

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS)

A research paper on:

**"THE SOMALI CONFLICT AND ITS SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS TO THE HORN OF AFRICA
BETWEEN 1990 AND 2004."**

A research report submitted to IDIS in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the award of a Post Graduate Diploma in Strategic
Studies.

Presented by

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
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DECLARATION.

I **SAMUEL AMBANI WAMWAYI** do hereby declare that this research report is my original work and has never been submitted for any award in any university, higher institution of learning or military academy.

The views and opinions expressed in this Project Paper are solely of the researcher and do not reflect the official position of the University of Nairobi, Defence Staff College, Kenya Navy or the Department of Defence Kenya.

Signed: 

Date: 26 September 2025

Why repeat yourself fool.
Ammoniti & tautology fool.
tautology ≠ specificity

APPROVAL.

This research report has been under my supervision and is now ready for submission to the Board of Examiners of the University of Nairobi with my approval.

Signed: *Anita Kiaraba*

Ms Anita Kiaraba

*She is not a doctor!
She is not even married!
She should supervise you.*

Date: *28* September 2005

- Her marriage status is inconsequential
- I second that she is not a doctor.

ABSTRACT.

This paper is set to analyze Somalia as a collapsed state between 1990 and 2004 and explore the protracted conflict situation despite diverse conflict management efforts in the relatively homogeneous community. The Somali people live in an egalitarian society and are inherently individualistic with little regard for amorphous communal authorities and initiatives. This study wishes to connect this view with elements of capitalists' modernity, which includes urbanism, individualism, and private enterprise in fierce competition for survival. It is interesting to try attributing this to reasons why no solution has been reached considering that 14 conferences have so far been held about the Somalia Peace process. Thus, is the Westphalian nation-state still relevant to the individualistic society?

Identifying key issues and actors pertinent to the conflict and review is to be tried. Further interrelations between these actors and interested parties are conflict prone and this as expected adversely impacts on security concerns of the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa region is in the process of regional security co-operation through IGAD initiatives that conform to setting the ultimate environment for global security. The Somalia conflict has a spill over effect that frustrates these security initiatives and sets issues that require to be addressed urgently and collectively. Internationalization of conflict recognizes the spill over effect of conflict and resultant security implications in the Horn of Africa. Should IGAD initiate moves through the recently established CERWARN (Conflict Early Warning System) mechanism to identify potential sources of insecurity and to facilitate collective and timely pre-emptive action?

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

A number of institutions and individuals were directly involved in the process of undertaking this study. While it is not possible to acknowledge the roles played by every individual or group, special mention goes to the Defence Staff College for designing this stimulating study environment.

My research supervisor Ms Anita Kiamba deserves credit for her tireless effort in helping me put my thoughts about Somalia together. Profound gratitude is also extended to my colleagues in DSC Course 21/05 for their ever present drive to push on whenever things got tough.

I am especially indebted to all those whom I held informal discussions in different places and particularly Dr Henry Matukho Wamwayi who thinks that Somalia has some of the most enterprising people on earth.

DEDICATION.

I dedicate this research report to my **Mum and Dad**, my wife **Mrs.Elizabeth Waliaula Wamwayi**, and my stars **Sharon and Joseph** who have always made me smile despite the distance between us. May the Almighty God bless you all.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
ASF	African Standby Force
CERWRN	Conflict Early Warning System
CIA	Criminal Investigation Agency
EASBRIG	Eastern Brigade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICG	International Crisis Group
IGAD	Inter Governmental Agency for Development
IGADD	Inter Governmental Authority on Draught and Desertification
EU	European Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NSC	National Salvation Council
NFD	Northern Frontier Districts
OAU	Organization of African Union
PSC	Peace and Security Council
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SSA	Somali Salvation Alliance
SPLM	Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement
SPLA	Sudan Peoples Liberation Army
SRRC	Somali Restoration Reconciliation Council

SYL	Somali Youth League
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UN	United Nations
USC	United Somali Congress

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THE SOMALI CONFLICT AND ITS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS TO THE HORN OF

AFRICA BETWEEN 1990 AND 2004

CHAPTER ONE: DYNAMICS OF THE SOMALIA CONFLICT BETWEEN 1990 AND 2004.

1.0. Introduction

Somalia and the Somali people are a mystery to much of the world. How can the Somalis have journeyed to the eve of the 21st century and have no modern state, no laws, no government, no courts, no taxes, no social services, no trash collection, no public schools, no post office, no official currency, no means to settle defaulted business contracts, no public health system, and no police? Do they exist, as Robert Kaplan in “The Coming Anarchy” would have us believe, in the depths of anarchy or even nihilism? There are many opinions about Somali identity and some questions remain unanswered to date.

Are the Somalis an entrepreneur dream? How can there be rudimentary yet efficient local banks, private phone systems which are more efficient and cheaper than any other system in Africa, private clinics and schools springing up all over the country and new Somali-owned airlines flying regularly into the larger cities, keeping generally reliable schedules?¹

Or are the Somalis the last of the great outlaw nations? They expelled the United States and other external militaries and the United Nations between 1993 and 1995. Crimes of violence go unpunished and no known alliances work to maintain the uncertain balances of power among factions. The arms trade flourishes in Somalia, with automatic weapons and light assault ordnance readily available for sale in most of the larger towns and generally finding way to other parts of Africa and beyond.

Will Somalia turn out to be the environmental nightmare that panics the entire globe? Asian and European companies are reported to be dumping toxic waste off the Somali coast as others plunder the Somali fishing grounds. Rangelands are overgrazed with little restraint because no one is in charge of water or pasture access. Wind erosion and deforestation in some parts of the former nation are among the most severe in the world.

Are the Somalis simply a peace-loving and innocent people who suffer the abuse of power-hungry, capricious leaders playing international agencies against one another? Is the impasse among Somali factions perpetuated by ambitious leaders who receive unprecedented attention in the media and expense-paid travel to peace conferences in comfortable hotels around the world as they enjoy power and attention far beyond the fruits of their own labors?

Or on the other hand are the Somalis models of a new, decentralized, participatory, and democratic future for Africa? Are they the first to incorporate traditional law and governance into modern economic structures? Are they the leading African nation to encourage women groups and to recognize specific formal authority for women in commerce, reconciliation, and peacekeeping? Are Somalis breaking new ground in localizing planning, decision making, monitoring, and accountability in water development, agriculture, credit, health services, livestock management, and export promotion?

Somehow all of these queries contain elements of truth. The task is to identify which voices represent the most important aspects of what is happening in Somalia and how a Somali leadership, working with external facilitators, can create an environment in which peace and security in the Horn of Africa can return. How economic growth can blossom, human rights and social equity prevail, and the productivity of Somalia's cultures and natural resources be sustained.

¹ Hussein Adam, Richard Ford Web Sight collections: Removing Barricades in Somalia: Options for Peace and Rehabilitation. Peaceworks: US Institute of Peace




Fig 1. Map of Somalia.²

1.1. Problem Statement

This paper is set to analyze Somalia as a collapsed state between 1990 and 2004 and explore the protracted conflict situation despite diverse conflict management efforts in the relatively homogeneous community. The reason why no solution has been reached so far is of premium importance considering that 14 conferences have so far been held about the Somalia Peace process.

The paper is also set to identify key issues and actors pertinent to the conflict and review how their interrelations affect measures to reconstitute Somalia. Further interrelations between these actors and interested parties are conflict prone and this as expected adversely impacts on security concerns of the Horn of Africa.

² "Nation-State," *Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2000*. © 1993-1999 Microsoft Corporation.

The Horn of Africa region is in the process of regional security co-operation through IGAD initiatives that conform to setting the ultimate environment for global security. The Somalia conflict has a spill over effect that frustrates these security initiatives and sets issues that require to be addressed urgently and collectively.

1.2. **Objectives of the Study**

1. To examine the Somalis' nature of individualism and its effects on interpersonal relations.
2. To examine actors within the Somali people and interests in the region.
3. To review efforts of reconstitution of Somalia and security challenges in the Horn of Africa.

1.3.0. **Justification of the Study**

1.3.1. **Academic**

The Somali people live in an egalitarian society and are inherently individualistic with little regard for amorphous communal authorities and initiatives. This study sets to connect this view with elements of capitalists' modernity, which includes urbanism, individualism, and private enterprise in fierce competition for survival. Thus, is the Westphalian nation-state still relevant to the individualistic society?

Actors and interested parties in the Somalia conflict have used this arena for a long time and matured to profiteers in the emergent system. Solutions advanced to manage this conflict are typical one fit all paradigms in the international system. Can Somalia be addressed as a unique emergent system which is at equilibrium with itself?

1.3.2. Policy.

An attempt should be made to harness individualism and entrepreneurship in the Somali community that seems to operate within the liberal flow of goods and services without state inhibitions.

Somalia has been isolated as a nation in the international realm due to its collapsed status. Somalis have however been seen to still function without state ties. It is in this context that the regional cooperation with the stateless nation should be considered. Neo-realism recognizes non-state actors as participants in international relations and hence Somalia factions and groupings should be incorporated in the international system as non-state actors.

Internationalization of conflict recognizes the spill over effect of conflict and resultant security implications in the Horn of Africa. IGAD should initiate moves through the recently established CERWARN (Conflict Early Warning System) mechanism to identify potential –sources of insecurity and to facilitate collective and timely pre-emptive action.³ In this respect, IGAD should lead frontline states to establish frontiers with Somalia as a measure to stem the conflict spill over effect from far distance.

1.4.0. Literature Review

The literature will be reviewed under four sub-headings: Somalis' nature of individualism and its effects on interpersonal relations, literature on collapsed states, literature on conflicts, paradigms of security against internal and external threat created by the Somalia conflict and dynamics of the peace and state reconstitution measures.

³ Ibid

1.4.1. Somalis' nature of individualism and its effects on interpersonal relations

The common statement on colonial legacy as instrumental towards collapse of the civil society and to the Somalia state is lame when we study the Somali people. The simple logic is that the colonial powers partitioned Somalia due to nomadic pastoral activities of its people. These people initially did not have a centralized authority and a hierarchical structure in society. The Somalis had an egalitarianism system where every man (though not woman) had a right to a say in communal matters. Settlement of disputes was through an informal legal contract called the *Xeer*. Issues were discussed in the institutionalized "*shir*" which I M Lewis defines as:

"the fundamental of government, which has no formal constitution, except that of membership of the lineage concerned, no regular place or time of meeting, and there are no official positions on it."⁴

Thus during the late 1930s to 1960s lineage politics were manipulated to serve the political needs of the colonizers. A new form of hierarchy was introduced, and chiefs, called *akhils*, were appointed by the colonial administration to represent and speak for the clan lineages. The colonialist further attempted to bring order by posting chiefs as community leaders who would arbitrate over issues and represent people's wishes and aspirations to authorities. This is a system, which the civilian government at independence inherited but misused, and also a system that Siad Barre discarded and with his ouster, clearly no semblance of authority was left behind.

Looking at the history of Somalia people and their traditional institutions, it is interesting to theorize that due to its single mono-ethnic mono-cultural background, Somalia had been a nation long before it became a state. This heritage offered a good chance to establish a strong and

harmonious state. The fact is that Somalis have very strong clan loyalties that transcend nationalistic feelings. Conversely it is evident though that Somalis only exhibit solidarity against external threats but quickly become antagonistic when the external threat has vanished.

A closer look traces the Somali society to two brothers Soomaal and Sab. From the lineage of Soomaal the Dir, Daarood, Isaaq and Hawiye clans are descents. The Rahanweyn and the Digil are the descendants of Sab. Besides these six clans are the smaller communities of Wa-Gosha, the Reer Shabbelle, the Shiidie and the Goobwayn who are all of Bantu descent.

Relatively speaking, the Cushitic Somali people are one of the most culturally, linguistically and religiously homogenous groups in the world, yet divided along clan lines, with the five principle clans being the Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, Darod and Rahanweyn including Digil and Merile; Swahili and Bantu minorities are concentrated in the farming areas of the South. The predominant religion in Somalia is Islam.

⁴ I M Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy. (London: 1961) p 38




Fig. 2 The Somali Clan Structure

The Somalis racial inheritance from Cushietic ancestry and their genetic make up suggests inherent aggressive tendencies that are easily triggered when survival is at stake as portrayed in the Biological theories of conflict. War and feud occur constantly in Somalia and constitute a further hazard to the pastoralists in their movement. In an arid environment in which overgrazing is general and where the human and stock population press heavily upon the sparse resources available, there is constant competition for access to pasture and water and frequent lineage strife.⁵ Though conflict is a universal phenomenon, many scholars portray the Somali inter-clan conflict as centered on feuds in order to injure or eliminate the hostile clan, to seek revenge, to reverse wrongs, and to protect its rights over resources.

“Many social scientists believe that much of the conflict arises out of fear of imagined threats, and that the stuff of social conflict is misunderstanding. A situation may develop into what social scientist call autistic hostility, that is when people lacking information about others fail to understand the reasoning behind the others’ actions. The rival group thus commits atrocities and justifies its actions based on wrong premises. Worse, both rival sides come to see themselves as well intentioned and in the right, and their enemy as mistaken and threatening. This may help to explain the horror which followed in the wake of the fall of Siad Barre in January 1991 and subsequent failure and collapse of the Somali state.”⁶

⁵Lewis I M, Marriage and the Family in Northern Somaliland. Kampala: East African Institute of Social Research; Uganda 1962 p 6

⁶ Issa-Salwe M Abdisalam, The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy (London. Haan Publishing, 1996) p 7

Could this offer light in seeking management of their protracted conflict situation that sets to achieve some balance in anarchy?

1.4.2 Literature on Collapsed States

The classical definition of a State as given in Webster's Concise Encyclopaedia is:

"An association which, acting through law as promulgated by a government endowed to this end by coercive power, maintains within a community territorially demarcated, the universal external conditions of social order".

There are four essential elements in this definition that is: that people have formed an association to create and preserve social order; that the community comprising the State is clearly defined in territorial terms; that the government representing the people acts according to promulgated laws; and that it has power to enforce these laws. Simply put, a State has citizens, it occupies a distinctive territory, and it has a central authority, (the internal sovereignty), which upholds the law and implements political decisions –politically (legally) independent of the outside world (the external sovereignty). In the realm of international relations, states are the main actors recognized in the international system. Somalia is seen as a case of failed states and this paper examines it within the theoretic framework of failed states.

The Somalia state collapse has made Somalis to live without a state for a long time and hence denied them some basic needs in life. During the heydays of the nation-state, the state was seen world wide as to serve three related functions in society.

"First, the nation state was the framework for organizing socio economic development, that is planning, directing and safeguarding development initiatives and outcomes. Secondly, the state

was the organizational frame for pursuit for peace and security against external aggression and attack. Thirdly, the state was a basis for social and cultural identity and a framework for expression of both nationhood and nationalism.”⁷

Max Weber defined the state as the organization, which successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.⁸ Here, the state is seen as a organization in society which can inflict sanctions without risk of disavowal and can disavow sanctions by others. The state is absent in Somalia and hence there is no single entity with monopoly of legitimate use of coercion.

On a broader scale, there are many factors that explain the state of affairs in the Horn of Africa. First, like other newly independent states in the continent, these countries have been faced with several dilemmas of consolidating the state. The extent to which the states in contemporary Africa have become a source of conflict has been subject of debate for a long time both continentally and globally. In IR today, there is a more immediate recognition that in contemporary Africa, the primary challenge to state sovereignty comes from particular models of exercising, social power, particularly its mode of governance and style of leadership.⁹ From colonial intrusions and the African responses, for example, emerged a unique linkage under colonialism between bureaucratic authoritarian, patronage and clientelism, and ethnic fragmentation and competition.¹⁰ Thus, some scholar argue that the crises in the continent have emerged over time because of patterns of political practice that led to growing dysfunction of the state as an instrument of organizing and exercising power, counter productive efforts to “squeeze the peasantry” and the unproductive buildup of wealth in the hands of the ruling strata.¹¹ Berman adds that the continuity of these institutions, power

⁷Ludeki Chweya, Globalisation and African Foreign Security Policy: Paper presented at the International Conference on Globalisation and Foreign Policy held at the University of Nairobi. February 17-18, 2004.

⁸ Max Weber, ‘Essay in Sociology’, in De Jasay A; *The State*: (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1985) p 78.

⁹ Cirino Hiteng Ofufo: Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa, in *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004). Edited by Makumi Mwagiru p 10

¹⁰ Bruce J Berman, *Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State* (1998) p 309.

¹¹ Quoted in Jenny Pearce, Peace Building in the Periphery: Lessons from Central America. *Third World Quarterly* 20, No 1 (1999) p 53.

relations and identities in post colonial states has shaped the particular character of state-society relations in Africa and the politics of the belly. The Africa post-colonial states, however is much more vulnerable and the ruling elite can no longer exploit superpower rivalry to shore up the government.¹²

The analysis depicts Somalia's story that included the colonial abuse and creation of inhibiting structures in society. The post colonial politics further alienated society by use of the authoritarian rule of Siad Barre who exploited the superpower rivalry to swing his country from left to right and in the process consolidated his power and misrule of Somalia. A classic case of effects of the collapse of the bipolar world order was in Somalia as the weak and unjust system could not resist the resentment it had created without external support.

Somalia status as a collapsed or failed state has been from 1990 to 2004. During this period, the world has seen dynamic changes in how the 'state' relates to the society with a growing trend towards loosening of state created inhibitions in societal relations. The mood of liberalization is global and the boundaries of societal needs are progressively being opened in the name of globalization.

This current trend toward globalization is directly, an antithesis of statism. The advent of globalization is an assault on the state in all the three spheres of its activities i.e. Economy, Political and Security. A study of Somalia through the years of 1990 to 2004 has seen semblance of functions of human activities without the state being in place. These functions like those propagated by globalization identify the inadequate capacity of states to lead the pursuit of development and safeguard the socio-economic security of citizens.

¹² Cirino Hiteng Ofufo: Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa, in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation. (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004). Edited by Makumi Mwangi p 10

A question lingers in my mind whether the reconstitution of Somalia while considering globalization issue is an effort to reverse the wheel of time.

1.4.3 General Literature on Conflict.

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff define the term conflict as referring to a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings is in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible goals.¹³

Zartman argues that implicit meaning of conflict is the incompatibility that is inherent in multi-issue and multiparty situations.¹⁴ The explicit definition of the term refers to the violent stage or expression of that incompatibility. P. Godfrey Okoth¹⁵ simplifies the definition of conflict as just an issue between or among parties

Mwagiru, et al¹⁶ take the same line of conflict definition and contend that conflict exists where people have incompatible goals and each believe that their point of view is the correct one.

Whether conflict is necessary or not is a matter of debate between the conflict scholars.

Zartman describes conflict as an inevitable aspect of human interaction. This notion is also shared with Mwagiru, et al who argue that provided that conflict is not dysfunctional (Harmful conflict for instance violence) it can be beneficial to us – for when there is a conflict it helps us to realize that things are going wrong in our relationships.¹⁷

¹³ Cited in Hassan Farah Shirwa's MA Dissertation, The Sub –Regional Management of an Internal Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of Diibouti Peace Initiative in the Somali Conflict. (University of Nairobi, October 2001) p 6.

¹⁴ I. William Zartman, Conflict Resolution: Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa. Francis M Deng / I. William Zartman (eds), Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institutions, 1991)

¹⁵ P. Godfrey Okoth, Conflict in Contemporary Africa (Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2000) p.1

¹⁶ Mwagiru, M, Munene, M. and Karuru. N. Understanding Conflict and Its Management: Some Kenyan Perspectives (Nairobi: CCR-WLEA, 1998) p 5

¹⁷ Ibid. p 4

Deng and Zartman¹⁸ argue that conflicts in Africa have many underlying causes: incomplete nation building, differences in identities derived from ethnicity, religion, culture and language, economic and competition for limited resources, political demands that exceed state capabilities. The categorization of these conflicts as either domestic or international is now widely disputed. They may have both domestic and external sources. Deng and Zartman point out that internal conflicts get internationalized through external patronage. They argue that, although African power to pursue conflict is limited, additional power comes from outside. This is an important characteristic of African conflicts. Internal insurgencies frequently build ties with neighboring states to gain access to safe havens and military resources, thereby internationalizing a conflict that originated in domestic environment¹⁹ External sources of power are activated primarily through alliances for political support and through arms for military. Internal insurgents have to build external ties for patronage.

1.4.4 Dynamics of the Peace and State Reconstitution Measures.

This section reviews the literature, which highlights some relevant facts to Somalia's peace process. It pinpoints, among other things, the interests of the external as well as internal actors and the causes of the failure of the various peace initiatives.

Some of the interests in the Somali peace process are highlighted by some writers like Ahmed Yusuf who argues that countries in the Greater Horn region and in Africa (Ethiopia, Egypt, Djibouti, Kenya and Sudan) and Gulf states (Yemen, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates) all have interests and try to influence events unfolding in Somalia.²⁰ Cirino Hiteng raises two important security concerns in the

¹⁸ Francis M Deng / I. William Zartman (eds), Conflict Resolution in Africa op cit p 4-5

¹⁹ I. William Zartman: Ripe for Resolution Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1989) p 7

²⁰ Ahmed Yusuf, Assessing Reconciliation Initiatives by the Transitional National Government (TNG) after the Arta Peace Process in Richard Ford, Hussein Adam and Edna Adan (eds), War Destroys, peace Nurtures (NJ, The Red Sea Press, Inc. 2004) p 131-132

Horn of Africa; the proliferation of light weapons; and the influx of refugees and the uncontrolled movement of the people across the porous borders from one country to another.²¹

The International Crisis Group (ICG) argues that Egypt perceives a strong, unified Somali state can support her strategically in her perennial dispute with Ethiopia over the waters of the Nile and use Somalia as a counterweight to Ethiopia influence in the Horn.²² Stedman also argues that strategic concerns inform Ethiopia's military incursions into Somalia. Ethiopia is a Christian enclave surrounded by Arab countries and fear that Somalia serves as a base for armed groups opposed to her.²³

Ethiopia's interest in Somalia is traceable to the history of the two countries. Indeed both Menelik II and Emperor Haile Selassie annexed portions of Somalia. Ethiopia shares a 2000-km border with Somalia, which explains its strategic concerns for security. It has been argued that internal wars have a regional effect through a spill over effect. Thus Ethiopia needs a neighbor that would be a partner in its security arrangements. An additional factor is that the current Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi took refuge in Somalia for a long time and made friends with some faction leaders whom he would like to see ascend to power like him.

