

**THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS THROUGH PEACE
SUPPORT OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF UN EXIT FROM BURUNDI**

By

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Reg No R50/71584/09



**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES TO THE
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

September 2010

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
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DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been submitted for award of a degree to any other University.

J M MUTHYA

Signature



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
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This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University supervisor.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This work is dedicated to all my lecturers at the University of Nairobi, specifically my supervisor, Dr Musambayi Katumanga for his total support with insights and advice. Equally vital was the advice given by both Prof Makumi Mwangi of University of Nairobi – institute of Diplomacy & International Relations and Major General Rob of National Defence College who kindly provided me with helpful tips on key elements to include in the work.

The entire fraternity of the National Defence College, Kenya; Lt Gen J M Mutwii – Commandant, Ambassador Kahende – Deputy Commandant, All Senior Directing Staff, Participants of Course 12/2009 and the faculty for their encouragement and support while at the college.

Finally and very important, I wish to thank my wife – Joyce and our children for the ever unreserved prayers and encouragement throughout my stay at the National Defence College in Nairobi, in 2009, while pursuing this course and after up to its logical conclusion.

ABSTRACT

This study examines the dynamics that led to the exit of the United Nation (UN) mission in Burundi. The study revolves around the theoretical framework put forth by idealists that world security can be ensured collectively through the coming together of states under the UN. The study is guided by two objectives that examine; the internal dynamics within Burundi that caused the termination and the UN mission processes that contributed to the termination. The study found out that the ONUB exit was a function of a convergence of internal political dynamics within Burundi and a rationalized calculation of UN bureaucratic process *visa vis* national interest which saw value in exit than in likely costs in extended stay.

The study notes that the dividing line between entry and exit in a UN mission is very thin and both need be factored in at the beginning of the mission if total value is to be gained from the mission. Though the UN is emphatic on clear, credible and achievable mandates, there is little emphasis on exit through which assessment of mission success and achievement can be measured.


In this study it is recommends that for the UN to have a strategy for exit from missions, exit should be planned in advance rehearsed during the mission processes and executed when time comes to exit. Secondly, when a transition comes to an end, it may be prudent to consider replacing the entire echelon of top UN mission management and additionally, since the dividing line between deployment and exit is thin, there is need to continuously build channels with other actors directly and opportunistically which could be used to ensure a smooth exit that leaves no gaps that facilitate the resurgence of conflict.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

- AMIB - The African Mission in Burundi — the pioneering African Union peacekeeping deployment in Burundi.
- CNDD - Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie
- CNDD-FDD - Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie - the principal rebel movement that stayed outside the Arusha process. Having signed the Global Ceasefire Agreement late in the day it then entered the Transitional Government and proceeded to win the Presidential elections held in August 2005.
- DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
- FAB - Forces Armées Burundaises, the former government army
- FDD - Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie
- FDN - Forces Nationales de la Défense, the new, integrated Burundian army
- FNL - Forces Nationales de Libération — the major remaining armed group still fighting with the Burundian Government.
- FTA - Forces Technical Agreement
- FRODEBU - Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi — the long-standing non-armed party associated with the Hutu ethnic group and the winner of the elections of 1993 under President Melchior Ndadaye.
- JCC - Joint Ceasefire Commission
- MDRP - Multi-County Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
- IMC - Implementation Monitoring Commission — led by the United Nations, this commission was charged with verifying the implementation of the Arusha Agreement.
- ONUB - Operation des Nations Unies au Burundi
- PARENA - Partie pour le Redressement National, the party for national redress, a predominantly Tutsi party led by former President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza.
- TGoB - Transitional Government of Burundi
- UNOB - The UN Office in Burundi — ONUB's predecessor, a political office active from the early 1990s.

UPRONA - Union Nationale pour le Progres — the main non-armed political party associated with the Tutsi ethnic group.

MAP OF BURUNDI



CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1 Problem Statement

As a result of a sustained complex and complimentary interaction of domestic, regional and international/multilateral actions Burundi's conflict management registered successes. This was after an endless conflict in Burundi that had reached its climax in the 1993 in assassinations that included that of the elected president Ndandaye¹ and some ministers of his government. The United Nations (UN) was challenged at each stage to identify the most productive mode in which to be of assistance. The UN was engaged alongside domestic and regional actors at the political and strategic level.

South Africa's willingness to put troops on the ground while violence continued helped to generate momentum towards peace. South Africa remained heavily involved in negotiations to end the FNL insurgency. The wider international community, while allowing the region to take the lead, provided financial and political support for its efforts.

After several negotiations and peace initiatives led by both Tanzania and South Africa, an African mission in Burundi (AMIB) was established on 23 April 2003; The mission aimed at finding a speedy and lasting solution to the conflict in Burundi pursuant to the effective implementation of the 2 December 2002 Arusha Ceasefire Agreement. The African Union (AU) Mission was credited first and foremost for initiating Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) of the combatants. Secondly, the mission helped in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced persons and others. However the mission's success was undermined by the continued violence by the warring factions and the unwillingness of the international community to defray its costs.

¹ Lemarchand Rene, *Burundi. Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*, (Cambridge, 1996) pp. 5-7.

From the onset, the UN department of peace keeping operations expressed strong reservations on the idea of mounting a UN mission before certain conditions were met on the ground. Core in those reservations were; meaningful security on the ground and resources in support of AMIB which were feared would have provided a sense of false security to AMIB. By September 2003, AMIB's financial position was difficult and international support minimal. In view of the prevailing conditions on the ground, pressure from the African states and fearing a similar situation like what had happened in the Rwanda genocide, the UN moved to deploy in Burundi.

On 21 May 2004, The United Nations established a Multi-Dimensional Peace Operations in Burundi (ONUB) through resolution 1545. Pursuant to the ONUB mandate², the mission was mandated to organize and assist in the holding of a free and fair election in the country. The election was won by CNDD-FFDD whose presidential candidate was Piere Nkurunziza and party leader Hussein Rajabu.

From the onset ONUB enjoyed a Chapter VII mandate which included the use of force where necessary to facilitate the achievement of its diverse mission objectives. However, in December 2006 ONUB terminated its mission. This was before bringing all the warring factions to agree to the provisions of the peace agreement ostensibly due to local political machinations. This is to be blamed on the bureaucratic processes of the UN devoid of a clear deployment and exit strategy guidelines³.

² Under UN Security Council Resolution 1545 ONUB had enjoyed the Security Council assertiveness with regard to mission mandates. From the beginning ONUB enjoyed a Chapter VII mandate. The mandate itself, *Inter alia*, Included: 1. Cease fire monitoring and Implementation; monitor and ensure the implementation of the various ceasefire agreements, 2. Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) Carry out the National DDR Programme, collect and secure material and provide security at disarmament sites. 3. Human Rights; Ensure the promotion and protection of human rights with particular attention to women, children and vulnerable persons and investigate human rights violations. 4. Security Sector and other Institutional Reforms; assist the government in carrying out institutional reforms as well as constituting the new integrated national Defence and internal security forces, Police and judiciary. 5. Arms Flow Monitoring; Monitor the illegal flow of weapons across the national borders (in co-operation with the UN's Mission in the DR Congo, MONUC) 6. Elections; Contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process through advice and Assistance. 7. Humanitarian access; Create the security conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. 8. Civilian protection; And without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional government of Burundi, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

³ Boutros Ghali Boutros: An Agenda for peace. preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making and peace keeping: New York, United Nations 1992 p 11.

This research paper grapples with this decision. It specifically seeks to answer three pertinent questions; what internal factors within Burundi determined the end of the UN Mission? What External factors within the UN mission processes determine when and how to end a UN mission? And how can the Burundi UN Mission processes assist in sustaining future missions in the third world and Africa in particular?

1.2 Objectives of the Study

Broadly stated this study examines factors underlying the UN disengagement from Burundi. In specific terms it seeks to:

- a. Examine and analyze internal factors in Burundi that influenced the UN decision to pull out of Burundi.
- b. Examine and analyze factors within the UN mission processes that determined the termination of ONUB mission in Burundi.
- c. Proffer research based lessons learnt from the mission and suggest ways of terminating missions.

1.3 Justification of the Proposed Research

Entry and exit strategies have been a major preoccupation of UN since its foundation. Scholars and practitioners alike have spent time looking at the best way to go about the strategies. However the main concentration has been on entry or deployment to the mission and very little emphasis is given to the equally important phase of exit. Exit is as important as entry since no UN mission is supposed to last for ever. Entry into a mission must lead to an exit and therefore both should be treated with a fair degree of importance. This research paper is going to show the importance of this relationship.

Since the founding of the world body, the UN has clear stipulations on a number of issues particularly the way to conduct her business as provided for in both the UN charter and the international court of justice statute. Over the years areas found wanting in the charter have either been revised or been made agendas for discussion in UN General assembly meetings and ways to progress the same has been formulated. Discussions on how to formulate an exit strategy to apply to missions has never been made an agenda but what is clear is that exit from missions are discussed on need by need basis and mission to mission specific without a general layout of how these missions should be concluded. This has also put into question issues on how success in missions should be measured as it relates directly to mission termination. This could also be used to explain in part the reasons underlying UN missions that have existed for several decades such as the Kashmir mission (dispute between India and Pakistan) where the UN deployed since 1947 to date and the Cyprus mission which has existed for several decades.

The UN charter is the basis upon which the world body conducts its stipulated actions. Over the years several weaknesses have been noted and several recommendations suggested. One such effort to move a change in the charter was made by a one secretary general of the UN - Burtros B. Ghali's. The main focus of Ghali was on chapter VII which deals with peace keeping operations. Since then and the recommendations thereof, Chapter VII of the Charter gained momentum⁴ at the end of Cold War particularly after Burtros B. Ghali's "Agenda for Peace"⁵ document to the General Assembly which gave UN peace keeping operations a new outlook in as far as troops involved in peace keeping and their actions including the use of force are concerned. During this time exit did not feature as one of the major problems of the UN despite the glaring problems the world body faced in getting out the multi-national United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployed in the former Yugoslavia.

⁴ Christine Gray: *International Law and the Use of Force*: Oxford university press, 2000 P.145.

⁵ Boutros Ghali Boutros: *An Agenda for peace, preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making and peace keeping*: New York, United Nations 1992.

Today UN decisions to commence missions revolve mainly around the Brahimi report. It is through the reports' chapter 4 that outlines Rapid and effective deployment to UN mission with emphasis on "clear, credible and achievable mandates."⁶ Even with this revised way of undertaking UN missions by the Brahimi report, there is little mention on how troops should exit such missions. It is important to note that it is not possible to talk about success or failure of a mission leave alone achievable mandates without thinking about the end which is actually exit. This research will endeavour to explore how this affected the Burundi mission and seek to recommend better ways of undertaking exit by the UN.

There has always been an attempt to reform the UN in whole or part which seemingly does not serve the member states well. One of such attempts was the Secretary General's appointment of a panel to look into the grey areas in the operations of the UN. The panel's main mandate was to identify and assess the weaknesses of the United Nations' best known tool for stabilizing recent zones of conflict, and to offer practical recommendations to remedy those weaknesses. Exit was never identified as a weakness or grey area in the operations of the UN. UN Under Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi ably chaired the Panel⁷ and its report informally bears his name and therefore referred to as the Brahimi report⁸. Had this report which already existed, been strictly adhered to during the Burundi mission, a lot of ground would have been covered in as far as realizing the set objectives but since exit was never examined as one of the areas requiring reform, it would have still remained outstanding even with the total implementation of the report. This research will try to fill this gap.

The Brahimi report is organized into five chapters which included: Chapter 1- Introduction, Chapter 2 – issues of Doctrine and Strategy, Chapter 3 – Capacity for anticipating, planning and managing operations, Chapter 4- Rapid and effective

⁶ Report on the panel on United Nations Peace Operations (The Brahimi Report), A/55/305 S/2000/809: p10.

⁷ Panel members included: Mr. J. Brian Atwood, Amb. Colin Granderson, Dame Ann Hercus, Mr. Richard Monk, Gen. (ret.) Klaus Naumann, Ms. Hisako Shimura, Amb. Vladimir Slustov, Gen. Philip Sibanda, and Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga.

⁸ UN General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

deployment and Chapter 5 – Assessing implementation and recommending next steps. In a nutshell looking at the layout of the chapters there is a clear indication that the exercise by the panelists left out the key component of Exit strategy which has all along been down played in most UN mission operations. This research is interested in showing the importance of planning exit in advance through which other mission activities can be based. The research is also interested in examining factors that are responsible for exit in the absence of planning it in advance and how this could complicate mission processes.

1.4 Literature Review

There is quite a lot written on the UN and its management of conflicts. However, our focus here is on the literature which is geared towards UN mission processes determining when and how to end a UN mission, as well as, internal dynamics in the Burundi conflict and Burundi UN Mission process. In addition to literature on UN conflict management, literature on the internal conflict in Burundi will also be assessed so as to provide a broad picture of the country upon which to base our study of how UN managed conflicts are started, managed and terminated.

1.4.1 Literature on General UN Mission Deployment and Exit Processes

As mentioned above, literature on UN and UN mission processes is plenty. However, most of the literature deals to a great extent on the processes of establishing such missions and the legality of the missions including the methods to be employed in arriving at resolutions. These provisions are found in first and foremost starting with the UN Charter⁹, despite short comings, clear provisions are provided for authorization of missions. In this regard, Chapter VI is specifically dedicated to the establishment of a Peace Keeping Missions. Chapter VII of the UN Charter deals with peace enforcement missions while Chapter VIII deals with missions established under regional arrangements. The Charter was written with the disasters of the previous years in mind

⁹ *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*: United Nations: New York. December, 2006. pp 24-36.

and did not foresee accurately the shape and balance of the post-war world¹⁰. The Charter was negotiated and prepared by the allied and victorious nations. This therefore meant that it carried with it the interests of a few nations. An example of such interests is that the states preparing the Charter assigned themselves the largest role in determining the peace through their permanent representation in the Security Council (SC) and the right of veto¹¹. While this helps in understanding how UN enters a mission which in turn informs exit, it falls short of discussing peculiarities that are experienced in different parts of the world and the intricacies thereof.

Such peculiarities are seen in some of the very early UN missions which provide good examples. The first deployment of UN missions was in 1956 during the Suez Crisis¹². Two observer missions had been deployed earlier than the Suez Crisis but were not characterized as UN missions. The Suez Canal Crisis therefore was the first UN Peace Keeping Mission following an invasion of the French and the British forces. The deployment and the operations were poorly organized for a number of reasons. These include the involvement of two members of the Security Council, both holding veto powers and the choices left for the other members to join the Crisis. The deployment of the UN Mission that followed – United Nations Emergency Force, was the brain child of the then Secretary General Hammarskjold and a Canadian Diplomat Lester Pearson. The mission deployment allowed Britain and France to withdraw without disgrace and established the basis for the conduct of all other missions. Brian Urquhart, a former Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs argued that the documents were a conceptual masterpiece in a completely new field but formed the blueprint for a non-violent, international military operation¹³.

Examination of another UN mission that followed had more less similarities in its nature of deployment and exit, though not necessarily the same. The Congo 1960-64 UN peace

¹⁰ Urquhart B., *International peace and Security – Thoughts on the Twentieth anniversary of Dag Hammarskjold's death* : New York: Harper Row, 1981, p 7.

¹¹ Fetherston A. B. *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peace Keeping*: New York, St. Martins Press, Inc, 1994 p 8

¹² Fetherston A. B. *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peace Keeping*: New York, St. Martins Press, Inc. 1994 p 12.

¹³ Urquhart B., *A life in peace and War*: New York: Harper Row. 1987. p 133.

1.4.2 Literature on Conflict Theories and Processes

Scholars have defined conflict differently ranging from the definition of competition for scarce resources and values¹⁵ to pursuing incompatible goals by two or more parties. It is through understanding these theories that one can precisely place an exit theory in place. Zartman, I. W. prefers looking at the underlying issues in dispute between parties. He further adds that crisis is an outbreak of armed conflict¹⁶. Galtung views conflict from the perspective of structural violence arising from the structures that exist within the society that people may not even be aware of¹⁷. Azar on the other hand relates conflicts to ethnicity. He further attributes conflicts to underdevelopment, class differentiation, identity and justice¹⁸. His idea is important and may explain the Burundi conflict where there are deep rooted ethnic feelings which are a primary contributing factor in the protraction of the conflict in the country and the great lakes region in general.

Literature on conflict theories is diverse, concentrating on or relating to theories in other disciplines such as Biology, Psychology, International Relations and Economics. In addition to theories, approaches and paradigms also exists specific to conflict and its management. Such paradigms include; Strategist paradigm, The Peace Research paradigm and the Conflict Research Paradigm¹⁹.

While some scholars deal with the conflictual behaviour of the individuals, others deal with the group and societal level of conflict. At times they converge on the understanding

¹⁵ Mwangiru M.: *The international Management of International Conflicts in Africa: The Uganda Mediation*, 1985 (Ph.d.Dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1994).

¹⁶ Zartman, I.W.: *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and intervention in Africa*: New York, Oxford University Press, 1985. p8.

¹⁷ Galtung J.: 'Peace and peace Researcher' *Journal of Peace research* 3 1969 pp167-197.

¹⁸ Azar Edward E: 'The Theory of protracted Social Conflict and the Challenge of transforming conflict situations' in Dinna Zinnes (ed) *Conflict processes and Breakdown of International systems*: Denver Co., university of Denver. 1993. pp 81-99.

¹⁹ Groom, A. R. J., *Paradigms in Conflict. The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the peace researcher*. In J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds) *Conflict; readings in management & resolution*: London: Macmillan, 1990

that conflicts are generally dysfunctional in nature. Only a few agree that conflicts at times could be functional and that conflictual behaviour is a response to an actors' perception of the environment. Hence, it is a learnt behaviour triggered by circumstances²⁰.

One of the approaches to the conflict understanding that may be useful in understanding the Burundi conflict is the systems approach advocated by Kaplan and later by Mwangiru. They looked at the existing paradigms and believed that they may not be all inclusive and are now proposing a conflict systems approach to conflict management up to its eventual exit. This approach is informed by the notions that internal conflicts in one part of the world become internationalized with time and the other notion is that conflicts are a system.

1.4.3 Literature on internal dynamics in the Burundi Conflict

The peculiarities of the internal conflict in Burundi which were to a great extent factors contributing to the early termination of the conflict is scanty. This is an area that needs to be pursued vigorously to unearth the underlying issues which continue to shape the Burundi state even after the exit of the UN peace keeping mission. Existing literature on the practice and management of conflicts is plenty and varied. However there are areas of commonality in conflict resolution and ways to arriving both at conflict resolution and settlement. Scholars who propose resolution to conflict such as Kaplan, Mwangiru, Bercovitch, Touval, Zartman and conflict research paradigm researchers will be useful in the study of the exit from the Burundi conflict. Mwangiru views conflicts like the Burundi one from a broad understanding and proposes a resolution that is all encompassing without viewing one conflict in a country in isolation whose resolution, he suggests lies in managing the whole²¹. However a gap in identifying the epicentre exists, also a problem in identifying as endogenous or exogenous actors and conflict managers exist.

²⁰ Drew D. M. & Dr. Donald M. Snow "Making Strategy- An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems" (Air University press 1988), pg 86.

²¹ Mwangiru M: *Conflict in Africa Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*: (CCR publications, 2006). pp 71-85.

Bercovitch advances the view that mediation is the peaceful form of conflict management that delivers some help to desiring parties in a conflict²². This view is also supported by Touval and Zartman²³. What is of critical interest here is the way they understood mediation to mean either from the International law perspective or from the International Relations perspective in managing the Burundi conflict. Available literature indicates that the UN managers adopted an International Law perspective which in the long run leads to a settlement while it was supposed to be the International Relations/conflict management which presupposes resolution and therefore the problems of exit.

1.4.4 Literature on Conflict Transformation and external dynamics in ending a UN mission

Literature that deals with conflict transformation is readily available. It concentrates on the outcomes of the conflict as a result of third party involvement; this is discussed at length by Bercovitch, Mwangiri and Touval. They all agree in principle that there is a problem of gauging successes, outcomes and the criteria to be used. This goes with the problem of understanding when one phase ends and another one begins. A success index was however suggested by Anagnoson et al²⁴ who attempted to propose the conditions that should be present for a conflict outcome to be gauged. This is an area that will be applied keenly in analyzing the successes or failures of the Burundi conflict.

1.4.5 Brief assessment of the Literature

A brief analysis of the existing literature shows that most of the literature deals to a large extent with general conflict management. Rarely do scholars attempt to critically look at the methods employed by the UN in exiting from specific internal conflicts such as the

²² Bercovitch, J.; *Social Conflicts and Third parties; Strategies of Conflict resolution*: Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1984. p11.

