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Management of Cross Boarder Conflict in Karamoja Region.

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Declaration

I declare that this research project is my original work and has not been submitted either wholly or in part to any other University for the award of degree or diploma.

....   12/11/2012
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Edel Wambui Kawara   **Date**

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the supervisor.

....   17/11/12
                                        ....

Prof. Makumi Mwagiru   **Date**

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Dedication

To my

Dear mum-Margaret, dad, brother, sister

and

My fiancé –Humphrey,

Your levels of encouragement, endurance and perseverance have
been very inspiring

Acknowledgement

Abstract

This research investigates the impact of cross-border conflict between the Karimojong of Uganda, Pokot and Turkana of Kenya and other communities in this region on conflict management efforts and regional development of the Karamoja region along the Kenya-Uganda border. The study is guided by the understanding that conflict in any part of a country directly affects the central government and thus, the whole state at large. The research recognizes that the region has not only suffered high levels of conflict and insecurity for decades, but has also had dismal development indicators and severe poverty. The study therefore, reviews the scale, causes, consequences of, and responses to the many pastoral conflicts in the Karamoja region. The study is guided by the human needs theory, which states that all people are driven to fulfill their fundamental human needs for safety, security, love, a sense of belonging to a group, self esteem, and the ability to attain one's goals. It further explains that ethnic groups fight because they are denied not only their biological needs, but also psychological needs that relate to growth and development. The methodologies employed in this study use multiple tools, which were designed to triangulate with one another for maximum data reliability. They included both primary and secondary data sources. The primary sources included interviews with community members and key informants in the region, while the secondary data concentrated on the analysis and review of books, journals and reports of various organizations working with these communities. The analysis was primarily a qualitative study. The key findings of the research are that communities in Karamoja have been and continue to be involved in cycles of cattle raiding and counter-raiding, often involving cross-border raids thus, increasing conflict and insecurity between ethnic groups year after year. The study also found out that there exists other causes of conflict that together lead to underdevelopment in the area. The study also found out that the communities in this region do not think that the Kenyan and Ugandan governments are doing enough to guarantee their security and believe that the two above mentioned governments have imposed disarmament programmes that are misguided. This thus, reveals that these governments and the communities should consult and work together if peace and order are to be realized in the Karamoja region.

Abbreviations

AU	African Union
ASTU	Anti-Stock Theft Unit
CEWARN	Conflict Early Earning Response Mechanism
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
KIDDP	Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and development Programme
KPR	Kenya Police Reserve
LRA	Lord's Resistant Army
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SLDF	Sabaot Land Defence Force
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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Chapter One

1. 1 Introduction to the study

The Karamoja cluster is commonly used to refer to the pastoral and agro pastoral ethnic groups, occupying the area from south western Ethiopia, northwestern Kenya, southeastern Sudan and northeastern Uganda. [1] The area is populated by fourteen pastoralist tribes who share a common language, culture and way of life spreading over three districts in Kenya: Turkana, West Pokot and Trans Nzoia in Rift Valley Province. In Uganda there are four districts that fall under the Karamoja region; Kotido, Moroto, Nakapiripirit and Kapchorwa. In Ethiopia the following districts are covered under the Karamoja region; one Woreda, Nationalities Peoples Regional State and Kuraz Woreda of the South Omo Zone of the Southern Nations. Meanwhile, in Sudan; two counties in the Sudan Kapotea and Budi in the Eastern Equatoria Province in Southern Sudan also fall under the Karamoja region.[2]

The study will focus on the trans-boundary areas on the Kenya-Uganda border involving the Karimojong (Dodoth, Jie, Tepes, Daguoro, Bokora, Matheniko and Pian), Turkana (Lukumong, Ngimonia, Woyakwara and Ngikamatak) and the Pokot (both Kenya and Uganda) and will not cover the areas along the Kenya-southern Sudan border, due to the expansity of the Karamoja cluster.

The chronically food-insecure region composed of semi arid savanna, with wooded grassland to the north and a desert to the south generally receives unpredictable rainfall, making agriculture an unreliable subsistence strategy and pastoralism an ever daunting task. Livestock

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[1] IGAD. (2004) 'First Regional Report on the Karamoja Cluster.' *The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism.* IGAD, Addis Ababa, p.3.

[2] Atim H. & Sennoga R. (2009). *Karamoja Subregion in North Eastern Uganda.* OCHA, Uganda, p. 10.

raiding is a common practice in Africa among the pastoral communities, and has been identified as the single greatest impediment to development in the Karamoja cluster. The practice is exacerbated by recurrent drought and disease epidemics which decimate herds in the Karamoja cluster.[3]

This is threatening the success of nomadic livestock production , which is not only the backbone of the economy of pastoral communities in the Karamoja cluster, but also serves as the source and sign of political and social survival for many people. The cross border conflict and violence which dates back decades has now become endemic in the Loima-Moroto corridor. This has led to loss of human lives, stealing of livestock, and displacement of populations, thus adversely disrupting peoples' livelihoods and affecting regional growth and development.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem:

Despite Kenya and Uganda enjoying fifty years of independence, cross-border conflict in the Karamoja cluster has persisted even with efforts from both countries to quell the conflict between and among the pastoral communities in the region. There is a need therefore, for the decision makers to be made aware of the nature of the cross border pastoral conflict and the need to develop well coordinated regional response strategies and mechanisms that would help de-escalate or fully alleviate pastoral conflicts along the border areas of Kenya and Uganda.

This study investigates how the cross-border conflict between the Karimojong of Uganda, Pokot and Turkana of Kenya and other communities in this region has influenced conflict

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[3] Irungu Patrick. (2001). *Formalisation of Village Peace Committeesin the Karamoja Cluster.* Community-based Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology Unit (CAPE), p.9.

management efforts and regional development of the Karamoja cluster along the Kenya-Uganda border.

1.3. Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are to:

I. Investigate continuous cattle raiding as the main cause of cross border conflict in Karamoja,

II. Identify the effects of conflict on social economic dynamics on regional growth and development,

III. Identify why conflict resolution initiatives have failed.

1.4 Literature Review

Conflict has rapidly grown in Africa in the last three decades, with pastoral areas being among the most vulnerable. The nomadic way of life has led to pastoral groups crossing borders and subsequently leading to cross border conflicts, which are widespread in both arid and semi-arid zones, and overlaps often with extreme food insecurity. This has led to many actors especially those from private sector including; civil society organizations, international NGOs, intergovernmental organizations and donors to increasingly preoccupy themselves with programmes to manage conflict, and hopefully understand pastoral related conflicts as they experiment with solutions.

There is an urgent need therefore, to deeply analyze cross border conflicts and their effect on regional development in the Loima-Moroto corridor of the Karamoja cluster and take stock of

lessons drawn so far from the various conflict management experiences and further enrich them with not only theoretical ideas but apply pragmatic, well coordinated and long lasting strategies.

This literature review of cross border conflict along Kenya-Uganda border is designed to map the state of knowledge, to identify important gaps in cross border conflict management, and to suggest promising avenues for future practical work.

1.5 Historical Perspective

The pastoralist communities living in the Kenya and Uganda sides of the Karamoja cluster are among the poorest in their respective countries.[4] The various confrontations and incidents in the region often appear as clear illustration of the changing phase of conflict from a cultural practice sanctioned and controlled by traditional institutions into a commercial, international and political undertaking.[5].

The change can largely be attributed to the increased prevalence of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the area making the conflict 'modern'. This is in contrast to the traditional cross border conflicts which heavily relied on bows, arrows, spears, pangas and rungus for protection and warfare. The influx of the cheap and easy to use assault rifles and weaponry can be attributed to the high availability of the same from unstable regions of Uganda to the North, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia.[6]

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[4] Intermediate Technology Development Group Eastern Africa (ITDG EA). (2003). Northern Kenya Conflict Resolution Initiative project. USAID, Uganda, p 7.

[5] Osamba J.O. (2000), The Sociology of Insecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditry in North-Western Kenya,in: *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, p.12.

[6] Eulenberger, I. (2009), *Report on the peace and reconciliation emergency dialogue between Toposa & Turkana elites of Sudan and Kenya:* At St. Teresa community centre Lodwar 31st October to 1st November, pp.39-40.

Kenya also provides a ready market especially to the North Rift pastoral communities where firearms provide an excellent and easily available answer to Kenya's failing security measures. These areas have suffered and continue to suffer systematic marginalization, chronic underdevelopment, tremendous hardships and pressures on the community such as the lack of vital services like adequate infrastructure. This is as a result of decades of pastoralists being pushed further towards the peripheries of their respective states. These problems are further exacerbated by the widespread insecurity in the region and the harsh and dry climate.

The cross border conflicts occur as a result of migrations which bring about inter communal contact and cause competition and disputes over access to and management of natural resources which are traditionally negotiated through flexible and reciprocal arrangements. This is in the understanding of the fact that livestock depend on pastures for their diet, thus, pastoralists undertake seasonal migrations in search for qualitative pasture and water to sustain their herds. [7]

The cross border conflicts further cause suffering in the area, leading to loss of life and property, interrupted livelihoods and decreased mobility and access to vital social services. Small arms are also readily available due to the regional conflicts in the Sudan and Somalia which further intensifies the scale of conflict and hence limit access to the area.

1.5.1 Culture and Lifestyle of Pastoralists

Pastoralists are referred to as rural dwellers whose livelihood depends predominantly on livestock or agro-pastoral livestock production. Small scale cross-border trade, wage labor,

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[7] Kimani M.J.(2008), *Access-Management-Ownership*: The 'Water and Pasture Menu' in Pastoralist Conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa (GhoA), paper presented at: 'Natural Resource Conflict in Africa-Is Water the New Oil?' United Nations Conference Centre, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 – 14 November p.5.

remittances and humanitarian aid are important sources of income that complement local subsistence economies. [8]

Pastoralist communities in the Karamoja cluster, share broad characteristics that include kinship structure on clan or lineage, the existence of age-or generation grade organizations and the eminent role played by religious ritual prophets in managing public affairs. This is despite the fact that there exist important socio-economic and political differences among them that are often ignored and frequently overlapped by generalizations.[9]

The theoretical explanation as guided by the primordialist approach explains that these forms of basic groupings are natural units that derive their cohesion from somewhat inherent cultural or racial traits which then become instruments of social differentiation.[10] The idea and security derived from being in a specific group or group worth is therefore based on the results of economic and political competitions a phenomenon evident among the Karamoja cluster.

In Kenya and elsewhere, the word 'pastoralist' is used to refer to a broad scope of ethnicities regardless of whether one makes a living through pastoralist activities or not. It thus appears that beyond reference to livelihoods, pastoralism appeals to aspects of identity.[11]

[8] Halderman, M. (2004): 'The political economy of pro-poor livestock policy-making in Ethiopia'. *PPLPI Working Paper No. 19*. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.

[9] Abbink, G.J. (2007). Warfare [in Afrika]: Overview. In J. Middleton & J.C. Miller (Eds.), *New Encyclopedia of Africa* (New Encyclopedia of Africa, 5) (pp. 172-179). Detroit, MI, USA: Charles Scribner & Sons.

[10]Szayna Thomas (2000). *Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict*: Application of a process model. Rand, Santa Monica. Pp. 17.

[11] Kratli, S. and Swift, J.(1999), *Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature Review*, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, p.1.

1.5.a Actors Involved in the Cross Border Conflict in Karamoja Region

1.5.b Age groups

The most common stratification element in African communities is age. Thus, age groups are not only dominant, but also yield a lot of power in either controlling or influencing the conflict or its management in the Karamoja region.

The structural arrangement that creates age groups is of useful distinction on whether the conflict is youth or elder driven. Although young men are usually the fighters in both cases, the nature of the conflict and the chance of peace building may change greatly from one to the other. Elders have their own herd and a family. Their interest is in ensuring good relations in order to widen access to resources, to facilitate commercial activities and in general to promote security, although they may also start violent conflicts to gain access to resources or to political power. In this case the elder tries to gain power to feed his family or for other personal reasons. The explanation for this behavior can be explained through the human needs theory which states that all people are driven to fulfill their fundamental human needs for safety, security, love, a sense of belonging to a group, self esteem, and the ability to attain one's goals can be used to analyze the need to achieve ones goals through whatever means possible. [12] This is not unique to just pastoralist communities in the Karamoja cluster, as evidenced by the clashes in Wajir district in 1992-1995 which were driven by the elders. [13]

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[12] Conflict Research Consortium, (1998). Http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/problem/needs.htm

[13] Ibrahim D. and Jenner J. (1996). Wajir Community Based Conflict Management, Paper presented to theUSAID Conference on *Conflict Resolution in the Great Horn of Africa*, June 1997, p. 54.

