

**EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AND RESPONSE MECHANISMS IN AFRICAN  
CONFLICTS: THE CASE OF RWANDA, 1992-2010**

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**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  
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## DECLARATION

I declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree in any other University.



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CHRISTINE ACHIENG ONYANGO

9/11/2011

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Date

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.



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Dr. Ibrahim Farah

10/11/2011

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Date

## **DEDICATION**

To my God and Lord; my children for the understanding and encouragement they provided during all these years of study; and to all those who believe in the richness of learning.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I offer my regards and blessings to all of those who supported me in any respect during the completion of the project. I would like to acknowledge the inspirational instruction and guidance of Dr. Ibrahim Farah who has been the ideal project supervisor. His erudite advice, insightful criticisms, and patient encouragement aided the writing of this project in innumerable ways.

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Lastly, I wish to express my love and gratitude to my beloved family; for their understanding and endless love, through the duration of my studies. A very special thank you for your practical and emotional support as I added the roles of mother, to the competing demands of business, work, study and personal development. This work is for, and because of you and all the generations to come. It is dedicated to all our journeys in learning to thrive.

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>AU</b>	<b>African Union</b>
<b>CDR</b>	<b>Comité pour la Défense de la République</b>
<b>CEN-SAD</b>	<b>Community of Sahelo Saharan States</b>
<b>CIDMC</b>	<b>Centre for International Development and Conflict Management</b>
<b>COMESA</b>	<b>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</b>
<b>COSIMO</b>	<b>Conflict Simulation Model</b>
<b>DC</b>	<b>District Commissioner</b>
<b>DOP</b>	<b>Declaration of Principles</b>
<b>DPKO</b>	<b>Department of Peace-Keeping Operations</b>
<b>EAC</b>	<b>East African Community</b>
<b>ECCAS</b>	<b>Economic Community of Central African States</b>
<b>ECOWAS</b>	<b>Economic Community of West African States</b>
<b>EWC II</b>	<b>Second International Conference on Early Warning</b>
<b>EWR</b>	<b>Early Warning Response Mechanism</b>
<b>EWS</b>	<b>Early Warning System</b>
<b>FAR</b>	<b>Force Armée Rwandaise</b>
<b>FEWER</b>	<b>Forum for Early Warning and Early Response</b>
<b>GTZ</b>	<b>German Technical Cooperation</b>
<b>HEWS</b>	<b>Humanitarian Early Warning System</b>
<b>ICTR</b>	<b>International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</b>
<b>IDP</b>	<b>Internally Displaced Persons</b>
<b>IGAD</b>	<b>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</b>
<b>ISA</b>	<b>International Studies Association</b>
<b>KAIPTC</b>	<b>The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</b>
<b>MARAC</b>	<b>Mécanismes d'Alerte Rapide en Afrique Centrale</b>
<b>MRN</b>	<b>Mouvement Révolutionnaire National</b>
<b>MRND</b>	<b>Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement</b>
<b>NCO</b>	<b>National Congress Organisation</b>
<b>NGO</b>	<b>Non- Governmental Organization</b>
<b>NGOs</b>	<b>Non- Governmental Organizations</b>

<b>OAU</b>	<b>Organization of African Unity</b>
<b>OECD</b>	<b>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</b>
<b>OMC</b>	<b>Observation and Monitoring Centre</b>
<b>PDC</b>	<b>Parti Démocratique Chrétien</b>
<b>PL</b>	<b>Parti Liberal</b>
<b>PLO</b>	<b>Palestinian Liberation Organization</b>
<b>PSD</b>	<b>Parti Social Démocrate</b>
<b>RECs</b>	<b>Regional Economic Communities</b>
<b>RPF</b>	<b>Rwandan Patriotic Front</b>
<b>RTML</b>	<b>Radio Télévision des Mille Collines</b>
<b>SADC</b>	<b>Southern Africa Development Community</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>UN</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>UNAMIR</b>	<b>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</b>
<b>UNICTR</b>	<b>United Nations International Tribunal for Rwanda</b>
<b>UNHCR</b>	<b>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</b>

## **ABSTRACT**

**This study gives an overview of early warning and response mechanisms (EWR) in Africa which have not significantly improved over the past two centuries. Regarding historical aspects of early warning systems and response mechanisms, the study establishes that conflict EWR was conceived as a means of protecting and preserving life. Since its initial conceptualization, the field has evolved and EWR has been integrated into the policies of many governments and organizations. The study provides an overview to the Rwandan conflict, examines the existing early warning mechanisms in African conflict, and explores the theoretical explanation of conflicts and early warning systems and response mechanisms. The study establishes that preparedness, prevention and mitigation reduce the risk of conflicts. Using qualitative research methodology, the study asserts that when preventive measures are in place, the occurrence of violence is significantly reduced thus conflicts are averted. Taking Rwanda as a case study of the effectiveness of the existing EWR mechanisms and critiquing the same, the study proposes the best EWR mechanisms needed for effective risk management in conflict. This study therefore concludes that the availability of EWR mechanisms is important for conflict management especially in African context, hence makes the following key findings: That regional early warning systems and response mechanisms should focus on improving the quality of reporting; the warning-response link; and sensitivity of the value of evidence-based decision making in situations of violent conflict and state fragility. The international EWR on its part should explore the establishment of a new global network for early warning and response involving regional organizations, governments, and non-governmental agencies to address conflicts. The international EWR mechanisms should also endorse efforts to build internal capacity and functional external relations dealing with conflict-affected countries and situations of state fragility.**



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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

#### 1.0 Introduction

Although attempts to prevent conflicts through the use of early warning are inarguably a very recent phenomenon, the idea of war prevention is not new to Africa. As an important component of conflict prevention, conflict early warning is basically conceived as a mechanism for minimizing violence, and humanitarian crises that may threaten the sustainability of livelihoods human development.<sup>1</sup> Attempts to apply early warning in the realm of conflict prevention in the continent began in the 1990s, in line with global trends in conflict management and resolution which espoused a preventive approach towards violent conflicts.

The earliest effort in Africa was initiated in June 1992, when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) decided to establish a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution.<sup>2</sup>

This study will analyze situation of Rwanda at the time of the genocide and discuss the challenges to early warning. Early warning is a major element of disaster risk reduction. It prevents loss of life and reduces the economic and material impact of disasters. To be effective, early warning systems need to actively involve the communities at risk, facilitate public education and awareness of risks, effectively disseminate messages and warnings and ensure there is constant state of preparedness.

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<sup>1</sup> J. Davies, "Conflict Early Warning and Early Response for Sub-Saharan Africa: Crisis and Transition Tool Kit," Summary of Working Draft Submitted to Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, (University of Maryland, Maryland, 2000).

<sup>2</sup> J. Cillers, "Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa: What Role for the Civil Society?" in Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (eds.), *Resolution of African Conflict: The Management of Conflict Resolution and Post Reconstruction*, (Oxford: James Curry Publishers, 1998), p.39.

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In 2005, the World Conference on Disaster Reduction adopted the Framework for action 2005-2015 for building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters. This included clear references to the importance of early warning, and encouraged the development of “early warning systems that are people centered, in particular systems whose warnings are timely and understandable to those at risk including guidance on how to act upon warnings. The Third International Conference on Early Warning (EWC III) held in Bonn, Germany in March 2006 provided the opportunity to present new and innovative early warning projects and discussed natural hazards and risks around the world and how their impacts can be minimized through the implementation of people-centered early warning.<sup>3</sup> Some scholars have therefore observed thus:

“Countries that develop policy legislative and institutional frameworks for disaster risk reduction and that are able to develop and track progress through specific and measurable indicators has greater capacity to manage risks and to achieve widespread consensus for, engagement in, and compliance with disaster risk reduction measures across all sectors of society.”<sup>4</sup>

Nhara has also averred that “engaging in conflict prevention without an Early Warning system is like entering into a cave without a torch’.<sup>5</sup> Indeed out of the hundreds of conflicts faced by the world during the second half of the 20th century, one in four originated in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>6</sup> Seventy percent of the crises escalated into violence that ranged from sporadic use of force

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<sup>3</sup> The present document “Developing Early Warning Systems: A Checklist,” was developed as a conference outcome, to both inform and draw upon the discussions and practical examples raised during the conference, and to support the implementation of the early warning components of the Hyogo Framework for Action.

<sup>4</sup> Council of Europe, “Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters,” United Nations World Conference on Disaster Reduction, (Kobe, Japan, 18-22 January 2005), p.8.

<sup>5</sup> W. G. Nhara, “Early Warning and Conflict in Africa,” Occasional Paper no.1, presented at the Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, 1996, p.5.

<sup>6</sup>P. Okoth, “Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Role of the OAU and the AU,” in Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (eds.), *Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict Resolution and Post Reconstruction*, (Oxford: James Curry Publishers, 2008), p.4.

against the population to full-scale war. While the face of conflict changed since the Cold War from less frequent interstate to intrastate<sup>7</sup> the scale of violence did not.<sup>8</sup>

## **1.1 Statement of the Research Problem**

Africa has been regarded as a peaceful continent over the last century, with only a few major violent conflicts. Nonetheless, many situations of civil unrest and flagrant social inequalities are experienced every day in Sub Saharan countries, generating feelings of discontent and resentment in their populations, daily situations that call for research and critical analysis on the prospect for a conflict prevention.

An alert on upcoming crisis raise, the chances in preventing the situation from escalating into a serious crisis. A crisis is often the result of a number of negative events which ideally can be monitored. If monitored, information about these events data, combined with structural data about the country, can be analyzed resulting in predictions and warnings. To make predictions on negative/positive developments in a country, it is necessary to consider both short-term and long-term trends. Short-term trends can be analyzed by continuously monitoring local and regional events data. Long-term trends can be analyzed by looking at a country's structural data over a period of several years.

Conflicts are preventable and are not a fatality. A conflict is announced early by a multitude of converging signals which may not be visible at all. Since the beginning of the millennium, the

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<sup>7</sup> "Measuring Systemic Peace," Center for Systemic Peace. The indicators used by the center's assessment included security, governance, economic, and social dimensions of state performance,

<sup>8</sup>J. L. Davies and T. R. Gurr, "Preventive Measures: An Overview," in John L. Davies and Ted R. Gurr (eds.), *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1998), p. 2.

African continent multiplies the initiatives to set in place modern early warning system. These early warning systems allow anticipating the occurrence of natural or manmade catastrophes, be it in the health sector, in the access to natural resource, or in the political realm. At the level of Africa, the African Union is currently working on the establishment of an integrated continental early warning system.<sup>9</sup>

Most observers and practitioners even agree on the role of such a system; that it should be designed around objectives which are the result of cooperation and coordinated action among a range of actors. Most also agree that the coordinated short term action strategies that have characterized international intervention in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda are not enough to support the new challenges resulting from ever-increasingly complex emergencies. The question of whether it is simply early warning that is needed or the political will to initiate political action at the highest levels within the UN and among states is equally relevant here.

The aim of this study is to explore the current debate around the concept and practice of conflict prevention, taking into account experience of many international organizations. The study aims to analyze different early warning systems implement worldwide, in order to create or adapt a specific model to the requirements of the African continent, using Rwanda as the case study. The study raises the following fundamental question which early warning modes are likely to translate into preventive action? How can such modes lead to intrinsic changes? From these the following specific questions can be derived to guide the study:

- i) What are the existing conflict early warning mechanisms in Africa?

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<sup>9</sup> D. Wisler and E. H. Ateya, "Public Conference on the Conflict Early Warning Systems" Presented at the University of Khartoum (Peace Research Institute) in the Sudanese national capital, Khartoum, 11 and 12<sup>th</sup> of April 2006.

- ii) What measures have the African Union taken to strengthen early warning systems in Africa?
- iii) What are the main challenges and constraints that lead to failure like the Rwandan case in 1994?

## **1.2 Objective of the Study**

This study generally aims at critically examining the early warning mechanisms in Africa with a view to explain why the Rwandan genocide was not prevented. From this objective the following specific ones are derived:

- i) To provide an overview of the Rwandan conflict;
- ii) To examine the existing EWR mechanisms in Rwanda; and
- iii) To explore the theoretical explanation of conflicts and EWR mechanisms.

## **1.3 Literature Review**

Literature review will take cognizance of four main categories. Literature on Early Warning System and Response; the second part shall review literature on Rwanda; thirdly literature on African conflicts will be reviewed and, finally literature on Early Warning Systems and Response in Africa with specific focus on Rwanda shall be reviewed.

### **1.3.1 Early Warning System Literature Review**

The concept of early warning cannot be ignored considering the negative impacts of violent conflicts which can be avoided most of the time. An effective early warning must be broad-



based, scientific and based on local perspectives in order to generate prompt response.<sup>10</sup> There are different definitions and scholarly perspectives on the definition of early warning and its mechanisms. This will include the perspectives from Africa and Europe based on differing experiences. Rupesinghe concludes that early warning is about *information that can provide a timely alert to potential conflicts*.<sup>11</sup> Early Warning system as such is a useful management tool and provides an ongoing learning process for those who are to utilize it. Such a system therefore will collect information and data on the social, economic, political, religious, cultural, educational, resource utilization, and military situations. Rupesinghe on the other hand, views early warning as an instrument of preventive diplomacy. Accordingly its objective is early detection of developments that may result in the eruption of violence. As such, it is a specific aspect of the more general concept of conflict prevention. In this view early warning refers to situations in which conflicting goals are controlled to avoid the development of hostilities.<sup>12</sup>

Tidwell, offers advices that conflict will be well understood and clarified if it is divided into functional, situational and interactive types.<sup>13</sup> Conflict prevention for Versteegen, the aim of what she calls conflict prognostication, can be approached in three main ways: the theoretical concern of predictability, regarding issues of reliability and validity in early warnings and risk assessments; the practical concern of action, regarding operational concerns of how to respond; and the concern of desirability, regarding political issues of sovereignty and non interference. For conflict early warning purposes, Versteegen says there is a weakness in focusing on specific

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<sup>10</sup> K. Rupesinghe, 'Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy,' The Journal of Ethno-Development. vol. 4, 1994, pp. 88-98.

<sup>11</sup> K. Rupesinghe, 'Introduction,' in K. Rupesinghe, and M. Kuroda, (eds.), *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 194-214

<sup>12</sup> K. Rupesinghe, 'Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy,' The Journal of Ethno-Development. vol. 4, 1994, pp. 88-98.

<sup>13</sup> A.C. Tidwell, Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution. (London, 1998).

types of conflict, such as ethnic, communal, state failure, genocide, politicide, and human rights violations, among others. The danger is that conflicts are rarely mono-causal.<sup>14</sup>

Conflict early warning is part and parcel to conflict prevention; however, it differs from other conflict mitigation efforts because it applies to pre-conflict stages. While early action is important in peace building and conflict management, these applications apply only after conflict erupts, escalates, and subsides. The difference is important for Schmeidl, for if early warning initiatives become mixed with conflict management, there is a tendency to shape its analysis in favor of policy promotion. Thus, is it difficult, if not impossible, to tailor an indicators list to only estimate a particular kind of conflict. Schmeidl describes the focus of conflict early warning practice in the Horn of Africa as simply violent conflict that can lead to, “destruction, instability and humanitarian disaster.”<sup>15</sup>

The situation becomes even more complex because stakeholders often disagree about how to perceive a risk.<sup>16</sup> Sometimes there is simply no unambiguous interpretation available about what is known or knowable. Furthermore, in many cases early warning is necessarily probabilistic, while at the same time the probability characteristics are poorly understood, and consequently false warning rates are high.<sup>17</sup> Kuroda from a different perspective views it as a tool for preparedness, prevention and mitigation with regard to disasters, emergencies, and conflict

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<sup>14</sup> S. Versteegen, “Conflict Prognostigation: Toward a Tentative Framework Vulnerability,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 45, no.1, 1999, pp. 3-31.

<sup>15</sup> C. Mwaura, and S. Schmeidl, “Conflict Early Warning and Prevention: Toward a Coherent Terminology,” in *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*, (Asmara Eritrea: The Red Sea Press, 2002), pp. 43-99.

<sup>16</sup> C. Mwaura, “Regional Early Warning and Conflict Management Mechanisms” in *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*, (Asmara Eritrea: The Red Sea Press, 2002), p. 100. See also S. Versteegen, ‘Conflict Prognostigation: Toward a Tentative Framework Vulnerability,’ *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1999, Vol.45, pp. 3-31.

<sup>17</sup> R. Basher, “Global early warning systems for Natural Hazards: Systematic and People-Centered,” *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society*, vol. 364, August 15, 2006, pp. 2167-2182.

situations, whether short or long-term ones.<sup>18</sup> Whereas preparedness, prevention and mitigation, as the three pillars of an Early Warning system, are of critical importance in understanding the purpose of such a system, it is of no use unless there is the capability for a timely reaction.

Barrs on the other hand views early warning as a complimentary activity between the external and the internal. In this regard the local knowledge helps to solidify the regional and international mechanisms and thus lends credence to the actions supposed to be taken. Early warning in this sense means not only gathering data analyzing the data and developing strategic response; options which contingent to local and international resources. It's a combination of these that not only brings about an early warning response that is also appropriate.<sup>19</sup>

### 1.3.2 Literature Review on Rwanda

Howard and Astri, authors of "The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience," argue that, early warning serves the common good and thus differs from traditional intelligence.<sup>20</sup> A crucial, yet so far mainly under-reflected, issue is the question of *who* is going to be warned and *who* is supposed to act upon this warning. A well-established definition<sup>21</sup> sees early warning as the act of alerting a recognized authority such as

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<sup>18</sup> M. Kuroda, "Early Warning Capacity of the UN System," in Kumar Rupensinghe and Michiko Kuroda (eds.), *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*, ( St Martin's Press: New York, 1992), p. 217.

<sup>19</sup> B. Casey, "Conflict Early Warning: Warning for Who?" *Journal of Humanitarian Affairs*, vol. 2, 2006.

<sup>20</sup> H. Adelman, and S. Suhrke, "Early Warning and Response: Why the International Community Failed to Prevent the Genocide," *Disasters*, vol.20, no. 4, December, 1996.

<sup>21</sup> D. Walter, "Early and Late Warning by the UN Secretary General of Threats to Peace: Article 99 Revisited," in Albrecht Schnable and David Carment (eds.), *Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality, Volume II: Opportunities and Innovations* (Lexington Books, Latham, ML, 2004), pp. 305-344.

the UN Security Council to a new or renewed threat to peace at a sufficiently early stage.<sup>22</sup> Barrs states, we typically wire that warning toward ourselves so we can take action. But we have given much less thought to *also* warning those who are about to be attacked. Thus, the underlying assumptions of most early warning systems is that international actors will take over responsibility as protectors as soon as adequate information is being processed along with rules and procedures for initiating appropriate action at the level of an international or regional organization.<sup>23</sup>

Despite the work being done in the UN, national governments and at the regional level to develop mechanisms for early warning of conflicts, prevention, mitigation and resolution of conflicts, we still lack real consensus on how to get broader participation in global-scale decision-making.<sup>24</sup> One solution, suggested by Cottey relies on the development of approaches which are less dependent on the short-term attention and narrow interests of particular states and governments. He further adds that strengthened international organizations, whose action does not always depend on the active support of governments, are one way forward.<sup>25</sup> Others would conclude that as a result of recent developments in the UN system and at regional levels “a humanitarian early warning system for the delivery of emergency aid is in place, but a conflict management one is not;”<sup>26</sup> and still others would add that “the debate on early warning has not yet

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<sup>22</sup> A. Ahmed and E. Voulieris, “The Humanitarian Early Warning System: From Concept to Practice,” in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 210. See also C. Susanna and M. Patrick, “Deciding to Prevent Violent Conflict: Early Warning and Decision-making within the United Nations,” Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, (Chicago, 2007).

<sup>23</sup> B. Casey, ‘Conflict Early Warning: Warning Who?’ *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, vol. 2, 2006.

<sup>24</sup> P. Brecke, “What Stirs Concern is What Might Need to be done,” *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 39, supplement 2, October, 1995.

<sup>25</sup> A. Cottey, “Early Warning and Conflict Prevention,” *Refuge*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1995.

<sup>26</sup> H. Adelman, *Difficulties in Early Warning Networking and Conflict Management*, (Clingendael, The Netherlands, 1996).

moved forward to deal with the issue of the process link between early warning analysis and effective preventive action.<sup>27</sup> Or that preventive action must be an integral part of early warning, “to address the issue of preventing large-scale conflicts and bloodshed by way of a quick and effective procedure for bringing impending violent situations to the attention of the Security Council.”<sup>28</sup> Rupesinghe views preventive action as integral to early warning and links the two with preventive diplomacy. He further takes the view that preventive action needs to be based on comprehensive contingency plans for entire regions of conflict and that regional bodies “may prove better equipped than States or the UN to deal with [the prevention of conflicts at an early stage.

Rubin and Jones bring to bear a Meta analysis of prevention at three levels. The analysis factors in trigger, proximate and the underlying sources, as elements to be addressed if early warning is to work. In dealing with Jones recommends operational prevention; this involves political or military usage to check the escalation into violence. While the structural prevention addresses itself to proximity and calls for a regulatory framework that reduces the risks, the systemic level on the other addresses the underlying sources.<sup>29</sup> Campbell and Meier introduce issue of timing by distinguishing midterm and long-term issues.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>J. Cockell, “Draft Early Warning Analysis Framework,” paper prepared by the Peacebuilding and Democratic Division, Global Issues Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada, 1996.

<sup>28</sup> K. Rupesinghe and Michiko Kuroda (eds.), “Introduction”, *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*, (St Martin’s Press, New York, 1992), pp.194-214.

<sup>29</sup> R. Barnett and D. Bruce, ‘Prevention of Violent Conflict: Tasks and Challenges for the United Nations,’ *Global Governance*, 2007, pp. 391-408.

<sup>30</sup>C. Susanne and P. Meier, “Choosing to Prevent Violent Conflict: Early Warning and Decision-Making at the United Nations,” *Partners for Conflict Reduction (PCR)*, 2007.