²³ Touval, S and Zartman I.W.: 'International Mediation: Conflict resolution and power politics' *Journal of Social Science issues* vol.41 1985 pp27-45.

²⁴ See Anagnoson J. T., Bercovich J., & Willie, D., Some conceptual issues and empirical trends in the study of successful mediation in International Relations: *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 28, 1991 pp 8 -16.

Burundi one. Neither does comprehensive literature on how or when to end a UN mission exist. This study will endeavour to fill this gap. The Burundi conflict will provide a case study in examining the methods applied by the UN Peace Keeping in exiting from Internal Conflicts particularly a unique conflict between members of the same ethnic group lacking clear distinctions between the warring groups that according to scholars qualify as one as an ethnic conflict.

Scholars emphasize that for a conflict to qualify to be ethnic, the warring groups should be inhabiting different geographical areas and both groups should possess clearly identifiable criteria which include; Name for the group, belief of common ancestry, shared historical experiences, shared cultural language, religion, laws, customs, dress and music, piece of territory, sense of common ethnicity and self awareness. Conflict would therefore exist when two or more of such communities disagree or compete for political, economic, socio – cultural or territorial issues. Burundi's case does not qualify in some of the set criteria and therefore studying what caused UN exit will be of peculiar interest. Another concern that scholars do not address, is the period that the UN mission lasted from 2004 to 2006, making it one of the shortest UN missions in history.

1.5 Theoretical Frame work

For one to understand the UN involvement in Burundi, the collective security approach to International Security is the best suited theory for the purpose. The collective security theory best describes, explains and predicts entry and exit from the Burundi security predicament. Collective security presupposes a system for maintaining world peace and security. The system operates through a concerted action and agreement of all nations. The central idea of collective security is to institutionalize a permanent arrangement of the balance of power in which the entire international community agrees to oppose military aggression by any member. The logic of the scheme is that no state can stand up to all of the other members of the system together, and that aggression will therefore be permanently deterred.

The necessary conditions for collective security are very demanding²⁵. First, all states must accept the *status quo* sufficiently to renounce the use of force for any purpose other than defence of their own territory. Secondly, all states must agree on a clear definition of aggression so that paralysis can be avoided if cases arise. Thirdly, all states, and especially the 'great powers', must be willing to commit their own Armed Forces and or funds or to create, pay for, and find means of controlling, an International Armed Force to prevent aggression even if it is remote from, or opposed to, their immediate interests. Fourthly, all states must prevent actively any breaches of sanctions that might assist the declared outlaw. Attempts by the League of Nations to implement collective security failed because of inability to meet these conditions. United Nations forces went into the Congo in some strength in 1961 under conditions of chaos and strife in that recently liberated former Belgian colony, as leaders spoke of "putting out a bush fire" before it became a major conflagration. The UN force in the Congo suffered from divided counsel, reflecting the divergent aims of the various interests involved: East, West, and Third World. The action was hardly a success and resulted in fresh disillusionment with use of the United Nations as a military force. From this time on, "crisis management" took the form of direct negotiations between the powers concerned, or special conferences, with the United Nations usually playing a peripheral role as supplier of truce-observing teams. The United Nations Security Council is a mechanism for collective security, and its operations particularly in 1991 against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait might be seen as an instance of successful implementation of the idea.

Security is a concept that can be widened to include almost any facet of state, international and human existence.²⁶ Based on this understanding, today, the world is failing in the face of successive threats to its peace and security. It is beleaguered by a set of recurring and intensifying crises. Internal conflicts particularly in Africa, terrorist networks, weapons of mass destruction, religious intolerance and hatred, roving militias and insurgents, organized crime, trafficking in women and children all challenging the

²⁵ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 2nd edition. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991. p. 271.

²⁶ Neack L., *Elusive Security – States First, People Last*: New York. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2007. p 1

way collective security should be conducted today. There is no confidence in international institutions and national governments to respond adequately. The world cries out for new thinking and creativity. With this outlook in mind, it is therefore not easy to make clear distinctions between collective security and national security. Collective security was at the core of the formation of the UN. It is a variation of national security approach today²⁷ and therefore a variance of realism. The major assumption of national security is that power is necessary to contain aggression by maintaining national security.

In practice however, what has been experienced is that international peace can not be contained by peaceful means alone and a lot of times force must be used at a collective level. There is also an assumption of collective security that any threat to peace is a threat to peace at the international level. The operationalization of collective security is therefore centred on several assumptions which include; firstly, that contrary to idealism military force is still the critical element to maintaining peace in international relations, however in a deviation from the classical idealism, collective security moves beyond the self help by calling on initiatives for collective approaches to security threats. It presupposes that states will renounce force to alter the status quo and agree to settle disputes peacefully. Secondly, the concept of national security goes beyond state interests to include other states interests which is solely an idea enshrined in collective security. Thirdly is the variable of trust which is necessary for collective security like it is the case with the UN within which interventions have to take place.

In the context of Burundi there was no doubt that the conflict was a threat to regional security and by inference international peace yet the conflict was internal. The anticipation of collective security was assumed aggression by others. It is important to note however that when an issue is internal there is a problem of anticipating aggression let alone describing who the victims are. This notwithstanding therefore brings in the question of sovereignty that comes into play and the costs to be incurred. States have to willingly sacrifice resources both human and materials. The problem is that there is

²⁷ Cothran H. *National Security -Opposing views points*: New York. Greenhaven Press: 2004. p 23.

always reluctance to act collectively. This unwillingness can be traced to national interest questions.

For us to understand exit from Burundi there is need to understand interests that go with state interests which is of paramount importance. National interests govern and determine behaviour. This means at times taking costly actions such as was the case in Burundi. An explanatory model must be one that seeks to show how national interest and in deed the search for power is operationalized. In the context of national security states will engage collectively such as it was the case in Burundi in a way that their soft power interests satisfy and continue to engage until their interests continue to work against their global interests elsewhere. They are likely to continue to engage as long as their engagement is equal to their valued returns. The decision to exit from Burundi is presumed to have been motivated by the feelings that enough had been done to germinate international processes that could have consolidated the peace processes allowing exit. This thinking is compared to the internal processes that would have generated another fleck mission.

1.6 Research Hypothesis

The study was underpinned by two hypotheses:

- a. That internal dynamics in the politics of Burundi hurriedly animated the ONUB mission in Burundi
- b. That the mission termination was a function of rationalized calculations of the objective achievement in line with cost calculations of the UN Security Council member nations.

1.7 Methodology and limitations

The nature of this study informed the methodology adopted. We adopted a mixed grill of secondary and primary sources of data under the former, we examined a wide range of UN documents on Burundi and peace keeping operations. These included; UN written

information such as the UN charter, The Brahimi report, the UN resolution establishing ONUB mission, the mandate for the mission and ONUB periodic magazines. We also used academic material and journal articles underlying this has was the fact that they contained a wide range of practical data on the UN mission in Burundi. The disadvantage of using the UN available material was that most of the written material from the UN, was the apparent inclination to justify the UN position. To counter this, we opted to supplement them with purposed interviews with respondents such as UN officials, senior government and military officers from Burundi. The assumption here was that the two methods would compliment and support each other.

1.8 Definition of Terms and Concepts

Armed Conflict - As defined in the UN Charter, this is the Societal and group level of conflict where armed groups take arms to fight one another in competition for scarce resources or pursuing incompatible goals.

Ceasefire Agreement - As defined by the UN in the UN Charter, this is a negotiated understanding to stop armed confrontation between warring factions.

Combatant - As defined in the UN observer handbook this is armed groups engaged in fighting other groups whether illegal or legal.

Conflict - As defined by scholars such as Kenneth Boulding, Johan Galtung, John Burton and Makumi mwagiru, conflict denotes competition for scarce resources and values/ Parties Pursuing incompatible goals.

Conflict resolution - As defined by Makumi Mwagiru, this is a mutual understanding arrived at by parties in conflict through the process of negotiation or mediation.

Exit Strategy - As defined by the UN, this is a pre-planned process of terminating or repatriating or withdrawing a UN mission either at the conclusion of the mission or otherwise dictated by circumstances.

Internal Conflict - According to definition given in the UN charter this is a situation where the parties in a conflict come from the same state.

Peace Enforcement Mission - As defined in the UN charter, this is a situation where the UN deploys in a Conflict area under chapter VII of the UN charter, the warring factions need not to have agreed on the involvement of the UN. The UN Main function in this case is to force the warring factions to agreed. The UN forces are reasonably armed to make this happen and can fight to ensure the desired outcome to maintain world peace in addition to using force in self defense.

Peace Keeping Mission - As defined in the UN charter this is a situation where the UN deploys in a Conflict area under chapter VI of the UN charter, after the warring factions have agreed on the involvement of the UN. The UN Main function in this case is to ensure that the peace agreed upon is kept and the ceasefire observed and only authorized to use force in self defence.

Peace Support Operation - As defined in the UN charter, this is a general term used to define all UN military involvement in conflict areas.

Mission Termination- As defined in the UN Charter, mission termination is the process through which the UN winds up a mission at the end of a mandated period or dictated by the prevailing circumstances.

Mediation - As defined by Makumi Mwangiru, Mediation refers to the continuation of negotiation by other means. Mediation is a process in which the parties to a conflict attempt to reach a mutually acceptable solution under the auspices of a third party. The need for mediation arises when the parties to a conflict have attempted negotiation but have reached a deadlock.

Negotiation - As defined by Makumi Mwangiru, Negotiation refers to a process whereby the parties to a conflict sit down by themselves and talk it out. It is a non-

coercive method of conflict management because the parties decide to manage their conflict jointly.

Peacekeeping - As defined in the UN Charter, Peacekeeping refers to non-threatening and impartial action. The primary aim of peacekeeping is to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict. It thus acts as a physical barrier between hostile parties and also monitors military movement. Its secondary aim is to create a stable environment for negotiations.

Security Council - As defined in the UN Charter, this is one of the UN organs that deals with World Peace. It is composed of the five permanent members and 10 more members elected on rotation basis from the member states by the general assembly for a five year period.

Troop Contributing Countries – As defined in the UN Charter, these are countries that are members of the UN that offer their military forces to the UN for deployment in conflict areas.

1.8 Chapters Outline (Structure of the Study)

The study is organized around five core chapters. Chapter one is the introduction to the study which includes; the Statement of the Problem, Objectives of the Study, Justification of the Study, Hypothesis, Literature Review, Theoretical Framework and Methodology.

Chapter Two deals with the Understanding of the Burundi Conflict and for better understanding the chapter is organized into two sections. Section one deals with organization of the ethnic groupings immediately before colonialism and the impact of the Belgian rule upto 1962, section two concentrates on the period after Belgian colonization with a climax on the 1993 massacre and the UN involvement.

Chapter Three deals with Internal Dynamics within Burundi, the Influences exerted to the UN mission and their consequences which is divided into; Political Dynamics and socio-economic variables.

Chapter Four deals with UN Mission Bureaucratic Processes and their effect in determining UN exit from Burundi which is organized into three sections; the first

section looks at the objectives development and mission termination. The second section looks at the UN timings for deployment and ONUB operations. The third deals with interests of the powers and termination of the mission.

Chapter Five is the recapitulation, recommendations and conclusions of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

Understanding the Burundi Conflict

2.0 Introduction

To clearly understand issues underlying the UN termination of the Burundi mission, there is need to understand the underlying issues in the Burundi conflict. Also to appreciate variables underlying decisions taken by various actors in the decision to terminate the UN mission in Burundi a historical context of the state's experience with conflicts is imperative. Also equally important, is the fact that to get to the bottom of the issues that inform the internal dynamics in the Burundi politics that caused the UN exit which are examined in the next chapter, a clear understanding of the core issues is imperative. This chapter is therefore designed to provide the bridge.

This chapter is underpinned by several assumptions that; Every conflict has its origins, underlying issues and immediate causes, that there is no single cause of a conflict and that it is through understanding these underlying issues that other areas of the conflict can easily be tackled such as what forced the early exit of UN. The chapter is organized around two sections. Section one looks at the organization of the ethnic group prior to colonialism; it also examines the Belgian rule. Section two recapitulates on the independence period. It also outlines events leading to the 1993 massacre.

2.1 Burundi: The Belgian rule and the ethnic question.

Burundi. was fragmented into four rather distinct spheres of influence prior to colonialism each with its own geographic area and under its respective Ganwa leadership. The most interesting features in the pre-colonial period was the distribution of power which was signified by the then marginalization of the positions of the Burundi areas inhabited by the Tutsi group known as Hima. It is from this marginalized position of the Hima to the dominating position in the post-colonial power struggle and the question of

how this group transformed itself to the top in the politics of Burundi, through their control of the army, and hence the state, thus turning its position as the 'underdogs' of the pre-colonial system into the top position from which it has controlled much of Burundi from independence until the UN deployed in the country.

This transformation by the Hima (Tutsi) is one of the mysteries that explain the power play game that the Belgians staged during their forty six years or so rule in Burundi and the institutionalization of conflict in the country²⁸. Belgian duplicity in disadvantaging the dominant Hutu ethnic group and thereby affecting power politics in Burundi is best understood following a close examination of the colonial period briefly.

Burundi fell under German control subsequent to Berlin Conference of 1884-5. It was later allocated to the Belgians courtesy of the League of Nations mandate after World War One. The greatest impact can be traced back to the period between 1916 and 1962 during the Belgian rule, and is the cause of most of the conflict problems to be witnessed in Burundi for many years both during and after their rule.

Following a familiar pattern of a replica of the Westphalian state system born and practiced in Europe, the colonial power introduced to the Burundians a package of burdening the masses including compulsory labour, taxation and obligatory crop cultivation. Illustrating the connection between demands from international markets, increased scarcity of natural resources and conflict in Burundi, the pressure derived from these demands made local people turn to *Ganwas* for protection and aid in a number of aspects. This need for protection strengthened the *Ganwas* at the expense of lineage powers in the country and hence centralization of power in the *Ganwas* provided the colonial rulers with a small number of political actors by which they could manipulate the country using their familiar divide and rule strategy²⁹.

²⁸ Oketch, J.S. and T. Polzer: "Conflict and Coffee in Burundi". in Lind, Jeremy., and Kathryn Sturman. eds., *Scarcity and Surfeit The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts*. African Center for Technology Studies and Institute for Security Studies. 2002. p.93.

²⁹ Buyoya Pierre, edited by David Gakunzi: *Building Peace in Burundi, Mission: possible*. Paris, L'Harmattan, 1998. pp 45- 49.

The colonialists further entrenched their positions and suppression of the Burundians through a series of other administrative reforms. For example, from 1929 to 1945 the number of chefferies (chiefdoms) were cut down from 133 to 35. These reforms were also used by the colonialists to entrench marginalization of Hutus in Burundi. Out of the 133 chief in 1929 during the first revision, there were 27 known Hutus; in 1945 during the second revision of the administrative reforms, there were non Hutu chiefs. Using the number of chiefs as an indicator of power, the Tutsis slightly increased their positions during the reforms. The winners of the colonial administrative reforms were two Ganwas groups known as the Batare and Bezi. Before the rise of power of the current Tutsi/Hima rulers, there was a demise of these two predominant groups in the years that followed³⁰.

In order to strengthen their control of the territory, German and Belgian colonizers exploited the existing social hierarchy to codify and institutionalize the domination of the royal family and the Tutsi over the Hutu and the Twa. This process was backed by the racist belief that the natural order was the Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi Tutsi rule. Tutsi supremacy was engineered in the interest of the colonial power, specifically to guarantee local support for the colonial administration. To strengthen the Tutsi supremacy, the colonial administration gave privileged access to education to members of the royal family and the Tutsi. As a consequence, the Tutsi domination was extended from the indigenous hierarchy to the modern administration, polarizing politics and the economy along ethnic lines.

Towards the end of its rule, however, the Belgian colonial administration turned its back on its former protégée and allowed probably takeover by the Hutu elite. With the rise of the Hutu demand for political and social reform that the Belgian rulers tacitly supported or were unable to control, tension rose between the colonial administration and the monarchy. In 1959, the Tutsi oligarchy was overthrown and an ethnic crisis erupted in which several thousands of Tutsi were massacred and over 100,000 more were forced

³⁰ Pottier Johan, *Re imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the late Twentieth Century*: London, Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp 12-13.

into exile³¹. The Rwandan crisis was often used in Burundi by the Tutsi regimes to cultivate a nightmarish vision of Hutu power in the minds of the Tutsi population. Sustained efforts to repeal any control of power by the Hutu resulted in constant oppression of the Hutu elite and savage repression against the Hutu population during ethnic conflicts. Contamination of the social climate by ethnic crises went both ways between the two countries.

During the year prior to independence, the power struggle in Burundi indicated that colonialism would be replaced by a return to a sort of pre-colonial, monarchical system under the leadership of the Batare group and its leader Prince Louis Rwagasore. During this time there was no mention of the Hutu group despite their huge numbers and predominant population in the country. The prevailing question then did not centre on the control of certain chiefdoms but about capturing the state apparatus that was becoming the nexus of power, wealth, and security.

What was more visible than was the struggle for power which had taken on political colours, Rwagasore had founded the political party UPRONA that managed to transcend existing divisions in society and enjoyed wide political support. UPRONA won 58 of the 64 seats in the 1961 legislative elections which was part of the political reform process prior to independence. For various reasons the Belgians and the UN threw their weight behind UPRONA's main opponents, the Bezi's party PDC (Party Democrat Chretien). However from the regional perspective, it was interesting to note that Rwagasore was widely associated with the agenda of Patrice Lumumba in Zaire. This could explain part of the Belgian collusion to have him eliminated together with Lumumba who was a bottleneck to the extractive processes of the colonialists which they wanted to maintain by all means.

2.2 From Ethnic Marginalization to the 1993 Massacre

³¹ National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), and Yozo Yokota. eds. *Internal Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa and Preventive Diplomacy*. (in both Japanese and French) 2001. p 272.

The assassination of Rwagasore in 1961 set the stage for a conflict situation in the country that was to seriously undermine the viability of the monarchical system in Burundi, heightened the conflict situation in the country and brought in a new thinking of the ethnic balance³². Given a symbolic position that the independence brought to the Burundians in 1962 and the system that it brought with it, the system played a stabilizing role during their first year of independence but did not cure the wounds of conflict that hovered over the ethnic divide. Independence was unable to neither contain nor calm the increasing discontent among the Hutu population. A clear manifestation of the conflict situation in the country started to manifest itself immediately thereafter. The discontent was demonstrated in the 1965 coup in which a group of Hutu military officers made an attempt to obtain the state powers. The coup was mainly directed at the monarch. Contrary's to the expectations of the coup leaders, the coup did not lead to a Hutu rule but was in fact used as a political pretext to accelerate the system of the Tutsi domination. In the eyes of the Burundian Tutsis, the 1965 coup attempt was an early warning that the bloody events in Rwanda and Burundi formed a significant part of the legitimization of the subsequent accession to power by Hutus which was later repeated in Burundi.

The attempted coup event dealt a severe blow to the effort of construction of the nation and a derailment of the democratic experiment. The imposing victory of the UPRONA party was interpreted as a victory of the Hutu and created intense resentment by the crown and among the Tutsi elite. In July 1965, King Mwambutsa, under the pressure from the Tutsi elite, modified the constitution and refused to inaugurate the recently elected Assembly and Senate. In an extraordinary show of disdain for the democratic popular verdict, King Mwambutsa nominated his cousin Leopold Bihumugani as Prime Minister, even though he was not a member of the elected Parliament or Senate.

This decision deteriorated a social climate that was already highly tumultuous following the assassination of the Hutu Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe a few months earlier. The country had just missed another chance for building democracy; this was the second

³² Ngaruko. P. and J. D. Nkurunziza. "An Economic Interpretation of Conflict in Burundi." *Journal of African economies*, Vol. 9, No. 3. 2000.

false start³³. The democratic process was completely destroyed with the takeover by the military following the coup by Micombero in November 1966. Since then, the political system in Burundi revolved around military dictatorship and ethnic discrimination. Nevertheless, popular demand for institutional reform remained alive despite continuous oppression by the government's repressive apparatus. Due to domestic and international pressure, the military regime slowly allowed new political parties which did not change the situation much. Legislative and presidential elections were organized in later years, in which the civilian party-Front Democratique du Burundi (Burundi Democratic Front) (FRODEBU) defeated the ruling UPRONA party. For the first time in the history of the country, a civilian, and most importantly, a Hutu, became president. Unfortunately, anti-democratic and diversionist sentiments were still too bitter among the political elite and in the military to allow such a sweeping change in the political system.

