TITLE

INFORMAL ALLIANCES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CONFLICT: A STUDY OF THE LUSAKA PEACE PROCESS, 1998-1999.

BY

KENNETH GOGA

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, AT THE INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI.

OCTOBER 2001

DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

Kenneth Goga

24th October 2001

Date

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University Supervisor.

Dr. Mwagiru Makumi

26 October 2001

Date

DEDICATION

IN MEMORY OF

LUCAS GOGA ACHINGO AND PHILIP OTIENO ACHINGO

ACKNOLEDGEMENTS

I wish to record my indebtedness to individuals and institutions without whose assistance and co-operation this dissertation would have not been conceptualized, embarked on and completed. I may not be able to acknowledge all the contributions by every individual in this dissertation. However, I would like to pay tribute to all those who in one way or another contributed to the realization of this work.

I thank the University of Nairobi for granting me the opportunity to pursue a Masters degree in International Studies. I also express my sincere thanks to the Tokyo Foundation for a warding me a two-year scholarship that enabled me complete my study in time.

I owe a great debt to my supervisor, Dr. Mwagiru Makumi, who exhibited unqualified devotion and patience in making sure that this work is perfectly done and completed. Despite his demanding academic work, he never failed to get time to guide and advise me appropriately. I benefited a great deal from his views and comments from the beginning to the end of this study.

Friends never let me down during this study. I must acknowledge three friends who played invaluable roles to see me succeed in my academic endeavours. These are Mr. Oscar Odhiambo, Mr. Tobias Osano and Mr. Tom Okumu. They provided valuable assistance in the process of data collection, typing and printing. They also encouraged me to be courageous and firm when things were not working well. In fact, Mr. Osano exclusively helped me in gathering the necessary data from the Internet.

I record great appreciation to all my classmates and friends especially Emma A. Oketch, Tom Kagwe, Miranda Tabifor, Judy Oduma, Simiyu Wanyonyi, Moses Omwago, Nancy Jamal and Jacob Awuor. Their company and advice cannot go unrecognized.

My family members including my mother (Mary Goga), brother (George Goga), sisters (Rose Okado and Joyce Okumu), Uncle (the late Philip Otieno Achingo) and loving grand mother (Anjeline Achingo) were helpful in providing me with moral and financial support. Their unfailing support, empathy and patience during this study cannot be forgotten.

I also sincerely thank the staff of the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies for their cooperation and advise.

" He who loves the roses has to put up with the thorns"

For the love of books, I decided to come back to the University of Nairobi for a Master degree in International Studies. I learnt that good things are not easy to come by without a spirited fight.

Abbreviations

ADF.....Allied Democratic Forces

AFDL.....Alliance for Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire

DRC.....Democratic Republic of Congo

EAC.....East African Cooperation

EX-FAR.....Former Rwandan Armed Forces

FAA.....Angolan Armed Forces

FAC.....Congolese Armed Forces

FAZ.....Ex-Zairian Armed Forces

FDD.....Forces for the Defense of Democracy

ICG.....International Crisis Group

ICJ.....International Court of Justice

JMC.....Joint Military Commission

LRA.....Lord's Resistance Army

MLC.....Movement for the Liberation of Congo

MPLA.....Movement for Popular Liberation of Angola

NALU.....National Army for the Liberation of Uganda

NATO.....North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NRM.....National Resistance Movement

OAU.....Organization for African Unity

OSLEG.....Operation Sovereign Legitimacy

RCD.....Rally for Congolese Democracy

RPF.....Rwandan Patriotic Front

SADC.....Southern Africa Development Community

UN.....United Nations

UNITA.....Union for Total Independence of Angola

UPA.....United People's Democratic Army

UPDF.....Uganda People's Defense Force

WNBF.....West Nile Bank Front

ZANU.....Zimbabwe African National Union

ZDI.....Zimbabwean Defense Industry

ZESA.....Zimbabwean Electricity Supply Authority

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BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Introduction

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the third largest country in Africa. It was previously called Zaire until 1996. It was formally a Belgian colony. Mobutu ruled this country from 1965 to 1997. His rule was characterized with immense human rights abuses, despotism, nepotism, corruption and collapsed economy.[1] During the Cold War era, Mobutu was instrumental to the West as he worked to contain communism in Central Africa.[2] The United States foreign policy geared towards the containment of communism ended with the end of Cold War. The United States began to withdraw its support for Mobutu in 1986 thus leaving him vulnerable to opposition both from within and from outside the country.[3]

In 1996, Laurent Desire Kabila, with the support of Uganda and Rwanda began a rebellion in eastern Congo under the Alliance for Democratic Forces for Liberation of Congo Zaire (ADFL), which led to the ouster of Mobutu on 17 May 1997.[4]

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[1] "From Mobutu to Kabila," *The Internationalist*, September-October 1997, p.1.
[2] Ibid., p.1.
[3] Ibid., p.2.
[4] S. Massey, "Operation Assurance: The Great ... intervention that Never Happened," The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, http://www.iha.ac/articles/a036.htm , p.1.

However, by 1998, differences emerged between Kabila and his former allies, Uganda and Rwanda, as Kabila expelled their Soldiers in late July 1998.[5] According to International Crisis Group,[6] this move by Kabila to shrug off his former sponsors was perceived by Uganda and Rwanda as a security and economic threat to their interests thus effectively accelerating the activation of an armed movement. This led to a situation of reciprocal distrust between Kabila versus Uganda and Rwanda. Both parties sought to organize a new coalition for themselves and these attempts led to an assortment of alliances between various actors on the Congolese political scene and outside. [7] All the major participants in the DRC conflict such as the rebel groups, the ex-Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ), the *interaharamwe* militia and the *mai-mai* warriors have been integrated into the two alliances.[8]

The country has been engulfed in two consecutive wars since 1996. Kabila and his allies (Uganda and Rwanda) in a bid to remove President Mobutu from power fought in the first war.[9] The second war pits the first allies (Kabila versus Uganda and Rwanda) against each other. It is this second war that this study is concerned with. This is one of the most internationalized war in Africa. The war has directly engaged half-dozen states (Uganda, Rwanda, DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia) which form two opposing alliances. Uganda and Rwanda fight to overthrow the

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[5] Human Rights Watch, *Casualties of War: Civilians, Rule of Law and Democratic Freedoms*, February, Volume 11, Number 1(A), p.1.
[6] International Crisis Group, *North Kivu Quagmire* 13 Aug. 1998 p.2
[7] Ibid., p.2
[8] F. Reyntjens, "Briefing: The Democratic Republic of Congo, From Kabila to Kabila", *African Affairs*, Volume 100, Number 399, April 2001, pp. 311-317:313.
[9] International Crisis Group, *North Kivu Quagmire*, op.cit. p.2.

Kabila government. Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola intervened in support of Kabila.

On 2 August 1998, barely 14 months after the fall of the President Mobutu, a new-armed movement (involving Uganda and Rwanda armies) announced the beginning of another "war of liberation" of DRC.[10] This new movement backed by Rwanda and Uganda speedily swept across the DRC and on the verge of capturing Kinshasa. In order to retain power, Kabila sought for support from other neighbouring states. A military counter-alliance emerged composed of the DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, which repelled the Uganda-Rwanda alliance. This is a form of military intervention based on convergence of interests leading to the formation of alliances and counter-alliances. The involvement of a number of regional states in this conflict has transformed its nature. It is no longer a local conflict but a regional one.

The term alliance is widely used in the study of international politics. The international community has all along been concerned with matters of international peace and security. Alliances have featured as part and parcel of processes of maintaining international peace and security. During the Cold War rivalries between the East and the West, alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact were central to issues of peace and war. Therefore some scholars like Friedman, Bladen and Rosen view alliances as 'peace seeking' or 'war promoting' systems.[11]

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[10] International Crisis Group, North Kivu Quagmire, op.cit. p.3.

[11] J. R. Friedman, C. Bladen and S. Rosen, *Alliances in the International Politics*. (Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1970) pp. 3-33.

The Great Lakes region has experienced a lot of internal and external conflicts since the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold war exposed long ignored tensions, quickly unleashing many political, ethnic, economic and social upheavals: the traditional state structures are weakening and long suppressed cultural and ethnic groups are resurgent. [12]

Alliances are not only formed through treaties but also through less explicit agreements which may be secretive. Therefore, there exist formal and informal alliances. What has emerged in the DRC conflict is a non-institutionalized, informal alliance of neighbouring states.[13] The Uganda-Rwanda and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliances are informal.

According to Omach[14], many leaders in Africa have weak power bases and hence are faced with immense opposition from within the state. Some of these states are also faced with external threats. In order to survive in power, these leaders have been engaged in mitigating both internal and external threats by aligning with other states.[15]

Alliances are formed, maintained and extended in an effort to provide for military security systems in the international arena. Military alliances emerge when a state recognizes the presence of a threat, which it cannot manage with its own resources.[16]

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[12] E. Childers and B. Urquhart, *Renewing the United Nations System* (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjold, 1990) p.9.
[13] P. Omach, "The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interest", *African Affairs* Volume 99, Number 395, pp. 73-95: 81.
[14] Ibid., p. 81.
[15] Ibid. pp. 81-82
[16] M. D. Ward, *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics.* (Colorado: Graduate School for International Studies, 1982) p. 39.

Various mediation attempts have been made to end this war. The OAU, the UN, SADC, the International Francophonie Community, Libya, South Africa, Tanzania and a number of individual personalities (such as President Mandela, Chiluba, Mkapa and Mbeki) have attempted to mount peace initiatives in the conflict.[17] Issues involving withdrawal of foreign troops, cease-fire, security, participation of rebel groups among others have posed great obstacles to these peace processes.

However, the Lusaka Peace Process mediated by President Chiluba of Zambia broke through these barriers. This peace process led to an agreement between the alliances about the modalities of ending the war. The Lusaka Peace Process went through five major Phases. In the first four phases, no agreement was reached. It is only in phase four that an agreement was reached and signed by the belligerent states.[18]

This inquiry focuses on the effects of alliances and the policies they pursue on the mediation process and outcome. The main aim of the study is to examine the role of alliances from a mediation perspective. In order to understand the role of alliances in negotiation, it is important to focus on policies pursued by the alliances. Alliance policy objectives and means of achieving them are crucial in conflict creation and in understanding issues and outcome of a mediation process. Policy-making plays an important

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[17] International Crisis Group, *The Agreement on Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace*, Report Number 5, 20 August 1998, p. 32.
[18] International Crisis Group, *The Agreement on Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo, op. Cit.* p. 32.

role in conflict creation and in negotiation as most of what happens in negotiation are the assertion of policy arguments by one side and the response with other policy arguments by the other side.[19] States use mediation as a method of peaceful attainment of foreign policy objectives.[20] Job view alliance formation as a way in which parties consult and cooperate on policy matters.[21] It can be asserted that when two or more policy conclusions are incompatible in the sense that they cannot be obtained simultaneous then a conflict develops.

The initial step for parties to a conflict in negotiations is to state their policy conditions.[22] Holsti asserts that alliances partners have some similar or overlapping foreign policy objectives and that mediation involves modification of these policies.[23] It is therefore evident that foreign policy plays an important role in any mediation process.

It is because of this importance of foreign policy in mediation that this study strives to link the two.

The problem

The conflict environment in the DRC has not only necessitated external military intervention by neighbouring states, but also led to

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[19] R. Axelrod "Argumentation in Foreign Policy Setting" in I. W. Zartman, (Ed.) *The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications* (London: Sage, 1978) p.177.
[20] See S. J. Brown and K. M. Schraub. (Eds). *Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of peace Press, 1992).
[21] B. L. Job, "Grins without cats: In Pursuit of Knowledge of International Alliances" in P. T. Hopmann, D. A. Zinnes and J. D. Singer (Eds.), *Cumulation in International Relations Research* (Colorado: Graduate School of International Relations, 1984) p.74.
[22] R. C. North, H. E. Koch and D. A. Zinnes, "Integrative Functions of Conflict" in J. R. Friedman, C. Bladen and S. Rosen (Eds.), *Alliances in the International Politics.* (Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), pp. 290-313: 311.
[23] K. J. Holsti, "Diplomatic Coalition and Military Alliances" in K. J. Holsti (Ed.), *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (New jersey: Prentice Hall; 1967) pp. 93-103:93.

interstate coordination of military strategy (alliances). It exhibits elements of imperialism in which some countries forcefully occupy part of another country, establish direct or indirect control of its population and exploits its resources. The war has led to grouping of six states into two opposing military alliances. The involvement of regional states in the DRC conflict through alliance formation has complicated the conflict enviroment. Many more variables such as different interests, perceptions and attitudes have been brought to bear on this conflict.

Alliances are characterized by some aspects, which might pose great challenges to mediation process. Scholars who have studied alliances have come up with the following alliance characteristics. Singer and Small's study on alliances reveals that they impose constraints and obligations on the adherents, which would not have existed or would have been weaker had the alliance not existed.[24] They assert that alliance members are bound by some goals and also establish that a state's alliance commitments increase chances of its war involvement. [25] Job sees alliances as arrangements establishing obligations to which states publicly commit themselves.[26] He asserts that an alliance relationship is distinguished from other forms of cooperation among states because it focuses on issues of national security that are pursued largely through strategic and military planning and action.[27]

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[24] J. D. Singer and M. Small, " Formal Alliances 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description" in J. R. Friedman, C. Bladen and S. Rosen (Eds.), *Alliances in the International Politics*. (Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1970) pp. 130-164.

[25] J. D. Singer and M. Small, "National Alliance Commitments and War Involvement, 1815-1945" in S. D. Jones and J. D. Singer, *Beyond Conjecture in International Politics* (Michigan: F.E. Peacock, 1972) pp. 366-367.

[26] Job, B.L. "Grins Without Cats. In pursuit of Knowledge of International Alliances", op.cit. p.40.

[27] Ibid. p.39.

According to Walt,[28] states choose allies in order to balance against the most serious threats. He establishes that alliances are formed in response to a perceived threat, which creates the cohesion through which alliances form and persist.[29]According to Ward, bargaining situations involving alliances begin with two pre-existent coalitions holding rigid, conflicting negotiating positions on the issue under contention.[30] Rivalry, negative perceptions and attitudes, ideological inflexibility, tensions and threat characterize the relationship between alliances.[31]

These alliance characteristics run counter to a meaningful mediation process thus posing a great challenge to mediation. This challenge creates a problem situation, which needs to be understood.

The study attempts to examine the impact of alliances and the policies they pursue on mediation processes and outcome. The goal of the study is to analyze alliances from the mediation perspective. The study investigates how alliances affect mediation process and outcome and how the policies pursued between alliance members impact on mediation process and outcome.

Objectives of the study

This study aims at pursuing the following objectives:

1. Examining the conflict environment in DRC.

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[28] S. M. Walt, *The Origins Of Alliances* (London: Cornell University Press, 1987) p.31.
[29] Ibid., p.31.
[30] M. D. Ward, *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics* (Colorado: Graduate School of International Studies, 1982) p.39.
[31] Ibid., p.39.

2. Highlighting the various alliance characteristics in the DRC conflict and how they affect the mediation process
3. Establishing the alliance objectives and means of pursuing them (alliance policy).
4. Exploring the positive and negative impacts of alliances on the process and outcome of mediation.

Justification of the study

The justification of the study lies in the search for an understanding of conflicts involving 'aggregation of states'. Conflict is not only a military issue, but also a socio-economic and political concern. Incidences of violent conflicts have increased in Africa since the end of the Cold War. There are more potential for intra-state and inter-state strife and collapse in Africa following the end o f the Cold War as evidenced in Somalia. Therefore, understanding the different aspects in conflict situations such as alliance formation becomes imperative to peace initiatives.

Many mediation processes in the Great Lakes region have focused on parties directly involved in the conflicts without integrating some regional states as parties to the conflict. For example, the Arusha Mediation of 1994 on Rwanda involved only the RPF and the Habyarimana government as the parties to the conflict.[32] The parties to the mediation on the Ugandan conflict of 1985 were only the Tito Okello's

military government and the NRM leaders.[33] It can be said that the idiosyncratic view of treating conflicts as unique to a particular country has been the cause of failures of many peace processes in Africa. According to Sisk, the Africa's contemporary conflicts are invariably infused with common elements (ties transcending borders), which deserve special management methods (conflict system approach).[34] The involvement of regional states such as Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in the DRC conflict has reinforced the need to treat these states as parties to the conflict and include them in the mediation process. This study is therefore a departure from the "traditional" approach of mediation, which considers conflict as unique to a particular place, to a conflict system approach, which considers (external) systemic variables as well. The study of alliance networks in the DRC and their participation in mediation process offers a meaningful approach to conflict management in the Great Lakes region.

There is substantial literature on alliances but very little of this touches on Africa. Walt observes that much of the propositions about alliances have been derived from European experience especially from the Great Powers' perspective.[35] Most of the studies on alliances and negotiation during the Cold War touched on security relations between the

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[32] See T. D. Sisk, "Mediating Africa's Civil Conflicts: A User's Guide" in M. G. Sorbo, and P. Vale, (Eds.) *Out of Conflict: From War to Peace in Africa* (Uppsala, Nordiska, 1997) pp. 179-198: 179.
[33] See M. Mwagiru, *The International Management of Internal Conflict: The Uganda Mediation, 1985*, (PhD Thesis: University of Kent at Canterbury; October 1994).
[34] T. D. Sisk, "Mediating Africa's Civil Conflicts: A User's Guide", op.cit. pp.179-198.
[35] S. M. Walt, *The Origins Of Alliances*, op.cit. p.31.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact.[36] Some examples of these negotiations include the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the Partial Nuclear Test Ban treaty.[37] By focusing on informal alliances in DRC, this study seeks to address the current state of imbalance in the literature. The inquiry therefore introduces an African perspective to the study of alliances.

This study strives to fill the gap in alliance literature and provide useful insights into the conflict and its resolution. It will be useful not only to the academic community but also to policy makers, peacemakers and other stakeholders dealing with conflict situations involving alliances. It will also enrich the knowledge of negotiation involving coalitions of states.

Literature review

Many attempts have been made to study alliances in the international system. The works, which have been undertaken on alliance, can be categorized under the following broad categories.

Balance of power

Literature on this issue views alliance as protective devices of states generally aimed to attaining balance of power to curb domination by others. [38]

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[36] M. D. Ward, *Research Gaps in Alliance*, op.cit. p.33.
[37] Ibid., p.33.
[38] H. J. Morgenthau and K. W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for power and Peace* (New Delhi: Kalyani, 1991) p. 207.

Naidu[39]examines the relationship between alliance and balance of power. He evaluates regional alliances such as NATO and Warsaw pact in terms of achievement of military goals and concludes that these two alliances were important in preventing the outbreak of a major war during the Cold War era.[40] The grouping of states into alliances and counter alliances produce an equal distribution of power between them. Riker examines the stability of alliances in a balance of power system and establishes that alliances and counter-alliances create 'equilibrium' of power leading to stability in the international system since no single state or group of states is capable of starting and winning war.[41]

Morgenthan, views alliances as a necessary function of balance of power within the multi state system and that states can add to their power the power of others by embarking on the policy of alliances. [42] He establishes that powerful states are reluctant to enter into alliances with powerful ones and it is only weak states that seek alliance with powerful ones.[43]

Origin, size, models of growth and function of alliances

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[39] M. V. Naidu, *Alliances and Balance of Power: A Search for Conceptual Clarity* (London: McMillan, 1974) p.77.
[40] Ibid., p.77.
[41] W. H. Riker, "The Size Principle" in J. R. Friedman, C. Bladen and S. Rosen, *Alliances in the International Politics*. (Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1970) pp. 263-267.
[42] H. J. Morgenthau and K. W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, op.cit. p. 201.
[43] Ibid., p.201.

Much of the literature on alliance centre on these issues. Liska surveys how alliances came about and operate by using historical materials from 16th Century onwards on European diplomacy.[44]

Job[45] presents an empirical investigation concerning the patterns or networks of state alliance membership in the international system. He explains how several types of mathematical probability models are applicable to the exploration of inter-state alliance membership pattern. He pays attention solely to networks of formal peacetime commitments negotiated by states in response to perceived threats of their military security. Job's mathematical model has been used to study the manner in which people choose their friends and disseminate information in the international system.[46]

Alliance collective goods, cohesion and war

'Collective goods' are the benefits derived by alliance members from associating together. Glenn[47] uses collective goods approach to alliances to assess the effects of NATO and other alliances which America involve in, on American foreign relations. He views alliance goods as deterrence, which leads to protection of alliance members from external threat.[48] Morgenthan and Thompson look into ways of distributing alliance goods to its members and assert that the role played by each member of an

[44] G. Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press; 1968)
[45] B. L. Job, "Grins Without Cats. In Pursuit of Knowledge of International Alliances", op.cit. pp. 39-63.
[46] Ibid., pp.39-63.
[47] See P. Glenn, " Corralling The Free Rider: Deterrence and the Western Alliance." *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 34, Number 2, June 1990, pp. 147-164.
[48] Ibid., pp. 147-164.

alliance should be commensurate to the benefit derived.[49] The theme of 'collective goods' has achieved wide consensus from different authors in this field.

Olson & Zeckhanser [50] develop an economic theory of alliances and assert that alliances serve the common interests of member states in protecting them from aggression by a common enemy. They see the common objective of an alliance as collective good which if achieved, then every alliance member automatically benefits.[51] Thus, they offer a theory of the distribution of alliance costs among members in relations to the benefits derived by each.

Alliance cohesion looks at factors, which lead to unity within the alliance. Threat is exemplified as the main reason of alliance cohesion.[52] However some scholars have warned against cohesiveness arguing that highly cohesive groups have a tendency to suppress doubts and arguments that challenge existing or emerging consensus.[53]

Singer and Small[54] investigate what causes and are caused by alliance bonds. They are concerned with ways in which alliance aggregation alone and in conjunction with other national and systemic phenomena correlates with war, status shift and conflict

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[49] H. J. Morgenthau and K. W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, op.cit. p. 210.
[50] M. Olson and R. Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances" in J. R. Friedman, C. Bladen and S. Rosen, *Alliance in International Politics*, op.cit. p.177.
[51] Ibid., p. 177.
[52] See S. M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances, op.cit. p.4.
[53] D. G. Pruitt and S. A Lewis, " The Psychology of Integrative Bargaining" in D. Druckman, (Ed.) *Negotiation: Social Psychological Perspectives* (London: Sage, 1977) pp. 161-192; 187.
[54] J. D. Singer and M. Small, " Formal Alliances 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description", op.cit. pp. 130-164.

management. They attempt to test the notion that alliances impose constraints and obligations upon their adherents and conclude that there is a meaningful relationship between alliance and war occurrence.[55]

Rosen asserts that the process of alliance is part of the larger subject of organization for war and that the logic of military alliance derives from the logic of war, as alliance is a functional device for purposes of war.[56] Singer and Melvin investigate the extent to which alliance commitments of states predict to their probability in involvement in war and conclude that a state's alliance commitments predict positively to its likelihood in involving in war.[57]

Negotiation and mediation

Druckman presents concepts and methodologies that are intended to advance understanding of negotiation processes and influences from a socio-psychological perspective.[58]

Schelling[59] studies conflicts as essentially bargaining situations between states. These are situations in which the ability of one state depends to a great extent on decisions of other states.[60] Bargaining power, strength and skill are advantages, which accrue to the powerful, the strong

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[55] Ibid. pp. 130-164
[56] Rosen, S. "A Model of War and Alliance" in J. R. Friedman, C. Bladen, and S. Rosen, *Alliance in International Politics*, op.cit. p.215
[57] J. D. Singer, and M. Small, "National Alliance Commitments and War Involvement, 1815-1945" in S.D. Jones and J. D. Singer, *Beyond Conjecture in International Politics*, op.cit. pp. 366-367.
[58] D. Druckman, (Ed.) *Negotiation: Social Psychological Perspectives* (London: Sage, 1977) p.9.
[59] See T. C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (London: Cambridge, 1960)
[60] T. C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, op.cit. p.5.

and the skillful bargainers.[61] Synder and Diesing examine the effect of bargaining and decision-making on the outcome of international crises.[62]

North, Koch and Zinnes[63] explore how conflicts lead to integration by focusing on the group as their unit of analysis. They attempt to answer how and to what degree parties to a conflict can be integrated by negotiation or manipulation on the part of parties to it or by third parties acting as mediators or adjudicators.

Hammers and Yukl[64] attempt to determine the extent to which and under what conditions various strategies and tactics affect negotiation outcomes. These strategies include "tough" strategy, "soft" strategy and "fair" strategy. They assert that a harder strategy is less successful than a softer strategy especially when a stalemate and high pressure is present. They conclude that various strategies are successful under different situations determined by timing of the concessions, relative power, and pressure to reach agreement, stalemate versus no stalemate, and competitive orientation.[65] Spector studies negotiation as a psychological process in which negotiation is seen as a set of personal and interpersonal dynamic that result in outcomes of varying acceptability to participants.[66] From the micro level perspective, the resolution of conflicting interests through negotiation is motivated by the individual needs of negotiators, personality capability among negotiators and negotiators perceptions and expectations of the

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[61] Ibid., p.5.
[62] See G. H. Synder, and G. H. Diesing, Conflicts Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in the International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
[63] R. C. North, H. E. Koch and D. A. Zinnes, " Integrative Functions of Conflict" in J. R. Friedman, C. Bladen, and S. Rosen, *Alliance in International Politics*, op.cit. pp. 290-315:311.
[64] P. T. Hamner and G. A. Yukl, "The Effectiveness of Different Strategies in Bargaining" in Druckman, D. (Ed.) *Negotiation: Social Psychological Perspectives*, op.cit. pp. 137-159: 157.
[65] Ibid., p. 137
[66] B. I Spector, "Negotiation as a Psychological Process" in I. W. Zartman (Ed.), *The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications* (London: Sage, 1978) p.55-86: 55

opponent.[61] Bartos views negotiation as a process involving dual and mostly conflicting motivations with the individual (competitive) desire to maximize one's own utility and the collectivist (cooperative) desire to reach a fair solution.[67]

Spector[68] develops a negotiation model that attempts to determine the extent to which personality perception expectation, persuasion and the interaction of these factors can explain the process and outcome of negotiation. He argues that although negotiation often represents group interests, personal predisposition and motives are highly prevalent driving forces. He further asserts that perception and expectations of the opponent's strengths, weakness, intentions, commitments and goals are likely to affect negotiation. Perception of threat (as evident in alliances) may cause some negotiation to retreat to more cautions positions while others might become more aggressive.[69] He conceives outcomes as culmination of power plays between participants.