Herbert Spencer's analogy of functionalism could explain the use of institutions as 'organs' that work toward the proper functioning of the entire 'body' of society. Traditionally, all raids were to first be approved by the elders, but early ethnographers stress that often young men decided in secret and took action quickly without informing the elders of their intentions. [14] However, large scale daylight attacks typical of escalated conflict and all-out war required a degree of organization and mobilization that was only within the power of elders or war leaders.

Control of the pastoral economy used to be a monopoly of the elder age-set. The men and women in the elder age-set had various degrees of power that influenced the economy in various ways. This is mainly because the elders own the livestock, control resources and dispose of marriages. The young are poor by definition, to the point that should a young man inherit a herd and family responsibilities, he would become an "elder" regardless of his age. [15] With respect to warfare, the notion of pastoralists should be disaggregated, to take account of the antagonistic interests between age sets. Marxism would analyze the evident tension between the have and the have-nots, and the social classes of the elders versus the youth.

1.5.c   State

A sovereign state's responsibility is to secure its territory and protect its people. Often cross border conflicts happen far from the centre of power which means that most of these areas are mostly geographically, politically and culturally marginalized. [16] Their presumed distance from

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[14] Gulliver P.H. (1951). *A Preliminary Survey of the Turkana. A Report compiled for the Government of Kenya.* Communications from the School of African Studies, New Series No. 26, University of CapeTown, Cape Town, p. 46.

[15] Baxter P.T.W. (1979). Boran Age-Sets and Warfare. In: Fukui K. and Turton D. (eds) *Warfare among East African Herders,* National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, p. 35.

[16] Amselle J.L. 1990. *Logiques métisse: anthropologie d'identité en afrique et ailleurs,* Payot, Paris, p. 233.

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modern institutions and from the controlling action of the state is often accepted as a self-evident explanation for widespread violence. However, these conflicts later polarize the whole state as is the case of Kenya and Uganda as a result of the cross border conflict in the Karamoja cluster. The realist approach would identify the concerned governments' failures to understand that security is one of the paramount interests of a state that must be secured.

1.5.d Women and Youth

Women and children bear the brunt of any conflict, and are generally not actively involved in cross border conflicts, their roles are not diminished either. In many pastoral communities, women sing war songs which taunt and incite the men towards more fighting. [17]Women however, can also be used in mediation systems.[18] For example, Somali women ties to her lineage of birth are not fully severed with marriage and thus can provide crucial channels of communication in conflict management in an inter-clan rivalry.

1.5.e International Actors

International actors include organizations, countries and people from without who have interests in the outcome of the conflict. They may help in fueling the war or be positively involved in the conflict management plans. The wars in the Horn of Africa have created thousands of refugees and displaced people, whose massive movements affect patterns of resource management and alter

[17] Ibrahim D. and Jenner J.(1996). Wajir Community Based Conflict Management, Paper presented to the USAID Conference on *Conflict Resolution in the Great Horn of Africa*, June 1997, p.50.

[18] Lewis I.M. (1961). *A Pastoral Democracy. A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*, Oxford University Press, London, New York, Toronto, p. 67.

relationships between groups. The conflicts in the region have funned the instability in the Karamoja cluster through increased availability of automatic weapons in the region. [19]

1.5.f   Causes of Cross Border Conflict

Besides the various actors who are major actors in the cross border conflicts and especially in the Karamoja cluster, there exists a range of root causes to the recurrent conflicts in the area. Chronic and persistent political marginalization, widespread lack of security and justice institutions and personnel which leaves citizens feeling insecure, lack of development, mismanagement of available resources, ecological crises, drought, crop-failure and, at times, famine have forced pastoralists in the Karamoja cluster to pursue their livelihoods through armed raiding. All these factors have led to the erosion of their cultural identity and have affected their personal growth and development as well as that of the region.

The study will therefore try to establish how community needs can be harmonized with government policies and structures so as to effectively meet the needs of the communities in the Loima-Moroto corridor of the Karamoja cluster.

It is necessary for the study to be carried out so as to find out the impacts of cross border conflict on the growth and development of the Karamoja cluster with a view of inter-linking the need to not only concentrate on the cross border conflict across different states, but also 'territorial' borders as described by the primordialist approach within an individual country.

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[19] Goldsmith P. (1997). Cattle, Khat, and Guns: Trade, Conflict, and Security on northern Kenya's Highland-Lowland Interface. A Case Study, A paper prepared for the USAID Conference on Conflict Resolution in the Great Horn of Africa, June, draft, p. 27.

Conflict management efforts either within or without the two countries will still not yield favorable results and may only exacerbate the instability and continued retardation of growth and development in the region if they remain de-linked and disjointed. This can be analyzed through Burton's view, who through adopting Maslow's ideas to conflict theory suggests that these needs underlie many deep-rooted and intractable conflicts.[20]

1.6 Theoretical Framework

Conflict is dynamic, and as the argument has shown, competition for scarce resources cannot fully explain violent conflict behavior in the Loima-Moroto corridor of the Karamoja cluster. Thus, the primordialist and environmental conflict theories of pastoral violence would not encompass the changing political rationality of inter-group conflicts by retracing the multiple impacts of state-building and development on pastoral land tenure and resource governance, peacemaking and customary authorities, and competition over state resources.

Proponents of primordialist accounts of ethnic conflict argue that ethnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as territorial location.[21]

This may be used in the analysis of cross border conflicts in the Karamoja cluster. The theory relies on a concept of kinship between members of an ethnic group. Szayna further states

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[20] Burton, John (1997). *Violence Experienced*: "The Source of Conflict Violence and Crime and their Prevention". New York. Manchester University Press. C. Chapman and A. Kagaha: *"Resolving conflicts using traditional mechanisms in the Karamoja and Teso regions of Uganda"*, Minority Rights Group International, August 2009: p. 2, 4.

[21] Steven Gryosby (1994). The verdict of history: The inexpungeable tie of primordialityhuth – A response to Eller and Coughlan', *Ethnic and Racial Studies 17(1)*, pp. 164-171, p. 168.

that such primitive or basic groupings are natural units that derive their cohesion from somewhat inherent cultural or racial traits which then become instruments of social differentiation. [22]

Horowitz argues that this kinship "makes it possible for ethnic groups to think in terms of family resemblances". The group worth is therefore based on the results of economic and political competitions, explaining the need for the Karamoja cluster communities crossing borders to secure resources to sustain their livelihoods.[23] This is closely related to Gurr's relative deprivation theory which offers an explanation based on an ethnic groups' access to power and economic resources. [24]Smith attributes persistent cross border conflict in the Loima-Moroto corridor of the cluster to the instrumentalist theory which states that community leaders use cultural groups as sites for mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources.[25] This theory is however challenged by Ursel who explains that, for the instrumentalists whether ethnicity is a fixed perception is not crucial to them. Instrumentalists simply claim that ethnic difference is not sufficient to explain conflicts.[26]

The theory of constructivism could also attempt to explain the cause of cross border conflicts in the cluster as socially constructed. This is through codified distinctions by different forces on the basis of for example cattle ownership. This would explain the ethnic division of closely related

[22] Szayna Thomas (2000). *Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict*: Application of a process model. Rand, Santa Monica, pp. 17.

[23] Donald L Horowitz (1985) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 57.

[24] Robert Gurr. (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 1-25.

[25] Anthony Smith (2001) *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, Cambridge: Polity, pp. 54-55.

[26]Schlichting, Ursel, (1997): 'Conflict between Different Nationalities: Chances for and Limits to Their Settlement' in Andreas Klinke, Ortwin Renn & Jean Paul Lehners, eds, *Ethnic Conflicts and Civil Society*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, p. 432.

cultural groups in the Karamoja cluster rising against each other due to ethnic divisions caused by colonial boundaries; it would however fail to address other causes of conflict in the cluster.[27]

The social cubism theory which is designed for the analysis of ethno territorial conflict may be applicable in explaining the cross border conflict on the Kenyan- Uganda border as it looks at an issue from multiple perspectives, with the consideration of the fact that conflict is dynamic and can change at different times, under different circumstances and in different circumstances and settings.[28] Since the theory recognizes a "social cube of conflict as having six interrelated facets or forces: history, religion, demographics, political institutions, non-institutional behavior, economics, and psycho-cultural factors.[29]

It may be used to analyze cross border conflict in the Karamoja cluster as it can bring various actors together in conflict resolution and thus focus on strategic community planning. The cross border conflict in the Karamoja cluster however, requires a theory that does not just look at the bigger picture but starts with the view of the unmet individual needs.

Kratli and Swift state that it is relatively difficult to clearly categorize pastoralism as either a means of livelihood or identity as the word 'pastoralist' in Kenya and elsewhere, is used to refer to a broad scope of ethnicities regardless of whether one makes a living through pastoralist

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[27] Mahmood Mamdani (2001) *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

[28] McKay Judith (2002). *Analysis and Application: The Use of Social Cubism in the Analysis of Community Conflicts.* 8 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 883, p. 78.

[29] Sean Byrne & Neil Carter, (1996), Social Cubism: Six Social Forces Of Ethno-territorial Politics In Northern Ireland And Quebec,Vol 3 No.2. *J. of Peace & Conflict Stud*, pp.52-71.

activities or not. It thus appears that beyond reference to livelihoods, pastoralism appeals to aspects of identity. [30]

The human needs theory which states that all people are driven to fulfill their fundamental human needs for safety, security, love, a sense of belonging to a group, self esteem, and the ability to attain one's goals can be used to analyze the cross border conflict in the Karamoja cluster. This theory encompasses the basic need of an individual which shapes their actions in a community and eventually as a nation. Herbert Kelman and John Burton have adopted Maslow's ideas to conflict theory, suggesting that these needs underlie many deep-rooted and intractable conflicts. [31]

Burton's human needs theory is important in conflict management as it explains that ethnic groups fight because they are denied not only their biological needs, but also psychological needs that relate to growth and development. The human needs theory in my opinion thus, provides a plausible explanation of ethnic conflicts in Africa and in the Karamoja cluster where such needs are not easily met by many regimes. [32]

1.7 Hypotheses

The following hypotheses will be held:

I.   Cattle raiding and counter-raiding has been the main source of conflict in Karamoja,

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[30] Kratli, S. and Swift, J.(1999), *Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature Review*, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, p.1.
[31] Conflict Research Consortium, (1998). Http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/problem/needs.htm

[32] Burton, John (1997). *Violence Experienced*: "The Source of Conflict Violence and Crime and their Prevention". New York. Manchester University Press, p.6.

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II. Other than conflict, there are other salient issues that affect the social economic dynamics of the region,

III. Despite various interventions peace has been elusive in the region.

1.8 Methodology

This study will research and employ qualitative methods, with data collected through primary and secondary sources. The primary data collection methods will include interviews and participatory rural appraisal methods.

Key informant interviews will be conducted in Amudat, Moroto (Uganda) and in the West Pokot and Turkana districts of Kenya. The intention is to include all or as many as possible communities along the Kenya-Uganda border of the Karamoja cluster. The study will therefore be confined to the easily and secure communities along the Kenya – Uganda border; which includ the Karimojong (Tepes, Matheniko, Dodoth), the Turkana and the Pokot of both Uganda and Kenya.

Interviews will be conducted targeting a variety of actors, including local administration officials (chiefs, district commissioners and resident district commissioners), military officials, and NGO officials, group discussions with village elders, youth and women. The interview questions will mostly be open-ended, allowing the respondent to give anecdotal evidence to support his/her opinions. Interviews are expected to take an average of one hour to complete and will be conducted in Swahili and English for the Kenyan and Ugandan sides respectively through an interpreter.

To ensure consistency in the information gathered, a checklist of questions to be used will be prepared beforehand. These questions will be based on three major themes derived from

the topic of research, such as the causes and effects of cross border conflict, the impact of cross border conflict on their livelihoods and other economic endeavors, and their recommendations and suggestions of resolving their conflicts.

