

**INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN AFRICAN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ELECTIONS: A  
CASE STUDY OF KENYA**


**BY**

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**REG NO: R51/62919**

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MA DIPLOMACY IN THE INSTITUTE OF  
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## DECLARATION

This research proposal is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any other institution, college or university.


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## **DEDICATION**

To my parent Rose Kihara who makes everyday a slice of joy and hope, this I dedicate to her with heartfelt gratitude for her love and support through it all.

And to the rest of my family, as always, who support deserve unqualified credit for my work.

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I would also like to acknowledge with gratitude the cooperation from my colleagues and all those who assisted me in writing this project. Special thanks to brother, sister and friend Mariam for their encouragement and endurance.

## **ABBREVIATION**

<b>IMF</b>	<b>International Monetary Fund</b>
<b>MNCS</b>	<b>Multinational Corporations</b>
<b>IOS</b>	<b>International Organizations</b>
<b>UN</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>US</b>	<b>United States of America</b>
<b>EU</b>	<b>European Union</b>
<b>EC</b>	<b>European Community</b>
<b>DRC</b>	<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>
<b>UNOCI</b>	<b>United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast</b>
<b>DP</b>	<b>Democratic Party of Kenya</b>
<b>FORD</b>	<b>Forum of Restoration of Democracy</b>
<b>KANU</b>	<b>Kenya African National Union</b>
<b>IPPG</b>	<b>Inter Parties Parliamentary Group</b>
<b>UNDP</b>	<b>United Nations Developmental Programme</b>
<b>NARC</b>	<b>National Alliance of the Rainbow Coalition</b>
<b>UNCTC</b>	<b>United Nations Counter – Terrorism Convention</b>
<b>ATPU</b>	<b>Anti Terrorism Police Unit</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>ECK</b>	<b>Electoral Commission of Kenya</b>
<b>PNU</b>	<b>Party of National Unity</b>
<b>ODM</b>	<b>Orange Democratic Movement</b>
<b>ICC</b>	<b>International Criminal Court</b>
<b>UNEP</b>	<b>United Nations Environmental Programme</b>

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## **ABSTRACT**

The concept of international actors in African politics and elections has currently raised much debate than ever before. This engagement is affecting governments, states and politics in Africa and is critically effecting, either positively and negatively, in the unfolding of socio-economic and political developments on the continent. Although the concept of sovereignty and non interference has been emphasized by various international organizations, including EU, UN, the international community and their central role of promoting 'peace' in elections and politics raises a number of questions. The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of international actors in Africa domestic politics , using Kenya as a case study. The study seeks to establish how Kenya's domestic politics and elections are responsive to the West's interests, strategies and use of international organizations in their pursuit of in politics, and whether this involvement is beneficial or exploitative. The election crisis as witnessed in Kenya has attracted a number of international actors. The study is hypothesized on the notion African politics and elections are a reflection of Western powers interests through other international actors. A detailed literature review provides the regional and national cases of international actors' involvement in politics, elections and emerging challenges. The dependency and realist theories are used. The study will adopt a descriptive design and draw response from citizens, leaders and secondary information from literature sources. Focused interview guides will be used to collect primary data. The study will focus on international involvement in the context of politics and elections only and select respondents within Nairobi.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN AFRICA'S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ELECTIONS: A CASE STUDY OF KENYA**

#### **1.1 Introduction**

The involvement of international actors in Africa's domestic politics and electoral processes has gradually increased over the ages even after independence. This in turn, hands over Africa's political destiny to the will of these international actors who at most times are donor organizations whom majority are driven on an interest schema for the West in pursuing national interest in the international relations and not altruistic intentions for Africa. This means that international actors masquerade behind the lines of activism to advance the interests of their host countries, which are at most times western countries. This has seen institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank assisting, recognizing, legitimizing, funding coups and turning a blind eye on fraudulent elections in the interests of the West demeaning the purpose of having elections in Africa.

As the West interests evolve, so do their strategies by use of other international actors. This has seen most African States revolutionize their domestic politics and elections from de facto States to multi-party elections. These were conditionality's preceded by the Structural Adjustment Plans set by the West by use of international organizations such as IMF and the World Bank to pave way for their Multinational Corporations. Despite Africa's efforts in democratization, the interests and influence of the West has not weakened. Their bargaining and involvement with autocratic leaders who commit atrocities in African with western aid, contradicts the claims of international actors to be of mutual benefit but of self-interests of dominant international actors from the West.

This study seeks to demonstrate that international actors in Africa's domestic politics and elections act under pressure if not on behalf of the West to propagate their interests in Africa. With the Western States themselves as actors, it will attempt to show their dominance in the international system and control over the other international actors. The focus will be on Western states, and international organizations, that I believe and will attempt to demonstrate have had a great impact in Africa's domestic Politics and elections.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Throughout Africa's interaction and relations with international actors, Africa's domestic politics and electoral structures have conformed to the interests of the West. This has been dependent on Western needs at a specific time. Through international actors, the West has managed to influence Africa's political structures to their advantage without the considerations of the ramification to the indigenous constituents.

Consequently, this has seen those African governments, leaders and activists who are an impediment or do not conform to Western interests toppled, demonized, assassinated or even wrongfully prosecuted. Such leaders as Patrice Lumumba, Yakubu Gowon as well as Ken Saro Wiwa, shared a similar fate because of the West's aggressive nature in pursuing their interests. To their benefit of the West, international actors have embraced tyrants and dictators hence protect their regimes if they are compelling to their economic and strategic interests. On the other hand, they enforced democracy and toppled tyrants if they were not useful to the self-interests of the West.

With Kenya being geographically strategic for the West's diplomatic, economic and military interests, their involvement has been enormous. In the face of anti-regime popular mobilization, the West's primary concern appeared to be the avoidance of any path that could lead to a

breakdown of the political and economic order, even if this meant legitimizing and prolonging the regime's authoritarian rule to attain their self Interests.

### **1.3 Objectives**

Main Objective of this research will be to:

Evaluate Africa's domestic Politics and Elections as a reflection of the Western interest in Africa.

#### **Specific Objectives**

- To examine international organizations and their role in promoting western interests in Africa's domestic politics and elections.
- To evaluate how much Western interests entrenched into Africa's politics and elections have impacted African states

### **1.4 Literature Review**

#### **1.4.1 Introduction**

This section reviews literature as well as observations made with regards to the interests, involvement and participation of international actors in Kenyan politics and elections. It will review literature from academicians, researchers as well as media reports covering the subject.

#### **1.4.2 Literature review of the international actors**

Williams describes States as the "dominant actors in the international system"<sup>1</sup>, based on the power the State wields over other actors. Hawkins, et al, also agrees with this view outline that, principal actors of the world politics and international relations are nation-states.<sup>2</sup> However, Wade disagrees and contends that, State's continue to dominate the International system. He

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<sup>1</sup> T.L. Williams, 2005 International Actors in International Relations. p2

<sup>2</sup> Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Neilson and Michael J. Tierney (2006). States, Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp14

argues that State dominance has been irrevocably eroded in the recent past with the rise of other international actors like MNCs and the United Nations. Miller adds to this by illustrating the importance of other non-state actors in terms of status and influence.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney refute this view and assert that other international actors are agents of States, and only implement a “Washington Consensus” in Africa.<sup>4</sup>

Hawkins, et al describe International Organizations as agents of principal actors who are the West. To them, they compare the West to ‘the Wizard of Oz’ who delegates tasks to International Organizations to their self- interest.<sup>5</sup> Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal agree with Hawkins argument and further state that International Organizations are a design and adaptation by the West, in pursuit of their self -interest.<sup>6</sup> Karns and Mingst adds that, in spite of the fact that international organizations being used by powerful nation-states, they make a difference in international interactions and have notable influence even on the West.<sup>7</sup> Khor upon evaluation of the IMF and World Bank activities in Africa, refutes Karns & Mingst and Sarooshi’s and argues accusing the West of retarding Africa’s politics through International organizations, by refuting the role IMF played in Africa by and their imposing the Structural Adjustment Plan and their negative impact on structures and propagation of the West’s self-interest.

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<sup>3</sup> Miller, L. H. (1994). *Global Order: Values and Power in International Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press p.2

<sup>4</sup> See Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Neilson and Michael J. Tierney (2006).pp3

<sup>5</sup> Ibid pp4

<sup>6</sup> Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Sindal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organizations* 55(4)(autumn): 761-99

<sup>7</sup> Karns M. and Mingst K. (eds.) (1990). *The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence*, Boston: Unwin Hyman.p29

### 1.4.3 Literature of international Actors in African Politics

According to Lonsdale, the instrument of political control in African states has been violently constructed by outsiders, that is, the West to propagate and protect their interests in Africa.<sup>8</sup> To him the West uses all forms of power and resources including IOs to control the politics of Africa. William Lewis as quoted by Baker states that, “The African continent is at the center of globalist planning and our political military needs” referring to United States self-interests.<sup>9</sup> <sup>10</sup> However, Elliott maintains that, many western governments, especially the US, use that power towards promotion of democracy in Africa.<sup>11</sup> He blames Africa’s political dismay on domestic factors. Nevertheless, States are never known for their altruistic nature, but pursuit of self-interests in an anarchic world.

To Kokole and Mazrui, African politics and leaders are a mold of the West as the French involvement in Ivory Coast and Togo is more open and evident.<sup>12</sup> A sentiment also shared by Cooper and he establishes the West would go to any length including assassinations or aiding coups to attain and retain political control in Africa for their self-interests. To him the U.S participation in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba signaled the West’s willingness to treat Africa’s politics as a pawn to their self-interests.<sup>13</sup> On the contrary, Zartman argues Africa has control over its politics recovered from its colonial rulers. He blames Africa’s political retardation on African leaders who use the “Western-scapegoat” as an excuse to their poor

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<sup>8</sup> Lonsdale, John (1986) ‘Political Accountability in African History’, in Patrick Chabal, ed. *Political Domination in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p126-157

<sup>9</sup> Pauline H. Baker (1989), *United States and South Africa: Regan Years USA*: Ford Foundation. p8

<sup>10</sup> Newman, M. (1996) *Democracy Sovereignty and The EU*. New York: St Martin Press. p17

<sup>11</sup> Elliott P. Skinner *African Political Cultures and the Problems of Government African Studies Quarterly* | Volume 2, Issue 3 | 1998 p18-23

<sup>12</sup> Omari H. Kokole and Ali Mazrui, 1988 *Uganda: The Dual Polity and Plural Society* in Larry Diamond, Juan J Linz and Seymour Martin Lipse. , *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa*. Colorado. UK Rienner Publishers. p86

<sup>13</sup> Frederick Cooper (2002) *Africa Since 1940: The past of the Present* . Cambridge University Press. p134

leadership.<sup>14</sup> Arguably, Zartman's claims are refutable and based on the historical facts of Africa's tyrants who have survived due to their close relationship with the West and articulation of their interests.

According to Cooper, the West has continuously used International Organizations to inject their self-interests in Africa's politics. He concludes that, the UN is pressured by the West to take part in political atrocities in Africa such as the coup d'eta of 1960 in Zaire for their interest.<sup>15</sup> Alemazung concurs to Cooper's argument, and further states international organizations like the European Union, the IMF and the World Bank are used by the West to preserve good relationships with African tyrant leaders through aid for the benefit of the West's self-interests.<sup>16</sup> However, Deegan disagrees drawing his argument from the enforcement of the Strategic Adjustment Plan by the IMF that demanded democratization and would lead to political liberalization in Africa.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, persuaded by the arguments of Hawkins it is believed that International Organizations pursue a 'Washington consensus' and only engage in African politics as tools of the West.

#### **1.4.4 Literature on International Actors in African Elections**

Elections, in terms of their origin in Africa, were a colonial contrivance to decolonization as argued by Jinadu.<sup>18</sup> Hence, they were to impose and legitimize the West's preferred leaders. Mackenzie and Robinson further claim that, elections are alien to African politics; super imposed

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<sup>14</sup> I. William Zartman. 1978 *Coming Political Problems in Africa* in Jennifer Seymour Whitaker's, *Africa and The United States: Vital Interests*. New York. New York University Press. p 87

<sup>15</sup> See Frederick Cooper(2002) p165

<sup>16</sup> Joy Asongzoh Alemazung, (2010) *Post-Colonial Colonialism: An Analysis of International Factors and Actors Marring African Socio-Economic and Political Development* *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, vol.3, no.10, September 2010 p 73-75

<sup>17</sup> Heather Deegan(1996) *Third World : The Politics of The Middle East and Africa*. Fetter Lane: London. Routeledge p58

<sup>18</sup> Jinadu, A. (1995). "Electoral Administration in Africa: A Nigerian Case-Study under the Transition to Civil Rule Process." In *The Political Economy of Nigeria Under Military Rule, 1984-1993* (S. Adejumobi and A. Momoh, eds). Harare: SAPES.



by West to strategically place leaders who would be beneficial to their interests.<sup>19</sup> However, Coulon argues that elections are known to Africa even before independence citing Senegal to have practiced democratic elections that did not have foreign interference or self-interests of the West attached to them.<sup>20</sup> Arguably, elections in Africa are a means by which the West can get access to African politics to articulate their self-interests. This over time has seen the West imposed elections or declared their preferred candidates as winners despite electoral malpractices, for their self-interests.

Palmberg argues that the West, force elections in African states to gain access to their mineral resources and elaborates the role the West particularly the U.S played to secure their economic and military interests in Namibia and not democracy.<sup>21</sup> Kasongo further adds the U.S has not contributed to the development of liberalized democracy in Africa but enforced dictators that act as their intelligence agencies in the one party period.<sup>22</sup> Herbst however argues the West in Africa is to promote democracy and has used aid as an incentive for autocrats to promote democracy.<sup>23</sup> However, in reality the West has always had self-interests as a prerequisite while engaging in Africa.

As Cooper shows, the West in African elections had their preferred candidates or parties that were optimal to their self-interests. The West worked to support them and put in place structures to impede their opposition as shown by France's support of the R.D.A in Cameroon against U.P.C in 1955.<sup>24</sup> Neocosmos agrees to Coopers claims, and further shows the West could declare

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<sup>19</sup> W.J.M. Mackenzie and Kenneth Robinson.(1960) Five Elections in Africa. Oxford: Clarendon Press p462-466

<sup>20</sup> Christian Coulon, 1988 Senegal: The Development and Fragility of Semidemocracy.. in Larry Diamond, Juan J Linz and Seymour Martin Lipse. Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa. Colorado. UK Rienner Publishers p141-145

<sup>21</sup> Mai Palmberg, (1983) The Struggle for Africa. Zed Press, 57 Caledonian Road, London p229

<sup>22</sup> Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo(2005) Liberal Democracy and Its Critics in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA p3

<sup>23</sup> Jeffery Herbst (1991) The United States and Africa: Issues for The Future. In John W. Hareson and Donald Rothchild Africa in World Politics. San Francisco; Westview press. p172-177

<sup>24</sup> See Cooper p75

winners in elections and justifying them to be 'free and fair' despite of them being fraudulent as they did in Swaziland in 1993 to their self-interests.<sup>25</sup> Kreigler nevertheless commend Africa's electoral progress to the West and considers them to have a vital role in uplifting Africa's democracy citing U.S and Europe's role in South Africa's elections.<sup>26</sup> However, Kreigler's assertions are disagreeable since the West's hand in Africa's elections is to propagate their interest and go further to use other resource organs at their helm to their benefit.

Palmberg terms the West's ability to pressure International Actors such as UN to act in their interest as "Western Coercive Diplomacy".<sup>27</sup> He develops this term on the account the West pressured UN to facilitate elections in Namibia to access minerals for their self-interest. Ong'ayo, concurs and adds, the West uses institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and other donor aid institutions through to pressure African states to undemocratic elections to legitimize or put leaders who would articulate their self-interests citing Nigeria and Kenya as case studies.<sup>28</sup> However, Motsamai refutes this claim and states international organizations have been the champions in advocating for democratic elections in Africa. In addition, they provide monetary and observation assistance to ensure the fair elections citing the EU's role in Malawi and Mozambique as case studies.<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless Motsamai's notion is disputed hence majority of elections in African state under the watch of international organizations and the West have transformed tyrants and democrats to semi-authoritarians leaders to the self-interests of the West.

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<sup>25</sup> Michael Neocosmos.(2002) Politics Of National Elections In Botswana Lesotho And Swaziland In Michael Cowen And Liisa Laakso's Multi-Party Elections In Africa. Oxford ; James Currey. P32

<sup>26</sup> Johan Kriegler (2006), Democratic Reforms in Africa, in Muna Ndulo's Democratic Reforms in Africa: It's Impact On Governance & Poverty Alleviation. . Oxford ; James Currey p11-12

<sup>27</sup> See Mai Palmberg, (1983)p228

<sup>28</sup> Antony Otieno Ong'ayo (2008) Political instability in Africa: Where the problem lies and alternative perspective. *The African Diaspora Policy Centre, Amsterdam., p5-7*

<sup>29</sup> Dimpho Motsamai,(2010) The European Union's Electoral Assistance: Perceptions of African Democracy Building. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. p9-14

#### 1.4.5 Literature on international actors in Kenyan elections

According to Gathii, the West has continuously altered Kenya's elections to their self-interests. By U.S endorsing a one party rule in 1964, Kenya transformed from multi-party to a de facto one party State, has led to authoritarian regimes of for their self-interests against Kenyans democratic rights and the spread of communism.<sup>30</sup> Burja further adds that, the strategic position of Kenya to the West has made countries such as the US and Britain device ways to manipulate and control Kenya hence backed the de facto rule.<sup>31</sup> However, Mbai solely blames the disbandment of multi-party elections to the autocrats by them forcing changes in the constitution and claims the West had no hand in it.<sup>32</sup> Nonetheless, there are contentions that the de facto one party State election was an instigation of the West to advance their self-interests.

To Godwin, the re-introduction of Multi-party elections in the 1990s as a conditionality of IMF and World Bank has a never demonstrated commitment to a truly fair poll and on several occasions actively impeded domestic efforts aimed at designing a new, more democratic political system but the protection of Western States self interest.<sup>33</sup> Klopp, further adds international organizations tend to use political conditionality in an ad hoc manner, often with modest outcomes, and are relatively quick to resume support even if reform is only partial, citing the actions of IMF and the Democratic Development Group of donors did in 1999 so as not to impede the interests of the West.<sup>34</sup> However, Atieno-Odhiambo argues that international

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<sup>30</sup>James Thuo Gathii 2002 The External Interests In Kenya's Impending Change ,In Wanza Kioko, Laurence Murugu Mute And S.Kichuma Akivaga, Building An Open Society: The Politics Of Transition In Kenya. Nairobi Claripress Limited, p241

<sup>31</sup> Abdala Bujra(2005)Democratic Transitions In Kenya: The Struggle from Liberal to Social Democracy. Nairobi ACEG & DPMF p18

<sup>32</sup>Walter O. Oyugi, Peter Wanyande and C. Odhiambo-Mbai, The Politics of Transition in Kenya: From KANU to NARC. Nairobi; Heinrich Boll Foundation. p58-61

<sup>33</sup> Murunga Godwin R. (2004) The State, Its Reform and the Question of Legitimacy in Kenya, *Identity, Culture and Politics*, Vol 5, Nos. 1 & 2, pp. 198

<sup>34</sup> Jacqueline M. Klopp (2000) Pilfering the Public: The Problem of Land Grabbing in Contemporary Kenya. *Journal Africa Today*.p14

organizations in Kenya have been the archetype of democratic reforms and free and fair elections.<sup>35</sup> Nonetheless, it is deemed that multi-party elections by the International Organizations, was to give the West leverage over Kenyan leaders to articulate their interests.

Oyugi claims that the West acting as observers in Kenya's elections is solely to ensure the protection of their self-interests tracing the West's strategic and economic interests from the cold war to date.<sup>36</sup> Brown also concurs and adds that, the West could refuse to recognize the validity of flawed elections in Kenya if they have no self-interests but continue to do so despite of numerous electoral violations by the incumbent.<sup>37</sup> Conversely, Adar argues that Western countries have continuously imposed conditionality's to the incumbent Kenyan leaders to promote free and fair elections.<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, there is a contention that, the West has the capability to enforce true democracy in Kenya if the pursuit of their self-interests had a moral obligation to Africa. Kenyan elections to date continue to be marred electoral malpractices and to further disintegration, electoral violence under the watch of the West.