While early warning is an integral and necessary tool for any mechanism to prevent and manage conflict, prevention may not always be possible. However, early warning allows for action that may affect the political causes of conflict in particular. Gurr and Scarritt<sup>31</sup> have determined that there are at least 261 minority groups at risk in 99 countries. With early warning three components can be differentiated as estimating the magnitude and timing of relative risks of emerging threats, analyzing the nature of these threats and describing plausible scenarios, and communicating warning analyses to decision makers.<sup>32</sup> Perhaps ninety-nine percent of what we read about conflict early warning refers to regional or international mechanisms. They are egocentric in that they are primarily built by outsiders to be used by outsiders.

Gurr's work with Harff on state repression of groups considered as outsiders indicates that there have been 44 instances of genocide and politicide in all world regions since 1945, with estimated casualties numbering between seven and sixteen million people.<sup>33</sup> Rummel contends that, "*the world-wide risk of being killed by one's own government because of one's race, ethnic group, politics, etc. is more than three times greater than the risk of war.*"<sup>34</sup> Focusing specifically on Africa, Gurr indicates that since 1960, 28 full-fledged civil wars have been fought in Africa, in addition to the protracted proto-revolutionary conflict in South Africa; and eleven genocides and politicides occurred in Africa between 1960 and the late 1980's, compared with 24 elsewhere in

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<sup>31</sup>T.R. Gurr and J. Scarritt, "Minorities Rights at Risk: A Global Survey," Human Rights Quarterly 11, August, 1989, pp. 375-405.

<sup>32</sup>W. Lawrence, 'The Effects of Cognitive Biases on Early Warning' Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, United States Institute of Peace, March 2008), p. 3.

<sup>33</sup>B. Harff and T.R. Gurr, "Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases since 1945," International Studies Quarterly vol. 32, September 1998, pp. 359 - 371.

<sup>34</sup>R. Rummel, "Deadlier than War", Institute of Public Affairs Review, vol. 2, August -October 1987.

the world.<sup>35</sup> In examining the extent operational Early Warning Systems are able to identify areas of tension in sufficient time that preventive action remains possible and efficient, the central question in this is: whether (in whatever way possible) a tension-meter can be developed from which it is possible to gauge the span of time over which states and the world community must sound the alarm and begin a process of early warning.<sup>36</sup>

### 1.3.3 African Conflicts and Early Warning Review

A part from undermining the promise of African democratization and development, armed conflicts contribute to political decay, facilitate state collapse, cause widespread human right violations, facilitate state collapse, cause wide spread human right violations, generate refugees and internally displaced person (IDP). African conflicts do not primarily stem from ethnic diversity, despite the horrific level of ethnic violence and genocide as witnessed in Rwanda and Burundi. Despite the encouraging recession in the number of armed conflicts in Africa, the positioning of African states at a transitional crossroads renders them more likely to experience periods of instability as they move towards establishing new socio-economic and political frameworks. As Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka have rightfully remarked, “African states face a quadruple as compared to a triple for Eastern Europe and a double for Latin America] transformation: they must negotiate ethnic diversity at the same time as they are building state capacity, democratizing political systems and liberalizing economic institutions.”<sup>37</sup> All these

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<sup>35</sup> T.R. Gurr and J. Scarritt, “Minorities Rights at Risk: A Global Survey,” Human Rights Quarterly, 11<sup>th</sup> August, 1989, pp. 375-405.

<sup>36</sup> H. De Lange, “The Causes of Political violence and War, Particularly in the Third World,” NCO Congress Paper, 1994, p.19. See also J. Leatherman, and R. Väyrynen, Structure, Culture and Territory: Three Sets of Early Warning Indicators, (1995), p. 6.

<sup>37</sup> B. Berman and D. Eyoh and W. Kymlicka, ‘Introduction’. Ethnicity and the Politics of Democratic Nation-building in Africa,” in Berman, B., Eyoh, D. and W. Kymlicka, (eds.), *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*, (Oxford/Athens (Ohio): James Currey/Ohio University Press, 2004)), p. 15.

transformation processes are a recipe for competition, heightened contestations and, if not well managed, violent confrontations.

In 1990, the Organization for Africa Unity (OAU) rededicated itself, to work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all conflicts.<sup>38</sup> Out of this agreement came the plan to develop and implement a continental-wide early warning system for its member states, the Secretary General of the OAU, the central organ and partner non-governmental organizations (NGOs).<sup>39</sup> However, the OAU began exploring the viability of an early warning system, some member states expressed fears that the warnings would be criticized or even repressed by defensive governments not open to perceived external criticism.<sup>40</sup> The OAU eventually gave way to the creation the African Union, during Durban Summit of 2002.<sup>41</sup> In December 2003, the AU member states established the Peace and Security Council and mandated it “anticipate and prevent conflicts” through a functioning continent-wide early warning system (EWS). Article 12 of the protocol describes. The EWS as consisting of a monitoring center called “The Situation Room” where data on “political, economic, social, military and humanitarian” indicators are collected and analyzed. The Situation Room also coordinate efforts of regional bodies tasked with similar responsibilities.<sup>42</sup>

In July 2005, an AU commission drafted roadmap that covered areas of data collection, analysis, and indicators, along with the mode to coordinate the reports with decision-makers; the AU,

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<sup>38</sup>J. Malan., Conflict Resolution Wisdom from Africa. (African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes Durban, South Africa, 1997), p.121.

<sup>39</sup> W. G. Nhara, “Early Warning and Conflict in Africa,” Occasional Paper no.1, presented at the Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, 1996, p.5.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> African Union, “*African Union In A Nutshell*,” 2007, p.1.

<sup>42</sup>IGAD: Protocol of the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States, Djibouti, 2002.



Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and other stakeholders.<sup>43</sup> Other efforts are within sub regional organizations in African. In 1999 for example the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed on a protocol to establish an Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC), which would collect process and analyze data, and produce reports on its fifteen member states for the Executive Secretary.<sup>44</sup> The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is still in the process of creating the Central African Early Warning Mechanism (*Mécanisme d'Alerte Rapide en Afrique Centrale*-MARAC). Its protocol calls for a network of offices, a staff of inter-disciplinary experts, and a situation room for, "data collection and analysis in order to prevent crises and conflicts."<sup>45</sup> The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) established the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) to focus on violent conflict that ranges in scale from low level violence (such as that which occurs in pastoral areas and along borders) to that of intra- and inter-state war.<sup>46</sup> Its tasks are similar to the other REC initiatives. Other RECs, such as the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahelo Saharan States (CEN-SAD), and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) do not yet have an agreed upon functioning system or are finishing the development of one.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Africa Union Report on Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa: Towards Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System," in African Union (eds.), *Conflict Management Division of the Peace and Security Department, African Union Commission, Concept paper,* (African Union, Kempton Park, South Africa, 2006).

<sup>44</sup> ECOWAS Newsletter, Issue 2 March, 2007, ECOWAS.

<sup>45</sup> J. Cilliers, "Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa," Institute for Security Studies, 2002, ISS Paper no. 102.

<sup>46</sup> S. Susanne, "Conflict Early Warning and Prevention: Toward a Coherent Terminology," in S. Schmeidl and Ciru Mwaura (eds.), *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa,* (Asmara, Eritrea: The Red Sea Press, 2002), pp. 43-67.

<sup>47</sup> IGAD: Protocol of the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States, Djibouti 2002.

Nhara suggests that an early warning system for the African context should be based on a number of methodologies; rather than detail how their incorporation into one system might appear. However, he merely lists general sources of information to include: historical surveys and analyses of events, analyses of the content of documents and reports, comparative analyses of relevant information, physical inspections and field visits, statistical sampling and inference, operations research techniques, economic and econometric analysis, and modeling and remote sensing.<sup>48</sup> This enumeration offers little explanation as to how the analyst might process the information, except to say that the responsible agency should store it in a database.

True to their “generic” classification, the list ran the gamut of background, trigger, and accelerator type indicators, for which an indicators-based model would serve the creation a continental-wide early warning system. The organization’s efforts are not the first of its kind in Africa, but mark an important change as the region’s decision makers seek to no longer rely on the outside.

The application of early warning in the realm of conflict prevention in the Africa was started in the 1990s in line with a global trend in conflict management and resolution which espoused a preventive approach towards violent conflict. The 1990s are crucial datelines in the discussion of conflict early warning systems both globally and in Africa. Globally, since the late 1990s, early warning and conflict prevention have become high-priority areas for multilateral organizations and, the highest levels, there is growing political will for more effective

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<sup>48</sup>W. G. Nhara, “Early Warning and Conflict in Africa,” Occasional Paper no.1, presented at the Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, 1996, p.5.

institutional approaches.<sup>49</sup> Africa's very first attempt at establishing a conflict early warning unit was initiated in June 1992, 'when the Organization of African Unity decided to establish the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.'<sup>50</sup> However, the OAU did not manage to establish a fully-operational early warning system for a number of reasons to be explained at a later stage of this.

The worst may still lie in the future if Africa remains a spectator to its own demise. In another global survey of minorities at risk of involvement in future conflict, and at risk of victimization, Gurr and Scarritt<sup>51</sup> identified 74 such communal groups among 29 per cent of the total regional population in Africa, a proportion far higher than in any other region in the world. to reduce conflict.

#### **1.3.4 Early Warning Review and the Rwanda Case Literature Review**

The idea of EW in cases of genocide was probably advanced first by Israel Charny, a clinical psychologist. Harff argues that she was interested in identifying local, national and international factors that enabled elites to commit crimes against humanity and get away with it.<sup>52</sup> In the assessment of early warning failure in Rwanda, Stein and Jones argue that within large organizations, information tends to move too slowly up the chain of command. Leaders of large organizations tend to discount important information that requires a response. If the current humanitarian emergency in the Great Lakes has taught us anything, it is that we do not have an

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<sup>49</sup> S. Srinivasan, "Minority Rights, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Lessons from Darfur." Minority Rights Group International Micro Paper, 2006.

<sup>50</sup> B. T. Tiruneh, "Establishing an Early Warning System in the African Peace and Security Architecture: Challenges and Prospects". KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 29.

<sup>51</sup> T.R. Gurr and J. Scarritt, "Minorities Rights at Risk: A Global Survey," Human Rights Quarterly, 11 August, 1989.

<sup>52</sup> B. Harff, "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955," American Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 1, 2003, pp. 57-73.

effective international system for intervention in humanitarian emergencies. Following the previous crisis in Rwanda in 1994, lessons learned exercises stressed the need for an early warning system whose warnings would result in the initiation of appropriate responses on behalf of those displaced by conflict and coercion.<sup>53</sup>

Adelman and Suhrke posit that early warning was less critical in Rwanda than the willingness to respond. The failure to respond adequately, however, was influenced by poor and unsystematized systems for the collection and analysis of available data that resulted in a failure to translate what was available into effective and strategic plans for action. “Information and analysis are critical, the authors argue, not only in anticipating a crisis, but in determining the appropriate response in a particular situation.”<sup>54</sup>

The international community today is hardly in a position to avoid genocide, as witnessed in Rwanda in 1994, despite the significant evolution of early warning systems in recent years. Based on a review of the literature on early warning and response, as well as inputs from surveyed agencies, *Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse* assesses the value and role of early warning for the prevention of violent conflict and identifies the most effective early warning and response systems. It concludes with a set of recommendations for policy makers in donor and partner countries in influencing future developments in this field. The author inquires whether there are early warning and systems prepared for the conflicts of the future and value

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<sup>53</sup> J. Bruce and G. Stein, *NGOs and Early Warning: The Case of Rwanda*, (1997).

<sup>54</sup> H. Adelman and A. Suhrke, “Early Warning and Conflict Management”, in *International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, (Copenhagen, 1996), p.11.

and role in the prevention of violent conflict for peace building. He concludes that early warning and response system require further support to ensure their future relevance.<sup>55</sup>

Adelman and Lund have outlined several difficulties with moving from early warning to early response. These have revolved around the role and motivation of the intervener and have included: the press of daily commitments, humanity versus selfishness, confusion of the intervention and noise.<sup>56</sup> The latter refers to more pressing matters, such as actual violent rather than potentially violent conflicts, that tend to override the prevention of conflict with the management of conflict.<sup>57</sup> One significant factor is the by-stander syndrome. The review of this syndrome is currently being undertaken within the socio-psychological field by academics such as Levine.<sup>58</sup> Although Levine asks the same questions as those posed by early warning experts, namely why was there no responsive action, there has been, as yet, little or no application to the conflict setting. As Staub asserts the by-stander plays a central part in the establishment and maintenance of human rights abuses. By turning away or remaining passive in the face of threats to human life, the conditions for genocide are maximized.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>D. Nyheim, *Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Response*, (Development Co-operation Directorate - Policy Division, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris, 2009).

<sup>56</sup>H. Adelman and M. Lund, "Early Warning and Conflict Management", in *International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, (Copenhagen, 1996), p. 34.

<sup>57</sup>M. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflict: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

<sup>58</sup>R.M. Levine, "Rethinking Bystander Non-Intervention: Social Categorization and the Evidence Of witnesses at the James Bulger murder trial," *Human Relations*, 1999.

<sup>59</sup>E. Staub, "The origins and Prevention Of Genocide, Mass Killing, Peace And Conflict," *Journal of Peace Psychology*, 1999.

### 1.3.5 Literature Gap

There seems to be enough literature in the area of EWR in Africa. Harff identified key ethnic groups on areas where internal violence and civil wars are more prevalent and in terms of early warning what to look at.<sup>60</sup> In her study, she identifies a number of accelerators, decelerators and triggers, assessing a situation and potentials of a longer term larger conflict. When assessing early warning responses, mechanisms, signals there is need to do to have a regular monitoring of the situation in order to come up with efficient mechanisms of early warning and early response and tracing of the accelerators, decelerators and triggers.<sup>61</sup>

On the theory of early warning there is need to focus into the structural conditions which cause conflicts so when analyzing early warning and early response, whether the response is on the violence or the structural conditions which promote the conflict.<sup>62</sup> In terms of the literature and strategies it is better to differentiate between what are the structural conditions or causes or what may be defined as the proximate causes of such occurrences. In terms of early warning do all conflicts emit early warning signals, and how do to identify them before violence escalate. There is need to address structural causes and what needs to be done so that people can generate responses to conflict prevention and early warning.

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<sup>60</sup> B. Harff, "A Theoretical Model of Genocides and Politicides" The Journal of Ethno-Development, July 1994, Vol. 4, No. 1—Special Issue.

<sup>61</sup> H. Adelman and A. Suhrke, "Early Warning and Conflict Management", in *International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, (Copenhagen, 1996).

<sup>62</sup> T. R. Gurr, , "Testing and Using a Model of Communal Conflict for Early Warning," Journal of Ethno-Political Development, Vol. 4, No. 1, July 1994, p. 20.

## **1.4 Hypotheses**

The study will test the following hypotheses;

- i. Ethnicity leads to conflict;
- ii. The lack of Early warning systems and response mechanisms led to the Rwandan genocide;
- iii. There is a correlation between conflict and early warning systems and response mechanisms.

## **1.5 Justification of the Study**

This study can be justified on the grounds that it will analyze the Rwandan genocide case in relations to the Early Warning Systems and Response. There has not been any other study specifically done along this line. In this sense it will contribute to knowledge by highlighting some of the challenges faced which undermined action taken. In terms of policy the findings of this study will help in decisions making in future in order to avoid a repeat of what occurred in Rwanda. Decision-makers need to be able to set priorities for timely and effective response to a disaster when information is received from early warning system. In this way the study modestly helps to prepare African policy makers to handle a crisis similar to that as in Rwanda and avoid genocide. The scientific community and policy-makers should outline the strategy for effective and timely decision-making by indicating what information is needed by decision-makers. Institutional networks should be developed with clear responsibilities.

## 1.6 Conceptual Framework

Early Warning Systems (EWS) are examples of measures related to preparedness, and complement other measures such as the implementation of emergency committees, emergency planning, posting evacuation routes, simulations, and exercises.<sup>63</sup> Preparation, if not prevention, necessitates the need to improve conflict early warning capabilities.<sup>64</sup> Conflict Preparedness involves forecasting and taking precautionary measures prior to an imminent threat when advance warnings are possible. Preparedness planning improves the response to the effects of a conflict by organizing the delivery of timely and effective response.

Preparedness involves the development and regular testing of warning systems (linked to early response systems) and plans for measures to be taken during a conflict alert period to minimize potential loss of life and physical damage. It also involves the education and training of officials and the population at risk, the training of intervention teams, and the establishment of policies, standards, organizational arrangements and operational plans to be applied following a conflict. Conflict early warning is part and parcel to conflict prevention; however, it differs from other conflict mitigation efforts because it applies to pre-conflict stages.

While early action is important in peace building and conflict management, these applications apply only after conflict erupts, escalates, and subsides. For early warning systems to be effective, it is essential that they be integrated into policies for violence mitigation. Good governance priorities include protecting the public from violence through the implementation of

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<sup>63</sup>J. Carlos Villagran de Leon, "Early Warning Systems: A Tool for Mitigation and Coordination," Paper presented at EWC II conference in Bonn, Germany, October 2003.

<sup>64</sup>H. Miall, O. Ramsbotham, T. Woodhouse, "Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts," Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999.



violence risk reduction policies. Violence risk reduction measures require long term plans and early warning should be seen as a strategy to effectively reduce the growing vulnerability of communities and assets.

The information provided by early warning systems enables authorities and institutions at various levels to immediately and effectively respond to violence.<sup>65</sup> It is crucial that local government, local institutions, and communities be involved in the entire policymaking process, so they are fully aware and prepared to respond with short and long-term action plans. The early warning process, as previously described, is composed of 4 main stages: risk assessment, monitoring and predicting, disseminating and communicating warnings, and response. Within this framework, the first phase, when short- and long-term actions plans are laid out based on risk assessment analysis, is the realm of institutional and political actors.<sup>66</sup> Then EW acquires technical dimension in the monitoring and predicting phase, while in the communication phase EW involves both technical and institutional responsibility.

The response phase then involves many more sectors, such as national and local institutions, non-governmental organizations, communities, and individuals. The argument is that with regard to risk management in EWR, preparedness, prevention and mitigation reduces the risk of conflicts. When preventive measures are in place, the occurrence of violence is significantly reduced thus conflict shall be averted. Similarly, preparedness by having the correct EWR mechanisms reduces the chances of conflict escalation to violence hence mitigates the


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<sup>65</sup> J. Cilliers, "Towards a Continental Early Warning System For Africa: What Role For The Civil Society?", in Alfred Nhema and Paul Tyambe Zeleza (eds.), *Resolution Of The African Conflict: The Management Of Conflict Resolution And Post Reconstruction*, (Oxford: James Curry Publishers, 2011).

<sup>66</sup> W.G. Nhara, *Early warning and conflict in Africa*. (South Africa: Institute Of Security Studies, 1996).

vulnerability of citizens who may become victims in the conflict. The availability of these EWR mechanisms is therefore critical for conflict management especially in African context.

**Figure 1: Showing Conceptual Framework Relationship with EWR<sup>67</sup>**



*Source Adopted: J. Carlos Villagran de Leon, "Early Warning Systems: A Tool for Mitigation and Coordination," Paper presented at EWC II Conference in Bonn, Germany, October 2003).*

<sup>67</sup> J. Carlos Villagran de Leon, "Early Warning Systems: A Tool for Mitigation and Coordination," Paper presented at EWC II Conference in Bonn, Germany, October 2003.

## 1.7 Research Methodology

The research is a qualitative and exploratory one which utilizes case study as the main research strategy. The proposed research design is such that it does not need to collect primary data, being able to test the hypotheses using data that already exists among the wealth of data available in the public realm. The research in this study is library-based, since all the information and data that are used in it has been taken from studies, statistics and papers written or collected by other authors. This strategy is called secondary data analysis, which involves the use of existing data, collected for the purposes of a prior study. In order to pursue a research interest which is distinct from that of the original work; this may be a new research question or an alternative perspective on the original question.<sup>68</sup>

Journals and technical reports are particularly important to the research, since updated data is fundamental to build valid indicators. The analysis of qualitative and quantitative data from governmental agencies and international organizations is also useful in order to generate a comparative basis for the target population. The researcher shall have adequate public and official literature sources both of national and international origin at her disposal. The material garnered from these sources shall enable the researcher to reach her overall research objective which is interpretive, descriptive, and applicatory. The Internet may be very useful as it would give important views of what is going on, comments from East Africa, Africa and the world at large. These groups of target population will enable reliability, repeatability and representativeness.

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<sup>68</sup> Heaton, J., Secondary analysis of qualitative data. (Social Research Update, Issue 22 Autumn 1998, University of Surrey).

## **1.8 Chapter Outline**

This study is structured in five (5) chapters:

**Chapter 1- Introduction the Study**

**Chapter 2- Early Warning Systems and Response Mechanisms in African conflicts: An Overview**

**Chapter 3- Early Warning Systems and Response Mechanisms in Africa: The Case of Rwanda**

**Chapter 4- Early Warning Systems and Response Mechanisms in African Conflicts: A Critical Analysis**

**Chapter 5-Conclusions**

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AND RESPONSE MECHANISMS IN AFRICAN CONFLICTS: AN OVERVIEW**

#### **2.0 Introduction**

Chapter one introduced the topic under investigation and gave the study background while also analyzing the available literature and the conceptual framework of EWR. The chapter also gave the study objectives as well as the hypotheses and the research methodology used in this study. Chapter one equally outlined the justification as well as the objectives of the study. The chapter therefore laid a solid foundation on which the subsequent chapters shall be developed.

Chapter two therefore provides the general overview of the study with regard to the development of early warning, theory, policy and practice, in order to understand the thinking underpinning Early Warning and Response System and the EWR development. The chapter will also review the historical development of the concept EWSR as a way of looking at its development. The aim of this chapter therefore, will be to examine the different perspectives that have emerged throughout history in terms of theories and practice.

#### **2.1 Origin and Development of the Concept of Early Warning System**

##### **2.1.1 Concept of Early Warning**

While it is widely known how early warning/ response should be carried out, very little is known about how early warning actually happens, especially in field-based systems. As a result there is

some uncertainty about the entire concept of early warning among outsiders.<sup>69</sup> The primary conceptual challenges revolve around the central issue that the added value of early warning is still unproven. This is due to two facts: that predictions have not been accurate in the past (or important events were not foreseen), and that operational responses have been inadequately linked to warnings.<sup>70</sup> Indeed early warning/ response presents a number of challenges. Firstly, attracting attention to low-profile conflicts is problematic.