Kenya also shares a 700-1000 km borderline with Somalia. Kenya has suffered highly through the huge numbers of refugees who are a financial burden and a threat to the environment. Further, the war in Somalia has led to an increase in insecurity through the infiltration of small arms into Kenya.²⁴ Thus it is essential that Kenya motivates the Somalia reconstitution to stem these spiral effects of the conflict. The personal reasons for retired President Moi in establishing the Moi

²¹ Cirino Hiteng, *Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation* op cit p.12

²² ICG, *Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State*, Africa Report No 59, 23 May 2002.

²³ Stephen John Stedman, *Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: A Conceptual Framework* in Francis M. Deng/I. William Zartman (eds), *Conflict Resolution in Africa* (Washington D.C: Brookings Institutions, 1991) p. 379.

²⁴ Ochieng Kamudhayi, *The Somali Peace Process, in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Nairobi Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004. Edited by Makumi Mwagiru p 119

Foundation as a conflict management instrument also played a role in Kenya's wish to get involved with the reconstitution of Somalia.

The interests of Uganda are naturally influenced by the fact that once Moi left power, President Museveni considered himself his successor as the regional leader. This, was strengthened by the fact that Museveni took over as the Chairman of the IGAD Summit of the Heads of State and Government, which provided an opportunity for leadership in the region²⁵

Eritrea on its part saw this as a perfect opportunity to settle scores with Ethiopia as the two countries have had a long-standing border dispute. Eritrea sought an alliance to counter Ethiopia's interests and ambitions in the region. While struggling to settle scores it found perfect allies in Djibouti, which bears a personal grudge against Ethiopia, and Uganda whose aim is to scuttle Kenya's ambitions to retain regional supremacy.

→ Although some countries have legitimate concerns to intervene in the Somali conflict, it is apparent that some states did more harm to the peace and stability in Somalia in the name of pursuing their legitimate interests. Mark Bradbury, for instance argues that accusations of terrorism have served to create a permissive environment for regional states to pursue their own agenda in Somalia. Ethiopia in particular has take the opportunity to increase support to anti TNG (Arta Process) forces.²⁶ These abuses of interests were also mentioned by the UN report of the panel of experts mandated to collect information on the violation of arms embargo, which cited several countries namely Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen, Egypt and Libya to have supplied arms to different factions in Somalia. The report states that since the adoption of the Security Council Resolution 733(1992) there have been numerous and regular violations of the arms embargo by outside state

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Mark Bradbury, Somalia: The Aftermath of September 11th and the War on Terrorism. Oxfam report Series. p 18

actors. The report particularly charges that Ethiopia played an overt military role in Somalia and also blames the UN for contributing to a perception that the embargo need not to be taken seriously.²⁷

ICG also contends that IGAD member states have utilized the peace process as an instrument to pursue rival national interests.²⁸ ICG further points out that the best diplomacy in the world, if limited to internal Somali matters, will not succeed because of the deep differences within the region over their objectives in that country.²⁹ It suggests that regional rivalry has played havoc both at peace conferences and inside Somalia. It gives the example of Ethiopian sponsorship of SRRC which has been matched by Djibouti and Arab Patronage of the TNG creating deadlock and causing the peace process to puncture. It also contends that regional tension has often been replicated by political cleavages inside Somalia and that IGAD's crippling divisions have rendered it an inadequate forum for tackling the challenges of conflict resolution in Somalia.³⁰ IGAD's members' failure to enforce the arms embargo has enabled the armed factions to exploit differences within the regional actors to get arms to consolidate their positions. The subsequent proliferation of arms across regional borders is the cost of this negligence.

1.4.5 Insecurity against Internal and External Threat to the Horn of Africa as Created by the Somalia Conflict.

One of the major themes that have emerged in international relations generally, and security studies in particular at the turn of the twenty first century, is that not only is the term 'security' essentially contested, but that it needs to be redefined. This redefinition of the term is intended to capture two issues; the broadening concerns of the concept and content of security; and the special security perspectives of third world – and African states. This latter concern is prompted by the fact

²⁷ Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 2003/233, 25 March 2003

²⁸ ICG, Biting the Somali Bullet, Africa Report No 79, p 18

²⁹ ICG, Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, Africa Report No 45, 23 May 2002.

³⁰ ICG, Biting the Somali Bullet, Africa Report No 79, p 13

that the traditional (Western) understanding of what constitutes security threats to states are not wholly applicable in the African setting where threats to security are conditioned by its different operating environment.³¹

As the title of this paper suggests, the security impact of the Somalia conflict in the Horn of Africa is a central theme to this research. In this regard, I wish to identify some parameters within which security concerns will be addressed.

It is seen that the concept of security has evolved with time and currently there are three standpoints from which security can be defined: Thus from the Realist school of thought, security refers to the state and more specifically, from the absence or presence of threats to the welfare, safety and peace of the state. Realists focus on security of state and absence of external threat rather than internal threat. Specifically, realists emphasize on external military threat and not other threats as key issues to address regarding security in a state. However this state centric perspective has been changed dramatically; it is now not contested that security is not just concerned with state regimes, but also with individuals - and people.

Chweya Ludeki argues that in Africa, the realist approach to security has declined since the August 7 1998 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania. The most immediate threat to security in Kenya today is less from neighboring states than from terrorist organizations that target Nairobi as the hub of international diplomatic and commercial activity in the Horn, Eastern and Central African sub-regions. For example, while Somalia posed a threat to Kenya in the 1960's, today Kenya faces threats from terrorist organizations believed to operate in Somalia, rather than from the 'state' of

³¹ Makumi Mwangi, An Introduction in "African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation". Nairobi Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004. p 1

Somalia. Furthermore, all IGAD member states are today drawn into the US security regime no longer as possible havens of communism, but of anti-US international terrorist organizations.³²

The second concept as propagated by the Idealist school of thought (Liberal school) considers security as an issue to be addressed in consideration of threat to the welfare of society. Idealists view threats to security of society as emanating from non-state actors e.g. terrorists, multi-nationals and generally non-state actors. This threat is not military threat but could be economic, social or cultural. Such threats include threats from Western Institutions through the 'Conspiracy Theory' which points at threats to social, economic and cultural institutions in Africa.

This threat from international institutions has further enhanced the Idealists paradigm of co-operation among states to stem the cross border insecurity, which has moved beyond the state to encompass the wider environments in which the state operates. These enlarged theatres and concerns have encouraged security to be seen within larger, regional contexts. The rationale for this is supplied for the process of internationalization (of national affairs, conflicts and politics), and those of interdependence, including contemporary complex interdependence.³³

The regional perspective to security issues raises fundamental questions about security and foreign policy of individual states in the region; and it also raises questions about the emergence of a regional security and foreign policy, and the content of such a policy. And this in turn focuses attention on the regional institutions that can or – or should – spearhead the emergence of a regional and security policy. It raises fundamental questions about whether the existing regional and sub-

³² Ludeki Chweya, Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region, in "African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation". Op cit, p 33

³³ Makumi Mwangi, An Introduction in "African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation". op cit, p 1

regional organizations in Africa are prepared to spearhead such a debate, and to provide the engine that will drive the emerging regional security and foreign policy.³⁴

IGAD has in practice, brought the different dimensions of security under its mandate. It began with the liberal definition of security before broadening its scope to include what are arguably realist dimensions of security. Indeed, IGAD was originally inaugurated in January 1986 as Inter-Governmental Authority on Draught and Development (IGADD). The Authority was concerned with conventional, realist security issues like armed conflict at a secondary level, as a by-product of security in the socio-economic sphere. The Djibouti Declaration in March 1987 stated that IGAD activities would “further contribute to the creation of a climate of confidence and trust which will promote a policy of dialogue, peace and stability in the region”.³⁵ However the authority had by the end of the first decade broadened its understanding of security, dropped the ‘draught’ in its name in early 1996 to become IGAD, and formally brought the prevention, management and resolution of armed conflicts within its mandate. For example the concept of ‘early warning’ that IGAD used in socio-economic sphere, that is, to refer to the monitoring of climatic conditions especially draught in order to predict it and arrange for ‘food security’ has now been introduced to the sphere of conflict in Conflict Early Warning and Response CERWARN).³⁶

The Human Security school of thought on the other hand is a refinement of the Idealist school and defines security from the standpoint of satisfaction of basic human needs (welfare). From this standpoint, security is presence or absence of threat to the capacity or ability to satisfy basic human needs. These basic human needs include food and nutrition but broadly encompass freedom from hunger, access to clean drinking water and sanitation, decent shelter, education, employment and income, and absence of social strife (conflict).

³⁴ Ibid p 2.

³⁵ IGADD, Report of the First Donors Conference, Djibouti 16-18 March 1987, April 1978, p .4.

Contemporary security concerns in the Horn of Africa emerge from the fact that the nature, dynamics and impact of insecurity in the region are manifest in many ways. In order to comprehensively articulate the present, past security concerns must also be revisited. Since the 1960's Africa has been the site of many of the worlds most deadly conflicts.³⁷ Most of them have been internal conflicts but with profound effects on neighboring sub-regions and the continent as a whole. In the Horn of Africa, Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia have since independence been major destabilizing entities to the neighborhood. The total collapse of the Somali State in the 1990's and the raging war in Sudan have had direct effects on Kenya ad Uganda. Similarly, the political situations in Uganda and Eritrea have added into the instability in the region.³⁸

This state of insecurity in the region has been largely due to the nature of the states. These states had not grasped the security goals from within as demanded by human society school of thoughts, which emphasizes the satisfaction of basic human needs. This ineptness further exposed the states to demands of security against threats to the welfare of society emanates from non-state actors.

Apart from the nature of the states as destabilizing elements the other important source of insecurity in the Horn of Africa has been the contested borders. As early as 1969, Somalia claimed parts of the territory of the Kenyan North Eastern Frontier (Northern Frontier District) and the Ogaden region in Ethiopia.

Security hence underwrites a broad spectrum of human activity which the study will address as well as the security implications of the Somalia conflict to the Horn of Africa region within the parameters of definitions from the three schools of thought. Hence, the term security can be applied

³⁶ Ludeki Chweya, *Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region*, in "African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation". op cit , p 34

³⁷ Gunnar Sorbo and Peter Vale, eds. *Out of Conflict: From War to Peace in Africa*. (Upsalla: Norsdiska Afrikainstitutet, Upsalla, 1997) p 5

to refer to states and non-state actors, including individuals and communities, and to military and non-military aspects of states and societies. Furthermore, the definition suggests that threats to security can have both internal and external sources and solutions. It presupposes the use of strategies that involve cooperation and collaboration by far more than self-regarding state pursuit of power and continual exploration of military options.³⁹

1.5 **Conceptual Framework**

The study intends to address issues raised in the problem statement along a conceptual framework which is based on theories advanced by eminent scholars as follows:

1.5.1 **Biological Theories of Conflict**

Another area of analysis is the Biological theory of conflict where the study of the Somali as a community (man) will be done. Thus in trying to define man (the Somali), we seek to indulge in examining his behavior and conflict in his life as a response to his nature or as response through the environment (nurture) he is exposed to. This debate is basically whether conflict is an inherent part of society and human nature or the environment conditions it. According to the nature view, conflict is a normal and inevitable part of society. It arises because human beings are inherently aggressive and have a natural tendency to try to dominate others and this results in conflict. Biological theories of conflict espouse this view which seeks to describe how human beings are prone to engage in conflict due to their genes which ascribe to competition for survival. Competition has made man develop aggressiveness as an instinct for survival according to the Social Darwinism school of biological theories of human behavior. In his book, *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* (1859), Charles Darwin (1809 – 1882) presented a picture of nature as a battlefield for an

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Ludeki Chweya, *Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region*, An article in “*African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*”. Nairobi Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004. Edited by Makumi Mwangi p 34

unforgiving war of survival in which the fittest survived. The thought and work of Sigmund Freud (1856 – 1939) also support this view. As an illustration, consider his predatory view of human nature presented in *Civilization and its Discontents*:

“Men are not gentle friendly creatures wishing for love, who simply defend themselves when they are attacked, but..... a powerful measure of desire for aggressiveness has to be reckoned as part of their instinctual endowment. The result is that their neighbor is to them not only a possible helper or a sexual object, but also a temptation to them to gratify their aggressiveness to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture him and kill him. Anyone who calls to mind the atrocities of the early migrations, of the invasion of the Hun or the so-called Mongols under Genghis Khan and Tarmalane, of the sacks of Jerusalem by the pious crusaders, even indeed the horrors of the last world war, will have to bow his head humbly before the truth of this view of man”⁴⁰

The Somalis racial inheritance stems from Cushietic ancestry and their genetic make up suggests inherent aggressive tendencies that are easily triggered when survival is at stake. This battle for survival is taking place within a relatively homogeneous community with common ancestry. Could the Social Biology theory about aggressive genes together with Social Darwinism theory of survival for the fittest offer light to the protracted conflict situation that sets to achieve some balance in anarchy?

1.5.2 Realism.

Security implications in the region are felt as far as Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan, Eritrea and even Yemeni. Generally the whole Great Horn of Africa together with global bodies have raised

concerns and tried to initiate Somalia's reconstitution and reconstruction measure but their interests have often been at variance with expectations of Somali's. The realist's theory on states relations recognizes states as selfish in all desires and undertakings and their pursuits of interests are not made on the basis of the collective security interests present but on the basis of narrow national interests and own regime security typical of thoughts implied by the realism theory of international relations.

Daniel Papp defines interests as those values that a given country or institution holds dear. A state's interests are called the national interests, and the methods and actions it employs to achieve the national interests are called national policy⁴¹ However, there are regime and individual interests which are often covered as national interests to serve the regimes and the individuals in power.

Interventions are led by interests in either the conflict or its settlement. According to ICISS,⁴² many observers deem national interests as a necessary condition for a successful humanitarian intervention. For many countries, there is an interest in maintaining solidarity within regional groupings and military alliances. For other countries, international expectations and images remain influential. The foreign policy strategies, priorities and capacities of individual countries are key determinants in discussions by individual governments to participate in robust military missions.

For the purpose of this study, interests are classified into three interwoven categories; those interests of the state actors like Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, and those of the organizations like IGAD, UN and AU, and those interests pursued by individual actors like presidents of the countries that host peace processes are mainly security and humanitarian related interests. Organizations also pursue image, reputation and strive to fulfill the mandates and objectives which are established. Individual leaders and presidents also desire to achieve publicity, statesmanship and to leave legacies. The three interests are interrelated and none of them can be analyzed in isolation since state

⁴⁰ Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents (London: Hogarth, 1930), p, 86

⁴¹ Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations. Framework for Understanding. 3rd Edition (NY, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994), p 38.

interests are defined by individual leaders and organizations embody the sum of the interests of the states that created them. These interests cut across in the Somali peace process.

1.5.2.1 **External Actors**

Other interested parties or generally interests are represented by actors in this process. The term 'actors' refers to all the participants in the conflict be they mediators or the warring parties. All actors have certain interests in the process, which is what makes them involved in the first place.⁴³ The term refers to individual state, regional international institutions, which had hosted, supported or even sabotaged the peace initiatives. The concept of activities also encompasses those who did not act because by not acting they have influenced certain causes of action in Somali peace process. For the purpose of the peace process, external actors mean:

1. IGAD and its member states (Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan and Uganda).
3. United States and the European Union countries.
4. League of Arab States/Arab countries (i.e. Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Libya and United Arab Emirates).
5. United Nations, European Union and African Union

Are the frontline states in the Horn of Africa good Samaritans to come to rescue Somalia from conflict while at the same time, fearful of the *Pan-Somalism* philosophy held to heart by most Somalis?

1.5.3. **Internationalization of Conflict**

Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter prohibits interference in the internal affairs of states. In respect to this, frontline states have suffered due to spill over of the Somali conflict without taking

⁴² ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001) p 211-212.

remedial action. However, with time, the interdependence of the societies and states in economic, political, social and security concerns have led them to take action through IGAD and this demonstrates the theory of internationalization of conflict and conflict systems. This theory states that internal conflicts turn into international conflicts because of interdependence of international societies which make it impossible to draw a hard and fast line between internal and international conflicts. The kin country syndrome in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti further highlight this concept.

Thus internationalization of conflict means that the previously internal conflicts become endowed with many international characteristics which render it no longer purely internal.⁴⁴ Indeed no analysis of the internal conflict can ignore its external elements as Dunner notes:

“A complete analysis of the internal war must.....take into account the relations of several kinds: first.....there is the purely internal constellation (the split within the country), then the relations of the internal parties to the actors in their surroundings, and finally, the relations between the external actors.⁴⁵

A major actor in the internal conflict is the warlord. Evidence suggests that the commercial livestock trader, the arms merchant and the warlord are increasingly one and the same person.

A warlord has been defined as the leader of an armed band sometimes numbering thousands of fighters, who hold territory locally and act financially and politically in the international system without interference from the state from which he is based.⁴⁶ Warlords operate in three levels of sophistication. At the highest level, they are organized, have extensive transnational relationships and control large swathes of territory. Examples include Charles Taylor in Liberia and the late Jonas

⁴³ Makumi Mwangi, *Community Based Approaches to Conflict in Kenya: Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management* (Nairobi, GTZ, 2001)

⁴⁴ Makumi Mwangi, *Conflicts and Peace in the Horn of Africa: Theoretical and Practical Perspectives*, Presented at the IRG Conference Mombasa, Kenya 6-9 November 1996.

⁴⁵ Dunner, B, *The Intervenor: Lone Wolf or? Co-operation between the Interveners in Civil Wars* (1983) p 197-213: 197 cited in Makumi, *The International Management of Internal Conflicts in Africa: The Uganda Mediation 1985*, A Doctorate Dissertation in International Conflict Analysis, University of Kent, October 1984 p 27.

Savimbi. In his early years John Garang, leader of the SPLA, could have been included in this group. These 'big warlords' accumulate resources mainly through the illegal export of valuable primary resources such as tropical wood, diamonds and ivory and minerals.⁴⁷

The intermediate level of warlord is less organized and does not control significant tracts of territory, although they may be able to operate freely in certain areas His armed band is smaller in size, and his transnational links are weaker although not necessarily insignificant. Such warlords tend to utilize local resources and 'tax' local communities or companies in order to survive. Examples are the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, the Somali warlords in major towns, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and Mayai Mayai in Kivu, both in DRC and the Republic of Congo. The lowest level of sophistication includes businessmen, politicians, traders or local 'strongmen' pursuing predominantly economic objectives. Somalia is dominated by these local strongmen who use clan and sub-clan alliance to operate. They have weak and at best incipient transnational links and do not control any territory. Their armed bands are small in size, not normally paid by the warlords other than the obligatory sustenance allowances and are under limited supervision.⁴⁸

Warlords in these three levels of warlordism make the conflict management process very fluid. Their hierarchy is dynamic and small warlord have been seen to move towards higher levels while conflict agreements are at high levels thus introducing new actors in conflict management processes.

1.5.4. Structural Violence.

Among many paradigms of conflict management taken, I intend to analyze the Structural Violence model as outlined by the Peace Research school of thought. The structural violence

⁴⁶ Hills Alice, 'Warlords, Militia and Conflict in Contemporary Africa: A Re-examination of Terms' Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. No 1, Spring p 35-51.

⁴⁷ Ibid

paradigm recognizes that structures in society prevent individuals from achieving their potential. Are structures in creation of government as introduced by third parties interfering with the equilibrium of forces in Somalia that have achieved a balance of power? Are Somalis not generally happy (Happy Slaves notions) as we even see initially marginalized people e.g. women taking up roles that were prohibited by the Clan structures? Does a conflict exist among the Somalis? Do the Somali pastrolist as well as the man on the street perceive conflict?

1.6. **Methodology**

The research will basically use secondary sources including Books, Publications on the Somali Peace Process, Reports of UN Secretary General and Journals. An endeavor is to be made to secure some primary source eg interviews.

1.7. **Hypotheses**

1. The management of the Somalia conflict will engender security and development in the Horn of Africa.
2. The Horn of Africa is a conflict prone area and *Pan-Somalism* is a threat still seen in advent of a stable Somalia.
3. The Horn of Africa under IGAD initiatives is on the right development track and it is geared to underwrite its own security especially with activation of the EASBRIG.

1.8. **Chapter Outline**

⁴⁸ Osamba J, The Sociology of Insecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditry in North Western Kenya. A Journal of Conflict Resolutions (2, 2000)

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CHAPTER 2: EMERGING FACTORS OF THE SOMALIA CONFLICT AND SECURITY

IMPLICATIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA.

2.0. Introduction

Security implications of the Somali conflict are felt as far as Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, Sudan, Eritrea and even Yemeni in testimony of the theory of internationalization of conflict. Generally the whole Great Horn of Africa together with global bodies have raised concerns and tried to initiate Somalia's reconstitution and reconstruction but their interests have often been at variance with expectations of Somali's. The realist's theory on state relations recognizes states as selfish in all desires and undertakings. Their pursuits of interests are not made on the basis of the collective security interests present but on the basis of narrow national interests and own regime security typical of thoughts implied by the realism theory of international relations. This chapter sets to lay the foundation of the study of the Somali conflict by following through the dynamics of the Pastoral Social and Clan Systems, Pan-Africanism and *Pan-Somalism*, The nation state and its collapse, Change and conflict in the Horn of Africa and subsequently the Security implications in the Horn of Africa.

2.1. The Pastoral Social and Clan Systems.

The challenge today of identifying the dynamics of conflict associated with pastoralism in the Horn of Africa cannot be made without involvement of the Somalia conflict. Thus it is in this respect that some implications of the Somali conflict in the Horn of Africa are to be addressed.

Scattered over a territory nearly 600,000 square kilometers in the northeastern corner of the African continent, the Somali speaking people form one of the largest single ethnic groups in Africa. With a population of nearly eight million, the Somali people are distributed from the Awash Valley

in the north-west, round the periphery of Ethiopian highlands and along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean coast to the Tana River in north-eastern Kenya.

A study of Somalis from the northern region of the Republic depicts the general society of the Somalis which lives in a segmentary lineage organization. Descent is traced patrilineally and through his genealogy (*abtirsiinyo*, 'reckoning of ancestors') each individual has an exact place in society. Patrilineal descent (*tol*) indeed is all pervasive and most corporate activities are subject to it; in the respect of local lineage saints, Islam is interpreted to some extent according to it; and policies stem from it. Everyone is born into a patrilineage, and thereby into a system of highly segmented patrilineal descent groups. The largest effective units are nine patrilineages, which from their size and distinctiveness may conveniently be called 'clans'. These range in population from 20,000 to 130,000. At a higher level of genealogical grouping, these clans are grouped in three larger groups called 'clan families.'⁴⁹ These are the Dir in the west; the Isaaq in the center; and the Darood in the east. Although clan-family membership has political implication, in the traditional structures of society the clan families never act as united corporate groups for they are too large and unwieldy and their members are too widely scattered.

