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INTERNATIONAL NGOs AND PEACE BUILDING: THE CONTRIBUTION OF CARE-INTERNATIONAL (KENYA) IN KIBERA

BY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration

I, MWANGALA JOEL MTANJE hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree to any other University.

MWANGALA JOEL MTANJE   Signed..................   Date... 8 · 11 · 2011

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

PROF. MARIA NZOMO   Signed...................   Date... October /0th 2014

Abstract

This research project attempts to give a critique of the peace building process in Kibera following the early 2008 post-election violent conflict. In particular, the researcher assesses Care-International's peace building project in Kibera between 2008 and 2010, with the ultimate objective of recommending better and more suitable ways of engaging international NGOs in the on-going peace building process in Kenya.

This is a relevant and viable study as the research findings will not only contribute to the available peace building knowledge, it will also offer valuable insights into the current national debate on how to address the post 2008 conflict situation in Kibera and Kenya as a whole.

To carry out this study, the researcher will use both qualitative and quantitative data, which will be analyzed using Thematic Analysis and Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), respectively.

Dedication

This research project is dedicated to the late Peter Mwangala Kakunde, and Everlyn Kadzo Peter - my parents - for sowing and nurturing the seed of intellectualism in me; Leah Ayoo and Tatiana Mwaka – my wife and daughter, respectively - for their sacrifice, understanding and unwavering encouragement throughout my studies.

Acknowledgement

List of Abbreviations

AU	African Union
B- NEP	Building a Network of Peace Project
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CIPEV	Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DC	District Commissioner
DO	District Officer
DPC	District Peace Committee
FBOs	Faith Based Organizations
FORD	Forum for Restoration of Democracy
GOK	Government of Kenya
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African Nation Union
KPU	Kenya People Union
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics

LDCs	Least Developed Countries
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
PNU	Party of National Unity
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NGOs	Non Governmental Organizations
NSC	National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management
SHGs	Self Help Groups
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

List of Figures and Illustrations

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.01 Problem Context

Conflicts form an integral part of human life. Defined as the existence of incompatibilities in goals, values and norms between two or more parties[1], a conflict avails opportunities for the parties and authorities concerned to re-examine and rectify the said incompatibilities. A better relationship between the parties would then follow. Conflicts also serve as a warning that the rot is starting, and can pave the way for remedial action.[2]

However, whether a conflict offers a silver lining or total gloom depends on a number of factors. A good starting point is the understanding of the meaning of conflict, and peace building. Peace has traditionally been viewed as the absence of overt violent confrontations or direct physical violence.[3] This contradicts Galtung's view of peace as the absence of structural violence but existence of social justice that allows for the optimization of one's full potential. To him, desirable peace is that which is characterized by sustainable social justice, harmony and happiness. The opposite of this is negative peace, which is the mere absence of physical violence unaccompanied by the requisite social justice.[4]

Secondly, it is imperative to understand the process of peace building; its beginning and ending - which is quite complex. According to Lederach, peace building is

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[1] C.R. Mitchell; *The Structure of International Conflict* (London: Macmillan, 1998) pp. 15-25
[2] A. de Reuck, "The Logic of Conflict: Its Origin, Development and Resolution." in M. Banks ed. *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective in International Relations.* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1984) pp. 96-111.
[3] W. Heinrich, *Building The Peace: Experiences and Reflections of Collaborative Peacebuilding – The Case of Somalia* (Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute, 2006) p. 9
[4] J. Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", in *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 3 (1969) pp.167-191.

not necessarily a post – conflict undertaking. Rather, since conflict is endemic in society and the relationship between peace and conflict is cyclic, peace building is also a cyclic and continuous process. More importantly, peace building is an enormous task which requires multiple players, resources, processes, and a comprehensive approach.[5]

The world over, peace building initiatives have brought together Governmental and Nongovernmental agencies. From Angola to Afghanistan, Israel to India, and Somalia to Sierra Leone, international Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have contributed to peace building - at some point – in one way or another. The outcomes of, and reactions to such engagements are mixed. In spite of the increasing role and influence of NGOs in the field of peace building, their relationship with the State has not been easy and consensual. In Kenya, conflict and peace NGOs have been aspiring to fill the gap left by State agencies but such an undertaking has not been without challenges.

This study seeks to come up with possible solutions and recommendations to the above predicament. Since the Kenyan government alone has apparently failed to ensure sustainable peace[6], there is need to explore the importance of international NGOs in peace building and reconciliation in Kenya – and the possibility of a genuine, desirable and formal peace building partnership between the Kenyan government (GOK) and international NGOs. This will be done using the Case Study research design as the whole study will be based on Care-International's 2008 – 2010 peace building project in Kibera.

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[5] J. Lederach, "Civil Society and Reconciliation", in C. A Crocker et al *The Challenges of Managing International Conflict.* (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 2001). pp. 841-854.
[6] See M. Omosa et al, *Theory and Practice of Governance in Kenya: Towards Civic Engagement.* (Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press.)

1.02 Background to the Research Problem

At independence, the Kenyan government inherited conflicts that had emerged and developed during the colonial era.[7] These conflicts included class, ethnic and regional, and political conflicts. Tense and uneasy relationships - between the then main independent Kenya political parties (KANU and KADU), between the State and Political Parties, between various political regions or ethnic groups, and between the property-owning elites and labor-providing poor and peasants- grew during the first decade of independence.[8]

With time, these conflicts grew in size, issues, actors involved and dimensions because they were never successfully resolved[9]. Consequently, the Kenyan government and communities have continued to suffer the negative impacts of the said political, economic and socio-cultural conflicts. For example, the 1966-1969 political contests between then President Jomo Kenyatta's KANU and Jaramogi Oginga KPU captured the class, ethnic, regional and political conflicts that confronted the Kenyan society. [10]

Meanwhile, the Kenyan society was treated to settlement-oriented, short term solutions as the government remained the main driver of peace building programs. Considering the nature of conflicts the government was addressing, and also because the government was an interested party in the various raging internal conflicts, limited reconciliation and peace building was realized. Positive social activism as advocated for

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[7] R. Maxon, " Colonial Roots", in Oyugi (ed), *Politics and Administration in East Africa*(Nairobi: EAEP,1994)pp.33-60

[8] See D. Berg-Schlosser, "Ethnicity, Social Classes and the Political Process in Kenya" in Oyugi ed. *Politics and Administration in East Africa* pp.244-278

[9] P. Wanyande, "The Politics of Coalition Government" in Wanyande et al *Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya* (Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press) pp.107-129.

[10] The contest between Kenyatta and Odinga led to major ideological fallout between the Capitalist-leaning KANU and the Socialist-inclined KPU and a by-election.

by the Peace Research paradigm[11] could only be pursued successfully - under the circumstances - through appropriate partnerships between Government agencies and peace building international NGOs. Such an arrangement was never genuinely pursued during the Kenyatta rule.

The Moi regime was fundamentally the same as the previous regime.[12] In fact, Moi's highly personalized rule never trusted the civil society, whether they were local based or foreign governmental or non governmental organizations. As a result, the above mentioned conflicts were never fully resolved. The various conflicting parties were never fully reconciled. Meaningful and real peace was yet to be realized. Kenya as a society was experiencing what Johan Galtung refers to as negative peace as opposed to the ideal and desirable positive peace.[13]

The so called ethnic clashes in the run up to, and after the 1992, 1997 and 2007 general elections, where government agencies and officials were implicated[14] emphasized the need to fully address the root causes of the conflicts between various social groups and communities, in a different way. The need to consider the involvement of NGOs in peace building and post- conflict reconciliation was made even more relevant by the landmark violent conflict which followed the 2007 General Elections.

The violent conflict experienced after the 2007 General Elections is the biggest the country has ever suffered, in terms of number of victims, intensity and magnitude of

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[11] Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research" in *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 3 (1969) pp. 167-191

[12] D. Moi, *Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principals* .(Nairobi: Macmillan,1986)

[13] According to Galtung, positive peace lasts. It is not merely the absence of physical violence but also the condition of a socially just society, with members capable of realizing their full potential.

[14] See Commission if Inquiry into Post Election Violence, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV)*, Nairobi, 2008

the violence and losses suffered.[15] After contributing to the emergence relief and humanitarian response by local and international, Governmental and Non- governmental agencies, Care-International (Kenya) rolled out a one - year peace building project in Kibera in 2008. This enormous task and its several challenges necessitated a project extension of two years hence the project's winding up in 2010.

1.03 Statement of the Research Problem

Since independence, enjoyment of lasting and positive peace in Kenya has not been possible as relative calm continues to be disrupted by political, social and economic incompatibilities which often turn violent and costly. Efforts by the GOK and other actors have not yielded the desired outcome, which is long-term and sustainable positive peace. Meanwhile, the conflict situation has continued to assume a complex body with far-reaching negative implications, like the "ethnic clashes" now synonymous to General Elections. This study seeks to explore solutions to the problem of unresolved historical and dynamic conflicts in Kenya.

More specifically, this research seeks to find out whether Care- International (Kenya) has been able to contribute to peace building and reconciliation in Kibera after the post-2007 elections violent conflict. Has Care-International's quest to build peace in Kibera after the said violent conflict been successful? Should the Government then embrace more robust, genuine and formal partnerships with international NGOs in sustainable peace building in Kenya? These are question the study seeks to answer. The study will also find out whether GOK itself has in any way positively contributed to peace building and reconciliation in Kibera.

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[15] According to the CIPEV Report the post-2007 election violence claimed more than 1130 lives, more than 620,000 people were internally displaced and more than 600,000 people lost their livelihoods.

1.04 Research Objectives

The general objective of this study is to investigate the contribution of international peace and conflict NGOs in the pursuant of sustainable peace and reconciliation in Kenya. The following are the specific objectives:-

1. Establish the role of Care-International (Kenya) in peace building and reconciliation in Kibera between 2008 and 2010.

2. Assess the performance of Care-International (Kenya) in peace building in Kibera between 2008 and 2010.

3. Establish and recommend a better and viable GOK – international NGOs peace building partnership in Kibera, but also the whole country.

1.05 Research Questions

The following research questions will be addressed:-

1. What is the role of Care-International (Kenya) in peace building and in Kibera?

2. What was the contribution of Care-International (Kenya) in peace building in Kibera between 2008 and 2010?

3. How can the GOK and international NGOs like Care-International partner for successful peace building in Kenya?

1.06 Justification of the Research Problem

Since independence, various Kenyan communities have continued to be entangled in different types of conflicts. The government has been attempting to address some of these conflicts, but it has not been very successful resolving them. Probably due to highly

unilateral conflict management by the government, similar or the same conflicts have continued to recur although with variations in context, parties and issues. This study therefore seeks solutions to real problems that come with perpetual conflicts.

Secondly, this is a timely undertaking considering that Kenya is currently exploring different ways of arriving at a lasting solution to the conflicts which have bedeviled the country since independence. Whereas some ordinary Kenyans and conflict/peace practitioners have rooted for forgiveness and reconciliation through a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, a contrary opinion holds that peace can be guaranteed through retributive justice which entails punishing all those who have perpetrated violence against fellow Kenyans. Yet, the criteria of determining victims and perpetrators of injustices, is also shrouded in controversy and debate.[16] The findings of this study will therefore be insightful to Kenya's pursuant of sustainable peace.

This study is also relevant as it is undertaken at a time when Kenya as a society seems to be reflecting on its historical quest for, and pursuit of nationhood and the challenges so far encountered. A debate continues to rage on how unity and legitimate relationships of the more than forty ethnic groups or nations can be achieved and sustained in the midst of perpetual ethnicised and politicized internal conflicts.[17]

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[16] This debate acquired a new importance with the release of the CIPEV Report, which recommended the establishment of a local special tribunal to handle cases of persons bearing greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity. Alternatively, the international criminal court may take over such cases.

[17] *op cit*, Wanyande, 2007. National politics continue to be highly politicized, with political parties serving as medium of "ethnic" alliances.

1.07 Literature Review

The idea of peace building has at its core, the realization that real, enduring and positive peace[18] is desirable but realized only when a conflict is fully resolved. According to Cockell, peace building involves deliberate efforts and activities in the form of government policies or NGOs programs and projects geared towards institutionalizing peace[19]. Peace building would then be concerned with the total social advancement of the individual in a given social set up as opposed to the "well being" and security of the State.

While expounding on the concept of human security, Renner[20] explains that an individual who can meet basic needs like food, shelter, clothing and education is less likely to feel insecure. Neither is that individual likely to be embroiled in conflicts of big magnitudes to warrant State intervention. Provision of the said basic needs is therefore one way of ensuring and safeguarding peace; but the GOK alone has not been able to create a conducive environment for the optimization of these basic needs.

Lederach[21] on the other hand draws similarities between peace building and sustainable reconciliation of highly divided societies. He notes that bringing back the trust and ending mutual suspicion for antagonistic social groups to reconcile is a difficult task. For the long process to go all the way, deliberate efforts and decisions should be made by all interested parties, to safeguard the process through establishment of institutions that command respect and authority. Ledarach's position on this particular

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[18] See J. Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", in *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 6 No. 3, 1969
[19] J. F. Cockell, "Conceptualising Peace-building: Human Security and Sustainable Peace", in Pugh (ed.) *Regeneration of War-torn Societies.* (London: Macmillan, 1999) pp.15-34
[20] M. Renner, "Re-defining Security" in Mwagiru & O. Oculi (eds.) *Rethinking Global Security: an African Perspective?* (Nairobi: Heinrich Ball Foundation, 2006)pp. 1-11
[21] J. P. Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies.* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1997)

issue is that State institutions alone may lack the capacity to initiate sustainable peace building and reconciliation among communities, considering their negative vested interests and limited resources.

Government agencies or State institutions are however fundamental for the sustenance and safeguarding of sustainable peace. The State or its institutions have some unique roles to play in the transformation of internal conflicts. As Keating and Knight[22] explain, there is a big relationship and connection between peace building and governance. Yet only the State exercises the function of governance. In intra-state conflicts the State may be involved in a conflict as a party with vested interests. The State may also stand accused of omissions or commissions which perpetrated a conflict. Yet, it is the same institution which enjoys important powers and authority- including the monopoly of using lawful force and violence. If exercised lawfully, State violence may positively transform a conflict as a step towards reconciliation and realization of peace. A similar scenario obtained from the violent conflict that followed the fiercely contested 2007 Presidential Election results in Kenya.

Where the State or government agencies and officers are deemed partisan or holding vested interests in a conflict, then the State cannot successfully assume its role and place in the lengthy process of peace building and reconciliation. In such a case it may either support an informal peace building and reconciliation process spearheaded by CSOs, which may be international or national. Alternatively, it may collaborate and team up with such organizations intending to positively transform the internal conflict. However, the need to exercise and safeguard sovereignty often discourages state agencies

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[22] T. Keating & Knight, "Recent Developments in Post Conflict Studies: Peace –Building and Governance" in Keating, *Building Sustainable Peace*. (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2004)

from partnering with peace CSOs, or even sanctioning and supporting their peace building work. The State is even more hesitant to entertain the involvement of international NGOs in the management of internal conflicts.

The Kenyan government has been widely criticized for taking too long to resolve long- standing and historical issues which are widely seen as the root cause of the violent conflict that followed the 2007 General Elections. According to Walter Oyugi[23], the first post-independence Kenya government started on a wrong footing. Faced with the noble but enormous task of transforming a highly expectant but socially, economically and politically divided and antagonistic citizenry into a prosperous and integrated nation-state, the first government failed to take advantage of available opportunities to promote equitable distribution of scarce resources like land, senior public service positions, and prime development projects. This position is supported by Muigai[24] and Kanyinga[25]-more so concerning the thorny and divisive issue of land access, use and ownership.

When the ruling KANU government lost power in the December 2002 General Elections, a Coalition government (NARC) made up of previously opposition political parties took power[26]. Although it was hoped this "reformist" Government would now bring the much needed transition into a just government where peace building and reconciliation would be given priority, this would never be the case. The optimism and promise which came with the popular NARC government was short-lived as the

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[23] W. Oyugi, "The State in Post Colonial East Africa" in Oyugi (ed.) *Politics and Administration in East Africa.* (Nairobi: EAEP, 1994) pp. 3- 29.
[24] See G. Muigai, "Kenyatta and Ethno-Nationalist State" in Berman et al, *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa* (Oxford: James Carrey, 2004)
[25] K. Kanyinga, *Readings on Inequality in Kenya.*(Nairobi: SFID, 2006)
[26] P. Wanyande, "The Politics of Coalition Government" in Wanyande et al, *Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya*(Nairobi: UON Press, 2007) pp.107-129

government and its agencies veered off the road to peace building and national reconciliation.

Makumi and Mutie hold the position that although crises and conflicts subsist during government transition period, this does not necessarily mean the said conflicts have been fully and completely addressed. Structural conflicts are also in transition during the transition period, "and hence their management becomes problematic in practice."[27] This probably explains the apparent failure by successive Kenyan governments to initiate far-reaching societal transformation. But their argument also builds a case for the integration of Governmental and Non-governmental conflict management.

Indeed, NGOs have been engaged in conflict management in one way or another in the world long before peace work become a major area of interest and study. Although international NGOs have been strongly felt and seen in humanitarian relief and emergency operations, quite a big number of them have contributed to consequent development and peace building programs. From the 1990s refugees crises in Afghanistan and Rwanda to deadly and complicated internal and internationalized conflicts in Somalia, East Timor, Ethiopia, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Cambodia, Sudan and Congo Kinshasa (now Congo DRC), NGOs (both national and international) have played significant roles in general conflict management, and the resultant peace building and reconciliation programms.[28]

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[27] M. Mwagiru & M. Mutie, "Governance and Conflict Management", in Wanyande et al, *Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya.*(Nairobi: UON Press, 2007) pp.137-154

[28] F.K. Abiew & Keating, "Defining a Role for Civil Society", in Keating and Knight eds. *Building Sustainable Peace* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004)

In 2004, Care International was listed as one of the eight humanitarian relief and development NGOs responsible for more than 50% of relief budget, which translates to approximately $5 billion annually[29]. The role and contribution of NGOs in conflict management and peace work, whether directly or indirectly should therefore be interrogated and documented accordingly.