Secondly, shifting from macro-level political early warning to micro citizen-based warning and response systems has been too slow. Thirdly, some actors like the civil society organisations at times find themselves in a position of both ‘warners’ and implementers of response measures which can create tensions and pose questions with regards to the legitimacy of their mandates. These indeed are weighty matters that need to be addressed for an effective early warning system in Africa. Conflict early warning is *not* understood as a means to prevent or undermine conflicts in general. In our understanding, conflicts serve as a motor for social change and therefore are seen as constituent for humankind.<sup>71</sup>

The development of the concept of early warning can be traced during the Cold War in the field of national military intelligence to enhance the capacity of predicting potential (ballistic) attacks.<sup>72</sup> The meaning at that time looked at the capacity to prevent attacks of a military kind.

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<sup>69</sup> D. Nyheim, and C. Gaigals, Development in Conflict: A Seven Step Tool for Planners. (London: International Alert, Saferworld and FEWER, 2001).

<sup>70</sup> A. Sherriff, “Supporting and Enhancing Community Based Peace building”, *Guidance Notes for DAC-OECD CPDC Working Group*, (London: International Alert, November, 2003).

<sup>71</sup> N. von Keyserlingk and S. Kopfmüller, Conflict Early Warning Systems Lessons Learned from Establishing a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia: October 2006), p.3.

<sup>72</sup> P. Brecke, “A Pattern Recognition Approach to Conflict Early Warning,” in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 130.

This understanding however, was narrow and has changed overtime. At the international level the United Nations picked the concept and applied it to forecasting natural disasters like earthquakes, volcanicity, floods, and drought. The concept then in this sense expanded beyond the traditional militaristic application of preventive measures. It came now to be employed to predict and respond to issues that affected civilian population. The third generation of meaning to early warning was the application of the concept to conflicts as a measure of preventing the harm caused by violence.

### **2.1.2 Why Early Warning Systems?**

An early warning effort in prevention of conflicts is not intended to suppress conflicts, but to respond to the trajectory of a conflict. The objective of conflict in early warning and crisis prevention initiatives in this sense is to prevent the use of violence. In the current discourse on conflict early warning, a variety of different understandings and concepts are employed, sometimes leading to inconsistencies. The term “early warning” itself is often used to describe activities such as conflict analysis and monitoring, data analysis, risk assessment or advocacy, which are related to early warning, but do not represent early warning approaches in the strict sense. Furthermore, some conflict early warning systems work with only one of these tools, whereas others combine them. In this context, early warning is understood as “a part of mechanism that helps us to size up threats of early crisis by reporting such promptly to the appropriate decision-makers to take action. Failure to respond appropriately to stem the tide of the crisis might brew bigger consequences to manage.”<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>73</sup>N. von Keyserlingk and S. Kopfmüller, Conflict Early Warning Systems Lessons Learned from Establishing a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the Horn of Africa. (Ethiopia: October 2006), p.5.

Broadly speaking, the aim of conflict early warning is to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent response strategies can be formulated to either prevent violent conflict or limit its destructive effects.<sup>74</sup> Effective early warning involves the collection and analysis of data in a uniform and systematized way and according to a commonly shared methodology. It requires the formulation and communication of analysis and policy options to relevant end-users – information towards action. EWR therefore serves as a neutral source of information, helps to analyze any given situation to define and detect trends for future development; and introduces information regarding conflict into the public domain to encourage discussion and awareness.<sup>75</sup> EWR also influences the course of conflicts to prevent or de-escalate violence. Conflict early warning systems are designed to provide information on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in a timely manner. The information is then processed to develop scenarios, anticipate most likely developments and to propose appropriate response options designed to prevent and/or limit violent conflicts.<sup>76</sup>

Not all conflict early warning systems include response actions as an integral part of the system. An effective conflict early warning system should allow to identify the causes of conflict, anticipate possible directions in the escalation of conflict, and, most important, help mitigate that conflict by providing strategic advice to decision-makers. Attempt to prevent conflicts through the use of early warning is inarguably a very recent phenomenon. Being an important component of conflict prevention, conflict early warning is basically conceived. In fact, there are several definitions and objectives of a conflict early warning system which will be dealt with

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<sup>74</sup> J. Cilliers “Conflict early warning systems and support of the Comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan,” (paper Presented at the Conference on Early Warning Systems ‘Conflicts are Preventable, Peace is Sustainable, Khartoum, 10-13 April 2006).

<sup>75</sup> A. Alexander, “Early Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science,” in Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, (eds.), *Handbook for Conflict Transformation*, (Berlin, 2003).

<sup>76</sup> See J. Cilliers, *ibid*.



greater depth in the succeeding chapters of this study as means of avoiding or minimizing violence, deprivation or humanitarian crises that threaten the sustainability of human development and livelihood.<sup>77</sup>

The 1990s are crucial datelines in the discussion of conflict early warning systems both globally and in Africa. Globally, since the late 1990s, early warning and conflict prevention have become high-priority areas for multilateral organizations and, the highest levels, there is growing political will for more effective institutional approaches<sup>78</sup>. The application of early warning in the realm of conflict prevention in the continent was started in the 1990s in line with a global trend in conflict management and resolution which espoused a preventive approach towards violent conflict. Africa's very first attempt at establishing a conflict early warning unit was initiated in June 1992, 'when the Organization of African Unity decided to establish the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.' The first Early Warning systems appeared in the 1950's and were used by the military intelligence community to predict possible attacks. Later, different Early Warning systems were developed for managing disease control and to be used for other humanitarian aid purposes. The prevalent of conflict has remained a major feature of post independence Africa. The hopes that accompanied Africa's Independence in the early 1960's have, so far, proved to be largely a mirage for many Africans as the region continues to be devastated by conflicts and the widespread destruction of life and property. Africa is perhaps the most devastated by internal conflicts and with catastrophic consequences.

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<sup>77</sup> J. Davies "Conflict Early Warning and Early Response for Sub-Saharan Africa: Crisis and Transition Tool Kit", Summary of Working Draft Submitted to Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), (University of Maryland, Maryland, 2000).

<sup>78</sup> S. Srinivasan, "Minority Rights, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Lessons from Darfur," Minority Rights Group International Micro Paper. 2006.

It must be noted however that, in spite of the increased resources going into early warning, key shortcomings of governmental and multilateral interventions in violent conflict remain. These include faulty analysis, late, uncoordinated and contradictory engagement, and poor decision making. Conflict early warning as a field of conflict prevention is today undergoing significant scrutiny.<sup>79</sup> There have been inaccurate predictions, failure to foresee important events, and inadequate linking of operational responses to warnings. From a donor perspective, the visible impacts of early warning are often seen as meager. Indeed, at times early warning analyses can provide donor officials with political headaches, by being alarmist or offensive to other governments, or by advocating responses that are not feasible. However, proponents of conflict early warning insist that it contributes to the evidence base of conflict prevention decision making.

## **2.2 Theories of Early Warning**

Rubin and Jones factor in a Meta analysis of prevention that uses three levels. A wide range of definitions, ranging from more narrow ones focusing on limited ways of prevention and wider ones from the theoretical perspectives. From this view, the analysis takes into consideration trigger, proximate and the underlying factors. This means that analytically there is a response aiming at preventing long term sources of conflicts, mid-term sources and immediate sources. In dealing with this approach, Jones recommends operational prevention involving political or military usage to check escalation into violence. This measure addresses itself to triggers that drive the conflict. While the structural prevention addresses itself to proximity and calls for a

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<sup>79</sup> J. Cockell, "Toward Response-Oriented Early Warning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 232. See also A. R. Hayward, T. R. Gurr and K. Rupesinghe (eds.), Africa Peace Forum Background Report, Great Lakes Early Warning Report, in *Journeys through Conflict: Narratives and Lessons*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001).

regulatory framework that reduces the risks, the systemic level on the other addresses the underlying sources.<sup>80</sup> In this review, Campbell and Meier add the issue of timing and distinguish between midterm and long-term issues.<sup>81</sup>

### **2.2.1 Conflict Prevention**

Conflict prevention aims to end violence or to keep violence from occurring. This means that early warning system as a preventive measure should stop violence from occurring. This implies that prevention of conflict according to Jones is a level one operation that should first and foremost look at the trigger issues then proximate and finally the underlying issues. In early warning programs, conflict prevention demands a conscious effort to terminate the conflict before or prior to violence. This requires mechanisms and procedures that address structural risks to prevent the escalation of tension into violent conflict, the continuation of conflict or the reoccurrence of armed conflicts in post-conflict situations.<sup>82</sup> This in turn broadens and diversifies the purpose of early warning, meaning that the tools or early warning should focus on collecting data, analysis and communicating information to prevent conflict from occurring.

Different conceptions of prevention are used depending on the stage at which the conflict is when prevention is implemented. One way to know at which stage the conflict is conceptualizing it into a conflict cycle. The cycle views preventive action from three opposing approaches. One of which is that prevention should take place at the early stages of the conflict. The second that

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<sup>80</sup> R. Barnett, and D. Bruce, 'Prevention of Violent Conflict: Tasks and Challenges for the United Nations', Global Governance, 2007, pp. 391-408.

<sup>81</sup> S. Campbell, and P. Meier, Choosing to Prevent Conflict: Early Warning and Decision-Making at the United Nations. (The Fletcher School, 2006).

<sup>82</sup> K. Annan, "Prevention of Armed Conflict," Report of the UN Secretary General, 2001.

prevention should be during the middle stages of the conflict cycle and thirdly, that prevention should be at the later stages of the conflict.

The fundamental components of conflict prevention are early warning and early response. Early Warning is 'the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from area of crises, and the provision of policy options to influential actors'<sup>83</sup> for preventive actions. Preventive action or early response is the other essential component of conflict prevention. It consists of timely and targeted actions, undertaken by concerned actors based on early warning, with the aim of preventing the re-emergence of violent conflicts. Despite the wide array of writings on conflict prevention, there is a lack of consensus regarding its definition.<sup>84</sup> Deep-seated problems with the concept of prevention act as impediments for effective policy application. The nature of a preventive approach and the structure of the international system are not always compatible. Additional difficulties concern problems of prediction and early action, different interpretations of conflict dynamics and patterns, and what constitutes long-term structural prevention.

Another broader definition is provided by Munuera, who defines conflict prevention as the application of non-constraining measures that are primarily diplomatic in nature.<sup>85</sup> Non-constraining measures are those that are not coercive and depend on the goodwill of the parties involved. Lund has also suggested a wider definition: "any structural or intercessory means to keep intrastate or interstate tension and disputes from escalating into significant violence and use of armed forces, to strengthen the capabilities of potential parties to violent conflict for resolving

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<sup>83</sup> International Alert, *Resource Pack for Conflict Transformation*, "London: International Alert, 2003. p.3.

<sup>84</sup> A. Alice, "The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention", *Journal of Peace Research*, 2003, vol 40, no 3.

<sup>85</sup> M. Gabriel, "Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons learned from recent experience", *Chaillot Paper*, 1994.

such disputes peacefully, and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that produce these issues and disputes”.<sup>86</sup> This definition takes into consideration any measures that prevent violent conflicts and strengthen the capacity of concerned actors to act structurally to reduce the possibility of conflict.

The other theoretical perspective is understood from Lund’s definition of early warning as preventive diplomacy. Lund understands preventive diplomacy as action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related form of cohesion by state of group to settle political disputes that can arise from destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change.”<sup>87</sup>

Boutros Boutros-Ghali sees preventive diplomacy as the use of diplomatic techniques to prevent disputes from arising; prevent them from escalating into armed conflict and prevent the spread of armed conflict from spreading.”<sup>88</sup> This means that the focus of preventive diplomacy is conflict prevention during the early stages. However, there is disagreement on whether preventive action should be nearly confined to diplomacy which is narrow or should be wider than diplomatic efforts alone. Modern literature however, ignores this division between preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention but at the same keeps them separate. This is largely because of the need to apply different mechanisms which may be diplomatic or otherwise.

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<sup>86</sup> M. Lund, “Preventing Violent Intrastate Conflicts: Learning lessons from experience”, in Paul van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen & Juliette Verhoeven, (eds.), *Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peace building Activities*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p.117.

<sup>87</sup> M. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press).

<sup>88</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Challenges of Preventive Diplomacy: The role of the United Nations and its Secretary-General,” in Kevin M. Cahill (eds.), *Preventive diplomacy. Stopping wars before they start*, (New York: Basic Books and the Center for International Health and Cooperation, 1996).

The third theoretical approach is informed by the understanding of Carment and Schnabel of conflict prevention. Among the more inclusive definitions is define conflict prevention as a medium and long-term proactive operational or structural strategy undertaken by a variety of actors, intended to identify and create the enabling conditions for a stable and more predictable international security environment.<sup>89</sup> Under this theory the main objectives are promotion of trust and confidence, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement or humanitarian intervention. This is directed at preventing escalation, once conflict has erupted-more of a fire-fighting short term operation.<sup>90</sup> Lincoln and Amelia add to this conflict prediction. early warning indicators proposed by various academic experts, such Thomas Homer-Dixon findings that four main factors underlie conflict in developing countries as decreased agricultural production, economic decline, population displacement, and disruption of institutions and social relations; other experts who find poverty to be the single most important factor in predicting countries that will experience violent conflict; Myer's correlations between population pressures including environmental ruin and political turmoil.<sup>91</sup>

#### **2.4 Debates in the Modern Context**

Gurr considers Early Warning as a preventive measure for violent conflicts. In his view the collection of data and interpretation of events is used to empirically to forecast and determine the

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<sup>89</sup> D. Carment and A. Schnabel, "Introduction – Conflict Prevention: A concept in search of a policy", in David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, (eds.), *Conflict Prevention. Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?*, (Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, 2003), p.6.

<sup>90</sup> H. Hill and J. Saldanha, *East Timor*. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001).

<sup>91</sup> P. L. Bloomfield, and A. C. Leiss, 'Heading Off Conflicts Before they Happen: Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy, Paper presented at a Briefing of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, Conflict Prevention Reporting Analysis, Decision making Response System (RADARS) Team, US Department of State and US Agency for International Development, November, 6, 1995.

chances of conflict intensification.<sup>92</sup> In contrast Rupesinghe considers early warning as *information collection in order to provide a timely alert to conflict potentials.*<sup>93</sup> Such a system therefore will collect information and data on the social, economic, political, religious, cultural, educational, resource utilization, and military situations. Thus Rupesinghe links early warning and preventive diplomacy. Accordingly its objective is early detection of developments that may result in the eruption of violence. As such, it is a specific aspect of the more general concept of conflict prevention. In this view early warning refers to situations in which conflicting goals are controlled to avoid the development of hostilities.<sup>94</sup>

However, Gurr considers Early Warning as a preventive measure for violent conflicts. He ignores the preparedness aspects and calls for the development of early warning models. Gurr therefore, emphasizes the collection and interpretation of events and data for forecasting and determining the chances of conflict intensification.<sup>95</sup> Barbara adds to these aspects of risk assessment. She recommends a diagnostic perspective that includes assessment of background conditions, including legacies of past antagonisms between groups, loss of political status, political and economic inequalities.<sup>96</sup>

Lund recommends either preventive or containment efforts. The core notion behind his thoughts is addressing problems as they emerge than responding after they have grown to less manageable

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<sup>92</sup> G. T. Robert, "Testing and Using a Model of Communal Conflict for Early Warning," Journal of Ethno-Political Development, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1994. 'p. 20.

<sup>93</sup> K. Rupesinghe and M. Kuroda, (eds.), *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*, (St.Martin's Press, New York, 1992).

<sup>94</sup> K. Rupesinghe and M. Kuroda, (eds.), *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*, (St.Martin's Press, New York, 1992).

<sup>95</sup> G. T. Robert, 'Testing and Using a Model of Communal Conflict for Early Warning.' Journal of Ethno-Political Development, 1994. Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 20

<sup>96</sup> B. Harf, "A Theoretical Model of Genocides and Politicides" The Journal of Ethno-Development, July 1994 Vol. 4, No. 1-Special Issue.

scale. He concludes that there is need to develop more systematic data collection as a way to track the antecedents and triggering processes in the emergence of conflicts. He warns that early warning should be tied to preventive response mechanisms by decision makers.<sup>97</sup>

Jiro factors in the humanitarian dimension. On his part therefore, early warning is increased capacity of humanitarian aid preparedness and timely response.<sup>98</sup> Tidwell, offers advice that conflict will be well understood and clarified if it is divided into functional, situational and interactive types.<sup>99</sup> For Verstegen, conflicts are rarely mono-causal and therefore early warning should focus on different types of conflict differently. For example ethnic, communal, state failure, genocide, politicide, and human rights violations, among others.<sup>100</sup> The difference is important for Schmeidl, for if early warning initiatives become mixed with conflict management, there is a tendency to shape its analysis in favor of policy promotion. The indicators must be tailored to a particular kind of conflict.<sup>101</sup>

Kuroda from a different perspective views early warning as a preparedness, preventive and mitigation tool for disasters, emergencies, and conflict situations, whether short or long-term.<sup>102</sup> He identifies preparedness, prevention and mitigation, as three pillars of an Early Warning system. In this regard, the provision of information alone does not constitute Early Warning

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<sup>97</sup> M. Lund, *Preventive Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: A guide for the Post-Cold War Era*. (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1996).

<sup>98</sup> M. Jiro, "Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS): Progress and Prospects." *A report of the Senior Advisor for Early Warning, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs*. (New York, NY: United Nations, 1995).

<sup>99</sup> A.C. Tidwell, *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution*. (London, Continuum, 1998).

<sup>100</sup> V. Suzanne, 'Conflict Prognostication: Toward a Tentative Framework for Conflict Assessment', (*Clingendael Institute CRU Occasional Paper*, 1999).

<sup>101</sup> S. Susanne, 'Conflict Early Warning and Prevention: Toward a Coherent Terminology', in M. Ciru and S. Schmeidl, (eds.), *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*, (Asmara, Eritrea: The Red Sea Press, 2002).

<sup>102</sup> K. Rupesinge, and M. Kuroda, (eds.), *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*. (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 1992), p. 217



unless such information serves a specific purpose. A critical issue is the origin of the information and data, and the time frame in which it is developed. The receiver of such a forecast and what is done with the information provided becomes critical in determining the success or failure of an Early Warning system.

Barrs views early warning as a complimentary activity between the external and the internal. In this regard the local knowledge helps to solidify the regional and international mechanisms and thus lends credence to the actions supposed to be taken. Early warning in this sense means not only gathering data analyzing the data and developing strategic response; options which contingent to local and international resources. It's a combination of these that not only brings about an early warning response that is also appropriate.<sup>103</sup>

## **2.5 Early Warning Intervention in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century**

Intervention in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century that can be considered as early warning is based on the historic attitude in the United States which can best be defined as opposition to intervention in war outside the western hemisphere, particularly in Europe; to involvement in permanent military alliances; and to participation in organizations of collective security.

The 1990s witnessed the emergence of a growing conviction that Africa has the potential not only to control its own affairs and deal with its own problems, but has something definitive to offer the rest of the world. In some quarters this move is being hailed as the beginnings of a new African renaissance. For a long time the rest of the world has been asking when Africa is going

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<sup>103</sup>C. Barrs, "Conflict Early Warning: Early Warning for Who?" Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, February 2006.

to take responsibility for her problems. History has shown, of course, that those on the outside have often been far from passive observers of Africa's travails - witness the Arabic slave traders of the 18th century, the European imperialists of the 19th and the Russian and American Cold War masters of the 20th century. It is only over the last few decades, therefore, that Africans have once again begun to regain a semblance of control over Africa's destiny, notwithstanding the omnipresent and omnipotent power of global markets and political associations.<sup>104</sup>

Despite decades of conflict, death and tragedy, coverage of issues in Africa has often been ignored, oversimplified, or excessively focused on limited aspects. Deeper analysis, background and context has often been lacking, so despite what seems like constant images of starving children in famines, news of billions in aid to Africa from generous donor countries, the background context and analysis is often missing. Whether aid makes the situation worse, or why there is famine and hunger in Africa when African nations are exporting crops to other parts of the world are rarely asked by the mainstream.

## **2.6 Early Warning Intervention in 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

The first early warning systems appeared in the 1950s and were used by the military intelligence community to predict possible attacks; later, different Early Warning systems were developed for managing disease control and to be used for other humanitarian aid purposes. The first EWS which implements a theoretical model into practice was the United Nations Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS).<sup>105</sup> The HEWS project focuses on drought and famine problems by

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<sup>104</sup> I. Henderson-Wille, "Creating African solutions to African problems" Conflict Prevention Newsletter, September 1998, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 12-13

<sup>105</sup> V. Suzanne, 'Conflict Prognostication: Toward a Tentative Framework for Conflict Assessment', (Clingendael Institute CRU Occasional Paper, 1999).

suing over 100 indicators. Results are published in country reports. As computing capacity increased, several large and quantitative oriented EWSs were launched in the 1980s and 1990s.

With the introduction of the Internet, it became even easier to collect data and it facilitated automatic even data coding, thus enabling cost-effective event input to Early Warning systems.

The concept of EW has only recently made its way to the field of high politics and the settlement of conflict. It was first developed during the Cold War in the field of national military intelligence to enhance the capacity of predicting potential attacks. Within the United Nations System, early warning was used as a tool for forecasting natural disasters such as droughts food shortages and earthquakes among others. Today Early Warning is employed to predict or respond to both natural disasters and violent conflicts. As a mechanism for conflict, EW efforts are not intended to suppress conflicts, but to respond to the trajectory of a conflict.<sup>106</sup> Conflict early warning and response is conceived as a means of preventing violent conflict in order to protect life. Broadly two types of mechanisms are distinguished: quantitative and qualitative models.

The 1990s has so far witnessed events that will remain as serious indictments in the history of African political development. Never before have there been such bloody experiences, leaving well over three million dead, more than ten million refugees and a historical legacy for our children and future generations of democides and ethnocide. *Conflicts have turned Africa, the most diverse of all the continents in the world, into a Continent unable to turn its trend of diversity into opportunities for development. Conflicts have torn the social fabric of the African*

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<sup>106</sup> N.V. Keyserlingk, and S Kopfmuller, Conflict Early Warning Systems Lessons Learned from Establishing a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the Horn of Africa early warning-systems, (2006).

