

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**THE ROLE OF TRACK ONE DIPLOMACY IN CONFLICT
RESOLUTION: A CASE STUDY OF THE SOMALI
CIVIL WAR, 1991 - 2000 ?/**

**BY
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**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AWARD OF A MASTERS
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
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DECLARATION

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


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This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.



Mr. L. Soita Chesoni

20.1.05

Date

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my dear daughter, *JERUSHA ODAMEA
ACHEAMPONG.*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This work is the culmination of my input and the unseen imprint of all those who played a role in its accomplishment. All of them deserve a mention in this segment of the work but space constraints limit my desire to do a roll call of everyone who midwifed this work with me.

Nonetheless, it is appropriate to give thanks to the Almighty God for the inspiration and strength He granted me throughout this work, in spite of some difficulties I encountered at one stage or another.

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ABSTRACT

The main thrust of this study is to analyse the role played by official diplomacy resolution in the Somali conflict that has been raging for over a decade.

To accomplish its objective, the study mainly relies on secondary data and examines the efforts made by the United Nations, United States of America, Organisation of African Unity, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, the European Commission and some individuals in resolving the Somali civil war. The study demonstrates that all these efforts by the different parties did contribute, at one stage or another, in bringing the various Somali factions to the negotiating table, and prevented the further deterioration of the mayhem in that country, although for a short period of time. However, the restoration of lasting peace proved elusive and to date, the country remains embroiled in internecine conflict, forcing some of the peace-makers to abandon their mission in the face of the local opposition.

These examples of third party intervention in internal conflicts show that new mechanisms will have to be devised in tackling internal strife, as peacekeeping could not help to end this conflict which was made worse by the absence of a legitimate government. The study also concludes that African states and African regional and sub-regional organisations need to find new ways to manage internal conflicts or reinforce their present capacity to do so, particularly where conflicts occur in failed states. This becomes more imperative as it would be too presumptuous to expect that the United Nations and the international community should effectively manage all conflicts on the

African continent. The overall lesson is that Africans must find indigenous solutions to African problems.

The study also shows that the defunct OAU was limited as far as the intervention in internal conflicts of member states is concerned because of a provision in its Charter. And it recommends that the AU be more efficient and present in dealing with internal conflicts as provided in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the Union.

The study recommends that a clear distinction be made between all forms of third party intervention. It further suggests that new mechanisms for managing conflicts that occur in a "failed state" are to be found. The study also recommends that the UN exercise some flexibility in the interpretation of the concept of "failed state". In a situation whereby a sovereign state loses one or two of the attributes of statehood, the UN should have a mechanism through which it should work for the restoration of the lost attributes.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

DART	-	Disaster Assistance Response Team
EC	-	European Commission
EU	-	European Union
ICRC	-	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGAD	-	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
LAS	-	League of Arab States
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	-	Organisation of African Unity
OFDA	-	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OIC	-	Organisation of the Islamic Conference
SNA	-	Somali National Alliance
SNM	-	Somali National Movement
SRC	-	Supreme Revolutionary Council
SRRC	-	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSA	-	Somali Salvation Army
SSDF	-	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SYL	-	Somali Youth League
TNA	-	Transitional National Assembly

TNC	-	Transitional National Council
TNG	-	Transitional National Government
UN	-	United Nations
UNITAF	-	United Task Force
UNOSOM	-	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS	-	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
U. S. A.	-	United States of America
USC	-	United Somali Congress
WFP	-	World Food Programme

CHAPTER I

1.0. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

After the two World Wars which had far reaching consequences on world politics, came the Cold War that was marked by two competing ideologies and the threat of a nuclear confrontation between the superpowers. The end of the Cold War, therefore, brought with it a glimmer of hope for peace and a reduction in armaments as well as the size of military expenditure of many nation-states. This, however, has not been the case and the world has instead witnessed an increase in the number of conflicts in Africa and other parts of the world. Africa in particular has been bedevilled by ethnic, regional, and intra-state conflicts.

These conflicts erupt as a result of the parties involved having incompatible goals, dissenting opinions and divergent interests. As Mitchell points out: “both intranational and international conflicts also arise from a (possible temporary) scarcity of goods, which existing value systems define as worthwhile or desirable and over which competition occurs.”¹

The conflicts constitute a source of great destruction on the African continent. The quest for peace, therefore, remains one of the greatest challenges facing Africa in the new Millennium.

¹ C. R. Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, London, Macmillan, 1998, p. 19

Conflicts destabilise the population both physically and psychologically. The effects of conflict range from physical maiming and displacement of the population to loss of life, that the population of a given area or country is subjected to. The Somali civil war is no exception in terms of the effects. The civil war in Somalia led to the collapse of the state, prompting mass exodus of Somalis into the neighbouring states to avoid the escalating violence and famine.

Some of the consequences of the 'destruction of the Somali statehood' and the disintegration of a state for that matter, are the proliferation of small arms and the flow of refugees which have resulted in instability in other countries within the region or sub-region. It therefore, can be said that when a state is experiencing a conflict, it inevitably causes a variety of problems to its neighbours. This underlines the great concern of the international community in trying to broker peace, using both diplomatic and non-diplomatic methods where necessary in order not to plunge whole regions, continents or sub-regions into total anarchy. Some diplomatic efforts have been made in a bid to reconstruct the nation after the massive destruction: these are efforts from regional actors, sub-regional bodies and individual state actors. But how successful have these diplomatic efforts been? This study seeks to analyse the extent to which these efforts have been successful.

1.1.STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The causes of conflict may vary from one country to another. However, irrespective of the location and the causes of these conflicts, they always produce the same devastating effects everywhere. Therefore, great need was felt by the international community to attend to the war that engulfed the Somali capital, Mogadishu in 1991.

Since 1991, Somalia has been in turmoil. The Somali conflict has raised concerns of the international community about the sanctity of human life and human dignity. This is due to the fact that hundreds of thousands of Somalis lost their lives in this conflict and others rendered homeless. It is estimated that 500 000 people died due to war and famine in Somalia.² A US diplomat described the situation in Somalia as the worst humanitarian crisis faced by any people in the world.³

There have been initiatives - both official and unofficial – that have been taken, and this conflict called for one of the largest UN operations which comprised of 30 000 men. However, these approaches have not made much progress because the Somali conflict remains unresolved. Track One diplomacy has encountered a lot of challenges that have made the search of peace unattainable. The nature of the Somali war is deeply rooted in a clan-based political system. The international community intervened in a bid to save Somalia and her people. And this was mainly done through the provision of emergency relief and the organisation of conferences aimed at peace and reconciliation. Somalia still

² Bradbury, *The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace Oxfam Paper No. 9*, Oxford: Oxfam Print Unit, 1994, Part II and III.

³ J. Prendergast, *Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia* (London, Pluto Press with Center of Concern, 1997), p. 115

does not have a central government, the infrastructure has still not been rebuilt. On the whole, nothing has been achieved and the conflict is ongoing.

Both Track One and Track Two efforts made to resolve the conflict have not yielded the expected peace in Somalia although they all have used different approaches suitable to their status. Owing to the persistence of this conflict, other initiatives may be required in addition to the approaches adopted by official diplomacy as a result of the fact that the conflict remains a threat to international peace and security. This is what this study seeks to establish despite the little literature that is available as of the moment of writing this paper.

Irrespective of the results achieved so far in the Somali conflict, track one diplomacy cannot be ruled out completely since the process being hosted by Kenya is ongoing and a positive result might be achieved in the near future.

1.2. OBJECTIVES

This study seeks to examine:

- 1. the efforts made by the international community to resolve the conflict in Somalia;**
- 2. the track one diplomatic approaches adopted by the international community in the management of the Somali conflict;**
- 3. the extent to which track one diplomacy has been effective in resolving the civil war.**

1.3. JUSTIFICATION

Somalia has been in the limelight since 1991 when its President, Mohamed Siad Barre fled the country. The country has been a place of untold suffering; there is famine, war and all other crimes that go with them. The fighting among rival faction leaders resulted in the killing, dislocation and starvation of thousands of Somalis. The civil war that preceded and followed the fall of Siad Barre's government uprooted and estimated 1.7 million people.⁴ Civil wars, according to Frederic Pearson and J. Martin Rochester⁵ have produced a greater death toll than conflicts between states. Civil strife has therefore become a preoccupation to the international community in the post-Cold War era.

Somalia's central government has been broken and is non-existent, thus making of Somalia a "failed state". It has been replaced by different self-proclaimed governments, which consider themselves autonomous, thus the rise of total anarchy posing a threat to both the national and international communities.

This explains the intervention in Somalia by the international community in order to try and restore peace. A lot of studies have been carried out by scholars on the Somali war. However, these previous studies did not focus so much on track one diplomacy. Chesoni, for example, did a comparative study on peace keeping, which is one method of official diplomatic intervention, in Somalia and Liberia.⁶ Mwagiru's study is on conflict in the

⁴ The United Nations and Somalia: 1992 – 1996 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1996), Volume VIII, p. 14

⁵ Frederic Pearson and J. Martin Rochester, *International Relations: The Global Condition in the Twenty-First Century*, New York, McGraw-Hill Companies, Forth Edition, 1992, p. 302

⁶ Soita Chesoni, *The Role of Peace-Keeping in Internal Conflict in Africa: A comparative Analysis of the Economic Community Of West African States Peace-Keeping Operation In Liberia and the United Nations Operations in Somalia*

Horn of Africa in general⁷. Other contributions on Somalia are by Hussein Ali Dualeh, who narrates the background of the conflict without dwelling on official mediation to end the conflict. Scholars like Terrence Lyons, Ahmed I. Samatar and Anna Simons have extensive academic contributions on Somalia.

Nevertheless, not much research has been done on the role of official diplomacy in conflict resolution in Somalia. Not much is known about track one diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. It is this knowledge gap that the present study seeks to fill. It is hoped this study will help to understand the different approaches that were used and why they were not successful in resolving the conflict in Somalia.

1.4. DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS

1.4.1. Diplomacy

Diplomacy is the conduct of relations of one state with another by peaceful means and the skill in the management of international relations.

1.4.2. Track one diplomacy

Official diplomacy as opposed to unofficial diplomacy, is practised by states and organisations of states and is dominated by official policies. The main tools are bargaining and power relations by actors who have the right to participate in decision making under International Law. Track one diplomacy is mainly influenced by the realist paradigm of international relations. Realists are of the view that the international system is anarchical and sovereign states interact and influence behaviour through power politics

⁷ Makumi Mwangi, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Nairobi, Watermark Publications, 2000

and coercive mediation. Parties therefore agree on a settlement deal based on the benefits that are immediately accrued from the causes of the dispute. Track two diplomacy is not driven by power and its agents do not act in accordance with official bureaucracy. It is totally informal. Unofficial actors do not practise diplomacy.

The mediators in the Somali conflict are:

Foreign Ministers, accredited heads of International Organisations: such as the United Nations, Organisation of African Unity, Sub-regional organisations, Individual state actors and Prime Ministers.

With track one diplomacy, there is a win-lose outcome and this does not bring a lasting solution to the conflict as accusing fingers are pointed at each one of the parties involved in the conflict.

1.4.3. Conflict

Conflict is the struggle between opposing forces. Opposition is shown between incompatible wishes, ideas and interests which sometimes lead to emotional tension. For the purposes of this study, conflict and war may be seen to mean the same thing.

1.4.4. Conflict Management:

For the purposes of this study conflict management will be seen as trying to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiating table in order to find the sources of conflicts so that at the end of it all, both parties would have achieved mutual gains or a new set of benefits. And also parties bringing the conflict to an end through bilateral bargaining, tacit or face-to-face negotiations. They find a solution to their conflict through promises

or concessions. And this, often, is done through the help of a third party, a mediator, for a peaceful solution to be found in order to put an end to the conflict.

1.4.5. Conflict Resolution

Resolution of conflict according to Mwangi, is non-power based, and non-coercive.⁸ Resolution deals with, first and foremost, the relationship after the conflict and this is lasting because parties are satisfied with its outcome. This also has to do with the fact that parties come to the understanding that concessions are to be made as far as the needs that led them to the conflict are concerned. Wallensteen joins him in defining conflict resolution thus: where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other.⁹

1.4.6. Conflict Settlement

Settlement does not end a conflict since the very causes of the conflict are not addressed. "...the best that can be done in situations of conflict is to reach accommodations which the parties in the conflict are forced to live with."¹⁰

1.5. LITERATURE REVIEW

This research will mainly be based on both published and non-published works on conflict and on conflict resolution or settlement. Literature on attempts at resolving the

⁸ Makumi Mwangi, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Nairobi, Watermark Publications, 2000, p. 41

⁹ Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*, SAGE Publications, London, 2002, p. 8

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 40

conflict in Somalia is assessed in order to analyse the role played by regional and sub-regional actors as well as individual state actors.

