MULTIPARTYISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN KENYA: THE CASE OF LIKONI DIVISION, MOMBASA DISTRICT, 1991-1997.

BY

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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND ARCHEOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS IN ARMED CONFLICT AND PEACE STUDIES

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DECLARATION

I satisfy that this is my original work and has not been presented for the award of degree in any other University.

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JULIUS K. KILONZO   DATE

This project has been submitted for examination with our approval as University supervisors.

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DR. MARY MWIANDI   DATE

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DR. HERBERT MISIGO AMATSIMBI   DATE

DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my parents, particularly my mother, Janet Kasyoka Kilonzo and my late father, Daniel Kilonzo Kiema who were my earliest influences in education. Thank you for instilling a sense of compassion and sensitivity to injustice caused by conflict within me, as well as for nurturing my sense of social citizenship.

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I would also like to thank my beloved parents, mother Janet Kasyoka Kilonzo and my late father Daniel Kilonzo Kiema for not only parenting me but also mentoring me. Apart from my parents I would like to thank my beloved wife and children Mwende, Janet and Joy who were a source of encouragement during this study. I would also like to acknowledge the support I got from my classmates who made my experience in this study, possible. Last, but definitely not least, I would like to thank all the members of the Department of History for their support, not only for their time, but most importantly for their expertise. They challenged my personal assumptions and enabled me to learn, understand, and appreciate their perspectives. I wish you all the best.

ABSTRACT

Although introduction of multiparty politics in Kenya in the early 1990s was seen as the only way of redeeming the country from dictatorial rule, the system was never without short falls. Multiparty system of government in Kenya was highly associated with the political violence that becomes a common place particularly during election period. Ethnic violence became entrenched into politics with some regions being known for their vulnerability to the conflict that characterized the election. This research, guided by the structural conflict theory, explores and seeks to examine how the removal of section 2A from the Kenyan constitution and the introduction of multiparty politics in Kenya informed the frequent ethnic clashes that occurred in Likoni constituency.

To achieve the objectives of the study, various secondary data such as books and journals were reviewed and primary data from newspapers and oral interviews were conducted in Likoni area of Mombasa. The conflict in Likoni constituency had its roots to the migration of the so called "Wabara" communities to the coastal region and subsequent takeover of economic and political opportunities that should have benefited the Mijikenda communities. The main economic opportunities taken by the Wabara people included land, employment in the tourism and port industries leaving the Mijikenda bitter and feeling exploited by the foreigners. The feeling of exploitation haboured by Mijikenda against the upcountry people was to set the ground for the political violence that was experienced in Likoni. The Mijikenda took advantage of the call for multiparty system as to mean majimbo, and advanced the perception that every individual was to go back to their ancestral land. They cited numerous forms of social discrimination and exclusion from that threatened health and development. Socio-economic status appeared to be the primary source of inequities, including gender inequity. Process and outcome exploitation were noted among participants throughout the course of this research. Finally the research found out that the clashes in Likoni constituency impacted on both the residents of the area.

LIST OF ABBREVIATION

CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CJCC	Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics
CJPC	Catholic Justice and Peace Commission
CLARION	Center for Law and Research International
ECEP II	Ecumenical Civic Education Program II.
ECK	Electoral Commission of Kenya
GFD	Group Focus Discussions
GSU	General Service Unit
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KNHRC	Kenya National Human Right Commission
LYCODEP	Likoni Youth Community Development
MCET	Muslim Civic Education Trust
MUHURI	Muslims for Human Rights
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NGOs	Non Governmental Organizations
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslim
UNCEF	United Children Educational Fund
YWCA	Young Women Christian Association

WORKING DEFINITIONS

Wabara: This is a Swahili term that refers to the people from up-country. The term is commonly used by the indigenous people of the Coast to differentiate themselves from the people coming from up-country.

Wapwani: This is a Swahili term that is used to refer to people from the Coast. The term is commonly used by the indigenous people of the Coast to differentiate themselves from the people from up-country.

Kayabombo: This term is derived from Kayabombo Forest. This is a sacred forest in the Kenyan Coast preserved by traditional leaders. The term is generally used to refer to the violence that emerged in 1997 where militia groups trained and attacked some ethnic communities including a police station from, this forest.

Likoni: Likoni has gone through a transformation process. Initially before 2009 Likoni was both a division and a constituency in Mombasa District. However as from 2009 through the Presidential executive order it was transformed to one of the districts in Coast Province. For purposes of consistency in this research Likoni will refer to the division due to its persistency through the period under study.

LIKONI DIVISION & ENVIRONS

RURUMA

JIBANA

MWARAKAYA

JUNJU

KAMBE

KALOLENI DISTRICT

RURUMA

RIBE

KILIFI DISTRICT

MTWAPA

MWAWESA

BAMBURI

BAMBURI

MOMBASA DISTRICT

MOMBASA DISTRICT

MIKINI

MIKINDANI

KISAUNI

CHANGAMWE

NIKINDANI

KILINDINI DISTRICT

MAWENI

CHAANI

TUDOR

RAILWAY

MAJENGO TONONOKA

KONGOWEA

MOMBASA DISTRICT

MWEMBE TAYARI OLD TOWN

•Mongwe

GANJONI

National Youth Service

Peleleza Pri. Sch.

•Dona Olinda Academy

MTONGWE

•Mongwe Pri. Sch.

Mtongwe Health Centre

Barululum Sec.Sch

KILINDINI DISTRICT

'ijiweni Primary school

Likoni

•Bucubu

Likoni Secondary School

Likoni Youth Polytechnic

Mrima Pri.Sch.

Shela Beach Hotel

•Sunter

Savanah College

S Breeze Hotel

SHIKA ADABU

•Shika Adabu Pri. School

•Quen

Pingu Fuel Villa

•Bambauto Pri. Sch.

NGOMBENI KWALE DISTRICT

INDIAN OCEAN

Legend

| • | Land Mark | | Likoni Division | | District | | Location |

Scale 1:60,000

0   1.5   3   6 Km

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

The political history of independent Kenya has evolved through various phases. The evolution began with a multiparty system in 1960, which was then transformed into a single party state with the merger of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and Kenya African National Union (KANU) parties soon after the country became a republic in 1964.[1] Notably, this merger strengthened the conservative wing of KANU, which was comprised of Jomo Kenyatta, Tom Mboya and James Gichuru. They espoused a reformist approach and advocated closer cooperation with Britain, United States and countries of the European Economic Community. In the economic field, the conservatives advocated the retention of the status quo and strongly, supported the protection of property rights of white settlers and other immigrants. This conservative view was however opposed by the radicals within KANU, who included Oginga Odinga, Bildad Kaggia, Achieng Oneko, J.D Kali and Pio Gama Pinto, together with some ex-Mau Mau detainees. These radicals advanced some form of socialism and a closer co-operation with socialist countries. They also stood for rapid Africanization, nationalization of foreign industries and enterprises, and free redistribution of former settler farms to the landless.[2]

With these ideological differences quickly splintering KANU, the country began to enter into an era of restricted democratic practice. This new direction was embodied in the proceedings of the KANU Limuru Conference of 1966 that saw the party's vice chairman and the country's vice president, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, being ousted from the party leadership. Odinga resigned from the vice presidency soon afterwards and went on to form an opposition party, the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU). This party was, however, banned by the Kenyatta government in 1969; effectively meaning that Kenya had entered into a de-facto one-party political system, a position that was held strong until 1 982.[3] In this year, Parliament amended the constitution, inserting Section 2A, thereby making

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[1] P. Asingo, "The political Economy of Transition in Kenya" in Walter Oyugi, et al *The politics of Transition in Kenya: From KANU to NARC.* Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation. 2003 pp 15-51.
[2] William Ochieng; "Independent Kenya, 1963- 1986" in W.R Ochieng' (ed), *A modern History of Kenya, 1895-1980,* Nairobi: Evans Brothers Limited, 1989, p.206.
[3] *Ibid.*

Kenya a *de-jure* one-party state. Significantly, under the one party state, all forms of political expression were expected to be performed under the aegis of the only political party-KANU. But between 1982 and 1988, a strong opposition to political and intellectual monolithism gradually developed.[4] This spirit of dissidence was given impetus by sweeping events that were taking place in Europe. The reforms of Gorbachev in the former Union Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR) inspired transformations that had led to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. By the 1990s, the attendant dramatic collapse of one-party communist regimes had given a fresh impetus to the pro-democracy movements in Africa.[5] Thus, by 1991, several African states were moving towards multipartyism: Benin, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mauritania, Rwanda, Zambia and of course Kenya. In May of the same year, the Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam was forced to flee his country making other African nationals to be energized in the first against dictators. All these events were followed with keen interest in Kenya.[6]

The pro-democracy movement in Kenya was spearheaded by veteran politicians such as Oginga Odinga, Masinde Muliro, George Anyona and Martin Shikuku, prominent clergymen such as Dr Henry Okullu, Bishop of Maseno South, and the Presbyterian cleric the Reverend Timothy Njoya; as well as lawyers and academicians. The movement was greatly encouraged by policy statements from Western nations and the World Bank, which indicated that future financial assistance would be linked to respect for human rights, transparency, accountability and democratization, Notably, the media and the clergy provided crucial support without which most of the opposition views would not have been disseminated to Kenyans and the rest of the world.[7] The pro-democracy proponents and the clergymen produced a programme for radical change, which was soon adopted by the advocates of pluralism as their agenda for the next two years. They

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[4] K.Kanyinga, "Limitations of Political Liberalization: Parties and Electoral Politics in Kenya" In Walter Oyugi et al, *The politics of transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC*. Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation. 2003 pp 96-124.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] B.A Ogot Transition from Single party to Multiparty Political System" In *Decolonization and Independence in Kenya: 1940-1993*. London: James Currey, 1995 pp 239-270.
[7] *Ibid.*

demanded the scrapping of Section 2A of the constitution which had made Kenya a single party state in 1982.[8]

The people also demanded the dissolution of the sixth parliament, which they regarded as illegitimate. This parliament had done little to safeguard the interests of the common people. To the people it was a platform through which Moi's dictatorship was perpetuated inflicting suffering to innocent people. Although with the above grievances the people felt they had moved a step towards the positive direction when the constitutional changes placed a limitation to the presidential tenure to two terms of five years each, and the convening of a national convention to chart out Kenya's political future.[9]

The opposition movement's call provoked a violent reaction from KANU leaders, who reiterated the orthodox position that multipartyism would generate ethnic tensions and threaten political stability. On this basis, the KANU elites argued that the introduction of the multiparty system be postponed until Kenyan society was more "cohesive". It was at this time that two former cabinet ministers, Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia, both expellees from KANU joined forces against the single-party system. They received the support of thousands of Kenyans, who were similarly frustrated and dissatisfied with the way Kenyan politics were being managed.[10] However, from June 1990, the KANU government launched a major offensive against pro-multiparty democracy activists, denouncing them as traitors, agents of foreign powers, tribalists and anarchists, who were out to fan ethnic violence in the country. Matiba and Rubia, however, applied for a licence to hold a public rally at Kamukunji in Nairobi on 7 July 1990 (the famous saba-saba meeting). The application was rejected and the main organizers of the rally were arbitrarily arrested and thousands of people who had streamed into the venue were forcibly dispersed by police.[11]

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[8] KHRC, *Killing the Vote: state Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya*, Nairobi: KNHR, 1998 p. 14.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] P. Wanyande, "The politics of Alliance Building in Kenya: The search for Political Unity." In Walter Oyugi et al, op. cit, pp. 96-127.
[11] KHRC, *Killing the Vote: state Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya, op. cit.*

And on 3 December 1991, some 3,600 KANU delegates, meeting at the Kasarani Sports Centre in Nairobi, adopted the recommendation by the KANU Governing Council to ask Parliament to repeal Section 2A of the country's constitution. Subsequently, on 10 December 1991, Parliament passed the constitutional amendment repealing Section 2A, thereby effectively ending KANU's legal monopoly of political power and paving way for multiparty elections.[12]

The KANU governments respond to the clamour for multiparty came in different forms. First Moi appointed a Review Committee, under the chairmanship of George Saitoti, the then vice-president of the party, to look into the growing demands for political change. The committee came up with a report, which was discussed in a special KANU Delegates' Conference on 4 December 1990. Significantly, the conference rejected extremist positions terming it dangerous to the country. It also promised more change by not closing the door to opposing views and ideas. Indeed, President Moi had already set the trend ahead of the commencement of the Special Delegates Conference by instructing the Attorney-General, Justice Muli, to introduce a Bill restoring the security of tenure for the judges, the Attorney-General and other public officers.[13]

The move was received positively because the people of Kenya thought that security of tenure to the Judges and the Attorney General will restore some independence in the performance of the two important offices. However, this was misconceived, Moi still maintained high influence over the two offices making the war against dictatorship to be far from being won. The struggle against Moi's misrule of the nation was to continue for little had been achieved in terms of freedom and respect for human rights in Kenya.[14]

The critics of the Moi's regime, from both within and outside Kenya, took advantage of these reforms to clamour for even more change. For veteran politicians such as Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Masinde Muliro and Martin Shikuku among others, it was the

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] B.A. Ogot Transition from Single party to Multiparty Political System" In *Decolonization and Independence in Kenya: 1940-1993.* London: James Currey, 1995, pp. 239-270.
[14] *Ibid*

introduction of a multiparty state that would prove the genuineness of the President's reform programme. Some church leaders such as, Timothy Njoya and Mutava Mutsimi, lawyers and academicians also demanded the dissolution of Parliament and the release of all political detainees. Consequently, in August 1991, six veteran politicians - Masinde Muliro, Martin Shikuku, George Nthenge, Philip Gachoka, Oginga Odinga and Ahmed Bamahriz teamed up to form the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), a pressure group whose stated objective was to fight for the restoration of democracy and human rights in Kenya.[15]

As the country approached its first multiparty general election, there was much apprehension and fear among the different ethnic groups because the KANU elites led by President Moi had "prophesized" the eruption of ethnic clashes. In an effort to assuage such fears, attempts were made to partition Kenya into protected political zones whose borders coincided with the existing ethnic boundaries. In many areas, ethnic groups now referred to outsiders in some regions were forced to conceptualize their future in terms of a new federal constitution demarcated along ethnic affiliations, which would institutionalize political zones based on ethnic alignments.

It was, therefore, not surprising that ethnic clashes, which first broke out in October 1991 at Meteitei farm in Tindaret Division, Nandi District, soon spread to Western, Nyanza, Rift Valley and Coast provinces. It was evident that political incitement played an important role in the cause of ethnic clashes. Instead of factual information, what has been coming out are claims and counterclaims by politicians, clergymen and individual seeking to make political capital out of the plight of the clash victims. The Kennedy Kiliku Parliamentary Select Committee, which was appointed by Parliament on 13 May 1992 to "probe the root cause of fighting and make recommendations with a view to averting such incidents in the future", revealed that political incitement and historical

[15] K, Kanyinga, "Political Change in Kenya" In P. Wanyande, *Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya*, Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 2007, pp. 81-97.

injustices in relation to land allocation in post colonial period was responsible for the clashes witnessed in various parts of Kenya.[16]

1.0.1 Likoni Area

Likoni constituency is located in Mombasa District of the Coastal Province. The region has a cosmopolitan urban set up with a central business area and an urban mainland with some areas predominantly rural in nature.[17] Likoni region lies between Latitudes 30° 60' and 4° 10 South of the Equator and between Longitudes 39° 60' and 39° 80 east of the Greenwich Meridian. Most of the local residents who live in the Likoni constituency are poor due to their low level of education which is a barrier to access to employment.[18] This left a mark of dissatisfaction among the local residents therefore, causing the conflict that was witnessed in Likoni constituency.

Most of the employment opportunities, therefore were taken by up-country people making the local residents to harbor a negative feeling against the up-country migrants. The local Mijikenda people claimed that most opportunities had been taken by the *Wabara*, a term they used to refer to the immigrants from Kenyan main land. To them the Coast Province belonged to the Mijikenda communities who inhabited the region earlier.[19]

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

During the early 1990s, the Kenyan political scene changed after the repeal of the controversial section 2A provision in the Constitution of Kenya, an event that allowed a reintroduction of the multiparty political system into the country. Reintroduction of multiparty politics, in the year 1992, changed the face and nature of national politics. Most significantly, this change meant that the sitting president who had previously never met any serious opposition at the ballot box was now to face an intense challenge mounted by candidates from competing political parties. Moreover, the repealed

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[16] NCCK, *The Cursed Arrow: The NCCK Contemporary Report on the Politicized Land Clashes in Rift Valley Nyanza and Western Province*, Nairobi: NCCK, 1992, p. 1
[17] *Ibid*
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] Oral interview, Flora Tabu, Likoni, 5/5/2010.

constitution required the winning presidential 'candidate to initially win a parliamentary seat, apart from garnering at least 25% of the vote cast in a minimum of six (6) out of the eight (8) provinces of Kenya.

In order to meet the above requirements, political parties formulated various strategies. These strategies included the call for a federal system of government famously known as *majimbo* where regions would have autonomous power and regional voting blocs which were ethnic in nature. This study is thus an attempt to understand ethnic violence in Kenya, using Likoni constituency as a case study, to answer the following questions; Could the repeal of section 2A of the Constitution of Kenya, in 1992, have been the cause of ethnic tension and eventually, ethnic conflict in Likoni constituency? What factors were responsible for the outbreak of conflict in Kenya in general and Likoni constituency in particular? Was this conflict aimed at manipulating the voting patterns in Likoni? What were the impacts of ethnic violence on residents of Likoni constituency? These issues can only be answered after systematic analysis of the causes and effects of the Likoni violence.

1.2 Objectives
The overall goal of this study was to;
1. To investigate the causes of ethnic clashes in Likoni constituency.
2. To examine the impacts that ethnic conflict posed on residents of Likoni constituency.

1.3 Justification for the Study
Generally, the study of ethnic conflict and violence in Kenya has attracted a good deal of scholarly research. However, very limited effort was put into the study of the unique nature of ethnic conflict in the Coastal province, and even less so on Likoni division. This study investigated Likoni constituency, which is cosmopolitan with the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya and other upcountry inhabitants who had an impact on the direction of election victory in Likoni constituency. This study therefore examined whether political violence was used by political parties to win in 1991 and 1997 General elections. Such a study was

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informed by the fact that Likoni constituency experienced recurrent political violence during the 1991 and 1997 general elections and yet very little has been written about the causes and effect of such political violence.