Clan families are segmented agnatically by reference to highest ancestors in their family history whereas, clans are similarly divided into a series of component patrilineages. While to the ancestor of his clan-family a person commonly counts twenty named generations or more, to the apex of his clan he could counts between fifteen and twenty ancestors according to its size. Within the clan the largest most clearly defined subsidiary group can conveniently be termed a 'primary lineage.'

Finally within the segmentation of his primary lineage a person most frequently acts as a member of a '*dia-paying* group,' and this is the basic jural and political unit of northern Somali society. It is a lineage or coalition of a few small lineages tracing descent to a common ancestor

through between four and eight generations. Its male strength ranges from a few hundred to a few thousand. The name *dia-paying* group which has become standard administrative usage derives from the Arabic *diiya* (Somali, *mag*) meaning blood-wealth. For the *dia-paying* group is essentially a corporate agnatic group whose members are united in joint responsibility towards outsiders, the most important aspect of their unity being the collective payment of blood-compensation⁵⁰. If one member of a *dia-paying* group is injured or killed by another group, or if his property is attacked, the wronged group is pledged to collective vengeance, or if reparation is made, to sharing the compensation paid amongst all its male members. Conversely, if a person of a *dia-paying* group commits homicide or injury outside his group, all the other members are collectively responsible for his actions and jointly concerned in paying reparations.

Dia-paying groups act similarly in less serious issues and the joint interests of their members are defined today in written treaties (*xeer*) which are lodged in the District Offices. Their actual terms vary from group to group with size, degree of internal segmentation (generally associated with size), wealth, and other factors. But in principle all northern Somali accept that a man's life is worth 100 camels and a woman's half that number. It is important to stress that the *dia-paying* group owes its unity to a formal contract by which its members, who are agnatic kin, bind themselves together (Political unity in northern Somaliland is not merely a matter of agnatic loyalty but equally a question of formal political contract - *xeer*).

⁴⁹Lewis, I M. 'Marriages and the Family in Northern Somaliland.' Op cit p 1

⁵⁰ Ibid. p 2

Kablallah Daarood.....*clan family*
 I
 Koombe Kablallah
 I
 Harti Koombe
 I
 Si iid Harti (Dulbahante).....*clan*
 I
 Muuse Si iid
 I
 Abdalle Muuse
 I
 Habarwaa Abdalle
 I
 Shirshoore Habarwaa
 I
 Faarah Shirshoore (Faarah Garaad)
 I
 Ahmad Faarah
 I
 Ali Geri Ahmad.....*primary lineage*
 I
 Suubaan Ali Geri.....*dia-paying group*
 I
 Khayr Suubaan
 I
 Igaal Khayre
 I
 Heyri Igaal
 I
 Faarah Heyri
 I
 Mahammad Faarah.....*Individual elder*

Dia-paying contracts thus define the basic jural and political status of individual and are so regarded by the administration in the settlement of disputes. In recognition of their importance, stipended

⁵¹ Ibid p 2

local authorities (*Akhils*)⁵² were appointed by the government as heads of the larger *dia-paying* groups, and smaller *dia-paying* groups have un-salaried but government recognized headmen.

This is in keeping with the general character of northern Somali political structure, which lacks chiefly offices to a marked degree. The only traditional political office occurs at the level of the clan and, in the case of very large clans, at the level of those lineages within them, which may be distinguished for their size as 'sub-clans.' And even clan-heads (commonly styled 'Sultan') have little instituted authority. At every level of political division policy is made by the elders concerned meeting in ad hoc councils (*Shir*) in which every adult male has been preserved and is little affected by the appointment of government headmen for the *dia-paying* groups. Hardly any attempt has been made to erect artificially a system of indirect rule. Nor, unlike the situation in the Northern Province of Kenya, has a poll tax ever been imposed.

Land is communally owned and only at the level of the clan is there usually a marked association between lineage and territory. As pastoral nomads, members of a given lineage are widely deployed with their sheep and goats and herds of camels in pastures. Grazing is regarded as a gift of God to man in general and not as parceled out amongst specific groups. Pasture thus is not subject to ownership in the ordinary sense, and the right to graze in an area depends upon its effective occupation. Thus, ultimately, men and their stock move where they will be subject only to their ability to maintain their position against others, if necessary by force.

However, at the level of the clan particularly there is some regularity in grazing movement from year. This incipient localization is reinforced through the ownership of wells by groups and individuals in particular areas, and through local interest in the trading villages and small towns which are the oases of Somalia. While there is great seasonal mobility in the population of such centers, and a constant movement between them and pastures, there are almost always some villages

Issa-Salwe M Abdisalam, The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy (London. Haan Publishing, 1996) p 139

in which some members of a clan are permanently domiciled. Within the clan, at subsidiary levels of lineage division attachment to territory is less well defined and grazing movements present a less regular pattern.⁵³

There are two basic herding units particularly in northern Somali pastoral economy: the nomadic hamlet, which is essentially a sheep and goat herding unit; and the camel camp which contains only camels. This division reflects the superior powers of endurance of camels and their less exigent watering needs in comparison with sheep and goats. In the dry seasons sheep and goats require regular watering every few days and must move in close proximity to water-points. Camels, on the other hand, can go without water for fourteen days or longer on dry grazing and have a correspondingly wider range of movement. The nomadic hamlet (*guri* or *reer*)⁵⁴ consist of a group of nuclear families whose heads are closely related agnatic kin. A hamlet may be no more than the domestic group of a man and wife, or wives, and their youth children with the livestock necessary for their support. Often, however, it consists of several nuclear or polygamous families of brothers or more commonly of close agnates of the same *dia-paying* group with their dependants. Affines and other non-agnatically related men are frequently also included: in a sample of fifty seven hamlets drawn from three grazing encampments and containing one hundred and eighty married women and widows, each with their own huts, 32 per cent of the hamlets contained affinally and other non-agnatically related men.

The herding of the grazing camels is exclusively the work of men. It is rare to find a married man though with the camels since after marriage men usually move with the nomadic hamlets; although in the dry season when the grazing camels are brought in from the pastures to the wells every two or three weeks their owners in the hamlets assist with their watering. The youths and boys

⁵³ Lewis I M, *Marriage and the Family in Northern Somaliland*. Op cit, p 4

⁵⁴ As a social unit the hamlet is called *reer*, and in its physical aspects as a structure of huts and fences is known as *guri*. In an extended sense the term *reer* is applied to any group of agnates and means lineage.

sons younger brother, nephews and occasionally hired servants of the camel owners who are out in the camel camps live mainly off the milk of the camels. They are often without means of cooking and sleep out in the open. In the dry season particularly when milk and water are scarce their lot is especially hard. In addition to the physical rigours of their existence – constant movement with the herds to new pastures and in the dry seasons the regularly repeated long treks to the wells they have to be constantly on the watch for stock thieves and raiders.

Where pasture is sufficient, groups of hamlets or camels camps congregate to form temporary encampments (degmo from deg, to settle or pitch camp). These are not firm local units, they have no formal leader, and as the grazing is exhausted or in response to reports of better pasture else where, they split up at random, each hamlet or camel camp moving some times separately to a new area of grazing where a new and equally ephemeral encampment is formed with a new composition. Nevertheless, despite this shifting pictures, where people settle in such transitory clusters they tend to distribute themselves according to their lineage affiliation. This applies to the temporary encampment of hamlets and of camel camps and is most marked in time of war when kinsmen cluster together for support and safety. but other times except in the case of very small lineages of only three or four generations in span, all the men of a lineage are rarely found together in the same grazing encampment.

War and feud occur constantly in northern Somaliland and constitute a further hazard to the pastoralist in their movements. In an arid environment in which overgrazing is general and where the human and stock populations press heavily pull the sparse grazing resources available there is constant competition for access to pasture and water and frequent lineage strife. This is most acute in the dry seasons but is generally characteristic of the pastoral life as a whole. Feud is thus endemic and moreover is not easily controlled in an arid country whose population is widely dispersed and

where rifles and motor vehicles are commonly employed in battle⁵⁵. With the corresponding belief in the ultimate power of force as the decisive factor in lineage relations agnatic solidarity is at a premium. In the last analysis the individual security depends upon the strength of his *dia-paying* groups and upon the number and power of his agates. This is true even when administrative intervention prevents open hostility between groups and forces a settlement. For to a significant extent the amount of compensation offered and the alacrity with which it is paid is a function of the size and power of the lineages concerned. At the same time the pastoralist is equally dependent on his kinsmen for assistance in the herding and watering of his stock, particularly his camels, and relies upon them for help in time of misfortune and famine. Thus in addition to common property interests in camels, the force of agnation regulated and given political definition by contract is extremely strong.

Moreover, the struggle between lineages extended into other spheres to an unusual degree. Lineages compete in trade and there is constant rivalry over the granting of trading licenses: in appointment to all kinds and ranks of employment in the public service, and now also in party politics. These patterns of lineage allegiance persist strongly in the recently established towns and trading villages of northern Somaliland which economically and politically are essentially part and parcel of the pastoral social system. And although these settlements, the market centres for the trade of the interior, are now also the centres of social change and of nationalism, for the most part the social relations of their inhabitants many, of whom alternate between town and pasture, are based on the same clan and contractual ties as operate in the interior. Thus in a wide range of activities and spheres of social interaction beyond the strictly political, agnatic allegiance is of fundamental importance and its moral force is exceedingly strong.

⁵⁵ Lewis I M, *Marriage and the Family in Northern Somaliland*. Op cit, p 6

In keeping with the weakness of territorially based social ties, agnation supplemented by construct has a primacy which kinship does not appear to possess in other similar seminary societies with less shifting land relationship and more binding local loyalties. In discussing the compelling moral force of kinship Somali compare agnation (*tol*) to iron or to the testicles.⁵⁶ It is something which in principle, and generally in practice also, cannot be effected or forgotten.

It is thus seen that study of the Somali conflict and its effect on security in the Horn of Africa between 1990 and 2004 reveals many facts which can be traced from the nature of the Somali people, the nurture or environment in which they live and the interests they pursue. The nature of the Somali is viewed from the standpoint that he is inherently aggressive to ensure his survival. The Somalis live in *dia-paying* groups which I M Lewis traces from the Arabic *diiya* meaning blood-wealth or which Abdisalam Issa-Salwe in "*The Collapse of the Somali State*"; calls blood-compensation group. This *dia-paying* group is made up of members with joint responsibilities about collective payment of blood compensation if its member is injured or killed. In this realm violence is institutionalized and can just be settled by payment of 100 camels in event of a mans death whereas 50 camels are paid when a woman or child is killed.

Thus violence among members of the community in pursuit of their interests is tolerated as a way of life. This violence is associated right from the time of Somalis occupation of the predominantly arid Horn of Africa. The Somali maintain close knit families composed of immediate members of patrilineal lineage able to identify each individual within the patrilineal descent. This individual has equal right and say in society and he tends to pursue his interests in a way to ensure his individual survival.

The pastoral life of the Somali community inhibits ownership of land. Movement of livestock is free and requires access to pastureland as it is believed that grazing is a gift from God to man. The pastoral life of the Somali once coupled with non-ownership of land suggests that administrative

⁵⁶ Ibid. p 7.

institutions that are locality based are un-workable in the community. To further compound this predicament, the Somali only owe allegiance to their blood compensation groups within which each individual has say. This setup does not recognize any other leadership and the concept of collective and central authority is alien

Siad Barre tried to dismantle and replace the traditional leadership structures that bore allegiance to blood compensation groups with stipended local authorities (*Akhils*) which were a colonial legacy. This dispensation was soundly resisted by the people and resulted in Siad Barre forcing their deployment in order to facilitate his repressive authoritarian rule. Resentment of the *Akhils* was displayed when Siad Barre's government collapsed as clan quickly replaced the *Akhils* with warleaders who are mainly associated with blood compensation groups.

2.1.1. The Militias as Agents of Authority

Blood compensation groups and clan loyalty bore the Militia as the principal bulwark against raiders from rival clans or bandits in the post Siad Barre Somalia. The militias are led by warleaders and are grouped in local structures existing throughout the country on the authority of traditional councils of elders. According to interviews by Human Rights Watch, local authorities presented the arming of local men as a prime objective in many communities, as a kind of standby militia that could be called to arms by the community's leaders in time of emergency.

These forces however differ significantly in form and substance. Few are uniformed, and they generally use a grab-bag of weapons. They may be on permanent call to a warleader, or part-time soldiers called up by their communities-or unaccountable roving groups engaged in banditry who occasionally hire out their services. They may receive payment for their services, particularly if permanently attached to a warleader; they more frequently do not, but receive payment in kind through looting.

The *moryan*, the bandit gangs, contrast distinctly with both the networks of clan-based self-defense militias and the "faction" armies at the service of the warleaders (although their membership may overlap). The latter are accountable, to various degrees, to their clan councils or to the personal figure of the warleader, or to lower-ranking warleaders allied with the major faction leaders. The bandit groups cannot easily be shown to act on the authority of anyone. Protection from the militias of rival communities as well as the independent gangs is at the heart of most Somali communities' concerns.

Standing armed forces with personal loyalties to warleaders, the "factions," are relatively small in number, and dependent upon the resources available to the warleaders. Although no precise figures are available, and force levels are themselves in constant flux, generally, a range of figures for the standing forces of major warleaders was averagely in the low hundreds. Discussions of the levels of authority attributed to the warleaders centered on their vulnerability to the disenchantment of their base communities, as expressed through the clan councils of elders. Where warleaders were seen to have exceeded their authority, by failing to consult or disregarding the sentiments of the elders; to have failed in war; or to offer little in the way of guaranteeing resources to the clan, they may lose the support of the clan's elders and armed men and find their forces may abandon them.⁵⁷ The foundation of a warleader's armed faction on clan support was described in one Human Rights Watch interview as an almost contractual one based on the following:

The popular base of any faction is through clan support. It is like an electoral college: the subclan supports the clan which supports the militia and the political leaders. They are warlords

⁵⁷ April 1995 Vol. 7, No. 2: Human Rights Watch, *Somalia Faces The Future: Human Rights In A Fragmented Society*

and clan leaders at the same time.⁵⁸ The situation in Mogadishu which is a cosmopolitan town, where the warleaders dominated society, was the exception rather than the rule:

The warleaders' real power is in their capacity to call upon the clans for temporary manpower, either for defense or attack. By far the largest numbers of armed men are accountable to their clan elders' councils, not the warleaders; they are raised at the behest of the clan councils for the defense of the clan or for other operations at the behest of the clan, but do not remain mobilized for long periods. It is through the clan councils, moreover, that the warleaders assume their own authority and can be held accountable for their actions.

Although estimates regarding force levels in Somalia are generally speculative, the small numbers generally given for the central core of gunmen permanently on call to the warleaders can illustrate the importance of the clan's grassroots support to their operations.

A typical example of a warleader can be attributed to General Morgan's reputation in Somalia, which dates back from his role as a key officer of Siad Barre. Morgan led the government's devastation of the northern city of Hargeisa in Northwest region, and is held responsible by many Somalis-and others-for the deaths of up to 60,000 people in the army's campaign in the region.⁵⁹ Later, his services as a warleader have been linked to the Majerteen clan, and his stronghold has been the southern port city of Kismayo-captured in an assault under the guns of UNOSOM in February 1993 from the rival warleader Colonel Jess.

In 1994 UNOSOM estimated that Morgan, operating under the name of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), directly controlled about one hundred militiamen and about twenty technicals. At that time Morgan could also call upon small standing forces maintained by the warleader General

⁵⁸ Aid official, Human Rights Watch interview, Nairobi, January 18, 1995. April 1995 Vol. 7, No. 2 Somalia Faces The Future: Human Rights In A Fragmented Society

Gebiyo, an Ogadeni. More importantly, he could call upon the thousands of armed men of the Marehan and Majerteen subclans (part of the Darood clan) so long as their elders chose to respond to his call to mobilization.

General Morgan himself told Human Rights Watch that his plans for the defense of Kismayu-against the Ogadeni groups that formerly made up the majority population there, or any Habr Gedir incursion-centered on local militia. "Groups are beginning to develop self-defense consciousness, especially Digil-Mirifle. The people are ready to defend themselves. There is a secret plan in event of attack." Mobilization, as in the cases of other clan-based militias, requires calling part-time soldiers to arms. He maintained that he can "mobilize 5,000 people in seven to ten days." He added that although there are as yet no uniforms, these are planned, as well as a radio communication system to work with the police. General Morgan said that in addition to the militia, he had a national security service, which deals with intelligence matters. As to training and discipline, General Morgan said cryptically that training "is gained in fighting," while "discipline depends on motivation."⁶⁰

A longtime relief worker in Somalia told Human Rights Watch that recruitment for Morgan's militia was done by the subclans, and that forced recruitment was simply unheard of. "Morgan talks to elders about external threats in order to mobilize; the clan elders are relied upon to mobilize people."⁶¹ The militias, in turn, are loyal first to their families, and secondly to Morgan: Morgan's militias are all part of subclans which are supported by and supporters of the elders. Morgan has to be in tune with the elders. Here militias are largely controlled by families, unlike some in Mogadishu. Families place members into militia. The militias themselves are confusing.

⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch, *The Lost Agenda*, pp. 107-134); and Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project, *Seeking Refuge, Finding Terror*.

⁶⁰ Gen. Said Hersi Morgan, Human Right Watch interview, Kismayu, January 27, 1995.

⁶¹ Aid official, Human Rights Watch interview, Kismayu, January 28, 1995. April 1995 Vol. 7, No. 2 Somalia Faces The Future: Human Rights In A Fragmented Society

There are young gunmen as well as organized units. The young gunmen who are in the regular militia might also form bandit groups on the side.

A Majerteen aid worker added that "everyone has guns in Kismayu," and the whole town can be called a militia. The army veterans control the others. There are perhaps 3,000 to 5,000 in Kismayu alone. They are divided into divisions, commanded by officers. They have training outside the town. When disobedient, they discipline them. There is no separation between the Marehan and Majerteen militia [others disputed this assertion]. Each section has leaders, and they are all under Morgan.

The militia organization in Baidoa, according to a Somali elder cited above, had been established after the twenty-five chiefs of the different subclans were instructed to choose members for the "militia/army" in proportion to the size of their communities: "The biggest subclans had to contribute one hundred, medium eighty, and smallest sixty." Once the manpower was identified, organization proceeded along military lines:

This is the makeup of the militia, though it is a small force, with small arms, little ammunition, and no technicals. The elders organized the purchase of weapons for self-defense. There is a committee of Rahanweyne military officers led by Ahmed Sheikh Muhaddin. They had collected many Rahanweyne soldiers from the previous army as early as November 1994, when 1,800 men assembled in Baidoa for training as the Indian U.N. forces withdrew. This contrasted the situation with that of 1991-1992, when the Rahanweyne had been unarmed. Weapons have been purchased since then, mainly in Ethiopia. Training had been intensive, and defense plans count on being able to call the militia to arms within one day in the event of a raid.

Human Rights Watch observes that although civilians are not yet sufficiently organized to assume leadership from warleaders, the capacity to do so is there, given international support. A key part of the equation is that the clans control the vast majority of the militias, and can withdraw support from

the warleaders. This suggests that the international community should not "withdraw support for civil society" by encouraging domination by one or other faction at the regional level. Its proposed that continued support at the district level, and for traditional authorities like the *ugases* and sultans should be made. By his account, "the local authorities can control 80 percent of gunmen, and there is no need to create new structures. We need to empower civil groups and maintain the link between traditional groups and international community.

2.2. Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism

Somali attitude towards Pan-Africanism, and more particularly towards the federation of African states, have to be understood in relation to the very special conditions of the Horn of Africa. It will be necessary therefore to begin this survey with a few general remarks about the Somali peninsula and the special characteristics of Somali nationalism

Before the partition of their grazing lands by Egypt, and later by France, Britain, Italy, and Ethiopia, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Somali did not constitute a single autonomous political unit. They were divided into a number of large and often hostile classes, themselves further split into a wide array of subsidiary kinship groups. And while wider ties were acknowledged, the individual loyalties were most often focussed upon the small blood compensation groups of kinsmen with whom he paid and received damages, which provided his main security in an extremely unfriendly environment. Within these small groups of kinsmen, usually only a few thousand strong the rule of law applied in the sense that the elders had the power and the means of disposing disputes. Outside these, however, there was not stable centralized authority to regulate the relations between opposing groups.

Yet there was a common code of morality recognized by all Somali, and a common tariff of damages and indemnities for wrongs. All disputes between rival groups could, when the parties were

willing, be compounded by the payment of standard rates of compensation. There was thus a common code of as it were, international law, and courts of arbitration could be mounted to judge between conflicting groups. Thus the Somali have always constituted a nation, but political nationalism was absent largely because of the divisive forces within the nation: it was only after imperial partition that the way was opened towards the formation of a Somali nation stage⁶².

The division by non-muslim colonial powers of the Somali Peninsula into French Somaliland, British Somaliland, the Ethiopian Haud and Ogaden, Italian Somalia, and Northern Province of Kenya tended to reinforce Somali sentiments of national identity through Islam. This multiple colonization of a single Muslim ethnic area brought the Somali as a single people into contact not only with three European governments, but also with the Egyptians and Ethiopians. No other ethnic groups were involved, except in French Somaliland, which the Somali shared with the ethnically related Dunakil (or *Afar*); to assert their rights to independence the Somali therefore had no need to claim any other common feature than that of being Somali. There was no need in this situation, and indeed for long little inclination, to appeal to a wider identity as Africans. Equally, the stereotype of the colonizing power was not of a monolithic European or 'white' domination as opposed to African or black but of French British, Ethiopians and Italians whose differences in national character and in systems of government were very obvious, and whose competition and rivalries the Somali were quick to exploit.⁶³

Thus when between 1900 and 1920, the famous Sayyid Mohammed Abdille Hassan (the so-called 'Mad Mullah' conducted his remarkable rebellion against the Christian colonizers and particularly against Britain and Ethiopia, his appeal did not extend beyond the Somali as a national group.

⁶² I M Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy* op cit, p 17.