To Brown, the West through the IMF and World Bank knowingly endorse unfair elections in 1992 including suppressing evidence of their illegitimacy and repeatedly undermine domestic efforts to secure far-reaching political reforms to protect their interests in Kenya.<sup>39</sup> Ong'ayo claims that, the West through international organizations such as the IMF deploy observers during general elections in Kenya and despite open knowledge of widespread violation of electoral laws, let the incumbent who complement their self-interests continues wielding to

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<sup>35</sup> Elisha Stephen Atieno-Odhiambo(2002)Hegemonic Enterprises and Instrumentalities of Survival: Ethnicity and Democracy in Kenya Taylor & Francis Ltd *African Studies*, 61, 2 p226

<sup>36</sup> Walter O. Oyugi, Peter Wanyande and C. Odhiambo-Mbai, The Politics of Transition in Kenya: From KANU to NARC. Nairobi; Heinrich Boll Foundation. p350-351

<sup>37</sup> Stephen Brown(2005) Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa The European Journal of Development Research, Vol.17, No.2, June 2005, pp.179-198

<sup>38</sup> Korwa G. Adar (2000) The Internal and External Contexts of Human Rights Practice in Kenya: Daniel Arap Moi's Operational Code. *African Sociology Review* 4,(1) p84

<sup>39</sup> Stephen Brown (2001)Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: how foreign donors help to keep Kenya's Daniel arap Moi in power *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 22, No 5, pp 725-739

power.<sup>40</sup> However, Hyde claims International Organizations give a true account of elections in Kenya in addition to encourage free and fair elections.<sup>41</sup> Nonetheless, it is believed that, international organizations in Kenya have continuously turned a blind eye on undemocratic electoral practices that complement the West's self-interest.

#### **1.4.6 Summary of the literature**

The gap that appears in the literature is that there is nothing 'African' in the domestic politics and elections in African States. The West has managed to dominate the politics and elections in Africa at all costs to further their strategic and economic self-interests by dictating the terms of political engagement. Depending on their self-interests, the West through international organizations advocates for political reforms or use the same institutions to support tyrants who are beneficial to their self-interests. As a result African political leaders, elected or dictators have become cronies for the west and articulate their self-interests.

#### **1.5 Theoretical Framework**

Realism is an approach to the study and practice of international politics. To this school of thought, the international realm is anarchic. It emphasizes the role of the nation-state and makes a broad assumption that all nation-states are motivated by national interests, or, at best, national interests disguised as moral concerns.<sup>42</sup> Realism or political realism prioritizes national interest and security over ideology, moral concerns and social reconstructions. This term is often synonymous with power politics. Realism is the view that world politics are determined by

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<sup>40</sup> See Antony Otiemo Ong'ayo p7

<sup>41</sup> Susan D. Hyde (2008) Does Information Facilitate Self-Enforcing Democracy? The Role of International Election Monitoring. Unpublished manuscript, Yale University papers.ssrn.com p25-26

<sup>42</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, "Six Principles of Political Realism," *Alfred A. Knopf, (1978) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, Revised, New York:, pp. 4-15

competitive self-interest.<sup>43</sup> Realism is one of the oldest theory that explains international relations, its history can be traced as far back as the fifth century BC to Thucydides<sup>44</sup> ; realism explains international relations in terms of power; realpolitik is the “exercise of power by states towards each other”<sup>45</sup> .

Within this theory states thus have the right to make the instruments, in this case, international organizations, to work for them in order to protect their national interests and to ensure that it acts as a form of deterrence to the weaker states so that they do not seek to rebel.

State centrism also plays an important role in the relations between states thus power is important to ensure that there is no shift in the balance of powers. International Organizations are pawns in the strategic game of International Relations, as they are manipulated in order to serve the national interests such as security, sovereignty etc, of the powerful states. Mao Zedong exemplified this view in his statement: “All power grows out of the barrel of a gun”<sup>46</sup> . As Newman outlines States are fundamentally self interested and competitive phenomena and it is in the name of national interests and not humanity they engage in international relations.<sup>47</sup>

This paper is inhabited in this school of thought where offense by other states is inevitable; though perhaps not necessarily of a military kind, but an offensive act nonetheless which may see to the diminishing of power of the weak African states. Western nations continue to advance their interests, which are those of international hegemonies at the expense of the African States. Realism brings out the justification of these hegemonies to exploit and control Africa’s political

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<sup>43</sup> Rourke, John (30) [2010]. Michael, Ryan. ed (in English). *International Politics On The World Stage*. Boyer, Mark A., New York, New York: McGraw Hill. p. 16

<sup>44</sup> James Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2002)pg. 1

<sup>45</sup> Joshua Goldstein, *International Relations* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2003) pg.44

<sup>46</sup> op.cit., Goldstein, p.49

<sup>47</sup> Newman, M.(1996) *Democracy Sovereignty and The EU*. New York: St Martin Press. p17

and electoral processes to advance their self-interests at all costs even by using international organizations as tools to achieve them.

### **1.6 Justification of the study**

The international state actors have continuously shaped Africa's domestic politics and elections to the detriment of African politics. The West's self-interests have seen the manipulation and formation of International Organizations to advance the same in Africa. Though African States might be members of some of the institutions, the power hierarchy in the international community comes to play and 'survival of the fittest' becomes the rule of interaction as states pursue their self-interests. Domination of the international system by the West has seen International Organizations act as their tools to pursue their self-interests and at times violating and victimizing African states and leaders to a point of political instability. The purpose of this study is to investigate if there is anything "African" in Africa's domestic politics and elections since there has been an active participation if not domination by international state actors from slave trade to date. There has already been research and analysis in this issue and credits should be given where due. The research mostly covers issues with regards to whether there is actual involvement of international actors in Kenyan politics and elections. This research seems to not cover how the actors are involved and what have been the implications of the involvement of international actors in Kenyan elections and politics.

From staging coup d'états, assassinating leaders to validating flawed elections, the West has continuously imposed leaders and policies in Africa. International organizations have been created, used or at times pressured by the West to act to their self-interests in Africa by engaging in questionable practices in African domestic politics and elections. The West dominates institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and

European Union both by funding or political control and by composition. For them to articulate the West self-interests in African domestic politics and elections, would serve a Realistic purpose for their existence. This has seen international organizations actively participating in politics and elections at times violating the sovereignty of African states.

The study will be used as a guide to the government on designing strategies found to be effective in election processes. Additionally, knowledge on how Kenya can avoid external interference in its political processes will allow other countries to learn from the Kenyan experience. It will create an opportunity for comparison with other countries as well.

Notably, Kenya has seen its fair share of political and electoral manipulation by international actors' prior to independence to date. The West's self-interests in Kenya have seen them fund and orchestrate flawed elections to retain incumbent regimes to retain optimal conditions for their self-interests. With the two candidates of the 2013 elections bound to the International Criminal Court, this study seeks to evaluate and explain , if Kenya's politics and elections are a reflection of the West's self-interests? And if international actors in Kenya dominate the domestic political and electoral process for the self-interests of the West? It also seeks to investigate how the international actors are involved and the implications that their involvement is having on Kenyan politics and elections.

### **1.7Hypothesis.**

H0: Africa's politics and elections are not a reflection of Western powers interests through international actors.

H1: Africa's politics and elections are a reflection of Western powers interests through other international actors.

H3: Africa's politics and elections are a reflection of African interests.



## **1.8 Methodology**

The methodology of research details the technical aspects of the research process in terms of how the entire study will be carried out, the methods used to investigate the research problem as well as how the results will be achieved. This includes the research design, concepts and how they are operationalized, tools for measurement, sampling methods, data collection and analysis undertaken as well as findings arrived at. Additionally, constraints arising during the research process are detailed.

### **1.8.1 Research purpose**

The purpose of this research is to provide an accurate description of the situation or of an association between African domestic politics and international actors, which the design used shall be one that minimizes bias and maximizes the reliability of data collected and politics and elections

### **1.8.2 Population and sampling techniques.**

Since the research is a purposive one. actors in international relations as well as in politics, the sampling of the population for this study is purposive, that is key individuals are to be selected from the population because they hold specific knowledge on international actors and African politics and can therefore provide a representative range of points of view. The initial respondents are persons known to the research in the diplomatic and political sector as well as various international organizations. This will be 2 focus groups with a maximum of 10 students each in their final year International Studies students from the institute of diplomacy, University of Nairobi.

### **1.8.3 Data collection instruments and procedures**

Information on the research relies both on primary and secondary data. Primary data collection involves direct interaction of the researcher with the respondent in order to generate data for use in the research. This type of data is considered to be original in that it is generated from the source. The main methods to be used in this research to collect primary data are focused interview. Using focused interviews will be beneficial in this study as the data collected will be from the people knowledgeable in the area of study and will therefore provide peer credence towards the result of the study. In using self-administered questionnaires, the questions will seek to capture relevant data and avoid departures from the main objectives of the research.

In order to corroborate or disprove information generated from the generated from the primary data, as well as collect representative material, secondary data will also be used in this research. Secondary data is that which someone else has collected. The secondary data used will be from written materials and documents from the archives and include: Books, policy reports and papers, news paper articles, online journal and publications. The research instruments will be used to ensure reliability and validity of data collection from various respondents who will be selected period of two months. The employment of various methods and techniques would justify that the study will be conducted in qualitative and quantitative research methods.

### **1.8.4 Ethical Considerations**

Before data collection exercise begins, permission will be sought from the University of Nairobi Institute of Diplomacy and international Studies, to conduct the interviews and administer the questionnaires. The researcher will also obtain a letter of introduction from the University commencing the research study. In general, the researcher will ensure all ethical standards relating to the research are adhered to.

### **1.8.5 Data analysis procedures**

The data analysis will be qualitative and will take place concurrently with the data collection; this is in order to guide decisions related to further data collection. Using mapping aspects, the various variables will be categorized on an ordinal scale. This will provide the most manageable way of measuring the variables in the study. The theme that emerges from the interviews and from document analysis will form the basis of further data collection and summary. The analysis of the final data will make it possible for themes to be identified and findings presented descriptively.

### **1.8.6 Scope and Limitations of the research**

The scarcity of sufficient literature and data on the involvement of international actor in Kenya elections makes the research situation problematic and the fact that next year is an election year can makes respondents to withhold crucial information to the study or give unreliable and inaccurate data. Accessing recent literature is also quite costly and not readily available.

The time line is also a vital limitation, with the study of international actors in African domestic politics and elections being vast and wide. In addition to work commitments, this has led to use of few and available respondents in order to complete the project in time.

## **1.9 Chapter Outline**

Chapter one comprises of introduction/ background of study, statement of the problem, a review of existing literature, objectives of study, hypothesis, scope, of the study and ethical issues for considerations.

Chapter two will embark on the historical context of the problem of the study and trends that have emerged over time to date. It will focus on how the West's interests and through international organizations have evolved with time in relation to African politics and elections.

This chapter will seeks to trace back the involvement of international actors in African domestic politics and elections in the past and analyze the evolving role and trends in their pursuit to promote western interest from the colonial era to date.

Chapter three will seeks to analyze the west's interests and various strategies they incorporate to ensure they are protected or optimal conditions exist to advance them through Kenya's domestic politics and elections. This chapter will be a more practical and will encompass the research design and methodology, including the procedures that will be used to conduct the study and various methods that are employed in collecting information. This includes the primary data source from a focus group, observations and secondary data that will complement the primary data from the field.

Chapter Four will seeks to analyze the data collected in the previous chapters by comparing and contrasting with the hypothesis and the theoretical framework that will be used to guide the study to see if the research meets its objective and either confirm or nullify the hypothesis of the research. Realism in this case is used to justify the actions of the West to engage in Kenya's domestic politics and elections directly or indirectly by using other international actors in particular international organizations to confirm it or nullify if African politics and elections are a reflection of Western powers interests through other international actors.

Chapter five is the final chapter of research in which the researcher will provides conclusions and recommendations of the study. This chapter will give a brief summary of the findings the research was set out to do which was to evaluate the presence of international actors in Africa's domestic politics and elections drawing examples from Kenya, which was the case study, and other countries reviewed in previous chapters.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN AFRICA'S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ELECTIONS**

#### **2.0 Introduction**

This chapter seeks trace back the involvement of international actors in African domestic politics and elections in the past and analyze the evolving role and trends in their pursuit to promote western interest from the colonial era to date. The domination of Africa's domestic political and electoral structures by the west depending on their interests has evolved over time depending on the reception and policies African leaders choose to adopt. If the conditions were conducive to their interests, host countries protected or even rewarded irrespective of their human rights and democratic records. This in turn, hands over Africa's political destiny to the will of these international actors. To whom majority are driven on an interest schema for the West in pursuing national interest in the international relations and not altruistic intentions for Africa. This has seen institutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank assisting, recognizing, legitimizing, funding coups and turning a blind eye on fraudulent elections in the interests of the West demeaning the purpose of having elections in Africa.

As the West interests evolve, so do their strategies by use of other international actors.

#### **2.1 International actors on elections and politics in Africa in the colonial era**

Colonialism was far from being a "School for Democracy" for several reasons. First, Africans were clearly not natives of the métropole and thus had no claims to citizenship by birth. Secondly, Europeans did not regard Africans as their equals. Because they regarded them as

racially or culturally inferior, Africans had no business affirming claims to citizenship based on equality. Third, citizenship required knowledge of the language of the colonizer, literacy in that language, and commitment to the political and legal institutions of the métropole. Few Africans had access to the kind of western education needed to achieve a certain level of cultural equality that could be used to claim the rights of citizenship.

Unlike in pre-colonial societies where political power and the task of governance were relatively diffused with various layers of authority, checks, control and participation, the new local structure was predicated on a tight fusion of power of legislative, executive, judicial, and extractive functions in the native authorities manned by the chiefs. Most of those chiefs had no legitimacy and were simply colonial creations. It was a case of power without responsibility and governance without accountability. Control and accountability of those structures were exogenous, not by the people, but the colonial authorities.<sup>48</sup>

Colonial rule wiped out the dependency of the chiefs, as was the case in pre-colonial rule, replacing this with autocracy and replacing the rulers dependence on the people to elite ruler ship which depended upon colonial superiors and later foreign powers.<sup>49</sup> The colonizers ruled without the consent of the people: they deposed and executed traditional rulers, when the latter failed to implement the instructions of colonial administrators or failed to serve the need of the colonial government.<sup>50</sup> The most important political relationship in the colonial state was the alliance between European district administrators and the chiefs of administrative sub-divisions and

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<sup>48</sup> M. Mamdani, (1996) *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>49</sup> Nugent, Paul (2004) *Africa since Independence: A Comparative History*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p107-8

<sup>50</sup> Shillington, Kevin (1989) *History of Africa*. Revised Edition. New York: St. Martin's Press. p 354-357

village headmen beneath them.<sup>51</sup> The extensive autonomy and discretion that European administrators exercised in practice was applied primarily to working out an effective relationship with their local African collaborators, who supplied the actual day-to-day presence and muscle of colonial domination.<sup>52</sup>

The colonial conquest and imposition of Western rule shattered the old political and religious orders, which in the past were closely joined because of the ruler's sacred powers. The denigration of traditional African cultures and religions and the destruction of indigenous political orders laid the foundation for the decline of traditional religious institutions and religious communities. Although the pre-colonial political systems in Africa had some shades of democratic principles and practices embedded in them, the concept of voting and the notion of a political majority and minority were not part of the African political tradition.

Perhaps the oldest example of an African territory having the right to vote in national elections on the European model is the four communes of Senegal, French colonial settlements whose inhabitants had voting rights from the mid-nineteenth Century. This was an example of a colonial institution introduced into African politics, an effect of colonial rule in general. For while colonial governments were notable for their authoritarianism, and based their claim to legitimacy not on any appeal to the will of the people they governed but rather to a mixture of an alleged racial superiority and a supposedly greater skill in public administration, they did gradually introduce elections, among other trappings of popular representation.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Sandra Fullerton Joireman(2001), *Inherited Legal System and Effective Rule of Law: Africa And The Colonial Legacy Journal Of Modern African Studies*. 39 p579

<sup>52</sup> Bruce J Berman (1998) *Ethnicity, Patronage And The African State: The Politics Of Uncivil Nationalism African Affairs* p97

<sup>53</sup> S. Ellis 2003 *Elections in Africa in Historical Context* in Jon Abbink and Gerti Hasseling *Election Observation and Democratization in Africa*. Palgrave p40

Some colonial jurisdictions gave rights to certain Africans based on a property qualification, as in Cape Colony in the earlier twentieth Century, or allowed individual Africans to acquire the right to vote through assimilation into the European political ambit, as in the French and Portuguese traditions.<sup>54</sup> The introduction of elections in which the mass of the African adult population could participate occurred only after 1945, and in conformity with the new views of international order which we have referred to as forming a central part of the Worldwide System of international relations emerging from that period. British colonial authorities in West Africa realized by about 1950 the necessity of formulating new policies for the accommodation of social forces, which had emerged during and after the Second World War. The last years of the colonial period saw an attempt to build unified, integrated parliamentary political Systems that would form the bases for political independence. However, elections during this period were of two kinds. First, unofficial members were elected to the Legislative council (Legco), under the most restrictive of franchises. Bound by race and other prescriptive sources of exclusion, Legco became a forum for arguments with colonial administrations over policy. Second, elections were held for Local Native councils.<sup>55</sup> Both elections were done under the supervision of the colonial powers and their self-interests, which meant having free and fair elections was highly improbable.

Elections served to endorse the political presence of European settlers within their colonial territories. In extreme cases, that of Southern Rhodesia in 1922 and South Africa, referenda and elections played no small part in making the territories independent of British colonial administration but make the settlers more political responsible. The electoral process, with its franchise qualifications, was the main constitutional means by which an African majority was

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<sup>54</sup> April A. Gordon and Donald L. Gordon (2001) *Understanding Contemporary Africa* 3<sup>rd</sup> ed London; Lynne Rienner Publishers p48

<sup>55</sup> Michael Cowen And Liisa Laakso's 2007 *Multi-Party Elections In Africa*. Oxford ; James Currey p.3



exclude from the legislative and executive power. Francophone colonies worked differently in that a small number of officially assimilated Africans were able to vote for a deputy to the French *Assemblée nationale*, as in the communes of Senegal after 1848.<sup>56</sup>

It was only in the final years of colonialism following World War II that African electoral participation became more widespread as the French and British attempted to mollify emerging nationalist movements.<sup>57</sup> The British began establishing fledgling parliamentary systems that would eventually form the basis for independence. The French ordinances of 1945 established electoral colleges by which Africans could elect representatives to the Constituent Assembly so as to participate in the writing of the Fourth Republic's constitution. This was followed by the introduction of universal suffrage and a high degree of internal autonomy in francophone Africa in the *Loi Cadre* of 1956. The French ultimately hoped to maintain their influence in Africa by establishing a French dominated federal community. The first African elections based on universal suffrage and unrestricted party formation was held in the late 1950s just before the formal date of independence for most countries.<sup>58</sup> Similar electoral reforms to those instituted by the French and British occurred much later in the Belgian and Portuguese colonies. It is clear that the colonists only brought democracy to Africa as they left and as a means to have political control indirectly in the post independence era.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Christian Coulon, 1988 *Senegal: The Development and Fragility of Semi-democracy*. in Larry Diamond, Juan J Linz and Seymour Martin Lipse. *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa*. Colorado. UK Rienner Publishers p141-145

<sup>57</sup> Ellis, S. 2000. *Elections in Africa in Historical Context*. In *Election Observation and Democratization in Africa*, ed. Jon Abbink & Gerti Hesselting. New York: St. Martin's Press.

<sup>58</sup> Cowen, Michael & Liisa Laakso. 1997. "An Overview of Election Studies in Africa." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 35: p717-744.

<sup>59</sup> Adejumobi, Said. 2000. *Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy*. In *Government and Politics in Africa: A Reader*, ed. Okwudiba Nnoli. Harare, Zimbabwe: AAPS Books p. 242-261.

