


**THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS (PKOs) IN
AFRICA: THE CASE OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA,
2007 – 2012 //**

BY

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NAIROBI.**



NOVEMBER 2013

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented to any other University.



20 NOVEMBER 2013

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This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.



25/11/2013

.....
Dr. Ibrahim Farah

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Date

DEDICATION

I dedicate this paper and the hours of hard work that came with it to the international peacekeepers worldwide. Whether affiliated to the United Nations, regional organizations or individual states, it is the devotion of peacekeepers to ameliorating conflict and promoting peace that makes for a more stable and just international system. I commend them on the hard and exhausting job they do and honor them for all the lives saved and suffering alleviated under their watch.

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Esther Nyokabi Mungai

Nairobi, November 2013.

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ABSTRACT

African states have suffered numerous conflicts that have pitted tribes against tribes or clans against one another or between religious factions. For a long time the rest of the world left the combatants and the collateral victims to their own devices on the basis that states were sovereign entities that should not be interfered with rather they should be left to solve their issues. However in the 1960 the world changed its attitude and through the UN it focussed on intra-state conflicts. In Africa came the only United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960 – 1964. The Civil War in Rwanda and the breakup of Yugoslavia were occasions of widespread atrocities and ethnic violence. These saw the sending of eight UN peacekeeping missions to the former Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR, UNCRO, UNPREDEP, UNMIBH, UNTAES, UNMOP, UNPSG, and UNMIK and two to Rwanda, UNAMIR and UNOMUR. Despite the cessation of international, Cold-War inspired aid, civil wars continued in many regions and the UN attempted to bring peace. Several conflicts were the cause of multiple peace-keeping missions. The collapse of Somalia into the Somali Civil War in 1991 saw UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II fail to bring peace and stability, though they did mitigate the effects of the famine. The community of nations rethought its approach to peacekeeping operations and decided to develop a more “home-grown” vehicle for peacekeeping but within a UN framework. In January 2007, this idea was implemented through the African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, Sudan. The same year saw the birth of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This study examines the efficacy of peacekeeping operations with special focus on AMISOM which as a home grown approach to conflicts in Africa is led and controlled by the African Union with troop contributions from Africa. AMISOM receives support from the UN and the UN Security Council. Therefore in addition to executing the regional agendas of the African states, AMISOM must also contend with international agendas. The interplay of the forces at play is bound to have an outcome on the effectiveness of peace keeping in Africa. This study will examine and document any impact posed by the interplay of these agendas on the effectiveness of peacekeeping in Africa by African missions. The study is guided by three objectives: to examine the purpose and effectiveness of peace keeping operations in Africa; to establish the effectiveness of AMISOM in Somalia; to document the challenges of peacekeeping operations in Africa. One of the questions the study seeks to answer is, are regional organizations effective in peacekeeping? The research design that was used in this research project was a combination of purposive sampling, snowball sampling and quota sampling of practicing diplomats and scholars in the area of the PKOs. There is insufficient literature on the effectiveness of such PKOs in the African context. This is especially in relation to the multi-dimensional model of peacekeeping that is currently being used in Africa. By plugging this information gap, this study will benefit academics, policy makers and scholars of the subject under discussion.

ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia

AU: African Union

DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations

ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

MINUGUA: United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala

MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MIPONUH: United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti

MONUC: United Nations Mission in the Congo

MPLA: The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola – Labour Party

ONUB: United Nations Operation in Burundi

ONUSCA: United Nations Observer Group in Central America

ONUMOZ: United Nations operation in Mozambique

ONUSAL: United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador

PKOs: Peace Keeping Operations

RENAMO: The Mozambican National Resistance

SRRC: Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council

TFG: Transitional Federal Government

TFP: Transitional Federal Parliament

TFI: Transitional Federal Institutions

TNG: Transitional National Government

UNAMIC: United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia

UNAMID: United Nations Mission in Darfur

UNAMIR: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNAVEM: United Nations Angola Verification Mission

UNCRO: United Nations Confidence Restoration in Croatia

UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

UNEF: United Nations Emergency Force

UNGOMAP: United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan

UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNIMOG: United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group

UNIPOM: United Nations India – Pakistan Observation Mission

UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

UNMIH: United Nations Mission in Haiti

UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMISSET: United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor

UNMIT: United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor

UNMOGIP: United Nations Mission Observer Group in India and Pakistan

UNMOP: United Nations Messengers of Peace

UNMOT: United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan

UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

UNOGIL: United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon

UNOMIG: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

UNOMIL: United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

UNOMUR: United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda

UNOSOM I : (The first) United Nations Mission in Somalia

UNOSOM II: (The 2nd) United Nations Mission in Somalia

UNPREDEP: United Nations Preventive Deployment Force

UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection Force

UNPSG: United Nations Police Support Group

UNSF: United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea

UNSMIH: United Nations Support Mission in Haiti

UNSOA: United Nations Support Office for AMISOM

UNTAC: United Nations Transition Authority of Cambodia

**UNTAES: United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and
Western Sirmium**

UNTAET: United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

UNTAG: United Nations Transition Assistance Group

UNTMIH: United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti

URNG: Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity

USSR: United Soviet Socialist Republic

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The end of Cold War saw armed conflicts emerging at the intra-state level.¹ To contain these conflicts, peace keeping missions has been one of the main methods used. The United Nations (UN) has been a significant player in peace keeping missions. However due to the rise of regionalization, regional bodies have also entered the realm of peace keeping many times with the support of the UN.

This study seeks to examine the effectiveness of peace keeping operations in Africa. This will be done by examining the effectiveness of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) during the period 2007-2012. The research will then further delve into examining Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia – UNSOM I, UNSOM II & AMISOM. The study will delve into the meaning and purpose of peace keeping generally by exploring the history of peace keeping by the UN and other regional organisations. It will then conclude by showing that peace keeping operations have been adversely affected by many contradicting agendas that have marred the good intentions of peace making and post-conflict peace building in Somalia.

This study is relevant because peacekeeping is not anchored by any statute in either the UN or AU Charter rather it's guided by practical precedents. The performance of AMISOM will be a relevant lesson and guide to future PKOs and policy makers within the UN and regional organisations in devising conflict management and resolution mechanisms that work.

¹ Yilmaz, Muzaffer Ercan. "UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era." *International Journal on World Peace* 22 (June 2005): pp.13-28.

1.1 BACKGROUND

For the better part of the last two decades, the international community has struggled with the task of helping Somalia build peace and end the violence, despite its repeated attempts in creating a government having failed². After the fall of Sayed Barre in the early 1990's the country has been in a conflict situation with intermittent periods of calm. Following the eruption and escalation of the civil war in Somalia in 1991, the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) strived to abate the suffering that was caused as a result of the high-intensity conflict. Half the Somali population were in severe danger of starvation and malnutrition-related disease and by the early months of 1992, three hundred thousand Somalis had died and another million fled the country as refugees.³

A series of Security Council resolutions (733, 746) and diplomatic visits eventually helped impose a ceasefire between the two key factions, signed at the end of March 1992. By the end of April 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 751 which provided for the establishment of a security force of 50 UN troops in Somalia. The resolution also allowed for an expansion of the security force and the first group of ceasefire observers arrived in Mogadishu in July 1992. In August 1992 the Security Council endorsed sending of another 3,000 troops to the region to protect relief efforts.

By November 1992, General Mohamed Farrah Aidid formally defied the Security Council and demanded the withdrawal of peace keepers, as well as declaring hostile intent against any further

² Bronwyn Bruton, 'In the Quicksand's of Somalia', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 6, November/December, 2009. pp. 82-83

³United Nations, 'The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996', *The United Nations Blue Book Series*, Vol. VIII, New York: United Nations, 1996.

UN deployments.⁴ The United States of America offered to establish a multinational force⁵ under its own leadership and this was accepted by the Security Council, and became known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF).

The founders of the UN made no explicit provisions for peacekeeping in the 111 page long Charter. Chapter VI covered the voluntary settlement of disputes while Chapter VII dealt with enforcement action. Peacekeeping as a concept was therefore very much an invention of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and the concept has struggled to find legal standing in the UN charter but as missions have been deployed over time, certain practices have developed which have overtime become the '*modus operandi*' of successive peacekeeping missions. The UN defines peacekeeping as "an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict."⁶

Some of the principles of peacekeeping include the consent of the parties involved to the mandate, the continued support of the Security Council, the use of force only in self-defense, the willingness of individual member states to supply personnel, and of course, the member states and Security Council's willingness to fund the operation.⁷ These principles and the UN

⁴ United Nations, 'Letter dated 92/11/24 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 1992, www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission Accessed 17 July 2013

⁵ Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul Williams. "Explaining the National Politics of Peacekeeping Contributions." In *Providing peacekeepers: The politics, challenges, and future of United Nations peacekeeping contributions*. Edited by Alex J. Bellamy, Paul D. Williams. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 417-436 (chapter 19).

⁶ Durch, William J. "Part Four: Peacekeeping in Africa." In *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, 315-434. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. p509.

⁷ Brian Urquhart, 'The UN and International Security after the Cold War', in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), 'United Nations, Divided World: the UN's Roles in International Relations', Oxford: Clarendon Press, revised edition, 1993, pp. 81-103.

definition for peace keeping have led to numerous debates as to the effectiveness of peacekeeping, some of which will be further examined in this study.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

An examination of peacekeeping operations around the world with an emphasis on Africa shows that there have been some success stories and more failures of this mechanism in conflict resolution. At the onset of peace keeping operations by the UN, conflicts that were addressed via peacekeeping missions were largely inter-state but observation now shows that current conflicts are increasingly intra state. This brings the question of whether peacekeeping can be a case of 'one-size-fits-all' in regard to inter-state conflicts and even intra-state conflicts.

This study seeks to examine inter governmental peacekeeping operations in Africa to enable the academic community as well as policy makers to make informed decisions on how to manage conflicts in the continent. As Africa looks more towards itself for solutions to its problems one of the mechanisms that is becoming increasingly attractive to regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) is the option to deploy peacekeeping forces in conflict hit areas. While wisdom holds that homegrown solutions are a best approach to problems at the home front, there exists a gap in regard to detailed literature on the efficacy of regional intergovernmental organizations in peacekeeping.

This paper will be anchored on a case study of the AMISOM which fits the bill of a home grown approach to conflicts in Africa. AMISOM receives support from the UN and the UN Security Council. Therefore in addition to executing the regional agendas of the African states, AMISOM

must also contend with international agendas. Indeed to Boutellis and Williams,⁸ the central challenges blocking more effective AU-UN collaboration on peace operations can be identified across three dimensions: the strategic, political relationship between the two councils; the bureaucratic and organizational interaction between the two councils; and intra-AU dynamics, namely, relations among the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Council and AU member states.

This study will therefore examine and document any impact posed by the interplay of these agendas on the effectiveness of peacekeeping in Africa by African missions.

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The overall objective of the study is to examine the effectiveness of peace keeping operations in Africa with a case study of AMISOM in Somalia from 2007 to 2021. More specifically, the study aims to:

- i. Provide an overview of peacekeeping operations in Africa;
- ii. Analyze the effectiveness of the African Union Mission (AMISOM) in Somalia;
- iii. Examine the role of various Somali governments in the security sector.

1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

This section will seek to review data by various scholars and experts on peacekeeping in Africa and its effectiveness. One of the major concerns that must be addressed in the study of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are the definitional problems as well as a lack of theory

⁸ Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, "Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships in Peace Operations," New York: International Peace Institute, April 2013.

specifically related to the study of PKOs. Paris argues that "in essence, we are still largely in the dark in terms of improving analysis, effectiveness, and successes of peacekeeping. This can be attributed directly to the lack of theoretical underpinnings for the field."⁹ There are as many definitions of PKOs as there are scholars in that field and though this study will not be focusing on addressing the definitional problems of the field it is worthwhile to note that this is a problem that exists in the literature and therefore a look at some definitions would be in order to understand the paradigms within which this study will traverse.

1.4.1 Definitions

The United Nations defines peacekeeping as ways to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace. UN peacekeepers—soldiers and military officers, civilian police officers and civilian personnel from many countries—monitor and observe peace processes that emerge in post-conflict situations and assist ex-combatants in implementing the peace agreements they have signed. Such assistance comes in many forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and economic and social development. All operations must include the resolution of conflicts through the use of force to be considered valid under the Charter of the United Nations.¹⁰

1.4.2 Theoretical Debates of Peacekeeping Operations

In the early 1990s, several new approaches to international peacekeeping developed as a response to the post-Cold War proliferation of PKOs. Their primary task was to address the definitional problems discussed above. Only a few authors, however, attempted to explore the

⁹ Featherstone A.B., 'Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution, and Peace building: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks', In *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, edited by Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Portland, (2000)

¹⁰ List of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, (2013) <http://www.un.org> Accessed 20 August 2013.

actual theoretical underpinnings of international peacekeeping. For most authors, moreover, theoretical questions originally emerged almost by default-as a (not always intended) by-product of the search for criteria by which to evaluate a PKOs success.

Several authors have also attempted to spell out the criteria for success of PKOs, but even now little agreement has emerged among experts in the field on this issue. In part, this derives from a lack of consensus about the specific goals peacekeeping ought to accomplish. More importantly, however, the debate about the best criteria for evaluating particular PKOs also reveals the lack of consensus about the larger role of peace-keeping in international politics.

Buress¹¹ maintains that although the peacekeeping literature is growing, there still lacks a genuine theory of international peacekeeping. The theoretical debate is relatively new and most of the available literature on international peacekeeping is still primarily focused on practical implementation and policy-related issues. Until the late 1990s, virtually all authors conceptualized peacekeeping as a form of conflict resolution. Featherston¹² however reminds us that there is a difference between the terms conflict management and conflict resolution. While conflict resolution stresses the need to remove the roots of conflict to achieve true and long-lasting peace, conflict management has more limited aims as it merely seeks the cessation of fighting and/or abatement of on-going violence. Therefore, in contrast to conflict management, peace in the context of conflict resolution is more than just mere absence of violence.

¹¹ Buress O., 'Wanted a Mid Range Theory of International Peacekeeping', *International Studies Review*, Vol 9, No.3, 2007, pp. 407-436

¹² Featherston, *op.cit.* p 191

Paul Diehl in the early 1990s attempted "to fill some of the theoretical and policy gaps that exist in our understanding of international peacekeeping operations." His work had as its primary purpose the consideration of "theoretical explanations across a variety of peacekeeping operations for why and how those operations are successful (or not)"¹³.

