

University of Nairobi

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

A Critical Analysis of UN Peacekeeping: The Case of Sierra Leone, 1995-2005.

David Simiyu/Wambulwa,

R50/8549/2004

**A Project Submitted in partial fulfillment for the Award of the degree of
Master of Arts (M.A) in International Studies, Institute of Diplomacy and
International Studies, University of Nairobi.**

November 2012

University of NAIROBI Library



0389626 3

ind 560-77

Afr

JZ

6374

1135

C-2

Declaration


This project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

David Simiyu Wambulwa

Signed  Date 08th November 2012

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

Prof. Makumi Mwagiru

Signed  Date 9/11/12

Dedication

To God almighty, you made everything possible,

To my earthly father Joseph, from whom I learnt never to give up on life,

**To my mother Marciana Nasambu Wambulwa, your unfailing, unsullied love and maternal care
grew me and gave me hope and strength.**

Acknowledgement

This work is the culmination of the input and support of various people whose invaluable contributions I wish to recognize. First of all I acknowledge the time attention and painstaking detail Prof. Makumi Mwangi took in ensuring that my contribution to scholarly debate and discourse is worthwhile.

His supervision and advice has brought to life this dissertation and most credit goes to him. I also wish to acknowledge IDIS teaching and non-teaching staff especially Patrick Maluki, Prof Kithure Kindiki, Dr. Robert Mudida, Anita Kiamba, and Mina for their skills, knowledge and encouragement. To my classmates Emmanuel, Patrick, Gitonga, Caroline, Bongi, Judy, Odera and Rose, you were good companions and how I would have loved to have graduated with you.

I wish to acknowledge the support of my family, Mum, brothers, Martin and Emmanuel, sisters Linnet, Dorine, Faith and Angela, uncles Maurice, Pius, for your moral support and financial contributions. I also recognize the motivation given to me by Joy my daughter and nephews Brian and Ruth.

Table of Contents

Declaration	ii
Dedication	iii
Acknowledgement	iv
Table of contents	v
Abbreviations	ix
Abstract	xi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY	
1.0 Introduction.....	1
1.1 Statement of the Research Problem.....	2
1.3 Objectives of the Study	3
1.4 Literature Review.	4
1.4.1 Defining Peacekeeping.	4
1.4.2 Peacekeeping in International Law.	5
1.4.3 State Sovereignty and Non-Intervention.....	6
1.4.4 Impartiality and Non-Use of Force.	7
1.4.5 Contemporary Peacekeeping.	8
1.4.6 Characteristics of Peacekeeping.....	10
1.4.7 Peacekeeping in Practice: Impasse and Inaction.	11
1.4.8 Peacekeeping in Africa.	11
1.4.9 Humanitarian Intervention.....	11
1.4.10 Sierra Leone.....	13
1.4.11 Evaluating Challenges Facing the UN.....	13
1.4.12 Justification of the Study.	14

1.5 Theoretical Framework	14
1.6 Hypotheses	16
1.7 Research Methodology.....	16
1.8 Chapter Outline.....	16
CHAPTER TWO: PEACEKEEPING: FROM CONCEPT TO PRACTICE	
2.0 Introduction.....	18
2.1 The Rationale for Peacekeeping.....	19
2.2 The Character of a Peacekeeping Operation.....	20
2.2.1 Consent of the Parties.....	20
2.2.2 Use of Force.....	21
2.2.3 Impartiality.....	22
2.3 The Changing Face of UN Peacekeeping.....	23
2.4 Emerging Themes in Peacekeeping.....	26
2.4.1 Human Security and Peace.....	26
2.4.2 State Sovereignty.....	27
2.4.3 Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Enforcement.....	28
2.4.4 Alternative Approaches to UN Peacekeeping.....	29
2.5 Conditions for Instituting a Peacekeeping Operation.....	32
2.6 Challenges to UN Peacekeeping.....	34
2.7 Conclusion.....	36
CHAPTER THREE: THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT.	
3.0 Introduction.....	38
3.1 The Character of the Post-Colonial State.....	38
3.2 The Sierra Leone Context.....	39
3.2.1 Patron-Clientelism.....	42

3.2.2 Decline in Economic Development.....	43
3.2.3 Militarization of Politics	45
3.2.4 The Role of Civil Society and Student Groups	47
3.2.5 Unemployed Youth and the Culture of Violence.....	49
3.2.6 The Revolutionary United Front	49
3.3 The Role of Diamonds in the Conflict.....	51
3.4 Private Military Companies.....	53
3.5 ECOMOG and the Peace Effort.....	53
3.6 Impact of the Sierra Leone Conflict.....	55
3.7 Conclusion.....	56
 CHAPTER FOUR: A CASE STUDY OF UN PEACEKEEPING IN SIERRA LEONE	
4.0 Introduction	58
4.1 Background to UN Presence.....	58
4.2 Initial UN Presence.....	60
4.3 Establishment of UNAMSIL	61
4.4 The Character and Mandate of UNAMSIL	61
4.5 Deployment and Initial Challenges	62
4.6 UNAMSIL Renewal and Task Performance	63
4.6.1 Provision of Security.....	64
4.6.2 Security Sector Reform and Britain’s Impact.....	64
4.6.3 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.....	65
4.6.4 Electoral Assistance	66
4.6.6 Justice and Reconciliation	67
4.6.7 Economic and Social Development	68
4.7 Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement?.....	69

4.8 An Assessment of UN Intervention.....	70
4.9 An Assessment of UN Performance.....	71
4.9.1 Peace and Security.....	72
4.9.2 Peacebuilding.....	73
4.9.2.1 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.....	74
4.9.2.2 Democratization and the Rule of Law.....	75
4.9.2.3 Statebuilding and Economic Development.....	76
4.10 Challenges and key Learning Points.....	78
4.11 Conclusion.....	79
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS.....	80
Bibliography.....	84

Abbreviations

AFRC-Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

APC-All Peoples' Congress

AU-African Union

CDF-Civil Defence Forces

DDR-Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DPKO-The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

ECOMOG-ECOWAS' Monitoring Group

ECOWAS-Economic Community of West African States

EO-Executive Outcomes

GAF-Guinea Armed Forces

GoSL-Government of Sierra Leone

IRCSL- Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone

MARWOPNET- Mano River Union Peace Network

NCDDR-National Committee for DDR

NCRRR-National Committee for Relief, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation

NPFL-National Patriotic Front, Liberia

NPRC-National Provisional Ruling Council

ONUC-United Nations Operations in Congo

ROE-Rules of Engagement

RUF-Revolutionary United Front

SLA-Sierra Leone Army

SLPP-Sierra Leone Peoples' Party

SLP-Sierra Leone Police

SRSG-Special Representative of the Secretary General (of the UN)

TRC-Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UN-United Nations

UNAMSIL-UN Mission in Sierra Leone

UNDOF –UN Disengagement Observer Force

UNEF-UN Emergency Force

UNFICYP-UN Force in Cyprus

UNMOGIP-UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

UNOGIL-UN Observer Group in Lebanon

UNTAG-UN Transition Group in Namibia

UNTSO-UN Truce Supervision Organization

WANEP-West African Network for Peacebuilding

Abstract

This study investigates the role of UN Peacekeeping in conflict management and peace building and examines the achievement of UNAMSIL in maintaining international peace and security in Sierra Leone. It proceeds from the view that in light of added responsibilities to peacekeeping especially after the end of the Cold War, and the increasing use of peacekeeping to solve internal conflicts, there is a need for a re-evaluation of the UN's peacekeeping function since it is no longer a short term observer mission but more of a long term peace builder. The study argues that the criteria for analyzing peacekeeping success should incorporate this expanded nature of UN peacekeeping. It uses the Sierra Leone case study as this African example sought to address the near collapse of the Sierra Leone state which led to widespread human suffering. This Sierra Leone intervention is notable as it preceded UN failures in Somalia and Rwanda which bore similarities in terms of state collapse. The lack of sufficient literature on this intervention is also a motivation in carrying out this study.

The study makes several observations the first of which is that the reconceptualisation of state sovereignty and international peace and security to incorporate norms of human security and sustain peace had a bearing on the expanded nature and longevity of peacekeeping missions. Secondly and upon an examination of the Sierra Leone conflict the study observes that the conflict was deep seated and fuelled by regimes' self-perpetuation and aggrandizement schemes that ignored citizens' entitlement to proper government and better life. Realistic interests lay at the internationalization of the conflict as individuals, companies and states sought economic gain from diamonds.

The eventual UN intervention provided relief to a state that had failed to secure its perpetuation in the system of states. The study, in examining this third party involvement, seeks to (dis)prove the hypothesis that peacekeeping does play a major role in achieving sustainable peace and in achieving lasting peace. The study concludes that though the UN succeeded in conflict management and peace building in Sierra Leone, it recognizes that this intervention was at times chaotic and had to reinvent itself in the face of poor resource base and unfavorable hostile environment and that peacekeeping alone is not the answer to all situations of conflict.

Chapter One

Introduction to the Study

1.0 Introduction

The increased prevalence of internal conflicts that have bedeviled the African continent has become a cause of concern not only to the affected countries themselves but also to the wider international community. Such conflicts have brought with them widespread human suffering, retarded Africa's developmental agenda, created ripple conflict effects in other countries and emerged as threats to regional and international peace and security¹. The term complex political emergency (CPE) was coined to describe the proliferation of major crises, the majority being intra-state conflicts, which emerged after the cold war.²

CPE describes such conflicts, prevalent on the continent as multi-causal, requiring a multi-dimensional international response, including a combination of military intervention, peacekeeping and peace support operations, humanitarian relief programmes and high level political intervention and diplomacy. Consequently, attempts to solve these conflicts have thrust into the limelight the efficacy and relevance of peacekeeping in such endeavors. More so, Africa has witnessed the deployment of numerous UN peacekeeping operations making it (peacekeeping) the foremost conflict management and resolution mechanism in use. The sheer number and complexity of UN peacekeeping missions have occasioned widespread debate on how and when the UN should use force; on what should be the mandate of such missions and how it should be executed; using which resources, and on the overall success or

¹ Francis J.D., (et al), *Dangers of Co-Deployment: UN Co-operative Peacekeeping in Africa*, (Hampshire: Ashgate publishing Limited, 2005),p 1.

²Ibid, p 83. See also Neethling T., "Limitations of UN Peacekeeping Operations where Conflict did not Result in Victory for Any Side: Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone," in *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military studies* Vol. 1. No. 2.

perceived failures and the challenges faced. This study seeks to investigate the role of United Nations peacekeeping in the management of conflict with a close examination of Sierra Leone from 1995 to 2005. More specifically, it critically examines UN's response to the conflict in Sierra Leone, the performance of UNAMSIL in executing its mandate while analyzing the footprints of this UN involvement.

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

The use of peacekeeping to manage conflicts in the international system and especially Africa has grown since the end of the Cold War. While most peacekeeping missions were focused primarily on the physical separation of the opposing sides, more recent missions have increasingly come to focus on the broader elements of developing peace, alleviating human suffering and ensuring the non- recurrence of the conflict. Most of the missions since the end of the cold war have been deployed to civil war situations either to stop ongoing conflict or to help enforce a cease fire or a negotiated settlement and to address the root cause of the conflict in order to indulge in peacebuilding. Peacekeeping could no longer be evaluated on the basis of how it managed to separate adversaries or observe a ceasefire.

Considerable scholarly attention has centered on defining what it means for a peacekeeping mission to be successful. The debate asks whether peacekeeping can be labeled as "successful", based solely on its mission mandate, or the achievement of post-civil war peace.³ The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was such venture whose

³See Wright M. Thorn, (et al), "Staying the Course: Assessing the Durability of Peacekeeping operations," in *Journal of Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 127-147.

mandate was not just to halt hostilities and oversee the successful implementation of a ceasefire agreement but also to foster peace, democracy and development in Sierra Leone.⁴

In examining UNAMSIL, this study will focus on the question of whether peace keeping in Sierra Leone was successful in helping to maintain a durable peace especially in light of the new responsibilities bestowed on it that includes elements of peacemaking. The study will examine both the achievements of UNAMSIL's mission mandate and in terms of the degree to which the institutions supported and established by the mission were able to function. The success or otherwise of UNAMSIL will be qualified upon the assessment of the above variables together with the variables of availability of material resources for such missions and political good will.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study are to:

- assess the role of UN peacekeeping in conflict management and peacebuilding with direct focus on the Sierra Leone conflict.
- analyze the success and/or failure of peacekeeping as a conflict management tool,
- identify the challenges faced by peace keepers in the execution of their mandate.

⁴See Malan Mark (et al), *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight*, (Johannesburg: Institute for Security Studies, 2007). Monograph Series. No. 68, p. 10.

1.4 Literature Review

1.4.1 Defining Peacekeeping

The United Nations has traditionally defined peacekeeping as “missions involving military personnel but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.”⁵ Peacekeeping is widely regarded as a mechanism created to respond to inter-state conflicts but may also be employed in situations of internal upheavals that threaten not only national but also international peace and security. This expanded definition takes cognizance of the fact that there has been continued globalization of domestic and international politics especially in conflict situations.⁶

A more comprehensive definition is given by the University of Peace.⁷ In its opinion peacekeeping is the maintenance of public security, civil services, and ceasefire agreements in war and conflict zones by UN or regional military, police and civilian forces with the consent of the nation- state on whose territory these forces are deployed. Lester Pearson, one of the originators of the concept of peacekeeping, aptly describes it as an intermediary technique between “merely passing resolutions and actually fighting”⁸.

Of the various definitions of the concept, the most apt is captured in the Brahimi Report which avers that peacekeeping missions must go beyond the achievement of military victory and towards the more complex goal of establishing an environment conducive to peace

⁵See United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 2nd Ed, (New York: United Nations, 1990), p 4.

⁶See Mwangi M., “Introduction,” in, Mwangi M., (Ed), *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2004), p 1.

⁷University of Peace, *A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict studies*, 2nd ed., (Geneva, 2005), P 61.

⁸Dewitt D., (et al), *Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Security*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993), p 299.

building activities⁹. This expanded definition takes into account the expanded nature of peacekeeping operations while moving away from the classical view peacekeeping being essentially a lightly armed observer mission interpositioned between two warring states and the observation of a cease fire.

1.4.2 Peacekeeping in International Law

In an international system where the principal actors are states, it is evident that the instruments of force are in the sole custody of states that must approve its use by a supranational entity. The UN Charter gives meaning to the idea of peacekeeping. Though no reference to the concept is found in the Charter, various provisions have been interpreted liberally to give muscle to peacekeeping. It has however been argued by Findlay that placing peacekeeping in the UN Charter context automatically robs it of its flexibility and adaptability, which has made it a vital and pragmatic tool in maintaining international peace and security.¹⁰

The sections of the Charter most relevant to peacekeeping are Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. Chapter VI allows for the Security Council to recommend peaceful measures to resolve disputes through such means as “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement.”¹¹ The use of force under Chapter VI is limited to self defense whereas the use of military force by the UN for enforcement measures is seen as deriving its legality from Chapter VII. Chapter VII mandates the Security Council to authorize coercive measures to counter threats to and breaches of international peace and

⁹United Nations Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/503-S/2000/809), 21 August 2000. Popularly known as the Brahimi Report and hereinafter referred to as “The Brahimi Report.”

¹⁰Findlay T., *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, (New York: Oxford University Press 2002), p 4.

¹¹Jeong H., *Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction*(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing,2000),pp120-129. Also visit the UN Charter at <<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter>>

security as well as acts of aggression.¹² This Chapter therefore authorizes the use of force beyond self defense and towards enforcement purposes. Chapter VIII relates to co-operative security between the UN and regional organizations in responding to regional peace and security problems. It gives the framework within which regional organizations, working alone or in conjunction with other regional groupings or with the UN address regional threats to peace and security.

An Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of July 1962 confirmed the Security Council of the UN as the pre-eminent custodian of peace and security when it stated that an entity (a state or the UN) may exercise “belligerent rights” when authorized to do so by the Security Council acting under chapter VII.¹³ Dag Hammarskjöld interpreted the Charter to come up with the famous phrase “Chapter six-and-a-half” argument in referring to and advocating for peacekeeping operations. According to him, peacekeeping lay between voluntarism and compulsion and that peacekeeping can be mandated under Article 40 of Chapter VII regarding “provisional measures” that could be taken prior to the Security Council taking more drastic enforcement measures under Article 39.¹⁴

1.4.3 State Sovereignty and Non-Intervention

The principles of non-interference and state sovereignty as advanced by Article 1(3) of the Charter have proved particularly controversial regarding interventions justified on humanitarian or human rights grounds especially considering that such operations have assumed increasing prominence during the post Cold-War era .These Westphalian edicts have highlighted tensions with the principles of individual human rights¹⁵ as well as other

¹²Findlay T., *The use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, op cit. p 1.

¹³See Coloumbis T. A., (et al). *Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice*, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1987, p 42.

¹⁴ibid.

¹⁵ Lucas G., “From *jus ad bellum* to *jus ad pacem*,”in, Chatterjee D., Scheid D., (Eds), *Ethics and Foreign Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp 68-82.

fundamental UN pronouncements on personal liberties and the responsibility of world society to guarantee human security.

