

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**ANALYZING DISARMAMENT IN POST CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING:
LIBERIA 1996-2006**

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
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that his research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

Signature 

Date 11th November 2009.

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as university supervisor.

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DEDICATION

To Stella Andenyi and Justin Kavole,

‘Beautiful are the feet of those who pursue peace’.

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ABSTRACT

Getting rid of the weapons with which violence is waged may prevent war. But not everyone world agree, not even the most ardent advocate of disarmament, but, as long as people have the capacity to resort to violence, war will continue to haunt us.

Though the connection between weaponry and war is well documented, the history of disarmament however has not been very encouraging because disarmament proposals have been seen as self serving; giving one side advantage over the other. As a result, complete disarmament and demobilization is a difficult task, but with proper planning success can be achieved. The objective of this research project was to analyze the United Nations disarmament programme implemented to build peace after the conflicts in Liberia . This complex stage of peace building in post conflict situations is known as the DDR, which stands for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

The conceptual framework focuses on liberal institutionalism in the context of post conflict settings as the perspective that is best able to explain UN intervention in internal conflict and provides the answers on what to do after the conflict has come to an end under the umbrella of post conflict peace building. Using the huge bulk of available literature, the case study gives detailed description and analysis of the disarmament programme implemented by the United Nations in Liberia discussing the achievements and failures.

The conclusion reveals that there is need to increase awareness on the need for states to carry out total disarmament among its civilians if durable peace and security are to be realised in Africa.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFL Armed Forces of Liberia, the official national army of Liberia under former President Samuel Doe. Charles Taylor supplanted the AFL with his own loyalists when he came to power in 1997. Those forces are usually referred to as GOL.

AU: African Union

DDR: Disarmament demobilization and Reintegration

4Rs: Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

DPKO: United Nations Department of Peace-keeping Operations

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

ECOMOG: ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group

IGAD: Inter Government Authority

LURD: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy

MODEL: Movement for Democracy in Liberia

OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UNICEF: UN Children's Fund

UNCT: UN Country Team

UNDG: UN Development Group

UNDP: UN Development Programme

UNHCR: UN High Commissioner for Refugees

UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNOMIL: United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

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DISARMAMENT IN PEACE BUILDING IN LIBERIA 1996 – 2006

1.0 CHAPTER ONE.

1.1 Introduction to study

In many of Africa's armed conflicts civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure is a consequence of deliberate targeting of non combatants by irregular forces and privately financed militias. Many of those killed or conscripted are young adults who would otherwise contribute to food production, factory labour or child rearing. Even more significant than and now in Africa is the availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Their concealability, affordability and lightness have made them the principle instrument of violence in all the intra-state conflicts of the post cold war era. After a period of violent conflict, war torn societies face many challenges. One of the main challenges is the implementation of the peace agreement often negotiated through a third party mediating between the warring factions. These settlements contain important clauses detailing what will be done to return a state into normalcy, some of the clauses focus on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, resettlement, reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, reconstruction of governance structures and restoration of law and order among others. The implementation of these clauses is done under the umbrella of post conflict peacebuilding. The driving forces being; to rebuild the war torn societies and to prevent any outbreak of armed violence or conflict in future. One of the tasks that is key to obtaining stable or durable peace is Disarmament which encourages the ex combatants and society to surrender arms so as to facilitate dialogue and to build confidence among the populace.

In this context, this study examines the disarmament programme in post conflict peace building after intra-state conflict with specific reference to Liberia. The literature reviewed will look at the evolution of peacebuilding, its expansion to include disarmament and the various perspectives that inform disarmament in post conflict peacebuilding. A discussion presents arguments in the debate about the most appropriate theoretical framework to explain the implementation stage of post conflict peacebuilding after a civil war, and the actors involved with emphasis on the disarmament programme carried out by the United Nations.

In many cases the war torn societies lack the human and financial resources to implement the treaties and agreements which mark an end to violent conflict. As a result, international and external assistance has become prominent. Indeed, during the 1990s the international organizations became involved in post-conflict peace processes and started including a peace building agenda in their programmes¹. Among them are regional organizations, like the African Union (AU)², sub-regional such as ECOWAS, SADC, and intergovernmental organizations primarily led by the United Nations (UN) among a other non-governmental organizations. This is a result of increase in international diplomacy mainly authorized and mounted by the United Nations. The revitalization of the UN system after the end of the cold war has made it the only international organization with a global security mandate to carry out the sensitive but crucial phase of disarmament in peace building. However the United Nations has not been the only organization to intervene to end a conflict and participate in peace building, The African Union, European Union, ECOWAS and SADC have been involved but due to the spillover and the internationalization of the internal conflicts, the states forming the regional and sub regional bodies have often found themselves with interests to safeguard, some have been seen as being partisan and in some cases a hindrance to lasting peace.

The UN launched several initiatives involving elements of peace building in Africa with the first operational offices in Liberia in the late 1990s thereafter in Guinea Bissau and the Central African Republic. This study will focus on the role of the United Nations in carrying out disarmament in post conflict peace building with specific focus on Liberia in the years 1996 – 2006.

1.2 Statement of research problem

That formal peace settlements alone are not enough to build sustainable peace and they must contain clauses on disarmament. The greater challenge is to ensure commitment by the warring parties to disarm because unless this is done the presence of weapons makes it easier for resumption of armed conflict.

One of the characteristics of external assistance to war-torn countries is a bias towards a 'quick fix' with peace building viewed as a series of programs to be quickly administered. This

¹Stiles K. *Global Institutions and Local Empowerment: Competing Theoretical Perspectives*. (2000) pp 114-5.

² The African Union Commission Vol. 1 (Addis Ababa 2004):14

time bound approach by the International community through various humanitarian agencies has often led to incomplete peace building implementation thus undermining the long term sustainability of peace. Conflict analysts cite that no less than 30 percent of intrastate conflicts resume within ten years³. Hurriedly implemented disarmament programmes lead to recurrence of war since combatants may take up weapons again if the peace agreement fails as happened in Liberia In 1997.

Each conflict has its unique characteristics. The Liberian civil war evolved into a complex violent conflict which required a critical analysis of its root causes. After no less than 15 peace agreements it emerged that western centric clinical approaches to peace building as had been developed under the Marshall Plan style solutions⁴ were not successful in Africa.

In this context that this study seeks to show that without commitment to disarmament in peace building, it is almost impossible to implement other aspects of any peace agreement because the availability of weapons makes a return to violence easier if there is a breakdown in the peace agreement. It also seeks to demonstrate that coordinated efforts through well established and accepted institutions are better equipped to carry out successful disarmament.

1.3 Objectives of the research

To examine the role of disarmament in post conflict peacebuilding.

To examine the success of disarmament in building durable peace after violent conflict in Liberia.

³Bigombe et al (2000) p 2 .See also ,Sida. Conflict Sensitive Development Cooperation. Stockholm (2004):32

⁴ The Marshall Plan as conceived and implemented after WW2 to reconstruct war torn countries in Europe involved large scale construction to jumpstart the economic structures of a particular country without paying attention to other sectors .

1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will review the main debates, concerns and critique by researchers, practitioners and academicians on peace building with specific focus on scholarly literature on the disarmament process which is carried out in the implementation stage after cessation of violent conflict.

The first part of this chapter will focus on the concept of peace and how negotiated settlements are a critical factor in the establishment of a stable peace. The second part will focus on different approaches to peacebuilding. The final part will review literature on the disarmament in peace building with reference to UN involvement.

The UN's supplement to an agenda for peace defines "post-conflict peace building" as the comprehensive efforts to identify and support structure which will consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. This will be through ending of civil strife, disarming, custody and possible destruction of weapons, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions among others." In his study of the peace implementation process in Africa, Donald Rothchild asserts that "by effectively dealing with the short-term, military-related challenges to the implementation process, the third party helps to create a structure of incentives that increase the prospect of a safe landing". Evidence from places as diverse as Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia and Nicaragua similarly shows how the international community may play a key role in "ending military hostilities, defusing tensions, and laying the groundwork for peace⁵" and that it thus might contribute to the creation of a stable post-civil war environment mostly free of violence and political intimidation. Concurring with these postulations, statistical data have indicated that the presence of a third-party enforcer after the signing of a peace agreement reduces the likelihood of peace collapse by an estimated 98 percent. Since then, academic and practitioners have contributed to expand upon the above definition it is now understood to be an intervention that promotes positive peace through activities undertaken and through implementation.

Many definitions of post conflict peace building attempt to answer questions such as: What kind of peace should be build? Who should guide the process? What is its time frame? These questions guide the debates to be reviewed in this chapter.

⁵Crocker, C. and Hampson, F., eds, Making Peace Settlements Work. Foreign Policy, 1996 (104), 54-71

1.5 Building Peace

The first debate looks at the core of peace itself, introduced by Galtung as negative and positive peace. He defined peace building as encompassing the practical aspects of implementing peaceful change through social economic reconstruction and development. He has termed this associative feature of the peace building process which does not just address the ending of hostilities (negative peace) but also the root cause of conflict thereby bringing positive peace. If well coordinated peace building will then insure against the recurrences of conflict by building capacities and establishing institutions to facilitate civil society reconciliation through courts and an electoral process that will enable a society to resolve its conflicts before violence breaks out.

The point being made here is that peace building should be defined by its activities and not just as a sequence of programmes in the peace process because it is not just instrumental in the post conflict stage but in preventive diplomacy as well.

Over the past decade, operational frameworks for assisting war torn societies have been emerged. The different approaches of international peace building form the core of the debate.

During the 1990's international organisations involved in humanitarian relief and development began including a peace building agenda in their programmes. This was driven by recognition of the potential impacts of humanitarian aid on peace and partly by the expansion of international nongovernmental organization NGOs with the UN agencies and increasing formalisation of relations with their donor governments. As a result post conflict peace building has become a focus and of increasing resources and attention from international actors in military, private sector, global financial institutions, regional/intergovernmental organisations and academia. Organizing the convergence of these actors has meant that although strategies and methods differ, actors with formally clashing agendas are now reading from one script adhering to similar principles, aims hence forming the basis of an international post conflict peace building community. If indeed there is a convergence of international organization for peace building, how is it happening?

Data from diverse primary documents such as policy papers, official reports speeches and resolutions as well as peace building literature have noted an adherence to an increasingly standardized peace package⁶. However Bush warns against the development of a peace building

⁶ Duffield, M., Evaluating Conflict Resolution: contexts, models and methodology. In Scrbo et al., eds, pp79-112

commodity⁷” leading to mass produced initiatives ‘conforming to a ‘Northern blue print’ as becoming dominant in post conflict interventions.

That international post conflict peacebuilding community is converging around pragmatic and ideological principles there is no doubt. Duffield and Roland Paris argue that it is because there is growing support within the peacebuilding community for a global system rooted in liberal principles of open economies and societies built around democratic principles which is permeating into every policy aspect of post conflict reconstruction intervention⁸ through an interlinked process of transfer of best practice, shaping of global agenda by donors and governments.

The United Nations has emerged a leader in this process with several support offices headed by office of the secretary general and the respective representatives and donor governments. This has led to emergence of diverse actors working in post war situations. This sharing of knowledge between organizations involved in peace building has produced influential policy documents such as the UN 2000 Brahimi report⁹.

However, Barakat and Chad in ‘Theories Rhetoric and Practices’ argue that despite myriad actors in peacebuilding, their inappropriate strategies still remains as they were in the 80 & 90s hence the need for a transformation of approaches in the field.¹⁰

Crocker in ‘Turbulent Peace’ quoting von Hippel argues that the various actors have their own distinctive implementation methods of peace building. As a result they enter the field with different agenda creating a gap between theory and practice however, apart from the differences, one cannot ignore that the defining aim of all these actors is to transform society, its institutions and promoting peace by ending the hostilities and dealing with the worst causes of conflict thus ensuring positive peace. If properly coordinated, peace building can complete the conflict cycle by insuring against the recurrence of conflict. This will be through building institutions that enable a society to resolve its conflicts before violence breaks out.

7 Bush, K., Towards a balanced approach to rebuilding war-torn societies. *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3(3), 49-69

8 Paris, R., Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism. *International Security*, 22(2), 54-89

9 Brahimi Report 2000: Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. UN Doc. A/55/305/2000/809 Convened by Kofi Annan and chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi the former foreign minister of Algeria. It called for more integration of the locals in order to ensure ownership of the peacebuilding process.

10 Barakat, S., and Chad, M., *Theories, Rhetoric and Practices; Recovering the capacities of war torn societies*. 2002, pp 817-835.

1.6 Approaches to peacebuilding.

The debate on the different practices of individual peace building is divided into two extremes¹¹. These are deductive and inductive approaches. In the early 1990s peace building focused mainly on post conflict situations. In this approach peacebuilding was to take place only after the other phases of conflict management had been completed. The deductive approach was characterized by drafts of peace building activities but it did not include conflict prevention as one of the main objectives of peace building. In 1995, this was rectified in the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace. Thus academicians like Doyles and Sambanis¹² argue that this approach is segmented due to its focus on instruments and tools to promote peace. Peacebuilding activities are prescribed and implemented without relating them to the needs of the war torn societies. Critics of this approach argue that this approach gives no comprehensive strategy outlining the long term goals for peacebuilding. In addition, proper prioritization of the peacebuilding activities and conflicting mandates are ignored. What Mial et al in 'Contemporary Conflict Resolution' call "standard operating procedure" by the international community is actually characterized by mandates, procedures, response, inappropriate assistance creating the danger of negative impacts on the peace process. The main weakness of this approach is that it does not pay attention to the culturally specific needs of the participants, applying a blanket prescription which assumes that each activity is equally appropriate to all other post-conflict situations. It has become common place to describe societies that formally conclude hostilities as post-conflict societies.

Inductive approaches on the other hand focus on the conflict itself with the aim of identifying appropriate channels for external action to address its causes. This approach supports the peace process based on local needs. It allows local capacities to be developed as resources which need to be supported and not supplanted by external assistance. Critics of this approach cite lack of clarity and the changing dynamics of each conflict, which hinder uniform identification of priorities and the appropriate strategy for peace building for the local population as well as international actors. This debate is also described as the "theory gap discourse"¹³

11 Cousens E., Kumar C., Policy briefing; Peacebuilding in Haiti.2000, pp5-10 www.ipacademy.org.haiti.html

12 Doyle. M.,and Sambanis,N., International Peacebuilding :a theoretical and quantitative analysis. American Political Science Review 94(4), 779-801.

13 Paul von Tongeren., People building Peace: Reflecting on Peace practice project;Ulstein Study .2003, p33

1.7 Actors in peacebuilding.

Some scholars¹ tend to promote peacebuilding as heavily dominated by external actors. This view ignores the contributions of local citizens and organisations making it seem donor biased and hindering the consolidation of peace. However Pugh² argues that external actors not only wield the power and moral authority to bring about the peaceful change that communities have failed to do, they are also endowed with superior techniques for dealing with peaceful change he is supported by arguments that local actors have failed to react successfully and have sometimes promoted escalation of conflict promoting the reasoning that external actors are better equipped to carry out postconflict peacebuilding. In contrast, Zartman argues that even if others provide the means for the better management of conflict they cannot do that without delegitimizing the process since the government should be the sole agent of management.

One proposed solution is for external actors or international community involved in peacebuilding to take the views of the parties involved in the conflict as the starting point for external assistance. In this scenario, though the international community may help to develop and establish conflict managing institutions, their operations are guided by the dynamics of the post conflict society. The implication here being that international peace building has to accept and support the local institutions established along the culturally specific modalities.

