# UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

\\ETHNICITY AND ELECTORAL CONFLICT IN KENYA: A CASE STUDY OF 2007 ELECTIONS \\

APOLLO O. APUKO
REG. NO. R50/71744/2008

Supervisor: Prof. Makumi Mwagiru

Research project submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree of Master of Arts in International Conflict Management, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi.

OCTOBER, 2011

Declaration

I Apollo O. Apuko declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted and is not currently being examined for award of degree in any other university.

....

Apollo O. Apuko

....

Date

This thesis has been submitted for external examination with approval as university supervisor

....

Prof. Makumi Mwagiru

....

Date

Dedication

This study is dedicated to my wife, Everlyne Mengo, my sons Higgins and Emmanuel.

Last but not least my parents Tabitha Apuko & John Apuko who gave birth to me.

Acknowledgements

TABLE OF CONTENT

List of acronyms

CCK	Communication Commission of Kenya
CDF	Constituency Development Fund
CIPEV	Commission into the Post Election Violence
DC	District Commissioner
DO	District Officer
ECK	Electoral Commission of Kenya
EMBs	Election Management Bodies
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IPPG	Inter- Parties Parliamentary Group
KNCHR	Kenya National Commission for Human Rights
LATF	Local Authority Transfer Fund
LRA	Lords Resistant Army
MOA	The Media Owners Association
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NGOs	Non Governmental Organization
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
PNU	Party of National Unity
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
TJRC	Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission

YDV   Youths Development Funds

Abstract

This research is based on ethnicity and electoral conflict with specific reference to Kenya, 2007 elections. Causes and dynamics of ethnic related electoral conflict form an important component of the discourse. The objectives of this research, is to find out the root causes of electoral violence in Kenya. The research will also analyze the role of ethnicity in electoral conflict in Kenya and at the same time, the actors in the conflict and their interests. A brief account of electoral conflict cycles that denotes the stages of electoral violence in Kenya will be of importance. Also in the focus will be the Kenya's ethno-regional map that influences the political party formation and voting pattern confined in the precincts' of rigid ethnic boundaries that causes electoral conflict. This will provide a profile of the genesis, and stages (phases) of violence that has bedeviled Kenya, with its climax in the 2007-2008 post election violence. Broad problem statement focusing on the perennial violence every election cycle, resultant destruction of property, and loss of human lives would be discussed. The research will incorporate both qualitative and quantitative data to determine the correlation between ethnicity and electoral conflict in Kenya. The findings and recommendations will provide an informative knowledge bank for mitigating strategies to avert occurrence and recurrence of ethnic related violence, a part from stimulating further research. This will save Kenya from sliding in anarchy and self destruction into "failed state." The narrow ethnic interests that have dominated its electoral scene are also in the focus of the discussion. An explorative literature review that involves the concept of ethnicity, electoral conflict, and the interplay between ethnicity and electoral violence forms an important component of this research. The research also employs 'relative deprivation' theory as paradigm of its analysis that attempts to explain the conflictual relationship between ethnicity and electoral violence in Kenya. The study concludes that there is relationship between ethnicity and electoral conflict in Kenya. However, a number of other factors ranging from proximate, structural and trigger equally contributed to the 2007 electoral conflict.

Chapter One

1.0 Introduction to the Study

Election violence is a common phenomenon the world over that has permeated even into the traditional western democracies and is not confined to Kenya and Africa alone. In the United States of America where there is strong cultural norm of free elections, there have been episodes of political violence associated with 'turn out suppression' by threats of violence against African – Americans by the organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan"[1] 'the white supremacists'. These organizations present collective group identity which is also the hallmark of ethnicity. Africa, Kenya included has also been hit by fits of ethnic related electoral violence. Zimbabwe, Uganda, Ethiopia and Chad have all in the past been characterized by violence.[2]

Kenya, which is the focus of this study, has been marked with violence every election cycle since the repeal of section 2(A) of the constitution in 1991 that ushered in multi-party democracy. The 1992, 1997 and 2007 paint a dark image of ethnically polarized competitive elections, plunging the country to destructive violence in terms of human casualty and property.

The 2007 post election violence killed about 1000 people and internally displaced over 350,000[3]. For the first time in history, Kenyans moved out en-masse to neighboring Uganda and Tanzania as refugees. Most unfortunate is that the election related violence has always targeted particular ethnic groups. This makes it necessary to determine the correlation between ethnicity and electoral conflict in Kenya. Since conflict is subtle, and develops over a period of time, both the colonial and post colonial structural inhibitions that impeded ethnic groups from achieving

---

[1] S. M. Meadow, 'Political Violence and the Media,'*Marqette Law Review 2005*, pp. 93-240
[2] S. M. Atuobi, 'Election Related Violence in Africa' *in Conflict Trends. Issue No. 1 (Brussels, ICG, 2008)*, p. 11
[3] H. Axel et al, 'Kenya 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks.' *Africa Spectrum 43(GIGA Institute of African Affairs Hamburg.2008), pp1-133*

their desired goals[4] some of which can be traced to the colonial past, the Kenyatta and Moi regimes are critical in this chapter. Even the voting pattern has been ethnically skewed and represents collective behaviour perpetuated by ethnic fear. The colonial regime has a share of blame for using 'divide and rule' policies, thus perpetuating ethnicity. But, it is unfortunate that independent African regimes did little to delink from the' 'sad colonial' past. Instead, they preserved, perfected it, for purposes of controlling the African masses. There was strong centralization of government administration, leaving the masses at the periphery in major socio-political and economic decisions affecting them. Politics of ethnic marginalization continued unabated. Kanyinga attest to the fact that during Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki regimes, influential ministries, departments and State Corporation were held by people from their ethnic group.[5]

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Stability of African states hangs in the balance during the elections period due to the threat of electoral violence.[6] Kenya is an evidence of this checkered instability during the electioneering period that has threatened the socio-economic and political fabrics of a nation that was once considered an island of peace in turbulent Africa, due to its relative stability.[7]

Valuable lives were lost, property destroyed and many displaced .Kenya witnessed ugly images of violent conflict as women were raped and many others maimed, horrors any civilized country would detest to be associated to. In retrospect, Kenya was ranked position 25 among the weak and failing states by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.[8] Within a few, days of

---

[4] M. Mwagiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theory Processes and Institutions Management* (Nairobi, Watermark. 2000), p. 6.
[5] K. Kanyinga, 'Governance Institutions and Inequality in Kenya' in *Readings on Inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics and Perspectives* (Nairobi, Society for the International Development. 2006), p. 383.
[6] S.M. Atuobi, 'Election Related Violence in Africa' in *Conflict Trends. Issue* No. 1 (2008), p. 13.
[7] H. Axel et al, Kenya 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks. *Africa Spectrum 43((GIGA Institute of African Affairs Hamburg.2008), pp. 133-134.*
[8] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Failed State index. *Foreign Policy No. 149.* (July- August, 2005), pp. 56- 65.

violence, there were far reaching repercussions on the socio-economic effects on the wider eastern African region of Rwanda, Burundi, DR Congo ,Uganda and Southern Sudan landlocked countries depending on Kenya as a trade route. The violence could easily be internationalized, thus affecting regional peace and stability. Furthermore, the position of Nairobi as a major regional hub for diplomacy, communications as well as development and relief operation was at stake as was the role of Kenya as the only supposedly stable country in conflict ridden Horn of Africa.[9]

Owing to similar electoral related violence in a number of African countries represented by Uganda, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Chad, Kenya, [10] it is necessary to find out why elections that are supposed to enhance smooth transition of power cause conflict.

Another unfortunate thing is the fact that these electoral related conflicts in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa tend to take the form of ethnic confrontations. In a multi ethnic society like Kenya and due to the discursive nature of ethnic confrontations, proper analyses of the root causes of the violence to inform appropriate mitigating strategies needs to be advanced .The following questions therefore beg to be answered; what is it in ethnicity that causes electoral conflict in Kenya? To what extent is electoral conflict in Kenya ethnically manipulated? What is the root causes of electoral conflict in Kenya?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

1. To examine the role of ethnicity in the 2007 /2008 electoral conflict in Kenya.

2. To investigate the root causes of the electoral conflict in Kenya.

3. To examine the role of ethnic manipulation in the 2007 /2008 electoral conflict in Kenya

---

[9] Axel, H. et al. 'Kenya 2007 General Election and its aftershocks.' *Africa Spectrum. GIGA Institute of African Affairs Hamburg.* Vol. 43, No. 1 (2008), p. 141.
[10] S.M. Atuobi, *'Election Related Violence in Africa'* in *Conflict Trends. Issue* No. 1 (2008), p. 13.

1.4 Literature Review

This section presents the theoretical literature on ethnicity and its relations to electoral conflict. In focus is the concept, and dynamics of ethnicity and electoral conflict in Kenya. Detailed profile of causes, impacts and mitigating strategies to maintain a stable polity will form an important facet of the section. Also to be analyzed are the global perspectives, regional, local dynamics and experiences of ethnic related electoral conflict. This will give reliable comparative literature necessary for understanding the dynamics of the electoral conflict in Kenya.

1.4.1 The Concept of Ethnicity

Ethnicity as a concept is both complex and diverse in its definition. It has been defined variously by different scholars. According to Andersen and Taylor, ethnicity projects the essence of group identity based on common language or dialect, a common religion, common norms, practices, customs and history.[11] Burkey goes further and introduces the dynamics of phenotype which denotes "physical appearance" as an attribute of ethnicity. This view is also held by Shitubani and Kwan who see ethnicity as physical and provide visible physiological clues such as hair texture, skin colour, nose shape,[12] yet these may be misleading. The Tutsi and Hutu though belong to different ethnic groups speak the same language and are more or less similar physically. The supposed physical differences may only be characterized by mere 'perception' as opposed to 'reality'.

Burkey's view that ancestral ties are central in defining ethnicity,[13] also reinforces Andersen and Taylors attributes of ethnicity as a product shared history, yet this shared origin

---

[11] M. L. Anderson and H.F. Taylor, *Sociology the Essential* (Belmont U.S.A., Thomson Wadsworh, 2005), pp. 236-389.

[12] T. Shitubani and M. Kwan, *Ethnic Stratification; A Comparative Approach* (New York, Macmillan), 1965, p. 5.

[13] M.R. Burkey, *Ethnic and Racial Groups: the Dynamics of the Dominance* (ed) F.J. Short, (California Cummings Publishing Inc. 1978), p. 2.

may be 'mythical' as opposed to 'reality'. But even with the doubt of shared ancestry, it still remains a catalyst to group identity that informs their collective interest, fears and action.[14] This may mean that ethnicity may not only coalesce around fear and threats but also to positive adventures such as economic, political and social advantages. Young, confirms this by his assertion that ethnicity is a collective phenomenon and form of identity, has in the contemporary world a singular capacity for social mobilization[15]. Nyasani in explaining the concept of ethnicity from an etymological perspective introduces the essence of "peculiarity" as a central theme of the concept. He asserts that ethnicity is derived from the Greek word "*ethnos*" meaning race, or group of people with common cultural peculiarities, peculiar circumstances, unique geographical terrain and unique physical, psychological, emotional and moral comportment developed in their own surroundings.[16]

Shitubani and Kwan introduce the concepts of "ethnicity" and "ethnic groups" that they say have been used interchangeably by many social scientists. [17] Yet they try to put a distinction. They conceptualize ethnicity as more of an attitudinal edifice, hence psychological in nature, while ethnic group is conceived as a sociological enterprise.[18] But even with the distinct differences the two paradigms share a common idea of ancestry.[19] They further admit the fact that ethnicity is rewarding though not always, as the ruling elites may favour class associates rather than their own ethnic group. [20] Karl Marx explains this in terms of 'class struggle' that

---

[14] D. Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflicts in Africa. Pressures and Incentives for Co-operation* (Washington D.C., Brooking Institution Press 1997), p. 4.

[15] C. Young, 'Explaining the Conflict Potential of Ethnicity.' in J. Derby and R. MacCarthy; *Contemporary Peace Making: Conflict, Violence and Peace Process* (London, Pulgrave 2003), p. 9.

[16] M. F. Nyasani, 'The Meaning and Implication of Ethnicity,' *in Tarimo and P. Manwelo; Ethnicity Conflict and the Future of African States* (Nairobi Paulines, Publications Africa 2009), p 14.

[17] T. Shitubani and M. Kwan, *Ethnic stratification; A Comparative Approach* (New York, Macmillan), 1965, p. 5-6

[18] Ibid, pp. 5-6

[19] Ibid, pp. 5- 6

[20] Ibid, p. 34.

even surpasses ethnic identity. He explains the exploitative 'symbiotic' relationship between the

bourgeoisie and the proletariat[21], which is purely a class concept as opposed to ethnic identity.

Ethnicity is not negative *parse*, but rather dormant and harmless, and if in the negative

form, it is fuelled by lurking human instinct of psychological fear, what the existentialists refer to

as angst or dread as Nyasani argues. He further explains that this assumes the character of

xenophobia, imagery complexes and hidden hatred.[22] This may portend unfounded fear, yet

some fears could be real and confirmed [23] based on the primordial historical experiences of harsh

treatment by the out-group.

Nthamburi agrees that ethnicity is neutral sociologically and blames ethnocentrism as

pathological, destructive state of cultural and ethnic absolutism.[24] This narrow ethnic

romanticism make ethnicity that should be a neutral concept depicting common origins, shared

historical memories, ties and aspirations turning violent. He summarizes it, as a sense of

'people-hood' which has its foundation in combined remembrances of past experience and

common inspirations, values, norms and expectations.[25]

1.4.2 Electoral conflict

The process of electioneering has been flawed with irregularities due to the high stakes

attached to the outcome of the elections. Elections have always entailed 'zero sum game' where

the winner takes it all.[26] This has always elicited 'cut throat' competition that if not guarded by

---

[21] J. S. Goldstein, '*International Relations*, 6th ed.' Pearson "Education. Inc. (Delhi, Darling Kindersley Publishing Inc. 2005), p. 492.

[22] M. F. Nyasani, op. cit. p. 15.

[23] F. Stewart, *The Root Causes of Conflict' Some Conclusions Working Paper Number 16* (Oxford University 1998), p. 9.

[24] Z. Nthamburi, 'The Paradigms of Ethnicity; Its influence and Relevance in Public Life Today' in Tarmio and Manwello *Ethnicity and Conflict; the Feature of African States* (Nairobi Paulines Publications Africa 2009), p. 70.

[25] D. Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflicts in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Co-operation* (Washington D.C., Brooking Institution Press. 1997), p. 4.

[26] S. M. Atuobi, 'Election Related violence in Africa,' in V. Gounden (ed); *Conflict Trends Issues* 1. (South Africa, Accord, 2008), p. 12.

strong institutions, attract mischief from actors, which may be political parties or ethnic groups, bent on acquiring political power. Power here means the ability to access and distribute state resources by the ruling elites to their favoured loyalists or ethnic groups. But, it is not always obvious that the ethnic group(s) may be rewarded. The ruling elites may end up favoring their 'class' associates as opposed to the ethnic groups. Karl Marx, explain this as a 'class struggle' that dominate the relationship between 'bourgeoisie', the exploiter and 'proletariat', the exploited, though quite often the dominant group always benefit. Cohen asserts that political power is an important instrument of economic power, setting the values and determining the allocation of employment, of government economic and social investments and incentives for private employment.[27]

Many states, including the traditional western democracies such as United States have been victims of electoral conflict or violence. There have been accusations of vote rigging and other electoral malpractices, whether real or perceived leading to electoral violence. It is therefore the desire of this paper to define and explain this broad concept of electoral conflict. Just like ethnicity, electoral conflict is equally complex in its definition and diverse in meaning, but for brevity and precision only a few definitions and dynamics involved would be discussed.

Atuobi defines election violence as violent action against people, property or electoral process, intended to influence the electoral process, before, during or after elections[28]. He gives a detailed typology of electoral violence as murder, destruction and damage of property, assault or death threats, forceful dispersion of rallies, street protests, hooliganism, arbitrary detentions and arrests without warrants, abduction, economic repression or sabotage intimidation of voters

---

[27] A. Cohen, *Two Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in Complex Society* (Berkeley California. California University Press, 1974), p. 11.
[28] S.M. Atuobi, 'Election Related Violence in Africa' in V. Gounden; *Conflict Trends Issues* 1. (South Africa, Accord, 2008), p. 11.

among others.[29] This therefore connotes the fact that electoral violence encompasses a retinue of violent actions and should not be seen in the overt essence, but should include social and economic perspectives which may sometimes be covert. Although, Chaturvedi confines electoral violence to pre-electoral conflict and intrigue, he agrees with Atuobi that power of using force influences the electoral outcomes.[30]

Electoral violence may not be confined to parties competing for elective positions alone, but can be conducted through proxy. Roessler, refer to this as 'privatized state violence',[31] where the state or incumbent is involved, a situation where he gives Kenya, Rwanda and Malawi are given as the best examples of privatized violence to gain political advantage. In the same vein, electoral violence may not necessary target voters who are responsible for the electoral process; it may target political parties, their members, electoral officers, and media, civil society organizations, though, by large immediate victims are usually voters.[32] In a nutshell, election violence is a deliberate act[33] meant to change the electoral outcome in favour of the practitioner.

1.4.3 Ethnicity and Electoral conflict

The interplay between ethnicity and electoral violence is another complex dynamic worth analyzing for better understanding. This will inform its effective management. The fact that many countries have witnessed ethnic related electoral violence should not be misconstrued that

---

[29]Ibid, p. 11

[30] A. Chaturvedi, Rigging Elections with Violence' *Public Choice, Vol. 125 No. ½ (Oct. 2005). p.190*

[31] P. G. Roessler, 'Donor Induced Democratization and the Privatization of State Violence in Kenya and Rwanda' *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 37. No 2. (New York; University of New York. .2005), pp. 207-22

[32]S. M. Atuobi, 'Election Related violence in Africa' in: *Conflict Trends. Issue* No. 1. (2008), pp.11 -12.

[33]S.J. Tarimo, 'Competing Identities Loyalties and Interest' In Tarmio and Manwello *Ethnicity and Conflict; the Feature of African States* (Nairobi, Paulines Publications Africa 2009), p. 24.

ethnicity per se is evil.[34] Identity on the basis of ethnicity may be harmless, unless it is manipulated for political, social and economic expediency.

Stewart argues that the cultural differences alone are not sufficient to bring about violent group mobilization.[35] This view is also shared by Cohen, who postulates that men do not fight due to different cultures, and when they do fight across ethnic lines, it is nearly always the case that they fight over some fundamental issues concerning the distribution and the exercise of power.[36]

Young slightly differ in his opinion about the violent potentials of ethnicity. He argues that "although, it is not inherently conflictual, ethnicity has psychological properties and discursive resources which have the potential to decant into violence."[37] This argument tends to discredit the primordialist viewpoint of ethnicity and violence as deeply embedded into the historical roots of how a group perceives others based on the earlier encounters. These images could be real or imagined.

Lake and Rothchild postulate that intensive conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future. They quip that the group's fear of their safety leads to the emergence of difficult- to-resolve strategic dilemmas that contain within them the potential for tremendous violence.[38] Their assertion that ethnic conflict may only be contained rather than being resolved due to its endurance, [39] seems to only suggest palliative strategy to conflict resolution, though

---

[34] P. Manwelo, 'Root Causes of the December 2007 Post Election in Kenya;' In Tarimo A. & D. Manwelo; *Ethnicity Conflict and the Future of African States* (Nairobi, Paulines Publications, 2009), p.15.

[35] F.Stewart, *The Root Causes of Conflict: Some Conclusions: Working Paper Number 16* (Oxford University 1998), p. 10.

[36] A. Cohen, Two Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in Complex Society (Berkeley California. California University Press .1974), p. 94.

[37] C. Young, *'Explaining the Conflict Potential of Ethnicity,'* in J. Derby and R. MacCarthy; *Contemporary Peace Making: Conflict, Violence and Peace Process* (London, Pulgrave, 2003), p. 9.

[38] D. A. Lake and Rothchild, D. Containing Fear, the Origins and Management of Ethic Conflict. *International Security*, Vol. 21 (Harvard College USA. 1996), pp.1- 41.

[39] Ibid, p. 41

this seems to be in agreement with Schaefer's view that conflict is endemic"[40], since parties will always have incompatibility in their goals to achieve[41]. However, Jeong argues that expectations can be compensated by the availability of opportunities in other areas;[42] but, this may be possible if the deserved is not based on the basic human needs.

