

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

**INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES**

**AN EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN
NEGOTIATION PROCESSES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN: A
CASE OF THE 2005 MACHAKOS/ NAIVASHA PEACE
PROCESS**

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE IN MASTER OF ARTS IN
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

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DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

Signature Agesa Date 8th September, 2010

RUTH AGESA

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as a university supervisor.

Signature Kiamba Date 13th September 2010

ANITA KIAMBA

DEDICATION

I dedicate this study to my two sons, Brian and Maurice for their strength and support during this course.

God Bless.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to a lot of people for their invaluable contributions to the completion of this dissertation. My gratitude go to the Ministry Education for partial sponsorship and Hon. Andrew Ligale for the financial support. I also acknowledge the support I received from Madam Anita Kiamba who supervised this study. I thank her for her patience and generous guidance. I also thank my dear friend Sela who assisted in proof reading my work and generous advise she offered. I also thank Col Samwel Nandwa who assisted me so much with reading materials. I also benefited a lot from my other teachers and classmates. Above all, I would like to thank the Almighty God for His care throughout this study.

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ACRONYMS

APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NEPAD	New Partnership of African Development
NIF	National Islamic Front
OAU	Organization of African Union
SPLA	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army
SSLM	Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
UN	United Nations
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WLA	Women's Land Army
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

ABSTRACT

This dissertation contends that despite bearing the highest brunt of violence, it is imprecise to relegate all women to the status of victims of war and conflict. Consequently, the study argues that women deserve a place at the table, actively involved in decision-making processes to ensure peaceful coexistence within their environments. It is on this background that this study investigates the main contributions of women to negotiation processes by examining the case of the Machakos and Naivasha peace processes.

These processes were conducted by use of track one and a half because both state and non-state actors participated as the Sudan conflict was internal. It is important therefore to engender and even increase the participation of women in both tracks not only due to the increasing attention within governmental and non-governmental circles to merge the two tracks but also due to enabling accurate evaluation of the contributions of women in decision-making.

The main findings of the study was that peace agreements, post-conflict reconstruction and governance can do better when women are involved but the challenges they embrace are immense. In essence, the study established that women who were involved in the Machakos and Naivasha peace processes contributed considerably to the CPA agreement despite the substantial challenges they were faced with. They continue to be instrumental in the implementation of the Agreement.

CHAPTER ONE

GENDER AND PEACE BUILDING IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

1.0 Introduction

The exploitation of Africa by actors from other continents like the international community goes as far back as the 1500s. For more than three centuries, Africa was ravaged by the brutal slave trade that split millions of families, broke the economic back of the continent, and served to make other countries more powerful and prominent. In 1886, those same countries held the Berlin Conference to carve up Africa in various colonial territories. The Conference set up arbitrary state boundaries that did not take into consideration the natural divisions of the African people (religion, culture, language, ethnicity, and so on).¹

Currently, Africa exists within a globalized world where much is often taken from the continent, and less put in. Africa has suffered the loss of its sons and daughters; Africa has been drained of much of its natural resources; its frontiers have been artificially designed. Despite many recovery programs set up in the past for Africa by UN organizations and the international community, there has been little progress; Africans are still suffering and facing extreme poverty.

Sudan, Africa's largest country, has endured civil war for all but 10 years since it achieved independence in 1956, after nearly 80 years of British rule. One of the world's poorest country, Sudan sits on more than six hundred barrels of oil that cannot be exploited due to the continuing conflict.² Despite its vast size, Sudan is largely a land torn by a complex struggle that stems from its colonial experience, its ethnic and religious divisions

¹ Jeffrey Herbst, 'Responding to State Failure in Africa' *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 120-144

² Salopek Paul, 'Shattered Sudan: Drilling for Oil, Hoping for Peace' *National Geographic* February 2003, pp. 30-59

and from the self-interests that take precedence over progress. Historically, Sudan has been viewed as a nation divided between north and south. The North is more developed and more prosperous, is influenced by Egypt and is predominately Muslim. The South is home to untapped natural resources, Christian and animist beliefs, poverty and a resilient rebel movement.³

Thus, while the conflicts are growing in number by the day with far reaching consequences, the mechanism for resolving them, let alone preventing them, remains elusive. Women suffer most alongside their children in crisis situations.⁴

1.1 Problem Statement

While everyone is affected by war, not all are affected in the same way. Women generally bear the brunt of violence and conflict. They are subjected to rape and physical abuse, they risk losing their sons and husbands to war; they are often left to act as sole income providers and run their households. Women are disproportionately affected by the spread of HIV/AIDS, and as we have observed with the Sudan crisis, women often represent more than 50% of refugee camps.⁵

However, it is imprecise to relegate all women to the status of victim. They have a lot to say and their input is valuable – women deserve a place at the table, actively involved in decision-making processes to ensure that human security is prioritized in national policies in Africa. As they are greatly affected by war they should be heard. They deserve to be part of the solution – to be included not only as actors but as beneficiaries as well.

³ Sorensen Birgitte, *Women and Post- Conflict Reconstruction : Issues and Sources* (Geneva: UNRISD, 1998) p. 62

⁴ African Rights, *Rwanda Not So Innocent: When Women Become Killers* (London: African Rights, 1995) p. 91

⁵ Dunstan M. Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981) p. 49

Unfortunately, in Africa there has been very low participation of women in decision-making processes due to the patriarchal structures embedded in institutions and peoples. This has also affected the effective contribution of women to peace building and conflict resolution given that most of the processes of peace building involve decision-making. This does not mean however that the minimal contributions should not be mentioned, they should in fact be studied in order to reinforce the potential strength of the role of women in negotiation processes or to improve their weak points.

It is on this background that this study seeks to examine of the major contributions of women to the implementation of peace building in Africa with the hope that their contributions, if positive, will facilitate an increase in their levels of participation in decision-making processes. The study specifically reviews the Machakos and Naivasha peace talks which began in 1993 when IGADD heads of state conceived an initiative to bring the Government of Sudan and the SPLA together and culminated into the CPA Agreement in 2005. In this regard, it attempts to answer the following major question: what is the role of women in the Machakos and Naivasha Peace processes in Sudan? It addresses this question by examining the role of women in the negotiation processes which began in 1993 and resulted in signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.

1.2 Objectives

The main objective of this study is to examine the role of women in conflict resolution in traditional African societies with specific focus on Southern Sudan. In addition, the study seeks to achieve the following specific objectives;

1. To investigate the role of women in the negotiation process that led to the signing of the CPA.

2. Identify the challenges that faced women during the negotiations process.

1.3 Literature Review

The literature review addresses three contentious issues that affect the main focus of this study. The first analyses the relationship between gender and peace building. Here, the impact of a gender based peace building initiative is identified. The second section looks into the history of conflict and initiatives to bring peace in Southern Sudan. The 2005 comprehensive peace agreement, a culmination of the Machakos and Naivasha Peace Processes, is also introduced. Finally an evaluation of the role of women in peace building is done using case studies of Rwanda, East Timor and Afghanistan.

1.3.1 Gender and Decision-Making in Peace building

Peace building is a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building and political as well as economic transformation. Peace building involves a full range of approaches, processes, and stages needed for transformation toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships and governance modes and structures. Peace building includes building legal and human rights institutions as well as fair and effective governance and dispute resolution processes and systems. To be effective, peace building activities requires careful and participatory planning, coordination among various efforts, and sustained commitments by both local and donor partners.

According to the UN, peace building consists of a wide range of activities associated with capacity building, reconciliation, and societal transformation.⁶ In this sense, peace building is a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building, and political as well as economic transformation. This consists of a set of physical, social, and structural initiatives that are often an integral part of post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Many NGOs on the other hand, understand peace building as an umbrella concept that encompasses not only long-term transformative efforts, but also peacemaking and peacekeeping. In this view, peace building includes early warning and response efforts, violence prevention, advocacy work, civilian and military peacekeeping, military intervention, humanitarian assistance, ceasefire agreements, and the establishment of peace zones.

To further understand the notion of peace building, many contrast it with the more traditional strategies of peacemaking and peacekeeping. Peacemaking is the diplomatic effort to end the violence between the conflicting parties, move them towards nonviolent dialogue, and eventually reach a peace agreement. Peacekeeping, on the other hand, is a third-party intervention (often, but not always done by military forces) to assist parties in transitioning from violent conflict to peace by separating the fighting parties and keeping them apart. These peacekeeping operations not only provide security, but also facilitate other non-military initiatives.⁷

⁶ Boutros-Ghali Boutros, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1995) p. 17

⁷ Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, *Managing Global Chaos: Sources or and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996) p. 593

Some draw a distinction between post-conflict peace building and long-term peace building. Post-conflict peace building is connected to peacekeeping, and often involves demobilization and reintegration programs, as well as immediate reconstruction needs. Meeting immediate needs and handling crises is no doubt crucial. But while peacemaking and peacekeeping processes are an important part of peace transitions, they are not enough in and of themselves to meet longer-term needs and build a lasting peace.⁸ Long-term peace building techniques are designed to fill this gap, and to address the underlying substantive issues that brought about conflict. Various transformation techniques aim to move parties away from confrontation and violence, and towards political and economic participation, peaceful relationships, and social harmony.

Peace building measures also aim to prevent conflict from reemerging. For instance, creating effective channels of communication increases fundamental mutual trust and reduces probability of misjudgment. On the other hand, gender is a fundamental element of conflict and of peace. Gender analysis can play an important role in furthering the understanding of successful peace building. Through the transformations it illuminates, it may contribute to knowledge and skills required for the prevention of future violent conflicts. For such reasons, gender cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to the peace building enterprise. Reychler and others dispute the “worrisome presumption that ‘gender’ is intellectually bland” and maintains that “to take seriously the full implications of gender entails shining bright lights into the cultures, the structures, and the silences of peacekeeping.” They challenge us all to “pull away gender’s reassuring public mask of

⁸ John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace, 1997) p. 75

comfortable blandness and reveal it for what it should be: a conceptual tool to make us see things at work that we would rather not see”.⁹

The continuing evidence of gender discrimination found in conflict and post-conflict settings, and occasionally even within the structure of peace operations themselves despite the increased attention to gender, suggests that peace building and reconstruction activities and the actors that conduct them have yet to grasp the nettle of the problem. Gender-sensitive approaches often fail to address the larger contextual issues behind women’s marginalization in peace building and post-conflict reconstruction, which in turn can exacerbate women’s marginalization in economic, social, and political processes and undermine their well-being and quality of life. While the peace building community may show greater recognition of and appreciation for the new open spaces (social, economic, political) in conflict and post conflict settings that accommodate new roles and opportunities for women, those open spaces often close as the dust of conflict settles.

While the sex ratio and gender training of peacekeeping teams are only parts of the bigger picture, it appears that operations which give greater weight to gender in their own make-up and procedures can increase the chances for successful transformative change during reconstruction, as suggested by the early example of the peacekeeping mission in Namibia in 1989-90 and events now unfolding in East Timor.¹⁰ This also suggests the fundamental importance attached to strategies which ensure women’s equal representation and participation in structures of governance and policymaking in countries emerging from conflict. While increased numbers of women in office do not themselves translate into gender equitable public policy, it is possible to use related indicators (e.g., proportion of

⁹ Luc Reyhler and Thania Paffenholz, (eds) *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) p. 12

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 12

men and women going to the polls, elected to public bodies, or appointed to public office) to envision and assess strategies supporting a country's political revitalization in relation to women's right to full and equal participation in the conduct of public affairs. Such changes in national and sub national leadership structures have been the aim of programs in human rights education and political skills building in East Timor, Afghanistan, Rwanda, and elsewhere, and represent one important component of a transformative approach to gender-sensitive peace building.

Understanding women and peace is to understand the experience of militarization and political violence for women in terms of physical, economic and cultural violence. Disempowered in peace time, in the time of conflict, a time of decision by arms, women are even more disadvantaged and less able to assert their rights and the rights of their children to entitlements. War magnifies the already existing gender inequalities of peace time. Peace politics is of central concern to all in unequal power relations. Peace is not envisaged as a return to the status quo. A just peace involves the reworking of the gender status quo.

Traditionally, those involved in defining and conducting peace building have operated from a stance of gender neutrality, considering specific interventions to be time-bound and aimed at discrete outcomes such as the cessation of hostilities or the opening of communication channels.

1.3.2 Conflict and Peace Building in Southern Sudan

Civil war between the north and south broke out in 1955 and continued after Sudan became an independent nation in 1956. Sudan's succession of northern governments could not bring the conflict under control. Fighting continued until 1972, when the Southern

Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) signed a peace agreement with the Nimeiry government. This was the Addis Ababa Accord which was aimed at appeasing the leaders of the insurgency in southern Sudan after the first Sudanese Civil War proved costly to the government in the North. Autonomy was granted to Southern Sudan. There followed a decade of relative peace. Policies forcing the south to adopt Arab culture, Arab language, and the religion of Islam only intensified as Nimeiry strengthened Sudan's ties to Egypt and Saudi Arabia.¹¹

When reserves of strategic minerals and petroleum were discovered in the south, Nimeiry's government thought it had found the solution to Sudan's troubles. But before he could exploit these new sources of wealth, Nimeiry somehow had to get the country back under control. By the early 1980s, strikes, riots, and shortages of goods and services had paralyzed the nation. To rally support from the northern parties, President Nimeiry announced on September 8, 1983 that Sudan's civil laws had been revised to bring them into conformity with *Sharia*, or Islamic Law thus breaking the Addis Ababa agreement.¹²

The declaration of the so-called September Laws accompanied serious violations of the 1972 peace agreement with the SSLM. The government in Khartoum clearly intended to exploit the south's natural resources at any cost. Civil war broke out again. The southern forces, backed this time by the Soviet Union's surrogate in Ethiopia, had reorganized in 1983 as the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA). This civil war took on a religious necessity that had not characterized the previous struggle. In 1986, a coup d'etat forced Nimeiry out of power. The coalition government of northern political parties that replaced him was, in turn, overthrown in 1989 by General Omar al-Bashir and the charismatic

¹¹ Dunstan M. Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan* op. cit., p. 26

¹² Mohamed Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: From Conflict To Peace* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1975) p. 73

fundamentalist leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF), Hasan al-Turabi. The NIF outlawed all other political parties and transformed Sudan into an Islamic dictatorship. In response, the northern parties formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which included the SPLA. Peace talks between the SPLA and the Government of Sudan continually stumbled over the south's right to self-determination and over the relationship between state and religion.

In 1991, the SPLA split into factions. The south was virtually destroyed by the infighting that followed the split, but the SPLA survived. International intervention enabled both the armed resistance to the north and the peace talks to continue. By 1994, a significant grassroots peace movement began to emerge in the south. In 1996, several southern rebel factions signed a peace charter with the Government of Sudan. That charter, while never approved by the SPLA, became the basis for subsequent peace talks. A breakthrough in the peace process came in April 1997, when the Government of Sudan agreed to allow a referendum on self-determination for the south. The referendum will give the southern people the option of either unity or independence.

The war between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan's People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLAM/A) that erupted in 1983 following the breakdown of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, culminated into the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Over the long years of war, there was a plethora of attempts by various external actors, including neighboring States, concerned donors and other States, as well as the parties themselves, to bring the conflict to an end. However, the immense complexities of the war and the lack of political will prevented its earlier resolution. In 1993, the Heads of State of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) became involved in the latest initiative to bring the parties together. This was the beginning

of a long process that has led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.