The concerns of states on sovereignty and non-intervention hampered the maintenance of international peace and security especially during the Cold War and are still cited by states for refusal to allow UN staff in conflict situations.¹⁶ This has brought about the idea of consent of parties to a conflict viewed as a key ingredient to the success of any peacekeeping mission.¹⁷ Diehl argues that any attempt to station troops without the permission of a host country would inevitably precipitate a military confrontation which will not augur well with the mission mandate.¹⁸ The classical Westphalian state has however increasingly been eroded by new approaches to the definition of conflict, the redefinition of international peace and security and the increasing use of peacekeeping as an effective tool at managing conflict and alleviating human suffering.

1.4.4 Impartiality and Non- Use of Force

Conroy argues that peacekeeping is highly problematic to implement when trying to maintain the impartiality of UN forces especially when such impartiality is likely to be abused by some parties to a conflict. Furthermore, the use of coercion on one of the parties involves the risk of being drawn into the conflict or being accused of partiality by stepping out of peacekeeping into the muddy world of war making¹⁹.

Initially, impartiality required peacekeepers maintain a moral high ground and not to favor either party to a conflict. This was the idea behind inter-positioning themselves between

¹⁶ Whitaker J. D., *United Nations in Action* (London: University of London Press 1995), p 36.

¹⁷ Urquhart Brian, in a foreword to Liu F. T., *United Nations and Non-use of Force* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p 7.

¹⁸ Diehl P. F., *International Peacekeeping*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), P 3.

¹⁹ Conroy R., "From Peace Keeping to Peace Enforcement: Lessons from the case of Somalia," Paper presented to conference on *Approaching Fifty: The UN from Europe*; The Hague, June 23-25, 1984.

warring parties and not favoring any in the observation of a ceasefire agreement (mostly between states). Such peacekeepers could not also heavily arm themselves as such action would be an expression of intent to engage in hostilities.²⁰ However in the post-Cold War scenario where conflicts are increasingly happening within states boundaries, the concept has taken on a new meaning. The Brahimi Report redefines impartiality as the adherence to the principles of the UN Charter, rather than continuing to treat all parties to a conflict as if they were morally equal.

Together with the concept of impartiality has been the edict of non-use of force by peacekeepers stationed in a conflict situation. Liu argues that, parties to a conflict are more likely to accept a peacekeeping operation if the latter has no offensive intent and capability and will, in no conceivable circumstances, become a threat to them.²¹ The principle of non-use of force came into sharp focus in the Sierra Leone conflict when over 500 peacekeepers were taken hostage and UNAMSIL lost equipment and military hardware to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). It became clear that such a principle can be easily abused and taken advantage of by an adversary to a conflict which can have devastating consequences to a peacekeeping mission and the overall achievement of peace.

1.4.5 Contemporary Peacekeeping

Findlay identifies two distinctions of peacekeeping; traditional and expanded. Traditional or otherwise referred to as classical peacekeeping refers to UN peace operations involving the deployment of military contingents to monitor, supervise and verify compliance with ceasefires, ceasefire lines, withdrawals, buffer zones and related military agreements. Upon

²⁰The Brahimi Report, op cit.

²¹Liu F. T., *United Nations and Non-use of Force*, p 11.

the end of this short mandate, they are withdrawn. He puts forward examples of such peacekeeping ventures to include UNMOGIP, UNTSO and UNDOF.²²

A new, wide-ranging type of peacekeeping emerged after the Cold War. This expanded role meant that whereas peacekeepers once studiously avoided tackling the root causes of armed conflict in favor of containment and de-escalation, they were now mandated to seek just and lasting solutions in a multi-faceted, multi-dimensional long term operation. Boutros-Ghali, qualifies the departure as being necessitated by the desire to protect humanitarian operations during continuing warfare; protecting civilian populations in designated safe areas; and pressing parties to achieve national reconciliation at a faster pace than they were ready for.²³

This shift to an expanded of peacekeeping has been manifested in the complex or multifunctional operations and the requirements for a strong UN presence. This has required the involvement of significant numbers of not only military, but also civilian personnel, as peacekeepers incorporated such tasks as the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants; electoral support; humanitarian assistance; verification of ceasefire arrangements, buffer zones and foreign troop withdrawals as well as preventive deployments.²⁴ The Brahimi Report echoes these sentiments by stating that multi-functional peacekeeping represents an ethos which tries to address the root causes of complex conflicts which implies the incorporation of a civilization concept in peacekeeping operations besides the armed military aspect.²⁵

²²Findlay T., *The use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, op. cit, p 5.

²³Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping," Report of The Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by The Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992.para 5.

²⁴Neethling T., "Whither Peacekeeping in Africa in Africa: Revisiting the Evolving Role of the United Nations," in, *African Security Review*, Vol 18, No.1 (March 2009), pp 1-17

²⁵The Brahimi Report, p ix.

1.4.6 Characteristics of Peacekeeping

In recognition of the changing composition and functioning of peacekeeping missions, their characteristics have expanded from the distinctive characteristic of voluntary consent, impartiality and minimum use of force to incorporate the elements of peace enforcement and the dedication to a lasting peace²⁶. This has implied broader mandates, more logistical requirements, a bigger budget and long-term missions.

1.4.7 Peacekeeping in Practice: Impasse and Inaction

The UN charter designates the Security Council as the primary custodian of international peace and security. The General Assembly on the other hand is the UN's principle deliberative body comprising its entire membership it is authorized to consider any matter deemed to be of international significance, including issues of international peace and security. This function is accentuated especially when there is an impasse in the Security Council²⁷.

The UN charter provided for the establishment of a Military Staff Committee and a standing army under the collective security arrangement²⁸ but due to major differences amongst the Permanent Five on issues of composition, positioning, control and mandate of such a force the idea was stillborn. Articles 97, 98 and 99 of the UN charter authorizes the secretary General as the chief administrative officer of the UN to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." This function has been used by succeeding Secretary Generals to advance the cause of peacekeeping. The establishment of a Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Peacebuilding Commission has attested to the

²⁶Findlay T., *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

²⁷The UN Charter, Chapter V, op cit.

²⁸ See Kingsbury R., *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p 31.

emergence of the phenomenon of peacekeeping not just as a mechanism for conflict management but also as a field of study.

1.4.8 Peacekeeping in Africa

Africa has been the focal point for peacekeeping as its multiple use has coincided with the exponential increase in internal conflicts especially after the end of the Cold War. Peacekeeping has arguably represented the UN's most public face and presence on the continent as it has been increasingly in use as a humanitarian intervention effort and conflict resolution mechanism. Emerging norms of international law have recognized that sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct and that the international community will increasingly be prepared to set aside the principles of inviolability of natural borders and non-intervention in situations of genocide, state collapse and gross human rights abuses.²⁹ Over twenty peacekeeping missions have been undertaken on the African continent with varying success. Such missions include UNMEE, MONUC, UNAMIR, and UNAMSIL. This study will attempt one such case study in the form of UNAMSIL.

1.4.9 Humanitarian Intervention

UN's responses to domestic armed conflict in the post Cold War era fundamentally called into question antiquated notions of the inviolability and absolute character of state boundaries as well as the sanctity of the notion of interference in the internal affairs of states. Inis Claude advances the argument that once human rights became codified in international law, states treatment of its citizens was no longer a matter of purely domestic jurisdiction shielded by State sovereignty.³⁰ Furthermore, he argues that a state's inability to protect its citizens from insecurity, natural and manmade calamities was likely to attract an international response. Weiss and colleagues concur with Claude when they promote the idea that

²⁹See Sall I., "Human Security in International Law," in, Sall I., et al, (Eds), *Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa*, (United Nations, 2005).pp 17-34.

³⁰Foreword to the 2nd edition of, Weiss T.G (et al), *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, 5th Ed, (Colorado: Westview Press 2007), p xliii

peacekeeping operations should be linked to the principle of human rights and peace considerations. They observe that “the role of humanitarian concerns in justifying outside military force may have been the most salient dimension of UN security operations after the Cold War.”³¹

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICSS) in its report (2001)³² encapsulates two developments in the field of humanitarian intervention thus: first it calls for moving away from the rights of interveners towards the right of victims and the obligations of outsiders to act; Secondly it proposes the modification of the just-war doctrine for future interventions to incorporate humanitarian values of human rights. Potter reinforces this argument by stating that consent for such operations does not mean consent from the warring parties but from the domestic constituencies of troop contributing countries and the authorizing United Nations Security Council and its veto-wielding Permanent Five³³.

Parekh defines humanitarian intervention as intervention inspired by humanitarian considerations.³⁴ He argues that such intervention is designed to influence the conduct of internal affairs of the affected State and its legitimacy is drawn from popular demand for such a venture. Potter examines the conditions that may trigger humanitarian intervention by noting that a failed state unable to function normally will have characteristics such as; a breakdown of political, economic and social institutions, systematic corruption, organized crime, loss of territorial control or large-scale , public unrest and violent internal conflict.³⁵ This scenario aptly describes the Sierra Leone case.

³¹ See Weiss T.G (et al), *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, op cit, p 83.

³² Ibid

³³ In Potter D.W., “The Responsibility to Protect: No More Rwandas; The Internal Community and Humanitarian Intervention in the 21st Century,” op cit, p 182.

³⁴ Parekh B., “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,” in the *Journal of International Political Science Review* Vol. 18, No. 1 (Jan 1997), pp 47- 65.

³⁵ Potter D.W., “The Responsibility to Protect: No More Rwandas; The Internal Community and Humanitarian Intervention in the 21st Century” op cit.

1.4.10 Sierra Leone

Most studies on Sierra Leone have tended to be historical in nature, only concerning themselves with the general matters of chronological transcriptions. Bangura, Rashid, Kpundeh and Abraham delve into topics on the origins of the Revolutionary United Front, student radicalism and political insurgency, corruption and state failure, the role of civil society and ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone.³⁶ This is valuable contribution to the subject of conflict but there is minimal attention given to a detailed examination of UN's involvement in peacekeeping.

Malan, Phenyio and McIntyre detail the origin of Sierra Leone's conflict and give a blow by blow account of UN involvement. They all however provide a limited review of the success of UNAMSIL as their views were made even prior to UNAMSIL completing its mandate.³⁷ This study will detail the role of the UN in bringing about sustainable peace as not only the absence of war but the facilitation of peaceful interactions in an atmosphere devoid of violence. This will be directly linked to the Sierra Leone case in order to establish the effectiveness of the UN in promoting peace.

1.4.11 Evaluating Challenges facing the UN

The UN's performance in its field operations in conflict management has drawn sharp focus and varied interpretations. Galadima observes that the capacity to plan, support and command peacekeeping, let alone peace enforcement missions is scarcely greater now than during the Cold War.³⁸ He advises the UN to distance itself from exercising coercion because states are unwilling to provide the Secretary General with the necessary tools for Chapter VII

³⁶See Abdullah I., (Ed) *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War* (Dakar:CODESRIA,2004).

³⁷Malan M. et al, *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight*, op cit.

³⁸See Galadima H., "Peace Support Operations in Africa," in Best S., (Ed), *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader*, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2007), pp 297- 320.

missions. He adds that standby troops and funds, independent intelligence and appropriate systems for command and control along with professional personnel are never readily available or forthcoming. In his opinion the Security Council should still authorize enforcement measures on selected occasions but such efforts should be sub-contracted to regional arrangements or coalitions of the willing.

Neethling alludes to logistical challenges and the lack of a clear mandate and organizational structure as the cause for failure of UN missions³⁹ while observing that many financial problems affecting peacekeeping operations system from the ad hoc way that missions are financed: each mission is financed separately, with its own fiscal term beginning when a mandate is approved, and so member states are asked to make payments at unexpected moments throughout their own domestic budget cycles.⁴⁰

1.4.12 Justification of the Study

This study is significant in terms of academic relevance as the study seeks to offer a better understanding of the local, national and international complexities involved in the running of peacekeeping missions. It attempts to fill the gap in literature found in analyzing UN's peacekeeping in Sierra Leone.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

Theories in social research science enable students and researchers to examine and analyze concepts and relate different variables in order to establish co- relation and allow for an evaluation of how one variable affects the other. This study will be guided by the Realist theory of international relations which has been dominant in explaining the nature of world politics. Realism recognizes states as major actors in the international system and that

³⁹See Neethling T., "Whither Peacekeeping in Africa in Africa: Revisiting the Evolving Role of the United Nations," in, *African Security Review*, Vol.18, No.1 (March 2009), pp 3-5.

⁴⁰Francis D., *Dangers of Co-Deployment, op cit*, p 14.

interaction among these principal actors is guided solely by selfish national interests. In an anarchic international environment devoid of a central authority to regulate contact between states, realism observes that states are ever guided by power and security concerns which therefore imply that conflict and zero-sum competition will always characterize relations more than co-operation⁴¹. Carr observes that “war lurks in the background of international politics”⁴² and the preoccupation of states is on enhancing their capabilities than co-operation which could possibly diminish payoffs accruing from such an interaction and thus threaten their survival in an unpredictable environment (where your friend today could be your enemy tomorrow).

To realists, a state’s motivation to engage in co-operative behavior or intervention is ultimately guided by partisan interests and not by altruistic concerns about achieving a common good. By engaging in peacekeeping, realists would argue that states will be motivated to coalesce if their security is threatened or if they will gain material resources to advance its defense capability or to gain status and prestige. This explains partly the reasons for the unstructured way that peacekeeping has been conducted and the fact that the activities of the UN is just but an indicator of the leeway given to it by the member states (the real bosses).

⁴¹See Morgenthau H., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985), p 10.

⁴²Carr E.H., *The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1964), p 109. see also, Grieco J., “Anarchy and the Limits of Co-operation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” in *Journal of International Organization*, Vol. 42 No. 3, (Summer 1988), pp 485-507.

1.6 Hypotheses

The study hypothesizes that;

- The UN was successful in maintaining peace and security in Sierra Leone,
- Peacekeeping does not play a major role in ensuring sustainable peace.

1.7 Research Methodology

The study will gather its data from mainly secondary data and primary data.

1.7.1 Primary Sources

I will attempt informal interviews from lead scholars on conflict and peacekeeping and Kenyan officials who served in UNAMSIL operations in Sierra Leone.

1.7.2 Secondary Sources

This will be gathered from books, seminar papers, journal articles, UN reports, academic papers and reports of relevant international organizations. The study will rely mainly on secondary data in its analysis of UN peacekeeping.

1.8 Chapter outline

Chapter One: “Introduction to the Study” – This will introduce the concept of peace keeping as a theme in conflict management theory and practice. The chapter will justify the study of this phenomenon in conflict management and it will attempt to hypothesize the outcome of the study based on the objectives set. A Methodology and theoretical framework relevant to this study will also be provided.

Chapter Two: “Peacekeeping–From Concept to Practice”- This chapter will trace the development and evolution of peacekeeping as an alternative peace and security measure to the collective security system security system envisaged in the UN character . Also under scope will be the performance and challenges faced in peacekeeping missions.

Chapter Three: “The Sierra Leone Conflict” –This chapter will explore the root causes of the conflict that necessitated the intervention of UNAMSIL. A brief history of the country and the said conflict will be provided.

Chapter Four: “A Case Study of Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone”. This chapter will detail UN’s presence in Sierra Leone embodied in the operations of UNAMSIL and its precursor UNOMSIL. Close attention will be paid to UN charter provisions, UN Security Council Resolutions relating to the Sierra Leone conflict, the functioning of UNAMSIL on the ground, challenges faced and lessons learnt.

Chapter Five: “Conclusions”

Chapter Two

Peacekeeping: From Concept to Practice

2.0 Introduction

The failure of the collective security mechanism as designed by the UN Charter was a result of the Security Council's inability to reach agreement on how to address threats to peace during the Cold War. Articles 43 and 47 which were to establish a military command structure and troops within UN control were never actualized partly due to misgivings of states having no control of their troops once under UN command and consent as to where these were to be deployed. Peacekeeping therefore emerged as a pragmatic attempt to circumvent the inability to institute deterrence capability within the UN, the inhibiting Cold War environment and to address threats to peace emerging from decolonization and inter-state conflicts. The lack of clear provisions within the Charter saw the improvisation of peacekeeping to denote measures that ostensibly lay between Chapters IV and VII.¹

Since mid-1988, there has been a phenomenal expansion in the number and complexity of peacekeeping forces. As of June 2005, the number of peacekeeping operations had risen to 60, 17 of which were still active missions in the field involving 67,000 military personnel and civilian police, costing the United Nations in excess of \$17 billion². This explosion in UN field undertakings have been made possible to a large extent by the increased ability of the UN Security Council to agree on action in security emergencies and conflict hotspots since the end of

¹Initially referred to as "Chapter six-and-a-half" measures by Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary General credited with inventing peacekeeping.

²United Nations, *Vision of Hope: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, (London: The Regency Corporation, 1995), p 53. see also Neethling T., in "Whither Peacekeeping in Africa: Revising the Evolving Role of the United Nations" in *African Security Review* Vol.18, No.1. (March 2009), pp 3-14.

the Cold War. Enhanced international co-operation and the decreased use of veto power reinvigorated multilateral efforts at resolving conflicts with the UN always expected, and allowed to take a leading role. This chapter explores the development of peacekeeping as a concept and practice as a conflict resolution instrument.