Lake and Rothchild's assumption that these ethnic groups would be competing for scarce resources may also be inaccurate as the protracted conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been due to the struggle by both foreign and regional actors to access its natural resource wealth.[43]

Ethnic conflict is a common phenomenon in Africa and the world over. Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Sudan and even Kenya, are typical examples[44]. Wood, in his comparative study of Bosnia and Rwanda genocide suggests that while ethnic conflict has its own unique history, it shares a variable incubation period for predisposition factors, followed at some point by a set of triggering factors that result in mass violence. Violence, be it ethnic or otherwise develops over a period of time[45].This informs what Axel typology of underlying problems, proximate and trigger causes[46]. Bosnia a multi ethnic society in the authoritarian Yugoslav polity, held together by "dictator" Tito as president, had the desire for greater freedom and autonomy, though this was based on the ethnic nationalism, thus culminated into ethnic genocide.[47] This gives the evidence of a long standing rivalry that had been nursed over time.

[40] R. Schaefer, *Sociology Matters* (New York, McGraw Hill, 2004), p. 9.
[41] Ibid, p. 9.
[42] H. W. Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies; An Introduction* (England, Ashgate. 2000), p. 5.
[43] D. A. Lake and D. Rothchild, 'Containing Fear, the 'Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict.' *International Security*, Vol. 21 (USA, Harvard College. 1996), pp. 1-44
[44] Ibid, p. 45.
[45] B. W. Wood, Geographical Aspects of Genocide; A Comparative Study of Bosnia and Rwanda; *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, New Series Vol. 26 No. 1 (Britain, Blackwell. 2001), pp. 57– 75
[46] Axel H. et al, 'Kenya 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks' *Africa Spectrum* 43, 1:133- 144 (Hamburg, GIGA Institute of African Affairs, 2008), p. 135.
[47] H. W. Jeong, *Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis* (London, *Sage* Publications Ltd.2008), pp. 16-47.

Rwandan genocide was a product of age long rivalries over power and arable land, [48] and not ethnicity per se. Comparative study Bosnia and Rwanda confirms that ethnic differences alone do not cause conflict. The belligerent ethnic groups speak the same languages and most Tutsi and Hutu belong to the same religion, however, the political leaders in both areas exaggerated perceived ethnic differences and old grievances"[49] for political expediency, leading to the genocide.

Mozaffar introduces the dimension of Election Management Bodies (EMBs). Effectiveness of EMBs as institutional linchpins of electoral governance depends largely, but not exclusively on their autonomy from the government.[50] This postulates the fact that to a larger extent, the state meddles in popular elections, though ethno-political fragmentation [51] is also a factor. Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia are examples of regimes whereby tightly controlled plebiscitary elections are done by the incumbent to secure nominal legitimacy.[52] This connotes the fact that there are many dynamics in to the electoral conflict and not just ethnicity alone. Atuobi also doubts the EMBs in conducting elections in Africa. He argues that they have often been forced to resign or declare the election results they do not believe reflect the true outcomes of the election.[53]

Atuobi inputs into the above debate. He explains electoral related violence that has affected a number of African nations in terms of cultural and structural perspectives. Cultural,

[48] D. Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflicts in Africa. Pressures and Incentives for Co-operation* (Washington D.C. Brooking Institution Press, 1997), p. 40.

[49] B. W. Wood, *'Geographical Aspects of Genocide; A Comparative Study of Bosnia and Rwanda; Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers'* New Series Vol. 26 No. 1 (Britain, Blackwell, 2001), pp. 57 – 75.

[50] S. Mozaffar, Patterns of Electoral Governance in Africa's Emerging Democracies, *International Political Science Review,* Vol. 23, No. 1, 85 – 101 (Sage Publications, 2002), p. 85.

[51] Ibid, p. 85.

[52] S. Mozaffar, 'Patterns of Electoral Governance in Africa's Emerging Democracies' *International Political Science Review Vol. 23, No. 1, (Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 85 – 101*

[53] S. M. Atuobi, 'Election Related Violence in Africa' in conflict *Trends.* Issue No. 1 (2008), p. 11.

presupposes the existence of a political culture of thuggery and generally predisposes actors to engage in violence and intimidation during political contests, while structural denotes society and politics are organized in a manner that generates conflict. He says that the two perspectives are reinforced by ethnic rivalries and mobilization in politics in most African countries that have been volatile during elections.[54] He argues that, even when the election are free and fair there would still be violence, before, during and after the elections.

Many scholars share the belief that electoral conflict in Kenya is a product of structural imbalance and ethnically stratified polity. Nyasani, views employment in the civil service as an ethnic reward other than merit based. He recommends meritocracy in employment opportunities for the country to take off socially, economically and politically with confidence.[55] Although his opinion projects the need of professionalism in employment, it may end up rewarding a few technocrats, hence marginalizing other less endowed ethnic groups. This is a recipe for violence. African context needs an affirmative action in employment for it to be inclusive enough, taking into account diverse disadvantages of the marginalized groups.

The Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV) that was mandated with the task to investigate; circumstances surrounding the violence, role of state security agencies in handling the conflict and suggest mitigating recommendations – postulate that politicians have always deliberately used force to obtain power,[56] since the presidency is seen as an opportunity to access state resources and goods. He gives another dimension of the conflict that the youth who took action were both paid and pressed.[57] This seems to undermine the salience of ethnicity and its emotive passion to violence especially when it touches on ethnic security and prestige,

---

[54] S. M. Atuobi, 'Election Related Violence in Africa' in conflict *Trends*. Issue No. 1 (2008), p. 11.
[55] M.F. Nyasani, 'The Meaning and Implication of Ethnicity,' in: Tarimo & P. Manwelo; *Ethnicity Conflict and the Future of African States* (Nairobi, Paulines Publications Africa, 2009), p. 12.
[56]*Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence- CIPEV* (Nairobi 2008), p. 22.
[57] Ibid, p. 26.

what presidency in Kenya stands for. He suggests that impunity that is responsible for the cycle of electoral violence in Kenya should be punished to avoid its recurrence.[58] But this is to suggest retribution which may be counterproductive in peace building. Conflict can be meaningfully appeased by social justice or restorative justice not retributive justice, as suggested by Waki.[59] However, between the retributive and restorative, there should be a balance, since the victim of the abuses also need justice. Also those who commit atrocities must be brought to book to be exemplary to others to deter them from committing the same offence.

1.5 Justification of the study

Kenya just like many African countries has suffered violent conflicts that have caused untold suffering in terms of human casualties and destruction of property. Prior to 1992, this country enjoyed relative peace, and only to explode into violence with the 1992 general elections, especially in Rift valley. This was repeated in 1997, and later 2008, considered, the height of electoral violence in Kenya, as it engulfed almost the whole country, threatening the tenets of its stability. This cycle of violence must be analyzed to provide a deeper understanding of the root causes that have been shrouded in controversy based on political persuasion. This research will therefore stimulate policy decisions to equip conflict managers with effective mitigating strategies to avert ethnic conflict in violence fatigued Africa.

Kenya's electoral violence 2007 /2008 is a recent phenomenon and may have attracted few studies to inform credible findings. This therefore influences my passion to conduct a research in this area to fill the knowledge gap. This research will provide proper understanding of the concepts, dynamics of ethnicity and electoral conflict whose manifestation in Kenya has always been shrouded in secrecy and denial, yet prejudices and stereotypes exist. It will shed

---

[58] Ibid, p. 26.
[59] Ibid, p. 26.

light on ethnically skewed voting pattern and collective violence being experienced routinely every election year. Kenya also command important socio-economic and geo-political position in east and central Africa, whose instability due to conflict can destabilize the whole region and beyond. This may affect world peace and security. Kenya is a major commercial corridor to goods entering and exiting land locked DRC, Uganda, South Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi. Kenya is also a strategic partner of the USA in the war against terrorism, a part from hosting refugees fleeing turmoil in neighboring countries such as Somalia. Kenya, as a weak state may provide safe haven for terrorists, and this research is therefore viable.

The research will also examine how multi-ethnicity can be harnessed to promote unity in diversity to help African delicate multi-ethnic balance to coexist peacefully. In addition, recent reports by Waki and Kriegler, though useful present qualitative factual data with little theoretical basis, and insufficient statistical analysis hence inadequate to determine the role of ethnicity on electoral conflict in Kenya.

1.6 Theoretical framework

The study will use relative deprivation theory as a framework of its analysis. Jeong defines relative deprivation as actor's perception of discrepancy between the value expectations and the value capabilities[60]. He further explains that it results from the combined effect of rising expectations and a lack of progress towards demands for better life.[61] However, structural circumstances may inhibit individuals from achieving those demands, hence frustration and aggression as Mwagiru argues.[62]

---

[60] H.W. Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies; an Introduction* (England Ashgate, 2000), p. 69.
[61] Ibid, p. 60
[62] M. Mwagiru, Conflict in Africa... op. cit. p. 19.

Gurr reinforces this theory .He argues that the potential for collective violence depends on the discontent of members of a society which results from a gap between what they have and what they think they should have. He calls this gap relative deprivation which provides action through psychological aggression theory.[63]

The presidency and by extension the state has been viewed as a source of wealth acquisition and distribution and may also be an impediment to other groups attempt to enhance social, political and economic welfare and security .This may dampen their expectations and introduce a sense of insecurity .This explains why the presidential elections in Kenya and elsewhere in the world have elicited cut throat competition that sometimes involves violence. The stakes are high since like any democratic elections it is based on majority takes it all which is based on a win-lose situation that has made Kenya vulnerable to political violence.

Crawford argues that should power be the exclusive of one's ethnic adversaries one is fated to unlimited insecurity and this makes competition for political power a matter of life and death.[64] With fear according to Jeong groups see each other as boundless evil or mortal threat to ethnic self.[65] Whether the fear threat is real or perceived rivaling groups will therefore try by all means to escape decimation and annihilation, one of the expectations the presidency could fulfill. The presidency may also offer socio-political and economic opportunities.

The loss of the presidential contest in a perceived rigged election thus dumped various groups' expectation of a better future.

However, in conflict the masses are often used as pawns in the elitist power games, with little benefits to reap .This presents the essence of greed as opposed to grievance. It also

---

[63] S. G. Brush, 'Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Science; Relative Deprivation and Collective Violence' *Journal of Peace Resolution* Vol. 40, No. 4 (Dec 1996), p. 527.
[64] Young, C, 'Explaining the Conflict Potential of Ethnicity,' in: J. Derby and R. MacCarthy; Contemporary Peace Making: Conflict, Violence and Peace Process. London, Pulgrave (2003), p. 15
[65] Jeong, H.W. *Peace and Conflict Studies; An Introduction.* (England Ashgate. 2000), p.15

postulates the reality that different actors in 2008 electoral conflict had different motives and interest. The perceived flawed elections may therefore inform only be a trigger cause, yet beneath, there were some other underlying problems. This informs different typologies of the electoral conflict into trigger, proximate and structural or root causes. However, feelings of relative deprivation intensify, not only when benefits decline, but also when expectations increase.[66]

In the context of ethnicity, Richardson argues that when large numbers of ethnic grouped experience relative deprivation simultaneously, the potential for spontaneous outbreaks of violence diversifies at rival groups, intensifies.[67] He argues that historical legacies of mistrust and "victim mentally" make it more likely that feelings of deprivation resulting from declining benefits will be interpreted as ethnically motivated injustice.[68] This further concurs with the long term structural injustices, reinforced with mobilization a long identity issues, as a cause of ethnic related electoral violence.

But all in all, relative deprivation may only cause conflict when people perceive they are suffering otherwise they will be in a state of what Mwagiru calls "happy slaves status". When they suffer and do not realize that they are suffering. Possibly, this is the reality that dawned on Kenya, coupled with the perceived flawed presidential elections triggered conflict.

1.7 Hypotheses:

1. Ethnicity causes electoral conflict in Kenya.

2. Manipulation of ethnicity causes electoral conflict in Kenya.

3. Ethnic inequality causes electoral conflict.

---

[66] L. Richardson, 'Arms and Insecurity.' (Chicago, Quadrangle, 1967), p. 506
[67] Ibid. p. 6
[68] Ibid, p. 6

1.20 Methodology

The research design to be used here is social survey. This is meant to cover 4 provinces in Kenya. The research will be conducted by direct interviews using preplanned questions. The respondents who are hard to reach will be engaged through telephone interviews. The interview will be conducted to 40 respondents as follows; women leaders, religions leaders; members of the Provincial Administration– Chiefs, District Officers (Dos), District Commissioners (DCs); Non Governmental Organization (NGOs), local village elders, youth and political leaders.

The questions will be short, simple and clear. In cases where natives do not understand English or Kiswahili an interpreter will be sought. The interviewee's responses will be recorded. Open ended interview will be used due to their comparative advantage of clarity and simplicity.

Data analysis will be both qualitative and quantitative. Secondary data will also be used for comparison and to attest to the accuracy of the responses. This will form the basis of interpretation and conclusion. Interview are time saving and allows free interactions with the interviewee. Observation of body language also gives informative judgment based on empirical reality. It is also flexible; questions can be explained to the respondents. However, the respondents may be suspicious thus with holding vital information.

The snow ball and random purposive techniques will be used. The respondents will intentionally be selected from a *bank* of people with wealth of experiences as participants, victims and audience. For each category in every region, two will sampled for the interviews, this is after identifying those of them with knowledge of the 2007/2008 electoral conflict in Kenya. They will also lead the researcher to other resourceful persons to be interviewed which denotes snow-ball technique.

The questions will be in print form. Secondary data will also form part of the research findings to be compared with the primary data accessed through direct interviews and conclusions made. Secondary data are easily accessible and less expensive since there are no field trips.

Chapter outline

Chapter 1: Ethnicity and Electoral conflict; An Introduction.

In this chapter introduction and background of the research has been discussed covering; the statement of the problem, research objectives, literature review, theoretical framework, hypotheses, methodology and justifications of the research.

Chapter 2: The concept of ethnic conflict

This chapter will focus on the concept of ethnic conflict. In-depth analysis of the role of ethnicity in courting conflict with specific reference to Kenya will be of importance. Factors and actors in ethnic related conflicts, its types and the ethnic conflict cycle will be covered.

Chapter 3: The Concept of Electoral Conflict

This chapter will explain the concept of electoral conflict detailing its types and manifestations. It will also analyze the root causes of electoral conflict. The Kenyan electoral conflict experience will form an important component of this chapter.

Chapter 4: Analysis of ethnicity and electoral violence in Kenya.

This chapter will critically analyze data on the dynamics of ethnicity and election violence in Kenya.

Chapter 5: Summary and Reflections

This chapter contains the conclusions of the research findings.

Chapter Two

2.0 Ethnic Conflict

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will analyze the concept of ethnic conflict, diagnosing in detail the types of ethnic conflict, their causes, the actors and their interest, constituents and audience. Also in the focus will be the link between ethnicity and conflict to inform the effective conflict mitigation strategies, to eliminate its discursive nature that has plunge several African nations, Kenya included into political instability. Definition of ethnic conflict as a concept and phenomena will also be part and parcel of this chapter. Valuable experiences from Kenya, Africa and the world over will be used to illustrate the dynamics of ethnic conflict for a deeper understanding of the concept.

2.2 The Concept of Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflict has been defined variously by different scholars. This makes Sotiropoulou to presuppose that there is still no definitive and explicit scientific definition of ethnic conflict.[1] It may be therefore difficult to come up with one accepted single definition that suffices all the academic fields. Bruce argument concurs with this reality of lack of uniformity in defining the term. He opines that the definition of ethnic conflict range from competing meta-narratives of meaning to violent conflagrations where the combatants display different cultural symbols.[2] The concept and terminology may lack universal uniformity; this does not mean that there has been no attempt to define it.

---

[1] A. Sotiropoulou, *The Role of Ethnic Conflicts: The case of Yugoslavia* (University of Bath, Euromaster, 2007), p. 3
[2] G. Bruce, 'Against the Concept of Ethnic Conflict' *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 26 (2004), pp. 1157-1166.

According to Wolff ethnic conflict is a form of group conflict in which one of the parties involved interprets the conflict, its causes and potential remedies along an actually existing or perceived discriminating ethnic divide. He further argues that the goals of at least one ethnic party are defined 'exclusively' in ethnic terms and in which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinct.[3] This therefore introduces essence of primordial ethnic attribute as being pertinent to ethnic conflict. However, identity alone is not sufficient to explain the complex dynamics of ethnic conflict.

Roessingh argues that in ethnic conflict, one of the groups will define its goals in the ethnic terms for example it will claim that distinct ethnic identity and the lack of opportunity to preserve, express and develop it is the that its members do not have the same rights and cannot realize the same interest.[4]

This prefix reinforces Jeong's[5] edict that if a group has been denied the opportunity to achieve the desired goals then frustration sets in, hence aggression. This has been identified in several African countries Kenya included. The barriers put on the ways of a given group to achieve goals, are often defined on the ethnic grounds. This may be link to access to socio-economic and political opportunities.

Muktha defines ethnic conflict as a collision among diverse ethnic groups with reference to their ethnic racial or religious differences.[6] This definition though precise undermines the strength of mobilization perspective and structural problems as pertinent features of ethnic conflict.

---

[3] S. Wolff, *Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 2.
[4] M.A. Roessingh, *Ethnonationalism and Political Systems in Europe: A State of Tension* (Amsterdam. Amsterdam University Press), p. 15.
[5] H.W. Jeong, Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction (England, Ashgate, 2000), p. 5.
[6] S. Muktha, 'Main Approaches to the Definition of Ethnic Conflict.' *International Journal of Academic Research.* Vol. 3. No. 1. January, 2011, pp. 889-892.

Brown defines ethnic conflict as a dispute about important political, economic, cultural, or territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities. He further opines that ethnic conflict is used to describe a wide range of internal conflict, besides identity conflict, others include ideological, governance, racial and environmental conflicts.[7] This gives a wider projection that ethnic conflict is not just an identity paradigm but diverse in nature and causes.

Roessingh[8] affirms the same viewpoint. His conclusion that ethnic conflict is a result of cultural incompatibility of groups coupled with a sudden rise in awareness of one's identity vis-à-vis another ethnic group. This reinforces identity perspective as well as incompatible socio-political, economic heritage and aspirations identified with different ethnic groups, the same perspective that is also shared by Sotiropoulou[9]. He believes that most conflicts between the groups of people are mostly caused by social problems or straitened circumstances defined in ethnic terms.

In a nutshell, ethnic conflict can therefore be seen as a conflict based on ethnic differences. The grievances whether real or perceived can be explained from the context of ethnic identity. The actors to the conflict, their interest and motives are also interpreted from the ethnic identity prism.

2.3 The Ethnic conflict cycle

Ethnic conflict is dynamic and presents itself in phases. This therefore postulates the essence of ethnic conflict cycle that has attracted a number of scholarly discourses. According to Doran, conflict cycle denotes a turning point or changes in the conflict which are marked by

---

[7] M. E. Brown, (ed). *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (London, Princeton University Press.1993), p. 5.
[8] M.A. Roessingh, *Ethno nationalism and Political Systems in Europe: A State of Tension* (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2003), p. 15.
[9] A. Sotiropoulou, *The Role of Ethnic Conflicts: The case of Yugoslavia* (University of Bath, Euromaster, 2007), p. 3.

different levels of escalation that inform the phases.[10] He gives three phases of conflict escalation; the breakout phase, crisis alert phase and aggravated escalation which correspond to the natural brake points on the conflict cycle.[11]

This viewpoint agrees with Jeongs contribution. He argues that the entire conflict cycle proceeds over time through a series of recognizable stages, comprising initiation, escalation, de-escalation and cessation.[12] This model tends to juxtapose the intensity of conflict at different stages. Jeong believes that the transformation is a result of the interaction between parties in the process of conflict evolution that introduces complex issues. He refers to the changes in conflict cycle as conflict transformation[13] which denotes the stages or phases of ethnic conflict. These phases may broadly include: pre- conflict: conflict, and post conflict.

2.3.1 Initiation phase

Mwagiru describes this phase as the early stage of the life cycle of a conflict before the conflict becomes manifest.[14] This assertion reinforces his argument that conflict is rarely abrupt and develops overtime. And that by the time it erupts, its signs have been there.[15] The signals may include endless quarrels and wrangles among leadership. He further argues that this matter could have been sorted out through dialogue and debate has turned into serious protests and strikes some of which may appear violent.[16]

---

[10] C. F. Doran, 'Leading Indicators of June War: A Micro Analysis of the Conflict Cycle.' *International Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol. II, No. 1, February, 1980, p. 24.*
[11] Ibid, p. 24
[12] H. W. Jeong, *Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis* (London, Sage Publications Ltd. 2008), p. 36.
[13] Ibid, p.36.
[14] M. Mwagiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theory Processes and Institutions Management* op. cit. p. 11.
[15] Ibid, p. 9.
[16] Ibid, pp. 9-10.

different levels of escalation that inform the phases.[10] He gives three phases of conflict escalation; the breakout phase, crisis alert phase and aggravated escalation which correspond to the natural brake points on the conflict cycle.[11]

This viewpoint agrees with Jeongs contribution. He argues that the entire conflict cycle proceeds over time through a series of recognizable stages, comprising initiation, escalation, de-escalation and cessation.[12] This model tends to juxtapose the intensity of conflict at different stages. Jeong believes that the transformation is a result of the interaction between parties in the process of conflict evolution that introduces complex issues. He refers to the changes in conflict cycle as conflict transformation[13] which denotes the stages or phases of ethnic conflict. These phases may broadly include: pre- conflict: conflict, and post conflict.