1.5.1. LITERATURE ON CONFLICT

A great deal has been written since the demise of the Siad Barre regime in January 1991. Among the studies done on Somalia include that of Mwangiru. According to him, conflict is endemic in society and is not easily defined.¹¹ Conflict involves disagreement and confrontation. Some of the causes of conflict remain deeply entrenched in cultures owing to the differences that there are in them.

He further raises the complexity of conflicts at all levels. According to him the role of the state has contributed in increasing political conflicts. This is so because of the interest each party to the conflict attaches to it. However, if preventive diplomacy is made good use of and applied, it arrests the emerging conflict. However, the reality is that preventive diplomacy often times comes in too late, that is, when hostilities have really began and the parties to it have adopted diametrically opposing views on the issues in contention.

Mitchell posits that “wars and civil wars may be the most obvious examples of organized human behaviour in situations where salient goals are perceived as incompatible.”¹²

This is the reason why Anyang' Nyong'o says that unmanageable conflicts undermine the basis for development.¹³ Development in itself requires a peaceful environment that is to be created by a peaceful people. Nevertheless, this is far from being achieved because of

¹¹ Ibid, p. 1

¹² C. R. Mitchell, 'Conflict, War and Conflict Management' in M. Light and A. J. R. Groom (eds.), *International Relations: A Handbook of Theory*, London, Pinter Publishers, 1985, p. 121

¹³ P. Anyang' Nyong'o 'An Introduction', in P. Anyang' Nyong'o (ed), *Arms and Daggers in the Heart of Africa: Studies on Internal Conflicts*, Nairobi, Academy Science Publishers, 1993, p. 2

irreconcilable differences that are prevailing in our African societies and in the world. This means that there is the need for Africa to be self-determined and need not dwell so much on the divisions of the past. Unity is more than ever needed in order to establish strong institutions which a nation will rest on.

The tendency in contemporary Africa is for conflicts to assume clan, sub-clan, ethnic and tribal dimensions. I. William Zartman sees conflicts in Africa in a different perspective. To him, conflicts are prevalent in Africa because it is a means by which internal and external relations are founded.¹⁴ He further asserts that until Africa is empowered to establish its own systems of domestic, regional and continental order¹⁵, conflict will still increase.

This view is further developed by Hansen in his assertion that "for lasting and reliable peace to be attained, it is important to fashion economic systems which can generate sustained economic growth, guarantee for the mass of the population a certain minimum of material existence and basic needs."¹⁶ To Burton¹⁷, conflict is a social phenomenon that can either lead to a peaceful end or degenerate into a destructive end. He is of the same view as Zartman who believes that conflict is an inescapable condition so far as human relations are concerned. He cautions that an attempt to suppress conflict, will

¹⁴ I. William Zartman, 'African Regional Security and Changing Patterns of Relations' in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (ed), *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security*, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. p. 53

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 53

¹⁶ E. Hansen, *Africa Perspectives on Peace and Development*, London, The United Nations Zed Books Ltd, New Jersey, 1987, pp. 12-13

¹⁷ J. W. Burton, *World Society*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972, pp. 137-138

render society static. Therefore, human beings must learn to live and cope with conflict since “conflict is endemic.”¹⁸

Wallensteen¹⁹ is of the view that conflict refers to behaviour or action. He goes on to explain that “it contains a severe disagreement between at least two sides, where their demands cannot be met by the same resources at the same time. This is an incompatibility.²⁰ Populations become bitter owing to the unequal sharing of resources, political power, education, health. And these are forms of structural violence which cause direct violence. In this regard, Mwangi asserts that “violent conflict is nested on behavioural violence while structural conflict is nested on structural violence.”²¹ He goes on to contend that it is because relationships exist in society that there is structural violence or conflict.²²

Berridge²³ makes a comment on structural conflict by saying that it is caused by the anarchical structure of the state-system itself. Wallensteen joins him and says that “...the existence of one state is a danger to any other state.”²⁴ Because as long as there is unpredictability in the system, there will be fear and thus, conflict.²⁵

¹⁸ K. Webb, ‘Structural Violence and the Definition of Conflict’ in *World Encyclopaedia*, Vol. 2, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1986, pp. 431-434

¹⁹ Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*, London, SAGE Publications, 2002, p. 15

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ M. Mwangi, *Conflict, Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Nairobi, Watermark Printer, 2000, p. 23

²² Ibid, pp. 24-25

²³ G. R. Berridge, *International Politics: States, Power and Conflict since 1945*, Prentice-Hall, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1997, p. 72

²⁴ Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*, op. cit, p. 15

²⁵ Ibid

Far from being conflicts between rival factions or ethnic groups, these civil conflicts originate from the practices of government and also involve the existing structures.²⁶ Hence, a conflict is not purely internal because it affects other structures outside the country. This therefore, calls for third party mediation as regards the management of these internal conflicts.

In terms of collective security, many attempts have been made in the various conflicts Africa is fraught with and there have been some successes. These efforts came from Heads of states, regional and sub-regional organizations. Nevertheless, African countries resort to mediation from global organizations such as the United Nations²⁷ in their attempt to resolve African conflicts. Such media have been greatly used as regards conflict management in Africa.

It must be pointed out however, that despite the catastrophic effects of conflicts, they might have some utility value. For instance, conflicts draw attention to the inequalities and disaffection in a polity; issues which the political leadership of a given nation-state might otherwise wish to suppress or pretend that they do not exist.

Furthermore, conflicts tend to define issues over which lack of clarity hitherto existed. It is when a secessionist group launches its war, for instance, that their complaints are brought to the fore and become matters of national and international concern.

²⁶ I. William Zartman, 'Africa Regional Security and Changing Patterns of Relations', op. cit, p. 54

²⁷ Ibid, p. 59

Lastly, conflicts have the ironic power to force the resolution of issues. Oftentimes, the political elite in a nation-state prevaricate on very salient issues and are forced to dialogue and to the conference table when conflicts explode and a mosaic of ways to arrest them are embarked upon.

1.5.2. LITERATURE ON THE CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

Most of the literature on the Somali civil war emphasise on its devastating nature and some of the initiatives that have been taken to combat it. Among the writers who have focused on Somalia are Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I, Samatar. They begin by showing the characteristics of the collapsed state. To them, state collapse occurs when structure, authority, legitimate power, law, and political order fall apart.²⁸ And this causes a great vacuum in the society that leads to anarchy.

Furthermore, they are of the view that state collapse compels international action because of the chaos that extends to other regions.²⁹ Some authors have written about the origins, the different types of conflict management approaches to manage the Somali conflict. This chaos precipitated by the disintegration of the state, causes other countries to become homes to a lot of refugees, hence jeopardizing the stability of the international community. This explains why the United Nations (UN) had to intervene in Somalia from 1992 to 1995. This military operation involved the UN and the United States (US). And this, according to the two writers, was one of the first cases of international action in

²⁸ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, Washington, D. C. The Brookings Institution, 1995, p. 1

²⁹ Ibid

response to state collapse in the post-cold War era.³⁰ To them, Somalia's example remains a challenge to analysts and policymakers owing to its uniqueness since there is no single model for international action as regards state collapse.³¹ And in this regard, Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst do agree by saying that since there is no legally sanctioned authorities or state structures to provide legitimate consent, the actions of the international force are governed exclusively by the United Nations, normally authorized by a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.³² President Siad Barre was driven into exile after the January 27, 1991 uprising.

Samatar is of the view that the divisions in Somalia date way back to the colonial rule and lingered on after independence. They manifested themselves in the glaring disparity between the north and the south. Many thought the north was to become a neglected outpost.³³ During the 1969 general elections there was an overwhelming rigging and alteration of electoral rules that gave rise to clanism and sub-clanism.³⁴ After the landslide victory of the ruling Somali Youth League (SYL), Somalia became a one party state.³⁵ To Samatar, the state started to weaken because the economy failed; politically, there was a feeling of discontentment based on the regional disparity.³⁶ Bradbury³⁷ agrees with Samatar saying there is no single factor which can explain the causes of the Somali

³⁰ Ibid, p. 6

³¹ Ibid

³² Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (eds.), *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, Colorado, Westview Press, 1997, p. 10

³³ I. A. Samatar, "Under Siege: Blood, Power, and the Somali State" in P. Anyang' Nyong'o (ed) *Arms and Daggers in the Heart of Africa: Studies on Internal Conflicts*, Nairobi, Academy Science Publishers, 1993, p. 83

³⁴ Ibid, p. 84

³⁵ Ibid, p. 85

³⁶ Ibid, p. 86

³⁷ Mark Bradbury, *Somaliland Century Report* (Totton: Hobbs the Printer Ltd, 1997), p. 1

civil war. He points out the legacies of European colonialism, the Somali kinship system, the contradictions between a centralized state and a pastoral culture. He goes on by mentioning how the Cold War politics, militarisation, marginalisation and uneven development, ecological decline, lack of power sharing, corruption, oppression and the cumulative impact of decades of armed conflict have all contributed. Relationships were not one of the best owing to the fact that the colonialist “divide and rule” tactic was still prevailing.³⁸ This led to hatred among Somalis. And the regime was further weakened by the series of killings of suspected dissidents.

One would have thought Siad Barre’s demise was going to improve the situation since the dictatorship was over. But on the contrary, clanism accentuated and the fight for the survival of individual clans persisted. In order to help curb the growing anarchy, the President of Djibouti, Hassan Gulaid, convened two reconciliation conferences³⁹ in a bid to restore peace. This, however, yielded no positive result. Somalis continued fleeing from the country in order to escape the lawlessness, thus calling for further international intervention. Nevertheless, the process remains very slow with a lot of controversies. Recently Abdullahi Yusuf, one of the people contesting for the position of transitional president in the new Somalia withdrew from the peace talks being held at Mbagathi, in Kenya.

Furthermore, Dualeh, like Samatar, sees the Somali conflict to have been founded on clanism. He proceeds by exposing the kind of leader Siad Barre was and also by tracing

³⁸ I. A. Samatar, *Op cit*, p. 87

³⁹ *Ibid*, p. 95

the character of the latter. His findings are that Barre was a tribalist and very sinister.⁴⁰ These traits possibly helped to build him as a dictator. In the end, they accelerated his unpopularity in Somalia.

Dualeh is of the view that the American intervention in Somalia had not only a humanitarian dimension but also because America had an interest to protect.⁴¹ However, the UN intervention is negatively perceived through what Dualeh refers to as “the blunders committed by UNOSOM”. Thakur⁴² also argues that the UN will have to sharpen its skills in identifying potential conflicts before they break into war. It also needs to be involved in post-conflict peace building by identifying, supporting and deepening the structure which will consolidate peace and enhance people’s sense of confidence and well-being.

The review of these few references shows that efforts have been made by the international community with a number of initiatives to peace in Somalia. However, the bloodshed has still not subsided. The apparent failure of official diplomacy in bringing peace to Somalia is what this study seeks to explain. For “successes at the local level depend on successful peace processes at the national, international or regional level.”⁴³

⁴⁰ Hussein Ali Dualeh, *From Barre to Aideed, Somalia: The Agony of a Nation*, Nairobi, Stellagraphics Ltd, 1994, p. 27

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 140

⁴² R. Thakur, “From Peace keeping to Peace Enforcement in Somalia” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 1994, pp. 384-410

⁴³ Hassan Ba, “Peace-building Initiatives of Civil Society in Africa”, in *Report 14 Disarmament and Conflict Prevention in Development Cooperation Proceedings of an International Conference 30 – 31 August 1999*, p. 57

1.7. HYPOTHESIS

The following is the hypothesis which the study seeks to test:

1. Track one diplomacy is ill suited to manage the Somali war and restoring peace in Somalia.

1.8. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theory describes, explains and predicts events and relationships between variables. Different theories have guided the study of conflict. However, this study will basically be built on the theory of Realism. This theory believes in the use of force to have certain situations remedied and is mainly concerned with human nature. It also believes that states are the principal and unitary actors.

States are considered by this theory the most important actors in world politics, and act according to their national interest. Realists lay an emphasis on the egoistic urge that is present in man. Human beings are naturally egoistic and are concerned with their self-interest in international politics. Realists do believe that because this urge cannot be done away with, conflict is inevitable. Peace is not always permanent in the international system. There are moments of tension and conflict which are inevitable. As Jack Donnelly argues: "whatever their other disagreements, realists are unanimous in holding that human nature contains an ineradicable core of egoistic passions; that these passions define the central problem of politics; and that statesmanship is dominated by the need to

control this side of human nature.”⁴⁴ Anarchy pervades the global system because of lack of a central authority, hence conflicts and wars do arise as a result of this structural weakness.