1.3.3 Case Studies of Women in Search for Peace

United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325, which passed unanimously in October 2000, acknowledged that civilians, particularly women and children account for the vast majority of those adversely afflicted by armed conflict. Resolution 1325 recommended mainstreaming a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations. To that end, the resolution set a new threshold of action for UN and all governments by calling for institutionalizing the participation of women at the peace table, and in the post-conflict processes of peace-building and reconstruction.

The 2002 UNIFEM report, “Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peace building” was designed in response to Resolution 1325, as part of the effort to document and analyze the disproportionate impact of war on women and the potential of involving women in the peace process. The report gives their suffering a human face, but also acknowledges them as combatants in certain wars. It provides information on the changing nature of the battlefield, and the increasing use of rape as a weapon of war to humiliate both the female victims as well as the men in the community.¹³

The report also argues and demonstrates that peace agreements and reconstruction work better when women are involved in the building process - bringing women to the peace table improves the quality of agreements reached and enhances the chances that they

¹³ Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (eds), *Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peace-Building* Vol. 1 (New York: UNIFEM, 2002) p. 86

are implemented. A critical mass of women, and not merely token representation, however is needed for this to work, and the report recommends a minimum of 30 percent. Often in the midst of crisis, it is difficult to prioritize such principles - provision of food, shelter and healthcare are the urgent needs and the focus is taken off women. The report reminds that it is in the midst of such crisis, when humanitarian assistance is most readily available, and that these resources must be used to build the social structures that will empower women to play their full role in post-conflict reconstruction.¹⁴

Powley examines the role of women in peace building in Rwanda. She argues that after the genocide in Rwanda, there was a pressing need to rebuild both human capital as well as the human psyche because of issues such as the return of the diaspora, which has very high illiteracy rates; children born as a result of rape during war; women deliberately infected with HIV/AIDS; households headed by children, and so on. A tremendous opportunity existed within the new legal framework formulated after hostilities ended. A Gender Desk was established in the law ministry, which resulted in reformed inheritance and marriage laws. The Justice and Reconciliation Committee incorporated women after being criticized for not having any female judges and for humiliating female witnesses.

Besides, she holds that the new Rwandan government made significant policy changes to promote gender equality. A gender-sensitive Constitution and national laws regarding inheritance rights and property have opened new opportunities for Rwandans. What is more, women now represent a remarkable 48.8 percent of seats in the current parliament, placing it in first in the world for gender parity. However, as participants

¹⁴ Birgit Brock-Utne, *Educating for Peace: a Feminist Perspective* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985) p 2

noted, much work remains to be done in order to translate these achievements into substantial material and political gains for women in rural areas.¹⁵

On the other hand, Candio and others analyze the case of East Timor. They hold that women have played a critical role in East Timor's struggle for national independence. Both inside the country and in the diaspora, they courageously challenged the Indonesian invasion and occupation, as well as the international support that made these possible. East Timorese women have survived Indonesian military campaigns of violence, including forced sterilization, rape and sexual slavery. They have shown themselves as leaders, though they are often pushed aside in political discussions. And women have continued to struggle for equality throughout the United Nation's administration of East Timor.

A thirty percent quota was stipulated for women in the new parliament and 267 women candidates ran for election; these women as well as female voters were trained in preparation. Since cessation of hostilities, however, domestic violence has increased because of the vast numbers of unemployed men. This is being dealt with as a community issue by faith-based organizations.¹⁶

Looking at the Afghanistan scenario, Barnett notes that the American government was discouraged by some experts from focusing on women; it was feared that this would alienate some of the anti-Taliban forces whose support was required in the war against terrorism. But eventually women's issues were placed at the top of the agenda and the United States pressed for full participation of women at Bonn, the reconstruction conferences in Washington and Tokyo, and the Loya Jirga in Afghanistan. Media also played an extremely effective role in highlighting the Taliban's repression of women. (The

¹⁵ Powley Elizabeth, *Strengthening Governance: The Role of Women in Rwanda's Transition* (Washington, DC: Women. Waging Peace, 2003) p. 36

¹⁶ Candio P. and Bleiker R., 'Peacebuilding in East Timor' *The Pacific Review* Volume 14, Number 1, 1 March 2001, pp. 63-84:72

UNIFEM report notes that overall levels of assistance to women in conflict, especially humanitarian aid, are related strongly to media interest in the country's trauma.) Currently, work is underway to ensure the mainstreaming of gender in various ministries and projects, and ensuring that the new constitution guarantees equal rights for men and women. Finally, the economic and physical security of Afghan women is inextricably linked to peace and security in Afghanistan itself, as well as to its economic growth.¹⁷

Women's inclusion in educational structures, religious, political, and even familial leadership are all extremely critical to a democratic model of national development. Inclusion alone, however, is not enough. Both traditional and "modern" hierarchical structures that give power to some while oppressing others must be challenged. Democratic process is not only about who participates, but also the structures and rules of participation.

1.4 Justification

The analysis of feminist epistemology in Africa focuses purely on addressing patriarchy in traditional African societies and therefore on the discourse of protest against the cultural injustice on the girl child in traditional societies. However, this analysis is limited by its one-sided emphasis on the theme of woman subordination in Africa. By its omission to give account of the positive aspects of the woman in traditional Africa, the analysis overshadows and fails to draw out the immense contributions and the agentic role of women in peace building and conflict resolutions in traditional African societies. Such omission creates the unnecessary impression of African women as victims rather than

¹⁷ Barnett R. Rubin, *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995) p. 12

givers and builders of culture within the society. And the result is the prevailing opposition that now exists between women and men in contemporary Africa. This study attempts to examine the role of the woman in peace building because if the positive contributions of women in traditional African societies are to be seriously reviewed and noted, both men and women would have seen the indispensability of the other in the arduous task of nation building and harmonious living in contemporary African societies.

From the literature review, it is apparent that scholars have researched on the status of the woman in the African society. Although various scholars have covered the part women play in abetting and managing conflict in Sudan and other countries in the world, evidence indicates the absence of a comprehensive detailed analysis on the role of women in negotiation processes in Sudan. The study is therefore justified by the existence of this lacuna, which it intends to fill. Consequently, the study will contribute to the literature and data that will be useful for researchers, students and implementers and will form a basis for future studies of a similar nature.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

The main theory employed is feminism whose main proponents include Gloria Steinem and Naomi Wolf. Feminism is the organized movement which promotes equality for men and women in political, economic and social spheres.

The main view of feminists is that all people are created equal by God and deserve equal rights. They believe that women have the same mental capacity as their male counterparts and should be given the same opportunities in political, economic and social

spheres. Women should have the right to choose, not have their life chosen for them because of their sex. Essentially, women must be like men.¹⁸

In their struggle for equality and a just society in which both men and women are empowered, feminists are confronted by patriarchy, a social power structure and an ideology which provides a context and justification for institutionalized discrimination and violence against women. Its material aspects are manifest in men's control over resources and over women's labour power and in the marginalization of women from positions of power and decision-making. Peace activists must contend with the institution of the military and its material and ideological manifestations.

Feminists believe that women are oppressed simple due to their sex based on the dominant ideology of patriarchy. Patriarchy is the system which oppresses women through it's social, economic and political institutions. Throughout history men have had greater power in both the public and private spheres. To maintain this power, men have created boundaries and obstacles for women, thus making it harder for women to hold power. There is an unequal access to power.¹⁹

This school believes that the domination of women is the oldest and worst kind of oppression in the world. They believe this because it spans across the world oppressing women of different races, ethnicities, classes and cultures. Feminists want to free both men and women from the rigid gender roles that society has imposed upon them using various ways. One way is by creating and supporting acts of legislation that remove the barriers for women. These acts of legislation demand equal opportunities and rights for women,

¹⁸ Code Lorraine, *Encyclopedia of Feminist Theories* (New York: Routledge, 2000) p. 53

¹⁹ Gamble Sarah, *The Routledge Companion to Feminism and Post-feminism* (London, New York: Routledge, 2001) p. 29

including equal access to jobs and equal pay. They believe that removing these barriers directly challenges the ideologies of patriarchy, as well as liberates women.²⁰

Feminists also contend that there are fundamental, biological differences between men and women, and that women should celebrate these differences. Women are inherently more kind and gentle. Because of these differences, if women ruled the world there would be no more war and it would be a better place. Essentially, they posit that a women's way is the right and better way for everyone. The Western society values male thought and the ideas of independence, hierarchy, competition and domination. Females value ideas such as interdependence, cooperation, relationships, community, sharing, joy, trust and peace.²¹ Unfortunately, these ideas are not valued in contemporary western societies.

The interrelation between peace activism and feminism has long been recognized by activists. Birgit Brock-Utne's definition of peace combines non-violence, equality and justice. Feminism envisions similar ideals. As a social movement and an ideology, its aims include the empowerment of women, the achievement of equality between men and women and the creation of a just society. Ending discrimination against women and achieving a non-violent world are mutually interdependent, inseparable goals. If women want to build peace, they must also rid themselves of oppression based on gender. Similarly, if women want to gain their emancipation, they must work for a peaceful society in which to live.²²

²⁰ Humm Magge, *The Dictionary of Feminist Theory* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1990) p. 4

²¹ John Stuart Mill, *The Subjection of Women* (New York: D. Appleton Co., 1869) p. 52

²² Wood Julia, *Gendered Lives: Communication, Gender, and Culture* 2nd ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1997) p. 46

1.6 Hypotheses

The study attempts to test the following hypotheses;

1. Women play an instrumental role in the implementation of peace building in Southern Sudan especially in the Machakos negotiation process.
2. Peace building initiatives should include a full range of stakeholders in society such as women, main parties and international actors for them to be successful
3. Peace building is not dependent on gender roles.

1.7 Methodology

This section discusses the research methodology, target population and sampling procedures. It also explains the design to be used in data collection, instruments of data collection, the type of data and how it is analyzed.

The research design adopted by this study relies on both primary and secondary sources of data. Most of the information, however, will be obtained from secondary sources.

Primary data will involve interviews guided by unstructured questionnaires with women in various cadres in Sudan. The population sample will encompass women and men who have been involved in peace building in the Sudan. This will be conducted both in Kenya and Juba, Southern Sudan. In Kenya, organizations working on Sudanese matters of conflict and peace will be targeted while in Juba, where most Southern Sudanese leaders live. Women will specifically include those in decision making positions, House wives, women parliamentarians, women in managerial positions in civil society organizations, and women who participated in war in any way. The research uses probability sampling to have two women from the following categories: decision makers, House wives,

parliamentarians and managers in civil society organizations. On the other hand, men who were engaged in the peace building initiatives such as those working in organizations that have enhanced these initiatives will be interviewed. Five organizations have been selected and one man will be chosen from each organization using convenience sampling.

In addition, published books, papers, journals, internet and unpublished works will be used as secondary data sources. Other secondary sources will include UN documents, peace pacts and so on. This will be with particular reference to the composition, participation and involvement of women in negotiations leading to the agreements of peace in the Sudan.

1.8 Chapter Outline

Chapter One: Gender and Peace Building in Southern Sudan

This chapter provides an insight into the structure of the dissertation. It lays the background in which the introduction, statement of the problem, objectives, hypotheses, justification, literature review, theoretical framework, research methodology and chapter outline are discussed.

Chapter Two: Debates of Women in Peace Building

This chapter identifies women in decision making positions in Africa but narrows down to those involved in the process that resulted in the signing of the CPA (1993- 2005) and relates their views on how peace should have been achieved.

Chapter Three: Peace Building in the Southern Sudan: A Focus on the 2005 CPA Agreement

This chapter looks at the history of conflict in Sudan by its root causes. The picture since pre colonial times is set up till present. The chapter then examines the process that ended in the signing of the 2005 CPA Accords.

Chapter Four: A Critical Analysis of the Role of Women in Peace building in Southern Sudan

This chapter affirms women's inclusion in peace-building in Southern Sudan. It outlines the main contributions of women in the 2005 CPA agreement and looks at the reasons why women should be included in the process of peace building. The unfavorable conditions in women's lives to attaining positive peace will also be analyzed.

Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations

Following the findings in the previous chapter, this chapter offers a conclusion. After assessing these findings, it also proffers recommendations concerning the future of women in peace-building, the need for political good will, effective democratic structures and continued skills enhancement in order to ensure sustained effort of women in peace building.

CHAPTER TWO

DEBATES OF WOMEN IN PEACE BUILDING

2.0 Introduction

Until the CPA was signed, Sudan was marred by twenty years of civil war between north and south. Since then, there has been some progress. The Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement created a Government of National Unity (GNU), and outside Darfur, violence is far less pervasive. Infrastructure and services are slowly improving in southern Sudan. But the CPA-mandated disarmament process is incomplete and skirmishes are worsening in some parts of the country. Decisions about revenue-sharing, boundaries, a national census, and distribution of oil revenues are woefully delayed. Meanwhile, the conflict in Darfur continues unabated.

It was not until the year 2000 that the United Nations Security Council acknowledged that women have a key role in promoting international stability by passing Resolution 1325.²³ It called on all parties to ensure women's participation in peace processes, from the prevention of conflict to negotiations and reconstruction. The Security Council reaffirmed the importance of women's inclusion in Sudanese reconstruction when resolution 1590 established the United Nations Mission in Sudan and specifically mandated "a national inclusive approach, including the role of women, towards reconciliation and peace building."²⁴ These resolutions are important steps, but must be enacted.

In Sudan, women comprise 65 percent of the population, and up to 75 percent in areas most affected by the conflict. They are integral to rebuilding, reforming, and

²³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, 2000

²⁴ United Nations Security Council 1590, 2001

revitalizing the life of the country, yet they have been underrepresented in peace building efforts. This chapter brings out the various ways in which women influenced the process that resulted in the CPA in 2005.

2.1 Women Engagement during the CPA Process

Women participated in pushing the decision making process leading to the comprehensive Peace Agreement both directly and indirectly. This section examines the different ways in which women engaged with and in this process.