*Society. Conflicts have separated and split families. Brother has risen against Brother; Father against Son and Son against Father.*<sup>107</sup>

## 2.7 Conclusions

Uncertainty still engulfs the whole concept of the EWSR mechanisms in Africa. On the other hand, the origins of EWR and its role are still debatable. Preventive, humanitarian, risk management, and preparedness during conflict are all arguments advanced by various scholars in the field.<sup>108</sup> The EWR in the 19<sup>th</sup> C was not very clear and seemed to be under control of the superpower (U.S.A). This led to deaths of millions due to conflicts which otherwise would have been averted. Much has also not changed with EWR mechanisms in the 20<sup>th</sup> and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century as conflicts which would easily been mitigated have erupted. This trend shows the need for better EWR mechanisms that includes preparedness, mitigation, prevention and humanitarian consideration for efficient EWR in Africa.

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<sup>107</sup>C.J. Bakwesegha, "Conflict Situations in Africa in the context of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution," (Lecture at the African Centre, London, UK., 1994), p.3.

<sup>108</sup>J. Galtung, "Three Approaches to Peace, 'Peacekeeping, Peace Making and Peace Building,'" in J. Galtung (eds.), *Essays in Peace Research*, (Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1976).

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISMS IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF RWANDA, 1992-2010**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

Previously in chapter two, we took a critical look at the EWR in African conflicts and the concepts of EWR that exist for a better understanding and appreciation of Africa EWR since the 19<sup>th</sup> century to the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The eye opening revelation that EWR mechanisms have been poor with regard to African conflicts was therefore underscored and strengthening of these EWR mechanisms is therefore critical for the African continent in managing its conflicts.

This chapter therefore, in particular seeks to explore the genesis of the Rwandan genocide with a view to examining the sources of the war and the measures of intervention that were used. The purpose of trying to do so is essentially to establish if the early warning system were ever used is so what were the factors that lead to their failure in preventing the genocide. The focus will therefore be to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the modes of intervention both at international and regional level and to critique the early warning systems during the conflict. The chapter will mirror the three levels of analysis used, local/state, regional and global or international, applied to understand and terminate conflict.

### 3.1 Actors, Issues and Processes in the Rwandan Conflict

The causes of the conflict and genocide in Rwanda are heavily debated, and one particular issue that has received considerable attention is the part that ethnicity played in these events. The conflict was ethnic to the extent that it involved Hutu extremists – like the *Comité pour la Défense de la République* and members of Habyarimana's *akazu* or inner circle inciting hatred against Tutsis (but also against Hutu moderates and members of the opposition).<sup>109</sup> Yet to describe the conflict as being solely or primarily about ethnicity is far too simplistic, for at least three main reasons.

Owing to the very significant number of actors involved, the conflict resolution process in Rwanda was highly complex and therefore became necessary that the management process be all inclusive.

#### 3.1.1 Actors

While policies were shaped by underlying structures of power and interest, the various actors in the Rwanda conflict nevertheless operated within a framework of alternative options that permitted a certain choice. Among these, a few stand out as commendable efforts to reduce or mitigate the conflict; others are conspicuous for failing at critical moments.<sup>110</sup> Key actors included the following.

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<sup>109</sup> J.B. Adekanye, *Linking Conflict Diagnosis, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in Contemporary Africa, Selected Essays*, (Ibadan: Center for Gender Governance and Development, 2007).

<sup>110</sup> A. de Waal, and R. Omaar., "The Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response," *Current History*. 1995, Vol.94, No.591, pp. 156-161.

### **OAU and the Tanzanian government**

The organization for African unity (OAU) efficiently and patiently spearheaded a sustained international effort to mediate the Rwanda civil war. While the Arusha Accords in retrospect were not as perfect as the sponsors claimed, the agreement did provide a reasonable basis for settling the civil war.<sup>111</sup> Partly undermined by unforeseen developments in neighbouring Burundi, the peace agreement also carved some seeds of its own destruction by failing to take care of the losers. Having been excluded from the settlement and not dealt with otherwise, the Hutu extremists became an obstacle to its implementation.<sup>112</sup> The OAU and the Tanzania government efforts therefore helped to reach accords that were aimed at averting the brewing conflict in Rwanda in the early 1990s.

### **United Nations Armed Military Intervention in Rwanda (UNAMIR)**

This military intervention did not prove a success in Rwanda. The Force Commander struggled in vain to bring the mission up to authorized strength and to alert an unresponsive UN Secretariat (DPKO) to the fact that the situation in early 1994 was seriously deteriorating.<sup>113</sup> Once the civil war resumed and genocide commenced, UNAMIR was able to save lives by protecting some 15,000 persons in the Kigali area, despite lack of supplies and heavy equipment and a drastically down-sized-force. Its credibility and hence ability to modify the conflict in other respects (e.g. by promoting a cease-fire) was critically undermined by the decision to withdraw.

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<sup>111</sup> J. H. Burkhalter, "The Question of Genocide: The Clinton Administration and Rwanda," World Policy Journal, .1994, p.199.

<sup>112</sup> J. B. Adekanye, Rwanda/Burundi: "Uni-Ethnic" Dominance and the Cycle of Armed Ethnic Formations. (Oslo: Norway: International Peace Research Institute).

<sup>113</sup> R. M. Connaughton, Military Support and Protection for Humanitarian Assistance. (Rwanda: April - December 1994).

The effectiveness of UNAMIR also suffered from three characteristic features of UN peacekeeping operations.<sup>114</sup> The Field Mission had very limited authority to make decisions; routine matters as well as issues heavily dependent upon judgment of the situation in the field were micro-managed by New York. When deployed in late 1994, UNAMIR I had only a small investigative unit and no separate human rights component designed to monitor and report on human rights violations. This limited its ability to gauge a deteriorating situation. It also signaled to the Rwandan parties that the UN placed low priority to human rights violations in the implementation of the peace accords.<sup>115</sup>

The normal, slow process of assembling a peacekeeping force had monumental consequences. Once the Security Council decided in May 1994 to gage the for the explicit purpose of protecting civilians, a period of about 3 months elapsed before new UNAMIR units arrived in Rwanda. In the intervening period, hundreds of thousands were killed. The deployment was particularly slow because none of the industrialized states that could have provided the UN with fully equipped units at sort notice were willing to do.<sup>116</sup> It is therefore arguable that the UNAMIR failed in their mission of peace keeping in Rwanda as it failed to prevent the genocide.

### **The United Nations<sup>117</sup>**

After a bungled start and initial paralysis by the DPKO, the UN Secretary-General recovered the initiative by proposing that the UN re-engage itself to mitigate the conflict. The Under-Secretary

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<sup>114</sup> A. Surhke, "The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwandan Experience," *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda*, (Copenhagen, 1996).

<sup>115</sup> H. Adelman, "The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwandan Experience," *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda*, (Copenhagen, 1996).

<sup>116</sup> K. Fukui, and J. Markakis, (eds.), *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1994).

<sup>117</sup> M. Barnett, *Eyewitness to Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).



General of Humanitarian Affairs helped focus attention on the crisis during the early period and was the first high-level representative from New York to visit Kigali after April 6. At the same time whilst failing to anticipate that some 1.5 million persons would flee across the border, UNHCR soon recognized the need to deal with the problem of militarized refugee camps so as to avoid the start of a new conflict cycle.<sup>118</sup> The agency's innovative proposal was bogged down in discussions at UN/New York, where the Secretary-General sought to address the problem comprehensively as a peacekeeping matter. This failed, however, and the result was a critical delay of several months before UNHCR could move ahead to deal with the camps issue.

### **Regional states**

Some of the regional states like Uganda and Zaire at various times provided support which served to escalate the conflict rather than reduce it, though Uganda also contributed to the mediation process.

### **The International Community**

States like the US, France and Belgium played a key role in the Rwanda conflict. Through its military and economic assistance, as well as diplomatic support, France gave significant and sustained aid to a regime that was linked to systemic human rights violations and ultimately genocide. On the other hand, the Belgian decision to withdraw its UN contingent at the time of crisis crippled UNAMIR and drastically reduced its options for the future.<sup>119</sup> Belgian lobbying for the Security Council to withdraw the remaining force altogether helped shape the final decision to this effect.

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<sup>118</sup> J.V. Montville, *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, (Lexington: Mass, Lexington Books, 1996).

<sup>119</sup> H. Adelman, "The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwandan Experience," *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda*, (Copenhagen, 1996).

On her part, United States ensured that neither an effective national response nor a collective UN effort to mitigate the genocide materialized. Citing financial restraints, the United States wanted a barebones UNAMIR before April 6, argued for withdrawal soon afterwards, and delayed the authorization as well as deployment of an expanded UN force in May-June. At the same time the government failed to recognize the violence as genocide.

### **The Media**

The media by and large covered events in a fundamentally irresponsible manner. Notable exceptions were reports from correspondents for BBC, Le Monde, Liberation and the Times.<sup>120</sup> The rest of the media reported in a highly selective and initially misleading way, although some later were quick to charge Western governments with complicity in the genocide. Genocide and politicide were at first depicted as tribal ethnic conflict with ancient and typically African roots. Coverage did not become intense until the genocide was over, and huge refugee flows streamed into Goma.<sup>121</sup> The failure of the media to accurately and adequately report, on a crime against humanity significantly contributed to international disinterest in the genocide, and hence to the crime itself. In a more general sense, the failure to respond was also linked to inadequate structures or procedures in decision making.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> See for example the International Herald Tribune (1994), Le Monde (1994), London Times (1994), New York Times (1994) Reuters (1994), The Economist (1994) Toronto Star (1994, 1995) Washington Post (1994).

<sup>121</sup> R. Rummel, "Deadlier than War," Institute of Public Affairs Review , August - October 1987, vol.41 no. 2, pp. 24 - 30.

<sup>122</sup> A. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story. (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).

### 3.1.2 Issues

The international response to the Rwandan crisis also raised several policy issues of general concern. These included the National peacekeeping operations with a UN umbrella whereby the French Operation Turquoise was quickly deployed and efficiently run and some held it up as a model. It should be noted, however, that smooth operation was not only a function of its being national (as distinct from cumbersome multilateral).<sup>123</sup> Effective communication with the RPF made it possible to agree on the boundaries of the French "safe humanitarian zone," and behind this line, French troops were in generally friendly territory. The operation also raised some troublesome issues. Mounted at the same time that the was struggling to obtain troop commitments for UNAMIR II, the French initiative detracted from the collective effort and weakened the credibility of multilateral interventions. The circumstances of the operation cast doubt on official claims that it was a purely humanitarian intervention, thus degrading the latter concept.

The international persistence that Rwanda's political system be democratized had contradictory implications. The formal institutions of multipartism provided a political framework for accommodating the RPF and in that respect foreign donors promoted a formula that would help terminate the civil war.<sup>124</sup> On the other hand, democratization so defined did not address human rights issues, and in some respects became a substitute for dealing with them.<sup>125</sup> The results of efforts to strengthen civil society were also ambiguous in that they provided space for both human rights organizations and extremist groups. More generally, donor demands for

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<sup>123</sup> "Humanitarianism unbound? Current Dilemmas facing Multi-mandate Relief Operations in Political Emergencies". Discussion paper no. 5, November 1995.

democratization added to the overall pressures experienced by a regime that was at war and faced national economic collapse as well as mounting internal opposition.

The combined effect was a sort of system overload which enhanced the power and possibly the appeal of Hutu extremists. These dysfunctional consequences were not sufficiently recognized at the time in the belief that the multiparty system entailed by democratization and endorsed by the Arusha Accords would take care of the extremists in d course.

In retrospect it can be clearly seen that the closer the parties at Arusha<sup>126</sup> came to ending the civil war, the more Rwanda inched towards disaster. The inter-connectedness of the two tracks - the civil war and the civil violence – was recognized at the time, but the Arusha process was basically designed to settle a war, not to prevent a dimly perceived future catastrophe. The lesson here lies in the tested principle that a settlement to end one war can be the beginning of a new one if the peace agreement is also constructed as preventive diplomacy.

Regionalism and the Disjuncture between Mediation and Implementation since 1990, contributed to the regional states participation in diplomatic efforts to deal with the conflict. Over time, all external parties to the conflict appeared to gain a stake in the success of the mediation effort, and all signed the final document. There was, however, no continuity between the mediation and implementation phase of the peace accords. The UN took over the peacekeeping operation, essentially closing the regional effort and cutting out the OAU. The consequent structural

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<sup>124</sup> D. Bond, and P. Meier , “CEWARN: IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism,” in Ramcharan, B.(eds.), *Conflict Prevention in Practice*, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005).

<sup>125</sup> “Rwanda: Who is killing, who is dying, what is to be done.” A discussion paper, African Rights , May 1994.

<sup>126</sup> H. Adelman, “The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwandan Experience,” *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda*, (Copenhagen, 1996), p.73.

disjuncture between the mediation and implementation phase affected three critical areas which made it difficult to maintain the momentum of the Arusha peace process.

The Arusha Accords presumed and specifically called for a peacekeeping force with a broader mandate than the UN was willing to undertake, the timetable of the Arusha process presumed a speedy international presence, yet this did not sufficiently take into account, nor was it adequately coordinated with, the timeframe for establishing UN peacekeeping operations. Finally the existence of an extremist group excluded from power in the results of the peace process, but continuing to hold power in the interim, should have been dealt with by other means in the implementation phase. In the shifting of responsibility from one set of actors to another, this critical issue fell out of focus and the extremist issue was neglected.

In important respects, Rwanda got a peacekeeping force rather different from what the negotiators of the agreement had anticipated and deemed necessary for the implementation of the Accords. The disjuncture was partly caused by organizational competition between the OAU and the UN. The OAU actively sought to obtain a leading role in the peacekeeping phase as well, but the Security Council insisted that the UN would not pass unless it retained command and control of the operation.<sup>127</sup> Apart from France, which lobbied hard to make it a UN force, and the Rwandan government which happened to be a member, no other states in the Council gave the issue much consideration. The UN Secretary-General weighed in on the side of his own organization.<sup>128</sup> Moreover, the dismal record of the OAU in managing its minor military mission in Rwanda (NMOG land II), gave ammunition to critics in the UN who maintained that the OAU had

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<sup>127</sup> T. Amare, *The OAU and Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution*. (Asmara, 1995).

<sup>128</sup> P. Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda*. (Kumarian Press (1998)).

neither the capacity nor the required impartiality to undertake peace keeping operations. As it turned out, however, the UN Headquarters did not run an effective peacekeeping operation in Rwanda either, and UN neutrality in face of genocide became a matter of criticism rather than approbation.<sup>129</sup>

Other stakeholders, the United Nations had formal responsibility for helping to implement the Arusha Accords; the main stakeholders in the peace agreement were in the region, not in the Security Council. The latter consequently gave UNAMIR a narrow mandate, a limited budget, and scant attention. When the Arusha Accords appeared to unravel, the Security Council threatened to withdraw rather than strengthen UNAMIR. When the crisis erupted after April 6, there was a "stampede to get out," as one member of the Security Council described the reaction of the chamber. At this critical juncture, the department of the UN Secretariat most directly responsible (DPKO) showed neither initiative nor an ability to rise above its assessments of what "the traffic would bear " in the Council.

African states showed more interest, partly reflecting the notion that African states had a special responsibility for solving their own conflicts. States in the region had particularist interests as likely receiving countries for massive refugee flows. Apart from the military observers, the African battalion in UNAMIR I was the only unit which stayed put during the crisis; Ghana decided to keep its contingent while the Belgian and Bangladeshi governments withdrew theirs. During subsequent UN efforts to manage the conflict retroactively by reintroducing a force, only African countries offered to send troops. Operating under severe resource restraints, they

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<sup>129</sup> C. Duggan, "UN Strategic and Operational Coordination: Mechanisms for Preventing and Managing Violent Conflict," in Albrecht Schnable and David Carment (eds.), *Conflict Prevention: Vol. 1, From Rhetoric to Reality*, (Lanham, Lexington Books, 2004), p. 349.

required external financing and some equipment, to which the major powers only reluctantly agreed.

In conclusion, the regional contribution to conflict management was undervalued and underutilized despite recent and formal recognition by the UN leadership, including the Secretary-General, of the need to involve regional organizations to promote international peace.

UN procedures governing peacekeeping operations were slow and thus led to incomplete deployment. While this was not specific to Rwanda, the consequences were more acutely felt because the country had no "patron" in the Security Council that could cut through the political and bureaucratic morass.<sup>130</sup> The Secretariat for the most part proved unwilling or unable to compensate.

Before the acute crisis erupted on 6 April, DPKO, which had responsibility for UNAMIR, made no contingency plans or efforts to strengthen the mission's preparedness for worse case scenarios despite clear evidence of mounting tension. The problem was partly due to limited institutional capacity in face of a rapid increase in peacekeeping operations worldwide.<sup>131</sup> The restraints were also more deep-seated, as indicated by the failure of DPKO to overcome a near-paralysis when the crisis broke and Rwanda moved to the top of the agenda. DPKO's communications to the Security Council were tailored to expectations of what the Council would approve (thus giving the Permanent Five anticipatory vetoes); options were formulated in terms of standard operating procedures, rather than the unique needs of the situation; and instructions to the field were

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<sup>130</sup> See Financing of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda. Financing of the United Nations Assistance Mission of Rwanda, March 6 1995.

<sup>131</sup> DPKO: Improving Preparedness for Peace-keeping in Africa: An Informal Note. March 1995.

heavily influenced by concern to reduce risk so as to avoid failures" - which was defined as the death of UN peacekeepers.

Only when the Secretary-General in late April decided to provide some leadership did the Secretariat play an innovative and proactive role, based on more comprehensive and independent assessments of the requirements of the Rwandan situation. At that point, however, the limitations of retroactive conflict management, and inability of the UN to respond with dispatch, rendered the operation largely irrelevant.<sup>132</sup>

The critical importance in this case of leadership raises broader issues of accountability and transparency in the ongoing discussion of UN reforms. Given the large number of crises in the world, the Secretary-General cannot respond equally effectively to all. However, the criteria for selection, and the process which leads the Secretariat to highlight some conflicts rather than others, remain obscure to the public. Similarly, the fateful decision to virtually withdraw UNAMIR was taken by the Security Council in informal consultations. In keeping with normal Council procedures, only select formal statements made at the conclusion of the decision-making process (21 April) were recorded in the proceedings and are thus in the public domain.

### **3.1.3 Processes**

The key actors in this process were the parties themselves, namely the RPF and the Rwandan government. The two parties sent delegations to the Arusha negotiations. The RPF delegation

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<sup>132</sup> D. Carment and Schnabel, Albrecht, "Into the Mainstream: Applied Conflict Prevention," in David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), *Conflict Prevention: Vol. 2, From Rhetoric to Reality*, (Lanham, Lexington Books, 2004), p. 6.



included Mazimpaka and Théoneste Rudasingwa, the RPF vice-president and general secretary respectively who were able to strongly represent the RPF in the negotiation process. The government on the other hand sent a delegation headed initially by Foreign Minister Boniface Ngulinzira from the MRD subsequently replaced (by James Gasana from the MRND). In contrast, this delegation from the government was much weaker and far less effective. The fundamental problem was that the government delegation was internally divided. It was split into three factions that had three different inclinations, each responding to a separate centre of power. While the faction aligned to Habyarimana's tended towards political pluralism during the Arusha talks, the other factions within the government team consisting of the prime minister among others opposed this move. So Habyarimana's men, led by the President himself and Hutu extremists, represented by the CDR, led by Colonel Théoneste Bagosora had a different vision. This meant that the government delegation was thus extremely fragmented and the hardliners exploited the situation to portray the negotiations as talks between the internal opposition and the RPF that is, between the RPF and its internal Hutu accomplices.<sup>133</sup> Beside the RPF and the Rwandan government, there were a wide range of regional and international actors also with interest in the conflict and outcome of the Rwandan conflict resolution process from the outset.

Rwanda therefore became a laboratory wherein sub-regional, regional and inter-state actors tested their capacity to engage in conflict management.<sup>134</sup> During the early stages of the process, Zaire assumed a leading role. For example, it was President Mobutu Sese Seku who organized the first regional summit, held on 26 October 1990 in Gbadolite (Zaire). Mobutu's efforts produced a cease-fire agreement between the FAR and the RPF signed in N'Sele, Zaire,

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<sup>133</sup> M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001).

<sup>134</sup> B.D. Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001).

on 29 March 1991. As such this effort by Zaire played a pivotal role in laying the groundwork for the Arusha negotiations. By the time that the Arusha negotiations began in July 1992, however, the peace process had shifted from Zaire to another of Rwanda's neighbours, Tanzania. The entry of Tanzania boosted the peace talks since Tanzania was regarded as far more neutral mediator than Zaire. The latter was less trusted by the parties to the conflict because of the support President Habyarimana received from them during the RPF attack on 1 October 1990.

Although the Arusha negotiations were officially held under the authority of the Organization for Africa Unity (OAU), it was Tanzania and more specifically the Tanzanian ambassador Ami Mpungwe who acted as mediator. In addition, Burundi, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, Zaire, Zimbabwe, the OAU, the United Nations (UN), as well as Belgium, France, Germany and the United States, were all involved in the negotiations as observers.<sup>135</sup>

The Rwandans felt let down most of all by the permanent members of the Security Council and not once but many times, more specifically by China and Russia, as well as America, Britain and France. The Carlsson report points to the obliqueness of these countries attitude towards the Rwandan conflict escalation without any intervention by these members. But the report does not examine their individual culpability in the disaster, perhaps because it was unable to question closely the grandees of the Security Council. Though it had access to complete UN records and any UN official, it interviewed no British representatives and was allowed access only to American and French officials who were peripheral at the time.<sup>136</sup> As such the knowledge of

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<sup>135</sup> A. Ahmed and K. Elizabeth Voulieris, "The Humanitarian Early Warning System: From Concept to Practice," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 210.