2.3.1 Initiation phase

Mwagiru describes this phase as the early stage of the life cycle of a conflict before the conflict becomes manifest.[14] This assertion reinforces his argument that conflict is rarely abrupt and develops overtime. And that by the time it erupts, its signs have been there.[15] The signals may include endless quarrels and wrangles among leadership. He further argues that this matter could have been sorted out through dialogue and debate has turned into serious protests and strikes some of which may appear violent.[16]

---

[10] C. F. Doran, 'Leading Indicators of June War: A Micro Analysis of the Conflict Cycle.' *International Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol. II, No. 1, February, 1980, p. 24.*
[11] Ibid, p. 24
[12] H. W. Jeong, *Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis* (London, Sage Publications Ltd. 2008), p. 36.
[13] Ibid, p.36.
[14] M. Mwagiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theory Processes and Institutions Management* op. cit. p. 11.
[15] Ibid, p. 9.
[16] Ibid, pp. 9-10.

Jeong shares the same view point. He perceives this phase as one early stage of conflicts process that includes precipitating events, public awareness, and consciousness of incompatible goals. This stage is characterized by antagonisms and making demands for change.[17]

This period marks the pre-conflict phase. It may appear that conflict is absent, but this is deceptive. This period is marked with negative peace that connotes the absence of violence or war as opposed to positive peace which is the integration of human security.[18] Absence of violence does not postulate peace. People may suffer silently due to the existence of structures that impede them from achieving their goals.

In the Kenyan context, the pre-conflict stage is therefore marked by initiation or structural problems that have bedeviled this country for a long period of time. Ethnic conflict in Kenya predates to the colonial regime of divide and rule, a scenario that was also encouraged by the independent state leaders. Failure by the leaders to remove these anomalous structures inhibiting people from achieving their goals have always degenerated into violent conflict.

Jeong asserts that such structure engenders a sense of injustice and resentment.[19] When people realize they are suffering, the struggle to change or replace the structures ensues. Conflict has therefore been initiated according to Jeong,[20] However, this realization only comes when they perceive their suffering or else, they are 'happy slaves'[21] According to Jeong, once conflict is initiated, it is exposed to various types of transformation, along with a proliferation of issues and an increase in the intensity of struggles.[22]The connotation of relative peace in Kenya may denote a situation of what Mwagiru refers as to the happy slaves' status. Despite serious

[17] Joeng. *Peace and Conflict Studies* ... op. cit. p, 295.
[18] J. Galtung, *The Galtung Triangle and Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, (CRIA, 2008), pp. 2-3
[19]H. W. Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies; an Introduction* (England, Ashgate. 2000), p. 92.
[20] Ibid, p. 36.
[21] Mwagiru. op. cit. p. 9.
[22] H. W. Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies; an Introduction* (England, Ashgate. 2000), p. 36.

structural problems, the country enjoyed relative peace. However, this can be relegated to negative peace.

2.3.2 Escalation

This stage of conflict cycle also corresponds to conflict phase. In the context of conflict cycle, structural violence which is not attended to eventually becomes violent conflict.[23] The failure of preventive diplomacy therefore marks the start of conflict phase. According to Mudida, conflict cycle moves to the crisis phase which is challenging in terms of management. This can easily result into escalation of conflict.[24] Mudida's view point reinforces the above analogy. He asserts that if crisis management is not effectively undertaken, physical or behavioral violence eventually results.[25] This is therefore seen as transformation of structural conflict to violent conflict,[26] which is a distinctive feature of conflict phase.

Jeong argues that "in every conflict, a certain event triggers the initiation of a manifest struggle, but behind the catalyzing situations, there are structural conditions and socio-psychological factors that explain the nature and causes of conflict.[27] This postulates the fact that conflict phase is an extension of the structural violence that has defied effective management initiative.

According to King, this phase is marked by escalation which is an increase in quantity and intensity for scope of violent exchanges among parties. He refers to this as spiral escalation which he argues that typically occurs in cycles of attacks and counter attacks.[28] As the conflict

---

[23] R. Mudida, *Structural Sources of Constitutional Conflict: a Conflict Analysis of Constitution Making in Kenya 1997-2005' PhD Thesis* (Nairobi, 2008), p. 1.
[24] Ibid
[25] Ibid
[26] A. Curle, *Making Peace* (London, Tavistock. 1971), pp. 1-26.
[27] H. W. Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies: an Introduction* (England, Ashgate. 2000), p. 92.
[28] E. A. King, *a Glossary, Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies*, 2nd. Ed. (Geneva, University of Peace. 2005), p.34.

escalates it leads to entrapment and eventually de-escalation. In essence violence have reached fever pitch and is no longer economical. Jeong refers to it as hurting stalemate.[29]

2.3.3 De-escalation

In this phase, intensity in hostile behavior diminishes for strategic reasons without the changes in intentions, namely, being designed towards a more economic and effective conduct of conflict.[30] The choice for peace is designed as an alternative to achieving group's goal without 'painful' conflict. This suggests that conflict environment is transformed for tactical bargaining or negotiation.[31]

Zartman's argument justifies the above analogy. He asserts that both parties to the conflict have reached mutually 'hurting stalemate'[32] which denotes a deadlock in the struggle in which there is absence of clear cut victory and increasing cost of conflict which they may decide to dialogue to cease hostilities.[33] This is comparable to Jeong's entrapment theorem explained as flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the future with the damaging and potentially drawn out impasse.[34]

However, there are many complex intervening variables at every conflict stage that may change the evolution of the conflict cycle. Issues, interests, nature and nurture of the protagonists and their allies define the variations in the stages of the conflict cycle and may change its course, momentum and intensity. The cycle may not just be evolutionary and linear, but dynamic and curvi-linear.

---

[29] Ibid
[30] Jeong, op. cit. p. 99.
[31] Ibid
[32] I. W. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, Updated Ed* (New York, Oxford University Press. 1989, p. 268.
[33] Ibid, p. 268.
[34] Jeong, op. cit. p. 99.

In the context of ethnic related conflict in Kenya, it is difficult to determine whether the protagonists ever reached a hurting stalemate and resolution ripeness even with the 2008 electoral violence. Even with heavy human casualties on both sides, wanton destruction of property and massive displacements, the government side [PNU] seemed to have had an upper hand in the conflict through the armed forces and had thus little interest in dialogue.

2.4 Types of ethnic conflict

2.4.1 Irredentist conflicts

According to Carment and James, irredentist conflicts are by definition interstate in scope and involve third-party support.[35] The original term *"terra irredenta"* means territory to be redeemed. The territory to be redeemed is regarded as part of a cultural homeland or historic state, as an integral part of one state. The claim to territory is based on existing or cultivated transnational ethnic affinities and is conditioned by the presence of cleavage between the minority in group and its state-centre.

In the Kenyan context and especially in Rift-Valley, where land has been a serious factor in any conflict, the fight to get back their perceived 'stolen' land meets irredentist demand. Rift-Valley is believed to be Kalenjin ancestral home or territory and thus their heritage. This explains the cycle of conflict from 1992, 1997, 2002 and 200 courted as 'electoral conflict'. However, this was not national territorial claim, but ethnic territorial claim, thus depicts ethnic nationalism.

2.4.2 Secessionist conflict

---

[35]D. Carment and P. James, 'Two-Level Games and Third-Party Intervention: Evidence from Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans and South Asia. *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique*, Vol. 29,No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 521-554

In a secessionist conflict, the state-centre and/or minority group will seek out and obtain external support, which intensifies internal cleavage and disruption and leads to interstate conflict and third-party intervention.[36] Secessionist conflicts may involve the use of force and politically mobilized, well-organized, ethnic insurgency movements. Carment and James argue that secessionist conflict can lead to external intervention in three non-exclusive instances: When ethnic groups refuse to recognize the existing political authorities, they can; trigger internal disruption for the state in question (internal challenge leading to external involvement); invite external involvement based on transnational ethnic affinities (including threats of involvement) of one or more state interlocutors that support secession; or provoke external involvement by one or more states based on ethnic affinities with the state centre.[37]

In the context of third-party intervention, secession and *irredenta* share, several properties. First, their ethnic particularities should tend to make forceful intervention self-limiting in geographic extent. This means that the claims that give rise to ethnic conflicts will characteristically extend only as far as there are ethnic affinities and the states directly involved will be territorially adjacent.

The Somalia *shifta* war represents a clear example of secessionist conflict, as for it was meant for territorial transfer to the greater Somalia. However, in the Kenyan context, there is little relevance apart from the echoes of *majimbo* debate that have dominated political arenas during the elections thus polarizing the country into ethno-regional antagonisms. The Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) demanding ethno-regional autonomy predisposes secessionist call.

2.5 Causes of Ethnic Conflict

[36]R. Young, 'How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?' *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), pp. 774-792.
[37]T.R. Gurr, (ed). *Minorities at Risk: Origins and Outcomes of Ethno-political Conflicts* (Washington: United States, Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. 21.

2.5.1 Weak state institutions

States that cannot protect its people from external aggression and internally exercise its legitimate authority to maintain law and order in its area of jurisdiction may be considered weak,[38] though this is debatable. However, the state weakness and its inability to protect the peripheral group will necessitate the groups to provide for their own protection.[39] This leads to security dilemma[40] which is a situation whereby an ethnic group fearing for its security employs surprise attack to diminish the power of the perceived adversary group.

Brown's systemic framework focuses on the nature of security system in which ethnic group operate and security concerns of these groups. He argues that in a system where the national, regional or international authority is too weak to ensure security of individual groups is a prerequisite for ethnic conflict.[41]

Posen opines that in systems where there is no sovereign – that is – where anarchy prevails – individual groups have to provide for their own defence.[42] Lake and Rothchild contribution also reinforces the systemic perspective of ethnic conflict. They argue that ethnic conflicts are mainly caused by the collective fear of the future as the groups take the strategic initiative to protect themselves leading to offensive and counter offensive attack of the perceived adversary, hence escalating ethnic conflict.[43]

Jeong adds the dynamic of scarce resources to the weak state phenomena. He quips that weaker state capability to accommodate ethnic and other sectoral interests with limited resources

[38] M. Brown. (ed). *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (London, Princeton University Press.1993), p. 6.
[39] Ibid, p.7.
[40] D. Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflicts in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Co-operation* (Washington D.C., Brooking Institution Press. 1997), pp. 3-22.
[41] Ibid. p. 6.
[42] Ibid, p. 6.
[43] D. A. Lake and Rothchild, D. 'Containing Fear, the Origins and Management of Ethic Conflict' *International Security*, Vol. 21 (Harvard College USA. 1996), p. 22.

serves as a fertile ground for rebellion.[44]Although he introduces the element of scarce resources as a cause of conflict, some states with adequate resources such as DRC exhibit intense ethnic or class competition thus leading to conflict. However, this analogy may not explain why Somaliland is relatively peaceful compared to Somalia, yet it is endowed with less resources.

According to Rodolfo, structural violence may also take the perspective of dwindling economic resources that renders the state weak and vulnerable to conflict. As the state no longer controls the kind of resource it can redistribute to ethnic and regional clientele, ethnic groups compete over these shrinking resources as it is the case of Nigeria and Sudan.[45] Kenya is not an exception. The waning economic stability of the Moi era put a limit to the state ability to distribute resources to ethnic and regional clientele therefore the loyalty could not be restored.

Apart from systemic weaknesses, institutions of governance such constitution, judiciary, police among others may be rendered dysfunctional by those in the authority to inhibit individual group from achieving their full potential as Rothchild argues.[46] This denotes the essence of structural problems which later mutates into structural violence.

Kenya is a stark example of a weak polity coupled with dysfunctional institutions. The judiciary, constitution, law enforcement agencies, parliament among others display little independence and autonomy in the intercourse with executive and therefore cannot be trusted as the custodian of the rule of law and neutrality thus exposing the groups to security risks.

The emergence of a ethnic based militia groups such as *Mungiki, Sungu sungu, Taliban, Kalenjin warriors, Chinkororo, Saboat land Defence Force* (SLDF) among others is seen as a strategic ethnic agenda to fill the security void left by dysfunctional state institutions. With no

---

[44] Jeong, op. cit. p. 93.
[45] S. Rodolfo, Ethnic Conflict and the Nation State. UK. McMillan Press Ltd. 1996, p. 6
[46] D. A. Lake and Rothchild, D. 'Containing Fear, the Origins and Management of Ethic Conflict' *International Security*, Vol. 21 (Harvard College USA. 1996), p. 26.

regard to law and order these groups, operate with impunity and thus courting conflict. It is these groups that were used by political elites and ethnic chauvinist to advance their political agenda thus polarizing the society, and eventually leading to post election violence of 2008.

2.5.2 Regional inequalities

Regional inequalities in distribution of economic, political and social resources create ethnic conflict. In his analysis of violent multi-ethnic society Hewitt argues that they are marked by severe political and economic inequalities, constitutional difference and demographic instability.[47]

In the economic perspective, Hewitt argues that there are very few societies where one community does not complain about its economic situation relative to the other.[48] This postulates the essence of relative deprivation has held by Jeong.[49] An ethnic group may be denied the economic opportunities or vital infrastructure such as roads, schools, electricity that may boost economic development and improved standards of living. In addition, inequality in the employment opportunities is also a factor in ethno-regional conflict affecting several polities. Kenya's experience during Presidents Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki regimes reflects a system where employment to important government institutions was based on ethnic identity.[50]

Bates argues that the major sources of ethnic conflict are economic. Ethnic conflict in a society can be explained by various economic indicators such as economic development and rivalry, economic welfare of the ethnic group, benefit distribution and relative deprivation,

[47] C. Hewitt. 'Majorities and Minorities: A Comparative Survey of Ethnic violence' *Annals of American Academy of Political Science*. Vol. 433. Ethnic Conflict in the World Today. Sept. 1977, p. 150.
[48] Ibid. p.154.
[49] W. Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies; an Introduction* (England, Ashgate. 2000), p. 93.
[50] Axel H. et al, 'Kenya 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks' *Africa Spectrum* 43, 1:133- 144 (Hamburg, GIGA Institute of African Affairs, 2008), pp. 133-144

meaning a decline in the standards of living of a group relative to another one.[51] Ethnic conflict is even more heightened by modernization as Bates argues. He states that ethnic groups are rational coalitions formed to compete for scarce goods within the context of social changes brought about by modernization.[52] According to Connor & Walker, modernization increases the awareness of economic differences and resentment of differences between advantaged and the disadvantaged groups.[53] In his contribution to instrumental theory, he states that the economic conditions are the major sources of ethnic conflict and they examine it under economic development and rivalry as well as relative deprivation.

Boswell and Dixon argue that economic development is one of the fundamental causes and motives of group grievances.[54] Economic development brings contextual change into the society, decreases the socio-economic linkages, and increases competition over resources hence contributing to ethnic rivalry. Gurr states that in the presence of some groups gaining more advantages at the expense of others, the frustration and the ethnic identity increases, leading to ethnic mobilization and conflict.[55] Chua on the same note also indicates that economic dominance of one group provokes, maintains or worsens the intense ethno-economic resentment among the unprivileged ethnic group. She claims that under those conditions the subordinate group will mobilize and the resentment will transform into a potential ethno-nationalist movement in order to remove the dominant groups' advantage.[56]

---

[51] R. H. Bates. 'Modernization, Ethnic Competition and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa' in: *State vs. Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*, ed. Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola. Boulder: Westview, p. 152.

[52] Ibid, p.152.

[53] W. Connor, 'The Politics of Ethno-nationalism' *Journal of International Affairs* 27 (1): (1973), pp. 1-21

[54] T. Boswell and W. J. Dixon, 'Dependency and Rebellion: A Cross National Analysis' *American Sociological Review* 55 (4): (1990), pp. 540-59

[55] T. R. Gurr, 'Peoples against States: Ethno-political Conflict and the Changing World System' *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (3), (1994), pp. 347-377

[56] A.L. Chua, 'Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development' *Yale Law Journal* 108 (1): (1998), pp. 37-38

In Kenya, economics marginalization was more pronounced during the Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki tenure where distribution of economic opportunities was majorly based on ethnic loyalty and to a smaller extent the social class who demonstrated political loyalty. Kanyinga displays evidence of an ethnically skewed employment in important civil service slot perpetrated by the three regimes.[57]

Kaufman shares the same view point and argues that decline in the living standards is a major cause of ethnic conflict based on the essence of relative deprivation theory.[58] Horowitz one of the proponent relative deprivation theories also agrees with Kaufman's view point when he asserts that an uneven distribution of the benefits of modernity among the ethnic groups, which is an indication of relative deprivation, increases the ethnic group tension.[59]

In the political realms, unequal ethnic representation to institutions of governance and power courts conflict .Hewitt argues that ethnic conflict is frequently associated with grievances or demands that are of a political nature.[60] He argues that the general complaint is that one community is denied fair share of political power- which corresponds to the proportion of population.[61] However, it is not just political power for the sake of it. Power is associated with the distribution of resources and this therefore explains why perceived unfair political representation generates intense conflict among divergent groups in Kenya.

2.5.3 Ethnicity

---

[57] K. Kanyinga, 'Governance Institutions and Inequality in Kenya in Reading on Inequality in Kenya Sectoral Dynamics and Perspectives.' Nairobi, Society for the International Development (2006), p.17.

[58] S.J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press (2001), p. 18.

[59] D. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, G.A.: University of California Press, 1985), p. 101.

[60] C. Hewitt, 'Majorities and Minorities: A Comparative Survey of Ethnic violence.' Annals of American Academy of Political Science. Vol. 433. Ethnic Conflict in the World Today. Sept. 1977, p. 154

[61] Ibid

Africa and the world over is awash with examples of ethnic related conflicts for example the Yugoslav conflict of 1990s, Eastern Europe conflict that led to break up of the Soviet Union into ethnic nationalities, the Rwanda genocide of 1994, the Arab – Israeli conflict and the Kenyan post election violence of 2008 among others. This brings to the fore the primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist ethnic theoretical viewpoints that have elicited scholarly debates.

Ethnic conflict from primordial perspective is seen as evolutionary[62] and based on individual groups' markers that define the boundaries and therefore rigid and less flexible, thus creating conflict.[63] Young explains that ethnic boundaries emerge resulting into "they" and "we", or "us" and "them". The perpetual "we" is laden with 'positive', symbols and ethnic others viewed as harmful. Young further argues that, ethnicity beyond the collective self is subjective to negative stereotype which later mutates into hostile behavior.[64]

Jeong's argument also reinforces the above discussion, when he asserts that identities are guided by subjective group consciousness. In this case, ethnic groups claim boundaries and autonomy and use elements such as myths and symbols to close ethnic group's boundaries.[65] However, manipulation by ethnic elites should not be underestimated.

The Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda is a stark evidence of how atrocious and dangerous primordial ethnic stereotypes can be to a country that once enjoyed relative peace and stability. The "inzense" or cockroaches as the Tutsi were referred to by the Hutus animalized their very human existence and were seen to be a dangerous group who were to be eliminated at all costs to

[62] F.P. Harvey, 'Primordialist, Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Violence in the Balkans: Opportunities and Constraint for Theory and Policy' *Canadian Journal of Political Science* Vol. 33. No. 1. March, 2000, pp. 37-65.
[63] C. Young, 'Explaining the Conflict Potential of Ethnicity' In: J. Derby and R. MacCarthy; *Contemporary Peace Making: Conflict, Violence and Peace Process.* (London, Pulgrave. 2003), p. 13
[64] Ibid, p.13.
[65] H.W. Jeong, '*Peace and Conflict Studies; an Introduction...* op cit. p. 71.

guarantee Hutu security and survival.[66] However, the genocide operation was also manipulated by Hutu elites whose interest was political power. Ethnicity was only used as a vehicle to mobilize people into action. Stereotypes are therefore used to strengthen ethnicity, thus entrenching the primordial consciousness. Andersen and Taylor also share Kuperman's opinion of relationship between security threat and ethnicity. They argue that ethnic identity may grow stronger when the group faces prejudice or hostility from other groups.[67] The Kenyan situation clearly display ethnicity and on the extreme, ethnocentrism as courting ethnic conflict.

The Instrumentalist paradigm is based on the mobilization or manipulation of ethnic identity to achieve collective goal. Jeong recognizes the fact that identity can be used instrumentally to promote individual or collective interests.[68] He gives an example of a political struggle where the competing elites use ethnicity as a tool to mobilize popular support.[69]

Jeong further argues that ethnic and religious differences are not in themselves causes of conflict. He argues that ethnic communities remain passive and un-mobilized for long periods, and only to be awakened by socially derived inequalities in material well being or political access.[70] Ethnic destinations are deepened by the denial of political participation, lack of physical and economic security and even marginalization.[71] This view point brings in the paradox of inhibitive structural conditions that may infringe the social, economic and political rights and consequently igniting collective action, in the process of seeking justice.