On the other extreme, this argument has been used to show that peacebuilding serves the agenda of the external actors and the international community by transplanting western socio-political, economic peacebuilding models into African war torn states. The peace building community has responded to this challenge by facilitating establishment of locally owned conflict managing institutions sensitive to the dynamics of the particular post conflict society. As a response, in 1990s the UN launched some of the earliest peacebuilding initiatives in Liberia. Still on the actors, the role of the population of the war torn country in the peacebuilding process is often ignored as attention is paid to the role of the international community of the UN, yet internal actors also are necessary for the activity to succeed.

1 Kühne, W., The transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding: Planning, coordination and funding the twilight zone. 1997, p41

2 Pugh, M., Regeneration of War torn Societies. 2000, pp3-9

1.8 Coordinating peacebuilding

The issue of actors in peace building is closely linked with how it should be coordinated. One perspective sees centralization of efforts as critical to successful implementation. W.kühne in 'Winning the Peace' argues that the overall leadership for peacebuilding should be United Nation's responsibility otherwise there will be dozens if not hundreds of international agencies on the ground which may complicate the situation" This has been described as the top-down approach to peacebuilding.

The other approach is that of multi track diplomacy which according to the institute of multi-track diplomacy sees the efforts of NGOs and other volunteer organisation as important as the bilateral programmes undertaken by the IGOs in that they complement each other. Supporters of this multi-track diplomacy argue that it plays a useful role as a means of overcoming institutional rigidities governments and UN agencies. This multi track perspective (as opposed to the centralized process) is also likely to be more open to feedback from all the agencies carrying out peacebuilding activities in the war torn societies. Its proponents add that it involves the community in the economic, security and humanitarian spheres as opposed to the centralized international operations which offer primarily political interventions which may not reach the indigenous communities effectively because of their time bound approach.

The final argument of the supporters of the multi track diplomacy argue that peace building facilitated by a multiple of actors provides more diversity, as opposed to the centralist approach under the auspices of the UN which stresses more on coordination than diversity and tends to equate peace building with a series of actions undertaken as opposed to it being a process.

One could ask what the deeper rationale is behind this divergence in approach to peace building and why do disagreements arise in the literature? In the immediate aftermath of violent conflict, the international community plays an important role as a security guarantee and in the provision of resources for the re-establishment of institutions. The presence of the UN and other actors is especially important when violent conflict has ended in a peace settlement and thus external peace building more important and more stabilizing. On the other hand to avoid a long stay in the host country, the local community must be involved in their own peacebuilding tasks in which the result will be durable, stable peace.

1.9 Gaps in the literature

As peace studies and peacebuilding areas have evolved into a proper field of research, issues that have a vital impact on rebuilding post civil war states have been identified, studied and models developed to explain 'successful' peacebuilding and how durable peace can be achieved. However many of the findings have proved to be conflicting and may not provide solutions to actors trying to build peace in post war societies.

The other gap has been the changing perception of the sacredness of the sovereignty of the state especially when it is clear that the state is unable to offer expected governance leading to failed states. From the literature reviewed there is the realization that there is need to reconsider the role of the international community in resolving the intrastate conflict which is not well covered by international law. There is also the tendency for studies on peacebuilding to consider those cases studies where conflict ended with a negotiated settlement. This excludes those internal conflicts that ended through informal truce or military victory.

In the rush to promote disarmament and other forms of weapon reduction as important elements of peacebuilding many shortcomings are ignored; the criteria to determine 'success or failure is not always clear even to practitioners and scholars. Each group applies their own criteria. There is evidence that too much attention and resources have been given over to disarmament and demobilisation at the expense of reintegration which the functionalists consider to be of long term benefit to transform a society from postwar tensions to normalcy. Indeed there is the feeling that success is measured in terms of numbers of weapons collected rather than the extent to which security has been improved. Implementers have been criticized for adopting unrealistic objectives and targets. Thus disarmament and other weapon reduction are treated with suspicion by the very combatants and civilians are meant to assist especially where weak military structures lead to the recycling of weapons back to the community.

1.10 Conclusion

In the last decade the study of peacebuilding literature has shown revisionist trends in the consideration of the complex dynamics and processes of post conflict peacebuilding.

There has been a subtle shift in the treatment of postwar settlements from being the domain of diplomats and the elite of the society to the inclusion of the affected communities. This is the paradigm shift in the 'top down' approach to 'bottom up approach' to peacebuilding

The blooming peacebuilding literature is centered on aims and approaches is giving way to a critical examination of values and underlying intentions. It seems that peacebuilding is well founded in the structures of coordination and implementation. For peacebuilding to become wholly applicable to the point of policy it has to encourage exploration in both theory and practice to achieve sustainable peace.

1.11 Theoretical framework

The realist authors that dominated the field in the 1940s and 1950s had conceived of peace as an episode in the permanent and violent struggle for power among nation states. In this pessimistic view, the only chance for peace lay in the existence of balance of power and of a complementary body of diplomats capable of understanding and managing it. The modest liberal theories that began to emerge in the postwar decades were more optimistic about the prospects of peace and more imaginative in the development of mechanisms to prevent the recurrence of war. UN advocates, functionalists, early peace researchers and, later on, American neoliberals, began to rediscover the liberal faith in international law and to unbury some of the interwar idealist thinking on collective security, peaceful settlement, disarmament and arms control in their quest to avoid a nuclear war. Yet these theories shared with realism an essentially negative conception of peace, as simply the absence of war and consequently focused on the means to prevent and terminate violent conflict as the building blocks of peace.

A crucial development in later peace research was the appearance of a new, positive approach to peace, whereby the latter came to be defined as much more than the mere absence of war. This positive approach opened up a new agenda for peace research and a more ambitious set of goals for peace-builders seeking durable peace after the end of intra state or internal conflict.

The intrastate conflict has become the most dominant form of armed conflict and conflict analysts have focused on applying the dominant theories to understand the root causes, termination and the creation of durable peace. Neorealists find that there are similarities between the anarchical international system and the lack of a clear governing authority within a post conflict state³. In their view, neo realism explains how wars begin and end, but are unable

3 Weiss, Forsythe and Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics 1994, p88

to offer prescription as to how to avoid recurrence of war. This stems from their focus on the state as the main actor in international relations. It overlooks the role of other non-state actors such as the regional, international and nongovernmental organisations. In its focus on the states' use of force to realize gains and safeguard its sovereignty, it is unable to explain the need for disarmament after a peace agreement has been signed in order to provide a secure environment where law and order can be reinstated in a post conflict state.

On the other hand the constructivists argue that they provide better explanations for the role of states and international organisations than the neorealists. However both the neorealists and the constructivists are unable to effectively address the issues arising in the post conflict situation of the intrastate conflict today and their theorizations favour inter-state conflicts.

In its discourse liberal institutionalism defines sustainable peace as a situation characterized by the absence of physical violence, elimination of unacceptable forms of discrimination while enhancing constructive transformation of conflicts⁴. According to Lederach, peace building emphasizes building right relationships with partners and programme recipients as an integral part of establishing lasting peace. A review of the practice reveals peace building as Multi Dimensional with seven pillars⁵. Distinguishing it from conventional development it is understood to be a highly political project to build political peace between opposed leaders and social peace between hostile and estranged citizens and eventually creating a legitimate political authority that can avoid resurgence of violence. Peace building is often described in the post conflict context. Butros Butros Ghali in an agenda for peace; said that... "peace can be defined as action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict". These principles stand out, that relationship and partnership, on one hand and participatory processes and are central to peace building. Structures that contribute to strengthening and solidifying peace can be institutions that offer forms for peaceful conflict resolution and or those that prevent violence. However peace is not only consolidated through formal structures or institutions, it also consists of informal institutional framework that supports peace as well as a culture of non violence".

4 Reyhler, L., Paffenholz T., Western Approaches to Negotiation and Mediation: An Overview In Peacebuilding :A field guide .2001,p12

5 GTZ Joint Utstein study of peace building 2003, the most important of the seven pillars are: political, social, economic, security and legal dimensions. The Study analyses 336 peacebuilding projects supported or implemented by Germany, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway.

This is a common thread running through liberal thought from Rousseau, Kant to Schumpeter and Doyle, that democratic processes and institutions would break the power of the political elite and curb their propensity for violence. This argument is furthered by Keohane and Nye⁶ that via membership of international institutions, states can broaden their conceptions of self interest to widen their scope of co-operation. This is further developed in the theories of liberal institutionalism which asserts that cooperation between states even without a hegemonic player can enforce compliance with agreements. In this theory, institutions then assume the role of encouraging cooperative habits, monitoring compliance and sanctioning spoilers.

The assertion that democracies seldom go to war with each other has become the basis of assuming that liberal values and institutions advance peace and prevent peace ipso facto⁷ Every component of liberalism now has a theory of peace underlying its philosophy. The liberal model has been grafted into societies by international agencies associated with post conflict peace operations. That peace building is intellectually based on liberal institutionalism is proved by the number of agencies (in and out of the UN system) involved in post conflict peace building⁸ However liberals argue that humans must learn to cooperate more fully to build a sustainable peace. Despite this, they are not so naïve as to think that potential for conflict can be fully eliminated, they are willing to use coercion when necessary to halt the aggression or oppression. However, this option to restore right is acceptable if accomplished through UN sanctions and forces as well as other regional/sub regional organisations. Peace building practice in areas such as Kosovo, Bosnia and Afghanistan reinforces this conceptual framework that... “the most effective means of establishing new governmental institutions is to rebuild from scratch , staff them with international personnel, then gradually replace them with adequately trained and politically non-partisan locals...”⁹In the liberals’ advocacy of global institutions they see foreign policy as unfolding in a society where institutions are used to mediate in solving disputes...“beating swords into ploughshares “through disarmament as a means of avoiding further conflict. Although traditionally, international assistance focused mainly on economic development , recent post conflict peacebuilding programmes have included political

6 Keohane and J.S. Nye., Power and Interdependencies: World politics in Transition.(Boston 1977 p 23)

7 Lund Michael in a discussion paper ;Taking stock of post conflict peace building and charting future directions.(IDRC January 2003 p15)

8 There are more than 4000 NGO’s in the OECD countries, and an estimated 20,000 outside affiliated to multinational agencies such as Oxfam, Save the Children among a myriad of community based organizations.

9 Roland ,Paris; 2003 Peacekeeping and the constraints of global culture. European journal of International Relations,9(3) ,441-73

programmes focusing on institution building, promotion of elections and the disarmament(within the more comprehensive DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration)of former combatants, rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees, traumatized children and sexually abused women. Such comprehensive attempts to restore peace are better carried out by well established organisations which are able to gain the war torn societies' confidence. In light of this the neoliberals argue that the role of international organisations in providing international assistance is one of the most important factor in predicting the duration of peace after the internal conflict¹⁰.

To the liberals, institutions encourage cooperative habits, monitoring of compliance and sanctioning defectors. Thus to the neoliberal institutionalists post conflict peace building seeks to diminish existing or potential threats to peace such as easy availability of arms to the civilians among others. They also acknowledge that cooperation among states is bound to be fragile but in an environment of regional and global organizations it will be possible to rebuild durable peace.

In conclusion I find that neoliberal institutionalism is a more useful framework for understanding disarmament in post conflict peace building. The realist framework which may advocate for outright victory will not promote durable peace after violent conflict within the state first, because victory creates a feeling of lingering hostility towards former rebels thus increasing the chances of recurrence of the intrastate conflict and secondly because the view that the sovereignty of the state is primary but not sacrosanct especially where the internal conflict affects the peace and security of other states. In addition, the neoliberal institutionalist theory has been able to factor in the changes that have occurred in the scope of UN peace operations from just separating the warring parties to preventing recurrence of war, to finally include military and non military missions aimed at promoting long lasting peace¹¹.I find that the Institutional peace paradigm is able to explain best the proliferation of regional and sub-regional mechanism such as the AU, ECOWAS,IGAD and SADC to provide non violent resolutions to the internal conflicts ravaging the African state.

10 Kumar, K., (1997) The promise of the institutionalists Theory. *International Security*. 20(1): 39-51

11 Holsti, K., *Peace and war: Armed Conflicts and the International Order 1648-1989* (63),5

1.12 Justification of the research

The proliferation of arms is the fuel of conflict; not the trigger. Widespread unemployment, poverty, social inequity and resource depletion in the presence of large quantities of arms make a highly combustible combination¹². Even after cessation of conflict, bands of well armed soldiers can block successful implementation of peace agreements. Thus disarmament during peacebuilding is in the interest of all parties. Effective programs will help former soldiers make the smooth transition to civilian life. If this is done well, there will be less incentive for these individuals to turn to crime and violence and stable peace can be realised.

In Liberia arms were obtained through looting of military depots, seizure of weapons from government armies and the black market. Charles Taylor and other Liberian warlords had also been trading timber, iron ore and agricultural products for small arms since 1990. Beyond the arms found with the government forces and insurgents, large numbers of civilians are usually armed even as a country emerges from the conflict stage to the post conflict stage. This easy availability of weapons may translate into broad-scale violence and is one of the greatest dangers societies struggling to rebuild themselves after long years of warfare grapple with.

The 2nd justification of this study flows naturally from the first, effective disarmament requires strengthening the capacity of the institutions mandated with the disarmament of former combatants. Although ECOWAS and the AU intervened at various stages of the conflict in Liberia, the United Nation's determination to address this problem is demonstrated through the establishment of UNIDIR¹³ which has addressed the issue of arms proliferation through several resolutions. In addition, the UN is able to provide sufficient funding through its global membership. Although governments profess concern about private arms they are themselves an important source of the same. They are more interested in control than outright banning of arms in their respective countries. As a result, the United Nations; viewed as neutral, has been the central implementer of the peace agreements and especially those clauses dealing with disarmament during peace building.

For any peace agreement to be successful it must have the necessary degree of international support; with all the guarantees and commitment of resources necessary. At this point, only the UN has both the mechanism such as Peace building Commission and trained

12 Renner M, *Fighting for survival*; New York (1996) p58

13 United Nations Institute of Disarmament and Reintegration. Established through article 26 of the UN Charter.

personnel to implement the disarmament phase of peace building effectively in order to avoid the recurrence of violent conflict. In addition, the UN is able to legislate and implement long term measures aiming at total disarmament to enhance peace after conflict. Researchers, policy makers and peace builders can learn and improve on what the UN has been doing in Liberia. Thus, there are many lessons to be learnt; the main one being that disarmament needs to be given higher priority in the post conflict peace building.

1.13 Hypotheses

That stable peace is more likely after institutionalized settlements of the intrastate conflict.

That lasting and sustainable peace is more likely be realised if the tasks of disarmament are effectively implemented through UN intervention than in societies where such interventions are absent.

1.14 Methodology

This study utilizes two main types of sources; primary and secondary. Primary sources will be obtained from written testimonies by participants ,witnesses or practitioners in the field as well as accounts by UN personnel involved in post conflict peacebuilding. Charters, official records and publications will be valuable in provision of firsthand accounts. Information obtained from these sources will be important in highlighting the complexities of post conflict peace building and the centrality of disarmament in preventing recurrence to war. These sources will also help to make inferences in an attempt to provide solutions to the gaps identified.

Primary sources will facilitate the re-evaluation of data in relation to the selected hypothesis, theories and any other generalizations that are currently held about disarmament in post conflict peace building.