2.1.1 Women Organizations: Contributions and Impact during the Process

Women organizations, both international and local, did a variety of activities which shaped the outcome of the CPA process in one way or the other. The Initiative for Inclusive Security held that sustainable peace in Sudan will not be possible without the commitment and contributions of women. Their unique skills and insights must be harnessed for this critical peace agreement to succeed. The hope was that by convening this group of influential women in Khartoum, their voices will be amplified and build momentum for peace.²⁵

Despite not being involved formally, many women's organisations were registered observers with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and presented technical papers to negotiators in the Machakos talks. Similarly, women's organisations

²⁵ Carla Kopell, *Assessing Prospects for Peace in the Sudan* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004) p. 7

were forced to present their papers with recommendations to the parties by pushing them under the closed doors of the negotiation room at Naivasha.²⁶

When the Government of Sudan prevented women from boarding a plane to take them to the Naivasha talks in Kenya, women from the South joined northern women to formally protest their exclusion from the peace process. This was facilitated by the women-led organization, women waging for Peace.²⁷

Women of Southern Sudanese through organizations, organized congresses in preparation for the constitutional conference and National Convention for the South, expected to take place by the end 2003. The Machakos protocol completed in 2002 had inspired women to redouble efforts in order to engender the Sudan peace process from a southern perspective. This occurred in civic education which was effected very urgently in order for women on the ground, in general, and women aspiring for nominal or electoral position in particular, to be informed about the content of the Protocol and to be empowered to take part in the development of the following protocols. Training in skills enhancement helped women to improve their knowledge base and skills in preparation for the proposed southern women's convention. Moreover, the convention was planned for July-August 2003, with the attendance of about 300 women. Modalities and logistics that needed urgent attention, were addressed by these women organizations otherwise the convention was to be rendered useless. The convention was to be preceded by regional preparatory conferences, and for the Equatorial conference, topics such as women's

²⁶ Rogaia Abusharaf, 'Sudanese Women Waging Peace' also available online at <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRndfs/FMR24/FMR2424.pdf>

²⁷ Ibid

political and social rights were examined. A survey on violence against women was presented by Amnesty International.²⁸

Registered in 2003 as a non-governmental, non-political, and not-for-profit network, the Women's Empowerment for Peace and Development Network's primary aim was to encourage Sudanese women to participate in peace efforts. WEPD presented a women's perspective in a wide range of national and international forums in addition to doing various activities that influenced the CPA process. These activities network coordination, funding allocation, training, advocacy, peace building and capacity building. WEPD prepared the Sudanese Women's Minimum Agenda for Peace, Nairobi 2000 and the Naivasha position paper, 2003. With others, the organization also prepared the Machakos position paper, and participated in the Inter-Sudanese consultation group to advance the peace process in 2004. Moreover, WEPD participated in the evaluation of the IGAD peace process by the UN Mission to Sudan 2003, and in a number of UNDP forums.²⁹

The organization's lobbying helped to ensure that the target of 25% female decision-makers is enshrined in the CPA and the Interim Constitutions. The organization has been successful in bringing together women from both North and South Sudan in joint delegations to international conferences. In particular it ensured that the women's agenda for peace was presented to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) negotiators. WEPD also stimulated the UN Security Council resolution on Sudan.³⁰

²⁸ World Bank and UNDP, *Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication* (Nairobi and Khartoum: Sudan Joint Assessment Mission, 2005) p. 82

²⁹ Insight on Conflict available online at http://www.insightonconflict.org/women_s_empowerment_for_peace_an/

³⁰ Ibid

On August 7, 2002, the Sudanese Women's Civil Society Network for Peace (SWCSNP) and the Secretariat of Women Solidarity Group issued a position paper which unequivocally proclaimed women's entitlement to active participation in subsequent rounds of all peace negotiations. It gave the following recommendations:

'[W]e would like to express our special concerns, as women are not well represented in the delegations negotiating the peace process although since 1996 women from the south, north and western Sudan have been networking for peace issues and culture and for strengthening the conflict resolution mechanisms. Furthermore, in relation to the impact of war, in some cases, women have been marginalized in the peace negotiations as if war and peace are not of women's concern and as if Sudanese society is only a male society, We are worried that [women's] exclusion [from] the negotiations would be a momentum to the end results as well as to the after peace or transitional periods. Evidently our rights, needs and interests would be neglected or stereotyped.'³¹

These recommendations served to increase the number of women in peace processes in Sudan. Agnis Lukodo, the first woman governor in modern Sudan, participated in the 1993 Peace Talks coordinated by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), marking a bright experience in the Peace process. Similar participation was broadened in the interest of securing a lasting peace marking three women in the Machakos Peace Talks.

In addition, the Southern Women's Group for Peace convened on August 8, 2002, and issued a position paper on the protocol noting that 'the negotiation process should include professionals, technicians, and women.'

Sudanese Women's Empowerment for Peace (SuWEP) is a network of Sudanese women's organizations representing the north and south who worked together toward creating a peaceful Sudan. This network advocated for women and fought for their representation in the new government besides advocating for thirty percent women's

³¹ Mohamed Awad Osman, *Transition from War to Peace* (Geneva: University of Peace, 2003) p. 13

representation. Every document, correspondence, or interaction any SuWEP member had with IGAD, the Dutch government, contacts in the United States, leaders in the Sudanese government, or the SPLM/A, stated with resounding clarity that, as stakeholders in the future of Sudan, the women would be represented at the decision-making level. Present at the negotiation processes was a delegation of northern women and southern women living in the north from SuWEP, reflecting the collective face of Sudanese women as they reiterated their demand and simultaneously supported those at the negotiating table. They insisted that while the Government of Sudan and SPLM were using arms, women in Sudan carried UNSC 1325 as their arms to promote inclusion.³²

At one time, Women Waging Peace convened 16 Sudanese women from across every region, religion and ethnicity. Together they developed concrete recommendations for ensuring that the peace that was being negotiated is sustainable. It also prepared a more comprehensive discussion paper on women and civil society's perspectives on the Sudanese peace process that it availed to relevant stakeholders.³³

In civil society too, women are demonstrating their drive to consolidate peace and promote the democratic governance promised in the CPA. A national coalition of women from outside and inside government advocated for issues of peace-building. Included were members of parliament, employees in ministries, and representatives of non-governmental organisations in the fields of education, health, women's rights and democracy promotion. The coalition already ensured that women were represented in the upcoming legislature;

³² Natalie Zanzucchi, *Sudanese Women Peace-Makers* (California: University of San Diego, 2008) p. 2

³³ Women Waging Peace, 'Peace in Sudan: Women Making the Difference' available online at <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/Sudan%20Recommendations%20final3.pdf>

the draft election law currently guarantees women a minimum 25 percent of seats in the national assembly. Women and civil society are similarly leading the way in Darfur.

When given the space to influence negotiations, women and civil society often play critical roles paving the path to peace. In Guatemala, an extensive Civil Society Assembly helped revitalise stalled negotiations that resulted in an agreement in 1996. Liberian negotiations only concluded successfully when women literally stormed talks in 2003 and locked delegates in the conference room until they emerged with an accord. In Naga, India, a long-standing ceasefire between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim has held partly because civil society monitors compliance, and women mediate tension when it arises in communities.³⁴

2.1.2 Women in the Sudan Joint Assessment Mission (JAM)

The rapid initiation of rehabilitation and development in Sudan was imperative to ensure the sustainable gains of peace. In this context, the Sudan Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) sought to inform the Oslo International Donors' Conference by providing an assessment of the current status and overall reconstruction and rehabilitation needs of Sudan over the six year pre-interim/interim period agreed under the Machakos Protocol (July 2002). The JAM began during the peace process, and was completed soon after the signing of the CPA.

The JAM sectoral work was organized in eight thematic clusters with one extra cluster specifically focused on the three Areas (Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.). Special attention was paid to inter-linkages within and between clusters, and to cross-

³⁴ Cook T. and Deng L., *On the Threshold of Peace: Perspectives From the People of New Sudan* (Rumbek: NDI and NSCSE, 2004) p. 25

cutting issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS, capacity building, conflict assessment and natural resources/environment, though there was no direct policy guidance on how to operationalize this in practical terms.³⁵

Focusing on gender impacted on the efforts of not only engendering the ongoing peace processes but also the JAM itself. The background information available to cluster teams included indicators used in the diagnostics of sector issues that were disaggregated by gender. In terms of process inputs, UNIFEM designated two gender specialists to work with the Sudan JAM team, one for the North and one for the South. There was very little opportunity for interaction between the South gender team and the North as the GoS was not supportive of the issue; the two sides therefore had separate work programs until the Oslo donors conference, when they came together to generate common recommendations as part of the parallel Sudan Gender Symposium. The ability of the teams to impact the outcomes of cluster and synthesis work was reduced by two factors: gender concerns were not formulated as actions within cluster and were not costed; and gender focal points only gave comments after drafting of the report was done.³⁶

In the South, the interaction between the UNIFEM expert and her SPLM counterpart was a dynamic one. Initially, UNIFEM wanted to focus on violence against women, using Security Council Resolution 1325 as the driving force, but after working with southern Sudanese, it was agreed to focus on gender equity rather than affirmative action – educational standards for both boys and girls the same – which generated a much more supportive reaction from national stakeholders.

³⁵ World Bank and UNDP, *Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication* (Nairobi and Khartoum: Sudan Joint Assessment Mission, 2005) p. 3

³⁶ Ali A.A.G. and I. Elbadawi, *Prospects for Sustainable Peace and Post-Conflict Economic Growth in the Sudan* (Washington: World Bank, 2002) p. 31

The Gender advisors felt they came in too late to the process (after the cluster teams had already begun their work) which made it tough to get the issues on the table at the right stage; as a result, they felt the gender checklist was poorly understood. UNIFEM covered its own costs, and did not accompany the field visits and had no opportunity to inform the questions that were asked or the people that were interviewed. Field visits themselves were important but limited in geographic scope, and thus not able to cover the broad range of diversity that exists in South Sudan. Getting actions into the matrix based on specific costed interventions was seen by UNIFEM as the key to JAM leverage, but only governance, infrastructure and basic social services mentioned gender-specific actions. Specific gender reports for North and South were produced but not published either as annexes or separate text, on the assumption that key gender issues had been mainstreamed.³⁷

As part of their participation, UNIFEM convened a group of 60 women, comprising representatives from the GOS, the SPLM, civil society and academic institutions for a Symposium on Women's Rights and Leadership in Post-Conflict Sudan in Oslo on 10 April, 2002 under the auspices of the Government of Norway and in the margins of the Donors Conference. They presented their recommendations to the assembled delegates after the Sudan Gender Symposium. As they watched the proceedings on the big-screen TVs outside the venue, they felt "vindicated" that their demands made were discussed among donors and they "heard" commitments made to opening a window in the MDTF for women's concerns. Subsequently, frustrations have grown because the MDTF Secretariats have not reached out to explain to the women how

³⁷ PCNA, 'Sudan Joint Assessment Mission' available online at www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2008/06/mil-080624-voa10.htm

they can access this “window” of funding; a frustration that is exacerbated by the fact that other stakeholders, including the Norwegian hosts of the Oslo pledging conference, do not believe that any specific commitment was made on a gender “window” in the MDTFs.³⁸

2.1.3 Women in Parliament

Peace has become a priority in most of Sudan’s institutions. The parliament created the Permanent Peace Committee to monitor peace-related matters and to bring developments in the peace process to the attention of the legislature through regular testimony and open hearings. Although MPs are elected from across the country, there are doubts about whether the national legislature is truly representative and democratic because some of the major political parties boycotted the last elections.³⁹

If members of parliament raise questions concerning the peace process that require authoritative responses, the Permanent Peace Committee asks the concerned minister, through the parliament chairman, to appear before a special or public session and impart any necessary details and answer questions. Ministers have been frequently called upon to testify during such sessions. Most of the sixteen permanent parliamentary committees are involved in issues of peace, including the Human Rights Committee, Social Development Committee, Education and Scientific Research Committee, and Judiciary Committee.

When the negotiation’s progress stalled as when there was an outbreak of hostilities in Torit in September 2002 following the Machakos agreement, parliament convened a committee of the whole to discuss the situation with certain ministers and presented its recommendation to the chairman of the legislature. Before leaving for Naivasha in October

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Richard Garfield, *Violence and Victimization in South Sudan* (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2007) p. 23

2003 to resume peace talks, the first vice-president, Ali Osman Taha, addressed parliament on the achievements of the first Naivasha round and the signing of the framework agreement on security arrangements. He stressed two points: peace would be for all the peoples of Sudan, and a final agreement would be signed before the end of 2003.⁴⁰ The issue of 'peace for all' was of particular urgency to the many members of parliament who represent areas that feared being marginalized by a new peace accord. People had little faith in politicians' testimonials that such an event will not be allowed to occur. It is indeed a major task for parliament to ensure that any final agreement would bring peace and development to all parts of Sudan without political or economic exclusion or social discrimination. Few people would fail to see this as an essential measure protecting against further rebellion. The defense minister and top brass of the armed forces appeared before parliament in October 2003 to affirm the army's commitment to the Naivasha Agreement and a final peace settlement. Only time would prove their sincerity, as peace deals are always in danger of being reversed by unconvinced military leaders. The 87 women parliamentarians within the GNU formed a cross-party caucus — the sole caucus involving all parties in the national assembly — that developed a legislative agenda. They hosted a national conference of elected women leaders to identify priorities and needs. These women are providing the pragmatism and multi-party collaboration Sudan desperately needs.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Skye Wheeler, 'Growing Women's Power in Government', *InterPress Service* 2007 p. 2

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 2

2.1.4 Women in the Negotiation Process

Thousands of women joined the political struggle for peace with justice. They left their homes, not just to accompany their husbands but also to fight for freedom, democracy, and justice—the very same values that form the foundation of the United States.

Keziah Layinwa Nicodemus, head of the SPLM Women and Gender Commission asserts that Sudanese women are speaking in one voice and in one language regardless of their divisions. She observes that women had been given 25% seats in Southern Sudan's constitution but they have to push to make this a reality. Sudan is a country of men and women have to work hard with the support of the international community to train their women to be leaders.⁴²

Mariam Abdalla Omar has earned a reputation as both a fighter and a peacemaker in the troubled western Sudanese region of Darfur. Omar joined the rebel movement due to the anger built up by the way her relatives were murdered and her husband slashed with knives all over his body before killing him. She was left a widow to take care of five children and eight other children whose parents - all close relatives - had been slaughtered by the army. Omar, who was picked up by security agents several times, found herself walking out right through prison doors.

A commander in the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), one of the two rebel movements, fighting the army and its janjaweed ally in Darfur, Omar is no longer talking war. She is campaigning for peace.

⁴² IRIN, 'Interview with SPLM's Women Commissioner Kezia Lawinya' Commentary posted by IRIN March 11, 2004 also available online at <http://www.sudan.net/news/press/postedr/271.shtml>

Rebecca Joshua Okwaci cultivated many identities throughout her struggles for peace in Sudan. As a journalist, an advocate, a wife, a mother, and a revolutionary with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), she found ways for each of these identities to contribute to the overarching goal of peace. From her innovations in connecting media to peace, to bestowing an understanding of selflessness in wartime to her children, Rebecca never wavered from her mission. Rebecca is the founder of Sudanese Women's Association in Nairobi (SWAN) and the nongovernmental organization Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace (SWVP). She reported from Naivasha, Kenya on the on-goings of the negotiations and the signing of the three protocols which provided the framework for the CPA in May of 2004.⁴³

Before this in 2000, Rebecca had been called on by the African Renaissance Institute to participate in a series of workshops geared toward peace building interventions in Sudan. This intellectual forum addressed issues that would later become integral elements of the CPA, such as power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and humanitarian issues. The participants were selected based on their previous efforts for a peaceful Sudan and asked to participate as individuals, putting their affiliations with governments and organizations aside. Throughout the series of workshops, Rebecca made her presence known and contributed greatly to the issues with an eye for inclusiveness of marginalized groups, such as the people of the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and Abyei.

Rebecca was privileged to report the minute-by-minute happenings back to Sudan Radio Service during the signing the CPA in Nyayo Stadium, Kenya. While her focus was on covering the story, she also stood in the stadium representing all of the roles in which,

⁴³ Natalie Zanzucchi, *Sudanese Women Peace-Makers* op. Cit., p. 3

in her own way, she had contributed to peace between the government and the south. She had sacrificed all of her adult life for the realization of this moment.⁴⁴

2.1.5 Women at the Negotiation Table

The Machakos and Naivasha peace processes were conducted by use of track one and a half. Women at the negotiating table were represented by use of the three tracks of diplomacy; track one, two and one and a half. Track-one diplomacy refers to official governmental diplomacy, or a technique of state action, which is essentially a process whereby communications from one government go directly to the decision-making apparatus of another.⁴⁵ On the other hand, Track II diplomacy is a specific kind of informal diplomacy, in which non-officials (academic scholars, retired civil and military officials, *public figures*, and social activists) engage in dialogue, with the aim of conflict resolution or confidence-building.

