

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI  
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

W  
**THE QUEST FOR A REGIONAL SECURITY  
FRAMEWORK  
FOR THE  
EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY** 7

By

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
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## Declaration

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree/diploma in any university.

James Mwangi Kahiga  ..... Date 28-02-05

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as university supervisor.

Dr Musambayi Katumanga  ..... Date 28-2-05

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## **DEDICATION**

**I dedicate this work to my late mother Loise Wanjiru, who passed on when I was in the middle of this work and who toiled so hard for my education.**

## CONTENTS

Title Page	i
Declaration	ii
Acknowledgement	iii
Dedication	iv
Contents	v
Abbreviation	viii
Abstract	x

### CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

<b>1.1. Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1.2. The Problem Statement</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>1.3. Objectives of the Study</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>1.4. Justification and Rationale</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>1.5. Scope</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>1.6. Literature Review</b>	<b>14</b>
1.6.1. Security and Regional Integration Schemes	16
1.6.2. Shifting Loyalties and Common Foreign and Security Policies	20
1.6.3. Security Community and Regional Security Framework	21
1.6.4. Interdependence and Regional Security Framework	23
1.6.5. Security Alliances and Regional Security Framework	25
1.6.6. Third World Vulnerability to the International System	26
1.6.7. Political Variables in Economic Integrations	28
1.6.1. Cold War and Third World Security Predicament	28
1.6.2. States as Actors in The Global and Regional Arena	29
1.6.3. Norms and Standards in Regional Security Frameworks	31
1.6.4. Use Of Force in Regional Security	32
1.6.5. Societal Surveillance	34
1.6.6. Civil Society and Regional Security	35
1.6.7. The Multinational Institutions and Regional Security	37
<b>1.7. Theoretical Framework</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>1.8. Hypothesis</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>1.9. Definition of Terms and Concepts</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>1.10. Methodology</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>1.11. Chapters Outline</b>	<b>47</b>

### CHAPTER TWO: IMPEDIMENTS TO SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY

<b>2.1. Introduction</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>2.2. Political Hindrances to Regional Security Framework</b>	<b>50</b>
2.2.1. Leadership as an Impediment	51
2.2.2. Ideological Differences in Regional Security Framework	54
2.2.3. Excessive Political Ambition and Political Wrangles	57
2.2.4. Endemic Corruption	58
2.2.5. The Psychological Dependency Syndrome	60

2.2.6.	State Crisis	61
2.2.7.	The Realist View and Erosion Of Sovereignty	69
2.2.8.	The New Definition of Security,	72
2.2.9.	The Lack of Coercion Factor	77
2.2.10.	War and the Changing Role of the Military	81
2.2.11.	Security Alliances and Regional Security Framework	83
2.2.12.	Weak East African Community Structures and Institutions	86
<b>2.3</b>	<b>Economic Hindrances to Regional Security Framework</b>	<b>88</b>
2.3.1.	Globalisation	89
2.3.2.	Poverty of States and Governments	92
2.3.3.	Economic Dependency Syndrome	93
2.3.4.	Technological Backwardness	95
<b>2.4.</b>	<b>Social Issues in Regional Security Framework</b>	<b>96</b>
<b>CHAPTER THREE: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY</b>		
<b>3.1.</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>103</b>
<b>3.2.</b>	<b>Localised Political Threats</b>	<b>106</b>
<b>3.3.</b>	<b>Localised Economic Threats</b>	<b>110</b>
<b>3.4.</b>	<b>Local Environmental Conflicts</b>	<b>114</b>
<b>3.5.</b>	<b>Social Threats</b>	<b>118</b>
<b>3.6.</b>	<b>External threats</b>	<b>121</b>
<b>CHAPTER FOUR: RECAPITULATION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</b>		
<b>4.1.</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>132</b>
<b>4.2.</b>	<b>a. Objective 1</b>	<b>132</b>
	<b>b. Objective 2.</b>	<b>134</b>
<b>4.3.</b>	<b>a. Hypothesis 1</b>	<b>135</b>
	<b>b. Hypothesis 2</b>	<b>140</b>
<b>4.4.</b>	<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>141</b>
<b>4.5.</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>	<b>145</b>
4.5.1.	Mitigating Factors in Favour of a Regional Security Framework	148
4.5.2.	Regional Security Framework Coordination	150
4.5.3.	Regional Force Structuring	151
4.5.4.	Suggested Structure of the Regional Security Framework	152
4.5.5.	The Continental and IGAD Regional Security Initiative	155
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>		<b>157</b>

## **Abbreviations**

<b>ACRI</b>	-	<b>African Crisis Response Initiative</b>
<b>AG</b>	-	<b>Attorney General</b>
<b>ASAL</b>	-	<b>Arid and Semi Arid Lands</b>
<b>AU</b>	-	<b>African Union</b>
<b>CinC</b>	-	<b>Commander in Chief</b>
<b>COMESA</b>	-	<b>Common Market for Eastern &amp; Southern Africa</b>
<b>DOD</b>	-	<b>Department of Defence</b>
<b>DRC</b>	-	<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>
<b>EAC</b>	-	<b>East African Community</b>
<b>EASBRIG</b>	-	<b>East Africa Standby Brigade</b>
<b>ECOWAS</b>	-	<b>Economic Community of West African State</b>
<b>EPZs</b>	-	<b>Export Processing Zones</b>
<b>EU</b>	-	<b>European Union</b>
<b>FDIs</b>	-	<b>Foreign Direct Investments</b>
<b>GA</b>	-	<b>General Assembly</b>
<b>GDP</b>	-	<b>Gross Domestic Products</b>
<b>GS</b>	-	<b>Grand Strategy</b>
<b>ICC</b>	-	<b>International Criminal Court</b>
<b>IFIs</b>	-	<b>International Financial Institutions</b>
<b>IGAD</b>	-	<b>Inter-governmental Authority on Development</b>
<b>IMF</b>	-	<b>International Monetary Fund</b>



IR	-	International Relations
KADU	-	Kenya African Democratic Union
KAPOTUR	-	Karamoja Pokot Turkana Triangle
LRP	-	Long Range Planning
MNCs	-	Multinational Corporations
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	-	Non-Governmental Organizations
OAU	-	Organization of African Unity
ODA	-	Overseas Development Assistance
OSCE	-	Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
PLO	-	Palestinian Liberation Organization
SADC	-	Southern Africa Development Cooperation
SALW	-	Small Arms and Light Weapon
UN	-	United Nations Organisations
US	-	United States of America
WB	-	World Bank
WTO	-	World Trade Organizations
WW2	-	World War 2

## **Abstract**

The treaty forming the second East African Community was signed on 30<sup>th</sup> November 1999. The second attempt is now in its seventh year without showing significant results. In this thesis we investigate the impact of the absence of a regional security framework on the pace and depth of the implementation of the treaty. We establish that political, economic and social issues impede evolution of a regional security framework. Issues of political leadership, sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence feature prominently as major obstacles to achieving common perception and conceptualisation of common threats and hence the reluctance to regional security framework. Security belongs firmly in the political domain, and therefore political strong-will is crucial in the establishment of a regional security framework. Regional

Security framework is necessary because it possess a pacifying effect between states. It creates common expectations amongst the political and security elites and in this manner reduces the likelihood of violent conflicts between the states. At the same time it injects some permanence in the relations between states. Without a regional security framework any developments achieved in the economic field can easily be back-rolled or ignored in the event of a political divergence. The East Africa Community member states face common security challenges. These include endemic poverty amongst the masses, political instability, domestic insecurity, societal weakness and weak structural and institutional frameworks. The treaty for East African Community lacks mechanisms for dealing with three types of security concerns, those emanating from outside the bloc; those from internal domestic conflicts threatening the legitimate government and those crisis generated by the behaviour of a member state government. Presently, the power of the East African Community to address these challenges is

greatly undermined by its structure and institutions. This thesis also provides a strong argument not only in support of creation of regional security framework but also proffers a possible structure.

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Introduction

This study is about regional security framework in the East African Community. Security is a major component of the politics of regional integration process. Because of its central role in under-girding sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, security is one of the most crucial elements in regional integration schemes<sup>1</sup>. The security element in regional integration determines the form of regional governance. A sound regional security framework offers a firm foundation on which to build other regional governance structures. In the East African Community treaty the security element has not been given adequate prominence<sup>2</sup>, hence the need to investigate the impact of this omission. Past studies of regional integrations in third world and particularly EAC<sup>3</sup>, have firmly attested that the element of institutionalised security cooperation is of paramount importance in any successful regional integration scheme. This is because the fragile socio-political status of East African states, engender insecurity to rank very high in the national political agenda<sup>4</sup>.

This study investigates why a regional security framework is lacking in the EAC, the consequences of this omission and suggests regional security strategies that would guarantee success and survival of the Community. It examines how successive East African Community states' leadership have created impediments to a regional security

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<sup>1</sup> ECA Policy Research Report: *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa*. Economic Commission for Africa 2004. p 70 .

<sup>2</sup> *Perspectives on Regional Integration and Cooperation in East Africa*. Secretariat of the commission for EA cooperation and German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Arusha. 2000.

<sup>3</sup> *Study of the operationalisation of article 123 of the EAC treaty and related provisions*. African Peace forum, Nairobi. 2003.

<sup>4</sup> Ayoob describes this as the third World security predicament. See Ayoob, M. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. L. Rienner Publishers, 1995.

framework in preference to enhancing their individual state positions and how they exploited or ignored emergent opportunities for introducing the framework. The study will seek to establish the importance of a well-institutionalised regional security framework and explore the factors that impede it. It replays the processes of the East African state creation, deconstruction, reconstruction, and consolidation, as well as sub-regional problems of reconstruction as well as the emergent contradictions and omissions<sup>5</sup>. The EAC region has been selected for this study because of its unique characteristic. Firstly, this scheme has a past history of failure, the collapse of the first EAC in 1977. Secondly, the second integration attempt is at a relatively young stage, which can allow amendments and/or new inclusions of new provisions.

Security is and will remain the key rationale for legitimising governments. The central role of security is the creation of an environment where majority of citizens can go about their businesses in peace and harmony<sup>6</sup>. In this endeavour governments seek the ability to maximise control of domestic and external factors that tend to diminish this harmony, while enhancing the resource extractive capabilities that promote the welfare of the citizens. In the international system of states, states strive to achieve absolute autonomy in the conduct of their affairs, and unilaterality in their decision-making processes. However, states often find that they cannot achieve their individual national objectives singly without involving other states in their national agenda. This is because state resources are finite and state's national interests often lie beyond their national borders. Self-sufficiency in resources and autonomy in action become difficult and cooperation with other states becomes inevitable. Regional economic integration seeks

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<sup>5</sup> Zartman W I: *African Regional Security and Changing Patterns of Relations in Keller EJ et al: Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking state Sovereignty and Regional Security*. Lynne Rienner, Colorado. 1996. p55.

<sup>6</sup> NARC Party manifesto. Nairobi. 2002. p1-3

to widen the scope of the resource base. Regional integration has become more and more accepted in the present times due to the growing trend of global interdependence. However regional security framework, which underpins political integration, is not so readily accepted because it inherently diminishes state sovereignty<sup>7</sup>. This inhibition to surrendering sovereignty is fast fading. Koech<sup>8</sup> argues that the establishment of International Criminal Court (ICC) and the general acceptance of humanitarian interventions into sovereign states, signals acceptance of the concept of pooling sovereignty in exchange of regional security. However the contradiction between state autonomy and cooperation is still a major source of debate in regional integration process.

Third World countries, especially African states, have become more vulnerable to the international system in this age of globalisation due to their weak economies and low military capabilities<sup>9</sup>. They therefore have more intrinsic reasons to cooperate in order to use their combined capabilities against these disadvantages. The genesis of African state weaknesses is traced to the process of states creation in the African continent, which rendered them collectively weak and vulnerable<sup>10</sup>. The process of colonisation dismantled the traditional ways of life of the communities as the generation of state boundaries disregarded traditional boundaries between different communities. In the process, colonialism dismembered ethnic communities by erecting boundaries between them. Boundaries were also erected between communities and their source of

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<sup>7</sup>Zartman W I: *African Regional Security and Changing Patterns of Relations in Keller EJ et al: Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking state Sovereignty and Regional Security*. Lynne Rienner, Colorado. 1996. pp 3-11.

<sup>8</sup>Koech, J. *Emerging Challenges of Security in IGAD* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 129.

<sup>9</sup>Ayoob, M. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. L. Rienner Publishers, 1995.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*

livelihood such as grazing land, watering points and cultivation<sup>11</sup>. This created inter-community antagonism. At independence this dismemberment endeared infant African states to easy prey for continued post-colonial exploitation and a haven of internal and regional strife.

In the early stages of decolonisation, majority of leading African elites saw an opportunity for re-membering African. They advocated pan-Africanism ideals of uniting Africa into one great Federal State<sup>12</sup>. Two models were proposed, thus: the United Nations of Africa and the United States of Africa. This became the debate between the Monrovia and the Casablanca groups<sup>13</sup> at formation of OAU. Pan-Africanism spirit waned on attaining independence due to, among other reasons, the prevalent internal disharmony in the states, colonial power manipulations, inadequacy of the emergent state leadership and the prevailing ideological divide in the international system<sup>14</sup>. It became difficult to agree on the modalities of achieving this greater African State. Ochieng<sup>15</sup> argues that by 1963 the founding fathers of Kenya realised that continental unity was not going to be possible and shelved the idea. For this reason all first party manifestos of EAC states did not reflect the notion of African federation. When pan-africanism failed, the newly independent East African states settled on a regional integration motivated by the existing common colonial economic

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<sup>11</sup> Kamenju, JAN. et al, *Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya*. Security Research and Information Centre. Nairobi Kenya. 2003. p 3.

<sup>12</sup> Orwa D. K: *The Search for African Unity* in Ojo O.J.C.B. et al: *African International Relations*. Longman Kenya. 1985. p73.

<sup>13</sup>This is well discussed in Amate, C.O.C. *Inside the OAU: Pan Africanism in Practice*. Macmillan, London. 1986.

<sup>14</sup> Hiteng, C. O. *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 9-10.

<sup>15</sup>Orwa, K. *Foreign Policy, 1963-1986*, in Ochieng, W. R. ed. *A Modern History of Kenya, 1895-1980*. Evans Brothers (K) Ltd, Nairobi, Kenya. 1989. pp 221.

and political infrastructure. Albeit with difficulties, the treaty forming the East African Community was signed in 1967<sup>16</sup>. Unfortunately, this Community collapsed in 1977<sup>17</sup>.

Rebirth of the cooperation amongst the three countries was initiated in 14 May 1984 with the signing of the EAC Mediation Agreement. On 30 November 1993 the Heads of States established the Secretariat for Permanent Tripartite Commission for Cooperation of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and on 29 April 1997 the tripartite agreement was upgraded to the EA Cooperation Treaty<sup>18</sup>. The secretariat was tasked to study and make proposals for rebirth of East African Community. On the completion of the study, the second East African Community Treaty was signed on 30<sup>th</sup> November 1999<sup>19</sup>. It was to a large extent motivated by the same reasons as the first; the realisation of numerous vulnerabilities of the member states and weaknesses in states' capacities to singly survive in the international system of states. In both the first and second integration initiatives the framework for the integration was based on an initial liberal economic integrative model aimed at gradual transformation into a political union<sup>20</sup>. In the second attempt, the architects had attributed the failure of the first attempt to among others, absence of private sector involvement. The second attempt was given a heavy bias on the private sector involvement in the economic integration process<sup>21</sup>. That practically the first scheme did not take off and collapsed after ten years of turbulence is indicative of absence of fundamental insurance or stabilising mechanism. The lack of political will to create an explicit regional security framework

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<sup>16</sup> *Perspectives on Regional Integration and Cooperation in East Africa*. Secretariat of the commission for EA cooperation and German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Arusha. 2000. p21.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* p21.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* p 24.

<sup>19</sup> See Preamble. *The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community*. Arusha, Tanzania. November 30, 1999.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* Articles 127, 128, 129.



stands out as a major omission in the treaty and has a major bearing on the slow pace of the current integration process.

The current East African Community treaty can be logically split into two parts. The first part addresses economic integration while the second part aims at political integration. The political under-girds the economic while the economic is the *raison d'être* for integration. Therefore these two parts are mutually complementing. There has been concern on the slow pace of the implementation of the treaty. Indeed having noted the slow pace, the three Heads of States, sitting in a lowly publicised meeting at Nairobi in August 2004, decided to appoint a joint committee of experts study new ways of fast-tracking the integration process. This was recognition that there were serious impediments to implementation of the treaty that needed sorting out. The committee appointed concentrated on the economic integration component and by November 2004 they had pushed the process of economic integration well underway. They drew up the Customs Union Protocol, which came into operation in January 2005. However, there was no mention of regional security cooperation. Omission of a security framework in the recommendations slows the pace towards political union. Absence of security structures in the treaty means that any development in economic integration will be cosmetic and reversible. This is because future political divergence can back-roll economic achievements. This raises fundamental questions; why is a regional security framework absent in the Community treaty yet it is a crucial requirement for cementing relations between the states? To what extent does this absence affect the success of the integration process? Is the achievement of a political union feasible without a regional security framework? What are the major issues that must be addressed to evolve an East African Community regional security framework?

## 1.2. The Problem Statement

Regional security cooperation in East Africa existed during the period of colonisation underpinned by the British interests in the three colonial states. This cooperation collapsed in East Africa when each country attained independence and established its own security forces<sup>22</sup>. The armed forces became territorial and were to serve the interests of their respective states. There was no common security framework when the first East African Community was formed. Therefore an important centripetal force - regional security framework – which would bind the Community together, was missing. As a result there was no clear framework for conflict resolution among member states. This omission explains the emergence of a high level mistrust, suspicion and differences of opinion, which manifested itself in form of political, ideological and economic conflicts. These differences destroyed the foundation for cooperation and eventually graduated into war between Tanzania and Uganda<sup>23</sup> and tension and border closure between Kenya and Tanzania<sup>24</sup>. These quarrels preceded the collapse of the Community.

Despite the then existing common colonial infrastructure in the region, the East African Community collapsed in 1977. There were no plausible mechanisms or infrastructure to arbitrate this collapse. Unlike West African subsystem, ECOWAS which has inbuilt defined security and arbitration framework<sup>25</sup>, the East African Community subsystem

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<sup>22</sup> Freund B.: *The making of Contemporary Africa: the Development of African Society Since 1800*, Macmillan London. 1984. p217-221

<sup>23</sup> Avirgan T and Honey M: *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin*. Tanzania Publishing House. Dar es Salaam. 1982.

<sup>24</sup> Ojo O.J.C.B. et al: *African International Relations*. Longman Kenya. 1985. pp43-48.

<sup>25</sup> Sengor, J. C. *ECOWAS: Problems and Prospects: Notes for Discussions*, in Bourname, N. ed. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa*. African Academy of Sciences. Nairobi, Kenya. 1996.

had none of this<sup>26</sup>. The amalgamating treaty was built entirely on low politics-economic model- lacking a regional security outlook. There were no set norms of state behaviour or criterion for intervention in regional disputes. The impact of this deficit was intra and interstate conflicts.

The emergent states' social, political and economic crises, amplified by the emergent international threats from globalisation, post cold war threats of isolation, international crime, among other, have seen new efforts being made to revive the East Africa Cooperation. The eventual objective of this new initiative is to form a political federation aimed at mitigating the common threats and broadening resource base<sup>27</sup>. However, cooperation in the political field comes head-on with the traditional principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and self-determination<sup>28</sup>. States are generally reluctant to surrender these principles. Therefore, unless the East African Community political leaders are deeply convinced that these principles will be well protected in an integrated security framework they are unlikely to offer the necessary political will and acceptance , hence the need for a study to establish the implication of the absence regional security framework.

The East African Community treaty glosses over regional security issues in a number of articles. The main clauses that pertain to security are Articles 5, 123, 124, and 125. Article 5 provides for safety, peace and security cooperation. Article 5(1) summarises the objectives of the community as to 'develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among partner states in political, economic, social

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<sup>26</sup> *The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community*. Arusha, Tanzania. November 30, 1999.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid* See Preamble.

<sup>28</sup> Mwangi. *Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region* in Mwangi, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 134- 138.

and cultural fields research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs for their mutual benefit'<sup>29</sup>. The overall spirit of the security cooperation is captured in article 5.2 (f) as 'the promotion of peace, security and stability within, and good neighbourliness among the partner states'. This article does not propose any mechanism or institutional framework for the promotion of security. Article 123 specifically addresses political unification and notes that 'in order to promote the objectives set out in article 5 with reference to eventual establishment of political federation, the states shall have common foreign and security policies which will address common cultural values, common fundamental interests, independence of the community, security of the community, develop democracy and rule of law and respect human rights, preserve peace and international security, and cooperate in the international forums'. It does not elaborate on how the said important element of preserving the security of the community or regional security will be achieved. In pursuance of article 123, it is not clear where the point of entry in the pursuance of common foreign and defence policy is<sup>30</sup>. Does common foreign and defence policy mean representation by a regional organ in articulating the common foreign policy or separate state foreign and security institutions articulation of what the particular state views as of common interest to the other two?<sup>31</sup> This question is paramount in the discussions of regional foreign and security policy because operationalisation implies the establishment of a regional security and foreign policy institution. Such an institution is not explicitly implied in the treaty. This absence makes the implementation of article 123 problematic.

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid. Article 5 (1).

<sup>30</sup> Lindberg notes that a successful regional integration is predicated on the surrender of power and rights to conduct foreign policy and key domestic policies independently. See Lindberg, L. *The political Dynamics of European Economic community integration*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1963.

<sup>31</sup> Mwangiru M: *Diplomacy: Documents, Methods and practice*. IDIS Nairobi, Kenya 2004. p133.

Article 124 addresses regional peace and security. The article recognises that ‘peace and security are pre-requisites to social and economic development within the Community and vital to the achievement of the objectives of the Community’. Although the article provides for curbing cross-border crime and cooperative activities on fighting crime such as arrest and repatriation of criminals and exchange of information and intelligence, it falls short of proposing specific framework under which such activities would become operationalised by the member states. Article 125, which deals with defence issues notes that ‘in the promotion of peace, security and stability within, and good neighbourliness among the Partner States, the States will closely co-operate in defence affairs by establishment a framework for co-operation’. No further elaboration is given pertaining to the structure or content of the implied framework. The article does not establish institutions and frameworks or give specific guidelines or timelines on the implementation of the common security and defence policy. This makes the operationalisation of the article problematic. a few attempts were made to formulate a defence protocol but none has been accepted by the political actors. The existing MOU on cooperation in defence addresses training exchanges, joint exercises and visits and therefore falls short of being a RSF.

the articles discussed above address different aspects of regional security. They do not provide for specific responsibilities of partner state governments neither do they propose structures or institutions. The provisions lack specificity on structural and institutional frameworks and timeframes necessary for their implementation<sup>32</sup>. Yet East Africa faces numerous and serious security common threats which demand regional

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<sup>32</sup> The EAC secretariat regretted this omission in 2000 when they noted that the governments had insisted that the integration was to be based on Cooperation ONLY and not federation. See *Perspectives on Regional Integration and Cooperation in East Africa*. Secretariat of the commission for EA cooperation and German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Arusha. 2000. p 100 .

conceptualisation. For instance since 1987 Uganda has been facing internal rebellion in the North and Northeast from fundamentalist groups<sup>33</sup>. Kenya and Tanzania were attacked by terrorists in August 1998 leading to loss of over 240 lives with over 1,000 people injured. A second terrorist attack near Malindi in Kenya resulted in 13 deaths<sup>34</sup>. Kenya and Uganda continue to be undermined by internal and cross-border pastoral conflicts that have disrupted socio-economic activities in North Eastern Uganda and North Western Kenya<sup>35</sup>. The proliferations of small arms and light weapons (SALW) have escalated serious crimes in the three countries<sup>36</sup>. The refugee problem manifests itself in Kenya<sup>37</sup> and Tanzania<sup>38</sup> as a result of political strife in Somalia and Burundi respectively. The collapse of the state of Somalia has grave regional consequences<sup>39</sup>. The conflict over the waters of Lake Victoria and the River Nile has the potential to become a major threat to security in this region<sup>40</sup>. The conflicts in the exploitation of the lake Victoria and the Indian Ocean marine and aquatic resources are of great concern to the region<sup>41</sup>. Environmental degradation and management of the East African eco-system is a joint responsibility to all in the region<sup>42</sup>. To the extent that these threats exist it is unlikely that the intended integration can succeed. The absence of a regional security framework becomes highly visible. It is this phenomenon that greatly intrigues us. Despite the existence of common and mutual threats, the East

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<sup>33</sup>Hiteng, C. O. *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 9-10.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid

<sup>35</sup>Katumanga M. *Security Concerns and Lateral Pressures as a Basis for Enhanced Regional integration: a Case Study of N-W Kenya*. Paper prepared for DPMF. Unpublished . 2004.

<sup>36</sup>Kamenju, JAN. et al, *Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya*. Security Research and Information Centre. Nairobi Kenya. 2003. p 3.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid

<sup>38</sup> Ibid

<sup>39</sup>Kamudhayi, O: *The Somali Peace Process* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 107-122.

<sup>40</sup> Okoth G. *Regional Institutional Responses in the Era of Globalisation* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004.

<sup>41</sup> Daily Nation ..... August 2004

<sup>42</sup> Okoth G. *Regional Institutional Responses in the Era of Globalisation* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004.

African states have failed to evolve a common security framework. Why is this so? To what extent does the absence of this framework impede the pace and content of the East African Community integration? Can the current security threats constitute a basis for the formation of a regional security framework? These questions form the main subject of this inquiry.

### **1.3. Objectives of the Study**

Broadly stated this study analyses the extent to which the absence of regional security framework undermines integration in East Africa. In specific terms the study seeks to:

- a. Examine and analyse, political, economic, environmental and social factors underlying the absence of a regional security framework in the East African Community.
- b. Examine the current security threats and demonstrate how they offer an opportunity for establishing a regional security framework for the East African Community states.
- c. Proffer recommendations.

### **1.4. Justifications and Rationale**

Two important factors underpin the justification for this study. Firstly, there is no existing literature that specifically addresses lack of regional security framework as the major problem impeding the pace of implementation of the EAC integration. Existing literature looks at regional security in terms of the classical military roles of securing the states' territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the overall regional security is calculated as the aggregation of separate state securities. This view holds that it is possible to advance region economic integration that is fully independent of security issues. This view fails to see clearly the dependency relationship between

operationalisation of regional economic imperatives and the regional security assurance. It therefore fails to explain the slow pace of the implementation of the EAC treaty. The tendency to concentrate on issues associated with economic factors such as attainment of Customs Union without exploring the wider spectrum of political and security issues has a profound negative effect on the anticipated political federation.

The other problem is associated with the lack of a wider view of security that encompasses the totality of human security. This omission leads scholars to discuss issues of economic nature that generate conflicts such as poverty as if their solutions lie squarely in the economic domain. This is erroneous because in most cases securitising such economic issues, which is a political process, promises their faster resolution.

Policy problematisation of regional security reveals that there is an underlying fear and mistrust amongst the EAC political leaders<sup>43</sup>. This explains the careful wording of clauses on security issues in the East African Community treaty<sup>44</sup>. The question of security as a major predicament of third world governments and has become imminent in the studies of International Relations. The debate is hinged on the fact that because third world countries are weak states they are preoccupied with security<sup>45</sup>. The international balance of power theory based on this view proposes that third world countries require protection, while strong states guarantee this protection<sup>46</sup>. Weak states often establish a dependency relationship with strong states to guarantee their security. Following this logic the East African countries are considered as weak states, and are

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<sup>43</sup>ECA Policy Research Report: *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa*. Economic Commission for Africa 2004. p 70 .

<sup>44</sup>*The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community*. Arusha, Tanzania. November 30, 1999.

<sup>45</sup> Ayoob M. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Colorado. US. 1995

<sup>46</sup>Etzioni, A. *Political Unification*, Holt Rinehart and Winston. New York. 1965



therefore consumers of security generated by strong states<sup>47</sup>. This protection has not always been forthcoming because strong states pursue their national interests, which often leads to exploitation of weak states. To EAC political actors, a political integration amongst weak states, which is unlikely to extricate them from this weak category, does not make sense. This weakness can be mitigated through pooling of the available strengths. Therefore the weak status of the East Africa countries can be overcome through regional integration. Because of their poor economies and weak political bases, East African countries are characterised by many serious conflicts and numerous human security threats. These threats can be categorised into national, regional and international. No state can hope to eliminate these threats singly and hence they require a RSF, which will not only create a regional perception of issues and conceptualisation of remedies but also safeguard the region from the unfavourable International environment. This argument justifies the need to study security provision in the EAC region.

Dismemberment of the African societies through the arbitrary carving of boundaries between states was a product of the processes of colonialism and state creation at independence. This engendered interstate and intercommunity cross-border conflicts. Boundaries became sources of dispute at independence. For this African and especially EAC political leaders highly value and guard their state sovereignty and territories<sup>48</sup>. This phobia of loss of sovereignty or territory explains the reluctance of EAC presidents to accept regional security framework even when existing circumstances

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<sup>47</sup>Shaw argues that strong states with greater socio-political cohesion are more capable of providing security to society within their territories while weak states with poorer socio-political cohesion are less capable. See Shaw M. *Global Society and International Relations, Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives*. Polity Press. Cambridge, UK. 1994

<sup>48</sup>Snow DM: *International Relations: the Changing Contours of Power*. Longman. NY 1988.

clearly point to the need. They hope to re-member the East African society through commercial interactions generated under economic integration and not the political integration. This explains why they have given a lot of prominence to the private sector involvement and denied prominence to security issues<sup>49</sup>. Security is a political issue and politics override all other issues of governance. If security is not under-girded by any political consensus then any development in commerce can easily be reversed in the event of a political dispute. There is therefore need to examine ways of under-girding security in the region in order to bind the states together in a more permanent way.