Even as the presence of NGOs in peace building and reconciliation continues to expand by the day the political environment in which many such organizations operate affect their performance. According to Slim,[30] both local and international NGOs have to deal with the politics of formal actors like States, Political Parties, International Organizations, and Regional Organizations, in their humanitarian, development and ultimate peace building work. To be effective and successful they must embody political sophistication, the humanitarian principles of independence, universality and operational imagination. They must be non-political but have a detailed political analysis and understanding of the conflict, and the role of third parties within it.

The involvement of NGOs in peace building assumed more importance with the end of the Cold War in early 1990s as the international community realized that a paradigm shift in International Relations in general and International Conflict Management in particular, was necessary for peace building and reconciliation efforts to be successful and sustainable. Although a number of conflict scholars and practitioners had already explained the need for a paradigm shift,[31] the United Nations initiated this new thinking and practice before it was embraced by the international community. A

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[29] *ibid* Abiew & Keating , pp. 96-97
[30] Hugo Slim, "International Humanitarianism Engagement with Civil War in the 1990s: A Glance at Evolving Practice and Theory" in *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (December, 1997) p5. 10
[31] As the Cold War raged, conflict Researchers and Peace Researchers Sustained their attack on the state-centric Strategists who held that State power was the answer to world conflicts and insecurity.

report by the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* charted a new and fresh path for Conflict Management as it officially called for a comprehensive and multi-sectorial approach to Conflict Management.

Emphasizing the fact that many major conflicts had multiple causes, Boutros-Ghali underscored some principles of Galtung's structural understanding of conflict when he stressed the importance of addressing the deepest causes of conflict, namely: economic and social injustice, and political oppression and seclusion.[32] The implications of this new thinking on the UN system and its partners in the international system became even more explicit when Boutros-Ghali developed his position further in his 1995 *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*. It was now evident peace building could contribute to preventive diplomacy by creation "of structures for the institutionalization of peace".[33]

Just as the definition of conflict and the conflict cycle imply, peace building could now be understood not necessarily as a post-conflict undertaking but a continuous process logically pursued even in times of peace. This new thinking also underlined the position that equity and justice should prevail not only in the pursuit of basic needs like food, shelter and clothing but also optimization of all human needs like individual security, personal and group identity, and happiness.

NGOs today control huge resources rivaling budgets of Less Developed Countries (LDCs) and reaching more than 300 million people annually. Their operations and programmes now determine in a big way, the success or failure of many countries' development plans - including Kenya. This fact has raised questions about their potential

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[32] Boutros Boutros –Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace Keeping*, 17 June 1992, Paras 15-16.
[33] Boutros –Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, January 1995,Para 49.

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to influence a government's development plan and policy process.[34] There are however weaknesses and challenges faced by these NGOs thus necessitating the call for robust and creative ways of engaging with conflict parties.

As noted above, the end of the Cold War was the beginning of initiatives to deal with a completely new and different political environment and international system characterized by among other changes, more Civil Wars and internal conflicts than ever experienced. The long-held Strategist Paradigm of International Conflict Management was on trial. The increased prominence of International Humanitarian Law necessitated a big change of attitude among UN members and other key international actors, from non interference to active intervention, preventive diplomacy and peace building.[35]

This new thinking however, implied an increased role for a resource-strained UN. Hence the need for more Non-state actors, like NGOs to take up the resultant professional and specialist civil assignments in peace building. NGOs operating in the field of peace building and reconciliation consequently became very useful as they took up assignments on behalf of the UN, donor governments or as their own programmes.

Although the changing international system necessitated a corresponding change in conflict management approaches, other specific factors and new developments in the 21st century have collectively continued to cultivate a role for NGOs in peace building and reconciliation. Aall has noted that international NGOs have in many cases overshadowed UN agencies in humanitarian intervention and consequent peace building. For instance, World Vision International spent over $180 million in post-conflict

[34] op cit Abiew and Keating, 2004)
[35] ibid, Abiew & Keating, pp. 100-101

Mozambique between 1993 and 1994, yet the total five year budget of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for the country was around $60 million.[36]

Abiew & Keating cite the apparent absence, or inability of State authorities to effectively manage internal conflicts or Civil Wars. Thus, the yawning gap that humanitarian and development NGOs continue to fill. For example, NGOs played central roles in the response to internal conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, and Zaire.[37] The absence, or failure of government agencies to end conflicts and initiate peace building and reconciliation programs could be attributed to several reasons from complete State failure in the case of Somalia to vested political interests in Congo DRC, and deeply rooted issues calling for resolution-oriented approaches in the Bosnia and Kosovo cases. More importantly, the huge interests held by the State and its ruling *elite* in internal conflicts often militate against genuine and effective State involvement in positive conflict transformation.

In the case of the 2007-2008 violent conflict in Kenya, government operatives and the political class were viewed as interested parties who could not be trusted to bring about a favourable outcome.[38] State institutions like the Police, the Provincial Administration and the Judiciary seemed to lack the required impartiality to be trusted with the management of the conflict.[39]. This politically charged environment also required a politically sensitive approach informed by a sophisticated political analysis of the obtaining environment.

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[36] P. Aall, "Nongovernmental Organizations and Peacemaking", in C. Crocker et al eds. *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflicts*. (Washington, D.C. : US Institute of Peace, 1996) p.435.
[37] *op cit*, Abiew & Keating, p. 95
[38] See Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (Waki Commission), *The Report of Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence*. Nairobi, 2008.
[39] The prevailing position as postulated by mediation scholars like Touval and Bercovitch is that mediators may be partial but must be neutral to the conflict and deliver requisite resources for successful mediation.

In addition, the shortage of financial resources and peace building expertise by the side of governments faced with internal conflicts, and the disinterest by donors to finance government peace programs seemed to have collectively led to a diminishing peace building role for the State but a more prominent role for peace/conflict NGOs. As to whether these Non-governmental initiatives succeed, other related issues have to be put into perspective.

It has been observed that NGOs which are familiar with a conflict area are able to apply their prior knowledge of the conflict parties, issues, and environment to successfully dismantle prohibitive structures and install desired changes. In the long-running Somalia conflict, both internal and external NGOs have proved more knowledgeable and useful. They understood the conflict, issues and actors better due to their long presence and operations in that country way before the conflict attracted the attention of the UN resulting to "Operation Restore Hope".[40] Although most of these NGOs were operating in humanitarian assistance and relief fields before the escalation of the conflict, it was easy for them to adjust and join development and peace building efforts. In many such cases, peace building became a natural extension of development and humanitarian relief operations.

Development NGOs have particularly contributed to the peace building process by tackling oppressive socio-economic structures during the reconstruction period, or even in a pre-conflict setting. By building the social capacity of local groups, reassembling the country's economic and social infrastructure, NGOs are able to avail

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[40] A. Natsios, "NGOs and the UN System in Complex Emergencies: Conflict or Cooperation?", in *Third World Quarterly* No. 3 (1995) p. 406

more economic and related political opportunities, which together enable individuals and groups to realize their optimum potential.[41]

Key information, skills and knowledge of a conflict's issues, parties and environment possessed by particular NGOs have proved important tools and resources not only to local authorities but also the United Nations and other international formal players in conflict resolution. In the 1990s, NGOs provided credible information and analyses on the Great Lakes Conflict to the UN and other formal actors. In the case of Somalia, NGOs provided more reliable and credible information than what the UN Special Representative, Mohamed Sahnoun could avail.[42]

According to Eliasson, NGOs are easily accepted in a conflict situation by State actors, concerned with legitimacy and sovereignty issues and implications because- in the eyes of interested State actors- they lack any formal powers or authority to extend legitimacy to the parties challenging the State or its organs. Although that may be true, the same can be held as strength of NGOs when engaging belligerent local authorities uncomfortable with formal actors like the UN and other International Organizations. As State actors set out to 'manipulate' intervening NGOs, the latter can use the extended goodwill (or assumed weakness) to positively transform the conflict.[43]

In summary, the following are widely held as the great strengths and advantages of NGOs (whether local or international) involved in peace building and reconciliation: flexibility, speed of reaction, comparative shorter bureaucracy and minimal red tape,

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[41] *op cit* Abiew & Keating, p. 98

[42] Alex de Waal, *Famine Crimes* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998) pp. 179 – 221.

[43] J. Eliasson, "Establishing Trust in the Healer" in K. M. Cahill ed. *Preventive Diplomacy- Stopping Wars Before They Start* (New York: Basic Books, 1996) p. 332.

optimum operational and implementation capacity, commitment and dedication, relative conflict neutrality, and political independence.[44]

The good record of NGOs in development work, and their pursuit of positive peace[45] anchored on social justice have encountered several challenges. Some of these challenges can be derived from the inherent qualities and weaknesses of NGOs as distinct organizations whereas others can be attributed to the highly charged political environment they operate in. However, their weaknesses can be minimized and the challenges may be addressed by applying particular strategies recommended by some peace building scholars and practitioners.

Some NGOs are neutral in their approach as a matter of principle whereas others do not exhibit the slightest sense of neutrality. Moreover, some international NGOs are state-sponsored (e.g. USAID), faith-based (e.g. World Vision International) or autonomous and non-religious (e.g. Care- International and Medecins Sans Frontieres). LDCs like Kenya have been uneasy and cautious when dealing with government-sponsored international NGOs because of their perceived tendency to interfere in the internal affairs of the host country. Although the practice by NGOs to disregard state sovereignty and operate without borders may be viewed as a strength, it has also led to unfortunate but avoidable disagreements, with host governments accusing external NGOs of "intruding and meddling" in internal affairs.[46] According to Baitenmann, NGOs can be

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[44] M. Griffiths et al, "Sovereignty and Suffering", in J. Harris ed. *The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* (London: Printer Publishers, 1995) p.72

[45] According to Peace Research scholars like J. Galtung positive peace is the most desirable although it appears unrealistic. This is a societal situation whereby individuals, groups and social organizations are free and able to fully optimize their potential in all areas and possibilities.

[46] H. Baitenmann "NGOs and the Afghan War: The Politicization of Humanitarian Aid", in *Third World Quarterly*, No. 1 (1996) p. 62.

used by external forces to influence the direction and outcome of conflicts, without their direct involvement.

Bush has pointed out that the joint deployment of NGOs and the military in conflict areas is tantamount to militarization of relief and development systems, which may lead to the perpetuation of undesirable state-centric and power-based approaches.[47] As witnessed in some cases, such an arrangement is often necessary if unavoidable. The conflict management cycle shows that force may be necessary in stopping violence and addressing immediate and, or short-term needs before resorting to the pursuit of long-term and sustainable change.

Moreover, joint deployment of (civilian) NGOs and military units may be taken to be a sign of the expanding peace building mandate of previously emergency operation and humanitarian NGOs.[48] Their engagement also provides the crucial link between peace enforcement and peace building. Peace enforcement would in this case refer to all those short-terms initiatives aimed at stopping violent combatants, implementing peace accords, checking international humanitarianism and human rights abuses.

The early 1990s Rwanda Conflict which deteriorated into Genocide attracted a big number of humanitarian and peace NGOs in Rwanda and the entire Great Lakes region, resulting to a complicated government-civil relationship and coordination challenge.[49] Similarly, by the time the UN Security Council endorsed peace enforcement in Somalia through "Operation Restore Hope", about 40 NGOs were already working

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[47] As Quoted by Abiew & Keating (2004)
[48] Abiew & Keating pp. 95-96.
[49] See R. Von Bernuth, "The Voluntary Agency Response and the Challenge of Coordination in the Rwanda Emergency: Causes, Responses, Solution" (Special Issue), *Journal of Refugee Studies* No. 3 (1996) p. 283.

there.[50] Although these mainly external organizations ultimately took up prominent peace building roles, competition among them, and the task of coordination in the absence of a functioning internal government limited their success.

The fear by African states like Kenya and other LDCs in the South, that some NGOs may use internal conflicts to expand and perpetuate their influence in an increasingly politicized peace building environment - and the failure of multilateral peace building operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, among others in the 1990s - has raised questions about the effectiveness of NGOs in peace building and reconciliation initiatives.[51]

However, as Lederach holds, the dynamic, multilateral and comprehensive work that is peace building requires careful balancing and planning. Immediate issues must be addressed without jeopardizing short-term and long-term objectives. All actors, from grassroot level to top leadership through middle range parties and leaders must play their roles harmoniously for peace building and reconciliation to be successfully undertaken.[52] In addition, more efforts should be directed at coordination and accountability among the multiple actors involved in peace building. According to Somavia, where international actors are engaged with regional and local authorities, a coherent system in tandem with national and grassroots institutions is paramount.[53]

From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that international NGOs have a big role to play in peace building and reconciliation. Indeed, from the time Kofi Annan

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[50] A. Natsios, "NGOs and the UN System in Complex Emergencies: Conflict or Cooperation?" in *Third World Quarterly* No.3 (1995) p. 456.

[51] *op cit*, Abiew & Keating, pp. 103-104.

[52] J.P. Lederach, "Civil Society and Reconciliation" in Crocker et al, *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 2001)

[53] J. Somavia (Permanent Representative of Chile to the UN), "The Humanitarian Responsibilities of the United Nations Security Council", (1996 Gilbert Murray Memorial Lecture, 26 June 1996, Oxford)

advocated for information sharing and exchange between NGOs and other institutional actors like States and IGOs,[54] the increase in Civil Wars and other internal conflicts has meant a bigger role for NGOs. Yet, NGOs often have to deal with a politically charged environment in their initial humanitarian and subsequent development and peace building work. To be effective, a detailed political analysis of the operating area must inform their work.[55]

In a summarized form, Prendergast [56]and Smock[57] propose the following eight guidelines as key to successful NGOs' engagement in peace building: better planning; more accurate needs assessment; analysis of work environment risks and opportunities; providing strategic assistance; independent evaluation of relief and development programmes; empowering local people and institutions; working closely with line organizations; monitoring and acting on human rights abuses by warring parties.

1.08 Conceptual Framework

This study shall be anchored on the concept of Peace Building and Reconciliation, which has at its core a principled, comprehensive and sustainable resolution of conflicts, resulting into sustainable desirable change in society.

According to J. P. Lederach the concept of Peace Building is essentially premised on the understanding that parties in conflicts often live in close geographical proximity

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[54] Kofi Annan, *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform. Report of the Secretary-General* (New York: United Nations, 1997) pp.207-216.

[55] Hugo Slim, "International Humanitarianism's Engagement with Civil Wars in the 1990s: A Glance at Evolving Practice and Theory" in *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (19 December 1997)

[56] See J. Prendergast, *Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa* (Builder, Co: Lynne Reinner, 1996)

[57] See D. Smock, "Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa", in *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (July 1997)

"yet are locked into long-standing cycles of hostile interaction"[58] Peace Building as a concept therefore underlines a flexible and creative yet dynamic way of restoring societal relationships at both individual and community level. It is concerned with all those governmental (or formal) and non-governmental (or informal) policies, programes and associated efforts geared towards the functioning of social, political and economic structures.

Contrary to what the term "peace building" may suggest, Peace Building as a concept goes beyond post-conflict reconstruction. Just like the conflict cycle, Peace Building encompasses "a full array of processes, and stages needed to transform a conflict towards more... peaceful relationships."[59] The said processes and activities may precede or follow a conflict. Peace building programs, activities and initiatives may therefore be undertaken before and, or after a conflict.

Although Peace Building as a concept focuses on long term desired change, it appreciates the importance of the need to address immediate issues and relationships before eventually resorting to transforming the entire system through long-term programs and plans. While it pursues the ultimate goal of a desired future, the concept underscores the importance of immediate and short-term plans, emergency and humanitarian operations, crisis interventions, mid-term training, and design of long-term social change.[60]

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[58] J.P. Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1997) p. 23

[59] J. Lederach, "Civil Society and Reconciliation", in Crocker et al, *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, *2001)* pp.841-855.

[60] This is according to J.P. Lederach's integrated framework for peace building as expounded in his many cited works including *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*

Both Lederach and Cockell[61] are in agreement that relationships and sustainable peace are critical components of the concept of Peace Building. According to Cockell, the unique challenges posed by post-Cold War (internal) conflicts have given relevance and prominence to this concept, which ideally addresses internal and dynamic conflicts by targeting and uprooting their root causes. Drawing from the postulation of Galtung[62], Cockell also holds that Peace Building is fundamentally about ending structural violence by eliminating inhibitive and unjust societal structures which may be political, social or economic.

The need for a shift from rigid and inadequate state-centric approaches which dominated a bigger part of the 20th century was underlined by the landmark 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace* by the then UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros- Ghali. In this report, Boutros- Ghali called for "an integrated approach to human security" to address "…. the deepest causes of conflicts: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression."[63] In his 1995 *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, Boutros- Ghali backs Lederach's position that Peace Building as a concept is not confined to post-conflict activities. Rather, as a Conflict Management concept, Peace Building should be defined by its activities and objectives, not its sequencing in the peace building process.[64] Peace Building should therefore entail "the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace".[65]

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[61] See J. Cockell "Conceptualizing Peacebuilding: Human Security and Sustainable Peace" in M. Pugh (ed.) *Regeneration of War-Tom Societies* (London: Macmillan Publishers, 2000).

[62] See Johan Galtung "Three Approaches to Peace: Peace Keeping, Peace Making and Peacebuilding", in Galtung, *Peace, War and Defense; Essays in Peace Research*, vol. 2, 1976, pp 282-304.

[63] Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace -keeping*, 17 June 1992, paras 15-16.

[64] J. Cockell, *op cit* p. 17.

[65] B. Boutros Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, 3 January, 1995 para. 49.