Track 1½ intermediation typically involves unofficial actors (former government officials, or religious or social organizations such as the Church or the Quakers) who intervene between official government representatives to promote a peaceful resolution of conflict. Given that the Sudan conflict was internal, both state and non-state actors were involved.

At first, the inclusion of women on the negotiating table was not promising. However, as negotiations dragged on, women became determined to participate in the talks themselves. Under track one, Women convinced the involved parties such as the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army to nominate a handful of women leaders as formal

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 4

⁴⁵ Said, A.S., Lerche, Jr., C.O. & Lerche III, C.O. (1995). *Concepts of international politics in global perspective*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. p. 69

delegates. The Machakos talks included a few women's delegations - members of the two parties to the negotiations. There were at least six women delegates from SPLM/A-controlled entity, and the GOS also included at least one-woman delegate. Nevertheless, making a difference was difficult. They were few in number. They were expected to contribute to a gender-blind party-position; and were ill prepared for debates with seasoned politicians who intimidated anyone who dared to focus on gender issues. Nonetheless, women made important contributions. They developed the Sudanese women's minimum agenda in which they called for one-third women's representation in decision making bodies. When the talks grew tense, women pressed men to keep negotiating. They worked across party lines to find points of compromise. They organized visits to the talks and sent strong messages to the mediator, who was always understanding. They grew savvier as time went on and their impact grew. Thanks to their efforts, the CPA recognizes the need for positive discrimination for women and the importance of recognizing women's equal rights.⁴⁶

As noted earlier, Track II diplomacy is a specific kind of informal diplomacy, in which non-officials, including international organizations, engage in dialogue, with the aim of conflict resolution or confidence-building. Women organizations and other stakeholders in Sudan would not have successfully contributed to the process without the support of the international actors both financially and in principle. In passing Resolution 1325 in 2000, the UNSC acknowledged that though women are victims of conflict in many ways, they are also critical agents of peace and constructive change. In Resolution 1547, it acknowledged that IGAD has done commendable work that "will contribute to improved

⁴⁶ Kwaje S., 'The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha' in Makumi Mwagiru (ed) *Regional Security Issues in the Age of Globalization* (Nairobi: Clarion, 2006) p. 3

stability and peace.” Sudanese women and citizens of Sudan want it to go forward and believe that the IGAD process can provided a foundation for the resolution of the Darfur and Eastern Sudan conflicts.⁴⁷

Canada and the Initiative for Inclusive Security were among those assisting the parliamentary women's caucus. Norway facilitated technical support for the civil society women's coalition. Donors, including the United States, UNIFEM and Femmes Africa Solidarite, supported capacity building and consultations to enable women and civil society to participate more fully in the peace-building process, and to help the international community make better use of their potentially constructive influence.⁴⁸

These are positive steps; but a more concerted effort is needed to broadly involve these groups in formal negotiations and decision making. Negotiations must be structured to ensure that civil society and women are meaningfully involved throughout. Donors and the U.N. Mission in Sudan, which oversees CPA implementation, must mandate women's participation in all decision-making structures and highlight and support the parliamentary women's caucus as a model. There needs to be a greater focus on cultivating civil society movements for peace.⁴⁹

Civil society and women stand ready to promote good governance and implement the CPA. They also are prepared to help bring armed actors back to the Darfur talks and ensure negotiators are accountable back home. Cultivating and building on local efforts to push for peace and democracy will increase the likelihood of success. Women and civil society have demonstrated that they are allies for those who want stability and prosperity. Involving them will pay dividends.

⁴⁷ Scroggins Emma. *Emma's War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002)p. 47

⁴⁸ Thorkildsen Fridtjov, 'Sudan at the Crossroads: The Triumph of African-led negotiations? Brokering Peace in Sudan' Presentation at the Fletcher School, 11 March 2004

⁴⁹ Ibid

With the support of the Government of Norway, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and The Initiative for Inclusive Security, a diverse delegation of Sudanese women attended the Oslo donor's conference in April 2005. They established a common agenda and asserted their role in Sudan's post-conflict reconstruction and peace efforts. Women made recommendations that offered concrete proposals for promoting gender equality in all aspects of peace building. They urged donors to reflect strong gender-responsive principles in the allocation of resources for Sudan's recovery and reconstruction. Specific areas requiring immediate attention were access to basic health and social services; support for economic policies to improve women's livelihoods and to ensure food security; removal of gender discrimination in education and training; and confrontation of rampant gender-based violence.

The US Agency for International Development (USAID) recognized the key role women will play in the recovery and reconstruction of Sudan and called for gender to be a primary crosscutting theme in all programs. USAID required 50 percent women be beneficiaries of its Localizing Institutional Capacity in Sudan (LINCS) program (being implemented by Mercy Corps and International Rescue Committee). Besides, the US Government supported the women's caucus in the GOSS through the International Republican Institute (IRI). IRI has helped this nascent caucus organize and begin achieving results. This visionary decision to prioritize women's leadership has enhanced women's capacity to stabilize the country.⁵⁰

Unfortunately, there has been little overall progress toward achieving the Oslo priorities. Again with support from Norway, UNIFEM, and Inclusive Security, a

⁵⁰ Lucian Niemeyer, *Africa: The Holocausts of Rwanda and Sudan* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006) p. 59

delegation of women recently participated in the Sudan Donor's Consortium meeting in Oslo. In reiterating women's priorities it was noted that there has been very little progress in advancing women and girls' literacy, increasing access to capital, reducing maternal mortality, ensuring economic and political empowerment, and protecting women from gender-based violence. Similarly, there is significant scope for improving efforts to better facilitate the repatriation and reintegration of returning women refugees, internally displaced people, and former combatants.⁵¹

2.2 Conclusion

The positive discrimination promised in the CPA is not reflected in resource flows or in the results of peace building and development to date. Many of the critical needs identified in the framework for reconstruction in southern Sudan have not been met. The relevant national ministries lack sufficient resources and influence in decision-making. Women's real access to justice is limited by significant constraints in the judicial sector including the absence of family law reform and adequate criminal law provisions for addressing violence against women; legal reform must be accelerated to bring judicial processes in line with constitutional equality provisions. Women are not given the opportunity to lead and to own peace building and development; they are insufficiently represented on the oversight committees of trust funds and the peace negotiations in Darfur. The following chapter looks at the history of conflict in Sudan by its root causes. The picture since pre colonial times is set up till present and an examination of the

⁵¹ Thorkildsen Fridtjov, 'Sudan at the Crossroads: The Triumph of African-led negotiations? Brokering Peace in Sudan' Presentation at the Fletcher School, 11 March 2004

Machakos process that ended in the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Accords is reviewed.

CHAPTER THREE

PEACE BUILDING IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN: A FOCUS ON THE 2005 CPA AGREEMENT

3.0 Introduction

War in Africa has recently attracted significant attention because the continent seems more prone to conflict than others and because any disruption in security is especially threatening to populations, like those in most of Africa, where people are already living at the margins. It is indeed acknowledged that Africa is no more prone to violent conflicts than other regions. Indeed, Africa's share of the more than 180 million people who died from conflicts and atrocities in the twentieth century is relatively modest. Violent conflicts have exacted a heavy toll on Africa's societies, polities, and economies.⁵²

Sudan, Africa's biggest country, owes its existence as one unit to colonial history. It is divided by religion (70 per cent Muslim, 25 per cent animist, 5 per cent Christian), ethnicity (between African and Arab origin Sudanese), tribe and economic activity (between nomadic and sedentary cultures). This country has been in constant conflict since it became independent 1956.⁵³ For this research to successfully attain its objective of analyzing the contributions of women in peace-building in Sudan, it has to examine the historical trajectory of conflict in the country. This chapter looks at the history of conflict in Sudan by its root causes. The picture since pre colonial times is set up till present. The chapter then examines the process that ended in the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Accords.

⁵² Furley Oliver, *Conflict in Africa* (London: Taurus Publications, 1995) p. 15

⁵³ Arkell Anthony, *A History of the Sudan, From the Earliest Times to 1821* (London: Athlone, 1961) p. 7

3.1 Conflicts in the Sudan

The Loose Ottoman-Egyptian administration collapsed 1880s after national-religious revolt led by self-appointed Islamic Mahdi. Anglo-Egyptian forces captured Khartoum 1898 and established jointly-administered condominium. The British kept north and south separate until 1947 when they were fused with political power given to northern elite ahead of independence in January 1956. Fearing marginalization by the more populous north, southern army officers revolted in 1955, eventually forming Anya-Nya guerrilla movement.⁵⁴

The first civil war, which occurred from 1955 to 1972 between the northern and the southern parts of Sudan, was triggered by the 1955 Torit mutiny of the Southern Defence Force and was heightened by the northern politicians' rejection of federalism. Under the parliamentary system (1956 - 1958), the south was marginalized politically. Under the military rule of General Ibrahim Abbud (1958 - 1964), the religious and ethnic norms that predominate in the north were imposed on the south. For instance, Arabic became the language of government and education, Islam was promoted and Christianity repressed, and increasingly harsh military means were used to quell the revolt.⁵⁵

By then, members of the absorbed AnyaNya forces had engaged in sporadic mutinies, culminating in mutinies in Bor and Pibor in spring 1983. When Numeiri sent troops to crush the mutineers, they fled to the bush, where they were joined by Colonel John Garang de Mabior, head of the army research center in Khartoum. Half a million people died over the 17 years of war, which may be divided into three stages: initial guerrilla war, Anyanya and South Sudan Liberation Movement.

⁵⁴ Patterson Donald, *Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999) p. 59

⁵⁵ Arkell Anthony, *A History of the Sudan, From the Earliest Times to 1821* op. cit., p. 11

Southern troops rebelled against the government in early 1983. Nimeri abrogated the Addis Ababa agreement in June 1983, dissolving the constitutional guarantees of the south and declaring Arabic official language. Islamic Sharia law was announced as sole source for Sudanese law in September 1983. This provoked the Second Sudanese Civil War (sometimes referred to as Anyanya II), although it was largely a continuation of the First Sudanese Civil War.

Like the first civil war, the second civil war began with a mutiny, with a battalion of southern Sudanese soldiers refusing an order to move north in January 1983. By July, a new organization was established, the Southern People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), whose military wing, dominant in the movement as a whole, was the Southern People's Liberation Army (SPLA), commanded by John Garang and with an important base in Mengistu's Ethiopia.⁵⁶

The patronage of Ethiopia (a country that, fighting a secessionist movement in Eritrea, had no desire to set a precedent of secession), combined with the desire to reach out to other groups that were against the Sudanese regime but not necessarily for separation, made the SPLA opt for a program of 'revolution'. The SPLA says it is fighting for a new Sudan, in which the aspirations of the South can be met.⁵⁷

This position, along with other factors, eventually led to a split in the SPLA between the dominant faction seeking federalism for all of Sudan and a movement for outright independence for the South. The central government sought to capitalize on this division, and ended up sponsoring the latter faction to try to weaken the SPLA overall. This resulted in an odd situation: the separatists were being armed and supported by the

⁵⁶ Anderson G. Norman, *Sudan in Crisis: the Failure of Democracy* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999) p. 24

⁵⁷ Burr Millard and Robert Collins, *Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster* (Princeton N.J.: Markus Wiener, 2006) p. 108

very power they sought to separate from, in order to fight the federalists. The government also employed tribal militias and Arab cattle herders as part of their counterinsurgency strategy. The cycle of raid and attack against civilians, reprisal and counter-reprisal, including many excesses by the SPLA, turned the war into a war on the civilian population.⁵⁸

The SPLA had some military successes and managed to capture and control parts of the South. Nimeiri's regime collapsed in 1985 after a popular uprising. Islamist parties emerged from the ensuing elections far stronger, as members of the ruling coalition of Sadiq al-Mahdi's government. The Islamic banks thrived under the new government, expanding their mechanized farming schemes into parts of the South in the mid-1980s, "ultimately drawing new regions into the civil war."⁵⁹ Under the new regime, raiding by northern-sponsored militias against populations of the South became extremely devastating, creating famine. These raids resurrected the institution of slavery as well, with militias capturing people for sale, partly as a means of terrorizing and displacing the population. The SPLA regained the military initiative, however, and sentiment in the Northern military against the unsuccessful war led to the fall of Sadiq al-Mahdi's regime in 1989.

The SPLA returned to the defensive when the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, their most important ally, fell in 1991. 200,000 Sudanese refugees, who had been living on the border in SPLA-protected areas, had to evacuate Ethiopia to Sudan. These refugees, as well as the hundreds of thousands internally displaced by the war, created a crisis not only

⁵⁸ John O. Voll, *Sudan: State and Society in Crisis* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991) p. 96

⁵⁹ Johnson Douglas, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (USA: Indiana University Press, 2003) p. 80

for the SPLA but for the relief agencies of the world. Relief was, and is, used as a weapon of war. It is worth quoting Johnson at length on this issue:

The international relief effort was both ill-coordinated and inadequate and was incapable of confronting the government strategy of splitting the SPLA through manipulating relief... The US government obstructed the relief effort, disputing the UN's figures and proposing to divert relief aid to help stabilize the new Ethiopian government's control over its provinces. The US even floated a proposal that relief to the Sudanese returnees be cut off and all those who could not return to their homes should be required to return to Ethiopia as refugees. The returnees thus became a political football, and the relief effort was seriously undermined. This opened the way for further intervention from Khartoum, which ultimately split the SPLA.⁶⁰

In the 1990s, some of the worst fighting was between the different factions of the 'split SPLA'. The fighting, the war-caused famines, and the politicized relief efforts brought the casualties into the millions. The factions only re-united in 2002: in the meantime, the government had taken advantage of their disunity to seize control of key oilfields in the South.⁶¹

Meanwhile, the Islamic government was beginning to alienate parts of the population of the North, with its repression, its imposition of a particular kind of politicized and self-serving Islam. One example of this was the outlawing of 'apostasy', the repudiation of Islam by a Muslim, punishable by death. But whether or not one has committed an 'act of apostasy' is decided by the government, and the government has applied the law to execute Muslims who are its opponents. The progressive disenfranchisement and harassment of women, as well as those of minority Muslim sects, has also alienated many. In other parts of the country, regional, ethnic, and sectarian conflicts have flared. As the war continues relentlessly, the question arises, what are

⁶⁰ Johnson Douglas, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* op. cit., p. 90

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 126

people fighting for? There are now many more - and more diverse - combatants than there were in 1983, and they are fighting for different immediate objectives.

3.2 Causes of Conflict in Sudan

In a continent of grand dimensions, Sudan is notable for a number of reasons. It is the biggest country in Africa and has endured its longest conflict. It is a wealthy country in terms of available resources. It is endowed with minerals like petroleum, mica, chromites, gypsum, marble, mica, gold and diamonds: these are mostly found in its southern states and western equatorial areas. Sudan's varied climate, which ranges from the wet equatorial south-west to hot and dry in the north can support an array of agriculture like sugar cane, cotton, timber, gum, livestock, peanuts and wheat. Sudan's population of 38'000'000 (as in July 2003) is made up of a number of ethnic groupings like the Bantu, Nilotics and Arabs.⁶² These are all positive attributes to Sudan's development. But, over the last 50 years the Sudan conflict has left almost 4.5 million people either dead, exiled or displaced.