The study examines the reasons why East Africa governments despite their obvious need for cooperation in security have tended to want to go it alone on security matters. This is a policy flaw. There are numerous incidences where East Africa countries are collectively threatened by same factors that the logical remedy would be to integrate their resources in combating these threats. For instance globalisation phenomenon has continues to threaten weak states. State boundaries have become virtual have been replaced by new concepts like regulatory landscape<sup>50</sup>. The market has replaced the state. The flooding of manufactured goods into East African economies through MNCs, promotes Western States perpetual domination of the region. To ward off these and many other forms of exploitation EAC states need to promote creation of regional financial institutions, local NGOs and strengthening regional civil society organisations. Terrorist threat to East Africa is real and it vindicates the requirement for a security integration scheme. For instance, after the terrorist attack of the US

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<sup>49</sup>*The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community*. Arusha, Tanzania. November 30, 1999. Articles 127-129.

<sup>50</sup>Mwagiru. *Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 134- 138.

embassies in Nairobi and Dares Salaam on 8<sup>th</sup> August 1998 there was no coordinated effort in the tracking of the terrorists<sup>51</sup>. Such efforts required immediate seamless information chain through the states. This was not possible because there was no integrated intelligence network. If a RSF were there the process would have been much easier.

Absence of security framework and effective policies has been responsible for many security lapses at the borders. The combined cost of security apparatus employed at the common borders outstrips the psychological satisfaction of remaining autonomous<sup>52</sup>. The number of illegal weapons that penetrate the region, together with the havoc they cause, justify some form of integrated control at the common borders<sup>53</sup>. Traditional cattle raids using spears and arrows have now turned into big time livestock rustling using more lethal weapons towards illegal economic gains. Proliferation of weapons in this region can be attributed to a number of causes: the frontier community conflicts (commonly known as the kin country syndrome<sup>54</sup>) and the conflict system within the great lakes region, the collapsed state of Somalia and the Northern Uganda/Southern Sudan conflict system<sup>55</sup>. The only effective way of fighting international terrorism is a establishing a seamless stream of information gathering, processing and analysis devoid of bureaucratic tapes and selective sharing. This can only be achieved by establishing a regional monolithic intelligence institution centralised under one organisation framework.

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<sup>51</sup> Republic of Kenya: Counter Terrorist Strategy. Nairobi. 2003.

<sup>52</sup> Katumanga M. *Security Concerns and Lateral Pressures as a Basis for Enhanced Regional Integration: a Case Study of N-W Kenya*. Paper prepared for DPMF. Unpublished . 2004.

<sup>53</sup> Kamenju, JAN. et al, *Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya*. Security Research and Information Centre. Nairobi Kenya. 2003.

<sup>54</sup> Katumanga M. *Security Concerns and Lateral Pressures as a Basis for Enhanced Regional Integration: a Case Study of N-W Kenya*. Paper prepared for DPMF. Unpublished . 2004.

<sup>55</sup> Kamenju, JAN. et al, *Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya*. Security Research and Information Centre. Nairobi Kenya. 2003.

## 1.5. Scope

The timeframe for this study mainly covers the period between 1993 and the beginning of 2005. This period is selected for two reasons. Firstly, the year 1993 heralded the beginning of the second attempt at forming the East African Community – the establishment of the Secretariat of the Tripartite Commission<sup>56</sup>. This was followed by the formation of East African Cooperation in 1997. Later in 1999 the second East African Community treaty was signed and subsequently the current integration process was initiated. However, we cannot adequately discuss the present process without reviewing the past East African Community because it informs the arguments on why a regional security framework is lacking East African Community treaty<sup>57</sup>. It is therefore necessary to revisit the first East African Community and the subsequent antagonism after the collapse where Kenya was viewed as the main benefactor of the collapsed community. Kenya therefore becomes an important component in the discussions on the sharing of the East African Community assets and later the discussion on revival of the community. These events are relevant to the current East African Community process since they inform the logic of the Heads of States and their decision criteria on the critical issues of the regional cooperation. Central to this psychology is the regional security assurance. Most of the study is conducted in the year 2004. However, the beginning of the year 2005 is significant in the study because major events have taken place including the signing of the Customs Union in November 2004 and its commencement of implementation in January 2005<sup>58</sup>. The study takes place under

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<sup>56</sup> African Peace Forum. *Study on the operationalisation of article 123 of the EAC treaty and related provision*. (APFO). 12<sup>th</sup> June 2003 (APFO).

<sup>57</sup> *The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community*. Arusha, Tanzania. November 30, 1999.

<sup>58</sup> Daily Nation ..... January 2005

these current dynamics. The process evaluation and the conclusions drawn thereof are based on the current state of the community.

## **1.6. Literature Review**

The literature that informs regional security integration study is multidisciplinary, multi-institutional and multifaceted. On the one hand there are many models of cooperation schemes such as political, cultural, and economic and security, each of which has its established paradigmatic foundation. On the other hand there is a marked difference between the approaches in each disciplinary context depending on whether the author is looking at security integration from the standpoint of the affluent societies of the Western countries with long histories of nationalism or from the third world standpoint, predisposed to internal insecurity and external vulnerability. Furthermore the concept of security has now been enlarged to embrace not only physical security within national borders but also human security that guarantee individual survival. In the regional security framework studies in the East African Community a number of factors help to define the relevant literature. One must establish the reasons why states should have common security framework, the methods available for achieving this framework, the common impediments to regional security frameworks and establish the requisite elements of a sound regional security framework.

### **1.6.1. Security and Regional Integration Schemes**

In defining regional integration Etzioni<sup>59</sup> notes that an integrated community is a political community which has control over use of violence, possesses the centre for decision making - has the ability to allocate resources and rewards, and is capable of

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<sup>59</sup> Etzioni, A. *Political Unification*, Holt Rinehart and Winston. New York. 1965

providing political identity for majority of its citizens. Etzioni rightly explains that regional integration process is not only a political process but also captures both the security and the economic components of states; thus the ability to distribute resources and the control of use of violence. He underscores the interlock between security and economic factors. However Etzioni's model on allocation of resources is based on rich states with fairly well distributed wealth. It does not prescribe how the poor states of East African currently bedevilled by international debts and internally facing political crisis as a result of uneven distribution of resources, can be able to apply his model for a regional security framework in the East African Community.

The control of use of violence is only possible in a pacified society with deep state penetration of society; states with a culture of peaceful and well-established state surveillance of society. The model does not explain how security integration can be achieved in the East African Community where the police and the military are sometimes used by the state to unleash violence on the public and corrupt government officials man many public offices and the countries are in perpetual state crisis. Identity with a given society is only possible because of shared values and norms. Etzioni's model does not tell us how political identity can evolve where there are no set standards of behaviour of either the state or the individual.

In the report by the African Peace Forum<sup>60</sup> on the operationalisation of article 123 of the EAC treaty they noted the gravity of the political problems facing the EAC. Specifically they noted the difficulty in developing a common perception and conception of security, peace, threats, regional interests, regional foreign policy and

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<sup>60</sup> *Study of the operationalisation of article 123 of the EAC treaty and related provisions.* African Peace forum, Nairobi. 2003.

regional identity. The study notes that an EAC identity is seriously lacking and suggests confidence-building measures among citizens, the private sector, policy makers and opinion leaders such as trade unions and civil societies. Okoth<sup>61</sup> notes that as much as the EAC leaders would like to cooperate on economic matters only, there will always be conflict. Already there is internal conflict among various groups and the region is surrounded by the Horn Of Africa conflict system. There are also global security issues as a result of globalisation as well as environmental threats that call for collective action. Therefore attempt to apply Etzioni's model is immediately faced with the unique problems of the EAC society. Hence this model does not provide a base for building a regional framework for East African Community.

Etzioni further suggests that the process of political integration has three stages: pre-unification, integrating power and the unification process. He suggests that the pre-unification properties include; cultural homogeneity, economic interdependence and territorial contiguity. Integrating power consists of coercion, utilitarian and identitive properties of the states. The unification process involves distribution of the goods, interaction between persons and communications. The three stages suggested by Etzioni are vital for regional security framework for East African Community. To a large extent the pre-unification stage has been fulfilled. East African Community enjoys fair amount of economic interdependence, it is based on territorial contiguity and by virtue of historical background can be said to have reasonable cultural homogeneity. The second stage; namely integrating power, lacks most of the suggested ingredients. There are no coercive forces, the utilitarian is not explicitly apparent and

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<sup>61</sup> Okoth G. *Regional Institutional Responses in the Era of Globalisation* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 51-56.

the identification of the populace with states is weak<sup>62</sup>. In absence of these factors, Etzioni's model fails as a basis for wholesale application in the East African Community regional security framework. Similarly the third stage- unification - will be difficult to realise due to among others the poor communication infrastructure and lack of political and economic institutions to facilitate it.

Etzioni's suggestion that initial cultural homogeneity is a natural prerequisite to integration is sharply contradicted by Shaw. Shaw proposes that the prerequisites for integration are predicated on normative consensus reflected in commonly accepted institutions<sup>63</sup>. He suggests that in some cases integration evolves simply by existence of networks of relationships, with mutual expectations, even if commonality of values and norms among the members are highly limited. Shaw argues that the experience of society in complex multinational states has been that national, ethnic and other divisions will continue to remain powerful. It seems inconceivable that these divisions will be less important on the much larger scale of global society, however much global institutions develop. This argument applied at a lower scale of regional integration of the EAC states(truly multinational) means that it does not matter whether there exists a common culture at the initiation stage of integration because once integration takes place it predisposes the population to continuous interactions and this commonality of culture would develop within the integration. Although this model persuades that it is not necessary to wait for individual state homogeneity before engaging in regional integration, it does not explain what networks of relationships and mutual expectations exist in the East African Community that would persuade the politicians to create a

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<sup>62</sup> *Study of the operationalisation of article 123 of the EAC treaty and related provisions*. African Peace forum, Nairobi. 2003.

<sup>63</sup> Shaw M. *Global Society and International Relations, Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives*. Polity Press. Cambridge, UK. 1994



regional security framework in the first place. There is a sharp differentiation in the operations of the commonly accepted institutions in the East African Community states; for instance the judiciary, the police or the military, which must be harmonised before integration can take place<sup>64</sup>. Shaw does not suggest how this can be achieved.

### **1.6.2. Shifting of Loyalties and Common Foreign and Security Policies**

Haas<sup>65</sup> defines integration as a process in which actors in distinct national settings are persuaded to shift loyalties, expectation and political activities to a new centre. This implies that regional integration is a process that obscures territorial boundaries and dilutes sovereignty. Haas model means that states that wish to form an integration scheme must be ready to surrender their control of boundary activities to the regional scheme. This model has been partly alluded to in the East African Community treaty where it proposes the establishment of a common foreign and defence policy. However, Haas does not explain how a common foreign and defence policy will evolve in East African Community when the East African Community politicians cling to the traditional notion of state sovereignty and independence and states are perpetually preoccupied with internal insecurity, regime consolidation and state crisis<sup>66</sup>.

Lindberg<sup>67</sup> goes further and notes that integration is twofold; a process in which nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and domestic policies independently preferring joint decision, and secondly a process where political actors are persuaded to

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<sup>64</sup> African Peace Forum. *Study on the operationalisation of article 123 of the EAC treaty and related provision*. (APFO). 12<sup>th</sup> June 2003 (APFO).

<sup>65</sup> Haas, E. B. *The uniting of Europe*. Stanford University Press, Stanford. 1958.

<sup>66</sup> Okoth G. *Regional Institutional Responses in the Era of Globalisation* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 51-56.

<sup>67</sup> Lindberg, L. N. *The political Dynamics of European Economic community integration*. Stanford University Press, Stanford. 1963.

shift expectations and political activities to a new centre. Here Lindberg is concerned with state interaction with other states; thus, a regional foreign policy that is supportive of regional security integration. He points that a regionally integrated entity should conduct its diplomatic affairs like a singular state. His model implies that states must surrender their political independence and submit themselves to the control of a supra-national organ. In the East African Community states foreign policy formulation is not well defined and it is the Heads of States who particularly articulate it<sup>68</sup>. Like Haas, Lindberg does not explain how this responsibility can be shifted when leadership clings to power and the states are in perpetual condition of state crisis and regime consolidation.

### **1.6.3. Security community and regional security framework**

Deutsch,<sup>69</sup> the father of modern integration, defines integration as a condition in which a group of people have attained a sense of community, institution and practices, strong and widespread enough to assure peaceful change among its population. He argues that integration is a matter of fact not time. Deutsch model suggests that regional integration is only possible when there exists a sense of community among the citizenry of the states and that the populations share common culture. In such an environment, desired changes are subjected to popular vote and accepted on their own merit but not on the basis of nationality or other state differentiations. He fails to explain how this harmony can evolve in the East African states where even within the same state there are serious conflicts based on internal differentiations such as regional, ethnicity, race or religion. Building a political community demands the presence of leadership, organisation and

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<sup>68</sup>*Study of the operationalisation of article 123 of the EAC treaty and related provisions*. African Peace forum, Nairobi. 2003.

<sup>69</sup>Deutsch, K. et al. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton University press. 1957.

institutions that respond to people's needs and values. East African Community lacks basic infrastructure such as penetrative roads and other infrastructures for facilitating movements of goods and services and persons. This factor sustains termite economies. The question is how this can be put in place to facilitate integration. What will come first; integration at state level or regional level. This model is therefore difficult to apply in the evolution of a regional security framework for East African Community.

Deutsch splits regional integration into two types: amalgamated and pluralistic integration. In the amalgamated model a number of units form into one. In the pluralistic model individual unit retain legal government<sup>70</sup>. The East African Community can be viewed to fall under the pluralistic model at present but is intended to transform into the amalgamated model through the process of unification of states. Deutch does not explain how this transformation process can be affected. His analysis of European countries led to the conclusions that a number of conditions are necessary for amalgamated integration. The units must have; distinctive way of life, expectation of joint rewards, increase in political and administrative capabilities, superior economic growth, link in social communications, broadening political elite, mobility of persons and multiplicity of transactions. He postulated that conditions for pluralistic integrations are threefold; compatibility of values, mutual predictability, mutual responsiveness. Deutch's model is predicated on Western European setting with a long history of interactions between states. The relative absence of these pre-requisites in the East African Community region negates its wholesale application to the regional security framework in the East African Community.

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid

Deutsch says that hindrances to integration or conditions for disintegration consist of extended military commitments, increase in political participation on passive groups, growth of ethnic and linguistic differentiation, prolonged economic decline or stagnation, relative closure of political elite, excessive delay in socio-economic and political reforms and failure of formerly privileged groups to adjust to their loss of dominance. These negative factors to integration are all present in the East African Community integration. It explains why regional integration process in East Africa is slow and the reluctance of the political elite to hasten the process in fear of the loss of their privileged positions.

#### **1.6.4. Interdependence and regional security framework**

Galtung<sup>71</sup> defines regional integration as a process by which cultural, political and economic interdependence between actors is increased. Regional actors become linked to such an extent that what harms one actor injures the other. Galtung is more concerned with socio-economic interactions between the populations. He concludes that these interactions create incentives for peaceful coexistence on the basis of mutual loss of benefits in case of economic disruption. By implication he does not see the need for deliberate efforts at security integration since economic activities would eventually guarantee security. He however fails to emphasise on the need for political institutions and economic infrastructure development necessary for a regional security framework in East African Community.

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<sup>71</sup>Galtung J. *A structural theory of integration*. Journal of peace Research vol 5 No 4 (1968)

Galtung<sup>72</sup> further explains that the allocation model of integration considers provision of sense of identity, protection from enemy, economic gains such as markets and improvement of standard of living. Galtung sees the process to consist of three types of integration: territorial, organizational and associational. Territorial integration is concerned with insurance of boundary integrity. Achievement of this leads to organizational integration, which is concerned, with the provision of means of production of necessities for the promotion of livelihood. Organizational integration leads to associational integration, which is concerned, with allocation and distribution of benefits i.e. justice and fairness. This model fails to acknowledge that modern boundaries have become extremely virtual. Modern concepts now accept regulatory landscapes because physical boundaries have been obliterated by modern communication technology and globalisation and no longer serve their earlier purpose of absolute control of state factors<sup>73</sup>. Regulatory landscapes are concept of controls of physical immigration of persons and tax administration but not information or loyalty to the state.

These definitions represent a wide range of views among scholars on the management of integration schemes. They are varied and at times sharply contradictory. However they all converge on the view that integration is possible provided certain conditions are fulfilled. Their applicability to regional security framework for East African will require intermarriage and modifications to bring them to relevance. East African Community has a peculiar setting different from that obtaining in the environments where these theories were formulated. The main problems with the East African

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Mwangi. *Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region* in Mwangi, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 134- 138.

Community setting arise where the integrating states are poor, militarily weak, riddled with internal economic and political strife and facing a relatively hostile international system. This is the problem of Africa and East Africa in particular. There is therefore need to go beyond this Western lens of viewing integration to mitigate internal conflict. Economic, political and security integration must all move in tandem to mitigate the threats.

#### **1.6.5. Security Alliances and Regional Security Framework**

Liska<sup>74</sup> discussing security alliance cohesion argues that alliances between political units are decided upon through an evaluation of cost and benefits. The number of alliances or the size of alliance group is decided on the basis of marginal utility, weighing the cost of surrendering state control of own security to the alliance against the ever-possible threats from within the alliance. This cost is weighed against that of being out of the alliance and the possibility of being confronted with threats posed by states outside the alliance. He fails to address the situation in the East African Community region where the principal threats are more internal than external. This fact does not however diminish the need for regional security framework because the gravity of internal threats can be greater than external. For instance the conflicts such as Uganda under Idi Amin<sup>75</sup>, the Rwandan genocide<sup>76</sup>, the state collapse of Somalia<sup>77</sup> and the Southern Sudanese conflicts<sup>78</sup> are examples of internal conflicts threaten survival of

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<sup>74</sup>Liska G F. *Nations in Alliance. The Units of Interdependence*. John Hopkins press, Baltimore. 1962.

<sup>75</sup>Avirgan T and Honey M: *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin*. Tanzania Publishing House. Dar es Salaam. 1982. Ojo O.J.C.B. et al: *African International Relations*. Longman Kenya. 1985.

<sup>76</sup>Prunier, G: *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide: 1959-1994*. Fountain Publishers Kampala. 1995

<sup>77</sup>Kamudhayi, O: *The Somali Peace Process* in Mwangi, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 107-122.

<sup>78</sup>Hiteng, C. O. *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa* in Mwangi, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 9-10.

states. Hobbes<sup>79</sup> argues that consensus between states (regional integration treaties) can only be obtained by the presence or threat of force. He underlines the importance of coercive power in integration of political communities. Hobbesian model is founded on the old school of thought of integration based on conquest of states and military alliances. His model is not suitable because it does not address integration in a condition where there are no direct external threat to the states. In the East African Community case the Westphalian model of external threats does not constitute the main threat to the survival of the state. The existing internal threats must be viewed just as important as external and we must project the telescopic international threats as sufficient stimuli for evolving a regional security framework in the East African Community.

#### **1.6.6. Third World Vulnerability to the International System**

Ayoob<sup>80</sup> comes closer to explaining the problems of third world countries than any other writer in recent times. He says that Third World has a multidimensional relationship with the international system.

“The most fundamental dimension of this relationship is a direct result of the Third World’s weakness towards the two organizing principles of international social life -the sovereign state and the international market. This weakness is manifested at both of the levels at which the Third World interacts with the international system: as a group, and as individual sovereign states. Many scholarly attempts to explain this weakness have been made from many different perspectives. These attempts include the world system critique of the current international order, which provides the philosophical foundation on which much of the dependency literature is based; the reformist prescriptions for improving the position of the developing world by co-opting the more important countries, particularly the more important socio-economic strata within those countries; and the neo-conservative justification of inequality embedded in that order. This entire spectrum of views, from the revolutionary through the reformist to the most ardent defence of the status quo, accepts the notion of Third World weaknesses and vulnerability, even though the proposed solutions range from radical restructuring of the international order to vehement opposition. Even more interesting is that few, if any, analysts of these various persuasions have taken

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<sup>79</sup> Hobbes T. Leviathan

<sup>80</sup> Ayoob, M. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. L. Rienner Publishers, 1995.

their arguments to their logical end by concluding that Third World state behaviour, whether at the individual or the collective level is largely determined by the insecurity that is aggravated by the overwhelming feeling of vulnerability, if not impotence, among its state elites"<sup>81</sup>.

He argues that Africa's problems should be viewed through the multidimensional nature of North-South relations. The neglected issues are found in the field of political and military security and also in the economic and technological spheres, including aid, trade, investments, and technology transfers. Economic and technological limits severely constrain the Third World's capacity to bargain effectively with the developed countries of North America and Western Europe, and these limitations contribute to the EAC's multifaceted dependence on the North, as individual states and as a group. Economic and technological dependencies and political and military weaknesses therefore have great bearing on developed countries- EAC relations. The main reasons for the lack of attention to security in EAC, which should be considered the major variable determining EAC states behaviour both domestically and externally, are essentially their security dilemma. On interstate conflict and regional insecurity Ayoob says that there are two major sources of interstate conflict and insecurity in the Third World: the intermeshing of domestic insecurities with interstate antagonisms, and the autonomous dynamics of regional conflict, which is often centred on the aspirations of pre-eminent regional powers.

Ayoob's arguments correctly and generally cover the problems afflicting the African statesmen leadership. He however fails to explain how regional security frameworks can evolve and used as springboards for escaping this security predicament. He fails to show that it is the poor political leadership and the lack of common regional institutions

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<sup>81</sup> Ayoob, M. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. L. Rienner Publishers, 1995. p 45.



for addressing internal and regional conflicts, together with the lack of integrated regional infrastructure that is responsible for the backwardness and regressive development.

### **1.6.7. Political Variables in Economic Integrations**

World system theorists, led by Immanuel Wallerstein<sup>82</sup>, argue that the lack of attention to security has arisen from the relative neglect of political variables in favour of economic ones and from the theorists who almost exclusive concentration on the systemic level of analysis at the expense of the unit level. Although Third World states, as with all states in the international system, seek to enhance their capabilities and to improve their standing within the international hierarchy, the primary objective of Third World state elites is to reduce the deep sense of insecurity. To achieve this aim the agents of the states characteristically carry on four different activities: war making: which is eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force. Secondly, state making: eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories. Thirdly, protection: eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients. Finally, extraction: acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities - war making, state-making and protection. In the execution of these activities, EAC states have fallen into major difficulties, which have increased their insecurity dilemma. In war-making and state-making the states have degenerated into internal states-crisis that has negated the protection activities. In fact the states have tended to be the agents of insecurity.

### **1.6.8. Cold War and Third World Security Predicament**

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<sup>82</sup> Wallerstein, I. *The modern world system, 3 vols.* Academic Press, NY. 1974.

Ayoob argues that in many instances the superpower rivalry exacerbated tensions in the Third World by providing external sources of political, military, and economic support to regional disputants; this support prompted local protagonists to adopt more rigid postures and provided them with the wherewithal to prolong conflicts<sup>83</sup>. Frequently, conflict-prone areas of the Third World were also used by the superpowers to fight proxy wars, to test each other's political will, and to assess the efficacy of new weapons systems. By marking a fundamental transformation in the global balance of power, the end of the Cold War has had a major impact on conflicts in the Third World and on the way great powers attempt to manage conflicts. To tackle the issue of the impact of the post-Cold War configuration of global power on the Third World, we must first attempt to decipher the emerging contours of the new global balance. The EAC states are caught up in this problem of deciphering the new global security balance. The complexity of this task created by indecisive leadership leads to delay in the formulation of a regional security framework.

Shaw says that in a crisis of the entire global state and political systems, new forms of nationalism flourish. The collapse of state structures, following the removal of the underpinnings of the Cold War, has often been swift in a process, which has spread beyond Europe particularly to African countries. The Cold War, arms race and surveillance of lesser states were the mechanisms, which kept the blocks in place and guaranteed an important degree of pacification. He argues that the effects of the two World Wars in subordinating most state rivalries within blocs and of the nuclear arms race in forcing the recognition of the need for a global security order have brought us a peaceful industrial society. It has been not the automatic effects of scientific and

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<sup>83</sup>Ayoob, M. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. L. Rienner Publishers, 1995.

technological or socio-economic rationality but the twisted results of their utilization in international conflict, which has forced the issue. Although this view is true for the North, this vision is not shared by African scholars who view the developed countries as the major beneficiaries of an unfairly large portion of global resources and therefore a major cause of the conflicts they face either domestically or internationally. So the idea that there exists a peaceful industrial society is quite misplaced.

#### **1.6.9. States as Actors in the Global and Regional Arena**

There is an ongoing debate on whether states should remain as the principal referent point in security matters<sup>84</sup>. This is important in the formulation of a regional security framework because it will determine the structure of the framework and various institutions that need to be incorporated. Buzan<sup>85</sup> argues that the standard unit of security is the sovereign territorial states. He defines societal security in terms of sustainability of traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, national identity and custom. Buzan lists five major factors in security of human collectivities thus, military, political, economic, societal and environmental. He proposes that the security of the individual is inseparably entangled with that of the state. State and society have become increasingly indistinguishable. The state is composed of individuals bound together in a collective political unit. Individual security is essentially subordinate to the higher-level political structures of the state and the international system and so national and international security cannot be reduced to individual security.

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<sup>84</sup> Okoth G. *Regional Institutional Responses in the Era of Globalisation* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 51-56.

<sup>85</sup> Buzan, B. *An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.

He argues that the state cannot be the only referent in security because human beings entered into social relations of various kinds before they began to develop states. States are only one kind of human relations. He argues that strong states with greater socio-political cohesion are more capable of providing certain sorts of security to society within their territories while weak states with weaker socio-political cohesion are less capable. Buzan rejects the idea that states are the primary referent objects of security on three grounds: Firstly states are unreliable as primary referents because whereas some are security (internal/external) providers while some are consumers. Secondly, it is illogical to place states at the centre of our thinking because even those, which are the producers of security, represent the means not the ends. Finally, states are too diverse in character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security. Despite developing globalisation, many levels of society remain linked to the nation state. A new paradigm has become established in which the state is no longer the theoretical object but has been displaced by the state system in which the relations of states among one another is of crucial importance. In effect Buzan convinces us that the EAC states do not constitute the absolute providers of security. Other non-state agencies must be incorporated in the security package for its total fulfilment.

#### **1.6.10. Norms and Standards in Regional Security Frameworks**

Regional security is founded on common expectations. Common expectations can only be generated through common norms and standards. Globalisation tends towards this conclusion. Globalisation phenomenon has been characterised by common expectations, values and goals. These cultural norms include ideas of standard of living, lifestyle, entitlement to welfare, citizenship, rights, democracy, ethnic and

linguistic rights, nationhood, gender, and environmental quality<sup>86</sup>. They tend to create common standards on which to evaluate the performance of the state. Governments that are at variance with these norms are criticised by their citizens and often voted out. States are therefore tending towards uniformity of character.

This tendency creates a motivation, incentive and opportunity for politicians to generate accountability for their decisions. There are no clearly set norms and standard in EAC. This omission diminishes convergence in the conceptualisation of threats and their solutions. Therefore this explains the absence of a regional security framework. Hedley Bull says that the political system of global society is that of competitive international system of states, coordinating an equally complex diversity of nation state politics. The global cultural system is largely one of diverse, part competing, part overlapping, part-distinctive, part-integrated national and sub-national cultures organized around a wide range of principles.

#### **1.6.11. Use of Force and Intervention in Regional Security**

In this age military, political, economic and cultural crises are increasingly being defined as global crises; even relatively regional crises are defined as global crises. Giddens<sup>87</sup> views the modern society as dominated by knowledge based abstract systems which coordinate human activity and which enable as well as constrain the individual action and choice. Giddens suggests that pacification of societies can be achieved through surveillance and the concentration of violence in the outward-pointing activities of nations states. At the centre of Giddens's theory is the nation state,

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<sup>86</sup> Shaw M. *Global Society and International Relations, Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives*. Polity Press. Cambridge, UK. 1994.

<sup>87</sup> Giddens, A. *The consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity, 1990.

presented not just as major institution or set of institutions, but as the defining and integrity institution of modern societies. He suggests that the four institutional clustering associated with modernity are; heightened surveillance, capitalistic enterprise, industrial production and the centralized control of the means of violence. He defines warfare as one of the four major institutional clusters of modern society and one of the two which are central to the state; the way in which warfare is dealt with is therefore of major significance.

Military power has normally placed a decisive role in the integration of class divided societies. The use or the threat of the use of violence in sustaining system integration is ever present in class divided societies. This is of major importance to the conceptualisation of the state. The centrality of war, military power and violence are the cutting edges of his theory of state and society. The debate centres on the role of the military forces. In the modern times the principal desire is to outlaw war in all its forms. The debate suggests two roles for the military; peacekeeping or peacemaking. Peacemaking implies some use of military force, which raises two issues; the sovereignty and non-intervention. The choice is between intervention, which receives lukewarm support from the states - or public outcry as result of non-intervention under human catastrophes or respect for sovereignty. This is amply demonstrated in the criticism of UN and US delay in intervention on the Rwandan genocide. Therefore there is a new military debate (or in conventional terms - defence debate) in which the politics of global policing, peacekeeping and peacemaking rather than cold war increasingly defines an intrinsically more limited role for military power.

On the role of war and the military Shaw notes that major writers have continued the debate of the 19th century thinkers about industrialism and capitalism, recognizing war as an event external to the main processes of social change<sup>88</sup>. They argue that total war in the earlier part of the 20th century was a fundamental process in the restructuring of state, economy and society. In highly capitalist societies, class struggles are a chronic feature of the organization of production, but they are correspondingly less violent and they are regulated mainly by surveillance rather than by violence. Military power no longer plays a decisive role in system integration. The growth of military power contains however and can only be explained by external conflict. Because of the new importance accorded to military power, as one of the core institutional clustering of modern societies it is necessary to develop a social theory of war and militarism.

