

CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: ANTECEDENTS OF KENYA -
UGANDA RELATIONS, 1964 - 1990

BY

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.



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This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as a university supervisor.



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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my late uncle Justice James
Onyiego Nyarangi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This thesis has been brought into fruition through both moral and technical aid from colleagues, experts and my parents. The most central, meaningful and constant moral cum technical boost came from my supervisor Dr. Korwa Adar. Dr Adar, my lecturer since 1986 persistently urged me to take thesis writing as a "total vocation". His brotherly and yet stern advice always rendered my planning and implementation both timely and apt. His academic input was not only challenging but also equally rewarding in the entire exercise.

Through the chairman of our department, Dr. Joshua Olewe Nyunya, I was able to make contacts in Uganda, which I would otherwise not have made. Dr. Nyunya's open-minded, fatherly and intellectual academic and non-academic advice was as well crucial in the whole exercise.

My father and mother (Mr. Charles Mokaya, Mrs. Mary Mokaya) were the greatest moral boost that I perhaps got. When things looked too rough, both my dad and mum reminded me "you have not come all this way only to give up" - and that as sure as magic gave me new impetus every time and again.

The continued constructive criticism from my colleagues as I wrote my first drafts was also important. I want to pass special thanks to Mr. Mutahi Ngunyi of Institute of Development Studies (IDS) University of Nairobi, Mr. Oscar G. Mwangi of Department of Government, Mr. Kennedy Omollo of Department of Government, Mr. Japheth Munene and Mr. Muli Kasoa. Their criticism was after all meaningful.

The fellows from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who aided me with trade data are equally acknowledged. Dr. Godfrey Okoth of Department of History, Makerere University must not be forgotten. He provided unparalleled information regarding my third chapter that I could perhaps not have found.

And last but not least, this work would not have been put on paper without Mr. Patrick Mwaurah's (Vetlabs, Kabete) tireless efforts. We duely accord him thanks too.

RESEARCH PROBLEMS

We encountered certain problems in the course of gathering our data which should be stated in order to enlighten the reader on the contextual nature of this study.

First, we found it exceedingly problematic to acquire representative data, that is Kenya-based or Uganda-based devoid of subjectivity. This problem was considered to have been accentuated by the long-term 'animosities' between the two countries. We however sought to overcome it by co-relating and co-varying the data available from these individual countries with 'common' data; that is data generated and analysed by independent bodies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the East African Community (EAC) or from journals and periodicals based outside either country.

Second, we discovered that despite the two decades of post-independence Kenya-Uganda interaction, not sufficient literature has been generated dealing with their relations. Thus, we had to depend on the numerous works which have been written dealing with Uganda's internal political crisis. We also relied heavily on East African Community (EAC) material which was deemed relevant to the study.

At much broader scale, such material as we used from either Kenya or Uganda was seen as value-laden. We sought to overcome this problem by reading independent sources whose works touched on Kenya-Uganda relations; especially from other African-based journal articles.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the nature of inter-state relations between Kenya and Uganda. The core premise of the investigation is that despite continuous conflicts between the two countries, cooperation has continued to thrive. It is in this "inconsistency" that our poles of analysis; conflict and cooperation are derived.

Particular conflictive and cooperative events under the period of study are linked to trade trends to determine the correlation between conflict and/or cooperation and these events. Consequently, trade as an agent of inter-state interaction is used to demonstrate how Kenya and Uganda have continued to cooperate despite frequent conflicts.

Besides this, certain internal political developments in Uganda are examined with a view to unravelling their ramifications on Kenya-Uganda relations. This is the case because Uganda has experienced manifest political instability of a nature more telling than Kenya.

The breakup of the East African Community, (EAC) is equally examined with the purpose of determining how the disintegration of a supra-national organization can

contribute to a particular nature of relations between states. More specifically, it is argued that the collapse of the EAC has had certain impacts on the nature of the two states interactions.

In brief then, this thesis elucidates on the primacy of national interest in dictating inter-state relations. It argues that concurrence of national interest between Kenya and Uganda leads to cooperation while discordance of the same culminates in conflict. It is because of such concurrence and discordance that the nature of Kenya-Uganda relations is largely seen as both cooperative and conflictive.

1.0 Introduction

It is clear to a great extent that conflict and cooperation have characterised individuals and groups since the emergence of human society. At the core of these conflictual and collaborative tendencies have been concurrent and/or divergent interests of the interacting parties. It is in this respect that students of international relations have variously argued that conflict and cooperation are aspects of the same continuum in states' interactions. It has also been frequently observed that if interactions entail exchange of certain goods, then one or two of the parties in an exchange are bound to experience unequal gains. Broadly speaking, such an argument is authentic to the extent that states harbour different and often unequal resource attributes.

Care must however be taken in the event of dismissing frequent conflictive and cooperative relations between states upon this position. The contiguity of states plus their proximity to specific waterways and/or harbours dictate the nature of states relations as well. On another level yet such an analysis easily negates factors basic to states relations over a period of years. The danger normally is that the possible inconsistencies depicted in cooperation amidst conflict are overlooked.

It is in this context that Holsti, K.J. writes,

'Interactions between states in the contemporary system are numerous and diverse ... here it should be pointed out that virtually all relationships contain characteristics of conflict and cooperation'.

The diverse interactions in inter-state relations engender conflict and cooperation dependig on the immediate national interests perceived. To this end, dyadic interaction extricates inter alia the political and economic factors that underpin states' relations.

How then do political and economic factors in interstate interaction relate to conflict and cooperation? Actors normally seek to achieve specific trade surpluses, access to markets, prestige or alliances. In the attempt to actualize these objectives, their actions, demands or both may run counter to the interests of the other actors. It is also possible for mutuality to exist between interacting parties, especially when their interests complement each other.

Political conflict can thus be seen as contention amongst interacting actors about the structures or policies of a political regime. Consequently, if we take these political and economic needs as the subject of contention between actors, conflict behaviour is

likely to occur when one actor occupies a position that is incompatible with the wishes or interest of the other actor. The contrary obtains in cases of cooperative interaction.

It need be noted that conflict is therefore different from competition. Competition attains the level of conflict when the interacting actors attempt to augment or expand their economic and political positions at the expense of either actor. Put differently, two actors may be engaged in competition without attempting to deter the other actors from obtaining their ends. In this case, cooperation still exists between the interacting actors.

Economic conflict usually demonstrated through embargoes, that is the seizure of a foreign state's carriers and goods found within the territorial jurisdiction of another state or boycotts, that is the refusal to purchase goods and services from another state until specific political conditions have been met, is a means of national-interest attainment. Worth of note is the fact that inter-state relations are in effect heavily determined by the power attributes they have at hand.

In light of the preceding, actors' power attributes are inter alia the economic or political capabilities at their disposal which make it possible for them to push for the actualization of their basic goals in interaction. Basic to co-operative interaction therefore is "concurrence" of goals. Even then, given that some states have limited power attributes they normally sacrifice certain interests for the attainment of other interests.

Broadly stating, the manner in which states apply their power capabilities is thus determined by their external goals. On another level however, these objectives are also determined by their internal political conditions. Certain conditions of a political system, for example political stability, political instability, or economic backwardness dictate the mode of application of its power capabilities.

The diversity and complexity of nation-states' needs and the shifting nature of their power-attributes dependent on different interactive conditions accords students of international relations and foreign policy intriguing areas for study.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

This study seeks to analyse and explain the patterns of conflict and cooperation that have characterised Kenya - Uganda relations. The core thesis of this study is that despite frequent conflicts between Kenya and Uganda, cooperation has continued to characterise their interaction.

Our concern with these states' relations is thus the uniqueness of cooperation during conflictual periods. It is this inconsistency that intrigues us into research. The study shall mainly focus on the economic and political factors that underlie such inconsistencies. Let us illustrate briefly.

Trade figures between the two countries since independence show that Kenyas exports to Uganda generally rose in an inversely proportional manner compared to Ugandas exports to Kenya. Between 1976 and 1977 for example, when Uganda claimed portions of Kenya's Rift Valley and Nyanza provinces, Kenyas imports from Uganda rose from K£818 in 1976 to K£1,977 in 1977 (Table four). Though students of international relations generally agree that trade is not affected in the event of conflict, this study will seek to explain why such should be the case.

The direction of inter-country trade between the two countries from 1971 to 1987 illustrates this inconsistency even more lucidly. While Kenya exported goods worth K£476,284 to Uganda, the latter exported goods worth only K£25,936 to Kenya (Table three). In this regard therefore, Uganda experienced a trade imbalance worth K£451,348. What this kind of imbalance portended for Kenya-Uganda relations will be examined.

There was conflict for example in 1971, when Uganda 'expelled workers of Kenyan origin from Uganda. In 1969 too, there was conflict between the two countries when Obote promulgated the Common-Man's Charter that was a socialist-oriented document. This was anti-thetical to Kenya's Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 that ascribed to epithets of free enterprise. Such events will be be correlated to trade figures to determine the magnitude of either cooperation and/or conflict between the two countries.

As indicated above, it can be deduced that export trade grew in an inversely proportional manner between the two countries². , In this respect, it aptly indicates that though cooperation is a major facet in international relations, it is usually sidelined by most scholars. , Our argument is that the unavailability of incisive studies on forms of economic and political

exchanges between states renders studies on conflict incomplete. It is for this reason that conflict and cooperation are examined concurrently - with a view to unravelling the antecedent variables that explain relations between the two states.

The foregoing analysis raises several observations. Firstly, in the circumstance of conflict between the two countries, Kenya continued to heighten her export trade with Uganda³. Second, even though Uganda continued to experience an imbalance of trade to the extent of Kenya having trade surpluses, she continued to depend on Kenya for most of her import commodities. Third, even in the event of 'cautious foreign policies'⁴, conflict still emerged amidst cooperative economic interactions. It is with such observations in mind that we describe the nature of relations between Kenya and Uganda as inconsistent.

At another level, scholars like Okoth⁵ and Mamdani⁶, who have attempted to analyse the dynamics of Kenya - Uganda relations have failed to explain this inconsistency.⁷ Okoth for instance correctly argues that the 'core' national interests of Kenya and Uganda dictate the mutuality in economic and political interaction. What then culminates in frequent conflicts between these two neighbouring states?

Our presumption is that accounting for the nature of relations between Kenya and Uganda along political and economic lines only accords unclear reasons for inconsistent relations. By inconsistent we mean inability of dyadic interactions to be devoid of conflict or any such conditions that hamper cooperation. There is thus inconsistency in the context of occasional conflicts and continued cooperation.

It is safe to assert from the preceding that there may be certain intervening variables that explain the constantly dis-harmonious nature of the two countries relations. Such intervening variables are examined and analysed with the aim of demonstrating the correlation between them and conflict and/or cooperation.

The intervening variables are in effect subdivided into economic and political factors. Under the former, inter-state trade between Kenya and Uganda, over the years is examined.

Political explanations include factors leading to the break up of the East African Community (EAC) and certain internal political developments in Uganda concomitant with certain time periods. This study therefore assumes that conflict and cooperation are independent albeit related dimensions in the study of

states' relations. Moreover, conflict is viewed within precincts of states' interactions. This is because it is cooperation that offers a basis for clashes in national interests.

Precisely then, this study has the task of examining and explaining the nature of relations between Kenya and Uganda using conflictive and cooperative events as poles of analysis. It is hoped that the inconsistency depicted in the nature of relations shall thereby be demonstrated.

1.2 Objective of the Study

Broadly stated, this study aims at investigating the key factors that underly Kenya - Uganda relations. This task is geared towards showing the patterns of conflict and cooperation that have characterised the two states relations over the years. An examination of the trends that have spanned Kenya - Uganda relations are meant to demonstrate "regularities" and "irregularities" in inter-state relations.

More specifically, the aims of this study can be encapsulated in these statements:-

- a) To show how trade interactions between Kenya and Uganda relate to conflictive and cooperative events between Kenya and Uganda.

- b) To show how certain internal political developments in Uganda contribute to conflict and/or cooperation between Kenya and Uganda.
- c) To show how certain reasons leading to the break-up of the EAC led to conflict and/or cooperation between Kenya and Uganda.
- d) To give alternative recommendations to Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation.

1.3 Justification of the Study

In heuristic terms, this study intends to fill certain gaps in the study of states relations in East Africa.

In more particular reference, no one study has attempted to explore the relevance of economic and political factors underlying Kenya - Uganda relations. Nsubuga's⁸ study as Okoth's⁹ accords a superficial analysis of the chronological events that have occurred in the countries relations. To this end, Nsubuga, Okoth and Mamdani¹⁰ do not give salience to the economic and political foreign policy determinants of the two states and in effect the variety of such intervening variables that could well explain the nature of Kenya - Uganda relations. It is for instance

apparent in the studies of the three scholars that historical premium is given in their analyses at the expense of the probable national interests dictating interaction.

In theoretical reference, the concern with inconsistent relations is crucial due to various reasons. Basically the cooperative and conflictive of relations between Kenya and Uganda have been prime strands in the character of the two states relations. Besides this, the actual economic and political interaction have shown a marked inconsistency with the declared foreign policy stances of the two states making an investigation into this inconsistency vital.

Third, more often than not, weight has been placed on the economic factors that influence their dyadic interaction without duly correlating them with political factors. This is seen as an a-priori linkage because no economic factors in state's foreign relations are economic qua economic. Put differently, economic explanations for states relations only depict the intrinsic national interests of the states concerned.

To go back to our initial argument, scholars have explained Kenya - Uganda relations in geo-political and historical perspectives. The gap this study intends to fill in this regard is to put such assertions to test.

declarations from Uganda. We are of the considered opinion that this will contribute to Kenya's development process in respect to policy formulation and implementation. Such a concern for external development is important given an increasingly interdependent international system.

We have chosen to focus on the period 1964 - 1990. This period covers the entire independence lifespan of the two countries almost up to date. Such an extensive period is considered appropriate in as far as it depicts and substantively allows for a correlation of the economic and political factors that have underlay Kenya - Uganda relations. We are of the opinion that due to the intermittent conflicts and fairly continued cooperative interactions, an incisive analysis of the states relations must encompass this period.

This study is also comprehensive to the extent that it includes certain conflictive and cooperative events that have determined the nature of the states interaction. The year 1964 is specifically important because it delineates colonial legacies and post independence economic and political policy. If Kenya got independent in 1963 and Uganda a year earlier, then it is in 1964 that they commenced meaningful external interaction. The year 1990 is equally important to the

extent that it not only brings us to the most recent dyadic event interaction but also marks a start of 'cordial' relations between the two countries.

1.4 Literature Review

Oliver¹¹ has given evidence to show that as early as 1899, British colonial authorities contemplated a Kenya - Uganda federation. Amery¹² observes that British authorities were interested in a merger of the two colonies for exploitation purposes. This was rendered impossible due to Uganda's qualms about a possible Kenyan dominance. It was argued that Kenya's economy had thrived and flourished on Uganda's non-inclusion in settler schemes¹³. Consequently, by 1902 enormous sections of Eastern Uganda were relegated to Kenya with the presumed aim of coordinating the management of the Uganda railway¹⁴. Ingham argues that at the start of the twentieth century, a federative endeavour was in the offing. Interestingly however, all these integrative services were administered by a Governor from Kenya. Rosberg¹⁵ and Segal¹⁶ contend that this was the case because Nairobi was seen as a commercial cum industrial center for East Africa. To our mind, the foregoing colonial background

offers a foundation for examining Kenya - Uganda relations. Oliver and Ingham¹⁸ and Segal¹⁹ aptly argue that the colonial policies of developing one sphere of influence at the expense of the other set in motion latent disagreements between the two contiguous states on the same level too. In this vein too, Armstrong²⁰ argues, "the nation with limited economic resources is more vulnerable to pressure from other nations and more likely to comply under stress".

Furthermore Studies on conflict and cooperation done by Hirschman, Knorr and Trager²¹ also state that dyadic interaction depends on contiguity and capability. They observe that the more a nation is dependent on foreign transactions the more conflict and cooperation are brought into play because of clashes in national interests. Such theoretical analyses of state interaction do not however dissect the underlying economic and political factors that influence states relations over time. It is with this in mind that the literature present on conflict and cooperation in Africa Legum²²; Orwa²³; Hoskyns²⁴; Putman and Bayne²⁵ is not adequate. Apart from Putman's and Bayne's²⁶ work which examine cooperation and conflict, few or no studies have done this at an inter-state level. Most of them are generalised studies or simply cover boundary conflicts, for example Day²⁷, Widstrand²⁸ and Bozeman²⁹.

Nye³⁰ has argued that on the eve of the formation of the East African Community (EAC) Uganda was "uncooperative" because of her size. According to Nye³¹, the size of Uganda dictated that she jealously preserve and protect the meagre resources at her disposal. Uganda had better natural-resource potentials - "nearly twice the reserves of the other two countries combined"³². It will be noted also that Uganda was the envy of East Africa as she pooled migrant workers from Kenya and Tanzania. Moreover, whereas Kenya needed an extra K£2 million from her colonial master to burgeon the 1962-63 budget, Uganda's budget was "balanced"³³. Our observation is that Uganda feared that cooperation with Kenya and Tanzania would destabilize her "balanced" economy. Uganda maintained that there had to be parity before effective integration took place.

If we take Orwa's³⁴ argument that colonial economic policies deliberately nurtured Nairobi into an industrial cum commercial center at the expense of Kampala, one sees latent reasons for belligerence in the 1960s. This belligerence concerned the acquisition and exploitation of resources in the region. How the disagreements affected Kenya - Uganda relations in the later years is a question this investigation seeks to unravel.

Mazzeo³⁵ indicates that on the eve of Amin's advent to power, President Obote had expelled Kenyan migrant workers and nationalised several Kenya-based companies. Obote's move according to Okoth³⁶ was meant to make the Ugandan citizen gain from Uganda's manufacturing industry instead of Kenyan migrant workers. Concomitantly, Keohane's³⁷ argument that certain internal, economic, social and political factors emanating from the nation-state dictate the options available for foreign policy makers, renders Obote's move understandable. Kenya then naturally celebrated the overthrow of Obote as this neutralised an emerging "socialist circuit" in the East African region. As Babu³⁸ contends, Kenya had initially been alarmed by the "Red-belt"; a chain of anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and increasingly anti-zionist states slicing through Egypt, Libya and Sudan" ... Thus,

".... Kenya's frontier capitalism was antithetical to the socialist policies. After the coup, Amin quickly scored points by announcing that he intended to reverse the deteriorating relations between Kenya and Uganda³⁹.