---

[66] A.J. Kuperman, 'Rwanda in Retrospect' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 1 (Jan –Feb, 2000), pp. 94 -261.
[67] M.L. Anderson and H.F Taylor, '*Sociology the Essential* (Belmont U.S.A Thomson Wadsworh, 2005), p. 236.
[68] Ibid, p. 72.
[69] Ibid, p. 72.
[70] H. W. Jeong, '*Peace and Conflict Studies; An Introduction*' op cit. p. 72.
[71] Ibid, p. 72.

Constructivists regard identity as manufactured rather than given and emerge from dialectic between similarity and difference in group interaction.[72]Ethnicity according to Jeong is therefore a social process which is not predetermined and varies in different situations.

According to Jenkins, socially constructed nature, the significance attached to a particular identity varies in situations.[73] Young confirms that this variation is also revealed by uneven degree of mobilization potential among ethnic communities, since some have a weak ideology of collective self. This argument predisposes the fact that constructivism is a product of group perception, hence amplifying group's identity fault- lines, leading to conflict. These constructed perceptions may advance stereotype image of the out-group hence generating conflict. Rothchild refers to this hostile and insecure perception as essentialist perception.[74]

Nthamburi argues that ethnicity is benign and only becomes problematic when aroused, but this depends on the trust and materials benefit the manipulators inspire.[75]In Kenya the political elites either promised the militia employment or money.

2.5.4 Negative Ethnicity

Ethnicity manifests itself in cultural stereotypes and prejudices that are used to explain the relationship between the dominant and less dominant groups. The dominant is endowed with power to subdue and surmount the other identities as Nthamburi opines, while the less dominant group is deprived of resources. The result of this is "superior civilized" group and inferior "backward" group. Nyasani refers to these stereotypes as a litany of ethnic profiling. He explains that, the protagonists always see each other as villainous, lazy, incompetent, barbaric,

---

[72]H.W. Jeong, 'Peace and Conflict Studies; An Introduction' op cit. p. 72.
[73] Jenkins, op. cit. p. 11.
[74]D. Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflicts in Africa. Pressures and Incentives for Co-operation (Washington D.C., Brooking Institution Press, 1997), pp. 36-38.
[75] Z. Nthamburi. op. cit. p.82.

infantile, intellectually retarded, atavistic, immoral, debauched and profligate.[76]In Rwanda, the Batutsi and their R.P.F counterparts in Rwanda were dehumanized and even given demonic qualities; as depraved beasts, cannibalists and rapists capable of atrocities of all kinds.[77]

These animalistic images are meant to rally ethnic emotions against perceived adversarial group. This also confirms that ethnic profiling is a tool for mobilization of the masses against an "out group". Nyasani argues that this kind of mobilization on the basis of stereotypes change the people and make them ready for action, and therefore will defy alterative and palliative or even conciliatory statement, unless restrained or controlled by mutual tolerance.[78]

2.5.5 Ethnic geography

Atanassova views ethnic geography as a demographic concentration of a particular ethnic group in a given area in a territory.[79] Ethnic geography also defines occupation and to a larger extent cultural engagement which promote ethnic cleavages based on stereotype in-group and out-group perspectives. This is a catalyst to ethnic conflict. In Kenya the predominantly Luo Nyanza, Kikuyu Central province, Kalenjin Rift Valley among others, products of European colonial boundary christened on divide and rule policy and purely defining each ethnic group's occupation, is a source of ethnic conflict.

According to Hechter cultural division of labor denotes a pattern of structural discrimination whereby individuals are assigned to specific types of occupations and other social roles on the basis of observable cultural traits or markers.[80] This reinforces the essence of social

---

[76]M. F. Nyasani, 'The Meaning and Implication of Ethnicity.' In Tarimo & P. Manwelo; *Ethnicity Conflict and the Future of African States* (Nairobi, Paulines Publications Africa, 2009), p. 16.

[77] A.J. Kuperman, 'Rwanda in Retrospect' *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 79, No. 1 (Jan –Feb, 2000), p. 267.

[78] M. F. Nyasani, *The Meaning and Implication of Ethnicity...* op. cit. p. 16.

[79] I.N. Atanassova, *The Impact of Ethnic Issues on the Security of South Eastern Europe: Report Commissioned by the NATO Office of Information and Press* June 1999, p. 21.

[80] M. Hechter and B. Borland, *National Self Determination: the Emergence of an International Norm* (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), pp. 186-234.

stratification, which is synonymous with ethnic identity in the sense that the social structure of

the nation-state is characterized by one ethnic group being subordinate to the other. Social

mobility for subordinate group members is therefore restricted by ascriptive criteria of ethnic

markers.[81]

Demographic instability can be seen in the context of in –migration whether voluntary or

forced thus creating social stress to the host community. It may accelerate intense competition

over limited resources thus straining ethnic relations and eventually culminating into violence

.This reinforces Brown's edict that for ethnic conflict to occur two or more ethnic groups must

reside in close proximity,[82] Hewitt in the same context recognizes demographic instability as one

of the many factors that precipitate ethnic conflict in violent multi-ethnic societies.[83]

In Kenya, migration of the predominantly Kikuyu ethnic group disinherited of their land

at the height of Mau Mau uprising in early 1950's particularly into the Rift Valley diaspora , is

viewed as a source of ethnic conflict. Land has always been seen to be at the centre of ethnic

clashes in Rift Valley as witnessed in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2008. These are elections calendar

years in Kenya, and may only inform trigger causes. However, long standing grievance over land

equates one of the root causes of ethnic conflict, as Axel argues.[84]

2.5.6 Manipulation of Ethnicity

According to Osaghae, ethnicity is a neutral concept yet it has been manipulated to take

discursive face. The manifestation being among others the ethno regional parties, ethnic voting

[81] Ibid, pp. 186-234.
[82] M. E. Brown, (ed). *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (London, Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 6.
[83] C. Hewitt, 'Majorities and Minorities: A Comparative Survey of Ethnic violence.' *Annals of American Academy of Political Science.* Vol. 433. Ethnic Conflict in the World Today. Sept. 1977, p. 150.
[84] Axel H. et al, 'Kenya 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks' *Africa Spectrum* 43, 1:133- 144 (Hamburg, GIGA Institute of African Affairs, 2008), p. 135.

that makes it something to be ashamed of.[85] With reference to Nigeria, Osaghae believes that

ethnicity is caused by both declining standards of living due to scarce resources which were

created by Structural Adjustments Programmes (SAPs), and by the manipulation of ethnic elites

that magnify ethnic consciousness.[86]

However, many scholars agree that it is not just manipulation alone that leads to ethnic

conflict, but hash socio-economic and political realities. Rothchild and Mudida believe in the

economics of ethnic conflict. Mudida argues that conflict is motivated by greed and rebels will

be encouraged by the economic well being of the war.[87] He also mentions "perceived

grievances" as courting conflict. This will therefore bring to the fore greed and grievance[88]

debate that is controversial.

Politicization of ethnicity is another aspect of ethnic manipulation whose design is to gain

political advantage. Kenya is a stark example of polity where political competition is based

ethnic identities. This is reflected in 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007 general elections[89] thus

polarizing the society into different ethnic protagonist. Wanyande further argues that ethnic

groups want their own to occupy presidency so that they too can benefit from the political

system. However, all the members of an ethnic group may benefit from the system.[90]

Getui's argument reinforces the above view point. She opines that those who have

political power draw support from the ethnic lineage.[91]

---

[85] E. E. Osaghae, *Structural Adjustment and ethnicity in Nigeria* (Sweden, Motala Grafiska, 1995), p. 44.
[86] Ibid, p. 45.
[87] R. Mudida, *Structural Sources of Constitution al Conflicts: A conflict Analysis of constitution making in Kenya 1997 -2005' PhD Thesis* (Nairobi, September 2008), p. 77.
[88] P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War (Winchester, Oxford, World Bank, 2002), pp.1-44.
[89] P. Wanyande, 'The Persistence in Kenya's Public Life, in: *Ethnicity Conflict: and the Future of African States'* (Nairobi, Pauline Publications Africa. 2009), p. 59.
[90] Ibid, p. 59.
[91] M. N. Getui, 'The Ethnicity Factor in Politics Religion and Politics' in: *Ethnicity Conflict: and the Future of African States'* (Nairobi, Pauline Publications Africa, 2007), p. 51.

Chapter Three

3.0 Electoral Conflict

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter found out that ethnicity in its primordial condition may appear neutral, it has discursive properties that if manipulated may turn conflictual. This postulates the instrumentalist perspective of ethnic conflict. Equally its role in conflict may also be defined by perceived grievance or greed. Real economic, political and social injustices may have been committed against an ethnic group thus prompting antagonism.

This chapter analyses the concept of electoral conflict with a view to gaining broader insight into what makes elections conflictual. The types of electoral conflict, manifestations and causes of electoral conflict, the actors involved and their interests will form important part of the discourse. Equally, electoral conflict cycle will be discussed.

3.2 The Concept of Electoral Conflict

Fischer defines electoral conflict as acts that are used to harm, intimidate, exploit, disrupt, determine, hasten, delay or reverse electoral processes or outcomes, and acts that occur between the registration of a voter and inauguration of a political regime.[1] Meadow sees electoral violence as a subset of political conflict predisposing both proactive and reactive perspectives. "Proactive", denotes conflict before the elections while "reactive" postulates conflict after the elections as Meadow opines. He shares the same view point with Fischer with his assertion that

---

[1] J. Fischer, *Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention.* (Washington DC, IFES, 2002), pp. 3-8.

the motive behind violence are usually to force compliance, to subjugate, to persuade, or intimidate except for those individuals or groups who enjoy pointless bloodshed.[2]

Kenyan conflictual electoral experience is a demonstration of the central force of conflict as a tool to manipulate the electoral outcome. Both the incumbent and opposition employ it, due to high stakes in the electoral results since it provides zero-sum outcome where the winner takes it all.[3] Atuobi views this, as political violence aimed at the electoral process and geared towards winning political competition or power through violence by subverting the electoral and political process. He further argues that election related violence should be seen as violent action against people, property or the electoral process intended to influence the electoral process before, during or after elections.[4]

3.3 Types of Electoral Conflict

It is rather difficult to come up with exhaustive typology of electoral conflict, since the concept itself is complex. According to Meadow, electoral conflict has numerous typologies ranging from tactics of violence for example; kidnapping, beatings and killings; perpetrators of violence for example party officials, governments; participants in for example paid thugs, mobs, military, campaign workers and party loyalists; venues for example polling places. However, Rief views conflict in the context of proactive or reactive perspectives. He explains proactive violence as involving violence or threats of violence to affect election outcomes and voting decisions. He gives two broad designs of proactive violence as turn out suppression and boycott

[2] R.G. Meadow, *An Essay based on a brief talk given at the Marquette International Media and Conflict Resolution Conference on March 21, 2009*, pp. 231-234.
[3] H. Axel et al; 'Kenya 2007 General Election and its aftershocks' *Africa Spectrum*. GIGA Institute of African Affairs Hamburg. Vol. 43, 2008. No. 1, pp. 133- 144.
[4] S.M. Atuobi, Election Related violence in Africa, in *Conflict Trends.* ' Issue No. 1, (2008), p. 11.

enforcement,[5] which are meant to influence the election process before the actual voting in favour of the actor.

In the context of reactive violence, it is viewed as violence that occurs post-election and is often used to protest perceived unfavorable election results. It is meant for justice seeking, retaliation and outcome grieving.[6]

The electoral violence in Kenya prior to the 2007 elections pre-disposes the essence of the proactive electoral conflict culminating into the post election violence; when ODM refused to accept the results of the perceived fraudulent elections.[7] This therefore confirms the aforementioned typology. It is clear that few days to the general elections of 2007/2008 in Kenya; violence had been realized in a number of places as Waki Report indicates.[8]

According to Atuobi, manifestation of electoral violence ranges from, murder, looting, destruction and damage of property, assault and death threats, forceful dispersion of political rallies, violent street protests and hooliganism, arbitrary detentions and arrests without warrant, abduction, economic repression or sabotage, and intimidating voters and attempting to prevent voting.[9] Many of these are reflections of Kenya's conflictual electoral experience.

3.4 Actors and Factors of Electoral Conflict

Elections everywhere in the world are meant for peaceful transfer of political power and authority from one regime to the next. Axel, refer to this, as change of power through the ballot boxes.[10] However, Berman and Murphy see it as people's empowerment to decide how they will

[5] M. Rief, *Making Democracy Safe: Institutional Causes and Consequences of Electoral Coercion and Violence* (Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 2010), pp. 17-28.
[6] Ibid, pp. 17-28.
[7] Commission to Investigate Post – Elections Violence. Report of the Independent Review Commission of the Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV),' Nairobi, Government Print, 2008, p. 351.
[8] Ibid
[9] S. M. Atuobi, 'Election Related Violence in Africa' *in Conflict Trends*. Issue No. 1 (Brussels, ICG, 2008), p. 11.
[10] H. Axel et al, 'Kenya 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks' *Africa Spectrum*, 43.No. 1. (GIGA Institute of African Affairs Hamburg, 2008), pp. 133-144.

be governed, and more so an institution that give people the opportunity to participate in public life.[11] Elections should therefore be viewed as a process of selecting or choosing peoples representatives in a free and fair political contest. But this may only apply to democratic or competitive elections where people are given equal rights to vote and to be heard.[12] The democratic process may be flouted by various actors hence courting conflict. According to Awuondo, democratic ideals may not be followed in practice and may merely be a cheer word and a kind of populism.[13] This creates conflict.

According to Mwagiru, the major actors in the electoral conflict are the political parties The two protagonists struggle for the control of states' political power and resources. As participants in the electoral conflict they also have constituents, allies and audience who are either local or international with interest in the outcome of the conflict. These multiple actors enter the conflict environment with divergent issues and interests and thus making conflict complex.[14] In the context of this competition for state power, these actors manipulate various institutions to influence the electoral outcome in their favour, thus flouting rules of the game hence, exacerbating conflict. The major actors in the 2007/2008 electoral conflict were, ODMK, ODM, the opposition party and PNU the party for the incumbent and its constituents bent on maintaining the status quo. The conflict was over the perceived rigged elections by the ECK in favour of PNU. Other participants were the international allies, the diaspora and mediator as 3rd parties in the conflict.[15]

Winning an election connotes the control of state power and entails acquisition of resources whose loss is catastrophic and therefore invigorates stiff competition that may lead to

[11] L. Berman and B.A. Murphy, *Approaching Democracy, 3rd ed.*' (London, prentice Hall. 2001), p. 17.
[12] M.L. Anderson and H.F. Taylor, '*Sociology the Essential*' (Belmont, USA, Thomson Wadsworh. 2005), p. 389.
[13] C.A. Awuondo, *Introduction to Sociology* (Nairobi, Basic Books Ltd, 1993), p. 11.
[14] M. Mwagiru, 'Conflict in Africa...' op. cit. pp. 49-51.
[15] M. Mwagiru, 'The Water's Edge...op. cit. pp. 7-10.

conflict. The executive, as in the case of Kenya has the leeway to use the state machinery to influence the electoral process. PNU was viewed as a state actor because of the incumbent, while ODM non state actor.

The electoral management body, the law enforcement agencies and the judiciary, among others, have been victims of state manipulation by the 'executive', being his appointees. This compromises their impartiality in discharging their mandate. In addition to this, there have been structural weaknesses that make Election Management Bodies (EMBs) ineffective in discharging their mandate. Mozaffar argues that effective electoral governance is obviously crucial in securing credible elections. He further states that the weakness of electoral governance leads to flawed elections,[16] and may mar its credibility and wider acceptance hence creating conflict. Atuobi concurs with Mozaffar's viewpoint. He asserts that inherent structural weaknesses in election administration and management in Africa causes electoral related violence.[17]

On the same note, Matlosa argues that one of the facets of constructive conflicts management is the nature of the electoral system in terms of how liberal the political space is,[18] a factor that has been lacking in the defunct Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) structures.

The incentive for political groupings to approach the courts in cases of electoral dispute is dependent on their confidence in the judiciary as an independent arbiter. Where legal institutions are weak or biased and display open complicity with one group against the other, they may opt for extrajudicial means in seeking justice. This denotes conflict.

---

[16]S. Mozaffar, 'Patterns of Electoral Governance in Africa's Emerging Democracies' *International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique*, Vol. 23, No. 1, Electoral Governance and Democratization. Governance électorale et démocratisation (Jan., 2002), pp. 85-101. Sage Publications, Ltd.

[17]S.M. Atuobi, 'Election Related violence in Africa,' in: *Conflict Trends*. Issue No. 1, 2008, p. 11.

[18] K. Matlosa, *'Electoral processes and post –settlement Peacebuiding : Perspective from Southern Africa'* Stockholm , International IDEA, Democracy Conflict and Human Security, Stockholm International IDEA, p. 189.

The security agency, another important actor, in electoral conflict has often been used by the incumbent to cause violence in order to influence the election results. The military and the police have fallen victims to state manipulation, thus compromising their roles of maintaining law and order. In the Kenyan context, it is believed that the security agencies played a major role in the perceived rigged elections in favor of the incumbent.[19] These state organs identified with the appointing authority to protect their positions within government which may be in jeopardy in an opposition win.

Several non-state actors with interest in electoral conflict such as political parties and their different ideologies add to the mix of electoral conflict.[20] They heighten intense political competition that is a recipe of conflict. State and non-state actors also have constituents and audience with different interest in electoral conflict, hence changing the dynamics and complexity of the conflict. Political elites and ethnic bureaucrats bent on taking political advantage manipulate ethnic markers hence exacerbating conflict.[21] Africa and the world over are replete with examples of parties using identity markers to hasten political competition, hence, conflict.

3.5 Causes of electoral conflict

Despite attempts to organize democratic elections for peaceful transition of power and authority, several countries in Africa and the world over have been victims of electoral conflict.

---

[19] Commission to Investigate Post – Elections Violence. *Report of the Independent Review Commission of the Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV)* (Nairobi, Government Print, 2008), pp. 417- 421.

[20] K. Kanyinga, J.D. Long and D. Ndii, 'What is Rigged? A forensic Analysis of Vote Returns in Kenya's' in Kenya's 2007 Elections,' in: D. Kanyinga and D. Okello (eds). *Tension and Reversals in Democratic transition: The Kenya 2007 General Elections. Nairobi, Society for International Development* (SID, University of Nairobi, (2010), pp. 373-414.

[21] K. Kanyinga, D. Okello and A. Akech, Contradictions of Transition to Democracy in Fragmented Societies: the Kenyan 2007 elections in Perspectives, in: D. Kanyinga and D. Okello (eds). *Tension and Reversals in Democratic transition: The Kenya 2007 General Elections. Nairobi, Society for International Development* (SID, University of Nairobi, (2010), pp. 8-9.

This has rendered many countries weak and unstable.[22] However, this does not mean that every election generates conflict. Conflict can either be prevented or minimized to a reasonable lower level depending on the effective management structures in place. Despite this, electoral conflict is one of the many menus that are being used to manipulate the electoral process.[23] In essence, several scholars have identified divergent causes of electoral conflict that can be categorized broadly as; structural, proximate and trigger causes.[24]

3.5.1 Structural causes

Electoral conflict just like any other conflict may not be abrupt and develops overtime. In the context of electoral conflict in Kenya, Mwagiru sees a long standing structural grievance that had bedeviled this country triggered off by the disputed presidential elections.[25]

Curle argues that in the societies where there is structural conflict violence may not be in the evidence, yet peace is absent.[26] He calls this kind of situation *"unpeaceful."* He explains it as the impeding of a human being from achieving full development because of their own internal relations or because of the type of relations that exist between themselves as individuals or group members and other persons or groups.[27] Electioneering process thus provides forum for the manifest of the structural grievances.

Even prior to the 2007/2008 electoral violence, Kenya seems to have been in a state of structural conflict and the supposedly peace and stability was a mere façade, juxtaposing negative peace. Kenya has witnessed quarrels among the political actors, emboldened political

[22] Carnegie Endowment For international Peace. 'Failed State Index' *Foreign policy* No. 149, 2005, pp. 56-65.

[23] H. Axel, et al, 'Kenya 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks,' *Africa Spectrum* 43, 1:133- 144 (Hamburg, GIGA Institute of African Affairs, 2008), pp. 133-144

[24] S.M. Meadow, *'Political Violence and the media,'* op. cit. pp. 231-234.

[25] M. Mwagiru, *The Water's Edge: mediation of Violent Electoral Conflict in Kenya* (Nairobi,   Institute   of Diplomacy and International Studies, 2008), pp.6-7.