According to Lederach, the following key ingredients are mandatory for successful sustainable peace building: peace building must run simultaneously at numerous levels of society; short-term needs (e.g. ending physical violence) and long-term vision (e.g. equal opportunities) must be linked; critical issues must find immediate response while broader structural change is envisioned.[66] In summary, the concept of Peace Building is long-term oriented, visionary, comprehensive and focuses on the whole rather than part of the whole. As one sets out to stop what is undesired and seeks solutions to particular incompatibilities, Peace Building demands that all those initiatives should build into a desirable whole, which would be restoration of mutual and legitimate relationships.

The concept of Peace Building goes hand in hand with Reconciliation. Although reconciliation hints at a post-conflict environment, the continuous and dynamic process which defines peace building would then contribute to the failure or success of reconciliation. Successful peace building prevents the occurrence or recurrence of conflict. Yet post-conflict reconciliation without successful peace building is at best unsustainable and at worst impossible. Moreover, both Peace Building and Reconciliation have the need to heal and restore interpersonal relationships at their very core. Reconciliation is therefore a dynamic and adaptive process aimed at building and healing interpersonal and community relationships. It is about building relationships among real people in real life situations who must move forward together.[67]

As a dynamic process, peace building can only lead to reconciliation if it is undertaken successfully. Although force and other elements of State power may be

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[66] J.P. Lederach, "Civil Society and Reconciliation", in Crocker, *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 2001) pp. 841-855.
[67] *ibid*, p. 842.

deployed to address and respond to immediate issues and concerns, systematic transformation of the systemic and underlying economic, social and political structures leads to long-term positive change, and sustainable or positive peace. According to Lederach, this task is even heavier in societies deeply divided by long- running conflicts. Things get even more complex and tricky where the State has been sucked into an internal conflict and, or it is suspicious and resistant to external intervention.

Whereas peace agreements deal with interests and issues of substance, Peace Building and Reconciliation seek to understand and address deeper emotional, and "psychological and subjective aspects... often based on generations of pain, loss and suffering."[68] Individuals and communities are called upon to reconsider their images of self, community and the enemy. These are definitely long and engaging processes requiring enormous skills, creativity and resources, which can only be mobilized through a multi-sectored and inclusive approach.

Although it may be difficult to bring about reconciliation and peace, some Peace and Conflict scholars and practitioners[69] hold that peace building and reconciliation is the surest way to a desired and sustainable future among previously conflicting communities. According to Lederach, successful reconciliation depends on a unique, dynamic and practical balance of four key ingredients, namely: truth, mercy, justice and peace.[70]

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[68]*ibid* Lederach, , p. 842.
- [69] J. Galtung's 1969 position is hereby suppEarly Life
- Human Nature and the State
- Theory of Extension of Dominion
- Value of Machiavelli's Theory on the State

orted by Cockell's and Lederach's 21st century discourse.
[70]*op cit* Lederach, pp. 848-853

Truth is a disclosure of wrongs, those behind it and their reasons. More important is the acknowledgment by the wrong doer(s). It is therefore an important beginning of the healing process. After the truth, the difficult journey of forgiving (and showing mercy) the guilty and seeking a united fresh start begins. Justice contributes to mercy and peace by restoring and compensating (restorative justice) losses and injustice suffered, and preventing a recurrence. Peace is thus the result of a successful balance of truth, mercy and justice. As past pain and loss ends, people build new, legitimate and dynamic relationships – the desired future.

According to Cockell, the concept of Peace Building is progressive since it gives prominence to Human security as opposed to State security. The focus is therefore on the individual right from the analysis of a conflict's root causes, the obtaining context and the options available for sustainable resolution and reconciliation. The Human Security approach is thus in harmony with the Peace Building concept because it cites the following as the basic parameters for sustainable peace building programs: focus on the root causes, context-specificity, sustainability and persistence, mobilization of indigenous and people- centered resources.[71]

From the foregoing discussion, peace building is then an integrated, multi-sectoral and comprehensive undertaking which, of necessity, requires the engagement of combinations of multiple actors like State/Government agencies, the Civil Society (local and international) and International Organizations. Moreover, the central threats to sustainable peace may be addressed by applying the following specific yet related

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[71] *op cit* Cockell pp. 20-23.

strategies: political security and governance; community security and societal stability; personal security and human rights; economic security.[72]

The highly engaging and comprehensive work of peace building clearly requires long-term planning and enormous resources, which may be availed by a multi-sectored team resulting from a strong and genuine Governmental-Nongovernmental partnership. Abiew and Keating have observed that the contribution of both development and humanitarian NGOs in all phases of peace building - including advocacy and actual service delivery in the field - is too significant to be ignored.[73] The performance of these NGOs, which operate in different conflict environments using different approaches may be best investigated and assessed using the Peace Building concept.

Although the concept of Peace Building began to enjoy international policy limelight as a key part of the post-Cold War global changes, its definition and meaning in policy and operational terms continues to be debatable. Whereas Keating seems to limit peace building to activities addressing post-conflict issues, Lederach is emphatic that peace building is continuous since it may be undertaken before or after a conflict provided that it aims at achieving desired long-term change. There is however reasonable consensus that the distinctive feature of the concept of Peace Building is "its emphasis on addressing the root causes of conflict within societies"[74]. Galtung emphasizes that peace building is basically about the abolition of structural violence (oppression and domination) but not merely ending direct violence (physical harm and warfare)[75]. This

[72] *ibid* Cockell, pp. 24-26.
[73] K. Abiew & T. Keating, "*Defining a Role for Civil Society*", in T. Keating & Knight (eds), *Building Sustainable Peace* (Tokyo, UN University Press, 2004) pp. 93-117, p. 93.
[74] *op cit* Cockell p. 16.
[75] *op cit* Galtung pp. 285-287.

key understanding of the concept will then provide the foundation, and define the boundaries of this study.

Definition of Related Terms and Concepts

The following related terms and concepts will also be used in this study. It is therefore important to briefly them.

i) Civil Society

This is that part of the society independent from the State System. This collective realm includes networks of institutions engaged in cultural, ideological and political issues. Examples of civil society organizations are Non- Governmental Organization (NGOs), Professional Associations, and Interest Groups.[76]

According to Jusu-sheriff, "open, disciplined and democratic civil society organizations can provide alternative models for public life" [77]

ii) Conflict Management

These are interventionist efforts towards stopping the escalation and negative effects of ongoing violent conflicts.[78] Since conflicts are rarely fully resolved, Conflict Management is inevitable and often a long-term process.

iii) Conflict Resolution

It is a distinct approach of solving conflicts by which clashing parties recognize and appreciate one another's interests, needs and continued existence. It focuses on the

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[76] C. Miller (Ed), *A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies* (Geneva: U.N University for Peace, 2005) pp. 19-20.
[77] Jusu-Sheriff: "Civil Society", in A. Adebajo and I. Rashid (eds.): *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004) p. 284.
[78] *op cit* Cicil Miller, p. 23.

underlying causes of conflict and addresses them mutually, satisfactorily and sustainably.[79] This approach is characterized by cooperation, non-confrontation, and a win-win orientation. By building peace, one seeks to resolve a conflict rather than merely managing it.

iv) Conflict Transformation

These are changes in all or any of the following matters regarding a conflict aimed at, or resulting into, more opportunities for conflict resolution or conflict management and ultimately more acceptable and equitable outcomes: the general context or framing of a situation, the contending parties, and the issues at stake, the processes or structures affecting the aforementioned.[80]

v) Intervention

These are requested or imposed actions by external parties in relation to a conflict situation. Intervention - as a part of conflict management - often seeks to attain acceptable or favourable conditions[81] or outcomes. NGOs' intervention is third- party intervention aimed at upholding accepted values, or to alter dynamics or outcomes of a conflict management process.

1.09 Hypothesis

The following hypotheses will be tested:

(a) The higher the number of NGOs supporting Governmental peace building efforts the higher the potential for sustainable peace.

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[79] *ibid,* Miller p. 26.
[80] *ibid,* Miller pp. 26-27
[81] *ibid* Miller, p. 43

(b) The lower the funding of peace building initiatives the higher the potential for conflicts.

(c) The higher the number of NGOs engaged in peace building the higher the potential for sustainable peace.

(d) Realization of sustainable peace depends on sustainable Governmental-Nongovernmental peace building partnership.

1.10 Research Methodology

The need to change or improve the *status quo* can be justified by reliable research findings. Without research, intervention measures lack justification. This study will be conducted using an appropriate research design that will ensure validity and reliability. Methodology will in this case consist of research design, study site and population, sampling techniques, research instruments, and data analysis.

Research Design

The study will use the case study approach, which allows a researcher to investigate a big social problem in detail and wholistically by just focusing on a particular case.[82] By investigating the contribution of Care- International (Kenya) in peace building in Kibera, this study aims at establishing the possible role, strength and challenges faced by international NGOs in peace building and reconciliation in Kenya.

From the quantitative data collected, the researcher will make generalizations about the study population using a numeric description of trends, attitudes and opinions

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[82] See D. Kombo & D. Tromp, *Proposal and Thesis Writing*. (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2006) pp.70-74.

of the study population.[83] To ensure flexibility and check interviewee's unnecessary rigidity, focus group discussions will supplement the use of administered questionnaires and face-to-face interviews

Sources of Data

Both primary and secondary sources will be used in this study. Primary data will be obtained from interviews, administered questionnaires and focus group discussions. Secondary data will be sourced from academic journals and text books, reports and documentaries, government reports, documents and policy papers, and other relevant scholarly sources. All the sources will be reviewed, analyzed and acknowledged.

Whereas secondary data will be useful in giving specific background information on the subject of study, primary data will enrich the study with objective and qualified information. Moreover, it will allow for collection of first hand information from key GOK officials in Kibera, community leaders, officials of CSOs involved in conflict management in Kibera, and some local residents who have been exposed to conflicts in one way or another. These diverse sources of information will guard against sectarian biases and improve on the reliability and viability of the study.

Study Population and Site

This study focuses on the intervention of Care- International (Kenya) in the post-election conflict in Kibera, between 2008 and 2010. For the sake of this study, Kibera refers to the slum area of Kibera Division, which is made up of about 13 small but

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[83] J. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. Second edition (California: Sage Publishers, 2003) p. 153.

densely populated "villages"[84], namely: Kambi, Lindi, Makina, Kisumu Ndogo, Gatwikera, Soweto West, Soweto East, Kianda, Mashimoni, Lainisaba, Silanga, Raila, and Kichinjio. This informal settlement is located about 5 kilometers from Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya.

A 1995 population survey put the population of Kibera at between 750,000 and 1 million people.[85] The 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census report drew controversy from Kibera residents and stakeholders when it put the slum's population at 217,000.[86]

Kibera is purposely selected as the Study Site since this was the project area for Care-International's Building a Network of Peace Project, which ran from the year 2008 to 2010. Moreover, Kibera is diverse and a fair representation of Kenya as a conflict case study. This slum is home to many Kenyan ethnic groups and conflict is a key feature of their interactions and relationships.[87] Some of these conflicts have a national outlook as they have little to do with Kibera *per se*.

Sampling Procedures

Both probability and purposive sampling will be used appropriately to avail requisite information for an in-depth analysis of the subject of study.[88] Probability sampling will be used to pick three ordinary residents from each of the 13 villages to

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[84]It is not clear how many villages make up Kibera. Moreover, newer ones keep coming up.

[85]Peter Ngua, *Baseline Survey of Slums and Squatter Settlements and Inventory of NGOs and CBOs*, prepared as part of a Collaborative Study of the Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Nairobi, and Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, October 1995.

[86] Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, *2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census, Volume 1 A*. Nairobi, August, 2010. p34. About 10% of the overall population of Kibera (241,306) comes from formal, middle-income Estates.

[87] See R. Onyango, *Conflict in Kibera: An Analysis. Nairobi*, May 2009.

[88]*op cit* D. Kombo & D. Tromp, 2006. pp. 77-83.

whom questionnaires will be administered. This should bring out the general perception and attitude of residents towards Care-International's peace building project, while avoiding unnecessary bias and prejudice.

Unstructured interviews will be held with Care-International's OVC Program Manager and the B-NEP Project Officer. Purposive sampling will guide administering of questionnaires to selected eight Assistant Chiefs, two and four members of Langata District Peace Committee and Kibera Division Peace Committee, respectively. Because of their strategic role in Kibera, structured interviews will be held with the Langata DC, Kibera DO, the three Chiefs of Kibera, as well as leaders of six CBOs selected from the eighteen CBOs which partnered with Care-International to implement a peace project.

Research Instruments

Bearing in mind the objectives of this study - which is modeled on a case study design and conducted in a small informal settlement – the researcher will use the following research instruments accordingly: questionnaires, focus group discussions, interviews, and observations.

All these tools will compliment and supplement each other. For example, guided interviewing reduces the errors associated with questionnaires because it allows for clarification where a question or answer is not clear enough. Respondents express themselves freely whereas the researcher gets the chance to use direct observation to collect key data.

Data Analysis

The study will generate both qualitative and quantitative data which will be used to draw conclusions and make recommendations. Quantitative data will be analyzed for conclusion drawing and recommendations using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Qualitative data will be categorized into various thematic concerns and analyzed to offer clarifications, verifications and explanation. Intensity or frequency of an idea or theme will serve as a pointer to its importance.[89]

Scope and Limitations of the Research

The case study approach adopted may be limiting since the interventions of Care-International in Kibera is likely to offer a completely different outcome and experience from that of similar NGOs engaged in peace building in other parts of Kenya. Resource limitation would not allow the study to cover the role of a couple of other NGOs which also responded to the 2007-2008 emergency and humanitarian crises.

General and nationally applicable sources like government reports and policy documents on peace building and reconciliation referred to, should nonetheless give the study reasonable uniformity for generalization, as their wider perspective will minimize this limitation. Moreover, Kibera conflicts' causes, issues and dynamics may not be the same but they are similar to those of other conflicts.

Secondly, this study is carried out more than two years after the historic December 2007- February 2008 post-election violence. Some of the residents most affected by the violent conflict no longer reside in Kibera and may therefore not be interviewed. This means the study may not factor in their views on how peace building

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[89] *op cit* Kombo & Tromp, 2006. p.119

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has been managed so far. However, the use of purposive sampling techniques will minimize that limitation by ensuring that available key respondents are interviewed.

Lastly, some of the respondents may respond in a standard or stereotypic way. To mitigate this limitation, questionnaires will be designed in a manner that hinders stereotype answers.

1.11 Chapter Outline

Chapter One introduces the topic of study by first setting a broad context of the study, and giving a background to the research problem. This is followed by Statement of the Problem, Study Justification, Theoretical Framework, Literature Review, Hypothesis and Study Methodology.

Chapter Two provides an overview of NGOs and Peace Building in selected African countries.

Chapter Three analyses Care International's Building a Network of Peace Project (B-NEP) in Kibera, which is located about 5 kilometers from Nairobi- the capital city of Kenya.

Chapter Four analyses, and presents data collected in light of the hypotheses and conceptual framework already stated.

Chapter Five finally concludes the study and gives recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO: NGOs AND PEACE BUILDING IN SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

2.01 Introduction

As already outlined in the previous chapter, since the late 1980s when the international system experienced a far reaching change of conflict actors, issues and the overall political environment, the previously supreme role of the State in International Conflict Management and politics continues to be challenged. Not only did the end of the Cold War herald a more inclusive and democratic international political process, it also marked an increased demand for human rights and international humanitarian principles observance, enhanced human welfare and a reduced role for the State in public affairs.[90]

Moreover, as the Cold War came to an end in the early 1990s the political arena (both nationally and internationally) was opened up. African regimes which had received unconditional support from either the Capitalists or Communists now had to contend with both internal and external criticism of their political, economic and social development policies. Most significantly, it is the "humanitarian tragedies of the 1990s" that opened up a new chapter for the concept of Peace Building and Reconciliation in Africa and other less developed parts of the world.

This chapter starts by first giving a general overview of the experience and performance of NGOs in the growing and expanding field of peace building and reconciliation internationally. The strengths and weaknesses, advantages and disadvantages of NGOs' involvement in peace building are explored. The chapter then gives an analytical account of NGOs' post – conflict peace building and reconciliation interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, successes, failures and challenges are discussed.

According to Stephen J. Stedman the 1990s was dominated by humanitarian tragedies which necessitated a big response from humanitarian and development NGOs.

"Between 1991 and 1993, 400,000 Somalis died from war – induced famine....

In 1994, approximately 800,000 Rwandans fell victim to genocide. In four years

of Civil War, Liberia has seen nearly half of its population of 2.5 million die or

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[90] S. Stedman, "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa". In M. Brown ed., *International Dimensions of Internal Conflicts* (Cambridge: Center for Science and International Affairs, 1996) pp. 235-266, p. 243

flee. In Sudan nearly 1.2 million people have died from famine and civil war....

In 1993, over 100,000 people lost their lives in Burundi during a one - month ethnic bloodletting"[91]

In all the post - Cold War internal conflicts in Africa, the State as an institution and the ruling political *elite* were implicated. It therefore, became difficult for the same State or its agencies to successfully take up the subsequent tasks of peace building, reconciliation and general reconstruction. Moreover, systematic ethnicization of society, regional divisions and other forms of social exclusion, led to the emergence and gradual development of a civil society role in peace building and reconciliation.[92]

2.02 NGOs in Action: An Overview

The proliferation of internal conflicts in Africa in the 1990s resulted into humanitarian, social and economic crises which necessitated urgent and comprehensive response. The State and other formal institutions often lacked the capacity, will and moral authority to engage constructively and positively. It should however be noted that NGOs and other CSOs have played significant roles in emergency relief and humanitarian operations, as well as long term development programmes aimed at building peace in Africa,Asia, Europe and South America.

As Abiew and Keating observe, international NGOs have performed a variety of tasks in multilateral peace building and relief operations. In many cases, such NGOs have come to the rescue of overwhelmed governments, regional organisations and international organisations like the United Nations.[93] Where NGOs have been on the ground implementing development programmes long before outbreak of conflict - as was the case in East Timor, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Iraq - their contributions in post - conflict peace building has been more remarkable.[94] This is mainly because of their wealth of experience, knowledge of the operating area and its key issues, and actual (or potential) partners available.