What emerged in the 1970s then was a need to cooperate given Uganda's dependence on Kenya for her import trade and Kenya's export trade to Uganda. In the preceding connection, a number of studies have

dealt with the basic conditions of cooperation and conflict related to dependence; Blau⁴⁰, Knorr⁴¹, Hirschman⁴² and more recently Carporaso⁴³. The general thesis in this school of thought is that the more a nation is dependent on foreign transactions, the more its well-being is at stake. We want to argue that this thesis needs to be tested. Therefore, an examination of Kenya-Uganda relations fills this gap.

In 1972, November 19th, President Amin held talks with President Kenyatta of Kenya on matters of "mutual interest". It was later announced that Kenyatta had agreed to mediate in the reopening of the Uganda-Tanzania border⁴⁴. Speaking of the role, President Kenyatta had played in the re-opening of the border, President Amin said,

"Our special gratitude goes to one of Africa's leading statesman, a leader who has spent all his time in struggle for freedom and independence ... we in Uganda appreciate Mzee's great concern for East African unity as witnessed by the fact that he has sent several of his cabinet ministers to be present on this occasion"⁴⁵.

That economic factors per se may not adequately explain the erratic picture of Kenya-Uganda relations is perhaps best attested by Kenyan connivance in Israel's raid on Entebbe in 1977. Stevenson⁴⁶ has documented evidence to show that Israeli war planes

fuelled at Nairobi while on transit to and from Uganda. This complicity in Amin's view was despicable and conflictive. In Kenya's view, she had simply supported an anti-terrorist cause by anchoring a force geared towards salvaging victims of terrorism⁴⁷.

Nsubuga⁴⁸ observes that though president Amin persistently gave Kenya reason to trigger war, Kenya stopped short of this because of the flourishing trade that Kenya enjoyed. It will be noted from Table two that between 1969 and 1982 Kenya contributed 85% of total export trade between Kenya and Uganda. Between the same years, Uganda contributed a sheer 15% of total export trade between the two countries. Concurrently, Kenya contributed a sheer 10% of the total import trade (1969-82) whereas Uganda had 90% of the total import trade.

Uganda therefore experienced a trade imbalance of about £3207 million shillings. Orwa has correctly observed that during this period - 1970s and 1980s, Uganda's economy became "hostage" to Kenya. We are of the opinion that given the Kaleidoscopic nature of relations, an investigation into the variables capable of explaining the same is necessary.

The above observation is reinforced with Lule's and Binaisa's relatively short regimes. On Lule's advent to power, (1979) a delegation was sent to Kenya to forge a foundation for good relations. Interestingly again, Kenya generously granted Uganda Ksh.20 million and "waived all port and demurrage charge on Uganda's goods stranded at Mombasa during the Uganda-Tanzania war"⁴⁹. Was it that Kenya foresaw better relations in Lules's government or was the Ksh.20 million grant an assurance for continued cooperation? These are questions which have not been addressed by scholars like Nsubuga⁵⁰, Okoth⁵¹ and Tandon⁵², who have all written on aspects of Kenya-Uganda relations.

In 1985, Kenya took a leading role in mediating between opposing factions in Uganda - Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) and Okello's military junta which was in power. Following consistent failure by the two factions to strike an agreement between September 25th and October 26th, President Moi commented, "They are coming here and I do not want any more adjournments"⁵³.

Why did Kenya take a leading role in this peace drive? Okoth⁵⁴ has argued that Kenya realised that she had a stake in carving the internal destiny in Uganda. She

therefore had to directly involve herself in seeking a solution to Uganda's internal civil strife. One wants to comment though that it did not need to take Kenya this long to realise that her trade with Uganda depended on the internal situation - whether peaceful or otherwise in Uganda. In our view, there are intrinsic reasons that underlay Kenya's role in the 1985 peace talks; which factors this study aims to highlight.

It is even more intriguing that despite Kenya's mediating role in the peace talks, the year 1987, 1988 and 1990 have witnessed frequent accusations and counter-accusations about the hostility of one another. Kenya has frequently accused Uganda of harbouring dissidents bent on causing mayhem in the country. Though President Moi and Museveni met at Mbale in 1987 to settle differences caused by a shoot-out at the border town of Busia, and more recently on August 17th 1990, there still lingers an element of doubt about each other. Kenya has for instance not stopped claiming that Uganda offered passage to Kenyan teenagers headed for Libya to train and come to overthrow the Kenya government⁵⁵.

It is evident from the preceding literature review that an incisive examination of the patterns that have characterised Kenya - Uganda relations ought be done.

This will heavily hinge on the national interests of the states concerned. An examination of the two states cooperation and conflict during certain year periods will in effect depict the points of congruence and/or discordance of national interests.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

Theory has always served three important roles in the social sciences, that is description, explanation, analysis and prescription⁵⁶. It is through theory that correlation between variables is made possible. In the case of cooperation and conflict as determinants of state relations, numerous theories abound to explain the occurrence and/or their perpetuation. Such theories include the power theory, interdependence theory and decision-making theory.

For a meaningful study of conflict and cooperation as antecedents in Kenya-Uganda relations, a theoretical model that will capture both aspects of investigation is imperative. In this context, we shall adopt the national-interest approach of the power theory. Before justifying this model, it is useful that we examine the probable theories or approaches alluded to above.

Decision-making theory is an important contribution to the study of inter-state relations. Its utility lies in the processes that culminate in

certain decisions that affect inter-state relations⁵⁷. The rational actor model of decision-making for instance examines the elites who make decisions with particular concern to their social backgrounds, biases, peer-group and organizational orientation. It perceives the society as unitary and non-segmented. Scholars like Dahl⁵⁸ have contested the assumption of this model because of the assumed rationality of its actors and the infallibility of their decisions⁵⁹.

Consequently, the organizational process model or the pluralist approach to decision-making theory lays emphasis on decisions as they are formulated based on various divergent and competing interests accruing from the various units, values and interests of the nation-state.

The elitist approach to decision-making however contends that the resultants are determined by elites whose perception of world politics is characterized by active and latent conflict and cooperation among states; making the use of force inherent in inter-state interactions.

Even though interdependence theory elucidates the reasons for inter-state relations, it does not explain why certain dependencies should continue in events of

conflict. If we take the realist interdependence perspective, then Kenya-Uganda relations should have been characterised by war.

To argue that interdependence theory does not adequately accommodate the antecedents of inter-state relations under study is to say that it does not answer the question of inconsistent relations. Inherently therefore, assumed in interdependence theory is continued cooperation irrespective of divergent national interests.

As indicated earlier, we have opted to use the national-interest approach of the power theory. Our choice of the national interest approach is premised upon the fact that cooperation and conflict are two related sides of inter-state relations. We find it necessary at this point to elaborate on the national interest approach and its applicability to this study.

Though various scholars have given differing definitions of the concept national interest⁶⁰, it can be simply seen as the consensus arrived at after a multiplicity of divergent interests have been considered. As one scholar has put it,

'National interest must always emerge from a contest of conflicting sectional interests, a synthesis which must be more than any particular sectional interest on their sum⁶¹.

Various questions come to mind when talking of 'national interest'. How do we arrive at a generally acceptable or standardized definition of national-interest? What is specifically in the national-interest of a given country and its people at a given time and in regard to a certain issue?

Morgenthau⁶² perhaps accords us the most reasonably cogent answer. To Morgenthau, national interest is a "compromise of conflicting interests. It is not an ideal arrived at scientifically, but is rather a product of constant internal political competition"⁶³. Scholars like Magdoff⁶⁴, Kolko⁶⁵ and Pareto⁶⁶ subscribe to this view.

It is important to note that the national interest of nation-states is articulated by their statesmen. Statesmen being the representatives of the entire cross-section of competing interests are meant to transcend the fractional dichotomies of these entities.

The fact of an "anarchical" international system overly subsumed in competing whims of nation-states makes the search for power, its sustenance and perpetuation the sole concern of statesmen. Consequently, whereas classical realist theory⁶⁷ suffers from the inconsideration of the overwhelming interests of the statesmen and his class, structural

realist theory⁶⁸ takes into account the various structures and classes that emerge from the nation-state; aspects that are keenly considered in defining national interest. In this context therefore, structural realist perspective of national interest is more relevant to this study.

Kenya-Uganda relations has been characterised with conflict and cooperation. The points in time when conflict occurred, it was/is explained in terms of clash of the national-interests of the countries. When cooperation thrived/s there was/is a congruence in the transactions entailed as related to their national interests. If Kenya and Uganda are two contiguous nation-states, then their interactions must be seen as arising from this fact of proximity. Again, and therefore logically succeeding the latter argument, a perpendicular meeting of the national-interests of Kenya and Uganda necessarily depicts agreement about the perceived good in interaction. On the contrary, a parallel continuum of the national interests of Kenya and that of Uganda demonstrates non-agreement about the conceived good in inter-state interaction.

To this end therefore, the role of national interests in Kenya-Uganda relations greetly oscillates around the perpetuation of their power. The search for prestige and power as a guiding factor in inter-state

relations is best covered by the national interest approach: What about power? Even though power has been variously defined, in our context, it will refer to the ability of either Kenya or Uganda to enforce its interests vis-a-vis the other.


The variables under study largely encompass the national interests of the two states. For instance, while examining the contribution of certain of Uganda's internal political developments explain the nature of Kenya-Uganda relations, aspects of events in Uganda that dictate conflictual or cooperative tendencies emerge. Such facets that determine the nature of relations run along the national interests of Uganda.

As Good⁶⁹ argues "security" and "survival" of nation-states are not static points in the international system. The factors that determine the way nation-states relate to each other are divergent, multifarious and always changing. If Kenya and Uganda are both concerned with their security and survival, then the perpetuation of their power capabilities goes to enhance the same.

It is for reason of the preceding conception that we have chosen the national interest approach of the power theory as our theoretical framework.

1.6 Hypotheses Conceptualization

Figure One



The foregoing figure is meant to serve the purpose of illustrating our hypotheses. As indicated, our intervening variables are subdivided into economic and political factors. These variables may explain the cooperative and/or conflictual nature of relations between Kenya and Uganda. A correlation of the economic and political factors is done and related to the various conflictive and cooperative events. Consequently, the figure above only demonstrates the kind of matrices that will guide our explanation of the hypotheses

1.7 Hypotheses

- 1) Bilateral trade interaction influences conflict and/or cooperation between Kenya and Uganda.

- a) Specifically, this hypothesis suggests that if trade surpluses to one country are higher than those accruing to the other, then conflict is likely to occur.
 - b) It also suggests that cooperation can be a function of unequal gains from trade interaction despite the imbalance.
- 2) Internal political development in Uganda influence conflict and/or cooperation between Kenya and Uganda.
- a) Specifically, this hypothesis suggests that political instability in Uganda, translate into conflict with Kenya.
 - b) It also suggests that unstable regimes in Uganda, are likely to cooperates with Kenya.
- 3) The break-up of the EAC influenced/s the conflictual and cooperative interactions between Kenya and Uganda.
- a) In particular reference, the factors that led to the break-up of the EAC lead to conflicts between Kenya and Uganda.
 - b) It also assumes that the factors that culminated in the break-up of the EAC engender(ed) cooperation between Kenya and Uganda.

1.8 Methodology

Library research will constitute the dominant source of investigation.

Consequently this study is essentially documentary, hinging majorly on secondary sources of information.

The secondary sources of information will include journal articles, magazines, newspapers, books, statistical abstracts, annual trade yearbooks, public documents periodicals and any other such literature that shall be deemed adequate in giving appropriate information.

1.9 Data analysis

The relevant data shall be collected, recorded and analysed. Particular emphasis will be laid on association of the independent and intervening variables; with the aim of illuminating on the patterns of conflict and cooperation between the two countries. Thus associations are drawn to depict causal relationships between variables. Such findings are used for descriptive, tabular and explanative analysis.

9.1 Definition of concepts

a) Co-operation

For our purposes, the condition of cooperation empirically exists when there is no overt conflict between the two countries. Thus, diplomatic visits, establishments of communiques, high-level government meetings are the indicators of cooperation in this study.

b) Conflict

The condition of conflict empirically obtains when expulsions, rejections, accusations, denials, demands or threat characterise Kenya-Uganda interaction.

c) Internal Political Developments

This specifically refer to the political events in Uganda that determine the way she relates to Kenya. This is indicated in political instability, numerous changes of governments, political turmoil, i.e the state created upon the break-up of law and order, attended by civil strife and struggle for power by competing fractional entities like the Uganda National

Liberation Front (NLF), the National Resistance Movement (NRM), the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) or the Anyanya Rebels.

(d) Tension: We define tension as the condition in which both Kenya and Uganda relate to each other with overt caution. Thus, suspicion about the intentions of either party underlies this tension. It is seen in constant conflicts amidst co-operative events, frequent statements from either side about each others hostile behaviour, constant press attacks on either side, 'magnified' border skirmishes which are captured by the print media to cause alarm in both countries. Tension do not per se cause conflict but only pre-dispose the parties concerned to manifest or employ conflict behaviour; should they endeavour to attain incompatible objectives.

(e) Power: This is seen as the capacity of a state - either Kenya or Uganda to control foreign policy behaviour of the other. These capabilities are broadly any physical or mental objects available as instruments of inducement, persuasion, reward, threat or punishment. They include among others harbour facilities, industrial and manufacturing capacity and trade-blockage ability.

1.9.2 Chapter Layout

Chapter two examines how trade interactions between Kenya and Uganda have influenced cooperation and/or conflict between the two countries. It examines the association between certain political events and certain trends in trade interaction between the two countries. It also considers the continuity in cooperation and conflict as relates to the trade trends.

Chapter three deals with the role of certain internal political developments in Uganda as they influence the conflictive and/or cooperative nature of relations between Kenya and Uganda. This chapter shows the significance of certain political events in Uganda as they dictate the national-interests of Uganda and how this simultaneously replicates to Ugandas relation with Kenya.

Chapter four attempts to demonstrate the role the break-up of the EAC has had on the nature of relations between Kenya and Uganda. Some of the pertinent factors responsible for the dissolution of the EAC are examined with a view to showing how abortive efforts at integration can cause conflict and/or cooperation between two contiguous nation-states.

Chapter five eventually dissects and demonstrate the data collected. It will mainly covers all the hypotheses basic to this study in as far as they are proved or disproved. Thus, the validity of the three hypotheses is tested in this chapter. This chapter also offer general recommendations, policy recommendations, besides raising issues for further research.

1.9.3 Footnotes

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----- It is important to note that in relation to our second hypothesis. Uganda's internal political developments are emphasized because of the relative manifest political instability in Uganda as compared to Kenya. In effect therefore, political instability is seen as the condition emerging upon economic and political mismanagement of the political system. Consequently, mismanagement can be seen in incessant attempts to quell political dis-affection, increased grandiose development schemes and continued trampling of citizenry's civil liberties. During the period under study, these conditions among others obtained in Uganda. Such a setting had an impact on the conflictive and cooperative dyadic interaction between the two countries.

CHAPTER TWO

TRADE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN KENYA AND UGANDA

2.0 Introduction

Interaction between nation-states usually rotate around trade, diplomacy and socio-cultural exchanges. This is the case because of certain reasons. First, no single nation-state in the international system is completely independent, dependent or totally self-sufficient.

Second, proximity and contiguity burgeoned by the sociability of human beings dictate that nation-states exchange cultural tenets which are deemed fit for their welfare. Bilateral interaction can thus be seen as geared more or less towards mutual gains¹.

Even though nation-states perpetually hanker for mutuality in economic and political interaction, the fact of different and diverse power attributes encumbers the eventual possibility of equality in these exchanges. In this context, interactions between nation-states can also be perceived as inherently characterised with cooperation and conflict; Levels of cooperation and conflict may however not only differ but also shift in the event of particular actions by these nation-states.

It is important to note that we give conflict such indicators as rejections, accusations, denials, demands, warnings or threats. These indicators accord the concept conflict "reality" in inter-state interactions. To this effect, we are able to know when conflict has occurred when the above actions or statements are given between the two countries.

This chapter addresses Kenya-Uganda trade interactions. Specific political events in the two states' foreign relations are linked to certain trade trends. The main purpose then, is to co-vary trade trends to the specific cooperative and/or conflictive events. We presume that at the end of the inquiry, the role of trade in Kenya-Uganda relations will have been explicated.

We shall use a chronological approach to this examination. By this we mean that the period 1964-1990 will be divided into various sub-periods. These sub-periods will coincide with certain regime sessions in either Uganda or Kenya. Let it be noted however that it really is the changes in Uganda that dictate our sub-period analysis; reason being, and as will be inferred from the inquiry, Uganda depended more on Kenya; consequently changes in Uganda's regimes provide a meaningful basis for studying trade interactions and

their ultimate effect on Kenya-Uganda relations. On the other, hand leadership change has occurred only once in Kenya; 1978. Kenya's foreign policy stances have thus been relatively continuous. Again Kenya's relative political stability makes it possible for Uganda to depend on her.

2.1 Convergence of National-Interests' in Trade Interaction?, 1964-1976)

'Just as modern nations are politically and economically interdependent, so do they rely upon each other for resources and commodities which enable them to develop and sustain viable economies',².

This assertion introduces two gambits of analysis that we find meaningful here.

On one level, the idea of interdependence is considered basic in Kenya-Uganda relations. This is the case because the two nation-states' depend on each other for commodities and export/import services. Even then, the extent to which one economy was/is more dependent on the other and in effect how this affects the countries' relations is examined. This point of departure is predicated on the position that individual

governments attempt to benefit from international exchanges while upholding as much sovereignty as is possible³.