From a methodological perspective, one problem with this series of key explanatory variables lies in the fact that they seem to be derived inductively rather than deductively and therefore come short of fulfilling Diehl's original aspiration for a theoretical explanation¹⁴. Moreover, his criteria for evaluating the success of PKOs have been subsequently criticized for measuring peacekeeping against an ideal state of peace and against an ideal form of conflict resolution.¹⁵

Another criteria that have thus far been put forward for evaluating PKOs include: Whether the purpose of the mission, as stated in the mandate, was fulfilled.¹⁶ However Druckman and Stern¹⁷ hold that "evaluating missions in terms of their mandates or in terms of accomplishments of other operations has drawbacks. The specific accomplishments of the mission such as the number of people fed, disasters avoided, and cease-fires achieved is useful but leaves open the question of just how many accomplishments are needed to qualify as successful." Buress maintains that as important as this criterion is, it begs the question "compared to what," and

¹³ Diehl Paul F., "International Peacekeeping", Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993

¹⁴ Ibid. Buress

¹⁵ Johansen Robert C., "Enhancing United Nations Peace-Keeping. In *The Future of the United Nations System: Potential for the Twenty-First Century*", edited by Chadwick Alger. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998. pp. 95-96

¹⁶ Ratner Steven R., "The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Civil War", New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995

¹⁷ Druckman, Daniel. & Paul C. Stern. "Perspectives on Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions", *International Journal of Peace Studies* Vol. 4 No. 1 January 1999

according to Druckman and Stern¹⁸, it "ignores the impacts on broader political processes that may have larger impacts on the lives of the local population."

The other criterion for evaluation is to examine the manner in which mission accomplishment has been achieved. A problem with this criterion is that while placing a premium on efficiency, it may favour the interests of particular constituencies or organizations over the broader goals as defined, for example, by the UN. Another criterion suggested is to evaluate the contribution of peacekeeping to larger values rather than to self-serving gains.¹⁹

This research is grounded on a theory postulated by Michael Doyle²⁰ who states that PKOs have come to encompass three distinct activities that have evolved as three "generations." They include not only the early activities of Chapter VI "first-generation" operations, which call for interposition of a force after a truce has been reached, but also a far more ambitious group of "second-generation" operations that focuses on political reconstruction and that rely on the consent of parties and an even more ambitious group of "third-generation" operations that function with Chapter VII mandates and without a comprehensive agreement reflecting the acquiescence of the parties.

This view is augmented by Featherston's²¹ theoretical framework built on the assumption that conflicts pass through several phases and that it is vital to identify intervention strategies that are

¹⁸ Ibid. Druckman

¹⁹ Pushkina, Darya, 'A Recipe for Success: Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission. *International Peacekeeping*, 2006, 13:133-149.

²⁰ Doyle M.W. And N. Sambanis, 'International Peace Building: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis'. *American Political Science Review* 94(4), 2000, pp.779-802

²¹ Featherston, A.B., 'Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping', New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995

effective at each stage. By applying this framework, Featherston asserted, peacekeepers could be better trained in the art of conflict resolution, mediation, and effectiveness of peacekeeping. He also suggested that the practice of peacekeeping ought to be based on a theoretical framework that takes into consideration both the means available to peacekeepers and the desired ends.

Given the diversity of opinions expressed by the experts and practitioners and the wide range of roles being performed by contemporary PKOs, it is unlikely that a single theoretical framework will be appropriate to capture all mission types. Buress holds that as consequence, we may well need several different mid-range theories for different types of PKOs. Ideally, however, it should be possible to use these theoretical approaches to different mission types in a complementary fashion. Some scholars suggest that, instead of restricting peacekeeping to one stage of any conflict, we should be assessing how peacekeeping can be made more appropriate for all stages.

1.4.3 Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

Since 1960, there have been a total of 19 peacekeeping missions in Africa under the aegis of the United Nations. The first operation was United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), 1960-1964. Following vital lessons learnt by African leaders from this mission - which will be discussed later in this study, for close to two and a half decades, no other mission was carried out in Africa between 1964 till 1989.

From the foregoing it's obvious that traditionally peace keeping was a function of the United Nations however in current times it has extended to international and regional organizations. In an assessment of these UN missions, Ahere²² contends that Peacekeepers in Africa have been plunged into the most intractable problems in attempting to maintain some kind of order. For

²² Ahere J., "A Critical Analysis of UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa", Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008.

them the relatively straightforward tasks of merely policing agreements between states are not an option. They have been called on, rather, to prop up (or re-create) collapsing states; to intervene in vicious civil wars; and to negotiate and, if need be, enforce peace settlements among conflicting parties.

1.4.4 Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia

For decades, Somalia was little more to Americans than a pawn in the Cold War. Then, in 1992, the world was flooded with images of dying Somali children, the victims of brutal warlords and their civil war. The UN, with the active support of all rebel faction leaders, felt that some sort of peacekeeping force would be required to uphold the ceasefire and assist the humanitarian relief and the end of April 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 751 which provided the establishment of a security force of 50 UN troops in Somalia to monitor the ceasefire. This detachment would be known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and it existed at the consent of those parties who had been represented in the ceasefire. In August 1992 the Security Council endorsed sending of another 3,000 troops to the region to protect relief efforts. However, most of these troops were never sent.

Some elements were actively opposing the UNOSOM intervention and by November 1992, General Mohamed Farrah Aidid had grown confident enough to formally defy the Security Council and demand the withdrawal of peace keepers, as well as declaring hostile intent against any further UN deployments.²³ The United States of America offered to establish a multinational force under its own leadership to secure the humanitarian operation. This offer was

²³ United Nations, 'Letter dated 92/11/24 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 1992

accepted by the Security Council, and the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was authorized to utilize "all necessary means" to ensure the protection of the relief efforts. Accordingly, the Security Council suspended any further significant strengthening of UNOSOM as UN affairs in Somalia were subsumed by UNITAF (also known to Americans as Operation Restore Hope). With only a handful of the 3,000 plus troops envisaged for UNOSOM ever put in place, the Security Council left it to "the discretion of the Secretary General" as to what should be done with the abortive mission.³⁴

UNITAF was composed of forces from 24 different countries, with the vast bulk contributed by the United States. UNITAF soon secured the relief operations which were being coordinated and carried out by UNOSOM, which was also attempting to negotiate a political end to the conflict. Indeed, although UNOSOM had been replaced by UNITAF, it was technically still in operation and would remain ready to resume its function when UNITAF had met its goals of creating a secure environment for humanitarian relief. Initially intended as a relief effort, the mission soon got mired in Somalia's violent internal politics. On July 12, 1993, U.S. forces mistakenly attacked a peaceful meeting of clan elders, killing 73 civilians and a few months later it hit bottom when a Somali mob desecrated the corpses of U.S. soldiers.

In 2002, the UN bankrolled efforts by regional actors to set up a transitional government. Negotiations with warlords and clan and civil-society leaders sputtered for a couple of years and then bred the TFG. A group of militant youths formed al Shabab, and although it was associated with an anti-TFG coalition and started assassinating members of the TFG.

³⁴ United Nations, Security Council resolution 794 (1992)

The UN Secretary-General convened a meeting in early 1993 in which 14 important Somalia political and rebel factions agreed to hand over all of their weapons to UNITAF and UNOSOM, and over \$130 million was pledged by donors at an aid conference that year to assist in reconstruction. However, Somalia continued the stumble, and in March the UN decided to transform the UNITAF mission into what came to be known as UNOSOM II.

By early 2006, the TFG's inability to govern was evident which eventually brought the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Hawiye-backed sharia courts, to power. The ICU's policies quickly became unpopular with the public and by December 2006 it dissolved with its leaders scattering into the bush in southern Somalia or fleeing to Eritrea. By the time the Ethiopian forces withdrew in early 2009, Al Shabab's influence had spread throughout southern Somalia, and gradually metamorphosed into a brutal local political movement.²⁵

1.4.5 The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

The security situation still remained fluid and in January 2007 The African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council with an initial six-month mandate. On 21 February 2007 the United Nations Security Council approved the mission's mandate. AMISOM replaced the regional military mission (IGASOM) of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) which had been approved by the United Nations Security Council on December 6, 2006. IGASOM was originally proposed for immediate implementation in March 2005 to provide peacekeeping forces for the latest phase of the Somali Civil War. At that time, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had not yet taken control

²⁵ Barnett, Michael. "Partners in Peace? The UN, Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping." *Review of International Studies* 21, no. 4 (October 1995): pp. 411-25.

of Mogadishu, and most hopes for national unity lay with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which was organized in Nairobi, Kenya in 2004 and was planning to establish a provisional capital in Baidoa, Bay region, Somalia.

In March 2007, Ugandan military officials arrived on the ground in Somalia. On 20 August 2007, the UN SC extended AU's authorization to continue deploying AMISOM²⁶ and requested the Secretary-General to explore the option of replacing AMISOM with a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation to Somalia. Between March 2007 and mid-2011, AMISOM was essentially embroiled in a bloody struggle. AMISOM's major breakthroughs came in August 2011, when al-Shabaab forces withdrew from central Mogadishu, and in late 2011, when Kenyan and Ethiopian forces launched major military operations against al-Shabaab. These operations promoted a major rethink of AMISOM operations.²⁷

Over the last three years AMISOM has become the biggest and most complex peace operation the AU has ever conducted. One of the main challenges that AMISOM has faced is the difference in the mandates of PKOs under the UN and the AU. This has complicated efforts to support it through mechanisms designed for more traditional UN peacekeeping missions.²⁸ A significant portion of literature on PKOs focuses mostly on the traditional peacekeeping as defined by the UN. However, this study will be going into the more contemporary type of PKOs where the UN has seemingly derogated its role to a regional organization.

²⁶ Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, *op.cit.* p. 249

²⁷ AMISOM (2008). "AMISOM: Background and Political Developments." *Africa for Peace, Stability and Development*. Retrieved Sep. 12, 2013.

²⁸ Ibid. AMISOM

The challenge of contradicting or expanded mandates that are different from the UN mandate is a challenge that should be addressed because there are chances that this will affect the effectiveness of AMISOM on the ground. Peacekeeping by a regional organisation is a relatively new field and literature on the same is still scant

This study will seek to address that gap in the literature. The central challenges blocking more effective AU-UN collaboration on peace operations can be identified across strategic, political relationship between the two councils and intra-AU dynamics, namely, relations among the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Council, and AU member states²⁹

1.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

Peacekeeping Operations are a mechanism used extensively in dealing with conflict. The literature review above shows that though there has been extensive research conducted on peacekeeping; there are still significant gaps that need to be addressed. For instance, AMISOM reflects a shift toward regional organizations.

This study seeks to examine and understand whether peacekeeping is effective in the hands of the AU and add to the field of peacekeeping research. Scholars will also benefit from this paper because it also addresses PKOs from the perspective of a regional organisation, the AU. The rise of regionalisation will witness an increase in the relevance of these types of organisations in the peace and security arena. This study will therefore add to the field of research in PKOs.

²⁹ Bures, Oldrich. "Regional Peacekeeping: Complementing or Undermining the UN Security Council?" *Global Change, Peace & Security* 18, No. 2 (Spring 2006): pp. 83-99.

Additionally, policy makers will benefit from this paper because PKOs as a mechanism of conflict management draws lessons and modus operandi from previous successful and failed PKOs. This study will be of specific interest to policy makers on Africa because it is premised on the African context. However it will also be relevant to global policy makers as an interesting case study on the regionalisation of PKOs.

There is insufficient literature on the involvement of regional organisations in peace and security areas and a literature gap in the area of examining the effectiveness of the contemporary multi-dimensional models of PKOs in the African context. The results of this study will be used to inform decision making on ongoing and future PKOs. Even more significantly it will be of benefit to both scholars and policy makers in understanding the efficacy of PKOs in Somalia so as to make an informed decision on whether to continue with the current AMISOM model or to overhaul it or to withdraw the troops totally. Bruton argues that sometimes, as in Somalia, doing less is better.³⁰

1.6 HYPOTHESES

The study is guided by the following hypotheses:

- i) A 'One-size-fits-all' approach to peacekeeping is not effective in conflict management in Africa;
- ii) Regional organizations can deliver effective peacekeeping operations;
- iii) Multiple agendas impede peacekeeping operations in Africa.

³⁰ Bruton. B, *op.cit.* pp. 79-94: 84

1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section tries to ground the topic under study within a theoretical framework though “we are still largely in the dark in terms of improving analysis, effectiveness, and successes of peacekeeping. This can be attributed directly to the lack of theoretical underpinnings for the field.”³¹

The first theoretical contributions, influenced by post modern concerns and critiques, have raised a number of important questions about the nature of the conflict resolution approach, its usefulness and relevance for both the study and practice of peacekeeping operations. Although some authors have recently utilized international relations (IR) concepts in analyzing peacekeeping operations, IR theories have yet to be fully integrated into the study of peacekeeping.³²

In the late 1990s, Robert Johansen (1998:98) pertinently suggested that “because peace-keeping has developed in response to a wide variety of conflicts, it has taken so many forms that it defies easy categorization.” Thus, in examining the functions of PKOs, it may be helpful to recall that a single peacekeeping function might be carried out in a variety of modes in different political contexts.³³

Building on these thoughts and suggestions, Johansen proposed that peacekeeping functions range across several continua.³⁴ More recently, Bellamy has suggested that the division of

³¹ Featherston A.B., *op.cit.* p. 249.

³² Center on International Cooperation. *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008. pp. 375

³³ Johansen, Robert C. ‘Enhancing United Nations Peace-Keeping. In *The Future of the United Nations System: Potential for the Twenty-First Century*’, 1998 edited by Chadwick Alger. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

³⁴ *Ibid.* Johansen

peace-keeping missions into "generations" is historically misleading because already during the Cold War, there were missions that ran into many of the problems encountered by peacekeepers in post-Cold War conflicts. In addition, he warned that many of the aforementioned taxonomic approaches are self-referential.³⁵

To overcome this shortcoming, Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin³⁶ have subsequently identified types of operations according to the role that they fulfil in global politics. Buress holds that in the case of peacekeeping, we are still sorting out our word problems.³⁷ He strongly holds that given the diversity of opinions expressed by the experts and practitioners and the wide range of roles being performed by contemporary PKOs, it is unlikely that a single theoretical framework will be appropriate to capture all mission types and therefore a mid-range theory of international peacekeeping offers a bridge across the various levels of analysis.³⁸

This study is therefore convinced that no single theoretical framework can be absolutely successful in the world but agrees with Buress' approach and avers that in the Somali case where AMISOM is now on the ground several different mid-range theories are required; the mid-range theory of traditional peacekeeping and a mid-range theory of second and third generation peacekeeping. Subsequently this study posits that it should be possible to use these theoretical approaches in a complementary fashion in Somalia. The development of a mid-range theory or a set of mid-range theories is the maximum we can reasonably aim for at the moment in Somalia. This study refers to this approach as the "mixed methods approach".

³⁵ Bellamy Alex J., 'The "Next Stage" in Peace Operations Theory?' *International Peacekeeping* 11, 2004 (1):17-38.

³⁶ Ibid. Bellamy

³⁷ Buress *op.cit.* pp. 407- 436

³⁸ Ibid. Buress

1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research project employed a combination of research designs: purposive sampling, snowball sampling and quota sampling of practicing diplomats and scholars in the area of the PKOs. Purposive sampling is a technique that allows a researcher to use cases that have the required information with the respect to the objectives of his her study. The cases are handpicked because they are informative and have the required characteristics.³⁹ In this study purposive sampling included identification of the target group who are experts in the area of PKOs and who willingly gave their view on the effectiveness of PKOs, specifically the case of AMISOM.

