were indeed the difference between life and death for many.

In 2008 NPI-Africa travelled to different conflict regions in Kenya facilitating listening forums with the purpose of not only creating space for Kenyans affected by the violence to talk about how the violence was impacting them, but also to discuss possible solutions to the end of violence, including initiatives by individuals within the respective communities that were contributing towards peace and reconciliation. Many lessons emerged from the Listening Initiative. The listening forums, in general, indicated that peace building in post-crisis Kenya requires the re-enforcement of peace infrastructure, beginning at community level (NPI-Africa, 2011).

NPI-Africa thus identified individuals within communities affected by the violence that took deliberate action towards reconciliation, and accompanied these strategically placed individuals towards a process of creating long-term sustainable peace within their respective communities, through training in conflict transformation. In 2011, a two-year collaborative project, “Vital Voices”, was established with the overall aim being to contribute to enhanced reconciliation and peaceful co-existence in Kenya. However, as an initial step towards this greater objective, a the “Voices of Reason” project was developed, to identify, document and share stories, of ordinary people that went out of their way to save the lives of fellow Kenyans from supposed ‘enemy’ tribes, with the hope that by presenting a different narrative of the post-election violence in Kenya, key lessons would be learnt that would inspire deliberate action towards peace and reconciliation in Kenya.

In the process of documenting these exemplary stories of courage and hope, NPI-Africa's project team ensured that local communities and their leaders were consulted to identify people that saved lives and property during the post-election violence. Several sessions were held in Kibera, Naivasha, Kisumu and Eldoret, identified as the main epicenters of violence at the time. (NPI-Africa, 2012)

These included two sessions with District Peace Committees (DPCs) and one community Baraza in each of the above mentioned areas, where participants were informed of the objectives and process of the project. An additional two sessions brought together the DPCs and community leaders, with the aim of training and affirming the identified "vital voices". An assessment tool in form of a questionnaire developed by NPI-Africa with pre-set common questions was used to carry out interviews, and all sessions were recorded and video-taped. These were then transcribed and translated into English as most of the interviews were conducted in Kiswahili.¹²²

The Kenyan government through the National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management worked hand in hand with peace building non-governmental organizations such as NPI-Africa majorly during the Post-Election Violence for the realization of peace. Through this engagement, there was established District Peace Committees (DPC) in every epicenter of violence. These District Peace Committees served as representative institutions that facilitated peace forums at the various governance levels and brought together traditional dispute resolution mechanisms involving elders, women and religious leaders and modern mechanisms for conflict resolution that included security agencies and non-governmental organizations. Some of the roles of the District Peace

¹²² NPI-Africa (2012). *Voices of Reason, "Towards Enhanced Reconciliation and Peaceful Co-existence"*.

Committees included; promoting peace education by enhancing a culture of peace and non-violence; enhancing conflict early warning and response; overseeing the implementation of peace agreements and social contracts in consultation with security and intelligence committees including other stakeholders; ensuring prudent administration and accountability of resources allocated to them; documenting and keeping records of peace processes and interventions and facilitating trainings, community dialogue, sensitization and awareness raising.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATIONS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is a presentation of the findings and discussions of the study. The first section looks at the demographic information and the other sections the results are presented. The data has been presented in tables and figures. The responses were analyzed using qualitative method of data analysis.

4.2 Response Rate

A total of 30 questionnaires and interview schedules were used in the study. Out of the total 18 were able to be retrieved from the respondents. This is displayed in the Table 4.1 which shows that the response rate was 60% from the total questionnaires sent to respondents. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) assert that a response rate of 50% is considered adequate for a descriptive study. This represents an appropriate response rate for the study since it was above the 50% which is recommended by Mugenda and Mugenda (2003).

Table 4.1 Response Rate

Questionnaires	No. of respondents	Percentage (%)
Issued	30	100
Collected	18	60
Not collected	12	40

4.3 SECTION A: Demographic Data

The section looked at the respondent's gender, age, academic qualification and years living in kibera.

4.3.1 Gender of the Respondents

The study sought to determine the gender distribution of the respondents. From the findings as presented in the table 4.2 shows that a Majority (61%) were male while 39% were female respondents. This shows that both genders were able to take part in the study and the study getting opinions from both genders helping enrich the study from different perspectives.