Second, the concept national-interest is regarded vital in these inter-state trade exchanges. National interests' define a country's perception of its good vis-a-vis the rest. Thus, in Kenya-Uganda trade interaction, the good of both countries is meant to be consistently upheld. The intriguing aspect however is that certain national interests are sacrificed on the alter of economic gains. Such an assertion takes into account the fact that the scarcity of economic resources and their centrality in fulfilling national values and aspirations makes interactions in the international system frequently of economic nature⁴.

We now deem it timely to analyse these trends. Available trade figures between Kenya and Uganda for the years 1964-71 (Table One) indicate that there was general increase in Uganda's exports to Kenya. It is for example clear from Figure two that Uganda's net foreign exchange between 1964 and 1971 was higher than that of Kenya. In this respect, Kenya paid more in terms of foreign currency to Uganda⁵. Again, whereas Uganda's percentage share of total exports in inter-state trade oscillated between Ksh.69 million and

Ksh.100 million, Kenya's percentage share of total exports in inter-state trade shifted between Ksh.48.6 million to Ksh.60 million; a range comparatively smaller than Uganda's (Figure Two). Certain reasons ably account for this trade imbalance.


Table One: % Shares of Each Country's Export

Years	Kenya's Exports to Uganda	Uganda's Exports to Kenya
1964	48.55	77.10
1965	47.13	74.25
1966	60.00	72.83
1967	57.10	68.55
1968	51.40	60.00
1969	57.10	82.85
1970	48.55	85.70
1971	57.10	91.40
1972	51.40	95.68
1973	57.10	97.10
1974	60.00	100.00
1975	57.10	100.00
1976	52.83	100.00

Source of Figures: Statistical Abstracts Kenya, 1971, 1975, 1978

FIGURE TWO

PERCENTAGE SHARES OF EACH COUNTRIES' EXPORTS 1964-1976



---+ Series 1K/U EXPORTS
----- Series 2U/K EXPORTS

Scale: Vertical Axle: 1cm = K£'000

Horizontal Axle: 1cm = 1 Year

Source: Statistical Abstracts 1971, 75 & 78

One can deduce from Figure two that there were falls and rises in Kenya-Uganda trade interaction. Uganda's exports to Kenya generally rose between 1967 and 1976. Though an indepth analysis of this trend will be done shortly, it is useful to note that between 1967 and 1973, Uganda had a relatively stable economy hardly ravaged by political mismanagement. It is in this context that Uganda ably exported goods as noted in the above paragraph.

In the same period too, Kenya and Uganda broadly cooperated. This period was characterised with efforts at nation-building and economic development in both countries. To this end therefore, little conflict-generating agents were evident in Kenya-Uganda interaction; apart from 1971.

The formation of the East African Community (EAC) with apparatus for enhanced inter-state trading also explains the heightened export trade of Uganda after 1967.

The creation of a common market with attendant machinery for enhancing trade between the two countries contributed to increased trade. This factor thus correlates positively with cooperation.

On the other hand, the Kenya-Uganda export trade was relatively on a straight line. In this regard therefore, Kenya's exports to Uganda during this period were relatively not affected by conflict.

During the formative years of the country's economies, the major aim of their governments was internal economic development. It has for instance been argued that 'throughout the years of Kenyatta's presidency, Kenya remained ambigous about the benefits of close cooperation with its neighbours'⁶. Kenya had gradually become excluded from the mainstream of regional politics after Tanzania had regrouped with Zambia in the "Mulungushi club"⁷. There is a way in which Kenya therefore became nonchalant about trading with Uganda. Put this way, trade trends between the two countries between 1964-1971 explain one aspect of their relations. Visibly, in-as-much-as she traded with Uganda, the fact of Uganda's alliance with Tanzania and Zambia pissed Kenya's prestige, a fact that explains Kenya's indifference to general East Africa cooperation. At another level, in May 1965, Kenya seized 75 tons of Chinese weapons being transported secretly from Tanzania via Kenya. Whether destined for remnants of Congolese rebels, the Ugandan border forces or Army units defending Obote from internal opposition, the weapons sparked a conflict in

Kenya-Ugandan relations. To secure the release of the arms and the accompanying Ugandan soldiers, Obote travelled to Nairobi to make a "personal apology" to the Kenya government.


This event illustrates the deduction that political events do not necessarily tamper with trade interactions between Kenya and Uganda. Table two shows that Kenya actually increased her exports to Uganda from Ksh.252m to Ksh307m, an increase of Ksh.55 million (1964-1965). We find this single event in the 1960s a clear indication of the earlier argument about Kenya's and Uganda's concern for internal economic development; a facet demonstrative of core national interests.

Table Two: Direction of Inter-Country Trade Between 1964-76 (Million Shillings)

Years	Exports to Uganda	Imports from Uganda
1964	252	+ 107
1965	307	164
1966	337	190
1967	296	93
1968	265	92
1969	319	163
1970	334	133
1971	383	222
1972	330	178
1973	436	345
1974	586	510
1975	517	488
1976	537	522

Source: East African Community (EAC): Review of Economic Activities in the EAC, 1976

FIGURE THREE
KENYA'S TRADE WITH UGANDA, SELECTED
YEARS: 1971 - 1987 (K£ millions)



--- Series 1 W/M EXPORT -- Series 2 W/M EXPORT

Scale: Vertical axis: 1cm = K£ 10, 000M
 Horizontal axis: 2cm = 1 Year.
 Source: IME, 1974 - 1990

Figure Two indicates that, 1966 marked a relatively high point of Kenyas exports to Uganda. It is useful to assert at this stage that cooperation between the two countries was at a high level. Importantly however, this cooperative tendency was a function of the establishment of the East African Community (EAC). Apart from the strive towards amalgamating economic capabilities, the formation of the EAC propelled the drive for amicable relations as integration required consensus. Why did Kenya export more to Uganda at this time than vice versa? This question is pertinent in understanding the antecedent trade factors that explain the nature of Kenya-Uganda relations. A valid explanation is found in Kenyas relatively better industrial potentialities⁹. Kenya had been developed as an industrial - cum - agricultural enclave in East Africa by the departing colonialists. She in effect had the comparative economic leverage of exporting more than Uganda.

However, to advance the preceding trends is also to suggest that Uganda had reasons for not exporting elsewhere. Precisely, Uganda could not have continually depended on Kenya had she the power capability to be independent. In way of explanation, Kenya and Uganda share a common border with the latter being a landlocked country. To the extent that Kenya

has had an outlet for her goods in Mombasa, Uganda relies on Kenya for re-export trade¹¹. Consequently, the high level of imported goods from Kenya as indicated on Table two demonstrates a brand of cooperation steeped in Ugandas dependence on the Kenyan port.

In a fairly general sense, Kenya-Uganda trade interactions in the 1960s then illustrate that despite the concern with internal economic development, their relations were cooperative. During the one instance that conflict reared its head, the need for commodities submerged the conflict between the two countries¹².

In 1971, there was a conflict between Kenya and Uganda upon President Obote's expulsion of Kenyans working in Uganda. During this year, Kenya's exports to Uganda hit an apex of Ksh.383 million. Thus, Kenya's exports to Uganda had grown by Ksh.135 million between 1964 and 1971 (Table Two). At the same time Kenya imported Ksh.115 million worth of goods from Uganda.

For purposes of showing the link between expulsion of Kenyan workers and actual cooperative and/or conflict nature of relationship, the figures on Table Three prove useful. It is lucid that after 1971 Kenya's exports to Uganda increased from Kfml9,150m to

K£1,992 in 1977. On much closer scrutiny, the immediate two years after the conflictive event (1971), Kenya increased her exports by K£1,740. Before attempting to extricate the significance of the above figures, let us look at Ugandas part of the trade.

Table Three: Kenya's Trade with Uganda, Selected years 1971-87 (K£)

	1971	1973	1975	1977	1979	1981	1983	1985	1987
Exports	19,150	21,890	25,855	51,992	37,747	52,611	71,476	70,071	69,687
Imports	8,026	4,668	1,447	581	804	1,010	855	2,585	910

Source: Compiled from International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Direction of Trade Statistics (1974, 1977, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1990))

Still on Table Three, Kenya's imports from Uganda fell from K£8,026m in 1971 to K£581m in 1977. It is thus safe to argue that Kenya's export trade to Uganda grew in an inversely proportional manner to that of Uganda. Save this, Obote's action of expelling Kenyan workers resident in Uganda did not impair trade interaction between the two countries. The figures on Table three however demonstrate a disparity in Kenyan exports as opposed to imports from Uganda. This fact then goes to be demonstrated in the trade imbalance between Kenya and Uganda - which is even more

decipherable on Table One. At this point, one wants to draw certain deductions about the 1971 event and the succeeding trends of trade.

Essentially, Kenya was more independent in terms of commodities when compared to Uganda which imported heavily from Kenya. The interesting aspect of this dependency however was that it did not spill-over into the political arena, so much as to reduce Kenyas exports, nor even to dislocate the cooperative nature of relations between them. Again, it is significant to reiterate that there was a congruence of national-interests based on their trade. Ultimately then, if Uganda was to tamper with the generally collaborative nature of relations, this could emanated from the concern with imbalances in trade. This is a facet of Kenya-Uganda trade that we shall attempt to address shortly. It indeed relates to conflict and trade imbalances.

At a slightly different level, the immediate tangible gains to be extracted from exportation of goods overrode the conflict caused by expulsion of workers. We thus concur with Adrienne Armstrongs assertion that, "... generally speaking, a nation with great economic resources has more influence on events in the international system and greater security against pressure from other nations"¹³.

For us to draw adequate inferences about the conflictual nature of relations created by trade imbalances, we need to examine Amin's advent to power. General Idi Amin Dada, the military leader during President Obote's reign staged a coup de tat in September 1971 while the latter was attending a United Nations Conference at Singapore. We shall analyse the effect of this event on Kenya-Uganda trade and ultimately on relations between Kenya and Uganda under a new sub-title.

2.2 Inconsistency in Trade Patterns: Aspects of Conflict and Cooperation (1971-1978)

Before we embark on examining the nature of trade interactions between 1971 and 1977, it is worthwhile to examine the figure.

In a fairly broad sense, Kenya-Uganda export trade increased after 1971 while her imports from Uganda decreased. It is sensible to infer that Kenya therefore experienced trade surpluses to the tune of K£70,895. We want to argue that this nature of lopsided trade interaction indisposed the generally cooperative character of Kenya-Uganda relations. Such a deduction is evidenced in 1977 when the EAC broke up.

Figure three



Upon the collapse of the common market, the latent dis-affection with Kenya's dominant position in the East African Market saw a fall in Uganda's imports from Kenya. It is safe to argue that such a fall emanated from the endeavour on Uganda's part to seek for other markets other than Kenya; (Rwanda, Zaire, Burundi). Importantly therefore, it was the national interests of Uganda based on power that dictated this trade trend.

Despite this trend between 1977 and 1979, Kenya's exports to Uganda hit an apex of K£71,476M after five years from the low of K£37,747M. Worth of reiteration is the fact that the trade imbalance between the two countries was thus perpetuated. These state of affairs were a function of the relatively developed export sector of Kenya; which had been deliberately built by the British colonial masters. Again, Uganda's 'Economic War' against Asians had incapacitated the manufacturing base of Uganda and thereby enhanced her dependency on Kenya.

It is equally clear that unlike Figure one, Uganda's exports to Kenya generally declined between 1971 and 1987. As will be argued elsewhere, Amin's regime set in motion political and economic ripples that affected Uganda's economy. Due to the inability of Uganda's economy to cope with its internal demands for political and economic participation. Its ability

to export to Kenya at a level commensurate with her, was lower. This fact is nevertheless cognizant of Uganda's landlockedness. Of importance then, Kenya's exports to Uganda were higher because Kenya's Mombasa port handled Uganda's re-export trade.

On a more general level, the preceding figure illustrates the largely cooperative nature of Kenya-Uganda interaction. The complementarity of needs is evident in Uganda's lower export trade and her concomitant dependence on Kenya for re-export trade. On Kenya's part, her enhanced export trade to Uganda makes cooperation salient; conflict-causing agents are thus sidelined in the bid to uphold the foothold on Uganda's market. We shall now attempt an analysis of these trade trends and link them up with certain conflictive or cooperative events.

In 1972, President Amin visited Kenya where he held discussions with President Jomo Kenyatta "on matters of mutual interest between the two counties"¹⁴. It was announced (soon after that) that the Uganda-Tanzania border (closed since July the previous year) would be re-opened. Uganda's Minister for Information and Broadcasting Mr. Naburi disclosed that the decision had been reached because of "the useful outcome of the decisions which Idi Amin had had with President Kenyatta in Nairobi"¹⁵. Radio Kampala reported

on November 19th that President Amin had returned from Nairobi where he had held discussions with President Kenyatta on matters of mutual interest between the two countries and problems existing between Uganda and Tanzania. The Uganda-Tanzania border was reopened by President Amin at a ceremony at the border village of Mutukula on November 21st in the presence of Kenya's Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Power, Communications and Finance.

Observable from Table Four is a general increase in export goods to Uganda from 1971 when Amin took over power. Concurrently too is a general decline in the imports from Kenya between 1971 and 1977. In as much as Kenya received Amin's advent to power favourably, the preceding cooperative event ironically diverted Ugandas trade through Tanzania. Thus, since Uganda-Tanzania borders had now been opened, Uganda exported goods to Tanzania, a factor that denied Kenya the trade leverage she hitherto enjoyed¹⁶.

It will also be noted that the good favour with which Kenya received the change of guard in Uganda stemmed from the concern with Obote's "move to the left". Kenya had feared that Obote's acquaintance with socialist approaches to development would easily ingratiate him with President Nyerere of Tanzania whose development policies were (in the Arusha Declaration

1967) socialistic. In actual sense the concern was with an alienated Kenya bearing the looming power of two neighbouring countries with a common ideology.

Basic to Kenya's concern about an ideological alliance in East Africa, was the question of her security. During this time, the Cold-War was prime in the considerations of Africa's foreign policy makers. There was a worry that the East-West chessboard would not only subsume the newly attained sovereignty of African states, but would also inexorably tie her economies with either of the blocs. In this same respect, it was to Kenya's national interest that her capitalist-oriented economic and political system was not threatened, especially within the East African region.

It is then crucial to note that Kenya clearly supported Amin's advent to power, supposing that he would steer away from socialist-oriented approaches to development.

It is equally meaningful to remember that President Amin was regarded unfavourably in Tanzania¹⁷. Amin therefore had to bridge the gap between Kenya and Uganda with the purpose of counterbalancing Tanzania's indisposition towards her. Uganda was weary too about Obote's asylum in Tanzania. Combined with the fact

that she required an ally in the region to bolster her legitimacy, Amin identified more with Kenya; a fact which accounts for their cooperation during this period after 1971.

The preceding two analyses of Amin's presence in power do not necessarily explain the nature of trade trends between Kenya and Uganda. As we have observed, trade did continue to thrive between the two countries. However, to the extent that Uganda exported less to Kenya is explicable in the cooperative event wherein Kenya mediated between Uganda and Tanzania. Basic to this event then is an emergent inherent hostility between Kenya and Uganda. This hostility was based on Uganda's indifference to Kenya's friendly gesture of mediation. To this end, the general downward trend of Kenya's imports from Uganda (Figure Two) is explicable.

To go back to our initial observation about conflict being superceded by cooperation between the two nation-states and vice versa, the following comment of President Amin serves illustration;

'Our special gratitude goes to one of Africa's leading statesmen, a leader who has spent all his life in the struggle for freedom and independence - Mzee Jomo Kenyatta. We in Uganda appreciate Mzee's great concern for East African Unity (Kenya-Uganda cooperation) as witnessed by the fact that he has sent all his cabinet ministers to be present on this occasion'¹⁸.

In the light of all the foregoing arguments, conflictual Kenya-Uganda relations even upon Amin's advent to power were not reflected in trade trends.

Of salient recognition too, is the event that saw Amin expel scores of Asian entrepreneurs from Uganda. President Amin argued that the Asian community engaged in trading malpractices that had led to capital outflow from Uganda¹⁹. As Adar and Ngunyi aptly observe, Uganda's export trade after 1971 significantly decreased. As indicated in Table Three, Uganda's exports to Kenya fell from Km£8,026 to Km£504 in 1977. As Adar and Ngunyi argues,

"The Indian community which had dominated the manufacturing sector in Uganda was also the most vibrant actor in intra-EAC trade in Uganda ... Since the Indian community in Uganda had dominated the manufacturing sector as already mentioned, they were also bound to dominate Uganda's intra-EAC export trade ... hence, their expulsion saw something close to collapse of this trade'²⁰.

For purposes of elaborating on our initial proscrutation of certain trade figures till a later period, the foregoing provides a basis for analysis. Besides Amin's action lay a desperate attempt to boost the prestige of Uganda in East Africa.²¹ To the extent that Uganda was the "economic backyard" of Kenya,

endeavour at rejuvenating the economic perils of Uganda set in motion extra events that jeopardized the state of relations between the two countries.

Essentially, by expelling the Asian community, Uganda's local entrepreneurial base was shattered given that the indigenous Africans allocated the Asian businesses were merely interested in massive exploitation of hitherto 'denied' wealth. Least were the African entrepreneurs bothered about sustainable economic investment in the allocated businesses²². Basic to this event then, was a propulsion on the trade arena. As Table Three demonstrates, lesser exports accrued from Uganda. Evidently then, whereas Kenya exported goods worth Kmf.322,209 between 1971 and 1987, Uganda only exported goods worth Kmf.20,866 in the same period. Uganda thus experienced a trade imbalance to the tune of Kmf.30,143. This imbalance translates in percentage to this: Kenya controlled 93 per cent of the total trade between the two countries in the 1970s and the 1980s. Within the same span of time, Uganda controlled only 7 per cent of Kenya-Uganda trade.

In order to compensate for this shortcoming, President Idi Amin Dada sought for deviationary tactics; he claimed portions of Kenyan territory in

1976²³. This was a conflictive action that could be explained through Kenya's export trade leverage which gave her trade surpluses.