Europeans violently implemented various political policies that enabled them to maintain or extend their authority and control over different territories in Africa to their self-interests, which had changed from slaves to raw materials and minerals. African political structures were further restructured to complement the self-interests of the West. Depending on the kind of interest being pursued and resources available to the West, they employed direct and indirect rule to administrate over their colonies. Though some form of elections during this period were introduced, they were not democratic but restrictive to Africans and were only used to legitimize interests of the West.

Colonial rule was thus a tenet by force and oppression, that is, autocracy in its extreme. Ndirangu Mwaura maintains that nothing in Africa changed after the colonizers left. According to Mwaura, the only change that occurred was the replacement of colonial governors with colonial ambassadors. The administrative structures were maintained as well as the economic structures to preserve the flow of wealth from the continent to the West, which began in the colonial time.<sup>60</sup>

## **2.2 International Actors in African Politics and Elections during Decolonization**

Decolonization was a rather hasty attempt to reorder the colonial system in the light of the world order which took shape after 1945, super-powers for example the United States advocating for decolonization to gain access to the resources and popularize capitalism as an ideology over communism. Their main interest was the maintenance of the European colonial empires in Africa and Asia, and which were powerful sponsors of awakening nationalist movements in Africa itself. A vital element of continuity between the old colonial powers and the newly independent African states was the relationship between European former imperial interests and elites in Africa. For African elites to carry out their share of the bargains they had made with

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<sup>60</sup> Mwaura, Ndirangu (2005) *Kenya today: Breaking the yoke of colonialism in Africa*. USA:Algora Publishing.p.6

imperial economic or strategic interests they had to be able, in turn, to reach agreements and make deals of every description with sub-national elites. After independence, they had to govern. Hence, decolonization represented a reordering of the complex series of bargains which linked African economies with the international economic systems dominated by the West.

After Africans finally “won” the fight for their liberation from the alien dictatorship of colonialism, many nationalists were later upset to find that the economic, political and cultural exploitation of the continent actually continued in what is known as neo-colonialism.<sup>61</sup> The legacy of European dominance remained evident in the national borders, political infrastructures, education systems, national languages, economies, and trade networks of each nation. Ultimately, decolonization produced moments of inspiration and promise, yet failed to transform African economies and political structures to bring about true autonomy and development.

In 1953, with formation of the European Community (EC) and the increasing unpopularity of the colonial rule, many European masters sought means of retaining their economic control and interest in Africa, following an eventual independence. Leading colonizing countries like France and Belgium did not want their oversea colonies to be left out of consideration in any European Community because of the economic advantages and resources that they provided.<sup>62</sup> France, for example, used so-called Cooperation and Defense Agreements with selected countries to justify its continuing military presence in Africa and conduct no less than twenty military interventions between 1963 and 1983.<sup>63</sup> In addition, Europe and the rest of the West did not want to lose hold of Africa for fear that it could fall in the hands of the communist Eastern bloc that presented a

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<sup>61</sup> See Mwaura, Ndirangu (2005) p5

<sup>62</sup> Joy Asongazoh Alemazung, Post-Colonial Colonialism: An Analysis of International Factors and Actors Marring African Socio-Economic and Political Development *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, vol.3, no.10, September 2010 p.70

<sup>63</sup> Martin, Guy. (1985) The Historical, Economic and Political Bases of France's African Policy. *The Journal of modern African studies* 23: p189-208

political, economical and military threat to the capitalist West. With development aid, the EC hoped to reduce or stop the influence and spread of communism from the Eastern bloc to these new and underdeveloped countries.<sup>64</sup>

### **2.3 International Actors in African Politics and Elections during the Cold War**

Between the early 1950s and the mid-1970s, as African leaders took direct control of their economies, political institutions, and resources, they entered the brutal trap of Cold War-era global politics. European economic and political influence remained deeply entrenched in Africa throughout the period because of their strategic interests in maintaining unobstructed access to Africa's natural resources and in supporting governments friendly to Western political interests. More important, there was an acute failure of African leadership in many of the newly independent African nations as Western geopolitical strategic and economic interests and a focus on anti-communism paved the way for political detriment of Africa. It was this fear of Soviet influence in Africa, particularly on the part of the United States, that created such a major problem for African nations.<sup>65</sup> Western powers viewed African independence through the lens of the Cold War, which rendered African leaders as either pro West or pro East. Naïvely, most African leaders believed that they could navigate the political land mines of the Cold War through political neutrality.<sup>66</sup>

The West worked through the support of dictators to sustain their economic control, prevent the influence of the Eastern bloc and maintain relations with African dictators, while the Eastern bloc continually fought to gain influence. In the end, the African people became victims of a political struggle among world powers with their elite leaders as accomplice and instruments of

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<sup>64</sup> See Joy Asongazoh Alemazung p71

<sup>65</sup> Jeffrey Herbst, 1991 The united states and Africa in in John W.Harberson and Donald Rothchild Africa in World Politics .Westview Press p169

<sup>66</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein(1967), Africa: The Politics Of Unity.New York: Random House ch.4

the game in the hands of world powers. The result was the upholding and consolidation of dictatorial regimes and the implantation of the culture of autocracy and repugnance towards opposing opinions and parties by the ruling nationalists' autocrats. In most situations in Africa, the Cold War ideologies were used predominantly as the instruments of control and manipulation. In most cases during the cold war era, state apparatuses, especially ruling political parties and executive branches of government, essentially served as national intelligence agencies for the superpowers to investigate, recruit and intimidate progressive forces and halt their agendas.<sup>67</sup>

Cold war politics de-emphasized the object of real elections and genuine democracy, and prioritized the search for political allies in the ideological power game. Thus, from both ends, East and West, tyrants were sustained in Africa and political agitations for multiparty elections were ruthlessly put down with the active support of the two power blocs. It is incorrect to assume that Africans never craved democracy, for there is no un-democratic country where democratic struggles are not being waged rather; Africans were denied democracy by a confluence of internal and international factors.<sup>68</sup>

Notably, the West Cold War considerations were less central. France and Britain, for example, maintained important commercial and financial ties with their former colonies, largely independently of ideology (though this generally kept recipient countries pro-Western. Indeed, France usually supported sometimes militarily the autocratic rulers of its client states, regardless of domestic governance issues.<sup>69</sup> To cooper, "Nigeria's worst luck was that it was lying atop one of the world's largest pools of high-grade oil and by the mid 1960s it was coming under

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<sup>67</sup> Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasango(2005)Liberal Democracy and Its Critics in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA p3

<sup>68</sup> Lopes, C. (1996). "The Africanisation of Democracy." African Journal of Political Science, 1(2).

<sup>69</sup> Stephen Brown, 2005 Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa. The European Journal of Development Research, Vol.17, No.2,

production".<sup>70</sup> Being the most coveted resource by the West, it saw France engaging in the destabilization of Nigeria's politics to get entrée to the resource. It began with the toppling of the Balewa's government and his assassination in January 1966. These led to 'Military populism' funded by the West who 'would get things done' for the West. The Biafran war of 1967-70 saw the support of the West most notably to topple Yakubu Gowon, who impeded their operations in the Delta.<sup>71</sup>

As the West granted aid to African nations, they also coerced governments to support their agendas, instigated, and aided coups against democratically elected governments. They also fomented civil unrest to ensure that governments friendly to their Cold War agenda remained in power and those that were not, toppled by political machinations or assassination. In the Congo, for example, Joseph Mobutu took a strong anti-communist position, subsequently he was rewarded by Western powers by neglecting his autocracy.<sup>72</sup> It mattered little that in 1960 he helped orchestrate the coup that removed and ultimately brought about the murder of Patrice Lumumba, was among the most anti-democratic leaders on the continent, and siphoned Western aid and revenue from the nation's natural resources into personal accounts. Mobutu's rise to power and economic and political damage to Congo in the process with the help of his Western allies demonstrates that the politics of the Cold War, more than anything else, defined the successes and failures of African decolonization to the advantage of Western interests.<sup>73</sup>

Western powers viewed Lumumba as dangerous and vulnerable to falling under Soviet sway, and they quickly collaborated on a plan with the United Nations' assistance to undermine him. He served as prime minister for fewer than seven months before he was deposed and

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<sup>70</sup> See Fred cooper p172

<sup>71</sup> See Cooper p 173

<sup>72</sup> Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges(2002), *The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila*. New York: Zed Books, .p

<sup>73</sup> Mai Palmberg, (1983)*The Struggle for Africa*. Zed Press, 57 Caledonian Road, London p60

assassinated as part of a plot drawn up by the United States, Belgium, and their allies within the Congo. Because Western powers feared that the country's resources would be nationalized or, even worse, be made available to the Soviet Union, they thought it necessary to have a pro-Western government installed, regardless of its legitimacy within the Congo or its commitment to democracy and development.

From a Western standpoint, Nkrumah forged alliances that increasingly placed him in the camp of the Eastern Bloc. Western governments understood Nkrumah's agenda to be socialist and worried about his influence on other African leaders. There are debates about the forces behind the coup that overthrew him in February 1966, but there is strong evidence from the State Department Archives that the United States was interested in removing him from power and that they worked to manipulate the international cocoa price to fuel dissatisfaction with his regime.

From the early 1960s to the late 1980s, an era of intense superpower competition, strategic alliance was the most common condition for development assistance. Security imperatives dominated the choice of aid recipients. While the USSR supported strategic allies, especially Marxist-Leninist regimes, the US and other Western powers provided economic assistance to developing countries that helped contain communism and Soviet 'expansionism'. For the US and, to a lesser extent, other bilateral donors recipient allegiance usually eclipsed concern about the nature of internal political arrangements. A formal semblance of democracy deemed sufficient; often, not even that was of importance.<sup>74</sup>

However, such support was often more rhetorical than financial, as the recipients and levels of aid indicated that human rights remained a low priority. For the bulk of bilateral aid, recipients

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<sup>74</sup> Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 1979, 'Dictatorships and Double Standards', *Commentary*, Vol.68, No.5, pp.34-45.

were chosen and rewarded mainly using Cold War considerations. In practice, foreign aid was often inimical to democratization by supporting military and civilian autocracies.<sup>75</sup>

Still, the West sometimes used aid as leverage to pressure a developing country to carry out certain political and social reforms. The US, especially after the Cuban revolution in 1959, worried that conspicuous inequality in poor countries increased the chances of socialist revolutions paving the way for alignment with Moscow. Promoting democratic institutions abroad became an explicit goal of US development aid in 1961, with the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act.<sup>76</sup> American foreign aid during the Cold War was more anti-communist and anti-revolutionary than it was pro-democratic. US president Jimmy Carter officially adopted a human rights-based policy in the late 1970s, but it was 'partial' and ineffective, quickly subordinated to other priorities, which it often contradicted.<sup>77</sup>

Angola from 1974 to 1975, while in civil war, its government accused by the U.S of being funded by the communist and pursuing socialist ideologies. As a result, America with its Angolan investments close to \$200 million stopped payment of royalties to Angola. The action of the U.S was imperialistic and inimical to the political stability of Angola.<sup>78</sup> To the Americans, their strategic and ideological interests during the cold war outweighed the political ramifications the royalties had on Angola. The use of Gulf Oil Company to articulate its interests was the priority.

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<sup>75</sup> Mushi, Samuel S., 1995, 'Determinants and Limitations of Aid Conditionality: Some Examples from Nordic-Tanzanian Co-operation', in Olav Stokke (ed.), *Aid and Political Conditionality*, London: Frank Cass, pp.225-49.

<sup>76</sup> Brown Stephen, 2005 *Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa*. The European Journal of Development Research, Vol.17, No.2, p.181

<sup>77</sup> Carothers, Thomas, 1999, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace pp99

<sup>78</sup> O.E. Udofia, (1984) *Imperialism in Africa: A Case of Multinational Corporation*. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 14, No.3 pp 358



According to Stephen D. Krasner, institutions such as the UN emerged as important forums African states could advance their interests after colonialism.<sup>79</sup> However, this was only to be a pipe dream since during the cold war and after, the ideological war between the veto powers renders the institution to be impotent and a field of zero-sum games if the superpowers interests are not on the agenda. At some point, the United Nations had control over African States as custodians to independence and gatekeepers of Western States interests. U.S, Canada, France, Britain and West Germany had vast mineral interests in Namibia after the fall of the Portuguese colonial empire and the used the United Nations to protect these economic and strategic interests from South African Bantustan policies which was a threat to them. Mai describes the West's action as 'Western coercive diplomacy' since in September 1976, through the UN Security Council had taken a resolution (385) which said it was imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the UN be held for the whole Namibia as one political entity in April 1977.<sup>80</sup> The Western Contact Group, then referred did this to impede South Africa's presence which would jeopardize their economic and strategic interests. Hence, African leaders and the Namibian government of SWAPO that, they had assisted to power through elections and rescued from apartheid South African regime would owe them and be easy manipulate to conform to optimal conditions for their economic and strategic interests.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, (1985) *Structural Conflicts: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*. Berkely : University of Carlifornia Press. p8

<sup>80</sup> See Mai Palmberg, (1983) p 206-233

<sup>81</sup> See Mai Palmberg, (1983) p229

## 2.4 International Actors in African Politics and Elections in the post Cold War

The collapse of the Soviet Union also led to a marked shift in the global balance of forces, with the liberal West and particularly the United States emerging as the dominant center of military and economic power. The disappearance of viable alternative models created an “almost universal wish to imitate a way of life associated with the liberal capitalist democracies of the core regimes”<sup>82</sup>, which encouraged the diffusion of Western-style institutions.<sup>83</sup> Moreover, the main sources of external assistance were now located in the West.

Key changes in the international environment created conditions that were highly favorable to the emergence and survival of competitive authoritarian regimes. First, the end of the Cold War led to a withdrawal of external support for many superpower-sponsored dictatorships. Beginning in the late 1980s, both former Soviet Union-and U.S.-backed dictators faced a precipitous decline in external military and economic assistance, which eroded their capacity to maintain themselves in power. States became bankrupt, patronage resources disappeared, and in many cases, coercive apparatuses began to disintegrate, leaving autocrats with little choice but to liberalize or abandon power.<sup>84</sup>

Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s was characterized by a general trend towards plural politics and multiparty electoral competition. The popular political clichés were elections, “multi-party,” “civil society,” and “democracy.” Between 1985 and 1991, no less than twenty-eight authoritarian regimes were forced to liberalize the political arena, while multiparty elections were held in eight countries. By 1997, about three-quarters of all African countries

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<sup>82</sup> Whitehead, Laurence. 1996. “Three International Dimensions of Democratization.” In Laurence Whitehead, ed. *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p21

<sup>83</sup> Kopstein, Jeffrey S. and David A. Reilly. 2000. “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Post communist World.” *World Politics* 53, No. 1 (October): p1-37.

<sup>84</sup> Joseph, Richard. 1997. “Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives.” *Comparative Politics* 29, No. 3 (April): p363-382.

were under "democratic rule," succumbing to the logic of periodic elections, albeit mostly with questionable content.

In countries where Western powers have countervailing economic or strategic interests at stake, autocratic governments may ward off external demands for democracy by casting themselves and regime stability as the best means of protecting those interests. Thus, the U.S. and other Western powers have exerted little democratizing pressure on major energy producing states such as Egypt that are strategically important. In such cases, external democratizing pressure is likely to be limited. Efforts to take punitive action are likely to divide Western governments, thereby diluting the effectiveness of those efforts.<sup>85</sup>

Political stability is the West's other large preoccupation. Unlike mass demonstrations for political reform in Eastern Europe in 1989–90, African popular mobilizations ignite a fear of the mob and the sense that anything could happen.<sup>86</sup> The West and domestic elites are concerned with potential violence, loss of life, populist or socialist policies, property damage, impaired production, interruptions of trade, increased refugee flows or missed debt repayments. The more radical potential of fundamental reform threatens the West's interests and incites them to seek accommodations that will restore order, at the expense of progressive democratic change.<sup>87</sup>

In contrast however, some authoritarian regimes displayed considerable ingenuity to evade political conditionality and resist democratization. In Zaire, for instance, President Mobutu Sese Seko responded to domestic and donor pressure by allowing multiparty elections in 1990. His survival was attributed to his 'retaining control of key institutions' and his 'formidable political

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<sup>85</sup> Crawford, Gordon. (2001). *Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis of Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality*. New York: Palgrave p211-227

<sup>86</sup> Stephen Brown,(2005) Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa. *The European Journal of Development Research*, Vol.17, No.2, p.189

<sup>87</sup> Stephen Brown, (2001), 'Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections in Africa: How Foreign Donors Help to Keep Kenya's Daniel arap Moi in power', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.22, No.5, pp.725–39.

skills, practicing successful divide-and-rule tactics against the domestic opposition as well as his erstwhile backers', namely Belgium, France and the US.<sup>88</sup> Mobutu constituted minimal ineffective reforms with the blessings of the West to justify their support of his regime and maintain a status quo, which was optimal for their interests. Carothers notes that the US generally pursues more aggressive democracy promotion when its relations with a country are poor, while it adopts a 'highly indirect, non confrontational approach to democracy aid' with countries with which it enjoys more positive relations.<sup>89</sup>

## **2.5 International Actors in African Politics and Elections in the Multi-party era**

The 1990s saw the rapid growth of democracy promotion as bilateral and multilateral donors reformulated their priorities for assistance. With the disappearance of communism and Soviet expansionism as credible threats to the US and its allies, security considerations lost much of their relevance, especially in Africa. No longer in grave need of strategic alliances in the developing world, the West became more closely involved in the domestic politics and elections in Africa.<sup>90</sup> New guidelines and policy statements from the Americans, British, Canadians, Dutch, French, Germans and others all stipulated that funding allocation would take into account political liberalization, and the European Community, as it was then known, changed its rules to enable it to take into account a country's political system when determining aid levels.<sup>91</sup>

In 1990, the U.S., Great Britain, and France each announced that they would link future economic assistance to democratization and human rights, and during the 1990s, both governments and multilateral institutions began to condition loans and assistance on the holding

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<sup>88</sup> Turner, Thomas, 1997, 'Zaire: Flying High Above the Toads: Mobutu and Stalemated Democracy', in John F. Clark and David E. Gardinier (eds.), *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*, Boulder, CO: Westview, pp.246-64.

<sup>89</sup> Carothers, Thomas. 'Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?'. *Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 1 (2009): p14

<sup>90</sup> Op. cit Brown 2005 p181

<sup>91</sup> ibid 182

of elections and respect for human rights. Though never applied consistently, the use or threat of political conditionality induced many autocrats to hold multiparty elections. The “new political conditionality” was accompanied by efforts to create permanent international legal frameworks for the collective defense of democracy.<sup>92</sup>

The post-Cold War international environment raised minimum standards for regime acceptability, making single party or military rule difficult to sustain, but the new standard was electoralism, not democracy. In most of the world, democratization continued to require a domestic “push”.<sup>93</sup> Where favorable domestic conditions such as a strong civil society, effective political institutions, and a rule of law were absent like much of Sub-Saharan Africa, the new international environment was more likely to give rise to regimes that combine multiparty elections with various degrees of electoral manipulation, repression, and incumbent abuse.

Financial aid became the new tool of control after the Cold War where the West used aid conditionality to enforce democracy and strategic adjustment programmes for their companies to get access to African markets and resources.

The main concern of the West during this period and still is, was political stability and democracy. If dictators and tyrants are able to ensure stability for optimal conditions of the West’s self-interests, the West would turn a blind eye to their atrocities and in some cases fund or commit the same. Institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank were and still are key in implementing the ‘Washington consensus’ by funding African leaders articulating and complementing the self-interests of the West irrespective of their human rights and democratic

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<sup>92</sup> Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2002. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” *Journal of Democracy* 13, No. 2 (April): 51-65.

<sup>93</sup> Bratton, Michael and Nicolas van de Walle. 1997. *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press. p182-183

records. On some occasions, the IMF and World Bank funds acted as bribes to pursue some dictators at the expense of African democracy.