The questions will also be structured in an analytical framework so as to identify the three conflict types that exist in the Karamoja cluster. The first group being; conflict and insecurity between ethnic groups. The type of conflict cited most frequently by respondents living in or working on Karamoja is that between ethnic groups, often expressed through inter-ethnic cattle raids and other armed raiding on the Ugandan side, as well as between Pokot and Turkana on the Kenyan side.

The second type of conflict to be investigated will be; conflict between the state and Karamajong society. This will investigate the tense and distrustful relations and sporadic armed violence and disarmament between the individual state forces and the Karamojong, Pokot and Turkana coupled with the historic marginalization of Karamoja, demonstrating an enduring 'latent conflict' between the state and Karamoja cluster communities.

The third type of conflict to be investigated will be; conflicts and insecurity within communities. This will investigate the high levels of conflict that exist within Karamojong communities, Pokot, Turkana and ethnic groups, and social cohesion at the community level and how this is challenged.

This will be done due to the realization that majority of the existing conflict and security literature on Karamoja focuses on interethnic conflict. However, the consultation phase will seek to highlight the effects of the other two types of conflict and their importance, if tangible and long lasting stability in the region is to be realized.

A thorough search for relevant literature on the topic of research will be done before and after the field work, which will include searching over the internet and library visits.

The expansive Karamoja cluster has wide variation of elements in terms of altitude, climate and resource endowment. For instance, the Pokot and Tepes areas are generally mountainous; the others consist of flat or undulating plains with scattered hills.

However, the whole region is generally semiarid. The rainfall varies both spatially and temporally rarely exceeding 600mm annually, except on the mountains. The mean annual temperature goes beyond 30 degree Celsius, resulting in low relative humidity and high desiccation for most of the cluster.

The soils are generally shallow, sandy and clayey, with rock-outcrops on the numerous hills. Alluvial soils are found along the many riverbeds in the area. The natural vegetation is dominated by thorny plants, particularly the Acacia species. The expansive area has different climatic conditions and normally when one area is experiencing drought another has enough pasture which necessitates seasonal migrations that are a leading cause for cross border conflict in this region.

The use of an interpreter sometimes has been known to make interviews difficult, as the researcher is not able to probe the informants further for more information due to lack of direct conversation. This will therefore necessitate the search for a project veterinarian/guide who understands both the Turkana and Karamoja languages well, so as to resolve the communication barrier.

Driving through the rough terrain of the Turkana area is also expected to be a serious challenge as the region has a poor road network, with some areas having no roads at all. This will therefore

take some time off the data collection exercise. In addition, it is expected that driving through the highly volatile area between Amudat and Moroto might minimize the research time.

The poor infrastructure in this region touches on the availability of other social amenities like schools, health centers, electricity, water and telephones, which are few and far between and only found in relatively big town centers along the corridor.

1.9   Chapter outline

Chapter 1

Management of cross border conflict in Karamoja region.

Chapter 2

Karamoja region and its' people.

Chapter 3

Conflict types and their causes in the Karamoja region.

Chapter 4

Conflicts management in Karamoja region.

Chapter Two

Karamoja Region and Its' People

2.1   Introduction

This chapter will examine the people of the Karamoja region- their identity, history, anthropology, political, economic and cultural organization. This is in an effort to appreciate and understand their ways of life and reasons why they are entangled in cross border conflict in the Karamoja region. The Karimojong are members of a group of specialized pastoralist societies identified collectively as the Karimojong Cluster of the Eastern Nilotes. [1] Lamphear, also states that the people who currently include the Jiye and Toposa, in southern Sudan, the Nyangatom, in southern Sudan and Ethiopia, the Turkana, in northwestern Kenya, and the Iteso, Karimojong, Jie, and Dodoth, in northwestern Uganda are also referred to as the Ateker, or "clan' cluster. [2]

Lamphear, says that as far as can be determined on the basis of scant archeological data and oral traditions, they are all descendants of Sudanese peoples who migrated south some 500 years ago to a location in northern Karamoja that they recognize as their ancestral homeland. [3] A second dispersal, beginning some 300 years ago, gave rise to their modern territorial configuration. The Karimojong and the Turkana diverged from a common ancestral population

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[1] Gulliver P.H. (1955) *The Family Herds. A Study of Two Pastoral Tribes in East Africa. The Jie and Turkana*, Routledge, London.

[2] Lamphear, J .(1992). *The scattering time: Turkana responses to colonial rule*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p 34.

[3] Lamphear, John E. (1976). *The Traditional History of the Jie of Uganda*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 46.

sometime in the mid-1800s. [4] As recently as the 1960s the two populations still demonstrated marked cultural and biological affinities reflecting their shared ancestry. [5]

The people of Karamoja are pastoralists and depend almost entirely on livestock for their livelihoods. To locate adequate water and grazing for their livestock, they have traditionally traveled large distances across national boundaries. Many pastoralists in the area are unclear about the country of their citizenship. With an ambiguous relationship with national governments, this lack of clarity about citizenship suggests a legacy of incoherent and incomplete colonial administration.

The national boundaries among Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya in this area have been redrawn more than once, with little regard for the effects on local populations. During the colonial era, infrastructure was not developed, and the area was left alone. [6]

The table below gives an overview of these groups based on their home areas. All these groups in the Karamoja region use their land in different and complex ways, but they all keep livestock as an important aspect of their economy. The region has a highly heterogeneous collection of people with deep political divisions, different production strategies, history as well as recent conflicts. Nevertheless, their needs are such that all groups share an interest in keeping open the possibility to access areas normally controlled by some of the others, and at times across national borders.

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[4] Barber, J. (1968). *Imperial Frontier*. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, p. 44.

[5] Lamphear, John E. (1976). *The Traditional History of the Jie of Uganda*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.47.

[6] Ibrahim D. and Jenner J.(1996). Wajir Community Based Conflict Management, Paper presented to the USAID Conference on *Conflict Resolution in the Great Horn of Africa*, June 1997, p. 87.

2.2 Table indicating the Communities and Districts that fall under the Karamoja Region in Particular Countries.

Uganda	*Amudat district* Dereth	*Kotido and Abim district* Jie	*Moroto district* Karimojong Matheniko Karimojong Bokora Tepeth	*Nakapiripirit district* Karimojong Matheniko Karimojong Pian
Kenya	*Turkana district* Turkana	*West Pokot and Trans-Nzoia district* Pokot		
Ethiopia	*Jinka Woreda, South Omo SNNPR* Dassanetch Nyangatom (Topotha)			
Sudan	*Budi & Kapoeta counties, Eastern Equatoria Region* Topotha (Toposa)			

A 2007 census estimated the number of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in the region to be 1.4 million a number that remains indicative in these remote rural areas.[7]

2.3 History of the Karamoja Region

The British colonial administration viewed the area around Lake Turkana in Kenya as a zone of insecurity. It waged a protracted military campaign against the Turkana, and by the late 1800s had destroyed Turkana resistance to imperial rule.[8]

The northeastern part of Uganda was left with little infrastructure by the colonial government. Before 1912, it was official colonial policy that no contact at all was needed with the Karamoja area, as it possessed no minerals or natural resources.[9] In 1912, it was determined that Karamoja had become a security risk, and like the area occupied by the Turkana, warranted military

Some footnotes are segmented.

[7] Akabawi D. and Ateyo P.E. (2007.) The Scramble for Cattle, Power and Guns in Karamoja, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, Medford MA, and Addis Ababa, p. 53.
[8] Lamphear, John. (1993). Aspects of "BecomingT urkana":Interactions and Assimilation Between Maa- and Ateker-Speakers. In Being Maasai, edited by Thomas Spear and Richard Waller. London: James Currey.
[9] Barber, J. (1968). Imperial frontier. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, pp 44.

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intervention and disarmament. In 1958, when the British government hired Nevile Dyson-Hudson to help determine the fate of the Karamoja region, he noted that a long history of governmental lack of interest in the region had created a feeling of hostility toward the central government. [10]

Unfortunately, these sentiments continued into the post-colonial era with arms flooding into the area during the Amin government and widespread insecurity has continued to present day. Up to date, many argue that the southern regions of Ethiopia and the northern regions of Kenya are maintained primarily as "buffer zones" and are not seen as priorities for development. The pastoralist communities in the Karamoja region have continued to be marginalized from national development strategies because of their isolation and nomadism since the colonial era.

2.3.1 History of the Evolvement of the Gun in Karamoja

Even before the nineteenth century, Jie, Turkana, and Karimojong were attacking, assimilating or driving off the neighboring peoples and indigenous peoples such as Poet, Kuliak, Mogos, and Oropom. [11]Thus, across the region, large scale raids which engaged hundreds of warriors became the most successful strategy to "harvest" other peoples' livestock. [12]

There were repeated battles between the Jie on the one hand, and the Karimojong and Dodoso on the other, that could escalate into an attempt to break up the Jie polity in the second half of the nineteenth century. The rationale for their failure, which was sealed by the battles won by the Jie

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[10] Dyson-Hudson N. (1966) *Karimojong Politics*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

[11] Knighton, B. P. (1990). 'Christian enculturation in Karamoja, Uganda'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham.
[12] Bollig, Michael. 2000. 'Staging social structures: ritual and social organisation in an egalitarian society. The pastoral Pokot of northern Kenya', Ethnos 65 (3).

led by Loriang their great war leader, was that a constant supply of enemy cattle to raid was needed.[13]

2.4   Change In Karamoja

Political changes and transitions among other pastoralists in North-East Africa are also to be found among the Karamojong. Cultural change has particularly been evident and undeniable. In the last decade, women in this region have collectively chosen to wear dresses for everyday life rather than skins. Respected trends are being dismissed with cattle-rich raiders selling more animals for beer; the older men having chosen to have their headgear cowboy hats pinned up on one side; more consumer goods are being taken on raids of agriculturalists' villages; in imitation of the army, raping women has been introduced as a feature of such raids; with the growth of population and famine relief, a larger absolute number feel obliged by the loss of cattle to drop out of the pastoralist livelihood. Without an historical perspective it is easy for the non-pastoralist observer to assume that beneath such phenomena lies the degeneration of a culture into chaos.[14]

The dimension of insecurity has also changed with the control over local armed groups having shifted from clan elders to warlords over the past two decades with an increased focus on guns and warlords.[15] The "new leaders" are associated with the arms trade and state politics.

[13] Lamphear, John E. (1976). *The Traditional History of the Jie of Uganda*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[14] Niamir-Fuller, Maryam. (1999). 'Conflict management and mobility among pastoralists in Karamoja, Uganda', in Maryam Niamir-Fuller (ed.), 454 *The State as Raider*. Managing Mobility in African Rangelands: the legitimization of transhumance, pp. 149-83. London: Intermediate Technology.
[15] Oloka-Onyango, Joe, Zie, G., and Muhereza, Frank. (1993). *Pastoralism, Crisis, and Transformation in Karamoja*. Drylands Network Programme, issues paper no. 43. London: International Institute for Environment and Development; Kampala: Centre for Basic Research.

Mirzeler and Young [16]say with the concentration of arms, the main identifiable social change is that of warlords replacing elders in leadership. This gives Gray ground to predict the disintegration of the culture, which she claims began in the 1950s. [17]

Historically, raiding cattle or cattle rustling played an important cultural function within these groups: it has always been glorified, and successful raiders have been welcomed home as heroes, not thieves. Male infants are named after successful raiders, and grow up being told they must fulfill their legacy by being an even fiercer and more powerful raider.

Raiding is seen as a rite of passage into manhood. Men participate in raids to obtain the cattle needed to pay bride prices. In the past, these raids were characterized as being "half war and half play". Before going on a raid, young men would receive blessings from tribal elders and their mothers. Villagers would pray for their safe return. Fighting was done with spears and sticks, so fatalities were rare, and raiding was strictly controlled. Traditionally, these activities, as well as other group policy decisions, have been controlled through a social organization of male age grades within which the elders have wielded great political and ritual power. [18] This has however, changed with the continued erosion of the communities' culture.