1.4 Scope and Limitations of the study

This study specifically focused on Likoni Constituency, beginning from the year 1991 to 1997. This was the period that witnessed the climax of the long struggle and agitation for multiparty politics, which led to the outbreak of political violence in some parts of the country. The study ended in the year 1997, the period during which the ethnic clashes in Likoni constituency had reached their peak. In 2002 the majority of Kenyans were united against President Moi's favourable candidate hence there was no ethnical animosity since Uhuru Kenyatta and Mwai Kibaki the opposition candidate were both from the Kikuyu community. In 2007 General Elections the situation changed when Raila Odinga the ODM candidate joined hands with other opposition politicians against PNU candidate and incumbent president Mwai Kibaki. Each camp claimed victory hence drugging the country into the worst conflict ever experienced in Kenya and Likoni was not left out. The conflict attracted the international community which sends in peace delegations led by Koffi Annan, former UN Secretary General leading to signing of the National Peace Accord which ended the hostilities by power sharing plan in which Raila Odinga become the Prime Minister.

Several limitations to the research exercise were, however, expected. At the outset, the use of the oral interview method posed difficulties, as local respondents were uncomfortable with discussing several aspects of the research which touched on security issues. Secondly, there existed the real risk that the research undertaking might have been perceived as being motivated by political undercurrents. The fact that the researcher is a known politician caused the problem of misunderstanding although it did not affect the out come because I clarified to them that the research is strictly academic.

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1.5 Literature Review

Since the early 1990s, various parts of Kenya have witnessed ethnic conflict of varying magnitude and intensity, especially during the ejection period. Likoni constituency, the focus of this study, was one of the areas that had been affected by such conflicts. Mostly, these conflicts took place around the election time, beginning from the 1990s and especially after the repeal of section 2A of the Constitution of Kenya in 1991. Section 2A had provided for a *de-jure* one party (KANU) state in Kenya. The repeal of this section had therefore allowed the re-introduction of a multi-party political system in the country. The re-introduction of multiparty system was characterized by ethnic clashes in various parts of Kenya with Likoni featuring as one of the regions hit by the clashes. The literature reviewed is therefore the wider Kenyan scenario and Likoni in particular.

Andrew Morton argues that during the call for multiparty politics and repeal of section 2(A) of the Kenya Constitution, serious ethnic clashes occurred in Kenya because of the hate speeches given by political leaders from Rift Valley and the Coast.[20] Although the author agrees that leaders rallied ethnic groups to vote for them in the 1992 and 1997 general elections, he concentrates on competition for resources as the cause of ethnic clashes. However, if resources were the primary cause for ethnic disputes, why did ethnic clashes occur only after the repeal of section 2A? It was interesting to investigate the relationship between ethnicity and political violence in Likoni constituency.

According to Atieno Odhiambo, Kenyans experienced racism until 1963 and tribalism subsequently. Tribalism was gradually morphed and rebaptized as ethnicity.[21] The author argues that the Kenyatta government used ethnicity campaigns in a bid to consolidate itself in power. For instance "The House of Mumbi" Campaigns saw Kikuyu people take oath at Gatundu to ensure that Kenya's flag would never leave the house of Mumbi although the constitution was clear that incase the president dies while in office the vice president takes office before the elections are called after three months. However, if such

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[20] A. Morton, *Moi: The making of an African Statesman*, London; Michael O Mara Books Limited, 1998, p.40.

[21] E.S. Atieno Odhiambo, in Berman, Dickson Eyon and will Kymlicka, *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*, Oxford: James currey ltd. 2004. pp. 167-182.

arguments were the primary influences in Kenyan politics, then how comes power was transferred to Moi, a Kalenjin, without ethnic conflict occurring between different Kenyan communities?[22] Furthermore Otieno did not discuss the conditions of section 2A. Moreover, why did ethnic violence break out during Moi's rule? What factors were responsible for the outbreak of conflict, particularly in Likoni area?

The chapter by Atieno Odhiambo is important to the study because it touches on how ethnicity cannot be neglected in Kenyan politics. However, it concentrates on the role of the colonial government in constructing ethnicity in Kenya. The difference between this study and the cited work was that, this one focuses on how ethnicity was used as a tool of political armed violence, unlike the cited work, which concentrated the role of the British colonial administration and the new post-independent government in cultivating and engendering a sense of ethnic divisions among Kenyans.

According to Michael Cowen and Karuti Kanyinga, ethnic or tribal identity in Kenyan politics arises out of territorial association.[23] Although the article generally looks at ethnicity in Kenyan politics, it mentions ethnic armed violence in passing with no in-depth information on ethnicity in the Likoni area or the Coastal Province. One then raised important questions, such as what factors were responsible for the outbreak of violence in Likoni? How did the conflict impact on the residents?

Henry Bienen argues that land continued to be a divisive feature among Kenyans. He contends that distribution of former white-held land was a major aim of the Kenya's independence government. Bienen maintained that ethnic conflicts were focused on land issues. The situation was similar in towns of Rift Valley, Western Province and Mombasa. Migrations of Kikuyu and Luo produced fears of the domination by new-comers over the indigenous inhabitants.[24] Bienen's study excessively concentrated on

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[22] *Ibid.*

[23] M. Cowen and Karuti Kanyinga "The 1997 Elections in Kenya: The Politics of Community and Locality" in Michael Cowen and Lisa Lakso, *Multi- party elections in Africa.* Oxford: James Currey 2002 pp. 67-96.

[24] H. Bienen, *Kenya the Politics of Participation and Control*, Princeton: Princeton University press, 1974, p. 49.

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how land issues continued to divide Kenyans, although it offers valuable information on this study on ethnic interactions in Kenya.

According to the Kenya Human Rights Commission, in the late 1991 the supporters of multiparty democracy who were also supporters of opposition seemed to be headed for victory in the General Election. The commission's reports therefore state that KANU resorted to instigation of ethnic violence, especially in Kenya's multi-ethnic and multiracial provinces. This was achieved by means of KANU refurbishing the ideology of Majimbo to mean "ethnic cleansing".[25] Important questions arose here; is this reason why ethnic violence broke out in Likoni?

Following the 2007 electoral violence, President Kibaki appointed a six-member Commission to inquire into the contentious aspects of the 2007 General elections. The commission was chaired by Judge Johann Kriegler. The commission was to investigate the organization and implementation of the 2007 electoral polls. Significantly, one of the commission's findings was that the implementation of the electoral process was flawed and that the electoral environment was polluted by the conduct of many public participants, especially political parties and the media.[26] The commission also found out that the Kenyan constitution and legal framework contains a number of weaknesses, which have resulted into a culture of electoral lawlessness for many years.[27] This information begs the question; if the Kriegler report's findings were indeed valid, can they be used to explain the conflicts that were witnessed in 1991 and 1997, particularly in Likoni?

Through legal Notice No 4473 the president appointed another commission, chaired by Judge Philip Waki. The commission was to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the post-election violence. This commission found that the period leading up

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[25] KHRC, *Killing the Vote: State Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya*. Nairobi: KHRC. 1998, pp. 6-20.

[26] Kriegler Report, *The Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Electronic held in Kenya on 27th December 2007*, Nairobi: Government Printer, 2008.
[27] *Ibid.*

to elections was notably peaceful in most areas in Kenya.[28] The report however indicated that there was a lot of incitement by politicians. This led one to ask, could politicians have played a similar role in the Likoni violence? If indeed so, what benefit did they stand to gain from this violence?

The question of land in Kenya was critical and almost all conflicts revolved around it, there were conflicts when non-indigenous communities encroached on land that was widely perceived as 'ancestral', by coastal residents. The Kenya land Alliance report thus looked at how local communities were affected by the influx of up-country populations into Coast province, and whether powerful political figures may have played a key role in instigating violence through invoking the land question.[29] Although the cited work acknowledged ethnicity and conflict in Kenya, it dwelt on associating the introduction of a multiparty system with the emergence of ethnic clashes. This hypothesis had limitations, though, because it did not explain why clashes recur even after more than a decade of the multi-party system of government. The intended research therefore finds out why ethnic conflicts were more intense in Likoni area than in other parts of the Coastal province.

In their article "Governance issues in Kenya: An overview" Peter Wanyande, Mary Omosa and Ludeki Chweya argue that the authoritarian British colonial rule had been responsible for widespread problems, including the creation of the concept of ethnicity.[30] They contend that this problem was to persist into the post-colonial period. For example, the Kenyatta administration perpetrated ethnicity through visibly empowering the house of Mumbi (the Kiambu group). When Moi took power, he too promised to follow in Kenyatta's footsteps, thereby creating powerful Kalenjin elite. These elite promised to use all means to safeguard the interests of the Moi administration. They also reintroduced

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[28] Waki Report, *The Report of the Commission to Investigate Post Election Violence 2008*, Nairobi: Government Printer, 2008.
[29] Kenya Land Alliance "Facts finding on Eviction July 2005."
[30] Peter Wanyande, "Governance and issues in Kenya: An overview", in Peter Wanyande, Mary Omosa and Ludeki Chweya's *Governance and Transition politics in Kenya*, Nairobi: Nairobi University Press: 2007, pp. 1-5

the aspect of KAMATUSA[31], when they perceived the renewed calls for multiparty politics as a significant threat to Kalenjin dominance, especially the Moi regime. The advent of the multiparty movement, at the beginning of 1990s therefore brought to the fore ethnic conflicts, especially in the Rift Valley and the Coastal province.[32] Although the argument by these writers were plausible, it left some questions unanswered, more so for the case of Likoni. For instance, in whose interests were the actors fighting?

In his article "Kenya's Multiparty Elections in a Comparative East African Perspective", Peter Nasong'o analyzed multiparty politics in East Africa and the influence of western countries in electoral processes. Peter Nasong'o contended that all past general elections of the twentieth century in East Africa were carried out against the background of profound legal and constitutional changes.[33] He argued that before the changes were instituted, the constitutional and legal structures and processes had been tailored to suit the requirements of non-democratic, single party rule in which popular participation in governmental processes was restricted and elections were neither free nor competitive.[34]

Nasong'o further argues that in all the three east African countries (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) there was need for a new legal and constitutional framework that would remove political restrictions, guarantee human rights and freedoms and facilitate free, fair and competitive elections. Kenya therefore became the first among the three east African countries to commence the processes of constitutional and political reforms.[35] This was a consequence of the struggle for political pluralism that followed the end of the cold war. The struggle was so intense, culminating into the Saba Saba riots. Later, the government was forced to scrap the single-party constitutional clause that had been introduced in 1982, ushering in a new era of multiparty politics.[36] The article by Nasong'o explains why we had riots in 1990s, but left out several questions unanswered. If all East African countries were undergoing the same process of constitutional change, why then was

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[31] KAMATUSA stands for the alliance between the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu
[32] *Ibid*
[33] Peter, Nasong'o, "Kenya's Multiparty Elections in a Comparative East African Perspective", in Ludeki Chweya, *Electoral Politics in Kenya*, Nairobi: Claripress 2002, pp. 197- 216.
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] *Ibid.*

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Kenya affected by ethnic clashes and not the other two countries? Secondly, if single party rule restricted political processes countrywide, why then was there intense violence in Likoni and not any other parts of the country?

According to Patrick Asingo, the run-up to the 1992 elections was characterized by a lot of violence, particularly the politically instigated ethnic clashes. Asingo contends that the ethnic clashes were well planned and executed and that this was done by the rift valley political elite who intimidated and blackmailed opposition candidates by influencing the banks to issue bankruptcy threats to opposition figures.[37] Asingo's work seemed to inform this study by acknowledging that the violence was well planned and executed. However, the work failed to disclose who planned it, more so in Likoni constituency.

Karuti Kanyinga, in his article "Limitations of Political Liberalization: Parties and Electoral Politics in Kenya, 1992-2002" argued that the demands for the introduction of a multiparty form of democracy began through the efforts of among others, the Christian churches and disengaged politicians.[38] Kanyinga contended that the early months of 1990 marked the clear beginning of this struggle, which was backed by underground groups like Mwakenya. The opposition groups succeeded in establishing a common front in the name FORD, which appeared to be a threat to Moi's regime. Karuti further argues that FORD later split into various factions, which were based on ethnic and class interests. The end result was to divide the country along similar ethnic lines. Although the work by Karuti informed this study, it never mentioned to the coast or Likoni political violence.

Analyzing the electoral landscape in Kenya, Anders Narman observed that there were several processes that influence the political divisions and alignments witnessed within the country's population.[39] Particularly, he observed how the formation of political parties and their coalitions are reflective of ethnic and regional affiliations, and how the selection of presidential candidates influences the nature and composition of parties' membership.

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[37] P.O. Asingo "The Political Economy of Transition in Kenya" in *The Politics of Transition in Kenya from KANU to NARC*", Nairobi: Heninrich Boll Foundation, 2003, pp.15-51.

[38] Karuti Kanyinga "Limitations of Political Liberalization: Parties and Electoral Politics in Kenya, 1992-2002" in Walter Oyugi, Peter Wanyande and Odhiambo Mbai, in *The Politics of Transition in Kenya from KANU to NARC*, Nairobi: Heninrich Boll Foundation, 2003, pp. 96-124.

[39] Anders Narman, "Election in Kenya" in *Review of African Political Economy Vol. 30 No. 96*, 2003 pp. 343 -350.

Additionally, Narman noted how the winner of the presidential seat tends to shape the allocation of resources in ways that exclude or reward certain ethnic and regional blocs, based on his perception of their loyalty. From these bases, Norman's work was informative to this study especially in helping to understand how political alignments are reflective of ethnic affiliations.

From his analysis of the 1997 electoral process and his treatment of the election as an experiment in Kenya's democratization process, Rok Ajulu concludes that democratization was not an easy process.[40] He justifies this position by noting that it was only after the application of international pressure that the constitution was amended to allow for multi-party democracy in Kenya. Local efforts were therefore insufficient, or inadequate, to bring about this change. Even after receiving constitutional protection, the idea of multi-party democracy still had some way to go before gaining acceptance. As Ajulu observes, the idea of 'free and fair elections' was almost non-existent in the 1997 electoral process, since violence and intimidation were widely used to influence the election's outcome. Even the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) was rendered powerless and could not exercise its legitimate authority in punishing unfair practices.

Ajulu noted that since the 1990s, electoral violence that takes on ethnic dimensions has been common-place in the country. More particularly, there was the incidence of ethnic cleansing at the Kenyan coast in 1997, where militia groups were trained to attack Likoni and Kwale. As evidence he cites the Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHCR) reports, which observed that the attacks were meant to undermine the demographic strengths of opposing parties. While being important to the understanding of the democratization process in Kenya, Ajulu's work still has several gaps. Firstly, it did not explain how ethnicity was manipulated to pursue sectarian interests. Secondly, it did not explain who was responsible for training and outfitting the militia that attacked non - indigenous people in Coast Province. Nevertheless, Ajulu's work will be informative to this study.

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[40] Rok Ajulu, "Kenyan Democracy Experiment: The 1997 Election" in Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 25 No. 76, June 1988, pp. 276- 285.

Saad Yahya argued that there was a link between resource control and distribution, and the conflict in coastal region. Among the resources in contention was land.[41] At independence, the open land policy in the coastal region gave people from other parts of the country an opportunity to invade the Kenyan coast and alienate most of the land. In this process, coastal people became landless and/or squatters, with little or no access to land. Yahya continued to give a detailed account of the violence that engulfed the coastal region in 1997, emanating from Likoni constituency and spreading to Kwale district.[42] This violence lasted about two months, claiming the lives of many and shattering an important sector of Kenya's economy tourism. These attacks targeted non-indigenous communities at the coastal province, such as the Luo and the Luhyia. The weapons necessary for this campaign were obtained by carrying out attacks on police stations. As evidence, Yahya provides reports indicating that over 30 guns and 5000 rounds of ammunition were stolen from several police stations.[43] Over the course of these raids, inmates were freed and three police women were kidnapped.[44] Although Yahya is informative in his analysis, he is rather general in his presentation of the violence that occurred in coast province, without analysis of specific areas and how these areas were affected by the violence.

In his study on politicized ethnic conflicts in Kenya, Walter Oyugi observes that the Coastal violence and conflict is hinged on a resource struggle between the indigenous and immigrant ethnic communities.[45] According to Oyugi, in 1992, the Likoni parliamentary seat had gone to opposition and out of fear of a similar outcome in 1997, the use of violence was conceived by KANU politicians to expel the immigrant groups that were perceived to be opposition supporters.[46] He links violence to senior politicians-cum-businessmen in Mombasa. Oyui further indicates that the security agents acted minimally

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[41] Saad S Yahya, "Who owns the Kenya Coast? The Climaxing of Land Conflicts on the Indian Ocean Seaboard", March 1998.
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] *Ibid.*
[44] Walter Oyugi, "Politicized Ethnic Conflict in Kenya: A Periodic Phenomena" (Addis Ababa, 2000), www.UNFPAN.org accessed on 29/10/2010
[45] *Ibid.*
[46] *Ibid*, p. 12.

in their pursuit of the raiders.[47] He thus contends that the way in which the government handled the 1997 violence makes people feel that either the state or powerful people in the government actively supported the violence.[48] Oyugi further observed that the violence in Mombasa ended as soon as elections were over indicating that they were politically motivated to influence the outcome of the elections. Although Oyugi acknowledges the political influence on the 1997 violence in Mombasa, he did not demonstrate or analyze the possible influence of the repeal of section 2A on local politics and the violence witnessed in Mombasa and Likoni, in particular. To him, it was mainly local politics backed by state influence that motivated the 1997 violence in Mombasa and Likoni.

Analyzing the contribution of Kenyan civil society in bridging the democratization gap between the urban and rural parts of the country, Orvis observes that NGOs have made some significant steps in aiding the country's democratization process.[49] He however states that most of the NGOs have concentrated in urban areas, with limited success in accessing rural parts of the country. Those that have attempted to access the rural areas have done so relying on ethnic, clan, partisan and other non-civil networks to advance their democratic agenda. Orvis' work will greatly inform this study, especially in unraveling the patterns of ethnic manipulation and the construction of identity of 'us-versus-them.

The responsibility for the violence in coast province has often been shifted from KANU to opposition parties, and vice versa.[50] According to Adar and Munyae, violence spread in the Likoni-Kwale areas prior to and after the 1997 general elections; areas where opposition to KANU was strongest.[51] Thus, opposition parties accused the KANU government of attempting to frustrate the democratization process, while the KANU government-particularly president Moi accused the opposition of fanning tribal tension.