<sup>136</sup> H. Hintjens, "Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 1999.

what went wrong and what was not done to prevent the Rwandan genocide is critical for us to prevent future occurrence of similar tragedies of such magnitude.<sup>137</sup>

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda has produced a vast literature, as scholars and policy-makers alike try to explain and to make sense of what happened. What has tended to receive less attention, however, is the complex and multi-layered conflict resolution process that preceded the genocide. It is this process which culminated in the signing of the Arusha Accords on 4 August 1993 that forms the focus of this chapter. For a study about the theory and practice of conflict resolution, Rwanda is a particularly important case study as it highlights a critical gap between the two. In short, the Arusha peace process can be described as an extraordinary story of a sophisticated conflict resolution process gone disastrously wrong.<sup>138</sup> The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to explain why it went so wrong.

### **A Chronology of the Rwanda Conflict Negotiations**

Almost as soon as the RPF attacked Rwanda on 1 October 1990, a flurry of diplomatic activities began.<sup>139</sup> By mid-October, for example, an initiative by the Belgians, led to a series of regional talks and a regional summit in Mwanza, Tanzania on October 17. This resulted in the Mwanza Communiqué which, *inter alia*, provided a basis for further negotiations to take place and formalized the role of Rwanda's neighbours in the nascent peace process. A series of subsequent agreements, like the Dar es Salaam Declaration on the Rwandese Refugees Problem (19

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<sup>137</sup> Salim Ahmed Salim, former OAU Secretary-General.

<sup>138</sup> J. Darby, The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes. (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001)

<sup>139</sup> Rwandese Patriotic Front., "Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and Assistance to War Displaced Persons in Rwanda." Rwandese Patriotic Front statement to the 44<sup>th</sup> session of the Executive Committee of UNHCR, October, 1993, pp. 4-8.

February 1991), cease-fires and pre-negotiations all paved the way for the Arusha talks to begin. That there were always very significant regional and international elements to the intervention in Rwanda made the structure of that process very complex and multi-layered, involving a host of different actors and organizations with individual interests and priorities. Yet it was precisely the inclusion of these diverse regional and international players that gave the process its dynamic character and helped to create the necessary momentum for the negotiations to move forward. In addition to these formal, so-called track I international and regional diplomatic efforts, moreover, the process also involved unofficial, track II initiatives by such actors as OXFAM Rwanda and the Rwandan Catholic Church.<sup>140</sup> The latter, for example, supported by the Vatican, put pressure on Habyarimana to negotiate; and in May 1992, secret talks took place between the Church and the RPF in Bujumbura, Burundi. It was this successful combination of official and unofficial diplomacy that the Arusha talks possible.

On the issue of structure, three particular points stand out vis-à-vis the Arusha negotiations. The first is that their structure closely reflected the beliefs and principles of the man who led the process, primary mediator Ambassador Mpungwe. He was seeking not merely conflict management or conflict settlement but conflict resolution. With this in mind, Mpungwe heavily designed the process around communication, as the vehicle for allowing the parties to dialogically resolve their issues, to change their perceptions of each other and to reach an agreement acceptable to them both. According to Jones, therefore, the design of the Arusha process certainly conforms more closely to the conceptions of peace processes found in conflict

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<sup>140</sup> H. Adelman and A. Suhrke, "Early Warning and Conflict Management", in *International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, (Copenhagen, 1996).

resolution literature than in the more traditional negotiation/mediation literature.<sup>141</sup> Since the structure of the process was thus too academic, this explains why it ultimately failed. Additionally and more obvious however, is that the dialogue and communication that took place between the government and the RPF were always skewed and uneven due to unequal bargaining positions of the parties. The structure as they were favoured the government to the detriment of the RPF.

Before coming to this issue, however, a second important point relating to the structure of the Arusha talks must be noted. In some peace processes, particularly contentious issues are postponed for resolution at a later date. The Dayton Peace Accords, for example, which ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, left unresolved the heavily disputed status of Brčko District, instead submitting the matter to binding international arbitration; and the 1993 Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed by Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), deferred negotiations concerning the most difficult questions, such as Jerusalem, final borders and security. In the Arusha talks however, in contrast, nothing was postponed. The process was structured in such a way that it ignored the negotiation principle of prioritization of issues where the least controversial issues are dealt with first before the most controversial ones.<sup>142</sup> Hence, during the first two stages of the negotiations, in July and August 1992 respectively, the focus was on issues pertaining to the rule of law and on the creation of a new cease-fire. This goal was successfully achieved on 14 July 1992, based on the previous N'sele cease-fire agreement negotiated by Mobutu in March 1991.

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<sup>141</sup> J. Darby, The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes, (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001)

<sup>142</sup> H. Adelman and A. Suhrke, "Early Warning and Conflict Management", in *International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, (Copenhagen, 1996).

The third stage of the negotiations dealt with power-sharing and political co-operation. Agreements were reached and initialed, but they were not actually signed, due to lack of support from President Habyarimana. The difficult issue of power-sharing was further addressed during the fourth stage of the negotiations, in October 1992, when the parties agreed upon the creation of a multi-party transitional government, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary system and, as a corollary, a significant reduction in the President's powers.<sup>143</sup> The two most sensitive and contested issues, namely the composition of the transitional authorities that the parties had agreed to create and the integration of the FAR and the RPF were reserved until the final stages of the negotiation process. What is interesting is that on both of these latter issues, it was the RPF who prevailed; the third key point is concerning the structure of the Arusha talks.

On 30 October 1992, the parties signed a protocol on power-sharing, which subsequently became the basis of the Arusha Accords. The RPF, however, insisted that the extremist CDR should be excluded from the new transitional government. While the government delegation, backed by France and the US, was equally adamant that the CDR must be included, it ultimately conceded to the RPF's demands. As a consequence, Habyarimana and the CDR rejected the power-sharing protocols and organized demonstrations against the Arusha talks, notably in the two Habyarimana strongholds of Gisenyi and Ruhengiri.

The ensuing violence against Tutsis and moderate Hutus led the RPF, in turn, to end its ceasefire in February 1993. Yet this may have been a tactical move, designed to strengthen the RPF's

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<sup>143</sup> N. von Keyserlingk and S. Kopfmüller, Conflict Early Warning Systems Lessons Learned from Establishing a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the Horn of Africa, (Ethiopia: October 2006), p.6.

bargaining position in the forthcoming negotiations on the issue of the armed forces.<sup>144</sup> Following a high level summit in Dar es Salaam on 7 March, organized by Tanzania, and the conclusion of a new cease-fire agreement, these negotiations began in March 1993. The government initially proposed only a 15 per cent share for the RPF in the armed forces, yet subsequently consented to the RPF's demand for a 50 per cent share. Thus, the final agreement was that there would be a 50/50 split in terms of command positions and a 60/40 split in favour of the FAR for all other positions. It is clear, therefore, that because the RPF delegation represented a very strong and united force, in contrast to the government delegation, it was in a position to extract significant concessions and to secure its objectives. What this meant in terms of the structure of the Arusha talks, however, is that they were rather one-sided, a lop-sided negotiation dance,<sup>145</sup> which, in turn, produced a somewhat lopsided deal.<sup>146</sup>

In 1994 genocide in Rwanda claimed the lives of at least 500,000 Tutsi some three-quarters of their population while UN peacekeepers were withdrawn and the rest of the world stood aside.<sup>147</sup> Ever since it has been argued that a small military intervention could have prevented most of the killing.<sup>148</sup> Combining unprecedented analyses of the genocide's progression and the logistical limitations of humanitarian military intervention, Kuperman reaches a startling conclusion: even if Western leaders had ordered an intervention as soon as they became aware of a nationwide

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<sup>144</sup> B.D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001).

<sup>145</sup> L. Scourgie, "Rwanda's Arusha accords: a missed opportunity". *Undercurrent* vol.1, 2004, pp. 66-76).

<sup>146</sup> B.D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, . 2001).

<sup>147</sup> United States Committee for Refugees, *A Selected Chronology of the Rwanda Crisis*, April 5 to September 30, 1994(1994) Genocide in Rwanda. Documentation of Two Massacres during April 1994.

<sup>148</sup> A. J. Kuperman In *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda*, exposes such conventional wisdom as myth.

genocide in Rwanda, the intervention forces would have arrived too late to save more than a quarter of the 500,000 Tutsi ultimately killed.

Matters came to a head on the evening of April 6, 1994, when the Rwandan presidential jet plane, carrying Rwanda's President Habyarimana and also as a last-minute passenger Burundi's new provisional president back from a meeting in Tanzania, was shot down by two missiles as it came in to land at the airport of Kigali, Rwanda's capital, killing everyone on board.<sup>149</sup> The missiles were fired from immediately outside the airport perimeter. It remains uncertain to this day by whom or why Habyarimana's plane was shot down; several groups had alternative motives for killing him. Whoever were the perpetrators, Hutu extremists within an hour of the plane's downing began carrying out plans evidently already prepared in detail to kill the Hutu prime minister and other moderate or at least less extreme members of the democratic opposition, and Tutsi.<sup>150</sup> Once Hutu opposition had been eliminated, the extremists took over the government and radio and set out to exterminate Rwanda's Tutsi, who still numbered about a million even after all the previous killings and escapes into exile.

The lead in the killings was initially taken by Hutu army extremists, using guns. They soon turned to efficiently organizing Hutu civilians, distributing weapons, setting up roadblocks, killing Tutsi identified at the roadblocks, broadcasting radio appeals to every Hutu to kill every "cockroach" (as Tutsi were termed), urging Tutsi to gather supposedly for protection at safe places where they could then be killed, and tracking down surviving Tutsi.

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<sup>149</sup> L. Turid, Mismanaging the Rwandan Tragedy. (Oslo: 1995).

<sup>150</sup> J. Peik, International Press Coverage of the Rwandan Conflict. (Helsinki: Report prepared for Study II, 1995).



The message that began to circulate, therefore, propagated in particular by the radio station *Radio Télévision des Mille Collines* (RTML), was that the Tutsi, *inyenzi* ' or cockroaches needed to be exterminated. As the situation continued to deteriorate, moreover, two significant moments of crisis occurred.<sup>151</sup> The first was the assassination, on 21 October 1993, of Melchoir Ndadaye, the first democratically-elected Hutu president of neighbouring Burundi. For Hutu extremists in Rwanda, the murder of Ndadaye served to further underscore the insidious threat posed by the Tutsis to cite Hintjens. By an unhappy coincidence, the killing of Ndadaye coincided with the RPF's second invasion of Rwanda, giving apparent plausibility to the notion of a Bahima (pan-Tutsi) conspiracy to re-conquer the entire region and re-impose the old feudal order in Rwanda.<sup>152</sup>

When international protests against the killings eventually began to surface, the government and radio changed the tone of their propaganda, from exhortations to kill cockroaches to urging Rwandans to practice self-defense and to protect themselves against Rwanda's common enemies. Moderate Hutu government officials who tried to prevent killings were intimidated, bypassed, replaced, or killed. The largest massacres, each of hundreds or thousands of Tutsi at one site, took place when Tutsi took refuge in churches, schools, hospitals, government offices, or those other supposed safe places and were then surrounded and hacked or burned to death. The genocide involved large-scale Hutu civilian participation, though it is debated whether as many as one-third or just some lesser proportion of Hutu civilians joined in killing Tutsi. After the army's initial killings with guns in each area, subsequent killings used low-tech means, mainly

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<sup>151</sup> J. William, "Structural Issues and the Future of UN Peace Operations," in D.C.F. Daniel and B. C. Hayes (eds.), *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 56.

<sup>152</sup> R. Lemarchand, "Consociationalism and power sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo." *Journal of African Affairs*. 2006.

machetes or else clubs studded with nails. The killings involved much savagery, including chopping off arms and legs of intended victims, chopping breasts off women, throwing children down into wells, and widespread rape.

While the killings were organized by the extremist Hutu government and largely carried out by Hutu civilians, institutions and outsiders from whom one might have expected better behavior played an important permissive role. In particular, numerous leaders of Rwanda's Catholic Church failed to protect Tutsi or else actively assembled them and turned them over to killers. The United Nations already had a small peacekeeping force in Rwanda, which it proceeded to order to retreat; the French government sent a peacekeeping force, which sided with the genocidal Hutu government and against invading rebels; and the United States government declined to intervene.<sup>153</sup> In explanation of these policies, the U.N., French government, and U.S. government all referred to chaos, a confusing situation, and tribal conflict, as if this were just one more tribal conflict of a type considered normal and acceptable in Africa, and ignoring evidence for the meticulous orchestration of the killings by the Rwandan government.

Within six weeks, an estimated 800,000 Tutsi, representing about three-quarters of the Tutsi then remaining in Rwanda, or 11% of Rwanda's total population, had been killed. A Tutsi-led rebel army termed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) began military operations against the government within a day of the start of the genocide. The genocide ended in each part of Rwanda

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<sup>153</sup> "Burundi and Rwanda Mission: Finding/Recommendations," Refugee International, Washington, D.C., November 28, 1994.

only with the arrival of that RPF army, which declared complete victory on July 18, 1994.<sup>154</sup> It is generally agreed that the RPF army was disciplined and did not enlist civilians to murder, but it did carry out reprisal killings on a much smaller scale than the genocide to which it was responding. The RPF set up a new government, emphasized national conciliation and unity, and urged Rwandans to think of themselves as Rwandans rather than as Hutu or Tutsi. About 135,000 Rwandans were eventually imprisoned on suspicion of being guilty of genocide, but few of the prisoners have been tried or convicted. After the RPF victory, about 2,000,000 people (mostly Hutu) fled into exile in neighboring countries (especially the Congo and Tanzania), while about 750,000 former exiles (mostly Tutsi) returned to Rwanda from neighboring countries to which they had fled (Plate 22). The usual accounts of the genocides in Rwanda and Burundi portray them as the result of pre-existing ethnic hatreds fanned by cynical politicians for their own ends.

This genocide resulted from the deliberate choice of modern elite to foster hatred and fear to keep itself in power. This small, privileged group first set the majority against the minority to counter a growing political opposition within Rwanda. Then, faced with RPF success on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, these few power holders transformed the strategy of ethnic division into genocide. They believed that the extermination campaign would restore the solidarity of the Hutu under their leadership and help them win the war.<sup>155</sup> The evidence is overwhelming that this view is correct and accounts in large degree for Rwanda's tragedy.

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<sup>154</sup> H. Adelman and A. Suhrke, "Early Warning and Conflict Management", in *International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, (Copenhagen, 1996).

<sup>155</sup> H. Adelman and A. Suhrke, *ibid.*

But there is also evidence that other considerations contributed as well. Rwanda contained a third ethnic group, variously known as the Twa or pygmies, who numbered only 1% of the population, were at the bottom of the social scale and power structure, and did not constitute a threat to anybody yet most of them, too, were massacred in the 1994 killings. The 1994 explosion was not just Hutu versus Tutsi, but the competing factions were in reality more complex: there were three rival factions composed predominantly or solely of Hutu, one of which may have been the one to trigger the explosion by killing the Hutu president from another faction; and the invading RPF army of exiles, though led by Tutsi, also contained Hutu. The distinction between Hutu and Tutsi is not nearly as sharp as often portrayed. The two groups speak the same language, attended the same churches and schools and bars, lived together in the same village under the same chiefs, and worked together in the same offices.<sup>156</sup> Hutu and Tutsi intermarried, and (before Belgians introduced identity cards) sometimes switched their ethnic identity. While Hutu and Tutsi look different on the average, many individuals are impossible to assign to either of the two groups based on appearance. About one-quarter of all Rwandans have both Hutu and Tutsi among their great-grandparents.

In fact, there is some question whether the traditional account of the Hutu and Tutsi having different origins is correct, or whether instead the two groups just differentiated economically and socially within Rwanda and Burundi out of a common stock. These intergradations gave rise to tens of thousands of personal tragedies during the 1994 killings, as Hutu tried to protect their Tutsi spouses, relatives, friends, colleagues, and patrons, or tried to buy off would-be killers of those loved ones with money. The two groups were so intertwined in Rwandan society that in 1994 doctors ended up killing their patients and vice versa, teachers killed their students and vice

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<sup>156</sup> J. Peik, International Press Coverage of the Rwandan Conflict, (Helsinki: Report prepared for Study II, 1995).

arsa, and neighbors and office colleagues killed each other. Individual Hutu killed some Tutsi while protecting other Tutsi.

Especially puzzling, if one believes that there was nothing more to the genocide than Hutu-versus-Tutsi ethnic hatred fanned by politicians, are events in northwestern Rwanda. There, in a community where virtually everybody was Hutu and there was only a single Tutsi, mass killings still took place -- of Hutu by other Hutu. While the proportional death toll there, estimated as "at least 5% of the population," may have been somewhat lower than that overall in Rwanda (11%), it still takes some explaining why a Hutu community would kill at least 5% of its members in the absence of ethnic motives. Elsewhere in Rwanda, as the 1994 genocide proceeded and as the number of Tutsi declined, Hutu turned to attacking each other.

The opportunity to put their plan into action came on April 6<sup>th</sup> 1994, when an airplane was mysteriously shot down. That aircraft was bringing both Habyarimana (the former president of Rwanda) and Ntaryamira (the president of Burundi, a neighboring country).<sup>157</sup> In front of, and in the eyes of the U.N. mission for Rwanda, with heavy weapons and enormous combat helicopters, more than 1,000,000 of Tutsi and Hutu moderates cruelly perished within a matter of weeks.

Various propaganda techniques were being used by Habyarimana's inner circle, such as setting up a radio station a potent source of power in a country that is 60 percent illiterate, Robbins notes<sup>158</sup> to denounce attempts at peace between the government and the RPF, while also inciting more hatred. Acts of violence against Tutsis increased, as Robbins continues, after the president

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<sup>157</sup> L. Turid, *Mismanaging the Rwandan Tragedy*, (Oslo: 1995).

<sup>158</sup> R. H. Robbins, *Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism*, (Allyn and Bacon, 1999, 2002).

of neighboring Burundi was killed in an attempted coup by Tutsi army officers. Hutus were incited to kill Tutsis, and the RPF responded by killing Hutus: some 50,000 peasants were reported killed, slightly more Tutsis than Hutus.

The shooting down of a plane which killed Habyarimana provided the final step to start the genocide: As Habyarimana continued to negotiate with the opposition under international pressure to reach a settlement; his plane (a gift from President Mitterrand of France) was shot down, killing him and everyone on board. Within an hour of Habyarimana's death, roadblocks were put up throughout Kigali as militia and death squads preceded to kill moderate Hutus, including the prime minister, whose names were on prepared lists. Then the death squads went after every Tutsi they could find, inciting virtually everyone in the civil service to join in the killing. The Hutu extremists set up an interim government committed to genocide. Yet, even when it was clear to most people that the genocide was orchestrated by an authoritarian state, journalists as well as U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali would characterize the slaughter as "Hutus killing Tutsis and Tutsis killing Hututs."<sup>159</sup> Building on Western stereotypes of savage Africans, Mayor Ed Koch of New York City, characterized the genocide as "tribal warfare involving those without the veneer of Western civilization."

As long as the killing could be characterized as interethnic violence, the core states, whose actions had created the situation for the killings and whose economic policies precipitated the violence, could distance themselves from the conflict. U.S. and European leaders, in fact went to great lengths *not* to use the word *genocide*, for to call it genocide may have required military intervention as agreed on in the United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948. It wasn't until

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<sup>159</sup> See Letters from the Secretary-General to the Security Council: April 13, 1994; S/1994/518, 1994, S/1994/518.

months later, after some 800,000 Tutsis had been killed, that government leaders in the West began to acknowledge the genocide.<sup>160</sup>

Looking at the dimension of the Rwanda conflict, so many countries were involved actively, indirectly, and directly. A big country like France and its president Mitterrand is the one who fueled the genocide, just accomplishing the idea created by colonialists (Germany and Belgium). Remember that in the 1994 genocide, the identity books brought by Belgians in 1931-35 played a major role in determining whom to kill or whom to let go.

The vital role of France was to give military support to the French-speaking government (weapons, training, and battlefield support on front line), and they were present on roadblocks as well. Other countries, like the USA, UK and others, were there too, helping directly or indirectly the English speaking rebels. This really shows how the so-called “powerful countries” often used to destroy the so called “poor countries” with the aim of gaining respect over other countries, and raising their celebrity status. In this issue of the Rwanda conflict, English speaking countries were against France and Belgium, former colonialists of Rwanda.<sup>161</sup> At this time Rwanda was directly or indirectly on the English speaking countries’ side as well.

During the horrific genocide in Rwanda, 1994, the Rwandan media played a major part in supporting, or creating an atmosphere to sanction the terrible human suffering that ensued. A detailed report from Human Rights Watch in 1999 looked into how the killing campaign was

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<sup>160</sup> R. H. Robbins, *Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism*, (Allyn and Bacon, 1999, 2002).

<sup>161</sup> H. Adelman and A. Suhrke, “Early Warning and Conflict Management”, in *International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, (Copenhagen, 1996).

executed, using oral testimony and documentation from a wide variety of sources.<sup>162</sup> It explained how this was planned for a long time and how the international community was aware of what was going on yet ignored it, and were even present during the systematic killings. The report notes that at least half a million people perished in the Rwandan genocide, perhaps as many as three quarters of the Tutsi population. At the same time, thousands of Hutu were slain because they opposed the killing campaign and the forces directing it.”

But one issue about the whole tragedy was how it was portrayed in some of the mainstream media of some western countries. The genocide was often attributed to ancient tribal hatreds. However as Human Rights Watch notes, the genocide was not an uncontrollable outburst of rage by a people consumed by ‘ancient tribal hatreds.’ Instead: This genocide resulted from the deliberate choice of modern elite to foster hatred and fear to keep itself in power. This small, privileged group first set the majority against the minority to counter a growing political opposition within Rwanda. Then, faced with RPF success on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, these few power holders transformed the strategy of ethnic division into genocide. They believed that the extermination campaign would restore the solidarity of the Hutu under their leadership and help them win the war, or at least improve their chances of negotiating a favorable peace. They seized control of the state and used its machinery and its authority to carry out the slaughter.<sup>163</sup>

Up until that point, the colonial powers first Germany and later Belgium had always favoured Rwanda’s minority Tutsis over the majority Hutus, regarding the former as Hamites and thus

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<sup>162</sup> See also Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War" in Human Rights Watch Vol.6, No. 1, 1994.