Realists hold the view that statesmen act in accordance with their national interest defined in terms of power.⁴⁵ They also argue that the state has one policy at any given time on any particular issue. And the state’s ability to attain certain objectives through various alternatives makes of it a rational actor. On the international scene, realists consider national security to be the most important. Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi maintain “a preoccupation with national security and the state by definition relegates other issues to secondary importance or bans them entirely from the realist agenda.”⁴⁶ They continue with the assertion that realist stability reflects a world bristling with weapons, forever on the verge of violent conflict and war.⁴⁷ There is a focus on actual or potential conflict between state actors and the use of force. The use of force being considered a means to resolve conflicts.

Nevertheless, a new breed of liberal internationalists had a different view of the world. To them the world consists of “multiple actors bound together in a complex web of conflictual and cooperative relations.”⁴⁸ Donnelly holds though, that anarchy is not as

⁴⁴ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.

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⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 29

⁴⁶ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond*, (Third Edition), USA, Allyn and Bacon, 1987, p. 85

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 86

⁴⁸ Ibid

simple or as constraining as realists suggest.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, their view of the political structure being weak, with no authority, is revealed by the deteriorating stages of the disintegration of Somalia.

Siad Barre was an authoritarian ruler who sought to remain in power through force in order to protect his own interests, thus giving credibility to the realist view of society as being composed of individuals driven by their desire to influence others through force or the use of power.

By way of intervention, the international community – through regional actors, the United Nations, the United States, Italy – initiated attempts to restore peace in order to end the humanitarian catastrophe and disaster in Somalia. Therefore, the Djibouti conference was held and brought together major faction leaders in Mogadishu to sign a cease-fire. This intervention was partly humanitarian owing to the lawlessness and famine that resulted from it. The emergency of the situation “led the United States to sponsor an airlift of relief supplies and the United Nations to send peacekeepers.”⁵⁰ However, the United States for instance, had interests to protect in Somalia; interests that were invested in Somalia from 1983 to 1990.⁵¹ This was in support of the Barre regime. An earlier mediation between Siad Barre and the opposition in 1990 failed because not all opposition parties agreed to talk with Barre.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 82

⁵⁰ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, Washington, D. C. The Brookings Institution, 1995, p. 25

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 26

Another attempt that failed was the Djibouti conference held in June and July 1991 that aimed at ending hostilities between the rival factions. But again, this ended up with no better solution because Italy, one of the countries that supported this initiative was perceived as having allies in the Manifesto Group, and was making the attempt of placing them at the highest position after Siad Barre's demise.

Some of the actors in this conflict resolution are merely motivated by the interests they have in the conflict. And this is in line with the realist view of states being concerned with their national security and power politics.

As lawlessness became the order of the day through looting, fighting, the international community was compelled to intervene in Somalia because of the humanitarian problems that arose. International peace and stability were threatened by the growing conflict in Somalia that caused a huge loss of human life and widespread material damage.⁵² Realism helps in linking the interest of the international community to have the conflict resolved in Somalia in order to salvage peace and stability as well as for humanitarian purposes.

However, there are some limitations to this fact. Albeit the international community was aware of the devastating nature of the Somali conflict, some opportunities to have the conflict resolved were missed, thus weakening the realist argument that state interest leads nations to intervene in a conflict.

⁵² Ibid, P. 30

1.9. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION

Secondary and primary data are used in this study. Secondary data includes published and non-published scholarly works, journals, articles, magazines that are available in libraries as well as the internet.

1.10. CHAPTER OUTLINE

This study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one offers the introduction and an overview of the civil war in Somalia. Chapter two provides the background of the conflict and the political system that was in existence before the war. Chapter three looks at efforts that have been made in terms of resolving the conflict. Chapter four analyses track one diplomacy in conflict resolution. Finally, Chapter five is the conclusion that summarizes the study and makes recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0. BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

Introduction

This chapter offers a background to the situation prevailing before the war broke out and led to the fall of Barre and his regime. It gives a brief historical overview of the merging of the two Somalias that were under two different colonial administrations. Economic, social and political consequences that the country has been subjected to are also enumerated.

2.0.1. Background of the conflict

Somalia shares borders with Kenya to the south and east, Ethiopia to the west, the Gulf of Aden to the north and Djibouti to the north west. The Indian Ocean lies to the east. Somalia has a total area of 637 700 square kilometers. In 1997, Somalia had a population estimated at 6 590 325.¹ British Somaliland got her independence from Britain on the 26th of June 1960. South-Italian Somaliland got hers from Italy on the 1st of July 1960. The two Somalias merged on 1st July 1960 giving birth to the Somali Republic.

The Somali are divided into six clans namely: the Hawiye, Isaq, Dir, Darod, Digil and Rahanweyn. These clans are composed of sub-clans; some of whom live in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and others in Somalia itself.

¹ <http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/Somalia.htm>

Despite the merger, there still was division between the North and the South. According to Dualeh, “the differences between the two regions...were irreconcilable”.² Many scholars are of the view that the root causes of the instability in Somalia originate from clannism. These strong differences led to the disagreement among the parties over the distribution of power. This led to the unsuccessful December 1961 rebellion³.

Power was unevenly distributed between the North and the South, the latter being seen to have taken the biggest share of the national cake. The union, though perceived initially as a unifying factor, instead contributed to the deterioration of the already existing bitter feelings of individuals who now focused on their own career grievances.⁴ This bitterness was further accentuated by the general elections held in 1964, which saw an overwhelming victory for the Somali Youth League (SYL) and the transformation of Somalia into a one party state⁵. That electoral outcome generated skepticism and disillusionment. Worse still, the future of the elected government was thrown into jeopardy following the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Sharma’arke on 15th October 1969. The resulting power vacuum was made worse by the absence of the Prime Minister who was absent visiting the USA. This paved the way for a bloodless and popular coup⁶ less than a week later, on the 21st of October 1969.

² Hussein Dualeh, *From Barre to Aideed, Somalia: The Agony of a Nation*, Nairobi, Stellographics Ltd, 1994, p. 17

³ Ibid

⁴ I. A. Samatar, “Under Siege: Blood, Power, and the Somali State” in P. Anyang’ Nyong’o (ed) *Arms and Daggers in the Heart of Africa: Studies on Internal Conflicts*, Nairobi, Academy Science Publishers, 1993, p. 83

⁵ Ibid, p. 85

⁶ Ibid

That putsch brought General Siad Barre to power, who became Head of State and President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council. Contrary to popular expectations, his regime became a dictatorship and was marked by a strong resurgence of corruption and clannism. The popularity of Siad Barre and the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) began to wane in the mid 1970s as a result of their failure to restore democracy.⁷

Furthermore, Barre became unpopular because of the accumulated privileges and the execution of military officers who dared to criticize his leadership following Somalia's defeat in the war with Ethiopia over the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia in 1977-1978. The Somali defeat led to a large influx of refugees from the Ogaden. After the Ogaden defeat, says Paolo Tripodi⁸, clannism became a difficult problem to deal with and ultimately led the country to its present situation. This dictatorial rule led to the formation of opposition parties such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which was formed in 1978 in north-east Somalia after an unsuccessful coup and which sought to topple the Barre regime. The Somali National Movement (SNM), for example, was formed abroad by people with different ideologies whose common goal was to overthrow the Siad Barre regime.⁹ The SNM quickly gained ground by capturing the two cities of Burao and Hargeysa. Hargeysa was destroyed in bombardments by Government forces and 500 000 people were displaced in 1988. Siad Barre's regime continued the manslaughter as accusations mounted against it and demands for his departure increased. Anarchy became the order of the day and

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Paolo Tripodi, *The Colonial Legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu from Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope*, Macmillan Press Ltd, Great Britain, 1999, p. 2

⁹ Op cit, p. 86

lawlessness spread as Barre's popularity continued to decline. This gradually led to his ouster in January 1991. He fled Mogadishu which fell to the rival factions of the USC and took refuge in the south-western Gedo region. Barre's fall plunged Somalia into chaos as other clans sought revenge against the Mareehan, Barre's clan and their Darood allies¹⁰. Despite mediation efforts sponsored by Djibouti, Egypt and Italy, and two conferences of faction leaders in Djibouti in June and July 1991, the political crisis deepened and in November 1991 an all-out war for control of Mogadishu broke out.¹¹ The escalation of violence led to the destruction of Mogadishu and other major cities. Thousands were rendered homeless and forced to flee the lawlessness. Many faced the risk of death from the fighting and the resulting famine. The situation was made worse by the absence of a central authority that had the monopoly of power.

2.1. Government and Political System Prior to the Civil War

Somalia is one of the most homogeneous countries in Africa both ethnically and culturally. It is for this reason that the violence which engulfed the country seems to have come as a surprise to the international community. One of the causes of this incompatibility despite the homogeneity can be attributed to the fact that the population was completely stifled by the regime that was in place during Barre's rule. Another explanation is that of cultural differences between the former British North and Italian South. The North felt marginalised from power and the administration because all the important ministries and other government positions went to the South: Prime Minister, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs including the

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 89

¹¹ The United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996, Op cit, p. 12

Presidency. Post-colonial Somalia was, consequently, characterised by tension between the two territories which culminated in the 1969 coup that brought Siad Barre to power. At the initial stage of his rule, Barre enjoyed a lot of support because of the reputation of the previous government. However, he soon lost that trust following accusations of the same vices his predecessor was alleged to have been guilty of.

Furthermore, the differences between the North and the South were more evident in the appointment of party officials. Owing to nepotism, most of the top officials were people with close ties to Barre's family.¹² This led to increasing resentment. Any attempt to voice dissent was suppressed ruthlessly. There was continued repression of critics and the Barre regime failed to eliminate the fledging opposing. Instead there emerged a number of opposition movements dedicated to Siad Barre's removal from power by force of arms. Among these were SNM and SSDF. "The result was a bloodbath" as Samatar observes correctly "Swiftly, to benefit from the element of surprise, SNM fighters overran many villages until they captured Burao and Hargeysa. ...Hargeysa was the target of aerial bombardment and heavy artillery fire. Within days, the second largest city of Somalia lay in ruins with more than 70 percent destroyed."¹³

The rebellion against the Siad Barre regime started in the North and later spread to Southern Somalia. The resistance, therefore, assumed national proportions.¹⁴ Lawlessness gained ground and people were arrested and executed for either participating in the July

¹² Ibid, p. 86

¹³ Ibid, P. 87

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 88

¹⁵ Ibid. Also see Hussein Ali Dualeh, *From Barre to Aideed, Somalia: The Agony of a Nation*, Nairobi, Stellagraphics Ltd, 1994, P. 30

14, 1989 demonstration or either being suspected to be dissidents.¹⁵ However, the arrests were mainly based on clan origin.

The killings perpetrated by the regime continued to intensify culminating in the July 9, 1990 incident where the Presidential Guards shot dead nearly one hundred civilians¹⁶.

Such acts were undertaken in a bid to muzzle opposition forces and communities perceived to be in favour of the opposition. This slaughter went on unabated until January 26 1991 when Barre's twenty one years of dictatorship were brought to an end. Barre as well as his supporters were forced to flee the country. Victory was claimed by the United Somali Congress (USC) with Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed proclaiming himself head of government and interim President. This move was contested by General Mohamed Farah Aideed, Chairman of a rival USC faction. The collapse of the Barre regime brought with it total anarchy because of the absence of a central authority. In March-April 1991, forces loyal to former President Siad Barre staged an unsuccessful attempt to advance on the capital. More clan fighting followed as the feuding groups sought to exact revenge. Life became increasingly unbearable for the inhabitants of Mogadishu who were

¹⁶Ibid, p. 89

compelled to seek refuge in neighbouring countries to escape the terror of armed gangs.¹⁷

Ali Mahdi's government failed to gain control over the whole of Mogadishu, half of which was controlled by forces loyal to Farah Aideed.

