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THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN PEACE –

BULDING: CASE STUDY OF ISIOLO DISTRICT, KENYA

BY

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
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STUDENT'S DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted to any other college, institution or university other than the University of Nairobi for academic credit.

Signed: ....Date:.. 14.11.12 ....

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This project has been presented for examination with my approval as the appointed supervisor

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Professor Makumi Mwagiru

ACRONYMS

ASAL – Arid and Semi Arid Lands

CJPC – Catholic Justice and Peace Commission

CSO – Civil Society Organization

DC – District Commissioner

DO - District Officer

DPCs-District Peace Committees

DSG – District Steering Group

EW– Early Warning

FGD – Focused Group Discussion

FONI – Friends of Nomads International

GoK – Government of Kenya

IDP – Internally Displaced Person(s) / People

KII – Key Informant Interview

MP – Member of Parliament

NGO – Non Governmental Organization

SALW – Small Arms and Light Weapons

SMS – Short Message Service

ABSTRACT

Conflicts, especially those related to competition over resource use, have defined the better part of the history of Eastern Africa's dry lands communities. Violent conflicts involving pastoralists have become widespread and increasingly severe throughout much of the Northern Kenya. This research identifies and examines the factors contributing to such conflicts, and discusses issues and priorities for conflict prevention and peace-building. These are examined across Northern Kenya in general, and in Isiolo – a district in northern Kenya – in particular. On the basis of this examination, a number of conclusions and recommendations are developed on ways in which non-governmental organizations could contribute to efforts to prevent conflicts involving pastoralists in Isiolo and more generally in the North of Kenya.

Isiolo is one of 17 Districts in the Rift Valley region of Kenya. It is a multi-ethnic tribal district which pastoralist communities share with farmers, wildlife conservatories, ranchers and horticulturalists. It includes extensive arid and semi-arid lands as well as arable and urban areas. Pastoralists rely on access to water and pasture land. Such resources are scarce and under increasing pressure owing to increased farming activities, rapid population growth, and periodic drought. Conflicts involving pastoralists associated with resource competition, cattle rustling, and wide availability of small arms are widespread and of increasing concern. It thus provides a useful case study to examine in depth the factors contributing to conflict and the issues and priorities for conflict prevention.

The purpose of the study is to evaluate the extent to which non-governmental organisations have impacted on peace-building in Isiolo. The specific objectives of this study are: to establish the extent of NGO involvement in peace building in Isiolo district; to investigate why previous strategies implemented towards peace by key NGOs in Isiolo have been ineffective in peace building and to explore alternatives/options that the NGOs can apply in the peace building process to increase their success rate.

The research design used is a descriptive research and the target NGOs and community members. Secondary data collection was also utilised. The study has contributed to knowledge on the extent to which NGO practices impact the process of peace building and how they can be made more effective. The study established that NGOs do impact peace building positively but are also in some cases perpetuators of conflict, willingly or unwillingly.

The research found that peace building efforts carried out by NGOs in Isiolo would be more effective if they involved all affected actors, especially mid and grass-root level actors, in the coordination of efforts. This includes women and youth who are often side-lined despite their huge role in perpetuating conflict and also in peace building exercise. It is also established that the peace building process would be enhanced if NGOs were supported by good governance practices like proper political leadership and political will, leadership that doesn't use ploys like 'divide and rule' so as to accomplish selfish gains.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.0 Background of the Study

The inter-connections between peace building and conflict risk reduction have been gaining strength in recent decades. A central feature of the last three decades of neoliberal globalization has been the increased incidence and appalling outcomes of ethno-nationalist violence within rather than between states (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998).[1] The nature of conflict has thus changed substantially, now often appearing as struggles for power, resources and dominance within states, pitting ethnic group against ethnic group and neighbour against neighbour. Such has been the situation in Isiolo County in the Northern part of Kenya. Communities involved include the Boran, Turkana, Somali, Meru and the Samburu. The conflict in and around Isiolo is two-fold. The first is rooted purely in cattle rustling by the Samburu from Meru, Somali, Boran and Turkana with associated shifting alliances and recurrent issues. The second is the intra-Isiolo county conflict between the Boran and the Turkana, with the three other tribes being directly or indirectly involved. The motivation behind this conflict is built on, but very different from, the traditional cattle rustling issue in and around Isiolo as most attacks have been found to be organised without stealing any livestock. Such virulent conflicts typically result in waves of displaced persons who fall prey to a deadly combination of starvation, epidemics, and despair that spirals out of control since government services are on the verge of collapse during such crises, resulting in complex emergencies.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play a critical role in the response to such crises, offering many different skills and approaches outside military intervention,

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[1] Rogers, B. and Laitin, D. D, 'Ethnic and Nationalist Violence' in *Annual Review of Sociology vol. 24* (U.K: University of Bradford, October 1998), pp. 423-452.

including humanitarian relief, preventive action and conflict resolution, development assistance, and institution-building. Hardly any discussion on peace, poverty or development today is complete without considering the role of NGOs as they are a visible, respected and entrenched part of many societies. NGOs are doing even more peace building activities than official governmental agencies. They have been identified as critical actors in any substantive programme of conflict prevention and resolution which are able to play many roles that governments are unable or unwilling to perform, making them explicitly more significant partners for governments and international organizations in preventing conflict and for this reason, NGO participation must become a matter of deliberate multilateral policy.[2]

By definition, NGOs exist outside the public governmental and private market sectors. They have been variously classified under the third, voluntary, or non-profit sector.[3] A report by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence gives three broad categories of identifying NGOs in the peace and conflict arena: human rights and advocacy groups; humanitarian and service organizations; and mediation or "track two" groups that pave the way for formal peace. The report states that such NGOs have the capacity to "monitor conflicts and provide early warning and insight into a particular conflict; convene the adversarial parties by providing a neutral forum; pave the way for mediation and undertake mediation; carry out education and training for conflict resolution, building indigenous capacity for coping with ongoing conflict; help to strengthen institutions for conflict resolution; and foster the development of the rule of law .."[4] Hence, the ultimate goal of their efforts is usually conflict

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[2] Michael, L. *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996) pp 7, 193.

[3] Lester M. S, and Helmut, K. A. (eds). *Defining the Non-profit Sector: A Cross National Analysis*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) pp. 67-69.

[4] Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report*, (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997). P. 4.

reduction and/or resolution, not just between official actors, but among ordinary citizens.

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

NGOs inspire great confidence because they form the best organized, equipped, and most experienced component of civil society. They stand out as being committed to defending respect for all individuals. However, due to recurring conflicts over the same issues, their impact on conflict and peace dynamics has come under increasing scrutiny because of their inefficiency towards managing conflicts, such as the inter-community conflicts in Isiolo. Despite sustained efforts, there has been no success in reducing the number of these conflicts. This inability points a failure to identify a conflict management framework that would satisfy the cultural dynamics of the parties in conflict. This has made it necessary to study the roles that NGOs play and why they have failed at building lasting peace in Isiolo.

1.2 Objectives of the study

The study will be guided by the following objectives:

a) To establish the extent of NGO involvement in peace building in Isiolo district.

b) To investigate why previous strategies implemented towards peace by key NGOs in Isiolo have been ineffective in peace building.

c) To explore alternatives/options that the NGOs can apply in the peace building process to increase their success rate.

1.3 Literature review

The literature is reviewed according to the following broad themes: literature on peace building, literature addressing the underlying causes of conflict in Isiolo, literature on roles of NGOs in peace building and the impact of NGOs in peace

Peace Building

Peace building is a long-term process that covers all activities with the objective of preventing violent outbreaks of conflict. Various scholars have attempted to give a more concise definition. Barnes describes it as "multiple activities aimed at addressing the structural causes of the conflict and reconciling relationships affected by conflict."[5] This definition can refer to a varied set of activities or the manner in which these activities are implemented and their potential outcomes. This is similar to Lederach's multidimensional approach which includes indigenous and international actors and emphasizes the need to address the root causes of the conflict and the type of interventions needed[6]. Galtung concurs with this because he defines peace building as practical aspects of implementing peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development, arguing that issues like culture and human needs are crucial in the peace debate.[7]

Peace building activities include: monitoring conflicts and providing early warning and insight into a particular conflict; convening the adversarial parties and providing a neutral forum; paving way for mediation and undertaking it[8]; humanitarian assistance catering to basic human needs like food and shelter during emergencies; building indigenous capacity for coping with ongoing conflict; promotion of transparency; policy development; implementation of peace accords; environmental security to prevent wanton destruction that leads to depletion and subsequent resource scarcity;

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[5] Nick, L. 'International Non-Government Organizations and Peace-building Perspectives from Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution' (*Working paper series No. 13*, Centre for Conflict resolution department of Peace studies U.K: University of Bradford, October 1999) p. 12.

[6] John P. L, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C, United States Institute of Peace, 1997) p. 75.

[7] Johan, G. 'Three Approaches to Peace, Peacemaking and Peace Building' in Galtung, J: *Peace, war and defense* – Essays in Peace Research,Vol. 2 (Copenhagen: Chrisian Ejlers, 1999) pp 282-304.

[8] Benjamin G. et al 'Peace and Conflict Resolution Organizations in Three Protracted Conflicts: Structures, Resources and Ideology' in *'Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Vol. 10,No. 4'* (Springer, December 1999), pp. 276-277.

human security which grants people freedom from fear and freedom from want and advocacy.

In the discussion pertaining to human security there is an emerging role of NGOs in the development of multidimensional peace-building activities. Traditionally, most of the NGOs have been involved in works relating to development, relief and advocacy, which are of direct and visible benefit to the people. Over time, the character of conflicts has changed from inter-state to intra-state, pitting neighbour against neighbour, resulting in great numbers displaced persons. This has compelled NGOs to broaden their traditional role to include ensuring stability and fulfilling basic governmental functions on the road towards peace building.

Nature and causes of conflict in Isiolo district

Conflict causes are multiple and interact at many levels. Kriesberg postulates that "social conflict emerges when four components become minimally manifest."[9] These components include the development of a distinct us-them group, the existence of a grievance "between one or more parties", "one or more of the parties must formulate goals to change another person or group so that the grievances will be reduced," and a belief by the members of one group that they indeed can bring about such a change. These dynamics are particularly potent when they exist in the context of horizontal inequalities, defined as inequalities between cultural groups.

According the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict , one of the central key reasons groups engage in conflict is to "fill power vacuums" or "from economic factors, such as resource depletion, rising unemployment, or failed fiscal and monetary policies, particularly when discriminatory economic systems create

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[9] Louis K. 'Application and Misapplication of Conflict Resolution Ideas to International Conflicts' in John V, James T. J, Sanford J, and Linda S *Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era'* (Michigan: university of Michigan Press 1995) p. 55.

economic disparities along cultural, ethnic, or religious lines, what in recent years has been termed "horizontal inequalities" i.e.inequalities between groups with shared identities.[10] Other theorists like Baker and Ausink, have postulated that the emergence of violent conflict can be traced to state collapse. Along this line of thinking, searching for indicators of state weakness can provide some early warning of impending collapse. Some ominous signs include demographic pressures; massive refugee movements that create cycles of human disasters and further intensify demographic pressures; uneven economic development along ethnic lines; a legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia. Moreover, criminalization or de-legitimization of the state; sharp and severe economic distress; massive, chronic, or sustained human flight; progressive deterioration or elimination of public services; and suspension of the rule of law and a security apparatus operating as a "state within a state". Schnabel adds onto this catalogue of indicators regimes of short duration[11]. While common to all these factors is the deployment of violence in a permissive environment which enables group leaders to prefer violence as a mode of political bargaining, the choice to use violence to achieve a certain end is not inevitable. A "window of political opportunity" helps to explain why, under some circumstances, violence breaks out between groups—both within and across state boundaries—and why with other groups in very similar circumstances it does not. "Mass violence results when leaders see it as the only way to achieve their political objectives and they are able to mobilize groups to carry out their strategy. Without determined leaders, groups may riot but they do not start systematic, sustained campaigns of

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[10] Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. 'Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report.'(New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997), pp. 26-27.
[11] Albrecht, S, *Post-Conflict Peace building and Second-Generation Preventive Action, International Peacekeeping. 9: 2,* (2002) P. 18

violence to achieve their goals; and without mobilized groups, leaders are unable to organize a fight.[12]

The drift by groups towards violence can normally be foreseen. Such early indicators for outbreaks of violence can include "widespread human rights abuses, increasing brutal political oppression, inflammatory use of the media, the accumulation of arms, and sometimes a rash of killings." Hence retarding and reversing the development of such circumstances is the best course of action. However, "most early warning and response mechanisms lack effective means of engaging with grass-root organizations, informal networks, indigenous early warning systems and commonplace signs of conflict that are not systematic but reflect the reality of conflict in these regions. [13] Indeed, prevailing approaches to conflict prevention have been reluctant to engage practices that focus on addressing the historical, material and political conditions of existence of various groups as part of an early response to the threat of violent conflict.