With the inauguration of Micombero, Burundi embarked on its postcolonial, self reinforcing cycle which was fed by complexes of structural and direct violence³⁴. The cycle revolved around nexus of ethnic and geographic stratification and control with different social groups trying to obtain some degree of livelihood under increasing structural constraints. The dramatic events of 1965 were followed by new and violent uprising in 1969, 1972, 1988 and 1993. During the particularly savage violence in 1972, Micombero received support from Zaire's Mobutu as the Hutu uprising at the time was constructed as a coming enemy; the Mulelists. In the 1972 events, an estimated 250,000 people were killed including most of the educated Hutus. Another 150,000 Burundians fled the country in fear, seeking refuge in neighbouring Tanzania where the vast majority remained until the UN intervention. The 1972 events unleashed a cycle of violence which continued until the present time. During these cycles, periods of killing and disorder were witnessed.

Both the second and third republics that followed Micombero's first republic were inaugurated by bloodless couples. Both republics offered a new set of political rhetoric

³³ Brachet, J. and H. Wolpe. *Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi*: The World Bank Social Development Papers. Paper No. 27. June. 2005.

³⁴ *Ibid*

and, to some extent institutional reforms. The call for 'national unity' during Bagazas presidency after taking over from Micombero turned out to be a little more than a rhetorical disguise for continued marginalization perpetuated in educational reform, secularization of society and state, and half-baked 'villagisation' programme. The structural adjustment programme introduced in 1986 contributed to feed the rhetoric and hopes of reform but not the people.

The political reforms undertaken by Buyoya who took over from after taking over from Bagaza were convened by intentional and domestic actors to put democracy to the test since they believed that Burundi had arrived at its biggest post colonial window of opportunity. Following the adoption of the new constitution and introduction of a multiparty system, Melchior Ndadaye emerged as the winner of the June 1993 first democratic presidential election since independence. Buyoyas eventual handover of power increased hope for long-term stability and broader political participation, and Burundi was hailed internationally as a symbol of peaceful democratic transition in Africa. This however did not last for long. Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated only four months after winning the elections on 21st October 1993.

2.2.1 The Assassination of Melchior Ndadaye

The assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye³⁵ and six ministers of his government among other things led to the detonator of the Burundi conflict. It should be noted here that Ndadaye was also the leader of Front Pour la Democratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) which was the main Hutu ethnic group political party at the time. Ndadaye was said to be the first democratically elected president. His assassination was followed by a unprecedented wave of ethnic massacres grounded on hatred between the Hutus and Tutsis dating back to colonial times of divide - and- rule.

³⁵ Buyoya Pierre, edited by David Gakunzi: *Building Peace in Burundi, Mission: possible*: Paris, L'Harmattan, 1998. pp 91-93.

The assassination of the newly elected Hutu president in Burundi, on 21 October 1993, by the Tutsi-dominated military provided an additional motive to the Habyarimana regime to resist against power sharing at all costs. The deterioration of an already explosive political environment eventually set the stage for an unprecedented massacre. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda deteriorated even further the image of a Hutu regime in the minds of the Tutsi. The events were used (and are still used) to justify ethnic supremacy in the name of the security of the ethnic minority. Unfortunately, this attitude is both nearsighted and self-defeating. The history of Burundi and Rwanda shows that ethnic confrontation arises at the climax of ethnic discrimination.

Ndadaye's assassination, was followed by a tense period, his successor, president Cyprien Ntaryamira was out to shore up the FRODEBU government the threat represented by the solidly Tutsi army-forces armées Burundaises (FAB). Though the United Nations was quick to act through the then Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali by appointing Ahmed Abdallah in November 1993 as his special envoy, the established United Nations Office in Burundi (UNOB) to restore constitutional rule. This did not stop the killing of president Ntaryamira on April 1994 by shooting down the plane that carried him and the then Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana. Some scholars argue that; were it not for the presence of UNOB in Burundi, and visible diplomacy during this period, a similar genocide like the one witnessed in Rwanda would have taken place³⁶. A third president Sylvester Ntibantunganya of the FRODEBU tried to maintain control and at the same time accommodated the demands of the FAB.

This balance displeased radicals within his party who in 1994 split to form the rebel Conseil National pour la Defence de la democratie (CNDD) led by Leonard Nyangoma with its armed wing Forces Pour la Defence de la Democratie (FDD) which operated in eastern democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In 1996, Ntibantunganya and his government which had been put in place in 1994 through an agreement between the Hutus and the Tutsis was ousted in a military coup by former president Pierre Buyoya of

³⁶ UNDP, *Human Development Report*, 2006.

the mainly Tutsi Union Nationale Pour (UPRONA) party. Though African countries through the AU had imposed an economic embargo on Burundi³⁷, fighting continued in the country displacing 800,000 people. 500,000 were placed in regroupment camps and 300,000 fled to Tanzania to escape the violence.

These complex events in the Burundi conflict help us to see the multidimensional and compounded nature of the Burundi conflict. The incorporation and amalgamations of four factors will help in understanding the conflict complex. Each of these factors is elaborated here below. First and foremost is direct violence. Secondly is structural violence that exists in the country. Thirdly are the deliberate efforts in the processes of production of knowledge and identities and fourthly and lastly are the deficiencies in the rule of law and democratic governance.

Each of these factors help in understanding processes oriented towards conflict situations and hence not causes or effects of the conflict. Each factor contributes to the conflict complex, and is at the same time part of the same complex in a way that challenges distinctions between dependent and independent variables in conflict analysis.

In addition the conflicts in Burundi are intricately interwoven into the regional conflict configuration of the great lake region. The sources of the conflicts have a multi dimensional character and affect several countries. Consequently, the problems cannot be managed if the development in the different states does not pull in the same direction. Processes in a neighbouring country could easily undermine a reform process or aid intervention. Conflict in one country should be understood in the context of an internally regional coherent manner in order to not only analyse what side effects interventions in one country have on neighbours but prescribe remedial measures that are all inclusive.

Burundi's characterized by variations in the level of direct violence in different parts of the country. Only on a few occasions during the decades of conflict in Burundi has the

³⁷ Burundi Under Siege, Lift the sanctions, Re-Launch the peace process: *International Crisis Group-ICG: Burundi report No 1 of 28, April 1998.*

conflict pattern been homogenous throughout the country³⁸. Each stage of the conflict has been simultaneously pre-conflict, conflict and post conflict which makes awaiting a national cease fire in Burundi a futile exercise. At any particular time different geographical areas were hit by violence while others were relatively peaceful.

The conflict in Burundi showed a high degree of variations in the set-up of actors engaged in direct violence. Low level of institutionalization of actors, high costs of communication with geographically dispersed troops and the accessibility of arms, led to the repeated break-up of actors into sub-units taking on new names and new leadership. In addition, the warring factions show a surprisingly high level of flexibility in the patterns of alliances. The absence of clearly manifested goals facilitates a pragmatic approach in the constellation and change of actor alliances and network and some groups seem to lack coherent, long term goal or military strategy. As one commentator put it 'their goal is on their nose, so they can't see it'. Instead fighting in itself becomes a self-generating objective for groups typically consisting of a high proportion of child soldiers and young fighters brought up and traumatized by war.

The population of Burundi is characterized by a rigid ethnic stratification and unequal distribution of power along ethnic lines. While the Hutu make up the majority of the population (about 85 percent), the minority Tutsi (about 14 percent) are used to control the government, the military, and the economy. The third ethnic group, the Twa, assumed a role of second-class citizens with little integration in the economic and political system. The colonial administration exploited and strengthened this stratification to its advantage in the spirit of its doctrine of divide and rule.

The resulting imbalance of power, maintained and reinforced by the post-colonial regimes, this was an important cause of the chronic violence that engulfed the country since the mid-1960s. Key institutions such as the military, the judiciary, and the education system were controlled by ethnic and regional entities. The population felt

³⁸ Belgium, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Revival of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries in Brussels, 2004.

alienated and disappointed by the inability of the state to protect its rights and advance its interests. The ruling elite basically 'privatized' the state through clientism, patronage, and rent seeking, state institutions which used to accumulate wealth and serve and protect the interests of individuals and ethnic and regional entities³⁹. Violence was created and maintained in a vicious cycle of frustration claims and counter claims and repression as the rulers try to hold onto power while the oppressed categories of the population claim for their fair share in national resources. Moves for social justice often degenerate into ethnic confrontation. This largely explains the failure of the various democratic experiments throughout the post-independence era. In this ethnically polarized country where resources are limited, ethnic violence also arises as a result of insecure property rights when individuals and ethnic and regional entities attempt to appropriate property by instigating or perpetuating a chaotic social climate. Because accountability is not enforced, individuals who enjoy a comparative advantage in the ethno-political system can derive significant rents in orchestrating chaotic situations that allow them to expropriate the property of the politically less well off citizens.

2.2.2 Conflict Complexes

During successive ethnic wars, massive amounts of wealth including land, business property, etc. were regularly expropriated from the victims of war killed or forced to exile. Again, the reintegration of refugees after wars is a highly sensitive political issue especially because it involves the redistribution of stolen land. The gravity of the situation in Burundi was clear to any honest observer. The task of achieving peace in Burundi was both emergent and complex, and that there was need to use any opportunity to preach peace and stability. Ethnicity in the political process and the roots of violence decades of denial and a 'Dialogue with the Deaf' could be seen as an important feature of the political system in Burundi which led to the high degree of ethnicization of politics.

³⁹ Ake, Claude: *A political Economy of Africa*: Longman, 1981. p 47.

For more than three decades, the country experienced recurring massacres which, to a large extent, were a result of political conflicts among the elite divided along ethnic lines. However, the issue of ethnic divisions largely remained taboo in the official language. Governments over the years sponsored intensive propaganda both in the media and in academia to promote the idea that ethnicity was an artificial creation of colonial and neo-colonial imperialism, aimed at destroying the nation. It is only in the late 1980s-early 1990s that the military regime surrendered to internal and external political pressure and allowed a debate on ethnic divisions. Until then, to engage in discussions involving ethnicity in politics was considered an offence to national security. Many intellectuals were jailed and tortured. many of them died in prison or after their release due to consequences of harsh conditions in jail because of their attempt to call to the regime's attention to the inequalities in the distribution of political and economic power along ethnic lines.⁴⁰

Hence, the post-colonial regimes inherited a polarized state and faithfully continued the policy of ethnic exclusion. Meanwhile, governments engineered ideologies to deny the existence of ethnicity in order to mask the amplitude of ethnic discrimination. The attempt to downplay and even deny the existence of ethnic differences contributed to legitimizing inequality and discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin. For many years, the nation was denied a chance to examine, through sincere dialogue, the true causes of the recurring ethnic crises. Even when the dialogue was finally initiated it was only a 'dialogue of the deaf.' In most cases, it turned into a display of political prowess by the government in hiding a smoking gun in the face of a population asking for a chance to heal its wounds.

A good example of the failure of the national dialogue on ethnic problems was the sub-standard work done by the 'National Commission to Study the Question of National Unity' in 1989. The Commission was created to engage in a discussion of the root causes of ethnic conflicts and to propose solutions to allow the country recover its lost social

⁴⁰ Lemarchand Rene. *Burundi. Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*, Cambridge, 1996.

cohesion and political stability. For the first time in the history of the country, an official document-the report of the commission was produced that acknowledged the Hutu-Tutsi conflicts and attempted to resolve it. Unfortunately, the report means, 'a mix of truths and untruths,' as Rene Lemarchand characterizes it proving that the ruling class was not ready to examine the ethnic problem honestly⁴¹.

First of all, the report repeated the old claim that ethnic differentiation was created by the colonial administration. The Commission failed to acknowledge that post colonial regimes perpetuated and even increased ethnic discrimination by using the structure inherited from their colonial masters. It thereby excused the previous regimes of their role in ethnic massacres as well as the social inequalities institutionalized long after independence. Second, the report missed a golden opportunity to initiate a national process of closure on the tragic events that engulfed the country in 1965, 1969, 1972, and 1988. In fact, little was even said in the report about the extent of human losses. Moreover, it recommended mechanisms of prosecution of those responsible for the massacres and compensation for the victims. Just as before, the victims were expected to forget and move on. However, the Commission did a commendable job in analyzing the 1988 massacres in the northern communes of Ntega and Marangara. The Commission had quickly forgotten the role that tension between the population and local government officials played in crystallizing ethnic sentiments.

This was probably a calculated attempt by the government to evade the pressing demand by the population to elect their representatives at the local level. Some of the local administrators nominated by the central government were not native to these communes and often displayed an incredible arrogance in handling the demands of the population. Unfortunately, the two communes were not isolated cases; many other local entities were ruled by government appointees with little sense of accountability to the local community reference (as was alleged by one of the interviewees). Allowing the population to elect its

⁴¹ Ibid

local leaders or at least nominating local candidates was the obvious solution according to this person.

For the ruling elite, this solution was undesirable because it would have resulted in a dramatic change of the balance of power at the local level to its disadvantage. It is difficult to see how the 'recommendations for maintaining and strengthening national unity' suggested by the Commission could have produced any significant results since the report assumed an institutional status quo. It was a mistake for the Commission to imagine that national unity and equity could be achieved without a major restructuring of key institutions like the military, the judiciary, and the education system. Hence, another chance for restoring peace was missed due to lack of sincerity in addressing the hard question of ethnic discrimination.

The future will tell whether the leaders of these two countries have learned that power sharing is the only viable means of governance. Otherwise, the highly acclaimed recent change of leadership in Rwanda would have simply taken the country to where it was prior to 1959, waiting for another tragedy to unfold. The democratic process was derailed numerous false starts of the road to democracy in Burundi which has been long, hard, and perilous. At the eve of independence, the democratization movement was initiated and gained momentum due to the devoted work of national heroes including Prince Rwagasore, the son of the then ruling king Mwambutsa IV. Rwagasore emphasized the importance of national unity in the struggle of independence⁴².

Unfortunately, the Prince was not given a chance to enjoy the fruits of his hard work as he was assassinated in an anti-democratic, pro-feudal and pro-colonial conspiracy two weeks after his nomination as Prime Minister. This was the first false start of post-colonial Burundi. With the death of Rwagasore, the ideal of national unity was shaken deeply. Rwagasore was obviously undesirable to the colonial administration because he espoused national sovereignty. Further, he was also undesirable to the King and royalist

⁴² Brachet, J. and H. Wolpe. *Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi*. The World Bank Social Development Papers. Paper No. 27. June, 2005.

forces because he favoured participatory democracy. He was disliked by ethno-conservatives both in the royal family and among the Tutsi extremist elite because he broke the sacred nature of the monarchy by marrying a woman from the Hutu ethnic group. His political assassination had devastating consequences by exacerbating political antagonism along ethnic lines.

The interactions between ethnicity and politics in Burundi are extremely complex and difficult to comprehend. A closer analysis identified three critical factors of antagonism that caused and perpetuated civil unrest⁴³. These factors are ethnicity, regionalism, and a politicized military. They determined a person's position in the social hierarchy, which in turn influences the payoffs in social and economic exchange. While the Hutu make up the majority of the population, they had little political or economic power. In contrast, the minority Tutsi controlled the military, the judiciary, the education system, and the economy. The Twa lived at the margin of the society and are integrated only at the lowest level of the modern sector. The geopolitics in Burundi revolved around three key regions: the south (Bururi and Makamba provinces), Muramvya (former headquarters of the monarchy), and the rest of the country. The South controlled the military and the government. Muramvya comprised a large proportion of the national intelligentsia. The South had dominated the political scene after the independence and considered Muramvya as a political rival. However, ethnic cohesion always took precedence over regional differences when Hutu-Tutsi antagonism threatened the Tutsi supremacy.

The military dominated politics since Micombero's coup d'etat in November 1966. Before the election of 2005, the military was controlled by one ethnic group (the Tutsi), and one region (the South). Following the 1965, 1969, and 1972 massacres, the army was purged of Hutu elements and became largely monolithic. It was extremely hard for Hutu candidates to enrol in the military, and even when they do enter, they have to endure a hostile environment in the barracks. These were some of the possible triggers for conflict

⁴³ Oketch, J.S. and T. Polzer: "Conflict and Coffee in Burundi". in Lind, Jeremy., and Kathryn Sturman. eds., *Scarcity and Surfeit The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts*. African Center for Technology Studies and Institute for Security Studies. 2002. p.97.

and any initiative that did not squarely address these issues could not get to the bottom of the underlying issues in the Burundi conflict.

2.2.3 Prospects versus Ethnic Success

In Burundi, the likelihood of economic, social, and political success was largely influenced by ethnicity, the region of origin, and whether one was civilian or member of the army. The chances of social mobility were almost predetermined at birth for two reasons. First, ethnicity was determined at birth and was irreversible. Also the attributes of the region of origin often did not change even when people migrate from one region to another. For example, families who migrated from Muramvya to the Imbo region in the northwest are associated with Muramvya. Therefore, the only factor of mobility that individuals can choose-in principle-was the civilian/military status. In practice, however, this choice was constrained because entry was restricted for the Twa, the Hutu, and also for the Tutsi who are not from the South. These barriers to entry constituted an incumbency advantage for the Tutsi from the South that generated significant economic and political rent. This created a self-enforcing mechanism of control of power by the Tutsi from the South.

This mechanism permitted a process of privatization of the state in which national resources and institutions used for accumulation of wealth and the advancement of the interest of individuals and ethnic and regional entities. The importance of ethnicity, the region of origin, and the military status in determining expected social mobility while ethnicity and regions were determined at birth, the military/civilian status results from a choice of the citizen with varying degrees of flexibility conditional on the two other factors. An important instrument used to maintain this supremacy was discrimination in the school system. Using a secret identification system, the Education Ministry controlled the proportion of Hutu entering high school and college to ensure the predominance of the Tutsi at high levels of education.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Jones Bruce, *Peace Keeping in Rwanda: The Dynamics of failure*: Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 2001. pp 96 – 132.

Moreover, the fact that high schools were concentrated in the South and the capital city. Therefore there was limited access to education for the population in other regions. For the privileged ones, this situation generated a belief that they were destined to rule. This partly explains why institutional reform aimed at achieving better power sharing was always opposed by the military and the civilian Tutsi elite from the South. Institutional failure, its Nature and Dimensions, the human tragedy on display in Burundi and the deterioration of the economy are the results of the failure of the institutions to fulfil their basic functions of economizing, reducing risk and uncertainty and distributing wealth.

The first fundamental role of institutions is to allow efficiency in social exchange by ensuring that individuals or groups of individuals maximize their welfare without making others worse off. Economizing institutions are those that allow individuals to achieve their highest potential by preventing artificial impediments to fair game and barriers to entry in all markets. The role of institutions in reducing risk and uncertainty was particularly important in an undeveloped country like Burundi where resources are near the subsistence level for a large proportion of the population. Improving the standards of living always requires investment of scarce resources in anticipation of higher returns in the future⁴⁵. As uncertainty increased, individuals became excessively short-term oriented and shy away from large and irreversible investments.

For the majority of Burundians, the future was more uncertain than ever before. Because of the escalating civil war, the very notion of life expectancy had become a matter of fiction, probably even for those who perpetrated the crimes. In such a violent environment, energy and resources were spent in activities that maximize the chances for survival rather than future living standards. This contributed to reducing the capital accumulation and expected future long-term growth. Through their redistributive role, institutions ensure fair distribution of the gains from specialization and exchange. The effectiveness of institutions in ensuring equity depends on the relative distribution of power as well as the degree of competition among alternative institutions.

⁴⁵ UNDP, *Human Development Report*, 2006.

In the case of Burundi, the power to impose the rules of the game was unequally distributed and heavily skewed in the favour of the military and the Tutsi elite from the South. The political system was always a virtual monopoly. For example, the unitary party system completely precluded political competition for decades, thereby generating inefficiency in the provision of state services. In fact, it is this unequal distribution of power and monopoly in the political system that gave the redistributive function a prominent motive for state institutions. Institutions were maintained and used for the primary purpose of accumulation of wealth by individuals and political entities that had the most bargaining power.

The Burundian state then had degenerated into a private institution, which made it unsuited for fulfilling its role of third-party enforcement agent in social exchange. Individuals, ethnic and regional entities that controlled the state and were able to shape and influence the way in which the basic functions of the state and the provision of law and order are designed and implemented. Specifically, political leverage allowed privileged groups to mould and bend the law to facilitate accumulation of power and wealth. This may explain why in Burundi, as in many other African states, the control of power was achieved and maintained by all means, including violence. Military takeovers are induced by the high 'premium on the capture of state power',⁴⁶ which is a product of a long history of use of the state for patronage and accumulation purposes.