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[91] *ibid* Stedman p.235

[92] M. Omosa et al, *Theory and Practice of Governance in Kenya: Towards Civil Engagement* (Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 2006) p. 62

[93] F. Abiew & T. Keating: "Defining a Role for Civil Society" in Keating and Knight eds. *Building Sustainable Peace*. (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2004) p. 96

[94] *ibid* Abiew & Keating pp 96-97

When violence flared up in Kibera following the announcement of presidential election results by the Electoral Commission of Kenya chairman, Care - International (Kenya) was already implementing development and psycho - social support projects deep inside the informal settlements of Kibera, some of which were started in 2004.[95]

In most parts of the world, the effectiveness of NGOs in peace building has continued to be determined and influenced by a combination of factors, ranging from resource constraints to politico-official impediments and the operational environment. Conflicts in a transition context have been known to pose serious management problems because of the obtaining change in characteristics, social environment and other militating realities.[96] There is therefore need to consider changing management mechanisms of old conflicts during a political transition period. Kenya has undergone changes of government and political system but structural (social, political and economic) conflicts have been constant. Scholars and critics attribute this state of affairs partly to the continued application of same, old conflict management mechanisms even during transition periods.[97]

Resource availability has also been a major determinant of the outcomes of peace building initiatives by NGOs. Huge budgets, competent and committed personnel and information-based intervention have often made all the difference. In post - conflict Mozambique, World Vision International spent over $ 180 million in two years, while the total five - year budget of UNDP was around $60 million. In early 1990s Afghanistan, NGOs came in to support the UNHCR, the governments of Pakistan and the USA in addressing emergency, humanitarian and development concerns occasioned by 3.5 million Afghan refugees. As the 1994 Rwanda crisis unfolded, "an unprecedented number of NGOs responded" with more than 100 organizations operating in DRC Congo's Goma and North Kivu, and 169 others based within Rwanda.[98]

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[95] See Care - International (Kenya), *OVC Integrated Program*. (Presented to ELT on 24 November,2010, Nairobi.)

[96] See M. Ottaway, "Mediation in a Transitional conflict: Eritrea", in *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 518, Resolving Regional Conflicts: International Perspectives* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1999)

[97] M. Mwagiru & P. Mutie, "Governance and Conflict Management", in P. Wanyande et al, *Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya.* (Nairobi: UON Press, 2007) pp. 131-154: p. 138

[98] *op cit* Abiew & Keating pp. 95-97.

In Kenya, NGOs gained prominence in the quest for far-reaching structural changes after it became evident that elections and changes of government were mere change of figureheads while unjust regimes remained in place courtesy of same structural apparatus.[99] Both national and international NGOs thus joined the push for structural and sustainable positive change in Kenya by advocating for justice, democracy and good governance practices. Over the years, the NGO world became "an important part of the structure of public conflict resolution" which must be incorporated in government peace building and conflict management strategies.[100]

Consequently, since early 1990s NGOs and other CSOs have played the following key roles in peace building in Kenya; humanitarian support during ethnic and other civil conflicts, community development, shaping of public agenda, civic education and community mobilization.[101]

According to Omosa, far - reaching structural changes in Kenya would then lead to reconciliation, comprehensive and lasting peace. This is because injustices are deeply entrenched and historical as they started with the colonial regime but consecutive governments advanced various forms of structural and cultural violence. The colonial government initiated political, social and economic seclusion, and racial segregation. Kenyatta's regime worsened economic injustices whereas Moi's era aggravated despair in most Kenyans with worse cases of tribalism, corruption and mismanagement of public resources experienced. Although Kibaki's rule rekindled hope, this hope was not sustainable. Nepotism, negative ethnicity and corruption continued. In fact, Kibaki's NARC party "failed to reconcile even with itself. Instead, it established itself as a serious disappointment to most Kenyans"[102]

Going by the long history of injustices and incompatibilities discussed above, one can appreciate consequent enormous peace building tasks, which had to, of necessity incorporate both government and non-governmental initiatives.

[99] *op cit* Mwagiru & Mutie p. 137
[100] *ibid* Mwagiru & Mutie p. 148
[101] *ibid* Mwagiru & Mutie p. 148
[102] M. Omosa et al, *Theory and Practice of Governance in Kenya: Towards Civil Engagement* (Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 2006) pp. 99-100

In Uganda, internal conflicts started taking shape soon after independence. Although the Idi Amin *coup d'etat* caused far reaching economic, social and political upheavals, both within Uganda and the entire East African region, the regime of Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) took Uganda's internal conflicts to another level. As Museveni's rule perpetrated physical violence and extra-judicial killings, Obote's people and other communities in the North were the most affected. They felt victimised and marginalised.[103]A huge ethnic conflict was therefore gathering momentum, and the Lord's Resistance Amy (LRA) insurgency in the North (perceived as legitimate self-defence) would result into a major humanitarian and political crisis that would suck in neighbouring governments, and both local and international NGOs. It is estimated that 1.8 million people from the Acholi and Lango ethnic groups of northern Uganda have been displaced from their homes and communities.[104]

According to Rose Othieno, women NGOs have contributed in a big way to peace and reconciliation work in Uganda, more so through NGOs advocacy, education, and structural reforms programmes. Over 40 women groups under the National Association of Women's Organisations (NAWOU) worked together to co-ordinate peace campaign projects and activities[105]. Citing the deadly outcomes of physical violence over the years, women NGOs in Uganda lobbied for peaceful means of setting conflicts. Dialogue forums were organised right from the grassroots level, urging parties embroiled in violent conflicts to pursue peaceful methods of resolving their incompatibilities. Organizations like Uganda Women Network (UWONET), Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE), Uganda Media Women Association (UMWA), Action for Development (ACFODE), propagated peace messages through the mass media.[106]

Moreover, through women ACFODE trained and built the capacity of peace NGOs in the North, and rehabilitated child soldiers following the 1980s Civil Wars. CECORE organised and conducted trainings for women peace workers who would then act as mobilizing agents and entry points to peace NGOs at the grassroots level.

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[103] A. Adedeji ed., *Africa Conflict, Peace and Governance Monitor* (Ibadan: Dokun Publishing House, 2005) p. 63
[104] *ibid* Adedeji p. 64.
[105] R. Othieno, "Women's Contribution to Peace and Reconciliation in Uganda", in Heinrich Boll Foundation, *Towards Sustainable Peace – Civil Society Dialogue Forum for the Horn of Africa* (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2001)
[106] *ibid* Othieno p. 228

Although peace NGOs' work in Uganda may not have conclusively addressed all the internal conflicts, their contribution was nonetheless notable. Much would have been achieved had the Ugandan government and other State actors succeeded in disarming all the rebel units and militias. LRA's Joseph Kony continues to avoid negotiations by shifting goal posts and evading mediation efforts. Moreover, the implication of the Ugandan government in the "more than two decades state terror, civil war, and inordinate human rights abuses" made peace building initiatives quite challenging.[107]

Soon after independence, Sudan fell under the grip of costly Civil Wars and internal conflicts, which were political and resource - based, but later on took other dimensions. According to Hassan Abdel, "except for the very short period of peace following the Addis Ababa agreement in early 1970s", Sudan has largely been a civil strife zone.[108] The coming to power of the 1989s Salvation military rule escalated the conflict to the western and eastern parts of Sudan as the main northern opposition, National Democratic Alliance (NDA) joined the South's Sudan People Liberation Army in fighting the government. In addition to other negative outcomes of the Civil War, around 6 million people were displaced.[109] Contending issues changed from structural injustices and bad governance to religious and ethnic differences as the government called for a holy war against opposition forces.

As the conflict issues and dynamics moved outside the realm of political leadership and government military command, religious jihadism and martyrdom worsened already existent deep social cleavages. Although more actors were drawn into the intensifying conflict, the imposition of restrictions on NGOs' activities in early 1990s jeopardized NGOs' efforts to positively transform the now complex conflict.[110]However, the 1999 proved to be the turning point when the ruling NIF party suffered internal divisions. Most of the parties to the conflict (Khartoum government, NDA, SPLA etc) called for national reconciliation and post - conflict peace building as they realized that the Sudan problem would not be solved militarily but through peaceful negotiations.

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[107] *ibid* Othieno pp. 228-229
[108] Hassan Abdel, "The Sudan Conflict", in *Towards Sustainable Peace – Civil Society Diologue Forum for the Horn of Africa* (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2007)
[109] *ibid* Abdel p. 130
[110] *ibid* Abdel p. 130

Critics posit that the conflict had also entered a stage of a hurting stalemate and only NGOs positive engagement of the parties could unlock it.[111]

When the regime barred political parties and other CSO like trade unions, and imposed restrictions on NGOs in the 1990s, only national NGOs could continue to engage the parties in conflict. Their success in humanitarian intervention had already earned them trust, recognition and legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens, foreign donors, and State actors. National and international NGOs then operating in Sudan also possessed valuable information, knowledge, experience and links (internal and external) established and developed over the years.[112]

As the democratic and civil space opened up, NGOs mobilized civil groups made up of youth, women and professional associations, to apply the much needed pressure on conflicting parties to move to the negotiations table. This was informed by the NGOs' quest for "a comprehensive solution that addresses the root causes of the problem". These efforts partly contributed to the re-awakening of more civil and human rights groups like child rights organisations, women movements, and overall internationalization of humanitarian concerns. Fatigued actors including regional formal entities like Egypt, Libya, Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD), IGAD partners, were also re-energized by the NGOs' programmes.[113]

Consequently, NGOs placed the pursuit of real peace through peaceful resolution of the conflict as the ultimate long term desired goal. The guiding points were: basic civil rights for all as provided in the United Nations rights convention, democracy and civil liberties, freedom of thought, expression, and cultural diversity as a way to peaceful co-existence.[114]

The contribution of NGOs to the Sudan peace process encountered several challenges but the most formidable were the acute crisis that engulfed the political, social and economic systems, lack of commitment to negotiations, unwillingness to accept

[111] *ibid* Abdel pp. 132
[112] *ibid* Abdel pp. 133-134
[113] *ibid* Abdel p.135
[114] *ibid* Abdel pp. 134-135

negotiation outcomes. These strategic and crucial challenges curtailed the positive contribution of the NGOs in the Sudan peace process.[115]

In conclusion to the overview of NGOs peace building programmes and operations, it should be noted that in additional to the external challenges suffered, these peace/conflict NGOs also exhibit inherent and internal impediments and weaknesses. Most African NGOs enjoying funding from developed European and American states have been justifiably accused of selfishly perpetuating their existence, lucking patriotism and advancing "unrealistic goals."[116] In some instances, national NGOs' leaders have been sucked into domestic conflicts and politics thus becoming active parties to the conflicts they seek to resolve. This has led to pessimism concerning "perceptions about the sincerity of the agenda setting and neutral role of the civil society".[117]

Yet, Harbeson insists that NGOs provide the key to sustained political reform, conflict (structural) resolution, legitimate states and governments, viable state - society and state - economy relationships, and ultimate prevention of political failures.[118] With this noble duty, the challenge for NGOs is probably to ensure continuous improvement, re-invention and re – energization, which would then enable sustainable standard-setting, dialogue supporting and community mobilisation of community and other resources for peace building and reconciliation.[119]

2.03 The Sierra Leonean Conflict and NGOs' Peace Building Efforts.

Three decades after gaining independence in 1961, Sierra Leone found itself embroiled in a brutal Civil War as a rebel movement; the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) engaged three successive governments in fierce violent conflicts. This conflict turned violent when RUF fighters attacked Bomaru in Kaitahun District from Liberian territory in March 1991, with the implicit support of President Charles Taylor.[120] Although RUF initially seemed to target Joseph Momoh's dictatorial and long one-party

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[115] *ibid* Abdel p. 135
[116] *op cit* Abiew & Keating pp. 104-106
[117] *op cit* Mwagiru & Mutie p. 149
[118] J. Harberson, "Civil Society and Political Renaissance in Africa" in Harbeson et al, *Civil Society and the State in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1994)
[119] *op cit* Mwagiru & Mutie p. 150.
[120] T. Abdullah, "Introduction", in Abdullah ed. *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004), p. 2

regime, the internal conflict would soon assume an organic life of its own, similar to other African cases like Uganda (1979-86), Sudan (1973-2005), and Congo DR (1999-2005).[121]

Although the violent opposition to Momoh's rule could initially be attributed to civil disobedience and rebellion brought about by a long period of bad governance and misrule, state complexity and systemic corruption would help perpetuate the conflict. Corrupt and unprofessional Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) often collaborated with RUF militias to prolong the war and benefit from illegal gold and diamond mining.[122] This internal conflict and subsequent failure of state organs and systems was deeply entrenched that in 1997 RUF and Major Koroma's Armed Forces Ruling Council jointly fought Tejan Kabbah's democratically elected Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) government.

The reconciliation and peace building process would expectedly draw in internal and external, formal and non-formal actors, as the long Civil War resulted into complicated economic and socio-political structural conflicts. As the hurting conflict drew frustration and desperations in the late 1990s, western powers and NGOs compromised long - term real peace objectives to end the violence by drafting the 1999 Lome Peace Accord, which elevated RUF's Foday Sankoh and Johnny Koroma to Chairman of Diamond Management Committee And Chairman Committee to Consolidate Peace, respectively.[123]

Some of the local NGOs which fought the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) which came to power after the May, 1997 *coup* include Sierra Leone Labour Congress (SLLC), National Union of Sierra Leone Students (NUSS), Women's Peace Movement (WPM), and Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAT). SLAT sustained a media campaign underlined by the rallying call, freedom and liberty is only possible within a democratic constitution and the realms of rule of law.[124] By bravely opposing the ruling junta and upholding the public view of the sanctity of a democratically elected government, SLAT shaped and reflected the dissenting public opinion.

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[121] *ibid* Abdullah p. 3.
[122] *ibid* Abdullah p. 4.
[123] O. Gordon, "Civil Society Against the State: The Independent Press and the AFRC-RUF Junta", in Abdullah, *Between Democracy and Terror* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004) pp 180-196: p. 181.
[124] *ibid* Gordon p.187

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It is imperative to note that post-conflict peace building and reconciliation work is often confronted by many challenges, which may be surmounted by adopting an inclusive and multilateral approach. In such a setting state institutions may partner with non-state organisations to seek long - term solutions to incompatibilities. In a failed state, the said state institutions are non-existent and the state cannot therefore undertake its peace building role and functions. According to Zartman, this situation arises when the state is unable to perform its most basic functions of protecting the lives and properties of its citizens against internal and external aggression, or even controlling the exploitation and use of state resources.[125]

Considering that for ten years, consecutive governments were unable to neutralise RUF, and rebel government solders (nicknamed sobels) openly colluded and collaborated with rebels and militias to loot prime resources like gold and diamonds, Sierra Leone then exhibited qualities of a failed State as postulated by Zartman. President Kabbah had to rely on the militia groups like Kamajors and private security companies (or mercinaries) like Executive Outcomes, to hang on to power.[126] In such a political and governance scenario, post - conflict peace building understandably faces numerous systematic challenges.

As Joseph Momoh's All Peoples Congress (APC) could not provide the much needed executive leadership in managing this deadly conflict, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), UN and Commonwealth peace initiatives also failed as RUF remained disinterested and suspicious to mediators and the whole peace process. Amidst all this gloom, International Alert, a London based conflict resolution NGO personally connected to Sankoh and his friend (Liberian president) Taylor, was able to exploit its informal set up, strengths, and networks to engage the warring parties. International Alert however lost its neutrality to the conflict as one of its senior officers called Ayaaba Addai-Sebo joined RUF as Sankoh's advisor and "warned RUF against dealing with imperialist organisations like the UN and the Commonwealth."[127]

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[125] W. Zartman: *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, Co. Lynne Reinner, 2004) p. 5

[126] Se, A. Abraham ,"The Elusive Quest for Peace: From Abidjan to Lome" in Abdullah ed. *Between Democracy and Terror*, pp. 199-208

[127] *ibid* Abraham p. 202

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The UN and other international actors however pushed on with the process, leading to the February 1996 election of Kabbah and SLPP to power, and the November, 1996 Abidjan Peace Accord. The signing of this Accord was the culmination of a desperate peace process which failed to focus on truth, justice and forgiveness as the long - term desirable goals. Instead, it sought to reach a settlement that would stop the physical violence by appeasing Sankor and RUF with lucrative and prestigious positions. This Peace Accord protected RUF and the military National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from any restorative or retributive justice as it was silent on truth, justice, and reconciliation.[128] Apart from detaining Major Karomah, Sankoh (in Nigeria) and other few RUF/AFRC leaders, no comprehensive long term measures were taken to resolve the now deeply entrenched structural causes of the conflict. The structural conflict would then be triggered into a violent one in January 1999 when AFRC and RUF, supported by neighbouring Liberia's president Taylor, attacked Freetown. Within days, more than 3,000 children were missing and over 5,000 people reported dead.[129]

The July 1999 Lome Agreement was again kind and inclusive to RUF as it was allocated 4 ministerial posts and Sankoh was made the Chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development. A Truth Commission was proposed without provision for justice or punishment to the RUF. NGOs condemned the Lome Agreement for providing unconditional amnesty to RUF as a violation of international humanitarian law and a case of "peace without justice".[130] Although virtually excluded from the peace process, NGOs supported the Kabbah government but strongly opposed any power sharing arrangements with the RUF/AFRC. Towards the Leone agreement however, the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL) was instrumental in initiating dialogue with the RUF and Charles Taylor of Liberia, and continued to play a supporting role in the implementation of the agreement.[131]

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[128] *ibid* Abraham pp. 205-210

[129] *ibid* Abraham p. 211

[130] *ibid* Abraham p. 213

[131] F. Kaikai, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration in Post-war Sierra Leone, in A. Ayissi ed. *Bound To Cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone* (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2000) p. 123.