Snowball sampling starts with a subject who displays the qualities the researcher is interested in investigating. The researcher then asks the respondent to suggest another person in the same field for interviewing. This process is repeated until the researcher gets the number of cases he or she requires to provide enough information on the topic. In this study the snowball sampling involved getting references of experts willing to participate in the study, from the first group of experts identified through the purposive sampling.

Quota sampling ensures that various groups or quotas of the population are included in the study. Participants are conveniently picked because they fit into the identified categories or groups to ensure a more comprehensive data set.⁴⁰ In this study quota sampling was used in an attempt to collect varied feedback from experts from the different regions of the world who might have different perspectives on the issue at hand.

³⁹ Mugenda A.G., "Social Science Research-Theory and Principles", (Nairobi, Arts Press, 2008), p196

⁴⁰ Ibid. Mugenda

1.9 CHAPTER OUTLINE

This study is structured around five (5) chapters:-

Chapter One: Introduction to the Study;

Chapter Two: The Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: An Overview;

Chapter Three: The Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: The Case of the African Union Mission (AMISOM) in Somalia, 2007 – 2012;

Chapter Four: The Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: A Critical Analysis of AMISIOM Somalia, 2007 – 2012

Chapter Five: Conclusion

CHAPTER TWO

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter delves into the background of peace keeping before zeroing in on the history of AMISOM. The chapter also examines the relevant theories of peacekeeping and against which AMISOM's success or otherwise can be gauged and by extension which theory or theories can be used by policy makers to fashion a successful PKO.

The chapter starts off by examining various definitions of peace keeping especially based on the knowledge that peacekeeping is not explicitly anchored on any clause in the UN Charter and as we know it today it's driven more by precedent than definition.

2.1 Background

The term "peacekeeping" was invented in the 1950s as the international community's most sustained attempt to reduce and manage armed conflict.⁴¹ As a means to resolving conflicts in the anarchic International System (IS), the UN has resorted to the use of peacekeeping as an instrument to counter conflict and create conditions for lasting peace.⁴² Bellamy⁴³ suggested five different types of peacekeeping operations: "Traditional peacekeeping, Managing transition, Wider Peacekeeping, Peacekeeping enforcement and Peace-support operations".

⁴¹ Bellamy, Alex J., Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin. *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010, pp. 14-18, 47-65 and 173-179.

⁴² *Ibid.* pp. 81-91 and 179-192

⁴³ *Ibid* 93-152: 113

Peacekeeping operations are generally undertaken under chapter VI of the UN charter with the consent of all the major parties to a conflict, to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement.⁴⁴ Ahere⁴⁵ notes that incidentally, one is never likely to find the word peacekeeping in the UN Charter. In order to respond to progressively enlarging peacekeeping activities and enhance the organization's capacity to plan, manage and direct them, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was established in 1992.

The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. This was code named the UN Emergency Force 1 (UNEF 1) 1956-1967 and was deployed in the Sinai after the Suez Canal crisis.⁴⁶ It saw Britain and France withdraw relatively gracefully from the Canal Zone that they had occupied. Since then, there have been a total of 63 UN peacekeeping operations around the world.

2.2 Peacekeeping Operations in Africa - An Overview

Since 1960, there have been a total of 19 peacekeeping missions in Africa under the aegis of the United Nations. The first peacekeeping operation in Africa was United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) undertaken in Congo (1960-1964). However, no other mission was carried out in Africa from 1964 till 1989.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Charter of the United Nations and Statute of International Court of Justice. *United Nations Department of Public Information*, p.5

⁴⁵ Ahere John *op.cit*

⁴⁶ DPKO Policy Directive on Authority, Command and Control for United Nations Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operations. 2010

⁴⁷ Adebajo, Adekeye. 2000. Back to the future UN peacekeeping in Africa. *International Peacekeeping* Vol 7 No. 4 (2000): pp. 13-19

Adebajo⁴⁸ contends that ONUC raised particular challenges for African states as Congo turned out to be the battleground for the ideological and geostrategic struggles of the two forces in the cold war –US and USSR. The death of Congo’s Premier Patrice Lumumba in 1961 and the failure of the UN to assist in stopping the succession of the diamond rich Katanga province, convinced African leaders of the risks in inviting the UN for PKOs in Africa. Adebajo⁴⁹ holds that it was this concern that prompted Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and other leaders to push for a continental military force and to advocate for the creation of the Organisation of the African Unity (OAU) in 1963. A consensus emerged amongst African leaders that henceforth African problems were to be resolved by Africans themselves. This attitude was dubbed the “Congo allergy” and prevailed for nearly three decades as a result of which no major UN peacekeeping mission was deployed in Africa between 1964 -1989.

Ahere⁵⁰ maintains that though for the longest time, the only UN operation in Africa was ONUC. This was not because Africa was devoid of conflict situations warranting UN response but rather due to the Cold War. Both sides of the ideological divide had their own interests in Africa hence the unlikelihood of reaching a consensus in the SC so as to run a peacekeeping mission in response to civil wars in Mozambique, Angola or Ethiopia. The end of the Cold War brought a rapid growth in quantity of UN activities in Africa. Soon after, unsuccessful withdrawal from Somalia and failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda led to the retrenchment and reassessment of UN operations in Africa.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Adebajo, Adekeye, “UN peacekeeping in Africa: from the Suez crisis to the Sudan conflicts”. Adekeye Adebajo. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011.

⁴⁹ Ibid. Adebajo

⁵⁰ John Ahere, “A Critical Analysis of UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa”, 2009, pp. 4-10: 6.

⁵¹ Boulden J., “United Nations Security Council Policy on Africa”, in J. Boulden (ed), ‘Dealing With Conflict in Africa’, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 1.

Major Powers in the SC retreated from their initial post-Cold War enthusiasm for engagement in African conflicts. Simultaneously, a debate about possible increased cooperation with regional organizations emerged. The slogan “African solutions for African problems” became an excuse for the most powerful members of the SC to avoid large scale UN involvement in Africa.⁵²

2.3 Relevant Theories in PKOs

This study also seeks to examine the relevance of theories in PKOs and to pin point the theory or theories that can possibly enhance AMISOM’s efforts and by extension any other PKO undertaken by a regional body. The logical departure point would be to provide a definition of peace keeping operation.

The first problem as noted in Chapter one is the lack of a cogent definition of the term peacekeeping and in such a scenario it then becomes difficult to identify a theory to assess the success or otherwise of AMISOM and other PKOs and to and to help policy makers and academia to identify the most suitable theory for future PKOs since definition is a first step towards benchmarking the success of an operation and organ. According to Buress defining peacekeeping is a mission impossible as none of these definitions has been accepted universally either in academia or by the member states of the UN.⁵³

Another even more elaborate taxonomy based on the mission characteristic approach was developed by Paul Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall (1998:39-40) who identified as

⁵² Baregu M.L., and Landsberg C., “From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges”, Lynne Reinner Publishers, (2003), p. 261

⁵³ Buress *op.cit.*

many as 12 different types of operations. The problem is that regardless of the frequency of their use, none of the aforementioned terms has been used repeatedly with the same meaning. In the late 1990s, Robert Johansen (1998:98) pertinently suggested that "because peace-keeping has developed in response to a wide variety of conflicts, it has taken so many forms that it defies easy categorization."⁵⁴

To overcome this shortcoming, Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin⁵⁵ have subsequently identified five broad types of operations according to the role that they fulfil in global politics rather than the particular functions that each mission fulfils:

- Traditional peacekeeping: operations that attempt to create a space for the political settlement of disputes between states.
- Managing transition: operations which assist in the implementation of a comprehensive political settlement agreed to by the parties to a conflict.
- Peace enforcement: operations that seek to impose the will of the Security Council by direct military or economic action.
- Wider peacekeeping: operations that attempt to accomplish "wider" humanitarian tasks within a context of on-going violence or fragile peace.
- Peace support operations: operations that support the establishment of liberal democracy in formerly war-torn societies. They are multifaceted (comprising significant military and

⁵⁴ Johansen, Robert C. "Enhancing United Nations Peace-Keeping." In *The Future of the United Nations System: Potential for the Twenty-First Century*, edited by F. Alger Chadwick, 89-126. Tokyo/New York/Paris: United Nations University Press, 1998.

⁵⁵ Bellamy, Alex J., Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, "Understanding Peacekeeping", Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004

civilian components) and employ broad and flexible definitions of "consent," "impartiality," and "mini-mum use of force."

Distinguishing between basic terms and concepts is, however, more than political science pedantry. According to Buress the prevailing terminological muddle arguably represents the first major obstacle on the road toward a genuine theory of international peacekeeping. This study is convinced that no single theoretical framework can be absolutely successful in the world of peacekeeping. The study agrees with Buress' approach and avers that in the Somali case where AMISOM is now on the ground several different mid-range theories are required.

The concept here is that in Somalia a number of factors combine and interact competitively to influence the effectiveness of AMISOM in Somalia and therefore a mixed methods approach is required if AMISOM is to be effective in Somalia. As noted in Chapter one, while such theories may not offer clear-cut answers to some of the complex contemporary debates about the nature and proper role of international peacekeeping, they will not suffer from the other conceptual and methodological shortcomings.

This research is grounded on a theory postulated by Michael Doyle⁵⁶ in reference to UN PKOs. Doyle states that these PKOs have come to encompass three distinct activities that have evolved as three "generations": They include not only the early activities of Chapter VI (or so-called six and a half, "first-generation" operations, which call for interposition of a force after a truce has been reached, but also a far more ambitious group of "second-generation" operations that focus on political reconstruction and that rely on the consent of parties and an even more ambitious

⁵⁶ Doyle *op.cit*

group of "third-generation "operations that function with Chapter VII mandates and without a comprehensive agreement reflecting the acquiescence of the parties.

Given the diversity of opinions expressed by the experts and practitioners and the wide range of roles being performed by contemporary PKOs, it is unlikely that a single theoretical framework (macrotheory) will be appropriate to capture all mission types. Buress holds that as consequence, we may well need several different mid-range theories for different types of PKOs (for example, a mid-range theory of traditional peacekeeping and a mid-range theory of second-generation peacekeeping, etc.). Ideally, however, it should be possible to use these theoretical approaches to different mission types in a complementary fashion. Some scholars suggest that, instead of restricting peacekeeping to one stage of any conflict, we should be assessing how peacekeeping can be made more appropriate for all stages.

2.4 Somalia since 1992

For decades, Somalia was little more to Americans than a pawn in the Cold War.⁵⁷ In 1992, the world was flooded with images of dying Somali children, the victims of brutal warlords and their civil war. The U.S. government set out to respond not only to the humanitarian emergency through Operation Restore Hope and also to the clarion call of a new era of peacemaking and multilateral cooperation.

The UN, with the active support of all rebel faction leaders, felt that some sort of peacekeeping force would be required to uphold the ceasefire and assist the humanitarian relief effort. By the

⁵⁷ Taw, Jennifer Morrison. "The Perils of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Internal Conflicts: Somalia in the 1990s." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 15 (August 2004): pp. 5-19

end of April 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 751 which provided for the establishment of a security force of 50 UN troops in Somalia. The resolution also allowed for an expansion of the security force, with a number of around 500 troops initially discussed. The first group of ceasefire observers arrived in Mogadishu in early July 1992. In August 1992 the Security Council endorsed sending of another 3,000 troops to the region to protect relief efforts.

In November 1992, the United States of America offered to establish a multinational force under its own leadership to secure the humanitarian operation. This offer was accepted by the Security Council, and what became known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was authorized to utilize "all necessary means" to ensure the protection of the relief efforts.

Accordingly, the Security Council suspended any further significant strengthening of UNOSOM as UN affairs in Somalia were subsumed by UNITAF (also known to Americans as Operation Restore Hope). With only a handful of the 3,000 plus troops envisaged for UNOSOM ever put in place, the Security Council left it to "the discretion of the Secretary General" as to what should be done with the abortive mission.⁵⁸

UNITAF was composed of forces from 24 different countries, with the vast bulk contributed by the United States. UNITAF soon secured the relief operations which were being coordinated and carried out by UNOSOM, which was also attempting to negotiate a political end to the conflict. Indeed, although UNOSOM had been replaced by UNITAF, it was technically still in operation

⁵⁸ United Nations, Security Council resolution 794 (1992), 24/4/92

and would remain ready to resume its function when UNITAF had met its goals of creating a secure environment for humanitarian relief.

The Secretary-General convened a meeting in early 1993 in which 14 important Somalia political and rebel factions agreed to hand over all of their weapons to UNITAF and UNOSOM, and over \$130 million was pledged by donors at an aid conference that year to assist in reconstruction. However, Somalia continued the stumble, and in March the UN decided to transform the UNITAF mission into what came to be known as UNOSOM II. The mandate of UNOSOM II stipulated that the operation was to secure continued relief efforts and, more significantly, to restore peace and rebuild the Somali state and economy.

In the few months of its operation, 54 military observers and 893 military personnel served with UNOSOM I, with the support of international civilian and local staff. The mission suffered six fatalities. Contributing nations were: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan and Zimbabwe.⁵⁹

Initially intended as a relief effort, the mission soon got mired in Somalia's violent internal politics. On July 12, 1993, U.S. forces mistakenly attacked a peaceful meeting of clan elders, killing 73 civilians. The mission had derailed, and a few months later it hit bottom when a Somali mob desecrated the corpses of U.S. soldiers. The incident, known as "Black Hawk down," was a bewildering assault on the American public's self-image, not to mention a low-

⁵⁹ United Nations Operation in Somalia I: facts and figures, 1992

water mark of the Clinton administration, and it left the Americans and the Somalis distrustful of each other. For close to a decade afterward, the U.S. government effectively let Somalia be.

The growing concern that the country's lawless territories could become a safe haven for al Qaeda quickly drove the Bush administration's Somalia policy, producing a series of failed political interventions designed to create a central government in Somalia. In 2002, the UN bankrolled efforts by regional actors to set up a transitional government.

The Transitional Federal Government was to balance the interests of all of Somalia's clans, but in practice, it was dominated by the Darod clan, from the north. This left the Hawiye, Somalia's majority clan, feeling like it had been short changed, and it responded by striking an anti-TFG alliance of convenience with the business community and a group of Sharia courts in Mogadishu. The alliance's goal was to restore enough order in the capital.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, a group of militant youths formed al Shabab which started assassinating TFG members. By early 2006, the TFG's inability to govern was evident; the group no longer posed a meaningful threat to the Hawiye.

Public outrage over the United States' support of the group, which included several despised warlords, sparked a vicious four-month battle for the control of Mogadishu that eventually brought the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Hawiye-backed sharia courts, to power. At first, Washington encouraged the TFG to negotiate with the ICU, but it stopped as soon as it understood that al Shabab was effectively operating as the ICU'S military arm and was intent on enforcing a harsh version of Sharia law.