Clausewitz's<sup>89</sup> dictum is that war, is a continuation of policy by other means. But the core of his work is his concept of warfare as a contest of force to which there is no necessary limit. War may be limited by friction-constraints such as geography, climate, logistics, and technology; but the essence of war is the contest of force, which tends to become absolutely destructive. Absolute war is not merely one type of war but the logical culmination of the deeper meanings of war. Shaw believes that Clausewitz may not have envisaged that absolute war would ever be fully realized in practice; but nuclear war threatens to abolish friction and make war instantaneously absolute.

Warfare has in general moved beyond the stage in which quantities of men and weapons are crucial, to the supremacy of technological sophistication -in electronics as

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<sup>88</sup>Shaw M. *Global Society and International Relations, Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives*. Polity Press. Cambridge, UK. 1994.

<sup>89</sup> Clausewitz, C. V. *On War*

well as nuclear physics. This helped to create military industrial complexes during the cold war. Now ideological mobilization accompanies practical demobilization. Populations are no longer mobilized en masse in war preparations, nor will they be required to fight and produce in a nuclear war.

#### **1.6.12. Societal Surveillance**

Surveillance is the capacity for storage of authoritative resources, a key attribute of modern states. Traditional states could claim a legitimate monopoly of violence within a given territory but only modern nation-states have really achieved it through societal surveillance. Modern states have become absolutists. Shaw<sup>90</sup> suggests that there are three sets of military developments that have decisively influenced the rise of the absolutist state; technological changes in armaments, the emergences of modern military discipline and the development of naval strength It is the development of standing armies and discipline that has propelled the development of modern nations states aided by military organization and technology in the establishment of monopolies of violence<sup>91</sup>. Nations states as bordered-power containers achieve more and more effective surveillance of their societies and are able to eliminate or marginalize violence within them.

The elimination of violence or pacification of societies by nation states and their surveillance activities were necessary conditions for the expansion of capitalism and industrialism. Pacification of social relations occurs primarily through the accumulation of power in the nation-state. Although the mature form of pacified society is one in

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<sup>90</sup> Shaw M. *Global Society and International Relations, Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives*. Polity Press. Cambridge, UK. 1994.

<sup>91</sup> Giddens, A. *The consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity, 1990.



which surveillance is paramount, the initial pacification occurs partly through military power and leads to a standing army as the foundation of the modern nation state. Surveillance takes many forms; more sophisticated forms of surveillance, monitoring and manipulation have opened up new economic and political era in advanced Western nation states.

Giddens<sup>92</sup> suggests that the development of surveillance is related to democratisation. Modern nations states involve a more genuine balance between society and the state in which society is able to influence state forms. Surveillance may actually be the price of social reform and involves the creation of institutions able to monitor social inequalities and achieve social change within the nation state framework. Surveillance is an important factor in the establishment of EAC. An effective surveillance will require a high level of state penetration of society, which can only result from infrastructure development, and institutionalisation of regional security.

### **1.6.13. Civil Society and Regional security**

With globalisation, economic, cultural and political relations develop rapidly independent of relations between states. Individuals and groups within society begin to develop relationships with international institutions, mediated through cultural forms and institutions of civil society, which have themselves developed beyond the national context. Development of global civil society creates the concept of global responsibility, which is at an embryonic stage<sup>93</sup>. It comes in form of global ecological movements: global environmental management, human rights movements and

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Shaw M. *Global Society and International Relations, Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives*. Polity Press. Cambridge, UK. 1994.

democracy all judged by a global standard. This growth is fuelled by media coverage. These interventions have challenged sovereignty and non-intervention<sup>94</sup>. There are many attempts by statesmen to maintain the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention but there is also pressure from global civil society to transcend them. What is required now is to systemize the demands of global responsibility in a new conception of roles, rights and duties of citizens, society, states, the system of states and international institutions.

The main obstacle in regional integration centres on enforcement and the infringement on the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. A global society perspective requires recognition in the institutions and culture of the state system of the demands of society for accountability. Martin Shaw concludes that the global society perspective has an ideological significance, which is directly opposed to that of international society. Post Cold War era has been breaking boundaries in International system theories. Buzan argues that it is possible to see an emerging gigantic northern European security community. Shaw notes that within the EU there is greater convergence of civil society. The collapse of former Soviet Union revealed weakness of civil society in that system. Within the third world there is a greater worldwide recognition of global interdependence of civil societies. Okoth<sup>95</sup> argues that global civil society is characterised by growth of common expectations, goals and values – common world culture. For example new expectations of UN include human rights, humanitarian aid, and environmental agencies. Global civil society constitutes a source of constant pressures on the state system although its development is depended on the state system.

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<sup>94</sup> Chweya, L. *Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 32.

<sup>95</sup> Okoth G. *Regional Institutional Responses in the Era of Globalisation* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 51-56.

The conclusion of this observation is that while states can control much of the process of change, they are ultimately subject to a much wider array of social forces.

#### **1.6.14. The Multinational Institutions and Regional Security**

Shaw suggests that the global economic system consist not merely of a global division of labour and global market exchanges but increasingly also a variety of global or regional economic institutions aiming to regulate these processes – World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Union (EU), are just a few. Although dominated by major western states they are distinct from any specific state or private interests and operate effectively as global regulators. Global political system similarly consist of global/regional institutions – above all the UN, which plays an increasingly critical role. This is precisely why EAC countries must unite to curb the exploitative nature of these organisations.

Buzan<sup>96</sup> discusses the state and world politics and argues that states remain central actors in world politics but their interactions are surrounded and complemented by the ever more important interventions of trans-national and sub-national actors<sup>97</sup>. He suggests that there are three levels of security; individual, society but national security has tended to organize the other two levels.

#### **1.7. Theoretical Framework**

The objective of the theoretical framework is to establish a suitable theory that describe, explains, prescribes and predicts the absence of a regional security framework

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<sup>96</sup> Buzan, B. *An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

in the EAC region while at the same time suggesting that the threats found herein provide an opportunity for evolving the regional security framework. Theoretically, regional cooperation involves a process that establishes linkages between and among a group of countries within a given geographical space, motivated by common and shared interests. Cooperation can be achieved between contiguous states, which are more likely to have a wider range of common interest, or between states, which are far apart but have shared interest in some areas or issues. Contiguous states form regional cooperation while for non-contiguous states cooperation is mostly associated with issues of commerce and security alliances. For example the European Union (EU) is the best example of an economic cooperation scheme, based on contiguity of states, which has almost fully matured to political integration. The success of this integration scheme is under-girded by the existence of a strong security alliance among the states through the NATO. To further strengthen the security aspect of the EU the organisation has recently formed the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to specifically address security of the EU.

Within a regional integration scheme, integration creates common or regional interests. These interests are bound to attract both intra, sub-regional and international threats. States have to decide on two forms of protection: collective security<sup>o'</sup> of collective defence. If the aim is eventual political union like in EAC the collective security is the natural choice. Cooperative efforts for mitigating these threats become necessary. However cooperation at these level heralds problems. Formulation and creation of instruments for collective security at regional level have become extremely controversial in such schemes for three reasons; firstly because in cooperating, states have to surrender some degree of sovereignty and state power to a central coordinating

organ. Secondly, the individual states fear and question the dependability and reliability that the regional defence mechanism will be available, prompt and appear in the right strength to defeat the threat when the need arises. Finally, because these governments are involved in perpetual regime consolidation, there is fear by the ruling elite that integration in security matters opens doors for coercive interventions into their states by this supranational security organ, especially if the threats are construed to emanate from their misrule.

Classical International Relations theories approach regional integration from differing standpoints. Classical liberalism<sup>98</sup> avers that cooperation is good, it helps distribute wealth and common goods, it brings about cooperation among states and hence promotes peace and it recognises the position of the individual. It avoids states political imperatives of territorial integrity and sovereignty. It does not however explain how political issues including the security aspects can be mitigated in an integration scheme. It therefore has little to offer in explaining the existing threats in the EAC and the absence of a regional security framework to mitigate them. Classical realism<sup>99</sup> on the other hand avers that cooperation is not possible because states have absolute authority and autonomy in their territories they are preoccupied with maximisation of power and competition for domination. It emphasises that integration can only flourish when cooperation enhances individual states self-interest through promotion of influence and state power. This theory negates the whole idea of integration and hence is not suitable. Communism (or radicalism) insists that integration is not possible because the state is a product of the class system and hence regionalism is a progression of exploitation and domination of the working class (proletariat) by the bourgeoisie class

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<sup>98</sup>Snow DM: *International Relations: the Changing Contours of Power*. Longman. NY 1988.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

of the partner states. This theory has been rejected in the contemporary world politics because it negates the basic liberal capitalist economic mode of modern society.

Some scholars have proposed theories that specifically address integration processes. Karl Deutsch<sup>100</sup> theory of security community proposes that integration as a condition in which a group of people have attained a sense of community, institution and practices, strong and widespread enough to assure peaceful change among its population. This notion implies interdependence in all spheres where disputes are resolved peacefully without recourse to force. Attainment of a sense of community implies pacification of threats and fears thereof. Deutsch model suggests that the problem of internal disharmony within an integration scheme is resolved. He suggests that regional integration is only possible when there exists a sense of community among the citizenry of the states and that the populations share common values and expectations. In such an environment, desired changes would be subjected to popular vote and accepted on their own merit but not on the basis of nationality or other state differentiations. He fails to explain how this harmony can evolve in the East African states where even within the same state there are sharp differences based on internal differentiations of regional, ethnicity, race or religion. Building a political community demands the presence of leadership, organisation and institutions that respond to people's needs and values. East African Community lacks responsive regional leadership and basic infrastructure such as penetrative roads and other infrastructures for facilitating movements of goods and services and persons. This factor sustains termite economies and ethnic chauvinism and prejudices. The question is how this can be eliminated to facilitate integration. What will come first; integration at state level or

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<sup>100</sup> Deutsch, K et al. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton University press 1957.

regional level. This model is therefore difficult to apply in total in the evolution of a regional security framework for East African Community.

Katumanga<sup>101</sup> proposes the theory that a class that controls and wields power necessarily shapes foreign policy. In this sense, foreign policy is a means through which the state extracts resources from its external environment to satisfy demands made by the regime's domestic constituencies, critical to the consolidation of its domestic power base. If the state can use foreign and security policies to secure support, it is possible for social forces to use the absence of security to pressure the state to re-orient its foreign policy. Foreign policy here constitutes the means through which national interest is pursued. National interest ranges from the core values such as sovereignty and territorial integrity to middle range objectives such as economic and commercial activities. The middle-range objectives constitute one of the core bases helping the state to consolidate its legitimacy in the public realm.

To the extent that the state cannot provide values such as education, health, security and the enabling socio-economic framework that can under-gird job creation, its legitimacy realm gets increasingly eroded and in the process engenders a threat to national cohesion. Katumanga's is a state-centric theory with little value to regional application. Projection of this theory to the process of evolution of a regional security framework presupposes common threat assessment, common capacity definition and creation, common capability design and training and regional mobilization and employment strategy. However these common institutions are missing in the EAC. It is therefore not an appropriate theory for this study.

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<sup>101</sup> Katumanga, M. *Good Governance Sensitisation Workshop for Senior Policy Makers from EAC Countries*. 2003

Buzan's<sup>102</sup> model defines societal security in terms of sustainability of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Buzan lists five major factors in security of human collectivities: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. Buzan says the security of the individual is inseparably entangled with that of the state. State and society become increasingly indistinguishable. The state is composed of individuals bound together in a collective political unit. He argues that the state cannot be the only referent in security because human being entered into social relations of various kinds before they began to develop states. States are only one kind of human relations. Individual security is essentially subordinate to the higher-level political structures of the state and the international system and so national and international security cannot be reduced to individual security. Buzan<sup>103</sup> argues that although the standard unit of security is the sovereign territorial states and hence states remain central actors in world politics their interactions are surrounded and complemented by the ever more important interventions of trans-national and sub-national actors<sup>104</sup>. He states that national security in a strict sense is a concept with limited application to the state. Buzan identifies three levels of security; individual, society and national but national security has tended to organize the other two levels. He rejects the idea that states are the primary referent objects of security on three grounds: One; states are unreliable as primary referents because whereas some are in the business of security (internal/external) some are not. Two; it is illogical to place states at the centre of our thinking because even those which are the producers of security represent the means

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<sup>102</sup> Buzan, B. *An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991. Ibid

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.



not the ends. Three; states are too diverse in character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.

Buzan's argument takes cognisance of other non state actors, identifies wider security factors recognises the position of the individual and society and notes that the state cannot be the primary referent object in security. Buzan therefore comes closer to explaining the absence of a regional security framework in EAC as a result of leadership preoccupation with the state as the only provider of security. He recognises that national security has little to offer in any integration scheme, hence accepts the logic of regional security. Statism problem appears to be psychologically manifest in the East African Community and may explain the absence of a regional security arrangement. Buzan however fails to explain how this absence in itself becomes the primary cause of insecurity or how the resulting insecurity provides fertile ground for creating a regional security framework. This study adopts Buzan's theory as it is the closest to explaining the issues under study. In the process Buzan's arguments will be expanded and modified to suit the specific situation obtaining in the EAC region. We shall use the theory to explain, describe, prescribe and predict the absence of a regional framework in EAC and investigate how the threats constitute an opportunity for creating this framework.

### **1.8. Hypothesis**

The study will therefore test the following hypotheses:

- a. The absence of regional security framework in the East Africa Community is a function of the political, economic, social, environmental and military factors obtaining in the EAC.

- b. That the existing regional security threats offer an opportunity for creating a regional security framework for the East African Community.

### **1.9. Definition of Terms and Concepts**

In the entire thesis the following terms and concepts will have the meanings shown against each.

**Bad governance.** Lack of transparency and accountability in management of resources meant to benefit communities.

**Economic cooperation.** Concerted actions of trade and industry aimed at lessening discrimination in certain areas of common interests.

**Economic Integration.** A process designed to completely abolish discrimination between local and partner goods, services and factors over some agreed period.

**Economic security.** Freedom of production, distribution and consumption of goods and services within a state or region.

**Globalisation phenomenon.** The development of a unified world system dominated by social-economic relationship of world capitalism, characterised by common expectations, values and goals. These cultural norms include ideas of standard of living, lifestyle, entitlement to welfare, citizenship, rights, democracy, ethnic and linguistic rights, nationhood, gender, and environmental quality

**Leadership.** The ability to influence others to carry out a desired task and revolves around a process of evaluation of options and selection of goals.

**Mutual responsiveness.** A sympathetic response to events taking place in a neighbouring state. It is a measure of concern and a desire to expend resources to mitigate problems in the neighbour's territory or issues of common concern.

**National identity.** It is associated with the state and societal values and people who fall within the state.

**Classical National Security.** The ability to protect the territorial integrity of the state and the state's internal and external interests.

**Psychological Dependency Syndrome.** Lack self-confidence and confidence in own population to grow solutions to their problems without turning to the developed world for prescriptions.

**Redefined security.** The ability for providing basic survival, welfare and protection of the state and its peoples. It is an all encompassing concept that enables the individual citizen to live in peace and harmony, to have equal access to resources and the basic necessities of life, to participate fully and freely in the process of governance and enjoy the protection of fundamental rights.

**Regime Consolidation Project.** A systematic application of exclusivity in which rule of the majority creates process of exclusion and in some cases extermination of the minority which in turn creates refugees and movement to exile.

**Regional Grand Strategy.** The art and science of coordinating and use of instruments of power to achieve regional security objectives.

**Regional interests.** Include vital interests, which are regional self-assertion, territorial integrity and sovereignty, promotion of regional values, environmental conservation, promotion of science and technology, economic development, promotion of equity and promotion of democracy and good governance.

**Regional security framework.** A common security arrangement among the regional states to protect the territorial integrity of the states.

**Regional vision.** The imaginative insight about the future development of the region. Statesman-like foresight or wisdom.

**Relative deprivation.** Discordance between expected and what is got

**Societal security.** The state of being free to acquire and retain values without fear that these values may be attacked or if challenged the ability to defend them.

**State collapse.** A situation in which a state can no longer performs those functions normally expected of it. Collapsed state is characterised by a collapsed government, shrinking economy, collapsed borders, violence that creates massive movement of people; while the states watches transfixed and unable to act due to its internal structural degeneration.

**Terrorism.** The intentional infliction of suffering or loss on one party by another party, which has no authority or legitimacy. An alternative definition is the use of indiscriminate violence to intimidate the general majority of people in a state to accept the changes advocated by the terrorists.

#### **1.10. Methodology**

The study will rely mainly on secondary sources of information. This will involve review of both published and unpublished materials. The study will involve collecting experiences from a selected number of integration schemes worldwide with a view to identifying how and why they have dealt with issues of political and particularly regional security nature. The study will evaluate their successes and failures and the reasons thereof. The study will establish how political inputs especially in security have affected the past and present challenges in the East African Community. Weaknesses will be identified in the integration treaty, policy definition and implementation. Sources of data will consist of government archives and government live sources, Internet sources, books, journals (electronic and print), and periodicals, government publications, reputable magazines and electronic and print media, public pronouncement of decision makers, past research findings relevant to the subject.

### **1.11. Chapter Outline**

The entire thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter One forms the introduction. It is a summary of the study and constitutes the statement of the problem, the conceptual framework, the justification, the review of the literature and methodology of the research. Chapter Two constitutes the impediments to regional security framework for EAC. It examines the political economic and social impediments. Chapter Three investigates security threats in the East African Community and how they constitute an opportunity for establishing a regional security framework. Threats are categorised into domestic political threats, domestic economic threats, domestic environmental threats, domestic social threats and external threats. Chapter four is a recapitulation of chapters one and two to establish whether objectives set have been met and whether the hypotheses have been proved or disapproved. The chapter also contains the conclusion and recommendations.

**CHAPTER TWO**  
**IMPEDIMENTS TO SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE EAST**  
**AFRICAN COMMUNITY**

**2.1 Introduction**

Regional political, economic and social integrations necessarily attempt to converge interests and aspiration among the actors. States integrate to reap greater benefit in numbers, consolidate resources for better utilisation or present a bigger military threat to other states. When states form regional integration schemes, there emerges regional common interests which become subject to internal and external threat factors. For this reason, states must create institutions for protection against these threats. The absence of a security framework in the East African Community to mitigate these threat factors fatally weakens the foundation of this regional body. Absence of a regional security framework is a critical omission because, internally, it provides room for reversibility of the processes of integration. A regional security framework, once put in place, will introduce security interdependence amongst the partner states, which will tend to galvanise the states together in a more permanent way. Therefore regional security framework becomes a fundamental requirement in the integration scheme. The EAC states therefore needs to design measures and institute frameworks for perpetual protection of their common interests.

Each of the East Africa state has its own security machinery exclusively designed to deal with the individual state's national threats. In absence of a common threat analysis platform, there is no common threat perception and hence no common prescription. Each state security organs view the other state as a potential adversary. Presently, the

East African Community member states militaries share activities like the training exchanges, shooting competitions and exchanges of officer level courtesy visits. Without a proper legal framework and a widened scope and structure these activities cannot however be construed to constitute a regional security framework. Unlike West African subsystem, ECOWAS which has inbuilt defined security framework, the East African Community subsystem has none of this<sup>105</sup>. The integration treaty of the East African Community is built entirely on low politics, thus; without an explicit regional political or security framework. The first East African Community also lacked this important ingredient and the net impact of this deficiency was intra and interstate conflicts, state collapse,<sup>106</sup> and ultimately the collapse of the Community. Regional security framework will form a firm foundation on which to build the regional economic infrastructures. And yet the states' politicians, bureaucracy and scholars of the East African Community integration process have neglected this important factor of security and are generally preoccupied with economic issues.

This chapter seeks to investigate the reasons why regional security framework is missing in the integration process and the consequences of this omission. The first part, which is divided into twelve sections, traces political factors that have hindered establishment of a security framework in the East African Community. Section one covers poor leadership as an impediment, section two covers ideological differences in the region, section three covers excessive political ambition of the presidents and

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<sup>105</sup> Sengor notes that although ECOWAS has in the past been reluctant to get involved in conflicts despite the protocol on Non-Aggression of April 1978 and Protocol of Mutual Assistance of May 1981 the adoption of the ECOWAS Declaration on Political Principles in July 1991 now allows intervention in conflicts in member states. See Sengor, J. C. *ECOWAS: Problems and Prospects: Notes for Discussions*, in Bourname, N. ed. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa*. African Academy of Sciences. Nairobi, Kenya. 1996. pp 113.

<sup>106</sup> Uganda can be viewed as a collapsed state at the later stages of Amin's rule and the period immediately after Amin's ouster. See Museveni, Y. K. *What is Africa's Problem*, NRM Publications, Kampala, Uganda. 1992.

domestic political wrangles, section four covers endemic domestic corruption, section five covers the psychological dependency syndrome, section six covers state crisis and section seven covers the realism and erosion of sovereignty. Section eight covers the expanded definition of security and its impact, section nine covers the absence of coercion factor and its effect, section ten covers thoughts on war and the post-modern roles of the military, section eleven covers external security alliances and section twelve covers the weaknesses of institutions and organs of the East African Community. Part Two traces economic hindrances to regional security framework in the EAC and is divided into four sections. Section one covers effects of globalisation, section two covers poverty in the EAC, section three covers the economic dependency syndrome and section four covers industrial and technological backwardness. Part Three discusses social issues in regional security framework and is divided into three sections. Section one covers public and civil society apathy, section two covers the social perception of regional security and section three covers ethnicity, social cultural diversity and economic deprivation.

## **2.2 Political Hindrances to Regional Security Framework in the East African Community**

We have already established that security issues are highly sensitive in an integration scheme because they tend to introduce control over states political leadership. Factors like the liberalisation of the economy, globalisation based on liberalised investments and markets, knowledge based industrial and information systems, highly competitive and dynamic investment profile, a highly informed and conscious domestic public, new forms of threats such as terrorism and cyber crime and poverty and unemployment are all demanding innovations and new ideas from the East African politician. In this age



the public is demanding more democratic, accountable and responsible leadership, which can only be achieved through evolution of institutions for securing the region and not just the individual state. The leadership seem not to have come to terms with these changed realities.

### **2.2.1. Leadership as an impediment to Regional Security Framework**

Leadership in the EAC states has always been wanting. Each states history is full of bad leadership that has promoted internal strife and conflicts perpetuated by the state machinery<sup>107</sup>. This has necessitated the states to be preoccupied with fighting internal insecurity often without success due to the destruction of the states institutions of governance. Some examples of leadership style of the Heads of States included patronisation and bribery of politicians using states funds, destruction of institution of governances such as the judiciary and the police force and attempts at reduction of power of parliaments. In Uganda for instance democracy has had no space<sup>108</sup>. The political leadership has been centred on one man, the President who does not entertain dissent or criticism.

The states leadership, preoccupied with domestic politics, have lacked a regional political and security outlook. Visionary leadership would harness the positive qualities of the region and exploit them to reduce the endemic poverty and incidences of famine and conflicts, which threatens to decimate the population. The behaviour of the political leadership should be sensitive to the contemporary national, regional and

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<sup>107</sup>Freund B. *The Making Of Contemporary Africa; Development Of African Society Since 1800*. Macmillan London. .1984. p248-249.

<sup>108</sup>Davidson B: *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of Nation-State*. James Currey. London. 1992.

international political economy. While the region has the potential to lead Africa in many respects, the leadership lacks the incentives, motivation, and psychological capacity to discern this potential. For instance the regional states acquired independence earlier than other regions in Africa. The region should therefore have matured politically and consolidated the individual state population into cohesive units. It should be presenting a good example to the rest of Africa. It should have evolved structures and institutions for integration in socio-economic fields. Unfortunately the reverse is true. The region has been torn apart by poor leadership and wrangles. The region leads the world in production of certain agricultural commodities such as coffee, tea, pyrethrum, and cut flowers. The region has the highest potential for production of marine and aquatic foods such as fish and other sea foods. The regional endowment of climate, flora and fauna, beautiful beaches and inland landscape has no rival in the world and has great potential for tourism. The greatest asset in the region is its people who are generally friendly, peace loving and hospitable to visitors. They also share a common language- Kiswahili.

The leadership lacks the important quality of mutual responsiveness. Mutual responsiveness is a sympathetic response to events taking place in a neighbouring state. It is a measure of concern and a desire to expend resources to mitigate problems in the neighbour's territory or on issues of common concern. To illustrate lack of mutual responsiveness, the birth and apparent success of SADC posed a major threat to the region and started a process of fragmentation and isolation of East Africa Community states<sup>109</sup>. The close ties of Tanzania to the freedom struggle in the south tended to push the country to join SADC at the expense of East Africa integration. The end of

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<sup>109</sup> African Peace Forum. *Study on the operationalisation of article 123 of the EAC treaty and related provision*. (APFO). 12<sup>th</sup> June 2003 (APFO).

apartheid in South Africa with its relatively strong economy created a state of paralysis in the East African Community and is credited with multiplicity of membership of the East Africa states to differing regional organisations. State predation and official corruption at high levels<sup>110</sup> in the three countries has greatly reduced mutual responsiveness to the detriment of regional security framework. Leadership is the ability to influence others to carry out a desired task. Leadership revolves around a process of evaluation of options and selection of goals. The goals selection is dependent on value perception and availability of resources for their achievement.

Leadership further involves decision-making process whose efficacy is a function of past experiences intertwined with present situation and future intentions. In addition, leadership involves a process of resource selection and ordering. To the extent that any leader does not march goals to resources and programmes, he is unlikely to succeed. Value orientation in political leadership is very important. In the East African Community value assignment can characteristically be identified with Western European education and hence European mode of thinking and belief on matters of political and socio-economic organization and intellectual criterion basement<sup>111</sup>.

The decisions of earlier politicians were generally informed by the contradictions that existed at the time of independence namely; the colonial legacy and the cold war bipolarity. Later the leadership was faced with internal disharmony among competing social groups such as ethnic, class and political parties. They were also faced with declining economy due to the fall of commodity prices. The weak national institutions

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<sup>110</sup>Asingo P O: The political economy of Transition in Kenya in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003.

<sup>111</sup>Davidson B: *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of Nation-State*. James Currey. London. 1992.

did not provide sufficient checks and balances on the excesses of the state. This endeared the growth of corruption. The state machinery became completely immersed in regime consolidation project<sup>112</sup>. They often employed state security organs for securing the regime by intimidating the population to submit to the state. They even recruited international organisations to help them embezzle from the states<sup>113</sup>. This preoccupation tended to eclipse the need for a regional security framework. Poor leadership is therefore a major reason for the absence of a regional security framework in EAC.

### 2.2.2 Impact of Ideological differences in East African Community States

Differing political ideological approach to development explains the absence of regional security framework in East African Community. The political ideologies of the pioneer Presidents of the East Africa states at independence is an appropriate beginning in the analysis of divergence of views in the East Africa integration. Kenya's President Kenyatta embraced capitalism and is often accused of having advanced the exploitation of the Kenyan peasantry right from where the colonialist left<sup>114</sup>. His economic ideology has persisted to this day and can be the reason why Kenya has one of the highest disparities of income between the rich and the poor in Africa<sup>115</sup>.

Nyerere on the other hand had a different value perception and believed in creating community homogenising environment through the Ujamaa village system<sup>116</sup>. Today Tanzania may be the most homogenised state in Africa but in the process Tanzania

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<sup>112</sup> Ayoob, M. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. L. Rienner Publishers, 1995.

<sup>113</sup> Zartman W I: African Regional Security and Changing Patterns of Relations in Keller EJ et al: *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking state Sovereignty and Regional Security*. Lynne Rienner, Colorado. 1996. p56.

<sup>114</sup> See Orwa, K. *Foreign Policy, 1963-1986*, in Ochieng, W. R. ed. *A Modern History of Kenya, 1895-1980*. Evans Brothers (K) Ltd, Nairobi, Kenya. 1989. pp 219-221

<sup>115</sup> *Republic of Kenya. Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for the Period 2001-2004*. Sept 2001.

<sup>116</sup> Freund B. *The Making Of Contemporary Africa; Development Of African Society Since 1800*. Macmillan London. .1984. p248-249.

declined the Western capitalist model of development and the price for this was reduced economic assistance resulting in slow economic growth. Tanzania ranks among the poorest countries in the world today. Uganda was faced with military coups soon after independence and did not stabilise to present a credible ideology for a long time. The intransigencies of the cold war and its ideological propositions helped to expand this value perception conflict. Under these conditions it was not possible to have a regional security framework in the East African Community. The failure of formerly privileged groups to adjust to their loss of dominance explains the reluctance by the political elite to embrace the notion of regional security framework in fear of the loss of their privileged position in their individual countries<sup>117</sup>. This endeared relative closure of political elite amongst themselves, a significant disincentive to integration.

The lack of shared vision still persisted even at the formation of the second East African Community but this time for different reasons. Today each of the three East African Community state Presidents represents a separate agenda in the Community. They are all at different stages of regime consolidation in their respective countries. A number of reasons can be adduced why each President has supported the integration process so far. Moi of Kenya initiated integration when the West rejected him in the mid 90s<sup>118</sup>.

The integration agenda provided him with an ego boost nationally, regionally and internationally. President Kibaki has assented to the integration and Customs Union

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<sup>117</sup> Deutch, K. et al. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton University press, UK. 1957.

<sup>118</sup> Kanyinga, K: *Limitations of political Liberalisation: parties and electoral Politics in Kenya* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC* . Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003. p 62-70

with an economic agenda in mind<sup>119</sup>. He views the integration entirely in terms of boosting trade between the partner states and particularly boosting Kenya's economy and not in its entirety of political, economic and security domain. This is partial view because promotion of economic imperatives cannot be adequately achieved without security safeguards.