Secondary sources will form the bulk of information utilized in this study. Sources in this category will be drawn from previous studies by well known peacebuilding researchers such as Call,Charles with Vanessa Wyeth ¹⁴Collier, Paul et al¹⁵Cousens E and Chetan Kumar¹⁶,Doyle M,

¹⁴ Their work, *Building States To Build Peace*(2007) contains case studies of countries including (Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor, Liberia and Palestine).These case studies illustrate core substantive areas of post conflict peace building and the implications of that to state-building.

and Sambanis N.¹⁷, Roland Paris¹⁸ among others from civil society organisations , UN documents and affiliated agencies. The wide variety of sources will enable cross referencing of data to corroborate information in the primary sources. Their value lies in the use of case studies which allow for varied interpretations.

The strength of the case study method is the fact that it is based on reality of Liberia. This case study will allow for generalizations as well as draw attention to the subtle and complex nature of the case in its own right. The use of the Liberia as a case study will be useful in providing institutional feedback for further research and policy making, serving multiple audiences. “Social scientists have come to abandon the spurious choice between qualitative and quantitative data...¹⁹” as such this study will utilize quantitative data provided especially in disarmament in order to enhance the qualitative analysis and to make the necessary recommendations.

15 **Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development policy.** (2003)The authors challenge the idea that civil wars are inevitable and argue that civil wars have significant negative consequences for neighboring countries as well.

16 **Peacebuilding as politics: Cultivating peace in fragile societies** (2001) this is one of the earliest assessments of international peace building and they argue for an integrated approach rooted in greater understanding of the local context.

17 **In Making war and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations.** (2006)This is one of the most comprehensive quantitative study of post conflict transition to date. The main argument is that practitioners should design each mission with appropriate resources and authority to fit specific conditions on the ground.

18 **At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict.**(2004) In this work Paris examines fourteen UN peacekeeping operations between 1989-1999 assessing the relationship between liberalization, institution building and peace in post conflict countries.

19 Merton and Kendall in Cohen and Louis. **Research Methods In Education** 3rd Ed. (1928) pp58-61

1.15 CHAPTER OUTLINE

- Chapter one :** Introduction to study
- Chapter Two:** Disarmament in post conflict peacebuilding
- Chapter Three:** The Liberian civil war and peace process
- Chapter four:** Critical Analysis of disarmament in Liberia.
- Chapter five:** Conclusion.

2.0 CHAPTER TWO.

2.1 Disarmament in Postconflict Peacebuilding.

Introduction to chapter.

This chapter will focus on the linkage between postconflict peacebuilding and disarmament. The first section will cover the varying definitions of post conflict peacebuilding as it developed and expanded its mandate in international relations.

The next discussion will be on where postconflict peacebuilding occurs in the conflict cycle. Postconflict peacebuilding is described as a multidimensional process with various tasks. This chapter will explore these tasks in order to understand the comprehensive nature of peacebuilding. How long should a successful postconflict peacebuilding process be? This is another question that this chapter will seek to provide an answer.

In its objective to restore durable peace there are certain tasks that take precedence. The task of disarmament is one part of the comprehensive DDRR¹ programme under the umbrella of postconflict peacebuilding. This study argues that disarmament is central to the restoration of peace, and is also a way of holding the warring parties to their commitment in the peace agreements that often precede post conflict peacebuilding in the entire process.

The second part of this chapter will then focus on exploring the objectives, role and significance of disarmament in postconflict peacebuilding.

As many actors are now actively involved in postconflict peacebuilding activities: individuals, privately funded organisations, regional and sub-regional bodies such as the AU and ECOWAS, numerous Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and the United Nations; this study will focus on the United Nations efforts in the disarmament process during and after the Liberian civil war.

¹ Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration

2.2 Origins of postconflict peacebuilding

Postconflict peacebuilding which is carried out after termination of an armed conflict is understood to be an overarching term describing a long term process covering all activities aiming first; to prevent violent outbreak of conflict and second, to prevent recurrence of violence after the end of armed conflict. Although aspects of postconflict peacebuilding were first implemented after the Second World War in the reconstruction of post war Europe, it has since developed into a comprehensive process combining political, military, socio economic, cultural and transitional dimensions. It is usually the last phase in conflict resolution mechanisms.

In the peacebuilding discourse J. Galtung distinguishes between two types of peace, namely; negative peace(end of violence)and positive peace (peaceful society at all levels²). Thus to this school of thought An Agenda For Peace in 1992 was seen as the epitome of the narrow definition of peace, that is, negative peace which is viewed as the mere absence of open armed conflict.

Although peacebuilding had been carried out in Namibia as early as 1989, An Agenda for Peace was the first policy document by the UN defining the concept of post conflict peacebuilding. It was perceived as an integral part of UN efforts to promote peace beyond stopping hostilities by initiating long term peace. At that time it was defined as, “an attempt, after peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution.” This was a significant development in that there was a deliberate effort to address the root causes of every conflict, to obtain positive peace in addition to addressing root causes of the just concluded war, and any potential conflict; it is inclusive of justice, equity, and other core political and social arrangements.

The end of the Cold War marked the turning point for the UN in terms of enlarging the perspective of its missions in internal conflicts. This is because chronic civil unrest began to represent a threat to regional and even global stability. Several internal conflicts spilled over international borders undermining the security of adjacent states- as the Rwanda conflict did to Zaire in the mid-1990s and the Liberian conflict to Sierra Leone triggering a regional conflict that went on for over a decade. In response to this challenge the international community

2 Violence, Peace and Peace Research, 1969, 6(3) 167-191.

3 UN; An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.

Report of the Secretary General, United Nations, 17th June 1992. www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html

experimented with new techniques for managing civil unrest. This task fell largely on the UN and leading governmental and non-governmental organisations. Most of these early missions sent with the goal of prevention of recurrence of violence- became known as “peacebuilding” operations. The rationale for these missions was compelling: Without effective techniques for preventing recurrence of violence large scale conflict might resume undermining international efforts to stop the fighting.

Three years later, in 1995 The UN *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* defined peace building as the “comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well being among people by overseeing the implementation of agreements ending civil strife. These efforts include reforming the security sector, rebuilding structures such as the judiciary, disarming previously warring parties...possible destruction of weapons... among others for sustainable, durable peace” In the Supplement, two significant issues are addressed:

First, it defines peacebuilding, as a distinct phase which follows an armistice or peace agreement. This definition recognizes it as a process and a conflict management and resolution mechanism that is implemented after the cessation of armed violence. In this phase interests are pursued using dialogue and non violent means. This definition gives outcomes that are clear and modest enough to be realistic.

Secondly peacebuilding is seen as an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and modify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict of states already tottering at the brink of collapse⁴. From then on post conflict peacebuilding developed and peacebuilding operations were carried out in Nicaragua 1989, Mozambique 1992 and Liberia 1993 and Sierra Leone in 1999 among others mainly in the former states of Eastern Europe⁵.

2.3 Implementing postconflict peace building.

2.3.1 Cycle of conflict

Understanding the conflict cycle is essential to an understanding of what post conflict peace building is, where it is applied in the conflict cycle and how it is done. Although terminology is often confusing, with the same terms used in different ways within and without


4 Collier et al., report that a post conflict state had 44% chance of slipping back into war within the first five years. This is according to a study of 78 civil conflicts between 1960-1999. (2004) p83

5 Roland Paris., *At War's End* (2003) P3

academic literature, the term conflict has many meanings. Wallensteen defines conflicts as a social situation in which a minimum of two actors or parties strive to acquire at the same moment an available set of scarce resources⁶. Armed conflict denotes a conflict where both sides resort to use of force in the form of manufactured weapons or sticks, stones, fire, water among others. An armed conflict is categorized as intrastate when it occurs within a country between a government and a non state actor. A conflict is not a static situation; the intensity level may change over a conflict's life cycle.

Academicians in this field have developed many models but one of the well known is that conflicts tend to be described as cyclical; escalating from stability to crisis then war. Then de-escalating into relative peace. In principle, conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and peace building are regarded as applicable interventions at different phases of the conflict. The models presented here show the conflict processes and possible intervention measures. However empirical evidence shows that this may not always be the pattern as each conflict is unique and the reality of conflict is not that simplified⁷


Figure 1. Conflict cycle.



⁶ Wallensteen P. Understanding Conflict Resolution. London, Sage(2002)p16

⁷ Ernest-Otto Czempiel International Politik. Paderbor Schiningh(1981)pp190-203

Figure 2. The conflict cycle is also presented as a curve.



Source: Lund., Michael. Preventing Violent Conflicts. US Institute for Peace.1996.

From the second model, the course of disputes that result in violent conflict can be explained in two dimensions; the intensity of conflict through the vertical axis, and the duration of conflict through the horizontal axis.

The curve is divided into five levels of conflict intensity (stable peace, unstable peace, open conflict, crisis and war) stable peace is where tension is low and there is cooperation among the different groups. When tension increases this is the phase of unstable peace also referred to as negative peace. If the root causes of this tension are not addressed the situation deteriorates to open conflict where parties opt to take their own measures to deal with the situation. War then becomes imminent in the crisis phase when parties opt to use arms. Sporadic violence becomes a regular feature in the interactions of the opposing groups. If left unchecked open armed violence breaks out in the war phase. On other side of the curve the pattern is reversed moving from war to crisis, open conflict, unstable peace to finally reach a situation of stable peace. The division of

the conflict into phases as a cycle also becomes the starting point for research on conflict prevention, management and resolution.

2.4 Ending the civil war

Civil wars have become the most difficult to end⁸. Lederach argues that intra-state or civil wars occur around identity groups living in close proximity and they are often characterized by deep rooted intense animosity, fear, and severe stereotyping⁹. As a result of these dynamics, national and mechanical processes and solutions aimed at conflict transformation are rendered offensive and irrelevant. Charles King¹⁰ further argues that in these circumstances, the space for negotiations is limited and that the incentives to continue violence also inhibit negotiations and settlements. Peace agreements that bring these conflicts to an end often focus, therefore, on rebuilding democratic governance mechanisms. The manner and method by which a war is brought to an end also affects the substance of an agreement. Violent conflicts, typically end in one of three ways: an agreement on the terms of surrender, a partial agreement, or a full negotiated peace agreement¹¹. Peace agreements are contracts intended to end a violent conflict, or to significantly transform a conflict, so that it can be more constructively addressed. There are various types of agreements that can be reached during a peace process. Each type of agreement has a distinct purpose and serves a value in itself towards building positive momentum for a final settlement. These agreements, however, are not easily distinguished, as the content may sometimes overlap. Not all types of agreements are needed for each conflict. Some processes may have step-by-step agreements that lead towards a comprehensive settlement. Other peace processes may seek to negotiate one agreement comprehensively. While formally written implementation agreements often take a longer time to achieve, there is usually a perception that the parties are committed, serious and obligated to implement these agreements.

While categorizing each document that is negotiated during a peace process is often difficult, the following are common classifications used by the United Nations to differentiate the various types of peace agreements: A ceasefire agreement, pre-negotiation agreements and

8 Licklider, R. ed; *Stopping The Killing: How Civil Wars End*. 1993 p4

9 Lederach, J.P., *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, in: Mulu, F.k., *The Role Of Regional Organisations In Conflict Management* 2008 p5.

10 King, C., *Ending Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper 308, 1997, p13.

11 "Peace Agreements" in UN Peacemaker Databank, Policy Planning Unit, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations. April, 2006.

preliminary agreements. The terms "Comprehensive Agreements" and "Framework Agreements" are often used interchangeably. However, there is a slight difference between the two types of agreements: Comprehensive Agreements address the substance of the underlying issues of a long-standing conflict by seeking to find the common ground between the interests and needs of the parties to the conflict, and resolve the substantive issues in dispute¹². Framework Agreements are agreements that broadly agree upon the principles and agenda upon which the substantive issues will be negotiated. They are usually accompanied by protracted negotiations that result in Annexes that contain the negotiated details on substantive issues, or are a series of subsequent agreements that are sometimes collectively known as the Comprehensive Agreement¹³.

Although there have been significant cases of conflicts that have come to an end through peace agreements or settlement, this is not always the normal pattern. Conflicts may die out but the root causes remain and they are prone to break out again. However the post-cold war era has seen significant peace agreements. Wallensteen and his colleagues classify a conflict ended by a peace agreement as one in which no armed violence occurred in the following year. 'Although the majority of civil wars end when one warring party achieves a victory over the other, negotiated agreements are growing more common as a means of ending intrastate conflict'. There is a compelling argument that those negotiated settlements, which provide institutional guarantees for the security threats for the warring parties are the ones most likely to prove stable. The substance of an agreement depends on The type of war, the issues in dispute and how the war is brought to an end. The aim of the peace agreement is a result of successful negotiations to bring warring parties back to dialogue and negotiation. This often marks the beginning of implementation of the peace agreement of which peace building is an integral part.

2.5 Third party involvement in Peace settlements.

In the initial period after the end of the civil war, confidence among antagonists that the other party will adhere to the terms of the peace agreement is crucial. External parties, (exogenous and endogenous) such as regional and international organisations, individual nation states often play a critical role in the confidence building process immediately after the civil

12 For example: Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties.

13 Yawanarajah, Nita and Julian Ouellet. "Peace Agreements." Beyond Intractability. Eds., Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: September 2003
<http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/structuring_peace_agree/>

war. A number of studies of civil war have concluded that the international community may play a critical role in the initiation of a post-civil war period. The argument is that mechanisms implemented by external third-parties have the potential of addressing the security fears of the former combatants and thus to contribute to the prevention of further escalation of war in the immediate post-civil war period. Examples of international peacekeeping in post-civil war societies, such as Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia and Nicaragua, show third parties have helped in creating stable security environments. But in what way may third-parties possibly prevent renewed hostility? Are some international actors more influential than others? And what role should the international community take to ensure that post-civil war societies do not relapse into chaos as soon as the third party leaves?

Third parties to the armed conflicts, such as regional organizations (e.g., African Union (AU), European Union (EU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)) or regional/international/global leaders as well as the UN, attempt to create an atmosphere that will facilitate negotiation among the parties, leading to a peace agreement. They also add new perspectives to the conflict resolution process. However, a peace agreement is not an event marking the end of a conflict that will then suddenly enter a post-conflict peaceful situation¹⁴. Warring factions – including those that sign such peace agreements – do not always outwardly show their true intentions and may accept agreements under pressure, or to allow breathing space before a change of tactics. Trust-building measures implemented gradually through negotiations after the signing of peace agreements are also crucial to lasting peace.

2.6 Mechanisms for implementation of peace agreement.

Institutional components are mechanisms intended to promote the peace consolidation efforts after the agreement. These mechanisms are either directly responsible or provide oversight and guidance to other actors to carry out the activities intended to consolidate the fragile peace and lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. There are two types of organizational components. The first, often referred to by the United Nations as “implementation mechanisms¹⁵,” are intended to promote agreement implementation. Monitoring committees, observation missions and transition missions like UN Transitional Authority in

14 Ho-Won Jeong, *Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy & Process*, Rienner, 2006, p.6.

15Hartzell, Caroline. "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43:1, January 1, 1999.

Cambodia (UNTAC) chaired by the United Nations or a neutral third party are in this category, including parties to the conflict and other relevant actors required to help build the peace. The second type of institutional component is designed to resolve future conflicts over substantive issues, such as the abuse of state power in relation to human rights and the promotion of transparency and accountability in governance are “peacebuilding mechanisms.”

Peacebuilding mechanisms are designed to provide: A neutral structure and capacity within the state to resolve future conflicts and complaints, means for the peaceful resolution of public grievances before they become a source of conflict in a society and means for preventing future conflicts¹⁶.