2.1 The Rationale for Peacekeeping

Javier Perez de Cuellar posits that there are many conflicts which neither side can hope to win but in which peaceful settlement between the warring parties remains elusive. In such situations, Perez avers, peacekeeping offers a dignified and inexpensive escape from such situations. According to him, peacekeeping operations tend to be established for conflict control where the danger of escalation is high.³

Peacekeeping, promotes mediation and negotiation success⁴ and the prospects of peacekeeping may positively influence the content of agreements reached if this will be followed by a peacekeeping presence on the ground. Furthermore, agreements reached with peacekeeping in mind are more comprehensive in addressing the causes of a conflict and instituting long-term strategies of solving it. Peacekeepers therefore provide a powerful solution to the security dilemma faced by enduring rivals who may feel the need to consider the possibility of withdrawing from an agreement agreed upon. Peacekeeping is an important tool that provides third parties with the reason and mechanism to get involved in situations that may threaten international peace and security. It also allows for a sober evaluation of the negative impact a war has on society and the long-term realization of development and peaceful co-existence.

³“Foreword” to the 2nd Ed of, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*. (New York: United Nations, 1990), p xx.

⁴Diehl P., Greig M., “The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma” in *International Studies Quarterly*, (2005), No.49, pp621- 635.

2.2 The Character of a Peacekeeping Operation

Peacekeeping missions, since inception, have been guided by certain norms and principles that were considered essential to the successful completion of a peacekeeping mandate. These were non-use of force, impartiality and the consent of the parties. During the evolution of peacekeeping, these guiding principles have had to be reconceptualized to conform to the challenges in applying this peace strategy to new and more challenging situations.

2.2.1 Consent of the Parties

The concept derives its evolution from the reality that the UN lacked the power to enforce its will on parties to a conflict. This meant that for a peacekeeping mission to be established on a territory and between antagonists, these warring parties had to consent to its establishment, to the countries contributing troops (TCCs), to troop levels of such contingents and their movements in the host territory had to be sanctioned and closely monitored. In essence, there was a rigid framework within which such peacekeeping missions could operate. Peacekeepers in this initial phase were presumed to be pacifist-oriented enablers rather than enforcers and could therefore only operate under the ambit of Chapter VI of the Charter.⁵

This characterization of peacekeeping as was the case during the Cold War became untenable to missions instituted especially after the end of the Cold War. Such missions were increasingly venturing into volatile situations of internal conflicts that demanded a drastically different qualitative and quantitative approach to stop violence and deal with the sources of conflict. Consent in its classical meaning could no longer hold water in states where there was no

⁵Groom A.J.R., "The Question of Peace and Security," in, *International Institutions at Work* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), p 83.

sovereign or in situations where the state abuses its authority and disregards the rule of law to perpetuate its stay in office. Peacekeepers, citing impartiality, could no longer sit and watch as adversaries engaged in conflict leading to a high turnover of human life and the accompanying effects of refugees as they await consent from the same parties who are more concerned with fighting than engaging each other in ways of ending the conflict.⁶ Consent could be coerced to ensure parties accord proper attention to peace processes rather than the prolongation of conflict.

2.2.2 Use of Force

Initially, peacekeepers only used minimum force in the extraordinary case of self defense as a last resort. This conformed to their role as impartial observers to a ceasefire agreement. These peacekeeping contingents, limited in number and lightly armed were essentially to operate under Chapter VI provisions of the Charter which only recommended use of force to protect their lives.

The transition from this non-use of force to use of force to protect and advance the interests of a peacekeeping mandate were heralded by Boutros-Ghali's statement in his 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace where he qualified the departure from peacekeeping to peace enforcement as being determined by the desire to protect humanitarian operations during continuing warfare, protect civilian populations in designated safe areas and to enforce compliance (by recalcitrant parties) to a ceasefire agreement or induce a halt to hostilities. Military force could be employed not just for self defense but for the defense of the objectives of the mission as well. The legal backing for this has been the authorization of such peacekeeping, missions under "action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression." ⁷It has become necessary for peacekeepers to use force and for such peacekeeping

⁶Francis J. (et al), *Dangers of Co-Deployment*, op cit, p 20.

⁷Article 39 of the *Charter of the UN*.

operations to get clear forceful mandates due to the added responsibilities of protecting civilian life and creating conditions for peaceful coexistence among adversaries in the long-term.

2.2.3 Impartiality

Impartiality grew from the belief that peacekeepers, having no enemies in a conflict and without the military objective of winning a war, should not favor any side to that conflict. They were supposed to be politically neutral, in order to avoid influencing the political balance of power between belligerents. The use of force was therefore initially thought as undermining the impartiality of peacekeepers and inevitably call into question their credibility and commitment to peace. This perception of an impartial, non-intrusive force was the norm for UN peacekeeping during the Cold War where such forces were to be lightly armed and use force based on saving peacekeepers' lives as a last resort measure.

The evolution of peacekeeping to encompass broader mandates in peacebuilding and humanitarian affairs demanded a rethink of the concept of impartiality. Added to this was the increasingly intrusive political nature of second generation peacekeeping which at times required the use force to enforce compliance to peace terms by amorphous groups whose commitment to peace could not be guaranteed. Impartiality had to mean more than just fence sitting. The Brahimi Report averred that impartiality "had to mean adherence to the principles of the UN Charter rather than continuing to treat all parties to a conflict as if they were moral equivalents."⁸ Kofi Annan argued that a second generation peacekeeping force must be ready to challenge factions opposing the conditions of its mandate and especially when such factions are engaging in genocide, massive displacement of civilian communities and thus fail to abide by the laws of armed conflict.⁹ Impartiality has therefore evolved to ensure peacekeepers' compliance with the

⁸The Brahimi Report, op cit,p viii

⁹Annual Report of the Secretary General to the UN, (New York :UN Department of Public Information,2002) p 12

dictates of their mandate and the strict dedication of parties to a conflict to the objectives of peace and denouncing their parochial, selfish interests.

2.3 The Changing Face of UN Peacekeeping

The unfavorable Cold War environment and the fact that peacekeeping was still in its nascent stage ensured a phase of careful balancing acts to deescalate conflicts and avoid major power involvement in an increasingly nuclear world. Between 1948 and 1988, the UN undertook 13 peacekeeping operations which were more or less inclined to the observance of the behavior and actions of conflicting parties, monitoring ceasefires, controlling buffer zones and preventing resumption of hostilities mainly in inter-state conflicts. The character of such missions was guided by the classical application of the principles of consent of the parties, non-use of force and impartiality and this third party intervention was short-lived and basically military in nature.

Peace was understood to mean the absence of war and therefore the interposition of peacekeeping forces between adversaries and the signing of a ceasefire agreement or a cessation of hostilities was meant to be a guarantee of peace with peacekeeping facilitating the disengagement of rivals and providing conditions for a mutual settlement.¹⁰ United Nations Emergency Force 1 (UNEF 1) and the United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC) were such early ventures whose impact and challenges faced during operation influenced future peacekeeping engagements in terms of the range of duties and extent of involvement in conflict resolution. UNEF 1 showed the potential that peacekeeping could do to resolve international conflict and normalize relations among states while at the same time demonstrating the shortcoming of attaining superficial peace (absence of fighting rather than addressing the roots of

¹⁰United Nations, *A Vision of Hope*, op cit, p 55.

the conflict) among two nations. Initial questions on the principles of state sovereignty, impartiality and the non-use of force were raised as ONUC had to stretch the meaning of these concepts to engage in direct combat not only in self defense but also in the defense of the mission mandate and the lives of civilian populations.

Whereas peacekeeping during the Cold War delivered a measure of success that had to balance between selectively avoiding proxy war hotspots, managing the expectations of the veto-wielding permanent five (P5) members of the Security Council and avoid paralysis in decision-making and slow financial support, the end of the Cold War offered a more enabling environment for the conduct of peacekeeping operations. New conceptions of peace and security such as positive peace, human security, human rights and individual sovereignty gained meaning in application in international co-operation and peacekeeping had to shift focus to new ways of approaching emerging threats to international security.¹¹ The structural conflicts which had been characteristic of the African state came to the fore as standards of living added on to other underlying causes of conflict. The resultant explosion in internal conflicts on the continent demanded an appropriate response and peacekeeping had to reinvent itself to tackle these new challenges to regional and international security as these conflicts tended to outgrow their national confines to assume regional and even international threats to security.

More and more peacekeeping operations were subsequently instituted to stem gross abuses of human rights, the large-scale displacement of civilian populations as conflicts were increasingly fuelled by ethnic and religious intolerance, political ambition and greed, often exacerbated by the illicit trafficking of small arms, drugs and gems through porous state borders. Peacekeepers now

¹¹Yilmaz M., "UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era" in *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. 22, No.2, June 2005, pp 14-29.

provided emergency relief, demobilized and reintegrated combatants, assisted in clearing and destroying land mines, oversaw constitutional and legal reform, built functional state institutions and organized peaceful transitions to democratic rule.¹² Besides military officials, a peacekeeping mission had to have such personnel as lawyers, judges, experts in administration, customs, health, education, sanitation and agriculture. Authorization for peacekeeping had to be detailed, and mandates had to be bigger entailing more concise SOPs and ROE as missions stayed in the field for a longer time.

United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG), United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC) and engagements in Kosovo and East Timor are model examples of the advanced roles of peacekeepers. UNTAG assisted in the training of the local police force, supervision of national elections and in the monitoring of Namibia's transition from colonialism to indigenous rule. UNTAC's mandate on the other hand encompassed human rights monitoring, organization of free and fair elections, civil administration, the maintenance of law and order and the rehabilitation of essential infrastructure. UNTAC highlighted the expanded role of UN peacekeeping in terms of tasks and the emerging approach to a more proactive use of force against the recalcitrance of the Khmer Rouge who were sabotaging the peace process. On the other hand, it was a perfect illustration of the requisites for the success of a mission in terms of resource outlay, mandate clarity and the advantages of consensus and co-operation among all levels of players and stakeholders.

¹²Annan K., *Common Destiny, New Resolve: An Annual Report on the Work of the Organization*, (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 2000), p 10.

2.4 Emerging Themes in Peacekeeping

2.4.1 Human Security and Peace

The concepts of individual sovereignty, human security and peace have become part of the new definition of international peace and security. The human rights and fundamental freedoms of each and every individual as enshrined in the Charter have been enhanced by a renewed consciousness of the rights of every individual to control his or her destiny. These rights inherent in the individual including but not limited to right to a safe environment, freedom of expression, assembly, conscience could not be precluded by the state which had the responsibility of promoting and respecting these rights as valuable ingredients to advancing social and economic prosperity. A state and its government could therefore attract international attention if it failed in its responsibility of creating an enabling environment for the observance of such individual and rights freedoms.

Following on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and its Additional Protocols and the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court to try states and individuals that commit crimes against humanity, the UN Security Council added more emphasis to the new definition of security when it defined international peace and security as “not the result of the absence of war and military conflicts alone but the result of instability prevailing in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields.”¹³ Chweya notes that the classical definition of state security presupposes potential threats to a state’s existence from fellow states on its sovereignty, yet “a state can be secure-free from any external military threat or from aggression-and yet its citizens suffer insecurity in terms of physical attack, genocide that internal, non-state aggressors (rebels, terrorist groups, and human traffickers) commit, including

¹³Sall A., “Human Security in International Law” in *Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa*, (New York, United Nations Document, 2005), p 17.

state officials.”¹⁴The definition of security now encompasses threats to individuals, groups and communities and non-military threats to human well-being (health, nutrition, education, rights and freedoms).

Peace and security is now widely regarded as a means to the achievement of development and peaceful; co-existence among peoples and not just the presence of deterrent army capabilities. The Brahimi Report and the World Summit of 2005 advanced the idea of sustainable peace as the foundation for lasting world peace and in reducing the prevalence of internal conflicts which were mainly caused by widespread poverty and underdevelopment.¹⁵

2.4.2 State Sovereignty

Article 2(7) of the UN Charter protects national sovereignty from intervention “in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” The treaties making up the Peace of Westphalia created the legal foundation for this conception of sovereignty. States were viewed as equal with no one state prescribing what the other could do and should do within its domain. Sovereignty was therefore the idea of legitimate and independent rule by a country over a certain territory. Governments became adjuncts of the state and could not be challenged or questioned by any other authority within its defined territory or outside.¹⁶

It is now accepted that a state unable to protect its citizens or abets the commission of crimes against humanity or when its government is illegally constituted, it effectively loses its sovereignty and the international community would not be acting illegally if it decides to act

¹⁴Chweya L., “Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region” in Mwagiru M. (Ed), *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2004)*, pp 32-45.

¹⁵Herro A., (et al), “Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa: The Political Contribution of a UN Emergency Peace Service” in the *African Security Review*, Vol.18, No1, March 2009, pp 47- 55.

¹⁶Claude I., “Foreword” to the 2nd Ed. of, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, op cit., p xliv.

against such states. The Charter qualifies the principle of state sovereignty as not prejudicing the application of Chapter VII enforcement measures where there is evidence of threats to international peace and security. The AU Constitutive Act in Article 4(h) recognizes the limit of state sovereignty by observing that the principle does not preclude the Union from intervening in a member state in respect to grave situations of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.¹⁷The effects of globalization and new definitions of security have dimmed the classical thinking on sovereignty. The state however still remains as the principal institution for achieving domestic order and facilitating international co-operation.

2.4.3 Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Enforcement

The principles of non-interference and state sovereignty have turned out to be surmountable obstacles in interventions justified on humanitarian or human rights grounds which have assumed increasing prominence in this post-Cold War era. The institution of such pronouncements and bodies as the UDHR and its Additional Protocols, the Economic and Social Council, UNICEF, UNDP, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(OCHA),the ICC and the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs have all served to catapult into prominence the importance of human rights to overall world peace and development.

The modified just-war doctrine as encapsulated by the International Commission on International and State Sovereignty (ICISS) calls for a responsibility to protect when there is large scale loss of life and where armed conflicts within a State is a danger to civilians. The international community must be prepared to set aside the principles of inviolability of national borders and non-intervention in situations of genocide, state collapse and gross human rights

¹⁷Neethling T., "Whither Peacekeeping in Africa" op cit, p 14.The Conference of Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation (CSSDCA) is a mechanism under AU led the push for a rethink on sovereignty to advance peacekeeping initiatives.

violations.¹⁸ Consent of the guilty parties, impartiality and non-use of force in their initial meaning could prove unhelpful as authorization for humanitarian interventions assumed or called for a more robust Chapter VII mandate of peace enforcement.

2.4.4 Alternative Approaches to UN Peacekeeping

Various attempts have been made to enhance the capacity and capability of the UN in peacekeeping. These have been in the form of suggestions on strengthening the early warning mechanism to identify potential conflict zones, formation of a readily deployable standby force in case of emergencies and the creation of a permanent fund from which such quick-response mechanisms could draw their funds from. This renewed debate on how better to manage conflicts in the world and especially Africa is a result of the increase in number of “collapsed” states beset by ethnic, religious and political rivalries and the preoccupation of the major Western States to confront terrorism which has made them to either ignore these homegrown conflicts or attempt to entrust their peacekeeping responsibilities to regional allies, institutional mechanisms or go it alone to safeguard their national interests.

Within the UN, there have been efforts to make peacekeeping adaptable to the changing face of conflict. In his Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali called for the constitution of a readily available force (UN Standby Arrangement System-UNSAS). Repeated calls for such a force were made by Kofi Annan who supported the actualization of the provisions of Article 43 of the UN Charter. The constitution of for the Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN operations

¹⁸Herro A., (et al), “Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa”, op cit, pp 47-55.

(SHIRBRIG) was viewed as a positive step towards the realization of this goal. Though deployed to selected conflict situations its impact and full potential is yet to be fully realized.¹⁹

A similar mechanism has been the United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) intended to supplement existing UN and regional operations and strengthen the early warning and preventive capacities at the UN. Peacekeeping can benefit from such an initiative as it attempts to give peace approaches a permanent role as opposed to the ad hoc way that is descriptive of such operations. The training of more staff to handle aspects of intelligence and peace operations would be a step in the right direction for peacekeeping as it removes such sensitive but crucial functions from the uncertain world of national control and interests. This idea is however still nascent and an evaluation of its efficacy is beyond this study.

Preventive diplomacy, the initiative of Dag Hammarskjold has been put forward as mechanism to precede or supplement peacekeeping measures. This involves the use of the Secretary General's good offices and the International Court of Justice to pre-empt conflict conflagrations. This obliges the importance of vigilance and the ability of the Security Council to act expediently in emergency situations. The utilization of aspects such as preventive deployment and preventive disarmament²⁰ promotes confidence building and reduces the instruments of war (small arms) and actors (arms traffickers and armed groups) in a conflict thus promoting human security.

National security concerns have influenced unilateral moves by the United States, Britain, France and Canada to propose and practice different approaches to peacekeeping. Their interventions in Sierra Leone, Somalia and Rwanda have been an indictment of their desire to

¹⁹*United Nations Peace Operations: Year in Review*, (United Nations Document 2006), p 14.