⁶⁰ Cohen, Jared. "The 'Somalia Hangover': Peacekeeping Reformed." In *One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide*, 47-57. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.

ICU's policies quickly became unpopular with the public. In December 2006, with U.S. support, Ethiopia invaded Somalia which led to the dissolving of ICU with its leaders scattering into the bush in southern Somalia or fleeing to Eritrea. Ethiopia was forced to occupy Mogadishu to prop up the unpopular TFG and its presence ignited a complex insurgency.

The indiscriminate shelling of civilians turned the population against the government and its patron, the United States. Washington aggravated the outrage by dropping bombs on terrorist targets and thereby allegedly killing scores of civilians. Jihadists from the Middle East, sensing an unprecedented opportunity to find a foothold in the shifting sands of Somalia's conflict, poured resources into the hands of Al Shabab. By the time the Ethiopian forces withdrew in early 2009, Al Shabab's influence had spread throughout southern Somalia. Al Shabab gradually metamorphosed into a brutal local political movement.⁶¹

2.5 The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

The African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate. AMISOM was initially established as an exit strategy for the Ethiopian military, which had occupied Mogadishu in order to support Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG). On 21 February 2007 the United Nations Security Council approved the mission's mandate. Subsequent six-monthly renewals of AMISOM's mandate by the African Union Peace and Security Council have also been authorised by the United Nations Security Council.

⁶¹ Fishel, John T., and Max G. Manwaring. "The Challenge of Peace Enforcement: Somalia." In *Un-comfortable Wars Revisited*, 204-229. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006.

On 21 February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorised the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months. In March 2007, Ugandan military officials arrived on the ground in Somalia. On 20 August 2007, the United Nations Security Council extended the African Union's authorisation to continue deploying AMISOM for a further six months and requested the Secretary-General to explore the option of replacing AMISOM with a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation to Somalia.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)⁶² is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations in Somalia. It is mandated to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. As part of its duties, AMISOM also supports the Federal Government of Somalia's forces in their battle against Al-Shabaab militants.

Between March 2007 and mid-2011, AMISOM was essentially embroiled in a bloody struggle; caught between various anti-Transitional Federal Government forces—most notably al-Shabaab—fighting for control of the city of Mogadishu. To that end, it received unprecedented UN logistical support from 2009; unprecedented financial support from a range of donors but most importantly the EU, which used its African Peace Facility to pay allowances to AMISOM uniformed personnel; as well as various in-kind (training and equipment) bilateral support packages to its troop contributing countries (Uganda and Burundi) most notably from the United States. AMISOM's major breakthroughs came in August 2011, when al-Shabaab forces withdrew from central Mogadishu, and in late 2011, when Kenyan and Ethiopian forces

⁶² Boutellis and Williams, *op.cit.*150

launched major military operations against al-Shabaab. These operations promoted a major rethink of AMISOM operations.⁶³

During December 2011, the UN, AU, and a variety of other partners worked together on a Joint Technical Assessment Mission that subsequently produced new strategic and military concepts of operations for AMISOM. The new concepts of operations were endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council on January 5, and February 22, 2012, respectively.⁶⁴

AMISOM has involved more institutional partnerships than arguably any other peace operation in the post-Cold War era. As a consequence, it has involved a more complicated mix of parties than just the UN and AU. AMISOM was never an “ordinary” peace -keeping operation but was rather tasked with a combination of objectives that revolved around VIP protection, war-fighting, counterinsurgency, and facilitating humanitarian assistance. This has complicated efforts to support it through mechanisms designed for more traditional UN peacekeeping missions.

Debates about how to sustain AMISOM led to the creation of an unprecedented UN-AU Collaborative mechanism: the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which provides logistical support to AMISOM using UN assessed contributions and the AMISOM Trust Fund. Boutellis and Williams⁶⁵ record that both the UN SC and the PSC of AU have a vested interest in conducting more effective peace operations in Africa. In many respects, considerable progress has been made with the UN and AU enjoying a deep, multidimensional and maturing relationship.

⁶³ Boutellis and Williams, *op.cit.*162

⁶⁴ *ibid*

⁶⁵ *ibid*

Of particular importance, in February 2012, the UN Security Council endorsed the expansion of the UN support package for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and an increase of its uniformed personnel from 12,000 to 17,731. This decision followed a joint AU-UN planning process, which both organizations praised. In late 2012 and early 2013, the UN and AU both conducted strategic reviews of their engagement with Somalia and in March 2013, UN Security Council Resolution 2093 extended AMISOM's mandate for another year.

2.6 Conclusion

Having presented the foregoing discourse this study in the next chapter will seek to evaluate the success or otherwise of AMISOM within the framework of the theory postulated by Michael Doyle⁶⁶. The study will evaluate the Mission's effectiveness of meeting its mandate through "Doyle's" lenses of the three "generations" theory which includes the early activities of Chapter VI (or so-called six and a half, "first-generation" operations, which call for interposition of a force after a truce has been reached, the "second-generation" operations that focus on political reconstruction and which rely on the consent of parties and the "third-generation" operations that function with Chapter VII mandates and without a comprehensive agreement reflecting the acquiescence of the parties.

As a reminder AMISOM is mandated to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.⁶⁷ As part of its duties, AMISOM also supports

⁶⁶ Doyle *op.cit*

⁶⁷ Gounden, Vasu, Venashri Pillay, and Karanja Mbugua. "African Solutions for African Conflicts: Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in Africa." In *Shaping a New Africa*, ed. Abdullah A. Mohamoud, pp. 27-60. Amsterdam: KIT, 2010

the Federal Government of Somalia's forces in their battle against Al-Shabaab militants. The next chapter will interrogate its effectiveness in meeting this mandate. The study will however keep in hindsight earlier efforts to secure peace in Somalia but will be cautious in its judgement since AMISOM has very few experiences to draw from.

CHAPTER THREE

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION (AMISOM) IN SOMALIA, 2007 – 2012

3.0: Introduction

This chapter examines the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in Africa with particular focus on AMISOM between 2007 -2012. It seeks to do this through a theoretical framework. However as was pointed out in chapter one this study is convinced that no single theoretical framework can be absolutely successful in the world but agrees with Bures's approach and avers that in the Somali case where AMISOM is now on the ground several different mid-range theories are required; the mid-range theory of traditional peacekeeping and a mid-range theory of second and third generation peacekeeping.

The chapter will also delve into the efficacy of PKOs in Africa, key challenges and opportunities of the AMISOM operation, lessons to be learnt by AMISOM's policy makers/personnel and lessons for other peace keeping missions.

3.1 An Historical Overview of PKOs

Since the end of the Cold War the international community and the UN have moved beyond "traditional peacekeeping" between states and have become much more involved in civil conflicts, monitoring and often managing or administering various aspects of the transition to peace within states.⁶⁸ As conflict becomes more intra-state, the nature of peace keeping has also evolved from the more traditional model of peacekeeping. Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild

⁶⁸ Fortna. V.P., 'Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War'. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 2, Jun., 2004, pp. 269-292

(2001) find that there is weak evidence that observer missions and enforcement missions improve the chances for peace. In their view traditional peacekeeping has no effect on peace building.⁶⁹

This study posits that it should be possible to use these theoretical approaches in a complementary fashion in Somalia. The development of a mid-range theory or a set of mid-range theories is the maximum we can reasonably aim for at the moment in Somalia. This study refers to this approach as the “mixed methods approach”. While such theories may not offer clear-cut answers to some of the complex contemporary debates about the nature and proper role of international peacekeeping, they will not suffer from the other conceptual and methodological shortcomings.

The concept here is that in Somalia a number of factors combine and interact competitively to influence the effectiveness of AMISOM in Somalia and therefore a mixed methods approach is required if AMISOM is to be effective in Somalia. It is the theory of this study that any other approach but the mixed methods approach will not work. This study will therefore assess AMISOM’s effectiveness in Somalia through this theoretical lens.

3.2 The Effectiveness of PKOs in Africa

Since 1960, there have been a total of 19 peacekeeping missions in Africa under the aegis of the United Nations. The first operation was undertaken in Congo between 1960-1964, under the auspices of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). Following vital lessons learnt by African leaders from this mission - which will be discussed later in this study, for close to two

⁶⁹ Adar, Korwa G. “Beyond Rhetoric: Peacekeeping in Africa in the New Millennium.” In *Africa at the Crossroads: Between Regionalism and Globalization*, ed. John Mukum Mbaku and Suresh Chandra Saxena, 267-286. Westport: Praeger, 2004.

and a half decades, no other mission was carried out in Africa between 1964 till 1989.

Subsequent Missions⁷⁰ were:

- 1988-1991 United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)
- 1989-1990 United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)
- 1991-1995 United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)
- 1992-1994 United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
- 1992-1993 United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)
- 1993-1997 United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)
- 1993-1994 United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)
- 1993-1996 United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
- 1993-1995 United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)
- 1994 United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)
- 1995-1997 United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)
- 1997-1999 United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)
- 1998-1999 United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)
- 1998-2000 United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)
- 1999 -2005 United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
- 2000-2008 United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)
- 2003-2004 United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI)
- 2004-2007 United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)

⁷⁰ Adopted from John Ahere, " A Critical Analysis of UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa", 2009, p3-4.

The United Nations has ongoing Missions in various parts of Africa⁷¹:

- 1991 United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
- 1999 United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)
- 2003 United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
- 2004 United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
- 2005 United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)
- 2007 United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)
- 2007 United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)

Ahere notes that the absence of UN missions in Africa after ONUC was not because Africa was devoid of conflict situations warranting UN response but rather due to the Cold War.⁷² Both sides of the ideological divide had their own interests in Africa hence the unlikelihood of reaching a consensus in the SC so as to run a peacekeeping mission in response to civil wars in Mozambique, Angola or Ethiopia. It is no wonder that most of the UN operations that have taken place in Africa have occurred in the post-cold war era. UN deployments in Africa remain steady with approximately 80 percent of all blue helmets deployed on the continent. AU deployments have also increased to an all-time high, largely due to AU-UN collaboration in the Somalia and Mali theatres.⁷³

Based on the review of a purposive sample of five UN missions, ranging from the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) in the Middle East to United Nations Interim Force in

⁷¹ Stephen M. Hill & Shahin p. Malik, "Peacekeeping and the United Nations" Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., 1996. P. 156.

⁷² Ibid. Stephen M. Hill & Shahin p. Malik

⁷³ Boutellis and Williams *op.cit*, pp. 89-90

Lebanon (UNIFIL), Diehl concluded that "the conditions under which peacekeeping operations have met with success are limited" and warned that "peacekeeping troops are not appropriate for all international functions" as they "remain governed by the limitations of the peacekeeping strategy itself." Interestingly, however, he also examined several institutional military alternatives to the UN blue helmets, including standing UN forces, regional forces, and multinational forces not under the control of a pre-existing international body, such as the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, and concluded that the current UN system is at least as good as the alternatives.

In his quest for explanations of the success of peacekeeping missions in containing conflict, Diehl considered three sets of factors: (i) the characteristics of the force itself, including internal characteristics of the operation (force composition, particularly with regard to neutrality), operational characteristics (command and control, integration of national contingents), and locus of deployment (size and terrain of area, population density); (ii) the characteristics of the mission authorization (nature of mandate and financing); and (iii) the political and military context, including the nature of the dispute, the behavior of primary disputants, and the actions of third-party states and sub national actors.

3.3 The African Union Mission (AMISOM) in Somalia

The UN having deployed two missions to Somalia with disastrous outcomes, the African Union had to fashion a PKO: The African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). According to Boutellis and Williams⁷⁴ AMISOM was never an "ordinary" peace-keeping operation. Its initial mandates

⁷⁴ Ibid. Boutellis and Williams

involve a mixture of protecting VIPs, government personnel, institutions and conducting military enforcement operations against anti-government actors (counter insurgency) principally Al-Shabaab and facilitating humanitarian assistance. The mission's police component is mandated to help train, mentor and advise the Somali Police Force although AMISOM's Formed Police Units have the additional task of public order management. The Mission is also mandated to help facilitate humanitarian relief and civil-military operations.

Between March 2007 and mid-2011, AMISOM was essentially embroiled in a bloody struggle caught between various anti-Transitional Federal Government forces fighting for control of Mogadishu. AMISOM's major breakthroughs came in August 2011, when al-Shabaab forces withdrew from central Mogadishu, and in late 2011, when Kenyan and Ethiopian forces launched major military operations against al-Shabaab. AMISOM initially had 8,000 troops but in 2012 the UN Security Council Resolution 1964 (December 22, 2010) endorsed a troop increase for AMISOM from 8,000 to only 12,000.

After AMISOM's expansion in 2012, the mission made considerable progress: it helped facilitate an end to Somalia's transitional government; it put al-Shabaab on the back foot; received pledges of additional troop- and police contributing countries; expanded operations across four land sectors covering most of south-central Somalia and a maritime sector (although it lacked significant maritime assets)⁷⁵ established a new force headquarters, and started moving its mission command to Mogadishu complete with multidimensional components. These advances generated greater confidence within the AU about its own abilities and the once

⁷⁵ Diel Paul F *op.cit.*

incessant calls for the UN to re-hat AMISOM into a blue helmet mission subsided.

However, with the selection of the new Federal Government of Somalia in August-September 2012 both the AU and the UN decided to re-assess their engagement with the country and both institutions engaged in strategic reviews. After a subsequent period of consultations between the UN, the AU, and the Federal Government of Somalia, a new way forward for AMISOM was agreed to in Security Council Resolution 2093 (March 6, 2013). The resolution welcomed “the Strategic Reviews of both the UN and the AU on their presence and engagement in Somalia, and the decisions taken by both organizations to enhance collaboration on the basis of comparative advantage and a clear division of labour, and underlining the importance of both organizations improving their coordination with one another.”

In this spirit, SC authorized a new UN Special Political Mission to work in tandem with an enhanced AMISOM force (at the same level of 17,731 uniformed personnel and with the same UN logistical support package) to, among other things, reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, support reconciliation processes, assist in the implementation of Somalia’s new national security plans, to extend the new government’s authority across the country, and to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and civilian protection tasks. AMISOM is thus in a period of potentially fundamental transition. Like all transitions, this one brings both opportunities and challenges, and AMISOM and its partners will be forced to make some difficult choices.

AMISOM’s future is being shaped by the need to respond to several important recent developments. In the political arena, the most important of these was the establishment of the

new Federal Government during August and September 2012. President Hassan Sheikh's insistence that it was the new government's prerogative to determine the nature and timing of outside assistance were only the latest evidence of the determination on the part of FDS to assert its autonomy on the basis that it is no longer a transitional mechanism but a sovereign government.