The political nature of violent conflict between groups is revealed in the fact that the groups are usually organized and/or because the state is involved either in trying to handle conflict or in becoming the arena for such conflict[14]. The operative word here is violent conflict which can lead to humanitarian disasters. Social conflict per se is an inherent aspect of social change and in certain cases an instrument of social justice. Kriesberg notes that such conflicts are not unequivocally bad; rather "conflicts are important and sometimes essential ways to advance widely shared interests." Attempts at eliminating social conflict are thus impossible and may be undesirable.

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[12] Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. 'Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report.'(New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997), p. 30
[13] Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa. (2009).

[14] Cliffe, Lionel and White Phillip, 'Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa' in Mwaura, Ciru and Schmeidl, Susanne (eds). *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*. (The Red Sea Press, 2002) p. 45

Indeed, conflict prevention refers more to processes or interventions that inhibit social conflict from taking on a violent form, rather than eliminating all disputes and conflicts of interest in a society. In fact those states that have tried to do so have collapsed under due to internal mass rebellions indicating on the one hand the absence or ineffectiveness of institutionalized processes and rules for resolving social conflict, the state's inability to enforce them, the government's illegitimacy and/or involvement as a party to the conflict, or the absence of social consensus on the issue of the conflict. On the other hand, alternatively, resort to violence can indicate the presence of individuals or factions with an interest in instigating and perpetuating conflict that can shape and manipulate group opinion. But not all disputes and conflicts between groups are expressed in collective, organized violence. Unfortunately, this is not the case in Isiolo.

Isiolo is cosmopolitan in its ethnic mix. Significant numbers of Borana, Somali, Turkana, Samburu and Meru either live or trade there. The areas involved in the conflict in are Wamba, Merti, Laisamis, Isiolo, Garbatulla and Tigania East. There are five communities involved; The Boran, Turkana, Somali, Meru, and the Samburu[15].

The role of NGOs in Peace Building

NGOs have become increasingly involved in the response to armed conflict, some aiming to mitigate the effects of war and others to help end the violence.

In the past, NGOs did not go beyond their traditional relief objectives of providing food, water, sanitation, and emergency health measures. However, as a consequence of both their growing numbers and resources and the variety of functions they fulfill, NGOs are fast becoming a vital component in the international response mechanism

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[15] "Ethnicity" can be seen as a feature of social organization which involves the construction of (ethnic) boundaries, as well as cross-boundary relationships; while an "ethnic group" should be understood as being characterized by both self-ascription and the ascription of others as being a distinct group (Barth 1994).

to humanitarian crises, especially in situations of conflict. Hence, in recent years there has been a shift towards developmental and peace building approaches. They are now serving as a substitute for local government, encouraging the growth of civil society, and using mediation and negotiation skills to bring antagonists together as part of a relief mission.

NGOs actions can have real impact on intervention outcomes. However, NGO action is also limited by structural constraints. The ability of nongovernmental organizations to positively affect peace also varies and is influenced by the level of coordination between Track One and Track Two diplomacy, the strength of the state, and the commitment of other societal actors to the peace building effort. There exists no specific guideline as to what is the best approach to intervention, and furthermore, evidence suggests that the potential for nongovernmental organizations to have a significant impact—whether positive or negative—is limited.

While NGOs cannot be expected to solve all the problems associated with humanitarian crises, Andrew Natsios identified four fundamental roles NGOs could perform during these types of crises: a preventive function through early warning; human rights monitoring; the relief and rehabilitation functions normally associated with NGOs; and conflict resolution activities, such as mediation and reconciliation.[16] These distinct functions require different sets of disciplines and skills, some of which already exist in the NGO community and some of which do not. He stresses the importance of keeping these functions separate. They need to be separate functions performed by separate organizations. Similarly, organizations involved in advocacy should not attempt mediation and reconciliation, and those engaged in relief work should not be involved in security operations. Making these distinctions and assigning

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[16] Andrew, N. S. 'An NGO Perspective' in William, Z. and Lewis, R. M. eds. *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997) pp. 337-361.

different functions is an important component of ensuring effective action in conflict situations. Of the four roles that Natsios outlined, the early warning and conflict resolution functions generate the most debate. The intense discussions surrounding these two NGO roles reflect not only their relative newness in the repertoire of NGO capabilities, but also the fact that both of these roles incorporate many other increasingly important—and, some would argue, controversial—tasks NGOs must consider in carrying out their primary missions during complex emergencies.

The role NGOs could play in early warning and preventive action, alerting the international community to potential breakdowns in a distressed country's governance or in relations among the country's major domestic groups has been a source of contention. Since many NGOs have deep roots in local communities, their relief and development workers in the field have a unique vantage point to identify deteriorating conditions that might lead to conflict. Jan Eliasson details a number of steps, including fact-finding missions that NGOs and the international community could undertake in order to provide early warning for looming conflicts. These actions precede more formal approaches, such as peacekeeping operations and peacemaking. According to Eliasson, NGOs can play a key role in information gathering, early warning, and peace building, and can help the international community to move from simply responding to crises to preventing their occurrence.[17] In Eliasson's metaphor, such activity among NGOs moves the international community from merely extinguishing fires, to finding the arsonist before the fire breaks out, to identifying conditions that lead to arson.

Some scholars however assert that the lack of early warning is not the central problem in preventive action. The key—and often missing—element in prevention is

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[17] Jan E. *Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start* ed. Kevin M. C (New York: Routledge, Sep. 2000) p. 215.

developing the political will to act on early warning signals. Here, too, NGOs play a central role as advocates for action. Lionel Rosenblatt insists that early action saves lives and resources, stressing that the inability to detect a conflict's early warning signals is not the main impediment to preventive action.[18]

In as far as Conflict resolution and sustainable development is concerned, Lederach feels that, the NGO community should develop ways in which our crisis management activities are embedded within, and linked to, a broader set of activities which lead to sustainable development. However, the context in which these needs emerge almost always involves settings of protracted and deep-seated generational conflict.[19] To move beyond the management of an immediate crisis, NGOs must change their planning time frames to a long-term perspective. Pamela Aall contends that the initial emergency relief response should be linked to a set of activities that leads to the transformation of those conflicts in a way that promotes sustained and comprehensive reconciliation among the warring parties[20]. NGOs should recognize that there are many levels of activity as well as many actors and functions necessary for peace building. Most peace operations tend to rely on a top-down approach to peace building, in which the country's political leaders and high-level officials from international organizations make decisions that are supposed to be implemented throughout the rest of the country. In many cases, however, relying solely on a top-down approach to peace building results in failure and frustration. It has been argued that there may sometimes be fallacies and unintended consequences of participatory approach, as was the case in Liberia. According to her, in local arenas, interventions

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[18] In the capacity of President, Refugees International
[19] John P. L, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C, United States Institute of Peace, 1997) pp. 75-77.
[20] Pamela, A et al, *Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001) p. 121.

may aggravate current lines of conflicts, as questions of both legitimacy and representativeness are not sufficiently raised by the development agents in charge. This gives the impression that patterns of international intervention even if 'translated' to some extent by local NGO actors into social realities, may enhance or trigger conflict at the local level, thereby going against the intentions of their official missions.

Lederach recommends focusing instead on the middle and grass-roots levels of societies in crisis, since NGOs are particularly effective working with both a country's mid-level officials and the recipients of aid at the community level. Because of their familiarity with the country and its decision makers, NGO representatives have a keen understanding of the realities on the ground that allows them to reach across their counterparts from other agencies into a web of indigenous officials and resources in order to build and maintain a sustainable infrastructure that has a better chance of ameliorating not just the manifestations but also the causes of conflict.

To work effectively in a conflicting situation NGOs should preserve their own identities and neutrality and should appear to be impartial. Unofficial status of NGOs provides more access to conflicting parties, which helps in the process of negotiation. Natsios however notes that some of the interest in NGOs as mediators stems from their presumed neutrality.[21] However, NGOs are rarely neutral. They may be beholden to the interests of their fundraising constituency. Even strictly need-based relief may benefit one party in a conflict predominately. NGOs may be perceived of as biased due to their location or hiring practices. NGOs are a valuable source of information on developing conflicts. However, such reporting may make NGOs suspect as informants or threats to security.

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[21] Andrew, N. S. 'An NGO Perspective' in William, Z. and Lewis, R. M. eds. *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997) pp. 348.

Impact of NGOs in Peace Building

Natsios recognises that NGOs play increasingly larger roles in international conflict management. However, he cautions against exaggerated expectations regarding their peacemaking abilities. Some studies have shown that aid delivered by NGOs is rarely central to people's coping or surviving crises, whilst the impacts of NGOs on both conflict and peace have been overstated both by their supporters and detractors. Exaggerating the importance of NGOs is quite strategic as it serves many interests. It helps the NGOs themselves raise funds in a highly competitive market, provides donors with success stories and lends legitimacy to Western political leaders. In fact, some NGOs have been found to be carrying out activities that are totally unrelated to their goals. [22]NGOs in Northern Kenya are for instance accused of being involved in obstruction of peace through direct involvement in transfer of money and weapons to certain groups in order to evict, harass or kill opponents, or indirect involvement in focusing developmental activities in home areas of key NGO officials while other areas are denied assistance.

1.4   Justification of the study

As seen in our literature review, roles of NGOs in peace building show both strengths and weaknesses depending on which perspective one looks at it. Some scholars feel that they play a very crucial role and others feel that their importance has been massively exaggerated, and that their impact on peace has been overstated. This study therefore aims at propelling NGOs towards looking for binding, inclusive and genuine approaches to peace building. It assumes that NGOs have a significant role to play in peace building, but such roles are facing a number of challenges today. By studying

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[22]International Development Research Center, *Understanding Obstacles to Peace: Actors, Interests, and Strategies in Africa's Great Lakes Region.* ed. Mwesiga Baregu (Fountain publishers , 2011) p 151.

their role in peace building, this study aims to bridge the gap between what is the role of NGOs in peace building, how effective is their role in achieving lasting peace and what other alternatives exist to peace building in the region.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

This section seeks to explore the theme of peace and peace building theory. According to Lederach, peace building occurs after the slowing down of hostilities, and involves the restoration of faith amongst opponents, restoration of trust amongst opposing sides, restoring sources of livelihoods, rebuilding infrastructure, and restoring the dignity of those affected by the conflict.[23]

Peace building interventions are conducted on the basis of both the nature of the conflict and the sustained peace. In line with this, Burton, in his work on conflict resolution calls for new attitudes and practices that are conflict sensitive, consultative, collaborative and flexible.[24] This implies that, for the approach to work it must be operating from a deep understanding of the root causes of the conflict, the approach must involve consultation with indigenous partners, local leaders and so on as they know better than anyone what is best for them. It must also facilitate dialogue – inter-ethnic, inter-faith – for trust building. Once the root causes of the conflict, emerging needs, positions, actors and interests are well understood, agreeable alternative to oppressive structures that contribute to insecurity, marginalisation, inequitable distribution of resources, insecurity and other injustices can be found. In a nutshell, the intended outcome in doing this is to bridge the gap in the varying attitudes so as to work in unity towards the same goal of lasting peace.

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[23] John P. L, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C, United States Institute of Peace, 1997) p. 73-74.
[24] John, B. *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990) pp. 36 – 47.