On the sidelines of all the agreements however, various CSOs were very instrumental in mobilizing, shaping and propagating public opinion in favour of peace, justice and democratization. The IRCSL in particular stood out as an effective NGO bridge builder between the government, warring factions and a war-ravaged population. Representing Muslims (mainly) and Christians (20%) it mobilised churches and mosques to preach against violence but also reconciliation for all, as it remained neutral to the conflict but supportive of the mediation process.[132]

Achievements of the Peace Process

Within a year of the end of the Civil War, Sierra Leone established a positive record by achieving a growth rate of 6%, and inflation rate of 0%. Over 300,000 IDPs and refugees were resettled and more than 70,000 combatants disarmed and demobilized.[133] The government also committed itself to addressing long - term developmental challenges, like social inclusion issues, good governance, decentralisation, equity and sustainable growth through private sector partnership and reviving agriculture and mining sectors.[134]

Although the Lome Agreement was criticised by NGOs for not serving any form of justice against the perpetrators of violence and other forms of injustices, it provided for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC was mandated to record violations of human rights and humanitarian law, to address impunity, to assist the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation, and to prevent a repetition of the abuses. A separate Special Court was later proposed to try those bearing the greatest responsibility for the abuses.[135]

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[132] T. Turay, *Civil Society ad Peace building: The Role of the Inter-religious Council of Sierra Leone*, Internet Site: www.c-r.org/accords/s-leone accessed August 2010.
[133] The World Bank, *Peace Recovery and Development in Sierra Leone* (New York, The World Bank Group, 2004)
[134] *ibid*, The World Bank , 2004
[135] *op cit* Abraham p.217

Major Challenges

As already noted in this chapter, this peace process expectedly faced major challenges, partly attributable to the extensive use of brutal violence and terror during the 10 - years Civil War.

According to the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSU) the rebel incursion into Freetown in January 1999 resulted into about 6,000 deaths, at least 2,000 of whom were civilians. [136] Systematic rape and other forms of sexual abuse would need long term psycho-social intervention. Up to 200,000 people were displaced in and around Freetown, as thousands sought refuge in Guinea and other neighbouring countries. About 90% of buildings were destroyed in Freetown. ECOMOG forces and Civilian Defence Forces (CDF) supporting president Kabbah also committed human rights violations but in a smaller scale. [137]

The country may therefore easily address economic and general infrastructural reconstruction but psycho - social, cultural and personal violence aftermath issues proved quite challenging to the NGO fraternity in the entire process.

2.04 An Overview of the Liberian Conflict and NGOs' Peace Building Efforts

Liberia was established as an independent republic in 1847 after it became a centre for freed slaves from America in 1821. Although the 197, 754sq. km area now known as Liberia, was already inhibited by several ethnic groups, descendents of freed slaves referred to as "Americo-Liberians" would dominate the country's political and economic realms for more than a century. Thus, economic, political and social injustices had a long and deep history by the time the country was engulfed by violent conflicts. Incompatibilities among the Liberian communities were deeply entrenched when in 1980, army Master Sergeant Samuel Doe led a bloody *coup*, in which president William Tolbert was killed.

Although Doe's *coup* was widely accepted as a justified way of purging the dominant and overbearing minority Americo-Liberian *elite*, he favoured his Krahn ethnic

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[136] Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Recommendations to the International Contact Group in Sierra Leone,* (New York, 1999) p.2
[137] *ibid,* Amnesty International p. 4

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group as his ethnic and ruthless regime intensified the conflicts between indigenous groups in search of state power.[138]

As the case was in neighbouring Sierra Leone (discussed in preceding sections above) what started as a struggle for good governance and justice had now taken dangerously divisive, emotional and often illogical ethnic conflict dimensions. An attempted *coup* in 1985 saw Doe government's forces kill about 3,000 Mano and Gio civilians.[139] Continued persecution of rival ethnic groups by Doe's regime galvanised other ethnic groups and opposing forces into forming the Charles Taylor- led National Patriotic Force of Liberia (NPFL). In 1989, Taylor – a former government minister - backed by Gio and Mano ethnic groups, launched a guerrilla war against Doe.[140]

Doe had previously successfully resisted several *coup* attempts during his turbulent rule. However, desperate victims of his unjust and ethnic government joined Taylor's campaign in large numbers and soon they captured Monrovia.[141] But Taylor's campaign expectedly increased the level of ethnic divisions among Liberians, in addition to escalating the political and humanitarian crises not only in Liberia but the entire region. This state of affairs partly informed the Nigeria-led ECOWAS Cease – Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) humanitarian intervention. By this time, the civil strife had claimed about 5,000 lives and turned almost half of the country's population into IDPs and refugees.[142]

The ECOMOG intervention force managed to keep NPFL/ INPFL forces at bay, and established an interim government but Doe was captured in 1991 and killed by Prince Johnson's INPFL.

Post-conflict Peace Building and Reconciliation

Liberia's vast mineral resources like diamond and gold played a crucial role in fuelling and prolonging the conflict. In fact, the Liberian case shares a lot of similarities

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[138] E. Berman & K. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (Geneva, UNIDIR, 2000). P. 83

[139] H. Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping", in E. Michael et al (eds.) *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997) p.3

[140] L. Schuster, "The Final Days of Dr. Doe", *Granta*, No. 48, (Summer 1994), p.66

[141] *ibid*, Schuster pp. 67-68

[142] C. Bassey, "Nigeria and Regional Security in the West African Sub-Region: Lessons from Monrovia", in *Nigerian Forum*, January - February 1994, vol. 14 Nos 1-2

with the Angola, Sierra Leone, and Congo DRC conflicts, where control over natural resources like timber, water bodies and minerals helped to finance various factions and parties engaged in the conflict.[143] Managing this conflict and the post-conflict peace building work would therefore never be easy.

The peace process begun in 1990, with the intervention of ECOMOG. With the passing of resolution 866, the UN stepped in through the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMN) in September 1993 to assist ECOMOG implement the Cotonou Peace Agreement.[144] This process however proved more intense and dynamic than envisaged as it went beyond 2002. As Taylor and the National Patriotic Party won over 75% of the votes in the July 1997 elections, government agencies could not support NGOs' peace building and reconciliation efforts since the government was busy fixing internal weaknesses and dealing with armed insurgency and banditry.

Among other challenges, disarmament of combatants and reintegration child soldiers, took a big chunk of the peace building and reconciliation process. Out of the estimated 60,000 fighters involved in the conflict, UNICEF estimated that 10% were children under 15 years while 20% were between 15 and 17 years.[145] A Liberian NGO, Children's Assistance Programme (CAP) was one of the main organizations which ran rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. The crucial contribution of such NGOs in the peace building process was limited by the government's restrictions and controls. For instance, President Taylor's Kiss-FM was the only countrywide radio FM station. Media control laws enacted during Doe's reign served to constrain the social and political spaces left for NGOs to contribute to the peace building process. In spite of this government hostility, a few NGOs ran justice and peace programmes, like the Catholic Peace and Justice Commission. Together with other women's organisations it helped an estimated 25,000 women who had been raped and abused during the conflict, by availing legal and psycho – social support.[146]

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[143] United Nations, *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, Report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Security Council,* 16th April, 1998.
[144] R. Hay, *Peace-building During Peace Support Operations: A Survey and Analysis of Recent Missions.* (Canada, DF ATT, 1999) p. 7
[145] Human Rights Watch/Africa, *Easy Prey: Child Soldiers in Liberia,* 1994. p. 2
[146] O. Agbu, "Sub – regional Dynamics of the Resurgent Conflicts in Liberia", in Nigeria Forum, Vol. 23. Nos. 9-10 (2002) p. 275.

Peace building Achievements

As noted above, a few NGOs operating in difficult and hostile environments managed to counsel and reintegrate sexually abused women. CAP and UMCEF rehabilitated former child soldiers although it was not conclusively done.

Political and economic reforms supported by the UN and several economically developed States, like the USA contributed to the October 2005 democratic ascendancy to power of Ellen Sirleaf Johnson - the first women president in Africa. A national debt burden which stood at $3 billion at one point has also been lessened.

Failures and Challenges

Disarming, rehabilitation and reintegration of rebels and child soldiers stood out as a great challenge to the players in the peace building process. Long after fighting was stopped in 1996, renewed rebel activities were reported in 2002, probably to serve as a reminder of the incomplete peace building work.[147] Reigning in of rebel units, disarmament and ensuring security in all parts of the country after such a long and violent conflict is understandably challenging.

Considering that this conflict was largely militarized and necessitated a largely military response through ECOMOG and UNOMIL, one appreciates the minimal role played by NGOs in peace building. Moreover, successive NGO – hostile and restrictive regimes discouraged potential national and international NGOs from venturing into the peace process. Yet, as Annan observes, the dominant role of informal actors in any peace process should not disregard the noble role of NGOs in sustainable peace building:

> "Even though states remain the building blocks of the international system, there are real limits to what states can achieve on their own, particularly in our era of globalisation and interdependence.....networks of non-governmental organisations now embrace.....every level of organisation from the village community to global summits - and almost every sector of public life."[148]

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[147] *ibid* Agbu p. 278.
[148] P. Tongeren et al (eds), *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), preface.

CHAPTER THREE: CARE-INTERNATIONAL (KENYA) AND PEACE BUILDING IN KIBERA.

3.01 Introduction

This chapter shifts the spotlight to the core subject of this study namely; the role played by Care - International (Kenya) in peace building and reconciliation in Kibera following the 2007 - 2008 election - related violence in Kibera. In determining the contribution of this NGO in the engaging and multi-sectored work of peace building[149], this study will also be exploring and recommending possible Governmental – Nongovernmental partnership areas in peace building.

3.02 Brief Profile of Kibera

Kibera is a slum or informal settlement located just about 5 kilometres away from the Nairobi city centre. "Kibera" is a corruption of the Nubian word 'Kibra' which means forest. While discussing this informal settlement one has to highlight the historical connection between Kibera and the Nubian community (or tribe).

Kibera's history as an informal settlement dates back to colonial Kenya when Sudanese fighters from the Nubian community who had fought alongside the British army in the World War I, were rewarded by being settled in a vast land adjacent to present day Ngong road and Mbagathi way. Then, the area was deemed unproductive and of lower value by the colonial authorities compared to prime settlement and agricultural areas like present day Karen, Dagoretti and Westlands, among others.[150] This gesture of goodwill by the colonial authorities was however never formalised. The first independent Kenya government also never formalised the land offer to the Nubians. Meanwhile, as rural-urban migration begun in earnest and the demand for affordable housing increased, many low - income workers found their way to Kibera. Moreover, the government initiated some planning and formal housing projects, most of which ended up displacing

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[149] See J. P. Lederach, "Civil Society and Reconciliation", in Crocker et al, *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 2007)

[150] Mwangala J. M., Interview with Sebit Yusuf, Nubian Elder, Kibera D. O's Office, October, 2010.

many Nubians as they were alienated from what they held as their rightful and historical settlement.[151]

Rapid urbanisation and population increase in Nairobi suburbs, coupled with government housing projects in Kibera which produced housing estates like Jamuhuri, Karanja, Fort Jesus, Olympic and Ayany Estates - and acquisition of land for public utilities like hospitals, offices, schools and law courts – then laid the roots of what would later turn out to be complicated conflicts revolving around land use, access and ownership rights, poverty and ethnicity in Kibera.[152]

Currently, Kibera is settled by various ethnic groups but the majority are Nubians, Luos, Kikuyus, Kambas and Luhyas although members of other ethnic groups like the Mijikenda, Taita , Kalenjin, Borana, Somali, Maasai are also settled in this affordable and conveniently located informal settlement.[153] These communities live in small units (called villages) which make up the big informal settlement known as Kibera. The ethnic settlement pattern is often mixed but some villages are dominated by particular groups. For example, Makina is home to Nubians, Gatwikera and Kisumu Ndogo villages are dominated by Luos, Laini Saba and Soweto East villages are mostly inhibited by Kikuyus and Kambas, whereas Kichinjio "belongs" to Luhyas.[154]

Politically, although Kibera may be seen to fall under Orange Democratic Party (ODM) and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, the mixed ethnic settlement coupled with structural poverty and deeply rooted historical issues, combine to present a very dynamic political scenario. Whereas Luos would belong to Odinga's ODM, Kikuyus and Kambas are aligned to the Party of National Unity (PNU) coalition, whereas Luhyas and Nubians portray a divided allegiance to both ODM and PNU.[155] This political fluidity combined with a mass of poor, idle and desperate youth, has often resulted into heightened tension and actual physical violence in Kibera. Indeed, the area was hardly hit in the post-2007

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[151] Kibra Land Committee (KLC), *Memorandum on Nubian Land Presented to Lands Minister.* Nairobi, 2009.

[152] Mwangala J.M. Interview with Mr. Gore Mohammed, Makina Councillor and former KLC Secretary, Kibra, May 2010.

[153] Located about 5 kilometres from Nairobi city centre, Kibera slum is affordable and convenient to lower cadre civil servants working in the several government Departments in the city, whereas poorly paid casual labourers in the nearby Industrial Area also reside here.

[154] See R. Onyango, *Conflict in Kibera: An Analysis for Care Kenya* (Nairobi: Care-International in Kenya, 2009) pg 6-7

[155] *ibid,* Onyango p.6. Supported by my personal observation while working in Kibera Division

elections violent conflict and was categorised as a hot spot in the run up to the 2010 Kenya Referendum on the proposed constitution.[156]

A larger part of Kibera is today packed with small and unplanned temporary houses and structures. It lacks basic infrastructural services like roads, sewerage system, formal electricity and water supplies. This area is currently made up of four administrative locations namely, Kibera, Sarangombe, Mugumoini and Lainisaba, three of which fall under Kibera Division. It is not clear how many villages make up Kibera slum because newer ones keep cropping up, but there are thirteen main and well known villages: - Kambi, Lainisaba Makina, Kisumu Ndogo, Gatwikera, Soweto West, Soweto East, Kianda Mashimoni, Lainisaba, Silanga, Raila and Kichinjio.[157]

The population of Kibera slum is shrouded in controversy. Whereas previous surveys by some institutions reported that the slum is inhibited by approximately 1 million people, the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census surprised many residents, NGOs and other interested parties when it came up with a figure of 120,000 people.[158] Poverty levels are high[159] with more than 70% living in congested and dirty environs, in addition to living on less than a dollar per day. Suppressed demand forces have however led to the thriving of the "kadogo economy", a market situation whereby high demand for household items in smaller units is prevalent.

3.03 Outline of Care-International's OVC Integrated Program.

In order to put Care-International's Kibera peace project into perspective, a brief outline of its Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC) Integrated Program is imperative. This is one of Care-International's Urban Programs. Similar programs are run in the informal, urban settlements of Kisumu in Nyanza Province. The OVC Program falls under Care-International (Kenya)'s Health and HIV/AIDS Sector, and is operated in an

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[156] See CIPEV (Waki) Report (Nairobi, 2008). Violence was mainly between Kikuyu "landlords" and Luo and Luhya tenants, leading to death, destruction of property and internal displacements (IDPs).
[157] op cit Onyango p. 6
[158] See Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census (Nairobi: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2010) p. 34.
[159] Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Basic Report on well-being in Kenya (Nairobi: KNBS, 2007) p. 51

area considered to be one of the largest urban informal settlements in Africa, with a HIV/AIDs prevalence of 17-20%.[160]

Widespread low income levels, poverty, hopelessness and idleness contribute to high levels of physical violence and communal or group insecurity, as postulated by the Peace Research paradigm.[161] This state of affairs combines to build into several conflicts which are easily trigged into full - blown violent conflicts. Once triggered, the conflicts often understandably take on ethnic and or political dimensions.[162]

The first project under the OVC Integrated Program was Local Links Project for OVC Support, initiated in April 2004. This six-year project with a budget of $2,808 556 was later followed by three main projects as the Integrated Program widened its horizons while adapting and responding to issues of concern, and challenges.[163] Moreover, the adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to issues by Care-International necessitated the program's expansion. The projects which followed the initial one are: Sweetening Justice for Vulnerable Women, Children and PLWHAS, Innovation Through Sport (ITSPLEY), and Building a Network of Peace (B-NEP).[164]

An analysis of these projects' goals, objectives and activities clearly shows a desire by Care - International (Kenya) to offer humanitarian assistance, psycho-social support and socio-economic development. The local community would be facilitated to develop and strengthen their systems and organisational capacities, so that they may achieve their desired long term goals. For instance, the main objectives of the Local Links Project were to strengthen the economic coping mechanisms of OVC families and strengthening the capacity of local organisations to meet the needs and rights of orphans and vulnerable children, through economic empowerment, capacity building of Community Based Organisation (CBOs), reduction of stigma and discriminations against people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) and their families.[165]

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[160] See Care - International (Kenya), *OVC Integrated Programme Presentation*, Nairobi, 24th November, 2010

[161] Refer to this study's Conceptual Framework in chapter one

[162] *op cit* Onyango pp. 14-16

[163] Mwangala J.M. Interview/Discussion with Oscar Munyao, Care - International (Kenya) Program Co-ordinator, Kibera Field Office, March 2011.

[164] *op cit* Care - International (Kenya), 24th November, 2010

[165] *ibid* Care - International (Kenya)

Sweetening Justice for Vulnerable Women, Children and PLWHA Project "was initiated to address gaps realized in the first OVC project - human rights violations to the OVCs and their care-givers."[166] In addition to OVCs, this project would also capture the salient concerns of vulnerable women, OVC care-givers, and PLWHA, by adopting the following short-term and long term strategies:

> "Strengthening the capacity of CBOs and local (grass roots) law enforcements structures; to support community structures and systems to facilitate referrals and review cases of violations; facilitate vulnerable and marginalised groups to access necessary legal and social-economic services; advocate for enforcement of national and international laws and policies that secure the rights of women, children and PLWHA; raise awareness one existing national/international laws and policies."[167]

Care- International's Innovation through Sport (ITSPLEY) Project aimed at empowering the youth to pursue their socio-economic advancement to the fullest, and promoting community leadership by identifying and developing, leadership capacities of the youth in Kibera. The project's conceptualisation was influenced mainly by the hopelessness, desperation and biting poverty among the youth – a situation which frequently exposed them to abuse by irresponsible politicians and selfish local leaders.[168]

As anticipated, the OVC Integrated Program initiated in April 2004 entailed various activities whose successful implementation would call for partnership, and co-operation between the Kibera community, relevant government Departments, and Care - International. Due to the organisation of the Kenyan government structure, some relevant agencies could not play their meaningful part in the implementation of this program. For example, due to lack of representation at the District level, the State Law Office and the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs could not complement the justice and human rights components of this program.