Monopolization of the state weakens its ability to enforce and protect property rights. As a result, individuals attempt to invest valuable resources to capture those rights or to protect their own rights. When critical resources such as land are scarce, incentives for investing in capturing weakly devised or insufficiently secured property rights increase. Ethnic tension is often exploited to create a chaotic situation that facilitates extortion of property. Ethnic violence was accompanied by the displacement of large numbers of people from their property (land, houses, businesses, etc). Property was often destroyed

⁴⁶ Ake, Claude: *A political Economy of Africa*: Longman, 1981. p 6.

or expropriated by the remaining population. There were even cases where property was taken away from surviving widows and orphans, often with the complicity of state institutions.

It is generally asserted that the state fails "not only if it does the wrong thing but also if it does too little or too much about the right thing". The Burundian state basically failed on all those accounts. Instead of providing law and order, state institutions both security forces and the judiciary were repeatedly used as machines of repression. A large proportion of the casualties of the civil wars were attributed to the state security forces. Instead of protecting property rights, state institutions allowed and even facilitated expropriation of land, business property, and other assets during ethnic wars. If Burundi was to have a chance to survive as a nation and to get back on the development track, it was necessary to rewrite a social contract aimed at maximizing the well being of all citizens.

2.2.4 Institutional Decay that gave way to Conflict Cycle

For this contract to be enforced, it was essential to reinvent the state. It was necessary to address the fundamental dilemma of development as stated by Douglas North (1990:58)⁴⁷: "If we cannot do without the state, we cannot do with it either. How does one get the state to behave like an impartial third party"? This obviously was a very complex question. As a first step toward addressing this issue, there was need to examine some of the reasons why inefficient state institutions persisted for so long. Why Did Failed Institutions Persist? It was often argued that, through some law of natural selection, inefficient institutions tend to decay and give way to more efficient ones. Alchian's evolutionary principle suggests that "ubiquitous competitions would weed out inferior institutions and reward by survival those that better solve human problems". In practice, however, countries are often forced to put up with inferior and even lethal institutions for extended periods of time. One of the reasons for the perpetuation of failed

⁴⁷ Hara Fabian. "Burundi: A case of Parallel Diplomacy", in *Herding Cats: Multi party Mediation in a complex World*, United States Institute for Peace, 1999.

institutions was the inertia resulting from the society's 'historical endowment'. A key factor of this inertia was the 'political settlement,' that was the balance of power between the various groups of the population. Unequal distribution of power allowed the privileged political entities to build a material and political base that allowed them to neutralize movements toward institutional reform.

A good illustration of this was the derailment of the 1992-1993 democratic experiment in Burundi⁴⁸. The attempted move toward pluralistic democracy met strong resistance from the political and economic interest groups that had extracted rent from their privileged position in the system. Pluralistic democracy meant the end of military rule, a change that the army was unwilling to accept passively. Also, democracy was seen as a threat to the interests of ethnic and regional entities that benefited from corruption and nepotism to accumulate wealth under previous military regimes. The importance of political settlement can be illustrated by the difference in the ways the incumbent governments in Burundi and Rwanda responded to internal and external demand for democratic change.

Given the apparent popularity (both domestic and international) of incumbent President Buyoya and the strict centralization of the administration, Buyoya's victory was almost a foregone conclusion. The ruling minority expected to win the elections by exploiting its comparative advantage based on its control of the military and security forces, the support by a wealthy constituency in the business class, and better experience in the game of politics. The outcome of the 1993 elections therefore came as a surprise, even a shock. The frustration from the unexpected defeat largely explains the rapid crystallization of ethnic extremism that ultimately resulted in the October 1993 military coup d'etat. The political settlement in Rwanda prior to 1994 was significantly different from the one prevailing in Burundi because of the increasing weakness of the incumbent government torn between the rising opposition from Hutu groups opposed to Habyarimana's regionalist policy and the Tutsi opposition in exile.

⁴⁸ Ibid

This may have been the main reason for the resilient resistance of the incumbent government to implement the agreements signed with the opposition. For President Habyarimana and his shrinking entourage, the chances of winning a fair election ranged from slim to none. As a result, the discrimination card was played again, this time more intensely, which led to the unprecedented massacres of 1994. The cases of Burundi and Rwanda are striking because of the incredible costs of institutional transition failure in terms of human losses. Rent seeking and bureaucratic discretion play a major role in delaying or derailing institutional reform. Bureaucrats who seek to protect their own interests often distort institutional development to maintain the status quo.

However enlightened a ruler might be with respect to institutional change, success requires a responsive bureaucracy. In Burundi, the military, members of the ruling party, and the elite from the South have regularly accused leaders of "selling out the nation" every time the latter made a move toward power sharing. In June 1993, members of the military stormed the residence of the late Melchior Ndadaye; backed by elements of the civilian elite, they attempted to stage a coup d'etat against the FRODEBU regime before it was even inaugurated. The events were a signal that the military and the southern Tutsi oligarchy were not ready to share power.

Another important reason for the perpetuation of sick institutions is the absence of precise rules that eliminate failed institutions.⁴⁹ Institutional efficiency and political stability require a set of rules that not only rewards success but also allows efficient institutions to veto the inefficient ones. In the case of Burundi, sheer force prevailed as the only rule of the game in politics. Four of the five regimes of the republic era gained and maintained power by force. The political opposition also resorted more intensively to force to counteract the domination of the political process by the military. This lethal game where the tit-for-tat strategy became the norm ending in a lose-lose situation with incredibly high costs for the society.

⁴⁹ Didier Goyvaerts, *Conflict and Ethnicity in Pre-Colonial Rwanda*, Institute of the Study of Languages and Culture of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 2000. p157.

The population, although not party to the war, bears a disproportionate share of its costs. The resolution of the crisis did not seem to be anywhere near because of the lack of compromise between political opponents. The inability to reach compromise solutions was another reason for the perpetuation of failed institutions. The military and the Tutsi elite from the South were able to impose their will to preserve their predominant position. Negotiations were plagued by disagreements even within political camps as hard liners block and sabotage any venues for equitable settlement. For example, the former ruling party UPRONA was no longer a unified front and its leaders distanced themselves from Buyoya's policy. Buyoya's move (albeit hesitant) to negotiate with the Hutu opposition constitutes towards the election time was a threat to the supremacy of the southern military and civilian elite.

It appeared that the intersection of the choice sets of the leaders of the parties in the conflict was almost an empty set. The real problem was to align and reconcile the interests of the leaders with those of the people that they were supposed to represent. The maximization of personal welfare made leaders naturally short term oriented. They thereby lost interest in the well being of the nation as a whole and its long term stability. The role of a credible impartial referee (mediator) was critical at this stage because of the unequal distribution of power and because the leaders often had their hands tied by an uncompromising entourage. The effectiveness of the Mwalimu Nyerere led mediation process was limited. Nothing can force the leaders to negotiate; everyone tries to call the shots instead. This situation evidently favoured the man in the house and the biggest loser the population.

The long drawn-out conflicts could be seen as having brought about a general militarization of all Burundi, both in terms of budget allocation, lifestyle and security situation. Interlinked to the militarization of society was the staggering level of criminalisation of the every-day lives of millions of people which amounted to very high insecurity.

The proliferation of armed groups of different character and extent was a major challenge both for conflict perversion, post-conflict rehabilitation and peace building. The term 'rebel' group or 'militia' refers to a wide variety of groups, ranging from loose gangs of bandit, at times with a political objective but not necessarily so, to relatively well organised groups. As further elaborated in the section below, armed groups in Burundi are linked to a cobweb of networks, with local, national, regional and international dimensions often with formal and informal connections and illegal activities on all levels.

In this context, one could also point to elite rivalry on a regional level regarding hegemonic power. As will be evident from the section below hegemonic effort from elites in Tanzania stood out via the support to FDD - an anti the 'Hutus- movement'. In addition, Burundi was also affected by elites in Uganda and Rwanda as well as in DRC who tried to further its positions. The efforts are often challenged through proxies of other countries territories. This contributed to the situation with multiplication of local warlords, often with weak social bases, but with protection from the government in another country. Patterns of alliances shift with a speed and flexibility that sometimes benefits an outsider's comprehension. In the process, spreads of rumours, disinformation stereo-type and manipulation of identities all contribute to aggravating an already difficult situation.

The almost ultimate access to weapons in the area is an important source and amplifier of conflicts⁵⁰. Control of the trade and distribution of arms is a prerequisite for stability in Burundi and the Region. The difficulties in addressing the arms trade stems from the strong economic and political interests involved, and the fact that the trade is typically conducted in the nexus of formal Legal economy. Add to that the global increase in availability of arms and the regional interconnectedness of distribution. Small arms as opposed to conventional weapons were easy and inexpensive to manufacture and transport and several factories in the region produce weapons. As a consequence, their production was highly decentralised which adds to the problem of control. In addition,

⁵⁰ Philippart, M: Media Status Report: *Burundi. Research and Technological Exchange Group*. October.2000. p.5.

the recycling of weapons from different conflicts in the region increased access to weapons. FDD's heritage of weapons from Zimbabwe's DRC adventure⁵¹ stands out as a tragic example.

A structural violence was at the centre of conflicts in Burundi as in most of the societies in the great lake's area⁵². This includes extreme and increasing poverty, exclusion or marginalization of the majority from economic, social, human and cultural rights, inequality in all aspects, not the least of women, youths and children. This is a situation that creates widening frustration gaps both in the marginalised poor sections of the societies as among various elites⁵³.

A high degree of structural violence in combination with incomplete nation building processes, lack of inclusive legitimate political processes, absence of power sharing and poor institutions for the maintenance of rule of law, structural violence with the potential to turn to acute violence, both at macro and micro level. Structural violence aggravates cohesion in local communities fuelling communal conflicts and within families resulting in domestic violence, splintered families and the collapse of social structures and values⁵⁴. Making the vulnerable even more vulnerable and frustrated, and potentially easier to mobilise by various elites. This is what characterised the Burundi conflict.

The rapid population growth and the population destiny in Burundi as well as in different areas in the region, in particularly in parts of Uganda Rwanda and East DRC created increased demands on land, water, firewood, economic resources and social services. FNL and FDD were known to recruit from social groups and under stress. This increased

⁵¹ UN OCHA Report of July 31st 2002. pp 12.

⁵² Mwangiri M: *Conflict in Africa Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*: (CCR publications, 2006), pp 71-85.

⁵³ Drew D. M. & Dr. Donald M. Snow *"Making Strategy- An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems"* Air University press 1988.

⁵⁴ Galtung J.: *'Peace and peace Research'* *Journal of Peace research* 3 1969 pp167-197.

stress became a breeding ground for widespread social frustration and mobilisation to ragtag armies.

While the porosity of its national borders in the great lake regions, conflicts created a high level of regional demographic fluidity. Burundi was one of the largest net contributors to the refugees in the Great Lake region. Adding to the magnitude of demographic fluidity were the vast numbers of IDP's in the country. Some of the people classified as refugees knew no other home apart from the IDP camps which complicated the categorisation. A second methodological issue pertained to the elusive accuracy in the reports on refugees and IDP's. Most reports on the situation presented the odd combination of very accurate number of refugees and subdivided along different social strata, while at the same time included caveats like 'the IDP's figures excluded a possible further 100,000 IDP's , and possibly more⁵⁵ . ' These 'margins of error' reveals some of the problematic related issues to the demographic fluidity in the region. Camps are often located in areas with a very low level of infrastructure. This added to the general problem of the control of the inhabitants and high level of militarization. IDP's refugees are 'hard currency' in the cynical market for attention and aid from international donor community, which calls for systematic inflation of figures.

These displaced populations often lived in squalid conditions marked by lack of personal security, fragile food security and absence of basic health and education services. The displaced populations typically constituted a security risk both for the receiving state and the country of origin. The influx of refugees increased the strain on local communities and their ability to provide for their own food security. Increase in demand for food, land, water, sanitation provided structural conditions conducive to political mobilisation against the displaced populations. Systematic and collective stigmatisation of the displaced groups, for example as genocidaries hiding for justice, further hampered the integration in to the reversing communities.

⁵⁵ *UN OCHA Report of July 31st 2002. pp 5-6.*

The presence of large uprooted populations outside their country of origin provided opportunities for armed groups to use refugee camps as shields against military attacks, to profit from humanitarian aid to recruit new members, if necessary by force. FDD used refugee camps in Tanzania and to some extent DRC as safe havens to launch attacks into Burundi and as recruitment centres for new members. Burundi refugees in DRC are also known to have mingled with Ex-FAR and Interhamwe and their conflict with Rwanda.

Tanzania was by any standards the largest receiver of Burundi refugees, which generated both income and conflict over scarce resources, as well as and insecurity for the population in the areas where camps were located. In addition, the future of the refugee camps constituted substantive reason for Tanzania's involvement in Burundi's conflict.

It was for these complexes that existed in Burundi before the UN deployed in the country that complicated UN operations but also provided pre-conditions inhibiting a comprehensive plan for both deployment and even exit strategy as the outcomes were not very clear to fathom owing to the many variables affecting the country.

CHAPTER THREE

Burundi Internal Dynamics and the Withdrawal of the UN

3.0 Introduction

Having looked at the broad picture informing the conditions that existed in the country of Burundi and the conflict complexes experienced in the country, it makes it a lot easier to draw our attention to the main tasks of this study; what caused the UN exit from Burundi starting with the internal dynamics. Exit can not be examined in isolation to entry and therefore both exist as twin brothers.

The decision to intervene in any given nation to avert or stem a conflict is a convergence of perceptions states have over the conflict. The main overriding factor is the said conflict and international security. Once UN is inserted in a state, the decision to withdraw may be determined by the UN itself depending on whether the objectives have been met and peace established or the host state decides to request the termination⁵⁶. In the case of Burundi, demands for the UN forces were meant by African and Asia governments who responded by contributing troops to the mission.

Two and half years after the mission was established, the UN opted to terminate the mission. This chapter is interested in understanding the internal dynamics within Burundi that informed mission terminating. The chapter explore the nature and forms the termination was manifested, the actors involved, the modes of engagement, the strategies and tactics used to achieve this. The objective is to seek to examine and analyse internal factors in Burundi that influenced the decision to pull out of Burundi.

The assumptions in this chapter are that there are certain Economic, Political and Social factors that combined to influence UN exit. At the political level we examine interests of different political actors, the modes and forms of articulation, the forms of cost benefit calculations done within the minds of individual players, taking power relations and

⁵⁶ *United Nations Observer Handbook*: United Nations: New York. 2001. p21.

constraints they perceived with the presence of the UN in to consideration. The chapter is interested in demonstrating the convergence of these calculations with those of the UN hence the decision to pull out. It could be explained that the internal dynamics within Burundi provided a decisive phenomenon in ending the UN mission pre-maturely. A combination of misunderstanding and lack of good enough information coupled with suspicion were among the reasons for the early withdrawal of the UN troops. The newly elected government in Burundi felt that the UN was another competitive government in waiting and therefore the pressure to end their mission. The main theme in the chapter is examination and analysis of the internal factors in Burundi that influenced the UN decision to pull out of Burundi. The chapter is organized into two sections; Political Dynamics and socio- Economic variables.

Under the political dynamic section, the chapter will examine key political issues and events in the country such as warring faction's problems, the electoral process, lack of good will from the newly elected government in Burundi and the Gatumba Massacre. The socio-economic variables section will concentrate on undercover operations that boosted the individual faction economic well being or social standing that provided it with the capacity to stand on its feet.

3.1 Political Dynamics

Internal politicking within Burundi was one single factor that not only led to the UN exit but was one key factor that dominated UN actions a great deal. The Burundi politics as said earlier in chapter two are of complex nature and are the reasons that have kept conflict in the country alive for many decades. Due to the expansive nature of political dynamics that may have caused the UN exit some of which have been dealt with in chapter two but not in depth and not exhaustive, even then, it is not possible to deal with all the political issues that existed in Burundi in this chapter and therefore will select only a few factors of concern. We will only discuss a few issues in the broad political arena in as far as the early exit of the UN mission in Burundi is concerned. These discussions will be centred on four factors; Warring Factions, the electoral processes and the arguments for UN exit, Paucity of good will, the UN exit and the Gatumba Massacre.

To enable clarity of understanding in these areas, we will examine each factor separately providing insights on how the affected not only deployment but the operations culminating to the eventual exit of the ONUB mission as follow:

3.1.1 Warring Factions

The tactics employed by the warring factions in Burundi were very much like those that are employed by Gorrilla movements⁵⁷ in their efforts to gain political power in a country. The competition by the warring factions to gain political power in Burundi and the politicking that went with it was one of the factors that informed the early exit of the UN. For example, unconfirmed sources claimed that, together, these groups nurtured a dream of a 'Hutu -land' located somewhere in the border land of Rwanda, Burundi and DRC. The actual viability of an alliance formed around a common dream, was questionable due to low level of institutionalisation of these groups. It was these groups that the newly elected government in Burundi alleged were enjoying ONUB support and that was the reason why the government was unable to deal with them unless ONUB left the country. Though the claim was baseless it robbed the mission of some degree of trust particularly by those who did not understand the way UN operated.

FNL, the oldest of the Hutu- oriented rebel groups under the leadership of Agathon Rwasa was linked up to the gains and support from Hutu oriented groups based in DRC⁵⁸, i.e. Interahamawe, Ex -far, and mayi-mayi. This support was hampered by the presence of ONUB and it was believed that its exit was the surest way to continue enjoying the support. The low level of institutionalisation of FNL and DRC based group's called into question any coordination between the groups. Nevertheless FNL were said to consist of 3,000-4,000 men under arms⁵⁹. The Support from DRC allegedly consisted mainly of supplies of food and arms and temporarily shelter from the fighting in Burundi. There

⁵⁷ Brian Steed, *Armed conflict, The lessons of modern warfare*, Ballantine publishers group, New York, 2002, pp.139 - 152.

⁵⁸ National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), and Yozo Yokota. eds. *Internal Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa and Preventive Diplomacy*. (in both Japanese and French) 2001. pp 272-285.

⁵⁹ <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/VBOL-6MPEBS>. September, 2009

also seemed to be political/ideological links between FNL and Hutu base groups in DRC that prompted the idea of an increased Hutu power in the region.

FDD under peter Nkurunziza was the largest Hutu based group in Burundi with 10-20000 men under arms. The main support was in Tanzania. Evidently, the support came from refugee camps in Tanzania and consisted of supplies of military equipment, funds, food and personnel. FDD as well as FNL, obtain much of their material base through looting and informal taxation of the local population. FDD was said to have had at least a core of very well organised fighters that were structured on the pattern of the Burundi National Army. These clandestine activities were resisted by the UN and since even after coming to power of the faction, it was not possible to abandon some of the activities right away and therefore come into collision course with the UN. This therefore started a poor relationship with ONUB which lasted all the way to the exit of the mission.

Several independence sources pointed at individual members of the Tanzania Government, most notably the Minister of Foreign Affairs offering political and strategic support which was not clear but several independence sources mention personal profit through the exploitation of patron-client relations as a likely reason⁶⁰. This did not go well with ONUB and was therefore viewed as a way to fuel the conflict. It is not clear to what degree the Tanzanian adventure in Burundi had the blessing of president Mpaka, but it was frequently argued that Tanzania had the ambition to strengthen its political and economic position in the region, and that it did not take kindly the increased role played in the process by South Africa. Some parties in Burundi therefore claimed that the UN could have stopped this link which gave the CNDD FDD undue advantage on one hand while on the other hand CNDD FDD became increasingly conscious that the UN was aware of it and could use it against them even when they ascended to the leadership of the country⁶¹. In the circumstances the exit of the UN mission was therefore inevitable to

⁶⁰ UN Peace and Security Council, *Burundi Report update*, 2007.

⁶¹ Burundi Under Siege, Lift the sanctions, Re-Launch the peace process: *International Crisis Group-ICG: Burundi report No 1 of 28, April 1998*.

pave way for the dominance of South Africa or Tanzania based on whatever “faction lens one used”.

What can not be down played here is however, the fact that there was a long history of close political interaction between Burundi and Tanzania. During the early 1960’s the issue of a political union between the countries was on the table in top level discussions. Though much of the postcolonial period Tanzania was known to side with the Hutu majority in Burundi. This was seen as an expression of Tanzania’s socialist tradition and support of marginalised group. In this tradition, support to FDD or similar Hutu Groups could be seen as an extension of the linearization movement in Africa. Efforts to this end were limited owing to the presence of the ONUB mission in Burundi whose mission was to bring harmony among all the warring factions and groups hence the ever present suspicion.