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[47] *Ibid.*

[48] *Ibid.*

[49] Stephen Orvis, "Kenyan Civil Society: Bridging the Urban-Rural Divide" in *Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 41, No 2* (2003) Pp 247-268.

[50] James C McKinley Jr., Ethnic Strife in Kenya Derails Talks on Reforms, www.riytimes.com

[51] Korwa C Adar and Isaac Munyae, "Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi, 1978-2001" in African Studies Quarterly.

Such blame games clearly demonstrate the link between national political processes and local political developments, such as outbreaks violence. Adar and Munyae's works opens an opportunity for scholarly reflection as to why there was violence in opposition-dominated region. Could the violence have been sanctioned by the KANU government?

The Kenyan Coast has almost always been of interest to political observers, since the 1997 ethnic clashes. According to George Gona, ethnic clashes in Coast province were instigated by the state, in order to depict the negativity of multiparty politics.[52] The 'native' people of Likoni, too, found in these clashes opportunity to address the sticky question of land ownership in the area, a question which the government had not addressed for a long time. Indeed Political leaders such as Suleiman Shakombo, who demonstrated their intention to address land issue if elected, won election on the platform that they would directly address issues affecting the native population.[53] Gona's analysis points to the fact that at different times, the national political landscape and local political dynamics have shaped the direction that politics and violence have taken in the Kenyan Coast, particularly in Likoni. Gona's work thus offers a partial understanding to the relationship between politics and electoral violence in Likoni, since his work is summative. However, Gona does not link the effect of the constitutional amendments, particularly the repeal of Section 2A, to the Likoni etimic clashes.[54] Gona was also silent on how the government depicted the negativity of multi-party politics. His work, however, is very informative to this study.

Studies that focused on individual cases of ethnic violence at the coast, which would better illustrate the influence of national politics on local political and conflict trends, are missing, Particularly, a serious study on the nexus between the repeal of section 2A and local political and conflict trends in Likoni is what is needed. Although some studies keep referring to Likoni as having been affected by electoral violence since the 1990s, no systematic academic effort has been made to single out and investigate how and why

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[52] G. Gona, "Changing Political Faces on Kenya's Coast, 1992-2007" Journal of Eastern African Studies Vol.2 No. 2. pp. 242-253 July 2008.
[53] Ibid.
[54] G. Gona, "Changing Political Faces on Kenya's Coast, 1992-2007" Journal of Eastern African Studies Vol.2 No. 2. pp. 242-253, July 2008.

violence in Likoni seem prevalent in the post 1990s and if this violence has anything to do with the repeal of section 2A of the constitution.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

This study will be informed by the structural conflict theory, rooted in the works of Johan Galtung.[55] Structuralism is an approach to the human sciences that attempts to analyze specific issues as a complex system of interrelated parts.[56] According to structural theory, meaning is produced and reproduced within a culture through various practices, phenomena and activities that serve as systems of significance.[57]

Others who have built on Galtung's theoretical foundation include Richard Little who argued that the aggregate of human behaviour precipitates structures of which individuals may be unaware.[58] He further argued that such structures, though not necessarily consciously produced, can be reproduced consciously in the future.[59] According to Galtung, there is need to probe beneath the surface manifestation of human motivation in order to identify the invisible but powerful structures which mould and guide behaviour.[60] Although this theory emerged from the study linguistics it was later modified and applied to other fields.

According to the structural conflict theory, conflict does not progress in a linear manner or cyclical form, but occurs due to structural causes, proximate causes and triggers. Structural causes are the underlying causes of the discontent that deals with the relationship between the citizens and the state. These may include but are not limited to inequality and poverty, breakdown of the rule of law, unequal access to the means of

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[55] John Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research Vol. 3*, 1969, pp. 167-191 and J. Galtung "Cultural Violence" in *Journal of Peace Research Vol. 27*, 1999, pp. 291- 305.

[56] Wildpedia encyclopedia, structuralism, found in www.wikipedia.org.

[57] Richard Little, "Structuralism and Neo-Realism" in Margot Light and AJR Groom, (Eds), *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1985, pp. 74-78.

[58] *Ibid.*, p.76.

[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 74-78.

[60] *Ibid.*

production and institutional deficiencies. Thus, once a significant level of inequality is reached in society, there is likelihood of violent conflict.[61]

The existence of structural conflict therefore implies that it is necessary to look beyond the immediate manifestation of physical violence and instead take into account the structure that underlies social relationships, since it might be in itself a source of conflict.[62] Structural conflict theory thus deals with the questions of 'whom' and 'what' is responsible for the generation of conflict. It also has much to do with who 'identifies' the conflict, and hence, who will 'take action' to solve the conflict.[63]

Structural conflict is about structures that generate or cause conflict in society. These structures can be legal, social, economic, social, psychological, religious and political. Essentially, structural conflict must be as a result of relationships in society. In the process of relationships within the society, structures of relationships can create structural conflict which, subject to triggers, can turn into violent conflict.[64] Structural theory has been criticized by Thompson for having a dehumanized view of the world, where systems and subsystem is elements and structures are drilled up and down, pretending to be people. In other words, the theory is criticized for favoring deterministic structural forces over the ability of individual people to act.

Despite the criticism, the structural conflict theory still remained relevant to this study since it scrutinizes the structures of relations and interactions whether conscious or unconscious and how such structures influence people's behavior. Some actors may dominate the minds of others leading to false consciousness' that can be mobilized for selfish interests, thereby resulting in conflict and disruption of coexistence. Therefore, this theory explains how such psychological domination can be mobilized to influence perceptions of the local communities and more often with negative consequences on

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[61] M. Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and institutions of Management*, Nairobi: Watermark, 2000, p. 56.
[62] *Ibid.*
[63] E.P., Thomson, *The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays*, London: Merlin Press, 1978, p. 45.
[64] Wikipedia encyclopedia, *Structuralism*, found at ww.wikipedia.org

community coexistence. Indeed, the repeal of section 2A of the constitution, which in itself is a structure of governance and a basis of resource allocation, had implications on the national and local political scene.

The structural conflict theory is helpful in explaining the structure of relationships between local and national electoral politics. The theory also explained national manipulation of local group identities for political purposes and interests. It offers insights on the structure of relationship between the national political scene and local politics and the possible influence on the 1997 violence in Likoni. This theory therefore was critical in the explanation and understanding what and who is responsible for he 1997 violence in Likoni constituency. Additionally, the theory helped in understanding how the state has created conditions necessary for conflict, by allowing economic marginalization and disparity that once manipulated by politicians, results in violent conflict. The theory also assisted in the investigation of national political manipulation of the local population of Likoni, for purposes of achieving particular interests in national politics during the 1997 elections and the resulting outbreak of violence.

1.7 Hypotheses

The study employed the following hypotheses:

1. The repeal of section 2A of the constitution significantly contributed to the outbreak of ethnic conflicts in Likoni constituency.

2. The Likoni violence negatively impacted on the socio-economic and political life.

1.8 Methodology

This study used both secondary and primary sources.

Secondary Sources

Secondary data was collected from books, political reports, articles from scholarly journals and periodicals, reports by NGOs as well as newspapers such as Daily Nation and the East African Standard. These reading materials will be sourced from libraries

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such as Jomo Kenyatta memorial Library (JKML), Kenya National Assembly Library and African Peace Forum Library.

Primary sources

Apart from reports such as Waki, Krigler and KNHR reports, oral data was gathered through field interviews with different stakeholders, including residents of Likoni. To enable me proceed to the field, I will get a research permit from the Ministry of Education allowing me to collect the desired data for this research. The sampling method was purposive where respondents will be sampled based on the people who are knowledgeable in the subject under study. The study sample was drawn from Provincial Administration, politicians- including former and current Member(s) of parliament area councilors and residents and community leaders of Likoni. Those people who had lived and worked in Likoni as well as civil society officials, including religious leaders and academic and social analysts will also be interviewed in the process of data collection. Purposive sampling will be important in collecting data from selected respondents, who have or are considered to have particularly vital information related to the study.

The categorized informants were reached for interview through the snow-ball technique. This was the method where the initial informants, name other people who had the desired characteristics for interview, until the researcher arrived at the number of cases required.[65] Open ended questionnaires were utilized to collect data from the field. This instrument was important in that it opened an opportunity for the respondents to feel free and give their opinion relating to questions asked. Probing was employed to clarify emerging issues during the interview. Interviews were recorded by note taking although tape recording was utilized to record data only where the respondents' consent was given. Recorded data was transcribed and relevant information drawn. The collected data was analyzed qualitatively. This method of data analysis was important as it explored diverse issues underlying the subject under study, this method also gave the data collected meaning and subjects data to critical scrutiny by qualifying the data.

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[65] Olive Mugenda and Abel Mugenda, *Research Methods*, Nairobi: Act Press, 1999, pp.50 -51.

CHAPTER TWO

THE KENYAN COAST

2.0 Introduction

This chapter is a historical background of the coast region and Mombasa in particular, where Likoni lies. The chapter documents the inhabitants of the coast and in particular Mombasa from the period when the hunters and gatherers first settled in the coastal region. The hunters and gatherers settled in the coast before the Bantu speaking Mijikenda (Duruma, Giriama, Digo, Kauma, Chonyi, Ribe, Kambe, Taita and Taveta) groups moved in. Later in the 11th Century non-African populations from the outside world began trading with the coast of Kenya. Some of who would settle permanently at the coast.

The main aim of this chapter is to discuss the historical background of the coast region since the period of settlement of early inhabitants (hunters and gatherers). The chapter further analyses the movement of other groups into the coast. These groups would include the Mijikenda, the Arabs, Portuguese, the Oman Arabs and the British. Settlement of different groups at the coast exposed the region to different administrative powers, thus influencing the coastal way of life. Since Likoni which is the main subject of this study is in the coast province, it would be of great interest to first understand the history of the coast region. This chapter is largely a history of the coast which would help in the understanding of the different people who settled at the coast in different historical times.

2.1 Coast Inhabitants

The coast of Kenya was originally inhabited by hunters and gathers Stone Age people. These people were then replaced by or merged with Cushitic speaking people from the north that migrated into the region and arguably may have been the tall piratical people referred to in the writings of the Greek merchant's guidebook known as the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea written in the first century AD. Although the guidebook mentions these people we cannot be sure from these early written accounts about the exact origins

of the coastal people. The Greek referred to these people and the entire inhabitants of Africa as Ethiopian, a word which was often used loosely to refer to the whole of Africa south of Sahara.[66]

Evidence shows that in the early centuries of the first millennium A.D. Bantu-speaking groups started to move northwards along the Kenyan coast as far as the area known as Shungwaya on the southern borders of Kenya with Somalia. Although little trace of it can be found today it is believed to have been in the vicinity of port Durnford in the current day Somalia coast. Port Durnford therefore became an important settlement area for these early Bantu migrants. The Bantu possibly spread out along the coast of southward movement and assimilated the Cushitic speaking people who had settled on the coast earlier. By the middle of the first millennium AD., the Bantu speakers had already established settlement along the coast.[67]

The question of the ownership of the Coastal region in general and Mombasa in particular can be clearly be explained in relation with the migration and settlement of the hunters, Gatherers and the Bantu ancestors of the Mijikenda who inhabited a place called Shungwaya. Shungwaya is a region between the mouth of the Tana River and Port Dunford, probably located in the current day coast of Somalia. The Mijikenda comprise of the Giriama, Ribe, Kauma, Chonyi, Duruma, Digo, Kambe, Taita and the Taveta people.[68] These ethnic groups were driven from Shungwaya by the more warlike communities such as the Galla and the Somali who inhabited the country to the north of Shungwaya. In the early 17th century, before the coming of rise of the coastal city states, the ancestors of the Mijikenda were already settled in nine individual fortified hilltop *Kayas* or villages parallel to the Kenyan Coast.[69]

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[66] Abdalla, Bujra, "Islam in Eastern Africa: Historical Legacy and Contemporary Challenges", Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF), August 2002, Addis Ababa.
[67] Atieno Odhiambo, et al., *A History of East Africa*, Nairobi: Longman, 1986, pp. 16-23.
[68] KNA, DC/MAL/2/3, Anthropological and History 1913-1949.
[69] *Ibid.*

2.2 Establishment of City States

Settlement along the coast exposed the Bantu to constant contact with traders from overseas. The contact marked the start of the process of international trade, settlement and intermarriage that led to the formation of a distinct coastal people and culture. Of those who came to east Africa by sea there were the early Greeks, Egyptians and Arab speaking traders who did not settle permanently but frequently visited introducing a very important historical mark in the history of the coast.[70]

By the 7th century Mombasa and the neighboring islands were self-governing settlements that had established varying patterns of relationships. Slowly Mombasa and other neighbouring towns developed centralized political organization. Immigrant Arabs and Persia were allowed to settle in these towns. The populations of Mombasa and other towns in the coast became a mixture of indigenous people and immigrant races.[71] From about the 11 Century the pace of immigration and settlement at the Coast seems to have increased. These were no longer traveling merchants because now they were prepared to stay for a season or two before returning home in the Arab world. To some extent some Arab clans and families come to establish new homes for themselves and intermarrying with the local population. Apart from those who came to settle permanently in Eastern Africa there remained a large number of traders and sailors who traveled seasonally up and down the coast.[72] They included Arabs from the Arab world.

The rulers of the coastal settlement took an active part in developing and encouraging trade through their towns. Among all the occupations of the inhabitants that of the merchant was the most prominent and prosperous. Mombasa as was other towns had its own ruler, a Sheikh or Sultan, usually chosen from the leading local family, in most cases those who claimed descent from Arab or Persian ruling families. These rulers would govern with the advice of a small council, with specific tasks for certain officials. The

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[70] Masao, F. T and H. W. Mutoro, "The East African Coast and the Comoros Islands" in M. El Fasi (ed), *UNESCO General history of Africa III: Africa from the Seventh to Eleventh Century*, Nairobi: East African Publishers, 1993.
[71] *Ibid.*
[72] Shariff, A. M. H, "The East African Coast and its Role in Maritime Trade" in G. Mokhtar (ed), *UNESCO General History of Africa II*, Nairobi: East African Publishers, 1994.

rulers followed the principles and direction as laid down by the Islamic faith, or embodied in the Koran. By the 14th Mombasa had acquired a distinctive character and life of its own.

The daily pattern of life would be much like that of any other seaport in the Islamic world of that time. Life included regular prayers offered at the mosques and Muslim festivals were frequently observed by the Muslim inhabitants. There was also coming and going of ships and traders, occasional military operation on the mainland, the tending of fields and plantations, the weaving of cloth and the construction of new buildings. [73] It was a flourishing and active society, but one which was confined to the coastal towns and settlements and had little influence on the hinterland. The prosperity of Mombasa town collapsed mainly with the coming of the Portuguese and the Oman invaders.[74]

2.3 Indian Ocean Trade

The Indian Ocean Trade began with small trading settlements around 800 A.D., and ended in the 1500's when the Portuguese invaded and tried to control the trade for their own profit. The Indian Ocean slave trade predates the Islamic era.[75] With the rapid Arab conquest of the Middle East in the 7th century, the Indian Ocean became an Arab, set contested at times by the Persians.[76] The Arabs conducted slave trade into the 19th and 20th century when the Sultan of Zanzibar opened palm oil and spice plantations in East Africa.[77]

As trade intensified between Africa and Asia, powerful city-states flourished along the eastern coast of Africa. These included Kilwa, Sofala, Mombasa, Malindi, and others. The city-states traded with inland kingdoms like Great Zimbabwe to obtain gold, ivory,

[73] Atieno Odhiambo, et al., *A History of East Africa*, Nairobi: Longman, 1986, pp. 16-23.
[74] *Ibid.*
[75] Clark, Leon, *Through African Eyes: Cultures in Change. Volume III: The African Past and the Coming of the European*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1970, pp. 62-67
[76] H. Misigo Amatsimbi, *History of Kenya to 1900*, University of Nairobi, Centre for Open and Distance Learning, pp. 120-145.
[77] Davidson, Basil, *The Lost Cities of Africa*, Little, Brown and Company. Pages 171- 212

and iron.[78] At the same time, the East African city-states were buying items from Asia such as cotton, silk, and porcelain objects. The city-states along the eastern coast of Africa made ideal centers of trade. An important attraction was the gold obtained from inland kingdoms.[79] Merchants, tired after their long overseas journey, enjoyed the fine restaurants, lodging, and entertainment offered by the port cities. Finally, East Africa was a peaceful region, and the few conflicts that did occur were small and brief. All of these factors created an ideal setting for import-export companies to conduct business.[80]

Many of the merchants from the Arabian Peninsula, India, and Southeast Asia stayed in the city-states of East Africa. Although interracial marriages were not uncommon, as time went by gradually over the centuries, a new and distinct ethnic group developed, known as the Swahili. Today millions of Swahili people live in the nations of East Africa, where the Swahili language is widely spoken. The Swahili language is a mixture of the Arabic, Hindi, and Bantu languages. The Swahili city-states steadily grew and prospered, and were a major world economic power and were famous throughout Africa and Asia, no European countries knew of them until the Portuguese captain Vasco da Gama came across the bustling port cities of Sofala, Kilwa, Mombasa, and Malindi as he sailed up the eastern coast of Africa. He and his crew were welcomed by each of the cities he visited apart from the city of Mombasa, although neither his ships nor the European items they attempted to trade were of much interest to the Swahili governments.[81]

Vasco da Gama's mission was to find a route to Asia by sailing from Portugal, around Africa, then on to India. European countries had been buying Asian goods for years through other, more difficult routes. But now the countries of Europe had begun looking for faster, cheaper routes to Asia. Vasco da Gama did eventually reach India with the help of a navigator from Malindi named Majid. On his return to Portugal da Gama told the king and queen, who had sponsored his voyage, everything that he'd seen, including

[78] Sibanda, M., Moyana, H., and Gumbo, S.D., *The African Heritage: History for Junior Secondary Schools. Book 1.* Harare: Zimbabwe Educational Books (PVT) LTD, (no date), pp. 97-106.
[79] Davidson, Basil, *The Growth of African Civilization: East and Central Africa to the late Nineteenth Century*, London: Longman Publishing Company, pp. 95-119.
[80] *Ibid.*
[81] Davidson, Basil, *The Growth of African Civilization: East and Central Africa to the late Nineteenth Century*, London: Longman Publishing Company, pp. 95-119.

the shiploads of gold, ivory, porcelain, silk, and cotton being bought and sold in the port cities along the eastern coast of Africa.[82]

The Portuguese government took immediate interest in the Swahili city states. They sent more ships to the eastern coast of Africa with three goals: to take anything of value they could find, to force the kings of the city to pay taxes to Portuguese tax collectors, and to gain control over the entire Indian Ocean trade. The city-states had never needed forts or huge armies, and were unprepared for the Portuguese attacks. One-by-one, the Portuguese captured the port cities, then wrecked, looted, and burned them to the ground. The residents of the cities who were unable to escape were killed. Shiploads of priceless goods were sent back to Portugal. However, the Portuguese attempt to take over and run the Indian Ocean trade was a failure.[83] Although the Portuguese destroyed the Swahili city states as shown by the archaeological evidence some remains such as the pieces of Chinese porcelain vases and dishes have been found along east African beaches. These remains indicated that people from different parts of the world including Muslims traded and settled in the East African coast.