⁶³ I M Lewis, 'Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism' : *A Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, 1,2 (1963): Lecturer in Social Anthropology, University of Glasgow. This article is based on a paper read in January 1963 to the post graduate seminar on Pan-Africanism and Eastern Africa at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London

2.2.1 The Development of the Pan-Somali Ideal

The development of the Pan-Somali ideals can be traced to the 1930's and its path was met with passionate resistance from neighboring states. *Pan-Somalism* however grew in stature and contributed largely to the conflict situations in the Horn of Africa. Whilst post independence African nations were contemplating Pan-Africanism, the main modern Somali Nationalist movements were from the onset unconcerned with African nationalism. From their inception these organizations set objectives for common national identity of all Somali and pursued the right to make their nation a nation-state.

The Somali National League SNL that had had an intermittent existence since 1935 emerged as a fully-fledged party in the British Protectorate in 1951 with the following program:

1. To work for the unification of the Somali people and territories
2. To work for the advancement of the Somali by abolishing clan fanaticism and encouraging brotherly relations among Somalis
3. To encourage the spread of education and the economic and political development of the country.
4. To co-operate with the British covenant or any other local body whose aims are the welfare of the inhabitants of the country

Similarly, the Somali Youth league (S.Y.L), founded as a youth club in British occupied Somalia in 1943 and fully organized as a party by the end of 1947, sought:

1. To unite all Somalis generally and the youth especially, with the consequent renunciation of all harmful old prejudices, such for example as tribal distinctions

2. To educate the youth in modern civilization by means of schools and by cultural and propaganda circles
3. To take an interest and assist in eliminating by constitutional and legal means any existing or future situations which might be prejudicial to the interest of the Somalis.
4. To develop a Somali language, and to assist in putting to use among the Somalis the already existing writing known as *Ismaniya*.

Here also it was Somali nationhood that was stressed and there is no reference to wider African issues. The paramount importance which the S.Y.L attached, at this early period to the *Pan-Somali* ideal was made even more explicit by the parts representatives to the Four Power Commission which visited Somalia early in 1948 to examine Somali aspirations for the future. On that occasion the S.Y.L stated that: the union of Italian Somaliland with the other Somalilands was their primary objective, for which they were prepared to sacrifice any other demand standing in the way of the achievement of greater Somalia.⁶⁴ This aim of the amalgamation of all the Somali territories translating cultural nationalism into political nationalism, remains the basic credo common to all the nationalist parties. Such differences as exist on this issue, and they are slight, refer merely to the means by which *Pan-Somalism* should be achieved.

When the SYL were returned to power in Somalia in 1956 as the first Somalia government, with control only in internal affairs, the Prime Minister Abdullahi Ise, in his policy statement before the assembly assigned first place to the resolution of his countries border dispute with Ethiopia. Three years later, however, when performing the same task on 26 July 1959, with independence close at hand and the Greater Somalia League to contend with, Abdullahi Ise gave first place to the unification of the Somalia territories. 'The Somali', he told the Assembly 'form a single race,

⁶⁴ Report of the Four Power Commission (London, 1949), II, P. 10-11. The members were Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union.

practice the same religion and speak a single language. They inhabit a vast territory, which, in its turn, constitutes a well-defined geographical unit. All must know that the Government of Somalia will strive its utmost within legal and peaceful means which is its democratic prerogative to attain this end, the union of Somalis, until all Somali form a single Great Somalia'⁶⁵

With the approach of independence there was now a growing awareness amongst political leaders of the importance of forming links with the already independent African States with whom Somalia would soon have direct relations. This is evident in the charter of the National Pan-Somali Movement, an organization founded at Mogadishu a month after the formation of the new government

The Movement expressed its primary aim for the unity and independence of all Somali territories by peaceful and legal means, in much the same terms as the Prime Minister. But it set this in a wider context, seeking also 'to institute and maintain firm ties with the other peoples of the African continent and to maintain and reinforce relations with the states of the Islamic world.'⁶⁶

The final version of the constitution, which was accepted by the Assembly, reflects the new trend towards viewing the Pan-Somali ideal in a wider African context. Article VI (Para.4) states: the Somali Republic shall promote by legal and peaceful means, the union of Somali territories and encourage solidarity among the people of the world and in particular among African and Islamic people. With this constitutional pledge to uphold, the British Protectorate and the former Italian Somalia united on 1 July 1960, as a unitary republic of the component countries. However, the disadvantageous position of this new African state was most eloquently described by its first Prime minister, Dr. Abdirashid Ali Shirmarke:

⁶⁵ *Il Corriere della Somalia*, 27 July 1959.

⁶⁶ *Il Corriere della Somalia*, 31 August 1959

"Our misfortune is that our neighboring, countries, with whom, like the rest of Africa, we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations, are not our neighbors. Our neighbors are our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary 'arrangements.' They have to move across artificial frontier to their pasturelands. They occupy the same terrain and pursue the same pastoral economy as ourselves. We speak the same language. We share the same creed, the same culture and the same traditions. How can we regard our brothers as foreigners?..... Of course, we all have a strong and very natural desire to be united. The first step was taken in 1960 when the Somaliland protectorate was united with Somalia. This act was not an act of colonialism or expansionism or annexation. It was a Positive contribution to peace and unity in Africa and was made possible by the application of the principle of the right self-determination.⁶⁷

Here we see the view that *Pan-Somalism* is not merely compatible with Pan-Africanism, but is in fact a positive contribution towards Pan-African Unity.

2.2.2. Relations with other African States

Before examining how, since independence, the Somali government has developed this view and sought to gain support for it among African states, it will be convenient to consider the relations between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic, since Ethiopia's position is a crucial factor in any further implementation of the Pan-Somali ideal.

Ethiopia consistently opposed the union of the Somali territories, advocating instead federation with herself. Thus the Ethiopian Government sought to prevent the union of the British Protectorate with Somalia, protesting to the British Government after Mr Lennox Boyd's announcement at Hargeisa in February 1959 that, should the protectorate legislative council desire closer association with Somalia, his government would arrange the necessary negotiations.

⁶⁷ Lewis, I M, *The Somali Peninsula: A New Light on Imperial Motives* (London, 1962),p.vi

This was hardly a favorable start to amicable relations between Ethiopia and the Republic. But it was of course merely a symptom of the fundamental issue. This arises from the fact that perhaps as many as three quarters of a million Somalis live in the Haud and Ogaden, regions which are administered by Ethiopia, but which have no mutually agreed frontier with the Somali Republic and which are moreover, claimed by the Republic.

On attaining independence the Somali republic not only inherited the old Italo-Ethiopia border dispute on which so much has been written, but was also pledged by its constitution, and obliged by popular sentiment to bring into the Republic the Somalis in the Ogaden region and to recover the western Haud, which Britain had relinquished to Ethiopia on the dubious basis of the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1807. In practice, since independence both sides have observed pre-existing frontier. Relations between the two states however, were hostile, and Ethiopia was concerned not merely with retaining her Somali regions, but also with French Somaliland, where she was deeply committed through her virtual control of the railway line from Addis Ababa to Djibouti.

Following the Somali Republic's emergence as an independent state on 1 July 1960, the Ethiopians strengthened their military garrisons in the disputed Haud and reserved areas. The regions have seen a number of incidents of which the most serious occurred at Danod, on the Ethiopian side, 85 miles south of the de-facto frontier. The refusal of the Ethiopian Authorities to allow a party of nomads from the Republic to draw water from the Danood water holes led to a tribal skirmish in the area, which was suppressed by Ethiopian ground and air forces. This and other similar incidents led the Somali Government to protest strongly to the Ethiopian Government, and the situation was also brought to the attention of the United Nations in 1961.

Further strained relations continued with the approach of independence of Kenya as it affected Somali aspirations for the union of the Northern Frontier District (N.F.D) with the Republic.⁶⁸

While popularizing a proposed constitution before a referendum was held in June 1961, Dr Shirmarke, the Prime Minister, told the national Assembly:

“While acknowledging its traditional friendly ties the Somali republic wishes to establish relations with the largest possible number of independent countries and to remain outside any bloc or political coalition, thus confirming as the goals of its international activity the maintenance of peace respect for the neutrality principle, co-operation and solidarity among countries, and in particular among the African and Muslim nations. It (that is the new government) always places above all not only in thought but also in action, the intention of achieving the unification of the Somali territories by legal and pacific means.”⁶⁹

The contentious NFD is an area covering 102 000 square miles and is in fact a province and comprises six administrative district: Garissa, Wajir Mandera, Moyale, Marsabit, and Isiolo. The Somali, estimated to number about 200,000 in 1961 are mainly concentrated in the east of the NFD in Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera districts.

The majorities of the Somali entered this area by migration from the north within the last hundred years, although some Somali groups entered the area earlier and appear to have been its first known inhabitants. This Hamitic migration displaced groups of the north-east coastal Bantu – known

⁶⁸ I M Lewis, ‘Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism’ : A Journal of Modern Africa Studies, 1,2 (1963): Lecturer in Social Anthropology, University of Glasgow. This article is based on a paper read in January 1963 to the post graduate seminar on Pan-Africanism and Eastern Africa at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London. P 153

⁶⁹ The Somali News, 25 August 1961

to the early geographers as the 'Zengi' also intruders, who had expanded into this area and Jubaland from the south.⁷⁰

In response to approaches from the Somali NFD parties in Kenya (particularly the people progressive particularly the People Progressive Party led by Ali Aden Lord) the Somali National Assembly in November passed a motion in support of the union of the Province within the Republic, urging the government to press for self determination for its people. As a result, the Somali government was now being forced to concentrate its Pan-Somali endeavor on the demands of a national minority in Kenya, a course bound to lead to conflict with the Kenyan nationalists as well as with Ethiopia and likely to increase the Republics difficulties in finding Pan African support for her aims. Indeed in October Tom Mboya of KANU had visited Addis Ababa and after an audience with the Emperor announced that his party would categorically oppose all attempts at secession on the part of the peoples of the NFD.⁷¹

At that time, relations between Ethiopia and the Republic were particularly hostile and both sides were engaged in a defamatory campaign by press and radio. The Somali government was particularly anxious to deny that its support for the NFD secessionist was delaying Kenya independence, or was in any sense detrimental to the cause of African unity.

The Somali News summed up the Somali point of view in the phrase 'Pan-Somalism is Pan Africanism'; and the depth of feeling in the republic at that time could be gauged from the fact that 31 members of the National Assembly chose this moment to table a motion of no confidence in the government. One of their specific criticism was that the government lacked courage on the Pan Somali issue. In replying to the motion which was defeated by a considerable majority, the Prime Minister re-affirmed his government's dedication to the Belgrade principles of non-alignment, to the

⁷⁰ I M Lewis, 'Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism' :: A Journal of Modern Africa Studies, 1,2 (1963 op cit, p 155

promotion of solidarity between people (particularly Africans and Muslims) and to the continuing struggle for Somalis unification.

Meanwhile Jomo Kenyatta in numerous discussions and speeches made it clear the NFD as an inalienable part of Kenya, and was not to be moved on the Somali issue. After his visit, the Somali Minister for Information held a press conference, at which he clarified his government position emphasizing that a federation of East And Central Africa States was an absolute necessity but that it would have to be harnessed so that the Somali people formed a single unit within it. There was no question, however of its government forcing Somalis under alien rule to unite. Unity could only be based upon the principle of self-determination. And notwithstanding his governments' earlier reservations, the minister made it clear that they now welcomed the British Governments decision to send a commission to the NFD. The Republic, he stated would not object if the commission found a majority of the people of the Province wished to remain within Kenya. But if majority feeling ran the other way his government insisted that secession should be granted before Kenyan independence.

In the middle of October 1962, the two men Commission eventually arrived and a month later had completed its work.⁷² It had found that he vast majority of the Somali of the province desired secession and union with the Republic as did most of the Muslim Galla and some other minor groups.

Despite these quite unequivocal findings, the new constitutional arrangement for Kenya announced in March 1963 by the British colonial secretary provided only for the creation of a new seventh region embracing the predominantly Somali areas of the NFD. This decision, interpreted as

⁷¹Mboya argued that Kenya had as legitimate a claim to Jubaland, which Britain had excised from Kenya and given to Italy to add to Somalia in 1925. These statements were attacked in an editorial in *The Somali News*, 20 October 1961, and in a letter from the Secretary General of the SYL to *The East African Standard*, 30 October 1961.

⁷² The Commission consisted of Major General M P Bogert from Canada, and Mr G M Onyiukie, Director of the Public Prosecutions in Eastern Nigeria. Their findings were published as Report of the Northern Frontier District Commission (London, 1963).

precluding the possibility of subsequent Somali secession, was received with anger and resentment in the district and the Republic

In summary to the Pan-African and Pan-Somali issue, it can be said that the Somali nationalism began as an exclusive movement aimed at the amalgamation of the Somali territories in the Horn of Africa. Its wider interest was directed towards the Muslim nations of the world than towards the African States. Since independence, Somali nationalists showed growing proximity with both African and world affairs, while still retaining the Islamic ties. The Post –Independence government maintained a position of strict non-alignment and at the same time sought to play an active, if modest role in Pan-African affairs. *Pan-Somalism*, based on the principle of self-determination, was then viewed as a positive contribution towards African unity, of which the first step had already been achieved as the creation of the Somali Republic.

It is my view that the Somali leadership was pressurized to pursue *Pan-Somalism* ideals that resulted in conflict with resisting governments of Kenya and Ethiopia. Further pursuit of these constitutional objectives led to war and played a big role towards the disintegration of weakened Somalia especially after the Ogaden War.

2.3. Conflict in the Horn of Africa.

What is the nature of the frontier dispute on which the United Nations has passed several resolutions without, so far, making much progress, and what is the likelihood of a compromise?

The Italians and Somalis have always held that Wal Wal, where the incidents in 1934 were the pretext for war, is part of Somalia; the Ethiopians maintain the contrary and at present the administrative boundary runs east of these wells. More relevant than the convention, which set this boundary, are the underlying fears on both sides of what internal and external pressures can do in the area.

Ethiopian have some deep rooted fears in that due to their agricultural occupation they must carefully watch the nomadic tribes that move around their frontiers. Two-thirds of the Somalis in the Trust Territory are nomadic. They also fear about the Egyptian government interests in the Ethiopian headwaters of the Blue Nile

The Somali leaders are conscious of the jealousies and internal divisions of their nomadic clans. Even Mohamed Abdallah Hassan al-Mahdi, the Mullah, who resisted the British for 20 years, never rallied more than a part of the whole. Agitation for the association of all Somalis is in part an effort to compose a force that will carry weight. So Somalia's emblem is the five-pointed star, representing the five political entities into which Somalis are split –Italian, British, Kenyan, Ethiopian and French.

Yet, united in one state or not, locally the Somalis will continue to dispute over water holes and split up into small factions competing for grazing. Genealogical rivalries are cemented by sectarian disagreements; each clan has periodic scores to settle with its neighbor over stolen stock or some insult. Africa has escaped the rigid caste and class systems of other continents at the price of profound and exclusive blood loyalties.⁷³

Ethiopian policy has been known to attain a welcome flexibility. Under a 1954 agreement, legal cases involving Somalis in the Haud came before a Protectorate Court not an Ethiopian one, and it is British liaison officers with their police who accompany the nomads back across the frontier. Nevertheless, more impassive peoples than the febrile Somalis would smart under the treaty. This is an African "Polish Corridor." Each year more than a million camels – the bulk of the people 's wealth –wander across the international frontier into a foreign land. The Emperor has given instructions that the tribes be sympathetically treated, but it is one thing to decree in Addis and another to enforce such an order in the field. Meanwhile, "Somalization" is going ahead in the

⁷³ Silberman Leo, Change and Conflict In the Horn of Africa p 653

Ogaden, where Somali sultans are being drawn into the administration. The process is unlikely to stop there.

There are, however, advocates of a greater Ethiopia, who see in an Ethiopian Horn the best long-term hope of peace and economic viability for the whole area. They hold that Ethiopia is the Somalis' natural and possibly only future hinterland, into which they are destined to penetrate deeper and deeper. Ethiopia has undeveloped wealth and requires people. She is considered credit-worthy by the World Bank. All the Somali rivers come from the Ethiopian highlands. As a multi-racial, multi-lingual state (Abyssinia means "mixed") with many religious people living side by side without interference, Ethiopian could provide the Somalis with a future. A few educated Somalis share this view, though the solution is wholly improbable. As things stand at present, the likely compromise on the outstanding issues between Ethiopians and Somalis is rather this:

Somali nationalism has won the right to a separate personality. Fired by the memories of the ancient titanic battles rather than by Egyptian propaganda, fearful that the Ethiopian will menace the nomad's personal sense of independence, animated by a traditional suspicion of low countryman for highlander, of Moslem for Christian, of the roaming herdsman for the tax assessor, of the anarchic clansman for him who pays homage to a crown, the Somali nationalist carries the day when he says "Lesser differences than these have created demands for separate political entities in Europe."⁷⁴

Salient points made from the study of the Somali community and their attitudes towards other Africa communities can be said to include the following:

1. Scientifically, the genetic make up of the Cushietic race suggests inherent aggressiveness of the Somalis. This aggressive nature is acceptable in the community and the blood compensation groups institutionalize its related violence.
2. The community recognizes the traditional leadership based on blood compensation groups with a partrilineal lineage to form a clan. Any other form of centralized authority is not

acceptable. This background explains the difficulty in the reconstitution of Somali under a central government.

3. The pastoral community relies on availability of pastures for their livestock for survival. This community believes that grazing is a gift from God to man and the arbitrary colonial borders that separate them from pastures during cyclic seasons are wrong and generally structurally violent. On this account, access to grazing grounds in the Huad and Ogaden in Ethiopia during dry weather is of paramount importance. This reality has been the main justification for the unification of Somali speaking people in the Horn of Africa to form a Greater Somalia.
4. Omar Mohamed Osman in *"Somalia: A Nation Driven to Despair"* argues that Somalis just like Germans, the Vietnamese and the Yemeni have dreams of unification of all Somali territories that will ensure integrated livelihood (pastures) of the Somali people.
5. Dr Said S Samatar in *"Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil"* asserts that Ethiopia and Kenya are apprehensive of the *Pan-Somalism* concept of a Greater Somalia. He accuses Kenya and Ethiopia of anxiously watching Somalia disintegrate because Somalia has never renounced her territorial claims over NFD and Ogaden respectively.
6. The concept of *Pan-Somalism* makes Ethiopia and Kenya develop interests towards solving the Somali crisis in the two countries favor. Ethiopia and Kenya are involved in ensuring that the Somalia reconstituted government is friendly and does not harbor the *Pan-Somalism* ideals. These self-serving interests have made mediation of the conflict under IGAD to be relatively skewed and subsequently causing re-entry difficulties after the mediation process.
7. Omar Mohamed Osman calls on the international community to help Somalia to resolve her territorial dispute with Kenya and Ethiopia through a plan that calls on Somalia to renounce her territorial claims on Kenya and Ethiopia. He also calls on the latter two countries to in turn guarantee and self guard interests and needs of the large Somali minorities in their countries. The

⁷⁴ Ibid P 656

globalization theory suggests that countries should open their boundaries for prosperity and Somalia's desire to have more territory is outdated. All countries in the Horn of Africa are eager to open and allow cross border trade and are waiting for opportunities of growth in investments once Somalia stabilizes

2.4 The Collapse of the Nation State

At the end of the Cold War, many African nations in the late 80s, faced economic, social and political problems and are still struggling to survive the difficulties of this period. Somalia succumbed as a nation; leading to its disintegration and dismemberment in a bloody civil war which has claimed more than three hundred thousand dead and many others wounded, with roughly four fifths of its population displaced. Nearly one fifth of the population fled to Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya as refugees. These displaced people have lost their past and their future and that of their children. Subsequently, the country has been divided into fiefdoms ruled by separate armed clans.

This part of the study examines chronological events in Somalia and lays emphasis to dynamics towards collapse of the state. Among many definitions the state, is defined as an association which, acting through law as promulgated by a government endowed to this end by coercive power, maintains within a community territorially demarcated, the universal external conditions of social order.

Somalia fails in most of the attributes highlighted and can thus be seen as a case of failed states. We may ask ourselves the following questions:

What caused this agony and collapse of civil society?

What were the forces which shaped it?

Was it part of an inevitable evolutionary process?

To what extent did the colonial partition contribute to the calamity?

By examining the Somali politico- historical perspective, this paper sets to explore the impact of the colonial legacy on the political, social and economic life of the Somali nation, and posits that it is one of the main factors which led to the collapse of the modern Somali state in the early 1990s. It also briefly considers some immediate post-collapse outcomes.

The statement on colonial legacy as instrumental towards collapse of the civil society has been outlined in the failure of the concept of Pan-Somalism. To qualify this further, it is seen that the colonial powers partitioned Somalia due to nomadic pastoral activities of its people. These people did not have a centralized authority and a hierarchical structure in society. The Somalis had an egalitarianism system where every man (though not woman) had a right to a say in communal matters. Settlement of disputes was through an informal legal contract called the *Xeer*. Issues were discussed in the institutionalized "*shir*" which I M Lewis defines as:

"the fundamental of government, which has no formal constitution, except that of membership of the lineage concerned, no regular place or time of meeting, and there are no official positions on it."⁷⁵

During the late 1930s to 1960s lineage politics were manipulated to serve the political needs of the colonizers. A new form of hierarchy was introduced, and chiefs, called *Akhils*, were appointed by the colonial administration to represent and speak for the clan lineages. The colonialist further attempted to bring order by posting chiefs as community leaders who would arbitrate over issues and represent people's wishes and aspirations to authorities. This is a system, which the civilian government at independence inherited but misused, and also a system that Siad Barre discarded and with his ouster, clearly no semblance of authority was left behind.

The first part of this chapter deals with the people and their traditional institutions, and makes an acquaintance with the society of the Somali people. It is interesting to theorize that due to its single mono-ethnic mono-cultural background Somalia had been a nation long before it became a state. This heritage offered a good chance to establish a strong and harmonious state. The fact is that Somalis have very strong clan loyalties that transcend nationalistic feelings. It is evident though that Somalis exhibit solidarity against external threats but quickly become antagonistic when the external threat has vanished.