Brown[70] assesses the intangible problems that arise from negotiations. These problems are categorized into "face "saving and "face" restoration problems. Face saving action is aimed at preventing potential sources of weaknesses or incapabilities from becoming evident to others. It is a desire to project an image of capability and strength, which is heightened by threat to face. Threats to face may be experienced as a result of intimidation, insult, unfair reduction of one's outcomes, and other events seen by a

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[61] ibid. p.55.
[67] O. J. Bartos, "Simple Model of Negotiation: A Sociological Point of View" in I. W. Zartman,(Ed.), *The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications*, op.cit. pp. 13-27:13.
[68] B .I. Spector, "Negotiation as a Psychological Process," op.cit. p.57.
[69] Ibid. p.57
[70] B. R. Brown, "Face Saving and Face Restoration in Negotiation", in D. Druckman, (Ed.) *Negotiation: Social Psychological Perspectives*, op.cit. pp. 275-300.

negotiator as casting doubts on his strength prestige, capability and reputation.[71] Face restoration behaviour is designed to repair damaged or lost face.[72]

According to Lall[73] asserts that disparity in power levels between parties to a conflict may result from the support, which one of those parties obtains from other states (support from allies). This support creates power disparity between parties to a conflict and a weaker party may seek support from other states and form counter-alliance. In this manner, power disparity is corrected and negotiations are likely to ensue. In such negotiation all parties will protect and promote their vital interests, primarily bearing on such tangible realities as national security and national prosperity.[74]

Druckman and Rozelle[75] explore the effects of the interplay between values and interest on decision-making and conflict resolution. They come up with a paradigm based on the notion that actors in the process of decision making balance their interests against their values. Hopman and Walcot[76] analyze the effects that stresses and tensions may have on both the processes and outcomes of negotiations. They state that stresses and tensions tend to enhance cognitive rigidities which lead-to-lead difficulties and inabilities to respond to a changed situation appropriately. They conclude that stress and tension are dysfunctional to negotiations as they tend to create greater hostilities among negotiators

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[71] Ibid., pp. 275-278.
[72] Ibid., p.276.
[73] A. Lall, *Modern International Negotiation Principles and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). p.263.
[74] ibid. p.278.
[75] D. Druckman and R. Rozelle, "Conflict of Interest and Value Dissensus: Two Perspectives" in D. Druckman, (Ed.) *Negotiation: Social Psychological Perspectives* (London: Sage, 1977) pp. 105-131.
[76] P. T. Hopman and C. Walcot, "The Impact of External Stresses and Tensions on Negotiations" in D. Druckman, (Ed.) *Negotiation: Social Psychological Perspectives*, op.cit. pp. 301-323: 321.

thus producing harder bargaining strategies which often lead to less successful outcomes than when such tensions are not so strong. [77]

Winham[78] views coalitions as affecting the way in which negotiation is framed and compromises and concessions reached. This is because groups bring many outstanding issues to bear on negotiations and in such situations, arriving at outcomes acceptable to all the parties also becomes difficult.[79]

According to Mwagiru[80], when a third party becomes involved in a bilateral conflict, it brings its own interest into the conflict. This transforms the overall dyad structure into triad and the original negotiation between the parties is transformed into a mediated negotiation. Zartman and Touval[81] examine the role of a mediator: the "ripe" moment for mediation, modes of mediation and what constitutes leverage. They also adopt realist point of view by arguing that conflicts over politico-security issues take place within the context of power politics, which has a major effect on international mediation.

Pruitt and Lewis examine the process by which negotiators reach agreements that reconcile their separate needs and values.[82] They argue that distributive and integrative strategies are the key methods adopted by the negotiators. Distributive strategy involves the use of threats, demands political commitments, status slur and

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[77] Ibid. pp. 321.
[78] G. R. Winham, "Complexities in International Negotiation" in Druckman, D. (ed.) *Negotiation: Social Psychological Perspectives* (London: Sage, 1977) pp. 347-366.
[79] Ibid. , p.347.
[80] M. Mwagiru, *The International Management of Internal Conflicts in Africa: The Ugandan Mediation, 1985,* op.cit. p.38.
[81] I. W. Zartman and S. Touval, "Mediation: The Role of Third Party Diplomacy and Informal Peacemaking" in S. J. Brown and K. M. Schraub (Eds.), *Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992), pp. 241-261.
[82] D. G. Pruitt and S. A. Lewis, "The Psychology of Integrative Bargaining", op.cit. pp. 161-192.

extraneous arguments for one's offers as to why the other party should concede. This amounts to rigidity with respect to means thus blocking the development of integrative agreements (accommodation of each other). Win-lose structure underlies distributive behaviour and that heightened stress and tension are inherent in the distributive competition thus reduces the flexibility and creativity of negotiators.[83]

Critical appraisal of the literature

A lot of research has been done on alliance but very little touches on alliance mediation aspect. Sociologists and psychologists who concentrate on socio-psychological aspects of coalitions have done most of the works on alliance-mediation, which might not be necessarily military alliances. These studies are not specific to military alliances as such. There are few works, which have looked at alliance-negotiation aspect from the political and military aspect. However, most of these studies were carried out during the Cold War and concentrated mainly on NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization, which were the formal security alliances.

The literature review reveals that most of the studies on alliances provide a general overview of the place of alliances within the international relations rather than probe in details specific issues such as the negotiation processes within the alliances.

Although there is a lot of literature on alliances, very little of it focuses on the alliance in the context of foreign policy and mediation.

[83] Ibid. pp. 161.

Scholars studying alliances and peace process have failed to view policy processes as useful determinants of the type of information required in understanding peace processes involving alliances. The alliance-mediation connection cannot be brushed aside. This study on informal alliances in the DRC can provide an important link between alliance, foreign policy and mediation, which is missing from the literature on alliance.

Definition of terms

For the purpose of this research, the term informal alliance implies a harmonized policy bond of states reached through implicit (informal) agreements involving military forces geared towards ensuring mutual national security. The alliances are informal in the sense that they neither involve formation of institutions nor codification of legal rules. Informal alliances are formed through less explicit agreements which are usually secretive. This study focuses on informal alliances in the DRC. These are military alliances rather than non-military ones, wartime alliances rather than peacetime alliances.

Foreign policy is viewed in this study as a set of interest; objectives and goals coupled with means, which states pursue between the alliances.

Theoretical framework

The study adopts strategic paradigm as its main organizing principle. Strategic theory is concerned with making rational decision in international politics without provoking a situation which is either

uncontrollable or which results in direct or indirect lose. [84] Strategy assumes a 'rational' value-maximizing mode of behaviour. Schelling[85] develops strategic theory as a theory of conflict in which he brought the insight from game theory and rational actor model of decision making to bear on the analysis of joint decision-making. Strategic behaviour is motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages based on rational premises. It portrays an image of participants who try to 'win' in a given situation or conflict. Winning means gaining relative to one's own value system and this may be done by bargaining, by mutual accommodation and by avoidance of mutually damaging behaviour.[86]

Although this theory depicts an impression of participants concerned with winning in particular conflicts, it is not essentially a theory of aggression or of war. Rather, it is the conditioning of one's own behaviour on behaviour of others that the theory is all about.[87]

The strategy of conflict advanced by Schelling also view conflicts as games in which mutual dependence is part of the logical structure demanding some kind of collaboration or mutual accommodation and a mediator in this game (conflict) facilitates an efficient outcome through control of communication pattern or can be viewed as a third party with its own interests.[88]

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[84] M. Light (et.al) (Eds.), *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory*, (London: Frances Prints) p. 141-155.
[85] T. C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, op.cit. pp. 4-5.
[86] Ibid. pp. 4-5.
[87] Ibid. p.15.
[88] Ibid., p.14.

Strategists view states as the main actors in international system. States pursue national interest in the anarchic international system based on their power capability with a drive to dominate other states. Strategists also see a hierarchical pattern of state system (powerful states, middle powers and lesser powers) based on power potentials. In such a system, the more powerful states control the events.

According to strategic theory, issues of peace and war are determined by power. The desire to make peace is intertwined with other motives best described within the context of power politics.[89]

Strategic theory offers a good rational explanations in situations where there are conflicts of interest, where a number of alternatives are open and where outcomes are determined not only by one's choices but also by the choices of others. The literature review on alliances and negotiations reveals the pervasiveness of the concept of power and interest. In alliance-negotiation situations, each alliance attempts to maximize its gains by using tactics such as persuasion, promises, power and threats to influence the course of events. Negotiation is a major aspect of alliances but it is common for power to be used coercively to attain goals.[90] Strategic theory captures this essence of power and interest in conflict management thus useful in this study

[89] See I. W. Zartman, and S. Touval, "Mediation: The Role of Third Party Diplomacy and Informal Peacemaking" in Brown, S.J. and Schraub, K.M. (Eds.), *Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992) pp.239-241.

[90] J. R. Friedman, C. Bladen and S. Rosen, *Alliances in the International Politics*, op.cit. p.7.

Hypotheses

This study will test the following hypotheses:

1. Hostilities and use of threats characterize alliances, which lead to difficulties in reaching peace agreements.
2. Alliance members pursue conflicting objectives, which make consensus during mediation difficult to achieve.
3. Groups excluded from the mediation process form a coalition to undermine the mediation process.
4. The outcome of mediation reflects policies pursued by the alliances.
5. Management of conflicts within an alliance is necessary for successful mediation of conflict between alliances.

Methodology

Data will be derived mainly from secondary sources. Data will be collected from relevant books, journals, magazines, newspapers and other relevant materials. Official Communiqués from the Lusaka peace meetings shall be examined.

CHAPTER TWO

ALLIANCE ORIGIN AND POLICY

This chapter examines the origin of the Uganda-Rwanda and the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliances and policies they pursue. The forces that bring states to support one another's foreign policy or territorial integrity are studied.

The Origin of the Uganda-Rwanda and the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliances

The Realist explanation of the origin of alliances is based on the balance of power theory. According to this theory, alliance formation is attributed to the distribution of power and threat to balance of power.[1] Alliances are seen as instruments for preventing other states from acquiring hegemonic positions over the rest and as a means of deterring or defeating states or coalitions, which seek to replace the existing balance of power.[2] The DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance grew out of the fear emanating from expansionist policies of Uganda-Rwanda alliance that would have drastically placed the regional balance of power in favour of Uganda and Rwanda. The main reason why Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia opposed Museveni and Kagame was because of their expansionist policy aimed at creating Hima Empire.[3] For example, Zimbabwe alleges that the DRC is faced with a "Tusti conspiracy" whose ambition is to create a Tutsi-Hima Empire in the Great Lakes region, composed of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and the eastern DRC.[4] The Tutsi-Hima theory revolves around the commonality of Tutsi in Rwanda, the Hima in Uganda and the *Banyamulenge* in the eastern DRC. The

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[1] Holsti, "Alliance and coalition Diplomacy" in J. N Rosenau, K.W Thompson and G. Boyd, *World Politics: An Introduction* (New York: The Free Press; 1976),pp. 337-387: 339.
[2] I bid.,340.
[3] Africa Peace Forum, *African Great Lakes Report*, August/September 1998, p.21

Banyamulenge are the Kinyarwanda speaking ethnic group living in the eastern DRC. They fled to Zaire as refugees following a battle of succession in pre-colonial Rwanda in the 1880s and settled at a place called Mulenge, thus the name *Banyamulenge*, (the people of Mulenge).[5] Kagame dismissed the Tutsi-Hima theory as a political manipulation "to divert the attention from the real (security) situation (which prompted Rwanda's intervention in the DRC).[6]

The creation of the Tutsi-Hima empire in the Great lakes region cannot be a major reason for the emergence of Uganda-Rwanda alliance as other factors such as threats emerging from the rebels operating from the DRC are more important. Moreover, Uganda's and Rwanda's attack on the DRC followed the expulsion of their armies by Kabila and does not look as a planed conspiracy of expansion but rather an immediate response to the security threat. Uganda and Rwanda helped Kabila seize power in the DRC in 1997. However in 1998 Kabila cut links with Uganda and Rwanda.[7] Ugandan and Rwandan army responded to their expulsion from the DRC by invading it. The attack of DRC by Uganda and Rwanda can be adduced to the perceived security threat from unfriendly government in DRC.

From the balance of power perspective, the emergence of DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance can be seen as a way of neutralizing the power of Uganda-Rwanda alliance in the Great Lakes region. Liska finds in balance of power the basis for

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[4] L. Machipisa and J. B. Kayigamba, *Congo Conflict Spreads*, http//www.mg.co.za/mg/news/98oct 2/22 oc-congo-zim.html p.1.
[5] M. Mamdani, *Preliminary Thoughts on the Congo Crisis*, (Harare: Sapes Trust: 23 September 1998) p55.
[6] P. Kagame cited by African Peace Forum, *African Great Lakes Report* op.cit. p.2.
[7] See Chapter One.

alignments by asserting the states form alliances to supplement each other's capabilities and to reduce the impact of antagonist power.[8]

However, the balance of power theory is inadequate in explaining the origin of alliances in the conflict in the DRC. It becomes difficult to calculate the power capabilities of the states involved in this war. The balance of power theorist would deduce the origin of the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance to need to neutralize the growing power of the Uganda-Rwanda alliance. Instead the balance of threat theory explains the origin of alliances in the DRC better than the balance of power theory. Walt[9] traces the origin of alliances to balance of threat theory, which assumes that states form alliances against the source of threat. He argues that, in anarchic system, states form alliances to protect themselves and their conduct is determined by the threats they perceive and the power of others is merely one element in the calculations".[10] The balance of threat theory incorporates factors that create threats to national sovereignty and security and therefore provides a better explanation of alliance formation in the DRC conflict than the balance of power theory.

Holsti notes that states join alliances to act as deterrence to those making demands against their interests or posing immediate military threats to them.[11] For example, the Warsaw alliance was formed in 1955 in response to threat emerging from NATO in the context of the Cold War rivalry between the East and the West.[12]

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[8] G. Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins Press: 1968), p.26.
[9] S. M. Walt, *The Origin of Alliances* (London: Cornell University Press: 1987), p.viii.
[10] Ibid; p.viii.
[11] K.J. Holsti, "Diplomatic Coalition and Military Alliances" in J.R Friedman, C. Bladen and S. Rosen (eds.), *Alliance in International Politics* (Boston and Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon; 1970) pp93-103: 94.
[12] Ibid., p.94.

The major source of threat, which explains emergence of alliances in the DRC, is the rebel the problem. The origin of Uganda-Rwanda alliance can be traced to the security threat emanating from the rebels operating from DRC territory. For example, when Museveni took over power in Uganda in 1986, the major security threat emerged from the defeated rebels from the former regimes in Uganda.[13] These rebels include the northern-led United Peoples Democratic Army (UPA), the Holy Spirit Movement from the East, the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which have rear bases in the DRC.[14] Rwanda on the other hand faces rebel threats emanating from ex-FAR and *interahamwe* militia, which operate from the DRC.[15] Museveni and Kagame, in a joint statement asserted that their military intervention in DRC is based on genuine security interests emerging from the rebels operating from DRC territory.[16]

According to Rosenau, states join alliances in order to aggregate power sufficient to achieve policy goals such as establishing security buffer zones and isolating potential adversaries.[17] The origin of Uganda-Rwanda alliance can be explained in terms of the rebel threats whose removal require the cooperation of both of these countries in creating a buffer zone in the whole of their frontiers with the DRC. Therefore, the Uganda-Rwanda alliance emerged due to the domestic security needs. According to Holsti, governments, which consider joining alliances, assume that they cannot achieve their objectives and interests or deter threats by mobilizing their own energies and therefore

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[13] G. M. Khadiagala, "Uganda's Domestic and Regional Security Since 1970s", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Volume 31,Number 2, 1993, pp. 231-255: 243.
[14] C. Watson, "Uganda: Ending the Rule of the Gun in Africa", *Africa Report*, Volume 32, Number 1, January-February 1988, pp. 14-17.
[15] "Rwakitura Meets Digs in on Congo" *The Monitor*, 8 October 1998, p.1.
[16] K. Museveni and P. Kagame, "Rwakitura Meets Digs in Congo", *Monitor*, Ibid., p.1.
[17] J. Rosenau, K. W. Thompson and G. Boyd, *World Politics: An Introduction*, op.cit. p. 339.

augment their capabilities with those of other states, which face the same problems or pursue similar objectives.[18]

The formation of Uganda-Rwanda alliance and its intervention in DRC in turn created threat to other countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. These countries formed a counter alliance to neutralize the threats emerging from the expansionist tendencies of Uganda-Rwanda alliance. The formation of an alliance can therefore necessitate the formation of a counter alliance. Rothstein observes that an alliance of attack necessitates the formation of an alliance of counter-attack, which neutralizes of action by reaction.[19]

Commonalities of past experiences between some of the countries and the Presidents involved have played an important role in the observed patterns of alliances in the conflict in the DRC. According to Liska, the construction of alliances, their implementation and perpetuation has specific ideological requirements and that durability, cohesiveness and effectiveness of alliances is linked to similarity of values and world view of the alliance members.[20] For example, before independence, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia were embedded in a system of white minority rule. To stamp out white minority rule, these countries cooperated together and formed the Frontline States, which fought to remove the whites from power in southern Africa.[21] The frontline states were guided by Marxist-Leninist rhetoric in their fight against the white minority rule.[22] At independence, the Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) converted itself into

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[18] K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall; 1998), p.101.
[19] R. L Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press; 1969) p.48.
[20] G. Liska, *Nations inn Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: The JohnsHopkins Press: 1968) p.62.
[21] J. D. Sidaway and D. Simon, "Geographic Transition and State Formation: The Changing Geographies of Angola, Mozambique and Namibia", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Volume 19, Number 1, March 1993, pp. 1-18:7.

a party guided by Marxism-Leninism, the ideology of the proletariat.[23] In 1980, the Zimbabwe African National Union came into power espousing a socialist ideology.[24] Kabila, Mugabe and Nujoma belonged to the Marxist school of thought in Dar-es-salaam where they were exiled in the 1960's.[25] The commonality of the past experience and worldview have played an important role in the formation of the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola and Namibia alliance. Commenting on the commonality of worldview within the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance, Bangura asserts that Museveni and Kagame did a blunder in intervening in the DRC, as they did not factor in the security fears of southern African countries, which also have a legitimate stake in the stability of the Congo and Kabila's historical and ideological ties with these countries during the liberation struggles.[26]

On the other hand, Museveni and the Tutsi cooperated during the struggles to overthrow the Tito Okello's government in Uganda and the Habyaramana's regime in Rwanda. This cooperation is important to the formation of Uganda-Rwanda alliance.

Economic considerations are important to alliance formation in the DRC conflict. Olson and Zeckauser[27] develop an economic theory of alliances where by an alliance is viewed as a relationship which members derive benefits and share costs. The presence of vast mineral resources in the DRC as a reason for formation of the alliance in DRC

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[22] Ibid,. p. 7.
[23] J. A. Marcum, "The People's Republic of Angola: A Radical Vision Frustrated" in T. M. Callagy, *The State Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective*, (New York: Columbia University Press; 1984) pp. 67-83: 71.
[24] M. Sithole, "State Power Consolidation in Zimbabwe: Party and Ideology Development" in T. M. Callagy, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective*, op.cit. pp. 85-106:85.
[25] See International Crisis Group, *The Agreement on a Cease Fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects of Peace*, Report number 5, 20 August 1999, p.32.
[26] Y. Bangura, "Comments on the Regional Security and the Congo War", in M. Ibbo (ed.), *Reflection on the Crisis in the Congo*, http://www.oneworld.org/afronet/Hrreview/vol4_pp5.html p.4.
[27] M. Olson and R. Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances" in J. R. Friedman, C. Bladen and S. Rosen (eds.), *Alliances in International Politics* (Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon; 1970) pp. 175-198: 177.

will be discussed latter in this chapter. It will be argued that economic considerations can stimulate military operations by the alliances in a bid to acquire strategic resources or deprive the other opponents of resources necessary for economic and military success.

Alliance policy

Foreign policy can be analyzed in terms of objectives, strategy and tactics.[28] Policy permeates the whole conduct of war. Rosthstein asserts that alliances are designed to facilitate the attainment of goals by introducing into a situation a specific commitment to pursue them by legitimizing that pursuit.[29] Alliances therefore commonly act as sources of foreign policy for states that are parties to them. They act as important conduits in the process through which foreign policy is formulated and implemented. Alliances can therefore be viewed as a conscious choice among foreign policy behaviours and policy positions.[30] The willingness of a country to form alliances with another may be seen as an indicator of shared policy preferences.

Although alliances pursue common policies, individual alliance members sometimes pursue divergent policies, which may not necessarily coincide with the overall alliance objective. This is because different countries have different objectives, interests and goals they pursue. For example, the Uganda-Rwanda alliance's main objective is to remove Kabila from power and establish security on its frontiers with the DRC. Pursuit of this objective requires cooperation in military strategy within the alliance itself. However, Uganda and Rwanda have pursued other conflicting objectives such as economic exploitation of DRC resource, which led to clashes between these countries in

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[28] A. J. Klinghoffer, *The Angolan War* (Colorado: Westview Press; 1980) p.4
[29] R. L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, op.cit. p.54.
[30] R. M. Siverson and H. Starr, "Opportunity, Willingness and the Diffusion of War" *American Political Science Review*, March 1999, Volume 84, Number 1, pp. 47-67.

Kisangani in 1999.[31] McCarthy asserts that the involvement in commercial activities led to the split of RCD rebel group into RCD-Goma (supported by Rwanda) and RCD Kisangani (supported by Uganda) as competing commercial interests take precedence over common strategic objectives.[32] Rosenau observes that alliance commitments tend to be flexible thus allow considerable leeway for independent plans and actions on the part of their member.[33]

Holsti[34] approaches the notion of foreign policy from four perspectives: foreign policy orientation, foreign policy objectives, national roles and policy actions. In this chapter foreign policy pursued by the alliances in the DRC conflict will be approached from two perspectives: foreign policy orientation and foreign policy objectives.

Foreign policy orientation

Foreign policy orientation is a states general attitude and commitment towards the external environment including its fundamental strategies for accomplishing its domestic and external objectives and coping with threats.[35] The two major foreign policy inclinations are isolationism and interventionism. States pursuing isolationist policy avoid entering into certain relationships such as joining alliances and other undertakings such as foreign intervention.[36] For example, the United State pursued isolationist policy in the 19th century. Interventionism on the other hand is any external role of one country in the affairs of another state, especially during wartime.[37] The members of Uganda-Rwanda alliance exhibit an interventionist foreign policy orientation. They intervened militarily

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[31] F. O'Reilly, *Congo in Crisis*, http://www.national post-com/features/0800/congo/story4.html ,pp.3-4.
[32] See F. T. McCarthy, "Old Friends New War: Uganda and Rwanda", *The Economist*, 21 August 1999.
[33] J. N. Rosenau, K. W. Thompson and G. Boyd, *World Politics: An Introduction*, op.cit. p.23.
[34] K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, op.cit, p.93.
[35] Ibid., p. 93.
[36] R. W. Tucker "Isolation and Intervention" *National Interest*, Number 1, Fall 1985, New York, pp. 16-25: 16.

in the affairs of another state, that is, the DRC. Holsti argues that the perception of common external threats and a sense of insecurity is an important factor for formation of military alliances, which adopt interventionist foreign policy orientation.[38]

The foreign policy strategies of states are shaped by domestic variables or needs within these states.[39] The foreign policy orientation adopted by the alliances in the DRC is shaped by economic needs, threats and geographic proximity variables. Dietrich[40] demonstrates how economic considerations can stimulate external military operations. He cites a case whereby a

> "Stronger African State deploys the national military in a neighbouring country, supporting either the sovereign power (in the case of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia) or the rebels (in the case of Rwanda and Uganda), in exchange for access to profits".[41]

He further argues that if domestic resources cannot be obtained domestically, then "cross border predatory behaviour, hidden behind legitimate political and military concerns, provides an alternative resource".[42]

According to Choucri and North[43], as a country develops, its population and economic needs expands thus creating more demand for resources. If the resources cannot be sourced locally, they are externally obtained. Lateral pressure is created and attained externally through commercial activities and dispatch of troops into foreign territory. The interests of the intervening state clashes with the interests of other states in

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[37] A. J. Klinghoffer, *The Angolan War*, op.cit. p.4.
[38] K. J. Holsti, International Politics. A Framework for Analysis, op.cit; p. 102.
[39] T. A. Couloumbis and J. H. Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice, p.114.
[40] See C. Dietrich, *The Commercialization of Military Deployment in Africa.* http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/9.1/commercialisation.html.
[41] Ibid., p.4.
[42] Ibid., p.5.
[43] N. Choucri and R.C. North, *Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman; 1975) p.2.

the external environment as they complete over the available resources thus resulting into conflict.

Foreign policy objectives

Holsti[44] categorizes the objectives that states pursue into core objectives, middle range objectives and long-range objectives. The core objectives aim to ensure sovereignty, independence and the territorial integrity of states. The middle range objectives ensure the promotion of interests such as foreign investments, prestige and creation of spheres of influence. The long-range objectives are the future plans or visions of states.[45]

Security Objectives

Security reason forms the basis of Uganda and Rwanda intervention in the DRC. Buzan defines security as the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile.[46] The core objective of Uganda-Rwanda alliance is to neutralize the security threat posed by the rebels operating from DRC territory.

The anti-Uganda rebel forces with bases in the DRC include the ADF, the LRA, the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA), the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) and the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNFII).[47] In his address to Parliament on 28 May 2000, President Museveni asserted that President Kabila supports rebels fighting his government such as the ADF and that the neutralization of the rebel

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[44] K. J. Holsti, *International Politics; A Framework for Analysis*, op.cit p.118.
[45] Ibid., p.118.
[46] B. Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty First Century" *International Affairs* Volume 67, Number3, July 1991, pp.430-445: 432.

threat is the main reason for Uganda's military presence in DRC.[48] Museveni was also quoted as saying that

> " Our involvement in the Congo indirectly last year (1997) and a bit more directly now is a result of our security concerns and the risk of rebels in the area (DRC) ...That is why our army will stay in Congo until there is a regionally agreed *modus videndi* on how to live together."[49]

Kazini, the acting Ugandan Army chief of staff also asserted that the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) intervened in the DRC to destroy the ADF's Congolese rear bases and cut supplies to this rebel group.[50]

Rwanda intervened in the DRC due to continued threats to its security emanating from the *interahamwe* militia and ex-FAR. O'Reilly asserts that Rwanda intervened in the DRC in order to secure its borders and hunt down the *interahamwe* militia who are responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.[51] According to the African Peace Forum[52], at the beginning of 1998, areas such as Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Byumba in northern Rwanda came under intense attacks from the Hutus rebels with rear bases in the DRC. These areas are the political power bases of the former Habyaramana's regime. According to Abdulraheem, the secretary of Pan-African Movement, the way Kabila has exercised his sovereignty by integrating the anti-Rwandan rebels in his army has adversely affected the security of Uganda and Rwanda as these rebels are destabilizing these countries.[53]

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[47] International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly war* (Nairobi/Brussels. Report Number 26, 20 December 2000), p.30.
[48] Museveni cited by the International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, Ibid., p.30.
[49] " Museveni Says Uganda Troops to Stay in Congo", *The Guardian*, 17 September 1998, p.1.
[50] J. Kazini "Operation Safe Haven" *The Monitor*, 6 October 1998, p.18.
[51] F. O'Reilly, *Congo in Crisis*, op.cit. pp.3-4.
[52] Africa Peace Forum, *Great Lakes Report*, op.cit. p. 6.
[53] T. Abdulraheem, "When Did the Forces Become Invaders", *The Monitor*, 20 October 1998, p.24.

Uganda and Rwanda intervention in the DRC can be seen as an extension of the civil war between the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and between the NRM and rebel forces from the former regimes in Uganda. Hutu-Tutsi conflict dates back to colonial era when the differences between these two ethnic groups were played out through divide and rule tactics by the Belgian colonialists in which the Tutsi were promoted to the exclusion of the Hutus.[54] In 1959, a Hutu revolt against Tutsi monarch in Rwanda led to the death of 20,000 Tutsis and exodus of hundreds into exile.[55] The Tutsi in exile in Uganda formed the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), which overthrew the Hutu-led government in 1994 thus leading to a massive outflow of refugees into Kivu province in eastern DRC.[56] Rwanda's intervention in pursuit of the Hutu rebels can therefore be seen as a continuation of civil violence between the Hutu and the Tutsi, which dates back to the pre-colonial period. Rwanda intervened in the DRC to secure a final victory in its war against Hutu rebels, which were retaining and re-arming in the DRC.[57] The conflict is due to the politics of exclusion (zero sum game) between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi. The DRC cannot escape from this conflict due to the historical ties between the three countries, which include the fact that there are ethnic Tutsi and Hutu who are Congolese citizens, a common experience of Belgian colonialism and post colonial political alliance between Mobutu and Hutu leaders in Rwanda.