The Muslims settled along the coast, engaging in trade. The Shirazi intermarried with the local Bantu people resulting in the Swahili people, most of who were converted to Islam hence resulting to Swahili language which was a Bantu language with heavy borrowings from Arabic language. Primarily, Islam spread through the assimilation of individuals, with the Arab Muslims who had settled in small groups maintaining their culture, and religious practices. Despite encountering local communities, Islam was not 'indigenized' along the patterns of the local Bantu communities. Nevertheless, Islam grew through absorption of individuals into the newly established Afro-Arabic Muslim communities.[84]

The Swahili people and Swahili culture emerged from these island city-states through the interactions and inter-marriage of Africans island natives and settlers from the hinterland

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[82] Clark, Leon, *Through African Eves: Cultures in Change. Volume III: The African Past and the Coming of the European*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1970, pp, 62-67.
[83] Davidson, Basil, *The Lost Cities of Africa*, Little, Brown and Company, pp. 171- 212.
[84] *Ibid*

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and Arabs, Iranians and some Indians settlers from across the Ocean. This process took place over several centuries and with successive waves of migrations. Islam was at the core of Swahili culture of these city-states which were actively involved in the international trade of the Indian Ocean.[85] The Muslim Swahili coastal communities were prosperous from their linkage with international trade of the Indian Ocean and maintaining peaceful coexistence with each other.[86]

The presence of the Portuguese and Arab Muslims in Mombasa marked the beginning of European and Arab presence at the coast and Mombasa in particular.[87] Until the mid-1880s the British position rested on the on the mainland sovereignty of her protected sultan of Zanzibar and campaign against slave trade.[88] In 1889 the British after the occupation of Egypt moved to control the Nile headwaters. By 1895 Britain declared the region now known as Kenya as the East African Protectorate. Then, for six years, the British engaged in the construction and protection of the Uganda railway from Mombasa which reached Lake Victoria in 1901.[89]

The construction of the railway from Mombasa to Uganda attracted more and more immigrants from poverty-stricken districts of India in search of economically potential regions. Stories of better economic prospects in East Africa which were reaching India stimulated emigration. Subsequently more families were called from India by their relatives at the coast to come and settle in Mombasa and exploit the available economic opportunities.[90] The location of Mombasa acted as a pull to the high number of foreigners due to a number of various factors. First, it occupied a unique position in the vast complex of railroad and sea, communication of Eastern Africa. It was rapidly developing

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[85] Abdalla, Bujra, "Islam in Eastern Africa: Historical Legacy and Contemporary Challenges", Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF), August 2002, Addis Ababa.
[86] H. Misigo Amatsimbi, *History of Kenya to 1900*, University of Nairobi, Centre for Open and Distance Learning, pp. 120-145.
[87] *Ibid.*
[88] Sheriff, A. M. H., "The East African Coast and its Role in Maritime Trade", in M. El Fasi (ed), *UNESCO General History of Africa III: Africa from the Seventh to Eleventh Century*, Nairobi: East African Publishers, 1993.
[89] *Ibid.*
[90] Karim Kassam Janmohamed, *A History of Mombasa, C. 1895-1939, Some Aspects of Economic and Social Life in East African Port Town during Colonial Rule*, Illinois: Northwestern University, PhD. Thesis 1977, pp.44-80.

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into a convenient point where the import and export trade could be organized.[91] This development was greatly facilitated by the increasing number of ships calling at Kilindini Harbour. The table below shows the distribution of Kenya migrants. The volume of immigration into the coastal region of the principal races for eight years is well illustrated in the table. According to the table it was evident that, Mombasa therefore was an attraction region for all the races, sexes and ages who would in later years have an economic and political say as the foreign population increased.[92]

The British had economic desire such as need for markets of manufactured goods and raw materials for British industries back home. When the protectorate was declared most African communities resisted this establishment of British rule because they wanted to safeguard their independence. This forced the British to use the policy of divide and conquer by allying themselves with communities which appeared accommodative while using their warriors against those who resisted the British rule.[93] Declaration of the protectorate over Kenya exposed the coastal people to the colonial policy of land alienation.

The British colonial land alienation processes in the coast fractured pre-colonial economies and inter-ethnic relations among the people of the coast. The Mijikenda people, who are the indigenous of the coast, had mixed economies. These economies included pursuing trading strategies which linked them to the local and international traders. Trade promoted ethnic relations that were mutually beneficial and helped to neutralize potential rivalry and conflict within communities living at the coast.[94] Colonial policies created a common political administrative centre, which had the effect of bringing together all ethnic groups under one authority but saw the division of the state into ethnic administrative enclaves, and the confinement of the "natives" to their reserves. The colonial alienation of land in the coastal region therefore robbed the Mijikenda their

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[91] *Ibid.*
[92] A. Walter, *Statistics of Migration Through the Port of Mombasa*, Nairobi: Department of Statistical Research, British East Africa, Statistical to the Conference of East African Governors, and Director of the Meteorological Service, Memoir No. 7, 1931, pp.1-15.
[93] Tiyambe Zeleza, "The establishment of colonial rule, 1905-1920", in William Ochieng's *A Modern History of Kenya 1895-1980*, Nairobi: Evans Brothers Limited, pp.35-38.
[94] Hyder Kindy, *Life and Politics in Mombasa*, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972, pp. 33-40.

land use rights.[95] During the colonial period, inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts at the coast were nurtured by the policies and conditions created by British colonial rule. These policies included division of the coastal region into districts without taking into account the interests of the Mijikenda communities. Secondly, the British did not respect the Mijikenda *kayas* and its leadership hence creating mistrust and hatred between the indigenous people and the colonial rulers.[96]

The conflicting relationship was also nurtured by the British colonial economic policies. The pattern of development during the colonial period was uneven with resulting disparities in resources and amenities between ethnic groups and districts.[97] This uneven economic and social development exacerbated ethnic and sub-ethnic divisions and became an obstacle to ethnic unity. The development of the port facility encouraged young people to migrate in search for employment in Mombasa. Although development of the Mombasa port was a positive move by the British employment was discriminatory in the sense that the Mijikenda were perceived to be lazy hence the British favoured the up-country people. It was mainly due to this that the Mijikenda developed hatred for the up-country people.[98]

2.4 African Migrants to Mombasa

Mombasa District recorded some of the highest numbers of in-migrants. Majority of these people were seeking employment opportunities.[99] In their effort to open up Uganda to the international waters, the British occupied Kenya and began the construction of a railroad from Mombasa to Kisumu. With the construction of the railroad many people migrated to Mombasa both as workers as well as businessmen. By 1930s a large number of migrants from all over Kenya were moving to Mombasa to try to earn a living.[100] The

[95] *Ibid.*
[96] Maina wa Kinyatti, *History of Resistance in Kenya 1884-2002*, Nairobi: Mau Mau Research Centre, 2008, pp. 1-7.
[97] A. Mazrui, *Violence, Ethnicity and State in Coastal Kenya*, Nairobi: Kenya Human Rights Commission, 1997.
[98] *Ibid.*
[99] S. Ngiriri Njue, "Origins and Demographic Characteristics of Migrants in Mombasa", University of Nairobi, Post-Graduate diploma Project, Development studies, 1988, pp. 13-27.
[100] *Ibid.*

dominance of migrants to Mombasa by 1938 was that of adolescents and young adults in their economic productive age as indicated on the table below.

Distribution of Migrants in Mombasa in 1930s by Age and Sex

Age Group	Percent of Total male as a percent of Total Migrant Population	Percent of Total Female as a percent of total Migrant Population	Total Percent
0-4	5.97	6.04	12.01
5-9	5.17	5.66	10.83
10-14	4.17	4.57	8.74
15-19	7.37	7.91	15.28
20-24	9.91	7.97	17.88
25-29	6.29	4.95	11.24
30-34	3.99	2.94	6.93
35-39	2.67	1.99	4.66
40-44	1.89	1.50	3.39
45-49	1.43	1.26	2.69
50+	2.74	3.27	6.01
N/S	0.19	0.12	0.31
Total	51.79	48.18	100
N	29,061	27,029	56,090

Source: Ngiriri, S. Origins and Demographic Characteristics of Migrants in Mombasa, University of Nairobi, Post-Graduate Diploma Project, Development Studies, 1988, p. 14.

The number of migrants in Mombasa continued to increase through 1940s, 1950s and 1960s hence by 1979, the Kenya population census indicated that, migrants in Mombasa numbered 56,090 in total, the male comprising of 29,061 (51.79%) of the total migrant population, while the female comprised of 27,029 (48.18%) of the total migrant population. It was evident that the dominant age among migrants was between ages 15-

29.[101] Trends indicated that, the male in the age group 15-19 constituted 7.37 percent of the total population of migrants to Mombasa. The females in the same age group however tended to be more as they constituted 7.91 percent of the total migrants. This was explained by the tendency of the Young girls who migrated to the Mombasa to work as maids and babysitters.[102] The migration of up-country people into Mombasa was therefore, motivated by employment opportunities related to tourism, marine and shipping.[103]

Within the Coast Province, most migrants to Mombasa originated from districts such as Kilifi, Taita Taveta and arid parts of Kwale districts, while from outside the province, Kitui, Siaya, Machakos and Kisumu were the major contributors of migrants to Mombasa. The high migration rates from the above mentioned districts were due to low employment opportunities found the districts. In Ukambani region the situation was worsened by the economic, social and ecological linkages of the Kamba people broke down leading to soil erosion, overstocking, and persistence of famine since 1954.[104] A combination of these factors inevitably led to out-migration principally to Mombasa, which has hence forth become part and parcel of the Kamba way of life.[105] Similar economic conditions informed the migration from other districts such as, Kakamega, Siaya and Kisumu. For Kakamega, Kisumu and other districts, besides unemployment, population densities acted as a push factor to the process of migration and human adjustment from these areas to urban centres such as Mombasa.[106] Mombasa therefore received migrants from all the districts of Kenya and neighbouring countries.

[101] Government of Kenya (hereafter ,GOK) Ministry of Finance and Planning, "1979 Population Census, Volume 2 Analytical Report" Nairobi; Frejos Design Graphics 1979.
[102] Ibid.
[103] S. Ngiriri Njue, "Origins and Demographic Characteristics of Migrants in Mombasa", University of Nairobi, Post-Graduate diploma Project, 1988, pp. 13-27.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Oral interview, Hassan Juma Kajembe, Likoni, 6/5/2010.
[106] S. Ngiriri Njue, "Origins and Demographic Characteristics of Migrants in Mombasa", University of Nairobi, Post-Graduate diploma Project, 1988, pp. 13-27.

2.5 The Coastal Province Land Problems

The movement of different communities to the coast exacerbated the land problem at the coast. Kenya inherited a highly skewed system of land ownership at independence in 1963. British colonialism in Kenya was not merely administrative. Rather, it was accompanied by massive and widespread land alienation for the benefit of settler agriculture. As a result the best agricultural land-the White Highlands and the adjacent rangelands were taken from the Africans, without compensation, and parceled out to white settlers. Colonial legislation was enacted to legalize this process. As a result, whole communities lost valuable land that they had occupied over generations. The customary land tenure systems under which Africans had guaranteed claims over the land they occupied were supplanted by the registration of individual title holders under the colonial system.[107]

This explains why the Africans would wage a bitter war against the colonial regime which led to independence in 1963. The African hope was that they would get back the lost land. Independence government failed to reverse this loss of African land. The colonial legislation protecting the rights of the land title holders was inherited by the first post-independence government of President Jomo Kenyatta. The Constitution negotiated at Lancaster House in London, provided for an elaborate protection of private property without reference to the history of its acquisition.[108] The successive post-independence governments have continued to uphold the sanctity of privately owned land to the frustration of the large number of Kenyans who had been dispossessed through colonialism leaving them squatters on their ancestral land or landless poor. This situation demanded an equitable land distribution process that was capable of providing livelihood opportunities to the landless poor as well as redressing colonial wrongs and re-establishing justice in the land sector.[109]

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[107] Kenya Land Alliance, "National Land Policy in Kenya: Addressing Historical Injustices" Issues Paper No. 2/2004.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Republic of Kenya, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land*, Government Printer, Nairobi, 2004

The severity of the problem of historical injustices was repeatedly articulated to the various forums established by the government, including the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law System of Kenya and the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land and the National Land Policy Formulation Process. The Draft Constitution of Kenya which was rejected at a referendum in 2005 recognized this problem of historical injustices and required the government to effectively address them. This is in recognition of the fact that equitable access to land is an essential precursor for economic development in Kenya, as most primary and secondary economic activities- agriculture, tourism, mining, pastoralism and agro-based manufacturing sector -are dependent on land.[110]

The failure by successive independence governments to adequately deal with historical injustices has allowed the grievances to fester and the problem to ferment into a national crisis. Reports by both government and non-governmental agencies have recorded that the violent clashes and conflicts over land-based resources in the Coastal Province and other parts of the country in the 1990s were ignited by the political exploitation of these grievances. Since then, far from subsiding, these kinds of clashes appear to have gained momentum nationwide. The various studies of the land question in Kenya have established the inextricable linkages between the problems of poverty, insecurity and landlessness.[111]

The landlessness led to the squatter problem at the coastal province therefore worsening the problem. The Draft National Land Policy developed by the government identified the problem of squatters at the coast as a historical product. Although the precise number of squatters was unknown, it was clearly a problem that dates back to the colonial period when Africans were declared Tenants at will of the Crown following the Crown Lands

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[110] Republic of Kenya, Draft National Land Policy, 2006.
[111] Kenya Land Alliance, "National Land Policy in Kenya: Addressing Historical Injustices" Issues Paper No. 2/2004.

Ordinance of 1915.[112] Most of the displaced peasants never got back their land after independence owing to the limitations of the post-colonial land resettlement policy. After independence, the Kenyatta government opted for a land resettlement programme based on a "willing buyer-willing seller" system rather than direct land repossession and redistribution. However, two serious shortcomings undermined this land resettlement program. First, the market-based system required mobilization of financial resources which many of the landless at the coast did not have.[113]

The coastal landless were the poorest of the poor and the loan-scheme that was established to advance credit to the landless to enable them purchase land did not improve their livelihoods and development as many were unable to repay the loans leaving them in an insecure tenure regime and totally inhibiting their economic potential. As a result, the middle class and other economic elites from up-country who had the resources bought the land at the coast. Second, corruption in the land resettlement programme allowed the corrupt political and economic elites within the Kenyatta government to acquire land that was meant for the landless at the coat province. As a result a large number of the genuinely landless lost out on the opportunity and remained locked in a cycle of poverty this further denied them opportunities for improved livelihoods and development.[114]

In every corner of the coast, there is a significant number of squatters who trace their landlessness to historical injustices and the failure of the post-independence governments to undertake a comprehensive resettlement programme. Their status as squatters has also left them in grinding poverty and vulnerable to all manner of human rights violations, including incessant evictions. This historical failure has given rise to a deep seated sense of grievance among many of the coastal squatters.[115]

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[112] Republic of Kenya, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land*, Government Printer, Nairobi, 2004.

[113] Republic of Kenya, Draft National Land Policy, 2006.

[114] Kenya Land Alliance, "National Land Policy in Kenya: Addressing Historical Injustices" Issues Paper No. 2/2004.

[115] Republic of Kenya, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land*, Government Printer, Nairobi, 2004.

2.6 The Likoni Land Problem

The widespread landlessness in the Coast Province and in particular Likoni division has unique historical origins. It is traced back to the decision by the Colonial government to introduce a system of individual land title deeds under the Land Titles Ordinance to those who claimed ownership rights within the Ten Mile Coastal Strip. Unfortunately, only a few of the local inhabitants were aware of the process and few availed themselves of the opportunity to register land in their names. As a result, the land that they inhabited was declared Crown Land, which later became Government Land at independence. However, many people of Arab descent acquired vast pieces of land in the Ten Mile Coastal Strip, although they did not occupy it. To this day, they continue to collect rent from the local inhabitants of Likoni as absentee landlords. This problem is a source of a deeply-felt grievance by the local inhabitants of Likoni who find themselves squatters in their ancestral land.[116]

The Likoni land problem was further perpetuated by the fact that after 1963, the independence governments embarked on various initiatives to create new economic opportunities that did not address the Coast peoples 'land hunger'. Initiatives such as the development of tourism industry and the corruption riddled re-settlement programmes, have all failed to address colonial wrongs at the Coast. These initiatives would also encourage many people to migrate to the coast for employment opportunities at the expense of the Likoni people therefore worsening the situation. The politicians took advantage of the already worsened situation to instigate violence that was witnessed at Likoni.[117]

The politically instigated violence of the 1990s in Likoni left a large number of Kenyans displaced from their land. Many of the displaced had acquired title to their land through purchase or as part of resettlement by the government. Some of those displaced have never managed to go back to their land, which in some cases, has since been occupied by

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[116] Kenya Land Alliance and Kenya Human rights Commission, "Historical Injustices and Land Reforms in Kenya", Nakuru: Kenya Land Alliance, www.kenyalandalliance.or.ke, accessed on 22/02/2011.
[117] Ibid.