Pan-Somalism depicted the trauma which developed as a result of European colonial occupation at the end of the nineteenth century and the subsequent partition of the territory into five different political entities. The legacy of the colonial partition of the Somali people is one of the root problems of the Horn of Africa. Attributed to this phenomenon is the restriction of easy flow to grazing areas during the times of draught especially in Western Somalia after the Hawd and Reserved Areas were ceded to Ethiopia in 1944. Other factors included the frustration of not recovering "lost" territories by subsequent post independence governments in their quest for *Pan-Somalism*.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed in 1963 to tackle these and other problems as well as become the voice for African in the arena of world politics in the spirit of Pan-Africanism. However, it failed to solve the basic conflicts over national borders, and rather complicated the whole issue by accepting the status quo on colonial-drawn boundaries in Africa as many OAU member-states saw Somali's position on borders as troublesome and potentially divisive. Somalis attitudes were seen as threatening the sovereignty of other member states.

For the Somali people the creation of an independent Somali Republic on 1 July, 1960 was only the beginning of their struggle for national unity and linked those Somalis formally ruled by

⁷⁵ I M Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy*,: op cit, p 38.

Italian and British colonial powers. It excluded those living in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti (the latter becoming independent from France only in June 1977).

The map below shows the dotted boundaries of the Greater Somalia as dreamt by the Pan-Somalists.




Fig 3. Map of Greater Somalia – Pan-Somalists view⁷⁶

The preamble of the Constitution of the Somali Republic promulgated in June 1961 stresses that Somalia be a unitary republic with a representative democratic form of government. However, the democratic parliamentary process under President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke which was 'expected' to go well with the traditional political institutions, turned sour. The army took advantage

⁷⁶ "Nation-State," Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2000. © 1993-1999 Microsoft Corporation.

of this situation when it seized power on Thursday, 21 October 1969 at 3.00 am in a bloodless coup. Hoping that the army had rescued the country from plunging into turmoil, the people could not perceive the real intention of the military junta. But soon a dictatorial form of authority was in the making showing a repressive military government of Siad Barre, which persecuted people without giving them a chance to express their grievances.

The current situation of Somalia is best understood by referring to the period before the outbreak of the civil war. Siad Barre ruled the country for more than 20 years, after overthrowing, in 1969, Abdirahid Ali Sharmarke, the first and so far only Somali democratically elected president. The Barre regime was extremely repressive and divisive, preventing the large majority of the population often by the use of force from taking part in the political process or to express their opinion in public. During the cold war era, he shifted alliance between international political camps several times; this has to be seen in connection with the long standing and ongoing enmity between parts of Somalia and the Ethiopian neighbor.

In an attempt to regain popularity and legitimacy, Siad cynically manipulated the surviving elements of his version of Pan-Somali nationalism. In 1974/75, massive drought had weakened Ethiopia and pushed Emperor Haile Selassies' government to a state of collapse. To liberate the Somali-speaking peoples of Ethiopia, Siad acted. In a bold, even brilliant, military maneuver, he invaded the Ethiopian Ogaden in 1976. Then the Soviet Union, pursuing an opportunistic Cold War strategy, ruptured its long-term relations with Somalia to give full political, diplomatic, and military backing to its new Ethiopian ally, the revolutionary leader Mengistu Haile Mariam, who had toppled the Emperor. With the help of thousands of Cuban troops operating sophisticated Russian weapons, the Ethiopians ejected the Somali army from the disputed territories.

The effect of the support from the Soviet Union swinging to Ethiopia changed the course of the war and had subsequent impact on Siad Barre's swinging scientific socialism and its destabilizing effects in the Horn of Africa. Abdullahi Dool in '*Failed States: When Governance Goes Wrong*,' writes about Siad Barre's quest for Greater Somalia arguing that his strategy was to first recover Western Somalia (Ogaden) and the rest (NFD and Djibouti) would fall like Dominos.⁷⁷ Unlike Mohamed Osman Omar, he is opposed to the clamour for Greater Somalia saying no more wars should be fought over it and in fact the Barre's Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1977 was the beginning of the state collapse due to the heavy economic blow it caused the country.

Inequitable distribution of power and wealth was the hallmark of Barre's era and his strategy for maintaining leadership, creating one of the most centralised states in Africa in modern times. The more resource-scarce northern part of the country was largely neglected during his reign, with most public investment concentrated in the South. Under Barre, the state assumed overall responsibility for provision of social and productive services. These practices have had a profound influence on the orientation of the population, encouraging dependency, and have prevented the development of a sense of ownership and responsibility. When the regime was ousted, the accumulated frustration gave way to massive looting of public institutions, which represented the image of the regime. In a last attempt to consolidate power and diffuse opposition during his latter years, Barre had divided the country into 18 "autonomous" regions, which remained in reality deprived of any means of political power. Perhaps most harmful was Barre's relentless exploitation of divisions of the already separatist clan society of Somalia: not only it paved the ground of civil war, it made even the slightest form of cohesion among the warring groups most challenging.

The chapter looks at the disintegration of the Somalia state and portrays how the warlords' sadism and lust for power deliberately destroyed what remained of Somalia. After two decades of

⁷⁷ Dool, Abdullahi, '*Failed States: When Governance Goes Wrong*' Horn Heritage Publications, London 1998

dictatorial rule followed by four years of fratricidal war, Somali society has lost its bearings as a result of the cumulative erosion and decline of the social, cultural and moral values by which a society lives. Somalia was being ripped apart as warlords vied for power.

“In this anarchical situation traditional clan hostility, which during the colonial struggle had been extinguished, was re-ignited. There was reaffirmation of lineage identity and territoriality of a national concern, a re-drawing of alliances, and struggle over the control of resources. It marked an unprecedented turning point for the Somali state, with people returning to their ‘clan areas’. The dispute in the north, between the Isaaq and the Ogaadeen in the last days of Siad Barre, the feud between the Majeerteen and the Habar Gidir (Hawiye) in the Mudug region in central Somalia, the confrontation between the Hawiye’s Abgaal and Habar Gidir clans in Muqdisho, and the strife in Kismaayo between the Daarood’s Harti and the Mahamed Subeer Ogaadeen, was over ownership and access to territory.”⁷⁸

Given the weakening of the foundations of national unity, it was inevitable that the relative strength of lineage and clan institutions should become the dominant social theme. In the urban situation, the clan became a political instrument used by greedy and ambitious leaders. The clan system introduced a destructive political culture into the political thinking of the Somalis, and transformed the positive cultural values of nationhood. After twenty-one years of dictatorial rule followed by a half decade of civil war, Somali society had lost unity.

This development as Ali Mazrui’s remark – “microtribalization” was in contrast to the “macrotribalization” which was the earlier vision of Pan-Somalism. Not only had the Somali state failed to replace the clan in nurturing the security of the individual Somali, it had actually become a

⁷⁸ Issa-Salwe M Abdisalam, The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy op cit, p 137

threat to its being. Was it not natural, then for the Somali to go back to his/her tribal roots? The political exploitation of the past had created resentments, which turned into a mood of destruction towards the state and its institutions.

The overall picture of leadership problems can hence be greatly attributed to the Siad Legacy. However, it is also seen that the centralism of the system of government following independence brought a new type of leaders who were free of the traditional pattern of constraints, and less and less accountable as community leaders due to their distance from their constituents. They were more concerned with personal power and aggrandizement and this degeneration in standards of responsibility would help pave the way for the subsequent leadership crises during the military era, and in the period of disintegration of the Somali nation state

After the power vacuum created by the downfall of Barre, the leadership of so called “warlords” which emerged, changed the course of events into widespread factional warfare of primitive feudal nature. The “warlords” became indistinguishable from Siad Barre in deliberately destroying what remained of Somalia to satisfy their sadism and lust for power. In the opinion of Siciid F Maxamuud:

“Political organizations exercising the same programme (i.e. a clan-based programme) as that of their opponent in government, could not be expected to bring about change... The misreading of the warning signs by the opposition fronts precipitated the savory consequences of today. A deadly trap of clan chauvinism for supremacy devoured the country at the very time when it deserved a worthwhile rest from years of civil war, economic deprivation and repression. It was a trap well set by the government, who then mastered the intricacies of the game of ‘clannism’ - exploitation of the clan system for political ends to consolidate their power. The explanation of the frenetic events after the downfall of President Siad Barre partly lies in the above.....other than being an unfortunate episode of the weaknesses of clan superstructure; it is a triumphal manifestation of Siadist culture over the Somali identity and tradition.”⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Siciid F Maxamuud, Prisoners of Siyadist Culture. Hal-Abuur, Vol 1, No 1, Summer 1993.

In spite of the fact that Siad Barre left the country after his downfall, his political culture, Siadism, which is a system of destructive psychosis that overrides the cultural, traditional and spiritual values of Somali people' prevailed in the country.

Additionally, failure on the part of the opposition highlights the poor quality of its political leadership and the institutions in general. Degeneration of Somalia can be blamed on its leadership. Thus from the view of Hassan Ali Mirreh;

".....depending on the quality of its leaders one country quickly embarks upon a dynamic course of development while another country steadily slips into the abyss of instability and disintegration let alone to attain a minimum tempo of economic and social progress."⁸⁰

Somali leadership failed to set the country upon a dynamic course of national unity, stability and development. The leaders lacked vision, commitment, and moral fibre. Instead they were interested in satisfying their egos, and lust for power became contagious. The example of history forcefully suggests that such lust, unchecked, could easily spread to epidemic proportions⁸¹, and that is exactly what happened in Somalia, where the megalomania of a handful of individuals plunged the country into devastation and chaos. It was chaos, which had been nurtured by Barre's tribalization of Somalia politics, where maximum suspicion and mistrust among Somali clans had been created by the military regime, and where no clan trusts another.

In the wake of the breakdown of law and order, the power thirsty warlords or war leaders aggravated an already tense situation. It was necessary for each group of clan to rely on itself for its safety and defense, and to form it's own Militia. The clan militias were composed of young men, and organized by the clan elders. The fighters were maintained by their communities in return for their

⁸⁰ Hassan Ali Mirreh, Providing for the Future, The Somali Challenge, Geneva 10-14 July 1992, p 17

defense of the clan interests and for fighting off attacks from opposing clans. In addition to the core groups of fighters there were the “freelance” militiamen called mooryaan, jirri or day day who joined the factions or clans whenever their services were required. Organized and encouraged by their leaders, this last group looted what the group required. Much of the warlords’ power was founded on a promise of protection, supremacy and spoils for their clans, and on the domination of others.⁸²

Further to the leadership problems, the society was engulfed in such deep social crisis that normality to individuals was suspended. Individuals were faced with mental and moral confusion. Modern institutions were not developing from within, or else did not have the underpinnings to endure the ever-increasing economic and political chaos. With weakened and confused moral standards, and urban society became more and more tolerant of corruption, the stealing of state property, black marketer in, etc. The concepts of theft, bribery and corruption became synonymous with the success of the individual. This was the recipe for chaos in the country. Such circumstances can be said to be anomic. Anomy is defined as “a state of normlessness, which leaves man without moral guidance.”⁸³ This new moral code tolerated any action emanating from the use of crude power and violence. In this scenario, moral restraint was seen as the very height of human weakness.

In summary, some additional factors that led to the eventual collapse of Somalia are:

1. The undermining of traditional authority over decades,
2. The shortcomings of alien notions of government, e.g. the parliamentary system during the independence decade which failed to meet the high hopes of the people and failed to deliver the missing territories,
3. The two decades of Scientific Socialism which spawned Siadism and which completely destroyed the moral fabric of the society,

⁸¹ Swami Kriyanda, *Crisis in Modern Thought*, 1972, Vol.1 p 10.

⁸² Issa-Salwe M Abdisalam, *The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy* op cit, p 142

4. Neo-colonial super-power interests in the Horn which left it littered with weaponry as well as boundary problems with neighbors which would not go away and which were ignored by the OAU,
5. In the absence of a benevolent state, the reversion of the people to old clan loyalties and with it the loss of a Pan-Somali vision.

Finally, a big question to pose is whether Somalia will be reconstituted? If so then when and in what form may be difficult to predict considering that a very gloomy picture of Somalia and its immediate boundary areas within the Horn of Africa is being illustrated.

2.5. Security Implications in the Horn of Africa.

Security related problems have had an impact on socio-political matters in the present situation in the Horn of Africa. The proliferation of conflict has given birth to the proliferation of light weapons. The kin country syndrome as well as the influx of refugees from one country to another has made trafficking of illegal arms much easier thus increasing security vulnerabilities within and between communities. Today, one of major security concerns in the region is that it is the individual rather than the state, which has become a soft target for attackers.⁸⁴

Looking at the same problem differently, war or conflict - whether internal or external - has negative effects on socio-political and economic development of a state. Hence there is a different correlation between a war situation and the prevalence of poverty. Poverty in itself is a security concern. Poor people with no basic needs, living in a state of near or pure anarchy will pose a threat

⁸³ Human Rights Watch Africa, 'Somalia Faces the Future: Human Rights in a Fragmented Society', Vol 7, No 2, April 1995, p 14

⁸⁴ Cirino Hiteng Ofufo: Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa, in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation. op cit, p 12.

to the security of the state and its neighbors. This was typical of Uganda in the 1950's and Somalia and Kenya in the 1990's.

Taking another line of argument; since the end of the Cold War, nature and dynamics of international political and security matters have changed and are felt the world over.⁸⁵ Two of these can be singled out as being important to security matters in the Horn of Africa region, one, the growing tension between the Arab world and the west - as well as the Arab – Israeli conflict. And, secondly, new (ethnic) conflicts in Africa especially the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, which led to the disintegration, and collapse of Somalia as a state. This was paralleled by the ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe that also saw the disintegration of Yugoslavia.⁸⁶ Similarly, the tension between the Arab world and the west, associated mainly with the war in the Middle East has also affected the Horn of Africa, thus adding to contemporary security concerns in the region.

The rise of extreme militant and fundamentalist politics has spiraled into the Horn of Africa and analysts have drawn a line cutting across the Arab World passing through several countries in the Horn of Africa. Links of militant groups backed by some religious ideology – Islamic Fundamentalism – launching specific attacks on western targets have been identified in the Horn of Africa . This is the same network notably termed global terror.

Investigation by CIA have revealed that Islamic Fundamentalists such as Osama Bin Laden and his accomplices have been harbored for many years in the Horn of Africa region, particularly northern Sudan. Other countries accused of having such links include Libya and Somalia and by extension, operatives in Kenya.⁸⁷ A strong argument presented in this case is that the absence of a government in Somalia creates a safe haven for terrorists activities in the region.

⁸⁵ Network with a view to Promoting 'Peace' Toward a Sustainable Peace: Civil Society Dialogue Forum for the Horn of Africa. (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2000)

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Cirino Hiteng Ofufo: Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa, in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation. op cit, p 13

Some uniquely peculiar problems of security in the region attributed to the conflict in Somalia can be comparatively analyzed by considering facts that some 500-600 million people live in the arid and semi-arid parts of the world and 30-40 million of them depend entirely on animals for their livelihoods. Of the latter, 50-60 percent are found in Africa. The Horn of Africa, where arid and semi-arid areas make up 70 percent of the total land area, contains the largest grouping of pastoralists in the world⁸⁸ These areas provide an average of 20 to 30 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the Horn of Africa countries. At the local level, as much as 70 percent of cash income is generated from livestock

All aspects of pastoral social and economic life are ordered in relation to livestock and the environment in which they live. Cattle hold central value within the pastoral societies and are the basis of association in a complex of social, political and religious institutions. The system depends largely on the availability of water and the distribution, quality of, and access to pasture. However pastrolism is under threat. This is due to the range of factors including: weak governance; inadequate land and resource management policies; political and economic marginalization of pastoral groups; and increasing insecurity, resulting from cattle raiding fuelled by growing access by all sides to small arms and light weapons.⁸⁹

Small arms and light weapons present another security concern, which is the cross border banditry and cattle rustling. Active banditry and cattle rustling have become prolific along the Kenya-Uganda, Kenya-Somali, Kenya-Ethiopia, Kenya-Sudan and Uganda-Sudan and vice-versa. Even though each practice has been linked to indigenous cultural practices, the introduction of modern weapons has made them become costly both in terms of human life and resources. Historically, various pastoralist groups in the region would occasionally steal livestock from one

⁸⁸ The term 'pastoralist' is used to describe a person for whom the herding of domestic animals on open bushland is the dominant economic activity. See 'Nomads of the Drought: Fulbe and Wodaabe Nomads Between Power and Marginalization in the Sahel of Burkina Faso and Niger Republic' in *Adaptive Strategies in African Arid Lands*, eds Bolvin, Mette & Manger Leif (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies (SIAS), Uppsala, 1990) p 30.

another but with far less inflicted human loss of lives. However, today, with instability in the region coupled with weak administration in the region, cattle rustling has emerged as one of the bigger security problems in the Horn of Africa. For example it is no surprise to come across young Karamojong, Toposa, Turkana girl or boy herding their flocks with an AK-47 rifle on their backs. Courtesy of Somalia, a lot of arms are in the wrong hands and this in itself is a security risk within and among countries in the region.

Subsequently, war and feud is largely facilitated by gun culture. The pastoralists with guns feel secure and are able to ward off attack. They have a sense of security and can venture into the countryside to graze their livestock since they feel they can protect themselves and their cattle in case of attack. There is enough evidence that the gun culture has penetrated the region whose continued proliferation is the background to continued use of the said arms in raids and pastoral conflicts. There is need for decisive action to be taken to bring this gun culture to an end, so as to give room for the development of the pastoral areas.

In a special report carried by the Daily Nation Thursday July 29, 2004 titled, “ Arms Trade Booms in Northern Kenya” it was reported that women and children are used as conduits for trans-border trade in guns and ammunition in Northern Kenya. The guns and bullets are then transported to various parts of the country including Nairobi by donkey cart, trucks and sometimes by government vehicles

In a research carried out by Oxfam, a British development and charitable organization, whose campaign is against small arm explains that Isiolo Moyale highway is one of the major arteries in the road network systems whose notoriety as a conduit for small arms and ammunition trade is well known to the authorities.⁸⁹ Isiolo is rendezvous for arm dealers, traders, travelers and livestock

⁸⁹ Mketu Kennedy, 'Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya-Uganda Border Region in Reclaiming Africa (Edited by James Shikwati). Nairobi: Published by Inter Region Economic Network 2004 Pg 124

⁹⁰ Oxfam Report –Daily Nation, 29 July, 2004.

traders form the northern region. Its location in the heart of Kenya therefore is of significant strategic importance

Of course, the routes used in arms trafficking in the region are not fixed. These routes include the Sudan- Karamoja, the Sudan Lokichogio, the Karenga –Lopoch-Kotido and the northeastern route beginning in Somalia. Arms in this route towards the Horn of Africa pass through the porous borders of Kenya into Kenya and through the Merille area in Ethiopia towards the Uganda-Kenya border, which has also suffered prolonged conflict related to cattle rustling between the communities. These arms move through the Upe Pokot areas in Uganda onto the Karamoja region.⁹¹ The arms are also conveyed into Turkana and Pokot areas on the Kenyan side. This route though costly involves movement through a series of brokers over long distance and mainly involve the G3 rifle instead of the AK-47 which is a weapon of choice in the Karamoja, Turkan, Pokot, communities.

Somalis involvement is enhanced by their influence in the Kenya Uganda border areas one respondent to a casual interview asserted that “the best arms smugglers are Somali - they carry arms on donkey and exchange them for oxen. They take miraa (khat) to Kacheliba In Kenya, Iriri, Karenga, Namule in Uganda, and sometimes they transport the guns in miraa.”⁹²

2.5.1 Control of Arms Proliferation

The Horn of Africa region plays host to thousands of Somali refugees who contribute greatly to local insecurity and ecological destruction. The question of refugee issues and their relations to security in the region presents itself clearly. It is widely recognized that the IGAD region is one of the most affected areas in terms of the generation of refugees and the resultant problems of

⁹¹ Mkutu Kennedy, ‘Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya-Uganda Border Region in Reclaiming Africa (Edited by James Shikwati). Nairobi: Published by Inter Region Economic Network 2004. p 154

⁹² Ibid. p 155

insecurity.⁹³ The refugee problem is so inextricably a part of the security context of the region that it needs eventually to be seen as a foreign policy and diplomatic issue that needs to be addressed from those fronts. Unfortunately however, it has tended to be treated as a national, rather than a regional, security issue.⁹⁴ Lack of policy in this issue will manifest itself with continued flow of refugees in the region.

This flow of refugees has had destabilizing effect regionally particularly in the form of proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The arms proliferation has serious implications for inter-state relations in the sub-region as well. Besides escalating violence and insecurity in urban and rural areas, prolonged fighting in Somalia accompanied by the big number of weapons in wrong hands in the neighboring states has inevitably increased the number of people illegally skilled in the use of firearms. These people pose a serious threat to peace and stability in the East African region.

2.5.2. National Security Interests of Kenya in the Somali Conflict.

This part of the chapter critically looks at the national security interests of Kenya as one of the countries in the Horn of Africa affected by the Somali conflict and assesses the extent of threat posed by Somalia's long-held dream of a Greater Somalia. The national security interests when looked at in broader context encompass security in its ordinary sense and also economic development. This entails such mundane issues as trade, export of skilled manpower, promotion of Kenya exports to and via Somalia, development of Kenya's Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) and the return of refugees.

⁹³ Cynthia Macharia, 'Post-Cold War Challenges of the Protection of Refugees: A Case Study of the Horn of Africa.' (MA dissertation, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi, 1998)

⁹⁴ Makumi Mwangi, Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region, in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation. op cit, p 142

Of all Kenya's neighbors, Somalia to the northeast has been her nemesis. It is the only country with which Kenya has fought a war, and the only country that has seriously claimed a part of Kenyan territory consistently.

The Somali living in northern Kenya are ethnically, religiously, and linguistically part of Somalia, a remarkably nationalistic and homogeneous country. The Kenya Somali are culturally and racially different from the Bantu and Nilotic peoples that are found in Kenya. Prior to Kenyan independence, Somali leaders in northeastern Kenya lobbied the British to adjust the boundary and include them in Somalia. A British commission appointed to survey the wishes of the people reported a near-unanimous desire by Somalis to be part of Somalia, not Kenya. The British colonial, however, failed to act on these findings and allowed the independence of Kenya to proceed with its northern boundary as it is today.