Peace building can take three main approaches; 'Conflict Management', 'Conflict Resolution' and 'Conflict Transformation'. *Management* implies that conflicts are long term and hence quick fixes are out of the question. It also suggests that solutions may be imposed on the opposing parties so long as the long term goal of controlling violence rather than dealing with the underlying issues is achieved. *Resolution* on the other hand is quite the opposite in that it presumes that a conflict is a short term occurrence that can be dealt with in the shortest time possible, in which a permanent solution can be reached and life can move on. These two approaches however unfortunately go down the path of simply trying to eliminate or contain the conflict. *Transformation* goes beyond the resolution of concrete problems and gives an opportunity to rearrange the basic issues of the underlying dispute. In trying to understand a conflict, Lederach acknowledges that conflict is a natural occurrence among humans who are involved in relationships.[25] Once it occurs, it changes (transforms) the people, the relationships and the dynamics that initially led to the conflict. Hence, the *cause-and-effect* relationship alternates from the people and their relationships to the conflict and back to the people and their relationships once again. Thus, it is prudent to examine and understand deep rooted issues to any conflict as such conflicts have a synergy which can very easily spark off another conflict. Transformation is therefore seen to improve mutual understanding due to its focus on the actors in the conflict, the issues as well as the structures present. Actors are recognised and empowered, relationships of adversaries are transformed, and oppressive structures are overhauled so as to achieve durable change.

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[25] John P. L, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C, United States Institute of Peace, 1997) pp. 75-77.

Thus, peace building goes above and beyond offering relief to the affected. It digs deep into the root causes of the problem, addresses it and fosters reconciliation amongst those in conflict.

1.6 Hypotheses

- Peace building efforts carried out by NGOs in Isiolo would be more effective if they involved all affected actors, especially mid and grass-root level actors, in the coordination of efforts.

- The peace building process would be enhanced if NGOs were supported by good governance practices like political will.

1.7 Methodology

This study evaluates the role that NGOs play in peace building. The study is drawn largely from literature reviews and field interviews. Reviews of relevant literature on peace-building/conflict management and risk reduction were sourced from books, journals, articles, CSO reports and government policy documents. The review of literature examined nature of violent conflict, and the links between peace-building and risk reduction generally and those that focused particularly on Kenya.

Primary data was then obtained from key informant interviews (KIIs) and community members. These site visits were carried out as follows: meetings with key informant NGO leaders, community elders and government representatives and analysis and validation of findings with research assistant.

Using purposive sampling procedure, all interviewees were asked if they knew anyone with similar knowledge and interests in peace and conflict in the area. Interviewees were then subsequently contacted. The interviews were conducted using open ended questions with expert key informants from the government, NGOs, some

IDP camps and community elders in the study area. In the IDP camps, focus group interviews with up to 5 people at a time were conducted. The interviewees comprised pastoralist communities who bore the brunt of violence and eviction. The assumption was that the impact of violence would be strongest and most direct among both these populations. Urban residents were also included in the study in order to obtain a balanced understanding of the interventions to build peace. In all places representation in terms of ethnicity, gender and age was also considered.

By structuring the interviews chronologically, narratives were obtained which gave information on the perceptions and experiences of informants about issues related to violence, its causes and mitigation, peace interventions and their impact and suggestions on ways forward. Information was also sought concerning their livelihood activities, their views on changing political conditions, how they were affected and how they coped with and adapted to violent conflicts and evictions.

Limitations

Though case analyses that take into account the complex interaction of actors, incentives, power structures and networks is highly favoured, in this case study the data to capture all these factors was not possible due to cost, time, and difficulty of access.[26] Therefore the study has been limited by the paucity of data. Issues of insecurity also confined the researchers to the Town centre and its close environs because of the uncertain atmosphere Moreover, Isiolo is geographically expansive and could not be widely covered due to limited funds and the relatively short time in which outputs were required.

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[26] Bøås, Morten and Kathleen M. Jennings, 'Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the 'Failed State'', in: *The European Journal of Development Research*, (2005) pp. 385-395.

The study was also undertaken in the midst of a fluid political climate in Kenya clouded by the impending trials of key suspected masterminds of the post-2007 mass political violence. The oscillating views people gave were therefore likely to be influenced by their perceptions and stand on this issue which is also anticipated to be a major factor in the direction in which the 2013 general election will take. Furthermore, a study of this type is bound to invite socially desirable answers from those involved ranging from government officials to NGO leaders because violence is generally viewed as a bad thing. Responses to questions may thus not be as accurate as anticipated. Indeed, the likely involvement of the higher political elites in local conflicts meant that finding them for interviews would prove difficult. Finally, despite assurances to the contrary, the researchers were sometimes perceived to be on a humanitarian mission revealed in the way that locals were quick to divert in to the multitude of problems they face and hence had the hope that the researchers could provide solutions. These are areas worth taking in to account in future research.

1.7.1 Research Design

A research design is a master plan specifying the methods and procedures for collecting and analysing the needed information, Zikmund. The research design used will be a descriptive research. This is because the primary purpose of a descriptive research is determining frequency of occurrence of a phenomenon.

The research approach adopted will be qualitative where the researcher will take an active role as an observer and explore different settings, emotional reactions and attitudes of the informants. The design permits the researchers to adopt a holistic approach in the study of the chosen social institutions in an attempt to use indigenous structures to resolve conflicts. Second, it is easy to apply research tools like interviews which could be supplemented by focus group discussions, opinion censors

and observations where applicable. Field research entails study of communities/societies by allowing the researcher to take an active role in the activities by assuming the role of participants' observer.[27]

1.7.2 Population and Sampling Design

This study will be conducted in Isiolo County and will mainly pay close attention to the Turkana community as most conflicts in the region are experienced between the Turkana-Samburu and the Turkana-Boran communities.

1.7.3 Sampling Design and Sample Size

1.7.3.1 Sampling Frame

The relevant population will consist of all the NGO's working towards peace building. The sampling frame will include NGO's such as *Friends of Nomads International (FONI)*, OXFAM, PEACENET just to name a few. The number of NGO officials interviewed from each NGO will average two per NGO. Local populations will also be in the sample.

1.7.3.2 Sampling Technique

The study will utilize non-probability sampling technique because the researcher requires maximum degree of insight into the problem under investigation and will therefore purposively select informants with relevant knowledge. There is no complete list of population but elders, youth, women, NGO peace actors and state security organs will be interviewed. This technique is appropriate for heterogeneous population like in this study. This will ensure that all the different segments in a population will be represented in the sample.

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[27]Royce, A. S, Bruce, C. S, and Miller M. S, *Approaches to Social Research*, (New York: Oxford, 1993) pp. 50-54

1.7.4 Methods and tools of data collection

Instrumentation will include use of interviews including key informant interviews (KII), in-depth interviews and focused group discussions (FGD) with the intention of eliciting information and opinions. To compliment this, the researcher will also play a keen role of observation to understand people's behaviour and institutional values, rituals, beliefs, symbols and emotions. Analysis of recorded information/documents will also be done in order to obtain information that informants gave thought to while compiling, and also information in their own words. Lastly, questionnaires will be used, especially among NGO respondents for information that can easily be described in writing.

1.7.5 Data analysis

The data collected will be analyzed mainly qualitatively. Discourse analysis will be used to analyze written, spoken or sign language. The objects of discourse analysis are variously defined in terms of coherent sequences of sentences, speeches, intonations and repetitions. Trend analysis will also used where the researcher will analyze patterns of behavior and sequence of events narrated and identify common or repeated occurrence. Case studies of peace building activities facilitated by selected NGO's will also be covered in the report.

1.8   Chapter Outline

Chapter 1: Introduction to the study

Chapter 2: Peace-Building Theory

Chapter 3: Historical Perspective of Isiolo District

Chapter 4: Data Presentation and Findings

Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations

CHAPTER 2

PEACE BUILDING THEORY

2.0 Origin and Definition

Peace building is not an entirely recent phenomenon. The UN played such a role in the Congo in the early 1960s. [1]As the dynamics of conflict in the world changed, so too did the response of the UN, and other international organizations and states. [2]Since the concept was conceived during UN operations in Namibia in 1978, the idea of peace-building has gained much acceptance. The process of peace-building is formulated from the concept of 'peace'. To have a clear understanding about what constitutes the process of peace-building; we must first understand the term 'peace'. *Peace* refers to a state where groups of people or nation-states co-exist harmoniously. This is not necessarily supposed to mean the absence of conflict, but rather, the absence of violence during the process of settling conflicts. The concept of peace-building entails adoption of amicable solutions to end hostilities between and within groups.

Peace-building is therefore understood by some as a long-term process that covers all activities with the overall objective of preventing violent outbreaks of conflict, or transforming armed conflict into constructive ways of dealing with conflict. It was defined by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros- Ghali in 1993 as 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict[3]. He envisioned peace-building measures such as human rights protection, disarmament, reforms in governmental institutions, restoring order, an increase in inclusion and participation, and observation of free and fair

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[1] Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane, R.O. (eds), *Humanitarian Intervention,* (Cambridge University Press; International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001) p. 67

[2] Patrick, R. Shai, K & Maphunye, M 'Conflict, Peace-Building, Human Security and Democratization in Lesotho' in *Africa Peace and Conflict Journal,* (University for Peace, 2008) pp. 41, 115

[3] Boutros B-G, *'An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping',* Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, (UN Doc A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 199), paragraph 21.

elections. In 1998 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan similarly defined the concept but added the task of 'providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed development'.[4] Most post conflict societies often face two distinctive challenges: economic recovery and risk reduction. Annan's definition thus encompassed economic and socio-political reconstruction of society, including establishing constitutional, administrative and legal structures and determining resource allocation. Peace-building was also understood to include the physical reconstruction of hospitals, housing, roads, schools, electricity, and other infrastructure.

The concept entails implementation of measures that consolidate peaceful relations and deter the emergence or escalation of tensions which may lead to conflict. Peace-building has become a major player in the realm of international institutions. We are a far cry from the times when the international community aimed simply to maintain a ceasefire and restore some form of stability in conflict zones. Since the early 1990s, there has been increasing attention directed towards creating peaceful and democratic societies through international intervention.

Peace-building can improve the prospects that a civil war will be resolved. Although peace-building strategies must be designed to address particular conflicts, broad parameters that fit most conflicts can be identified. Strategies should address the underlying roots of hostility, the local capacities for change, and the specific degree of commitment available to assist sustainable peace. [5]This can be looked at as the three dimensions of a triangle whose area is the effective capacity for building peace. This

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[4] Kofi Annan, '*The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace in Africa*', Report of the Secretary-General to the UN Security Council, (UN Doc A/52/871-S/1998/318, 16 April 1998) paragraph 63.
[5] Doyle W. Michael and Sambanis Nicholas, '*International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*' in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (American Political Science Association, Dec 2000) pp 779-801

suggests that the dimensions substitute for one another, that is, more of one substitutes for less of another; less extreme hostilities substitute for weak local capacity or minor international commitment.

While some critics have dismissed peace-building as mere social work that takes away resources from proper military focus, it has been generally acclaimed as a valuable activity. Its significance on the international agenda is emphasised by the joint establishment by the General Assembly and Security Council of a UN Peace-building Commission. Peace-building also has standing in the international legal framework. It operates in the framework of international treaty, customary law and general principles of law. These include the principles and rules deriving from human rights law; international humanitarian law; international criminal law; prohibition of the use of force in international relations; the right to economic and social rights and to sustainable development; the obligation for the peaceful settlement of disputes; the emerging law of transitional justice; refugee law; and the principles on internal displacement. International law also creates a framework for those implementing peace-building measures that allows for the assessment of policies and practices against stated criteria.

The use of international law should however be informed by an awareness of its shortcomings with respect to the objection to using international law as a framework for peace-building based on its colonial origins. Although international law provided the legal basis for decolonisation and self-determination, some observers have pointed out that peace-building is almost always carried out in third world countries and raises questions of neo-colonialist imposition of standards of 'civilisation'. Its western genealogy, selective application and perceived double standards undermine its claim

to objectivity and impartiality.[6] International law has been used to designate 'failed' states, leading to western intervention, for example in Somalia, and to situations where the west has failed to intervene to prevent, or at least lessen, tragedy, for example in Rwanda. Effective peace-building is aimed at preventing future conflict and states have a similar obligation with respect to the processes and structures of conflict prevention, management and resolution.