Museveni on the other hand assented to integration in the 90s with a hegemonic agenda in mind. At the time, he had become a darling of the West as an African leader with a vision. In many international forums, he advocated re-uniting Africa and overthrowing of dictatorial leaders by whichever method. He saw himself as the eventual leader in the East African Community, particularly because Moi's term (the oldest among the three, and coming from the more economically viable state, Kenya) was coming to an end as per the Kenya's constitution. Therefore his design was to ascend to the throne of the East African Community leadership. He had already experimented his agenda by assisting in the overthrow of the Rwandan and DRC governments<sup>120</sup>. Although they later quarrelled with the President Kagame and their forces exchanged fire in DRC, the desire to be the strongman in the region did no wane. Currently President Museveni is facing serious opposition on his agenda to remain in power when his current term ends. Due to this, he is showing signs of withholding assent to some new protocols in the integration process. For instance Uganda was strongly opposed to the signing of the Customs Union until Kenya accepted asymmetrical tariff system in Dec 2004.

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<sup>119</sup>NARC Party Manifesto 2000.

<sup>120</sup> Freund B. *The Making Of Contemporary Africa; Development Of African Society Since 1800*. Macmillan London. .1984. p248-249.

For President Mkapa of Tanzania, the EAC has been a matter of prestige. Hosting the HQ of the East African Community in Arusha<sup>121</sup> and having been selected by ICC to host the international Tribunal on Rwandan Genocide<sup>122</sup>, Tanzania was getting to prominence internationally and this was good for Mkapa. He was also backed by a supportive population who have in the past been bombarded by politicians on virtues of Pan Africanism and brotherhood during the liberation struggle in the South. Currently Mkapa is at the end of his political career with election taking place in 2005<sup>123</sup>. Judging from the past, Tanzania's behaviour is more mature in political elections, having had three peaceful Presidential exit<sup>124</sup>. It is therefore unlikely that Mkapa will try any dirty tricks to perpetuate himself. He is however facing a major crisis in retaining the union with Zanzibar. He is unlikely to resolve this problem and will have to bequeath it to the next President.

Although today, value perceptions amongst the political elite on the need for economic integration seem to be converging, this may not be because the political elite are now better informed or more rational, but perhaps because of the more informed public and the changed international environment which demands accountability for political decisions and the apparent international marginalisation of the region. This convergence has however not fully embraced the security aspect. The above analysis clearly shows that there is no shared vision among the principle actors in the East African Community, hence no shared ideology. In this environment it is futile to expect them to embrace Regional Security Framework in the East African Community.

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<sup>121</sup> Hosting Hq in Arusha

<sup>122</sup> Prunier, G: *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide: 1959-1994*. Fountain Publishers Kampala. 1995

<sup>123</sup> Mkapa elections

<sup>124</sup> Freund acknowledges this quality of Tanzanians. See Freund B. *The Making Of Contemporary Africa: Development Of African Society Since 1800*. Macmillan London. .1984. p248.

### **2.2.3. Excessive Political Ambition of the EAC Presidents and Political Wrangles**

Actor excessive political ambition has been the most devastating factor of leadership in the East African Community. This engenders activities aimed at actor perpetuation in power. In the 70s Idi Amin<sup>125</sup> of Uganda used the security organs to propagate insecurity in order to subject the population to total submission. Terror by the state was the order of the day. Moi<sup>126</sup> at the height of the multiparty agitation in Kenya and the eve of elections designed what came to be called ethnic clashes in 1992 and 1997<sup>127</sup>. He used state security machinery to cause mayhem and expel part of the population, which he perceived as against his re-election. In such an environment regional security framework would have been a hindrance to the regime perpetuation designs of Ugandan or Kenyan government. as it would have prevented the execution of their designs. The internal turmoil in the late 80's and the 90's especially in Kenya and Uganda illustrates the ineptitude of the respective leadership. The tyrannical nature of successive Ugandan governments and the state predation in Kenya reduced credibility, reliability and predictability. Lack of strong political and security structures and the weak state institutions made it difficult to predict the behaviour of successive regimes. It was not possible to create norms and standards neither was it possible to ensure commitments to any pre-agreed norms. Therefore in absence of structural frameworks and credible institutions coupled with progressive mutations of successive governments has created suspicion and mistrust, which erodes regional security framework.

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<sup>125</sup> Museveni, Y. K. *What is Africa's Problem*, NRM Publications, Kampala, Uganda. 1992.

<sup>126</sup> Munene G M: *The Changed Relationship between the US and Kenya, 1985-1995* in the International Journal of African Studies.

<sup>127</sup> Jonyo , F.: *The Centrality of Ethnicity in Kenya's Political Transition* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC* . Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003.



Excessive power ambitions engendered activities such as attempts at constitutional amendments to allow continuation in power<sup>128</sup>, rigging of elections, political patronage, and promotion of infrastructure decay in order to promote termite economies. In Uganda, the incumbent President is presently pre-occupied with attempts at constitutional change to allow him to stand for election one more time. In Kenya constitutional review<sup>129</sup> has stalled after the current political elite realized the review would disadvantage them in the next election. In Tanzania, the regime is pre-occupied with attempts by Zanzibar to recede from the union. Party politics in Kenya is threatening to fragment the NARC coalition<sup>130</sup>. Political wrangles are the order of the day in the East African Community states. In the existing environment, the space for regional politics is completely occupied by national and sub-national political wrangling. It is not possible to evolve a Regional Security Framework in such an environment.

#### **2.2.4. Endemic Corruption**

Corruption in the East African Community states ranks about the highest in any region in the world<sup>131</sup>. The corrupt practices have penetrated into the public service, the political, the judiciary, the security services and even the private sector. Due to the endemic corruption, state development programmes are not implemented and funds are embezzled. Corruption has many faces. For instance high level corruption is conducted

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<sup>128</sup> Odhiambo-Mbai C: *The Rise and fall of the Autocratic State in Kenya* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC* . Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003.

<sup>129</sup> Odhiambo-Mbai C: *The Rise and fall of the Autocratic State in Kenya* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC* . Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003.

<sup>130</sup> Jonyo , F.: *The Centrality of Ethnicity in Kenya's Political Transition* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC* . Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003.

<sup>131</sup> Asingo P O: *The political economy of Transition in Kenya* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC* . Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003.

through issuance of contracts and tenders (Anglo leasing scandal<sup>132</sup>), robbery of state coffers through fake compensation for imports (Goldenberg Scandal<sup>133</sup>), printing of currency<sup>134</sup>, printing and issuance of fake land titles, illegal allocation of land, including allocation of road reserves plots to individuals<sup>135</sup>.

The police in the three countries are the most corrupt especially traffic police units. This results in high road carnage due overloading and unroadworthy vehicles being allowed on the roads. Corruption includes illegal issuance of passports work permits to foreigners and illegal immigration at border entry points. Custom officers at entry points allow uncustomed goods and dangerous cargo. The key sector of judiciary is notorious with bribery where cases are determined by the size of bribe paid<sup>136</sup>. Criminals are let to roam free. State corporations have been looted by corrupt CEOs.

The members of the legislature have their own type of corruption. Being in the privileged position of making laws they award themselves large salaries and allowances. In Kenya, they have been known to accept luxury hosting and payments of allowances by MNCs to pass laws favourable to them<sup>137</sup>. In July 2004 the British High Commissioner to Kenya decried the rising rate of high profile corruption in Kenya<sup>138</sup>.

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<sup>132</sup> This was a contract scandal with international flavour in which Kenya would have lost over Ksh 7 billion in undelivered goods and services. See The daily Nation Newspaper, 11<sup>th</sup> Jan, 2005. p1 *Anglo Leasing: Four To Face Charges*. Nation Media Group Nairobi.

<sup>133</sup> In the process of export compensation Kenya paid illegally over Ksh 58 billion to Pattni. The Commission of inquiry set in 2002 is still going on. See the daily Nation Newspaper, 7 Jan Feb, 2005. p 2: *New Storm over Prisoner Pattni Luxury Lifestyle*. Nation Media Group Nairobi.

<sup>134</sup> Asingo P O: The political economy of Transition in Kenya in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid

<sup>136</sup> Oyugi W O: The Politics of Transition in Kenya : 1992-2003: Consolidation or Deconsolidation in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003.

<sup>137</sup> BAT hosting of MPs

<sup>138</sup> Clay

More recently on 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2005 he came out again and said that high profile corruption involving ministers and other senior government officials has not abated; in fact it had shot up<sup>139</sup>. Hardly a week later on 8<sup>th</sup> February 2005 the Permanent secretary in charge of Governance and Ethics, the office that is charged with coordinating anti-corruption activities resigned while in London<sup>140</sup>. Though he did not elaborate on the reasons for his resignation many analysts suspect it was as a result of pressure to drop corruption cases he was investigating against highly placed government officials. The domino effect followed and the US ambassador to Kenya announced the US decision to withhold Ksh 200 million intended for Kenya on the grounds that corruption was still rampant<sup>141</sup>. This illustrates the depth of corruption in the Kenyan society and its effects. Corruption is a virus that eats into society and has the potential to collapse a state. In conditions where corruption roams free, it is impossible to evolve norms and standards of behaviour, which are necessary for a Regional Security Framework.

### **2.2.5. The Psychological Dependency Syndrome**

Dependency syndrome can be viewed through two mirrors – psychological and economic dependency. In psychological, dependency syndrome is manifest mainly in the leadership sphere. Here the elite lack self-confidence and confidence in their population to grow solutions to their problems without turning to the developed world for prescriptions<sup>142</sup>. This results in unnecessary expenditure of funds and effort in foreign consultations, feasibility studies, use of inappropriate foreign models for local

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<sup>139</sup> Clay

<sup>140</sup> East African Standard Newspaper, 8<sup>th</sup> Feb 2005, p 1.: *Githongo Quits*. The Standard. Nairobi Kenya. p1.

<sup>141</sup> The daily Nation Newspaper, 9<sup>th</sup> Feb, 2005. p1 *Now US Blocks Sh200m Funding In Graft Protest*. Nation Media Group Nairobi.

<sup>142</sup> Freund B. *The Making Of Contemporary Africa; Development Of African Society Since 1800*. Macmillan London. .1984. p248-249.

problems, lack of innovations, apathetic reception of local intellectual capacity and shunning of local scientists and engineers proposals in regional problem solving.

This happens despite the now visible brain-drain of the local intellectual resources through immigration of highly trained manpower to foreign countries, where they occupy high positions and become important human resources for the development of the recipient countries. Novel innovations like the Kenya Car (nyayo pioneer), the Gachamba aircraft, the Ruiru 11 strain of coffee seedlings and many more have been shunned in preference to foreign systems. This problem of the East African mind-set, requires to be changed by building confidence measures through promotion of home-grown solutions to home problems. As long as the experts (foreigners) do not propose a Regional Security Framework as the solution to regional problems in EAC then it is not. The elite is largely responsible for perpetuating this dependency but it behoves on the leadership to evolve and promote other problem solving models that emphasize on the local knowledge and talents. In a situation where there is leadership psychological dependency syndrome it is not possible to evolve a Regional Security Framework.

#### **2.2.6. State Crisis and Regional Security Framework**

Poor leadership in the East African Community has created the state crisis. State crisis is characterised by a large number of factors. The main factors include crisis of resources, crisis of identity and crises of governance. Crisis of resource distribution and allocation creates alienation and a process of marginalisation of part of the society. This is a derivative of relative deprivation conflict. Relative deprivation is discordance

between expected and what is got<sup>143</sup>. It includes aspiration deprivation in which hope is created that things will improve but this does not happen. Social deprivation is exclusion from enjoying social rights. In the East African Community region land is a major resource that creates conflict. Manifestation and indicator of crisis of resources is the wide gap between the rich and the poor in Kenya<sup>144</sup>, Uganda and Tanzania and is a clear pointer of a looming state crisis.

Crisis of identity is engendered through social differentiation and lack of a common value definition in the integration. Katumanga<sup>145</sup> explains identity crisis as a result of promotion of a termite economy. This is a political economy that is highly localised. A termite economy promotes identity of communities as members of specific ethnic group first before identification with the state. Lack of infrastructure contributes to a large extent to this. Politicians promote termite economies to consolidate their political power in their localities. They engage in what Katumanga calls 'regime consolidation project'<sup>146</sup>. This is effected through a systematic application of exclusivity in which rule of the majority creates a process of exclusion and in some cases extermination of the minority, which in turn creates refugees and migration to exile. Regime consolidation results in dismembering the state. Examples abound; in the 1980s and 90s Burundi and Rwanda were involved in the extermination of the Hutus and Tutsis respectively, which created a large influx of refugees to Tanzania, DRC and Uganda.

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<sup>143</sup> Mwangi, M. *Conflict Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*; Watermark Publications, Nairobi. 2000.

<sup>144</sup> Republic of Kenya. *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for the Period 2001-2004*. Sept 2001.

<sup>145</sup> Katumanga M. *Security Concerns and Lateral Pressures as a Basis for Enhanced Regional Integration: a Case Study of N-W Kenya*. Paper prepared for DPMF. Unpublished . 2004.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

Crisis of governance has many faces. It includes the inability of the state systems to penetrate society. Part of the reasons for this crisis can be attributed to the collapse of the traditional community organisation occasioned by the colonial history<sup>147</sup>. Another important indicator of state crises is power confrontation. In this concept the state reproduces violence using public security organs<sup>148</sup>. The state allows the military and the police to pay themselves through erection of roadblocks, sell drugs and commercialise security. This was common in Rwanda before the genocide<sup>149</sup> and covertly in Kenya<sup>150</sup> due to corruption in the police force as a result of extremely low salaries. Another practice was the appropriation of private violence. This manifested itself in the degeneration of state security organs to a level where it was possible to hire the military to commit violence<sup>151</sup>. A serious practice was the privatisation of the state. The political elite appropriated state institutions and used them for personal gain<sup>152</sup>. The resultant of these actions is that state becomes fragile, lacks legitimacy and in this degenerate condition the political elite and their friends consume the state infrastructure in a process akin to self-cannibalisation. The elite may engender the state to become a

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<sup>147</sup>Lecture Course 7 NDC by Katumanga M. 2004. The traditional chief was a respected source of authority and leadership. Colonialists destroyed this by conversion of the traditional chief to an illegitimate chief. The chiefs were recruited to propagate colonial policies. They were empowered to enforce colonial laws and hence the chief became the source of law (the legislator), the prosecutor and the judge and the jailer. This alienated the chief from the community. In some communities this view of the chief as the agent of oppression of the state has persisted and it reduces states ability to penetrate society.

<sup>148</sup> Nzomo, M: *Civil Society in the Kenyan Political Transition: 1992-2000* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC* . Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003. p 180-207.

<sup>149</sup> Prunier, G: *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide: 1959-1994*. Fountain Publishers Kampala. 1995

<sup>150</sup> Nzomo, M: *Civil Society in the Kenyan Political Transition: 1992-2000* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC* . Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003. p 180-207.

<sup>151</sup> Freund B. *The Making Of Contemporary Africa; Development Of African Society Since 1800*. Macmillan London. .1984. p248-249.

<sup>152</sup> Asingo P O: *The political economy of Transition in Kenya* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC* . Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003.

predator in which case it predated on the society, for instance through police or chiefs looting citizens' property<sup>153</sup>. In such circumstances the citizens are forced to form their own security systems against the state security organs and the ensuing conflict creates insecurity. The agenda of state is lost when the Head of State eats the state. Examples include Rwanda, DRC, Kenya<sup>154</sup>.

State crisis may be caused by informalisation of the state. Informalisation includes formation of cartels to run the state<sup>155</sup>. In this case the elite create closed channels of communications amongst themselves. The politicians create conflicts that fragment the state through public utterances, for instance government ministers openly inciting the public against one another<sup>156</sup>. Lack of internal integration at state level is exacerbated by political tribalism where attitudes like "as long as I am eating on behalf of my people they will defend me" prosper. Politics of survival including buying out of other political classes leads to systemic frustrations and degeneration.

Certain external factors are also responsible for generating crisis of the state. Externally prescribed state-centric policies during the 1990's by the IMF and WB in form of demands for liberalisation of the economy and SAPs are important causative factors of the crisis of regional governments<sup>157</sup>. The enforcement of these demands turns states into 'watch-man states' – where a government that adopts the prescribed SAPs watches

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> Prunier, G: *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide: 1959-1994*. Fountain Publishers Kampala. 1995.

<sup>155</sup> Odhiambo-Mbai C: *The Rise and fall of the Autocratic State in Kenya* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003.

<sup>156</sup> Jonyo, F.: *The Centrality of Ethnicity in Kenya's Political Transition* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003.

<sup>157</sup> Turok B. *Towards a Democratic Coalition Against SAPs* in Ny'ong'o P O. ed *30 years of Independence in Africa: the Lost Decades*. Academy Science Publishers, Nairobi, Kenya. 1992. pp 131-133.

as the workers are retrenched from state institutions, private industries are closed, prices of commodities plummet and generally citizens undergo suffering under extreme poverty. This could have been avoided had the East African states carried out thorough evaluation of these policies before adoption and created regional institutions that reduce their dependency on these international institutions. Privatisation of state institutions prescribed by donors became a controversial subject with some scholars and practitioners arguing that parastatals' sale is an antithesis to development<sup>158</sup>. They argued that the solution to the insolvency of state enterprises lies in improving their efficiency and accountability. They argued that it is illogical for donors to force EAC governments sell all state enterprises to them (donors) in order to be given aid. Finally, arbitrary borders from colonial legacy have engendered cascading of regional conflicts from one country to the other following a path closely related to blood relationship of the protagonists. This is the 'kin-country syndrome'.

Progression of state crises leads to state collapse. Zartman<sup>159</sup> defined state collapse as a situation in which a state can no longer perform those functions normally expected of it. These functions can be categorised into three groups. Firstly, decrease of the state as the source of supreme authority. The state as a sovereign authority is expected to make domestic laws and ensure compliance through reward and punishment. It is accepted as a source of authority. The state is expected to provide an arena for political activities. The state retains the monopoly of violence. Secondly, the state as a legal institution is a tangible source of organization and infrastructure. In this context the state has legitimacy in the extraction of resources from the society through tax. Thirdly,

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<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> Zartman W I: African Regional Security and Changing Patterns of Relations in Keller EJ et al: *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking state Sovereignty and Regional Security*. Lynne Rienner, Colorado. 1996. p52.



the state is the ultimate guarantor of security. It exercises maximum control of society because it has the monopoly of violence. The degeneration of these properties of the state create state collapse

Zartman argues that state collapse results when the internal struggles are so balance as to produce only losers rather than a clear victor capable of governing the state<sup>160</sup>. State collapse is characterised by violence within the state that creates massive migration of citizens while the states watches transfixed and unable to act due to its internal structural degeneration. State collapse is characterised by a shrinking economy. The collapsed state's borders shrink (the border shrinks while the neighbouring states borders expands due to inflow of population). When a state collapses borders become less important. For instance after the collapse of Somalia, many Somalis criss-crossed Kenya/Somalia border while others settled in Kenya as refugees<sup>161</sup>. This can be viewed as an expansion of Kenyan border into Somalia. Similarly in the 70's during the tyranny of Idi Amin in Uganda Kenya had a booming trade selling Ugandan coffee and many Uganda fled Uganda into Kenya<sup>162</sup>. A collapsed state can stabilize by building infrastructures for the enforcement of law and order but once the problems have set in, all space between state and society has already been occupied by many actors including street people, land grabbers, hawkers, streetlights, *matatus* and others. This makes the reconstructions a very costly business, as the new state will have to conquer the barriers inch by inch.

The state making process if not well executed can lead to state crisis. At independence

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<sup>160</sup> Ibid. p52.

<sup>161</sup> Kamudhayi, O: *The Somali Peace Process* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 107-122.

<sup>162</sup> Ojo O.J.C.B. et al: *African International Relations*. Longman Kenya. 1985.

the political elite in the regional states engaged in the process of state making. State making involves four different activities, thus: war making, state making, protection and extraction<sup>163</sup>. In war making the regimes are involved in eliminating or neutralizing the rivals outside the territories. This includes the expansion and consolidation of the territorial and population domain under their political authority, including the imposition of order on contested territorial and demographic space. While conducting this process Kenya inherited the irredentist Shifta insurgency propagated by the Somali-speaking communities in the Northern Frontier District assisted by the Somali Government, which had vowed to create a greater Somalia Republic<sup>164</sup>. Apart from massive procurement of military hardware, the immediate reaction of the Kenya government was to enter into a military assistance arrangement with Great Britain and to sign a Defence Alliance Pact with Ethiopia<sup>165</sup>. The Shifta war became an extended military commitment. Preoccupied with this security threat, Kenya did not view regional security arrangements with the East African Community member states as urgent. Indeed all the member countries did not envisage a situation of hostilities amongst them. So the security issue did not come up in the discussions on the first East African Community. The only time security organs were mentioned was in the discussion on the inclusion of emergency powers in the EAC Treaty where the military would be employed to assist the police under the aid to civil authority role<sup>166</sup>.

The second activity, the regime consolidation process, involved the elimination or

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<sup>163</sup> Ayoob identifies these four different activities associated with state making process. See Ayoob, M. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. L. Rienner Publishers, 1995.

<sup>164</sup> Ogot B. A and Ochieng W R. *Decolonisation in Kenya: 1940-1993*. East African Educational Publishers, Nairobi. Kenya. 1995. p 108.

<sup>165</sup> Deutsch identifies extended military commitments as one of the hindrances to regional political integration. See Deutch, K. et al. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton University press, UK. 1957.

<sup>166</sup> Ogot B. A and Ochieng W R. *Decolonisation in Kenya: 1940-1993*. East African Educational Publishers, Nairobi. Kenya. 1995.

neutralization of rivals inside the territories. In Kenya, Kenyatta became preoccupied with vanquishing the opposition party KADU<sup>167</sup> through persuasion and horse-trading. He was able to achieve this without resorting to force. Uganda became preoccupied with redefining the role of the Kabaka and soon Obote executed a military coup and took over power<sup>168</sup>. Tanzania was involved in a process of unification of the mainland Tanganyika with Zanzibar<sup>169</sup>. Preoccupied with these activities the political elite failed to recognise the crucial role of a regional security arrangement. The third activity involved the protection of the state. It entailed eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of the state agency clients. This activity includes the maintenance of order in the territory, which is essentially a policing activity. This includes the provision of security for the whole population and is an ongoing process. The extraction activity involved acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities. It means the extraction of resources from the territory and the population under the control of the state essential to support the war-making and policing activities undertaken by the state. It entails taxation and enlargement of extractive capability and resource base. Throughout the state making process there were varied types of conflicts. The problems arose because the way these activities were carried out engendered state crisis. The leadership was not well-organised, articulated or responsive to regional population needs and hence did not create a regional security framework.

The leaders in East African Community had a major weakness - preoccupation with the sovereignty of the state<sup>170</sup>. This weakness was manifested at all the levels at which the

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<sup>167</sup> Ibid

<sup>168</sup> Freund B. *The Making Of Contemporary Africa; Development Of African Society Since 1800*. Macmillan London. .1984.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> Ayoob, M. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. L. Rienner Publishers, 1995.

region interacts with the international system: as a region, and as individual sovereign states. The states' behaviour, whether at the individual or at the collective level is largely determined by the insecurity that is aggravated by the overwhelming feeling of vulnerability among its state elites<sup>171</sup>. This is attributed to factors such as political and security, and also in the economic and technological spheres, including aid, trade, investments, and technology transfers. Economic and technological limitations severely constrain the East African Community capacity to bargain effectively with the developed countries. These limitations contribute to the economic dependency syndrome as individual states and as a region<sup>172</sup>. Economic and technological dependencies and political and military weaknesses therefore have great bearing on the absence of Regional Security Framework in East African Community.

The poor political leadership and the lack of common regional institutions for addressing internal and regional conflicts coupled with the lack of integrated regional infrastructure is responsible for the backwardness and regressive development the East African Community<sup>173</sup>. The responses to these state-created insecurities have been, among other things, public demand of more representative forms of government, power sharing, electoral pluralism, the re-invention of the post-colonial "social contract", cultural autonomy for minority groups and the devolution of power<sup>174</sup>. The problems of state crisis and state collapse have discouraged evolution of a Regional Security Framework in the East African Community. Escape from state crisis however lies in

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<sup>171</sup>Gomes S: *The OAU, State Sovereignty and Regional Security* in Keller EJ et al: *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking state Sovereignty and Regional Security*. Lynne Rienner, Colorado. 1996. p 29.

<sup>172</sup>Gambari I.A: *Role of Regional and Global Organisations in Addressing Africa's Security Issues* in Keller EJ et al: *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking state Sovereignty and Regional Security*. Lynne Rienner, Colorado. 1996. p 29.

<sup>173</sup>Ibid. Ayoobs arguments generally explain the problems caused by leadership of African statesmen.

<sup>174</sup>Hiteng, C. O. *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa* in Mwangiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 10.

moving from the traditional state centred solutions and establishing of a Regional Security Framework.

### **2.2.7. Realism and Erosion of Sovereignty**

The classical realism perspective regards states as the main actors in IR<sup>175</sup>. States being the main actors have a primary responsibility of providing security. In the realist view definitions of security were purely based on the state as the only actor in the IR. Security meant the protection of the state from external aggression and preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty<sup>176</sup>. This definition covered explicitly the security interest of the state especially its two core properties, namely territorial integrity and international sovereignty and, to a limited extent, the security of the state leadership (the government). This definition assumes the state to be an abstract edit that is devoid of humanity and is autonomous from the domestic society<sup>177</sup>. Security provision gives regimes legitimacy of governance. It is not therefore possible to transfer this vital responsibility to a regional organisation. If this was done then the state would lose legitimacy of existence. This argument is important in the formulation of a regional security framework because it determines the form and content of the structure of the regional security framework and the security institutions that need to be incorporated. Autonomous exercise of state power and authority is the hallmark of realism paradigm. The objective of accumulation of state power and dominance is to guarantee security.

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<sup>175</sup> Snow DM: *International Relations: the Changing Contours of Power*. Longman. NY 1988.

<sup>176</sup> Gomes S: *The OAU, State Sovereignty and Regional Security in Keller EJ et al: Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking state Sovereignty and Regional Security*. Lynne Rienner, Colorado. 1996. p 29.

<sup>177</sup> Aseka, E. M. *Globalisation, Intellectuals and Security in Africa in Mwagiru, M. ed. African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 32.

Buzan rejects the classical realism paradigm on security but modifies it to include other players and issues. He argues that states remain central actors in world politics but their interactions are surrounded and complemented by the ever more important interventions of trans-national and sub-national actors<sup>178</sup>. He identifies three levels of security; individual, societal and national, but notes that national security has tended to organize the other two levels. He argues that the standard unit of security is the sovereign territorial states but clarifies that the state is composed of individuals bound together in a collective political unit. As a result the state cannot be the only referent in security because states are only one kind of human relations. Buzan rejects the idea that states are the primary referent objects of security on three grounds: Firstly states are unreliable as primary referents because whereas some are security (internal/external) providers, some are consumers. This implies that some states are able to guarantee security for other states. The consumer states cannot strictly be proper referents of security in their own states. Secondly, it is illogical to place states at the centre of our thinking because even those, which are the producers of security, represent the means not the ends. This means that even the very able states may not guarantee security in other states unless they are invited to. Finally, states are too diverse in character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security. In other words while some states are interested in securing whole populations other concentrate in securing the elite sections of society like in some monarchies and authoritative states.

From Buzan's arguments it is therefore possible to see other players in the provision of security. Society and the individual play a great role in security. Buzan sees societal

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<sup>178</sup> Buzan, B. *An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.

security in terms of sustainability of traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, national identity and custom. His argument is that the security of the individual is inseparably entangled with that of the state. State and society have become increasingly indistinguishable. However individual security is essentially subordinate to the higher-level political structures of the state and the international system and so national and international security cannot be reduced to individual security. He argues that strong states with greater socio-political cohesion are more capable of providing certain sorts of security to society within their territories while weak states with weaker socio-political cohesion are less capable. Buzan lists five major factors in security of human collectivities thus, military, political, economic, societal and environmental.

Over the last thirty years the definition of security has mutated and acquired a new and broader meaning. Scholars and statesmen realised that some internal factors presented graver threats to the survival of the states than the perceived external threats<sup>179</sup>. This notion has altered the meaning of security to include not only threats from the external but also threats from internal and non-state actors<sup>180</sup>. These include threats to individuals, groups and communities; and 'civilian' threats to the human well-being (health, nutrition, education, fairness, rights and freedoms, dignity)<sup>181</sup>. Redefined notion of security demands a redefined view of the relationship between the state and other potential providers of security. It should be possible to see a regional body efficiently providing security to sovereign partner states. It should also be possible to see other aspects of society getting more attention and higher priorities in state

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<sup>179</sup>Ayoob, M. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. L. Rienner Publishers, 1995.

<sup>180</sup>Mwagiru. *Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 134- 138.

<sup>181</sup>Chweya, L. *Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 31.

programmes just like security. In other words it should be possible to securitise other factors of society. Adherence to classical realist thinking retards development of this new thinking.

From the above analysis it is possible to see that regional integration processes shifts power to other areas and hence erodes the sovereignty, independence and autonomy of the state. The surrender of state power to regional power becomes a big challenge to the political leadership. The lack of a security framework in the East African Community can be attributed to politicians who strictly adhere to the realism paradigm.