Figure 4.1 Gender of the Respondents

4.3.2 Age Distribution

The study sought to determine the age of the respondents who took part in the study. The findings were presented in figure 4.2 below which showed that 39 percent of the total respondents were of age 18-30 years, 11 percent were between 31-40 years of age, 33 percent were between 41-50 years of age, and 17 percent were of above 50 years of age. According

to the findings the majority (39%) of the respondents were from the age brackets of 18-30years of age. The findings also showed a people from various ages therefore they would be able to give various perspectives according to age.




Figure 4.2 Age Distribution

4.3.3 Academic Qualification

The study further sought to establish the respondents academic qualification of the respondents in order to understand their qualifications and their ability to provide the study with the information the study needed. From the study findings as shown in figure 4.3, 6% indicated that they had a primary school education as their highest academic qualification, 39% of the respondents indicated that they had secondary education as their highest level of education, 33% had a college level education. 22% had university level education. From the response shown in the figure below the respondents had a level of formal education which was important in order to provide the study with the require knowledge required by the study.




Figure 4.3 Academic Qualification

4.3.4 Years In Kibera

The study sought to find out how many years the respondents have lived in Kibera. From the findings as presented in the figure 4.4 below shows that a majority (39%) had lived in Kibera for a period of 10-15 years, 33% had lived in Kibera for 5-10 years, 22% had lived for above 15 years and 6% had lived for less than five years. This showed that the respondent had lived long enough to provide the study with the required information.




Figure 4.3 Years In Kibera

4.3.5 Experience Of Conflict In Kibera

The study sought to find out whether the respondents had experienced any type of conflict and from the response given the figure 4.6 below shows that majority (83%) had experience some type of conflict whilst living in kibera whilst 17% indicated that they had not experience any conflict in the area. This findings show that the respondent had the required knowledge that the researcher sort to study.




Figure 4.4 Experience Of Conflict In Kibera

4.3.6 Major Causes Of Conflict In Kibera

The study sought to determine what were the major causes of conflict in kibera. Figure 4.7 below shows what were the major causes of the conflict and from the responses they indicated that there were 53% indicated: electoral disputes, 47% indicated tribal feuds, 11% indicated land matters, 43% indicated political influence, 33% indicated unemployment and 37% indicated lack of security.

Table 4.2 Major Causes Of Conflict In Kibera

Cause of conflict	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Electoral Disputes	16	89
Tribal Feuds	14	78
Land Matters	11	61
Political Influence	13	72
Unemployment	10	56
Lack of security.	11	61

Source: (Author, 2016)

4.4 SECTION B: NPI-Africa peace building and conflict management in Kibera

4.4.1 NPI-Africa contribution

The study sought to determine to what extent NPI-Africa contributes to peace building and conflict management in Kibera. From the finding as shown in the figure 4.5 it was determined that majority 45% indicated to a moderate extent, 22% indicated to a little extent, 17% to a great extent, 11% to a very great extent and 6% to a little extent. Most respondent indicated to a moderate extent which showed that NPI-Africa contributed to the peace building and conflict management in Kibera.




Figure 4.5 NPI-Africa contribution

4.4.2 District Peace Committee Involvement

The study sought to determine whether the district peace committee was involved in any way in NPI-Africa peace building initiative during the post-election violence. From the responses given in the figure 4.5 below show majority (61%) indicated that the district peace committee did take part in the peace building initiative, while 39% indicated that they did not take part in the peace building activity.




Figure 4.6 District Peace Committee Involvement

4.2.3 NPI-Africa Launch Peace Initiatives Frequently

The study sought to find out whether NPI-Africa did launch peace initiatives frequently in Kibera. The responses shown in the figure 4.6 below indicate that majority (89%) of the respondent indicated they took to peace initiatives frequently in kibera while a small number 11% felt they did not engage frequently.




Figure 4.7 NPI-Africa Launch Peace Initiatives

The study sought further clarification on how NPI-Africa contribution to peace building impact and from the findings as displayed in the table 4.3 below shows the results of the activities where the majority of the respondents indicated that they engaged in all the activities to a large extent. 78% indicated truth, justice and reconciliation, 89% indicated conflict prevention, and 94% indicated conflict resolution, 51% indicated economic empowerment, 45% indicated psycho-social support and finally 83% indicated building a network of peace.

Table 4.3 Major Causes Of Conflict In Kibera

Contribution	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Truth, justice and reconciliation	14	78
Conflict prevention	16	89
Conflict resolution	17	94
Economic empowerment	10	51
Psycho-social support	8	45
Building a network of peace	15	83

Source: (Author, 2016)

4.5 SECTION C: CONSTRAINTS AND CHALLENGES TO PEACE BUILDING IN KIBERA

4.5.1 Support From The Government

The study sought to investigate whether the government did support NPI-Africa peace initiative in Kibera. From the responses given in the figure 4.11 shows that majority (78%) of the respondents indicated that NPI-Africa peace did receive support from the government whilst a small number indicated that they did not. They continued to explain the help was very little support for them to consider it as support.