Information received from those interviewed indicated that FDD troops used DRC for remobilisation. Although the reports were more scant than in the case of FNL, it seemed evident that FDD received support from other ‘Hutu’ movements in DRC including Mayi-Mayi, Interhamwe, and Ex – far. The connection between Hutu-based groups in Burundi and DRC which created direct link between DRC’S peace process and the relative power position of the alliances tied to the Burundi conflict configuration therefore had some truth, but the way it was used to link UN to it for exit purposes could have been false. The nature of this implication was, however, not clear. Peace in eastern DRC could imply the cutting off of support and hence the weakening of FNL and FDD. However, the peace settlement in DRC was not inclusive, excluded groups, most likely various Hutu groups, who could try to job up with FNL and /or FDD and found a lebensraum in Burundi⁶².

Burundi and Rwanda Armed Forces, directly or via their proxies, had on several occasions joined forces in the broader areas of Burundi, DRC and Rwanda. While

⁶² *Ligwa Iteka’s 2004 Annual report notes: A precipitous decline in almost every category of human rights violation. 2004.*

militarily small estimated at just three thousand combatants the FNL retained considerable capacity as a spoiler. Moreover, its goals remained hard to read: was it interested in an accommodation with the Government or should its often bellicose and extremist (anti-Tutsi) rhetoric be taken seriously? Despite the FNL's formal absence from the negotiating table, there had naturally been multiple attempts at engagement. The Tanzanian Government kept an open channel, as had Western governments (such as the Dutch, who brokered Ndayizeye's meeting with FNL leaders in January 2004). At a quiet level, ONUB's leadership had maintained discreet contacts too including by Jean Arnault, during his period as SRSG in 2001 and therefore justified to constitute part of the ONUB mistrust which was not clearly explained to the Burundi masses by the politicians.

Before SRSG McAskie's June 2004 deployment from New York, strong signals were being sent from DPKO to ONUB that it should work actively towards a ceasefire between the TGoB/FAB and the FNL. In particular, it was suggested that the political and military elements of a ceasefire be de-linked from each other and that a ceasefire be pursued on security/humanitarian grounds, leaving the political aspects for future elaboration. It is unclear to what extent this idea for a new approach to the FNL had been discussed or coordinated with the Regional Initiative or the Facilitation and eventually led to fuel the agitation for the ONUB mission to terminate its operations in Burundi.

In her first official press conference (5 July 2004) following her arrival in Bujumbura on 25 June 2004, SRSG McAskie confirmed that contacts between her and the FNL leadership had begun,⁶³ She had insisted upon the necessity of an FNL ceasefire and had accepted that first discussions between ONUB and the FNL could take place '*at the highest possible level of the FNL.*'⁶⁴ Such discussions took place in Nairobi in July and August 2004, involving both SRSG McAskie and PDSRSG Satti from the UN, and a senior FNL team. By mid August, after continued assurances from the FNL side that they

⁶³ First Contact had been established through a phone conversation with Agathon Rwaso on 30 June 2004. Contained in the Morning Briefs to UNHQS – 1 July 2004.

⁶⁴ <http://www.un.org/french/pence/peace/unmission/onub/pr14pdf>

wished to down arms, there was optimism of a breakthrough and work had begun on a draft ceasefire agreement. At a press conference on July 30, 2004, PDSRSG Satti reported that ONUB was now investigating how to plan an on the ground meeting between the two belligerents to follow a cessation of hostilities.⁶⁵ These contacts did not go well with all the groups and some felt left out and therefore a feeling of absence of a level playing ground created by the ONUB leadership.

While this was given as one of the reasons at the time the UN was pressured by the newly elected government to leave, there may have been several factors at play in the FNL's apparent opening of a channel to ONUB. One was their desire to tell their story to the highest possible international authority. FNL leaders frequently and mistakenly referred to SRSRSG McAskie as the Special Representative of the "Security Council". Secondly, having cast themselves as the "protectors of the Hutu people", the FNL negotiators seemed keen to explore the possibility that ONUB presence could in effect take on that role itself, providing an increasingly marginalized (though still deadly) rebellion or face paving way to go out of business.

However, the optimism generated by the new initiative was soon destroyed in a particularly vicious fashion. On the night of August 13th 2004, an armed band massacred more than 150 Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi) refugees at the Gatumba camp⁶⁶. Officials of the FNL claimed responsibility for the attack shortly afterwards. Not only did this outrage destroy the UN's initiative towards the FNL, it raised questions about information gathering and exchange within ONUB as well as between ONUB, the FAB and the UN mission in DR Congo (MONUC). The attack bore the hallmarks of long planning and its timing was almost certainly deliberately chosen to coincide with the visit of DRC Vice President Ruberwa (a Banyamulenge) to the camp on the same day⁶⁷. Yet

⁶⁵ <http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/onub/pr23e>

⁶⁶ *Report of the Permanent Mission of Burundi to the United Nations*. 2004. Ref.: 204.09.15/61/RE/2004. New York. 27 April. 2004.

⁶⁷ Rackley, E: *Burundi: The Impact of Small Arms and Armed Violence on Women*. UNDP. November, 2004. p.4.

ONUB only became aware of the incident during a phone call from the MONUC SRSG William Swing to SRSG McAskie the following morning, some 10 hours after the attack (it was, of course, Burundi's army that was directly responsible for security at the camp, with the TGoB and later the newly elected government having consistently refused ONUB permission to patrol after curfew hours). This also added impetus to the accusations of the ONUB mission and later demands to exit the country of Burundi as they were seen as an inefficient lot.

3.1.2 The Electoral processes and the Arguments for UN Exit

On deployment the ONUB mission faced two main challenges, one to postpone the elections due to the short time that was left for its preparations or conduct the elections all together to offset the violence that was being witnessed in the country at the time within the short time that was available. Election in November 2004 was likely to offset a new wave of violence, while postponing elections was likely to undermine the legitimacy of the conflict⁶⁸. The Arusha Agreement stipulated that democratic elections be held in November 2004. However, a very frequent assessment in Bujumbura was that this goal would not be easily achieved. Notwithstanding practical constraints, such as the lack of cease-fire, lack of an election law, the need to update the electoral register, the need for infrastructure arrangements to conduct elections, the main objection towards the elections was the eminent risk that the election campaign was turned into a rally on ethnic grounds which would have mostly ignited a new wave of violence throughout the country.

However, considering the weight given to the elections in Arusha Agreement, any attempt to postpone the election date risked reducing momentum for the Arusha process. In the eyes of the international donor community, postponing the elections was to be seen as breaking off from the Arusha process that had been set in motion with clearly tangible results. The election ended up being postponed anyway based on the underlying issues.

⁶⁸ *Fourth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi*. 19 May 2005.

It should be clearly understood that the Burundi general elections were informed by the proceedings of the peace process where the UN was heavily present and therefore partly the reasons of the outcome. With the draft constitution through Parliament and the Independent National Electoral Commission commonly referred to as CENI in place, attention was ripe to turn to the daunting challenge of six separate electoral processes in the country: the Constitutional Referendum, followed by Communal, Legislative, Senate, Presidential and *Collinaires* (literally “hillside”, but equivalent to village-level) elections. In theory, all these needed to be preceded by the passage of new electoral law and communal law and the UN had to push for their enactment. However, in order to avoid further delay, ONUB and the TGoB went ahead with the referendum on the basis of the pre-existing 1993 electoral law, with the new law passing only after the new constitution had been approved. The ONUB position was put into close focus then by all the parties agitating to ascend to national leadership.

The electoral calendar also required close calibration with a number of key mission activities, including DDR and security sector reform. The former rebel movements needed to reach a point in the DDR process where they could qualify for formal recognition as political parties i.e. they had to be fully disarmed. An electoral calendar that called for elections before the rebel movements had met the qualifications as political parties would have alienated all the former fighters and invalidated the election process which the ONUB leadership managed to the best of their knowledge but interpretations both for and against their actions could not be avoided.

This time round strong political pressure was applied by Burundian actors either to slow-down or speed-up this timetable. In resisting this pressure, the head of the Electoral Unit, Ahmedou Seck, and his team came in for particular praise⁶⁹. Their defence then was the ostensibly “technical” nature of their role. When under pressure to accelerate, combining the communal and legislative elections, their response was to plead for lack of funds or to point out that basic equipment like ballot boxes would simply be too small to contain the

⁶⁹ *United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) OCHA, 2006 Mid-term Review.*

ballot papers from two simultaneous rounds. Under pressure to delay, the response was that the electoral process, honed elsewhere in the world by the UN, was essentially machine-like and consisted of a set of steps that unfolded more or less automatically at their own pace.

The ONUB supervised elections in Burundi posed several challenges that eventually became a rallying point for the newly elected government to demand the withdrawal of the ONUB forces. The decision to postpone the election which was the eventual position taken by the UN was seen by the Parties including the CNDD-FDD which won the elections as a way of assisting the transitional government to stay in power and therefore UN biasness. It is on this understanding that the government on taking power demanded UN exit.

The elections were rightly understood by ONUB leadership as a key element in what the UN could provide in Burundi in 2004/5. As a result, all available resources were employed to deliver election materials in all the provinces, raise public awareness and reinforce civic education. To avoid another postponement, ONUB helicopters were tasked to airlift ballot boxes to remote hilltop polling stations and staff from other sections were pressed into service either at a logistical level or, just as importantly, as a visible international presence at locations where the elections risked disruption. Hence, the UN may have exceeded its limit leading to suspicion of its sincerity.

All six elections were held in a six-month period starting from the end of February 2005. The schedule was incredibly tight and slippage in any element, logistical or political, would have resulted in yet another extension to the transition which the ONUB leadership was unwilling to do. Turnouts were, on average, around 90%. The processes were mostly conducted without violence, with the FNL threatening the process in just two provinces around communal elections in June 2005.

The elections save the individual party's opinion, was one of the greatest contributions of the ONUB mission to the Burundian citizenry⁷⁰. Eye witnesses, a large number of interviewees for this study with a wide range of domestic and international actors, and those with inside knowledge about the country, all agreed that ONUB's role in the conduct of elections in Burundi was "unimpeachable" and an "immeasurable contribution" to the cause of peace. However it was during these elections that the ONUB leadership came under the highest level of unending suspicion and formed the rallying point to the eventual call for withdrawal of the mission as the new government came to power.

3.1.3 Paucity of Good Will and the UN Exit

The idea of establishing a UN mission and its future life revolves to a great extent around interested party's good will and in particular the hosts. This is clearly demonstrated in the UN charter which outlines the underlying Universal Principles which include among others the principle of Consent⁷¹. It is this trust and understanding that was eroded with time and eventually leading to ONUB exit from Burundi.

The Mistrust by the newly elected government can be traced as far back as the times of the transitional government. As the first FNL talks were unfolding, ONUB was also obliged to work energetically on an extension to the transition timetable. At first, ONUB's instinct had been to press actors to stick to the timetable as originally envisaged. But with the transition formally to end on 31 October 2004, it soon became clear that there was little chance of accomplishing all the necessary tasks in that time. According to the letter of Arusha, a new constitution should have been drafted, passed by Parliament and then put to a referendum. But extending the transition timetable risked precipitating a crisis in the peace process; that it was indicative of an early and impressive political achievement for the Operation. The approach was to identify specific benchmarks that

⁷⁰ Burundi Under Siege, Lift the sanctions, Re-Launch the peace process: *International Crisis Group-ICG: Burundi report No 1 of 28, April 1998.*

⁷¹ *United Nations Observer Handbook: United Nations: New York, 2001. p 6.*

could be achieved in the remaining time that would signal sufficient forward momentum to allay Burundian, regional and international nervousness and to ensure that any extension of the Transitional Period resulted from a consensus among the political partners.

A major controversy delaying progress concerned ethnic representation in a future parliament. There was general consensus that the new constitution should guarantee representation for both ethnic groups by setting out the share of posts they would have in parliament and government and the army, with 60% of assembly seats to go to Hutu representatives and 40% to Tutsi. However, there was disagreement about whether these seats should belong to ethnicities or to ethnic parties. The “Tutsi” parties, fearing they would be wiped out at the polls, argued they should be guaranteed a certain proportion of the seats within the overall 40% of seats going to Tutsi. The “Hutu” parties argued they should be able to field Tutsi candidates of their own and thus potentially availing the full 40% quota.

Though a solution that ONUB devised to the impasse (a deal on the sidelines, through use of a certain number of non-elected seats to be decided by what the Burundians called “co-optation” ultimately fell apart in September, when the Tutsi parties withdrew their consent, ONUB’s near success with it and the fact that different parties in the negotiations were increasingly referring to their “discussions with McAskie” obliged the South African facilitation to take more note of ONUB. The Pretoria Summit was, thus, an early point in building trust between the facilitation and ONUB. ONUB’s strategy became one of ensuring that the mission was not seen as a competitor to the South African Facilitation but as a useful counterpart. However a problem of who to trust had been created in the minds of the Burundians and was to be used later by some to demand for ONUB exit.

Through intense, concerted pressure, President Ndayizeye, ONUB and the regional actors were able to ensure that at least a draft constitution had passed through Parliament by the end of October 2004 and had been agreed to by 5 out of the 6 parties associated with the

Tutsi ethnic group. Ndayizeye deftly piloted the fledgling constitution through the National Assembly and Senate on the eve of a visit to New York⁷². Once it had been voted on as the “Provisional Constitution” he was able to use his new powers to fire his Vice-President Kadege, UPRONA’s representative within the transitional executive, who had become an obstinate spoiler. Indeed, UPRONA’s brinksmanship through the use of threats and boycotts would ultimately cost it greatly as the transition process proceeded without it. ONUB was said to have played a role in the saga and therefore more mistrust.

Similar unrelenting pressure on the TGoB finally achieved the long-delayed appointment of an Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) and the construction of a provisional electoral calendar by the end of August 2004. Together, these events permitted the transition extension to be sold on the basis that there was considerable forward momentum in the peace process and that only “logistical” difficulties now stood in the way of the constitutional referendum and the various elections. The transition calendar could thus acceptably be extended. Summits of the Regional initiative in fact extended it twice, first to April 2005 and then to August 2005, in both cases using electoral logistics as the main pretext. However all the blame was heaped on ONUB by the parties who did not know clearly ONUB’s assignments and therefore the growing mistrust which was to be used later to call for the UN to leave.

Unfortunately, the successful management of the extension was somewhat marred by attempts by UPRONA to draft a constitution permitting Transition President Ndayizeye of FRODEBU to run again for election, attempts towards which Ndayizeye was fully supportive⁷³. The Tutsi party’s logic was that if it could not hope for a candidate of its own to win, then better it should be a known candidate from FRODEBU who could be relied upon to understand the need to rule on the basis of consensus. Ndayizeye’s running again was, however, effectively ruled out under the terms of the Arusha Agreement.

⁷² *Ligua Iteka's 2005 Annual report notes: A precipitous decline in almost every category of human rights violation. 2005.*

⁷³ Hara Fabian: “*Burundi: A Case of Parallel Diplomacy*”, in *Herding Cats: Multi party Mediation in a complex World*, United States Institute for Peace, 1999. p 60.

Moreover, it was strongly resented by other power blocs within FRODEBU and by other political parties. Not the least opposition came from CNDD-FDD, who saw their own rising chances at the polls threatened by a Ndayizeye campaign. In the event, this combined opposition prevented Ndayizeye and his supporters from gaining a constitutional draft that would have permitted him to run again. But because of its necessarily close working relationship with the TGoB and Ndayizeye, and its technical role in assisting with the overall constitutional drafting, ONUB ended up unfairly accused of having assisted in Ndayizeye's attempt, particularly in CNDD-FDD quarters. This perception lingered in some quarters and may have contributed to the difficulties ONUB experienced early in its relationship with the incoming CNDD-FDD government and the eventual exit from Burundi.

3.1.4 The Gatumba Massacre and ONUB Exit

On the night of August 13th 2004, an armed group massacred more than 150 Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi) refugees at the Gatumba camp. Officials of the FNL claimed responsibility for the attack shortly afterwards. Not only did this outrage destroy the UN's initiative towards the FNL, it raised questions about information gathering and exchange within ONUB as well as between ONUB, the FAB and the UN mission in DR Congo (MONUC). The attack bore the hallmarks of long planning and its timing was almost certainly deliberately chosen to coincide with the visit of DRC Vice President Ruberwa (a Banyamulenge) to the camp on the same day.

ONUB only became aware of the incident during a phone call from the MONUC SRSG William Swing to SRSG McAskie the following morning, some 10 hours after the attack. It is important to note that it was, Burundi's army that was directly responsible for security at the camp, with the TGoB and later the newly elected government having consistently refused ONUB permission to patrol after curfew hours. Though another school of thought suggests the brutal political logic of Gatumba had more to do with FNL attempts to form a regional alliance with the FDLR, the Congolese-based remnants of the former Rwandan Genocidaires, the Interramwe.

The Gatumba massacre damaged ONUB's political credibility at a very early moment and permitted a degree of mistrust from regional actors and later used as one of the reasons listed to demand the ONUB mission termination. Senior ONUB leadership concur with a view held by senior actors within Burundi and the region that ONUB was effectively "set up" by the FNL to be damaged by Gatumba⁷⁴. There was some irritation among regional actors that ONUB, so recently arrived in Burundi, imagined an ability to deliver so immediately a breakthrough in negotiations with the FNL that had puzzled others for several years. ONUB's experience in July/August 2004 in fact closely paralleled that of the Regional Initiative and the Facilitation in earlier years an enticing promise from the FNL, followed by betrayal. While any new approach from the FNL definitely merited exploration, regional diplomats confessed having been frustrated by what they saw as a lack of consultation by ONUB before proceeding with the initiative and by the prospect of parallel processes.

. It is important to point out the prevailing situation about the FNL that existed at the time of the Gatumba massacre which to some degree exonerates the movement from executing the massacre. In February 2005, a new FNL statement of readiness to negotiate with the TGoB divided opinions, with Tanzania avoiding to press ahead, South Africa deeply sceptical, and the TGoB itself divided on the issue with President Ndayizeye seemingly anxious to have a successor on his hands, but with the army equally unwilling, perhaps for the same reasons as discussed before. The FNL indicated once more that they would have liked the UN to play a mediating role and ONUB with New York supporting a new initiative, seeing in this an opportunity to fulfil a mediating role but this time in consultation with the Regional Initiative. New York, however, advised against this, citing scepticism about the genuineness of the initiative given past experience, the dangers of further dividing the region and the TGoB against themselves (which may, indeed, have

⁷⁴ Though another school of thought suggests the brutal political logic of Gatumba had more to do with FNL attempts to form a regional alliance with the FDLR, the Congolese-based remnants of the former Rwandan Genocidaires, the Interamwe. Yet others suggested that the FNL's only involvement was to fix the army in its Barracks while others the *(FDLR?) committed the massacre, and that the army knew in advance about the attack. Burundi's Government to date has not published its official report of the massacre claiming that it does not which to embarrass the DRC Government. The truth may never be known.

been part of the FNL game plan), and the risks inherent in providing funding to the FNL to attend talks which might then be diverted to the purchase of weapons and ammunitions. Instead, it was recommended to continue providing support to Tanzania, which had been mandated by the Region to mediate with the FNL.

Little did ONUB understand this complex and intricate situation as it went about the routine as underlined in its mandate. It was part of ONUB's responsibility which it did not effectively execute in protecting vulnerable groups that became pivotal in the accusations when later the government was demanding the withdrawal of the mission and therefore the suspicion that the massacre was orchestrated to point at that direction by the government and not FNL as the government was trying to portray.

3.2 The Socio-Economic Dynamics

The proliferation of armed groups of different character and extent was a major challenge both for conflict perversion, post-conflict rehabilitation and peace building. The term 'rebel' group or 'militia' refers to a wide variety of groups, ranging from loose gangs of bandit, at times with a political objective but not necessarily so, to relatively well organised groups⁷⁵. As a further elaborated in the section below, armed groups in Burundi were linked to networks, with, local, national, regional and international dimensions often with formal and informal connections and legal activities of all levels. A UN mission will not favour such a situation to exist and at the worst will always attempt to either bring them to a negotiating table or disband them especially if working under Chapter VII as was the case with ONUB. This was known to some of the operatives in Burundi and as such could have been a cause to demand the UN withdrawal.

Only on a few occasions during the decades of conflict in Burundi had the conflict pattern been homogenous throughout the country. Each stage of the conflict has been

⁷⁵ Anyanwu, John C: *Economic and Political Causes of Civil Wars in Africa: Some Econometric Results*. in *Peace, Conflict and Development*. Issue Four. Volume 4. Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. April. 2004. pp214-220.

simultaneously pre conflict, conflict and post conflict which made awaiting a national cease fire in Burundi a futile exercise. At any particular time different geographical areas were hit with violence while others were relatively peaceful. The conflict in Burundi showed a high degree of variations in the set-up of actors engaged in direct violence. Low level of institutionalisation of actors, high costs of communication with geographically dispersed troops and the accessibility of arms, led to the repeated break-up of actors into sub-units taking on new names and new leadership to escape tracing by the UN. This scenario could have lasted for the duration of the ONUB mission, and there was likelihood to uncover this cobweb network of institutionalised actors. In this case therefore, exit was the most viable option for the ONUB mission so as to continue the networking which facilitated the illegal sell of arms which in turn boosted the individual faction economic well being.