Its initial six-pillar strategy detailed in a formal policy document is intended to make progress in the areas of stability, economic recovery, peace building, service delivery, international relations and unity. The document laid the foundations of a new beginning for Somalia. President Hassan Sheikh has since amplified his government priorities in the areas of security, judicial system reforms and public finance management reform.⁷⁶

AMISOM has a force headquarters in Mogadishu and is organized around four land sectors and one maritime sector. Sector one is centered in Mogadishu and staffed primarily by personnel from Uganda and Burundi. Southwest Somalia as sector two is run by Kenyan Forces with a new battalion from Sierra Leone deployed in February 2013. Sector three is focused on Baidoa where Ugandan and Burundian Forces are supported by Ethiopian troops. To the north is sector four where the Djiboutian battalion worked with Ethiopian forces to stabilize the area around Belet Weyne. In mid January 2013, AMISOM was holding some 250 fighters who were disengaging from Al-Shabab while the FGS was holding 1,500.⁷⁷

While on the Al-Shabab front, success has been scored, on the humanitarian front the famine that hit Somalia in 2011 has ended but the situation in most parts of the country is still dire. In

⁷⁶ President Hassan Sheikh Mohmoud, "The Future of Governance in Somalia", Speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC, 17 January 2013

⁷⁷ Diel Paul F *op.cit.*

January 2013, the UN's office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that approximately 2.1 million people were living in a state of emergency and crisis, 1.1 million were internally displaced half of them in lower Shabelle and Banadir⁷⁸. Access for aid agencies involved in human relief remains difficult yet there are some 3.8 million or so Somalis in dire need.⁷⁹

AMISOM has acknowledged the need for an effective partnership in the form of Somali's security forces but the UN has left it to bilateral donors to support the SNA directly opting to support AMISOM.⁸⁰ Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti have provided training while the US and Italy have provided stipends to some SNA soldiers. These support programmes need to be enhanced, better coordinated and moved to Somalia.

3.4 The Effectiveness of AMISOM Operations in Somalia

Kagwanja⁸¹ notes that AMISOM has triumphed over Al-Shabaab militia in Mogadishu, Kismayo and other Somali towns and this has restored a rare calm, created a safe environment for humanitarian operations and return of refugees and cleared the ground the ground for stabilisation, reconstruction and development after decades of lawlessness and violence. This has enabled the UN and its agencies to return to Somalia after two decades of lawlessness. This created a platform for the UN Security Council to authorise the creation of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia as a brand new initiative deployed on June 3 2013 to coordinate peace building and state building efforts inside Somalia.

⁷⁸ UN OCHA, 'Somalia Humanitarian Bulletin: December 2012, 4 January 2013, <http://bit.ly/.TNON2b>. Accessed 29 July 2013

⁷⁹ Diel Paul F *op.cit*, p. 4

⁸⁰ African Union, PSC/PR/COMM. (CCCVI)

⁸¹ Kagwanja P., 'UN Returns to Somalia, Criminalises KDF', Sunday Nation, August 4, 2013, p. 38

On a review of AMISOM's performance many scholars lean towards a negative score. Neuss for instance states that, what AMISOM has done so far would be viewed for many as a "timid success."⁸² With AMISOM's support, the Somali national forces have effectively evicted Al-Shabaab, the Islamist group which emerged in 2006, from most major urban centres in southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, Baidoa situated in south-central Somalia, and the port cities of Marka and Kismayo, as well as many other towns, including Afgooye, Afmadow, Bay, Bakool and Hiran. Jawhar, 90 km northwest of the Somali capital, Mogadishu, was captured by the Somali National Army on 9 December 2012, with the support of AMISOM.

It was only a few months ago that AMISOM developed the techniques and tactics that have enabled it to score military successes against Al-Shabaab in the capital. As a result, the Mogadishu is witnessing an improvement in the security realm. However, asymmetric attacks and intimidation of locals in some areas remain a reason for concern. Thus AMISOM's military successes in those areas remain unpredictable. Moreover, the much needed presence of the government's allied forces in vulnerable areas is crucial to prevent Al-Shabaab from regaining control, as happened in southern Galgadud in June 2012 -August 2012.

Progress has also been made in the political field. After 21 years of statelessness, and partially due to AMISOM's stabilisation efforts, Somalia is now facing a post-transitional situation that will rely very much on the strategic approach of the AU PSO. This new context is characterised by the launching of a new interim Constitution on 14th August 2012, the inauguration of a new

⁸² Segui Neus, "Appraising the Role of the African Union in Somalia (AMISOM)", *Peace and Security Council Report*, Issue 42, June 2013

Federal Parliament on 20th August 2012 and the swearing in of Mr Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President of the Federal Republic of Somalia. These political events can be considered milestones in the stabilisation of the country and they have engendered hope that such events could be the inception of a broader political process embracing all Somalis.

3.5 The Role of Somali Governments

A series of meetings were held in Arta, Djibouti, on April 20 - May 5, 2000 officially dubbed as the Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC), and sometimes called the Djibouti conference. The conferences were aimed at bringing together representatives of the warring factions of Somalia to end the civil war that had claimed over 300,000 lives.⁸³ The name Transitional National Government (TNG) was selected for the movement. TNG had Election of Abdiqasim Salad Hassan as President by the clan/faction representatives (2000), National Commission for Reconciliation and Property Settlement (2001) and Somali Reconciliation Conference in Eldoret, Kenya (2002). TNG was opposed by a rival pan-Somali governmental movement, known as the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). Eventually the factions of the TNG and the SRRC reconciled, and a new united movement subsequently developed, dubbed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

3.5.1 The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) I

TFG was established in October–November 2004 in Nairobi, Kenya with the adoption of the following Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), all accomplished by the end of the sessions:

- Selection of 275 Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) members

⁸³ Somalia National Peace Conference Program, hosted at Banadir.com

- o Approval of the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC)
- o Election of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as President of Somalia and head of the TFG by the Parliament (October 10), and his appointment of the Council of Ministers, including Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi (November 4).⁸⁴

In February 2004, at Nairobi, Kenya, the government endorsed the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic.⁸⁵ Yusuf Ahmed was elected as TFG President on October 10, 2004, in a session held by the TFP in Nairobi. After his election, Yusuf formed the first council of ministers by appointing Cabinet officials in November 2004. One of his key appointments was Ali Mohammed Ghedi as Prime Minister. On February 26, 2006 the parliament first met inside Somalia, in the city of Baidoa. 210 lawmakers of the 275-member parliament met in a grain warehouse temporarily converted into a meeting hall.⁸⁶ For this reason the TFG was sometimes referred to as the "Baidoa Government."

In June 2006, Ghedi sacked four ministers, part of the CIA-backed Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, who ignored his orders to stop fighting the Supreme Islamic Courts Council in the Second Battle of Mogadishu. Following the success of the Supreme Islamic Courts Council in taking Mogadishu, and the alleged entry of Ethiopian troops into Somalia, members of the transitional government started to resign.

⁸⁴ "Africa: Somalia: New President Appoints Prime Minister". New York Times. 2004-11-04. Retrieved 23 Sept 2013.

⁸⁵ "Somali Transitional Charter. Transitional Federal Charter for the Somali Republic, February 2004. Retrieved 22 Sept. 2013.

⁸⁶ Parliament meets for the first time inside Somalia, Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, 2006

On July 27, 2006, 18 members resigned including the Public Works Minister Osman Ali Atto, who said *"Our government failed to implement national reconciliation, so we have decided to resign."* Ghedi survived a no-confidence vote on 30 July when his opponents failed to obtain the two-thirds majority required to dismiss him. On August 1 eight more ministers resigned in protest at Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi's postponement of talks with the Islamic Court. By August 2, twenty-nine ministers had resigned including eleven full ministers.⁸⁷ By August 3 the tally had reached 36, including former Prime Minister and Health Minister Muhammad Abdi Yusuf, who complained that *"Our government is a reconciliation government, the prime minister has failed to honor that."*⁸⁸ By August 4, forty cabinet members and 16 full ministers had quit, including Reconstruction Minister Barre Shire Adan who said *"I have resigned because the government of Ali Mohammed Ghedi has failed to deliver."*⁸⁹ On Monday August 7 the three top TFG leaders - Prime Minister Ghedi, President Ahmed and parliamentary speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden reportedly reached an agreement on talks with the Islamic Militia and the formation of a new government. The President announced the dissolution of the present cabinet and Ghedi was asked to propose a new cabinet, with only 31 full ministers, within a week.⁹⁰

On August 21 Prime Minister Ghedi appointed a new reduced cabinet of 31 ministers.⁹¹ It included new Ministers for national security, defence, finance and foreign-affairs but retained former warlord Hussein Mohamed Aidid as Interior Minister. On December 15, 2006, sixty government members, including Member of Parliament Omar Hashii, gathered in Mogadishu to

⁸⁷ Eight more ministers resign from Somali government, Reuters, 1 August 2006.

⁸⁸ 29 Ministers Leave Somali Government, CNN, 2 August 2006

⁸⁹ Somali Government "Confident" Despite Resignations, Reuters, 3 August 2006

⁹⁰ Somali Crisis Grows As Another Minister Quits, Scotsman, 4 August 2006

⁹¹ Somalia: President Dissolves Cabinet, Reuters, 7 August 2006

protest the presence of the foreign troops.⁹² Late in December, the government won a series of victories at the battles of Baidoa, Bandiradley, Beledweyne, Jowhar and Jilib. At the end of the year the TFG took possession of Mogadishu and Kismayo. Throughout 2007 and 2008, the Al-Shabaab group of militants scored military victories, seizing control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia. At the end of 2008, the group had captured Baidoa.

By January 2009, Al-Shabaab and other militias had managed to force the Ethiopian troops to withdraw from the country, leaving behind an underequipped African Union (AU) peacekeeping force.⁹³ In February 2009 TFG with the help of a small team of African Union troops, began a counter-offensive operation to retake control of the southern half of the country. To solidify its control of southern Somalia, the TFG formed an alliance with the Islamic Courts Union and other members of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia. In March 2009, Somalia's coalition government announced that it would implement shariah as the nation's official judicial system.⁹⁴ On October 14, 2010, diplomat Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed was appointed the new Prime Minister of Somalia after the resignation of Premier Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke.⁹⁵

3.5.2 The TFG II

As per TFG Charter, Prime Minister Mohamed named a new Cabinet on November 12, 2010, which has been lauded by the international community. The allotted ministerial positions were reduced from 39 to 18. Only two Ministers from the previous Cabinet were reappointed: Hussein Abdi Halane, the former Minister of Finance and a well-regarded figure in the international

⁹² Somali Legislators Say Ethiopia Was Never Invited, Garowe Online, December 16, 2006

⁹³ USCIRF Annual Report 2009 - The Commission's Watch List: Somalia

⁹⁴ Shariah in Somalia – Arab News, January 5 2009

⁹⁵ Somali-American Is New Prime Minister In Somalia, Reuters, October 15, 2010

community, and Dr. Mohamud Abdi Ibrahim remained the minister of Commerce and Industry.^[35] Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, a moderate Sufi group and an important military ally of the TFG, was also accorded the key Interior and Labour ministries. The remaining ministerial positions were largely assigned to technocrats new to the Somali political arena.

In its first 50 days in office, Prime Minister Mohamed's new administration completed its first monthly payment of stipends to government soldiers, and initiated the implementation of a full biometric register for the security forces within a window of four months. Additional members of the Independent Constitutional Commission (ICC) were also appointed to engage Somali constitutional lawyers, religious scholars and experts in Somali culture over the nation's upcoming new constitution, a key part of the government's Transitional Federal Tasks. In addition, high level federal delegations were dispatched to defuse clan-related tensions in several regions. According to the prime minister of Somalia, to improve transparency, Cabinet ministers fully disclosed their assets and signed a code of ethics. On the war front, the new government and its AMISOM allies also managed to secure control of Mogadishu by August 2011.

On 19 June 2011, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed resigned from his position as Prime Minister of Somalia as part of the controversial Kampala Accord's conditions. The agreement would also see the mandates of the President, the Parliament Speaker and Deputies extended until August 2012, after which point new elections were to be organized. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, Mohamed's former Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, was later named permanent Prime Minister.

In February 2012, Somali government officials met in the northeastern town of Garowe to discuss post-transition arrangements. After extensive deliberations attended by regional actors and international observers, the conference ended in a signed agreement between TFG President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, Speaker of Parliament Sharif Adan Sharif Hassan, Puntland President Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, Galmudug President Mohamed Ahmed Alim and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a representative Khalif Abdulkadir Noor stipulating that: a) a new 225 member bicameral parliament would be formed, consisting of an upper house seating 54 Senators as well as a lower house; b) 30% of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) is earmarked for women; c) the President is to be appointed via a constitutional election; and d) the Prime Minister is selected by the President and he/she then names his/her Cabinet.

On June 23, 2012, the Somali federal and regional leaders met again and approved a draft constitution after several days of deliberation. The National Constituent Assembly overwhelmingly passed the new constitution on August 1, with 96% voting for it, 2% against it, and 2% abstaining.

3.5.3 The Federal Government of the Somali Republic

The Federal Government of Somalia was established on August 20, 2012, concurrent with the end of the TFG's interim mandate. It represents the first permanent central government in the country since the start of the civil war. The Federal Parliament of Somalia serves as the government's legislative branch.

3.6 Challenges

Williams⁹⁶ holds that AMISOM faces the task of working out how it can work with the Federal Government to encourage defections from al-shabaab and help fighters who have abandoned militias and armed factions to make the transition into civilian livelihoods. These include fighters captured in combat and those who have surrendered voluntarily and those who have blended with the local population but are willing to surrender if the circumstances are right. But this is complicated by the absence of formal peace agreements that have helped to structure many post war disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes such as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Liberia (2003) and Sudan (2005).

AMISOM will also need to concentrate on its own military operations especially the consolidation operations aimed at mopping up al-shabaab sleeper cells and agents, in areas retaken by the government and allied forces. It will also need to strengthen its operations to secure its extended supply routes. To be successful AMISOM will need additional forces, military enablers and expanded logistical support stipulated by the UN Security Council's Resolution 2036 and to enhance its existing analyses, planning and management capacities. In each of these AMISOM will have to assess how best to work with the military forces of the Federal Government and evaluate the extent to which the Somali national army is ready to take on a leading role. AMISOM has to make the transition with its approach focussed with its eventual departure.

As AMISOM works out how to ensure peace in Somali, the AU needs to secure predictable and sustainable operational funding for the remainder of the mission. AMISOM's funding comes

⁹⁶ Williams, *op.cit.*

from various sources: The UN Assessed Peacekeeping Budget, the UN Trust Fund for AMISOM, the UN Trust for Somali Security Forces; the AU Peace Fund and AU/AMISOM partners and the EU which pays the allowances of AMISOMs uniformed personnel. The EU has however given notice that it cannot fund all the allowances for the entire fiscal year which at current levels are USD 220 million.⁹⁷

AMISOM now finds itself at a political cross road. However this is not the first time it has to adapt to a new set of circumstances. It found itself in a similar scenario in 2009 after the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and in 2011 after the Kenyan intervention and subsequent re-entry of Ethiopian troops. This time its situation arises from positive developments: the selection of a new Federal Government in Somalia that wants to assert its sovereignty, the retreat of al-shabaab and the subsequent increasing numbers of defectors and tentative signs of a functioning Somali national security presence.