Figure 4.8 Support From The Government

4.5.2 Challenges Faced By NPI-Africa

The study sought to determine the main challenges being faced by the NPI-Africa peace initiative in Kibera. The table 4.2 below shows the response on the challenges. 28% identified lack of resource as challenge, 45% also indicated lack of peace building knowledge/ skills being an

issue, 33% identified lack of support from the government and finally 56% indicated lack of support from residents.

Table 4.4 Challenges Faced By NPI-Africa

Challenges	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Lack of resources	5	28
Lack of peace building knowledge/ skills	8	45
Lack of support from the government	6	33
Lack of support from residents	10	56

Source: Author (2016)

4.5.3 Main Strength/ Advantage Of NPI-Africa

The study went further to look into determining the main strength/ advantage of NPI-Africa engagement in peace building and conflict management in Kibera. From the table 4.3 below shows that 61% indicated resources to a major strength, 56% indicated support from residents, 45% indicated support from government, 78% indicated knowledge and skills in peace building & conflict management.

Table 4.5 Main Strength/ Advantage Of NPI-Africa

Strength/Advantage	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Resources	11	61
Support from residents	10	56
Support from government	8	45
Knowledge and skills in peace building & conflict management	14	78

Source: Author (2016)

4.6 SECTION D: ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES

4.6.1 Government partnering with NGOs

The study went on to determine whether the government does partner with NGOs in peace building and conflict management work. The findings are presented in the figure 4.12 below where majority (89%) of the respondent indicated that the government should partner with peace building organizations a minority of 11% indicated that they shouldn't partner so as to limit government interference.




Figure 4.9 Government partnering with NGOs

4.6.2 Statements On Conflicts In Kibera

The study put out some statements of conflicts in Kibera. The table below shows the responses from the respondents regarding the statements. Majority of the respondents agreed with the statements below. 94% agreed with the first statement conflicts in Kibera are deeply entrenched, historical and multi-causal, 78% agreed with the statement peace building and conflict management is successfully undertaken through a dynamic, comprehensive and multi-sectorial approach, 57% agreed with the statement that sustainable peace and reconciliation is arrived at through truth, justice and forgiveness, 78% agreed with the statement individual economic empowerment is key to peace building and reconciliation in Kibera and finally 83% agreed with the statement community involvement is key to realization of sustainable peace in Kibera.

Table 4.6 Statements on conflicts in kibera

Statements	Mean	Std dev.
Conflicts in Kibera are deeply entrenched, historical and multi-causal	4.27	0.74
Peace building and conflict management is successfully undertaken through a dynamic, comprehensive and multi-sectorial approach	4.2	0.62
Sustainable peace and reconciliation is arrived at through truth, justice and forgiveness	4.32	0.68
Individual economic empowerment is key to peace building and reconciliation in Kibera.	3.87	0.99
Community involvement is key to realization of sustainable peace in Kibera.	4.55	0.51

Source: Author (2016)

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents discussion of the findings, conclusions and recommendations and further research on the problem which the study investigated. The chapter begins with a summary of the findings, followed by conclusions drawn based on the results of the study. It also provides the limitations faced while undertaking the study, recommendations and suggestions for further studies.

5.2 Summary of the findings

A total of 30 questionnaires and interview schedules were used in the study. Out of the total 18 were able to be retrieved from the respondents. The study sought to determine the gender distribution of the respondents. From the findings shows that a Majority (61%) were male while 39% were female respondents. The study sought to determine the age of the respondents who took part in the study. The findings showed that 39 percent of the total respondents were of age 18-30 years, 11 percent were between 31-40 years of age, 33 percent were between 41-50 years of age, and 17 percent were of above 50 years of age.

The study further sought to establish the respondent's academic qualification of the respondents in order to understand their qualifications and their ability to provide the study with the information the study needed. From the study findings, 6% indicated that they had a primary school education as their highest academic qualification, 39% of the respondents indicated that they had secondary education as their highest level of education, 33% had a

college level education and 22% had university level education.

The study sought to find out how many years the respondents have lived in kibera. The findings showed that a majority 39% had lived in kibera for a period of 10-15 years, 33% had lived in kibera for 5-10 years, 22% had lived for above 15 years and 6% had lived for less than five years.