Angola's intervention in the DRC can also be seen as a continuation of a civil war between the Movement for Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and UNITA. The rivalry between the radical MPLA and UNITA degenerated into an open civil war even

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[54] P. Rigby, *African Images: Racism and the End of Anthropology* (Oxford: Berg; 1996) p.65.
[55] F. Fenton " A Short History of Anti-Hamitism" *New York Review Books*, 15 February 1996, p.7
[56] S. Massey "Operation Assurance: The Greatest Intervention that Never Happened" *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, http://www.jha.ac/articles/9036.htm p.1

before the Portuguese colonialists left Angola in 1975.[58] Angola's motive for intervention in the DRC is to fight UNITA by cutting off its Congolese supply line and bases.[59]

The security justification of Uganda and Rwanda's military intervention in DRC should be critically examined against facts. According to Turner, neither Uganda nor Rwanda has been able to secure itself from rebel attack even though this was the main reason given for their intervention.[60] The intervention has instead spurred a growth of commercial activities geared towards exploitation of Congolese resources. It is also not common in international affairs for one country to occupy the territory of another for along period in the name of controlling rebel insurgencies. Israel's occupation of parts of Syria and Lebanon is one of the rare occurrences.

Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia militarily intervened in the DRC to ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of DRC, which was violated and threatened by Uganda and Rwanda.[61] The Zimbabwean troops entered DRC in October 1998 to assist Kabila against attacks from Uganda and Rwanda. Angolan intelligence Services were convinced that contacts existed between UNITA, the RCD rebel command and its Rwandan and Ugandan patrons.[62] Angola intervention in the DRC through close cooperation with Kabila was strategically to pre-empt an alliance of UNITA with the RCD rebels and stamp out UNITA. Angola also feared that the defeat of Kabila by the

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[57] International Crisis Group, *Scramble for Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, op.cit. pp.11-12.
[58] J.D. Sidaway and D. Simon "Geographical Transition and State Formation: The Changing Geographies of Angola, Mozambique and Namibia" *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Volume 9, Number1, March 1993, pp.1-18: 9.
[59] T. Turner, *War in the Congo*, Volume 15, Number 10, April 2000, http://www.forcign policy.infocus.org/briefs/vol 5/v5n10congo-body. html, p.2.
[60] Ibid., p.2.
[61] Ibid., p.24.
[62] European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, *Central Africa: Shifting Alliances, Extra-territorial Conflicts and Conflict Management*, http://www.oneworld.org/eurconflict/sfp/part2/181.htm, p.3.

loyal to him pull back to Katanga (Kabila's home area) and join forces with UNITA rebels.[63] The joining of forces would give UNITA more power and would further threaten Angolan security. Angola was uncertain about the establishment of a new regime in Kinshasa, as it might be more sympathetic to UNITA.[64] By supporting UNITA, Angola got access to DRC territory thus making it easy to target UNITA bases. Angola's strategy is to encircle UNITA, cut off its supply lines and destroy its bases both in the DRC and in Angola itself.

According to Taylor and Williams[65], territorial protection of Cabinda enclave that is wedged between DRC and Congo Brazzaville was at the heart of Angola's intervention in the DRC as Cabinda enclave accounts for 75 percent of Angola's oil production. The funds from oil wealth in Cabinda supports Angola's military campaign against UNITA and also reinforce President Dos Santos' patronage networks.[66] An unfriendly government in DRC would threaten Angola's control of Cabinda.

Namibia and Zimbabwe pursue no security objective in the DRC. These countries do not share borders with DRC and are not directly affected by the conflict in the DRC. Their support of Kabila is induced by economic gains, moral and political support.[67] Namibia's contribution of troops to Kabila has been modest. This shows that the engagement is more a symbolic show of solidarity amongst a group of former liberation movement leaders than an expression of any real interest in the outcome of the war.

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[63] International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, op.cit. p.54.
[64] Ibid., p.54.
[65] I. Taylor and P. Williams, "South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis: African Renaissance Melts '*Vagabondage Politique*'?" *African Affairs: The Journal of the Royal African Society*, Volume 100, Number 399, April 2001, pp.265-286: 276.
[66] Ibid., pp. 276.
[67] F. O'Reilly, Congo in Crisis, op. cit. p.2.

Economic objectives

According to Mujaji, the DRC "does not invite intervention only by being incoherent and divided. Its wealth such as gold and diamonds are an attraction to fortune seekers".[68]

Commenting on the economic motives behind foreign military intervention in the DRC, Weinstein observes that

> "Resource attraction has been largely the province of post-independence leaders – many of whom followed the lead to their former colonial masters to create vast personal fortunes. The current war in the Congo is surprising to the extent to which participating states have blatantly advertised the economic motivations underlying their participation. Intervening states have sought a direct share in Congo's revenues from the extraction of mineral and other resources".[69]

Foreign interventions in the DRC "is not only about preserving national security and defeating enemies. It is also about securing access to resource rich areas and establishing privatized accumulation networks..."[70]

Dietrich[71] analyses trends in the deployment of the military as a tool for economic gains. He refers to the strong influence of economic considerations as a key component of foreign military deployment as military commercialism. The DRC is not the only place where the phenomenon of military commercialism exists. Military commercialization is a widespread trend. For example, President Charles Taylor of Liberia, supported incursions by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) into Sierra Leone, which resulted into larger portions of diamonds from Sierra Leone being,

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[68] A. Mujaji, "How to Make Sense of the Events Taking Place in the Great Lakes Region". *Southern African Political and Economic Monthly*, Volume 12, 1999, p.7.
[69] J. M. Weinstein, "Africa's Scramble for Africa: Lessons of a Continental War" *World policy Journal*, Volume 17, Number 2, pp.6-17; 17.
[70] I. Taylor and P. Williams, South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis, op.cit. p.273.
[71] See C. Dietrich, The Commercialization of Military Deployment in Africa, op.cit.

exported through Liberia thus benefiting Taylor and his cronies.[72] Reno also observes that poor command and control of Nigerian forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone led to "hit-and-run" alluvial mining ventures in captured areas".[73]

Studying the military deployment in Latin America, Brenes and Casas observed that due to diminishing budgetary allocations after the end of cold war, weak economies cannot afford to sustain unproductive sectors such as the military thus forcing the Latin American militaries to become "productive establishments".[74]

Cheung states that China's Peoples Liberation army's defence allocation has been slashed down since the end of the Cold War thus transforming military subsistence (the PLA used to grow its own food crops) into full business as the army now runs a loose network of around 20,000 companies and is involved in practically every sector of the Chinese economy.[75]

Dietrich identifies a "symbiotic" relationship between UNITA and the Armed Forces of Angola (FAA) in which

> "FAA forces deployed against UNITA in Lunda Norte-the province with the heaviest concentration of diamonds – often appear to opt for personal enrichment as opposed to combat, sometimes mining for diamonds on one side of a river with UNITA mining the other".[76]

In this way, military objectives are substituted for economic ones.

The DRC is potentially rich with large reserves of gold, diamond, copper, cobalt and tin. Deutsch asserts that every country's foreign policy first deals with the

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[72] Ibid., p.2.
[73] W. Reno quoted by C. Dietrich, Ibid., p.5.
[74] See A. Brenes and K. Casa (eds.), Soldiers As Businessmen: The Economic Activities of Central America's Militaries (San Jose: Arias and Cosude; 1996).
[75] T. Cheung cited by C. Dietrich, The Commercialization of Military Deployment in Africa, op.cit p.3.
[76] C. Dietrich, The Commercialization of Military Deployment in Africa, op.cit p.5.

preservation of its independence and security and then with the pursuit and protection of economic interests, particularly those of its most influential interest groups.[77]

The quest for economic benefits in the DRC has directed Zimbabwe's intervention policy as Mugabe and his ministers, relatives, Generals and associates accrue substantial personal benefits from the exploitation of Congolese resources.[78] Zimbabwe through Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) has reportedly spent about US$250 million in its military involvement in DRC.[79] Mugabe is therefore anxious to "ensure that the Kabila regime remains in power not only because it is underwriting Zimbabwe's military costs but also in order that he can pay his debts to the government-owned ZDI".[80]

Zimbabwe's armament industry supplied Kabila with weapons worth US$80 million during the first war in DRC in 1996-1997 and still had not been paid for these supplies by the time the second war broke out in August 1998.[81] This means that the overthrow of Kabila from power would be of great financial loss to Zimbabwe. Referring to Zimbabwe's military involvement in commercial activities in DRC, the Zimbabwean Defense Minister, Mohachi asserted that

> "We saw this (business) as a noble option. Instead of our army in Congo burdening the treasury for more resources, which are not available, it embarks on viable projects for the sake of generating the necessary revenue".[82]

One such projects was initiated through the establishment of Zimbabwean company, Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (Osleg) in 1998 to buy gold and diamonds from the

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[77] K.W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (New Delhi: Prentice Hall; 1989) p.97.
[78] R. Rotberg. "Africa's Mess, Mugabe's Mayhem" *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 97, Number 5, 2000, pp.51-66: 53.
[79] I. Taylor and P. Williams, South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis. African Renaissance Melts" op.cit.p.275.
[80] Ibid., p.275.
[81] F. Miser and A. Rake "An African World War?" *New African*, Number 367, October 1998, p.14.
[82] M. Mohachi quoted by S. Barber, "Stars and Stripes, US Finds Diamonds Issue a Hard Issue to Cut in Congo Market", *Business Day*, 13 October 1999. P.12.

DRC in partnership with the DRC's COMIEX (company owned by Kabila's chiefs).[83] Osleg aims at exploiting the DRC resources in the process of maintaining the DRC's sovereignty against invasion, thus the name Operation Sovereignty Legitimacy (Osleg).

Individuals around Mugabe have also benefited from the war in DRC. For example, Hartnack observes that

> "General Vitalis Zvinavashe, the Commander of the ZDF, has allegedly accrued significant financial gains from military deployment in DRC. Of the nearly US$50 million ZDI contract to supply Kabila's army and the ZDF, a major private beneficiary was Zvinavashe's trucking company, Zvinavashe Transport, sub contracted through a subsidiary".[84]

Gecamine, the DRC's copper and cobalt parastatal was transferred without compensation into Ridge Point International, a Zimbabwean company.[85]

The DRC has a huge hydroelectric potential from the Inga dam in Bas Congo. The Zimbabwean electricity supply authority (ZESA) is performing poorly thus promoting Zimbabwe to sign a deal with the DRC to double its import of electricity from the DRC.[86] Zimbabwean rural development Authority has also been given a 2000 square mile land concession in Katanga for the production of maize, Soya beans, potatoes and rice.[87] O'Reilly summed up the reasons for Mugabe's intervention in the DRC as based on the need to exploit minerals, to deflect attention from the growing problems on the home front due to rising opposition to his rule and to keep open commercial ties with the Congo due to a sharp economic down turn.[88] It can be argued that economic rewards by Kabila were one of the reasons for Zimbabwe's military intervention in the DRC. The economic benefit that Zimbabwe enjoys in the DRC is a major factor in the Zimbabwe's continued

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[83] International Crisis Group, *Scramble for Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, op.cit.p.61.
[84] See M. Hartnack, "Private Firm to Aid Kabila's War", *Business Day*, 27 September 1999.
[85] "Rhodies to the Rescue", *Africa Confidential*, Volume 40, Number 22, 5 November 1999, p. 5.
[86] International Crisis Group, *Scramble for Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, op.cit.p.62.

military involvement in the DRC. Otherwise the high costs of military upkeep could have forced Zimbabwe out of a "distant" war in the DRC.

Uganda has been involved in commercial activities in the Congo. The International Crisis Group reported that

> "Since the beginning of the second war, Kampala has exploited the resources of Congo with impressive resolve. An illustration of this is again the spectacular rise in Ugandan gold exports, which became the country's largest non-coffee official export in 1999 despite the lack of any increase of gold corrected the country's US$600 million trade deficit, and caused a significant improvement in Uganda's balance of trade despite radically increased defense expenditures."[89]

Santoro asserts that Rwandan Revenue Authority "denounced top military officers for smuggling Congolese goods arguing that 121 freight companies, some of them connected to the army had been mysteriously licensed to operate unscheduled flights between Uganda and Congo."[90] Santoro claims that Rwanda's commercial activities in the DRC are hidden but cited Tristar, a consortium, which economically supports Rwanda's war efforts through exploitation of Congolese resources.[91]

In Uganda, economically powerful individuals such as the late Major General Salim Saleh (Museveni's brother) and Brigadier Kazini, chief of the armed forces have emerged through exploitation of Congolese resources. Salim Saleh's gold deals in the DRC were exposed when he and other gold dealers, employed by Israeli firm, Efforte Corporation died in a plane crash in Ruwenzori Mountains in 1998.[92]

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[87] See "Congo: A war Without Victors" Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2001,
[88] O'Reilly, *Congo in crisis*, Op.cit. pp. 1-2. .
[89] International Crisis Group, *Scramble for Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, op.cit. p. 31.
[90] See L. Santoro, "Behind the Congo War: Diamonds," *Christian Science Monitor*, 16 August 1999, op.cit p.276.
[91] See Santoro, ibid.
[92] see "Uganda's Congolese Treasure Trove." *New African*, May 1999.

Rwanda and Uganda's commercial activities in DRC were openly demonstrated when fighting broke out between UPDF and RPA troops in Kisangani in August 1999 over jockeying for positions and " competition over access to Congo's valuable natural resources." [93] Dietrich [94] asserts that Uganda and Rwanda, a part from directly involving in commercial activities in DRC, also secure financial rewards by demanding protection fees from private businessmen operating in the war zone. He argues that extorting protection fee can be most lucrative venture for securing financial rewards for those with guns in resource-rich areas.[95] Santoro provides the evidence that the approximately thirty five diamond dealers in Kisangani, all pay protection fee to Uganda Colonels and that the fight between RPA and UDF in 1999 was caused by an attempt by RPA to break this monopoly over protection fee paid to the UPDF officers.[96]

The intervention has also enabled Angola to pursue economic interests in the DRC. Dos Santos controls Sanangol (National Angolan Fuel Company). Which has been granted Petroleum production, distribution and marketing in the DRC.[97] Though the Angolan government had strategic reasons for intervening in the DRC, commercial opportunism came to be a substantial ingredient of deployment of troops.

Namibia has a US$25 million trade deal with Kabila before the outbreak of the second war.[98] This trade deal played an important role in Namibia's decision to enter and

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[93] "Uganda Explains Clash with Rwanda". *APonline*, 25 August 1999.
[94] Dietrich, *The Commercialization of Military Deployment in Africa*, op.cit. p.8.
[95] L. Santoro, *Behind the Congo War: Diamonds*, op.cit. p.40.
[96] I. Taylor and P. Williams, *South Africa Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis: African Renaissance*, op.cit. p.276.
[97] F. Reyntjens "The Second Congo War: More than a Remark," *African Affairs*, April 1999, pp. 232 - 250: 249.
[98] Ibid., p. 249.

continue with the war in the DRC.[99] Nujoma and Namibian army officials also own a 25-square Km opencast diamond mine at Maji Munene, 45 Km from Tshikapa in the DRC.[100] Namibia has also benefited from intervention by supplying the DRC with fish and Nujoma's brother in law, Mushimba, has also been awarded a stake in the Muba diamond mining Company.[101]

It is therefore evident that military intervention in the DRC is influenced by economic motives. However, this is not to suggest that economic criteria dominates foreign military deployment since political and security reasons remain at the center of these states' foreign policy objectives. It can be argued that the initial foreign policy objectives behind the military intervention in the DRC remain political and security concerns while commercial objectives were developed during the war as a means to reduce the costs of military deployment. Economic objectives may not be the main consideration behind "predatory" foreign policy, but it has evidently increased in salience.

Humanitarian objectives

In 1981, the Zairian Parliament passed a Nationality Law, which refuted the claim of the *Banyamulenge* to Zairian citizenship.[102] This law came into force in 1995, leading to the expulsion of the *Banyamulenge* from Zaire, forcing them to join forces in fighting and ousting Mobutu from power in 1996.[103] When Kabila severed relations with Uganda and Rwanda in 1998, he fostered popular hatred and fear of Congolese Tutsi origin whom

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[99] I Taylor and P Williams, *South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Conflict: African Renaissance*, op.cit. p .276.
[100] International Crisis Group, *Scramble for Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, op.cit. p. 65.
[101] K. Dixon, *Recent conflicts in the Great Lakes Region*, paper presented to the African Studies Association of the UK Biennial Conference, SOAS, University of London, 14th - 16th September 1999.
[102] Ibid., p.6.
[103] Human Rights Watch, *Democratic Republic of Congo: Casualties of*

he linked to Uganda and Rwanda as constituting the larger Tutsi-Hima conspiracy.[104] Attack on the *Banyamulenge* and people of Tutsi origin by the indigenous Congolese and Kabila forces was rampant prior to the out break of the war in 1998.[105] A joint communiqué by Museveni and Kagame justified their intervention in the Congo as "based on genuine and legitimate security interests on (their) determination to prevent genocide" (on the Tutsi speaking groups by Kabila).[106] The *Banyamulenge* nationality question has been evident as the cause of the outbreak of the two consecutive wars in the DRC. The *Banyamulenge* were the first to denounce Kabila regime on local radio in Bakavu and to declare that they were in rebellion against Kabila.[107]

The main objective pursued by Kabila has been to maintain hold on power and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of DRC from external threat. This would include taking full control of Congolese recourses. However, Kabila's invitation of foreign backers (Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia) placed the sovereignty he seeks into further jeopardy. This is because these foreign armies occupy and control certain areas in the DRC. Kabila also has limited powers over his backers, as he needs to serve their interests and avoid conflict with them, which might necessitate their withdrawal. Kabila cannot make important autonomous strategic decisions because he must consult other members of the alliance as this alliance acts as a source of the group's strategic decisions.

The effect of strong involvement of the military on the peace process shall be discussed and analyzed in the Chapters Four and Five respectively.

War: Civilians, Rule of Law and Democratic Freedom, February 1999, Volume 11, Number 1(A), p.2

[104] Ibid., p.2.

[105] See "Rwakitura Meets Digs in on Congo" *The Monitor*, 8 October 1998, p.1

[106] International Crisis Group, *North Kivu Quagmire*, 13 August 1998, p.3.

[107] See Chapter One.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ROLE OF ALLIANCES IN CONFLICT

This chapter examines alliance conflict relationship. It investigates the role of Uganda-Rwanda alliance and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance in the DRC conflict. The major question to be answered in this chapter is whether alliances lead to conflict escalation or to peace. The political, economic, social, humanitarian and environmental impacts of alliances on the whole region and on the individual countries engaged in the conflict is also assessed.

Alliance conflict relationship

There is a disagreement among scholars as to whether alliances lead to war or peace. Some scholars view alliances as the origin of security fears and tensions, which propagate international hostilities and exacerbate conflicts.[1] Other scholars associate alliances with war-deterrence, which leads to stability and peace in the international system.[2]

Alliances lead to war school

This school regards alliances as contributing to conflict creation and escalation. The proponents of this school view alliances as helping in the spreading of international hostilities in terms of frequency, intensity and geographic scope.[3] It is for the advantageous conduct of war that military alliances are formed.[4]

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[1] See S. Rosen, "A Model of War and Alliance" in J. Friedman (*et.al*), *Alliance in International Politics* (Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon; 1970) pp. 215-237: 215.
[2] See P. Glenn, " Corralling the Free Rider: Deterrence and the Western Alliance" *International Studies Quarterly* vol.34, Number 2. (June 1990). pp. 147-164.
[3] M.D. Ward, *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics* (Colorado: Graduate School of International Studies; 1982) p.40.
[4] S. Rosen, "A Model of War and Alliance" Op.cit. p.219.

The Uganda -Rwanda alliance and the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance have led to the complication and spread of the conflict in the DRC through three major processes: internationalisation of conflict, the game of alliances and politicisation of ethnic conflicts.

Internationalisation of conflict

The current conflict in the DRC can be seen as a continuation of civil war over the control of state power, which dates back to the independence days in the Congo. The conflict was an internal affair of the Congolese until the military involvement of the regional states such as Uganda and Rwanda since 1996, and Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola since 1998. The engagement of these states in the DRC war has brought international dimensions to the previously internal conflict. According to Roston, out of one central conflict internal to the DRC, a number of long-running and terrible destructive battles have emerged, spanning almost the entire length and scope of Africa in what must be one of the "largest continuing battle-fronts in history."[5] The second war that began in 1998 in the DRC is one of the most complex and intractable conflicts in Africa, involving at least six national armies and twenty militia groups.[6] The involvement of the Uganda-Rwanda alliance and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliances have helped spread the conflict to areas, which were formerly free of it. Alliances can therefore be seen as contagion mechanisms through which conflicts spread and expand.

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[5] M. Roston, *Great Lakes Crisis: Countries as Resolution Subjects*, University of IOWA, http/www.mtsu.edu/~debate/lakes.txt) p.2.

According to Mwagiru, when allies come to the aid of one another in a conflict situation, the conflict becomes complex, as more parties are involved thus more issues, interests and values are brought in the conflict.[7] He gives an example of the DRC conflict in which the internationalisation of conflict involved varied actors such as Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia.[8]

The spatial diffusion of conflict is encouraged by the ethnic overlap across international boundaries and shared borders, interdependence of states and the refugee problem.

Ethnic overlap across borders

The colonialists without properly taking into account ethnic composition drew the international boundaries in Africa. This led to separation of some ethnic groups into different countries. For example, the Somali speaking people can be found in Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia itself. The existence of one ethnic group in different countries has been one of the causes of conflicts in Africa.[9] This is more so when the territorially divided ethnic group adopts irredentism as a policy or come to the aid of one another in conflict situations. For example, the *Banyamulenge* of DRC have closer ties with the Tutsi of Rwanda as the both speak Kinyarwanda and this explains much why they are allies in the DRC conflict.

One of the reasons given by Rwanda for its involvement in the DRC conflict is to prevent the ethnic cleansing of the *Banyamulenge* and other Tutsi by Kabila

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[6] African Rights, *The conflict Cycles: Which Way in the Kivus*, http://www.unimondo.org/AfricanRights/html/book007.html , p.1.
[7] M. Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institution of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark Publishers; 2000) p.51.
[8] Ibid. p. 69.
[9] O. J. C. B. Ojo, D. K. Orwa and C. M. B. Utete, *African International Relations* (London: Longman; 1985) pp.135-136.

regime after Rwanda fell out with Kabila.[10] The "ethnic overlap" factor is important in the formation of Uganda-Rwanda alliance. The Hima clan is found in Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi and Kagame, Museveni and Buyoya all belong to this clan.[11]

The shared borders, which are porous help, facilitate the free movement of people thereby transfusing conflicts across borders. For example, the lack of proper central control in the DRC leaves a "gaping hole" in the porous borders, which armed units, use.[12]

Interdependence between states

Trade links states to one another. The countries in the Great Lakes region either belong to SADC or COMESA trading blocs. These regional economic organisations help integrate the countries in the Great Lakes Region, making them dependent on each other. The geographic proximity of these countries to one another has meant that internal economic and political events in one country have a direct impact on the peace, stability and development of the other neighbouring countries. For example, the conflict in the DRC can be said to have originated from the Rwandan civil war, which led to the 1994 genocide and mass flow of the Hutu refugees to the DRC. Rwanda intervened in the DRC to flush out the rebel forces, which use the DRC to launch attacks against it.[13]

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[10] See chapter 2.
[11] The African Peace Forum, *Background Report on Great Lakes Early Warning Project* (August/ September 1998) p. 21.
[12] European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, *Central Africa: Shifting Alliances, Extraterritorial Conflicts and Conflict Management* (May 1999), http://www.one world.org/euconflict/sfp/part2/181_html p. 21.
[13] F. Misser and A. Rake. "Congo in Crisis" *New Africa,* Number 367(October 1999) p. 10.

The refugee problem

The refugees can spread conflicts to the host countries. For example the murder of the Hutu President, Ndandaye in 1993 by the Tutsi soldiers led to the outburst of conflict in Burundi and flight of about 700,000 Hutus, some of whom later became active in the Rwandan genocide.[14] The militant Hutu refuges in Rwanda have necessitated the military intervention of Rwanda in the DRC.

Refugee problem has been a major factor in conflict causation in the Great Lakes region. For example, Rwandan refugees as a springboard to attack their home government have used the Kivu region. The war in DRC illustrates a "pattern in the Great Lakes region where support for insurgents provided by host governments not only fuels interstate conflicts but breeds them as well."[15] Prunier shows how the RPF posed as "Rwandese refugees in Uganda waiting to go home" but instead forcefully overthrow the Habyaramana's regime latter.

According to Mamdani[16], after genocide in the Rwanda in 1994, over 1 million refugees fled to south and north Kivu and set themselves up in camps. The ex-FAR and *interahamwe* militia also fled to these camps and began re-arming the refugees in the camps, while the international community and International Non-Governmental Organizations fed and funded them.[17] When the ADFL attacked Congo in 1996, the refugee camps in the Kivu region were attacked thus leading to the killing of the armed and unarmed refugees.[18] The presence of the armed elements among the unarmed Hutu

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[14] United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *The State of the World's Refugees* (New York: Oxford University Press; 2000) p.259.
[15] International Crisis Group, *North Kivu Quagmire*, 13 August 1998, p. 5.
[16] M. Mamdani, *Preliminary Thought on the Congo Crisis*, 1999, htpp://muse.jhu.edu/demo/soc/17.3mamdani.html, p.5.
[17] ibid., p.5.
[18] International Crisis Group, *North Kivu Quagmire*, Op.cit. p.8.

refugees was given as a justification for the attack on the refugee camps. The refugees were dispersed and some killed.

Uganda and Rwanda hoped that by installing an ally (Kabila) in power, they would be assured their interests and securities were protected.[19] When Uganda and Rwanda fell out with Kabila, their security became threatened as Kabila incorporated the ex-FAR and *interahamwe* in his army. Braeckman asserts that the ex-FAR and the *interahamwe* were reconstituted into the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance.[20] Prendergast and Smock state that it is the Rwandan *genocidaires* (ex-FAR and *interahamwe)* and the forces they build with the kabila forces and his allies that provides the greatest impetus to cross-border conflicts.[21]

The management of refugee problem is a crucial factor in maintenance of peace, security and stability in the Great Lakes region.

The game of alliances

The emergence of alliances not only led to the assortment of allies outside the DRC but from also within the Congolese political scene. At the "macro" level, alliances are formed between Uganda and Rwanda on one hand and DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia on the other hand. At the "micro" level Uganda - Rwanda alliance allies with the *Banyamulenge* and the RCD rebel group while the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance allies with the *Mai-Mai* warriors, the ex-Mobutu Generals, the interahamwe militia, the ex-FAR and the ADF rebels.[22]

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[19] K. Museveni, " Why Uganda Must Intervene in the Congo Crisis," *The East African*, 21-27 September 1998, p. 10.
[20] C. Braeckman, "Congo: A War Without Victors," *Le Monde Diplomatic*, April 2001, p.8.
[21] J. Prendergast and D. Smock, *Post Genocidal Reconstruction: Building Peace in Rwanda and Burundi*, United States Institute of Peace and Security, p.9.
[22] ICG, *North Kivu Quagmire*, op.cit. pp.10-16.