<sup>163</sup> Human Rights Watch, "Leave None to Tell the Story; Genocide in Rwanda, " , March 1999.



naturally superior to the Hutus (and the Twa). In 1959, however, the Belgians switched allegiance to the Hutus. This ignited an explosion of anti-Tutsi violence, driven by the deep-seated grievances and anger that the colonialists' discriminatory policies had created and fuelled among the Hutus. These grievances, in turn, were to play a significant role in the 1994 genocide, as Hutu extremists tapped into and exploited Hutu fears of once again being made subordinate to the Tutsis. Following its attack on Rwanda in 1990, the RPF, which had close links to Uganda and Yoweri Museveni, became engaged in a three-year conflict with the Rwandan army (FAR). According to Hutu extremists within Habyarimana's regime, however, it was not only the RPF who posed a fundamental threat. Rather, all Tutsis, by extension, were the enemy.

The second and more fundamental crisis moment occurred on 6 April 1994.<sup>164</sup> As President Habyarimana was returning to Rwanda from Tanzania, his airplane was struck by two missiles and everyone on board was killed. To this day, it remains unclear who fired these missiles. While some commentators point the finger at the RFP and its leader, Paul Kagame, others maintain that the most likely culprits were Hutu extremists and members of Habyarimana's own political party, the *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement* (MRND), since they had the most to lose from the nascent peace process.<sup>165</sup> Regardless of who killed Habyarimana, the genocide began almost as soon as his airplane was shot down, thus underscoring the fact that it was highly planned and organized. Over the next three months, between 500,000 and one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed, a faster rate of slaughter than the Holocaust.

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<sup>164</sup> G. Prunier, *ibid.*

<sup>165</sup> G. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*. (London: Hurst & Co; Clapham. 1998), p. 204.

Firstly, prior to the arrival of the colonial powers, the labels Hutu and Tutsi denoted social, rather than ethnic, differences related to status, wealth and way of life.<sup>166</sup> What is more, these categories were very fluid. A Hutu, for example, could become a Tutsi through ownership of cattle. It was the colonialists' policies, not least the introduction during the 1930s of identity cards that transformed Hutu and Tutsi into ethnic identities.

Secondly, while there was an important ethnic dimension to the conflict and genocide in Rwanda, ethnicity per se was not the cause of those events.<sup>167</sup> Rather, what was critical was the manipulation and abuse of ethnicity, as extremists sought to make ethnicity the sole lens through which people viewed the country's current problems and the sole determinant for crafting possible solutions.<sup>168</sup> Of course, such an instrumentalist, as opposed to a primordialist, view of ethnicity cannot explain why this elite manipulation of the masses was successful. To understand this, it is also necessary to have regard to the country's colonial history, the grievances that it engendered and the particular circumstances of the early 1990s; in particular the civil war between the FAR and the RPF, the uncertainties and fears that it generated and the impact of the economic crisis, fuelled by a fall in world coffee prices in 1989. To emphasize elite manipulation of ethnicity, however, is to highlight one of the key features of the genocide, namely its top-down dynamic. In essence, the episode's central feature was a deliberate, systematic, state-led campaign to eliminate a racially defined social group.<sup>169</sup> Elites, in other words, were the main drivers.

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<sup>166</sup> L.A. Fujii, *Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

<sup>167</sup> H. Hintjens, "Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1999.

<sup>168</sup> Fujii, L.A. "Transforming the moral landscape: the diffusion of a genocidal norm in Rwanda." *Journal of Genocide Research*, 2004.

<sup>169</sup> S. Straus, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

Thirdly, to over-focus on ethnicity is to neglect other important cleavages that contributed to the violence in Rwanda. There was, for example, a very significant 6 political dimension to the conflict, pitting moderates committed to multi-party democracy against those opposed to it. There was also a critical north/south dimension. In contrast to his predecessor Grégoire Kayibanda, who came from Gitarama in the south, President Habyarimana was from Gisenyi in north-west Rwanda and always favoured the minority northern Hutus. Under Habyarimana's rule, northern Hutu elites thereby gained significant power and privileges that they were intent upon preserving. From their perspective, therefore, it was not only Tutsis who posed a threat to their positions but also Hutu opposition parties from southern Rwanda. These political and regional aspects of the conflict were closely linked to democracy-building in Rwanda.

In response to strong pressure from France and the conclusion of a Franco-African summit at La Baule in July 1990, Habyarimana announced the introduction of a multi-party system in Rwanda. Thus, by March 1992, five main opposition parties existed the *Mouvement Démocratique Républicain* (MDR), the *Parti Social Démocrate* (PSD), the *Parti Libéral* (PL), the *Parti Démocratique Chrétien* (PDC) and the *Comité pour la Défense de la République* (CDR).<sup>170</sup> In April 1992, Habyarimana further agreed to the creation of a coalition government with the opposition parties, headed by Dismas Nsengiyaremye from the MDR. In other words, there seemed to be genuine progress towards change.<sup>171</sup> What is more, by agreeing to formal peace talks aimed at ending Rwanda's civil war, the new government played a key role in facilitating the conflict resolution process.

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<sup>170</sup> African Rights, "Rwanda: Who is killing, who is dying, what is to be done." A discussion paper, 1994.

<sup>171</sup> L. Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide*, (London: Verso, 2006).

### 3.2. Conflict Prevention

Conflict prevention is a multifaceted, complex process ranging from long-term or structural policy to promote stability, to short-term intensive diplomacy to resolve disputes, preventive diplomacy and civilian or military intervention to monitor and/or control the early stages of conflict or crisis management.<sup>172</sup> It also refers to attempts to stop the recurrence of violence in conflict zones peace-building or post-conflict reconstruction/rehabilitation. It is therefore an activity primarily, although not exclusively, concerned with the period before the outbreak of war. Conflict prevention covers a range of activities also associated with gathering information on impending conflict (early warning), aid to relieve the effects of conflict, sanctions, and humanitarian intervention.

Preventing the recurrence of violence also includes issues of peace-building and post-conflict rehabilitation.<sup>173</sup> It is because conflict prevention covers various stages of the cycle of conflict, (as well as the arbitrary use of multiple similar and interchangeable terms), that confusion concerning policy application arises. The variety of terms used and their implications will be further examined later. Needless to say, this wide interpretation of conflict prevention has hampered attempts to formulate coherent policy specific to a certain conflict at a certain time. Turning a concept which has gained wide support into specific policy, the efficacy of which is frequently contested, has proved remarkably difficult.

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<sup>172</sup> G. J. Heidenrich, "How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen," (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).

<sup>173</sup> L. D. Saur, 'From Kibeho to Medjugorje: The Catholic Church and Ethno-Nationalist Movements and Regimes', in Carol Rittner, John K. Roth and Wendy Whitworth (eds.), *Genocide in Rwanda: Complicity of the Churches?*, (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2004), p. 220.

The genocide in Rwanda could have been prevented. There were many steps that the international community could have taken to prevent the genocide that would not have involved military action.<sup>174</sup> Solidarity within the UN was practically nonexistent with regards to Rwanda. Most countries had no investments or anything to gain from helping Rwanda, so little was done. Three of the five permanent members of the UN had reasons not to prevent the genocide. The US had nothing to gain, and France and China were supplying the government with arms. If the UN had expressed more concern for the atrocities going on, had decided early on that what was happening was indeed a genocide, action could have been taken much sooner. Early action could have prevented France and China from funding and/or fueling the genocide, and also could have prevented French troops from helping the Hutu Power regime flee the country.

The United States was very reluctant to take any kind of action in Rwanda because Rwanda did not represent one of the country's economic interests. They refused even simple means of interference, and even helped to impede other countries from taking action. One thing that could have been done by any country was simply to recognize that the conditions in Rwanda after their independence lent themselves to the possibility of genocide. Recognizing this early and taking step to ensure that genocidal plots were not put into action by the government could have been a serious obstacle to the genocide's execution.<sup>175</sup> Instead, United States officials argued over the use of the word genocide for fear that it would compel the country to act, as it obviously would have. If the conditions had been recognized, or rather, acknowledged sooner, the international community could have responded much quicker.

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<sup>174</sup> P. Samantha, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, (New York, 2002).

<sup>175</sup> D. Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Rwanda did not have all the technology available to more developed countries. Telephone lines were, and are, scarce, but the country was heavily saturated with radios. In a country where almost everyone had a portable radio, especially after the government issued them to Hutus for free, radio was the most suitable and effective way of spreading propaganda. Only the United States had the technology for jamming the radio waves of propaganda, and, when alerted to this fact, the countries staunchly refused to use the technology, to lend it, or even lend the equipment, to the United Nations so that someone else could take action.<sup>176</sup> This completely prevented the international community from being able to jam the radio frequencies. Had they been able to, however, they would have been able to stop the spread of hate messages, and later in the genocide, it would have nearly incapacitated the government from hunting down targeted individuals, as lists of these people were read of the Hutu Power radio station.<sup>177</sup> This could arguably have stopped the genocide in its tracks without setting a single soldier on Rwandan soil.

The United States and other western countries generally interact with other states, specifically on a state level. The consequences of this are that, even when the UN has reports that genocide may be taking place within a country, its response is to notify the government that is possibly carrying out genocide that there may be a genocide happening in their country. Obviously, if reports are leaking to the international community, it must be well-known internationally, and the government, for some reason, is not taking action. The insistence on only dealing with other countries as states prevents any action being done for the voiceless individuals.

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<sup>176</sup> N. Eltringham, Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda, (London: Pluto, 2004).

<sup>177</sup> M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

Again, on the issue of support, had the United States not so staunchly opposed action in Rwanda, other countries would probably have been more willing to lend troops or equipment or money.<sup>178</sup> As it was, the United States' refusal to contribute set the tone for the intervention, and that tone basically told other countries that they were not expected to help. Furthermore, when the United States did begrudgingly contribute equipment, they delayed its employ by haggling over the fee to the UN, to whom it has never paid its dues. This delay cost more lives as the meager intervention force was stalled for a couple months while it waited for heavy machinery.

In the aftermath, Rwanda is a very different country. While Hutus and Tutsis now live side by side, many feel that the only way for them to survive is to destroy the other ethnic group.<sup>179</sup> The post-genocide government has tried to establish a greater level of stability within the country to ensure that a second genocide will not happen. The government has abolished the ethnic identity cards that, for so long, were the only tangible means of distinguishing one group from another. Many citizens of Rwanda still remember what their neighbours were once labeled, however, and many victims of the genocide live side by side with the killers of their families. Many Rwandans now refuse to place themselves in an ethnic category at all, however, and a new generation of Rwandans who do not grow up with ethnic identity cards will help to ease the ethnic tensions.<sup>180</sup>

After the genocide was officially declared "over" by the international community, the genocide continued outside of Rwanda's borders, in the refugee camps where the Hutu Power regime-in-exile had set up operations. A year or two after the genocide, however, the government of

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<sup>178</sup> L. Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide*, (London: Zed Books, 2000).

<sup>179</sup> R. Dallaire and B. Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004).

<sup>180</sup> S. Straus, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

Rwanda, with help from the Ugandan government, launched an attack against these camps and broke them up forcibly. This prevented the escaped criminals from exercising further misery upon the refugees, and from launching attacks on Rwanda. It also stopped the influx of foreign aid dollars funding reprisals from the Hutu Power refugees.

Some things that can be done to prevent further genocide in Rwanda would be monitoring of the radio broadcasts to ensure that no hateful messages are sent, and to jam any frequencies that broadcast hateful messages against one ethnic group or the other.<sup>181</sup> Also, the infrastructure in Rwanda has been completely gutted, and its restructuring will take a long time. The Rwandans finally won the right from the UN to try their own criminals, in their own country, though this process has been shown to have innumerable problems of its own. Education is practically at a stand-still, and much needs to be done to ensure that the children of Rwanda are taught to live in community with each other. And, while recognize that it is a very Western way of looking at things, there is a severe level of psychological damage that has been done to the Rwandans almost categorically, and if those issues are not addressed then there are sure to be repercussions in the future. Early warning therefore did not work in Rwanda because of scarce technology which inhibited the gathering of information. Preventive action could not also occur because early warning is not only about gathering information but also triggering action and action was not triggered on the basis that there was lack of political will on the part of international community and regional states. This inaction is what scholars for early warning argues as an obstacle to preventive measures.

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<sup>181</sup> K. Chiedu, Rwanda's Genocide: The Politics of Global Justice, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.87. See also Article 19, Broadcasting Genocide, p. 3.



### 3.3 Modes of Intervention

The UN and OAU interventions were pretty useless. Only RPF invasion and victory brought it to an end, although some might argue that RPF attacks increased the chance of genocide occurring because it backed an extremist regime into a corner.<sup>182</sup> Advocates of humanitarian intervention often claim that 5,000 U.N. troops alone could have staved off the Rwandan genocide in 1994. But a more realistic appraisal suggests that an intervention of any size would have required much more time and logistical planning than most proponents care to admit. Given the genocide's terrifying pace, even a major mission by the West could have saved only a fraction of the ultimate victims, herewith a reassessment of the limits of intervention.<sup>183</sup>

The AU has reached major strides in developing and establishing its CEWS. Notable steps include the drafting of the roadmap for the operationalization of the CEWS that provides a detailed and in-depth look into the nature and the role of these systems in conflict prevention on the continent. The premise behind the CEWS is that early warning and early response on emerging and potential conflicts on the continent would solicit a rapid response from the AU. As a key element of the CEWS, the Situation is responsible for data collection, analysis, and dissemination and monitors developments in the 53 member states of the Union, especially conflict and post-conflict zones and potential conflict areas.<sup>184</sup> The UN could work because there were fewer officials to implement and take action against those who were undermining peace efforts. The UN failed because of lack of guarantees from Security Council Members.

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<sup>182</sup> P. Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. (Kumarian Press 1998).

<sup>183</sup> A. J. Kuperman The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda. (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2001).

<sup>184</sup> A. J. Kuperman, *ibid.*

The international community might have responded better had the early warning systems generated a clearer anticipation that genocide was on the horizon. Yet, conflict management is a function of capacity, interest and commitment as well as information. In the Rwandan case, the relevant actors knew at a critical stage that the situation was unstable and dangerous. Unforeseen detrimental events did indeed occur to give the situation a turn for the worse - in particular, the October 1993 ethnic massacres in neighboring Burundi.<sup>185</sup> But the major powers which controlled UN peacekeeping operations paid only cursory attention to Rwanda and there were no contingency plans except for withdrawal.

The sustained and careful attention so necessary to successful conflict management was lacking. There was considerable international investment in preventive diplomacy in Rwanda, but when this failed and genocide ensued, the international community effectively disengaged. Humanitarian relief within Rwanda and to refugees across the border soon resumed, but these efforts were designed to deal with the consequences of conflict rather than the violence itself.<sup>186</sup> Re-interventions to save civilians had very limited impact, as indeed might be expected from retroactive conflict management. The reasons for this fundamental failure to respond are found, ultimately, in a structural mismatch between institutions and interests in the contemporary state system.

Revitalized by the end of the Cold War, the United Nations in the 1990s rapidly expanded its peacekeeping operations throughout the world. Rwanda was added to the list in October 1993.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>185</sup> H. Adelman, Astri Suhrke, "Early Warning and Response: Why the International Community Failed to Prevent the Genocide, 1996, *Disasters*, vol. 20, no. 4, pp.295-304.

<sup>186</sup> H. Adelman, Astri Suhrke, "Early Warning and Response: Why the International Community Failed to Prevent the Genocide, *Disasters*, 1996, vol. 20, no. 4, pp.295-304: 290.

<sup>187</sup> See S. Straus, "Darfur and the Genocide Debate," *Journal of Foreign Affairs*, 2005, vol. 84, no. 1, pp.123-133.

The framework for peacekeeping, however, was set by the distribution of power in the Security Council, which in form still reflected the world as it was half a century ago. Apart from France, the major powers on the Council were basically uninterested in a small Central African country that was marginal to their economic or political concerns, and peripheral to international strategic rivalries. Through their power of veto and financial commitments, these states also controlled the peacekeeping or enforcement operations of the United Nations. Preoccupied with crises elsewhere, especially in Bosnia and Haiti, and haunted by the memories of Somalia, they decided not to engage in Rwanda until it was too late. Other potential actors were either unwilling or, at that late stage unable to respond on their own. Hence, a principal lesson from the Rwandan conflict is that in a world of multiple crises, even major disasters in a seemingly peripheral state fall victim to neglect.<sup>188</sup>

Another lesson refers to the general principle that respect for international law and norms will tend to diminish conflict, whereas violations will tend to stoke it. The behaviour of state and presumptive state actors in the Rwandan conflict was in this respect less than adequate, and mostly counter reductive. International law and associated principles designed to uphold international order were repeatedly violated including sanctity of national borders and arms embargoes. International refugee law was not observed. The legal right and moral obligation to intervene to stop genocide was not acted upon. Human rights law was repeatedly and severely transgressed with impunity. Donors continued to give economic aid, and, in one case, also substantial military assistance, to a government lied to systemic violations of human rights. While this might be expected in a world of competitive nation-states observing the rules of

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<sup>188</sup> H. Adelman, A. Suhrke, "Early Warning and Response: Why the International Community Failed to Prevent The Genocide," *Disasters*, 1996, vol. 20, no. 4, p.68.

*Realpolitik*, it should also be recalled that the consequences of lawlessness in this case were exceedingly costly - both for the Rwandan parties and people, and for outside states concerned.<sup>189</sup>

International efforts to manage the conflict - as distinct from addressing its humanitarian consequences - were a failure when judged against international norms governing the prevention or mitigation of genocidal violence, as well as other UN standards. By explicitly asserting the right to intervene in a world otherwise governed by principles of national sovereignty, the Genocide Convention implicitly affirms the associated moral obligation to act.<sup>190</sup> The United Nations and its members had already assumed some responsibility for conflict management in Rwanda by establishing a peacekeeping operation to help implement the Arusha Accords. When the Accords failed and the genocide commenced, the UN formally acknowledged an obligation to help protect civilians. This recognition came belatedly in the form of a Security Council resolution on 17 May 1994 - i.e. six weeks after the genocide commenced.

### **3.4 Early Warning Systems during the Rwandan Conflict**

Recent catastrophes in Rwanda, Yugoslavia and elsewhere, as well as the realization that it may be easier to deal with conflicts at the earliest stage has led to growing consensus on the importance of conflict prevention in the United Nations and among many trans-governmental and nongovernmental organizations.<sup>191</sup> The cost-effective aspect of prevention of conflicts also

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<sup>189</sup> J. Craig, Conflict-Carrying Capacity, Political Crisis, and Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996: The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, (Copenhagen: DANIDA, 2001).

<sup>190</sup> J. Davies, Conflict Early Warning and Early Response for Sub-Saharan Africa, (Crisis and Transition Toolkit, 1998).

<sup>191</sup> H. Miall, Ramsbotham, T. Woodhouse, Contemporary conflict resolution. The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999).

explains the increasing interest in conflict prevention: tackling conflicts before they reach the point of armed conflict or mass violence is very inexpensive compared to the exorbitant bill for relief, protection, reconstruction and reconciliation activities in conflict areas. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse distinguish two general types of active measures to prevent conflict; 'light prevention' and 'deep prevention'. In the context of post-Cold War conflicts, light prevention generally means improving the international capacity to intervene in conflicts before they become violent, through, for instance, preventive diplomacy. Deep prevention means building domestic, regional or international capacity to manage conflict. In cases, prudent decision making and effective conflict prevention measures require a capacity to anticipate and analyze possible conflicts and to be warned in time about developments that threaten peace in a particular region. In fact, early warning of (a potential) escalation of tensions is essential to be able to come up with preventive measures and strategies in the early stages of conflict development as to have the highest chance of success.<sup>192</sup>

The definition of 'genocide was an international sticking-point. There would be at least 10 clear warnings to the UN of the 'Hutu power' action, including an anxious telegram from the UNAMIR commander to the then UN Secretary- General (Boutros Boutros Ghali) three months before the event. The UN Security Council met in secret after the start of the violence.<sup>193</sup> At this meeting Britain urged that UNAMIR should pull out (and later blocked an American proposal to send in a fact-finding mission when the death toll had reached six figures). Council members resisted admitting 'that the mass murder being pursued in front of the global media was in fact

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<sup>192</sup> P. Tongeren, 'The role of NGOs in conflict prevention', in Dutch Centre for Conflict Prevention, in ACCESS and PIOOM (eds.), *Prevention and Management of Conflicts: an international directory*, (NCDO, Utrecht, 1996), pp. 18-24.

<sup>193</sup> C. Mitchell, and M. Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem-Solving Approach*, (London: Pinter/Cassell, 1996).

genocide': genocide involved action no-one wanted to take. Once it was inescapably clear that genocide was indeed going on, it was too late. The USA had actually banned its officials from using the term. Finally, in June, Secretary of State Warren Christopher grumpily conceded 'If there's any particular magic in calling it genocide, I've no hesitancy in saying that'.

### 3.4.1 International and Regional Interventions in Rwanda

The international community is faced with a wave of new conflicts. Taken together they amount to nothing less than an epochal watershed: a time that future historians may describe as the moment when humanity seized or failed to seize the opportunity to replace obsolescent mechanisms for resolving human conflict.<sup>194</sup> The USA when requested to send 50 armoured personnel carriers to help UNAMIR sought clarity on whom and what they were going to save before their departure while the answers were not forthcoming they marked time and then relocated APCs to Uganda instead.<sup>195</sup> Asked to use its hi-tech skills to get the génocidaire radio off the air, America replied, 'the traditional US commitment to free speech cannot be reconciled with such a measure', on this occasion. France, a backer of most French-speaking African governments, had been backing the genocidal government: it was one of their generals who advised the Hutus to 'improve their image' (hence, perhaps, the order to keep corpses out of the sight of cameras).

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<sup>194</sup> Renner, Michael, *Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity*, (New York: Norton, 1996).

<sup>195</sup> M.E. Hanrahan, *Rwanda: An Introduction. Prepared for Canadian Peacekeeping Mission to Rwanda*, (1994).