[26] A. Curle, *Making Peace* (London, Tavistock. 1971), pp. 1-26.

[27] Ibid, p. 2.

protests, points to structural problems affecting the people as Mwagiru argues.[28]The result was the 2008 electoral conflict, as people struggle to replace anomalous structures that oppress them. However, this may not explain exhaustively why violence took an ethnic cue.

The electoral conflict in Kenya is believed to have been caused by perceived regional and by extension ethnic marginalization and discrimination by the political leadership. In a country where presidency is interpreted in terms of ethnic acquisition of power and resource allocation, this perception is even more reinforced, when anomalous social structures lead to the marginalization of certain ethnic group.[29] Although this could be mere perception, some of the grievances may be based on real injustices. Kiringai argues that the distribution of socio-economic resources in Kenya, displays glaring disparities during the Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki regimes.[30] This confirmed the perception and fears of other ethnic groups and heightening emotions that degenerated into violence, with the perceived rigged elections.

Perception of marginalization may also be created by insufficient resources to support all the population, thus eliciting intense competition".[31] This edict is reinforced by Shitubani and Kwan that parties independently strive for values that are in short supply. [32]However, it is not just scarcity, but inequitable distribution that is viewed as marginalization. In-spite of the argument, structural violence such as poverty reduces the quality of life and is not in any way better than death by shooting.[33]

[28]M. Mwagiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theory Processes and Institutions Management* (Nairobi, Watermark. 2000), p. 9.

[29] R. Mudida, '*Structural Sources of Constitutional Conflict: A Conflict Analysis of Constitution Making in Kenya1997- 2005' PhD Thesis*. p. 86.

[30] K. Kiringai, 'Public Spending in Kenya,' in: *Readings Inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics and Perspectives* (Nairobi, SID, 2006), p. 383.

[31]T. Shitubani and M. Kwan, *Ethnic Stratification; A Comparative Approach* (New York, Macmillan, 1965), p. 20.

[32] Ibid, p. 41.

[33] Rothchild, op. cit. pp. 3-22.

The Kenya constitutional structure is responsible for much of the structural violence.[34]

Mwagiru's sentiment is shared by many scholars one being Kanyinga who opines that the

constitution as an aspect of structural violence, gave the president executive powers that was

sometimes abused, to the detriment of other ethnic groups. President being immune to

prosecution when still in office entrenched impunity.[35]

Kenyan judicial system is perceived as partisan, inept and may not adequately preside

over judicial dispute including the electoral disputes. This forces the people to look for

alternative mechanism to address electoral dispute of which violence is an option. This explains

why ODM chose mass action to protest the perceived rigged elections other seeking justice in

'government courts', [36]thus opening the field for political confrontations. The judiciary as a legal

structure in Kenya is seen therefore as abating structural conflict. Mwagiru confirms this when

he argues that administration of justice in Kenya favour the 'wealthy'.[37]

Government structures were also a source of structural problem. Political power was

concentrated at the centre, reducing the periphery to subordinate levels, even in decisions on

matters affecting them. In recognition of this, Mwagiru asserts that the system of governance in

Kenya almost seems to have been designed to create structural violence.[38] The boundaries further

entrenched ethnicity as they were based on ethnic administrative units. [39] Some kind of

devolution could have been advisable to protect the dignity, identity and cultures of certain

ethnic interests,[40] but it may promote secession tendencies. Kenya under President Kibaki tried

---

[34] M. Mwagiru. op. cit. p. 29.

[35] K. Kanyinga. op. cit. p. 6.

[36] M. Mwagiru, *The Water's Edge: Mediation of Violent Conflict In Kenya* (Nairobi, IDIS, 2008), p. 41.

[37] M. Mwagiru, 'Conflict in Africa...' op. cit. p.33.

[38] Ibid, p. 33.

[39]J. O. Oucho, 'Undercurrents of Post Elections Violence in Kenya: Issues in the long Term Agenda,' in: K. Kanyinga and D. Okello (eds). *Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transition: The Kenya 2007 General Elections.* (Nairobi, Society for International Development, 2010), p. 439.

[40] H. W. Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction* (England, Ashgate. 2000), p. 235.

the economics of devolution through Constituency Development Funds (CDF) and Local Authority Transfer Funds (LATF) but these are minimal enterprises and do not make serious impact.[41]

3.5.2 Proximate causes

Banfield defines proximate causes of conflict as those that are symptomatic of the root causes of the conflict and can lead to its escalation.[42] This can be explained from the context of an existing grievance being aggravated by a 'pathetic condition' that heightens the chances of violent conflict. For example, declining quality of life may aggravate the feelings of marginalization which in itself is a condition of structural violence.

Oucho views proximate as multifarious intermediate variables that must have determined the post elections violence in Kenya, and that these proximate factors were influenced by other independent variables.[43] The perceived flawed election is believed to have triggered the conflict, but this coincided with three critical factors according to Karanja Mbugua, majority electoral system in which the winner takes it all, a politico-environment characterized by a widening regional imbalances, an ethnic anger that had been stoked by elites through manipulating community collective memories prior to the polls.[44]

Land as a proximate cause of conflict has been at the centre of Kenya's political economy. Land alienation, a colonial legacy, permeated into the independent Kenya regimes. The ruling elites and their cronies acquired a lot of land irregularly from the natives. Klopp refers

---

[41] J. O. Oucho, 'Undercurrents of Post Elections Violence in Kenya: Issues in the long Term Agenda' op.cit. p. 500.
[42] J. Banfield et al, Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance for Extractive Industries (London, International Alert. 2005), p. 4.
[43] J. O. Oucho, 'Undercurrents of Post Elections Violence in Kenya: Issues in the long Term Agenda,' in: K. Kanyinga and D. Okello (eds). Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transition: The Kenya 2007 General Elections. (Nairobi, Society for International Development, 2010), pp. 494-502.
[44] K. Mbugua, 'Kenya Factional Conflicts in Historical Context' in Conflict Trends, Issue 1, No. 9. (2008), p. 4.

to this as land "grabbing mania."[45] Private and public utility land ranging from cemeteries, church compounds and even gazette forests like the Mau complex were not spared. They were sometimes used by executive to reward specific ethnic groups and political loyalists.

A number of people became squatters, yet they were to provide for their basic needs such as food, shelter and clothing. As a means to the provisions of basic needs, land thus is a potential source of conflict. In recognition of the value of land president Kenyatta opined in his speech in 1968 in land lie our salvation and survival."[46]

Historical injustices ignite collective passion thus leading to conflict. In Kenya, the unresolved historical injustices provided a fertile ground for the 2008 post election violence. High profile political assassinations such as Tom Mboya, J.M. Kariuki rekindled collective memories that culminated into violence. However, political elites also whipped the ethnic emotions to rally people behind them for political expediency or advantage, thus causing violence. Myths and legends that bore ethnic stereotypes were used even in music to enhance ethnicity. Mwagiru asserts that, the custodians of collective memories are those who witnessed and took part in the conflict that transfers it to the next generating.[47]

The youths are important actors in any political process as they offer security and are also part of the campaign detail. However, unemployed youths may be vulnerable to militia enlistment, hence exacerbating electoral conflict. In recognition to this, Collier argues that, civil strife is as a result of economic decline that leads to the availability of male youth with little or no education seeking financial rewards through conflict.[48] However, this argument is deceptive.

[45] J. M. Klopp, 'The Problem of Land Grabbing in Contemporary Kenya,' *Africa Today*, Vol. 47, No. 1. (Indiana University Press, 2000), p. 7
[46] Ibid, p. 7.
[47] M. Mwagiru, op. cit. 13.
[48] P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War* (Winchester, Oxford, World Bank, 2002), pp. 91-111.

Illiterate males may not be the only victims of unemployment, but even the educated ones and females alike. Nevertheless, in Kenya, it is indicated that the unemployed youth played a central role in 2007/2008 electoral conflict.[49] They attest to have been given money and promised employment to enlist their participation in the election violence. Oucho adds another dynamic to the unemployed youth theory. He links the existence of small arms and the emergence of gangs like *Taliban, Mungiki,* and *Baghdad Boys* as actors that fueled the electoral violence.[50] This therefore reinforces the vulnerability of the un-employed youths to political manipulations to cause violence.

3.5.3 Triggers of conflict

Banfield defines trigger cause of conflict as single acts or events, or anticipation that sparks off a conflict or its escalation.[51] However, conflict is rarely abrupt,[52] but a build-up of spiral structural problems that may have been with the society for quite a length of time. The simmering, unbearable structural problems can be marked by an event that spurs violent conflict. Mbugua concurs that the disputed election only triggered the explosion of existing conflict into the most serious violence Kenya has seen since independence.[53] His argument expands the polemics. He asserts that the interplay between the compromise of the power of the vote and the structural and approximate factors predisposed all groups towards violence reaction, characteristics of mass communal conflicts.[54] The concept of trigger cause is therefore, but a

---

[49] Commission to Investigate Post – Elections Violence. *Report of the Independent Review Commission of the Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV),* (Nairobi, Government Print, 2008), pp. 33-35.

[50] J. O. Oucho, 'Undercurrents of Post Elections Violence in Kenya: Issues in the long Term Agenda,' in K. Kanyinga and D. Okello (eds); *Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transition: The Kenya 2007 General Elections.* (Nairobi, Society for International Development, 2010), p. 502.

[51] J. Banfield et al, *Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance for Extractive Industries* (London, International Alert. 2005), p. 4.

[52] M. Mwagiru, Conflict in Africa...' op. cit. p. 9

[53] K. Mbugua, 'Kenya Factional Conflicts in Historical Context,' *Conflict Trends,* Issue 1, No. 9. (2008), p. 4.

[54] Ibid, p. 266.

stage in a wider conflict cycle marked by escalation and physical violence. The announcement of Kibaki and as president in a perceived rigged election led to the immediate commencement of the violence.[55]

In Kenya the independence of the ECK was in doubt, since they were single handedly appointed by the incumbent. The perception of flawed elections was even reinforced with controversial presidential votes tally. In addition, delays occasioned by organizational weaknesses were generally interpreted as additional tactics towards rigging.[56] The complaint by the ECK chairman that he could not locate some Returning Officers confirmed the rigging theory.

3.6 The Electoral Conflict Cycle

Like any conflict, electoral conflict presents itself into phases which postulate the electoral conflict cycle. Mwagiru argues that, conflict has a life cycle of its own and is both dynamic and organic and transcend from birth, life and death in the conflict cycle.[57] These stages also correspond to what Galtung; refer to the stages as "conflict triangle" or "violence triangle" which is a theoretical model designed in three phases; before violence, during violence, and after violence. These correspond to direct violence or behavioural or social violence or social construct, and structural violence.[58] He further gives a broader categorization based on observable and non-observable conflict traits; visible and invisible conflicts.[59]

[55] T. Kagwe, 'The Unfinished Agenda and the 2007 General Election in Kenya,' in K. Kanyinga and D. Okello (eds); Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transition: The Kenya 2007 General Elections. (Nairobi, Society for International Development, 2010), p. 445.
[56] M. Katumanga, 'Militarized Spaces and the Post -2007 Election Violence,' in: K. Kanyinga and D. Okello (eds); Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transition: The Kenya 2007 General Elections. (Nairobi, Society for International Development, 2010), p. 543.
[57] M. Mwagiru, 'The Water's Edge..." op. cit. pp. 5-6.
[58] T. Ziyadov, The Galtung Triangle and Nagorno-Garabagh Conflict (Washington D.C. CRIA, .2008), pp. 2-3.
[59] Ibid, pp. 2-3

Jeong's attempt to classify conflict identifies five stages of conflict; initiation, escalation, entrapment, de-escalation and cessation.[60] This model tends to juxtapose the intensity of conflict at different stages. Jeong believes that the transformation is a result of the interaction between parties in the process of conflict evolution that introduces complex issues. He refers to the changes in conflict cycle as conflict transformation.[61]

From the above typologies, conflict can therefore be classified into pre-conflict, conflict and post conflict stage. There may be other models the few cases presented are only meant to create harmony and for convenient analytical purposes,[62] especially where there are several classifications.

These stages can clearly be identified in the 2007/2008 Kenya's electoral conflict whereby long standing structural conflict mutated into violent conflict with the perceived rigged elections. Otherwise, conflict itself may not necessarily follow an orderly sequence.[63] Different circumstances, actors and their issues, influence conflict differently, thus determining level of escalation at any stage.

Jeong argument is a justification of this perspective. He sees conflict predisposing a common strand, but is not always a predictable process following precipitating events that signal the surfacing of a conflict.[64] However, every stage influences the outcome of the previous phases.

The Kenya's electoral conflict according to Mwagiru is a manifestation of this cycle and denotes pre-conflict, conflict and post conflict phases. He argues that prior to 2008 electoral violence the country was relatively peaceful. Later peace was replaced by protests and quarrels

---

[60]H. W. Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies; an Introduction* (England, Ashgate. 2000), p. 36.
[61] Jeong, p. 36.
[62] Ibid, p. 97.
[63]M. Mwagiru, 'The Water's Edge...' op. cit. pp.5-6.
[64] Ibid, p. 36

about MOU and the failure effect a new constitution within 100 days as promised by President Kibaki during the elections. This denotes structural violence, which is a demonstration of negative peace.

3.6.1 Pre-Conflict Phase

Mwagiru describes this phase as the early stage of the life cycle of a conflict before the conflict becomes manifest.[65] This assertion reinforces his argument that conflict is rarely abrupt and develops overtime, and that by the time it erupts, its signs have been there.[66] The signals may include endless quarrels and wrangles among leadership. He further argues that this matter could have been sorted out through dialogue and debate has turned into serious protests and strikes some of which may appear violent.[67]

This period marks the pre-conflict phase. It may appear that conflict is absent, but this is deceptive. This period is marked with negative peace that connotes the absence of violence or war as opposed to positive peace which is the integrations of human security.[68] Absence of violence does not postulate peace. People may suffer severe structural violence. Jeong asserts that such structure engenders a sense of injustice and resentment.[69] When people realize they are suffering, the struggle to change or replace the structures ensues. Conflict has therefore been initiated according to Jeong.[70] The complaints, misunderstandings and antagonistic relationships therefore arise, but these can easily be handled through dialogue and other facilitative methods.[71] Mwagiru calls these initiatives to avert conflict before they are manifest, "preventive

---

[65] M. Mwagiru, 'Conflict in Africa: Theory Processes and Institutions Management,' op. cit. p. 11.

[66] Ibid, p. 9.

[67] Ibid, pp. 9-10.

[68] J. Galtung, The Galtung Triangle and Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Caucasian Review of International Affairs, (CRIA, 2008), pp. 2-3.

[69]H. W. Jeong, Peace and Conflict Studies; an Introduction (England, Ashgate. 2000), p. 92.

[70] Ibid, p. 36.

[71] Ibid, p. 36.

diplomacy".[72] But the success of preventive diplomacy depends on issues, interests and goals of the protagonists in the conflict, their constituents and audience. The failure to manage conflict at this level leads so direct violence, which is defined as conflict phase in the conflict cycle.

Galtung in his conflict triangle theorem refer to the pre-conflict stage as "before conflict". He asserts that this stage is distinguishable by invisible violent traits such as structural and cultural violence, which are equally catastrophic in the longer term compared to direct violence. [73] He further argues that "cultural and structural violence" causes direct violence by using violent actors who revolt against the structures and using the culture to legitimize their use of violence, as instruments.[74]

This phase thus is characterized with controversial step in struggle aimed to alter the status quo, which may not be easy. Intergroup tensions are realized, though they have not exploded into violent conflict.[75] Unless a win, win situation is created by positive peace approach to change the whole system by addressing the anomalous structures, then conflict still abounds.[76] Goldstein further suggests that, socio-economic and political justice is necessary for peace.[77] This posits a delicate balance between peace and outbreak of violent conflict.

Kenya prior to 2007 elections was in this state as quarrels, starting with the 2002 pre-election MOU between NDP and NARC took centre stage. This was followed by protests against the governments' failure to honour its pledge to provide a new constitution within 100 days as promised by President Mwai Kibaki during the elections. The climax was the defeat of the government in the 2005 constitutional referendum. In addition, the country was in a state of

---

[72] M. Mwagiru, Conflict in Africa...' op. cit. pp. 10-12.
[73] T. Ziyadov, *The Galtung Triangle and Nagorno-Garabagh Conflict* (Washington D.C. CRIA, 2008), p. 1.
[74] Ibid, p. 1.
[75] Ibid, p. 1.
[76] J. S. Goldstein, *International Relations* 6th Ed. op. cit. p. 159.
[77] Ibid, pp. 159- 160.

structural violence represented by socio-political and economic inequalities. Despite these signals as early warning, the government did little to respond .The end result was the infamous 2007 electoral violence whose effects were devastating in-terms of human casualty and destruction of property.

3.6.2 Conflict Phase

In the context of conflict cycle, structural violence which is not attended to eventually becomes violent conflict.[78] The failure of preventive diplomacy therefore marks the start of conflict phase. According to Mudida conflict cycle moves to the crisis phase which is challenging in terms of management. This can easily result into escalation of conflict. Mwagiru's view point reinforces the above analogy. He argues that, if crisis management is not effectively undertaken, physical or behavioral violence eventually results.[79] This is therefore seen as transformation of structural conflict to violent conflict,[80] which is a distinctive feature of conflict phase.

This period or stage according to King is marked by escalation which is an increase in quantity and intensity for scope of violent exchanges among parties. He refers to this as spiral escalation which he argues "typically occurs in cycles of attacks and counter attacks".[81]

There are human casualties, destructions of property and displacements are conspicuous features in this phase. Ziyadov argues that this phase is behavioral, since it is marked with visible physical impacts such as; bloodshed, which explains the actual killing.[82] Jeong also shares the same opinion. He argues that "in every conflict a certain event triggers the initiation

[78] R. Mudida, 'Structural Sources of Constitutional Conflict: a Conflict Analysis of Constitution Making in Kenya 1997-2005' PhD Thesis (Nairobi, 2008), p. 1.
[79] M. Mwagiru, 'The Water's Edge... op. cit. pp. 5-6
[80] A. Curle, Making Peace (London, Tavistock. 1971), pp. 1-26.
[81] E. A. King, A Glossary, Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies, 2nd. Ed.' (Geneva, University of Peace. 2005), p. 34.
[82] T. Ziyadov, The Galtung Triangle and Nagorno-Garabagh Conflict' (Washington D.C. CRIA. 2008), pp. 1-5

of a manifest struggle, but behind the catalyzing situations, there are structural conditions and socio-psychological factors that explain the nature and causes of conflict.[83] This postulates the fact that conflict phase is an extension of the structural violence that has defied effective management and has its roots in the underlying problems. These could be historical injustices that may be perceived or real.

Jeong expands the discourse. He argues that, it takes much more effort to bring about constructive transformations of a conflict once a vicious cycle of violence has been set in motion.[84] The protagonists are already charge for action and management may be of little help. Conflict may only stop when one side is defeated militarily or if there is a "mutually hurting stalemate," [85] can de-escalation and cessation of hostilities be witnessed. This is not to suggest that conflict cycle is strictly evolutionary and automatically lead to conflict when escalated.

In the Kenyan electoral violence cycle, this stage is represented by the 2007 electoral violence. Conflict was physically manifest, leading to the death of over 1000 people, displacing over 350,000.[86]

3.6.3 Post Conflict Phase

De-escalation and termination of violence, is another stage in the conflict cycle referred to as "Post Conflict Phase". Mwagiru, also describe it as "after conflict",[87] giving a false impression of relative peace. Physical violence may have stopped due to mutually hurting stalemate,[88] Yet conflict abounds. Jeong argues that the diminished intensity of the conflict can

---

[83] H. W. Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies: an Introduction* (England, Ashgate. 2000), p. 92.
[84] Ibid, p. 37.
[85] I. W. Zartman. *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, Updated Ed.* (New York, Oxford University Press. 1989), p. 268.
[86] Axel, Op. Cit. p. 23
[87] M. Mwagiru, '*Conflict in Africa: Theory Processes and Institutions Management,* ' op. cit. p. 11
[88] H. W. Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies; An Introduction* (England, Ashgate. 2000), p. 99.

be for strategic reasons without changes in the intensions namely, economic and affective conduct.[89]

This period is thus marked by negative peace, which postulates absence of violence.[90] Absence of violence does not constitute peace, since structural problems that may not conflict may have been resolved, can easily decant into violence.This phase is therefore, but a level in the transformation process in the conflict cycle. Mwagiru agrees with the transformation perspective as a reflection of the conflict cycle. He argues that conflict is never static, and as conflict within a system transforms them, so also does, larger complexities which mirror the transformations.[91] This therefore justifies the violent potentially of post-conflict phase. In view of this, Mwagiru suggest preventive diplomacy as an effective strategy to contain conflict since conflict to consolidate peace. [92]

According to Ziyadov, this period is marked by painful memories of violent past, leading to destructive collective consciousness as witnessed in Nagorno Garabagh at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century.[93] Armenians mirrored themselves as survivors of genocide and therefore members of a community of sufferers. The heightened violence was marked with serious acts of brutality, ethnic cleansing and massacres on both sides.[94]

In the context of conflict memory, Mwagiru argues that it is carried by those who experienced the conflict, and took part in it. The anger is passed on to the following generation, and as long as those people live, conflict will never die or fade away.[95] This postulates the fact that Post Conflict Phase does not portend an end to conflict, since conflict leaves a "bitter"

[89] Ibid, p. 99.
[90] M. Mwagiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theory Processes and Institutions Management*... op. cit. pp. 7-8.
[91] M. Mwagiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theory Processes and Institutions Management*... op. cit. p.92.
[92] Ibid, p. 11.
[93] T. Ziyadov, *The Galtung Triangle and Nagorno-Garabagh Conflict*...op. cit. p. 324.
[94] Ibid, p. 324
[95] M. Mwagiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theory Processes and Institutions Management*,' op. cit. p.13.

memory of the past that plays into the future. Ethnic chauvinists and political elites often use myths and history to create violence for their selfish political capital.