The study sought to find out whether the respondents had experienced any type of conflict and from the response given, majority (83%) had experience some type of conflict whilst living in kibera, 17% indicated that they had not experience any conflict in the area. The study sought to determine what were the major causes of conflict in kibera. The findings showed that 53% indicated Electoral Disputes, 47% indicated tribal feuds, 11% indicated land matters, 43% indicated political influence, 33% indicated unemployment and 37% indicated lack of security.

The study sought to determine to what extent NPI-Africa contributed to the peace building and conflict management in kibera. From the findings, it was determined that majority 45% indicated to a moderate extent, 22% indicated to little extent, 17% to a great extent, 11% to a very great extent and 6% to a little extent. The study sought to determine whether the district peace committee was involved in any way in NPI-Africa Peace building initiative during the post-election violence. From the responses given majority (61%) indicated that the district peace committee did take part in the peace building initiative, while 39% indicated that they did not take part in the peace building activity.

The study sought to find out whether NPI-Africa did launch peace initiatives frequently in Kibera. The responses showed that majority 89% of the respondent indicated they took to

peace initiatives frequently in Kibera while a small number 11% felt they did not engage frequently.

The study sought further clarification on NPI-Africa contribution to peace building and from the findings, majority of the respondents indicated that they engaged in all the activities to a large extent, 78% indicated truth, justice and reconciliation, 89% indicated conflict prevention, 94% indicated conflict resolution, 51% indicated economic empowerment, 45% indicated psycho-social support and finally 83% indicated building a network of peace.

The study sought to investigate whether the government did support NPI-Africa peace initiative in Kibera. From the responses given, majority (78%) of the respondents indicated that NPI-Africa peace did receive support from the government whilst a small number indicated that they did not. They continued to explain the help was very little support for them to consider it as support.

The study sought to determine the main challenges being faced by the NPI-Africa peace initiative in Kibera. 28% identified lack of resource as a challenge, 45% indicated lack of peace building knowledge/skills being an issue, 33% identified lack of support from the government and finally 56% indicated lack of support from residents.

The study went on to determine whether the government does partner with NGOs in peace building and conflict management works. The findings show majority 89% of the respondents indicated that the government should partner with peace building organizations. A minority of 11% indicated that they should not partner so as to limit government interference.

The study sort to determine responses to peace building statements of conflicts in Kibera. Majority of the respondents agreed with the statements. 94% agreed with the first statement that conflicts in Kibera are deeply entrenched, historical and multi-causal, 78% agreed with the statement peace building and conflict management is successfully undertaken through a dynamic, comprehensive and multi-sectorial approach, 57% agreed with the statement that sustainable peace and reconciliation is arrived at through truth, justice and forgiveness, 78% agreed with the statement individual economic empowerment is key to peace building and reconciliation in Kibera and finally 83% agreed with the statement community involvement is key to realization of sustainable peace in Kibera.

5.3 Conclusion

The study made the following conclusions;

The study was able to conclude that NPI-Africa peace initiative in Kibera contributed moderately to peace building and conflict management in Kibera. The study also concluded that NPI-Africa peace initiative did launch frequent initiatives. Further the District Peace Committee was involved in the efforts by NPI-Africa peace initiatives during the Post-Election violence.

The study also identified several constrains and challenges which faced the effort of peace building in Kibera. Such challenges involved support from the government. The study further identified that there were some advantages had NPI-Africa had such as support from the residents and also the knowledge and skills in peace building and conflict management in dealing with conflicts.

The study concluded that government should assist peace organizations in their work in peace building and conflict resolution. The study also concluded that conflicts in Kibera are deeply entrenched in historical injustices, and conflict resolution should be undertaken through a dynamic, comprehensive and multi-sectorial approach. The study further concluded that sustainable peace and reconciliation is arrived at through truth, justice and forgiveness.

The study concluded that involving the community needs to be important in the realization of sustainable peace. The study finally concluded that there is need for partnership between government and both local and international peace organizations in order to for peace to be realized.

5.4 Recommendations

The study recommends the following:

- I. The study recommends that there be further endeavors to promote peace in Kibera and other conflict epicenters so as to ensure sustainable peace.
- II. The study further recommends that the government be more involved in the peace building efforts across conflicting parties to ensure sustainable peace.
- III. The study recommends the need for empowerment of and resource flow of communities living in hostile environments such as Kibera to enhance their effective participation in conflict early warning and early response.
- IV. The study recommends that NPI-Africa address its challenges so as to ensure that peace building is sustainable and strengthen its institutional mandate.
- V. Further, the study recommends NPI-Africa develop a clear and shared monitoring and

evaluation (M&E) plan with other peace entities that are context specific.