²⁰See Oche O., "Human Security in Africa: An Agenda for the Next Millennium," in Mathoma P., Mills G and Stremmlau J., (Eds) *Putting People First: African Priorities for the UN Millennium Assembly*, (Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs, 2000), pp43-49.

carry out unilateral engagements independent of the operational difficulties of UN peacekeeping. Such initiatives as African Standby Force, IMATT and ACRI (African Crisis Response Initiative)-later renamed ACOTA (African Contingency Operations Training Assistance) have been designed to train and equip a homegrown African force in peacekeeping and peacemaking mechanisms to promote local solutions to African problems. The Somalia and Rwanda debacles and the domestic opposition to involvement in conflicts abroad have led these powers to propose these alternative peacekeeping responses just as the challenge of terrorism has shifted intelligence, personnel and military resources away from peacekeeping.

Support for co-operation between the UN and regional bodies in peacekeeping has grown over the years since the end of the Cold War. This move to decentralize the maintenance of international peace and security was a recognition of the role regional organizations could play in conflict resolution and avoid internal conflicts from taking on a regional or global element due to the internationalizing aspects of refugees, weapons trafficking and involvement of foreign troops. Such regional and sub-regional mechanisms presumably have a better understanding of conflicts within their proximity; are more politically acceptable by warring factions ;and their proximity makes it easier for troop deployment and logistical support.²¹ It also avoids excessive centralization in the complex UN planning machinery and lethargy in decision-making of the Security Council.

Examples of sub-regional mechanisms in peacekeeping were the Liberia and Sierra Leone ECOMOG operations and SADC intervention in Lesotho where these initiatives had some degree of success. The Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) part of AU's Africa

²¹Francis D., "ECOMOG: A New Security Agenda in World Politics" in Bakutt B. (Eds), *Africa at the Millennium: An Agenda for Mature Development*, (Hampshire: Palgrave Publishers, 2000), pp175-189.

Standby Force has made strides in equipping forces within the larger East Africa with skills in peacekeeping. An appraisal of regional mechanisms' performance has revealed certain weaknesses. One such shortcoming has been the observation that their troops are poorly trained and equipped to effectively manage conflicts. Such expensive ventures and the inability of poor regional States' inability to bankroll them has been cited as a factor leading to the poor performance of such initiatives. It has also been pointed out that regional players are not always impartial arbiters in conflicts in which they seek to resolve and in a way their involvement and the vested interests that dictate their involvement effectively regionalize a conflict and make it more intractable and protracted.

Another alternative approach to UN peacekeeping has been the proposal to authorize a coalition of willing States to maintain peace and security in any part of the world. Such a mechanism would be modeled on the French operation in Rwanda and "Operation Palliser"-the British unilateral operation in Sierra Leone which supposedly sidestepped the bureaucratic challenges of UN decision-making and stifling operational environment. The mechanism presupposes that at any given time, a group of States will be willing and ready to undertake peacekeeping functions on behalf of the UN. Such an arrangement has to overcome the difficulties of national interest misgivings, reticent decision-making within troop contributing countries, organizational and financial challenges characteristic of national rivalries in joint initiatives.

2.5 Conditions for Instituting a Peacekeeping Operation

The decision to deploy a peacekeeping mission always has to answer the question of whether a conflict situation has achieved the threshold for an international response and when should such a response be initiated. There are always powerful political, strategic and moral reasons for

deploying a peacekeeping force in conflicts that are marked by a substantial loss of civilian life but converse arguments argue that even if the timing is right for peacekeeping deployment, there is need for such an operation to delay entry until either a peace agreement between adversaries has been arrived at or after a consensus is reached among stakeholders as to the substance of a peacekeeping endorsement as the situation is monitored on the ground to ensure a matching response to the prevailing conditions on the ground.

Zartman advances the notion of a hurting stalemate-when opponents have reached an impasse in their conflict such that neither is likely to achieve their goals through force.²² With rising battlefield costs in terms of soldier deaths and damage to military hardware and the possibility of a conclusion to such confrontation likely not being within their reach, such adversaries could have created the perfect time for a third party input in resolving the conflict. The understanding is that the adversaries have rationalized that it is more costly to continue fighting and it is in their best interests to pursue a different means of achieving their objectives. This hurting stalemate forces them to climb down from their zero sum goals to a win-win foresight which is key to the eventual resolution of the conflict.

Diehl and Greig advance the argument that a third party intervention deployed early before warring parties are negatively affected in human lives lost and cost of advancing a war will most likely not succeed as it diminishes the chances of achieving the threshold of a hurting stalemate.²³ This however assumes that parties to a conflict are ever rational and will choose peace over war if they fail in succeeding in the latter and that every conflict follows a similar path of progression.

²²Zartman W., "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond" in Stern P. (Eds), *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*; (Washington: National Academy Press, 2000), p 27

²³Diehl P., Greig M. "The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma", p 628.

Actors in conflict are sometimes prone to irrational decision making due to the environments they find themselves in, the level of education and idiosyncrasies of decision makers, awareness of the dynamics of the conflict and type, level and nature of decision making in a party to a conflict. It is also important to point out that conflicts are shaped not only by what is happening on the war front but also in locations far away from it. It might therefore be difficult in certain conflict situations to clearly pinpoint a right moment for peacekeeping or entry of a third party.

The decision whether to institute a peacekeeping presence in a conflict situation either prior to the outbreak of violence; during active combat; following a ceasefire or after the signing of a peace agreement needs to be informed by the conflict dimensions of a dispute. Such dimensions include the level of violence, projected human cost in terms of lives and probable dislocation of people, the possible imminent contagion effect and above all the impact of inaction. A peacekeeping mission would therefore be suitable in conflicts where the level of violence is high, leading to loss of civilian life and triggering a refugee problem which could have devastating regional effects if there is no timely response. This calls for a case by case analysis as to the dynamics and complexity of a conflict to establish the need for peacekeeping, when it should be instituted and under what mandate.

2.6 Challenges to UN Peacekeeping

UN peacekeeping has come under stress from various challenges within its operational structure and from the vagaries of international co-operation which is the environment within which it operates. The lethargic deliberations as to what constitutes threats to peace and security have at times dragged on far too long to render any intervention in a conflict ineffective. Differences of perceptions and interests always make united action on security issues difficult

and uncertain Moreover, the personnel at the disposal of UN peacekeeping secretariat have been wanting, a situation that made Kofi Annan bemoan about it in his 2002 Annual Report.²⁴

There is yet to be established a permanent fund for financial contributions from member States which could come in handy in emergency operations or in cases where a peacekeeping mandate has been expanded to include more operational elements. States have been known to withhold contributions as a sign of political protest for one reason or the other or when there is no clear national interest involved. Kofi Annan observes that states spend more in national defense budgets than they are willing to commit to peacekeeping²⁵. This lack of steady inflow of contributions to the UN could also be as a result of weak economic conditions in some member countries or the failure to authorize contributions by legislative bodies in member States on time due to bureaucratic challenges. Efforts at reforming the financial regime of the UN has resulted in proposals to institute a global tax on currency transactions, environmental taxes and taxes on maritime travel and arms trade. These are still just proposals which face enormous challenge of overcoming the national interest on States which have to authorize such affronts on national interests. In the meantime, the challenge of sufficient funding still confronts the UN.

The UN has benefitted little from great power troop contributions which has hampered peacekeeping efforts. The reason for stressing on sourcing of troops from military powers is the reality that they are better trained in intelligence gathering; possess superior logistical organization and boast of battle-hardened troops in warfare and war games. They also have better equipment and are highly conversant in the important military aspects of command and cohesion. This great power apathy at troop contribution has evolved in line with national interest qualms of

²⁴ "Prevention of Armed Conflict", *Report of the Secretary General* (New York:UN,2002),pp 3-17

²⁵ Annan K., "Common Destiny, New Resolve" *Annual Report on the Work of the Organization* (New York: UN, 2000), p 3.

such states. States still prefer ad hoc contributions as this gives them greater control of troops and the power to decide exact situations in which their armed forces will or will not be used.

The lack of a stable foundation on which to base peacekeeping missions has resulted in piecemeal missions which eventually tend to be overwhelmed by the realities on the ground. This mission creep²⁶ has contributed to the ineffective way in which peacekeepers have handled their missions as the personnel on the ground are too few to handle the increase in duties being placed on their in tray. The UN can however perform only as much as national governments want it to, as it is their handiwork and they set the tempo and dictate the pace at which it approaches its responsibilities.

The UN still lacks reliable independent intelligence on which it can rely on to map out potential conflict hotspots likely to require its attention. There is also the challenge of making available at its disposal sufficient technical staff knowledgeable in the dynamics of potential conflicts in various regions.

2.7 Conclusion

Peacekeeping has undergone major changes seventy five years since the first mission was initiated. The initial conceptions on no-use of force, consent of the parties and impartiality had to be rethought to make them applicable to the new definitions of international peace and security that emerged especially in the post-Cold War period. The emergence of such principles as individual sovereignty, human security, human rights and humanitarian intervention have delegitimized the Westphalian conceptions of state sovereignty and put at the forefront of the

²⁶The incremental increase in tasks assigned to UN forces as a result of the changing nature of a conflict.

international community the importance of having a peace conducive to the enjoyment of human life and freedoms.

The proliferation of internal conflicts in various locations around the world has required an expanded UN presence to manage these conflicts. The performance of peacekeeping and the resulting evaluation of such ventures have included proposals at bettering its performance. Proposals have included the creation of a stand-by force, co-deployment with regional bodies. Peacekeeping is here for the long-term and there is need for concerted efforts at ensuring its efficacy in a constantly changing world.

Chapter Three

The Sierra Leone Conflict

3.0 Introduction

Sierra Leone is situated in West Africa in the Mano River basin area from which the Mano River Union, a sub-regional integration effort which also includes Liberia and Guinea, derives its name. This union has been characterized more by conflict than co-operation, with internal conflicts tending to always take on regional and international dimensions due to porous state borders that facilitate cross-border movement of small arms through smuggling, making them easily available to armed groups. The conflicts in this region have also been made more intractable by the major role played by international arms traffickers, PMCs and neighboring countries who have sponsored armed groups to advance their interests and the systematic failure of governments to fully perform their duties of providers of security and facilitators of economic development.

In order to understand and analyze the conflict in Sierra Leone, this chapter will make inferences from the realist theory which observes that conflict is inherent in human nature which predisposes man to pursue power and its attendant benefits (security, material wealth) at the expense of other individuals who are likely pursuing the same goal in a cut-throat zero-sum game/competition. The study will however also benefit from the World Systems and the Systems theories. The former, espoused by Samir Amin, Ali Mazrui and Walter Rodney¹ allude to the unfair, exploitative international system that allows for the appropriation of wealth, labor and resources to the benefit of Europe at the expense of Africa. Lucian Pye, on the other hand explains conflict as a failure of the state to address crises of legitimacy, identity, distribution,

¹ Ademola F., "Theories of Social Conflict," in Best S., Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd, 2007), pp 37-56

integration, participation and penetration which strains the smooth performance of government as a system.²This Chapter examines the background and context of the Sierra Leone conflict, actors and their interests, the instruments of prosecuting the war and issues that prolonged the conflict. This will offer a situational analysis of the conditions that necessitated third party intervention in the form of peacekeeping.

The conflict did not originate from the 1991 Foday Sankoh-led invasion from Liberia but had its genesis in the nature of colonial and post-colonial society which created conditions for exclusion, oppression, violence and poverty. This initial phase-where the socio-economic and political environment inhibited development-is what Galtung referred to as structural violence³where deliberate policies and structures that threatened the achievement of positive peace resulted in marginalization, fragmentation and overall human suffering of the underdog at the advantage of the top dog.

3.1The Character of the Post-Colonial State

The typical African post-independence state drew its distinctiveness from the preceding decades of colonization which had a bearing on its identity, political structure and path to development. Besides drawing artificial borders which would later become a source of conflicts, the colonial order entrenched authoritarian rule. This absolute elitist nature of colonial rule which would later be perpetuated by most African governments was symbolized by the imperial bureaucracy that was established to dominate Africans and create conditions favorable for economic exploitation of the colonies' resources for the onward development of home

²Ibid.

³Galtung J., "Cultural Violence," in, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 3,(1990), pp 292-302.

economies.⁴ The administrative structures of colonial rule, (army, police, taxation and indirect rule) ensured loyalty and revenue for perpetuating this dominance while at the same time giving birth to the reward scheme of patron-clientelism which was to be utilized fully by post-colonial regimes to divide and rule.⁵ These colonial administrations were only accountable to their home governments.

The transition to independence was largely arranged and determined by colonial masters who made inadequate preparations for a seamless hand-over of power. The structures of transparency, accountability, effective representative government were ignored as the outgoing colonialists favored regimes that would promote a cordial relationship with their home governments and ensure a say in local matters once they had gone.⁶ Upon inheriting centralized governments which had little democratic elements, these independence champions were given a blank cheque to chart the political future of their young nations. The two major choices available were either to continue with the closed political system with a few modifications or open the playing field for more players. Many independent nationalist leaders chose the former, including Sierra Leone's. Equipped with what I would call a culture of entitlement which allowed them to perceive themselves as the legitimate leaders to lead their countrymen towards prosperity and opposition meant subversion of legitimate rule and the will of the people. A low political culture in these newly independent countries also predisposed these leaders towards statist, nationalistic

⁴See Drame T., "The Crisis of the State," in, Ellis S. (Ed), *Africa Now: People, Policies and Institutions*, (London: Heinemann, 1996), p 302.

⁵See Okoth A., *A History of Africa: African Nationalism and the Decolonization Process*, Vol. 2, (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 2006), p 239.

⁶See Steadman S., Lyons T., "Conflicts in Africa," in, Gyimah-Boadi E. (Ed), *Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), pp 139-153.

pronouncements which portrayed the state as uniter of the nation as it fights the common enemy of poverty, ignorance and tribalism.

3.2 The Sierra Leone Context

Sierra Leone gained independence in 1961, with Milton Margai as the prime minister with his brother Albert Margai succeeding him posthumously in 1964. The Margai administrations had inherited a divided nation which was as a result of the British colonial policy of dividing the country into two administrations; the Freetown Crown territory and the Protectorate comprising the hinterland. The crown territory boasted the best infrastructure and social amenities than the rest of the country⁷, a situation which would persist many years later and contribute to the collapse of state control on most of Sierra Leone territory. The Siaka Stevens (1968-1985) and Brigadier Joseph Momoh (1985-1992) regimes embarked on the systematic centralization of power at the expense of the majority of the population.⁸ The instruments of power were structured in a way so as to be answerable and responsive to the heads of state.

The Armed Forces of Sierra Leone (AFSL), the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) became embedded in the regimes' informal command and control system and to ensure the head of state's security and reinforce patron-client relationships and suppress dissent, the Secret Service Division (SSD) a paramilitary police division was created. Tolerance to divergent views was minimal and these coercive apparatus of the state ensured loyalty while ruthlessly dealing with political opponents

⁷See Cartwright J., *Political Leadership in Sierra Leone* (London: Crown Helm, 1978), p 36.

⁸Bangura Y., "The Political and Cultural Dynamics of the Sierra Leone War: A Critique of Paul Richards," in, Abdullah I., (Ed), *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004), pp13-29

and calls for accountability and participation in state affairs. Sycophancy replaced patriotism, hard work and independent thought.⁹

The APC *de facto* political system instituted in 1978 reduced the political space for expression as the independence party SLPP was denied existence as the instigation of violence to coerce loyalty and punish opposition meant that genuine grievances against the state went unaddressed, thus accumulated over time as the APC used state machinery to win electoral contests and define the agenda of the state.

3.2.1 Patron-Clientelism

Patron-clientelism in post-independent African states coincided with the growth of state machinery which was used to fashion cross-ethnic co-operation to create a semblance of unity.¹⁰ The state and government became informal as institutions and structures meant to facilitate overall development were circumvented as proximity to high ranking individuals in APC and government guaranteed one infrastructure contracts, mining, import export or trade licenses, tenders and tax breaks or even material wealth. A case in point is the Lebanese dominance of mining and trade with one such businessman Jamil Said Mohammed at one time running state departments and providing basic services as well as being President Stevens' proxy in appropriation of public wealth¹¹.

⁹ibid

¹⁰See Walle N., "Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss?: The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa," in, Wilkinson S., Kitschelt H., (Eds), *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp 52-64.

¹¹Rashid I., "Student Radicals, Lumpen Youth, and the Origins of Revolutionary Groups in Sierra Leone, 1977-1996," in, Abdullah I., (Ed), *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004), pp 67- 84.

The opposition was deprived of the means of economic development as the traditional chieftain structure was employed to spread the benefits of the patron-client relationship. This undemocratic chieftain system made it despotic and unresponsive to popular demands and was to later form the basis for youth radicalism in their rejection of established state and social structures. The patronage system was evident when Stevens sidestepped the constitution to appoint his successor, Brig. Momoh a military man in 1985. Upon assuming power, Momoh continued this benefits-for-loyalty skewed way of development when he surrounded himself with the "Binkolo mafia"¹² through which one was to reach him and ensure benefits.