Kenya controlled 85.7% of Kenya-Uganda trade by 1975²⁴. In this respect therefore, cooperation continued though of a lop-sided nature. Being brewed in the backdrop of such cooperation was latent conflict, exemplified in Uganda's border claims on Kenya the following year. Such aspects of mixed cooperative and conflictive strands in Kenya -Uganda relations take into account structural-realistic provisions about endogenous nation-state conditions springing into nation-states' interaction²⁴. As one scholar aptly asserts, states endeavour to acquire, sustain and expand power capabilities²⁵. More to the case under study, certain economic and political factors emanating from both Kenya and Uganda determine trading interactions with each other and correspondingly on overall Kenya - Uganda relations.


The inconsistent nature of trade interactions, between Kenya and Uganda is further demonstrated in the period after 1976. Table Four shows that Kenya's exports increased from K£33,162 in 1976 to K£51.992 in 1977 despite the imminent tense relations engendered by Amin's border designs on Kenyan territory.

Table Four: Kenya's Trade with Uganda (1970-1979) Figures in K£'000

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Exports	16,698	14,150	16,507	29,557	39,676	32,910	33,162	51,992	38,433	37,741
Imports	10,048	8,026	7,447	4,060	3,843	1,466	818	581	1,977	804
Balance	6,650	11,124	8,924	24,697	35,833	31,424	32,344	51,411	36,456	39,943

Source: Compiled from Economic Survey (Republic of Uganda 1973, 1978, 1981, Mean Exchange Rate (1970-79) - K£ = 2.69 US\$)

FIGURE FOUR
KENYA'S TRADE WITH UGANDA (1970-1979)
FIGURES IN K£'000



----- Series 1 K/U EXPORTS —+— Series 2 U/K EXPORTS

Vertical Axis: 1cm = K£5 million
 Horizontal Axis: 2cm = 1 year
 Source: Economic Survey (K&U 1973&1981)

Figures on Table Four also show a slightly different pattern from 1978 to 1980. It is noteworthy that Kenya's exports fell from K£51,992 in 1977 to K£37,747 in 1979. During this period the East African Community had collapsed and Tanzania was embroiled in a war with Uganda. As relates to Kenya, Okoth states that: 'For Uganda-Kenya relations there were heightened mudslinging, name-calling confrontation politics and aggressive pursuits of separate and divisive ways despite the rhetoric to the contrary'²⁵ (sic). This situation lucidly indicates the state of relations in the trade arena as relates to Kenya. Even then, trade did not come to a halt in the condition of such conflicts.

It is however not exactly clear why Uganda's exports to Kenya should have fallen from K£1,977 in 1978 to K£804 in 1979. A probable reason can be found in what Jorgensen²⁶ has called Uganda's "reduced industrial output". Uganda's economy had experienced in the 1970s grandiose economic projects, mismanagement of public funds which drained the country off resources requisite for generating revenue. Michael Twaddle argues that:

'The most noticeable change from previous years is the large increase in expenditure on defense in both the recurrent and development budgets. Military spending in the development budget jumped from Sh51 million to Sh160 million and currently absorbs 25 percent of the total development budget'²⁷.

By 1977 for example, industrial activity was in decline, production of industrial chemicals and fertilizers was down by 50%. Manufacture of metal products was down to only a fifth and sugar factories were producing below thirty (30%) of capacity ²⁸. This accounts for the decline in export and import trade in the period noted above.

One can therefore draw certain inferences about Kenya-Uganda relations in the 1970s. Though Uganda occasionally released overtly belligerent statements vis-a-vis Kenya, the need for continued trade interaction necessitated immediate "mending of fences". Consequently, the fact of dependence on Kenya²⁹ culminated in Uganda always taking the role of reconciliator. Kenya did not take this role due to her power attribute of the Mombasa port. Thus, cooperation superceded conflict. Such an assertion begs elaboration.

For a more illustrative depiction of trade interaction in the 1970s, Figure Three accords us a basis for analysis. As in the case with Figure Two, Kenyas export trade with Uganda generally rose between 1970 and 1979. On the contrary, Uganda's exports to Kenya generally fell.

One can deduce from this general inference that though certain conflictive events (as has been analysed in the foregoing) interspersed Kenya and Uganda, the concurrence of trading interests between the two countries overrode these conflicts. Such mutual interdependence was however lop-sided to Kenya's advantage. Uganda's relatively lower export trade perpetuated the cooperative nature of their relations because it was burgeoned by Kenya's interests to sustain this status quo.

More specifically, 1974 marked a high point of Kenya's exports to Uganda for two reasons. One, Kenya and Uganda experienced a broadly un-eventful period of cooperative interaction. In fact, during this period there was no event that explicitly tampered with trade between the two countries; thus exports increased between 1972 and 1974 as indicated in the figure. This was thus a unique period (in this analysis) because cooperation and trade significantly co-varied. Second, the EAC was functioning then, though with latent disaffections about Kenya's preponderant economic position in the scheme. Indeed, because of this, Kenya exported more goods to the East African market, Uganda inclusive.

The year 1977 marks an all high export print in Kenya's exports. This fact is explicable in the background of Uganda's dependence on Kenya for re-export trade. It is also clear that Uganda was then experiencing economic and political problems of a magnitude that made it necessary that she depend on outside markets for her sustenance. The crumbling of her economic resource base caused by internecine warfare between the warring factions bent on dislodging Amin resulted in less export output. Kenya not only took the chance to export more, but also boosted her power capabilities vis-a-vis Uganda, given the circumstance of handling Uganda's re-export trade from other markets.

The fall in Kenya's exports to Uganda after 1977 are a function of the dis-integration of the EAC. The break-up of the community reduced the framework or the scope within which Kenya easily interacted with Uganda. The Common Currency Board, the Common Market were dissolved, thus undercutting the economic basis for trade interaction. It is interesting to note however that this was to change in the 1980s.

In August 1976, President Amin for example sent a delegation to Kenya saying that one of the issues that Uganda would discuss was a new agreement for normalisation of trade ties³⁰. Related to this

question was the issue of transportation of Uganda's exports and imports through Kenya which were halted on Kenya's insistence that Uganda pay for transportation costs in advance. Moreover, Kenya Railways demanded for decentralised services. This made Kenya virtually autonomous in effect placing an extra burden on Uganda to establish a railway; an operation that called for Kenya's assistance.

The key indicator of cooperation between the two countries then in terms of trade was complementarity of needs. In this context, whereas Uganda's exports and imports were circumscribed by the Kenyan demand to have them pay in advance, they had to bargain with Kenya. Clearly then, Kenya's national-interest was relatively preponderant at this time. Uganda's role as reconciliator was predicated on the calling of what Morgenthau has called "survival". This was reflected not only in trade transactions but also in conflictual political events - 1971, 1976 (elaborated on in the foregoing) that required normalization of relations.

.3 Trends of Trade Interaction in the 1980s

The 1980s perhaps offer the most intriguing pattern of trade transactions between the two countries. As we shall see shortly, there were several falls and rises in trade transactions; sometimes

commensurate and sometimes in-commensurate to either conflictive or cooperative events. It will be important to note at this juncture that the often "belligerent" President of Uganda Idi Amin had been forced to relinquish power³¹ and there were a series of short-lived regimes succeeding his deposition. Correspondingly, in Kenya; President Moi had come to power and the question then was whether the nature of relations could shift from inconsistency to consistency or what Vincent Khapoya would call continuity or change. For this study, the above background is vital to the extent that trade is a reflection of a country's level of economic development³². Its the levels of economic development that dictate the quantity of exported goods between these contiguous states.

Table Five indicates that, Kenya's exports to Uganda increased from K£66,378 to K£71,476 between 1980 and 1983, an increase of K£5,098. Uganda's exports to Kenya however decreased from K£1,206 to K£855 within the same period. Closer scrutiny of these trade figures reveals that there was a fall of Kenyan exports to Uganda between 1980 and 1981 of K£8,767. On Uganda's side, there was a fall of a mere K£196. If Kenya had a significant export trade fall then it was a function of the economic conditions that characterised the country then. There was imminent famine and drought that for instance forced the

leadership of the country to seek for relief aid in the United States of America³³. Thus, her exporting capacity decreased markedly. As relates to Uganda, though she was embroiled in internecine civil warfare³⁴, the fact that Kenya imported less by a sheer K£196 demonstrates Kenya's preponderance over Uganda in trade transactions. Kenya was relatively more independent on other markets; Britain, Germany, the Netherlands.

Table Five: Kenya's Trade with Uganda, 1980-89 (K£'000)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Exports	66,378	52,611	58,466	71,476	67,583	70,673	72,625	69,687	60,623	72,625
Imports	1,206	1,010	1,390	855	1,149	2,585	2,155	910	723	851

Source: Economic Survey 1985:97, 1990: 87


President Obote aware that he needed extra goodwill to anchor his rise to power, and consolidate the political economic conditions of his country, met President Moi (Kenya) at (Bungoma District, Kenya), within a month of taking oath of office. Certain collaborative decisions emerged from this meeting that directly touched on Kenya-Uganda trade transactions and indeed on the cooperative nature of their relations.

First, the two presidents agreed to re-schedule all the debts which Uganda owed Kenya and to let Uganda railway wagons proceed straight to Mombasa instead of unloading at Malaba to later transfer the coffee to Kenya trains³⁵. Importantly, this was a friendly gesture on Kenya's part. It will also be recalled that in the mid 1970s, Uganda had experienced stockpiling and smuggling of coffee at Malaba on Kenya's border worth 70,000 tons³⁶. Such was the nature of conflictive trading dynamics that were now streamlined in this meeting.

Second, Presidents' Moi and Obote consented to specific administrative and security mechanisms meant to deter illegal trade (magendo) which was common at the border provinces. Ultimately then, cause for animosity and tension caused by illegal trade was nipped.

Furthermore, Uganda pledged to tighten security and in effect curb harassment of Kenyan truck envoys on transit to Uganda and Rwanda. A probable improvement of the security condition in Uganda thus meant a reduction of the fear that Kenya citizens could become victims in Uganda. Reasonably therefore, Kenya's exports to Uganda did substantatively increase between 1980 and 1983 and even more significantly in 1986 (Table Five).

FIGURE FIVE
KENYA'S TRADE WITH UGANDA, 1980-89
(K£'000)



Series 1K/U EXPORTS
 Series 2U/K EXPORTS

Scale: Vertical Axis: 1cm = K£10 million
 Horizontal Axis: 2cm = 1 Year
 Source: Economic Surveys 1985&1990

As can be seen on Figure Five, Kenya's exports to Uganda did increase as argued above. Significant in this rise was the meeting alluded to in the foregoing. Thus, again here, when specific arrangements for enhancing cooperation were made, not only did trade increase to Kenya's advantage but on the overall, cooperation characterised their relations. It is to this effect that Okoth argues, 'Indeed by 1985, Uganda had emerged as the most important destination for Kenya exports after Britain and West Germany,'³⁷.

The figures on Table Five further show that there was significant fall in Ugandas exports to Kenya after 1987. Welch³⁸ has also argued, that Uganda attempted from 1985 to reduce her dependence on Kenya by seeking markets in the Sudan and Djibouti. There thus exists a linkage between this trade aspect with the border skirmishes that occurred in 1987 between the two countries.

On December 10, 1987, there ensued armed confrontation between Kenya's security forces and Ugandan soldiers at Busia. To demonstrate the intensity of conflict the President Museveni warned that Uganda would use appropriate "self-defense" measures "if Kenyan security forces did not stop firing at Ugandan troops, people and territory"³⁹. President Moi simultaneously alleged that "two hundred Kenyan

teenagers had traversed Uganda in transit to Libya for subversive military training"⁴⁰. Thus, Uganda was "interfering in Kenya's internal affairs". The tense border situation culminated in fuel rationing in Uganda given that trade between the two countries had come to a standstill. Why did the two Presidents release such overtly war-like statements then? This situation presents an aspect of conflict in the two states relations that ought to be linked to their trading interaction.

One can deduce from the foregoing paragraph that Kenya and Uganda had sought for trade markets besides theirs. There was emerging then an element of "don't-care" attitude from Ugandan. If the Kenyan claim that Uganda connived in acts likely to destabilise her were true, then Uganda had clearly taken a different attitude to Kenya as compared to the 1970s. This however proved untrue when the two Presidents' met on 28 December, 1987 at Malaba. At this meeting, Uganda asked for a normalization of trade ties explaining the border skirmishes on grounds of "disgruntled internal elements"⁴¹. On the other hand therefore, whereas Uganda could afford to give a harsh statement, her landlocked position still made her vulnerable to economic blockades. She therefore budged despite having sought for trade outlets to the north, Ethiopia

and Djibouti⁴². In connection with this inference, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye have correctly said, '... Asymmetries in interdependence are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another',⁴³.

Kenya then was more influential than Uganda given the circumstances of the power attribute of the Mombasa port. It is to this extent that cooperation re-emerged despite initial belligerent statements from Kenya and Uganda.

In January 1988, Kenya and Uganda became parties to a joint communique in which cooperation in problems related to the flow of traffic along the common border were settled⁴³. This had a direct effect on the trade trends after 1988, until 1990. Table Five demonstrates the general increase in Kenya's exports to Uganda and a corresponding rise in Uganda's imports from ^{Kenya} Uganda. This upward trend is explicable in the improvement of relations subsequent upon the signing of the communique. Thus, there is a strong case for arguing that whenever Kenya and Uganda resolved conflict-causing factors, trading interaction depicted the broad levels of heightened cooperation. Such was the case in 1981 and 1987 for instance when Presidents Obote and Museveni of Uganda met President Moi separately as has been recorded in the foregoing sub-topic.

2.4 Conclusion

The foregoing analysis has attempted to demonstrate that national-interests of a nation-state influence(ed) the way the two states related to one another.

In relation to our first hypothesis, it became clear that the dependence on Kenya by Uganda contributes to certain Ugandan foreign policy orientations. Concomitantly, the provision of a market for Kenyan goods dictates certain Kenyan foreign stances. /In short, Kenya and Uganda are forced to shelve belligerent attitudes and pursue functionally useful foreign policy options vis-a-vis one another. If we take Abisaab's⁴⁴ argument that trade between states continues even in the face of simmering conflict, then this study illustrates the salience of nations' survival motivations.

Again, in view of the preceding analysis, it can be predicted that Kenya and Uganda will continue to harbour overt or covert tense relations. As indicated in this chapter, the relatively higher economic development of Kenya, its endowment as a littoral state, plus its harbour facilities, will continue to accord her leverage vis-a-vis Uganda's probable power

aspirations of submerging Kenya's prestige. Even with this latent weary relationship, the need to sustain the economy of Uganda will always make her back down from releasing terse and absolute statements implying the dispensability of Kenya. Furthermore, as the case has been in the past, Uganda is bound to continue searching for outlets for her goods to reduce dependence on Kenya.

As was deduced in the 1980s, trade continued to thrive to Kenya's advantage despite frequent conflicts between the two countries. This state of affairs clearly demonstrates the inconsistency in the two states relations viz: cooperation and conflict. One can therefore safely conclude that trade does not get affected in cases of conflict causing events between Kenya and Uganda. In cases where trade trends are disrupted, it normally is a function of factors accruing from a particular nation-state rather than a result of the nature of relations at a particular time.

The trade imbalances between Kenya and Uganda also demonstrated that Uganda depends a great deal on Kenya for imports. Kenya exports more to Uganda and this culminates in trade surpluses. Clearly then in as much as Kenya has the vested interest of perpetuating her export trade, Uganda has an explicit economic need

to import from Kenya. This situation is enhanced by Uganda's landlocked position. She depends on Kenya to re-export most of her goods.

Simply stated, the complementarity of needs in Kenya-Uganda trade renders conflict-causing tendencies subservient to the mutual benefits evident in cooperation.

On another level yet, such leadership as comes to power in Uganda will always be perceived suspiciously by the Kenyan foreign policy makers. This observation is based on the fact that a running tense era of relations imbues ingrained distrust between foreign policy makers of neighbouring states. Taking our theoretical framework as the basis for this postulation, the realist perspective of upholding national interests defined in terms of will constantly culminate in tensions between the two states. This assertion is based on the view of the 'irritable' nature of relations that existed between 1971-78. By irritable we denote susceptibility of foreign policy orientations to be adverse and harsh in circumstances of threatened economic interests or security per se.

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4.5.7.1
THE IMPACT OF CERTAIN UGANDA'S INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS ON KENYA-UGANDA RELATIONS

3.0 Introduction

The nature of relations between two contiguous nation-states is often determined by endogenous factors accruant from their body-politics'. This assertion is founded on the assumption that needs of states emanate from their internal setting. To this end, the crystallization of specific national-interests accruing from the nation-states affect and are in turn affected by the countries' foreign relations with its neighbours. This fact is for instance strongly advanced by structural-realist thinking¹. In the latter respect, nation-states do not only endeavour to concretize their felt interests through statesmen but also project foreign policies reflective of their "internal situation"². Indeed this is what most scholars refer to as countries foreign policy determinants.

This chapter seeks to examine the impact of certain Uganda's internal political developments on Kenya-Uganda relations. Specific events within Uganda are linked to certain conflictive and cooperative events in the two states' relations. It is hoped that

this correlation will elucidate the significance of the "political turmoil" in Uganda on its interaction with Kenya. We shall not attempt a corresponding indepth analysis on Kenyas part. This is because available data shows that there has been less civil dissension in Kenya as compared to Uganda.

On the other hand however, Kenya's political condition during the period under study could be described as depicting latent political instability. This kind of instability as contrasted with Uganda's is not characterised with evident civil, group or general upheaval. Kenya's condition is a-priori a function of the smooth transition from Kenyatta's regime to Moi's regime. Such transition allowed for institutional adaptation to the new leadership alongside allowing for continuity in foreign policy choices. The reference to latent however, specifically points to the Coup de tat in Kenya in 1982 which evidenced a rising disenchantment with the Moi regime. Further indicators of this disenchantment are referred to in this chapter: the Mwakenya group based outside the country is one of this.

This analysis of latent political instability is important to the extent that the latter evidence of an underground political grouping calling for change in

Kenya, finds a gateway in Uganda; thus the continued complaint on Kenya's part about Uganda's connivance with "disgruntled elements" bent on "causing chaos in the country.

This offers our analysis in this chapter particular emphasis. That the preceding chapter has shown continued cooperation despite occasional conflicts does not completely negate or even neutralise the latent tension between the two countries.