### 3.5 Conclusions

It can be concluded that the various key actors in the Rwandan conflict significantly contributed to the genocide. The key issues which could have been resolved had the various actors played their parts exposed the need for both regional and international interventions in the conflict. The series of events that culminated into the genocide in 1994 therefore, exposed the insensitivity and the unwillingness of the key actors to intervene. Dallaire argued that he could have stopped the unfolding slaughter in Rwanda, had the UN Security Council granted his request for extra troops.<sup>196</sup> At the UN Security Council, deliberations were in secret, preventing an examination of government actions. Dallaire, head of the UN peacekeepers in Rwanda, wrote a report to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, but it was not passed to the Security Council. Meanwhile, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary-General, was detached, perhaps purposely not informed.<sup>197</sup>

Prunier discusses political leadership, periods of violence, the plight of refugees forced to remain in exile, the civil war, genocide, foreign intervention, and resulting refugee crisis in the Kivu regions of Zaire<sup>198</sup> and observes that Africa lacks the means for total war, so conflicts there are generally carried out only part time. Military interventions rapidly become privatised, and looting is a natural tendency for all combatants, particularly since the fighters are usually unpaid for long periods. This in turn means that civilians become the main targets since it is by taking from them that the invaders guarantee their survival. Indeed, during the Congolese conflict the armies have generally avoided contact with one another and almost all casualties have been

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<sup>196</sup> See R. Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. (London: Arrow Books, 2004).

<sup>197</sup> R. Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. (London: Arrow Books, 2004).

<sup>198</sup> G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

civilians. Prunier is contemptuous of most western attitudes and interventions in a crisis he believes it never bothered to understand. His disdain is particularly directed at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which has managed to combine “the worst aspects of UN bureaucratic inefficiency” with mere political jousting, all within “a swamp of nepotistic and corrupt practices.”<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> See G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of Genocide. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p.32.



## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AND RESPONSE MECHANISMS IN AFRICAN CONFLICTS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS**

#### **4.0 Introduction**

The study in chapter three focused on early warning systems and response mechanisms in Africa with specific reference to the Rwandan genocide from 1992-2010. The chapter had a critical look at the major actors, issues, processes in the conflict and the both regional and international responses to the Rwanda genocide. It is indeed clear from chapter three that the existing EWR in the case of Rwanda did not work due to their ineffectiveness or failure by Africa and the international community to act in order to avert the conflict.

This chapter gives a critical analysis of the EWR mechanisms in African conflicts namely, under what conditions, these mechanisms might be a useful conflict prevention tool for Africa; the nature and ingredients of violent conflict in relationship to escalation and de-escalation efforts; efforts made to prevent the crisis in Rwanda; failure and successes of these EWR mechanisms in Rwanda; the role played by the actors and issues in the Rwanda conflict; the development of the concept of early warning systems in the African context and why EWR mechanisms failed to avert the Rwanda crisis. This analysis utilizes the conceptual framework.

#### 4.1 The Development of the Concept of Early Warning in the Rwanda Context

Since its initial conceptualization, and early warning has been integrated into the policies of nations, institutions and organizations. Today it cannot be said, however, that the international community is in a position to prevent another Rwandan genocide. African conflicts lack appropriate EWR mechanisms since inaccurate information and failure by the international community to detect and recognize state fragility is inadequate. It is for this reason that conflict early warning, especially in Africa faces challenges similar to those it faced 15 years ago with new challenges on the horizon.<sup>200</sup>

The failure to respond to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the experiences of the Balkans conflicts were major spurs to the development of better conflict early warning and response; they led to several major policy initiatives in governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental sectors. However, governments and stakeholders and policy makers need to depart from the traditional approach towards EWR in tackling conflicts especially in Africa, to a more practical approach that is more appropriate and suit the peculiar nature of African conflicts.

Towards this end, international and regional intervention in conflicts needs to be prompt and timely to save lives of innocent citizens. The case of Rwanda for example presented a case where countries like France, Belgium and the US failed to avert the looming crisis despite the fact that since 1992, there were sufficient evidence that a deadly conflict spurred by ethnic hatred and animosity would erupt in Rwanda.<sup>201</sup> The reason could be because conflict early warning was

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<sup>200</sup> C. J. Herman, "Africa and the United Nations Agenda for Peace", (Unpublished paper. Washington, D.C., 1993).

<sup>201</sup> R. M. Connaughton, Military Support and Protection for Humanitarian Assistance. Rwanda, April - December 1994, (London: Report prepared for Study III, 1995).

envisaged as distinct from intelligence-based analysis that focused on protection of state interests.

Regional actors should also strive to act as intermediaries. They would seek to strengthen local and national capacities, but also be prepared to step in if the authorities at this level are obviously inadequate or prone to failure. If regional capacities do not suffice to handle such a situation or if political will to react is lacking, ringing the international alarm bell would be of crucial importance. Admittedly, those ideal models of a division of labor at the various levels of intervention never work in practice. At the same time, crisis situations necessitate adequately tailored fora at the interface of these different levels.

There is no best methodology or best set of methods, or indicators but there is basic good practice in analysis. Many methods are based on this good practice and are designed to address the needs of specific institutions. Second, the best way to use these methods is to combine quantitative and qualitative tools. This ensures the necessary triangulation required for creating a robust evidence base for decision making.

Early warning systems now exist within governments, multilateral agencies and NGOs. They play different roles ranging from sounding alerts and catalyzing response, to bolstering the evidence base of decision making, to serving as response mechanisms themselves. There is consensus on what constitutes a “good” early warning system, and this good practice has been put into operation in several initiatives.<sup>202</sup> Early warning systems provide: a crisis prediction capacity that enables proactive decision making; a stronger basis for evidence-based decision

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<sup>202</sup> Y. de Moal, “Promotion of Human Security in Rwanda,” (Unpublished paper, Kigali, 1994).

making on countries affected by crisis; improved programming through systematic country reviews and expert analysis; a priority-setting contribution through watch-list type products; a starting point for developing a shared problem definition for crisis-affected countries that sets the stage for more coherent responses; and an ideas pool for responses and sometimes the forum to meet fellow responders and plan joint response strategies. However, with a few exceptions, early warning systems suffer from under-investment. The more natural clients for early warning systems are political decision-making entities. Still, the often poor/shallow quality of analyses, unrealistic recommendations, and biased or ungrounded opinions present in many early warning products means that “poor early warning” remains an important cause of non-response to violent conflict.

It has also been noted by scholars that in spite of the increased resources going into early warning, key shortcomings of governmental and multilateral interventions in violent conflict remain.<sup>203</sup> These include faulty analysis, late, uncoordinated and contradictory engagement, and poor decision making. Conflict early warning as a field of conflict prevention is today undergoing significant scrutiny. There have been inaccurate predictions, failure to foresee important events, and inadequate linking of operational responses to warnings.<sup>204</sup> From a donor perspective, the visible impacts of early warning are often seen as meager. Indeed, at times early warning analyses can provide donor officials with political headaches, by being alarmist or offensive to other governments, or by advocating responses that are not feasible. However, proponents of conflict early warning insist that it contributes to the evidence base of conflict

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<sup>203</sup> R. Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

<sup>204</sup> C. Mitchell and M. Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem-Solving Approach*, (London: Pinter/Cassell, 1996).

prevention decision making. Cause of non-response to violent conflict. The focus of this report is on tools/systems that deal with violent conflict and state fragility.

Early warning systems now exist within governments, multilateral agencies and NGOs. They play different roles ranging from sounding alerts and catalyzing response, to bolstering the evidence base of decision making, to serving as response mechanisms themselves.<sup>205</sup> There is consensus on what constitutes a “good” early warning system, and this good practice has been put into operation in several initiatives. Early warning systems provide: a crisis prediction capacity that enables proactive decision making; a stronger basis for evidence-based decision making on countries affected by crisis; improved programming through systematic country reviews and expert analysis; a priority-setting contribution through watch-list type products; a starting point for developing a shared problem definition for crisis-affected countries that sets the stage for more coherent responses; and an ideas pool for responses and sometimes the forum to meet fellow responders and plan joint response strategies.<sup>206</sup>

However, with a few exceptions, early warning systems suffer from under-investment. The more natural clients for early warning systems are political decision-making entities. Still, the often poor/shallow quality of analyses, unrealistic recommendations, and biased or ungrounded opinions present in many early warning products means that “poor early warning” remains an important. Regional EWR models could have a cutting edge in pushing forward these requirements for communication and coordination and avoid the present ambitions of regional

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<sup>205</sup> W. Klaas van, (eds.) *Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Limitations and Possibilities*, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998).

<sup>206</sup> C. Mitchell, “Classifying conflicts: asymmetry and resolution,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1991, vol.23, pp.518.

organizations in developing their own scenarios and recipes for action.<sup>207</sup> The evolution of the conflict early warning field has been driven by the advances made in quantitative and qualitative analytical tools. As the capabilities and value of the tools grew, they were integrated into the different early warning systems operated by governments, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs. Such tools have enjoyed significant advances. Quantitative methods have strong predictive capabilities, particularly in relation to political crisis and instability.

State fragility indices should be provided as they present easily graspable watch lists and help agencies working on these issues to set priorities. Qualitative methods provide rich contextual analysis, as well as ways to plan programmatic responses and assess the impact of these responses on violent conflicts. The more recent qualitative methods for state fragility analysis provide useful planning frameworks for programmatic responses. Qualitative tools satisfy important analytical requirements among development agencies, particularly in terms of informing programming.

Nevertheless, several weaknesses still persist with regard to EWR. For example the existing analytical tools fundamentally oversimplify complex and fluid violent conflicts and situations of state fragility. They provide simple snapshots that are quickly outdated, and the quality of analysis suffers from data deficits that characterize many of the countries covered by such studies. Provision of accurate information therefore requires proper tools of analysis in EWR mechanisms in Africa.

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<sup>207</sup> J. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History. (New York: Harper Collins, 1993).

#### 4.2. Conceptual Problems of Early Response Mechanisms in Rwanda

Hagmeyer-Gaverus and Weismann argue that there are several reasons why EWR is not used effectively and why a warning-response gap is so apparent in many conflicts.<sup>208</sup> Institutional rigidity and cognitive biases; conflict escalation processes and, in particular, the role of triggers and single events is still under researched. While structural indicators fit into relatively simple models, the escalation of a tense situation into violence does not result from the linear summation of a neatly defined set of causes, but from interactions among multiple phenomena in a complex system with several levels of organization.<sup>209</sup>

There is a disconnect between early warning advisers and early action decision makers. Even if an early warning system is accurate and timely, it does not automatically lead to timely action. Laurie Nathan convincingly argues that “above all, it must be useful to the senior officials who are responsible for making decisions on early action. The system will have scant value if its outputs are not tailored precisely to meet their needs.”<sup>210</sup> The various decision makers who deal with governance and human rights abuses, reconstruction programs, mediation in conflicts, deployment of peacekeepers, planning and implementation of humanitarian and military programs, or preventive diplomacy all of whom are engaged in peace and security missions need tailor-made information rather than general reports on the potential emergence of violent conflict. Specific information for each conflict is require

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<sup>208</sup> See G. Hagmeyer-Gaverus and W. Mikael, “Early Warning Indicators for Preventive Policy - a new approach in Early Warning research,” (Working Paper no.1, 2003).

<sup>209</sup> P. Meier, *ibid.*

<sup>210</sup> L. Nathan, “Africa’s Early Warning System: An Emperor with No Clothes?” South African Journal of International Affairs 2007, Vol.14, no. 1, pp. 49–60: 50.

EWR mechanisms according to Meier are based on “hierarchical structures” that cannot adequately cope with nonlinear developments.<sup>211</sup> As a remedy, it would mean that at certain stages EWR mechanisms must address not only a vaguely defined “international community,” but find ways to inform different levels of potential actors all the way down to the local level.

According to Woocher, more accurate models and a change in communication and the structures of organizations will not suffice because they do not reflect the ways in which individuals and groups’ process information and make decisions in the shadow of risk and uncertainty.<sup>212</sup> Most EWR models are based on the prevalent “rational actor” model. This model, however, does not take into account that individuals and groups are prone to mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies.<sup>213</sup> These arguments suggest that the effectiveness of EWR systems is affected not only by the quality of alerts, but also by institutional factors and cognitive biases. Such biases can skew the empirical evidence and, thus, the reliability of the early warning risk assessment or forecast. Some of these biases result from self-referential logics of national and international institutions that are far away from the places where violent conflict evolves a constellation that can well be captured with the term cognitive distance.

Political interest, probably the most important structural deficiency in the insufficient use of EWR by regional organizations is that governments do not want to or are unable to react. Governments are usually quite aware of acute or emerging major conflicts. Often they are the cause of this conflict. Sophisticated early warning indicators are not needed to warn about such

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<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> L. Woocher, “The Effects of Cognitive Biases on Early Warning,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, March 2008.

<sup>213</sup> R. J. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, (1999).



conflicts. However, governments are usually not interested in the fact that their abuses of civil rights and the violation of human rights are documented or acted on. Thus, despite mandating secretariats of regional organizations, this *Herbert Wulf and Tobias Debiel* might only be lip service. In practice, certain governments make sure that the relevant regional bodies remain weak in early warning, thereby preventing early response. Furthermore, looking at the differences of the political systems among the member states of regional organizations and the lack of common values, it is no surprise that unified decisions on when and how to intervene to prevent a conflict can only seldom be agreed on in such organizations. Governments hesitate to overrule the principle of noninterference in internal matters of their neighboring states. Donor governments and organizations who support the establishment of EWR mechanisms in regional organizations usually emphasize the need for capacity building. While it is correct to assume that early warning capacities are not very strong, the more pressing problem is the lack of political consensus on possible action and response to warnings.

IGAD, although also a region compromised by conflicts, has chosen a different approach. Due to the political and security situation, IGAD was not in a position to develop a functioning and effective region-wide EWR concept. As a compromise, IGAD presently restricts its fully developed indicator and report-based EWR to two pilot areas. This political compromise has both costs and benefits. Certainly, the declared intention of the EWR system of predicting violent conflict cannot be met. This would require a region-wide approach.<sup>214</sup> Thus, numerous conflicts and tensions with a potential to turn into violent conflict remain unobserved and unreported by the official IGAD CEWARN system. However, the concentration on two local cross-border

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<sup>214</sup> A. Rapoport, "Various conceptions of peace research," *Peace Research Society (International) Papers*, 1971, no. XIX, pp. 91-106.

conflicts has the advantage of collecting the relevant information at the local level. Thus, the strong criticism against many EWR models, of largely ignoring the strength of the local space in mediating conflict, is less relevant in the case of IGAD's two pilot projects.<sup>215</sup>

Lack of capacities and inefficient allocation and use of resources, the field of EWR is characterized by a striking duplication and overlap of data collection in numerous different models. In particular, we have witnessed an "inflation" of relatively closely related capacity and risk assessment models within the past few years, resulting in duplication and waste of resources. At the same time, there is a remarkable gap between the high ambitions and far reaching goals of EWR projects and the status of their actual implementation.

Guided by the introduction, there is need for particular attention: as is shown, EWR research has been quite successful in gathering and assessing macro data. At the same time, its models have so far only marginally included the impact of small events and assessments of the local level. More refined models will have to take these dimensions into account in order to come to valid and reliable predictions and address their potential impact. Since local Spaces differ greatly from national ones, more creative methodological and praxeological approaches of integrating local knowledge will be required. Observation of day-to-day communication is required, including the use of stereotypes or even aggressive notions in local media.

At the same time, gathering local information has to be selective in order to not overburden EWR systems. It is essential to not rely on false assumptions in order to respond adequately to

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<sup>215</sup> T. Amare , The OA U and Conflict Prevention. Management and Resolution. (Asmara: Report prepared for Study II, 1995).

upcoming threats, as a study for the AU rightly suggests: Lack of information on within-country variation is not necessarily a limiting factor in macro-system monitoring activities as societal conflicts that occur in specific localities should be monitored by local authorities and managed by local agencies. It is only when disturbances span localities and involve coordination among local groups in larger activities that directly challenge state authorities or the state's conflict management capabilities that the larger system should be alerted and ready to assist.<sup>216</sup> Furthermore, regional and sub regional organizations thus far have not only fared poorly with regard to implementing EWR, but also have lacked a clear self-understanding on how they relate to the national and local level; and how they link up to global monitoring and response mechanisms.

Developing concepts on the precise role of regional organizations in the nexus between the national and the global space could also avoid duplication with regard to EWR databases and lead to a cost-saving exchange of information. Without doubt, a variety of regional settings and solutions need to be adapted to these specific circumstances. At the same time, effective response is to a large extent about the question of which agency on which level should take over responsibility in a crisis. It may be doubtful whether responses can truly be harmonized. But a minimum goal could be to avoid both coming to contradictory conclusions on responses to an emerging crisis; and displaying a wait-and-see attitude by shifting responsibility ad hoc to other levels.

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<sup>216</sup> African Union Commission, (eds.), *Development Indicators for Early Warning Systems: Some Conceptual and Methodological Issues?*, (Conflict Management Division of the Peace and Security Department, Background Paper No. 3, p. 3.)

#### 4.3. Regional and International Early Warning Systems

Conflict early warning was conceived as a means of protecting and preserving life. The field has evolved significantly since its initial conceptualization, and early warning has been integrated into the policies of many organizations.<sup>217</sup> Today it cannot be said, however, that the international community is in a position to prevent another Rwandan genocide. Conflict early warning faces challenges similar to those it faced 15 years ago and there are new challenges on the horizon. From initial conceptualization in the 1970s and 1980s, conflict early warning only really emerged on the international policy agenda after the end of the Cold War, when the conflict environment and the international conflict management framework evolved rapidly in response to the new geostrategic reality. The failure to respond to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the experiences of the Balkans conflicts were major spurs to the development of better conflict early warning and response; they led to several major policy initiatives in governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental sectors. From the start, conflict early warning was envisaged as distinct from intelligence-based analysis that focused on protection of state interests. It sought multi-stakeholder solutions, was gender-sensitive, used open source information and aimed at protecting human lives and creating sustainable peace based on locally owned solutions.

However, this approach has been overshadowed by the new Northern perception of international threats that emerged after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and consequent counterterrorism and counter-proliferation measures taken by the United States and its allies. Those attacks also acted as a spur to growing interest in and analysis of weak, fragile and failed

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<sup>217</sup> S. Suzanne, Early Warning and Integrated Response Development, (Swiss Peace Foundation).

states. In spite of the increased resources going into early warning, key shortcomings of governmental and multilateral interventions in violent conflict remain. These include faulty analysis, late, uncoordinated and contradictory engagement, and poor decision making.

Conflict early warning as a field of conflict prevention is today undergoing significant scrutiny. There have been inaccurate predictions, failure to foresee important events, and inadequate linking of operational responses to warnings. From a donor perspective, the visible impacts of early warning are often seen as meagre. Indeed, at times early warning analyses can provide donor officials with political headaches, by being alarmist or offensive to other governments, or by advocating responses that are not feasible. However, proponents of conflict early warning insist that it contributes to the evidence base of conflict prevention decision making.

Scholars have argued that early warning was less critical in the Rwanda crisis than the willingness and ability to respond. Nevertheless, the failure to respond adequately was in part influenced by the failure to collect and analyze the information that was provided and to translate this into strategic plans. Information and analysis is critical, not only in assisting in anticipating a crisis, but in determining the appropriate response in a particular situation.<sup>218</sup>

As many UN resolutions have reiterated, there is a need to develop an early warning system within the UN.<sup>219</sup> However, such an early warning system must go beyond simply developing a network or building on the new enchantment with data-based systems for anticipating crises and

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<sup>218</sup> H. Adelman and A. Suhrke, "Early Warning and Conflict Management", in *International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, (Copenhagen, 1996), p.76.

<sup>219</sup> See for example Resolutions of the Security Council: 812(1993), 846(1993), 872(1993), 891(1993), draft res.S/25981(1993), 912(1994), 918(1994), 925(1994).

their degree. The and regional organizations must develop, both at headquarters and in the field, a high level capability for collecting and analyzing information in a particular crisis area and translate this into strategic alternatives further, this early warning analytic system must have direct and regular access to the Chief Executive.

The UN has neither the capacity nor the need to build such an early warning system on its own. The organization needs to build on area expertise inside and outside the relevant regions - in the Rwandan case, the Great Lakes Region of Africa – utilizing information officers to coordinate a world network of specialists in various state agencies, academic institutions, and rights monitoring groups.

The following characteristics of an ideal early warning system would have been extremely helpful if even approximated in the Rwanda case: the presence of specialized units in the field, in regional institutions (i.e. the OAU conflict resolution unit) and within the UN system, without any operational responsibilities, but with responsibility for collecting and analyzing information and translating that information into strategic options; the backstopping of that unit with a network of experts, many of whom are in academia, electronically linked to participate in the provision of information and analyses; the institutional assignment of lead responsibility for regions to ensure that even states considered peripheral in the international system are not ignored and lest other Rwanda's fall through the cracks of an intelligence analysis system.

Fitting human rights monitoring within a larger information and analytic structure that can process the info Information in terms of complex social conflicts (not currently done by human

rights organizations) and communicate this to the policy planning levels; the development within the human rights monitors and any early warning system of a method of prioritizing and flagging in order to bring significant attention and resources on important cases; and linking early warning with contingency preparedness, since even under the best circumstances it is impossible to pin-point specific future outcomes of a complex social conflict, and since the absence of any contingency planning will limit what will be heard. These early warning networks would help relieve what seems to be an overreliance on media sources of information. The inadequate media coverage of the genocide in Rwanda is a separate and serious matter of concern.

#### **4.3.1 Humanitarian Response to the Rwanda Conflict**

It is clear that in matters of conflict management, the international response to the Rwanda disaster revealed a high degree of formalism.<sup>220</sup> The United Nations projects a vision of the unity of humans governed by norms which enhance equality and justice, peace and the well-being of all, and these principles were duly referred to. In practice, the behaviour of states was mostly characterized by contests for power and a narrow concept of self-interest. The UN as a collective actor was unable to rise above its members in this respect. Yet, the picture is more complex. Within the UN system, a number of states identified national security with international security and the attempt to enhance world order by placing units of their armed forces at the disposition of the UN. Other states invested in preventive diplomacy, recognizing that renewed conflict would threaten regional peace and security and probably create large refugee flows. Some states took some notice of persistent efforts by NGOs to flag human rights issues.