#### **2.2.8. The Expanded Definition of Security and its Impact on Regional Security Framework**

In the past security issues were defined mostly with the roles of the Armed Forces. Today more and more actors are coming into the security realm due to the expanded meaning of security. Prior to 1980's security meant the protection of the state from external aggression and preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty. Today security has been expanded to mitigate threats to individuals, groups and communities and threats to the human well-being such as food, poverty, health, education, fairness, rights and freedoms, and human dignity<sup>182</sup>. The East African Community regional security framework must take cognisance of the changed meaning of security so that its form and structure can mitigate the envisaged threats. New actors such as civil society, other line ministries, NGOs, and civilians are being employed where traditionally the military dominated. At the same time the character of military security commitments has drastically changed. They have taken a more humanitarian form of conflicts

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<sup>182</sup>Chweya, L Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 31.



prevention, resolution and management, rather than executing war. Peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian relief missions and reconstruction of post-conflict infrastructure are now considered security tasks. For these reasons, the envisaged East African Community regional security framework design will have to take cognisance of these changes in order to have the necessary relevance in the region in the 21st century. Gambari says that Africa must start a process of differentiating topography from demography<sup>183</sup>. Moskos<sup>184</sup> has ably described these new thoughts in the discussions on the role and form of the post-modern military. He has noted that the post-modern military has mutated in more ways than one. He says that the soldier-warrior has been transformed into soldier-manager, soldier-diplomat/politician, soldier-technocrat and soldier-intellectual as a result of technological advancement in military operations and contemporary tasking in the age of globalisation. The military has been forced to open up more to the public and the media. There is less differentiation amongst the officer, soldier and even between branches of the military. Employment with regard to gender has become less differentiated with servicewomen being assigned combat tasks in some countries, duties hitherto preserved for servicemen. Recruitment has also been changing from conscription to voluntary. In some cases it is not mandatory to recruit nationals of the mother state as we find foreigners, having the requisite qualifications, being recruited as soldiers or officers in foreign countries. Sexual orientation is becoming less differentiated with homosexuals and other orientation being admitted.

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<sup>183</sup>Gomes says that Africa must start a process of differentiating topography from demography. See Gomes S: *The OAU, State Sovereignty and Regional Security in Keller EJ et al: Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking state Sovereignty and Regional Security*. Lynne Reinner, Colorado. 1996. p 29.

<sup>184</sup>Moskos, C.C. *Armed Forces After The Cold War* in Moskos, C.C. ed. *The Post-Modern Military: Armed Forces After The Cold War*. Oxford University Press, New York. 2000. pp 1-11.

Following the expanded notion of security to cover human collectivities the present definition covers not only the classical security interests of the state namely territorial integrity and international sovereignty but also certain fundamental aspect of the way of life (national values) within the state, and values like democracy, freedom, and religion. Redefined security pays attention to the living individual citizen, domestic social groups, and local communities. The redefined term of 'security' refers to the condition where individuals, groups, communities and states as a whole are free from armed or unarmed threat to physical, social, psychological, material, and political well being, and possesses adequate resource to deal with such threats whenever they occur<sup>185</sup>.

To capture the impact of the evolving new meaning of security we need to view regional integration process not only as a political process but also as containing security and the economic components of states; thus the ability to distribute resources and the control of use of violence. As Etzioni notes, an integrated community is a political community which has control over use of violence, posses the centre for decision making - has the ability to allocate resources and rewards, and is capable of providing political identity for majority of its citizens<sup>186</sup>. This notion underscores the interlock between security and economic factors.

East African states are poor and currently bedevilled by international debts and internally facing political crisis as a result of uneven distribution of resources. The control of use of violence is only possible in a pacified society with deep state penetration of society; states with a culture of peaceful and well-established state

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<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

<sup>186</sup> Etzioni, A. *Political Unification*. Holt Rinehart and Winston. New York. 1965

surveillance of society<sup>187</sup>. In the East African Community the police and the military have in the past been used by the state to unleash violence on the public and corrupt government officials man all public offices. The countries are in perpetual state crisis. There are no set standards of behaviour of either the state or the individual so cultural identity is not possible to evolve without shared values and norms. These conflicts and crises can only be mitigated if the states fully embrace the changed meaning of security and redesign their security organs on this basis. A regional security framework based on the expanded security meaning would greatly benefit the population of the EAC region. The military having requisite security experiences can take the lead but it would require remodelling.

Already the military role as the primary referent state organ for provision of security has been changing in response to the changed meaning of security. The military is more often than not now being employed in humanitarian missions, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction missions. Furthermore, civilians in the military are performing more of military duties and some relatively core tasks are being done by contractors. Deployment is no longer done purely by national governments as more national Armed Forces are being deployed regionally and internationally through regional (for instance AU) and international (UN) organisations<sup>188</sup>. The movement away from the traditional concerns and understanding about security has further encouraged security analysis to move beyond the state, and to encompass the wider environments, which the state operates<sup>189</sup>.

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<sup>187</sup>Giddens, A. *The consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity, 1990.

<sup>188</sup>Moskos, C.C. *Armed Forces After The Cold War* in Mokos, C.C. ed. *The Post-Modern Military: Armed Forces After The Cold War*. Oxford University Press, New York. 2000.

<sup>189</sup>Mwagiru, M. *Introduction* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 1.

Within this changed character of the main security organ of the state the military, the envisaged regional security framework must find relevance in its structural design, institutional and doctrinal foundation together with its legal framework. It must reflect the expanded view of regional security and the expanded roles based on the expanded threat factors. This formulation provides an opportunity to create a regional security organ markedly different from current national security organs, designed to mitigate the expanded threat scenario. Of necessity, it will be more on peace support roles of peacekeeping and peace making/enforcing and conflict early warning. It will also be more civilians based, more open to the public - interactive with civilian organisation, and more educated. This forms a core prerequisite for the post-modern regional security framework. Lack of appreciation of the new meaning of security has retarded the evolution of regional security framework.

Furthermore the problem of apathy by members of the security organs must first be overcome. There exists a strong mutual suspicion between security organs and state political elite. The history of military coup de tats in Africa and elsewhere promotes the feeling that the military should not involve itself in political or economic affairs. This has created extreme apathy amongst members of the security organs concerning political mismanagement of the state. Service commanders, intelligence chiefs, and police chiefs are not adequately concerned with systems and structural design of security systems that can control incidences of mismanagement. This apathy fights back because when conflicts arise it is the security organs that are called upon to deal with them. Subordination of the military and other security structures to civilian

command is a well-founded and accepted principle in democratic governance<sup>190</sup>. However, because of the crucial role of the military in the expanded security<sup>191</sup>, the security organs must involve themselves with strategic governance especially concerning securitised human threat factors and traditional security issues. The determination of the need for, institutionalisation and structural design of conflict management schemes and early warning systems should be given to the security organs of the region. Chiefs of Defence Forces, The military, intelligence and police organs of the state need to be enabled to carry out security researches that enable right political decisions to be taken to forestall insecurity situations. In a situation where the principle organs of state are apathetic to security issues it is not possible to evolve a Regional Security Framework.

#### **2.2.9. Absence of Coercion Factor and its effects on regional security framework**

The most controversial components of security integration is the partial surrender of sovereignty, independence and self-determination<sup>192</sup>. That security is a highly regarded political component is no doubt. However, political imperatives demand regional security framework in order to achieve and guarantee continued protection of economic imperatives. Majority of the politicians are ignorant of the details pertaining to East African Community integration. Those aware of the details believe that security integration is not urgent and will emerge gradually and automatically if economic integration is successful<sup>193</sup>. This notion is not informed by pragmatic evaluation of the situation but by politicians hope of buying time. The lack of direct threats explains this

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<sup>190</sup> Snow DM: *International Relations: the Changing Contours of Power*. Longman. NY 1988.

<sup>191</sup> Giddens, A. *The consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity, 1990.

<sup>192</sup> Snow DM: *International Relations: the Changing Contours of Power*. Longman. NY 1988.

<sup>193</sup> *Perspectives on Regional Integration and Cooperation in East Africa*. Secretariat of the commission for EA cooperation and German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Arusha. 2000. p101

complacency. The prerequisite to political integration include the presence of integrating power; defined as that of coercion, utilitarian and identitive properties of the states<sup>194</sup>. The absence of coercive element in the region reduces the feeling of urgency over regional security framework. This argument is supported by Bourname's observation that 'it was the effects of WW2 and the aftermath, galvanised by force of circumstances orchestrated by the US government that the political leadership in Europe developed a congenial level of political consensus'<sup>195</sup>. In this example the presence of threat of coercion and use of force (threat from the soviet Union) encouraged the Western European states into regional integration. This statement shows that European states may not have accepted integration at the formative stages of EU due to the concern for individual state security without the pacification and assurance from NATO. In some instances EAC states have convergence as a result of common threats. For instance in all partner states internal dissent or calamities such as famine, diseases, and floods have at times constituted harmonized perception of security threats<sup>196</sup>.

Haas<sup>197</sup> views regional integration where actors shift loyalties, expectation and political activities to a new centre. This means that territorial boundaries in a regional integration scheme are obscured. In this model states that wish to form an integration scheme must be ready to surrender their control of boundary activities to the regional scheme. This notion obliterates the individual state's preoccupation with territorial integrity in preference to regional control. This model has been partly alluded to in the

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<sup>194</sup>Etzioni, A. *Political Unification*. Holt Rinehart and Winston. New York. 1965

<sup>195</sup>Bourname, N. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa* in Bourname, N. ed. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa*. African Academy of Sciences. Nairobi, Kenya. 1996. pp 34.

<sup>196</sup>African Peace Forum. *Study on the operationalisation of article 123 of the EAC treaty and related provision*. (APFO). 12<sup>th</sup> June 2003 (APFO)

<sup>197</sup>Ernst B. Haas. *The uniting of Europe*. Stanford University Press, Stanford. 1958.

East African Community treaty where it proposes the establishment of a common foreign and defence policy. But as it was noted in chapter one the current treaty does not explain whether the common foreign and defence policy means representation by a regional organ in articulating the common policy or separate state institutions articulating what the particular state views as of common interest to the other two. Clarification of this point is crucial in the formation of a regional security framework.

Foreign policy is about state perspectives of the national, regional and international security and other state's national interest<sup>198</sup>. The combined regional foreign policy is of crucial importance in informing the security issues at play in the East African Community. Foreign policy and security policy are so intertwined that they cannot be divorced from one another. A country's foreign and security policy takes cognisance of the country's external interests, threats perception and the means of reduction or eradicating these threats<sup>199</sup>. State's national security strategy is founded on two prerequisites - national interests and resource base necessary for its protection (defence and deterrence). The achievement of this strategy is the role of states foreign policy, which in turn shapes the relationship between the state and other states.

Absence of regional security framework in the East African Community integration can be closely associated with the process of determination individual state's foreign policy<sup>200</sup>. At independence, domestic, regional and global intransigencies affected not only content of the foreign policy but also the bureaucratic formulation process. The role of the Presidents in foreign policy decisions became crucial. He became the sole

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<sup>198</sup> Mwagiru M: *Diplomacy: Documents, Methods and practice*. IDIS Nairobi, Kenya 2004.

<sup>199</sup> Ojo O.J.C.B. et al: *African International Relations*. Longman Kenya. 1985.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid

determinant of foreign policy<sup>201</sup>. His support of the policy on the integration process or lack of it has determined decisions on whether to continue with it or not. Even the new attempt at East African Community is still pegged on the perception of the Head of State. This tends to constrict the decision base and narrows the debate. It denies the public a say in the matter and yet it is intended to benefit them<sup>202</sup>. Increasing the actor base will popularise and broaden the process to include a regional security framework and help to speed it up.

The state Presidents in agreeing to revive the community demonstrated their realisation of the inevitability of unity for regional and state survival. Four elements have tended to determine foreign and security policy i.e. compatibility of values, mutual predictability, mutual responsiveness and the lack of or the presence of threat of use of force<sup>203</sup>. Mutual development of values, predictability and mutual responsiveness in an atmosphere free of threat of use of force is the major challenge to the political leadership in EAC. It is important to note that while many states are continuously preoccupied with territorial issues in regional security integration schemes, the enhancement of individual states overall security would more easily be achieved through mutually agreed framework and complementation of security resources. This requires a high level of political trust and reliability of the regional security organs. Regional foreign policy must address this challenge for the evolution of a regional security framework.

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<sup>201</sup> Ibid

<sup>202</sup> *The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community*. Arusha, Tanzania. November 30,

<sup>203</sup> Etzioni, A. *Political Unification*, Holt Rinehart and Winston. New York. 1965



### **2.2.10. Thoughts on War and the Post-Modern Role of the Military**

Roles and aims of war are relevant in discussions on the regional security framework in the East African Community because war features prominently as the ultimate method of dealing with external threats to the security of a state<sup>204</sup>. To protect against war states develop programmes for offence, defence or deterrence depending on the security philosophical orientation of the particular state. Around these programmes and philosophy, state security organs develop their national security doctrine and strategy, which guides policies towards the external<sup>205</sup>.

War has been used over generations as a legitimate tool for resolving disputes<sup>206</sup>. In an anarchic world system of states the possibility for conflict and war will always be there. Therefore states and regional schemes must maintain some defence mechanism at all times. The history of war is traceable in ancient civilisation including the Bible, where it appears to have been given divine blessings. Clausewitz<sup>207</sup> says that war is an extension of policy by other means. The causes and aims of every war could be diverse but most past wars were destined on three outcomes; conquest of territory, conquest of a people (which includes subjection of a population to foreign rule) or access to resources in the conquered territory.

The conduct of war has undergone major revolution. In its raw form, the conduct of war is generally brutal use of force. Over the centuries the effect of force has relatively changed in consonance with other human developments.<sup>208</sup> The greatest effect of war in

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<sup>204</sup> Snow DM: *International Relations: the Changing Contours of Power*. Longman. NY 1988.

<sup>205</sup> Giddens, A. *The consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity, 1990.

<sup>206</sup> Snow DM: *International Relations: the Changing Contours of Power*. Longman. NY 1988.

<sup>207</sup> Clausewitz. *On War*

<sup>208</sup> Shaw M. *Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives*. Polity Press. Cambridge, UK. 1994.

history was demonstrated in the Second World War where, due to technological development, the war resulted in the greatest massacre of human beings in history through the use of advanced weapons of aerial lethality. This war culminated in the development and use of the most lethal weapon ever known to man - the atomic bomb. Subsequent development during the cold war created more powerful nuclear weapons, which eliminated the need for the traditional amassing of ground troops and mobilisation of the military industrial complex in support of the war. This is because war between states that are thousands of kilometres apart could be conducted using missiles to deliver nuclear warheads without necessity of human movement through these vast distances.

Immediate and long-term effects of war are varied. The immediate effect has generally mutated over time from a feeling of triumph - common during medieval times when casualties were few and valour was regarded as a virtue - to a feeling of emptiness and regret in the later wars. Wars today are mostly regarded as the epitome of human folly and as unnecessary evils. Earlier wars before the advent of automatic weapons had certain rules. They were based on sheer might and strength of the warriors and their skills in handling their hand-based weapons. The advent of the automatic weapons and emergence of strategic thinking brought new ideas which emphasised on deceit and outwitting the enemy in all ways, so that he may not know the direction or the time of attack or the weapons that is likely to be used against him. This essentially eliminated any form of rules of war. In absence of rules, war became brutal and tended to be absolute. Clausewitz contends that war by its very nature can be absolutely destructive<sup>209</sup>. During his time, he noted that war was only limited by ever-present

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<sup>209</sup> Clausewitz: *On War*

friction represented by logistics limitation, terrain, weather and other constraints. There has been a debate that this friction is no longer a major limitation in a nuclear war and hence the next war is likely to be absolutely destructive. This fact has drastically reduced the prospects of a war between major nuclear powers.

Non-nuclear states however still feel they need troops because their regional wars will remain conventional for a long time to come<sup>210</sup>. However, they will always remain vulnerable to threats from nuclear states with long reach. This reality underscores the need to maintain some form of alliance with nuclear states. This notwithstanding, other threats to humanity today feature prominently in national security. This has led to a redefinition of security to include human factors that threaten the citizens' survival<sup>211</sup>. Until these changed realities are properly understood and taken aboard in the formulation of regional security framework no peace or real unity can be achieved in the East African Community region.

#### **2.2.11. Security alliances and regional security framework**

Burton defines alliances as agreements for mutual defence<sup>212</sup>. We have already eluded to the need for security alliances in the previous section. Alliance result from a feeling of vulnerability when faced with a stronger adversary. The weak status of the EAC states relative to nuclear states and other more economically endowed states results to EAC regional vulnerabilities. This has in the past generated various alliances between the EAC partner states and other states outside the region. Security alliances between

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<sup>210</sup>Shaw M. *Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives*. Polity Press. Cambridge, UK. 1994.

<sup>211</sup>Chweya, L *Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004.

<sup>212</sup> Burton J W; *World Society*. P85 Cambridge University Press . 1972. p85.

political units are decided upon through an evaluation of cost and benefits<sup>213</sup>. The number of alliances or the size of alliance group is decided on the basis of marginal utility, weighing the cost of surrendering state control of own security to the alliance and the ever-possible threats from within the alliance, against the cost of being out of the alliance and the possibility of being confronted with threats posed by states outside the alliance.

Threat analysis of the East African Community region shows that the real threats are more internal than external. The worst-case scenario of external threat would be confrontation with a nuclear power. In such a case it is not feasible to create a force that would fight such a threat. The possibility of such a threat is also remote. However the regional powers should align the region with a strong nuclear state for protection while at the same time supporting international peace initiatives. So the relevant threat scenario for our analysis is the national, inter-regional and the extra-regional threats. Because of the definition of security which has resulted in the introduction of new threat factors in the discussion of security it demands that new type of alliances be formed to mitigate these new internal threats.

The regional security framework is therefore a new form of security alliance that goes beyond the traditional perception of alliances, because it includes roles, institutions and structures designed to overcome traditional threats as well as non-traditional threat factors such as food, water, cultural decay and undemocratic practices. This is because the gravity of these internal threats in EAC outstrips the external. Cognisance here is given to the fact that internal threats have often threatened the survival of African

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<sup>213</sup>Liska George F. *Nations in alliance. The units of interdependence* (Baltimore. John Hopkins press 1962)

states. For instance the internal conflicts in Uganda under Idi Amin<sup>214</sup>, the Rwandan genocide, the state collapse of Somalia and the Southern Sudanese conflicts are examples of internal conflicts that have threatened states survival.

Hobbes<sup>215</sup> argument that consensus between states (regional integration treaties) can only be obtained by the presence or threat of force underlines the importance of coercive power in security integration schemes. The Hobbesian model is founded on the old school of thought where integration was based on military conquest of states and consensus was built in military alliances. But threat in the sense of the Westphalian model of state is not the main threat in EAC. However the absence of threat or use of force in the East African Community does not mean that there is no *locus standi* for establishment of a regional security framework. The regional insecurity (in the modern sense) provides this *locus standi*. In modern regional integration schemes, coordination and intervention have become very important as a result of concerns for strengthening human rights and democratic control, reducing regional inequalities, ensuring basic standards of life in the partner states and addressing regional environmental issues<sup>216</sup>. The existing national, regional, extra-regional and telescopic international threats provide the sufficient reason and stimulus for evolving a regional security framework in the East African Community. The political leadership in EAC have in the past neglected this fact and this explains why a regional security framework is lacking in EAC.

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<sup>214</sup> Avirgan T and Honey M: War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin. Tanzania Publishing House. Dar es Salaam. 1982. pp3-5.

<sup>215</sup> Hobbes T. *Leviathan*

<sup>216</sup> Giddens, A. *The consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity, 1990.

### **2.2.12. Weaknesses of Institutions and Organs of the East African Community**

The established East African Community structure lacks power and authority, important ingredients for securing the region. The structure has the following institutions and organs The summit, The council, The coordinating committee, The sectional committee, The East African court of Justice, The East African Legislative assembly and The secretariat<sup>217</sup>. The above institutions and organs established in the treaty of the East African Community do not have adequate mechanism to achieve the requisite objectives. There is no organ with specific responsibility to ensure security at the regional level<sup>218</sup>. Security has been discussed casually in articles 124 (foreign policy) and 125 (defence). There is no mention of reaction of sister states in case one member is faced with an invasion from outside the community, a coup de tat, or internal insurgency. Without this provision the integration cannot be viable, hence the need for a regional security framework. These institutions and organs of the East African Community have also not been empowered enough to create the necessary framework for regional security. The Summit and the Council are manned by state Presidents and ministers of foreign affairs respectively. These persons are already too busy politicking in their respective states to adequately pay sufficient attention to regional security threats. The General Assembly (GA) is an important organ because it should be the main legislative organ. However as it stands now it cannot make laws independent of the summit or council neither does it have a mechanism for enforcing compliance. This encourages existence of unstable, undemocratic and dictatorial regimes within the Community. No meaningful Regional Security Framework can be

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<sup>217</sup>*Perspectives on Regional Integration and Cooperation in East Africa*. Secretariat of the commission for EA cooperation and German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Arusha. 2000. p101

<sup>218</sup>*The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community*. Arusha, Tanzania. November 30, 1999

established under the existing weak structures and institutions of the East African Community. There is need to review the structures to include a security council in the organization and strengthen the EACGA to enable it legislate and have mechanism for enforcing compliance.

We have already discussed the fragility of East African governments created by ethnic and class differentiation. Political parties are also formed along the same lines. Therefore the national party politics are bound to interfere with the running of the East African Community in future unless it is cushioned from the national political dynamics through an appropriate framework. This framework is best based on independence of the structures of EAC. Independence may be emplaced through additional power and authority for enforcement of compliance that carries specific penalties on the violating state. The election of members of the national assembly is currently done by the states' parliaments. It could be best done through national elections, which would promote public participation in EAC governance<sup>219</sup>. Constituencies may be drawn along existing district or provincial boundaries. Modalities can be worked out based on the European Union (EU) model<sup>220</sup>. There is no programme for promotion of domesticity to demystify activities of the East African Community and popularise their decisions at grassroots level. The attractiveness of integration is based on evaluation of benefits versus losses. Decisions made are not subjected to such evaluation brought out for public consumption and comments. This

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<sup>219</sup> The EAC secretariat noted this as a major drawback as early as 2000. See *Perspectives on Regional Integration and Cooperation in East Africa*. Secretariat of the commission for EA cooperation and German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Arusha. 2000. p101

<sup>220</sup> Hoek N J van: *Regional Cooperation and integration in Europe: Lessons to be learnt* in Bourname, N. ed. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa*. African Academy of Sciences. Nairobi, Kenya. 1996.

does not promote the feeling of identity and participation in the East African Community governance among the citizens of the East Africa states.

The position of the EACGA assembly should give it fairly sufficient power and authority to behave like a state government<sup>221</sup>. It should be able to articulate sovereignty and independence of East African Community as a super-state<sup>222</sup>. This is a very important requirement especially looked at in the light of intervention in member state internal security problems. The East African Community governance should be seen as dependable mediator with power to enforce compliance using the common security framework provided to it. The question of dependability and reliability will be dispelled if this is done properly. The rules governing intervention should reflect common good and be made attractive to all because here lies the key - acceptance or rejection of regional security integration. Positive cooperation can only be assured when it becomes clear that war between member states is absolutely unlikely even in the long term and that the forces are unlikely to be used against one of the states unless there is an attempt to overthrow the legitimate government or the government actions are viewed as gross violation of human rights – the likes defined by UN charter. There is therefore need to create an early warning system to monitor possible conflict situations and mechanism for reaction.

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<sup>221</sup> *The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community*. Arusha, Tanzania. November 30, 1999.

<sup>222</sup> *Perspectives on Regional Integration and Cooperation in East Africa*. Secretariat of the commission for EA cooperation and German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Arusha. 2000. pp 90-93



## **2.3 Economic Hindrances to Regional Security Framework in the East African Community**

Liberalised global commerce, communication and information systems have predated on the state sovereignty to a very large extent and in the process invited indeterminate number of non-state actors in the policy decision loop<sup>223</sup>. The global economic system consist not merely of a global division of labour and global market exchanges but increasingly also a variety of global or regional economic institutions aiming to regulate these processes – World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Union (EU), are just a few. Although dominated by major western states they are distinct from any specific state or private interests and operate effectively as global regulators. Global political system similarly consist of global/regional institutions – above all the UN, which plays an increasingly critical role. In some cases the states have been rendered impotent.

### **2.3.1. Globalisation**

The globalisation phenomenon is characterised by common global expectations, values and goals. These cultural norms include ideas of standard of living, lifestyle, entitlement to welfare, citizenship, rights, democracy, ethnic and linguistic rights, nationhood, gender, and environmental quality<sup>224</sup>. They tend to create common standards on which to evaluate the performance of the state. Governments that are at variance with these norms are criticised by their citizens and often voted out. As a result of globalisation states are tending towards uniformity of character. This tendency creates a motivation, incentive and opportunity for regional security integration.

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<sup>223</sup> Shaw M. *Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives*. Polity Press. Cambridge, UK. 1994.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid

Despite evolution of globalisation, many levels of society remain linked to the nation state<sup>225</sup>. A new paradigm has become established in which the state is no longer the theoretical object of IR but has been displaced by the state system where the relations of states among one another is of crucial importance. The political system of global society is that of competitive international system of states, coordinating an equally complex diversity of nation state politics. The global cultural system as of diverse, part-competing, part-overlapping, part-distinctive, part-integrated national and sub-national cultures organized around a wide range of principles.

The globalisation phenomenon has become a major challenge to weak nations. It is a double-wedged sword, which presents threats and opportunities. Coercion by West countries to adopt liberalised form of economic organisation that allows them access to domestic markets is particularly damaging to African nascent economies. Bourname suggests that economic integration demand a stable policy. Instability in policy is not always generated internally as it can result from externally forced SAPs measures by WB and IMF<sup>226</sup>. The dumping of manufactured goods into African economies through MNCs, promotes Western states perpetual domination of the states while promoting conflicts and poverty in the weak states. The concepts of foreign aid, Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), Western civil societies and Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs), are mostly calculated to benefit the Western states. Third World countries have recognised the need to have a combined global front to fight these global disadvantages. For instance the walk-out of third

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<sup>225</sup> Galtung J. *A structural theory of integration*. Journal of peace Research vol 5 No 4 (1968).

<sup>226</sup> Turok B. *Towards a Democratic Coalition Against SAPs* in Ny'ong'o P O. ed *30 years of Independence in Africa: the Lost Decades*. Academy Science Publishers, Nairobi, Kenya. 1992. pp 131-133 and also in Bourname, N. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa* in Bourname, N. ed. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa*. African Academy of Sciences. Nairobi, Kenya. 1996. pp 43.

World countries from WTO conference in Cancun, Mexico in March 2004 is demonstrative of this effort to extricate themselves from global economic disadvantage. Etzioni<sup>227</sup> notes that economic interdependence is critical to the unification process because it involves distribution of goods, interaction between persons and communications. The East African Community must create its own regional economic interdependence to extricate themselves from the global exploitation.

As a consequence of globalisation modern boundaries have become extremely virtual. Modern concepts now accept regulatory landscapes because physical boundaries have been obliterated by modern communication technology and they no longer serve their earlier purpose of absolute control of state factors. A regulatory landscape is a concept of control of physical immigration of persons and tax administration but not information or loyalty to the state<sup>228</sup>. On the positive perspective globalisation phenomenon has changed the perspective of the state independence. It has created a complex interdependence among states. Regionally the integration process will generate cultural, political and economic interdependence between actors<sup>229</sup>. True regional integration renders regional actors to become linked to such an extent that what harms one actor injures the other. These interactions would create incentives for peaceful coexistence on the basis of mutual loss of benefits in case of economic disruption. By implication regional economic activities would eventually guarantee security. However because of the need for political guarantee, political institutions and economic infrastructure cannot be divorced and their development is necessary for a regional security framework. Globalisation with all its encroachment on the formal

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<sup>227</sup> Etzioni, A. *Political Unification*. Holt Rinehart and Winston. New York. 1965.

<sup>228</sup> Mwangi, M. *Introduction* in Mwangi, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 1.

<sup>229</sup> Galtung J. *A structural theory of integration*. Journal of peace Research vol 5 No 4 ( 1968)

state is unstoppable. It can be beneficial to the state and it can also become a threat. Understanding its impact on the region is important for the formulation of regional security framework. A regional security perspective is necessary to guard against its encroachment and predation of the regional states.

### **2.3.2. Poverty of States**

Due to state weaknesses and inadequate leadership, most African governments fail to justify their statehood. They exist as quasi states. Economic stagnation, excessive delay in socio-economic and political reforms is a major disintegrating factor in regional integrations<sup>230</sup>. Bourname argues that ‘an important concomitant of economic integration is consensus building on regional political and security issues. In the EU context attaining a minimum consensus on desirable governance on a regional level required some yield of domestic economic sovereignty. Many countries are reluctant to do so. For developing countries it may be particularly difficult to defer part of the coveted sovereignty to a regional authority<sup>231</sup>. Most internal conflicts in Africa are as a result of real or perceived relative deprivation of sections of the community. As a consequence security organs have been employed to quell rebellions. The public often regard the security institutions as state machinery for suppression and oppression. To popularise regional security framework this image must be erased from the public mind. A regional security framework should be understood to guarantee the vital interest of the region- that of guaranteeing the national and regional survival in modern sense of security. In addition, it must also protect other core interests of economic growth and prosperity and the preservation of cultural values of the society.

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<sup>230</sup> Deutch, K. et al. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton University press, UK. 1957.

<sup>231</sup> Bourname, N. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa* in Bourname, N. ed. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa*. African Academy of Sciences. Nairobi, Kenya. 1996. pp 47.

Poverty of states has been a major disincentive to evolution of regional security framework in EAC . The states have increasingly looked upon financial assistance from donors in form of loans, grants and other forms of aid. They have invited many actors into their states who at times have tended to dictate policies<sup>232</sup>. Even funding for the envisaged regional security framework will require donor input. So poverty has been a major impediment to evolution of regional security framework in EAC.