The IMF funneled aid only to countries enforcing U.S-friendly foreign policies such as Egypt that supported its policy in the Middle East.<sup>94</sup> In this way, the neutral economic criteria spelt out in its charter gave way to political criteria in lending decisions.<sup>95</sup> The IMF and World Bank became instruments of U.S. neo/imperialism in Africa. Foreign aid was politically profitable; hence, despite its economic failures, it continued to exist as there was no incentive for African politicians (now under its power) to implement reforms on a system from which they benefited. Meanwhile, the cost of complying with conditions imposed by the West, such as structural adjustment program worsened the debt crisis of the 1980s, and this, in turn, meant greater dependency on foreign aid, which continued to cripple Africa's bureaucratic structures and societies depending on the west interests

A substantial and decisive effect of aid on politics in Africa is that it took the state building responsibilities, public policy and democratic debate out of the borders of the African nations and placed them along international lines between head of states and the international powers and institutions. The established economic structure supported by autocracy, which placed reliance of African political systems on natural resources, renders the citizens "irrelevant" in public policy and decision-making processes.<sup>96</sup> In Benin France's withdrawal of support for Kerekou contributed to the fall of the longtime ruler and dictator meanwhile in Cameroon's example, France's support for Paul Biya helped sustain and stabilize his regime after the 1992

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<sup>94</sup> Thacker SC (1999). The high politics of IMF lending,' *World Politics*, 52(1): 38-75.

<sup>95</sup> Andersen T, Henrik H, Thomas M (2006). US politics and World Bank IDA-lending,' *J. Dev. Stud.*, 42(5): p772-794.

<sup>96</sup> Joy Asongazoh Alemazung, 2012 Post-Colonial Colonialism: An Analysis of International Factors and Actors Marring African Socio-Economic and Political Development *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, vol.3, no.10, September 2010 p75

rigged presidential elections with minimal popularity.<sup>97</sup> The effect of foreign support from this point of view is that, rulers “debate” on their political future and stay in power with the International actors, instead of negotiating with their own citizens.

Though the special geopolitical considerations at stake in Algeria and Pakistan do not apply to most of Sub-Saharan Africa, security interests nonetheless trump pressure for democratization in many instances, especially when recipients embrace economic liberalization. In Ethiopia, for example, a nascent multiparty democracy has given way to a ‘de facto single-party state’.<sup>98</sup> Western donors and international financial institutions generally ignore this because of the country’s pro-free market rhetoric (if not always actual policies) and its role as a so-called stabilizing force in the volatile Horn of Africa, including opposing ‘expansionist Islam’ and counterbalancing the Sudanese regime.<sup>99</sup>

Since 1997, the US President has been bound under an act of US Congress to suspend foreign aid to another country in the case of a coup d’etat.<sup>9</sup> A comparable commitment has been made on the EU level in 1991. Smith records how the EU suspended aid after following coups Burundi 1993, Comoros 1995, Gambia 1997, Niger 1996 and Sierra Leone 1997.<sup>100</sup> The insistence on competitive elections reflects normative concerns with the political rights of others, but also rests on an understanding that a liberal international order is in the long-term strategic interests of the West.

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<sup>97</sup> Takougang, Joseph (1997) ‘Cameroon: Biya and Incremental Reforms’, in John F. Clark and David E. Gardinier, eds. *Political Reforms in Francophone Africa*,. Oxford: Westview Press. p.162-182

<sup>98</sup> Harbeson, John W., 1999, ‘Rethinking Democratic Transitions: Lessons from Eastern and Southern Africa’, in Richard Joseph (ed.), *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa*. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner, p52-53

<sup>99</sup> Young, John, 2004, ‘Post-Civil War Transitions in Ethiopia’, in Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews (eds.), *Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa*, Toronto, Buffalo, NY and London: University of Toronto Press, p20.

<sup>100</sup> Smith, Karen. 2003. *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*. Cambridge,UK: Polity. pp. 205-208

Jonathan's victory was seen by some northern youth as evidence that the results had been rigged, triggering protests that, in some areas, turned deadly. U.S. government views on the elections were positive, despite the violence. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared, "This historic event marks a dramatic shift from decades of failed elections," but stated, "While this election was a success for the people of Nigeria, it was far from perfect".<sup>101</sup> This was due to its oil reserves, Nigeria has the ninth-largest natural gas reserves in the world and the largest in Africa and U.S. firms such as Halliburton has a stake.<sup>102</sup>

As the most advocated process that is supposed to usher in a democratic culture, holding free and fair elections in a competitive manner has been touted as crucial step in that direction, however, the connivance of western interests seem to contradict these principles time and again. For instance many external observers have been deployed during general elections in many African countries in the recent past, and despite open knowledge of widespread violation of electoral laws, massive rigging and use of undemocratic means to tilt the electoral outcomes, "stability" of the concerned countries have been suggested as good reason enough to let the incumbent continue.<sup>103</sup> In the period 2000–2009, the EU provided EUR 560 million for electoral assistance projects in over 50 countries, including post-conflict states in Africa such as Chad, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, and countries such as Madagascar and Mozambique.<sup>104</sup>

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) held national elections beginning on 28 November 2011. The Carter Center, European Union observers, United States, other Western

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<sup>101</sup> Lauren Ploch 2012 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy *Congressional Research Service* July 18, 2012 p3

<sup>102</sup> *ibid* 2012 p.8

<sup>103</sup> Antony Otiemo Ong'ayo (2008) Political instability in Africa: Where the problem lies and alternative perspective. *The African Diaspora Policy Centre, Amsterdam.*, p7

<sup>104</sup> Dimphe Motsamai, (2010) The European Union's Electoral Assistance: Perceptions of African Democracy Building. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. p.4



states, United Nations, and many others stated that these elections were badly flawed. Yet, in early March 2012, the UN, Western, and European Union governments are striving to interact with President Kabila on a “business as usual” basis. A mere two months ago, some of the same governments were criticizing the elections. Unfortunately, in the case of the Congo, the West has conjured a false dichotomy between stability and democracy promotion, and, as they normally do, has chosen stability.<sup>105</sup>

The election related aspects of the right to political participation are set out in two major bodies of international law: human rights instruments and the election observation practice of international organizations.<sup>106</sup> A number of major universal human rights instruments stipulate elections as central to realize the right to political participation. Nevertheless, the electoral support activities by international actors take place against the background of a detailed set of international standards and best practices, which governs and guides these activities. Consequently, a quick look at the past political history of some African countries reveals a number of limitations. This range from the selective support and hidden agendas of the international actors to the reluctance and ulterior motives of the African states themselves that severely affect their political and election processes.<sup>107</sup>

International election observer missions have become a more or less normal part of electoral politics in Africa. External foreign aid donors may make international observation of elections a condition of further assistance.<sup>108</sup> When engaging in electoral assistance, including support for

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<sup>105</sup> Anthony W. Gambino 2012 Values vs. Interests: The US and African Elections. March 21, 2012 *A Project of the Social Science Research Council* [www.ssrc.org](http://www.ssrc.org)

<sup>106</sup> Binder, C. P. 2009. Election Monitoring, International”, in: R. Wolfrum (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, Online Edition p216

<sup>107</sup> Franke, B. 2009. Who own African ownership. The Africanisation of security and its limits. *International History and Politics*. No.1. p24

<sup>108</sup> Liisa Laakso, 2002 *The politics of international election observation: the case of Zimbabwe in 2000* *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40, 3 (2002), United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press p.438

voter registration, the promotion of an independent electoral commission and the assignment of observer missions even in politically unfavorable conditions, international actors try to apply at least some basic standards. Economic and security self-interests remain important for EU and US actors, but reluctance to pay more than lip service to the effective promotion of democratization may be a serious miscalculation.<sup>109</sup>

As noted earlier, this is inherent in a hegemonic agenda of promoting both liberal democracy and liberal peace in post-conflict societies around the world. It also accounts for the 'elevation' of free and fair elections, as certified by international observers, into one of the conditionality's for granting African governments' international legitimacy, as well as donor support. However, the international certification of elections has not been altogether unproblematic. This is partly because of the 'confusion, contradictions and unevenness that have characterized international election observation in Africa'.<sup>110</sup> In the reality that although election monitors may indeed see themselves as 'neutral observers' of the electoral process, they are also actors within the framework of their countries and organizations, which may have strategic, ideological and economic interests in Africa.<sup>111</sup> The West might have had very different motivations when sending observers to Zimbabwe. Most seriously, Zimbabwe's programmes with the IMF and the World Bank had been suspended.<sup>450</sup>

It is commonly known in Africa, that Museveni enjoys the benefits of a double standard concerning the distribution of aid, debt relief, and investment for Uganda, as in order to continue his dictatorial, one-party rule past well as unique public support from world leaders. While other

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<sup>109</sup> Judith Vorrath 2011 African Developments: Political Trends in Recent Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. German Development Institute [www.die-gdi.de](http://www.die-gdi.de) p1-4

<sup>110</sup> Laakso, L. (2000), 'The Politics of International Election Observation: The case of Zimbabwe in 2000', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2 p437

<sup>111</sup> Cyril I. Obi 2007 Elections and the Challenge of Post-Conflict Democratisation *African Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 10, Nos. 1&2 p8

African nations are chastised, and discriminate against for not living up to the democratic ideals set by the West, and for not practicing “good governance,” Museveni was rewarded, even while he maintained ironclad control of the country.<sup>112</sup> Despite the recent electoral malpractices of rigging and violent arrests of opposition candidates, the EU Election Observation Mission found the 2011 Ugandan general elections showed some improvements over the previous elections held in 2006.<sup>113</sup> The impact of post-9/11 foreign policy priorities usually translated into increased support for authoritarian regimes that cooperated with the West and its allies in the so-called ‘war on terror’. Moreover, there is a growing concern that foreign aid was increasingly being used as a security tool, conflating military, political and humanitarian goals. For instance, Australia’s official development assistance includes counter-terrorism programs.<sup>114</sup> Museveni’s strong stand against terrorism by enacting the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 has led to the West turning a blind eye on his tyrannical trait in addition to military support from the West.<sup>115</sup>

What has been offered or gaining ground as the middle way, out of the political stalemate concerning electoral thieving in Africa is the now famous phrase of power sharing. This view brings to question, the role of the international actors, in the political processes in Africa and their potential for enhancing stability or exacerbating instability.<sup>116</sup> Even if power sharing as a formula is the most expedient response in post-electoral violence situations, for instance, these deals also fall short of addressing the very factors that underpinned the post-election violence, namely, the decades of political and economic marginalization.<sup>117</sup> What is observed is a

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<sup>112</sup> Lawrence Freeman 2005 Is President Museveni Losing U.S. Support? *EIR* June 17, 2005 p34

<sup>113</sup> European Union Election Observation Mission Final Report on the Uganda General Elections, 2011 p5

<sup>114</sup> Randel, Judith, Tony German and Deborah Ewing (eds.), 2004, *The Reality of Aid 2004: Focus on Governance and Human Rights*, Manila: IBON Books.p.5

<sup>115</sup> Lauren Ploch 2010 Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response *Congressional Research Service* November 3, 2010 p.61

<sup>116</sup> Op.,cit Otieno Ong’ayo 2008p.8

<sup>117</sup> Ibid p8

continuation of the old order, where dictators molded by the West re-emerge at the expense of stability and basic fundamental rights. Instead, we see previous “good Boys” turning out to be the most authoritarian and brutal towards their one people as has been the case in Uganda.

Gbagbo was never been the first choice of the French imperialism for the leadership of its flagship outpost in Africa. Gbagbo, with a radical background, was at the centre of protests against the one-party "democracy" of Houphouet-Boigny. He ruled the country as his personal fiefdom and made it the goldmine of French exploiters and fortune hunters. Houphouet-Boigny's regime enjoyed unflinching support from Western imperialism since it was good enough for their economic interests and an instrument against radical and pro-Moscow leaders in Africa in the period of the Cold War.<sup>118</sup> In 2011, the United States supported and advocated robust implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1975, which reaffirmed President Alassane Ouattara's victory in an internationally recognized election in Ivory Coast and demanded that former President Laurent Gbagbo end his illegitimate claim to power. The resolution imposed sanctions on Gbagbo and his close associates and reiterated that the UN Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) could use all necessary means in its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of attack.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Peluola Adewale/Ivory Coast: Behind the post-election political crisis and threat of military intervention *Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal* January 5, 2011 <http://links.org.au/node/2092>

<sup>119</sup> USUN PRESS RELEASE #194 *Fact Sheet: Advancing U.S. Interests at the United Nations*, September 25, 2012 <http://www.usun.state.gov>

## **2.6 Conclusion**

As the self-interests of the West evolve to the dynamic nature of the international system, African domestic politics and elections are coerced to change or conform to their needs. International actors have managed to assert themselves in Africa's political and electoral processes to impose or strategically place leaders, standards and policies that will be optimal to their operations of self-interests. Support for Africa by the international actors in the form of preserving good relations with tyrant leaders is not only counter-productive but raises a question about the genuine character of Western support for African domestic politics and election.

In spite of those apparent supports, a lot of distrust, suspicion and western phobia characterize the relationship between Africa and international actors. This is due partly to Africa's past debilitating experience with the international actors especially of the colonial encounter and the continued structural dependence of those countries on western nations, even after the attainment of political independence. Yet the international actors remain crucial to the current domestic politics and elections in Africa. Undue external control only ensures that African domestic politics and elections are responsive not to the needs of the people, but the interest of Western governments even through other actors such as international organizations.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN KENYA'S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ELECTIONS**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

This chapter seeks to analyze the west's interests and various strategies they incorporate to ensure they are protected or optimal conditions exist to advance them through Kenya's domestic politics and elections. Kenya, has transformed from a de facto party state under the supervision of the west to a multi-party democracy, which does not seem to reflect the aspirations and responses of Kenyan citizens but those of the West.

By use of a focus group and from written materials and documents ranging from books, policy reports and papers, newspaper articles, political websites, online journal and publications, it will seek to investigate on; who are the external actors in Kenya's domestic politics and elections, their interests and how these interests manifest themselves into Kenyan politics?

#### **3.1 International Actors in Kenya's domestic politics and elections**

With Kenya being geographically strategic for the West's diplomatic, economic and military interests, their involvement has been enormous. In the face of anti-regime popular mobilization, the West's primary concern appeared to be the avoidance of any path that could lead to a breakdown of the political and economic order, even if this meant legitimizing and prolonging the regime's authoritarian rule to attain their self interests at the expense of Kenyans democratic rights. Other than the leaders who are Western government cronies, Kenyan citizens withstand dire consequences of autocracies sustained and maintained by the West. This has seen western governments engage directly or indirectly through international organizations to secure and advance their national interest.

### **3.2 Kenya's Domestic Politics and Elections of 1992 General Elections**

Prior to 1990, donors virtually ignored the issue of domestic political representation and played little or no active role in promoting democratization in Kenya. If anything, the continued and growing support for the Moi regime, despite worsening governance and the deterioration in civil liberties, tended to strengthen its hold on power.<sup>120</sup> The only role that donors played in promoting democracy was an indirect and presumably involuntary one: structural adjustment and the continuing economic crisis undermined the regime's ability to finance its clients' loyalty, thus contributing to growing dissatisfaction with the regime, as well as to popular and elite support for political reform. The economic crisis also made the country more dependent on foreign aid and the government more susceptible to policy pressure from donors.

Starting in 1990, the US and other donors increasingly spoke out against economic mismanagement, growing human rights abuses and restricted political opportunities. The end of the Cold War had decreased the importance of having a solid ally in the Eastern African region, while public opinion and budget deficits in donor countries among other motivations prompted bilateral donors to take into account Kenya's domestic politics in their aid allocations.

US Ambassador Smith Hempstone's May 1990 mention of tying of aid to political reform marked the beginning of Western donors' active involvement in Kenya's democratization process.<sup>121</sup> He warned that Kenya was losing the *carte blanche* it had previously enjoyed. At first, he acted without the support of his counterparts in the Western diplomatic corps or his own government. Most bilateral donors distanced themselves from Hempstone's words, especially the British high commissioner, Sir John Johnson, who defended Moi's record. Even Washington

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<sup>120</sup> 'Aid and Corruption: A Worm's-Eye View of Donor Policies and Practices' by Brian Cooksey 11<sup>th</sup> International Anti-Corruption Conference, Seoul, South Korea, 26-29 May, 2003 Workshop 5.6: Corruption and Donor Policies and Practices

<sup>121</sup> Washington Post, Monday, November 20, 2006.

failed to back up its “rogue amabassador”: When US Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen visited Kenya later that month; he reassured the government that no such decision on political conditionality had yet been made.<sup>122</sup>

Donors began to implement their threats in September 1991, when the Danish government suspended all new aid to Kenya, citing corruption and human rights abuses.<sup>123</sup> The following month, it terminated a rural development program that it had been financing for 17 years, after an audit showed that most of the \$40 million it had contributed had been embezzled. Britain cancelled \$7 million in oil subsidies, fearing the money was going to corrupt politicians rather than consumers, and the World Bank followed deciding not to grant a \$100 million loan for the energy sector.<sup>124</sup>

However, the decision by the trading partners and donor agencies Canada, the USA, Britain, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, the IMF and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to back the forces for change in Kenya in November 1991 by denying aid to the Moi regime was not based on altruistic motives or democratization. Rather, they wanted to guarantee that the incumbent or incoming regime would meet its commitments to debt repayments. These organizations were acting in their own self-interests.<sup>125</sup>

During the period from 1990 to 1991, after long ignoring Kenya’s domestic political realm, donors gradually spoke out and then applied concrete pressure on the Moi regime to liberalize the political system. The US ambassador spearheaded the movement, initially contradicted by

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<sup>122</sup> *New York Times*, August 6, 1990

<sup>123</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 1990 - Kenya*, 1 January 1991, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca28c.html> [accessed 22 October 2012]

<sup>124</sup> Wa Maina, Kaniaru. 1992. “The Future of Democracy in Kenya.” *Africa Today*, vol. 39, nos. 1-2 (1st and 2nd Quarters).

<sup>125</sup> Elisha Stephen Atieno-Odhiambo 2002 Hegemonic Enterprises and Instrumentalities of Survival: Ethnicity and Democracy in Kenya *African Studies*, 61, 2, 2002 p226



messages sent from Washington. Such mixed signals illustrated the conflict between democracy promotion and other foreign policy objectives. Gradually, other branches of the US government and other donors endorsed the ambassador's initiatives and also became vocal in their critiques of the Moi regime. Donors overcome their internal divisions to take decisive action by November 1991, when they collectively suspended most new aid. Once this consensus emerged, it took only a few days to convince the Moi regime to end single-party rule.

Britain did not take a strong stand against Moi's regime, due to their interests in Kenya worth \$1 billion in Kenya.<sup>126</sup> Hence, Moi's autocratic regime was more of a 'necessary evil' that served their interest. The British actions were comparatively mild, prompting Moi to thank Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher publicly for her continued support in the face of criticism.<sup>127</sup> In July, a group of British parliamentarians visited Kenya at the expense of the Kenyan government. After meeting with only ruling party officials with no single member of the opposition, nor investigating human rights conditions first hand, they concluded that Kenya was "peaceful, stable and democratic.

Between 1990 and 1992, most bilateral donors followed the US ambassador's lead and increasingly acted as demiurges, adding their voices to domestic calls for political pluralism and backing this up with aid suspension. This caused the Moi regime to immediately modify the constitution, though not effect any further changes to permit free-and-fair electoral competition.