2.1 Ethics of Peace-Building

There are a number of social relationships involved in the process of peace-building. The obvious relationship, which is the primary focus of peace-building, is the one between the opposing groups during periods of conflict, or the affected victims in the conflict. Most conflicts are accompanied by large numbers of refugees and/or IDPs fleeing their homes in order to escape the direct conflict or its side effects. In some cases, such as in intra-ethnic conflicts, targeted attacks on civilians may be explicitly intended to drive population groups from their land. Therefore, in post-conflict situations, it is often extremely important to focus peace building activities within IDP communities, lest those communities emerge as incubators of bitter memories and future violence. In 2005, former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan highlighted this, noting that "the return of refugees and internally displaced persons is a major part of any post-conflict scenario ... it is often a critical factor in sustaining a peace process and in revitalizing economic activity."[7]

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[6] A. Anghie, 'Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law', (Cambridge University Press, 2005.) pp 47-51

[7] Jacqueline, K. M., Patrick G, and Keffa K. *Internal Displacement and Local Peace building in Kenya: Challenges and Innovations.* (USA: United States Institute of Peace. Special Report 251, September 2010) p. 3

According to Klopp IDP resettlement is a key plank of local peace building because displacement may on the one hand "such returns can exacerbate tensions and potentially lead to the re-emergence of localized violence", "disrupt local economic webs" or re-establish social cohesion when done properly in post-conflict settings. They suggest that in order to overcome the challenges posed by population dislocation efforts need to focus on traditional peace building tools such as "resettlement [and] dispute resolution, etc and local government.

Besides these, the peace-building process introduces a new set of relationships between the specific groups recovering from conflict situations, and the external observers of the conflict who participate in the peace-building process. It is commonly assumed that peace-building reflects humanitarian, honourable intentions in seeking to stop the violence and human rights abuses that occur during conflicts. But given the compromised state of post-conflict groups, there is significant risk that external intervention can have unforeseen, negative consequences. Two types of negative consequences from the efforts of peace-builders, as well as international development assistance agencies and their staff, have been identified in recent years through the development of peace and conflict impact assessment approaches. One set of negative consequences arises from the actions and approaches of individuals and organizations. The other set arises from the political instrumentalization of external resources and interventions by domestic political actors' intent on resolving conflict through violence. The work of Mary Anderson has examined in length the negative effects arising from the actions and approaches of individuals and organizations.

International mechanisms for protecting human rights are not always acted upon (e.g., Rwanda), and provide the basis for intervention to end those forms of conflict which rely upon human rights abuses. But this does not justify the imposition of liberal

values upon compromised groups involved in low intensity conflict. Low intensity conflicts not only destroy property and societies, but also result in immense human costs. People are wounded, disabled, or killed in violent conflict. Among the survivors, the psychological costs are immeasurable. The loss of loved ones, home, security, and a normal context for everyday living disables individuals, inhibiting their ability to interact with others. The strategic infliction of terror upon the innocent further deprives them of their humanity. Rape, torture, and particularly the targeting of children, all serve to strip individuals of their confidence and their self worth. The impact of low intensity conflict is long-term. Once an individual's own secure identity has been displaced, the process of rediscovering the self is necessarily long and difficult.

[8]This should however not be taken to mean that post-conflict development entails rebuilding the affected society from nothing. Conflict does not necessarily correspond with social breakdown because conflict often goes hand in hand with normal social life experiences. Many communities are well versed at dealing with adversity in a way that best suits them. Unfortunately however, a lack of curiosity about sociological and cultural causes has often invited operational responses which are insensitive to local social and cultural conditions. Intervening in an emergency by ignoring indigenous coping strategies is to increases civilian suffering. A prime aim of humanitarian operations should be to identify patterns of social resilience and vulnerability and reinforce local capacities rather than introduce foreign perceptions and foreign responses. Respect for social and cultural integrity, then, is of the utmost importance in dealing with low intensity conflict situations, when cultural identity is perhaps all

[8] Jo, B. *Children's Experience of Conflict Related Emergencies: Some Implications for Relief Policy and Practice. Disasters.* (Published Online, 1994) pp. 18:254-257.

that is left to persons who are compromised by violent conflict. [9]Imposing alien liberal values is likely to fail as the chances of it being perceived as a form of aggression are very high. When such attempts are perceived this way, members of non-democratic cultures are more likely to reject such values. Liberal values can only take hold in a society when those values are internally embraced by members of that society. The key to the promotion of lasting values is to introduce those ideas gradually and to support internally-driven movements for liberalization. Owing to the fact that the most enduring forms of liberalization are those that result from internal reform, the primary focus for liberals outside the group should be to provide this sort of support.[10]

Thus, although intervention objectives include the projection of liberal values, these must be promoted with caution in post-conflict situations. The imposition of alien values upon individuals struggling to regain their own identity, independence, and confidence may cause unintended harm by inhibiting authentic cultural identities. Peace-building strategies should provide compromised individuals and groups with an opportunity to rediscover their identities and situate themselves in a context of peace. The opportunity for rediscovery of self is essential if any peace is to be lasting. Individuals who are compromised and threatened cannot enter into the process of building healthy, trusting relationships that are necessary for a society to engage in sustainable, peaceful relations.

It is thus recommended that, democratization should be the primary goal of peace-building initiatives. At the centre of this lies the importance of the reconstruction of civil society as a means of fostering indigenous democratic elements. Strengthening

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[9] Walter. K. 'Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights'. (USA: Oxford University Press, 1994). p.167.
[10] Walter. K. 'Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights'. (USA: Oxford University Press, 1994). pp. 168.

the social/economic sphere can create a political space for civil society to develop, and can help democratic development that reflects local values and history. This recommendation recognises the need to respect the cultural integrity of post-conflict groups, while at the same time supporting internal liberalization. The question, then, is how to promote liberal values in post-conflict situations, without taking advantage of the compromised position of those individuals and groups who are trying to rebuild their lives. The successful promotion of such values requires an approach which is both respectful of other cultures, and which allows others to appreciate the benefits of incorporating liberal practices within their society. J.P. Lederach suggests that a dialectical approach to the practice of mediation, which he terms an 'elicitive model', may be useful.[11] Rather than imposing alien standards in resolving conflict, the elicitive model seeks to discover and solidify the resources that exist in a specific post-conflict context. There are several reasons to recommend this model as a peace-building approach. By empowering individuals to speak for their own cultural traditions, it allows a voice to under-represented or oppressed groups. And in seeking resources within the specific contexts in which it is applied, it also demonstrates respect for the value and integrity of the culture. However, mediation alone is not sufficient to achieve sustainable peace. The elicitive model of mediation necessarily focuses on past conflict and recalls the essential differences that initially triggered unrest. Peace-building strategies should also incorporate approaches that are forward thinking, and that demonstrate the common values shared by those affected by conflict. Some key perspectives must be shared by both sides, yet each group needs to comprehend the unique perspectives of the other in their own cultural context. It is only through such a fusion that we can truly begin to appreciate the value of other

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[11] Lederach, J. P. *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures.* (New York, Syracuse University Press. 1995) pp. 64-66

perspectives. The ideal peace-building approach will enable this fusion of horizons to occur between opposing groups, as well as between the victims of conflict and peace-builders.

[12]There are a number of frameworks, methods, tools and processes being used by a variety of development actors to achieve and monitor such peace-building strategies. These tools are used at the formulation, monitoring and evaluation stages in the programme cycle of humanitarian, reconstruction, and traditional development interventions. Donors and other development actors now recognize that their interventions are not conflict neutral and are seeking ways of increasing the conflict-sensitivity of their activities in operationally feasible ways[13].

2.2   Principles of Peace-Building

In order to decipher the best strategies towards peace-building, it is dire to look at the principles underlying peace building. The principles include:- the need to **build partnerships** among national structures and the civil society so as to cultivate local ownership; the need to have a sense of **national ownership**, which is essential for success and sustainability of recovery efforts, and for building consensus around recovery objectives and reinforcing local capacities. The government's transition strategy and plan should be based on a clear strategy and timeframe; **Capacity development** must be a key goal and must therefore enjoy national support. National ownership cannot fully materialize if those national actors and institutions ultimately responsible for a county do not have the required capacities to manage and lead. The process must work towards the concept of building back the society to a state that's

[12] John, P.L, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies.* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997) pp. 72-75
[13] Keele B. *A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones — Working Paper No. 1.* (Ottawa: IRDC. 1998)

better than what it was before. Crises are also opportunities for change and reform and therefore peace-building should seek to avoid simply rebuilding what existed before, and place a premium on rehabilitation of services and institutions through the application of **better standards and methods** of reconstruction and the adaptation of improved policies. A **bottom-up participatory approach** should be applied in order to foster national and community ownership beyond the central government level. It is essential for sustainable results-oriented solutions to the delivery of goods and services, and the empowerment of vulnerable populations. In line with this, marginalized and vulnerable people should be included throughout the transition process. Children and Youth are especially essential parts of peace building. As the future of their country, they represent the hope for a better tomorrow, and the motivation for a war-torn society to start re-building and healing - vital elements for any peace-building process. Adequate, predictable and **flexible funding** is essential to support peace-building efforts. Appropriate funding mechanisms are indispensable to have impact on the ground in a timely manner. **Time element** is also an essential aspect to put into consideration. Timely, quick-impact interventions are critical in influencing peace building outcomes. However, peace-building is a long-term process that may take a generation to bear fruit. Rapid response is necessary, but not sufficient for success. These are just but a few of the principles of peace-building.

2.3   Peace-Building Strategies

[14]The political strategy of a peace-building mandate is the concept of operations embodied in its design. Just as civil wars are usually about failures of legitimate state authority, sustainable civil peace relies on its successful reconstruction. Peace-

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[14] Doyle W. Michael and Sambanis Nicholas, *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis* in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (American Political Science Association, Dec 2000)

building is about what needs to happen in between. Civil wars arise when individuals, groups, and factions discover that those held in a position to represent them no longer speaks and acts for them. These could be politicians or even the police. When the disaffected mobilize, acquire the resources needed to risk an armed contest, meet resistance, and judge that they can win, civil war follows. [15] Although it is possible to imagine purely cooperative solutions to domestic peace, the confusion, violence, and changing identification that characterize the onslaught and conduct of civil war do not seem to be promising circumstances for rational cooperation among factions. Instead, the establishment of civil peace seems to require addressing directly both the defensive and aggressive incentives that motivate faction leaders and sometimes their followers. Defensive incentives arise in the domestic security dilemma. When central authority collapses, anarchy emerges, and when this happens, each group/faction seeks to arm itself for protection. Offensive incentives arise because factions and their leaders want to impose their ideology or culture, reap the spoils of power, seize the property of rivals, exploit public resources for private gain, or all of the above. Peace thus requires the elimination, management, or control of "spoilers"[16]or war entrepreneurs[17]

Though conquest by one faction can solve the problem, political and social reconstruction is vital for longer term legitimacy and stability. Peace through agreement can employ the separation of populations and territorial partition to address war-prone incentives.[18] Civil wars can be turned into international conflicts, as

[15] James, D. *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion'* (Princeton NJ-Princeton University Press, 1985) pp. 780

[16] Stephen, S. *Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.* International Security 22 (Fall, 1997): 5-53.

[17] Rui, D and Weingast, B. 'The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict.' In *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention,* (ed). Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) Pp. 261-302.

[18] Chaim, K. *Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Conflict.* International Security 20 (Spring 1996): 136-75.

between Eritrea and Ethiopia, or stable and relatively secure international or inter-communal balances of power, as in Somalia. But in many civil wars the contest is over whom or what ideology controls a single polity. Moreover, in some ethnic wars the costs of "cleansing" will seem too high, or a common basis for overarching civic citizenship exists or can be created. Combatants in these circumstances still have continuing disputes over material interests, who or what rules, and safety. Each has experienced devastating destruction in varying degrees, and both leaders and followers are likely to harbor deep resentment for losses sustained, particularly to family and friends. They also experience the costs of war and may come to a "hurting stalemate," in which no faction sees that it can win and each perceives the high costs of continuing strife.[19] In these latter circumstances, sustainable peace needs state authority as a starting point to overcome security concerns. State sovereignty or authority-fills that role, restoring legitimate power. The rational choice theory of civil war is relevant to the calculations parties make to support or reject peace after the fighting ends. Simply put, war will recur if the expected utility of war is greater than the expected utility of peace. Such a model underpins recent work on civil war occurrence and termination.[20] These studies assume that the warring parties are rational but not infallible; war generates private and public gains and losses that are unevenly distributed; private gains explain why war may be rational for some groups; and because war is collectively suboptimal, it is also collectively irrational. These assumptions allow analysts to make a series of hypotheses regarding the likelihood of war, but the results of such a decision-making model clearly depend heavily on a further set of detailed assumptions. The specific motivations that shape the behavior

[19] William, Z.I. *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa.* (Oxford University Press, 1985) pp. 267
[20] Paul, C and Hoeffler, A. *Greed and Grievance in Civil War.* World Bank Policy Research Paper 2355 (May, 2000).

of combatants are thus complex and varied. Fear, honor and interest are present in modern variations-security dilemmas, ethnic identity and/or ideological fervor, and loot seeking-and each of them is complicated by potential differences between leaders and followers and factions and patrons. The decision to organize or participate in a rebellion and then attempt to achieve a viable peace is not a straightforward matter and may differ greatly across actors. What each shares, however, is a political environment in which success in achieving peace depends on the degree of harm sustained, the resources available for development, and the international assistance to overcome gaps. Low levels of economic development and other deficiencies in local capacities may motivate actors to violence, due to the low opportunity cost of war and the opportunities for private gains from violence. Increased hostility due to the experience of war makes reconciliation more difficult. To achieve peace and reconciliation under these circumstances, we need to; [21] re-concentrate central power by recognizing the powerful as legitimate, or empowering the legitimate; increase state legitimacy through participation (elections, power sharing), and; raise and allocate economic resources in support of peace. All three generally require external, international assistance or authority in a transitional period. This last dimension is our particular focus here. We do not intend to model a specific decision-making framework; rather we will explore the correlates of successful and unsuccessful peace-building after civil war.