The Karamoja region has seen a proliferation of automatic weapons since the 1970s. Today, the problem continues to be exacerbated by the presence of organizations like the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). With the eroded

[16] Mustafa Mirzeler and Crawford Young (2000). Pastoral politics in the northeast periphery in Uganda: AK-47 as change agent. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 38, pp 407-429
[17] Gray S.J. (2000). The memory of loss: Ecological politics, local history, and the evolution of Karimojong violence. Human Organization 59:pp.401–18.

[18] Quam, Michael. (1996). Creating Peace in an Armed Society: Karamojong, Uganda, 1996. Springfield: University of Illinois, p.432.

culture, raiding among youths in the area has become much more frequent and results in a significant number of fatalities. Elders complain that they are losing control over the young men in their communities, and traditional sanctions and controls are being increasingly ignored. As the level of violence escalates, traditional communication and interaction between communities decrease, reducing many of the traditional mechanisms used to maintain peace, like trade and intermarriage. Traditionally, when raids occurred between youths from neighboring tribes, there were mechanisms in place that allowed for cattle to be returned or compensatory payments to be made. Because communication between communities has broken down, this remediation no longer occurs.[19] Additionally, with the existence of this gap, opportunistic raiding by outsiders is becoming common.

Traditionally, the Karimojong have engaged in opportunistic sorghum cultivation in years of adequate rainfall which is approximately one out of every three years. In the agricultural zones, they maintain semi permanent homesteads from which adult males, herd boys, and unmarried girls migrate seasonally with the herds. Typically, women and children follow the herds during drought years but, remain in the homesteads year-round when the sorghum harvest is good.[20]

The central role played by livestock in both social and economic life of the Karimojong makes pastoralism more popular than cultivation in the region. Livestock competition has particularly increased with the prevalence of livestock diseases, droughts leading to scarcity of

[19] Umar, Abdi. (1997).R esource Utilization, Conflict, and Insecurity in Pastoral Areas of Kenya. Paper presented at the Seminar on Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa. Nairobi,Kenya,March.
[20] Gray S, Sundal M. et al. (2003). Cattle Raiding, Cultural Survival, and Adaptability of East African Pastoralists. Current Anthropology, Vol. 44, No. S5, Special Issue Multiple Methodologies in Anthropological Research (December 2003), pp. S3-S30. Published by: The University of Chicago Press

water, pasture and famine. Hence, livestock keeping has become the centre of conflict in the region.[21] Livestock are kept in the region to primarily sustain livelihoods through milk, meat and barter trade. The sale of livestock is of secondary importance to the communities in this region. Mobility and productivity of the livestock keeping system is greatly hindered by the chronic insecurity in the region, poor access to water in the dry season, poor quality of available forage, high incidence of contagious diseases and limited access to veterinary services.

The climate is generally harsh with the area covering arid and semi-arid agro ecological zones with rainfall ranging between 350-1000 mm per annum. There is sporadic precipitation falling between June and October, leaving the desert winds and the hot dry season to take over from November to March. Drought has become more frequent and severe in recent years making the region more vulnerable to the effects of climatic shocks.

There are numerous rivers and streams flowing from mountains in East Karamoja towards the south and west, besides the region being mostly semi-arid plains, largely savannah covered with seasonal grasses, thorny plants, and shrubs. The region has a harsh climate with low annual rainfall and has been experiencing drought in the last three years.[22]

Due to the heightened insecurity, the government of Uganda set-up protected kraals in early 2008 in the Karamoja region. There are currently an estimated 38 Protected Kraals in Karamoja, including eight in Kaabong, seven in Kotido, nine in Moroto, and 14 in Nakapiripirit.

[21] UNDP, Uganda Human Development Report (2007). *Rediscovering Agriculture for Human Development* .UNDP, Kampala.
[22] OCHA. (2008). *Joint Factsheet on Karamoja:* Humanitarian and Development Realities in the Region. OCHA, Kampala.

2.5   Policies, Processes and Institutions In Karamoja Region

According to the Uganda Bureau of Statistic, the population of Karamoja who live in poverty is 82 per cent on the Ugandan side. This underdevelopment is rooted back to the colonial period (1888-1962).[23] Karamoja was regarded as a closed district and failed to have water and electricity supply developed unlike nearby towns such as Jinja and Fort Portal. Economic marginalization has continued even with post independence governments with far reaching effects; life expectancy for example is estimated to be 42 years, whereas nationally it is about 52 years.[24]

Currently, Karamoja in Uganda has only 2.5 km of tarmac, despite the population density of approximately a third of the national average. The region also suffers from the principle that central government funds are allocated to regions on the basis of population. With most present grants being allocated according to criteria such as number of inhabitants, kilometers of road network, surface area, Karamoja stands disadvantaged as differences in expenditure needs or to reasonably address the concern of poverty and cost variations are not strongly considered.[25]

The Kenyan and Ugandan governments which have the mandate over the Karamoja region have made effort to settle pastoralists through imposition of boundaries, gazetting of land for game and forest reserves, restriction of movement to dry season grazing areas, forced destocking, marginalization of customary institutions, and the intensification of sedentary farming.

[23] Uganda Bureau of statistics. (2006). *Statistical Abstract*, (http://data.mtti.go.ug/docs/ABSTRACT2006-PART1.pdf), p.viii .
[24] Sacha K., Ollech S., & Knaute David. (2009). *The Karamoja Syndrome: Tran disciplinary systems research informing policy and advocacy*, ACTED/Leuphana Universität Lüneburg.
[25] Local Government Finance Commission. (2003). Allocation principles, formulae, modalities and flow of central government transfers - phase one, July, 2003.

[26] This is as a result of the fact that both colonial and post-colonial governments viewed the pastoralist way of life as chaotic, economically unproductive, and environmentally destructive.

Thus, by establishing boundaries, these policies succeeded in compromising the pastoral livelihoods of the people of Karamoja. For example, Karamoja is in drought for almost half of the year, which was traditionally dealt with by moving to other places with greener pastures and water. Social interactions with neighbouring communities have however dwindled following the establishment of these boundaries.

Previously, the Karamojong relied on the Iteso for water and pasture during the dry season; the Iteso too, relied on the Karamojong for oxen to plough their land. Boundaries have therefore, negatively affected the rules of reciprocity that previously governed relations and promoted trust between the two groups.

Karimojong's conflicts with neighbouring communities have increasingly involved cattle rustling. The colonial governments kept these conflicts in check by enforcing a strict system of compensation, whereby if the Pokot killed a Karamojong, the government would round up animals to compensate the aggrieved family. This effectively created strong disincentives for raiding, stealing and killing. However, post-independence governments have failed to enforce this system effectively and conflicts have escalated. The Karamojongs' have been in conflict with neighbouring communities for decades, notably the Pokot and Turkana (Kenya) and

[26] (UNDP) Human Development Report (2005). *The Impact of Insecurity on Livelihood and Social Service Provision in Kotido District*, occasional paper by Nangiro, S., United Nations Development Programme.

Toposa (Sudan); for example, severe outbreaks of fighting occurred in the 1950s over encroachment of land.[27]

With respect to policies, processes and government institutions, policies governing the various countries are different and so are the governance systems, and thus greatly reduce the effectiveness of conflict resolution efforts across international borders, with the different systems proving to be impediments as the policies and structures that deal with the conflict are different. Kenya has a centralized system, Uganda a devolved system, while Ethiopia and Southern Sudan have federal systems. For example, when it comes to livestock recovery, the military is involved in Ethiopia, Uganda and Southern Sudan, but in Kenya, it is the police and not the military that is involved. Also the Karimojong cattle are protected in kraals by the Ugandan military during the disarmament process but in the other countries this is not the case.

In addition disarmament processes do not take place in all the countries at the same time and neither are they implemented using similar approaches. Even within countries some communities have been disarmed more than others thus bringing about more animosity between communities. In Uganda due to the failure of the equitable disarmament of communities, cattle rustling in on the increase again and communities are rearming themselves.

The three governments have also established development programmes in the Karamoja region geared towards the provision and enhancement of basic services such as water and food which are run and coordinated differently. In Uganda the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and

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[27] C. Chapman and A. Kagaha. (2009)*"Resolving conflicts using traditional mechanisms in the Karamoja and Teso regions of Uganda"*, Minority Rights Group International, August 2009: p. 2, 4

Development Programme and in Kenya the Arid lands Resource Management Programme have been specifically designed to address development issues in areas that fall within the cluster.[28]

However, lack of consultation between the governments and these communities have led to governments imposing policies that have led to unsustainable economic development in Karamoja in the form of agricultural intensification, coercive resettlement of nomads, and concomitant restrictions on pastoralists' access to large areas of traditional grazing land and thus, directly affecting the population resilience of these communities.[29]

Further, these policies have reduced the mobility of the people and the herds in response to environmental stress, thus promoting overgrazing and undermining local strategies that facilitate recovery of rangelands during the intervals between droughts.

The region is characterized by a variety of elements ranging from acute poverty, vulnerability to drought, poor infrastructure and basic social services delivery, limited marketing opportunities, especially for livestock, natural resource degradation, social and cultural marginalization, long-standing dependency on external aid and most importantly, chronic insecurity.

[28] MacOpiyo Laban (2011). *Pastoralists' Livelihoods in the Kidepo Valley area of Northern Uganda.* AU-IBAR.
[29] Mamdani, M. , P . M. B. Kasoma, and A . B . Katende. (1992). *Karamoja: Ecology and history.* Centre.

Chapter Three

Conflict Types and their Causes in the Karamoja Region

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the character of conflict between and among the communities living in the Karamoja region- on the Kenya-Uganda border. The study will also investigate the causes to the phenomenon of perennial cross border conflict in the Karamoja region, their dynamics and evolution.

In the Horn of Africa, many low-intensity, long-term conflicts take place in isolated regions between nomadic pastoralist groups. These conflicts are perpetuated by a confluence of local, national, regional, and international factors, which have created an environment of economic scarcity, insecurity, and isolation or disenfranchisement with state and local governmental institutions. [1]

Groups living in the Karamoja area are mostly agro-pastoralists, who are predominantly reliant on livestock rearing as their main source of subsistence and who also cultivate millet and sorghum and supplement their food supply by gathering wild fruits and greens and through hunting and fishing. Ellis states that agro-pastoralism appears to be the most appropriate and sustainable livelihood strategy throughout much of the semi-arid savannah and mountains of the Karamoja Cluster. [2] However, the international border between Kenya and Uganda has little significance to the (agro) pastoralist communities who constitute the majority of the population

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[1] Helland, Johan. (1980). Five Essays on the Study of Pastoralists and the Development of Pastoralism. Bergen: African Savannah Studies, Universitetet i Bergen.

[2] Ellis, James E. and David M. Swift. (1988). "Stability of African pastoral ecosystems: Alternate paradigms and implications for development," *Journal of Range Management*. No. 6, p. 41.

in the area of Karamoja and Pokot. In this dry land landscape the communities only have sufficient natural resources to sustain their livelihoods during the rainy season: In the dry season they are compelled to migrate to access other grazing areas and water points, and will often cross district and national borders. Increasing periods of drought, and unsupportive government policies, have led to an escalation in inter-community and cross-border competition over resources—resulting in conflict. This insecurity then further restricts access to resources, becoming a threat to the overall livelihoods of these communities who are already highly vulnerable to drought.[3]

The entire region receives only sporadic and limited rainfall and has a terrain that is filled with deep gullies caused by ground run-off after heavy rainfall. It is in such a harsh ecological setting that the agro-pastoralists of the Karamoja Cluster have to scrape a living.

Thus, the key to survival for communities and their livestock is mobility. Most of the herds move epicyclically, instead of the traditional transhumance, because of the region's erratic and scarce rainfall. However this mobility is often the source of conflict among neighbors and, at the least, requires continuous negotiations for grazing rights among groups.[4]

3.2   Types of Conflict in Karamoja

The Karamoja region has remained one of the most marginalized regions in Eastern Africa. For decades, it has suffered high levels of conflict and insecurity, alongside low levels of development and serious challenges to its well-being. The Ugandan and Kenyan government

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[3] Lambroschini S. (2011). "Technical Brief: Using cross border programming to address cross border dynamics in Karamoja (Uganda) and Pokot (Kenya). Acted, Kenya.
[4] Akabawi D. and Ateyo P.E. (2007.) The Scramble for Cattle, Power and Guns in Karamoja, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, Medford MA, and Addis Ababa.

have been among the various parties that have been involved in the cross border conflict in this region. There is therefore a deepening need to understand the complex dynamics causing conflict and insecurity in Karamoja.