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<sup>126</sup> Murunga Godwin R. (2004) The State, Its Reform and the Question of Legitimacy in Kenya, *Identity, Culture and Politics*, Vol 5, Nos. 1 & 2, pp. 179-206

<sup>127</sup> Africa Watch. 1991. *Kenya: Taking Liberties*. New York, Washington and London: Africa Watch 364

Donors then abandoned the demiurge role and failed to recognize the significance of incomplete democratization.<sup>128</sup>

The repeal of the constitutional clause that established KANU as the sole political party permitted the legalization of opposition parties. However, the one-party system was otherwise left intact, including numerous provisions for state repression. KANU benefited from clear and well-documented advantages: the number and size of constituencies overrepresented its strongholds in parliament; the electoral commission was appointed by Moi and highly partisan; there was a high degree of intimidation, numerous instances of bribery and irregularities in voter registration; the media was strongly biased in KANU's favour; the ruling party used state funds for its campaign; and, not least, so-called "ethnic clashes" prevented opposition supporters from voting.<sup>129</sup>

On 10 June 1992 FORD, the DP and two smaller parties called for a boycott of voter registration, with the support of religious leaders, in an attempt to force the government to even the playing field. Bilateral donors strongly opposed this position. US ambassador Hempstone, who had been of great assistance and inspiration to the reformers, especially FORD, which felt indebted to him, actively pressured opposition and church leaders to end the boycott. On 2 July, after the churches withdrew their support for the boycott, the opposition parties capitulated. KANU made a couple

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<sup>128</sup> Godwin Rapando Murunga and Shadrack Wanjala Nasong'o, eds. *Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy*. London and Dakar: Zed Books and Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2007: 303-31

<sup>129</sup> Stephen Brown (2003). "Quiet Diplomacy and Recurring 'Ethnic Clashes' in Kenya." In Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester, eds. *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner: 69-100

of only minor concessions. Donors had spent a total of about \$2.1 million on the 1992 elections and were determined to see them take place, even under grossly sub-optimal conditions.<sup>130</sup>

US Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen had insisted that the elections be held without delay.<sup>131</sup> Hence, they were not necessarily seeking Moi's defeat; most would have been content for Moi to remain in power, as long as it was through multiparty elections. Still, many donors hoped that an opposition victory would improve economic management rather than democracy.<sup>132</sup> Hempstone naïvely stated his belief that KANU had been changed by the multiparty experience and was "likely to be more reasonable and responsible" in the future.<sup>133</sup> A few years later, however, Hempston admitted in his memoirs that he should probably have called for the elections to be postponed, given their blatant unfairness, and failing that declared them to be a fraud, supported the boycott of parliament and called for fresh elections; he claimed, however, to have been worried about a resulting civil war. Instead he was held back for the fear and outbreak of civil war which would have caused instability putting at risk the continuity of western interests.<sup>134</sup> France, for its part, was uninterested in any form of conditionality that would interfere with debts owed to the French government and French companies.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> D W Throup & C Hornsby, *Multi-Party Politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and Moi States and the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Elections*, Oxford: James Currey, 1998,

<sup>131</sup> H J Cohen, 'US policy and current events in Kenya, Malawi and Somalia', Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, 19 June 1992, *US Department of State Dispatch*, 3 (26), 23 June 1992, p 520

<sup>132</sup> Stephen Brown 2001 Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: how foreign donors help to keep Kenya's Daniel arap Moi in power *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 22, No 5, p731

<sup>133</sup> *Sunday Nation*, January 3, 1993

<sup>134</sup> Stephen Brown, (2001) "Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: how foreign donors help to keep Kenya's Daniel arap Moi in power", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 22, no. 5, p731

<sup>135</sup> Geisler, Gisela. 1993. "Fair? What Has Fairness Got to Do with It? Vagaries of Election Observations and Democratic Standards." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 31, no. 4 December p632

### 3.2.1 International Actors in the post 1992 General Elections

Foreign aid was resumed in 1993 despite clearly deficient elections, no end to the violence, and complete impunity for its perpetrators. In both cases, aid resumption followed not particularly credible promises of economic reform that pleased the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and bilateral donors. As in the past, the government soon reneged on its commitments.<sup>136</sup>

After the 1992 elections, donors greatly reduced their pressure for political change, placing much more importance on economic reform and stability than on democracy. The economic cost of KANU's campaign, combined with other factors, had almost eliminated economic growth for 1992 and 1993 and Kenya defaulted on its debt service for the first time. After repudiating IMF-recommended policies in March 1993, Moi took some macroeconomic measures that pleased donors. The following month, the World Bank disbursed \$85 million it had been withholding.<sup>137</sup> European donors, particularly, were divided over the issue of aid resumption. The Scandinavians were especially critical of the Moi regime and resisted any move that could be interpreted as support for the government. However, Britain reportedly blocked attempts within the European Union to invoke political conditions in respect to their investments in Kenya.<sup>138</sup>

The Wests' reserve to provide funding was over both the political and economic situation in Kenya and it is difficult to disentangle the two. For example, the Bretton Woods institutions are particularly interested in action on high profile corruption case, such as the Goldenberg affair. Corruption notably straddles the political and economic categories. Both are cited when aid is suspended. However, all the instances of aid resumption to Kenya follow economic reform,

<sup>136</sup> *The Economist* August 19, 1995

<sup>137</sup> Throup, David W., and Charles Hornsby. 1998. *Multi-Party Politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and Moi States and the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Elections*. Oxford: James Currey

<sup>138</sup> Human Rights Watch/Africa. 1995. "Kenya: Old Habits Die Hard. Human Rights Abuses Follow Renewed Foreign Aid Commitments." New York: Human Rights Watch (July).: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca28c.html> [accessed 22 October 2012]

either past or promised, or support for Western foreign policy. In fact, there were no true domestic political advances in between the 1992 elections and the latter part of 1997.

### 3.3 Kenya's Domestic Politics and Elections of the 1997 General Elections

Prior to the elections, The international community was shocked by the images of police brutality against pro-democracy demonstrators. Twenty-two foreign diplomatic missions in Nairobi signed a joint letter to Moi in July, deploring police violence and urging the government to open talks on legal reforms with the opposition, church and civic groups. A few donors refused to sign the letter, maintaining that both sides had used violence and should be condemned for it (Holmquist and Ford 1998: 239). In Washington, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright issued a strongly worded statement.<sup>139</sup> Thus physical violence brought many donors together, to a certain extent motivated by a desire to restore peace, but also in fear of mobs taking over.

Donor attention returned to domestic political conditions in Kenya in 1997, drawn by the growing number of participants—and violent deaths—at successive demonstrations, organized by the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC) under the theme of “No reforms, no election”. On May 31, images of excessive police violence were broadcast around the world. On July 7, some 20-25 people were killed when security forces repressed the crowds.<sup>140</sup>

Sensing growing hostility from the donors, Moi postponed the donor Consultative Group meeting scheduled for July 21. The IMF suspended lending at the end of July, including a \$220 million loan, officially attributing its decision to poor economic governance and corruption. The World Bank, the European Union and several bilateral donors soon followed the IMF's lead and

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<sup>139</sup> *Economist*, July 19, 1997

<sup>140</sup> *Kenya Television Network, English* July 7 1997

suspended a total of over \$400 million in aid, which was \$50 million more than in 1991. The donors explicitly urged the government to meet with the opposition.<sup>141</sup>

Many donors, some of whom had been financing the NCEC (Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands), and a number of NCEC members distanced themselves from the increasingly “radical” NCEC reform agenda. With donor support, opposition and government MPs formed the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) and signed an agreement on minimal reforms that would allow elections to proceed as scheduled.<sup>142</sup>

Within weeks, donors rescheduled \$560 million of Kenyan loans signaling that it was back to business as usual between the Moi regime and donor countries. Domestic observer reports were more critical, but released a few weeks later and widely ignored.<sup>143</sup> Western pressure tended to ease up after the holding of elections, even if the elections did not result in democratization.

In December 1997, President Moi was once re-elected in a grossly unlevel playing field and a poll marred by irregularities. Donors again expressed concern over some electoral practices, but despite the greater coordination of donor observation missions accepted the overall result. They deliberately suppressed evidence presented by their own joint Election Observation Centre that KANU had not legitimately obtained a majority in parliament.<sup>144</sup> In spite of very detailed and critical internal reports, only went through the motions of raising the question of electoral irregularities. Moreover, Canada, the US and France reportedly convinced other donors not

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<sup>141</sup> Barkan, Joel D., and Njuguna Ng’ethe. 1998. “Kenya Tries Again.” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 9, no. 2 (April) p37

<sup>142</sup> Holmquist, Frank, and Michael Ford. 1992. “Kenya: Slouching Toward Democracy.” *Africa Today*, vol. 39, no. 3 (3rd Quarter) p243

<sup>143</sup> Op., cit Holmquist, Frank, and Michael Ford. 1992 p243

<sup>144</sup> Op., cit Stephen Brown, (2001) p728

reveal that their own joint observation team had concluded that KANU should only have a minority of seats in parliament.<sup>145</sup>

Numerous donor country officials invoked various forms of feeble reasoning to legitimize the deeply flawed 1997 elections. The two most common clichés were ‘the elections were better than last time’ and ‘it was a step in the right direction’.<sup>146</sup> Jon Abbink has called the expression ‘a step in the right direction’, when used to endorse ‘faulty’ elections, ‘one of the worst most worn-out metaphors in this field’.<sup>147</sup> The British high commissioner similarly called the elections ‘a further step in Kenya’s development towards greater democracy’, even if they did not meet ‘normal democratic standards’.<sup>148</sup>

Geisler reports that a few days after the elections, the Commonwealth Observer Group, issued a press release that expressed their concern with the ‘lack of real commitment on the part of the Government to the process of multi-party democracy’.<sup>149</sup> Yet after the British through their High commissioner praising the progress of the 1992 elections as ‘a further step in Kenya’s development towards greater democracy’, the Commonwealth Observer Group retreated their previous and lauded the elections as a ‘giant step on the road to multi-party democracy’,<sup>150</sup> a similar statement recurring in the 1997 elections. Domestic monitors’ reports contradicted the international observers, stating that the elections were overall clearly far from free and fair.

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<sup>145</sup> Rose, Gideon. 2000/01. “Democracy Promotion and American Foreign Policy”, *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 3, p.186-203.

<sup>146</sup> Interview with IDIS students focus group, Nairobi, Kenya, October 2012

<sup>147</sup> Abbink, Jon.2000 ‘Introduction: Rethinking Democratization and Election Observation’, in *Election Observation and Democratization in Africa*, ed. Jon Abbink and Gerti Hesseling. New York: St Martin’s Press, p1–17

<sup>148</sup> Foeken, Dick, and Ton Dietz. 2000 ‘Of Ethnicity, Manipulation and Observation: The 1992 and 1997 Elections in Kenya’, in *Election Observation and Democratization in Africa*, ed. Jon Abbink and Gerti Hesseling,. New York: St Martin’s Press, p122–149

<sup>149</sup> G Geisler, ‘Fair? What has fairness got to do with it? Vagaries of election observations and democratic standards’, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31 (4), 1993 p 626.

<sup>150</sup> Commonwealth Observer Group, *The Presidential, Parliamentary and Civic Elections in Kenya, 29December 1992*, London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1993, p 40.

However, the report only released month's later and received negligible international attention and locally.

### **3.3.1 International Actors in the post 1997 General Elections**

In reference to the 1992 and 1997 elections, the focus group confirmed the west had the ability enforce democracy through withdrawal of aid and sanctions but chose to accept minimal reforms to the constitution. To them the west acceptance of the two elections despite, police brutality, detention of opposition candidates, political assassinations and voter intimidation prior to the elections was and is clear indicator of the west's lack of commitment to promote democracy in Kenya. As a result Kenyans had suffer a dictatorial regime for 10 years even after the inception of Multi-party politics in 1991.<sup>151</sup>

The coastal violence in 1997, followed by more attacks in the Rift Valley in early 1998, led to renewed foreign interest in the "clashes." U.S. president Bill Clinton sent a special envoy, Reverend Jesse Jackson, to visit Nakuru and meet with government officials in Nairobi. Again, local donor representatives publicly spelled out neither the nature of the violence nor its links to government. They showed little or no interest in providing assistance for the newly displaced. Neither the internal report of the donors' Electoral Observation Centre nor their publicly released joint report on the 1997 elections mentioned the new "clashes" on the coast and subsequent disenfranchisement of perhaps 100,000 voters, most of whom were believed to be opposition supporters.<sup>152</sup>

The desire to prevent upheaval led donors to endorse KANU and Moi's victory in the 1997 elections, despite a detailed internal report by their joint observation team on extensive rigging.

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<sup>151</sup> BBC News Wednesday, November 12, 1997 Published at 14:38 GMT

<sup>152</sup> Election Observation Centre, *Kenya General Elections 1997: Final Report for Donors' Democratic Development Group* Nairobi: Election Observation Centre, January 1998



Yet they did not appear to have understood that Moi's team saw how effective the tactic of ethnic cleansing has was in the past and how it could be used with impunity and can therefore reasonably be expected to use it again in the future, without further sanction. On the other hand, if they did understand, it did not seem to preoccupy them. For donors, the prevention of violent conflict was merely an ad hoc subsidiary interest, largely unarticulated, and not a conscious strategy. The donor group appeared to trust that the problem will go away, subscribing to the overly optimistic belief that the current constitutional review process, stalled from 1997 to 2001, will result in a political system that will forestall further violence.<sup>153</sup>

During his last term, Moi continued to pursue a number of donor-prescribed economic reforms, though erratically and as little as possible without overly displeasing donors, who were reluctant to cut aid further and thus lose leverage. Though donors endorsed the government's re-election, they acknowledged that they were not satisfied with economic governance. Though they did not resume high levels of aid, they did not initially appear particularly critical of the government.

The country's relationship with Western donors soured in the early 1990s, when donors as a whole distanced themselves from the Moi regime over issues of economic and political governance. Nonetheless, they still maintained an important presence, and with few exceptions most donors became less critical of the government around 1994, thereafter concerning themselves mainly with economic governance. The United States took a noticeably softer line with the Moi regime in light of the government's close cooperation in the investigations into the

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<sup>153</sup> Stephen Brown. 2003. "Quiet Diplomacy and Recurring 'Ethnic Clashes' in Kenya". In Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester, eds. *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UNCapacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner: 69-100

1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy. The Kenyan government's cooperation with the U.S.-led "war on terrorism" weakened donor criticism.<sup>154</sup>

However, in 1999 most bilateral donors had started to become intolerant of the Moi regime. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) revealed in September 1999 that the government had failed to account for \$43.7 million in aid since 1994. Still, this did not prevent the organization from signing a new \$14 million grant agreement with Kenya.<sup>155</sup> Hence, whereas most bilateral donors remained concerned by Kenya's political situation. The , worry that the worsening economic crisis "could culminate in political and economic instability" reportedly swayed donors, including the "reluctant" United States to facilitate the grant.<sup>156</sup>

By 2001, it seemed that donors expected little more from Moi than to hand over power peacefully to a democratically elected successor at the end of his mandate. This issue more than any other dominated the political scene until mid-2002. Though Moi was constitutionally barred from running again for the presidency, he long avoided stating explicitly that he would step down. A constitutional amendment or a number of cunning interpretations of the constitution could have allowed him to secure at least one other five-year term. After sustained pressure from donors, civil society and the independent media ensured that no underhanded measures be taken, he finally announced in June 2002 that he would definitely not be a presidential candidate.

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<sup>154</sup> BBC 'News Kenya Bomb suspect flown to the US' Thursday, August 27, 1998 Published at 11:08 GMT

<sup>155</sup> *Daily Nation*, September 18, 1999

<sup>156</sup> *EastAfrican*, June 26, July 24

### 3.4 Kenya's Domestic Politics and Elections of the 2002 General Elections

During the 2002 electoral campaign, donors encouraged opposition parties to work together and agree on a joint opposition candidate. When Mwai Kibaki, the coalition candidate, won the elections, the spectre of aid sanctions helped to convince KANU hardliners to hand over power.

It is widely believed that US president Bush and secretary of state Colin Powell are discuss this with Moi when he visited Washington a few weeks before the elections.<sup>157</sup> The political climate in Kenya remained uncertain at the time of the pre-election assessment. Whereas Kenya's previous elections had been marked by widespread political intimidation and violence, the first six months of 2002 were relatively calm. At the time, the opposition political parties were engaged in talks about forming an election coalition behind a single presidential candidate, but it was not clear whether this coalition would succeed. KANU appeared to be on their way to confirming President Moi's designated successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya's founding president, Jomo Kenyatta, and a representative of the new generation of KANU leaders.<sup>158</sup>

Though the elections fell short of being free and fair, NARC's lead was far too large to be easily erased, including because donors had once again mounted a strong joint electoral observation team. Opposition leader Kibaki was elected with over 62% of the popular vote, compared to only 31% for Uhuru Kenyatta.<sup>159</sup> Once Kibaki assumed office, Kenya completed its transition to democracy, at least according to formal definitions, a monumental milestone

To the focus group, when asked if Western interests or support of their policies could influence voting patterns or outcomes in Kenya, the answer was positive stating that Kenyan's sometimes

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<sup>157</sup> Stephen Brown (2004). "Theorising Kenya's Protracted Transition to Democracy." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, vol. 22, no. 3 (September): 325-42

<sup>158</sup> The Carter Center, Observing The (2002) Kenya Elections 'July-August 2002: Exploratory Assessment' May 2003 p17

<sup>159</sup> Electoral Commission of Kenya.(2003)."General Elections Results 2002". Internet, [http://www.eck.or.ke/general\\_elections\\_results\\_2002.htm](http://www.eck.or.ke/general_elections_results_2002.htm)

conform or relate to the aspirations of the West. In some cases, the West's interests have manifested themselves into Kenya's domestic interests and are difficult to tell them apart hence by Kenyans voting for Kibaki in the 2002 elections served both interests. The US backing of Kibaki's candidacy was based on their interests to fight terror in the East African region and at the same time complimented Kenya's aspirations to have a regime change apart from Kenya having been attacked by terrorists in the 1998 US embassy bombing.

In 2002, to the surprise of many, Moi agreed to step down at the end of his term. His attempt to hand-pick a successor angered many presidential hopefuls and generated a realignment of personalities that led to the formation of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). With the opposition finally united behind a single candidate and Kenyans anxious for change, the elections produced a decisive NARC victory and Kibaki sworn in as president. Many politicians who had worked hand-in-hand with U.S. diplomats to pressure Moi were now in leadership positions, and officials on both sides hoped for better relations in the context of the "war on terror".<sup>160</sup>

#### **3.4.1 International Actors in the post 2002 General Elections**

In some cases however, the support of western governments' interests cost leaders local support and might lead to loss of some ethnic or religious voting blocs during elections as it did for Kibaki during the 2007 elections. The focus group stated that Kibaki's support of the Terrorism bill might have cost him the Muslim vote that is concentrated in the coastal region and parts of the North Eastern. Hence, the terrorism bill was seen to be against or targeted Muslims by stereotyping Muslims as terrorists rather than terrorists as Muslims.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> Beth Elise Whitaker 2008 *Reluctant Partners: Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Democracy in Kenya* International Studies Perspectives (2008) 9, p257

<sup>161</sup> BBC NEWS: Published: 2003/07/15 17:19:22 GMT <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/3069211.stm>

The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (UNCTC) stepped up pressure by sending high-level delegations to the country. In the face of calls for stronger legislation, the newly elected Kibaki government in 2003 introduced a controversial Suppression of Terrorism Bill. Opponents quickly seized on the perceived U.S. backing of the bill, drawing comparisons with the U.S.A. Patriot Act and describing it as a foreign imposition. Human rights activists worried about the bill's implications for civil liberties and blamed the Kenyan government for bowing to American pressure. According to Seesemann, Kenyan Muslims felt especially targeted by the proposed legislation and blasted a provision that would allow the police to detain people who wore certain types of clothing.<sup>162</sup>

On the other hand, recent counterterrorism cooperation between Kenya and the United States has not been without criticism, however. Human rights groups and Muslim leaders in particular have expressed concern outrage at times over the treatment of suspects and their families. The Anti Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) is accused of targeting Muslims, especially ethnic Somalis, and using extreme tactics. Amnesty International (2005) describes a significant but unknown number of irregular arrests, searches without warrants, unlawful detentions, and instances of torture, some involving "foreigners." Allegations of human rights violations by Kenyan and American investigators increased in 2007, when security forces intensified their activities in northeastern Kenya to capture suspected terrorists fleeing violence in Somalia. As anger grew over the government's cooperation with the U.S. "war on terror" and opposition politicians highlighted

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<sup>162</sup> Seesemann, Rudiger. (2005) East African Muslims After 9/11. Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers, No. 3, Bayreuth: Institut für Afrikastudien & Kulturwissenschaftliches.

the issue while campaigning in Muslim areas before the 2007 elections Kibaki got U.S. backing.<sup>163</sup>

The 2002 elections were also the first where the Kenyan people voted out the ruling party KANU that had been in power since independence in 1963, which was no longer handy to the west's interests. The 2002 experience boosted the Kenyans' confidence and trust in democracy as a political system. For the international community, it indicated a consolidation of democracy in Kenya. These assumptions were proved wrong by the 2007 elections and their aftermath since the west had conflicting interests in Kenya.