2.7 Development and expansion of Postconflict Peacebuilding

The end of the Cold War opened new possibilities for international intervention. Given the nature of these interventions (usually in extreme humanitarian crisis like Kosovo, Liberia and Sierra Leone), traditional peace keeping soon turned out to be an insufficient instrument for meeting the new security challenges. As a result, multilateral peace operations were elevated to the more comprehensive task of post conflict peace building.

The term post conflict is at best a simplification to describe countries that have normally terminated hostilities either through negotiation or through the battlefield and have not yet relapsed into violence¹⁷. Armed conflict retards the development process as people abandon their homes, education and livelihoods, flee their countries or are killed. Infrastructure is destroyed, resources are diverted and resource bases are depleted. As a result, state capacity to protect property, ensure personal safety or provide conducive environment for investment is eroded¹⁸. It would seem an easy task to undertake peace building after conflict, but continued social instability, political tension, economic disruption and heightened crime often mark what is described as “post conflict” societies. As a result of these features, building peace in post conflict societies has become more complex. To Lederach, every conflict is unique and so every peace building mission must be able to address the unique cultural differences at the root of every

16Werner, Suzanne. "The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms." *American Journal of Political Science* 43:3, January 1, 1999.

17 Rama, Mani., *Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War*. 2002 p.11

18 Many post conflict governments were unable to fulfill these functions satisfactorily prior to wars.

conflict¹⁹. Thus the core function of post conflict peacebuilding as a response to these problems is building durable peace. Post conflict countries face a particularly large and complex set of issues that must be addressed rapidly since these issues are often related to the conflict itself. Over the 1990s the concept of peacebuilding became more expansive driven by the growing complexity of post conflict transitions as more agencies and nongovernmental organisations became involved and the multiple needs of the post conflict societies. The United Nations General Assembly can also mandate peace-building measures according to Article 55 Chapter IX. In reaction to the World Summit held in 2005, the General Assembly formed the Peace building Commission. The main responsibility of the commission was to propose integrated strategies for post conflict peace building and recovery to ensure sustained financial investment and extend the period of attention by the International Community.

In the enabling resolutions establishing the Peacebuilding Commission, resolution 60/180 and resolution 1645 (2005) of 20 December 2005, the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council mandated it, *inter alia*, to provide resources for early recovery activities both medium to long-term; to develop best practices on political, security, humanitarian issues; to bring together all relevant actors in marshalling resources and to advise on the proposed integrated strategies for post conflict peacebuilding and recovery.

The resolutions also identify the need for the Commission to extend the period of international attention on post-conflict countries and where necessary, highlight any gaps which threaten to undermine peacebuilding. The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) was established to assist and support the Peacebuilding Commission in administering the Peacebuilding Fund, and serve the Secretary-General in coordinating United Nations agencies in their peacebuilding efforts²⁰. The UN Charter recognizes the legitimate roles for regional organizations and regional arrangements in Chapter VIII. The letter of the charter requires action by regional organizations to be subject to prior authorization from the Security Council. However in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone approval was sought after the events. The African Union, IGAD, ECOWAS

19 Paul, Lederach., A framework for building peace in preparing for peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures. 1995 p8

20 Prepared and maintained by the Peace and Security Section, Department of Public Information October 2000. United Nations website at [http:// www.un.org](http://www.un.org)

and NEPAD are collaborating with the UN in peace building missions in Africa. Though many recent studies have criticized peace building's record in practice, they have not weakened the concept but indicate the inherent difficulties of translating an evolving and dynamic concept into practice.

2.8 Objectives of Post conflict peacebuilding.

“In order to prevent a relapse into conflict, a peacebuilding strategy should prioritize those activities that aim at establishing institutions that reward moderation and encourage compromise among contending interests²¹” There is no doubt that the main objective of peace building is to implement peace agreements which move the society from conflict to peace and to prevent any relapse into conflict.

Within this objective are the principles guiding peace building as presented by Lederach in his ground breaking work in 1997²². In this work he argues that, for designing specific peacebuilding interventions to meet the needs of the war torn society, peacebuilding needs to be comprehensive, interdependent, sustainable, strategic in its focus and able to construct an infrastructure for peace. However different organisations add or change the principles in order to suit their work better.²³ In being comprehensive, a peace building strategy needs to see the overall picture in order to effect changes within it when a gap is identified. This is an imperative for addressing the multiple root causes of conflict at different levels of society. For this reason peacebuilding activities are linked to broad long term goals for a just and durable peace. A successful post conflict peacebuilding strategy is designed to meet the immediate needs of the post conflict society as well as building checks and balances that will enable the society to respond to crisis through peaceful means instead of being driven by the crisis.

With people at the core of peacebuilding, the activities are designed to encourage relationships necessary for pursuing and sustaining desired changes. This includes encouraging participation in governance through democratic processes like elections, providing links between the people and the police through programmes like community vigilantes as well as establishment of a corruption free judiciary. The relations forged during the post conflict

21 Rothschild, Donald. Responding to Africa's Post-Cold War Conflicts.(1996)P 227

22Lederach, J.,Building Peace;Sustainable Reconciliation in divided Societies.

23 See Peacebuilding: A Caritas Training Manual p90 .The Catholic Relief Services (CRS) developed ten principles out of these five to respond to CRS peacebuilding programmes.

peacebuilding phase need to be interdependent but strong and durable to withstand strain and prevent relapse of violent conflict.

Violence in a conflict is usually the last resort by the aggrieved party to redress long term injustices .Similarly one cannot expect peacebuilding to effect enduring attitude changes and help the people develop their economic capabilities in the post war society in a span of two to three years only. Thus peacebuilding activities are developed in such a way that they can be sustained over the people's lifetime. Post conflict peacebuilding can be compared to the foundation of a house which if weak then cannot withstand a storm. A peacebuilding infrastructure creates a society where the people live in an environment with institutions which enable them to transform conflict into an opportunity for greater cooperation to ensure peace.

2.9 Tasks and Activities of Post conflict peacebuilding.

Successful peacebuilding is said to have three main tasks: reforming the security situation and security sector, facilitating a smooth political transition to establish institutions of good governance and an economic agenda whose aim is to rebuild the post war society's economic capabilities²⁴.Although all are considered necessary for durable and self sustaining peace, there is no consensus within the international community in what chronological order they should be addressed. Peacebuilding has become an industry of its own in its effort to reform, streamline, specialize or coordinate international actors . Within the UN system, agencies give priority to functional tasks such as transitional justice; police development; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex combatants; refugee return and economic recovery²⁵.The complex security situation in Liberia was underscored by a number of issues that have seriously eroded the monopoly of the state over the use of force. These include: the involvement and role of non-state actors in undermining human security; the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; the calculated exportation of the conflict into neighbouring states such as Sierra Leone and its fuelling through a network of regional warlords and mercenaries; illegal exploitation of natural resources by cross-border criminal networks; and the civil society involvement in the processes of peacebuilding, including constitutional, socio-political, judicial and security reforms.

24 Forman, Shepard and Stewart Patrick., Good Intentions. Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict recovery. Centre on International Cooperation. 2000,p5.

25 Charles T,Call., and Cousens. M., Ending Wars and Building Peace: Coping with Crisis,2007,p10

Conflict resolution can be used to reduce the chances of violence or to consolidate the cessation of a violent conflict in order to prevent re-escalation. These phases became clear as the trends towards negotiated settlement after the Cold War created entry points for international peacebuilding. However there was also the clear pattern of recurrence, Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom indicate a 23 percent chance of revision within five years and a 17 percent in the subsequent five years²⁶. Several factors contributed to failed peace processes, Steadman and Downs²⁷ call them the “degree of difficulty” while Doyle and Sambanis²⁸ label them the “degree of hostility”. For both approaches the higher the stakes, the greater the degree of difficulty the required from international actors in troops, money and time. This argument posits that multidimensional international post conflict peacebuilding can help reduce recurrence in war. Also interesting are findings about the comparative effectiveness of the UN which significantly increases the prospects of a successful peacebuilding in comparison to the non-UN operations. In addition, where governing institutions such as police had been totally destroyed the UN has proved capable of taking over for the transitional period till the national actors were able to assume those roles²⁹.

Under the social economic development sector, post conflict peacebuilding is characterized by reconstruction of physical infrastructure and ensuring equitable access to services and natural resources among others. The second group of peace building activities is covered under the broad category of reform of Justice and security institutions. Thereafter, are those tasks covering truth and reconciliation arrangements and finally those activities aiming at reforming the civil society through good governance. The main tasks of post conflict peace building are summarized in this table.

26 Collier P., Hoeffler A., and Soderbom M., “Post Conflict Risks”, paper delivered to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and World Bank(August 17, 2006)

27 George Downs and Stephen J. Steadman, “Evaluating issues in peace implementation in Ending Civil Wars” (2003) pp43-70.

28 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Peace (2006)p84

29 Charles T. Call., “Institutionalizing Peace: A review of post conflict peacebuilding. Concepts and issues for DPA”(January 31, 2005)

Table 1. Tasks of post conflict peace building.

Socio-economic development	Reform of justice and security institutions	Culture of justice, truth and reconciliation	Good Governance
Balanced physical Reconstruction. Sound and equitable economic management. Equitable and balanced poverty reduction. Gender equality. Equitable access to Services. Repatriation and reintegration of the displaced. Sustainable use and equitable access to natural resources. Social inclusion in Projects.	Security system reform (police, military, intelligence). Small arms and light weapons reduction. Nonviolent Accompaniment. Community policing. Peacekeeping. Nonviolent observers. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants. Demining.	Dialogue among conflicting groups. Enhancing nonviolent dispute resolution systems. Prejudice reduction or diversity training. Trauma healing Capacity building and training in conflict resolution. Peace education. Transitional justice Processes. War crimes trials	Civil society Development. Freedoms of expression association Media development Power sharing,processs Democratization and electoral proceses. Transparency and Accountability. Anticorruption. Human rights Protection. Rule of law

Source: Inspired by the Joint Utstein Study of peace building, 'Utstein palette' 2004pp27-28

2.10 Duration of post conflict peacebuilding.

In post conflict peace building the time element is multidimensional. Timely, and quick impact interventions are crucial in influencing outcomes. However, the process is a long term process and so whereas rapid response is necessary it does not mean success. Luttwak Edward in the *Curse of Inconclusive Interventions*³⁰; argues that interventions that impose armistices or ceasefires only without sustainable peace are merely freezing the war for a while, providing the incentives to the belligerents to rearm , reconstitute and prolong war. Post conflict stage can be divided into two; the immediate aftermath of armed conflict lasting between one to five years and the period after lasting between five to ten years. This newer distinction of the post conflict phase is a result of post conflict research that finds evidence that there is a higher risk of

30 Luttwak, Edward ;in *Turbulent Peace* 2003 p265

recurrence of interstate conflict within the first five years after the hostilities, this risk falls significantly after the first post conflict decade³¹.

2.11 DDR Links Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

This section will start with a brief overview of the evolution of disarmament. Emphasis will be made on the importance of DDR of ex-combatants as the link between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The focus will narrow down to disarmament as the core of the entire DDR process. Although this study is focused on disarmament, it does not exist alone. A number of scholars and peace activists have defined disarmament as reducing or abolishing weapons and arms control (skilful management of weapons). It is the first phase of the comprehensive DDR programme in post conflict peacebuilding. It also marks a clear departure from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in any mission undertaken by the UN in the post conflict context. Demobilization; the second phase, is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary center to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonments sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion. Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization prior to the longer-term process of reintegration into civil society.

2.12 Evolution of DDR

DDR has evolved through the experiences of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) through 1990s, to respond to the recurrences of armed conflicts even after peace agreements. UNPKOs have been attached the mandate with "DDR" since the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) which was authorized by the UN Security Council in 1999. African countries in particular, can easily identify difficulties at the beginning of peacebuilding operations including DDR just after peace agreements, where UNPKO and other peace support operations are combined, as in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi³².

31 Collier, et al., *Breaking The Conflict Trap: Civil War And Development Policy*. 2003

32 Researcher, Hiroshima University Peacebuilding and Capacity Development (HIPEC) <yamane@hiroshima-u.ac.jp>

While the DDR was originally within the framework of UNPKOs, a broader set of activities in “non-peacekeeping” operations are now seen as being related to the DDR concept in post-conflict areas. “Reintegration” of ex-combatants becomes conducted as the crucial concept of peace support operations which is excised by non-peacekeeping agencies like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) World Bank and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In light of peacebuilding, these operations also take account of local ownership for realizing local peacebuilding.

Currently, UNPKOs and other agencies aim to maximize their work for DDR by seeking “integrated approach”. While UNPKOs as military organizations mainly play a role in restoring security through disarmament and demobilization, the other agencies as non-military organizations tend to plan and implement reintegration itself. However, all of these approaches for DDR share the common principles including being “nationally owned” and “human centered”. As non-peacekeeping operations aim “longer term reintegration” along with their respective mandate, the other effect of DDR is felt in the “human security” national security components as well³³. The UN Security Council held a public meeting on the matter of DDR on 8 July 1999 under the then president of the UN Security Council, the Malaysian Ambassador to the UN. The agenda item was “the role of the UN peacekeeping on DDR” and its importance was recognized in the Security Council for the first time by the report of the UN Secretary-General. In that meeting, the importance of DDR in peacekeeping environment was extensively discussed through many brief statements by the UN delegations, following which a presidential statement was adopted requesting the UN Secretary-General to submit a report further investigating the issue of DDR³⁴. According to the UN annual report of the year 2000, the UN peacekeeping operations with mandates including “DDR related activities” were as follows: United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL), United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), United Nations Observer Mission in

33 See, Mards R. Berdal, “Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars,” Adelphi Paper, No.303, 1996, Herbert, Wulf., ed., *Disarmament and Conflict Prevention in Development Cooperation*, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) (Report 14), February 2000, Joanna Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M.Cousens (eds).

34 UN Doc. S/2000/101.

Liberia (UNOMIL), United Nations Angola Verification Mission II & III (UNAVEM II&III), United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) among others.

This was revised for the new edition from the DDR report of the UN Secretary-General in 2000. The importance of such a process had already been pointed out in a paper entitled “Guns, Camps and Crash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Transition from War to Peace” written by Mark Knight and Alpaslan Ozerdem. The DDR report in 2006 presented seven principles under the integrated DDR standards as follows: (a) people centered; (b) flexibility; (c) accountability and transparency; (d) nationally owned; (e) integrated; (f) well-planned.

Although lacking a doctrine or even minimum standards, DDR came to comprise an integral element of peace processes, usually introduced early on in the post-conflict period and geared towards building confidence between parties and neutralizing potential spoilers. DDR and weapons reduction initiatives, whether pursued bilaterally or through regional and multilateral development organizations, are being tested and refined in the 21st century. There is a growing consensus that DDR is an intrinsic component of the ‘post-conflict’ period, whereas weapons reduction can be pursued later on and over longer periods of time. A major rethink of disarmament and DDR in the context of transition and post-conflict occurred with the UN Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (UNSC, 2000). In what is commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report, the panel warned against deploying troops under the auspices of ambiguous mandates—and against the particular risks of undertaking disarmament in such an environment. It also emphasized the importance of clear chains of command, a commonly shared doctrine and competence and the dangers of contrasting objectives. Within a few years DDR rapidly came to occupy a central pillar of so-called military-civilian transition operations’ to be implemented by the UN. DDR is also characterized among the practices linking the peace process. Because leaders of armed groups are interested in the peace process for obtaining the peace dividend convenient for their own profit in return for accepting DDR.