Goldstein confirms the possibility recurrence violence in this stage. He argues that mere absence of war does not guarantee war will not be there.[96] It takes long to build trust between the protagonists and to eliminate enmity after conflict. Lambourne calls it, "building bridges that entails, transforming violent enmity, developed during violent conflict."[97] Confidence building to enhance trust among the adversaries will be necessary, so as to maintain peace.

Mwagiru suggests preventive management.[98] However, this may involve multiple actors; protagonists, their constituents, allies, and audience all with stakes in the outcome of the conflict. They enter the conflict environment with divergent issues thus changing the architecture of conflict according to Mwagiru. He further attests to the fact that this poses serious challenge to conflict management.[99] Satisfying their needs may be difficult, and may ignite acrimonious struggle, hence undermining peace. Lambourne is skeptical about peace after conflict. He argues that ending overt violence via peace agreement or military victory may not mean the achievement of peace.[100]Post conflict peace building that is fragile and must be nurtured. Peace can either be undermined or nurtured according to Lambourne,[101] to achieve relative success or fiasco hence re-escalation.[102]

[96] J. S. Goldstein, 'International Relations 6ᵗʰ Ed,' op. cit. p. 159.
[97] W. Lambourne, 'Post Conflict Peace Building: Meeting Human Needs for Justice and Reconciliation' Peace Conflict and Development. Issue 4, 2004, p. 4.
[98] M. Mwagiru, 'Conflict in Africa...' op. cit. pp. 90-92
[99]Ibid, pp. 90-92
[100] W. Lambourne, Post Conflict Peace Building: Meeting Human Needs for Justice and Reconciliation' Peace Conflict and Development. Issue 4, (2004), p. 2.
[101]Ibid, p. 2.
[102] Ibid, p. 2.

Chapter Four

4.0 Analysis of Ethnicity and Electoral Conflict in Kenya 2007-2008

4.1 Introduction.

The previous chapter reveals the challenges of democratic transition that needs to be addressed to avoid conflict before, during and after the elections. It presents Kenya as a case of a society with deep structural problems leading to conflict. The perceived flawed elections only triggered the violence. Factors of the conflict are multiple; ranging from structural, proximate and trigger causes. This conflict also displays that different actors had divergent interests in the conflict and that ethnicity was only mobilized for political advantage.

Electoral conflict in Kenya has often taken an ethnic dimension giving the impression that there is a strong link between ethnicity and electoral conflict. In 1992, 1997, and 2007 Kenya witnessed ethnic related electoral violence that accumulated to undermine the stability of a polity which once was earlier viewed as relatively peaceful in a conflict prone Africa.[1] This chapter will therefore analyze the findings of the dynamics of ethnicity and electoral conflict in Kenya. Qualitative analysis of both primary and secondary data will be used to pretest the hypotheses and to attest to whether ethnicity causes electoral conflict.

A study was conducted in four Provinces; Rift Valley, Nyanza, Central and Nairobi. A sample frame of 40 respondents was interviewed and both random purposive and snowball techniques were used to identify resourceful interviewees. These included; government officials, NGOs, victims, faith based organizations and scholars with interest in electoral conflicts in Kenya. These four provinces were selected due to the magnitude of electoral violence in those

---

[1] H. Axel. et al, Kenya 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks,' *Africa Spectrum* 43(2008) 1:133- 144 GIGA Institute of African Affairs Hamburg. (2008), pp.138-139

regions with its epicenter in the Rift Valley Province. The gender composition of 32.5% female and 67.5% male were interviewed representing a ratio of 1:3.The ratio of the youth to adults was 50% for the youth and 50% for the adults. This was done in-order to adequately represent all the variables

4.2 Ethno- Regional Inequalities

Kenya is multi-ethnic state of about 42 ethnic groups that are distributed in various regions that majorly form the provinces. Colonial administrative system divided Kenya into broad regional blocks with ethnic distinctiveness called provinces. This strategy was for ease of administration and also to engender the colonial policy of divide and rule. The independent African regimes in Kenya did not delink from this system and instead perfected it to perpetuate their hold over the periphery, hence promoting ethnic consciousness.

An interview with the provincial administrator, DC for Koibatek district revealed that people from Rift Valley province in particular Koibatek district and by extension the Kalenjin community were complaining that since Moi left the presidency, they have been marginalized especially in appointments of high profile civil services slots. Thus, the Kalenjin community was in search of a 'friendly' regime that would guarantee the community such benefits:

> "The major complaint among the Kalenjin, is their belief that they are being marginalized. The Kalenjin community believe that a good number of their people have been removed from key employment positions and thus feel aggrieved. Their interest was to get a proxy president to protect their jobs that were given to them by the Moi's regime. In addition to this, land has been a source of conflict and has always rallied the Kalenjin against other groups, let alone the 2007/2008 conflict. The violence was pre-planned and even if ODM won, it could still have been witnessed. The flawed elections, was however a trigger to the imminent conflict."[2]

An interview with a church leader, in Eldoret on the 14th, September, 2011 confirms the same sentiment of the former Koibatek DC and revealed,

---

[2] An interview with the former Koibatek District Commissioner on the 12th September, 2011

"There are complaints among the Kalenjin on how the Kikuyu are favored by the Kibaki regime. Our people that hold bigger jobs were all kicked out when president Moi left office and replaced by their fellow Kikuyus. Nowadays, even our boys are not recruited in the army as before. They are all here with us jobless... nobody can accept this kind of treatment. We are old and we do not need these jobs ourselves, but what about our children? They must be considered like any other Kenyan. There are no special beings, we are all Kenyans and deserve humane treatment. Our children should not be mistreated for mistakes that they never contributed to, what wrong did president Moi do that our community must pay in these harsh conditions?" [3]

These are harsh judgements on the government of Kenya, as unemployment affects all ethnic groups and not just Kalenjin .Kenya is a developing economy and may have constraints in job creation. During Moi's tenure the Kalenjin had a bigger share in employment opportunities, until President Kibaki, changed the status-quo. Many Kalenjin therefore lost their jobs.

Kanyinga's argument is a confirmation of imbalance in the ethno-regional representation in various governments' portfolios. He argues that during Kenyatta and Moi regimes important government positions in the civil service, cabinets, parliament was reserved for people from the president's home. [4]

It was further revealed that there was the existence of ethnic inequality, denoting structural conflict:

"Over the years Nyanza has always lagged behind in social, economic and political development. This was a product of wider government scheme to punish the people of Nyanza for their support of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, who was opposed to Kenyatta and Moi regimes. In the economic perspectives, the road infrastructure from Kendu Bay to Homa Bay shows that it had been tarmac as early as 1975 and completion certificate signed, yet in reality, no work has been done. As we speak now that road is not motorable." [5]

This conflict was thus a protest against the perceived government's intention to exclude

---

[3] An interview with Reverent Murpus of the Reformed Church of East Africa, Eldoret on the issues affecting the Kalenjin Community that led to their participation in the post election violence of 2007-2008 on the 14th September 2011.

[4] K. Kanyinga, 'Governance Institutions and Inequality in Kenya' in Readings on Inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics and Perspectives (Nairobi, Society for the International Development. 2006), p. 17

[5] An account by former Mayor for Homa Bay Municipal Council during an interview on the 08th September 2011

Nyanza, and specifically the Luo community from getting their fair share of the *national cake*. Kiringai also sees a case of regional imbalance in the distribution of economic resources. He gave an example of infrastructural distribution in different parts of the country that favoured certain regions with specific reference to Rift-Valley and Central province getting the lions share. Since regions denote ethnicity, any aspect of regional marginalization would be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to exclude that particular ethnicity from their socio- economic entitlement.

It has been disclosed that the cause of 2007/2008 electoral conflict was as a result of unfair distribution of resources among different regions and ethnicities, for example the Turkana community that had been marginalized by the government:

> "Look at Lokitaung district, and tell me how many schools have been built by the government for the last five years and how does the government provide access to educational opportunities to the pastoral communities in Turkana. The few mobile schools for mobile communities do not even have government teachers. With poverty in Turkana, they can do little as a people to salvage themselves. My interaction with the locals as a World Vision Program Officer shows a lot of ignorance. Turkanas do not even know the dates, the days of the week, or when one was born, leave alone reading and writing. These places need affirmative action in order to develop at the same par with the rest of the country, something the Nairobi government has ignored. Although the Turkana did not participate in the combat, if they did, then this could have been the main reason for their involvement."[6]

This reflects the whole of North Rift and even Pokot is not any better. These are aspects of structural problems that eventually lead to conflict, especially when people discover they are suffering as Mwagiru demonstrate.[7] Imbalance in regional representation has always been seen in matters pertaining to ethno-regional representation in terms of employment, social economic inequalities between different regions and ethnicities thus giving rise to conflict based on regional identities. The electoral conflict in Kenya is therefore is a manifestation of ethnic

---

[6] Interview with Chairperson, Kerio Valley Development Authority on 15th September, 2011
[7] M. Mwagiru, 'Conflict in Africa...op. cit. pp. 7-9

inequalities, however, this does not rule out the class perspective. Wanyande, argues that discrimination whether real or perceived erodes a sense of citizenship and nationhood among the disadvantaged groups who often resort to their ethnic groups for security and protection as happened in the 2008 general elections.[8]

4.3 Actors in the conflict

In any conflict, there are several actors with varied interests in the outcome of the conflict. Conflict has audience, participants, allies and constituents that form a coterie of actors whose involvement in conflict change the nature and the texture of conflict from simple to complex.[9] Political parties are participants and a forum for the display of democratic competition for political office. These political parties' front different ideologies and sometimes their composition may include aspects of ethnic identity. Their interests, motive and their formation could therefore be ethnic or otherwise.

An interview with a Professor of Maseno University, revealed an ethnic hand in the formation of political parties in Kenya. He viewed the political parties as mere ethnic blocks, advancing ethnic agenda in favour of their respective ethnic groups. He added that even the perceived coalition of political parties only constitute ethnic coalitions. As participants in any conflict, political parties in Kenya therefore have stronger link to ethnic related electoral conflict.

"Kenya has complex political party formation. Anybody can wake up and start a political party, depending on the perceived ethnic backing he has. The ideology aspect is not given priority, and that is why it does not matter in Kenya whether the party manifesto is good. What matters is where one comes from and if he has solid ethnic following. Major political parties in Kenya, PNU, ODM, KANU, and ODM-K among others, all have ethnic faces thus fronting ethnic competition. With ethnic competition, expect ethnic

[8] P. Wanyande, 'The Persistence in Kenya's Public Life, in: Ethnicity Conflict: and the Future of African States' (Nairobi, Pauline Publications Africa. 2009), p. 66
[9] M. Mwagiru, 'Conflict in Africa...op. cit. pp. 90-92

violence. The post election violence in Kenya was therefore not an accident, but a product of negative ethnicity, advanced by ethnic based political parties."[10]

In Getui's view, it is argued that ethnicity is at the centre of the political parties' formation in Kenya and even with coalitions they are basically ethno-regional in nature. This is also reflected in the voting patterns which are just but an ethnic plebiscite. Getui gives a profile of voting patterns in Kenya in 1997 and 2007 general elections where the presidential hopefuls got overwhelming support from their respective ethnic backyards.[11]

In any political contest, political parties often present divergent views and ideological based on their manifestos. This posits conflict, according to Mitchel who argues that conflict arises when two or more parties have incompatible goals about something,[12] a situation represented by different political parties in Kenya. If they are ethnic based, then the resultant conflict would be fought along ethnic fault lines. Tarimo argues that there is relationship between ethno- political competition and violence in contemporary Africa.[13]

The views of a village elder from Rachuonyo district, postulates the fact that competitive elections in Kenya have been interpreted from ethnic paradigm and that the presidential contest as a mere chip of ethnic bargaining:

"We have been supporting the Kikuyus all the times, and there is no single day that they ever supported our presidency. During independence, Jaramogi Odinga gave presidency to Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, and again in 2002 Raila declared Kibaki *tosha* and Kibaki became the president from our support, yet this has not been reciprocated. It is therefore our turn to be supported."[14]

---

[10] An interview with Professor Omollo Ongati, Maseno University on 5th September, 2011

[11] P. Wanyande, 'The Persistence of Ethnicity in Kenya's Public Life,' Factor in Politics, Religion and Conflict,' in: S.J. Tarmio and P. Manwello (eds) *Ethnicity and Conflict; the Feature of African States*. (Nairobi, Paulines Publications Africa 2009), pp.53- 67

[12] C.R. Mitchel, *'The Structure of International Conflict'*(London, McMillan, 1998), pp. 15-23

[13] A. Tarimo and P. Manwelo (ed), *'Ethnicity Conflict and the Future of African States.'* (Nairobi Paulines, Publications Africa 2009), p 26

[14] An interview with Mr. Magunga, a Luo elder, Rachuonyo District on 06th September, 2011

This denotes ethnicity in its entirety and that became part of the grievances of the people of Nyanza. This helps explain why Nyanza was involved in electoral conflict against the perceived adversaries that they accused of betrayal and stealing their votes. The punishment meted against the Kikuyu and Kisiis in Nyanza, whereby their businesses were burnt or looted, was therefore an ethnic agenda to discipline an ethnic group that were perceived to have stolen their electoral victory. This therefore justifies the fact that there is a strong link between ethnicity and the 2007/2008 electoral conflict in Kenya.

4.3.1 Ethnic Entrepreneurs.

Entrepreneurs are important actors in any conflict for their motives and interests in the conflict add to its complexity. Entrepreneurs as actors are manipulators in conflict and their interest is for personal gain. Ethnic entrepreneurs manipulate ethnic identities to achieve political power and advantage. These ethnic bureaucrats or elites polarized the country thus dividing it into ethno- political enclaves. They often invest monetary resources into political parties to either gain power or have a proxy. However, their interest may not be purely ethnic but elitist. Some of them may have acquired a lot of wealth whose security may only be ascertained by having one of their own (ethnic group) in power:

> "Kikuyu have a lot of investments that they acquired through their hard work, and these wealth are distributed throughout the country. It is very difficult to trust anybody with our wealth, unless is one of us. If any anybody from another ethnic group is to get the presidency, then he/she must get the consent of the rich Kikuyu elders."[15]

This is a justification of the role played by ethnic entrepreneurs in electoral conflict.

An interview also confirms the existence of ethnic entrepreneurs and their role in 2007/2008 electoral conflict. It has been argued that the president was ready to step down due evident

---

[15] An interview with Mr. Nathan Mwangi on 31st August, 2011

irregularities in the elections process, but was prohibited by a few wealthy clique from his ethnic community surrounding him:

> "This country is being ruled by wealthy individuals from the president ethnic group who would want to protect their ill gotten wealth. They have held the president at ransom in state house despite the president's willingness to step aside. Along with this, there are also others who may not be from the president's ethnic group but they belong to the same class."[16]

This therefore gives the perspective that the ethnic entrepreneurs is not the only rigid actor that may want to influence electoral outcome for their own advantage, but equally a political class has also been identified as manipulator. Whether ethnic or class in nature, ethnic entrepreneurs are important actors in any conflict, whose role in the 2007-2008 electoral conflict in Kenya cannot be underestimated.

4.4 Historical injustices

The findings revealed that there were long standing grievances that had not been resolved. The historical injustices among the various communities in Kenya since independence contributed to the buildup of animosities which resulted into collective action. People interpreted their suffering in ethnic terms thus rekindling their collective memory of past injustices, hence leading to conflict. In relation to collective memory, Mwagiru argues that people who are alive and have witnessed injustices become the custodians of collective memory and hand it over to the next generation.[17] The unresolved political assassinations and aspects of perceived marginalization by earlier regimes predispose the people of Nyanza to collective memory. Just as

---

[16] An interview with a Nairobi based businessman, Mr. Mohammed Ibrahim on issue concerning ethnic entrepreneur in the post election violence on 31st August, 2011

[17] M. Mwagiru, 'Conflict in Africa: *Theory Processes and Institutions Management,* ' (Nairobi Watermark. 2000), p. 13

Russell argues that when a group feels aggrieved it will lead to collective actions, which denotes conflict.[18]

It was also disclosed that injustice has often caused ethnic related electoral conflict in Kenya:

> "The complaint we have as Luo community, is that we have been a target of state assassinations. Our prominent sons like Tom Mboya, Agwings Kodhek, and Robert Ouko among others have been killed. The explanation being given by those in authority are not convincing at all. In the case of Dr. Ouko, it is hard to believe how one would kill himself and then burn himself. This is direct murder. This is not to forget the 1972 Kisumu massacre, where the police sprayed unarmed civilians with live bullets, killing many of them. President Moi also killed our people in 1992; Kibaki also stole our votes and also killed our people when they were protesting. The people of Nyanza cannot therefore sit and wait to be finished and must defend themselves. We have been provoked for a very long period of time and must fight for our rights no matter the cost"since we are also Kenyans."[19]

4.5 Media Stations

Media is a tool of mass communication and has often played a critical role in the election process. However, there are certain instances where the media do not display professionalism, but becomes a propaganda tool and even takes sides in political contests. Media therefore needs to maintain impartiality, and avoid bias when airing items. This is rarely, the practice.

In Rift- Valley, the local media using vernacular was used to pass information, propaganda and directed the local militia on the position of their enemies, Kikuyus, so as to drive them away out of the Kalenjin land. They also spread hate speeches. In their reference to the foreigners, Kikuyu they were labeled *madoadoa meaning the odd one out*. The same ethnic profiling has been confirmed by Justice Philip Waki when he indicates when the Kikuyus were being called *madoadoa*.[20]

---

[18] H. Russell, 'One for All; The Logic of Group Conflict,' Princeton University, (1995), p. 22
[19] An interview with the former Councilor of Kibiri Ward, Rachuonyo Constituency on 06th September, 2011
[20] *Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence- CIPEV* (Nairobi 2008), p. 63

In Nyanza, the Ramogi radio station playing songs that portrayed the Kikuyus in bad taste *"wangni wadinonu jokabimbe wang'ni uromogo"* meaning *"these baboons we have cornered you this time."* This is what according to Nyasani is referred to as an act of ethnic profiling,[21] aired in local radio stations. Since language is an ethnic marker,[22] if it was used in 2007 general elections to fuel conflict, then it predisposes the ethnic link to the 2007 electoral conflict in Kenya. Among the Luos, *baboon* is a metaphor that denotes a *thief,* which meant that Kikuyus are associated with theft. This is a fallacy, as it does not respect the concept individual differences. The fact that a few individuals of an ethnic identity may be bad, should not be generalized. Even in matters of corruption in Kenya, all ethnicities across the board are represented.

Report of the United States Institute for Peace confirms that, 2007 general elections while in some cases the media provided information on the election, in other cases, they have been charged with inciting violence through the dissemination of hate speeches.[23] Mbugua, confirmed these hate speeches by recording, no more kikuyu blood will be shed, we will slaughter them right here in the capital city. For justice to prevail, compile the list of *Luos* you know; fellow Kenyans the *Kikuyus* have stolen our children future, we must deal with them in the way they understand better...violence.[24]

In addition to hate speech, *Inooro* Radio Station with specific reference to Central province used propaganda to whip ethnic emotions. The radio station ran an advert urging the Kikuyu to protect their God given entitlement, wealth and presidency:

---

[21] M. F. Nyasani, *The Meaning and Implication of Ethnicity'* in Tarimo and P. Manwelo; *Ethnicity Conflict and the Future of African States* (Nairobi Paulines, Publications Africa 2009), p 16.

[22] M. L. Anderson and H.F. Taylor, *'Sociology the Essential'* (Belmont U.S.A., Thomson Wadsworh, 2005), pp. 236-389.