2.2. The Civil War and its Consequences

2.2.1. Introduction

According to Blainey, wars are caused by a clash of aims¹⁸, and are not without consequences on the population of the country that goes to war. In terms of the consequences, Somalia is no exception and the Somali war is characterised by its protracted nature. The consequences have been tremendous as far as the stability¹⁹ and sustainable development of the sub-region²⁰ are concerned. The over a decade civil war in Somalia has had a lot of effects on the political, economic and social life of the country. This section examines these effects.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 90

¹⁸ Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War (3rd Edition)*, New York, The Free Press, 1988, P. 148

¹⁹ Makumi Mwangi, *Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa* (A paper presented at the IRG conference on Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa, Mombasa, Kenya, 6-9 November 1996, P. 2)

²⁰ See Basil BS Nyama, Focus on Somalia in *NEW PEOPLE: The African Church open to the World*, No. 79 July-August 2002, Nairobi, New People Media Centre, Comboni Missionaries, PP. 4-6

2.2.2. Political Consequences

It is argued that 40 percent of the conflicts in Africa are in sub-Saharan Africa.²¹ The Somali conflict falls within this percentage with huge consequences that affect peace and stability in the country in particular and in Africa as a whole.

Politically, this conflict has greatly damaged relations between Somalia and the international community. However, despite every effort being made to end the conflict, it is being fuelled by both regional and international political and economic interests.²²

The widespread violence led to the closure of the United Nations' offices in Mogadishu and evacuation of UN and other international personnel engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance.

Somalia lost credibility in the eyes of the international community due to the high rate of corruption and nepotism that characterised Barre's rule. Under him, certain clans and sub-clans were more privileged than others. Samatar observes that: "... nearly all of Barre's most sensitive appointments came from his immediate blood relations and others related through marriage."²³

²¹ Editorial: *Natural Resources and Civil Wars: Loathsome connection*, Ibid, P. 1

²² Ibid

²³ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, Washington, D. C. The Brookings Institution, 1995, p. 19

The political scene was thus marred by violent struggle for power²⁴, because of massive repression. The result was erosion state institutions which led to the total collapse of the central government.²⁵ There was gross violation of human rights and man-made starvation, and a refusal on the part of the various factions to cooperate to ending the hostilities that brought a humanitarian catastrophe. This, therefore, undermined Somalia's relations with the international community because the latter found it difficult to continue with its efforts to resolve the conflict because of the evident lack of political will by the protagonists.²⁶

This subsequently resulted in the division of Somalia as the Somali National Movement (SNM) declared the north independent in May 1991 and renamed it the new Somaliland Republic.²⁷ The step taken by the SNM contributed to the disintegration of Somalia as a nation. Somalia's political framework then turned into several clan-based entities some of which are ruled by warlords.²⁸ Somalia's case remains exceptional because of the absence of a functioning government structure.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 15

²⁵ Ibid, P. 19

²⁶ The United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996, Op cit, p. 87

²⁷ Ibid, P. 23 See also I. A. Samatar, "Under Siege: Blood, Power, and the Somali State" in P. Anyang' Nyong'o (ed) *Arms and Daggers in the Heart of Africa: Studies on Internal Conflicts*, Nairobi, Academy Science Publishers, 1993, p. 90

²⁸ War-torn Societies Project in Somalia, *Somalia*, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland or <http://www.unrisd.org/wsp/>

2.2.3. Economic Consequences

The effects of the Somali war spread across all levels of the society. The economy was no exception because when Barre's autocratic regime collapsed in 1991, the result was one of political vacuum and the collapse of the economy. Somalia was the worst humanitarian tragedy since the Ethiopia famine of 1984-1985.²⁹

Inflation exacerbated these economic problems. And since different factions were supported by different countries and or organisations, the conflict has been prolonged. These problems accentuated because funds were redirected to fuel the conflict.

Most of Somalia's land is good for raising livestock. And before the war that displaced the population, "about a quarter of Somalia's people were settled farmers, growing sorghum, maize, sugar cane and bananas".³⁰ The country was traditionally an exporter of livestock in spite of the structural food deficit. Somalia is vulnerable to drought that causes famine. But it is the war that plunged the country into famine since "the huge displacement of people led to a massive disruption in food production."³¹ Besides, the interriverine area that contains the country's richest agricultural land and serves as its breadbasket was the hardest hit.

²⁹ Andrew S. Natsios, 'Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos' in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (eds.) *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, Westview Press, 1997, p. 77

³⁰ The United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996, Op cit, p. 13

³¹ Ibid, p. 14

Somalia is a pastoral nation with over 80 percent of livestock exported in 1988.³² Sheep, cattle and camels are the main source of wealth and income. The economy also relies on the export of bananas. And most of this arable land lies between the Shabelle and Juba rivers.³³ The economy declined and experienced crisis as politics turned into violence and chaos. Prices fell and there was lack of growth in the quantity of animals exported.³⁴ This had serious repercussions on the state and most people because terms of trade for producers diminished³⁵, and foreign exchange reduced tremendously.

These economic hardships led the country to adopt the Structural Adjustment Program in 1981.³⁶ Inflation recorded was between 500 percent and 800 percent annually.³⁷ The collapse of the economy caused mass unemployment and a dramatic drop³⁸ in family income severely reduced available funds and diminished the purchasing power of many families to feed themselves.

Inter-clan reprisals led to the destruction of economic structures. This collapse of the economy was one of the causes of the unrest in Mogadishu that was on the increase. Somalia is also more vulnerable to natural calamities because of its natural environment.

³² I. A. Samatar, "Under Siege: Blood, Power, and the Somali State" in P. Anyang' Nyong'o (ed) *Arms and Daggers in the Heart of Africa: Studies on Internal Conflicts*, Nairobi, Academy Science Publishers, 1993, P. 76

³³ The United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996, New York, Department of Public Information, 1996, P. 13

³⁴ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, Washington, D. C. The Brookings Institution, 1995, p. 16

³⁵ Ibid

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ Ibid, P. 17

³⁸ Andrew S. Natsios, 'Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos' in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (eds.) *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, Westview Press, 1997, p. 82

However, famine in Somalia was largely caused by warfare. Many people were displaced; thus causing a huge influx into such southern cities as Kismayo and Baidoa.³⁹

Furthermore, the conflict led to a lot of revenge through killing of livestock belonging to rival clans and the pollution of wells. There were huge losses of livestock because of the collapse of veterinary services.⁴⁰ The situation clearly called for relief supplies by the UN and other bilateral aid agencies and NGOs⁴¹, in order to curb the severe famine that raged more especially the south where, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “40 percent of people were severely malnourished and another 50 percent were moderately malnourished.”⁴²

2.2.4. Social Consequences

The then UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his introduction to “the United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996”, admits that the conflict in Somalia constitutes “one of the most challenging, arduous undertakings in the Organisation’s 50-year history.”⁴³ After all government structures collapsed, the Somali war caused a devastating famine⁴⁴ and led to the deaths of at least 300 000 people.⁴⁵ Political instability in Somalia dates back to the 1960s⁴⁶ and was further exacerbated by Somalia’s defeat in the war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden in 1977 – 1978, when a lot of refugees sought refuge thus

³⁹The United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996, New York, Department of Public Information, 1996, P. 14

⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴¹ Ibid

⁴² Ibid, P. 15

⁴³ Ibid, P. 3

⁴⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶ Hussein Dualeh, *From Barre to Aideed, Somalia: The Agony of a Nation*, Nairobi, Stellographics Ltd, 1994, p. 17

destabilising the existing clan demography.⁴⁷ The social fabric, at that time, was marred by instability.

Therefore, as the conflict became more developed, food production was reduced⁴⁸, and economic and social resources were redirected to military expenditure.”⁴⁹ This conflict has had a great deal of negative effects on the population, some of which have been forced to flee the country, others losing their lives in the process because they are caught in the middle of armed rival gangs. Many died as a result of the conflict and many others died because of the drought since the chaos made it impossible to deliver food. Civil war and drought in Africa inevitably produce starvation because access problems impede relief efforts.⁵⁰

Again, the population suffered looting and banditry because of the lack of a central government. After the fall of Siad Barre, General Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi saw themselves as heir-apparent and being the rightful persons to lead the country. This resulted in frequent and protracted clashes between the two factions. For example, the four-month fighting between the two forces for control of Mogadishu in November 1991 left 25 000 civilians dead⁵¹ and most of the population without basic services.⁵²

According to the UN report:

⁴⁷ This is also discussed in the United Nations document titled: *The United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996*, op cit, p. 3

⁴⁸ Ibid, P. 11

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ Andrew S. Natsios, 'Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos' in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (eds.), *Op cit*, p. 79

⁵¹ *The United Nations and Somalia*, Op cit, P. 12

⁵² Ibid

“health services were rudimentary: only 27 percent of the population had access to them in 1988 – 1991, compared to an average of 81 percent for all developing countries. Only 60 percent had access to safe drinking-water and only 17 percent to sanitation.”⁵³

The intensity of the fighting led the population to attempt to escape the violence. This forced them into refugee camps where they were compelled to live under poor sanitary conditions that favoured epidemics. Women were subjected to violence especially when unaccompanied and traditional family ties were broken in the chaos.

The shortage of food is explained by the fact that rival clans, in order to exact revenge, plundered grain and seed stocks⁵⁴, and also killed livestock and polluted wells of the opposing clans.⁵⁵ “This called for an additional pledge of 145 000 metric tons of food aid by the U. S. (the United States had already delivered 88 000 metric tons), the dispatch of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to the region, and a US military airlift of relief food to urban areas in the southern part of the country.”⁵⁶

The situation was aggravated when armed bandits prevented humanitarian aid from reaching the suffering and starving people. Families have been destabilised with the dispersion of their members. An estimated 500 000 Somalis⁵⁷ fled in order to save their lives. The United Nations did its best to reach those in need. But their efforts were

⁵³ Ibid, P. 13

⁵⁴ Ibid, P. 14

⁵⁵ Ibid

⁵⁶ Andrew S. Natsios, ‘Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos’ in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (eds.), *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, Westview Press, 1997, p. 82

⁵⁷ The United Nations and Somalia, Op cit, P. 15

sometimes thwarted by the violence. Emergency relief programmes⁵⁸, however had to be maintained in order to salvage the population, particularly women and children who are most vulnerable, from further damage.

2.2.5. Conclusion

This chapter has offered an overview of the Somali war and its consequences politically, economically and socially. Barre's ouster left a political vacuum that led to the disintegration of the state and the collapse of all state apparatus and with it all its institutions.

This absence of the government and its organs led to the deterioration of the political situation and life in general in Somalia and the Somali community had to resort to clan identities⁵⁹ - that would provide them with security which was lacking because of the state in which the country found itself - and allegiance in order to survive. That was the major reason why the Somali society got polarised along clan lines.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹ Life and Peace Institute: *LPI in Somalia: 7 years later*, in *New Routes, A Journal of Peace Research and Action*, Volume 4 Number 4, 1999, P. 20

⁶⁰ Ibid

CHAPTER THREE

TRACK ONE CONFLICT RESOLUTION EFFORTS IN SOMALIA

3.0. Introduction

Diplomacy is the peaceful interaction between nation-states. Diplomacy was, traditionally, carried out by government officials known as diplomats, who undertook the negotiation of treaties and other international agreements. These negotiations are both very formal and informal. Formal diplomacy is known as Track one diplomacy and informal diplomacy as Track Two diplomacy. Owing to some of the unsuccessful attempts made by traditional diplomacy in trying to resolve international conflicts, more and more attention is being given to track two diplomacy. This is diplomacy carried out by citizens whereby international negotiations are carried out by private citizens, rather than official diplomats. This type of diplomacy is, however, not a replacement for track one, but rather a supplement to it. Track two approaches can precede official negotiations, laying the groundwork and establishing a certain level of trust between people; sometimes they occur simultaneously.

In the case of Somalia, a number of interventions by the international community in an attempt to redress the situation of lawlessness and massive human rights abuses have been carried out. They range from conferences to peacekeeping missions. The UN acknowledged that its mission in Somalia was one of the most difficult in the history of the organisation.¹

¹ See the introduction by the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *The United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VIII, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, p. 3

The looming humanitarian crisis prompted the international community to intervene in an attempt to safeguard the millions of Somalis threatened by the war and famine. The most immediate concern was attainment of a cease-fire to enable humanitarian relief supplies to reach the many civilians caught up in the conflict. Beyond that, the international community hoped to assist the contending factions find a negotiated settlement which would result in establishment of a new government and other institutions of state. To this end, a number of conferences were convened.

“In 1992 and 1993, several major UN conferences on Somalia took place in Ethiopia.”² All these efforts were intended to bring peace and reconciliation to the population which had been living in conflict. Another aim of these efforts was to help restore a central authority that would help rebuild the economy and also make life bearable for the inhabitants of the country. Success of these efforts would have helped bring back refugees who fled the country during intensive fighting and see to their reintegration into society. Again violations of human rights would be monitored closely in order to ensure their curtailment and possible elimination.