In addition, the factions showed a surprisingly high level of flexibility in the patterns of alliances and group actions⁷⁶. The absence of clearly manifested goals facilitated a pragmatic approach in the constellation and change of actor alliances and network and some groups seemed to lack a coherent, long term goal or military strategy. As one commentator put it 'their goal is on their nose, so they can't see it'. Instead fighting in itself became a better self-generating objective for groups typically consisting of a high proportion of child soldiers and young fighters brought up traumatised by war meaning that the demand for ONUB to exit may have just been an unconscious reaction of groups that did not know exactly what they were asking for as they did not even correctly visualize the situation after the UN exit.

Corruption and its multi dimensional perspectives was also a source of mistrust between the newly elected government and ONUB. No quantitative figures existed on the level of corruption in Burundi but a different assessment by the many respondents interviewed seemed to compete to identify the most derogatory word which would aptly describe the pandemic. In addition, the administrative structure was characterised by high level of

⁷⁶ Adedeji, Adebayo: *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace & Good Governance*. London. ZED Books in association with the African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS), Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria. 1997.pp 135-178.

centralisation. All administrators were appointed by the Central Government. Taxes collected from the commune level were centralised in Bujumbura, and there was basically no institutionalised mechanisms for public accountability.

This called for a close partnership with the Burundian government to have anything significant moving forward as well as any other collaborating partners in Burundi. Capacity building was undertaken by some bilateral donors, the UN and NGOs, most notable was within the fiscal and health sectors. Nevertheless, the needs for better ways to manage the situation in the country remained staggering and unpredictable. Thus the UN mission on the ground seemed more concerned with the events on the ground and would more often than not criticize any wrong doings that came to their attention. This constant criticism in turn may have earned ONUB a call for the mission to terminate its operations among other things.

The other social related and contributory factor to the UN's early exit was that of Refugees and IDPs. While the porosity of Burundi's national borders in the great lake regions, create a high level of regional demographic fluidity. Burundi was the largest net contributor to the refugee in the region. Adding to the magnitude of demographic fluidity was a vast number of IDP's and refugees in and outside the country. Some of the people currently classified as refugees were known to no other home than the refugee or IDP camps, which calls into question these categorisation.

Within these IDPs and refugee camps were those believed to have committed atrocities and therefore wanted or at least some degree of cleansing required to be done. This was not possible in the glare of the UN who considered them venerable groups and in need of protection. It is this different view points that the government believed that the exit of the UN was the surest way to have a free hand in dealing with those they did not want or a cleansing exercise could take place. A second methodological issue pertained to the elusive accuracy in the reports on refugees and IDP's. A report on the situation may present the odd combination of very accurate number of refugees and subdivided along different social strata, while at the same time include caveats like 'the IDP's figured

exclude a possible further 100000 IDP's and possibly more⁷⁷ . These margins of error reveal some of the problematic situations related to the demographic fluidity in the region. Camps were often located in areas with a very low level of infrastructure. This adds to the general problem of the control of the inhabitants and high level of militarization. IDP's and refugees are 'hard currency' in the cynical market for attention and aid from international donor community, which calls for systematic inflation of figures. It is this situation that the government felt was fuelled by the presence of UN and that an exit could allow for better management of their citizenry.

The displaced populations often live in squalid conditions marked by a lack of personal security, fragile food security and an absence of basic health and education services that made them fertile grounds for recruitment to illicit activities. The displaced populations typically constituted a security risk both for the receiving communities, as well as the country of origin. The influx of large groups of people increased the strain on local communities and their ability to provide for their own food security.

Increase in demand for food, land, water, sanitation provided structural conditions conducive to political mobilisation against the displaced populations. Systematic and collective stigmatisation of the displaced groups, for example as genocidaries hiding for justice, further hampered the integration into the reversing communities. The presence of large uprooted populations outside their country of origin provided opportunities for armed groups to use refugee camps as shields against military attacks, as well as to profit from humanitarian aid to recruit new members, if necessary by force. FDD used refugee camps in Tanzania, and to some extent DRC, as safe havens to launch attacks into Burundi and as recruitment centres for new members. Burundi refugees in DRC were also known to have mingled with Ex-FAR and Interhamwe and added in to the conflict with Rwanda⁷⁸. Tanzania was by far the largest receiver of Burundi refugees, which generated both income and conflict over scarce resources and insecurity for the

⁷⁷ UN OCHA Report of July 31st 2002pp 5-6

⁷⁸Gahama, Joseph: *Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Burundi*. 2002.

population in the areas where camps were located. In addition, the future of the refugee camps constituted a concrete reason for Tanzania's involvement in Burundi's conflict. Due to the fact that the main support of these refugees came from ONUB, it was desired that their exit was likely to guarantee a free hand in doing away with the problem once and for all as there was unlikely to have the camps without the support they enjoyed from UN.

Demobilisation, repatriation and –above all–reintegration of refugees and IDPs was a key question within the ONUB circles, both for reducing human suffering and stabilising the security question. At the same time this was a politically sensitive process. Among the issues that needed to be addressed were; how could returning refugees be integrated, in particular if there was a shortage of land? Have the possessions of the refugees been appropriated by another returning refugee or a former neighbour? How could repatriation and reintegration be carried out without tilting a precarious political balance? How were crimes and violence committed by various groups to be reconciled? National Commissions on Refugees and IDPs (CNRS) was the institutional arrangements set out in the Arusha arrangement with the mandate to lead the reintegration of refugees and IDPs in Burundi.

According to the Arusha agreement, CNRS was to have an independent status in relation to the government⁷⁹. It is this orderly plan by ONUB of returning refugees that the sitting government feared since it was likely to destabilize it further, so the earlier the UN left without getting to the bottom of these issues the better and therefore leaving the government to exercise a free hand in resolving the issues to their advantage. Worst still on the issue of refugees and IDPs, all these issues were blamed on the UN as it was the main facilitator of all activities pertaining to the refugees and IDPs. While some of the issues could be viewed as omissions and commissions by default other than design, the UN was at the centre of events and could not defend itself effectively on some of these commissions and omissions which added to the rationalization of the calls for exit.

⁷⁹ *Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi*. 28 August 2000.

What has been discussed above is the political environment within Burundi alongside UN operations that were seen as possible reasons that caused the ONUB exit. These political dynamics in Burundi coupled with other externalities such as the UN bureaucratic processes that existed within the international body having been inherited over the years and thus being present in this mission and therefore combining to provide the complete reason for termination. The next chapter will be dedicated to examining those dynamics present in the UN body that could have helped in the termination of the ONUB mission.

CHAPTER FOUR

UN Mission Bureaucratic Processes and Exit from Burundi

4.0 Introduction

The UN bureaucratic processes that caused the ONUB mission exit from Burundi existed side by side with the Burundi politics of the day discussed in the previous chapter and therefore a clear line of demarcation between the two on what caused what may not be so distinct. This chapter therefore links to the political dynamics discussed in chapter three and therefore should be seen as part of the reasons that assisted in terminating the UN mission in Burundi.

The involvement of the UN in the Burundi conflict can be traced as far back as in the 1990's, UN then provided weak support and encouragement for a return to peace. Some historical events will be useful here to set the stage for the weakness in this support by the UN. Between 1993 and 2004, the UN support was limited largely to attempts at quiet diplomacy whose results were mixed effect that did not guarantee the much desired peace.

This inability by the UN to provide total support could be traced all the way back to the formation of UN and the provisions as laid down in the UN charter and the international law statute. It may be necessary here to look back and examine the history of the UN so as to understand this phenomenon better. Some of the major concerns came after the outbreak of the Second World War. Though concerns of world peace were there immediately after the First World War, they were weakly articulated leaving many gaps such as; the League of Nations Covenant did not obligate its members to participate in collective security⁸⁰ It is in the process of trying to negate the weaknesses by the league that the UN plugged into other difficulties and the weaknesses continued.

⁸⁰ Brian D Lepard: *Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: A fresh legal approach based on fundamental ethical principles in international law and world religions*: Pennsylvania state university press: Pennsylvania, 20002, Pg 221

Moving on in the history of the UN, since the end of Second World War, there has been a sustained effort to limit the use of force than to allow the use of it in her efforts to provide collective security. Though collective security was meant for the members who are states, the UN Security Council monopolized by the permanent members was seen as the only entity with the monopoly to use force in the interest of world peace. The United Nations Charter in Article 2(4) clearly states that “All member States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. The UN charter stated that “ every state has the duty to refrain from intervention in the internal or external affairs of any other state and that every state has the duty to refrain from fomenting civil strife in the territory of another state and to prevent the organization within its territory of activities calculated to forment such civil strife”⁸¹.

This by implication meant that states are not allowed to involve themselves in the internal affairs of other states including internal conflicts. The thinking then was that collective security which was the driving force behind the formation of the UN was a matter of inter state conflicts and not internal within the state. In practice today, since the end of the Second World War, there has been a reduction of inter-state conflicts and an increase in internal conflicts which today has become the main pre-occupation of the UN. The Burundi conflict was an internal one and therefore outside the provisions of the charter as articulated.

Increasingly so, the UN has no choice but to get involved in internal conflicts. Internal conflicts have always had an international dimension in that there are at times domestic sources that are of international nature, the refugees they generate, the humanitarian catastrophe, the human rights issues intertwined in the conflict, the ethnic dimension which at times cuts across international borders, the many external actors that become involved in the conflict. The concerns necessitate the need to re-examine the UN Charter with a view to empowering it to deal with not only issues that arise from such complexities but also the internal conflicts that will always have an international perspective. It is in this understanding and complexities that the UN got involved in

⁸¹ Christine Gray: *International Law and the Use of Force*: Oxford university press, 2000 P 51

Burundi. Acting under Security Council Resolution 1545 of 21 May 2004, the United Nations established a multi-dimensional peace operation, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB).

The main objectives of the UN mission in Burundi included: Cease fire monitoring and Implementation; monitor and ensure the implementation of the various ceasefire agreements; Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) Carry out the National DDR Programme, collect and secure material and provide security at disarmament sites; Human Rights; Ensure the promotion and protection of human rights with particular attention to women, children and vulnerable persons and investigate human rights violation; Security Sector and other Institutional Reforms; assist the government in carrying out institutional reforms as well as constituting the new integrated national Defence and internal security forces, Police and judiciary; Arms Flow Monitoring; Monitor the illegal flow of weapons across the national borders (in co-operation with the UN's Mission in the DR Congo, MONUC); Elections; Contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process through advice and Assistance; Humanitarian access; Create the security conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; Civilian protection; and without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional government of Burundi, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

The clarity of these objectives was a function of the processes and engagements. The assumption was that once the objectives were met the UN was to pull out. On 31 December 2006 the UN terminated the peace keeping mission. At the time of this termination, the UN had not accomplished complete cease fire. One of the main warring faction FNL was still at large and fighting the government; the DDR programme was also incomplete and there was still widespread human rights violations taking place in the country⁸².

⁸²Ligua Iteka's 2005 Annual report notes: *A precipitous decline in almost every category of human rights violation.* 2005.

This chapter seeks to facilitate our understanding of the reasons within the UN underlying the decision to terminate the UN mission. The chapter specifically examines and analyses the dynamics within the UN that determined the termination of the Burundi mission. Coupled to this, the chapter looks at the nexus between the mission grading (analysis) at a given time in relation to assumptions of consolidation with or without the UN at one level and other more pressing needs elsewhere at another. The argument here is that entry into a mission is a function of internationalization of consensus by dominant actors. Notably, termination of a mission is a function of appreciation of these interests in relation to pressing demands elsewhere in relation to elements of success.

To better examine and analyze the UN mission dynamics that determined the termination of the Burundi mission, the chapter is organized into three sections; the first section looks at the objectives development and mission termination. The second section looks at the UN timings for deployment and ONUB operations. The third deals with interests of the powers and termination of the mission.

4.1 Objectives Development and Mission Termination

UN decisions to commence or exit from missions revolve mainly around the Brahimi framework. This emphasizes “clear, credible and achievable mandates.”⁸³ With this in mind the ONUB mission was mooted whose mandate delineated clear areas in which the UN was to provide technical assistance to the TGoB, The mandate included issues such as DDR and Security Sector Reform, human rights and electoral preparations⁸⁴. In principle, these had a direct relation to core UN competences and provided benchmarks against which the forward progress of the peace process could be assessed. To operationalize the mandate the Secretary General had appointed his representative to Burundi. This representative was to work hand in hand with South Africa, which had brokered the ceasefire agreements well before there was an SRSG or a mission in place.

⁸³ *Report on the panel on United Nations Peace Operations (The Brahimi Report)*, A/55/305 S/2000/809: p10.

⁸⁴ Kristinn A. Bentley and Roger Southall: *An African peace process: Mandela, South AFRICA and Burundi*. Human Sciences research Council/ Nelson Mandela foundation. Cape town, South Africa, 2005.

South Africa continued to play a key political negotiating role until the end of the transition. Among its core activities was the negotiating of the Pretoria Agreement that brokered a stalemate that was preventing the formulation of a new constitution. This gave the South African team an hedge over the UN. In the eyes of Burundians compared to the UN, the South Africans were better and more well come, making the exit of the UN an option.

The UN had the task of monitoring the implementation of the various ceasefire agreements, particularly through the SRSG's ongoing chairing of the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC), a body that continued to play a key political role with respect to the Arusha Agreement signatories up to the end of the transition period. Beyond this, there was no clear role laid out for the UN as a mediator in the broader peace process, which would have enabled the mission to engage the various armed groups not included at Arusha. This left a gap within the ONUB mandate and at this point in time did not have a specific role to play which no other entity could not play. This meant therefore that they were not unique and their leaving was unlikely to create any gap or vacuum. Even if there was a gap it was easy to fill.

During the period of the mission, it could not be established clearly the tasks that belonged to ONUB and those of the South African facilitator. At a July 30, 2004 press conference, in response to a question about whether the UN risked duplicating the proper role of the mediator, the deputy SRSG Mr. Nurrudin Satti replied that the mandate of ONUB was such that the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General is authorized to intervene in the name of the Security Council in the process of these negotiations. He continued to note that, in her capacity as President of the Implementation Monitoring Committee of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Accord, the SRSG Ms. McAskie had plenty of powers to act⁸⁵.

⁸⁵ UN OCHA Report of July 31st 2005.

The negotiations to which the deputy SRSG Mr. Satti was referring to were those being undertaken by the various Burundian political parties who were still in disagreement on aspects of Arusha's accord implementation which was ably handled by the South African mediator and therefore he may not have been totally correct in his assertion. What was not clear and what later became a point of contention to attract doubt was that at an early moment, ONUB was involved in direct and publicized talks with the FNL, the only major rebel force still not signatory to a ceasefire agreement. This could be viewed as a strong point and unique undertaking by ONUB but it was later used against the mission and therefore was also a weakness as it later turned out to be. It was later used as fertile ground to suggest that the mission was unnecessary since all the talks between the faction and ONUB yielded to no tangible results. When the gravitation towards the demand for ONUB to exit, these were some of the issues raised. The government having ascended to power with such mixed feelings about the ONUB mission demanded the UN mission to terminate its operations even without the FNL coming to agreement with the peace accord which reinforces this point further.

The other dynamic was in the mission composition provided for in the mandate. ONUB was conceived as an integrated operation and therefore uniting the military and civilian components and enhancing cooperation with UN specialized agencies and organizations already present in Burundi. The issue of integration disorganization can be traced all the way to the UN statutes. Integration unfortunately was a relatively new concept in 2004 when ONUB was being established, there was relatively little in form of "templates" or guidelines on how to make it an operational reality which made the mission management somewhat obliged to work it out as they went along. This problem lived with the mission up to the time when the issue of exit arose.

In practice, on the ground, success at integration was low. At the military/civilian level cooperation was generally good particularly as work in the DDR/SSR sector matured. However, the relationship between civilian functions within ONUB and other parts of the UN system in Burundi generally bears out Bruce Jones's observation that "the theory of integrated operations has been replaced by parallel capacities, some of which are well

integrated or well coordinated, others substantially less so.” Because of the background of senior ONUB management either in development and humanitarian issues (SRSG McAskie’s work in OCHA and previously) and/or the agencies (DSRSGs Satti and Fall) there was some optimism within the UN Secretariat⁸⁶.

On their appointment it was believed that if integration will ever work anywhere it would work in ONUB. In the event, success at integration was uneven, working moderately well with UNICEF on DDR, with UNDP and UNOPS on elections, UNHCHR on Human Rights, and between WFP and ONUB on security and logistics, less so in other areas.

Integration was one of the areas where the ONUB mission found divisions particularly when the question of whether to exit the mission or not was raised. It was very difficult to reconcile the many divisions within the mission as to whether the job had been done or not which by extension meant that exit was the only option irrespective of what was happening on the ground.

Integration became one of the issues that accelerated the need for the mission to terminate the operations since it was easier to exit than to actualize the concept. Secondly, to overcome the entrenched positions that consistently inhibited UN inter-agency cooperation would have required significant and sustained senior management time and attention; given the high pressure environment and the highly compressed transition timetable, operationalising integration, simply lost out to other more pressing imperatives particularly to the labour-intensive organization of elections which was considered a success and a strong point to benchmark as the mission terminated its operations.

A third factor concerns the attitudes of the specialized agencies and country team themselves, who in some cases did not move beyond the view that ONUB was more of a phenomenon to be endured and outlived than to be embraced and therefore the need for its early exit without considering issues of the mission integration and completion.

⁸⁶ Agoagye, Festus: *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learnt from the first African Union peacekeeping operation*: Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies. 2004. p 59.

Though integration can be considered mainly an issue of operational coordination, it also touches on the political and strategic levels and therefore affects both entry and exit to a mission as it happened in Burundi. The lack of progress in integration in Burundi reinforced the bifurcated view of the UN that the new Government put forward in its demand for ONUB to depart precipitously. That the country team and the peacekeeping operation remained essentially, un-integrated permitted the Government to see the two as quite distinct and unrelated security versus development and to insist on the strengthening of one versus the winding down of the other.

The UN's insistence that the two are vitally intertwined during the peace building phase might have had more force if integration had been more successful in the UN's own planning and actions. It is in the light of lack of tangible integration that it was easy for different forces coming from different quarters to penetrate up to the centre of the ONUB mission and accelerating the termination of the mission without following the logic that exists in the termination of such missions.

It is in this light that the ONUB mission exit traces its weaknesses that led to its early termination all the way from its inception through the underlying principles along which it operated up to the day it terminated its operations in Burundi. Issues like efforts to operationalize the Brahimi report⁸⁷ and the fact that the mission was disintegrated from the beginning versus the need for integration, all combined to accelerate the early exit.

4.2 UN Timings for Deployment and the ONUB Operations

Similar to the exit of ONUB, the timings and its deployment was clouded with mystery of issues. This was by itself a dynamic that also influenced the termination of the mission. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, on 21 May 2004 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1545, establishing ONUB. ONUB came into being

⁸⁷ UN General Assembly and Security Council. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

on 1 June 2004 and the new SRSG arrived in Bujumbura on 25 June 2004. The operation would soon grow to more than 5,500 military and civilian staff including more than 1,000 civilians.

The long start path of Burundi's peace process, new agreements alternating with resurreptions of violence and splits within factions and parties made determining the appropriate moment for exit complicated. If conventional wisdom is anything to go by, that, the UN should only try to keep peace where there is a peace to keep, then this criterion is never as clear in practice as it might seem in theory. One view of ONUB's history held within the Secretariat and the mission was that the UN successfully resisted significant pressure to deploy a PKO until the peace process was all but irreversible "ripe" and the UN's contribution could thus be effective but this was not the case for exit. Logically a mission is supposed to terminate when all the issues enumerated in their mandate are meant, short of this, issues will be raised as it was the case for Burundi.

The counter-argument to the Burundi mission on deployment, however, was that by waiting, ONUB arrived at almost literally the last moment meaning that the mission had to overcome so many hurdles and even assume some which set the troubles for the mission to be realized later during termination. The timetable to complete the transition, established by the Arusha Agreement, was a strict one and any deviation risked creating the impression of a crisis in the peace process⁸⁸. When ONUB finally deployed less than five months remained until the official end of the Transition on October 31st 2004.