### **2.3.3. Economic Dependency Syndrome – The Core and Periphery Theory**

States' poverty endears the East African Community states to high dependency on the developed states of the west. This is the condition referred to as the dependency syndrome. In the perspective of balance of power theory of IR, East African Community countries are weak states. Weak states are consumers of security generated by strong states<sup>233</sup>. Weak states have lower socio-political cohesion and are not capable of providing security to their societies. They are characterized by a relatively poorly equipped military system, weak and highly dependent economy, unstable political system, an inhomogeneous and uncohesive society and a submissive attitude against commitment of the military to war. Weak states are forced to establish a dependency relationship with strong states to guarantee their security. Security is a major preoccupation of Third World governments due to their vulnerabilities<sup>234</sup>. But in the minds of politicians regional security integration amongst weak states is unlikely to extricate them from this weak category. It therefore does not make sense. This explains

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<sup>232</sup> Gambari I.A: *Role of Regional and Global Organisations in Addressing Africa's Security Issues* in Keller EJ et al: *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking state Sovereignty and Regional Security*. Lynne Rienner, Colorado. 1996. p 30

<sup>233</sup> Shaw M. *Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives*. Polity Press. Cambridge, UK. 1994.

<sup>234</sup> Ayoob, M. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. L. Rienner Publishers, 1995.

the tendency of East African Community statesmen to cling to vertical security alliances with former colonial powers<sup>235</sup>. The political leaders are hence reluctant to form regional security schemes from the dictates of their states poverty, which engenders high dependency on the West.

The World System Theory<sup>236</sup> (core and periphery model) aptly explains the dependency phenomenon. It explains how the colonialists (core of the core) recruited elite Africans (core of the periphery) and differentiated them from the rest of the peasantry (periphery of the periphery). When the colonialists left they continued transactions with these elite. It explains the close relationship between the core of the core and the core of the periphery. The masses have relegated to perpetual peasantry engaged in production of commodities, whose prices are controlled by the consumer and hence can never extricate them from their extreme poverty situation. It explains how the African elite becomes brainwashed to such an extent that they cannot do anything without first seeking permission from the master. It further explains how the master manipulates commodity prices in his favour and denies any meaningful development to retain his control of the states. This exploitation became the rationale for the perpetuation African elite, some despotic, in power throughout the cold war and after<sup>237</sup>. Poverty, poor leadership, ignorance, uncaring politicians and the exploitative tendency of capitalism have perpetuated the current dependency. By its very rationale dependency negates evolution of a Regional Security Framework in the East African Community.

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<sup>235</sup> Gambari I.A: *Role of Regional and Global Organisations in Addressing Africa's Security Issues* in Keller EJ et al: *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking state Sovereignty and Regional Security*. Lynne Reinner, Colorado. 1996. p 29.

<sup>236</sup> Wallerstein, I. *The modern world system, 3 vols*. Academic Press, NY. 1974.

<sup>237</sup> Zartman W I: *African Regional Security and Changing Patterns of Relations* in Keller EJ et al: *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking state Sovereignty and Regional Security*. Lynne Reinner, Colorado. 1996. p52.

#### **2.3.4. Industrial and Technological Backwardness**

The dependency syndrome discussed above is particularly demonstrated in technological dependency of East African Community states on the developed countries. This is especially demonstrated in the areas of machinery, vehicles and equipment. This dependency is likely to remain so because no meaningful programmes are in place that are aimed at extricating the states in the region from it. The East African elite are especially vulnerable to dependency because of their love for elegance and prestige in imported goods coupled with their hate and despise for self and locally made goods. Technological aridity has been overcome in other state through first a process of change of attitude and secondly affirmative programmes of industrialization<sup>238</sup>. They include emphasis on purchase of manufacturing machinery rather than finished manufactured goods, research and development for industrialisation and value addition of local products. Change of attitude is a major handicap because it involves an initial acceptance of relatively low quality products at probably a higher cost. It carries with it some level of patriotism.

In the regional security, technology is a major factor because almost all security equipment are imported<sup>239</sup>. Development of technology would therefore create savings in regional security budget. In many instances, including in the developed states of the West, security organs have been the source of technological innovations<sup>240</sup>. Such innovations are first developed for security use and are later adapted for civilian systems. Technology determines the level of development of states, their military and

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<sup>238</sup> Asian Tigers

<sup>239</sup> Giddens, A. *The consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity, 1990.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid

economic power. It is impossible to discuss security framework without the technology factor. Because of this dependency on imports East African Community states have in the past-established links for sourcing military hardware from specific states. Furthermore because security hardware is expensive they have over the years established how to fund these purchases. In many cases there are programmes, which are still underway. This discourages the states from breaking links with the sources to establish a Regional Security Framework that is not assured of financial support from outside. This is a major reason why regional governments of the East African Community are reluctant to evolve a Regional Security Framework.

#### **2.4. Social Factors that Impede Regional Security Framework**

The reaction of society to public policy is important in correcting misdeeds by leaders. The speed at which scandals are forgotten in East African Community societies is really alarming. Due to public apathy the leadership lacks motivation and incentives to correct mistakes. Public reaction to political issues determines the direction the leadership takes. One of the most striking aspects of the East African Community public is high loss of public memory. For example in Kenya criminals who have looted the state coffers have been recycled in leadership positions. Repeatedly the public is cheated on expenditure of public funds and the benefactors go free. For instance cases exposed by the auditor general are forgotten immediately they come out of print. The Goldenberg Scandal has been handled by the public like a circus with some people demanding autographs from Kamlesh Pattni the principal architect of this massive theft of public funds. The main reason for this memory lapse is lack of/or poor institutions for checks and balances in public affairs including weak civil societies.



In this globalisation era, economic, cultural and political relations develop rapidly independent of relations between states. Individuals and groups within society begin to develop relationships with international institutions, mediated through cultural forms and institutions of civil society, which have themselves developed beyond the national context<sup>241</sup>. Following this argument it is possible to demand of EAC states certain rights if only strong civil societies evolved. Development of regional civil society creates the concept of regional responsibility. It can come in form of ecological movements: regional environmental management, human rights movements, democracy and security watchdogs, all judged on well developed regional standards<sup>242</sup>.

Presently the media determines duration of public memory. For example international intervention in conflict areas has challenged sovereignty and non-intervention principles<sup>243</sup>. There are many attempts by statesmen to maintain the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention but there is also pressure from global civil society to transcend them. The growth of public pressure has been fuelled by media coverage<sup>244</sup>. Reduction of public apathy can be enhanced through the influence of the civil societies, the judiciary and the education system. What is required is to systemize and legalise the demands of regional responsibility in a new conception of roles, rights and duties of citizens, society, states, the system of states and international institutions. Currently at national level the legal mechanism for redress or compensation for loss of services is either absent or inert. A civil society role should be recognised in the institutions and

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<sup>241</sup> Shaw M. *Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives*. Polity Press. Cambridge, UK. 1994.

<sup>242</sup> Nzomo, M: *Civil Society in the Kenyan Political Transition: 1992-2000* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003. p 180-207.

<sup>243</sup> *The East African journal of Human Rights and Democracy: East African Human Rights Report 2003*. A publication of the East African Human Rights Institute and the East African Law Society. Vol 1 No 2 December 2003.

<sup>244</sup> *ibid*

culture of the state system as agents of society for demanding public accountability<sup>245</sup>. This should include establishment of avenues of public redress. Priorities lie in civic education on rights, privileges and responsibilities of the regional citizen.

Regional civil societies will enhance the growth of common expectations, goals and values – common regional culture. This will include human rights, humanitarian aid, and environmental agencies. Regional civil society should constitute a source of constant pressure on the state system. Therefore while states can control much of the process of change, they are ultimately subject to a much wider array of social forces. As long as public apathy is at the level it is today and the existing civil societies are weak it is unlikely that politicians will treat Regional Security Framework as priority in the East African Community.

Social Perception of security is major impedance to regional security framework. Security to the EAC public is associated with the military, which induces fearful thoughts of oppression, war, death, and state suppression in some areas. To the ruling elite, it is an organ of legitimacy and power – a tool that can be used to promote narrow regime objectives or deny the public their rights<sup>246</sup>. For this reason the military decision structure in an integration scheme must be carefully crafted to reduce to the minimum these fears among the masses and the elite alike.

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<sup>245</sup> Nzomo, M: *Civil Society in the Kenyan Political Transition: 1992-2000* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC* . Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003. p 180-207.

<sup>246</sup> Nzomo, M: *Civil Society in the Kenyan Political Transition: 1992-2000* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC* . Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003.

Many people hold the view that security in East African Community integration should be left to individual states<sup>247</sup>. Their fears are based on the view that the existing internal instability would escalate if security organs played regional role. Other than Tanzania, which seems to have high level of pacification of the society, Kenya and Uganda are embroiled in perpetual internal squabbling that threatens to tear apart the political fabric. Conflicts are hindrances to regional security integration. Yet these same threats invite intervention from the regional security organs. A two-tier structure of the regional security framework with a homeland (territorial) force structure and an integrated regional command structure would provide limited autonomy to dispel interference from state politics.

Convergent societal values and identity play a great role in the fusion of states<sup>248</sup>. For instance, in Western European states, democratic values and democratic systems of government are elements of identity and are reflected in the structure and the functioning of the political systems. In Islamic countries, religion and moral values are held as core to identity. From the foregoing, protection of presenting security as one of the core cultural values should form the basis of regional security framework<sup>249</sup>. Bourname notes that in the first East African Community, East Africa countries jealousy guarded their economic sovereignty to the extent the power political situation permitted<sup>250</sup>. The new integration process of East African Community should therefore

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<sup>247</sup> This is why the individual states insisted on cooperation and not political federation at the time of crafting the EAC treaty. See *Perspectives on Regional Integration and Cooperation in East Africa*. Secretariat of the commission for EA cooperation and German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Arusha. 2000. p 100 .

<sup>248</sup> Buzan, B. *An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.

<sup>249</sup> Shaw M. *Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives*. Polity Press. Cambridge, UK. 1994.

<sup>250</sup> Bourname, N. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa* in Bourname, N. ed. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa*. African Academy of Sciences. Nairobi, Kenya. 1996. pp 45.

take cognisance of these principles and promote growth of an East African culture and value system. This will require rebranding and promotion of regional security framework in the East Africa Community.

Ethnicity, social cultural diversity and economic deprivation in the region have heavily contributed to the absence of regional security framework. The East African states were carved as separate states from a multitude of disparate communities. These communities had differing relationships with neighbouring communities spanning from trade, use of shared natural resources to intermarriage. These relationships were general harmonious coexistence. Cooperation between communities is therefore an old practice in East African region. The problem of ethnicity in East African Community is a construction created by politicians and the elite. Promotion of ethnicity ensures support and self-perpetuation. It ensures that the community is galvanized in supporting the incumbent on grounds other than service delivery. There are factors that promote the continued feelings of deprivation and discrimination among certain communities<sup>251</sup>. These factors are inadequacy or lack of infrastructure, poverty, lack of state penetration of society, poor distribution of national resources, intra-regional resource conflicts.

Lack of adequate infrastructure curtails movement of goods, people or services. This ensures that there is little or no state penetration into the society. It also ensures that a termite economy grows<sup>252</sup>. It further ensures retention of poverty because farm produce cannot get to the market and goods produced elsewhere cannot get to the farmers. Lack of state penetration means that the community does not share the

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<sup>251</sup> Jonyo, F.: *The Centrality of Ethnicity in Kenya's Political Transition* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003. p 155-175

<sup>252</sup> Katumanga M. *Security Concerns and Lateral Pressures as a Basis for Enhanced Regional Integration: a Case Study of N-W Kenya*. Paper prepared for DPMF. Unpublished . 2004.

national cake, it is ignorant of the government development programmes, it has no share in decision making on governance (not democracy-enabled), it predates on the neighbouring community in times of scarcity<sup>253</sup>, it feels alienated and discriminated upon and hence has little loyalty to the state<sup>254</sup>. The conflicts arising from sharing or resources are not mediated by the state since it is absent. Poor distribution of resources is responsible of regional, class and community asymmetry of wealth and infrastructure. Ethnicity is therefore a construction of the state machinery and can be addressed through a programme of affirmative actions in marginal communities and regions.

Socio-cultural diversity plays a major role disintegrating communities. The state system in Africa is a contributory factor to conflicts and to the absence of a regional security framework in the EAC. The modern state system (Westphalian) was born out of extreme nationalism (ethnicity) in Europe<sup>255</sup>. It emphasises on the individuality of the state in contrast with cooperation between communities. It was born out of European communities having deep community homogeneity and wide differentiation between communities . As Deutch avers growth of ethnic and linguistic differentiation acts as a catalyst to disintegration<sup>256</sup>. As a result European history is full of incidences where these extreme nationalistic tendencies created wars. The treaty was therefore a culmination of the desire to curve out state boundaries to correspond with community boundaries. This is not the case with African states. The state boundaries do not reflect any cultural definition. For this reason East African Community political leaders main

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<sup>253</sup> Kamenju, JAN. et al, *Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya*. Security Research and Information Centre. Nairobi Kenya. 2003.

<sup>254</sup> Ojo O.J.C.B. et al: *African International Relations*. Longman Kenya. 1985.

<sup>255</sup> Snow DM: *International Relations: the Changing Contours of Power*. Longman. NY 1988.

<sup>256</sup> Deutch, K. et al. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton University press, UK. 1957.

challenge has been to consolidate the population into nationhood. They have not been successful because of greed and power ambition. The states can be considered at the present time to subsist between the two stages of state creation and state consolidation.

Inability of the states to garner sufficient resources necessary to galvanise the communities within a specific state to the state is one of the reasons why state consolidation has become illusive. Poverty erodes national unity, and the poor distribution of the available meagre resources engender conflict and discontent<sup>257</sup>. To gain public support, the state has therefore to seek ways of broadening the resource base. The attempts at integration with neighbouring states equates to expanding the state resource base. The challenge facing the political leaders today is whether to accept integration before attaining individual state nationality (a formation stage) or to delay the regional integration and concentrate on individual state consolidation until a predetermined level of homogeneity within the state is achieved. This paradox explains why regional security framework is absent, urgent and illusive at the same time. In a situation where sections of society feel alienated, it is unlikely to evolve a Regional Security Framework. Equitable distribution of infrastructure and establishment of conflict early warning mechanisms will considerably reduce the feelings of discrimination and alienation associated with ethnicity. Integral societal surveillance and pacification mechanisms are necessary in addressing state penetration of society and hence the need for a regional security framework..

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<sup>257</sup> Republic of Kenya. *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for the Period 2001-2004*. Sept 2001.

## CHAPTER THREE

### Threats and Opportunities for Regional Security Framework in the East African Community

#### 3.1. Introduction

In Chapter Two we discussed the factors that have contributed to the absence of a regional security framework in the East African Community. We have noted that until the Berlin conference of 1884/85 that heralded colonisation of Africa, communities in East Africa coexisted as peaceful and cooperative societies<sup>258</sup>. Colonialism imported the European Westphalian system of government to Africa based on the primacy of the state. It was established that political factors have hindered establishment of a security framework in the East African Community. These factors include leadership, ideological differences, excessive political ambition and political wrangles, endemic corruption, the intellectual dependency syndrome, state crisis, the realist view and erosion of sovereignty, the impact of the changing meaning of security, the coercion factor the changing role of the military, security alliances public and civil society apathy, the weak institutions. It was also established that there are economic hindrances to regional security framework. They include globalisation, poverty of states and governments, economic dependency syndrome and technological backwardness. The social issues that hinder regional security framework include the social perception of regional security ethnicity, social cultural diversity and economic deprivation.

It was firmly established that the definition of security has mutated to include not only the traditional meaning of protection of regimes and sovereignty but also the protection

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<sup>258</sup>Freund B. *The Making Of Contemporary Africa; Development Of African Society Since 1800*. Macmillan London. .1984.

of the individual and populations<sup>259</sup>. Security now takes the form of food security, environmental preservations, and protection against natural calamities, diseases, international crimes and even exploitation by MNCs. Similarly; there is a consensus on the idea that there are now many emerging notions of security. These emerging notions have become evident particularly in the post-Cold War period and include gender, environmental, social, health and similar dimensions<sup>260</sup>. Without a firmly founded regional security framework that embraces contemporary notion of security, the intended regional economic integration rests on shaky grounds. Threats of disintegration of the economic community will remain unless a security framework is put in place. Attainment of political union will prove difficult unless the political leadership in the East African Community member states agree to a regional security framework.

The threats to regional security framework are largely directed against the national interest of the states and the principal values of citizens. They also impact on cultural, religious, ecological, technical and other factors that unfavourably influence the realization of regional interests. These threats arise in the political, military, economic, informative, social, ecological and criminal spheres either individually or acting together. Some threats to the national interest result from the international environment and the development processes of the states and societies<sup>261</sup>. An important concomitant of integration is consensus building on regional political and security issues. For developing countries it is often difficult to defer part of the coveted sovereignty to a

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<sup>259</sup> Chweya, L. Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region in Mwangi, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 32.

<sup>260</sup> Mwangi, M. Introduction in Mwangi, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 2.

<sup>261</sup> Aseka, E. M. *Globalisation, Intellectuals and Security in Africa* in Mwangi, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 27.



regional authority<sup>262</sup>. To the extent that social political stability of one member of a union deteriorates to a considerable degree, its feasible role in the integration undertaking will be in doubt<sup>263</sup>. Combating these threats provide an opportunity to create institutions and structure necessary for a regional security framework.

This chapter investigates these threats and how they form a sound foundation on which to build a common security framework. The chapter is divided into six parts. Part one is the introduction. Part two covers domestic political threats. Part three investigates domestic economic threats. Part four discusses environmental threats. Part five discusses social threats and Part six investigates external threats.

### **3.2. Domestic Political Threats**

Internal threats as a result of bad politics include, domestic crime and disasters, bad governance and corruption and the frontier communities conflicts system. Insecurity is a problem that manifests itself in the physical, political, economic and social dimensions. Insecurity encompasses banditry, hijacking, stock theft, robbery, looting, intimidation, rape and murder among other diverse actions<sup>264</sup>. Bad governance manifests itself in lack of transparency and accountability in management of resources meant to benefit communities. The annual government wastage rate of revenue as a result of bad governance in Kenya is estimated at over Kshs 100 billion<sup>265</sup>. Improper planning, inadequate monitoring and misplaced priorities are all indicative of bad

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<sup>262</sup> Bourname, N. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa* in Bourname, N. ed. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa*. African Academy of Sciences. Nairobi, Kenya. 1996. pp 47.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid. p 43.

<sup>264</sup> Kamenju, JAN. et al, *Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya*. Security Research and Information Centre. Nairobi Kenya. 2003.

<sup>265</sup> Republic of Kenya. *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for the Period 2001-2004*. Sept 2001.

governance. The worrying situation of urban slums and street families is a consequence of bad governance and lack of national vision.

Gross mismanagement of resources through corruption has contributed to the loss of an estimate of Kshs 68 billion annually through shady deals<sup>266</sup>. Government officials have perpetuated a culture of corruption in the public sector, which has contributed towards mismanagement of the economy and misuse of public resources. Corruption is further manifested by under-valuation and under-declaration of imported goods and fraudulent tax computations by customs officials. At the international level, corruption impacts negatively on the inflow and outflow of capital<sup>267</sup>.

The weak public institutions as a result of corruption are major security concerns. The performance of public institutions in the partner states is greatly hampered by the fact that appointments particularly at the higher echelons have been politicised. Under these circumstances, there is a high risk of institutions being headed by incompetent managers who owe their allegiance to whoever influences their appointment. Not only do such institutions fail to run efficiently due to lack of professionals at their helm, but such individuals and those who patronise them could also plunder their assets. Most managers and functionaries of public institutions lack job security, which affects their overall performance. The lack of freedom from political interference compels some of these managers to misuse their positions for personal gain at the expense of their institutions.

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<sup>266</sup> Ibid

<sup>267</sup> The daily Nation Newspaper, 9<sup>th</sup> Feb, 2005. p1 *Now US Blocks Sh200m Funding In Graft Protest.* Nation Media Group Nairobi.

Insecurity is predominant in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) and urban areas though it is a nation-wide problem. The poor who are the majority in the affected areas are the main victims despite the estimated resource base potential in the ASAL regions being Ksh 70 billion<sup>268</sup>. The devastating effects of insecurity include injury, trauma, social tension and violent death, among others. The net impact of insecurity is an impediment to economic growth discourages investors and raises production costs. Natural and man-made disasters have the capability of disrupting people's way of life and constitute a serious threat to the economy and, by extension, national security. The August 1998 bomb blast in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam<sup>269</sup> and the El Nino floods that occurred in the same year demonstrated the region's inability to deal with disasters. Not only is the region unprepared for such calamities, in terms of equipment and skilled personnel, but it also lacks the financial capacity to deal with the aftermaths.

Absence of regional security framework and effective policies has been responsible for many security lapses at the borders. Historically, various pastoral communities in the region would occasionally steal livestock from one another but with far less loss of human lives<sup>270</sup>. Even though such practices have been explained as indigenous cultural practices, the introduction of modern weapons has made them become costly both in terms of human toll and economic resources. The pastoralist districts of Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya are characterized by conflict such as cattle rustling, banditry and ethnic rivalry. The baseline of the conflicts is resource-related in that the area is generally semi-arid and therefore draught is common, necessitating in

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<sup>268</sup> Republic of Kenya. *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for the Period 2001-2004*. Sept 2001.

<sup>269</sup> Republic of Kenya : *Counter-terrorist Strategy* , 2003.

<sup>270</sup> Hiteng, C. O. *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa* in Mwangi, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 14.

search of pasture and water<sup>271</sup>. During such movement contact with other communities turns into conflict as each group guards its territory and seeks supremacy over others. The long and porous borders and inadequate policing facilitate conflict. Traditional cattle raids using spears and arrows has now been turned into big time livestock rustling using lethal weapons for illegal economic gains. The cost of security apparatus employed in the North West of Kenya (KAPOTUR triangle)<sup>272</sup> and the northern Uganda to combat the insecurity, the combined death toll of the Karamoja, Pokot and Turkana, the tribesmen, and the domestic effect of their possession and sale of arms vindicates the need for surrendering some degree of sovereignty in order to have a common regional approach to resolving this problem.

These weapons are either used against their domestic enemies or sold to willing buyers, who in turn transport them to potential criminals in urban centres mitigates the need for integration of security apparatus. It is estimated that there are over half a billion SALW in circulation globally, which kill over 3,000,000 people a year in conflict 200,000 in criminal activity<sup>273</sup>. Proliferation of weapons in this region can be attributed to a number of causes two of which are the frontier community system and the conflict system within the great lakes region coupled with the Northern Uganda/Southern Sudan conflict system and state collapse in Somalia. Weapons that penetrate the region, together with the havoc they cause, justify an integrated framework for control.

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<sup>271</sup> Kamenju, JAN. et al, *Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya*. Security Research and Information Centre. Nairobi Kenya. 2003.

<sup>272</sup> Katumanga M. *Security Concerns and Lateral Pressures as a Basis for Enhanced Regional Integration: a Case Study of N-W Kenya*. Paper prepared for DPMF. Unpublished . 2004.

<sup>273</sup> Kamenju, JAN. et al, *Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya*. Security Research and Information Centre. Nairobi Kenya. 2003.

The conflict system in the East African region includes the intermittent cross border crime, banditry, grazing rights conflicts and livestock rustling including proliferation of SALW<sup>274</sup>. A common and integrated approach in dealing with these threats will render the borders virtual and pursuit, apprehension, investigation, interrogation, prosecution and punishment of offenders would be carried out through a central agency operating across border, as if it was the same state. The conflict situation in northern Uganda could have been resolved earlier if Kenya and Tanzania had intervened<sup>275</sup>. Issues of common interest to the East Africa states that tend to divide them would best be tackled if the states had integral regional security institutions. The influx of refugees that is generated by conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan and Somalia impacts negatively on the region<sup>276</sup>. Some of them engage in arms or drug trafficking and contribute to crime. This East African Community conflict system therefore presents an opportunity to develop a common security strategy.

The regional political strategy should be to develop and strengthen integrated policies that guarantee democracy, good governance, regional unity and social cohesion<sup>277</sup>. Further, develop common interactive policies on civil society, challenges to security and their complementary role as well as transform domestic and regional security institutions to meet modern challenges; develop regional unity through upholding of democratic principles that include constitutionalism and the rule of law. Modernise domestic security agencies in order to be able to deal with situations that threaten law

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<sup>274</sup> Kamenju, JAN. et al, *Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya*. Security Research and Information Centre. Nairobi Kenya. 2003.

<sup>275</sup> Katumanga M. *Security Concerns and Lateral Pressures as a Basis for Enhanced Regional Integration: a Case Study of N-W Kenya*. Paper prepared for DPMF. Unpublished . 2004.

<sup>276</sup> Kamenju, JAN. et al, *Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya*. Security Research and Information Centre. Nairobi Kenya. 2003.

<sup>277</sup> ECA Policy Research Report: *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa*. Economic Commission for Africa 2004. p 70 .

and order, protection of life and property and keeping abreast with modern crime trends. Develop institutions to pursue pro-active common foreign and defence policies that address current and strategic interests of the region on principles of peaceful coexistence with regional neighbours. The common policy should support international organizations and conventions that encourage understanding, peace, development and regional and international integration. These institutions will constitute as part of the establishment of the regional security framework.

### **3.3. Domestic Economic threats**

The internal economic threats include poverty and unemployment food, insecurity and poor agricultural policies, dilapidated infrastructure and low level of industrialization<sup>278</sup>. Poverty is a serious security concern. Poor people with no basic needs, living in a state of near or pure anarchy, will pose a threat to the security of the state and its neighbours. There is a direct correlation between a war situation and the prevalence of poverty. Poverty as complex and multi-dimensional phenomena can be defined as the condition when people lack the means to satisfy their basic needs. In Kenya, the 2001 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)<sup>279</sup> reports defined poverty in relation to conditions such as the lack of land, unemployment, inability to feed ones family, lack of proper housing, poor health and inability to educate children and payment of bills. 56 per cent of Kenyans fall into this category, making it one of the country's most serious security concerns<sup>280</sup>. Unemployment is an area of concern leading to poverty. Many school-leavers fail to secure meaningful employment due to lack of opportunities. The net impact is that the country suffers from brain drain after

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<sup>278</sup> Republic of Kenya. *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for the Period 2001-2004*. Sept 2001.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid

<sup>280</sup> Ibid

heavily investing in educating its citizens. Also they cannot secure credit for self-employment due to inability to obtain collateral. In the case of women, access to credit is conditional upon the husband's consent. Reforms that involved liberalisation of the economy and downsizing the public service further worsen the problem of unemployment<sup>281</sup>. Poverty has engendered a marked increase in the number of members of street families in major urban centres in the region. According to Kenya's Ministry of Labour and Human Resource Development in the year 2000, there were 137,000 street children in major urban centres in 13 districts. The number of street families has risen to an estimated 300,000 in the year 2002. Most of these street families involve themselves in various kinds of crime and are an eyesore to the image of the country.

Agriculture contributes 36.6% of Kenya's GDP<sup>282</sup>. The country's main exports are coffee, tea and horticultural products. Contribution of agriculture to GDP is on the decline due to a number of factors. Rain fed agriculture has been adversely affected by drought. With the removal of subsidies in the sector, the prices of inputs have increased significantly and are generally out of reach for many farmers. On the other hand poor market prices in comparison with the production costs, both locally and internationally, are a disincentive for farmers to continue growing cash crops. Due to poor planning and the cost of irrigation equipment, the potential of Arid and Semi-arid areas has not been realised. Other impediments to the growth of the sector include poor infrastructure, limited access to credit facilities, poor marketing strategies, use of inappropriate technology, limited application of research findings and poor extension

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<sup>281</sup>Turok B. *Towards a Democratic Coalition Against SAPs* in Ny'ong'o P O. ed *30 years of Independence in Africa: the Last Decades*. Academy Science Publishers, Nairobi, Kenya. 1992. pp 131-133.

<sup>282</sup>Republic of Kenya. *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for the Period 2001-2004*. Sept 2001.

services. The rural poverty levels in the region are estimated at 60%. The data for Kenya shows rural poverty stands at 56% and those who cannot afford a minimum of 2,250 kcal per day now stands at 15 million up from 7.3 million in 1973. Of these, 3 million are in constant need of food relief<sup>283</sup>.

The situation in the other states is not any better. This clearly portrays a gloomy picture of food insecurity that is further worsened by prolonged droughts and low agricultural productivity that require serious attention. Population growth and economic decline have been a development nightmare in the region. For instance despite the decline of growth in Kenya from 4% to 3.4% per annum during the 1980s, the population growth rate still exerts enormous pressure on the country's limited and fragile resource base<sup>284</sup>. Signs of this pressure are small land-holdings, landlessness, encroachment on marginal lands and environmental degradation. Also, the rapidly growing population has given rise to an expanding labour pool with limited employment opportunities.

The infrastructure is essential to economic and social development. It links centres of production with markets and gives people access to jobs and social services. The region's infrastructure contributes to economic growth, but the current situation is a serious constraint to development. Poor corporate governance also affects the regional transport systems such as the railways corporations, the ports authorities and the telecommunication corporation.

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<sup>283</sup> Ibid.

<sup>284</sup> Ibid



The performance of the region's industrial sector is declining. For instance Kenya aspires to industrialise by the year 2020. A depressed economy, coupled with unstable power supply, poor infrastructure and the high cost of inputs have generally affected production costs in Kenya. Due to poor planning, Kenya is unable to meet her electricity requirements. The ramifications of power blackouts pervade all sectors of the Kenyan economy and has resulted into huge financial losses, closure of companies, and loss of jobs. In the entire region the supply of electricity is concentrated around urban areas, with only 3.8 per cent of the total rural population having direct access to electricity, thus hampering rural development. The current domestic demands for Kenya for various petroleum fuels is about 2.5 million tones, which is equivalent to Ksh 54 billion, or 48.7 per cent, of the total foreign exchange earnings from merchandise exports<sup>285</sup>. The cost of petroleum products to end-user is increasing daily and negatively affect inflation. This is a major cause of increase in prices of all commodities.