This is the role of the UN - which had both diplomatic initiatives and a peacekeeping mission - the US, regional organisations, international organisations and some individual state actors tried to play for the restoration of civil society in Somalia. Some of these efforts were unsuccessful and others were.

² Heinrich Wolfgang, *Building The Peace: Experience of Collaborative Peace building in Somalia, 1993-1996*, Life and Peace Institute, Uppsala, 1997, P. XVI

This chapter seeks to give an account of track one diplomacy efforts in restoring peace in and reconstructing Somalia.

3.1. THE UNITED NATIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOMALIA

Among the track one actors was the UN. Though it was a difficult and challenging task, the UN did try by mediating diplomatically and by establishing a peacekeeping force, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II). Though there was no model for the UN to follow in its efforts to bring humanitarian assistance and peace to the people of Somalia³, it made a lot of efforts in order to see peace return to that country.

3.1.1. Diplomatic Initiatives

Early in January 1992, Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali sent his Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. James O. C. Jonah to Mogadishu on a fact finding mission. He met with General Farah Aideed and Mr. Ali Mahdi. The aim of this meeting was to bring about a cease-fire in the capital and securing access by international relief agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations to civilians caught in the conflict.⁴ This was their first contact and little progress was made because battles continued and gunmen bombarded the airport with artillery shell during Under Secretary General Jonah's visit. This was however the first time that both factions did declare their support for a United Nations role in bringing about national reconciliation.⁵

³ *The United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VIII, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, p. 5

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 17

⁵ *Ibid*

On the 23rd of January 1992 the UN Security Council adopted its first resolution on Somalia, Resolution 733 (1992) in which it urged all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, promote reconciliation and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This followed an appeal by Somalia's Prime Minister, Mr. Omer Arteh Qhalib on the 15th January 1992 to consider the situation in Somalia.⁶

Other consultations were convened upon invitation of the Secretary-General and this time, were held at the UN Headquarters in New York during the week of 10th February 1992. Though Ali Mahdi and General Farah Aideed were invited they did not turn up. Instead they both sent representatives. Other interlocutors were the OAU, the League of Arab States, and the Organisation of Islamic Conference. On the 14th of February the two factions signed pledges committing themselves to an immediate cessation of hostilities and to the maintenance of a cease-fire in Mogadishu. During the talks and following the signing of the pledges, hostilities continued in Mogadishu.

A four-day meeting was held from the 29th of February to the 3rd of March 1992 comprised of a joint delegation led by the Envoy for Somalia, Mr. Jonah who arrived in Mogadishu for intensive negotiations. Mr. Jonah managed to persuade Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aideed to agree on the implementation of a cease-fire "by means of a United Nations monitoring mechanism."⁷ These agreements were signed by General Aideed on the 27th of March and by Mr. Ali Mahdi on the 28th of March. An ad hoc committee was

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Ibid, p. 18

established to prepare for a national reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa on the 15th of March 1993.

The Preparatory meeting on national reconciliation was preceded by talks that were held on the 4th of January 1993 at Addis Ababa and chaired by the UN Secretary-General. The interlocutors were the OAU, the League of Arab States, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn of Africa. All the main political factions attended except the Somali National Movement (SNM).⁸

The outcome of this meeting was a declaration of an immediate cease-fire. There was an agreement for the establishment of a cease-fire monitoring group, the encampment and disarmament of the militias, the release of prisoners of war and the free movement of Somalis throughout the country.⁹

The UN decided to send twenty-five (25) observers to each part of the city - that is, North of Mogadishu controlled by Ali Mahdi's faction and South of Mogadishu controlled by General Aideed's faction – as mechanisms of monitoring the cease-fire.

In March 1993, a National Reconciliation Conference was held in Ethiopia. The participants of the said conference were the warring factions and other Somali groups, the Standing Committee of the countries of the Horn of Africa, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organisation of the Islamic

⁸ *The United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VIII, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, p. 17

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 39

Conference and the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries. This resulted in the Addis Ababa Agreement in which fifteen (15) political movements agreed to put an end to armed conflict on the one hand and reconcile their differences through peaceful means and seek to establish a transitional governing mechanism.

All fifteen (15) main factions were present at the conference but the SNM sent observers. Also present at the conference were clan leaders, leaders of community and women's organisations and prominent representatives of the Somali civil society. The UN was represented by Mr. Lansana Kouyaté of Guinea and the Deputy Special Representative for Somalia. President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia played a major role in facilitating the negotiations.¹⁰ The agreement that was reached at the Conference on National Reconciliation included the establishment of a Transitional National Council.

A meeting of the representatives of the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) or the Group of 12 and the Somali National Alliance (SNA) was held on the invitation of the Ethiopian Government and with the support of UNOSOM II in Addis Ababa from the 2nd to the 11th of December 1993

In March 1994 a Consultation was convened in Nairobi by the Secretary-General's Special Representative. This was as a result of the Secretary General's attempt at finding a lasting political solution. Participants at the consultation were leaders of the main Somali political organisations, namely General Aideed, Chairman of the USC/SNA and Mr. Ali Mahdi (Spokesman of the Group of 12) and a number of elders. This meeting

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 46

was able to bring together political leaders who had not spoken to each other for a long time. A proposal to have a national Government of Somalia established was made. This led to the Nairobi Declaration signed on the 24th of March 1994 in which primary antagonists in the Somali conflict were asked to cease-fire, disarm voluntarily and find a peaceful settlement to the conflict. This, however, did not yield the expected result because the parties failed to honour their commitments.

3.1.2. Peacekeeping Efforts

The Charter gives the UN the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Under Chapter VI, the UN employs peaceful methods to settle conflicts. Chapter VII gives it the mandate to use force under collective security. Peacekeeping though popular, is not explicitly provided for in the Charter. The establishment of UNOSOM was consistent with the UN's determination to maintain peace by providing the military personnel to carry out such peacekeeping operations. And the Security Council always reasserts itself to be the principal source of control when it comes to international decision-making in the field of peace and security.¹¹

But in the case of Somalia, the legal basis for the application of the UN Charter was annulled¹², according to Agostinho Zacarias, because there wasn't any government or a legitimate representative of Somalia that would have justified the UN's intervention. However, the UN did intervene on humanitarian grounds despite that absence of a

¹⁰ Henrikson, A. K., 'The Growth of Regional Organisations and the Role of the United Nations', in Fawcett, L. and Hurrell, A. (eds.) *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organisation and International Order*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, P. 122

¹¹ Agostinho Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping*, I. B. Tauris Publishers, London. New York, 1996, P. 33

government. And this is consistent with the Charter. "Peacekeeping operations are part of the UN's collective responsibility."¹³ The role of the Security Council shows how decentralised international peace and security are.

The UN peacekeeping mission began with the establishment of UNOSOM I on the 24th April 1992 upon a resolution adopted by the UN Security Council: resolution 751 (1992).¹⁴ The Secretary General was requested to deploy 50 unarmed military observers, who would monitor the cease-fire and 500 infantry - consisted of Pakistani peacekeepers - to provide security for relief personnel.¹⁵ Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun, from Algeria, was then appointed by the Secretary General as a Special Representative to coordinate the organisation's peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts. His task was also to encourage the different factions to find a peaceful solution to their conflict.¹⁶ UNOSOM I was a peacekeeping mission though the primary purpose was to enable the delivery of emergency assistance to the civilian population. UNOSOM I encountered a lot of challenges which impeded its functioning. One of these problems was the 3rd March cease-fire, which involved only two parties in Mogadishu.¹⁷ Another one was the shifting of alliances among disparate factions.¹⁸ Though the Secretary General did propose the authorisation of the Security Council of additional troops, this will not materialise owing

¹² Ibid, P. 35

¹³ *The United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VIII, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, P. 19

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 20

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 25

¹⁷ Ibid

to the refusal of some faction leaders to approve the deployment of peacekeepers.¹⁹ This threw UNOSOM I into jeopardy because it was unable to stop the escalating violence that threatened to degenerate into total anarchy.

The UN Security Council established UNOSOM II under resolution 814 (1993) as the first peace-enforcement operation under Chapter VII of the Charter, that formally took over from the United Task Force (UNITAF) on the 4th of May 1993 because it became obvious that UNITAF could not hand over operational responsibility to a new United Nations operation mandated for traditional peacekeeping as earlier envisaged.²⁰ UNOSOM II had the mandate to ensure compliance of the Addis Ababa Agreement by all factions, to see to it that conflict does not recur and to protect civilians and UN agencies alike. UNOSOM II also had the mandate of “assisting in the process of national reconciliation, in the rehabilitation of Somalia’s institutions and economy, and in the re-establishment of the nation’s police forces.”²¹ It also had a broader mandate to cover the whole of Somalia and was endowed with enforcement powers. UNOSOM II’s mandate included disarmament, which was to be enforceable should factions fail to comply with the Addis Ababa agreements of January 1993.²² The Security Council also had on its agenda the assistance in the process of national reconciliation and in the rehabilitation of political institutions and the economy. UNOSOM II had a very large contingent with

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 27. Also see Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Somalia, proposing the deployment of four additional security units, each with 750 troops, in Bossasso, Berbera, Kismayo and the south-west.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 42

²⁰ *The United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VIII, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, p. 40

²¹ Ibid, p. 42. Also see the Security Council’s resolution on the size and mandate of UNOSOM II, giving UNOSOM II responsibility under Chapter VII of the Charter for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia, after a transition from UNITAF.

thirty countries contributing troops; some of which were the United States, which contributed most of the logistical units²³(3 017), and Germany which contributed a contingent for non-combat duties²⁴ (1 726). Other countries that contributed were Australia (48), Bangladesh (945), Belgium (948), Botswana (326), Canada (4), Egypt (1 100), France (1 107), Greece (102), India (4 937), Ireland (79), Italy (2 576), Kuwait (156), Malaysia (871), Morocco (1 424), Nepal (311), New Zealand (43), Nigeria (614), Norway (130), Pakistan (5 005), Republic of Korea (252), Romania (236), Saudi Arabia (757), Sweden (148), Tunisia (142), Turkey (320), United Arab Emirates (662), Zimbabwe (895).²⁵

This breakdown shows how reluctant some of the countries were as regards the deployment of their troops. This is because of the high cost and high risk involved in peacekeeping. And therefore will have to convince their public.

Just as UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II was not without challenges in the exercise of its mandate because of the way it was structured. The United States had different forces (Joint Task Force, Quick Reaction Force, Army Rangers) who reported to different authorities and not to a central command, thus diffusing responsibility.²⁶ There was therefore lack of effective coordination between the different forces. Another challenge

²² Ibid, p. 44

²³ Ibid, p. 44

²⁴ Ibid, p. 56, See map of UNOSOM II deployment as of November 1993. The deployment of UNOSOM II attained its peak in November 1993 with 29 000 troops. The Joint Task Force and Quick Reaction Force comprised an additional 17 700 troops. Also see the breakdown of the composition of UNOSOM II on page 328.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 45

was the attack on UNOSOM II troops. On the 5th of June 1993 Pakistani soldiers²⁷ came under attack and twenty-four of them killed and an additional fifty-six wounded when the inspection of the storage sites for heavy weapons was carried out in spite of the objection of one faction security officers. Another incident was attempts by UNOSOM II to disarm USC/SNA militia and Admiral Howe's call to have General Farah Aideed arrested and detained. This was a difficult undertaking since USC/SNA forces were well armed and resorted to guerilla tactics.²⁸ In one such incident, on 17th June 1993, five Moroccan soldiers lost their lives, two Pakistanis also were killed on the 28th June 1993 and three Italians on the 2nd of July.²⁹ Attacks and ambushes on United Nations personnel were on the increase during this period. On the 8th of August 1993, four US soldiers were killed and on the 5th of September SNA gunmen killed seven Nigerian soldiers.³⁰

All these acts endangered the cease-fire agreement signed on the 27th March 1993 in Addis Ababa and jeopardised UNOSOM II's mandate. What further aggravated the exercise of UNOSOM II's mandate was the killing of eighteen United States soldiers on the 3rd of October 1993. A helicopter pilot was also captured and a dead American soldier was dragged in the streets of south Mogadishu.³¹ This led President Clinton to announce the US' withdrawal of all its combat forces on the 7th of October 1993. Following his announcement, many European Governments also decided to withdraw their contingents. UNOSOM II subsequently lost most of its "best-equipped" contingents and saw its strength of 29 300 troops being reduced: more than 9 000 troops were pulled out, together

²⁶ Ibid, p. 50

²⁸ Ibid, p. 52

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Ibid, p. 53

³¹ Ibid, p. 61

with 17 700 troops of the Joint Task Force and 1 350 troops of the Quick Reaction Force. This impaired UNOSOM II to really carry out the mandate it set out to undertake.