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[21] William, Z.I. 'Putting Things Back Together.' In *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*': (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). Pp. 267-73.

2.4 Limitations of Peace-Building

Evidence of the limitations on peace-building is available in all the countries where external engagement took place from the mid-1990s until today. In the case of Latin America, for example, Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala are three countries where peace-building has failed after decades of war and violence (comprising all aspects of 'gendered' violence against children and women as well as gang and criminal violence mainly involving men), and poverty is widespread .This should come as no surprise, because although the 'root causes' of the conflict are known (including land distribution, income inequality, and a small powerful elite running the country), the engagement of the international community, showed that imposing short-sighted liberal governance frameworks helped to stabilise existing elite structures. Large sections of the elite had accepted the need for economic liberalisation, but had not accepted 'the need for redistribution or even responsibility to invest domestic resources in the reconstruction of the country .The general point here is that peace-building as defined by the international community could never carry transformative potential. Instead, it often became a cover for familiar development interventions. And, as elsewhere in development, there was little critical attention paid to systemic shortcomings, and to worst practices from around the peace-building globe. The myriad theories on conflict prevention must also be linked, solidly, to implement programming. It's not simply enough to theorize or generalize ideas of how conflict prevention should work rather it is vital that they be "translated into meaningful and feasible models that are policy-friendly and relevant.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF ISIOLO DISTRICT

3.0 Profile of Isiolo District

3.0.1 Introduction

Isiolo is one of the thirteen districts in Kenya's Eastern Province, a region that is home to some of the most volatile areas[22]. Pastoral communities here have a long history of violent conflict that has contributed to significant loss of property and life, adversely affected social and economic activities and increased poverty levels. Historically, raids and fights among pastoral communities spared human lives, especially those of women and children. Recently, the changing nature of localized conflict has become more violent and resulted in greater loss of life. Raids are no longer conducted with traditional weapons or under traditional mores, but increasingly with the use of sophisticated weapons that have devastating effects.

The district borders Garissa to the southeast, Wajir to the east, Marsabit to the North, Tana River and Meru districts to the South and Samburu and Laikipia to the west. Its proximity to districts bordering Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia put Isiolo (and the rest of the northern Kenyan districts) in the thick of violent conflicts and instability. These include Moyale near Ethiopia and Lagdera near Somalia. Protracted civil conflict in all three of these unstable neighbours contributes to the steady flow of small arms into the region. People from Somalia for example sell arms to people from Moyale, Isiolo and Marsabit. Far from becoming passive victims of this regional small-arms trade, some Kenyans in the isolated north have seized the economic opportunity to join an easy market by facilitating or participating in illegal trafficking. The decision to run guns, made in the context of little government presence and few other alternative

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[22] Taya, W, *Guns in the Borderlands; Reducing the demand for small arms,* (South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, Brooklyn Square Pretoria, 2004) p. 46

sources of income to pastoralism, is often one based not on malice or ideology, but on simple opportunism. Automatic guns are now easily available to local communities, where they increase the frequency and intensity of inter-tribal skirmishes, but also serve as protection from cross-border raids that have been subject to little control from the police of any Nairobi Declaration signatory.

3.0.2 Topography and Climate of Isiolo

[23]The Northern Kenya district covers an approximate area of 26,605 sq. km. Most of the land in the district is flat, low-lying, featureless plain resulting from weathering and sedimentation. The plains rise gradually from an altitude of approximately 200 meters above sea level at the Lorian Swamp in the northern part of the district to about 300 meters at the Merti plateau.

Isiolo has four major rivers; namely Ewaso Nyiro, Isiolo, Kinna and Bisandi (Bisan Adhi). River Ewaso Nyiro originates from the Aberdares and drains into the Lorian Swamp. It is the main source of water in the district. During the dry season it dries up at the lower part of the district, while during the wet season it floods the plains. These plains along the River Ewaso Nyiro are the main grazing areas during the dry season.

3.0.3 Ethnic diversity and Economic Activities in Isiolo

[24]The district is a multi-ethnic tribal district, but there are five main ethnic groups/communities involved in conflict. These are the Boran, Turkana, Somali, Meru and Samburu; with the Boran assumed to be the most and the Samburu assumed to be the least in that order.

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[23] Taya, W, *Guns in the Borderlands; Reducing the demand for small arms*, (South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, Brooklyn Square Pretoria, 2004) p. 56
[24] UNOCHA / UNHCR and KNCHR *The current violence affecting vulnerable persons in Isiolo. Analysis and Recommendations for Follow-Up* (8 November 2011) p 2

Nomadic pastoralism is the major economic activity in the district, with herders raising cattle, sheep, goats, camels and donkeys. Livestock remains the principle driver of conflict in the area. It is a fundamental form of pastoral capital.[25] It is the pastoralist's means for production, storage, transport and transfer of food, wealth and other services. Any threat to livestock – such as lack of fodder or water, raiding, price variation, and disease – is a direct threat to pastoral livelihoods. There is limited rain-fed and irrigation agricultural activities in the wetter areas of the districts along the rivers. Banditry cases have severely limited infrastructure development. Isiolo, therefore, is vulnerable to both drought and insecurity. The Somali Shifta wars in the 1960s are sometimes cited as the start of Isiolo's troubles. During and after the Shifta war, the government confiscated many livestock as punishment for the insurgency. Continued insecurity and the collapse of regimes in Somalia and Ethiopia have resulted in continuous infiltration of illegal firearms[26].

3.0.4 Political Dimensions

The politicization of conflict in the area began with the advent of multi-partyism as the-then ruling party KANU tacitly gave support to local ethnic warlords in a bid to keep the opposition at bay.[27] This conflict worsened in 1999-2001 as the KANU rule came under strong challenges and at the onset of the 2002 elections.

Since 2002, ethnic alliances have become an important determinant in political contests in the district. In the period post 2007 elections, Isiolo has seen on and off confrontations between the communities leading to a disarmament campaign by the military in 2009. The exercise was however stopped after local leaders accused the

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[25] Gufu O. *Ecological Factors in Land use Conflicts, Land Administration and Ford Insecurity in Turkana, Kenya* (Pastoral Development Network Papers 25, 3-4, 1992) pp 146-160.
[26] Taya, W, *Guns in the Borderlands; Reducing the demand for small arms*, (South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, Brooklyn Square Pretoria, 2004) pp. 56
[27] UNDP Kenya, *Conflicts Dynamics in Isiolo, Samburu East and Marsabit South Districts*, in Amani Papers, Vol 1 No3 of June 2010

government of unfairly targeting the Samburu hence making them vulnerable to attacks from Borana. It took the intervention of the Prime Minister Raila Odinga for the exercise to stop. The conflict reared its head once again towards the end of 2010 and was triggered by clashes over pasture and water between the Borana and the Turkana.

3.1 Factors Contributing to Conflict in Isiolo

The causes of conflict in the district are diverse. [28]Cramer notes that major conflicts never have a single cause and are almost always a combination of major and minor issues. These may include: limited access to water and pasture resources, loss of traditional grazing land, culture of cattle raiding, lack of alternative sources of livelihood, political incitement, non-responsive government policy and inter-tribal animosity. These complexities are heightened by the presence of international and regional boundaries that have affects nomadic pastoralism through creation of administrative units, which split communities that once lived together. This is true for example, amongst the Borana who freely cross the Kenya-Ethiopia border. These boundaries have interfered with nomadic movements that were occasioned by pasture and water distribution at different seasons. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) from war torn countries in the Horn of Africa has amplified the problem.

Hence, typical causes of violent conflict are land related (for instance, trespassing), animal related (mostly rustling), and personal issues (such as rivalries). These issues deserve further discussion as conflict in the region has often been trivialized as mere cultural practice.

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[28] Cramer, C *War is not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for violence in developing countries*, (London, Hurst & Co. 2004) p. 13

3.1.1 Negative Cultural Practices

Women have often been seen as the motivation behind cultural practices such as cattle rustling. They encourage men to steal livestock from other communities because they want to improve their livelihood. They also incite men through songs to raid cattle from other communities, and after successful raids, they sing songs of praise. However, communities in Isiolo have been enlightened on the negative effects of this practice and stopped it. Unfortunately it is still widely practiced among neighbouring communities.

Cattle-rustling is a traditional activity among pastoralists. Traditions carried from one generation to another show that pastoralist communities engage in cattle rustling culture, raiding weaker communities and taking away their animals as a means of restocking livestock and obtaining cattle for bride price.[29] When the warriors return from successful raids, there are songs of praise to welcome them. Traditionally however, cattle rustling did not involve killing people, but rather, rustled livestock were meant to replenish lost herds following drought. However, if elders from the neighbouring communities identified the stolen herds, the matter was usually discussed and livestock returned. If death occurred during the raid, extra cattle from the killer's family were given to compensate the victim. Cattle rustling did not explode in its present violent form until the 1970s.[30]

Inter-communal cattle rustling is now more frequent. It is now alleged that the economically powerful people are funding livestock thefts and politicians are encouraging conflicts to flush out would be supporters of political opponents from their political turfs. There have for instance been constant clashes between the Pokots

[29] Mkutu K, *"Banditry, cattle rustling and the proliferation of small arms, the case of Baragoi Division of Samburu District"*, Arusha report (African Peace Forum: Nairobi, 2000)
[30] Mkutu K and Marani M, *"The role of civic leaders in the mitigation of cattle-rustling and small arms: The case of Laikipia and Samburu"*, (African Peace Forum: Nairobi, 2001).

and Turkana in Kenya, the Pokots and Samburu, Boran and Gabbra; resulting in deaths and theft of livestock. Some politicians and wealthy entrepreneurs also have intentions to procure cattle in vast quantities either to feed warring armies or to sell on the market for profit. The implications of cattle rustling on communities have been wholly negative, not only owing to their scourge but also because the future of pastoralism as an economic activity is endangered, mainly because the commercialisation of cattle raiding has introduced a significant new criminal element. Thus, we can confidently conclude that armed livestock raiding causes a higher incidence and deeper levels of poverty even though it is hard to quantify the impact. Local people report greater impoverishment now compared with the 1970s before raiding increased in frequency and violence. The size of many household herds has diminished to the point of material insignificance, leaving them in a situation that makes it extremely difficult to return to a livelihood based predominantly on pastoralism. It is important to have herds in order to maintain social contacts through which a herd can be rebuilt. Presently it is more difficult to reconstitute herd losses through borrowing and receiving gifts of livestock. Raiding and banditry have rendered entire social networks livestock-poor. Extraordinary circumstances may contribute to a household's recovery after the theft of animals such as waged labour or regular remittances from relatives or friends working in other parts of Kenya. However, this is unusual. Instead, armed violence further constricts the already narrow set of opportunities that poverty brings. The options are few for negotiating out of the condition of chronic poverty. Thus, the impact of cattle banditry and armed violence for many is to create irreversible conditions of poverty in the absence of viable alternative economic opportunities to livestock herding.

3.1.2 Socio-Economic and Political Marginalization

Governance in the Kenya is dominated by manipulation of ethnicity, patronage and a political culture of exclusion. Although the government has made some efforts to include pastoralists in the civil service and ministries, they are still not adequately represented in political life, nor do they have education levels to compare with the majority of the population. Access to education has been hindered by several factors including local customs; the nomadic lifestyle; and insufficient attention by governments to alternative models of schooling. Moreover, the rapidly increasing insecurity in pastoral areas hinders formal education. Many schools in pastoralist areas have been closed due to insecurity. As a result, pastoralists have lagged behind in modern education. The low literacy levels, particularly among women and girls, adversely affect development and reduce opportunities for influencing political decision-making processes at district and national level. Marginalization, neglect and general poor governance are thus seen as a major contributor to conflict in Isiolo.