The concept of this study is that in Somalia a number of factors combine and interact competitively to influence the effectiveness of AMISOM in Somalia and therefore a mixed methods approach to peacekeeping is required if AMISOM is to be effective in Somalia. Certain things have to be place:

First the AU, the UN and the Federal Government must shape a new mandate for AMISOM that supports President Hassan's declared priority of providing security throughout Somalia. Williams⁹⁸ states that this would entail a continuation of AMISOM's enforcement operations against al-shabaab as well as a clarification of how the mission can best support the restructuring

⁹⁷ Ibid

⁹⁸ Ibid

and empowerment of Somalia's National security Forces on which AMISOM's exit strategy depends.

Secondly although al-shabaab has been displaced from several of its previous strongholds and has lost many fighters through the war and defections, it still controls considerable territory and is capable of causing significant disruption and maybe expand its activities. It's worth securing more resources to recover territory and deal with disengaging fighters. Failure to do so could reverse the gains made against al-shabaab so far.

The UN, AU and AMISOM's supporters must empower the mission with the tools its needs. These include funding, air assets, enhanced capabilities for analysis, planning and management activities. Boutellis and Williams,⁹⁹ maintain that the central challenges blocking more effective AU-UN collaboration on peace operations can be identified across three dimensions: the strategic, political relationship between the two councils; the bureaucratic and organizational interaction between the two councils; and intra-AU dynamics, namely, relations among the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Council and AU member states.

There are a number of challenges facing the SNA, the most severe and urgent being problems of command and control.¹⁰⁰ These are to be found at the level of senior officers, between clan leaders, warlords and the official military commanders, there is also an absence of collaboration between the existing SNA brigades. Different components of the army have received different types of training, mostly abroad and there are poor levels of training for commissioned officers.

⁹⁹ Boutellis and Williams, *op.cit.*

¹⁰⁰ Matt Bryden and Jeremy Brickhill, 'Disarming Somalia. Lessons in Stabilization from a Collapsed State', *Conflict, Security and Development*, 10/2, 2010, pp. 239-62

Salaries are unreliable: most of this is in form of USD 100 per month stipends paid by the US and Italian governments to some SNA soldiers. There is also lack of modern weaponry, with many SNA weapons belonging to warlords, clans and individuals and a major deficit of logistical and medical support add to this the challenge of recruitment with the government under pressure for regional balance and national inclusiveness in a country where skills development took a backstage during the long war.

This study departs on the premise that several different mid-range theories are required if peace is to prevail; the mid-range theory of traditional peacekeeping and a mid-range theory of second and third generation peacekeeping. The Federal Government, AMISOM and others interested in a peaceful Somalia must model their initiative along peacekeeping generations. In as much as the federal Government wants more sovereignty and wishes for a reduced role for AMISOM, it must address the challenges of the nascent SNA. In its relationship with the SNA, AMISOM has been the dominant partner and there is considerable pressure to reverse this relationship but in practical terms SNA is still not well heeled to take on al-shabaab and general peacekeeping on its own.

3.6 Conclusion

In conclusion as Buress¹⁰¹ notes that peacekeeping has come to encompass many types of activities, both military and civilian, including the use of military force to attain peace. The potential categories of peacekeeping seem to increase in diversity and complexity with each new peacekeeping mission. Given the diversity of opinions expressed by the experts and practitioners and the wide range of roles being per-formed by contemporary PKOs, it is unlikely that a single

¹⁰¹ Oldrich Buress, *op.cit.*

theoretical framework will be appropriate to capture all mission types. A mid-range theory of international peacekeeping, therefore, needs to offer a bridge across the various levels of analysis.

As a consequence, we may well need several different mid-range theories for different types of PKOs (for example, a mid-range theory of traditional peacekeeping and a mid-range theory of second-generation peacekeeping, etc.).¹⁰² Ideally, however, it should be possible to use these theoretical approaches to different mission types in a complementary fashion. There is a suggestion that, instead of restricting peacekeeping to one stage of any conflict, we should be assessing how peacekeeping can be made more appropriate for all stages appears to be one possible starting point. Some of the complex conceptual and methodological difficulties may, nonetheless, be insurmountable even at the mid-range level, although building bridges between micro- and macro level criteria for success would certainly help to tackle some of them.¹⁰³

¹⁰² *Ibid*

¹⁰³ Diehl Paul, *op.cit.* p. 515.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION (AMISOM) IN SOMALIA, 2007 - 2012

4.1 Introduction

This chapter identifies the key issues that emerged in the course of the study and provides a critical analysis of the same while pointing out the lessons that can be learned both positive and negative by policy makers at AMISOM, the warring parties, students of the subjects and policy makers in general.

From the study, it emerged that PKOs in Africa have faced several challenges which hamper their efficacy. For instance in Somalia, AMISOM is hostage to various agendas that hamper its efficacy which make AMISOM far from an ordinary peacekeeping force. Indeed its mandates remain unclear to date. However it has emerged that AMISOM cannot be dismissed as a failure, it has played a major role and Somalia is not all war. However there are various gaps in the operation both in regard to AMISOM's *modus operandi* and its structure which if addressed will go a long way in making AMISOM more effective and peacekeeping will result in total peace.

4.2 The Effectiveness of PKOs in Africa

From this study it emerged that since 1960, there have been a total of 19 peacekeeping missions in Africa under the aegis of the United Nations. The environment for peacekeeping is no longer benign.¹⁰⁴ Previously under the rules by former Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, the parties to the consent had to give consent for PKOs to be effected. Petru Dimitriu argues that this

¹⁰⁴ Sambanis, Nicholas, and Michael W. Doyle. "No Easy Choices: Estimating the Effects of United Nations Peacekeeping." *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (March 2007): pp. 217-226.

new and complex environment, together with the ambitious objectives of the United Nations and ever-growing pressure on scarce resources, has made it more imperative than ever to think clearly about when and how the UN should become involved in peacekeeping operations.¹⁰⁵ Not only should the UN consider how and when to deploy PKOs but they should also examine the effectiveness of these operations and examine whether to deploy them at all, or in their current state.

Mats Berdal argues that "the fundamental distinction between enforcement and peacekeeping should be maintained combining peacekeeping with enforcement action in one operation, as is effectively the case with the United Nations's Operation in Somalia, carries with it considerable military and political risks."¹⁰⁶ Berdal is insistent on a more traditional model of peacekeeping as opposed to multi-dimensional peacekeeping. In order to deduce which of the two models is effective, or not, this study will examine the PKO in Somalia and see what effect it has had on conflict management in the country.

Another aspect that must be considered is the question of what constitutes an effective peacekeeping operation. An understanding of what existing literature says about the criteria for success or failure of peacekeeping is critical in this study because it will help to paint a clearer picture of the situation in Somalia as regards to AMISOM and its effectiveness. Many scholars have analyzed the effectiveness of third-party peacekeeping missions, including the factors

¹⁰⁵ Dimitriu, pp. 224-5.

¹⁰⁶ Berdal.M, 'Whither UN Peacekeeping?', Routledge; 95 edition, p.6

influencing the success or failure of peacekeeping missions. Fortna suggests that there are indeed criteria that used to measure success or failure of missions.¹⁰⁷

There is however a caveat in the statement that suggests that the scholar should be aware of the reasons for setting up the PKO in the first place. This caveat represents the dynamic nature of conflict management and therefore the one-size-fits-all model reduces the effectiveness of PKOs because each conflict is intrinsically different. Fortna is of the opinion that the UN established a number of peacekeeping missions in the early 1990s in states experiencing ideology-based civil conflicts because of the end of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States."¹⁰⁸ While UN peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Namibia were largely considered successful, it is possible that UN peacekeeping missions would not have been as successful in one or more of the other states experiencing civil conflicts based largely on ethnicity, race, or religion.¹⁰⁹

However, Fortna also notes that there were other ongoing conflicts of a religious, ethnic, political nature that the UN chose not to intervene in. This is why Mullenbach argues that there would have been limited success of the PKO model in this type of conflict. This is extremely relevant for our case study of Somalia where a significant component of the conflict is ethnicity. Mullenbach seems to suggest that a PKO in Somalia would therefore meet limited success. Mullenbach further argues that on the other hand, it is also possible that third-party actors are

¹⁰⁷ Fortna, *op.cit.* pp. 269-292.

¹⁰⁸ Fortna, V.P, 'United Nations Transition Assistance Group' In 'The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis', edited by Durch J. William, pp. 353-375. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1993

¹⁰⁹ Mullenbach M., 'Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 49, No. 3 ,Sep., 2005, pp. 529-555

arguably motivated to establish peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes involving significant humanitarian problems. If so, this might account for some of the ineffectiveness of third-party peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes since conflicts involving large numbers of fatalities and displaced persons might be among the most difficult conflicts to manage and resolve.¹¹⁰ This argument seems to be more reflective of modern PKOs and hence their multidimensional aspects are included in order to make the PKO more dynamic.

Mullenbach seems to argue that PKOs can also be used not just for conflict management but also for humanitarian assistance. Fortna goes further to argue that Opponents of peacekeeping often point to dramatic failures that dominate news coverage of peacekeeping without acknowledging the success stories that make less exciting news.¹¹¹ This argument infers that the measures for the success of the modern PKOs are still measured against traditional principles and goals of PKOs hence leading to the notion that they have failed extensively. However, it is also fair to argue that in whatever criteria that is used, that the PKOs are indeed non-effective in both the traditional and multi-dimensional sense.

4.3 The Uniqueness of the Somali Situation

Somalia has politically undergone various periods of change. Following the outbreak of the civil war and the ensuing collapse of the Siad Barre regime in the early 1990s, from this study it emerged that Somalia's residents reverted to local forms of conflict resolution, consisting of civil law, religious law and customary law. A few autonomous regions, including the Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug administrations, emerged in the north in the ensuing process of

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p 532

¹¹¹ Fortna. *op.cit.*, p. 285

decentralization. The early 2000s saw the creation of fledgling interim federal administrations. The Transitional National Government (TNG) was established in 2000 followed by the formation of its successor the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004, which re-established national institutions such as the Military of Somalia. In 2006, the TFG, assisted by Ethiopian troops, assumed control of most of the nation's southern conflict zones from the newly formed Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU subsequently splintered into more radical groups such as Al-Shabaab, which battled the TFG and its AMISOM allies for control of the region, with the insurgents losing most of the territory that they had seized by mid-2012. In 2011-2012, a roadmap political process providing clear benchmarks leading toward the establishment of permanent democratic institutions was launched. Within this administrative framework, a new Provisional Constitution was passed in August 2012, which designates Somalia as a federation. Following the end of the TFG's interim mandate the same month, the Federal Government of Somalia, the first permanent central government in the country since the start of the civil war, was also formed.

On September 10, 2012, parliament also elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as the new President of Somalia. President Mohamud later appointed Abdi Farah Shirdon as the new Prime Minister on October 6, 2012. On November 4, 2012, Shirdon named a new Cabinet, which was later endorsed by the legislature on November 13, 2012.

At the behest of Somalia's federal authorities, the 15-member UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 2093 on March 6, 2013 to suspend the 21-year arms embargo on Somalia, the oldest such global weapons blockade. The endorsement officially lifts the purchase ban on light weapons for a one year period, but retains certain restrictions on the procurement of heavy

arms. The repeal is slated to be reviewed in 2014. The nation has concurrently experienced a period of intense reconstruction, particularly in the capital, Mogadishu.

4.4 The Role of External Players

AMISOM was initially established in 2007 as an exit strategy for the Ethiopian military, which had occupied Mogadishu in order to support Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Between March 2007 and mid-2011, it emerged that AMISOM was essentially embroiled in a bloody struggle; caught between various anti-Transitional Federal Government forces fighting for control of the city of Mogadishu. In 2011, al-shabaab forces withdrew from central Mogadishu. In late 2011, Kenyan and Ethiopian forces launched major military operations against al-Shabaab. These operations promoted a major rethink of AMISOM operations.

During December 2011, the UN, AU, and a variety of other partners worked together on a Joint Technical Assessment Mission that subsequently produced new strategic and military concepts of operations for AMISOM. The new concepts of operations were endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council on January 5, and February 22, 2012, respectively.

Earlier on in December 2010, UN Security Council through Resolution 1964 had endorsed a troop increase for AMISOM from 8,000 to 12,000. After AMISOM's expansion during 2012, the mission made considerable progress: it helped facilitate an end to Somalia's transitional government; it put al-Shabaab on the back foot; it received pledges of additional troop- and police contributing countries; it expanded operations across four land sectors covering most of south central Somalia and a maritime sector, it established a new force headquarters staffed by

personnel from over a dozen African countries, and started moving its mission command to Mogadishu complete with multidimensional components. These advances generated greater confidence within the AU about its own abilities and the once incessant calls for the UN to re-hat AMISOM into a blue helmet mission subsided. Eventually August-September 2012 saw the selection of the new Federal Government of Somalia.¹¹² However by the time of this study (2013) the security situation was still very fluid, fighting was going on in Kismayu, the Federal Government was still facing threats from Ras Kamboni forces and generally the only thing that could be said about larger Somalia is that peace was only describable as the absence of full scale war. Questions still linger about AMISOM's exit strategy otherwise granted the security situation its exit is not in sight.

Several issues emerge upon examination of AMISOM which stymie its efficacy. Foremost AMISOM was the biggest and most complex peace operation the AU has ever conducted. As such, it starkly exposed the limits of the AU's capabilities (material, financial, and bureaucratic) and reiterated the importance of finding workable partnerships with various external actors, including the UN.

AMISOM was never an "ordinary" peace -keeping operation but was rather tasked with a combination of objectives that revolved around VIP protection, war-fighting, counterinsurgency, and facilitating humanitarian assistance. This has complicated efforts to support it through mechanisms designed for more traditional UN peacekeeping missions.

¹¹² Boutellis and Williams, *op.cit.*

4.5 Lessons for AMISOM Somalia

During AMISOM's early years, it has emerged that the mission exposed some important differences in the UN and AU approaches to peace operations. Most notably, in spite of repeated AU calls for a transition of AMISOM into a "blue helmet" mission, the UN repeatedly refused to deploy a UN force to Mogadishu arguing circumstances on the ground were not appropriate for a blue helmet mission. Vital time was wasted on agreeing on approaches as opposed to the actual peacekeeping and conflict resolution.

Boutellis and Williams hold that AMISOM's shortcomings were apparent from the start arguing that its initial deployment was controversial for two main reasons. First, when launching the mission, the Ethiopian delegation broke the PSC's¹¹³ internal rules of procedure and the AU Commissioner called for the UN SC to take over the mission without securing the agreement of the relevant authorities in New York.