The causes of Sudan conflict are numerous and are rooted in tribal, economic, religious, social and political factors. It is important to point out that these divergent political and socio-economic factors are both vital to, and yet have been detrimental for, Sudan's economic development and political emancipation. Successive Sudanese governments have abused and exploited these factors, turning them from a well-spring of strength into a menace and source of diversion and violence. Given Sudan's diverse ethnic makeup, unless there is strong leadership, determined political will, democratic governance and respect for human rights, there is always bound to be a problem of quarrels and

⁶² Lucian Niemeyer, *Africa: The Holocausts of Rwanda and Sudan* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006) p. 108

discomfort within the country. How such quarrels have developed into a savage civil war and spilled over into neighboring countries is a sad history of misunderstandings and lethal parochialism.⁶³

3.2.1 Ethnicity

Sudan is inhabited by two distinctive groups of people; the Arabs and Arabinised Sudanese predominantly inhabiting the northern part of the country while the southern part is occupied by the black Africans, who are mainly Christian. Like many conflicts in Africa, much of the cause of Sudan's conflict can be traced back to its colonial past. At the advent of the British colonialists, the Arabs were the main political leaders of northern Sudan while the black Africans had their own leaderships in their distinct kingdoms in the south although the northern Arabs were venturing to arabinise and Islamize the south.⁶⁴

Key to Britain's policy for governing Sudan was based on polarizing the Sudanese people, favoring the northern Arabs, giving them positions of authority in the administration. This focused economic and political power in the north. They ignored the southern part and even isolated it in terms of economic and social development. The vast majority of infrastructure developments, which stem from colonial times, such as the 'Gezira' irrigation scheme, the cotton industry and most of the modern railways were all built in the North. Consequently, the preponderance of commercial activity and hence administrative centers, like Khartoum, with their roads, hospitals, schools were concentrated in northern region. In stark contrast the south remained in total poverty. Given the usual pattern of British colonial rulers meshing Anglo culture over a subjugated

⁶³ Johnson Douglas, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* op. cit., p. 92

⁶⁴ Patterson Donald, *Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe* op. cit., p. 67

majority, such as in India, it is a historical curiosity that this norm was somewhat inversed in Sudan.

The south was instead left to Christian missionaries who were supposed to keep these southern people meek and obedient to the northern Arab leaders. This isolated the south not only from the north but also from the rest of the world. Because of this split the Arabic language became the medium of leadership in the north while English and other African indigenous languages were not allowed for communication with the Northern leadership. The south was to be the producers of raw materials. They became the laborers and even slaves for the northerners. Therefore, in terms of development and leadership, the southern remained isolated and neglected and so remained a plunder zone for raw materials and slaves for the north. This polarization was reflected in leadership distribution that even at the time when Sudan gained independence in 1956, the southern Sudanese had a meager share in administrative positions. Out of eight hundred posts, only four junior posts of Assistant District Commissioners and two Mamur were given to the southern people.⁶⁵ Furthermore, it is unequal development, with southern Sudan, the neglected region experienced economic marginalization and social injustice that contributed to the unrest that erupted between the north and the south of Sudan in 1955.”⁶⁶ More so, the north even tried to Islamize and Arabise the south and it was due to this fact, that first sparked conflict, which continues today. The northern leaders in Khartoum have never tried to address this imbalance between regions, and this is indeed the main cause of this conflict.

⁶⁵ Deng D. Akol Ruay, *The Politics of Two Sudans: The South and the North 1821-1969* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994) p. 18

⁶⁶ Cranna M., *The True Cost of Conflict* (London: Earthscan, 1994) p. 50

3.2.2 Resources

The resources in southern Sudan have always been a magnet for the leadership in northern Sudan, to which the southern people have resisted for years. For instance, the first resistance occurred in 1955 when the Anyanya (southern tribe) resisted a Northern raiding party, which had come in search of slaves. The war subsided in 1972 when the then President Nimeiri came to an agreement with Anyanya leaders, such as Joseph Lagu, in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, to grant autonomy to the southern region. But it did not take long before the discovery of oil at Bentiu in southern Sudan destroyed this peace. President Nimeiri rescinded the Addis Ababa agreement because he wanted to exploit oil fields from the Bentiu in southern region to assist him pay an accumulated debt of US \$ 8 billion, which he had incurred on developmental projects in Northern Sudan.⁶⁷

There is an economic logic to the war in Sudan. Combatants seek to control strategic resources, targeting the civilian populations who live in the territories where those resources are found. The populations are displaced by war and massacre, and peculiar forms of 'development' can proceed. In addition, the deployment of paramilitary forces who are used to terrorize civilians contributes to flight and displacement. In Sudan, the use of slave raiding by these paramilitary militias is a particularly atrocious form of terror.⁶⁸

Sudan's oil is a good example. Described in a report by Human Rights Watch, control over oil in the South has become one of the causes of the conflict itself, with Canadian companies like Talisman Energy Inc., as well as Chinese National Petroleum Company, the Malaysian Petronus Carigali Overseas Sdn Bhd, and the Sudanese state oil company getting into Sudan in 1995, followed by the Qatari Gulf Petroleum Corporation and the

⁶⁷ Christian Aid, *The Scorched Earth: Oil and War in Sudan* (London: Christian Aid, 2001) p. 37

⁶⁸ Bechtold Peter, *Politics in the Sudan: Parliamentary and Military Rule in an Emerging African Nation* (New York: Praeger, 1976) p. 45

Swedish Lundin company and the Austrian OMV (Sudan) Exploration GmbH in 1997.

The Netherlands based Trafigura Baheer BV got a contract to sell Sudan's oil internationally in 1999.⁶⁹ Johnson describes the logic of oil exploitation as follows:

It is made possible by clearing the oilfields of their civilian population through the activities of the Sudanese armed forces and... militias... and then securing the areas through the alliance with the ... break-away factions of the SPLA. Once installed, the Sudanese military has used the oil company roads and airfields to attack civilian settlements within a widening security radius.⁷⁰

Disputes over natural resources include ownership and use of arable land, trespassing of animals into agricultural land and use of water sources, and occupying plots of the people forced out by the civil war. The Sudanese civil war was an important factor in the perpetuation of conflict within the entire social structure in Southern Sudan. Other sets of interconnected factors such as trans-boundary cattle rustling should also be taken into consideration when trying to identify types and causes of conflicts in Southern Sudan.

3.2.3 Legal/ Constitutional Disparities

The other factor fanning conflict was religion, specifically Northern Sudan's attempts to impose Sharia law and other aspects of Arabization on the mainly Christian and traditional religious South. Further exacerbating the conflict were moves initiated by the North to grab land from the southerners. This proved highly unpalatable to the Southerners who regarded the mechanized farms that were to be introduced into the South by the northern leaders as colonization by the north. This was again resisted in 1983 and a movement, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army led by Col. John Garang, was born. Its stated goal was self-determination for Southern Sudan. This movement had a lot of objectives. The resistance focused not only on the leadership but also on projects like

⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch, 'Sudan Oil and Human Rights' *Human Rights Watch Report* November 2003

⁷⁰ Johnson Douglas, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* op. cit., p. 163

the Jonglei canal, mechanized farms and oil installations, which were regarded as an encroachment on the land, by the southern faction.⁷¹

3.2.4 Ecological Effects

Drought is an inherent feature of the arid regions of western Sudan, north Darfur and Kordofan. There have been five drought disasters over the last hundred years. Two of these, however, have occurred in the last twenty years alone. In these regions, lying between the isohyets 100 mm and 600 mm, a mere 100 mm decline in the mean annual precipitation could bring people and livestock to the brink of disaster. From a diagram drawn by Suliman and Ahmed, rainfall data covering the period 1950-1990 reveal three major spans of drought, a relatively mild one in the mid-1960s, and two severe droughts in 1972-1974 and 1982-1984. In all three cases the drought was accompanied by the flaring of skirmishes, the worst of which took place in the mid-1980s and assumed the form of a regular armed conflict.⁷² The diagram correlates rainfall data to conflict intensity over a 30 year period (1957-1990). The diagram reveals two interesting patterns: an increase in incidents of conflict with the corresponding decrease in rainfall and a lag between minimum rainfall and maximum conflict intensity of roughly one year, a relaxation period for the impact of the drought to take full effect. The diagram also exposes an anomaly between the impact of the drought of the mid-1970s and that of the mid-1980s. Both are almost equal in intensity; the latter, however, causing far greater social turbulence.

The drought of the 1980s brought famine, displacement and war on a much larger scale than that of the 1970s. Possible explanations of this apparent discrepancy are:

⁷¹ Mohammed Beshir, *The Southern Sudan Background to Conflict* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1970) p. 64

⁷² Suliman Mohamed and Ahmed Osman Omer, 'Civil War in the Sudan, From Ethnic to Ecological Conflict' *The Ecologist* vol. 23, no. 3, 1994 pp. 104-109

- In the 1970s agricultural food production of the Sudan was geared towards the internal market. In the 1980s it was geared towards export;
- During the 1970s regional food and other reserves mitigated the impact of the drought, the 1980s found these reserves depleted;
- In the 1970s the local traditional administration was still functioning and supportive. In the 1980s it was abolished by central government; and,
- In the 1970s there was no large-scale warfare in the Sudan or neighbouring countries. By the 1980s there was civil war in the Sudan and the Chadian-Libyan conflict was raging.

This vindicates the plausible assumption, that, by itself, environmental degradation can rarely precipitate an armed conflict and only in combination with other economic and social factors does it function as cause of violence.⁷³

3.2.5 Humanitarian Aid

Johnson points out the politics of relief as an issue as well. The displaced populations, removed by force from their lands and their means of earning income or producing food, are totally dependent on external aid for their survival. They are used as a blackmail or bargaining chip, and relief agencies are unable to respond adequately to this problem.⁷⁴

Humanitarian operations find themselves in a position of unprecedented involvement in civil wars and internal conflict. Modern conflicts, including the one in Sudan, are largely internal and are characterized by an overall tendency toward increased brutality. No one is spared as warring groups violate some of the most austere laws of war by targeting civilian populations. Inevitably, the poorest and most vulnerable members of society, namely the sick, elderly, women, and children, fall victim to the onslaught. A fundamental aspiration of all humanitarian organizations is the alleviation of human suffering. In such situations, the capacity for humanitarian aid to 'do good' by saving lives is undeniable. However, there is a darker side to humanitarian assistance, for the same aid intended to alleviate

⁷³ UNEP, 'Sudan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment' June 2007 available online at <http://www.postconflict.unep.ch/publications.php?prog=sudan>

⁷⁴ Johnson Douglas, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* op. cit., p. 163

suffering caused by conflict has the capacity to exacerbate and prolong conflict, further compromising the safety of those individuals to whom they aim to deliver assistance. Relief agencies, long beholden to the principle of neutrality, along with impartiality and independence, have been confronted with the idea that, although well intended, aid can often have a non-neutral effect on war.

3.3 Conflict Management in Sudan

As indicated earlier, conflict has persisted in Sudan since colonial times. Conflict management in Sudan is also as old as conflict itself in the country. Many approaches have been used to this end. They include negotiations, mediation, treaty-making among others. This section examines the issues that were prevalent in different conflicts in Sudan and the conflict management mechanisms that were used to address them.

Ever since its independence in 1956, Sudan has known peace for only eleven years, 1972 - 1983 following the peace accord signed in Addis Ababa between the North and the South. Other conflicts like those in the West of the country are worsening the situation. Conflict management requires a holistic approach that addresses all the causes of conflict.

Since its inception in 1956, the Sudanese State has always been a Jellaba state and so government troops have always been fighting the Jellaba wars by proxy. It is also interesting to note that earlier attempts at conflict resolution in the South and West have almost entirely been focusing on the sharing of political power, the issue most relevant to the power elite on both sides of the conflict divide.⁷⁵

Given the opposition of the Sudanese people to the council, the British Governor of Sudan was forced to seek approval from his government in Britain to discuss the future of

⁷⁵ Deng D. Akol Ruay, *The Politics of Two Sudans: The South and the North 1821-1969* op. cit., p. 71

Sudan as a united country comprising of North and Southern Sudan. A conference which included northerners and southerners was convened in Juba in 1947 (The Juba conference). The conference recommended that a legislative council should be formed with members drawn from the North and the South. It was also agreed that a plan for economic, administrative and educational development should be initiated in the South Sudan to enable the region to match the North. In May 1952 the Northern political powers presented a proposal to the colonial authorities demanding for independence. The colonial government convened the Cairo conference to discuss the proposal. The conference was attended exclusively by the Northern powers and adopted the 1952 agreement granting independence to Sudan as one country. However, out of the 800 administrative posts vacated by the British in 1953, the Northern politicians allotted a mere four posts to the southerners.⁷⁶

Following the independence a special commission was established to draft the constitution. The commission comprised of 43 members but only three were from the South. It was not surprising therefore that the Commission voted against federalism and this led to the formation of Anyanya I in 1963.

In 1965 a round table conference was convened between the northerners and the southerners. Monitors from the African and Arab countries also attended. The two parties failed to reach any conclusive understanding but agreed to form a joint commission of 12 members to draw the basis on which a comprehensive and complete understanding could be reached. Although the joint commission examined southern grievances, the ruling northern political parties still sought to establish an Islamic state, which was anathema to southerners and northern secularists. Only after Muhammad Jafar Nimeiri seized power in

⁷⁶ Gurdon Charles, *Sudan at the Crossroads* (London: Menas, 1984) p. 30

May 1969 was an effort made to recognize the inherent ethnic and religious diversity in Sudan and negotiate with the Anya-Nya rebels.⁷⁷

General Abboud seized power Khartoum 1958 instituting policy of Islamisation but was forced out of power by popular uprising in 1964. Arab-dominated governments succeeded each other until the coup of General Nimeiri in 1969. Following failed coup attempt by Communists in 1971 which left Nimeiri isolated politically, he began to seek peace with neighboring countries (Ethiopia and Uganda) and southern rebels. This resulted into the Addis Ababa peace agreement which he signed with Anya-Nya in March 1972, allowing for Anya-Nya integration into national army and autonomy for the south.⁷⁸

The Addis Ababa Accord of 27 February 1972, which ended the first war, was implemented through the Regional Self-Government Act for the Southern Provinces (promulgated on 3 March 1972) and incorporated into the permanent constitution of 1973. Sharing political power in the Addis Ababa Accord for example had left the economic status quo in tact, a state of affairs most welcome to its beneficiaries. The three southern provinces became one large region with its own regional assembly and High Executive Council (HEC). The south gained considerable autonomy in the social and economic fields. Religious discrimination was prohibited, and English was recognized as the principal language in the south because it had been the common language used in schools. Efforts were made to reintegrate the refugees who had fled the country during the seventeen years of fighting and to absorb the Anya-Nya into the regular armed forces.