There are various types of conflict in the region namely: Conflict and insecurity between ethnic groups, conflict between the various governments and the communities in the Karamoja region and conflict and insecurity within communities. Some of the most visible and well-documented violence in Karamoja occurs between different ethnic groups, particularly in the form of cattle raiding. The effects of such violence are well-known – death, injury, displacement and disruption of economic and social activities. The assessment shows that this form of violence is still prevalent in Karamojong society, affects all communities and mostly still involves firearms. While some responses have been initiated to change this dynamic, perceptions differ between the Karamojong and state actors about their effectiveness. The Karamojong still report a high level of fear of attacks by other ethnic groups (or sub-groups), leading to restricted freedom of movement. State actors on the other hand see their responses as having become more proactive and effective, and perceive there to have been an overall reduction in violent incidents across Karamoja.

Underlying this violence are a number of more long-term and structural factors. The first cluster of these factors relate to access to the tools of violence (arms availability and demand factors) and responses to control or reduce the violence, namely civilian disarmament processes and longer-term security and justice provision. The second cluster of issues deals with socio-economic motivations for conflict between groups, focusing on access to resources and livelihoods. And the third cluster of factors relates to current attempts to improve perceptions of and relations between different ethnic groups.

The relationship between the two states and society in Karamoja has long been a difficult one. The current Ugandan government has significantly increased its engagement with Karamoja in recent years, including through devising new programmes such as the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP), meant to decrease insecurity and stimulate development in the region. The Kenyan government has on various occasions started voluntary disarmament. It remains, however, a strained relationship between the state and its subjects. This conflict is mostly latent, but punctuated by specific incidents of violence.

While inter-ethnic violence is a more well-recognised dynamic in Karamoja, the assessment found that intra-community (and therefore intra-ethnic) violence was also at a very high level, increasing local-level insecurity and undermining social cohesion.

This violence is reported to be mostly perpetrated against men, using firearms, and some of it seems to be well organized. Very high levels of theft within communities were reported as characterizing this conflict type, targeting livestock, but also food and personal property.

Protection from violence and the provision of security are major concerns of the people in Karamoja. Scholars suggest that the provision of security might be improved if the state adopted more people-centred and co-operative approaches to security and responded more directly to the expressed priorities and needs of Karamoja communities. Karamoja communities are quoted to frequently say that they felt as though they were the targets, rather than the beneficiaries, of state security operations in the region.

3.3   History of the militaristic identity

The communities in Karamoja have always glorified the ideals of a professional military group or class in their society. The communities in this region have a policy in which young men are prepared to be warriors as part one of their primary and most important roles in the society. Before the entry into East Africa of people practicing cultivation some 1500-2000 years ago, the region was populated by nomadic groups, for whom cattle played not only an economic role, but also had major social significance. With the colonial expansion of cash crop production, a conflict over land between the cattle population and agriculturists emerged. In the mid-1800s the Uganda Karimojong adopted a settled form of pastoralism, with families staying in a certain place with only animals and their herders moving in search of water and pastures. A struggle for grazing land and water led to confrontations.[5]

Gun ownership and gun-related violence in the region is nothing new. The communities under discussion were already armed by the time Europeans scrambled to control the wealth of Africa. They had previously bartered ivory and cattle for weapons from gunrunners operating from the sprawling gun market in Maji, southwestern Ethiopia. An even earlier source of guns was the Arab and Swahili slave traders coming from the East African coast. In their partitioning of Africa, the British took the area that is now occupied by the members of the Karamoja Cluster and formed the states of Uganda and Kenya, while the Toposa were incorporated into Southern Sudan, and the Nyangtom into Ethiopia[6]

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[5] Ocan, C E (1992,) Pastoral Crisis in North-Eastern Uganda.T heC hangingS ignificanceo f CattleR aids, Centre for Basic Research, Working Paper 21, Kampala.

[6] Akabawi D. and Ateyo P.E. (2007,) The Scramble for Cattle, Power and Guns in Karamoja, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, Medford MA, and Addis Ababa.

3.4 Factors contributing to the cross border conflict

3.4.a Environmental Factors

Unfavorable climatic conditions often play a critical role in necessitating the migration of pastoralists in search of pasture lands and water. Dry seasons lead to the drying of water sources as the land turns arid. This forces young pastoralists to leave villages with their livestock in search of water and grazing lands. It is during these times that pastoralists engage in conflict over herding territory and replenishment of lost cattle. When conditions are made worse by extended periods of drought, conflicts become more intensified and frequent. The past few decades have seen the sharp rise of drought-related emergencies.

Oxfam, for instance, reports that from 1975 to 2006 the number of people affected by drought rose from 16,000 to an estimated three million. This calculation does not take into account that the population has also grown significantly, but not nearly as exponentially as those impacted by the recurrent droughts. [7]

The Turkana have been faced with a persistent drought problem since 1999. They call this event "Kichutanak," which means "it has swept away everything, even animals." In some areas of Turkana District, 70 per cent of people's livestock were lost. In financial terms, this is equivalent to losing 70 per cent of one's savings. Thus, prolonged drought and cattle deaths associated with it brought about escalating levels of violence in the region.

Over 600 Turkana families from Oropoi village, Kenya, left their homes in March 2006 and crossed the border into Uganda with their livestock in search of water. This became their

[7] Oxfam_(2006).Counting the cost :Twenty years of war in northern Uganda.
http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/briefingnotes/report CSOPNU nuganda 060330

only option when the sole water pump within a radius of 50 km dried up. The fleeing Turkana were however, inevitably attacked by the neighboring Dodoth tribe in Northern Uganda.[8]

In the past, pastoralists had strategies for coping with the impacts of drought. However, more severe weather patterns resulting from climate change, coupled with colonial and post-colonial policies that constrain the movement of pastoralists, makes inter- and intra-tribal rivalries more commonplace.

3.4.b Colonial and Post-Colonial Policies

Traditionally, cattle rustling, often involved some violence, which was redistributive and only involved the theft of cattle to replenish herds after death from drought or to pay out as bride price. Thus, cattle raiding phenomenon among pastoralists stretches back centuries.

When tribe members were killed, cattle were offered as compensation and the culprits were subjected to intense cleansing rituals. Prior to the system of hierarchical government, councils of elders, traditional courts, and peer groups were at the center of authority among tribes. As such, they governed raids to ensure that they did not spiral out of control, and when disputes arose, traditional mechanisms were employed to settle them. Typically, the loss of life from raiding was on a much smaller scale. [9]

Colonial rulers however, disrupted the pastoralist social order, replacing it with a system of provincial government appointees within newly established borders that limited the free movement of pastoralists. Traditionally, land belonging to families was passed down from one

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[8] Africa News, March 28, (2006). http://www.uscrusade.com/?p=444

[9] Mkutu K. (2003) *Pastoral conflict and small arms: The Kenya-Uganda border region*, report on small arms and security in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. Saferworld, London.

generation to the next, but alienation of pastoralists from their land, combined with discriminatory land reforms eroded this custom.[10]

Mburu adds that in addition, pastoral communities were isolated from other areas that enjoyed the benefits of colonial security and development.[11] The apparent crackdown on cattle raiding is emblematic of an overall attack on pastoralism itself, on the grounds that it was a primitive and thus inhumane way of life. The weakening of traditional governance has undermined pastoralists' authority and ability to settle disputes. Thus, due to lack of adequate alternatives to replace traditional structures of governance and security, pastoralists operate in an anarchic environment.[12]

To date, the colonial attitude has continued to persist in the post-colonial era, with the spread of land privatization, and government policies favoring sedentary groups and large-scale agriculture over nomadic livelihoods, competition over grazing areas has grown increasingly fierce. Pastoralists are also heavily underrepresented in parliament and civil service posts.

Furthermore, the neo-liberal policies that embrace a market economy polarize rich and poor, resulting in a new generation of youth that disregard the authority of elders by obtaining wealth through militia formation and banditry. Thus, local business, political elites and those able to

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[10] Kandagor D. (2005). Rethinking Pastoralism And African Development: A Case Study Of The Horn Of Africa. October 2005. Kenya, pp1-15, 9.

[11] Mburu N. (1999) 'Contemporary Banditry in the Horn of Africa: Causes, History and Political Implications', Nordic Journal of African Studies 8(2): 89-107.

[12] Mkutu K. (2003) Pastoral conflict and small arms: The Kenya-Uganda border region, report on small arms and security in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. Saferworld, London.

manipulate the colonial governing structures use cattle rustling as a means for commercial profit, capitalizing on the breakdown of traditional lines of authority.[13]

3.4.c Commercialization of Cattle Rustling

A new phenomenon has emerged where local elites aim to profit from cattle rustling. This has changed the scope of the conflict by creating economic incentives that did not previously exist. This has exacerbated the brutality associated with raiding and has created links between the illicit trades in stolen cattle and small arms. Mkutu's scope of the conflict by creating economic incentives that did not previously exist. This has exacerbated the brutality associated with raiding and has created links between the illicit trades in stolen cattle and small arms. Local businessmen and even politicians reportedly fund raids in order to sell cattle on the black market to places as far away as South Africa and Saudi Arabia. Stolen cattle are also used to supply large towns, which have grown in population through rural-to-urban migration.[14]

Whereas small-scale raiding does not deplete entire stocks, commercialized raids with elaborate planning and logistical know-how can render entire communities destitute. Buchanan-Smith and Lind suggest that there are typically five large raids in Southern Turkana in a given year. Large infrequent raids, coupled with repeated small-scale incidents create an environment of insecurity and financial hardship.[15]

The commercialization of cattle raiding has had devastating effects on the pastoralist economy. Whereas cattle traditionally circulated within the pastoralist region, they are now being

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[13] Duffield M. (1997). Ethnic War and International Humanitarian Intervention: A Broad Perspective. In: Turton D. (ed.) *War and Ethnicity. Global Connections and Local Violence*, University of Rochester Press, Woodbridge.

[14] Mkutu K. (2003) *Pastoral conflict and small arms: The Kenya-Uganda border region*, report on small arms and security in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. Saferworld, London.

[15] Buchanan-Smith, M. and Lind, J. (2005). *Armed Violence and Poverty in Northern Kenya: A Case Study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative*. University of Bradford, London.

sold outside without any revenue to speak of. In many instances, warriors conducting large commercial raids outnumber security forces. There is also evidence that many local security providers are in collusion with the profiteers of raids.[16]

Systemic marginalization and the lack of state control in the pastoralist region have made way for, what Osamba calls "the emergence of cattle warlords with armed militia".[17] Without proper security provision, a small number of entrepreneurs will continue to benefit at the expense of a great number of people.

3.4.d Lack of State Security

The Kenyan and Ugandan governments have neglected to invest a great deal in infrastructure and public services in the pastoralist border areas, as part of their political campaign that favors sedentary communities over non-sedentary, thus exacerbating the lack of state security in the region. Thus, without sufficient roads, accessible lines of communication, and a large qualified security presence, pastoralists have had no choice but to take up arms in order to protect their families and livestock. Moreover, cross-border raiders are immune from prosecution, because governments lack the capacity or infrastructure required to prosecute those involved in acts taking place in other jurisdictions. For example, McEvoy and Murray state that

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[16] Mkutu K. (2003) *Pastoral conflict and small arms: The Kenya-Uganda border region*, report on small arms and security in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. Saferworld, London.

[17] Osamba J.O. (2000), The Sociology of Insecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditry in North-Western Kenya,in: *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, p.12.

nearly 60 percent of residents living along the Kenya-Sudan border are dissatisfied with security provisions in their communities.[18]

In Kenya and Uganda, where the military's role is restricted to responding to large-scale incidents and carrying out community disarmament programmes, governments have armed local defense units to provide security at the local level. These comprise civilians who are given a registered firearm and ammunition without any training or remuneration. In Kenya, for instance, the Kenyan Police Reservists (KPR), armed with Kalashnikov-pattern and G3 assault rifles, function as a community task force mandated to respond to local crime and disputes. While the KPR are sometimes effective in defending communities against cattle raids, they are known to lend out their weapons to warriors for raiding purposes, undermining the very security they are supposed to protect. Moreover, a 2008 ammunition study in Kenya found that the majority of illicit civilian-held ammunition was Kenyan-manufactured; revealing that it had either been stolen from weakly guarded stockpiles or sold by corrupt officials.[19]

Deficits in the government security sector are compounded by the common practice of governments and security forces arming paramilitary groups for political advantage against opponents, notably in Uganda and Sudan. This, among other things, sustains the circulation and widespread availability of small arms.