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[166] *ibid* Care - International (Kenya)
[167] *ibid* Care - International (Kenya)
[168] Mwangala J. M. Interview with Grace Wachuka, Project Officer Care International (Kenya), Kibera, February 2011.

The OVC Integrated Program was firmly on course when political and election-related tensions culminated into a full-blown violent conflict with the announcement of the 2007 Presidential Election results. Kibera has been identified as one of the areas that first experienced physical violence during the conflict.[169] As the case has been in other conflict areas[170], Care-International and other NGOs like Medicins San Frontiers already operating here were (understandably) better placed to mount emergency and humanitarian operations in Kibera as the conflict intensified, taking different dimensions. Whereas NGOs not based in Kibera, like Kenya Red Cross Society and World Vision had to terminate their activities with the end of emergency operations, those based in Kibera like Care-International (Kenya) and Jamii Bora Trust[171] with long-term development and social transformation agenda, pressed on - but with some program reviews and adjustments. That is how Care-International (Kenya) came up with the Building a Network of Peace Project (B-NEP) in Kibera.

hat had started as a dispute over the Presidential Election results triggered deeply rooted and historical incompatibilities, which threatened not only Kibera's social fabric but also the achievements and progress of the OVC Integrated Program. Care-International therefore realised that their long-term objectives of empowering OVCs, PLWHA and other vulnerable groups (economically and socially) would not be realised unless the simmering conflict was positively transformed.

3.04 Building a Network of Peace Project (B-NEP): An Overview.

The diverse conflicts which had been experienced by various communities in Kenya since independence,[172] may have contributed to what would come to be known as the Post-2007 Election Violence. Violence was witnessed in several parts of the country

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[169] *op cit,* Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence Report, in Nairobi province, suspicion and acrimony between Kikuyu landlords and Luo and Luhya tenants in Kibera, Kawangware, Dandora and Pipeline Estate (Embakasi) boiled into violent expressions. Other affected areas are Mathare North, Lucky Summer, Quarry, Babadogo, etc.

[170] F. Abiew & T. Keating "Defining a Role for Civil Society: Humanitarian NGOs and Peacebuilding Operations", in Keating and Knight, eds. *Building Sustainable Peace* (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2004) pp. 95-99

[171] Jamii Bora Trust runs savings and credit schemes targeting small income earners in Kibera, and other slums. The Trust funded reconstruction of business premises and markets after the physical violence stopped with the signing of the National Accord.

[172] See M. Omosa et al, *Theory and Practice Governance in Kenya: Towards Civic Engagement* (Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 2006) pp. 51-88

but mostly in Rift Valley, Nairobi, Nyanza, Western, Central and Coast Provinces. According to the CIPEV report, a total of 1,133 people died as a consequence of the violence. A total of 117,216 private properties were destroyed, while 491 government properties were destroyed. About 350,000 people were internally displaced (IDPs) and ended up in camps whereas a further 300,000 IDPs were integrated in host families.[173]

Disruption of economic systems resulted into the collapse of livelihood sources, shortage of basic food items, displacement and concentration of people in particular areas. It spelt even harsher challenges for the already struggling families in slums like Kibera. According to Care-International (Kenya), some of the hardest hit groups in Kibera included households headed by females, children, the elderly, PLWHA, the injured and the sick.[174]

Care-Kenya's internal response structure entailed the creation of an emergency response team consisting of Head Office staff and Field-based (Kibera) staff. This team held daily emergency meetings focusing on security and program support to the emergency response work. The response focused on quick access to established partnerships with community members, like minded NGOs, CBOs and Government agencies in Kibera. The structure previously established by the OVC Program was mainly relied upon to move the B-NEP Project forward in the initial stages. Adjustments and adaptations would later be made where necessary. Partner CSOs previously involved in the Local Links and Sweetening Justice Projects, were mobilised to form the core of a network of local and grass roots CBOs, NGOs, FBOs, youth and women groups.[175]

B-NEP Goals

The B-NEP project had short-term objectives and long-term desired goals. In the short-term, the project administered emergency relief and humanitarian operations targeting integrated IDPs, people in conflict areas, and IDPs in informal camps within the slum e.g. in Informal/Community Schools, Churches, Police Posts and the Kibera District

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[173] *op cit* CIPEV Report (findings on violence)
[174] Care - International (Kenya), *An Overview of Building a Network of Peace Project in Kibera*, Nairobi 16th April, 2008 p. 1
[175] *ibid*, Care International (Kenya) pp. 2 - 4

Officer's office. The emergency response distributed food, household items, clothes and food vouchers to 6,258 households / families in Kibera.[176]

With the prevailing relative calm following the signing of the National Accord, the B-NEP project now sought to address medium-term as well as long-term needs and desired changes among the people of Kibera. The project would pursue the broader goal of realising harmony, peace and reconciliation by developing, strengthening and facilitating local CSOs to prevent an outbreak of new violence, but also pursue peace and reconciliation.

Project Activities and Priorities

The project had the following four broad activities; extending psycho-social support to those affected by the post-election violence; civic education support to local communities and organisations; advocacy and lobbying of government and other relevant institutions involved in the national peace building process; capacity building of local CSOs for long term engagement in comprehensive peace building and reconciliation.[177]

Some of the priority areas of this project were: trauma processing, peaceful resolution of disputes at community level, support and capacity building of traditional and grassroots leadership structures, and promotion of peace ambassadors tasked with development and propagation of localised and appropriate peace messages. The project's entry point was envisaged to be the established network of local CBOs working under Care-International (Kenya)'s OVC Integrated Program, and the local Provincial Administration.

According to Onyango, most of the conflicts in Kibera could be described as multi-causal but the main causes are structural in nature, namely: land ownership, tenancy laws, poverty, ethnicity, corruption, and urbanisation.[178] Considering this structural nature of conflicts in Kibera, more time would be required to positively transform such conflicts. Moreover, the crucial role of the State in such an undertaking necessitates a strategic and long-term partnership between it and NGOs. However, as

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[176] *ibid*, pp.6-7
[177] *ibid*, p. 8
[178] *ibid*, Onyango, pp. 11-12

demonstrated by Lederach, different types of actors normally play important and complementary roles at different levels and using different approaches.[179] The figure below[180] gives a graphical presentation of the said complementary roles of different types of peace building actors at different levels:

[179] J.P. Lederach, "Civil Society and Reconciliation", in Crocker et al. *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 2001) pp 841-854: p 843-847

[180] J. P. Lederah, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, J.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997) p. 39

Figure 3.01: Different peace building actors at different levels.

Types of Actors	Approaches to building peace
Level 1: Top leadership military/political/religious/leaders with high visibility	Focus on high level negotiations. Emphasises cease fire. led by highly visible, single mediator.
Level 2: Middle range leadership leaders respected by sectors Ethnic /Academic/ humanitarian leaders (NGOs)	Problem solving workshops training in conflict resolution peace commissions insider – partial team
Level 3: grassroots leadership. Local leaders of indigenous NGOs. Community developers. Refugee camp leaders	Local peace commissions grassroots training prejudice reduction psychosocial work

Few — Affected Population — Many

Although Lederach's prescription may be seen to give a clear demarcation of roles by various actors, conflicts are known to be dynamic and organic. Often, a variety of initiatives by different types of actors run concurrently in a complicated web of interactions. This necessarily occurs as the negotiation process reacts and adjusts to issues and changes in conflict setting, parties, constituents, and allies.[181] Lederach's

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[181] M. Mwagiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theory Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi, Centre for Conflict Research, 2006) pp. 113-116

approach referred to above is therefore often amended accordingly to suit particular and unique contextual situations.

In addition to the dynamics and challenges that come with partnerships between State actors and Non - state actors (like NGOs) in peace building, the Kibera peace building process had to deal with both the historical aspects and high dynamism of the issues and actors of this particular conflict scenario. Care International's B-NEP project was mainly a level 3 approach, according to Lederach's categorization explained above. Working through grassroots and local leaders of indigenous CSOs, the project purposed to avail psychosocial support and train community leaders and youth on attitude and behaviour change.

In conclusion, an analysis of the impact of this peace project brings to test, the supposed strengths and advantages of Care-International's B-NEP project as weighted against the challenges and limitations of peace building and reconciliation in Kibera. The B-NEP project's civic education support to local communities, psycho-social support, advocacy and lobbying, and local CBOs' capacity development and structure strengthening components, are assumed to have informed a positive change towards reconciliation, peace, harmony, and development in Kibera. However, the long history of a largely structural conflict laced with sporadic physical violence - and its link to national politics - combine to offer a formidable challenge.

Successful peace building would in this case depend on a proper, multi-sectored and comprehensive approach where State organs and agencies in Kibera collaborate and co-operate with relevant NGOs to pursue desirable and sustainable long-term goals.[182] In the said multi-sectoral approach, each and every actor should play their roles successfully. Whereas the State avails strategic legal, governance and administrative support, NGOs may bring to bear, their wealth of humanitarian support and development experience and knowledge, financial and material resources, time, and technical expertise. It is against this background that the contribution of Care-International (Kenya) in peace building in Kibera is being assessed. This study's conclusion and recommendations shall also be made with this conflict context in mind.

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[182] J. P. Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997) pp. 73-103.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

4.01 Introduction

This study examined the contribution of Care-International (Kenya) in peace building in Kibera between the year 2008 and 2010. It also aimed at identifying and recommending a better and viable formula through which the government of Kenya (GOK) may partner with international NGOs in long-term peace building work.

Chapter three gave a review and analysis of Care-International's Kibera peace project. It also described the setting and conflict scenario in which the said peace project was implemented. This chapter will now present the quantitative data which was analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), but with the support of, verification, collation and reference to qualitative data.[183]

4.02 Demographic Data

The researcher used probability sampling to administer questionnaires to three Ordinary Residents (man, woman and youth) in each of the 13 main villages, and six members of the Kibera Division Peace Committee.[184] Through purposive sampling, eight Assistant Chiefs were also administered with questionnaires. Structured interviews were held with all the three Chiefs of Kibera Division. The researcher had also purposed to interview the Langata District Commissioner (under whose watch Kibera falls) but could only interview his deputy, the D.O1. Unstructured interviews and discussions were also held with Care-International (Kenya) Emergency Sector manager, the Kibera OVC Integrated Program manager, as well as the B-NEP Project Officer, and leaders of five local Community Based Organizations (CBOs) which were the main partners of Care-International's Building a Network of Peace (B-NEP) project.

The researcher deliberately factored in duration of stay in Kibera, gender and age when administering questionnaires to the Ordinary Residents only. As the illustrations below clearly show, demographic concerns were never put into consideration while identifying respondents who would give information in their official capacity. Apart from

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[183] D. Kombo & D. Tromp, *Proposal and Thesis Writing* (Nairobi, Paulines Publications Africa, 2006) pp. 117-123.

[184] As already explained in the previous chapters, Kibera slum initially had 13 main villages but minor ones keep on mushrooming.

the case of the Ordinary Residents, gender and age would not be reflected in the responses of those giving information in their official capacity, for example the Provincial Administrators in Kibera, the Kibera Peace Committee members, and Care-International personnel.

In total, the researcher administered questionnaires to 53 respondents, and interviewed 13 respondents (1 District Officer, 3 Chiefs, 3 senior Care-International Officers, 5 CBO leaders, and the Deputy National Coordinator, National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC)).

Illustration 4.01: Sex of Respondents (Ordinary Residents)

Out of the 39 Ordinary Residents, Majority were youths as 35.9% fall under the 21-30 years age bracket, 33.3% are between 31-40 years old, whereas 5.2% are between 51 and 60 years old. Majority of them have resided in Kibera for more than 26 years (33.3%), followed by those who have been in Kibera for between 16 and 20 years (20.5%).

**Illustration 4.02:** Age of respondents (Ordinary Residents)

Illustration 4.03: For how long have you been an Ordinary Resident of Kibera?

4.03 Data Analysis and Presentation

Conflicts are highly prevalent in Kibera. Whereas the researcher observed a number of land-based conflicts between the SDA Church and World Lutheran Church (near Olympic estate), between Guadalupe Catholic Parish and a section of Makina village Muslims, between pro-Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme residents and those against it, between "landlords" (structure owners) and tenants, most of the respondents also answered in the affirmative when asked whether they had experienced any forms and types of conflicts in Kibera.

65

Out of the 39 Ordinary Residents, 84.6% have experienced conflicts in Kibera. All the 6 (100%) Kibera Division Peace Committee members have experienced conflicts. Similarly, all the 8 Assistant Chiefs (100%) have experienced conflict in Kibera, in one way or another.

In addition to maintaining law and order, and harmonization, coordination and implementation of government policies and programs at the grassroots level, all the Provincial Administrators (District Commissioner, District Officer, Chief, Assistant Chief) in Kibera affirmed that peace building and reconciliation is also one of their many core functions. However, when the researcher asked the Assistant Chiefs to list their core functions, none of them mentioned peace building. But when asked, "Do you have any role in peace building and reconciliation in Kibera?" 100% responded in the affirmative.

The Langata D.O 1 later clarified that although conflict management and peace building is a core function of the Department of Provincial Administration in the field, it is a relatively new function. Moreover, the Department often undertakes conflict management duties only in a reactive manner or in a crisis situation when some decisive action is inevitable.[185] Lack of resources, expertise and an unrealistically heavy work load has hindered regular, robust and proactive peace building by Provincial Administrators in Kibera. The Assistant Chiefs' response should thus be understood in that context.

Care-International's B-NEP project aimed at restoring peace and promoting co-existence among "communities affected by the post-election violence in Kibera."[186] Care-International (Kenya) intended to achieve this goal by working through a network of CBOs, local political leaders, Chiefs and other community leaders.[187] However, although all the Kibera Provincial Administrators reported to have been involved in peace building and reconciliation activities in Kibera, it was not in a uniform manner across the board. Even the Assistant Chiefs were engaged differently, as illustration 4.03 shows.

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[185] Interview with Ms Victoria Mutiso, Langata D.O 1, Langata DC's Office, August 4th, 2011.
[186] Interview with Mr. Oscar Munyao, Program Manager, Care-International's OVC Integrated Program, Kibera Field Office, August 23rd, 2011.
[187] ibid

Illustration 4.04: Involvement of Assistant Chiefs in B-NEP activities.

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Highly involved   Moderatley involved   Not involved

One of the main objectives of this study was to determine possible functions and roles of international NGOs like Care-International, in peace building in Kibera and the whole country. The researcher's other objectives were to assess the performance of Care-International's B-NEP project in Kibera, and consequently recommend a better and viable GOK-international NGOs peace building partnership for Kibera and Kenya in general.[188]

Out of the 39 Ordinary Residents, 87.2% believe that international NGOs can contribute to peace building and reconciliation in Kibera, while 12.8% are of the contrary view. 75% of the Assistant Chiefs held that Care-International (Kenya) was highly involved in peace building and reconciliation in Kibera during the period under study whereas 25% said it was only moderately involved. 84% of the Kibera Peace Committee members also said Care-International (Kenya) contributed to peace building and reconciliation in Kibera, as the charts below illustrate.

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[188] See "Research Questions" and "Research Objectives" in chapter one.

Illustration 4.05: Response of Kibera Division Peace Committee members, as to whether Care-International (Kenya) contributed to peace building in Kibera.


Illustration 4.06: Ordinary Residents interviewed acknowledged that Care-International (Kenya) contributed to peace building and reconciliation in Kibera.

The researcher also sought to establish the strengths, weaknesses and general performance of Care-International's B-NEP project. According to Ms Grace Wachuka, the B-NEP Project Officer, the project did well in spite of limited time and other

resources.[189] The project had targeted to establish a network of local peace CBOs which would then mobilize the community to own and further the on-going reconciliation and conflict prevention activities. However, the B-NEP project "managed to not only put in place the targeted network of peace CBOs but it also built the capacity of the network by registering it with relevant authorities, training member CBOs on conflict resolution approaches, promotion of dialogue among communities, civic education and proposal writing."

Ms. Wachuka's position is buttressed by the Ordinary Residents, Assistant Chiefs and the Kibera Peace Committee members. For instance, the Kibera Peace Committee said that Care-International (Kenya) did well in conflict resolution mechanisms by building a network of local peace CBOs, and putting up a case for, and preparing Kibera communities for a truth, justice and reconciliation process. As illustration 4.07 shows, the Kibera Peace Committee gave Care-International (Kenya) 40% for building a network of peace, and advocating for a truth, justice and reconciliation process, and 20% for psycho-social support. On the other hand, the Assistant Chiefs (illustration 4.08) felt that building a network of peace was well done (62.5%), followed by promotion of conflict resolution approaches (at 37.5%). As for the Ordinary Residents (illustration 4.09), the B-NEP project did well in addressing structural causes of conflict by initiating sustainable peace building through building a peace network, promoting truth, justice and reconciliation approaches, and empowering the residents economically.

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[189] Interview with Ms Grace Wachuka, B-NEP Project Officer, Kibera Field Office, August 26th, 2011.

Illustration 4.07: Care-International's performance by priority areas according to Kibera Peace Committee.

Legend:
- Psycho social support
- Truth justice and reconciliation
- Building a network for peace

Values shown: 20%, 40%, 40%

Illustration 4.08: Assistance Chiefs' response.

Legend:
- Conflict resolution
- Building a network of peace

Values shown: 38%, 62%

Illustration 4.09: Ordinary Residents' response.