Despite being a key party to the conflict under discussion, the Ethiopian representative played a crucial role in the debate to establish AMISOM. Under Article 8.9 of the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* (2002) Ethiopia's representative should have withdrawn from the deliberations after the briefing session. Instead, the Ethiopian representative even sought to chair the meeting, arguing that her country was not a party to the conflict.¹¹⁴ The net result was that AMISOM did not transition into a UN operation as initially envisaged.

¹¹³ African Union, *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* (2002), Article 2, paragraph 1.

¹¹⁴ Taw Morrison, *op.cit.* pp. 5-19.

It took 18 months for the UN SC to endorse the new concept of operations in February 2012 after it had rejected the AU's previous request that it fund an increase in AMISOM's troop strength to 20,000 personnel. UN Security Council Resolution 1964 (December 22, 2010) endorsed a troop increase for AMISOM from 8,000 to only 12,000. This definitely hampered and delayed AMISOM's operations while probably giving al-shabaab space to strengthen its grip in the areas it occupied.

The AU's review team was formed in mid-December 2012 under the chairmanship of veteran diplomat, Ibrahim Gambari. It had two key tasks: decide how best to engage with the new Federal Government and support its priorities, and find a sustainable solution to AMISOM's chronic funding problems. In mid-January 2013, the review team announced their conclusion that AMISOM should be transitioned into a new hybrid arrangement with the UN. At the heart of this new joint arrangement would be a more predictable source of financial support for the AU mission, which would come via the UN's assessed contribution peacekeeping budget.¹¹⁵

The UN review team reached different conclusions. It quickly ruled out the deployment of

- a UN peacekeeping operation and instead deliberated among four forms of UN mission configurations short of a blue-helmet operation:
- a UN assistance mission parallel to AMISOM and a UN country team;
- a UN peace building mission parallel to AMISOM and UNSOA;
- an integrated UN peace building mission encompassing UNSOA and the UN's Political

¹¹⁵ De Waal, Alex. "Mission Without End? Peacekeeping in the African Political Marketplace." *Inter-national Affairs* 85 (January 2009): pp. 99-113.

- Office for Somalia (UNPOS); and a joint AU-UN mission along the lines of UNAMID (The UN/AU hybrid operation in Darfur), with a separate UN country team.

There is currently no established working procedure for the meetings between the UNSC and AU PSC, nor any form of dispute resolution mechanism should the two councils disagree on a specific African peace and security challenge. Moreover, while previous annual consultations have ended in communiqués they have not resulted in concrete actions or action points.

Different bureaucratic cultures have further impeded collaboration between the two councils:

- The lack of coordination between the monthly agendas of the two councils (while the UN Security Council has a formal public agenda, the AU PSC does not) and the agenda for their annual meeting;¹¹⁶
- Different working methods, including over how the councils adopt communiqués/resolutions; The AU Commission has a greater role in drafting such documents than the UN Secretariat. In the UN, permanent members of the UN Security Council have the monopoly over “pen holding,” i.e., leading the drafting process, although in coordination and with support from the UN Secretariat’s relevant departments
- and the absence of regular communication between the respective presidents of the two councils.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ Boutellis and Williams, *Ibid*, p. 17

¹¹⁷ Arnold, Roberta, and Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, eds. “Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations under International Law”. Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 2006. Pp. 303.

It also emerges that at the UN, in New York the AU representation lacks both a strong mandate and capacities and therefore cannot play an effective bridging role between the AU PSC and the African member states in New York.

While an African member of the Security Council traditionally presides over the New York based “Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa,” this forum has not been sufficiently utilized to convey common AU positions on pressing issues. The “Africa Group” is also hamstrung by the fact that it includes a non-AU member, Morocco. Some of these problems might be remedied if the AU Peace and Security Council had an explicit presence in New York, but its fifteen members do not currently exist as a caucus there, and elected African members on the UN Security Council do not necessarily hold concurrent seats on the Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa. Consequently, Africa’s representatives on the UN Security Council may not always be informed of AU Peace and Security Council positions and decisions in a timely manner.

William and Boutellis state that an additional political issue is that even when a clear AU position is articulated, African members of the UN Security Council may not automatically represent this official AU position in New York and vote in accordance with it. This occurred in the vote over UN Security Council Resolution 1973 imposing a “no-fly zone” over Libya and authorizing civilian protection measures. All three elected African members of the Security Council (Gabon, Nigeria, and South Africa) voted in favor in spite of an earlier AU communique rejecting “any military intervention, whatever its form.”¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ William and Boutellis, *Ibid*, p. 19

In an interview with the researcher, officials in United Nations in Somalia agreed as much. Nicholas Kay, a special representative to the Secretary General said that there have been failures “most notably the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda which led to a period of self examination in UN peacekeeping.”¹¹⁹

When one studies conflict management it emerges that though peacekeeping is an important tool for conflict management in the international system, it is only one of a myriad of approaches to conflict management. Bercovitch, Diehl, and Goertz¹²⁰, for example, distinguish between three general categories of conflict management approaches: unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral methods. Deterrence is the most common means of unilateral conflict management while negotiations are the most common form of bilateral conflict management. Mediation and peacekeeping are both multilateral forms of conflict management. Simply managing conflict, however, only represents a limited victory for peace. Without successfully settling the issues under conflict between disputants, the seeds for renewed conflict remain and the conflict is not resolved.

Although peacekeeping can help to manage conflict, by itself, it cannot settle disputes. The UN administration has recognised the same. In an interview with the researcher, UNSOA official Leila Manly said “as demands for UN intervention grew both in size and scope, peace keeping operations expanded to include the rule of law, civil administration, economic development and

¹¹⁹ Nyokabi's interview with Nicholas Kay, Special representative to the UN Secretary General to UNSOA. July 2013

¹²⁰ Bercovitch J, Diehl P & Goertz G. Goertz, 'The Management and Termination of Protracted Interstate Conflicts: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations'. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 26:751-769

human rights. Reforms continue with special emphasis on “integrated missions” comprised of the major actors in bringing peace (human rights, the rule of law, humanitarian assistance)¹²¹.

Carnevale and Pruitt¹²² point to four general means through which disputed issues can be settled: struggle, adjudication, negotiation, and mediation. Adjudication, although relatively rare in violent international conflicts, involves the imposition of a settlement upon the disputing parties, backed by the force of law. Negotiation and mediation represent middle grounds between struggle and adjudication. Similar to struggle, both mediation and negotiation preserve the independent decision-making of disputants. Mediation and negotiation, however, by relying on dialogue and bargaining, avoid many of the costs that are endemic to struggle.

Diehl and Greig¹²³ hold that the addition of a third party can have important consequences upon the prospects for dispute settlement. Even if both disputants desire a settlement, bilateral negotiations may fail because disputants are unable to recognize areas of commonality, lack the means of guaranteeing the agreement, or require further incentives to bridge the gaps between their proposals.

In this respect, third parties can play a powerful face-saving role for a disputant that allows them to better “sell” an agreement to their domestic constituents. Finally, mediators can serve as settlement innovators by recognizing or creating settlements that the disputants are unable to achieve on their own. A third party, for example, can provide resources to one or both of the disputants that makes an otherwise unacceptable settlement proposal acceptable.

¹²¹ Nyokabi’s interview with Leila Manly, Training Officer-UNSOA

¹²² Carnevale Peter and Dean Pruitt, ‘Negotiation and Mediation, Annual Review of Psychology 43:531-582, 1992

¹²³ Greig Michael J and Diehl Paul F., ‘The Peacekeeping - Peacemaking Dilemma, International Studies Quarterly, Vol 49, No. 4, Wiley for The International Studies Association, p 623, 2005

According to Greig and Diehl¹²⁴, mediation and negotiation agreements can vary in terms of the degree to which they resolve all of the outstanding disputes between parties. Some agreements may be comprehensive, settling all of the issues of contention between the parties; others may be more narrowly focused upon a few areas of agreement while leaving other disputed issues unsolved. Although these partial agreements do not solve all of the issues between disputants, they do have important effects upon the parties.

One of the key factors thought to affect the success of mediation and negotiation attempts is the level of conflict between the disputants at the time of those efforts. Greig and Diehl refer to a series of studies in conflict management, (Kochan and Jick¹²⁵; Brockner¹²⁶; Kressel and Pruitt¹²⁷; Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille¹²⁸; Pruitt and Carnevale¹²⁹; Bercovitch¹³⁰), which have found that intense conflict between disputants undermines the prospects for mediation.

According to Greig and Diehl (2005), diplomacy will fail if peacekeepers do not keep the peace; that is, the positive spin-off effects of peacekeeping are predicated on cease-fires holding. They further posit that peacekeeping should be associated with more frequent mediation and negotiation attempts. Diehl¹³¹ held that traditional peacekeeping is generally successful in

¹²⁴ Ibid

¹²⁵ Kochan T. Homas and Todd Jick, "The Public Sector Mediation Process: A Theory and Empirical Examination", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 22:207-240, 1978.

¹²⁶ Brockner Joel, "Factors Affecting Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts" *Journal of Research In Personality* Vol. 6. 1982. pp. 247-266.

¹²⁷ Kressel, K. and D.G. Pruitt. 1989. A research perspective on the mediation of social conflict. In *Mediation research: The process and effectiveness of third-party intervention*, edited by K. Kressel and D.G. Pruitt. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

¹²⁸ Ibid. Bercovitch

¹²⁹ Pruitt I Dean, A and Peter Carnevale, "Negotiation In Social Conflict", Pacific Grove, Ca: Brooks/ Cole Publishing Company, 1993

¹³⁰ Ibid. Bercovitch

¹³¹ Ibid. Diehl

maintaining cease-fires. Yet, in a series of case studies. Diehl (1994) does not find peacekeeping to be followed quickly or frequently by diplomatic settlements.

Sambanis (1999)¹³² accepts the argument that peacekeeping's ability to promote conflict resolution is heavily dependent on how well the operation performs its mandate, including monitoring cease-fires. Yet, he concludes that much depends on how the parties and the international community react to the peacekeeping success or failure. For example, failure to maintain the cease-fire may redouble international efforts to resolve the conflict. Similarly, success in conflict abatement may change the preferences of the protagonists, build trust between them, and make them more amenable to a settlement.

Greig and Diehl (2005)¹³³ however do not agree and dismiss the above two as narrow studies because they are based on an examination of only one case: the Cyprus scenario. Greig and Diehl instead take a pessimistic view of PKOs arguing that war and other militarized competitions are essentially information problems. War begins because there is some uncertainty about the outcome of a confrontation between disputants. Under conditions of perfect information, disputants would come to an agreement ex ante, and therefore not incur the costs of competition. They cite Cetinyan¹³⁴ who argues that bargaining breakdown in ethnic conflicts occurs because of the problems of information and commitments, not capability differences between the parties.

¹³² Sambanis Nicholas, 'The United Nations Operations In Cyprus: A New Look At The Peace-Keeping-Peacemaking Relationship' *International Peacekeeping* 6(1):79-108, 1999.

¹³³ Greig Michael J and Diehl Paul F., 'The Peacekeeping - Peacemaking Dilemma. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol 49, No. 4, Wiley for The International Studies Association, p 627, (2005),

¹³⁴ Cetinyan Rupen, 'Ethnic Bargaining In The Shadow Of Third-Party Intervention', 2002, In Greig And Diehl, *Ibid*

In an interview with the researcher Michael Hanrahan of UNSOA admits that “though the UN has consistently improved its capacity to support operations (like AMISOM), the new ballooning demands have tested the UN’s peacekeeping capacity as never before and have required substantial additional resources and another look at how the UN runs its peace operations”¹³⁵

Greig and Doyle¹³⁶ conducted an analysis of peace keeping in civil wars between 1949 and 1999 to gauge the impact of peacekeeping on peacemaking. The analysis cast a rather dim light on the ability of peacekeeping forces to assist the conflict resolution process. In enduring rivalries, the presence of peacekeeping forces reduced the occurrence of mediation and negotiation attempts as well as reduced the prospects for their success when they do take place, at least with respect to achieving a broad peace agreement. The effects with respect to civil wars were not as harmful, but neither did peacekeeping have the kind of positive impacts it was designed to have. From their analysis, there was virtually no support that peacekeeping promotes peacemaking.

Joel Cohen¹³⁷ informed this study that “certain factors are critical for the success of any peace keeping operation. The international community must diagnose the problem correctly before prescribing peace keeping as the treatment; there must be peace to keep and all key parties must consent to stop fighting. Members of the Security Council must agree on a clear and achievable mandate. The international community has to be prepared to stay on course. Real peace takes time; building national capacities takes time; rebuilding trust takes time.

¹³⁵ M. Hanrahan, Head of Somalia Support Base-Mogadishu, UNSOA

¹³⁶ Ibid. Doyle

¹³⁷ Joel Cohen, Deputy Director, UNSOA in an interview with the researcher

This study was categorical in Chapter two, that in Somalia, it would be imprudent to use a macro theory of peacekeeping -in this regard traditional peacekeeping, rather what may very well work is a “ mixed methods” approach: a mid range theory as proposed by Oldrich Bures¹³⁸ that combines various generations of peacekeeping. Enforcement missions are authorized under Chapter VII, and they do not necessarily require the consent of the belligerents. Their forces are generally better armed and larger, mandated to impose peace by force.

Because they represented a development not envisioned in the Charter, consent-based missions are sometimes referred to as "Chapter six-and-a-half." More robust missions short of enforcement have been dubbed "Chapter six-and-three-quarters" and are also sometimes referred to as "gray area" peacekeeping.

Cohen in the interview cited previously that some UN missions have included a brief to restore basic services and government, support law and order by supporting activities by the local police, judiciary and corrections in ongoing operations, several Peacekeeping missions have been mandated conduct or support the local organization of elections but elections are not a quick fix, however the UN has learned the importance of creating the right conditions first, including an acceptable level of security, a legal framework, a transparent voter registration process and a constitution drafted and accepted by all parties; creating a secure environment for the success of PKO; towards achieving collective action the UN in 2005 established a Peace building Commission as a forum for international players to work out a common strategy for countries emerging from conflict to ensure they don't lapse back to war.

¹³⁸ Oldrich Bures, 'Wanted A Mid-Range Theory of International Peacekeeping', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 407-436. Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association, Autumn, 2007

However Greig and Diehl state that an empirical puzzle emerging from their study comes from the finding that when peacekeepers failed to keep the peace (i.e., peacekeeping forces on the ground did not prevent severe violence), third parties and disputants alike made fewer efforts at peacemaking. A dilemma emerges that if decision makers decide to defer the deployment of peacekeeping forces until after a peace agreement this diminishes the positive effects that flow from ending bloodshed and allowing the local population to live as normal lives as possible. Furthermore decision makers may wait for a peace agreement that never comes, as there is no guarantee that the conditions for ending an enduring rivalry or civil war will ever be manifest.