### 3.5 Kenya's Domestic Politics and Elections of the 2007 General Elections

Before the 2007 general elections, the West was already divided in their preferences. Kibaki had lost most of the European donor support during his first term, notably over issues of corruption.<sup>164</sup> Some, such as UK and France, were generally supportive of Odinga, while others preferred the status quo of a second Kibaki term to the uncertainty of a new president. Clear is the fact that the United States supported the candidature of the incumbent Mwai Kibaki, not because he is good but because through his hands-off leadership, the United States could reap in line with their stated and unstated parochial interests in Kenya. Rannenberger was aware of the fact that Raila is not easily predictable, and so a Raila Presidency could not be welcomed news in Washington.

On December 27, 2007, millions of Kenyans went to the polls in Kenya's fourth multi-party elections, with the hope of strengthening the institutions of democracy and, most importantly in

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<sup>163</sup> Beth Elise Whitaker 2008 *Reluctant Partners: Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Democracy in Kenya International Studies Perspectives* (2008) 9, p258

<sup>164</sup> Murunga, G., and S. Nasong'o. 2006. Bent on self-destruction: The Kibaki regime in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 24, no. 1: p1-28

the view of many observers, of bringing change. Several months before the December elections, a number of polls indicated that the incumbent president trailed behind opposition candidate Raila Odinga. Many observers, including key President Mwai Kibaki advisors, acknowledged that President Kibaki and his party would lose in December.<sup>165</sup>

On 30 December 2007, the day the ECK announced the results and Kibaki was sworn in, a US Department of State spokesperson in Washington congratulated Kibaki for his election and 'called on the people of Kenya to accept the results of the election and to move forward with the democratic process. Adding that the electoral commission in Kenya and the commissioner there would be the ultimate authority, and they would look to them to investigate any claims of fraud or mismanagement.<sup>166</sup> US officials later dismissed that statement as an error, stating that it was a committed by a relatively low-level official on weekend duty and not an accurate representation of the official US position an explanation received with widespread skepticism. The only other donor official to endorse Kibaki's victory was the World Bank representative in Kenya, Colin Bruce, who wrote in a confidential internal memo to headquarters in Washington that the UN had endorsed Kibaki's victory, a position which the UN denied taking. In the memo, which was leaked to the press Financial Times, 10 January 2008, Bruce alleges that 'the considered view of the UN is that the Electoral Commission of Kenya announcement of a Kibaki win is correct'.<sup>167</sup>

On its side, Her Majesty's Government expressed open reservations on the Kibaki re-election, forcing the British Parliament to demand a ministerial statement on the position of the British Government relating to Kenya's situation. Behind-the-curtains diplomacy ensued between

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<sup>165</sup> Ted Dagne ' Kenya: Current Conditions and the Challenges Ahead Congressional' Research Service June 8, 2011

<sup>166</sup> Agence France Presse. 2007. US congratulates Kenyan president on re-election. 30 December. Internet, <http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iwyrTTCO3xh8nYriU0EvFhHMQP2w>

<sup>167</sup> Stephen Brown 2009 Donor responses to the 2008 Kenyan crisis: Finally getting it right? *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, vol. 27, no. 3 (July 2009)

Gordon Brown and George Bush to find a solution to the impasse that had rocked Kenya.<sup>168</sup> The bungled 2007 General Elections and the nasty aftermath of violence that rocked the nation was a reaction to the power struggle between the United Kingdom and the United States of America

In many ways, the ECK was a disaster in slow motion, culminating in its breakdown during the vote count. Donors, including the United States, which had provided direct support, and others that channeled their assistance through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), were initially hesitant to disown the body in which they had invested so much.<sup>169</sup> In part to avoid any possibility of conflict, they emphasized during the campaign that the ECK would be the final arbiter of the results. This made it very hard for donors to disavow the ECK's announcement of Kibaki's victory, even if they almost unanimously had expected challenger Raila Odinga to be the elected president. Though there was no immediate evidence, that Odinga should have won, here were sufficient reasons to believe that the fraud had made the results unreliable.

### 3.5.1 International Actors in the post 2007 General Elections

To the respondents in the focus group, the divided preferences of the 2 leaders in the 2007 elections by the US and the British resulted to polarization of the country along ethnic lines and led to the post election violence that rendered more than 300,000 people to be IDPs and the deaths of more than 1000 persons. To the focus groups, the western governments were purely to blame for the escalation of violence since despite their intelligence networks in Kenya and knowing its ethnic vulnerability, still went ahead with their actions in pursuit of their national interests. Though the Kenyan political leaders were partly to blame since they campaign along

<sup>168</sup> Deogratius Magero **THE Usa/uk Interests AND THE Kenyan Politicians** on 26/09/12 at 1:46 am <http://trifter.com/africa/kenya/the-usauk-interests-and-the-kenyan-politician>

<sup>169</sup> Kiai, M. 2008a. The Crisis in Kenya. *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 3: 162-168.



ethnic politics and foster rivalry between Kenyan tribes, hence western governments only back existing structures of tribal politics.<sup>170</sup>

After the results of the elections were announced followed by chaotic fighting that threatened to result in widespread civil war threatening their long-term interests, the US and UK quickly began pushing their leading men in Kenya, namely Odinga and Kibaki respectively, to accept a power-sharing agreement. The West worked in close coordination to help winners and losers reach a compromise, in the form of a power-sharing agreement, which de-escalated tensions and largely restored social order. Some observers believe that the power-sharing agreement 'would not have been possible without this united stand by the international community'.<sup>171</sup>

This saw repeated efforts by the UK and US ambassadors in Kenya to meet personally with both Kibaki and Odinga to push for power sharing. Britain also quickly sent its African men to mediate the conflict such as former President of Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who was the head of the Commonwealth Election Observer Group monitoring Kenya's elections. Even so, it took almost two months for the PNU and ODM to reach an agreement, as the government dragged its heels. The government was expecting donors to cave in, as they had done in Kenya and elsewhere in the past, in an overarching concern for stability. Although much of the electoral violence ended with the formation of the coalition government in Kenya, as it did in the recent case of Zimbabwe, coalition governments formed after disputed elections can set a misleading precedent to the future of democracy in Africa. Coalition governments are not a substitute for

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<sup>170</sup> The Star Monday, October 1, 2012 BY KIBIWOTT KOROSS

<sup>171</sup> Harneit-Sievers, A., and R.-M. Peters. 2008. Kenya's 2007 general election and its aftershocks. *Afrika Spectrum* 43, no. 1 p133

democracy and as our survey in Kenya showed, it is ultimately, not what people want but an invention of the west to create stability.<sup>172</sup>

The West rejected any scenario involving a recount, a forensic analysis of the results or any other form of action that would help determine the legitimate winner according to the democratic rules in place. No Western government called on Kibaki to step down from the presidency, or at least step aside until results were verified, thus legitimizing his position. Instead, donors abandoned the principles of the will of the people and justice in favor of a politically expedient ad hoc compromise that eventually ended the political crisis and violent conflict.<sup>173</sup> All other donors were much more cautious in their pronouncements, expressing concern about the irregularities but avoiding any mention of what free-and-fair results would have been. Even though most donor officials believed that Odinga should have won, not one said so publicly. None called for Kibaki to step down. A few staff members in the Scandinavian and Canadian diplomatic missions advocated reviewing the records and conducting a statistical analysis, after which they might recommend a rerun, but their position was not adopted by their respective embassies.<sup>174</sup>

On 1<sup>st</sup> January 2008, the British foreign secretaries and US issued a joint statement calling on Kibaki and Odinga to compromise to achieve political stability for the “sake of democracy.” The US also sent the then head of the African Union, President John Kuffuor of Ghana, to try to mediate but he was not immediately successful. The US then sent in its undersecretary of state for African affairs, Jendayi Frazer, to Nairobi where she met repeatedly with Kibaki and Odinga.

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<sup>172</sup> Stefan Dercon and Roxana Gutiérrez-Romero 2010 Triggers and Characteristics of the 2007 Kenyan Electoral Violence CSAE WPS/2010-12 <http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2010-12text.pdf>

<sup>173</sup> Stephen Brown 2011 Lessons Learned and Forgotten: The International Community and Electoral Conflict Management in Kenya in David Gillies, ed. *Elections in Dangerous Places: Democracy and the Paradoxes of Peace building*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011, pp. 127-43

<sup>174</sup> Stephen Brown 2009 Donor responses to the 2008 Kenyan crisis: Finally getting it right? *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, vol. 27, no. 3 (July 2009)

Britain also sent its foreign minister in charge of African Affairs, Lord Malloch-Brown, to Nairobi for meetings with Kibaki and Odinga. At the same time, the US and UK built strong international pressure via the UN security council, African Union, European Union and IMF to push for a mediated solution. This was done under a panel of so-called 'Panel of Eminent African Persons' headed by former UN secretary general Kofi Annan and assisted by both the former Tanzanian president, Benjamin Mkapa, and the former first lady of South Africa, Graca Machel.

On February 28 2008, President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya signed a power-sharing agreement with Raila Odinga, leader of the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). It was witnessed by both Kofi Annan, chief mediator of the African Union appointed mediation panel that was strongly supported by the international community, and President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania, chairperson of the rotating leadership of the African Union. Immediately the deal was signed, messages of support and congratulations poured in from the international community as represented by the same parties which had shown a keen interest in resolving the political crisis in Kenya and pressuring for a solution including the United States foreign secretary Condoleezza Rice, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, and European Union. Behind this power-sharing deal were two key influential powers, the US and UK, that imposed this solution upon the Kenyan government in order to preserve their vital interests.<sup>175</sup>

The power sharing agreement has been a potential minefield that can be detonated at any time. For example, the agreement created the position of an executive prime minister for the first time

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<sup>175</sup> Analysis of the Power-Sharing Agreement in Kenya Saturday, 19 April 2008 16:18 [http:// www.khilafah.com/index.php/analysis/africa/2554](http://www.khilafah.com/index.php/analysis/africa/2554)

since 1964 as well as requiring major constitutional, legal and administrative reforms to work. In addition, there have been major question marks as to the extent of the prime minister's powers especially when compared to the president's powers. Moreover, since the deal was the result of a compromise based upon a benefit bond between the US and UK, it became notoriously weak and subject to bargaining and recalculation over time depending upon the variance of each power's interests and strength. The 'government of national unity' in Kenya became exposed to the danger of collapse at any time that either power believes it has the strength to resolve the struggle exclusively in its favor.

### **3.6 International Actors in Kenya's Domestic Politics and Elections in the eve of 2013**

#### **General Elections**

Hillary Clinton has been marauding Kenyan politicians. She caused jitters in African political heavyweights when she came to Kenya on one-day official tour. They had to complain later when she had already jetted to the US. She came to deliver a clear and precise message; 'United States don't want to see William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta's names in the ballot box in the forthcoming general elections'. This caused disquiet amongst the two politicians who are vying for presidency. United States of America is a powerful country that has immense political and economic influence in Kenya. This influence does not come free. America has been channeling funds to Kenya in form of investments, loans and grants. United States foreign aid to Kenya was at \$687.7 million making Kenya the ninth beneficiary of US tax revenues. This put Kenya in the same league as Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Israel and Haiti yet Kenya was not at war (In 2010, Kenya had not invaded Somalia). The question is who is United States funding and the impact of their funds?

According to Tony Gachoka, it is surprising that the American government has taken such a stark position on the ICC case against four Kenyans. To him, it is whispered along the corridors of power that the US has decided on a particular politician as its preferred candidate for president. With so many millions of dollars poured into determining the outcome of the 2013 General Election, it is hardly surprising that America is backing a process that will seemingly eliminate two presidential aspirants, regardless of whether they are guilty.<sup>176</sup> Hillary Clinton and Obama administration understands that Kenya is heavily dependent on the US for its economic growth and development. This makes them demand that the two International Criminal Court (ICC) suspects; William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta should not vie for political office in the forthcoming general elections or they will not work with them if elected. The implication will be devastating to the Kenyan economy and to avert that, the two politicians might have to pull out of the political race in the polls next year.<sup>177</sup> It is ironic that the United States, which is not a party to the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, but which has steadfastly refused to have its activities or those of its allies subjected to the scrutiny of The Hague based court, is such an ardent supporter of the process.<sup>178</sup>

The West's lack of more active intervention is in large part because they simultaneously pursue several policy goals that supersede their concerns over the violence in Kenya. Their other priorities include economic reform and overall stability, which they worry would be compromised should the current regime be removed from power with no clear leader-in-waiting to fill the vacuum. They are hesitant to compromise these objectives for what they appear to

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<sup>176</sup> Tony Gachoka Hypocrisy, double standards and a blinkered view of the world: US style Updated Sunday, August 12 2012 at 10:40<http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=200006388>

<sup>177</sup> Seecloud on US Economic and Political Influence in Kenya: Hillary Clinton Bulldozing Kenyan Politicians; Uhuru & Ruto <http://seeclouds.com>

<sup>178</sup> Tony Gachoka Hypocrisy, double standards and a blinkered view of the world: US style Updated Sunday, August 12 2012 at 10:40<http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=200006388>

consider a matter of lesser importance and sovereign jurisdiction. As a result, western nations do not intend to spend significant economic and political capital in actively responding to the “ethnic clashes.”<sup>179</sup>

### **3.7 Conclusion**

From the observations and the data above it is evident that there is imminent existence of western interests within matters of elections and politics in Kenya. It is obvious from above that the interests are mainly based on who has the ultimate power and what can the west can gain from these leaders being in power. This therefore involves bending of rules using a carrot and stick mechanism especially when it comes to policies and donors to ensure that they create an appropriate environment for western interests to thrive. This has many implications and many reasons attached to it. As we will examine in chapter four there is more than meets the eye when it comes to these interests and the implications that they have on Kenya.

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<sup>179</sup> Stephen Brown. 2003. “Quiet Diplomacy and Recurring ‘Ethnic Clashes’ in Kenya”. In Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester, eds. *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict*. Boulder: Lynne Rienne p 69-100.

## CHAPTER FOUR

# KENYA DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ELECTIONS AS REFLECTION OF WESTERN INTEREST

### 4.0 Introduction

This chapter seeks to analyze the data collected in the previous chapters by comparing and contrasting with the hypothesis and the theoretical framework that was used to guide the study to see if the research met its objectives. Realism in this case was used to justify the actions of the West to engage in Kenya's domestic politics and elections directly or indirectly by using other international actors in particular international organizations.

### 4.1 Kenyan's domestic Politics and Elections as a reflection of the Western interest in Africa

The West has continuously altered Kenya's elections to their self-interests. This began by U.S endorsing a one party rule in 1964, Kenya transformed from multi-party to a de facto one party State, has led to authoritarian regimes of for their self-interests against Kenyans democratic rights and the spread of communism.<sup>180</sup> The strategic position of Kenya to the West has made countries such as the US and Britain device ways to manipulate and control Kenya hence backed the de facto rule that facilitated their interests.<sup>181</sup>

Political control, which is often legitimized by elections, ensures the selection of leaders and policies optimal to their interests while the interests of the constituents barely matter. Hence voting by Kenyans in the western perspective is to affirm their choice of leaders prescribed by

<sup>180</sup> James Thuo Gathii 2002 *The External Interests In Kenya's Impending Change*, In Wanza Kioko, Laurence Murugu Mute And S.Kichuma Akivaga, *Building An Open Society: The Politics Of Transition In Kenya*. Nairobi Claripress Limited, p241

<sup>181</sup> Abdala Bujra(2005) *Democratic Transitions In Kenya: The Struggle from Liberal to Social Democracy*. Nairobi ACEG & DPMF p18

the west. Western multinationals own almost all of the most profitable companies in the mobile telecommunications, banking, agriculture, horticulture, cement manufacturing and other sectors. Any form of political instability jeopardizes their interests directly and cuts on their profit, hence their involvement in Kenya's domestic politics and elections are self-serving to their economic interests and not philanthropic. This has seen the west using various strategies to manipulate electoral outcomes including accepting flawed ones in respect to protect and advance their interests.

Even after political liberalization began in Kenya in the early 1990s, the West has not promoted wide-ranging reform, preferring to focus on the rapid holding of elections. From 1992 onwards, the West has actually discouraged measures that could lead to democratization that is more comprehensive. Often, the West knowingly endorses severely flawed elections and even prevents measures that will lay the foundation for future democratization. In Kenya in the 1990s, for instance, the West never demonstrated commitment to a truly fair poll and on several occasions actively impeded domestic efforts aimed at designing a new, more democratic political system.<sup>182</sup> They did this by endorsing blatantly unfair polls and subverting domestic efforts to secure wide-ranging reforms.<sup>183</sup> Bilateral donors could have refused to recognize the validity of the 1992 and 1997 elections that returned Moi and Kenya African National Union (KANU) to power, but declined to do so.<sup>184</sup> Nevertheless, this would have been against their interests and would have only antagonized the incumbent president Moi in both elections yet he conformed to

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<sup>182</sup> Stephen Brown (2005) Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa *The European Journal of Development Research*, Vol.17, No.2, June 2005, pp.179-198

<sup>183</sup> Stephen Brown, (2001) Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: how foreign donors help to keep Kenya's Daniel arap Moi in power *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 22, No 5, p 731

<sup>184</sup> Stephen Brown, 2004, 'Theorising Kenya's Protracted Transition to Democracy'. *Journal on Contemporary African Studies*. Vol.22, No.3, pp.325-42.



their needs and wants as they pursued their National interests. Hence, Moi's regime was responsive to their interests.

The African elites, who are bent on hanging to power at all cost and for the purpose of primitive accumulation, have perfected the art of political expediency even when these acts threaten the development of their countries. However, in all these cases, there is always a hidden hand of external interests, who would like to retain the status quo or where they support political change, and then their choice of preference is always contradictory to the wish to the people. As seen in the previous chapter, while many countries took a tough stand on Moi regime in 1980s and early 1990s, Britain did not take a strong stand against Moi's regime, due to their interests in Kenya. Britain had an investment worth \$1 billion in Kenya.<sup>185</sup> In this case, the safety of their investments and profits was enough justification to accept the Moi regime even after flawed elections in 1992 and 1997.<sup>186</sup> It is presumed that, the British had a hand in the flawed elections to sustaining Moi in power to protect their interests. Therefore, it shows the West would go to any extent including sustaining an autocrat to protect their interests and the consequences that befall the host country's political structure are never a priority.

Unashamedly, the west's engagement in Kenya's politics and elections are to advance their state interests, and that democracy is only a priority when it suits their interests. Kenya in since independence and her interactions with the west has only witnessed one democratic election out elections of four multi party elections held from 1992 to 2007 under western supervision. The west's commitment to democracy in Kenya is questionable since they only concentrate on the

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<sup>185</sup> Murunga Godwin R. (2004) *The State, Its Reform and the Question of Legitimacy in Kenya, Identity, Culture and Politics*, Vol 5, Nos. 1 & 2, pp. 179-206

<sup>186</sup> Oyugi, Walter, Wanyande Peter., and Mbai, Odhiambo (2004) *The Politics of Transition in Kenya, From KANU to NARC*, Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation

leadership that would progress their interests in Kenya other than the political participation of Kenyan citizens.

As established earlier, before the 2007 elections Western governments were divided in their preferences. Kibaki had lost a lot of donor support during his first term, notably over issues of corruption.<sup>187</sup> Some, such as UK and France, were generally supportive of Odinga, while others preferred the status quo of a second Kibaki term to the uncertainty of a new president. Clear is the fact that the United States supported the candidature of the incumbent Mwai Kibaki, not because he is good but because through his hands-off leadership, the United States could reap in line with their stated and unstated parochial interests in Kenya. Rannenberger was aware of the fact that Raila is not easily predictable, and so a Raila Presidency could not be welcomed news in Washington. Hence the US congratulatory message to Mwai Kibaki after the 2007 elections was not coincidental or done by lack of knowledge of the discrepancies that marred the elections, but was a reflection of the interests of the US and their desire to have Kibaki remain in power.