The assessment of Care-International's peace project should however be contextualized. As explained in chapter three, most of the conflicts in Kibera are both structural and historical, a position supported by the analyzed data in this chapter. Addressing them successfully - and realization of positive peace - would therefore require more time, a conflict resolution approach (as opposed to dispute settlement) and involvement of all relevant players.[190]

According to Ordinary Residents, politics (29.7%), elections (24.3%) and rent (24.3%) are the leading causes of conflicts in Kibera. Nubian community leaders and Provincial Administrators in Kibera were unanimous that poor (or lack of) land tenure system, and divisive politics highly contributed to conflicts in Kibera. Members of the Peace Committee placed landlord-tenant differences (33.3%) as the leading source of conflict, followed by politics (22%) and resources (22%) as the other causes. The land question is at the centre of the landlord-tenant animosity. With time, the land issue as a crucial resource in Kibera became politicized even as the Nubian community cited their historical claim and right to land in Kibera.[191] All the responses above (politics and land

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[190] According to Lederach, peace (happiness) is realized when truth, justice, and mercy are simultaneously pursued successfully.
[191] The researcher observed strong, emotional and often violent expressions from the Nubian leadership whenever the land issue resurfaced in Kibera.

ownership, use and access) are however related and point to structural and deeply rooted conflicts.

Illustration 4.10: Sources of conflict in Kibera according to the Kibera Peace Committee


Illustration 4.11: Main causes of conflict in Kibera according to Ordinary Residents

Although most of the primary data and secondary data collected pointed to a need for co-operation, collaboration and even institutional partnership in peace building and reconciliation, the primary data collected in Kibera indicated that Care-International may not have successively engaged all the potential peace building partners appropriately. Out of the 39 Ordinary Residents who responded to the administered questionnaires, only 59% said the government of Kenya (GOK) supported Care-International's peace project in Kibera, 7.7% held a complete opposite position, whereas 33.3% said they did not know whether GOK supported the said project. The Kibera Division Peace Committee is a GOK structure created to mobilize the local community into long-term and strategic conflict management. Yet, a significant 33.3% said that the peace committee structure was not involved in any way in Care-International's B-NEP project.

Illustration 4.12: Was the Kibera Peace Committee structure involved in the Care-International (Kenya) peace project?

Illustration 4.13: Ordinary Residents' response as to whether the GOK supported Care-International's Kibera peace project.


Moreover, some of the challenges faced by the B-NEP project were regrettable, unnecessary and avoidable. The B-NEP project officer [192] disclosed that at some point, they received hostile treatment form the then chairman of the Langata District Peace Committee, and the District Officer. She however, quickly added that most of the Chiefs and their Assistants were supportive all through, whereas support from the incoming District Officer in the year 2009 was marvelous.

Most of the respondents were of the view that Care-International faced challenges from both within and outside, and that the local community and its leadership, the government and other peace NGOs, should have done more to support Care-International's worthy cause. The Kibera Peace Committee cited lack of resources (50%) as the main challenge faced by international peace NGOs in Kibera, contrary to what many studies have held. [193] Assistant chiefs gave lack of support from residents (62.0%) as the leading challenge with lack of resources standing at (38.0%). Ordinary Residents felt that poor mobilization mechanism (20%) limited resources (10%) and poor identification of strategic partners e.g. not involving youth (7%), were the leading challenges/ weaknesses faced by Care-International's B-NEP project.

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[192] *op cit* Interview with B-NEP Project Officer.
[193] See F. Abiew & T. Keating "Defining a Role for Civil Society", in Keating (eds) *Building Sustainable Peace* (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2009) pp. 93-117

74

Illustration 4.14: Challenges faced by Care-International's B-NEP project according to Kibera Peace Committee.

High expectations of financial benefits amongst the B-NEP project partners may have informed the view that lack of resources was the project's main problem. The Chiefs said that community leaders felt disappointed whenever they returned from peace seminars organized by Care-International with empty pockets. The B-NEP Project Officer[194] disclosed that as an organization, Care-International exercised strict financial discipline while implementing projects in partnership with communities. In an interview, Ms Muhonja (a leader of Kibera Women for Peace and Fairness), confessed that members of her CBO found it challenging to spend many hours spreading "the peace gospel deep in the slums only to return home tired, hungry and penniless."[195]

As expected, NGOs - and indeed Care-International - had their strengths, according to the data collected on the ground. It was frequently disclosed that Care-international's previous development projects in Kibera, and its emergency response immediately after the outbreak of post-election violence earned it trust, legitimacy and the image of a genuine, non-affiliated organization, which is neutral to the conflict.[196] According to the B-NEP Project Officer, it is their prior knowledge and contacts of partners in Kibera established through preceding projects, which largely contributed to their success.

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[194] *op cit*
[195] Interview with Ms F. Muhoja, Chairlady, Kibera Women for Peace and Fairness, Kibera D.O's Office, 23rd August, 2011.
[196] Interview with Ibrahim Maina, Chairman, Nairobi Dam Community Project, Kibera D.O's compound, 23rd August, 2011

Both the Assistant Chiefs and Kibera Peace Committee gave peace building skills/knowledge as Care-International's main strength (50%), followed by support from residents at 33.0% (Kibera Peace Committee), and support from the GOK at 25% (Assistant Chiefs).

Illustration 4.15: Strengths of Care-International's B-NEP project, according to Kibera Peace Committee.

Illustration 4.16: Strengths of Care-International's B-NEP project, according to Assistant Chiefs.

Both the secondary data and primary data collected in Kibera point to an uneasy relationship between GOK and international peace NGOs. In spite of that, a very strong message of partnership and multi-sectored approach in peace building in Kibera in particular and Kenya in general, came out of the findings. All the 6 (100%) Kibera Division Peace Committee members fully supported Governmental-Nongovernmental partnerships in peace building because "the government alone cannot realize sustainable peace and reconciliation in Kibera." 66.7% of the Peace Committee also strongly agreed (with 33.3% agreeing) that "international NGOs need the support of the GOK and the local community to secure sustainable peace in Kibera." 75% of the Assistant Chiefs strongly agreed (25% agreed) that "successful peace building depends on successful partnership between GOK agencies and peace NGOs." 83.3% of the Ordinary Residents strongly agreed that "Governmental-Nongovernmental partnerships in peace building in Kibera should be pursued" while 66.7% strongly agreed that "international NGOs need the support of the GOK and local community to attain sustainable peace in Kibera"

Care-International's Emergency Sector manager, Mr. Michael Adam was also emphatic that international NGOs "cannot do everything. After all, we are not here forever. We have to leave at some point."[197] On her part, the B-NEP Project Officer was categorical that what B-NEP did could have been best undertaken by the GOK, an organization with a clear peace building and conflict management mandate, "staying power" and long-term capacity. But, although the government is permanently present in Kibera it was evident - from both primary and secondary data collected - that the governments alone cannot successfully undertake long-term and sustainable conflict resolution and peace building. A case was therefore successfully put for comprehensive and sustainable peace building in Kibera - and other parts of Kenya experiencing conflicts - through viable GOK- international NGOs partnerships.

As illustration 4.17 shows, Care-International (Kenya) had valid roles in the Kibera peace building process. These roles may however be best undertaken through appropriate partnership with the GOK and other appropriate peace building stakeholders.

Illustration 4.17: Main peace building roles for Care-International in Kibera.

[197] Interview with Michael Adam, Care-International (Kenya) Emergency Sector Manager, Kibera DC ground, 23rd September, 2009

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.01 Introduction

This chapter summarizes the whole study, whose main driving force was the need to recommend a remedy to the problem of intermittent but persistent conflicts in Kibera and other parts of Kenya[198]. Although the research was based on Kibera as the case study, it was assumed that the Kibera case was a fair reflection of the problem obtaining in most parts of the country since independence[199].

The main objectives of this study were; to establish the role of Care-International (Kenya) in peace building and reconciliation in Kibera between the year 2008 and 2010, and to determine and recommend a viable peace building partnership between the government of Kenya (GOK) and international Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) for the Kibera peace building process and Kenya generally.

The researcher collected data from both secondary and primary sources using the following research methods and instruments: questionnaires, interviews, observation, literature review, and discussions.

The study's findings discussed in chapter four gave satisfactory answers to the research questions outlined in chapter one[200]. One of the main findings of the study was that, although it has been held that international NGOs command enormous financial and other material resources to be unleashed on development and peace projects, some of them are actually looking upon the State to part-finance their budgets, or complete the projects they (NGOs) initiated.

5.02 Summary of Main Findings

As stated above, the researcher used various methods to collect data and analyze it. This was done deliberately as a way of minimizing limitations and unreliability of some of the sources of data. For example, apart from the Provincial Administrators in Kibera and Care-International (Kenya) staff, most of the respondents were Kibera

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[198] See "Background to the Research problem" and "Problem statement" in chapter one
[199] See M. Omosa et al eds. Theory and Practice of Governance in Kenya: Towards civic engagement (Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 2006)
[200] *op cit*

79

residents. But since the researcher was aware that Kibera is also a market, work place, and alternative (second) home to some of the residents, efforts were made to verify data collected using the various complementary and supplementary methods.

The researcher also realized that Chiefs and their Assistants are transferable in Nairobi Province contrary to the practice in other seven provinces of Kenya. He was however able to contact those who had served in Kibera during the study period through the guidance of their immediate supervisors. "Youths" has an additional special meaning in Kibera. To quite a number of people in Kibera, "youths" refers to the extortionist, ready-for-hire criminal groups or gangs prevalent in Kibera, and not the people aged between 18 and 35 years. The researcher realized this misconception early enough and managed it accordingly

All the study objectives were satisfactorily achieved. The research findings established the gap which was filled by Care-International (Kenya) in the Kibera peace building process, as inadequate capacity of community based organizations (CBOs) engaged in conflict management in Kibera. Secondly, as illustrated in chapter four Care-International (Kenya) also advocated for a sustainable and long-term peace process by developing a network of peace building CBOs in Kibera, and also promoting the idea of truth, justice, forgiveness and reconciliation. These strategic and important roles had not been well addressed prior to the coming in of Care-International (Kenya).

In addition, the study was able to fairly assess the performance of Care-International's Building a Network of Peace (B-NEP) project in Kibera, which was a one year-project started in 2008. According to the B-NEP Project Officer, Ms. Grace Wachuka, the project's goal was to restore peace and harmony in Kibera following the post-election violence by establishing a network of local CBOs which would then own up and carry forward the healing and reconciliation process. Care-International's rationale was, the then simmering conflicts were structural and deeply rooted, yet the NGO had only one year and limited funds to contribute to the peace building process. A community centred approach was then the best option under the circumstances.

However, the project was extended by one year, and managed to not only have in place a network of peace CBOs in Kibera but also helped in registering, training and linking up the network with potential donors and partners. Moreover, 89% of the

Ordinary Residents polled believed that Care-International (Kenya) contributed to peace building in Kibera, whereas all the Provincial Administrators interviews (District Officer, Chiefs, Assistant Chiefs) affirmed that the contribution of Care-International (Kenya) and other international NGOs was significant. For instance, 75% of the Assistant Chiefs said that Care-International (Kenya) was highly involved in peace building in Kibera, whereas 83% of the Kibera Division Peace Committee said the international NGO contributed to peace building in Kibera, through its B-NEP project.

The study's hypotheses were also affirmed albeit with some qualification. All the respondents believed more peace would be realized in Kibera if more genuine, competent and resourceful NGOs supported the GOK's peace efforts. The Provincial Administrators in Kibera, and the Deputy Coordinator at the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC), Office of the President, were all of the feeling that peace building and conflict management has not been thorough in Kibera and Kenya as a whole – partly because of lower funding of relevant institutions and poor approaches. Care-International's Emergency Sector Manager, Mr. Michael Adam, confessed that limited resources were availed for the Kibera B-NEP project as adequate funds could not be mobilized in short notice. Moreover, it is a fact that resources are always limited. Thus Care-International advocated for a multi-sectoral, complementary and comprehensive approach as the solution to enduring structural conflicts[201].

5.03 Conclusion

In conclusion, the study reaffirmed the researcher's assumptions as stated in the problem statement and hypotheses contained in chapter one. However, although data analysis in chapter four made it apparent that Governmental–Nongovernmental partnership in peace building was both viable and desirable, the study also brought to the fore key issues that should interest policy makers, peace scholar and practitioners, communities affected by conflicts, and the general public.

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[201] Interview with Michael Adam, Emergency Sector Manager, Care-International, Kibera DC Grounds, 23rd september, 2009.

A considerable number of respondents criticized the manner in which international NGOs engage conflict parties in the peace process. Whereas some questioned the credibility of "rehabilitated" ex-combatants and leaders of outlawed groups mobilized by Care-International (Kenya) into the Kibera peace building process, other respondents were not happy with the practice of NGOs preferring to work with elderly community and political leaders at the expense of the idle and often explosive youths. According to Wilkister Ogolla, a volunteer Social Worker in the sprawling Kisumu Ndogo village of Kibera, since the youth are often used to carry out violence, it makes a lot of sense to involve them in peace building.

Grace Wachuka, the B-NEP Project Officer, agreed with Ms. Ogolla fully but added that international NGOs risked losing trust from the community for embracing youths with dubious backgrounds. Care-International (Kenya) indeed successfully engaged a criminal youth group (Gogo Boys) and transformed it into a resourceful group, complete with a new name (Youth Reformed)[202] and leadership recognized by the government and other development agencies in Kibera.

The NSC, as the institution mandated by the government to coordinate peace building and conflict management in the country, may therefore have to consider reviewing its mandate, mission and programmes in view of the above findings, more so complaints over the extortionist conduct of some Provincial Administrators and some District Peace Committee members, by Care-International (Kenya) personnel.

Finally, the study established that international NGOs also operate under resource constraints. In fact, some of them - like Care-International - would welcome financial support of any kind from the government and like-minded NGOs, whether national or international.

5.04 Recommendations

As already demonstrated above, international NGOs have a lot to contribute to the peace building process in Kibera, but also in the entire country. It is therefore recommended that the GOK should continue supporting and partnering international

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[202] Interview with Mr. Mohamed, Chairman Youth Reformed, Darajam, Kibera. 27th August 2011

NGOs in the peace building process. In addition, this study makes the following recommendations for fruitful partnerships and engagements:

i) The GOK should come up with a conflict management and peace building policy through a highly consultative and sincere process devoid of political pragmatism, which will then guide the work of peace building in Kenya.

ii) International NGOs should exercise extra care and caution while identifying and mobilizing community leaders and organizations for their community based peace building initiatives.

iii) Both the GOK and international NGOs should engage each other wholeheartedly and genuinely considering that they all need each other to succeed in the enormous and dynamic work of peace building.

iv) More studies should be done on Kibera's conflict scenario. It may be an urban informal settlement like Mathare, Mukuru and Korogocho, but the Kibera conflict situation seems to be very complicated and unique in some ways.

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_____ Interview with Mr. Adera, Chief, Lainisaba Location, Soweto East, Kibra, August, 2011

_____ Interview with Mr. Makotsi, Deputy Coordinator, National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Nairobi, September, 2011

KIBERA INFORMAL SETTLEMENT

11

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Introduction

A Master of Arts student at the Institute Of Diplomacy And International Studies is carrying out research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Conflict Management. The research title is "The Contribution of Care-International in Peace Building and Reconciliation in Kibera". The aim of this study is to assess the contribution of international NGOs in peace building in Kibera, the challenges faces and recommend solutions.

This questionnaire is administered to ordinary Kibera residents selected randomly, for academic purposes only. To maintain confidentiality, you may not indicate you name. Thank you in advance for your time and understanding.

SECTION A: Bio Data

1. What is your sex? Male [ ]   Female [ ]

2. What is your age? *Please tick one*

    10-20 [ ]   20-30 [ ]   31-40 [ ]
    41-50 [ ]   51-60 [ ]   60-70 [ ]

3. What is your level of formal education? *Please tick one*

    None at all   [ ]
    Primary education   [ ]
    Secondary education   [ ]
    College education   [ ]
    University education   [ ]

4. For how long have you been a Kibera resident? *Please tick one*

    0-5 years   [ ]   6-10 years [ ]   11-15 years   [ ]   16-20 years [ ]
    21-25 years [ ]   26-30 years [ ]   36 years and above [ ]

5. Have you experienced conflict in Kibera? Yes [ ]   No [ ]

6. What was the main cause of the conflict? tick one

    a). Land   [ ]

b). Rent   [ ]

c). Tribalism   [ ]

d). Politics   [ ]

e). Bad governance [ ]

f). Elections   [ ]

Other *specify* _____

SECTION B: Contribution of Care-International in Peace Building and Reconciliation in Kibera

7. Do international NGOs contribute to peace building and reconciliation in Kibera?

   Yes [ ]   No [ ]

8. Did Care International contribute to peace building and reconciliation in Kibera between 2008 and 2010?

   Yes [ ]   No [ ]

9. Which of the following peace building activities do you consider to be most important? *Please tick one*

   a). Truth, justice and reconciliation   [ ]

   b). Conflict prevention   [ ]

   c). Conflict resolution   [ ]

   d). Economic empowerment   [ ]

   e). Psycho-social support   [ ]

   f). Building a network of peace   [ ]

   Other *(specify)*_____

10. What was the best contribution of Care-International in peace building and reconciliation in Kibera between 2008-2010?

    a). Truth, justice and reconciliation   [ ]

    b). Conflict prevention   [ ]

    c). Conflict resolution   [ ]

    d). Economic empowerment   [ ]

    e). Psycho-social support   [ ]

    f). Building a network of peace   [ ]

Other *(specify)*_____

11. What was the overall performance of Care-International's peace project in Kibera between 2008 and 2010?

Excellent [ ]   Good [ ]   Fair [ ]   Poor [ ]

12. Did the government support Care-International's peace project in Kibera between 2008 and 2010?

Yes [ ]   No [ ]   Don't know [ ]

SECTION C: Addressing NGOs challenges in peace building and reconciliation.