Owing to the above-mentioned constraints and the frustrations encountered by UNOSOM II, and also as a result of the non-cooperation on the part of the Somali parties, the Security Council decided to terminate UNOSOM II's mandate. However, the mandate was extended under resolution 946 (1994) until the 31st of March 1995 to facilitate political reconciliation. They withdrew in March 1995. And, renewed fighting broke out around Mogadishu which led agencies such as the World Food Programme to close its operations in Kismayo and Belet Weyne.

From the above one can deduce that, though the UN tried to have peace restored in Somalia, it had to withdraw its troops without having fulfilled the main reason behind the deployment of its troops.

3.2. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOMALIA

The Somali tragedy evoked considerable international outcry. The overriding comment and sentiments were that there existed an immediate need for the international community to intervene and halt the humanitarian catastrophe and massive carnage that were savaging and ravaging the country. It was against the backdrop of these nightmarish events in Somalia that the US government under President George Bush decided to send in the Marines to assist in halting the Somali mayhem.

The first batch of 1 800 US marines were dispatched to Somalia on 9th December 1992. The Bush administration announced on 20th November 1992 that it would send 30 000 US troops³² to Somalia. This was called the United Task Force (UNITAF), also known as 'Operation Restore Hope'. UNITAF had the mandate to create a secure environment for the delivery of international relief aid to the starving Somali public and subsequently hand over operations to the UN peacekeeping missions.³³

This move was important because the warring factions failed to allow safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. The US then agreed to lead the peace-enforcement³⁴ operation upon the Security Council's authorisation. The US had the largest contingent in this operation and the multinational force was mandated to use force where necessary to create a secure and an enabling environment for safe delivery of humanitarian assistance.

UNITAF consisted of approximately 37 000 troops³⁵ of which the US accounted for 27 000. The operation was able to restore a secure environment and between December 1992 and January 1993, World Food Programme (WFP) ships docked safely in Mogadishu with supplies³⁶, and relief workers were no longer attacked as they used to be. Security improved considerably and this enabled the UN to revert to its original peacekeeping role.

³² Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, *The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy*, HAAN Publishing, London, 1996, p. 130

³³ *The United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VIII, op cit, p. 40

³⁴ Ibid, p. 30

³⁴ Ibid, p. 34

³⁵ Ibid, p. 35

With the arrival of UNITAF in Mogadishu, General Aideed and Mr. Ali Mahdi met for the first time to reach an agreement leading to a cease-fire. Though 'Operation Restore Hope' only covered the central and southern regions, it had an impact on all of Somalia.³⁷

This Operation was meant to intervene on humanitarian grounds. But, the crisis in Somalia required more than humanitarian relief. The issue of national reconciliation was also to be taken into consideration in order to rebuild the nation.

In spite of some noticeable successes, neither UNITAF, which had a temporary peace-enforcement mandate nor UNOSOM II, a peace-keeping mission, were in a position to stop armed militia from entering and interfering with the fragile situation of the country and with the economy. This is partly due to the rather short mandate that UNITAF was given, which extended from December 9, 1992 to May 4, 1993.³⁸

The UNITAF operation, which was spearheaded by the USA had a lot of loopholes because this is a country whose troops were trained for combat and not peacekeeping.³⁹ Again, some of the criticism has been that the US lacked experience in peacekeeping. Its combat units were not ideal for traditional peacekeeping and their refusal to serve under UN command created problems in terms of coordination of

³⁶ Martin R. Gonzglass, 'The Restoration of The Somali Justice System' in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (eds.) *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, Westview Press, 1997, p. 20

³⁷ Kevin M. Kennedy, 'The Relationship Between the Military and Humanitarian Organisations in Operation Restore Hope', *Ibid*, p. 99

³⁸ Agostinho Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping*, I. B. Tauris Publishers, London. New York, 1996, p. 70

peacekeeping operations. There were, therefore differences between the UN government and the UN. The Secretary-General's over-interpretation of the mandate made things worse because the US kept insisting disarming the factions was never part of the mandate as was national reconstruction. Furthermore, some factions considered UNITAF as partial and therefore refrained from co-operation with the force, hence the non-implementation of the UNITAF main task.⁴⁰ Following the humiliation imputed on the USA that was characterised by a video recording of a captured helicopter pilot and footage of a dead American being dragged on the streets of south Mogadishu, President Clinton announced the withdrawal of the USA combat forces from Somalia by the 31st March 1994⁴¹ and UNITAF formally handed over its operation to UNOSOM II on the 4th May 1993.

3.3. OTHER ACTORS

3.3.1. REGIONAL ACTORS

3.3.1.1. THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)

One of the regional organisations which should have spearheaded matters of conflict resolution on the African continent was the OAU, which unfortunately had a problem as regards intra-state conflict management and that of capacity. Part of OAU's problems emanated from its Charter. The OAU, according to Article 3(2), was forbidden from interfering in the internal affairs of states.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 70

⁴⁰ *The United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VIII, op cit. p. 61

The situation in Somalia, however, raised a lot of concern. This led the Secretary-General of the organisation to call on the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, for a prompt consideration by the Council of the Somali crisis in December 1991.⁴² After Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali took office in January 1991, he convened a consultation meeting in New York with senior officials from the League of Arab States, the OAU and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. This preparatory meeting, held a day before consultations with representatives of the warring factions in Mogadishu, considered what the way forward was going to be in achieving durable peace in Somalia. All parties present showed their determination to act jointly towards achieving an agreement for a cease-fire and for the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia.⁴³ Because it was clear to them that the war in Somalia constituted a threat to peace and stability to the Horn of Africa Region. This consultation aimed at ending the heavy loss of life and material damage that resulted from the hostilities.

At the end of the discussions held with the two Somali factions, an agreement was reached as to the commitment to the cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire.⁴⁴

The Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, President Abdou Diouf, put forth the idea of “convening an international peace conference on

⁴² Ibid, p. 92

⁴³ *The United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996*. See Joint Communiqué dated 12 February 1992 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and senior officials of the League of Arab States, the Organisation of African Unity and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on the implementation of Security Council resolution 733 (1992), p. 199

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 121. See Joint Communiqué issued on the 14th February 1992 at the conclusion of discussions between the UN, and representatives of the LAS, OAU and OIC.

Somalia under the auspices of the United Nations and in cooperation with the OAU, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States, the Standing Committee of the States of the Horn of Africa on Somalia. ” And this was welcomed by the General UN Assembly on the of 18th of December 1992.⁴⁵

The OAU was also present at the Reconciliation Conference held in Ethiopia in March 1993, which included the factions and other Somali groups, and also the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn of Africa, the Organisation of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries. This conference yielded the Addis Ababa Agreement⁴⁶ which saw the participation of fifteen Somali political movements who agreed to put an end to armed conflict, under the UN supervision, reconcile their differences through peaceful means and seek to establish a transitional governing mechanism.

This article 3(2) of the OAU Charter might have been misinterpreted by member states since it does not state categorically that member countries must not intervene in internal conflicts. It rather calls on "member states to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of states, but it does not prohibit the organisation from so involving itself."⁴⁷ With the conflict in Rwanda, it was clearly demonstrated that the OAU and some individual members have started revisiting the issue of conflict management on the continent. This

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 94

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 6

⁴⁷ Makumi Mwangi, *Who will Bell the Cat?, Article 3(2) of the OAU Charter and the Crisis of OAU Conflict Management*, Kent Papers in Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, Series 4, No. 7, 1995, p. 4

shows that there is an attempt to shift from the adherence to the interpretation of Article 3 (2) to espousing new trends on the international political scene.

One major problem prohibiting the OAU from effectively playing an active role in the management of conflicts, is the question of capacity. Member states are often not in the position to afford their subscription fees. Thus making it difficult for them to spearhead conflict resolution. This went a long way to limit the OAU's efforts with regard to the Somali conflict in particular and to conflicts in Africa as a whole.

Some proposals to put an OAU conflict management mechanism in place were made in the "Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World in July 1990"⁴⁸ at the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. These proposals sought to establish some bodies within the organisation that are to mainly deal with conflicts and their management. However, they were not accepted.⁴⁹

In March 1992, a Division of Conflict Management was established by the OAU to be involved in conflict prevention, management and resolution. And this was adopted in a Declaration by the Heads of State and Government. At this Consultation meeting by the OAU and International Peace Academy (IPA), held in Addis Ababa from 19th to 21st May 1993, it was agreed that peacekeeping should be left to the United Nations but the OAU was to focus on peacemaking.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 7

⁴⁹ Ibid

The tendency of sticking to Article 3(2) of the OAU Charter is gradually fading away as the African Union in its Constitution Article 4(h), states "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity."⁵⁰

3.3.1.2. The European Commission's Initiative

Naivasha and Nakuru (Kenya) hosted two seminars under the auspices of the European Commission (EC), all with the aim of finding a peaceful solution to the Somali conflict. The first seminar took place in Naivasha between the 20th and 22nd June 1995 where intellectuals were invited to discuss the results of a study conducted by a team of consultants led by Professors James Mayall and Ian Lewis entitled: *A Study of Decentralised Political Structures for Somalia: A Menu of Options*. The Participants at this seminar opted for decentralisation and institutionalised power sharing as a precondition for the return of peace in Somalia.

The Nakuru seminar was the second attempt at bringing peace to Somalia. At the seminar, more emphasis was laid on community leaders. The EC made it a point of bringing in community leaders, clan leaders, intellectuals, religious leaders, women representatives, former ambassadors, government ministers and a prime minister. Present at this seminar were Mr. Felix Moshia who then was Representative of the UN Secretary General and also head of the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), Mr. Singurd Illing, the EC's Special Envoy to Somalia and Mr. Arend Pieper, the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at the Royal Netherlands Embassy who represented the European Union (EU)

⁵⁰ Constitutive Act of The African Union, p. 6

presidency. Three important issues were discussed in Nakuru: decentralised political structures, economic development in a decentralised state and security in a decentralised state. This seminar resulted in the formation of two committees that were to mainly follow-up the findings and recommendations of the workshops and to ensure the continuation of the project.

President Moi of Kenya was represented by the Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner, Mr. Mohamed Yusuf Haji. Participants were officially received and President Moi's concerns about the situation in Somalia were conveyed to them. At the end of the second seminar, participants came up with what they called '*Nakuru Peace Appeal*'. This was a call to all Somalis to put an end to the fighting and to rebuild their state. They also appealed to the international community to keep on facilitating efforts made by Somalis to re-establish peace and to help with the provision of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development assistance. Finally, President Moi met with participants where the Nakuru Peace Appeal was officially launched.

Participants at both workshops did express the need of having follow-up workshops in Somalia. And this request was heeded which resulted in three workshops conducted in Somali towns of Mogadishu, Bosasso and Hargeisa.

3.3.2. SUB-REGIONAL ACTORS

There have been a lot of responses to the conflict in Somalia. Among these, is the response from sub-regional organisations. Peace and reconciliation efforts were made in Addis Ababa which were facilitated by Ethiopia “under the auspices of other organisations and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).”⁵¹

The Somali peace process is a result of the involvement of the IGAD which is made up of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan and Somalia. It has played a leading role in international efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Somali conflict. There have been many IGAD sponsored initiatives, one of which led to the peace conference held in Djibouti in 2000 where the Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed. However, only few warlords recognised the government. An idea of widening the TNG to include opposition warlords in a national unity cabinet received little backing in December 2001.⁵² The TNG therefore has little grip on the country for it only controls parts of the Somali capital Mogadishu and little portions elsewhere in Somalia. However, a peace pact on national unity government signed in Nakuru, Kenya by some of its members led the coalition to fracture. New attempts made to establish a new authority had mixed results. And the armed factions and warlords still have much of the power.

Recent efforts by IGAD to mediate peace talks sparked off a lot of controversies once again. The National Reconciliation Conference, which initially started off in Eldoret –

⁵¹ Ibrahim Farah, Abdirashid Hussein and Jeremy Lind, *Deegan, Politics and War in Somalia* in Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman (eds.), *Scarcity And Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts*, Institute For Security Studies, South Africa, 2002, p. 327

⁵² <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/em/fr/-/2/ti/africa/1747697.stm>

Kenya - had to be moved to Mbagathi, Nairobi, following a number of problems. The change of venue angered many of the delegates who complained about the unsuitability of Mbagathi, citing the presence of wild pigs as one of the reasons. The number of participants was another source of controversy. These misunderstandings have caused the discussions not to achieve any progress for four months now and agreements to stop fighting are still violated. Organisers have been trying to reduce the number of delegates as 1 000 people turned up when 300 were invited. Many attempts to broker peace in Somalia have failed since President Siad Barre was ousted in 1991. The present National Reconciliation Process under the chairmanship of Kenya has dragged on for more than one year. And there is no clear indication that an agreement is in sight. It nevertheless is one of the most determined attempts to find a negotiated settlement.