2.13 Disarmament

Disarmament is also described as the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and of the civilian population or the process in which former combatants surrender their weapons,

preferably on a voluntary basis. Disarmament has expanded to include the development of responsible arms management programs³⁵.

In essence these measures aim to eradicate or permanently remove the tools of violence, namely weapons. General consensus is that the lack of disarmament has the potential to destabilise the entire southern African region, due to the uncontrolled and unaccounted for mass movement of weapons that are no longer of political or military value to the former warring parties³⁶. Consequently, this area of research has largely focused on the problem of light weapons proliferation and the possible means to contain it³⁷. Many researchers interested in disarmament contend that the control and reduction of weapons can be an effective tool for ensuring stability and establishing peace. In terms of peacebuilding, disarmament and weapons control is a preliminary step towards demobilising and reintegrating ex-combatants and amalgamating opposing armies. Mads Berdal contends that disarmament, like demobilisation and reintegration, is an intensely political process, whose long-term and sustainable impact depends on parallel efforts of political and economic reconstruction to resolve the root causes of conflict³⁸. Where peacekeeping troops are deployed (UN, AU, sub-regional) they are usually charged with the collection, safe storage and eventual disposal of the weapons collected. This is a critical operation that takes weapons that have been used in conflict out of circulation and thus creates a secure environment in which the peace process can be consolidated. Disarmament entails reductions in force levels, military spending and weapons holdings. Since World War II the UN has devoted much attention to the necessity for progress in this area in the interests of international peace and security. In 1978 the General Assembly resolved that the ultimate goal of the international community is general and complete disarmament under effective international control; the UN remains the only organisation that is able to secure these weapons effectively with the warring parties sure that they will not find their way into the enemy's hands³⁹.

35 DPA"(January 31, 2005)

36 . One of the most useful reference manuals with respect to data and international agreements and resolutions are the SIPRI Year Books (New York: Oxford University Press).

37 Smith, C., "Light Weapons and the International Arms Trade", Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva; Cock, J. 1996.

38 "Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil War", Adelphi Paper 303.

39 Katherine Glassmyer Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 45, (2008)No. 3, 365-384

The resolution has served as a guiding principle in subsequent UN deliberations on the subject⁴⁰. The Organisation of African Unity also endorsed this position, and African states have repeatedly declared their commitment to conventional and nuclear disarmament⁴¹.

Conflicts lead to the recruitment of large numbers of soldiers and members of irregular rebel forces. In many countries communities also organize self-defense militia. Some of the recruits, including women and children, are forced into service by government and rebel forces. At the end of conflicts the combined strength of the regular and irregular forces is much greater than post-conflict military and security needs. Surplus troops have to be discharged from service in order to avoid the possibility of large numbers of armed ex-combatants harassing the population and threatening the security of the State, special programmes are established to disarm the discharged troops prior to their demobilisation from their military units. Increasingly, efforts are being made to help the demobilized former combatants reintegrate into communities of their choice and acquire skills which enable them to engage in productive activities.

Programmes have been undertaken in some conflicts⁴² where the urgency of taking weapons out of circulation was thought to outweigh any negative consequences resulting from such payments⁴³. However, non-cash incentives have been used successfully in some countries to encourage the surrender of weapons⁴⁴. Disarmament is sometimes coercive. In situations such as the Ituri district of the Democratic Republic of the Congo where the prevailing insecurity has made armed groups reluctant to voluntarily disarm, forced disarmament has been approved⁴⁵. This entails a considerable degree of risk to the forces charged with the operation. It is therefore authorized only in exceptional cases⁴⁶. Disarmament is complicated by the fact that not all combatants carry weapons owing to shortages or lack of confidence in the combatants on the part of leaders. This is particularly so for child combatants and women which tends to exclude them

40 Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, (1989).

41 Albert Carames. Analysis of DDR programmes in the world in 2005.

42 Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia.

43 \$300 paid in Liberia as against the \$1000 planned for neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire

44 A catholic charity in Mozambique has exchanged building materials, seeds and agricultural tools for weapons many years after the end of DDR in 1994.

45 Owing to the resistance of the many armed groups in Ituri to disarm voluntarily, the UN Security Council authorized the use of force. Resolution 1484 (2003). Significant quantities of arms have been collected, many armed group leaders arrested and jailed but at the cost of the lives of some peacekeepers.

46 Disarmament, Demobilization And Reintegration Of Ex-Combatants In A Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines Lessons Learned Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations United Nations (December 1999)p16

from the disarmament process and benefits. Consequently the frequent relapse to conflict following supposedly successful disarmament programmes provoked a rethinking of the entire process. Some efforts are made to ensure that the non-possession of a weapon does not block children and women who have been associated with armed groups from participation in disarmament. Weapons storage and destruction facilities are constructed to ensure that weapons do not get recycled. Attempts are also made to properly define what constitutes a weapon, which is very important because irregular forces such as the community defense forces in Sierra Leone and the Mai Mai in the Democratic Republic of the Congo did not rely on conventional arms⁴⁷.

⁴⁷ African Development Bank, 2005, Overview of Post-Conflict Recovery and Reconstruction: Experience and Lessons Learnt. Paper presented at the 4th Brainstorming Retreat of the Peace and Security Committee and other AU Member States Permanent Representatives to the AU, (September 2005) p4-5

3.0 CHAPTER THREE:

3.1 Liberian conflict, the peace process and disarmament.

This chapter will start with a summary of the Liberian civil war which occurred between 1989 to 2003. The second part of this chapter will be an overview of the Liberian peace process first under ECOWAS and later under the United Nations. This section will also highlight the clauses on disarmament as found in the various peace agreements.

3.1.1 Roots of the Liberian civil war.

The origins of the Liberian conflict lie in the nature of the establishment of the state¹ and its domination by the freed slaves and their descendants known as Americo Liberians² who perceived themselves superior to the indigenous African Liberians. Power and wealth was in the hands of the Americo Liberians and inequalities in accessing education made the African Liberians extremely resentful. Since 1847 when it was recognized as an independent republic, to 1980 all the presidents were of the Americo Liberian stock yet they made up only 5 percent of the entire population. However as more 'natives' received education they began to demand for more political power. In the fore front were teachers, workers and student movements galvanized by the political NGOs.

3.1.2 Military coups

Real discontent and confrontations began to manifest during the rule of William Tolbert president of Liberia from 1971 to 1980. In 1980 the African Liberians formed the opposition Progressive Peoples Party (PPP) and demanded the resignation of president Tolbert and the government of the True Whig Party (TWP). They were quickly arrested on charges of sedition and treason. The conflict began in earnest when the president was assassinated in a coup led by a section of the Armed Forces of Liberia (ALF) in favour of the banned PPP. The seventeen non-commissioned officers named master-sergeant (M-Sgt) Samuel K. Doe as head of state. The government was run by a joint military and civilian Peoples Redemption Council (PRC). This coup was welcomed by a large segment of the Liberian population. However it soon became a disappointment as M-Sgt Samuel Doe consolidated his power by surrounding himself with members of his Krahn tribe to the exclusion of others. Repression of the opposition intensified as

1 In 1822, American freed slaves were returned to Africa. They founded Liberia from the word Liberty. See Youboty James in A Nation In Terror, the true story of the Liberia civil war. (2004)pp10-12

2 Ibid p11

Samuel Doe rigged the 1985 elections to obtain victory. This triggered a coup attempt against him by a non-commissioned officer now promoted to Brigadier General, Thomas Quinwonkpa from the Gio tribe. Doe and his AFL soldiers responded by killing three thousand Mano and Gio civilians. This began a vicious cycle of ethnically oriented violence which would intensify with time.

3.1.3 NPFL and INPFL.

As a result of increased ethnic rivalry, rebel groups were formed to protect tribal interests. One such group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor supported by the Mano and Gio tribes organized an invasion of the Nimba County³ from the neighbouring Ivory Coast to overthrow president Doe. The NPFL split and the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) was formed led by Prince Johnson. Both factions targeted the Krahn and Mandingo civilians associated with Samuel Doe. By 1990 the NPFL and INPFL controlled most of the country side. Such was the brutality meted out that pregnant Gio and Mano women suspected of relations with the Krahn and Mandingo would have their bellies split open to eject the fetuses. The AFL soldiers not sure of who the rebels were because they wore no uniform and spoke local languages also increased their brutality. In the Liberian situation, all of the warring factions have committed atrocities against the civilian population, most especially the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) headed by Charles Taylor. Atrocities against the "Mandingo-Muslims ethnic groups" were beyond imagination. It was an unfortunate situation if not intentional, that the initial peace agreements signed by the UN, ECOWAS, and the O.A.U. did not provide any stipulations in the agreements for impunity for gross human rights violations and abuses of the NPFL October 23, 1992 invasion and the massacre of over eight hundred civilians, unarmed men and women, children and the disabled at 12:00 mid-night while at sleep. Also, the May 3, 1993 Firestone Robber Plantation Company Carters' camp massacre by both the NPFL and the Liberian National Guard (LNG), where six hundred Liberian, unarmed men and women, children, old and disabled were massacred while sleeping in one of the refugees camps mentioned above. The NPFL massacred of the four US nuns in Liberia, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) Lutheran Church massacre in 1990 where over seven hundred Liberians, mostly women and children, seeking refuge in the church.

³ See map of Liberia.

This raging civil war had by this time claimed over five thousand people and turned over half a million into refugees and thousands internally displaced. In June the Liberia Council of churches tried to organize peace talks in Sierra Leone but the agreement was never signed. In July 1990 the rebels had moved through the country and were just outside Monrovia. On July 24th the Executive Mansion, the president's official residence came under heavy mortar fire. From then onwards Samuel Doe was under siege in his own capital; Monrovia. In September as Samuel Doe went to visit the newly established ECOMOG headquarters, he was captured and murdered by the INPFL in a horrific event that was televised for the world to see.

3.1.4 Intervention by ECOMOG (1990) AND UNOMIL (1993).

ECOMOG is a West African peacekeeping force that began with approximately 3,000 troops the vast majority being Nigerians. ECOMOG included forces from five countries of ECOWAS: Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, later joined by Mali. In September 1991 as part of the ongoing peace process and in an effort to appease Taylor, Senegalese troops also joined.

The ECOMOG intervention can be separated into three phases: from August to November 1990, the initial intervention that led to a cease-fire; from November 1990 to October 1992, the fragile truce; and from October 1992 to 1996. Since the November 1990 cease-fire, Liberia had been a divided country, with the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) governing Monrovia and its environs, backed by ECOMOG, while the NPFL controlled approximately 90 percent of the country. This situation lasted until late August 1992, when ULIMO, formed primarily by soldiers from former President Samuel Doe's army, the AFL, attacked the NPFL from neighboring Sierra Leone, and captured two western counties, Bomi and Grand Cape Mount. However, the situation changed dramatically on October 15, 1992, when the NPFL attacked Monrovia, ending two years of an uneasy peace and plunging the country back into war. Having failed to enforce a peaceful solution to the crisis, ECOMOG was dragged back into the war, and is considered by many to constitute a warring faction. Its role changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcing, and its rules of engagement were more aggressive, they not only used force if they felt threatened they were empowered to disarm the warring factions, but they could also attack targets that contributed a threat against them.

In August 1990, without any prospect for intervention by the United States or the United Nations, ECOMOG arrived in Monrovia to separate the warring factions and to stop the

bloodshed. The West African countries justified their intervention on the grounds that it was no longer an internal conflict since thousands of their own nationals were trapped in Liberia and tens of thousands of refugees had fled to neighboring countries. The ECOMOG mandate was to impose a cease-fire, help form an interim government and hold elections within 12 months. Unfortunately, with NPFL attacks continuing, there was no peace to keep, and ECOMOG was thrust into combat to push the NPFL out of Monrovia.

There has been much speculation about the ulterior motives of the participating states for intervening in Liberia. Some have accused Nigeria of attempting to support the Doe government, since Doe and Nigeria's President Babangida were allies; others contend that Nigeria was acting like the regional superpower. Another theory is that the enormous flow of refugees into the neighboring countries compelled them to act. Regardless of its motivations, ECOMOG accomplished certain concrete objectives between August and November: it established order and peace, which allowed international humanitarian groups to return to Liberia; it confined to the AFL and, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), led by Prince Johnson into their barracks. it enabled the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), headed by Amos Sawyer, to be installed after agreeing to a cease-fire.

One of the most important accomplishment was that ECOMOG stopped the slaughter of Krahm and Mandingo people in Monrovia. Liberians and expatriates pointed out that were it not for ECOMOG, Monrovia would have disintegrated into a situation like Mogadishu, with the factions preying upon the civilians. From November 1990, when the cease-fire was signed in Bamako, until October 1992, ECOMOG's role was confined to that of a police force. "ECOMOG was respected more than the Liberian institutions," observed a Liberian lawyer. "They became the de facto police for a long time, because the police were totally discredited." ECOMOG became involved in settling all sorts of disputes that bore no relation to their peacekeeping functions.

ECOWAS sponsored peace talks, culminating in the October 1991 Yamoussoukro IV accord which sought disarmament and encampment of all warring factions, to be followed by elections. President Taylor did not comply with Yamoussoukro, Taylor continued to renege on his commitments to disarm, ECOMOG was a West African phenomenon responding to West African realities Despite its many problems, ECOMOG has considerable support among

Liberians, especially in the territory controlled by NPFL. This is partially due to the mistrust of the other factions -- the NPFL, ULIMO and the AFL

Before the execution of Samuel Doe, Nigeria had initiated the formation of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene between the NPFL, INPFL on one side and the AFL on the other. In order to bring peace ECOMOG declared an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) with the support of Prince Johnson. However Charles Taylor refused to attend and instead launched an attack against Monrovia in 1992. ECOMOG initiated the Cotonou Agreement between INPFL, IGNU and Doe's remaining supporters who now called themselves United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) which later split into ULIMO-J, a Krahn faction led by general Roosevelt Johnson and ULIMO-K a Mandingo based faction led by Alhaji G.V. Kromah.

In September 1993 the UN Security council approved the establishment of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to support ECOMOG. However renewed hostilities broke out in May 1994 becoming intense in July when ECOMOG and UNOMIL members were captured and held hostage by some of the factions. In September 1994 the different factions met in Ghana and signed the Akosombo Agreement to reduce hostilities in order to allow humanitarian agencies reach the displaced. In spite of this security in Liberia deteriorated and due to lack of will power to end the war, the UNOMIL contingent was reduced to ninety observers but its mandate extended till September 1997.

3.1.5 Ceasefire and elections 1997

In August 1995 Charles Taylor agreed to a cease-fire and a timetable to disarm his troops. In September 1995 the principal warlords; Taylor, George Boley and Alhaji Kromah met in Monrovia and formed a council of six members under a civilian Wilton G.S. Sankawulo to prepare the country for elections. Intense fighting broke out in April 1996 and only lessened with the signing of the Abuja Accord in Nigeria agreeing to Disarmament and demobilisation. In July 1997 the country held presidential and national assembly elections which Taylor won under the National Patriotic Party (NPP). These elections were held in an atmosphere full of intimidation. Liberians voted for Charles Taylor hoping that he would end the bloodshed. Although it abated it did not end. Furthermore Charles Taylor was accused of backing guerillas in the neighbouring Sierra Leone and funneling diamond and timber monies into arms purchases for the rebel armies.