3.2.2 Decline in Economic Development

The preoccupation of the political class on acquiring power and wealth through a deeply entrenched patron-clientelism created an unfavorable environment for planned socio-economic progress. Moreover, the exponential growth of state bureaucracy in Keynesian proportions consumed most state revenue that would have been used on infrastructure development. All these factors distorted market forces and directed a corrupt development model along disproportionate lines of favor and loyalty. State resources, such as coffee, diamonds, and rutile became wealth creators for the chosen few who monopolized state power. By 1992, not a single economic sector or activity registered any growth, with declining exports leading to a decline in export revenue.¹³

This was partly attributable to the informalisation of the economy, with many small-scale traders, businessmen and smugglers taking advantage of weak administrative structures, clientelism and poor infrastructure networks (that denied the government access to most of inner Sierra Leone), exploited the prevailing conditions without paying taxes to the central

¹²See Kandeh J., et al, in "Ethnicity and National Identity in Sierra Leone," in, Laremont R., (Ed), *Borders, Nationalism and the African State*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), pp 200-225.

¹³ibid

government. As corruption permeated spheres of government, infrastructure and extension services to agriculture—the major source of income and food for 80 percent of rural livelihoods was abandoned. Social amenities such as schools, health centers, water, and recreation facilities were rundown. This led to a drop in basic indicators such as literacy,¹⁴ life expectancy and general quality of life. Exchange rate overvaluations, subsidies on imported food items while heavily taxing and under-pricing of export produce by such state organs as Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board, poor road networks all made life especially in the rural areas miserable.¹⁵

These internal failures were exacerbated by the effects of globalization as the liberalization push by global financial institutions and western economies conflicted with the prevailing view of the state as the major employer and developmental spur of growth. The desire by Sierra Leone to obtain funding to meet shortfalls in revenue and enable it pay civil servants and provide basic services became conditional on structural adjustment. This meant layoffs, end of subsidies and the removal of regulatory frameworks which had become conduits for siphoning of state resources for local monopolies. Demobilization in the bloated security sector became contentious just as the civil service disapproved of this SAP¹⁶. The Momoh government was forced to balance between securing funding and exacerbating the poor living conditions of his countrymen and women through job losses, reduced income from subsidies and competition from foreign companies.

¹⁴Gordon D., “African Politics,” in Gordon A., Gordon P., (Eds), *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, 3rd Ed, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), pp 69-88.

¹⁵Kpundeh S., “Corruption and Political Insurgency in Sierra Leone,” in, Abdullah I., (Ed), *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004), pp 90-101.

¹⁶See Egwu S., “Beyond ‘Revival of Old Hatreds’: The State and Conflict in Africa,” in, Best S., (Ed), *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader*, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2007), p 425. See also Chweya L., “Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region,” in, Mwagiru M., (Ed), *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2004), pp 32-47.

3.2.3 Militarization of Politics

Sierra Leone witnessed several coups and attempted coups which had devastating effects on the rule of law, promotion of a culture of violence, material gain and the perverse role of the state in development. Siaka Stevens came to power after two successive coups and had to weather five attempted coups. Joseph Momoh, a military man and beneficiary of the patronage of Stevens was overthrown in a coup in 1992 while Captain Valentine Strasser, the beneficiary of this 1992 overthrow of Momoh was also deposed by Joseph Bio in a palace coup in 1996. The military played a major role in shaping the national culture of violence and intolerance that would permeate and shape the course of the conflict, having been in power for over eleven years and being a partner in the Stevens regime for seventeen years. As promoters and beneficiaries of the patron-client system, the military's material gain meant that they had an interest in perpetuating the despotic rule of Stevens. The institution of violence was used to govern civil-military relations and ensure little public resistance to regime appropriation of resources.¹⁷

The advent of global of global economic forces which called for the restructuring of the state meant that the corporate interests of the military was threatened through proposed demobilization, salary cuts and reduced military budget allocations. Furthermore, the instituting of other paramilitary groups by the state threatened their existence while greed and desire for material benefit ensured they had to continue a stranglehold on state resources. The NPRC and AFRC regimes, though coming to power with populist reasons for taking power such as bad

¹⁷See Luckham R., "Military Withdrawal from Politics in Africa Revisited," in Kieh G., Agbese P., (Eds), *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), pp 93-102.

governance, corruption and nepotism, were no better in performance .they stoked the fires of conflict by using their command and obey military culture to subvert constitutional order, promote a culture of intolerance, and a disregard for consultation and dialogue in civil-military relations. It became accepted that for one to get anything or express an opinion, one had to use violence to be noticed.¹⁸

The role of the military in perpetuating conflict is highlighted by Agbese and Decalo who point out that military rule is often followed by civil wars and that the non-cohesive, undisciplined nature of armies makes a complete disengagement from politics very difficult.¹⁹ These views were vindicated by the professional failure of the NPRC to quell the RUF rebellion and the AFRC complicity in the conflict and the overall failure of military rule to spur economic development. The NPRC preoccupation with acquiring diamond wealth, the recruitment of illiterate, undisciplined youth, battlefield capitulations and the lack of a clear strategy to confront the RUF led to the rebels establishing a foothold in the countryside and allowed time to commit crimes, loot and profit from the diamond trade.²⁰ Since both the military and the RUF had an interest in the prolongation of the conflict, it became convenient to engage in *sobel* (soldier by day and rebel by night) activities and blame them on RUF, by trading uniforms, or tactically withdraw in a hurry from a region and leave ammunition that would be useful to rebels. The NPRC, in an attempt to prolong profiteering from conflict, would claim to be fighting a tough

¹⁸See Kieh., "Military Engagement in Politics in Africa," in, Kieh G., Agbese P., (Eds), *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), pp 49-56.

¹⁹See Agbese P., in, "Soldiers as Rulers in Africa," in, Kieh G., Agbese P., (Eds), *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004) pp 58- 72, and Decalo S., *The Stable Minority: Civilian Rule in Africa, 1960-1990*, (Gainesville: Florida Academic Press, 1998), p 4.

²⁰See, Abraham A., "State Complicity as a Factor in Perpetuating the Sierra Leone Civil War," in, Abdullah I., *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004), pp 105-118.

enemy that required time especially when there were calls for democratization.²¹ The NPRC also used the Bintumani Conferences to prolong their stay in power by claiming to embrace peace while not really addressing the issue of conflict.²²

This militarization of the state and the widespread use of violence engendered less cooperation and dialogue. Insecurity, poverty, lawlessness and desire to get rich quickly was what led to vigilantism, the emergence of PMCs, RUF violence and the subsequent entry of ECOMOG, British and UN intervention to stop the violence. The civil defense forces (CDF), comprising of Kamajors, Kapra, Tamabors and Konso Donsors emerged to protect the populace from RUF and elements within the army who turned on the people they were supposed to protect. These CDF would play a major role in providing security and negating warfront gains made by RUF. The Gurkhas, Sandline and EO, initially employed to protect the mining industry and foreign interests were later to be a major part of government security war making and security provision. Sierra Leone literally became a militarized state as various armed groups acquired weapons legally or otherwise in a bid to protect themselves and their interests. Life resembled the Hobbesian state of nature where life was solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short²³ as no effective government existed to supervise state affairs.

3.2.4 The Role of Civil Society and Student Groups

Though civil society was present in the country in the 1960s and 1970s, it was ruthlessly crushed and many members had to flee the country. Labor union activism also played a low-key role in resisting autocratic rule due to the grave consequences of open dissent. The notable exception was when the civil society marshaled public servants to stay away in protest at AFRC

²¹ibid

²²See Kandeh J., "In Search of Legitimacy: The 1996 Elections," in, Abdullah I., *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004), pp 125-137.

²³Hobbes T., *Leviathan*, (London: Penguin Classics, 1968), p 186.

taking power in 1996. Women organizations' role in resolving the conflict was only evident when between 1997 and 2000 they held widespread demonstrations against AFRC and against Foday Sankoh and the continuation of the war. This contributed to the arrest of Sankoh and his ministers and heralded the concerted efforts at peace which led to the end of the civil war in 2002. more civil society groups and religious organizations became influential in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.²⁴Oxfam, MARWOPNET, WANEP, and IRCSL among others were noticeable in the rehabilitation of child soldiers, resettlement of ex-combatants and DDR. Other NGOs allegedly used their contacts with the military and RUF to get access to diamonds and thus becoming part of the conflict as actors.

Student radicalism was more persistent and pronounced since independence and its contribution to the conflict was its espousal of revolutionary ideologies which attracted many unemployed youth who would later be major actors in committing acts of violence on both parts of the divide as volunteers or forced recruits while others became victims of this carnage. Foday Sankoh and his RUF have its origin in this student movement.²⁵ The initiative of the Libyan People's Bureau to sponsor study clubs resulted into strong ideological viewpoints on how to bring about change in society and resistance to autocratic rule. The Fourah Bay College (FBC) became a focal point for the Green Book Study club, the Gardeners club, Mass Awareness and Participation (MAP), and the Pan African Union (PANAFU) among others. Violent clashes with government security machinery became inevitable as radicalism beget open resistance to

²⁴See Konteh R., "Responding to Conflicts: The Role of Civil Society in West Africa," in Best S., (Ed), *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader*, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2007), pp 274- 288.

²⁵Abdullah I., "Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the RUF," in, Abdullah I., (Ed), *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004), pp43-65.

government whose intolerance bred repression. This radical views and the unwillingness of GoSL to dialogue transformed the conflict system from sporadic violence to permanent siege mentality. Several elements in college and society opted to undergo military training in Libya and came back more radicalized and ready to convert more to confrontation with the state as avenues for conflict management became scarce as time went by.

3.2.5 Unemployed Youth and the Culture of Violence

The failure of successive governments to provide education and employment opportunities, coupled with poor standards of living in the countryside led youths to the urban areas in search of a better quality of life and access to job opportunities. As many illiterate youth swelled in Freetown and other urban areas and as they failed to improve their lives they resorted to criminal behavior and abuse of drugs. Revolutionary ideology in their meeting points bred a culture of violence which was exploited by politicians who paid them for errands. These youth eventually made their way to armed groups and the army. Their rejection of the state, the traditional chieftainship and the social fabric led them to extremes in violent conduct.

3.2.6 The Revolutionary United Front

Its origins are in the student movement and the “*rarray* boys” culture of Freetown. It was in these informal settings that Foday Sankoh, a former SLA corporal, and ex-convict for alleged complicity in the attempted 1971 coup, grew his revolutionary credentials. By attending PANAFU meetings and enlisting in the Popular Democratic Front (PDF), he was able to make concrete his claim to power and the means to do so. It was by associating with student radicalism that he, Abu Kanu and Rashid Mansarray (later to be key players in leading RUF war campaign) went to Libya under the Green Book study club umbrella to train in military tactics and conduct of guerrilla warfare in 1987. Upon returning from Libya, this trio was welcomed in Liberia by

Charles Taylor just as a civil war was erupting and Taylor's interest in hosting them became evident. He attempted to gain diamonds to fund his onslaught on the Liberian government. He had been also opposed to the backing Sierra Leone (and Joseph Momoh) had given to ECOMOG that intervened in Liberia in 1990 that allegedly frustrated his bid for power.²⁶ His "Greater Liberia" dream and Sankoh's desire to lead his country somehow became a common denominator as the former gave men and materiel to the latter to launch attacks across the border into South Eastern Sierra Leone. Burkinabe and Guinean interest in profiting from the diamond trade led them to covertly support RUF. *The Basic Document* and *Footpaths to Democracy* became initial guidebooks on how to gain power while violence became the means.

Abdullah attributes the initial RUF violence to NPFL elements who, intoxicated by drug abuse, short of discipline and forming the majority of fighters before RUF embarked on forced conscription, engaged in indiscriminate violence²⁷ which immediately alienated it from the populace and denied it of steady supply of recruits. The rebel movement, in an attempt to replenish its ranks due to attrition, forcibly recruited youth and children as combatants, spies and assistants. Without a clear ideology and common war aim, the RUF used drugs to intoxicate these recruits and turn them into ruthless "Burn House Units," "Cut Hands Commandos," and "Bloodshed Squad"²⁸ while conducting "Operation Feed/Pay Yourself" looting sprees. As the gains from conflict became attractive, peace became a direct challenge to the immediate benefits of war to the RUF and the national army leadership.

²⁶See Alao O., "Diamonds are Forever... but so are Controversies: Diamonds and the Actors in Sierra Leone's Civil War," in, *Journal of Civil Wars*, Vol. 2 No.3(Autumn 1999),pp 47-56.

²⁷Abdullah I., "Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front," in, Abdullah I., *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004), pp 43- 65.

²⁸See Penfold P., "Faith in Resolving Sierra Leone's Bloody Conflict," in, *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 94 No. 382, (October 2005).pp 49-62.

The language of democratic elections, peace agreements often was a reason enough to engage in spates of violence clearly intended to deter potential voters and punish those pushing for political reconciliation as Mitton notes.²⁹ He observes that looting, diamond mining, illicit trade, free reign, fear of peacetime reprisals and prosecution led RUF combatants to cling more to violence as they rejected civilian life as it would guarantee them either jail, death, or joblessness. Illiteracy further clouded their judgment and made them engage in war more and less in public debates about peace.³⁰ The lack of discipline and intellectual capability (many students shied away from the RUF) deprived the RUF of the long-term vision of prosecuting the war and poor structures allowed for combatants to engage in heinous crimes which were tolerated and ensured that the conflict in Sierra Leone became intractable. Moreover, collusion with NPRC and AFRC frustrated peace efforts as sympathizers on both sides seized power in 1996 and 1997 in order to benefit from diamonds.

3.3 The Role of Diamonds in the Conflict

The “resource curse” argument by posits that resource abundance and dependence in a country always result in negative social and economic outcomes which often are the source of poor governance, economic decline and conflict. Gilmore and colleagues concur and provide example-Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Nigeria.³¹ Sierra Leone’s diamondiferous South Eastern region especially Kono District near the borders between Guinea and Liberia were ideal for alluvial mining. This method of mining means that diamond ores are shallow in the ground and can be obtained by the basic of equipments (a pan and shovel)

²⁹Mitton K., “Engaging Disengagement: The Political Reintegration of Sierra Leone’s RUF,” in *Journal on Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol.8, No.2 (May 2008), pp 188- 199.

³⁰ibid

³¹See Wilson S., “Sierra Leone’s Illicit Diamonds: The Challenges and the Way Forward,” in, the *GeoJournal*, Vol. 76, pp 190-205, (October 2009), and Gilmore, et al, “A Diamond Curse?: Civil War and a Lootable Resource,” in, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49, No. 4 , (August 2005),pp 537- 554.

whereas their size-value ratio ensures that they draw a high price and are thus perfect candidates for stealing and smuggling as they are highly portable. So their situation near Sierra Leone's neighbors attracted foreign merchants and ensured that these diamonds could reach Monrovia, Ouagadougou and Conakry easily for onward sale on international markets.

The poor infrastructure developed in these areas denied the government access to these areas to regulate its exploitation. The Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), a British based company was given exclusive rights to mine diamonds but it was unable to expand its reach over all diamond-producing regions thus opening the way for informal groups to control, mine and/or smuggle or export this commodity. Traditional chiefs, Lebanese merchants, PMCs as well as local and foreign miners dominated this sector in the absence of direct GoSL control thus denying it revenue. Government control was at its lowest between 1991 and 2002 which coincided with the extremely violent phase of the conflict. The RUF, upon launching their rebellion from this south eastern region, promptly sought to and eventually controlled diamond mining with Charles Taylor becoming the major facilitator and financier of rebel transactions in the diamond trade as Guinea and Ivory Coast assumed peripheral roles.³² Diamonds from Sierra Leone passed off as legal exports of either of these neighboring countries upon being smuggled out of the country. The exploitation of diamonds by informal groups, the RUF as well as elements in the military assured them of wealth and a steady supply of small arms through the same porous borders.

This trade therefore drew foreign players whose interest in Sierra Leone was to obtain the precious mineral. International arms traffickers, mercenaries, armed groups had an interest in prolonging the war or offering their services in order to be paid in diamonds. They had the

³²See Wilson S, "Sierra Leone's Illicit Diamonds," op cit, p 190-205.

motivation, opportunity and interest to engage in the conflict with diamonds as the target. The failure of the government to control this resource and police its borders denied it the means to buy arms and effectively stop the civil war and allowed more players to join the conflict as perpetrators.

3.4 Private Military Companies

As actors in the conflict, PMCs were present for economic gain. The Gurkhas, Sandline and EO were employed in the mining industry or by the GoSL for security as they were professional and efficient as compared to the military was indisciplined and busy in *sobel* activities or in the diamond trade. Sandline and EO were instrumental in routing RUF out of Freetown in 1996, 1999 and forced it into signing the Abidjan Peace Accord of 1996 and the eventual withdrawal of EO led to the overthrow of the Kabbah government in 1997. Despite their relative success, this came at a cost to Sierra Leone as the GoSL paid exorbitantly for PMC service.

3.5 ECOMOG and the Peace Effort

The conflict drew slow international reaction which failed to stop violence or mitigate the negative effects of the war at the first time of asking. An initial ECOMOG contingent made of Nigerian and Guinean troops deployed to prop the Momoh government was small in stature and failed to stem the RUF onslaught. There were disagreements about a Sierra Leonean ECOMOG presence and the reluctance of Ghana on the modalities to use force and on rules of engagement prevented a bolder presence. Muted political will, small troop levels, poor leadership and the lack of intelligence on the conflict situation ensured a disjointed response. The international response only became consensual and concerted when the AFRC regime took power at the expense of the democratically elected Tejan Kabbah government in 1996. Sanctions by the

Commonwealth and ECOWAS were supported by a Security Council resolution on 8 October 1997 under Chapters VII and VIII provisions.