The role of the state in Isiolo has also been minimal, which is typical of most of the northern arid districts of Kenya. Pastoralist people have usually had limited contact with government which, in turn, has failed to provide security. A culture of impunity has prevailed and a distrust of government has built up over many years. [31]Even when the security forces have attempted to control raiding, in very large raids the number of raiders easily outstrips the security forces (Mkutu, 2003).

3.1.3 Inadequate Land Tenure Policies

Pastoral land resources are usually held under a controlled access system which is communal. Communal land tenure is a tenure system in which the tribe or clan or a group has access to land. Tenure is thus a social institution: a relationship between

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[31] Mkutu, K., 2003, 'Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya-Uganda Border Region', Saferworld.

individuals and groups or tribes consisting of a series of rights and duties with respect to the use of land[32].

In the past, there have been attempts to integrate pastoralists into the private property system through the granting of private group title to limited areas. Having group title gave security to the groups but it also circumscribed their ability to maintain reciprocal relations among their own communities and with others. It also reduced their access to critical grazing and water resources outside the group ranch boundaries.

The enforced changes in land tenure altered the way people related to land as a resource and this created uncertainty and tension. The customary regime governing pastoralist land recognised the communal use of land and was in contrast to the privatisation of land advocated by state legislations. As result of increased levels of privatised land, pastoralists' traditional grazing patterns and coping strategies have been disrupted. This has resulted in reduced and fragmented grazing areas and increased the impact of droughts and scarcity.

Existing policies and legal institutional frameworks were put in place in the 1950s and 1960s when the ratio of land to population was greater. The major concern of policy and law was the regulation of 'orderly' use of land[33]. The tension between state legislation and customary land regimes and the continual grabbing of land and displacement of pastoralists are now leading to violent conflict among pastoralists, ranchers, sedentary farmers, and state security forces.[34]

[32] Birgegard L E, *Natural Resource Tenure: A review of issues, experiences with emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa. Rural Development Studies* (Swedish University of Agriculture Science/International Rural Development Center: Uppsala, 1993). Pp 24

[33] Bazaara, N, *Land reforms and agrarian structures in Uganda: Retrospect and prospect,* (Nomadic Peoples, vol. 34, no 35 1994), pp 37-54;

[34] Fratkin, E, *Pastoral land tenure in Kenya: Masai, Samburu, Boran and Rendile experiences, 1950-1990,* (Nomadic Peoples, vol. 34, no 35 1994), pp 55-68.

Currently, the 'Resort City' is the single largest reason for conflict. The highly lucrative project has seen various persons grab chunks of land for speculation purposes. The Turkana were gradually forced out of the eastern parts of Isiolo town by the Somalis and Boranas as they never registered any of the land they were entitled to communally, and have later realized that with the Resort Town developments, control of land is essential to survival. One way of the Turkana to grab land and hold onto it has been through enclosing big chunks of it and protecting it, another has been through the 'Conservations'. The Borana and Somali are, however, also active of grabbing and fencing land in this, and other areas. This is encroaching on the traditional pastoralist grazing areas.[35]

3.14   Easy Access to Illegal Arms

The gun problem in the district is very complex. Its magnitude can be illustrated by the large number losses of human life, livestock and wanton destruction of property. Many pastoralists living near the borders of Kenya-Ethiopia, Kenya-Uganda, Kenya-Somalia, Kenya-Sudan and Uganda-Sudan; have found themselves victims of cattle rustling. As opposed to traditional times where spears, bows and arrows were used during cattle rustling, the current weapon of choice used is a firearm, most commonly, the AK-47 as it is quite easily acquired and low in cost. While the exact number of small arms in the hands of pastoral communities is difficult to know, it is clear that they pose a big threat. This problem is simply a question of bad governance where the government security systems have failed miserably, because the government has commercialized security for personal financial and political gains. This has led the communities to have little or no faith in the government.

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[35] UNOCHA / UNHCR and KNCHR *The current violence affecting vulnerable persons in Isiolo. Analysis and Recommendations for Follow-Up* 8 November 2011 pp 3-4

Pastoral communities hence seem to be arming themselves primarily because they need to protect themselves against being raided by hostile groups, and to steal stock from other pastoral communities. Guns are also an economic investment as acquisition of these illegal guns enables the pastoral communities to guarantee a sustained market. The economic benefits of obtaining a gun are more attractive now than in the past.

The porous borders, without clear security procedures, make it easy for arms to move to and from one country to another. The arms issue is a cross-border problem which is greatly influenced by existence and operations of the Oromo Liberation Force. We thus see that arms acquisition is now both a cause and consequence of insecurity and conflict pastoral communities.

NGOs and civil society in the region are faced by various challenges in as far as disarmament is concerned. For instance, they may find themselves unable to entice community members to give up their arms because they lack appropriate incentives to use in exchange programs for those surrendering their firearms. Although the disarmament record to date has not been very impressive, there is the potential for greater future success as a result of the Nairobi Declaration. This Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa was signed by ten governments in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region in March 2000. Not only is this a positive example of much-needed regional cooperation, it acknowledges the link between security and development and the framework envisages a broad partnership between governments, multilateral agencies and civil society. The potential for this initiative is substantial as it enters the implementation phase in Kenya. However, there are also a number of challenges, for example overcoming the top-down approach that has characterised the

NAP so far, linking to development and poverty reduction, combating corruption and making headway in the long process of building trust between the state and civil society.[36]

3.1.5 Vulnerability to Climatic Changes

[37]The climate in East Africa has changed dramatically in the last century or so, as is the case in most other parts of the world as is evidenced by indicators such as changes in the level of lakes such as Lake Victoria and in the ice-core records among other indicators. These show that there have been major climate and vegetation changes in East Africa with warmer and cooler periods, and wetter and drier conditions.

[38]Endemic drought and environmental degradation has led to food shortages and increased pressure on available land and water resources. Climatic conditions play a major controlling role in a pastoralist's life because rainfall affects the availability of pasture and water. Droughts have a long-term impact on the people in arid regions as they result in the loss of lives and in the decline in livestock population. While it is expected that in some situations people will recover from these losses over several years, the majority of the population will not have the capacity to rebuild their livestock resources in the short term.

In former times, pastoralists had strategies for coping with the pressures caused by nature. These included: leaving land fallow; splitting families to better manage family herds; pooling resources; migration; and trade ties with traders and businessmen.[39]

[36] Peleman, J., and Mutahi ,*Review of NAPs for SALW Reduction in Uganda and Kenya*, for DFID, Draft (2004)
[37] L.M Kiage and K Liu, *Late Quaternary Paleo-Environmental Changes in East Africa: A Review Of Multiproxy Evidence from Palynology, Lake Sediments and Associated Records - Progress in Physical Geography* 30 (5) (2006) pp. 633-658
[38] Taya, W *Guns in the Borderlands; Reducing the demand for small arms*, (South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, Brooklyn Square Pretoria, 2004) p. 57
[39] Casper O A, *Life in the Balance: Ecological Sociology of Turkana Nomads* (ACTS: Nairobi, 1990) pp 2-6

These strategies were based on the premise that control of a variety of resources was needed to provide access to pasture and water at different times of the year and particularly during droughts.

Government policies have consistently sought to alter, rather than build upon, the pastoral production and coping systems. The failure to appreciate the pastoral logic has meant that development objectives have been defined on the basis of erroneous assumptions and the policies which have been implemented have disrupted pastoral economies.

An example of how climate variability contributes towards conflict is seen in the onset of the 2011 drought. This drought led to conflicts at village level, owing to migration by livestock owners to villages with permanent sources of water. This migration was often seen as encroachment and was highly unwelcome by the residents who didn't want water in their jurisdiction used by others. Climate change has also caused a clash in livelihoods, owing to conflict between groups of people practicing different economic activities, such as livestock keepers and crop cultivators; where pastoralists may encroach land meant for crop production and similarly, cultivators may utilize pastoral land hence reducing pasture. Water-access and use conflicts at this level is heighten during the dry season as opposed to the wet season, and is manifested between up-stream and down-stream users, regardless of what economic activity they practice.

[40]We there see that climate change and variability have the potential to impact negatively on availability of water, and subsequently, demand for and access to the water. Climatic change is likely to result to water scarcity, resulting in stiff competition with regard to access and use. East Africa in general is experiencing

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[40] Donald A. M and Jo-Ansie, V.W, *Climate Changes and Natural Resources Conflicts in Africa* (South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, Brooklyn Square Pretoria, 2010) pp. 72-76

dramatic rainfall changes that have seen a decrease in river flows and drying up of other many natural water resources. Owing to this decrease, water conflict may occur at different levels such as between villages, ethnic groups, livelihood systems, government institutions and local people, or even between countries. This makes it necessary to formulate and implement national policies and other legal frameworks geared towards addressing issues regarding climate change and especially the adaptation to and mitigation of impacts caused by climate changes. It is also imperative to improve water management so as to reduce and combat degradation of available water resources and enhance equitable access to and utilization of the resource, owing to the fact that water resources touch every sector of the economy. This is all geared towards reducing or alleviating sources of conflict pertaining to water access and utilization. Climate impact adaptation and mitigation measures must therefore be put in place when policies are formulated and when developments projects are planned.

3.1.6 Government Policies

Over the years there has been a tendency to neglect the needs of pastoralists and even to envisage the gradual eradication of pastoralism. In addition, there has been a tendency by governments to focus on the interests of agriculture and urban dwellers, thus marginalising other stakeholders. Most policies are based on containment, pacification and sedenterisation of pastoralists.

The pastoral livelihood has always been exposed to harsh environmental conditions. However, in recent years, pastoralists have faced numerous new problems, including competition for water and pasture in the context of decreased access to land; more explicit political and economical marginalisation; lack of appropriate responses to the deteriorating security situation; and the proliferation of weapons across the region.

[41]Owing to climatic variations, people encroaching in marginal lands and protected areas such as game reserves and national parks have often found themselves on the wrong side of the law because access to these areas and their resources is prohibited. However, owing to scarcity, local people encroach on these areas, creating conflict between institutions that manage these areas and the encroachers. This leads to forcible eviction of these families who were encroaching in search of pasture. The families are then pushed to other areas in search of pasture and water where they in turn find themselves in conflict with local communities over the scarce resources and the cycle continues.

3.1.7 Mistrust of Provincial Administration

The history of relations between governments and pastoralists is one of confrontation. Pastoralists have often drawn attention when invaded or under invasion. This has led to strained relationships between the state and pastoralists. The response by administrations and security forces has had an influence on conflict. Force is often applied, even to civilians who are not part of the conflict and this has exacerbated strained relationships.[42]

The establishment of home guards, coupled with arming and training, increases the potential for conflict escalation given that there is no clear-cut policy to address the root cause of the problems. A coordinated regional programme to address the issue of insecurity is also lacking. Additionally, arming one community leads to others demanding arms for protection, resulting in further proliferation of small arms across

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Donald A. M and Jo-Ansie, V.W, *Climate Changes and Natural Resources Conflicts in Africa* (South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, Brooklyn Square Pretoria, 2010) pp. pp. 73

[42] The best example is the Pokots of Kenya. Many operations by the Kenyan army to try and retrieve unlicensed arms often target innocent civilians

the region. The current breakdown in law and order and rising insecurity in Kenya is now also leading to the formation of 'home-guards' and vigilantes.

Insecurity in pastoral areas heightens instances of poverty and competition for resources. Pastoralists are forced to flee from their communal areas and this affects their ability to maintain their livelihood and forces people to congregate in more secure areas; which increases the pressure on land and resources. The unchecked infiltration of small arms and the deliberate arming of certain communities without due regard to the security of others is a major threat to peace in the entire region.

The government of Kenya, as is the case in other governments in the Horn, has shown inadequacies combating the unprecedented escalation of inter-pastoralist conflicts. The response by state law enforcement bodies has been slow, ineffective, overly forceful, or non-existent. There are no effective policies to address insecurity and the formation of vigilante groups and home guards. This is leading to additional threats to law and order and increased proliferation of small arms. Vigilante groups are now in the forefront of sectional fighting.