Mwagiru also asserts that alliances complicate rather than limit a conflict situation because a different conflict can break out between allies and continue side by side with the main conflict.[23] There is always the probability of conflict between alliance members as alliances can be formed between states with incompatible interests and goals so long as a common threat exists. Sumner refers to such a co-operation between states with incompatible goals as "antagonistic co-operation" in which two or more actors join to serve a major common interest despite the "lesser antagonism of interests " which exists between them.[24] Alliances can therefore place members in a situation of living with conflicts of interests, which might explode into violent confrontation. Alliances can therefore expand conflicts by creating new "unforeseeable" intra-alliance conflicts.

According to Raddle, alliances may disagree on war aims, methods of conducting war and on bargaining tactics at peace talks.[25] Uganda and Rwanda disagreements have led to violent clashes in Kisangani.[26] On methods of conducting war, Uganda's war strategy *Mchaka Mchaka* is geared towards acquiring local allies through political mobilisation while Rwanda's political strategies are aimed at quick military victory without political mobilisation of the local population. [27] Disagreements within an alliance may also arise if some allies discover that their partners have made moves towards peace without consulting them.[28] For example,

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[23] M. Mwagiru *Conflict: Theory, Processes and institution of management*, Op.cit. p.50.
[24] W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (New York: Dover Publications; 1959) p.17.
[25] R. F. Raddle *The Origin of Peace: A Study of Peacekeeping and the Structure of Peace Settlements* (New York: The Free Press; 1973) p.118.
[26] See chapter 2.
[27] International Crisis Group, *An Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace*, Number 5, August 1999, p.11.
[28] R. F. Raddle, *The Origin of Peace: A Study of Peacekeeping and the Structure of Peace Settlements* (New York: Free Press; 1973) p.118.

Museveni and Kabila signed a peace deal in Sirte, Libya, on April 18, 1999 in which foreign troops were to be withdrawn, African peace keeping force established and internal political dialogue instituted in DRC.[29] However, Rwanda and rebel groups it supports because they were not involved directly in the negotiations rejected this peace deal. These disagreements are a source of conflicts within the Uganda - Rwanda alliance. By clashing in Kisangani, Uganda and Rwanda became enemies and created a new intra-alliance conflict.

According to Naidu, Alliances are preoccupied with the problems of external threats and generally neglect attempts at managing intra-alliance threats which may lead to conflicts within the alliances.[30] The neglect of the conflict within an alliance may lead to the split of the alliance. This can be seen in the split up of Uganda-Rwanda alliance, which led to fierce fighting in Kisangani on 7th August 1999 and renewed violence for three days beginning from14th August 1999.[31] This conflict led to the death of about 600 people while many civilians fled to the forests to avoid being caught in the crossfire.[32] The division between the Ugandan backed RCD-Kisangani and Rwandan backed RCD-Goma was given as the main reason behind the failure of the RCD to sign the Lusaka Peace Accord on 10th July 1999.[33]

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[29] See chapter 4.
[30] M. V. Naidu, *Alliances and Balance of Power: A Search for Conceptual Clarity* (London: Macmillan; 1974) p.155.
[31] International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo: An Anatomy of an Ugly War* (Nairobi/ Brussels: Report Number 26, 20 December 2000) p.9.
[32] Ibid. p.9.
[33] B. Basongo. *Rebel Split, Suspicions Mark First Anniversary of DRC Uprising, Daily Mail and Guardian* 2 August 1999, p. 1.

Alliances exacerbate conflict by clearly defining outside enemies whose existence helps sustain the alliance internal cohesion.[34] Because alliances create bonding, which serves as referents through which in-group and out-group differentiation is made, this leads to generation of conflicts.[35] For example, cordial relationship, which existed between Uganda and Rwanda on the one hand and DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia prior to the outbreak of the second war collapsed with the advent of alliance formation in the second war in 1998. These countries were formally friends but are now enemies. Rwanda Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deo Ntarugera asserts that Rwanda and Zimbabwe have been friends all along, but now find themselves divided into two different camps, which automatically makes them "daggers-drawn"[36]

Alliances are usually formed to neutralise outside threats. However, alliances are frequently met with counter-alliances, which exacerbates the threat the original alliance was created to prevent.[37] When Museveni and Kagame entered into an alliance against the threat emanating from the unfriendly Kabila regime, they did not foresee the formation of a countervailing alliance between DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, which could pose a greater threat to them. Bangura asserts that Rwanda and Uganda are likely to come out of war with higher levels of instability

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[34] M. S. Walt, *The Origin of Alliances* (London: Cornell University press; 1989) p.viii.
[35] M.D. Ward *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics* (Colorado: Graduate School of International Studies; 1982) p.41.

[36] D. Ntarugera, quoted by L. Machipisha and J. B. Kayigamba, "Congo Conflict Spreads," *Mail and Guardian*, 2 October 1998, p. 2.
[37] R. L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press; 1969) p.48.

and threats to their security than they faced before the second war in the DRC.[38] He argues that the formation of Uganda -Rwanda alliance is not a stabilising factor but a risky policy with potential of plunging the central and East Africa into a protracted chaos and humanitarian disaster.[39]

The enhanced military capabilities of these alliances have potential of not only threatening the security of the states engaged in the war, but also the security of many other states outside the alliances, which have to live in fear of the combined military force of the alliance members. Alliances and counter-alliances therefore widen insecurity. It is because of this that Wright observes that international stability is better served by efforts aimed at breaking up alliances, as they are dangerous to security rather than offsetting them with counter-alliances.[40] Alliances are a threat to peace and that is why peace in the DRC is sought through appeals to the foreign allies to withdraw their troops. The withdrawal of troops would mean the end of these military alliances.

Alliances stimulate arms race.[41] Arms are the tools through which wars are fought. Without arms, war can be eradicated. According to African Peace Forum[42] there is a proliferation of arms to both the rebels and the government armies involved in the DRC conflict, and the conflict has attracted arms from South Africa, North Korea, Russia, some Eastern European countries and from within the region.

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[38] Y. Bangura, " Comments on Regional Security and the War in Congo" in M. Ibbo (ed.) *Reflection on the Crisis in the Congo,* Reviewed by A. Alfred, http://www.one world.org/afronet/HR review/vol4_pp5.html p.4.
[39] Ibid. p.4.
[40] Q. Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1965) p.774.
[41] R. Chowdhury, " The Military Alliances and the United Nations Charter" in J. Friedman (*et.al*), *Alliance in International Politics* (Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon; 1970) pp.369-388: 370.
[42] African Peace Forum, *Background Report on Great Early Warning Project* (August/September 1998) p. 18.

According to Shearer of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, South African government provided arms to Rwanda while private mercenaries from South Africa's Security Lining Pretoria Company has been commissioned by Kabila.[43] Hartung and Moix[44] of the Arms Trade Resource Centre assert that heavy weapons and training transferred to the Great Lakes region has helped in fuelling the conflict in the DRC. In 1998, the United States transferred weapons to Africa worth US $ 12.5 million with substantial deliveries to Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe (Kabila's allies), while Uganda received nearly US $ 1.5 million in weaponry between 1996 and 1998.[45] They further assert that Uganda has increased its military expenditure due to the war in DRC. In 1997, Uganda only received under a million dollars in U.S. weapons but by 1999 it increased its military expenditure to US $ 350, increased its troops commitments and stockpiling tanks and anti-aircraft missiles for use against Kabila forces.[46] Zimbabwe and Angola have also increased their weapon purchase from the United States including jets and tanks, which are used in the combat in DRC.[47]

The strengthening and maintaining of military alliance require stockpiling of weapons. The alliances in the DRC conflict have led to proliferation of small arms in the region. From her work on illicit arms in Africa, Austin has documented weapon smugglers working in the region, asserting that "little attention is paid to how weapons suppliers fan the flames of the region's conflicts."[48]

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[43] See D. Shearer, "Africa's Great War", *Survival*, Volume 41, Number 2, Summer 1999.
[44] W. D. Hartung and B. Moix, Deadly *Legacy: United States Arms to Africa and the Congo War*, http:www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/congo.htm ,p.11.
[45] Ibid., p.9.
[46] Ibid., p.11.
[47] A. Venter, "Arms Pour into Africa," *New African*, 19 January 1999, pp.10-15.
[48] See K. Austin, "Hearts of Darkness," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientist*, January/February 1999.

However, arms critics argue that arms do not kill people but people kill people. The Rwandan genocide of 1994 was mainly inflicted by use of machetes and stones and this give proof that arms control alone cannot eliminate war as long as political causes are not addressed. However, the weapons available to the parties to a conflict determine whether the conflict will evolve to violence and how long and devastating the violence will be.

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff assert that alliances reduce interaction opportunities and the freedom of choice of states, thereby increasing polarisation and the chances of war within the international system.[49] This assertion follows the classical free market economic thinking in which free trade is considered to lead to co-operation and other beneficial effects. Alliances interfere with free interactions between states. States, which are allied militarily also, tend to co-operate socially, economically, and politically thus discriminating against those that are not aligned or those that are in the opposite alliances.[50] States in opposing alliances are not likely to co-operate on international issues and this breeds conflict. For example the economic and political co-operation between DRC on one hand and Rwanda and Uganda on the other hand broke down with the emergence of the second war, which saw the DRC forming an alliance with Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. The military pact established between the Rwanda Patriotic Army and Zimbabwe in 1997 also collapsed at the same time.[51] The lack of co-operation between the Uganda-Rwanda alliance and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance contributes to instability and violent

[49] J. E. Dougherty and R. L. Pfaltzgraff, JR., *Contending theories of International Relations: A Comparative Survey* (New York: Longman; 1997) P.324.
[50] J. N. Rosenau, K. W. Thompson and G. Boyd, *World Politics: An Introduction* (New York: The Free Press; 1967) p. 367.

means of conflict resolution in the DRC. The re-establishment of a co-operative relationship between the alliances in the DRC conflict becomes a prerequisite to addressing the border security issues and bringing peace.

Naidu establishes that military alliances pay little attention to the development of non-military services because the process of sustaining and strengthening alliances is mainly accompanied by the accumulation of arms thus resulting in an arms race, which is incompatible with efforts aimed at maintaining peace.[52] Although military collaboration may lead to other co-operations such as economic, this is not necessary or sufficient for integration because co-operation in security related matters have a lower potential for spill over than collaboration in issue areas such as economic.[53] This is because fewer people, especially the civilians, benefit from a military co-operation as compared to an economic one.

In order to win the war, each alliance spends more in terms of military hardware and upkeep of forces. States that join alliances become entrapped into them as the high costs incurred in the war inspire these countries to justify their continued military involvement. Mugabe came under political pressure in Zimbabwe to withdraw troops from the DRC but finds himself stuck, as it is difficult to pull out without achieving a "return on what he has already heavily invested in the war".[54] The emergence of the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance against the Uganda -Rwanda alliance led into a stalemate but none of the alliance members is willing to

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[51] L. Machipisha and J. B. Kayigamba "Congo Conflict Spreads," Op.cit. p.13.
[52] M. V. Naidu, *Alliances and Balance of Power: A Search for Conceptual Clarity* (London: Macmillan; 1974) p.155.
[53] F. A. Beer *Integration and Disintegration in NATO: Processes of Alliance Formation and Prospects for Atlantic Community* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press: 1969) p.44.

[54] ICG *Scramble for the Congo: An Anatomy of an Ugly War,* Op.cit. p.60.

pull out its troops from the DRC.[55] The Lusaka Peace Accord is seen to offer states trapped in the DRC a face-saving exit from the conflict.[56] The resulting stalemate will be analysed in terms of entrapment model in chapters four and five. It will be argued that this "entrapment" hindered the successful outcome and implementation of the Lusaka peace process.

Politicisation of ethnic conflict

Mamdani asserts that the process of acquiring allies in the DRC has politicised and militarised ethnic conflicts, making them difficult to resolve.[57] The scramble for internal allies encouraged the politicisation and militarization of ethnic conflict. Both alliances in the DRC exploit ethnic differences, which leads to ethnic conflicts. The eastern DRC has been transformed into an arena of ethnic violence, creating ethnic "warlords" and contributing to the "Somalianization" of the conflict.[58]According to Denyer[59], the Hema and the Lendu lived in peace in the Djugu area in Zaire for centuries. They speak the same language and intermarry. Differences existed between these two tribes but they did not result into violent conflicts. The Hema are richer than the Lendu. The Lendu are Bantu while the Hema are Nilotes. The Lendu are more numerous than the Hema. With the advent of alliance formation in the DRC, these differences were exploited in the process of acquiring internal allies culminating in violent conflict between the two tribes since

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[55] T. Turner, *War in the Congo*, vol.5, Number 10, April 2000, http://www..foreignpolicy-in focus. Org/briefs/vlo5/v5n10congo_body.html, p.3

[56] United States Institute of Peace, *Putting Humpty Dumpy Together: Reconstructing Peace in the Congo* 31 August 1999, p.2.

[57] M. Mamdani, *Preliminary Thoughts on the Congo Crisis* (1999), Op.cit. p.4.

[58] ICG *North Kivu Quagmire*, Op.cit. p.12.

[59] S. Denyer, "Thousands Die in Congo Ethnic Clashes" *Daily Mail and Guardian*, 2 January 2000, http:// www.mg.co.za/mg/news/2000 jan2/21jan_drc.html, p.1.

early June 1999.[60] The Hema-Lendu conflict is a form of ethnic vendetta reminiscent of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda and Burundi. The Bantu tribes such as the Hutu of Rwanda and Burundi and the Lendu of Congo now identify the Nilotic tribes such as the Tutsi and the Hema as their common enemy.[61] Evidence show that both the alliance members are involved in this ethnic conflict. In 1999, Wamba dia Wamba, the leader of RCD-Kisangani, was quoted as saying that a renegade Ugandan commander had been dismissed for hiring soldiers to the Hima leaders, while the Lendu were being supported by "infiltrators" loyal to Kabila.[62]

The involvement of Uganda and DRC, who have superior weapons and training, has led to an increased death toll in the Hema-Lendu conflict, which would otherwise have been fought, with traditional weapons and tactics.[63] Again the ethnic difference between the Tutsi and the Bantu is ancient but external manipulation induced by the alliances have "flared it into an astronomical catastrophe above and beyond the capacity of local means to contain it." [64] The war between the Uganda-Rwanda alliance and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance tends to entrench ethnic differences in the DRC thus leading to violence.

Uganda-Rwanda and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliances attempt to establish spheres of influence in the DRC. For example Uganda applies its "Mchaka-Mchaka" method (a form of indirect rule) in the areas it controls. Through this strategy, Uganda aims at politically empowering the local Congolese population.

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[60] Ibid. p.1.
[61] D. Gough, "*Ethnic War Deepens in Congo" Daily Mail and Guardian*, 28February, 2000. *P.50.*
[62] Wamba dia Wamba cited by S. Denyer, "Thousands Die in Congo Ethnic Clashes" op.cit. *P.2.*
[63] see "Uganda Involved in Congo Ethnic War," *Daily Mail And Guardian*, 9 February 2000. Also see "Greed Fans Ethnic Flames in Congo War" *Daily Mail and Guardian*, 28 February 2000.
[64] Human Rights Watch, *Ethnic Strife: Hema Against Lendu* (New York: Oxford University Press; 1999) p.3.

This approach has worked well in the Equateur area controlled by MLC but in other areas this system has been met with great opposition leading to conflict between UPDF and the local population.[65]

Alliances lead to peace school

Proponents of this school believe that alliances have a stabilising effect on the international system. The framers of the United Nations Charter viewed regional alliances as important to establishing peace within a given region. Regional alliances can play an important role in maintaining peace especially in conflicts where the international community is reluctant to intervene. In Chapter VII, Article 52 to 54 of the United Nations Charter, regional arrangements are supposed to deal with issues relating to international peace and security including helping in the pacific settlement of local disputes before referring them to the Security Council.

Alliances can lead to peace through deterrence. According to Liska,[66] an alliance provides deterrence by restraining an adversary with the objective of discouraging or at least confining conflicts. Rothstein also regards an alliance as an instrument of deterrence and defence, which deters war by making the threat of combined force incredible.[67] An alliance of attack usually leads to an alliance of counter-attack or defence thereby neutralising the effect of action by reaction, of attack by counter-attack and of aggression by deterrence.[68] This state of affairs creates peace through balance of power. Spykman asserts that

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[65] International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo: An Anatomy of an Ugly War*, Op.cit. p.34.
[66] G. Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press; 1968) p. 124.
[67] R. L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press; 1969) p.51.
[68] M. V. Naidu, *Alliances and Balance of Power: A Search for Conceptual Clarity*, Op.cit. p.178.

> "If all states are held in check, no state could win war, and if no state could win a war then no state could start a war or threaten war. Equilibrium is balanced power and balanced power is neutralised power."[69]

According to balance of power theorists, an alliance-conflict relationship is negative. In the DRC conflict, the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance produced a meaningful effect of deterrence against the Uganda-Rwanda alliance thus securing the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accord in 1999. The war between these alliances reached a stalemate in which no alliance could win. The stalemate provided the "ripe moment" for the peace process.

The DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance stopped the Uganda-Rwanda alliance from overthrowing Kabila from power in 1998. This alliance pushed back the invading rebel forces and their foreign supporters, confining them to the east. By 1999, fighting only took place along the few battlefronts while the rest of the country is relatively peaceful as the war is confined only to positions of tactical advantage along the 2,4000-km frontline.[70] There are three main frontlines: the Equateur, Kasai and Katanga frontlines.[71] At the Equateur frontline, the forces of MLC of Bemba face off with Angolan troops. The confrontation is strategically over the control of Mbandaka, which is on the Congo River. In Kasai and Katanga, the UPDF and the RPA face the combined forces of Zimbabwe, Angola, DRC and Namibia. The main strategic area of contest is the diamond rich Mbuji-Mayi. Alliances help in building formidable military power and establish clear power relations.[72] By doing this, alliances help to mitigate potential for conflict by reducing the possibility of major

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[69] N. Spykman, " Balance of Power as Policy" in F. H. Hartman *World in Crisis* (New York: Macmillan; 1962) pp.202-223:206.
[70] International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo: An Anatomy of an Ugly War,* Op.cit. pp.3-4.
[71] Ibid. pp.4-6.

power shifts which might be disruptive. According to Ward, Alliances tend to increase the certainty of the structure of international system by clarifying the positions of each of the potential friends and foes to one another.[73]

Alliances are able to reduce international tensions and potential for mutual attacks through bargaining. Since the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accord in 1999, there have been numerous bilateral consultations between Uganda and Angola, Angola and Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and Rwanda and Zimbabwe to ease tensions between them.[74] The signing of the Lusaka Peace Accord reveals that alliances can be instruments of peace.

From the available evidence in the DRC conflict, one can assert to some degree that alliances lead to worsening of conflict more than limitation or eradication of conflicts. These alliances have led to internationalization of conflict and politicization of conflict through acquisition of local allies. Alliances are responsible for the longevity and severity of the conflict in the DRC as it has become difficult to put in place a peace deal acceptable to all diverse parties. Even if the current conflict in the DRC comes to an end, alliance practices of establishing spheres of influence would remain to define future conflict patterns.

Impacts of alliances in the DRC conflict

The war in the DRC has political, economic, social and humanitarian effects on the DRC and the intervening states' own home fronts.

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[72] J. N. Rosenau, K. W. Thompson and G. Boyd, *World Politics: An Introduction*, Op.cit. p. 365.
[73] M.D. Ward, *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics*, Op.cit. p.40.
[74] International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo: An Anatomy of an Ugly War, Op.cit. p.82.

Political impacts

In 1997,mobutu, who had ruled Zaire with an iron hand, was overthrown from power and replaced by Kabila. There was hope for revival of democratisation process in the DRC after Mobutu's ouster. Kabila was committed to democratisation process including holding of elections.[75] However, the emergence of the second war in August 1999 disrupted the initiation of a democratic process. For example, on assuming power, Kabila promised to hold elections within two years but postponed it indefinitely in May 1999 due to ongoing war.[76]

Mamdani[77] asserts that foreign invasion of the DRC can not produce democracy. He argues that internal reforms in the DRC are more difficult today than before the invasion. He sites Uganda in 1979 (invasion by Tanzania), Zaire in 1997(invasion to remove Mobutu from power), and DRC in 1999 (intervention by Uganda, Rwanda. Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia) as examples in which foreign invasion did not establish democracy. The war has turned DRC into a battleground for the interests of its neighbour and Congolese political elite at the expense of democratisation as neither of the alliances has made democratisation process a priority.

Lose of life and finance in Zimbabwe resulted into domestic opposition against Mugabe government leading to lose of popularity.[78]

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[75] Human Rights Watch, *Democratic Republic of Congo: Casualties of War, Civilians, Rule of Law and Democratic Freedoms*, Vol.11, No. 1(A), February 1999, p.2.
[76] International Crisis Group, *Scramble for Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, Op.cit. p. 42.
[77] M. Mamdani *Preliminary Thoughts on the Congo Crisis*, Op.cit. p.5.
[78] C. Braeckman, "Congo: War Without Victors" Le Monde Diplomatic (April 2001) p.5.

Politically, the international image of Rwanda and Uganda is dented by the war. Rwanda and Uganda are viewed as aggressors. Before the war, Uganda and Rwanda had cordial relations with DRC, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The formation of two opposing alliances automatically made Uganda and Rwanda to become enemies to Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Uganda is increasingly being isolated in the region.[79] Uganda also has bad relations with Sudan. The clashes between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani confirm that these countries have no genuine security concern in the DRC.[80]

The conflict in the DRC has the potential of being exported to other neighbouring countries. Attempts at violent acquisition of power by forming alliances between government forces and rebels can easily legitimise similar movements in neighbouring countries. Other political costs are incurred by compromising conflicts of interests that alliance members have to live with and in accepting a certain amount of internal interference through lose of decision making autonomy and sovereignty. For example, Kabila cannot claim autonomy and sovereignty of the DRC as his allies occupy large territories in the DRC and make important military decisions.

Economic impacts

The war in the DRC has undermined economic development of the DRC as well as that of the intervening states. This is because the resources, which could have been used to spur economic development, are instead channelled to non-economic activities like funding the war. Regional integration efforts are also weakened by the war, as economic integration requires the existence of political stability and security in order to attract investments.

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[79] J. Achieng, "Uganda Over Stretched by Congo War," *Electronic Mail and Guardian*, 24 September1998, http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/98sep2/24sep_uganda_congo.html p.1.

According to the African Peace Forum, the conflict has adversely affected the economic growth of the DRC as the economy, which was expected to rejuvenate after Kabila took up power, has been severely disrupted.[81] The Kivu region, which is agriculturally rich, has been severely affected by war leading to disruption of farming activities and destruction of crops thus the rise of prices of major staple foods and other basic commodities.[82] The alliance members are involved in the exploitation of the Congolese resources at the expense of development of the DRC economy.[83]Kabila has to reward his allies with resources for them to continue supporting him. All these lead to external transfers of Congolese resources.

In Rwanda, the large expenditure and upkeep of troops in the DRC has forced the government to resort to extra-budgetary funding like the reallocation of the teacher's salary to pay for defence bills.[84] Rwanda economy relies on agricultural production. However, the war affects the agriculturally rich areas such as Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, which are under frequent attacks from the Hutu militia allied to the Kabila regime.[85] The population in these areas has abandoned the farms for towns, which are safer. This has created food shortage and rise on food prices.

Uganda also experiences a net drain on its resources due to her military presence in the DRC war. The large military expenditure has created economic problems for Uganda. For example, the defence budget overshot the Enhanced Structural Adjustment

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[80] see chapter 2.
[81] The African Peace Forum, *Early Warning Report: The Great Lakes Early Warning Network*, October 1998, p.6.
[82] Ibid. p.6.
[83] see chapter 2
[84] SIPRI Year Book 2000, p. 295.
[85] African Peace Forum, *Background Report on Great Lakes Early Warning Project* (August/September 1998) p.5.

Facility (ESAF) by 2.2 percent in the first six months of 1999 leading to the freeze of ESAF.[86] The ICG observes that

> "Uganda's intervention has proved to be expensive. ADF violence has persisted in Western Uganda despite the UPDF's presence in the DRC. In the financial year 1997/1998, Uganda's defence expenditure was some Us $70 million. This represented 1.5% of the GDP and was higher than the targeted expenditure of 1.1% of GDP. In 1998/1999, Uganda budgeted an increase in defence spending to US$98.6 million. The rise was expected to facilitate army operations to pacify Northern and Western Uganda and to protect the border with the DRC. However, actual expenditure for the financial year 1998/1999 turned out to be much higher – US $129.3 million."[87]

Zimbabwe on the other hand claims to spend US $ 3 million a month for the upkeep of its troops deployed in the Congo while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank assessed the true monthly figure at US $27 million and puts on hold US $ 340million of desperately needed aid to the country.[88]

Social impacts

The 1994 genocide led to the death of over 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The post genocide Rwanda requires efforts aimed at reconciliation between the Hutus and Tutsis, reconstruction and rehabilitation. However, the war in the DRC engages both the Tutsis and the Hutus against each other. The war undermines the reconciliation process and makes the Hutu in Rwanda live in fear for a possible reprisal from the Tutsi. The containment of the rebel activities drains the Rwandan government's post-genocide reconciliation funds. The militarisation of relations between the Tutsi and the Hutu has reduced all credible politics to armed politics and this result in the marginalisation of the

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[86] W. Reno, cited by the International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo: An Anatomy of an Ugly War*, Op.cit. p31.
[87] Ibid. p. 36.
[88] H. Morris and S. Fidler, "Zimbabwe Misled the IMF Over Spending in War" in International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo: An Anatomy of an Ugly War*, Ibid., p.62.

Hutu in the Rwandan political process.[89] The deep-seated disagreement between the Tutsi and the Hutu and its extension to the DRC through alliance formation conflict complicates attempts at resolving both the war in the DRC and the conflict in Rwanda. There is need to resolve the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda for the peace process in the DRC to succeed well.

Humanitarian impact

The conflict in the DRC contributes to the worsening of humanitarian situation. The DRC bears most of the burden arising from this Conflict. The effects of the war have resulted into the collapse of institution of authority in most parts of the country leaving control in the hands of armed bands. The eastern side of the DRC is ungoverned. The lack of governance resulted into a predatory system of control whereby those with weapons control the allocation of resources. The consequence of this is the rising human loses and displacement. Turner observes that

> "Conditions are worse in the occupied zones along the Congo's eastern frontiers with Rwanda and Uganda. Many civilians have been killed in south and north Kivu, where the local fighters known as the Mayi-Mayi harass the Rwandans and their Congolese allies. In Kibali-Ituri, the zone nominally controlled by Wamba's rebel faction, missionaries estimate that 50,000 to 70,000 people, both the Hema cattle raisers and the Lendu cultivators have been killed in ethnic fighting resembling the Tutsi-Hutu conflict in Rwanda and Burundi."[90]

Uganda is allied to the Hema. According to the Human Rights Watch,

> "In July and August 1999,the UPDF deployed units mainly in Hema Villages. The Lendu reacted by erecting roadblocks and attacking the Uganda military. The Ugandan soldiers accompanied the Hema in attacks on the Lendu villages. An estimated seven thousand persons were killed and 150,000 displaced."[91]

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[89] M. Mamdani *Preliminary Thoughts on the Congo Crisis*, Op.cit. p.4. htpp://muse.jhu.edu/demo/soc/17.3mamdani.html

[90] T. Turner, *War in the Congo*, vol.5, Number 10, April 2000, http://www..foreign policy-in focus. Org/briefs/vlo5/v5n10congo_body.html, p.1

[91] Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), *Democratic Republic of Congo: IRIN Special Report on the Ituri Clashes*, 3 March 2000, p.1.