No definite agreement has been reached to date. In fact, some of the parties involved in the peace talks, at some point, have been pulling out of the whole process, thus making it quite difficult to reach a peaceful agreement. Individual members of IGAD, namely Ethiopia, have been making frantic efforts in the Somali war because of the stake they hold in the country. This led Ethiopia to sponsor the 1996 Conference.

The talks being held in Nairobi have been put into jeopardy once again as a result of the withdrawal of the President of Puntland, Abdullahi Yusuf in July 2003.

3.3.3. INDIVIDUAL STATE ACTORS

3.3.3.1. President Gelle's Initiative

In September 1999, President Gelle of Djibouti initiated a peace process by calling on Somali leaders and IGAD to help him address the Somali impasse.

Unlike other peace initiatives, this initiative included the civil society, traditional clan leaders, community elders, politicians from past Somali governments. This is known as the Arta Peace Process. This resulted in the formation of a Transitional National Assembly (TNA).

The Transitional National Government (TNG) was however resisted by a number of faction leaders. Hence a coalition of opposition groups was formed with its chairmanship being on a rotational basis. This was the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC).

The plan of action brought up by President Gelle of Djibouti was to set up the government system within six months. This Arta Peace Conference held from 2nd May to 25th August 2000 saw the election of an interim President, Dr. Abdiqassim Salad Hassan who was inaugurated on the 27th August 2000 in Arta, Djibouti. The TNG was rejected by Puntland and Southern warlords.

However, this Djibouti initiative was recognised by IGAD during its Summit of Heads of State and Governments on the 26th November 1999.

Conclusion

A lot of efforts have been made by the UN, US, EU, OAU, IGAD and individual actors, all with the aim of finding a lasting solution to the Somali conflict. In spite of all these peace initiatives by the different actors at different levels, peace has still failed to return to Somalia. This, perhaps, is due to the fact that there have been many obstacles to the implementation of decisions made at those peace and reconciliation seminars or workshops. Again, this may be due to the fact that the right people to be involved in the talks are not involved at the right time or that the right people were invited at the wrong time. Some critics have argued that diplomats in the international community pursued strategies that were not appropriate at the time. Or perhaps the lack of cooperation on the part of the Somali did not help the UN, the US and all other peacemakers and mediators involved in the conflict resolution process in Somalia. The on-going peace talks being hosted by Kenya are a proof that peace has still not returned to Somalia.

CHAPTER FOUR:

THE ROLE OF TRACK ONE DIPLOMACY IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION – A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.1. Introduction

The Somali conflict is part of the wider Horn of Africa conflict system and has lingered on for more than a decade without a lasting and an acceptable solution by all parties being found.

The conflict has involved major international actors in an attempt to restore peace in Somalia and the entire sub-region. This study has tried to examine how the conflict was approached and how the track one of diplomacy helped in the various peace and reconciliation initiatives. Chapter one was mainly on the relevant and existing literature on the Somali conflict in general, the theoretical framework of analysis. Chapter two examined the background of the conflict in Somalia and the various consequences. Chapter three looked at the efforts of conflict resolution in Somalia and the role of diplomacy in the resolution of the Somali conflict.

This chapter shall critically examine track one diplomacy and the issues that emerged in the previous three chapters.

4.2. Analysis of Track One Conflict Resolution Efforts

The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) which operated from April 1992 to March 1995 has been under a lot of criticism for having failed to restore peace in Somalia. This is, according to some critics, partly due to the reluctance of the

international community to intervene at the initial stages of the conflict. For timing is of paramount importance in both preventive action and peacemaking. As Ismat Kittani observes, "It is important for the UN to have the infrastructure and expertise to seize opportunities as they arise."¹ It is probable that an early intervention in the Somali conflict would have prevented it from escalating and becoming more complex. The ripe moment might have been ignored by both the UN and potential peacemakers because "...a potential peacemaker must follow a conflict closely to know when the situation is ripe for timely diplomatic intervention and to know how to intervene in a sensitive and constructive way."²

The UN, in establishing UNOSOM I and II aimed at ending the human suffering in Somalia. And to enable the delivery of emergency assistance to the civilian population caught in the fighting. Its ultimate aim was to foster reconciliation among the Somali people and the facilitation of the re-establishment of the collapsed institutions of the Somali state. For it is the UN's responsibility to determine the measures that are to be taken when there is any threat to international peace and security, as contained in the Charter. The Somali war being a threat to her neighbours and to the world as a whole, the UN embarked on both its diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts in order to help restore peace in the country. This was in the UN's interest because should the conflict spill over to other countries, it will be more costly and more difficult to deal with it. To some extent, the UN succeeded. The UN's resort to enforcement powers that were bestowed on

¹ Ismat Kittani, *Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking: The UN Experience in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century*, Olara Otumu and Michael Doyle (eds.), Landharr, MD. Rowman and Littlefield, 1996, p. 105

² Ibid

UNOSOM II gave credit to the realist thinking as regards the use of force, coercion, to remedy certain situations. However, the UN did not see peace return to Somalia before the withdrawal of its troops. The UN's approach comprised of both track one and track two diplomacy though it set out to conduct track one diplomacy. For instance, the first Addis Ababa conference gathered delegates who were community elders, clan leaders, NGO representatives, intellectuals and religious and women's groups, who belong to track two. And yet the UN employed track one approach of conflict resolution. The UN's approach was therefore a complex one. Again, there was a problem of coordination because reports on the situation were sent to different commanders. There was no central command to help with the coordination of the mandate. There was therefore less time to actually focus on peace and reconciliation in Somalia. Attention was rather diverted to less important issues which were not contained in the mandate. And this contributed to its failure to manage the Somali conflict. Furthermore, the UN was not autonomous financially. Most of the funds were provided for by the US. Thus restricting their autonomy in decision-making.

In conflict resolution, mediators ought to pay particular attention to the appropriate time to intervene. As Mwangi argues, "... the moment becomes ripe when both parties reach a hurting stalemate, in which the cost of continuing the conflict is much higher than the cost of negotiating an end to the fighting."³ And this is what the UN perhaps failed to do by intervening as the parties were busy fighting and defending their interests, thus leading to attacks on the international aid workers in the latter part of 1992. In addition, the UN

³ Makumi Mwangi, *Beyond The Negotiating Table: Emerging Challenges for Regional Conflicts and their Political Management, Post-Election Seminar for Members of Parliament, 3-4 August 1998, p. 11*

intervened at a time when there was absolute absence of all organs of government. And this operation was much more complex owing to its nature involving 'peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and peace-building.'⁴

Again, this failure is due to the fact that there was no prior model of a failed state in conflict which the UN would have followed in trying to reduce the human suffering and restore peace in Somalia.

The US spearheaded the peacekeeping mission in Somalia to create a secure environment for the delivery of international relief aid to the starving Somali people. The US deployed her troops which was the largest contingent and was given the mandate to use force where necessary to secure that enabling environment. The operation succeeded in securing a safe environment for international relief agencies to be able to attend to the needy people. It also succeeded in bringing the two faction leaders together, who had each been fighting for their egoistic needs, to agree to a cease-fire. At some point, the mission had to use force in order to repel the warring factions who impeded the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. The US was so much involved in the Somali war and was committed to have peace restored because of her own interests that she sought to protect. From 1983 to 1990, the United States committed almost \$500 million worth of military resources to Somalia.⁵

⁴ The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996, New York, Department of Public Information, p. 3

⁵ Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, *The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy*, HAAN Publishing, London, 1996, p. 26

The Regional and international influences in the Somali conflict are a major cause and a contribution to the continuation of the conflict.⁶ Liberal internationalists see multiple actors bound together. And this is how the OAU, as a regional organisation, which is handicapped in resources, worked closely with the UN and other regional organisations, as regards the Somali war. It took part in the preparatory meeting held at the UN Headquarters in New York prior to the consultations that were held with representatives of the warring factions. All parties were determined to end the heavy loss of human life. The discussions yielded the agreement of both parties to cease hostilities. However, the OAU had limited resources to effectively spearhead conflict resolution efforts.

The European Commission set out to find a peaceful solution to the Somali conflict by hosting two seminars in Kenya. These seminars resulted in the formation of two committees and a 'Nakuru Peace Appeal' calling on all Somalis to end the fighting and to rebuild their country. This is due to the economic interest some European countries have in the south. Italian government and businesses also had sizable financial interests in Somalia.⁷ There was competition between former Somali colonialists. Britain and Italy lobbied for a federal and a central state system respectively. On the one hand, the Italian government lobbied for a central state system because of its economic interests in the south. The British government, on the other hand, lobbied for either secession for the northwest or for a federal system where 'Somaliland' would have regional autonomy

⁶ See P. Johnson, *Somalia/Land: Political, Economic and Social Analysis*. A Report for Oxfam, GB. April 1999, pp 12-13.

⁷ Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, *The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy*, Op cit, p. 26

because Hargeisa was once a British colony.⁸ The EC's peace initiative can be said to have come at a time when the situation was conducive for resolution by a third party. This can be said to be the ripe moment for the EC to intervene in its bid to settle the conflict. However, though the EC's unit was a track one agent, it employed track two approach to resolve the conflict. But since it incorporated different parties to the conflict, its approach was acceptable. Nevertheless, some of the people invited to the peace talks – clan leaders, intellectuals, religious and women representatives and former statesmen – were not directly or were little involved in the actual conflict that was raging because decision-making had to also involve the warlords.

Some countries within the IGAD sub-regional organisation, namely Ethiopia, are competing for a greater role in the formation of the future Somali government. This was shown in its conflict management efforts for Somalia and the critical role President Meles Zenawi played in the National Reconciliation Conference that was held in Addis Ababa from the 15th to 27th March 1993. Ethiopia sponsored a Conference in 1996, which focused on Somali unity and agreed on a transitional and rotating presidency. Ethiopia had the support of the IGAD and that of the US. Ethiopia still has an interest to protect and this can be traced back to the Ogaden war of 1977-78 between Somalia and Ethiopia. Egypt too was involved in another conference, the Cairo Conference, which was held in December 1997. This conference focused on a federal structure and produced the Cairo Declaration. Egypt had the support of the Arab League and the Islamic Conference and it

⁸ Ibrahim Qassim Farah, *Dual Diplomatic Approaches in Conflict Management: The International Peace Initiatives in Somalia, 1991-1999*, A dissertation submitted to the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi, 2000, p. 108

is in favour of a central Somali state, which can become a threat to Ethiopia so that it would have some relief over the Nile waters.⁹

President Ismael Omar Gelle of Djibouti initiated a peace process with regard to the Somali war by calling on Somali leaders and IGAD to help bring peace in the country. His initiative, unlike other peace initiatives, took into consideration traditional clan and community leaders, and politicians from past governments. This is what came to be called the ARTA Peace Process which led to the formation of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and the election of an interim President. Owing to the importance attached to national security, he could not have looked on without intervening since the war and its consequences could have spilled over into his county. He was thus protecting his national interest.

Another obstacle was the non-cooperation and failure on the part of the Somali factions to commit themselves to peace so as to facilitate the process undertaken by the UN and its agencies.¹⁰ This led the Security Council to decide on the withdrawal of United Nations forces from Somalia in March 1995.

It is also argued by some critics that diplomats in the international community pursued diplomatic strategies that were not appropriate at the time, in efforts to revive the central state system that had collapsed. Additionally, the reconciliation conferences held in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the UN in mid-March 1993 and that held in Nairobi in

⁹ P. Johnson, *Somalia/land: Political, Economic and Social Analysis*. A Report for Oxfam GB, Nairobi, April 1999, pp. 12-13

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 3

March 1994 failed to address the real concerns of the people of Somalia. This is because too much emphasis was laid on the warlords without the involvement of other national leaders since their authority and legitimacy were questionable. National expectations were generally not met owing to the fact that the country was now divided into clans and sub-clans, some of which were denied participation in the reconciliation process. This was also noticed at the Djibouti Conference held from 5th to 11th June 1991 where only seven out of eleven opposition groups were present.¹¹

4.2.1. Rethinking Peacekeeping and Peace enforcement

Some regional organisations, it has been revealed, have little capacity for intervention. This explains why the OAU, for example, prefers prevention to resolution. The main obstacle being financial constraints.