Liberalisation has been detrimental to several sectors of the region's economy. It has exposed the region's agricultural produce and manufactured goods to unfair competition with imported ones, which are invariably cheaper due to lower production costs. The importation of cheap goods has contributed to the decline in production in the agricultural and industrial sectors. It has also led to the collapse of many industries and the loss of jobs. Both external and domestic debts are on the increase, hence posing a serious problem to the regional economy. The net effect of excessive borrowing is the risk of distorting the regional economic growth.

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<sup>285</sup>Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, *Kenya's Strategic Policies for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Macro-Economic and Sectoral Choices

The regional economic strategy should aim at being self-reliant through poverty reduction, diversification of sources and markets, sustainable industrialisation, enhancement of comparative advantage, development of regional oriented infrastructure, improvement of the investment climate thus ensuring regional economic growth and development. It also aims at having a competitive advantage and active support of integration within the regional and global arena in order to enhance growth and development. By establishing structures and institutions that enhance regional economy this strategy will constitute part of the regional security framework. The technological strategy would be to develop a regional technological policy that will address issues of protection of inventions and encouragement of innovations, communication security, management of impact of technology and development and management of science and technology.

### **3.4. Domestic Environmental conflicts**

The environment is an issue in a regional security framework because of three reasons; first humanity is faced with a range of environmental problems that are regional and global<sup>286</sup>. Examples include climatic changes, emission of green house gases and safeguarding of bio-diversity and protection of the natural heritage. Environmental conflicts include East African resources conflict system, water conflicts, soil erosion and deforestation, poaching and wildlife management. For example in Uganda about 90% of the land has been degraded<sup>287</sup>. This calls for regional cooperation between states and global control. Secondly, the scale of exploitation of natural resources and

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<sup>286</sup> Mwagiru. *Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi. 2004. p142.

<sup>287</sup> Okoth G. *Regional Institutional Responses to Security in the Era of Globalisation* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, 2004. p63.

degradation of regional environment threatens to go out of hand and may undermine the economic base and social fabric of the weak and poor states of Africa<sup>288</sup>.

Although some of the effects of environmental degradation are felt locally, they are likely to lead to conflicts in the region in future. Examples of these factors include urban degradation, deforestation and desertification. Thirdly, the problem of environmental and effective control of globalised economy engenders conflict between states. This includes affluent disposal from industries, natural resources depletion, poverty, population pressure, and economic interdependence. For instance the sharing of the resources of lake Victoria, management of the cross border national parks and ecosystems, and the surveillance and exploitation of the Indian Ocean Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) would have been much easier if there was an integrated approach. The utility of Lake Victoria resources of fishes, transport services and the preservation of the ecology has caused differences among East Africa states themselves in the last four years. There is need to debate this and come up with an amicable solution including obliterating borders on the lake and sharing it as a common heritage.

Water is an essential natural resource. Clean drinking water resources the world over is shrinking due to among others, increased population, environmental degradation through deforestation and desertification, industrial chemical pollution, urban pollution and changing weather patterns. In East African rain-fed agriculture is the mainstay of over 90% of the population. The rains have been diminishing and weather patterns are changing. There is a major becoming crisis of water the signs of which are demonstrated by the recent conflicts over water among the Masaai community

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<sup>288</sup> Bannon I, et al: *Natural Resources and Violent Conflicts: Options and Actions*. The World Bank. Washington DC. 2003. p1.

(pastoralists) and the kikuyu (farmers) at Mai Mahiu in Naivasha<sup>289</sup>. Further recent reports of water conflict include Rongai in Nakuru district and Mandera District. In the amai Mahiu incident at least 15 people were hacked to death. Similarly in the Mandera conflict scores of people were killed. Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt had warned in that the future wars would be fought over water. The Un has predicted that the main conflicts in Africa in the next 25 years will be over water<sup>290</sup>. In the East African Community perpetual conflicts are there in all the northern districts of Kenya, Northern Uganda and Northern Tanzania. So water crisis affects the entire East African Community. In the urban centres water crisis affects all major cities of East African at one time or the other. A major international water conflict concerns the River Nile waters, (discussed elsewhere).

Scarcity of water is therefore a major threat in this region, which must be securitised. Securitisation of water provides a sound basis for a Regional Security Framework. Water catchments areas, flows paths of rivers or lakes traverse national boundaries. Population or overuse in one country affects the other. They must therefore be managed regionally. Securitisation of water resources would mean evolution of a common authority to control and manage the resources. It would also require security organizations to be enabled to provide water in marginal areas through damming and drilling of boreholes to curtail water-based conflicts. The military is well versed with water provision and hence may only require capacity expansion and extension of range of operations to include management of rivers and lakes.

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<sup>289</sup> Saturday Nation January 2005, *New Laws make water fights senseless.*, Nation Media Group, Nairobi Kenya. p 9.

<sup>290</sup> Ross M: *The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth can Make you Poor* in Bannon I, et al: *Natural Resources and Violent Conflicts: Options and Actions*. The World Bank. Washington DC. 2003. p24-25.

The discharge of soil and liquid waste into rivers and lakes, which is perpetuated by the industrial sector (including coffee factories), local councils and excessive use of pesticides is the biggest cause of water pollution in the region. Not only does this render water unusable for domestic purposes, but affects the aquatic life within these water resources and thus has environmental implications. Over-cultivation and poorly planned irrigation schemes are causing severe erosion of fertile top-soils leading to the decline of agricultural land. A high population growth rate has triggered settlement and farming activities in ecologically fragile marginal areas also causing soil erosion. Destruction of forests has become a major threat to water catchments. For instance Kenya's forest cover is less than 3% of the total land surface<sup>291</sup>. The harvesting of trees for timber which the Forestry Department sanctions is not matched by a corresponding effort to plant trees, hence the lack of sustainability. Despite the banning of harvesting of indigenous forests, greedy and unscrupulous government officials and businessmen continue to plunder natural forests such as those on Mount Kenya, Kilimanjaro and Mount Elgon.

The excision of forests by the governments in order to pave way for human settlements only serves to aggravate an already serious situation. Other causes of deforestation are grazing, forest fires, making curios and charcoal burning. The negative impacts of these activities have began to manifest themselves in the form of massive erosion and dry river beds in the Aberdare ranges and Mount Kenya which are Kenya's foremost water catchments areas. This will have wide reaching repercussions in the economy of the region, particularly in the fields of agriculture and the generation of energy. Wood

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<sup>291</sup> Government of Kenya, *Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation, 2003-2007*

fuel is popular in both rural and urban areas because it is cheap. Increased demand for this commodity due to high population growth rate has exerted a lot of pressure on the region's rapidly diminishing forest resources with serious environmental consequences. This has amounted to deforestation, soil erosion and loss of water catchments areas.

Tourism has the potential to be the largest service sector, accounting for over 15% of GDP in Kenya and earns the region huge sums in foreign exchange. However insecurity within the region has adversely affected tourist arrivals. Other factors affecting this sector include very poor state of roads leading to key tourist attractions, lack of diversification of the products and poor marketing strategies. Wildlife is an important resource for economic development of the country because it is Kenya's main tourist attraction. While poaching has been largely contained in most parks and reserves, wildlife outside these areas estimated at about 70%, is far from secured. A new phenomenon is has emerged in the form of hunting of game meat for food. In ASAL areas where there is frequent famine the only source of free food other than relief food, which is rarely enough is trapping game for food.

Also due to the prevailing high level of poverty, there has been an upsurge in subsistence and commercial poaching of wildlife for meat and other products. Claims of game meat being sold in urban areas have increased. If this is not checked it can easily become a big time business and have significant impact in the wildlife management and tourism in general. The environmental strategy is to draw policies that support effective environmental management, sustainable economic development and manageable population growth<sup>292</sup>. Further it aims to support global and regional conventions that uphold global environmental conservation efforts. The military can

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<sup>292</sup> Bannon I, et al: *Natural Resources and Conflicts: What Can We Do?* in Bannon I, et al: *Natural Resources and Violent Conflicts: Options and Actions*. The World Bank. Washington DC. 2003. p1.

easily be mandated to oversee the implementation of this strategy. By establishing institutions for regional environmental preservation the EAC will have introduced part of the regional; security framework

### 3.5. Social Threats

One of the most severe social threats is ethnicity. Ethnicity as nationalism is a social constructed phenomenon. It is not fixed and hence it should be understood in relational and historical terms. Ethnic conflicts in Africa such as that in the Great lakes region and the Hon of Africa, have led to disintegration and collapse of the state - for instance Somalia<sup>293</sup>. The consequences of the ethnicity carry profound security concerns, as some of Africa's worst genocide activities and military coups have directly been attributable to it<sup>294</sup>. The threats of ethno-nationalism to security can be tackled through an ideological approach to civic education by which serious political education is undertaken to demystify cultural difference and de-politicise ethnicity as par of social re-engineering of the state. In Kenya various ethnic grievances and claims have led to the formation of lobby group such as pastoralists forum in Kenya comprising the Oromo, Somali, Turkana, Samburu and Masai among others. Some of these communities straddle existing national borders of the state forming the greater Hon of African region. These lobby groups contest the marginalization of minority pastoral communities in the management of the state<sup>295</sup>.

Ethnicity undermines the legitimacy of the state, inhibits the formation of broader trans-ethnic national identities, and determines the prospects of current efforts at

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<sup>293</sup>Hiteng, C. O. *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp13.

<sup>294</sup>Aseka, E. M. *Globalisation, Intellectuals and Security in Africa* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 28.

<sup>295</sup> Ibid. p 28.

democratisation and institutional reforms. Although the very process of colonial state creation accounted, in part, for the prevalence of ethno-political conflicts in post-colonial states, it also gave rise to a shared nationalist, multi-ethnic aspiration for self-determination and self rules<sup>296</sup>. The state is supposed to play a mediating role not only in the confrontation between tradition and modernity but also between external and indigenous structure and values<sup>297</sup>. Kenya's ethnic diversity has at times been used by politicians to incite communities that have lived peacefully with each other since time immemorial. The ethnic clashes of 1992 and 1997<sup>298</sup> culminated in the loss of human lives, destruction of property and the displacement of people from their homes. The subjection of ethnicity to political manipulations has adversely affected the country by driving a wedge between communities and undermining national cohesion.

HIV/AIDS presents the greatest challenge to the regional economy as the most affected are in the age bracket between 15-49 years (the productive age group of the society). For instance about 700 Kenyans die of AIDS daily although the figure is reported to have dropped to about 400<sup>299</sup>. This scourge seriously affected Uganda in the 1990s but they have managed to stem its growth. The financial and material costs to families, the communities affected and the states are enormous. The net impact from time lost in care, absenteeism from work, loss of capacity in human capital and pressure on health facilities is equally enormous. Also the number of orphans is on the increase. Notable in the health sector management is a high infant and maternal mortality rate, lack of

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<sup>296</sup> Hiteng, C. O. *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 10.

<sup>297</sup> Aseka, E. M. *Globalisation, Intellectuals and Security in Africa* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 27.

<sup>298</sup> Jonyo, F.: *The Centrality of Ethnicity in Kenya's Political Transition* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003. p 155-175.

<sup>299</sup> Government of Kenya, *Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation, 2003-2007*



access to primary health care for the rural population, concentration of modern health facilities in urban centres, low doctor-to-patient and nurse-to-patient ratios, soaring costs of medical care, malnutrition and unhygienic living conditions.

Societal security strategy would be to develop societal security institutions that promote regional ethnic and religious harmony, moral values and principles, respect for individual and communal rights to ensure adequate social security and equity. It would aim to project a positive regional image while protecting against international cultural negative influences that erode our cultures.

### **3.6. External threats**

A major contentious issue has recently emerged concerning the management of the river Nile waters<sup>300</sup>. This issue brings together all the riparian states, the most affected understandably, being Egypt. This is a potentially explosive issue and it would pay well if the East Africa would approach the issue together. The River Nile is longest river in the world and has its source in East Africa. River Nile is unique in the world. The lives of millions of people entirely depend on it. The states of Egypt and Northern Sudan cannot survive without the Nile waters. Ancient civilizations were built around it. The debate on its utilisation therefore elicits high emotions and if not handled carefully can easily cause war. The controversy is based on some colonial agreements that guaranteed Egypt exclusive and perpetual supply of water. Egypt and Sudan are therefore purported to have special claims on it based on two 1929 and 1939 Treaties

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<sup>300</sup>Hiteng, C. O. *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 7-17.

signed between British colonial rulers in the two states<sup>301</sup>. The treaty gave special rights to the two northern states while denying the East Africa states any rights of usage.

The East Africa counties have not only the source of the River Nile – Lake Victoria- as part of their territory but also have the sources of the many rivers that feed Lake Victoria. They must therefore negotiate regionally for the rights of usage according to international laws. However, they must also be sensitive to the needs of other riparian states that depend entirely on the waters of the Nile. There is need therefore for East Africa states to approach this issue as a combined force to forestall division in approach and secure a common solution beneficial to all.

The Conflict System in the Horn of Africa impacts very seriously on the security situation in EAC region<sup>302</sup>. East Africa and neighbouring Great Lakes Region and Horn of African have seen some of the longest and most devastating post- World War 2 conflicts in the world. Genocide in Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, civil wars in southern Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda, the failed state of Somalia, international wars pitting Uganda-Tanzania, Ethiopia-Eritrea and the Uganda, Rwanda - DRC war, which invited a multitude of African states in DRC represents the greatest human tragedy in the world in the last quarter century. However, the Sudan case is unique in many aspects. Since Sudan became independent in 1956, it has been at war with itself for over forty years<sup>303</sup>. The proliferation of conflicts in the region has generated another problem that of the proliferation of light weapons. Moreover the influx of refugees and the uncontrolled movement of people from one country to another has also made the trafficking of illegal arms much easier, thus increasing security vulnerability within and

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<sup>301</sup> Hiteng, C. O. *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 7-17

<sup>302</sup> Ibid

<sup>303</sup> Ibid p 12.

between communities<sup>304</sup>. It therefore behoves on the leadership in this region to put to an end this human holocaust by creating institutions and frameworks that will deny any leadership opportunities for genocide or regional strife. A regional security framework would guard against this.

International terrorism and organised crime are recent phenomenon threats to East Africa. Terrorism can be defined in general terms as the intentional infliction of suffering or loss on one party by another party, which has no authority or legitimacy. An alternative definition is the use of indiscriminate violence to intimidate the general majority of people in a state to accept the changes advocated by the terrorists. The essence of terrorism is to kill or injure opponents in ways specifically designed to cause fear, and thus to disorganize the opposing society to a degree far out of proportion to the number of victims. International terrorism has become a major threat to security<sup>305</sup>. The newest international terrorism is attributed to the growing tension between the Arab world and the west- as well as the Arabs-Israel conflict<sup>306</sup>. These conflicts have led to the rise of extreme military and fundamentalists' politics. Analysts have identified a link between some Arab countries and several countries in the Horn of Africa with links to militant groups professing Islamic fundamentalism aimed against western targets<sup>307</sup>. Terrorism, because of its diffuse and individualistic nature, does not lend itself to a single definition. However terrorists use violence or the threat of violence for political objectives. They are generally motivated and sustained by deep

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<sup>304</sup>Hiteng, C. O. *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa* in Mwangi, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 12.

<sup>305</sup>Weiss, T. *A Demand –Side Approach to Fighting Small Arms Proliferation*. In Snyder, A. ed. *African security Review*. Vol 12, Number 2- 2003 Institute for Security Studies, 2002. p.5.

<sup>306</sup>Hiteng, C. O. *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa* in Mwangi, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp13.

<sup>307</sup> Ibid. p 13.

feelings of frustration seated in perceptions of profound social, economic, and political inequities.

While the exact causes of frustration vary from case to case, these general factors usually are among the causes of terrorism. Not only are terrorists motivated by similar frustrations, but also the methods they use to vent their frustrations are similar. Terrorist groups have been forced, because of practical limitations to pursue the strategy of a small group against a larger group. The violent tactics that are employed by terrorists also are limited to a few major classifications: killing, bombing, kidnapping, and sabotage. Some groups that practice terrorism may also employ non-violent or less violent strategies such as propaganda and various forms of political mobilization and protest. Terrorism is borderless and hence the best method of fighting it is through development of a seamlessly regional intelligence and security mechanism.

There are a number of reasons, which make the region terrorism prone. The region's geo-strategic location on the Eastern Coast of Africa along the Indian Ocean and its borders with Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan where there is internal strife has made maintenance of security difficult<sup>308</sup>. The region, especially Kenya and Tanzania, also enjoys relative peace, which is in sharp contrast to the surrounding regions where there is internal instability in the countries. These instabilities create a spill-over effect with a direct bearing on the region's security. This has been caused by the huge influx of refugees into the region. The cordial relations with the Western World especially the United States of America, United Kingdom and Israel has contributed immensely to the

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<sup>308</sup> Government of Kenya: *Counter terrorist Strategy*. 2003.

vulnerability as a target for international terrorism<sup>309</sup>. International terrorism has become increasingly complex as was amply demonstrated by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack against World Trade Centre in New York US, and other key economic, military and political targets inside the US. With the onset of globalisation increasingly defining international interaction, this threat has become even more intricate. Terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon to the East African Community region and has serious consequences far and beyond the boundaries of the region. Past terrorist incidences in the East African, regions include the bombing of Paradise Hotel, Mombassa on 28 November 2002 in which 13 Kenyans, and 3 Israeli nationals were killed and a large portion of the hotel was destroyed. The twin bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on 7 August 1998 led to the loss of over 200 Kenyan, and about 20 US citizens including more than 2,000 people injured<sup>310</sup>.

An earlier incident occurred on 31 December 1980, when a bomb went off at the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi leaving 14 people dead. The Norfolk hotel attack claimed two Americans, two British, one French, one Belgian, one Columbian, one Dutch and one Italian. Investigations had revealed that the Palestinian liberation organization (PLO) was responsible. To counter international terrorism requires an international approach. The most effective way of fighting international terrorism is establishing a seamless stream of information gathering, processing and analysis devoid of bureaucratic red tape and selective sharing<sup>311</sup>. This can only be achieved by establishing a monolithic intelligence institution in the region centralised under one organisational framework. The problem with intelligence organisation is that they can be very discriminatory.

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<sup>309</sup> Ibid

<sup>310</sup> Ibid

<sup>311</sup> Ibid

The region must therefore take all the necessary counter terrorism measures including joining the rest of the world in fighting and/or containing the threat posed by this unfortunate phenomenon. To guard against international terrorists infiltration, the region needs to have the ability to maintain constant surveillance on the porous borders, to track and detect illegal aliens and their activities and have a rapid response capability to defeat imminent terrorist attack. East Africa governments must therefore understand the importance establishing a regional security framework based on a programme of security integration capable of reducing if not completely eliminating possibilities of recurrence of terrorist attacks. Because of its stronger economy and the strategic geo-political location Kenya can be the lead nation in the East African region.

The regional counter terrorism strategy should aim at mitigating the terrorist threat in the region to the point where people can go about their daily lives without disruption and where economic, social, and political development takes place unhindered. The objectives of all counter terrorist activities are to deter would-be terrorists from planning or executing terrorist acts against Kenya or her visiting friends.

The fundamental principle of fighting terrorists is based upon early detection and pre-emptive strike. Due to the nature of international terrorism, the fight against it must be multi-faceted with the involvement of regional security organs and the citizens. The fundamental responsibilities of the principal players would include the Police whose duty would be surveillance, detection, investigation, arrest and prosecution. The Armed Forces being the principal guarantor of peace and security in the region from external Armed threats will carry out active and passive surveillance, intelligence gathering,

physical patrols and protection of borders and other likely terrorist targets and pre-emptive strikes or apprehension of imminent terrorists.

Airports and aviation authorities would aim to counter any existing or emerging terrorist threats to the airports by providing appropriate and effective security mechanism in order to deter and detect terrorist and their accomplices from being able to execute attacks on the airports and their customers. In addition they would have a regional capability to carry out surveillance of the airspace and to secure all air traffic control facilities and equipment against sabotage, destruction or misuse by terrorism that may jeopardise safety of aviation operations.

The ports authorities would secure all seaports and facilities against sabotage destruction or misuse by terrorists and to guard against illegal entry of undesirable materials or personnel through the ports. The immigration departments would guard against illegal entry and residency of aliens and undesirable immigrants, ensure immigrants into the region are properly vetted by issuance of bona-fide travel documents and to monitor movement and residency of aliens. The customs and excise departments would have the legal mandate to check and inspect imports and exports. The departments therefore have a central role of ensuring goods and equipment that can assist terrorists do not enter the country.

The regional security intelligence service would focus on collecting, collating and analysing information, and ultimately disseminating intelligence on all aspects of terrorism. The service would work in close tandem with all relevant government departments to create counter-terrorism infrastructure to accumulate data, identifying

terrorists and disrupting terrorist support networks. Other players such as ministries of foreign affairs, AGs offices, would domesticate international treaties and conventions in order to counter terrorism and terrorist threats in the country and globally. They will be responsible for putting in place the appropriate legal mechanism. Operationalisation of the above strategies will automatically form a base for a regional security framework

Globalization phenomenon and the proliferation of MNCs has negatively affected the EAC region. The end of the cold war heralded changes in the international system, which is responsible for major events including emergent of internal wars, state collapse, death and migration as a result of these conflicts. East Africa became a haven for refugees and SALW proliferation<sup>312</sup>. This has increased crime rate in the urban centres and armed banditry and livestock rustling among the pastoral community. Weaker states become extremely vulnerable where the superpower can blackmail them to adopt comprising positions to their national interest due to fear and intimidations. Finally, the US seems to be violating the democracy it is supposed to be promoting creating a threat situation wherever the Americans are. The deep hatred and despondency they have created for themselves endangers every state that is viewed as American friends and puts the state in line for hit by terrorists. Saudi Arabia, Kenya and Tanzania have had a taste of this. The above are just a few examples of some of the changes that have occurred since early 1990s.

Global society is a diverse social universe in which the unifying forces of modern production markets, communications and cultural and political modernization interact with many global, regional national and local segmentation and differentiations, global

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<sup>312</sup> Kamenju, JAN. et al, *Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya*. Security Research and Information Centre. Nairobi Kenya. 2003.



society should be understood not as social system but as field of social relations in which many specific systems have formed<sup>313</sup>. Globalisation represents a major shift in the international system. First the global village effect has created almost instantaneous internationalisation of events through media coverage and the fast movement of information, goods and people across continents<sup>314</sup>. This internationalisation of events first reduces state government's ability to cover their misdeeds. Secondly it reduces the role of the state as the only actor in the international system as more actors emerge in the international arena.

The globalisation phenomenon, which has promoted greater human movement in the globe has created globalised threats. Terrorists can now move and communicate freely globally causing simultaneous havoc at different places continents apart. On the economic front large multinational corporations are now operating worldwide with continuous business interaction day and night. States have been forced by this market driven phenomenon to give way to their MNCs free operations. Driven by the need to promote the living standards of their citizens, politicians have been forced to cede more and more state sovereignty in order to facilitate free movement of businesses transactions internationally. In the process states have opened borders and even redefined the extent of their independence with respect to other states to conform with market forces. This has led to a situation where state frontiers have become less and less distinct.

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<sup>313</sup> Burton J W: *World Society*. P85 Cambridge University Press . 1972.

<sup>314</sup> *The East African journal of Human Rights and Democracy: East African Human Rights Report 2003*. A publication of the East African Human Rights Institute and the East African Law Society. Vol 1 No 2 December 2003.

Globalisation presents itself as an opportunity as well as a threat. Characterised by grand movement of cash in search of markets and investments globalisation can easily destroy domestic economies and lead to political upheavals<sup>315</sup>. At the same time if states approach the world together they are likely to benefit through globalisation by presentation of dominance in commodities in which they have competitive advantage. In the process of separate development there is bound to be unhealthy competition, which presents conflict regionally and internationally<sup>316</sup>. Regional security framework has an inherent pacifying and integrating tendency and can be designed to mitigate all the above threats.

The private sector, the media, civil society and MNCs have also curved a niche in public decision loop<sup>317</sup>. MNCs have established their own foreign policies, which sometimes infringe on states foreign policies. These organizations have attained a very high level of legitimacy through actions of the states. In the last four decades states have at international level progressively created regimes whose purpose has innocently been to safeguard the proliferation of bad behaviour of states for the greater common good of humanity and for the ease and peaceful conduct of international commerce<sup>318</sup>. These regimes have created rules and treaties, which often infringe on the sovereignty of states. Once a state accents to these treaties and protocols the state becomes bound by the rules and norms that go with it. Subsequent activities designed for the implementation of these protocols do not call for any further negotiation with the

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<sup>315</sup>Turok B. *Towards a Democratic Coalition Against SAPs* in Ny'ong'o P O. ed *30 years of Independence in Africa: the Lost Decades*. Academy Science Publishers , Nairobi , Kenya. 1992. pp 131-133

<sup>316</sup>Ojo O.J.C.B. et al: *African International Relations*. Longman Kenya. 1985.

<sup>317</sup>Nzomo, M: *Civil Society in the Kenyan Political Transition: 1992-2000* in Oyugi W. O. et al: ed. *The politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC* . Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2003.

<sup>318</sup> Shaw M. *Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives*. Polity Press. Cambridge, UK. 1994.

respective state. Apart from eroding the power of the state these entities have become major competitors with sovereign states in influencing global events.

There is a growing feeling that these MNCs and international organisations are conspiring to disadvantage the third world countries. They are continuously changing the rules of the game whenever third world countries seem to catch up. Certain demands for institutional restructuring by these institutions have been responsible for economic instability of many developing countries. For instance instability in policy includes an account of forced SAP measures<sup>319</sup>. In another example Kenya produces about 80% of world cut flowers. The Kenyan flower farmers have always used certain chemicals in the production of the flowers, which are sold in the world markets. The recent rules insist on some phytosanitary requirements, which reject use of certain herbicides in the farms, have immediate effect in the economy. This is a major affront to the third world economies. In the year 2000 it was declared that certain old aircrafts could not land in certain cities because their noise levels were too high. They required certain modifications. Third world states that still had these aircrafts in service were forced to programme them for modification at very high costs.

Due to technological advancement it has become increasingly easier to manage the MNCs from anywhere in the world through remote controlled informatics. Technology has also created modular designs of production plants, which can be easily dismantled and assembled. This has facilitated easy movement of production equipment from one unfavourable location to another at minimum costs. This has created what is today

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<sup>319</sup> Bourname, N. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa* in Bourname, N. ed. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa*. African Academy of Sciences. Nairobi, Kenya. 1996. pp 43.

dabbed as platform industries, for example the EPZs. Sudden relocation of these industries causes havoc to third world economies. The regional strategy should be to integrate the control of MNCs including their political and environmental impact in the region. This requires establishment of a regional institution that evaluates their investments in relation to benefit and impact.

The military strategy would be to maintain a compact, capable, credible and efficient military in order to intervene in situations that threaten regional security. It would aim at participating in regional and global peacekeeping efforts in support of world peace and to formulate a regionally integrated security policy to address current and future security issues.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **RECAPITULATION CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION**

#### **4.1. Introduction**

This chapter seeks to examine the extent to which the objectives and hypothesis set at the beginning of the thesis have been achieved. It is divided into four parts. Part one examine whether the objectives set at the beginning of the study have been met. To recapitulate, the objectives were firstly, to examine and analyse, political, economic, environmental and social factors underlying the absence of a regional security framework in the East African Community and secondly to examine the current security threats and demonstrate how they offer an opportunity for establishing a regional security framework for the East African Community states. Part two examines how far the two hypotheses have been proved or disapproved.

Again to recapitulate, the hypotheses were firstly that the absence of regional security framework in the East Africa Community is a function of the political, economic, social, environmental and military factors obtaining in the EAC and secondly that the strategies for the eradication of the current regional security threats will generate a regional security framework for the East African Community. Part three is the conclusion of the thesis while Part four forms the recommendations for a regional security framework.

#### **4.2.a. Objective 1: Examination of the Impediments to regional security framework**

We examined a large number of political factors and we indeed established how they impede evolution of a regional security framework in the EAC. We established that the

political leadership promoted internal strife and conflicts through patronisation, bribery and destruction of institution of governance. We saw how the leaders lacked a regional political and security outlook and often were not democratic, accountable or responsible. It was shown that poor leadership tore apart the states through political wrangles. The lack of mutual responsiveness negated the establishment of regional security framework. Emergence of SADC posed a major threat to the region and started a process of fragmentation and isolation of East Africa Community states.

State predation and official corruption contributed to weak national institutions that did not provide sufficient checks and balances on the excesses of the state. The political elite often employed state security organs for securing the regime. This preoccupation tended to eclipse the need for a regional security framework. We also established that ideological differences were a contributory factor to the denial of a regional security framework. Political ambition and regime perpetuation as well as endemic corruption resulted in perpetual political wrangles and state crisis. We established that there exists a psychological dependency syndrome amongst the elite. Preoccupation with the realism view and the fear of erosion of sovereignty discouraged evolution of regional security framework. We also noted that the leadership has not come to terms with the new definition of security, which demands concern for the individual. We saw how apathy in security organs mainly due to the absence of the coercion factor has diluted the need for a regional security framework. Issues of war and the changing role of the military, security alliances and the weak EAC structures and institutions were shown to contribute to the absence of a regional security framework.

We further established that factors hindered the evolution of a regional security framework they included globalisation poverty of states and governments economic dependency syndrome and technological backwardness. Social issues identified to have had major impact in the denial for a regional security framework included public apathy and civil society social perception of regional security ethnicity, social cultural diversity and economic deprivation.

#### **4.2.b. Objective 2: Examination of Threats and How They Offer Opportunity for an Evolution of a regional security framework**

In chapter three we examined an array of threats and established that their mitigation offers an opportunity for evolving a regional security framework. They were internal political threats, which included bad governance, corruption, domestic crime and disasters and the frontier communities' conflicts. We proposed political strategies to mitigate these threats such as to develop and strengthen integrated policies that guarantee democracy, good governance, regional unity and social cohesion. Further, develop common interactive policies on civil society, transform domestic security institutions to regional organs and develop regional unity through upholding of democratic principles that include constitutionalism and the rule of law. Establishment of organ for this strategy becomes part of the regional security framework.