Battlefront defeats orchestrated by ECOMOG and mercenaries and rising international pressure forced the GoSL and RUF to sign the Abidjan Peace Accord on 13 November 1996 which however offered no real incentives for peace and its amnesty provisions were criticized for its lack of justice and accountability by rewarding RUF with government positions while clearly committing crimes against humanity.³³The RUF and its leader by virtue of this accord controlled the Vice Presidency and the diamond industry thus allowing them time and resources to restock for the war effort. The ECOWAS-brokered Conakry Peace Plan on 23 October 1997 saw the AFRC commit to handing over power but this was never fulfilled due to the lures of benefitting from the war in the form of diamond and looting. Soldiers opposed any handover of power as it would deprive them of easy pay something that never happened under civilian rule.

ECOMOG later reinforced their positions under Nigerian leadership and was effective in sustaining Kabbah's government. Rivalries within national contingents and the death of Sani Abacha, the main benefactor of this mission led to the eventual withdrawal of ECOMOG in 2000, effectively handing over control of the security situation to the UN which had not been fully established on the ground. The Abuja Ceasefire Agreements of 10 November 2000 and 2 May 2001 led to the eventual halt in hostilities, DDR process and the effective establishment of UNAMSIL to replace UNOMSIL and supervise peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts as the civil war eventually run out of steam in 2002.

³³See Mitton K., "Engaging Disengagement," op cit pp 188- 199.

3.6 Impact of the Sierra Leone Conflict

This conflict had devastating effects on almost every sphere of Sierra Leone life. The state failed to provide security, development and quality of life. As it concentrated on the war effort, it neglected other sectors of the economy leading to total institutional collapse. This was the final nail on the coffin as the state had suffered years of erosion to corrupt patron-client relationships. State wealth was rundown or manipulated for private gain thus negatively impacting on the road and rail system, hospitals, schools and colleges, and clean water which became known more by their unavailability and poor state. The attendant effect on quality of life was evident; life expectancy reduced to as low as 37.9, adult literacy of 31 years in 2000 while school going years fell to 2.9.³⁴ Over a decade of Sierra Leone time was lost in war which cost billions of Leones which could have contributed to economic development.

The social fabric became disrupted and people became foreigners in their own country as they were displaced and always on the move both to escape RUF or Army attacks and avoid recruitment into these war machines. The normal way of life was replaced by suspicion, anger, violence, uncertainty about the future leading to a fall in GDP levels. The failure of the state to provide security led to a serious threat to human security challenges to the people and necessitated a response of any kind. 2.5 million people were displaced at least once during the conflict, 80,000 people lost their lives while 20,000³⁵ sustained permanent reminders of the war through maim injuries and over 5,000 child soldiers served in the war.

³⁴Human Development Report, 2000, UNDP. See also Kpundeh S., "Corruption and Political Insurgency in Sierra Leone," in, Abdullah I., (Ed), *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004), pp 90-101.

³⁵See Malan M. et al, *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone*, op cit, p 12

The efficacy of peace efforts was to restore faith in human life and give purpose to living, institute reconciliation efforts, facilitate the re-establishment of institutions to provide basic services, ensure the rule of law and accountability while promoting co-operation and interaction in economic development efforts. These institutions were to also foster a spirit of dialogue, democratic participation to ensure that the government is responsive and answerable to the people. The withdrawal of foreign players from Sierra Leone and international co-operative efforts to walk Sierra Leone through healing reconciliation and state building was required. The absence of deep ethnic and religious chasms in society offered hope for a faster return to normalcy if a political culture of tolerance was to be cultivated through civic education and legislation.

3.7 Conclusion

The conflict in Sierra Leone was long-running having its roots in the colonial state structure and the eventual failure of the post-colonial state to take its rightful place in securing its borders, establish its presence across the country (by making all areas governable through accessible road, rail, postal networks), inability and failure to institute and sustain an independent judiciary, establish a professional police and army units, cultivate a culture of accountability through checks and balances and an independent media and most important of all checking rampant poverty and corruption. International partners through their national or regional interests (or lack of them), failed to bring successive regimes to account especially in the Cold War era as a result perpetuating this structural conflict.

The ensuing violent conflict in 1991 was therefore no surprise to keen watchers of the Sierra Leone situation. It was long time coming. The war itself was a case of banditry with self-seeking greed fueling it and to call it a civil war will require a reconceptualization of the classical

definition of a civil war as players often switched sides with rebels and the army sharing common interests in the war-benefiting from diamond wealth and through looting with no long-term aim defining the war objective. Civilians became targets as both groups sought to make political statements through attacks on these unarmed defenseless victims. The intention was always to scare them into conceding to the futility of peace and ensure the war continues. It was not an all-out clash between two identifiable groups seeking conflicting agendas which were known.

The war took a decade to end due to this convergence of interests and the muted international response which could be attributable to; lack of political will, the conflict failing to attract enough publicity, reluctance to engage into another Rwanda or Somalia, preoccupation with the war against terrorism and the fact that there were too many international players in the conflict making it difficult to solve.

Chapter Four

A Case Study of UN Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone

4.0 Introduction

The Abidjan Peace Accord and the Lome Peace Agreement were viewed as major steps towards realizing the objective of peace through the halting of hostilities, disarmament and overall reconciliation. The participation and engagement of rebels in the peace effort was interpreted as a clear indication of the desire for peace and no defection from this quest was foreseen. The United Nations observer mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was therefore incorporated into the peace drive to ostensibly facilitate the transition to peaceful co-existence envisaged in the Abidjan accord. When, however, this mission encountered spoiler behavior on the ground, a rethink of the magnitude of response by the UN was warranted. This came in the form of UNAMSIL (United Nations mission in Sierra Leone). This chapter brings to the fore the nature of UN response to the Sierra Leone conflict. It highlights the role that this global body played in maintaining international peace and security through examination of the West African country's case study.

4.1 Background to UN Presence

When the RUF, with the backing of Charles Taylor, transformed the Sierra Leone conflict to a more violent phase in 1991, ECOMOG responded by deploying Nigerian and Guinean contingents to suppress this rebellion. This initial minor presence did little to stop RUF incursion and entrenchment in the south and southeast of the country. Through a combination of factors, ranging from professional negligence, indiscipline, lack of clear military strategy poor equipment, low morale, the NPRC junta of Captain Strasser was unable to repulse the RUF

onslaught and thereby prolonging the conflict¹. As the NPRC was dealing with this military threat, there was a concerted domestic and international pressure for it to disengage from the political sphere and allow for a return to civilian rule. Eventually, national elections were held on 26 and 27 February 1996. With no major efforts so far done to stop the fighting, the Kabbah government had to contend with a spiraling wave of attacks from RUF and *sobel* elements which culminated in the overthrow of Kabbah in a 25 May 1997 coup which put AFRC and RUF in power. With all intents and purposes, this new regime took little interest in peace and democratization. The Abidjan Peace Plan of 23 October 1997, and the ECOWAS sanctions regime (which was backed by UN Security Council Resolution 1131 of 8 October 1997) were met by intransigence and violations of the peace plan by the Koroma junta. It took the concerted military efforts from ECOMOG, CDF and Sandline to remove this APRC regime and restore Kabbah to power on 10 March 1998.

The quest for peace however culminated in the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999 which ushered in new optimism for the prospects of peace even though the agreement was vilified for its appeasement of RUF and blanket amnesty provisions. It was this scenario which made the UN to consider the presence of a peacekeeping force as the signing of Lome Peace Agreement coincided with an impending ECOMOG pull-out which would have left a serious gap in a volatile security situation.²

¹See Abraham A., "State Complicity as a Factor in Perpetuating the Sierra Leone Civil War," in, Abdullah I., (Ed), *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004), pp 107-116.

²See Olonisakin F., "Nigeria, ECOMOG and the Sierra Leone Crisis," in, Abdullah I., (Ed), *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004), pp 232-235.

4.2 Initial UN Presence

Mr. Felix Mosha, upon appointment by the secretary general in December 1994, was tasked with exploring the possibilities of dialogue between the NPRC and RUF. His duties were taken over by the Special Envoy of the Secretary General to Sierra Leone, Mr. Berhanu Dinka, who besides working with ECOWAS and OAU to negotiate a settlement to the conflict, was to assess the humanitarian and economic situation and report on the necessary course of action.³ This low-key UN presence would continue up to March 1998 when the Security Council, upon the restoration of democratic rule, ended the 1997sanctions regime and strengthened the office of the Special Envoy, according it more roles and augmenting its status by adding military liaison officers and security advisory personnel.⁴

The Abidjan peace process provided the convenient basis on which to establish UNOMSIL as had been the case in previous peacekeeping missions which were established to oversee the implementation of a pre-signed peace agreement. UNOMSIL was established by Security Council resolution 1181 of 13 July 1998 and was mandated to oversee the implementation of disarmament demobilization and reintegration of rebel fighters and the restructuring of GoSL security forces as well as observing the halt in hostilities and facilitate humanitarian efforts occasioned by the displacement of people. The volatility of the security situation on the ground especially between December 1998 and March 1999 meant that security of this UNOMSIL skeletal staff could not be guaranteed as its weak mandate and capability meant that UNOMSIL had relied largely on the consent and goodwill of adversaries to the conflict who, expected to accord it full co- operation did the opposite thus leading to the premature end of UNOMSIL.

³Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Sierra Leone, (S/1995/975), November 1995, para 5.

⁴UN Security Council Resolution 1162/1998 of 17 April 1998.

4.3 Establishment of UNAMSIL

The hasty withdrawal of UNOMSIL and the impending exit of ECOMOG implied that barring any other international response, Sierra Leone would degenerate further into bloodshed and lawlessness. The signing of the Lome peace agreement on 7 July 1999 however restored the fading hopes of achieving peace and provided the platform on which a bolder UN presence could be re-established in the country. Indeed, Article XIII of the Lome agreement had called for the rehatting of ECOMOG troops to a peacekeeping force pending withdrawal and its eventual replacement with an enlarged UN force.⁵ It was on this basis that three months after the signing of the Lome peace agreement on 22 October 1999 the UN Security Council under Resolution 1270 authorized the secretary general to establish a united mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) with an initial maximum authorized strength of 6,000 military personnel including 260 military observers.⁶

4.4 The Character and Mandate of UNAMSIL

Unlike UNOSMIL, UNAMSIL was established under the Chapter VII ambit of the Charter which authorized the “use of all necessary means” to enforce compliance with the mission’s objectives. This peace enforcement capability implied that consent could be forced to enforce UNAMSIL’s objectives. A larger armed and well equipped force was required to enforce the mandate of the mission which was to provide security to UN and GoSL in order to facilitate DDR, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.⁷ The revised mandate of UNAMSIL as contained in Security Council resolution 1289 of 7 February 2000 detailed the role of this

⁵See Francis d, et al, *Dangers of Co-Deployment*, op cit, p 143.

⁶<www.un.org/dpko>

⁷UN Security Council Resolution 1270/1999 of 12 October 1999.

peacekeeping force in providing security during DDR and at DDR sites, at government institutions and key infrastructure centers to facilitate UN work in peace enforcement and humanitarian aid.

4.5 Deployment and Initial Challenges

The lack of sufficient transport and the subsequent slow movement into the interior of the country, the lack of intelligence on the situation on the ground and poor communication made UNAMSIL vulnerable to RUF attack. A poor command structure furthermore resulted in the divergent interpretations of mandate and rules of engagement; a disaster in waiting which became reality when in May 2000, the RUF attacked UNAMSIL positions in the north, killing, wounding many and taking hostage over 500 personnel and appropriating military hardware.⁸

A premature end to UNAMSIL presence was only saved by a British unilateral intervention, which alarmed by the threat this fluid security situation posed to its nationals and interests deployed in Freetown, immediately securing the Lungi airport and key roads and government installations. This rapid British deployment and its success in rescuing its troops captured by the West Side Boys, a civil defense force, emboldened the British to lend a hand to a flailing UNAMSIL presence. Further challenges however, befell the mission when a row broke out between mission commander Vijay Jetley and the Nigerian contingent with the former accusing the latter of complicity in the diamond trade and in sabotaging the mission. This fall-out led to the pull-out of Nigerian, Indian and Jordanian contingents and the replacement of Jetley with Lieutenant General Daniel Opande in November 2000. The first year of UN operations was

⁸Malan M, et al, *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone*, op cit p 23.

therefore, wasted in slow deployment, poor logistical support, rebel defection from the Lome Peace Agreement, poor organization of the mission, low morale and infighting among staff.

4.6 UNAMSIL Renewal and Task Performance

The change of guard at the helm of the mission coincided with the signing of the Abuja ceasefire agreement on 10 November 2000 and the incarceration of Foday Sankoh and his replacement with Issa Sessay. The ceasefire agreement, signed between GoSL and RUF, set the framework for a halt in hostilities, the disarmament of RUF in a DDR programmes and mandated UNAMSIL to observe these commitments while ensuring that GoSL restores its authority in the whole of Sierra Leone and restructures its army. This road map to peace was consolidated by the Abuja Ceasefire Review Agreement of 2 May 2001 which, noting the positive effects made in observing the ceasefire, the DDR programmes, freedom of movement and GoSL extension of state authority, pointed at the challenges in disarmament, release of RUF detainees, transformation of RUF into a political party and return of refugees as areas worth attention by all the parties.

Spoiler activities had been reduced significantly and there was a renewed push for peace with UNAMSIL leading the way. The renewal of UNAMSIL was assured when the Security Council first approved a concept of operation (CONOPS) for year 2001 and then imposing economic sanctions on Liberia for aiding the RUF.⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 1346 of 30 March 2001 expanded UNAMSIL strength to 17,500 military personnel and troop deployment arrived faster than before. All these events and developments made clear the mission mandate and reinvigorated UNAMSIL as evidenced in subsequent gains in security, disarmament and capacity building.

⁹Findlay T., *The Use of Force in UN Operations*, p 310

4.6.1 Provision of Security

The initial setback encountered in the first year of UNAMSIL's operation provided key learning points on cohesion among the many national contingents, adopting a common doctrine on peace enforcement and the need to formulate a single operating procedure and training on rules of engagement and conduct in the field. By the end of 2001, UNAMSIL had been successful in establishing its presence in the country leading to the dramatic decline in rebel activity. On the other hand, GAF attacks on rebel positions on the Liberian-Guinean border and the resumption of disarmament reduced RUF options and forced it to rethink the cost of continuing with the war and embracing peace. The incarceration of Sankoh and his replacement with Sessay rekindled hopes of peace and the carrot approach of transforming RUF into a political party after the DDR programmes proved attractive to the new RUF leadership. The strides made by UNAMSIL in laying the foundation for positive peace were evident when in January 2002, an end to fighting was declared. Relative calm and peace would characterize the remainder of UNAMSIL stay in Sierra Leone until eventual withdrawal in December 2005.

4.6.2. Security Sector Reform and Britain's Impact

The rebuilding of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) and the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) began in earnest in mid 2001 and picked up pace with the major contribution of Britain's International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT). Jolted by a historical sense of responsibility, pressure from the British media and Sierra Leonean exiles, coupled with the presence of British nationals and interests in Sierra Leone, Britain deployed specialist forces whose initial evacuation plan was expanded to include the rehabilitation of security infrastructure in the country.¹⁰

¹⁰See Schumer T., *New Humanitarianism: Britain and Sierra Leone 1997-2003* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p 60.

With UNAMSIL facilitation, Britain instituted the Military Reintegration Programmes (for training and absorption of ex-combatants into the army) and the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programmes (SILSEP) to oversee the overall restructuring of the security forces. The objective of these initiatives was to institute a military culture in a professional army that is under the control of the civilian administration. At the end of this exercise, Britain and UNAMSIL had assembled a combined force of approximately 16,000.

4.6.3. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

The Lome Peace Agreement had established the framework for DDR but the twin Abuja Ceasefire Agreements set specific time lines in its implementation. The initial attempts at disarmament were thwarted in early 2000 by RUF which denied UNAMSIL access to its strongholds and escalated attacks on personnel as well as civilians. This hostility and the fact that UNAMSIL was under strength and still grappling with operational challenges meant that little reconstructive progress was made. This was to change in 2001 with new deployments, British assistance and the signing of the Abuja agreements. A National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) was established to co-ordinate these efforts with support coming from UNAMSIL, ECOMOG and donor funds. Some of which were pledged at a 2001 Paris conference.

Setbacks were encountered in the low turn-out of the ex-combatants partly due to RUF preventing its combatants from participating in the DDR exercise. Lack of awareness of the benefits of the programmes and uncertainty about the future was also a major factor. Another problem facing the disarmaments officers was insecurity at DDR sites and inadequate logistics of housing combatants awaiting disarmaments and lack of funds to resettle these disarmed fighters.

Furthermore, combatants were surrendering low quality weapons and the ratio of collected arms to ex-combatants was unproportional.¹¹

The DDR exercise however picked up pace in 2001, and by the end of the year, 36,741 combatants had been disarmed (12,087 RUF, 24,456 CDF and 198 AFRC /ex-SLA) which brought the total to over 50,000 ex-combatants. In 2001 alone 13,500 weapons and 2.3 million assorted pieces of ammunition were collected.¹² A reinsertion package of \$300 was paid to ex-combatants upon successful disarmament. This transitional safety net allowance (TSA) was to facilitate their re-entry into normal life in their home districts and assist them to start rebuilding their lives. By the end of 2003, the process had been declared a success and officially over by the government.