3.2 Conclusion

The conflict dynamics that fuel livestock raiding are complex. Over-emphasising on a *competition for scarce resources* model of conflict risks simplifying the causes. It has increasingly been acknowledged by scholars (for example Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998 and Obi 1999) that scarcity may not by itself be a sufficient condition for violent conflict. And the causal link between resource scarcity and conflict is not very clear. It becomes a more potent force in circumstances where there are pre-existing grievances and tensions, by increasing the grievances of the affected population and

changing the structure of political opportunities so that it is more rational to act violently upon those grievances[43].

In both the north-west and the north-east of Kenya, the wider regional dynamics are critical and must be understood. The weakness of state security institutions means that criminal activity can flourish probably on a large-scale in some districts more than others. Building political power around particular ethnic groups has been another factor fuelling violence and livestock raiding between different groups and districts within Kenya, particularly during the regime of the previous government.

Kratli and Swift propose a three-category typology of pastoral conflict in Kenya: traditional, commercial and political conflict. However, they also acknowledge the overlap between these three categories and especially the deliberate hiding of commercial and political conflict behind 'traditional' conflict.

It is evident that the causes of conflict are many and emanate from internal to external push factors. Internally, political rivalry between clans and cultural tendencies that reward rustlers as community heroes have perpetuated conflicts in Isiolo district. However, the internal factors are reinforced by external influences like spread of illegal arms from neighbouring countries like Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. The inaccessible terrain and poor infrastructure render state security operations ineffective. Negligence and apathy contribute to the spread of conflict in the region.

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[43] Dixon, H. T and Blitt, J 'Introduction: A new theoretical overview' In T Homer Dixon and J Blitt (eds) *Ecoviolence: Links among environment, population and scarcity* (Lanham Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998) pp 8-19

CHAPTER 4

DATA PRESENTATION AND FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

This research set out to interrogate the following objectives; to establish the extent of

NGO involvement in peace building in Isiolo district; to investigate why previous

strategies implemented towards peace by key NGOs in Isiolo have been ineffective in

peace building and; to explore alternatives/options that the NGOs can apply in the

peace building process to increase their success rate.

This chapter is organised as follows:

Section 4.1 seeks to establish to what extent NGOs are involved in peace building in

Isiolo

Section 4.2 investigates why previous strategies applied by NGOs haven't succeeded

at building peace

Section 4.3 comes up with alternatives that NGOs can explore to be more successful

4.1 Extent of NGO involvement in peace building in Isiolo District

The research found out that dialogue projects, especially those focused on

psychosocial support have been the main approach to peace interventions in Isiolo.

Furthermore, attempts at institutionalization of dialogue projects under the DPC has

entailed provincial administration-led public barazas centred on discussions about

historical experiences of various injustices, reparations, conflict resolution training

groups or exchanges between *wananchi* and re-building the conditions for peaceful

coexistence.[1] This work has been carried out under the auspices of inter-religious

forums, women groups, district and local committees, including "traditional" elders.

Key representatives of segments of the local population such as women, youth,

government officials, NGOs, and various ethnic communities come together to

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[1] To be sure, the historical accounts seek to attain a minimal consensus since the issues at hand are much more complex, divisive and are supposedly likely to arouse more passions.

constitute the dialogue sessions. Membership in these forums has been on a voluntary basis, except for the DPC chair who is the district commissioner and the DSIO who is an ex-officio member. The work then focuses on psychosocial support, negotiations, mediation, public *barazas* and the organization of traditional festivals all involving ethnically-mixed groups in order to heal strained relationships among communities. This structure was significantly complemented by NGO efforts in Isiolo.

In Isiolo, NGO and DPC peace interventions have been to some extent closely coordinated involving especially influential local and international humanitarian and international NGOs (e.g. KRC, GOAL, IOM,)[2] and NGOs have concentrated too on reconciliation and trauma healing while the government has focused on the reinforcement of security structures entailing the heavy involvement of the provincial administration and establishing more police posts. For instance, IOM dealt with a mixture of reconciliation and 'livelihoods' (e.g. farm input provision); KRC et al. provisioned needy people through immediate relief and building shelter; USAID/Anglican Church of Kenya (through Heifer International) have provided dairy cattle, shelter, etc. The system is such that when the heifer produces a calf, it is given to the neighbour and the same is replicated with the production of subsequent calves and so on.

The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC) took the lead and has done a lot in reconciling people and in providing humanitarian aid under the leadership of a local Bishop. However, their peer group model entails organizing separate dialogue sessions each for elders, youth, and women and with every group having a representative for each ethnic community living in the area. They are voluntary and some little lunch is offered. Initially, in the midst of the violence, most of the

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[2] Others are ADB, Danish Refugee Council, Chemonics, CJPC

meetings took place in the local Catholic Church, and later moved to farms and other trading centres. They also held public barazas together with the DPC members in various localities. Basically people are facilitated to hold meetings in order to open up and air their grievances. This was intended to minimize suspicion. These are held in "peace" halls where people come for meetings and "political" statements are discouraged. Other activities include peace marches, bicycle racing, common meals, and planting trees. However, despite all these, respondents warned that "healing is a process and there is still need for individual intervention" to deepen the healing process among community members.[3]

As a result of the negative impacts of the conflict, loosely organized community groups have been established at the level of community to carry out peace building projects. Indeed, the mushrooming of such projects has been phenomenal. However, interviews conducted indicate that these efforts have been marginal since such projects are not professionally managed, are poorly funded and in some cases funds are considered insufficient. In an interview with a section of the leadership in Isiolo, the effort by part of the NGOs was dismissed as "self-serving"[4] and as "private businesses".[5] This was confirmed by a number of key informant interviews who expressed concern that increasingly, the role of NGOs in peace building is unregulated with potential of being the anti-thesis of the peace building agenda. Indeed, similar findings on corruption have been reported by Mahmoud in the context of peace efforts among pastoralist in Kenya. According to Mahmoud corruption is reported in cases where one of the feuding communities raises money to bribe the

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[3] Other interventions include: Building a cooling plant for milk, a bakery class for women, poultry farming, enrolling young people into driving classes, hairdressing, horticulture (e.g., mushrooms), tree nurseries, tailoring and accounting classes.
[4] Interview with Regional Commissioner, Isiolo
[5] Interview with former member of Parliament Isiolo

police and the provincial administration so as to be favoured against their rivals.[6] It also emerged that most civil society actors interviewed confessed to being potential political candidates and hence closely intertwined with the state. They are thus perceived as not entirely neutral in their work.

However, initiation of more infrastructure projects as a component of peace building in Isiolo still has a long way to go. By the time field observations were made, IDPs were still holed up in camps, about 15 schools were closed in Kambi ya Juu, Garba and Shambani, insecurity was (and is) still a major issue, especially in the villages and fear was evident all over among those displaced and affected by the violence. Field interviews establish that the main reason given by lack of hardware investment was the lack of appropriate funding for such investment projects. Interviews with the government officials in Isiolo indicated a negative perception to the work some of the NGOs were doing arguing that such organizations were not interested to address the root causes of the conflict (livelihood) in order to continue being in business.[7]

Isiolo: Shambani IDPs Left to 'Integrate' themselves

Increasing violent conflict has been a periodic phenomenon in Isiolo since 2002, usually manifested in the increased intensity and brutality of individual killings. More recently, on February 25, 2012 camels were driven into Shambani area, a relatively lush common grazing area west of Isiolo town. The next day at around 11.00 pm gunshots awoke the local Turkana community who are predominant inhabitants. According to one account by a Catholic catechist, he was in church when he heard gunshots. He ran toward Kambi Garba Catholic mission as the assailant in question

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[6] Mahmoud, H A. 'Conflict and Constraints to Peace among Pastoralists in Northern Kenya' in Baregu, Mwesiga (ed). *Understanding Obstacles to Peace: Actors, Interests, and Strategies in Africa's Great Lakes Region* (Kampala: Fountain publishers, 2011) p. 161
[7] This includes the Regional Commissioner and members of the District Peace Committees

approached them because any time conflict occurs there is always security at local churches and such attackers never chase them into the church compound. The displaced persons associate the most recent conflict in January 2012 with the drought prevailing in large parts of Northern Kenya. They narrate how thousands of camels came to invade their land without being given prior warning by the Somali owners, as was the custom before. One elder narrated how historically movements of animals were always negotiated beforehand so as to avoid conflicts. But he noted how increasingly, traditional mechanisms for early warning are slowly dying out increasing cases of violent conflict. The IDPs cite the fragility of peace in the area given the numerous dialogue meetings has taken place in the area yet violence has become more recurrent. With very little help except from some from humanitarian organizations in the form of tents, utensils, blankets, food, etc, only elders have consistently tried to mediate between communities but that these have had no impact because more powerful people including corrupt local security agents who are then compromised to respond to distress situations. The elders blamed the increasing interest in the land in that area because the planned government development project known as Isiolo Resort City is planned to be located in their land. "The Somalis are no longer interested in pasture, they want to displace us completely and take our land" they argued. There is thus a feeling among the IDPs that because they are politically powerless and therefore enjoy very weak representation, their voices are largely muted.

There was however light at the end of the tunnel as various NGOs in the district can be credited for being involved in peace building by attacking one or more of the causes of conflict from different angles. For example, some NGOs have been working

towards peace building through dealing with negative cultural practices, for example by;

Encouraging involvement of women and youth in peace building

Traditionally, leadership and decision making obligations and mandates have been vested in males (elders). However, NGOs in the district are increasingly recognizing the role that women play in conflict, as peace builders, perpetuators and victims. With great difficulty, they are working towards influencing men to create space for women participation in high level peace negotiations. But even more difficult is convincing men at the grassroots as they strongly hold on to traditional views relegating women to domestic duties, despite the fact that women are actively involved in performing peace building rituals. This does not change the fact that women bear the brunt of the conflict, being targets of sexual violence, displacement, and murder. Significance of the youth is also yet to be recognized even though more often than not, it is this group that executes the conflict.

Most traditions and customs have never granted women the mandate to directly deliberate on decisions of the wider community; neither have they given equal rights in discussing community issues and jointly reaching a decision. By including women and youth in peace committees, some of the committees have been seen as a threat to some traditions and a challenge to the status quo of the traditional decision making structures. This belief has constrained women and youth participation in the affairs of the peace committees, leaving matters of peace and security issues as an arena only for men.

4.1.1 Case Study: Friends of Nomads International (FONI)

[8]FONI was registered in 1998 with the objective of promoting and creating awareness on the Kenyan Constitution, land tenure issues, and civic education in Isiolo district. FONI has been trying to revive traditional systems of natural resource management among the different ethnic groups in the district. Its entry point is through the facilitation of activities aimed at mitigating resource conflicts.

A representative of the peace building NGO explained how FONI brings the community together in peace dialogues, trying to influence the men to create space for women and the youth in the dialogue meetings. He further explained that FONI has done this by setting up Women Peace Forums in Isiolo, Merti, and Garbatulla. These have representatives from Borana, Turkana, Somali, Meru, and Samburu communities.

He further explains that they are keen to target women as their focal point because, in the very same way that women perpetuate conflict by praising men after successful raids and mocking them when their communities are attacked, they can also be key focal persons in promoting peace as they can talk to their husbands and sons who are involved in conflict.

NGOs in Isiolo have also participated in peace building by targeting the socio-economic status of the pastoralists and trying to protect the future of pastoralism. They have done it from different angles such as;

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[8] Taya W. *Guns in the Borderlands; Reducing the Demand for Small Arms*, (South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, Brooklyn Square Pretoria, 2004) p. 62

4.1.2 Case Study: ActionAid

ActionAid's data officer in Isiolo explained how the drought response project works. Once every week, she receives a list of livestock prices from the Ministry of Livestock and using innovative technology, she transmits this information to multiple recipients. The information is then sent out via short message service (SMS) / text message to Relief Committee members and ActionAid's Food Monitors, who are based within communities. The Food Monitors then transcribe the livestock prices, in the local language, onto a bulletin and post it on a notice board in their community. They then organise a community gathering to alert people to the fact that new information is available and talk through the prices. The same procedure applies for information on staple food commodity prices in Isiolo market, using information sourced from the Ministry of Agriculture.

This livestock market information empowers drought-hit pastoralists to achieve better prices for animals that they sell to traders – boosting their cash income thus empowering them financially. The food price information allows them to keep tabs on the price of staple foods such as maize, beans and vegetable oil, on which they increasingly depend in times of drought.