13. Give three main strengths of Care-International's Kibera peace project

i)

ii)

iii)

14. Give three main weaknesses/disadvantages of Care-International'S Kibera peace project.

i)

ii)

iii)

15. How can international NGOs succeed in peace building and reconciliation in Kibera?

i)

ii)

iii)

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Introduction

A Master of Arts student at the institute of diplomacy and international studies is carrying out research as part of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in international conflict management. The research title is, "The Contribution of Care-International (Kenya) in Peace Building and Reconciliation in Kibera." The aim of the study is to assess the contribution of international NGOs in peace building in Kibera, the challenges faced and recommend solutions.

This questionnaire is administered to Assistant Chiefs in Kibera for academic purposes only. To maintain confidentiality, you may please not indicate your name. Thank you for your understanding.

SECTION A: Bio Data

1. sex?   Male [ ]   Female [ ]
2. What are your core functions as an Assistant Chief?

3. Do you have any role in peace building and reconciliation in Kibera?
   Yes [ ]   No [ ]
4. Have you been involved in any peace building and reconciliation activities in Kibera?
   Yes [ ]   No [ ]
5. Were you working in Kibera between 2008 -2010?
   Yes [ ]   No [ ]
6. If yes, to what extent were you involved in Care-International's Building a Network of Peace (B-NEP) project between 2008-2010? *Please tick one*
   Not involved [ ] Less involved [ ] Moderately involved [ ] Highly involved [ ]

SECTION B: Role of Care-International in Peace Building and Reconciliation in Kibera.

7. To what extent has Care-International been involved in peace building and reconciliation in Kibera?

   Not involved [ ] Less involved [ ] Moderately involved [ ] Highly invo'   [

8. Which of the following peace building activities do you consider to be most important? *please tick one*

   a). Truth, justice and reconciliation   [ ]

   b). Conflict prevention   [ ]

   c). Conflict resolution   [ ]

   d). Building a network of peace   [ ]

   e). Economic advancement   [ ]

   f). Political advancement   [ ]

   g). Other *(specify)*_____

9. Which of the following peace building activities was best undertaken by Care-International in Kibera, between 2008-2010? *Please tick one*

   a). Truth, justice and reconciliation   [ ]

   b). Conflict prevention   [ ] .

   c). Conflict resolution   [ ]

   d). Building a network of peace   [ ]

   e). Economic advancement   [ ]

   f). Political advancement   [ ]

   g). Other *(specify)*_____

10. Was the Government of Kenya, and its agencies in Kibera supportive of Care-International's Building a Network of Peace (B-NEP) project?

    Yes [ ]   No [ ]   Don't know [ ]

11. List three way in which the government of Kenya can support international NCC peace building projects.

    i)

    ii)

iii)

SECTION C: NGOs challenges in peace building and reconciliation

12. Do NGOs face challenges while engaging in peace building and reconciliation in Kibera?

Yes [ ]   No [ ]

13. Did Care-International face challenges while implementing its building B-NEP project in Kibera?

Yes [ ]   No [ ]

14. What was the greatest challenge faced by Care-International's peace project in Kibera? *Please tick one.*

a) Lack of resources   [ ]

b) lack of support from residents   [ ]

c) Lack of support from the government   [ ]

d) Lack of peace building knowledge /skills   [ ]

e) Other *specify*_____

15. What was the greatest strength/advantage of Care-International peace project in Kibera? *please tick one*

a) Resources   [ ]

b) Residents' goodwill/support   [ ]

c) Support from the government [ ]

d) Knowledge/skills in peace building and reconciliation [ ]

e) Other *(specify)*_____

SECTION D: Addressing Challenges

16. Should the Government of Kenya support NGOs' peace building projects in Kibera?

Yes [ ]   No [ ]

17 Is Governmental-Nongovernmental peace building partnership possible in Kibera?

Yes [ ]   No [ ]

Please rate the following statements by ticking to show the extent to which you agree or disagree (Strongly Agree- SA, Agree-A, Undecided-U, Disagree-D, Strongly Disagree - SD)

Statement	SA	A	U	D	SD
18. Conflicts in Kibera are historical, deeply entrenched and multi-causal					
19. Comprehensive, dynamic and multi-sectored peace building approach can best address conflicts in Kibera					
20. Successful peace building depends on successful partnership between government agencies and peace NGOs					
21. Community involvement and empowerment is key to sustainable peace and reconciliation					

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Introduction

A Master of Arts student at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies is carrying out research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Conflict Management. The research title is "The Contribution of Care-International in Peace Building and Reconciliation in Kibera." The aim of this study is to assess the contribution of international NGOs in peace building in Kibera, the challenges faced and recommend solutions.

This questionnaire is administered to selected members of Langata District Peace Committee and Kibera Division Peace Committee, for academic purpose only. To maintain confidentiality, you may conceal your identity. Thank you for your time and understanding.

SECTION A: Bio Data

1. Sex   Male [ ]   Female [ ]
2. What is your age? *Please tick one*
   10-20[ ] 20-10 [ ]   31-40 [ ]   41-50[ ] 51-60   [ ]   60-70 [ ]
3. Level of formal education? *Please tick one*

   None at all   [ ]
   Primary education   [ ]
   Secondary education   [ ]
   College education   [ ]
   University education   [ ]
4. For how long have you been a Kibera resident? *tick one*
   0-5 years [ ]   6-10 years [ ]   11-15 years [ ]   16-20 years [ ]
   21-25 years [ ] 26-30 years [ ]   31-35 years [ ]   35 years and above [ ]

5. Have you experienced any type of conflict in Kibera? Yes [ ] No [ ]

6. What are the 3 major causes of conflict in Kibera?

    i)

    ii)

    iii)

SECTION B: Care-International and Peace Building and Reconciliation in Kibera

7. Do International NGOs contribute to peace building and reconciliation in Kibera?

    Yes [ ]   No [ ]

8. Did Care-International contribute to peace building in Kibera through its Building a Network of Peace Project (B-NEP)?

    Yes   [ ]   No   [ ]   Don't know [ ]

9. If yes (above), in what area was Care-International's contribution most felt?

    a). Truth, justice and reconciliation   [ ]

    b). Conflict prevention   [ ]

    c). Conflict resolution   [ ]

    d). Economic empowerment   [ ]

    e). Psycho-social support   [ ]

    f). Building a network of peace   [ ]

    Other *(specify)*_____

10. Which of the following peace building activities do you consider most important?

    Please tick one

    a). Truth, justice and reconciliation   [ ]

    b). Conflict prevention   [ ]

    c). Conflict resolution   [ ]

    d). Economic empowerment   [ ]

    e). Psycho-social support   [ ]

    f). Building a network of peace   [ ]

    Other (specify) _____

11. Was the District Peace Committee structure involved in any way in Care-International's Building Of Network Of Peace (B-NEP) project?

    Yes [ ]   No [ ]

12. What has been Care-International's main contribution to peace building Kibera?

_____

_____

SECTION C: NGOs' Peace Building Challenges

13. Was the government of Kenya supportive of Care-International peace project in Kibera?

Yes [ ]   No [ ]

14. What is the main challenge faced by International NGOs in Peace building work in Kibera? *Tick on*

i) Lack of resources   [ ]

ii) Lack of support from residents   [ ]

Lack of support from the government [ ]

Lack of peace building knowledge /skills [ ]

Other (specify)_____

15. What is the main strength/advantage of international NGOs engaged in peace building and reconciliation in Kibera?

a) Resources   [ ]

b) Support from residents   [ ]

c) Support from the government [ ]

d) Knowledge and skills in peace building and reconciliation [ ]

e) Other (specify)_____

SECTION D: Addressing the Challenges

16. Should the government partner with NGOs in peace building and reconciliation work in Kibera?

Yes [ ]   No [ ]

Please rate the following statements by ticking to show the extent to which you agree or disagree.(Strongly Agree – SA, Agree – A, Undecided –U, Disagree- D, Strongly Disagree- SD)

Statement	SA	A	U	D	SD
17. Conflicts in Kibera area deeply entrenched, historical and multi-causal					
18. Peace building and reconciliation is successfully undertaken through a dynamic, comprehensive and multi-sectored approach					
19. Sustainable peace and reconciliation is arrived through truth, justice and forgiveness.					
20. Individual economic empowerment is key to peace building and reconciliation in Kibera.					
21. Community involvement is key to realization of sustainable peace in Kibera					
22. The government alone cannot realize sustainable peace and reconciliation in Kibera					
23. Sustainable peace is realised through empowerment of peace CBOs					
24. International NGOs need the support of the government and the local community to attain sustainable peace in Kibera					
25. Governmental –non governmental partnerships in peace building and reconciliation in Kibera should be pursued					

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR KIBERA PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATORS.

The following-questions will-be-asked to the D. C. Langata, D. O. Kibera and the 3 chiefs of Kibera, Sarangombe, and Laini Saba locations.

1. As a Provincial Administrator in Kibera what are your core functions?

2. Is peace building and reconciliation one of your functions?

   Yes ( )   No ( )

3. If yes describe this function in detail

4. Comment on the management of the Post – 2007 General Elections' violent conflict in Kibera, by the GOK and partner NGOs.

5. Are you aware of any peace building activities in Kibera by Care-International, between 2008 and 2010?

6. If yes, did the activities generate desired impact?

7. In your view, are international NGOs capable of contributing to peace building and reconciliation in Kibera?

8. Give reasons for your answer above.

9. What are the main challenges of realizing peace in Kibera?

10. What are the opportunities for peace and reconciliation in Kibera?

11. How do we then attain sustainable peace and reconciliation in Kibera?

Thank you for your time.

INTERVIEW WITH LEADERS OF SELECTED MEMBER CBDS OF B-NEP

The following questions will guide this structured interview with leaders of the following CBOS:-

(i)	Pillars of Kibera	-	0714459459
(ii)	Kibera Community Youth Programme	-	0721859861
(iii)	Kibera Peace and Reconciliation Network	-	0728466719
(iv)	Nairobi Dam	-	0720588128
(v)	Kibera Pastors Network	-	Rev. Omorro
(vi)	Kibera Women for Peace and Fairness	-	0721882746

1. Briefly introduce your organization, stating its mission and objectives/goals

2. For how long have you been operating in Kibera?

3. Describe the Kibera conflict setting, and state the three main causes/types of conflict.

4. Who are the main actors in Kibera's conflicts?

5. As a partner of Care-International's Building a Network of Peace Project (B-NEP) in Kibera between 2008- 2010, what was your key contribution?

6. What were the main challenges of Care International's peace and reconciliation project?

7. Any achievements?

8. Briefly describe your interaction and working relationship with Care-International during the project period.

9. What was the main contribution and strengths of Care-International in this peace project?

10. Any weaknesses?

11. Briefly describe the role/contribution of the G.O.K. towards this Peace Project. Was it satisfactory/adequate?

12. How should we pursue sustainable peace and reconciliation in Kibera, and the whole country?

13. Whose duty is peace building and reconciliation in Kibera?

Thank you for your time and understanding.

UNSTRUCTURED INTERVIEW WITH CARE-INTERNATIONAL'S
KIBERA OVC PROGRAM MANAGER/ B-NEP PROJECT OFFICER

1. Introduction

2. Your work with Care-International

3. Your experiences with the Kibera OVC Program/ B-NEP Project

4. Briefly describe B-NEP project, giving its Objectives, Goals, Strategies and Activities.

   Objectives

   Strategies

   Activities

5. B-NEP was a 2-year project. Any achievement?

6. Failures and challenges?

7. Given another chance/ project extension, what would you change?

8. Your project partners

9. Government contribution

10. Whose role is peace building and reconciliation?

11. How do we move forward with peace building in Kibera and the whole country?

12. Concluding remarks

DIVISIONAL PEACE COMMITTEE KIBERA DIVISION

P.O.BOX 30124 - 00100
NAIROBI
TEL: 0722- 376865, 0721- 967932
EMAIL: pkiberadivision@yahoo.com

15/6/2010

DISTRICT PEACE COMMITTEE
LANGATA DISTRICT
P.O.BOX 30124
NAIROBI

Dear Sir,

RE: REQUEST FOR WORKSOP FUNDS.

The division peace committee intends to organize a four days workshop for each locational peace committee members and selected few peace practitioners within Kibera slums.

The objectives of the workshop will be to harmonize various stakeholders in peace building, capacity building and behaviour change, strengthening peace networks within the various locations and to map out peace and security concern areas within the Division.

In that regard we have attached with this letter attentative budget proposal for the workshop which will take place from 23rd June – 26th June 2010 in each location.

We hope to get prompt feed back from your office to get us started.

Yours faithfully,

Peter Tumba
Chairman DPC

Cc to. District Officer Kibera Division
       District Commissioner, Langata District.

Noted

care®

17/09/09

THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER,
LANGATA DISTRICT,
NAIROBI, KENYA.

RE: INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INTERNATIONAL DAY OF PEACE TO BE HELD ON 21st SEPTEMBER 2009.

CARE Kenya is an international Non Governmental Organization and has been working in Kenya since 1968.CARE Kenya works in close collaboration with various stakeholders ranging from Government, Private sector and Civil Society Organizations. CARE Kenya current development focus is on three main sectors Health and HIV&AIDS, Livelihoods and Emergency & Refugee Operations (ERO).

CARE Kenya has been implementing programs in Kibera since 2004 targeting children, OVCs women, youth and men. The programs are aimed at tackling the underlying causes of poverty and underdevelopment with a view to achieving sustainable development amongst the communities. CARE Kenya recognizes that sustainable development can only be realized in a peaceful environment where diverse communities and other development actors co-exist and adhere to existing laws of a country. The 2008 post election violence in the country and particularly in Kibera created a lot of animosity coupled with mistrust amongst the different communities living in Kibera.It is from the foregoing that CARE Kenya initiated a peace building project aimed at promoting mutual coexistence amongst the different communities with a view to creating an enabling environment for sustainable livelihoods.

As part of the project activities, CARE Kenya together with her partners (Youth groups, CBOs, women groups, FBOs and the coalition for Peace and Development) are planning to participate in the annual International Day of Peace which will be marked on 21st September 2009.The day will be marked by a procession from the Kenya Bus stage at 42 and culminate at the D.Os ground where peace related activities and speeches will be delivered.

It is from the foregoing that CARE Kenya requests your office to be part of this important activity and offer the necessary support. Specifically you are invited to flag off the procession in addition to giving a key note address during the celebrations. Your presence in this key activity will be highly appreciated. Finally I would like to take this early opportunity to thank you and your office for your commitment in serving the needs of the Kibera community. We look forward to further strengthening our partnership. Attached is the program for the day.

Sincerely,

Stephen Gwynne-Vaughan
Country Director

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CARE Kenya
Head Office
Mucai Road
Off Ngong Road
P.O. Box 43864 - GPO 00100
Nairobi. Kenya
tel: 020-2710069. 2711766. 2712374
fax: 020-2728493. 2724486
e-mail: info@care.or.ke

Omar Beja,

District Commissioner

Lang'ata District

17th March, 2010

Dear Sir,

RE: INVITATION TO A STAKEHLDER FEEDBACK SESSION BY CARE KENYA B-NEP PROJECT

CARE Kenya is an international Non Governmental Organization and has been working in Kenya since 1968.CARE Kenya works in close collaboration with various stakeholders ranging from Government, Private sector and Civil Society Organizations. CARE Kenya current development focus is on three main sectors Health and HIV&AIDS, Livelihoods and Emergency & Refugee Operations (ERO).

CARE Kenya has been implementing programs in Kibera since 2004 targeting children, OVCs women, youth and men. The programs are aimed at tackling the underlying causes of poverty and underdevelopment with a view to achieving sustainable development amongst the communities. CARE Kenya recognizes that sustainable development can only be realized in a peaceful environment where diverse communities and other development actors co-exist and adhere to existing laws of a country. The 2008 post election violence in the country and particularly in Kibera created a lot of animosity coupled with mistrust amongst the different communities living in Kibera.It is from the foregoing that CARE Kenya initiated a peace building project aimed at promoting mutual coexistence amongst the different communities with a view to creating an enabling environment for sustainable livelihoods.

The project; Building a Network of Peace in Kibera (B-NEP) has been carrying out different activities in Kibera since last year. As part of the end of project the project intends to hold a Stakeholder feedback meeting with the partners and potential Donors to have an interactive evaluation and speak of key achievements of the project, the challenges met and plan for a way forward for the Network formed by the partners.

It is from the foregoing that CARE Kenya requests you to attend this very important Stakeholders meeting tthat will be held on 26th **March 2010** at the **Olive Garden Hotel** in Harlenghurm starting from **8.30am to 4.00pm.**

We look forward to your presence which will be highly appreciated.

Kindly confirm your attendance to Grace Wachuka on 0721 434 355 or Wachuka@care.or.ke

Sincerely,

Oscar Munyao
Program Manager
OVC and Integrated Program

Sub Offices
Dadaab: P.O. Box 43864 - 00100 Nairobi tel: 046-2060 / 2529 fax: 046-3242 e-mail: info@ddb.care.or.ke
Kisumu: P O Box 88 Kisumu tel: 057-2020010 / 2023438 fax: 057-2024474 e-mail: info@ksm.care.or.ke
tel: 057-2020010 / 2023438 e-mail: info@care.or.ke

KIBERA PEACE RUN

Certificate Of Recognition

Awarded to

DO's OFFICE KIBERA DIV

In recognition of your valuable contribution

and participation during the

KIBERA PEACE RUN

6th February, 2010

Jones Churchill
Regional Coordinator
EARYN

Ministry of Youth Affairs Sports

Stadi za Maisha   GOVERNMENT OF KENYA

Stephen Gwynne-Vauyhan
Country Director
CARE International Kenya

Certificate of Participation

This is to certify that

CLEMENT OMBATI

successfully participated in the Joint Training on Conflict Management for Peace Committees and Provincial Administration at Kenya Institute of Education on 28th – 29th April 2011.

NJOROGE NDIRANGU, EBS
PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER
NAIROBI AREA

S.K. MAINA, EBS
NSC COORDINATOR