4.6.4 Electoral Assistance

With the official declaration of the end in the war in January 2002, the holding of elections became a key marker in this transition from war to peace and a break from years of authoritarian and military rule to representative majority rule. A National Electoral Commission (NEC) was constituted to organize the holding of election on 14 May 2002. Through UNAMSIL facilitation, the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR), the Commission for Consolidation of Peace (CCP) and NEC organized a national consultative conference from 13 to 15 November 2001. It brought together representatives of political parties, civil society and government to set the roadmap for elections and foster peaceful dialogue and engagement.

¹¹See Third Report of the Secretary General on United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (S/2000/186), 7 March 2000, para 24

¹²Twelfth Report of the Secretary General on United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, (S/2001/1195), 13 December 2001, para 15.

UNAMSIL provided technical assistance, assisted the SLP in provision of security and ensured the smooth execution of voter registration, boundary delimitation and resettlement of refugees.¹³

4.6.6 Justice and Reconciliation

The Special Court was established through a bilateral agreement between the UN and GoSL upon a Security Council Resolution of 14 August 2000 to try individuals who bore the greatest responsibility of crimes committed from 30 November 1996. Though lacking a Chapter VII mandate like the ICTR and ICTY, the Court was superimposed on the local courts and member countries of the UN were expected to co-operate with it. The Special Court commenced trials on 3 June 2004 with trials of RUF and CDF affiliated individuals such as Isa Sessay, Moinina Fofana, Moris Kallon and Hinga Norman.

A Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established through an act of parliament in 2000 but due to logistical challenges the commission only began operation 2 years later. It sought to establish the causes, nature and extend of gross human rights violation and determine the culpability of individuals, groups or state organs and the role of both internal and external actors in the conflict. The TRC traversed the country and engaged ordinary people in collecting valuable oral data from witnesses, victims and perpetrators. The Special Court and the TRC were marked departures from the blanket amnesty provisions of Lome Peace Agreement which had been widely criticized as creating a poor post-conflict peace building environment for both victims and perpetrators. Further efforts were spear headed by UNAMSIL in reviving the courts which had come under attack from rebels and renegade soldiers who saw them as threats to their wild and untamed quest for instant wealth. Collaborations between UNAMSIL and the civil society also facilitated programmes dealing with curbing the regional trade in small arms,

¹³Ibid. See also Malan M., et al, *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone*, p 46.

promoting the role of women in peacebuilding, civic education on democracy and good governance and gender mainstreaming activities.¹⁴

4.6.7 Economic and Social Development

UNAMSIL facilitated the return to normalcy and to economic processes. The end of the war assured the country of peace and an end to displacement of people and such illegal activities as banditry, looting, smuggling of mineral resources. The rebuilding and rehabilitation of infrastructure and extension of government control and services promoted a resumption in agricultural production, natural resource mining and trade within Sierra Leone and with its regional and international trade partners.

While recognizing the negative role played by conflict diamonds in fueling the Sierra Leone conflict and the positive role it will play in inspiring economic growth if in GoSL control, the UN Security Council through Resolution 1306 of 5 July 2000 imposed a ban on the direct or indirect import of rough diamonds from the country not controlled by GoSL through a certificate of origin regime. A subsequent Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) drastically reduced rebel control of the diamond trade.¹⁵ Moreover the supervised withdrawals of mercenaries, illegal merchants and regional brokers and extension of government control promoted licensing and mining production culminating in higher production numbers and thus a larger revenue base for the government. The UN, working closely with international financial institutions and NGOs extended budgetary and developmental support to Sierra Leone in the form of loans and fostered the establishment of small and medium business enterprises. The infusion of foreign direct investment further boosted production, thereby creating employment.

¹⁴See Oluoyemi-kusa D., "Gender, Peace and Conflict in Africa," op cit. p 221.

¹⁵See *Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War*, (UN Document, Department of Public Information).

The rehabilitation of educational institutions and health facilities saw enrolment in primary schools rise to 59 percent and immunization rates rise to 70 percent in 2002. Further gains were witnessed in life expectancy and adult literacy levels while the GDP grew by 5.4 percent.¹⁶ Government control of the mining sector translated into bigger revenues from a low of \$10 million in 2000 to a high of \$9 million in 2005.¹⁷

4.7 Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement?

UNOMSIL was the first tangible response and instituted on traditional peacekeeping lines but this time in an internal setting. It was established to supervise the implementation of a cease fire and disarmament outlined by the Abidjan Peace Accord. Essentially being an observer force, it was mainly made up of a small number of military observers and civilian officials, who operating under a Chapter VI mandate relied on the goodwill of the signatories to the Abidjan agreement to facilitate its activities by consenting to its presence and committing themselves to peace. In reciprocation, the observer force would be impartial and avoid using force to upset the existing equilibrium and balance of power among the adversaries. This gentleman's agreement collapsed in the face of UNOMSIL as rebels defected from the agreement and not only attacked their foes but also attacked the peacekeepers. UNOMSIL, only allowed to defend itself but in reality having less than 400 largely unarmed members and relying on ECOMOG to defend itself, could not continue its mission and had to pull out.

The failure of the peacekeeping nature of UNOMSIL and the worsening of the situation in

¹⁶Sixteenth Report of the Secretary General, p 32.

¹⁷Twenty-Seventh Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (S/2005/777), 12 December 2005, para 37.

Sierra Leone was hoped to be the basis on which the UN would launch a more robust response. The inception of UNAMSIL in October 1999 failed to distinguish it from its predecessor though having more roles; it was mainly tasked with supervising the cessation of hostilities as agreed upon in the Lome Peace Agreement. UNAMSIL's resemblance to its predecessor extended to the low capacity in personnel levels and lack of an enforcement capability. The UN found itself in a *déjà vu* situation in May 2000 similar to what had occurred in mid 1999 as the UN force once again failed to protect itself while the country degenerated further into lawlessness.

The clarification of the mandate and the expansion of capabilities enabled UNAMSIL to have a peace enforcement posture which was crucial to the achievement of the peacekeeping objective. Through Operation Focus Relief (OFR), these forces underwent training in peacekeeping and were well equipped with weapons and ammunition.¹⁸ When they combined with the remnants of the Sierra Leone army and police, they totaled over 20,000 thus being a credible deterrent force to the over 40,000 rebel militia. The use of force to enforce the military objectives of the mission and hence ensuring consent to this mission changed UNAMSIL from a fence sitter to an impartial force ready to enforce compliance with the mandate. The negotiation of the Abuja Ceasefire Agreements was a testimony to this rejuvenation of UNAMSIL and once issues of security had been sorted, the mission proceeded with the peacebuilding aspects.

4.8 An Assessment of UN Intervention

The lack of consensus in intervening in Liberia had a negative impact on the international response in Sierra Leone. The failure of the UN Security Council to intervene at the first time of asking and divisions in ECOWAS translated into a weak and muted intervention criteria in

¹⁸ Malan M., "New Tools in the Box?: Towards a Stand by Force for the AU," in Shannon F., *Peace in Africa: Towards A Collaborative Security Regime*, (Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2004), pp 202-209.

Liberia based on humanization concerns.¹⁹ In Sierra Leone, the UN intervention was characterized by indecision and a failure to anticipate the worst-case scenario the conflict would take.²⁰ It took the UN four years from the flare-up in hostilities in 1991 to initiate a presence and eight years to determine that there was a threat to international peace and security. The initial lack of a credible deterrent capacity, poor co-operation between TCCs and the Secretariat and absence of an enforcement capability prolonged the time frame within which the mission was to carry out its task thus incurring extra costs.

The legitimization of the RUF through its incorporation in the peace process had threatened to derail peace efforts as it was viewed as acquiescing with the rebel movement's brutal attacks on civilians. This perception of UN's perceived appeasement policy only changed with the 2002 electoral defeat of the RUF party and the special court proceedings against RUF right hand men. It can be observed that the UN intervention in Sierra Leone was a poor test case and an example of how not to intervene in a volatile situation and that the pragmatic approach of "learning by doing" could have gone disastrously wrong had the British unilateral intervention not been forthcoming.

4.9 An Assessment of UN Performance

The focus of peacekeeping after the Cold War has been on facilitating sustainable peace and the creation of a safe habitat for human existence.²¹ The transition from negative peace (a halt in hostilities) to an emphasis on sustainable peace (human security and development) meant an essentially peacebuilding nature of UN peacekeeping missions which will be analyzed as below.

¹⁹ Aboagye F., "The ECOWAS Security Regime and the Utility for Africa," in *Peace in Africa: Towards A Collaborative Security Regime*, (Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2004), p 168

²⁰ See Annan K., *Common Destiny*, New Resolve, op cit, p 11

²¹ Amneus D., "Rethinking Security: Humanitarian Intervention in the Age of Human Security-A Responsibility to Protect?" In, Torpman-Svansberg K., Amneus D., (Eds), *Peace and Security: Current Challenges in International Law*, (Stockholm: Studentlitteretur, 2004), p 340.

4.9.1 Peace and Security

A measure of the progress the UN made in establishing peace and security is the relative peace enjoyed in Sierra Leone since 2001 and the non-occurrence of large-scale violence. UNAMSIL overcame the initial challenges to consolidate its presence across the country thus providing safe areas for civilians to shelter, deterring rebel attacks and thus containing rebel activity to localized areas. Peacekeepers had to confront spoilers to the peace process whose numerous and amorphous factions challenged the prospects for peace. The eventual matching of resources to the mandate demonstrated a sense of purpose to confront defectors and diminish the benefits of war making.²² By creating conditions for a mutually hurting stalemate, UNAMSIL coerced rebels to abandon the zero-sum objective of winning the war and embrace co-operation in the peace effort. The desire to demonstrate good will, commitment and mutual trust resulted in the Abuja agreements which became binding statements of intent to resolve the conflict. It can be noted that the absence of defection from these agreements signified the end of unilateral pursuit of war aims to a joint co-operation effort at returning Sierra Leone to peace. Relative peace and calm followed a halt in hostilities and enabled civilians to return to normal life as their security was, unlike before assured.

The international nature of the conflict meant that mercenary involvement and the role of regional countries in aiding rebels in the form of small arms purchases through proceeds from the diamond trade had to be addressed. The withdrawal of EO and fighters from Liberia reduced the number of players in the conflict while GAF attacks on rebel positions near the Guinea-Sierra Leone and Liberia borders reduced rebel activity on the border. Moreover co-ordinate UN patrols on both sides of the border in Sierra Leone and Liberia restored security to the border and

²² See Sambanis N., "How Strategic is UN Peacebuilding?" In, Phillpott D., Powers G., (Eds), *Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p 150.

diamond mining areas thus minimizing illicit trade and smuggling of the natural resource while allowing the GoSL to establish its presence. The long-term security in Sierra Leone is however to a large extent dependent on security in the Manu River Union so that cross-border rebel activity and trade in small arms is eliminated to ensure state control of border areas.²³

4.9.2 Peacebuilding

The justification for peacekeeping efforts to incorporate the element of peacebuilding are based on the argument that many settled conflicts revert back to warfare within five years after settlement due to failure to address the roots of conflicts.²⁴ Karbo observes that “peacebuilding seeks to address the root causes and effects of conflicts by restoring broken relationships, promoting reconciliation, institution-building and political reform, as well as facilitating economic transformation.”²⁵ This multiple approach to peacekeeping and the close attention it gives to the aspects of good governance, legitimacy and democratic rule borrows from Emanuel Kant’s liberal peace proposition that posits that states governed by democratic ideals and representative governments have strong check on the propensity to war characteristic of autocratic regimes.²⁶ At the state level this implies that a state where there is rule of law and democratization will generate less conflict and more co-operation, peace and development.

²³ See The Sixteenth Report of the Secretary General, op cit, para 8.

²⁴ Phillipott D., “Introduction: Searching for Strategy in an Age of Peacebuilding?” In, Phillipott D., Powers G., (Eds), *Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp4-34

²⁵ Karbo T., “Peacebuilding in Africa,” in, Francis D., *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, (London: Zed Books, 2008), pp 115-129.

²⁶ See arguments on liberal peace in Brown M, et al, (Eds), *Debating The Democratic Peace: An International Security Reader*, (Cambridge: The Mitts Press, 1996).

4.9.2.1 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

The initiation of this DDR push was to deny adversaries to the conflict the tools of war which were used to transform the conflict into a more violent destructive phase. By demobilizing and re-integrating combatants into civilian life, the UN attempted to break the organized structure of violence and remove individuals from the pre-occupation and mentality of war and the belief that war is the unlimited solution to ideological and societal differences. Reintegration was supposed to foster co-operation among people. Besides this, the national aim of DDR was to disassemble the various factions which possessed the utility of violence which was used for individual or sectarian interests and not for the benefit of the whole nation. DDR was therefore to eventually ensure the control of the monopoly of violence in the exclusive hands of national security apparatus which would use it for the common interest and under civilian control.

The legal reference point for this DDR programmes was initially the Lome peace agreement but this was superseded by the Abuja Ceasefire Agreements of 2000 and 2001. Early setbacks in 1999 and 2000 due to the escalation in rebel activity, reluctant to disarm, insecurity at DDR sites, low personnel levels and poor co-ordination became learning points and UNAMSIL was able to mop up arms, demobilize combatants and reintegrate them by the end of 2002. The lack of funding would however ensure that not all combatants were paid reinsertion packages and thus posed a threat to peace as they could likely be lured back to fighting. The proliferation of arms in the West Africa region also threatened Sierra Leonean peace as conflict configurations were witnessed in Liberia, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Guinea Bissau. The largely porous nature of these West African borders means that in the event of state instability in one or more countries, the likelihood of a contagion effect in other countries is high in terms of the proliferation of small arms through borders and the safe haven provided to rebels in an unstable country.

4.9.2.2 Democratization and Rule of Law

One of the roots of the Sierra Leone conflict was the many years of autocratic and military rule which fostered corrupt patron-client relationships, self aggrandizement from state resources especially diamonds, and the lack of accountability of state officers and non-participation of citizens in state affairs. The role of UNAMSIL was to reverse this scenario and facilitate the return of the country to democracy and rule of law. With democracy viewed as the pre-eminent political system of choice to assure long term stability, Sambanis wonders how a society emerging from decades of authoritarian dictatorships and militarization of politics smoothly transition to democracy.²⁷ The liberal peace argument avers that a democratic nation-state manages conflict well through its participatory governance structure and the respect for human rights and the rule of law thus ensuring peaceful co-existence.

UNAMSIL facilitated the conversion of RUF from a rebel group into a political party in a preparatory phase leading to the 2002 elections. The UN mission offered assistance to NEC in demarcating electoral boundaries, voter registration, and civic education in an inclusive consultative process. The resettlement of IDPs and refugees enlarged the voting populace while peace and security across most of the country ensured a national vote. The whitewash of the RUF in the elections raised questions about the efficacy of the winner-takes-all democracy and the limited alternative avenues that could be used by the RUF party and other electoral losers in furthering their positions in an APC/SLPP dominated system but the RUF rejection by the populace served as a lesson to rebel movements' lack of genuine political goals in their war aims and the often negative use of civilians in the divisive quest for political power.

The rehabilitation of the judiciary, the return to democracy and the establishment of the

²⁷ Sambanis N., "How Strategic is UN Peacebuilding?" op cit, pp 138- 156.

Special Court were pointers to a new era of accountability and rule of law. This was to signify the end of the culture of violence; a break from the culture of entitlement of leaders to rule without checks while enriching themselves with state resources. Though a semblance of order was instituted in Sierra Leone, there are still challenges to be faced as corruption is still rampant and security organs (especially the police) are far from professional organs cultured in human rights and rule of law.

4.9.2.3 Statebuilding and Economic Development

The calamitous collapse of the Sierra Leone state through years of patron-client relationships substituted service to the people to the use of state institutions for the selfish self-help of the politically correct. National resources and state processes became the means to wealth acquisition while the poor wallowed in economic ruin. UNAMSIL was tasked with assisting the national government to re-establish and reform key state institutions to ensure service delivery to citizens, promote interactions and foster general economic development. The intention was to heighten the visibility of government across the country and thus promote its legitimacy. Economic development was to generate enough national wealth to be distributed across the nation thereby eliminating marginalization, poverty, engage as many citizens in peaceful development activity and thus eradicate one of the major causes of the conflict.

UNAMSIL together with donor agencies and development partners provided funding and technical assistance in establishment of ministries, the school infrastructure, licensing and supervisory agencies in the agricultural, trade, and mining sectors. The alleviation of poverty was expected to be addressed through the model of economic liberalization where the Sierra Leone economy was to be integrated into the global economy through the creation of a neo-liberal *laissez faire* economy. The importance of economic development in peacebuilding is underscored

by Sambanis and Collier. The former stresses that a return to war is minimized if a firm foundation for economic development is laid²⁸ while the latter finds that countries at great risk of civil war also experience high levels of inequality.²⁹

The role of economic growth in spurring economic development and addressing inequalities were put to doubt by the UNDP Human Development Report of 2005 which argued that there was no evidence to show the correlation between liberalization and development more so in developing countries.³⁰ Another impediment to wholesome economic benefits to all is the complex nature of relationship Sierra Leone finds itself as it interacts with IFIs, multinational corporations, neighboring states (through regional integration efforts) and other bilateral donors. These interactions are mainly characterized by power and inequality and more often than not Sierra Leone is required to acquiesce to conditionalities in order to get its share of international trade. Tax cuts, subsidies and government control of weak but crucial sectors of economy are viewed as impediments to foreign aid inflows, FDI, and trade with regional and international partners. In such settings, the state is therefore precluded from altering market forces to address inequality in society lest it attracts a reduction in much-needed aid inflows or investment cash. Moreover, any attempts to diversify the economy and prevent overreliance on diamonds would be interpreted to mean interference in market forces yet overreliance on diamond revenue breeds corruption and fosters neglect of other sectors of the economy.