In this regard however, the concern with Uganda is further extended to its dependence on Kenya. As was demonstrated in Chapter One, Uganda's relative landlockedness makes her seek reconciliation upon occurrence of conflict-causing events. This is pertinent to the internal situation in Uganda in-so-far-as we would want to show how far Uganda takes the two issues seriously in relating to Kenya. On the other hand, the relative political stability that Kenya has experienced during the period under study, is equally linked to its effects on Uganda's internal situation. Thus, a co-variation is done between Kenya's relative stability and Uganda's internal situation to their overall relations. The various facets of conflict and cooperation that characterise

'national' bourgeoisie of Buganda owed their relatively privileged position among Africans in Uganda to the colonial alliance between the Buganda and the British⁶.

Consequently, from UPC perspective, the alliance between it and Kabaka Yekka (KY) was vital in bringing the Buganda Kingdom into the post-colonial state with least scathing. This alliance was also supposed to ensure electoral victory over the democratic party besides ascertaining UPC preponderance in the coalition government.

As Uganda moved towards a dominant one-party state in the period 1963-66, the rise of the UPC within parliament, district councils and kingdom legislatures was attended by conflict within the UPC⁷. The economic programme of the conservative faction of the UPC demanded for protection of privilege based on land and birth. The conservatives viewed with suspicion the slogan 'African Socialism' and emphasized state recognition of traditional rulers as a bulwark against socialism. They equally perceived group farms and cooperative societies as obnoxious encroachments on private property. This will be related to KANUS state-assisted capitalism soon after independence in 1963.

On 15 April 1966, President Obote presented an interim constitution without debate to the National Assembly sitting as citizens. The guide of the new order was 'one country, one parliament, one government, one people led by an executive president,⁸. All powers had thus been arrogated to the presidency.

In effect therefore, a path towards a one-party political system was in the making. Before perhaps examining the correlation of this internal political development to the political scenario in Kenya, it is meaningful to elaborate on its cause.

Kenya, like Uganda and many other African countries that had attained independence then, were inebriated with the newly won independence. The political sovereignty that Kenya and Uganda acquired from their former British masters was however coloured by initial colonial policies. The administrative institutions for economic and political management were basically British in nature. We want to argue that the tendency towards arrogating power to the emerging leadership was a reflection of the absolutist nature of colonial policy, as relates to according leeway for other interest groups in the policy-making process. In relation to the national-interests of both Kenya and

Uganda then, there was a concurrence as is seen in Kenya's quashing of an emerging political party, the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU). Cooperation between the two countries then during this period, can be safely seen within context of shared ideals of the emergent leaders in both countries.

We find it timely to draw a few inferences for this internal situation in Uganda on Kenya-Uganda relations. As was argued in the preceding chapter, both Kenya and Uganda were British colonies. The fact of a shared colonial heritage therefore developed a latent tendency towards cooperation. Such cooperation was based on shared educational and cultural tenets that had been imbibed from British colonialism. For us, in this chapter therefore, one question is crucial in understanding Kenya-Uganda relations. Were the internal political developments in Uganda similar to the internal political scenario in Kenya?: and if so, how did this affect their relations in the immediate post-independence period?

It is worthy of note that Kenya became independent with the Kenya African National Union (KANU) as the ruling party⁹. Despite its dominance, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) was a legally registered opposition party whose allegiances traversed

a sizeable section of the Kenyan ethnic groups¹⁰. It is also clear that the registration of the Kenya People's Union (KPU) in 1966 was an explicit derogation from the capitalist oriented KANU and a concomitant acclaim for "socialist-specific tenets". Such a setting in the immediate post-independence period is easily correlated with the one in Uganda.

In as much as the UPC had taken over power in 1962, its main concern (as has been indicated above) was to completely subsume any opposing faction. Even then, Jorgensen¹² aptly observes, 'although the UPC - KY alliance was based more on expediency than political principle, it was not without harmony of class interests'.

The corresponding crossing-over of KADU delegates in parliament after persistent lobbying by KANU representatives equally accorded the latter preponderance. The KPU was banned in 1966 (as well) giving KANU further absolute control for running state affairs. Now there is a strong case for arguing that such developments in Kenya and Uganda not only accrued from the need to sustain the 'status-quo'. Both the internal political situations afford a plane for perceiving the generally cooperative relations that

characterised the countries' relations in the immediate post-independence period. This is the case to the extent that the contiguity and continued complementary interdependence made it possible for state machineries in both states to borrow approaches of management from each other. Let us qualify this by according empirical fact.

The basic elements of UPC economic policy which came to be dubbed as the 'commanding heights' strategy were threefold:

- (1) the establishment of new state corporations and the expansion and reorganization of existing 'parastatal' bodies inherited from the colonial period;
- (2) the setting forth of a more active role in economic development in the second five-year plan; and
- (3) the ambitious nationalisation measures issued as part of the 1969-70 'move to the left'¹³

In Kenya, Sessional Paper No.10¹⁴ was launched as the guide for Kenya's economic development. It cherished a policy of mixed economy where both public

and private sectors collectively played a part. There was thus substantive concurrence of both approaches to development; Sessional Paper No. 10 and the "Commanding Heights Strategy". It is also increasingly safe to assert that the modes of economic policy pursued by both countries were similar. Cause for conflict-generating events was thus reduced.

Divergent approaches to economic development could have engendered varied frameworks for defining their national interests. Even though their national interests were not similar, given the different levels of economic development and the particular political conditions and needs of each country. The similarity in Kenya's Sessional Paper No. 10 and the Commanding Heights Strategy led to a concurrence in inter-state interaction; conflict was in effect curtailed. This state of relations takes a different picture after 1966.

The Common-Man's-Charter (Dec. 1969) outlined the ideological framework of President Obote's 'move to the left'. While it accorded a place to private firms and foreign investment in the economy, the charter suggested that certain private firms should be nationalised - in order to place control of the means

of production in the hands of the 'people as a whole. The charter also called for income redistribution to close the income gap between the rich and the poor and widen the market for consumer goods.

As Chemonges recorded, the period between 1966 and 1971 also saw relative stability in Uganda.

'Indeed, it was during this period that the political alliance between Uganda and Tanzania to counter Kenya's economic preponderance in the region was very much in evidence',¹⁵.

The political 'serenity' at home gave Uganda the chance to initiate the common - man's charter that was directly antithetical to Kenya's state-assisted capitalism. Again Kenya's African socialism had certain principles that ran counter to the common-man's charter viz.

- (1) Economic non-alignment not to mean a policy of isolation any more than political non-alignment implied a refusal to participate in world affairs. It meant a desire and a willingness to borrow technological knowledge and proven economic methods from any country without commitment.
- (2) Did not depend for its success on a satellite relationship with any country or a group of countries. African socialism was in Kenya's

perspective therefore pragmatic¹⁶. In this vein, Mboya argued, 'African socialism is designed to be a working system in a modern setting, fully prepared to adopt itself to changing circumstances and new problems'¹⁷.

Uganda's brand of socialism was formulated along Tanzania's scientific socialism¹⁸. If this was the case then, cause for dissension lay in divergent approaches to development. Let us see how this ramified itself on Kenya-Uganda relations.

As was noted earlier, the internal situation in Uganda afforded her the chance to pursue policies that in Kenya's view undermined her ideological stand. It was such a state of affairs that introduced tension between the two countries after 1969. Uganda's friendly relations with Tanzania were for instance demonstrated in the repatriation of non-Ugandan unskilled workers from Kenya in 1971. This concretized the growing fears amongst Kenya's foreign policy makers that a connivance was in the making between Kampala and Dar-es-Salaam to isolate Kenya in East Africa. As Chemonges aptly notes,

'Kenya's cold reaction to the January 1971 coup in Uganda and its treatment of the deposed President Obote thereafter, seems to confirm Kenya's dislike for the policy of the UPC government'¹⁷.

Odhiambo also concurs with this view point. He argues that one of the cause of conflict in Eastern Africa is in issues of ideological differences. He notes that the up-shoot of socialist-oriented approaches to develop in Somalia, Uganda and Sudan in the second half of the 1960s, 'Variously aroused a sense of insecurity in the non-socialist countries of the region such as Kenya',¹⁹ ...

Visibly then, the early periods of the 1970s can be seen as having been characterised by conflict between Kenya and Uganda - for reasons related to ideological leanings emanating from Uganda. Such tension as characterised the two countries, are illustrable in Kenya's connivance in the 1971 Amin coup. This was quite inconsistent to the cooperative state of relations preceding 1969. Let us examine the situation that obtained after the coup, and its impact on Kenya-Uganda relations in the 1970s.

Just a few days before the coup in 1971, 700 British troops arrived in Kenya. There were in addition reports that two Israeli generals were sent to Nairobi to help organise the coup²⁰. Israeli soldiers were also reported to have been seen careering around in the streets of Kampala after the coup, besides

flying planes in Amin's victory parade²¹. Furthermore, British intelligence officers acquired from the contingent in Nairobi as well as Colonel Bolka Bar-Lev, the head of the Israeli military mission in Uganda were Amin's chief advisors in the days after the coup²². It is this lucid blend between Kenya's uneasiness about Uganda's alliance with Tanzania and forces bent on under-cutting socialism in Uganda that brought a new leaf of relations between the two countries after 1971.

After the coup, Amin announced that he intended to reverse the deteriorating relations between Kenya and Uganda. Commensurately too, President Kenyatta dispatched a senior government minister to Kampala, and in April sent Vice President Danial Arap Moi to the state funeral of the Kabaka²³. These gestures of friendliness were apparently geared towards enhancing the national interests of both countries. Kenya had seen a chance to win over Uganda from the emerging socialist-circuit in the region. Uganda equally saw a chance in identifying with a "Big-Brother" in East Africa, a situation that could aid bolster its legitimacy internally. Importantly then, it was the internal political developments in Uganda that had culminated in this re-institution of cooperative relations between Kenya and Uganda.

1970-1989 Political Developments in Uganda and their Impact on Kenya-Uganda Relations

After the coup, power passed yet more decisively into the army's hands with the dissolution of parliament and all local councils and with the civil administration demoralised by periodic purges²⁴. But Uganda's army was already riddled with factions as Amin sought to consolidate his hold by lashing at troops that hailed from Obote's tribe, the Lango, and its neighbours, the Acholi²⁵. Many of these were killed or fled to the Sudan and Tanzania; they were replaced by recruits from Amin's own West Nile district. The army's command structure was upset by the rapid promotion of men whose loyalties were guaranteed by their tribal or religious affiliation²⁶.

The new regime initially enjoyed goodwill but this was soon dissipated. Ugandans as a whole had to endure an increasingly assertive and undisciplined army. It is useful to note that machinery for clamping down on dissenting opinion was therefore increased. The heightened steps of quashing all nature of disaffection in effect bred not only a culture of fear in Uganda, but equally aroused concern in East Africa. This concern emanated from the inhuman manner in which

Amin's regime dealt with other interest groups. The concern was also founded on the weariness about an emerging dictatorship in the region, whose power designs were apparently not limited to Uganda's territory.

It is in this vein that we see this internal political development as causing tension with Kenya. We want to argue that such tension affected the way the two countries related to each other in the 1970s and early 1980s given the Kenya's suspicions about what the real designs of Uganda in the region were. And it was indeed on Kenya's national interest of political survival that this tension was based. Development and welfare expenditure was for instance cut as military appropriations expanded. As Nyaduwa argues,

'The military establishment grew in terms of numbers and the regime also embarked on major weapon modernisation with arms from Libya, Israel and the USSR. Amin acquired 12 Soviet Mig 21s, a number of Soviet battle tanks and Sam II Ground to Air Missiles'²⁷.

The foregoing picture of the political environment in Uganda had two effects on Kenya-Uganda relations. On matters of security, the continued improvement of Uganda's military hardware caused alarm in Nairobi. Such a state of affairs was compounded by the ruthlessness with which dissenting views were quashed

in Uganda. Kenya's foreign policy makers as noted earlier, feared that a power-hungry ruler had emerged in Uganda who would not stop at anything short of actualizing his intense drive for power in the region. The unexpected trend towards acquiring weaponry from the Eastern Bloc, to which Kenya was not exactly averse, also rendered Kenya's perception of emerging political events in Uganda cautious.

Such caution was not only predicated on Uganda's explicit alliance with the Eastern Bloc. It was also based on Uganda's continued efforts to arm herself; in effect, improving her armaments vis-a-vis Kenya and the other countries in the region. In this light, though cooperation straddled on between Kenya and Uganda, the arms race that Uganda initiated led to tension between the two countries.

At yet another level, Amin was desperately attempting to cling to power in the circumstances of a mismanaged economy aggravated by grandiose economic projects²⁸. The implementation of Amin's 'Economic war' saw the expulsion of the Asian community that was apparently instrumental in boosting Uganda's revenue bases²⁹. This was the case in as far as Amin attempted to ingratiate his cohorts to him. This mode

of consolidating power ironically had the effect of not Africanizing the economy but removing the key contributors to economic development, the Asians.

Such actions as the latter were understandable within context of boosting Uganda's prestige in the Africanization endeavour. There emerged however growing disenchantment with the Amin regime in both Kenya. If Amin had expelled Asians, a group of entrepreneurs who were seen in Kenya to be equally exploitative, there was implicit pressure on Kenya's part to follow suit. President Kenyatta's prudence dictated that it could be anti-Kenya's national-interests to sever the stronghold of commercial business in Kenya. Correspondingly too, there was ingrained in Kenya's leadership abhorrence for Uganda's leadership for having implicitly challenged the continued presence of foreign entrepreneurs in East Africa. It is noteworthy here that Asians had majorly appeared in East Africa during the formative period of the Kenya-Uganda railway³⁰.

To hastily undercut their linkage with the developing East African economies, would be to sound a death-knell for their commercial sectors. And this is indeed reflected in the trade trends analysed in the preceding chapter after 1972. Uganda's export trade took a downward trend: explicable in this single event.

There is in effect a strong case for arguing that the internal economic and political developments in Uganda between 1971 and 1973 indisposed the good state of amicable relations the two countries had hitherto enjoyed. This was a function of Uganda's (Amin's) outright clamping at the opposition which made him identify with the East; and the prestige-searching (expulsion of Asians) actions of Amin that saw Uganda sag her entrepreneurial foundation besides implicitly antagonizing Kenya - as has been argued in the foregoing.

To this end, Okoth P.G. has put it thus,

'The President (Amin) took pride in this act and felt obliged to 'advise' other African states to liquidate economic exploitation in their countries by foreigners, the way he had done in his country. He did this in a provocative style, implying that it was President Jomo Kenyatta who was himself hindering rapid Africanization of the African economy'³¹. It is noteworthy then that the particular internal political development of expulsion of Asians spilled over to the then generally cooperative relations between the two countries causing conflict.

Increasing insecurity in Uganda also culminated in the disappearance of Kenyan officials working with the defunct East African Railways resident at Kampala³². This action infuriated Kenya's Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU), an umbrella organization of

Kenya's unionised workers. COTU demanded that the government withdraw from Uganda all workers of Kenyan extraction. Uganda counteracted by insisting that continued attacks on her by the Kenyan press were not doing anything better to improve the strained state of relations. Uganda also agreed that Kenya could withdraw her workers if she so wished to. This facet of conflict was further aggravated upon Uganda's added claim that Kenya's Luo nationality was in league with Obote forces bent on undermining Amin's regime³³.

This condition of strained relations was to recede when President Amin withdrew his threat to expel Kenyans, on February 14 1973. There are certain deductions that are decipherable from the internal political situation in Uganda and its resultant spill-over effect on Kenya.

On one level, even when certain events in Uganda directly touched on Kenya's national-interests (as in the claim of Luo collaboration in subversion), Uganda held to her guns to a certain point. Uganda was consequently averse to the fact that immediate admission of offender-status could jeopardise her prestige. She was equally aware that persistent insistence on the validity of her claims could be to her disadvantage. This was due to a number of reasons.

Essentially, and as has been indicated elsewhere, Uganda understood the effects of probable halting of her goods on transit through Kenya. Moreover, the advent of combative relations with Kenya not only opened up the possibility of losing an important ally (ideologically) in the East African region, but also made her more vulnerable to attacks from Tanzania - which had given Obote asylum. In this vein too, Tanzania had explicitly expressed dislike for the anarchic train of event that characterised Amin's rulership³³. Thirdly, Uganda's economy was in shambles given the factors of economic mismanagement and excessive military spending. Tallying with this was increased discontent emerging from the army and the civil population; several endeavours at President Amin's life had been made³⁴. Additional belligerence from Kenya could further induce such repelling forces. It is in the backdrop of such internal conditions that Uganda had to normalise the strained relations with Kenya. The re-institution of amicable relations was however not to last long because of other political developments emanating from Uganda. 1976 provides two cases in point.

President Amin's claim to portions of Kenyan territory; parts of Nyanza and Rift Valley Provinces (1976) is seen as a culmination of erstwhile political

events in Uganda. Even though Britain had transferred parts of the Uganda protectorate to the East African Protectorate Kenya³⁵, Amin's claim on Kenyan territory was a deviationary tactic meant to shift the attention of Uganda's population from the economic and political turmoil rocking the country then³⁶. Amin meant to appeal to the patriotic and nationalistic feelings of Uganda at the behest of a dislocated economy. There was also a more tangible explanation. 'Uganda had failed to pay up debts totalling 400 million shillings owed to Kenya-based British multinational enterprises. President Amin turned this issue into a confrontation with Kenya for internal consumption'³⁷. One wants to note here that, President Amin set in motion events that were supposed to boost Uganda's tottering prestige. As Amin later commented, 'It is interesting that when a Field Marshal becomes a professor of geography, all the radios of the world tune in'³⁸.