5.5 Suggestions for Further Research

The study recommends further studies to be done in other areas such as Mathare, Mukuru and Korogoshi to determine whether peace organizations are able to build peace in such urban conflict epicenters. The study recommends further the study of another peace building organization in order to compare and contrast achievements and failures of this peace organization and lessons learnt.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESEARCH I

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Introduction

A Master of Arts student at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration is carrying out research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. The research title is "Impact of NPI-Africa in peace building in Kibera: 2008-2015". The aim of this study is to assess the impact of NPI-Africa in peace building in Kibera, identifying challenges experienced and recommending solutions.

This questionnaire is administered to selected Kibera community leaders, Lang'ata District Peace Committee and Kibera Division Peace Committee for academic purpose only. To maintain confidentiality, you may conceal your identity. Thank you for your time and understanding.

Please tick where appropriate

SECTION A: Bio Data

1. Sex Male [] Female []
2. What is your age?
20-30 [] 31-40 [] 41-50 [] 51-60 [] Above 60 []
3. Level of formal education
None at all []
Primary education []
Secondary education []
College education []
University education []
4. For how long have you been a Kibera resident?

- 0-5 years [] 6-10 years [] 11-15 years [] 16-20 years []
 21-25 years [] 26-30 years [] 31-35 years [] 36 years and above []
5. Have you experienced any type of conflict in Kibera?
 Yes [] No []
6. What are the major causes of conflict in Kibera?
 a) _____
 b) _____
 c) _____

SECTION B: NPI-Africa peace building and conflict management in Kibera

7. To what extent does NPI-Africa contribute to peace building and conflict management in Kibera?
 To a great extent [] To a moderate extent [] To a little extent [] To no extent []
8. Does NPI-Africa launch peace initiatives frequently Yes [] NO []
9. If yes, in what area does NPI-Africa's contribution to peace building impact most?
 a) Truth, justice and reconciliation []
 b) Conflict prevention []
 c) Conflict resolution []
 d) Economic empowerment []
 e) Psycho-social support []
 f) Building a network of peace []
10. Was the District Peace Committee involved in any way in NPI-Africa peace building initiative during the Post-Election Violence?
 Yes [] No []

SECTION C: CONSTRAINTS AND CHALLENGES TO PEACE BUILDING IN KIBERA

11. Has the government of Kenya supported NPI-Africa peace initiative in Kibera?
 Yes [] No []
12. What is the main challenge faced by NPI-Africa in peace building in Kibera?
 a) Lack of resources []
 b) Lack of support from residents []
 c) Lack of support from the government []
 d) Lack of peace building knowledge/ skills []
 e) Other (specify) _____
13. What is the main strength/ advantage of NPI-Africa engagement in peace building and conflict management in Kibera?

- a) Resources []
 b) Support from residents []
 c) Support from government []
 d) Knowledge and skills in peace building & conflict management []
 e) Other (specify) _____

SECTION D: ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES

14. Should the government partner with NGOs in peace building and conflict management work?

Yes [] No []

Please rate the following statements by ticking to show the extent to which you agree or disagree (Strongly Agree- SA, Agree-A, Undecided-U, Disagree-D, Strongly Disagree-SD)

	Statement	SA	A	U	D	SD
15.	Conflicts in Kibera are deeply entrenched, historical and multi-causal					
16.	Peace building and conflict management is successfully undertaken through a dynamic, comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach					
17.	Sustainable peace and reconciliation is arrived at through truth, justice and forgiveness					
18.	Individual economic empowerment is key to peace building and reconciliation in Kibera.					
19.	Community involvement is key to realization of sustainable peace in Kibera.					
20.	Governmental and non-governmental partnerships in peace building and conflict management in Kibera should be pursued.					

APPENDIX II: PERMIT



NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

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4th Floor, Utako House
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NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref No **NACOSTI/P/16/36221/14590**

Date

7th November, 2016


Lorraine Njuhi Mburu
University of Nairobi
P.O. Box 30197-00100
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on "*Impact of NPI-Africa in peace building in Kibera: 2008-2015,*" I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in Nairobi County for the period ending **7th November, 2017.**

You are advised to report to the **County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Nairobi County** before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are expected to submit **two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf** of the research report/thesis to our office.


BONIFACE WANYAMA
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO

Copy to:

The County Commissioner
Nairobi County.

The County Director of Education
Nairobi County.