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<sup>220</sup> H. Adelman and A. Suhrke, "Early Warning and Conflict Management", in *International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, (Copenhagen, 1996),

It is possible, therefore, to escape from formalism. The issue is not choosing between vision and reality, between idealism and prudence. State policy based on narrow self-interest alone is costly in terms of the conflicts and humanitarian expenditures it entails, and in the diminution of the sense of ourselves. A policy which leads to shame is not realistic. On the other hand, promoting an idealism which fails to consider the dictates of *Realpolitik* is a recipe for future disasters and failures.

The central issue is to define a prudent idealism. To translate this most general philosophical approach into policy is a challenge for all concerned with public policy. In part, the task is to develop structures that include the stakeholders; in part it is to develop policy approaches and procedures which ensure that the stakes held are compatible with a rational order of justice and peace. Some guidelines which embody the principles of humanitarian realism can be derived from the Rwandan case.

#### **4.3.2 Incoherent Policy Approaches to the Rwanda Conflict**

Lack of policy coherence was a problem throughout, but from a conflict perspective the human rights issue is central. There was the tendency to isolate human rights monitoring into a superego role rather than an integral element in anticipating and responding to the crisis. The exemplary work of human rights organizations was too often content with resting on the fence of abstract principles. At the same time, organizations involved in economic development did not



incorporate human rights as a specific dimension of development. Peacekeeping operations did not acquire a human rights component until after the crisis had erupted.<sup>221</sup>

### 4.3.3 Integration of Human Rights, Diplomacy and Peace Keeping

Human rights monitoring must be integrated with related economic development planning, diplomacy and peacekeeping operations, as well as humanitarian polices to aid refugees and displaced persons. A coherent approach must be developed in the work of the United Nations and exemplified in coherent plans of action. While all conflicts are important, in a world of limited resources and attention span, greater efforts must be made to prioritize issues for purposes of early warning and conflict management. While prioritizing among crises involve difficult trade-offs, similar ranking are made, for instance, by legal scholars who seek to identify the most basic human rights in international law.

It must be noted that the failure to mitigate the genocide in Rwanda was neither a function of lack of early warning, nor of malevolence, but essentially of neglect. The case points to the inability of the UN, with its fragile structure and economic base, to respond adequately in world of multiple, simultaneous crises. Absent a division of labour among international organizations and state actors, the UN becomes overburdened and formalism develops: abstract principles are recorded in resolutions but policy follows the interests - or disinterest - of the major powers on the Security Council. In Rwanda, the result was neglect. The regional organizations and states - i.e. the most immediate stakeholders in both peace and war in the Great Lakes region - were excluded at critical stages.

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<sup>221</sup> H. Adelman and A. Suhrke, "Early Warning and Conflict Management", in *International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, (Copenhagen, 1996), p.72.

#### 4.3.4 Policy of Conditionality in Rwanda

Policy of conditionality in Rwanda entailed several dilemmas. Attaching human rights conditions to development aid required early action before conditions developed into a crisis where development aid became irrelevant.<sup>222</sup> Yet, the nature of the conflict in its earlier stage was difficult to discern and did not raise sufficient alarm. The relationship among different kinds of conditionality was another problem. Conditionality on economic restructuring exacerbated social tensions and undermined efforts to improve human rights through political conditionality. In fact, a more general concept of "conflict conditionality" should be considered, where different kinds of conditionality (economic, political, human rights) are treated flexibly in terms of their likely contribution to, or impact on, violent social conflict. Policy should be informed by systematic study of past cases regarding the timing, nature and effect of such conditionality.

#### 4.3.5 Preparedness with Regard to Rwanda Conflict

An underlying philosophy and policy guidelines are mere abstractions unless the tools are in place to respond to a crisis. Effective crisis management requires preparedness which permits a proactive stance. The UN and the states that assume multilateralism as an integral part of their foreign policy had to develop systems of planning and response to humanitarian crises that go well beyond simply the ability to deploy troops with speed, but must include planning, strategies and the preparation for deploying the wide array of personnel required for such emergencies. Taking the case of Rwanda, the goal of early warning systems may be conceived as avoiding or minimizing violence, deprivation or humanitarian crises that threaten the sustainability of human

<sup>222</sup> H. Adelman and A. Suhrke, "Early Warning and Conflict Management", in *International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, (Copenhagen, 1996), p.77.

development. Reliable early warnings buy time not only to prepare for short term containment and relief strategies, but also to design, build support for and implement longer term<sup>223</sup> proactive strategies and development programs that can reduce the likelihood of future disasters. An early warning system is more than the flow of information and reports from those on the ground regarding highly visible or rapidly escalating crises.

#### **4.4 Impacts of the Rwanda Conflict**

At the core of the Rwanda crisis were two interrelated issues concerning ethnicity and refugees. Ethnicity was utilized as a means of fostering divisions and mistrust of the minority group. The refugees were members of that minority group and originally residents of the country, but prevented from returning and denied full rights of residence in the countries of first asylum. Unresolved refugee issues typically worsen over time to become festering sores and sources of new conflict. To deal with the refugee issue effectively, UNHCR would have needed: a plan of action to settle the problems within a reasonable timeframe, and support from states and financial institutions with leverage that could be brought to bear on the situation. The Rwandan case demonstrated the need for authoritative determination of when genocide is in progress.

#### **4.5 Other Issues**

##### **4.5.1 Historical Aspects of Early Warning in Rwanda**

Conflict early warning and response even though conceived as a means of preventing violent conflict has not been successfully implemented to help manage the conflicts that have erupted in

<sup>223</sup> J. Davies, "Progress in Analysis of Social Vulnerability and Capacity," in Bankoff, G., Frerks, G. and D. Hilhorst, (eds.), *Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development & People*, (London: Earthscan, 2004), p.2.

Africa, especially in the Rwanda case. Lack of strong governmental institutions, skills, and experience and sheer negligence led to the Rwanda genocide. In fact ethnic rivalry and the uneven distribution of resources, human-rights violations, and lack of good governance could be argued to have led to the genocide. For this reason, it is vital that those wishing to transform or resolve protracted conflict, acknowledge the past, and take into account the effects past of Rwanda as a country.

The political scene in Kigali in 1992-93 was admittedly complex, and a flurry of rumours and propaganda further complicated the picture. Key questions remain unclear even today, including the relationship between Habyarimana and the extremists. Was he a master or a victim of the hard-liners, and if he moved from one role to another, when did this happen?<sup>224</sup> Furthermore, outside analysts had to decipher the civil society that suddenly flourished. The print media multiplied across the political spectrum, as did NGOs and various political movements.

Yet, there was considerable evidence of Hutu extremism, and human rights violations were documented. Much information was generated by human rights organizations and concerned activists; intelligence sources produce some, and, in Kigali, the small foreign diplomatic corps observed the scene, reported home, and for the most part shared information with each other.<sup>225</sup> An informal grouping of the ambassadors from the United States, Belgium, Germany, France and the Vatican - also known as The Five Musketeers - met frequently.

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<sup>224</sup> Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War" *Human Rights Watch* Vol. 6, No. 1, 1994. See also "Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity. International Support for the Perpetrators of the Genocide." in *Human Rights Watch* vol. 7, no. 4.

<sup>225</sup> Representatives of Rwanda's Genocidal Government Expected in New York: Militia Groups Ordered to Halt the Slaughter During Kigali Visit by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights", Human Rights Watch. May 11.

It was well known at the time that the combined peace and democratization process faced strong opposition. Already in July 1991, a French intelligence assessment identified three critical circles of power in relation to the peace process, starting with the inner circle formed by the President's in-laws and associates, an outer circle of relatively more moderate members of the military and the cabinet, and, lastly, an amorphous grouping of younger officers and intellectuals willing to entertain change. Since the objective of the fast circle was to retain power, any form of imposed negotiation would provoke their resistance, it was concluded. The analysis found its way to other donor states and was soon amplified by pointed statements and actions by the hard-liners.

Later signs pointed to the consolidation of the power of the first political grouping – the Hutu supremacists -through the formation of what amounted to parastatal organizations. The CDR was formed in March 1992, bringing together military and political extremists from circles inside and connected to the Presidential Palace. The party militias (*the interahamwe and impuzamugambi*) were also formed at this time with direct support from the CDR, the ruling government par, and the Presidential Guard. Both operated openly, and diplomats in Kigali readily recognized both as instruments of the ruling party. Yet, their precise function was open to various interpretations. Some observers accepted at face value that the militias were formed to defend the country against the invading RPF-troops according to the doctrine of village self-defense.

By late 1992 and especially in early 1993, a much more comprehensive body of evidence was available and frequently discussed in the diplomatic community in Kigali. There were increasingly frequent killings of Tutsi and more information about death squads as well as the existence of a Network Zero around the President which reportedly was plotting to exterminate regime opponents and circulated death lists.

The report of the International Commission of Inquiry on human rights violations in early 1993 was widely circulated (FIDH 1993). The Belgian government, for one, took it so seriously that it temporarily recalled its ambassador from Kigali. The report documented the involvement of the government in what was described as systematic killings directed against the Tutsi, and estimated that about 2,000 persons had been murdered in the 1990-92 period.<sup>226</sup>

Simultaneously, diplomats in Kigali noticed that the extremist opposition to the Arusha talks was gaining strength. During the talks on power-sharing, Habyarimana was oscillating between moderates in his own delegation and the hard-liners at home. The talks were halted in September, but when they resumed the Foreign Minister, Boniface Ngulinzira, was negotiating without the authority of the President, as an observer delegation noted at the time. Habyarimana soon made the point publicly by calling the accords merely "a piece of paper" in his famous 15 November speech. At Arusha, as noted, the CDR representative predicted "an apocalypse" when the power-sharing protocol was finalized. The message was given added significance since it was delivered by Col. Bagosora who was widely believed to be behind the work of the death squads, including the Kibuye massacres in August 1992.

The presence of hate propaganda in Rwanda was also noted as an indicator of increasing tension and mounting Hutu power." However, interpretations of the message differed. As with the notorious Radio et Television Libre Milles Colines (RTLM) - founded soon after the signing of

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<sup>226</sup> Briefing reporters on its finding, the Commission used the term "genocide" to describe the killings. This claim was retracted in their official report published in March because of fear that such a designation would be considered hysterical. <sup>23</sup> It was, however, upheld in a report by the UN Commission on Human Rights a few months later (see below).

the peace agreement - the hate media in this period was so explicit and literal that some diplomats, both Western and African, afterwards said they tended to dismiss it. Similar reactions were entertained even by the RPF, as a leading Front member later recalled.

#### **4.5.2 Prospects of Early Warning Systems in Africa**

EWR mechanisms in Africa have been poor. UN history is filled with examples of failures at early warning, until now; these tools have not been adequately implemented or fully used. The principal reason for this is not a lack of sufficient EWR data. Instead, regional organizations have failed to respond in time to prevent an emerging violent conflict because of weaknesses of the organization and political disagreements within the organization.

From a definition of EW, what constitute early practically is time for an effort at conflict prevention, is the sufficient time to take potentially successful preventive action, if the conflict is already rapidly escalating, then warning may not be applicable at all. For conflict prevention and preparedness, early warning should be done as far in advance as possible, otherwise it is harder to make accurate prediction over the long range and, unless both is imminent and evident, states are unlikely to respond to a very early warning. Early warning therefore is considered on the basis of time and the intensity.

There are a host of challenges in early warning, with uncertainty of the future which leads to early warners to fear being wrong in their predictions. From the historical development Africa has not been able to yield to the early warning up to the last few decades that Africans have

begun to regain a semblance of control over Africa's destiny, notwithstanding the omnipresent and omnipotent power of global markets and political associations.<sup>227</sup> Despite decades of conflict, death and tragedy, coverage of issues in Africa has often been ignored, oversimplified, or excessively focused on limited aspects. Deeper analysis, background and context of conflicts have often been lacking, despite news of billions of needy people, the background context and analysis is often missing.

The twentieth century being one of mass massacre that occurred because of world wars, revolutions, purges, internal strife, and other forms of mass violence. Genocide, however, appeared as something new with greater intensity, perhaps because of the availability of the technologies of industrialization to be used for mass murder and the willingness of regimes to use these methods. However, the willingness to embrace genocide as a formula for removing the other, a perceived enemy, represents the absolute opposite of the seeking of accommodation through diplomacy, negotiation, and compromise.

#### 4.6 Conclusions

The early warning mechanisms in Rwanda conflict never averted the conflict as it revealed the unpreparedness of both the African continent and the international community. In fact the Rwanda genocide of 1994 could be argued to have acted as an eye opener to the entire world on the need to have effective EWR to avert future crises. African continent known for its incessant conflicts requires preparedness and effectiveness in dealing with conflicts that have become part

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<sup>227</sup> I. Henderson-Wille, above, pp. 12-13



and parcel of it. African governments, institutions, NGOs and other stakeholders must therefore improve on their EWR and conflict management in Africa.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSIONS

#### 5.1 Summary

This study in chapter one gave an introduction, background, objectives and equally presented the conceptual framework of early warning systems and response mechanisms in Africa. Equally discussed in the chapter is the literature review, research methodology and the hypotheses of the subject. The study in chapter two provided an overview of the various theoretical perspectives of early warning that have developed over the last century, that is to say the traditional philosophies of early warning, philosophies that have been developed or recognized by various academics over the more recent history of early warning system and response policy.<sup>228</sup> The study noted that friction between the dominant philosophies of justice and welfare in policy debates and legislative content over the course of the last century.<sup>229</sup>

In chapter three the study established that Rwanda presented enormous challenges for conflict resolution theory since there were unequivocal signals are found in four areas: contradictions in the international system; the UN structure; attitudes of senior officials towards messengers and inadequacies in the messages sent; and interference.<sup>230</sup> This is in addition to the fact that in the higher echelons of state and international agencies, the early warning signals were hardly heard

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<sup>228</sup> See Africa Peace Forum, Center for Conflict Resolution, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, FEWER, International Alert, Saferworld: Conflict-sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace building, A Resource Pack, 2004, in chapter two above.

<sup>229</sup> G. T. Robert, "Testing and Using a Model of Communal Conflict for Early Warning," Journal of Ethno-Political Development, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1994. p. 20. See p. 35 above.

<sup>230</sup> A. de Waal, and R. Omaar., "The Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response," Current History, Vol.94, No.591, 1995, pp. 156-161, at chapter three, p.42 above.

at all, and news of the genocide was an even greater surprise.<sup>231</sup> The key lesson drawn from this chapter is that an overly-conceptual approach to conflict resolution is too limited and should thus be avoided. For a synthesis, rather than gap of theory and practice, conflict resolution theory should be combined with empirical insights and case study analysis. It must therefore be understood that the Rwanda War was not historically anomalous and is not the only war in history in which only the vanquished committed crimes.<sup>232</sup>

Finally in chapter four a critical analysis of early warning systems and response mechanisms in Africa revealed the unpreparedness of both the African continent and the international community in dealing with conflicts. In fact, the Rwanda genocide of 1994 could be argued to have acted as an eye opener to the entire world on the need to have effective EWR to avert future crises.<sup>233</sup> African continent known for its incessant conflicts requires preparedness and effectiveness in dealing with conflicts that have become part and parcel of it. African governments, institutions, NGOs and other stakeholders must therefore improve on their EWR and conflict management in Africa.

## 5.2 Key Findings

Regional early warning systems and response mechanisms should focus on improving the quality of reporting; the warning-response link; and sensitivity among senior policy making of the value

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<sup>231</sup> See p.81 above.

<sup>232</sup> Information available at p.104. See also Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War" Human Rights Watch Vol.6, No. 1, 1994. See also "Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity. International Support for the Perpetrators of the Genocide." in Human Rights Watch vol.7, no.4.

<sup>233</sup> R. Michael, Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity. (New York: Norton, 1996).

of evidence-based decision making in situations of violent conflict and state fragility.<sup>234</sup> The international early warning systems and response mechanisms on its part should explore the establishment of a new global network for early warning and response (involving regional organizations, governments, and non-governmental agencies) to address conflicts.

The international EWR mechanisms should also endorse efforts to build internal capacity and functional external relations dealing with conflict-affected countries and situations of state fragility; promote the practice of regular assessments of “whole-of-system” responses to violent conflict and state fragility situations; ensure that the reviews both tackle the institutional mechanism/instrument and measure dimensions of responses; call for the standard use of multi-stakeholder platforms for joint problem definition and planning of responses to situations of violent conflict and state fragility;<sup>235</sup> consider how well placed (or not) current regional and international early warning and response capabilities are to assess and respond to global current and future security threats.<sup>236</sup>

There are two major challenges to the concept of early warning namely: generating timely and accurate warning analysis and getting warnings to be heard by policymakers and taken into consideration in their policy planning. The accuracy of analysts' warnings will also depend on the extent to which they can identify warning signs or indicators of genocide and mass

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<sup>234</sup> A. Alexander, “Early Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science?”, in Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berghof (eds.), *Handbook for Conflict Transformation*, (Berlin, 2003).

<sup>235</sup> H. Miall, T. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, *Contemporary conflict resolution. The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts*, (Polity Press, Cambridge, (1999). See also chapter three, p. 92.

<sup>236</sup> P. Tongeren, ‘The role of NGOs in conflict prevention’, in Dutch Centre for Conflict Prevention, ACCESS and PIOOM (eds.), *Prevention and Management of Conflicts: an international directory*, ( NCDO, Utrecht, 1996), pp. 18-24.

atrocities.<sup>237</sup> A related challenge stems from the fact that earlier warning, which is obviously preferable, typically means lower confidence that the apparent trends toward mass atrocities are real and significant. Earlier warnings are, therefore, easier to dismiss as being alarmist. The other major challenge is getting warnings to be heard by appropriate policymakers and taken into consideration in their policy planning.<sup>238</sup>

With regard to historical aspects of early warning systems and response mechanisms, conflict early warning was conceived as a means of protecting and preserving life. The field has evolved significantly since its initial conceptualization, and early warning has been integrated into the policies of many organizations. Conflict early warning faces challenges similar to those it faced 15 years ago and there are new challenges on the horizon. Indeed in the 1970s and 1980s, conflict early warning only really emerged on the international policy agenda after the end of the Cold War, when the conflict environment and the international conflict management framework evolved rapidly in response to the new geostrategic reality.<sup>239</sup> Conflict early warning was envisaged as distinct from intelligence-based analysis that focused on protection of state interests.

On future prospects of EWR mechanisms in Africa and Rwanda in particular, more needs to be done. In spite of the increased resources going into early warning, key shortcomings of

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<sup>237</sup> J. Craig, 'Conflict-Carrying Capacity, Political Crisis, and Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996. The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience,' (Copenhagen: DANIDA, 2001).

<sup>238</sup> A. R. Hayward, T. R. Gurr and K. Rupesinghe (eds.), *Africa Peace Forum Background Report Great Lakes Early Warning Report*, in *Journeys through Conflict: Narratives and Lessons*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001).

<sup>239</sup> See chapters Three and Four above. See also the arguments of J. Davies "Conflict Early Warning and Early Response for Sub-Saharan Africa: Crisis and Transition Tool Kit", Summary of Working Draft Submitted to Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), (University of Maryland, Maryland, 2000).

governmental and multilateral interventions in violent conflict remain.<sup>240</sup> These include faulty analysis, late, uncoordinated and contradictory engagement, and poor decision making. Conflict early warning as a field of conflict prevention is today undergoing significant scrutiny. There have been inaccurate predictions, failure to foresee important events, and inadequate linking of operational responses to warnings.

### 5.3 Recommendations

There is need for countries, especially those in Africa to consider how early warning systems can promote improved understanding of armed violence dynamics by setting up early warning systems. Governments must therefore invest in early warning systems.<sup>241</sup> Secondly in case of a conflict, taking swift action, including use of military force should be an option for the international community. This is necessitated by the fact that in September 2005, at the United Nations World Summit, all Member States formally accepted the responsibility of each State to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.<sup>242</sup>

The basic good practice analysis of Early Warning Mechanisms and Systems should be established. Early warning systems must now exist within governments, multilateral agencies and NGOs since they provide a crisis prediction capacity that enables proactive decision making; a stronger basis for evidence-based decision making on countries affected by crisis; improved programming through systematic country reviews and expert analysis; a priority-

<sup>240</sup> H. Adelman, and A. Suhrke, 'Early Warning and Conflict Management' Study 2, Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, (1996), p. 68.

<sup>241</sup> R. Barnett and Jones, D. Bruce, 'Prevention of Violent Conflict: Tasks and Challenges for the United Nations', *Global Governance*, 2007, pp. 391-408.

<sup>242</sup> C., Susanne and P. Meier, Choosing to Prevent Violent Conflict: Early Warning and Decision-Making at the United Nations, (Partners for Conflict Reduction (PCR), 2007).

setting contribution through watch-list type products; a starting point for developing a shared problem definition for crisis-affected countries that sets the stage for more coherent responses; and an ideas pool for responses and sometimes the forum to meet fellow responders and plan joint response strategies.<sup>243</sup>

Response Mechanism and Systems to manage violent conflict at national, regional and international should be established. At national, regional and international levels, capabilities to respond to situations of violent conflict and state fragility have evolved significantly. Institutional mandates for response need to be strengthened, funding increased, and a greater range of operational tools, and mechanisms to be refined on the basis of applied experience. This way multiplicity of actors and responses shall be avoided which means that the problems of late, incoherent, fragmented, and confused response shall never occur again as was in Rwandan genocide.<sup>244</sup>

Last but not least governments must help to educate other people about the signs of genocide;<sup>245</sup> monitor and report any abuses of human rights in a country; support of peacekeepers in a country by educating community as to why peacekeepers are there; hold leaders accountable for carrying out their duties fully, responsibly and honestly; help to ensure that all people including the smallest minority groups including women are able to fully take part in the political, economic and social life of a country; support of local media by helping journalists report stories honestly and openly; holding the media accountable if journalists become involved in hate speech.

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<sup>243</sup> K. Annan, "Prevention of Armed Conflict," Report of the UN Secretary General, 2001.

<sup>244</sup> S. Srinivasan, "Minority Rights, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Lessons from Darfur," Minority Rights Group International Micro Paper, 2006.

<sup>245</sup> A. R. Hayward, T. R. Gurr and K. Rupesinghe (eds.), "Africa Peace Forum Background Report Great Lakes Early Warning Report," *Journeys through Conflict: Narratives and Lessons*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001). See also the critical analysis provided in Chapter four above.

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