In the time remaining, a new constitution was to be established, no fewer than six electoral processes had to take place and DDR was to be accomplished. From arrival, therefore, ONUB's urgent priority was to manage domestic and regional perceptions concerning the inevitable extension of the transition period against the backdrop of issues stipulated in the mandate. This placed ONUB under considerable time pressure of its own and risking that it would be seen as favouring those Burundian actors who wished for

⁸⁸ Agoagye, Festus: *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learnt from the first African Union peacekeeping operation*. Pretoria. Institute for Security Studies. 2004. p 9-15. & <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/other/cl2.2004>.

their own interests to extend the Transition. The troubles dragged on until the end of the mission and therefore affected the termination of the mission. Every step of the mission had to endure the rush and therefore ONUB as a mission never stabilized completely, a weakness that may have caused the mission its premature exit.

Stability in a mission is a key aspect, not only to guarantee confidence in the conflicting parties but to take time to plan, process and execute issues that may be controversial. Most issues in peace keeping missions are fairly controversial and ONUB rarely had time to fully process these issues. This could be easily seen in the way the warring factions from the very beginning handled issues and therefore the little faith they had with the mission to an extent to believe that they could better deal with their problems assisted by others such as the South African facilitation which seemed better than the UN processes which did not matter much and therefore even the ONUB exit did not seem to affect the process.

It is this situation that characterised the ONUB mission from the very beginning to the time it terminated the operations. The deployment having been done hurriedly, the timings of the deployment and time allowing the processes to be executed to the letter was one of the issues that contributed to the termination of the mission and therefore a point to consider in evaluating the ONUB mission exit.

Seen from a different dimension another dynamics that may have caused the mission its quick exit from Burundi is the way it conducted its operations as was provided for in the mandate. From the very beginning of the deployment of the mission, there had been a considerable evolution in the Security Council's assertiveness with regard to mission mandates. From the beginning, ONUB would enjoy a Chapter VII mandate, permitting, in principle, the use of deadly force to protect Burundians in imminent danger.

This ability to use deadly force was a scaring perspective to a government that was known to perpetrate all sorts of human rights abuses and therefore the presence of ONUB send mixed signals in their midst. The call for ONUB exit did not come as a surprise. In

practice, however, Blue Helmet forces in Burundi interpreted the Chapter VII dimension as mainly a psychological rather than an actual deterrent with mixed effects. Both the UN's own reporting and that of independent actors such as the widely respected Burundian monitoring organization Ligue Itaka⁸⁹ confirm that 2004 saw a considerable improvement in the human rights situation across the country ostensibly due to the presence of the ONUB mission which was under chapter VII and a mandate to protect the violation of human rights abuses. But this may have had as much to do with the fact that by the end of 2003, the CNDD-FDD and FAB had finally enacted a meaningful ceasefire, dramatically decreasing the overall level of violence, which had nothing to do with UN peacekeeping *per se*. Reports suggest that the human rights situation worsened again in 2005 probably owing to the fact that ONUB was consigned to the back seat and a newly elected government had taken the control.

Indeed, significant violence continued at times under ONUB's watch most notoriously the Gatumba massacre⁹⁰ of August 2004 and the FNL, in particular, continued to act with apparent impunity, questioning how much a dissuasive mission was really dissuasive. From the perspective of the Burundians population the presence of 5,500 highly visible peacekeepers with an apparently strong Chapter VII mandate seemed to promise and the continued insecurity was the source of some criticism. This criticism was so deeply rooted that there was a general feeling that even without the mission there was likely to be no difference in the country as ONUB was doing nothing since the government took control. It is this feeling that was to be lifted a notch higher by the politicians later to demand the ONUB exit.

Another dimension to view this is the fact that a number of factors may have influenced the operation's performance in the security area. First, the mandate carefully stated that "without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional Government of Burundi,"

⁸⁹ Ligue Iteka's 2004 Annual report notes: *A precipitous decline in almost every category of human rights violation. 2004.*

⁹⁰ Ligue Iteka's 2005 Annual report notes: *A precipitous decline in almost every category of human rights violation. 2005.*

ONUB should take steps “to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”. The mandate recognized therefore, that Blue Helmets would have to operate alongside Burundian armed forces controlled by a sovereign government who retained the primary responsibility to protect the civilian population.

One would wonder at this point in time and question who would violate the human rights or cause insecurity to the civilians? Such joint operations would have involved a degree of reporting to, and information sharing with the Burundi security services that would have likely proven unacceptable to UNHQ. ONUB Forces’ role was thus necessarily somewhat circumscribed, particularly in instances where the Burundi army itself was the perpetrator of attacks against civilians. Indeed, the relationship between Burundi’s army and ONUB forces remained difficult throughout the period of the mission. One indicator to this complication being the number of months it took finally to reach agreement on the Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA. But had ONUB attempted to implement the security dimensions of its mandate on its own it might have ended up in open confrontation with the army in areas such as Bujumbura Rural. This was a serious constrain to a force deployed under chapter VII and its clear operational duties could not therefore be executed to the letter.

This reduced to a great degree the free working hand of ONUB and therefore rendering the force susceptible to accusations and demands to terminate the mission. After elections there was need either to change the mandate and operate under chapter VI in efforts to implement the remaining tasks or seek a new mandate with new stipulations for the way forward. The inability to do either of this coupled with other complications provided fertile grounds for exit or exposure to ridicule.

The blue helmet force had only changed from a AU mission to a UN mission (re-hatted) and supplemented a contingent that had already been present in Burundi for some years at smaller troop levels under the AMIB banner. Whether the 5,500 troop level of ONUB was sufficient for a more assertive civilian protection role was and remained a debatable point. It is important to remember that the previous AMIB contingents, were both smaller

and designed for different roles, were not, and they had set the pattern for a less assertive foreign troop presence⁹¹. By that time the mandate demanded and troop levels permitted a more assertive stance including ONUB deployment to the regions. Precedents for how those deployments would then operate had already been set. An operation short of this was seen as insufficient and therefore led to accusations and demand for ONUB to exit.

Another angle to the problem was the issue of intervening on behalf of civilians in 'imminent danger'. This intervention would have ordinarily required effective and immediate intelligence concerning where attacks were likely to take place. However from the very beginning to the end, ONUB's intelligence capacity remained under-developed. Overall, even if ONUB interpreted its security mandate (in legal terms) and prudently (in operational ones) correctly, With only 5,500 troops, even with a very much more muscular stance on the ground, it seemed unlikely that ONUB could have guaranteed security for the population across the country. And even with only 5,500 troops, ONUB at least represented a more credible protection force for the population than did the Burundian army with its 30,000 troops: Recognizing this, however, does not take away the negative impact there was on Burundian views of ONUB.

As one who was a once a UN staffer in the mission interviewed put it, "Burundi was a small country and the combined military and civilian presence was very visible across the country, a white blanket, in effect. If we didn't appear to be delivering improved security then Burundians naturally would have asked how we were spending our money and our time"⁹². Certainly the inability to guarantee anticipated security for ordinary Burundians may have added to the ease with which the new Government could make the argument for the rapid phase-down of the Blue Helmet presence.

In addition, the planning and execution of the exit from the mission. Towards the end of the mission, ONUB and the Government were engaged in discussions concerning the

⁹¹ Kristina A. Bentley and Roger Southall: *An African peace process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi*, Human Sciences research Council/ Nelson Mandela foundation, Cape town, South Africa, 2005. pp 95 - 125

⁹² These were words used by one of the interviewees who once served with the UN mission in Burundi.

future shape of UN engagement, with the Government exerting strong pressure for the UN to terminate its peacekeeping presence forthwith and re-orient itself to priority areas like education and health. The pressure was strongly resisted, and in the event, what first looked like an imminent departure for the mission instead became a phased drawdown which was completed in December 2006, then followed by peace building mission of some kind, just a year and a quarter after the inauguration of the new government meaning that there was pre-planned deployment of the peace building mission engineered from within the UN circles. This gives an impression that even the UN exit could also have been engineered from within the UN itself.

ONUB ranks as one of the UN's shortest ever Peace Keeping Operation. Mighty steps could have been taken (or avoided) to escape this result. As detailed in this research, the shortness of time, the division of labour within the peace process and the limitations of strategic analysis within the operation combined efforts to leave ONUB's relationship with the CNDD-FDD weakened. This was exacerbated by some inadvertent signals interpreted differently by the new Government. These included the September 2005 announcement of the new Burundi Partners Forum,⁹³ an international support mechanism, coinciding with President Nzurunziza's address to the UN General Assembly and interpreted in sensitive Burundian quarters as an attempt by the international community (and by the SRSG in particular) to undermine him as a president.

More work could have been done much earlier to avert this and cultivate closer connections with the CNDDFDD, particularly as the shift of electoral support to the movement became clear. However, it is also clear that the new Government arrived determined to forge its own way, with an overriding pride in its "crushing electoral victory." As Government members gleefully describe the results in Burundian sovereignty, the resolve to follow the example set by the Rwandan Government after 1994 victory, had they been insisting upon sovereignty, and demand that most

⁹³ Agoagye, Festus: *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learnt from the first African Union peacekeeping operation*: Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies. 2004. pp 2-5.

international actors leave, thereby signalling a determination to negotiate from a position of strength with a strong affinity for the ONUB mission to terminate its operations.

4.3 The Struggle for Power; Interests; and the Termination of the Mission

Contradiction or influence by the contenting interests of world powers dates back to the founding of the world body and continue to affect every aspect of UN missions from deployment through operations to exit⁹⁴. The interests by the world powers differ in degrees and dimensions, influenced by the value the world powers attach to their interests in given states or regions.

Looking back at the UN history and processes, it will be clearer to understand the complexities of the exit from Burundi mission and the related problems in the UN mission. The point of departure should be the UN Charter itself. The enactment of the UN Charter after the end of the Second World War had peculiar deficiencies which have become problematic over time. The Charter was written with the disasters of the previous years in mind with no accurate foresight on the shape and balance of the post-World Wars Period⁹⁵. Secondly, the Charter was negotiated and prepared by the allied and victorious nations.

Worst still in the UN Charter, the so called 'great powers', the framers of the Charter concentrated more on enforcement and dealing more with immediate causes of interstate disputes through the Security Council rather than the underlying causes of conflict and also did not factor in internal conflicts as was evident in the Burundi case. This weakness is evident in the conduct of deployments and exits of UN missions starting with the very first one in the Suez Canal through the one in Congo in the 1960s to the former Yugoslavian one. The absence of guidelines to give direction on how to go about internal conflicts in the member states is a major weakness of the UN even today. Had there been

⁹⁴ Reyntjens Filip, *A Dubious Discourse on Rwanda*, *African Affairs* 98, no 390, 1999.

⁹⁵ Uruqhart B., *International peace and Security – Thoughts on the Twentieth anniversary of Dag Hammarskjöld's death* : New York: Harper Row, 1981, p 7.

clear guidelines to deal with entry and exit in internal conflicts in states experiencing problems de-linked from the inter-state thinking, the Burundi case would have been clearer and easy to handle.

Even though, chapter VII of the Charter gained momentum⁹⁶ at the end of Cold War particularly after Burtros B. Ghali's "Agenda for Peace"⁹⁷ document to the General Assembly which gave UN peace keeping operations a new outlook in as far as troops involved in peace keeping and their actions including the use of force are concerned there are still a lot of grey areas that needs re-examination with a view to corrections. Some of these areas were evident in the mandate for UN mission in Burundi (ONUB). Under UN Security Council Resolution 1545 ONUB had enjoyed the Security Council assertiveness with regard to mission mandates. From the onset ONUB enjoyed a Chapter VII mandate which included the use of force which were where necessary in the accomplishment of the diverse mandate of the mission. However, all the above examples lacked clear deployment criteria, guidelines and exit strategies to cushion the mission from external influences such as the local politics and critics. Consequently, ONUB terminated its operations without accomplishing all the tasks in the mandate. One such mandated task left unaccomplished was bringing all the warring factions to agree to the provisions of the peace agreement which was ostensibly blamed on local political machinations. But a closer look will show that it can also be blamed on the bureaucratic processes of the UN devoid of a clear deployment and exit strategy guidelines⁹⁸

The UN Charter at its inception meant that it carries with it the interests of a few nations that were instrumental to its establishment. An example of such interests is that the founder states assigned themselves the largest role in determining the peace through their permanent representation in the Security Council (SC) and the right of veto⁹⁹. This is a

⁹⁶ Christine Gray: *International Law and the Use of Force*: Oxford university press, 2000 P.145

⁹⁷ Boutros Ghali Boutros: *An Agenda for peace, preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making and peace keeping*: New York, United Nations 1992.

⁹⁸ Boutros Ghali Boutros: *An Agenda for peace, preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making and peace keeping*: New York, United Nations 1992 p 11.

⁹⁹ Fetherston A. B. *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peace Keeping*: New York, St. Martins Press, Inc, 1994 p 8.

key domain in determining the establishment of a mission and its termination. Several factors influence this, such as if a mission is not beneficial to the powers they will not support it. Examples to support this assertion are many.

To begin with, in the case of Burundi at the time of UN exit the mission was not beneficial or of any strategic value either to the West or East coming after the end of Cold War and the drastic reduction of East /West suspicions. The mission only was supported by fears of situations such as what had happened in Rwanda and the international community feared degeneration to anarchy and the accusations that went with the Rwanda genocide. At this point in time one would ask what was the strategic importance of Burundi in Dec 2006 to allow for the continued engagement of the world powers? It would be important to remember that the war between Israel and Lebanon gained significant dimension towards the end of 2006. This meant that the UN had to shift focus from the less important missions such as the Burundi one to focus resources both human and material to the more important one. Due to the control exercised by the powers on the UN both in passing a resolution at the security council and contribution of resources to support the UN operations, it was unlikely that the UN would have continued to engage in Burundi while the gravitation this time round was towards middle East that required to be strengthened.

A concern that had dominated the UN was the mission in the D R Congo. Considering the strategic interests of the powers in the Congo which has virtually every mineral resource that could be exploited to the benefit of their strategic industries, there was need then to pay more interest to the Congo which was next door to Burundi. It is also important to note that at that time round, Burundi had already conducted its elections and had a government in place and therefore deserving less attention than the Congo which was preparing for elections and if Burundi experience was anything to go by, there was need to pay more attention in the Congo elections so as to register same successes or better avoiding the pitfalls experienced in the Burundi elections.

The troop contributing countries and the powers particularly the members of the Security Council had agreed to increase the troop levels to a higher figure during the electioneering period in the Congo. This meant that the ending of the Burundi mission was a way to free some troops and make them available for redeployment in the Congo. The Kenyan battalion was the first in line to be earmarked for redeployment in the Congo though the authorities in Nairobi declined based on other strategic reasoning. The closure of the Burundi mission saw the redeployment of a Pakistan battalion and an aviation component to the Congo. Some UN staff also redeployed in the Congo plus sizeable material resources while the rest was redeployed in Lebanon.

Another area of concern by the Security Council particularly by the European powers was the growing need to re-focus resources to support the economies of the newly independent states emerging from the break-up of the Soviet Union¹⁰⁰ and the formation of a more economically vibrant European Union. Since some of these former soviet Union states were either gravitating towards joining the European Union or had already joined it, logically more resources were required to be channelled towards supporting this initiative to uplift their economic standing closer to their counterparts and not far away African states that were of little strategic value. Burundi was no exception in this arrangement. This was provided by the evidence of declined financial support in generally most African countries which had turned to be concentrated in the poorer European countries.

Following on the same interests is the Arusha Agreement itself which also did not clearly stipulate exit provisions. The methods employed to implement the Arusha agreements called into question many issues including what the UN was supposed to do. The first step in implementing the Arusha agreement came from Buyoya. Buyoya¹⁰¹ responded by lifting the ban on political parties and convening direct negotiations with the CNDD in September 1996. These had faltered by May 1997. However, his approaches to

¹⁰⁰ *World Bank Report*. 2004d. pp. 12-3

¹⁰¹ Buyoya Pierre, edited by David Gakunzi: *Building Peace in Burundi, Mission possible*: Paris, L'Harmattan. 1998. pp 65-77.

FRODEBU fared better and by May 1998 what remained of FRODEBU within the country (many of its members were in exile) re-entered the Government forming with Buyoya what came to be known as the *Partenariat Interieur*¹⁰².

Sensing the potential for progress, Secretary-General Kofi Annan first appointed Felix Moshia (from October 1997) and then Ayite Jean-Claude Kpakpo (from July 1998) as Senior United Nations Adviser to the Facilitator of the Burundi Peace process. Most of the time the facilitators were only in location and did not have a clear position on what the negotiation process was supposed to go. From this time on the warring factions saw the UN as a toothless bull dog since most of the work was done by the facilitator. They did not clearly understand the work of the UN adviser and it is through this understanding that was carried forward to see ONUB later after deployment and therefore a feeling that even if the mission was not in place, the facilitator was good enough without ONUB as one of the respondents interviewed put it.

By June 1998, Nyerere considered circumstances propitious once more for negotiations and convened 'Arusha II', the first in a sequence of talks that was to lead to the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. Designed to be all-inclusive, the talks were attended by UPRONA, FRODEBU, and a variety of smaller parties who would collectively become known as the "Arusha parties". There were 18 in total, underlining how challenging the negotiations were. However, the talks triggered splits in both the CNDD and PALIPEHUTU (*Parti pour la Libération dii Peuple Hutu*), which, together with its military wing the *Forces Nationales de Liberation* or FNL constituted the longest standing and most radical of the Hima-associated movements. They were not acting alone but behind them were the power games at play with the world powers offering differentiated support. Nyerere elected to proceed in the absence of PALIPEHUTU-FNL and CNDD-FDD (as the main factions resulting from the split would become known) and sought a political agreement between the "Arusha parties", trusting that a broader ceasefire agreement with the rebel groups would follow after. During this time round UN

¹⁰² Buyoya Pierre, edited by David Gakunzi: *Building Peace in Burundi, Mission possible*: Paris. L'Harmattan, 1998. p17.

was no where to be seen leaving alone influencing the outcome of the decisions and therefore the interests of the powers therefore pre-dominated.

The Arusha Agreement had envisaged a request to the UN for an international peacekeeping force (under Article 8 of Protocol 'V')¹⁰³. The December 2002 Ceasefire Agreement concluded with the CNDD-FDD and others. However, specified "verification and control of the ceasefire agreement ... by an African Mission" (Article III) perhaps an early indicator of the CNDD-FDD's antipathy towards the United Nations which would later become so apparent to elicit a need to call for its withdrawal. The Security Council's ambivalence towards the prospect of a UN peace operation versus the enthusiasm of a newly invigorated African Union, pressured by the key regional actors on Burundi, meant that the African option carried the day. The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was deployed in April 2003 with a mandate to oversee the implementation of ceasefire agreements, Support Demobilisation, Disarmament and Re-integration (DDR), prepare the ground for a fuller UN peacekeeping operation and promote political and economic stability. This situation of not knowing clearly who should do what persisted upto the end and the exit of the mission and therefore adding impetus to the exit.

¹⁰³ Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi 28 August 2000.

CHAPTER FIVE

Recapitulation, Conclusions and Recommendations

5.0 Introduction

This chapter recapitulates on our entire study. It sets out four main objectives: The first re-examines our two core objectives with a view to demonstrating the extent to which their set out tasks have been met. The Second objective is to examine our two hypotheses with a view to demonstrating the extent to which they are validated. The third aim anchors our conclusion and thesis of our entire study while the fourth responds to the third objective of our study; to proffer research based recommendations. To this end the chapter is organized around four parts: Part one treats our two objectives, part two discusses our two hypotheses, part three looks at the conclusion and recommendations.

5.1 (a) Internal politicking and the UN Exit.

In this section we examine our first objective; this objective sought to answer the pertinent question of what were the internal dynamics in Burundi that influenced the UN decision to pull out of Burundi? This objective was under girded by several assumptions; that the internal dynamics within Burundi provided a decisive phenomenon in ending the UN mission pre-maturely; second assumption was that a combination of misunderstanding and lack of good enough information coupled with suspicion were among the reasons for the early withdrawal of the UN troops. We examined several political and Socio - economic factors such as; Warring Factions, the electoral processes and the arguments for UN exit, Paucity of good will, the UN exit and the Gatumba Massacre.