The recent visit by the US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton to issue warnings against the participation of William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta in the oncoming 2013 elections clearly illustrates the US has a preferred candidate hence unwanted ones. The pertinacious nature of the 'ICC duo' as established by the focus group has made the US wary of their quest for power hence the west prefers leaders they can easily control and manipulate to advance their interests and the two do not seem to fit that criteria. This has sparked a heated debate in the political and civil society arenas of the viability of Ruto and Uhuru's candidature in relation Hilary Clintons statement hence there is a fear by the political elite not to contradict the West's aspirations.

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<sup>187</sup> Murunga, G., and S. Nasong'o. 2006. Bent on self-destruction: The Kibaki regime in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 24, no. 1: p1-28

We recall that the United States clearly supported Kibaki's victory as declared by the Electoral Commission of Kenya sending its congratulatory message, only to backtrack later when it was clear that Kibaki had clearly stolen the victory from Raila Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement. On its side, Her Majesty's Government expressed open reservations on the Kibaki re-election, forcing the British Parliament to demand a ministerial statement on the position of the British Government relating to Kenya's situation. Behind-the-curtains diplomacy ensued between Gordon Brown and George Bush to find a solution to the impasse that had rocked Kenya.<sup>188</sup> The bungled 2007 General Elections and the nasty aftermath of violence that rocked the nation was a reaction to the power struggle between the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

It is evident that the interests of the West especially Britain and US in Kenya determine and validate the political and electoral outcomes depending on their interests. Thus, leaders who wield power in Kenya, acquire it from the citizens through elections but with the consent of the West. As established by the focus group, the two presidents that have served after the inception of the multi-party democracy have had western governments backing as a priority. In turn, they reciprocate by advancing western interests instead of those of the constituents that elected them hence Kenya's domestic politics and elections become a reflection of western interests.

The 'war on terror' has come to define the political landscape in Africa, with leaders who embrace or join in the war attain financial and political favors' or at times both depending on how much the US values their cooperation. Leaders such Museveni in Uganda enjoy the US full political and financial support being among the first African countries to embrace the anti-

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<sup>188</sup> Deogratus Magero THE Usa/uk Interests AND THE Kenyan Politicians on 26/09/12 at 1:46 am  
<http://trifter.com/africa/kenya/the-usauk-interests-and-the-kenyan-politician>

terrorism bill in 2002.<sup>189</sup> Despite his tyrannical reign in Uganda, which is been characterized by turning Uganda into a police State and suppression of any form of opposition, Museveni remains a key ally of the US and they continue to turn a blind eye on his tyranny as long as he continues to support the 'war on terror'.

The 'War on terror' has seen the US embrace Moi's autocracy especially after the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi and Dar Salam despite his repressive reign.<sup>190</sup> The US criticisms prior to the bombings seemed to die off hence according to the focus group, the US interests in containing terrorists activities as well as the cooperation by Moi's government in investigating the bombings superseded their democratization quests. Moi's dictatorship and ruthless means to contain any form of opposition by use of the police was beneficial to the US given their record of human rights violations while dealing with terror suspects. Moi's last tenure in office was a celebrated one by the US irrespective of his gross violations of human rights as long as he aided the 'war on terror'.

Similarly, Kibaki's coming to power in the 2002 elections is attributed to the US quest to find a reliable ally in the 'war on terror'. Hence, during his first few months in office; his government introduced a controversial Suppression of Terrorism Bill that resembled the U.S.A. Patriot Act.<sup>191</sup> This proves the election of Kibaki in the 2002 general elections despite NARC's popularity and the urge of Kenyans to have a regime change; it was an appointment and concession of the US to pursue their interests in fighting terror in the East African region. This is further attested, as illustrated in the previous chapter by United States military foreign aid to

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<sup>189</sup> Lauren Ploch 2010 Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response *Congressional Research Service* November 3, 2010 p.61

<sup>190</sup> Beth Elise Whitaker (2008) *Reluctant Partners: Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Democracy in Kenya* International Studies Perspectives 9, p257

<sup>191</sup> Seesemann, Rudiger. (2005) *East African Muslims After 9/11*. Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers, No. 3, Bayreuth: Institut für Afrikastudien & Kulturwissenschaftliches.

Kenya, which was at \$687.7 million making Kenya the ninth beneficiary of US tax revenues putting Kenya in the same league as Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Israel and Haiti.<sup>192</sup>

The main signpost that helps realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power. The actions of the US and UK to control Kenya's domestic politics and elections best affirms these theory as they pursue their economic and security interests and at times struggle/clash for the control of Kenya's political power prioritizing on their interests.

Realism assumes that the key concept of interest defined as power in an objective category, which is universally valid, this means that politics always has interests in gathering more power. The involvement of western governments in Kenya's domestic politics and elections to acquire their national interests by controlling its leaders further demonstrates their quest for power to protect their interests in the East African region and globally. To realists' actions of the west to back specific leaders, validate their flawed elections or even seek the banishment of some leaders from the presidential race is more of a necessity despite the negative implication it has on the growth of democracy in Kenya.

#### **4.2.1 The West's pursuit for Stability at the expense of democracy in Kenya's domestic Politics and elections**

Despite their control of Kenya's political structures, the west's priority condition in Kenya is stability. This has seen Western governments embracing and enforcing quick short-term

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<sup>192</sup> FOREIGN AID DILEMMA: Dictators On Our Dollar David Francis March 16, 2011  
[http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-03-16/politics/29971625\\_1](http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-03-16/politics/29971625_1)

resolutions to ensure stability at all costs irrespective of the long-term repercussions it has on Kenya and its citizens. As established by the focus group, stability in Kenya outweighs the West's quest for democracy in Africa. Over the four general elections that have taken place from 1992, the US and UK have been keen in ensuring stability remains even if it meant recognizing flawed elections and backing ruthless but strong founded leaders such as Moi who could facilitate optimal conditions for their interests by brutally thwarting any attempt to cause instability.

The fear of an outbreak of civil war due to the ethnic politics that characterizes Kenya's elections has made Western governments back down from calls of democracy and instead concentrate in stabilizing the country even under autocracy. The role of Nairobi as a major regional hub for diplomacy, communications, as well as development and relief operations is a high stake for the West and Kenya is the only supposedly stable country in the conflict-ridden Horn of Africa region.<sup>193</sup> Hence, the stability of Kenya is a key prerequisite for the Western governments to articulate their interests be they economic, political or security. To the West, political instability in Kenya would have a ripple effect in the rest of the region and can jeopardize their National interests. Consequently, their rushed actions to stop or deter any form of instability has led them to acknowledge flawed elections and putting in place poorly thought out power sharing structures in Kenya that grants authority to leaders who were part of an election that to date the results are speculated despite of numerous Western observers.

The call for peace is the most conspicuous statement in the utterances of the west on the eve of elections, which they tend to emphasize other than the call of free and fair elections in Kenya. In

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<sup>193</sup> Axel Harneit-Sievers and Ralph-Michael Peters 2008 *Kenya's 2007 general election and its aftershocks Afrika Spectrum* 43 (2008) 1:133-144 © 2008 GIGA Institute of African Affairs, Hamburg

most cases, electoral financial assistance in Kenya after the 2008 post election violence is mostly directed to peace initiatives rather than democracy and voter education. For the oncoming 2013 elections, the US has already rolled out a budget of US\$6,000,000 through the USAID that began running from May 2011 to April 2013 implemented by International Foundation Election Systems (IFES) in a programme named 'Kenya Election and Political Processes Strengthening'.<sup>194</sup> To West, a peaceful election in Kenya are more preferable than democratic ones and has seen the west issue congratulatory messages praising current elections in comparison to previous elections not in reference to their level of transparency but to the level of violence.

Evidently, in 2008, no Western government called on Kibaki to step down from the presidency, or at least step aside until results were verified, thus legitimizing his position. Instead, donors abandoned the principles of the will of the people and justice in favor of a politically expedient ad hoc compromise that eventually ended the political crisis and violent conflict.<sup>195</sup> A short term consensus of power sharing was resolved between two hegemonic powers the US and UK to restore stability and not long-term solutions that would resolve crucial matters to Kenya such as the IDP situation and empowerment of its the citizens

The west has the capacity to enforce credible change in the domestic politics and elections of Kenya either militarily as they did in Ivory Coast by ousting Gbagbo or by use of sanctions as they have isolated Mugabe as established by the focus group. But the West does not consider these options viable to Kenya due to the strategic interests they have in Kenya. Any form of sanctions or military intervention in Kenya that would destabilize the economy, would have a

<sup>194</sup> USAID Kenya : Kenya Election and Political Processes Strengthening'12-08-2011

<sup>195</sup> Stephen Brown 2011 Lessons Learned and Forgotten: The International Community and Electoral Conflict Management in Kenya in David Gillies, ed. *Elections in Dangerous Places: Democracy and the Paradoxes of Peace building*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011, pp. 127-43

ripple effect the rest of the East and Central African region. Hence, Kenya is situated at a key geographical point just below the Arabian Gulf, at the mouth of the Red Sea and with a long Indian Ocean coastline plus being the entry point for many landlocked African countries like Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Hence, the US and UK plans are implemented by proxy through the Kenyan government and for this reason the need to influence its politics and to attain leaders complement their interests under a stabilized condition.

The power sharing agreement between PNU and ODM that retained Kibaki and brought Raila to power was undemocratic and deprived Kenyan's of their elected President to a Government of National Unity created by the west. It did not encompass the domestic implications it would have in Kenya but stability, a conducive environment for Western government interests in Kenya. The US and UK activities in Kenya evidently demonstrate the west's' lack of moral obligations to Kenyans in their pursuit of national interests.<sup>196</sup>

Realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. The quest for stability other than democracy in Kenyan politics and elections further affirms this theory since the west's principal agenda is to advance their self-interests rather than promote democracy, which is a principal of human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human rights. Instead, the west has continued with its cold war trends of supporting autocrats if they are beneficial to their interests. This has come at the expense of Kenya's democratic growth, as the west in reference to the realism theory have no moral obligation to enforce democracy if it does not meet their ends to achieve national interest. Hence,

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<sup>196</sup> Axel Harneit-Sievers and Ralph-Michael Peters 2008 *Kenya's 2007 general election and its aftershocks Afrika Spectrum 43 (2008) © 2008 GIGA Institute of African Affairs, Hamburg p133*



stability and not democracy remains their key prerequisite while determining the fate of Kenya's domestic politics and elections.

#### **4.2 International organizations and the role promotion of western interests in Kenya's domestic politics and elections**

International Organizations act as agents of principal actors who are the West. Hence, Hawkins, et al., compares the West to 'the Wizard of Oz' who delegates tasks to International Organizations to their self-interest.<sup>197</sup> In Kenya domestic politics and elections, they implement a "Western consensus" for the purpose, which they have been created and designed for by Western governments. Funding for these organizations originates from the West for these institutions to advance their national interest and not for altruistic purposes, as many international organizations would purport to be autonomous.

The involvement of these international organizations in Kenya's domestic politics and elections is responsive to Western interests hence the agendas and policies they propagate resemble those of the West and rarely progressive policies for Kenya's development and democratic growth. Through the UN Security Council, the West was able to pressure ODM and PNU to accept the power sharing agreement. Though it may be argued that their involvement in Kenya's domestic politics is to ensure their interests are secure since institutions such as United Nations has substantial interests in Kenya, with its agencies such as UNEP, UN-HABITAT and UNHCR. But their embracing of the short-term solution of power sharing was purely the manifestation of the West's interests to restore stability rather than democracy and proves their involvement in

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<sup>197</sup> Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Neilson and Michael J. Tierney (2006). States, Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p14

Kenya's domestic politics and elections is responsive to western interests hence their heavy presence in Kenya.

Key international organizations used to secure western interests have important regional offices in Kenya such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank moreover have over the been used as influential tools by the West particularly the US to attain political conditions and policies that are conducive for them to articulate their interests. Through aid conditionality, the IMF has been able to gain tangible leverage for the US in Kenya. Moi's reign in power through undemocratic elections and unsubstantial minimal could partly be attributed to the IMF if not entirely to the West.

The decision by the trading partners and donor agencies Canada, the USA, Britain, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, the IMF and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to back the forces for change in Kenya in November 1991 by denying aid to the Moi's regime was not based on altruistic motives to advance democracy. Rather, they wanted to guarantee that the incumbent or incoming regime would meet its commitments to debt repayments. These organizations were acting in their own self-interests.<sup>198</sup> Each time the donor institutions played a role in quickly ending it without the Moi regime making more than minimal concessions but sufficient reforms for the West to articulate their interests.

International organizations in Kenya have continuously turned a blind eye on undemocratic electoral practices that complement the West's self-interest. Brown further proves this by stating that 'donors deliberately suppressed evidence that KANU had not legitimately won a majority in

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<sup>198</sup> Elisha Stephen Atieno-Odhiambo 2002 Hegemonic Enterprises and Instrumentalities of Survival: Ethnicity and Democracy in Kenya *African Studies*, 61, 2, 2002 p226

parliament' in reference to the 1997 general elections to facilitate the Moi's stay in power.<sup>199</sup> This shows that international organizations are extensions of Western governments and might even be taken as departments of the West since at times they over step their mandate by violating their own restrictions to pursue western interests.

The IMF and the World Bank have used foreign aid in Kenya to influence political changes preferred by the West by funding projects of leaders embracing policies and strategies optimal to western governments' interests. This was confirmed by the visit by Officials of the Bretton Woods institutions in 2001, who were currently on an assessment trip in the country, and were categorical that no more funds would be forthcoming until the government in Nairobi fulfilled certain conditions prior to the 2002 elections, which brought in to power Mwai Kibaki.<sup>200</sup> Hence, some of these international organizations were keen on a regime change in Kenya in the 2002 elections to a western friendly leader rather than democracy. This confirms International Organizations are proxies for western governments hence articulate their interests.

The backing of Kibaki in the 2002 general elections by the UN though it coincided with the aspirations of Kenyans to have a regime change from Moi's authoritarian regime, their pressure through the UNCTC for Kibaki to enact the Terrorism Bill into Kenya's legislations show their actions to be a Western initiative.<sup>201</sup> The adaptation of 'western consensus' by institutions such as the UN to advance policies and conditionality's that are optimal to the US 'war on terror' clearly illustrates the dependence international organizations have in the west and their priority is to serve their interests in Kenya's domestic politics and elections. consequently the same 'war on

<sup>199</sup> Stephen Brown, (2001) Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: how foreign donors help to keep Kenya's Daniel arap Moi in power *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 22, No 5 p734  
<sup>200</sup> Panafrican News Agency, Kenya: World Bank, IMF Suspend Financial Aid to Kenya 18 January 2001  
<sup>201</sup> Beth Elise Whitaker 2008 Reluctant Partners: Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Democracy in Kenya *International Studies Perspectives* (2008) 9, p258

terror' was the basis of these international organizations particularly the UN to follow the lead of the US in congratulating Kibaki before reverting after the flawed 2007 elections that were marred with violence.

Similarly, the same scenario is a repetition of the IMF endorsement of Moi's regime through two flawed general elections of 1992 and 1997.<sup>202</sup> By advocating for the SAPs and accepting minimal political concession made by Moi, they derailed Kenya's expedition for democracy but concentrated on the privatization aspect of the aid conditionality. This would ensure the West's economic interests are protected against nationalization and their debts were going to be 'paid' which in reality means continue to be used as leverage against the Kenyan government as has been the trend by the west especially the US. For this reason, International organizations act as tools for the west to ensure Kenya's domestic politics and elections are responsive to the interests of the west.

Stability being a key prerequisite of the West to articulate their interests as established earlier, international organizations have been a vital apparatus to the West's mission to retain and attain stability in Kenya. Despite the dire ramifications the process to achieve stability sometimes has on Kenya's political and social structures, international organization have continuously embraced western strategies that are short term in nature neglecting the core grievances that affect Kenya's domestic politics and elections. The power sharing agreement of 2008 was backed by the UN because of the stand taken by both the US and the UK as a compromise to have both of their candidates in the 2007 elections come to power as a short term solution to the post election violence that broke out. Through the UN Security Council, the West was able to

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<sup>202</sup> Carothers, Thomas. 'Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?'. *Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 1 (2009): p14

pressure ODM and PNU to accept the power sharing agreement to end the violence and restore stability.

#### **4.2.1 International organizations as biased observers for the west in Kenya's domestic politics and elections**

International organizations in Kenya also double up as international electoral observers in Kenya's elections and has been the new trend, which the West has been able to manipulate elections in Africa. Instead of being neutral observers and impartial arbitrators in the event of electoral malpractices, they articulate Western interests and even manipulate election outcomes by suppressing evidence of the atrocities carried out by the incumbent government depending on the needs of the west. As established by Brown earlier, international observers have been part of the West's plot to containing evidence of electoral malpractices as they did for Moi in the 1992 and 1997 general elections.<sup>203</sup> In Kenya in 2007, when international observers mysteriously withheld the results of its "quick count" of the vote, some suspected that it had done so at the behest of the U.S. government.<sup>204</sup> International organizations as electoral observers, act as gatekeepers of the West during elections to ensure Kenya's domestic politics and elections are responsive to their Masters interests.

Despite being on the ground and witnessing the violations committed during elections, international observers tend to wait for the verdict of the West on the elections. Irrespective of the evidence they may hold which may contradict Western perceptions and needs, the verdict determined by the West is their official taken stand. Statements issued by international organizations and electoral observers seem to originate from the same manuscript. The World

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<sup>203</sup> Op. cit Stephen Brown, (2001) p734

<sup>204</sup> Judith Kelley Election Observers and their Biases *Journal of Democracy* Volume 21, Number 3 July 2010 p164

Bank boss in Kenya Colin Bruce during the 2007 general elections, regardless of being in Kenya and having a contingence of electoral observers on the ground to witness and gather credible information on the occurrence of the elections, decided to follow the path the US had taken in congratulating Kibaki for his win.<sup>205</sup> In spite of the contradictory nature of the elections and the evidence they had in hand, they only recanted after the US did. Confirming African politics and elections are a reflection of Western powers interests through other international actors.

A previous experience by the Commonwealth Observer Group and the British government further confirms that the stand of their home countries, which is, usually the west determines their findings in Kenya's elections and not empirical evidence they themselves collect from the ground. Geisler reports that a few days after the elections, the Commonwealth Observer Group, issued a press release that expressed their concern with the Kenya Government's commitment to the process of multi-party democracy but later repudiated.<sup>206</sup> Not to contradict the British, the Commonwealth Observer Group issued a similar if not the same statement praising the 1997 general elections despite the tribal clashes and rigging as a 'giant step on the road to multi-party democracy'.

The bias characteristic of international observers in Kenya's domestic politics and elections is noticeably illustrated in the 2007 general elections where two western powers interests conflicted. The split preference of the West namely the US and UK between two presidential candidates of ODM and PNU. The United States support of the candidature of the incumbent Mwai Kibaki of PNU because his hands-off leadership and the support of the United Kingdom for Raila Odinga of ODM as a revolt against Kibaki's nationalization strategies did not only tear

<sup>205</sup> Stephen Brown 2009 Donor responses to the 2008 Kenyan crisis: Finally getting it right? *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, vol. 27, no. 3 (July 2009)

<sup>206</sup> G Geisler, 'Fair? What has fairness got to do with it? Vagaries of election observations and democratic standards', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31 (4), 1993 p 626.

apart the country along ethnic lines but also created a rift between international electoral observers and various international organizations.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) having been funded by the US was hesitant to disown the ECK results hence would contradict the United State's preference of the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki to stay in power.<sup>207</sup> On the other hand, the Commonwealth Observer Group remained quiet on the matter awaiting the action of the British government, which ended with the US and UK compromising on a power sharing agreement, which they later enforced to Kenya via the UN Security Council, European Union and IMF to push for a mediated solution. During the whole process after elections, no international electoral observer called for a forensic audit of the 2007 general elections and to date there has never emerged an official report from any international organization or international electoral observer on who won the elections. Instead, they continuously review the progress of the coalition government corroborating that the decision by the UK and US to enforce a power sharing agreement sealed the matter. This confirms that the activities of international organizations and international electoral observers in Kenya's domestic politics and elections are based on the articulation of Western interests.