Another major issue that constituted a hindrance to the UN and other organisations within the international community is the absence of a legitimate government that these organisations were going to deal with; because realists believe that states are the principal and unitary actors, the most important actors. The UN had to intervene without the consent of national authorities, since the situation in Somalia was such that there was total breakdown of law and order and there was no government.

The Somali example constitutes a model which should lead the UN to devise ways and means to handle similar situations where there is absence of a government and total

¹¹ Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, *The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy*, HAAN Publishing, London, 1996, p. 118

breakdown of law and order. For in the case of Somalia, there was no prior model to guide the UN in its efforts.

The situation was so complex that there was no international consensus on how to resolve it. Agostinho Zacarias says thus : “The concept of peacekeeping needs to be reformulated in the light of the special experience of the former Yugoslavia.”¹² Owing to the high cost and the high risk involved in such operations, governments become reluctant in sending their troops since they will have to convince their public. Such risks were experienced in the ambush of UN troops and the killing of some of the soldiers. And the humiliation that ensued when an American soldier was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu. This, therefore, calls for the international community to rethink a “ mechanism of intervention to sustain stability in the international system ”¹³, for intervention remains a constant tool within the international community as far as the maintenance or the restoration of peace is concerned. This will help avoid such catastrophes as that of Rwanda in 1994 which is a clear example “ of lack of enforcement in the face of human tragedy ”¹⁴.

Intervention, most of the time, is made when there is a great interest of the great powers in the country involved in the conflict. This, therefore, explains why some Third World countries are neglected or left to themselves until the situation deteriorates. Hence “ the

¹² Agostinho Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping*, I. B. Tauris Publishers, London. New York, 1996, p. 176

¹³ Ibid, p. 183

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 176

UN often intervenes in an atmosphere of polarisation and degeneration that demands wide-ranging reconstruction. ”¹⁵

There is yet another challenge faced by the UN, which is the finding of strategies to tackle intra-state conflicts since interstate conflicts are becoming more and more rare. Conflicts now sprouting up are more of internal ones where nationals take up arms against one another to question the legitimacy of the government of the day. And this is a situation the UN still does not have a solution to.

4.2.2. Failure of diplomacy and Mediation

Diplomatic efforts and mediation failed in Somalia because, in spite of the many efforts made, they all came in too late. The UN was conspicuously absent when battles were seriously raging, which subsequently led to the collapse of the central government and the departure of Siad Barre.

Right from the outset, there were “doctrinal and procedural difficulties ”¹⁶ that thwarted the UN’s action. Representatives of the various groups were not identified ; neither was a venue appropriate to meet the militias since none of them was in favour of a meeting being held in Somalia.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 179

¹⁶ Martin R. Gonzglass, ‘The Restoration of The Somali Justice System’ in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (eds.) *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, Westview Press, USA, 1997, p.6

The situation deteriorated, especially the humanitarian situation was so deplorable that efforts were made by the U.S. to airlift some food in order to reduce the catastrophe. The 37 000 UNITAF forces, 27 000 of whom were Americans extended their relief operations to other major centres in Somalia. UNITAF was mainly to help establish a secure environment that would facilitate humanitarian assistance. Though this helped in the supply of humanitarian assistance which enabled the UN mission to revert to its original peace-keeping role, efforts made by UNITAF and UNOSOM did not stop Somalia from descending into total anarchy. And all this convinced the international community of the need for new mechanisms of intervention in situations of a failed state ; despite the UN being authorised by a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter . The UN was, for the first time, embarking on a peace-enforcement venture where there were “ no legitimate authorities to provide consent. ”¹⁷ And yet leaders of the various factions were treated as if they were legitimate when they clearly were not. Those who were not treated the same way obviously could not give their consent on any kind of negotiation aimed at peace since some of the people were favoured within the international community. Thus rendering efforts towards reconciliation very difficult and complex. Again, some of the warlords were not in favour of the return to stability.

Above all “ neither the UN nor the U.S. administrations involved recognised the special characteristics of the failed Somali state and therefore failed to develop those measures to facilitate the restoration of Somali civil society. ”¹⁸ These ‘special characteristics’ being

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 10

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 14

the total collapse of government and its instruments leading to the lack of a track one agent to hold negotiations with all track one intervening third parties.

4.3. Conclusion

This chapter has offered a critical analysis of the role of track one diplomacy in conflict resolution in Somalia. It mainly focused on what each one of the actors set out to do, what they were able to achieve and why they could not fulfil their mandate in its entirety. Track one diplomacy has been found not to have been able to resolve the conflict though it was successful in some instances. It had a lot of limitations. However, the peace process is still ongoing in spite of the many misunderstandings. Dual diplomacy will therefore be useful in trying to resolve the Somali conflict. Mwangiru argues that “the use of dual diplomacy in any case would lead to an enduring and self-sustaining outcome to the conflict with the two tracks acting as valuable components of the same conflict management process. Dual diplomacy or dual track diplomacy would address simultaneously both inter-state and internal levels.”¹⁹

¹⁹ See M. Mwangiru, *The International Management of Internal Conflicts in Africa: The Uganda Mediation 1985*, Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1994, p. 41

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. CONCLUSIONS

This study sought to investigate the Somali civil war from the demise of the Siad Barre regime through the various interventions made by the international community.

An effort was made to point out some of the difficulties encountered by the initiatives undertaken by the international community, that is by the United Nations, the United States, the European Commission, the Organisation of African Unity, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and some individual state members.

The civil war in Somalia raised a lot of questions because of its unique status in Africa as a nation having one ethnic group, one religion and one language. Some successes were achieved by the different parties. However, a lot of challenges hindered the peace initiatives. Hence their failure in their attempts in peace-building.

The study has demonstrated that efforts to restore peace “proved unavailing, as the cooperation of the Somali parties was not forthcoming, and the Security Council decided to terminate UNOSOM II’s mandate.”¹ The withdrawal of the mission was done in March 1995 without having achieved the aim of restoring peace and reconciliation.

The Somali situation became intractable primarily due to the selfish stance adopted by the warlords. Each overestimated his importance and niche in the power game in Somalia. This led to the misconception of victory being within reach for each warlord,

¹ *The United Nations and Somalia 1992 – 1996*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VIII, p. 68

while the reality was that the country was deep down in debilitating fragmentation that resulted in almost untold human tragedy.

Furthermore, the Somali civil war has been one of the most challenging tasks undertaken by the UN and the international community as a whole. Thus a lot of lessons have been provided to the international community in devising new policies and mechanisms in future interventions in conflicts involving “failed states”. The UN and its agencies failed in carrying out their mandate fully² owing to the lack of cooperation on the part of the Somali factions. And also because there was no model of previous failed states for the UN to follow in the efforts to provide humanitarian assistance. One of the conditions of peacekeeping being the existence of peace on the ground to be kept, the UN operation was not totally successful because of the absence of peace to be kept in Somalia.³ And one thing the UN was accused of was the late response given to the Somali crisis because it was focusing attention on the conflict in the Balkans. Mohamed Sahnoun, a reputed Algerian career diplomat is of the view that “if the international community had intervened earlier and more effectively in Somalia, much of the catastrophe could have been avoided.”⁴

The study has also concluded that the international community is not to be counted on to effectively provide support in a state that loses its government - a failed state. Neither should it be counted on to effectively intervene since it does not have the will and the

² Ibid, p. 3

³ Agostinho Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping*, I. B. Tauris Publishers, London. New York, 1996, p. 17

⁴ Mohamed Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*, (Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1994), p. XIII

resources to do so. For a state that loses one of its attributes of statehood, in this case the government, ceases to be a member of the international community.⁵

Nevertheless, the international community should not give up attempts at restoring peace. The current Liberian situation is an indication that despite political chaos and mayhem, conflict resolution is still feasible if only parties to the conflict are willing to dialogue and negotiate peace. The role of the international community is to provide the enabling environment for the warring factions to iron out their differences and cease hostilities.

Again, the study reveals that regional organisations such as the OAU and sub-regional organisations lack the necessary capacities to manage conflicts that occur on the continent as a whole and in some sub-regions in particular. This calls for efforts to be made to reinforce such capacities in order to give a timely response to conflicts that erupt on the continent. This is because the international community has limits as far as what it can achieve is concerned. Moreover, Africans are to own the process towards achieving peace on the continent through their contribution and willingness to put an end to hostilities once efforts are made through negotiation.

The study has also concluded that the OAU was unable to find a lasting solution to the Somali crisis. As the main regional organisation, it had limitations “in the face of the grave humanitarian needs in a country with food shortages, breakdown of civil order and

⁵ Op cit, p. 87

absence of security.”⁶ Another limitation of the OAU is the complex and slow system of its decision-making body. Whereas the UN Security Council works on a permanent basis, the Council of Ministers meets twice a year or if approved by two-thirds of all members meets in an extraordinary session. This reduces the OAU’s versatility and flexibility of the organisation in dealing with matters concerning peace missions.

However, the OAU has come to understand the financial implications of peace-keeping, and therefore has decided to establish a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. With this, “members seem at last to have achieved a consensus that in an internal crisis sovereignty ceases to be sacrosanct and intervention by a supra-national institution is legitimate.”⁷ That is the spirit of the new African Union (AU).

With the Somali civil war, the principle that the consent of all parties involved in an internal conflict as a precondition for a UN intervention could not be respected. This is because there was no central government. And yet, “Somalia was the first opportunity for the United Nations, liberated from its Cold War constraints, and its new leader to act aggressively to restore order to a troubled community.”⁸

The international community failed in restoring peace in Somalia though there was a humanitarian success. Politically and militarily it was a failure. And Andrew Natsios says thus: “These killings, President Clinton’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops, and the

⁶ Agostinho Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping*, I. B. Tauris Publishers, London. New York, 1996, p. 67

⁷ Ibid, p. 119

⁸ See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: UN, June 1992).

subsequent withdrawal of all UN peace-keeping troops in March 1995 have labelled the Somalia intervention as a failure.”⁹ And this teaches the lesson of the success of a peacekeeping operation being dependent on the goodwill of the parties to the conflict. Nationals of the state at war are the sole people to build peace. This is to say that the contribution of Somalis will help a great deal in building peace in the country.

5.2. Recommendations

The study has come up with recommendations:

1. The UN together with the international community need to come up with new mechanisms that will help in the resolution of conflict in potential failed states.
2. In such situations as those of failed states where there is gross violation of human rights such as in the case of Somalia, responsible states must form a coalition as a moral requirement to undertake a political and military intervention that will create a conducive atmosphere for the restoration of civil order. The characteristics of the failed state must be recognised and identified in order to facilitate the devising of the necessary measures aiming at the restoration of the civil society and civil order. A lesson to be learnt is that no two humanitarian emergencies are the same. Thus each complex humanitarian emergency

⁹ Andrew Natsios, ‘Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos’ in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (eds.) *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, Westview Press, 1997, p. 78

is to be studied well in order to come up with strategies that will be adaptable to the unique case of the emergency.

3. Another recommendation the study has come up with is that of exercising some flexibility in the interpretation of the concept of “failed state”. In a situation whereby a sovereign state loses one or two of the attributes of statehood, the UN should have a mechanism through which it should work for the restoration of the lost attributes instead of abandoning the situation and allowing the conflict, as in the case of Somalia, to further degenerate.
4. The African Union, unlike the OAU, should be more present and efficient in intervening in the internal affairs of member states. As stipulated in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the Union, the Union shall have “the right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.¹⁰ In this regard, the African Union¹¹ is planning to put in place a stand-by brigade, whose troops will be pledged by member countries, to help restore peace in troubled countries. It hopes to respond to African conflicts as soon as they occur in order to minimise an international intervention in African affairs. Such a move is encouraged and recommended.
5. Owing to the Somali experience, the international community must be prepared to contribute well-trained contingents in peacekeeping. And

¹⁰ Constitutive Act of the African Union, p. 6

¹¹ This was one of the items of the British Broadcasting Corporation’s news of the 16th May 2003 at 3 pm GMT.

since internal conflicts tend to be protracted, contingents must be prepared to intervene over a long period of time and adequate financial resources must be made available.

6. The study also recommends the use of a dual track diplomacy in the management of the Somali conflict as they complement each other. And Thomas Bailey¹² says that the generals and the diplomats should cooperate in both peace and war since diplomatic and military affairs are intertwined.

In all this, the ripe moment must be carefully studied and known for an efficient mediation between two or more conflicting parties.

This study encountered many constraints and limitations: there is lack of adequate documentation since the whole process has still not ended.

¹² B. Thomas, *The Art of Diplomacy: The American Experience* (New York: Appleton – Century – Crofts, 1968), p. 244

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