According to the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), over 700,000 persons have been displaced since August 1999.[92] Between the outbreak of the second war in the DRC in August 1998 and the end of 1999, the number of people displaced is estimated at more than one million.[93] Alliance formation with the ethnic groups and militia at the local level has played a major factor in the observed wave of violence in DRC.

The conflict has also increased the threat to the environment or disrupting environment by removing or disrupting environmental protection structures thus leading to high rate of deforestation, soil erosion, loss of soil fertility and siltation of rivers.[94] Environmental conservation is neglected and disrupted by violence.

The conflict situation in the DRC shows that alliances exacerbate conflict rather than mitigating it. The alliance activity in the DRC has led to the emergence of not only inter-alliance conflict but also intra-alliance and ethnic conflicts.

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[92] United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees, *Country Profile: The DRC* at http:// www. Unhcr.ch/worldafri)

[93] United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees, *The State of the World's Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action* (New York: Oxford University Press; 2000) p.272.

[94] UNEP/UNCHS (HABITAT) Strategic Plan for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, (Nairobi, February 1999) p.40.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE LUSAKA PEACE PROCESS

This chapter will examine the Lusaka peace process of 1998-1999. The various processes that occurred in the pre-mediation, mediation and post-mediation phases will be illuminated to help understand the peace process. The Chapter also focuses on the Lusaka peace agreement, which is helpful in discovering how the policy objectives (see Chapter Two) of the belligerents were integrated into the peace outcome.

Mediation

Bercovitch [1] argues that the introduction of a third party into a conflict transforms the structure of the conflict from a dyad to a triad. By accepting to mediate in a given conflict, the mediator becomes part of that conflict. Bercovitch further observes that mediation is a voluntary process in that a mediator cannot carry out his duties without the trust and cooperation of the conflictants. Thus trust, credibility and a high degree of competence are the necessary requirements for effective mediation.[2]

According to Bartunek, Benton and Keys[3], there are two techniques of third party intervention in conflict. These are the content form of intervention and the process form of intervention. The content form of intervention emphasizes third party suggestions to the conflictants about specific ways of settling the dispute. The process form of intervention is directed towards creating a cordial relationship between the parties to the conflict in which

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[1] See J. Bercovitch, *Social conflict and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution* (Boulder: Westview: 1984).

[2] J. Bercovitch, "International Mediation and Dispute Settlement; Evaluating Conditions for Successful Mediation" *Negotiation Journal*, Volume 7, pp. 1-27: 3.

[3] J. M. Bartunek, A. A. Benton and C. B. Keys, "Third party Intervention and Bargaining Behaviour of Group Intervention" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 19, Number 3 (3 September 1975) pp. 532 - 557.

they are able to work out their solutions. The substantive issues form the core of the content form of intervention while the process form of intervention deals with issues of perception and interpersonal relationships between parties to a conflict.[4]

Young identifies four functions of a mediator. These are informational, tactical, supervisory and conceptual functions. A mediator acts as an informant by informing parties to a conflict that lack perfect information about the conflict situation or about the opponent party. Tactical functions deal with reducing rigidities existing between the parties by suggesting plans of mutual accommodation or serving as a source of impartial proposals.[5] The mediator divests conflict situations of non-realistic elements" which are not associated directly with the ongoing conflict but with the need for tension release.[6]

There are some unique characteristics of the Lusaka peace process, which needs to be mentioned. The peace process in the DRC conflict resulted in the emergence of multiple mediators who coordinated their efforts and recognized Chiluba as the main mediator.[7] There were over 23 different peace initiatives in the DRC conflict but the main one remained the Lusaka peace process with others being supplementary.[8] It is reminiscent of the Namibian mediation of 1977-1978 in which the mediation was conducted jointly by

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[4] Ibid. p.534.
[5] O. R. Young, "Intermediaries; Additional Thought on Third Parties" *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Volume 16, pp. 51-56.
[6] Ibid. pp. 51-56.
[7] International Crisis Group, *The Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace,* Report Number 5, 20 August 1999,p. 32.

[8] I. Taylor and P. Williams, "South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis: African Renaissance Melts" *African Affairs: The Journal of Royal African Society,* Volume 100, Number 399, pp. 265-286: 280.

many mediators with the United States taking the leading role.[9] Chiluba or his Defense Minister chaired the peace meetings even those hosted by other head of states. For example, the Windhoek peace summit on the DRC agreed on a cease-fire, which was to be signed in Lusaka, Zambia.[10]South Africa on the other hand reached a deal with the rebel factions in South Africa in which they agreed to sign the Lusaka peace accord but the signing was postponed and rescheduled to Lusaka latter.[11] The Sirte summit, the Pretoria summit, the OAU peace initiatives among others were called by other leaders but coordinated by Chiluba. Unlike many mediations in Africa which only address the internal problems of the state concerned, the Lusaka peace process was concerned with Congolese internal problem and the external boundary security concerns of Uganda, Rwanda and Angola. The mediation not only addressed the inter-alliance conflict but also the intra-alliance conflict emerging from divisions within the RCD.

Zartman and Berman[12] identify three phases of negotiations. These are the diagnostic phase (pre-negotiation phase), the formula phase and the detail phase. In the diagnostic phase, attempts are made towards eliminating the obstacles that keep parties to a conflict apart. The third party tries to show the conflictants that the already existing situation is worse and would become even worse in future if the parties do not adopt peaceful approaches.[13] In the formula phase, solutions are defined while in the detail phase, the conflict is moved towards a resolution or a settlement.

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[9] M. A. Spiegel, "The Namibia Negotiation and the Problem of Neutrality" in S. Touval and I. W. Zartman (Eds.), *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, (Boulder and London: Westview Press; 1985) pp. 111-139.
[10] "Congo Peace Talks Start in Windhoek", *The Guardian*, 19 January 1999, P.1.
[11] "Diplomatic Front Opens in Kabila Congo Conflict", *The Guardian*, 25 August 1999, p. 10.
[12] I. W. Zartman and M. R. Berman, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven: Yale University Press; 1982) pp. 42-191.
[13] Ibid., pp. 42-191.

The Lusaka peace process initiated by president Chiluba of Zambia went through five major phases with different issues marking each phase. However, some phases overlap into each other.

Phase one (August-September 1998)

The search for a mediator dominated this phase. Zartman and Touval assert that a mediator must be acceptable to the parties to a conflict but mediators usually face rejection at the early stages of the mediation process.[14] In the conflict in the DRC, Nelson Mandela was initially seen as the best mediator in this conflict due to South Africa's pro-active role in resolving conflicts in Africa.[15] It is often believed that only South Africa, alone or in partnership with the United States, is capable of exercising the necessary leverage over Rwanda and Uganda to deliver peace process in the DRC conflict.[16]

South Africa recognized the inevitability of its involvement in the conflict from an early stage. After the outbreak of the second war in DRC in August 1998, South Africa was criticized for failing to provide a coherent response, let alone broker a solution.[17] Shearer adduces the weak response to the second war by South Africa in the DRC to Pretoria's lack of any real foreign policy framework except the rather worn tactics of offering President Mandela as an international mediator.[18]

Mandela's early involvement in the DRC conflict began during the first war against Mobutu. Mandela was involved in "Ocean Diplomacy" aboard Outeniqua (Ship) in an

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[14] I. W. Zartman and S. Touval, "The Role of Third party Diplomacy and Informal Peacekeeping" in S. J. Brown and K. W. Shraub (Eds.) *Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era* (Washington, DC; United States Institute of Peace Press; 1992) pp. 241-261:242.

[15] See *The Economist*, 2 September 2000 p. 18.

[16] I. Taylor and P. Williams, "South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis; African Renaissance Melts", op.cit. p. 266.

[17] Ibid. 266.

[18] D. Shearer "Africa's Great War", *Survival*, Volume 41, Number 2, 1999, p.100.

attempt to broker peace between Mobutu and Kabila.[19] The involvement of Mandela as a mediator in the first war acted as a stimulant for him to continue mediating in the second war in the DRC. In fact, on 23 August 1998 before the creation of the Chiluba-led mediation, a SADC meeting mandated Mandela as the Chairman of SADC to organize a ceasefire in the DRC in partnership with the OAU Secretary General, Salim.[20]

However, many factors stood against the choice of Mandela as a mediator in the conflict in the DRC. Firstly, Mandela's mediation efforts were undermined by the bad relationship existing between him and Mugabe who headed the SADC Security Committee which authorized the intervention of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in support of Kabila.[21] The rivalry between Mandela and Mugabe began when the latter became the president of South Africa.[22] Mandela favoured diplomatic means to end the DRC conflict while Mugabe favoured a military intervention. The Mandela peace initiative foundered because of the rivalry and the support given to Kabila by the key SADC members.[23]

Secondly, Kabila and his allies questioned Mandela's role in this conflict. South Africa was questioned over its previous arms sales to Kabila's rivals, Uganda and Rwanda, over the involvement of South Africa's machineries on both sides of the conflict and over its inability to condemn Uganda and Rwanda' invasion" of the DRC.[24] For example,

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[19] I. Taylor and P. Williams, "South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis; African Renaissance Melts" op.cit. p. 266.
[20] Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), *Congo Peace Talks Update* 6 August 1999 http://www. African news.org/congo.kinshasha, p.3.
[21] Ibid., p.3
[22] "Zimbabwe's Mugabe to the Rescue" *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, Number 822, 29 August 1998, p.1.
[23] Ibid., p.1.
[24] I. Taylor and P. Williams " South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis: African Renaissance Melts", op.cit. p. 281.

Kabila viewed South Africa as impartial as it is the "puppets of aggression" in the DRC.[25] Mandela was also occupied with mediation of Burundian conflict. It is because of the simmering image of Mandela and South Africa in the eyes of Kabila and allies that Chiluba strongly emerged as an alternative mediator. At the annual summit of SADC held in Mauritius on 13 September 1998, Chiluba was appointed to lead the mediation efforts assisted by Presidents Mkapa of Tanzania and Chissano of Mozambique.[26]

In phase one of mediation, Chiluba traveled and met all the belligerents in the conflict.[27] He formed two committees under the Lusaka peace process to draft modalities for the implementation of an eventual cease-fire agreement and collect information on the security concerns of the DRC and its neighbours.[28] Through these contacts, an agenda for discussions was formulated thus setting the stage for proper mediation.[29]

On 19 September 1998, Chiluba paid a diplomatic visit to Rwanda and Uganda with the aim of trying to secure a cease-fire and negotiate a political settlement to the conflict.[30] Not much came out of this diplomatic shuttle of Chiluba; however, he asserted himself as a mediator with Uganda and Rwanda accepting his mediation role while Kabila and allies gave a partial recognition, because of the claims by Angola that Zambia supports the UNITA.[31] Zambia officially received a letter from Angola, which claims that it supplies

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[25] "South Africa Lashed Over Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict", *The East African Standard*, 11 December 1998, p.15.
[26] A. B. Ali-Dinar, *Congo Peace Talks Update*, http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African studies/urgent Action/apic62499.ht...p.2.
[27] International Crisis Group, *The Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace*, op.cit p.32.
[28] Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) *Congo Peace Talks Update*, 6 August 1999 http://www.african news.org/congo_kinshasha, p.2.
[29] Ibid., p.32.
[30] "Kabila Says Troops Massing for Offensive in Congo", *The Guardian*, 18 September 1998, p.10.
[31] International Crisis Group, The Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and prospects for Peace, Report Number 5, 20 August 1999,p. 32.

arms to UNITA, a claim that Zambia vehemently denied.[32] This claim did not prevent Chiluba from continuing with his mediation role. This shows that neutrality of the mediator is not a mandatory requirement for successful mediation. Zartman and Touval assert that the acceptability of a mediator is determined by the power considerations and the expected consequences of acceptance or rejection and not by perception of neutrality.[33]

Motives for mediation

The motives for parties in a conflict for accepting mediation is due to the need to end the conflict and the expectation that mediation would gain a more favourable outcome than continued conflict.[34] The conflictants may be forced to the negotiation table by the existence of a "hurting stalemate". According to Griggs of South African Institute of International Affairs, the combatants in the conflict in the DRC came to the realization that the conflict cannot be won or lost.[35] Therefore, the only exit to the conflict was through diplomatic means. Zartman and Touval assert that the motivation of mediation lies in self-interest.[36] For example, self-interest motivated by the need for regional prestige and honor was evident in the fierce rivalry among several African leaders over who should be seen as delivering the final ceasefire.[37] Mugabe did not want South Africa to deliver the peace because this would threaten his status as the region's foremost statesman while

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[32] "Congo Rebels Fire on Each Other; Terrorize Town", *The Guardian*, 10 August 1999, p.5.
[33] I. W. Zartman and S. Touval, "Mediation in Theory and Practice", in S. Touval and I. W. Zartman (Eds.), *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985) pp. 251-268:255.
[34] I. W. Zartman and S. Touval, "The Role of Third Party Diplomacy and Informal Peacekeeping", op.cit. p. 247.
[35] See "Countries Involved in Democratic Republic of Congo Willing to Sign Cease-fire" *The Guardian*, 21 January 1999, p.9.
[36] I. W. Zartman and S. Touval, "The Role of Third Party Diplomacy and Informal Peacekeeping", op.cit. pp.243-244.

Angola did not want Zambia to have the honour of hosting the final cease-fire agreement meeting.[38]

Phase two (August-October 1998)

The major issues, which emerged in phase two, included the rebel participation in the talks, acceptance of military involvement, commitments by the belligerents to continue fighting and the need for a ceasefire. The major negotiations in this phase were held on 26 October 1998 in Lusaka, Zambia. However, there were other numerous peace initiatives. These are the Victoria peace talk on 18 August 1998, Addis Ababa peace initiatives on 11-13 September 1998 and Grande Baie peace initiative on 4 September 1998.[39]

The Victoria peace talk was hosted by Mugabe in Port Victoria, Zimbabwe and chaired by Chiluba.[40] The rebels were excluded from direct talks with the members of DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance and were only being consulted indirectly.[41] The rebel delegation led by Arthur Z' Ahidi Ngoma, deputy President of the Congolese Democratic Coalition arrived a day prior to the talks but was locked out of the meeting as the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance refused to meet them face to face.[42] The main topic of discussion was the inclusion of the rebel groups (RCD and MLC) in the talks with the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance insisting on proxy talks with the rebels while Uganda - Rwanda alliance demanding direct participation of the rebels.[43] Both alliances stuck to their positions on the rebel issue thus leading to a break down of

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[37] "Namibia's Nujoma Needs Help for Congo Peace", *The Guardian*, 21 January, 21 199, p.9.
[38] Ibid. , p.9.
[39] International Crisis Group, *The Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace*, op.cit. p.32.
[40] Ibid. p.32.
[41] "Congo Rebels Fight on After Cease-fire Attempt Fails", *The Guardian*, 9 September 1998, p.1.
[42] Ibid., p. 1.
[43] Ibid., p.1.

the meeting. Rwanda threatened to move out of the talks if the rebels were not allowed to participate directly but Angolan president, Dos Santos reinstated that he would also move out of the meeting if the rebels were allowed in.[44] Rwanda and Uganda did not accept that they have armies in the DRC thus giving a major blow to the negotiations as no talks on substantive issues such as cease-fire could be dealt with due to Rwanda and Uganda's denial.[45]

From 11th to 13th September 1998, the OAU hosted a meeting of ministers in Addis Ababa over the DRC conflict, which was mediated, by the defense minister of Zambia, Chitalu Sampa, and the United Nations Special envoy to the Great Lakes Region.[46] All the alliance member states attended apart from the rebels who were not invited.[47] Uganda acknowledged its military involvement in the DRC while Rwanda denied.[48]

The Lusaka peace meeting from 26th to 28th October 1998 marked a major stage in the second phase of mediation. The peace meeting was attended by the foreign and defense Ministers of Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, Rwanda, Gabon, South Africa and Kenya attended this meeting.[49] The involvement of a number of states widened the peace context from a dichotomous aspect involving the two opposing alliances (Uganda-Rwanda alliance and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance) to a multifaceted perspective involving states outside the two alliances. The rebels were not

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[44] "Victoria Falls Peace Talks", *The Guardian*, 7 September 1998p.19.
[45] P. Mwaura, "Maneuvering for Peace in the Congo" *African Recovery: A United Nations Publication* (New York: United Nations; 2001), p.2.
[46] International Crisis group, *The Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace*, op.cit. p.32..
[47] Ibid., p.32.
[48] "Rwanda Under Pressure at Congo Peace Talks", The *Guardian*, 12 September 1998, p.10.
[49] Ibid., p.10.

directly involved in the talks and their representative, Bizima Karaha charged that the issues under discussion were not relevant to the crisis and the conflict would not be resolved without the rebel direct participation.[50] The meeting began on 26 October 1998 and dragged on to early hours of 27 October 1999.[51] Before the conference was reconvened on 27 October 1998, officials from both the OAU and SADC consulted the rebel delegation to get their views on the conflict and after reconvening briefly in the morning, the conference was adjourned to allow the rebel delegation to meet Chiluba at the state house in order for its positions to be recorded.[52] Uganda accepted its military involvement in the DRC during this meeting.[53]

The major occurrences in phase two of negotiations include the exclusion of the rebels from the talks (adoptions of state-centric approach), name calling and refusal by Rwanda to accept its military presence in the DRC. For example, Mugabe asserted that

> " The more we negotiate peace, the more they (Uganda and Rwanda) have taken advantage to extend their conquest. They are liars and aggressors of the worst extreme. I do know what they want to gain by occupying further areas of the Congo."[54]

He pledged to continue fighting. The Rwandan Foreign Minister, Anastase Gasana reacted to Mugabe's sentiments by asserting that

> "There has never been any peace negotiations between any parties throughout the period that the Congo (war) raged on (because) president Mugabe personally derailed the possibility of negotiations to the Congo conflict when he choose to keep a rebel delegation out of a meeting in Victoria falls on September 7, 1998.

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[50] See "Talks in Danger", *The Monitor*, 28 October 1998, p.2.
[51] Ibid., p.2.
[52] Ibid., p.2
[53] International Crisis group, The Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace, op.cit. p.32.
[54] L. Machipisa and J. K. Baptiste, "Congo Conflict Spreads", http://www.mg.c.za/mg/nes/98oct2/22oc Congo.zim.html p.3.

It is a lie to give the impression that a cease-fire was violated when there is no such agreement in the first place."[55]

Kabila on the other hand asserted that there would be no ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of Congo until Uganda and Rwanda withdrew their troops, and that he was not prepared to negotiate with the rebels, as they are a "smokes screen" of Uganda and Rwanda invasion of the DRC.[56]

The rigid positions taken by the Uganda-Rwanda alliance and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance militated against any meaningful step towards achieving peace in the DRC. There was no good will from these two alliances to end the war as fighting raged on throughout this phase of the mediation. For example, in September 1998, the rebels captured strategic town of Kindu from Kabila forces including 16 Zimbabwean soldiers.[57] Tensions between the alliances heightened with Mugabe warning Rwanda of impending " drastic action.[58]

Phase three (November-December 1998)

In phase three of the peace negotiations, both the Uganda-Rwanda alliance and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola - Namibia alliance began to soften their initial rigid positions. Tensions receded and the rebels continued to participate in the talks indirectly. The major peace talks in this phase were held in Lusaka on 8 December 1998, 28 December 1998 and 16 January 1999. There were numerous other peace negotiations, which supplemented

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[55] Ibid.,p.3
[56] See *The East Africa Standard*, 11 December 1998, p.15.
[57] See *The Monitor*, 2 October 1998, p. 2
[58] Ibid., p.2

these two Lusaka negotiations. These include the Franco-African Summit in Paris (26 November 1998) and the OAU conference in Burkina Faso (18 December 1998).[59]

The 20th Franco-African Summit in Paris was hosted by President Chiraq and attended by 34 African heads of states.[60] The rebels were not invited while all the belligerent states were represented .A deal was signed by all the belligerent governments in which they agreed to sign a ceasefire agreement in Lusaka on 8th December 1998.[61] The importance of the Franco-African summit was that it gave the DRC conflict a wider context and audience. The heads of states attending the meeting overwhelmingly asserted that territorial integrity and sovereignty of the DRC was violated by the rebels and their allies.[62] The overwhelming support for Kabila in this meeting increased obstacles to the peace process. This is because the summit, in a way, reinforced Kabila's previous positions not to meet the rebels as they were branded as aggressors.[63] For example, the subsequent Lusaka peace meetings aborted as Kabila vowed not to meet face to face with the rebels "due to a show of support at the Franco-African summit in Paris"[64] for example, on 8 December 1998, there was a follow-up meeting to the Franco-African summit in Lusaka. All the belligerents attended but the meeting aborted due to Kabila's renewed attempts not to meet the rebels face to face.[65] The meeting was postponed to 28 December 1998 in Lusaka.

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[59] International Crisis Group, *The Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace,* op.cit. p.32.
[60] Ibid., p.32.
[61] Ibid., p.32.
[62] Ibid., p.32.
[63] See the previous peace negotiations.
[64] Ibid., p.32.
[65] P. Mwaura, "Maneuvering for Peace in the Congo", op.cit. p.2.

The rigid position taken by Kabila on the rebel issue changed during the Grande Baie conference in Burkina Faso (18 December 1998) called by the OAU's Central Organ for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. For the first time, Kabila agreed to meet the rebels face to face in Lusaka, Zambia on 28 December 1998.[66] However, Kabila declined to meet the rebels directly in Lusaka as he had promised leading to the breakdown in talks and their postponement to January 1999. South Africa asserting that proxy-talks with the rebels is a waste of time.[67]

The major occurrence before the two abortive Lusaka talks is that Kagame, who had refused to accept his country's military involvement in the DRC, accepted Rwanda had troops in the DRC when he met Mandela in Pretoria on 7 November 1998.[68] The belligerents could not sign a ceasefire unless they first all admitted their involvement in the DRC. Uganda had admitted their military presence in the DRC.

On 16 January 1999, foreign and defense ministers from all the belligerent governments attended a peace negotiations in Lusaka while the rebels did not directly participate.[69]The meeting was called to discuss a ceasefire agreement but failed due to wide disagreements between the two alliances on the inclusion of the rebels in the talks, withdrawal of foreign troops and disarmament of militia groups in the DRC, prompting the meeting to be postponed to allow regional and foreign ministers time to draft a

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[66] "Democratic Congo Peace Talks Set for Lusaka", *The Guardian*, 19 December 1998, p.10.
[67] "Peace Hopes Hurt as Congo Summit Postpones", *The Guardian*, 25 December 1998, p.10.
[68] P. Mwaura, "Maneuvering for Peace in the Congo", op.cit. p.2.
[69] International Crisis Group, *The Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace*, op.cit. p.32.

framework document for the peace process.[70] The bickering between the belligerents scampered hopes for ceasefire deal after all night negotiations.[71]

The landmark in phase three of mediation is that there was flexibility on the part of the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance on the issue of face-to-face meeting with the rebels. Although Kabila and his allies failed to meet the rebels face to face, they committed themselves during the Grand Baie peace talks to do so. Kabila agreed to meet the rebels at home or broad and sign a cease-fire while his previous position was that he would not hold talks with the rebels at all or would only meet them in Kinshasa and would also sign a ceasefire deal with Uganda and Rwanda only after they had withdrawn their forces from the DRC.[72] Rwanda accepted its military presence in the DRC.

Phase four (January-July 1999)

Following the failure of the Lusaka peace talks on 16 January 1999, Nujoma hosted a mini summit in Windhoek on 19 January 1999 to help iron out the remaining "technical matters" which offered obstacles to the Lusaka meeting.[73] The meeting was chaired by Chiluba and attended by Presidents Museveni (Uganda), Bizimungu (Rwanda), Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Nujoma (Namibia) and the Angolan defense minister Predro Sebastian while Kabila and the rebels were not invited.[74] Only the external parties to the DRC were invited. In this meeting, all the alliance member states agreed for the first time to sign a ceasefire agreement, which was to take place in Lusaka later.[75]

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[70] Ibid,. p.32.
[71] "Congo Peace Talks", *The Guardian*, 19 January 1999, p.10.
[72] See the previous phases of the mediation.
[73] "Congo Peace Talks Start in Windhoek", *The Guardian*, 19 January 1999, p.10.
[74] H. Barrell, "Allies Pressure Kabila into Peace Deal", http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/99feb1/5feb congo.html p.1.
[75] A. Malupenga and M. Goodson, "Countries Involved in the Democratic Republic of Congo Willing to Sign Cease-fire", *The Guardian*, 21 January 1999, p. 1.

There was silence on the participation of the rebels in the talks. The Windhoek peace talks were followed by bilateral consultations by Chiluba and Chissano from 27th to 28th February 1999 on issues of the security of Rwanda and Uganda, the withdrawal of foreign troops form the DRC, the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force and direct involvement of the rebels.[76] The UN Secretary General also appointed the Senegalese Foreign Minister as a special envoy for the Great Lakes region and tasked him with the duty of identifying the main obstacles to the DRC peace process and evaluating the performance of Chiluba as a mediator in this conflict.[77]

The Libyan leader, Gaddafi convened a meeting during this phase, which was attended, by Kabila, Museveni (Uganda), Idriss Deby (Chad) and Afeworki (Eritrea) on 19 April 1999 at Sirte, Libya.[78] A peace deal was signed by Kabila, Debby and Museveni, which provided for the establishment of an African peace keeping force within 14 days.[79] Chad agreed to withdraw its troops from the DRC and later did so.[80] However, Rwanda and the rebel groups asserted that they were not bound by the deal, as they were not parties to the negotiation process which led to the agreement.[81]

The Sirte agreement contributed much to the peace process in the DRC. It increased the pace of the peace process in the DRC as it proved that a peace agreement could be signed. Gaddafi on the other hand proved his worth as an "African peace

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[76] H. Barrell, *Allies Pressure Kabila into Peace Deal*, op.cit. p.1.
[77] International Crisis Group, *The Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace*, op.cit. p.32.
[78] "The Strange Sirte Agreement", *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, 24 April 1999, p.2.
[79] Ibid. , p.2.
[80] Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), *Congo Peace Talks Update*, 6 August 1999 http://www.african news.org/congo_kinshasha, p.2.
[81] B. Mundala, "Congo Rebel Reject Peace Accord" *Daily Mail and Guardian*, 16 April 1999, p.1

maker". Uganda achieved its objectives of getting out Chadian troops out from the DRC. Chiluba integrated the Sirte agreement into the Lusaka peace process.[82]

There were peace negotiations in Lusaka from the 6th to 7th June 1999 in which negotiators from all the belligerent states and the rebels, who participated directly in the negotiations signed a draft agreement which called for the deployment of UN military observers to verify the cessation of hostilities and subsequent deployment of a fully pledged UN peacekeeping mission.[83] The rebel groups (RCD and MLC) participated in these negotiations directly for the first time. The draft peace agreement signed at this meeting was to be ratified on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka. It is important to note that the peace deal was only reached when the rebel groups were directly involved in the talk. The mediation atmosphere was lively with most negotiators expressing hope for reaching a final peace agreement. For example, Mugabe asserted that "we look to this agreement as the start of the process of ensuring the triumph of the democratic process"[84] Kabila on the other hand asserted that the draft ceasefire agreement was a "miracle of peace" and further expressed hope for peace after eleven months of war.[85] The DRC officials and the rebels also embraced each other after the adoption of the draft agreement.[86]

The major impediment of these negotiations was that the division within the rebel RCD rank was not discussed but instead differed to the Lusaka peace talks aimed at signing the ceasefire accord on 10 July 1999.[87] A split had emerged within the RCD rebel

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[82] International Crisis Group, *The Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace*, op.cit. p.32.
[83] "Leaders Arrive in Lusaka", *The people*, 11 July 1999, p.21.
[84] Ibid. p.21.
[85] "It is a Miracle, Writes Democratic Republic Of Congo Newspaper", *Daily Nation*, 9 July 1998, p.8.
[86] Ibid. , p.8.
[87] "Congolese Foes Fail to Agree", *Daily Nation*, 11 July 1999, p.11.

ranks with Ernest Ilunga ousting Wamba dia Wamba as the RCD President in May 1999 resulting in the formation of RCD-Goma (Led by Ilunga) and RCD-Kisangani (led by Wamba dia Wamba).[88]

At the Lusaka peace negotiations on 10 July 1999, all the Uganda-Rwanda and DRC- Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance members including the rebel groups attended. The details of the negotiations had been thrashed out on 7 June 1999 at the same venue. What remained was the signing of the Lusaka agreement. The mediator did not foresee the division within the RCD as an obstacle to the signing of the agreement. The dispute over who should sign became evident when Wamba dia Wamba arrived and sat on the seat reserved for the RCD and demanded to sign.[89] The negotiations were to last for 24 hours but the dispute between the RCD leaders on who should sign delayed the process by fourteen hours.[90] Bizima Karaha, the RCD spokesman, asserted that if "Wamba dia Wamba is allowed to sign, then it will be a violation of the ceasefire before it starts."[91] The split prevented the RCD from signing the agreement. Chiluba said they would sign later after the leadership wrangles were resolved.[92] According to Winfield,[93] the MLC leader, Bemba insisted that the two RCD factions be allowed to sign. Bemba did not sign the agreement because RCD did not.[94] All the alliance member states signed the Lusaka

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[88] See Chapters Two and Three.
[89] Ibid. p.4.
[90] "Row Locks Rebels Out of Congo Deal", *The East African*, 12-18 July 1999, p.1.
[91] "Congolese Foes Fail to Agree", *Daily Nation*, 11 July 1999, p.1.
[92] International Crisis Group, *The Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace*, op.cit. p.32.
[93] N. Winfield *Democratic Republic of Congo Institutes Proceedings Before the International Court of Justice Against Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda*, http://www.undp.org/missions/drcongo/unmedia.htm p.7.
[94] International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, Report Number 26, (Nairobi/Brussels: 20 December 2000) appendix B.

agreement on 10 July 1999. With the signing of the agreement the DRC was placed on a path of peace and security.