[23] The Role of Media in Kenya Post; *Report of The United State Institute of Peace,* 2008

[24] Wa- Mungai, Mbugua. 'Soft Power in Electoral Politics,' in: Kanyinga, K and Okello, D (eds). *Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: The Kenya 2007 General Elections.* Nairobi, Society for International Development (SID), 2010, p. 257.

In Nyanza, the Ramogi radio station playing songs that portrayed the Kikuyus in bad taste *"wangni wadinonu jokabimbe wang'ni uromogo"* meaning *"these baboons we have cornered you this time."* This is what according to Nyasani is referred to as an act of ethnic profiling,[21] aired in local radio stations. Since language is an ethnic marker,[22] if it was used in 2007 general elections to fuel conflict, then it predisposes the ethnic link to the 2007 electoral conflict in Kenya. Among the Luos, *baboon* is a metaphor that denotes a *thief,* which meant that Kikuyus are associated with theft. This is a fallacy, as it does not respect the concept individual differences. The fact that a few individuals of an ethnic identity may be bad, should not be generalized. Even in matters of corruption in Kenya, all ethnicities across the board are represented.

Report of the United States Institute for Peace confirms that, 2007 general elections while in some cases the media provided information on the election, in other cases, they have been charged with inciting violence through the dissemination of hate speeches.[23] Mbugua, confirmed these hate speeches by recording, no more kikuyu blood will be shed, we will slaughter them right here in the capital city. For justice to prevail, compile the list of *Luos* you know; fellow Kenyans the *Kikuyus* have stolen our children future, we must deal with them in the way they understand better...violence.[24]

In addition to hate speech, *Inooro* Radio Station with specific reference to Central province used propaganda to whip ethnic emotions. The radio station ran an advert urging the Kikuyu to protect their God given entitlement, wealth and presidency:

---

[21] M. F. Nyasani, *The Meaning and Implication of Ethnicity'* in Tarimo and P. Manwelo; *Ethnicity Conflict and the Future of African States* (Nairobi Paulines, Publications Africa 2009), p 16.

[22] M. L. Anderson and H.F. Taylor, *'Sociology the Essential'* (Belmont U.S.A., Thomson Wadsworh, 2005), pp. 236-389.

[23] The Role of Media in Kenya Post; *Report of The United State Institute of Peace,* 2008

[24] Wa- Mungai, Mbugua. 'Soft Power in Electoral Politics,' in: Kanyinga, K and Okello, D (eds). *Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: The Kenya 2007 General Elections.* Nairobi, Society for International Development (SID), 2010, p. 257.

"This country, and by extension the presidency is our heritage given to us by god and we must protect it at all cost. We have worked so hard to create our wealth and we cannot allow an uncircumcised boy to joke with it"[25]

It was also revealed that the media displayed the pictures of the contested tallying and later people being killed, property destroyed hence enraging the constituents, allies and audience into violence. The reality of internally displace persons (IDPs) settling in their perceived ancestral land (Central Province) from other regions, provoked even a more violence against the perceived enemies.

4.6 Land Factor.

Land as entitlement is both an economic and societal entity. In the economic perspective land offers a means of production and is thus a source of wealth and livelihood. In the social context, land is part of ancestral heritage and thus sentimental and connects the community into their past. In Kenya as elsewhere in the world, land often causes conflict.

Kenyatta said land is our *heritage* given to us by our forefathers.[26]This therefore confirms the value and sentimentality of land as a cultural heritage. It emerged from the findings that land in Rift valley has been at the centre of conflict for a very long period of time due influx of the immigrants from different regions in the country during the colonial and post independence era. The outsiders were viewed as intruders since they were not traditional natives of Rift Valley and it does not matter whether one acquired land legally. This therefore explains the conflict cycle in Rift Valley disguised as electoral violence every election year represented by 1992 clashes, 1997, 2002, and 2007 electoral violence.

---

[25] An interview with Ngugi Njagi, a witness of the 2007-2008 electoral violence on 30th August, 2011
[26] K. Fukui and J. Markakis (eds), 'Ethnicity & Conflict in the Horn of Africa,' London, James Currey Publishers, (1994), p. 170

Land therefore informs a long standing proximate cause. Fukui also confirms the influx of immigrants into Rift valley diaspora that has turned Rift Valley into theatre of conflict.[27] Conflict therefore in Rift Valley has taken an ethnic dimension because people of different ethnic identities that settled in the region. The predominantly Kikuyu and the Kisii, with large tracks of land many of whom were sympathetic to PNU as revealed by one of the respondents were targeted. However, the long term plan was to evict every *foreigner* from the Kalenjin ancestral land. The fact that even ODM supporters from the unwanted ethnic groups were targeted attest to this ethnic cleansing scheme. Waki confirms this by his argument that *madoadoa* should be removed from the Kalenjin ancestral land.[28]This thus brings into focus the dynamic of irredentist thinking of redeeming the lost territory.

An interview with a victim of the 2007 electoral conflict revealed that, it was a strategy by the Kalenjin to drive 'foreigners' away from what they refer to as their ancestral land and that the electoral conflict was just but a coincidence:

> "I support ODM and I voted for Raila. Even the local Kalenjins here are aware of that, yet they still attacked me with an arrow leaving me for the dead. The problem here is that these people want to take our land by force and it does not matter which ethnic group you belong to and whom you voted for. As long as you are not a Kalenjin and you own land here even if you are not attacked now, you will be attacked one day."[29]

The fact that the grievance over land took an ethnic turn during the elections postulates a link between it and electoral conflict. There is some ethnic sentimentality about land:

> "Land is a communal institution in Rift Valley and throughout my work in Rift Valley people have collective claim to land since it is a communal thing. It draws a lot of ethnic appeal and always defended communally incase of encroachment by outsiders. You can remember the history of the Nandi rebellion against the whites, how fierce it was. Our land was given out cheaply by both Kenyatta and Moi regimes to outsiders without our consent. We want this corrected. We have always seen conflict in Rift Valley during

---

[27] Ibid
[28] *Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence- CIPEV* (Nairobi 2008), p. 63.
[29] An interview with Mzee Nyongesa, a victim of 2007-2008 electoral violence on the 16th September,2011

every election. What are deep in our heart is our land and the time that these people will leave our land."[30]

These sentiments show how land issue connects strongly to ethnic demands, thus leading to conflict. Land therefore becomes part of long standing cumulative structural grievances that causes the electoral conflict. With its ethnic appeal, it postulates strong relationship between ethnicity and electoral conflict in Kenya.

The strength of ethnicity is seen as a factor of the 2007/2008 electoral conflict. Even in land there is an ethnic factor that makes it appealing to collective action to protect it from the 'grabbers':

> "Every ethnic group has their own ancestral land and I do not see why grabbers from Central Province and Nyanza should steal our land as if we do not have the youth to protect it. People should go back to their homes, since we do not want to fight any tribe in the next elections"[31]

These sentiments clearly present land as a communal grievance that always emerge with the elections. Elections thus seem to be a condition that provides a forum for long standing communal grievances, of which land becomes a factor. In recognition of this Axel and Ralph the ethno- political tensions were on issues of land resource distribution.[32]

4.7 Ethnic-Militia

The vulnerability of the unemployed youth to enlistment into the militia groups is not in any way new to Kenya and the world over. Often, they have been used in the elections violence by actors who would want to influence the electoral results in their favour. It was revealed that the presence of the militia became a critical factor in the conflict and intensified the conflict. The

---

[30] An interview with Chairman, Catholic Peace and Justice on the 12th September, 2011
[31] An interview with a Kalenjin youth, Paul Chepkemoi on 12th September, 2011
[32] H. Axel et al, 'Kenya 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks' *Africa Spectrum* 43((GIGA Institute of African Affairs Hamburg.2008), p. 136.

71

militia was part of the ethnic agenda, and was being manipulated by local politicians against the

perceived adversaries who were non Kalenjins and people of different persuasions:

> "This is an insecurity zone. We have the Pokots, Turkana, Saboat Land Defence Forces and Kalenjin warriors' whose access to weapons through the porous borders, are an imminent danger in any conflict. It is these groups that formed the bulk of fighters in the 2007 conflict. These militias were majorly used by the local politicians to torch the property, maim, and kill so as to drive away the perceived foreigners from their ancestral land in Rift Valley. Many believed that it was only Kikuyu that were target during the post election violence of 2007, there were broader plans ... to ensure that other non natives were to follow the same suit of evictions. Even the Turkans were attacked, yet they are Kalenjin"[33]

The interview further revealed that in other parts of the country the militia groups present

an ethnic tag. The Mugiki are predominantly Kikuyu, Kalenjin warrior were from Rift Valley

and Bagdad Boys from Nyanza among others. The militia group membership therefore strongly

inclined to ethnic orientation than the perceived class. These groups because of the ethnic tag

they were identified with, and which they entered with in to the conflict environment made

ethnicity a distinct factor in the 2007 electoral conflict in Kenya.

The militia although may have joined the conflict due to manipulation by ethnic

entrepreneurs who paid or promise employment that fact that their formation and organization

was ethnic based makes ethnicity a distinct feature in the 2007 electoral conflict. If

unemployment was a genuine case behind the 2007 election then the conflict should have taken

the class dimension other than ethnic dimension. Axel and Ralph also confirm the presence of

ethnic militia that displayed terror in what they refer to as ethnic warfare that Kenyan post

election crisis had degenerated to.[34]

---

[33] An interview with National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) Officer on 12th September, 2011

[34] H. Axel et al, 'Kenya 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks.' *Africa Spectrum* 43((GIGA Institute of African Affairs Hamburg.2008), p. 140

4.8 Electoral Management Body

At the centre of any good democratic elections, with credible results there must be independent Electoral Management Body. Its credibility depends on its impartiality and a clear constitutional mandate. The preparation of voter registers supervision of the actual voting and even the tallying process, need to be transparent. Financing need to be from neutral kitty free from any political party influence, possibly from consolidated funds.

The power and authority to discipline election malpractices need to be given. The electoral management body in Kenya, ECK did not satisfied these conditions, as it was viewed as weak, lacked autonomy and had ethnic bias. The respondents interviewed gave an account of the fact that apart from the ECK being weak structurally it also had an ethnic tag. It was disclosed that the appointment of the commissioner by President Kibaki prior to general elections added more doubts to the credibility and impartiality of the ECK:

> "The credibility of ECK became at the spotlight when the spirit of Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG) agreement was ignored by president Kibaki by appointing ECK Commissioners without the due consultation with other political parties, as it was provided for in the IPPG. That is where the electoral mess started. Although there is nothing binding in law to warrant the President to appoint a commissioner as per the IPPG agreement, since it was a 'gentleman's agreement'. However, the fact that it was not used increased the level of suspicion. People claimed that the president had add to appoint commissioners single handedly but the more serious was the appointment of a Mr. Mutu one of his kinsmen to rigged the elections in favour of the incumbent. People believe that although, the ECK chairman and the other commissioners may not have been from his ethnic group, their unswerving loyalty to the appointing authority was unquestionable". This gave the 2007 elections an ethnic identity hence leading to conflict."[35]

The presence of Mr. Muttu, the President's kinsman may not be anything to scale up the President chances in winning the elections. It could be a wrong perception since in competitive elections the stakes are high and, even the elections that may not have been rigged are viewed as

---

[35] An interview with an Officer, Kenya National Commission for Human Rights (KNCHR) on 30th August, 2011

having been rigged.[36] In democratic elections the stakes are high because it entails a win lose situation in which the winner takes it all.[37]

4.9 Law Enforcement Agencies

Law enforcement agencies have a duty of maintaining law and order. This applies even to the process of electioneering because of their cardinal service to the people; the impartiality in the conduct of electoral process will define the credibility of any election. If the police are not perceived as impartial, then the election may not be deemed as free and fair. They have the duty to provide security, ensure safe custody of the electoral materials and ensure peace prevails in the polling stations, tallying centers, the role which would be in jeopardy with lack of independence.

The findings revealed that there the role of the police was quite evident in electoral conflict, raging from their recruitment to deployment in the 2007 general elections. The police force that was engaged to man elections was ethnically constituted:

"The police officers who were posted to the office reflected ethnic bias. How would you bring in a station half of the officers from the same ethnic group to manage election in particular areas? To make it worse the same officers were also engaged as political party agents? Not to forget, these officers were outside the command of the local police boss, they had their own commanders."[38]

It was also revealed that there was the presence of law enforcement agency from a particular ethnic community being engaged in Nyanza as elections agents for PNU hence causing conflict even prior to elections:

"On the 25th December, 2007, I received visitors from Nairobi who booked rooms at the hotel, *Ogama Plaza,* and other hotels in Homa Bay. These guests told me that they were many and spread all over ODM strongholds as elections agents for PNU. I advised them to take the fastest means to Nairobi, since I knew what would happen to them if they were discovered. I also knew my business would not be safe. I realized they were police officers and they showed me their service numbers and IDs. Many of them spoke Kikuyu.

[36] J. Fischer, *Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention.* (Washington DC, IFES, 2002), pp. 3-8.
[37] S. M. Atuobi, 'Election Related Violence in Africa' *in Conflict Trends.* Issue No. 1 (Brussels, ICG, 2008), p. 12.
[38] An interview with provincial Administrator based in Nairobi on 31st August, 2011

I also realized that some hotels in town were also booked by the same people. It was good luck that when violence started in Homa Bay on the 26th December, 2007 and possibly the whole of Nyanza my guests rang me that they were past Kericho heading back to Nairobi."[39]

These two accounts of the interviewee clearly revealed the wider perception of how ethnicity was manipulated within the security agencies to facilitate the perceived rigged elections. The abuse of the police mandate during the 2007 general elections has also been reported by Kanyinga, Okello and Aketch. They assert that the Administration Police was politicized and were posted to ODM strongholds as PNU agents. What is not clear is their ethnic constitution.

A youth leader from Kisii tried to explain their identities using the physical attributes. "Those PNU agents I met are strangers here and many of them were light skinned yet they were talking in different languages"[40]This is a wrong assumption, since it is not Kikuyus alone who are light skinned. All Kikuyus may not be PNU sympathizers, just like all Luos are not ODM supporters. Despite, the weakness of this argument, perception of police from pre dominantly one ethnic group being used rig the elections in favour of the incumbent was rife in Nyanza Province leading to violence two days before the elections.

Conclusion

This study was designed to examine the relationship between ethnicity and electoral conflict in Kenya in relations to the 2007/2008 elections. Also, the focus of the research was to examine the role of the manipulation in the context of Kenyan's electoral conflict and at the same time to examine the root causes of electoral conflict in Kenya.

---

[39] An interview with a Hotel Manager in Homa Bay on 08th September, 2011
[40] An interview with Mr. Kibebe on 6th September, 2011

It was found that; ethnicity played a critical role in the 2007/2008 electoral conflict in Kenya. Ethnicity though neutral and benign has often been manipulated by ethnic entrepreneurs for their own political advantage. When ethnicity is mobilized or politicized it is becomes conflitual. It emerged that ethnicity is a factor in the electoral conflict. In its primordial context ethnicity may appear neutral and benign, yet has discursive potentials that if manipulated by actors with interest in the conflict, turn out to be violent. From its primordial perspective, ethnicity presents identity boundaries that provide potential fault lines for conflict. The notion of "in-group and out-group" or we and them, reinforced with stereotypes and uncertainties of the 'ethnic others' intentions, sets in fear that culminates into conflict.

In the context of Kenya's 2007/2008 electoral conflict the role of ethnicity is evident. These ethnic related grievances ranged from structural, proximate to trigger causes. In the structural perspective, one of the ethnic related grievances was ethno-regional inequality. It emerged that there was regional imbalance in the distribution of socio-economic resources and political opportunities. Since regions represent ethnicity, it denotes an ethnic group was being excluded from their entitlement. The quest for political office is therefore an attempt to have one their own at the helm to own resource distribution.[41] In addition to this, ethnicity displayed itself in the political parties' formation and even the voting patterns where the Presidential candidates got overwhelming support from their ethnic backyards.

The role played by the media, specifically the vernacular radio, and ethnic based militia, such as *mungiki, talibans,* attest to role of ethnicity in the 2007 electoral conflict. In the context of the manipulation of ethnicity, it emerged that political elites, bureaucrats and other ethnic entrepreneurs with interest in the conflict mobilized people along ethnic lines to gain political

---

[41] P. Wanyande, 'The Persistence in Kenya's Public Life, *in: Ethnicity Conflict: and the Future of African States'* (Nairobi, Pauline Publications Africa. 2009), p. 59

power. These actors' motives may not have been ethnic, but the fact that they use the ethnic agenda makes ethnicity an important factor in the conflict.

Although other causes such as land, perceived rigged presidential elections also emerged, they equally relate to ethnicity. Conflict over land was basically nothing other than communal claim to get back their lost ancestral land. It is a long standing grievance that only needed a trigger that was the, 2007/2008 electoral conflict.[42] Recognize ethnic element in conflict over land in Rift-Valley as ethnic cleansing aimed at driving non indigenous away from their ancestral land. It is also evident that conflict over Kalenjin land always coincides with general elections.

Relative deprivation theory was used as a framework of analysis. It denotes actors' perception of discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities and results from the combined effect of rising expectations and lack of progress in achieving those demands.[43] In Kenya, value expectation for different ethnic groups, was the *presidency*, whose executive powers influence resource distribution, which could help improve groups' standards of living. The presidency was also a forum to remove the socio-economic and political structures that oppress an ethnic group and ensure their security. This was denied by the perceived rigged elections, which set in the conditions of deprivation and frustration hence, eruption of violence.

The findings also answered the statement of the research problem. It gave an insight into the Kenya's perennial ethnic related electoral conflict discussing its root causes and the extent to which it is a product of manipulation or ethnic inequality.

In a nutshell, it is quite evident that ethnicity causes electoral conflict. Ethnicity provides rigid identity boundaries and fault lines with discursive potentials that if manipulated by actors

[42] H. Axel et al, 'Kenya 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks.' *Africa Spectrum* 43((GIGA Institute of African Affairs Hamburg.2008), p. 139.
[43] H. W. Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies; an Introduction* (England, Ashgate. 2000), p. 60.

with interest in political power causes electoral conflict. It creates fear of the out group whose intentions are not known to the in group and sets in a condition of preemptive attack. This denotes conflict.

Chapter Five

5.0 Conclusions

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter details the research findings from both primary and secondary sources. It was found out that there were many factors in the electoral conflict; equally, ethnicity played a major role by creating fault line around the perceived grievances.

This chapter highlights the summary of the research and reflections based on the findings. The summary covers issues tackled in all the chapters of the research, with a view of highlighting critical areas of the research. Reflections given include the views, challenges and the opinion of the researcher that can form important component of policy decisions and pursuit of further research.

The study covers a representative sample of four provinces most affected by the violence. Chapter one of the study, involves; statement of problem, research objectives, literature review, theoretical framework, hypotheses, methodology and justification of the study. The second chapter focuses on the concept of ethnicity, types, causes, ethnic conflict cycle, factors and actors in ethnic conflict with special reference to Kenya. Chapter three discusses the concept of electoral conflict with special reference to Kenya; its causes, types, cycle of the electoral conflict and at the same time actors and factors in the conflict. The chapter reveals in-depth factors ranging from proximate, structural and trigger causes of electoral conflict. Chapter four uses both primary and secondary data to analyze the relationship between ethnicity and electoral conflict. The analysis is both qualitative and quantitative. It emerged from the findings that there was relationship between ethnicity and electoral conflict of 2007/2008 in Kenya.

5.2 Reflections

The research concentrated on the regions, most affected by the 2007/2008 post electoral violence and, among the victims and the perpetrators, hence may get bias report. Areas which were not affected by the conflict to be targeted to get balanced information

Elections involve competition for high value goal; that is political power and may be prone to abuse that may create conflict, if no effective checks and balances are in place. This therefore calls for credible institutions to facilitate free and fair electioneering process to avert the experience of 2007 electoral violence in Kenya which had devastating effects in terms of human causalities and destruction of property. Apart from efficient electoral institutions, it is also necessary to achieve *positive peace* to address the structural problems and ethnicity, factors that divide the people every election year. In an attempt to address the factors of electoral conflict in Kenya, a number of strategies have therefore been suggested;

In context of structural conflict, redistributive justice is important to avert perception of marginalization that may lead to frustration, hence aggression. Equitable resource allocation is crucial to avert the feeling of marginalization. Devolution of the resources and even the political institutions may appease the periphery. However, it should be limited autonomy to avoid cessation tendencies.

Post conflict peace building is important and thus calls for retributive and restorative justice. Punishment should be meted against the perpetrations of violence. This may assist in addressing the culture of violence and impunity. However the level to which punishment will appease the victims is contestable. Despite this, the victims need justice. Both the local and international courts may serve the purpose. In respect to restorative justice, both victims and villains need to be reintegrated back to the society. Kenyan Truth Justice and Reconciliation

Commission (TJRC) is a good strategy, if only it can meet credibility test. When the integrity of the chairman is in question, then, it can lead to little success. However, TJRC offers opportunity for the perpetrators to confess their crimes and also ask for forgiveness. The victims should get reparation to reconstruct their lives. In Kenya's perspective therefore, the internally displaced persons must be resettled.