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politically influential individuals.[118] This has spawned a large number of individuals who legally own the land, but cannot in practice use or access it owing to lack of security. Although land was the main grievance of ethnic clashes in Likoni, politics and other factors played a significant role as will be discussed in the next chapter

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter began with the description of the coastal inhabitants since the period when the hunters and gatherers settled at the coast. The chapter gives an understanding of the composition of the coastal inhabitants. This leads to a better understanding of the roots of conflict that affected Likoni area. Since the coastal region was ruled by different powers we classified the history of the region depending on the groups that administered the region. Generally the chapter addresses the migration of different groups of people into the coastal region. We traced the history of non-African inhabitants at the coast, the African migrants who comprised of the so called the up-country people famously referred to by the coastal people as the *Wa-Bara*. These Kenyan African communities moved to the coast for various reasons among them employment in the port facility and the tourism industry. The non-African migrants comprised of the Europeans, Arabs and Indians who also migrated into the coast for various reasons, among them was the construction of the railroad to Uganda. Conflict in the Islamic world forced some Arab families to migrate and settle in peaceful regions of Kenyan coast. While some Indians migrated to the coast in order to exploit available business opportunities.

The settlement of different communities at the coast led to displacement of some members of the Mijikenda community. The displacement led to discontentment among the members of the Mijikenda communities who felt that apart from loosing their land, they also lost the employment opportunities to the up-country people. As argued by the structural conflict theorists, the coastal communities felt marginalized by both the colonial and post-colonial governments. The marginalization therefore, informs the type of interaction and relationships between the communities that lived at the coast. It was this relationship that influenced conflict that was witnessed in Likoni constituency.

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[118] *Ibid*

Various theories have been fronted to explain the root causes of the conflict at Likoni which is the main subject of discussion in chapter three.

CHAPTER THREE

ROOTS OF CLASHES IN LIKON CONSTITUENCY, 1895-1991

3.0 Introduction

The year 1895 marked a change in Likoni history with the creation of the East African Protectorate. This anchored the moral obligation as agreed in the Berlin Conference on the British to lawfully administer Kenya. The British began the process by engaging in economic developments such as development of the infrastructure and convincing European settlers to come hand settle in Kenya. For this to succeed the Africans were to be displaced in order to create room for not only the settlers but also for the construction of the harbour at Kilindini in Likoni. The displacement left the Africans bitter because it interfered with their economic activities or livelihood. Africans were to remain in the disappointment state until when they could no longer bear it, hence they resorted to armed struggle with hope of regaining back their lost land and independence.

Although the Africans in Likoni as were from other parts of Kenya fought for land, most of them never achieved their objective of getting back the land which had been lost to the White settlers. The post-independence government adopted a policy of willing buyer of land. The policy did not favour most of the local Likoni people. It could be argued that almost all local structures were not developed to favour economic competition with the so called migrants. The less developed structures became potential cause for conflict as argued by the structural conflict theorists. Although Likoni region interacted with people from many parts of the world, the region suffered from low levels of education to the local people. This low level of education laid a structural discrimination against the Likoni people in terms economic and political competition. Most of the Likoni population could not access employment due to the regions poor education, leaving most of the opportunities to go to the up-country migrants.

This chapter we will deal the background to structural discrimination against the people of Likoni and discuss on land issue during the colonial period and in relation to Lancaster Constitutional making and how the land question influenced the formation of the early

political parties in Kenya. We will also look at how the same land question emerged during the 1980s and 1990s call for multi-party politics and how it influenced life in Likoni. Further more the chapter relates the land question, multi-party politics and the ethnic clashes that were experienced in Likoni in 1991 and 1997. How politics played out in these ethnic clashes is our area of concern in this chapter.

3.1 Roots of Likoni Clashes

The British conquest of the Mijikenda of Likoni after the crush of the Giriama Rebelion of 1914 was followed by the consolidation of colonial administration. The consolidation led to suppression of the African economy and introduction of suppressive policies against the Africans which informed the rebellion.[119] Although the Mijikenda engaged in squatter farming, the British colonial administration tried to frustrate peasant production by creating marketing, licensing, taxation and transport conditions. These obstacles which denied the Africans the right to economic prosperity led to the Giriama Rebellion in 1914 and since then the land issue remained a major problem to the Mijikenda community.[120] By 1922 the Land Office had issued 9,190 titles to Indians and Europeans in Mombasa, Malindi, Mambwi and Takaungu turning the Mijikenda to be squatters on European coastal plantations.[121]

During the rebellion 250 Giriama were killed, 70 per cent of all Giriama houses were burned, and 6,000 goats were captured. Although the British had silenced the coastal people, they remained bitter more so after they lost their land to the British settlers. After the British colonial government's victory over local resistance, there continued to exist within the local people feelings and sentiments of resistance although silently as compared to the Giriama rebellion.[122] The period from 1914 to 1945 witnessed suppression of the Likoni people under the British domination. The status of domination remained until the political awakening of the Africans after 1945 World War II

[119] W.R. Ochieng', *A Modern History of Kenya, 1895-1980*, Nairobi: Evans Brothers Limited, 1989, p. 48.
[120] *Ibid.*
[121] *Ibid.*
[122] Wunyabari Maloba, "Nationalism and decolonization, 1947-1963", in *A Modern History of Kenya, 1895-1980*, Nairobi: Evans Brothers Limited, 1989, p.181.

experiences. After the Second World War, Africans formed the protest movements which were used as a machinery to address African grievances.

The African grievances were not adequately addressed because the colonial administrators received orders from White Hall in Westminster Abbey. Such orders from His Majesty's government were sent to the Governor of Kenya, who in turn passed it to the PCs, DCs, DOs and colonial African Chiefs. The orders included ordinances that snatched African land. The Kenyan people were never consulted nor their approval sought. As a result of the above, the armed struggle for independence ensued, and on 20tn October, 1952 Sir Evelyn Barring declared a State of Emergency. After the declaration of the state of emergency the British launched a military offensive against the African freedom fighters.[123] The emergency ended in 1960 and followed on by the Lancaster House Conference of 1962. In the two conferences the main issue of concern was making of a compromise constitution which could be accepted by both parties of KANU and KADU as Kenya headed towards independence.

3.3 Towards Independence, The Land Question

The early story of the land conflict in Kenya stems from the history colonization and change of thought as Kenyans moved towards independence, and as political influence in Kenya shifted from the Europeans to the Africans. The African private ownership of land took place in 1960 with the amendment of the laws that had excluded African landownership in Kenya. Under the Swynnerton Plan of 1954, the Government was conducting a major revolution in African landownership and farming. The Plan promoted an intensive African agricultural development drive based on change of landownership from customary tenure to individual freehold.[124]

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[123] Kinyatti Maina, *History of Resistance in Kenya, 1884-2002*, Nairobi: Mau Mau Research Centre, 2008, p. 211.
[124] N.S. Carey Jones, "The Decolonization of the White Highlands of Kenya", in *The Geographical Journal, Vol. 131, No. 2,* (Jun., 1965), pp. 186-192, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1793793. Accessed: 14/03/2009.

The plan involved enclosure and registration of existing land with the purpose of giving through individual ownership, the greatest incentive to farmers to make the jump from subsistence agriculture to cash crop farming for economic growth. The plan was to be geared into the complex and highly organized agricultural marketing system of Kenya, designed to bring to the farmer a steady and high return for his produce. Secondly it would enable farmers to acquire agricultural long-term credit by pledging their land against borrowings and through permanent title.[125] The Mijikenda ethnic groups had already suffered from land pressure, with the result that some had very small holdings. Land pressure and the existence of a landless class existed among the Mijikenda. The plan was perceived by the Mijikenda as introducing a new rigidity into land titles. This heightened the division of landed some of who were up-country people and indigenous coastal people who were landless.[126]

The overpopulated areas at the coast, all bordering the former white farms had inhabitants who looked over the border and saw the more developed European farms. This land had previously been in Mijikenda occupation and little used. Most of the Mijikenda groups and non-coastal people claimed parts of the former European farms. This led to laying claim to ethnical spheres which went hand in hand with the thought of excluding other non-coastal ethnic groups.[127] Although some up-country people were expelled from the coast, some such as the Kikuyu remained farming on their farms although with fear while some of the up-country people remained in the coastal towns. Unemployment, therefore, rose in the towns. European farmers, with an uncertain future, ceased developing their farms leading to reduced employment on the land and increased trade union activities. The trade unionists and political leaders talked of taking over the European lands at independence.[128]

[125] *Ibid.*
[126] N.S. Carey Jones, "The Decolonization of the White Highlands of Kenya", in *The Geographical Journal, Vol. 131, No. 2,* (Jun., 1965), pp. 186-192, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1793793. Accessed: 14/03/2009.
[127] *Ibid.*
[128] *Ibid.*

To add to the over-population already existing in the Mijikenda Reserves were the new unemployed from the towns and farms that moved back to the Reserves because the up-country people had taken over many jobs. These pressures mounted in the coastal region and sharpened the ethnic exclusiveness mostly against the up-country ethnic groups.[129] The Mijikenda communities had in mind that they should share the European lands with each of the major Mijikenda ethnic groups, even if they had little or no need of more land, since the original desire was to keep other Africans or up-country ethnic groups out of their sphere of influence or coastal land politics. It was hoped at one time to be able to achieve mixed settlement at the coast, but this proved to be impossible as ethnic feelings hardened and divided communities even more as seen in the discussions in the Lancaster House Conferences.[130]

The conferences were attended by the then governor with all the elected and specially elected members of the Legislative Council. The talks were for the first time, to agree on a framework constitution. In 1963, a regional or then known as *Majimbo* type of constitution was agreed upon by both parties and Kenya became independent on 12th December, 1963. The delegates in the constitutional talks from both KANU and KADU were opposed to being ruled or governed from Whitehall where all the power was centred and opted to govern themselves through a system that de-centralized the power from the center to the regional assemblies and to ensure equitable distribution of the country's resources. The agreement was reached because the political atmosphere was tense.[131]

The KADU proponents such as Daniel arap Moi, Ronald Ngala, Masinde Muliro, Marie Seroney, Taita arap Towett, Peter Okondo, Martin Shikuku, John Keen and John Konchellah threatened civil war if their *majimbo* plan was not accepted by the KANU leadership.[132] One of the main reasons why the smaller communities opted for a majimbo constitution was to safeguard their land from the big communities. The first two years of

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[129] *Ibid.*
[130] *Ibid.*
[131] *Ibid.*
[132] *Ibid,* p.356.

independence were years of political readjustment. The members of KADU and the African People's Party were lured to join KANU.[133]

Land policy remained a major borne of contention with the coastal leaders arguing that, a good land policy would be good for expanding Kenyan economy and that the interests of the landless would ensure confidence of the poor.[134] During the Lancaster House Conferences on the constitutional making the coastal representatives such as Ronald Ngala advocated for *majimbo* hoping that, such a constitution will assure the coastal people of security of their land. But this was not to be the case, after independence there was massive program for the settlement of the landless in Likoni. These landless included those displaced during the colonial land alienation, among them the Kikuyu.[135]

The Land Question during Independence, 1963-1990

Thousands of the landless families were settled in settlement schemes in the Rift Valley and the Coastal Provinces particularly Likoni constituency.[136] During this settlement the lands question activated ethno-regional divisions in Kenya. The Mijikenda communities were concerned with the massive presence of the non-coastal people in their region. This made them to develop a negative attitude against the perceived foreigners who had taken over the land which was rightfully meant for the Mijikenda. The land question, therefore, generated intense political conflicts between the various African political organizations.[137]

Contestations over land in the coastal province had roots in the massive migration of the Kikuyu to the province and the acquisition of massive land in the coast by the Kenyatta family and societies. This led to the political conflict basically between an alliance of the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups against the smaller communities namely the Kalenjin,

[133] William Ochieng', "Independent Kenya, 1963-1986", in William Ochieng' *A Modern History of Kenya 1895-1980*, Nairobi: Evans brothers Limited, 1989, p.207.
[134] *Ibid*.
[135] C. Leo *Land and Class in Kenya* Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1984. pp. 86-150.
[136] S.C Wanjala "Land Ownership and use in Kenyan: Past, Present and Future in Smokin- c Wanjala *Essays on land law : The reform Debate in Kenya*. Nairobi: Faculty of Law , University of Nairobi 2000 p.31.
[137] K. Kanyinga, "Beyond the colonial legacy. The Land Question, Politics and Constitutionalism in Kenya" in Smokin C. Wanjala, Essays on Land law: *The Reform Debate in Kenya*. Nairobi: Faculty of Law, University of Nairobi. 2000. pp.45-58.

Maasai, Turkana, Samburu and the Mijikenda groups. Different groups interested in land caused socio- political divisions that spilled over to the political party formation in 1961 after the Lancaster house conference. Kenya African National Union (hereafter KANU) for Kikuyu –Luo alliance while the group of leaders championing the interests of minority ethnic communities led by Ronald Ngala, Daniel arap Moi and Masinde Muliro launched the Kenya African Democraptic Union (hereafter KADU).[138]

Land question gained attention similar to that of 1950s and 1960s where the land issue led to popular struggle triggering wide range of political events which pose a challenge to the nation-state.[139] Karuti Kanyinga argued that the land question comprised of land use, economic production, population movement and patterns of settlement, territories and identity and inequalities and development. Growing landless, historical grievances and restitution and demands for redistribution led to underlying demands for a comprehensive national land policy.[140] Towards independence the colonial government initiated a land redistribution programme aimed at bringing sanity in land redistribution by preventing the land hunger peasantry from destabilizing the economy of the country. Although the colonial governments motive was positive, the land redistribution programme did not address the problem of landlessness successfully therefore triggering other problems. From then the question of land remained key in shaping Kenyan political and economic life. The question of land haunted every competitive election.[141]

On the Coastal region Karuti observed that, the issue of land ownership has been at the centre stage of local politics. Land rights generated political conflicts. Differences in land ownership among the Mijikenda groups led to socio-political divisions along which several political parties formed. After independence, the resettlement schemes caused sharp hostilities between the upcountry groups and the indigenous coastal ethnic groups.

[138] K. Kanyinga, "Beyond the colonial legacy. The Land Question, Politics and Constitutionalism in Kenya" in Smokin C. Wanjala, Essays on Land law: *The Reform Debate in Kenya*. Nairobi: Faculty of Law, University of Nairobi. 2000. pp.45-58.
[139] Kanyinga, Karuti, *Redistribution from above: The Politics of Land Rights and Squatting in Coastal Kenya*. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2000
[140] Kanyinga, Karuti, 'Politics and Struggles of Access to Land: 'Grants from above' and 'squatters' in Coastal Kenya'. *European Journal of Development Research*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1998.
[141] Kanyinga, Karuti. 2009. The Legacy of the White Highlands: land rights, ethnicity, and post-2007 election violence in Kenya. In the *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 2009, pp. 325-344

Concerns by the coastal ethnic groups resulted in the appointment of a government Committees to investigate and make recommendations on the land question. Recommendations received little attention. During Moi's regime land allocations were for the purpose of concentrating power and of securing loyalty from the elite rather than according to broader economic or political objectives. This resulted in increased landlessness and deepening of the squatter problem around the coast making land to become the single most important resource for mobilising political support. Although articulation of land issues plays a critical role in political mobilization, those elected into office failed to continue to press for viable solutions to it. Soon the political elite would tore the people into ethnic divisions making problems of one subgroup to be rarely seen as universal problems but as localised to that specific group.[142]

The resettlement provided grounds for further inter-ethnic conflicts. This had its origin in the amount of land apportioned to the so-called up-country or non-coastal people. Although land remained a major issue in the post colonial regime it was never seen as a threat to stability or co-existence of communities that lived together since independence. The issue of land emerged again in 1990s during the time when Kenyan's pressured the KANU regime to re-introduce the multi-party politics.[143] The KAMATUSA alliance was revived by the Rift Valley politicians to counter the pressure for multi-party which was seen as a move against President Moi, their own kinsman. The Majimbo project was also revived in 1991 leading to the re-activation of ethnic differences that previously threatened evictions of the Kikuyu from the Rift Valley and up-country people from the coast.[144]

The dawn of multi-party politics led to wrangles and death never witnessed before in the Kenyan history. The politicians who campaigned against the re-introduction of the system broadcasted hate that targeted some communities in some regions. The attempts

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[142] Karuti Kanyinga, *Struggles of Access to Land: The Squatter Question in the Coastal Kenya*, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies
[143] K. Kanyinga, "Beyond the colonial legacy. The Land Question, Politics and Constitutionalism in Kenya" in Smokin C. Wanjala, Essays on Land law: *The Reform Debate in Kenya*. Nairobi: Faculty of Law, University of Nairobi. 2000. pp.45-58.
[144] *Ibid.*

in September and October 1991 to restart *Majimbo* debate resulted in the ugly manifestations of the so called land clashes that were experienced in Likoni.[145] These clashes were politically motivated, as the politicians at the coast promised land to the Mijikenda. With the clashes, energies and focus were redirected against the perceived non-coastal people.

The Mijikenda communities seemed to be on the offensive against the Wabara communities.[146] It is the consciousness of political identity mingled with the old ethnic sentiments that caused tension between ethnic communities in Coastal region. The tension led to violence created by organized groups which seemed to have been well trained to fight or evict the up-country people. Some of these groups were transported in Lorries to the areas of conflict in Likoni by certain unknown individual's in 1991 and 1997.[147]

3.4 Multi-party Politics

The wind for demand for multi-party democracy in Kenya intensified from July 7, 1990, when Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia publicly demanded an end to the one-party state. The two leaders were arrested and detained provoking protests that led to aid cutoff, the KANU regime was forced to allow competitive politics when President Moi in December 1991 at a KANU delegates meeting at Kasarani Stadium, repealed Section 2A of the constitution, thereby making Kenya a multi-party state. Multi-partism was abolished in 1983 making Kenya a single party state with KANU as the ruling party. This was followed by the mlolongo system where secret-ballots were no longer used. In this system those who appeared opposed to president Moi and KANU were subjected to a lot of political harassment. The change to multi-party also enabled the introduction of term limits to the Presidency although KANU was not ready to relinquish power. Although the

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[145] NCCK, *The Cursed Arrow: The NCCK Contemporary Report on The Politised Land Clashes in Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western Province.* Nairobi : NCCK 1992., p.1.

[146] NCCK, *The Cursed Arrow: The NCCK Contemporary Report on The Politised Land Clashes in Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western Province.* Nairobi : NCCK 1992., p.1.

[147] KNRC *Killing the Vote: State Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya.* Nairobi : KHRC. 1998. pp.6-20.