2.5.2.1 **The Irredentists Shifta War.**

Kenya had hardly settled as an independent country before she was plunged into a full-blown border war with Somalia. Somali irredentists took easily to guerilla warfare and often either eluded or inflicted heavy casualties on the Kenyan forces. During the fighting, the Somali government generally denied supporting the Somali shifta, although Mogadishu's radio often broadcast vitriolic encouragement.⁹⁵

Part of Kenya's unease is the reputation of the Somali as soldiers. Somalis won new fame in the opening months of the Ogaden war in 1977-78 when their army was not only able to drive six hundred miles inside Ethiopia but was also able to effectively resupply its tanks and field troops. A rout of the Ethiopian forces seemed assured before the Soviets interceded. Despite the ultimate Somali defeat, their early tank victories lent mystique to Somali invincibility. When the Kenya

⁹⁵ Chege Pius Keingati, 'The Somali Conflict and Security Implications for Kenya' A Dissertation submitted in the Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Ordinary Diploma in International Studies at IDIS, UON. September 2003.

government realized the Somali army was probably ten times larger than Kenya's, then some 120,000 men versus Kenya's 12,000, the uncertainties deepened.⁹⁶ In the wake of this uncertainty Kenya immediately saw the need to revamp its armed forces.

Dr Said S Samatar in "*Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil*" asserts that Ethiopia and Kenya are apprehensive of the *Pan-Somalism* concept of a Greater Somalia. He accuses Kenya and Ethiopia of anxiously watching Somalia disintegrate because Somalia has never renounced her territorial claims over NFD and Ogaden respectively.⁹⁷

The concept of *Pan-Somalism* makes Ethiopia and Kenya develop interests towards solving the Somali crisis in the two countries favor. Ethiopia and Kenya are involved in ensuring that the Somalia reconstituted government is friendly and does not harbor the *Pan-Somalism* ideals. These self-serving interests have made mediation of the conflict under IGAD to be relatively skewed and subsequently causing re-entry difficulties after the mediation process.

Post-war trade across the border between Somalia and Kenya still thrived despite the hostile environment. Miraa business prospered and foodstuff, petrol and small manufactured goods slipped in and out of the countries freely.

The human security school of thought identifies economic prosperity as an ideal toward achieving security. Somalia poses a threat to Kenya whether it is stable or unstable because it has not clearly renounced her territorial claims on Kenya. Kenya must therefore encourage economic activities in the NFD and carefully monitor unfolding events in Somalia and where possible play its rightful role by ensuring that her interests are not under threat.

With a stable and peaceful Somalia, trade between the two countries, which would by far be in Kenya's favour, would be boosted. Kenya's internal security would improve since the common

⁹⁶ Miller, Norman N. *Kenya: Quest For Prosperity*, Westview Pres, Inc. Boulder, Colorado. 1984, p 134

⁹⁷ Samatar, Said S: *Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil*, Minority Rights Group International, UK, (1991) p 33

border would be policed on both sides and Kenya would stand a chance of exporting skilled manpower to assist in Somalia's reconstruction.

2.5.2.2 Fighting Urban Crime and International Terrorism.

Kenya has had difficulty in containing urban crime and particularly armed robberies, car jacking and murders leading to an outcry from both citizens and the international community living in the urban areas. In the latter case the UN downgraded the status of Nairobi to a hardship station and the flow of tourists was also affected. The status of urban crime received more international attention after the two terrorist attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa in 1998 and 2002 respectively. With an unstable Somalia, Kenya has found it difficult to contain the rising crime and the terrorist threats.

2.6. Interpretation of Security concerns: People-centered security.

Few would dispute the importance of a state to protect itself from threats that could undermine its existence. But this is not an end in itself. The thrust of security is to create a peaceful environment in which citizens can pursue normal lives. The states in the Horn of Africa need to place the security of people at the centre of their security agenda. The protection of people from threats such as the proliferation of small arms should be a major security concern. It should be no surprise that a state that ensures the safety of its people from both traditional and non-traditional threats is far more secure than a state, which seeks only to preserve itself. The region has so far failed to achieve stability because the state-centric approach to security it has adopted does not contribute to the security of either the states or the people.

Contemporary security concerns are not only a phenomenon of the Horn of Africa but are also a preoccupation of both academics and practitioners globally. For example, Mohamed Ayooob

contends that the nature of the third world is responsible for its security predicament⁹⁸ He argues that there is a specific link between the process of state building and the security problems of the third world. This is equally true for the Horn of Africa where an overemphasis on the importance of national security in state building has become a main feature. For a long time, the roots of the security problems in the region included the lack of unconditional legitimacy for state boundaries, state institutions and regimes; inadequate societal cohesion; and the absence of societal consensus on fundamental issues of socio-economic and political organizations. Unfortunately, such problems emerged during the early stages of state building when the founding fathers of Africa attempted to impose order by preaching nation-building, monopolized instruments of violence, and demanded the exclusive loyalties of their populations. This phenomenon has been true of states in the Horn of Africa like Somalia and Sudan where the struggle for restructuring has been on for over forty years. In Europe similar problems were overcome by statesmen through the extraction and fair distribution of resources, institution building, entrenched political legitimacy and broadened and deepened penetration of state by society.⁹⁹ There is a need to have such frameworks in mind while researching and trying to address contemporary security conditions both regionally and globally.

The study of the foundation of the Somalia conflict and security implications in the Horn of Africa shows the dynamics of conflict in the Pastoral Social and Clan Systems; Pan-Africanism and *Pan-Somalism* related issues; the nation state and its collapse, Conflict in the Horn of Africa and the security implications of the conflict in the Horn of Africa. This reveals a conundrum of insecurity potential issues that are not in tandem with contemporary life. The Horn of Africa is however a part of the global village and is bound to respond to globalization demands. It is evident that there is need to come to grips with questions of regional security.

⁹⁸ Mohamed Ayoob, Third World Security Predicament (1995).

⁹⁹ Cirino Hiteng Ofufo: Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa, in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation. op cit, p 17.

This in turn has made it imperative to debate the shape of a regional security strategy for the IGAD region. The emerging process of globalization and its processes have opened up states and their security in ways that were not earlier thought possible. The process of interdependence which is emergent entails the thinking of states and other actors in the Horn of Africa to be networked together in complex ways and that each must rely on the other in diverse ways ranging from the economic, political and social aspect.

In the Horn of Africa or the IGAD region, the fact that the operating environment is unpredictable cannot be gainsaid. Indeed, it is the very unpredictability of the region that makes it imperative to debate issues in the context and content of a regional security strategy.¹⁰⁰ In the Horn of Africa, the complexity of the political environment is characterized amongst others by complex state identities: ranging from the failed – or collapsed – state of Somalia, caught in the web of almost intractable internal conflicts, to the uneasy relation between an ancient state (Ethiopia) and the region, such as Kenya, and to some extent Uganda, the issues that have held attention are concerned with transitions broadly defined and more particularly about rediscovering and even redefining the state and its role.

Evidently, the critical vulnerability in the region is that security concerns have for a long time been focussed in protecting states in the Horn of Africa. State security was strongly guarded at all expense. This traditional perspective was shaped and honed by history, and especially so the history of the modern state system. The Westphalian state was – and is – an imagined community¹⁰¹ to the extent that it was constructed in order to gravitate people and loyalties towards it. But without effective control, some states could not survive as states; they ended up being mere juridical

¹⁰⁰ Makumi Mwangi, *Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region*, in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation. op cit, p 135

¹⁰¹ Anderson B, *Seminal Work. 'Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism'* (London: Verso, 1991).

entities¹⁰² without effective institutions for survival. It is entities such as these, which are evident in the Horn of Africa region, that are now required to respond to globalization.

Globalization demands other measures to be adopted. Globalization demands new definition of regional security interests and the best strategies through which to secure those interests.¹⁰³

Somalia has to be stabilized in order for Horn of Africa countries to start thinking outside the box. Somalia has to be reconstituted in order that new security can be designed so that globalization demands for 'borderless' interrelation of people in the Horn of Africa can be conceptualized along common parameters. Networking for regional interdependence requires that institutions within countries must first be functional in the sense of seeing the definition of security strategies for the region as a major institutional concern. They must also be strong enough to be flexible, so that they can be able to capture the emerging dimensions of security without having first to re-engage debates about their mandates and competence.

IGAD in the Horn of Africa is a body that provides the framework through which security concerns of the region can be designed to meet globalization challenges. In this process, it needs to take in hand the need to provide strategic leadership in the area of foreign and security policy so that the first moving globalization process may not leave behind the region. IGAD has the mandate as it is composed of membership from all Horn of Africa countries and its span intersects two major conflict systems, that of Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes. Besides this, IGAD region is a crucible in which all the strengths and weaknesses of Sub-Saharan Africa are reflected.

Some IGAD associated initiatives to alleviate the conflict situations include the CERWARN and the EASBRIG. which are in line with the Africa Union (AU) creation of a Protocol to enhance peace and security on the continent. Central to the AU protocol is the Peace and Security Council

¹⁰² R. Jackson & C. Roseburg. 'Why Africa Weak States Persist: The Juridical and Empirical in Statehood' World Politics (1982)

¹⁰³ Makumi Mwangi, Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region, in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation. op cit, p 135.

(PSC) in which member states have agreed to take additional concrete steps for peace and security in Africa. In particular, they have signaled the intention to expand their willingness to take risks for peace, and again indicated they are ready to accept their share of responsibilities for ensuring durable development of the continent, particularly in the area of peace and security.¹⁰⁴

The Protocol establishing the PSC sought to create a number of structures, including the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC). This ASF is based in four geographical regions and within IGAD mandated 'territory' EASBRIG is established. Earlier IGAD initiative was the Conflict Early Warning and Response mechanism (CERWARN) and this when activated can trigger operations of the EASBRIG.

Reconstitution of Somalia now requires a force to enable the TNG government to put its foot in Somalia (Mogadishu) in order to concretize the IGAD led peace talks. It is my view that EASBRIG should hasten its formative stages and quickly deploy in Somalia at this opportune moment of state rebuilding which is delicate and needs all necessary support.

¹⁰⁴ African Union: Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (part 1): Document adopted by the Third Meeting of Africa Chiefs of Defence Staff 15-16 May 2003, Addis Ababa.

CHAPTER THREE: TACKLING ISSUES IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA.

3.1. Conflict Management Measures.

3.1.1. Introduction

Somalia succumbed as a nation after the end of the Cold War along many African nations in the late 80's due to economic, social and political problems. Resultant disintegration and dismemberment in the bloody civil war claimed more than three hundred thousand dead and many others wounded, with roughly four fifths of its population displaced. These displaced people have lost their past and their future and that of their children. Subsequently, the country has been divided into fiefdoms ruled by separate armed clans which are spreading the conflict beyond the territorial borders of Somalia. Today, most of the country remains structurally food insecure, and development has virtually ground to a halt.

In an attempt to highlight the causes of the Somalia conflict and the methodology used in its management this chapter will examine chronological events that affected society resulting in the conflict situation that led to the collapse of the state. It will also review the methodology used in managing the conflict. In this respect, the chapter will highlight domestic, regional and global concerns that prescribed conflict management tools.

In the realm of international relations, Somalia is considered as a failed state but what caused this agony and collapse of civil society? What were the forces, which shaped it? Was it part of an inevitable evolutionary process? To what extent did the colonial partition contribute to the calamity?

The common statement on colonial legacy as instrumental towards collapse of the civil society and to the Somalia state is lame when we study the Somali people. The simple logic is that the colonial powers partitioned Somalia due to nomadic pastoral activities of its people. Somali people

initially did not have a centralized authority and a hierarchical structure in society other than the agnatic association.

Thus during the late 1930s to 1960s lineage politics were manipulated to serve the political needs of the colonizers. A new form of hierarchy was introduced, and chiefs, called akhils, were appointed by the colonial administration to represent and speak for the clan lineages. The colonialist further attempted to bring order by posting chiefs as community leaders who would arbitrate over issues and represent people's wishes and aspirations to authorities. This is a system, which the civilian government at independence inherited but misused, and also a system that Siyaad Barre discarded to cement his authoritative and repressive rule and upon his ouster, clearly no semblance of authority was left behind.

Looking at the history of the Somalia people and their traditional institutions, it is interesting to theorize that due to its single mono-ethnic and mono-cultural background, Somalia had been a nation long before it became a state. This heritage offered a good chance to establish a strong and harmonious state but Somalis have very strong clan loyalties that transcend nationalistic feelings and are abhorrent of central authority that does not stem from their clan lineage. This culture remained immutable in the face of the European imposition of state structures with borders and centralized governments.¹⁰⁵

As earlier mentioned, a close look at the Somali society origin can be attributed to two brothers Soomaal and Sab. The common ancestry is adhered agnatically up twenty recognizable generations to form current clan families. The rest of the relation is lost through passage of time and coming of new generation.

The Somalis come from Cushietic ancestry and their genetic make up suggests inherent aggressive tendencies that are easily triggered when survival is at stake as portrayed in the

Biological theories of conflict. This theory is validated by the fact that feud is a regular occurrence in this pastoral society and the inter-clan conflicts are meant to injure or eliminate the hostile clan, to seek revenge, to reverse wrongs, and to protect its rights over resources. The common debate about nature versus nurture suggests that the Somali conflict is a product of both nature by patrilineal lineage loyalties as well as nurture due to their competitive pastoral way of life.

Thus from the nature and nurture view, conflict in the Somali society stems from breakup of society along clan lineages and the colonialists interference in their pastoralist life of freedom of grazing by creation of artificial boundaries.

Could this offer light in seeking management of their protracted conflict situation that sets to achieve some balance in anarchy?

The chapter will also look at the disintegration of the Somalia state and portrays how the warlords sadism and lust for power capitalized on the societal conflict situation and deliberately destroyed what remained of Somalia. After two decades of dictatorial rule followed by four years of fratricidal war, Somali society had lost its bearings as a result of the cumulative erosion and decline of the social, cultural and moral values by which a society lives. Somalia was being ripped apart as warlords vied for power.

Although much of the overall picture of leadership problems can be attributed to the Siad Barre's legacy, it is seen that the centralism of the system of government following independence brought new type of leaders who were free of the traditional pattern of constraints, and less and less accountable as community leaders due to their distance from their constituents. They were more concerned with personal power and aggrandizement and this degeneration in standards of

¹⁰⁵ Anna Simons wrote of the Somalis: 'For centuries Somalis have had contact with other sophisticated cultures without having been Islamicized, orientalized, or westernized.' Anna Simons, 'Hardly Innocent: Armed Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia', ACAS Bulletin, No. 48/49 (Fall 1997) p 6

responsibility paved the way for the subsequent leadership crises during the military era, and in the period leading to the disintegration of the Somali nation state¹⁰⁶

In spite of the fact that Siad Barre left the country after his downfall, his political culture, *Siyaadism*, which is a system of destructive psychosis that overrides the cultural, traditional and spiritual values of Somali people' prevailed in the country.

Somali leadership failed to set the country upon a dynamic course of national unity, stability and development. The leaders lacked vision, commitment, and moral fibre. Instead they were interested in satisfying their egos, and lust for power became contagious. History suggests that such lust, unchecked, easily spread to epidemic proportions, and that is exactly what happened in Somalia, where the megalomania of a handful of individuals plunged the country into devastation and chaos. These chaos, were actually nurtured by Barre's tribalization of Somalia politics, where maximum suspicion and mistrust among Somali clans had been created by the military regime, and where no clan trusts another.

In the wake of the breakdown of law and order, the power thirsty warlords or war leaders aggravated an already tense situation by making it necessary for each group of clan to rely on itself for its safety and defense, and to form its own Militia.

Further to the leadership problems, the society was engulfed in such deep social crisis that normality to individuals was suspended. Individuals were faced with mental and moral confusion. Modern institutions were not developing from within, or else did not have the underpinnings to endure the ever-increasing economic and political chaos. With weakened and confused moral standards, and urban society became more and more tolerant of corruption (*musuqmaasuq*), the stealing of state property, black marketer in (*suuq madow*), etc. The concepts of theft, bribery and

¹⁰⁶ Hassan Ali Mirreh, Providing for the Future, The Somali Challenge, Geneva 10-14 July 1992, p 17

corruption became synonymous with the success of the individual. This was the recipe for chaos in the country.¹⁰⁷

In summary, some factors that led to the eventual collapse of Somalia are:

Clan loyalty in the pastoral society and abhorrence of authority out of their lineage's.

The undermining of traditional authority over decades was one of the root causes of the conflict.

The shortcomings of alien notions of government, e.g. the parliamentary system during the independence decade which failed to meet the high hopes of the people and failed to deliver the missing territories (root cause).

The two decades of Scientific Socialism which spawned Siyaadism and which completely destroyed the moral fabric of the society and enhanced structural violence (proximate cause).

Neo-colonial super-power interests in the Horn which left it littered with weaponry, Boundary problems with neighbors which would not go away and which were ignored by the OAU (proximate cause).

In the absence of a benevolent state and the reversion of the people to old clan loyalties living in hostile attitude (trigger cause).

The effect of ideological conflict and wars in the Horn became the nail in Somalia's coffin (trigger cause)

In these circumstances, reconstitution of Somalia presents a very gloomy picture within and in outlying states within the Horn of Africa.

¹⁰⁷ Issa-Salwe M Abdisalam, The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy op cit, p 142

The numerous inter-clan conflicts that erupted during the war imposed a state of disintegration within the country, with most Somalis returning to their original geographic locale where their security was better assured while others sought for protection outside the country. As a result of these combined factors, three clan-based and distinct regional entities emerged: the self-administering north-western 'Somaliland', the self-administering 'Somali State of Puntland' in the north-east, and the newly created 'Transitional Government' in the South

The Somaliland administration, which emerged as early as 1991 under the leadership of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, claims unilateral independence from the rest of Somalia within the territorial boundaries of the former British protectorate of Somaliland. The Puntland autonomous administration was established in 1998 and regards itself as a constituent part of a future federal state of Somalia. The South, including the capital Mogadishu, remains characterized by civil unrest, widespread insecurity and irregular fighting between competing clans.

3.1.2. Conflict Intervention Measures.

Looming disaster attracted UN's intervention, which was intended to alleviate the Somali plight during the resultant strife and famine. Because of lack of security, food could not reach the needy as food convoys were being looted and ships were being shelled to turn them away. Relief workers were threatened by armed gangs.

In response, the UN Security Council Resolution 751 of 22 July 1992 agreed to send troops to ensure movement of food for the starving. This was the beginning of the United Nation Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The evident blunders, limitations and ultimately, failures of the UN in this mission are classic lessons learnt. Among lessons learnt that humanitarian assistance to populations embroiled in armed internal conflict like in Somalia made it clear that the common misinterpretation of Humanitarian Assistance as apolitical and neutral is dangerously counterproductive and can create

unintended negative consequences for donors and intended recipients alike. The provision of aid during a conflict is an inherently interventionist action and future relief efforts, if they take this into account will have a much better chance of success than did the aid efforts of the 1990's¹⁰⁸. It is obvious that the UN had rushed to address proximate causes before considering root causes in the Somali conflict.

The UNOSOM's overall purpose was political reconstruction hence, political support at the highest level of UNOSOM's operations was reserved for initiatives involving the warlords. The UN had by its own efforts yet again boxed itself in. Unfortunately this trend has continued to date where under the auspices of the United Nations, national reconciliation conferences between the Somali warlords were convened without questioning their authority and legitimacy. Inevitably, the conferences gave the warlords international legitimacy and validated them as holding the keys to peace.

3.1.3. Peace and Reconciliation Talks.

The same unyielding approach was continued after 1995 but failed in 12 such attempts. However, the peace initiative launched by Djibouti President Ismael Omar Guelleh in July 1999 based on civil society produced a tangible result. In August 2000, after lengthy negotiations between various civil society groups, a set of transitional institutions, all operating on the basis of a Transitional Charter stressing Somalia's unity and territorial integrity, was appointed for an interim three-year period. These transitional structures including a Transitional National Government (TNG) with an elected President and a 245-member Transitional Assembly was established in Mogadishu in October 2000. Despite widespread public welcome and tentative international support, a number of faction leaders from the south as well as the local administrations of Somaliland and Puntland, which

¹⁰⁸ Jennifer Morrison Taw, *The Perils of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Internal Conflicts: Somalia in the 1990's*. In *'Small Wars and Insurgencies'* Vol 15 Autumn 2004 No.2 Special Issue on *The Future of Peace Operations: Old*

did not participate in the Djibouti initiative, rejected the TNG. Despite a relative success in international forums, the TNG could not establish its authority almost everywhere in Somalia.

Turmoil and intrigue continues in this path of reconstitution and reconstruction of Somalia. Thus Samuel Mukinda in, *'Seeking Peace from Chaos'*, says that Somalia became an international commodity, an object of international manipulation and had no means of exercising its sovereignty to choose the course of its reconciliation and construction, thus being at the mercy of the international community. Somalia's civil war coincided with the end of the cold war and with diminished external interests in the non-strategic conflicts such as Somalia's. It took eighteen months for the UN to respond when the Gulf, Balkans and Ethiopia had pre-occupied the international attention. However, some Somalia's neighbors like Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti had some attempts to mediate the conflict and other regional actors including Egypt, Libya and Yemen initially intervened to broker a settlement.

Some of the landmark efforts to resolve the conflict are chronologically put as:

1991: Djibouti hosted two reconciliatory conferences with the support of Egypt and Italy. But contrary to Djibouti wanting to restore peace in Somalia, Italy and Egypt maintained close relations with Said Barre's regime. The conference declared a new Somali Government led by Ali Madhi who was favored by Italy and Egypt over his rival, General Aideed who was the chairman of the USC which had ousted Siad Barre. General Aideed dismissed the conference and the appointment of Ali Madhi. He blamed Italy and Egypt for plotting to alienate him from leadership. Eritrea and Ethiopia who were led by former guerilla leaders supported Aideed's claim for power. This led to a four month bloody confrontation between General Aideed's supporters and those of the interim government.

1993 – 1994: The UN organized four ill-fated conferences, three in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and one in Nairobi, Kenya. In March 1993, the UN assisted by the United States of America and Ethiopia organized conferences in Addis Ababa and brought together fifteen Somali factions with the aim of establishing transitional institutions. The outcome of these conferences antagonized General Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) of Ali Madhi and this led to clashes between Aideed's militia and the international force in Somalia and resulting in the UN complete abandonment of Somalia. To save the UN's face in the Somali crisis, the UN organized talks in Nairobi, Kenya in 1994 but this also failed.