For Kenya to have credible and peaceful elections, effective electoral management body must be in place. Its impartiality and independence must be ensured, to eliminate the perception of bias. The appointment of the electoral management officials must be transparent and should be done by a constitutionally mandated body. In addition, the electoral body should therefore establish a proper system for the storage, distribution and accounting for its electoral materials at all levels. The funding should be direct from the exchequer coffers or consolidated fund to warrant its independence from influence of interested parties. In addition to effective electoral management body, efficient mechanism to settle electoral disputes must be instituted. This calls for independent judiciary or independent electoral courts to make political parties seek recourse in law courts instead of violence, in-case of an electoral dispute.

Strong institutions for conflict resolution before it manifest to be put in place. This therefore calls for effective institutions of conflict management. Early warning systems and effective structures of response to avoid electoral related crises should be established. This calls for security sector reforms to include proper reporting system and effective chain of command for fast decision making to forestall violent conflict as witnessed in the 2007 elections in Kenya. Different command systems for the Administration police and Kenya police are faulty in handling crises as witnessed in the 2007 electoral conflict.

Since ethnicity is a factor in electoral conflict in Kenya, the problem of identity must be addressed. The government and its institutions should ensure the safe guarding of *inclusivity* in the task of nation building, through equitable political representation, social justice, mutual respect and tolerance among the diverse ethnic groups that make up the polity and efforts should be made by the government and other stakeholders to strengthen state institutions. This will ensure that the existence of the majority or minority ethnic groups are not threatened by exclusion in terms of access to power, space and resources which are potential sources of conflict, and may threaten national cohesion. The minority groups should therefore be purposively accommodated into the state socio-political and economic decision making through affirmative action. Ethnic linked parties must be outlawed, as they may ignite ethnic competition resulting into conflict. This will therefore help to forestall armed confrontations or violence as witnessed in Kenya in 2008.

The empowerment of the youth, through employment and wealth creation may help avert their gullibility to ethnic entrepreneurs and political chauvinists who may entice them into conflict. Often, the youths have been lured by the political actors into the militia gangs to participate in electoral violence with the promise of employment or money. This calls for comprehensive economic growth to be able to effectively support the youth initiatives among other sectors of the economy. Favourable economic conditions to attract both local and international investment should be taken into account. Investors therefore need to be assured of secure and conducive investment environment that entails fair tax regime among others. In addition, the education system should be made relevant to the needs of a developing economy to alleviate mass unemployment. It calls for science and technical oriented subjects necessary for a developing economy and promote self employment, so as to eliminate over reliance on *white*

color jobs. However, this must be accompanied by injecting adequate capital resources into the youth economic programmes, as opposed to paltry support they get currently through the Ministry of Youth and Sports as *Youths Development Funds* (YDV).

To institute radical reforms that may avert the repeat of 2007/2008 electoral conflict, there should be full and speedy constitutional implementation, independent of political interference. Piecemeal amendments as witnessed in the change of 2012 election date by the executive and the legislature should be discarded since it may water down the constitutional gains hence undermining its credibility.

Peripheral insecurity that makes specific ethnic and regions to acquire arms, a situation that exacerbates conflict as a result of security dilemma must be addressed. The porous borders must be secured by security forces, to guard against the influx of small into the country that may fuel conflict. In regions where people are already armed, disarmament should be conducted to remove illegal arms from civilian hands. However, disarmament should be tampered with alternative economic engagement to avoid re-arming.

The electoral management body should be given prosecutorial powers to investigate and punish those parties and people who involve in electoral malpractices, including violence. This will act as a deterrent to future misconduct in the elections.

Regular and broader civic education must be conducted for the public in-order to understand their rights and responsibilities in relations to the electoral process. This will assist them to reject political and electoral violence. The civic education being conducted in Kenya by electoral management body is narrow in scope and only confined to a few elites especially in urban centers. The rural masses are often left out, making them vulnerable to political manipulation and propaganda.

Media must exercise balanced coverage. The media should therefore stick to its professional conduct. Propaganda and hate speeches should be avoided, and if possible, they should be punished. The Media Owners Association (MOA) and Communication Commission of Kenya (CCK) need to effectively enforce the implementation of regulations to maintain media professionalism. However, this should be done cautiously in order not to undermine the press freedom and independence of the media.

The role of the police and the provincial administration in the electioneering process must be clearly defined. They should not view themselves as an extension of central government in tilting the balance of the electoral competition in favour of the incumbent and the status quo. This involves the need to remain impartial and not to take sides in any electoral contest. There should also be regular and elaborate orientation on electoral related matters ranging from security of the electoral materials and humane handling of election related crisis, like mass actions and demonstration.

Conclusion

The electoral conflict in Kenya cannot be confined to dispute over the elections and ethnicity, but to deeper persistent structural problems. According to Annan, any attempt to resolve the issue of electoral conflict, must go beyond the electoral dispute, if a lasting solution is to be found. We must tackle the fundamental issues underlying the disturbances-like equitable distribution of resources- or else we will be back here after three or four years.[1]

---

[1] M. Mwagiru, 'The Water's Edge ...' op. cit. p. 7.

Bibliography

Anderson, M.L. and Taylor, H.F. *'Sociology the Essential:* (Thomson Wadsworh, Belmont U.S.A, 2005)

Atanassova, I.N. 'The Impact of Ethnic Issues on the Security of South Eastern Europe,' *Report Commissioned by the NATO Office of Information and Press June (1999)*

Atuobi, S. M. 'Election Related Violence in Africa' *in Conflict Trends. Issue No. 1 (Brussels, ICG, 2008), pp. 11-13*

Axel, H. et al, 'Kenya 2007 General Election and its Aftershocks' *Africa Spectrum 43, 1:133-144* (Hamburg, GIGA Institute of African Affairs, 2008), pp. 133-144

Awuondo, C.A. *'Introduction to Sociology.'* Nairobi, Basic Books Ltd. (1993), p. 11

Bates, R. H. *'Modernization, Ethnic Competition and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa State vs. Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas,'* Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola.(ed) Boulder: Westview, p. 152

Berman, L. and Murphy. B.A. *'Approaching Democracy, 3ʳᵈ ed.'* London, prentice Hall. 2001), p. 17

Betram, E. 'Reinventing Government: The promise of the Perils of United Nations Peacebuilding,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 39. NO. 3. (1995), pp. 387-418

Banfield, J. et al, *'Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance for Extractive Industries.* (London, International Alert. 2005)

Boswell T. and Dixon, W. J. 'Dependency and Rebellion: A Cross National Analysis.' *American Sociological Review* 55 (4): (1990), pp. 540-59

Brown. M. (ed). *'Ethnic Conflict and International Security.'*(UK, Princeton University Press.1993)

Bruce, G. 'Against the Concept of Ethnic Conflict.' *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 25, No. 26 92004), pp. 1157-1166

Brush S. G. 'Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Science; Relative Deprivation and Collective Violence,' *Journal of Peace Resolution* Vol. 40, No. 4 (Dec 1996), p. 527

Burkey, M.R. (ed) *'Ethnic and Racial Groups: the Dynamics of the Dominance'* (California, Cummings Publishing Inc. 1978)

Burton, J. (ed), *'Conflict: Human Needs Theory,* (London: Macmillan 1990)

Carment D. and James, P. 'Two-Level Games and Third-Party Intervention: Evidence from Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans and South Asia. Canadian.' *Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique,* Vol. 29, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 521-554

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Failed State index. *Foreign Policy No. 149.* (July-August, 2005), pp. 56- 65

Chaturvedi, A. 'Rigging Elections with Violence.' *Public Choice,* Vol. 125 No. ½ (Oct. 2005).p.190

Chazan, N. *et al.* 'Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa. 2ⁿᵈ ed. USA, Boulder; Lynne Rienner Publisher (1992), pp. 1-10

Chua, A.L. 'Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development.' *Yale Law Journal* 108 (1): (1998), pp. 37-38

Cohen, A. *'Two Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in Complex Society,* (Berkeley California. California University Press, 1974)

Commission to Investigate Post – Elections Violence. Report of the Independent Review Commission of the Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV),' Nairobi, Government Print, 2008, pp. 33-35Curle, A. 'Making Peace' (London, Tavistock. 1971), pp. 1-421

Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War. (Winchester, Oxford, World Bank, 2002)

Connor, W. 'The Politics of Ethno-nationalism." Journal of International Affairs 27 (1): (1973),

Cordell, K. and Wolff, S. 'Ethnic Conflict: Causes, Consequence- Response.(UK, Cambridge University Press)

Curle, A. 'Making Peace' (London, Tavistock. 1971)

Doran, C. F 'Leading Indicators of June War: A Micro Analysis of the Conflict Cycle.' International Journal of Middle East Studies.Vol. II, No. 1, February, 1980, pp. 1-21

Evans, G. 'Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, (Sydney, Allen & Unwin 1993)

Fischer, J. 'Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention.(Washington DC, IFES, 2002)

Fukui, K. and Markakis, J. (eds), 'Ethnicity & Conflict in the Horn of Africa, (London, James Currey Publishers, 1994)

Galtung, J. 'The Galtung Triangle and Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Caucasian Review of International Affairs, (CRIA, 2008)

Galtung, J. 'The Galtung Triangle and Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Caucasian Review of International Affairs, (CRIA, 2008)

Gashaw, S. 'Nationalism And Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia' in C.Young (ed);The Rising Tide of Pluralism; The Nation –State at Bay (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press. 1993)

Getui, M. N. 'The Ethnicity Factor in Politics Religion and Politics' in: Ethnicity Conflict: and the Future of African States' (Nairobi, Pauline Publications Africa)

Goldstein, J.S. 'International Relations, 6th ed.' Pearson "Education. Inc. (Delhi, Darling Kindersley Publishing Inc. 2005)

Greetz, C 'The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays.' (New York, Base Books), 1973, p. 254

Gurr, T. R. 'Peoples against States: Ethno-political Conflict and the Changing World System." International Studies Quarterly 38 (3)©194), pp. 347-77

Harvey, F.P. 'Primordialist, Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Violence in the Balkans: Opportunities and Constraint for Theory and Policy.' Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol. 33. No. 1. March, 2000, pp. 37-65

Hechter M. and Borland, B. 'National Self Determination: the Emergence of an International Norm. (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2001)

Hewitt, C. 'Majorities and Minorities: A Comparative Survey of Ethnic violence.' Annals of American Academy of Political Science. Vol. 433. Ethnic Conflict in the World Today. Sept. 1977, pp. 150-154

Hewitt, C. 'Majorities and Minorities: A Comparative Survey of Ethnic violence.' Annals of American Academy of Political Science. Vol. 433. Ethnic Conflict in the World Today. Sept. 1977, p. 150

Horowitz, D. 'Ethnic Groups in Conflict. (Berkeley, G.A.: University of California Press, 1985)

Huntington, S. P. 'Third Wave Democratization in the 20th Century, (USA, University of Oklahoma, 1994)

Jeong, H. W. 'Peace and Conflict Studies; an Introduction.' (England, Ashgate. 2000)

_____, H. W. 'Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis Sage' (London, Publications Ltd. 2008)

Kanyinga, K, Okello, D. and Akech, A. 'Contradictions of Transition to Democracy in Fragmented Societies: The Kenya 2007 General Elections in Perspective,' in: D. Kanyinga and D. Okello (eds). *Tension and Reversals in Democratic transition: The Kenya 2007 General Elections.* (Nairobi, Society for International Development (SID, University of Nairobi, 2010)

_____, K. 'Governance Institutions and Inequality in Kenya,' in: *Readings on Inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics and Perspectives.* (Nairobi, Society for the International Development 2006)

_____, K, Long, J.D. and Ndii, D. 'What is Rigged? A forensic Analysis of Vote Returns in Kenya's,' in Kenya's 2007 Elections,' in: D. Kanyinga and D. Okello (eds). *Tension and Reversals in Democratic transition: The Kenya 2007 General Elections. Nairobi, Society for International Development* (SID, University of Nairobi, 2010)

Kagwe, T. 'The Unfinished Agenda and the 2007 General Election in Kenya,' in K. Kanyinga and D. Okello (eds); *Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transition: The Kenya 2007 General Elections.* (Nairobi, Society for International Development, 2010)

Kaufman, S.J. 'Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001)

Katumanga, M. 'Militarized Spaces and the Post -2007 Election Violence,' in: K. Kanyinga and D. Okello (eds); *Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transition: The Kenya 2007 General Elections.* (Nairobi, Society for International Development, 2010)

King, E. A. '*A Glossary, Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies*, 2nd. Ed.' (Geneva, University of Peace. 2005)

Kiringai, K. 'Public Spending in Kenya,' in: *Readings Inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics and Perspectives.* (Nairobi, SID, 2006)

Klopp, J.M. 'The Problem of Land Grabbing in Contemporary Kenya,' *Africa Today*, Indiana University Press Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 2000), pp.7- 8

Kuperman, A.J. 'Rwanda in Retrospect' Foreign *Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1 (Jan –Feb, 2000), pp. 94 -267*

Lake, D. A. and Rothchild, D. '*Containing Fear, the Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Vol. 21* (Harvard College USA. 1996), pp. 4-45

Lambourne, W. 'Post Conflict Peace Building: Meeting Human Needs for Justice and Reconciliation' *Peace Conflict and Development. Issue* 4, (2004), pp. 2- 4

Lulofs, R. S. and Cahn, D.D. 'Conflict: from Theory to Action. (Boston, MA; Allen and Bacon, 2000)

Manwelo, P. '*Root Causes of the December 2007 Post Election in Kenya;*' In Tarimo A. & D. Manwelo; Ethnicity Conflict and the Future of African States, (Nairobi, Paulines Publications, 2009)

Matlosa, K. '*Electoral processes and post –settlement Peacebuiding : Perspective from Southern Africa*' Stockholm , International IDEA, Democracy Conflict and Human Security, Stockholm International IDEA, 2006)

Mbugua, K. '*Kenya Factional Conflicts in Historical Context,*' *Conflict Trends*, Issue 1, No. 9. (2008), p. 4

Meadow, R.G. 'An Essay based on a brief talk given at the Marquette International Media and Conflict Resolution Conference on March 21, 2009

Meadow, S. M. 'Political Violence and the media,' *Marqette Law Review (2005)*, pp. 93-240

Mozaffar, S. 'Patterns of Electoral Governance in Africa's Emerging Democracies.' *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 23, No. 1, (2002), pp. 85 – 101

Mudida, R. 'Structural Sources of Constitution al Conflicts: A conflict Analysis of constitution making in Kenya 1997 -2005' PhD Thesis, (Nairobi, September 2008)

Muktha, S. 'Main Approaches to the Definition of Ethnic Conflict.' *International Journal of Academic Research.* Vol. 3. No. 1. January, 2011, pp. 889-892

Mwagiru, M. '*Conflict in Africa: Theory Processes and Institutions Management,*(Nairobi, Watermark, 2000)

Mwagiru, M. 'The Water's Edge: mediation of Violent Electoral Conflict in Kenya, (Nairobi, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, 2008)

Nthamburi, Z. '*The Paradigms of Ethnicity; Its influence and Relevance in Public Life Today'* in Tarmio and Manwello Ethnicity and Conflict; the Feature of African States. (Nairobi Paulines Publications Africa 2009)

Nyasani, M. F. '*The Meaning and Implication of Ethnicity,*' in Tarimo and P. Manwelo; Ethnicity Conflict and the Future of African States. (Nairobi Paulines, Publications Africa 2009)

Osaghae, E. E. '*Structural Adjustment and ethnicity in Nigeria*'(Sweden, Motala Grafiska, 1995)

Oucho, J. O. 'Undercurrents of Post Elections Violence in Kenya: Issues in the long Term Agenda,' *in*: K. Kanyinga and D. Okello (eds). *Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transition: The Kenya 2007 General Elections.* (Nairobi, Society for International Development, 2010)

Orr, R.C. 'Building in El Salvador: From Exception to Rule,' in: Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar (eds); *Peacebuilding and Politics.* (Colorado, Lyne Rienner, 2001)

Peas, W. 'The Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Liberia,' *International Peacekeeping*, 1743-906X, Volume 12, Issue 2, (Routledge, 2005), pp. 253 – 261

Rief, M. '*Making Democracy Safe: Institutional Causes and Consequences of Electoral Coercion and Violence.* (Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 2010)

Rodolfo, S. Ethnic Conflict and the Nation State. (UK, McMillan Press Ltd. 1996)

Roessingh, M.A. '*Ethnonationalism and Political Systems in Europe: A State of Tension.'* (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2003)

Roessler, P. G. 'Donor Induced Democratization and the Privatization of State Violence in Kenya and Rwanda' *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 37. No 2. (New York; University of New York. .2005), pp. 207-222

Rothchild, D. '*Managing Ethnic Conflicts in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Co-operation.* (Washington D.C., Brooking Institution Press. 1997), pp. 3-40

Russell, H. 'One for All; The Logic of Group Conflict, (Princeton University, 1995)

Schaefer, R. 'Sociology Matters, (New York, McGraw Hill, 2004)

Serensen, G. 'Utopianism in Peace Research: The Gandhian Heritage' *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 29. No. 2. (1992), pp. 135-144

Stiftung, F.E. '*Political and Election Violence in East Africa: Working Papers on Conflict Management Centre for Conflict Research, '*No.2 (2001), pp. 3-4

Shitubani, T. and Kwan, M. '*Ethnic stratification; A Comparative Approach.* (New York, Macmillan, 1965)

Sotiropoulou, A. *'The Role of Ethnic Conflicts: The case of Yugoslavia.* (University of Bath, Euromaster, 2007)

Stewart, F. *'The Root Causes of Conflict' Some Conclusions Working Paper Number 16.* (Oxford University 1998)

Tarimo, S.J. *'Competing Identities Loyalties and Interest'* In Tarmio and Manwello Ethnicity and Conflict; the Feature of African States. (Nairobi, Paulines Publications Africa 2009)

Vasquez, J.A. *'The War Puzzle.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)

Wa- Mungai, M. 'Soft Power in Electoral Politics,' in: Kanyinga, K and Okello, D (eds). *Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: The Kenya 2007 General Elections.* (Nairobi, Society for International Develeopment, 2010)

Wanyande, P. *'The Persistence in Kenya's Public Life, in: Ethnicity Conflict: and the Future of African States'* (Nairobi, Pauline Publications Africa. 2009)

Wood, B. W. *'Geographical Aspects of Genocide; A Comparative of Bosnia and Rwanda; Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers'* New Series Vol. 26 No. 1 (Britain, Blackwell. 2001), pp. 57– 75

Wolff, S. *'Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective.* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2006)

Young, R. 'How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?' *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), pp. 774-92*

Young, C. *'Explaining the Conflict Potential of Ethnicity.'* in J. Derby and R. MacCarthy; Contemporary Peace Making: Conflict, Violence and Peace Process. (London, Pulgrave, 2003)

Zartman, I. W. *'Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, Updated Ed.*(New York, Oxford University Press. 1989)

Ziyadov, T. *'The Galtung Triangle and Nagorno-Garabagh Conflict'* (Washington D.C. CRIA, .2008)

Annex

Interview Questions

1. What would you consider as the causes of the 2007 post election violence?

2. In your opinion, was there any link between ethnicity and 2007/2008 electoral conflict in Kenya?

3. Which ethnic groups were target and why?

4. In your opinion, who were the major actors in this conflict?

5. Do you think there have been adequate strategies to manage electoral violence in Kenya?

6. In your opinion, did ECK perform their election supervision mandate effectively?

7. In your view, what can be done to avert future electoral related violence?

List of Interviewees

Mr. Stephen Ikua, Former Koibatek District Commissioner

Reverent Murpus, Reformed Church of East Africa, Eldoret

Dr. peter Agulo, Former Mayor for Homa Bay Municipal Council

Ms. Joyce Emanikor, Chairperson, Kerio Valley Development Authority

Professor Omollo Ongati, Maseno University

Mr. Magunga, a Luo elder, Rachuonyo District

Mr. Nathan Mwangi, Youth Group leader, Central Province

Mr. Mohammed Ibrahim, Nairobi based Businessman

Councilor Ruth Anyango, Kibiri Ward, Rachuonyo Constituency

Mr. Ngugi Njagi, a witness of the 2007-2008 electoral violence

Mzee Nyongesa, a victim of 2007-2008 electoral violence

Mr. Solomon Mukenion, Chairman, Catholic Peace and Justice

Mr. Paul Chepkemoi Kalenjin Youth Group Leader

National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) Officer

Officer, Kenya National Commission for Human Rights (KNCHR)

Provincial Administrator based in Nairobi

Mr. Charles Opere, Hotel Manager in Homa Bay

Mr. Kibebe, Youth Leader, Kisii