KANU regime allowed opposition parties to exist, the regime continuously harassed and intimidated members of the opposition.[148]

Call for liberalization exarsbated political ethnicity, with groups not only competing for power control but also competition for resources. As the election moved close the opposition fragmented along personal and ethnic lines allowing KANU a clean victory. The initial Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (hereafter, FORD), which had united several ethnic groups such as the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya split into various factions. Immediately after announcing the end of the one-party state by President Moi, the former vice president Mwai Kibaki, announced the formation of the Democratic Party of Kenya (DP) as a second opposition force. This in turn led to the splitting of the Kikuyu vote between Kibaki's DP and FORD's Kenneth Matiba.[149]

In FORD, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and Kenneth Matiba differed on who was to carry the presidential candidacy. The difference resulted in a split of the original FORD into two factions. FORD-Kenya led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, comprised largely of the Luo with allies in the northern Luhya section and the banned Islamic Party of Kenya from coastal region. The FORD-Asili faction was led by Kenneth Matiba. The FORO-Asili faction largely represented the Kikuyu in the southern half of Central province, as well as in the cities of Nairobi and Nakuru, and a section of Luhya who were inclined to the group Secretary General.[150]

The 1992 election were, therefore, a competition between KANU, FORD-Kenya, FORD-Asili, Democratic Party of Kenya and other smaller parties. Because of the split in opposition parties Moi retained the presidency with only 36 percent of the total vote, but gained the constitutionally mandated 25 percent in five of the eight provinces. In this election the voting patterns were very heavily marked by politically instigated ethnicity.

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[148] A.M. Abdullahi "Ethnic Clashes, Displaced Persons and the Potential for Refugee Creation in Kenya: A Forbidding Forecast" in *International Journal of Refugee Law Vol. 9 No.2* Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997 pp. 196.
[149] *Ibid.*
[150] A.M. Abdullahi "Ethnic Clashes, Displaced Persons and the Potential for Refugee Creation in Kenya: A Forbidding Forecast" in *International Journal of Refugee Law Vol. 9 No.2* Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997 pp. 196.

Political parties dominated in their respective zones where their leaders come from while others like KANU declared some regions as no go zones. The local security apparatus were also politicized and used mostly by the KANU government to silence any opposition politicians.[151]

The opposition pressure against the ruling party KANU proved overwhelming, threatening to oust it. Sensing defeat KANU resorted to organized violence as a means of intimidating and interfering with opposition voters. The violence strengthened ethnic identity as communities developed hatred towards the ruling party KANU. In this political battleground, loyalty was usually more locally focused. It was therefore not very possible to unite the ethnic or often even sub- ethnic group.[152]

After the 1992 election the opposition continued to fragment. The fragmentation continued for five years leading to the 1997 election. Since the opposition had failed to gain power many of its followers were demoralized. At the same time the opposition politicians lacked the resources to use in mobilizing people to their parties. After Jaramogi's death and Matiba's withdrawal from active politics because of ill health, the two FORDs split further. Jaramogi Oginga Odinga's son, Raila, moved with majority Luo into the National Democratic Party (NDP) leaving FORD-Kenya, to be dominated by the northern Luhya leader, Kijana Wamalwa.[153]

Since Kenneth Matiba had withdrawn from active politics some of his Kikuyu supporters joined Mwai Kibaki's DP. Although Mwai Kibaki gained from Matiba's followers, he was still unable to unite the Kikuyu fully under DP. Several of them formed new parties such as Safina while others joined the Social Democratic Party (SDP), led by several university intellectuals such as Katama Mukangi among others and Charity Ngilu, a

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[151] KNRC *Killing the Vote: State Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya.* Nairobi: KHRC. 1998. pp.6-20.
[152] *Ibid*
[153] M.Cowen and Karuti Kinyinga, "The 1997 Elections in Kenya The Politics of Community and Locality " in Michael Cowen and Liisa Lakso. *Multi-party Elections in Africa.* Oxford: James Currey 2002 p. 256

Kamba leader from Eastern Province. The fragmentation was a benefit to KANU's presidential candidate who was also the head of state.[154]

The 1997 elections were largely a repetition of those of 1992, but with greater opposition fragmentation. Since the opposition had failed to agree on a compromise candidate they decided to run as many presidential candidates as possible, hoping that such a move would deny Moi who was the KANU candidate the needed vote of 25 percent in five provinces. But this move did not succeed because Moi won again, increasing his vote total to 40 percent as compared to what he got in 1992 although this time with thin majority in Parliament. The opposition entered the new Parliament with a bigger share of the seats but far more divided than in the previous Parliament.[155]

It was therefore evident that ethnic and sub-ethnic factionalism remained haunting Kenya's politics. Political ethnicities took a more grim turn on the ground. The local people literally took in Moi's prophecy that multi-party democracy would lead to ethnic conflict. Politically ethicized violence broke out in the predominantly KANU Rift Valley and Likoni region of the Coast Province in the months leading up to the 1992 election and continued occasionally afterward.[156]

The violence left thousands killed hundreds of thousands homeless. In the Rift Valley most of the victims were Kikuyu, descendants of colonial-era and post-colonial immigrants to the area, while at the coast most of the victims were up-country migrants mostly Kikuyu, Luhya, Kamba and Luo. The coastal and in particular Likoni people were opposition voters in what otherwise could be a KANU zone. Opposition factionalism had the advantage of awarding some KANU supporters with victory and at some point assured the perceived local people of land a precious commodity.[157]

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[154] *Ibid.*

[155] KNRC *Killing the Vote: State Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya.* Nairobi: KHRC. 1998. pp.6-20.

[156] *Ibid.*

[157] NCCK, *The Cursed Arrow: The NCCK Contemporary Report on the Politised Land Clashes in Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western Province.* Nairobi: NCCK 1992, p.1.

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3.5 Conclusion

The British conquest of Kenya laid the foundation to dislocation and grievances among the coastal and Likoni people. As more structures were developed many people sought income in Mombasa town. Employment opportunities found at the coast became pull factor to people who migrated and settled in the region. This settlement led to competition between the local residents and the migrants. The end result was long sited hatred that waited for a simple trigger to explode. The KANU ruling party used the urge by the people for multi-party politics to incite the coastal people against the migrants most of whom were supporting the opposition.

Although Kenyans were allowed by law to work and live anywhere in the republic, the government did not develop enough security structure to ensure safety of the migrants at the coast. There were no enough security personnel to contain the situation. Lack of enough security structure gave room for violence witnessed. This therefore was in line with what the proponents of structural conflict theorists supported that, insufficient structural development acted as a recipe to violent conflicts in society. The conflict in Likoni will therefore be a subject of discussion in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

CLASHES IN LIKONI, 1992-1997

4.0 Introduction

Likoni constituency was a home of various ethnic communities. One common future among the communities that lived at the coast was the disparities in development. The disparities were very clear in regions where the local Mijikenda communities settled. The Mijikenda communities had been perceived as lazy people who were not willing to work. This made most employers to depend on up-country labour. Available job opportunities therefore influenced migration of up-country people to the coast who would later seem to control the regions economic activities. The slow nature of the Mijikenda communities to adapt to the economic changes and accept to work subjected them to abject poverty while the up-country people seemed to accumulate wealth. The coastal people therefore, mobilized to evict the upcountry people so as to benefit from the economic opportunities which they held. This chapter therefore examines the trigger factors of Likoni ethnic violence and the 1992 and 1997 clashes.[158]

4.1 Trigger Factors of the Ethnic Conflict in Likoni, 1992-1997

The Likoni ethnic conflict can be attributed to the re-introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya in the early 1990s. The repeal of section 2A of the Kenya constitution which re-introduced multi-party politics in Kenya had a number of far reaching consequences. One of which was the eruption of ethnic clashes in various parts of Kenya among them Coast Province. This was partially a fulfillment of President Moi's earlier prediction that a return of Kenya to a multi party system would result in an outbreak of ethnic violence that would destroy the nation. It was therefore, because of the misconception of pluralism and *majimboism* by most of the Coast Provinces KANU leaders and their supporters that it meant people to return to their ancestral land. The coast politicians therefore called for the eviction of non-residents from the region causing ethnic violence.[159]

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[158] M.Cowen and Karuti Kinyinga, "The 1997 Elections in Kenya The Politics of Community and Locality " in Michael Cowen and Liisa Lakso. *Multi-party Elections in Africa.* Oxford: James Currey 2002 p. 256.
[159] The Nation Reporter, "Mombasa Clashes" in the *Daily Nation* March, 11/ 29/1992, pp. 3-6.

Beginning 1990, a number of political elites started questioning the KANU one party political system in the name of Kenya. They began to view multiparty political system (pluralism) as a panacea to democratic governance. They believed that pluralism could offer a forum for competitive politics and hence guarantee freedom of choice. The champions of multi-party system and pressure groups never took enough time to explain to their euphoric supporters the meaning and practice of pluralism, and hence the subsequent confusion, which resulted into conflict.[160] On the other hand, leaders and supporters of the one party political system in the face of this misconception or confusion began to argue that, the call for malt- party would create room for opposition leaders to plant the seed of nepotism, favoritism, unhealthy competition, hatred, animosity and ethnic conflict. President Moi advanced the argument that pluralism was as a synonymous to ethnic animosity and retardation in development.[161]

Although President and the KANU elites were against the re-introduction of multi-party system the pressure for the system was becoming very strong to bear with. The high ranking KANU officials therefore devised a mechanism to counter the strong movement that called for the re-introduction for multi-party system. The KANU elites from the Coast Province began calling for the re-introduction of a *majimbo* (federal) system of government which to them would ensure that KANU controlled some regions. To KANU elites federalism would ensure that some regions were controlled ethnically by eliminating the perceived up-country people. The idea of federalism was hastened to assert that the advocates of *majimboism* in the built up for the 1992 elections and after, often called for the expulsion of all other ethnic groups from land occupied before colonialism by the Mijikenda communities.[162] It was evident therefore that, the *majimbo* debate was recipe of chaos, ethnic animosity and conflict that were experienced in Likoni constituency of the Coast Province.

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[160] Oral interview, Rehema Mjomba, Vijiweni, Likoni, 6/5/2010.
[161] NCCK *The Cursed Arrow; the NCCK Contemporary Report on the Politicised Land Clashes in Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western Provinces* Nairobi: NCCK 1992 pp 25-27.
[162] Weekly Review June, 29 1993, pp. 1-10

In the coastal province the debate on *majimboism* was sparked off in late 1991 by Hon. Sharrif Nasir. Thereafter, pro-*majimbo* leaflets were circulated in 1994, calling on minority ethnic groups to fight for their rights. The pamphlets read in part: *Majimbo* or federal government is the only salvation of the minority communities and should not be treated just as on abstract concept. To the proponents of *Majimbo* it was the best solution to the suffering of the coastal people.[163]

The pamphlets also carried reports of Sharrif Nassir, urging coast leaders to join hands to fight for *majimbo*. Nassir further issued a statement that said, "the poor and the landless at the coast will sacrifice their blood for the sake of implementing the *majimbo* "constitution in Kenya."[164] To strengthen his point, he coined a slogan for *majimboism* which was *"wapende wasipende majimbo ni yetu"*, (whether they like it or not majimbo is ours). Nassir used the *majimbo* debate to attack and counter the envisaged Luo-Kikuyu Alliance championed by the likes of Raila Odinga and Kenneth Matiba. Nassir was quoted to have said, that he did not hate Luo, but he hated those who supported Raila Odinga because to him Odinga was not a good leader, because he supported the Kikuyu. It was soon after Nassir's statement that ethnic groups inhabiting Ujamaa Village in Likoni clashed destroying unknown amount of property and burning houses that belonged to non-coastal ethnic groups.[165]

Another important factor contributing to ethnic violence was marginalisation. In June, 1992, Ali Mazrui warned of a *'black intifada"* in the wake of riots that had rocked the Coast over the non-registration of the Islamic Party of Kenya. Mazrui argued that, the Coast people, especially Muslims, were seething with a lot of anger over their alleged marginalisation by their upcountry brethren. And that, bearing a Muslim name in Kenya was often an economic, social and political liability due to the discrimination that they faced from the government. To him unemployment rate among young Muslim males at

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[163] Oral interview, Athman Mwamtoa, Shika Adabu, Likoni, 6/5/2010.
[164] Kenya Times May 20 and 21, 1993, p. 4.
[165] *Ibid.*

the Coast was twice the national average and that, many of the best jobs at the coast went to the up-country ethnic communities.[166]

The people of Likoni argued that the uptake of employment opportunities by the up-country people exposed them people to poverty because they missed unemployment. Lack of employment exposed the Likoni people to poverty related problems such as illiteracy, disease and malnutrition. The political elite argued that, the coastal region was hit by rampant land grabbing, which was extended to sacred grounds such as mosques, indigenous *(kayas)* and public beaches, thus exacerbating the economic, religious and cultural exploitation of the local people. In order to survive, the coastal people were forced to realign against the up-country people hence acting as a contributory factor to the flare-up at the Coast.[167]

4.2 1992 Likoni Clashes

The Likoni clashes that shocked many people in Kenya can be said to have been influenced by the introduction of multi-party politics combined with other factors. It was evident that certain motives were abound to explain the reasons or for the deadly attacks by local Mijikenda people against mainly people of up-country origin, who had, settled, worked or did business in Likoni. The attacks had a purely political motive, which the coast KANU elite justified as being a result of the long-held, deep-seated grievances by the Coast people against their upcountry counterparts. Chief among them were resource allocation (land, jobs, education and business opportunities) and alleged political, social and religious marginalisation.[168]

The marginalisation was more felt in terms of land allocation. The land squatter problem was more acute at the Coast, especially in the 10-mile coastal strip known to the locals as *Mwambao,* which historically fell under the sultanates of Oman and Zanzibar, but reverted to Kenya after Independence in 1963. The locals claimed that no firm agreement was reached during the talks to ensure guarantees for the rights of the inhabitants mostly

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[166] The Weekly Review, "Muslims go on the Rampage", in *The Weekly Review,* May 29, 1992, p. 34.
[167] *Ibid.*
[168] Oral interview, Peter Waweru, Mkwajuni, Likoni, 6/5/2010.

the Muslim. And that the Muslims were being discriminated at by other Kenyans hence they needed their party which they would use to voice their grievances and yet the government denied them the opportunity.[169]

Violence in Likoni broke out in May 1992 as the country appeared to be headed to the first multiparty elections. Rioting rocked Likoni shortly after the release of Muslim activist Mr. Sheikh Khalid Salim Balala who had been arrested on allegations of inciting the coastal people against the KANU government. Balala's supporters and youthful sympathizers of the unregistered Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), who were celebrating his release, suddenly turned violent overturning and burning a Toyota saloon car belonging to Sharif Nassir the Mombasa District KANU chairman.[170] Nassir was attacked because to the people of the Likoni he was a symbol of the KANU government which was suppressing IPK.

Tension had been high over the delay in the IPK's registration with the Coast PC, Mbuo Waganagwa, who warned Muslim parents in Likoni against letting their children be used as pawns by fundamentalists out to achieve their own goals. While on the other hand, IPK leader Salim Balala who hailed from Likoni claimed that he had instructed over 100,000 youths to deal with two leading Mombasa Kanu politicians, Sharif Nassir and Mr. Said Hemed, the MP for Kisauni and an assistant minister for the environment and natural resources.[171]

The police responded by arresting some Muslim leaders provoking further riots. The crowds stormed the nearby police station where those arrested were held. They pelted cars and buildings with stones, looting shops as they battled it out with the police. A contingent of the Para- Military General Service Unit (GSU) personnel was called in to reinforce the regular police, who were trying to scare off rioters by shooting in the air.

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[169] Oral interview, Ramadhan Juma, Mkwajuni, Likoni, 6/5/ 2010.
[170] The Weekly Review, "Muslims go on the Rampage", in *The Weekly Review*, May 29, 1992, p. 34.
[171] *Ibid.*

The riots spread mainly to the slum areas around Tononoka, Buxton, Bondeni and Majengo.[172]

The Para-Military police pushed the rioters into the Kwa Shibu mosque near Mwembe Tayari where the rioters had taken refuge. The police then stormed the mosque and arrested a number of IPK sympathizers.[173] The police action angered the Muslims, leading to fresh violence and disturbances in Likoni. IPK followers who had converged on Mwembe Tayari to protest against the police action started stoning cars while shouting Allah Akbar (God is great) and showing the IPK symbol as they faced the police. Sporadic gunfire could be heard as the police battled with the rioters. Tension ran high as the demonstrators called for the resignation of the attorney-general, Mr. Amos Wako, as well as of Nassir and of Hemed, whom they also accused of blocking the IPK's registration.[174] The IPK's interim chairman, Sheikh Omar Mwinyi, warned that the continued denial of registration of the party could have untold consequences. He declared that further demonstration and violence were on the way until the party was registered.[175] The people could not understand why IPK party was being denied registration yet section 2A which restricted such registration had been repealed.