To realist, hegemonies can afford to create international organizations because only they can finance them. Other states join the organization because they believe that an alliance with the most powerful state in the world is to their benefit. The realist theory best explains the control of international organizations and international electoral observers by the west to engage in Kenyan domestic politics and elections hence they are a creation by them to further their interests. As extensions of the hegemonic powers, the question morality extraneous hence their priority is to

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<sup>207</sup> Kiai, M. 2008. The Crisis in Kenya. *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 3: 162-168.

their home states national interests who create and fund them. To the West, International Organizations such as the Bretton Wood institutions and international Electoral Observers such as the Commonwealth Observer Group, EU are only tools to further Western governments' interests even if it means neglecting undemocratic practices in Kenya's politics and elections of which they are mandated to do.

#### **4.3 Impact of external actors in Kenya's domestic politics and elections**

With Kenya being geographically strategic for the West's diplomatic, economic and military interests, their involvement has been enormous. In the face of anti-regime popular mobilization, the West's primary concern appeared to be the avoidance of any path that could lead to a breakdown of the political and economic order, even if this meant legitimizing and prolonging the regime's authoritarian rule to attain their self interests at the expense of Kenyans democratic rights. Other than the leaders who are Western government cronies, Kenyan citizens withstand dire consequences of autocracies sustained and maintained by the West.

At the onset of multi-party general elections, the west fostered undemocratic trends in Kenya that have continued to plague Kenya's political, economic and social spheres to date all to the national interests of the West. The emphasis of the electoral date other than the actual purpose elections, which is self-determination by Kenyan citizens to elect their own preferred leaders, has been the schema of the West to select their ideal leaders. Elections in Kenya during the 1992, 1997 and 2007 have taken place under grossly sub-optimal conditions under the determination of West to see leaders who would articulate their national interest retain power. During the 1992 general elections, the US Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen at the time had insisted that



the elections be held without delay.<sup>208</sup> This, as established by the focus group, ensured that Moi remained in power despite his autocratic rule confirming that the elections were responsive to Western interests and not the actual participants who are the Kenyan constituents they ought to serve.

As a result electoral malpractices have gained a strong footing in Kenya's general elections and consequently vote rigging, double registration, intimidation of the opposition, and use of the provincial administration to propagate conditions conducive for the incumbent defectively retain have become customary practices in Kenyan elections. Hence, it is this conditions that the West exploits since they guarantee continuity and by extension stability for them to articulate their National interests. For this reason, they have adopted various forms of feeble reasoning to legitimize deeply flawed elections. The two most common clichés are 'the elections were better than last time' and 'it was a step in the right direction'.<sup>209</sup> Yet Kenyans have lost lives, property and their dignity just for the West to advance their National interests.

The West deliberately suppresses evidence of atrocities committed by autocratic leaders in Kenya in their quest to retain power during elections and deprive Kenyans of the knowledge and proof that may lead to positive recourse if constructively acted upon. This ensures their favored incumbent president retains power and continues to advance policies and promote optimal conditions that are complimentary to their National interests. In the event of the 1997 elections, Brown states that 'donors deliberately suppressed evidence that KANU had not legitimately won

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<sup>208</sup> H J Cohen, 'US policy and current events in Kenya, Malawi and Somalia', Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, 19 June 1992, *US Department of State Dispatch*, 3 (26), 23 June 1992, p 520

<sup>209</sup> Commonwealth Observer Group, *The Presidential, Parliamentary and Civic Elections in Kenya, 29 December 1992*, London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1993, p 40.

a majority in parliament'.<sup>210</sup> This extended Moi's reign by five more years to the peril of Kenyans who had undergone brutal dictatorship for 14 years under his regime, characterized by political, economic and social retardation at the cost of articulating Western governments National interests, particularly those of the US and UK that supported and aided his autocracy. This confirms that Kenya's domestic politics and elections have been responsive to Western interests.

Though not marred by any substantial electoral malpractices, the 2002 general elections the first multi-party elections to be peaceful, but still had western interests entrenched in them which later played out against the incumbent in the 2007 general elections. Kibaki's support by the US was based on conditionality for his support on the 'war on terror' and was demonstrated by his attempt to enact the Anti Terrorism Bill.<sup>211</sup> As illustrated by the focus group, the bill was and is perceived to stereotype against Muslims and has been globally rejected Muslim faithful. These cost Kibaki majority of the Muslim support, which swayed towards his rival camp ODM in the 2007 general elections but was he content to have the support of the United States, which retained him in power despite all odds. This unmistakably shows that Kenya's domestic politics are responsive to Western interests, hence for Kibaki to neglect the calls of his Muslim constituents not to table the Bill, illustrates the West's power over Kenya's domestic politics and elections.

The similarly, the 2007 general elections were marred with violence and various electoral malpractices despite the presence of copious international electoral observers from a range of international organizations, no single report has ever emerged to give a proper account of who

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<sup>210</sup> Stephen Brown, (2001) Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: how foreign donors help to keep Kenya's Daniel arap Moi in power *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 22, No 5 p734

<sup>211</sup> Seesemann, Rudiger. (2005) East African Muslims After 9/11. Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers, No. 3, Bayreuth: Institut für Afrikastudien & Kulturwissenschaftliches.

rightfully won the elections. Kenyans are only left to speculate on who their rightful leader as they are burdened with the cost of an inflated cabinet of 60 ministers to accommodate both ODM and PNU. As long as the UK and US had agreed on a power sharing agreement, no forensic audit was attempted or a question of a re-run surfaced from any international organization.<sup>212</sup> Instead, Kenyans are forced to live with an undemocratic government that has no clear mandate from its citizens but a sanctioned compromise between the United States of America and the United Kingdom, via international organizations such as the United Nations reducing Kenyan elections to a ceremonial function that only responds to Western interests.

Evidently the quest for the West to determine who gets into power in the oncoming 2013 general elections has began with the US striking out the options of having some candidates in the ballot box. Despite their popularity among Kenyans in their respective regional factions, William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta are not viable candidates to the US. Hilary Clinton's visit to Kenya to issue warnings of the consequences that may befall Kenya if the citizens elect the 'ICC duo' clearly illustrates the west has preferred candidate in the 2013 general elections and two are not part of the options.<sup>213</sup> However, it may be argued that the US is advocating for justice for the post election victims, who they were partly to blame, but matters pertaining domestic elections should be taken to be sovereign and left for the citizens to decide. Hence, the will of the Kenyan people should outweigh the foreign interests but in reality the West's interests supersede the aspirations and rights of Kenyan though it is unethical. To the realist school of thought, the pursuit of National interests is the ultimate purpose of a State and the only moral/ethical obligations the US is accountable for are of its citizens.

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<sup>212</sup> ANALYSIS OF THE POWER-SHARING AGREEMENT IN KENYA FOLLOWING THE POLITICAL CRISIS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 27/12/2007 Saturday, 19 April 2008 16:18 <http://www.khilafah.com/index.php/analysis/africa/2554>

<sup>213</sup> Seecloud on US Economic and Political Influence in Kenya: Hillary Clinton Bulldozing Kenyan Politicians; Uhuru & Ruto <http://seeclouds.com>

To a power sharing agreement that was only possible and viable since it was a compromise between the US and UK, the coalition government has been a perplexing and complicated encounter for both the leadership and the citizenry. As to who is the overall authority and the constitutional limbo it has created in terms of resolving political stalemates that have continuously dragged and slowed down the decision making process, Kenya's governmental processes have increased in bureaucracies' unless there is an unanimous consensus by both factions of the coalition government. The idea of a coalition government only resolved short-term grievances of two western backed leaders to get to power, restore stability for the West, and left out the core issues that continue to plague the countries from the inception of multi-party elections in 1992.<sup>214</sup> Since 1991, approximately 3,000 Kenyans have been killed and hundreds of thousands driven from their homes in a series of violent incidents. While the commonly used term "ethnic clashes" suggests reciprocal conflict based on "tribal" animosity, it belies the overall one-sided source of the violence in the event of general elections.

The more than 1000 deaths that occurred as an aftermath of 2007 general elections can be blamed on the two Western powers that divided the country along ethnic lines by supporting tribal chiefdoms that had emerged during the campaign. The West's; US and UK's primary concern was to get their preferred candidate to power as for the US was more of retaining the incumbent.<sup>215</sup> The consequences that befell Kenyans because of the ethnic polarization fostered by them were acceptable until it started to affect their National interests due to the instability that rocked the country. In spite of Kenyans having lost their lives, property and some being internally displaced even to date, the West resumed to a business as usual routine after the

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<sup>214</sup> Axel Harneit-Sievers and Ralph-Michael Peters 2008 *Kenya's 2007 general election and its aftershocks Afrika Spectrum 43 (2008)* © 2008 GIGA Institute of African Affairs, Hamburg p133

<sup>215</sup> Op., cit Harneit-Sievers and Ralph-Michael Peters (2008) p140

formation of the coalition government. Hence to the US and UK they had no moral obligations towards the victims of the post election violence but to their Nationals in who they pursue their interests while manipulating Kenya's domestic politics and elections to conform to their interests and at times use international organizations to facilitate the same.

To realists, the western government actions to neglect the long term strategies that would have positive lasting implications to Kenya's democracy and instead impose short-term ones that advance their interests is a justified course of action despite the moral or ethic obligations that they may be presumed to have to Kenyans. To realists' school of thought only domestic implications and ethical obligations of the state pursuing its interests matter. Western governments' activities in advancing their national interests that undermine Kenya's quest of democracy is an acceptable norm to realist hence their state-centric approach to international relations. The US and UK activities in Kenya evidently demonstrate the west's' lack of moral obligations to Kenyans in their pursuit of national interests.

#### 4.4 Conclusion

Kenya's domestic elections and politics have been reflection of western interest because it is the key strategic country in East and Central Africa with many vital interests for western powers. The west has knowingly endorsed unfair elections, including suppressing evidence of their illegitimacy and repeatedly undermined domestic efforts to secure far-reaching political reforms, which were a prerequisite for a full transition to democracy. In the face of anti-regime popular mobilization, the West's' primary concern appear to be the avoidance of any path that could lead to a breakdown of the political and economic order, even if this meant legitimizing and prolonging the regime's authoritarian rule. This has seen the manipulation of Kenya's political landscape by the west directly or indirectly through international organizations to attain their

interests. As a result, they continue to perpetuate autocratic rule while simultaneously providing legitimacy via flawed elections. Hence the study confirms the hypothesis that African politics and elections are a reflection of Western powers interests through other international act.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

#### 5.0 Introduction

This chapter gives a brief review of the findings the research was set out to do which was to evaluate the presence of international actors in Africa's domestic politics and elections drawing examples from Kenya, which was the case study, and other countries reviewed in previous chapters. Hence, Kenya has seen the manipulation of its domestic politics and elections as a reflection of Western power interests through other international actors.

#### 5.1 Summary of Findings

The involvement of international actors in Africa's political, social, cultural and economic realm has gradually increased over the ages even after independence of African states, though the claims of sovereignty and calls for non-interference among African leaders remain adamant. It is argued that the same leaders auction Africa's resources to the 'interferes' by inviting them by assenting to stringent treaties, charters, accords and resolutions without the consideration of the citizenry but their own selfish interests to gain financial, reputational or international extol which is determined by foreign standards. This in turn has handed over Africa's destiny to the will of the West who are driven on a profitability schema or a realist perspective of actors having selfish pursuit of their National interest in the international relations and not Africa's welfare.

To achieve and protect their interest, these international actors have managed to assert themselves in Africa's political and electoral processes to impose or strategically place leaders standards and policies that will be optimal to their operations and agenda. These has seen the demonization and topple of extreme pan-Africanized leaders such Patrice Lumumba, Mugabe

and the late Gbagbo and embracement of western friendly dictators such as Museveni, Paul Biya, the late Omari Bongo and the controversial policies such as Strategic Adjustment Plans and Anti-Terrorism legislation. The notion of sovereignty has been repeatedly used and abused by despotic leaders as a shield against 'foreign interference' while at the same time perpetrating untold abuses and crimes against their own citizen leaving the international actors to embrace their opposition in the pretext to restore 'democracy' but it's to retain optimal conditions for their operations.

It is evident from the findings, that the interests of the West especially Britain and US in Kenya determine and validate the political and electoral outcomes depending on their interests. Thus, leaders who wield power in Kenya, acquire it from the citizens through elections but with the consent of the West. The two presidents that have served after the inception of the multi-party democracy have had western governments backing as a priority. In turn, they reciprocate by advancing western interests instead of those of the constituents that elected them hence Kenya's domestic politics and elections become a reflection of western interests.

The involvement of western governments in Kenya's domestic politics and elections has a negative impact on democracy hence it deprives the Kenyan citizens of the opportunity to genuinely elect their preferred leaders and instead vote for preferred selected leaders by the west in their general elections. The Kenyan elections have become a formality to endorse leaders that articulate western interests even if the domestically preferred leader might be popular though at times as in the case of the 2002 elections the Western governments' preferred presidential candidate concurred with the domestic interest.

The 'war on terror' has come to define the political landscape in Africa, with leaders who embrace or join in the war attain financial and political favors' or at times both depending on



how much the US values their cooperation. Leaders such Museveni in Uganda enjoy the US full political and financial support being among the first African countries to embrace the anti-terrorism bill in 2002.<sup>216</sup> Despite his tyrannical reign in Uganda, which is been characterized by turning Uganda into a police State and suppression of any form of opposition, Museveni remains a key ally of the US and they continue to turn a blind eye on his tyranny as long as he continues to support the 'war on terror'.

In countries where Western powers have countervailing economic or strategic interests at stake, autocratic governments may ward off external demands for democracy by casting themselves and regime stability as the best means of protecting those interests. Thus, the U.S. and other Western powers have exerted little democratizing pressure on major energy producing states such as Egypt that are deemed strategically important. In such cases, external democratizing pressure is likely to be limited. Efforts to take punitive action are likely to divide Western governments, thereby diluting the effectiveness of those efforts.<sup>217</sup>

The West would advocate for stability under an autocrat in Kenya than a democracy that they are uncertain of. This is explained by their backing and recognition by the West of the three out of four elections in Kenya, which were marred by violence and electoral malpractices. The call for peace is the most conspicuous statement in the utterances of the west on the eve of elections, which they tend to over emphasize other than the call of free and fair elections in Kenya. In most cases, electoral financial assistance in Kenya after the 2008 post election violence has been directed to peace initiatives rather than democracy and voter education. Hence, the west only

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<sup>216</sup> Lauren Ploch 2010 *Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response* Congressional Research Service November 3, 2010 p.61

<sup>217</sup> Crawford, Gordon. 2001. *Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis of Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality*. New York: Palgrave p211-227

intervenes in Kenya's domestic politics at the onset of violence and not during electoral malpractices in which they place observers. In which they have often fostered short-term solutions to restore stability, which is prerequisite for their articulation of National interests. For the West, the short-term solution to restore peace and stability is always the effective strategy for them and their other than prolonged long-term solutions, which would foster democracy in Kenya and prevent the reoccurrence of electoral malpractices. Over the four general elections that have taken place from 1992, the US and UK have been keen in ensuring stability remains even if it meant recognizing flawed elections and backing ruthless but strong founded leaders such as Moi who could facilitate optimal conditions for their interests by brutally thwarting any attempt to cause instability.

Only the threat of civil war that may affect optimal conditions for their interests namely stability would beckon them to act. Even then, their actions are minimal compared to their potential ability to enact long-term solutions such as a repeat of elections as in the case of 1992, 1997 and 2007 elections. Even in the latter where their interests were threatened, a short term consensus of power sharing was resolved between two hegemonic powers to restore stability and not long-term solutions that would resolve crucial matters to Kenya such as the IDP situation and empowerment of its the citizens.

The 2008 Kenyan crisis, alongside the concurrent case of Zimbabwe, produces a dangerous new precedent for other countries. An incumbent government or an opposition party unwilling to accept that it actually lost an election can foment enough violence to ensure that, with the blessing of the international community, it can retain or obtain a share of power, with no penalty for any abuses committed during the campaign period or for any fraudulent practices related to the tallying of votes. If this elite-pact model holds, the donors' overarching desire for stability

will trump the basic tenets of democracy, whereby the electorate determines who will form the government through the ballot box following predetermined procedures. Thus, in 'finally getting it right' in Kenya, donors chose a path that might unwittingly hamper democracy and promote conflict that is more violent in the future, both in Kenya and elsewhere.

International organizations in Kenya have continuously turned a blind eye on undemocratic electoral practices that complement the West's self-interest. Hence are extensions of Western governments and might even be taken as departments of the West since at times they over step their mandate by violating their own restrictions to pursue western interests. They have continuously used foreign aid in Africa to influence political changes preferred by the West by funding projects of leaders embracing policies and strategies optimal to western governments' interests.

The pressure by UNCTC for Kibaki to enact the Terrorism Bill into Kenya's legislations shows international organizations actions to be a Western initiative. The adaptation of 'western consensus' by institutions such as the UN to advance policies and conditionality's that are optimal to the US 'war on terror' clearly illustrates the dependence international organizations have to the west and their priority is to serve their interests in Kenya's domestic politics and elections.

International organizations in Kenya also double up as international electoral observers in Kenya's elections and has been the new trend, which the West has been able to manipulate elections in Africa. Instead of being neutral observers and impartial arbitrators in the event of electoral malpractices, they articulate Western interests and even manipulate election outcomes by suppressing evidence of the atrocities carried out by the incumbent government depending on the needs of the west.

## 5.2 Recommendations

The current emphasis on counterterrorism above all else (including democracy) is complicating relations with one-time allies and undermining their support at home, bringing into question future cooperation on a range of issues. In countries like Kenya, where moderate forces predominate and the United States continues to get some positive ratings, there is still a chance to change course. A renewed emphasis on democracy promotion would recognize the legitimate concerns of these populations and take away the message that American interests are more important. Suspicion of U.S. motivations would likely decline, thus paving the way for the identification and pursuit of common interests.

By emphasizing democracy and recognizing domestic political concerns, the United States may be surprised at the level of cooperation it receives on various issues, including perhaps counterterrorism. Leaders in these countries can no longer force their policies through rubber stamp legislatures; policymaking now involves consensus building among civil society, the media, and elected representatives. U.S. officials must engage all of these groups if they want to build support for their proposals. This involves collaboration and compromise, and at times stepping back altogether. Once people are given the opportunity to build consensus around their own ideas, it is possible that the resulting policies will resemble U.S. preferences Kenya also being a victim of terrorism.

We have argued that in democratization, information on election quality is an important but neglected variable. For leaders to have an incentive to hold clean elections, there must be an informational mechanism that signals the quality of the election to the public and the world. Given credible information about the quality of elections, there must also be domestic or internationally generated costs for those leaders revealed to be cheaters. If information is timely

provided and costs are conditioned on this information, governments have greater incentive to hold clean elections. Hence their suppression of evidence by international organizations and international electoral observers only leads to creation of autocracies.

Kenya has to strengthen its foreign policy and be more aggressive while engaging with other international actors by pursuing her national interests instead of reflecting the west's. Its strategic attributes should be used as leverage by her to attain her National interests through bargaining and not the other way round. Hence, Kenya should strive to be partners while engaging with other international actors while advancing her interests and those of her citizens instead of being only a means to achieve Western interests.

### **5.3 Conclusion**

Africa's domestic politics and elections have been responsive to western interests from independence and its high time African states enter into international relations as equal actors and not as victims of other international actors by protecting their agenda, sovereignty and politics against all forms of interference, to become determinants of their future and not puppets. This can only be achieved if African leaders concentrate and prioritize in domestic interests and those of its citizens from whom they should obtain the mandate and legitimate power from instead of the western interests.

## **APPENDIX**

### **Questions asked to the Focus Group**

1. What are the western interests in Kenyan elections and politics?
2. Who are the western actors in Kenyan elections and politics
3. What are the actors doing in Kenyan politics and elections
4. What has been the repercussions in Kenyan politics and elections
5. Has there been any positive or negative inputs, highlight some
6. Do you think that as a country we can be able to make these decisions without the western actors influence
7. Do you think the western actors have played a role in the political arenas
8. How have these interests affected Kenyan politics
9. State ways in which the indulgence of western interests /actors in the Kenyan political arena influenced decision making
10. Do you think the west is concerned over who leads the country.
11. Do you think that decision making lies heavily on western affiliations

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