Israeli salvaging of Palestinian hijacked hostages at Entebbe on July 4 1976 provided another cause for Amin to lash at Kenya and in effect, to appeal for the attention of the international system. President Amin accused Kenya of conniving with the Israeli contingent by allowing its planes to refuel at Nairobi. 'One hour after leaving Entebbe, the three hercules transport

planes briefly landed at Nairobi airport, two of them taking off almost immediately while the third left for Israel after turning over a wounded soldier for treatment by Kenyan doctors,³⁹. The two countries teetered on the brink of war, with each accusing the other of increased troop concentration at their borders. Kenya for example tightened the pressure on Uganda by stopping oil and other supplies destined for Kampala; ostensibly because bills had not been paid⁴⁰. Amin responded by turning off electricity from the Owen Falls dams; in effect stopping about 30% of Kenya's electricity supply. Out of a total consumption of 780,163,000Kwh of electricity, 512,943,000Kwh were domestically generated and 247,220,000Kwh were imported from Uganda⁴¹. By late July, Amin began to back down claiming he had only five days of oil in reservoir; he appealed to the U.N, the OAU and the Arab League to intervene in order to stop the blockade and avert a war.

For purposes of clarifying the importance of the foregoing on Kenya-Uganda relations, the following inferences are meaningful. President Amin had assumed that the diplomatic role he had taken in bargaining with the Palestinian hijackers could bolster his image

in world politics. This eventually seemed to have been denied by Israel's swift attack on Entebbe, an action that questioned the preparedness of Uganda's armed forces against external attacks. Such erosion of Uganda's security tenacity was further burgeoned by what Amin conveniently perceived as Kenya's alliance with Israeli forces. Consequently, internal political developments in Uganda were easily replicated unto Kenya given Kenya's perceivable connivance. The conflictual state of relations culminated in Uganda's assassination of Mrs. Dora Bloch, a remaining hostage, and a simultaneous killing spree directed at Kenyans resident in Uganda⁴². In all conflictive actions, Uganda's hostile attitude towards Kenya is conceived within context of misplaced aggression. Israel rather than Kenya had pinched Uganda's prestige.

Concurrently, Kenya qualified collaboration with Israeli soldiers, upon humanitarian grounds. She argued that terrorist elements in the international system had to be discouraged through concerted force by all members of the International Community. On the other hand, to the extent that President Amin appealed to the UN, the OAU and the Arab League⁴³, instead of bargaining with Kenya as he had previously done, was

indicative of Uganda's humiliated prestige. Amin did not want to appear to be "bending too low" considering that he was the aggressor. Again, Uganda knew that Kenya was fairly dependent on her for electricity; she therefore had some ace-cards to use in case of a stretched contest of power capabilities. However, it was to the national interest of Uganda that she budge; if she was to satisfy her immediate oil needs. It is important also to note that Kenya had issued a seven-point ultimatum demanding that Uganda move its troops away from the border, stop laying claim to parts of its territory, pay in advance for all purchases and pay all outstanding debts inter alia⁴⁴. In early August, Amin therefore sent a delegation to Nairobi for peace talks where the strained state of relations were normalised; Uganda apologised for her belligerence⁴⁵.

An important characteristic of the conflictive and cooperative nature of Kenya-Uganda relations was built on bargain. Though the internal political developments in Uganda often caused conflict between the two countries, the ability of both countries to bargain contributed to their generally cooperative interaction. It was agreed that the internal situation in Uganda should not tamper with the concurrence of both countries national interests.

Commission nor President Nyerere would agree to this. Kenya had a two-fold interest in the Ugandan conflict, perspectives that dictated her reaction to Uganda's internal political development. Firstly, the presence of Tanzanian troops at a time when the border between Kenya and Tanzania remained closed at Tanzania's insistence made Kenya sensitive to Tanzania's continued influence of Uganda politics. This sensitivity accrued from the fear that Tanzania wanted not only to politically occupy Uganda but also control her economy through her Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga Ports. Secondly, Kenya was concerned with the kind of leadership that would come to power in Uganda. The question was whether the new regime would cause the same tumultuous state of relations that characterised President Amin's regime. This fear continued for the rest of the year especially when it appeared increasingly likely that Dr. Milton Obote would become President for a second time. Kenya clearly distrusted the policies he would pursue. It is worth recalling that before Obote's ouster, his government had taken a 'move-to-the-left' - a socialist oriented approach to development. Kenya was evidently weary of Obote's come back to power given his initial ideological orientation.

Nevertheless, the felt national-interests of Uganda accruing from Uganda's internal political situation made Obote heal the breach with Kenya when he came to power in 1980. In January 1981, Obote met Moi to discuss transport problems associated with the passage of Ugandan goods to Mombasa; Uganda's shortest and cheapest route to the sea⁴⁹ thus reopening a new chapter of cooperation between the two countries. A few more indicators of this during the Binaisa era.

When President Binaisa differed with Tanzania over the powers that the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) should have vis-a-vis his own, the former revisited Nairobi⁵⁰. Though the two Presidents denied having discussed the possibility of Kenyan troops replacing Tanzanian occupational forces⁵¹, Binaisa was toppled on May 11 the same year. Kenya was irked by Binaisa's ouster blaming Tanzania and claiming that the populations of Kenya and Uganda "had always been together"⁵². Uganda retaliated by introducing a new aspect to the simmering animosities: Kenya was secretly training Ugandan guerillas bent on wrecking havoc in Uganda. It is imperative to note that this claim is regarded with circumspection.

With respect to Kenya's probable training of Ugandan guerillas, no concrete evidence was given to support the claim. Again, there was little correlation between the military commissions allegations and Kenya's remarks that the two countries had "age-old" links. In fact it was towards Tanzania that Kenya's remarks were directed. We must thus perceive Uganda's conflictive allegations then, as a bulwark against Kenya's attack on Tanzania. The Muwanga government that came to power in 1979 owed allegiance to Dar-es-Salaam and a denigration of this base of power was seen in Uganda as debilitating to the governments sovereignty. Interestingly, Kenya closed its borders holding up Uganda railway tankers other than stopping Uganda coffee enroute through Kenya. As in the instances before, Uganda was forced to withdraw its allegations. She gave a "categorical and unqualified assurance" that the allegations had been miscalculated⁵³. Evidently then, in 1979 the fact of Uganda's dependence on Kenya was stigmatized by Kenya's drastic action of holding up coffee. Kenya's power capabilities thus made Uganda to cooperate even within a setting of tension.

There are however two broad factors that made Uganda relate with Kenya with more caution in the early 1980s. The administration's succeeding President Amin

were aware that internal insecurity and armed opposition could attract external interest that could interfere in Uganda's internal affairs (as had been the case in Tanzania's inception to Uganda's politics). Secondly, Uganda meant to refurbish its international image given the general attitude by the international community of a country rocked by internecine civil warfare. It is along this line of thought that one scholar has observed,

'Uganda's foreign policy in the 1980s (was) that of trying to regain the country's tarnished image in the international community - both near and far. . . . Uganda's domestic problems again necessitated following a cautious foreign policy - near and far'⁵⁴.

Following the overthrow of President Obote of Uganda in July 1985, President Moi of Kenya attempted to intervene in the reshaping of Uganda politics. Obote, who had fled initially to Kenya was considered vulnerable to extradition under reciprocal arrangements between the two countries⁵⁵. Accordingly, he was encouraged to take up exile in Zambia, clearing the way for President Moi to sponsor a series of peace talks between the Okello government in Kampala and the insurgent National Resistance Army (NRA). However, in spite of putting various pressures on the contending factions, Moi was powerless in as far as restraining

Okello's regime from relying on ex-Amin troops from Uganda's West Nile district, or the NRAs steady advance on Kampala was concerned. When Kampala fell to the NRA in January 1986, Moi accepted the fact and offered full cooperation to the new Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni⁵⁶. However, relations between the two countries were destined to be less cordial as Moi became increasingly suspicious of the "radical" nature of the new regime in Uganda.

Moreover, Kenyan authorities became anxious that continued unrest in Uganda could provide a source of arms for 'Mwakenya' supporters in Kenya⁵⁷. This was an opposing group to the Kenya government based outside Kenya but filtering into the country mainly orchestrating for change in Kenya's political system. Tension further grew during 1986 over alleged Kenyan interference in freight deliveries to Uganda that were routed through Mombasa, developing into an open dispute over alleged ill-treatment of Ugandans resident in Kenya: A Ugandan national teaching as an expatriate in Kenya (Kisii) died in a police custody in 1987. The Kenya police alleged that he was performing intelligence activities for the Uganda National Resistance Movement (NRM)⁵⁸. It is in the perspective of retaliation that the foregoing is analysed. Kenya

was hitting against Uganda for offering bases for forces against her government. Thus, 'at least 500 Ugandas were among numbers of foreigners to be detained in March 1986 following a speech made by President Moi, assailing 'illegal aliens' who were creating unrest in Kenya',⁵⁹. This instances of conflict and cooperation then demonstrate the inconsistent nature of relations between Kenya and Uganda between 1971 and 1987.

For the period 1987 - 1990, the nature of events that characterised Kenya-Uganda relations were not necessarily of Kenyan nor Ugandan making. Even before we attempt a close look at these events and their significance in determining Kenya-Uganda relations, it is useful to observe that conflict and cooperation continued to straddle this period.

In December 1987, Uganda troops were alleged to have entered Kenya illegally in pursuit of rebels and for several days the Ugandan and Kenyan armed forces exchanged fire across the border. Kenya expelled the Ugandan High Commissioner and a number of other Ugandan citizens. Later in December, President Moi and Museveni agreed to withdraw troops from either side of the border and to allow the resumption of normal traffic. In January 1988, the two countries signed a joint communique which provided for cooperation between

them in resolving problems related to the flow of traffic across the common border. Relations subsequently improved in spite of a disagreement in February, arising from Kenya's refusal to allow a number of Ugandans described as 'illegitimate visitors' into the country at Nairobi airport. In July, however, tensions along the frontier were renewed when Uganda accused Kenya of complicity in smuggling weapons to a rebel group in northern Uganda. Consequently, cooperation and conflict characterised the two states relations between 1987 and 1989.

One can safely deduce from the foregoing array of interactions that Kenya and Uganda continue to cooperate despite frequent skirmishes in the two countries relations. There is a way in which Ugandas internal political developments directly spill over to the arena of Kenya - Uganda relations.

This has been the case due to Uganda's mainly contesting factions for power. Amin's reign for instance propelled anarchy in Uganda in a manner that affected Kenya. As was argued, the 1970s and 1980s saw a conflict - causing Uganda desperate to improve her warped prestige in international politics. Kenya's contiguity plus Kenya-Uganda complementary

interdependence necessitated the presence of areas of conflict and cooperation between the two countries. There is a sense in which (then) that Kenya - Uganda relations are continually coloured by the events that accrue from Uganda's political developments. This assertion is based on the above analysis preceding internal developments.

3.3 Conclusion

We can draw certain inferences from this chapter as relates to our third hypothesis. It becomes clear that such events as affected Uganda's domestic political scenario often spill over into Kenya-Uganda relations. This, as was deduced in the 1960s and 1970s is largely a function of the contiguity of the two states, their common colonial heritage, their interdependence and the power dynamics that dictate their foreign policies. Importantly too, the emergence and submergence of conflict and cooperation during the entire period under study confirmed the fact that Kenya-Uganda relations when explained through Uganda's internal political developments depict a pattern of both conflict and cooperation.

The 1980s specifically demonstrated that despite Uganda's frequent belligerence, the salience of economic and political survival make it imperative that

she hastily reconciles with Kenya. In another respect however, events emanating from Uganda during the Binasisa regime, i.e when Tanzania armed forces occupied Uganda, reflected Kenya's sensitivity to Ugandan alignment to any country in the region. On a slightly different level, Kenya's cooperation with Uganda is heavily determined by Uganda's non-alignment with other "powers" in the region. It is in fact safe to assert that the internal political instability in Uganda not only leads to conflict with Kenya, but equally offers basis for Kenya to seek for cooperation, as noted above. Despite this, Kenya's power capabilities i.e her economic export leverage and harbour facilities, force Uganda to cooperate even when she overtly causes conflicts. It is in this regard that the particular internal political development from Uganda causes both conflictive and cooperative interactions between Kenya and Uganda.

1. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence Revisited, International Organization Journal (Autumn 1987) 41 (4) p. 731.
- 1(a) This school of thought departs from the premise of classical-realist thinking as relates to the dominant role of the statesman. Whereas the latter emphasizes the salience of a state's national interests as defined and articulated by the statesman, the latter includes certain economic and structural realities present in the nation-state; factors that influence the way foreign policy behaviour proceeds. It is upon such a vantage point that specific political internal developments in Uganda are seen to affect her foreign policy behaviour towards Kenya.
2. Internal situation here specifically refers to the economic and political conditions in Uganda; such conditions are seen in political civil dissension, i.e. factions warring for power due to muzzling of political participation; consequently manifest political instability and economic conditions seen in a falling GDP and GNP depicted in continued trade imbalances with Kenya (in the foregoing chapter).
3. Yashpal Tandon, 'The Foreign Policy of Uganda: A Methodological Inquiry'-East African Institute of Social Research Conference Paper, Jan. (1966) p.20.

4. Jan Jelmert Jorgensen, Uganda A Modern History, (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1981), p. 213.
5. Ibid., p. 215.
6. Ibid., p. 216.
7. Ibid., p. 216.
8. Ibid., p. 216.
9. Daniel T. Arap Moi, Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles, (Nairobi: MacMillan Publishers, 1986), p. 3.
10. Ibid., p. 4.
11. Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru: The autobiography of Oginga, (London: Heinemann, 1967) p. 32
12. Jorgensen, Op.cit., p. 232.
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THE DIS-INTEGRATION OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY:
EFFECTS ON KENYA-UGANDA RELATIONS

4.0 Introduction

Nation-states usually carve their foreign policies along specific historically-perennial occurrences. By this we mean that certain events of interaction between states have a recurring influence on the manner in which they later interact.

This perennial presence of latter day events assumes such significance due to affected interests of nation-states. If a nation-state's national interests are perceived to have been relegated in a preceding integrative and supposed mutually beneficial endeavour, then the mode of relations that ensues after the break-up of this endeavour carry over some suspicions in any other later interaction. This is not to say that national-interests' are not defined by the reality and felt needs of the moment. This is however to assert that the definition of cooperative interaction between two contiguous nation-states includes the whole gamut of preceding interactions. It is in the complexity and diversity of such a gamut that conflict and cooperation are often intertwined.

This chapter will examine the correlation between factors leading to the breakup of the EAC and the cooperative and/or conflictive relations that characterise Kenya-Uganda relations. Consequently, a basic setting to certain services of the EAC shall be used to elucidate the break-up of the supra-national organization. Thus, factors leading to the break-up of the EAC will not merely hinge on the immediate triggering events to its break-up,, but will also include certain inherent disintegrative factors in the supra-national set-up.

This theoretical position draws from realist-interdependence assumptions: 'Politically it must be assumed that in any integration effort the participants will distinctly perceive themselves receiving benefits which will exceed the cost of participation'¹.

Crucial in this statement is the fact of cost of participation. It is Uganda's and Kenya's perception of their cost of participation in the EAC as related to their present day economies that is associated with the manner in which they interact today. Such inferences as will be drawn between the two variables, i.e factors leading to the break-up and conflict or cooperation will therefore be largely selected from correlation of certain events.

1.1 Inherent Factors of Disintegration in the Colonial Period; Projections on Kenya-Uganda Relations

An East African Currency Board and a Postal Union had been established by British colonialists by 1912². This board was charged with the duties of founding a customs union for East Africa. The two governors of Kenya and Uganda headed this board. A federal capital for this union was supposed to be at Nairobi. It is in relation to this centre that Uganda argued against the federation. As Nsubuga puts it,

'The Kabaka of Buganda Kingdom and his (Lukiiko) Legislative believed that such ties with Kenya and Tanganyika would jeopardize their special position under the 1900 Agreement with the British and would subject their people to the predatory designs of the Kenya white settlers',³.

Precedent upon such a viewpoint was the rational-interest of Uganda. As Nsubuga⁴ further reiterates, Uganda was the smallest (in size) of the three integrating parties. She contended that amalgamation with Kenya could not only accord Kenya the chance to exploit her meagre resources, but could also simultaneously wash back her benefits into Kenya

It is important to indicate at this point that Uganda was thus not initially anxious about integration. In fact the colonial-directed efforts at

integration not only laid the basis for dissension but also inhibited attempts at integration. Part of the succeeding text will elaborate on this;

'The European settlers in Kenya ... emphasized the need for a federation. They saw this as a means of "reducing British influence in the area". This in their view would have enhanced the settlers domination in a federal government. The idea of federation was also opposed by the African circles in the colonies and by the Governor of Uganda'⁵.

There is however a way in which both Kenya and Uganda could have been indisposed to integrative efforts. The period before and soon after independence was greatly coloured by nationalistic fervour. The urge to actualize the sovereignty of a newly acquired freedom and independence expressed itself in the integrative efforts. Consequently it became difficult to delineate between the national interest of sovereignty and the mutual interests pooled together in the EAC. / Let us draw a few inferences about this in relation to our third hypothesis.

Kenya and Uganda both suffered the tutelage of British colonialism. This fact engendered the possibility of integration based upon the interests of the colonialists. The development of integrative services after 1958 were thus depictive of the

interests of the colonial regimes. To stretch this contention further the negative Ugandan response to integration was thus basically caused by British settler interests. This kind of influence was to replicate itself in the period preceding the break-up of the community.

Ingrained in the Raisman Commission which emphasized uniform distribution of shares in integration was a strategy to accord Uganda and Tanganyika favourable disbursements. To the extent that the colonial policies outrightly developed Kenya as an industrial-cum-agricultural base the provisions of the Raisman Commission only held water theoretically. In practise, Kenya continued to gain more from the EAC compared to the other two constituting partners because of her industrial and agricultural leverage. For instance, 'In 1960 Kenya received duty disbursements of about K£11,000,000,000 compared to K£7,000,000 and K£6,000,000 for Uganda and Tanzania respectively'.⁶

In the light of the preceding, Uganda perceived Kenya as having benefitted more from the scheme. It is worth indicating that such an attitude was depicted in the recommendations of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) chaired by Mr. Herman Sarrwat. One of

its views read, 'decentralization of the community operations is necessary for efficiency and for maximising the benefits of the cooperation',⁷.