The violence in Mombasa, prior to the 1992 multiparty general election were to continued until, 1994 now not religious but ethnic in nature. The clash took a new angle or twist as the indigenous Digo ethnic group rose in arms against the up-country ethnic groups who they claimed had taken over all employment in Likoni leaving the indigenous people without a source of income. The indigenous people of Likoni area are the Digo, known as diggers who were less numerous than up-country communities. The politically instigated ethnic clashes in Likoni started when the person who wanted to vie for the Likoni parliamentary seat on a KANU ticket who was a Digo got scared of loosing the elections as the other communities who were supporting the opposition parties seemed to

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[172] Ibid.
[173] Oral interview, Scholarstica Auma, Mkwajuni, Likoni, 7/5/2010.
[174] The Weekly Review, "Muslims go on the Rampage", in The Weekly Review, May 29, 1992, p. 34.
[175] Ibid.

be the majority.[176] He decided with the support of the government to hire some raiders to fight and evict the up-country people who were supporting the opposition.[177]

The introduction of multi-party politics seemed to give the coastal people a chance to express themselves politically and the result of this, was a serious set back for the ruling party KANU. This meant that come in the presidential and general elections, KANU would be forced to take appropriate steps to ensure that they secured the twenty five per cent Coast Province vote in favour of its candidate President Daniel arap Moi. To achieve this goal KANU was to make sure upcountry people, namely, the Luo, Kikuyu and Luhya who were seen as supporters of the opposition parties, did not vote for their parties.[178]

The best way for KANU elite to achieve their objective was to exploit the existing and latent animosity which the coastal people had against the upcountry migrants. They managed doing so by inciting the Digo to resort to violence, so that they intimidate or drive away the up country people so as to stop them from voting for the opposition parties.[179] The violence of 1992 under the shade of *majimbo* or federalism laid the foundation to the ethnic clashes that were to be experienced during the 1997 General election.[180]

4.3 The 1997 Clashes in Likoni

Ethnic based sentiments and discriminations characterized relations between various Kenyan communities that lived in the Coast Province since the early calls for *majimbo* before Kenya got her independence. The indigenous Mijikenda ethnic groups appeared to discriminate the immigrant groups, mainly the Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya and Akamba at the coastal town of Mombasa. The indigenous groups felt that the upcountry communities were dominating in terms of economic opportunities. The Mijikenda felt that they could

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[176] Oral interview, Teresa Kakai, Longo, Likoni, 6/5/2010.
[177] The Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya, dated 31st, July 1999.
[178] P. Wanyande, "The Politics of Coalition Government" in Peter Wanyande, Mary Omosa and Chweya Ludeki *Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya,* Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press 2007 pp.107-130.
[179] Weekly Review, "Political Violence in Kenya", in the *Weekly Review,* June, 29 1993.
[180] *Ibid.*

only be safe if a *majimbo or federal* system of government was introduced hence leading politicians from the Coast Province, notably Hon. Ronald Ngala, Shariff Nassir and Najib Balala among others.[181]

With the advent of multiparty system of government, the indigenous Mijikenda communities at the coast formed various political parties such as the Islamic Party of Kenya, National Democratic Union (NADU) and Shirikisho Party through which they hoped to front their interests. IPK Party was denied registration by the Moi led KANU government, which was accused of practicing selective licensing of opposition parties. The KANU elite in government argued that registration of such parties would pose a security threat to the nation since they were religious based. As the pressure for registration for a coastal party increased, the Shirikisho Party which strongly advocated for *majimbo* system of government and with a large following of Likoni people was registered. The party was to contest in the 1997 elections, winning a seat in one of the constituencies in Mombasa District.[182]

It was therefore, against the discriminative sentiments that, the politically motivated ethnic conflict was occasionally camouflaged in the *majimbo* campaigns. This was a deliberate strategy intended by those who planned the clashes to give the impression that it was an ideological clash between the Likoni people who wished to see the upcountry people removed from Mombasa district and the entire coast so that they could benefit from the economic opportunities available in the region.[183]

During the 1992 general elections, KANU had worn most seats in Coast Province except in Mombasa area, mainly because most residents in Likoni were migrants from up-country, most of who came from regions which strongly supported the opposition parties. The Likoni parliamentary seat was worn by FORD-Kenya because of the support the

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[181] Karuti Kanyinga, "Political Change in Kenya" in Peter Wanyande, Mary Omosa and Chweya Ludeki *Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya* Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 2007, pp. 81-106.
[182] Karuti Kanyinga, "Political Change in Kenya" in Peter Wanyande, Mary Omosa and Chweya Ludeki *Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya* Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 2007, pp. 81-106.
[183] *Ibid.*

party had from the immigrant pro-opposition communities, especially the Luo and Luhya played a major role in the 1992 Likoni electoral victory.[184]

It was against that background that KANU wanted to get rid of opposition supporters in predominantly pro-KANU regions, hence causing the 1997 ethnic clashes in Likoni. The fear in 1997 was that the seat would again go to the opposition, although at this time it would have been the National Democratic Party a predominantly Luo opposition party formed following the split within FORD-Kenya in the run up to the elections. Thus, KANU elite prime objective was to frighten off the ethnic groups perceived to be in the opposition out of Mombasa, especially in Likoni constituency which was perceived to be leaning towards the opposition.[185]

The violence broke out on the eve of the December 1997 multi-party elections. Before the elections, the opposition parties joined by the civil society organs such NCCK and KHRC among others had been pushing the ruling party KANU and the government to effect constitutional reforms that would have facilitated free and fair electoral competition. The opposition parties and the civil society, through the National Convention Executive Council (hereafter, NCEC) presented the ruling party with a formidable challenge to force the ruling party back the reform agenda. This was to force KANU to implement the terms of the reforms agreed earlier in the Inter-Parliamentary Party Group meetings.[186]

The 1997 Likoni violence was therefore, a crisis precipitated by KANU elite in an attempt to distract the pro- reform group and thereby regain control of the political arena ahead of the 1997 general election. Before the violence, the up-country people received threats as early May 1997. The leaflets that appeared in the area were signed by a group that called itself "the Association of Pwani People", asking the coast people to cooperate

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[184] *Ibid.*
[185] P.O. Asingo, "The Transition in Kenya" in Walter O. Oyugi, Peter Wanyande and C. Odhiambo Mbai, *The Politics of Transition in Kenya from KANU to NARC*, Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2003, p.23.
[186] P. Wanyande, "The Power of Knowledge: Voter Education and Electoral Behaviour in a Kenyan Constituency" in Ludeki Chweya *Electoral Politics in Kenya*, Nairobi: Claripress 2002 p.67.

in a bid to rid the area of non-coast people or up-country immigrants. But the government dismissed these leaflets as the work of the invisible political instigators of the clashes.[187]

The first wave of violence broke out in August 1997. The police were informed of the suspected activities of gangs in the neighbourhood of Likoni but they did not take up the matter seriously. Ironically, they fell victim to the first round of attacks as the Likoni police station which was associated with the suppression of the activists for change and neighbouring homes were raided on the night of 13 August 1997, leaving at least 13 people dead, including 6 policemen.[188] The police had also been accused of attacking demonstrators who had taken refugee in the Mosque contrary to Islamic tradition.

Leaflets were thrown all over in Likoni constituency calling upon the Mijikenda people to evict the non-residents from the area. In August 1997, violence broke out in Mombasa that led to the deaths of more than 40 people and displacement of hundreds of others in a period of less than one week. After the attack on Likoni police station ethnic violence broke out in the Mtwapa, Kongowea and Kisumu Dogo areas on the North Coast. The Likoni raid was one of the most frightening and mysterious, because it raised questions whether the people were safe keeping in mind the notion that the police in-charge of security and yet they had fallen victim.[189]

The raid seemed to have been planned in the tactic of guerrilla warfare. It was an ambush which seemed to have been done under a great deal of reconnaissance before implementing. The raiders looted and disappeared with guns and ammunition. They made away with a total of 30 assorted guns and 5000 rounds of ammunition, making it the largest haul of guns from a police station by criminal elements in Kenyan history. Politicians were blamed for the attack. During the raid six policemen were killed, three at the police station, two at the tourist police booth near the ferry, and one who was escorting a Kenya Co-operative Creameries collection van. One of the dead officers was

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[187] The Nation Reporter, "the Association of Pwani People" in the *Daily Nation*, 18/8/1997, p.1.
[188] *Ibid.*
[189] The Weekly, Review, "Likoni Mystery: Death and Destruction as Ethnic Strife hits Mombasa", in *The Weekly Review*, August 22, 1997, p. 4

a policewoman who was on duty at the Likoni police station's report desk. Two of the police officers killed were beheaded. The raiders set free all inmates held, in the cells before setting the cells on fire. They also burnt down the Likoni police station and the district officer's office. They burnt down a night club adjacent to the Likoni ferry and injured the passengers who were leaving the ferry on their way home. Most of them were slashed and stabbed indiscriminately.[190]

The raiders exploited the fact that the Likoni police station was located in an isolated, place far away from other police stations, making it easy to target for a surprise attack. The stations only way of access was through a slow-moving Likoni ferry, hence it was difficult to the police to mobilise and organise a rapid response operation. The raiders seemed to understand well the nearby Kaya Waa, Kaya Bombo and Silimani Caves, which to the raiders was an escape route.[191] Since January 1997, the campaign and pressure for constitutional reforms in the country had led to high level of radicalisation in the politics of the country. Due to the radical approaches that the government used to silence the pressure mounted by members of the opposition parties.[192]

The attacks against upcountry people intensified as the local politician who were uncomfortable with the strengths of up-country people in Mombasa District called for their eviction. Apart from the Mvita constituency, which was represented by an assistant minister for information and broadcasting, Mr. Shariff Nassir, the rest of the constituencies in Mombasa district had a strong following of the opposition. The opposition depended heavily on both the up-country communities, majority of who were the Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya and Kamba and followers of the unregistered Islamic Party of Kenya (Hereafter, IPK). The Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya and Kamba combined with the followers of IPK were believed to hold the swing vote that would have decided the victory in Likoni.[193]

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[190] Oral interview, Mzee Hamisi Mwagongolo, Bamani, Likoni, 5/5/2010.
[191] *Ibid.*
[192] *Ibid.*
[193] Oral interview, Juma Mwakiboko, Vijiweni, Likoni, 4/5/2010.

In response to the violence the police arrested some Mombasa politicians among them Mr. Emmanuel Karisa Maitha and Mr. Omar Masumbuko. The arrests did not restore calm, clashes continued. On Saturday, 16 august 1997, more than 100 youths struck Mtwapa area, some ten kilometres to the north of Mombasa, and stabbed a man to death. The raiders were chanting pro-*majimbo* slogans. They slashed another man with a machete and set a video shop on fire. On Sunday 17, 1997 six people died, more than 20 were injured. KANU seemed to be achieving its objectives of eviction of up-country people, as thousands left Mombasa for their upcountry homes as the violence spread to Kongowea.[194]

The police seemed to be unable to contain the situation as violence spread to Ukunda on the South Coast, where about 100 kiosks were burnt, two people injured and a petrol station damaged. The government deployed a contingent of armed policemen, some Kenya Army and Kenya Navy personnel to comp the Shimba Hills area in pursuit of the estimated 50 armed people who were suspected perpetrators of the attacks. Several people were arrested but, leaflets still appeared in the area written in Swahili and signed by the Association of Pwani Peoples. The leaflets asked the Coast people to cooperate so as to redeem the area from the domination by non-coastal people.[195]

The leaflets led to the intensification of conflict as the violence spread to other towns in the coast province, such as the tourist town of Malindi, which is more than 120 kilometres north of Mombasa. On the Malindi beach, some 375 curio stalls and kiosks owned by upcountry people were burnt down. The situation was not different in Wundanyi another coastal town. The end results of the violence was the eviction of most of the up-country people who would have otherwise determined the out come of the election results hand denied the ruling party KANU their highly desired majority in the parliament.[196]

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[194] The Weekly, Review, "Likoni Mystery: Death and Destruction as Ethnic Strife hits Mombasa", in *The Weekly Review*, August 22, 1997, p. 4.
[195] *Ibid.*
[196] The Nation Reporter, "Many people took refuge at a local church for fear of being attacked by the ruthless gangs", *Daily Nation. 15/8/97*".

From Likoni the violence spread to other parts of the Coast, specifically Kongowea in the North mainland and Ukunda at the south coast as many more people were killed and homes and property destroyed by the attackers. The main targets were not just the Luo in Likoni who were majority supporters of the National Democratic Party but all immigrant ethnic groups perceived to be pro-opposition, notably the Kikuyu, Luhya and, to a large extent, the Akamba.The raiders were reported to have found a hiding place at nearby Kaya Bombo forest and Similani caves from where they carried out repeated attacks including a raid on the Likoni Catholic church where thousands of the victims of previous attacks had sought refuge.[197]

In response to the violent attacks on the Likoni Police Station and the up-country people, the government sent a combined contingent of the General Service Unit, the Kenya Army and the Kenya Navy, in addition to the regular police to pursue the raiders. The presence of this combined effort gave some assurance to up-country people but this assurance was short lived because, the navy and army were soon withdrawn. On the other hand the police who remained on the ground were reportedly harassing innocent locals while avoiding going into the raiders hiding places. The behaviour of the security agents made the people to believe that, the police had instructions not to interfere with the activities of the raiders.[198]

Several Coast politicians were accused of being behind the violence. To shift the blame the Coast politician accused a local tycoon cum politician and a Mombasa KANU activist of involvement in funding and organizing the violence.[199] And in December 1997 a member of parliament from Mombasa claimed that a senior politician from the Rift Valley together with a prominent Coast politician cum businessman were responsible for planning and funding the clashes. In order to show its commitment to end the violent

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[197] Ibid.
[198] KHRC, Killing the Vote: State Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya, KHRC, 1998, p.1.
[199] The Nation Reporter, "Clashes in Kenya" in Daily Nation, 20/8/1997, p.2.

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ethnic clashes, the government reshuffled senior police officers at both the provincial and district levels leading to further suspicion of state complicity in the violence.[200]

The manner with which the police handled the matter left a lot to be desired by both the local and international community. The police did not record statements from people confessed to having vital information about the activities of the raiders. This made the people to believe that the main aim of the police was to cover up the truth and leave the perpetrators to go unpunished. It is these lapses in the security system that made many people to suspect, that the Likoni clashes, were instigated by the powerful political elite serving in the KANU government.[201]

The strong reason behind this believe was, some of the politicians whose names featured in the press since the Likoni clashes were among the politicians who were believed to have a lot of power in the government and hence had every reason to fear the loss of power by the ruling party KANU. The 1997 Likoni clashes were therefore, politically instigated not because the coast people wanted to control the economic activities at the coast, but because the politicians feared loosing power to the opposition parties.[202]

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter set out to investigate the trigger factors that might have caused the Likoni clashes. The 1992 and 1997 Likoni violence occurred at the height of opposition and civil society agitation for constitutional reform that preceded the first and second election under the new multi-party system. Those in power used the state as an instrument of material acquisition hence those who benefited over the years from the structure of access used every trick available, including mobilizing ethnic support as happened in Likoni, to sustain the regime in power. Although the ethnic clashes in Mombasa were a further manifestation of the strategy, a new dimension was being introduced, namely, the invocation of an ideology that Kenyans once rejected. This was the balkanization of

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[200] People Daily reporter, "Coast politician cum businessman were responsible for planning and funding the clashes", in *The People Daily*, 18/8/2000, p. 2.
[201] *Ibid.*
[202] *Ibid.*

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Kenya into autonomous regions as a way of keeping each region's wealth in the hands of the locals. Some of the coastal communities, notably the Digo, unwittingly became part of these machinations without understanding the wider impact which is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

IMPACT OF THE LIKONI ETHNIC CLASHES, 1992-1997

5.0 Introduction

The Likoni ethnic violence affected and impacted on the social, economic and political life of the people of Likoni. Likoni constituency was ranked within the most severely affected areas by the ethnic clashes that rocked Kenya. The clashes were responsible for more damage that was experienced in the country. The scale and nature of warfare directly affected the lives of many millions of Kenyans. The main elements of this tragedy was the hundreds of thousands of uprooted people who lost their homes and livelihood, the increasing numbers of direct civilian casualties and increased levels of violence, abuse and mutilation suffered by noncombatants.

To a wider range the conflict impacted on the communities that inhabited the coastal province. This chapter will examine how the repeal of section 2A and subsequent politically instigated ethnic clashes in Likoni impacted on the communities living in the Coast Province. In examining the impact of conflict the chapter will employ the structural conflict theory. The structural conflict theorists argued that lapse in structures provided a fertile ground for conflict such as what happened at Likoni. The chapter will therefore look at social, economic and political impact of the Likoni ethnic clashes to the communities living in the coast, Kenya in general and the international community.

5.1 Social Impact of Likoni Ethnic Clashes

The Likoni ethnic clashes were responsible for one of the highest level of internal displacement in Kenya, the majority from areas affected by conflict. Discontent toward upcountry settlers materialised into violent attacks especially aimed at people with Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya background. Gangs of 200-500 people armed with guns, clubs, machetes and bows and arrows attacked villagers forcing thousands of people to flee to safe regions in Mombasa or inland. Over 2500 families were displaced by the fighting

most of who camped at Likoni Roman Catholic Church south of Mombasa. Another over 120,000 people fled Likoni as attacks on the up-country people intensified.[203]

As a result of the Likoni ethnic clashes many people became internally displaced. A lot of lives were displaced from their normal state of affairs. Most of the up-country ethnic groups were displaced, majority being Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya and Kisii. Most of the displaced people were businessmen/businesswomen who were doing business at the coast, followed by those who had bought land and were farming, those involved in the informal *(Jua Kali)* sector, civil servants, students and unemployed youth who had gone to try their luck at the coast.[204] Apart from the displacement of people from their homes, the ethnic clashes witnessed in Likoni caused increasing suffering to innocent civilians due to destruction of social infrastructure.

The Likoni clashes led to the destruction of the basic social infrastructure. Schools and health centres were increasingly targeted by the displaced people who turned them into IDP camps. Social provision was also squeezed by increased security expenditure. A long-term consequence was reduced access to education to the internally displaced young people. The IDPs also lacked health care. The end results were therefore high rates of mortality rate.[205] The destruction of the social infrastructure combined with use of extreme force led to many deaths.

Most people suffered death and injuries during the violence. The Likoni ethnic conflict involved increasing use of extreme violence, especially after attacking the Likoni police station where some policemen were killed. Violence was deliberately targeted at non-Mijikenda communities living in Likoni. Some people crossing the ferry were slashed to death indiscriminately. The attack on the police station provoked the government to dispatch to the area a combined force of the Para-military General Service Unit, the

[203] Muthui, Mwai, "75,000 Clashes Victims Resettled", in *Daily Nation*, Wednesday September, 14, 1994, p. 1.

[204] Oral interview, Mzee Juma Mwamba, Shika Adabu Village, Likoni, 3/5/2010.

[205] Tom Mshindi, "Clashes: Faulty Math's or Deliberate Distortion", in *Daily Nation*, Friday, May 7, 1993, p. 6.

Kenya Army, the Kenya Navy, Administration Police and the Regular Police, at some level they used excess force that at a point led to further deaths.[206]

The deaths incurred a burden on society, mostly to the non-Mijikenda who were already disadvantaged as many were forced to take care of the injured without support resources. Some retreated back to their rural districts without any property placing further pressure to their poor families who were forced to give them support. Those left behind to care for such injured people strained to raise money to meet their hospital bills since they had lost everything through extreme violence.[207] Apart from deaths caused by the conflict was mutilation.