3.1.6 Second Liberian war 1999-2003

In 1999 some ULIMO forces reformed as the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and renewed fighting in the Lofa County to take control of the diamond mines to obtain money to buy small arms and to destabilise Taylor's government. More opposition came from the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) who were organizing their invasions into southern Liberia from Cote'd Ivoire. As the situation deteriorated with widespread fighting all over the country various factions forcibly recruited under age soldiers captured from secondary schools and villages. In February 2002 Taylor's government declared a state of emergency as Government of Liberia (GOL) troops engaged various rebel factions in and around Monrovia. The saddening news of renewed rebel activities questioned the efforts made for peace. The armed invasions were coming from some of the fighters from Sierra Leone who felt sidelined by the Lome Peace Accord. As fighting spread south the government forces are said to have harassed, tortured detained and killed members of the Mandingo ethnic group and other LURD sympathisers. By November 2002 relief agencies estimated there were over one hundred and thirteen thousand refugees and IDPs in camps in the neighbouring countries this is because the conflict spread to Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Cote'd Ivoire as a resultant effect of the Liberian civil war. As the situation worsened in 2003, the American government called all combatants to cease their violence against unarmed civilians. With no change, the UN backed court in Sierra Leone indicted Taylor for war crimes, violation of human rights and funding the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels against the Sierra Leonean government. By mid June as LURD forces controlled over two-thirds of Liberia, the US sent an assault ship to Liberia to evacuate the few Americans in the American embassy in Monrovia. By this time tens of thousands of residents in the city were seeking shelter in the stadia and schools waiting for relief supplies.

On June 17 2003 a ceasefire was agreed upon by representatives of Liberia's government, MODEL, LURD and eighteen political parties excluding Charles Taylor in Accra. As violence intensified, the International community called for Taylor to step down and leave the country. As Taylor dug in to stay, the rebels began their final advance into the capital ending the week old ceasefire. Violent clashes between government and rebel forces intensified. By June 24 over three hundred people had been killed in and around Monrovia. Despite the violence President

Taylor insisted that the peace talks in Accra would continue. However the renewed fighting was undoing all efforts to bring an end to the conflict.

On June 30, 2003, the UN Security Council discussed the possibility of deploying a multi-national force to Liberia authorized under Chapter VII of the UN charter. As pressure mounted for the US to send troops to Liberia a Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended 14 years of civil war and prompted the resignation of President Charles Taylor who was exiled to Nigeria.

The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) composed of rebels; government and civil society groups assumed control in October 2003 under chairman Gyude Bryant for a two year period. The security situation remained volatile despite deployment of fifteen thousand UNMIL peacekeepers. Elections were held on October 2005 and in January 2006 President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was inaugurated as President dissolving the NTGL.

3.2 Liberia Peace Process.

Several attempts were made to bring peace and end violent conflict in Liberia. These efforts can be divided into two broad categories, unilateral peace initiatives such as those of Nigeria and USA through the appointment of Jacques Paul Klein as Special Representative by the UN secretary General. Multilateral efforts to establish a durable peace were carried out under within the mandate of ECOWAS, African Union (AU) and the UN.

From the outset of the conflict, the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) under the leadership of Nigeria, undertook various initiatives to bring peaceful settlement. The United Nations supported ECOWAS to end the bloody civil war. In 1990 ECOWAS's observer force the ECOMOG⁴ was established and in 1992 the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Liberia. Multilateral response was conducted under the auspices of the UN with the establishment of the UNOMIL through UN Resolution 866. In 1997 the first United Nations post conflict peace-building support office in Liberia (UNOL) was established. Though not comprehensive, some of the initial peace agreements were as follows:

ECOWAS Peace Plan Banjul communiqué of August 7 1990

Bamako Ceasefire November 28 1990

Banjul joint Declaration December 21 1990

Lome Agreement February 13 1991

⁴ Countries involved in the ECOMOG peace mission were Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Gambia. Later Mali and Senegal also contributed to a smaller extent.

Yamoussoukro I Accord June 30 1991

Yamoussoukro II Accord July 29 1991

Yamoussoukro III Accord September 17 1991

Yamoussoukro IV Accord October 30 1991⁵.

The Cotonou Accord of July 25 1993 was the first agreement that addressed the need for disarmament and encampment of ex combatants as the country prepared for elections scheduled for 1994. The accord provided for a UN supervised cease-fire and for the establishment of a transitional government. It was also signed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) and the UN who are responsible for ensuring its implementation. However, from December 1993 to the present, the armed rebel groups had not begun to place their combatants into camps or to disarm them, and the formation of the Transitional Government was plagued by disagreements among the various rebel leaders.⁶

This was followed by the Akosombo Agreement September 12 1994. Which was a supplement to the Cotonou Agreement. Signed by the NPFL, ULIMO and AFL of Liberia, it forbade the creation of new splinter groups and declared that such new or existing armed groups would be disarmed and disbanded by ECOMOG in collaboration with LNTG verified by UNOMIL⁷. In section E, Article 6 the Agreement explained the schedule for disarmament while Section H, Article 9 mandated ECOWAS and other international organisations to design a program for effective demobilisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration of former combatants⁸.

Another noteworthy attempt at peace was the Abuja Accord or Abuja Agreement signed on 19 August 1995, it was preceded by the Accra Clarification. The agreement set up a Council of State of Liberia, which was to consist of a chair, and five members. This is the council that handed over power to President Taylor after the 1997 election. Fourteen peace agreements had been signed between 1990 and 1996. The 1996 Accord provided for the demobilisation of more than 20,000 fighters from nine rival ethnic militias under the supervision of Nigeria and other West African peace keepers. As at January 1997 approximately 20,000 fighters had been

5 Osita Agbu. West Africa's Trouble Spots and the Imperative for Peacebuilding. Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) 2006, p33

6 Amos Mohammed D. Sirleaf, Ph.D. The Role of Amnesty International In The Liberian Peace Process 1990-Present .

African Studies and Research Department Howard University, Washington, DC. Liberian-African, p2

7 Akosombo Agreement Section D Article 5 sub-section(k).

8 Ibid section H ,Article 9.

disarmed. With the resumption of armed violence in Liberia in 1999, efforts to end the war began in earnest with several meetings in Abuja, which lay the ground for the National Reconciliation Conference in Liberia. This was followed by the ECOWAS Mediation and the Council Security in Dakar in March 2002. These meetings culminated in the formation of the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) to assist t ECOWAS and the UN in restoration of peace .The ICGL worked to ensure the widest possible participation in the search for peace. This culminated in the August 18 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra Ghana. It called for the cessation of hostilities in observance of a cease-fire. It also called for the establishment of an International stabilization force which would observe and monitor the ceasefire. This agreement put great emphasis on disarmament. This section also provide for the formation of the NCDDRR among other organs to monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

3.2.1 United Nations Peace Missions in Liberia

The first UN peace keeping group in Liberia was UNOMIL, established to support ECOMOG in implementation of the Cotonou Accord of 1993. It successfully oversaw the 1997 elections. This was followed by UNOL in 1997. It was tasked with assisting the government with national reconciliation and good governance. In addition it was tasked with helping Liberia develop peace building strategy integrating political programmes and human rights issues. This was followed by the UNMIL⁹. UNMIL was facilitate successful implementation of the Comprehensive peace Agreement in areas such as human rights, criminal justice, to facilitate the safe return of refugees and the internally displaced ,to provide security at key government installations, civil affairs among others. UNMIL was to assist the National Transitional Government in the implementation of a DDR programme, guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment from ex-combatants. It remained in Liberia until 2005.

From this case study of the conflict itself and the peace process, it is clear that the need for peace and peace building programmes in Liberia was a matter of priority. Some of the issues that could only be resolved through peace building were; disarmament and rehabilitation of ex-combatants promoting national unity and eliminating deep rooted ethnic prejudices. One of the important lessons from this case study is that ‘... diplomatically removing key actors and

⁹ UNMIL was formed through the Security Council Resolution 1509(2003) It had a troop strength of 15000,250 military observers,160 staff officers ,875 UN police officers ,5 units of armed officers and a civilian component as well as support staff.

families from the theatre of war should be included amongst the repertoire of peacebuilding measures in Africa¹⁰.

This is because Charles Taylor was seen as constituting a problem rather than a solution to the Liberian peace process. The success of the post transition elections justified the efforts made by Nigeria, ECOWAS, the UNMIL, the civil society and the international community to promote peace building in Liberia. One practice which has become closely associated with the Liberian civil war was the repeated meetings without a clear commitment by participants to the implementation of decisions made in these meetings. This is partly blamed for prolonging the civil war¹¹. The other factor was the slow rates of disarmament hence giving the armed rebels chances to revert to war when they became dissatisfied with a peace agreement.

3.2.2 DDR programme in Liberia

In 1993 the then UN observer Mission in Liberia UNOMIL was mandated to monitor the ceasefire between the warring factions as well as assisting in the disarmament and demobilization of combatants. During UNOMIL's mandate the Liberian women's initiative (LFI) began campaigning for the disarmament of the factions before the hand over power to the transitional governments. An organization called Funds for Disarmament raised money to purchase weapons from combatants in order to destroy them. However as, highlighted in the earlier chapter, the issue of security is very important in post conflict peace building and unresolved insecurity, poor governance and slow development plunged Liberia back into turmoil and new insurgencies culminated into full blown conflict between the government of Liberia, (GOL) Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). With respect to UNOMIL as a Peace Support Operation, it contained political, military and electoral personnel. Its mandate included; to observe and verify both parliamentary and presidential election, assist in the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants, train ECOMOG engineers in mine clearance and report on violations of Humanitarian Law among others¹².

10 Osita Agbu. West Africa's Trouble Spots and the Imperative for Peacebuilding. Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) 2006,p29

11 Tiawan S. Gongole., The Perspective:A look at the implications of the Abuja Accord on Elections in 2003.(2003)p1

12 United Nations,16 April 1998,op cit,p.5

It took ECOWAS five years from 1990 to 1995 to broker an agreement seen to have high success rate. Unfortunately no agreement could hold because the first phase of disarmament had been ignored. Indeed every ceasefire was seen as an opportunity for the warring factions to regroup and rearm since there had been no agreements. There were a number of peacebuilding elements in UNOMIL operation which included DDR aspects such as disarmament, demobilisation for about 50,000-60,000 soldiers who had arms of whom 25 percent were children. Civilians also played a role in the Liberian DDR process.

3.2.3 Disarmament in Liberia.

The folly of leaving disarmament until late in the negotiation process is seen in the fatalities suffered by ECOMOG troops every time the ceasefire or truce was broken; in September 1992 when police tortured and killed ECOMOG troops and again in 1995 police attempted to invest Roosevelt Johnson a former leader of the United Liberation movement of Liberia for Democracy ULIMO. Since the disarmament plans had not been properly implemented every faction has remained heavily armed. But more noticeable was lack of agreement between the intervention groups ECOWAS and UNMIL to concrete terms whenever trust was broken armed conflict resumed. The last peace agreement signed in May 1996 provided for the demobilization of more than 20,000 militias from nine ethnic rival groups¹³ As of January 1997 over 20,000 had been disarmed. Generally the slow pace of disarmament is attributed to the suspicions among faction leaders, lack of incentives to offer to belligerents to disarm and inaccurate figures on combatants.

In 1997 Liberia experienced a flawed DDR programme followed by refugee settlements and elections. The result was that Charles Taylor who was elected president in the July elections continued to pillage and abuse the population leading to resumption of armed civil war. This was because Taylor's government did not enjoy the trust or the support of the warring factions. Neither has the elections created a stable security environment. It was like patching up a wounded body without cleaning the deepest wounds. Representatives of LORD, the Government of Liberia MODEL signed the Accra Agreement into force on August 18th 2003.

¹³ In conjunction with voluntary disarmament, ECOMOG troops actively sought out arms. In December 1996, they recovered a cache of arms from the ULIMO-K leader, Alhaji Koromah; 600 bombs, 80 grenades, 40,613 rounds of ammunition.

The agreement detailed arrangements for cantonment of DDR. It established a National Commission on DDR in Article VI Article XXXI.

On September 2003 the Security Council Resolution 1509 established UNMIL and tasked it with (among other tasks) the developing of a DDR Action Plan that would also pay particular attention to the needs of child combatants and women. Despite the progress achieved in UNMIL's mandate and the DDR Action Plan, DDR process suffered a false start in December 2003. Flooded by the combatants eager to trade their weapons for \$300 cash payment¹⁴. Over 12,000 fighters presented themselves to be demobilized at a site intended to accommodate 1000. Riots ensued in Monrovia Camp as combatants were unable to fulfill their basic needs let alone receive benefits. As a result, the DDR process was officially suspended on 17th December 2003 after 12,664 combatants were disarmed and 8,686 weapons were collected¹⁵.

The second DDR site was opened at Gbarnga¹⁶, shows northeast of Monrovia. The lists of fighters which were meant to be previously collected from commanders in this case LURD incomplete and in some cases non-existent giving substance to claims that a substantial number of those participating in the Liberian process may not have been actual fighters¹⁷, since neither women nor children seemed to have been catered for in dining and recreation areas.

At Gbarnga, ex combatants were transported from the pickup points to the disarmament (DI) site where they were transported to the cantonment site for demobilization D2¹⁸. There men and women remained for five days before being discharged, there were two interim care for boys aged between 10 and 17 and one centre for girls aged between 13 and 18 of age. Here the combatants remained at the cantonment site for five days during which they received training for various skills, medical attention, counseling services and education.

UNMIL on the other hand, in its Mission overview¹⁹ reported that since December 2003 it had disarmed a total of 101,962 combatants including 21,945 women, 7226 boys and 2,330 girls, in the same report UNMIL reported that 27,892 weapons had been collected of which

14 IRIN News "Liberia former fighters in second day of Riots, UNMIL offers initial payment". Dec 2003.

15 Second Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Missions in Liberia 22 March 2004.

16 The site was actually located in Cari a former agricultural research complex within the military case of UNMIL sector 3.

17 UNMIL officials insist that all those in the DDR process were fighters or camp followers.

18 Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary General on the UN mission in Liberia 26 May 2004 (S/2003/430) Op Cit P. 5-16

19 UNMIL Mission overview 1 December 2004.

around 24,000 had been destroyed. Destruction of weapons went on every day at the UNMIL force headquarters. However though over 100,000 people had been disarmed UNMIL had collected fewer than one weapon every three combatants. SRSG Jacques Klein estimated that before the process began each combatant probably had three weapons, the DSRSG Seraydarian gave the as 1.09:1 ratio of arms to disarmed persons²⁰. To treat a DDR process as a member's game detracts from the statement being made by the combatant. Entering the DDR programme at individual level is a statement that he/she is tired of fighting.

UNMIL officials were adamant that theirs was not a "weapons buy-back" programme²¹ but several ex-combatants interviewed called it a "cash for arms", deal. This perception was disastrous because the weapons were not handed back as a symbol heralding a new beginning of the willingness to seek a new livelihood. Although voluntary disarmament is the preferred practice, various mopping-up mechanisms such as "cash for weapons", "turn-in", "buy-back", "swap" or "weapons-for-development" programmes, have been developed to collect weapons that have not been surrendered. It thus becomes obvious that any combatants were handing in weapons- one of the several they had-for cash installment.

20 IRIN "where are the weapons? Is disarmament really working?" 28th July 2004.

21 Crisis group interviews, Monrovia, Liberia, September 2004

4.0 CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 Critical analysis of United Nations disarmament programme in Liberia .