Consequently, even an independent inquiry sanctioned the lop-sided nature of profits towards Kenya's favour which was aided by the fact that Nairobi was literary the center of EAC activities⁸. Now, if Uganda initially saw cooperation as endangering her national interests⁹, then the same hangover of having been exploited are ramified in the cooperative and conflictive nature of their relations. Essentially, the dis-integration of such a scheme, added to the inadequacy of both Kenya and Uganda to be totally self-sufficient, renders cooperative events inevitable. On the other hand, the fact of a colonially captivated EAC scheme that seemed to have benefited Kenya, makes Uganda unwittingly react with hostility whenever she deems that her national interests are being tampered with by Kenya; a recurring influence of the assymetries embodied in the EAC.

Kenya provides the cheapest and most efficient outlet to the sea for Uganda. In this respect, perennial recurrences of conflict-causing events are normally settled for the sake of upholding Uganda's economic survival. However, as will be observed in the

next section, Uganda and Tanzania ganged up in 1976¹⁰ and even earlier in 1965 - in the Mulungushi club to forestall Kenya's overall economic and in effect political preponderance. As one observer put it,

'While accepting that the three countries that met in Dar-es-salaam have every right to consult with each other without inviting Kenya into their deliberations, on matters affecting security in East Africa, observers in Nairobi are concerned about the sense of "ganging-up" that is shown in the policies of Kenya's neighbours to the East, West and South'¹¹ (Reference to Uganda, Somalia, Tanzania).

Precisely then, it is the perceived fact of Kenya's predominance in the EAC that made Uganda gang up with the other countries. Such an alliance was meant to isolate Kenya and further curtail her capacity to act as a preponderant "middle-power"¹² in the East African region. It is for such a reason that there exists a correlation between this one factor of Kenya's domination of EAC benefits and the consequent alliance.

Rothchild has argued that Buganda, a kingdom within Uganda was totally opposed to her integration in the federation¹³. This she argued would undercut the constitutional provision of autonomy with the larger Uganda besides denigrating the newly acquired independence. What Buganda as an entity was concerned with was uniform distribution of benefits upon

integration. However, to the extent that Uganda as a whole was non-committal on the issue of integration,¹⁴ any subsequent entry into the scheme would ultimately be covered with elements of doubt by the other parties and herself vis-a-vis the rest. Such competing views on integration are in our view basic in understanding why the scheme disintegrated and subsequently how this has had long-term effects on Kenya-Uganda relations. As one source put it, 'The people of East Africa are no longer in doubt as to the fact that the continued existence and operation of the East African Community as we know it today has been made impossible by the exploiter's camp in Kenya',¹⁵.

This statement from a highly placed official in the Ugandan government soon after the break-up of the EAC clearly indicates the attitude of Uganda towards Kenya then. Thus, the 1976 border claims on Kenya can be seen as having been partly premeditated by this attitude. It is nevertheless difficult to cut a clear line between the immediate determining factors of such a conflict and the inherent, largely unconscious reasons; as the ones indicated above. Ironically, however, such fluidity in correlation goes to anchor our hypothesis. If a Ugandan Minister of State declared that Kenya was the "black-sheep" of the EAC,

then the attitudinal basis that would determine how Uganda defined/s her national interests vis-a-vis Kenya in the period succeeding the break-up of the EAC had been set.

Having examined some of the inherent facets of cooperation and conflict that were ingrained in the initial efforts at integration between the two countries, we find it important to closely examine the factors that led to the break-up of the EAC and their ramification on Kenya-Uganda relations.

4.2 Ideologically Based Factors of Dis-integration; Under-currents of Conflict and Cooperation

Various scholars¹⁶ have argued that ideology is a development approach that charts out the conceptual and practical basis for policy formulation and implementation. The arguments of these scholars usually rally around examining how uniform the written-down ideologies are to the mode and practicality of enforcement. This aspect of ideology renders itself handy to this analysis for two reasons. For one reason, if Kenya and Uganda pursued similar ideological viewpoints, then there would be no cause for overt conflict based on ideological dissension; rather cooperation would ensue. Second, if Kenya and Uganda

followed ideologically divergent approaches, then cause for dissension would emerge, especially predicated on the fear of ideological alliance with the third member of the EAC, Tanzania.

As has been indicated in the previous chapters, Kenya partook of a state-assisted mode of capitalism that ascribed both to principles of African socialism¹⁷ and tenets of free enterprise. In fact, it is due to this that the other members of the EAC saw her as advantageously poised in the scheme. Uganda on the other hand ascribed to principles of capitalism and socialism at certain points during the period under study. The 1969 'Common Man's Charter', the 'Nakirubo Pronouncements' and the nationalisation efforts succeeding the same are indicators of Uganda's turn to socialism in the late 60s and early 70s. Nevertheless, the UPC programme soon after independence abhorred tenets of socialism. Again, the Amin regime, the Obote II regime, the Lule and Binaisa regime all borrowed guidelines from capitalist approaches to development¹⁸.

Tanzania unlike her two partners explicitly ascribed to socialist approaches to development as charted out in their Arusha Declaration of 1967. In the East African region too, Somalia, Sudan and

Ethiopia had shown interest in socialist policies, more so because of the military aid that they acquired from the Soviet Union and the then Eastern Bloc. Kenya which was an avowed capitalist nation-state in East Africa was not only weary of this emerging socialist network, but equally eager to neutralise such an alliance. This would be to her national-interests of ensuring security; political and economic. Kenya hoped that the up-keep of amicable economic relations with Uganda would stave off the budding friendliness between Tanzania and Uganda. One event was to actualize her wishes.

Kenya benefited in her designs upon Amin's advent to power; the socialist oriented Obote had been overthrown and Kenya on superficial level, lucidly supported the coup in Uganda. It is in the foregoing context that the then Foreign Minister of Kenya, Dr. Munyua Waiyaki said, "We recognise states and not governments"¹⁹.

However, this non-committal statement served two purposes. First, by not explicitly going against the new regime, Kenya left all avenues open for later meaningful economic and political interaction.

Second, by not outrightly welcoming the new regime in Uganda, Kenya was prudently restrained and cautious about the policies Amin would pursue. Both aspects of this official statement served the national-interest of Kenya; political survival.

As noted, Kenya was cautious about the way it would seem to react to the new leadership in Uganda. This caution was based on the fact that Amin, the new president in Uganda, was not only a military leader but had also not participated in the EAC scheme. Furthermore, Kenya did not want to openly antagonize Tanzania given Tanzania's incessant accusations about Kenya's exploitative tendencies in the EAC²⁰. Interestingly though, this reduced Tanzania's commitment in the scheme. As Adar and Ngunyi observe,

... 'the breaking of this ideological axis between Tanzania and Uganda and Kenya's reaction to Amin's takeover in Uganda, saw Tanzania's interests in the community dwindle within the formation of the 'Frontline states' and the building of the Tanzania-Zambia (TAZARA) railway, Tanzania's interests apparently shifted from the community to the Southern Africa Sub-region'²¹.

There are certain deductions that can be drawn about the ideological link-up between Kenya and Uganda then and its impact on their relations.

Kenya was eager to acquire a new ally in the East African region. This plus the belligerence with which Tanzania took Amin's deposition of Obote - (illustrated in their giving him asylum) made it possible for a new chapter of relations to emerge between Kenya and Uganda in the 1970s. Worthy of reiteration is the fact that, Obote had before his ouster repatriated thousands of Kenya labourers back to Kenya. Thus, cause for tension had been created. Back to the first argument.

Kenya's position then, was circumscribed by the ideological rift that had allied Tanzania and Uganda. In fact, it is safe to contend that the continued conflictual and cooperative relations that characterised Kenya and Uganda (referred to in chapters 2 and 3) was a function of the need to hold on together as an ideological pole against Tanzania. Its worth recalling that Tanzania's dis-interest with the EAC and indeed the reasons that led to her non-commitment in the scheme was the emerging Uganda-Kenya alliance. To take such a viewpoint is to argue that there was a correlation between the "inconsistent" nature of relations between the two countries and the ideologically-specific reasons of EAC dis-integration.

4.3 Disparities in Levels of Development; Impact on State of Relations

Economic development amongst the EAC members was initially affected by British economic colonial policies. As has been observed in the above subsection, Uganda and Tanzania were neglected by British settlers because they did not promise as much fecundity in agricultural produce as the Kenya white highlands. Importantly too, British colonial policy had seized Uganda's Western borders and arrogated them to Kenya's Eastern border peripheries. Thus, the British wanted to maximise on the industries that had been established in Nairobi then. As one scholar has noted, 'By 1958 of the 474 companies registered in East Africa, only 70 operated both in Uganda and Tanzania',²².

At independence, the export-oriented agriculture in Kenya was based upon large-scale commercial agriculture of the settled 'white highlands' and on European owned plantations. Thus, the disproportionate development of manufacturing services was bound up with the early presence of settlers, whose high incomes generated a high demand for manufactures and services. This enabled the economy to develop service processing and manufacturing industries which provided not only

for its needs, but also for those of Uganda and Tanzania²³. From independence up to the break-up of the EAC (1977), the economy of Kenya progressed at a cumulative rate of over 8% in real terms, with growth in the industrial sector exceeding 10% per year²⁴.

During the same period, Uganda's economic growth rate fell from a high of 6.9% in 1971 to 1.2% in 1978²⁵. Furthermore, 'in the period 1970-76 industrial output fell by an average of 6.7% per year, compared with an annual growth rate of 7.8% in 1961-1970'²⁶. It is thus possible to see the disproportionate levels of economic development between the two countries that mitigated against untainted concurrence of national interests in the EAC and the period after its disintegration

Concentration of effort on federation had negated the chances for enhanced economic co-ordination available within the guidelines of the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO)²⁷. Although the Kampala Agreement was an attempt to meet the need of holding the common market together, the institution of separate currencies was a striking departure from the common arrangements

It would be fallacious to conclude that a dissolution of the common arrangements would lead to modest distributions in levels of economic development. A huge part of the relative backwardness of Uganda's economy could not be traced to the common market, and a withdrawal from the common market would not have reduced the economic weakness underlying its economy. As Arthur Hazlewood has stated, 'The dissolution of the common market given the small size of the economies of Tanzania and Uganda, would not have diverted much industrial development to them from Kenya',²⁸.

Taking the foregoing factor of derogation from the common arrangements, one sees negligible chances for mutual economic cooperation after the dissolution of the EAC. There is a way in which Uganda would continue viewing any economic transactions between her and Kenya as lop-sided to the latter's advantage. Though this assertion negates the fact that Uganda's economic inadequacies would continually need replenishment, this statement shows the magnitude of the perceived discrepancies in cooperation: 'Kenya continues to hold an upper-hand in the economic arena than our country because of our political rivalries',²⁹.

This assertion by Museveni in 1986 perhaps indicates the source of divergent national interests which can be correlated to the break-up of the EAC: 'We should always maintain an independent line in economics, politics, culture and foreign relations. We should judge friend or foe according to how they relate to our own interests - irrespective of the social and economic system obtaining in their countries',³⁰.

The constant accusations and counter-accusations about Uganda meddling in the internal affairs of Kenya³¹ and vice versa can (for instance) be associated with the above position of Uganda. To the extent that Museveni sees Kenya's national interests as perennially circumspecting Uganda's, then the factors that led to the dissolution of the EAC as argued above still play a role in determining the cooperative and/or conflictive nature of Kenya-Uganda relations. Such an assertion is qualified for example with Uganda's understanding of interdependence: 'It does not mean that an independent economy is inter-dependent with other economies. It is interdependent with other economies in fields where it cannot economically be self-sufficient',³².

Consequently, the interdependence that was basic to the EAC affects Uganda's relations with Kenya, even in the 1980s and in 1990s.

Under the transfer-tax system envisaged in the Treaty for East African Co-operation, it was possible for the industrially less-developed countries to institute a tariff on imports of manufactures from the fairly developed so as to protect their own budding industries. 'Transfer taxes can be imposed only by a country with an overall deficit in intra-East African trade in manufactures, and only on imports from a country with which it has a deficit',³³.

When the treaty came into operation, Uganda was able to impose transfer taxes on imports from Kenya whereas Kenya was not entitled to impose any transfer taxes.

As the essence of the transfer-tax system was to bolster domestic production, though Uganda was not supposed to place transfer taxes 'across the board', she could only tax those types of goods which she could produce. The imposition of a transfer tax by Uganda on Kenya would ironically raise the price of Kenya goods in the Uganda market in relation not only to Uganda products, but also to imports from outside East Africa.

The antecedent of the transfer-tax system was disparities in industrial development between the EAC members. There exists a strong correlation between how

the system operated and its paradoxical influence on Kenya-Uganda trade. Despite the efforts to instill equality in gains, 'between 1969 and 1978, Kenya controlled half of the total intra-EAC trade and three quarters of export trade on average',³⁴. Kenya and Uganda economic disparities were therefore not transformed by the transfer tax system. In fact, Kenya continued to benefit from the same - as illustrated above.

Might it then not be said that the post-1977 period was heavily coloured by latent dis-pleasure on Uganda's part by these failed efforts at equitable distribution? or as Chemonges has put it, 'The post 1978 Kenya-Uganda economic interaction will be affected by the failure of the transfer-tax system. The transfer tax system ... failed to bring about a halt in Kenya's trade growth,'³⁵.

In August 1979, the Sudanese News Agency reported about a road of about 100 kilometres under construction linking Lodwar in Kenya with Kapaeta in Sudan³⁶. This road was to transport Sudan-bound goods in complete negation of Ugandan commodities. In October of the same year, Kenya and Sudan signed another agreement for the construction of another road connecting Lodwar in

northern Kenya and Juba in Southern Sudan; to accord Sudan direct access to the port of Mombasa. Worth of emphasis is the fact that Tanzania had three months earlier announced plans to construct a new railway linking Lake Victoria to the Indian Ocean to curtail Uganda's dependence on Kenya's port of Mombasa.

First, Kenya's efforts to seek for markets to the north, i.e Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti illustrates the attempt to curb dependence on Uganda's market. This argument thus obtains from the dis-integration of the EAC; constant accusation by Uganda about Kenya's dominant role in the EAC and the fall of the regime in Uganda thus provided the basis for this action. The purchasing capacity of the Ugandan market had considerably gone down due to the economic travail that she experienced upon the Uganda-Tanzania war. Basically then, the dis-integration culminated in other outside economic ventures that in a way, drove the two countries away from cooperative interaction.

The above events following the break-up of the EAC are understood within context of disparate levels of economic development. From another perspective attempts by Uganda and Tanzania to join forces with a view to reducing Kenya's economic preponderance made

Kenya seek for trade outlets to the north. Kenya thus wanted to sustain her interests of having a dominant trading market despite Uganda's alliance with Tanzania. This, in our deduction, is the raison d'être for inferring that the conflictual nature of relations between 1977 and 1979 (illustrated in the preceding events) were a function of the back-drop of EAC dis-integration.

Having examined the various factors that led to the break-up of the EAC and their immediate post-1977 ramifications on Kenya-uganda relations, it is important to examine the same for the 1980s.

4.4 Other Factors Causing Conflict and Cooperation; Projections on the 1980s

We shall examine certain aspects of Treaty for East Africa cooperation and its ramifications on the conflictive and/or cooperative nature of interaction between the two countries: To the extent that it was meant to examine existing arrangements in East Africa for cooperation between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda on matters of mutual interest having due regard to the views of the respective governments³⁷. Thus, the question of mutual interest is meaningful here to the

extent that Kenya and Uganda did not stop interacting after the collapse of the EAC. To this end, certain inherent provisions of the treaty affect(ed) the nature of their relations.

Under the transfer tax system, Uganda could impose a tariff on imports of manufacturing industries. This provision had an immediate impact on the price of goods from Kenya. "The imposition of transfer tax by Uganda on imports from Kenya will raise the price of Kenya goods in the Uganda market in relation not only to Uganda products but also to imports from outside East Africa. There would therefore be a tendency for imports from outside East Africa to increase at the expense of imports from Kenya"³⁸. A rationalization of the thinking behind the transfer-tax system might be encapsulated in the following proposition: The development of industries in each of the individual partner states inhibits competition from the more developed partner states. A substantive demerit in this proposition for transfer taxes is that there would be industries which could operate efficiently within the market of any one of the partner states. However, Kenya's exports to Uganda decreased two years after the break-up of the EAC.

Table Three indicates that between 1977 and 1979, Kenya's exports to Uganda fell from K£51,992 to K£37,747, a fall worth K£14,245. However, due to the fact that Kenya had more developed industries, this fall was reversed in the 1980s; as Table three further shows. From the low figure of K£37,747 Kenya's exports to Uganda spiralled to K£71,476 by 1983; an increase worth K£33,729. Certain deductions ought to be made at this juncture about the effects of the transfer tax system on the nature of Kenya-Uganda relations.

At one level whereas Uganda expected the treaty provision for transfer tax to burgeon the marketing of her goods, in the long-run the undeveloped fact of her industries gave Kenya trading leverage. In effect therefore Uganda continued to experience an imbalance of trade after the break-up of the EAC due to the provision of the transfer tax system. It is important to note that although Uganda experienced internecine civil warfare between 1981 and 1985 (when the NRM) was fighting for power, the preceding argument affected the cooperative posture of relations between the two countries.

There is a way in which continued Kenya dominance of the East African market engendered tension between Kenya and Uganda. As one scholar has put it,

"presumably, Uganda expected that the growth of these industries within the lifetime of the transfer taxes would be establish a sufficient industrial base for her to be able to compete with Kenya on an equal footing"³⁹. In a nutshell therefore, there was general disenchantment about Kenya's relatively developed industrial sector. The attempt on Kenya's part in 1985 to mediate between Uganda's warring factions was thus a deliberate attempt not only to enhance her political leverage over Uganda, but also to gain a foothold in her internal affairs. Kenya was aware that despite the incessant conflicts that had arisen between her and Uganda, there was a need to continue trading with Uganda for economic gains. Importantly therefore, the transfer tax system both caused conflict as seen in tension arising from imbalances of trade and cooperation as exemplified in the 1985 peace talks between Uganda warring factions in Nairobi.

Conclusion

This chapter has tried to examine how the factors leading to the dis-integration of the EAC ramify themselves on Kenya-Uganda relations. It has generally been deduced that due to the perception of Kenya's relative economic preponderance in the EAC, Uganda

tends to behave belligerently causing conflict between the two countries. In this vein, Museveni's statement in 1987 after Kenya sent back Uganda's High Commissioner is apt. "Our neighbours should not imagine that because we are organising our economic mess, we should be bulldozed about"⁴⁰.