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[18]McEvoy C. & Murray R. (2008) *Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives onArmed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North*, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva.

[19] Bevan, James. (2008). *Blowback: Kenya's Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, pp 17.

3.4.e   Proliferation of Small Arms

Traditionally, pastoralists practiced cattle rustling using bows and arrows. Today however, with the availability of cheap and easy-to-use high-powered assault rifles, the conflict has taken on epidemic proportions with increased fatalities and indiscriminate killing during raids. Pastoralists living in the border region provide a large market for small arms and especially the popular AK-47 gun. Bevan quotes a study done in 2008 in Karamoja, Uganda, which found out that 88 percent of respondents recalled a small arm being used in the last violent attack on their community.[20]

The small arms survey quoted by McEvoy and Murray suggest that small arms are used in 96.9 per cent of cattle rustling events in the Kenya-Sudan border region. [21]With the various conflicts in the Horn of Africa region continuing, it is difficult to estimate the exact number of small arms in circulation in the region, experts estimate that it is well over 300,000. [22]

This together with the various reasons why pastoralist communities arm themselves which include germane issues like need to protect their family and livestock from warriors of other tribes and bandits, the need to have guns as they are used to raid livestock from other communities and also the fact that guns are an investment that can be traded for livestock and other commercial goods indicate that pastoralist living in the border region continue to provide a large market for small arms.

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[20]Bevan, James. (2008). *Blowback: Kenya's Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, pp 17.

[21] McEvoy C. & Murray R. (2008) *Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives onArmed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North*, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva.

[22] Regional Program of Action for Peace and Security (2006).

Besides the fact that small arms have been present throughout the region since the early twentieth century, past wars in Uganda, Sudan, and Ethiopia left a surplus of weapons in circulation. One event, in particular, that is often recalled is the 1979 raid on the Moroto arms depot in Uganda, following the collapse of the Idi Amin regime. The Matheniko Karimojong sub-clan were successful in acquiring large quantities of weapons and ammunition during the raid. [23]Bevan also quotes a similar event in Kapoeta, Southern Sudan, in 2002, during the North-South war. After the Sudans' People Liberation Army (SPLA) captured Kapoeta, which at the time was a military stronghold of the north, security at arms stores was lax or non-existent, and as a result, Taposa tribesmen (who live around Kapoeta) were able to seize thousands of weapons.[24]

The SPLA further complicated the matter when it laid off several hundred troops after the war, offering them small arms as part of their retirement package. Not surprisingly, many of the officers sold them to gun markets in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya. The issue is further compounded by the fact that it is widely believed that the government of Sudan in Khartoum provides arms to pastoralist communities in the South in order to destabilize the government of Southern Sudan's power base, and to challenge the authority of the SPLA. These weapons inevitably leak out of communities into the greater arms trade routes of the region. [25]Thus, the

[23] Mkutu, Kennedy. (2007). "Small Arms and Light Weapons among Pastoralist Groups in the Kenya–Uganda Border Area." *African Affairs*, vol. 106, No. 422. January, pp. 47–70.
http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/4346.pdf

[24] Bevan, James. (2008). *Blowback: Kenya's Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, pp 17.

[25] Mkutu K. (2006). Small Arms and Light Weapons Among Pastoral Groups in the Kenya-Uganda Border Area. *African Affairs*, 106/422, 47–70. Oxford University Press, pp 48.

magnitude of such events along with smaller raids of insecure stockpiles and sales from corrupt officials has contributed remarkably to the proliferation of small arms in the region.

There are four main trade routes for small arms in the border region, with the primary route being from Southern Sudan to the Karamoja region of Uganda. From Kotido district arms are trafficked into Pokot and Samburu districts of Kenya. Others are taken south to Moroto and Nakapiripirit districts in Uganda. The second is the "north-eastern route" into Kenya from Somalia. From Somalia, these arms move through the Merille area of Ethiopia and on to the Karamoja region in Uganda. From there, they move east into the Pokot and Turkana areas of Kenya.[26]

Due to the many areas of transit, this route is very costly. It is also believed that arms come in from Somalia from the south, but according to the local Turkana, most of these weapons are dropped off to Somali arms dealers to be sold in Nairobi, Kenya. The third route flows from Southern Sudan into Lokichoggio, Kenya. It is estimated that roughly 11,000 guns per year make their way over the border along this trade route.[27]

The Turkana take some of these arms into Uganda for resale. The fourth route is the Karenga-Lopoch-Kotido direction. This is the primary route for providing the sub-clans of the Karimojong with weapons. The Jie tribe is said to be the principle supplier of small arms to other groups of the Karimojong, and possibly the Turkana in Kenya.[28]

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[27] IGAD. (2004) 'First Regional Report on the Karamoja Cluster.' *The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism.* IGAD. Addis Ababa, p.3.

[28] Mkutu K. (2006). Small Arms and Light Weapons Among Pastoral Groups in the Kenya-Uganda Border Area. *African Affairs*, 106/422, 47–70. Oxford University Press, pp 48.

Over the past few decades, the price of small arms has dropped dramatically, with the AK- 47 ranging dropping from USD 3,000-3,500 to the range of USD 300-350 today. This trend creates a mystery as to why the price of small arms has not increased following the many aggressive state-led disarmament initiatives. The decrease in weapons after disarmament should have caused a price rise unless demand also decreased. Due to the resistance and conflict that has resulted from disarmament programs in the region, it is quite unlikely that this phenomenon can be explained by a decrease in demand.

A possible reasonable explanation would therefore be that the excess in weapons carried into the region by military forces has contributed to the overall number in circulation. Soldiers who are dissatisfied or looking for extra cash may sell the weapons they collect back into the civilian population. This type of corruption among security providers undermines the effectiveness and legitimacy of disarmament campaigns.[29]

3.4.f   Shift of Nature of Raiding

Traditionally, entire communities were involved in the consultation process to decide whether or not to conduct a raid. The elders of a community organized ceremonies and planned the raid. It was impossible to imagine a raid without their involvement. Afterwards, the stolen cattle joined the herds of several families of the community. All this implied that the entire community approved the raid and benefited from it. Targeted communities were challenged in advance, and the battle was fought outside the villages. Women and children were consequently spared and the death toll was kept down.

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[29] Mkutu K. (2006). Small Arms and Light Weapons Among Pastoral Groups in the Kenya-Uganda Border Area. *African Affairs*, 106/422, 47–70. Oxford University Press, p 48.

The raiding patterns have changed nowadays, with the attacks are planned and carried out by smaller groups of young warriors, often without the consent of the elders and the wider community. In many cases, the raids are secretive and the targeted community is taken by surprise. The rustlers may descend upon a village, killing women and children, but trying to avoid the enemy warriors.[30] Thus, with the changing nature of cattle rustling, the frequency of raids has caused a considerable higher impact on societies affected.

3.4.g The Waning Authority of Elders

Traditionally, the elders presumed to act in the interest of the entire community, tried to avoid thefts from neighbors, because this could harm the inter-community relationships and its accompanying advantages. They were therefore, an important actor to balance the pros and cons of a raid. With the colonial era, the traditional leaders were sidelined by the new administration that created a modern leadership structure. Today there is still confusion about how customary leadership relates to the elected local authorities.[31]

Further, during these last decades the traditional transfer of power and authority by the elders to younger generations is being held off within the Karamoja communities. This strengthens a feeling of disgruntlement within the younger generations, decreasing their sympathy and respect

[30] E. Stites, D. Akabwai. D. Mazurana and P. E. Ateyo: *"Angering Akujü: Survival and Suffering in Karamoja - A Report on Livelihoods and Human Security in the Karamoja"*, Feinstein International Center, December 2007: p. 57

[31] C. Chapman and A. Kagaha.(2009). *"Resolving conflicts using traditional mechanisms in the Karamoja and Teso regions of Uganda"*, Minority Rights Group International, August, p.37.

for the elders and their authority.[32] This helps explain the rise of cruel raids, performed increasingly by small groups of young warriors.

3.4.h Shifting Alliances

For a long time strict social rules have been in place so as to minimize violence within specific ethnic groups or sub-groups. Many of these rules are still valid and generally functional, and explain the minimal violence encountered at the border between Uganda and Kenya where the Pokot live on both sides of the border. Thus, Amudat can be seen as a 'buffer' zone, explaining the relative peace encountered in Kenya. There are flashes of violence that occasionally erupt at the border of Amudat and Nakapiripirit districts however.

The Pokot have ongoing conflicts with the Luhya, Sebei, Pian, Matheniko, Bokora, Samburu, and Turkana. The Pian are in conflict with the Matheniko and the Bokora (other Karimojong sub-groups), as well as with the Pokot, Jie and Teso.[33] Overall the conflict dynamics can be extremely difficult to understand as there may be shifting alliances depending on interests of each group, and one interesting feature of cross-border raids is that they always tend to be organized in alliance with a local group.

[32] Akabawi D. and Ateyo P.E. (2007.) The Scramble for Cattle, Power and Guns in Karamoja, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, Medford MA, and Addis Ababa.

[33] Lambroschini S. (2011). "Technical Brief: Using cross border programming to address cross border dynamics in Karamoja (Uganda) and Pokot (Kenya). Acted, Kenya.

3.4.i Power Imbalances

The ongoing forced disarmament policy in Karamoja has also created a power imbalance between 'enemy' groups both within Karamoja and between Uganda and Kenya. Within Karamoja disarmament has been unevenly implemented, which means that one clan can be disarmed while its 'enemies' are not, making the disarmed clan much more vulnerable to cattle raids. At the same time the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) and the police are unable to ensure civilian protection and social order due to insufficient resources or means for reinforcing justice mechanisms. In addition, as arms flow freely across borders from South Sudan into Uganda and Kenya, any disarmament operation will not be successful unless it is undertaken regionally by securing borders and by carrying out disarmament concurrently in all countries.[34]

3.5.j Uneven Disarmament

Forced disarmament is being implemented in Uganda but not in Kenya. The Kenyan government has only initiated a voluntary disarmament process that has not been very effective. With no systematic disarmament in Pokot North, Pokot warriors from Amudat are able to cross the border and hide their weapons in Kenya. The consequence of this uneven disarmament process is that disarmed Karimojong communities in Nakapiripirit become more vulnerable to Pokot raids, prompting them to re-arm however they can. This led to the government of Uganda introducing a temporary policy of 'protected kraals' wherein soldiers protected cattle during the night in confined spaces.

[34] Lambroschini S. (2011). *"Technical Brief: Using cross border programming to address cross border dynamics in Karamoja (Uganda) and Pokot (Kenya).* Acted, Kenya.

This policy however, faced challenges as confining cattle created an excellent breeding space for epizootics, and the surrounding areas became overgrazed. Thus, the 'protected kraal' system became a challenge and was officially suspended in mid-2010. Historically, raiding cattle or cattle rustling has played an important cultural function within these groups: it has always been glorified, and successful raiders have been welcomed home as heroes, not thieves. Male infants are named after successful raiders, and grow up being told they must fulfill their legacy by being an even fiercer and more powerful raider.

Raiding is seen as a rite of passage into manhood. Men participate in raids to obtain the cattle needed to pay bride prices. In the past, these raids were characterized as being "half war and half play." Quam continues to state that before going on a raid, young men would receive blessings from tribal elders and their mothers. Villagers would pray for their safe return. Fighting was done with spears and sticks, so fatalities were rare, and raiding was strictly controlled.[35]

Umar notes that since the 1970s, the Karamojong Cluster has seen a proliferation of automatic weapons. This has changed the raiding dynamic, and the cluster has become increasingly insecure. Today, the problem continues to be exacerbated by the presence of organizations like the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Raiding among youths in the area has become much more frequent and results in a significant number of fatalities.[36]

[35] Lambroschini S. (2011). "Technical Brief: Using cross border programming to address cross border dynamics in Karamoja (Uganda) and Pokot (Kenya). Acted, Kenya.