Bearing in mind the fact that illiteracy rates in the area are high, the project has also set up a recorded message service to complement information sent out by SMS. It allows members of the public to hear the same market information spoken in Kiswahili by calling a special information line. Messages on livestock and food prices are uploaded and Relief Committee members and members of the communities that ActionAid works with can call if they want to hear the information directly. Relief Committee members also have the ability to leave messages with information direct

from their communities. It's particularly useful for illiterate members of the community, who may be unable to write text messages. Messages received in the past have conveyed very important information such as reporting outbreaks of disease amongst livestock as was the case in Garba Tula. When such information is received, ActionAid passes it on to the relevant government department, in this case the Ministry of Livestock.

This communication allows pastoralists living in isolated communities to access reliable and up to date market information. ActionAid can also keep in closer touch with the village relief committees that handle food distribution to individual families, hearing directly from the community. The overall advantage to all this is that the emergency preparedness and response programming mechanism is improved[9].

Helping the community cope with adverse climatic changes

NGOs such as ActionAid have rolled out a projects in Isiolo district, which aim to help combat food insecurity amongst communities affected by the recurrent drought.

NGOs in Isiolo have also been instrumental in peace building by encouraging members of the community to come up with community driven conflict management structure/institutions that will promote peaceful coexistence in society as well as fill the security void left by the government in the conflict prone area. They have done it from different angles such as;

Support towards establishment of District Peace Committees

The formation of district peace and development committees has been highly commendable

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[9] Report from ActionAid's data officer in Isiolo

Peace committees borrow heavily from traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and the modern formal dispute arbitration processes. Although there is no unanimous definition of the concept peace committee as it relates to local level peace building activities, it can be defined and or described as a peace building structure that integrates both traditional and modern conflict intervention mechanisms to prevent, manage or transform intra-ethnic or interethnic conflicts.

Although some Peace Committees are initiated by the communities themselves out of the need for peace and security without external support, many of the committees' establishment is facilitated by NGOs. We must appreciate the fact that peace activities need financial facilitation. The rapid response teams for instance require automobile, fuel and living or travelling facilitation. Funding for Peace Committees is critical and although Jenner and Ibrahim say "as long as you are dependent on the outside funding, the bottom-line is that you are in vulnerable position", they need financial support whatever the source. However, this funding or facilitation should not be perceived as monetary gains to the committee but rather a facilitative mechanism.

Involvement in early warning mechanisms

NGOs have also been involved in establishing of early warning systems. Communities have been trained to identify stresses in the system to take corrective measures before violence erupts. As such, NGOs are involved actively in planning for the management and sharing of natural resources. However, largely the efforts of these organizations are not co-ordinated resulting in duplication of effort. For example, in Isiolo, multiple NGOs funded projects under the theme of conflict early warning which included engagement with communities during periods of relative resource stress such as droughts with view to diffusing tensions. However, on closer scrutiny, there was no avenue to coordinate these efforts. Whereas ostensibly such

effort was to be coordinated under the District Steering Group (DSG), our research shows that most NGOs do not present such interventions to the DSGs mainly as a result of fear of competition.

4.2 Previous Peace Building Strategies Adopted by NGOs and Reasons for Failure

Funding of Peace Committees

As we have come to appreciate, peace initiatives need financial support. Unfortunately, the committees established or supported by external actors have become so dependent on external funding and facilitation that they cannot operate on their own. Most of their activities are dependent on donor support and this has posed a major threat to the committee in terms of its independence (neutrality, objectivity) and its very existence. Many peace committees are active when there is funding but come to a halt when funding stops. Such committees have become puppets of the funding institutions, a practice that has completely eroded the philosophy behind the establishment of peace committees in conflict prone areas in Kenya.

On the same note, Peace Committees whose establishment was motivated by the benefits of funding from NGOs have experienced little stability. Some have been formed, disbanded and reconstituted in an *ad hoc* basis and as deemed necessary by the funding institutions. Some districts have also seen a multiplicity of peace committees, as each funding agency tends to form its own peace committee. This has also brought to life another problem of the structure of peace committees as each funding institutions forms the committee in their own way and or structure. The end result has been weakened and discredited legitimacy of such peace committee in society. They are no longer seen as nonpartisan and objective peace makers but have been perceived as outfits motivated by material gains and serving interests of a given

body. NGOs are therefore in some cases unhelpful because they literally survive on shoestring budgets of aid and seem not to want to risk funding flows by "meddling" in local politics. Together with the technical approach they adopt, this has the unintended result of depoliticizing peace building processes and the demobilization of grassroots movements for peace and justice.

Outreach of Peace Committees

Another problem of peace interventions in Isiolo is numerous unnecessary community dialogues with no follow ups/implementation. This routine of meetings has mostly been done in big posh hotels where representation is very narrow since community representatives are usually poor. This hampers their regular attendance and those who attend are people with no influence among ordinary people. In most meetings, those perceived to be community leaders (especially the local MP, councillors) have always had an erratic attendance and commitment record and/or refused to attend. The same people have thus had to attend the same meetings always; indeed, such workshops have become a source of income for attendees who are often local elites uninterested in the longer term commitments which peace building entails.

Furthermore, because representation is poor, local grassroots communities are never involved in peace committees who hold meetings in hotels. The DPC is thus engaged at arm's length among local people who have very little knowledge on its workings and achievements. Such low popular participation in local peace initiatives could have been the unintended consequence of voluntarism as the mode of participation in peace forums. Low participation is also affected blocked by the continued top-down nature of government and NGO peace efforts .e.g. in its plans to revive "elder's councils" which is still not yet clear how locals will be integrated into. Hence it seems peace interventions have had very little, if any, impact on conflict risk reduction in Isiolo.

Although people interviewed admitted that the impact of their work is immeasurable, evidence suggests that the general acceptance of peace is indicated by such empirical facts as 'students can now go to school', 'people intermingle in trade centres', 'people carry out casual work together', and 'the return of stolen goods'. The number of re-built shelters has also been mentioned as indicators of the impact of their work.

4.3 Alternatives which NGOs should explore to increase success rate

Previous chapters have identified and examined factors contributing to conflict involving pastoralists in Northern Kenya in general, and in the district of Isiolo in particular. There is, unfortunately, a wide range of such factors. Experience shows that they must be addressed in a timely and appropriate manner. Although the scale of the violence in Isiolo remains limited compared with many other parts of the North of Kenya, insecurity has become widespread. This undermines efforts to promote social and economic development, as well as posing risks of wider political instability in Kenya and beyond.

This section briefly discusses some issues and policy options relating to managing and averting such conflicts in Isiolo and similar districts in Kenya and her neighbours. It also proceeds to address potential sources of external assistance, such as NGOs.

Pastoralists and Conflict

As is clear from the foregoing analysis, the patterns of marginalisation and conflict involving pastoralists are complex in districts such as Isiolo. Some of the conflicts within and between pastoralist communities have a long history, and to some extent are an aspect of their traditional cultures. However, such 'traditional' conflicts have become more damaging and less manageable as, for example, traditional governance systems have weakened, cattle rustling has become embedded in wider criminal

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networks, and wide availability of automatic and semi-automatic weapons has made raiding much more deadly.

However, pastoralist communities and practices are under severe pressures, and are not in themselves responsible for many of the conflicts in which they become involved. Pressures on access to land and water have increased competition for scarce resources, bringing pastoralist communities into constant friction with other users including agriculturalists and ranchers. Long-distance nomadic movements of peoples, with their herds, intrinsically adds to the challenges of establishing understanding and conflict prevention arrangements between the different communities that are obliged to share scarce resources. Recent droughts have made matters worse. Not only have pastoralists had to compete for scarce resources, the asset base of their livelihoods has been seriously eroded. Some will not recover and will become a poorer and more vulnerable group within an already marginalised group.

Promoting development and preventing and resolving conflicts in the face of such structural challenges would test the capacities of even highly developed governance systems and police and judicial services. So it is perhaps not surprising that in Kenya the national and district governments have proved inadequate, and that the security sector often proves unable to ensure adequate security from crime and violence in a district such as Isiolo and neighbours like Laikipia.

Yet, as this study demonstrates, inappropriate development and security policies by the government have to some extent contributed to social division and conflicts. Development policies have been adopted that not only do not address the concerns of pastoralist communities but also sometimes run directly counter to their interests. The needs of ranchers, agriculturists and the rapidly expanding urban population have

generally taken precedence over those of pastoralists. The relatively low levels of education and political participation of pastoralists have re-enforced tendencies for them to become marginalised in national and district political decision-making processes. At the same time, traditional systems of authority and governance have been neglected and undermined by government agencies, thus reducing communities' own capacities for self-governance and collective problem-solving. Inadequate policing, and the impacts of occasional inappropriate arming of self-defense groups in border regions of Kenya, have meant that communities cannot rely on the state to provide a secure environment for development and conflict management. In this context, there are bound to be risks of violence.

Each of the above factors, and others discussed in the previous chapters, contributes to conflict. Combined, they become mutually reinforcing, making violence more endemic or intractable.

Preventing and responding to conflicts involving pastoralists

Efforts to prevent and reduce conflicts involving pastoralists in Isiolo and similar districts need to address each of the factors contributing to conflict. Indeed, as much as possible they need to be addressed comprehensively, taking into account the linkages that have become established between them. Once a conflict dynamic has become established, and the communities involved have become polarised and conflictual, one generally does not have the luxury of tackling one factor at a time.

Addressing the causes of conflict

The case of Isiolo demonstrates the need to take steps to address a number of underlying causes of conflict. In summary, these include the following: improving systems for managing and allocating scarce resources, particularly access to water and grazing land, to reduce the intensity of competition for scarce resources and help to

manage crises such as extended droughts; adopting development policies and land tenure arrangements that appropriately recognise the needs and interests of pastoralists as well as those of agriculturalists, ranchers and urban communities; addressing the problems of socio-economic and political marginalisation of pastoralist communities; improving the quality of governance based on state institutions, including rule of law, while also respecting and supporting traditional governance systems where they can contribute to problem-solving and upholding rules and agreements; and taking measures to reduce the rivalries and socio-cultural divisions.

This research supports the hypotheses that peace building efforts carried out by efforts of NGOs in Isiolo would be more effective if they included all affected actors, especially mid and grass-root level actors in the coordination of efforts. It was also established that the peace building process would be enhanced if NGOs were supported by good governance practices.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In Isiolo, the main manifestation of conflict is cattle rusting, banditry, border grazing disputes and traditional differences that have never been addressed. However, since the introduction of multi-party democracy in the Kenya, the conflict in Isiolo has taken a political angle with high levels of political incitement effectively turning the dynamic to be more political than traditional/cultural. In a focused group discussion with the DPC in Isiolo, all the members present agreed that since 1992 with the introduction of multi-party, the communities were motivated by gain of political power, making the conflicts deadlier and more difficult to resolve. The effect of the changing dynamic is that "traditional means of prevention and resolution of conflict is not longer respected and viable". Interviews conducted show that current hostilities are associated with the actions of the Member of Parliament for Isiolo who in 1992 moved people from Wajir and Mandera (Somalis) to Isiolo to boost his voter base. In the build up to the 1997 elections, the Borana community organized themselves to ostensibly remove the foreigners through forceful evictions.

There seems to be a broad consensus among academics, researchers, journalists that the violent conflicts in Isiolo are fuelled by politics especially the events leading to and after the 2007 general elections and the 2011 flare ups respectively. The problem of politics has two dimensions. Local intra-political elite struggles in these areas often aggressively refer to past "historical injustices" in order to gain symbolic capital with their ethnic support bases. These discursive constructions are often linked to territorial boundary issues, exclusive access to land, and calls to safeguard an ethnically homogeneous electoral base as the bone of contention. These dynamics are intimately linked to recent political liberalization processes and current attempts to implement

devolved power structures. In effect, these have opened up spaces for (re)negotiating territorial claims.

Conflict prevention must also be holistic, encompassing both security and development, and a 'root cause' approach to conflict prevention programming. There must be increased support for fact-finding and mediation, which are activities viewed more commonly as associated with preventive diplomacy. Finally, a key challenge for conflict prevention is it is a relatively low priority on the foreign policy agenda for most nations. While violence, or the potential for violence, can often be predicated well in advance of a conflict breaking out, it is only when the conflict has ignited that international actors tend to begin paying attention as not a moral concern but as a political threat to the international economic order. It is therefore suggested that policy makers, the state and NGOs pay attention to early warning signs to avert conflict.

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