Some of the major developments in this phase include the direct participation of the rebel groups in the talks, compromises between the alliances, the unilateral decision to withdraw troops by Rwanda, the institution of proceedings before the International Court of justice (ICJ) by the DRC against Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi and general softening of positions.

For example, Rwanda announced a unilateral cease-fire in the DRC while Uganda considered the decision to withdraw its troops altogether.[95]The decision by Rwanda and Uganda to unilaterally withdraw their troops opened the way for a smooth dialogue between the alliances. It also exerted pressure on the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance to take peace seriously and reciprocate. The United States and South Africa agreed to contribute peacekeepers.[96] According to Congolese Minister for Information, Didier Mumengi, Kabila gave priority to compromises and consensus in order to secure a peace agreement to end the conflict.[97] This shows that there was relaxation of the previously held rigid positions.

Despite these positive developments during this phase of mediation, the refusal by the rebel groups to sign the agreement was a major blow to the peace process. Ilunga, the RCD-Goma leader went further to state that they would continue fighting, as "we cannot

[95] "Rwanda to Withdraw Troops", *The East African*, 31 may -6 June 19999, p. 10.
[96] See *The East African Standard*, 10 July 1999, p.8
[97] "Congo Played it Soft", Daily Nation, 9 July 1999, p.8.

comply with this agreement because we did not sign it. We are in a state of war and war will escalate. To us there is nothing new."[98]

During phase four of the negotiations, fighting continued throughout. For example, the RCD spokesman was quoted as stating that his forces were under attack by the Kabila allies' forces near a key staging post on the way to Mbuji Mayi.[99]

On 24 June 1999, the DRC instituted proceedings before the ICJ against Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi for "acts of armed aggression committed, inflagrant breach of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity."[100]

Phase five (July-August 1999)

The mediation process did not end with the signing of the Lusaka agreement. This is because the rebel groups did not sign due to wrangles. This necessitated the need for further mediation to bring the rebels to sign the agreement. The peace agreement reached in Lusaka on 10 July 1999 was a partial agreement because not all issues were resolved and not all the parties to the conflict signed the agreement. Ikle talks of partial agreements in which peace deals even those whose terms are explicit leave out " some issues unsettled despite the fact the they are neither extraneous to its subject matter nor trivial."[101] He argues that residual agreement can be explicit in that certain issues are left for future negotiation or latent in that differences previously ignored or regarded as trivial later turn into serious disputes.[102] Parties to a conflict may settle to an incomplete agreement if they want to clarify what they have agreed on so as to focus future negotiations on the

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[98] "Congo Rebels to Fight On" *The East African Standard*, 10 July 1999, p.3
[99] "Congo Rebels Say Bombing Dims Peace hopes", *The Guardian*, 6 August 1999, p.1.
[100] N. Winfield, *Democratic Republic of Congo Institutes Proceedings Before the International Court of Justice Against Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda*, op.cit. p.7.
[101] F. C. Ikle, *How Nations Negotiate* (New York: Harper and Row; 1964) p.16.

unsettled issues. They may also want to postpone refractory disputes, which are difficult to resolve, as they are likely to hold on issues that are ripe for settlement. They may settle for an incomplete agreement in order not to sign an agreement for symbolic purpose while in the real sense it settles nothing. For example, if the Lusaka peace process was ended with the signing of the agreement on 10 July 1999, the agreement would have been merely symbolic as the rebel problem could have caused difficulties to the implementation process. They may also want to place the residual dispute in a new context where it can be handled effectively and cheaply.[103]

The phase five of mediation is different from other phases already discussed in that it was concerned with the intra-alliance mediation instead of the inter-alliance mediation. The mediation was concerned with the conflict within the Uganda –Rwanda alliance. The conflict between the Uganda-Rwanda alliance and the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance had already been resolved. This was a negotiation-within-a negotiation. The main parties to the negotiation were reduced to two, that is, the RCD-Goma and RCD - Kisangani. At the center of this mediation was the rivalry between Uganda and Rwanda.

President Chiluba sent a commission headed by his presidential affairs minister, Eric Silwamba to the DRC to investigate the true leadership of the RCD.[104] The rival RCD factions also met in Tanzania under the Chairmanship of President Mkapa in late July 1999 to resolve the dispute but failed to reach an agreement. [105]

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[102] Ibid., p.16.
[103] Ibid. , pp.20-21.
[104] "Zambia to Mediate Between Divided Congo Rebels", *The Guardian*, 4 July 1999, p. 10.
[105] "Congo Rebel Group Signs Conditional Truce", *The Guardian*, 2 August 1999, p.10.

The Chiluba initiative to make the rival RCD faction sign the peace accord was given a boost when the leader of MLC, Jean Bemba signed on a condition that he would resort to war if the RCD did not sign within seven days.[106]He signed the agreement on 1 August 1999 in Lusaka.[107] Presidents Chiluba and Mkapa witnessed the signing. This signing put pressure on the RCD to sign as well.

A peace summit was held in South Africa on 9 August 1999 under the Chairmanship of Presidents Chiluba and Mbeki in which the differences between the RCD rebel groups were ironed out leading to their acceptance to sign the peace agreement.[108] The differences in the rebel ranks were resolved when they accepted the idea of allowing all the 50 founder members of the RCD to sign the ceasefire agreement.[109]

The 50 founder members of the RCD signed the peace accord on 31 September 1999 in Lusaka. Those who attended the signing of the deal included Foreign and Defense Ministers from Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda, South Africa, Mozambique and Mauritius. The MLC leader Bemba also attended.

The signing of the peace agreement by the RCD meant that all the alliance members and parties to the conflict committed themselves to peace. The rebel split threatened the Lusaka peace process by creating a new conflict making implementation of the peace agreement impossible. However, war continued during this phase. The RCD reported heavy attacks from the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance in their positions in Kasai Oriental province.[110]

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[106] "Bemba Signs Deal", *The New Vision*, 2 August 1999, p.3
[107] International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, op.cit. appendix B.
[108]"Congo Rebels Agree to Sign Peace Deal", *The Guardian*, 25 August 1999,p.10.
[109] Ibid., p.10.
[110]"Congo Say to Sign Peace Deal Despite Attack", The *Guardian*, 27 August 1999, p. 10.

Strategies adopted in the mediation process

The strategies adopted during the mediation process include the use of the threat, the use of the rebel groups as autonomous parties to the conflict and non-attendance of the negotiations talks.

Threat as a strategy was adopted by both the alliances. The use of threat was rampant in the first and second phases of the mediation process. The rebel groups, for example, threatened to continue with fighting if they were not directly involved in the talks. They vowed not to obey a cease-fire reached without them. The use of threat by the rebels to continue with fighting might have played an important role in convincing the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance to negotiate directly with the rebels.

The mediator also employed the use of threats to warn the parties to the conflict. For example, Angola accused Zambia of supporting the UNITA rebels thus prompting Chiluba to warn Angola that this accusation may derail his mediation role and threatened that Zambia will defend itself as " we only have power to defend ourselves and not to attack other countries"[111]

Rwanda and Uganda support the RCD and the MLC rebel groups. It is believed that without the backings from these countries, the rebels groups could easily crumble. However, the rebel groups refused to be consumed under the umbrella of Uganda and Rwanda during the mediation process. This strategy has four advantages. Firstly, it enabled the rebels to be treated as an equal party to the conflict. Therefore, the Lusaka peace agreement addresses the rebel plights directly. Secondly, it gave the rebels say in the Congolese internal as enshrined in the accord. Thirdly, it gave the conflict in the DRC an

[111] "Zambia Will Defend itself if Angola Attacks, Warns Chiluba", *The Guardian*, 23 January 1999, p.10.

internal dimension as the RCD and MLC are treated by the peace deals as parties to the internal Congolese Dialogue. This lessened the notion of external invasion by Uganda and Rwanda. Lastly, it gave the rebels an international recognition by bringing their grievances to the international scene.

The Lusaka peace agreement was one of a partial gain to both the parties to the conflict. Neither side to the conflict achieved its long-term objectives but instead each achieved minimum short-term objectives. This is due to the fact that the war itself did not lead to a clear outcome as no party came to the negotiation table as a victor. For example, the long-term objective of the Uganda-Rwanda alliance of removing Kabila form power through military means could not be achieved, as this alliance could not win the war. Instead this alliance agreed to a democratic election as a means of determining the future president of Congo as per the Lusaka peace agreement.

Implementation of the Lusaka peace agreement

After the signing of the Lusaka peace agreement on 10 July 1999, its implementation began. This section will examine the terms of the Lusaka peace accord and the difficulties arising from its implementation.

The Lusaka peace accord is composed of three articles and three annexes. It can be divided into two parts. These two parts address both military and political issues: These two parts address the two dimensions of the conflict, which included the regional security concerns of the DRC and those of its neighbours and the internal Congolese political question. The military part incorporates a cease-fire, disarmament of armed groups, establishment of the Joint Military Commission (JMC), formation of Congolese national army, normalization of security along the common borders of the DRC and its neighbours, redeployment of forces, withdrawal

of foreign troops and disengagement of the forces.[112] The political part contains the organization of an inter Congolese dialogue aimed at agreeing on terms of a transition to democratic form of government and the reestablishment of the authority of the state throughout the territory of the DRC.[113]

The agreement provides for a ceasefire among all the forces in the DRC, which entailed cessation of hostilities within 24 hours of the signing of the Lusaka agreement.[114] This included the stopping of all air, land and sea attacks and disengagement of all forces. All forms of violence against civilians were to cease and the parties should facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance by opening of aid corridors.[115]

The agreement commits the parties to address the security concerns of the DRC and its neighbouring states.[116] The security of the DRC impinges on the security of the neighboring states.

A joint commission composed of two representatives from each belligerent party together with the United Nations and OAU is to be established within one week of the signing of the agreement pending the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force.[117] The duties of the JMC is to investigate reported ceasefire violations, work out mechanisms to disarm militia groups, facilitating the liaison between the parties for the purpose of ceasefire verifying the disarmament of the Congolese civilians, monitoring the withdrawal of foreign troops and verify all information data and activities relating to military forces. [118] All parties to the conflict were

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[112] see Annex A of the Agreement
[113] Ibid.
[114] Article (1) to (3) of the Agreement.
[115] Article (1) to (3) of the Agreement.
[116] Article 2 (4) of the Agreement.
[117] Article 3 (11b) of the Agreement.
[118] Annex A, Chapter 8 (1) of the Agreement.

to commit themselves to the process of locating, identifying, disarming and assembling all members of armed groups in DRC.[119]

The Lusaka accord provides for the establishment of an appropriate force by the United Nations in collaboration with the OAU.[120] The mandate of this force includes peace keeping[121] and peace enforcement.[122] Peace keeping duties include observing and monitoring the cessation of hostilities, investigating violations of the ceasefire agreement, supervising disengagement of forces providing and maintaining humanitarian assistance, informing the parties to the ceasefire on peacekeeping operations, collecting weapons from the civilians, verifying all information, data and activities relating to military forces of the parties.[123] Peace enforcement duties included tracking down and disarming armed groups, screening mass killers and handing over *genocidaires* to the ICJ and repatriation.[124]

Forty days after signing the Lusaka agreement, the DRC government, the RCD, the MLC and the unarmed opposition groups are to commence a six - weeks open dialogue and reconciliation, which is to culminate in the setting up of a new political dispensation in the DRC.[125] The Negotiation would be held under the authority of a neutral facilitator acceptable to all parties and chosen within 15 days of the signing.[126] The dialogue's agenda shall include organization of democratic elections among other things.

Obstacles to the implementation of the Lusaka peace agreement

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[119] Article 3 (22) of the Agreement.
[120] Annex A. Chapter 8.2.1 of the Agreement
[121] Annex A, Chapter 8. 2. 2 of the Agreement.
[122] Annex A, Chapter 8. 2.2 of the Agreement.
[123] Annex A, Chapter 5.
[124] Annex A, Chapter 8. 2. 2.
[125] Annex A, Chapter 5.
[126] Annex A, Chapter 5. 4.

Many impediments affected the implementations of the Lusaka agreement. Turner observes that the signatories of the Lusaka peace agreement have shown little or no capacity to implement the ceasefire.[127] A few days after the ceasefire was signed, it was abrogated by both the alliances. For example, about 524 people died when Kabila allies bombed the northern DRC controlled by MLC prompting Bemba to declare an end to the cease-fire.[128] This suggests that the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance lacked commitment to the peace agreement.

The disarmament of the armed militia provides a thorny issue for the implementation of the peace process. The peacekeeping force is mandated to track down all armed groups in the DRC. The militia groups will be located, identified, disarmed and assembled into specified camps. The militia problem is two-fold. First, while other forces that signed the accords can be identified easily and sanctioned under international law, the major forces that are not accounted for in the Lusaka peace process are the ex-FAR and the *interahamwe*. It is difficult to identify these militia groups as they are integrated into the civilians and the Congolese army. These forces are integrated in the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance. For example the ex-FAR, *interahamwe* and FDD have received training and equipment from Zimbabwe and the DRC government making their disarmament very difficult.[129]

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[127] T. Turner, *War in the Congo*, Volume 5, Number 10, April 2000, http://www.foreignpolicy_infocus.org/briefs/vol5/v5n10congo_body.html, p. 3.

[128] "Congo Rebels Say Bombing Dims Peace Hopes", *The Guardian*, 6 August 1999, http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/99jun2/25jun_congo.html, p.1.

[129] F. Reyntjens, "Briefing: The Democratic Republic of Congo, From Kabila to Kabila", in I. Taylor and P. Williams " South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis: African Renaissance Melts", op.cit. pp. 311-317: 313.

The conflict in the DRC has led to the emergence of a war economy where more people benefit from the war, instability and state decay. Campell ascertains that

> " Those who benefit from war as a business will agree to peace accords while making mobilization and troops movement for war. The battles in Kisangani exposed the reality that there were and are those elements that do not want to end war...war is more profitable than peace."[130]

The opportunities offered by resources derived from the war explain why Lusaka agreement, which was signed on 10 July 1999, has hardly been implemented.

The foreign forces have controlled parts of the DRC for over a year. For example, Uganda and Rwanda have controlled the eastern Congo since the start of the war. There is also the presence of armed militia in the eastern Congo. The withdrawal of Uganda and Rwanda from the eastern DRC may leave a political and security vacuum, which may lead to instability rather than stability. The local militia might take advantage of the situation to terrorize civilians

According to Dietrich, the Lusaka agreement provides a highly unrealistic timetable making the implementation progress little.[131] The Lusaka accord provided 180 days for the complete withdrawal of the foreign troops from the DRC. For example, the JMC was to be established within 7 days of the signing, national dialogue ended in 90 days and the disarmament of militia done within 120 days.[132] The Lusaka agreement also provided 180 days for the complete withdrawal of the foreign troops from the DRC. The JMC was to be established within 7 days of the signing, national dialogue ended in 90 days and the disarmament of militia done within 120 days.[133] According to Brigadier Kazini, the Ugandan

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[130] H. Campbell, *From War to Peace in the Congo or Devastation and Militarism*, 19 September 1999 http://www.unimondo.org/AfricanRights/htmlbook007.html p.1.

[131] C. Dietrich, *The Commercialisation of the Military Deployment in Africa* (Pretoria: Institute of Strategic Studies; 2001) p. 313.

[132] Annex B of the Agreement.

[133] Annex B of the Agreement.

Chief of Staff, the systematic withdrawal of the Uganda troops from deep inside Congo could take at least a year. [134] The 90 days provided for the national dialogue and reconciliation is short bearing the large number of internal parties to be involved and the sensitivity of some issues like reconciling some rival groups such as the Hema and the Lendu. Pillar observes that most of the provisions of a peace agreement other than a cease-fire cannot be implemented immediately due to the existing distrust between the warring parties.[135]

The armed groups identified by the Lusaka agreement include the Former Rwandan Army (ex-FAR), *interahamwe* militia, the Allied Forces for Democracy (ADF), Lord's Resistance Army, Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II), Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

The exclusion of these armed groups from the Lusaka peace process further complicates the implementation process because these militias are major actors in the DRC conflict and have the capacity of undermining the peace agreement. For the implementation process to be successful there is need to involve all the armed groups.

The classification of UNITA and FDD as armed groups to be disarmed creates two problems. Firstly, UNITA has existed as an independent rebel group with both domestic support and international networks since the Angolan independence in 1975. Disarming UNITA will do little in changing the internal situation in Angola as the conflict in Angola has its own internal dynamics, which goes beyond the current DRC conflict. The disarmament of UNITA therefore serves Angola's interests but distorts the Lusaka peace process and its

[134] "Withdrawal of Ugandan Army Could Take A Year", *The East African*, 14th-20th 1999, p.1.

impact on the Congolese internal situation. Secondly, the classification of FDD as a "negative" force to be neutralized is paradoxical in the sense that the Burundian peace process considers FDD as partners to the peace process.

The mandate of locating, identifying and disarming the armed groups is a difficult task for the JMC to bear alone, especially when the fact that Uganda and Rwanda have been fighting these militia groups without since 1996 is considered. The MPLA government in Angola has been fighting UNITA since independence with no victory. It would also be difficult for the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance to turn against their allies such as the *interahamwe*, ex-GAR and the *mayi-mayi* by disarming them. There is a possibility that these militia groups can be assimilated in Kabila's army. There is also the possibility of these armed groups going underground bearing the vastness and remoteness of DRC thus making it difficult to track them down. There are serious doubts that any force would be capable of disarming the militia. This is because these fighters are committed to fight to death.[136] Their disarmament would require the surveillance of the whole of the DRC and this is not possible due to few or bad roads and dense forest.[137] There are also some large non-navigable rivers with no bridges.

These militia groups can also cross to other neighbouring countries. The tracking down of the militia groups would further require the existence of mutual trust between the belligerents in sharing intelligence about these militia groups. The existence of trust between the belligerents is difficult to conceive given the "we-they" continuum adopted by the alliances.

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[135] P. R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1983) p. 231.
[136] African Rights, *The Conflict Cycle: Which Way Out in the Kivus*, 2000, http://www.unimondo.org/AfriccaRights/html/book007.html, p.8.
[137] Ibid., p. 8.

The Lusaka agreement transforms the former belligerents into peacekeepers. This transformation is advantageous bearing the fact that a large number of peacekeepers are needed while the international community is reluctant to contribute peacekeepers due to the past experiences in some areas such as Somalia where the United States peacekeepers were killed. This transformation of belligerents into peacekeepers is also likely to lead to continuity between the mediation phase and the implementation phase, as the same parties are involved in both phases. However, it is hard to expect those who have been fighting each other to effectively transform themselves into neutral peacekeepers.

Reasons for resort to negotiation and signing of the peace accord

Several factors prompted the alliance members to negotiate and sign the peace agreement. Each alliance member had different reasons for negotiating and signing the peace agreement.

One of the reasons why the belligerents resorted to negotiation was that the conflict was nearing an impasse and most of the foreign sponsors deemed it better to concentrate on their growing domestic problems. Zimbabwe could not sustain the large military expenditure in the DRC and the growing domestic opposition to the intervention.[138] Angola was faced with military threat from UNITA and needed to concentrate on the internal security threat caused by the UNITA rebels. Rwanda and Uganda were also faced with the rebel incursions, which external intervention in the DRC could not stop.[139] Namibia was faced with the Caprivi crisis in which secessionist forces began to push for autonomy in Caprivi region from 2 August 1999.[140] Therefore, there

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[138] C. Braeckman, "Congo: War Without Victors" *Le Monde Diplomatic*, April 2000, p.5.
[139] See Chapter Two.
[140] "Namibia's Caprivi Shaky After Rebel Assault", *The Guardian*, 4 August 1999, p. 10.

was a need for these countries to return their troops home to help curb internal military or political threats.

External pressure from individuals, states and international organizations played an important role in making the belligerents resort to peaceful methods of conflict management. For example, Mandela exerted intense pressure on the rebels to end the war and succeeded in pressuring Rwanda to admit its military presence in the DRC.[141] The Security Council constantly appealed to the belligerents to resort to negotiation.[142] The European Union also put pressure on the rebels to sign the Lusaka agreement.[143] In many occasions, the United States applied pressure on the belligerents to commit them to the peace process.[144] According to Zartman and Touval, international organizations participate in resolving conflicts because it is their raison d' être; a super power like the United States may mediate in a conflict in order to expand its influence; and medium states mediate in order to enhance their influence and prestige.[145]

The split of the RCD into two played an important role in committing the rebels and their allies to the peace process. This is because the split weakened the Uganda-Rwanda alliance cohesiveness thus the need for this alliance to resort to peace rather than wait for humiliation in the form of military defeat or disintegration of the alliance. The rebel split did not only force the rebels to be committed to the peace process but also had the impetus of motivating Kabila to enter into negotiations because if he organized

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[141] International Crisis Group, *The Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace*, op.cit. p.32.
[142] See The Security Council Resolution 1258.
[143] International Crisis Group, *The Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace* op. Cit. p.32.
[144] See J. K. Kevin, "United States Lays Down Conditions for Military Action in Africa" *The East African*, 10-15 August 1999.

elections, the rebels and their allies would be exposed as opportunists without Congolese agenda (the fighting between the rebel factions revealed that they had other motives rather than the liberation of DRC) and would likely lose.[146]

The need for both alliances to reinforce their defenses was another reason behind the signing of the Lusaka peace agreement. Both alliances were exhausted after eleven months of war and needed time to recuperate and bolster defenses. For example, the Rwanda delegates and the rebel representatives to the Lusaka peace negotiations charged that Kabila and his allies never had any intentions and goodwill in signing the ceasefire accord, but instead was buying time in order to build defenses on the diamond-rich Mbuji Mayi.[147] The use of the Lusaka peace deal as a recuperating plateau is exemplified by the resumption of heavy fighting immediately after the signing of the accord.[148]

The Lusaka accord partially met the objectives of the belligerents thus the need to sign the peace deal.[149] For example, the goal of DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance of preventing the Uganda-Rwanda alliance from talking Kinshasa and maintaining control of the secured territories had been reached. The peace agreement, which called for a standstill in military operations and later the withdrawal of foreign troops, would not therefore endanger its (the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance) position.[150] The

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[145] I. W. Zartman and S. Touval, "Mediation in Theory and Practice, in S. Touval and I. W. Zartman (Eds.), *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, op.cit. p. 252.
[146] International Crisis Group, *The Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace*, op.cit. p.32.
[147] I. Powell, *Diamond War Dooms Congo Peace*, 25 June 1999, http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/99jan2/25jun_congo.html p.3.
[148] See "Congo Rebels Say Bombing Dims Peace Hopes", *The Guardian*, 6 August 1999, http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/99jun2/25jun_congo.html, p.1.

[149] See the objectives pursued by the alliances in Chapter Two.
[150] International Crisis Group, *The Agreement on a Cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace*, op.cit. p. 38.

peace process advantaged the rebels in that the resulting agreement gave them international recognition as they were regarded as equal parties in the negotiation. The agreement also in a way diminished Kibila's hold on power as it left the rebels in control of large mineral fields in the east of DRC.[151]

To Kabila, the signing of the peace agreement meant that he would not be removed from power through military force. He could remain recognized as the head of state until elections were held. The range of different interpretations and expectations of the peace agreement may make the implementation of the Lusaka peace agreement difficult.

[151] Ibid., p.38.

CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYSIS OF THE LUSAKA PEACE PROCESS

This Chapter aims at examining the Lusaka peace process from the alliance perspective. The alliance origin and policy (Chapter two) and the role of Uganda-Rwanda and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliances in the conflict (Chapter three) are taken into consideration in the analysis of the Lusaka peace process.

Different processes in the Lusaka mediation can only be understood by examining the policy or objectives pursued by the alliances in the conflict. Alliance policy and means of achieving it is crucial in conflict creation and in understanding issues and outcome of a mediation process. According to Axelrod, most of what happens in negotiation is the assertion of policy arguments by one side and the response with other policy arguments by the other side.[1] States use mediation as a foreign policy instrument. Mediation can be seen as a method for the peaceful realization of foreign policy objectives. Alliances can be seen as conduits through which states consult and cooperate on policy matters.

Holsti asserts that alliance partners have some similar or overlapping foreign policy objectives and that mediation involves modification of these policies. [2] Kriesberg observes that "various parties to a fight have different objectives, and these objectives shift in the course of a conflict and its settlement."[3] The Uganda-Rwanda alliance and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola Namibia alliance had initial objectives in the conflict in the DRC, which

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[1] Axelrod "Argumentation in Foreign Policy Setting" in I. W. Zartman (Ed.) *The Negotiation Process; Theories and Applications* (London: Sage; 1978) pp. 175-192: 177.

[2] K. J. Holsti, "Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances" in K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (New Jersey; Prentice Hall, 1967) pp. 93-103:95

were characterized by rigidity of positions.[4] The mediation process transformed these objectives, as peace agreement requires concession making by parties thus changing their origin rigid positions to a more integrative or accommodative positions.[5] For example, the DRC - Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance was initially confident of removing the Uganda-Rwanda alliance forces from the DRC through the use of force.[6] The Uganda-Rwanda alliance was also committed to fight until Kabila is overthrown from power.[7] However, it latter became clear that military victory by any of the alliances was impossible and therefore, these alliances resorted to peaceful method to resolve the conflict.[8] The existence of a stalemate[9] between the alliances further transformed some of their objectives as they came to realize that some of these objectives were not obtainable.