Against internal economic threats of poverty and unemployment, food insecurity and poor infrastructure, low level of industrialisation, national loans and debt management threats we suggested an economic strategy that aims at actively support the regional integration aimed at being self-reliant through poverty reduction, diversification of sources and markets, sustainable industrialisation, enhancement of comparative advantage, development of infrastructure, improvement of the investment climate thus,

ensuring economic growth and development in the region. Establishment of a well-founded structure to oversee this strategy will form part of the desired regional security framework. On environmental threats we identified the East African resources conflict system, water conflicts, deforestation, wildlife management and we suggested having a regional institution to be charged with these responsibilities. We further suggested that the regional military could be given this mandate as part of the changed roles of the military. This new organ would be part of the anticipated regional security framework. On social threats we identified ethnicity, HIV/AIDS and general health management. Externally generated threats include River Nile conflict, the conflict system in the horn of Africa, international terrorism and organised crime, globalisation and the MNCs. To combat these threats it was found necessary to have a common regional front, which would also constitute to the evolution of a regional security framework. We have therefore accomplished what we set out to do in our second objective - to establish the threats and to show how they constitute an opportunity of evolving a regional security framework.

#### **4.3.a. Hypothesis 1: The Absence of a Regional Security Framework is a Function of Political, Economic, Social and Environmental Factors**

Our first hypothesis was that 'the absence of regional security framework is a function of political, economic, social and environmental factors'. To prove this hypothesis one must show that if political, economic, social and environmental factors were right, then a regional security framework would have evolved automatically in the EAC. We have already shown that a lot of these factors have not been right and this has led to the absence of regional security framework. One of the cardinal principles of regional



integration scheme is that there must be a shared vision on major issues for it to transform to a federation.

We have established in chapter 1 that political factors such as lack of shared vision on regional issues, domestic insecurity, protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity, perpetual state crisis and the regime security predicament have had a critical role in negating the establishment of a regional security framework. The importance of a shared vision is greatly amplified when matters of security are the subject of the integration, because the security factor is a critical provision that legitimises the state. The absence of a shared vision fatally weakens the scheme. We have noted how political leadership in the EAC has not responded to the regional challenges as a result of the absence of common perception and conception of major regional threat factors.

We have also noted how in the history of EAC leadership of the past and present EAC Presidents have determined the orientation of the states to regional security. The leadership have negated creation of a regional security framework. It is also evident that the historical colonial erection of boundaries across ethnic communities has been a security concern particularly when communities on either side are dissatisfied with the management of state power and resources<sup>320</sup>. International border conflicts have in the past created conditions of mistrust. We have established lack of shared vision as a result of differing political ideological approaches<sup>321</sup>. The presidents have embraced the

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<sup>320</sup> Although these past incidences explain why the first EAC could not succeed, Hiteng argues that the African post-colonial state is much more vulnerable to the contemporary international system and that the ruling elite can no longer exploit superpower rivalry to shore up their government. See Hiteng, C. O. *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 11.

<sup>321</sup> For instance, Kenyatta the first Kenya's president Kenyatta embraced unbridled capitalism. Nyerere believed in socialism as the vehicle to creating homogeneous Tanzanian community, while Uganda was faced with military coups due domestic differences. The current East African Community state

totality of the Westphalian state system where territory, sovereignty and independence reign supreme. They are victims of intellectual dependency syndrome. State-centric policies emanate from this kind of thinking. They therefore believe in the primacy of the state as the only provider of security. The idea of surrendering the provision of national security to a regional organisation is both incredible and impractical. This rigid position has led to negligence in solving common regional threats in order to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states.

We have established preoccupation with realism has contributed to failure to shared vision hence an regional security framework. Thus, for a long time the overriding interest of states has been national security, defined largely in terms of military capability. Realism has played a major role in negating consensus and common vision on the issues at play. We have further established that regime preoccupation with domestic insecurity has exacerbated the absence of a regional security framework. Excessive political ambitions generate domestic political wrangles. Poor leadership and greed amongst the political actors has resulted in perpetual state crisis. Regime security predicament generates activities aimed at actor perpetuation in power. The lack of common perception of threats and common conception of strategies for mitigating them diminishes the role of a regional security framework. National interests therefore override regional interests. Therefore lack of political will as a result of lack of shared vision is a function of the absence of regional security framework.

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presidents represent separate agendas in the Community. For president Kibaki it is the boosting Kenya's economy, for Museveni hegemonic designs, while for president Mkapa it is a matter of prestige in hosting the HQ of the East African Community in Arusha. The political elite in EAC states have had generally Western education and hence have assumed European mode of thinking and belief on matters of political and societal organization and intellectual criterion basement.

Poor Politics and Governance has played a major role in the absence of a regional security framework<sup>322</sup>. The East Africa countries have jealousy guarded their own economic sovereignty to the extent the power political situation permitted. Political consensus is an important underlying factor in regional integration<sup>323</sup>. We have already noted that in the past African governments have used the military to consolidate their stay in power even when their legitimacy is in question<sup>324</sup>. Poor leadership is responsible for bad governance<sup>325</sup>. Greed, excessive ambition for power, endemic corruption, endears perpetual political wrangles. Ethnicity is promoted through favouritism, political patronage, and public incitement. Due to lack of state penetration of society there is no sufficient surveillance of society. Conflicts that emerge are resolved through force, hence they employed state security organs for securing both the territory and quelling the public discontent.

We established also that African governments have constantly become dictatorial and progressively reduced public participation in policy formulation and decision-making. But now the private sector, the media, civil society and MNCs have now carved a niche in public decision making loop These events illustrate the fears of the EAC political

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<sup>322</sup>Regional integration schemes are crafted to solve existing problems associated with exclusiveness of states. The perception of the gravity of the issues determines the depth and range of the cooperation. Some schemes are by design intended to remain at the level of economic cooperation throughout their lives, while others are designed to mature into political union. The latter type will of necessity cover a wide range of issues and penetrate deeper into states' institutions. The earlier this penetration takes place the faster the integration takes root. Security belongs firmly in the political domain, and therefore political and security integration processes should move in tandem with economic cooperation. Indeed it is the extent of political and security consensus determines the speed of economic integration.

<sup>323</sup> Bourname, N. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa* in Bourname, N. ed. *Economic Corporation and Regional Integration in Africa*. African Academy of Sciences. Nairobi, Kenya. 1996. pp 45.

<sup>324</sup> Hiteng, C. O. *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 11.

<sup>325</sup> Examples were Uganda under Milton Obote's against the Buganda Kingdom and Uganda following the overthrow of Obote's regime by Idi Amin. There was massive build up of the military. We also noted that the most rapid military growth occurred in Somalia with the assistance of the Soviet Union. In 1969, the Somali army grew from about 3,000 to about 23,000 men Ibid. p 12.

elite to surrender sovereignty to a regional body, hence the absence of regional security framework. We have noted that convergence of regional interests creates a need for protection of these interests regionally<sup>326</sup>. The EAC society has not attained sufficient political and social convergence therefore they are at a cross-road on the emerging globalisation phenomenon. The East African Community must adopt this thinking to survive and prosper in the contemporary international system.

The second part of the first hypothesis is the analysis of whether the absence of regional security framework is a function of economic factors. Governments rule the states because they are the principal allocators. Resources extraction and distribution is a major legitimising factor of the state. To the extent that the state cannot adequately provide for its people then its legitimacy is null and void. We have noted the endemic poverty and unemployment found in EAC states and how it seriously undermines their legitimacy and sovereignty. The governments engage in perpetual soliciting for international assistance in form of aid, grants and loans. Because of their common status in poverty they prefer to borrow from outside their own circle. This reduces their interdependence and enhances the economic dependency syndrome.

Poverty presents itself through perpetual food insecurity resulting in constant incidences of famine. Food insecurity can be attributed to poor policies in agriculture, inadequate land policies, poor management of food production factors such as seeds, fertilizers, financing farmers, poor marketing strategies, corruption in the public sector and international competition in food products and high cost of productivity. Lack of interdependence discourages formation of regional security framework.

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<sup>326</sup> Koech, J. *Emerging Challenges of Security in IGAD* in Mwangi, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 129.

We have further noted how the degenerate poor Infrastructure dissuades the establishment of a regional security framework. The absence of adequate interstates physical infrastructure reduces the regional interaction. The degenerated domestic infrastructure has not only generated termite economies but has also led to inability of the state to penetrate society. The states ability to arbitrate intercommunity conflicts has been seriously undermined. The lack of common roads, railways, and communication networks reduces the incidences of interaction and hence negates regional security framework. Very low industrialization is a major disincentive to regional security framework. Disparities in economic development status was identified as the major issue that broke the first EAC. Kenya then was seen to be more developed. Today the same status exists. This creates fear that some partners may reap more benefits from the integration than others. This suspicion is responsible for the reluctance of the states to have a relatively permanently binding treaty as would result in the event of establishing a regional security framework.

We have discussed how international debt has created discouragement to regional security framework. The varying debt levels and different debt management programmes generate conflicts in a regional framework. Liberalisation of economies has also brought about fears that some states would consume others economically through oversupply of their commodities and therefore disadvantage them economically. In aggregate we have shown that the absence of a regional security framework is a function of the factors.

#### **4.3.b. Hypothesis 2: Existing regional security threats offer an opportunity for creating a regional security framework for the East African Community.**

Our second hypothesis was that 'the existing regional security threats offer an opportunity for creating a regional security framework for the East African Community'. In this section we shall therefore be concerned with establishing whether this hypothesis is valid. We have already established that security is paramount in the survival of the state and until security is guaranteed in an integration scheme, true commitment to the legitimacy of the governments is compromised. Therefore states should do all in their power mitigate threats to security. Each of the EAC state has a duty to fight imminent threats whether singly or commonly. Our duty here is to prove that for the states to effectively fight these existing threats they will require to do it commonly and by doing so they will have formed a sound foundation of an regional security framework.

We have identified existing common threats that include internal political threats, weak public institutions, domestic insecurity and disasters, the frontier communities' conflicts. Further we have identified internal economic threats such as poverty and unemployment, food insecurity and high population growth, poor infrastructure and poor industrialization, international debt management. In addition we have environmental conflicts, which include East African resources conflict system, water conflicts, soil erosion and deforestation, poaching and wildlife management. Social threats include ethnicity, HIV/AIDS and other diseases. External threats include the River Nile conflict, the conflict system in the Horn of Africa, international terrorism and organised crime, globalisation and impact of the MNCs.

All these threats call for development of sound national strategies to mitigate them. However we have established that because they are common even when some of them are purely domestic, they spill over into the neighbour. Hence they require regional strategies for mitigating them. We have suggested specific solutions for each of the threats. The broad strategy is to use regional approach in mitigating them. In so doing a broad regional strategy emerges. This proves that our hypothesis that the solution to these threats creates opportunity for evolving a regional security framework. Regional security framework will involve establishment of regional institutions that guarantee preservation regional territories and regional interests. The foundation of such a framework demands the formulation of a Regional Grand Strategy.

#### **4.4. Conclusions**

The subject of this thesis was security in the EAC. Security is a major factor in development. It is also a difficult item to achieve in totality. It becomes even more difficult to achieve in a regional integration scheme because it carries with it independence and sovereignty. We have established why a regional security framework is not there in the EAC treaty and why it is necessary. We have established threats whose only solution is to establish such a framework. In Chapter two we discussed various factors that impede regional security framework. We discussed political factors such as leadership, ideology, domestic political wrangles, corruption, dependency syndrome, and the crisis of the state, external security alliances and the weak institutions and organs of the East African Community.

We also discussed economic hindrances such as poverty, economic dependency syndrome and technological backwardness. In social issues we saw public and civil

society apathy, ethnicity, and social cultural diversity as major contributory factors to absence of regional security framework. It was shown that these factors impede evolution of an regional security framework. In chapter two we investigated threats in the EAC region and how they form foundation on which to build a regional security framework. We discussed internal political threats such as bad governance, corruption, and the frontier communities conflicts system. We also identified economic threats such as poverty, food insecurity and poor infrastructure. On environmental threats we saw conflicts EA resources conflict system and water conflicts, On the external scale threats identified included River Nile conflict, conflict system in the Horn of Africa, international terrorism and organised crime.

Mitigation of these threats constitutes strategies, which we set out whose foundation is regional. In Chapter four we sought to examine the extent to which the objectives and hypothesis set at the beginning of the thesis have been achieved. We were able to show that indeed we had accomplished what we set out to do. We have also proffer an array of suggestions and recommendations that will help in formulating a regional security framework

This thesis has enumerated a large number pertinent of regional security issues. The absence of a regional security framework is an obvious obstacle to deeper integration of the EAC states particularly to federation. The pride of a nation is normally dependent on its history and cultural identity of its people. Leadership ineptitude apart, each of the EAC state has built some form of history and cultural identity since independence. Any citizen of any of the partner states will give a list of items that she/he considers to be the achievements and failures of his/her country, but the majority will still want to



be identified as citizen's of their particular country despite the poverty, insecurities or diseases prevailing. Many will espouse optimism that these difficulties are temporary and will fade away as the countries develop. However as we discussed in the thesis, this optimism need to be anchored on some form of pragmatic leadership that is visionary, patriotic and selfless. In today's world of globalisation, competition between states, society and individuals is the under-girding principle for survival. It behoves therefore that citizens of EAC region and not just their political leaders get involved in the search for the best techniques that will give them a competitive edge in this international race.

In the matter of security many questions are now being asked. Some of them sound so naïve and ridiculous to practitioners of security that they fail to evaluate them and yet their relevance increases by the day. For instance the public is asking; what is the role of the military in peacetime? Is it necessary to have a military today in any of the EAC states? What military threats are there? Aren't our main security threats internal? Shouldn't we disband the military to expand our police forces or merge their roles to mitigate these internal threats? Are we able to deter external intrusive powers from our affairs? Can we hope to protect our sovereignty and territorial integrity from attack by a major power? If not, do we need those outdated military hardware we have been purchasing from these major powers at the expense of increasing our food production capacity or improving our health services? Can national security be hired, purchased, borrowed or donated from those who have excess of it? Can't the military be restructured radically to perform effectively civilian tasks such as agriculture, water management, environmental management, cultural development (training and enculturation of the youth) diplomacy or scientific and technological research?

These questions are vital in shaping the future of provision of security. The expanded definition of security points to this direction - dramatic and radical perception of security and threats to security and corresponding dramatic and radical changes in the institutions and roles of the security organs.

If these questions get sufficient attention we may in future require such professionals like agriculturalists, environmentalists, sociologists, water engineers and all types of researchers in the military. The military may require training in police work to carry out apprehension, arrest, investigation and prosecution in public courts of civilian criminals. The apparent higher domestic societal security in Western European states was built through the application of coercion presented by the military threats of use of force but this model may not be applicable in the EAC states or Africa in general today. A new conceptualisation of the military force is required today to address the new global and regional threat order.

The military becomes the centre of security analysis due to its standing characteristics, discipline, loyalty and structure for easy control and administration. It therefore becomes the first line resource to a nation or a region for carrying out non-traditional tasks. A regional security framework for EAC could be modelled incorporating these ideas in the structure. This is definitely the direction that will stand the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in the EAC region. The soldier-warrior era is gone and the post-modern soldier will require being an accomplished professional in a variety of non-traditional military disciplines.

#### 4.5. Recommendations

The foundation of a regional security framework implies a formulation of a Regional Grand Strategy. Strategy is the skilful formulation, co-ordination and application of ends, ways and means to promote and defend the regional interest. In military terms it can also be defined as any position in the field of war that one side may use to particular advantage against a foe. Strategy formulation process involves environmental analysis, resource analysis; identification of competing needs, defining scope, establishing performance standards and procedures. Strategic approach would evolve a common defence and security policy, common planning and execution, interoperability of equipment and weapons, common contingency planning, common recruitment, deployment and establishment of resources.

Grand Strategy is the art and science of coordinating and use of instruments of power to achieve security objectives.<sup>327</sup> Grand Strategy is the highest-level connection and primary interface between non-military instruments of power and military establishments. To achieve grand strategy objective there are obstacles to be overcome. Regional strategy demands a regional vision. A regional vision can be defined as that imaginative insight, statesman like foresight or wisdom<sup>328</sup>. It is the ability to imagine how the region or society will develop in future and how to plan in a suitable way. It is a mental imagination of the future by a region's leadership.

Relationships among elements of strategy allow the leadership to continuously plan and debate alternatives of the strategic visions, calculations and risk assessment in order to come up with a consensus course of action. Application of the Strategy therefore

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<sup>327</sup> Drew, D.M and Snow, D.N, *Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems*, Alabama, Air University Press, 1988, p 16.

<sup>328</sup> Gaston C. J. *Grand Strategy and the Decision Making Process*, National Defense University Press, 1992 Washington D.C.

involves the mobilization of all the instruments of national power to yield specific, well-defined outcomes. Strategic outcomes would be derived from regional interests. These are defined in terms of geographical and historical circumstances, physical security, economic well-being, promotion of values, policy choices and an interface between two or more of either strategic leadership and/ or strategic practice<sup>329</sup>. The strategic leadership provides vision and focuses on command by exploiting peer leadership skills and inspiration. In the latter, the leader develops a profound understanding of levels of strategy required and their inter-relationships. He creates 'what-if' scenarios to predict gains and losses in alternative strategies, and pools strategic thought from inter-agency and joint guidance. He also develops and executes strategic plans by applying ends, ways and means, and by using strategic force if necessary.

There is an imminent debate as to whether the East African Community leadership has a regional vision or not. This is attested by the absence of a Regional Security Framework. The regions security interests should alternate around issues that guarantee continued survival, integrity and well being of its citizens. The regional security strategy should reflect the regional interests. Regional security policy avails a mechanism to attain the regional interest. Regional interests include core interests, which are regional self-assertion, territorial integrity and sovereignty, promotion of regional values, environmental conservation, promotion of science and technology, economic development, promotion of equity and promotion of democracy and good governance. Other interests include improving the quality of life of the citizens, upholding the constitutional order, protection and promotion of human rights,

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<sup>329</sup> Ibid

promotion of regional cooperation, maintenance of good international relations, promotion of peaceful dissolution of conflicts, enhancing regional cohesion, maintenance of stability, law and order. The regional grand strategy will be a combination of various sector strategies.

The specific views of persons in national security organs must be taken aboard in the formulation of the regional security framework. Some of the important issues of security that raise political temperatures include roles of the regional security organs, regional security command structures, decisions on force structure, dependability, funding and the question of loyalty. These are of course valid questions and require careful considerations to ensure that each member state feels sufficiently secure. Critical issues like sovereignty, intervention, deployment and tasking mechanisms, alliances outside the regional framework and support from foreign forces, the decision making process, regional force distribution and responsibility for federal state security apparatus require consensus.

The regional security framework will need to address domestic socio-political and economic forces, disparate democratic practices, structural issues of military hierarchy, legality and legitimacy; legislation processes and mobilisation of popular support domestically. Of particular importance are economic issues concerning financial responsibility for the force, as well as responsibility for equipping, training and support. To achieve the above, strong leadership is needed to promote acceptability, responsibility and self-sacrifice, in order to shift egoism, style and orientation of

political leaders to accept the proposal. These issues have been the major hindrances to regional security consensus<sup>330</sup>.

#### **4.5.1. Mitigating Factors for a Regional Security Framework**

The main strength of East African Community integration is the common history of the member countries. Having been all colonised by the British they therefore inherited common basic system of public organisation of government. All the three countries have a relatively common culture with ethnic communities across borders. The geo-strategic position of the states is similar and the physical geography is very similar. They share one common language Kiswahili and use English as the medium of official communication. They also share common concerns and by extension should have common real and perceived threats and common aspiration.

Most of the current regional security threats are common to all and should be seen to present an opportunity for formulation of a regional security framework. The immediate gain from security integration is a guarantee for peace and stability in the region. A regional security framework will result into reduced national expenditure on security due to; first the reduced threat from each other and secondly the combination of security organs. The common historical heritage provides an opportunity to combine the regional security resources without expending much of national revenues.

In human security context economic gains will accrue from prosperity resulting from free trade in the larger market composed of the combined population, employment and job creation from the combined labour market, and the bargaining power created in the

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<sup>330</sup>Mwagiru. *Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi,

world forums. Greater opportunities will exude from the bigger share in the globalised world trade resulting from the broader diversity of goods on offer. Globalisation and liberalisation will have reduced negative effects on the member states. In effect the immediate security threats will be easier to confront. Integration will increase the ability to ward off external interference from the strong international military and economic powers. Integration will lead to barring free access and manipulation of each of the three countries and will reinforce greater bargaining power of the Community states. This will drastically degrade the big powers ability to manipulate the states economy to their advantage.

The main difficulties in regional security framework are the development of sufficient trust and consensus. Due to past ideologies of the EAC states, ideology becomes a major hurdle. However this has considerably waned after Tanzania adapted capitalist system of economic management. First-image analysis for the Heads of States is important particularly because of their role in foreign policy formulation. Political leadership in EAC must be convinced that a regional security framework is a public good for the Community. Domestic ethnicity is still a major concern especially in Uganda and Kenya. Industrialization level and economic development levels are in favour of Kenya but this has been solved through the signing of the Customs Union recently. Individual national external ties with other countries and organisations outside the community will require harmonisation, particularly matters concerning security. Affiliation to different economic integration schemes such as SADC, COMESA and IGAD bring problems in the regional security framework and will require consensus. All the three nations have varying degrees of foreign debts, which must be addressed. There is major disparity in the levels and forms of education for the three countries,

which must be harmonised to facilitate free movement of labour and ease common approach to capacity building programmes.

#### **4.5.2. Coordination in Regional Security Framework**

Coordination will be involved in resource allocation/strategic management, performance audit, ensuring decision makers are abreast with issues to make informed decisions, coordinate and integrate different actors policy makers, platform for long range planning giving regional policy a regional security outlook, rationalise the different image of the external environment - who to concentrate on, formulation and execution of a regional foreign and security policy and promote pluralist thinking .The regional GS must provide security in four main areas namely; the individual citizen, the states, the legal regimes and the region. The selection of regional interest is a contested process with several issues competing for inclusion in the strategy formulation. There are many actors who represent various interests. For instance within the regional government there are several ministries; the Departments of Defence (DOD), Ministries of Foreign affairs and finance, the Attorney General's offices (AG), and many more depending on the interest at in question.

Other actors with special interests could come from the private sector, the civil society, the media or the Non Governmental Organisation (NGOs). The coordination office should be available to coordinate all these actors<sup>331</sup>. Prioritisation becomes necessary in the determination of vital regional interests. Evolution and evaluation of the Grand Strategy (GS) require coordination. The coordination office should be available to preside over this process. Coordination in the formulation of the GS is necessary for the

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<sup>331</sup> Mwagiru. *Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi. p136.



above reasons. The achievement of the GS requires Long Range Planning (LRP). The coordination office provides the forum for LRP and its implementation.

It is therefore necessary that a coordination office for the regional Security Framework be established. The office should be high enough in the hierarchy to be able to interact easily with all stakeholders including the Heads of States. It should however be autonomous and independent of the member states to prevent interference or preferential treatment of some states. The office should be have sufficient powers to enjoy security of tenure in order to provide continuity and protection from regime change. The responsibilities of this office will include strategic decision making and prioritisation of resource allocation, performance audit of the states, custodian of information necessary for decision makers, coordinate and integrate different actors' points of view, provide forum for LRP, rationalise the different images of the internal and external environment and finally to promote pluralist approach in decision making.

#### **4.5.3. Criteria for Regional Force Structuring**

Because of the need for efficiency, force structure the world over is designed in accordance to media of the operations. The army is structure to operate on land while the air force and the navy operate in the air and the sea respectively. Division of labour and specialisation is constant feature in force structuring. Development of diverse weapons systems has had great influence in differentiating various military units. Need for support in prolonged military engagements created a specialised military branch called the logistics, whose responsibility is the maintenance of military formations in war with supplies. Leadership, command and management of forces is paramount.

In the East Africa region the Armed Forces are designed, modelled and constructed in the image of the British imperial forces of the colonial system. The philosophy of the force structure is based on the primacy of the state as the main actor in the international system and the chief guarantor of peace possessing the ultimate threat (war). In East Africa, armed forces are specifically designed to deal with conventional external threats although without varying their equipment holding or tactics they have the ability to deal with internal security threats to restore law and order. For this reasons the forces have a secondary role of aid to civil authorities. This aspect has been used and misused both during and after the colonial period.

The East Africa Security infrastructure consists of the armed forces consisting the army, the air force and the navy with their specialised support systems composed of the logistic support, the intelligence system and all the inherent integral administrative components. In the three East Africa countries, the military systems are subordinate to the respective political government with the Head of State as the commander in chief (CinC). The CinC wields exceptionally high power in national security decisions on the use and deployment of the armed forces. This is seen in the placing of the department of defence direct in the President's office.

#### **4.5.4. Suggested Structure of the Regional Security Framework**

The success of a security framework in an integration process presupposes actor consensus on the three fundamental principles of sovereignty, independence and non-interference<sup>332</sup>. This consensus is more likely to be obtained when the perceived level of threat to the state in absence of regional security framework is higher than the

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<sup>332</sup> Mwangi. *Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region* in Mwangi, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi. p135.

immediate quest for survival as an entity. The NATO had the Soviet Union threat as the *raison d'eta* for integration. The treaty for the envisaged regional security framework for East African Community must have mechanisms for dealing with three types of security concerns, those emanating from outside the integrated block, those presenting themselves from internal domestic conflicts threatening a legitimate government and those crisis generated by a member state government that are considered gross violations of the agreed norms. Dealing with the last type of conflict will normally be the most contentious because it challenges the behaviour of the political actors. This means that the setting up of conditions for interventions should be under-girded by a careful and very specific definition of norms whose violation will lead to reaction by the security institutions so set. The past gives a guide to some of the situations that must be safeguarded against. For example the integrated bloc should not tolerate genocide. Nation state crises of a magnitude likely to result into state collapse should be arrested at the earliest. Gross resource deprivation and marginalisation of communities in a given state should be debated to forestall escalation into insurgency.

Creation of common security framework involves formation of institutions and careful design of structures that outlast regimes and create mutual confidence in them. Potent structures can be based on three tier rotary command. The top tier (East African Supreme Military Command) should be occupied by the state Presidents being regarded as the Council of CinCs and should have rotary chairmanship. This would act as the top decision making organ of the Security Council. The Council of national Chiefs of Defence (East African High Council) would occupy the second tier and would assume the role of threat assessment, evaluation, force tasking and advice to the Supreme Military Command. It would also have a rotary chairmanship and to create more

confidence the chairman should not come from the same state as the chairman of the Supreme Military Command.

The third tier would be a permanent Military Command Headquarters manned by the East African Military Commander who will have at his disposal a given number of operational units dispersed in various states. He shall be appointed on rotary basis from the member states forces. He shall act autonomously on tasking from the Supreme Military Command through the chairman of the High military Council. The lowest tier will consist of a territorial force whose task would be to deal with selected threats that are rated lower than the regional threats. The forces shall remain under command of the military hierarchy in the individual states with tasking from respective Heads of States. These forces should be so designed that they can provide reinforcement where need be to the regional force.

This kind of structure presupposed a great deal of consensus building and will require a build-up phase to create. During this build up phase it is important that consideration be given to economic pay back system designed to mitigate non-military threats. This will enable the forces to contribute in lessening of other softer security threats of productive nature. They include infrastructure development, cohesion building in form of youth training, environmental protection activities and even involvement in pilot agricultural projects especially in marginal areas. They could also help in regional management of water resources and national parks.

#### **4.5.5. The Continental and IGAD Regional Security Initiative**

Sub- regional cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security has become a key feature of the current security regime in Africa. New conflicts are likely to arise in regard to shared natural resources like water and pasture<sup>333</sup>. The past performance of the OAU in the management and general response to conflicts in the region were largely inadequate. It had limited success in ending civil wars that have created poverty, mass displacement and deaths not only in the Horn of Africa but also in the continent as a whole<sup>334</sup>. It is premature to speculate whether the African Union will address continental conflicts successfully. However, there are positive indicators in that when the new African Union was formally established in September 2001, among its main objectives was to harmonize the economic and political policies of African states in or to improve pan-African welfare, and provide Africans with a solid voice in international affairs<sup>335</sup>.

The AU also created a security council. Prominent among its objectives is the establishment of the peace and security council of the African Union<sup>336</sup>. Secondly, the Security Council is aimed at anticipating and preventing conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it shall be responsible for peace making and peace building<sup>337</sup>. The need to quickly restore peace and security in the event of armed conflict has resulted in the establishment of joint military formations in all sub-regions to respond to needy situation<sup>338</sup>. Recently IGAD established a framework for

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<sup>333</sup>Chweya, L. Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 37.

<sup>334</sup>Hiteng, C. O. *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 14.

<sup>335</sup>Ibid p 15.

<sup>336</sup>Ibid p 15.

<sup>337</sup>Ibid pp 15.

<sup>338</sup>Chweya, L. Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp 33.

cooperation in the military sphere. Under this framework IGAD has advanced further in establishment of the eastern African standby brigade (EASBRIG).

The EASBRIG initiative is part of Africa standby force of the African union (AU) to operate under Article 4(b) and (j) of the AU constitutive Act whereby the AU is the actual authority and in turn derives its mandate from the chapter IV of the UN charter<sup>339</sup>. The United States has been a major financier of both AU and IGAD responses to insecurity in the Horn of Africa region. More recently, the US has been active in ensuring that African states can have the capacity to tackle conflicts situations and combat international terrorism. In the mid 1990s the US was instrumental in funding the African crisis response initiative (ACRI), which has since changed to African contingency operations training assistance<sup>340</sup>.

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<sup>339</sup> Ibid p 33.

<sup>340</sup> Hiteng, C. O. *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa* in Mwagiru, M. ed. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya. 2004. pp16.

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