The key goal for disarmament in Liberia was putting weapons beyond use, with an approach oriented toward promoting security¹. The benchmark set for qualification for disarmament was 150 AK-47 rounds². This method did not provide an accurate indication of how significantly the process was diminishing the potential for resumed fighting. This argument is proved true because of contradictions in UNMIL's own reports: in December 2004 it reported having collected and destroyed a total of 32,818 pieces of heavy munitions and over one millions rounds of small ammunition, yet in mid 2003 the three main rebel groups LURD, MODEL and GOL-Taylor's forces, all used heavy weapons in the final push towards Monrovia. By September 2004 (at the end of phase 3 of disarmament) UNMIL had collected only 3.3 percent of mortars anti-aircraft guns or large caliber machine guns. Most mortars and other heavy weapons were traded in Guinea and Cote d' Ivoire³. Before UNMIL was fully deployed in the border areas, multiple sources cited thriving cross border business between Liberia and Guinea where 3 AK-47 were valued at one motorcycle. Similar reports were made of trade in Cote d' Ivoire. The two main weapons of the Liberian fighters; the AK-47 assault rifles and rocket propelled grenade launchers account for 88 percent of weapons turned in. However, the percentages of fighters from the 3 main rebel groups were disturbingly low. Only 21 percent of (LURD) affiliated fighters, 24 percent of GOL fighters turned in their weapons. The forces were keeping some hard core fighters and weapons in reserve. Possibly for the run up, to the October 2005 elections. Even as the disarmament phase of Liberian DDR ended officially in October 2004, it confirmed unofficially through most of November 2004 at cantonment sites in Lofa and Maryland counties. DDR specialists cited reluctance to give up weapons due to the 1997 debacle where the demilitarized ex-combatants were given cheques that were never honored. In order to collect as many weapons as possible UNMIL needed a clear coherent policy. When UNMIL suspended the DDR program in December 2004, UNMIL directed the factions to implement an

1 Crisis interviews, May-Sept 2004. Crisis Group Africa report. No. 87 December 2004. p. 8-10

2 Crisis group interviews- April - September 2004 p 11

3 Ibid p. 11

information campaign for the combatants, commanders were asked to submit lists of their troops and arsenals to UNMIL. UNMIL also increased UN troops at the cantonment sites to ensure security of women and children as well as between the different factions. The DDR programme was officially relaunched on 15th April 2005. It is understandable that disarmament would be topmost on the agenda for bringing peace in Liberia. There was grave concern about the amounts of weapons in the sub region and the implications⁴.

Marrack Goulding⁵ argues that the DDR mechanism cannot be called peacekeeping at all because it involves some kind of enforcement. However he agrees that it is definitely the mandate of the United Nations. Where the UN deploys a UN force in a country where the institutions of the state have largely collapsed and an external agency is needed to put in together again. In this context, this chapter analyses the United Nations DDR process in post conflict peace building in Liberia and Sierra Leone highlighting the strengths and weaknesses

According to the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, "In order to be successful, DDR initiatives must be based on a concrete understanding of who combatants are- women, men, girls and boys". This chapter will analyze the UN DDR programmes and how successfully they were implemented since 1997 in Liberia. One question guides this chapter; did the UN do the right thing? This analysis will also consider the gender issues arising during the implementation of the DDR programme in Liberia.

In order to effectively analyze the success of the Disarmament process, we need to consider its objectives. The objective of the process is to contribute to security and stability in post conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin⁶

4.2 Institutional framework

The NCDDR was able to initiate 'targeted disarmament' and delegated responsibility to relevant agencies such as UNICEF who dealt with children and UNIFEM dealt with women and children. A closer analysis of the non state actors showed that the more actors involved, that the more complex and hence expensive the

4 It was estimated that there were approximately 15 million weapons in circulation.

5 The Evolution of United Nations peacekeeping. International Affairs 1993 London p. 452-464.

6 United Nations DDR Resource Centre P. 1

UN DDR programme becomes. There was also the problem of too many information channels due to multiplicity of non-state actors. For example Liberia had 5.⁷ non state actors collaborating with the DDR .

Due to the involvement of too many actors, there was also a disconnect from the people. According to Necla Tschirgi,⁸ external actors constantly neglect institutions and capacity building, which are recognized as central to long lasting peace. As such in Liberia, groups involved with security dealt only with armed combatants, while humanitarian organizations wanted to include women and children in the DDR programme. In Liberia, the number of demobilized persons grew to 112,000⁹ because women and children were considered under the same disarmament criteria as ex-combatants. Liberia's program administrator argued that different criteria should be applied to special groups¹⁰ so that resources could be allocated to those who really needed them.

Local ownership is one of the guiding principles of a successful DDR programme. In recent years there has been a push to transfer the DDR process from international groups to national commissions. The Liberian experience illustrated clearly that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration should be dealt with in a framework within which the community is the focal point around which DDR activities revolve.

A major challenge to United Nations Mission In Liberia (UNMIL) was its perception as solely a military activity which restricted the participation of different actors as compared to the community based operations..

While DDR is military in nature, it also has a social and economic dimension which was inadequately addressed especially in the Liberian process. The non combatants affected by DDR as relatives of soldiers suffered negatively due to the requirement that the ex combatant had to leave them to spend weeks at the cantonment sites. Similarly, most soldiers had to engage in petty trade having had to disarm without

7 These were the peace keeping operation (PKO), the African Union (AU), ECOWAS, UNDP, UNICEF and the World Food Programme (WFP) for Liberia and in addition to this World Bank in Sierra Leone

8 Necla, Tschirgi., in ; Post Conflict Peace Building Revisited; Achievements, Limitations, Challenges, A Paper Prepared For The International Peace Academy (IPA) October 2004 New York, P. 16-17

9 Stephanie Hanson (ed). Reintegration (DDR in Africa). A newsletter prepared for Council on Foreign Relations. February 16th 2007 p. 3

10 Special groups included women children, disabled, soldiers and the sick.

clear information about the benefits of DDR. This prevented universal local ownership of the DDR process by the people.

Information flows on the DDR programmes must be two-way, to both communities as well as from the communities. The lack of adequate communication meant that neither the combatants nor the host communities were well prepared for what was involved¹¹.

Too much information about the benefits to ex combatants seemed to indicate that the DDR process could solve the problems facing the young people. These were unrealistic expectations and created tensions at the beginning of the disarmament process. This experience illustrated to UNMIL the need to involve the other national actors and the civil society including women, media organizations and the use of local languages. This opened up a wide range of channels for communication. Since radio was not accessible to all, in Liberia drama, video clips and meetings were employed to reach every sector of the populace¹².

In this case of Liberia lack of feed back channel from communities meant that UNMIL could not ascertain that the messages were being received and understood by the fighters and community members. In many instances, local communities were not informed or educated on their role and responsibilities in the DDR process.

4.3 Duration and timing.

On the issue of timing and commitment, because DDR originally focused on short-term disarmament donors channeled their support in the form of time-bound projects without a strategic framework and long term commitment to peace building¹³

In a nutshell, external actors approached the DDR process as a short term, time-bound, project based enterprise even while acknowledging that it is a long term, home-grown, multi-dimensional process. The time frame given for Liberia-1997 to 2004 , approximately seven years for complete 3 phases was very short to facilitate new political forces to develop, train local military and improve the security sector. The judicial and

11 Hillary, Norise., Liberia Media Forum in a seminar a paper presented at the Conflict Prevention Partnership Conference in Brussels. 13th July 2006 p. 12

12 Ibid p. 12

13 Necla, Tschirgi., Challenges To Effective Peace Building. A Paper Prepared For The IPA Peace Building Forum. 7th October 2004 P. 15

law enforcement institutions and the economies were left vulnerable to criminal capture¹⁴. The Crisis Group Africa Report suggests that twenty five years is sufficient to ensure that the institutions are well established and utilized. Indeed the report continues that it took Liberia decades to decay and it will take decades to restore sustainable security, political and economic structures.

In Liberia, DDR programme tended to be commitments made by the confronting parties during the signing of the peace agreement or according to arrangements made by the peace agreements, for example the Lome Agreement. However even then several months would go before the DDR process would actually begin (average one year)¹⁵. This, Albert Carames argues, is because of not having planning well. This accounts for the flawed disarmament efforts in Liberia 1997 because disarmament was carried out too late, after the signing of the peace agreement. On the other hand, Albert Carames¹⁶ argues that a DDR programme has an average duration of 3-4 years with the possibility of extensions due to certain deficiencies like lack of funding.

By phases, he argues the correct situation is for disarmament and demobilization to last sixteen months if there are no setbacks whereas reintegration phase normally last two years although its usually extended to last as long as 3 years. From this analysis it shows that the rapid beginning of a DDR does not guarantee its good progress neither does the brevity of the DDR period. In fact with the exceptional case of Indonesia and Angola¹⁷ where the disarmament and demobilization stage was completed within four months Liberia had to overcome numerous difficulties thus prolonging the period of the DDR programme. One of the major hurdles to overcome was the way in which the disarmament programme was organized.

14 Crisis Group Africa, report No. 87 p. 1

15 Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. United Nations 2005

16 Albert Carames et al; analysis of DDR programmes in the world 2005 p. 8

17 Ibid p. 20

4.4 Organisation of the disarmament process

In Liberia, the structure of the cantonment sites reflected a gender perspective in its planning and layout in compliance with Security Council Resolution 1325¹⁸ separate compounds were provided for men, women, girl and boy ex-combatant inclusive of separate arrangements for feeding, toilet and bathing facilities. However not all women's needs were anticipated for instance, hygiene and menstruation pre and postnatal care. As a result many women opted for spontaneous reintegration reducing the cost of the disarmament process.

Despite the extent to which the cantonment sites and demobilization sites complied with the resolution 1325, the female ex-combatants still faced harassment they had to go through three compounds, girls two. That is, the first compound was for male ex-combatants, then boys, then girls and the last one women. Failure to adequately assess the number of women combatants, supporters and dependants during the disarmament and demobilization phases also affected women's participation in the Disarmament process. Furthermore being poorer in comparison to their male peers, access to news sources such as radios, coupled with lower literacy rates and the stigma of being associated with an armed group affected female ex-combatant participation.

Female disarmament experts, translators and counselors were very few and only increased in the last stages of the process. To make matters worse some seemed to have been posted there to pass time with no experience or knowledge of the issues at hand. Scarcity of field staff for reception centres, and conferment sites to whom women and girls could safely report was another challenge to successful disarmament of women, girls and children. As a result, many female ex-combatants may not have turned up for disarmament. The presence of gender expert's local female staff would have gone a long

¹⁸ Security Council Resolution on Women Peace and Security 2000 Para. 13. It specifically addressed these issues and reaffirmed the relevance of gender issues to the DDR process.

was towards offering counseling services to excombatants, and the abducted in culturally acceptable and appropriate ways¹⁹

On disarmament, reports from Liberia show that commanders sometimes removed weapons from the hands of women and especially girls prior to arrival at assembly points. This denied women and children access to services and benefits of the disarmament programme. The women were also reluctant to hand in their weapons because it was their only source of security as long as weapons remained in circulation with the men. This was a reflection of the insecurity felt especially by women, girls and boys. However as trust in the process increased, later disarmament phases extracted more weapons from these vulnerable groups¹³.

4.5 Women, children and disabled soldiers

In the face of paucity of resources, pragmatic decision-makers have focused DDR efforts on the perceived 'real' problem namely, disarming men with guns²⁰. This approach fails to address the fact that women can also be armed combatants. It also ignores the role women play in both maintaining and enabling armed groups in both forced and voluntary capacities leaving women out of the process has often underestimated the extent to which peace requires women to participate equally in the transformation from a violent society to a peaceful one²¹.

In Liberia during UNOMIL's mandate in 1993, the women's groups were extremely active in organizing around disarmament. In April 2003 Liberian women began a Mass Action for peace campaign to draw 'women from the market place, churches, mosques, civil society, refugee camps and governments'²². Due to this action, the peace agreement included provisions for the establishment of Disarmament programme with the aim of protecting and promoting women's rights²³. Women and girls actively participated voluntary and involuntary in every stage of the armed conflict in

19 Nelson Estella. 'Women identify flaws in DDR programme, want to assist'. The 'NEWS' Monrovia 12 December 2003. <http://allafrica.com/stories/2003.html>.

20 Peace keeping watch, 'women gender and peacekeeping'. June 2004; DPKO Mainstreaming a gender perspective. New York July 2000 p. 3

21 Ibid p. 3

22 Liberian women mass action for peace. "WIPNET journal her stories 12 December 2003: 11

23 Ibid

Liberia for example the Women's Artillery Commandos (WAC) composed of women who fought alongside LURD.

The estimated number of women and children eligible for disarmament was initially estimated at 10,000 and by August 2004 12,000 had already gone through the DDR process²⁴. Some girls formed LURD on their own in order to escape torturous treatment by government soldiers, including rape, beating, robbery and forced labour. These girls also forcibly recruited other children into LURD²⁵. Division of labour was highly gendered, girls in the small boys unit washed clothes, fetched water and cooked while older girls fought and scouted. While exact numbers of girls combatants is not known, they were thought to be less prevalent than boys amongst armed groups especially in purely fighting capacities.

Women and girls associated with armed groups usually received military training even if their primary functions within the group were domestic, spies or wives²⁶. Starting from the disarmament demobilization phases, the women noted that the transport and lodging facilities at the cantonment sites could often be inadequate especially considering the large numbers of combatants who presented themselves to be demobilized. Improved DDR processes made specific provisions and services to women and girls such as separate accommodation, dining and recreation areas. There were pick up points for men, women, children and the disabled. However the number of women and children who presented themselves for DDR were very few and only increased in the last stages of DDR process.

Table 2. numbers of women and children disarmed and demobilized In Liberia.

Period	Women	Boys	Girls

24 UNDP; strategically operational framework of reintegration and supposed for ex combatants. Monrovia 20 April 2004.

25 Human rights watch, "how to fight, how to kill: child soldiers in Liberia", volume 16 no. 2(1) February 2004.

26 Carlson Kristoper and Mazurana Dyan. From combat to community: women and girls in Sierra Leone Washington DC January 2004. Source: fourth progress report of the secretary general on the United Nations mission in Liberia 2004

April 2004	130	238	37
Apr-May 2004	2,292	1,561	352
By 10th September 2004	12,598	4,884	1,356 *

Source : NCDDR August 2002

4.5.1 Disarming children

Forced recruitment of children- girls and boys under 18 years in Africa and their use in hostilities by armed forces and groups is illegal. This consensus is expressed in a comprehensive set of international legal documents such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC.) Child disarmament is a specific process with its own requirements, Within this bracket are the former' child soldiers and the non-combatants. The Security Council resolution 1612 on children in armed conflict, affirms the commitment to protect the children other UN organs such as UNICEF with expertise in area. Of special concern was how to address the needs of former child soldiers, the impact of trauma and small arms on children's security.

The challenge that the child Disarmament had was how to treat the children due to the degree to which the children were involved. Some had been fighting for only often months and had families to return to, while others had been fighting for 5 or six years. Another problems arose when the children perceived they were not receiving the same benefits as adult ex-combatant of those children were heads of households who thought of themselves as adults. When treated as children it become counterproductive to their reintegration.

Table 3: DDR programmes with presence of child soldiers.

COUNTRY	MINORS	TOTAL TO BE DEMOBILIZED	%MINOR/TOTAL
Liberia	1,100	107,000	10.3

Source: Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2005

From the table above, the presence of minors among armed groups to be demobilized involved more substantial numbers than those who presented themselves to be demoralized.