In Chapter two, the origins of the Uganda-Rwanda and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliances were traced. It was suggested that existence of a common external threat is a major reason for alliance formation. Alliances are formed in response to external threats. The Chapter also examined the interests, objectives and goals pursued by these alliances. It was suggested that alliances lead to exacerbation of conflict rather than mitigating it. In Chapter Four, the Lusaka peace process and outcome was discussed.

This Chapter will integrate all the issues emerging from all these chapters in analyzing the Lusaka peace process and outcome. It will connect all these chapters and

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[3] L. Kriesberg, "Formal and Quasi Mediation in International Disputes: An Exploratory Analysis" *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 28, 1991, pp. 19-27: 19.
[4] See Chapter Two on the objectives pursued by the Uganda-Rwanda alliance and the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance.
[5] See the positions accepted by the alliances involved in the DRC conflict at the end of the mediation process in Chapter Four.
[6] See Chapter Two.
[7] Chapter Two.
[8] See Chapter Four.
[9] See Chapter Two.

consider the interplay between them. The following major issues will be analyzed: outcome of mediation, ripe moment, impartiality of the mediator, power in mediation, concession making, use of multiple mediators, exclusion of some parties to a conflict from peace negotiations and alliance cohesion.

Outcome of Mediation

According to Burton, mediation is a learned technique and its success or failure measures performance.[10] He argues that a successful outcome is one where a resolution rather than a settlement is achieved. This is because settlement deals with negotiable interests involving power bargaining and is likely to be short lived since the peace agreement depends on power capabilities of the parties to the conflict.[11] Resolution on the other hand addresses shared and core values, which are non-negotiable.[12] If the core values of the parties to a conflict are reconciled and an agreement reached, then a lasting peace is likely to ensue.

Ikle argues that the outcome of a negotiation process may range from total disagreement to complete agreement with varying mixture of ambiguities and specificity.[13] He categorizes negotiation, which end without an agreement as a failure while those, which come up with agreements as successful. However, Ikle is skeptical in considering achievement of agreement *per se* as a yardstick for success. This is because negotiations, which fail to reach amicable agreements, may succeed in one way or another[14] For

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[10] J. W. Burton, *World Society* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1972) p. 153.
[11] J. W. Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy" in S. J. Sandole and H. Vander Merwe (Eds.), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application* (Manchester: Manchester University Press) pp. 55-64.
[12] Ibid. , p. 55-64.
[13] F. C. Ikle, *How Nations Negotiate* (New York; Harper and Row; 1964) P.59.
[14] Ibid, p. 144.

example, a defensive side in a conflict may be successful in deterring the offensive side from carrying out its threat and thus preserve the status quo even if such negotiations fail to reach agreement. The DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance prevented the Uganda-Rwanda alliance from taking over Kinshasa and from overthrowing Kabila from power in August 1998. The DRC Zimbabwe - Angola-Namibia alliance therefore succeeded in its objective of preserving the status quo in the DRC. Even if the Lusaka peace process could have failed to come up with an agreement, it could still be argued that it achieved some.

Regarding peace processes which lead to peace agreements as successful may be an inadequate measure for success. This is because there is sometimes a disjuncture between securing settlements in conflicts and getting these negotiated settlements implemented without a return to violence. In Africa, peace settlements have been reached in certain conflicts but broken down thus leading to resort to violence. For example, President Moi mediated over the conflict between Tito Okello's military government and the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) in Uganda in 1985. According to Mwagiru, this mediation led to the signing of the Nairobi peace agreement by both parties to the conflict, but the peace agreements was never given a chance as the NRM forces were in Kampala on 25 January 1986 and Museveni sworn in as the President the next day.[15] The Lusaka peace accord was violated a few days after its signing[16]

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[15] M. Mwagiru, *The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa. The Uganda Mediation, 1985*, (PhD, Thesis University of Kent at Canterbury; October 1994) p. 347.
[16] Chapter Four. Also see J. B. Kayigamba, *Main Congo Rebel Group says Peace Accord Over*, 9 November 1999, http://news.lycos.com/stories/World/19991109 RTINTERNATIONAL - CONGO-DEMOCRATICASP p.1

Touval [17] introduces two requisites for successful mediation: the circumstances of mediator's intervention and the mediator's attributes and qualities. The circumstances of intervention are affected by whether the issues in the conflict are core or less important; by the environment in which the mediator intervenes; and the timing of the mediation[18] Actors in the mediator's environment may be supportive or act as a hindrance to the mediation efforts. Again the timing of mediation may be at the right moment when flexibility is on the increase or when a stalemate exists. Touval further asserts that when issues involved in mediation are core, then success might be impossible as compared to when the issues are less important.[19] He maintains that mediating in the early stages of conflict or when the parties to a conflict are exhausted stands a greater chance of success than mediating during the escalatory phase.[20] This is because in the late stages of conflict, the combatants are already entrapped into the conflict as they have invested a lot of resources and may not easily exit. Mediating when both parties are exhausted has an advantage in that "even a small accretion of benefits or resources may appear important" to them.[21] Therefore, according to Touval, the success of mediation is relative to the circumstances of intervention, the environment in which the mediator intervenes and the timing of intervention by the third party.

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[17] S. Touval, *Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab Israel Conflict, 1948-1979,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1982) p.7.
[18] Ibid. , pp. 7-9.
[19] Ibid., pp. 7-9.
[20] Edmend cited by S. Touval, *The Peace Brokers; Mediators in the Arab-Israel Conflict, 1948-1979.* Op.cit. p.9
[21] S. Touval, *Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab Israel Conflict, 1948-1979,* op.cit. p.10.

Bercovitch [22] observes that the issue of noting and ganging outcomes of a peace process is one fraught with problems: a temporal problem as to when examination of outcome should begin and the problem of criteria to be used in determining outcomes as a success or a failure.

Anagnoson, Bercovitch and Willie[23] develop a more valuable index for gauging mediation outcome. To them, mediation is fully successful when the mediator is credited with making great differences to or settling the dispute; it is partially successful when its efforts spurs negotiations and some dialogue between parties; it achieves limited success when it attains only a break of hostilities or a cease-fire and unsuccessful when it has no discernible impact on the conflict.[24]

To Kriesberg, a successful outcome is one in which there is further movement in the course of a conflict: a movement from escalation to de-escalation; a move towards an agreed settlement and where a settlement contributes towards an enduring solution to the conflict.[25] He further states that failure is difficult to ascertain as

> "failure is relative depending on the goal that was sought and not attained. Various parties to a conflict have different objective and these objectives shift in the course of a conflict and its settlement."[26]

The Lusaka peace process succeeded in normalizing relations between the warring parties it also succeeded in bringing the parties in the conflict to sign a cease-fire

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[22] J. Bercovitch, *Social Conflict and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution* (Boulder: Westview Press: 1984) pp. 112-113.
[23] See J. T. Anagnoson, J. Bercovitch and D. Willie, "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations", *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 28, 1991, pp. 7-17.
[24] Ibid. , pp. 7-117.
[25] L. Kriesberg, "Formal and Quasi Mediation in International Disputes: An Exploratory Analysis" *Journal of Peace Research*, op.cit. p.19.
[26] L. Kriesberg, "Formal and Quasi Mediation in International Disputes: An Exploratory Analysis" *Journal of Peace Research*, op.cit. p.19.

agreement and settled the conflict.[27] Using Anagnoson, Bercovitch and Willie's mediation success index, the Lusaka peace process can be judged as fully successful. However, this judgment should not blur some failures of the Lusaka peace process.

The ripe moment

The existence of certain "ripeness" is necessary for negotiations to be successful and result in the de-escalation of conflict.[28] The parties to a conflict must believe that it is necessary for them to enter negotiations and reach agreement. The ripe moment sets in with existence of a stalemate. When a stalemate exists, the costs of continuing the conflict exceed the benefits derived form it. [29] The expected gains from continuing with the conflict must seem small and uncertain compared to its costs and risks. It is at this point that mediators should take the opportunity to end the conflict. Zartman and Touval assert that a

> "hurting stalemate begins when one side is unable to achieve its aims, resolve the problems or win conflict by itself: it peaks when the other side arrives at a similar perception. Each side must begin to feel uncomfortable in the costly dead end that it has reached" [30]

The disputants must be able to perceive the stalemate as a "plateau", which is not a resting place for parties to recoup but as a "flat unpleasant terrain stretching into the future, providing no latter possibilities for decisive escalation or graceful escape". [31] In this

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[27] See Chapter Four.
[28] L. Kriesberb, *International Conflict Resolution; The United States - USSR and Middle East Cases* (New Haven: Yale University Press: 1992) p.144.
[29] H. M. Blalock, *Power and Conflict: Towards a General Theory* (New Delhi; Sage; 1989) p. 237.
[30] I. W. Zartman and S. Touval, "Mediation: The Role of Third Party Diplomacy and Informal Peacemaking", in S. J. Brown and K. M. Shraub (Eds.), *Resolving Third World Conflicts: Challenges for a New Era* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1992) pp. 241-261: 251.
[31] Ibid., p.251.

situation, no party can create a solution alone and each party can prevent the other form creating a solution.[32]

The Lusaka peace process began only 8 days after the conflict broke out on 2 August 1998. At this time, a military stalemate had not existed between the belligerents because the Uganda - Rwanda alliance had an upper hand in the war and was moving rapidly towards Kinshasa. At this time, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia had not entered into the war in favour of Kabila. Zimbabwe, for example, entered into the war in October 1998.[33] It was a "false ripe moment" for mediation to begin as the conflict was escalating with one side (Uganda-Rwanda alliance) on the verge of military victory.

When Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia entered the war on Kabila's side, the balance of power shifted to their favour as the Uganda-Rwanda alliance forces were pushed back and confined to the east of the DRC. The ripe moment was in reached early 1999 when the war resulted in a stalemate. According to the International Crisis Group, by early 1999, the fighting between the alliances was only confined to positions of tactical advantage along the 2,400 km front-line as none of the alliances had the power to achieve a decisive victory over the other[34]. The war was confined mainly along the *Equateur*; Kasai and Katanga battlefronts while the rest of the country remained peaceful.[35] The period after January 1999 provided the ingredients of a hurting stalemate and also

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[32] I. W. Zartman and M. R. Berman, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven; Yale University Press; 1982) p.77.
[33] See Chapters Two and Three.
[34] International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo; An anatomy of an ugly war*, Report Number 26, (Nairobi/Brussels; 20 December 2000) pp. 3-4.
[35] Ibid., pp. 3-4.

provided the moment thought to be ripe for mediation. The peace meetings, which proceeded this period, were characterized with accommodation between the alliances.[36]

Two factors further reinforced the existence of a stalemate in 1999: the rebel split and the unwillingness of Kabila's allies to continue supporting him.[37] The divisions in the RCD rebel group also weakened the Uganda -Rwanda alliance's ability to defeat the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola- Namibia alliance, as victory requires unity in military command.

However, the existence of a hurting statement in which the costs of continuing with the conflict become higher than the benefits was interfered with in the DRC conflict due to the involvement of the military in commercial activities. [38] The military involvement in commercial activities in the DRC cancelled the financial burdens of maintaining the armies abroad as these armies became self-supporting through exploitation of DRC resources.[39] Studying the military involvement in the commercial activities in the DRC, Dietrich observes that "if forces are essentially self-funding, financial constraints of deployment become marginalized".[40]

The DRC-Zimbabwe - Angola -Namibia alliance occupy strategic mineral areas such as Mbuji-Mayi while the Uganda-Rwanda alliance holds on mineral areas such as Kisangani. The resources generated from the minerals are used to fund the war making costs of engaging in war minimal.

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[36] See Chapter Four.
[37] C. Kabemba, *Good Guys and Spoilers: The Lusaka Peace Accord and Prospects for Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, brief number 4, September 1999, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/9.1/commerciallisation (sic).html p.2.
[38] Chapter Two
[39] See Chapter One for further discussions on the military involvement in commercial activities in DRC.
[40] C. Dietrich, *The Commercialization of Military Deployment in Africa*, Institute of Security Studies, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/9.1/Commercialisation.html, p.10

Military involvement in commercial activities and the Lusaka Peace Process

The military involvement in commercial activities[41] in the DRC poses great obstacles to the exit out of the conflict. According to Dietrich,

> "this commercialization of military deployment raises serious concern over entry and exit strategies for an invading /occupying army. Commercial considerations can take predominance over military mandates, hence blurring the distribution between entry criteria and financial gain. Traditional exit criteria, such as the return of stability or the achievement of strategic foreign policy objective, also become irrelevant if the occupying army participates in capital intensive and long-term commercial enterprise... In this manner, while semi-commercial criteria can create an incentive for entering a conflict, the establishment of entrepreneurial schemes by military commanders and political elite provide a long disincentive for troop withdrawal. In order to sustain advantageous resource -extraction ventures, a strong security presence is necessary; and if the security presence is strong enough, the sovereignty of the occupied territory is effectively held hostage and discouraged from seeking better deals elsewhere.[42]

Many people are financially benefiting from the ongoing war in the DRC.[43] To these people, the establishment of peace as envisaged by the Lusaka accord deprives them of valuable benefits. This may explain why the Lusaka agreement has been frequently violated. This view is supported by Mitchell who argues that if the operation of participating in a conflict brings benefits to some faction or individuals within the parties to the conflict, then it is "obvious that any settlement that takes away such valued benefits" would be resisted by those whose fortunes depend on the continuation of war.[44]

Dietrich associates the presence of military commercialism to the existence of a failed state in the DRC and patrimonial networks in Africa. He argues that

> " the decline in foreign aid to corrupt and undemocratic governments, as well as concurrent demands for economic and political liberalization have heavily strained

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[41] See Chapter Four.
[42] C. Dietrich, *The Commercialization of Military Deployment in Africa*, op.cit. p.10.
[43] See Chapter One.
[44] C.R. Mitchell "Evaluating Conflict" *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 17, Number 1, 1980, pp. 61-75:72.

> African patrimonialism. This has accelerated the implosion of weak states, as leaders could no longer service their patronage networks, giving rise to competing warlords and state collapse... As a result African leaders are forced to seek patronage finance through increasingly destructive methods (military commercialization). If domestic resources do not exist or cannot be illicitly mobilized as a result of the scrutiny of the international community, cross border predatory behaviour, hidden behind legitimate political and military concerns, provides an alternative resource."[45]

A failed state such as the DRC can offer substantial opportunities to neighboring states.

Chiluba's early mediation efforts before the ripe moment set in have advantages. According to Ikle, early mediation deals with side effect issues, which may not directly be linked to agreement and may be important in that it keeps the belligerents in communication.[46] Early mediation provides a forum for the exchange of views and also acts as a potential channel for emergency communication and crisis bargaining.[47] The process of negotiation can either be gratifying or entangling to one's opponent thus providing impetus for desisting from violent action, which might have otherwise been taken. Parties may be led to give up violence by the mere fact that negotiations are going on.[48] Touval also supports early mediation by arguing that it may help the mediator gain influence in the evolution of the conflict towards a situation, which would be appropriate for mediation.[49] The mediator therefore gets the control over mediation from the early stages.

The ripe moment would posit that a third party waits until the time the military stalemate is reached. This argument runs counter to the observations in most conflicts such as the one in the DRC as mediators do intervene in conflicts even before a stalemate

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[45] C. Dietrich, *The Commercialization of military Deployment in Africa*, op.cit. p. 6.
[46] F. C. Ikle, *How Nations Negotiate*, op.cit. p.43.
[47] Ibid. , p.44.
[48] Ibid, p. 45.

exist. Mediation efforts mature with the conflict and the ripe moment find when the mediation initiatives are going on. The "pre ripe-moment" intervention by third parties is advantageous because it is usually difficult to identify the ripe moments. The conditions for "ripeness" may set in unknowingly and it would be prudent to have mediation process in place early enough.

Zartman and Touval Observes that

> "mediation is sometimes induced by the evaluation that the intervention is desirable or necessary for the would-be mediator, without there being reasons to believe that the moment is propitious for a negotiated settlement. Together however, the two can provide the optimal conditions for mediation."[50]

They further argue that it is important to get the mediation process started even if the right moment for settlement is not evident as the synchronization of the mediators' efforts with the parties' readiness to compromise is sometimes difficult.[51]

Impartiality of the mediator

The traditional view is that a mediator's impartiality is a mandatory condition for effective performance of his duties. Mediation may be resisted if one party views the mediator as biased against it and in favour of the opponent. For example, Kabila refused to accept Mandela's mediation because he viewed him as biased in favour of the Uganda – Rwanda alliance.[52]

Some scholars like Touval challenge this traditional view that mediators must be impartial in order to be effective. Touval argues that mediators who are perceived to be

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[49] S. Touval, *Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab Israel Conflict, 1948-1979.* op.cit. p. 10.
[50] I. W. Zartman and S. Touval, "Mediation in Theory and Practice", in S. Touval and I. W. Zartman (Eds.), *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, (Boulder and London: Westview Press; 1985) pp. 251-268: 259.
[51] Ibid., p. 259.
[52] See Chapter 4.

biased can perform their functions effectively.[53] A biased mediator can use the influence he has over the party he supports to deliver him to a peace agreement. Touval gives an example of the United States mediation in the Arab-Israel conflict.[54] The United States is a known supporter of Israel. The Arabs accept the United States mediation because they believe the United State can influence Israel's negotiation behaviour and positions, that is, the mediator has resources which the parties value and it is this that they are interested in rather than the partiality of the mediator. Zartman and Touval[55] give the example of Pakistan's acceptance of the former Soviet Union's mediation in the conflict in Kashmir despite the closeness relationship between the Soviet's and India. They argue that Pakistan's attitude was influenced by the fact that there was a growing cooperation between Pakistan and China and thus the Soviet Union would be motivated to improve their relations with Pakistan. However this does not mean that a mediator can support one party to a conflict without risking the loss of cooperation from the other party.

It is very difficult to have an impartial mediator in a conflict situation involving numerous states like one in the DRC. Randle supports this idea by asserting that in a multilateral war involving many states and many issues and covering a wide geographic area, there will be very few disinterested states; and a mediator acceptable to some allies may not be acceptable to all."[56]

Mediators are motivated by some interest whether personal, humanitarian or materialistic. They are parties to the negotiation and bargain for their own positions.

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[53] S. Touval, *Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab Israel Conflict, 1948-1978*, op.cit. p. 3.
[54] Ibid., p. 12.
[55] I. W. Zartman and S. Touval, "Mediation in Theory and Practice", in S. Touval and I. W. Zartman (Eds.), *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, op.cit. p.256.

Therefore as parties to negotiation, mediators need not be impartial. Being biased may be an important asset in enhancing the mediator's bargaining power with both sides in a conflict.[57]

Mwagiru expands types of mediators and introduces a heterogeneous mediator with both characteristics of endogenous and exogenous mediator. [58]An endogenous mediator comes from within the conflict while an exogenous mediator is from outside the conflict. Chiluba can be regarded as a heterogeneous mediator. The conflict in the DRC has led to direct intervention by Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. Zambia is not directly involved thus Chiluba can regarded as an exogenous mediator. From another perspective the conflict in the DRC has a regional impact. Zambia neighbours the DRC and becomes linked to this conflict particularly by the refugees, who have fled to it from the DRC. Therefore, Chiluba can also be regarded as an endogenous mediator. It is difficult to conceive a heterogeneous mediator as impartial as he is affected by the conflict and has interest in it.

Burton [59] observes that a mediator represents to one party the views of the other and becomes identified by each party. He soon becomes regarded with suspicion, as parties to a conflict cannot accept neutral positions. "If you are not with us you are against us", becomes the common attitude and the longer the mediation continues the less the mediator is likely to be accepted as disinterested and impartial.[60] At the start of the Lusaka

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[56] R. F. Randle, *The Origins of Peace: A Study of Peacekeeping and the Structure of Peace Settlements* (New York: The Free Press; 1973) P .135.
[57] Touval, *Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab – Israel Conflict, 1948 – 1979*, Op. Cit. P 16.
[58] M. Mwagiru, *The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation, 1985*, (PhD Thesis, University of Kent at Canterbury, October 1994) pp. 371- 372.
[59] J. W. Burton, *Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations* (London: Macmillan; 1969) p. 155.
[60] Ibid., p.155.

Peace process, both belligerents viewed Chiluba as impartial.[61] In the course of mediation, he became to be regarded as biased, particularly by Angola, which accused Zambia of supporting UNITA.[62]

In Lusaka the peace process, impartiality of the mediator was crucial to accepting or refusing mediation by Chiluba and Mandela respectively. However, impartiality was not necessary for successful mediation. For example after the acceptance of Chiluba as a mediator, he was latter accused of being partial by Angola but this did not prevent him from delivering Angola to sign the Lusaka agreement. In the implementation stage, the former Botswana President Masire, was chosen as a facilitator. Kabila rejected him as impartial thus delaying the start of the Congolese national dialogue.[63] This rejection of Masire as partial did not prevent him from continuing with his duties. The Uganda-Rwanda alliance, on the other hand, was not interested in the issue of impartiality of the mediator. It never rejected any suggested mediator. This evidence supports Zartman and Touval's assertion that after third parties are accepted as mediators, their " subsequent meddling is tolerated because the are already part of the relationship. [64]

Power in mediation

Power between parties to a conflict plays an important role in negotiation between them. The commencement of negotiations requires parties not to be symmetrical in power as the more powerful party is unlikely to resort to negotiations but would rather prefer the

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[61] See Chapter Four.
[62] See Chapter Four.
[63] F. Reyntjens, "Briefing: The Democratic Republic of Congo from Kabila to Kabila", *Africa Affairs: The Journal of Royal African Society,* Volume 100, Number 399, April 2001, pp. 311 – 317: 313.
[64] I. W. Zartman and S. Touval, " Mediation: The Role of Third-Party Diplomacy and Informal Peace Making", op.cit. p.248.

use of force to attain its goals. [65] According to Mwagiru, Munene and Karuru[66], the stronger party would always be unwilling to change the existing structure as it benefits from it. For the stronger party in a conflict to resort to a negotiation, there is need to empower the weaker party by giving it resources or by reducing the resources possessed by the stronger party. The conflict becomes "expensive and very uncomfortable" thus the conflictants are likely to negotiate about their relationship and reach an agreement.[67] When parties to a conflict are about systematical in power, coercion and escalation of conflict becomes unnecessary for both parties, as each has an equal power of retaliation. [68] The formation of the Uganda-Rwanda alliance against the Kabila regime in August 1998 created a power disparity in favour of the former. Appeals to the Uganda-Rwanda alliance to resort to peaceful method of conflict resolution went unheeded as this alliance easily won on the battlefronts. The disparity in power levels was corrected when Kabila, the weaker power, gained military support from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. The military situation latter resulted into a stalemate, which provided grounds for mediation efforts. The formation of alliances can lead to the creation of rigid positions that hardly lead to peace. Kabila, for example, refused to meet directly with the rebels at first until he realized that his backers were withdrawing their support for him. [69]

Zartman observes that mutual attempts to use power to influence each other's position in negotiation are geared towards maximization of self-interest, identification of

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[65] J. T. Tedeschi and T. V. Bonoma " Measures of Last Resort: Coercion and Aggression in Bargaining" in D. Druckman (Ed.), *Negotiations: Social Physiological Perspectives* (Beverly Hill: Sage; 1977) pp. 213 – 241: 214.

[66] M. Mwagiru, M. Munene and N. Karuru, *Understanding Conflict and Its Management: Some Kenyan Perspectives*, (Nairobi: Center for Conflict Research and Women and Law in East Africa; 1998) p. 12.

[67] Ibid., p.12.

[68] J. T. Tedeschi and T. V. Bonoma " Measures of Last Resort: Coercion and Aggression in Bargaining" in D. Druckman (Ed.), *Negotiations: Social Physiological Perspectives*, op.cit. p. 214.

areas for accommodation and limits of acceptability.[70] Zartman and Touval [71] identify four sources of a mediator's leverage. These are the ability of a mediator to convince the conflictants that the future is more favorable than continuing with conflict; the ability to offer each party a solution to its problems; the quantity of resources at the hands of a mediator and resources that a mediator can add to the outcome of the conflict. However, the mediator's freedom of action is usually limited by the requirement that his intervention must be acceptable to both parties. A mediator can exercise his power only to the extent acceptable to the parties to the conflict.

The use of coercive power was evident during the Lusaka peace process. The rebels for example, threatened Kabila and his allies to continue fighting up to Kinshasa if they were not directly included in the negotiations. [72] This threat might have been credible in forcing Kabila and his allies into negotiation with the rebels directly. However, the use of coercive power may pose danger to a peace process as it creates a possibility of similar coercive response by the party to which threat is directed and this may lead to escalation of the conflict.[73] Therefore, great care should be taken when applying coercive powers as a negotiation strategy.

Alliances are formed in response to threats[74] and an alliance relationship is characterized by tensions.[75] According to Ward, tensions and threats create stress on individuals involved in negotiation and this stress initiates overreactions and

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[69] See Chapter Four.
[70] I. W. Zartman (Ed.) *The Negotiation Process: Theories and Application*, op.cit. p. 64.
[71] I. W. Zartman and S. Touval " Mediation: The Role of Third-Party Diplomacy and Informal Peace Making" op.cit. p. 254.
[72] See Chapter Four.
[73] C. Walcott, P. T. Hopmann and T. D. King, " The Role of Debate in Negotiation" in D. Druckman (Ed.), *Negotiations; Social Psychological Perspectives* (Beverly Hill: Sage; 1977) pp. 193-241: 234.
[74] See Chapter Two.

miscommunication between the parties to a conflict. [76] Hopmann and Walcott argue that tensions and the threats it entail are dysfunctional for successful mediation as it creates " both intra and inter alliance hostilities, produces harder bargaining strategies and is associated with reduced probabilities for successful conclusions of negotiation sessions" thus leading to a break down in a negotiation process. [77]

During the Lusaka peace process, the use of threats and the existence of hostilities and tensions receded as mediation proceeded from phase one to phase five. For example phase two of the mediation was characterized by tensions coupled with insults as Zimbabwean foreign minister referred to his Rwandan counterpart, Anastase Gasana, as " a rude naughty little boy who needs his ears pinched" after Gasana denied Rwanda's involvement in the DRC.[78] In the latter phases, tension receded for example; the rebel representatives and the Zimbabwean representatives to the June 1999 Lusaka peace negotiations openly embraced each other. [79] A change of foreign relations between the belligerent states from hostility to friendship was also characterized by a change in the negotiation style from "hard" to "soft" negotiation strategy.

Concession making

In the mediation process, each party gives and takes. Some movements from the original "rigid" to "soft" positions are needed for mediation to be result in an agreement. Nonetheless, each party becomes reluctant to move from its position leading to

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[75] See Chapter Two.
[76] M. D. Ward, *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics* (Colorado; Graduate School of International Studies;
1982) p. 33.
[77] Hopmann and Walcott, Cited by M.D. Ward, *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics*, op.cit. p. 33.
[78] "Insult Kick off Congo War Negotiations", *The Monitor*, 27 October 1998, P.1.
[79] See Chapter Four

evasiveness even after there has been willingness to make concessions. [80] This "negotiation inertia" (movements and reversals of positions) was evident during the Lusaka Peace Process. For example, on 18 December 1998, Kabila agreed to meet the rebel groups directly at a later date in Lusaka but reversed this position at the venue of the proposed in Lusaka meeting thus leading to the collapse of the negotiations.[81] Such tactics are usually evident in negotiations but are counter productive as they show lack of commitments and good faith.