Despite constitutional safeguards against altering provisions of the Addis Ababa Accord, Nimeiri interfered continually in the implementation of the accord. At times, he

⁷⁷ Deng D. Akol Ruay, *The Politics of Two Sudans: The South and the North 1821-1969* op. cit., p. 79

⁷⁸ Bechtold Peter, *Politics in the Sudan: Parliamentary and Military Rule in an Emerging African Nation* op. cit., p. 45

dissolved the regional assembly, dismissed the HEC, and tried to prevent potential oil revenue from accruing to the south. Finally, he decreed on 5 June 1983 the redivision of the south into its three original provinces. That illegal action completed the dismemberment of the accord.⁷⁹

By midsummer 1983 Garang had molded the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) into a militant force that supported the continued unity of Sudan. However, the SPLM required proportional sharing of power among the various peoples and regions; special attention to the socioeconomic needs of the deprived east, west, and south; and non-domination by any one religious or racial group over the others.⁸⁰

The SPLM gained support as Nimeiri's policies led to economic ruin and his institution of Islamic law in September 1983 alienated a wide array of citizens. Nimeiri's overthrow in April 1985 did not, however, end the rebellion. The transitional government (April 1985 to April 1986) and the elected government under Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi (May 1986 through June 1989) failed to respond to the underlying demands of the SPLM and SPLA. The governments sought to modify, rather than annul, Islamic laws, and they treated the SPLM merely as a southern movement. Nonetheless, in spring 1989 the high command of the armed forces compelled the politicians to negotiate an accord with the SPLM that involved canceling Islamic laws until a constitutional conference could resolve the issue of the legal basis of rule. By then, the SPLA controlled nearly 90 percent of the countryside in the south and had made inroads into areas in the north. Fighting had

⁷⁹ Anderson G. Norman, *Sudan in Crisis: the Failure of Democracy* op. cit., p. 25

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 26

spread into the Nuba Mountains and the southern Blue Nile Province, where the Inges-sana people held economic and political grievances against their Arab overlords.⁸¹

During the four years of democratic government (1985- 89) many peace bridges were built. These included the Kokudan Declaration of March 1986 in Ethiopia between SPLA/M and the Democratic Alliance for Political Parties and Trade Unions, the Umma Party initiative of June 1986, the African Parties of Sudan initiative of September 1987, the Sudanese Church Leaders initiative of December 1987, the Harare talks of March 1988 between SPLA/M and some Government delegation and the El Magarn / Garang in November 1988 among others.

However, all the above attempts came to naught following the coup of 30th June 1989 - the coup's leaders rejected the agreement to hold the constitutional conference and insisted that Islamic laws be retained. A comprehensive Islamic legal system was instituted in the north and the south was fragmented into ten provinces. After the coup, the SPLM aligned with the exiled opposition National Democratic Alliance in March 1990 and gained the support of the ousted high command of the armed forces in September 1990. The SPLM became the most militarily active element in the nationalist opposition to the Islamist military government. By 1991 the SPLA controlled nearly all the south. However, the fall of Mengistu's government in Ethiopia, which had provided essential support for the SPLA, deepened internal tensions inside the SPLA. Commanders in Upper Nile defected in August 1991, thereby enabling the armed forces to recapture many garrisons and to put the SPLA on the defensive.

⁸¹ African Rights, *Facing the Genocide: The Nuba of the Sudan* (London: African Rights Publication, 1995) pp. 42-43

Prospects for a negotiated solution seemed to vanish. At negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria, in 1992 and 1993, the SPLM proposed establishing a confederal system, just short of secession, but the government responded that "secession will come at the barrel of the gun"⁸² The Organization of African Unity's East African Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) initiated negotiations in 1994. IGADD called for the formation of a secular state in Sudan; absent a secular, democratic system, the south should have the right to secede.⁸³ This position pleased the SPLM but infuriated the government in Khartoum. Only in 1997 did the government allow the issue of self-determination to be an agenda item in the negotiations. Soon after, Khartoum's incentive to negotiate diminished. The export of oil from Upper Nile, which began in August 1999, enabled the government to double its arms purchases within two years and establish military industries. The expulsion of the indigenous (largely Nuer) population from the oil fields area accelerated in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This deepened the already severe humanitarian crisis on the south.

After 11 September 2001, the government began to respond to U.S. pressure to negotiate. It reengaged in negotiations (the African body having been renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development - IGAD) and signed a potentially breakthrough accord with the SPLM at Machakos (Kenya) in July 2002. This accord called for the formation of a confederation between the north and south that would last for a transitional six years. Negotiations between 2002 and 2003 over the specifics of power and resource sharing and the relation of religion to the state remained acrimonious and it

⁸² Steven Wöndu and Ann Lesch, *Battle for Peace in Sudan : An Analysis of the Abuja Conferences, 1992-1993* (New York: University Press of America, 1999) p. 51

⁸³ Thorkildsen Fridtjov, 'Sudan at the Crossroads: The Triumph of African-led negotiations? Brokering Peace in Sudan' Presentation at the Fletcher School, 11 March 2004

remained uncertain whether a fundamental accord was possible. The future status of the other marginalized areas also remained uncertain.⁸⁴

The two civil wars sought to deal with the underlying problem of Sudan - how to build unity in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. The first war proposed regionalism as the means to give each community a degree of autonomy; the second war proposed restructuring power in the center so that regional autonomy could be secure. Sudanese politicians still grapple with that fundamental problem.

In July –August 2003, the Sudan Government officials and Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement held meetings under the mediation auspices of the Kenyan government on power sharing, resource distribution and restructuring the army. But, progress has been frustratingly sporadic, Khartoum seems to be holding on to power and the Southern rebels seem to be holding onto their wealth, and the war rages on despite the ceasefire agreement. This indicates a lack of good faith in their negotiations. International law dictates that for successful mediation to occur, there is a need for genuine good faith, trust and consent between warring factions. The principle of good faith should be invoked for the conflicting parties to reach amicable settlement. Trust and confidence should be built between the two parties to settle their differences. But, in the case of Khartoum-SPLA peace talks, there seems to be no good faith and trust, and that is why peace settlement of the problem is eluding them.⁸⁵

International law requires that the conflicting parties have to agree on the mediators and they should have trust in them. But if there is no trust, then the negotiations and

⁸⁴ Kwanje S., 'The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha' in Makumi Mwangi (ed) *Regional Security Issues in the Age of Globalization* (Nairobi: CLARION, 2006) p. 3

⁸⁵ International Crisis Group, 'The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan's Uncertain Peace' Africa Report N°96 25, July 2005

mediations are bound to fail. In case of the Sudanese conflict, the Inter Government Authority of East Africa has been mediating between the conflicting parties. Unfortunately, the Khartoum regime particularly distrusts two of the states – Uganda and Ethiopia, which it alleges to be supporting the SPLM/A. Given this clear lack of trust, and that most of the East African members have been accused in one way or another to be supporting SPLM/A, some commentators have suggested that mediators outside the region may be best qualified to facilitate a settlement. However, it is worth noting that negotiations are geared towards a political resolution of conflict while law ends in settlement of disputes.

Though regional mediation efforts have not yielded tangible results, they have at least achieved numerous cease-fires, which usually give breathing space for the southern Sudanese. It is noted that during these ceasefires, crops can be cultivated, NGOs can operate and even some degree of normalcy can prevail; but these are only small spells of sanity, which cannot sustain lasting economic development for the south.

3.4 The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), commonly known as the Naivasha Agreement, was a set of agreements that were signed between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Government of Sudan.⁸⁶ The peace process that culminated into the CPA was encouraged by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as IGAD-Partners, a consortium of donor countries.

The set of agreements included the Protocol of Machakos: Signed in Machakos, Kenya, on 20 July 2002. Agreement on broad principles of government and governance;

⁸⁶ International Crisis Group, 'Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead' Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006

the Protocol on security arrangements: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 25 September 2003; the Protocol on wealth-sharing: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 7 January 2004; the Protocol on Power-sharing: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004; the Protocol on the resolution of conflict in southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile States: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004; the Protocol on the resolution of conflict in Abyei: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004 and the Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities During the Pre-Interim and Interim Periods: Signed in Naivasha on 31 December 2004.⁸⁷

The final agreement tying together and setting in motion all the protocols, implementation modalities and ceasefire was signed on 9 January 2005. This Naivasha Agreement was meant to end the Second Sudanese Civil War, develop democratic governance countrywide and share power and oil revenues. It further set a timetable by which Southern Sudan would have a referendum on its independence.

On 11 October 2007, the SPLM withdrew from the government of national unity (GoNU), accusing the central government of violating the terms of the CPA. In particular, the SPLM states that the Khartoum-based government, which is dominated by the National Congress Party, failed to withdraw over 15,000 troops from southern oilfields and failed to implement the Protocol on Abyei. The SPLM stated that it was not returning to war, while analysts noted that the agreement had been disintegrating for some time, notably because of international focus on the conflict in nearby Darfur.

The SPLM announced that it was rejoining the government on 13 December 2007, following an agreement. The agreement states that the seat of government will rotate

⁸⁷ Kwaje S., 'The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha' in Makumi Mwangiri (ed) *Regional Security Issues in the Age of Globalization* op. cit., p. 5

between Juba and Khartoum every three months, though it appears that this will be largely symbolic, as well as funding for a census (vital for the referendum) and a timetable for the withdrawal of troops across the border. Northern Sudanese troops finally left Southern Sudan on 8 January 2008.⁸⁸

3.5 Conclusion

Despite the many conflict management efforts that have been put in place for all the conflicts described in the history of Sudan, the success of attaining peace has proved futile. Currently, the numerous agreements under the comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 are the ones maintaining the delicate balance between peace and conflict in the country. This dissertation seeks to enhance the achievement of this accord by analyzing the place of women during its formation. The next chapter looks in to the various ways in which women contributed to the decision-making process of the CPA during the Machakos and Naivasha Peace talks.

⁸⁸ 'The Naivasha Agreement' *Wikipedia Encyclopedia* also available online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naivasha_Agreement

CHAPTER FOUR

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN PEACE BUILDING IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

4.0 Introduction

At the Machakos and Naivasha negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) it was assumed by the mediators that resolving the Sudanese conflict meant sharing power and resources between conflicting parties along regional or geographical divides. This approach neglected other constituencies and the fact that a just and sustainable peace, based on good governance, equity, justice and democracy, requires an environment where every citizen has the opportunity to contribute to decision-making and development.⁸⁹ In particular, Sudanese women play a very central role in their society, in physical and psychological welfare as well as conflict prevention and peace building. It is therefore important that women are not just seen as passive victims, or as representatives of political parties, or as having no political affiliation or perspective, but that they are encouraged to participate fully and see their perspectives taken seriously and incorporated into solutions to political conflicts.

4.1 Women & Peace Building in the Sudan

The issue of engendering the peace process in the Sudan emerged from the Nairobi Forward looking strategies for the advancement of women to the year 2000, following the Mexico discussion in 1975. The Beijing (1995) International Platforms & Beijing+5 put great support for action to be implemented in regard to gender studies and the ideals of

⁸⁹ Carla Kopell, *Assessing Prospects for Peace in the Sudan* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004) p. 13

equality, democracy and peace. Accordingly, many women groups in the Sudan are started to involve in peace building at both sides of the conflict: The Sudanese Women Union (SWU), New Sudan Women Federation (NSWF), SPLA women's movement, Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), Babiker Badri Scientific Association for Women Studies (BBSAWS), Sudan National Committee on Traditional Practices (SNCTP), Sudan Women's Voice for Peace (SWVP), Women Action Group (WAG), Sudanese Women Association in Nairobi (SWAN), Nuba Women Peace Group, Mandi Group and the Nuba Relief Rehabilitation and Development Society (NRRDS). In fact, many individual organizations and group organizations from the above mentioned put great efforts in raising various initiatives and training in the issue of peace building.⁹⁰

4.2 The Contribution of Women into the CPA decision-making Process

The roles that women play as supporters of fighting forces and peacemakers qualify them to sit at the negotiating table and to assume an active role in implementation. In fact, women kept constant check during the Machakos and Naivasha talks to ensure that talks did not stall. Seven women participated in the negotiations in Naivasha that ultimately culminated in the CPA. Women were the inspiration behind the series of agreements that led to the CPA.⁹¹

In the more than 40 years of war that plagued the country since independence in 1956, more than two million lives were lost due to violence and associated causes, and

⁹⁰ Amna Rahma, 'Women & Peace Making in Sudan; Roles and Vision of Sudanese Women', paper to Hague appeal for peace conference, 11th –15th May 2001 (unpublished paper)

⁹¹Kwanje S., 'The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha' in Makumi Mwangiri (ed) *Regional Security Issues in the Age of Globalization* (Nairobi: CLARION, 2006) p. 3

over four million – the majority women with their children – were internally displaced.⁹² Although Sudan is divided by conflicts between its centre in Khartoum and its peripheral regions, many key women leaders and women's organizations play important roles, both formal and informal, in the several peace processes and have consistently transcended conflict lines across the country.⁹³

Some of the most notable include: Rebecca Garang, the minister for transport and roads in the Government of Southern Sudan; Dr Anne Itto, the minister of state (agriculture) in the Government of National Unity and Mary Kiden, the minister for gender, social welfare & religious affairs; Awut Deng Achuil, who participated in the SPLM delegation at the IGAD peace negotiations and is now adviser on gender and human rights to Vice President Salva Kiir; Agnes Lukudu, adviser on development in the Government of Southern Sudan; and Sidiga Washi, the dean of family sciences at Afhad University for Women. Organizations such as the Sudanese Women Empowerment for Peace were very active.⁹⁴

These leaders worked with the international community to advance the argument that increased participation of women in all aspects of the peace process is critical if the country is to be stabilized. There have been some successes. For example, UNSCR 1590, which established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), contained groundbreaking language consistent with UNSCR 1325. Women also participated, albeit in a limited way, in the April 2005 Oslo Donors Conference.

⁹² Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (eds), *Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace-Building* Vol. 1 (New York: UNIFEM, 2002) p. 86

⁹³ Alex De Waal and Yoanes Ajamin (eds.), *When Peace Comes: Civil Society and Development in Sudan*, Justice Africa (Lawrenceville and Asmara, 2002), p. xiv

⁹⁴ There are two women ministers in the 22-member Government of Southern Sudan cabinet, and two of seven presidential advisers are also women. Profiles of women peace builders in Sudan can be found at Inclusive Security's webpage, http://www.womenwagingpeace.net/content/conflict_areas/sudan.asp

4.2.1 Training and Capacity building

SPLA/M trained their women with the aim of creating a critical mass of women capable of influencing policies and decisions. This was imperative because the SPLM/A leadership nominated a handful of women leaders as members of the delegation to Machakos and subsequent rounds of negotiations at short notice with very little opportunity to consult with each other and develop a women's peace agenda. Such trainings were therefore the sole providers of concrete thought on the advancement of gender sensitive policies in the peace processes.

Despite the considerable degree of instability owing to the armed conflict, the rebel movement also developed intellectual mainstream and vocational enterprises through collaborative research and training workshops. International organizations helped the movement stay abreast of intellectual currents by coordinating seminars on post-conflict needs.⁹⁵ One example, as noted in chapter three, is the training practicum sponsored by the World Bank to prime a number of apprentices from southern Sudan in planning and budgetary issues.