The giving of benefits and subsidies for ex-child soldiers was particularly sensitive so as not to engender resentment on the part of the community. The initial place of disarmament created an impression that former child soldiers were getting privileged treatment thus unwillingly enticing large numbers of children to re – enter the conflict whenever the conflict resumed. This was especially prevalent in Liberia. The demobilization subsidies were given as an immediate reward rather than as a long term sustained arrangement.²⁷

On integration, the programmes for former child soldiers anticipated the need to train the children to contribute to the social and economic life of the family during peace time through education, counseling services and vocational training – in fact of increased impoverishment of their families in the aftermath of the conflict. Furthermore the families economic security emerged as an important factor in the determination of a successful social integration and prevention of re- recruitment or delinquency.²⁸

Family recovery agencies were set up in Liberia and mention will be made here of the efforts being attempted in Burundi where the child DDR process is fast placed to integrate the former child soldiers with their families and foster communities within the first eight months.²⁹

The children and armed conflict research project sponsored by Canadian international development agency CIDA, criticised what it called the international legal ‘rights’ approach adopted to protect children in past conflict situations without giving consideration to the ethnocentric and trans cultural factors. The report argued that in the context of a changed security environment in which intra- state and internecine conflict is prevalent, there is need to consider a stratagem that is rooted in local norms and values.³⁰

27 DDR of ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment. UN department of peacekeeping Operations/Lessons Learned Unit. UN 2000 P77

28 ibid p 79

29 Albert Caramés; Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2005 p16

30 children and Armed Conflict Project: University of Alberta, March 2007 p8

internecine killing in Liberia indicates that the international community has had limited success in protecting children from the ravages of armed conflict.

4.5.3 Disabled soldiers

The ex-combats who had been wounded or disabled in action also registered for disarmament. However, most of them were quickly disarmed and sent on to the demobilization centers for provision of medical care. Most of the were also provided with professional vocational training, credit, jobs and subsidies as well as housing depending on the severity of their disability.

4.5.4 Disarmament of ex-combatants

“you cannot disarm people with no weapons” If the disarmament process is not conducted effectively, control over weapons threatens community security, groups become alienated (and therefore a threat) and newly formed initials can be a problem. One trend that raised questions is who carries it out ¹³ and why is it that only the rebels are considered ex-combats? In the case of Liberia, the international focus on the said ex-combats for funding and programming initiatives excludes the larger community from the process.

The cash for weapons programmes, were initially perceived as rewards to ex-combats for taking up arms. Additionally, cash incentives were responsible for contributing to cross border flow of weapons by armed groups which moved from one country to the next to exploit more attractive cash for weapons. The case of Liberia, the armed groups delayed giving up weapons as they waited to surrender for the more lucrative DDR process in Cote d Ivoire. In addition, depending on compensations established, the occurrence of “ghost combatants” was another problem. Evidence from this case study has shown that formal disarmament conducted by either United Nations or regional organizations such as ECOMOG did not lead to complete elimination or collection of prescribed weapons. Large caches of weapons remain hidden in storage sites or in private hands.

With the constant interruptions to the DDR process due to recurring hostilities, arms went unreported because the parties were not entirely confident that the peace process would hold and so held back their best weapons for a possible renewal of

Table 4: Weapons handed in per demobilized combatant

Country	People demobilized	Weapons handed in	Weapons per person
Liberia	107,000	28,314	0.26

Source: National committee for disarmament demobilization and reintegration (NCDDR) Dec 2005.

The management of weapons collected through the disarmament process is a sensitive part of the disarmament demobilization process. Improper management was itself a security risk if storage facilities and armories were not well secured and protected because they could easily be stolen leading to increase of violence and crime. It also emerged that well executed national disarmament efforts proved futile due to cross burden arms flows for example Liberia. This clearly indicates that in the case of conflict contagion, a state acting on its own cannot stem the flow of weapons. In Liberia it was especially challenging because of the abundance of small arms and light weapons on the international and black markets, the porosity of unsecured borders which allowed smuggling of small arms across state lines and the extensive shorelines or difficult terrain. To properly secure these areas was prohibitively costly and in this case the UN intensified the collection of arms. Methods used included mine clearing from roads and fields to facilitate transport, cattle grazing and other economic activities such as agriculture by both ex-combatants and civilians. Besides mine clearance weapons would be burnt publicly or cut up with special shears (however this was very time consuming) and burning the most used method.

4.5.5 Disarmament budget and financing

Many DDR programmes are planned without knowing exactly how many people are going to benefit and whether taken necessary resources will be obtained from the international community. As a result, DDR budgets are often changed to adapt to the needs of each situation. Most of the resources are obtained from abroad either through bilateral donations. World Bank which is the largest donor as a country collaborates with the highest amount of aid and other United Nations agencies like UNICEF and UNDP .

An overview of United Nations finding shows that between 2003 -2004 approximately 3.3 billion dollars was spent in African Disarmament programmes out of a total of 17 UN peacekeeping mission 8 were in Africa. In Liberia, the quick impact project fund for community development programme employing ex-combatants and civilians is one such example.

The absence of reliable statistics or budgetary breakdown in many disarmament programmes, increased by the delays in implementation has made it difficult to draw comparisons to facilitate definitive conclusions. However in analyzing the budgetary distributions articles and reports by groups such as CIDA, crisis group Africa and the United Nations show that DDR's occur generally in the poorest countries. And these are those that have suffered the greatest loss in contemporary conflicts. Topping these list in Sierra Leone then Liberia which according to the Human development Index (HDI) prepared by UNDP was the world's second poorest country despite its diamonds, was attributed rampant corruption where most of this wealth did not reach the state treasury.

Despite these obstacles, the initial disarmament phases were well funded due to its comparatively short duration as well as the urgency to disarm. The analysis of DDR programmes in 2005 reports that costs in this phase range from 5 to 15 percent of the total budget, the integration phase may take up to 70 percent of the total budget and the vulnerable groups would normally be allocated between 1 and 5 percent . Women children and disabled soldiers are not always included in the DDR processes . because the cost per person is higher than the rest due to the nature of specialized care.

Charles Achodo , head of United Nations DDR programmes in Liberia reported that funding often dries up at this phase of the process. However, the financiers qualified it by asserting that the United Nations has difficulties in accessing funds for integration but

the World Bank does not. In a nutshell, due to shortage of resources for each programme in the process, thousands of disarmed former fighter from Liberia civil war are still roaming the countries. Without trade or employment. As their optimism starts to dwindle they pose a very high risks to the fragile peace in those countries. With respect to Liberia, the international donors have outstanding pledges amounting to £ 2.76 million to jumpstart the integration of ex-combatants who have been disarmed and demobilized .

4.5.6 Justice and Impunity

One of the most controversial aspect of DDR programmes is the legal and political treatment that ex-combatants receive once they have handled in their weapons. In questions is the legal responsibility of the different groups that have participated in a conflict where serious human rights violations such as massacres, genocides have occurred.

DDR programmes begin after achieving a peace agreement that ends armed conflict and the conflicting parties agree to halt hostilities. As such, its marks the beginning of a new cycle where all parties have made their demands and compromises have been reached. These range from joint power sharing at military to political levels, and amenities for former leaders (like Charles Taylor being given exile in Nigeria.) These blanket amenities offered in conflicts which had lasted for more than 10 years created resentment and faced opposition form many of the affected individuals or groups. Though intending to foster forgiveness and reconciliation, the fact that the rule of law was broken remains a largely ignored by the DDR process.

According to the security report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post conflict of governance which all persons, institutions and entities including the state itself are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated equally enforced and independently and consistent with the international human rights norms and standards. As such some parties may be reluctant to participate in DDR when the rule of law has broken down and where their personal safety is not properly protected. DDR in Liberia contributed to strengthening the rule of law by disarming armed forces and groups who afterwards became subject to regular criminal justice system. A case in point is Taylors trial which was due to start in June 2007. The pressure of special courts, truth

operations are often included in the peace agreements.

However evidence shows that the civil society, especially victims of abuse, sexual violence and injuries are left with the sensation that a certain impunity or favours has been conceded to people who have committed heinous crimes when they are offered cash for their guns.

4.6 Appraising objective and hypotheses of study

War can be prevented by getting out weapons with which it is carried out but not everyone would agree. "You cannot simultaneously prevent and prepare for war" wrote Albert Einstein.³¹ This sentiment can be carried further to a more positive assertion

However there have been modest successes including prohibitions on specific weapons like biological agents, mutual agreements to forestall arms races in particular places (for example Antarctica and the sea bed). These and other accomplishments fall within the category of arms control. Peace researchers view arms control as a smoke screen to build more weapons because it seems to legitimize various arms races shifting from the ultimate goal of disarmament.

This study aimed to examine the role of disarmament in postconflict peacebuilding and its success in building durable peace in Liberia. Several questions were raised in the hypotheses. The claim being that stable peace is more likely after institutionalized settlements to end the intrastate conflict.

A successful disarmament and demobilisation process is crucial for creation of stable peace after a conflict. Yet the fewer weapons a group has the more vulnerable they feel making them more prone to violating the agreements signed. These post war feelings if not checked through effective confidence building measures by a neutral third party, has often led a build up of arms and a return to war as has been discussed in the foregoing chapters in the Liberian case. Ecomog was perceived as an interested party to the conflict making it more complex, its attempt to implement the peace agreements signed through ECOMOG also proved weak. The main contention here being that those

³¹ Quoted by Alva Myrdal in; *The Game of Disarmament*. 1976 Pantheon New York P. 85 (Alva Myrdal is a British disarmament and noble price winner)

peace agreements lacked the necessary institutional and organizational mechanisms to oversee the implementation of the said peace agreements.

Since the 1940s interstate wars have declined while civil or intrastate wars have become more common. They have proved to be more deadly with a propensity to become intractable. This has posed a challenge to scholars and actors searching for permanent solutions to these conflicts. Given that negotiated settlements are difficult to achieve it is encouraging to note some successes. For example some peace settlements have proved durable and have been successful in bringing an end to armed conflict. A case in point is the Comprehensive Peace agreement that brought an end to the conflict in Sudan under the auspices of IGAD, the same can be said of the Peace Agreements signed by the different factions in Liberia under the umbrella of the UN and ECOWAS. Others are Sierra Leone, and outside Africa there is the Paris Peace Agreements calling for national reconciliation in Cambodia facilitated by the UN through the UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) However its failure to effectively maintain a ceasefire undermined its credibility with the Cambodian people.

In the recent past, peacekeeping operations established by the UN Security Council have all included DDR in their mandate. These are the United Nations Missions in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNMIL, 2003), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, 1999), THE United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL, 2003), the United Nations Missions in Cote d' Ivoire (UNOCI, 2004), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004), the United Nations Operation in Burundi (UNOB, 2004), and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS, 2005).

Post conflict peace building literature has shown that the presence of a third party enforcer after signing of the peace agreement reduces the likelihood of peace collapse by an estimated 98 percent. Findings further support the hypothesis about the critical importance of an external third party in monitoring and controlling the behavior of the domestic groups thus stabilizing the fragile peace.

Finally findings have also shown that institutionalized settlements with mechanisms for power sharing are assumed to balance power among the rival factions. These arrangements provided by the settlement of the civil war cover the military, political,

territorial and aspects of power sharing are more durable than those settlements with weak provisions and lacking in detailed schedules and time lines for implementation of reforms agreed to.

5.1 Conclusion

This chapter will review the status of disarmament in past practice, the status quo and make suggestions for the way forward for disarmament under the United Nations.

In 1995 UNIDIR(UN Institute for Disarmament Research) initiated a process of collaboration with West African states. ECOWAS has been its major partner in carrying out preventive measures against the illegal circulation of small and light weapons.

The UN is also supporting DDR programmes in many countries where there is not a UN peacekeeping operation. These include: Indonesia, Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Niger, Somalia and Uganda.

Though the DDR programme for former combatants is a complex process involving political, military security humanitarian and socio-economic factors, it represents an opportunity for building peace and is thus one of the most important ingredients for achieving stability and building peace. Although the programme has been mainly focused on former combatants , the ultimate goal is the development of the whole community. Disarmament has emerged as a process that dignifies people involved as they voluntarily give up their weapons and begin rebuilding their nation.

Reducing the level of arms in the countries has become a crucial pre-condition for a consolidation of peace and stability. Liberia has now carried out fair elections and elected a government which is committed to the maintenance of peace. As has been observed in this case study, Disarmament is a process in itself with different programmes and it was not possible to carry out a part of it if its was not accompanied by proper planning of the next of the phases.

Institutionally, the national Disarmament Commission was to design flexible policy frameworks that accommodated the complexities of the conflicts without compromising the objectives of DDR.

There was ample improvement of the Disarmament programmes in the latter years from 2003 to 2005 which resulted in the disarmament and demobilization of over 100,000 excombatants and reintegration of over 70,000 men women and children into the community.

Despite all the interruptions, lasting peace is something to look forward to in Liberia. This could not have been achieved without successful DDR programmes.

5.1.1 Way Forward

The following suggestions shed light on areas where the DDR process can be improved to facilitate on planning. There is need to issue a policy guidance which control be adapted for specific conflict but be inclusive enough to include an operational definition of the criteria for eligibility to ensure that all men, women and children associated with armed groups are included.

There is need to develop a broader conceptualization of the composition of modern armed groups and weapons of use.

Involving traditional leaders and local mediators at grass root level would prepare and foster successful reintegration as well as trust for men women and children in the disarmament programmes .Actors should recognize that the Disarmament is a long term process and is not completed just because guns have been laid down. The psychological component which is an integral part of the final phase of reintegration must be seriously considered to ensure total change of attitudes which will enable more people to move beyond the culture of violence.

5.1.2 United Nations and Agency coordination.

The UN is overwhelmed by the demands on its resources which has led to the development of the strengthening of regional peacebuilding mechanisms for example, the peacebuilding commission in the African Union, SADC, and the strengthening of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

In the past, programmes were often conducted in a segmented way, resulting in poor coordination and sometimes competition between and among peacekeeping operations ,agencies and programmes. It has become imperative that if postconflict peacebuilding is to be successful there will be need to integrate project work and programming of various UN departments and agencies. As such there is need for a new UN approach to disarmament as part of a broad recovery process that must be

coordinated to ensure durable peace. As an intensely political process, there is need for political will from the political parties to enter into the process in a genuine manner.

There was delegated responsibilities to relevant agencies such as UNICEF which dealt with child soldiers and UNIFEM which dealt with women and girls.

Resources and expertise were well planned for and committed to the disarmament and demobilization phases thus increasing people's confidence in the merit of the programme especially when they witnessed public destruction.

The United Nations should encourage the National DDR commissions to work closely with the aid agencies, machineries, government ministries and national peace building networks international. That there is need to co-ordinate between the agencies. Employment is skilled personnel with sufficient knowledge of the specific situations to handle the process effectively and to facilitate smooth like transition.

Aid agencies should make transition adequate budgeting allocations especially for the reintegration phase which a priori remains one of the most challenged. The DDR programme should document the use of children within armed groups to facilitate legal processes to end those who recruit children. Special programmes should be prepared to meet the children's special needs while speeding up integration to their families.

The participation of women leaders in the peace processes should be facilitated to ensure that women's unique needs in the Disarmament process are taken into consideration. The security sector and DDR planners need to recognize and utilize women's expertise and information. Input from women should be deliberately solicited and incorporated into all phases of the process.

Disarmament programmes should be on going and policies for exchanging weapons for cash must be reviewed and other incentives sourced for to replace the prestige and power of owning a weapon.


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
Annex A: Liberia DDR programme: Strategy and implementation modalities

Institutional arrangements



Source: Comminos, Stelios, Aki Stavrou and Brian Stewart, *Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes of the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR)*, NCDDR, Freetown, 2002, p33

The Peacebuilding Palette



MAP OF LIBERIA



Map No. 3775 Rev. G UNITED NATIONS
January 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section