It is in this perspective that Adar and Ngunyi argue, "in the post-EAC era, inter-state relations between the member states of the defunct scheme have developed cautiously"⁴¹. On a more specific level they say, "Kenya's relationship with Uganda has however been pursued cautiously in the post-EAC era"⁴².

To this extent therefore, the break-up of the EAC contained animosities that reflect themselves in the conflictive and cooperative nature of their relations. The cooperative nature of their interaction aspect accrues from the integration background of the EAC while the conflictive aspect emanates from the asymmetries in economic gains that Uganda believes to have experienced. And that is why this chapter sees a close link between the factors leading to the break-up of the EAC and the cooperative and conflictive nature of Kenya-Uganda relations.

4.6 FOOTNOTES

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3. John K. Nsubuga, "Uganda-Kenya Relations, 1970-85: The Inter-play of History, Economics and Geo-Politics", Seminar Paper on 'Issues in Contemporary African International Relations, Department of Political Science, Makerere University, Feb. 16, 1988, p. 16. 4. Ibid, p.18.
5. Joseph S. Nye, "East African Economic Integration" International Political Communities: An Anthology. (Garden City NY: Anchor Books, 1966, p. 410.
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7. Review of Economic Integration Activities within the East African Community 1973-74, p. 164.
8. Ibid. p. 162.
9. Weekly Review. (August 9, 1976), p. 10.
10. David G.R. Belshaw, 'Agricultural Production and Trade in the East African Common Market' In Leys, C. and Robson, R. Federation in East Africa. (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 38.
11. Amon J. Nsekela, East African Community Special Survey, African Development, (12), (4), 1977 p. 17.
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---- The term "middle-power" is also used here in close reference to Mahmood Mamdani's assertion that Kenya has continued to serve as a conduit for British interests in East Africa. Mamdani argues that Kenya's relative economic development in relation to Uganda's is a function of British multi-national corporations that not only siphon away Kenyan benefits, but also Ugandan benefits given the latter's dependence on her for re-export trade. She, in his view, becomes a middle-power due to this structural linkage with metropolitan Britain

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20. Weekly Review, (August 9), p. 10.
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22. William T. Newlyn, 'Gains and Losses in the East African Common Markets', Yorkshire B. Economic and Social Research, Nov. 1965, p. 12.
23. African Contemporary Record, 1974-75, p. B320-B321.
24. Ibid, p. 320.

25. Ibid., p. 321.
26. Ibid., p. 321.
27. Arthur Hazlewood, Economic Integration: The East African Experience, (London: Heinemann, 1975), p.65.
28. Ibid., p. 67.
29. New Vision (Uganda) Dec. 29, 1987, p. 26.
30. Yoweri K. Museveni, Selected Articles on the Uganda Resistance War. (Nairobi: Colourprint Ltd., 1985), p. 56.
31. Refer to Chapters 2 and 3.
32. Museveni, Op.cit., p. 60.
33. Hazlewood, Op.cit., p. 68.
34. Adar and Ngunyi, Op.cit., p. 9.
35. Aggrey Chemonges, Uganda and the Dis-integration of the East African Community (EAC) between 1971-77, Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Nairobi, 1984, p. 66.
36. Elizabeth Ohini, "Trade" Africa Now, (August 10, 1979), p. 33.

37. Hazlewood, Op. cit., p. 116.
38. Ibid, p. 117.
39. Ibid, p. 122.
40. New Vision, (Uganda), Dec. 29, 1987, p. 16.
41. Ibid, p. 30.
42. Adar and Ngunyi, Op. cit., p. 11.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.0 Introduction

This chapter attempts to demonstrate our findings in relation to our objectives and hypotheses. The general conclusions from each chapter will contribute towards either proving or dis-proving our hypotheses.

We shall also give policy recommendations in this chapter. This will be done through examining alternative recommendations encompassing both merits and demerits. Bearing in mind that any externally-oriented decision-making process should have adequate and appropriate information, our provision of strengths and weaknesses to each alternative serves this purpose.

This does not however mean that a solution to the problem under study has been attained. It only shows that some knowledge has been generated from the entire investigation; which knowledge is not absolute but relative to the period under study.

5.1 Objectives and Means of Analysis

As noted in the foregoing, it is meaningful to first examine our objectives and show what analytical

means we used to attain these objectives. This will logically lead us into analysing our findings through the hypotheses.

Our general objective was to analyse the key political and economic factors that under-pin Kenya-Uganda relations. We set out to unravel the 'inconsistency' in these two states' relations depicted in frequent cooperative and conflictive events. We therefore sort to know whether Kenya-Uganda political and economic interaction was/is largely cooperative, conflictive or both.

More to the point, our first objective aimed at showing how trade interactions between Kenya and Uganda related to conflictive and/or cooperative events. We broke down the entire period under study into certain eras and analysed the trade trends between the two countries. Our choice of these periods was related to either change of regimes in either or both countries. It was also occasionally determined by drastic falls or rises in trade trends. This was the case only when regime sessions continued to be in power in both countries. The justification for this choice was that change of governments can and does affect not only internal political and economic policies, but also external economic political interaction.

We linked certain trends in trade interaction to either cooperative or conflictive events. This linkage was meant to explain the trends as well as demonstrate whether trade was affected in events of either conflict or cooperation.

Our second objective meant to show how certain internal political developments in Uganda contribute(d) to either conflict and/or cooperation between Kenya and Uganda. In this case, we divided our analysis into decades. We chose to do this because certain internal political developments in Kenya were characteristic of either immediate developments (post-independence political developments) in Africa, party struggles or depictive of the 1970s mainly characterised with national economic development, or the 1980s characterised with political "upheavals" and economic "hardships" alluded to in chapter three. Breaking these developments into ten-year periods also gave adequate material to link these internal political developments to overall Kenya-Uganda relations. Such a method equally made it easier for us to analyse the role of Uganda's internal political developments on the cooperative and/or conflictive nature of the two states' interaction.

We related certain developments in Uganda to certain cooperative or conflictive events with the purpose of determining the concurrence or discordance of national interests in both cases.

Our third objective sought to show how certain reasons leading to the collapse of the EAC culminated in conflict and/or cooperation between Kenya and Uganda. In this case, we took certain reasons leading to the dis-integration of the EAC and linked them to either cooperative or conflictive interaction between the two countries. Our choice of these factors was determined by their immediate relationship with political and economic aspects that determine Kenya-Uganda relations.

5.2 Hypotheses and Findings

Our first hypothesis was that trade interaction influenced(s) conflict and/or cooperation between Kenya and Uganda. Specifically, this hypothesis suggested that if trade surpluses to one country were/are higher than those accruing to the other, then conflict was/as likely to occur. This also suggested that cooperation in these inter-state interaction could be a function of these trade imbalances.

Broadly stating, it was deduced that trade interaction is not affected by conflictive events between the two countries. It was noted that due to the complementarity of needs between the two countries, conflict-causing events are not allowed to tamper with their economic interests encapsulated in trade. As relates to Kenya, the salience of trade with Uganda is captured in the ready market that the latter offers for her goods. In Uganda's case, her landlocked position in East Africa makes it imperative that she depend on Kenya for her re-export trade; this condition obtains in-as-far-as Mombasa offers Uganda the shortest route to the sea. As relates to cooperation, certain periods demonstrated heightened trade interaction upon specific arrangements between the two countries. Cooperation and trade therefore correlated strongly.

In a nutshell, this hypothesis provided us with one significant finding: That despite the instances of conflict between Kenya and Uganda, their economic national-interests dictate that they continue to cooperate. It is thus safe to infer from this finding that it is political factors, usually caused by attempts at enhancing the power and/or prestige designs of either Uganda or Kenya that cause conflict. The

underlying strand of interaction between the two countries trade interaction therefore largely translates to overall cooperation between them. In effect, this accrues from their trade interdependence.

Our second hypothesis was that internal political developments in Uganda influence conflict and/or cooperation between Kenya and Uganda. Specifically, this hypothesis suggested that political instability in Uganda translates into conflict with Kenya. This hypothesis also suggested that unstable regimes in Uganda are likely to cooperate with Kenya.

Our findings were that the historical factors of a shared British colonial heritage leads both to conflict and cooperation. It was argued that due to the assymetries in agricultural and industrial development that were propelled by British economic policies in East Africa, Uganda remained belligerent towards Kenya. This was for instance to offer cause for conflict in 1976 when President Amin demanded for portions of Kenya's Nyanza and Rift Valley provinces claiming that they were un-fairly arrogated to Kenya by British settler interests. On the other hand, due to a shared colonial heritage, both Kenya and Uganda are able to

cooperate given similar cultural and political backgrounds. This was largely seen to be the case in the early and late 1960s.

The factor of political instability in Uganda engendered by numerous Coup de tats and concomitant economic problems caused by continued warring by factions seeking for power was found to lead to conflict between the two countries. In this vein, there was a strong correlation between political instability in Uganda and conflict between the two countries.

At another level however, the political instability in Uganda was also seen to culminate in cooperation with Kenya. It was deduced that Uganda's dependence on Kenya for import trade plus Kenya's endeavours to determine the trend of politics in Uganda led to cooperation. This was for example demonstrated in 1985 when Kenya acted as mediator between the N.R.M of Museveni and the Military ruling junta of Okello.

In a more specific sense, internal political developments lead to both conflict and cooperation between Kenya and Uganda. The magnitude of either

conflict and cooperation is nevertheless dictated by the nature of the political developments in Uganda. Again, Uganda seeks to bridge any differences caused by her own internal situation in order to uphold her economic interests vis-a-vis Kenya.

Our third hypothesis stated that the break-up of the EAC influenced(s) the conflictual and cooperative interactions between Kenya and Uganda. In particular reference, the reasons that led to the break-up of the EAC lead to conflicts between the two countries. It also assumes that the reasons that culminated in the dis-integration of the EAC cause(d) cooperation between the two countries.

The findings revealed that the economic preponderance of Kenya in the EAC scheme caused disaffection amongst the other members. It was noted that this was not accidental, but rather a function of the choice of Kenya as an agricultural and industrial center by British economic policies in Kenya. This factor of assymetries in economic development consequently colours the way Uganda relates to Kenya. This was seen to be accentuated by Tanzania which saw Kenya as a 'man-eat-man society'¹.

Ideological alliances preceding the collapse of the EAC also determine(d) the way Uganda relates to Kenya. It was noted that Uganda's turn to socialism at certain points in time indisposed the cooperative trend of interaction between Kenya and Uganda. Even with this latent suspicions spilling over into the post-EAC era, the need to continue collaborating on the economic arena supercedes(ed) the political animosities that were instrumental to the break-up of the EAC.

It was thus broadly noted that even though certain events of inter-state interaction determine the way they later relate to each other, certain felt needs of the moment submerge any animosities that could have been carried over. This is the case to the extent that the contiguity and mutual economic interdependence of the two states neutralise initial factors leading to the EAC's collapse.

Notwithstanding the concurrence of economic interests and in effect therefore the shelving of power or prestige motivations, latent tension between the two countries still goes on,

Its important to note that this tension is not accruant from economics but from the perceptions of their foreign-policy makers about how they expect each

other to behave. Kenya assumes that because of her initial dominance in the EAC and more so in her trade interaction with Uganda, she should act as 'big-brother' where Uganda is concerned. This position is greatly detested by Uganda whose economic and political perils in the post-EAC era have aroused the drive to be self-sufficient. It is along such divergence of perception of national-interest that the tension precedent to EAC dis-integration is even more heavily laden in the post-EAC period.

We perhaps want to cite President Yoweri Museveni who during the recent African Conference on Stability, Security and Cooperation in Uganda is quoted to have said, 'there is no genuine problem between the people of Uganda and Kenya or between the two states, but there is a problem of subjective perception on the part of some people in the Kenya leadership'.

For purposes of relating this to the economic asymmetries responsible for EAC dis-integration, Museveni says,

'The problem with some leaders in Kenya is to underestimate us. Kenyan leaders do not like certain aspects of our policy which is in order, but to think that they could make us change by pressure is wrong because they have no right or power to do that'².

In light of the foregoing, though cooperation has continued to thrive in the post-EAC period, given Kenya-Uganda interdependence, certain innate tensions between the two countries often cause conflicts. There are about three possible policy recommendations available to the decision makers.³

5.3 Alternative Policy Recommendations

We shall attempt to give policy recommendations for foreign policy makers, taking into account our findings. Clearly, no one policy recommendation can be considered absolutely viable given shifting conditions and needs of the two countries. A combination of one, two or all three might be imperative in regard to a certain issue whereas the usage of only one of them might be considered meaningful in another circumstance.

5.4 Alternative One: Change of Perceptions

The traditional myth of conflict between the two countries should not be used by leaders in either country to refer to a "common enemy" when there are internal economic and political problems in their countries. It is this traditional tendency to constantly perceive each other's actions as hostile that anchors the impression of conflict even when the two countries enormously cooperate in trade; though with asymmetries in benefits.

The two countries' foreign-policy makers should in effect cultivate a change of perception regarding each other's initial hostilities. They need not harbour grudges based on this. A more extrovert view of interaction on either side can only emerge if an open-minded and positive attitude is nurtured by Kenya's and Uganda's foreign-policy makers

5.5 Merits

- (a) This alternative opens up avenues of interaction which were hitherto not perceivable due to the limitation of "fixed" animosities between the two countries' foreign-policy makers.
- (b) It eases the tension that has usually characterised the two states' relations.
- (c) It enhances the areas in which their national interests could concur and in effect therefore, subsumes any concern with power- or prestige-searching motivations by leaders in both countries.

5.6 Demerits

- (a) This alternative harbours the danger of living the securities' of either state's at risk. Given the inexplicable nature of human motivations; especially so where the national interests of nation-states are carved by statesmen, the danger of an open-minded attitude gives the risk of exposing security arrangements.
- (b) It assumes that the national interests of both countries are often at par. It in effect does not take into account the fact that their interdependence in trade could be shifted whenever either country seeks for alternative markets or routes.

5.7 Alternative Two: Foreign Policy-makers to Get Adequate Information Prior to Making Final Decisions

The press in both countries should be more sceptical about what happens at the borders of both countries. In most instances, the print media magnifies individual skirmishes at the border to portray overall Kenya-Uganda conflict. This, it was deduced, accords conflict a lot more salience than it deserves in practise.

Thus, adequate, appropriate and contextual information should be gathered by foreign policy makers before picking the analyses of the press about Kenya-Uganda conflicts. This is assuming that it might take the print media in both countries a long time before they step away from initial precedents laid about either countries hostility. Such indepth research demands for objective-oriented analysis.

5.8 Merits

- (a) Adequate, appropriate and realistic information about conflictive events will accord foreign policy makers consistency and continuity in policy formulation. This will be the case to the extent that what obtains as conflict and/or cooperation from either Kampala or Nairobi is bound to be consistent over a period of time. However, perceiving conflictive and/or cooperative events from insufficient information gathered from subjective press analyses may change from time to time, given their biased conceptions.
- (b) Factual investigation will not only offer the Ministries of Foreign Affairs objective information, but it will also allow for detailed

briefing of the Presidents in both countries on certain foreign policy issues. Official foreign policy pronouncements will in effect be authoritative and purposeful.

- (c) This will reduce the embarrassments that have in the past characterised foreign policy makers; where the press sensationalises a border skirmish and no factual statement is given to explain the discrepancy obtaining from continued cooperation

5.9 Demerits

- (a) It may not be practical to gather what we refer to as objective information. Not only might such information be absent, that is, deliberately hidden from the reach of the researcher, but such information may still be coloured by the researcher's biases.
- (b) The timing between the occurrence of a conflictive event and the urgency to produce an official statement might be too short for adequate and appropriate information to be gathered.

5.10 Alternative Three: Continued Pursuit of Economic Trade

That Uganda and Kenya should continue trading despite attempts by both countries to seek for alternative markets and routes for their goods. This was found necessary because it is the single strand of interaction that relates strongly with cooperation. Market for more goods should thus be sought in Uganda and the latter should also be encouraged to import more from Kenya.

However, we are of the opinion that Uganda's search for alternative routes for her goods should not be viewed with circumspection by Kenya. Even though this might not be to the national-interests of Kenya, Uganda has the right to seek for alternative routes due to her landlockedness.

5.11 Merits

- (a) As deduced, continued trade interaction submerges any political hostilities between the two countries; its enhancement will consequently perpetuate the generally cooperative nature of Kenya-Uganda interaction.

(b) It is to the national-interests of both countries that they trade with each other. Even though Uganda is seen to have experienced huge trade imbalances, the economic restructuring that is now underway in the country is bound to change this assymetry.

(c) Given Africa's position as a subordinate state system, regional trading constitutes a facet of cooperation that enhances African states

independence vis-a-vis the industrialised nations. It is to their national interests of attaining regional economic self-sufficiency, that they should boost inter-state trade.

5.12

Demerits

(a) Trade interaction may be used as an instrument to perpetuate the tension between the two countries. To the extent that Uganda remains a landlocked country making her depend on Kenya's port to acquire her re-export goods, this gives Kenya the advantage of using this as a power-attribute against Uganda.

(b) Continued trade interaction between the two countries over the years revealed an asymmetrical pattern of total export trade towards Kenya's advantage. These trade surpluses therefore burgeon Kenya's economic national interest against Uganda's in trade interaction. The tendency, as was deduced, was latent dis-affection against Kenya which leads to conflict between them.

5.13 FOOTNOTES

1. Reference to the phrase Tanzanians normally used when referring to the capitalist-oriented nature of the Kenyan economy. In Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru: The Autobiography of Oginga Odinga. (London: Heinemann), 1967).
2. The Nation (Kenya), May, 22, 1991.
3. There are diverse and numerous recommendations that can be generated as regards the conflictive and cooperative nature of Kenya-Uganda relations.
However, due to our Focus of Study, the three policy recommendations were deemed meaningful. This was the case to the extent that they rallied around the key areas that influenced the conflictive and cooperative nature of the two states' relations.

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