The Joint Assessment Mission retreat (6-9 September 2004) was designed to provide technical trainings with the aim of developing joint (joint UN and WB, but also joint North and South) cluster work plans and timelines for the completion of the cluster assessments. The JAM retreat also built largely on work and agreements reached during the preceding week's joint PES workshop (1-5 September), where the GoS and SPLM agreed on a shared vision and strategic objectives that would be developed into a full strategy for a new Government.

⁹⁵ Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (eds), *Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace-Building* Vol. 1 (New York: UNIFEM, 2002) p. 86

4.2.2 Technical Papers to Machakos and Naivasha

A number of women organizations helped develop papers that addressed particular issues to be discussed in the peace talks. Some of these papers formed the basis for the Machakos and Naivasha Protocols. For instance, the Sudanese Women's Civil Society Network for Peace (SWCSNP) and the Secretariat of Women Solidarity Group issued a position paper which unequivocally proclaimed women's entitlement to active participation in subsequent rounds of all peace negotiations.⁹⁶ The Southern Women's Group for Peace also issued a position paper on the protocol noting that 'the negotiation process should include professionals, technicians, and women.

On the other hand, Women Waging Peace prepared a more comprehensive discussion paper on women and civil society's perspectives on the Sudanese peace process which it availed to relevant stakeholders.⁹⁷

4.2.3 Advocacy and Peace Demonstrations

In order to effectively address social, economic and general problems of war facing women, many women organized themselves into groups, networks and NGOs on both sides of the political divide. These activist networks (including the Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace, New Sudan Women's Federation, and New Sudan Women's Association) went all over the world advocating peace and drawing attention to what was then referred to as 'the forgotten war.' In Washington DC, the UN Headquarters in New York, the Hague and Beijing, women lobbied the international community to pressure Sudan's warring parties to end the war.

⁹⁶ Mohamed Awad Osman, *Transition from War to Peace* (Geneva: University of Peace, 2003) p. 13

⁹⁷ Women Waging Peace, 'Peace in Sudan: Women Making the Difference' available online at <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/Sudan%20Recommendations%20final3.pdf>

The Initiative for Inclusive Security convened a group of influential women in Khartoum, with the hope of amplifying their voices and building momentum for peace. From November 8 through 12, the organization convened some of Sudan's most distinguished women leaders both from the North and the South. Together, they created an agenda to ensure that women are fully included in institution of the CPA. These women leaders presented their agenda and began advocating for their recommendations at a formal dinner on the evening of November 12 in Khartoum. Their audience included policy makers, the United Nations, the United States government, and other donor countries.⁹⁸

When the Government of Sudan prevented women from boarding a plane to take them to the Naivasha talks in Kenya, the NGO Women Waging Peace facilitated women from the South and the North to formally protest their exclusion from the peace process.⁹⁹ Such peaceful demonstrations bring to public the grievances of the demonstrators and sometimes, they are addressed.

In addition, Women Waging Peace convened 16 Sudanese women from across every region, religion and ethnicity. Together they developed concrete recommendations for ensuring that the peace that was being negotiated is sustainable.¹⁰⁰ These recommendations were availed to relevant stakeholders.

Advocacy on issues of peace building was also undertaken by a national coalition of women from outside and inside government. These included members of parliament, employees in ministries, and representatives of non-governmental organizations in the

⁹⁸ Carla Kopell, *Assessing Prospects for Peace in the Sudan* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004) p. 7

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8

¹⁰⁰ Women Waging Peace, 'Peace in Sudan: Women Making the Difference' available online at <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/Sudan%20Recommendations%20final3.pdf>

fields of education, health, women's rights and democracy promotion. Having people from different sectors, the advocacy component of this coalition was very effective.

4.2.4 Civic Education

Women's organizations carried out civic education with the aim of reaching the women on the ground, in general, and women aspiring for nominal or electoral position in particular, to be informed about the content of the Protocol and to be empowered to take part in the development of the following protocols.

In addition, USAID supported a local women's organization to conduct public forums in the Misseriya areas of Southern Kordofan in 2004. Thousands of people gathered for 20 dialogue sessions held in town centers and at outdoor markets. The organization brought copies of the Machakos protocol to the forums and initiated discussions on the provisions that aim to protect the pastoralists' right to continue grazing livestock along traditional migratory routes that cross into Southern Sudan. In addition, pamphlets on the national census and elections – two key markers in the peace process – were distributed.¹⁰¹

Prior to convening the forums, members of the organization took part in a training course to learn facilitation techniques and hone their understanding of the protocol designed to safeguard the rights and livelihoods of border groups like the Misseriya. The first two sessions were held in the railway town of Babanusa and reached more than 500 people, including laborers, nomads, government authorities, university professors and students, and passersby. Feedback on the sessions indicated that residents want to understand the Protocol so that they can pressure authorities to fulfill their obligations and

¹⁰¹ Carla Kopell, *Assessing Prospects for Peace in the Sudan* op. Cit., p. 7

influence the provisions of the subsequent protocols. Following one of the forums, a group of citizens from the towns of Muglad and Al Fula went to the state capital to urge the government to include their interests in the Naivasha Protocol.

4.2.5 Political Activism

Women and girls formed a significant contingent of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and other armed groups (OAGs) during the first and second Sudanese civil wars (1956–2005). Some fought on the front lines, while others travelled with the armed groups, carrying ammunition and food, and providing sexual services and medical support. Their roles were complex and multifaceted, and while some women served willingly, others were forced into supportive activities against their will. Still others saw their association with male soldiers as the only viable means of livelihood in a country bereft of economic opportunities. Today, the contributions and activities of South Sudanese female combatants and women associated with armed forces and groups (WAAFG) remain largely unrecognized and undocumented.¹⁰²

Their post-conflict status is among the lowest of all groups in South Sudan, regardless of ethnic or tribal background. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 neither identifies them as a specific group entitled to consideration, nor provides any special compensation for their many sacrifices.

With the deterioration, after 1991, of the rebellion into a bloody tribal war where southerners fought against one another, many women's commitment to the conflict waned. At the same time, there was an increase in diaspora attempts at advocating for peace,

¹⁰² World Bank and UNDP, *Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication* (Nairobi and Khartoum: Sudan Joint Assessment Mission, 2005) p. 54

which adopted different tactics to call for an end to the ethnic violence. The reality is that women and girls have never enjoyed equal status in South Sudanese culture. This is clearly reflected in the post-CPA period in the lack of provision for them in the DDR process.¹⁰³

Thousands of women had joined the southern liberation struggle in response to a political situation that affected whole communities, leaving the comfort and security of their homes not just to accompany their husbands but to fight for freedom, democracy, equity, justice, rights and dignity. Their roles in the conflict ranged from combatants to providers of support to fighters, including feeding and caring for sick and wounded soldiers. Although in any armed conflict women are victims of violence, bombing, landmines, hunger and diseases, it is not correct to portray them simply as innocent victims.¹⁰⁴

The Naivasha process, so near completion, was sidelined and according to some analysts placed at great risk in particular due to the evidence of a Government troop build-up in the south. This called for a quick response from the neutral actors to calm down the tensions. Before this was done though, women in the SPLA/M acted to quell the anxiety and prevent the escalation of conflict in the South. This included women like Rebecca Okwaci, Omar Mariam Abdalla and Keziah Layinwa among others. They sought to have a dialogue between the leaders from the conflicting parties, in this case, the government and the SPLA/M to iron out the trigger causes of conflict.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Fitzgerald, Mary Anne, *Throwing the Stick Forward: The Impact of War on Southern Sudanese Women* (Nairobi: UNIFEM/UNICEF, 2002)

¹⁰⁴ Mohamed Awad Osman, *Transition from War to Peace* (Geneva: University of Peace, 2003) p. 6

¹⁰⁵ Natalie Zanzucchi, *Sudanese Women Peace-Makers* (California: University of San Diego, 2008) p. 2

4.2.6 Financial and Moral Support

Sudanese women have long been active in civil society. Becoming increasingly aware of their political importance, partly through exposure to global peace activities and women's rights movements, they began to organize through NGO and civil society organizations, which they consolidated into networks since the 1980s. Despite repression from the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), these were important in maintaining a social fabric that was under tremendous stress because of conflict, especially among refugees and IDPs. The work frequently included offering the most basic support – sharing food or helping to care for the children of southern IDP women who are routinely arrested and imprisoned, sometimes for long periods, for traditional income-generating activities such as beer brewing which are illegal in the North. Nevertheless, women have increasingly learned to participate in public and political processes, and some have emerged as leaders capable of making effective contributions in post-conflict reconstruction and to peace building goals.

In Khartoum, women contributed gold in support of the *jihad* and encouraged their sons to join up, while in the south, the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile women contributed food and encouraged their sons to join the SPLA to fight marginalization and oppression by the government in Khartoum.¹⁰⁶

On the other hand, Sudanese women have worked very hard to keep families and communities together during conflicts through singing peace songs, persuading their husbands, sons and brothers to stop fighting, risking dangerous peace missions across enemy territories, or marrying across enemy lines to unite or reconcile warring

¹⁰⁶ Thorkildsen Fridtjov, 'Sudan at the Crossroads: The Triumph of African-led negotiations? Brokering Peace in Sudan' Presentation at the Fletcher School, 11 March 2004

communities. There were times when women stopped conflict from escalating by defying or opposing decisions by male members of the community to go to war. In one case women from a community in southern Sudan were reported to have threatened not to comply with their conjugal obligations until their husbands stopped killing each other, while in some areas of the south women threatened to expose their nakedness (a curse in most Sudanese customary beliefs) to protest ethnic conflict.¹⁰⁷

4.2.7 International and National Forums for Dialogue

Women have also taken a leading role in creating links and forums for resolving inter-ethnic conflict, leading to many grassroots peace accords. Women organized themselves into networks, and non-governmental organizations on both sides of the political divide. They organized and participated in many national and international conferences, such as the Oslo Donor's Forum to highlight the urgency for peace. During the CPA process, women engaged in dialogue and worked on reconciliation among the leaders.¹⁰⁸

Examples include the people-to-people processes, such as the Wunlit Covenant between the Nuer and the Dinka and the Lilir Covenant between Nuer groups. It has been reported that when it was decided by Dinka elders that a peace delegation was to be sent to Nuer land, no one wanted to go; it was the brave wife of a Dinka chief who demanded that her husband lead his people to Nuer land, even though she was aware of the high risk involved. Another example where women stood together in solidarity against their

¹⁰⁷ International Crisis Group, 'The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan's Uncertain Peace' Africa Report N°96 25, July 2005

¹⁰⁸ Natalie Zanzucchi, *Sudanese Women Peace-Makers* op. Cit., p. 2

husband's political position was the period following the split in the SPLM/A. Women from both sides of the split continued to visit one another, maintain communication and provide a forum to discuss issues that affected their communities, something no man was capable of.

4.3 Links between the CPA and Women's Role in the Negotiating Process

Despite the active role women played at various levels to bring peace to the Sudan their role has tended to be underestimated or ignored during negotiations. This may have originated from the misconception that women are passive victims of war, forgetting the very important role they have played in negotiating, keeping and building peace in their communities.

The most disappointing aspect of the 2005 *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* (CPA) and 2006 *Darfur Peace Agreement* (DPA) was that negotiations for an equitable share of power and resources were premised around political forces and regional interests. Neither mediators nor drafters gave much thought to other constituencies or dimensions, such as gender, along which power and wealth could be shared.¹⁰⁹

Yet conflict in Sudan is not just a matter of political rivalry but is triggered by many forms of marginalization. The late Dr John Garang, the SPLM/A leader and briefly the First Vice-President of Sudan and President of Government of Southern Sudan, publicly recognized women as the 'marginalized of the marginalized.' Long before the negotiations, he used affirmative action (quotas and training) aimed at creating a critical mass of women capable of influencing policies and decisions.

¹⁰⁹ Richard Garfield, *Violence and Victimization in South Sudan* (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2007) p. 18

The SPLM/A leadership nominated a handful of women leaders as members of the delegation to Machakos and subsequent rounds of negotiations. However, this did not necessarily enable their strong participation: the women were often co-opted to these delegations at short notice with very little opportunity to consult with each other and develop a women's peace agenda; they were expected to contribute to the overall party position which was gender-blind to begin with; and they were always a minority, ill-prepared for debates with seasoned politicians who ridiculed or intimidated anyone who dared to spend much time on gender issues.¹¹⁰

For example, during the negotiations, SPLM/A women proposed a minimum quota of 25 per cent for the representation of women in the civil service, legislative and executive at all levels of government, as provided for by the SPLM/A constitution. One senior male member of the SPLM/A delegation laughed and asked where the women would be found to fill these positions. The twenty-five per cent quota was eventually accepted in the larger group, where there were at least three women, but then the all-male SPLM/A drafting committee reduced this figure to five per cent. The SPLM/A Chairman raised this to ten per cent as a compromise. Later on it was learned that it had been dropped altogether when government negotiators refused a quota for women in power sharing on the grounds that they had not been fighting women.

There are articles in the final agreement that recognize customs, traditions and religion as sources of moral strength for the Sudanese people; personal and family matters including marriage, divorce, inheritance and succession fall under the competency of

¹¹⁰ Natalie Zanzucchi, *Sudanese Women Peace-Makers* op. Cit., p. 2

customary law. Yet some customs and traditions have contributed to the marginalization of women.¹¹¹

Even when women were consulted about gender issues or directly included in the peace negotiations, it was only a gesture to showcase democracy and inclusiveness: their perspectives and their experiences in peace building and negotiation were not recognized or fully utilized.

The SPLM/A women's realization that the CPA did not require any party to achieve gender-related targets prompted them to share their experiences with Darfurian women during the Abuja negotiations. They said how they had been shocked that the CPA - apart from making provision for a bill of rights - left women to the mercy of governments and political parties. The Darfurian women took these experiences seriously and with support from UNIFEM and other organizations (who realized they had not done enough to support the SPLM/A women), quickly started to lay down the strategy for influencing the peace process and the final document. They lobbied to be involved and the result is over seventy sections in the agreement referring to women, including the recognition of gender-based violence and the recommendation that women be involved in drafting legislation.¹¹²

However, like the CPA, the DPA now relies largely on men for its implementation due to the constraints facing women alluded to earlier, and the likelihood that the DPA will be fully implemented appears very slim. Given the insensitivity of many Sudanese - particularly men - towards gender issues, it will be hard work for Darfurian women to get the government in Darfur to commit to such important initiatives as gender-sensitive police training. A lack of commitment to implementing the provisions of an agreement can render

¹¹¹ Ali A.A.G. and I. Elbadawi, *Prospects for Sustainable Peace and Post-Conflict Economic Growth in the Sudan* (Washington: World Bank, 2002) p. 31

¹¹² Richard Garfield, *Violence and Victimization in South Sudan* op. Cit., p. 21

even a good agreement useless, so the full participation of women in the implementation of CPA, DPA and the recent *Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement* is essential. This can be achieved through the effective dissemination of the agreements and the Interim National Constitution and through building women's capacity to organize themselves to negotiate, lobby and advocate for their rights and interests.¹¹³

Even though many individual Sudanese men resist gender mainstreaming, in the south the official government position is favourable to women's equality and empowerment. Consequently, the south's Interim Constitution has a twenty-five per cent quota for women's representation in the legislative and executive, making it unconstitutional for any government institution not to have women in decision-making positions. The President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) has appointed women as chairpersons for the Human Rights Commission and the Anti-Corruption Commission, and he reportedly officially refuses to view any list of appointees for State and GoSS positions that does not include women. Currently two cabinet ministers, four Chairpersons of Parliamentary Committees and two presidential advisors are women.