This study was interested in finding out to what extent the warring factions affected the exit of the UN mission. After detailed analysis of their operations, networking, political links and the sources of their finances, the study arrived at several findings. The

competition by the warring factions to gain political power in Burundi and the politicking that went with it was one of the factors that informed the early exit of the UN. Following the results of the study it was found out that from the very beginning Burundi went through what was an internal conflict which took place within the confines of the territory of Burundi, it not only affected the country but other neighbouring countries and even far away countries that either provided assistance in form of troops but also mediators and sanctuary for the refugees the Burundi generated not forgetting the media coverage the country enjoyed worldwide. It was through the operations of the warring factions that generated most political heat that ONUB spent most of its time trying to overcome from the beginning to exit and therefore the inability to contain or put off this heat was one of the causes of the ONUB exit from Burundi.

Turning our attention to the electoral processes as a factor that caused the exit, the study found out that a lot of things took place in as far as the process was concerned that eventually caused the termination of the missions. It was clear from the study that on deployment the ONUB mission faced two main challenges, one to postpone the elections due to the short time that was left for its preparations or conduct the elections all together to offset the violence that was being witnessed in the country at the time within the short time that was available. Election in November 2004 was likely to offset a new wave of violence, while postponing elections was likely to undermine the legitimacy of the conflict. However, the election was one of the greatest contributions of the ONUB mission to the Burundian citizenry. There was agreement that ONUB's role in the conduct of elections in Burundi was "unimpeachable" and an "immeasurable contribution" to the cause of peace. The study further found out that despite all the successes registered in the election process, ONUB leadership came under the highest level of unending suspicion and formed the rallying point to the eventual call for withdrawal of the mission as the new government came to power.

In a situation such as what was experienced in Burundi, political good will is key to achieving UN set goals, a factor that formed the basis for mission and government official's relations which was wanting and therefore assisting to terminate the mission.

This was one of the major findings of this study. A good example where good will affected the UN operations during the mission is the mistrust that existed as a result of efforts to postpone the elections. Although the mistrust by the newly elected government started as far back as the times of the transitional government, its climax came as the first FNL talks were unfolding, during this time, ONUB was also obliged to work energetically on an extension to the transition timetable. At first, ONUB's instinct had been to press actors to stick to the timetable as originally envisaged, but with the transition formally ending on 31 October 2004, it soon became clear that there was little chance of accomplishing all the necessary tasks in that timeframe and therefore the inevitable postponement triggering mistrust and the political stand-off devoid of good will. The study found out that, this was a major cause of the eventual call for the UN to terminate its operations in Burundi.

Through the study, a factor examined was the Gatumba massacre. It was established that the Gatumba massacre also damaged ONUB's political credibility at a very early moment and permitted a degree of mistrust from regional actors and later used as one of the reasons listed to demand the ONUB mission termination. Through the study it was established that senior ONUB leadership concurred with a view held by senior actors within Burundi and the region that ONUB was effectively "set up" by the FNL to be damaged by the Gatumba massacre and therefore the eventual demand for its withdrawal.

Coupled with the political factors was an economic angle to it. Politics can not be de-linked with economics as the two exist hand in hand and this was the case in Burundi. The study found out that the parties were looking for an entity to blame in the many economic difficulties and the UN was susceptible to all manner of blame in as far as economic poor performance was concerned. It is worthy noting that this time round, the institutional capacity within the government was exceptionally low following the long conflict period, and the economy free for all, a situation that was experienced in the aftermath of falling coffee prices, the regional embargo, and the massive cutbacks in international aid. The UN therefore became a victim of circumstances in the economic problems being experienced in Burundi.

5.1(b) Internal UN Bureaucratic processes and termination of ONUB

The objective sought to answer the second question; what factors within the UN mission processes determines exit from the mission? Some of the assumptions made here included; UN missions have standing statutes that guide its operations from inception to exit, the statutes that exist are common to all the UN missions and that national governments are under obligation to support such missions processes. The main theme in this objective was examining and analyzing the factors within the UN mission processes underlying the decision to pull out of Burundi. The factors explored during the study included; first looking at the objectives development and mission termination, the second section looked at the UN timings for deployment and ONUB operations, while the third dealt with interests of the powers and termination of the mission.

The study examined closely the process through which UN establishes a mission from the beginning to exit as a key underlying factor. It also examined existing UN statutes with a view to evaluating UN decisions to commence or exit from missions. The study found out that there is little emphasis on exit in most of the existing statutes. There is a lot written about deployment but exit strategy is rarely emphasized thus giving exit a low rating in as far as UN statutes are concerned, yet there is no mission that deploys to stay for ever. All missions are established to accomplish a piece of work then leave. The way the missions finish their work is not given enough emphasis and some have even stayed for decades without plans to terminate their operations. This is a weakness as far as the UN is concerned. There should be a plan in place to exit on entry which has not worried the UN over the years. However, there was credible evidence that currently, UN decisions to commence or exit from missions revolve mainly around the Brahimi framework. The framework emphasizes “clear, credible and achievable mandates. In the first place the framework does not talk a lot about exit strategies but discusses achievable mandates which have a connotation of accomplishment and therefore exit at the end. Efforts were made to operationalize the Brahimi framework in the ONUB mission. However the framework just like it was the case in most UN missions, it was not fully put

into to operation and some recommendations were not implemented. The study established that ONUB mission exit traced its weaknesses that led to its early termination all the way from its inception through the underlying principles along which it operated up to the day it terminated its operations in Burundi. Issues like efforts to operationalize the Brahimi report and the fact that the mission was disintegrated from the beginning versus the need for integration, all combined to accelerate early exit.

Conceptually, entry into any conflict is a key parameter that needs to be evaluated critically. Intervention in conflict situations seek to establish the ripe moment for entry. Too early has its own shortcomings and equally so too late does not provide the desired effect to resolve it. Timing for deployment is one of the factors examined during the study. This is an issue that remained contentious in as far as the ONUB mission was concerned. Practical evidence available for the ONUB mission had it that ONUB came into being on 1 June 2004 and the new SRSG arrived in Bujumbura on 25 June 2004. The operation would soon grow to more than 5,500 military and civilian staff including more than 1,000 civilians.

This study gathered the information to the effect that, the long start path of Burundi's peace process, new agreements alternating with resummptions of violence and splits within factions and parties made determining the appropriate moment for entry and exit hard to determine. If conventional wisdom suggests that the UN should only try to keep the peace where there is a peace to keep, then this criterion is never as clear in practice as it might seem in theory. One view of ONUB's entry in Burundi, within the UN Secretariat was that the UN successfully resisted significant pressure to deploy a PKO until the peace process was all but irreversible "ripe" and the UN's contribution could thus be effective but this was not the case for exit. Logically a mission is supposed to terminate when all the issues enumerated in their mandate are meant, short of this, issues will be raised as it was the case for Burundi. In a nutshell, ONUB arrived at almost literally the last moment meaning that the mission had to overcome so many hurdles and even assume some which set the troubles for the mission to be realized later during termination. The timetable to complete the transition, established by the Arusha Agreement, was a strict one and any

deviation risked creating the impression of a crisis in the peace process. ONUB then literally rushed through most of the mandated tasks within the stipulated timeframe. This rush was subject to misinterpretation as it did happen and eventually was the cause of its exit as was found out by this study.

It was easy for the study to establish the interests of the powerful players within the UN body and the region at large, a factor examined during the study but it was not so easy to establish beyond any shadow of doubt the extent of the double interests of the same powers to have the mission stay or terminate and even when the interests started. To begin with, the study established that the Charter was written with the disasters of the previous years in mind with no accurate foresight on the shape and balance of the post-World Wars Period. The so called 'great powers', the framers of the Charter concentrated more on enforcement and dealing more with immediate causes of interstate disputes through the Security Council rather than the underlying causes of conflict and also did not factor in internal conflicts as was evident in the Burundi case. Coupled with this was the contradiction or influence by the contenting interests of world powers which was another factor that was at play in ending the UN mission. The interests of the world powers differed in degrees and dimensions, influenced by the value the world powers attach to their interests in given states or regions.

The study, found out that, in the case of Burundi at the time of UN exit the mission was not beneficial or of any strategic value either to the West or East coming after the end of Cold War and the drastic reduction of East /West suspicions. The mission only was supported by fears of situations such as what had happened in Rwanda and the international community feared degeneration to anarchy and the accusations that went with the Rwanda genocide. At the time of the Burundi mission termination, the war between Israel and Lebanon had gained significant dimension. This meant that the UN had to shift focus from the less important missions such as the Burundi one to focus resources both human and material to this direction influenced by the control exercised by the powers on UN both in passing resolutions at the security council and contribution of resources to support the UN operations. Without this support of both materials and

manpower the mission could not have been sustained any further and therefore the eventual exit.

5.2 Internal Political Dynamics and the Veto powers rationalized calculations Leading to termination of ONUB mission

The study proceeded with two hypotheses to proof or disproof based on earlier experiences of the UN the first was that; Internal dynamics in the politics of Burundi hurriedly animated the ONUB mission in Burundi and the second hypothesis was that the mission termination was a function of rationalized calculations of the objective achievement in line with cost calculations of the UN Security Council member nations.

This study set out to investigate the phenomenon in the light of these two but closely related mindsets. We believed that a combination of forces between the two resulted in the termination of the UN mission in Burundi. Based on the overriding assumption that due to the set processes in the UN peace Keeping methods, the outcomes can be predicted to a certain degree of accuracy all other variables held constant. In cases where exit occurs at a time when not expected as was the case in Burundi, the reasons could be sought in the host country political dynamics or the UN veto members rationalized calculations as hypothesises in this study. For a clearer picture of how each of these helped terminate the ONUB operations. We will discuss in detail one by one:

(a) Internal political Dynamics and Termination

Our first hypothesis was that internal dynamics in the politics of Burundi hurriedly animated the ONUB mission. This hypothesis is under girded by several assumptions; one of these assumptions is that due to the dynamic nature of the politics of a state, any politicking devoid of proper control could force a UN mission to terminate its operations. The second assumption is that the more the UN gets entangled in resolving a country's problems such as involvement in elections, the more the interpretations and misinterpretations by different players and observers which could adversely affect a

mission and therefore force a termination. The third assumption was that the more there were warring factions the less likely to deliver a solution that was satisfying to all.

The study undertook the task of exploring the validity of the hypothesis and the assumptions that underlie it. Through the examination of the political arena and the warring factions in the country at the time of agitation for the exit of ONUB several political forces aggravated by the warring factions were at play. The Gatumba massacre in particular provided the best example in this area among other examples as elaborated here; on the night of August 13th 2004, an armed group massacred more than 150 Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi) refugees at the Gatumba camp. Officials of the FNL claimed responsibility for the attack shortly afterwards. Not only did this outrage destroy the UN's initiative towards the FNL, it raised questions about information gathering and exchange within ONUB as well as between ONUB, the FAB and the UN mission in DR Congo (MONUC). The attack bore the hallmarks of long planning and its timing was almost certainly deliberately chosen to coincide with the visit of DRC Vice President Ruberwa (a Banyamulenge) to the camp on the same day. ONUB only became aware of the incident during a phone call from the MONUC SRSG William Swing to SRSG McAskie the following morning, some 10 hours after the attack.

It is important to note that it was, Burundi's army that was directly responsible for security at the camp, with the TGoB and later the newly elected government having consistently refused ONUB permission to patrol after curfew hours. Though another school of thought suggests the brutal political logic of Gatumba had more to do with FNL attempts to form a regional alliance with the FDLR, the Congolese-based remnants of the former Rwandan Genocidaires, the Interramwe. Yet others suggested that the FNL's only involvement was to fix the army in its Barracks while others the FDLR committed the massacre, and that the army knew in advance about the attack. Burundi's Government to date has not published its official report of the massacre claiming that it does not which to embarrass the DRC Government. The truth may never be known.

It is important here to look at the UN Mandate, it carefully stated that “without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional Government of Burundi,” ONUB should take steps “to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”. The mandate recognized therefore, that the UN troops would have to operate alongside Burundian armed forces controlled by a sovereign government who retained the primary responsibility to protect the civilian population. One would wonder at this point in time and question who would violate the human rights or cause insecurity to the civilians? Such joint operations would have involved a degree of reporting to, and information sharing with the Burundi security services that would have likely proven unacceptable to UNHQ. ONUB Forces’ role was thus necessarily somewhat circumscribed, particularly in instances where the Burundi army itself was the perpetrator of attacks against civilians.

With all this information, the burden rested with the UN. It was claimed that part of ONUB’s responsibility which it did not effectively execute was that of protecting vulnerable groups that became pivotal in the accusations when later the government was demanding the withdrawal of the mission and therefore the suspicion that the massacre was orchestrated to point at that direction by the government and not FNL as the government was trying to portray. This shows part of the wider political games that the UN had to endure and which partly caused its withdrawal, a clear indication that internal politicking was at the centre of the UN exit.

On the assumption that the more UN got involved in solving problems such as involvement in elections the more entangled it became. It was clear from the study that on deployment the ONUB mission faced two main challenges, one to postpone the elections due to the short time that was left for its preparations or conduct the elections all together to offset the violence that was being witnessed in the country at the time within the short time that was available. Though after evaluation of the logic that existed the UN ended up postponing the elections which put it at the centre of issues and accusations such as it was out to assist the TGoB. Had it not involved itself in the electioneering

process the situation may have been different. This therefore validly point the hypothesis to the direction earlier envisaged in the study.

(b) Veto Powers Rationalized Calculations and Termination.

The second hypothesis in this study is that the mission termination was a function of rationalized calculations of the objective achievement in line with cost calculations of the UN Security Council member nations. This view is supported by several assumptions; the first is that UN decisions are guided by the wishes of the five permanent members who hold veto powers. The second assumption is that UN peace keeping operations are driven by the likely gains assessed against other more deserving gains elsewhere. The third assumption is that the countries that contribute resources to sustain the UN mission dictate when the missions terminate their operations.

The validity of the assumption that UN decisions are guided by the wishes of the five permanent members who hold veto powers, the study undertook to explore the UN statutes and other relevant material and it was evident that from the very beginning, the UN Charter at its inception carries with it the interests of a few nations that were instrumental to its establishment. An example of such interests is that the founder states assigned themselves the largest role in determining the peace through their permanent representation in the Security Council (SC) and the right of veto. This is a key domain in determining the establishment of a mission and its termination. Several factors influence this, such as if a mission is not beneficial to the powers they will not support it.

On the assumption that UN peace keeping operations are driven by the likely gains assessed against other more deserving gains elsewhere is supported by the view that Burundi at the time of UN exit the mission was not beneficial or of any strategic value either to the West or East coming after the end of Cold War and the drastic reduction of East /West suspicions. The Burundi mission was only held in place by fears of situations deteriorating to a level that affects world peace such as what had happened in Rwanda. The international community feared degeneration to anarchy while the world watched

and the accusations that go with it such as the Rwanda genocide. To terminate such mission once the situation has been brought under reasonable control was easy and the best way forward to allow concentration elsewhere.

The control of resources means the control of UN operations. Resources which are mostly controlled by the wealthy nations particularly the permanent members of the Security Council are used to control UN operations. The inability to provide these resources means terminating such missions all together. At the time when the Burundi mission was at its climax many issues were also taking place in the international community. One area of concern by the Security Council particularly by the European powers was the growing need to re-focus resources to support the economies of the newly independent states emerging from the break-up of the Soviet Union and the formation of a more economically vibrant European Union. Since some of these former soviet Union states were either gravitating towards joining the European Union or had already joined it, logically more resources were required to be channelled towards supporting this initiative to uplift their economic standing closer to their counterparts and not far away African states that were of little strategic value. Burundi was no exception in this arrangement. This was provided by the evidence of declined financial support in generally most African countries which had turned to be concentrated in the poorer European countries. Refocusing these resources was the surest way to weaken the ONUB mission in Burundi and therefore the eventual withdrawal.

5.3 Conclusion

Managing the exit of a multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operation is a highly complex balancing act. The importance of deploying to the mission area at the right time is a primary parameter that directly determines a successful exit of the mission. Deploying either early or later has repercussions that could have far reaching exit consequences. The Burundi mission deployed late and therefore was forced to rush through most of the issues stipulated in their mandate. In another development, the mission lasted for a short period leading to an early exit from the mission without satisfactorily completing what they thought should have been accomplished in the

mission. Calibrating operation posture to such a crosscutting set of parameters must inevitably be a dynamic process. It is naive to imagine that the perfect operation could be designed and dropped onto a given context. Inevitably there were small miss-steps that, with the benefit of hindsight, was taken on the appearance of mistakes in exit calculus.

What complicated this still further is the time pressure under which ONUB operations had to be undertaken. Almost every PKO arrives late than might be desirable. In ONUB's case, the lateness had less to do with operation rollout but more to do with the reluctance of the Security Council and the UN Secretariat to authorize an operation in Burundi ostensibly, perhaps, due to the fact that two important peacekeeping imperatives collided: on the one hand, to mount a PKO only when peace is strongly in the offing; or on the other hand, to ensure that the timetable for the peace process/transition leaves sufficient time for the UN to exert its influence in effective fashion up to exit.

With deployment beginning only in June 2004, and a scant five months left on the transition calendar, ONUB had to hit the ground sprinting and kept running up to exit. Given this, ONUB's contribution to Burundi's return to peace and democracy was remarkable by any set of benchmarks. In less than 18 months, ONUB played a key role in shepherding a disparate set of actors through the final hurdles of implementing a complex and multi-faceted political agreement; it successfully managed the political perceptions at home and abroad with two postponements to the transition calendar. It oversaw the drafting of a new and inclusive Constitution; it organised no fewer than six electoral processes that met with near universal acclaim; it took key steps towards providing Burundi with unified, coherent and multi-ethnic armed forces and police; and it oversaw the peaceful transition to government under a former rebel movement, led by Burundi's second ever democratically elected President at the time of exit.

The other important issue in a multi-dimensional peacekeeping is what determines its exit which was the central concern in this research. Through the examination of a variety of issues that determined the UN exit from the Burundi peacekeeping mission, it was evident that a combination of both Burundi politics and internal dynamics within UN

processes were the cause of the early exit of the UN mission. One of the dynamics that determined the UN exit from Burundi was failure to ensure a balanced attention between a transitional government and opposition parties contesting to assume the leadership of the country. In the Burundi case, it involved careful attention to the recognized partners in a peace process while at the same time preserving an open channel to those assigned to the process. This did not seem to have gone very well. It required the provision of technical advice to governments of transition while remaining alert to the risks inherent in betting too much of the UN's political and other capital on such ephemeral administrations and in a world of proliferating mediators. It required striking an effective *modus operandi* with others, which could have assisted in building on their successes and reinforcing them rather than appearing to supplant them. All the same, of course, this calculus must be made in functions of directly operational demands of peacekeeping across multiple sectors which seemed wanting in the Burundi case.

However what remained more puzzling was the short duration that the mission lasted. Starting in June 2004 and ending in December 2006, it was one of the shortest missions in UN history and its exit was even more interesting crowned by both internal Burundi politics and dynamics of UN peace keeping processes that forced its exit leaving behind many questions unanswered which this study has opened for further academic discourse.

5.4 Recommendations

UN PKOs should be grounded on strong mandates backed by political will. Unless there is the political will and the military capacity to give such mandates full effect, their “dissuasive” impact may be limited and they may end up undermining the operation ‘political credibly. Conversely, peacekeeping operations should be determined to make use of strong mandates which need to consciously establish the precedent for using them from the beginning to the end.

From this study a clear lesson learnt is while “having a peace to keep” is an important principle for peacekeeping, this needs to be balanced against the ‘time pressure

introduced by deploying a PKO late on in a peace process and every effort must be made to catch up in the management of time least the mission exists without catching up and therefore the eventual exit which in most cases will be unplanned. There is therefore the need to make exit from a mission a key aspect of planning based on the time available for the mission. Exit should be planned in advance rehearsed during the mission processes and executed when time comes to exit which should stand on some planning criteria known to all mission managers.

PKOs must work closely with transitional administrations, but should ensure this does not compromise their relationship with potential successor administrations and in some circumstances it may be appropriate to appoint a new UN leadership after elections to signal a new beginning. A possible further recommendation suggested is that when a transition comes to an end, it may be prudent to consider replacing the entire echelon of top UN mission management in order to promote the confidence of the post- transition government which ensures an amicable conclusion of a UN Mission.

Building channels to other actors directly and opportunistically into UN Missions merits repetition elsewhere where a UN Mission is deployed. Noting that the dividing line between deployment and exit is thin, the same channels could be used to ensure a smooth exit which leaves no gaps that facilitate the resurgence of conflict.

The UN system needs to become more adept at the provision of behind-the-scenes technical assistance and political advice to mediation which must be a key task for the new Mediation Support Unit in DPA. Also, when a UN presence rapidly multiplies from a small and discreet political office to a large and visible peace operation it should take care of exit strategy to avoid destabilizing effects and broadly accepted divisions of labour amongst other actors that have arisen over the course of a long peace processes at the time of exit.

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