According to Pruitt and Lewis, concessions are made systematically, beginning with concessions in low-priority issues and later to high priority issues.[82] Kabila agreed to meet the rebels (low priority issue) face to face in phase three of the mediation while in Uganda and Rwanda accepted their military presence in the DRC (low priority issue) during phase two and phase three of mediation respectively.[83] The high priority issues such as the ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign troops were agreed on later in phase four of the mediation.[84]

It seems that the more one party to a conflict makes concessions, the more the opponent party or an ally lowers its demands. The Lusaka negotiations were marked by stimulus -response behaviour. For example, in May 1999 Rwanda unilaterally decided to withdraw its troops from some parts of the DRC.[85] Uganda responded by considering a total withdrawal of its troops altogether. When Kabila agreed to meet the rebels face to

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[80] A. Lall, *Modern International Negotiation: Principles and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press; 1966) p. 298.
[81] See Chapter Four.
[82] . D. G. Pruitt and A. A. Lewis, "The Psychological of Integrative Bargaining", in D. Druckman (Ed.) *Negotiations: Social Psychological Perspective* (Beverly Hills: Sage; 1977) pp. 161 – 192: 172.
[83] See Chapter Four.
[84] See Chapter Four.
[85] Chapter Four.

face, the rebels responded by agreeing to scale down their military campaign.[86] Hopmann and Smith assert that a positive reciprocation among actors in which one negotiator lowers his negotiation position leads to a response by the other negotiator(s) who roughly imitate the behaviour of former.[87]

The use of Multiple Mediators

The effectiveness of multiple mediators as opposed to a single one in conflict management has generated a lot of debate. Conflicts are "nested" and therefore call for multileveled solutions including the use of multiple mediators. The idea of co-mediation was evident in the Lusaka Peace Process. The SADC chose Chiluba, assisted by President Chissano and President Mkapa to mediate in the conflict in the DRC. These three mediators closely coordinated their efforts as they co-chaired most of the peace meetings.

This conflict also led to the emergence of numerous peace efforts initiated by different mediators. The use of many mediators in a given conflict has advantages in that diplomatic pressure on the parties can come from various sources. Statesmen involved in the mediation effort in the DRC included Presidents Mandela, Chiluba, Chissano, Gaddafi, Mkapa, and Chiraq among others. The OAU, the European Union and the United Nations were also involved.

The mediators in the Lusaka peace negotiations cooperated rather than competing with each other. This cooperation had the impetus of increasing the mediators' leverage. According to Zartman and Touval, if the mediators do not cooperate with each other then there is a possibility for coalition between the parties in the conflict and the mediators,

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[86] C. Kabemba, *Good Guys and Spoilers? The Lusaka Peace Accord and Prospects for Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, op.cit. p.1.

thus reducing or canceling the mediators' leverage.[88] By coordinating their efforts, the mediators in the Lusaka peace process compounded their leverage.

Burton argues for many mediators instead of one as this leads to the adoption of a wide range of specialized knowledge and experience, which cannot be within the competence of one mediator.[89] In his study of the mediation of Uganda conflict in 1985, Mwagiru points out the need for having more than one mediator by arguing that multiple mediators help unburden individual mediators emotionally as the " problems are not carried on one set of shoulders." [90] He argues that multiple mediators can prevent the tendency of a single mediator to take sides with one of the parties or stick to a failing strategy. It also introduces more than one point of view thus more innovative.[91] He also argues that multiple mediators widen the structure of the conflict by bringing in different perspectives hence enriching the discussions.

However, the involvement of numerous mediators can make the coordination of various peace efforts difficult. It requires proper coordination for such mediations to succeed. For example, on 22 June 1999, there were negotiations in Lusaka aimed at merging the various mediation initiatives.[92] Nevertheless, at some points, there were coordination disjunctures particularly when different mediation initiatives came up with radical proposals, which became difficult to reconcile. At the 20th Franco- African

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[87] P. T. Hopmann and T. C. Smith "An application of a Richardson Process Model" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 21,Number 4, December 1977, pp. 701-726:702.
[88] I. W. Zartman and S. Touval, "Mediation in Theory and Practice", in S. Touval and I. W. Zartman (Eds.), *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, op.cit. p. 263.
[89] J. W. Burton, *World Society*, op.cit. p.159.
[90] M. Mwagiru, *The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa. The Uganda Mediation, 1985*. op.cit. p.408.
[91] Ibid, p. 409.
[92] Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) "Congo; Peace Negotiations Update", 24 June 1999, http:// www.africanews.org/Congo-Kinshasha

Summit in Paris, heads of States who attended asserted that the invading forces undermined territorial integrity of the DRC.[93] This assertion increased obstacles to subsequent peace initiatives as Kabila's previous position not to meet the rebels as they were puppets of aggression by Uganda and Rwanda was reinforced. This led to the slow-down of mediation as rigid positions held by Kabila and his allies on the rebels were reinforced. In the previous meetings, Kabila was pressured to talk directly with the rebels.[94] Spiegel observes that collaboration of mediation can sometimes slow down negotiations, as it becomes difficult to secure agreements on a single strategy.[95]

The exclusion of the rebels from the peace negotiations

In the first three phases of the mediation process of the Congo conflict, the rebels were not directly included in the negotiations. In these phases, the parties to the conflict failed to reach any peace agreement demonstrating that an adequate peace cannot be achieved unless all parties to the conflict are included in the process. The rebel groups resisted their exclusion from the negotiations by continuing to fight, arguing that they were not parties to the peace negotiations. Their aim was to undermine the on-going peace negotiations involving the belligerent states. It is only when the rebels were involved directly in the peace negotiations, that a peace agreement was reached and signed.

Effectiveness of alliance cohesion on mediation

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[93] See Chapter Four

[94] See Chapter Four.

[95] M. A. Spiegel, "The Namibia Negotiation and the Problem of Neutrality", in S. Touval and I. W. Zartman (Eds.). *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, op.cit. pp. 111-139: 119-120.

Cohesion is the ability of members of an alliance to reach a working and enduring consensus" on their goals, strategies and tactics.[96] Cohesion is synonymous with alliance efficiency and ability of an alliance to survive.[97] Back asserts that members of a more cohesive group are more capable of reaching a joint decision.[98] However, Janis challenges this position by Back, by arguing that in highly cohesive groups there is a tendency to suppress doubts and arguments that challenge the existing or emerging group consensus[99]

The division within the RCD rebel group showed the absence of cohesion in the Uganda - Rwanda alliance. This division led to the emergence of divergent positions within the RCD, which was unhealthy for the peace process.[100] Randle asserts that sour intra-alliance relations may inhibit the effectiveness of the alliance by weakening its collective efforts to wage war or make peace. [101] The rebel groups did not sign the Lusaka peace accord on 10 July 1999 due to divisions within them. This led to the delay of the implementation process, as their consent was necessary for any meaningful implementation.

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[96] Ward, *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics*, op.cit., p.31.
[97] Ibid., p.31.
[98] See D. G. Pruitt and S. A. Lewis" The Psychology of Integrative Bargaining", op.cit., pp. 161-192:187.
[99] Ibid., pp. 161-192:187.
[100] Chapter Four.

[101] Randle, *The Origins of Peace: A study of Peacekeeping and the Structure of Peace Settlement*, op.cit. p. 124.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

This study examines the Lusaka peace process. The Lusaka peace process cannot be understood in isolation without the understanding of the origin of Uganda-Rwanda and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliances, which are involved in the conflict in the DRC. The knowledge of alliance origin and policy (Chapter Two) and the role of alliances in the conflict (Chapter Three) are important in understanding mediation. The examination of the origin of alliances in the DRC allows one to perceive clearly the evolution of this conflict.

Mediation can be viewed as a process which involves policy modification. [1] In the mediation process each party attempts to defend its objectives, which are derived from specific needs and interests.[2] Alliance members pursue different and changing foreign policy and their objectives keep evolving.[3] For example, Uganda-Rwanda and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliances intervened in the DRC mainly for politico-security purposes but with time, economic considerations became pertinent. However, this is not to suggest that economic criteria dominate and drive troops deployment in a foreign country since political and security concerns considerably remain at the forefront of foreign policy objectives of these alliances.[4] The profit motive may not be the most important consideration leading alliance members to pursue a 'predatory foreign policy, but it clearly has increased in salience."[5]

See Chapter Four

See Chapter Two

See the Objectives pursued by the alliances in Chapter Two and how the mediation process in Chapter Four changed them.

It was argued in Chapter Two that the core objectives of the alliances members particularly Uganda, Rwanda and Angola are security issues.

C. Dietrich, *Commercialization of Military Deployment in Africa*, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/asr/9.1/commerciallisation.html, p.12.

The security objectives such as the need to eliminate threats emanating from the rebel problem are important objectives behind the military intervention by Uganda, Rwanda and Angola in the DRC. It is evident that alliances have been used as vehicles of foreign policy in which member states augment their capabilities in order to enhance their security. [6]

It was suggested that the notion of threat is important in understanding the formation and policy pursued by Uganda-Rwanda and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliances in the DRC conflict. Alliance members ally against the source of threats in order to reduce the impact of hostile groups like the rebel groups, which are perceived as posing threats to one's independence and security. The formation of an alliance itself can be seen by other states outside this alliance as a threat thus leading to formation of a counter-alliance. The emergence of Uganda-Rwanda alliance necessitated the formation of the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance to counter the threat posed by the former. [7]

Alliances in the DRC have been formed at the "micro" and "macro" levels. At the "macro" level, alliances are formed between state actors and non-state actors such as the *mayi-mayi*, the ex-Mobutu forces, the *interahamwe*, the *Banyamulenge* among others. [8] At the "macro" level, alliances are formed between state actors. For example, Uganda allies with Rwanda and DRC with Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia.

It was established that alliance formation leads to conflict exacerbation rather than conflict mitigation. Alliances lead to the spread of conflict through three major processes: through internationalization of conflict, through the game of alliances and through politicization of

[6] See Chapter Two
[7] Chapter Two.
[8] Chapter Two.

conflict.[9] These alliances have also had social, economic, political and environmental impacts in the DRC.[10]

The relationship between these alliances is characterized by hostilities, tensions and threats [11] which have had negative impacts on the Lusaka peace process.[12] The Lusaka peace process went through five phases. It is only in phase four that an agreement was reached and signed by the alliance member states. The rebel groups signed the agreement during phase five of the mediation.

In Chapter four, the problems associated with the Lusaka peace process were identified. In this chapter suggestions will be made on how to resolve the problems effectively.

The ripe moments

The identification of the ripe moment posed difficulties in the Lusaka peace process. Mwagiru asserts that Zartman-type ripe moments are identifiable only by military stalemate and therefore can pose synchronization problem of timing the mediator's "entry to coincide with the party's readiness to negotiate and compromise."[13] The ripe moment may not be easily identified thus there is a need for a third party to enter into the conflict early as this could make a difference in the pattern of the conflict.[14]

Commercialization of conflict

The war in the DRC has led to the emergence of a war economy[i] in which more and more people benefit. This phenomenon has created obstacles to the establishment of peace in the DRC.

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[9] See Chapter Four.
[10] Chapter Four.
[11] Chapter Four.
[12] See Chapter Four.
[13] M. Mwagiru, *The International Management of Internal Conflict: The Uganda Mediation, 1985*, (PhD Thesis: University of Kent at Canterbury, October 1994) p. 441.
[14] Ibid., p.441.

Referring to the situation in the DRC, the former Botswana President Masire, who acts as a facilitator in the DRC conflict, observes that

> "One temptation for the warring parties would be to hold and consolidate their presence in the territories they already hold, thus perpetuating hostilities. Similar conflicts have shown that war can become a way of life, to the point where those engaged in the fighting have forgotten why they started the war. Initial motives are lost as conflict degenerates into the crude struggle for the control of diamonds, precious metals and other mineral resources by a powerful elite, who have a vested interest in the continued conflict and disorder that would allow them to sustain their patrimonialism."[15]

Under such situations, for peace to return to the DRC, the international community should support regional efforts to restore territorial integrity of the DRC and its sources. Any solution to the conflict must take into consideration the structural conditions spawning the conflict such as mineral resources and political boundaries.[16] The involvement of the military in commercial activities shows that the conflict may be due to lack of resources and low levels of development in the intervening states. The poor economic conditions in the belligerent states involved in the DRC war can pose serious strains to conflict management and if these economies are not structured to provide for greater opportunity, the potential for violence will persist. The Great Lakes region requires economic peace building as peace and security ring hollow in the absence of economic opportunity.

Exclusion of some parties in negotiations

The exclusion of the RCD rebel groups from direct talks led to the failure of numerous peace meeting aimed at resolving the conflict in the DRC.[17] This shows that any meaningful mediation must recognize and involve all the concerned actors and any solution must appeal

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[15] K. Masire, The Lusaka Agreement: *Prospects for Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo,* http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/10/masire.html p.3.
[16] R. Griggs, *Designs for Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo,* http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/two/2/ p.8.
[17] See Chapter Four.

directly to the affected parties. This conflict has led to the emergence of interstate alliances, which demands inclusive negotiations based on the needs of the entire region. The conflict system approach is best suited for managing this conflict. This is because several countries within the Great Lakes region are being used as bases, sources or rebel funds and arms or for diplomatic and other kinds of initiatives that affect the conflict.[18]

Other militia groups such as the mayi-mayi, ex-FAR, FDD and *interahamwe* were completely shut out of the Lusaka peace process. The Lusaka peace agreement treated these militia groups as "negative" forces to be disarmed by the JMC.[19] It would be difficult for these groups to obey the Lusaka peace agreement, as they were not part of the mediation process. These militia groups are major actors in the DRC conflict as they have formed alliances with other groups at micro and macro levels.[20] For the peace to be sustainable in the DRC, it must involve all the armed groups as parties to the conflict.

Issues of arms

The emergence of alliance in the DRC has led to the emergence of an arms race in the region.[21] According to Hartung and Moix of the Arms Trade Resource Center, the United States has helped build the arsenal of the governments directly involved in the conflict in the DRC.[22] They assert that

> "in 1998 alone, US weapons to Africa totaled US$ 12.5 million, including substantial deliveries to Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe - all now backing Kabila. On the rebel side, Uganda received nearly US$ 1.5 million in weaponry over the last two years (from 1998 - 2000), and Rwanda was importing US weapons as late as 1993."[23]

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[18] R. Griggs, *Designs for Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo* op.cit. p. 8.
[19] See Chapter Four.
[20] See Chapter Two.
[21] See Chapter Three
[22] W. D. Hartung and B. Moix *Deadly Legacy: US Arms to Africa and the Congo War*, http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/congo.htm p.9.
[23] Ibid., p..9.

The proliferation of small arms in the region has helped fuel the conflict in the DRC. The small arms have helped in militarizing ethnic conflicts, particularly, between the Lendu and the Hema.[24]

The management of the conflict in the DRC and the Great Lakes region as a whole requires proper policies aimed at checking the flow of arms to the region.

Conflict cycle

Conflicts pass through a sequence of stages. Mitchell observes that "protracted conflicts can pass through a wide variety of stages in their life cycles" and this progression need not be linear as some conflicts can go back to earlier stages and "might pass through both malign and benign cycles of interactions several times."[25] There is the phenomenon of "nested conflicts" whereby a given conflict can be seen as part of a larger one and as such, trying to resolve the larger conflict without first resolving the smaller one may be impracticable.[26] For example, the conflict in the DRC can be seen as closely linked to other conflicts in the Great Lake region. The DRC conflict is widely believed to be linked to the conflicts in Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and Burundi through cross-border insurgencies, cross-border ethnic linkages and cross-border economic ties.[27] The DRC conflict can be viewed as an extension of civil wars in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola into the DRC.[28]

The future security in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola is dependent on how successful the Lusaka peace agreement is. The future security of the DRC is also dependent on

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[24] See Chapter Three on politicization of ethnic conflicts in the DRC.
[25] C.R. Mitchell "Problem Solving Exercises and Theory of Conflict Resolution" in D.J.D. Sandole and H. Vander Merwe, *Conflict Resolution*: Theory and Practice (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press; 1996) p.87.
[26] E.D.J. *Plante Predicting the Next Stage of Conflict: Conflict Resolution in Peacekeeping Operations,* http://www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/irc/amsc/031.html
[27] J. Prendergast and D. Smock, *Post Genocidal Reconstruction: Building Peace in Rwanda and Burundi,* http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr990915/sr990915.html p.3
[28] See Chapter Three

the security of its neighbours. The Lusaka peace process did not take into account the on-going conflicts in the region and how they are interrelated to the DRC conflict. Prendergast and Smock observe that "much of the conflict on the Congolese soil has little to do with internal issues in the Congo; it simply exploits the vacuum presented by the erosion of Congolese state authority. Ending insurgencies in Rwanda and Burundi, which are being played in the Congo, would do much to stabilize the entire Central Africa. It is Rwandan *genocidaires* and the alliances they build that provides the greatest impetus to cross border conflicts."[29]

Perceiving conflicts as "nested" is important as it demands that various methods and strategies of conflict management should be linked in understanding the interplay between different but related conflicts, their complexities and resolution. African Rights observes that even if the Lusaka peace agreement were to be respected, it alone cannot address the series of distinct but interwoven conflicts in the Kivu, some of which preceded the current war and have their own dynamics.[30] Understanding of the conflict cycle or how conflicts in a region have been transformed over time is important in resolving the conflict in the DRC. The web of alliances in the DRC demands a regional approach to this conflict based on assessing the conflict dynamics in the whole region.

The conflict transformation approach[31], which considers long term and deeper structural, relational and cultural dimension of conflict resolution, would have enriched the Lusaka peace process. Reynolds argues that conflict transformation approach can yield rich insights in conflict management as it "focuses on dynamic processes through which conflict becomes violent, rather

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[29] J. Prendergast and D. Smock, *Post Genocidal Reconstruction: Building Peace in Rwanda and Burundi* op.cit., p.9.

[30] African Rights, *The Conflict Cycle: Which Way Out in the Kivus?* http://www.unimondo.org/African Rights/html/book007.html p..2.

than focusing narrowly on how to bring a violent conflict to a cease-fire or a settlement (as the Lusaka process). An emphasis on the transformation aspects of conflict helps us to understand the changes that occur in individual, relationships, cultures and countries as a result of the experiences of the violent conflicts."[32]

Re-entry problem

According to Mwagiru, the problem of "re-entry" is countered when the parties to the conflict try to "sell" the outcome of the mediation to their constituents.[33] He argues that the *Nairobi peace process* on Uganda was abrogated a few weeks after its signing because both NRM and the Tito Okello's military government could not sell it to their constituents.[34] The problems faced by parties involved in mediation in convincing their constituents to support the peace deal are often enough to break an agreement before it is implemented.[35] Conflicts continued to rage in post-Lusaka accords period. Local ethnic conflicts are frequent in the DRC.[36] The parties to the mediation have no proper legitimacy and support from the local Congolese population. For example, Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia which were parties to the Lusaka agreement, are considered as foreigners with no powers to convince the Congolese affected by the conflict to obey the peace deal. Kabila on the other hand has not established control over the entire Congolese population as almost half of the country is in the rebel's hands. The rebels also face resistance from some local ethnic communities and warriors such as the Lendu and the *mayi-mayi* respectively. It is therefore difficult for these parties to convince their constituents to

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[31] Center for Conflict Resolution, *Introduction to Conflict Resolution: Draft Distant Learning Course*, (Bradford: Department of Peace Studies) http:// www.brad.ac.uk/acad.confres/dislearn p. 1.

[32] Ibid., p.1

[33] M. Mwagiru, *The International Management of [illegible]rnal Conflict: The Uganda Mediation*, 1985 op.cit. p.435.

[34] Ibid., p.436.

[35] Coalition for Global Society and Social Development, *Mediation: The Dominant Approach to Conflict Resolution-War Enhancing or Peace Building? Setting the Stage*, http://www.globalsolidarity.org/medapp.html p.5.

observe peace. The problem or re-entry could have been resolved by complementing track II mediation with track I mediation.

Track I and II diplomacy

Track I diplomacy is an official, formal or government-to-government method of conflict resolution while track II is an unofficial and informal diplomacy. The Lusaka peace process was conducted under track I diplomacy. Track I diplomacy is a top down, elitist approach to the resolution of conflict as peace actor empowerment, strengthening of local resources and actors at the community and grassroots level play very little role.[37]

Lederach argues for the need to build a peace that integrates multiple levels of population affected in terms of both inputs in the process and its implementation.[38] He identifies three levels of peace process with key military and political leaders in level one; national leaders with interests in the key sectors of the economy such as health and education occupy the second level; and the common people, refugees, local leaders, religious groups, NGO's, the bulk of combatants and community groups are at the third level.[39] He further asserts that most international mediations take place at level one, which is characterized by high-level negotiations. For successful and sustainable peace to prevail, the co-ordination of peace strategies in all the three levels is mandatory.[40]

The conflict in the DRC has got three dimensions: local, national and regional aspects. All these three dimensions should be addressed effectively. The Lusaka peace process mainly dealt with the regional level of the conflict while neglecting the national and local aspects. The Lusaka

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[36] See Chapter Four
[37] Center for Conflict Resolution, *Introduction to Conflict Resolution: Draft Distant Learning Course*, p.6.
[38] Lederach cited by Center for Conflict Resolution, *Introduction to Conflict Resolution: Draft Distant Learning Course*, p.4.
[39] Ibid., p.5.

agreement concentrates more on the security interest of the intervening states than those of the local population.. This is mainly because the peace process was conducted under track I diplomacy which is power based and government-to-government. It fails to address the underlying structures that generate conflict and the residual traumas, psychological and physical suffering and the enemy perceptions generated and reinforced by conflict and violence.[41]

Track II can be helpful in identifying all the parties to a conflict. The involvement of all parties to a conflict makes agreements become much easier as all the parties feel ownership of the ideas.[42] Track II diplomacy is suited to deal protracted social conflicts that are not based on the material interests but on the needs like ethnic identity.[43] For example, the *Banyamulenge* doubted nationality has been cited as one of the reasons for the emergence of the first war against Mobutu and the second one against Kabila.[44] The Banyamulenge nationality issue was not addressed by the Lusaka peace deal. Azar and Burton employ the needs theory to explain causes of conflicts and its management. They argue that

> "deep-rooted conflicts are caused by the denial of one or more basic needs, such as security, identity and recognition. Needs being non material cannot be traded or satisfied by power bargaining."[45]

Reynolds introduces track III diplomacy that resembles track II diplomacy but differentiated from it in that it solely involves the use of indigenous people and knowledge in the peace process.[46] Lederach supports the use of indigenous knowledge by arguing that

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[40] Ibid., p.5.
[41] Coalition for Global Solidarity and Social Department, *Mediation: The Dominant Approach to Conflict Resolution-War Enhancing or Peace Building? Setting the Stage*, op.cit. p.5.
[42] R. Fisher, W. Ury and B. Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, (New York: Penguin Books: 1991) p.28.
[43] E. Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts: Theory and Cases* (Aldershot: Dartmouth: 1990) p. 93
[44] See R. Griggs, *Designs for Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, op.cit. p. 8. Also see chapters Two and Three.
[45] E. Azar and J. Burton, *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice* (Sussex: Wheatsheaf; 1986)

> "the principle of indigenous empowerment suggests that conflict transformation mu actively envision, include, respect and promote the human and cultural resources from given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we do not normally 'see the setting and the people in it as the 'problem' and the outsider as the solution"[47]

Chaotic conditions of contemporary conflicts poses immense obstacles on the effectiveness of th outside third parties making it essential to consider the potential of conflict resolution within th conflicting communities themselves.[48]

The wave of violence characterizing post-Lusaka accord shows that embedded ethnic hatred and commercialization[49] of violence offers credible impediments to constructive intervention by mediators. It also shows that the adoption of track I alone cannot lead to a stable peace. It is because of the inadequacy of track I diplomacy in sustaining a stable peace agreement that Reynolds appreciates the significance of track II intervention in post-settlement of conflicts. She argues that formal agreements need to be underpinned by structures and long-term development frameworks that will erode cultures of violence and sustain peace process on the ground.[50]

Track II diplomacy can play an important role in addressing the humanitarian problem in the DRC. For example, hostility expected from the local communities has delayed the establishment of a UN-led peacekeeping force in the DRC. Addressing the humanitarian problem can help alleviate suffering, build bridges towards ethnic reconciliation and slow down the militarisation of the local communities in the DRC.[51]

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[46] L. Reynolds, *Conflict Transformation*, http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confrcs/dislcarn p.6.
[47] Lederach cited by Reynolds, *Conflict Transformation*, op.cit. p. 4.
[48] A. Curle, *New Challenges for Citizen Peacemaking, Medicine and War*, 1994, Volume 10, Number 2, pp. 96-105: 96. Also see Chapter Three on how external intervention in the DRC failed to establish peace.
[49] See Chapters Two, Three and Four.
[50] L. Reynolds, *Conflict Transformation*, op.cit. p. 2
[51] International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, Report number 26, (Nairobi/Brussels, 20 December 2000) p.69.

Peace building

Galtung[52] identifies two concepts of peace: negative peace and positive peace. Negati peace is the mere absence of violence or cessation of hostilities while positive peace is a stat social equilibrium in which new disputes do not escalate into violence and war. Positive pea comes through peace building which addresses the root causes of a conflict.[53]

The Lusaka cease-fire agreement succeeded in stopping the war between the Ugand Rwanda and DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliances but cannot put the achieved peace on durable foundation as it lacks measures aimed to deal with underlying economic, social, cultur and humanitarian problems. Security concerns of the belligerent states formed the backbone of th Lusaka peace agreement. Peace does not merely entail absence of insecurity but should also enta "social, political, economic and ecological foundations that serve the welfare of the people." Peace building is a post conflict undertaking which aims at preventing the recurrence of violenc The signing of a peace agreement should be followed by peace building activities, however, th lacks in the DRC conflict. Violence is therefore common in the post Lusaka peace agreement.

Conclusion

It is clear that the conflict in the DRC is due to a complex web of domestic instabilities i the Great Lakes region, covert diplomacy, external subversion and temporary alliances. Th conflict in the DRC is linked to other conflicts in the neighbouring countries some of which hav their roots in the pre-colonial era. The management of the conflict in the DRC should take int

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[52] J. Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, (London: Sage; 1996) pp. 1-3.

[53] See United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, Report of th Secretary General, A/ 47/ 277, 17 June 1992.

[54] See Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Peace Building Consultation, December 1996, www.dfait-macci.gc.ca/peace building/engoc-report-e.aspb

account other conflicts within the region the management must take into consideration the multilevel nature of every conflict.

The study shows the redundancy of formal state centric approach in understanding African international politics. The attempt by the members of the DRC-Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia alliance to exclude the non-state actors such as the RCD rebels from the negotiations failed. This is because of the crucial role played by forces operating at a sub-national level. The concept of foreign policy as a tool for inter states diplomacy becomes expanded to include policy towards internal dissidents and rebels operating across national borders.

The phenomenon of military involvement in commercial activities is entrenched in the conflict in the DRC.[55] The effects of military involvement in foreign commercial activities on the peace process require a further study.

The broad generalizations in this study concerning alliance aspects can be applicable to alliances elsewhere. The only limitation is that this study is based on a single case study rather than on a comparative study. However, it highlights important issues on alliance-mediation aspect.

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[5] See Chapters Two and Three.

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