1996: In October 1996, former Kenyan President, Daniel T Arap Moi invited the Somali faction leaders to broker an understanding between Ali Madhi, General Aideed and Osman Atto. But his attempt achieved little because Ethiopia called for a parallel conference in Sodere, Ethiopia in November the same year to forge a coalition of the like-minded factions against Aideed's self proclaimed Salbellar government. Ethiopia managed to establish an anti-Aideed coalition of twenty six factions calling themselves National Salvation Council and used it to legitimize attacks into Somalia allegedly to route out terrorist bases which were operating against Ethiopia. This conference brought renewed tensions and aggravated the already volatile situation in Somalia.

1997: Yemen, who had historical ties as well as cultural ties with Somalia offered to mediate between Aideed and Atto whose supporters had been fighting in south Mogadishu. This meeting complemented the Nairobi understanding of the Mogadishu based faction leaders and ended hostilities in South Mogadishu.

In November 1997, Egypt hosted the Cairo conference attended by Hussein Aideed's (General Aideed's son and successor) Salbellar government and NSC formed at Sodere, Ethiopia. The mediation between the two rival groups was frustrated when several factions aligned to Ethiopia pulled out from the talks. Egypt then supported the creation of an administration in Mogadishu co-

chaired by Hussein Aideed and Ali Madhi while Ethiopia supported the creation of Puntland state led by its staunch ally Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Egypt was in favour of a strong unitary Somali state while Ethiopia promoted a polarized administration, which was vulnerable to her influence and manipulation.

Further dynamics motivated Djibouti to getting involved proactively. Thus in seeing Somalia's rebirth as the balancing factor in the power configuration in the region, Djibouti convened a reconciliation conference in Arta in 2002 and established the Transitional National Government (TNG) to be led by Abdi Kassim Salaad. This was the thirteenth conference and main participants were members of the civil society. Arta was an attempt to move away from earlier agreements which focussed on the parties as corporate entities and which led to the failure of early peace conferences. The warlords or armed actors did not attend and they eventually blockaded and confined activities of the new government to a section of Mogadishu. Arta had ignored interests of regional stakeholders like Kenya and Ethiopia. It seems the conference was had been held in the perspective of ideagraphism, which states that conflicts are peculiar ideas towards management do not need to be shared.

Eventually, armed faction leaders and Ethiopia challenged the TNG through the Somali Restoration Reconciliation Council (SSRC) and this countered the Arta outcome and crippled TNG authority.

3.1.4. IGAD Led Peace Conference 2002 to 2005.

The fourteenth Somalia Peace conference was convened under the auspices of IGAD and it mandated the three frontline states of Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia (as the Technical Committee) to run the conference. The conflict had in fact spilled over international boundaries and interest parties had since grown to include frontline states, warlords and members of the civil society. Under the

framework that focussed on actors or interested parties, all parties were invited to come on board and negotiate their stakes in the process. Clearly negotiation, as a mode of conflict management was put to use.

The pre-negotiations phase of the conference involved the identification of the actors in the conflict. IGAD sent a team to Somalia for this purpose¹⁰⁹. The conference was conceptualized in three phases. The first phase being the pre-negotiation phase, phase two was the negotiation stage and phase three concerned power sharing¹¹⁰. The pre-negotiation phase ended by defining and sorting out leaders and the Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities on 27 October 2002 at Eldoret.

Phase two of the conference (the negotiation stage) set six committees dealing with different issue. Committee One examined issues to do with the Charter and the transitional government while committee two looked at issues to do with disarmament, demobilization and re-integration, committee three's mandate was to discuss land and property rights, committee four was on economic recovery and reconstruction; committee five and six dealt with issues of regional and international relations and conflict resolution and reconciliation respectively.¹¹¹

All committee reports were adopted except two reports given by committee one. One group led by Abdikassim Salaad and Djiboiti favored a centralized government. The other group aligned to the SRRC and the Ethiopian government came up with a pro federalist structure. A stalemate was overcome by women delegates who lobbied hard and ensured that the conference adopted an agreed document on 5 July 2003. This document allowed the government to adopt the building blocks structure that devolved authority to local leaders and respective tiers upwards. (Building the Blocks is a proposal from the Arta Framework which involves the functional federal structure with

¹⁰⁹ IGAD Working Document, A Report on the visit to Somalia,(Djibouti)1999

¹¹⁰ Simon Fischer and D I Abdi et al, Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action. (London, Zed Books 2000), p 116

¹¹¹ Ochieng Kamudhayi, The Somali Peace Process, in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation. Nairobi Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004. Edited by Makumi Mwagiru p 111

multilateral associative process advocated by Puntland. It proposes a federal government comprising of limited number of States)

Finally a Transitional Charter was adopted on 15 September 2003. The Charter left many actors unhappy and notably Djibouti felt disenchanting and left the conference and withdrew from the Technical Committee. The 10th IGAD Summit of Heads of States quickly resolved this by expanding the Technical Committee (Mediators/Negotiators) and renamed it the Facilitation Committee to include all IGAD member states and the African Union (AU). The conference later culminated in the formation of a transitional Federal Parliament which in turn elected Abdallahi Yusuf Ahmed as the President of Somali in October 2004 for a period of five years. The president then appointed a Prime Minister who formed a cabinet. All these developments took place in Kenya and the government is yet to move to Mogadishu. One of the great challenges of this government is to foster credibility among the Somali people who have been disillusioned by the previous initiatives, which promised hopes but never delivered. The negotiations have been done away from home and the faction leaders are faced with re-entry challenges as they head back home.

3.2. Diplomatic and mediation processes

Kenya was the leading mediator in the recently concluded Somali Peace talks, but her role had been overshadowed by Djibouti and Ethiopia, which are battling to determine the outcome of the conference. Some Somali factions accused Kenya of colluding with Ethiopia, which is intent on micro-managing the talks to ensure an outcome favorable to her interests and allies. Despite Kenya's chairmanship of Technical Committee, Ethiopia dominance of the conference was apparent. It was closely involved in conference mechanics such as the organization of the daily agenda of screening of delegates. This had produced an increasingly noticeable bias in favor of SSRC and damaged the

Kenyan reputation as a neutral player in Somali problems.¹¹² This argument is however at variance with Kenya's foreign policy which is founded on basic principles of norms which are universally recognized viz.: good neighborliness, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, peaceful co-existence, peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity of other states and non-alignment. None of the stated objectives could be attributed to the accusation of Kenya being partisan but it led to interpretations that Kenya lacks any vision for the conference or it has been co-opted by Ethiopia.

Kenya's credibility as a neutral player in the Somali peace process suffered yet another blow when its special envoy Ambassador Bethuel Kiplangat endorsed a controversial charter which had been passed by those factions backed by Ethiopia on September 15, 2003. Kiplangat called the decision 'a historic day.'¹¹³

Statements made by former Kenyan president three days after the passing of the charter added to the mistrust of some Somalis who believed that Kenya is not a neutral player. The former president implied that Kenya and Ethiopia could not be trusted with the Somali peace process since they 'fear that a united Somalia and a prosperous nation might resurrect Somalia's territorial claims.'¹¹⁴

Kenyan officials downplayed Moi's statement and stated that it does not reflect Kenya's foreign policy. Ambassador Kiplangat, dismissed the allegations that Kenya is not serious in bringing about peace in Somalia asserting that Kenya wants "Somalia at peace with itself and at peace with its neighbors" He also argued that irredentism had cost Somalia a lot and there are no fears that any future Somali government will resort to territorial claims on its neighbors.

¹¹² Daily Nation, October 14, 2004

¹¹³ Ulf Terlinden, IGAD – Paper Tiger Facing the Gigantic Tasks, Berlin, February 2004 P 10

¹¹⁴ Salad F Dhohul, Washington Urges Somalis to Advance Peace Process, www.aljazeera.info 26 September quoted in ICG Africa Report No 79, Biting the Somali Bullet, May 4, 2004.

3.2.1. Diplomatic and Mediation Contexts.

Article 3(2) of the OAU Charter enjoined members not to interfere in internal affairs of other states. It had been widely interpreted in OAU circles to mean that any kind of involvement would constitute interference in the internal affairs of states. It has come to be construed to mean that even involvement by way of management should be condemned as interference. The fear of being accused of involvement contrary to that principle affected the structure of OAU and African conflict management. Article 3 (2) was an obstacle that was to be reviewed critically to enhance conflict management in Africa.¹¹⁵

However Article 3(2) notwithstanding, OAU practice had led it to construct a false internal and inter-state dichotomy of conflict. This dichotomy was extended to the diplomatic trails used for management. The resulting paradigm was that track one (OAU) conflict management was restricted to inter-state while those considered internal were managed through track two diplomacy.¹¹⁶ This led to dual diplomacy, which can be conceptualized to bring track one and track two diplomacy together in management of some conflict. It is not dual in the sense used elsewhere of two track approaches operating simultaneously in same conflicts. Neither does it imply merely the independent presence of both tracks in the field. The beauty of dual diplomatic approaches is in the possibility of addressing the various levels of the same conflict and further enriching the complexity of the mediation process. This two-track approach was formally operationalized under the AU charter when it came into being.

¹¹⁵ Makumi Mwangi, *The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation, 1985*. A Dissertation submitted in fulfillment to the PHD in International Conflict Analysis, Rutherford College, University of Kent at Canterbury, October 1994. p 425

¹¹⁶ Ibid. p 426.

3.2.2. Dual Diplomacy and the Problem of Re-entry.

One of the problems of the mediation process is the concern whether the parties will be able to re-enter their domestic environments successfully and ‘sell’ the outcome of the mediation to their constituents. This problem has two related levels: shaping the parties perceptions by getting them to have a commitment to implementing the agreement, and shaping the perceptions of their constituents so that they can buy the agreement and hence legitimize it. As both Wall and Mitchell¹¹⁷ emphasize, “parties in mediation are not unitary: they have wider constituencies and audiences which they must have in contemplation. They must therefore ensure that they do not get so far ahead of the parade that they can no longer hear the music.”

Re-entry by the negotiating parties back to Somalia is still a problem despite formation of an all inclusive government.

¹¹⁷ Wall, J A. *Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed*, 25 *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (1981) P 157-180 and Mitchell T, *The Motives of Mediation*.

3.3. The Future of Somalia: .Who Benefits from Somalia's Reconstitution?

Many schools of thought believe that reconstitution of Somalia is of great value to the Somalis and the frontline states of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan as well. This is the hypothesis I wish to put under test. The theoretical framework that anchors this argument is that the Somali culture provides for the egalitarianism way of life that has little regard for centralization of authority.¹¹⁸ The Somalis legitimate authority is the traditional leader within a kinship system that allows political authority to spread through the community as a whole. This reflects the Somalis extreme independence and individualism. It also reflects the entrepreneurship and innovativeness of the Somalis. This spirit does not wish to be contained. A question of who then will benefits from the institutions of a reconstituted government hence arises.

The end of conflict and the restoration of civil society in Somalia will depend ultimately on whether the combination of modern and traditional leaders of Somali society will assert their authority over the leaders who have benefited from anarchy and whose lives have been built on war. Their willingness to do so, in turn, may ultimately depend on the international community's continuing support for alternatives to Mogadishu's warleaders, and its rejection of appeals to use international resources to enable one or the other to prevail through force of arms.

Other complications to reconstitution of Somalia included the prevailing chaos in much of Somalia after 1991, which contributed to growing influence by various radical Islamic groups, including Al-Tabliq and Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (Islamic Unity). These groups, which are among the main non-clan-based forces in Somalia, share the goal of establishing a fundamentalist Islamic state. While each organization differs in its approach, Al-Ittihad supports the use of violence to achieve

¹¹⁸ Anna Simons wrote of the Somalis: 'For centuries Somalis have had contact with other sophisticated cultures without having been Islamicized, orientalized, or westernized.' Anna Simons, 'Hardly Innocent: Armed Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia', ACAS Bulletin, No. 48/49 (Fall 1997) p 6

that goal and has claimed responsibility for terrorist acts in the region. In the mid-1990s, Al-Ittihad came to dominate territory in Punt land as well as central Somalia near Gedo. It was forcibly expelled from these localities by Puntland forces as well as Ethiopian attacks in the Gedo region. Since that time, Al-Ittihad has adopted a longer-term strategy based on integration into local communities and establishment of Islamic schools, courts, and relief centers.

After the attack on the United States of September 11, 2001, Somalia gained greater international attention as a possible base for terrorism; a concern that became the primary element in U.S. policy toward Somalia. The United States and other members of the anti-terrorism coalition examined a variety of short- and long-term measures designed to cope with the threat of terrorism in and emanating from Somalia. The United Nations also took an increased interest in Somalia, including proposals for an increased UN presence and for strengthening a 1992 arms embargo. Clearly the wish to stabilize Somalia had grown to evoke global concerns.¹¹⁹

Somalia lacks natural resources and faces major development challenges, and recent economic reverses have left its people increasingly dependent on remittances from abroad which is estimated at US\$ 2 billion and among the highest revenue base in Somalia. Its economy is pastoral and agricultural, with livestock--principally camels, cattle, sheep, and goats representing the main form of wealth. Livestock exports in recent years have been severely reduced by periodic bans, ostensibly for concerns of animal health, by Arabian Peninsula states. Drought has also impaired agricultural and livestock production. Because rainfall is scanty and irregular, farming generally is limited to certain coastal districts, areas near Hargeisa, and the Juba and Shabelle River valleys. The agricultural sector of the economy consists mainly of banana plantations located in the south, which has used modern irrigation systems and up-to-date farm machinery.

¹¹⁹ Hussein Adam, Richard Ford Web Sight collections: Removing Barricades in Somalia Options for Peace and Rehabilitation. Peaceworks: US Institute of Peace

A small fishing industry has begun in the north where tuna, shark, and other warm-water fish are caught, although fishing production is seriously affected by poaching and the lack of ability to grant concessions because of the absence of a generally recognized government. Aromatic woods, frankincense and myrrh from a small and diminishing forest area also contribute to the country's exports. Minerals, including uranium and likely deposits of petroleum and natural gas, are found throughout the country, but have not been exploited commercially. Petroleum exploration efforts, at one time under way, have ceased due to insecurity and instability. Illegal production in the south of charcoal for export has led to widespread deforestation. With the help of foreign aid, small industries such as textiles, handicrafts, meat processing, and printing are being established.

This outline of activities suggests normalcy in the country albeit being stateless.

Circumstances that would help reconstitute the collapsed state and settle the Somalia conflict in order to ensure sustainable peace and productivity while taking into account two persistent characteristics of Somali politics i.e. abhorrence of centralization and fierce individualism include the following elements.

A spirit of local autonomy pervades the society and ought to be enhanced and formalized. During the height of Somali nationalism, there was pressure for strong centralization and expansion of the state. Repression however, accompanied the centrism, especially in the last years of the Siyad regime and resulted in its aversion.

The current theme of anti-centralization comes as a direct reaction against the excesses of Siyad's oppression. The opposition movements that destroyed the regime were themselves based on highly decentralized structures, relying on segmentary clan and geographic divisions of Somali society. Therefore, the new post-Siyad environment reflects the pervasive spirit of local autonomy, stressing cultural autonomy, pastoral lifestyles, and rugged individualism. With all its positives, it

must be noted that decentralization will create an enormous challenge for the new vision of constitutionalism and for the maintenance of security and the provision of human services.

Another extreme reaction to Siad has been the assertion of the right to self-determination by some regions, particularly the creation of the Republic of Somaliland. More recently, the leaders of the Northeast Regions have declared internal autonomy as the Puntland Federal Somali Republic.

People seek broad-based power sharing, both as an echo of the past and as a search for a more participatory future. External groups should join with local communities to reinforce quests for power sharing. Historically, Somali politics were based on the sharing of power among clans, families, and elders and the tradition runs very deep. Clans would bicker and, if necessary, fight for the preservation of their land access, water rights, and grazing territory. Yet no elder believed that he could impose a military or political hegemony on the others. Instead, each sought only to preserve access to and control of the clan's livelihood resources, within a system of reciprocity. The clans were more or less equal in power and practiced a time-honored give-and-take, obeying traditional rules and agreements. In short, they shared power. Remembering what repressive regimes did to them, Somalis always agitate for separation of powers as well as checks and balances to preserve options for shared power, fluid and shifting alliances, negotiation of positions, and availability of political choices and options.¹²⁰

Any new model of governance must include power sharing. Yet it should be made clear that power sharing does not automatically equal clan rule. While clans are an important force in Somalia and must be included in governance structures, they are not the only constituency. Other important considerations, among others, are gender, economic role, profession, political ideology, and religion.

¹²⁰ Hussein Adam, Richard Ford Web Sight collections: Removing Barricades in Somalia Options for Peace and Rehabilitation. Peaceworks: US Institute of Peace

This paper, supported by the enabling conditions and demonstrated by suggested leverage points to initiate action, argues that decentralized and local action is the primary means through which some of the barricades have been removed in Somalia, and can be the organizing principle around which permanent reform can be built. This does not preclude some form of central governance in Somalia, but it argues that the place to begin restoring peace is with local and community-based institutions, rather than at the top.

The United Nations learned this lesson in a pragmatic way in 1992/93 when conflict management was addressed from the top using warleaders only. The original donor vision had imagined reestablishing some form of autonomous state. But fierce resistance to such principles pushed UNOSOM toward regional councils as decision-making units even though there are virtually no models for such a confederation system anywhere in Africa. The EU was however influenced by the writings of Ahmed Yusuf Farah and I. M. Lewis, has explored a model for decentralization on a theoretical basis, work is although still needed on the grassroots implications of such approaches in Somalia.

A second encouraging example is a model, now in use in more than 100 Bari communities, which German Aid (GTZ) introduced in Jeded (Gardo district) in 1994. The approach involves persons in the community in structured and systematic participation to rank community priorities and create action plans. NGOs and UN units are now scaling up this model to work at the district level. A third model calls on elder councils augmented to include sometimes overlooked constituencies such as women groups, in local decision-making. Thus besides the Bari region, Somaliland and Puntland have devolved and elected parliaments and are good examples of Somali community based approaches that seem promising.

Statelessness has unveiled women to the challenges of increasingly prominent role in Somali civil society. These initiatives have won respect among men and women alike and offer a means to

build bridges between hostile clan groups. Women groups require special support and consideration for any lasting peace.

A free and unregulated market economy has emerged and its growth should be encouraged. As described earlier, there is now a thriving free-market economy in many Somali cities where investments during the past few years have produced a solid foundation upon which to expand. Yet there are three critical needs in the private sector. One relates to the security and transport of goods produced. Crops of maize, bananas, and grapefruit are not safe in the fields, and the security of goods in transit cannot be guaranteed. The port and airport of Mogadishu are not yet open. So improved means are needed to protect and ship goods out of the country. At present, large producers rely on own militias which are inefficient and are sometimes volatile.

The biggest problem about statelessness is the issue of collection of revenue to maintain or develop community infrastructural needs. At the moment, this is not happening and, without significant change, is almost certainly not going to happen soon. But generating public revenue is essential. If the present private sector is unable or unwilling to pay taxes, then infrastructure already collapsed will rot to unusable levels.

The third issue involves setting standards or acceptable terms of practice in the Somali private sector. Competition promotes efficiency and fair prices. Unregulated, it also encourages ruthless and sometimes destructive behavior and unprincipled practices. Such ills, derived from excessive competition and the dominance of an uncontrolled private sector, require regulation and monitoring.

Somalis have been ingenious at adapting external technologies and management systems to meet needs at local levels. This spirit of innovation and creativity ought to be encouraged at regional and national levels, as Somalis have always been creative adapters. The extreme challenges of the past decade have elicited amazing technologies and systems, based mostly on the imaginative use of

available resources. For example, many gasoline stations function efficiently though they are pumping with only gravity and a siphon system. Lack of electricity is not an insurmountable problem. The wireless phone system generally works well through high-tech satellite systems. Somali entrepreneurs have skillfully negotiated agreements with high-tech international corporations and have set precedents for new communications systems for much of Africa. Thus any agreement for Somalia's future must consider how it can focus on and benefit from the remarkable creativity and resourcefulness of its people.

Relations with neighboring states are improving and need to be nurtured. Because of Pan-Somali nationalism, Somalia's relations with its neighbors were generally sticky and even belligerent. But after the collapse of the Siad regime, recent relations have had a fresh start or example, Djibouti tried to convene a Somali peace conference after Siad's fall, and though the attempt failed, relations between the two remain good.

With Kenya, renewal of trust took a few years because General Farar Aideed had accused Kenya of assisting General Morgan and other remnants of the Siad forces. At present, relations with Kenya are quite good, and Kenya is gaining a lucrative economic windfall from NGO and international organizations based there to manage Somali programs. Hussein Aideed who succeeded his father as a Warlord relies on Nairobi as the main base of his external political and commercial transactions.

Perhaps most remarkable has been the emergence of generally good relationships between Somalia and Ethiopia. This is why Ethiopia was able to convene, with the support of UNOSOM, several major Somali peace conferences in Addis Ababa. At present, however, there are some clouds hanging on the Somali-Ethiopian horizon. Ethiopia is angry with the Somali Islamic fundamentalists, especially those of Gedo, because of the impact they are having on the Somali-speaking region of Ethiopia. Ethiopia has therefore sent several military parties across the Somali border, at the

invitation of some of the Somali clan factions, to combat the fundamentalists. This has produced a minority anti-Ethiopian sentiment among some sectors of Somali society. Despite this minor blip in external relations, for the first time in history Somalia and its neighbors enjoy generally good relations.

For the purposes of this study, it is convenient to view overall actors and interested parties in Somalia from the perspective of internal or external forces. This kind of analysis will help in understanding the kinds of pressures that were being applied to the Somali Peace Conference in Nairobi. The external actors can be referred to as the invisible actors. Although they are not directly involved in the war they are part of the conflict.¹²¹ In conflict resolution it is important that the invincible actors are taken into consideration. If they are ignored any solution to the conflict will not succeed because the invisible actors will undermine it. The actors in the Somali conference have an interest in the outcome of the conflict. The visible actors in this conflict are the Somali groups, both in terms of individuals and the clans. The frontline states namely, Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia and the two former colonial powers, Britain and Italy constitute the invisible actors.

Djibouti for instance would want a friendly Somali government that would be useful for economic purposes like resource extraction and to provide a viable market. Djibouti's 300,000 population, which is business, oriented would wish to access the Somali market.¹²²

Ethiopia's interest in Somalia is traceable to the history of the two countries. Indeed both Menelik II and Emperor Haile Selassie annexed portions of Somalia. Ethiopia shares a 2000-km border with Somalia, which explains its strategic concerns for security. It has been argued that internal wars have a regional effect through a spill over effect. Thus Ethiopia needs a neighbor that would be a partner in its security arrangements. An additional factor is that the current Ethiopian

¹²¹ Makumi Mwangi, *Community Based Approaches to Conflict in Kenya: Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management* (Nairobi: GTZ. Kenya. 2001)

¹²² Ochieng Kamudhayi, *The Somali Peace Process, in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*, Nairobi op cit, p 117

Prime Minister Meles Zenawi took refuge in Somalia for a long time and made friends with some faction leaders whom he would like to see ascend to power like himself.