[36] Umar, Abdi. (1997).Resource Utilization, Conflict, and Insecurity in Pastoral Areas of Kenya. Paper presented at the Seminar on Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa. Nairobi,Kenya,March.

Elders complain that they are losing control over the young men in their communities, and traditional sanctions and controls are being increasingly ignored. As the level of violence escalates, traditional communication and interaction between communities decrease, reducing many of the traditional mechanisms used to maintain peace, like trade and intermarriage. Traditionally, when raids occurred between youths from neighbouring tribes, there were mechanisms in place that allowed for cattle to be returned or compensatory payments to be made. However, because communication between communities has broken down, this remediation no longer occurs.

It is therefore clear that causes of cross border conflict in Karamoja are not only varied and complex, but also that there is no single cause to account for the frequent, unpredictable, and intermittent conflict in the region.

Chapter Four

Conflict Management in Karamoja Region

4.1 Introduction

The international development community has had its attention drawn to the search for durable resolution of protracted African conflicts. Many low-intensity, long-term conflicts take place in isolated regions between nomadic pastoralist groups in the Horn of Africa. An environment of economic scarcity, insecurity, and isolation or disenfranchisement with state and local governmental institutions have been created as a result of these conflicts which are perpetuated by a confluence of local, national, regional, and international factors.[1]

The problem of violent conflict and insecurity in the region causes great concern to the Governments and the pastoralists themselves. As food security and political stability become a vital development objective, appropriate development interventions become critical; however, national governments and international donors traditionally neglect this process.

In part, this neglect stems from past failures of the pastoralist development projects sponsored by international donors and insecurity in these areas caused by local conflict.[2]

Pastoralist conflicts in the Karamoja region are very complex and take place within several levels of the cluster- ranging from intra-clan to inter-district and the cross border conflicts that take place across the international borders. The third group of conflict is particularly difficult to deal with as it involves foreign governments. For example, the

[1]Helland Johan. (1980). Five Essays on the Study of Pastoralists and the Development of Pastoralism. Bergen: African Savannah Studies, Universitetet i Bergen, p. 70.

[2] Emily Frank. (2002). 'A Participatory Approach for Local Peace Initiatives: The Lodwar Border Harmonization Meeting.' Vol.49, No. 4, pp 69-87. Indiana University Press.

Karamajong of Uganda fighting the Turkana of Kenya or the Toposa of Sudan, or the Turkana of Kenya fighting the Merile of Ethiopia. Due to their complexity, cross border conflicts between the Turkana and the Karamajong pose a challenge to conflict analysis and management. Conflicts do not involve an entire group within either country, but one particular clan of Karamoja in Uganda against one particular section of the Turkana of Kenya. It may at any one time be the Jie against Kwatela, the Dodoth against the Lukmong, the Matheniko against the Woyakwara, or the Ngisonyoka against the Pokot. Each of these paired sections share frontiers. Although conflict has been characteristic of the region for decades and causes great concern to all parties involved such as the government and the pastoralists, the current trends, patterns, and scope are worrying and need to be addressed.

The intensity of conflict in the region has wreaked severe and far-reaching consequences in society. As a result of conflict, many livestock, people, and property have been lost or destroyed. These conflicts have left many people impoverished, with reduced options for alternative livelihoods, and such conflicts increase the likelihood of further clashes and instability in the region.[3]

4.2   Traditional Conflict Intervention Efforts

Conflicts in this region greatly interfere with the human security of these communities. To ensure the success of future development initiatives, conflict in these areas needs to be mitigated, and locally defined visions have to be the basis for development programs; however,

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[3] Omach P. (2003). Presentation on *"Security Sector Reform in Eastern Africa: The Interplay of Domestic Politics and International Contexts"* and Interviews with Hon. Peter Lokeris, Minister for Karamoja Development, p. 23.

involving local people in development processes while mitigating conflict is problematic, and currently under debate by many operating in the development sector.[4]

The Karamoja region has had various facilitated discussions by the African Union through IGAD, joint government conferences, and the international community through International and local NGOs in an effort to develop strategies for how governments and donors in cooperation with local leaders could promote peace and security in the area while at the same time promoting appropriate development initiatives that directly affect the livelihoods of communities in this region, such as human and animal disease control, animal health, education and livestock marketing.

Generally the selection of elders in such meetings have tended to focus on representation of areas characterized by extreme insecurity, and with trends of traditional raiding and banditry reaching high levels in recent years. For example, the Karamojong and the Iteso have a system of regulation of community rules led by a council of elders; the 'Akiriket' for the Karamojong and the 'Arriget; for the Iteso. This form of community governance mechanism is used in a wide variety of contexts; for example, it was traditionally used to make important decisions such as when an elder died, or when there exists major crisis involving grazing, disease or war. This mechanism is also used to discipline and sanction those who break community laws.

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[4] CAI (Creative Associates International). (1997). Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Revised Guide for Practitioners. Washington, D .C. : Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, pp 53.

[5] Emily Frank. (2002). 'A Participatory Approach for Local Peace Initiatives: The Lodwar Border Harmonization Meeting.' Vol.49, No. 4, pp 69-87. Indiana University Press.

The council of elders' community governance mechanism can also be considered as a form of conflict regulation, because it aims at ensuring that community members respect rules and thus reduce chances of tensions arising due to members' failure to comply. This mechanism is not only applicable but viable due to the remoteness of the Karamoja region and the difficulty in gaining access to formal justice mechanisms, which would otherwise have the potential to cause serious outbreaks of violence. This mechanisms, thus, allows for conflict resolution through negotiation and compensation when inter-ethnic conflicts in the region occur. [6]However, with the area being said to be awash with guns that originate from the war in Sudan, northern Uganda, and even far afield in Somalia and Ethiopia, and with lack of governmental controls in the highly polarized borders between and among the countries in the Karamoja region, other options have been sought in an effort to try and curb gun movements and the flourishing of gun markets in the region.[7]

4.3   Economies of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Karamoja

The pastoral parts of the Horn of Africa, which is considered as the most conflict-prone part of the world with over 189 million inhabitants, has become IGAD's top agenda through its Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) considering IGAD is focusing on over 5 million guns on the loose among the communities in the Karamoja region.

Other organizations like the USAID besides making effort to reinforce their objectives have sought proposals addressing violent conflicts having a cross-border dimension on the

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[6] Kagaha A. and Chapman C. (2009). *Resolving Conflicts using Traditional Mechanisms in the Karamoja and Teso Regions of Uganda.* Minority Rights Group International, August, pp 4.

[7] Wairagala, Wakabi. (2002). 'East African round up', available at http:// www.tbwt.com/specialrpt_0164.asp [accessed 16 October 2012].

conflict zone along Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan borders. Among USAD's strategy has been to support DDR efforts in the region. [8]

DDR programmes are expensive for the low economically developed nations in the Horn of Africa. Most of these DDR programmes are made possible by inter-governmental donors who fund majority of the national budget. For example, World Bank has previously given the Ugandan government a massive incentive to develop the north with proffered lending of $100m through the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Project (NUSAF). In 2003, World Bank Poverty Reduction Support Credit realized $27 million to the Ugandan national budget, to which $25 million was for classified expenditure in defense, $210,000 for antiterrorism activities, and $530,000 for Karamoja disarmament. [9]

4.4 DDR History and Statistics in Karamoja

The Karamoja are said to have hid their guns even when the Britons controlled their area as they awaited the superior force to leave. Colonial authority establishment in East Africa in the early 20th century interrupted a long-standing tradition of interethnic cattle raiding among the pastoralist communities in the north. Concentration of hostilities occurred during periods of extreme environmental stress. The survival of a community's livelihood in the arid area therefore depended on raiding in an effort to recoup livestock losses to drought and disease outbreaks and to redistribute herds and people due to abrupt fluctuations in the resource base quickly. [10]

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[8] 'Annual Program Statement for the Conflict Quick Response Fund (CQUICK)', available at http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/cquick.html [accessed 20 October 2012].

[9] New Vision, 26 February (2003). http:www.newvision.org/economics.

[10] Gray S.J. (2000). The memory of loss: Ecological politics, local history, and the evolution of Karimojong violence. Human Organization 59:401-18.

They eventually realized that the Britons were only interested in some of the productive regions and hence there was no need to retrieve their guns from the hills. The Karamojong for example, have always kept guns, some with hunting licence, but were careful not to upset the government on the sensitive issue as long as there was no interference with their freedom to graze. [11]

Both raiding and nomadism however, posed real threats to the colonial economy. The threat of encroachment by nomads and their herds on rangelands that were either claimed by European settlers, or areas that had been set aside as hunting preserves or areas designated by the colonial administration as permanent territory of another community was most problematic. [12] The colonial masters sought therefore, to protect these communities in both the Ugandan and Kenyan protectorates as the communities occupying the fertile agricultural and grazing lands in the south and in the highlands had already been assimilated into the colonial polity which was critical to British economic interests. [13]

The Karamoja region however, falling on the northern pastoralist zone was only briefly economically important, as a source of ivory. With the disappearance of elephant herds in the 1920s in the north, the zone was left literally unclaimed by any community and thus served only as a northern gun trade route which continued to expand troublesomely as years passed. [14]

[11] Little, Peter D., Smith, Kevin, et al. (2001). 'Avoiding disaster: diversification and risk management among East African herders', Development and Change 32 (3), 401-33.

[12] Barber, J. (1968). Imperial frontier. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, p. 44.

[13] Mamdani, M., P . M. B. Kasoma, and A . B . Katende. (1992). Karamoja: Ecology and history. Centre for Basic Research Working Paper 22.

[14] Barber, J. (1968). Imperial frontier. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, .p 44.

The colonial administration in an effort to safeguard its economic and political interests pursued a policy of disarmament, coercive containment, and forcible settlement of pastoralists in the north. The colonial administration deployed periodic military operations to restrict transhumant migrations in an effort to enforce new districts and tribal boundaries.

The British designated vast areas of the rangelands as forest or game preserves that were off-limits to herders, and established 'closed' districts in Karamoja and in neighboring Turkana in which rights to unrestricted travel and trade were limited to representatives of the colonial administration. [15] Heavy handed punitive campaigns were used to check cattle raiding, in which livestock was confiscated in large numbers by government troops, a means both to compel recalcitrant herders to submit to colonial authority and to implement the government's destocking policy.[16]

4.5 Disarmament and Security Interventions

In Uganda, after independence, the armed forces made several appeals and attempts to bring in all the guns, but the herders were hesitant as they basically used the guns for the protection of their livestock from neighboring communities' raids. The Kenyan and Ugandan governments in the region therefore, instituted disarmament programmes. Uganda which has long experimented with coercive disarmament of its pastoral populations and in particular in the Karamoja region starting with Obote II regime between 1980-1985. At least eight disarmament

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[15] Cisternino, M. (1979). Karamoja, the human zoo: The history of planning for Karamoja with some tentative counter planning. Ph.D. diss., Post-Graduate School for Development Studies, University of Swansea, Swansea, Wales, p. 420.

[16] Lamphear, J .(1992). *The scattering time: Turkana responses to colonial rule*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp 34.

campaigns have been undertaken since 1945. The Karamojong however, complain bitterly of abuses committed during government initiatives to disarm them. [17]

In 2001 before the December disarmament, a long NGO driven sensitization campaign had been carried out using chiefs, which led to Karamojong voluntarily handing in 7,780 guns out of the estimated number of between 40,000 and 150,000, which were expected to be handed in before the 15 February, 2002 final amnesty deadline. Forcible campaign using 15,000 stationed in Karamoja followed with instructions to act upon receiving information of any gunholding. [18]

In the 2007-2008 disarmament phase, the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) stressed that it would provide an enabling environment for safeguarding peoples' basic human rights as well as political, civil, economic and cultural rights during and after disarmament. [19] This followed criticism by donor community, including United Nations Development Programme of abuses committed during previous forcible disarmament programmes. Despite the promises though, the government was still accused of gross misconduct with the armed forces being accused of torturing men, raping women and young girls with some contracting HIV. This therefore, has led to the Karamojong viewing the government as enemies

[17] Kagaha A. and Chapman C. (2009). Resolving Conflicts using Traditional Mechanisms in the Karamoja and Teso Regions of Uganda. Minority Rights Group International, August, pp 3.