On the other hand, at the Government of National Unity level, the National Congress Party, including its women leaders, opposed both a quota for women in the government and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Instead they preferred 'women's empowerment,' a vague term which does not effectively tackle the issues of rights and freedoms.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Ali A.A.G. and I. Elbadawi, *Prospects for Sustainable Peace and Post-Conflict Economic Growth in the Sudan* op. Cit., p. 35

¹¹⁴ Cook T. and Deng L., *On the Threshold of Peace: Perspectives From the People of New Sudan* (Rumbek: NDI and NSCSE, 2004) p. 25

4.4 Constraints facing Sudanese Women

Sudanese women are urging the international community and Sudan's male leaders to do more to promote the inclusion of women in peace building and reconciliation. Although UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) specifically mandates women's participation in peace processes, Sudanese women have been consistently sidelined by North-South and Darfur peace processes. Although many women's organizations were registered observers with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and presented technical papers to negotiators in the Machakos talks, they were not formally involved. When the Government of Sudan prevented women from boarding a plane to take them to the Naivasha talks in Kenya, women from the South joined northern women to formally protest their exclusion from the peace process. At Naivasha, women's organizations were forced to present their papers with recommendations to the parties by pushing them under the closed doors of the negotiation room. Sudanese women have played hardly any role in the African Union-sponsored Darfur peace talks in the Nigerian capital, Abuja.¹¹⁵

Women comprise the majority of Sudanese IDPs and refugees. Even when housed in refugee and IDP camps, women are not safe from gender-based violence. Reports abound of women being abducted and/or raped while collecting firewood near camps while little or nothing is done to bring perpetrators to justice. During resettlement, women face specific challenges including increased burdens as female heads of household, little access to healthcare and education, and few economic opportunities.

¹¹⁵ International Crisis Group, 'Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The long road Ahead' Africa Report No 106, 31 March 2006

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Khartoum and the SPLM does not speak to the full complexity of the ongoing conflict in Sudan as it fails to address the intermittent conflicts throughout the country with additional parties, related human rights abuses and the deep ethnic and religious rifts which make reconciliation and transition to peace difficult.

Nowhere is this more so than in Darfur where the Janjaweed militia have used sexual violence as a strategy to dehumanize women and girls and humiliate and control entire communities. Abductions, sexual slavery, rape, torture and forced displacement have been so pervasive as to call into question the ability of communities ever to re-establish themselves. Louise Arbour, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has noted the absence of structures in Darfur to promote justice and healing and bring perpetrators to justice.¹¹⁶

Addressing the root causes of conflict in Sudan must include promotion of women's economic empowerment. Women make up the majority of Sudan's population and in some conflict-affected areas three quarters of the surviving inhabitants are women. Women head households, yet they do not have legal access to land or resources due to discrimination in Sudanese statutory and customary law. Sudan – like most Arab states – is not among the 180 nations which have signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

Sudanese women are challenging their traditional status. In Sudan and in the diaspora we have established organizations and networks to raise awareness about the human costs of the conflict and to call for an inclusive approach to the implementation of

¹¹⁶ Government of the Republic of The Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army, 2005 *Comprehensive Peace Agreement*

the peace agreement. As breadwinners and decision makers, women are starting income generation projects, some in fields as untraditional as carpentry. Women from the North and South have

4.5 Conclusion

The CPA ended a long and devastating war and was a source of pride for both the region and Africa as a whole because it demonstrated Africa's ability to resolve its conflicts, notwithstanding the importance of the support from the international community. However, with due respect to the achievements of all parties to the agreement, mediators and the international community, the role permitted to women during negotiations was based on a perception of them as passive victims of war, not active players in politics and society. This is clearly reflected in the CPA's lack of clear gender targets or timelines for the parties to meet, limiting the effective utilization of women's experiences, expertise and perspectives in decision-making in the post conflict period. Democracy is about freedom and rights of participation in decision-making, but the democracy bequeathed by the CPA and DPA will be lopsided, lacking a level playing field for women.

However, the CPA did create a new democratic political space and committed the government to good governance and the rule of law, justice, equity and respect for human rights. Sudanese women need to rise to the challenge of building a solid foundation for democracy by doing everything possible to increase their political participation and create an equal and level playing field for all citizens. The greatest hope now for women across Sudan is that they will be able to expand on the Bill of Rights in the Interim National Constitution as well as effect change through the mid-term elections and effective mobilization. The peace agreements and their shortcomings are important areas for their

campaign, making women realize the need to increase their representation in legislative assemblies at state and national levels, to gain more influence to address poverty and to change how laws and budgets are drafted and implemented.

The role of women in nurturing peace in the long struggle between SPLM and the central government has been mixed. Women were largely excluded from the negotiations that forged the CPA but they have taken a greater role in implementing post-conflict projects and in transitional institutions.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on 31 October 2000, dealing with 'Women, Peace and Security', was a groundbreaking moment for women's peace activism.¹¹⁷ This was a unified product of two distinct groups of women – peace activists working on the ground and those within the UN and other international organizations. The resolution established, for the first time, a coherent policy framework for promoting women's inclusion in a wide array of issues related to peace and security. It has made a measurable impression on governments, donors, and local and international institutions but its impact has been greatest on those who already supported women as agents of peace and security. Nevertheless, progress has been more limited in countries where leaderships remain hostile to a greater role for women in peacemaking and peace building. It is against this background that this study sought to examine the role of women in decision-making for peace in the Sudan by taking the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) peace process as a case study.

The first chapter reviewed literature on three contentious issues that affect the main focus of this study. These included an analysis on the relationship between gender and peace building where the impact of a gender based peace building initiative was identified. Gender is a fundamental element of conflict and of peace. The literature revealed that through the transformations gender illuminates, it may contribute to knowledge and skills

¹¹⁷ UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, October 2000

required for the prevention of future violent conflicts. As such, gender cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to the peace building enterprise.¹¹⁸

The study also established that Women organizations, both international and local, did a variety of activities which shaped the outcome of the CPA process in one way or the other. These included training and capacity building, civic education, preparation of technical papers to negotiating teams, advocacy and peace demonstrations, political activism, financial and moral support and through international and national forums.

The study also looks at the history of conflict and peace building in Southern Sudan. It was realized that conflict between the North and South parts of the Sudan began as long ago as 1955. These conflicts have been sustained by competition for resources, ethnic and religious differences and political ambitions among other factors. Many initiatives to resolve these conflicts were also explored but the Heads of State of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) became involved in one initiative to bring the parties together which was the beginning of a long process that led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.¹¹⁹ The 2005 comprehensive peace agreement was examined. Besides, an evaluation of the role of women in peace building is done using case studies of Rwanda, East Timor and Afghanistan.

The implementation process has been an uphill battle, with the NCP exploiting the gaps within the CPA and the weaknesses of its junior partner, the SPLM, to delay and frustrate the process. Following the death of SPLM Chairman Dr. John Garang in July 2005, the SPLM vision has blurred, and the NCP has abandoned its strategy for a political

¹¹⁸ Luc Reyhler and Thania Paffenholz, (eds) *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) p. 12

¹¹⁹ Kwanje S., 'The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha' in Makumi Mwangi (ed) *Regional Security Issues in the Age of Globalization* (Nairobi: CLARION, 2006) p. 3

partnership with the SPLM. It is increasingly clear that if this does not change soon, then all peaceful paths forward in Sudan – full implementation of the CPA, comprehensive political solutions to the conflicts in Darfur and the East – will likely lead to eventual regime change and an ousting of the NCP either via free and fair elections, or by simply whittling away its control of the structures of government to a minority stake.

Under growing pressure, the NCP attempted to manage all these challenges to ensure its own political survival. It has largely succeeded in keeping the international community at bay over Darfur by facilitating increased chaos on the ground and promoting divisions within the rebels. It is achieving a similar containment of the international community on the CPA by selectively implementing elements of the agreement without allowing for any weakening of its grip on power or fundamental change in the way the country is governed. Yet these strategies are not sustainable, and will ultimately lead to renewed or increased conflict. The NCP must begin to implement the agreement in good faith to help assure its political future in a peaceful Sudan by making partnership an attractive option to the SPLM, and unity an attractive option to southern Sudanese.

The first conclusion the study reached was the fact that peace building cannot succeed if half the population is excluded from the process. In Sudan, women comprise 65 percent of the population, and up to 75 percent in areas most affected by the conflict.¹²⁰ They are integral to rebuilding, reforming, and revitalizing the life of the country, yet they have been underrepresented in peace building efforts.

Besides, the study noted that peace agreements, post-conflict reconstruction, and governance do better when women are involved. Women make a difference, in part

¹²⁰ Cook T. and Deng L., *On the Threshold of Peace: Perspectives From the People of New Sudan* (Rumbek: NDI and NSCSE, 2004) p. 25

because they adopt a more inclusive approach toward security and address key social and economic issues that would otherwise be ignored. However, it was evidenced that women remain marginalized in formal processes and under-represented in the security sector as a whole.¹²¹ Governments and the international community must do much more to support women peace activists.

In fact, the scale of discrimination and violence against women in each armed conflict – and the impunity with which it continues to be committed – remain the central obstacles to expanding the good work being done by women peace builders. The international community speaks a great deal about including women in formal peace-making processes and recognizing their peace building contributions but fails to do so in a systematic, meaningful way. Advances have been made in understanding the links between gender, development, human rights, peace, security and justice. As noted above, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000 reaffirmed the role of women in preventing and resolving conflicts and mandates UN member states to take steps to increase women's participation in decision-making. However, endemic discrimination and sexual violence are significant barriers to achieving Resolution 1325's goal of inclusivity.¹²² The stereotype of "women as only victims" should not be reinforced. An array of women's organizations and women leaders are doing remarkable work in the country under difficult circumstances. The daily struggle for survival greatly limits the numbers who have become peace activists but their potential is significant. Because those who are courageous and capable enough to involve themselves as catalysts in peace building are an endangered minority, they should be safeguarded and strengthened with funding, training and inclusion

¹²¹ Carla Kopell, *Assessing Prospects for Peace in the Sudan* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004) p. 15

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 17

in assessment missions and other decision-making mechanisms that shape fundamental questions of security.

Properly supported, women's peace movements can affect large sectors of the population and be a powerful force for reducing violence and building democratic and participatory public institutions, particularly in the post-conflict period.¹²³ Their organizations should be identified at the outset of peacemaking processes and helped to work within broader peace initiatives and to communicate their messages to both national leaders and the international community. The role of Sudanese women varies by region. Though women contribute prominently to peace building through civil society, they were largely excluded from both the North-South peace negotiations.

Two pressing issues for women peace activists are the return of refugees and the internally displaced, and increasing women's capacity to enter the democratization processes set in motion after the CPA. Unfortunately, the CPA provided no firm guarantees for women's participation in the implementation processes.¹²⁴ Women are under-represented at national and local levels, and even stated commitments to their participation in formal government structures have not been fulfilled.

Women peace builders, often without formal support, are trying to bring security to their communities, countries and regions. Yet, for too many policymakers, recognizing and supporting the role and capacities of women in preventing and mitigating conflict remains an afterthought. Against a backdrop of persistent violence, exclusion and decaying social services, many see improving the status of women as an issue to be addressed further down the road, in a time of peace. This argument must be challenged: there are specific steps to

¹²³ Natalie Zanzucchi, *Sudanese Women Peace-Makers* (California: University of San Diego, 2008) p. 2

¹²⁴ International Crisis Group, 'The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan's Uncertain Peace' Africa Report N°96 25, July 2005

better the status of women which, if taken now, would make the ultimate goal of achieving sustainable peace far more likely. Women can make peace agreements and post-conflict efforts more viable, effective and practical by engaging in a wide variety of actions, including but not limited to participating in peace talks; rehabilitating children associated with armed groups; convening people across conflict lines to discuss common concerns such as access to clean water; and advocating budget priorities that emphasize social services rather than military expenditures.

The work that women have done in Sudan to challenge the dominance of militarized solutions to violent conflict has great potential but is seriously constrained. The peace activists expose themselves to extraordinary personal risks in their daily work to make their communities safer.¹²⁵ Often they receive few resources to support their efforts, and their experience and advice on peace building are ignored by policymakers. Those women who do make it into leadership positions frequently face considerable backlash when they try to continue to advance gender equality. It is important, however, to avoid approaching women's roles in peace building as uniform or "women" in general as an undifferentiated group. Most women are focused on survival, which means remaining out of sight as far as possible rather than publicly opposing politicians and military leaders. The courageous women who actively work as catalysts in peace building are a distinct minority but they are not elites, although they are usually more literate and organized than other women. Despite increasing international rhetoric about keeping women safe in armed conflict, women in Sudan face broad and persistent violence, which is frequently perpetrated by uniformed soldiers and police. Denial of the scale of this violence and impunity for the actions are widespread. In general, international solutions to armed

¹²⁵ Natalie Zanzucchi, *Sudanese Women Peace-Makers* op. cit., p. 2

conflict – negotiations, peacekeeping missions, governmental reform, disarmament processes and economic sanctions – do not offer women and girls adequate protection.

Although actively used by those women's peace groups that have been educated about it, UNSCR 1325 is largely unknown in the corridors of power. There have been no large-scale, organized efforts to explain its contents to the government or to civil society organizations not expressly involved in working with women, and it has had little, if any, impact on development of new policy, government spending and security sector reform. There is no measurable commitment or significant funding to support women's entry into security arenas, whether in police, prison and wildlife services, armies, defence ministries or other institutions of national security.¹²⁶

Women throughout Sudan are crossing party and regional lines to raise their collective voice for a more peaceful and secure Sudan. SPLA/M Women's roles in the 22-year Sudanese civil war (1983–2005) were much more varied and complex than has been generally acknowledged. When John Garang formed the SPLM/A as a rebel movement in 1983, women enlisted along with men, citing political beliefs, empowerment, and equality as primary motivations: for some women, it was a war for freedom on more than one level. Even today, it is not clear exactly how many women joined as active combatants and in supportive roles, largely because groups on all sides of the conflict intent on playing down women's active participation.

In essence, the study established that the role of women in nurturing peace in the long struggle between SPLM and the central government has been mixed. Women were

¹²⁶ Lucian Niemeyer, *Africa: The Holocausts of Rwanda and Sudan* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006) p. 108

largely excluded from the negotiations that forged the CPA but they have taken a greater role in implementing post-conflict projects and in transitional institutions.

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ANNEX ONE

Questionnaire: An Examination of the Role of Women in Decision-Making: A Case of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement

1. Who initiated the process that led to the adoption of the Comprehensive Peace agreement?

2. How many women were involved in the negotiations?

3. Were there any initiatives behind the scenes that were led by women?

Yes

No

4. If yes, which ones?

5. If no, why?

6. Do you know any women NGOs that advanced the course of peace while the CPA negotiations were ongoing?

Yes

No

7. Which ones and what did they advance?

8. Did women in government play any role?

Yes

No

9. If yes, what role did they play?

10. If not, why?

11. Did the lack of participation of women in the CPA affect the contents of the agreement?

12. In what specific way?

13. What challenges did women face during the negotiations?

14. How can these challenges be overcome?