Kenya has suffered highly through the huge numbers of refugees who are a financial burden and a threat to the environment. Further, the war in Somalia has led to an increase in insecurity through the infiltration of small arms into Kenya.¹²³ Thus it is essential that Kenya motivates the Somalia reconstitution to stem these spiral effects of the conflict. The personal reasons for retired President Moi in establishing the Moi Foundation as a conflict management instrument also played a role in Kenya's wish to get involved with the reconstitution of Somalia.

The interests of Uganda are naturally influenced by the fact that once Moi left power, President Museveni considered himself his successor as the regional leader. This, was strengthened by the fact that Museveni took over as the Chairman of the IGAD Summit of the Heads of State and Government, which provided an opportunity for leadership in the region¹²⁴

Eritrea on its part saw this as a perfect opportunity to settle scores with Ethiopia as the two countries have had a long-standing border dispute. Eritrea sought an alliance to counter Ethiopia's interests and ambitions in the region. While struggling to settle scores it found perfect allies in Djibouti, which bears a personal grudge against Ethiopia, and Uganda whose aim is to scuttle Kenya's ambitions to retain regional supremacy.

The absence of a central government in Somalia since 1991 has allowed outside forces to become more influential by supporting various groups and persons in Somalia. Djibouti, Eritrea, and Arab states supported the now-defunct TNG, which became one faction among many in Somalia. Ethiopia has provided political support to Somaliland and assisted a group of southern warlords organized as the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), which opposed the TNG.

¹²³ Ibid. p 119

¹²⁴ Ibid

For these reasons, the realism theory of relations between states holds because it is seen that inherently, states always pursue their own interests and ambitions towards self-empowerment whenever they relate to each other. The frontline states interests make peace in Somalia elusive because at any one time, there must be one side that stands to lose in the process.

Taking into considerations the fact that the Somali Peace process in on its fourteenth attempt, it is necessary that efforts for eventual reconstitution should consider the interests of apart from the internal forces, other external actors that should join the negotiation table. Thus whatever the legitimacy of the above-mentioned actors, a resolution will have to take into account the interests of all the parties.

Africa is facing a great challenge in which economics, political and business leadership must be exercised in an increasingly globalised economy. To Robertson (1992), globalization is a consequence of increased perceptions that the world has become compressed. This he attributes to an increased sense of self-awareness of humanity of its common habitat. Accordingly, it is engendered by a growing sense of self-consciousness of global citizenship.¹²⁵

Africa therefore ought to urgently define its comparative advantages, upgrade infrastructure and technology as well as improve the quality of human capital.¹²⁶ Henceforth, it is of great necessity that Africa should have leadership that can be responsive to harnessing Africa's dead capital to enable proactive roles in the global economy.

The enormous raw materials resource coupled with favorable weather should form a basis for processing, manufacturing and packaging products before export. "Currently Africa exports raw material and in the process exports jobs to the developed world. In Kenya, coffee is exported to

¹²⁵ Robertson Roland (1992), Globalisation. Social Theory and Global Culture: London p 183

¹²⁶ Shikwati James: The Prospects for Economic Freedom in Africa: in Reclaiming Africa (Edited by James Shikwati). Nairobi: Published by Inter Region Economic Network 2004 p 17

Germany for roasting, milling, blending and packaging. Kenya thus supports the job market in Germany at the expense of its unemployment.”¹²⁷

NEPAD accepts globalization as a reality and something to engage and challenge with innovative ideas and processes that will reshape the flows of world trade, undo global inequalities, democratize political and social systems and institutionalize global social democracy. NEPAD is the renaissance of Africa and its development agenda includes instituting good governance in the African Union member states. “Governance will be audited through the Peer Review mechanism which is meant to compel the state to good examples of governance and best practices so as to percolate in the rest of the society.”¹²⁸ The construction of Somalia will see Africa additionally reconcile all its efforts in order to claim a negotiating place in the global economic sphere.

3.4. Summary of analysis.

The Somali history has been dogged by structural violence which was introduced by colonialists and the poor post independence leadership. This interfered with homogeneous heritage associated with traditions and religion and resulted in conflict cycles with no foreseeable ends.

The Somali state was torn apart by gangs and armies while the international community remained passive from the onset of the conflict and late UN peacekeeping efforts replete with thirty thousand troops and a multi-billion dollar budget was unable to promote national reconciliation and restore peace.

The quality of international diplomacy in Somali was incompetent, uninformed, inconsistent and sometimes fueled the conflict it sought to mediate. Internationalization of the conflict had brought in many international actors and in true terms of the realism theory of interstate relations, states

¹²⁷ Gatumo Francis: Wealth Creation Through the Management of the Systematic Risks In Africa: The Case of Kenya. An article in Reclaiming Africa (Edited by James Shikwati). Nairobi: Published by Inter Region Economic Network 2004 p 341

concerns continued to play themselves out within Somalia. It is apparent that the regional powers had a tendency to use surrogate militias to advance their goals resulting in regional tensions, which influenced political cleavages in Somalia.

The IGAD led Somali peace talks met several hurdles which threatened to collapse the talks. Disagreements between Ethiopia and Djibouti paralyzed the frontline states entrusted to manage the talks. It was after the technical committee was expanded to include all IGAD member states that Djibouti returned. And in the two years the talks continued in Kenya, there were no face-to-face negotiations between these protagonists.

Despite providing financial and technical support, the donors failed to offer potential commitment to the talks. Notwithstanding, high declarations of support, the UN, USA and European Union (EU) did not have any noticeable leverage on the process and their engagement was hardly beyond low-ranking diplomats in Nairobi which was symptomatic of international neglect.

¹²⁸ Nyong'o Anyang' P. NEPAD: A Timely and Useful Institution for Africa. A Foreword to African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation. op cit, p xi

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. Summary of data.

The study of the Somali conflict and its effect on security in the Horn of Africa between 1990 and 2004 reveals many facts that can be traced from the nature of the Somali people, the nurture or environment in which they live and the interests they pursue. The nature of the Somali is viewed from the standpoint that he is inherently aggressive to ensure his survival. The Somalis live in *dia-paying* groups, which I M Lewis traces from the Arabic *diiya* meaning blood-wealth or blood-compensation group. In this realm violence is institutionalized and can just be settled by payment of 100 camels in event of a man's death whereas 50 camels are paid when a woman or child is killed. Thus violence among members of the community in pursuit of their self-regarded interests is tolerated.

The pastoral life of the Somali community inhibits individual ownership of land to ensure that livestock gets access to pastureland. The pastoral life of the Somali coupled with non-ownership of land makes the administrative institutions that are locality based un-workable and the concept of collective and central authority alien

Siad Barre tried to dismantle and replace the traditional leadership structures that bore allegiance to blood compensation groups with stipended local authorities (*Akhils*) which were a colonial legacy. This dispensation was soundly resisted by the people and resulted in Siad Barre forcing *Akhils* deployment in order to facilitate his repressive authoritarian rule. Resentment of the *Akhils* was displayed when Siad Barre's government collapsed as clans quickly reverted to warleaders who are mainly associated with blood compensation groups. This created warleaders; and according to Max Weber¹²⁹ the concept of state is unworkable when the monopoly of instruments of

¹²⁹ Max Weber, 'Essay in Sociology', in De Jasay A; The State: (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1985) p 78

coercion is decentralized. Thus, the un-coordinated instruments of violence interact violently and their resultant conflicts spiral and spill throughout the Horn of Africa with serious insecurity consequences.

Notable points made from the study of the Somali community and their relations with other Africa communities can be said to include the following:

Firstly, the genetic make up of the Cushietic race suggests inherent aggressiveness of the Somalis. This aggressive nature is acceptable in the community and the blood compensation groups institutionalize its related violence.

Secondly, the community recognizes the traditional leadership based on blood compensation groups with a patrilineal lineage to form a clan. Any other form of centralized authority is not acceptable. This background explains the difficulty in the reconstitution of Somali under a central government.

Thirdly, the pastoral community relies on availability of pastures for their livestock for survival. This community believes that grazing is a gift from God to man and the arbitrary colonial borders that separate them from pastures during cyclic seasons are wrong and generally structurally violent. On this account, access to grazing grounds in the Huud and Ogaden in Ethiopia during dry weather is of paramount importance. This reality has been the main justification for the unification of Somali speaking people in the Horn of Africa to form a Greater Somalia. Omar Mohamed Osman in "*Somalia: A Nation Driven to Despair*"¹³⁰ argues that Somalis just like Germans, the Vietnamese and the Yemeni have dreams of unification of all Somali territories that will ensure integrated livelihood (pastures) of the Somali people.

¹³⁰ Omar, Mohamed Osman, *Somalia: A Nation Driven to Despair*, Somali Publications Co. Ltd, New Delhi India (1998) p 26

Fourthly, Dr Said S Samatar in "*Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil*"¹³¹ asserts that Ethiopia and Kenya are apprehensive of the *Pan-Somalism* concept of a Greater Somalia. He accuses Kenya and Ethiopia of anxiously watching Somalia disintegrate because Somalia has never renounced her territorial claims over NFD and Ogaden respectively.

Fifthly, the concept of *Pan-Somalism* makes Ethiopia and Kenya develop interests in solving the Somali crisis in the own favor. Ethiopia and Kenya are involved in ensuring that the Somalia reconstituted government is friendly and does not harbor the *Pan-Somalism* ideals. These self-serving interests have made mediation of the conflict under IGAD to be relatively skewed and subsequently causing re-entry difficulties after the mediation process.

The relationship between a warleaders' armed faction and clans can be summarized as follows:

The popular base of any faction is through clan support. It is like an electoral college: the subclan supports the clan which supports the militia and the political leaders. The Politicians are warlords and clan leaders at the same time.¹³²

The warleaders' real power is in their capacity to call upon the clans for temporary manpower, either for defense or attack. By far the largest numbers of armed men are accountable to their clan elders' councils, not the warleaders; they are raised at the behest of the clan councils for the defense of the clan or for other operations at the behest of the clan, but do not remain mobilized for long periods.

Although estimates regarding force levels in Somalia are generally speculative, the small numbers generally given for the central core of gunmen permanently on call to the warleaders can illustrate the importance of the clan's grassroots support to their operations.

¹³¹ Samatar, Said S: *Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil*, Minority Rights Group International, UK, (1991) p 33

¹³² Aid official, Human Rights Watch interview, Nairobi, January 18, 1995. April 1995 Vol. 7, No. 2 *Somalia Faces The Future: Human Rights In A Fragmented Society*: www.hrw.org

In summary of the Pan-African and Pan-Somali issues, it can be said that the Somali nationalism began as an exclusive movement aimed at the amalgamation of the Somali territories in the Horn of Africa. *Pan-Somalism*, based on the principle of self-determination, was then viewed as a positive contribution towards African unity, of which the first step had already been achieved as the creation of the Somali Republic.

It is my view that the Somali leadership was pressurized to pursue *Pan-Somalism* ideals that resulted in conflict with resisting governments of Kenya and Ethiopia. Further pursuit of these constitutional objectives led to war and played a big role towards the disintegration of weakened Somalia especially after the Ogaden War.

In recapitulation, some of the factors that led to the eventual collapse of Somalia are:

1. Clan loyalty in the pastoral society and abhorrence of any authority out of their lineage's.
2. The undermining of traditional authority over decades was one of the root causes of the conflict.
3. The shortcomings of alien notions of government, e.g. the parliamentary system during the independence decade which failed to meet the high hopes of the people and failed to deliver the missing territories (root cause).
4. The two decades of Scientific Socialism which spawned Siyaadism and which completely destroyed the moral fabric of the society and enhanced structural violence (proximate cause).
5. Neo-colonial super-power interests in the Horn which left Somalia littered with weaponry. Boundary problems with neighbors which would not be wished away were ignored by the OAU (proximate cause).

6. In the absence of a benevolent state after the fall of Siad Barre people reverted to old clan loyalties living in hostile attitude (trigger cause).
7. The effect of ideological conflict and wars in the Horn became the nail in Somalia's coffin (trigger cause)

4.2. Security measures in the Horn of Africa.

The states in the Horn of Africa need to place the security of people at the centre of their security agenda by eliminating threats due to the proliferation of small arms. It is no surprise that a state that ensures the safety of its people from both traditional and non-traditional threats is far more secure than a state, which seeks only to preserve itself.

For a long time, the roots of the security problems in the region included the lack of unconditional legitimacy for state boundaries, state institutions and regimes; inadequate societal cohesion; and the absence of societal consensus on fundamental issues of socio-economic and political organizations.

The study of the foundation of the Somalia conflict and security implications in the Horn of Africa reveals a conundrum of insecurity potential issues that are not in tandem with contemporary life. The Horn of Africa is however, part of the global village and is bound to respond to globalization demands. It is evident that there is need to come to grips with questions of regional security for socio-economic development.

In the Horn of Africa or the IGAD region, the fact that the operating environment is unpredictable cannot be gainsaid. Indeed, it is the very unpredictability of the region that makes it imperative to debate issues in the context and content of a regional security strategy.¹³³ The regions complex political environment is characterized by complex state identities: ranging from the failed –

¹³³ Makumi Mwangi, Towards a Security Architecture in the IGAD Region, in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation. (Nairobi Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004) p 135

or collapsed – state of Somalia to the uneasy relation between an ancient state (Ethiopia) and the regions newest state Eritrea.

Evidently, the critical vulnerability in the region is that security concerns have for a long time been focussed in protecting states in the Horn of Africa. State security was strongly guarded at all expense.

Somalia has to be stabilized in order for the Horn of Africa countries to start thinking outside the box. Somalia has to be reconstituted so that a new security order can be designed to conform to globalization demands for ‘borderless’ interrelation of people in the Horn of Africa along common parameters.

IGAD is the body that provides a framework to meet globalization challenges. IGAD’s CERWARN and associated EASBRIG are in line with the Africa Union (AU) Protocol to enhance peace and security on the continent. In particular, AU member states intend to take risks for peace, and are ready to accept their share of responsibilities for ensuring durable development of the continent, particularly in the area of peace and security.¹³⁴

Reconstitution of Somalia urgently requires a force to enable the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) formed after the fourteenth peace talks in Kenya to put its foot in Somalia (Mogadishu) in order to concretize the IGAD led peace talks. In the peace and reconstitution efforts undertaken, so far, it has become clear that ‘no quick fix’ solutions can be fruitful if delivered by agreements reached at high-level talks in foreign capitals. Such agreements created misplaced expectations both for the Somalis and the international community but did not result in sustainable peace. This is partly because the participants of the peace conferences have no strong constituencies and do not have control of the territories they claim to rule.

¹³⁴ African Union: Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (part 1): Document adopted by the Third Meeting of Africa Chiefs of Defence Staff 15-16 May 2003, Addis Ababa.

However, some of the landmark efforts to resolve the conflict are chronologically outlined as follows:

1. In 1991, Djibouti hosted two reconciliatory conferences with the support of Egypt and Italy. The conference declared a new Somali Government led by Ali Mahdi who was favored by Italy and Egypt over his rival, General Aideed who was the chairman of the USC, which had ousted Siad Barre. This led to a four-month bloody confrontation between General Aideed's supporters and those of the interim government.
2. Between 1993 and 1994, the UN organized four ill-fated conferences, three in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and one in Nairobi, Kenya. In March 1993, the UN organized conferences in Addis Ababa and brought together fifteen Somali factions with the aim of establishing transitional institutions. The outcome of these conferences antagonized General Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) of Ali Mahdi and this led to clashes between Aideed's militia and the international force in Somalia and resulting in the UN complete abandonment of Somalia.
3. In October 1996, former Kenyan President, Daniel T Arap Moi invited the Somali faction leaders to broker an understanding between Ali Mahdi, General Aideed and Osman Atto. But his attempt achieved little because Ethiopia called for a parallel conference in Sodore, Ethiopia in November the same year to forge a coalition of the like-minded factions against Aideed's self proclaimed Salbellar government.
4. In May 1997, Yemen, who had historical ties as well as cultural ties with Somalia offered to mediate between Aideed and Atto whose supporters, had been fighting in south Mogadishu. This meeting complemented the Nairobi understanding of the Mogadishu based faction leaders and ended hostilities in South Mogadishu.

5. In November 1997, Egypt hosted the Cairo conference attended by Hussein Aideed's (General Aideed's son and successor) Salbuler government and NSC formed at Sodere, Ethiopia. The mediation between the two rival groups was frustrated when several factions aligned to Ethiopia pulled out from the talks. Egypt then supported the creation of an administration in Mogadishu co-chaired by Hussein Aideed and Ali Mahdi while Ethiopia supported the creation of Puntland state led by its staunch ally Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Egypt was in favor of a strong unitary Somali state while Ethiopia promoted a polarized administration, which was vulnerable to her influence and manipulation.

6. Further dynamics motivated Djibouti to participate in balancing the power configuration in the region by convening the thirteenth reconciliation conference in Arta in 2002 that established the Transitional National Government (TNG) to be led by Abdi Kassim Salaad. This was the thirteenth conference and main participants were members of the civil society.

7. Eventually, armed faction leaders and Ethiopia challenged the TNG through the Somali Restoration Reconciliation Council (SSRC) and this countered the Arta outcome and crippled TNG authority.

4.3. **Conclusion**

In conclusion, perhaps the most significant conflict in Somalia at present, one that is rarely mentioned pits warlords, faction leaders, and a rising commercial elite against traditional religious and clan leaders as well as women's groups that seek to maintain order and stability. It is a conflict between political entrepreneurs representing a new macro power and people's organizations drawn from the clans, religion, and women.

One of the problems of the mediation process is the concern whether the parties will be able to re-enter their domestic environments successfully and 'sell' the outcome of the mediation to their

constituents. This problem has two related levels: shaping the parties perceptions by getting them to have a commitment to implementing the agreement, and shaping the perceptions of their constituents so that they can buy the agreement and hence legitimize it. Re-entry by the negotiating parties back to Somalia is still a problem despite formation of an all-inclusive government.

Another threat to Somalia's reconstruction may be posed by external intervention that disrupts the uneasy balance between unsettled leaders and competing social groups. Although the traditional authorities that stand behind the military chiefs now appear prepared to end the conflict of the past five years, an interface between foreign governments to support one party to the conflict frustrate progress made. Ethiopia for instance has continued to behave like a hegemonic destabilizer in Somalia by its maintenance of veto over peace processes and sponsoring functional polarization and emergence of mini-structures, which were inherently irreconcilable. Ethiopia should be motivated to toe down its interests for the sake of getting acceptable solutions to all parties.

Having considered all the beneficiaries of the reconstitution of Somalia, it is also worth to note as Ali Mazrui¹³⁵ observes that Africa had two categories of people in relations to issues of governance. There are those who depend on land and those who depend on animals. Those who keep animals largely had stateless societies as opposed to those who tilled land who had some semblance of a state. The stateless societies however, ordered anarchy through consensus rather than through coercion. The Somalis in this case belong to the category of lovers of animals who had a stateless society. The creation of a western type of state lacked the basis of nationhood and thus it collapsed. Somali mentality lacks an adequate commitment to nationhood. The question is whether Somali society without nationhood is capable of holding onto statehood. This lends credence to the argument for a stateless society in Somalia.

¹³⁵ Ali Mazrui, "From Tyranny to Anarchy," in *Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Community in the 21st Century*, Edited by Hussein M. Adam and R. Ford. p 6-7

It could be argued further therefore, that the reconstitution of the Somalia state is of no benefit to the people of Somali origin, notwithstanding the desires of its neighbors and many other external actors in general.

4.4. Recommendations

The international donor community and institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) should come to the aid of Somalia by providing funds to rebuild the destroyed and almost non-existent infrastructure. IGAD and Arab states should undertake collective lobbying in the international circles for stabilization in terms of resource mobilization for the reconstruction of the country.

To concretize the IGAD led peace talks, the TFG of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed should be buffeted to gain foothold in Mogadishu. It is my view that EASBRIG should hasten its formative stages and quickly deploys in Somalia at this opportune moment of state rebuilding which is delicate and needs all necessary support. This is the ultimate solution as it has been seen that the successes of external peace initiatives largely hinge on availability of leadership within the regional and international circles around which all other efforts can coalesce. The Horn of Africa lacks this hegemony and EASBRIG under IGAD framework can do the job. Similar hegemonic stabilizers operate under ECOWAS and SADC sub-regions to facilitate solutions in the south and west of Africa.

The UN agencies like the United National High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Program (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO) should, when peace is restored, join in to ensure that Somali refugees in neighboring countries are repatriated, food is provided to the hungry and provision of medical services respectively.

The UN and international community should in future intervene as soon as a conflict is seen and the will to do so should be manifested by acting rather than being passive. The UN should assign priority to conflicts without bias, as was the case with Somali's conflict in which the UN and international community's attention was mainly to the Gulf and the Balkans.

Somalia's neighbors and other actors in the peace process world wide took sides in the affairs of Somalia. This calls for reconciliation of the regional actors so that they can shelf their self-interests for the sake of peace in the suffering Somalia.

The argument for a stateless society in Somalia needs to be considered seriously. A loose alliance of federal states should be constituted as expansive Somalia seems to be of no benefit to the people of Somali origin who abhor centralized authority, notwithstanding the desires of its neighbors and many other external actors in general.

The study further argues that decentralized local action is the primary means through which some of the barricades have been removed in Somalia, and can be the organizing principle around which permanent reform can be built. This does not preclude some form of central governance in Somalia, but it argues that the place to begin restoring peace is with local and community-based institutions, rather than at the top.

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4.5. Area of Further Study.

Somalis are irreconcilable within known forms of government as democratic representation is not trusted and scientific socialism failed. Socialism cannot work in such an individualistic population as all Somalis have a direct say in all affairs affecting them and there is no recognized leadership hierarchy other than within clan structures.

Thus the concept of state is not conceivable within Somalia and therefore, need arises to study if Somali people can be integrated into other Horn of Africa countries. This idea is complemented by globalization requirements of 'border-less' societies that allow free enterprise in societies.

The reconstitution of the Somalia State is seen as step in reverse when globalization is weakening nation-states all over the world.

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