[18] New Vision, 2 July 2002. http://www.newvision.org

[19] Office of the Prime Minister. (2007). Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme. January 2007, p.xiii

and as an institution that cannot be trusted, besides the economic neglect and suppression of the pastoralist lifestyle. [20]

In Kenya, the government has applied both coercive and voluntary disarmament approaches in an effort to discharge its mandate by mopping up illicit firearms, especially in northern Kenya. This has been in line with its primary responsibility of ensuring security through enforcing law and order. Kenya has implemented over 50 disarmament operations in the past 100 years, with President Moi's 24 year tenure having seen the head of state order over 20 disarmament operations among the Pokot community alone. [21]

Just like Uganda, coercive measures were fraught with concerns about human rights violations, with communities and civil society actors decrying the excessive use of force and torture. For example, the 1984 Operation Wajir was described as a massacre due to the number of deaths involved. [22]

In an effort to accommodate human rights concerns, the government modified its approach to include provision of alternative livelihoods and options to the targeted communities by designing a disarmament and development programme dubbed 'Operation Dumisha Amani (sustain peace). This approach integrates development efforts such as rebuilding infrastructure and has an elaborate multi-actor strategy that involves local opinion leaders, civil society, and the media in confidence-building measures for disarmament. The first phase hence, began in 2005 and over 2,298 firearms and 4,418 rounds of ammunition had been collected by 2006. The phase

[20] Kagaha A. and Chapman C. (2009). *Resolving Conflicts using Traditional Mechanisms in the Karamoja and Teso Regions of Uganda*. Minority Rights Group International, August, p. 3.

[21] Sikom Peace Network for Development. (2010). p. 3.

[22] Wepundi Manasseh, James Ndung'u, and Simon Rynn. (2011). *Lessons from the Frontiers: Civilian Disarmament in Kenya and Uganda*. Nairobi: Saferworld, p. 17.

however, failed to achieve the targeted 50,000 firearms, leading to a second that began in 2010, followed with a voluntary phase on February the same year. [23]Although, the operation went on for the whole year, there was persistent concern about inadequate provision of security by the government and continuous underdevelopment which contributed to the communities' unwillingness to surrender all of their firearms.

In an effort to control the proliferation of small arms in the Kenyan north and western parts of the country, the government launched two forced disarmament exercises in Mt. Elgon district, in Bungoma and Mandera counties- with the Mt. Elgon named as Operation Okoa Maisha (save lives) and the Mandera one dubbed Operation Chunga Mpaka (guard the border). Although the operations were criticized for human rights violations by the security forces, they were never the less considered successful as for dismantling Mt. Elgon's Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) and restoring peace and order in the two areas. [24]

The Anti Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) is mandated to control cattle rustling in the country worked together with the army officers that had been deployed to the north of Kenya for the DDR operations and reported to having recovered 75 rounds of ammunition, six AK-47s, three G3s and one SAR-80 between January 1st, 2010 and July 31st, 2011.[25]

Taking into consideration that Kenya faces the same challenges as Uganda and Ethiopia in the Karamoja region, Operation Dumisha Amani had envisaged the commencement of a joint disarmament programme with the two countries. However, the joint plans and negotiations that

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[23] KNFP (Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons). (2010). 'Disarmament in Kenya.' Presentation at the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) Practical Disarmament Validation Workshop. Mombasa, Kenya, 30–31 August, p. 12.

[24] HRW (Human Rights Watch). (2009). Bring the Gun or You'll Die: Torture, Rape and Other Serious Human Rights Violations by Kenyan Security Forces in the Mandera Triangle. New York: HRW, pp 10-15.

[25] Wepundi Manasseh, James Ndung'u, and Simon Rynn. (2011). Lessons from the Frontiers: Civilian Disarmament in Kenya and Uganda. Nairobi: Saferworld, pp 10-11.

had started between Uganda and Kenya were disrupted by the 2006 and 2007 Ugandan and Kenyan national elections respectively. The Kenyan government has also deployed members of the Kenya Police Reserve (KPRs) in this conflict region in an effort to manage security challenges in the area. Although KPRs are considered necessary in the communities they exist, their recruitment and management is seen as flawed. KPRs are voluntary officers who are attached to the police and are called upon when necessity arises. However, some have abused the obligations accorded to them and have privatized the small arms given to them by the government and are alleged to use them for criminal purposes.[26]

4.6   Review of Objectives and Hypothesis of the study

DDR operations are launched by government in an effort to maintain law and order. Thus, law enforcement efforts are always faced with challenges in an effort to control the proliferation of arms in the concerned countries. In the Karamoja region the challenges seem to be more pronounced due to the systematic marginalization of the communities in this area by both colonial and independence governments.

The not so friendly Karamoja region environment is characterized by inadequate physical presence of law enforcement officers, poor infrastructure, scarcity of resources, corruption, and difficult terrain in the small arms and trade route areas as well as in the conflict hotspot areas. It is also of great concern to note that some police security initiatives have equally posed as challenges in the fight against anarchy in this region. For example, it has been observed that almost 50 per cent of the ammunition that circulates illegally in Turkana North is supplied by the

[26] Ndung'u, James. (2010). A Reserve Force in Decline: Dilemmas of Supporting Community Security through Auxilliary Police in Greater Marsabit. Unpublished report. Marsabit: Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, pp 6-7.

Kenya Police in order to provide the Turkana with some defence against rival groups in Sudan and Uganda. [27]

The study observed that conflict in the Karamoja region kept changing and that each type of conflict had its various factors as the sources. It also emerged that the communities would prefer to rely on local instruments of conflict response that clearly understand the nature, back ground and the root causes of the conflict in the area than the government imposed and coercive disarmament programs that not only disrupt the order of the communities and their livelihoods but also leaves the communities feeling violated, disrespected and interfered with.

It also clearly came out that if there was sufficient and effective security provision in the region by the concerned governments, and the communities were no longer in jeopardy or fear of attacks, faced no threats from neighbouring tribes, then they would voluntarily surrender their weapons as their worth and utility would cease and as such government voluntary disarmament programs would not only be an appropriate answer to the control and elimination of small arms in the region but the whole exercise would make sense to the pastoralist communities in the Karamoja region.

The study therefore tried to establish how community needs can be harmonized with government policies and structures so as to effectively meet the needs of the communities in the Karamoja region.

[27] Bevan, James. (2008). *Blowback: Kenya's Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, p. 17.

Chapter Five

Conclusions.

5.1 Introduction

Pastoral systems are dynamic. The factors contributing to pastoralist conflict in the Karamoja region are multidimensional, and as such have various ramifications that affect livelihoods of the people within and across the Kenyan and Ugandan borders. This is especially in considering the fact that the majority of those living in the border region of Kenya and Uganda are not only pastoralists but that their livelihoods are dictated by the upkeep and size of their herds. Pastoralists have continually been forced to migrate in search of water and pasturelands during the dry seasons due to harsh environmental conditions. The limited access to water and competing rights to land has led to inter-tribal conflict arising as pastoralists from one tribe enter the territory of another. This has continued for years due to governments' failure to invest sufficient human and financial capital in abating the conflict and the underlying underdevelopment in the Karamoja region.

As pastoral societies continue to be incorporated into wider political and economic systems, the rationale of conflicts and violence is changing. Collective violence in the pastoral areas is being 'modernized' as its connections with modern state politics and capitalist modes of production intensify. The increased availability of small arms in the region from past wars has modernized the conflict and is increasingly making ordinary clashes fatal. Furthermore, some elite people in these communities are utilizing the culture of violence for their own personal gain and at the same time making the effort of ensuring that the communities in the region do not

completely loose their ritual and customary referent which incase things do not go their way, the traditional cultural elements can still be used to control the violence.

The Kenyan and Ugandan governments' top-down, heavy-handed coercive DDR approach have not only led to distrust between the communities involved and the governments but has also led to subsequent violent clashes between communities and security providers. This has therefore complicated the system by adding a different type of conflict to the already existing various types of conflicts in the region.

5.2   Harmonization of Conflict Management Efforts

Governments favor and often result to civilian disarmament programs in an effort to fulfill their obligation of providing security, when responding to this nature of perennial pastoral conflicts. This heavy-handed coercive disarmament programmes have often received support internationally, especially in the Horn of Africa, where pastoralists have been marginalized and perceived as continuing a historical conflict based on backward customs and ideals. However, such crackdown operations have often intensified insecurity for the disarmed groups, and in some cases prompting raids from neighbouring tribes who seek to take advantage of their neighbors' temporary weakness.

5.3 Karamoja Region-Way Forward.

It is therefore in my view that, the Kenyan and Ugandan governments which have jurisdiction over the Karamoja region should implement joint disarmament programmes running concurrently so as to have tangible and effective results. This would curb the tendency of communities running to their allies in neighbouring countries and only returning after the

disarmament program is over and hence, attacking the already disarmed groups in the home country.

A case in point would be the 2006 disarmament in Kenya whereby during the exercise, the Pokot of Turkana South fled to Uganda to avoid having their weapons confiscated. Unfortunately, the Turkana on the other hand, were unable to relocate which left them exposed to returning Pokot warriors from Uganda.[1]

I would also suggest that the Kenyan and Uganda governments seriously consult with the communities before the DDR exercises commence. It would also be highly beneficial for both the communities and the two governments if the latter, would carry out sensitization campaigns before implementing the DDR programmes. This is because although the programmes are well intentioned, they sometimes lack clear objectives and genuine consent from community leaders and populations especially if a similar exercise had previously been carried out and cases of human rights violation reported.

The governments should aim at ensuring that the community members play an active role in the disarmament process to give them ownership over the security of their communities, and thus make the communities obliged and responsible for ensuring sustainable peace in the region.

The main objective of the DDR must also be communicated to avoid pastoral communities from feeling as if the government is using the exercise to undermine their overall development, livelihoods and freedom of movement.

Imposed and coercive DDR programmes lead to the civilian population rapidly loosing confidence in the government especially if the terms and conditions of the disarmament were not

[1] Riam Riam. (2007). *Disarming the Turkana: The Riam Riam Experience.* Presented at the IGAD Regional Workshop on the Disarmament of Pastoralist Communities, May 28–30, 2007, p. 35.

clearly spelt out at the beginning. For example, a community might expect compensation in exchange for their weapons and this are issues that should be clearly spelt out to avoid conflict between the state and the pastoral populations.

The Kenyan and Ugandan governments should also make a point of ensuring that the DDR programmes get to the second and third phases that are demobilization and reintegration respectively. These campaigns must be introduced for the paramilitary groups, with particular attention given to the reintegration phase that trains the ex-combatants for employment so as to prevent their return to lives of violence.

The use of police reserves like in the Kenyan case where weapon holders are recruited as KPR, where they exchange their weapons for registered government-issued ones should be discouraged. This is because besides disarming the communities in the north peacefully and maintaining security without damaging civilian and military relations, there exist more risks especially if the majority of the KPRs come from a one community. This kind of method also fails to put into account the negative implications of arming untrained and unpaid civilians in any conflict prone society.

The Kenyan and Ugandan governments should encourage and support the provision for the signing of peace agreements that are all inclusive and especially encourage the participation of the youth. This should be between and among the warring communities in the Karamoja region to encourage long lasting peace and security. This would emulate the Lokiriama Peace Accord which is a peace treaty that was signed between the Turkana people of Kenya and the Matheniko of Uganda in December 1973 as a commitment by both parties to peaceful co-existence and holds water up to date.

Uganda and Kenya have since colonial administration maintained grass root local administration and can therefore; utilize this system to encourage peaceful sharing of resources on both sides of the border. Furthermore, the governments can collaborate with local organizations and come up with a cross-border conflict prevention, mitigation and response network with mechanisms for sharing natural resources between communities.

It is evident from the study that there has been some degree of systematic marginalization of the Karamoja region by both the Ugandan and Kenyan governments. There is need for equitable distribution of resources in all parts of the country in the spirit of nationalism and oneness so as to highly discourage violence related cultural tendencies as a means of livelihood.Good health services, provision of education, a well constructed road network should not only be budgeted for but also implemented so as to open up the region and provide chances of alternative lifestyles and cultural transformation.

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