From this study it emerges that policy makers are therefore confronted with an ongoing conflict face a difficult dilemma. On one hand, there are powerful political, strategic, and moral reasons for deploying a peacekeeping force in conflicts marked by mounting bloodshed. Cases of genocide or recurring warfare may be so extreme that they demand peacekeeping forces in order to separate the combatants and prevent the renewal of fighting. Indeed, the prospect of peacekeeping deployment may be the only way to get the protagonists to agree to a cease-fire in the first place.

Ferdinand Nsanzumuremyi¹³⁹ of UNSOA in an interview held that “ a peacekeeping operation can be considered successful in the short term, if the mandate given to it by the Security Council was effectively fulfilled. But ultimately, the UN effort in a post conflict situation will be judged by the ability of the country involved to sustain long term peace and stability and embark on the road to rebuilding and development.

¹³⁹ F. Nsanzumuremyi, Chief Technical Compliance, UNSOA in an interview with the researcher, July 2013

A review of existing literature on peacekeeping suggest the need for third parties to be judicious in their use of peacekeeping balancing the immediate need to limit conflict with the long-term goal of producing a settlement. It may be that the prospect of peacekeeping, rather than the actual presence of peacekeeping forces, promotes mediation and negotiation success. Reading the writings of Walter¹⁴⁰ and Fortna¹⁴¹ it has emerged that actually disputants may be willing to commit to an agreement if they know that peacekeepers will be there afterward to guarantee the settlement by acting as guarantors of agreements. peacekeepers may serve to lessen the possibility of renewed fighting when disputes over the implementation of agreements arise.

Protagonists may be more willing to commit to more detailed settlement provisions and those which address a broader range of disputed issues if some guarantees, facilitated by peacekeepers, exist such that provisions will be implemented with full compliance. Peacekeepers may also promote the durability of agreements by making disputants feel less exposed to the consequences of unilateral defection by the other side. In this sense, by making disputants feel more secure, peacekeepers can provide a powerful solution to the security dilemma often faced by enduring rivals and civil war combatants even after an agreement is reached between them. In this vein, peacekeepers may be able to reduce the tendency of disputants to build up their arms or lessen the degree to which they feel that they must strike first in the event of renewed conflict. In each of these ways, peacekeeping forces may be able to exert a positive long-term effect upon conflictual relationships, beyond simply encouraging cease-fires.

¹⁴⁰ Walter Barbara, 'Committing To Peace: The Successful Settlement Of Civil Wars', 2002, Princeton: Princeton University Press

¹⁴¹ Ibid

On the whole what emerges from this study is that despite a number of well-publicized peacekeeping fiascos in the early and mid-1990s, peacekeeping is an effective conflict management tool. The efforts of the international community to help war-torn states avoid a slide back to civil war are well worth it. This researcher agrees with who states that it is clear that intervention by the international community helps maintain peace.¹⁴²

Manuela De Luca of UNSOA¹⁴³ informed this study that “building peace from the ashes of war takes time and the international community must be willing to work with local institutions until they are ready to shoulder responsibility for democratic governance, the rule of law and continued economic development. Peace keeping operations must be linked to a longer term plan for achieving real stability. The Sierra Leone operation contained built-in peace building strategies currently under implementation.

4.7 Conclusion

At its 337th meeting, held on 11 October 2012, the AU Council on the Somalia issued a statement, in which it noted with satisfaction the remarkable progress made in the quest for peace, security and reconciliation in the country. Council urged the Somali stakeholders to remain steadfast in their efforts. It also underlined the need for the international community to remain actively engaged and to extend greater support to Somalia on the basis of the priorities defined by the Somali Government.¹⁴⁴ The Chairperson cited the gains made by the Somali and

¹⁴² Ibid

¹⁴³ Manuela De Luca, Chief Movcon Officer, UNSOA in an interview with the researcher, July 2013

¹⁴⁴ African Union Commission (AUC), ‘Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Somalia’ Modern Ghana Online, January 15 2013

AMISOM forces. He applauded the women and men serving under AMISOM, who are working under extreme difficulties to further the cause of peace and stability in Somalia.

The view of this study is that peace keeping works, particularly after the Cold War when most of the attempts to keep peace after civil wars have been made. The presence of international personnel is not a silver bullet, of course, it does not guarantee lasting peace in every case, but it does tend to make peace more likely to last, and to last longer. Somalia is much better due to AMISOM than before AMISOM.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary

Somalia has not had a functioning government for twenty years, during which it has suffered through several phases of civil war. The conflict is in essence a struggle between clans and sub-clans for political control and resources. Meddling by external states has also exacerbated internal tensions. In the 1990's the international community intervened in Somalia several times to stave off a humanitarian calamity. Yet after the 1995 departure of the last peacekeeping mission, UNOSOM II, the country was virtually abandoned by the international community.

Neighboring countries with political interests in the Somali conflict continued their involvement. Ethiopia, a neighboring state with a long history of ethnic, religious and territorial disputes with Somalia, intervened in December 2006 to provide support to TFG of Somalia. This government was the result of a peace process begun in 2000 that formed part of a long series of failed peace attempts. All Somalis did however not accept the TFG and it faced strong opposition from warlords and a powerful coalition of Islamic elements called the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The UIC established control over southern Somalia and the capital city, Mogadishu, succeeding in uniting the city for the first time in sixteen years. Ethiopian invasion galvanized public opinion against the TFG and ignited an insurgency. The militant Islamist group Al Shabaab, at present the most powerful anti-government group, grew out of this insurgency. Soon Ethiopia sought an exit from Somalia on the condition that a multinational peacekeeping mission would take over its role of protecting the TFG.

In the words of Peacock (2011),¹⁴⁵ the circumstances surrounding the creation of AMISOM are exceptional. The origins of AMISOM lie in IGASOM, a mission that was since 2005 being designed by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. IGASOM was unable to deploy due to funding issues and problems with the neutrality of troop contributing countries (TCC's). Instead the African Union authorized AMISOM's deployment on January 19, 2007 to take on IGASOM's role of replacing Ethiopian forces as they withdrew.

The mandate of AMISOM is outlined in AU PSC communique and in UN Security Council Resolution 1744. The mission is a chapter VII mission, authorized to "take all necessary measures as appropriate" to carry out the mandate. The mission was mandated as an interim mission of 6 months, explicitly designed to evolve into a UN stabilization and peace building mission¹⁴⁶

AMISOM has managed to achieve relative success in three main areas: guarding key areas of Mogadishu, protecting the TFG from collapse and providing humanitarian relief. Peacock reports that AMISOM's offensive against Al Shabaab in Mogadishu has led to 80% of Mogadishu's residents now living under AMISOM control. Inextricably linked to this is AMISOM's success in protecting the TFG from a military onslaught by insurgent forces, primarily Al Shabaab. Peacock reports that perhaps one of the most important successes of AMISOM is the provision of humanitarian aid to Mogadishu's residents.

¹⁴⁵ Peacock Emelie, 'The American Mission in Somalia: The Mission, Its Successes and Challenges and Way Forward', November 21, 2011

¹⁴⁶ African Union Peace and Security Council, 69th Meeting. "Communique of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council". 19 January, 2007

However AMISOM faces extensive operational challenges, most of which stem from the problematic nature of the AU institutional environment, the mandate, and the lack of resources available to the mission. Founded in 2002, The African Union is a new organization and suffers from what Bah calls the “willingness-capacity gap”. The institution has yet to build up the institutional structure and experience necessary to effectively manage these operations. As a result AMISOM suffers the confusion about command and control and peacekeeping doctrine coupled with a lack of guidance from the AU which “...issues only “guidelines” to national contingents...”¹⁴⁷

The AU is also highly dependent on external assistance in all areas of its operation, which has created a number of challenges for AMISOM with the primary challenge being troop generation. For AMISOM, the AU adopted the “Burundi model”, a method of troop contribution in which TCC’s are expected to provide all equipment and resources that their troops need and transport them to the theatre of operations. This model is problematic as most states in the AU lack the resources required to deploy and equip troops, often relying on donors.

Besides troop deficiencies, an array of other important resources are lacking such as maritime and air capacity, military hardware and specific equipment and expertise, all of which have prevented AMISOM from fulfilling its mandate.¹⁴⁸

The mandate itself is deficient in three respects; troop size, the expectation of UN takeover and the omission of the protection of civilians. The mandated tasks are ambitious and nearly

¹⁴⁷ Hull, Cecilia and Emma Svensson. ‘ African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplifying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges’. Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2008.

¹⁴⁸ Institute for Security Studies ‘Somalia’s Dilemmas: Changing Security Dynamics, but Limited Policy Choices’, Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, (2010).

impossible given the limited number of personnel mandated, troops and otherwise. In comparison UNOSOM II, with a similar mandate to AMISOM, had troop strength of 22,000 as well as 8,000 civilian personnel.

The conspicuous absence of the protection of civilians and aid workers in the mandate is highly problematic. It is especially problematic in the Somali context, where belligerents are particularly brutal towards these groups, resulting in large-scale humanitarian disasters. AMISOM troops have also been known to indiscriminately target civilians and the lack of an explicit civilian protection clause could be a contributing factor to this behaviour.¹⁴⁹

Due to the deficiencies outlined above, AMISOM encounters serious operational challenges. Attacks against AMISOM peacekeepers began immediately after their deployment and have continued to the present, with Al Shabaab presenting the most dangerous threat. In addition, because AMISOM deployed to ensure an Ethiopian withdrawal and continues to support the TFG militarily it is not seen as an impartial entity.

AMISOM troops have also been accused of engaging in corrupt activities involving arms sales and are alleged to have used indiscriminate force against civilians. In July 2013, there were discordant voices within the Somali government with some calling for the withdrawal of Kenyan forces in AMISOM due to “flagrant practices” some cited above but the official communication negated this stating that the government was content with Kenya’s presence on Somali soil.

¹⁴⁹ For a relevant discussion, see Matt Bryden and Jeremy Brickhill, ‘Disarming Somalia: Lessons in Stabilisation from a Collapsed State’, *Conflict, Security and Development* 10/2 (2010), pp.239-62.

As the Institute for Security Studies writes in *Somalia's Dilemmas*, "by default AMISOM has become the primary means of international engagement in Somalia, taking the place of an absent political process."¹⁵⁰ This is highly problematic, as AMISOM is not designed to have a political conflict resolution role. As past attempts in Somalia have shown, military solutions alone cannot solve the conflict. In fact, as Bah argues, a peacekeeping mission deployed without a political process can risk freezing the conflict, thus delaying its resolution.¹⁵¹ As the situation stands now AMISOM looks set to stay in Somalia, it may replicate the US in Afghanistan as no exit strategy is in sight.

5.2 Key Findings

There are multiple agendas in the conflict and there are those who exploit the war. For one, Somalia's coast has a large population of tuna fish and the war means any one can trawl without paying regulated taxes. For the warring factions, whichever controls the shores levies the tax.

Somalia is an abundant source of charcoal and whoever can smuggle it across to Kenya is in big business and peace in Somalia means the industry will be regulated and streamlined which reduces the profits by increasing the players in form of government. Somalia also neighbours the livestock hungry Middle East and it's a source of livestock which is big business for rustlers and middlemen in the absence of peace.

Somali's shores are reportedly a huge waste pit for nuclear waste from Europe and Asia and therefore a stable government means dumping of waste will be prohibited. War means money

¹⁵⁰ Ibid

¹⁵¹ Bah A. S., "The Broader Horn of Africa: Peacekeeping in a Strategic Vacuum" *International Peacekeeping* Vol 16, No. 4. (2009), pp. 499-513.

for arms manufacturers and dealers so the longer the war the more the money. Indeed the outcry in Kenya is that the proliferation of small arms is related to the situation in Somalia. Additionally Somalia is reported to have huge deposits of oil and natural gas at the coast and whoever can control that part of Somalia will control the oil whenever the drilling starts off. Finally, Somalia has the longest coastline and beautiful beaches which are a mainstay of tourism and whoever controls government will control this lucrative sector.

These multiple agendas mean that control of Somalia will continue to be an issue until all these issues are addressed and the current players are mollified that their interests will be factored into a peace agreement. The key finding is therefore that resources are at the centre of the war and there will never be peace until the players are settled that their interests will not be threatened by peace.

On AMISOM after an examination of its history, its successes, continued challenges and potential ways forward, it is important to be realistic about the amount of resources and political will it will take to successfully implement and sustain policy changes. Only when the international community's support is given to AU PSOs will these PSOs have a chance at success. If conflicts such as Somalia present a true threat to international peace and security, it is incumbent upon members of the international community not to shirk their duties to contribute to their solution through the support of AU PSOs.

5.3 Recommendations

In regard to working with the UN in the peace process, the AU PSC should establish a dedicated representation in New York. Its principal tasks could include facilitating timely communication

between the two councils and helping to disseminate the PSC's positions throughout the New York based UN Africa Group and newly created African Caucus.

The AU should develop a mechanism through which elected African members on the UN SC that do not hold concurrent seats on the AU PSC in Addis Ababa can obtain some kind of special "observer" or participant status in the PSC. The AU should also enhance the ability of the AU Commission to maintain institutional knowledge/memory and develop relevant information management tools for tasks related to peace operations.

In a general approach policy makers should refrain from deployment of peacekeeping operations, at least until the combatants have reached some kind of resolution to their dispute. There is an acute need for a comprehensive political process involving all stakeholders in the conflict. Previous peacemaking efforts have focused on including the main factions involved in the conflict, yet less focus has been placed on other important actors in Somali society such as the large Diaspora community, civil society groups, youth and Islamic groups.

Engaging these elements as well as the moderate Islamist elements willing to compromise politically could sway the balance of power away from the insurgency. An inclusive and Somali-led peace process is the only way that a lasting peace will be built that cannot easily be destabilized by spoilers.

If the international community is to facilitate a peace process through the TFG, it must reform its failed policy of exclusively providing military, financial and other support to the TFG.¹⁵² AMISOM could tilt the balance of power towards the TFG and provide it with the space to reach out to the Somali people with basic social services, effective institutions, reconciliation efforts and efforts focused on countering the radicalism of al shabaab.¹⁵³

The most needed change to the mission in the short term is expanded troop strength and resources. Hull and Svensson,¹⁵⁴ argue that strengthening the mission with troops according to the Burundi model will prove problematic. One solution is the provision of bilateral support from countries not willing to become directly involved in Somalia to TCC's and AMISOM in order to bolster the resources, training and capacity of troops on the ground.

Peacock (2011) posits that expanding the mission can only work to the advantage of AMISOM if it is combined with a stronger effort to gain the support of the public. AMISOM currently does not have an effective way of relaying information to the public. Communications and community engagement capacity must therefore be strengthened in order to explain AMISOM actions to the public. Otherwise AMISOM risks being seen as an occupying force and insurgents can use this sentiment to turn the people against it potential to create stronger, more efficient PSOs with the ability to react faster to developments on the ground.

¹⁵² Institute for Security Studies 'Somalia's Dilemmas: Changing Security Dynamics, but Limited Policy Choices', Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, (2010).

¹⁵³ Ibid

¹⁵⁴ Hull, Cecilia and Emma Svensson. "African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplifying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges". Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2008.

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