The most disturbing aspect of ethnic conflict in Kenya was the increasing use of extreme violence. Violence was deliberately targeted at civilians rather than armed groups, and at entire groups rather than individuals. In the conflicts in Likoni, violence took appalling forms. Mutilation and torture was used against of members of up-country ethnic groups, which were perceived as enemies to the coastal people. In some cases killing and rape was used as a means of waging attacks primarily by militia groups and by some state security personnel. Extreme violence was sometimes used as a means of humiliation or revenge. More frequently, it was used as a means of intimidation, in order to force the up-country people to leave and not to think of returning to the coast. Here, mutilation was brutally applied as part of a strategy to stop people from voting.[208]

Such acts of excessive violence exposed many people to psychological trauma. Children who witnessed the attacks and killings in Likoni became traumatized. Some young children witnessed the killing of the people they knew and were used to. Such children remained traumatized never to return to normal life since they lost their friends whom they lived and played together. Some family witnessed the killings of their beloved ones

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[206] The Weekly Review Reporter, "Muslims go on the Rampage", in *The Weekly Review*, May 29, 1992, p. 34.
[207] Tom Mshindi, "Clashes: Faulty Math's or Deliberate Distortion", in *Daily Nation*, Friday, May 7, 1993, p. 6.
[208] Oral interview, Amina Masumbuko, Mkwajuni, Likoni, 12/5/2010.

or saw violence carried out on them such as rape.[209] The memory remained fresh to the victims making it almost impossible for them to cope with life. The people remained traumatized psychologically. The situation worsened by lack of basic needs such as food, sanitary facilities and malnutrition due to destruction of income generating activities.

Since the violence led to loss of income for most of up-country people at the coast, they were exposed to hunger. With nothing to lean on these people were forced to depend on food donations from humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross, Red Moon and St. Johns Ambulance among others and yet before the conflict they were providing for themselves without any assistance. The sorry state that the displaced people found themselves exposed some to different forms of exploitation both in terms of labour and sex. In order to make ends meet some women resorted to trade their bodies in sex. These violations were either done by the arsonists or those who took advantage of the conflict to exploit the young girls. Some people capitalized on the economic situation that IDPs found themselves in, to sexually exploit them.[210]

Most of the children in the IDP camps contracted diseases associated with unbalanced diet. These diseases caused much suffering to the children leading to high mortality rate. Sex exploitation exposed most of the children to dangers of contracting diseases. On the other hand the young girls who engaged in sex to earn a living were at risk of contracting venereal diseases some of which are terminal such as HIV/AIDS.[211] Women and girls were not just killed during the Likoni political conflict, some were raped and sexually attacked. The African custom, culture and religion have built an image of women as bearing the honour of their communities. Disparaging woman's sexuality and destroying their physical integrity become a means by which to terrorize, demean, defeat and displace the entire upcountry communities, as well as to punish, intimidate and humiliate their women. Sexual violence was a tool of war and has left hundreds of women raped, brutalized, impregnated and infected with HIV/AIDS.[212]

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[209] Oral interview, Jane Wairimu, Shika Adabu, Likoni, 7/5/2010.
[210] Oral interview, Rosbella Akinyi, Shika Adabu, Likoni, 7/5/2010.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Odhiambo Orlal, "Life in the Clash Areas", Daily Nation, May 25, 1993, p. 6.

The impact of Likoni political conflict on children was also profound. In the violence many people were injured. Some people were disabled by the injuries they incurred living a permanent psychological impact that haunted them even after calm returned. The disabled were subjected to a lot of suffering now that they could not support themselves. The situation turned them to be restitutes who depended on borrowing for survival. To some extend the children were so young to support themselves hence remained desperate after their families were broken by the ethnic clashes. Children were dependent on the care, empathy, and attention of their adult parents and relatives who loved them. Their attachments were frequently disrupted in times of the Likoni ethnic clashes, due to the loss of parents, extreme preoccupation of parents in protecting and finding subsistence for the family, and emotional unavailability of depressed or distracted parents. The children found substitute care with religious groups and humanitarian organizations some that cared only slightly.[213]

The other, impacts of Likoni clashes on childhood was that, it adversely affected the life trajectory of children far more than adults. Most children lost the opportunity for education that they were getting at the coast schools before the clashes, children who were forced to move into displaced person camps, where they waited for the situation to calm in miserable circumstances for normal life to resume. Consider a fact that children were injured, they may, in addition have lost a limb, sight, or cognitive capacity, lost the opportunity of schooling and of a social life. Girls who were raped may be marginalized by their society and lost the opportunity for marriage. Long after the clashes ended, these lives never attained the potential they had before the impact of conflict.[214]

The Likoni ethnic conflict traumatized both the indigenous people and the upcountry migrants on a daily basis and sometimes for the rest of their lives. Experience of violence made a deep impression on the human psyche. The people's responses differed according to their own personalities, levels and types of violence experienced and their cultural interpretations of the conflict. Since most cases were left untreated, psychological

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[213] *Ibid.*
[214] Oral interview, Bennedet Auma, Msufuni, Likoni, 7/5/2010.

impacts of the Likoni ethnic clashes severely diminished the quality of life. The victims suffered high rates of anxiety, depression and post- traumatic stress disorders. Those who left their homes, friends and farms experienced cultural bereavement making them to grieve for their homes.[215]

In terms of human resource, the entire Coast Province faced a high rate of brain drain because of the politically instigated ethnic conflict that occurred during the 1992 and 1997 General elections. The educated migrants from upcountry opted to work in other parts of the country, where they were assured of their security plus that of their family members. This movement had a negative impact on all aspects of development including social, economic and political consequences. The Coast Province, therefore, became one of the least developed regions in Kenya with a lot of suffering by its inhabitants, due to the absence of professional services.[216]

5.2 The economic impact of Likoni Ethnic conflict

Kenya's development was threatened by the ethnic conflict in Likoni. The violence becomes one of the most important causes of poverty in Kenya, leading to displacement of people, and the destruction of communities' livelihoods. The effects of the ethnic violence cut across all levels of the economy down to the level of the household. The violence had a direct and immediate economic impact through the physical disruption it created, denied people access to land, key resources or markets. Likoni is strategically positioned, next to the port which serves as a gate to Kenya and the entire East and Central region of Africa. It was therefore, evident that disruption of operations at the port paralyses the entire region by denying the countries in the region access to the rest of the world.[217]

Some of the effects of conflict were less tangible, although it was evident that insecurity was the least conducive climate for domestic savings and internal or external investment.

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[215] *Ibid.*
[216] Oral interview, Mzee Hassan Mazoa, Vijiweni, Likoni, 4/5/2010.
[217] The Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya, dated 31st, July 1999.

Nor was the impact of ethnic violence limited to Likoni area. The ethnic violence damaged regional infrastructure, markets and investment confidence across a wider region. The violence made the country to loose a lot in terms of capital flow. Mombasa is a tourist destination apart from being the gate to east and central Africa. The spread of conflict to the entire coast led to closure of large tourist hotels at the coast which further led to loss of jobs hence increasing the levels of poverty.[218]

The World Bank estimated that ethnic clashes in Likoni caused a big loss of annual economic growth across the country due to the effect on the port services. Conflict also created a substantial loss of opportunity. Lost either through the inability of states to invest in their own populations or through high security spending as they were moved to try and stop the violence. This squeezed out effective investment in the economy. From then Kenya was seen by some economic experts as a high risk by potential external investors because of ethnic violence.[219]

On Kenyan economy the most direct impact of the Likoni clashes was on production and household livelihoods. The violence denied people access to their land at critical growing or planting periods, increased the costs of agricultural inputs, disrupted markets and restricted sales of produce. Agricultural production and family livelihoods suffered dramatically as a result of ethnic violence. Kenya suffered production losses of a considerable percentage. Average production losses through conflict were high. The violence was therefore, responsible for increasing the gap in food production for large parts of Kenya and created a substantial requirement for imported food and food aid.[220]

Apart from creating food shortage, the ethnic clashes in Likoni seriously damaged Kenya's infrastructure. Roads were damaged as the rioters' dug big trenches on the tarmacked roads in a bid to stop advancement of security personnel or advancing attackers. The railway was also not speared as the youths frequently uprooted it as a way

[218] "The Causes of Conflict in Africa" paper presented in Africa Policy hand Economics Department for International Development in London, africaconflicts@dfid.gov.uk.
[219] Kenneth Kwanya, "Kenya strategic position as the regional business hub at risk " in *Financial Standard*, February Tuesday 5. 2008. pp1-8.
[220] *Ibid.*

of protest in support or in opposition for violence. During the ethnic violence there was a dearth of investment in and maintenance of infrastructure. Since 1991 Kenya lost a lot of its transport infrastructure, many of the losses due to ethnic conflict. This loss had both immediate and long-term impact on Kenyan economy. In immediate terms, it increased impoverishment. This severely harmed the livelihood of the population, who were dependent on trading cereals as their means of survival.[221]

Insecurity caused by the Likoni ethnic clashes forced many schools and market centres to close. A large population of the upcountry people moved out of the coast to settle in the relatively safer regions in the upcountry. Many schools were abandoned as most of the students and teachers who came from upcountry relocated to secure regions. Disruption of learning opportunities affected trade, which had thrived in the years before the conflict. Some businesses collapsed in trading centres, because the upcountry people, who were key participants in trade, relocated.[222]

Disruption of socio- economic activities exacerbated the historic discrimination against women in the coast. Because of their long- standing domestic role, coastal women were less prepared than their male counter-parts for the crisis of lack of economic activities. They remained saddled with the brunt of responsibilities of child care, even with the hardships that came along with the conflict hence leading to hatred. The hatred was further fuelled by an atmosphere of misinformation and rumour mongering against the upcountry communities. Suspicion among communities living at the coast, therefore, remained high during the period of elections. This situation gave room to rumour mongering hence when elections approached most of the upcountry people always left only to return after the elections.[223]

The ethnic conflict at Likoni also contributed to unsustainable debt. To rebuild the destroyed infrastructure and reinforcement of security the government of Kenya had to

[221] Oral interview, John Wambua, Longo, Likoni, 4/5/ 2010.
[222] Oral interview, Adela Wamachio, Midodoni, Likoni, 6/5/2010.
[223] Kenneth Kwanya, "Kenya strategic position as the regional business hub at risk " in *Financial Standard*, February Tuesday 5. 2008. pp1-8.

borrow billions of external funds. This further added to the debt arrears to the International Financial Institutions. The debt burden placed a lot of pressure to the local economy which included increment in tax hence making life to be very expensive in Kenya. This further led to high levels of poverty which in turn affected political stability in the country and impacted on the regional economy.[224]

The effects of Likoni conflict were rarely confined to the coast and Kenya. The increasing trend of violence at Likoni led to sharp increases in prices of important commodities in the entire east and central region of Africa. The World Bank estimated that countries bordering Kenya and those that used the port services at the coast lost a lot in terms of expenditure. This excludes non- government security expenditure, private security outlays by firms and individuals, and off-budget expenditures.[225] The interrelated nature of East African economies also meant that the costs of conflict such as that of Likoni generally resulted in economic costs for neighbouring countries. These include production losses through loss of opportunities for migration, trade losses, increased costs of policing and the costs of supporting the Internally Displaced Persons, therefore, impacting on the international community.[226]

5.3 Political Impact of Likoni Ethnic Violence

Changes in the quality of governance resulting from conflict further contributed to the economic losses of conflict in Likoni. It was common for armed crime to increase substantially during a period ethnic violence that rocked the coast. Businessmen concentrated on reducing their activities due to the risk associated by ethnic violence. This had a downward spiral in both domestic savings and inward investment at the coast and the entire country. Government revenue suffered and the state become almost bankrupt affecting the government service delivery and unsustainable debt.[227]

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[224] The Weekly, Review, "Likoni Mystery: Death and Destruction as Ethnic Strife hits Mombasa", in *The Weekly Review*, August 22, 1997, p. 4.

[225] *Ibid.*

[226] *Ibid.*

[227] Jose Kalpers, *Armed Conflict and Biodiversity in Sub- Saharan African* Washington D.C: Biodiversity Support Program 2001, p.8.

The clashes also led to the resurgence of militia groups or vigilantes. Militia groups such as Kaya Bombo and Mulungu Nipa were reported to be recruiting members from the coastal ethnic communities. The vigilantes claimed that they wanted to safeguard the interests of the coastal people such as land and the political rights. It was noted that they were very bitter after losing most of the job opportunities, properties such as land and political control of the coast since independence period. It was reported that the militia groups were funded by politicians across the divide, business community, landlord and religious leaders while some were funded by the local community members through tax/levies to protect the societal interest. Reports also indicated that, in the 1992 post election violence, the perpetrators were being funded by the KANU government.[228]

This was in evident in the coast where the government moved in to expose the IDPs to security risks. The government closed the camps inflicting further negative impacts on the displaced persons. The IDP camps at the Coast the camps were disbanded barely two weeks after the violence erupted, the state of security of IDPs living with their relatives, friends and well-wishers and the community members in general hanged on the balance since the causes ethnic violence had not been addressed to guarantee security. Although the camps were closed some IDPs were reluctant to leave the camps taking into account that they had nowhere to go.[229]

The idea of how the government handled the ethnic violence and IDP problem led to the displaced persons mistrusting the government and resulted into trust to the civil society and humanitarian organizations such as Kenya Red Cross. Apart from assisting the IDPs these groups led the way in peace building. The structures for community peace building process were organized by government through chiefs' *barazas* and local NGO/CBO.[230] This included religious initiative such as the NCCK and SUPKEM, The NCCK which were running programmes known as the *Muungano wa Wanakijiji* which aimed at enhancing peace in the communities. Some have initiated community policing process in

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[228] The Weekly, Review, "Likoni Mystery: Death and Destruction as Ethnic Strife hits Mombasa", in *The Weekly Review*, August 22, 1997, p. 4.
[229] Oral interview, Rosmary Awinja, Ketuko, Likoni, 7/5/2010.
[230] Oral interview, Mzee Juma Fosi, Bagaani, Likoni, 5/5/2010.

their respective communities. Catholic Church through Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC) was also playing a significant rote in initiating and facilitating peace process in the community through workshops and training.[231]

5.4 Environmental impact

Likoni conflict also had a major effect on the environment through uncontrolled settlements and exploitation of natural resources. Organized crime also benefited from the conflict in Likoni, through money laundering and drug smuggling. Illegal drug traders found to smuggle illegal drugs into Kenya and the east Africa region. This was because the security system was over worked and therefore there were minimal monitoring at the country's entry points.[232]

5.5 Conclusion

There are many indicators that illustrate the suffering of the indigenous people of Likoni and the upcountry migrants. The social, economic and political structures remained less developed hence the entire coast remained prone to conflict as per the proponents of the structural conflict theorists. According to the findings of the research, the conflict imposed heavy social and economic costs in the Coast Province. It also imposed costs on neighbouring communities, the entire country of Kenya and the East and Central regions of Africa. The resources which would have been used for development were diverted either to military operations or assisting the displaced people.

The history of the culture of ethnic clashes at Likoni was disappointing. The impact of the violence extended far beyond the ethnic conflict itself. The survivors faced emotional torment, psychological damage, physical injuries, disease, social ostracism and many other consequences that can devastate their lives.

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[231] Oral interview, Salim Goli, Bagaani, Likoni, 5/5/2010.
[232] KHRC, *Killing the Vote :State Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya* Nairobi : KHRC, 1998 p.1.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The main objective of this study was to investigate the relationship between the repeal of section 2A of the Kenyan constitution and the emergence of ethnic clashes that rocked the country and in particular Likoni constituency of the Coast Province. Secondly, the study aimed at investigating the genesis and causes of ethnic tension and violence in Likoni constituency and finally, to examine the impact that the ethnic clashes posed on residents of Likoni constituency. The study began by documenting the history of Mombasa from ancient times and in particular the immigration of different ethnic groups of people to Mombasa. The main reason of so doing was to bring out an understanding of the people living in Mombasa and in particular Likoni. By so doing, the research was intended to give a clear understanding of the ethnic clashes at Likoni because it was these different ethnic communities that conflicted.

In order to achieve the objective of the study the structural conflict theory was used. The theory brought the rationality of factors that motivated the conflict. The factors ranged from economic, social to political as advocated by the structural conflict theory. This study has, therefore, achieved its goals. The research has shown that the disparities in development and ownership of property between the coastal people and the upcountry people dictated the reasons to why there was a conflict at Likoni. The developmental disparity between the coast people and the upcountry people is very   important. It determined how these communities related and how they felt about each other.

The origin of the Likoni conflict can be associated with the migration of different ethnic communities to the coast and Likoni in particular. During the pre-colonial period, different communities from Asia and Europe traded with Mombasa and their relationship could be described as being partly friendly and partly hostile. The coming of the British colonial rule introduced the modern port facilities at the coast which acted as an attraction to migrants. In the post-colonial period the Africans continued to flock to the coast in search for employment.

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The study has shown that the introduction of multiparty system of government gave room to the KANU elite who countered the move to liberal politics by calling for a majimbo system of government. Politicians in the KANU strongholds therefore called for the eviction of non indigenous from their territories Likoni included. There were various factors that caused the Likoni ethnic clashes. These ranged from social, political, economic and environmental factors. Socially, the Mijikenda communities were socialized to believe that the coast belonged to them and that, they were being exploited by upcountry people. They therefore, formed militia groups such as Kayabombo and Mulungunipa which were to act in defence of the coastal land.

Political factors ranged from international to local. The political pressure mounted against the Moi's regime in 1990s was one of the major factors that led to the Likoni ethnic clashes. The Digo people had a strong representation in the Moi government consequently tilting the balance against the upcountry communities who were in the opposition. The move annoyed the KANU coastal elite which, in turn, supported the Digo as a way of evicting the upcountry people in order to deny them a chance to participate in the General election. Apart from the upcountry people Muslims were also protesting over the refusal by the KANU government to register their Islamic Party of Kenya. This provoked a lot of violence which had a diverse impact on the people living in Likoni and the entire region.

The study found out that the Likoni ethnic conflict impacted on all communities living in Likoni, the coast and the entire East and Central Africa. It affected their general lives negatively, more so when they were uprooted from their homes and main economic activities. To some Mijikenda communities, the conflict had a positive impact when their people brought home the looted property from the upcountry communities.

This study on multi-partyism and political violence in Kenya, the case of Likoni constituency represents an attempt at understanding the conflict that affected Kenya during elections. What had began in 1992 as skirmishes that could be controlled remained a thorn in Kenya and threatened the stability that the country enjoyed since its

independence. Indeed, the Kenya's long standing history as a people who were peaceful has been destroyed by the ethnic clashes since 1992. The people who were admired by the entire world as a fountain of peace in Africa, have become a source of suffering to their own neighbours, weak gender and children that were once protected by every member of society.

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