The structure of economic liberalization promotes inequality in society and denies the state an opportunity to address these inequalities. Furthermore, economic growth often results in job

²⁸ Ibid, pp 142-145.

²⁹ Collier and colleagues are quoted by Smith J., "Economic Globalization and Strategic Peacebuilding," in, Phillpott D., Powers G., (Eds), *Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in A Violent World*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp 142-153.

³⁰ *International Co-operation at a Crossroads*, the UNDP Human Development Report 2005: (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p 119.

losses (especially in non-performing industries which are no match for MNCs), environmental destruction and vulnerability to international markets.³¹

4.10. Challenges and Key Learning Points

The UN's involvement in Sierra Leone was not a smooth affair and the incremental nature of its response can be viewed as an attempt to remedy shortcomings and put on course a derailed mission. Though succeeding to a large extent in establishing peace and in implementing peacebuilding elements of DDR, electoral reform, institution-building justice and reconciliation, there were challenges which threatened to end the mission before its time. The initial dismal nature of the response in terms of a weak mandate and non-existent resources led to UNAMSIL's pre-mature end and the same mistakes were made UNAMSIL though through British assistance and the subsequent strengthening of the mission, catastrophe was avoided. Poor standard operating procedures exemplified in the unstructured deployments initial impact of this UN presence which was not helped by the hostile behavior and the lack of intelligence on hotspots zones in the conflict and lack of flexibility to maneuver in field situations on the ground.

Key learning points of UNAMSIL therefore were first of all the need for matching of mandate with resources and above all to anticipate the levels of hostility and spoiler behavior of rebels. This meant establishing an enforcement force which was militarily superior to uncooperative elements in the war so as to guarantee the defense of commission and make uncooperative behaviors costly. There was also the learning point of the importance of instituting a readily deployable stand by force to avert human suffering and minimize an escalation in hostilities. UNAMSIL also learnt the important role played by a highly effective secretariat and a clear concept of operations to guide mission's activities. The importance of intelligence gathering

³¹ Smith J., "Economic Globalization," op cit, p 249.

and sharing among national contingents cannot be underestimated as UNAMSIL initially found out. Moreover, the assumption that appending a signature to a peace agreement is proof enough of commitment by party to a conflict proved false as RUF demonstrated in its relentless use of violence.

4.11. Conclusion

The UN's intervention in Sierra Leone in the form of UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL had mixed fortunes. While UNOMSIL was overcome by the hostile situation in the country, UNAMSIL was able to weather the storm and finish its mandate in 2005 having succeeded in laying the foundation to peace and generally handling the peacebuilding function. Challenges still remain on the economic path to development, the weak government institutions and the continued dependence on diamonds as the main source of foreign exchange. Corruption and rule of law violations still mean that vigilance and a strong civil society and press is needed to keep the government in check. All said and done, peacekeeping alone cannot restore a country to sustainable peace without local commitment to peace and co-operation with UN member states and donor partners to establish basic conditions for growth and development.

Chapter Five

Conclusions

The objective of this study was to assess the role of UN peacekeeping in the maintenance of international peacekeeping and security and to also analyze its success in managing the Sierra Leone conflict and to identify the challenges and learning points from this West African engagement. After expounding on the research problem and the methodology of research in Chapter One and advancing the concept of peacekeeping in Chapter Two, the study examined the Sierra Leone conflict in detail in Chapter Three. In this Chapter, the role of various actors was laid bare as the study explored the systematic degeneration of the Sierra Leone state right after independence as well as the interests, situations and contexts in which the conflict assumed an international dimension. Chapter Four provides a case study of UN involvement while Chapter Five analyses this UN intervention. It is from this analysis that this study arrives at the following conclusions;

First of all, UN peacekeeping (in form of UNAMSIL) played a critical role in maintaining peace and security in Sierra Leone and in resolving the conflict. UNAMSIL was able to overcome internal divisions, disorganization and a hostile reception to eventually facilitate the transition from war to peace in the country. In cases of failing peacekeeping presence, as was evident in Sierra Leone, a strong ally (Britain) is important in ensuring the perpetuation of a peacekeeping presence to guarantee safety for civilians and allow room for a reorganization of a UN presence. This co-deployment is necessary in cases of a limited UN intervention which is constrained by lack of consensus at the Security Council on the nature of response or affected by slow deployments in a fluid conflict situation. Such an independent deployment could also serve

as a precursor to a peacekeeping presence and serve as an assurance to civilians and adversaries on international preparedness to see the conflict resolved.

Secondly, the lack of proper organization structure, rules engagements and cohesion among various national contingents multinational peacekeeping force inhibits the implementation of peacekeeping overall mission objectives and displays a lack of commitment by the international community to resolve conflicts. It can be concluded that co-operation in the Security Council and between the Secretary General, the DPKO, member countries, TCCs and adversaries in a conflict is essential in ensuring a proper response to conflict situations. The lack of these attributes in the initial response to the Sierra Leone case had near catastrophic consequences to the success of peacekeeping.

Thirdly, peacekeeping responses to conflict tend to generalize and oversimplify the aspects of adversary behavior, level of hostility in a conflict, multiplicity of actors and the willingness of combatants to embrace peace. This study has shown that the reason why the violent conflict lasted for a decade is because of the entrenchment of the culture of violence, greed and the attractive benefits of war as opposed to peace to the rebels, readily available arms through purchases from diamond proceeds across porous national borders and the involvement of regional players who fuelled the conflict. This multilayered and multiplicity of actors meant that the Sierra Leone conflict should have been approached differently and in a more forceful way. The study concludes that the UN response, the way it did, suffered from a lack of an early warning system and enough intelligence to benefit a more structured response.

Fourthly UN peacekeeping cannot exclusively be relied upon as a solution to each and every conflict since not all conflicts have similar conditions requiring similar responses. The peculiarities of various conflicts mean that judicial process or arbitration among other conflict

resolution measures may suffice with peacekeeping only employed to complement these alternate process. There are times when UN peacekeeping may fail or may not be forthcoming and therefore there is need to employ other solutions so that peace efforts may continue in the absence of the blue helmets. This is crucial in safeguarding life and alleviating human suffering during conflict.

Fifthly, peacekeeping is yet to fully overcome the dominant hold and deciding influence of powerful states who constitute the membership of the United Nations. Determination of threats to international peace and security, troop contributions and provision of resources (material and logistics) is still within the purview of state control and peacekeeping therefore has to contend with this overarching influence. The success or failure of a peacekeeping venture is therefore a reflection of power politics that are guided by national interest concerns.

Sixthly the expansion of peacekeeping functions to incorporate broader peacebuilding elements means that the requisite to a sustainable peace lies in a co-operative effort between the UN, international and local organizations to carry out the various aspects of peace education, humanitarian assistance, civic education (on democracy, good governance and rule of law), justice and reconciliation and economic development. Peacebuilding's focus on people ensures a culture of participation, tolerance and ownership of the peace process in the development effort, thereby contributing to lasting peace.

Key areas warranting further research and analysis are the role and success of economic liberalism in promoting peacebuilding especially in countries recovering from prolonged conflict situations where the foundations of the economy were shattered. An evaluation of this model in promoting peace building efforts in Sierra Leone could be important in providing understanding of its role considering its preference. Another area in requiring attention is the contribution of

wartime peace agreements instituted in the midst of a peacekeeping presence on the ground in promoting overall peace and the end in hostilities. An examination of aspects such as the inclusion of violators to previous agreements the exclusion of justice and accountability provisions and role of external actors in crafting peace agreements could offer clear pointers on this area.

The study finally concludes by a reaffirmation that peacekeeping will still be an important mechanism for maintaining international peace and security and hence there is need for more attention to paid to institutionalizing its structure in the UN and in constantly aligning its functions and use to meet the evolving challenges facing the world now and in the future.

Bibliography

Abdullah I., "Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front," in, Abdullah I., (Ed), *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004).

—————(Ed), *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004).

Abdullah I., Rashid I., "Smallest Victims; Youngest Killers: Juvenile Combatants in Sierra Leone's Civil War," in, Abdullah I., (Ed) *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004).

Aboagye F., "The ECOWAS Security Regime and the Utility for Africa," in, Shannon F., *Peace in Africa: Towards A Collaborative Security Regime*, (Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2004).

Abraham A., "State Complicity as a Factor in Perpetuating the Sierra Leone Civil War," in, Ademola F., "Theories of Social Conflict," in, Best S., (Ed), *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader*, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2007).

Alao O., "Diamonds are Forever...but so are Controversies: Diamonds and the Actors in Sierra Leone's Civil War," in, *Journal of Civil Wars*, Vol. 2 No.3, (Autumn 1999).

Amneus D., "Rethinking Security: Humanitarian Intervention in the Age of Human Security- A Responsibility to Protect?" In, Torpman-Svansberg K., Amneus D., (Eds), *Peace and Security: Current Challenges in International Law*, (Stockholm: Studentlitteretur, 2004).

Bangura Y., "The Political and Cultural Dynamics of the Sierra Leone War: A Critique of Paul Richards," in, Abdullah I., (Ed), *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004).

Best S., (Ed), *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader*, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2007).

Carr E.H., *The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, (London: Macmillan, 1964).

Chweya L., "Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region," in, Mwagiru M., (Ed), *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2004).

Coloumbis T.A, (et al), *Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice*, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1987).

Decalo S., *The Stable Minority: Civilian Rule in Africa, 1960-1990*, (Gainesville: Florida Academic Press, 1998).

Dewitt D., (et al), *Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Security*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993).

Diehl P. F., *International Peacekeeping*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press,

1994).

Diehl P., Greig M., "The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma" in *International Studies Quarterly*, (2005).

Drame T., "The Crisis of the State," in, Ellis S. (Ed), *Africa Now: People, Policies and Institutions*, (London: Heinemann, 1996).

Egwu S., "Beyond 'Revival of Old Hatreds': The State and Conflict in Africa," in Best S., (Ed), *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader*, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2007).

Ellis S. (Ed), *Africa Now: People, Policies and Institutions*, (London: Heinemann, 1996).

Findlay T., *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Francis D., *Dangers of Co-Deployment: UN Co-operative Peacekeeping in Africa*, (Hampshire: Ashgate publishing Limited, 2005).

_____, "ECOMOG: A New Security Agenda in World Politics" in Bakutt B. (Eds), *Africa at the Millennium: An Agenda for Mature Development*, (Hampshire: Palgrave Publishers, 2000)

Galtung J., "Cultural Violence," in, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 3, (1990).

Gilmore, et al, "A Diamond Curse?: Civil War and a Lootable Resource," in, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49, No. 4, (August 2005).

Gordon A., Gordon P., (Eds), *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, 3rd Ed, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).

Greig M., Wright T., "Staying the Course: Assessing the Durability of Peacekeeping Operations," in the *Journal of Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 29, No.2 (April 2012)

Grieco J., "Anarchy and the Limits of Co-operation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," in *Journal of International Organization*, Vol. 42 No. 3, (Summer 1988).

Groom A.J.R., "The Question of Peace and Security" in, *International Institutions at Work* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988).

Gyimah-Boadi E. (Ed), *Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).

Herro A., et al, "Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa: The Potential Contribution of a UN Emergency Peace Service," in, *African Security Review*, Vol.18, No.1 (March 2009).

Hobbes T., *Leviathan* (London: Penguin Classics, 1968).

Ibrahim J., *Democratic Transition in Anglophone West Africa*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2003),

Monograph Series.

***International Co-operation at a Crossroads*, the UNDP Human Development Report 2005: (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).**

Jeong H., *Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2000).

Johnsen R., "Peace and Justice?: The Contribution of International Judicial Processes to Peacebuilding," in Phillipott D., Powers G., (Eds), *Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

Kandeh J., "In Search of Legitimacy: The 1996 Elections," in, Abdullah I., (Ed), *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004).

Kandeh J., Laremont R., Cremona R., "Ethnicity and National Identity in Sierra Leone," in, Laremont R., (Ed), *Borders, Nationalism and the African State*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).

Kieh G., Agbese P., (Eds), *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004).

Kingsbury R., *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

Kpundeh S., "Corruption and Political Insurgency in Sierra Leone," in, Abdullah I., (Ed), *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004).

Laremont R., (Ed), *Borders, Nationalism and the African State*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).

Laremont R., Ostegard R., "Ethnic Grievance or Material Greed," in, Laremont R., (Ed), *Borders, Nationalism and the African State*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).

Liu F. T., *United Nations and the Non-Use of Force*, (Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1992).

Malan Mark (et al), *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight*, (Johannesburg: Institute for Security Studies 2002), Monograph series No. 68.

Malan M., "New Tools in the Box?: Towards a Stand by Force for the AU," in, Shannon F., *Peace in Africa: Towards A Collaborative Security Regime*, (Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2004).

Mathoma P., et al, (Eds), *Putting People First: African Priorities for the UN Millennium Assembly*, (Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs, 2000).

Morgenthau H., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985).

Murithi T., "African Indigenous and Endogenous Approaches to Peace and Conflict Resolution," in Francis D., (Ed), *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, (London: Zed Books, 2008).

Mwagiru M, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of management*, (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2002).

—————, (Ed), *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2004).

Mwagiru M., Oculi O., (Eds), *Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective?* (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2006).

Neethling T., "Limitations of UN Peacekeeping Operations Where Conflict did not Result in Victory for Any Side: Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone" in *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies*, Vol. 1 No. 2, (November 2000).

Neethling T., "Whither Peacekeeping in Africa in Africa: Revisiting the Evolving Role of the United Nations," in *African Security Review*, Vol.18, No.1 (March 2009).

Obi L., "Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte D'Ivoire," *African Security*, Vol. 2, No.2, 2009.

Okoth A., *A History of Africa: African Nationalism and the Decolonization Process*, Vol 2, (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 2006).

Parekh B., "Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention," in *Journal of International Political Science Review*, Vol.18, No.1,(January 1997).

Penfold P., "Faith in Resolving Sierra Leone's Bloody Conflict," in *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 94 No. 382, page 50, (October 2005).

Phillpott D., Powers G., (Eds), *Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

Rashid I., "Student Radicals, Lumpen Youth, and the Origins of Revolutionary Groups in Sierra Leone, 1977-1996," in Abdullah I., (Ed), *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004).

Richmond O., "The Problem of Peace: Understanding the Liberal Peace", in *Journal of Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol.6, No.3, (28 November 2006).

Sall I., et al, (Eds), *Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa*, (United Nations, 2005).

Sambanis N., "How Strategic is UN Peacebuilding?" In, Phillpott D., Powers G., (Eds), *Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

Steadman S., Lyons T., "Conflicts in Africa," in Gyimah-Boadi E. (Ed), *Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).

Smock R., (Ed), *Making War and Waging Peace*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).

United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 2nd Ed, (New York: United Nations, 1990).

University of Peace, *A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies*, 2nd Ed (Addis Ababa, 2005).

Walle N., "Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss?: The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa," in, Wilkinson S., Kitschelt H., (Eds), *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

Weiss T.G., (et al), *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, 5th Ed, (Colorado: Westview Press, 2007).

Whitaker D., *United Nations in Action*, (London: London University College, 1995).

Wilkinson S., Kitschelt H., (Eds), *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

William K., *The Twentieth Century World: An International History*, 2nd Ed, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

Wright M. Thorn (et al), "Staying the Course: Assessing the Durability of Peacekeeping operations," in *Journal of Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 29, No. 2.

Yilmaz M., "UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era" in *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. 22, No.2, June 2005).

Zartman W., "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond" in Stern P. (Eds), *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*, (Washington: National Academy Press, 2000).

Reports

Annan K., "Common Destiny, New Resolve," Annual Report on the Work of the Organization (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 2000).

_____ "Prevention of Armed Conflict," Report of the Secretary General, (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 2002).

_____ "The Question of Intervention," (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1999).

_____ Annual Report on the Work of the Organization, (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 2001).

Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, UN Document.

Conroy R., "From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: Lessons from the Case of Somalia". Paper presented at Conference on, *Approaching Fifty: The UN from Europe*, The Hague, June 23-25 1994.

United Nations Peace Operations: Year in Review 2006.

United Nations Report of the Panel on the United Nations peace operations (A/55/503-5/2000/809) 21 August 2000 otherwise known as The Brahimi Report.

United Nations Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/502) 20 October 2000.

United States Institute of Peace, "Peacekeeping in Africa," Special Report No. 66, Part one, 13 February 2001.

Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping," Report of The Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by The Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992.

Internet sources

International crisis Group <<http://www.crisisweb.org>>

United Nations <<http://www.un.org/aboutun>>